Advances in Child Development and Behavior Volume 11

ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR

VOLUME 11

Contributors to This Volume Paul B. Baltes

Jacob L. Gewirtz

Gladys B. Baxley

Aletha Huston-Stein

Harry Beilin

Judith M. LeBlanc

Elizabeth F. Boyd

W. Stuart Millar

Orville G. Brim, Jr.

Leo Montada

Michael J. Chandler

Stephen W. Porges

Nancy W. Denney

Hayne W. Reese

Sigrun-Heide Filipp

John C. Wright

ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMEN-T AND BEHAVIOR edited by Hayne W. Reese Department of’Psycho1og.v West Virginia Universit,v Morgantown, West Virginia

VOLUME 11

ACADEMIC PRESS

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Contents

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ix

............................................................

xi

List of Contributors Preface

The Hyperactive Child: Characteristics, Treatment, and Evaluation of Research Design I. 11. 111. IV. V. VI.

GLADYS B. BAXLEY AND JUDITH M. LEBLANC Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Characteristics and Diagnosis of Hyperactivity ......................... Etiology of Hyperactivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evaluation and Assessment of Pharniacotherapeutic Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Analysis of Drug Research with Ilvperactive Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 3 11 14 20 28 29

Peripheral and Neurochemical Parallels of Psychopathology: A Psychophysiological Model Relating Autonomic Imbalance to Hyperactivity, Psychopathy, and Autism STEPHEN W. PORGES 1. Overview ..................................... 11. Hyperactivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

111. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII.

Psychopathy . . . . . . . . . . . .... Relationship between Central and Peripheral Autonomic Activity . . . . . . . . . . Statistical Model of Autonomic Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Autonomic Responses and Attention .......................... Autism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary and Conclusions ................................... .... ... References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40 43

60 62

Constructing Cognitive Operations Linguistically HARRY BEILlN I. Language as Representation ....................................... 11. The Mechanisms of Conservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68 69 V

vi

Contents

.

111 IV . V. VI .

Methodological Issues in Piagetian Training Research .................... The General Training Model: Methodological Issues ..................... Linguistic Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary of Results and Theoretical Considerations .................... References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71 75 82 96 102

Operant Acquisition of Social Behaviors in Infancy: Basic Problems and Constraints I. I1. I11. IV .

W . STUART MILLAR Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Social Responses Reinforced by Social Feedback ....................... Mixed Social and Nonsocial Contingencies: the Case for Constraints . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

108 109 125 135 136

Mother-Infant Interaction and Its Study I. I1 . I11. IV . V. VI .

VII .

JACOB L. GEWIRTZ AND ELIZABETH F. BOYD Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Direction of Influence in Child Socialization .......................... Mechanistic and Organismic Models of Development and Interaction . . . . . . . . Study of Interactions between Mother and Infant in Natural Settings . . . . . . . Learning Analysis of “Simultaneous” Behaviors ........................ An Experimental Analysis of Mother-Infant Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

142 142 146 149 152 153 159 160

Symposium on Implications of L ife-Span Developmental Psychology for Child Development

Introductory Remarks PAUL B. BALTES. CHAIRMAN Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

167

Theory and Method in L i fe-Span Developrnental Psychology: Implications for Child Development ALETHA HUSTON-STEIN AND PAUL B. BALTES 169 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I1. Prototypical Issues in Life-Span Developmental Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 I11. Prototypical Issues in Life-Span Developmental Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

1V. Summary References

..................................................... ....................................................

183 183

The Development of Memory: Life-Span Perspectives I. I1 . Ill IV V. VI .

. .

HAYNE W . REESE Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Memory Development in Childhood ................................. Memory Development in Addthood and Old Age ...................... Comparison between Childhood and Old Age .......................... Implications for Childhood Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

190 190 195 200 202 207 209

Cognitive Changes during the Adult Years: Implications for Developmental Theory and Research NANCY W. DENNEY AND JOllN C. WRIGHT Research on Adult Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. Implications for Developmental rheory .............................. 111. Implications for Research Procedures with Children ..................... IV Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I

.

.

213 215 220 222 222

Social Cognition and Li fe-Span Approaches to the Study of Child Development

.

MICHAEL J CHANDLER I . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I1. Pluralistic versus Monistic Views of Adulthood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I11. Social Cognition and Multilincar Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV . Social versus Impersonal Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

225 226 229 233 237 238

Life-Span Development of the Theory of Oneself: Implications for Child Development ORVILLE G . BRIM. JR . I . The Sense of Self Viewed as Theory about Oneself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I1. Culture and Socialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I11. The Child's Developing Theory of Self ............................. IV . Two Illustrations of Possible Systematic Changes in Theories of Onesclf through the Life-Span . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

242 244 245 247

viii

Cot2rents

V . Setting the Research Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Refcrenccs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

250 251

Implications of LifeSpan Developmental Psychology for Childhood Education LEO MONTADA AND SIGRUN-HEIDE FILIPP 1. Introduction

...................................................

I1 . Contributions of Developmental Psychology to the Establishment of Educational Goals ............................................... 111. Design of Intervention Programs .................................... 11’. Problems in Transforming Empirical Knowledge into Intervention Programs . . V . Toward Research in Childhood Intervention from Life-Span Perspectives . . . . VI . Concluding Comments ........................................... References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

254 255 257 258 262 263 264

Author Index

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267

Sub~ectIndex

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277

...........................................

280

Contents of Previous Volumes

List of Contributors Numbers in parentheses indicate the pages on which the authors’ contributions begin.

PAUL B. BALTES College of Human Development, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania (167, 169) GLADYS B. BAXLEY Department o f Psychology, University o f Illinois, Champaign, Illinois ( 1 )

HARRY BEILIN City University of New York, Graduate School and University Center, New York, New York (67) ELIZABETH F. BOYD Laboratory of Developmental Psychology, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, Maryland (141) ORVILLE G. BRIM, JR. Foundation for Child Development, New York, New York (241) MICHAEL J. CHANDLER Department of Psychology, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York (225) NANCY W. DENNEY Department of Psychology, Universit-vo f Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas (213) SIGRUN-HEIDE FILIPP Department of Psychology, University o f Trier, Trier, West Germany (253) JACOB L. GEWIRTZ Laboratory of Developmental Ps-vchology,National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, Maryland (141 ) ALETHA HUSTON-STEIN College of Human Development, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania (169) JUDITH M. LEBLANC Department of Human Development, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas ( I ) ix

X

List of Contributors

W. STUART MILLAR' Department of Psychology, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland (107)

LEO MONTADA Department of Psychology, University of Trier, Trier, West Germany (253) STEPHEN W. PORGES Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Champaign,Illinois (35) HAYNE W. REESE Department of Psychology, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia (189) JOHN C. WRIGHT Department of Human Development, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas (213)

' Present address: Department of Psychology, University College London, Cower Street, London, W.C.l., United Kingdom.

Preface The amount of research and theoretical discussion in the field of child development and behavior is so vast that researchers, instructors, and students are confronted with a formidable task in keeping abreast of new developments within their areas of specialization through the use of primary sources, as well as being knowledgeable in areas peripheral to their primary focus of interest. Moreover, there is often simply not enough journal space to permit publication of more speculative kinds of analyses which might spark expanded interest in a problem area or stimulate new modes of attack on the problem, The serial publication Advances in Child Development and Behavior is intended to ease the burden by providing scholarly technical articles serving as reference material and by providing a place for publication of scholarly speculation. In these documented critical reviews, recent advances in the field are summarized and integrated, complexities are exposed, and fresh viewpoints are offered. They should be useful not only to the expert in the area but also to the general reader. No attempt is made to organize each volume around a particular theme or topic, nor is the series intended to reflect the development of new fads. Manuscripts are solicited from investigators conducting programmatic work on problems of current and significant interest. The editor often encourages the preparation of critical syntheses dealing intensively with topics of relatively narrow scope but of considerable potential interest to the scientific community. Contributors are encouraged to criticize, integrate, and stimulate, but always within a framework of high scholarship. Although appearance in the volumes is ordinarily by invitation, unsolicited manuscripts will be accepted for review if submitted first in outline form to the editor. All papers-whether invited or submitted-receive careful editorial scrutiny. Invited papers are automatically accepted for publication in principle, but may require revision before fmal acceptance. Submitted papers receive the same treatment except that they are not automatically accepted for publication even in principle, and may be rejected. I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the aid of my home institution, West Virginia University, which generously provided time and facilities for the preparation of this volume. I also wish to thank Drs. Norman Cavior, Hiram E. Fitzgerald, John H. Flavell, Norah M. Gutrecht, David Klahr, Lewis P. Lipsitt, Willis F. Overton, and Marcia S. Scott for their editorial assistance. Hayne W. Reese xi

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THE HYPERACTIVE CHILD: CHARACTERISTICS, TREATMENT, AND EVALUATION OF RESEARCH DESIGN'

Gludys B. Baxley U N l V E K S I T Y OF I L L I N O I S Ulld

drrditli M . LeBlanc UNIV1:KSITY O F KANSAS

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. CHARACTERISTICS AND DIAGNOSIS OF HYPERACTIVITY . . A. DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. METHODS O F DIAGNOSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111. ETIOLOGY O F HYPERACT!VITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. ORGANIC FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. NONORGANIC FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IV. EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT OF PHARMACOTHERAPEUTIC EFFE,C'TS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. SYMPTOM RATINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. PSYCHOLOGICAL M1:ASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. OBJECTIVE LABORATORY TASK PERFORMANCE . . . . . .

2 3 3 5 11

11 13 13

14

14 15 16

' T h e preparation of this manuscript was supported in part by Public Health Service training grant HD 00183, by CORIl Grant HD 02528 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development t o thc Kansas Center for Research in Mental Retardation and Human Development, by Grant 40-32-66-301 from the University of Illinois Research Board to the first author, and by Grant HD 05951 from the National Institute of Chld Health and Development to the University of Illinois Institute for Child Behavior and Development. We wish especially lo thank Drs. Stephen W . Porges, Donald M. Baer, Nancy K . Squires, and William H. Redd for their critical evaluation of previous drafts of this paper. 1

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Gladys B. Baxley and Judith M.LeBlunc

D. BEHAVIORAL MEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E. PHYSIOLOGICAL MEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F. ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17 18 19

V. ANALYSIS OF DRUG RESEARCH WITH HYPERACTIVE CHILDREN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. LIMITATIONS OF GROUP-STATISTICAL DESIGNS . . . . . . . C. ADVANTAGES OF INDIVIDUAL ANALYSES . . . . . . . . . . . .

20 20 21 25

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

I. Introduction A hyperactive, or hyperkinetic, c h l d is characterized by short attention span, restlessness, distractability, and overactivity (American Psychiatric Association, 1968). It is apparent that the syndrome is defined essentially in terms of its behavioral manifestations. In addition, hyperactive children often display learning deficits presumably related to their lack of concentration and focus of attention. Bradley (1937) is generally credited as being the first to study the effects of psychoactive drugs with hyperactive children. He demonstrated that Benzedrine@, a central nervous system stimulant, produced spectacular calming effects on the behavior of hyperactive children. Although Molitch and Eccles (1937) published a similar report in the same year, it was Bradley’s research that was instrumental in the establishment of pediatric psychopharmacology as a formal discipline emphasizing the investigation of drug effects in children. Since Bradley’s demonstration, psychoactive drugs have been prescribed increasingly to control the behavior of school children, especially those diagnosed as hyperactive (Bazell, 1971; Krager & Safer, 1974). This increased use of drugs to control behavior has had a profound effect on pharmacology, in that it has generated a great deal of research with children, so much so that there presently exists an extensive body of research in pediatric psychopharmacology. However, a major problem is encountered in much of this research because of the manner in which the results are analyzed and interpreted. Possibly because of a tacit assumption that group data accurately reflect the performance of individuals who compose a group, pediatric drug researchers

The Hyperactive Child

3

consistently adopt group experimental designs and statistical analyses of the group data for interpretation of drug effects. The increased use of drugs to treat hyperactive children stems in part from the experimentally demonstrated beneficial effects of drugs for such children. Thus, inferences about the potential effects of drugs on individuals are derived from effects interpreted from group averages, with little attention paid to the effects on the individuals within the group. The sole use of group designs, however, may not necessarily be appropriate for psychopharmacology research. The purposes of this paper are to examine existing pharmacological research in terms of its implications for treatment and diagnosis and t o propose individual analysis procedures as a functional research addition for assessing the effects of drugs on hyperactive children.

11. Characteristics and Diagnosis of Hyperactivity A. DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS

1. Diversity of Labels Confusion surrounding the hyperactive disorder is reflected in the variety of labels given to it. For example, the disorder has been referred to as the “hyperkinetic syndrome,” “hyperkinetic impulse disorder,” and “hyperactive child syndrome” (American Psychiatric Association, 1968; Burks, 1960; Comly, 1962; Knobel, 1962; Laufer & Denhoff, 1957; Laufer, Denhoff, & Solomons, 1957; Millichap, 1968; Sainz, 1966; Stewart, 1967; Warren, Karduck, Bussaratid, Stewart, & Sly, 1971; Werry, 1968a; Werry, Weiss, & Douglas, 1964; Werry, Weiss, Douglas, & Martin, 1966). Other labels that have been used are based on theories of underlying neuropathology : “minimal brain dysfunction syndrome,” “organic deviation,” and “organic learning and behavior disorder” (Bradley, 1957; Clements, 1966; Clements & Peters, 1962; Conners, 1967; Millichap & Fowler, 1967; Solomons, 1965; Wender, 1971; Weiss, Werry, Minde, Douglas, & Sykes, 1968; Werry, 1 9 6 8 ~ ) In . the final analysis, however, the label of “hyperactivity” may be more appropriate, because it is the children’s overt behavior that distinguishes them from other children (even emotionally disturbed or learning-disabled children).

2. Behavioral Descriptions In spite of the diversity of labels, behavioral descriptions of the symptoms of the hyperactive disorder are remarkably constant among investigators. One of the most outstanding features of the disorder, and one for which children are typically referred for treatment, is excessive motor activity (Burks, 1960; Chess, 1960; Laufer & Denhoff, 1957; Millichap, 1968; Patterson, Jones, Whittier, & Wright, 1965; Sainz, 1966; Werry, 1968a; Werry & Sprague, 1970). Chess (1960), for example, defined the hyperactive child simply as one who carries out

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Gladys B. Baxley and Judith M. LeBlanc

activities at a higher rate than the average child, as one who is constantly in motion, or both. Werry (1968c), in contrast, defined hyperactivity as a total daily motor activity (movement of the body or any portion of it) that is significantly greater than the norm. Laufer and Denhoff (1957) defined the disorder in terms of a standard level of activity: hyperactivity is involuntary and constant overactivity that greatly surpasses the normal. In addition, most investigators include in the hyperactivity syndrome other more loosely specified accompanying characteristics such as short span of attention and concentration, impulsivity, distractability, low frustration tolerance, poor emotional control and emotional lability, hyperexcitability, aggressiveness, and specific cognitive defects (Burks, 1960; Comly, 1962; Eveloff, 1970; Millichap, 1968; Sainz, 1966; U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1971; Werry, 1968a; Werry et al., 1966). When these characterizations are combined, the hyperactive child is defined as one who chronically exhibits sustained above-normal levels of gross motor activity that is generally accompanied by secondary behaviors (e.g., short attention span) as well as specific cognitive deficiencies (such as memory impairments). Hutt, Hutt, and Ounsted (1963) suggested a technique to distinguish braininjured from other hyperactive children. Whereas brain-injured children are said to exhibit abrupt changes of activity accompanied by abrupt synchronous changes of visual fixation, other hyperactive children do not show this same synchronous change of fixation. Instead, the latter continue one activity while visually attending to another activity, often for extended periods of time. In addition to these general characteristics, there are other features somewhat correlated with hyperactivity. For example, although some hyperactive children are mentally retarded, most are generally of average or above-average intelligence (Millichap, 1968; U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1971). Hyperactive children are more frequently male than female, and, as Stewart (1967) reported, they represent approximately 4% of the grade-school population in the United States. Unfortunately, there is no clear evidence of the relationship between the incidence of hyperactivity and the socioeconomic status of the children so labeled. Although hyperactivity has been shown to result from lead poisoning (Silbergeld & Goldberg, 1974), which is frequently a problem among children from low-income groups, at the present time there are no exact data available to support an argument of a higher incidence of hyperactivity in this group as compared to other socioeconomic groups. Stevens, Sachdev, and Milstein (1968), however, have estimated that roughly 40% of all school children referred to mental health clinics because of behavioral disturbances are diagnosed as hyperactive.

3. Social Concomitants Parents of hyperactive children complain that their children are seldom quiet, are always on the go, have boundless energy, and require much less sleep than

The ffyperactive Child

5

their peers or siblings (Laufer & Denhoff, 1957; Werry, 1968a). Such children present a picture of perpetual m(jtlon. Comly (1962) reported that hyperactive children, as toddlers, are difficult to handle, tend to wake up from naps early, and frequently climb out of cribs, playpens, yards, etc. Thus, these children are not only a constant nuisance but are frequently in danger of physical harm (Werry, 196%). Parents and teachers seldom complain about the general activity level of hyperactive children but rathei about their overactive behavior in specific situational contexts. A teacher, for example, does not complain about overactive behavior on the playground during recess but has difficulty tolerating it during the spelling period. Therefore, hypcractive children are judged deviant or maladjusted at least as much by the social inappropriateness of their behavior as by any generalized quantitative exccss (Werry, 1968a). Thus, according to Zentall (1975), “the best definition o f hypeiactivity remains a social judgment of the frequency and intensity of specified behaviors displayed at ‘inappropriate’ times” (p. 549).

4. Academic Concomitants Hyperactive children are viewed by school personnel as distinctly different from their classmates. They are described as highly distractable, restless, and disruptive, and they are typically below average in academic performance. The poor academic performance is considered to result from poor concentration, impairment of motor, memory, and speech functions, and other cognitive deficits such as reading problems, reversals in reading and writing, and difficulties in arithmetic (Laufer & Denhoff, 1957; Millichap, 1968; Werry, 1968a; Werry et al., 1966). Hyperactive children can also be an academic paradox by their erratic academic behavior. Sometimes they compl-te work assignments correctly and neatly; other times, the same children either do not complete assignments at all or the work is messy and disorganized. On standardized intelligence tests these children frequently score higher than would be predicted from their academic performance and typically score higher on verbal than on performance measures of intelligence (Paine, 1968). B. METHODS OF DIAGNOSIS

The diagnosis of hyperactivity is shrouded in confusion because different authorities have used different criteria for diagnosis. A hyperactive child is quite likely t o have more than one diagnosis, particularly if the child has been seen in more than one clinic. The diagnosis is often derived from rather arbitrary criteria. Knobel (1962), for example, differentiated hyperactivity stemming from an organic etiology from that with a psychogenic cause. He labeled as “organic” those children who, in addition to exhibiting the behavioral character-

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Gladys B. Baxley arid Judith M. LeBlanc

istics of hyperactivity, also yielded positive findings on at least two o f three clinical measures: the neurological examination; electroencephalographic recordings; and psychological tests which are purported to show signs of “organicity.” Hyperactive behavior with an organic basis is said t o be erratic, without direction, situationally nonspecific, and accompanied by impulsivity and aggression that show neither intentionality nor direction. The child whose hyperactivity is more psychologically based, however, is said t o show impulsive and aggressive behaviors that are intentional in nature and have apparent direction. Laufer and Denhoff (1957) proposed that the behavioral manifestations of hyperactivity are characteristic enough t o be diagnostic in and of themselves. However, other investigators have reasoned that the overt behaviors associated with hyperactivity could also be indicative of emotional disturbance. From this latter viewpoint some investigators believe that a diagnosis of hyperactivity must be supported by evidence of brain dysfunction (Menkes, Rose, & Menkes, 1967). Werry ( 1 9 6 8 ~ )however, pointed out that the function of the diagnosis is not simply t o label a child but is also t o identify the appropriate population, t o facilitate treatment, and, if possible, to provide a basis for estimating prognosis. In other words, the diagnostic procedure should distinguish hyperactive children from children with other disturbances (e.g., brain damage) of which hyperactivity may be only a small part. With such a selection procedure, a treatment strategy could be based on characteristics common to the populatid5as a whole, and the prognosis thus could be determined from treatment results with other already identified hyperactive children. Several procedures are currently used to diagnose hyperactivity; these may be grouped into three major categories: (1) diagnostic procedures based on physiological and/or neurological factors: (2) procedures based on psychological factors; and (3) procedures based on behavioral factors. I . Diagnostic Procedures Based on Physiological andlor Neurological Factors The electroencephalogram (EEG) has contributed much t o the understanding of central nervous system function (Bradley, 1957). Although its initial value was primarily in the study of convulsive states, it is now commonly used in diagnosing hyperactivity. One reason is that EEG tracings are frequently abnormal in children who exhibit hyperactivity (Paine, 1968). Burks (1960), for example, noted that hyperactivity associated with abnormal EEG is one of the most widely accepted criteria for a diagnosis of organic brain pathology. He proposed that organic pathology of the cortex (or surface) of the brain often distorts or changes the nature of brain activity in typical ways that can be recorded by the EEG. Thus, the EEG is thought to provide positive evidence of hyperactivity through characteristically distorted brain-wave patterns. However, EEG recordings in children are often unstable, and anxiety or tension can disrupt their

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pattern (Werry et al., 1964). Therefore, reliance only on the EEG could lead to an erroneous diagnosis of hyperactivity. In a study of 97 children referred for evaluation of severe behavior disorders, Stevens et al. (1968) found that a generally abnormal EEG did not correlate with specific disorders. However, there was a correlation between specific regional and wave-form abnormalities and behavior disorders. Solomons (1 965) stated that EEG does not correlate directly with specific behavior patterns, intelligence, or the presence or absence of known cerebral trauma. Paine (1968) further acknowledged that abnormalities evidenced in the EEG are usually minor and probably do not contribute substantially to the diagnosis of hyperactivity. Thus, it is not surprising that Werry et al. (1964) viewed the EEG as a rather “crude” instrument. Because hyperactivity is sometimes equated with abnormal brain structure or abnormal function (Clements, 1966), neurological tests have been used for diagnostic purposes. However, conventional neurological examinations usually reveal no abnormalities of major or “hard” signs, such as in cranial nerves and reflexes (Paine, 1968), but only of minor or “soft” neurological signs (e.g., impaired muscle coordination, poor visual motor function, or difficulties in performing skilled acts) in a large proportion of hyperactive children (Werry, 1 9 6 8 ~ ) .For example, of the children studied by Hertzig, Bortner, and Birch (1969), 95% showed some abnormality on clinical examination, with the overwhelming majority having two or more “soft” signs of neurological disturbance. Thus, minor neurological deviations are sometimes taken as positive evidence for the existence of cerebral impairment i n the diagnosis of hyperactivity. Millichap (1968) also included in this list other findings such as motor impersistence or the inability to maintain gaze or posture, motor incoordination, impaired alternating movements of the forearms, gait ataxia, inability to hop, Babinski responses, and many others. By considering hyperactivity in terms of its associated neurological deviations, experts have been able to achieve consensus as to its diagnosis. However, as Werry ( 1 9 6 8 ~ )has pointed out, in the neurological sense there is as yet no evidence that any of these central nervous system deviations are in fact valid or reliable indices of cerebral dysfunction. Previous investigations have shown that specific kinds of deviations appeared on only those measures which were specifically designed to measure them (Paine, Werry, & Quay, 1968; Rodin, Lucas, & Simson, 1963; Schulman, Kaspar, & Throne, 1965). In other words, neurological, medical, and psychological measures reflected different and independent dysfunctions rather than a single dysfunction. Thus, neurological evaluations may have little relevance for a diagnosis of hyperactivity unless this information is combined with other kinds of information (Wender, 1971). The medical and developmental histories of the child do play major roles in the diagnosis of hyperactivity (Bradley, 1957; Burks, 1960; Comly, 1962). This

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Gladys B. Baxley and Judith M. LeBlanc

style of diagnosis of hyperactivity requires a detailed behavioral history (Wender, 1971). Information gained from specific inquiry into the child’s level of functioning at various stages in development may have more predictive value for an accurate diagnosis than any other kind of information. Bradley (1957) maintained that history is especially helpful when there are indications of illness or injury. However, he conceded that such positive indications are not always available, and specific inquiry into the health of the mother during pregnancy, conditions during the birth itself, and the child’s health during infancy may also yield “significant” information. Denhoff and Novack (1967) also suggested that information concerning family history may contribute substantially t o a diagnosis of hyperactivity. This is especially true in families that exhibit a high incidence of neurological disability, presumably because such facts may indicate hereditary influences (given the presupposition that such ilifluences are relevant). Burks (1 960) constructed a questionnaire to obtain information regarding the developmental histories o f a group of fourth-grade students. From the questionnaires completed and returned by 204 parents, one particularly interesting finding was that unusual circumstances surrounding the birth process were more frequently reported in the histories of hyperactive children than in those of a group of normal children or a group of retarded readers showing n o evidence of the hyperactive disorder. Circumstances noted in births of hyperactive children were unusually long or short labor, anoxia, breech or unusual presentation, cord about neck, misshapen head, etc. Additionally, more than five times as many premature births were reported for hyperactive children as for normals. Severe infectious disease and blows to the head were also more common among the hyperactive group.

2. Diagnostic Procedures Based on Psychological Factors A psychological examination is typically included in the diagnosis of hyperactivity. These examinations are considered t o be most valuable if they are conducted by experienced clinical psychologists (Bradley, 1957), presumably because in addition t o test performance the child’s general behavior in the testing situation provides valuable diagnostic clues (Comly, 1962). Experienced clinical psychologists supposedly can identify such behaviors as short span of attention and concentration, as well as low frustration tolerance in the testing situation. Measures of general intelligence are sometimes employed for diagnostic purposes. Tests such as the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Chi!dren (WISC) and the Stanford-Binet often reveal high verbal ability but low motor performance in hyperactive children (Comly, 1962; Denhoff & Novack, 1967). C o d y (1962) indicated that performance quality varies in hyperactive children, as denionstrated in frequent shifts from “insightful” approaches t o test items t o nonattentive trial-and-error performance, particularly on nonverbal tasks.

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The Bender Visual-Motor-Gestalt Test and the Goodenough Harris Draw-aPerson Test often show discrepancies between the responses of hyperactive children who have some degree of neurological impairment and hyperactive children who d o not (Comly, 1962; Denhoff & Novack, 1967). Those in the former category often do not appreciate the relationship of parts of figures to each other and have difficulty with tasks involving spatial relationships (Comly, 1962). Immediate visual recall (from the Bender test) is also frequently shown to be impaired in such children, as is short-term auditory memory (from the Digit Span subtest of the WISC). The Rorschach Inkblot Test, the Children’s Apperception Test, and the Goodenough Harris Draw-a-Person Test are sometimes used to identify children suspected of being borderline psychotic (Wender, 1971). These tests are also considered to be useful for identifying hyperactive children, who often exhibit symptoms similar t o borderline psychotic children. Despite widespread use, the value of psychological tests for diagnosing hyperactivity is questionable because no satisfactory correlation has been established between performance on sucli measrires and the behavioral or neurological attributes of hyperactivity (Wenc!er, 1971). In other words, performance on psychological tests, be it normal or abnormal, may tell very little about the behavioral or neurological status of the child. Thus any predictive and prescriptive value of psychological tests, especially for therapy, has yet t o be established.

3. Diagnostic Procedures Based o t i Behavioral Factors The major identifying characteristic of hyperactive children is the behavioral manifestation of their disorder (e.g., excessive motor activity, restlessness, distractability, short attention span). Consequently, diagnosis is frequently based on observations of those overt behaviors. Diagnostic procedures that emphasize the behavioral components 01‘ hyperactivity are generally used t o assess the seriousness of the behavioral disturbance i n terms of the number of settings in which the hyperactive behavior causes problems. These diagnostic procedures sometimes involve questionnaires or rating scales, direct observation, and direct measurement of physical movcnient. The questionnaire or rating scale approach is very common (Peterson, 1961 ; Werry, 196%; Werry & Sprague, 1970; Werry et al., 1966). It requires that adults (e.g., parents, teachers, ward attendants) or peers rate the target child on items that pertain to the child’s motor behaviors (Werry & Sprague, 1970). The rater is generally someone who is with the child for a long period of time, on a regular basis. This diagnostic technique, however, has one major disadvantage for which it has received considerable criticism. The raters are individuals with whom the hyperactive child frequently interacts, and it is these same individuals with whom the hyperactive child typically comes into conflict. Therefore, these individuals are likely t o have biased opinions of the child’s behavior. Werry and

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Gladys B. Baxley and Judith M. LeBIanc

Sprague (1970), however, proposed some advantages offered by the rating method as a diagnostic technique. They noted that the method is simple and inexpensive to use, and they also pointed out that questions about the chld’s behavior are at least “operationalized” and presented on a quantitative basis. Therefore, it is possible to assess their characteristic interrater reliability (Werry & Sprague, 1970; Werry et al., 1966). Yet, despite the fact that a number of published rating scales exist (Burks, 1960; Werry et al., 1966), no adequate tests have been made of their validity, their reliability, or their practicality. Direct behavioral observation, another diagnostic tool, requires that an observer watch and record the occurrence of specific motor movements at particular times and places. Such observations have been made in the child’s natural environment, such as the classroom (Becker, Madsen, Arnold, &Thomas, 1967; Patterson et al., 1965; Werry & Quay, 1969), or in a laboratory setting (Doubros & Daniels, 1966; Hutt et al., 1963). The structure of this technique is “freefield,” in that it can allow the children being observed to behave as they ordinarily would in usual situations. The major strength of this diagnostic technique lies in its objectivity and in its capacity to yield “real-life’’ data (Werry & Sprague, 1970). The observers do not interact with the child, thus minimizing problems of observer bias. In addition, relatively unskilled persons can quickly be trained to record these observations. The major weaknesses of this technique, however, are related to problems of inadequate sampling of the behaviors in question and the high costs involved in employing (and training) observers. The implementation of this technique also presents problems. It is difficult to have observers record the behavior of a child in many of the settings where the child is likely to be. However, as indicated by Werry and Sprague (1970), this technique is advantageous if at least a portion of clinical diagnostic time is devoted to it. Directly measuring the physical movement of children is now used increasingly for diagnosis. Such techniques rely on mechanical devices to measure activity as it naturally occurs. However, these devices measure only physical movement and no other behavioral manifestations of the problem. Some of these mechanical devices are self-winding wristwatches (Bell, 1968; Schulman & Reisman, 1959), photoelectric counters (Ellis & Pryer, 1959), ballistographic or stabilimetric chairs (Sprague & Toppe, 1966; Werry & Sprague, 1970), ultrasonic devices (McFarland, Peacock, & Watson, 1966), movies (Lee & Hutt, 1964), and telemetric devices (Werry & Sprague, 1970). With the possible exception of the self-winding watches, the majority of these devices are cumbersome, expensive, and have little relevance for routine clinical work (Werry, 1 9 6 8 ~ ) The . wristwatches, however, although relatively accurate, are difficult to calibrate, do not produce a permanent record, and record only movement of the limb to which they are attached. Nevertheless, with further refinement, this instrument may prove to have considerable diagnostic utility.

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4. Summary There appears to be little agreement concerning appropriate and relevant means for diagnosing hyperactivity in children, and the most commonly used diagnostic procedures (i.e., those based on pliysiological/neurological, psychological, and behavioral factors) have not provided an adequate solution to this dilemma. A major difficulty is that the diagnostic procedures currently in use do not provide consistent diagnoses when different diagnostic criteria are used. Some authorities rely primarily on physiological and/or neurological test findings, and others base the diagnosis on performance on various psychological tasks; still others diagnose hyperactivity from the outward (behavioral) manifestations of the disorder, and often use expensive and cumbersonle mechanical devices to measure the behavior. Thus, it is not surprising that at present there is little agreement and much uncertainty about a diagnosis of hyperactivity.

111. Etiology of Hyperactivity The exact determination of the etiology of hyperactivity is still unknown, and of course there are almost as many theories concerning its etiology as there are individuals who propose them. Theories range from organic t o psychogenic causes and from disordered metabolism to inborn temperament (Satterfield, Cantwell, Lesser, & Podosin, 1972). A. ORGANIC kACTORS

In a significant number of cases, tlie etiology of hyperactivity is thought to be direct insult t o or dysfunction within the brain or within the central nervous system as a whole (Boelsche, 1965; Clements, 1966; Eveloff, 1970; Menkes e l al., 1967; Millichap, 1968; Minde & Webb, 1968; Nichamin & Barahal, 1968). Pasamanick, Rogers, and Lilienfeld ( 1 956) and Millichap (1968) have proposed that hyperactivity results from brain damage sustained prenatally or at birth, or from encephalitis in infancy or early childhood. Support for this view is found mainly in prenatal and perinatal histories provided by parents of hyperactive children. Other investigators have proposed that hyperactivity develops through an imbalance between cortical and subcortical areas of the brain (Eveloff, 1970; Knobel & Lytton, 1961), with specific dysfunction in the diencephalon (Denhoff, 1961; Laufer & Denhoff, 1957; Solonions, 1965). The component of the reticular activating system that passes through the diencephalon acts as a sorting and routing mechanism for incoming sensory impulses prior to their transmission t o higher levels of the brain (cT. Grinspoon Sr. Singer, 1973). When functioning properly the primary function of the diencephalon is to inhibit flooding of tlie

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Gladys B. Baxley and Judith M. LeBIanc

cortex with irrelevant stimuli. Thus, dysfunction within the diencephalon may cause the cortex t o be bombarded with stimuli it cannot deal with efficiently. Such dysfunction would cause incoming stimulus inipulses t o spread out of the usual pathways into large, not yet mature cortical areas, causing a sensory “overload” and typical hyperactive behavior. However, Lytton and Knobel (1959) and Knobel and Lytton (1961) suggested that the diencephalon theory is untenable because, in their view, lesions in this region should produce a more complicated symptomatology . They proposed instead that the structural development of the cortex, slower than that of the diencephalon, makes the cortex more susceptible to damage. Thus, they suggested that consideration should be given to disorders of the cortex or of the subcortical pathways in the etiology of hyperactivity. Another theory that has considerable empirical support, one that is closely related to a theory of brain dysfunction, is that which attributes the etiology of hyperactivity to underarousal of the central nervous system (Satterfield, Cantwell, & Satterfield, 1974; Zentall, 1975). The abnormally high levels of motor activity, short attention span, and distractability of hyperactive children and the effectiveness of stimulant drug treatment have been interpreted as evidence that such children have an underaroused central nervous system and hence lack the capacity for selective inhibition of motor responses to environmental stimuli. Satterfield et al. (1974), for example, have suggested that hyperactive children who show a favorable clinical response to stimulants are those who have abnormally low levels of autonomic arousal as evidenced by lower skin conductance levels, higher mean EEG amplitudes, and larger evoked cortical-response amplitudes when compared to those who show a poor response to stimulants. These and other physiological measures, such as heart rate, are typically equated with autonomic activation and responsivity. Thus, the authors concluded that changes in these physiological measures following the administration of stimulants were consistent with an underarousal theory. The apparently heavy emphasis on brain damage or dysfunction as a possible cause of hyperactivity may be related to the belief that children with various behavior disorders share important common fcatures with the brain-damaged child (Conners, Eisenberg, & Sharpe, 1964). Yet Birch (1964) suggested that the term “brain damage,” as it is applied to hyperactive children, is an unfortunate label because it implies the existence of etiologic knowledge where none exists. In an effort to resolve this complex issue, he proposed that brain damage not be regarded as a neurological designation, but rather as a behavior pattern. In this view, any cerebral damage might cause similar patterns of deviant behavior, but the presence of hyperactivity is not a reliable variable for inferring brain damage (Becker, Englemann, & Thomas, 1971). Werry and Sprague (1970) theorized that brain damage is not necessarily a cause of hyperactivity. They, with others, usually attribute the problem to factors such as the following: genetic variation, “constitutional” determinants,

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or chromosome abnormalities (Bakwin & Bakwin, 1966; Chess, Thomas, Rutter, & Birch, 1963; Stewart, Pitts, Craig, & Dieruf, 1966; Warren et al., 1971); metabolic disturbance (Burks, 1960; Comly, 1962; Lindsley & Henry, 1942; Martin, 1967); emotional disturbance (Eisenberg, 1957; Schulman et al., 1965; Solomorfs, 1965; Werry et al., 1966); or central nervous system dysfunction (Satterfield et al., 1972, 1974). Hyperactivity is especially likely to be attributed to these factors when there is no evidence of existing neurological defect (Solomons, 1965). €3.

NONORGANlC FACTORS

In recent years there has been a renewed interest in a theory relating the incidence of hyperactivity in childrcn to the ingestion of foods containing food coloring and other additives (Feingold, 1974). The first report linking hyperactivity to food additives appeared more than 50 years ago: Shannon (1922) reported an improvement in the behavior of seven hyperactive children when one or more foods containing ccrtain additives were eliminated from their diet. Furthermore, when the foods were reintroduced, the hyperactive symptoms returned. More recently, Crook ( 1 974) reported the case of a 4-year-old child whose hyperactivity was treated by an elimination diet. Over a period of several weeks specific foods were eliminated fro111 the child’s diet until the hyperactive symptoms disappeared. However, when the foods were reintroduced, one at a time, the hyperactivity sometimes reappeared, but only after the child ate those foods containing sugar. The author concluded that this child’s hyperactivity was caused by an allergic reaction to cane sugar; in order to control the symptoms, no foods containing cane sugar should be eaten by the child more than once or twice a week. According to Crook (1974), the foods that have a special potential to produce an adverse reaction are foods containing milk, chocolate, cola, cane and beet sugar, cereal grains, eggs, and citrus (foods containing food coloring and other additives should also be avoided). Along with interest in the food-additives theory of hyperactivity, there has also been a great deal of controversy about it. For example, Brown (1974) criticized work in this area as being either incomplete or “so poorly designed as to be worthless, even harmful.” (p. 6 2 ) . However, because so much remains unknown about the causes of hyperactivity, especially any nonorganic causes, virtually no theory can be rejected until disproved. However, every hypothesis should also be developed into a rigorous program of objective research. <’. SUMMARY Based upon what is presently known about hyperactivity in children, there appear to be many questions that remain to be answered about the etiology of the problem. There are several extant theories about the cause of hyperactivity,

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Gladys B. Buxley and Judith M. LeBlunc

but none o f them is completely satisfactory. For example, it is believed by some that hyperactivity is the result of damage to the brain or central nervous system. More specifically, some authorities propose that damage (or dysfunction) within the reticular activating system of the central nervous system causes hyperactivity. Others, however, do not believe that brain damage would necessarily cause hyperactivity, and propose instead that it can be attributed to genetic and/or metabolic disturbances. or to emotional disturbance. A more recent (and highly controversial) theory attributes hyperactivity t o allergic reactions t o certain foods, especially foods containing artificial coloring and food additives. At the prcsent time, however, the etiology of hyperactivity remains open t o question. Yet the etiology, especially remote ctiology, although of interest, need not play a significant role in the diagnosis and management of a hyperactive child (Werry, 1 9 6 8 ~ ) Currently, . etiology, like the label “hyperactive,” tells little about the most appropriate treatment strategies t o be adopted. Although drug therapy is the primary medical treatment of hyperactivity, investigators should emphasize the importance of an accurate evaluation of the hyperactive symptoms and also the outcomes of all possible treatments.

1V. Evaluation and Assessment of Phariiiacotherapeutic Effects In the vast literature pertaining t o the pharmacological tieatment of hyperactive children, several methods have been used to evaluate treatment effectiveness. The methods can be classified into six categories: symptom ratings; psychological measures; objective laboratory task performance ; behavioral measures; physiological measures; and academic performance. A.

SYMPTOM RATINGS

Many clinical reports have contained analyses of positive drug effects in terms of reported symptomatic changes in the hyperactive child. Often, changes reported by physicians and clinicians are based on subjective and sometimes arbitrary ratings, such as “better,” “no change,” or “worse.” Because rating scales are so frequently employed in diagnosing hyperactivity (Werry er al., 1966), they are also felt t o be useful in the measurement of treatment effectiveness. For example, Conners, Eisenberg, and Barcai (1967), in a double-blind study, found that teachers rated the subjects’ behavior as significantly more improved following administration of dextroamphetamine than following placebo. Likewise, Alexandris and Lundell (1 968), using a five-point rating scale of worse, no change, mild improvement, marked improvement, and complete improvement, found that the effects of thioridazine and amphetamine on hyperactive children were rated superior t o placebo. These ratings were made by

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nurses, teachers, physicians, and the principal investigators once per week for 6 months. In another study, by Conners, Taylor, Meo, Kurtz, and Fournier (1972a), 96% of children treated with dextroamphetamine were rated by parents and teachers as either “improved” or “much improved,” while only 30% of those treated with placebo were rated as “improved.” A number of other studies have all contained evidence of improvement in symptom ratings (Conners, Rothschild, Eisenberg, Schwartz. & Robinson, 1969; Finnerty, Soltys, & Cole, 1971; Knights & Hinton, 1969; Sattcrfield et al., 1972; Sprague, Barnes, 8t Werry, 1970; Weiss et al., 1068; Werry, 1968b; Winsberg, Bisler, Kupietz, & Tobias, 1972). In spite of the fact that the rating scales used in these studies yielded data that support the effectiveness of drug treatment with hyperactive children, one cannot be certain how much of that effectiveness was actually due to the drug and how much was due to the perceptions and expectations of the raters. Even though the raters may have been “blind” to the specific experimental conditions in effect at any given time, their perceptions of and expectations for the behavior of the subjects could have influenced their ratings. In other words, the blind may not actually have been a blind because it may not have precluded the raters’ expecting changes in the subjects’ behavior and, hence, identifying the treated group. Moreover, a frequent criticism of the blind procedure as a control technique is that it may be broken when the active drug is administered either because of the development of unwanted (side) effects in some subjects or because the raters are extremely sensitive t o drug changes (cf. Rickels, Lipman, Fisher, Park, & Uhlenhuth, 1970). Therefore, merely providing a blind as an experimental control may not guarantee rater objectivity. One means for determining the degree of rater objectivity might be to have a second person rate the subjects along with the primary rater. However, the second rater would not know that the ratings were being made to determine drug-treatment effects. Therefore, with the primary rater blind to the specific experimental conditions in effect and the second rater blind to the purpose of the ratings, the product of the two ratings could then be compared for rater agreement. B. PSYCIIOLOGICAL MEASURES

A variety of different psychological measures are used t o determine the effects of psychoactive drugs. The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC), Porteus Maze Test, the Goodenough Harris Draw-a-Person Test, and many others have been used in drug rescarch I n separate investigations of the effects of dextroamphetamine, Weiss et al. (1968), Conners et al. (1969), and Finnerty el al. (1971) all observed no significant differences between active medication and placebo in the subjects’ performance on the WISC. Epstein, Lasagna, Conners, and Rodriguez (1 968), however, found that dextroamphetamine

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Glndys B. Baxley and Judith M. LeBInnc

decreased scores on the verbal subtests of the WISC but increased scores on the performance subtests. An analysis of the effects of methylphenidate on WISC performance (Knights & Hinton, 1969) showed that this amphetamine-like drug produced a significant improvement over placebo in the WISC performance scores but not in the verbal scores. In the latter comparison, methylphenidate was found t o be no more effective than placebo. Other measures, such as the Goodenough Harris Draw-a-Person Test, have also yielded conflicting data on various drug effects. For example, Conners and Rothschild (1968) found no significant differences between amphetamine and placebo on the Draw-a-Person Test, but Conners (I971 b) found that both niethylphenidate and dextroamphetamine produced highly significant improvements in performance over placebo on this test. Finally, Alexandris and Lundell (1968) found no significant differences between thioridazine, amphetamine, and placebo on any of the psychological measures they employed. These measures included the Bender Visual-Motor-Gestalt Test, the Goodenough Harris Draw-aPerson Test, and several subtests from the WISC. Thus, given the ambiguity of these findings, and the apparent lack of relevance of psychological measures for diagnostic purposes, it is not possible to make any unequivocal statements regarding the effects of psychoactive drugs on performance of psychological tasks by hyperactive children. C. OBJECTIVE LABORATORY TASK PERFORMANCE

Laboratory tasks have frequently been devised to assess the effects of various drugs in hyperactive children (Baxley & LeBlanc, 1974; Baxley & Marks, 1974). These tasks sometimes yield information that is difficult to obtain in the less structured natural environment but may have much relevance for the education of the children. For exatnple, Freibergs, Douglas, and Weiss (1 968) demonstrated that long-term administration of moderate dosage levels of chlorpromazine for hyperactivity had no apparent adverse effects on the capacity of the children to acquire object and number discriminations. The authors found no significant differences between subjects’ performance under chlorpromazine and placebo conditions. Sprague, Werry, and Scott (1967) found that the response latencies of subjects in a two-choice discrimination task decreased following treatment with amphetamine (Dexedrine@). In a later study Sprague et al. (1970) studied the effects of niethylphenidate and thioridazine on recognition-task performance in a group of hyperactive emotionally disturbed boys. In addition to performance accuracy, the reaction times of the subjects were also measured, as well as their activity levels during the experimental sessions. Two dosage levels of both methylphenidate and thioridazine were used, together with a placebo control condition. The results of this study indicated that methylphenidate was superior t o either

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thioridazine or placebo in significantly increasing the subjects' correct responses and decreasing their reaction tinies. Cohen, Douglas, and Morgenstern (1 97 1 ) found a significant difference between the reaction times of hyperactive children when they received methylphenidate and when they received placebo. Reaction times measured under drug conditions were significantly faster. The authors concluded that methylphenidate improves attention. In another investigation of reaction time, Sykes, Douglas, and Morgenstern (1972) found that hyperactive chldren were able to sustain their attention longer, detect more significant task stimuli, and make fewer incorrect responses following treatment with methylphenidate. In light of these examples, it seems clear that stimulants such as methylphenidate and amphetamine tend to enhance performance of laboratory tasks. However, the effects of other classes of psychoactive drugs, such as chlorpromazine, are not as clear. No doubt fuithcr research could clarify this issue. D. BEIIAVIORAL MEASURES

Behavioral measures provide a means for reliably determining the efficiency of pharmacologic therapeutic techniques. For example, in a study of the delayed speech and language of children of normal intelligence but diagnosed as having cerebral dysfunction, Creager and Van Riper (1967) compared the effects of methylphenidate with those of a placebo. In this double-blind investigation, three samples of speech were obtained for each subject: one at the beginning of the study, and one each after the administration of methylphenidate and placebo. During each experimental session, subjects were required to respond to a series of pictures and, in an effort to elicit less structured verbalizations, they were asked t o respond to two general questions. The authors found that verbal productivity (i.e., the total number of words spoken, the total number of responses, and the total numbcr of incomplete utterances) was significantly increased with the use of methylphenidate. Anton and Greer (1969) reported that in a group of hyperactive mentally retarded boys treated with dextroamphetamine, several of the children exhibited an increased awareness of environmental stimuli, engaged in less random activity, and increased the frequency of their vocalizations during drug therapy. This behavioral response was observed during a 3-week period when the subjects were orally administered 10 nig of dextroamphetamine per day. The authors noted, however, that this favorable response abated when the drug was continued for an extended period of time. Finally, data gathered by Sykes, Douglas, Weiss, and Minde (1971) indicated that the ability of hyperactive children to attend, as measured by their responses on a Continuous Performance Test, was significantly improved when they were treated with methylphenidate. In this study, 40 hyperactive children were

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Gladys B. Baxley and Judith M. LeBlanc

administered either methylphenidate or placebo. The drug dosage levels ranged between 30 and 40 mg per day and were individually titrated for each subject until an optimal clinical effect was obtained. The experimental task consisted of the individual presentation of series of letters, the subjects being required to select a specific letter whenever it appeared. The authors found that the hyperactive children who received the active drug had better performance in that they were able to detect more of the relevant stimuli with fewer impulsive and erroneous responses than were similar children who received placebo. E. PHYSIOLOGICAL MEASURES

Various studies have been conducted in an attempt to determine the treatment effects of psychotropic compounds as measured by physiological factors (e.g., Porges, Walter, Korb, & Sprague, 1975; Satterfield & Dawson, 1971). Physiological measures are frequently analyzed from the standpoint of the selection of “good” and “poor” responders to stimulant medications. In other words, hyperactive children who obtain a good clinical response t o stimulants are found to differ from poor responders on several physiological measures such as skin conductance level, EEG response, and auditory evoked cortical responses (Satterfield, Cantwell, Saul, & Lesser, 1973; Satterfield et al., 1972, 1974). Epstein et al. (1968), for example, attempted to determine the response of hyperactive children to 10 t o 20 mg of dextroamphetamine per day. Based on a variety of clinical data, the subject population was divided into an “organic” (probable brain damage) and a “nonorganic” group. Although no consistent or significant differences in physiological measures were obtained for either group following drug treatment, the “organic” group demonstrated a greater tolerance for higher dosage levels of dextroamphetamine with fewer side effects. However, there was an increased rate of excretion of the drug in the urine of the “organic” children, perhaps accounting for their greater tolerance level. In another study, Knights and Hinton (1969) found significant changes in weight, diastolic blood pressure, and heart rate among 40 children treated with methylphenidate. However, when the children were grouped according to whether they had a history of probable brain damage or not, no clear relationship was found between etiology and response to the drug. Similarly, Satterfield et al. (1974) demonstrated a promising technique for classifying hyperactive children. Using EEG recordings and measures of skin conductance level, the authors found significant differences between hyperactive subjects who responded well to methylphenidate treatment and those who responded poorly. The best drug responders had higher mean resting EEG amplitudes, greater resting EEG amplitude ranges, and a higher number of EEG movement artifacts prior to drug treatment than did the worst drug responders. Best and worst response to treatment was based on improvement in scores, or

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the lack of it, o n a teacher-rating scale. Furthermore, the skin conductance levels of the best-response group were lower than those of the worst-response group. The findings in this study and others (Anton & Greer, 1969; Conners et al., 1967) are suggestive of methods for separating “good” from “poor” stimulant drug responders before such treatment is attempted. The photo-Metrazol technique is an ingenious procedure that has strong implications for determining psychoactive drug treatment effects (Laufer ct al., 1957). It is used as a means of empirically establishing the relationship between diencephalic dysfunction and hyperactivity, where it is assumed that dysfunction in the diencephalon region 01‘ die brain is related t o the hyperactivity. This technique consists of determining the tlireshold dose, in milligrams of Metrazol (pentylenetetrazol) per kilogram of body weight, that is sufficient to elicit EEG spike-wave bursts and myoclonic: jerking of the forearms when an individual is visually stimulated by a stroboscopic light. Among 50 children studied with this technique, Laufer et al. found ;I clear separation between hyperactive and nonhyperactive children. Based on these data, Solomons (1965) concluded that hyperactive children have significantly lower photo-Metrazol thresholds than d o other nonhyperactive children o f comparable ages. Laufer et al. (1957) later l‘ouncl that when hyperactive children were treated with dextroamphetamine t o control their behavior, their photo-Metrazol threshold increased to normal levels. C‘onversely. when dextroamphetamine was discontinued, there was a decline in photo-Metrazol levels. Thus, the authors suggested that stimulant drugs (in this case, amphetarnine) restore the “normal” functioning of the diencephalon, thereby relieving hyperactivity. F. ACADtMIC PERFORMANCE

Because poor academic perfo~-manceof‘ hyperactive children is frequently the basis for their referral for treainient, it seems only fitting that an analysis of academic behavior be included in the assessment of psychotropic drug treatment effect. However, few rcsearctiers have systematically investigated the various parameters o f academic performaiicc. One exception is a study by Sprague et ul. (1970) in which tlie authors I‘otind a greater effect of methylphenidate on certain classroom behaviors of hyperactive boys than of either thioridazine or placebo. Specifically, ine~liylpliciiidatewas associated with significantly fewer classroom isolation or punishment periods, as well as higher percentages of on-task or task-related behaviois. In contrast, Alcxandris and Lundell (1968) could find n o significant tliflkrenccs between the effects of amphetamine, thioridazine, o r placebo on tlie rcading. spelling, and arithmetic performance of hospitalized hyperactive chiltlr-cn In view of the evidence presented, i t appears that psychoactive drugs generally have clear, positive effects on a t least some measures used t o assess treatment

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Gladys B. Baxley and Judith M. LeBlanc

effect (e.g., symptom ratings, laboratory task performance, and behavioral measures). However, drug effects on psychological test performance and academic performance are not as clear-cut. Therefore, it appears that before any statements can be made concerning the effect of drugs on measures such as school performance, more definitive research, especially in this area, is needed.

V. Analysis of Drug Research with Hyperactive Children A. INTRODUCTION

The foregoing discussion of hyperactivity and its treatment through pharmacologic means has been presented in light of some of the major issues related to psychotropic drug research and usage with children. The primary objective of this discussion has been to present a coherent picture of the characteristics that define hyperactivity, the means by which it is diagnosed, and the theories concerning its etiology that form the basis for drug treatment. This discussion will serve to undergird the subsequent argument for the individual analysis of psychotropic drug data in the treatment of hyperactivity. Without a clear understanding of the history of hyperactivity as a significant clinical and educational problem, this latter discussion would be difficult to place in perspective. In spite of the abundance of experimental evidence attesting to the apparent effectiveness of psychotropic drugs on the behavior of hyperactive children, criticisms have been raised which seriously challenge the adequacy of the research base. In many instances, the enthusiasm over drug therapy for hyperactive children has been based on research that in total yields mixed results and tenuous conclusions. Because several of the most frequently cited criticisms of pediatric drug research have been the subjects of a number of previous reviews (e.g., Conners, 1972b; Freeman, 1966; Grant, 1962; Sprague & Werry, 1971; Sprague, Werry, & Davis, 1969), it is perhaps unnecessary t o reiterate those criticisms here. Therefore, in the next few pages, consideration is given to an examination of the fundamental issue of design in drug research. More specifically, attention is given to an analysis of and justification for the inclusion of individualized (or single-subject) approaches in the design of drug research. A primary objective in the design of any psychopharmacological research is to provide a description of the functional relationship between the administration of a chemical agent and specific behavior change. Traditional attempts to establish such a relationship have involved the comparison of means obtained for groups of subjects exposed to different values of the independent variable. In fact, nearly all drug research with hyperactive children has included group designs with nontreatment groups employed to control for effects obtained in

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the treatment groups. Depending on the nature of the research question, a common practice of drug researchers is t o employ several groups of subjects to whom different levels of the particular drug are administered. The etfects on the dependent variables are then measured, and the results are analyzed statistically (the group-statistical approach). Alternatively, a repeated-measures procedure may be used in wliicli each gloiip of subjects participates in every experimental condition. The order in which the conditions are introduced may be counterbalanced across groups to control for (but not eliminate) effects of the sequence of administration; but any differences obtained between drug conditions are still analyzed statistically. The intent of this analysis is t o determine whether there are differences in ct'fect between the groups based on the administration of the drug. B . LIMITATIONS 01 GROUP-STATISTICAL DESIGNS

Although the group-statistical research design is the one most commonly employed in pediatric drug research, it has several limitations which iniflit militate against its sole use in research on hyperactivity. These limitations might be conceptualized in the following manner. Because data for all subjects treated similarly are lumped together in a group design, such a design precludes the specification of differential drug responsiveness in individual subjects. Owing to this fact, then, the group design does not allow thc identification of homogeneous subgroups (i.e., hyperactive children who are more similar on certain dimensions than other hyperactive children). Therefore, because of its limitations for identifying similar subjects, a group design also does not facilitate the determination o f idiosyncratic response styles and response patterns. But let LIS consider each of these points in turn. 1. Specification of Differential Drug Responsiveness Pediatric drug researchers make several assumptions about the nature of hyperactivity and psychotropic drug effects when they statistically analyze and interpret data from groups of hyperactive children. One assumption is that the response to drug treatment of individual hyperactive children corresponds t o the average drug response of the entire sample from which the individuals were drawn. This, however, may not be the case, because some subjects in the sainple might show very divergent responses. For example, in a saniple of 50 hyperactive children, 35 may improve following drug treatment, 10 may show no change a t all, while 5 may actually show varying degrees of deterioration. Where most of' the subjects in the group show a strong positive response to treatment, a few show a relatively weak response o r no response at all, and still others deteriorate. By using a group-statistical analysis procedure, the differential responsiveness of a few subjects is thereby masked by the strong response of the majority. The

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Glndys B. Baxley and Judith M. LeBlanc

data, however, are interpreted in terms of the statistical significance of the overall group effect, and inferences are made about the functional relationship between psychotropic drugs and specific behavioral changes based on this interpretation. But by drawing inferences based on the average group effect, the researcher obviates the possibility of identifying “nested” groups or subgroups of hyperactive children who may react in divergent fashion from the majority of subjects in the sample. In essence, psychoactive drugs may cause different behavioral consequences in different subjects. Dose-response data for individual subjects may also show differential effects from one subject to another at different dosage levels, yet the average group response may not adequately reflect this fact. When the data are interpreted from the average response of the group, the interpretation does not represent the range of effect across different dosage levels of the drug. Thus, when only the data of the group are considered in a statistical analysis, it is impossible t o determine which subjects in the group actually benefit from treatment, as well as the magnitude and direction of their response at each dosage level.

2. Identification o f Homogeneous Subgroiups Another assumption of drug researchers concerns the makeup of the experimental sample, namely, that the individuals who compose the sample are homogeneous with respect t o their defining characteristics. In other words, hyperactive children are assumed t o represent a specific subgroup identifiable by some generally agreed upon behavioral characteristics. However, from the myriad of labels applied t o the hyperactive disorder (Clements, 1966), and from the fact that there is presently very little consensus on either its definition or diagnosis (Conners, 1972b), it seems abundantly clear that hyperactive children are not a homogeneous group, and conclusions about hyperactivity based on group experimental data are, of necessity, tenuous. Although the diagnostic label is the same, the sequelae that contribute t o the label may vary widely from subject t o subject and thereby seriously challenge the validity of the label. Although hyperactive children do present a similar clinical picture, they constitute a very heterogeneous group. In fact, considering the variety of theories about the etiology of the disorder, hyperactive children probably should differ greatly with respect t o a multitude of factors, such as physical and neurological status, psychological functioning, neurophysiological history, and family interaction patterns. To average the effects of a drug across all the members of a group of such children would not only dampen the differential effects of the drug but would also obscure the importance of the diversity of factors which distinguish individual hyperactive children and define homogeneous subgroups. When the relevant dependent variable of the experimental sample is a particular behavioral characteristic (defined in this case as “hyperactivity”), some of the factors which comprise that characteristic may be unevenly distrib-

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uted among all the members of that sample. For example, in a comparison of. two groups of hyperactive children, factors indicative of brain damage which are associated with hyperactivity (e.g., neurological abnormalities, learning deficiencies, and a neurophysiological history suggestive of brain damage) may be i-ound at a much higher frequency among the subjects in one group. However, other factors associated with hyperactivity (e.g., excessive motor activity, sliort attention span) may be more evenly distributed among all of the subjects of both hyperactive groups. If, following drug treatment, statistically significant differences arise between the two groups (e.g., the “brain-damage’’ group improves with treatment, while the other group does not), what then can one conclude about that difference based on the statistical analysis? It is only possible to conclude that either: (1) the drug was more effective with hyperactive children who are brain damaged; or ( 2 ) the drug was least effective with hyperactive children who are not. Finer delineations about drug effects on specific kinds o f brain damage are also not possible from a group-statistical analysis. A problem that is closely related to that of homogeneous subgroups, and one which drug researchers tend t o overlook, is that of interpreting drug-effect data from experimental comparisons of hyperactive and “normal” children. A statistical comparison of groups of hyperactive and nonhyperactive children would assume homogeneity of variance ( i t . , the variance is the same for both groups o f children). This assumption may not be valid, however, in that comparisons of hyperactive and normal children may be statistically inappropriate. One would expect, as a function of the multiplicity of defining characteristics of hyperactivity, that the variability o n a specific dimension (e.g., attention span) would be greater among the subjects in the hyperactive group than among the nommal children. This fact, then, violates an assumption of homogeneity of variance. However, an analysis comparing only groups of hyperactive subjects (assuming random selection of those assigned to the various treatment conditions) is not affected by this assumption. This type of analysis assumes that the variance of the groups is stable over repeated testing situations. However, the assumption of stable variance over repeated measures may also be faulty. [For a more elaborate discussion of this problem, see Greenhouse and Geisser (1959)l.

3. Determination of Idiosyncratic Response Styles and Response Patterns By their sole use of group-statistical experimental designs, drug researchers assume that their findings will generaliLe from one group of hyperactive children to other hyperactive groups. This assumption implies the validity of interpretations of quantitative as well as qualitative similarities of drug response betwecn independent hyperactive groups. But group-statistical designs fail t o account for idiosyncratic response styles and response patterns of individual subjects. Because hyperactive children differ in their response t o psychotropic drugs (cf.

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Gladys B. Baxley and Judith M. LeBlanc

Conners & Eisenberg, 1963; Millichap, 1973; Millichap, Aymat, Sturgis, Larsen, & Egan, 1968; Satterfield, 1973; Satterfield et al., 1973), a delineation of the specific parameters along which they vary may be important for efficient treatment. When a drug has a statistically significant influence, that influence is partially determined by: (1) the magnitude of the subjects’ responses, and (2) the quality of their responses. However, the one aspect of a drug’s effect that has important implications for treatment outcome and is not adequately addressed in the literature is that of qualitative differences between groups, or more specifically, the direction of the effect. The distinction between quantity and quality of drug response is merely the distinction between the amount or magnitude of change as a function of the drug and the direction of that change, either positive or negative. Because the same drug at the same dosage level may, on a physiological level, affect individuals differently, there are likely to be extremes of response on a behavioral level as well for which average data are not representative. To carry this argument a step farther, suppose a sample of hyperactive children contains small homogeneous subsamples in which the subjects respond in a fashion consistent with one another but respond in a divergent fashion from the mean of the overall sample. If all the subjects are averaged together, the group curve may not mimic any actual individual, and the idiosyncratic response styles and patterns either of individuals or of the subsamples may be lost. Sidinan (1952) and others have demonstrated that, given a mean group-response pattern, the forms of individual response patterns are not uniquely specified. So, in essence, no inductive inference from a group mean t o individual response patterns is possible because, as suggested by Estes (1956), the shape of the group response pattern could have arisen from any of an infinite variety of subsamples of individual patterns. Thus, the sole use of a group-statistical approach t o the design and analysis of drug data is attended by considerable risk in any subsequent interpretation for individuals. Group-statistical drug researchers also assume that valid statements about the generality of experimental findings are possible when a large enough sample is used t o allow interpretations of the representativeness of those findings. In other words, as a sample of hyperactive children approaches the size of the population, the characteristics of the sample approach the characteristics of the population. This may be true theoretically, but as Sidrnan (1960) has argued, representativeness is an actuarial problem for which the currently prevalent group-statistical design is not appropriate. In the absence of some specification of the number of subjects who actually yield each value of the dependent measure, the use of groups adds little or nothing to the “representativeness” of the experimental results; instead, it merely allows the identification of small mean differences as “significant” differences.

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C. ADVANTAGES 01: INDIVIDUAL ANALYSES

1. Specification ofDiffereiztia1Drug Responsiveness In light of the limitations of group-statistical research designs, the inclusion of an individual analysis approach t o the analysis and interpretation of drug research seems a reasonable addition to a statistical design. There are a number of strong arguments which support this point of view. By employing a few carefully selected subjects and individually analyzing their responses, it becomes possible t o address some of the problems inherent in group-statistical designs. For example, an individual analysis of drug response allows the identification of subjects who show a differential response. A study by Millichap and Boldrey ( 1 967) is an example of this point. With the use of an actoineter t o measure gross motor activity of hyperactive children, they compared the effects of methylphenidate and phenobarbital to placebo on the hyperactivity and involuntary movements of 14 children referred for treatment. The actometer was a self-winding calendar wristwatch that was modified so that the pendulum was attached directly t o the hands of the watch. The apparatus was then worn by the subjects o n the wrist of their dominant side. The authors found that acute doses of methylphenidate (.25 t o .5 mg/kg) produced an increased rather than a decreased level of activity in four o f the subjects. However, because 10 of the subjects in this study continued t o receive other regularly prescribed medications, specific data on the effects of methylphenidate and phenobarbital were confounded, thus making it impossible to determine why methylphenidate should be associated with an increased activity level. This particular finding serves t o emphasize the importance of individually tailored drug assessment procedures. In a study by Baxley and LcBlanc (1974) differential effects were found on the short-term memory of five mentally retarded hyperactive children. The study was designed to determine whether or not five different dosage levels of methylphenidate were substantially different from placebo in their effects on the subjects’ performance of an instruction-following and digit-recall task. The authors found that the active drug had very different effects from placebo on each subject’s performance, at each of the several different dosage levels. In other words each subject showed a differential responsiveness to the drug, and the individual analysis design afforded the opportunity t o determine not only specific individual effects, but also the dosage levels at which those effects occurred. It allowed for a determination of which subjects actually responded t o the drug treatment. Sleator (Personal communication, 1975) found that in a group of 27 hyperactive children the mean increase in heart rate following treatment with methylphenidate was roughly 8.4 beats per minute. However, she reported that very

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Gludys B. Baxley and Judith M. LeBlanc

divergent responses were obtained by a few of the subjects following drug administration. For example, one child showed a 40 beats per minute increase in heart rate when the active drug was administered, while another child actually showed a 17 beats per minute rate decrease. These data also support the utility of an individual analysis of drug effects.

2. Identification of Homogeneous Subgroups When data of individual responsiveness t o drugs can be derived from a statistical distribution defined according to specific factors related t o hyperactivity, the subsample of which the individual is a part would be a nearly homogeneous one. The power of an individual drug effect could then serve a predictive function by showing the utility of the drug for the treatment of that subsample. Satterfield ct ul. (1974) demonstrated this point when they studied the effects of methylphenidate on a group of hyperactive children, testing the hypothesis that children who respond to stimulant medication are those who, prior t o treatment, arc found t o have low central nervous system arousal levels. In their study, a group of 14 hyperactive children was treated for 3 weeks with individually titrated doses of methylphenidate. Measures of resting EEG brain-wave patterns, auditory evoked cortical responses, and skin conductance levels were obtained as indices o f autonomic arousal prior t o drug treatment. Teacher ratings of classroom behavior were obtained before and after drug treatment, and changes in these ratings were used as measures of improvement. The children who showed 70% or better improvement on the teacher ratings (best responders) were compared to those with 30% or less improvement (worst responders). Using a nested (or hierarchical) design (cf. Winer, 1962), Satterfield et al. (1974) found that the subgroup of children who showed the best response t o treatment were those who were also found initially t o have low central nervous system arousal levels. They concluded from this finding that there was apparently an identifiable subgroup of hyperactive children with low levels of autonomic arousal whom one would predict t o be good responders to stimulant medication. This conclusion, incidentally, supports a neurophysiological model of hyperactivity; specifically, the analysis of idiosyncratic behavioral response styles and physiological response patterns may facilitate treatment of individual hyperactive children. It becomes possible t o increase the precision of the estimate of treatment effect because such an estimate is based on within-subject variability and, under certain conditions (e.g., where drugs are known to have differential effects), the within-subject variance is much less than the variance between subjects. Thus, repeated administrations of a drug which produce a consistent response within one individual or subsample could produce a very different but consistent response in a second individual or subsample. Therefore, thc diversity of symptoms associated with hyperactivity would no longer be a problem with which researchers must contend, but rather a valid foundation on

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which predictions about drug effects could be based. Important information is gained when a few subjects are studied whose hyperactivity (the characteristic by which the sample is defined) can be attributed to one of a number of different causes, but who nevertheless yield a similar response to the drug treatment. If a lawful relationship holds within a subsample of individuals who are similar in terms of the specific parameters of their diagnostic label, drug researchers can generate relevant data for the efficient treatment of that subsample, rather than bemoan the “heterogeneity” of the hyperactive population as a whole.

3. Determination of Idiosyncratic Response Styles and Response Patterns An individual analysis is not based on the assumption that generality is necessarily attributed to the data of a single subject; but, on the contrary, information that a given drug produces a reliable and replicable effect in individual members of a subsample has considerable generality. Porges et al. (1975), for example, hypothesized and found reliable differential physiological responsiveness to methylphenidate in groups of hyperactive children selected as a function of attentional measures. Using a nested design in a similar fashion to that of Satterfield et al. (1974), Porges and associates divided their subjects into two groups based on their reaction time performance: subjects who had attentional deficits (i.e., poor reaction time performance), and those who did not (good reaction time performance). The children in the two groups were then compared on teacher ratings for changes in classroom social behavior as a function of the drug treatment. Subjects who had attentional deficits prior to treatment showed improvement on the reaction time task following methylphenidate, but this subgroup did not show a corresponding improvement in classroom social behavior. In addition, the children initially found to be “good attenders” showed no improvement in reaction time performance following drug treatment, but their social behavior improved. Thus, the particular variables affected by drug treatment may have been a function of the initial deficit of each individual child. In the experiment of Porges et al. (1975) [as in that of Satterfield e t al. (1974)l , it was possible to categorize an a priori idiosyncratic behavior into two subgroups by an analysis of individual subject performance on a task. In designs which preclude such analyses (group-statistical designs), the identification of these subgroups would be impossible. The nested design allowed the decomposition of the entire sample of subjects according t o an identifiable characteristic. On a continuum from single-subject to group designs, the nested design may be viewed as containing aspects of both. By identifying more homogeneous subjects and categorizing them into subgroups, the nested design allows a more accurate estimate of the individual while preserving the utility of group statistics. Despite the fact that there may be quantitative as well as qualitative response differences

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Gladys B. Baxley and Judith M. LeBlanc

be tween group members, a primary concern of pediatric drug researchers is the generality of lawful cause-and-effect relationships and not the representativeness of specific pieces of data that are taken out of context (Sidman, 1960). The single-subject analysis, then, recognizes idiosyncratic differences with respect t o influences of independent variables and serves t o strengthen the validity of those individual effects. An argument for the individual analysis of drug effects, however, does not necessarily imply a small number of subjects for its own sake. The same logic that refutes the claim that the larger the group the more generalizable the findings argues also that an incomplete analysis of data for a single subject provides just as little basis for predicting drug effects for even that individual. However, when the responses of a few well-chosen subjects show an orderly and consistent relationship, adding more subjects t o the sample provides relatively little new information (Boren, 1966). A small number of subjects is often quite sufficient to permit a reasonable estimate of the adequacy of the experimental procedures.

VI. Summary and Conclusions In a n effort t o present a balanced picture of the hyperactive behavior disorder, we have attempted t o describe the hyperactive child on the basis of information gatliered from a variety of sources. The primary focus of this review has been the analysis of experimental literature related t o hyperactivity. More specifically, we have presented a discussion of: (1 j the behaviors which characterize hyperactivity; (2) the methods by which the disorder is diagnosed; ( 3 ) the theories of the etiology of the disorder; and (4) the methods used t o assess pharmacological treatment. Finally, we have presented an argument for the marriage of an individual-analysis approach with that of the traditional group design as a means of interpreting drug effect data for individual hyperactive children who may be categorized into a specific subgroup. Because children are labeled hyperactive for a variety of very complex reasons, attempts t o delineate and understand those reasons have generated much research activity. However, out of that activity has come much confusion about the trcatment of hyperactivity through pharmacological means, especially the research base which underlies that treatment. One indication of this confusion is evidenced by the variety of labels used t o describe the hyperactive child. Clements (1966) has identified no fewer than 38 different terms that refer t o the hyperactive disorder, but Cruickshank (1971) has placed the number at more than 40. Some of these terms are suggestive of neuropathology, while others refcr to the behavioral manifestations of the disorder, and still others focus on the intellectual concomitants of' hyperactivity. Despite the diversity of these labels, all appear t o be based on theories of the presumed etiology of the hyperactive disorder.

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Of the theories presently available t o account for the etiology of hyperactivity, those related to dysfunction within the brain and central nervous system have received the most research attention. Dysfunction within the diencephelon region of the reticular activating system as well as underarousal of the central nervous system are two theories which show some promise of elucidating the cause of the hyperactive disorder. Researchers are particularly interested in exploring these areas because of the evidence that stimulant drugs may exert their primary influence within the reticular activating system. There is also considerable evidence from stimulant drug therapy t o support the view that hyperactivity may be the result of attempts to gain sufficient stimulation by a child who is experiencing insufficient sensory stimulation due t o an abnormally low level of autonomic arousal. These theories have yet t o be substantiated, but future research endeavors should serve L O clarify this issue. This discussion of hyperactivity is by no means exhaustive but is intended to highlight some of the most pertinent questions surrounding the use of psychoactive drugs in the treatment and management of the hyperactive disorderespecially the research basis for drug trcatment. An argument has been made for increased, but not exclusive, use of an individual or single-subject approach in pediatric drug research, because the sole use of group-statistical research designs is less appropriate in certain expcrimcntal situations. However, a unification of the two approaches might well be a means of enhancing our knowledge of hyperactivity as well as of hci1it:iting its treatment in individual children. This dual analytic approach offers a viable alternative path for pediatric drug researchers t o take. REFERENCES Alexandris, A., & Lundell, F. W. Fffect of tldoridazine, amphetamine and placebo on the hyperkinetic syndrome and cognitive area in mentally deficient children. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 1968, 98, 92-96. American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. (2nd ed.) Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1968. Anton, A . H., & Creer, M. Dextroaniphetarnine, catecholamines, and behavior: The effect of dextroamphetamine in retarded children. Archives of Neurology, 1969, 21, 248-252. Bakwin, H., & Bakwin, R. M . Clinical rrianagernerzt of behavior disorders in children. Philadelphia: Saunders, 1966. Baxley, G . B., & LeBlanc, J. M. 1-ffccts o f psychotropic drugs on the short-term memory of mentally retarded children. Paper presented at the 82nd annual convention of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans, September 1974. Baxley, C . B., & Marks, L. A . Tlic ctl'ccts of rnethylphenidate on the acquisition of complex visual discrimination tasks in hyperactive children. Unpublished manuscript, University of Illinois, 1974. Bazell, R. J . Panel sanctions amphetamines for hyperkinetic children. Science, 1971, 171, 12-23. Becker, W. C., Englemann, S., & Thomas, D. R. Teaching: A course in applied psychology. Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1971.

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Becker, W. C., Madsen, C. H., Jr., Arnold, C. R., & Thomas, D. R. The contingent use of teacher attention and praise in reducing classroom behavior problems. Journal of Special Education, 1967, 1,287-307. Bell, R. Q. Adaptation of small wrist watches for mechanical recording of activity in infants and children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1968, 6, 302-305. Birch, H. The problem of “brain damage” in children. In H. Birch (Ed.), Brain damage in children: Biological and social aspects. Baltimore: Williams & Wikins, 1964. Boelsche, A. Early recognition of the child with minimal brain dysfunction. Post Graduate Medicine, 1965, 38, 321-326. Boren, J. J. The study of drugs with operant techniques. In W. K. Honig (Ed.), Operant behavior: Areas of research and application. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Bradley, C. The behavior of children receiving Benzedrine. American Journal of Psychiatry, 1937,94,577-585. Bradley, C. Characteristics and management of children with behavior problems associated with organic brain disease. Pediatric Clinics of North America, 1957, 4, 1049-1060. Brown, G. W. Food additives and hyperactivity. Journal of Learning Disab 62-63. Burks, H. F. The hyperkinetic child. Exceptional Children, 1960, 27, 18-26. Chess, S. Diagnosis and treatment of the hyperactive child. New York Journal o f Medicine, 1960,60, 2379-2385. Chess, S., Thomas, A., Rutter, M., & Birch, H. G. Interaction of temperament and environment in the production of behavioral disturbances in children. American Journal ofPsychiafry, 1963,120,142-148. Clements, S. D. Minimum brain dysfunction in children. NINDB Monograph No. 3. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966. Clements, S. D., & Peters, J. E. Minimal brain dysfunctions in the school-age child. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1962,6, 185-197. Cohen, N. J., Douglas, V. I., & Morgenstern, G. The effect of methylphenidate on attentive behavior and autonomic activity in hyperactive children. Psychopharmacologia, 1971, 22, 282-294. Comly, H. H. Clinical management of the hyperkinetic impulse disorder; etiology, diagnostic criteria: Comparison of dextroamphetamine and methylphenidate effects. Reprint of paper presented at a meeting of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, Los Angeles, March 1962. Conners, C. K. The syndrome of minimal brain dysfunction: Psychological aspects. Pediatric Clinics of North America, 1967, 14, 749-766. Conners, C. K . Drugs in the management of children with learning disabilities. In L. Tarnopol (Ed.), Learning disorders in children: Diagnosis, medication and education. Boston: Little, 1971. (a) Conners, C. K . The effect of stimulant drugs on human figure drawing in children with minimal brain dysfunction. Psychopharmacologia, 1971, 19, 329-333. (b) Conners, C. K. Behavior modification by drugs: 11. Psychological effects of stimulant drugs in children with minimal brain dysfunction. Pediatrics, 1972, 49, 702-708. (a) Conners, C. K . Pharmacotherapy of psychopathology in children. In H. C. Quay and J. S. Werry (Eds.), Psychopathological disorders o f children. New York: Wiley, 1972. (b) Conners, C. K., & Eisenberg, L. The effects of methylphenidate on symptoniatology and learning in disturbed children. American Journal of Psychiatry, 1963, 120, 458-464. Conners, C. K., Eisenberg, L., & Barcai, A. Effects of dextroamphetamine on children: Studies on subjects with learning disabilities and school behavior problems. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1967, 17,478-485.

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Conners, C. K., Eisenberg, L., & Shape, L. Effects of methylphenidate (Ritalin) on paired-associate learning and Porteus maze performance in emotionally disturbed children. Journal of Consulting Psychiatry, 1964,28, 14-22. Conners, C, K., & Rothschild, G. H . Drugs and learning in children. In J. Hellmuth (Ed.), Learning disorders. Vol. 3. Seattle: Special Child Publications, 1968. Conners, C. K., Rothschild, G., Eisenberg, L., Schwartz, L. S., & Robinson, E. Dextroamphetamine sulfate in children with learning disorders. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1969,21,182-190. Conners, C. K., Taylor, E., Meo, G., Kurtz, M . A., & Fournier, M. Magnesium pemoline and dextroamphetamine: A controlled study in children with minimal brain dysfunction. Psychopharmacologia, 1972,26, 32 1-336. Creager, R. D., & Van Riper, C. The effects of methylphenidate on the verbal productivity of children with cerebral dysfunction. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 1967, 10,623-628. Crook, W. G. An alternative method of managing the hyperactive child. Letters to the Editor. Pediatrics, 1974, 53, 656. Cruickshank, W. M. (Ed.) Psychology of exceptional children and youth. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971. Denhoff, E. Emotional and psychological background of the neurologically handicapped child. Exceptional Children, 1961,21, 347-349. Denhoff, E., & Novack, H. S. Syndromes of cerebral dysfunction: Medical aspects that contribute t o special education methods. In N. G. Haring and R. L. Schiefelbusch (Eds.), Methods in special education. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. Doubros, S. G., & Daniels, G. J . An experimental approach to the reduction of overactive behavior. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 1966, 4, 251-258. Eisenberg, L. Psychiatric implications of brain damage in children. Psychiatric Quarterly, 1957, 31,72-92. Ellis, N. R., & Pryer, R. S. Quantification of gross bodily activity in children with severe neuropathology. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1959,63, 1034-1037. Epstein, L. C., Lasagna, L., Conners, C. K., & Rodriguez, A. Correlation of dextroamphetamine excretion and drug response in hyperkinetic children. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders, 1968, 146, 136-146. Estes, W. K. The problem of inference from curves based on group data. Psychological Bulletin, 1956, 53, 134-140. Eveloff, H. H. Pediatric psychopharmacology. In W. G. Clark and J. Del Giudice (Eds.), Principles of psychopharmacology. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Feingold, B. F. Why your child is hyperactive. New York: Random House, 1974. Finnerty, R. J., Soltys, J. J . , & Cole, J. 0. The use of d-amphetamine with hyperkinetic children. Psychopharrnacologia, 1971, 21, 302-308. Freeman, R. D. Drug effects on learning in children: A selective review of the past thirty years. Journal of Special Education, 1966, 1, 17-43. Freibergs, V., Douglas, V. I., & Weiss, G. The effect of chlorpromazine on concept learning in hyperactive children under two conditions of reinforcement. Psychopharrnacologia, 1968,13,299-310. Grant, Q. R. Psychopharmacology in childhood emotional and mental disorders. Journal of Pediatrics, 1962, 6 1 , 6 2 6 4 3 7 . Greenhouse, S . W., & Geisser, S. On methods in the analysis of profile data. Psychometrika, 1959,24,95-112. Grinspoon, L., & Singer, S. B. Amphetamines in the treatment of hyperkinetic children. Harvard Educational Review, 1973, 43, 5 15-555.

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Hertzig, M. E., Bortner, M., & Birch, H. G. Neurologic findings in children educationally designated as “brain-damaged.” Ainerican Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1969, 39, 437446. Hutt, C., Hutt, S. J., & Ounsted, C. A method for the study of children’s behavior. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology, 1963, 5, 233-245. Knights, R. M., & Hinton, G. G. The effects of methylphenidate (Ritalin) on the motor skills and behavior of children with learning problems. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders, 1969, 128, 6 4 3 4 5 3 . Knobel, M. Psychopharmacology for the hyperkinetic child. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1962,6,198-202. Knobel, M., & Lytton. G. J. Stimulants in psychiatric disorders of children. Abstract, Kansas City Mental Health Foundation, 2200 McCoy Street, Kansas City, Missouri, 1961. Kmger, J. M., & Safer, D. J. Type and prevalence of medication used in the treatment of hyperactive children. New England Journal of Medicine, 1974, 291, 11 18-1 120. Laufer, M. W., & Denhoff, E. Hyperkinetic behavior syndrome in children. Journal of Pediatrics, 1957, 5 0 , 4 6 3 4 7 4 . Laufer, M. W., Denhoff, E., & Solomons, G. Hyperkinetic impulse disorder in children’s behavior problems. Psychosomatic Medicine, 1957, 19, 38-49. Lee, D., & Hutt, C. A play-room designed for filming children: A note. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 1964, 5, 263-265. Lindsley, D. B., & Henry, C. E. The effect of drugs on behavior and the clectroencephalograms of children with behavior disorder. Ps.vchosomatic Medicine, 1942, 4, 140-149. Lytton, G. J . , & Knobel, M. Diagnosis and treatment of bchavior disorders in children. Diseases of the Nervous System, 1959, 20, 334-340. Martin, D. M. Hyperkinetic bchavior disorders in children: Clinical results with nietliylphenidate hydrochloride (Ritalin). Western Medicine, 1967, 8 , 23-27. McFarland, J. N., Peacock, L. J., &Watson, J. A. Mental retardation and activity level in rats and children. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1966, 71, 381-386. Menkes, M. M., Rose, J. S., & Menkes, J. H. A twenty-five year follow-up study on the hyperkinetic child with minimal brain dysfunction. Pediatrics, 1967, 39(3), 393-399. Millichap, J. G. Drugs in management of hyperkinetic and perceptually handicapped children. Journal of the American Medical Association, 1968, 206, 1527-1530. .Millichap, J. G. Drugs in management of minimal brain dysfunction. Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 1973, 205, 321-334. Mithhdp, J. G., Aymdt, F., Sturgis, L. H., Larsen, K. W., & Egan, R. A. Hyperkinetic behavior and learning disorders. American Journal of Diseases of Childhood. 1968, 116, 2 35-244. Millichap, J . G., & Boldrey, E. E. Studies in hyperkinetic behavior: 11. Laboratory and clinical evaluations of drug treatments. Neurology, 1967, 17, 4 6 7 4 7 1 . Millichap, J . G., & Fowler, G. W. Treatment of “minimal brain dysfunction” syndromes. Pediatric Clinics o f N o r t h America, 1967, 14, 161-771. Minde, K., & Webb, G. Studies o n the hyperactive child: Vl. Prenatal and paranatal factors associated with hyperactivity. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology, 1968, 10, 355-363. Molitch, M., & Eccles, A. The effect of Benzedrine Sulfate o n the intelligence scores of children. American Journal of Psychiatry, 1937, 94, 587-590. Nichamin, S. J., & Barahal, G. D. Faulty neurologic integration with perceptual disorders in children. Michigan Medicine, 1968, 67, 1071-1075. Paine, R. S. Syndromes of “minimal cerebral damage.” Pediatric Clinics of North America, 1968,15, 779-801.

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Paine, R. S., Werry, J. S., & Quay, H . C . A study of “minimal cerebral dysfunction.” Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology, 1968, 10, 505-520. Pasamanick, B., Rogers, M., & Lilienteld, A. M. Pregnancy experience and the development Journal of Psychiatry, 1956, 112, 613-61 8. of behavior disorder in children. ,~ltneric~arz Patterson, G. R., Jones, R., Whittier, J., & Wright, M. A. A behavior modification technique for the hyperactive child. Behavioitr Research and Therapy, 1965, 2, 21 7-226. Peterson, D. R. Behavior problems o f middle childhood. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 1961,25, 205-209. Porges, S. W., Walter, G. F., Korb, R. J., & Spraguc, R. L. The influences of methylphenidate on heart rate and behavioral measures of attention in hyperactive children. Child Development, 1975, 46, 727-7 33. Rickels, K., Lipman, R . S., I’islit.r, S . , Park, L. C., & Uhlenhutli, E. H . Is a double-blind clinical trial really double-blind’! A report of doctor’s medication guesses. Psychopharmacologia, 1970,16, 329-336. Rodin, E., Lucas, A , , & Simson, C. A study of behavior disorders in children by means of general purpose computers. Proceedings of the conference on data acquisition and processing in biological medicitie. Oxford: Pergamon, 1963. Sainz, A . Hyperkinetic disease of children: Diagnosis and therapy. Diseases of the Nervous System, 1966, 21,48-50. Satterfield, J. H. EEG issues i n L,liildren with minimal brain dysfunction. Seminar in Psychiatry, 1973, 5, 35-46. Satterfield, J. H., Cantwell, D. P., Lesser, L. I . , & Podosin, R. D. Physiological studies of the hyperkinetic child: I . American Journal ofPsvchiatry, 1972, 128, 102-108. Satterfield, J. H., Cantwell, D. P., & Satterfield, B . T. Pathophysiology of the hyperactive child syndrome. Archives of (;enera/ Psychiatry, 1974, 31, 839-844. Satterfield, J. H., Cantwell, D. I)., Saul, R . E., & Lesser, L. I. Response to stimulant drug treatment in hyperactive children: Prediction from EEG and neurological findings. Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia, 1973, 3, 36-48. Satterfield, J. H., & Dawson, M. I . 13ectrodermal correlates of hyperactivity in children. Psychophysiology, 197 1 , 8, I 9 1-1 97. Schulman, J. L., Kaspar, J . C., & Throne, J. M. Brain damage and behavior: A clinical-experimental study. Springfield, 111.: Thomas, 1965. Schulman, J. L., & Reisman, J. M . A n objective measure of hyperactivity. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1959, 6 4 , 4 5 5 4 5 6 . Shannon, W. R. Neuropathic manifestations in infants and children as a result of anaphylactic reactions t o foods contained in their dietary. American Journal of Diseases of Childhood, 1922, 24, 89. Sidman, M . A note on functional relations obtained from group data. Psychological Bulletin, 1952,49, 263-269. Sidman, M . Tactics of scientific research. New York: Basic Books, 1960. Silbergeld, E. K., & Goldbcrg, A . M. Lead-induced behavioral dysfunction: An animal model of hyperactivity. Experimental Neurology, 1974, 42, 146-157. Solomons, G. The hyperactive child. .Journal o f Iowa Medical Society, 1965, 55, 464-469. Sprague, R. L., Barnes, K. R., & Werry, J. S. Methylphenidate and thioridazine: Learning, reaction time, activity, and classroom behavior in disturbed children. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1970,40,615-628. Sprague, R. L., & Toppe, L. K . Relationship between activity level and delay of reinforcement. Journal of Experimental Child l’.qdiology, 1966, 3, 390-397. Sprague, R. L., & Werry, J . Methodology of psychopharmacological studies with the retarded. In N. R. Ellis ( .), International review of research in mental retardation. Vol. 5 . New York: Academic Press, 1971.

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Sprague, K. L., Werry, J. S., & Davis, K. Psychotropic drug effects o n learning and activity level of children. Paper presented at the Gatlinburg Conference o n Research and Theory in Mental Retardation, March 1969. Sprague, R. L., Werry, J. S., & Scott, K. G. Effects of dextroamphetamine on activity level and learning in retarded children. Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, May 1967. Stevens, J. R., Sachdev, K., & Milstein, V. Behavior disorders of childhood and the EEG. Archives o f Neurology, 1968, 18, 160-177. Stewart, M. A. Hyperactive child syndrome recognized 100 years ago. Journal of the American Medical Association, 1967, 202, 28-29. Stewart, M. A., Pitts, F., Craig, A., & Dieruf, W. The hyperactive child syndrome. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1966, 36,861-867. Sykes, D. H., Douglas, V. I., & Morgenstern, G. The effect of methylphenidate (Ritalin) o n sustained attention in hyperactive children. Psychopharmucologia, 1972, 25, 262-274. Sykes, D. H., Douglas, V. I., Weiss, C., & Minde, K. K. Attention in hyperactive children and the effect of methylphenidate (Ritalin). Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 1971, 12, 129-139. US. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Report of the conference on the use of stimulant drugs in the treatment of behaviorally disturbed young school children. HEW News, 1971, March 10. Warren, R. J., Karduck, W. A., Bussaratid, S., Stewart, M. A,, & Sly, W. S. The hyperactive child syndrome. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1971,24, 161-162. Weiss, G., Werry, J. S., Minde, K., Douglas, V. I., & Sykes, D. Studies on the hyperactive child: V. The effects of dextroamphetamine and chlorpromazine o n behavior and intellectual functioning. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 1968, 9, 145-156. Wender, P. H. Minimal brain dysfunction in children. New York: Wiley (Interscience), 1971. Werry, J . S. Developmental hyperactivity. Pediatric Clinics of North America, 1968, 15, 581-599. (a) Werry, J . S. Studies of the hyperactive child: IV. An empirical analysis of the minimal brain dysfunction syndrome. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1968, 19,9-16. (b) Werry, J. S. The diagnosis, etiology, and treatment of hyperactivity in children. In J. Hellmuth (Ed.), Learning disorders. Vol. 3. Seattle: Special Child Publications, 1968. (c) Werry, J. S., & Quay, H. C. Observing the classroom behavior of elementary school children. Exceptional Children, 1969, 35,461-472. Werry, J . S., & Sprague, R. L. Hyperactivity. In C. G. Costello (Ed.), Symptoms of psychopathology. New York: Wiley, 1970. Werry, J. S., Weiss, G., & Douglas, V. I. Studies o n the hyperactive child: I. Some preliminary findings. Conadian Psychiatric Association Journal, 1964,9, 120-1 30. Werry, J. S., Weiss, G., Douglas, V. I., & Martin, J. Studies on the hyperactive child: 111. The effect of chlorpromazine upon behavior and learning. American Academy of Child Psychiatry Journal, 1966,5,292-312. Winer, B. J. Statistical principles in experimental design. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962. Winsberg, B. G., Bisler, I., Kupietz, S., & Tobias, J. Effects of imipramine and dextroamphetamine on behavior of neuropsychiatrically impaired children. American Journal of Psychiatry, 1972, 128, 1425-1431. Zentall. S. Optimal stimulation as theoretical basis of hyperactivity. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1975,45, 549-563.

PERIPHERAL AND NEUROCHEMICAL PARALLELS OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: A PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL MODEL RELATING AUTONOMIC IMBALANCE TO HYPERACTIVITY. PSYCHOPATHY. AND AUTISM

Stephen W . Porges U N I V E R S I T Y OF ILLINOIS

I . OVERVIEW

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I1. HYPERACTIVITY

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I l l . PSYCHOPATHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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IV . RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL AUTONOMIC ACTIVITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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V . STATISTICAL MODEL OF AUTONOMIC BALANCE . . . . . . . . . A . PHYSIOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. STATISTICAL TECIINIQUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C . TEST O F MODEL W I T H HYPERACTIVE CHILDREN . . . . . .

43 43 44 45

VI . AUTONOMIC RESPONSES AND ATTENTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A . TWO-COMPONENT MODEL O F ATTENTION . . . . . . . . . . . . B. RELATION BETWEEN TIlE TWO-COMPONENT MODEL AND AUTONOMIC AND NEUROTRANSMITTER ACTIVITY

47 50

VII . AUTISM

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VIII . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Stephen W.Porges

1. Overview The balance between the antagonistic components of the autonomic nervous system has been of interest for many years. Many theories have evolved which implicate autonomic balance with behavioral and psychological pathologies. Eppinger and Hess (1 9 1 5) theorized that specific nervous disorders may be associated with pathological autonomic balance and that autonomic balance may b e controlled by the central nervous system. Thus, speculating that the pathologies of autonomic balance were merely reflections of pathologies in the central nervous system, Eppinger and Hess used primitive pharmacological tests with vagotropic and sympathicotropic substances as a basis for their diagnostic procedures and as support for their theory. Subsequent tests of the theory produced inconsistent results. Wilder (1931), attempting t o implicate autonomic balance as an indicator of autonomic responses, formulated the Law of Initial Values, which drew attention to the importance of the state of the autonomic nervous system prior t o stimulus manipulations. The ‘‘law’’ has never been adequately applied t o psychophysiological research, since it requires the assumption of a linear regression between base-level activity and response direction and magnitude. Autonomic response systems are seldom determined solely by either sympathetic or parasympathetic influences but often by a relationship between these two antagonistic systems, and therefore a linear additive model may not be appropriate. Wenger (1941) utilized factor-analytic procedures t o assess autonomic balance. This approach is important in psychophysiological research, where multiple measures of the autonomic nervous system are taken and where correlations among variables are often low. Wenger modified and extended the Eppinger and Hess hypothesis of autonomic balance. The restated hypothesis consisted of two parts: (1) either phasic or chronic predominance of the adrenergic (sympathetic) or cholinergic (parasympathetic) branches of the autonomic nervous system may create a state of autonomic imbalance; (2) the relationship between adrenergic and cholinergc branches of the autonomic nervous system is distributed continuously about a central tendency which operationally defines autonomic balance. Research on autonomic balance has not been extremely fruitful, partly because the techniques developed to assess autonomic balance have been inadequate. However, the concept of autonomic balance is still theoretically associated with behavioral disorders characterized by defective attention. The balance in the autonomic nervous system has been theorized t o parallel the balance between the catecholaminergic and cholinergic neurotransmitter systems in the brain (Anisman, 1975; Broverman, Klaiber, Vogel, & Kobayashi, 1974: Gellhorn, 1957). Thus, the excitatory activity of the catecholamines may be “reflected” in the sympathetic nervous system and the inhibitory activity of central acetylcholine may be “reflected” in the parasympathetic nervous system.

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There appear t o be behavioral parallels of autonomic imbalance. For example, many psychopathologies that have as a defining characteristic an attentional or response deficit are associated with atypical autonomic nervous system activity. This chapter covers three of these psychopathologies: hyperactivity, psychopathy, and early infantile autism. Hyperactivity and psychopathy are discussed as examples of behavioral pathologies that may be theoretically explained in terms of autonomic imbalance. Early infantile autism is discussed after prcsentation of a statistical model of autonomic balance and a model of attention which links autonomic response to neurotransmitter activity. The models are used to predict an underlying physiological substrate of autism, and the predictions are evaluated against the available psychophysiological and biochemical research.

11. Hyperactivity Hyperactivity is a generalixd symptom which has been used to categorize a population of individuals who exhibit a lack of control of spontaneous activity. A diagnosis of hyperactivity is often associated with abnormally high levels of motor activity, short attention span, low frustration tolerance, hyperexcitability, and an inability to control itnpulses (Clements & Peters, 1962; Douglas, 1972; Laufer & Denhoff, 1957; Millichap & Fowler, 1967). Several physiological models have been proposed to explain hyperactivity. The high activity level has been interpreted as a parallel of an overaroused or highly aroused central nervous system (Freibergs & Douglas, 1969; Laufer, Denhoff, & Solomons, 1957), as a compensatory behavior to raise the arousal of a suboptimally aroused individual via an increase in proprioceptive sensory input (Satterfield & Dawson, 197 I : Stewart. 1970; Werry, Sprague, Weiss, & Minde, 1970), or as a correlate of defective cortical inhibitory mechanisms (Dykman, Ackerman, Clements, & Peters, 197 1 ). In a recent study, Porges, Walter, Korb, and Sprague (1975) demonstrated that hyperactive children who exhibited attentional deficits, defined b y long response latencies, also had heart-rate responses that were theoretically incompatible with sustained attention. Heart-rate responses theoretically associated with sustained attention are characterized by parasympathetic influences on autonomic activity (reduced heart rate and reduced heart -rate variability). When methylphenidate was administered, reaction-time performance improved, heart rate changed from acceleration t o deceleration, and heart-rate variability changed from increases t o decreases. The foregoing research summary might suggest that the hyperactive child is deficient in levels of parasympathetic activity and is dominated by activity of the sympathetic system. Centrally. the neurochemical balance might reflect high catecholaminergic levels and low cholinergic levels. Anisnian (1 975) suggested this pattern and discussed the S U C C ~ S So f sympathomimetic drugs in treating

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Stephen bf, Porges

behavioral hyperactivity. He suggested that these catecholnminergic agonists elicit a cholinergic rebound which may facilitate mediated inhibitory behaviors. Unpublished research in our laboratory has produced strong evidence that the vagally mediated relationship between heart rate and respiration (a measure of parasympathetic influence) increases in the hyperactive child when low doses of methylphenidate (a sympathomimetic drug) are administered. Moreover, the component of lieart-rate activity that is not vagally mediated (i.e., is sympathetically controlled) decreases with methylphenidate. This pattern of results suggests that the hypotheses relating sympathetic dominance to hyperactivity may be accurate and that, when the autonomic balance shifts from sympathetic t o parasympathetic, behavior becomes more nearly normal.

111. Psychopathy Although the term “psychopath” is often equated with criminal or asocial behavior, a number of behavioral characteristics define this psychopathology (Clcckley, 1955). It is generally believed that the psychopath does not exhibit signs of psychosis, does not hallucinate, and does not have delusions. The psychopath is often charming and intelligent, yet he violates laws even though he has been previously punished for these same behaviors. He often denies blame for misdeeds and frequently lies and cheats. Of importance in defining the psychopath is his resistance t o social conditioning; social reinforcers seem t o be ineffective. Moreover, he is relatively free from anxiety. Quay (1965) proposed a “stimulus-seeking” theory of psychopathic behavior. I n this theory, the psychopath seeks stimulation or increased stimulus input because he finds himself in a state similar t o stimulus deprivation. Quay (1976) speculated that the psychopath exhibits an autonomic dysfunction which may be characterized by low reactivity. This dysfunction would suggest that the psychopath is parasympathetically dominant and exhibits low levels of Sympathetic activity. In support of this hypothesis, Wheeler (1974) hypothesized that the adrenergic-cholinergic balance of the psychopath’s autonomic nervous system is in the direction of cholinergic dominance. Wheeler reported behavioral data supporting this hypothesis. He demonstrated that psychopaths perform poorly on automatization tasks and well on restructuring tasks. Automatization tasks are simple repetitive tasks; restructuring tasks require restructuring of obvious percepts in order to identify some hidden, less obvious stimulus relationship. These types of tasks, according t o Broverman, Klaiber, Kobayashi, and Vogel (1968), are not only associated with individual differences in cognitive styles, but are also indicators of underlying physiological and biochemical differences. Strong automatization is related t o a dominance of central autonomic nervous system adrenergic functioning, and weak automatiza-

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39

tion coupled with strong restructuring performance is related t o a dominance of central autonomic nervous system cholinergic functioning. Thus, Wheeler’s behavioral data may be used, according t o Broverman et al. (1968), as support for the hypothesis that psychopaths exhibit cholinergic dominance in the peripheral and central autonomic nervous system. Other investigators have reported reduced sympathetic activity in the psychopathy. Lykken (1957) reported that “primary” sociopaths exhibit both reduced amplitude and conditionability of the galvanic skin reflex (CSR). Lippert and Senter (1966) reported that psychopaths exhibit a lower frequency of spontaneous GSRs during rest, smaller increases over trials, decreases below resting level following the experimental manipulation, and more rapid habituation to repeated stimulation. Two behavioral characteristics have been associated with the psychopath: (a) limited reactivity t o environmental stimuli, and (b) an inability t o learn social contingencies, especially avoidance learning. It is possible that these two characteristics have a common mechanism which is related to autonomic imbalance. The limited reactivity of the psychopath may be postulated t o parallel attenuated sympathetic nervous system and central catecholaminergic activities, since these systems have been implicated in excitatory behavior. To explain the poor performance in avoidance learning, a general model relating the neurotransmitters of the central autonomic nervous system t o behavior has been postulated by Anisman (1975). According t o Anisman, when an aversive stimulus is presented, there is, in normal individuals, a catecholamine reaction which should facilitate avoidance behavior. This biochemical shift elicits a cholinergic rebound resulting in the behavioral inhibition associated with poor avoidance performance. Applying this model t o the psychopath, it is possible to speculate that individuals who are deficient in catecholaminergic activity or who have dominant cholinergic systems will perform inadequately on avoidance learning tasks. Thus, the psychopath who is hypothesized to have a less reactive catecholaminergic system and a dominant cholinergic system would be expected to exhibit attenuated responses t o external stimulation and poor avoidance behavior. Another characteristic of the psychopath is a limited ability t o express affect. Is it possible that this affective “flatness” is related to a dysfunction in autonomic or central (adrenergic-cholinergic) balance? Again, it is first necessary t o describe a relationship between adrenergic-cholinergic balance and emotion in a normal individual and then t o project this model to the psychopath. Solomon and Corbit (1974) have generated a model of emotional behavior which assumes that specific systems in the brain “suppress or reduce all excursions from hedonic neutrality” (p. 143). These systems attempt to maintain an emotional homeostasis when the organism is confronted with situations that are appetitive or aversive. The systems operate t o decrease the intensity of the subjective

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Stephen W.Porges

“liedonic quality” (i.e., emotion, affect, arousal) of the objective reinforcing properties of stimuli. The systems are automatic and are activated when there is a significant departure from “affective equilibrium” as a consequence of stimulation. Solomon and Corbit postulated an “opponent-process” which is precipitated by and is opposed to the stimulus-aroused affective state. They presented heart-rate conditioning data which suggest that the “opponent-process” is associated with vagal activity (parasympathetic/cholinergic) while tlie stimulus-aroused state is associated with vagal inhibition or generalized increased sympathetic activity. There is a similarity between the models proposed by Anisinan (1975) and b y Solomon and Corbit (1974). According to Anisman, the cholinergic system acts in response to the stimulus-aroused catecholaminergic state. Moreover, the cholinergic rebound is more sluggish and longer lasting. I n concordance with the above statements, Solomon and Corbit’s “Opponeiit-process” may parallel parasympathetic/cholinergic influences, whereas the “stimulus-aroused affective state” may parallel sympatlietic/catecholaniinergic influences. If the psychopath actually exhibits an autonomic imbalance characterized b y parasympathetic dominance and attenuated sympathetic activity, one would expect the psychopath to exhibit a resident or tonic “opponent-process” that would negate or reduce the affective response to ariy stimulus situation. Thus, the psychopath would behave as if lie were not affected by emotional events, whether pleasant or unpleasant.

IV. Relationship between Central and Peripheral Autonomic Activity Gellhorn (1957) demonstrated that not only does a balance exist between the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems, but also excitation of one system might result in the activation of the complementary system. Specifically, the parasympathetic reaction could be directly related to tlie iiiagnitude (intensity, frequency, or duration) of the preceding sympathetic stimulation. The function of this “principle of reciprocity” is t o maintain neurochemical homeostasis between the antagonistic portions of the autonomic nervous system. Moreover, the rebound presumably is mediated by the baroreceptors of the carotid sinus and aortic arch, since transection of nerves connecting the baroreceptors with the medulla prevents the occurrence of rebound effects. Recently, it has been observed that sympathetic excitation may result in a central cholinergic rebound similar to that stipulated by Gellhorn regarding parasympathetic activity. In addition, the balance resulting from the central innervation may modulate behaviors such as general activity and avoidance

Peripheral Parallels v f Psychopathology

41

behavior. Manto (1967) observed that 1 hour after injection of epinephrine (a peripheral sympathominietic drug), there was a decline in general activity. The decline in activity was reversed with scopolamine (an anticholiriergic drug with central sites of action) but not by the peripheral analog methylscopolamine (a parasympathetic blocker). This finding suggests that peripheral adrenergic stiniulation niay result in an inhibitory central cholinergic rebound and that the parasympathetic dominance that s e e m to exist following intense sympathetic activity can be attributed to a central rather than a peripheral process. Another neurotransmitter, serotonin, has been implicated in the mediation of behavior. Williams, Hamilton, and Carlton (1974) presented data which suggest that two different categories of behavior, reflexive and voluntary, may be pharmacologically extracted from a coninion habituation task. Specifically, they found that the norrnally observed decrenient of tlie reflexive response to the change in stimulation was relatively unaffected by an anticholinergic drug, scopolamine, while the decrement in voluntary exploratory behavior was profoundly attenuated. In contrast, when para-cliloroplienylalanine (PCPA), an antiserotonergic drug, was administercd, the decrement of the reflexive response was attentuated and the decrement in voluntary exploratory behavior was unaffected. These data suggest that the habituation of reflexive exploratory behavior was unaffected; they also suggest that tlie habituation of reflexive behaviors is mediated by serotoninergic systems and that the habituation of voluntary behaviors is mediated by cholinergic svstenis. Moreover, lesions to the medial septum, which contains areas sensitive t o both serotonin and acetylcholine, attenuated both reflexive and exploratory decrements (Williams et aL, 1974). These lesions may have disrupted the activities of both serotonin and acetylcholine. In developing models o f the relative influences of serotonergic and cholinergic systems on behavior, it is clear that both systems are inhibitoryserotonergic systems inhibiting reflexive behaviors, and cholinergic systems inhibiting voluntary or operant bcliaviors. However, it is very difficult to assess their independent effects on behavior, since most behaviors are complex and contain both reflexive and voluntary components (Swonger & Rech, 1972). Phylogenetically and ontogenetically, one niay observe the sequential development of three neurotransmitter systems: catecholaminergic, serotonergic, and cholinergic. Anatornically, the distribution of these neurotransmitters may reflect the evolution of these self-regulatory systems from the brainstem (exhibiting a high density of catecliolaniiiiergic areas) to the midbrain (exhibiting a high density of serotonergic areas), and then to the forebrain (exhibiting a high density of cholinergic areas). The distribution of the neurotransmitters in the brain is very complicated, and there is evidence of abundant interactions and overlapping distributions among tlicse systems. A simplistic view of their influences is presented in Table I.

Stephen W.Porges

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TABLE 1 Autonomic and Behavioral Parallels of Neurotransmitter Activity

Neurotransmitters

Influences o n behavior

Peripheral autonomic activity

Increases in general activity

Sympathetic responses

Serotonin

Decreases amplitude of reflexive behavior

Attentuation of sympathetic and parasympathetic reflexive responses

Acetylcholine

Inhibits spontaneous activity and is associated with voluntary behavior

Parasympathetic responses

Catecholamines

(epinephrine; norepinephrine; dopamine)

Earlier in this chapter we discussed the relationship between two behavioral disorders, hyperactivity and psychopathy, and autonomic imbalance. The autonomic imbalance hypothetically parallels an imbalance in the neurotransmitter systems. Thus, it might be predicted that the hyperactive individual would exhibit high levels of catecholaminergic activity relative to cholinergic activity and that the psychopath would exhibit the converse. Davis, Janowsky, ElYousef, and Sekerke (1973) have also speculated that mental health may be a function of a balance between these neurotransmitter systems. They believe that “it is reasonable t o consider that there may be a dimension in men which goes from an excited-activated-euphoric state t o an inhibited-retarded-depressed state, and that these behavioral states may have as their basis, a balance between adrenergic and cholinergic factors” (p. 680). Behavioral conditions, often observed in children suffering from defective attention, are states of hyperreactivity and hypoactivity. Hyperreactivity might be associated with deficient serotonergic systems which function t o inhibit reflexive responses to changes in stimulation. Hypoactivity might be associated with weak catecholaminergic systems, as in the psychopath. The behavioral consequence of weak catecholaminergic activity may be partially a function of high cholinergic levels which tend to inhibit catecholaminergic activity. Low levels of activity in both the catecholaminergic and cholinergic systems might result in lethargic behavior and a lack of structured cognitive activity. Retarded children exhibited low levels of autonomic activity in both sympathetic and

Peripheral Parallels oJPs.vchopatholog),

43

parasympathetic systems in a preliminary study conducted recently by the writer, suggesting low levels of b o t h catecholaniinergic and cholinergic activity. Low levels of catecholaniinergic activity might result in a compensatory behavior of stimulus seeking (proposed by Quay for the psychopath), whereas normal or high levels of cholinergic activity should be associated with proficient performance on complicated mediated cognitive tasks (Brovernian et al., 1968). The physiological relationship between central cholinergic-catecholaminergic balance and autonomic parasynipathetic-sympathetic balance is quite strong, as shown by the following points: ( I ) the transniitters in the two antagonistic peripheral systems biochemically parallel the central neurotransmitters; and (2) changes in the levels and actions of the central neurotransmitters are reflected in parallel changes in activity in the peripheral autonomic nervous system. Pharmacological interventions which directly affect central neurotransmitter activity also influence the peripheral autonomic nervous system. Pharmacological interventions which affect only peripheral autonomic activity have only slight influences on central neurotransmitter activity. This relationship suggests that although the autonomic nervous systeni may afford a noninvasive opportunity to monitor the balance of central catecliolaminergic and cholinergic systems, its direct influence on central nervous system activity-and b y inference, behavioris not great. Thus, the clear demonstration that sympathetic and parasynipathetic responses are spontaneously mediated centrally b y the central neurotransmitter systems enables psycliophysiologists t o utilize measures of autonomic balance as viable elements for understanding behavior.

V. Statistical Model of Autonomic Balance Recently, the author devised a simple noninvasive technique to assess autonomic balance b y measuring respiration and heart rate. 'The technique is extremely simple, although the statistical and physiological assumptions are extremely complicated. A . PHYSIOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS

Autonomic balance may be assessed by investigating the rhythm of the heart, since that rhythm ( R H )is deternnned by three causes: influence of the sympathetic nervous system (S); influence of the parasympathetic nervous system (P); and effects intrinsic t o the heart ( I ) . This relation may be expressed as:

44

Stephen W.Porges

If we assume that the intrinsic component is determined solely by individual differences in heart tissue independent of autonomic influences, the parameters of the intrinsic influence should be randomly distributed relative to the autonomic influences. Thus, the mean of any subpopulation selected by sympathetic nervous system or parasympathetic nervous system levels should result in the following function (K is a constant):

since

Z(Q=K

(3)

when I is random relative t o the fluctuations in the sympathetic nervous system and the parasympathetic nervous system. Given the relationship in Eq. 2, the problem is to partition the relative contributions of the parasympathetic nervous system and the sympathetic nervous system. Since the respiratory influences on heart-rate activity are mediated by the parasympathetic nervous system via the vagus (Chess, Tam, & Calaresu, 1975; Clynes, 1960; Eckoldt & Schubert, 1975; Katona & Jih, 1975; Levy, DeCeest, & Zieske, 1966), it might be possible t o assess the relative parasympathetic nervous system and sympathetic nervous system influences on heart-rate activity by quantifying the respiratory influence on heart rate. Chess et al. have demonstrated through pharmacological and surgical procedures with an animal preparation that the respiratory influences on heart-rate activity are vagally mediated and that the remaining heart-rate activity is primarily sympathetically mediated. Thus, the assessment of respiratory influences on the spontaneous pattern of heart rate may be used as a noninvasive measure of parasympathetic influences. B. STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES

Spectral analysis (a time-series statistical procedure; see, e.g., Box & Jenkins, 1970) may be used to detect rhythmic variations in a record of physiological events by decomposing the record into a series of sinusoidal functions of different frequencies. Frequency in time-series statistics refers to the duration of each sinusoidal function transformed in terms of the proportion of the function occurring within 1 second. Thus, an event (pattern of increases and decreases in heart rate or respiration amplitude) which could be described by a sine wave with a 5-second duration has a frequency of .2 Hz, since one-fifth of the function would occur within 1 second. The spectral-density function describes (with regard to frequency) t!ie distribution of physiological events.

Peripheral Parallels of Psychopathology

45

When two variables such as heart rate and respiration are simultaneously recorded, cross-spectral analysis may be used t o investigate whether frequency components in the two variables are related. The cross-spectral estimate displays peaks corresponding to the frequencies of coincident peaks in the individual spectral estimates, and their amplitudes are related t o the product of the amplitudes of the individual peaks. The measure emphasized in the present paper is called coherence and is related t o the influence of any observed rhythm in one variable on an observed rhythm in the second. Coherence is a normalized function with values between 0 and 1 . The coherence function is analogous t o a correlation coefficient defined at each frequency in the spectrum. The writer has developed a modification of the coherence measure which is weighted as a function of the actual heart-rate activity occurring at the specific frequencies associated with respiration. This weighted coherence measure identifies the percentage of heart-rate activity shared with respiration. The percentage is then used as an estimate of autonomic balance. The following equation is used t o define C,,, , the weighted coherence measure:

where coherence squared (C’) is the shared variance of heart rate and respiration and FH is the power density of heart rate (a measure of variance) at each frequency (A) at which respiration normally occurs (.2 to .5 Hz or 12 to 30 times a minute). The product of these values is summed over the dominant frequencies of respiration. The natural logarithm of the numerator, which represents the variance of heart rate shared with respiration, is operationally defined as the parasympathetic component. The denominator minus the numerator represents the variance of heart rate not accounted for by respiration, and the natural logarithm of this difference is operationally defined as the sympathetic component. C. TEST OF MODFL WIT11 t!YPERACTIVE CHILDREN

To test the proposed method of assessing autonomic balance and the model relating autonomic balance to behavioral psychopathology, a sample of children diagnosed as hyperactive was studied. To assess autonomic balance, spontaneous heart rate and respiration were recorded before and after a task demanding attention. Earlier, in the discussion of hyperactivity (Section In), it was postulated that if behavioral pathology is related t o autonomic balance, the hyperactive child might exhibit a balance reflecting sympathetic dominance. When heart-rate responses during attention were assessed in an earlier study with hyperactive children (Porges rt ul., 19751, the assumed parasympathetic response

46

Stephen Ct’. Porges

components associated with decreased heart rate and reduced heart-rate variability were observable only with the pharmacological intervcntion of niethylphenidate administration. The next study was addressed to the question of whether autonomic balance assessed by an estimate of weighted coherence (Eq. 4) would reflect the hyperactive child’s defective behavior and whether this measure of autonomic balance is sensitive to drug treatments that are known to have clear behavioral consequences. Weighted coherence was calculated for scven hyperactive subjects, each testcd in the following five conditions: (a) placebo; (b) .5 nig/kg methylphenidate; (c) . l nig/kg dextroamphetamine; (d) .?S nig/kg dextroamphetamine; and ( c ) off drug after these treatments. The sequence of conditions. excepting the Posttreatment condition, was randomized. Seven normal cluldren. matched in age with the hyperactive children, were tested without drugs. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , weighted coherence varied as a function of the specific drug treatment. Although both methylphenidate and dextroamphetamine are classified as stimulant drugs, the weighted coherence of the hyperactive children was higher during the methylphenidate condition than during the other drug treatments. However, the weighted coherence of nornial age-matched control children was higher than all the drug treatment levels for the hyperactive children. T i e data from this study may be interpreted to reflect two points: (1) The hyperactive child’s weighted coherence reflects a sympathetic dominance, whereas the coherence of the normal age-matched child reflects a greater parasympathetic influence. (2) Administration of methylphenidate, the preferred treatment for hyperactivity, selectively influences autonomic balance, but treatment with the other stimulant, dextroamphetamine, does not. A further study was undertaken t o answer two questions: First, do dosage levels of methylphenidate differentially influence the measure of autonomic balance? Second, is there an indication of autonomic imbalance in the hyperactive child prior to drug intervention? T o answer these questions, 13 hyperactive chldren were tested in the following conditions: (a) pretreatment; (b) .5 mg/kg methylphenidate; (c) 1.O mg/kg methylphenidate; (d) placebo; (e) . l mg/kg dextroamphetamine; (0.25 mg/kg dextroamphetamine; and (g) off drug after these treatments. All conditions except the pre- and posttreatment conditions were randomized. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the weighted coherence was significantly higher with the low dosage of methylphenidate than in the other conditions, which did not differ from each other. Of interest is the effect of the high dosage of methylphenidate, which, although not affecting the autonomic balance, actually suppressed autonomic activity by lowering both the sympathetic and parasympathetic components. Behaviorally, the preferred dosage has been low (between .3 and S mg/kg), since it has a positive influence on cognitive and social behavior (Sprague & Sleator, 1975); on the other hand, the high dosage often results in lethargic behavior as well as suppressed autonomic activity.

Peripheral Parallels of Psychopathology

4 ‘1 I

LDDPX

tl,llrr

f’Li

Rlt

Post

NOll71

Driig

Fig. 1. Estimate of weighted cohcrence for seven hyperactive children on .I mglkg dextroamphetamine (LoDex), .25 tnglkg dextroamphetamine (HiDex), placebo (Plac), .5 mglkg methylphenidate (Rit), mid off drug after the preceding drug treatments (Post), compared with seven norinal age-rnatched children (Norm).

It also appeared in the aforementioned pilot studies that, as autonomic balance shifted toward reduced sympathetic dominance, the hyperactive child’s behavior improved socially and cognitively . Based upon teacher ratings, the hyperactive child who is being treated with a low dosage of methylphenidate exhibits improved control of impulsive behavior and greater attentiveness within the classroom situation. Moreover. the proposed, technique of assessing autonomic balance seems t o be sensitive to the pharmacological intervention, and the model relating autonomic balance to behavioral psychopathology seems t o be reflected in the hyperactive child’s behavior.

VI. Autonomic Responses and Attention The term attention appears to most psychologists to be a vague construct; it is generally not defined and is used to explain behavior that can not be explained

48

Stephen W. Porges

501

Y

1

P~P

1 loDri

1 UtUex

I PIX

I LoRil

HiRit

Post

Drug

Fig. 2. Weighted coherencp for 13 hyperactive children in the following conditions: pretreatment (Pre), .I mgfkg dextroamphetamine (LoDex), .25 mglkg dextroamphetamine (HiDex). placebo (Plac), .5 mglkg methylph en idate (LoRit), 1.0 mglkg methylph en idate (HiRit), and off drug after the preceding drug treatments (Post).

in terms of a simple input-output or stimulus-response relationship. The term often implies some type of internal or cognitive process which has been used to explain overt behavior. Attention is commonly used in psychology to describe the active selection of information from the environment or the processing of information from internal sources. Within psychology, there are many instances of such varied usage: e.g., the child responded when he attended t o the appropriate stimulus contingency; or the subject attended intensely to the instructions until he understood the task; or he attended t o the thoughts of yesterday’s meeting; or the mother attended t o the baby’s cry. Obviously, attention as a construct has been used to label diverse processes. These processes range from the reflexive-reactive responses to massive changes in stimulation, at one end of the scale, t o the active instrumental behavior associated with cognitive or psychological processes, at the other. The theoretical orientation of the psychologist greatly influences the processes he associates with the construct of attention. In modern psychology, there are two common views of the human organism. These two outlooks have resulted in two families of psychological theory. The first is a derivative of the reductionism propagated by the English Empiricists, and the second is a derivative of the continental philosophy that emphasized the autonomy of the organism. Reese and Overton (1970) have described two general models which fit these theories: the first, formulated within the context of the mechanistic world hypothesis, portrays the

Peripherul Parallels o f Psychopathology

49

human as a reactive organism; the second, formulated within the context of the organismic world hypothesis, views the human as an inherently and spontaneously active organism. Within the framework of these two models, the construct of attention may be broadly defined. The mechanistic model would define attention t o stimulus change in terms of a reactive organism. In this model, attention is not a voluntary behavior but is a function of stimulus variables. Berlyne (1960) was concerned with the identification of these variables, which included novelty, complexity, conflict, surprise. and uncertainty. These collative variables were, according to Berlyne, the stimulus characteristics that determined attention. In contrast, the organismic model would define attention in terms of a spontaneously active organism which selects information from the environment. The critical difference betwecii these models is whether attention is seen as a voluntary or involuntary process. Perhaps psychologists today aIe so theoretically bound to one model that they are unable t o understand the other. According to Overton and Reese (1973), a model causes the experimenter to see the data with a specific focus. Therefore, the model may influence both the selection and the interpretation of research problems. Thus, many psychologists may be unable t o deal with the concept of attention from both the mechanistic and organismic models and therefore find it difficult t o accept the possibility that the construct of attention may deal with both voluntary and involuntary behavior. The notion that there may be different psychological processes associated with the construct of attention is not new. William James (1 890) distinguished between t w o broad categories of attention: passive-involuntary and activevoluntary. Passive-involuntary attention was defined as always immediate or reflexive and related only to objects that directly affect the sensory systems. Voluntary attention was associated with the concept of interest or selection and was assumed to be directed toward objects of the senses or toward ideational or symbolic objects. Psychophysiology as a research discipline is primarily concerned with physiological parallels of psychological processes. At different levels of investigation, psychophysiologists may concern themselves with physiological activity. Psychophysiologists often investigate such areas as physiological correlates of attention, physiological predictors of attentioiial performance, or physiological responses associated with the orienting reflex. Since the concept of attention may be associated with different psychological processes, there is a great need to be more precise in order to identify the appropriate physiological parallels. The possibility exists that there may be different physiological responses associated with the various kinds of attention. It has been a common practice, however, to use the same physiological measures to define and infer all attention-related behaviors. In lay terms, the psychophysiologist has correlated the same physio-

50

Stephen W.Porges

logical measures with attention, regardless of whether the attention process was reactive or voluntary. A. TWOCOMPONENT MODEL 01: ATTENTION

In a series of psychophysiological studies (Porges, 1972, 1974; Porges & Raskin, 1969; Porges et al., 1975; Walter & Porges, 1976) different heart-rate response components have been associated with different types of attention. Based upon observations from these studies arid the use of factor analysis techniques (Cheung, 1973), a two-component model of attention has been postulated that parallels the two categories of attention identified by William James. Within the context of a two-component model of attention, physiological responses may be partitioned into reactive and sustained components. Two reactive responses have been identified: the first is an immediate response (within 2 seconds of the stimulus change) that may parallel Sokolov’s (1963) limited definition of the orienting reflex as an intensity sensor; the second is a short-latency response which may last for 4 or 5 seconds and may be a function of the qualitative nature of the stimulus. The sustained attention response may be characterized by a reduction of heart-rate variability (the interbeat intervals become more constant) and a generalized inhibition of motor and respiratory activity (either reduced respiratory amplitude or a temporary cessation of breathing). This response persists as long as the subject attends. There is a physiological basis for partitioning the heart-rate response pattern. According t o Levy er al. (1966), the latency of the effect of vagal stimulation upon heart rate is considerably shorter than for the effect induced by sympathetic activation. Furthermore, after cessation of stimulation, the effects of sympathetic stimulation decay much more gradually than d o those of vagal activation. The latency for cardiac deceleration after a single shock t o the cervical vagus is 240 to 300 msec in the dog and 100 t o 160 msec in the cat. With sympathetic stimulation, cardiac acceleration first appears after at least 2 seconds. These data suggest that, if there is a similarity between the autonomic nervous systems of the dog or cat and man, the influences of the autonomic nervous system on the heart-rate response pattern may be temporally partitioned into the following components: ( l a ) a short-latency parasympathetic response occurring within 1 second after stimulation; ( l b ) a longer-latency response with sympathetic excitation or vagal inhibition occurring between 2 and 6 seconds after stimulation (the sympathetic component which occurs after 2 seconds would take longer t o decay relative t o the first short-latency parasympathetic response and may parallel the sympathetically mediated electrodermal responses); and (2) a subsequent, longer-duration parasympathetic response. Table I1 summarizes the description, the hypothesized psychological function, and the hypothesized physiological mechanism of these specific response components.

51

B. RELATION BE1 WI I N 1 HI TWO-COMPONENT MOD1 L A N D AUTONOMIC ANI) N I l ~ K O T R A N S M l T TI
It is hypothesized that geiicral levels of catecliolaiiiinergic a:id cliolinergc activity will be reflected in b a d e v e l Lrutoiiomic activity, wliicli in turn will influence the behavioral and autonomic I-esponses during attention. For example, when individuals are atteiiipting to sustain their attention, there is a tendency to suppress heart-ratc variability m d respiratory amplitude. However, the linkage between respiration and lieart rate (a function of parasympathetic activity) is a statistical determiriant o f the reduction in heart-rate variability observed during sustained attention. Moreover, it appears that individuals who d o not have a strong linkage. t h a t is. individuals in whom there is a weak parasympathetic influence, exliibit poorei performance relative to individuals who exhibit strong linkage. I n Section V , the hyperactive cliild-who has a weak linkage, reflected by a low weighted coherence--was described as exhibiting an inability to suppress heart-rate vai-iability. Given a low dosage of methylphenidate, the linkage became strongel and the behavior improved. It appears that the sustained attention response rcllcctccl in suppression of heart-rate variability is vagally mediated and parallels tlic cholinergic activity in the brain. Moreover the short-latency reactive response is ;~lsovagally mediated and therefore should be larger in subjects with high spoiitaiieous levels of parasympathetic activity. Pilot data with adult subjects support this contention. General levels of catecholaiiiiiici-gic activity should be mapped into the sympathetic nervous system. It is speculatccl t h a t high levels of sympathetic activity should result in conditions sucli ;is 114 [pel-activity. The heart-rate responses during attention should be influeiiced I,y high levels of sympathetic activity. The longer-latency reactive resporisc slioultl be enhanced and result in larger heartrate accelerations compatiblc with the sympathetic innervation of the heart, whereas the sustained response slrould be attenuated since the sympathetic activity is antagonistic to the piirasympathetic influences which define the response. The influence of serotonin on the Iicart-rate responses associated with attention is much more speculative. since serotonin does not have the clear autonomic parallels associated with the catechol,~iiiinesand acetylcholine. However, it is possible that since serotonin is related to the inhibition of reflexive behavior, it might be related t o the habituation of the reactive coinponents of attention. Thus, the short-latency deceleration associated with the parasympathetic nervous system and the longer-latency acceleration associated with both vagal inhibition and sympathetic excitatioii may habituate as a function o f level of serotonin, high levels resultiiig in rapid habituation and low levels resulting in hyperreactivity to changes in stimulation. It is possible that the three iieIirotransiiiitters discussed in Section 1V result in orthogonal influences on behavior (sec Fig. 3): catecholaminergic system along a

TABLE I1 Two-Component Model of Attention

Description

Behavioral function

Physiological mechanism

f 1. Reactive component a. Short-latency response (generally decelerative); latency -within approximately 1 second of change in stimulation b. Longer-latency response (directional changes in heart rate); lafency-within approximately 2 and 6 seconds following change in stimulation

Intensity sensor (orienting reflex in Sokolov’s limited definition) Magnitude and direction of response is a function of stimulus signal value: accelerative in response t o important or intense stimuli; decelerative in response t o novel or mild stimuli

VagalljJmediated

Primarily vagally mediated: when acceleration is observcd, the vagal inhibition is probably coupled with generalized sympathetic activation; when deceleration is observed, the vagal discharge masks the sympathetic contribution

2. Sustairzed component Tonic sustained heart-rate responses-these responses are more active (instrumental) than reactive (passive or reflexive): response is a reduction in heart-rate variability and respiratory-amplitude variability (respiratory inhibition, either more frequent shallow breathing or temporary cessation of breathing) during sustained attentional demands; heart rate is often reduced, although it is possible t o observe a reduction of heart-rate variability independent of directional heart-rate changes; latency-response is generally observable approximately 6 seconds following onset of stimulus and continues for duration of sustained at tention

Facilitates information and stimulus processing: this response reflects the organism’s ability to inhibit ongoing activity and is associated with what is generally called sustained attention

Vagally mediated: increased parasympathetic influences on heart rate, which result in a greater coupling between heart rate and respiration

Stephen W. Porges

54

C 0

HIPO

Hyper

*

Activity

Fig. 3. Simplistic model of the behavioral dimensions influenced bv the three neurotransmitter systems: catecholarninergic (activity): serotonergic (reactivity); cholinergic (inhihition).

dimension from hypoactivity to hyperactivity; cholinergic system along a dimension from hypoinhibition to hyperinhibition; serotonergic system along a dimension from hyporeactivity t o hyperreactivity. These orthogonal influences, in various combinations, might result in the same behavior. Since deviant behavior is the primary criterion for classification into a specific psychopathology, individuals with different etiologies might be diagnosed as suffering from the same psychopathology. This might result in conflicting reports regarding the success or failure of specific treatments with psychopathological populations. Assumptions made in group designs (see Baxley & LeBlanc, this volume) regarding the homogeneity of subjects are violated in research with psychopathological individuals. Group designs utilized to study the physiological substrate of various psychopathologies assume that all members of the group share a similar physiological substrate. By viewing the deviant behavior as being caused by the combined dysfunction of more than one physiological system, it night be possible to obtain a more accurate diagnosis: one might investigate the physiological indices of the three neurotransmitter systems and use this information t o reclassify the subjects into more homogeneous subgroups. The research described earlier (Section V, C) that involved autonomic balance measures of hyperactive children might serve as a method of identifying more liomogeneous subjects for a study on the influences of various drug treatments. To illustrate this point, the data from the second hyperactive study may be described. Although the weighted coherence for the group increased with a low dosage of methylphenidate, the three subjects who had the lowest weighted

Peripheral Parallels ojPsychopatho1og.y

55

coherence off drug not only increased with a low dosage of methylphenidate but, unlike the other subjects, their weighted coherence was even higher with the high dosage. In contrast, the two subjects with the highest weighted coherence exhibited little change with the drug treatments. This may indicate that there were three subgroups of hyperactive children in this study: (a) those that would benefit from a high dosage of methylphenidate; (b) those who would not benefit from any type of pharmacological intervention; and (c) those (the majority of the group) who would benefit from only a low dosage of methylphenidate. It is obvious that virtually any psycliopathological population is characterized by individuals with varied etiologies. However, there are indications in the literature that specific behavioral and pliysiological characteristics are commonly associated with individuals in specific diagnostic categories. The problem i s not that group designs give us n o information regarding the substrate of psychopathology but that they limit us by precluding investigations o f individuals who consistently respond in patterns not characterized by the group average. Thus, a technique for assessing more Iiomogeneous subgroups within a given psychopathology would benefit the treatment of individuals who exhibit idiosyncratic response patterns relative t o their diagnostic category.

VII. Autism Autism, a psychopathology associated with abnormal attention, may also be discussed within the proposed model of parallel behavioral (attentional) and autonomic (peripheral and central) dysfunction. The behavior of the autistic child will be discussed, and then the central and peripheral autonomic activity will be predicted as reflections of the observed behavior. Available psychuphysiological and psychopharmacological evidence will be used to test t!iese predictions. Kanner (1943) was the first t o label as infantile autism the syndrome characterized by an enduring failure to recognize and t o respond with affection t o others. The symptoms of autism have been grouped into five categories of disturbances: perception; motility; developmental rate; relationships to persons and objects; and language (Ritvo, Yuwiler, Geller, Ornitz, Saeger, & Plotkin, 1970). Autistic children are often diagnosed as suffering from childhood psychosis or schizophrenia. The distinction between autism and other psychoses is very difficult to make, and many practitioners rely on the Rimland E-2 scale (Rimland, 1964). The scale is based on a detailed questionnaire filled out by the patient’s parents. The cluster of scores above +20 on the E-2 scale is believed t o represent the t o p 10% of psychotic children who manifest autistic symptoms and who correspond t o Kanner’s definition of early infantile autism (Kimland,

56

Stephen W.Porges

1964, 1971). Often in research, however, all psychotic children have been clustered together. Central t o the theme of this chapter is the commonly observed characteristic of autistic children as having a response or attentional deficit. Rutter (1966, 1971) has described an absence of response both t o sound, which has often resulted in the autistic child being diagnosed as deaf, and to pain. The autistic child’s response deficit is generally manifested in a lack of responsiveness, but at times the child may exhibit excessive or erratic responses (Ornitz & Ritvo, 1968; Rindand, 1964; Rutter, 1966, 1971). Thus, situations exist in which an autistic child who may appear deaf t o loud sounds may suddenly overrespond, behaviorally and emotionally, t o a soft distant sound with the appearance of extreme distress. Autistic children may also manifest abnormal stimulus selectivity; one modality of a stimulus complex might dominate to the extent that others will be completely ignored (Lovaas & Schreibman, 197 1 ; Lovaas, Schreibman, Koegel, & Rehm, 1971). It is clear from this brief review of the literature that autistic children suffer a deficit or dysfunction on the dimension earlier described as reactivity. This dysfunction is evident from the observed hypo- and hyperreactiveness t o the environment. Given these observations, it might be predicted that autonomic parallels of reactivity would also be abnormal. In the peripheral autonomic nervous system the abnormality might be manifested in the magnitude of the orienting reflex and/or trials to habituation. In the central autonomic nervous system, the abnormality nught be manifested in abnormal levels of serotonin. There are very few investigations of the possible parallels of autism in the peripheral autonomic nervous system, although a relationship between psychosis and autonomic imbalance has been hypothesized. Cellhorn (1957) postulated that psychosis is a behavioral parallel of a primary disturbance of the central mechanism that regulates autonomic activity. Rubin (1 962) studied the pupillary response, which is mediated by parasympathetic constrictors and sympathetic dialators, and found it t o be heterogeneous in schizophrenics. Rubin suggested that chronic schizophrenics are less reactive than normal individuals and that they exhibit greater variance in the autonomic nervous system than do normal individuals. Rubin proposed a model based upon the balance of adrenaline and acetylcholine, the peripheral autonomic transmitters. He assumed that functional psychoses are associated with a disorder o f homeostasis. paralleled b y patterns of neurohumoral imbalance in the central and peripheral representations of the autonomic nervous system. He suggested that normal children have a significantly greater capacity for increased adrenergic outflow (sympathetic activity) than autistic children. The result would be greater rcactivit-v of normal children t o the environment. When normal and autistic children were compared with respect t o the rate of pupillary constriction (parasympathetic activity), it was found that the rate was significantly faster for the normal children. Rubin

Peripheral Parallels of Psychopathology

51

interpreted this finding as indicating that the rate of cholinergic activity was also more rapid in normal children. These results suggest that normal children, relative t o autistic children, have a greater reactivity to change in stimulation and a greater capacity to inhibit this reactivity and return t o a normal homeostatic balance. Bernal and Miller (1970) have suggested that the galvanic skin response (CSR) might be a useful index of stimulus detection with a schizophrenic or autistic child who may not be capable o f responding verbally. By comparing the CSR response of schizophrenic children with normal children, these investigators found that the schizophrenic children failed t o maintain habituation over the stimulus series and could be differentiated from normal children on the basis of a lower mean GSR response. Bernal and Miller interpreted these findings as evidence that the schizophrenic child has diminished sympathetic responsivity, which is detectable through the GSR. These findings and interpretations are consistent with those of Rubin (1962), suggesting that the observed decrease in sympathetic responsiveness is an autonomic correlate of the behavioral unresponsiveness characteristic of schi/ophrenic and autistic children. Experimental reports bearing upon the reactivity of schizophrenic or autistic children t o sensory stimuli have generally emphasized a lack of behavioral or autonomic responsiveness. Other dimensions related t o reactivity, such as central nervous system activity measured by an electroencephalogram (EEG), have been investigated in autistic and scliizophrcnic children. Reports of neurophysiological dysfunction have described a lack of responsiveness in the EEC (Walter, Aldridge, Cooper, O'Gorman, McCall~iii,& Winter, 1971) and a high incidence of abnormal EECs (Small, 1975). These studies showed that the pathological children were less neurophysiologically responsive to both internal regulatory mechanisms (normal cyclic rhythniic) and external stimuli (evoked cortical responses). Consistent with the abundance of reports depicting autistic and schizophrenic children as having limited or defective patterns of reactivity, there has been a trend toward the study o f ;I possible relationship between defects in the serotonergic neurotransmitter system and autism. Serotonin is the neurotransmitter which has been theoretically implicated with the proposed behavioral dimension of reactivity. Earlier (in Section V1, B), it was suggested that levels of serotonin might be reflected on the behavioral dimension of reactivity, high levels associated with hyporeactivity and low levels with hyperreactivity. Since autistic children characteristically exhibit a hyporeactivity t o environmental events, it might be predicted that autistic children have higher levels of serotonin than normal children. A major problem in investigating levels of neurotransmitter activity is the difficulty in assessing central nervous system levels, since levels in blood sampled from the periphery may not be isomorphic with brain levels. Given this possibil-

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ity, caution must be exhibited in interpreting research on the biochemistry of autism. The most common method of estimating central levels in humans is t o investigate peripheral blood platelets. The platelet model, presented by Pletscher (1968) and Paasonen (1968), is based upon the similarities between the properties of blood platelets and monoaminergic storage vesicles in the central nervous system (the catecholamines and serotonin are monoamines). Several investigations have compared monoamine uptake (absorption) and efflux (outflow) from the in vitro platelets of autistic and nonautistic children t o identify whether the pathological reactivity observed in autistic children is a function of a defect in serotonin binding. Unfortunately, this line of research, which will be reviewed in the following paragraphs, has produced conflicting results. A second method of assessing serotonin levels is merely t o measure levels of serotonin in the blood. A third method is to assess the acid metabolites of serotonin in cerebrospinal fluid as an index of the turnover (and, by inference, production levels) of serotonin in the central nervous system. A fourth method is to assay concentrations of metabolic by-products in the urine. The first study relating serotonin t o autism was reported by Schain and Freedman (1961), who noted that 6 out of 2 3 autistic children diagnosed in accordance with Kanner’s (1943) criteria had consistently elevated blood serotonin concentrations and higher platelet counts than age-matched control subjects. Subsequently, a study involving 24 patients and 35 control subjects demonstrated that, as a group, young autistic children have significantly elevated blood serotonin (Ritvo et al., 1970). This study also demonstrated that young autistic children had significantly higher platelet counts and a greater variability of serotonin concentrations per platelet. The finding that autistic children may have higher blood serotonin concentrations raises the question of what clinical changes might occur if the level of serotonin is reduced. Ritvo and his associates (Ritvo, Yuwiler, Geller, Kales, Rashkis, Schicor, Plotkin, Axelrod, & Howard, 1971) attempted t o answer this question. Through the use of biochemical techniques that involved the infusing of precursors of specific neurotransmitters into patients, these investigators effectively reduced blood serotonin concentrations in a few patients. However, the patients’ clinical status did not change; the amount of motility disturbances (handflapping), percentage o f REM (rapid-eye-movement) sleep time, and levels of endocrine activity were unaffected by the experimental manipulation. In two studies, Boullin and his associates (Boullin, Coleman, & O’Brien, 1970; Boullin, Coleman, O’Brien, & Rimland, 197 1 ) studied possible abnormalities in platelet serotonin in patients with infantile autism. The first study (Boullin et al., 1970) included six children diagnosed as autistic (scores above +21 on the Rimland E-2 scale). Five of the six children demonstrated an abnormally enhanced efflux of serotonin from blood platelets. Overall, there was slightly greater serotonin uptake but markedly greater efflux in the platelets from the six

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autistic children, as compared t o the platelets from normal children. I n the second study (Boullin ef al., 1971) the investigators attempted to use the serotonin efflux and uptake chatacteristics of platelets t o provide a biochemical diagnosis of autistic children froin a population of psychotic children and then t o predict the E-2 score. Predictions were made on the basis of enhanced serotonin loss (efflux) from platelets compared t o normal controls. Using the criterion that efflux had t o be at least three times greater than the control value, correct predictions (based on the E-2) were made on nine of the ten psychotic children. The biochemical results correlated with the E-2 score and predicted autism correctly in six out of scven cases and the absence of autism in three out of three cases. Other than the Boullin ef al. (1970) study, which revealed a slight increase in serotonin uptake of platelets from autistic children relative t o normal children, most studies have shown no differences (Boullin ef al., 1971; Lucas, Krause, & Domino, 1971 ; Yuwiler, Ritvo, Geller, Glousani, Schneiderman, & Matsuno, 1975). The more coniiiion finding is that there is an enhanced serotonin efflux from the platelets of infantile autistic children, which is often interpreted t o be the result of defective binding of serotonin in the central nervous system (Boullin et al., 197 1 ). In two recently published studies, data have been reported which d o not support the view that measurement of platelet serotonin activity can be used as a biochemical index t o aid in the clinical diagnosis of infantile autism. Yuwiler et al. (1975) studied the platelets from young normal, autistic, and hospitalized control children, and found that these gi-oups did not differ in serotonin uptake or efflux. Boullin, Bhagavan, Coleman, O'Brien, and Youdim (1975) found no significant difference between normal and autistic children in the rates of metabolism of serotonin and dopaminc. Another approach used t o study central nervous system biogenic aniine activity (the activity of serotonin and the catecholamines) is t o assay cerebrospinal fluid for metabolites of serotonin and dopamine as a reflection of rate of monoamine formation in the brain. I n a study of 35 children suffering from various pathologies (autism, atypical development, epilepsy, and movement disorders), metabolites of serotonin and dopamine were investigated in samples of cerebrospinal fluid (Cohen, Shaywitz, Johnson, & Bowers, 1974). There were statistically significant differences in the metabolites of both dopamine and serotonin among the groups, and the psychotic children (autistic and atypical combined) had higher levels than the children with epilepsy and movement disorders. It has been demonstrated previously that chronic schizophrenic adults excrete a metabolic by-product of serotonin, the psychogenic substance N,N-dimethyltryptamine (DMT), in their urine while normals do not (see Narasimhachari & Himwich, 1975). In the hope of establishing whether a similar defect is associated with the etiology of early infantile autism, Narasimhachari and Hiniwich

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studied concentrations of DMT in the urine of autistic children. As with the adult schizophrenics, children diagnosed as autistic excreted DMT, while none of the normal children did. However, seven of the ten parents of the five autistic children also were positive for DMT in their urine. The behavior of the parents, tested with typical assessment instruments such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, the Psychiatric Assessment Interview, and the Rorschach Inkblot Test, indicated no evidence of psychopathology. Although the literature just reviewed reveals some conflicting findings, there appears t o be a trend relating defective serotonergic activity with autism. The most consistent findings are that blood levels and platelet efflux are enhanced in the autistic child. As stated earlier, the abnormal levels and activity of serotonin may be interpreted to reflect defective binding or metabolism of serotonin in the brain. Two physiological characteristics appear t o parallel the response and attentional deficit of the autistic child: (1) the peripheral autonomic nervous system reflects a diminished sympathetic responsivity. (2) The serotonergic neurotransmitter system seems t o be defective and characterized by abnormally high levels of serotonin. Both findings might have been predicted from the proposed model as autonomic and biochemical parallels of hyporeactivity. If serotonin were also related t o perceptual thresholds, then the autistic child’s capacity t o ignore painful stimuli might be explained. Although there appear to be no studies relevant t o this hypothesis with human subjects, there is a recent study with rats as subjects. Harvey, Schlosberg, and Yunger (1975) demonstrated that increased pain sensitivity and enhanced reflexive responses to painful stimuli are behavioral consequences of serotonin depletion. The authors suggested that serotonin may not play any specific role in specific categories of behavior, including responses to pain, but may act merely as an inhibitory transmitter that reduces the effects of arousing stimuli. This interpretation is consistent with the role of serotonin proposed earlier in this chapter. If serotonin levels are abnormally high, one can predict the limited reactivity t o stimuli, including painful stimuli, observed in the autistic child. The incidents in which the autistic child is observed t o be hyperreactive may be related to abnormal cyclic depletion of serotonin (normal individuals show diurnal changes in serotonin levels).

VIII. Summary and Conclusions For inany years there have been hypotheses relating both autonomic imbalance t o behavioral disorders (Eppinger & Hess, 1915; Quay, 1976; Wenger, 1941; Wilder, 1931) and neurotransmitter balance t o mental health (Davis et al., 1973). The philosophical roots of these theories may be traced back t o the

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concepts of an “internal milieu” and “homeostasis” postulated by Claude Bernard (1 878) and Walter Cannon (1929), respectively. The link among psychopathology, defective attention, and atypical autonomic function proposed in this chapter appears t o be a reasonable speculation. This link beconies intuitively clear if attention, as einphasized here, is viewed as a state which may facilitate or impede information intake. This view of attention partitions the concept of an attcntiona2 state which facilitates or impedes stimulus intake from the in tellectual components manifested in information processing-the intellectual components hypothetically being associated with cortical activity and the state components being associated with tlie central and peripheral autonomic nervous system. Consistent with this view, individuals suffering from specific psychopathologies described earlier are often physiologically defective in the systems that mediate attentional states. An attempt has been made here to generate a testable model interrelating the biochemical theories of psychopathology and the psychophysiological theories of attention. The model, partially supported by experimental data, might lead to a better understanding of the mechanisnis mediating individual differences in attention and might, through future research, explain why and how specific pharmacological interventions are successful. The success of this approach is based upon the parallelism between behavior and physiological activity. This multivariate approach is the basis f o r pxycliophysiological research. The pathologies in the autonomic nervous system observed in the three psychopathologies discussed earlier may have a varied genesis. It is possible that there might be genetic components interacting with environmental factors. Physiologically, certain cells in the central nervous system have the potential t o respond t o a variety of neurotransmitters; that they actually respond t o one transmitter or another is, in part. a function of environmental influences. Although three psychopatliologies were selected t o demonstrate the relationship between behavior and physiological activity, the use of developmental populations for this purpose would have been as effective. There is a series of developmental trends in the au tvnomic nervous system that parallels the trends observed in behavior. For example, the behavior of a child as he matures, regardless of model of developiiient , shifts from a predominance of stiniulusdetermined reflexive activities (reactive behavior) and unlearned homeostatic mechanisms t o behaviors which are more organized and cognitively mediated (see Reese & Porges, 1976). Developmeiitally, this is characterized by subordination and integration of primitive reflexive behavior t o more complex voluntary behavior. Paralleling this shift is a n increased influence of the parasympathetic nervous system and tlie central cliolinergic systems. Thus, if one investigated various developmental populations from birth tlirougli old age, one would expect t o find that the capacity to attend (reactive and sustained attention) would be linked t o the changing balance in the autonomic nervous system. It is

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possible that autonomic imbalance, relative to age norms, might be a precursor of specific psychopathologies characterized by defective attention and that early detection through measurement of autonomic balance might facilitate positive and successful intervention. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The preparation of this chapter was supported, in part, by Research Scientist Development Award K02-MH-0054 from the National Institute of Mental Health and by grants NEC-00-3-0013 from the National Institute of Education, 524 from the State of Illinois Department of Mental Health. The hyperactive subjects were tested through collaborative research with R. L. Sprague; the research was funded in part by MH 18909 from the National Institute of Mental Health awarded to R. L. Sprague. The research described was aided by Michael N. Cheung, George J. Franks, Elwood Higley, Leighton E. Stamps, and Gary F. Walter. The weighted coherence formula and time-series analyses described in the manuscript are a product of interactions with my colleagues Robert E. Bohrer and Gideon Keren. I wish especially t o thank Brenda Brown for typing the manuscript, Michael N. Cheung for drawing the figures, and Carol Sue Carter-Porges for critically evaluating previous drafts and for stimulating the expression of my ideas in this chapter.

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Chess, G. F., Tam, M. K., & Calaresu, F. R. Influence of cardiac neural inputs on rhythmic variations of heart period in the cat. American Journal of Physiology, 1975, 228, 775-780. Cheung, M. N. Cardiac responses as measures of the orienting reflex: A factor analytic approach. Unpublished master’s thesis, West Virginia University, 1973. Cleckley, H. The mask of sanity. St. Louis: Mosby, 1955. Clements, S. D., & Peters, J. E. Minimal brain dysfunction in the school-aged child. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1962,6, 185-197. Clynes, M. Computer analysis of reflex control and organization: Respiratory sinus arrhythmia. Science, 1960, 13, 300-302. Cohen, D. J., Shaywitz, B. A., Johnson, W. T., & Bowers, M. Biogenic amines in autistic and atypical children. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1974, 31,845-85 3. Davis, J. M., Janowsky, D. S., El-Yousef, M. K., & Sekerke, H. J. The psychopharmacology of methylphenidate in man. In T. A. Ban, J. R. Boissier, G. J. Gessa, H. Heimann, L. Hollister, H. E. Lehman, I. Munkvad, H. Steinberg, F. Sulser, A. Sundwall, & 0. Vinar (Eds.), Psychopharmacology, sexual disorders and drug abuse. Prague: Avicenum, Czechoslovak Medical Press, 1973. Pp. 6 7 5 4 8 4 . Douglas, V. I. Stop, look and listen: The problem of sustained attention and impulse control in hyperactive and normal children. Canadian Journal of Behaviour Science, 1972, 4, 259-282. Dykman, R. A., Ackerman, P. R., Clements, S. D., & Peters, .I. E. Specific learning disabilities: An attentional deficit syndrome. In H. R. Mylebust (Ed.), Progress in learning disabilities. New York: Grune 8~Stratton, 1971. Pp. 56-93. Eckoldt, K., & Schubert, E. The influence of the tidal volume on the sinus arrhythmia of the heart. Acta Biologica et Medica Germanica, 1975, 34, 167-771. Eppinger, H., & Hess, L. Vagotonia. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, Monograph Series, 19 15, 20. Freibergs, V., & Douglas, V. I. Concept learning in hyperactive and normal children. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1969,74, 388-395. Gellhorn, E. Autonomic imbalance and the hypothalamus. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957. Harvey, J. A., Schlosberg, A. J., & Yunger, L. M. Behavioral correlates of serotonin depletion. Federation Proceedings, 1975, 34, 1796-1801. James, W. Principles of psychology. New York: Holt, 1890. Kanner, L. Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Nervous Child, 1943,2,217-250. Katona, P. G., & Jih,F. Respiratory sinus arrhythmia: Noninvasive measure of parasympathetic cardiac control. Journal of Applied Physiology, 1975, 39,801-805. Laufer, M. W., & Denhoff, E. Hyperkinetic behavior syndrome in children. Journal of Pediatrics, 1957,50,463-474. Laufer, M. W., Denhoff, E., & Solomons, G. Hyperkinetic impulse disorder in children’s behaviour problems. Psychosomatic Medicine, 1957, 19, 3 8 4 9 . Levy, M. N., DeGeest, H., & Zieske, H. Effects of respiratory center activity on the heart. Circulation Research, 1966, 18,67-78. Lippert, W. W., & Senter, R. .I. Electrodermal responses in the sociopath. Psychonomic Science, 1966,4,25-26. Lovaas, 0. I., & Schreibman, L. Stimulus over-selectivity of autistic children in a twostimulus situation. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 1971, 9, 305-310. Lovaas, 0. I., Schreibman, L., Koegel, R., & Rehm, R. Selective responding by autistic children to multiple sensory input. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1971, 71, 211222. Lucas, A. R., Krause, R. R., & Domino, E. F. Biological studies in childhood schizophrenia:

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Rutter, M. Behavioural and cognitive cliaracteristics of a series of psychotic children. In J . K. Wing (Ed.), Early childhood autisni: ('lirrical educational arid social aspects. Oxford: Pcrgamon, 1966. Pp. 5 1-75. Rutter, M. Thc description and classification o f infantile autism. In D. W. Churchill, G. D. Alpern, & H. K. DeMeycr (Eds.), ltrfaritilc autism: Proceedings of Indiana University colloquiurn. Springfield, 11.: Thomas, 197 1. Satterfield, J . R., & Dawson, M. F,. Electrotlernial correlates of hyperactivity in children. Psychophysiology, 1971, 9, 191-197. Schain, R. J., & Freedman, D. Studies of' 5-hydroxyindole metabolism in autistic and other mentally retarded children. .lourrial of Pcdiafrics, 1961, 68, 315-320. Small, J . G. EEG and neuropliysiologica1 studies of early infantile autism. Biological Psvchiatry, 1975, 10, 385-397. Sokolov, E. N. Perception and tlrc contfifioneclre/lex. New York: Macmillan, 1963. Solomon, R. L., & Corbit, J. D. An opponent-process theory of motivation: I. Temporal dynamics of affect. Psychological licvicw, 1974, 81, 119-156. Spraguc, R. L., & Sleator, E. K. What is thc proper dose of stimulant drugs for children. International Journal ofMental Ilealrlr. 1975. 4, 75-104. Stewart, M. A. Hyperactive children. Scictrrific, 4nwricaii, 1970, 222, 95-98. Swonger, A. K., & Rech, R. 13. Serotoncrgic and cholinerpic involvement in habituation of activity and spontaneous alternation of i a i s in a Y maze. Journal of Comparative and Pli.vsiologica1 Ps~vchology,1972. 8 I , 509-5 22. Walter, G. F., & Porges, S. W. Heart rate and respiratory responses as a function o f task difficulty: The use of discriminant aniilysis in the selection of psychologically sensitive physiological responses. P ~ ? ~ c h o p l r ~ ' s / o l 1976, o ~ ? , , in press. Walter, G. W., Aldridge, V. J., Cooper, R., O'Gorman, G., McCallum, C . , & Winter, A. L. Neurophysiological correlates of apparent defects of sensory-motor integration in autistic children. In D. W. Churchill, G. D. Alpern, & M. K. DeMyer (Bds.), Infantile aicfisnz: Proceedings o f Indiana U n i i ~ w i fcolloquiunz. j~ Sprinpficld, 11.: Thomas, 197 1. Wenger, M. A. The measurement of individual differences in autonomic balance. Psychosomatic Medicine, 1941, 3, 427-434. Werry, J. S., Sprague, R. L., Weiss, G., & Mindc, K. Some clinical and laboratory studies of psychotropic drugs in children: An overview. In W. L. Smith (Ed.), Dru,Fs and cortical function. Springfield, 11.: Thomas, 1970. Wheeler, C. A. The relationship betwecn psychopathy and the weak automatization cognitive style. K I R e s e a r c h Reports, 1914, 6, Monogr. No. 2. Wilder, J. Das "Ausgangswert-Gesctz." cin unbcachtctes biologisches Gcsetz und seine Bedeutung fur Forschung und Praxis. Lcitsclirift fiir die Kesartirnte Neurologic wid Psychiatric, 1931, 137, 317-339. Williams, J . M., Hamilton, L. W., & ('artton, P. L. Pharmacological and anatomical dissociation of two types of habituation. .lorcrrial of Comparative and Ph.ysiologica1 Ps~~cliology, 1914,87,724-132. Yuwiler, A., Ritvo, E., Geller, E., Gloucman, R., Schneiderman, G., & Matsuno, D. Uptake and efflux of serotonin from platclcts o f autistic and nonautistic children. Jourrral of Autism and Childhood Schizoplrrcnm, 1975, 5, 83-98.

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I . LANGUAGE AS REPRESENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I1 . T H E MECHANISMS OF CONSERVATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Ill . METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN PIAGETIAN TRAINING RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A . EARLY HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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IV . THE GENERAL TRAINING MODEL: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A . PRETEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B . TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C . POSTTEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D . TRANSFER AND DECALAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E . STRONG VERSUS WEAK CRITERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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V . LINGUISTIC TRAlNlNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A . VERBAL RULE INSTRUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B . LEXICAL TRAINING AND LEXICAL KNOWLEDGE . . . . . . . C . SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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VI . SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A . SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B . REPRESENTATIVE FUNCTIONALISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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C. LINGUISTIC S T R U C T U R A L I S M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D. V E R B A L R U L E INSTRUCTION: T H E O R Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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I. Language as Representation Cognitive structure in Piaget’s theory derives from the child’s action on objects and from internalized activity that is the analog of overt action. Language is also said to have its origin in action. The child’s first words-verbal signs such as “mommy” and “daddy,” and “semiverbal signs” such as “tch-tch”-are said t o “really represent complex schemes of actions, either related t o the subject or partly objective” (Piaget, 1962, p. 219). The process of naming an object is interpreted too as a statement of possible action (p. 222). The advance of true language over intuitive action, which is represented in images, and over the very earliest language, which is characterized as preconceptual, is that it constitutes a form of representation of concepts (pp. 279-280). This representational function of language remains for Piaget its most important characteristic. Language thus becomes the principal vehicle for representing concepts and operations, although it is not itself the source of the concepts and operations basic to the conception of space, time, causality, and other aspects of the real world. The by now well-known conservation phenomenon, for example, has its origin in the elaboration of elementary sensorimotor schemes. The rudimentary conservations are first realized (at 12 t o 18 months) in the concept of a permanent object and are fully attained (at about 7 years) in the construction of concrete operational schemes. Language enters into this process only for representing structures and functional relations already developed. Although the child does not attain the object concept until it is capable of representative activity (i.e., can symbolically represent the object that is not present), the form of representation which is needed for its realization is not linguistic but the image (Piaget, 1954a). This is evident in the child’s ability t o conceive of the object’s displacement through a series of detours behind or under screens. When knowledge of conservation is acquired later, it is again not language which ensures its construction but the composition of operations that entails internal symbolic action whose properties (such as reversibility) are basic to all logical structures and systems (Piaget & Inhelder, 1974). Much effort has been directed to testing and exploring the implications of Piaget’s theory, but no aspect of the theory has received more attention than Piaget’s characterization of conservation. And one of the principal vehicles for

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exploring the mechanisms of conservation has been the training study. The first efforts t o train conservation interestingly enough were initiated by the Genevans themselves, in an effort t o show that Piaget’s equilibration theory better accounts for cognitive change than other explanations, particularly enipiricistbehaviorist theories. Non-Genevan attempts t o account for conservation acquisition are not confined t o behaviorist or neobehaviorist theories, however. Among the alternatives [which are dctailcd by Beilin (1971a, in press)] are explanations based on a significant place given to the role of language. The purpose of this review is t o describe research, including that of the present author, designed t o show how conservation can be acquired by linguistic means, despite assertions of Piaget and H. Sinclair (the principal Genevan investigator of language development) that conservation is not acquired in this fashion. This paper goes one step further, however, in showing that in addition to its empirical demonstration, there is a theoretical basis for expecting such achievements t o occur, based in fact on Piaget’s more recent views on the relation between language and thought. Before describing the language-oriented training studies, we will set forth Piaget’s evolving views on conservation as background for the later discussion. We will also consider some of the more significant methodological issues that have arisen in Piagetian training research.

11. The Mechanisms of Conservation One of the marked characteristics of Piaget’s developmental theory is its emphasis on the construction of logical, semilogical and infralogical structures. These constructions extend over many years, with their most advanced level ordinarily achieved in technologically advanced societies in late adolescence or early adulthood, although the end point in the process is not really known. The natural process of construction, accoiding t o the theory, results from a selfregulating (i.e., equilibrating) niechanism that integrates the products of the subject’s own actions (experience) with internal change that occurs through another kind of biological regulation (maturation). The structural product of this interaction, according t o Piaget, is defined exclusively by neither nativist nor empiricist formulations. Piaget’s theory details the nature of the cognitive structures and the functional principles by which they are constructed. But it provides only a nonspecific characteriLation of the nature of experience and, similarly, a nonspecific characterization of natively given mechanisms, except for the reflexes observed at birth (Beilin, 1971b). Conservation is both the process and product of one such construction. As originally described by Binet (1890), it pointed t o the child’s difficulty in differentiating the number of elements in an array of objects from the length of the array. As Piaget’s studies disclose, this phenomenon is not confined t o the

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conservation of number but applies to all concepts that embody quantitative invariants (Piaget & Inhelder, 1974). In his account of conservation that refined and expanded upon the original formulation, Piaget (1 968) asserted that conservation was possible only when a composition of quantitative variations occurred. These compositions are of two kinds. One takes the form of a composition of transformations (higher X thinner = the same amount) and is manifest in the conservation of liquid (or continuous) quantity. The other takes the form of additive composition (nothing added, nothing taken away = the same amount). This form is evident when a wire in the form of an arc is extended to a straight line (or the reverse). The composition here is based on the intervals between the end points which form a system of additive inclusions (Piaget, 1968, p. 27). The additive and compensatory compositions plus the notion of operational identity, which is a necessary component of the compositions, are evident too in the child’s verbal justifications of his conservation judgments. These justifications involve two reversibility notions plus the identity argument. One is reversibility by inversion (a return to the original state, as when the child suggests that a row of counters, after being expanded to a wider length, can be contracted to return them to their original state); the other, reversibility by compensation, in which a change in one dimension is compensated for by a change in the other dimension (as in the pouring of a liquid from one jar to another of different dimensions with concomitant change in water level). Both reversibilities embody the logical negation of an operation carried forward in one “direction.” Conservation in essence requires the ability to concurrently or successively carry out an operation and then undo (reverse) it. Operational identity is inherent in the total scheme of conservation. In contrast to preoperational identity, which is concerned with maintaining the identity of the object (e.g., it is the same water), it is concerned with the identity of quantities. Entailed is an “identity operation” of an operational grouping ( t o - O = O ) that is only associated with other operations as part of a total system (the additive composition, etc.). Conservation thus requires a conjunction of operations with reversibility and (operational) identity coordinated in a system of additive and compensatory structures. The 1968 formulation emphasized the significant role of transformations in conservation, as did the theory prior to that. In fact, Piaget (1968) asserted, “where there is no transformation we cannot speak of conservation” (p. 18). Piaget has now altered his view of the necessity of transformation in conservation and other cognitive processes (in an address to the Jean Piaget Society, Phdadelphia, June 1975). He now proposes a significant role for correspondences that are sought by the subject in the matching and comparing of states before being able to respond adequately to transformations themselves. Transformations thus emerge as no longer sufficient for an understanding of cognition. Piaget presents three hypothesized relations between correspondences and trans-

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formations: (1) Correspondences pave the way for transformations (i.e., fixed states precede transformation). (2) There is an interaction between correspondences and transformations. (3) In operational structures there is an entirely new kind of necessary correspondence between a transformation and its inverse. In correspondences the relation between states is that of reciprocity. Conservation is offered as an example in which correspondences play a role. A comparison between states, e.g., a piece of clay observed in one shape compared with another in which a part has been transposed to the other end, while the body of the clay remains untransformed, leads to conservation judgments. In contrast to transformations, correspondences entail no inverse operation (and thus reversibility) but are related to one another when two states are compared in a relation of reciprocity. Beilin (1969) previously distinguished between two types of conservation-transformational invariance and fixed-state (or static) invariance, depending upon whether invariance in a quantitative concept is maintained in spite of a transformation or whether invariance is achieved by an implicit process of object transposition. Fixed-state invariance was demonstrated in a series of studies on area conservation, in which segmented squares of different configuration were compared, with the subject required to judge the equality of identical areas when they “appeared” to be different. This type of conservation ostensibly achieved by correspondence was referred to as quasiconservation, although it would appear now that Piaget accords this the status of conservation. Piaget reports that these correspondence processes lead to “precocious” conservation, although in Beilin’s experiments subjects experienced considerable difficulty in the task and were not successful in it until long after transformational conservation. This may have been due in part, however, to the dkcalage imposed by the task’s concern with area in contrast with the conservation of mass (solid quantity) o r number, or to the nature of the subjects, who were predominantly lower class. In sum, Piaget’s developmental theory, as well as the specific theory of conservation, has undergone a further significant development. This newer recognition of the significance of correspondences embodies the basis of a possible rapprochement with information-processing theories based on matching and comparison processes.

111. Methodological Issues in Piagetian Training Research A . EARLY HISTORY

Piaget’s theory of a cognitive system constructed by virtue of equilibrating mechanisms is not easy to test. Some of its assertions, such as those dealing with

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assimilation and accommodation, are quite abstract and general. These difficulties with the general theory probably account for conservation’s having been so popular with researchers. It is an easily observablc, intuitively interesting phenomenon about which Piaget makes very specific claims. At the same time it is informed by the most abstract elements of Piaget’s theory. The principal means of testing Piaget’s ideas of conservation has been through attempts to train conservation. As already indicated, the Genevans themselves embarked on such studies in the mid-1950s to show the superiority of the equilibration model over alternative empiricist explanations. These studies did not become widely known to American audiences until the appearance of Flavell’s (1963) book on Piaget’s theory, the reports of Smedslund’s (1961a, 1961b, 1961c, 1961d, 1961e, 1 9 6 1 0 studies in the Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, and Wohlwill’s (Wohlwill & Lowe, 1962) studies in American journals. Many other studies carried out in the United States and in the Soviet Union seemed to the Genevans to be focused merely on accelerating the acquisition of conservation and other cognitive functions, which Piaget derided. Though some of these studies did in fact have that emphasis from the start, others were addressed to the nature of conservation mechanisms (Beilin, I97 la. in press). Many of the training studies reflect dissatisfaction with Genevan methods of inquiry. What used to be called the “clinical method” and is now more aptly characterized as the “method of critical exploration” (Inhelder, Sinclair, & Bovet, 1974)-which we shall call here the “critical method”-has often been criticized as unstandardized and overly verbal. Consequently, much non-Genevan training research attempts t o provide a standardized means of eliciting and gauging the child’s cognitive performance. These more standardized procedures have their origin, however, in the earlier Genevan experiments. The earliest training studies (Apostel, 1959: Morf, 1959; Piaget, 1958, 1959a, 1959b, 1959c; Smedslund, 1959, 1961b; Wohlwill, 1959), which were begun in Geneva, and in some cases carried out elsewhere, started simply. In Smedslund’s (1959) case, it was with a procedure that employed a scale to verify that the weight of a plasticine ball was conserved as it was transformed through various deformations of the material. Feedback provided by weighing on the scale was said to be comparable to a “reinforcement,” in that it was external information that was used to establish proof of a conservation judgment. The weighing procedure over deformation trials was followed by addition/subtraction trials in which pieces of plasticine were added and subtracted from the original mass. Smedslund observed that learning in this circumstance was very rapid and inferred from this that nonconserving subjects were actually close to spontaneous acquisition (that is, they were transitional conservers). This latter fact was used to denigrate the effects of training (Oleron & Thong, 1968). In Smedslund’s later experiments, through various refinements, the effects of “external rein-

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forcement” were contrasted with a method of conflict-equilibration training based on Piagetian theory. The results of these experiments (Smedslund, 196 l c , 1961d, 1961e, 1961f) suggested that while “reinforcement” could be effective for learning it did not compare with the effectiveness of the conflict-equilibration procedure. Again Smedslund emphasized that when learning did occur it was with subjects who had the rudiments of operational structures already instated. Piaget (19641, taking note ot’ Sinedslund’s studies, observed that while Smedslund was successful in inducing weight conservation he was unsuccessful with the same method in inducing transitivity. Piaget proposed that training is more likely to be successful when physical relations are critical t o the task, as it is in the conservation of weight where weighing itself is required. When logicomathematical relations are involved, however, as in transitivity, and physical experience is not critical to the operation, training should be ineffective. Piaget proposed, additionally, on the basis o f Wohlwill’s (1959) success in inducing number conservation through addition operations, that learning is most likely to occur if more complex structures are approached by way of simpler structures logically related to them. These early training studies led t o the following general conclusions, which set the stage for much subsequent debate: (1) Successful training of relations embodying logicomathematical operations in children who had not acquired them naturally was not likely to occui. (2) If it did occur it was most likely to occur with children who showed some evidence of acquired structure. (3) When training was successful in inducing conservation it would be by methods that were consistent with Piagetian theory of how mathematical cognitive structures are naturally acquired, namely, by a conflict-equilibrium method. Alternative methods associated with behavioristic or neobehavioristic theories of learning would not be effective in creating cognitive structures in children who did not have them. Training of conservation and other cognitive functions by non-Genevans was already underway (e.g., Beilin & Franklin, 19621,’ and alternative interpretations were quickly proposed for the conservation phenomenon (e.g., Zimiles, 1963). The large number- of studies t h a t were t o follow reflect various kinds of dissatisfaction with Piagetian theoi-y. First is the conviction that Piagetian stage theory imposes t o o restrictive a limitation on cognitive learning. The view that each logical structure requires the acquisition of prior structures in strict developmental order impresses some as overemphasizing developmental control and underemphasizing learning.

’This study was motivated by the desire t o test the control of the child’s cognitive level on his ability to profit from training in measurement tasks.

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Secondly, it is argued that training and learning paradigms that are successful in other concept formation and attainment studies should be equally successful with the concepts described by Piaget. The implication is that Piaget’s characterization of learning, principally as “external reinforcement,” is methodologically if not conceptually out of date. Consequently, a number of other experimental approaches have been tested and have turned out to be successful in inducing cognitive change (Beilin, 197 la). A third dissatisfaction is with Piaget’s description of the mechanisms necessary for the development of logical thought, particularly for conservation. Alternatives to the necessary role of reversibility, compensation, and identity operations have been proposed and tested. These reductionist alternatives emphasize one type of Piagetian operation (such as identity or reversibility), instead of the complex of operations proposed by Piaget, or they provide alternative system explanations based on attention, memory, language, etc. These challenges to Piaget’s theory have resulted in periodic clarifications, additions, and changes in the theory, although at the same time the essential validity of the theory is reasserted. The most recent relevant work of the Genevans (Inhelder el al., 1974) manifests a modification of the Piagetian attitude towards training, although their fundamental posture on the relation of learning to development is not altered. B. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Many methodological problems have arisen to complicate the task of the training study in providing insight into cognitive structures and the processes by which they develop. In the prototypic study of the conservation of number, for example, the subject is provided with two rows of objects (abstract objects such as circles, or concrete objects such as dolls). The experiment essentially starts with two rows of objects laid out in one-to-one correspondence, i.e., for each object in one row there is a corresponding object in a corresponding position in the other row, usually below it. The experimenter then determines whether the subject understands that the two rows are the “same” or “different” in number or amount, or whatever. Controls may include unequal numbers of objects so that a response set to “same” is minimized. One of the rows is then either contracted or expanded so it “appears” to be less or more than the intact row. The subject is again asked whether they are the “same” or “different” in number or amount, and once the judgment is made, is asked why. In studies of the conservation of liquid (also referred to in the literature as continuous quantity) two prototypic forms are used. In one, a jar of particular proportions (width X height) is filled with water. A second jar of different proportions is shown to the subject, water is poured from the first jar to the

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second, and the subject is asked whether the amount of liquid is the “same” now as before. Elkind (1967) refers t o this as the “identity” case and implies that up to the time of his paper it was not used as a standard method of testing conservation. He cites another procedure, the “equivalence” case, which starts with two jars of equal dimensions as the more typical form of testing. With equal amounts of water poured into the two jars, the child is expected t o assert that the amount of liquid is the same in both. The water in one of the jars is then poured into a third jar of different dimensions while the first jar is kept within the child’s sight, and the standard question is asked. Elkind holds that the latter equivalence procedure is more difficult to conserve than the identity procedure and involves in fact a different form of conservation. Some controversy has arisen over whether different types of conservation are involved in the two procedures (e.g., Brainerd & Hooper, 1975; Moynahan & Click, 1972), but this issue will not be pursued here except to note later Piaget’s criticism of Jerome Bruner’s approach to the problem (Section IV, E).

IV. The General Training Model: Methodological Issues The procedure for each test o f conservation (i.e., length, area, volume. etc.) differs depending upon the attributes involved, but they generally follow the prototype procedures just outlined. The procedures for training conservation are much more varied, however. These depend mainly on the theoretical conception of the mechanisms involved in conservation and the conservation type. A . PRETEST

Training studies for the most part now converge on a common design. They usually start with a pretest to establish the child’s pretraining cognitive level. This is not always so, however, for pretesting is said to entail procedures that provide training prior to the testing itself (e.g., Beilin, 1965), or it is argued on the contrary that the pretest has negative transfer value in that it may increase the salience of “misleading” cues, particularly to transformation itself (Greitzer &Jeffrey, 1973). To assess for potential pretesting effects some studies include a no-pretest control group. The more usual practice, however, is to include a pretest to provide an assessment of the subjects’ pretraining cognitive status. This pretest is used as a device for selecting nonconservers and/or partial or transitional conservers for training. In some cases, however, subject selection is made o n the basis of the subject’s age. This procedure may be justified when gross difference in age (e.g., 5-year-old versus 8-year-old subjects) is taken as a gross indication of cognitive level difference. Brainerd (1972) makes the point

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that age and pretraining cognitive level are often confounded in training research. Unfortunately, in the two cases he cites t o support this point, the authors in question have made an issue of showing that performance is more critically related t o pretest cognitive level than t o age. Age status is introduced as a rule only when it correlates highly with cognitive status (e.g., 4-year-old subjects are rarely anything but nonconservers on pretest). Much has been made by experimentalists of the essentially verbal nature of Piaget’s assessment methods. Nonetheless, even when experimental training is ostensibly nonverbal or minimally verbal, it usually involves response to questions with comparative and related lexical constituents such as “same,” “more,” “less,” “amount ,” and “number.” This quantitative and comparative vocabulary may not in fact be known t o the subjects of these experiments (Beilin, 1964, 1965, 1975; Griffiths, Shantz, & Sigel, 1967). In this case, lack of conservation may be falsely attributed t o a child when the deficiency may be linguistic. This can occur in spite of the fact that progression in knowledge of the lexicon (such as the number lexicon) dcvelops in parallel with cognitive development (Beilin, 1975). (This issue will be treated more extensively in Section V.) It is evident too from recent studies that nonquantitative meanings of comparative terms such as “more” and “less” are known before quantitative meanings (Beilin, 1968; Bloom, 1970). Consequently, training studies increasingly utilize pretest procedures for assessing the child’s linguistic knowledge of relevant terms; nonknowledgeable subjects are dropped from the study or else trained in the use of the appropriate terms. B. TRAINING

Training may be given to one experimental group or it may be contrasted with other types of training, in which case there would be as many experimental groups as there are pure or mixed training procedures. Training procedures ordinarily utilize materials somewhat different from the pretests, though the same pretest materials are often used in training with a change made in the posttest or transfer tests. The more desirable procedure is one with different materials t o ensure that posttest change is a consequence of the concepts trained and not of familiarity with the materials used or of response learning attuned t o the specific set of objects. Pretests, including both assessment of cognitive status (or knowledge of the task) plus linguistic knowledge, are followed by training with as many experimental groups as is appropriate t o the nature of the study and at least one no-training control group. A number of studies fail to include controls, sometimes for legitimate reasons, sometimes not. The function of control groups, as traditionally interpreted, is t o ensure that whatever change occurs in posttest is a function of the experimental procedures and not a function of pretest experi-

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ence or learning that occurs from sources other than the manipulation of the independent variable. A separate control group may be necessary t o partial out the effect of pretesting from other effects, however. C. POSTTESTS

Training is usually followed by at least one posttest given immediately after training or following a short interval. Posttests may also follow after a longer delay, usually from 1 week to several months. Two types of task appear in posttests as a rule: (1) those testing specific (or “near”) transfer, which repeat the pretest if training is with different materials or entail a test of the same concept with different materials from those used in pretest and training; and (2) those testing nonspecific (“far”) transfer, tasks different in kind from the conservation training task, such as area, weight, or length tasks when training is with number conservation. D. TKANSI’EK A N D DkCALAGE

Posttest transfer tasks are used to provide a “strong” test of the effectiveness of training. If cognitive change were said to occur by virtue of learning, the change would have t o b e demonstrated to be nontrivial and stable. Transfer tests are considered t o provide a measure of such stability. Some special problems have arisen with transfer in Piagetian experiments, however. Nonspecific transfer is predicated by Piagetian theory on the basis of common structure. Inasmuch as conservations share a common structure or common mechanism (those of additive and compensatory composition, reversibility, and operational identity and possibly reciprocity in correspondences), conservations should be achieved normally in the same stage period. Thus when one conservation is learned, transfer should readily occur t o the others. This expectation has created much debate because the so-called horizontal ddcalage phenomenon, also posited by Piaget, appears to contradict this expected transfer by virtue of common structure. Empirically, dCcalage is manifest in the regularly ordered acquisition of different types of conservation, starting with conservation of number and ending with conservation of volume as much as 4 or 5 years later. The de‘calage is accounted for theoretically by the presumed common logical structure in each case of Conservation conjoined with a secondary or specific logical or physical knowledge structure particular to the quantitative concept involved. The structures involved in the conservation of length, for example, are more complex and more difficult to attain than those of number (as is spelled out in detail in Inhelder, et al., 1974). Each conservation, then, has two components-a common structure coniponent shared with other conservations, and a specific component that is not shared with other conservations but is

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shared instead with other cognitive structures (number, for example, has component properties that are shared with number classifications and number relations, etc.). This distinction is reminiscent of g and s factors in factorial theories of intelligence. One difficulty which the common factor versus de‘calage conflict engenders is that it complicates the definition of “stage,” in that stage in Piagetian theory is defined by both common structure and vertical ddcalage (i.e., the difference in age of attainment between common structures, for example, concrete operations vs. formal operations). Difficulty arises empirically when horizontal and the so-called oblique dCcalages2 merge into the vertical de‘calages, making clear-cut patterns of achievement difficult t o discern. In training studies, horizontal and oblique decalage becomes an issue in the seeming paradox that if the basic conservation structures are attained they should transfer-yet at the same time should not, because of the complications of horizontal and oblique ddcalage. If nonspecific transfer to another type of conservation does not occur, Piagetians are inclined to attribute it t o the de‘calage, although it might be argued contrariwise that training in respect to the common structure plus specific context knowledge should generalize to all appropriate contexts with sufficient training. The results of such attempts have not been consistent, although, in the main, training does lead to both specific and nonspecific transfer, for most types of training (see Beilin, 1971a, in press). E. STRONG VERSUS WEAK CRITERIA

Delayed posttests also provide a strong test of training. The need for such strong tests arises in part from Piaget’s criticism of training studies that are claimed to have induced cognitive attainments from relatively weak experimental evidence. Piaget puts it this way: “But, when I am faced with these facts, I always have three questions which I want to have answered before I am convinced. The first question is, ‘Is this learning lasting?’ What remains two weeks or a month later? . . . The second question is, ‘How much generalization is possible?’ . . . Then there is the third question, ‘. . . what was the operational level of the subject before the experience and what more complex structures has this learning succeeded in advancing?’ ” (Piaget, 1964). The experimental methods already discussed deal with three of these four questions: the pretest establishes the subjects’ operational level; specific and nonspecific transfer posttests establish whether there is generalization; and the delayed posttest establishes whether it is lasting. Another posttest procedure is often used t o answer the question as to whether what is learned is lasting and also t o explore

* Oblique ditcalage is indicated in differential achievement between conservation, for example, and classification and ordering tasks, which are informed by common concrete operational structures but different component structures.

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what structures have been learned. Smedslund ( 1 9 6 1 ~ )used a method designed to challenge the security of the child’s judgment by presenting him with a situation that is in conflict with his conservation judgment. The impetus for this was Piaget’s claim that when conservation becomes operational the child feels that conservation is necessary (i.e., “logically” necessary) and in fact will often ridicule the experimenter for presenting him with questions relating to the “obvious” equality of the presented quantities. Thus, if conservation were truly attained in a training experiment, the argument goes, trained conservers would resist extinction as d o natural conservers. After establishing that two clay balls weighed the same before and after deformation, Smedslund ( 1 9 6 1 ~ )surreptitiously removed some clay from one of the balls. The child was again tested t o see if he maintained conservation after weighing the clay or reverted to a nonconservation judgment and explanation. Extinction tests or trials have become part of many studies, even though Smedslund found that all l l subjects trained in his study extinguished in the countersuggestion test, and 6 of the 13 natural conservers resisted extinction. [See Miller (197 1) and Miller and Lipps (1 973) on this issue.] Possibly the most controversial issue in conservation training research concerns the knowledge acquired in a training experiment and the criteria by which one judges the attainment of such knowledge. Ostensibly, if training is successful, the general conservation structures or mechanisms already referred t o are acquired as well as the particular context knowledge associated with the particular type of conservation trained. Two behavioral criteria are employed by the Genevans in assessing such knowledge. One is a correct judgment or series of judgments for the particular quantitative concept trained, with the critical response usually that the “amount” of material is the “same” in respect to number, area, substance, etc. The other is the subject’s justification or explanation of his judgment. Both judgtnent and appropriate justification are required to establish the subject’s cognitive level. Controversy arises as t o whether both criteria are needed for minimal evidence of conservation. Because of the potential inhibition and/or confounding of performance when verbal means of testing are used, the effort is sometimes made to judge the presence of operations by nonverbal means (e.g., Beilin, 1965; Braine, 1959). kxplanations or justifications can only be verbal but “judgments” may be verbal or nonverbal (i.e., the subject can make a motor response that would be equivalent t o “same” and another that would signal “different” or “more.” As already indicated, however, some verbal instructions are necessary to establish the experimental conditions for the subject. Since a child could be a conserver and at the same time lack insight into why he is performing as he does, or because of limited language facility is incapable of expressing what he understands, an argument is made for using the judgmental criterion alone. This, however, is not the sole source of difficulty concerning the criterion problem. There is a more general question regarding the

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use of strong versus weak criteria in accepting evidence of conservation. Weak as against strong can be defined by the criteria suggested by Piaget: the strong are those satisfying all four of Piaget’s criteria; the weak are those satisfying fewer than four. Weak and strong criteria can be defined as well, however, by the nature of the unit of description and analysis. An individual subject’s responses can be considered in two ways. One is to take the subject’s response(s) as a unit (a within-subject measure). When this is done a categorical decision is taken (conserver versus transitional versus nonconserver) as the basic datum, and the number of subjects in the conservation (or transitional) category before and after training is used as the index of training success. A second criterion is needed, however, for determining when a response is a conserving, transitional, or nonconserving response. This may be a qualitative judgment based on justifications, o r it may be quantitative (based, say, on five of six trials with correct responses), or it may be a combination of these. The other way that subjects’ responses are treated statistically is to add or pool them for the number of subjects in a group (between-subject measure). In this case the number of correct responses in a series of trials is summed and the criterion of successful training is the mean of correct responses in posttest compared with the pretest mean. The number of correct responses both on posttest and pretest could be a small percentage of responses (say, 10% and 20%), however, and still show a significant difference with a large enough sample. In consideration of the fact that a statistically significant change could in this way be recorded, even though not a single subject could be identified as a consemer using a within-subject categorial criterion, one can only identify the between-subject nieasure as providing a weak criterion of conservation training. Nevertheless, many experimenters utilize just such group change data based on conservation responses, without at the same time indicating the number of conservers involved. The fact that the choice of criterion can affect the decision as t o whether conservation is present, o r learning has taken place, is demonstrated by Gruen (1966), among others. There are two aspects to the issuc, one conceptual and the other methodological. If one chooses a conceptual definition for conservation that is different from Piaget’s, can it be legitimately claimed that eonservation is being investigated? And if one uses procedures that d o not expose the ostensible Conservation operations a la Piaget, can one legitimately claim one is studying conservation? An exaniple of the conceptual difficulty is the argument between Piaget and Bruner (and Elkind) over the role of identity in conservation. Bruner (see Bruner, Olver, Greenfield, et al., 1966) holds that knowledge of identity is sufficient for conscrving quantity (as does Elkind, 1967). Piaget (1968) argues, however, that only operational identity (same amount) and not object identity (same water) qualifies as a necessary ingredient of operational conservation. In other words, the way conservation is defined b y Piaget requires operational identity for its comprehension. [Piaget also addresses a methodological limitation in Bruner’s studies that yield false positives by using

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a weak procedure (criterion) l.or judging conservation.] The studies of Mehler and Bever (1967) and those of Bryant (1974) appear to share the same conceptual difficulty. What these studies collectively imply is that a “truer” notion of conservation is embodied in a dirfet-ent definition of conservation. Thus, if conservation were identified simply as an invariance problem without the properties identified by Piaget (e.g., reversibility plus operational identity), one might find evidence for it at very young ages. With a conceptual definition different from Piaget’s, different methods 01- standards of measurement become acceptable. Thus, although one could identify a phenomenon as identity conservation, it is not the conservation uf a quantitative concept which Piaget identifies as conservation and justifies in various ways. A number of arguments directed against Piaget’s theory may similarly he reduced to differences in conceptual definition. Another aspect of the issue concerns whether it makes any difference if strong or weak criteria are used to assess the presence of conservation. Brainerd (1973; see also Brainerd & Allen, 1971) argues first that the criterion problem is not significant because strong criteria have been used in both successful and unsuccessful training studies. He argues fiirtlier, however, that only judgments are necessary for assessing subject competence. If the only question addressed in these studies was whether conservation training was successful, then the use of such a criterion might be justified. Furthermore, if one assumed that judgments and explanations probe the s u m structures, then judgments alone would be sufficient t o assess the robustness of such structures, as Brainerd claims (assuming, of course, that other sufficiently strong methodological criteria were adopted). What a judgmental criterion fails to do, however, is fully t o expose the nature of the underlying structure. Brainerd’s and similar proposals neglect to take cognizance of the fact that for Piaget concrete operational thought is more than rule-regulated behavior. Though the judgmental response and equivalent nonverbal response patterns may provide adequate knowledge of the underlying structures that govern choice, since such structures by their nature are nonverbal, it does not reflect the child’s consciousness of the events with which he deals. The verbal justification does this best in demonstrating that a symbolic (and operational) level of underlying structure has been reached that can be represented in a verbal justification. Consciousness of the relations that underlie behavior reflects capacities that go beyond those of rule-governed or structuregoverned behavior alone. I t is n u t an accident that Piaget so often titles his books “The child’s conception o f -.” A judgmental criterion thus ignores an essential ingredient in an adequate assessment of the child’s knowledge (Piaget, 1971, pp. 47-49). Brainerd makes the additional claim that judgments are devoid of built-in errors which are characteristic of explanations and incapable of being eliminated by methodological refinement. [See Recse and Schack (1974) for further comments o n Brainerd’s argument.] The “judgments” Brainerd refers t o do as a rule

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(e.g., in his own studies) embody verbal responses, if not verbal explanations. If one considers the difficulty, as evidenced by a great deal of conflicting research, in determining what lexical terms such as “more” mean to 2- to 5-year-old children (see, e.g., Beilin, 1975, Chapter 5), one would surely hesitate t o say that a judgmental criterion that embodies the use of such terms is readily amenable to methodological refinement, whereas verbal explanations are not (and therefore should be avoided). There are in fact difficulties with both sets of criteria that methodological refinements can improve upon but cannot fully eliminate. Brainerd (1974) again argues that whatever errors (“false positives” and “false negatives”) may appear with either response criterion chosen (judgments or explanations), they are both spuriously supportive of theoretical predictions, and so it does not matter which criterion is chosen. On this basis he holds that the judgmental criterion should be used because it is simpler. Since critical information is missed by omitting justifications, simpler is not necessarily better. Brainerd also argues that the nature of a Piagetian assessment is solely t o determine underlying structure of different concepts, apparently without recognizing that some phenomena such as transitivity and conservation have both common and unconimon structures. He argues further that Piaget theorizes only general synchrony in the achievement of a stage, when in fact the Genevans (see Inhelder et aL, 1974) posit, by virtue of dicalage, asynchronies in development of the very types Brainerd himself proposes. In sum, appropriate research design depends on a number of factors related t o the conceptual criteria by which conservations are defined. These criteria require the following: an assessment of the child’s pretraining operational level; an assessment of pretraining linguistic knowledge; control groups; posttesting for specific and nonspecific transfer; adequate assessment of the child’s posttraining operational level, both behaviorally and verbally; tests delayed a week or 2 months after training; and extinction trials. Not all studies require so strict or so extensive a set of design features. Studies of limited scope that deal with specific issues may require only some of these features. None of the studies that will be reviewed here includes all of the methodological constraints. For the most part they do follow a pretest, training, posttest design and vary in the extent to which they employ strong criteria. Where methodological problems require qualification of the findings, these will be discussed.

V. Linguistic Training A. VERBAL RULE INSTRUCTION

Piaget and his colleagues have made a particular effort to show that language at and before the stage of concrete operations is not critical to the development of

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cognitive structure; instead, cognition is critical to language development (cf. Beilin, 1975). Thus, for the development of conservation and related concepts, it is argued that language instruction and linguistic experience are unrelated to their construction. Sinclair [as will be discussed more fully in Section V, B,] attempted to verify the Piagetian claim by showing that training nonconservers with linguistic structures typically used by conservers resulted in n o improvement in conservation [see also Sinclair-de Zwart (1967)j. A quite different language training method was used by the present author (Beilin, 1965). Instead of stress on the lexicon, this method was based on the embodiment of conservation operations in rule statements that were coordinated in training with relevant expcrimcntal manipulations. The rules represent reversibility by inversion, reversibility by compensation, and the identity operation, and reflect the typical verbal justifications given by conserving subjects (Piaget, 1968). The verbal-rule instruction procedure was compared in effectiveness with a deformation-eqiiilibration procedure, an attention-orientation method, a method based on creating a nonverbal “learning set,” and a control procedure. Pretests and training werc with length and number conservation, and the posttests included specific and nonspecific transfer (area). Verbal-rule instruction was the most effective procedure in inducing conservation in the specific transfer posttests. There was little transfer, however, to the nonspecific transfer task (static area conservation). (Natural conservers by contrast did transfer t o the static area conservation task.) The lack of nonspecific transfer was attributed to area conservation being (1) a more advanced task in the normal de‘calage; and ( 2 ) , as a static invariance task devoid of transformations, more difficult than the usual transformation task (Beilin, 1969). It was proposed (Beilin, 1965, 197 1a) that learning occurred because verbal-rule instruction provided an instructional algorithm for processing perceptual input. Such an algorithm may or may not lead to true operatory structure, depending on the cognitive level of the child. I f the child had n o available relevant operatory structure t o which the algorithm could be assimilated, it could act as a placeholder until the relevant structures developed naturally. Nevertheless, without cognitive conflict, functional conservation was induced as a consequence of verbal-rule instruction. Operatory conservation was not ruled out, however, as we will consider later. The two linguistic approaches, lexical training in relational terms and verbalrule instruction, were combined in a study (Carlson, 1967a) that found this combination was more effective than “minimal verbal instruction.” Carlson holds (with Sinclair) that verbal instruction acts to orient the child’s attention to relevant features of the stimulus, and also suggests (with Beilin) that verbal training provides the subject an opportunity to use a model rule for processing relevant input. In another study, Carlson (1967b) employed a more stringent delayed posttest in which the combined rules-and-lexical training was contrasted

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with training without (or with a minimum of) these types of training. The provision of both lexical and rule instruction was as effective in this as in the prior study. The verbal-rule procedure was used by Smith (1968) in a conservation of weight study, and the effectiveness of the method was again shown. It was compared with a “reinforced practice” method and an addition/subtraction conflict procedure. Only the verbal-rule group showed significantly better performance than a control. Where the verbal-rule procedure was combined with extension and contraction manipulation of length in a number conservation task (Blum & Adcock, 1969), it resulted in nine of ten nonconserving trained subjects conserving on posttest, with one becoming transitional. In a delayed posttest, six of eight older subjects in the sample maintained their conservation performance, while two regressed. It is not uncommon for verbal-rule instruction to be introduced as a subsidiary part of an experiment where the focus is ostensibly on other procedures. In such cases, as in the Overbeck and Schwartz (1970) study, rule instruction was confounded with the other procedures to such an extent that it is difficult t o isolate its effect even when training was successful. The effectiveness of verbal-rule instruction was further confirmed by Peters (1 970), although a “perceptually-guided cue discrimination” procedure, in which configurations of dots aided the differentiation of number, was also effective. Verbal rules in conservation training usually comprise a number of components, as does conservation itself. Sjoberg, Hoijer, and Olsson (1970) attempt to isolate which of three components would be effective in inducing conservation of weight: “decentering” (change in form, not in weight); reversibility (transformed object returned to original shape and retaining weight); and addition/ subtraction (with nothing added or subtracted, weight must be unchanged). In addition to verbal-rule groups, there was a “reinforcement” control group which saw a demonstration without any experimenter explanation. The posttest included a transfer task (volume) and some extinction items. In training, the subject made a prediction of weight and, irrespective of whether he was correct or incorrect, obtained feedback together with a statement of the specific conservation principle. In training, 90% of each nonconserver training group of 15 was successful. In posttest, the three verbal-rule groups had high rates of success and were significantly better than the control (e.g., reversibility: 13). The demonstration control group had one conserver. Only the addition/subtraction group, however, showed a high degree of transfer ( l l ) , although the demonstration control group improved too (6). Posttested natural conservers dropped from 23 to 11 in extinction trials with a similar drop in the addition/ subtraction group. The other groups regressed much more. Verbal justifications yielded the same principles enunciated in the verbal-rule instructions, even in

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transfer, although with reduced frequency. Overall, rule instruction proved to be effective, with the addition/suhtraction type of verbal rule, and weight precliction most effective among those used. The authors held that the transfer and extinction test results demonstrated that verbal-rule training led t o true operational change. As with many verbal-rule instruction studies, no suggestion was offered as t o why verbal-rule instruction was effective. Verbal-rule instruction was also tested in a study b y Hamel and De Witt (1971), the results of which were related t o the pretest language level of the subjects, as determined b y three language tests. Subjects predicted water levels in a conservation of liquid experiment. Liquid was poured by either the ?xperimenter or subject, followed by visual verification of the subject’s prediction. Incorrect response was followed by verbal-rule instruction (as in Beilin, 1965). Posttests showed considerable improvement, from 4 subjects correct on the first trial t o 25 on the fourth trial, with about 30% overall conserving. Pretest language level was significantly related t o conservation performance. The inore verbal subjects started at higher conservation levels and acquired more conservation as a consequence of rule instruction (53% versus 38% of the less verbal group). In a later study (Hamel & Riksen, 1973), two groups of nonconservers were each given a different kind of verbal-rule instruction. One focused on identity, the other on reversibility for discontinuous and continuous quantity conservation. A common base of rule instruction was given to both groups (“same amount of water”), with identity instruction (“it’s the same ~vatcr”) given t o one group and reversibility (“when you pour it back it reaches the same level”) given t o the other. Both training groups did better than a control group, but there was n o difference between the trained groups on posttest. The identity instruction group showed greater gains in nonspecific transfer (to space, number, substance, and weight), whereas the reversibility group showed greater gains from pretest t o a delayed posttest. Equality and inequality conditions were included in the posttests to negate the possibility that the results were due to simple response sets, a type of control not always included in conservation experiments. In this study, then, rule instruction led to effective learning with nonspecific transfer that carried over to delayed posttests. Hainel is iriclined to an interpretation of his results that supports Bruner’s identity reduction thesis, but since training included rule instruction for invariance of quantity (“same amount of water”) in addition to object identity, it is difficult t o accept the reductionist thesis. (Bruner, it should be noted, used the same instructions.) Inasmuch as invariance of quantity is the critical aspect of the Piagetian thesis, its very addition t o the object identity rule precludes rejecting the Piagetian thesis even if the effect of the object identity rule exceeds the effects of the reversibility rule. A study that included a verbal-rule procedure (Figurelli & Keller. 1972) was designed primarily t o determine whether training differentially affected middle-

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versus lower-class children. Posttest effects of training in number, continuous and discontinuous quantity, size, and substance were significant, independent of socioeconomic status, although on transfer middle-class subjects were better than lower-class subjects, as they were on pretest. On the whole, nonspecific transfer to area and length was not effective. In addition, training was effective with pretest partial conservers, but not with nonconservers, as is often claimed by the Genevans (e.g., Inhelder e f al., 1974). A study of English mentally retarded children who ranged in age from 9 to 16 years (IQs 47 t o 81) was concerned principally with the dCcalage among conservation tasks (Lister, 1972). Additionally, however, two groups of subjects were trained by verbal-rule instruction-one group in understanding quantity in several attribute contexts; the second, in area conservation. A third group was a control. The experimental groups were given four types of rule statement: (1) quantitative identify, “nothing added or taken away”; (2) appearance-reality, “looks different but is really the same”; (3) compensation, “one is more this way, the other is more that way”; and (4) reversibizity, “you can get it back as it was before.” Rule giving was in conjunction with observation of transformations, manipulation of reversible transformations, and verification. In the quantity training group and in the area training group 15 of 17 subjects conserved on every posttest item. The two subjects in each group who did not profit from training did not conserve at all. This was even true for number, although 11 other subjects who had n o conservation on pretest did profit from training. The four nonlearners were given additional training in various conservation problems and then caught up with the others. All trained conservers gave “clear” justifications. The most frequent explanation was “nothing added or taken away”; compensation and material identity were rarely given as justifications. None of the 17 control children showed conservation on any test. Thus, educable mentally retarded children as well as normal children were capable of learning to conserve by means of verbal-rule instruction. It is possible t o make rule instruction contingent solely on incorrect response, or it can be given after both incorrect and correct response. Independently, informational feedback as t o the correctness of the response can be offered or omitted in an experiment. Beilin (1965) provided rule instruction only after incorrect responses, and corrective feedback after all responses. In other studies rule instruction and feedback have been given after both correct and incorrect responses. Two studies were specifically directed to the relation of verbal-rule instruction to feedback. In one, Siegler and Leibert (1972) followed the Beilin rule procedure with four training groups (feedback versus no feedback; rules versus n o rules) in training conservation of liquid quantity. Pretests and posttests additionally tested for solid quantity (clay) and length. Nonconservers ( N = 40) were selected for training from those who failed in liquid Conservation. Verbal rules given depended on the nature of the trials: “same amount”; quantitative

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identity (nothing added or taken away); compensation (thinner and u.idci-); object identity; reversibility-inverse. Feedback was either positive o r neutral (ix.. the child was not told he was “wrong”). The results showed that the rule plus feedback treatment was best in all test trials: 70% of the subjects consei-vctl 111 conservation trials; 50% were correct in nonconservation, perceptually discrepant trials; and 50% of nonconservation, perceptually consistent tlials wci-e responded t o correctly. Of rule-trained subjects, 35% gave both correct judgments and correct explanations in liquid and solid quantity conservation (Xi7 for clay). Only 10% of the feedback-only group did as well. At the saiiit t i i i w . only one subject generalized t o length conservation. Thus, while feedback ~ i i d rule instruction were each effective in improving performance, the conjuiictioii of the t w o was even more effective on b o t h judgments and explanations. l l i e results, the authors point out, could not be attributed t o “mere niimiciv” 0 1 response bias t o the word “same,” as performance improved in rclevaiit I I O I I C I servation trials where a “same” response was not called for. In addition. 6 t i t :‘O subjects generalized in specific transfer trials (solid quantity) although i i o t i i ! ‘I nonspecific transfer (length) task. In a second study, Siegler (1973) used simple one-sentence rules rathci tlian rules that include “descriptions and justification.” Subjects were pretestcd on solid and liquid quantity and trained on liquid quantity. There was a rulc plus feedback group and a control group. The rule used stated that “when w c p o i i t all the water from one glass t o an empty glass there is the same amount ofwaier to drink as before,” with variations for the amount of liquid poured. On s o - d l e t l “all plus some” trials, the rule was that “when we pour all the watcr fro111 oiic glass plus some water from another glass into an empty jar we havc moIc w a i ~ ‘ t in the new glass than there is in any of the other glasses.” Similarly, i n the “ o i r l ! some” trials (i.e., with the rule “. . . pour only some water . . . there is less. . .”) subjects received feedback whether they were right or wrong. Negative fecdl)acl\ was employed in this study: “That is not the right answer.” Again v e r M riiic plus feedback training resulted in significant learning. Of nine trained S L t h j ~ C i S . eight succeeded on all posttest problems or on none at all. I n noiisp~,cil’i~: transfer (to clay), however, there was a drop in conservation. Since there wiis I I O direct reference in the rules t o reversibility in this experiment, Siegler believes it is not a necessary component in conservation and thus the experiment is s:ii(l i o disconfirm Piaget’s view of conservation. Training is said instead to providi’ :\ strategy of attending to manipulations and connecting them with thcir c o i ~ v quences, which is close to Sinclair’s notion (see Inhelder ef al., 1074) 1ll:iI linguistic training merely leads t o chsnges in attention, although Siegler tags on ;I more traditional learning explanation. The rejection of reversibility as s co1llp(jnent in conservation is questionable, however, since in the experiment there IS x i i implied reference t o reversibility in that part of the rule statement refcrriiig to “the same amount of water to drink as before.” In addition, since Pi:iyt jii

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presently holds that conservation can be attained in situations where correspondences are noted between initial and end states with no focus on the transformation itself, it may be that Siegler’s rule statement embodies a comparison that establishes such a correspondence. Siegler’s interpretation also differs from the I’iagetian opinion in holding to the more traditional view that generalization is due t o similar perceptual transformations rather than t o generalization by coninion structure. Sullivan (1969) has been interested not only in rule instruction but also in the effectiveness of models in filmed presentations of conservation experiments. In one study, a filmed model demonstrated conservation together with verbal statement of the conservation principle (rule), and in another case simple conservation judgments were stated without rule specification. The verbal rule spelled out compensation, identity, and the appearance-reality distinction. In the no-principle condition the filmed model would merely respond “same” (correctly) after a transformation but give no rule information in response t o a question put by the film’s interrogator. The posttests, which included repetition of the pretest (substance: water or orange juice; wire), a nonspecific transfer test (clay), and an extinction test (the Smedslund method) showed rule instruction t o be better in all posttests than no-principle modeling (7 versus 3 subjects conserving; 7 versus 2; 7 versus 2-011 the respective tests). The results of this study differed f r o m a prior study in which the no-principle group also learned. In another experiment, rule instruction had no differential effect, but t h s result was discounted by Sullivan as due t o artifacts in the experiment. The inconsistent nature of these “modeling” plus rule training results is evident in a later study on training conservation of substance (Waghorn & Sullivan, 1970). Again the materials were wire, water, and clay in a pretest-posttest generalization design. The critical groups were shown conservation modeling films that had two actors, an interrogator and an adult model. In the verbal-principle group the model conserved liquid quantity and gave reversibility, identity, and compensation arguments in his justifications. The no-principle model conserved without explanation. There was substantial improvement in both principle and no-principle groups, not differing from each other, but differing from the control. In contrast t o Sullivan’s earlier study, rule instruction was interpreted as of little consequence relative t o the effect of simply modeling correct answers. Another series of studies on the effects of modeling with verbal-rule procedures has been interpreted within the context of social learning theory. In one experiment, Rosenthal and Zimmerman (1972), like Siegler, varied both feedback and rule instruction to yield four experimental groups plus a control. The subjects were divided on the basis of pretests into a nonconserver group (providing four or fewer conservation responses) and a conserver group (with five o r six conservatiun responses). The latter group was reserved for extinction training. The verbal rule used was, “They were the same in the first place,” which the

model said in response t o the cxpcriinenter’s request for an expianation of‘ a conservation manipulation. All ti-ealincnts led t o equal gains in posrtests arid also in transfer, using a judgments-only criterion. With an explanation criteiion the verbal-rule group showed a signiiicant training effect, whether o r not feedback was given during training. (Feedback was detined as verbal praise from the model, not as corrective feedback.) The fact that the feedback n o d e suhlccts were better than the controls was attributed t o the effect of simply observing the model. In a second part of tlic study, partially conserving pretest su1)jccts who observed tlie model fail t o give conscrvation judgments were tested t o see whether they extinguished their conservation responses. For both judgments and judgments plus explanation criteria there was a drop in conservation pcrtorniance and a drop in the level of conservation explanations, indicating partial extinction. In a third experiincnt with economically disadvantaged Mexican-American children there was a noiiniodeling verbal instruction variation i n which the experimenter rather than the model stated the rule plus the correct judgment. The modeling group was supcrior t o the verbal instruction group in both posttest and transfer. In a fourth expeiiinent cariied out with very young children (age: 4 years, 2 months to 4 years, 9 months; median: 4 years, 6 months), verbal-rule instruction and modeling led to significant increases in correct responding but no increase in verhal justifications. In Rosenthal and Zimmerman’s (1972) experiments the m success was the mean of correct 1-esponses and not a subject criterion. One does not know then how many subjects responded with sufficient consistency to be considered conservers. Nevertheless, the authors conclude that observing the model conserve without giving explmations was “indicative of inferential thinking elicited by modeling” in accoi-d with the assumptions of social lear-ning theory. In a further study, Zimniernian and Rosenthal (1974a) again assessed the effects of modeling, this time with corrective feedback, in length, number, and “2-dimensional space.” The subjects were those who failed on pretest (mean age: 5 years, 7 months). Both equality and inequality conservation were tested. Inequality items were transformed so that they still appeared unequal? but in reverse of the starting configuration. Inequality and equality trials were pooled in the analyses. Training entailed the use of a model plus rule instruction. The rule statement was the same as in the prior experiment, except for the substitution in the inequality condition o f “had more or larger.” The training gi-oups were as follows: (1) positive feedback with rule; (2) model plus correction and verbal rule; (3) model, no correction; and (4) control. All training gi-oups improved with both judgments ;ind judgments plus explanation criteria. The most effective procedure was tlie model plus correction (and verbal ride), followed by correctioiz-no modcl, next model-no correction, and last the control. The subjects were also tested on the frequency with which they correctly returned transformed materials t o their initial conditions. Again the

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phis correction (and verbal rule) group was best, and the poorest was

r u ~ ~ ~ d -corrcctiorz. no The study thus shows that verbal rule instruction was the

inost effective method, with corrective feedback more effective than modeling :ilone. Thus, contrary t o their earlier study with Chicano youngsters, the additJon of the model was not the critical element in training. A later study (Zimmernian & Lanaro, 1974) was concerned with relating verhnl rule instruction to the (nonverbal) demonstration of a reversibility response. with 4-year-old subjects, in response t o Beilin’s (1971 a ) observation that no i:hiltlren in that age range or younger had been shown t o that time t o profit i r o i n training to conserve. There were three experimental groups: modeling ~ I ~ i n modeling e; plus reversibility; and a control. All modeling included rule instruction. The same materials were used as in the prior experiments. In the ii,vt.tsihility condition, the subject observed the transformation in materials; in ttic others, not. Treatment and control conditions were repeated t o enhance “t-c.c.all” with a different set of materials 2 days after the first training session. Tlic p a t e s t gains from pretest t o posttest, in judgment alone, was for the model plits reversibility group relative to the modeling alone and control groups. In the i!cl;iyetl posttest the modeling alone group was superior. With the judgments plus cxpl:ination criterion, the training effect was significant, with slightly greater s c ‘ o i - c ~on the delayed posttest. There was, however, no difference between the ttioJclin~yplus reversibility and modeling alone groups. Transfer occurred and w s best in the modeling alone group. The authors concluded that 4-year-old :,uh,jects can be trained with rule instruction plus models and that the acquisition is stable. The authors also concluded that learning was not dependent upon the children’s cognitive level. One difficulty with the Zimmerman and Lanaro experiment is that no evidence is provided that the 4-year-old subjects had the requisite knowledge of such terms as “same length” and “as before,” although they were more likely t o understand “longer,” which the data d o show. With verbal instruction the child riiay simply have learned an algorithm-answer t o “before” and then applied it to tlic perceived transformations, for there is evidence that children at this age have olily ;I very limited conception of “before-after’’ time relations (Beilin, 1975). Another, and more serious, difficulty with the experiment is that although the chxnge data reported are statistically significant in respect t o responses, they are ver.y ineager and not enough t o suggest that individual children were conserving. None, in fact, appeared to have reached an above-chance performance level. With ;in expected chance level of 3.5 responses correct, and obtained mean response It.vels u t 2.5 correct, subjects on the whole were not responding even at chance level. Training was clearly “effective,” t o some extent, but whether it made conservers out of nonconservers is questionable. ‘I’he conclusions to be drawn from studies utilizing verbal-rule instruction will be presented later. First we wish t o consider those studies concerned with lexical kiiowledge and conservation.

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B. LEXICAL TRAINING AND LEXICAL KNOWLEDGE

Piaget’s position on the development of language vis-A-vis cognition i s that knowledge of the lexicon appropriate to an experimental task such as conservation is not expected t o be attained and understood prior t o the development of related cognitive operations. In other words, linguistic competence cannot be in advance of cognitive operations; in fact it should be a reflection of them (e.g., Piaget, 1954b). The role that the lexicon plays in knowledge of conservation is deeply rooted, then, in the general relation between language and cognition. Nevertheless, the argument is made by some authors (e.g., Griffiths et al., 1967) that success in conservation tasks may not become evident or can be inhibited because the subject lacks knowledge of the testing vocalary that includes such terms as “same amount,” “more,” and “less.” Sinclair (see Sinclair-de Zwart, 1967; Inhelder et al., 1974), in an attempt t o confirm the Piagetian claim, examined the words typically used b y subjects in conservation experiments. These fell into two classes, descriptive (“one,” “quantity,” etc.) and comparative (‘‘rnoi-e,” “less,” etc.). They were also characterized by Sinclair as “scalar” and “vector” terms, respectively. A study was then made of how these terms were understood and used in a conservation of quantities experiment (with clay). Though most terms used by the experimenter were understood by even the youngest subjects (age: 4 years, 6 months) in the experiment, their use differed depending upon whether the subject was a conserver or a nonconserver. Most nonconservers’ statements employed two-part (coordinated) structures embodying the use of scalars (e.g., “a lot,” “not a lot”) and much less use of vectors (“more,” “less”). The nonconservers also typically used undifferentiated terms (length terms in one instance; thickness terms in the other), whereas conservers used pairs of opposites (long/short ; thick/thin). In a conservation of length task (with pencils) conservers used four-part constructions: “This is long but thin, the other short but fat”; whereas nonconservers said, characteristically, “This pencil is long, that one is short, this one i s thin, that one is fat.” In a second experiment, subjects were trained in the use of the terms and constructions Sinclair found in the speech of conservers. Children were “encouraged” t o use examples proposed by the experimenter, e.g., “Give more t o one and less to the other,” in respect to dolls possessing different amounts of clay and marbles. Of 31 pretest subjects, 28 were nonconservers on conservation of liquids; in the first and second posttests after training, 18 remained nonconservers, 7 were intermediate, and 3 became conservers. Sinclair concluded that linguistic training did not lead to progress in conservation. If it did anything, it aided some children who had already acquired conservation t o give clearer verbal justifications. That is, language t nining facilitated rapid verbal coding and the efficient storage and retention of information (Inhelder er al., 1974, p. 215). Piaget has often commented that although cognitive structures develop in a

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fail-1y fixed order. their rate of development can be affected by social and

cultural experience. The same is true for conservation, and cross-cultural eviilerice is cited that points t o such differences in rate of acquisition. In one such instance, I’iaget, noting the way the comparative form is used in French and English (Sinclair found they were the same), observed that Turkish, which lacks :i w n i p a r ~ h l ecomparative form, is apparently associated with later acquisition of coiiscrvation t h a n is observed in Geneva. Sevinc and Turner (in press) purS I I ~ I I tliis observation with two groups of bilingual migrant Cypriote children residing in London-one predominantly Creek-speaking, the other predciiiiinantly Turkish-speaking. The Greek comparative is comparable to the English: the Turkish is different. A third group of native English speakers was ;rlso studied. (Subjects ranged from 4 t o 1 I years of age.) The Creek and Turkish subjects thus shared the same migrant Cypriote bilingual cultural background hilt dit‘fered in comparative type, whereas the English and Greek children t1it‘ti.i-edi n cultural experience but were similar in their linguistic use of comparatives. The children all spoke English, however, which confounds the results t o sonic extent in that they all had common knowledge of the comparative in English. The subjects were administered a linguistic pretest in their native language, based on Sinclair’s assessment of conservation language (see Sinclair-de %wart, 1‘367) delineating scalar (“much”) and vector (comparative-“more”) knowledge in the three groups, as well as three types of cognitive task: conservat i o n (six tasks), seriation. and multiple classification (nine matrices). (Cognitive tcsis were also conducted in the child’s native language.) The results showed that native laIiguage affects cognitive performance in consistent ways. English and Greek, which similarly code object attributes and differences with scalars (de,, and vectors (comparatives), yield organizations of concrete operations .,iiiptivcs) in c1:issification and conservation tasks. For Greek subjects, attainment of coiiiparativcs was predictive of (correlated with) conservation. Turkish has only m e forni for both classification and comparative relations; for the Turkishspeaking subjects, then, there was an overlapping of classification and conservat i m skills, and mastery of the comparative forni was found to be nonprcdictive of conservation performance. The authors suggested that language is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition f o r conservation. They held instead that language has a contributory role in cognitive development, a role nevertheless less influential than “maturation.” An additional finding is that the Turkish children, allhougli they are poorer than the others in conservation, far exceeded them in multiple classification skills. Why this occurred, or how the structure of thc ‘Turkish lexicon can account f o r it. is not discussed. The various ways language is used in conservation experiments lead t o a number of questions concerning its effects on conservation. These have been addressed in a number of studies, sometimes as a subsidiary rather than principal focus. Beilin (1964, I965), for example, showed that the child’s knowledge of ~

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comparatives (“more,” “less”) and terms of equivalence (“same,” “different”) were not understood equally well by children in conservation experiments. Children who understood ‘‘same number” on pretest were more likely t o conserve on number, length, and area tests both before and after training than those who did not understand the expressions. Children were also found t o understand “more” better than “less,” a finding which has now been extensively investigated in nonconservation contexts (e.g., Donaldson & Balfour, 1968; Palermo, 1973; Weiner, 1974). Beilin (1 968) later proposed that a noncomparative meaning of “more” is understood (as “addition to”) by children before they understand the comparative sense (as “more than”), which in turn is understood before the conserved sense (“more in spite of appearing like less, or equal to”). Bloom (1970) also showed that a noncomparative sense of “more” precedes the comparative, although “more” was said t o be understood first as “repetition.” A study by Pratoomraj and Johnson (1966) on the role of different types of questions employing different lexical ternis-“more,” ‘‘less,’’ “same,” “different”-showed that with three types of conservation task, i.e., prediction, judgment, and explanation, variation in the type of question (lexical term) had little effect on performance, whereas the type of task did. Griffiths et al. (1967), in contrast, hold that lack of knowledge of comparatives can interfere with conservation performance. Going in another direction, Shantz and Sigel(l967) tested the effects on conservation of labeling of object attributes in addition t o learning simple classification skills. Such labeling plus classification proved successful, but it was not clear whether this was due t o attribute labeling or to classification skill learning. Lumsden and Kling (1969) found that training for “bigger” led t o improvement in size conservation, but with older rather than younger subjects (7 years, 6 months versus 6 years, 6 months). They propose that teaching concepts should not be pursued prior to the child’s being able t o handle their appropriate verbal representations. A study by Russell (1975) was concerned with whether verbal competence is a reflection of the level of “operational” or “cognitive equilibrium,” although it was conducted not with conservation as such but with a task involving comprehension of the phrase “sanie amount of room.” The subject was presented first with a standard figure and had to choose one with the same amount of room from a set of comparison figures. In an alternative task he was required t o adjust an apparatus of fixed width and variable height t o a standard. Following the pretest, subjects were trained in one of two procedures (manipulative or conceptual) and posttested. Successful and unsuccessful subjects were given manipulative training plus corrective feedback in which they transferred squares or cubes t o selected figures “with a little help from the experimenter.” Conceptual training was verbal and was intended to “redraw” the chld’s concept of area and volume and t o “discourage” the interpretation of “same amount” as same shape or length. There was also variation in two-dimensional (area) and three-dimen-

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sional figures (volumes). Five-year-old subjects, in the pretest, tended t o interpret “sanie amount” as height when they varied tlie test figure t o conform t o the standard; they interpreted it as “same shape” when they selected from comparison shapes. The latter intcrpretation is questionable, however, since the data o n which it is based were not from tlie “coi-rwt” choices of the same shape (which were chosen at just about chance level) but from those close to it (which are statistically “dominant” when tlie correct choices are omitted from the statistical analysis). Russell also reported that conceptual training was effective in one condition, whereas manipulation training was not effective at all. However, when pretest differences arc cquated in an analysis of covariance, conceptual training was also ineffective. The most stable finding from the study was that 5-year-old subjects misinterpret the conservation expression ‘‘same amount of room” when tested in a nonconservatiori context. Russell, in light of other results, attributes the child’s difficulties to other than “sein:uitic” failure. The author holds that tlie notion that conservation failure I-esults from lack of knowlcdge of the meaning of words is too simplistic. Me asserts instead that the failure is inore basic and is related either t o a lack of cognitive operations (Piaget’s explanation) or 3 source related to tlie child’s “consciousness.” Another study combines relatiorial term training (“more,” “less,” “same”) with “language activation” [in fact, rule instruction; the rule given was: “The water is the same height and tlie glasses are the same width, therefore the glasses have the same amount of water” (Hamel, Van Der Veer, & Westerhof, 1972)l. Conservers were bettei- than nonconservei-s on a pretest of relational terms. After training, there were fewer relational term errors on the posttests and concomitantly substantial improvement in performance: 15 of 20 pretest conservers conserved on two posttests, as did 4 nonconservers and 1 control subject. Justifications also changed with conservation change. Hamel supports what he believes to bc Bruner’s position on identity, but offers as justification an argument that sounds more like Piaget’s. Haniel makes no distinction between levels or types of identity (i.e., object versus operational), which taken together with the confounding of rule instruction and lexical training leaves the results ambiguous. One feature of Bruner’s views merits attention here since it concerns language. Bruner cuntends that in the course of development the child increasingly fits his experience t o his language so that the verbal representation of objects and events enables the child t o acquire concepts and operations. The key to his “instrumental functionalism” is the notion of progressive change in the forms of representation that increasingly facilitate and extend the power of thought. The forms of representation~eiiactive,ikonic, and symbolic-involve different instruments of both representation and expression. Symbolic representation, the most advanced form of representation, is primarily linguistic, and speech is its princi-

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pal expression. Bruner’s experiments on conservation (Bruner et al., 1966) are interpreted as demonstrating that the linguistic representation of particular perceptual relationships results in resistance t o the effects of misleading perceptual cues (as in the screening experiments in conservation). The Genevans (Inhelder et al., 1974) argue, however, that Bruner’s verbal training combined with other procedures directs attention t o relevant features of the experiment, the result of which is correct local response (pseudoconservation) but not true operational change. The resistance t o misleading perceptual cues that linguistic representation provides is seen by Beilin (1969) as a form of algorithm learning in which the acquired linguistic algorithm provides the child with a processing procedure for dealing with perceptual and conceptual inputs. The notion of representation-bound cognitive structure is also held by Aebli (1970) and Steiner (1974). Their view is that the form (media) in which objects are represented affects their comprehension. Aebli suggests for example that the (linguistic) form in which the Piagetian “clinical” interview is conducted prestructures the problem posed by the experimenter (Steiner, 1974, p. W S ) , and affects the ease with which cognitive structures are achieved in Genevan experiments. C. SUMMARY

The research on lexical training and lexical effects on conservation indicates first that lexical training as such does not improve conservation performance, except t o a minor degree. When combined with verbal-rule instruction it appears t o be effective, but this may be more a consequence of verbal-rule instruction than lexical training. There does, however, appear t o be a relation between knowledge of comparative terms and conservation knowledge. Whether or not the relation is as originally posited by Piaget, the proposition that lexical knowledge is intimately tied t o acquisition of cognitive operations does not get strong support. Sinclair’s research suggests that conservers have a more complex linguistic structure than nonconservers, and this structure allows the use of comparatives b y conservers. But conservation performance clearly does not depend entirely upon such structures, since they d o not reflect the logical rule relation basic t o conservation itself. Instead, these linguistic structures reflect a larger complex of logical relations associated with concrete operational knowledge. For this reason training in the lexicon is not successful in leading t o conservation performance, but conservation rule instruction is successful. Although cross-cultural studies to some extent encourage the view that different languages relate t o cognitive functions differently, the case of Turkish is puzzling. The lack of a differentiated comparative form should lead t o poorer performance in conservation, as is in fact the case, but why an undifferentiated

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set of terms is associated with superior multiple classification is not clear. To date, n o clear pattern emerges from cross-cultural study of language-cognitive relations (Click, 1975). Research on the lexicon and conservation suggests a note of caution, however. It indicates that studies of conservation (or other cognitive functions) require an assessment of the child’s knowledge of the technical lexicon of the experiment. If the child lacks comprehension of the terms used, either the procedures have t o be capable of testing knowledge without the terms or an examination has t o be made of how acquisition of the terms relates t o the acquisition of the cognitive process in question. We have shown elsewhere (Beilin, 1975) that the acquisition and development of the number lexicon (cardinal, ordinal, determinate, and indeterminate number words) is generally related to the development of number conceptualization but that it is not a one-to-one relation. The studies reviewed here on the relation between lexical knowledge and conservation performance confirm this view. The lexical-conservation relations exposed in research by Sinclair and others show a relation between lexical knowledge and conservation, but the relation is not one-to-one. That is, conservation acquisition is not strictly and necessarily dependent upon linguistic knowledge, and lexical knowledge is not directly dependent upon cognitive operations. The nature of the relation is not one that assigns t o language an exclusive performance function (representational) or competence function (operational); its role in conservation is bound up with both, as the data on verbal-rule instruction suggest.

VI. Summary of Results and Theoretical Considerations The most evident conclusion to draw from the substantial research on verbalrule instruction is that it leads to effective change in conservation performance. Since many of the investigators employed strong criteria, including specific and nonspecific transfer, delayed posttests, judgmental and justification criteria (although justifications could clearly be artifactual since they are often cognitively similar to the training rules), and change measures, the evidence appears strong that the changes that occur reflect operatory change, although not necessarily in all experiments. The possibility of operational change is admitted by the Genevans: “we d o not deny that verbal training can sometimes result in truly operatory acquisitions” (Inhelder et al., 1974, p. 11 6); however, the consequences of such a possibility for Piaget’s theory are not developed. In contrast t o the strong evidence in favor of verbal-rule instruction, the evidence for positive effects of lexical training is weak. Only the verbal statement of rule

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relations among relevant lexical itenis that encapsulates or can be said to parallel hypothesized internal cognitive structures affects cognitive change significantly. The theoretical explanations proposed for the efficacy of verbal rule instruction follow, though on the whole there has been little speculation as t o why rule instruction is effective. A. SOCIAL LI ARNING T I E O R Y

The position espoused by Zimmerman and Rosenthal (1974b) is a neobehaviorist formulation that holds that a modeling “display” when “accompanied by symbolic codes . . . which provide a ninemonic summary of the rule governed response [enhances] concept attainment and retention. . .” (p. 39). Rules or rule structures are learned by creating “an arrangement and consolidation of behavioral components which allow the person to better adapt to environmental demands” (p. 39). Learning is said to occur not as a probability learning function but in “an integrated gestalt-like fashion” (p. 39). Association, by way of familiarity and plausibility, plays il role, but Zimniernian and liosenthal question a simple stimulus-response association explanation. Thus, the gradual, incremental conditioning view of‘ classical behaviorism is rejected for “abstract paradigms rapidly and holistically acquired” (p. 39). More specifically, the young child, according t o Zimmerman and Lanaro (1974) is said t o first acquire a “tionconservation rule” through observation of adults. That is, quantitative judgnients first reflect perceptual saliences rather than quantitative properties. When the child approaches 7 years of age, his verbal repertoire expands in describing dimensions (taller, bigger), and coordinations are learned more easily thrcugh verbal explanation. Verbal instruction directs the child to ignore irrelevant attributes and to attend to relevant attributes, though nonverbal learning can occur to the same level using many more instances. Inasmuch as such nonverbal learning is not naturally available, verbal instruction beconies more effective. Generalization, when it occurs, is based on stimulus characteristics (stimulus and response associations) and not logical structures. Conservation is seen, then, as a socially mediated form of rule learning in which social agents define the nature of the rules and how they can be applied. Dkcalage in turn is attributed to I’requency in modeling and use (e.g., number is better known; weight less so) ancl to difficulty of verification (number is less difficult to verify than weight). Some types of conservation are not known because prerequisite learning skills huve not been acquired. The long period of nonconservation is accounted f o r by tlie fact that conservation is not a typical rule to be learned. It is rarely encouiitered or seen applied as a nonverbal rule. In addition, the verbal skills of youtig children are far from developed.

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This form of empiricist theory, which owes much to A. Bandura, is a far cry from classical conceptions of behaviorism; it offers, however, an example of theoretical “eclecticism” in the bad sense of the term. As Reese and Overton (1970) point out, one of the paradigmatic requirements of a theory is consistent meaning in its constructs. In this instance, behavioristic theory requires that all behavior, covert or overt, function alike. Zimmerinan and Rosenthal treat “rule” as though it functions like real behavior, when it does not. Thus, the theory attempting to satisfy both cognitive and behavioristic theories satisfies neither. In spite of Zimmerman and Rosenthal’s conception of learning as “abstract paradigms rapidly and holistically acquired,” the theory is not a developmental theory in the Piagetian sense, in that it defines developnient as a function of learning rather than the reverse. A limitation of the theory in addition t o its self-defeating eclectism is that its stress on the significant role of the model is not generally borne out by the data reviewed here. The critical element in the model’s verbal behavior is the rule statement itself, that is, its form, content, and meaning rather than the model’s behavior. B. REPRESENTATIVE ITJNCTIONALISM

Bruner’s “instrumental conceptualism” (Bruner et aL, 1966) is based on the thesis that linguistic forms provide the symbolic representation of conceptual relations and that these are utilized in and define the nature of thought. Forms of representation are defined by Piaget as necessary for thought as well, but his emphasis differs from Bruner’s. Bruner asserts that our knowledge of the world is based on a “constructed model of reality” (p. 319). The axiomatic structures of this model are to some extent given in the “innate nature” of the three techniques for representing or “modeling” reality: action, imagery, and symbolism. The second tenet of Bruner’s thesis is that models of reality develop as a function of the uses t o which they have been put by the culture and by the individuals who use them. Man grows “by the process of internalizing the ways of acting, imagining and symbolizing that exist in his culture, ways that amplify his powers” (p. 320). In conservation, the linguistic system, as the symbolic form of representation, maps or translates the primitive idea of the identity of a substance (or “conservation in action”) into linguistic judgments. Thus, “ideas” exist first in action, and by implication language training has the effect of facilitating the mapping of one system onto another. Bruner’s instrumental conceptualism applied t o the acquisition of conservation differs from Piaget’s conception not so much over the role of linguistic representation per se (although they do differ in this regard) as in Bruner’s view of conservation as little more than identity of substance plus representation. The Genevans look on Bruner’s experiments as doing little more than creating pseudoconservations through the use of linguistic forms tied t o

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semilogical structures. The suggestion that cognitive growth proceeds b y internalizing the language-in-use of the culture implies that conservation has more of a social and cultural origin than Piagct's constructivist thesis allows. There are at least two limitations t o Bi-uner's view of linguistic represeiitation. The first relates t o the implication that symbolic thought requires linguistic representation for its occurrence; the second refers t o the emphasis on the internalization of cultural uses o f linguistic forms. In our view, the evidence [not reviewed here, but see Beilin (1975)] supports the Piagetian position that the origin of symbolic thought is not in language and that symbolic behavior (in play, for example) is not necessarily limited by o r dependent upon linguistic representation. Bruner's view of symbolization is so limiting as t o deny to imagery and t o action (such as gesture) a symbolic function, a position which also appears to be contrary t o the evidence (Piaget & lnhelder, 1971). Thus, although language is the symbolic representational systerns par excellence, it is not sufficient to account for the effectiveness of verbal-rule instruction in forming cognitive structures, since in Bruner's theory at least language does not account for the origin of these structures but only has a mapping function. C. LINGUISTIC STRUCTURALISM

The Genevans interpret linguistic methods of instruction as helping the child t o focus his attention on particular probleni attributes; as far as thev are concerned, the artifacts of the experiment facilitate response so that it simulates operatory behavior. This account is denied by the evidence reviewed here in that truly operatory response, evaluated by the sanie criteria used by the Genevans. is shown t o be the consequence of verbal-rule instruction. Although the possibility of true operatory acquisition by linsuistic means is not denied by the Genevans, n o attempt is made to account for it and evidence is in fact marshaled against it, consistent with earlier Piagetian views of the relation between language and thought. Piaget's and apparently Sinclair's views of the relation between language and cognition have changed, however, and we propose a theoretical account that is consistent with their more recent position. Piaget in this regard says in his preface t o Ferriero ( I07 1 ): Regarding t h e problem of rel~itiiin~ between the cognitive operations o r prcopcrations and language, it can be said . . . that the forrncr do n o t direct thc latter . . . according t o a one way action, b t i t that I h c progressions of Ianguagc ai-c duc t o :I regulatory or organizing mecliclnisiii intcrnal to [ i t ] and a t the sanic time coordinate with other forms of the siitiic pro acting at the canre 1c.vcl i n othcr domains; t h e logico-iiiatheinatic~il operation or prcopcration constitutes t h c n simultaneously the result of \\ 1i;it is i n c'oniiiion t o thc diverse eqtiilibrations and thc structural crystallization of this functioning in the domains whcre it becomes an end in itself: classification foi classification. seriation for scriation, etc. with

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the inclusions, order relations, transitivities, ctc., which that supposes. This. . . solution, which is that of I:. Fcrriero as well as ours (and we believe we have verified it in the domain of causality), naturally docs not signify that logical structures constitute a product or a derivative of the linguistic structure, since these will bc to the contrary the common result of all the regulations in all the domains at once. . . . 3

This statement suggests the following: (1) Cognitive operations and preoperations d o not direct language or language acquisition as a one-way relation (as in fact the Genevans had previously asserted). (2) What directs language acquisition is a regulating and organizing mechanism that has a counterpart in the regulating mechanisms in other (nonlinguistic) domains of behavior. These partially independent and at the same time coordinate mechanisms are the manifestations of a more abstract system. (3) Logicomathematical operations and preoperations manifest these more abstract structures when there is a need for them. These abstract structures are evident in classification, seriation, and other behaviors that embody the logicomathematical operations of inclusion, order relations, etc. (4) Cognitive structures do not derive then from linguistic structure, nor apparently d o linguistic structures derive from cognitive systems. They both derive from a more abstract system of regulations and organizations conimon t o all domains. The foregoing statement by Piaget, brief as it is, reflects an important development in his views on language, for it makes language less dependent on cognition for its structure. This partial autonomy implies the possibility that operational structures can be constructed in language independent of nonlinguistic cognition. Piaget’s new position illuminates (if it does not fully account for) the fact that verbal-rule instruction leads t o operational conservation, as will be indicated short1y . D. VERBAL-RULE INSTRUCTION: THEORY

There are three ways in which language intervenes in cognitive development. One relates t o linguistic representation in the sense suggested by Bruner. Language, as a conventional sign system (or symbol system for Bruner), is said by Piaget t o provide the means for representing concepts and conceptual relations. Language can thus map onto other forms of representation (e.g., imagery), or it may map onto existing or emerging cognitive structures (i.e., sensorimotor schemes or preoperations). In the latter instances structures formed in the process of cognitive construction are given linguistic expression or representation. Cognitive acquisition or construction in this case is not due t o language

3This is a slightly edited version of a translation made by Barbara Lust.

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itself; the manifestation of language is only a concomitant to structural attainments. The Genevan experiments (Inhelder et al., 1974), as well as others, show the way that the linguistic system maps onto operational structures as verbal justifications parallel the child’s conservation judgments. The successful experiments on verbal-rule instruction suggest two additional functions for language. One involves transient algorithmic learning. In this instance, coded representations in the form of rule statements of the ostensible underlying mechanisms of conservation (or any other logical structures) act as algorithms or processing routines for organizing various perceptual inputs. The generality of the rule determines the extension of the class of instances to which the algorithm applies. The critical question is not whether an algorithm in linguistic form will work, since it requires only that the child have sufficient linguistic competence to form an internal linguistic representation; rather, the question is whether the algorithm can function as an operatory scheme. In younger children (around 5 years of age) the algorithm will be a transient acquisition because there is no adequate cognitive system to accommodate to this linguistic acquisition. (In Piaget’s terms there is partial assimilation without accommodation.) The algorithm functions for a while as a placeholder in the processing system of cognitive structures. Unless the system undergoes sufficient change (in development or learning) to generate operatory structures that could accommodate to the algorithmic structures and integrate with them, the linguistic rule structures so acquired in training (or otherwise) will extinguish. The other possibility is that rule instruction mobilizes previously unintegrated cognitive structures or operations so that they may be brought to bear on the conservation problems at hand. In this sense rule instruction generates cognitive conflict to induce such coordinations. Piaget and Sinclair apparently d o not believe that such coordinations can occur without disequilibrium or cognitive conflict. There is no logical reason, however, why a verbal rule at variance with the subject’s available strategies may not generate such conflict and lead to coordinations that result in new operational schemes. This view requires little change in prevailing Piagetian theoiy. There is still another possibility, however, which does require a more radical change, because it views the language-thought relation differently from the representational role attributed by Piaget to language in the past. In this case, the linguistic algorithms generated by verbal rule instruction are not transient but lead t o true operatory schemes. This occurs in those instances in which the learner is sufficiently advanced in cognitive level so that available operatory structures can acconiniodate the schemes embodied in linguistic rules. This is based on the assumption that the linguistic system can generate structures that do not necessarily have their origin in nonlinguistic cognition. Piaget, as shown in the passage quoted earlier (Section VI, C), proposes now that the linguistic system does not depend on nonlinguistic cognitive operations for all of

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its structure. Instead, the cognitive system and the linguistic system are both semiotic instruments that derive from a common, more abstract form of structure, and by implication each system has properties unique unto itself. As a consequence, language schemes can parallel cognitive schemes without merely mapping onto them-although such mapping is also possible. Thus, in our view linguistic structures derived from their own internally regulated mechanisms may embody operatory schemes just as reasonably as nonlinguistic cognition. Verbalrule instruction that mimics such structures may either anticipate true operatory structures or lead directly to their assimilation into the child’s existing operational or preoperational schemes. Inasmuch as linguistic and cognitive systems share a common origin in more abstract logical structure, there is no reason why there cannot be complementary or reciprocal assimilation and accommodation. In sum, the verbal-rule instruction experiments provide the evidence for concluding that operational structures can be induced or constructed by verbal means, and Piaget’s more recent views of the relation between language and thought provide the theoretical basis for accounting for the evidence.

REFERENCES Aebli, H. Piaget, and beyond. Ititerchange, 1970, 1, 12-24. Apostel, L. Logique et apprentissage. In L. Apostel, A. R. Jonckheere, & B. Matalon, Logique, apprentissage et prohahilit&. (Etudes d%pist&mologiegdndtique. Vol. 8.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959. Pp. 1-138. Beilin, H. Perceptual-cognitive conflict in the development of an invariant area concept. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1964, I , 208-226. Beilin, H. Learning and operational convergence in logical thought development. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1965, 2, 3 17-339. Beilin, 1-1. Cognitive capacities of young children: A replication. Science, 1968, 162, 920-921. Beilin, 13. Stimulus and cognitive transformation in conservation. In D. Elkind & J . 13. I:lavell (Eds.), Studies in cognitive developnrent: Essays in honor of Jean Piaget. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Beilin, H. The training and acquisition of logical opcrations. In M. F. Rosskopf, L. P. Steffe, & S. Taback (Eds.), Piagetian cognitive-deI,elopment research and mathematical education. Washington, D.C.: National Council o f Teachers of Mathematics, 1971. (a) Beilin, H. Developrnental stages and developmental processes. In D. R. Green, M. P. Ford, & G . B. Flamer (Eds.), Measurement and Piaget. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971. (b) Beilin, H. Studies in the cognitive hasis of language dei~eloprnent. New York: Academic Press, 1975. Beilin, H. Creating cognitive structure through training. In G. Steiner (led.), Twentiethcentury psychology. Vol. 7 . Piaget arid beyond. Bern: Kinder, in press. Beilin, H., & Franklin, I. Logical operations in area and length measurement: Age and training effects. Child Dei~elopment,1962, 33, 607-61 8. Binct, A. The perception of lengths and numbers in some small children. In R. EL Pollock &

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M. W. Brenner (Eds.), The experimental psychology of Alfred Binet. New York: Springer Publ., 1969. (Originally published in Revue philosophique, 1890, 30, 68-81.) Bloom, L. Language development: Form and function in emerging grammars. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970. Blum, A. H., & Adcock, C. Successful number conservation. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Los Angeles, February 1969. Braine, M. D. S. The ontogeny of certain logical operations: Piaget’s formulation examined by nonverbal means. Psychological Monographs, 1959, 73, No. 5 (Whole No. 475). Brainerd, C. J. The age-stage issue in conservation acquisition. Psychonornic Science, 1972, 29,115-117. Brainerd, C. J. Judgments and explanations as criteria for the presence of cognitive structures. Psychological Bulletin, 1973, 79, 172-179. Brainerd, C. J . Postmortem on judgments, explanations and Piagetian cognitive structure. Psychological Bulletin, 1974, 81, 70-71. Brainerd, C. J., & Allen, T. W. Experimental inductions of the conservation of ‘first-order’ quantitative invariants. Psychological Bulletin. 1971, 75, 128-144. Brainerd, C. J., & Hooper, F. A methodological analysis of developmental studies of identity conservation and equivalence conservation. Psychological Bulletin, 1975, 82, 725-737. Bruner, J . S., Olver, R. R., Greenfield, P. M., et al. Studies in cognitive growth. New York: Wiley, 1966. Bryant, P. Perception and understanding in young children. New York: Basic Rooks, 1974. Carlson, J. S. The effects of levels of verbal instruction and overt activity on the attainment of conservation of substance. Dissertation Abstracts, 1967, 28(1-A), 118. (a) Carlson, J. S. Effects of instruction on the concept of conservation of substance. Science Education, 1967,51, 138-145. (b) Donaldson, M., & Balfour, C . Less is more: A study of language comprehension in children. British Journal of Psychology, 1968, 5 9 , 4 6 1 4 7 1 . Elkind, D. Piaget’s conservation problems. Child Development, 1967, 38, 15-27. Ferriero, E. Les relations temporelles duns le langage de l’enfant. Geneva: Librarie Droz, 1971. Figurelli, J. C., & Keller, H. R. The effects of training and socio-economic class upon the acquisition of conservation concepts. Child Development, 1972, 43, 293-298. Flavell, J . H. The developmental psvcholog,v of Jean Piaget. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1963. Click, J. Cognitive development in cross-cultural perspective. In F. D. Horowitz (Eds.), Review of child development research. Vol. 4. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975. Greitzer, G., & Jeffrey, W. Negative effects of the pretest in training conservation of length. Developmental Psychology, 1973, 9, 435. Griffiths, J. A., Shantz, C. U., & Sigcl. 1. E. 4 methodological problem in conservation studies: The use of relational terms. Child Development, 1967, 38, 841-848. Gruen, G. E. Note on conservation: Methodological and definitional considerations. Child Development, 1966, 37, 971-983. Hamel, B. R., & De Witt, S. The role of language-level in conservation-acquisition. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 197 I , 1 3-20. Hamel, B. R., & Riksen, B. 0. M. Identity, reversibility, verbal rule instruction and conservation. Developmental Psychology, 1973, 9, 66-72.

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Mainel, B. K., Van I>er Veer, M. A. A,, & Westerhof, R. Identity, language activation training and conservation. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 1972,42, 186-1 91. Inhelder, B., Sinclair, I{., & Bovet, M. Apprentissage e l structures de la connaissance. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974. (Learning and the developrnent o f cognition. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1974.) Lister, C. M. The development of ESN children’s understanding of conservation in a range of attribute situations. British Journal of’Edrccationa1 I’sycholog.~, I972,42, 14-22. Lunisden, E. A,, & Kling, J. K. The relevance of an adequate concept of “bigger” for investigations of size conservation: A methodological critique. Journal of Experimental Child Psycliology, 1969, 8, 82-91. Mehler, J., & Bever, T. G. Cognitive capacity of very young children. Science, 1967, 158, 141-142. Miller. S. A. Extinction of conservation: A methodological and theoretical analysis. MerrillPalrner Quarterly, 1971, 17, 319-334. Miller, S. A,, & Lipps, L. Extinction of conservation and transitivity of weight. Journal of Experimental Child Psyckolog~,,1973, 16, 3 8 8 4 0 3 . Morf, A. Apprentissage d’une structure logique concrete (inclusion): Effets e t limites. In A. Morf, J. Smedslund, V. Bang, & J. I;.WohlwiU, L’Apprentissagc. des structures logiques. (Etudes d’dpistdrnologie gdndtique. Vol. 9.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959. Moynahan, E., & Glick, J. Relation between identity conservation and equivalence conservation within four conceptual domains. Dei~elopmerztalPs.vchology, 1972,6, 247-25 1. Oleron, P., & Thong, T. L’Acquisition dcs conservations I’apprentissage. A n n & Psychologique, 1968,68, 549-575. Overbeck, C., & Schwartz, M. Training in conservation of weight. .loirrnal of Experinfental Child Pswhology, 1970, 9, 253-264. Palermo, D. S. More about less: A study of language comprehension. Journal of‘ Verhal Learriing arid Verbal Behavior, 1973, 12, 21 1-221. Peters, D. L. Verbal mediators and cue discrimination in the transition from nonconscrvation to conservation of number. Child Developmerrf, 1970, 41, 707-721. Piaget, J. The construction ofreality in the child. New York: Basic Books, 1954. (a) Piaget, J. Language and thought from a genetic point of view. Acta Ps?.chologica, 1954, 10, 88--98. (b) Piagct, J. Assimilation et connaissance. In J. Jonckheere, B. Mandelbrot, & J. Piaget, La lecture de [‘experience. (Etudes d%pisr&ridogicgt’tidtiqiie. Vol. 5.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958. Piaget, J. Apprentissage e t connaissance (part one). In P. GrCco & J. Piaget, Apprentissage ef connaissance. (Etudes d’&pistemologic getzetique. Vol. 7.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de I:rance, 1959. Pp. 21-67. (a) Piaget, J. Apprentissage e t connaissance (part two). In M. Goustard, P. GrCco, B. Matalon, & J . Piaget, La logique des apprenrissages. (Btlitles d’bpisthnlologie gddtiqiic. Vol. 10.) Paris: Presses Universitaircs de I:rance, 1959. Pp. 159-1 88. (b) Piaget, J. Introduction. In P. GrCco Cpr J . l’iaget, Appretitissagc et connaissaizcc. (Efiides d’dpisfdnzologie gdndriquc. Vol. 7.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1959. Pp. 1-20. (c) Piaget, J. Play, dreams and inzitation in childhood. New Y o r k : Norton, 1962. (Original edition: La forination du symbol, 1946.) Piaget, J . Development and learning. I n R. 1:. Ripple & V. N. Rockcastle (Eds.), Piaget rediscovered: A report of the confcvetrce on cognitive studies and cirrric~ilrrnzdevelop ment. Ithaca, N.Y.: School of Education, Cornell University, 1964.

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Piaget, J . 012 the development o f )rrcniorj’ arid identity. Barre, Mass.: Clark University Press and Barre Publishers, 1968. Piaget, J. Biologji and knowledge. C‘hicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1971. (Original French edition: 1967.) Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. Mental i i i f q y r i , in r/ie child. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971. (Original French edition: 1966.) Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. The child’s co?rstrfrctiofz of quantifies. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974. (Original Swiss edition: 1941 .) Pratoomraj, S., & Johnson, R. C. K i n d s of questions and types of conservation tasks as related t o children’s conservation responses. Child Developnient, 1966, 37, 343-35 3. Reese, H. W., & Overton, W. I,’. Models of clevclopnient and theories of development. In L. R. Goulet & P. 13. Baltes (Eds.), I.if‘-spaii dcvelopniental psychologv: Research arid theory. New York: Academic Press. 1970. Reese, H. W., & Schack. M. L. Commcnts 011 Brainerd’s criteria for cognitive structures. Psychological Bulletin, 1974, 81. 67 69. Roscnthal, T. L., & Zimmerman, 1%. I . klodcling by exemplification and instruction in training conservation, Developrricritnl Ps>droloRy, 1972, 6, 3 9 2 4 0 1 . Russell, J. The interpretation of conservation instructions by five-pear-old children. Journal o f Child Psychology atzd Psychiatry, 1975, 16, 233-244. Sevinc, M., & Turner, C. Language and tlic htructure of cognitive development. Interriational Journal ofPsychology, 1976, 1 l ( 4 ) . Shantz, C. U., & Sigel, I . E , Logical oper~itionsand concepts o f conscrvation in children: A training study. USOL Report, Meriill-l’almcr Institute, Detroit, Michigan. Final Report, June 1967. Siegler, R. S. Inducing a general coirscrvation o f liquid quantity concept in young children: Use of a basic rule and feedback. I’erc~epriccilarid Motov Skills, 1973, 3 7 , 4 4 3 4 5 2 . Siegler, K. S., & Liebert, R. M. f’ffects 01’ presenting relevant rules and complete feedback o n the conservation of liquid q u ; i n t i t y t . Dei7eloprnental psycho log.^^, 1972, 7, 133-138. e n tla pensbe. Paris: LDunod, Sinclair-de Zwart, H. Acquisitior7 drr /atiqncqc, et d P ~ ~ ~ l o p p r t n dc 1967. Sjoberg, L., Noijer, B., & Olson, I . ‘I caching conservation of weight by nieans of verbal 1970, 11, 266-273. instructions. Scatrdiriaviari Joiirnnl o / 13>~c/tolo,qi8, Smedslund, J . Apprentissage de la notioil de la conservation et de la transitivitk du poids. In A. Morf, J. Sniedslund, V. l3ang. X J . I , . \lolilwill, L’Apprentissagr des structitres logiqires. (Etudes d’dpistdrnologic Kc’ircitiqirc‘. Vol. 9.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959. Pp. 85-1 24. Smedslund, J. The acquisition of conservation of. substance and weight in children: I. 1961, 2, 1 1-20. ( a ) Introduction. Scandinavian Jorrrtial o f Psj’dio/o,q>~. Smedslund, J. 11. External reinforcement of conservation of weight and the operations of addition and subtraction. Scandiriai’iair .Joirriial ofPs,vcholo,yy, 196 I,2, 71-84. (b) Smedslund, J. 111. Extinction of con\crv;ition o f weight acquired “normally” and by nieans of empirical controls o n a balnncc. Scaritlirravian Journal of Psj~chology, 1961, 2, 85-87. (c) Smedslund, J. IV. An attempt at extinction o f t h c visual components of thc weight concept. Scandinaviati Journal of’Psyc.holoS\7, 1961. 2, 153-155. (d) Smedslund, J. V. Practice in conflict .;ituntions without external reinforcement. ScandiHQViQnJournal OfPSyChO[OgJ’, 1 96 1 , 2. 156-1 60. (e) Smedslund, J. VI. Practice on continiioits versus discontinuous material in problem situa-

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tions without external reinforcement. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 1961, 2, 203-210. (f) Smith, I. The effects of training procedures upon t h e acquisition of conservation of weight. Child Development, 1968, 39,5 15-5 26. Steiner, G . On the psychological reality of cognitive structures: A tentative synthesis of Piaget’s and Bruner’s theories. Child Development, 1974, 45, 891-899. Sullivan, E. V. Transition problems in conservation research. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1969,115,41-54. Waghorn, L., & Sullivan, E. V. The exploration of transition rules in conservation of quantity (substance) using film mediated modeling. Acta PsycholoKica, 1970, 32, 65-80. Weiner, S. L. On the development of more and less. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1974, 17, 271-287. Wohlwill, J. F. Un essai d’apprentissage dans le domaine de la conservation du numbre. In J. Smedslund, V. Bang, & J. F. Wohlwill, L ‘Apprentissage des structures logiques. (Etudes d’dpist6mologie g6n6tique. Vol. 9.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959. Pp. 125-35. Wohlwill, J. F., & Lowe, R. C. Experimental analysis of the development of conservation of number. Child Development, 1962, 33, 153-167. Zimiles, H. A note on Piaget’s concept of conservation. Child Development, 1963, 34, 691-695. Zimmerman, B. J., & Lanaro, P. Acquiring and retaining conservation of length through modeling and reversibility cues. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1974, 20, 145-162. Zimmerman, B. J., & Rosenthal, T. L. Conserving and retaining equalities and inequalities through observation and correction. Developmental Psychology, 1974, 10, 260-268. (a) Zimmerman, B. J., & Rosenthal, T. L. Observational learning of rule-governed behavior by children. Psychological Bulletin, 1974, 81, 2 9 4 2 . (b)

OPERANT ACQUISITION OF SOCIAL BEHAVIORS IN INFANCY: BASIC PKOBLEMS AND CONSTRAINTS’

W Stiturt Millar2 U N I V I R S Iry O I STRATHCLYDE

I . INTRODUCTION . . .

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11. SOCIAL RESPONSES RF,INFORCED BY SOCIAL FEEDBACK . . A. CONDITIONED, ELIC’ITI’D, AND HABITUATED SMILING: PROBLEMS O F CONTKOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. ELICITATION O F SMILING . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. SOCIAL CONDITIONIN(; O F INFANT VOCAL BEHAVIOR . D. CONDITIONED VERSLJS ELICITED VOCALIZATION . . . . . E. ELICITATION O F VOCAL RbSPONSIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . F. T H E SOCIAL RE,lNFOKCFR AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS IN SOCIAL CONDITIONING . . . , . . . . . . , . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 111. MIXED SOCIAL AND NONSOCIAL CONTINGENCIES: T H E CASE F O R CONSTRAINTS . . . . . . . , . . , , . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . A. NONSOCIAL REINFORC’EMENT O F SOCIAL RESPONSES B. SOCIAL REINFORCEMI1NT 01; NONSOCIAL RESPONSES C. CON STRAIN T S ON K E S PO N SE A CQ UI S IT10N . . . . , . . . . . D. REINFORCER SALIENC‘I: . . . , . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . E , I NT E R A CT I 0N A L E X P E CT A N C 1E S . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . F. T H E RECIPROCAL PERF:ORMANCE FACTOR IN T H E SO CI A L/ S0C I A L PA K A 1) I G M . , . . . . . , . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . .

108 109 111 114

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’ The writing of this review was cupportcd by a grant from the United Kingdom Social Science Research Council to H. R. Scliaficr. The author is gratcful t o H . R. Schaffer and G. M. Collis for their suggestions and helpful criticisms. Present address: Department of Psychology, Llnivcrsity College London, Cower Street, London, W.C.l., United Kingdom. 107

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REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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IV. CONCLUSIONS

I. Introduction To date, despite repeated reviews of the infant learning literature, none has focused on social conditioning phenomena. In many respects this omission is surprising, since social learning may undoubtedly be of singular relevance to our understanding of the development and acquisition of’ social skills which provide the fabric of social interaction. The subject matter of this review is specifically social learning and conditioning in infancy. Social interactive competence does not occur suddenly in development; rather the precursors of social skills appear to have their roots in interpersonal experiences during the infancy period, particularly within the context of mother-infant interaction, and it is towards understanding the infant’s capabilities in this respect that most social conditioning investigations have been undertaken. The implication, tacit or otherwise, is that a considerable amount of early social learning can best be conceptualized within a contingency paradigm. This conception, however, has one major drawback at present, since the demonstration of social control of infant social responsiveness does no more than show that the social learning approach could account for social interactive behavior in the natural setting. It certainly does not prove that this is the mechanism whereby social behavior is acquired. Obviously an examination of the extent to which contingencies do in fact occur in the natural situation and the extent to which these can be shown to be related to actual social learning is fundamental; i.e. the face validity of the contingency paradigm must be demonstrated for the infant’s ecology. In this respect some attempts have been made to provide this prerequisite naturalistic evidence to complement the experimental findings (Rosenfeld, 1973). At the same time, social learning research has been characterized by considerable methodological shortcomings, particularly with regard to the failure to control for the eliciting effects of stimuli. This is especially so where social signals and feedback are employed, since these are known to have powerful eliciting effects. At this juncture it seems valuable to examine critically, in some detail, existing social learning data in order to determine the extent to which they realistically provide a viable empirical base for social learning theory interpretations of early social behavior. To what extent can social conditioning of infant social responsiveness be deemed to have been demonstrated? Evalua-

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tion of this issue provides the primary objective for the present review. Thereafter, primarily for heuristic purposes, the extent t o which constraints may be operating o n the infant’s capacity to handle social contingencies will be discussed in the light of recent challenging findings.

11. Social Responses Reinforced by Social Feedback Brackbill’s (1 958) successful demonstration of the social conditioning of smiling marked the breakthrough of the operant paradigm in infancy research. Basically this investigation compared the effect of continuous (CRF, 100% social reinforcement) and intermittent (variable ratio, VR: 2, 3, and 4 schedules) social reinforcement contingent upon smiling for a group of 3.5 t o 4.5-month-old infants. An initial baseline period (eight 5-minute sessions) served to establish the infant’s rate of smiling t o the motionless and expressionless face of a female experimenter 37 cm from the infant. During the conditioning sessions the infant’s smiling was contingently reinforced, either regularly or intermittently, by a composite social act comprising reciprocal smiling by the experimenter, soft speech, and being picked u p and patted, all of which took some 30 seconds to administer. With the onset of the extinction sessions the experimenter resumed the motionless and expressionless posture maintained during the baseline. The entire procedure comprised two to three daily sessions which lasted from 10 t o 60 minutes spread over 8 to 16 days, a considerably protracted procedure which contrasts sharply with the relatively brief conditioning encounters of more recent investigations. Differential resistance t o extinction emerged as a function of reinforcement scheduling, with the variable ratio group taking reliably longer t o extinguish compared t o the continuous group. As an additional control, one infant was run on an extended baseline condition (approximately three times the duration of the baseline period). Under this regime an initial increase in smiling gave way to a general decrement in smiling over approximately 14 of the 19 5-minute intervals. Subsequently, Wahler (1 967) examined the relative effect of contingent social reinforcement on the smiling behavior of 3.5-month-old infants when this reinforcement is administered by a familiar and an unfamiliar adult. Smiling was reinforced by a composite social episode comprising a verbal statement, reciprocal smiling, and tactile stimulation of the infant’s chin. During extinction the social stimulation was maintained but made effectively contingent upon responses other than smiling. In some respects the findings were surprising, since conditioned smiling was demonstrated only when the reinforcing agent was the mother and not the unfamiliar adult. However, the fact that unfamiliar adults have been used successfully to bring social operants under control underlines the necessity for caution in interpreting this study. Brossard and Decaric (1968).in a study designed to establish the relative

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efficacy of the components of the composite social reinforcer, demonstrated the conditionability of the smile in 4 to 5-month-old infants. Visual, auditory, tactile, and kinesthetic components were examined individually and in various combinations. Feedback episodes lasted 3 0 seconds, and amount o€ time t o achieve a criterion of 20 smiles was the dependent variable. Reciprocal smiling coupled with picking up the infant proved the most effective reinforcer. Tactile stimulation alone was least effective for conditioning. Generally, the investigators observed that by far the most dramatic effects upon conditioned smiling were produced by stimulation conditions which included a kinesthetic component. The studies discussed so far have involved infants between the ages of 3 and 5 months. It is worth noting that Etzel and Gewirtz (1 967), in a more clinically oriented investigation of two infants aged 1.5 and 4.5 months, were able t o instrumentally condition smiling as early as 2 months of age. While the objective of these four investigations was quite distinct, they nevertheless are considered t o have successfully demonstrated operant conditioning of smiling in young infants. More recently, the duration of smiling in the first 6 months of life has been examined (Tautermannova, 1973). Two-day observation sessions were undertaken at 4-weekly intervals. On the initial day of each session a female experimenter stood motionless at a distance of 1 m from the infant. On the second day of each session a conditioning paradigm was unwittingly but effectively initiated. The experimenter now positioned herself much closer by bending over toward the infant, and whenever the infant looked at her face the experimenter nodded her head and talked to him. While the proportion of occasions when the infant looked and smiled and received reinforcement was not determined, it does seem highly probable o n the basis of elicited smiling studies (Vine, 1973) that the increase in smiling observed under the close condition (i.e., when the experimenter interacted with the infant) may in part have been effectively conditioned. It must be borne in mind, however, that the duration of smiling increased across the age span and for both the distant and the close positions, thereby revealing an eliciting effect. Duration of smiling increased from 12.6 seconds in the eighth week of life t o 48.6 seconds in the twenty-fourth week in the distant condition, while the respective durations for the close condition were 40.8 and 142.0 seconds. The important comparison for the present purpose is between the distunt and the close conditions. The distant condition served as a low-level eliciting condition providing what could be regarded as a basal level for smiling. Moreover, the amount of baseline smiling increased throughout the experimental period. In the close condition while visual-visual contact was reinforced (and smiling presumably only intermittently), this condition, it could be argued, combined a higher-level eliciting effect coupled with an intermittent reinforcing effect. Although not a conditioning study, these findings highlight

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the difficulties involved in undertaking conditioning research, specifically, the ever-present problem of confounding potential eliciting effects with conditioning effects. A. CONDITIONED, T,LICITIrD, AND HABITUATED SMILING: PROBLEMS OF CONTROL3

The fundamental criticism of the Brackbill (1958) study rested on the failure to incorporate a control for elicitation effects, although it can be argued that the scheduling aspect of the study may have rendered this criticism less serious. In her intermittent reinforcement condition Brackbill observed an abrupt change in the mean response rate with the implementation of variable ratio reinforcement. In effect, this meant that infants on VR 2 would have received half as much feedback as those continuing on the 100%schedule. If an elicitation effect were solely responsible for the increased responding observed, then the onset of intermittent scheduling should have resulted in a decrease in elicited smiling responses. Instead, an abrupt increase in rate was observed, suggesting at least at this point of the study that conditioning as opposed to entirely an eliciting effect had been demonstrated. The difficulty with eliciting effects in conditioning studies is simply that of deciding the extent to which any increase in responding is the result of conditioning, elicitation, or both these factors. However, yet another confounding dimension has been added to the problem of demonstrating conditioning with social responses. This arises not because of potential artifactual increases in responding-in fact quite the reverse; the problem is one of demonstrating a sufficient amount of acquisition to overcome a decremental effect over time that is most likely habituation. Thus, while in the case of eliciting effects one must decide whether an observed increase represents real conditioning or an artifactual eliciting effect, in the habituation case one must decide whether an observed failure to condition really represents an inability on the part of the infant to handle the contingency or, alternatively, whether it is attributable to habituation-type processes. This problem has been amply demonstrated in an investigation by Zelazo (1971). In one study the effect of the sex of the reinforcing agent and the sex of the infant were examined. One male and one female experimenter attempted to condition smiling in 11- to 13-week-old infants. During two

’Elicitation in this context refers to the occurrence of a specific response t o the presentation of some class of stimulation, as opposed t o a generalized arousal or activation effect. Obviously, elicited responses may be conditioned responses (CRs) which have been preexperinientally established. On thc other hand, they may constitute “built-in” speciesspecific packages of behavior that are released under certain stimulus conditions. In either case, occurring in the context of operant conditioning, such effects are confounding.

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6-minute baseline blocks the experimenter, although visually available, was totally unresponsive to the infant. In the conditioning blocks, infant smiles were contingently reinforced with a composite social reinforcement episode similar t o that employed by Rheingold, Gewirtz, and Ross (1959). The fact that no extinction phase was included represents a rather serious shortcoming, since changes in response levels could be assessed only relative t o basal level, rather than between (a) basal level arid (b) extinction level of responsiveness. The incorporation of an extinction period, though not ideal, would, if the decrement in responding were gradual, serve to reenforce a conditioning interpretation. In order to control for elicited smiles, Zelazo (1971) introduced an unusual and somewhat arbitrary procedure. During conditioning blocks those responses which occurred while the experimenter administered reinforcement (i.e., during a 3-second period) were designated elicited responses; those responses occurring outside this period were considered to be attributable to the contingency. This twofold classification did not allow for spontaneous smiles which naturally occurred within 3 seconds of each other. However, for the purpose of analysis, baseline smiling was “corrected” by applying the 3-second criterion. As it turned out, the absence of adequate controls was not so critical, since the expected conditioning effect failed t o materialize. The mean number of smiles t o the experimenter reliably decreased during conditioning blocks, rather than increased, relative t o the baseline level. With the female experimenter a negligible increase in responding occurred during conditioning blocks. In fact, in four of the five conditioning blocks the mean rate of responding was lower than the baseline rate. This finding, that contingent social stimulation by a stranger resulted in no reliable increase in social responsiveness relative to baseline, must be viewed in relation to other similar investigations (Brackbill, 1958; Rheingold et al., 1959) and in particular t o Wahler’s (1967) study. Wahler used a shorter procedure-two 1 5-minute trials with 3.5-month-old infants at home-and compared the relative reinforcing efficacy of the mother and a female stranger. Infants, it will be recalled, were conditioned only when the mother administered the reinforcement. The apparent discrepancy from the Brackbill and the Rheingold et al. results led Wahler to emphasize that his findings should be viewed with great caution. However, there were several important contextual as well as procedural differences among these studies that may go some considerable way toward resolving the discrepancy. Wahler’s investigation was undertaken in the infant’s home, and it therefore seems highly plausible that under these more familiar circumstances the infant’s reactions to the stranger may have been intensified and have been disruptive for learning under the stranger condition. Brackbill’s (1 958) more extensive procedure and consequent familiarization effect may have offset any such reaction. The Rheingold et al. (1959) study involved institutionalized infants with a history of multiple caretaking who were tested in the institutional setting. Despite the fact that the study was undertaken over an

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extended period, one might no( expcct infants from this background t o be so highly discriminating with respect to strangers. Clearly, in the light of Wahler’s and Zelazo’s data, researchers employing social reinforcement contingencies must exercise great caution in deciding whether a familiar, familiarized, or absolute stranger is t o administer stimulation. Moreover, some assessment should be made of the extent to which the degree of familiarity of contextual factors for the infant may potentially interact with the degree of familiarity of the reinforcer agent. In fact, Zelazo reanalyzed his data across trials and found that an initial increase in responding did occur foi- female infants relative t o their base rate, but subsequently, despite contingent feedback, the level of responding declined below operant level. I n the case of the male infants, reanalysis reaffirmed the consistent decline across trials from baseline. Zelazo tentatively suggested that the increase in Trial 1 could be viewed as confirming the broad findings of Brackbill (1958) and Etzel and Gewirtz (1967). However, in view of the failure to incorporate a matched noncontingent control procedure, coupled with the omission o f an extinction phase and the post hoc analysis on which this suggestion is based, the suggestion m u s t indeed be considered cautiously. In a subsequent study, Zelam ( I97 1 incorporated noncontingent and extended-baseline control conditions. ‘T’his study, appearing some 12 years after Brackbill’s investigation and despite other studies in the interim, was the first to incorporate the basic controls which Weisberg had employed as early as 1963 in his study of conditioned vocalization. ‘The noncontingent condition, modeled on Weisberg’s procedure, was designed t o control for eliciting effects and consisted of presenting control infants with stimulation at random intervals at a rate of four times per minute independent of the infant’s smiling. The only restriction was that the interval between one event and the next should not be less than 7 seconds. The extended-baseline condition simply extended the baseline across the entire experimental session. In Zelazo’s study only female experimenters were employed. Contingently stimulated infants smiled moi-e than the two control groups in the course of the first trial of each of the three conditioning blocks. On Trials 2 and 3, however, a significant decline in responsiveness occurred. In the case of noncontingent and extended-baseline groups this decline occurred immediately; the effect of contingent stimulation was really only t o attenuate the marked decremen t i n responsiveness that ultimately was observed for all groups. Zelazo was forced to conclude that infant smiling, while undoubtedly responsive to social contingencies, nevertheless waned even under shortterm contingent feedback. Two confounding processes appeared t o be operative, so that the incremental effect ~ ) conditioning f was more than canceled by the decremental effect of habituation.4

‘In a similar vcin, Kinimcl ( 1 9 7 3 ) wgpcsts that variability of findings for instrunicntal conditioning of autonomically mcdiatc~clI csponses map i n large part bc accountcd for b y thc

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In the light of these investigations it is evident that conditioning of smiling is a far more problematic affair than Brackbill’s initial study might lead one to believe. The most pertinent and severely undermining criticism of these studies, excepting Zelazo’s second study, was the failure to incorporate procedures which would adequately control for the eliciting properties of social stimuli. Many investigators have observed the period of 3 to 5 months after birth as the peak for spontaneous smiling to both social and nonsocial stimuli [Ahrens, 1954; Ambrose, 1961, 1963; Freedman, 1964; Gewirtz,, 1965; Laroche & Tcheng, 1965; L’Allier, 1961 (cited in Freedman, 1964); Piaget, 1953; Polak, Emde, & Spitz, 3964bl. None of these studies manipulated the contingency of the stimulation presented. They simply demonstrated that smiling could be more or less effectively elicited by a diverse range of social and nonsocial stimuli. Moreover, the peak for this eliciting effect was found between 3 and 5 months of age, the period during which most conditioning studies have been undertaken. Real faces and stimulation which incorporated movement were found to be particularly potent elicitors, i.e., particularly effective components of the conventional social reinforcement episode. For instance, Freedman (1964) presented a neutral face, then progressively supplemented this with speech, smiling, nodding of the head, and touching, and observed that between 2 and 4 months of age smiling is highly reflexive and transient in nature. Vocalization and touch were nevertheless highly effective elicitors. Similarly, Polak, Emde, and Spitz (1964a, 1964b) observed that the real face was effective in eliciting both smiling and vocalization between 2.5 and 5 months of age. Obviously the crux of the problem in demonstrating conditioned smiling in infants of this age rests on controlling for eliciting effects. Only when this is adequately achieved can the real effect of contingent social stimulation be assessed. In the light of these reactivity/eliciting studies, the more recent equivocal social conditioning data might suggest that developmental psychologists have perhaps overreacted to the earlier pessimistic view concerning the infant’s adaptibility to environmental contingencies (Millar, 1974a). Extravagant conclusions may have been reached precipitously and prematurely on the basis of important, yet clearly exploratory, and for that reason possibly poorly controlled studies. The extent to which these criticisms apply equally to social conditioning studies in general requires close and realistic examination.

interference of habituation effects to unchanging antecedent stimuli. Where antecedent stimulation is variable this serves to offset potential habituation effects, thereby increasing the likelihood of conditioning being demonstrated.

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C. SOCIAL CONDI‘I‘IONING 01: IN1:ANT VOCAL BEHAVIOR

Brackbill’s investigation marked the breakthrough in demonstrating the conditionability of a social response, and the subsequent Rheingold et al. (1959) study of conditioned vocalization served to consolidate the position. In format the Rheingold et al. study was broadly similar to Brackbill’s, although the former investigators were not concerned specifically with extinction effects under intermittent reinforcement. Three-month-old infants were exposed t o baseline, conditioning, and extinction sessions spread over a 6-day period. During baseline the experimenter positioned herself such that her face was 37.5 cm above the supine infant and maintained an expressionless face. In the contingency phase each discrete voiced sound was followed by a composite social episode consisting of simultaneous smiling and vocal and tactile components that took approximately 1 second t o administer. This, incidentally, was considerably briefer than the protracted episode used by Brackbill, which required some 30 seconds to administer. Vocalizations increased reliably from baseline during contingency sessions, and the expected decrement in responding occurred during extinction. Of the 22 infants, 19 exhibited an increased rate of vocal responding during conditioning, and in 14 of these instances the increase was reliable. While these findings certainly appear hghly impressive, Rheingold et al. were aware that the failure to include a noncontingent condition to control for potential eliciting effects undermined the power of their findings. There was a possibility, despite the presentation of the nonresponsive adult during baseline and extinction phases, that the contingent animation of an adult’s face coupled, in particular, with reciprocal vocalization tnay have effectively served to release infant vocal behavior during the contingency periods. Weisberg (1963) attempted to overcome this problem of elicitation by incorporating noncontingent controls. I n this respect the study was methodologically innovative and, until recently (cf. Bloom & Esposito, 1975; Millar, 1972, 1974b), was considered to provide an adequate and appropriate design for examining operant conditioning effects with infants. Weisberg examined the efficacy of social and nonsocial stimulation and incorporated the following six conditions: (1) an absolute control condition with n o experimenter present; ( 2 ) a nonresponsive adult condition; (3) contingent and (4) noncontingent social stimulation conditions; and ( 5 ) contingent and (6) noncontingent nonsocial stimulation conditions. Social stimulation comprised reciprocal smiling coupled with vocal and tactile components which lasted 2 seconds. In the noncontingent case, stimulation was not matched with the experimental subjects but instead was presented o n a prearranged random schedule at the rate of four episodes per minute. Nonsocial stimulation was provided by a door chime. First, visual availability of an unresponsive adult did not serve as an elicitor for infant vocal behavior. Secondly, contingent social stimulation effectively increased infant

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vocalizations, but noncontingent social stimulation failed to produce any increase in vocal behavior, clearly suggesting that, in the case of vocalization, discrete social stimulation is not an elicitor. In one respect the data were especially surprising: nonsocial auditory feedback contingent upon vocalization did not result in any increase in the infant’s vocal output. Whether one can construe from this finding that there may be something intrinsic to composite social feedback, such as the vocal component, which may be prerequisite for conditioning, is at this stage still a matter for conjecture. Nevertheless, this finding challenges the conception of arbitrariness, interchangeability, and transituationality of feedback stimuli in conditioning studies. On the basis of this study the conditioning interpretation of the findings of Rheingold et al. was basically consolidated. D. CONDITIONED VERSUS ELICITED VOCALIZATION

Since Weisberg’s relatively definitive study [but see Bloom and Esposito’s (1975) criticism of Weisberg’s random/noncontingent control procedure] , investigators have increasingly switched their attention to other aspects of the social reinforcement phenomenon. Routh (1 969) attempted to condition vocal response differentiation with 2- to 7-month-old infants. The procedure involved selectively reinforcing “vowel” sounds, “consonant” sounds, or all vocalizations in different groups, using social stimulation (a smile, “tsk, tsk, tsk,” and tactual stimulation of the infant’s abdomen). The procedure was similar t o that used by Rheingold ef al. and by Weisberg and comprised baseline, conditioning, and extinction periods spread over 5 days. During baseline the experimenter was expressionless and nonresponsive t o the infant. Routh’s findings are especially relevant t o the problems associated with conditioning, since the data reveal both conditioning and eliciting effects. During conditioning a general increase in vocal responsiveness was observed for all three groups, i.e., both consonant and vowel sounds increased relative t o baseline levels, and this effect was independent of whether stimulation was contingent upon one subclass or all vocalizations. Basically, this general undifferentiated effect confirms the findings of Rheingold et aL and Weisberg, although there were differences (such as in response criteria) among the studies. Alternatively, it could be argued that this general increase in vocal responsiveness might be attributable to elicitation since, in addition, infants also revealed reliable differentiation during contingency periods in the selectively reinforced class of vocal response. In the course of extinction, however, only a trend towards decreased responding was observed, but this, Routh suggests, is possibly a consequence of the brief extinction period used. Although noncontingent controls were not incorporated in Routh’s study, the strategy of producing differentiated responding by selective reinforcement provides an alternative control procedure and rules out, inasmuch as differentiated

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responding occurred, any interpretation in terms of eliciting effects. Sheppard (1969) also employed this strategy in a short-term longitudinal investigation carried out with one infant between the age of 10 days and 3 months. Using different types of reinforcement (tactual vibration of the palm, visual stimulation, mother’s voice, and recorded maternal heartbeat), he successfully shaped conditioned vocalization, then conditioned leg lucking so that ultimately differential responding under discriminative control was demonstrated for these vocal and motor operants. While the findings demonstrate a remarkable feat of control, the necessary extensiveness of the procedures makes it difficult to compare the study with the conventional short-term cross-sectional type of investigation. Nevertheless, Sheppard’s work instances differential shaping of operants as an alternative strategy for overcoming potential bias resulting from elicitation. Ramey and Ourth (1971) examined the efficacy of social reinforcement in a delayed reinforcement situation. Vocal responses of 3-, 6-, and 9-month-old infants were contingently reinforced after delays of 0, 3, or 6 seconds.’ While feedback consisted of the usual composite smiling, vocal, and tactual episode similar in format to that used by Rheingold ef al. (IYSY), a considerably briefer procedure was adopted: 1 minute of baseline, 6 minutes of conditioning, and 2 minutes of extinction. The finding that delaying reinforcement by as little as 3 seconds was totally disruptive to acquisition, while an important finding in its own right (see Millar, 1972), is nevertheless incidental t o the present review. When reinforcement was immediately contingent. reliable acquisition was demonstrated relative to both baseline and subsequent extinction levels of responsiveness.6 Unfortunately, by omitting to incorporate a matched noncontingent control procedure, the investigators failed to control for any eliciting function. The fact that the delay did not produce reliable levels of acquisition cannot of itself be construed as an indirect check on eliciting effects, since delaying feedback may substantially reduce the amount of stimulation presented to infants within the delay groups (Millar &Watson, 1975). Had scheduling been ’Vocal responses were defined following the Rheingold e l al. (1959) criteria as all sounds produced by infants other than protests, $training sounds, coughs, whistles, snorts, or noisy breathing (Ramey & Ourth, 1971, p. 293). ‘ It could be argued that an immediate drop t o baseline level during extinction, as opposed to a more progressive decrease, might indicate that an increase during conditioning was elicitation. However, Ramey and Ourth d o not compare the final minute of conditioning with the first minute of extinction. Instead, they compare the next to last minute of contingency with the first minute of cxtinction, and the next to last and final minutes o f contingency with the second minute o i extinction, despite the observable fact that a substantial drop in responsiveness wcurred during the final minute of conditioning. It is therefore difficult t o b e sure whether clicitation was responsible and, moreover, whether extinction proper or habituation was occurring latterly.

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arranged such that the delay groups had their session extended t o ensure exposure t o an equal amount of stimulation, and had acquisition still failed t o be achieved, then performance under immediate feedback would not be attributable to elicitation. The extent t o which these general findings on social reinforcement of vocal behavior might apply to developmentally delayed infants has been examined (Weigerink, Harris, Simeonsson, & Pearson, 1974). This study extended Wahler’s (1967) comparison of familiar versus novel reinforcer agents t o the vocalization field, and unlike much social conditioning research this study was undertaken in the infant’s home. An unusually extensive procedure covering some 28 days was employed with six infants 11 t o 22 months old, but with Mental Development Indices (Bayley, 1969) less than 50. Basically, the experimental format was an extension of Weisberg’s design, but surprisingly without incorporating either noncontingent or nonresponsive control conditions. Baseline, Conditioning, and extinction phases were included. Composite social stimulation was administered by the mother in the familiar-agent condition, and by the experimenter in the novel-agent condition. The investigators claimed t o have demonstrated an acquisition effect, but unlike Wahler (1967), who found the familiar agent to be the more effective, these investigators found familiar and novel agents t o be equally effective as reinforcing agents. An open question must remain as to whether this less differentiated picture results from delayed infants being less discriminating, the extensive age range of infants, or the lengthy procedure, which might be viewed as a familiarization procedure. These studies, despite their methodological shortcomings, are for the most part generally considered as support for the effectiveness of social reinforcement upon the rate of infant vocalization. Some investigations, by virtue of their more rigorous control procedures (Routh, 1969; Weisberg, 1963), carry considerable weight in this respect. E. ELICITATION OF VOCAL RESPONSIVENESS

The basic problem with most studies, as with the operant smiling studies, is that of effectively differentiating real conditioning effects from artifactual eliciting or releasing effects. Despite the fact that Rheingold et al. (1959) qualified their findings by drawing particular attention to the need for control for elicitation, subsequent investigators with few exceptions have persistently designed studies lacking essential controls and consequently in a post hoc fashion have resorted to looking for fortuitous procedural factors which might discount elicitation effects. There seems t o be little doubt that vocal behavior can be elicited t o greater or lesser degree by social stimuli (e.g., model faces or heads, pictures, schematic faces). Salzen (1963) observed that by 11 weeks of age infants’ vocalizations

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increase in response to brightness or contrast changes in facial and nonsocial stimuli, although facial stimuli produce the most dramatic increase in vocal production at this age. Similar efiects liavc been obtained in 2.5 to 3.0-monthold infants with the presentation 01' thc real face and colored photographs of faces (Polak et al., 1964a). Kagan and Lewis (1965) found female faces to be more effective elicitors of vocalizations ;it 6 months. However, by far the most important comparison to be made at this juncture is between the composite social episode used in conditioning work and the similar eliciting stimuli used in social reactivity investigations. I n making this comparison, the standard nonresponsive baseline condition (low-level elicitor) should be compared with the animated spectacle of the composite reinforcing event with its visual, auditory, and tactile components. Some idea of the extent to which elicitation is a potential hazard in infant conditioning work can best be obtained from social responsiveness studies which have involved the use of real faces, vocalization, and movement as stimuli, since these stimuli approximate the very components of the conventional social stimulation episode. Kagan and Lewis (1965) observed that at 6 months of age infants were vocally far more responsive to the human voice than t o music and tones. Furthermore, the general rule appears to be that where social stimuli are involved, the more realistic the stimulus configuration in terms of animation, etc., the more effective it will be in eliciting social responsiveness, particularly in the case of smiling and vocalization responses. There seems little doubt that elicitation effects must be specifically controlled; however, the conventional baseline, conditioning, and extinction comparisons can no longer be considered the most powerful means of demonstrating contingency effects, unless the strategy of selective reinforcement is employed (Routh, 1969; Sheppard, 1969). The reality of this problem has been highlighted by Bloom and Esposito (1975). These investigators examined social reinforcement of infant vocal behavior, but in doing so they introduced a variant on Weisberg's noncontingent control procedure. It will be recalled that Weisberg (1963) arbitrarily presented the social stimulation on a prearranged random schedule at a rate of four episodes per minute, with the proviso that the interval between one event and the next should be greater than 7 seconds. While this was noncontingcnt scheduling of a sort, it did not constitute matched noncontingent scheduling since the amount of stimulation was the same for all subjects. Moreover, this rate of stimulation (i.e., four times per minute) was considerably greater than the actual rate for the contingent social group (2.8 per minute). A more sophisticated type of matching procedure is lo yoke experimental and control subjects. Admittedly, yoking does have inherent disadvantages, but in this type of experimental situation the advantages of a truly random control (Rescorla, 1967) are far outweighed by the advantages of maintaining density and patterning of stimulation (i.e., interstimulus intervals) which may be critical in control-

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ling the infant’s attention and behavior generally. This yoked control procedure has been employed successfully in nonsocial conditioning studies with infants (e.g., Millar, 1972). Essentially, the feedback generated during the contingency period by experimental subjects is tape-recorded so that it can be replayed subsequently either to the same infant (providing within- subject control) or t o a control infant (providing between-subject control). It is possible in this way to match each experimental infant with a control infant so that only the contingency relationship is altered. In the Bloom and Esposito study the effect of contingent and noncontingent scheduling of social stimulation was examined on the vocal behavior of 3-month-old infants in their homes. Social stimulation was administered by the experimenter. Baseline, contingency, and extinction periods were included. The noncontingent matching procedure was, however, employed only to a limited extent. Schedules of response-independent stimulation were derived from only two experimental infants, who produced the lowest and the highest mean vocalization rates during conditioning. Five control subjects were yoked t o the lowest responder, and three to the highest responder. Noncontingent control infants were thus yoked t o either the lowest or the highest responding experimental infant. All experimental infants showed an increase in vocalization from baseline over the contingency period and a corresponding decrease during extinction. In this respect these data are comparable with those of Rheingold et ul. (1959) and Weisberg (1963), although there are considerable differences in the respective response rates for these studies. Difficulties arise when one notes that vocalization rate was equally inflated under noncontingent scheduling. Social stimulation administered contingently and noncontingently was equally effective in increasing infant vocalization rate. Subtle differences between experimental and control infants were found, however. In an analysis of interresponse times-the patterning of responses-across baseline, contingency, and extinction periods, clear-cut differences in interresponse times emerged for contingent and noncontingent groups. Response-contingent feedback produced a slight reduction in bursts of responses, while with noncontingent stimulation a large increase in bursts of responding was observed. The clear-cut eliciting effect deals a severe blow to many of the less well controlled studies and, on the face of it, might seem t o undermine the entire social conditioning research literature. The relevance t o the literature on conditioned smiling, with its equally poorly controlled studies from the viewpoint of eliciting effects, cannot be overlooked. Bloom and Esposito’s data pose the greatest challenge t o Weisberg’s (1963) findings, especially since the latter incorporated a considerable measure of control. One of the more striking differences between these studies is the respective operant o r baseline Icvels. The operant level for Weisberg’s infants was considerably lower than that in Bloom and Esposito’s study (i.e., one response per minute versus approximately 2.5

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responses per minute). Moreover, Bloom and Esposito’s operant levels were, incidentally, comparable with ihe basal levels observed by Rheingold et al. (1959). Marked differences in rate persisted during the conditioning blocks: Weisberg’s infants achieved a mean rate per minute of 2.8 vocalizations, which is almost comparable with the baseline rates achieved in other studies. Nevertheless, despite generally lower levels of responding, Weisberg’s analysis did Iughlight reliable differences between his contingent and noncontingent social conditions. Aside from differences in response levels, the only other major difference between the Bloom and Esposito (1975) and Weisberg (1963) studies rests on the former’s noncontingent effect. On this point, it is perhaps worth noting that in a long series of investigations involving nonsocial conditioning with slightly older infants, the noncontingent profile obtained has consistently been similar to that obtained by Weisberg (see Millar, 1072, 1974b: Millar & Schaffer, 1972, 1973; Rovee & Rovee, 1969; Watson & Kamey, 1972). Noricontingent scheduling in these studies was never observed to result in an increase in responsiveness, and in several instances response supprcssion was observed. Closer examination of Bloom and Esposito’s study, despite its startling revelations, suggests that it may itself require some qualification with respect t o the yoked control procedure employed. There exists the distinct possibility that, by selecting the highest and the lowest responding infants (i.e., those with the highest and lowest response density) f o r matching purposes, these investigators may inadvertantly have introduced some bias into the procedure. It is probable that operant rate interacts with the density of noncontingent stimulation such that an infant with a high operant level niay on exposure to the low-density noncontingent schedule reveal a difl’erent response profile than if he had been exposed to the high-density schedule. Yoking each experimental infant with a different control infant would help obviate this possibility. Furthermore, matching experimental and control subjects on baseline level before implementing yoking procedures, while considerably more laborious, would provide an even more adequate control. Bloom and Esposito’s noncontingent effect, while highlighting the hazard of elicitation in conditioning studies, is nevertheless quite at variance with the general trend of findings on the effect of noncontingent stimulation on response rate. In this respect, there are several studies which, while not specifically conditioning-type investigations, nevertheless include stimulation conditions which are virtually analogous to noncontingent scheduling, and some examination of these may cast some light o n Bloom and Esposito’s findings. One relevant finding emerges fi-om a study by Webster (1969) in which 6-month-old infants were acoustically stimulated either by tape-recorded vowel or consonant-vowel stimuli. Admittedly, this was not a conditioning study, but in some respects this stimulus piesentation was comparable to noncontingent scheduling. A range of sound stimuli was used, each sound repeated for 50

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seconds with widely varying intonational and rate patterns. During stimulation Webster observed that a reduction of vocal activity occurred for all subjects in response t o both sound types relative t o their baseline levels of vocal production. In the light of Bloom and Esposito’s findings, an increase in responsiveness would have been expected. Furthermore, Webster, Steinhardt, and Senter (1972) have replicated this effect with 7-month-old infants. Frequency of vocalization during stimulation periods was reliably lower than during both baseline and poststimulus periods. These findings, together with Millar’s ( 1 972) findings for noncontingent stimulation, Weisberg’s ( 1 963) data, and the restricted type of yoked control procedure used by Bloom and Esposito, strongly indicate that noncontingent control procedures may be less straightforward than has hitherto been supposed. Moreover, Bloom and Esposito’s assertion that their procedure constituies a proper control niay require some reappraisal. The operant conditioning paradigm, it seems, involves both conditioning and eliciting effects, which at present investigators have difficulty disentangling. The problem may be that the relative balance of conditioning and eliciting effects varies across studies depending upon other factors, such as the contextual salience of stimuli for eliciting the response, and operant levels of responsiveness. Ideally, if coefficients of elicitation in specific experimental contexts could be established, then appropriate adjustment or correction could be made in order to determine the residual conditioning effect. With regard to Bloom and Esposito’s data, a quite subtle effect may have been obtained unwittingly by the unusual yoking procedure, if operant levels are taken into account. In any case these disparate findings attest t o the quite problematic nature of conditioning paradigms with young infants. The extent to which these difficulties are accentuated in the social conditioning as opposed to nonsocial conditioning situations requires close examination. 1:. THE SOCIAL REINFORCER AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS IN SOCIAL CONDITIONING

Social conditioning studies undertaken with infants more or less exclusively involve composite social stimulation. Conventionally the episode comprises a visual component (a smile), a vocal component (three “tsk” sounds), and a tactual component, although occasionally a kinesthetic component is included (picking the baby up and/or rocking it). Having demonstrated global effects, investigators have speculated that particular components may possess greater reinforcing efficacy than other components. Rheingold et al. (1959), for instance, suggested that the presentation of the human face is most effective for conditioning of vocalization, whereas Todd and Palmer (1968) proposed that the human voice may possess particular reinforcing salience for conditioned vocal behavior. Similarly, Brossard and Decarie (1968) found that picking up the

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infant and those reinforcing episodes which included a kinesthetic component were most effective in increasing the rate of infant smiling. Schwartz, Rosenberg, and Brackbill ( I 970) examined in 3-month-old infants the relative reinforcing efficacy of three dual-component reinforcement combinations (auditory-visual, auditory-tactual, and tactual-visual) and the effectiveness of the individual components relative t o each other and the conventional composite auditory-visual-tactile episode, The auditory component consisted of a tape-recorded female voice saying “nice baby,” which lasted 1 second. Visual reinforcement consisted of the experimenter smiling and nodding his head, while tactile stimulation involved rubbing the infant’s abdomen with the palm of the hand. Stimulation episodes lasted 2 seconds, and the usual baseline, conditioning, and extinction phases were used. Elapsed time to achieve a rate of 2.5 times the base rate or until three consecutive 20-minute sessions had elapsed was the criterion. Stimulation that consisted of two of the usual components was found t o be as effective as the full-blown episode. Moreover, no single component was more effective than another. While no noncontingent control was incorporated, Schwartz et al. argued that these stimuli d o not act as social releasers since no additive effect occurs when they are combined. An additive or gradient effect, they argued, would be expected if the stimulus components operated as elicitors or possessed social releasing effects. Similarly, Haugan and Mclntire ( 1972) compared the relative effectiveness of contingent vocal imitation of the infant’s vocal behavior, tactile stimulation, and food for vocal responses in 3-month-old infants. Baseline, conditioning, and extinction phases were distributed over a 9 d a y period. Each type of stimulation was found to be effective in increasing the mean rate of vocalization over baseline level. However, over conditioning blocks vocal reinforcement produced a reliably higher rate of vocalization than food and tactile stimuli. The investigators suggested that the greater variability of the vocal stimuli may have contributed to their greater reinforcing effect. However, there was some delay in administering the food (2 seconds) and tactual stimuli (1 second), but apparently n o delay of the vocal stimuli. Relevant to this point, Millar (1972) has demonstrated that delaying contingent stimulation by as little as 1 or 2 seconds, though not precluding acquisition, resulted nevertheless in reliably lower levels of acquisition than were achieved with immediate feedback. Haugan and McIntire did not include any noncontingent scheduling of stimulation, and therefore it is not possible t o estimate the degree t o which real acquisition as opposed to elicitation was demonstrated. Banikotes and Montgomery ( I 972) focused attention on the vocal reinforcing component and examined whether male and female voices differentially modify infant vocalization rates. A conventional baseline, conditioning, extinction, and reconditioning paradigm was employed, with each period lasting 3 minutes. Three-month-old male and female infants were tested. Vocalization increased

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reliably during the contingency session for all groups, but n o main effects emerged for sex of the reinforcement agent and no interaction effect emerged between sex of recipient and sex of the reinforcing agent. Despite the lack of noncontingent controls the increased rate of vocalizations was attributed exclusively to conditioning. One notable feature of this study was the brevity of the contingency periods compared to the lengthier procedures that have usually been adopted. Rheingold et al. used 3-minute periods per day for t w o days, while Schwartz et al. used two 30-minute periods in one day. If Banikotes and Montgomery’s study does little else, it shows that 3 minutes of contingency experience is sufficient for reliable alteration of vocalization rate irrespective of whether this is ultimately attributable t o conditioning and/or elicitation. Other investigators have sought t o examine contextual factors, rather than t o manipulate reinforcer components. In the case of Todd and Palmer’s (1968) study on the effect of an adult’s presence, however, it could easily fall into either category. Since the adult’s presence was continuous and unrelated to the contingency, the study is considered here under the contextual category. A 5-second tape-recorded episode of a female voice saying “hello baby, pretty baby, nice baby” was administered t o 2- to 3-month-old infants contingent upon discrete vocal responses either in the presence or absence of an unfamiliar adult. In the adult-present condition, the adult was motionless and expressionless. Reliable acquisition was observed for both conditions, although the adultpresent group achieved a reliably higher level of vocal responding than did the adult-absent group. Thus, while human presence does not appear prerequisite to infant vocal conditioning at 2 t o 3 months of age, it certainly enhances the reinforcing effectiveness of the human voice. It is worth noting that Weisberg (1963) observed that presence alone (unfamiliar adult) did not result in any increase in vocalization. In a similar vein, Bloom (1974) demonstrated eye contact t o be a highly specific contextual factor, or setting event. Bloom found reliable acquisition only under conditions where reciprocal eye contact between the reinforcing agent and the recipient was possible. Under conditions where the reinforcing agent wore opaque lenses t o prevent eye contact, no vocal acquisition was observed. However, when the adult wore two-dimensional colored photographs of eyes (which eliminated natural eye and lid movement), acquisition also occurred. Bloom argued that it is only the infant’s regard of the adult’s eyes and not mutual regard that has the catalytic effect of providing for the effectiveness of the stimulation. This finding, while speculative, must be considered as highly tenuous from several viewpoints. Methodologically, the findings are not based on any formally analyzed data, although the graphical data are h a y suggestive. In addition, as has become almost conventional in social conditioning studies, no control for elicitation was incorporated. Finally, Bloom and Esposito’s (1975) subsequent failure to differentiate demonstrably between conditioning and

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eliciting effects in a far more controlled study must render these present findings and their interpretation extremely tenuous indeed. More rigorous replication of this speculative investigation is therefore essential. Broadly speaking, the picture is far from totally negative; on the contrary, there are considerable grounds for optimism. Nonetheless, there does appear to be a strong case for the view that researchers may have been overly optimistic and consequently have been unduly hasty in reaching largely unjustified conclusions. The problem is not necessarily that infant social responsiveness can not be conditioned, but rather that existing data do not provide sufficiently convincing grounds for concluding that increases in responsiveness can be attributed solely to conditioning processes. The principal reason for this lies squarely on the persistent failure to incorporate appropriate control conditions that would handle the ever-present problem o f the eliciting effect of feedback stimuli. This is always a potential problem in any sort of learning task; it is, however, especially accentuated where social responses and social stimuli are involved, and it is primarily for this reason that generalizations and conclusions based on existing data dre particularly hazardous.

111. Mixed Social and Nonsocial Contingencies: the Case for Constraints Previously, it has been tacitly assumed that n o distinction need be drawn between, for example, operant conditioning of motor head movements controlled by the sight of a feeding bottle (Koch, 1967) o r the movements of a mobile (Watson & Ramey, 1972), oI leg kicking controlled by the movement of a mobile (Rovee & Rovee? 1969), and those studies in which crying, smiling, and vocalization responses were brought under the control of composite social stimulation (Brackbill, 1958; Etzel & Cewirtz, 1967; Rheingold et al. 1959; Weisberg, 1963). In spite of the diversity of investigations in terms of procedures, operants, feedback stimuli, etc., this basic assumption that infant learning research constitutes a relatively homogeneous body of knowledge remains essentially intact. The extent to which this remains justified is, however, increasingly open to question; indeed there are indications that a more differentiated picture, while certainly less parsimonious, may nevertheless provide a better fit for the data and also represent a more realistic appraisal of the infant’s learning capabilities. The argument for comparability o f data rests squarely upon the assumption of general process learning theory that reinforcement is a unitary concept and therefore transituational. Essentially stimulus, response, and reinforcement components are considered t o be quite arbitrary-of equal valance and thus interchangeable, with no biological predispositions favoring one type of stimulus-

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response relationship over another (Teitelbaum, 1966). This extreme position of equal associability of response and feedback components has recently been considered untenable and highly unrealistic; however, this view is only slowly infiltrating the laboratories of infant learning researchers and theorists. This fact is particularly surprising since the work of Brackbill and Fitzgerald (1969) forcefully and unequivocally demonstrates within the classical conditioning paradigm that not all conditioned stimuli (CSs) and conditioned responses (CRs) are equally associable. Rather, specific interactions between stimulus modality and response system have been demonstrated, suggesting that associational areas which mediate stimulus and response components may represent a critical parameter which, moreover, is subject t o ontogenetic change. When we consider the social learning paradigm as providing some form of analogy to those naturally occurring contingencies within social interaction, it is evident that there are two parameters which can be either social or nonsocial: on the one hand, the response emitted by the infant; on the other hand, the feedback which is contingent upon the behavior. Conventionally investigators have employed the social reinforcement of’ a social response paradigm, in which both components are social, since this provides considerable face validity as a prototype or model of social interaction. There are obvious difficulties in attempting to define operationally what constitutes a social response and a social event for the infant. Conceivably, a social response can be considered a behavior predominantly associated with or elicited by members of the species, whereas social stimulation can be meaningfully viewed as that class of stimulation emanating primarily from persons in their interaction with others. These criteria are not meant to be rigorous since, at this stage, such an objective would be so fraught with difficulties as t o be counterproductive. Rather, they usefully draw attention t o a distinction between social and nonsocial responses and stimulation. One immediate difficulty arises from the observation that infants, under possibly unusual or unnatural circumstances, do emit “social” responses t o inanimate objects when these “behave” in certain ways (Watson & Ramey, 1972). Likewise, Piaget (1953) and Uzgiris and Hunt (1964) observed infants smiling to inanimate but familiar occurrences. Clearly such observations do pose difficulties; but, nonetheless, the fact that one can elicit social-type responses outside the social context in which they usually appear does not fundamentally detract from the distinction which is being suggested, given the proviso that the behavior under scrutiny is predominantly and habitually made in response to persons. Social reinforcement of a social response, however, hardly exhausts all the possibilities and in fact only simulates one aspect of social interaction. It is quite conceivable that infants may learn a nonsocial response which enables them t o exercise some control over the social environment. Furthermore, naturally occurring contingencies also occur when the infant interacts with the nonsocial

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environment. In doing so he may employ either social or nonsocial responses in order t o achieve some nonsocial end. When these various combinations are examined, it becomes possible for the infant t o employ either 3 social or nonsocial response for social or nonsocial feedback. Admittedly, the nonsocial/ nonsocial case has no direct bearing o i l social responsiveness and for that reason will not be discussed [see Fitzgerald &. Porges (1971) and Millai- (1974a) for reviews of this paradigm] . The sociul rrsponse/nonsocial feedback paradigm may have little direct relevance to our understanding of contingencies in naturally occurring social interaction, but it has been included in order to examine whether in fact infants have differential readiness t o respond to social as opposed t o nonsocial feedback. Thus, having examined the soccul/sociul paradigm, we now turn attention to the mixed social contingency paradigms in which only one of the components can be considered social in nature; those paradigms involve nonsocial reinforcement of social responses and sociul reirifijrccment o f nonsocial responses. A. NONSOCIAL KI IN1 ORC1 M I N1 O r SOCIAL R r S P O N S L S

Weisberg (1 963) included a nonsocial stimulation condition along with a noncontingent control condition. The stimulation consisted of a door chime that was either contingent or noncontingent upon the infant's vocalizations. During nonsocial stimulation the experimenter maintained a motionless and expessionless posture while fixating the infant. Contingent social feedback, it will be recalled, increased vocal output in this study. In contrast, contingent nonsocial feedback produced no comparable increase in responding. Noncontingent presentation of the door chime produced n o discerible alteration from basal level of responding. Admittedly, the possibility exists that in the social/sociui contingency situation the social stimulation was far more complex, considerably inore differentiated, and probably more variable. Therefore, it may have possessed far greater reinforcing salience o r potency than the auditory presentation of a door chime in the presence of a rather atypically behaving adult. The point nevertheless remains that nonsocial feedback has been employed successfully in other learning situations (e.g., Friedlander, McCarthy, & Soforenko, 1967; Millar, 1972, 1974b; Watson, 1967), and theoretically speaking, in terms o f response-contingent stimulus change, some form of acquisition effect would have been expected. Another possible explanation for this failure may rest on the marked strangeness of the experimental situation for the infant, in particular the continuous presence of a motionless and expressionless adult. The extent t o which infants of this age may have certain expectations about social interaction with the mother-or other members of the species for that matter-and the extent t o which some violation effect occurs is a consideration which should not be discounted lightly (Lewis,

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Goldberg, & Campbell, 1969). Had the adult’s presence been contingent along with the door chime, the findings might have been quite different. Smith, Zwerg, and Smith (1963), in one of a series of experiments, used a voice-controlled revolving playpen which temporarily stopped rotating when the infant vocalized. Unfortunately, full details of the infant sample are lacking, but it appears that infants even at the relatively advanced age of 1 8 months were unable t o learn to control the rotation of the playpen by vocalizing in this social operant/nonsocial feedback situation. The fact that these investigators were sufficiently unsuccessful in demonstrating acquisition effects across a wide range of situations does, however, cast doubt on the generality of these findings. Somewhat more equivocal findings emerged from an investigation of nonsocial reinforcement of vocalizations in 10- and 16-week-old male and female infants (Ramey & Watson, 1972). A display panel with a red bull’s-eye and a small panel light positioned about 38 cm from the supine infant’s face provided the visual stimulation. Auditory stimulation consisted of 1 second of a soft tone (1000 Hz) emanating from a speaker located midline behind the infant’s head. Visual feedback alone and combined visual and auditory feedback conditions were used. Under these contingency conditions no acquisition was demonstrated relative to baseline for either male or female infants at 10 weeks of age. At 16 weeks the males but not the females showed evidence of acquisition, but only under visual feedback. Sheppard (1969), however, it will be recalled, was successful in shaping differential responding of vocal and motor operants under both social and nonsocial feedback conditions (tactual vibration of the palm; visual; mother’s voice; and recorded maternal heartbeat). However, this successful integration of a nonsocial leg-kicking operant with social feedback seems very likely t o have been a consequence of the fact that the same infant was examined over a 3-month period. In another study, Ramey, Hieger, and Klisz ( 1 972) provided contingent visual stimulation for vocal behavior in two failure-to-thrive infants (7 and 1 4 months old) and two non-failure-to-thrive control infants (8 and 10 months old), all of whom were hospitalized. One notable feature of the study was that the investigators employed a less episodic form of stimulation than usual, in that feedback was presented at response onset and terminated at response offset. Reliably increased vocalization rates and durations were observed for all four infants, although considerable lag in acquisition was observed in the two failure-to-thrive infants. The extensive age range of these infants, however, makes comparison with existing studies of younger infants not only hazardous but less meaningful. Moreover, the extent to which this innovative synchronous feedback procedure may have facilitated acquisition is unfortunately not known, nor for that matter is the extent to which eliciting effects may have contributed t o the overall effects, since they were not controlled. Generally, there seem to be some grounds for considering that contingent

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nonsocial stimulation, though not precluding acquisition, nonetheless renders successful conditioning of inl‘ant vocalizations a somewhat problematic affair. Unlike Weisberg, Smith et ul., and Ramey and Watson, all of whose studies were undertaken in the laboratory, Tomlinson-Keasey (1972) examined conditioning of vocal behavior in the infant’s home. Light and bell stimulation was used and was administered in a ~liscrirninated-operantparadigm. For one group a tape recording of the mother’s voice was used as the discriminative stimulus, while for a second group a 500-112 tone was used. Presentation of the discriminative stimulus was randomly distributed over the experimental period. The data consisted of difference scores between stimulus-on and stimulus-ojy periods (which incidentally fails to control for any eliciting effect of the feedback stimuli). Despite this shortcoming 3 reliable increase in vocalization was observed under both discriminative cue conditions. To some extent these data d o not support the distinction being suggested, since acquisition did occur in both cases. However, the failure to control l‘or eliciting effects and the fact that basal rates for the four tone-group infants was only just short of being reliably higher than those of the voice-group infants must render these data suggestive at most. On the whole the findings from investigations in the social/nonsocial category are considerably more variable. In contrast, social/soczul studies have generally achieved a far greater incidence of success in conditioning social responses. While far from conclusive, these findings and observations lend support t o the possibility that social stimulation, in cvntiast to nonsocial stimulation, may involve certain intrinsic characteristics which are functionally prerequisite to the shaping of vocal and possibly other social behaviors in the young infant. B. SOCIAL RL IN1 OR( 1 M I N I O r NONSOCIAL RTSPONSLS

The studies discussed so far have involved the modification of social responses by either social or nonsocial st irnulation contingencies. From a different perspective, namely, that of control in social situations. casual observation readily demonstrates that the social enviroiunent is m t controlled solely by the deployment of social responses and social feedback. Instead, it is very often controlled by the deployment of operants which themselves are basically nonsocial in nature. Friedlander (1968), in an extensive short-term study, examined infants’ preferences for variations in auditory stimulation and demonstrated just such an effect. Three infants aged 1 1 to 15 months learned t o manipulate one of two toys in an operant discrimination situation for either the mother’s voice or an extract of organ music. One 1 3-month-old infant exhibited greater response durations on the toy which produced the mother’s voice in 15 of the 17 sessions. Effectively, the in fan t acquired ;I nonsocial response which produced contingent social feedback. More recently, Millar (1975, 1976) examined operant conditioning of a non-

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social response with contingent social feedback in 6- t o 10-month-old infants. These investigations differed in one basic respect from the format of previous work, since there existed no direct relationship between the infant’s response, on the one hand, and the social feedback, on the other. Instead, the relationship was mediated, so that the infant had to respond to a manipulandum in order to produce the social stimulation. Thus, the relationship between response and feedback was indirect, in contrast t o those direct procedures where emission of the social response by the infant produced social feedback. One might speculate that the latter situation is. as far as the infant’s social expectancies are concerned, a more natural link. In the initial study, with 6- and 9-month-old infants, the mother was seated at a table opposite the seated infant but faced away from the infant, thereby precluding mutual regard. During a baseline period (30 seconds) the infant’s discrete manipulative activity t o the manipulandum was monitored. Thereafter, during the contingency period, discrete touching of the manipulandum was immcdiately reinforced by the mother’s briefly turning towards the infant, looking at him, smiling, and saying “peekaboo.” In the extinction period the procedure was the same as during baseline. Control groups experienced matched amounts of noncontingent social stimulation, each experimental infant being matched with a control infant. The performance of the 9-month-old infants clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of contingent scheduling. in that reliable acquisition and extinction effects were obtained relative t o both baseline and the performance of noncontingent control infants. The performance of these older infants, however, contrasted dramatically with that of the 6-month-old infants, who showed n o sign of acquisition. In fact no reliable difference emerged between contingent and noncontingent scheduling at 6 months of age. I n the second study with 7- and 10-month-old infants, the procedure was similar except that in order t o avoid the unnatural gaze-averted posture of the mother during nonstimulation she was concealed behind screens. Feedback consisted of a brief exposure of the mother, who appeared as if playing a “peekaboo” game with the infant. The results confirmed the age X contingency effect of the first study. The conspicuous failure of the 7-month-old infants t o learn contrasts sharply with the findings of previous investigators of the influence of spatially displaced nonsocial feedback on operant conditioning, i.e., proximal versus distal reinforcement (Millar, 1974b; Millar & Schaffer, 1972, 1973). These studies demonstrated that 6- to 7-month-old infants employing the same manipulative response could tolerate considerable spatial discontiguity between the manipulandum and the feedback source, as long as this was within the bounds of the visual field. The amount of displacement can be considered similar to that involved in the two social studies, so the displacement factor would seem to be discounted. The findings from the social studies are paradoxical in at least two respects.

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The most telling contrast is the discrepancy with tlie earliei- cited sociul/social studies undertaken with youngel inlarrts. On the one hand, tire nianipulative response had previously been used successfully as an operant, whereas, on tlie other hand, the efficacy of social feedback has repeatedly been demonstrated independently. Against this, thc failure of tlie 6- to 7-month-old gtoup to integrate these response-feedback components when they ai-c paired outside these contexts renders the pat adox all tire inore salient. Why youngei- infants should manage t o cope with a social resi")nse-feedback contingency as successfully as they cope with a nonsocial contingency, yet be unable or at least less able t o integrate social and nonsocial components when cross-matched, is obviously a matter for conjecture. Millai (1976) suggests that the firrdiiigs might well be construed as indicating the operation of developmental constraints on the acquisition of certain contingency ielationsliips. C. CONSTRAIN I S O N I
Constraints o n learning XI-oss the phylogenetic scale and their implications are only now being recognized by comparative and developmental investigators (Hinde, 1973; Seligman, 1970; Slrcttlcworth, 1972). Classic instances can be cited of operants which are highly i-csistant t o tiaining; for example, Hogan (1964) unsuccessfully attempted to train pigeons to preen for food reinforcement. Similarly, Konorski ( I 967) encountered difficulty in trainiug dogs t o yawn. It is essentially this differential resistance to conditioning that has led investigators to think in terms of constraints, at least at the level of the rcsponse and reinforcement components. Broadly speaking, the position appears to be that isolated failures to demonstrate response acquisition would not pi-operly qualify as instances of constraints. Rather, some pattern 01' reliable failures would be required to indicate the operation of a constraint. Moreover, investigators have tended to consider the case for a constraint to be appreciably strengthened if some rational basis for such a factor can be established, itleally in terms of the evolutionary context of the species. For instance, the observation that the sucking response seems to be deeply ingrained in the behavioral repertoire of the human infant strongly suggests that it has functional or ethological significance for the individual and species alike. The remarkable feats of instrumental sucking demonstrate the facility with which this response system can be rnodified (Sanieroft', 1968; Siqueland & DeLucia, 1969). 'The relative flexibility with which the infant can employ this response system t o control the environment, in relation to other response systems, highlights the critical importance of response factors in learning and indicates the operation of constraints at the level of the response system. One can argue along similar lines with respect t o the differences in the effectiveness of feedback stimuli which have been observed both between and

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within species. In the latter case, those often difficult to interpret sex X modality-of-reinforcement interaction effects (Ramey & Watson, 1972; Watson, 1967) provide an example. Watson. in a study of operant visual fixation in 10and 14-week-old infants under visual and/or auditory stimulation, reported highly variable success in demonstrating acquisition, depending on (a) the sex of the infant and (b) the modality of the stimulation. At 14 weeks of age the female infants learned under auditory but not visual reinforcement, while male infants at this age learned under visual but, surprisingly, not auditory feedback. At 10 weeks the females still learned under auditory feedback, while the males now failed to learn under auditory, visual, and even combined auditory and visual stimulation. Often, it is possible post hoc to erect some rationale for such intricate findings. In the case of Watson’s finding that female infants condition better under auditory feedback, whereas males have more success if feedback is in the visual modality, it can be argued that this observation does fit, though somewhat tenuously, with more general findings that the female is subsequently superior in language skills and the males in visual-spatial skills. Seligman (1970) conceptualized constraints at the level of the responsereinforcer interaction. He postulated a continuum of preparedness to associate, insofar as an organism is prepared to associate certain response-reinforcer contingencies, unprepared for some, and in fact contraprepared for others. Within this framework Seligman pointed t o findings which indicate both between and within species variance in preparedness to associate particular response-feedback contingencies. The importance of Seligman’s position rests largely on the emphasis which he placed on the interactive aspect of the response and feedback components, since this emphasis shows that the organism may be quite capable of making a particular response and also may be shown to be susceptible to a particular type of reinforcement in a specific setting, yet nevertheless be ,unable to integrate these two particular components when they are contingently related. Shettleworth (1972) argues, however, that Seligman’s interactive position is an oversimplification and is flawed by the fact that variability in learning may be effected by several factors which are not associative in nature. In particular, Shettleworth (1972), though far from discounting associative factors, draws attention to motivational state and inhibitory effects induced by reinforcers as nonassociative factors which may prevent the operant being performed. The classical conditioning literature also provides ample evidence for this type of interactive effect in early infancy. Brackbill and her collaborators (Brackbill & Fitzgerald, 1969; Brackbill, Fitzgerald, & Lintz, 1967) concluded that probably the greatest constraint on early classical conditioning is the extent t o which the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the conditioned response (CR) are neurologically compatible. A distinction between somatically and autonomically innervated response systems affords the best fit for their data. For example. sucking and

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eye blinking (which are both somatically innervated response systems) have been conditioned t o tactual and t o auditory CSs in infants, but conditioning could not be achieved with a temporal CS (Abrahamson, Brackbill, Carpenter, & Fitzgerald, 1970; Fitzgerald & Brackbill, 1968). In contrast, the autonomically innervated pupillary dilation and constriction responses have been conditioned t o a temporal CS in infants as young as 2 6 days of age (Brackbill et al., 1967). There is, then unequivocal evidence for the operation of constraints on classical conditioning in infancy. In general, it appears that before classical conditioning can be established, differentiated schemata corresponding to the CS and the CR components must already be established (Samei-off, 197 1). Somewhat speculatively, a distinction has been drawn between social and nonsocial responses, on the one hand, and social and nonsocial feedback stimuli, on the other, in those situations where the components have been crossmatched. There are undoubtedly inherent difficulties in such a position, and these basically revolve around the problem of establishing acceptable operational criteria for social and nonsociul responses and stimuli. In this respect, it is probably more realistic and empirically sound to consider that both response and feedback components may vary in terms of their “social implication and control” for the infant, rather than be subject to some dichotomous classification (Rosenthal, 1973, p. 309). In general, the findings show that little difficulty occurs where both the response and feedback components are clearly either social or nonsocial. The difficulties are encountered when social and nonsocial components are involved in cross-matched contingencies. The speculative issue is one of deciding whether failures to demonstrate operant acquisition in these cases can be attributed to ontogenetic constraining factors or whether, alternatively, other factors-such as differences in reinforcer salience, infant expectancies in social situations, and age-related differential tolerance for violation of these-may be more likely explanatory contenders. D. R I ~ I N I ~ O R C ESALIENCE R

One straightforward possibility is that social stimulation per se may, by its very nature, be inherently more reinforcing than nonsocial events. There can be little doubt that the heterogeneous visual, auditory, and tactile episode has a high loading on complexity, which effectively might render social feedback considerably more salient for the infant. Nonsocial feedback has usually consisted of auditory tones and discrete o r conjugate visual stimulation. In the Weisberg (1963) study there can be liltle question that the auditory stimulation provided by a door chime would be less complex than the composite social episode. One might argue. however, that if nonsocial feedback of comparable salience could be achieved, then the chances are that it would be as effective as

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social stimulation. Alternatively, might it not be the case that there is some intrinsic quality specific t o social feedback that makes it inherently quite different from the nonsocial variety? Social feedback, particularly where a sequence of events is involved, may possess a particular cadence or tempo (impossible t o simulate in a nonsocial context) which might conceivably contribute t o its salient quality for the infant. The supportive contingent social stimulation emanating from animate beings usually relates closely and with a characteristic rhythmic continuity t o the infant’s behavior. This particular characteristic is lacking in experimental contingency situations, where the objective is simply the discrete matching of responses t o feedback with no attention t o the actual flow of synchronized episodes. When humans respond t o their young the potentially jarring discreteness of experimental contingencies does not exist ; instead they attentively follow the baby’s expressive movements and move t o support such movements (Trevarthen, Hubley, & Sheeran, 1975). In the natural situation, observations indicate that mother-infant interaction is far from a discrete affair, since the mother can provide, by subtle distribution of her contingent behavior across time, a certain flow or contiguity to the interaction. It may be precisely this continuous reciprocal contiguity which effectively serves to mesh infant and adult behaviors and thereby gives dyadic social interaction its possibly most striking characteristic: its synchrony. However, even if some substance can be empirically provided for these speculations, they still fail to provide a complete explanation, since the failure of younger infants t o learn under social feedback is not accounted for (Millar, 1975, 1976). Thus, aside from the complexity interpretation, there is likely t o be some other factor which may be partly or wholly responsible for the findings. E. INTERACTIONAL EXPECTANCIES

Bolles (1 972) has drawn attention to the possibility that learning may involve the building up of expectancies corresponding to new environmental contingencies. The importance of this cognitive approach to learning is the role played by previously established expectancies. These may produce expectancy sets which effectively impose constraints upon what the organism can learn about new contingencies. There exists the possibility, in the Millar studies, that the young infant possesses a more rigid set of expectancies about social interaction with the mother when she is in proximity t o him. This could very likely apply to the study in which the mother was continuously visible to the infant. Essentially, the mother was ignoring the infant except during stimulation episodes, and this feature of the stimulation coupled with the unexpected discreteness of the episodes might have violated established social interactional expectancies and

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thus may have been disruptive of acquisition. To account for the age effect requires the postulation of an age-related difference in tolerance for the violation of social expectancies. F. THE RECIPROCAL PLRI ORMANCE FACTOR IN THE SOC I A l /SOCIAL PARADIGM

One potentially important factor which has been ignored by most investigators concerns the very nature of the composite social stimulation. One singularly important feature of the sociul/social type situation has been the reciprocal performance of the operant, such that infant smiling and vocalizing behaviors have generally been reinforced by a composite social event which included the adult in the dyad returning the infant’s smile and vocally replying to the infant. It is not unreasonable t o consider that certain aspects of the animated human face and the auditory characteristics of the human voice might be prerequisite for the conditioning of smiling and vocal responsiveness. It would be unreasonable, however, t o dismiss or ignore the powerful eliciting qualities possessed by these responses (Vine, 1973). In this respect the reciprocal performance of the operant might have a considerable bearing on the extent t o which elicitation may be involved. Indeed, the very fact that certain stimulus configurations possess relatively greater eliciting power may conceivably render contingencies involving such stimuli more natural for the infant. In particular, Haugan and McIntire’s (1972) investigation provides suggestive evidence on this point. Infant vocalizations increased reliably under tactual, food, and vocal stimulation administered separately. However, contingent vocal imitation of the infant’s vocalization produced a reliably greater amount of vocalization than was obtained with either tactual or food reinforcement.

1V. CONCLUSIONS The principal conclusion to be drawn from these findings must surely be that researchers may have been somewhat precipitous in reaching unwarranted optimistic conclusions about the infant’s social conditionability . The data as reviewed are undoubtedly equivocal, in the main because of inadequate controls. On the question of whether infants’ social behavior can be conditioned, there are nevertheless some grounds for answering the question in the affirmative. Several investigations can be viewed as key studies in that they included controls, directly or indirectly, which provide grounds for discounting substantial elicitation effects and considering real conditioning t o have been demonstrated. Brackbill’s (1958) study, for instance, while not explicitly controlling for eliciting effects, nevertheless involved progressive intermittent scheduling of rein-

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forcement; this had the effect of increasing responsiveness, the opposite of what would have been expected had elicitation been responsible. Also, Routh (1969) and Sheppard (1 969) successfully selectively reinforced independent response components and in so doing controlled for elicitation. Routh’s study is of particular relevance in that it demonstrated a conditioning effect over and above what may have been an elicitation effect. There can be no doubt, however, that the most telling evidence against social conditioning comes from Bloom and Esposito’s (1975) study. This study, despite its rigor, is still subject t o some criticism with respect to the yoked noricontingent control procedure, and quite clearly replication of this important study is essential with yoking undertaken on an individual subject basis. Throughout the findings there is evidence that to a greater or lesser extent elicitation effects are present in conditioning studies, and it becomes critical t o be able to discount or subtract this component from the overall effect on performance. Unfortunately comparisons against baseline and extinction performance d o not surmount the problem, so that there is a definite need for investigators to achieve some consensus on acceptably adequate means of overcoming this difficulty. The second objective of this review was primarily heuristic, in that an attempt was made to classify social conditioning contingencies into those in which social responses are paired with social feedback or with nonsocial feedback, and those in which nonsocial responses are paired with social feedback. The relative difficulty in obtaining acquisition with crossmatched contingencies (i.e., those other than social/social) was discussed in relation to constraints on learning. Generally, it seems unlikely that constraints in terms of neurological compatability of response and feedback systems are responsible for the difficulties with crossmatched contingencies (Brackbill & Fitzgerald, 1969). Rather, alternative explanations seem more reasonable, particularly the suggestion of differential salience of social and nonsocial reinforcers and the resultant problem of matching salience. Cadence, another feature of social stimulation, was discussed since it may qualitatively distinguish social stimulation from more episodic or discrete nonsocial stimulation. Finally, infants’ interaction expectancies or social interaction sets were examined with respect t o discrepancies when nonsocial and social events are paired with social responses. At present the findings from cross-matched contingencies situations do little more than give rise to speculation; the extent, however, t o which these alternative explanations can themselves be considered manifestations of cognitive constraining influence is, clearly, still a matter for conjecture. REFERENCES Abrahamson, D., Brackbill, Y., Carpcntcr, Y., & Fitzgcrnld, H. I:. Interaction of stimulus and response in infant conditioning. Psychsomatic Medicine, 1970, 32, 3 19-325.

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Ahrens, R. Beitrage zur Entwicklung dcr Pliysiognoinie und Miinikerkcnnens. Zeitschrifi fiir experimentelle iind AriXewandtc Psj,c,liolopic., 1954, 2, 4 1 4 4 5 4 . 5 9 9 4 3 3 . Ambrose, J . A. The development o f tlic smiling response in early infancy. In B. M . I:oss (Ed.), Detcrniinar7ts o f iiifarrt bchuiiioiir. Vol. I . London: Mcthuen, 1961. Pp. 179-196. Ambrosc. J. A. The concept of a critic:il pcriod f o r the development of social responsiveness in early human infancy. In B. hl. 1 . 0 s ; ~ (I,:d.), Drferniiriarzts of ififant behavrour. Vol. 2. London: Methuen, 1963. Pp. 201--226. Banikotes, F. G., & Montgomery, A. A. Male and female auditory reinforcement of infant vocalizations. Developmerital Ps)'clit~lv,y~~. 1972, 6, 4761181. Bayley, N. Bayley Scales of' Irifhizt Di~i'elo~~iiicrit. New York: Psychological Corporation, 1969. Bloom, K. Eye contact as a setting event for infant operant learning. Joocirnal of Experimental Child P ~ j ~ c h ~ l1974, ~ g y ,17, 250-263. Bloom, K., & Rsposito, A. Social conditioning and its proper control procedures. Journal of Experimerital Child Psychology, 1975, 19, 209-222. Bolles, R. C. Reinforcement, expectancy and learning. Psychological Review, 1972, 79, 394407. Brackbill, Y. Extinction of the smilin: response in infants as a function o f reinforcement schedule. Child Dcveloprnenr. 1958. 29, I 15--1 24. Hrackbill, Y., & Fitzgerald, 11. E. Dcvclopnient o f the sensory analysers during infancy. In L. P. Lipsitt & H. W. Reesc (Eds.), Advances iri child d c i x k p n e n t arid behavior. Vol. 4. New York: Academic Press, 1969. Hrackbill, Y., E'itzgerald, H. E., & Lint/. I,. M. A devclopmental study of classical conditioning. Monographs of the Sociefv for Rcsearc,li iri Child Developrneiir, 1967. 32 (8, serial No. 16). Brossard, L. M., & Decarie, T. G. ('omparative reinforcing effect of eight stimulations on the smiling response of infants. Joirrriul (if Child Psychol~i~y arid Psvcliiatrj~,1968, 9, 51-59. Etzel, B. C., & Gewirtz, J . L. Experimcntal modification of caretaker-maintained high-rate operant crying in a 6- and a 20-week-old inl'ant (Infans Tyrnnnotearus): Extinction of crying with reinforcement of c ) e contact and smiling. Journal of f:iperirnerital Child PSychology, 1967, 5 , 303-317. F'itzgcrald, H. E., & Brackbill, Y. Interstirnulus interval in cia al pupillary conditioning. Psychological Reporrs. 1968, 23, 309-370. I.'itzgerald. H. E., & Porges, S. W. .4 d ~ ~ , ; i dof c infant conditioning and learning research. MerrilLPalmer Quarterl.y, 1971. 17, 70-1 17. Freedman, D. G. Smiling in blind infant.; arid the issue o f innate vs. acquired. Jouriial of Child Psjlcho1og.v arid Psychiatry. 1964. 5, 17 I -I 84. Fricdlandcr, B. 2. The effect of speakt.1 identity, voice inflection, vocabulary, and message redundancy on infants' selection o f v
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Hogan, J. A. Operant control of preening in pigeons. Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behaviour, 1964, 7 , 351-352. Kagan, J., & Lewis, M. Studies of attention in the human infant. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1965, 11,95-127. Kimmel, H. D. Reflex “habituality” as a basis for differentiating between classical and instrumental Conditioning. Conditional Reflex, 1973, 8, 10-27. Koch, J. Conditioned orienting reactions in two-month-old infants. British Journal of Psychology, 1967, 58, 105-1 10. Konorski, J. Integrative activity o f the brain. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. L‘Allier, L. Smiling as a result of aural stimuli. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Montreal, 1961. Laroche, J. L., & Tcheng, F. Phases de sommeil et sourires spontanes. Acta Psychologica, i965,24,1-28. Lewis, M., Goldberg, S., & Campbell, H. A developmental study of information processing within the first three years of life: Response decrement to a redundant signal. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 1969, 34 (9, serial No. 133). Millar, W. S. A study of operant conditioning under delayed reinforcement in early infancy. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 1972, 31 (2, serial No. 147). Millar, W. S. Conditioning and learning in early infancy. In B. M. Foss (Ed.) New perspectives in child development. Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1974. (a) Millar, W. S. The role of visual-holding cues and the siniultanizing strategy in infant operant learning. British Journal o f Psychology, 1974, 6 5 , 505-51 8. (b) Millar, W. S. The effect of social feedback contingent upon a non-social response in sevenand ten-month-old infants. Unpublished manuscript, University of Strathclyde, 1975. Millar, W. S. Social reinforcement of a manipulative response in six- and nine-month-old infants. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 1976, 17, 205-212. Millar, W. S., & Schaffer, H. R. The influence of spatially displaced feedback on infant operant conditioning. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1972, 14, 442-453. Millar, W. S., & Schaffer, H. R. Visual-manipulative response strategies in infant operant conditioning with spatially displaced feedback. British Journal o f Psychology, 1973, 64, 545-552. Millar, W. S., &Watson, J. S. The effect of delayed feedback on infant learning re-examined. Unpublished manuscript, University of Strathclyde, 1975. Piaget, J. The origin of intelligence in the child. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953. Polak, R. R., Emde, R. N., & Spitz, R. A. The smiling response: I. Methodology, quantification, and natural history. Journal of Nervous Mental Disorders, 1964, 139, 103109. (a) Polak, R. R., Emde, R. N., & Spitz, R. A. The smiling response: 11. Visual discrimination and the onset of depth perception. Journal of Nervous Mental Disorders, 1964, 139, 407-415. (b) Ramey, C. T., Hieger, L., & Klisz, D. Synchronous reinforcement of vocal responses in failure t o thrive infants. Child Development, 1972, 43, 1449-1455. Ramey, C. T., & Ourth, L. L. Delayed reinforcement and vocalization rates of infants. Child Development, 1971, 42, 291-297. Ramey, C. T., & Watson, J. S . Nonsocial reinforcement of infants’ vocalizations. Developmental Psychology, 1972, 6 , 538. Rescorla, R. A. Pavlovian conditioning and its proper control procedures. Psychological Review, 1967,14,11-80. Rheingold, H. L., Gewirtz, J. L., & Ross, H. W. Social conditioning of vocalization in the infant. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1959, 52,68-73.

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Rosenfeld, H. M. Time series analysis 01 mother-infant interaction. Paper presented at the symposium o n the Analysis of Motlicr-lntant Interaction Sequences, Suciety for Research in Child Development, Philadclpliia. 1973. Rosenthal, M. K. The study of infant-cnvirr,nmcnt interaction. Journal of Child Psychologv and Psychiatry, 1973, 14, 301-31 7. Routh. D. K. Conditioning of voL..al icsponsi‘ differentiation in infants. Devcloptnerztal PSJ1chdOgy. 1969, 1, 219-226. Rovee, C. K., & Rovee, D. T. Conjugate rcinforcement of infant exploratory behavior. Journal of Experimental Child Psvclro/o,iy, 1969. 8, 33-39. Salzen, E. A. Visual stimuli elicitinp tlrc smiling response in the human infant. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1963, 102, 5 1-54. Sameroff, A. J. The components of sucking in the human newborn. Jourtza/ of Lxperirnental Child Psyclzology, 1969, 7, 36-5 1 . Sameroff, A. J. Can conditioned rcsponscs be cstablished in the newborn infant: 1971? Developmental Psychobgy, 1971, 5. 1-1 2. Schwartz, A,, Rosenber?, D.. & Brackbill, Y . Analysis of the components of social reinforcement of infant vocalization. Psychorromic Science, 1970, 20, 323-325. Seligman, M. E. P. On the generality 01 thc laws of learning. Ps.vcliologica1 Review, 1970, 77,406-4 18. Sheppard, W. C. Operant control o f intnnt vocal and motor behavior. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1969, 7, 30--5 1 . Shettleworth, S. J . Constraints on learning. In I). S. Lehrman, R. A. tlinde, & 1’. Shaw (Eds.), Advances in the studjJ o f ’ h c h ~ ~ i o Vol. r . 4. New York: Academic Press, 1972. Siqueland, E. R., & DeLucia, C. A. Visual rcinforcement of non-nutritive sucking in human infants. Science. 1969. 165, 1144-1 146. Smith, I<. U., Zwerg, C., & Smith, N . 1. Sensory-feedback analysis of infant control of the behavioral environment. Pcrceptltal arid hfotor Skills, 1963, 16, 725-732. Tautermannova, M. Smiling in infants. C‘lrild L)ctdopment, 1973, 44, 701-704. Teitelbaum, P. The use of operant nicthods in the assessment and control of motivational states. In W. K. Honig (Ed.), Operant hcliavior. Areas ojresearch and application. New York: Appleton, 1966. Todd, G., & Palmer. B. Social rcinforccnient o f infant babbling. Child Development. 1968, 39,591-596. Tomlinson-Keasey, C. Conditioning of Infant vocalizations in the home. Joicrnal of Genetie Psychology, 1972, 120, 75-82. Trevarthcn, C., Hubley, P., & Sheeran, 1.. I’sycliolupical actions in early infancy. Recherche, 1975, 5 6 , 4 4 7 4 5 8 . Uzgiris. I. C., & Hunt, J. McV. Cathexis from rccognitive familiarity, an exploratory study. Paper presented at the American Psychulogical Association Symposium to honor J. P. Guilford, 1964, Los Angeles, California. Vine, I. The role of facial-visual sign all in^ in early social development. In M. von Cranach & I. Vine (Eds.), Social communication and movenzent. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Wahler, R. G. Infant social attachments: a reidorcement theory interpretation and investigation. Child Development, 1967, 38, 1079-1 088. Watson, J. S. Memory and “contingency analysis” in infant development. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1967, 13, 508-516. Watson, J. S., & Ramey, C. T. Reactions to response-contingent stimulation in early infancy. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1972, 18, 219-227. Webster, R. L. Selective suppression o i infants’ vocal responses by classes of phonemic stimulation. Developmental Psyclrology, 1969, 1, 410-414. Webster, R. L., Steinhardt, M. H., & Senter, PI. G. Changes in infants’ vocalisations as a

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function of differential acoustic stimulation. Deivlopmental Psj’chology, 1972, 7, 3943. Weisberg, P. Social and nonsocial conditioning of infant vocalizations. Child Development, 1963,34, 377-388. Wiegcrink, R., Harris, C., Simeonsson, R., & Pcarson, M. B. Social stimulation of vocalizations in delaycd infants: familiar and novel agent. Child Development, 1974, 45, 866-872. Zelazo, P. R. Smiling to social stimuli: cliciting and conditioninp effects. Developmental Psychology, 1971, 4, 3 2 4 2 .

MOTHER-INFANT INTERACTION AND ITS STUDY’

Jucwh L . Gewirtz2 NATIONAL INSTITUTk ( I F M h N T A L HEALTH UIld

Elizuhetlz I;. Boyd2 UNIVERSITY O F M A R Y L A N D BALTIMORE COUNTY

I. INTRODUCTION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

11. DIRECTION O F INFLUENCE IN CHILD SOCIALIZATION . . . . A . EARLY ANALYSES . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. RESEARCH ON CHILD INFLUENCE ON THE CAREGIVER . 111. MECHANISTIC AND ORGANISMIC MODELS O F DEVELOPMENT AND INTERACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. THE MODELS CONTRASTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. IMPLICATIONS OF TkIE MODELS FOR DIRECTIONS OF INFLUENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

142 142 144

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IV. STUDY OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN MOTHER AND INFANT IN NATURAL SETTINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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V . LEARNING ANALYSIS 01;“SIMULTANEOUS” BEHAVIORS

VI. AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF MOTHER-INFANT INTERACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 A. DESIGN AND RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 B. DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

’

Several methodological issues conwlered in this paper are also discussed, but less technically, in a concurrent paper that deals with the flow of influence and mutual attachment acquisition in mother-infant interaction (Gewirtz & Boyd, in press-a). Authors’ address: NIMH Laboratory of Developmental Psychology, B2A-25 NIH Clinical Center, Bethesda, Maryland 20014. 141

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V11. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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I. Introduction In recent decades, there has been an increasing realization that there is a mutual flow of influence in parent-child interaction. That is, it is now generally assumed that the behaviors of each interactor can influence the behaviors of the other, to greater or lesser degrees. Moreover, the complexities of the sequential and concurrent features of caregiver-infant interaction in life settings have come into focus. At the same time, at the empirical lcvel there has been an emphasis on (a) the difficulties of describing, or even organizing, these myriad interaction complexities, and (b) the study of the directions of influence in that interaction. In this frame, we will begin our analysis of the study of mother-infant interaction by tracing the modal approach to the direction of influence in environment-child interaction in child socialization from an emphasis on oneway caregiver influence on child t o a two-way caregiver influence on child and child influence on caregiver. Next, we will present two general perspectives on development, the mechanistic model and the organismic model, as convenient vehicles for considering some theoretical and methodological issues that are of current concern for the scientific study of child socialization in general and of caregiver-infant interaction in particular. We will attend particularly to the distinctive assumptions of the two models that are relevant to the study of environment/caregiver-infant interaction and the issue of direction of influence in that interaction. We will consider the implications of the models for the study of interaction and direction of influence in the context of several descriptive approaches to naturalistic caregiver-infant interaction, and will conclude that mechanistic and organismic perspectives have very similar implications for the empirical study of causal influences in that interaction. We will close with an example from our own work, from a mechanistic viewpoint, of an experimental approach to the mutual influence between caregiver and infant in nonsimultaneous interaction.

11. Direction of Influence in Child Socialization A.

EARLY ANALYSES

Traditional theoretical and empirical approaches t o human social and personality development (e.g., psychoanalysis, social learning) have been conceived in a

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mechanistic frame and based, for the most part, on the one-sided assumption that parent (or other caregiver) behaviors are the primary environmental determinants of child behavior and development. If the child’s behavior could at all influence those of the parent, it was assumed that this influence could play but a minor role in the child’s sociali/.ation. Observed relationships between parent and child behaviors were routinely attributed t o the effect of the parent’s behaviors on the child’s behaviors. Within a social learning approach, this assumption generated numerous demonstrations that selected child responses could be conditioned by actual or simulated parent behaviors (e.g., Brackbill, 1958; Etzel & Gewirtz, 1967; Haugan & Mclntire, 1972; McKenzie & Day, 1971; Ramey & Ourth, 1971; Rheingold, Gewirtz, & Ross, 1959; Routh, 1969; Weisberg, 1963). The limitations of this model of child socialization have been increasingly recognized during the past quarter century, and the assumption of mutual influence between caregiver and child behaviors has come t o prevail in diverse theoretical approaches t o child development. In an important instrumental-learning analysis published in 1951, Sears discussed the dyad with its simultaneous focus on the interdependent actions and motives of two or more persons and pointed t o instances where the child could influence another’s behaviors (in particular, the parent’s). Concerned primarily with child development as influenced by the social environment, Sears did not elaborate the implications of the dyadic concept either for existing research data or for prospective research. Further, when Sears’ paper appeared there was an insufficient data base t o compel a reinterpretation within a mutual influence model of child socialization. It may be for such reasons as these that, at the time it was published, Sears’ analysis had little impact on research on the direction of influence in child social development. I n the same decade, Bowlby (1958), influenced by ethological theory rather than learning theory, proposed innate releaser mechanisms whereby specics-specific maternal behaviors may be released by such infant behaviors as crying and smiling. Although Bowlby assumed that the “released” behaviors of the mother became organized around her infant (through an unspecified form of learning) to bind her t o her infant, in that paper he did not actually advance a mutual influence model for mother-infant interaction. During the same period, GewirtL (196 I ) attempted t o fill this apparent gap in Bowlby’s and similar approaches. He detailed a conditioning model for the mutual acquisition of behavioral attachment of mother to infant and of infant to mother. In this model, it was assumed that both mother and infant respond differentially t o the other’s behaviors. With examples from diverse interaction situations, Gewirtz showed how the responses of each could influence (condition) the responses of the othcr. In this conditioning process, stimuli provided by the appearance and behavior of the mother might acquire discriminative and reinforcing control over the infant’s responses, while stimuli from the appearance and behavior of the infant might acquire discriminative and reinforcing

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control over the mother’s responses and denote the acquisition by each of an “attachment” t o the other. Gewirtz’s model was open to the operation of unconditioned stimuli (releasers) for species-specific responses, as identified in animal behavior research and proposed by Bowlby ( 1 958). Paralleling Bowlby’s (1958) releaser-stimulus analysis, Gewirtz (1961) analyzed the learning processes that were potentially involved. He detailed how the infant’s smiles and cries, being reinforced by a mother’s systematic responding to them, in that very same context might be reinforcing other responses of the mother that the infant’s smiles and cries followed routinely. He also noted how often this mutual conditioning might occur without the mother’s awareness that her responses were changing systematically. More recent statements of this approach t o mutual conditioning and attachment can be found in a number of papers by Gewirtz (1969, 1972, in press-a, in press-b). The above-cited analyses had implications for interpreting directions-of-effects or influence in the literature of parent-child interaction. In that literature, cautions were occasionally raised that correlations did not necessarily imply a unidirectional flow of influence from parent t o child ( e g , Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957). However, it was not until well into the 1960s that the issue of the direction-of-influence became central for numerous analyses of early child development and parent-infant interaction (e.g., Bell, 1968, 1971; Harper, 1971; Kessen, 1963; Korner, 1965; Wenar & Wenar, 1963). It was clear that diverse research results could not be interpreted exclusively as the effect of adult behaviors on child behaviors, and nunierous studies were subsequently directed toward assessing the effects of child features or behaviors on caregiver features or behaviors (e.g., Moss, 1967; Osofsky & O’Connell. 1972; Yarrow, Waxler, & Scott, 197 1). R . RESEARCH ON CHILD INFLUENCE ON THE CAREGIVER

We present here a sample of child features or behaviors that have been reported to influence adult features or behaviors. No attempt is made to evaluate the soundness of specific studies surveyed, t o present tlie specific results of those studies, or to evaluate specific authors’ inferences about the child’s behavioral influence where multiple interpretations of tlie results are possible. Further, this summary is limited to humans and is more representative of the mother-child interaction literature in earlier than in later life. Two designs have been used in the main t o examine the influence of child features or behaviors as independent variables on caregiver features or behaviors as dependent variables. In one design, demographic variables such as age, gender, race, socioeconomic status, developmental level, and clinical population, were used as gross indices of child behaviors and related to parent behaviors, whereas in the other design, individual differences in infant behaviors were related descriptively or experimentally t o variations in parent behaviors.

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Studies in which basically d ~ n i o g r a p h i cchild ~ variables were related t o observed parent variables include the following: infant gender was related to differential maternal smiling and talking (Thoman, Leiderman, & Olson, 1972), and infant vocalizations were related by gcridcr t o differential maternal responding (Lewis, 1972; Moss, 1967); infant fussing and crying were related by age to verbally expressed feelings of maternal attachment (Robson & Moss, 1970), and child age was related t o maternal speech (Ferguson, 1964; Snow, 1972); infant developmeiztal level was related to adoptive mother's speech (Beckwith, 197 1); and children's membership in clinical or normal population groups was related to personality characteristics of their parents (Bell, 1964; Connerly, 1968; Klebanoff, 1959; Prechtl, 1963). I n addition, mothers responded differentially to their own and other children in a stnicturetl tutorial situation (Halverson & Waldrop, 1970). Individual differences in child features or behaviors as independent variables affecting parent behaviors were studied descriptively with emphasis on naturally occurring child differences, aud cxperimentally with child diffcrcnces selected or manipulated. Individual difl'ereiiccs in in rant behavior were related to differential caretaking behaviors (Osofsky & DanLger, 1974; Yarrow. 1963); and child behaviors (e.g., dependency) were related to positive and negative teacher contact behaviors (Yarrow rt ol., 197 I ) . Some examples follow of studies that have used experimental or selective sarnpling techniques to assess parent or adult responses to child features 0 1 bchaviors as stimuli: Differential adult behaviors were related to IQ-score labels (liusenthal & Jacobsen, 1966) and to verbal-skill labels (Siegel, 1963) assigned to children with wliom the adults interacted. Parents responded differentially to those behaviors of their daughters characterized as either independent 01-dependent (Osofsky & O'Connell, 1972). The quality of infant cries was ielated to the temperature of the breasts of lactating mothers (Vuorenkoski, Was/-lliickcrt, Koivisto, & Lind, 1969) and to maternal responsivity to crying (Wolff, 1969). h i d the behaviors of adults instructed to train a nominal child to learn LI task t o a specified criterion were conditioned by simulated correct responses 01' that nominal child (Berberich, 1971 ). In the studies listed, only the adult behaviors were bases of the dependent variables;

'We note here inter a h that wlien gross demographic variables are used to index behaviors, the level o f analysis o f the independent, child variables is remote from the level of the dependent, parent variables. 'Illis use of independent and dependent variables at discrepant levels of analysis may be justified occasionally under a research tactic where the gross variable serves as a first appro\irnation to the independent variables at the appropriate analytic level. Nevertheless, a serious cost of this discrepancy between levels of analq-sis is that a number of interpretation< 01' thc f!inctional relationships reported in these studies become possible. Numerous plausihlc assumptions can be made to reduce the gross independent variables t o the child features o r behaviors that, under the theory used, are assumed to control the observed adult featurc? o r behaviors.

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however, in principle, both adult and child behaviors i n interaction could be studied as dependent variables. Several studies illustrate attempts t o preserve the sequential flow and integrity of dyadic behaviors in naturalistic observations of mother-infant interactions: infant fretting and crying were found likely t o initiate maternal behaviors of vocalization and rocking (Lewis & Lee-Painter, 1974); infant sucking patterns were found to be related to maternal movement (Richards, 1971); and conditional probabilities were reported for related shifts in mutual infant and maternal gaze states (Stern, 1974). We will elaborate further on such approaches to caregiver-infant interaction following the discussion of mechanistic and organismic models of development.

111. Mechanistic and Organismic Models of Development and Interaction In this section we outline the mechanistic and the organismic views of development, as discussed by Overton and Reese (1973; Reese & Overton, 1970; Overton, 1973, in press), to provide a context for considering environment/caregiver-infant interaction and the flow of influence within that interaction. These two general models provide a useful vehicle for examining some theoretical and methodological approaches to interaction and to the direction of influence within it. A. THE MODELS CONTRASTED

Mechanistic models of development assume that the organism’s behavior may be completely predicted from a knowledge of the antecedent material and efficient causes of that behavior. As a corollary, the organism has been termed “reactive” t o external events. However, this “reactivity” is a purely formal metaphor, entirely a function of the assumptions such models make about causes and effects. The behavior of the organism may act, or operate, on the environment as “cause” at some points in time. However, as cause, this behavior is conceived to be entirely a function of the antecedent material and efficient causes of it. It is assumed also that the interactions of the behaviors of the organism and of the environment can be meaningfully analyzed into sequential components t o demonstrate influences between the two behavior sets. Such interactions are defined as mutual actions in that they imply sequential causality and a unidirectional influence from antecedent cause to effect (Baltes & Reese, in press; see, also, Baer. as quoted in that same paper). In this frame, development is viewed as quantitative change in behavior that, ultimately, can be reduced to or predicted from the history of the material and efficient causes of

the organism’s behavior. Further, within mechanistic models this prediction and control constitute an explanatiou of behavioral development. Experimental manipulation of the behavior o f the organism and the environment to identify the material and efficient causes o f behavior-the controlling variables-is often the preferred method of investigating research questions derived from niechanistic models. Organismic models of developiiient view the organism (and the environment) as inherently active and constantly changing. It follows from the assumption or metaphor of an “active” organism that the organism’s behavior cannot be predicted completely under those niodels. O n a priori grounds, organismic models assume that the behavior of the organism and the behavior of the environment are interdependeiit and, Iherefore, that their interaction cannot be meaningfully analyzed into sequences of cause and effect (Overton, 1973). Such interactions are defined as strong rcciprocal interactions and arc assumed to involve simultaneous, rather than sequeiitial, operations of cause and effect, i t . , reciprocal causality. That is, the heliavior of the organism may be “effect” and the behavior of the environment “cause” and, simultaneously, the behavior of the environment may be “et’fect” and the behavior of the organism “cause” (Overton & Reese, 1973). I t is ill the sense that each variable may be both the cause and the effect of the other, siniultaneously, that the influence of the organism and the environment is termed “bidirectional” by Reese and Overton. Natural developmental changes i n behavior are viewed as qualitative, emergent changes, the products of strong I-eciprocal interactions, that may not be predicted from an analysis of component parts or antecedents of the behavior. Under the organismic model, t h e basic causes of behavior are final and formal, i.e., teleological, in that be1iavior:il change is viewed as directional and due to the essential nature of the form o r structure of behavior (Overton & Reese. 1973; Reese & Overton, 1970). Howevci, inaterial and efficient causes are assumed t o function either to inhibit or t o facilitate these natural structural changes, which are not themselves open to spccific empirical determination. Hence, empirical research on such qualifiers of natural development cannot, in itself, lead to the complete explanation of this developnient. Under the organismic approach, descriptive rather than experimental study of the behaviors of the organism and the environment as a unit is typically preferred for discovery of the teleological principles of organization and structure that explain behavioral development. B

IMPLICATIONS or THI MOD€ LS I OR DIRECTIONS OF INFLUENCI

Overton (1973, p. 86) has noted that, in principle, organismic assumptions of an organism and environment that are interdependent and spontaneously and constantly changing actually preclude the experimental analysis of directions of influence in strong reciprocal interactions. However, it appears that direction of

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influence in interaction may be conceptualized in the frame of an organismic approach in at least three contexts, when: (1) strong reciprocal interactions are assumed and the model incorporates assumptions about the relative influences of causes such that some influences comprising these interactions are more effective than others; (2) strong reciprocal interactions are at issue and some of the behaviors of individual members of the dyad are efficient or material causes that inhibit or facilitate changes within these interactions; or (3) the “convenient fictions” of independence and sequential causality arc adopted, and some interactive behaviors of the organism and of the environment (or of a second organism) may be meaningfully analyzed into independent, static components such that routine descriptive, experimental, and statistical methods apply t o their study. Given these working assumptions, such interactions are defined as weak reciprocal interactions (Overton, 1973, pp. 86-87; Overton & Reese, 1973, p. 79). Under an organismic model, it is apparently not possible t o distinguish strong from weak reciprocal interactions on an a priori basis. When routine empirical analyses of interactions yield results consistent with an organismic theory, it can be concluded that they were meaningfully analyzed and are, therefore, weak reciprocal interactions. If the empirical analysis of components of the interaction yields results that are anomalous or inconsistent with a theory, it can be concluded that these interactions were not meaningfully analyzed and are, b y definition, strong reciprocal interactions (Reese, personal communication). On a priori grounds, it would not be possible t o study experimentally the assumptions of the relative degree of influence within strong reciprocal interactions. However, the study of facilitative or inhibitory effects on strong reciprocal interactions by material and efficient causes, and of weak reciprocal interactions, would not differ operationally from that of mutual actions described for mechanistic models. That is, in operational terms, the empirical study of direction of influence in both weak reciprocal interactions and mutual actions would be the study of unidirectional influences or one-way causality. On this basis, therefore, the two disparate perspectives, mechanistic and organismic, appear to have similar implications for studying the direction of effects in interaction. At the same time, mechanistic models with their emphasis on sequential causality routinely would attempt to order, or relate to antecedent or concurrent variables, phenomena that, t o organismic theorists, might connote reciprocal causality and/or facilitative or inhibitory effects on the formal course of development. In principle, mechanistic models assume that the complete empirical determinants of development can be specified, whereas, in principle, organismic models assume that development is a function of strong reciprocal interactions that have no specific empirical determinants. In the context of our earlier discussion of influence in caregiver-child interaction during child socialization, the study of the direction of influence neces-

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sarily involves unidirectional or sequential causality: the behavior of one member of the dyad is considered to be constant or is held constant-the independent variable-and its effect on the behavior of the other member of the dyad that is free to vary-the dependent variable-is assessed. Thus, in an empirical, though not necessarily in a theoretical, context we have raised the issue of direction of influence to correct traditional approaches that focused almost exclusively on the study of unidirectional influence from parent (or environment) t o child and hence t o provide a focus for the unidirectional influences of both caregiver and chdd in the interchange. The theoretical assumptions about the basic chai-acteristics of the organism and behavior and the interpretations of the observations depend on the theoretical approach employed. Under an organismic model, the observations could connote simultaneous bidirectional influences. Under a mechanistic model, these same observations could connote simultaneous unidirectional influences. In Section V we will describe approaches t o the study of such simultaneous unidirectional influences within a mechanistic approach.

IV. Study of Interactions between Mother and Infant in Natural Settings Mother-infant interaction in natural settings often involves numerous actor turns and behaviors that can occur concurrently and/or in rapid succession, with overlapping durations. Even with devised behavior categories available. the interaction flow between a mother and her infant could be so extensive as to make difficult even the recording of the details of the flow of interaction in such unrestricted life settings. Moreover, a few minutes of observation of the behavior flow could generate very considerable amounts of data, including myriad unique sequences. Some might conceive of such phenomena as reflections of strong reciprocal interactions, as units that cannot be readily analyzed into components and that involve simultaneous rather than sequential operations of cause and effect. We concluded in the preceding section that, on a priori grounds, under an organismic approach the experimental study of direction of influence within strong reciprocal interactions is precluded. It may be argued that the organismic assumptions of interdependence and spontaneous change, when taken to their logical extremes, preclude even the descriptive study of interaction phenomena that are assumed to be a function of strong reciprocal interactions of the behaviors of the organism and environment, without the “convenient fictions” of independence and behavioral stability, as the categorization of these behaviors implies independent and static characteristics. Yet assuming that such phenomena may be studied empirically, we will here sample alternative descriptive methods that have been used t o study motherinfant interaction in natural

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settings, to compare a descriptive approach to mutual actions w i t l n a mechanistic frame by J . L. Gewirtz and Gewirtz ( I 965) to three descriptive approaches to the complex details of the interchange flow that may reflect the organismic concepts of strong reciprocal interactions. In this comparison we will attempt to determine whether the organismic approach, which emphasizes reciprocal causality with interdependent and emergent phenomena, implies descriptive methods that are different from those implied by the mechanistic approach, which emphasizes sequential causality in terms of independent and stable categories for environment and behavior. It should be noted that the authors of the latter three approaches are not necessarily committed to the study of development as a function of strong reciprocal interactions. A procedure was specifically devised by Gewirtz and Gewirtz to record mutual actions in interaction occurring in natural settings(J. L. Gewirtz & Gewirtz, 1965; H. B. Gewirtz & Gewirtz, 1969). Retaining actor reference, the method emphasized the sequential order of behavior and stratified behavior elements according t o (a) whether or not the behaviors occurred in interaction, (b) background factors and persons, and (c) thematic settings (e.g., feeding). The determination, in interaction, of the conditional probabilities of each behavior of an actor being followed by each behavior of the other actor could be made. Those authors also employed a behavior-free pattern categorization of interaction in terms of actor turns and identities. Thus, the symbol “CMCM” represented a four-turn interchange sequence initiated by a behavior of the infant and terminated by a behavior of the mother. Gewirtz and Gewirtz related distributions of various of these interaction indices to such variables as identity of the interactor, thematic setting, place of interaction, and time of day, as well as t o such demographic independent variables as sibling order, group child-rearing conditions, and age. Lewis and Lee-Painter (1974) presented four methods of analysis of naturalistic observations of mother-infant interactions: (1) overall frequency of types of behaviors of mother and infant; (2) frequency of types of behaviors occurring within a 10-second period, without actor reference; (3) two-actor sequences in a 10-second period with each actor’s behavior referenced as initiator or as response; and (4) conditional probabilities of transitions from the following states on single 10-second trials: neither mother nor infant behaves; infant behaves; mother behaves; both behave; or mother behaves t o another and infant behaves. Lewis and Lee-Painter (1974) have pointed out that these methods of analysis are of single actor or static elements of interaction and are not of interaction as independent of these elements. Also, they have suggested that alternative methodologies may need to be developed to study the “flow” of interaction, independent of its elements. In the context of the formation of attachment, Hartup and Lempers (1973) proposed that a description of the structural properties of interaction is provided by group profiles of the overall or niean frequency of the behaviors of both

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infant and mother, without actor reference. Further, these authors considered that the second method of Lewis and Lee-Painter (1974), that of giving behavior frequencies within a 10-second period without actor identification, describes interactions as units rather than in terms of their individual components. Hartup and Lempers presented three response indices of attachment that were described as a composite of the behaviors of both interactors without referencing either actor in descriptions of the interaction unit: (1) distance between interactors, (2) dyadic gazing, and (3) dyadic mimicry. Brazelton, Koslowski, and Main (1974) developed a method of describing one-minute observations of mother-infant interactions, which they sampled longitudinally. Their intention was to maintain the integrity of the interaction chain by delineating cyclical patterns of attention and nonattention on the basis of the type and number of concurrent mother and infant behaviors. They described the infant’s attending behaviors as building up gradually to a peak intensity and frequency and then declining gradually. They described three general patterns of maternal response to the infant’s patterns of attention and nonattention: (1) increasing behavior during attention and withdrawing during nonattention; (2) increasing behaviors during nonattention; and (3) maternal attention and nonattention that is out of phase with the infant’s cycle. The four descriptive approaches surveyed are similar in that, at the observational or data collection level, behavior elements of the interaction are recorded. The data collection methods differ on the durations of the interval in which behavior elements are sampled and in the categories of behavior elements observed. At the data reduction level, the approaches are similar in their attempts to extract regularities or patterns of either concurrent or nonconcurrent behaviors of the two actors. Those who extract regularities or patterns of change without actor reference (e.g., Hartup & Lempers, 1973; Lewis & Lee-Painter, 1974, method 2 ) represent novel approaches. As the actors are not referenced, the resulting profile of behaviors docs index the interaction as a unit. However, without actor reference, there is a loss uf interesting regularities (such as behavior duration and identities o f initiators) and of sequences of actor behaviors. Further study can indicate whether the use of this technique will provide useful additional leverage on the process of interaction. As expected, inferences about directions of influence made from the observations are similar also in that sequential causality and independence are assumed. For example, Hartup and Lempers (1973) report that the frequency of dyadic gazing concurrent with other behaviors decreases over time. From this observation they conclude: “As the cognitive and motor apparatus of the child changes, the proportion of gazes in conjunction with other modes of contact decreases” (Hartup & Lempers, 1973, p. 247). I n this instance, the inferred developmental changes in the child’s capacities influence the frequency of beliaviors in the

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interaction. In a similar fashion, Brazelton ef al. (1974) propose that in motherinfant interactions the mother who reduces the intensity and frequency of her responses t o decreases in infant attentive behavior maintains longer periods of interaction. Therefore, data collection methods and inferences about directions of effects of the disparate mechanistic and organismic models are similar. Data observation depends on the analysis of the stable and independent components of interaction. Inferences about, or definitive empirical demonstrations of, directions of influence in interaction depend on assumptions that allow for the study of weak reciprocal interactions (under organismic models) or efficient and material causes with routine experimental and statistical methods. The heuristic functions of the two theoretical perspectives, for guiding and interpreting research, would be dissimilar. Within the organismic approach, research would focus on the (1) descriptive study of the course of development to discover the formal causes of development, which are not open t o empirical determination, and (2) facilitative and inhibitory effects on the course of development. Mechanistic models have been developed t o order sequential relations between environmental and behavioral events. Within such an approach, research would focus on the study of the functional relations among sequences of variables, t o provide the description and determinants of development.

V. Learning Analysis of “Simultaneous” Behaviors In some analyses of mother-infant interaction, there is a premium placed on assessing simultaneous or concurrent behaviors of both members of the dyad. We explore here briefly the feasibility of applying an instrumental-conditioning paradigm to the study of direction of influence in the interaction of concurrent behaviors. It might be concluded that the assumption in a conditioning approach of sequential causality between stimulus and response units as cause and effect implies that the independent and dependent variables can only be defined discretely and sequentially in time. However, this is not the case. Consider the example of interaction patterns observed in the naturalistic study of caregiver-infant interactions cited earlier (Brazelton er al., 1974). Suppose it is hypothesized that the caregiver monitored the infant’s patterns of nonattention and attention and maintained optirnal durations of attentive interaction by decreasing the level, in number and intensity, of behaviors concurrent with decreases in attentive infant behaviors. To test this hypothesis of the direction of influence between concurrent interactive behaviors, the caregiver’s behaviors could be defined as being at one of two levels of an independent variable: (1) providing a constant level of stimulation and (2) decreasing the level of stimulation. The caregiver could then be instructed to behave, alternatively, in these two manners toward the infant, concurrent with the infant’s decrease in atten-

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tive behavior. In this way the effect of caregiver behavior on the concurrent duration of the infant’s attentivc behavior could be assessed. Similarly, the stability of the patterns of the infant’s attentive behavior, either on cue or simulated, could be manipulated systematically to assess its effect on the caregiver’s maintenance of level of stimulation t o the infant. If then it were found that each interactor’s behaviors affected the other’s, when one interactor’s behaviors were held constant and the other’s behaviors were free t o vary, there would be some basis for the inference of mutual influence at a theoretical level. In order to analyze the effects of a caregiver’s behaviors on the infant’s behaviors, or vice versa, it has bceri thought necessary t o manipulate or t o hold constant either the caretaker’s or the infant’s behaviors. However, the working assumption has been that the observed functional relations would be valid when these behaviors are free t o vary i n natural interaction. Further, for cases of multiple determinants operating in an experimental context, where the effects of some factors are controlled, it has been routinely assumed that the furictional relations resulting from these procedures are operative in a context in which these multiple factors are free to vary in natural interaction. Further, the study of the effects of each interactor’s behaviors on the other’s might reveal ways in which different features of the behaviors of each are affected, that would better explain the pattern of their interaction when the behaviors of both are free to vary. There is another way t o look at the study of concurrent influences, in the frame of a mechanistic model like the instrumental conditioning paradigm. It may be assumed that a response of the caregiver (C, ) may function t o condition a response of the infant ( I , ) and that, simultaneously, another response of the caregiver (C,) may be conditioned by another response of the infant (I2). Wirhin response systems, the influence of C , on I , and the influence of Iz on C, would be conceived to be unidirectional. However, between response systems the influence is concurrent: at the same time that caregivcr behaviors can be influencing infant behaviors (C, on I , ) , infant behaviors can be influencing caretaker behaviors (I2 on C2). We now turn t o a first approximation of the experimental study of motticrinfant interaction, with emphasis on the direction of influence in that interaction. Examples will be presented from sonie contrived studies of the conditioning of maternal responses by infant behaviors.

VI. An Experimental Analysis of Motherlnfant Interaction A. DESIGN AND RESULTS

The design and results of two studies are described here. These studies begin an experimental program on the direction of influence in mother-infant inter-

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action. They illustrate research derived from a mechanistic model that emphasizes sequential causality via an instrumental conditioning paradigm (Gewirtz & Boyd, in press-a). Under a mechanistic model, this interaction is defined at both theoretical and empirical levels as mutual action (Baltes & Reese, in press). The influence that caregiver behaviors can have on infant responses in interaction has abundant experimental documentation (e.g., Brackbill, 1958; Routh, 1969). Hence, in these two completed experiments, emphasis was placed on studying the influence that infant behaviors can have on a mother’s response in interaction. The mother-infant interaction was contrived experimentally and the infant’s behaviors in the interaction were simulated. The mother and (nominal) infant were on opposite sides of a one-way mirror, with the mother facing the mirror side (Fig. 1). In these studies, each of eight middle-class mothers was asked to serve as “experirnenter” in an investigation of whether infant “subjects” could learn that their behaviors can have social consequences. Each mothcr was asked to provide these consequences by saying a short phrase (M) immediately following (i.e., when cued by) representations of one of her infant’s behaviors (I,,, ). A seemingly responsive but incidental behavior ( I R + ) , attributed t o the mother’s own infant, was identified for her as merely occurring in

Fig. 1. View from the infant’s darkened room, showing positions of infant (with a doll in infant’s seat) and o f mother (demonstrated by a modell in lighted room on the other side of one-way mirror.

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the situation. An explicit attempt was made t o give the mother no indication to attend t o that incidental infant behavior (IK+), much less to foster it. That infant behavior (IR+) was then presented contingent on one of the mother’s verbal and/or expressive responses (MI<). The actual purpose of the learning experiments was to determine the reinforcing efficacy of those seemingly responsive, but incidental, infant behaviors--vocalizations or headturns (IR+ )-for everyday maternal responses-verbali/,ations and/or facial expressions (ME< ). Specifically, in Experiment 1 , each mother was asked t o say a phrase (M) immediately following her infant’s headturns to her (I,,, ). Incidental vocalizations ( I R + ) attributed t o her infant were then presented contingent on the mother’s verbal phrases accompanied by her smiles @IR), to determine the reinforcing effectiveness of the infant vocalizations (IR+ ) for those maternal social responses (MR). In Experiment 2 , the elements of this paradigm of instrumental conditioning were reversed and extended to a study of the influence of a different infant behavior, the headturn to the mother (IR+), as a potential reinforcer for different maternal expressive response ( M R ) . Each mother was asked t o say a short phrase (M) immediately following (i.e., when cued by) her infant’s vocalizations (I,,, ). To detemiine the reinforcing effectiveness of those infant headturns to the mother ( I R + ) for her expressive responses (MR), the infant headturns were then presented contingent on her facial expressions (in one case crossed with her verbal responses). The maternal expressive responses (MK)that were reinforced were full smiles, partial smiles, and nonsmiling, clipped and sustained oral expressions, and smiles and nonsniiling accompanying particular verbal classes. The results of the two experinients are summarized in Figs. 2, 3, and 4. Contingencies were in effect in the two studies until the responses of each mother reached a criterion increase; therefore, the group curves charted in Figs. 2 and 3 are representative of the individual curves. For Experiment 1, Fig. 2 shows the mean response frequency curves for the reinforced verbal category accompanied by smiles on the first two arid the final three 45-trial blocks of the three conditions the four mothers had in common. Under Conditioning 1 and Conditioning 2, a maternal verbal category accompanied by smiles was followed by a vocalization attributed to the mothers’ infants. Under the Reversal 1 condition, this contingency was removed from that maternal response class and was, instead, provided following the alternative verbal response accompanied by smiles. Inferential statistical tests applied to the pattern of slopes of the conditioning and reversal curves of Fig. 2 showed that the incidental infant vocal behavior, when applied contingently on the maternal response charted, functioned as a reinforcer t o condition that response. Consequently, in this instance the incidental vocalizations attributed t o the offspring of the mothers were shown to influence maternal behavior, as indexed by the learning effected in the mothers’ responses (Cewirtz & Boyd, in press-b).

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REVERSAL 1

CONDITIONING 1

L-4-

1

2

3

4

5

CONDITIONING 2

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Fig 2. Mean frequencies o f the verbal-with-smile response first reinforced in the Conditioniizx 1 treatment, under three treatments with infant-vocalization reinforcement (Mothers 1, 2, 3, and 4 ) .

For Experiment 2, Fig. 3 shows the mean response frequencies, for the reinforced maternal facial expressions, of the terminal 45-trial block of Conditioning 1, Reversal 1, and Conditioning 2, of the three mothers who participated in all three treatment conditions. Under Conditioning 1 and Conditioning 2, the representation of a headturn t o the mothers, attributed t o their infants, followed a maternal facial expression. Under the Reversal 1 condition, this contingency was removed from that maternal facial expression and was, instead, presented after an alternative facial expression of the mother. Inferential statistical tests applied to the pattern of means charted in Fig. 3 showed that the incidental infant headturn to the mother functioned as a reinforcer t o condition the facial expression of the mother. Hence, as in Experiment 1, the incidental infant response functioned as a reinforcer t o influence the maternal responses (Boyd & Gewirtz, 1976). This learning can be illustrated for an individual mother. Figure 4 presents response data for Mother 5 , whose full smiles, and then whose partial smiles, were conditioned by contingent infant headturns t o her. As it was necessary for that mother to withdraw from the study, she was the only one of the four mothers in Experiment 2 who was not subjected t o a Conditioning 2 procedure. Hence, her data did not contribute t o the means that are charted in Fig. 3. Figures 2, 3, and 4 demonstrate that stimulated infant vocalizations (in Experiment 1 ) and headturns to mother (in Experiment 2) functioned as reinforcers t o

/:;I 1 Mother-Infant Interaction and Its Study

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CONDITIONING 2

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t a w: 15

10

4 FINAL 45-'TRIAL BLOCK

Fig. 3. Mean frequencies (Mothers 6, 7, and 8) of the expressive response first reinforced under Conditioning I , for the terminal 45-trial block in each of three treatments.

condition the mothers' verbal phrases and/or expressive responses. Hence these maternal social responses canie readily under the control of what, in the interactive context, appeared to be the responsive vocal or headturn behaviors of the mothers' own infants. Systematic postexperimental interviews and unsolicited comments during the course of the studies suggested that learning

full smiles

"

Partial smiles

It I

Fig. 4. Frequencies of full smiles, partial smiles, and nonsmiles for Mother 5 under three treatments with infant-headturn reinforcement.

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occurred without the mothers’ being aware either that (a) there were infant vocal or headturn behavior contingencies in effect for their verbal and/or expressive responses, (b) their responses had been conditioned, or (c) the behaviors of their infants had been simulated. These conclusions received support also from the fact that, in Experiment 2 , expressive responses were conditioned definitively even though mothers were not asked to make them. B. DISCUSSION

In the studies reported, mother-infant interactions were experimentally contrived to facilitate investigation of the interaction process by demonstrating selective functional relations among the behaviors of mother and infant. This procedure markedly reduces the rich and complex detail of natural mother-infant interaction, on the assumption that it is not necessary to capture all or even many possible features of life interactions to demonstrate the plausibility and utility of a theoretical conception. Therefore, our initial approach has been to delineate a context for interaction that involves very few actor turns and a single imposed sequence. With this experimental tactic, functional relationships or direction of influence among the sequenced behaviors of mother and infant can be determined definitively. This tactic also facilitates a demonstration of the relevance and utility of an instrumental-conditioning model to account for the influence of the behavior of one actor, the infant, upon the behavior of the other actor, the mother. Because interaction phenomena in natural settings may involve behavior elements that occur concurrently, in rapid sequence, and overlap differentially in duration, it is difficult to analyze them in the detail required to demonstrate their relevance or irrelevance to a particular model such as operant conditioning. This is not to conclude that such conditioning principles operate only under highly restrictive conditions. Rather, they can be shown to operate definitively only under highly specified conditions. At the same time, the simplified interaction contrived in the present studies shares salient features with natural mother-infant interaction. Although simplified and in part simulated, the sequence of maternal verbal and expressive behaviors followed by infant vocalizations, or of maternal facial expressions followed by infant turning toward the mother, are like behavior sequences that occur routinely in mother-infant interaction in life settings. Therefore, it is proposed that the reported results have validity for a portion of mother-infant interaction in natural settings and that mutual-conditioning processes may underlie many of these interactions. At present, the usual descriptive approaches to mother-infant interaction in life settings sample and summarize interaction instances that are relatively simple, involving few response elements in discrete or in convenient overlapping time periods. Indeed, the examination of the four descriptive approaches indi-

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cates, on an empirical level, that the interactions they described are not unlike those studied in the contrived situation we described here. By restricting focus to a small sample of interaction, the experimental tactic employed in the studies we reported is not unlike those descriptive tactics used to sample interactions in order to extract regularities within and between actor turns in the natural setting. Indeed, we know of no observation tactic that is capable of efficiently organizing the complexities of mother-infant interaction in life settings, except when (a) only a limited segment of the interaction instances is sampled, (b) those instances are relatively simple, involving few response elements, which occur in discrete or otherwise convenient periods of time, or (c) features of interaction sequences are abstracted. Admittedly, it is important to map mutual behavioral regularities as they occur in the natural environment. However, the functional implications of these regularities must often be presumptive in the absence of experimental or statistical manipulations. Because it facilitates the determination of functional relations between interactor behaviors, the experimental tactic employed in the studies reported offers a promising alternative to routine descriptive approaches of observing natural interaction on its own terms. It is planned to extend the results of these studies to a demonstration of the mutual conditioning of the actual behaviors of both the infant and the mother. Initially, it is planned to demonstrate a discriminative-cue function of an actual infant’s behavior for a mother’s behavior and the reinforcement control of this actual infant behavior by another of the mother’s behaviors. In these contemplated studies, the simulated mother-infant interaction will more closely approximate natural-setting interactions than was the case in the studies reported. As our experimental simulations of mutual conditioning in mother-infant interactions come to approximate more closely naturally occurring interactions, a conditioning account of the development of a substantial portion of these interactions will become increasingly plausible.

VII. Summary and Conclusion We have discussed the direction of influence in child socialization in general and in caregiverinfant interaction in particular. Theoretical and methodological approaches to caregiverinfant interaction and the directions of influence within that interaction were discussed in the context of two general theoretical perspectives for human development, the organismic and the mechanistic. These disparate models imply very different conceptualizations of behavioral development. It was concluded that, as they are presently conceived, the implications of the two disparate models are very similar for the empirical study of the directions of effects within caregiverinfant interaction. In the context of an organismic

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model, it appears that the empirical study of interaction and of the direction of influence in interaction is possible either under simplifying “fictions” of independence and sequential causality or when the facilitative or inhibitory effects on interaction of material or efficient causes are at issue. The assumptions of independence and sequential causality, of course, underlie a mechanistic model. The heuristic functions of the two theoretical perspectives, for guiding and interpreting research, would be very dissimilar. Within the organismic approach, research would focus on the (1) descriptive study of the course of development to discover the formal causes of development, that are not open to empirical determination, and (2) facilitative and inhibitory effects on the course of development. Mechanistic models have been developed to order sequential relations between environmental and behavioral events. Within such an approach, research would focus on the study of the functional relations among sequences of variables, to provide the description and determinants of development. We noted that researchers operating under the aegis of very different theories (e.g., mechanistic or organismic, cognitive or learning) may employ descriptive research methods that are very similar, and that no existing observation tactic appears capable of providing differential leverage on the complexities of what some conceive to be simultaneous effects comprising mother-infant interaction in life settings. In this context, we concluded that the experimental tactic involving the contrived procedure we reported offers a promising method for the study of interaction. REFERENCES Baltes, M. M., & Reese, €1. W. Operant research and operant paradigm: Resolution and apparent contradiction. In B. C. Etzel, J. M. LeBlanc, & D. M. Baer (Eds.), New developnzents in behavioral research: Theory, method, and application. In honor of Sidney W.Sijou. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum Associates, in press. Beckwith, L. Relationships between attributes of mothers and their infants’ IQ scores. Child Development, 1971,42, 1083-1097. Bell, R. Q. The effect on the family of a limitation in coping ability in the child: A research approach and a finding. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1964, 10, 129-142. Bell, R. Q. A reinterpretation of the direction of effects in studies of socialization. Psychological Review, 1968, 75, 81-95. Bell, R. Q. Stimulus control of parent or caretaker behavior by offspring. Developmerital Psychology, 1971,4,63-72. Berberich, L. P. Do the child’s responses shape the teaching behavior of adults? Journal of Experimental Research in Personality, 1971, 5, 92-91. Bowlby, J. The nature of the child’s tie to his mother. hzternatiorzal Jounial of Psychoanalysis, 1958, 39, 350-373. Boyd, E. F., & Gewirtz, J. L. An infant’s headturns to its mother condition her facial expressions. (Submitted for publication, 1976.) Brackbill, Y . Extinction of the smiling response in infants as a function of reinforcement schedule. Child Development, 1958, 29, 115-124.

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Brazelton, T. B., Koslowski, B., & Main, M. The origins of reciprocity: The early motherinfant interaction. In M. Lewis & L. A. Kosenblum (Eds.), The effects o f t h e infant on its caregiver. New York: Wiley, 1974. Pp. 49-76. Conncrly, R. J. A comparison of personality characteristics of parents of brain-injured and normal children. Dissertation Ahstracts, 1968, 28, 1291-1292. Etzel, B. C., & Gewirtz, J. L. Experimental modification of caretaker-maintained high rate operant crying in a 6- and a 20-week old infant (Infans tyrannotearus): Extinction of crying with reinforcement o f eye contact and smiling. Journal ofExperimenta1 Child PS.Vchology, 1967, 5, 303-317. Ferguson, C. A. Baby talk in six languages. In J. Gumperz & D. Hymes (Eds.), The ethnography of communication. Amvican Anthropologist, 1964, 66, Part 2, 103-114. Gewirtz, H. B., & Gewirtz, J. 1.. caretaker settings, background events, and behavior differences in four Israeli child-rearing environments: Some preliminary trends. In B. M. Foss (Ed.), Determinants of inJant behaiiour I V . London: Methuen, 1969. Pp. 229-252. Cswirtz, J. L. A learning analysis o f the effects of normal stimulation, privation, and deprivation o n the acquisition of social motivation and attachment. In B. M. Foss (Ed.), Determinants of infant behaviorrr. London: Methucn (New York: Wiley), 1961. Pp. 21 3-299. Gewirtz, J. L. Mechanisms of social Icnrning: Some roles of stimulation and behavior in early human development. I n D. A . Goslin (F,d.), Handbook of socialization theory and research. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969. Pp. 57-212. Gewirtz, J. L. Attachment, dependency, and a distinction in terms of stimulus control. In J. L. Gewirtz (Ed.), Attachment and tlependencj’. Washington, D.C.: Winston, 1972. Pp. 139-177. Gewirtz, J. L. Maternal respondinp and the conditioning of infant crying: Directions of influence within the attachment-acquisition process. In B. C. Etzel, J. M. LeBlanc, & D. M. Baer (Eds.), New developments in behavioral research: Theories, methods, and applications. In honor of Sidnry W .Bijoii. Hillsdalc, N.J.: Erlbaum Associates, in press. (a) Gewirtz, J. L. The attachment acquisition process as evidenced in the maternal conditioning of cued infant responding (particularly crying). Human Development, in press. (b) Gewirtz, J. L., & Boyd, E. 1:. Experimcnts o n mother-infant interaction underlying mutual attachment acquisition: The inl‘ant conditions the mothcr. In T. Alloway, L. Krames, & P. Pliner (Eds.), Attachment bchai,ior. Advances in the stud]>of communication and a j j k t . Vol. 3. New York and London: Plcnum, in press. (a) Gewirtz, J. L., & Boyd, E. 1‘. Infant vocalizations condition maternal verbalizations. Child Development, in press. (b) Gewirtz, J. L., & Gewirtz, H. B. Stimulus conditions, infant behaviors, and social learning in four Israeli child-rearing environments: A preliminary report illustrating differences in environment and behavior betwccn the ‘only’ and the ‘youngest’ child. In B. M. Foss (Ed.), Determinants o.f infant hehaviour III. London: Methuen (New York: Wiley), 1965. Pp. 161-184. Halverson, C. F., & Waldrop, M. I:. M;iternal behavior toward own and other preschool children: The problem of “ownness”. Child Deidopment, 1 9 7 0 , 4 1 , 839-845. Harper, L. V. The young as a source of stimuli controlling caretaker behavior. DevelopmentalPsychology, 1971,4, 73-88. Hartup, W. W., & Lempers, J. A problem in life-span development: The interactional analysis of family attachments. I n P. B . Baltes & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Life-span

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developmental psychology: Personality and socialization. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Pp. 235-252. Haugan, G. M., & McIntire, R. W. Comparisons of vocal imitation, tactile stimulation, and food as reinforcers for infant vocalizations. Developmental Psychology, 1972, 6, 201-209. Kessen, W. Research in psychological development of infants: An overview. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1963,9, 83-94. Klebanoff, L. B. Parents of schizophrenic children: Parental attitudes of mothers of schizophrenic, brain-injured and retarded, and normal children. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1959, 29,445-454. Korner, A. F. Mother-child interaction: One- or two-way street? Social Work, 1965, 10, 47-5 1 . Lewis, M. State as an infant-environment interaction: An analysis of mother-infant interaction as a function of sex. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1972, 18,95-121. Lewis, M., & Lee-Painter, S . An interactional approach to the mother-infant dyad. In M. Lewis & L. A. Rosenblum (Eds.), The effect of the infant on its caregiver. New York: Wiley, 1974. Pp. 21-48. McKenzie, B., & Day, R. H. Operant learning of visual pattern discrimination in young infants. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1971, 1 1 , 4 5 4 3 . Moss, H. A. Sex, age, and state as determinants of mother-infant interaction. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1967, 13, 19-36. Osofsky, J. D., & Danzger, B. Relationships between neonatal characteristics and motherinfant interaction. Developmental Psychology, 1974, 10, 124-1 30. Osofsky, J. D., & O’Connell, E. J. Parent-child interaction: Daughters’ effects upon mothers’ and fathers’ behaviors. Developmental Psychology, 1972, 7, 157-168. Overton, W. F. The active organism in structuralism. Human Development, in press. Overton, W. F. On the assumptive basis of the nature-nurture controversy: Additive versus interactive components. Human Development, 1973, 16, 74-89. Overton, W. F., & Reese, H. W. Models of development: Methodological implications. In J. R. Nesselroade & H. W. Reese (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Merhodological issues. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Pp. 65-86. Prechtl, H. F. R. The mother-child interaction in babies with minimal brain damage. In B. M. Foss (Ed.), Determinants of infant behaviour 11. London: Methuen (New York: Wiley), 1963. Pp. 53-59. Ramey, C. T., & Ourth, L. L. Delayed reinforcement and vocalization rates of infants. Child Development, 1971,42,291-297. Reese, H. W., & Overton, W. F. Models of development and theories of development. In L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Research and theory. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Pp. 115-145. Rheingold, H. L., Gewirtz, J. L., & Ross, H. W. Social conditioning of vocalizations in the infant. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1959,52,68-73. Richards, M. P. M. Social interaction in the first weeks of human life. Psychiatria, Neurologia, Neurochirurgia, 1971, 1 4 , 3 5 4 2 . Robson, K. S., & Moss, H. A. Patterns and determinants of maternal attachment. Journal of Pediatrics, 1970, 77,976-985. Rosenthal, R., & Jacobsen, L. Teachers’ expectancies: Determiners of pupils’ I.Q. gains. Psychological Reports, 1966, 19, 115-1 18. Routh, D. K. Conditioning of vocal response differentiation in infants. Developmental PsychologjJ, 1969, 1,219-226.

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Sears, R. R. A theoretical framework for personality and social behavior. American Psychologist, 1951,6,476-483. Sears, R. R., Maccoby, E. E., & Levin, H. Patterns of child rearing. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957. Siegel, G. M. Adult verbal behavior with retarded children labeled as “high” or “low” in verbal ability. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1963,68,417424. Snow, C. Mothers’ speech to children learning language. Child Developmenf, 1972, 43, 549565. Stern, D. N. Mother and infant at play : The dyadic interaction involving facial, vocal, and gaze behaviors. In M. Lewis & L. A. Rosenblum (Eds.), The effect of the infant on its caregiver. New York: Wiley, 1974.Pp. 187-213. Thoman, E. B., Leiderman, P. H., & Olson, J. P. Neonate-mother interaction during breast-feeding. Developmental Psychology, 1972,6,1 l(tl18. Vuorenkoski, V., Wasz-Hockert, O., Koivisto, E., & Lind, J. The effect of cry stimulus on temperature of the lactating breast of primipara: A thermographic study. Experientia,

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1963,34,377-388. Wenar, C., & Wenar, S . C. The short-term prospective model, the illusion of time, and the tabula rasa child. Child Development, 1963,34,697-708. Wolff, P. The natural history of crying and other vocalizations in early infancy. In B. M. Foss (Ed.), Determinants of infant behaviour IV. London: Methuen, 1969.Pp. 81-109. Yarrow, L. J . Dimensions of maternal care. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1963,9,101-1 14. Yarrow, M. R., Waxler, C. Z., & Scott, P. M. Child effects on adult behavior. Developmental Psychology, 1971,5,300-311.

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SYMPOSIUM ON IMPLICATIONS OF LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT

Introductory Remarks Paul B. Baltes, Chairrnan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Theory and Method in Life-Span Developmental Psychology: Implications for Child Development Aletha Huston-Stein and Paul B. Baltes ......................

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The Development of Memory: Life-Span Perspectives Hayne W. Reese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Cognitive Changes during the Adult Years: Implications for Developmental Theory and Research Nancy W. Denney and John C. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 13 Social Cognition and Life-Span Approaches to the Study of Child Development Michael J. Chandler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Life-Span Development of the Theory of Oneself: Implications for Child Development Orville G. Brim. Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Implications of Life-Span Developmental Psychology for Childhood Education Leo Montada and Sigrun-Heide Filipp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Paul B. Baltm, Chairman

The last decade has generated a growing interest in viewing the development of behavior within the framework of the life span. A new field of specialization with the label “life-span developmental psychology” has emerged. While life-span developmental psychology is in the process of defining its scope and its conceptual and methodological base, i t has also contributed t o the formulation of issues and methodologies which have direct ramifications for other developmental specialties such as the field of child development. In the following six chapters the questions examined are why and how a life-span approach alters and supplements current child development research in theory, methodology, and a variety of substantive areas. These papers were originally delivered in preliminary form as contributions t o a symposium (organized by Paul B. Baltes) presented as part of the 1975 Biennial Meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development. The symposium papers have been edited and revised for the present publication. Discussants of the various symposium contributions were Klaus F. Riegel and Willis F. Overton. Their implicit or explicit contributions t o the final version of this symposium are gratefully acknowledged. In the opening paper of the collection, Aletha Huston-Stein and Paul B. Baltes derive implications of theory and method in life-span developmental psychology for the field of child development. Ln two subsequent articles, Hayne W. Reese, and then Nancy W. Denney and John C. Wright, analyze the areas of memory and cognition with a view toward specifying conceptual and methodological recommendations for researchers primarily interested in the period of childhood. Michael Chandler and Orville G. Brim investigate in their respective contributions how child development theory and research in personality, social cognition, and social development can profit from being open to a life-span perspective on developmental change. Finally, Leo Montada and Sigrun-Heide Filipp apply the life-span developmental perspective t o intervention in the area of childhood education. Each of the contributions exemplifies, in one form or another, how application of a life-span developmental approach has an impact on child development 167

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and leads to either changes in substantive emphases, different accentuations and requirements in methodology, or novel theoretical conceptualizations. The contributions also point to ways in which the fragile connections between agespecific developmental specialties can be extended and solidified into a conceptual network encompassing the entire human life-span. Such explicit linkages between subspecialties cannot but advance the scope and precision of the field of developmental psychology. To this end it is important that proponents of various age-specific developmental specialties maintain or increase their awareness of their own age-centric vantage points. Age-centrism in the field of developmental psychology can lead easily t o restricted and shortsighted conceptions.

THEORY AND METHOD IN LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMLNTAL PSYCHOLOGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT

Aletha Huston-Stein and Paul B. Baltes THE PENNSYLVANIA S T A T E UNIVERSITY

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. PROTOTYPICAL ISSUES IN LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. DIALECTICS OF ONTOGENETIC AND HISTORICAL-EVOLIJTIONARY SOURCES O F CHANGE . . . B. AGE IRRELEVANCE O F DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE . . . . C. DESCRIPTIVE AND EXPLANATORY CONTINUITY VERSUS DISCONTINUIT'Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111. PROTOTYPICAL ISSUES I N LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENTAL METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. DEVELOPMENTAL CIIANGE VERSUS DEVELOPMENTAL DIFFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. TIME-LAG AND DISTAL-CAUSE EFFECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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I. Introduction The discussion of a life-span developmental approach t o the study of behavior is sometimes perceived to be new in the field of human development. This 169

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perception is a matter of something getting “lost on the way to the forum.” Historical reviews (Charles, 1970; Groffmann, 1970; Hofstatter, 1938) document that the consideration of development at all levels of the life-span was very much in the center of early work in the developmental field. In fact, one of the earliest comprehensive books on human development was written by a life-span developmentalist, A. Quetelet, a Belgian scientist who displayed competence as a mathematician, sociologist, and psychologist. In this work, Quetelet (1835 in French, 1838 in German) presented a large body of data on behavior encompassing the entire life-span, particularly in the area of mental abilities. Quetelet’s early contributions, little known in the United States, can be taken as an historical marker for developmental research in general. While in Central Europe a life-span developmental approach continued to flourish (Biihler, 1959; Thomae, 1959, 1968), or at least to hold its own, contributions in the Anglo-American literature with few exceptions (e.g., Bayley, 1968; Bloom, 1964; Brim, 1966; Erikson, 1959; Havighurst, 1948; Neugarten, 1968) have remained sparse, disjointed, and fainthearted. Proponents of the usefulness of a life-span approach were to be found primarily in two occasionally interrelated groups: sociologists or social psychologists interested in socialization or agecohort stratification (e.g., Brim, 1966; Keniston, 1971; Riley ef d ,1972), and developmental psychologists interested in adult development and aging (e.g., Biihler & Massarik, 1968; Neugarten, 1968; Pressey & Kuhlen, 1957; Schaie & Gribbin, 1975). In our view, as these two interest groups of sociologically oriented psychologists and life-span gerontologists did not particularly focus on the merits of an experimental, manipulative approach to the study of development, their important theoretical contributions did not find significant resonance among mainstream developmentalists. American developmental psychology in the 1950s and 1960s was dominated by psychological theories that lent themselves to experimental, manipulative research methods and, therefore, was inclined to reject creative and conceptually compelling ideas that could not readily be studied in that framework. The correlational, naturalistic research which characterized most life-span developmentalists at that time was not conducive to bringing a life-span approach into the center of attention. Although we should be careful in our evaluation of recent trends in developmental psychology (e.g., Looft, 1972), we believe it is fair to conclude that in the last 5 years American developmentalists have been attracted to a life-span developmental approach in considerable numbers. On the one hand, a number of review volumes were generated in conjunction with the West Virginia Conferences on Life-Span Developmental Psychology (e.g., Baltes & Schaie, 1973a; Goulet & Baltes, 1970; Nesselroade & Reese, 1973), to which a large number of researchers with diverse viewpoints and theoretical commitments (including core experimentalists) contributed. On the other hand, empirical research of the life-span kind is expanding rapidly and there has been a surge of life-span

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developmental textbooks (e.g., Kaluger & Kaluger, 1974; Lug0 & Hershey, 1974; Newman & Newman, 1975). All this activity is testimony to the fact that the thrust toward consideration of the entire spectrum of life in developmental work is gaining strength. For those of us involved in a life-span developmental endeavor, this growing belief in the usefulness of a life-span approach t o the study of behavioral development is a logical and satisfying trend. At the same time, however, it has become obvious t o the careful observer that “it appears easier to start a revolution than it is to carry it to impressive heights or even victory” (Baltes & Schaie, 1973b, p. 395). In order f o r a life-span developmental approach to survive and t o contribute vigorously, it is necessary to go beyond suggestive persuasion and t o articulate its conceptual and empirical usefulness. The purpose of the present symposium is to clarify theoretical and methodological implications of a life-span developmental approach for research and theory in child development. A counterpart effort has been made recently, dealing with the implications of a life-span developmental approach for the study of aging (Baltes, 1973). Our basic argument is that a life-span conceptualization is not qualitatively different in theory and method f r o m age-specific approaches such as infant or child development (e.g., Baltes & Schaie? 1973b; Bromley, 1970). However, a life-span developmental orientation has led t o a dramatic accentuation of a number of basic issues in developmental theory and method. These basic issues, although present and touched upon in the child development literature. have never attracted the level of discourse by child developmentalists that they deserve. The purpose of this paper is to identify some of these issues and t o illustrate how a life-span developmcntal approach makes them apparent and critical t o such a degree that denial o r indirect cover-up (e.g., by relegating them t o the level of error or meta-assumptions) is n o longer possible. The following prototypical issues and key conclusions are derived from a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on life-span human development (Baltes & Schaie, 1973a; Goulet & Baltes, 1970; Nesselroade & Reese, 1973); the set of issues delineated is not comprehensive but selective. For a more detailed empirical and theoretical account of the rationale for these conclusions, the reader is referred t o Baltes and Schaie (1973b), Riegel (1972, 1976a,b), or Baltes and Willis (1976).

11. Prototypical Issues in Life-Span Developmental Theory Life-span developmental psychology is defined as dealing with the description, explanation, and modification of behavioral change from conception to death (e.g., Baltes, 1973; Baltes & Goulet, 1970;). Comparisons of widely differing age

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groups provide one means of formulating hypotheses and extending theoretical constructs across the life-span, but it is important to realize that a life-span developmental approach does not necessarily lead to a comparative analysis of organisms of all ages or developmental levels. Similarly, the comparison of multiple age levels does not necessarily qualify a study to be life-span developmental. The center of attention needs to be a behavior-change process which has intrinsic life-span perspectives. The study of organisms across many developmental levels typically can provide some initial leads concerning the processes that may be examined. A comparison of cognitive style changes in children and elderly individuals (Denney & Wright, in this symposium) is an example of the first step within a life-span framework. Another is Goulet’s (1973) attempt to design explanatory research in the area of developmental memory, making use of subject populations from the entire spectrum of the life-span. However, the life-span view suggests going beyond these age comparisons to an examination of the processes involved in the observed changes and to examination of interindividual differences in change. The primary function of the initial age comparisons is to elucidate, stretch, and clarify one’s constructs and to suggest which explanatory principles accounting for developmental change may be most fruitfully pursued in further research. In this vein, it is possible to conduct meaningful life-span research within a restricted age range (such as childhood) if the target behavior process under investigation is related to a life-span conception. The use of developmental simulation (Baltes & Goulet, 1971) is a case in point. In a developmental simulation study, for example, it is possible to create within a given age group (e.g., college students) conditions which demonstrate ontogenetic changes representing segments of the entire life-span. In fact, Sjostrom and Pollack (1971) have done exactly this in a life-span study on visual illusions. Since it is occasionally argued that life-span developmental research is extraordinarily tedious, it is important to keep in mind that empirical life-span work does not necessarily include persons from the full spectrum of the life-span, nor is it necessarily longitudinal. The key focus is on the analysis of a behavior-change process which has been derived within a life-span framework. While expanding the notion of development across a broader age range, the life-span perspective in no way suggests ontogenetic change as the only or even the primary basis of development at any point in time. By contrast, historicalevolutionary sources of change are given more emphasis than is usually the case in developmental theories. The life-span view also contradicts the notion that childhood is a preparation for a static point of final maturity reached at the age of 18 or 21 years. Until recently, the final stage in most child development theories was defined at adolescence. With a life-span perspective, it is not realistic to expect childhood socialization to carry the burden for adequate functioning throughout adulthood. It is also not theoretically possible to predict adult behavior fully from childhood characteristics, because neither evolution-

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ary-cultural-historical changes nor outcomes of ontogenetic change can be predicted with a high degree of accuracy. One must expect continuing change and continuing need for intervention, education, and new forms of socialization throughout life (see also Montada & Filipp, in this symposium). Three related theoretical issues have been selected to illustrate the contributions of life-span work for theory in child development in greater detail: (a) dialectics of ontogenetic and historical-evolutionary sources of change; (b) age-irrelevance of developmental change; and (c) descriptive and explanatory continuity versus discontinuity. A. DIALECTICS OF ONTOGENETIC AND HISTORICAL-EVOLUTIONARY SOURCES OF CHANGE

One theoretical issue which has been sharpened by life-span developmental research and theory is that of the relationship between ontogenetic and historical-evolutionary sources for behavioral change. Traditionally, child development research has been conducted in a fairly invariant ecology within a given cultural setting and for an invariant biological species. Comparative developmental psychology (Baltes & Goulet, 1970), be it of the comparative-behavior, comparative-culture, comparative-species, or comparative-generation type, first attracted major attention to intergroup differences in developmental phenomena. The focus of many comparative developmental approaches, however, is largely a static one in its examination of differences in developmental change rather than of the dynamics involved in the genesis of development. Life-span research and theory have illustrated an interactive and dynamic conception of the relationship between ontogenetic and historical-evolutionary sources of change. Two specific examples may be cited in support of this conclusion. On an empirical level, there is the fact of pervasive cohort differences in personality and cognitive functioning (Goulet, Hay, & Barclay, 1974; Nesselroade & Baltes, 1974; Schaie, 1970). On a theoretical level, there are efforts to develop conceptions embracing the conjoint effects of ontogenetic and historical-evolutionary determinants (Buss, 1974; Riegel, 1972, 1976a) in the generation of life-span change. The formulation of dialectic models of development by Klaus F. Riegel and colleagues (Riegel, 1973, 1976a) is perhaps the most explicit statement of an interactive position asserting that ontogenetic and historical-evolutionary sources are intrinsically and dynamically related during ontogeny (see also Baltes & Willis, 1976). Historically, of course, a similar view has been promoted by sociologically oriented developmentalists (see Bengtson & Black, 1973; Brim, 1966; Elder, 1975; Neugarten & Datan, 1973) interested in formulating conceptions dealing with both cultural change and ontogenetic development. In practice, one implication of this position is that child development research-

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ers should be more attentive to sociocultural influences on children, particularly those which change over time. For example, most of the available research on children’s social development is focused on individual experiences with other people, primarily the parents. A few of the studies on schools and mass media as socializing agents are moving in the direction of recognizing the impact of the larger society on the child, but virtually none of this research takes into account changes in these institutions over time. In the case of television research, for example, little attention has been given to the changes in television content over time (e.g., regular increases and decreases in the levels of violence portrayed). In a few early studies (Schramm, Lyle, & Parker, 1961), an assessment of the impact of the introduction of television into children’s lives was attempted. Current research efforts could benefit from comparisons of cohorts for whom childhood television differed in specifiable ways [e.g., before and after the introduction of “Sesame Street” (Bogatz & Ball, 1971; see also Reese, in this symposium)]. Another area in which such an emphasis appears particularly appropriate is sex role development. Kohlberg (1966) called attention to the conimon elements in children’s sex role concepts and related behavior that override wide individual differences in parental behavior. While he emphasized the ontogenetic basis for commonality in development, some of the developmental changes that he discussed could be influenced by social and cultural variations. For example, he posited the development of cognitive gender identity, or the conception of oneself as male or female, as a critical element in sex role learning. Yet, it seems likely that the relative emphasis on sex differentiation in a given culture would influence the timing and salience of gender identity concepts. With the current interest among some groups in socialization toward androgyny, research concerning sex role differentiation and gender identity concepts among children in cultural milieus where sex differences are minimized would be of particular interest. A second process proposed by Kohlberg as inherent in the child is that of valuing those characteristics associated with oneself-in this instance, maleness or femaleness (see also Brim, in this symposium). Differences in the cultural value associated with sex roles could, however, be at least as influential as this supposedly inherent process. Kohlberg’s own data (Kohlberg & Zigler, 1967) indicate that females do not follow his proposed developmental sequence, perhaps because increasingly they recognize the relatively low status of the feminine role in current American society (Sherman, 197 1). Changing cultural values might also alter the pattern of sex role adoption over time. The focus on the interaction of ontogenetic and biocultural sources of developmental change is exemplified in some research on children, primarily comparative studies of children with different individual experiences within the same cultural milieu. For example, Money and Ehrhardt (1972) have demonstrated behavioral differences between females exposed to high levels of androgen

prenatally and females with normal prenatal chemical environments. Comparative research on other species indicates that the period in ontogenetic development during which the androgen exposure occurs is crucial in determining what long-range behavioral changes will result (Money & Ehrhardt, 1972). Attempts to specify critical pcriods for attachment formation in infancy and consequences for later social relationships (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1968; Caldwell, 1962) are other examples of the interaction conceptualization. Research on father absence (e.g., Hetherington, 1966) also indicates that the later behavioral outcomes of separation from the father depend on the age of the child at the time of separation. Similar attempts to investigate interactive relationships between ontogenetic processes and broad cultural inflncnces could be quite useful. One example of such an effort is a 10-year longitudinal study of the relation of television violence to aggressive behavior (Letkowitz, Eron, Walder, & Huesmann, 1972). Television viewing pattcrns and peer ratings of aggression were assessed at age 8 and again at 18. For boys only, preference for televised violence at age 8 was correlated with aggression at 18. Aggression at age 1 8 was not related to the males’ concurrent television preferences. Using time-lag methods t o be discussed later in this paper, the authors inferred that early exposure t o and preference for television violence was (causally related t o later aggression. It would be interesting to extend this study to other cohorts t o determine whether different patterns of development would result from the interaction of different modal television environments with ontogenetic development. The focus o n cultural and historical change in the life-span perspective highlights the danger of drawing conclusions from a study in one time period. Child developmentalists are usually cautious about generalizing findings across cultures or across social classes, but we often do not recognize similar limitations in generalizing findings over historical time. Yet, changes in observed patterns of relationship may OCCUJ if the nican levels of a given environmental variable change over time. For example, Bronfenbrenner ( 1958) presented a convincing case for the notion that middle-class parents as a group became more permissive from the period before World War I1 to the postwar period. Thus, researchers at these two periods were probably sampling different portions of the total possible distribution of permissiveness. If the relation of permissiveness t o independence, for instance, were not linear throughout the entire range of these variables, one would find different correlations in different segments of the distribution. Other data suggest that, indeed, many such socialization relationships are not linear (Baumrind, 1971 ; Bronfenbrenner, 196l ) , and it seems probable that cohort changes in mean levels would yield different patterns of findings. Life-span research and theory, thereforc, at a minimum has shown why any child development theory in which ecological invariance is assumed has shortcomings in precision and scope. Moreover, it has opened a powerful avenue

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toward novel conceptualizations of ontogenetic change phenomena in a changing biological, physical. and cultural world. B. AGE IRRELEVANCE OF DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE

It has been argued by some developinentalists (e.g., Baer, 1970) that it is theoretically shortsighted t o consider chronological age as the primary organizing variable in developmental psychology. Life-span developmental theory provides for novel and supplemental arguments on this issue. First, life-span research shows a systematic increase in interindividual differences with age during adulthood (e.g., Baltes & Willis, 1976; Maas & Kuypers, 1974). Changes in the magnitude of interindividual differences in childhood are more difficult t o document but may exist. One strategy for detecting increased (or decreased) individual differences as well as for deriving some of the principles for explaining developmental change is exemplified by Gewirtz’s (1 965) comparison of the course of the smiling response during the first year of life in four child-rearing environments in Israel. While all groups developed social smiling a t approximately the same age and at approximately the same initial frequency, home-reared babies manifested increased frequencies over time while institutionally reared babies manifested decreased frequencies. The net result was larger intergroup differences at 1 year of age than a t 3 months. In principle, of course, interindividual differences might decrease over time if common cultural forces impinged on a behavior that was under more idiosyncratic control in an earlier period of development. Some theorists (e.g., Douvan & Adelson, 1966) have proposed, for instance, a relatively sudden increase in pressures on girls t o be feminine at adolescence that might reduce the variability in sex role adoption characteristic of early and middle childhood. In either case, the point is that developmental changes in intergroup or interindividual differences may provide more interesting information than simple age changes in means. Marked cohort differences in personality and intelligence (Nesselroade & Baltes, 1974; Schaie, 1970; Schaie & Cribbin, 1975) are another demonstration of the lack of primacy of age-related change patterns. For example, in a recent study of cooperation in preschool children (Barnes, 1971). there were lower frequencies of cooperative and associative social play than in an earlier study by Parten (1932). Barnes suggested a number of possible reasons for these cohort differences, including effects of mass media, smaller families, and different types of toys. Although these interpretations obviously require further investigation, they exemplify a direction in which one might go using a life-span view t o formulate hypotheses. The search for life-span changes is less guided by agegraded patterns than by a taxonomy of life events (e.g., school entry, marriage, widowhood, retirement) which are related t o chronological age only in theoretically irrelevant ways.

A second argument of life-span developmental theory is that systematic behavior change not only exists at all levels of ontogeny, including infancy and old age, but also that such change patterns are both multidirectional and/or partial or truncated (see also Chandler, in this symposium). The discrepant developmental life-span functions for crystallized and fluid intelligence (Horn, 1970) are an example for such multidirectional change functions within a closely related set of behaviors, i.e., intellectual performance. The apparent absence of age changes in moral behavior corresponding t o those demonstrated for moral judgment in childhood (Grinder, 1964) is another example. Multidirectionality of behavior change requires a theoretical analysis which goes beyond the operation of a single-agent or unitary variable such as chronological age and beyond the formulation of invariant arid sequentially fixed chains of developmental processes. The assumption of multidirectional and multiply determined change patterns also leads to interindividual and intergroup differences in the patterns of change (as opposed to the timing of change discussed earlier). For example, some theorists (e.g., White, 1973) have proposed a reversed order of Erik Erikson’s stages of identity and intimacy for females in our culture, primarily because of the differing emphases on prepaimtion for a career versus marriage and family in adolescence for the t w o sexes. Different developmental patterns also appear for males and females in longitudinal research (Bayley, 1968; Crandall & Battle, 1970; Kagan & Moss, 1962). Identification of different developmental patterns for groups divided on subject variables is, however, only a first step, because these variables provide little explanatory power. The next step should be examination of process variables with theoretical meaning. For example, one might look at developmental patterns for subjects with differing patterns of sex role identification 01- differing role models. Life-span developmental theory, then, probably will further refine the criticism of the chronological age variable on a conceptual level (Baltes & Willis, 1976). Ontogenetically based developmental change is b u t a subset of the class of developmental processes, and the widespread focus on age-developmental theory is often accidental and related to the heavy emphasis placed on growth models during the formative pel-iods of child development. The all-inclusive concern of developmental psychology is with systematic long-term behaviorchange processes, only some of which are usefully related to chronological age. C. DESCRIPTIVE AND EXPLANATORY CONTINUITY VERSUS DISCONTINUITY

A third theoretical issue elucidated b y life-span theorists is that of developmental continuity versus discontinuity. Kagan’s (1969) and Neugarten’s (1969) contributions are most salient in this regard from a historical perspective. In child development theory and research, the issue of continuity versus

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discontinuity has been largely treated either as one of methodology (e.g., Beilin, 1971; Wohlwill, 1973), nietatheory (Reese & Overton, 1970), or adequate description of quantitative versus qualitative change. Descriptive discontinuity occurs when the behaviors or constructs in a later stage of development are emergent or qualitatively different from those in an earlier stage; they cannot be described simply as combinations or quantitative increases of elements present in an earlier stage (Overton & Reese, 1973). Many child development theorists and researchers have been sensitive to the issue of descriptive continuity. Theories that postulate stage-related qualitative changes, such as that of Jean Piaget, involve descriptive discontinuity. At the empirical level, Enirnerich (1964) and Maccoby and Feldinan (1972) have examined longitudinal data to determine whether phenotypically different behaviors at different ages are sufficiently related t o imply that they represent the same underlying dimensions or whether qualitatively new dimensions are emerging. When proceeding to the phase of “developmental explanation” (Baltes & Schaie, 1973b), explanatory discontinuity occurs when behavioral antecedents or mediating processes at one period in development differ from those a t another period. In this respect, Piaget’s theory is largely continuous, in that it maintains a set of invariant mechanisms (e.g., assimilation and accommodation) to operate at all levels of ontogeny (see also Riegel, 1973). With regard t o organismic theory (inclusive of Piaget’s theory), Reese and Overton (1970) have correctly pointed out that the continuity-discontinuity issue applies potentially both to the descriptive representation of the phenomenon and t o its developmental explanation. Life-span theory and research further illuminate the issue of descriptive and explanatory continuity versus discontinuity and demonstrate that the issue has substantive and empirical value beyond questions of methodology and metatheory. Life-span research has shown that chronological age becomes less powerful and interindividual differences increase with development. In addition, multidirectional and truncated change sequcnces emerge with greater frequency. Furthermore, both historical-evolutionary and ontogenetic influences conjointly define the course of behavioral development. These facts and arguments lead to the conclusion that the descriptive course and explanatory determinants of development may exhibit both continuous and discontinuous relationships (Baltes & Schaie, 1973b). For example. explanatory discontinuity would exist if one proposed that intellectual performance in children is regulated primarily by maturational components while intellectual perforinance in adulthood is largely a function of environmental influence. Such a discontinuity is represented by the conclusion (Baltes & Schaie, 1973b; Flavell, 1970) that organismic models of development may be most appropriate for childhood intelligence while mechanistic models describe adult intelligence best (see also Reese, in this symposium). Another example of explanatory discontinuity appears in a recent departure by Kohlberg

(1973) from strict adherence to ontogenetic explanatory processes in moral development across the life-span. Ile suggested that ontogenetic-maturational change is the major underlying principle in early moral development, whereas experience is an iniportant principle in later development. Research conducted from a social learning perspective may also be interpreted as illustrating explanatory discontinuity. For example, the initial appearance of attachment behaviors such as smiling may be primarily a function of maturation, but the subsequent course of the behavior may be influenced primarily by environmental stimulation and reinforcement (Gewirtz, 1965; Schaffer & Emerson, 1964). Both discontinuous and continuous explanatory principles were suggested by Parke (1974) as possible interpretations of age differences in the types of rationales that led t o resistance to deviation. In the first interpretation, age differences were attributed tu qualitative developmental changes in moral reasoning; i.e., he hypothesized t h a t different cognitive processes might affect moral behavior at different points in development. In the second interpretation, changes were attributed to cuniulative experience over time in receiving d b stract rationales from socialization agents. I n this instance, behavioral changes would result from age-correlated quantitative changes in learning, but the underlying processes would be continuous. Due to its focus on long-terni chain sequences and the changing conditions of ecological settings, life-span thcoi-y acccntuates the usefulness of both descriptive and explanatory continuity versus discontinuity. Its major contribution is t o provide conceptual clarification and methodological tools for determining which assumption is most appropriate in ;i given instance. It is widely held, therefore. by life-span theorists that life-span developmental change is not easily conceptualized by a monistic modcl of development, nor is it controlled only by age-graded influence systems. Life-span theory emphasizes the usefulness of determining whether change o c c ~ ~ not r s only for the behavioral phenomenon identified as developmental, but also for the form of explanation most useful at different points in the change sequence. It is also for this reason that a multivariate vantage point (e.g.. Ualtes CL Nesselroade, 1973) is easily embraced by life-span researchers.

111. Pro to typical Issues in Life-Span Devclopmen tal Methodology Two problem areas are choseti here t o exetnplify implications of life-span developniental research for methodology in the field of child development: (a) developmental change versus dcveloprnental differences; and (b) time-lag and distal-cause designs. The areas selected parallel i n many ways the theoretical issues presented in Section 11. Again, the design questions raised are not necessarily novel to child

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development research. However, their apparent clarity in a life-span perspective demonstrates the need for consideration and application in work on child development as well. A. DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE VERSUS DEVELOPMENTAL DIFFERENCES

Life-span research has established that only under rare and specific conditions can differences between developmental criterion groups (e.g., cross-sectional age differences or longitudinal age differences) be equated with true ontogenetic age changes (e.g., Baltes, 1968; Schaie, 1965, 1973). Cross-sectional age comparisons may reflect cohort differences as well as ontogenetic differences, and they may represent a pattern that is characteristic of the particular sociocultural conditions existing at the time of testing. Conversely, similarities among different age groups may be a function of current sociocultural conditions or strong situational influences that may mask ontogenetic patterns. For example, experimental studies (Bandura & McDonald, 1963; Cowen, Langer, Heavenrich, & Nathanson, 1969) have demonstrated that exposure t o modeling and reinforcement can alter moral judgment dramatically in a way that overrides age differences that occur under more normative socialization conditions. If a study of moral judgment were conducted at a time when many children were exposed to a peer culture or favorite television programs promoting a particular form of moral judgment, ontogenetic patterns might be difficult t o detect. Longitudinal assessments of one cohort may reflect cultural-social changes or invariances as well as ontogenetic patterns, not t o mention problems of retest effects and selective dropouts. They may also be affected by the interaction of ontogenetic development with historical events particular t o that cohort. A direct and valid assessment of the prime target of developmental work, i.e., of intraindividual change and interindividual differences in change, therefore is probably the rare exception and, at the same time, requires much more refined design methodology than is required for the bulk of child developmental work. Both for reasons of internal and external validity, the cross-sectional as well as the simple longitudinal method have been shown to be woefully inadequate for the study of developmental change. Perhaps the best-known empirical example supporting this conclusion is the demonstration that much of the "decline" in intellectual functioning in later life (inferred from cross-sectional studies) is in fact due to cohort differences (e.g., Schaie, 1970). Sequential longitudinal and/or sequential cross-sectional methods (Baltes, 1968; Buss, 1973; Schaie, 1965, 1970; Schaie & Baltes, 1976) are necessary in order to separate the effects of age, cohort, and time of measurement. Crosssectional sequences, for instance, would be especially useful in examining developmental phenomena thought t o be influenced by sociocultural variables. For

example, inferences from cross-sectional studies of sex typing (Rabban, 1950; Smith, 1939) could be made with considerably more sophistication if such studies were repeated (with different subjects) at several points in time. A combination of cross-sectional and longitudinal sequences (e.g., Kohlberg & Zigler, 1967) also can provide many more useful comparisons than simpler methods. The usefulness of age/cohort-sequential designs was persuasively demonstrated in a recent sequential-longitudinal study of adolescent personality development by Nesselroade and Baltes (1974), who studied 12- to 17-year-old adolescents in 1970, 1971, and 1972. On most of the personality dimensions evaluated. the year of measurement (1970 versus 1971 versus 1972) accounted for moi-e variance than chronological age. For instance, all adolescents (largely independent of their age or cohort) showed decrements in superego strength. socialemotional anxiety, and achievement from 1970 to 1971 and/or from 1970 to 1972 as well as an increase in independence during the same time intervals. Such historical time differences again draw attention t o the importance of culturalhistorical change for many of the behaviors with which child developnientalists are concerned; they also raise serious questions about the inferences drawn from most of the developmental studies of children currently in the literature. The methodological work of life-span researchers has easily impressed developmentalists interested in adult development and aging. Child developmenlalists, however, for the most part continue to rely primarily on cross-sectional or simple longitudinal designs, despite the fact that initial exploration of the significance of cohort effects in child development data (e.g., Baltes & Reinert, 1969; Coulet, 1975; Goulet et al., 1974; Schaie, 1972) has led to clear evidence for their importance, especially in light of additional methodological coniplications such as age-related selective sainpling effects (Labouvie, Bartscli, Nesselroade, & Baltes, 1974). It appears justified, therefore, t o conclude that much of the available work in child development is based on “malignant” data which are neither tested for cohort effects nor properly examined for a host of additional design errors. The conceptual distinction and methodological separation of developmental change and developmental differences are ill understood. In this vein, life-span research and the design issues stated by sorne of i t s proponents present a challenge but also serve as a guide for future methodological work in the field of child development. B. TIME-LAG A N D DISTAL-CAUSE EFFECTS

Since life-span research deals most explicitly with the analysis of long-teIm phenomena and chains, it has been forced to attend to the problem of structuring time-lagged relationships and performing distal-cause analyses. The methodological requirements and strategies for long-term causal analyses

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are only emerging at this time (Wohlwill, 1973). However, it becomes clear that most of the traditional experimental design methods in the psychological sciences are ill suited to the assessment of long-term chains and distal causes. Therefore, life-span researchers have pointed t o the general usefulness of quasiexperimental designs, including various forms of time-series analysis (e.g., Campbell, 1969; Glass, Wilson, & Gottnian, 1972) and path analysis (e.g., Labouvie, 1974; Werts & Linn, 1970). One ingenious use of distal-cause analyses was the 10-year longitudinal investigation of television violence and aggressive behavior (Lefkowitz et aL, 1972) discussed earlier (Section 11, A). Cross-lagged correlations (i.e., TV at age 8 with aggression at age 18 versus TV at age 18 with aggression at age 8) were used to show that childhood television preferences predicted later aggression, whereas childhood aggression did not predict later television interests. Therefore, the authors concluded that there was a causal relationship between early television viewing and later aggression. Path analysis of the data led t o the same conclusion (Neale, 1972). A similar approach might be usefully employed in teasing apart the contributions o f constitutioiial differences aniong infants and parental behavior in the generation of later patterns of parent-child relationships [see also Labouvie (1974) for additional examples] . With more powerful methods o f inferring causal relationships from correlational, naturalistic data, child developmentalists may be lured away from their heavy reliance on laboratory experiments. The external validity of such studies is severely limited by the fact that conditions can be arranged so that a small situational manipulation will generate a large effect (see Bowers, 1973), but such effects may have little generality over time, across situations, or even to related forms of behavior. For example, the literature is now replete with experimental studies demonstrating that models induce increases in donations t o charity and also with other studies showing cross-sectional age differences in donation behavior (Bryan, 1976). Yet, we know little about the relative importance of modeling in the socialization of altruism or about the developmental course of such behavior. There is little evidence that donation behavior generalizes to other behaviors that could be classed as altruism. The use of time-lag and distal-cause methods could generate important information about the role of socialization practices. exposure to models, and other variables, as well as permitting a more complex and multivariate definition of altruism. Such alternative modes of design and data analysis, then, are equally important for child development research, though the actual use of historical-developmental rather than concurrent paradigms (Baltes & Scliaie, 1973b) may be less conspicuous in the study of short-term childhood events than in the study of life-span phenomena. The use of simple cross-time correlation coefficients, for example, when linking time-ordered observations of the longitudinal kind is an ingenious strategy of change analysis. Moreover, much of the available “non-

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developmental” design methodology is not conducive to a powerful and consistent test of hypotheses derived froni developmental theory. In this sense, life-span research methodology and paradigms, because of their conspicuous emphasis o n historical-distal relationships, have helped to spell out the rationale for needed design improvements so that theory and method in developmental psychology can proceed in a concerted and matched fashion.

1V. Summary The purpose of the present paper was to elucidate implications of life-span developmental psychology for theory and method in the field of child development. Emphasis was given to three tlieoretical issues: historical-evolutionary versus ontogenetic components of change; the role of chronological age; and continuity versus discontinuity in the description and explanation of behavioral development. Two methodological issues were discussed: The conceptual and methodological distinction between developmental change and developmental differences; and the problem of examining historical-distal relationships among variables. It was argued that none of the theoretical and methodological issues raised is completely novel in developmental psychology. However, life-span research and theory, because of their concern with the extremes of a developmental approach, have led t o propositions and arguments that accentuate, clarify. and articulate important developmental issues with a new level of persuasiveness and urgency. The conclusion is that child development researchers need t o recognize the issues raised. Such recognition will lead not only t o a heightened understanding of the unique aspects of a developmental approach to the study of behavior but also t o novel questions, interpretations, conceptualizations, and methods of study. REFE RENC E S Baer, D. M. An age-irrelevant concept ot developrncnt. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1970, 16, 230-245. Baltes, P. B. Longitudinal and cross-scctional scquences for thc study of agc and generation effects. Human Development, 1968, 11, 145-171. Baltes, P. B. (Ed.) Life-span models of psychological aging: A white elcphant? Geroiitolo@St, 1973, 13,457-512. Baltes, P. B., & Goulet, L. R. Status and issues 0 1 a life-span developmental psychology. In L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), I,iliz-spari dcvelopmcntal psycholog]’. Researcli a t ~ d theory. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Baltes, P. B., & Goulet, L. R. Exploration of debelopmental variables by manipulation and simulation of age differences in behavior. Ilumatz Developmetzt, 1971, 14, 149-170. Baltes, P. B., & Nesselroade, J . R. Thc dcvclopmental analysis of individual differenccs on

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multiple measures. In J. R. Nesselroade & H. W. Reese (Eds.), Life-span developmerital psyclzology: Methodological issues. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Baltes, P. B., & Reinert, C. Cohort effects in cognitive development of children as revealed by cross-sectional sequences. Developmental Psychology, 1969, 1, 169-177. Personality and Baltes, P. B., & Schaie, K . W. (Eds.) Life-span developmental ps)’cholog~~: socialization, New York: Academic Press, 1973. (a) Baltcs, P. B., & Schaie, K . W. On life-span developmental research paradigms: Retrospects and prospects. In P. B . Baltes & K . W. Schaie (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Personality and socialization. Ncw York: Academic Press, 1973. (b) Baltes, P. B., & Willis, S. L. Toward psychological theories of aging and development. In J. E. Birren & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Handbook of the psychology of aging. New York: Reinhold-Van Nostrand, 1976. Bandura, A., & McDonald, F. J . Influence of social reinforcement and the behavior of models in shaping children’s moral judgments. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1963.67, 274-281. Barnes, K . E. Preschool play norms: A replication. Developmental Psychologv, 1971, 5, 99-103. Baumrind, D. Current patterns of parental authority. Devclopmental Psvchology Monographs, 1 9 7 1 , 4 , N o . 1 , P a r t 2. Baylcy, N. Behavioral correlates of mental growth: Birth to thirty-six years. American Psychologist, 1968, 23, 1-17. Bcilin, H. Developmental stages and developmental processcs. In D. K. Green, M. P. Ford, & G. P. Flamer (Eds.), Measurement and Plagct. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971. Bengtson, V. L., & Black, K . D. lntergenerational relations and continuities in socialization. In P. B. Baltcs & K . W. Schaie (Eds.), Life-span deoelopmental psycholog,v: Personality and socialization. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Bloom, M. Life-span analysis: A theoretical framework for behavioral science research. Human Relations, 1964, 12,538-554. Rogatz, G., & Ball, S. The second year of Sesame Street: A continuing evaluation. Princeton, N.J.: Educational Testing Service, 1971. Bowers, K . S. Situationism in psychology: An analysis and a critique. Ps.vchologica1 Review, 1973,80,307-336. Brim, 0 . G. Socialimtion through the life cycle. In 0. G. Brim & S. Wheeler (Eds.), Socialization after childhood: Two essa-vs. New York: Wiley, 1966. Bromley, D. B. An approach t o theory construction in the psychology of development and aging. I n L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltcs (Eds.). Life-span developmental psychology: Research and theory. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Bronfenbrenner, U. Socialization and social class through time and space. In E. E. Maccoby, T. M. Ncwcomb, & E. L. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in social psychology. (3rd ed.) New York: Holt, 1958. Bronfenbrenncr, U. Some familial antecedents of responsibility and leadership in adolescents. In L. Petrullo & B . M. Bass (Eds.), Leadership and interpersonal behavior. New York: Holt, 1961. Bronfenbrenncr, U. l k l y deprivation in mammals and man: A cross-species analysis. In G. Newton & S. Levine (Eds.), Early experience and behavior. Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1968. Bryan, J. H. Children’s cooperation and helping behavior. In E. M. Hetherington, J. Hagen, R. Kron, & A. H . Stein (Eds.), Review of child development research. Vol. 5. Chicago: University of’ Chicago Press, 1976. Buhler, C. Der menschliche Lebenslauf als psychologischcs Problem. (2nd ed.) Gottingen: Hogrefe, 1959. (Originally published, 1933).

Buhler, C., & Massarik, F. (Eds.) Thc coursc o f human life. New York: Springcr Publ., 1968. Buss, A. R. An cxtcnsion of develolmental models that separate ontogenctic changes and cohort differences. Psychological Bulletin. 1973, 80,466-479. Buss, A. R. Generational analysis: llcscription. explanation, and theory. Journal of Social Issues, 1974, 3 0 , 5 5 7 1 . Caldwell, B. M. The usefulness of the critical period hypothesis in the study of filiativc behavior. Merrill-Palmer Quarter!,), 1962, 8 , 229-242. Campbell, D. T. Reforms as experiments. American Psychologisr, 1969, 2 4 , 4 0 9 4 2 9 . Charles, D. C. Historical antecedents of lifc-span developmental psychology. In L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Life-span dei3clopn~c~t?tal psychology: Research ar7d theory. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Cowen, P. A., Langer, J., Heavenrich. J . , & Nathanson, M. Social learning and Piagct's cognitive theory of moral developmcnt. Journal of Personality and Social psycho log^^, 1969, 11,261-274. Crandall, V. C., & Battle, E. S. Thc antcccdcnts and adult correlates of' academic and intellectual achievement effort. In J . P. Hill (F,d,),Minnesota sJ'rnposia O I Z child psychology. Vol. 4. Minneapolis: University ot Minnwota Press, 1970. Douvan, E.. & Adclson, J . The adolesccwt experience. New York: Wiley, 1966. Elder, G. Agedifferentiation in a life cuurse perspective. Annual Review oj'Sociology, 1975, 1,165-190. Emmerich, W. Continuity and stability i n early social development. Child De~doprtleiit, 1964, 35,311-332. Erikson, E. H. Identity and the life cycle. Psyhological Issues, 1959, l(Who1e No. 1). Flavell, J. H. Cognitive changes in adulthood. In L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Life-span developmental pycholog),: Research and theory. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Gewirtz, J. L. The course of infant smiling in four child-rearing environments in Israel. In B. M. Foss (Ed.), Detertninaizts ofitifatit hehavior. Vol. 3. London: Mcthucn, 1965. Glass, G. V., Wilson, V. C., & Gottnian, J . M. Designs and analysis of time-series cxperimerits. Boulder: University of C o l o r d o , Laboratory of Educational Research, 1972. Goulet, L. R. The interfaces of acquisition: Models and methods for studying the active, developing organism. In J . R. Nesselroadc & 13. W. Recse (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Methodological issues. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Goulet, L. R. Longitudinal and time-lag designs in educational research: An alternative sampling model. Review of Educatiotial Research, 1975,45, 505-523. Goulet, L. R., & Baltes, P. B. (Eds.) Life-span developrneiztal psychologJl: Research and theory. New York: Academic Prcss, 1970. Goulet, L. R., Hay, C. M., & Barclay, C. I<. Sequential analysis and dcvelopmcntal research: Descriptions of cyclical phenomena. Psychological Bulletin, 1974. 81, 5 17-521. Grinder, R. E. Relations between behavioral and cognitive dimensions of conscience in middle childhood. Child Development, 1964, 35,881-891. Groffmann, K. J. Life-span developmental psychology in Europe. In L. R. Goulct & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Life-span developmental psj'chology: Research atld theory. New York: Academic Prcss, 1970. Havighurst, R. J. Developmental tasks and educatioif. New York: McKay, 1948. Hctherington, E. M. Effects of paternal ahsencc on sex-typed behaviors in Negro and white preadolescent males. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4,87-9 1 . Hofstatter, P. R. Tatsachen und Problenic einer Psychologic des Lebenslaufcs. Zeitschrifi f i r Angewandte Psychologie, 1938, 53, 273--333. Horn, J. Organization of data on life-span development of human abilities. In L. R. Guulet

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& P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Research and theory. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Kagan, J . The three faces of continuity in human development. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969. Kagan, J., & Moss, H. A. Birth to maturity. New York: Wiley, 1962. Kaluger, G., & Kaluger, M. F. Human dei~elopment:The span of life. St. Louis: Mosby, 1974. Keniston, K. Psychological development and historical change. Journal o f Interdisciplinary History, 1971, 2, 330-345. Kohlberg, L. A cognitivedevelopmental analysis of children’s sex-role concepts and attitudes. In E. E. Maccoby (Ed.), The development o f sex differences. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1966. Kohlberg, L. Continuities in childhood and adult moral development revisited. In P. B. Baltes & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Personality and socialization. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Kohlberg, L., & Zigler, E. The impact of cognitive maturity on the development of sex-role attitudes in the years 4 to 8. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 1967, 75, 89-165. Labouvie, E. W. Dcvelopmental causal structures of organismenvironment interactions. Human Development, 1974, 1 7 , 4 4 4 4 5 2 . Labouvie, E. W., Bartsch, T. W., Nesselroade, J . R., & Baltes, P. B. On the internal and external validity of simple longitudinal designs: D r o p o u t and retest effects. Child Development, 1 9 1 4 , 4 5 , 282-290. Lcfkowitz, M. M.. Eron, L. D., Walder, L. O., & Huesmann, L. R. Television violence and child aggression: A followup study. In G. A. Comstock & E. A. Rubinstein (Eds.), Television and social behavior. Vol. 3. Television and adolescent aggressiveness. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1972. Looft, W. R. Thc cvolution of developmental psychology : A comparison of handbooks. Human Development, 1972, 15, 187-201. Lugo, J . O., & Hershey, G. L. Human development. New York: Macmillan, 1974. Maas, H., & Kuypcrs, J. From thirty to seventy. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974. Maccoby, E. E., & Fcldman. S. S. Mother-attachment and stranger-reactions in the third year of life. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 1972, 37(1, Whole No. 146). Money, J . , & Ehrhardt, A. Man and woman: boj, and girl. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972. Neale, J . M. Comment on “Television violence and child aggression: A follow-up study”. In G. A. Cornstock & E. A. Rubinstein (Eds.), Television and social behavior. Vol. 3. Television and adolescent aggressiveness. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1972. Nesselroade, J . R., & Baltes, P. B. Adolescent personality development and historical change: 1970-1972. Monographs of the Society .for Research in Child Development, 1974, 39(1. Whole No. 154). Nesselroade, J. R., & Reese, H. W. (Eds.) Life-span developnzental psychology: Methodological issues. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Neugarten, B. L. Toward a psychology of the life cycle. In B. L. Neugarten (Ed.), Middle age and aging: ,4 reader in social psychology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968. Neugarten, B. L. Continuities and discontinuities of psychological issues into adult life. Human Development, 1969, 12, 121-130. Neugarten, B. L., & Datan, N. Sociological perspectives on the life cycle. In P. B. Baltes & K . W. Schaie (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Personality and socialization. New York: Academic Press, 1973.

Newman, B. M., & Newman, P. R. Diveioprncrir ,riirough life. Homcwood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1975. Overton, W. F., & Reese, H. W. Models of development: Methodological implications. In J . R. Nesselroade & H. W. Reese (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Methodological issues. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Parke, R. D. Rules, roles, and resistance to deviation: Recent advances in punishment, discipline, and self-control. In A. D. Pick (Ed.), Minnesota symposia on child psj3chology. Vol. 8. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1974. Parten, M. B. Social participation among preschool children. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1932, 21, 243-269. Pressey, S. L., & Kuhlen, R. G. Psychological derelopment through the life span. New York: Harper, 1957. Quetelet, A. Sur L'homme et le dewloppcmenr de ses facultes. Paris: Bachelier. 1835. 2 vols. Quetelet, A. Uber den Menschen und die Entwicklung seiner Fa'higkeiten. Stuttgart: Schweizerbart's Verlagshandlung, 1 8 3 8. Rabban, M. Sex-role identification in young children in two diverse social groups. Ccnctic Psychology Monographs, 1950, 42, 81-158. Reese, H. W., & Overton, W. F. Models o f development and theories o f development. In L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Lifc-spaii dewlopmental psycholog>.: Researcli and theory. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Riegel, K. F. Time and change in the developnient of the individual and society. In t i . W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child dei~elopmcntand behavior. Vol. 7 . New York: Academic Press, 1972. Riegel, K. F. Dialectic operations: 'The final pcriod of cognitive development, Human Development, 1973, 16, 346-370. Riegel, K. F. From traits and equilibrium toward developmental dialectics. In W. Arnold (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1976.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEMORY LIFE-SPAN PERSPECTIVES

Hayrze W . Reese WEST V l K G l N I A UNIVERSITY

1 . INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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I1 . MEMORY DEVELOPMENT IN CHILDHOOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A . CLASSIFICATION OF MEMORY TASKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B . THEORETICAL ORIENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C . SURVEY O F RESEARCIH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

190 190 190 191

Ill . MEMORY DEVELOPMENT IN ADULTHOOD AND OLD AGE . . . A . MEMORY SPAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. ASSOCIATIVE MEMORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C . RETRIEVAL DEFICITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

195 196 197 200

IV . COMPARISON BETWEEN CHILDHOOD AND OLD AGE

. . . . . . . 200

V . IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDHOOD MEMORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A . THE DIALECTICAL MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS O F THE DIALECTICAL MODEL C . METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS O F THE LIFE-SPAN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D . INTERRELATEDNESS OF ATTRIBUTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

202 202 203

VI . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

209

204 205

The paper originally written for the symposium was divided into two parts . One part is presented here; the other part is in Reese (1976b). 189

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I. Introduction There has been no single study of memory development across the entire life-span from infancy through old age. There has, however, been extensive research on memory in childhood and in old age. The purpose of this paper is to compare the data from these two age periods in order to show that a life-span perspective can influence the study of memory development by influencing the development of an explanatory model, the selection of specific research methodologies, and the direction of research programs. The research on the two age periods is surveyed separately, then is compared, and finally the implications of the comparison are discussed with a primary focus on the field of child development.

11. Memory Development in Childhood A. CLASSIFICATION OF MEMORY TASKS

Ann Brown (1975) proposed a scheme for classifying memory tasks based on two dichotomies: “strategic” versus “nonstrategic,” and “episodic” versus ‘‘semantic.’’ A strategic task requires the deliberate use of a mnemonic strategy for efficient performance; a nonstrategic task does not. The distinction is like the Soviet distinction between voluntary or premeditated memory and involuntary memory (Yendovitskaya, 1971). An episodic task requires memory of the exact input; a semantic task requires memory of the gist or theme. The distinction is Tulving’s (1972), and according to Brown is like Piaget’s distinction between “memory in the strict sense” and “memory in the wider sense” (F‘iaget & Inhelder, 1973). Brown noted that many tasks do not fit the scheme exactly, but it provides a convenient model for presentation of the typical theoretical orientation in developmental research, as well as for presentation of the research findings. B. THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

There are developmental changes in the structure of knowledge, or semantic system, and in the repertoire of mnemonic strategies. There is also development of the ability to utilize these systems to meet the demands of memory tasks. Developmental changes in performance on memory tasks should depend upon the nature of the tasks. Performance on nonstrategic tasks should change only to the extent that it is related to the semantic system. Performance on strategic tasks should also change if it is related to the semantic system, but in addition should depend on changes in the system of strategies. In both kinds of task,

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performance should also reflect the developing ability to utilize the relevant system. Developmental changes in the semantic system are well documented by Piagetian research. Changes in the system of mnemonic strategies are not so well documented, but it appears that more and more complex strategies are acquired, ontogenetically, to form a hierarchical organization. For example, nonrehearsal appears earlier ontogenetically than rehearsal, and rehearsal appears earlier than “tactical nonrehearsal” (Belmont & Butterfield, 1971). Early nonrehearsal reflects the absence of a mnemonic strategy: rehearsal and tactical nonrehearsal are mnemonic strategies, and at a mature level of development they can be coordinated to yield a highly complex and efficient strategy (Butterfield, Wambold, & Belmont, 1973). The ability to utilize the two systems depends on “metamemorial” processes, which also undergo development (Flavell, 1971a): the child develops the ability to evaluate the memory demands of a task and his own capacity to meet them; he develops the intention to use a strategy; and he develops the ability to implement the strategy selected. The coordination of mnemonic strategies is sometimes attributed to an “executive function” (Butterfield et al., 1973; Flavell, 1970) or “central processor” (Bjork, 1974). It is a conscious mechanism that directs and organizes mnemonic strategies, and it is at the core of the metamemorial processes. C. SURVEY OF RESEARCH

The research summary given here is derived largely from reviews by Brown (1975) and by Hagen, Jongeward, and Kail (1975). For details of the findings, the reader should consult these sources.

I . Stra tegic-Episodic Tasks Strategic-episodic tasks include most of those used in memory research. An example is serial recall. It exhibits a developmental increase in accuracy, i.e., a difference in the level of performance, and a developmental increase in the primacy effect accompanied by a smaller increase in the recency effect, i.e., a difference in the pattern of performance. The child who does not have the required mnemonic strategy in his repertoire obviously cannot use it, and his performance will be inferior to that of a child who uses the strategy. The deficiency is in the child’s repertoire of strategies, and instructions to use the strategy have no effect; this is a stage of “mediational deficiency.” Once the strategy is acquired, however, the child still exhibits a deficiency in that he does not spontaneously use newly acquired mnemonic strategies. This production deficiency can be overcome by instructing (or training) the child to use the strategy; but even with instruction there is an initial

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stage in which the strategy is used inefficiently and is abandoned when instructions t o use it are withdrawn (Hagen et al., 1975; Meacham, 1972). Thus, developmentally there is a stage of mediational deficiency, in which instruction has n o effect, followed by a stage of production inefficiency, in which some facilitation is produced by the appropriate instruction, followed by a stage of production deficiency, in which full benefit is produced, and finally followed by a stage in which instruction produces no benefit because the child already spontaneously uses the appropriate strategy.’ Salatas and Flavell (1975) obtained evidence of niediational and production deficiency in the use of category structure, with a transition from mediational deficiency t o production deficiency between kindergarten and third grade. A major theoretical problem is to explain the occurrence of production deficiency. One possibility, which seems, however, to be unsatisfactory, is that it results from immaturity of one of the nietaniemorial processes, the intention t o remember. The intention t o remember can affect performance only if the intention leads to selection and implementation of an appropriate mnemonic strategy. Therefore, a production deficiency with respect t o mnemonic strategies could result from the absence of an intention to remember, or from a failure of the intention t o lead to selection of an appropriate strategy, or from a failure of implementation of the selected strategy. However, the intention t o remember is not critical in itself, as shown by research on intentional and incidental memory (see Brown, 1975; Meacham, 1972): any instruction that produces an appropriate cognitive activity, such as semantic analysis, yields as much incidental memory as d o intentional-memory instructions. Thus, there may be no production deficiency even in the absence of an intention to remember. An alternative explanation is that production deficiency occurs whenever the

’The concepts of production and mediation deficiency were originally used to refer to the production and utilization of single-response mediators such as words but were extended to refer to the production and utilimtion of mnemonic strategies such as rehearsal. A refinement was to use these concepts to refer to strategy production and to use “production inefficiency” to refer t o strategy utilization (Flavell, 1970). As used most recently (and in this paper), “production inefficiency” includes both deficiency in production and inefficiency in utilization. The distinction between production and utilization should not b e discarded, however, because there are situations in which a strategy is produced spontaneously (Le.. with no production deficiency) but is utilizcd inefficiently (c.g., Simon, 1974; discussed later in the text). Furthermore, therc are surely situations in which a strategy is produced, spontaneously OT by induction, but cannot be utilized at all. For example, a subject may intend to usc rehearsal but not have labels for the materials presented. This “utilization deficiency” would be indistinguishable from production deficiency when the usual experimental techniques arc used hut might he distinguishable if the task is held constant and materials are varied. It should be noted that the distinction between production, or “evocation,” and utilization may be useful throughout the cognitive domain (Flavell, 1971b) and not limited to the memory area.

mediating activity is not “well established” (Reese, 1962; Yendovitskaya, 1971). A theoretical rationale for this explanation is provided b y the dialectical model of memory development, which is described later in this paper (Section V; see also Meacham, 1972; Reese, 197hb; Yendovitskaya, 197 1). After the child has a repertoire of well-established mnemonic strategies and the inetamemorial skills required to put them t o use, he still may exhibit less efficient performance than older children and young adults. The reason is that he may not have the most efficient strategy available in his repertoire, either because he has not yet acquired it or because it is still subject t o production deficiency. For example, Friedrich (1974) found that in a dichotic listening task, 7-year-old children did not use optimal strategies as often as older children and adolescents, and used less efficient strategies more often. Friedrich also found that even when children of different ages used the same strategy, accuracy of performance improved with age. He concluded that shortterm capacity increases with age. This conclusion disagrees with Simon’s (1974) assumption that memory capacity is fixed and constant over the age range under consideration. [Brown (1975) seenis t o have made the same assumption. She discussed age trends in control operations but never mentioned capacity, iniplying that she felt that capacity docs not change.] Friedrich’s conclusion therefore needs careful examination. He concluded that because children of different ages were using the same strategies. age differences in performance reflect age differences in memory capacity. Implicit, however, is the assumption that young children use a strategy as efficiently as older children. This implicit assumption is questionable, given the results o f studics of the effects of instructions, and thus Friedrich’s conclusion loses its force. In line with the inefficiency argument suggested here, Butterfield et al. (197.3) concluded that borderline and mildly retarded adolescents have no deficit in short-term capacity, and none in learning the component processes of a successful strategy. but they put the components together inefficiently because o f a deficiency in “executive control.” Similarly, Simon (1974) assumed that shot t - t e i m capacity does not change with age and attributed the well-known developmeii~alincrease in digit span to clustering of the digits into increasingly larger “chunks,” such as pairs of digits instead of single digits. Clustering, in other words, becomes more efficient with increasing age. A strategic-episodic task that has iiot been studied much is “prospective remembering.” What d o you d o now to remember t o carry out some specific activity at soiiie specific future time’! The task is episodic because i t involves specific activities rather than tlienies, and i t is strategic because it clearly requires intention, which should lead to seleclion and implementation of a strategy. Meacham, Leiman, and Dumitru ( 1 975) have reported a series of experiments which suggest that young adLilts exhibit production deficiency in this task but that even young children may be characterized more b y production deficiency than b y niediational deficiency.

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2. StrategicSeman tic Tasks Strategic-semantic tasks require memory of the gist or meaning of the material presented and are like nonstrategic-semantic tasks except that the experimenter suggests or requires the use of strategies or the subject spontaneously uses a strategy. Appropriate strategies would be elaborating, editing, and deliberately searching for meanings. There appears to have been little research of this type, but an experimental analog is to present a story with a picture illustrating the salient details in an organized way. Later, without the picture, semantic recall may be enhanced, in comparison with a condition in which the story was accompanied by a picture showing the details in an unorganized way (see Reese, 1976a). Apparently, the organized picture generates a memory image that provides a context for the story; subjects could presumably generate their own organizing image if given appropriate instruction. Another kind of strategic-semantic task is created when subjects involve the semantic system in a task that is objectively episodic. For example, the recall of related words is episodic, but clustering occurs and clustering involves the semantic system. The clustering strategy “may well be universal,” according to Scribner (1974, p. 493), but bases for clustering vary. Scribner found that even nonliterate African children and adults from traditional bush societies exhibited clustering, but the basis for clustering varied. There are also developmental differences in the basis for clustering; young children tend to use thematic clusters and young adults taxonomic clusters. Presumably, these societal and ontogenetic differences reflect differences in the semantic system rather than differential deficiency with respect to the clustering strategy. Another example is recall of unrelated words. A mature strategy which again involves the semantic system is to impose relations, or meanings, on the objectively unrelated words. Here, however, developmental differences probably reflect not only changes in the semantic system but also changes in the strategy system. 3. Nons trategic-Episodic Tasks Nonstrategic-episodic tasks include recognition memory for unrelated pictures and discrimination of relative recency. Age differences are not expected. The recognition task has revealed little if any age difference, but the task is extremely easy and ceiling effects are obtained, making the lack of a developmental trend impossible to interpret unambiguously. The relative-recency task has produced conflicting results, sometimes showing no age trend and sometimes showing increasingly accurate performance with increasing age. There is reason to suspect, however, that in the latter cases the older subjects are using strategies, thus transforming the task from nonstrategic-episodic for young children to strategic-episodic for older children (Brown, 1975).

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4. Nonstrategic-Semantic Tasks Nonstrategic-semantic tasks may include children’s spontaneously retelling the main events in a fairy tale or other story they have heard. The prediction to be made is complicated by developmental changes in the semantic system. Only those features of the story that can be assimilated to this system would be expected t o be remembered without the intervention of mnemonic strategies. In addition, memory for the unassimilated parts of the story would require episodic memory. Thus, the task can be a complex mixture of nonstrategic, strategic, semantic, and episodic. Nevertheless, specific kinds of developmental difference are expected. Because of the changes in the semantic system, certain differences in the pattern of performance are expected; and because of the possible intervention of strategies, differences in the level of performance might also occur. Yendovitskaya (197 1) summarized evidence supporting both expectations. Semantic integration of sentences is also a nonstrategic-semantic task. Subjects are shown a series of sentences, and later they incorrectly recognize inferences from the sentences as having been in the original list. Presumably, the subjects semantically integrate the original sentences to yield the inferences. The semantic integration of sentences appears t o be spontaneous and involuntary (Paris, 1975); hence it is nonstrategic in Brown’s model. It is also clearly semantic, hence the task is classified as nonstrategic-semantic. As such, it is expected to exhibit developmental differences in the pattern of performance more than in the level of performance. However, Paris and Upton (1975) obtained both level and pattern differences. They concluded that children spontaneously construct and remember inferences from sentences but that there is an increase with age in the ability to do so. The latter ability is the source of the level difference, and is attributed to mnemonic strategies: Paris and Upton suggested that increasing age and experience lead t o better strategies for encoding the information involved in inferential processes. That is, the developmental trend reflects other developmental changes such as the understanding of temporal order, focusing on relevant information, or increasing ability to retain premise information (Paris, 1975). These changes involve episodic information, and therefore the task involves a mixture of nonstrategic-semantic memory and strategic-episodic memory.

111. Memory Development in Adulthood and Old Age It is “common knowledge” that memory deficits occur in old age (Jerome, 1959), and there is n o reason to suppose that the old are unaware of this stereotype. There seems also to be no reason t o suppose that the stereotype is inaccurate, and there is considerable evidence to support it (e.g., Arenberg, 1973; Horn, 1975; Reese, 1973a). One could assume, therefore, that just as the

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child must develop awareness of himself as an active memorizer and must develop appropriate mnemonic strategies, so the old person must develop awareness of himself as an active but failing memorizer and develop appropriate mnemonic strategies t o cope with his deficits. For example, when the present author’s mother realized how much her memory was failing, she began t o use written notes as mnemonic aids. This can be an effective strategy (the author has been using it for years), but her use of it was inefficient because she wrote many of the notes in code and forgot the code.3 This anecdote illustrates two points about mnemonic strategies in the old: The strategies may be mi generis, not encountered in earlier stages of development, and they may be used inefficiently. The old seem generally t o be aware of their declining memory; thus, their problem is not in metamemorial processes but in effective strategies. They have the intention t o remember but not all the relevant mnemonic strategies that are required to implement this intention. Most of the data have come from two sources: (a) research with traditional memory tasks, often in connection with other tests related t o intelligence; and (b) research based on the information-processing model. The following survey of this research includes more specific details than the survey of child research in Section 111, because details of the latter research are readily available (e.g., in Brown, 1975). A. MEMORY SPAN

Factor analytic studies of intelligence have identified a Memory factor based on memory span, i.e., short-term recall and recognition of lists of items. This Memory factor declines with age (see Horn, 1975), but there are differential effects of aging on specific memory-span tasks. There is little age difference with subspan lists but a large age difference, favoring younger subjects, with longer lists (Craik, 1968). Memory-span tasks are episodic and presumably nonstrategic when the lists are subspan in length; they are episodic and known to be strategic when longer lists are used (e.g., Belniont & Butterfield, 1971). The implication, then, is that the developmental difference is in the selection or implementation of appropriate strategies for episodic tasks. Memory-span tasks are also included in the factor identified as Fluid Intelligence ( e g , Horn, 1970, 1975), which like the Memory factor declines with age (e.g., Horn, 1975). Recall of digits in reverse order is considered to be a better measure of Fluid Intelligence than recall in the forward order; and reverse recall declines with age while forward recall may not (see Horn, 1970, p. 459). Reverse recall seems to be more likely than forward recall t o require strategic intervention. Another problem would be forgetting where the notes are put.

It is not suggested here that Fluid Intelligence consists entirely of the ability t o select and use appropriate strategies for episodic tasks; it also includes such semantic abilities as the eduction of relations [Figural Relations, Induction; see Horn (1968)l. Rather, the suggestion is that Fluid Intelligence includes the ability in question. Consistent with this suggestion is the fact that Crystallized Intelligence seems t o b e limited to semantic tasks on which performance either increases with age or remains constant (e.g., Horn, 1970, 1975), and the memory tasks are unrelated t o Crystallized Intelligence. Performance on memory-span tasks, as already noted, is related t o the Memory factor and t o Fluid Intelligence. Horn (1975) suggested that these correlations reflect, respectively, relations t o primary and secondary memory, although he believed that the Memory factor reflects attention or concentration as well as primary memory. Primary memory does not decline with age except when there are retrieval problems, while secondary memory does decline (Arenberg, 1973). Primary memory is nonstrategic, and secondary memory is strategic. That is, primary memory involves storage in the sensory register, or in the short-term store when there is n o strategic intervention; secondary memory involves storage in the short-term store with strategic intervention, or in the long-term store, which always involves strategic intervert’loll. Arenberg (1973) concluded that tlierc is more decline in secondary memory than in primary memory. As suggested here, then, there is more decline in strategic-episodic memory than in nonstrategic-episodic memory. Horn (1975) suggested that the decline in primary memory (nonstrategic-episodic memory) reflects a contamination of the primary memory tasks by attention or concentration, which declines with age. In Brown’s system, this contaminant would be identified as a strategy, facilitating performance in the young but absent or reduced in effectiveness in the old. The suggestion, then, is that there is no decline with age in sensory registration., storage capacity, or storage duration (primary memory) but rather a decline in the utilization of mnemonic strategies including focused attention. Such a decline would result from production deficiency or production inefficiency, increasing with age. 1

B. ASSOCIA’IIVI’ MEMORY

Fluid Intelligence also includes associative memory, i.e., recall and recognition of paired associates. The paired-associate task is episodic and strategic, and like memory span for long lists it shows declining performance with increasing age (e.g., Arenberg, 1973). Again, then. there is seen t o be a developmental decline in the selection or implementatioii of appropriate strategies for episodic tasks. In paired-associate learning, old persons report using mediators that are less effective than those reported by young :rdults (Hulicka & Grossman, 1967; Hulicka & Rust, 1964; Hulicka & Weiss, 196s; Rowe & Schnore, 1971). Hulicka and

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Grossman (1967) and Canestrari (1968) showed, however, that the old improved when instructed t o use mediators, suggesting a production deficiency in the use of mediators by the old rather than a physiologically based deficit. The instructions were not completely effective, in that in both studies the performance of the old was inferior t o that of the young even with mediation instructions. Hulicka and Grossman compared old persons (mean age 74 years) with high-school students (mean age 16 years), using a study-test method with an 8-second response time in the test trial. They found that both old and young subjects reported more visual than verbal mediators, but the old reported more verbal mediators than the young. The proportion of correct responses for pairs with reported mediators was lower for verbal mediators than for visual mediators in the old (but not in the young), and both proportions were lower in the old than the corresponding proportions in the young. Canestrari (1968, Experiment I) varied the interpair interval (0, . 5 , and 6 seconds), using a study-test procedure with unlimited response time on the test trial. At each interpair interval, performance tended t o decrease with age, and within each age t o decrease with decreasing interval. The latter effect was examined further in the oldest group (60-69 years old) and was found t o reflect primarily an increase in omissions with decreasing interval, with little effect on errors of commission. The best interpretation seems t o be that the rapid-fire presentation of pairs confused the older subjects and decreased their confidence, because it was omission errors and not commission errors that were affected. [Canestrari (1968) and Arenberg (1973) suggested different interpretations, but without dealing with the differential effects on errors of omission and commission.] Data obtained by Arenberg (1965) can be explained in the same way. Arenberg found that subjects trained with a long anticipation interval made fewer errors on interspersed selfpaced test trials than did subjects trained with a short anticipation interval. It is possible that the shorter anticipation interval reduced the subjects’ confidence and hence increased their errors even when anticipation time was unlimited on the interspersed self-paced test trials. Canestrari (1968, Experiment 11) compared imposed verbal elaboration, imposed imagery, and no-elaboration conditions, manipulated within subjects. In the old, verbal elaboration and imagery reduced omission errors but not commission errors. Neither condition affected the performance of the young, but there was a marked ceiling effect in their performance. Even with verbal elaboration and imagery, however, the old were inferior t o the young. Canestrari suggested that mediation may make associations more available for recall; but if so, then commission errors as well as omission errors should have been reduced. As an alternative, he suggested that the mediation conditions might increase confidence. Given that omission errors are interpreted t o reflect lack of confidence, the alternative suggestion seems more justified. Furthermore, the imagery condi-

tion used seems to have involved side-by-side images almost exclusively, rather than compound images. Only t h e latter are effective mediators (see Paivio, 1971, for review). In speculating about why the old are impaired in the ability to develop mediators, Canestrari (1968) suggested that mediators of the type usually studied are most useful during the years of formal education, and the deficit consequently results from disuse in the later years. This suggestion is fully consistent with the distinction between episodic memory and semantic memory. Episodic memory is emphasized during formal schooling, and semantic memory is considered to be emphasized in day-to-day life. The mediators of the type studied are generated and utilized by the application of strategies that seem t o be maximally effective in episodic tasks. In fact, the evidence that they affect semantic tasks implies that their effect is on episodic aspects of these tasks (Paris, 1975). Canestrari also suggested that physiological impairments may affect the cognitive functioning of the old. but the present writer is unaware of any direct evidence t o support this belief, which nevertheless pervades gerontolOgY.

The inferiority of the old t o the young, even when instructed to use mediators, suggests that there is a source of deficit in addition t o production deficiency. One possibility is production inefficiency. Treat and Reese (1976) varied mediation instructions and duration of the anticipation and study intervals. They found that increasing the study time from 2 t o 6 seconds per pair had no effect on the performance of old and young subjects, implying that the problem of the old is not in forming intrapair associations. Anticipation interval, however, had an effect. When the anticipation interval was short (2 seconds) the old failed t o benefit from mediation instructions, but when the anticipation interval was long (6 seconds) the old performed as well as the young when instructed t o generate mediating imagery. This finding, a “pattern” difference (Brown, 1975), is consistent with other research showing that rapid pacing interferes with the performance of the old (e.g., Canestrari, 1963; Eisdorfer, Axelrod, & Wilkie, 1963; Hulicka, Sterns, & Grossman, 1967;Monge & Hultsch, 1971; see also Horn, 1975). It appears that the deficit in associative learning and memory in old persons results from a production deficiency combined with a relatively slow response latency. The slow response latency might be a kind of production inefficiency: slower retrieval of the mediator, o r slower retrieval of the response item from the mediator, or slower production of the overt verbal response. Any of these could have a physical basis. However, Botwinick (1973) has concluded that the slowing of reaction time in the old is central rather than peripheral, not due t o sensory impairment or slower neuromuscular transmission. Thus, physiological deficit is not necessarily involved. The slower response latency might reflect a lack of confidence in the correct-

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ness of the response. Lacking confidence, the older person may reflect and evaluate before responding overtly, consequently delaying the overt response (see Korchin & Basowitz, 1957). An alternative possibility, again with no direct physiological basis, is that inefficient retrieval strategies are used. C. RETRIEVAL DEFICITS

There is evidence that the old have deficits in retrieval strategies (Anders & Fozard, 1973; Anders, Fozard, & Lillyquist, 1972; Craik, 1968; Rabbitt, 1968; see also review b y Reese, 1973a), although the deficit is not always obtained (Reese, 1973a). Hultsch (1975) examined age differences in cued and noncued recall of lists of words, and concluded from the results that both trace-dependent and cuedependent forgetting occur, more so in the old than in young adults. Tracedependent forgetting is related to storage deficits, and cue-dependent forgetting to retrieval deficits. Hultsch’s data can provide estimates of the relative importance of each type of forgetting (although he questioned the required assumptions). The present author computed the estimates and found that there was very little trace-dependent forgetting in either age group. Therefore, the deficit of the old in this task, involving strategic-episodic memory, seems primarily to reflect cue-dependent forgetting, which is a retrieval deficiency and not a storage deficiency. A storage deficiency might have a neurophysiological basis; but a retrieval deficiency seems less likely to have a neurophysiological basis and more likely t o be merely a production deficiency. That is, the old are less likely than the young to produce an effective retrieval strategy at the time of recall.

IV. Comparison between Childhood and Old Age There are marked age differences in memory during childhood. The differences seem t o reflect not changes in capacity of the various storage structures but rather changes in the control operations and in relevant systems of knowledge. In early childhood, involuntary or nonstrategic memory is already well developed. It exhibits, however, age differences to the extent that the semantic system is involved, because of developmental changes in the semantic system. Deliberate or strategic memory exhibits marked age differences, especially when a semantic component is involved. The development of mnemonic strategies is seen most clearly when the memory task is purely episodic, because strategicsemantic tasks are influenced by developmental changes in the semantic system as well as in the strategies. There is a general progression in the acquisition of mnemonic strategies in childhood, going froin lack of the strategy, through production inefficiency and

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deficiency, t o full efficiency, and going from simple to increasingly complex strategies. The production deficiencies are explained in the dialectical model of memory, as already noted, and the explanation accounts also for the development of the hierarchy of mnemonic strategies. The model is discussed later. As in childhood, there are marked age differences in memory in adulthood and old age. As in childhood, the age differences seem to reflect not changes in capacity but rather in the control operations. Unlike the child, however, the old already have the required metamemorial processes, and if it is assumed that the age differences reflect age changes, then the old already had the required strategies in their repertoire. Yet, the old exhibit production inefficiencies and deficiencies. The problem is t o explain these. The old may acquire new kinds of mnemonic strategies and in the course of acquisition would be expected to exhibit the sequence of deficiencies exhibited in childhood, with production deticiency until the activity is well-established and subordinated to the memory goal. However, other strategies were presumably in their repertoires formerly yet now exhibit the deficiencies. One suggestion is that these strategies have become functionally less available because of disuse. The implication is that their use has becn forgotten t o seme extent. Though once well established, they have become less well established and hence exhibit the deficiencies like any mnemonic activity that is not well established. The simplicity of this assumption is inviting, not only because it relates the deficiencies t o the same causes found in childhood, but also because there is reason t o believe that it is correct. Specifically, the major deficiencies seem to be in strategic-episodic tasks, which arc considered to be the least valid ecologically, and hence would presumably be the least practiced in real adult life (outside the experimental laboratory). The problem is complicated by other variables that affect memory performance, but the complications pose no serious problems. For example, there is a decline in self-confidence in old age, which is reflected b y a need for greater response time or slower pacing of the materials. However, the decline in confidence could reflect the metameniorial awareness of declining memory. The decline in memory could also reflect in part a decline in the metameniorial intention t o remember. When the intention is active, however, the major problem seems t o be production inefficiency and deficiency. For short-term memory tasks, the old seem to have less problem in storing and retaining the material than in retrieving it from memory. It was mentioned earlier (Section 111) that a concrete analog is writing notes and then forgetting where the notes are, or writing them in code and forgetting how to read the code. The problem may be in using inefficient retrieval cues. For example, the retrieval cue used m a y , like a string tied around a finger, revive only the memory that something was t o be remembered and not the content that was t o be remembered. Again, however, there is only a production inefficiency.

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V. Implications for Childhood Memory The commonalities of memory changes in childhood and old age make it reasonable to take a life-span perspective. Indeed they may even demand this perspective. The life-span perspective has implications for the study and understanding of memory development in childhood. It implies a particular model, the dialectical model, which in turn has implications for research topics, and it implies a particular methodological orientation. These implications are discussed here. A. THE DIALECTICAL MODEL

The dialectical view has seemed especially appropriate to many researchers who focus on the life-span or on aging, because certain issues raised in their research, for example, issues about cohort effects and about individual change in a changing ecology, are already prominent in the dialectical model. Taking a life-span perspective therefore naturally suggests adoption of a dialectical model, specifically here a dialectical model of memory development. There are also technical reasons for believing that this model is more promising than other models of memory (Reese, 1973b, 1976b). Meacham (1972) has summarized the dialectical model developed by Soviet psychologists. In this model the first step in the development of mnemonic competence is to learn an activity, such as naming, for its own sake, or as its own goal. An example is naming objects during play. Subsequently, the activity is used as a means for achieving a new goal, such as remembering. Next, the new goal, which has itself become an “activity,” can be used as a means to a still newer goal, such as problem solving. The process continues, as more complex goals become activities in the service of ever more complex goals. The process is technically described as an action becoming subordinated as an operation (means for achieving a goal). A requirement for the subordination of an action is that it be well established. Thus, before an activity can be used in the service of new actions, it must be well practiced. As each newer action becomes subordinated as an operation, more and more complex actions become possible; and as they in turn become subordinated, there develops a hierarchy of operations ordered in complexity. The source of the sequence of new goals is the integration of the individual into his socialhistorical context. Memory deficits are attributed primarily to production inefficiencies and deficiencies. These are explained as resulting from a lack of practice with the related mnemonic activities. Selection of an activity for practice, and the practice itself, are related to the personal-social context of the activity, which

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tends t o change in characteristic ways across the life-span. It is assumed that as the context changes, there are changes in both episodic and semantic memory. The dialectical model implies that as the hierarchy of mnemonic strategies develops, strategies can be combined t o form new strategies to meet complex task demands. Apparently, the combination of strategies is itself a strategy and as such goes through the stage of production deficiency. Butterfield et al. (1973) found such a deficiency in borderline and mildly retarded adolescents and attributed it t o a deficient “executive function.” However, there seems t o be no good reason not t o assume that its production deficiency is like the production deficiency for simple strategies, attributable t o its not yet being “well established.” It is not that either explanation has any more demonstrated merit than the other, but rather that the one suggested here is more parsimonious in attributing the development of all production deficiencies to the same causes. Presumably, the parsimony problem could be reduced in the “executive function” explanation by attributing even simple production deficiencies to deficiencies in the executive function, but then there would need t o be another developmental principle t o explain the developmental sequencing of these production deficiencies. Additional details of the model are discussed elsewhere (Reese, 1976b), but it should be noted that many details remain to be worked out. A problem is that many of the theoretical details are imprecise. For example, the age at which a strategy becomes “well established” needs t o be predictable (in order that the reasoning not be circular). In spite of these problems, however, the dialectical model seems t o have more promise than other models as a life-span model of memory development. B. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS OF’ THE DIALECTICAL MODEL

The dialectical model suggests 3 number of research topics that need investigation. For example, much more needs to be done on combinations of strategies in complex memory tasks. In addition, research on the effects of the personalsocial context needs to be done. This research should be cross-cultural as well as developmental, and if possible should also be historical. The goal of the research would be t o identify differences in the context and t o relate these t o differences in the development of mnemonic strategies. On another level, an important implication of the model is that training in the use of mnemonic strategies should be most effective when given in the context of play, as opposed t o the context of the memory goal. Once the activity has been acquired and practiced in the context of play, its transfer to the memory task can be studied, with or without further instruction. Finally, an implication is that much o f the current memory research is so highly artificial that it reveals little if anything about how memory develops and

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functions in the real world (Kvale, 1974). Therefore, there is a pressing need for new kinds of memory task, such as Meacham’s “prospective remembering” task. C. METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIFE-SPAN PERSPECTIVE

We have seen that the life-span dialectical model generates novel hypotheses and research questions and implies a need for different kinds of research tasks. The general life-span perspective also has implications for research, of a methodological nature as well as a substantive nature. Although there have been a few longitudinal studies of memory development (e.g., Inhelder, 1969), the overwhelming majority has been cross-sectional. In fact, all main-stream research seems t o have been cross-sectional, in spite of the emphasis of life-span developmentalists on the necessity of using research designs that disentangle three index variables which are inextricably confounded in the cross-sectional design. These variables are (a) the age of the subject, identified as an age effect; (b) the date of birth of the subject, identified as a cohort effect; and (c) the date on which the observations were made, identified as a time-ofmeasurement effect. AS discussed extensively in the literature (e.g., Baltes, 1968; Buss, 1973; Nesselroade & Baltes, 1974; Schaie, 1965, 1970, 1973), there are at least two methodological points to be considered. The first is that in order to obtain unambiguous developmental data, it is necessary to use a design that either permits separation of age, cohort, and time-of-measurement effects or provides for a direct description of intra-individual change. The second is that in order to get beyond the level of mere description, research is needed to relate these effects t o their determining variables. The validity of the first point for child developmentalists is illustrated in the following paragraphs, and the validity of the second point is documented throughout the survey of research. Goulet (1976) has suggested a sampling model for educational research, designed t o separate effects of schooling from effects of age. He reviewed relevant data, showing marked effects of schooling on a variety of nonschool tasks, over within-grade intervals as short as 4 months. Schooling, then, can produce a time-of-measurement effect during the course of data collection. A clear time-of-measurement effect can also be seen in a study by Horka and Farrow (1970), in which children were shown meaningless black shapes on a white ground, which upon figure-ground reversal were white letters on a black ground. The children were not instructed that letters could be seen, but subjects who did not report seeing the letters were told the solution. Half of each classroom was tested in the morning, before recess and lunch periods, and the other half in the afternoon. There was apparently considerable communication among the subjects; for example, letters were reported by only 29% of the

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morning group but by 70% of the afternoon group. Thus, intersubject communication produced a time-of-measurement effect. Cohort changes have also been suggested. The writer reported a study (Reese, 1974) suggesting that the educational television program “Sesame Street” may have effected a cohort change by accelerating the rate of cognitive development during the preschool years (see also Ball & Bogatz, 1972). The present author discussed this study with several colleagues at a meeting in Ann Arbor in August, 1973, and t w o of them suggested similar cohort changes occurring at other times: J. P. Bronckart suggested that a cohort change was being reflected in Genevan research, which was revealing earlier transitions between Piagetian stages than had originally been observed; and L. Wilder suggested that an earlier instance of cohort change may be reflected in the failures of American investigators t o replicate Luria’s “squeeze, don’t squeeze” research showing mediational deficiencies in young children (for a brief review, see Miller, Shelton, & Flavell, 1970). The implication is that cohort changes occur in the preschool period, but the evidence for these changes is from cross-sectional studies, and consequently cohort effects are confounded with time-of-measurement effects. If we had t o guess about what the determining variable might be, we should favor environmental variables. Even if the causal variable is a maturation-environment interaction (Overton, 1973), accelerations in cognitive development seem likely t o reflect changes in environment because maturation seems unlikely t o have become accelerated over the short time-span involved, for example, in the Reese (1974) study. Thus, environment seems to be at the core of cognitive development, with maturation providing a material substrate for its effect. If one accepts this environmental argument, there is still no need to adopt a theory of continuous development, in that stages of cognitive development can be accommodated to an environmental view. It has been argued, for example, that the environment is structured and programs child development (e.g., Baer, 1976; Bijou, 1974; Bijou & Baer, 1965). The environmental structure is not inherent in the environment but rather is imposed by agents who reflect cultural history. Part of the structure is seen in the programming of developmental tasks; for example, increasing independence of exploration is generally encouraged, even in primitive cultures (Sorenson, 1974). Thus, the environmental variables are seen to be cultural variables. D. 1NTERRELAI’I:DNbSS OF ATTRlBUTES

Another emphasis in life-span developmental psychology-and the dialectical model-is on the interrelatedness of all characteristics of the organism, including its interactions with the environment (e.g., Baltes & Goulet, 1970; Baltes & Nesselroade, 1973; Wohlwill, 1973). A few memory theorists (e.g., Brown, 1975; Jenkins, 1974; Meacham, 1972) have mentioned the presumed interrelatedness

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of memory and other cognitive processes, but they have not done much about it even at the theoretical level. Perhaps memory and the other domains are too imperfectly understood to make it worthwhile to look for ways they might be interrelated; or perhaps this imperfect understanding has resulted from our tendency t o study each process in isolation and not even to look for interrelations. Research on the interrelatedness of cognitive processes has been scanty and limited in scope. Whether or not the research will ever be done successfullywith unambiguous outcomes-remains to be seen. There are difficult problems, including the competence-performance distinction and the problem of changing validity. Factor analytic research has shown that factor structures in some domains change with age (e.g., Baltes & Nesselroade, 1973; Reinert, 1970). Does the change reflect a change in the interrelations aniong the underlying processes, a reorganization of the structure of the processes? Or is it only a change in the structure of performance, a change in the validity or meaning of the tasks? The meaning of an “ability” test may change with age (e.g., Nunnally. 1973), and even a learning task may change in meaning. For example, Levinson and Reese (1967) noted in a life-span study of discrimination learning set that some elderly subjects interpreted the task as “playing with buttons” (buttons were used as token reinforcers), an interpretation apparently not educed by the younger subjects. Even within a single age level the meaning of a task may be unstable. For example, Labouvie, Frohring, Baltes, and Goulet (1973) studied recall of picture items in college students and correlated the recall scores with scores on four intelligence-test factors and four memory-test factors. They found no difference between the acquisition curves for immediate and delayed recall, but immediate recall was more strongly related to the Memory factors and delayed recall was more strongly related t o the Intelligence factors. Thus, changing the procedure of the memory task from immediate t o delayed recall changed the meaning of the task. Furthermore, the meaning of the task varied with stage of acquisition. Over a number o f trials there was an increase in the relation of recall to Intelligence factors and a decrease in the relation t o Memory factors. Researchers who deal with memory development in childhood seem to have been more concerned about nontask variables, i.e., the experimental treatments that influence performance, than about the changing meaning or appropriateness or ecological validity of the tasks at different stages of development and at different stages of acquisition. Both kinds of change, however, are emphasized in the dialectical model. The task influences the subject and at the same time the task is influenced by the subject. Different meanings of the task induce different strategies a t different age levels; and different strategies change the meaning of the task in different ways. In conclusion, the dialectical model tells us that cognitive attributes are

interrelated; but it also tells us that the attributes interact with the environment, including the tasks intended to ineasure them. The challenge, then, is not only t o design and d o the needed research, but also to have the ingenuity to interpret its outcomes.

VI. Suniniary and Conclusions Memory tasks can be classified as “nonstrategic” versus “strategic” and “episodic” versus “semantic.” Theoretical analysis of performance differences among these tasks can reveal developmental changes in storage capacity and in the cognitive structures-the strategy system semantic system, and “Inetameniorial” system-which are assumed to underlie performance. There is good presumptive evidence that storage capacity does not change during childhood, and therefore changes in the cognitive structures are thought to underlie developmental changes in memory. Changes in the semantic system and in rnetamemorial processes have not yet been studied extensively by memory researchers, although a promising start has been made. There is fairly extensive research relevant to changes in the system of strategies, and these changes are well understood at least in broad outline. The system of strategies changes in two ways, incorporating niore and more strategies and niore and niore complex strategies. Thc increase in the number of strategies reflects an acquisition process which for each new strategy progresses through identifiable stages: first, the strategy is absent (a stage of “mediation deficiency”); then it is available but not used unless induced and used inefficiently even when induced (“production inefficiency”); next, the strategy is available and if induced is used efficiently (“production deficiency”); and finally it is used spontaneously and efficiently (the inature stage). There is also a developmental progression in the complexity of strategies, resulting in part from coordinations of simpler strategies. The strategies are organized hierarchically, and higher-order strategies are not only niore complex but also more effective. Research on memory development in adulthood and old age suggests that declining memory in old age docs not result from a decrease in storage capacity and hence must be attributable to changes in the relevant cognitive structures. The important changes appear t o be in the system of strategies, particularly as it applies to episodic tasks, rather than In the semantic system or the metamemorial processes. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the problem is not mediation deficiency but rather is production inefficiency and production deficiency. The occurrence of production inefficiencies and deficiencies in both childhood and old age makes it reasonable to wonder whether a single model of memory development might be applicable across the entire life-span. The life-span per~

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spective suggests a dialectical model of development. This model has often been adopted b y life-span researchers, partly because of their concern with the distinctions among age, cohort, and time-of-measurement effects. The dialectical model deals explicitly with such effects, interpreted as the personal-historicalsocial context of development. The dialectical model of memory explains both developmental progressions in the system of strategies: the stages in the acquisition of a new strategy and the development of the hierarchy of strategies. An action learned for its own sake-as its own goal-can be used in the service of a new goal, but it cannot be used efficiently and spontaneously until it has become “well established.” As new goals arise, old goals become subordinated t o their service but exhibit inefficiencies until well established in this new role. Cultural demands, which change historically, dictate the progression of goals and during childhood dictate ever more complex goals, which in turn demand ever more complex activities. Thus, the development of the hierarchy of mnemonic strategies is seen t o reflect societal programming. In adulthood and old age, certain tasks lose their ecological validity, and presumably the strategies that serve their demands become less “well established,” hence exhibit the characteristic inefficiencies when the tasks are reimposed by society (whose agent is sometimes a researcher). In addition to these implications for the understanding of memory development in childhood, the life-span perspective also has implications about the kinds of problems that deserve to be studied. Specifically, it is implied that there is a more pressing need t o understand the social and historical influences on memory than to discover, for example, how list length influences serial memory. The life-span perspective also has methodological implications. The research on memory development in childhood has been almost entirely cross-sectional. yet life-span studies have repeatedly demonstrated marked cohort and time-ofmeasurement effects that often outweigh age effects. Cohort and time-ofmeasurement effects are known to occur in childhood, even over relatively short time spans, but the cross-sectional memory data continue to be interpreted as reflecting age effects. There is a need, then, to use research designs that disentangle the age, cohort, and time-of-measurement effects. A final implication of the life-span perspective for research on memory development comes from its emphasis on the interrelatedness of all characteristics of the organism, including its various interactions with the environment. Memory changes in old age have often been studied in conjunction with other cognitive and intellectual processes, but even this imperfect approach to interrelatedness is scarce in studies of memory changes in childhood. Perhaps more needs to be known about memory itself before it will be fruitful to look for its relations t o other organismic characteristics and environmental variables, but we will not know until the research begins to be done.

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R E F E R E N CE S Anders, T. R., & Fozard, J. L. I3’fccts o f age upon retrieval from primary and secondary memory. Developmental Psychologj~,1973, 9, 41 1 4 1 5 . Anders, T. R., Fozard, J . L.. & Lillyquist, T. D. Effects of age upon retrieval from short-term memory. Developnicwtol Psychology, 1 9 7 2 , 6 , 2 14-2 17. Arenberg, D. Anticipation interval and ape differences in verbal learning. Journal of Abnormal Psycholog)., 1965, 70, 4 1 9 4 2 5 . Arenberg, D. Cognition and aging: Verbal learning, memory, and problem solving. In C. Eisdorfer & M. P. Lawton (Eds.), The psycho/ogjJ of adult development and aging. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1973. Baer, D. M. Thc organism as host. In I I . W. Reese (Ed.), Conceptiotx of the active organism. Human Development, 1976, in prcss. Ball, S., & Bogatz, G. A. Sunimative rcscarch of Sesame Street: Implications for the study of op. preschool children. In A. D. Pick (lid.), Minnesota symposia on child p ~ j ~ c h ~ l Vol. 6. Minneapolis: University of Minncsota Press, 1972. Baltes, P. B. Longitudinal and cross-sectional sequences in thc study of agc and generation effects. Humaii Development. 1968, 11, 145-171. Baltes, P. B., & Goulet, L. R. Status and issues of a life-span developmental psychology. In L. R. Goulct & P. B. Baltes (1: an developmental psychology: Research arid theory. New York: Acadcmic P Baltes, P. B., & Nesselroade, J. R. The developmental analysis of individual diffcrences on multiple measures. In J. R. Nessclroadc & H. W. Iicesc (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Methodological issues. Ncw York: Academic Press, 1973. Pp. 219-251. Belmont, J. M., & Butterfield, 6. C . What the development of short-term memory is. In J. H. Flavcll (Chm.), What is memory developnicnt the development of? Human Development, 1971, 14,236-248. Bijou, S. W. Development in the presc~lioolyears: A functional analysis. Invited address at the meeting of the American I’. hological Association, New Orleans, September 1974. Bijou, S. W., & Baer, D. M. Child develo(mient. Vol. 2. Universal stage o,f infamy. New York: Appleton, 1965. Bjork, R. A. Short-term storage: Tlic ordered output of a central processor. Paper presentcd at the Indiana Theoretical and Cognitive Psychology Conferences, Bloomington, Indiana, April 1974. Cited by Hagcn ct al., 1975. Botwinick, J. Aging and behavior. New York: Springer Publ., 1973. Brown, A. L. The development ot meinmy: Knowing, knowing about knowing, and knowing how to know. In 11. W . liccsc (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior. Vol. 10. New York: Acadcmic Press, 1975. Buss, A. R. An extension o f devclopmcntal models that separate ontogenetic changes and cohort differences. Psychological Bullrriti, 1973, 80, 466-419. Butterfield, E. C., Wanibold, C., & Iklniont, J. M. On the theory and practice of improving short-term memory. Americati .Journal ofMc’ntal Deficiency, 1973, 7 7 , 6 5 4 4 6 9 . Canestrari, R. E., Jr. Paced and cclf-pacwd learning in young and elderly adults. Journal o f Geroiitology, 1963, 18, 165-168. Cancstrari, R. E., Jr. Age changes in acquisition. In G. A. Talland (Ed.), II/rtnati aging and behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1968. Craik, I;. I. M. Short-term memory and the aging process. In G. A. Talland (Ed.), Human aging and behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1968. Eisdorfer, C., Axelrod, S., & Wilkie. I:. L. Stimulus exposure time as a factor in scrial

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learning in an aged sample. Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1963, 67, 5 94-600. Flavell, J. H. Developmental studies of mediated memory. In H. W. Reese & L. P. Lipsitt (Eds.), Advances in child development and behavior. Vol. 5. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Flavell, J. H. First discussant’s comments: What is memory development the development of? In J. H. Flavell (Chm.), What is memory development the development of? Human Development, 1971, 14,272-278. (a) Flavell, J. H. Stage-relatcd propcrtics of cognitive development. Coxnirive P5ychobgJJ,1971, 2 , 4 2 1 4 5 3 . (b) Friedrich, D. Developmental analysis of memory capacity and information-encoding strategy. Developmental Psychology, 1974, 10,559-563. Goulet, L. R. Longitudinal and tinie-lag designs in educational research: An alternate sampling model. Review of Educational Research, 1976. Hagen, J. W., Jongeward, R. H., & Kail, R . V. Cognitive perspectives o n the development of memory. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior. Vol. 10. New York: Academic Press, 1975. Horka, S. T., & Farrow, B. J . A methodological note on intersubjective communication as a contaminating factor in psychological experinients. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1970, 10, 363-366. Horn, J. L. Organization of abilities and the development of intelligence. Psychological Review, 1968,75,242-259. Horn, J. L. Organization of data on life-span development of human abilities. In L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Research and theory. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Horn, J. L. Psychometric studies of aging and intelligence. In S. Gershon & A. Raskin (Eds.), Geriatric psychopharmacology: The scene today. New York: Raven Press, 1975. Hulicka, I. M., & Grossman, J. L. Age-group comparisons for the use of mediators in paired-associate learning. Journal of Gerontology, 1967, 22,46-51. Hulicka, I. M., & Rust, L. D. Age-related retention deficit as a function of learning. Journal of the American Geriatrics society, 1964, 11, 1061-1065. Hulicka, I. M., Sterns, H., & Grossman, J . Age-group comparisons of paired-associate learning as a function of paced and self-paced association and response time. Journal o f Gerontology, 1967, 22,274-280. Hulicka, 1. M., & Weiss, R. L. Age differences in retention as a function of learning. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 1965. 29, 125-129. Hultsch, D. F. Adult age differences in retrieval: Trace dependent and cue dependent forgetting. Developmental Psychology, 1975, 11, 197-201. Inhelder, B. Memory and intelligence in the child. In D. Elkind & J. H. Flavell (Eds.), Studies in cognitive development: Essays in honor of Jean Piaget. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Jenkins, J. J. Remember that old theory of memory? Well, forget it! American Psychologist, 1974,29,785-795. Jerome, E. A. Age and learning-Experimental studies. In J. E. Birren (Ed.), Handbook o f aging and the individual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. Korchin, S. H., & Basowitz, H. Age differences in verbal learning. Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1957, 5 4 , 6 4 4 9 . Kvale, S. Memory and dialectics: Some reflections on Ebbinghaus and Mao Tse-Tung. In J . A. Meacham (Chm.), A dialectical paradigm for psychological research. Symposium presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans, September 1974.

Labouvie, G . V., Frohring, W. R.. Iialtes, P. B., & Goulet, L. R. Changing relationship between recall performance and abilities as a function of stage of learning and timing of recall. Journal of Educational Ps,vchology, 1973, 64, 191-198. Levinson, B., & Reese, H. W. Patterns of discrimination learning set in preschool children, fifth-graders, college freshmen, and the aged. Motzographs of the Society f b r Research irz Child Development, 1967, 32(7, Whole N o . 115). Meacham, J. A. The development o f incrnory abilities in the individual and society. Human Development, 1972, 15, 205-228. Meacham, J. A., Leiman, B., & Dumitru, J . Prospective reniembering and external retrieval cues. Unpublished manuscript, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1975. Miller, S. A,, Shclton, J., & Flavell, J . 11. A test of Luria’s hypothesis concerning the development of verbal self-regulation. Child Development, 1970,41, 65 1-665. Monge, T. H., & Hultsch, D. I: Paired-associate learning as a function of adult ape and length of the anticipation and inspection intervals. Journal of Gerontology, 197 1, 26, 157-1 62. Nesselroade, J. R., & Baltes, P. D. Adolcsccnt personality development and historical change: 1970-1972. Monographs of tlic Society for Research in Child Development, 1974, 39(1, Whole No. 154). Nunnally, J . C. Research strategies and mcasureincnt methods for investigating human development. I n J . R. Nessclrcude ti €1. W. Reese (l?ds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Methodological issues. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Ovcrton, W. F. On the assuinptive h s e of the nature-nurture controversy: Additive versus interactive conceptions. Hurnari I ) c ’ i ’ c / o i ) , n e i z t . 1973, 16, 74-89. Paivio, A. Imagery and verbal proccwcs. Nrw Y o r k : Molt, 197 I . Paris, S. G. Integration and infercncc i n children’s comprehension and memory. In P. Restle, R. Shiffrin, J . Castellan, H . Lindinan, & D. Pisoni (Eds.), Cognitive theory. Vol. 1. Potomac, Md: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1975. Paris, S. G., & Upton, L. R. Children’s comprehension and memory of inferential relationships in prose. Unpublished manuscript, I’i.iidue University, 1975. Piaget, J., & Inheldcr, B. Memory atul intelligence. New York: Basic Books, 1973. Rabbitt, P. Age and the use of structure in transmitted information. In G. A. Talland (Ed.), Hunzan aging and behavior. Ncw Y o r k : Academic Press, 1968. Reese, H. W. Vcrbal mediation as i~ function of age level. Psychological Bulletin, 1962, 59, 502-509. Reese, H. W. Life-span models o f nrcmory. I n P. B. Baltcs (Chm.), Life-span models of psychological aging: A white c.lcpli;int? (;o-ontologist. 1973, 13, 4 7 2 4 7 8 . (a) Reese, H. W. Models of mcniory a n d models of development. Human Development, 1973, 16, 398-416. (b) Reese, H. W. Cohort, age, and imagery in children’s paired-associate learning. Child Developmen?, 1974,45,1176-1178. Reese, H. W . Basic learning processes irr childhood. New York: Holt, 1976. (a) Recse, H. W. Models of memory development. Human Development, 1976, in press. (b) Reinert, G. Comparative factor analytic studies of intelligence throughout the human life-span. In L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Research and theory. New York. Academic Press, 1970. Rowe, E. J . , & Schnore, M. M. Item concreteness and reported strategies in paired-associate learning as a function of age. Journul of(;erontology, 1971, 26, 470-4175. Salatas, H., & Flavell, J . H. Retrieval of recently learned information: Development of strategies and control skills. Unpublished manuscript, University o f Minnesota, 1975. Schaie, K. W. A general model f o r the study of developmental problems. Psychological BulZetin, 1965, 64, 92-107.

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Schaie, K. W. A reinterpretation of age related changes in cognitive structure and functioning. In L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Lije-span developmental psycho1og.v. Research and theory. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Schaie, K. W. Methodological problems in descriptive developmental research on adulthood and aging. In J . R. Nesselroade & H. W. Reese (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Methodological issues. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Scribner, S. Developmental aspects of categorized recall in a West Africa society. Cognitive Psychology, 1974, 6 , 4 7 5 4 9 4 . Simon, H. A. How big is a chunk? Science, 1974, 183,482-488. Sorenson, E. R. Anthropological film: A scientific and humanistic resource. Science, 1974, 186,1079-1085. Treat, N. J., & Reese, €1. W. Age, imagery, and pacing in paired-associate learning. DevelopmentalPsychology, 1976, 12, 119-124. Tulving, E. Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organization of memory. New York: Academic Press, 1972. Wohlwill, J. F. The study o f behavioral development. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Yendovitskaya, T. V. Development of memory. In A. V. Zaporozhets & D. B. Elkonin (Eds.), The psychology of preschool children. (Engl. transl. by J. Shybut & S. Simon.) Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971.

COGNITIVE CHANGES DURING THE ADULT YEARS: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY AND RESEARCH

I. RESEARCH ON ADULT COGNITION

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11. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY . . . . . . . . . . A. MORE PRECISE EXPLANATION OF DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. CONSIDERATION OF LIFE-SPAN CHANGES I N ADAPTIVE VALUE OF COGNITIVI~MODES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. CONSIDERATION OF THF FATE O F PREVIOUSLY USED RESPONSE MODES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 13 21 5

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111. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH PROCEDURES WITH CHILDREN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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IV. SUMMARY

I. Research on Adult Cognition Before much research had been conducted on the cognitive abilities of adults, it was assumed that there were no major changes in adult thought beyond adolescence. Piaget and Inhelder (1969) stated that, “Finally, after the age of 11 or 12, nascent formal thought restructures the concrete operations by subordinating them t o new structures whose development will continue throughout 21 3

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adolescence and all of later life” (pp. 152-153). Flavell (1970) expressed a similar opinion: “Cognitive changes during childhood have a specific set of ‘morphogenetic’ properties that presumably stem from the biological-maturational growth process underlying these changes: Thus, childhood cognitive modifications are largely inevitable, momentous, directional, uniform, and irreversible. No underlying process constrains and directs adult cognitive changes, and hence their morphogenetic properties should be quite different from those that obtain during childhood. The most important adult cognitive changes are probably the result of life experiences, and would for the most part be expected to lack the across-subjects uniformity that characterizes the child’s intellectual growth” (p. 247). Both of these statements express the view that the cognitive changes that do take place after adolescence are progressive and unidirectional. However, many investigators have found that the elderly tend to perform cognitive tasks in a manner qualitatively similar t o that of young children and different from that of the majority of people between these two age extremes. For example, studies have shown that elderly subjects perform at a more primitive level than middleaged subjects on the following Piagetian tasks: conservation (e.g., Kominski & Coppinger, 1968; Papalia, 1972; Rubin, Attewell, Tierney, & Tumolo, 1973; Sanders, Laurendeau, & Bergeron, 1966), egocentrism ( e g , Bielby & Papalia, 1975; Comalli, Wapner, & Werner, 1959; Looft & Charles, 1971; Rubin, 1974; Rubin et a/., 1973), animistic thinking (e.g., Dennis & Mallinger, 1949), classification (e.g., N. W. Denney, 1974a; Denney & Lennon, 1972), multiple classification (e.g., N. W. Denney & Cornelius, 1975), class inclusion ( e g , Denney & Cornelius, 1975), pendulum, balance, and flexibility problems (e.g., TomlinsonKeasey, 1972), and moral thinking (e.g.. Bielby & Papalia, 1975). Primitive modes of responding have also been obtained on non-Piagetian tasks. For example, the elderly have been found to give a high percentage of “hypothesistesting” questions on the 20 Questions Task (N. W. Denney & Denney, 1974), “relational” responses on the Conceptual Styles Test (N. W. Denney, 1974b), and “syntagmatic” word associations (Riegel & Riegel, 1964), all of which are also common among young children. Since the studies in which primitive modes of responding were found among the elderly were cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, it is not possible t o conclude that the obtained age differences are a result of actual ontogenetic change rather than generational differences (Baltes, 1968; Schaie, 1965, 1970). However, as Looft (1 973) pointed out, “Cross-cultural and cross-social-strata studies have shown that the sensorimotor, preoperational, and concrete operational forms of thought are apparently displayed by children everywhere 39). If most children today reach the stage of concrete operational thought, regardless of the culture in which they are raised, then it seems reasonable to assume that most elderly people had also attained this stage of thought at some

Cognitive Clia/i,ycs ditring the Adult Years

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time in their development. Since many of the previously mentioned studies demonstrate that the elderly do not perform at the concrete operational level, it seems reasonable t o suspect that there may indeed be actual ontogenetic regression in old age.

11. Implications for Developmental Theory If there are changes in performance on cognitive tasks during the adult years, as this recent research suggests, then theories of cognitive development that are based on the growth and development which take place between birth and adolescence are no longer adequate. In response to the finding that cognition does not remain stable beyond adolescence, developmental theories must now specify the course of the various cognitive processes throughout the entire life-span as well as incorporate the possibility of change in the adult years. One attempt along these lines has been made by Regel (1973), who proposed a fifth stage, that of dialectic operations. t o supplement Piaget’s theory. However, more theoretical attention needs t o be focused o n the adult years. A

MORF PRI CIS1 1-XPLANATION OF DLV€ 1 OPMI N I A L CHANGES

Most theories of cognitive development have been concerned with how the individual’s abilities progress from the very primitive processes and operations of the infant t o the more sophisticated processes employed by the adolescent. It is often assumed that children progress from the primitive t o the more sophisticated modes as they develop the biological mechanisms t o make the more sophisticated modes possible. Thus, biological maturation is often the explanation given for developinental changes in cognition. However, with the recent evidence from studies with adults that the so-called primitive modes of responding reoccur at later ages, some of these assumptions must be questioned. One very general theoretical consequence of a consideration of changes that take place in adult cognition may be il realiLation that a facile invocation of maturation as an explanation for those regular developmental changes which take place in childhood is no longer adequate. We shall be forced increasingly to place less emphasis on maturation per se and on developmental stages, invoked as if they constituted a causal variable. In their places we may begin t o see a need for explanation of maturational changes, for a more detailed analysis of differential components of maturation, and f o r a serious consideration of what really constitutes psychobiological maturation. Although the term maturation has included those changes attributed by default to determination by unspecified organic and biological processes, per-

haps it is time to make a division between those changes traceable to known biological changes and those for which there are no known established organic or environmental antecedents. Such a process might be facilitated by research with the elderly, for whom biological status, typical environment, and level of psychological functioning are not so thoroughly confounded as they are among children. To the extent that the processes which cause the reversals in old age can be sorted out by their determinants, traditional maturational processes in children may be better understood. An investigation of both the biological and the environmental variables that are associated with cognitive functioning throughout the entire life-span is necessary. In the past it has been too easy t o assume that developmental changes were a result of biological maturation and, therefore, not to consider how environmental variables might be involved in such changes. There is some evidence, however, that at least some cognitive processes may be more closely associated with environmental changes than with maturational changes. For example, Cole, Gay, Glick, and Sharp (1971) reported a number of studies on classification conducted with the Kpelle in Liberia. They concluded on the basis of these studies that changes in classification are more closely associated with the time at which the individual enters a Western-style school than with the age of the individual. Likewise, others (e.g., N . W. Denney, 1974c; Denney & Duffy, 1974; Flavell, 1972) have argued that certain developmental changes in cognition may be caused by external, environmental factors rather than by internal, organismic factors. Thus, the cont:ibution of environmental factors to developmental stages needs to be more fully investigated with a variety of cognitive processes. We think that recent research with the elderly emphasizes the deficiency of “maturation” as an explanatory concept, and therefore we are concerned about the tendency for investigators to assume, without ever questioning the validity of the use of inaturation as an explanatory concept for early developmental changes, that “explanatory discontinuity” is necessary. That is, we question the assumption that different explanatory concepts are necessary for different portions of the life-span. While maturation is still assumed to be the explanation for early developmental changes, some other explanation is sought for the changes that occur in adulthood. The tendency is usually to assume that experiential factors are responsible for developmental changes during the adult years. This position has been expressed by Kohlberg (1973): “The existence of adulthood psychological stage change is theoretically important since such change must be the result of experiential interaction with the environment, rather than being linked to biological maturation” (p. 179). A similar view was posited by Flavell (1970): “Cognitive changes during childhood have a specific set of ‘morphogenetic’ properties that presumably stem from the biologicalmaturational growth processes underlying these changes changes are probably the result of life experiences. . .” (p. 247). Thus, there is,

as Charlesworth (1972) has noted, “a widespread belief that man is more biological when he is an infant and more social and cultural when he is older” (p. 10). But, as Charlesworth went on t o say, “Biology and culture do not work separately at separate times during ontogenesis. The two sources of influence on human behavior are inextricably merged together throughout the organism’s whole existence” (p. 11). The assumption that early changes must be a function of biological changes and that later changes must be a function of experiential changes will unnecessarily restrict research into the possible variables that niight be associated with developmental change. It could very well be that early developmental changes are at least partially a result of experiential-environmental factlors, whereas many of the later changes may be at least partially a result of biological factors. I t is too early to restrict our thinking along these lines. We must approach the whole question of the causality of developniental change with a new openness and an increased determination t o get at specific antecedent conditions rather than rely on such global, catchall terms as maturation. Hopefully, the results of recent life-span research will facilitate a reconsideration of many of our assumptions about the factors responsible for developinentat change in childhood. B

CONSlDrRA r I 0 N 01 I I 1 E-SPAN CHANGrS IN ADAPTIVL VALUI 01 COGNITIVL MODLS

A second theoretical consequence of a consideration of changes that take place in adult cognition may be a realimtion that the later-developed response inodes may not be the most adaptive inodes f o r all situations. Typically, the later-developed processes are considered t o be the most adaptive and effective and it is, therefore, assumed that if an individual has the ability to use the later-developed processes, he will use them. However, thc fact that the elderly revert to childlike response modes calls this notion into question. Why should the elderly use less sophisticated responses than they have used in the past? One possible explanation is that they have lost the ability t o use more sophisticated types of responses. However, there is evidence that the elderly can, through various types of training or manipulations, give more sophisticated responses than they typically exhibit o n their own (e.g.. Ilenney & Denney, 1974; Hornbluni & Overton, 1975; Tomlinson-Keasey, 1972). Children have also been found to be capable of more sophisticated responses than they exhibit spontaneously (e.g., Beilin, 1971; Brainard, 1974; Jacobs & Vandeventer, 1971; Rosenthal & Zinimerman, 1972). Given that both young children and elderly adults are capable of more sophisticated responses than they typically give, why do they seldom use such responses? One possibility is that the environments of most elderly individuals simply lack conditions which would maintain h i d l levels of cognitive perfor-

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mance (see N. W. Denney, 1974c; Hoyer, Labouvie, & Baltes, 1973). A second, and closely related, possibility is that in certain circumstances the response modes that we typically consider t o be more primitive may actually be more adaptive. For example, Denney ( 1 9 7 4 ~ )has suggested that both young children and elderly adults may use “primitive” modes of classification because these modes are actually more useful for them, rather than because they are not Capable of more sophisticated modes of classification. Young children and elderly adults tend t o group items that are related in a con~plementaryfashion (e.g., a car and a garage) rather than items that are alike semantically (e.g., a car and a train). Such complementary classifications are usually considered to be more primitive than similarity classifications. However, it could be that both young children and elderly adults classify according to complementary criteria because that is the way objects are grouped naturally in time and space and, thus, it is the most salient way for individuals who live in the concrete, here-and-now world t o classify. Possibly only when there are pressures for individuals to classify in other, more abstract ways d o they tend t o classify according t o similarity. There is evidence that both young children and elderly adults are capable of more sophisticated classification responses after observing a model classify (N. W. Denney, 1974a; Denney & Acito, 1974); they appear t o use complementary criteria in spite of having the ability to use more abstract classification criteria. Since they use less sophisticated responses than they are capable of, it seems reasonable t o suspect that there may actually be some environmental “payoff’ for the use of these primitive responses. Although this argument was made for classification abilities, it is possible that similar cases could also be made that other types of primitive responses are more adaptive for young children and elderly adults. C. CONSIDERATION OF THE FATE OF PREVIOUSLY USED RESPONSE MODES

A third theoretical consequence of a consideration of the changes that take place in adult thought processes is an awareness that dcvelopmentar theories should specify what actually happens to the primitive modes of responding in children after they acquire the more advanced modes. With few exceptions (e.g., Flavell, 1972; Werner & Kaplan, 1963), not much consideration has been given t o the fate of the more primitive modes. There is a tendency to focus attention on the most advanced cognitive processes that individuals are capable of at any particular time in their development. However, the fact that the more primitive responses tend to increase in old age raises some interesting questions. We need t o investigate whether such allegedly primitive information processing remains available in older children, subject t o certain prompts and demands, or whether it atrophies from disuse and becomes more or less permanently unavailable, only t o be relearned in old age.

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A related question is what happens to the more sophisticated responses in the elderly once they begin t o use the more primitive responses. There is some evidence that the more sophisticated mvdes d o remain intact in the repertoires of the elderly. For example, it has been found that the elderly tend to use a very childlike strategy on Olver and Hornsby’s 20 Questions Task. Rather than asking questions that eliminate a whole class of items at a time (constraint-seeking questions) they tend t o ask questions that eliminate only one item at a time (hypothesis-testing questions). However, when exposed t o an adult model who asks constraint-seeking questions, the elderly tend to adopt the constraint-seeking strategy immediately after observing as few as one or two constraint-seeking questions (N. W. Denney & Denney, 1974). Thus, their ability t o use this efficient problem-solving strategy does not appear to deteriorate, since it appears full-blown when elicited by so sinall a stimulus as hearing someone else ask a constraint-seeking question. The behavior of the elderly in this situation appears to be very different from that of young children, who appear t o learn much more gradually when exposed to 3 model (D. R. Denney, Denney, & Ziobrowski, 1973). It seems likely that the elderly possess but do not spontaneously use this efficient though more abstract strategy, whereas young children have the capacity to acquire it but have not yet done so. It niay be that developmental achievements are ordered hierarchically in order of acquisition from most primitive t o most sophisticated. The most sophisticated responses that a child has acquired niay be those that are typically exhibited, but the more primitive responses may remain in the child’s repertoire and be available under certain conditions. Thus, the acquisition of more sophisticated responses may not only enable the individual t o use higher levels of information processing but also allow him niure tlcxibility in that he has more response modes to select from. If this is the case, individuals at adolescence and beyond should be more capable of processing the same environment in multiple ways than young children who have n o t yet acquired all of the necessary skills t o process it in the more advanced modes. Therefore, in addition t o determining whether the abilities for more primitive types of responses remain intact when individuals develop more sophisticated types of responses, we need to establish the circumstances in which individuals will use the more primitive responses, and whether individuals move back and forth between various types of responses flexibly to fit the demands of the situation or tend to overgeneralize the types of responses they use most frequently. Although there is some evidence that the elderly do not lose the ability for more advanced types of responses, there is also evidence that they d o not use the higher-level types of responses even when the higher-level types of responses would be more effective. For example, on the 20 Questions Task discussed earlier, the constraint-seeking strategy would be more efficient than the hypothesis-testing strategy for determining the correct alternative with the fewest questions, but the elderly do not tend to use it spontaneously. So, the elderly do

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W Detrriey arid Jolirz C. Wriglit

not seem to use the various response modes flexibly. It may be that the elderly who are retired and, therefore, no longer subjected t o demands for the exercise of abstract, high-level modes of information processing use those modes that are most adaptive and effective for their particular environments. Since their environments tend to be fairly consistent, the elderly may have developed ways of responding to the environment that have become rather automatic. They niay apply these responses without really analyzing task demands or evaluating alternative strategies. Whether the elderly would adapt their strategies to the situation more effectively if they were put into long-term situations in which other strategies were more effective has yet t o be determined. But it does appear that both young children and elderly adults may be less flexible than people between these two ages-young children because they have not yet acquired all of the different types of response, and elderly adults because they have become too automatic in their responding. Although we have pointed out similarities in the way young children and elderly adults approach cognitive problems and have suggested that they might also be similar in their inflexible approach t o problems, we want t o inject a note of caution about the conclusions drawn from these similarities. The similarities in responses that have been obtained need not necessarily stem from the operation of similar cognitive processes. In fact, it s e e m unlikely that there would not be differences in the processes employed by young children and elderly adults, since elderly adults have had so much more experience than young children. Thus, it is important to try to get at the underlying processes and to determine whether these processes are the same in young children and elderly adults, rather than to assume that they are the same because the overt responses are similar.

111. Implications for Research Procedures with Children In addition t o the aforementioned theoretical consequences, a consideration of the findings of life-span research may also have a beneficial effect on the tasks and procedures employed in developmental research with children and adolescents. Unlike most children, the elderly can be very candid about their reactions to artificial tasks, the apparently illogical demands of laboratory situations, and the like, and this may lead us to consider more realistically the motivation for working o n arbitrary cognitive tasks among young children as well as among adults. Research with the elderly has demonstrated that task-related variables are very important determinants of performance. Of particular interest are the studies in which task meaningfulness has been varied. Hulicka (1967) found that the performance of elderly subjects improved greatly on

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22 I

paired-associates tasks when the stimulus words were names of occupations and the response words were surnames (e.g., BANKER-SLAON), compared to when the stimulus components were two letters and the response components were a word (e.g., TL-INSANE). Arenberg ( 1968) reported that meaningfulness also affects the performance of the elderly on concept learning problems. He concluded that “the dimensions of color, form, and number and the entire task were too abstract t o be understood” (p. 279). He found that the elderly subjects performed better when the problems were made more lifelike, i.e., when the subjects were told that one of nine foods was poisoned and that they were to identify the poisoned food. Three foods were presented at a time in a “meal” and the subjects were told whether the person who ate the meal lived or died. These studies indicate that we niay riot be getting an accurate estimate of what the elderly are really capable o f with our more artificial tasks; thus, it is important that we develop more realistic, lifelike tasks for research with the elderly. At the same time it is important that we reevaluate the types of tasks that are employed with young children. It may be that we are not getting a very accurate estimate of what young children are really capable of either. In fact, Sigel (1974) has pointed out that the context of the particular task, the instructions, the content of the particular items, the meaningfulness of the task with respect to the child’s previous experience, as well as other task variables all influence the child’s performance. Just as research with the elderly has indicated, Sigel suggested that we will get a much more urate estimate of what children arc really capable of if we employ more realistic, lifelike tasks rather than the abstract, artificial tasks that researchers have tended to use in the past. But in addition to the fact that we will probably get a much more accurate estimate of what children are really capable of if we use more realistic tasks. i t also seems preferable to investigate children’s abilities on tasks similar to those they will encounter in their lives rather than on artificial tasks which, in some cases, were even adapted from research with animals. It seems that the results of studies with the more realistic tasks would be of greater interest to people who work with children in a variety of difterent capacities and, in addition, more amenable t o practical application. As a result of the above considerations, the findings of life-span research should have the following effects on the study of cognitive development in children: (a) they should facilitate a thorough consideration of what “maturation” really consists of; (b) they should facilitate a more thorough investigation of the influence of environmental factors in developmental changes; (c) they should elicit a consideration of why children respond as they d o in place of the assumption that children respond the way they d o simply because they are not capable of more sophisticated responses; ( d ) they may facilitate an investigation of what happens to the more primitive responses in young children after they

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progress t o higher levels of functioning; and (e) they may facilitate the development of more appropriate tasks to be used in research with children as well as with adults. Such recommendations are not new for child development researchers if considered one by one. Application of a life-span approach, however, creates a gestalt which gives each of these recommendations a new degree of persuasiveness and urgency.

IV. Summary Recent research indicates that the elderly often tend t o perform cognitive tasks in a manner qualitatively similar to that of young children. If such similarities in cognitive performance are the result of actual regressive change on the part of the elderly rather than the result of cohort differences, then developmental theories should specify the course of the various cognitive processes throughout the entire life-span as well as incorporate the possibility of change in the adult years. A consideration of adult cognitive changes should also facilitate a reevaluation of our present explanations of the developmental change that takes place during childhood years. Such a reevaluation should include a questioning of the utility of global, nonspecific, explanatory terms such as maturation, a more determined look at the contributions of both biological and environmental factors t o childhood developmental change, and a questioning of the assumption that children do not use the supposedly more sophisticated cognitive modes because they are incapable of the use of such modes. In addition, research with the elderly illustrates that task variables, such as meaningfulness, are important determinants of performance. This finding should facilitate the development of new and more realistic research tasks and procedures for use with children.

REFERENCES Arenberg, D. Concept problem solving in young and old adults. Journal of GerontoloKy, 1968,23,279-282. Baltes, P. B. Longitudinal and cross-sectional sequences in the age and generation effects. Human Development, 1968,11, 145-171. Beilin, H. The training and acquisition of logical operations. In M. F. Rosskopf, L. P. Steefe, & S. Taback (Eds.), Piagetian cognitive development arid tnathrmatical education. Washington, D.C. National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, 1971. Bielby, D. D., & Papalia, D. E. Moral development and perceptual rolc-taking egocentrism: Their dcvelopment and interrelationship across the life-span. Internarional Journal of Aging and Human Development, 1975,6, 293-308. Brainard, C. J. Training and transfer of transitivity, conservation, and class inclusion of length. Child Development, 1974, 45, 324-334.

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Charlesworth, W. R. Developmental psycliology: Does it offer anything distinctive? In W. R. Looft (Ed.), Developmental psvchologji.- A hook of readings. Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1972. Cole, M., Gay, J., Glick, J. A,, & Sharp, I). W. The cultural context of learning and thinking. New York: Academic Press, 1971. Conialli, P. E., Jr., Wapner, S., & Werner, 11. Perception of verticality in middle and old age. Journal of Psychology, 1959, 47, 259-266. Denney, D. R., Denney, N. W., & Ziobrowski, M. J. Alterations in the information-processing strategies of young children I'ollowing observations of adult models. Developmental Psvchology, 1973, 8, 202-208. Denney, N. W. Classification abilities i n the elderly. Journal of Gerontology, 1974, 29, 309-314. (a) Denney, N. W. Classification criteria in middlc and old age. Developmental Psychology, 1974, 10, 901-906. (b) Denney, N. W. Evidence for developmental changes in categorization criteria for children and adults. Human Development. 1974, 17, 41-53. (c) Denney. N. W., & Acito, M. Classification training in two- and three-year old children. Jouriial ofExperimenta1 Child Ps)'c,lrologv, 1974, 17, 3 7 4 8 . Denney, N. W., & Cornelius, S. W. Class inclusion and multiple classification in middle and old age. Devrlopmental Psycholo,sv, 1975, 11, 521-522. Denney, N. W., & Denney, D. R. Malcling effects on the questioning strategies of the elderly. Developmental Psycho1og.i~.1974, 10, 458. Denney, N. W., & Duffy, D. M. Possible environmental causes of stages in moral reasoning. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1974, 125, 277-283. Denney, N. W., & Lennon, M. L. Classification: A comparison of middle and old age. Developmental Psychology, 1972, 7, 210-213. Dennis, W., & Mallinger, B. Animism and related tendencies in senescence. Journal of Gerontology, 1949, 4, 21 8-221. Flavell, J. H. Cognitive changes in adulthood. In L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Life-span developmental psycholo~.v 71ic70rj and research. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Flavell, J. H. An analysis of cognitive-developmental sequences. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 1972, 86, 279-350. Hornblum, J. N., & Overton, W. 1:. Area and volume conservation among the elderly: Assessment and training. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Denvcr, April 1975. Hoyer, W. J., Labouvie, G. V., & Baltes, 1'. B. Modification of response speed deficits and intellectual performance in the elderly. Humapi Development, 1973, 16, 233-242. Hulicka, I. M. Age differences in rctention as a function of interference. Journal of Gerontology, 1967, 22, 180-184. Jacobs, P. I., & Vandeventer, M. The learning and transfer of double classification skills by first graders. Child Development, 197 I , 42, 149- 159. Kohlberg, L. Continuities in childhood and adult moral development revisited. In P. B. Baltes & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), I.ifi-spari dwelopmerztal psycho1og.v: Personality and socialization. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Kominski, C., & Coppinger, N. The Muller-Lyer illusion and Piaget's test for the conservation of space in a group of older institutionalized veterans. Unpublished manuscript, College of William and Mary, 1968. Looft, W. R. Socialization and persotulily throughout the life span. An examination of contemporary psychological approaches. In P. B. Baltes & K. W. Scliaie (Eds.), Life-span

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developmental psychology: Persona1it.v and socialization. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Looft, W. R., & Charles, D. C. Egocentrism and social interaction in young and old adults. Aging and Human Development, 1971, 2, 21-28. Papalia, D. E. The status of several conservation abilities across the life-span. Hunlarl Developmcnt, 1972, 15, 229-243. Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. The psychology o f t h e child. New York: Basic Books, 1969. Riegel, K. F. Dialectic operations: The final period of cognitive developnent. Human Development, 1973, 16, 346-370. Riegel, K. F., & Riegel, R. M. Changes in associative behavior during later years of life: A cross-sectional analysis. Vita Humana, 1964, 7 , 1-32. Rosenthal, T. L., & Zimmerman, B. J. Modeling by exemplification and instruction in training conservation. Developmental psycho log)^. 1972, 6, 392-401. Rubin, K. H. The relationship between spatial and communicative egocentrism in children and young and old adults. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1974, 125, 295-301. Rubin, K. H., Attewell, P., Tierney, M., & Tumolo, P. The development of spatial egocentrism and conservation across the life-span. Developmental Ps.vcholog,,, 1973, 9, 432. Sanders, S., Laurendeau, M., & Bergeron, J. Aging and the concept of space: The conservation of surfaces. Journal of Gerontology, 1966, 21, 281-285. Schaie, K. W. A general model for the study of developmental problems. Psychological Bulletin, 1965, 64, 92-107. Schaie, K. W. A reinterpretation of age related changes in cognitive structure and functioning. In L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltcs (Eds.), Lzf&span developmental psycho1og.v.' Theory and research. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Sigel, I. E. When do we know what a child knows? Human Development. 1974, 17, 20 1-2 17. Tomlinson-Keasey, C. Formal operations in females from eleven to fifty-six years of age. Developmental Psychology, 1972, 6, 364. Werner, H., & Kaplan, B. Symbol formation: An orgariisinic-developmental approach to language and the expression of thought. New York: Wiley, 1963.

SOCIAL COGNlTION AND LIFE-SPAN APPROACHES TO THE STUDY O F CHILD DEVELOPMENT

Michatd J. Chandler UNIVE ICSITY 01 ROCHESTEK

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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11. PLURALISTIC VERSUS MONISTIC VIEWS OF ADULTHOOD. . . 226 A. ADULTHOOD AS A DEVELOPMENTAL END STATE . . . . . . 227 B. STRATIFIED VIEWS OF MATURE DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . 228

111. SOCIAL COGNITION AND MULTILINEAR DEVELOPMENT . . . 229 1V. SOCIAL VERSUS IMPERSONAL COGNITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 A. THE ROLE O F OBJECT IN STRUCTURING OF SUBJECT-OBJECT INTbRACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 B. THE STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY O F PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1. Introduction The perspective provided by life-span approaches to developmental psychology has served t o draw attention to the importance of achieving a better understanding of the normal course of adult development and of the special importance of social forces in shaping these developmental outcomes (e.g., Baltes & Schaie, 225

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1973; Neugarten, 1968). The purpose of this paper, however, is not t o examine the direct consequences of this life-span orientation for the study of adulthood as such, but to consider instead the possible implications of these views for investigators whose research continues to focus on child development in general and on the development of social cognition in particular. [For parallel analyses written from a more sociological perspective, see Brim and Wheeler (1966); Clausen (1968); Elder (1975); Neugarten (1968)]. The suggestion that “child” psychologists should be more mindful of and better informed about developmental changes across the entire life-span could be urged for any one of several reasons. What is perhaps the most obvious and least compelling reason is that the study of adulthood and aging has been an area of relative research neglect. Although perhaps all serious students of human development should suffer some collective professional embarrassment that the brunt of our research efforts has been too narrowly focused o n the impersonal activities of young children, selective scientific attention is not a crime and does not constitute a particularly compelling reason to militate for a redirection of our research emphasis. While thoroughness and breadth of coverage have much t o recommend them, there is little merit in simply pointing out uncharted and understaffed areas of research and urging one another to fill in the gap for the sake of being thorough. There are, however, more compelling and complex reasons for the priorities which life-span advocates purpose, and it is to these reasons that attention will now be turned. Any attempt t o abbreviate the details of recent life-span research or to summarize the results of its findings in a set of anagram-length rules of thumb is hazardous at best. Still, many of these efforts can be regarded as providing convergent evidence for two propositions frequently overlooked by child developmentalists. The first is that adulthood may not be safely regarded as a kind of perpetual late-adolescent period in which the dynamisms of early development either simply come to fruition or die an early homeostatic death. The second and corollary proposition is that any adequate account of adult development must grow out of an understanding of the changing sociocultural context in which such changes evolve. Some of the theoretical and strategic implications of these conclusions will be taken up in the section which follows.

11. Pluralistic versus Monistic Views of Adulthood A special merit of research findings descriptive of mature, adult functioning is that they often carry meaning which extends beyond the age group from which they are derived and outline characteristics prefiguring the earlier course of growth. Without such evidence the task becomes much more difficult for other researchers who concentrate their efforts primarily on the study of children and

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youth. This is because, for all but the most mechanistic, antecedent-consequent sort of developmentalist, the models which most of us implicitly or explicitly employ presuppose that we already have a working understanding of the mature end state toward which development is directed (Reese & Overton, 1970). A. ADULTHOOD AS A DEVLLOPMENTAL END STATE

Latent in most developmental views is a tempered teleology which reflects in some measure what Aristotle referred to as “final determination”-that the ends of development are imminent in their initial organization, that the most mature form of such evolving systems is the actualization toward which earlier development is directed, and that developnient is a progressive approximation of this ideal end state (Langer, 1969). Although some might object that such assumptions are unacceptably teleological, the alternative is an aimless view of change that offers no basis for distinguisliing progressive and anomalous growth. Without a relatively clear view of the most advanced or mature state of development, it would not be possible t o anticipate the course of growth. to determine which steps are steps in the right direction, or to recognize regression or developmental deviation or deficit when it occurs. If one accepts such teleological assumptions, which appear t o characterize most of the major denominational faiths of developmental theory, then it becomes obvious that it is critical t o del‘ine as precisely as possible that mature end state toward which earlier development is imagined to progress. Life-span developmental research offers the means of clarifying that circumstance of which childhood is a progressive approximation. Despite the fact that a detailed history of adulthood is a logical first order of business, most developmental research, possibly because of its historical roots in child psychology, has, in the absence of any clear picture of the outcomes of development, commonly proceeded in the reverse order (D. B. Harris, 1957). We have tended, rather, to begin at the beginning and t o assume that the upper reaches of the growth process are already sufficiently well understood to permit getting underway. The presence of a well-developed experimental psychology already focused on adult functioning. the availability of standardized test data which seem to suggest that intellectual development reaches an asymptote in late adolescence, and the existence of prestigious developmental theories which argue this same point have all contributed t o the view that the study of adult development is a low-priority task. Such easy assumptions about adulthood are particularly commonplace in theories of cognitive development. According t o this widely held view, children are assumed to progress universally through the same few major stages of cognitive development and t o arrive in adolescence at some terminal stage of thought that continues to dominate their intellectual processes throughout adulthood. Adulthood, in this view, becomes little more

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than a mopping-up operation in which the individual more fully realizes the potential generality of previously acquired cognitive tools. B. STRATIFIED VIEWS OF MATURE DEVELOPMENT

The view that adulthood is a single monolithic stage which caps off the diversity of earlier development is troublesome for several reasons. First, despite what has often passed as evidence to the contrary, many developmental psychologists still harbor a conviction that cognition continues t o change in qualitative ways well beyond adolescence and possibly throughout the entire life-span (Baltes & Labouvie, 1973; Riegel, 1975b; Schaie, 1970). These developmental psychologists are not prepared to exchange their diachronic perspective on childhood for some more synchronic image of adult intelligence, and they reject as unwarranted the conclusion that adulthood is a state of being rather than becoming. Following the lead of Erikson (1959) and the Chicago group (Havighurst, 1973), advocates of this view have proposed and attempted to identify subsequent stages in adult development. Other challengers of the view that some terminal stage in cognitive development is reached in adolescence and evidenced throughout adulthood argue the evidence quite differently. Rather than insisting that adult cognition regularly goes beyond the achievements of adolescence, advocates of this second view ( e g , Baltes, 1973; Baltes & Willis, 1976; Dulit, 1972; Riegel, 1973) assert that the formal, abstract qualities commonly associated with adolescent thought are neither as universally achieved nor as universally practiced by mature adults as theorists such as Jean Piaget are thought to suppose. Those who promote this view are impressed instead by the frequency with which adults seem to operate simultaneously in terms of several developmentally different levels of cognitive functioning. Although in some sense mirror images of one another, the alternative suggestions that persons either only imperfectly attain or routinely go beyond conventional standards of “adult” development have the common effect of eroding any certain picture we might otherwise have held concerning what the mature end state of development looks like. In either case, the ultimate outcome or destination of early developmental sequences becomes indeterminate. Despite their common consequence, however, these alternative views d o prescribe quite different research strategies for approximating a picture of adulthood. In the case of the first view, where qualitative changes in the postadolescent period are anticipated, the task becomes one of identifying and characterizing additional, as yet unspecified, stages in adult development. In the case of the second, where maturity is viewed as an imperfect accomplishment, the task is one of determining if, when, and why children and adults sometimes employ other than their most developmentally complex modes of cognitive function. Of these two

agendas, the second has perhaps been more carefully researched and has had a more direct bearing on the study of social cognition. For these reasons the discussion which follows focuses primarily o n the theoretical and strategic consequence of the allegation (see also Huston-Stein & Baltes, in this symposium) that the course of development may be more multilinear. the end state of development more problematic, and the nature of mature functioning more pluralistic than has commonly becri supposed.

111. Social Cognition and Multilinear Development One consequence of theories and research which challenge the universality and uniformity of abstract, formal operational modes of thought is that by eniphasizing that thinking is not necessarily of a piece, such views draw attention to possible differences in the manner i n which different cognitive contents might be processed and understood. If tliinking is imagined to proceed in the same univocal manner, whatever its content, then we, as psychologists, are free to choose research problems opportunistii:ally, without any special concern that our choice of study materials will particularly prejudice our research findings one way or another. If, howevet, even adult cognitions are sometimes on one developmental level and sometimes 011 another. then one’s choice of study materials becomes potentially much niore critical. Under these circumstances, the popular practice of studying cognition outside its usual social context and basing broad conclusions about development on the interactions of children with their impersonal physical environment may no longer be defensible. For these reasons, questions concerning t l i e potential importance of studies of social cognition are intimately related to qimtions regarding the unilinearity or multilinearity of cognitive developinen t in general (Chandler, 1976). The divergence of opinion regarding the unilinear or multilinear course of cognitive development has recently begun to be arbitrated by a growing body of research which suggests that abstract, formal operational thought is not as commonplace or universal ;IS was once believed. Of these various lines of evidence it is useful to distinguish those which speak t o assumptions about universal acquisition from those which concern the ubiquity of application. First, the assumption that formal operational skills may be so universally the conclusion of normal developmental processes as to constitute a general standard of mature functioning has recently come under attack from several different quarters. The research of Dulit (1972) and Miller (1971) on conservation, the work of Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) on moral development, and Youniss’s (1975) research on perspective taking skills, t o name only a few, raise serious questions as t o whether adults are nearly so formal or abstract and logical as some contemporary cognitive theorists seem to imply. Recently, both Piaget

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(1972) and Furth (1973), on Piaget’s behalf, have commented on this evidence and have stressed the fact that situational, motivational, and cultural factors all exert an influence on both the rate at which formal thought structures develop and the full extent of their development. Whatever their other theoretical implications, these findings concerning the lack of universality of formal operational skills seriously obscure our view of the normal end state of adult development. The second, and related, question concerning the ubiquity of formal operational solutions once they have appeared within a subject’s repertoire is considerably more complicated than the first. The difficulty here centers upon the considerable difference of opinion that exists regarding the amount of withinstage developmental synchrony which theories such as that of Piaget are thought t o require. This ambiguity, in turn, rests upon a similar divergence of opinion regarding what is intended by the emphasis that Piaget and others place on the unity of structural organization at each successive developmental level. Piaget, for example, repeatedly stresses that subsequent stages of development are not simply supra-added as later installments upon subordinate stages. T o use his own words, “The process of knowledge never proceeds by a mere addition of items or of new levels, as if richer knowledge were only a complement of the earlier, meagerer one, it requires also a personal reformulation of previous points of view by a process which moves backwards as well as forwards.. .” (Piaget, 1962, p. 3). In this and various other contexts, Piaget alternately speaks of the fact that earlier stages of development are subordinated, incorporated, integrated, replaced, and/or regulated b y subsequent and qualitatively different and more mature stages. These various characterizations, all of which imply a kind of takeover of the past by the present, raise the question “as t o what happens, at later stages, t o the behavior or operations acquired and representative of earlier stages. . .” (Riegel, 1973, p. 23). The potential importance of this question lies in the fact that the manner in which it is answered sets limits on the amount of withinperson variation a particular model permits, thereby either shrinking or expanding the range of alternative ways of being that must go into its view of the nature of adult functioning. What is essentially at stake is whether the end state of development is t o be regarded as an expression of one or many developmental levels. Almost every conceivable interpretation of this issue has been advocated and ascribed to Piaget by one investigator or another. According to Van den Daele (1969), Piaget’s model is an example of what he terms a “simple, unitary progression” which makes n o provision whatsoever for within-person variations in developmental level. Any evidence of variation in the developmental level of a subject’s performance must, according t o Van den Daele, either be written off as

measurement error or seen as ;I direct contradiction of the model’s assumption about the unity of developmental organization. Bearison (1974), in a recent conceptual analysis of the concept of regression, has similarly argued that the frequent instances of selective opcrrational incompetence observed in disordered adults and aged persons cannot be intcrpreted in structural terms without doing violence to what he regards ;IS the unity of organization demanded by Piaget’s theory. He consequently intei-preted the difficulties of such “regressed” subjects as an expression of failures in perforniance rather than competence and assumed that such difficulties must be explained in situational rather than structural terms. On somewhat different grounds, Kiegel (1975b) has argued that Piaget’s emphasis upon the principle of equilibration implicitly disallows the possibility of multilevel operations; this is because the simultaneous or proximate execution of operations characteristic of different developmental stages would itself presumably result in a disequilibririni state that would be resolved at the expense of thinking which is characteristic of the earlier stage. All of these theorists, along with others such as Pinard and Laurendeau (1969), have concluded for one reason or another that the formal characteristics of Piaget’s theory disallow subjects the option of operation either simultaneously or in short succession at different developmental levels. This is not to say that these investigators deny the existence of within-stage developmental asynchrony. On the contrary, the special interest which most of these writers maintain in these assumptive asynchronies of development is prompted precisely because such instances are seen to contradict and stand as counterevidence to their own interpretation of Piaget’s theory. A second set of investigators (Flavell, 1971; Flavell & Wohlwill, 1969), in sharp disagreement with the first, contend that Piaget’s theory requires no particular degree of within-stage homogeneity. According t o this view (Flavell, 1971), Piaget’s theory makes adequate provision for the fact that skills developed in an earlier stage continue in the individual’s repertoire even though subsequent skills, proper to the next stage of development, are acquired. Earlier acquired skills and abilities d o not. in this view; drop out of existence, or even cease to be further refined or perfected, simply because the individual has reached a new stage of development. ‘The reason, according to Flavell (1971), that one stops referring to a child older than two as “sensory-motor, is that the most homo supien type of ‘intelligent’ things he can d o are now of a different sort, not because sensory-motor skills have reached functional maturity” (p. 431) or have ceased t o exist altogether. A stage of development, in Flavell’s view, is defined by “the best, highest-level cognitive act the subject can now perform; the fact that we now turn our attention t o the newer act does not mean that the older one has stopped being perfected” (p. 431). The key question, however, is not so much whether Piaget has or has not acknowledged

that persons d o not always operate at their most developmentally advanced level, but whether his theory makes provisions which allow an adequate explanation of such occurrences. Turner (1973) has attempted to synthesize these points of view by suggesting that “A distinction should perhaps be made between Piaget’s model of unilinear genetic development as a tool that serves to define and focus the interesting aspects of any diachronic sequence of structural stages and the conviction that all things naturally develop in such sequences, to which Piaget has never subscribed” (p. 367). In Turner’s view, Piaget’s emphasis on diachronic process has led him to focus his attention on those instances of developmental asynchrony in which the coincidence o f two different structural levels leads to the passage from one developmental stage to the next. There is, however, as Turner pointed out, n o intrinsic reason why the theory could not also permit a similar consideration of synchronic variations in structures at the same developmental level. In fact, the principle of “reflective abstraction” already plays this role in Piaget’s theory by providing a means whereby higher system levels serve t o coordinate the operations of lower levels. Apart from how one elects to choose up sides in this theoretical controversy, however, the data remain unchanged. As Flavell (1971) has pointed out, the assumption that persons capable of particular kinds o f cognitive operations actually apply these solutions across the board has received little empirical support. In light of these considerations, the view that the end state of human development is a kind of exclusively abstract and formal mode of thought seems no longer tenable, and what we seem to be left with is a much more complex, multilinear, unfinished portrait of mature functioning. Developmentally “lower” action systems seem not t o be lost with the elaboration of newer, “higher” forms but continue instead to exist side by side. This view, which in many ways closely approximates that expressed much earlier by Werner (Langer, 1969), greatly expands the potential repertoire of assumptive adult skills. Even if there is some growing consensus that cognitive development is more multilinear and niultileveled than was once imagined. this conclusion leaves open and unanswered the critical question of how an individual makes effective use o f his multilevel repertoire of developmentally different skills. When it was imagined that children always univocally apply their most developmentally advanced level of problem solution, an easy rule of thumb was available for knowing what to d o next and for distinguishinz normal from arrested or regressed functioning. If, however, people are imagined t o draw opportunistically upon their total range of developmentally different skills, how are we, as experimenters, t o regard these various options, and how are subjects as actors t o choose among them? At least a partial answer to these questions is, in our opinion, contained in a shift of emphasis from studies of impersonal to interpersonal interaction.

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IV. Social versus Impersonal Cognition If, as indicated in Section 111, current research seems t o suggest that cognitive development is more a multilinear affair than certain theoretical accounts would lead us to expect, then it becouics a matter of urgent importance to be able to understand when and why one cognitive mode is used rather than another. Although this problem has i i o t ieceivcd the attention which it warrants, two (JLS on a general sorts of solutions havc been pioposed. The first, which bin;competence-performance distiriction, acknowledges the fact tliat cognitioiis representative of multiple developmental levels may occur within the same individual but regards these occurrences in pejorative terms and counts them as instances of immature or regressive behavior which must be accounted for, c)r explained away, on the basis of cxpcriential deficit, lapses in motivation or attention, or situational hardship. l'liis solution preserves the view that developnient is essentially unilinear i n principle and that the best and the brightest of cognitions are always the pioduct of an individual's highest level of developmental accomplishment. Multiliiiea!iiy is recognized? bu: essentially as the exception to the rule. Much as one might catalog irregular verbs or plurals, these exceptions are filed away as instances of horizontal dicalage, regression, o r human frailty. The second, less coiiimoii, solution M. Iiich has been proposed freely adopts the principle of multilinearity and niaintains that different kinds of problems are best approached with strategies I epresentative of different levels of cognitive development. This is essentially ;I match-mismatch approach which, unlike the first, attaches no necessary pejorative connotations to the mature application of developmentally earlier cognit ivc strategies. On tlie contrary, advocates of this view hold that there are sensorimotor, preoperational, and concrete operational. as well as formal operational prol:leins. each of which deserves and is best dealt with by their associated sensoriinotor, preoperational, and concrete operational solutions. Whichever of these views 1s evciitually shown to havc the more merit, both have the consequence of di awing additional attention to the unique or distinguishing features of tlie various sorts of cognitive problems which face the individual. Although the two vicws have very different implicational networks, both imply that the particular ol>jects and contexts of cognition may be as important in determining tlie niiiniier in which issues are understood :is is the developmental level of the sublcci in question. and both leave open the possibility that objects of a certain class (social objects, for example) may not always be comprehended at the same level as other classes of objects (such as impersonal objects). Of the two views, the first. which hinges on a competerice-perforniance

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distinction, has rallied the most support. Flavell and Wohlwill ( 1 9 m ) , for example, advanced this view i n their inlluential article on “Formal and functional aspects of cognitive development,” as did Bearison (1 974) in the previously mentioned article on regression. The special merits of this position appear to lie in the fact that it preserves the parsimony of a unilincar rnodel o f the sort comriionly ascribed to Piaget, invites parallels with Noam Chomsky’s powerful competence-performance distinction, and reflects the generally shared conviction that ability is not always mirrored in performance. The difficulty with this view, as Riegel (197%) pointed out, is that it risks re-immersing us in a more contemporary version of the old mind-body problem and of opening a breach between competence and performance in which psychology could easily lose itself. So long as people’s performance hovers relatively close to theii assumed competence, the concept has considerable explanatory power. If, however, the gap between the two grows too wide, the distinction risks becoming a liability rather than an asset. in his 1960 article on the definition of stages of development, Piaget says, “I am for example at an operatory level for only a small part of the day. . . . the rest of the time I am dealing with empirical trial and error” (Piaget, Inhelder, & Szeniinska, 1960, p. 126). If we take Piaget as being reasonably representativc of others, then it would appear that formal operational competence only very imperfectly controls most routine performance and that a distinction which undoubtedly has interesting epistemological implications may not necessarily serve as the foundation for a workable psychology. If a large percentage of what happens on a day-to-day basis must be explained by principles which are not clearly represented in a particular explanatory system, then the efficiency and utility of such a model is sharply limited. The alternative solution is based on an acceptance of the principle of multilinearity; rather than concentrating on factors which might explain away socalled immaturities of performance, this solution focuses attention instead on trying to achieve some understanding of the potential legitimacy of sometimes employing cognitive operations characteristic of other than one’s most formal and developmentally advanced stage of development. Attempted solutions of this type have recently been independently proposed by Riegel (1975b), Turner (1973), and Youniss (1975). All of these views, while differing in important ways, share several key assumptions. Each underscores the often neglected role of the object in the structuring of subject-object interactions; each emphasizes the affective, social and cultural character of most or all such subject-object dialogues; and each concludes that such interactions are often best conducted with cognitive strategies that are more centered, more concrete, or more figurative than formal or abstract. In order to communicate some better understanding of these three points, each will be briefly elaborated in the following discussion.

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A. THL ROLl 01 OBJU’T IN STRUCTURING 01’ SUBJEC r OBJHT

INTERACTIONS

First, there appears t o be some tendency for cognitive structures, as they are characterized in the current developmental literature. t o gradually lose their status as a bridge between subjects and objects and to take on the qualities of psychological traits or faculties which are imagined to reside entirely within the persons who employ them (Riegcl, 1975b). Such a revival of an earlier faculty psychology is almost certainly not the intention of theorists such as Piaget who have advanced such structural views. If, as Piaget has repeatedly stressed (1970a, 1970b), development is t o he regarded as other than a passive reflection of situational forces or the autistic unfolding of preformed maturational inevitabilities, then it is critical that developmental outcomes not be viewed as implicit in either the child or the environment but be seen instead to evolve as a result of the changing bidirectional dialectic between the two. As an expression of this dialogue, the cognitive structures of Piaget’s theory cannot be regarded as static traitlike features of individuals isolated fi-om their environment but represent instead a reflection of the patterns of reciprocal interaction between the subject and object and the medium through which the two are interconnected. Such structures, therefore “can be neither uriderstood nor explained . . . out of relation t o the objective situations to which they refer and whose structures they incorporate, albeit in a mediate arid partial manner” (Turner, 1973, pp. 357358). Despite these claims to the contrary. however, cognitive developmental psychology in general and Piaget’s theory in particular are frequently represented as suggesting that all the meaningful variation in the developing system lies within the child. The equally active role of the object half of this subject-object interaction is often obscured, and one loses sight of the bidirectional character of development. This unfortunate shift in emphasis is, to an important degree, a function of the general failure o f developmental models to incorporate the second point stressed by Riegel, Turner, and Youniss-that development is an inherently social or interpersonal process. For reasons often having more to do with convenience than cogency, most cognitive developmental studies Iiave tenlded to focus on assessment situations in which only the subject is active and produces changes in what are essentially passive objects. By comparison, relatively little attention has been directed to those more usual situations in which both the subject and object are active participants, i.e., where the objects of cognition are, like the child, other subjects who are themselves actively engaged in the assimilation and accommodation of the relevant objects of their world (Riegel, 1975b). In the limited context of exclusively impersonal interactions, development appears t o become a one-way

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street, the bidirectionality of subject-object interaction is lost sight of. and evolving cognitive structures appear to assume the status of personal traits or faculties. By employing research strategies which minimize these interpersonal effects and framing its research in a relative social vacuum, however, cognitive developmental psychology has not yet fully come to grips with the influence of the object environment on the structuring of thought. nor has it begun to grapple with the specific interactive process by which social groups participate in and control the genetic development of their members (Turner, 1973). B. THE STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY OF PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS

Among the several productive consequences of shifting to a view of cognition that emphasiz.es the bidirectional contributions of both the subject and the object poles of subject-object interactions is the achievement of an explanatory framework within which the multilinearity of cognitive functioning can be better understood. So long as cognition is understood only as an activity carried out by persons struggling to adapt t o a static array of passive and impersonally defined objects, then development may reasonably appear to be a unitary process w h c h comes gradually to reflect the most abstract features of an objective world. If, on the other hand, attention is drawn to the dialogue features of such subject-object interactions, then the task of the subject is seen as one of rnatching the cognitive structures employed to the current structural complexity of an object which is itself potentially characterized by multiple levels of organization. An example of this kind of matching strategy can be seen in the active dialogues between mothers and their children. As A . E. Harris (1 975) pointed out, in conversations with their young children mothers regularly generate language productions which are not of the same structural complexity as their productions with other adults but are instead designed to match what the mothers assume t o be the encoding and decoding capacities of their children. Conceptually related studies by Moerk (1974), Sliatz and Gelman (1973), and Snow (1972) also demonstrate the same structural diversity of language as it is directed to persons of varying ages. Any formal analyses of the language of an adult in back-to-back conversations with a child and another adult would demonstrate the successive application of two very different levels of cognitive functioning. T o characterize such instances of selectively opportune within-stage variability as indicative of a horizontal decalage or any similarly pejorative account would almost certainly miss the point. What seems clearly the case instead is that such performances reflect an adaptive synthesis of the interactions between speaker and listener that represent an achievement of adult development rather than a symptom of fixation or regression. Although little research has been directed toward this issue, the

Social Coytiitloti atrd Lifc-Spati Approaches

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example chosen is almost certainly not unique. We live in a multigenerational society and each cohort has available to it symbols and rules and roles which are not present or are differently structured in other age groups. At least for those age groups which are themselves developmentally mature enough to appreciate this fact, substantial portions of their interactional efforts are undoubtedly pitched at developmental levels reflecting their assessment of their audience and are not intended and will not serve as an index of their own most abstract cognitive achievements. A second example of the necessity ot’ matching one’s own momentary level of cognitive functioning t o the special requirements of a task is provided by what Turner (1973) described as cognitive “recentering.” Although acknowledging that deccntered thought, defiticd ;IS [lie ability t o consider events in a way that is detached from one’s egocentric perspective of the moment, is a hallmark of mature cognition, Turner argued that this strategy has limited rather than universal applicability and that t’or cerrain purposes the detachment of subject from object is inappropriate and maladaptive. For example. he argued that “affect is inherently concrete, p a l ticular, and associated with the unique relationship of the self to its objective environment.” He continues: “For this reason the integration and shaping of the personality or subjective self, on both conscious and unconscious levels. cannot be achieved by a decentercd, abstract, and generalized mode of thought alorie. A more concrete symbolic medium, centered upon the particular position o f the subject, and capable of condensing affective with cognitive associations, is required” (Turner, 1973, p. 354). Both k e g e l (1973), in his article on ;I fiflli stage of cognitive development, and Youniss (1975), in his recent chapter on social cognition, have argued, as did Turner, that much of social interaction, religion, art, and ritual are commonly and most appropriately dealt with at concrete and figurative levels, rather than at an operative level. Dealing appropriately with such social and cultural events requires, according t o these theor ists, that we preserve within our cognitive repertoires and regularly ernploy inodes of thinking characteristic of multiple levels of cognitive development.

V. Conclusion The purpose of these remarks has bee11 to emphasize that the study of adult cognition in general and of wcial cognition in particular suggests conclusions which carry important implications f o r the more usual study of early cognitive development. Commonly held assumptions about the universal and ubiquitous application of terminal, formal operational skills seem unwarranted. What seems required, in its place, is a morc multilincar view which anticipates that within the dialogue between individuals and a consistently active and inherently social

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environment, cognitive strategies will develop that are adaptively matched to the structural complexity of the objects on which they operate. Multigenerational research, which attempts to explore the manner in which adults interact with children or other persons whose developmental progress is more limited than their own, appears t o be a promising strategy for extending our understanding of this multilinear developmental process. R E F E K I1 N C E S Baltes, P. €3. Prototypical paradigm and questions in life-span research on development and aging. Geror?tolo~ist,1973, 13, 4 5 8 4 6 7 . Baltes, P. B., & Labouvie, G. V. Adult development of intellectual performance: Description, explanation, modification. In C. Lisdorfer & M. P. Lawton (Eds.), T h e psjrchology oJ ad& dei~cloprrientand a,qf/ig.Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1973. Baltes, P. B., & Schaie, K. W. On life-span developmental research paradigms: Retrospects and prospects. In P. B. Baltes & K. W. Schaie (lcds.), I,ife-span developmental psychology: Persona1it.v and sociulizution. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Baltes, P. B., & Willis, S. L. Toward psychological theories of aging and development. In J . E. Birren & K. W. Schaic (Eds.). flatidhook o n thc p s y c h o l o ~ yof aging. New York: Reinhold-Van Nostrand, 1976. Bearison, D. J. The construct of regression: A Piagetian approach. Merrill-Palnier Quarterly, 1974,20, 2 1-30. Brim. 0 . G., & Wheeler, S. Socialization after childhood: Two essays. New York: Wiley, 1966. Chandler, M. J. Relativism and the problem o f epistemological loneliness. Huniatz Development, 1976, 18, 171-180. Clausen, J . A. (Ed.) Socialization and society. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968. Dulit, E. Adolescent thinking a la Piaget: The formal stage. Journal of' Youth and Adolescence, 1972, 1, 281-301. Elder, G. H. Agedifferentiation and the life course. Annual Review of Sociology, 1975, 1, 165-1 90. Erikson, E. H. Identity and the life cycle. Psycholo,yical Issues, Mono,sr. 1 :50-100. New York: International Universities Press, 1959. klavell, J. H. Stage-related properties of cognitive development. Cognitivc Psychology, 1971, 2,421453. Flavell, J. H.,& Wohlwill, J . 1:. Formal and functional aspects of cognitive development. In D. Elkind & J. H. Flavell (Eds.), Studies in cognitive development: Essuys in honor of Jean Piuxet. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Furth, H. G. Piaget, IQ, and the nature-nurture controversy. Human D~veloprnent,1973, 16,61-73. Haan. N., Smith, M. B., & Block, J . Moral reasoning in young adults. Journal ofPersorzaZify arid Social Psychology, 1968, 10, 183-201. Harris, A. E. Social dialectics and language: Mother and child construct the discourse. In K. F. Riegel (Ed.), T h e study ofdialectic operations. New York: Wiley, 1975. Harris, D. B. (Ed.) The concept of dei~elopment.Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957.

tlavigliurst, 11. J . History of developiiieiital psychology: Socialization and personality development through the life span I n 1’. U. Haltes & K. W . Schaie (Eds.), Life-span prricirtal p s ~ ’ c l i o l o , q I~’:c j s o w l r f I ’ urid socializariori. New York: Academic Press, L,,ingcr, J. Theorics of dcwloprwiri NL,VJY o r k llolt, 1969. hliller, S. A . Contradiction, surprise'. a n d cognilivc change: The effects of disconfirmation of belief on conservers and non-conwi-vcrs. llnpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1971. Xluerk, E. Changes in verbal child-iiiotlicr intcr;rctions with increasing language skills of the child. Jourrial of Ps,vc,liolriigiris/ < < ‘ . s ~ ~ u ~ c ~1974, //. 3, 101 --116. Ncugarten, B. L. Toward ii psychoh ( i t t h e life cycle. I n B. L. Neugarten (Ed.), Middle ugc’ u i i t f @rig. A render iri social psi o/o,q!,.(’hicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968. l’iaget, 1. Comments on Vygotsky’5 critical reinarks concerning The Language and Thought of the Child and Judgement and I< d. In L. S. Vygotsky (Ed.), Thotrght and Laizguage. C a m b r i d p , M Pidget, J. Sfrrrctur-alisr?i. New York: Ikicic I’iaget, J. Gcwrtic epistcvriofogv. N e w Y o l k : (‘olnriibia Univcrsity Press, 1970. (b) Piagct, J. Intellectual evolution from atl~rlesccn:‘e to adulthood. Hwtinrr Dcvcloprnerit, 1972, 15, 1-12. I’iaget, J., Inhcldcr, B., 6; Szeniinska. A . 7?r(’ tliild’s cotiec,ptiou of’geo/r/ctry, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960. Pinard, A,, & Laurendeau, M. “Stn:!e” i n I’ia s co~nitive-developincntaltheory: 1,;xegesis of a concept. In D. Clkind & I . IbI;ivcll ( F , Studies irr cogi?itive dcvclopineiir. London and New York: Oxford University I’iess, 1969. Reesc, 13. W., & Overton, W. I:. Modcls 01 dcvelopment and theories of tlevelopment. In L. 11. Goulet & P. B. Baltcs (Ed\.). I rtc,-spoir dcveloprncr/tal psychology: Research and fhcwr?,. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Riegel, K. F. Dialectic operations: I’hc final period of cognitive development. Hurnarz Dei’c.loprrwit. 1973, 16, 346-370. Riegel, K. F. A manifesto for dialectic psychology. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Psychology, University of Miehig;iii, 1975. (;I) Riegel, K. F. Subject-object alienation in p liological experimentation and testing. In K. f:. Riegel (Ed.), The study o f d / a l ic opcrotioris. New York: Wiley, 1975. (b) Schaie, K. W. A reinterpretation o i related changes in cognitive structure and functioning. In L. R. Goulet & P. 13. Ikiltes (Itds.), Life-span devek1pmcnta/ psychofogy: Research and tlzeory New York: Ac:idcniic Press, 1970. Shatz, hi., & Celman, R . The devclopinent 01‘ communication skills: Modifications in the speech of y-oung children as a function of listener. Moriogruphs of the Society f o r Research iii Child I ~ c i ~ c l o p r ~ i1973, c ~ ~ i ~38(S, , Whole No. 152). Snow, C. E. Mother’s speech t o childien learning language. Child Developvierit, 1972, 43, 549-565. ‘Turner, T. Piaget’s structuralism. Amcwcarl A!rtlrropologist. 1973, 75, 351-373. Van den Daele, L. D. Qualitative intiilels in idevelopmental analysis. Dcvelopnienral PsyC / Z O ~ O ~ . V1969, , 1, 303-310. Youniss, J. Another perspective on sociiil cognition. In A. D. Pick (Ed.), Miiinesotu s.ymposia oti child p s ~ ~ c l i o l o gV~o l~. 9. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975.

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LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF ONESELF: IMPLICATlONS FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT’

Orville G. Brim, Jr. FOUNDATION k 0 R C l l I L D DEVELOPMENT

I. THE SENSE O F SELF V I € , W E D AS THEORY ABOUT O N E S E L F . 11. CULTURE AND SOCIALIZATION

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111. THE CHILD’S DEVELOPING THEORY O F SELF

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IV. TWO ILLUSTRATIONS OF POSSIBLE SYSTEMATIC CHANGES IN THEORIES O F ONESELF THKOUGH THE LIFE-SPAN . . . . . 247 A. THEORIES O F PERSONAL CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 B. THEORIES ABOUT CHANGE IN ONESELF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

V. SETTING THE RESEARCH AGENDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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In the theoretical realm of the self-image or the sense of self, there have not been any powerful influences since the turn of the century, when we had some of the first new ideas about the self since Descartes. In Europe, Sigmund Freud was producing his classics in 1900, 1901, and 1905, and in the United States the

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Preparation of this paper was aided by the Social Science Research Council’s Committee on Work and Personality in the Middle Years through support from a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health, ROl-MH25547. This paper is also based in part o n an invited address to the International Society for the Study of Behavioural Development Biennial Conference, University of Surrey, Gulldford, Surrey, July 1975. The contributions of Carol Ryff to this paper are gratefully acknowledged. 24 1

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famous quintet of William James, J . M. Baldwin, John Dewey, C. H. Cooky, and G. H. Mead were developing new ideas about the self in a social world. More o r less out o f nowhere around 1900 came the concepts of the looking-glass self, the rules of the game, the role specificity of the self-concept, the generalized other. and, of course, repression and the mechanisms of defense. We have seen the production o f thousands o f studies and essays on the self in the past 75 years, and these now lie around like a pile of loose bricks in the brickyard, waiting for the buildcr.

I. The Sense of Self Viewed as Theory about Oneself What humans learn during life are axioms, concepts, and hypotheses about themselves in relation to the world around them. We can think of thc sense of self as a personal epistemology, similar to theories in science in its components and its operations, but dealing only with a specific person. The important thing to remember is that it is a self theory and that the sterile notion of the “self-concept” has stood in the way of further progress along this particular path. What we should say, more strictly, is that the self is a body of theory, and that it is a segment of a human’s whole theory of himself and the world around him.* To illustrate, research on self estimates of intelligence in national surveys of adults and secondary school students, asking them how they thought they compared in intelligence with certain significant others, was in fact exploring a component of self theory referring to one’s capacities (Brim, 1969). Analysis of the meaning of an individual’s sense of personal control over life also explores the theory o f oneself, in that it deals with idiosyncratic personal theories of causality involving the person as an actor and the world outside as the object (Brim, 1974). One’s sense of personal control is in fact a system of belief, i.e., a theory about oneself in relation t o one’s environment, and a concern with

2The most recent, significant statement of this point of view is presented in a paper by Seymour Epstein (1973, p. 407):

I submit that the self-concept is a self-theory. It is a theory that the individual has unwittingly constructed about himself as an experiencing, functioning individual, and it is part of a broader theory which he holds with respect to his entire range of significant experience. Accordingly, there are major postulate systems for the nature of the world, for the nature of the self, and for their interaction. Like most theories, the self-theory is a conceptual tool for accomplishing a purpose. The most fundamental purpose of the self-theory is to optimize the pleasure/pain balance of the individual over the course of a lifetime.

causality, with whether outcomes are a consequence of one’s own behavior or tend t o occur independently of t h a t behavior. Consider these items used frcquently in well-known inventories of the personality dimension of internal versus external locus of control. “Every time I try to get ahead something or somebody stops me”; “My existence is completely under the cor.tro1 of destiny”; ‘‘What happens to me is niy ciwn doing”; “When I make plans, I an1 almost certain that 1 can make them work:.” Responses to these items are not considered indicators of motives, or attitudes, or goals, or values, but of beliefs. The desire for mastery and control is different from the belief that one is in control in tlie same way that the desire for love and recognition differs from the feeling of being loved. A few aspects of this special perspective on the self deserve comment at this point. 1 . The most complete use of tho n e r a l concept of the “sense of self’ must include the experience of primary ill ct, not mediated by symbols or conceptssomething like a lizard lying on ;I flat rock in the sun. But that portion of the sense of self which is theory requires some symbolism, i.e., requires statements in the form of propositions. It will diff‘icult to set precise boundaries for these primary affect and symbolized theory components of the sense of self, for as we know, it is almost impossible t o eliminate the ubiquitous influence of society in labeling all of our experiences from birth on, e.g., the child utterly engrossed in eating his first ice cream cone, and thc mother saying, “Bite it, don’t lick it.” 2. Not only is there nothing incoriipatihle with this formulation and the fundamental principles of human learning, but the acquisition of concepts and propositions relating oneself to the world is the major substance of lifetime learning. However, calling it a self theory differs from its being only “just what is learned,” in that viewing this body of learning as a body of theory means we can analyze it in terms of what wc know about the nature of scientific theories; can examine it for axioms, concepts, principles, and hypotheses; and can develop and use a systematic language t o describe this vast portion o f the person’s learning. 3 . The “content” of a person’s self thci.)ry can be analyzed in many ways. One might classify self-theory content by institutional area, relating t o marriage, to work. t o religion, and the like. O r one might classify beliefs and propositions with reference to fundamental niotives, such as those centered around the concern about being liked and approved o r around the exploration and control over one’s life and environment. Still another, an ancient classificatory system, to be sure, would categorize components of the theory about oneself according t o whether they deal with the body or the mind or the personality; e.g., one’s body can do X or one’s intellectual capacities enable him to solve problem Y ; while one’s personal style permits him t o manage social situation Z.

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4. Any theory, formally defined, has properties separate from its substance. Mentioning just a few of these shows how familiar aspects of the “self’ component of personality are now approachable on new terms. Thus we can examine self theories in terms of their validity, their internal consistency, or their openness t o change. And since we strive to foresee our future, the time orientation characterizing theories about oneself are suitable for study, in the same way that scientific theories differ in their future predictive power. The extent t o which the components of the self theory are conscious or not also has a parallel in scientific theory generally. A straightforward view is that we hold a variety of beliefs and theories about ourselves, some of which we are conscious of, some of which we are not; some are deeply repressed, some are not salient enough to come beyond the subconscious, and others are the object of complete awareness. All of these are components of the theory, but only part is in conscious awareness. It takes only a brief stretch of the imagination to see that in scientific theory generally, digging out the hidden assumptions, the unrecognized axioms and premises, the implicit and unsurfaced key propositions, is an integral part of the growth and development of science, as it is for the self theories of individual human beings.

11. Culture and Socialization Self theory, like other knowledge, is dependent on the theories in one’s culture about human nature and about the social, biological, and physical world. Put succinctly, we are dependent for our theories about ourselves on what is available in our culture. Our culture provides most of the answers. Only to a small degree do we generate new knowledge from our own actions. For instance, our theories of bodily functioning, of whether we are sick or well, and what t o d o about either state are dependent on the theories of health and aging that exist in our culture. And our culture may do us wrong. At any given time the theories available t o a person are likely to hold much that is false, just as early medicine, and medicine today, mislead many people about the relationship of their actions to their own health. Consider the fact that although new evidence clearly shows the opposite, there is still a widespread scientific “theory” that intellectual functions uniformly decline through the life-span after physical maturity is reached, thus misguiding a person’s theory about what he or she might be able t o achieve in middle and later life. The culture provides the interpretation of the individual event and the accumulated theory into which our own theories about ourselves must fit; but it does much more. For one thing, the language available t o one expands or limits the concepts available for our own thinking. Language is elaborated on aspects of experience w h c h are most salient-for whatever historical-evolutionary

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reasons-to that culture. Thus we know only distantly about the Eskimos’ terms for 1 7 different kinds of snow and what they should do about them; or the Tibetans’ 120 terms for different states of being, concepts not available to those raised in the Western world. Moreover, studies in the sociology of knowledge show how the unequal distribution of amount and quality of knowledge in society, t o various privileged and less privileged social groups, must produce group differences in theories of man in relation t o others and to the universe. Perhaps 99% of the people on earth d o not have the concept of, say, repression, in their self theories-in their arsenal of thought about themselves. And, of course, the culture tells each of us not only what we should think about ourselves, but it also tells each of us what the other person’s self theory should be! Thus men acquire a theory o f what a woman’s self theory should be, of what is the right view for her to hold, as we clearly see in reports about male psychotherapists dealing with female patients (Miller, 1973). And so, if we have girls who think they are boys ( 0 1 vice versa), their theories about who they are and what they can d o are soon under corrective reform. As the cultural anthropologists tell us, each of us has some beliefs about himself that are unique, some that are similar to what others in their social groups believe about themselves, and some that are shared with all members of the culture.

111. The Child’s Developing Theory of Self Developmental psychology, in its concern with children, is, or should be, the great foundation of life-span developmental research, and so it is in large measure in the domains of physical and cognitive development. But when one turns t o the child development research literature to read about the origin and development of the young child’s theoiic; of self in relation t o the world, it yields little (for important exceptions, see Brooks & Lewis, 1975; Lewis & Brooks, 1975). There are, t o be sure, specialized areas of study and socialization in personality development of children dealing with some aspects of belief about how the world might work. One would include here June Tapp’s work (1971 ; Tapp & Levine, 1974) on how and what children learn about the legal system;possibly work on political and economic socialization; studies of moral development, which the present writer reinterprets as successively sophisticated self theories in certain kinds of social situations; and, of course, Piaget, on developing theories of the physical world. We have nothing comparable in research, however, on development of the sociological and psychological components of the child’s self theories. What are

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young children’s developing theories of causal reality about the social world and their own emerging roles in it; their developing theories about how the social system works; the preschool and first-grade child’s evolving, minute views of the school, of the classroom, of the peer group, as well as of what he or she can d o about it? What, indeed, are these miniature theories of behavior, and how do they develop and change over time? The failure of most developmental psychologists t o take this perspective on the child’s emerging personality is part of a general failure t o connect child development t o matters of greatest interest in adult personality-and this failure has several causes: (1) most child development studies proceed on the assumption that there is n o change in personality after childhood and that there is some “mythical plateau of adulthood” which child development can predict (see also Chandler, in this symposium). (2) The developing attributes of the child that have been most studied are, in the main, near completion by age 12. (3) The consumers of child development information have been the schools and families; and prediction has been of tasks in these institutions, not of later life tasks. (4) We have becn overly influenced by the infantile determinists. Such determinism might be the case in extreme personal disorders, such as severe Oedipal problems, but might not be the case in general. We recognize, as John A. Clausen has remarked, that the natural state of the person is t o be in the process of becoming something different while remaining in many respects the same. Neugarten (1976), in her up-to-date review of materials on personality change, clearly pointed out that there are very few conclusive data supporting the view that personality is similar or unchanging over time (or, for that matter, that it is fluid and transformed over time). Moreover, the correlations between secondary school and college performance (both academic and nonacademic achievements), on the one hand, and later happiness and adjustment in work, family, or community, on the other, are generally about zero (Hoyt, 1965; Munday & Davis, 1974). We might, then, set out a challenge and follow with a response. Instead of asking, “What has life-span developmental psychology to offer t o child development?” we ask, “What does child development research today have t o offer t o the study of adult personality, in particular the life-span developmental theory of oneself?” We no longer simply can assume its relevance. Now, one thing we might d o is accept the view that there is no connection between childhood and adulthood in personality and develop another rationale for child study. Thus, we might work t o predict performance and well-being in the school and family systems, but not try t o predict the child’s future life after he or she has left these institutions; or we might state that the child is of value in his own right, rather than as father of the man. The child is to be loved and supported for what he is now, not for what he can become. The age of childhood could be viewed as a

category of equal merit with other segments in the life-span, not on the basis of promise. Do we ask the elderly w h a t they promise us in the future? In contrast, we might take a dil‘ferei-it course: to say that it is people across their ages and not people in a n y particular age period who interest us; furthermore, that we want t o begin studying new kinds of personality characteristics which will be conceptualized s o as to illuminate continuities from childhood to adulthood and which indeed aIe the essence of the social being of humankind. The components of the person’s self theory may well be just such salient characteristics for a life-span apptoach.

IV. Two Illustrations of Possible Systematic Changes in Theories of Oneself through the Life-Span A. THEOIill S O F 1’1,RSONAL CONTROL

Essentially the concept of personal control deals with what is referred to as “internal versus external sense of control,” that is, whether one says that he or some other force is the detemiining factor in the outcome of some event. The items quoted earlier, e.g., “When I make plans, I am almost certain I can make them work,” are from scales measuring this personal belief. We are lacking descriptions of infancy and early childhood (Witkin, 1969)-of those first confrontations with reality in which the early vague sense of omnipotence begins t o be checked, and the process b y which this infantile sense of personal control is corrected by experience, and anthropomorphism is replaced by a valid, pragmatic, and growing belief in one’s control over his life. But even so, while there is not much to go on, it does appear that during the life-span segment from around the age of 5 or 6 years to the midlife period, changes in the sense of personal control correspond in a commonsense way to the realities of life: an increase from early childhood up through the adolescent expansionthe feeling of great power, of “I cannoi fail”; through the next several decades of mastery of the key tasks of life; and then the inversion point and the gradual erosion of the sense of control during the later years. Some convincing research by Beebe (1971) and Milgram (1971) shows increases in the sense of personal control from first to tenth grade and from fourth to tenth grade, respectively; one large national survey of attitudes demonstrates increases of a substantial nature in the sense of personal control from tenth t o twelfth grades and across all social class groups (Brim, 1969). Then, from age 20 onward, the data from a study by Gurin and Gurin (1976) show asteadyincrease by decades t o age 50. Not unexpectedly in our culture, from age 50 onward there

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is a clear decrease in reported sense of personal control through age 70 and beyond. And in support is Gutmann’s (1969) cross-cultural work showing that adult males from about 55 on stop seeing the world as something that can be conquered and begin t o regard their problems as beyond their own or any other human’s control. The research materials on socioeconomic status and race differences in the sense of powerlessness and fatalism present some of the most stable, substantial findings of United States sociology since 1960. The facts are that lower class, Catholic, and black members of society on the average do score lower in their sense of personal control and that each of these subgroup characteristics makes an independent contribution to the difference. In part this reflects the realities of life-we say that one’s personal theory is in accord with the facts of his or her life-but of course also in part shows the culturally determined content in self theories. “Que sera, sera.” R. THEORIES ABOUT CHANGE IN ONESELF

Every person must have as a component of the self theory some hypotheses about the kind of person he can become in the future and hence must have a theory of the possibility of personal change. He would draw heavily on his culture, which has its own theories of human nature, in the form of science, myth, legend, and religious belief, and specifically has a theory about the possibility of changing human nature; this can be seen as a cultural universal, in the same sense as are theories about life after death or the origins of man. One might have lived in Greece in the first century B.C., when mythology and legend said that all things are mutable, that anything can become something else and probably is in the process of doing so; or, in sharp contrast, one might have lived in a Calvinist world in which predestination for heaven or hell could not be altered by one’s acts, whatever they might be. And Calvinism stands as the bridge from the Judaic tradition to the modern Protestant sects which believe in the possibility of human improvement, viz.: “I wish 1 could live longer, because then I could be perfect by the time I die.” Our knowledge about whether American people think they can change or not is sparse. Some illustrative data come from two national surveys of American high-school students’ attitudes and beliefs about intelligence (Brim, 1969). One set of survey questions concerned beliefs about the stability of one’s intelligence over time. More than four-fifths of this adolescent population believed that intelligence continues to increase throughout life. A related question, “Given the best conditions of diet, education, intellectual stimulation, etc., it is possible for an average person t o raise his intelligence test score a t most by -,” showed that some two-fifths said about lo%, an additional one-quarter went as high as 20%, and still another one-quarter believed a 25-50% increase is possible. A

third question was whether they thought their own scores on intelligence tests had remained the same or changed: about one-half said they have remained the same; the other half said their scores had risen during the past 2 or 3 years. A fourth question, about the future, s1ic)wed some 70% of the respondents said that they would be higher or much higher in intelligence in 10 years. All in all, we get a portrait of this age group’s belief in the fluidity and upgrading of intelligence in years to come. However, there are significant social group differences in these theories. Those adolescents who see intelligence as continuing to increase throughout life are more often from lower class backgrounds, inore often females, more often white than black, and more often Protestan1 and Catholic than Jewish. The challenge to child development research is clear: What kind of experience up to the age of 16 or so, what kind of cultural background, what kind of cultural rhetoric or proverbs produces these differences in theories about the changeability of intelligence over a lifetime? In addition to one’s culture, one’s time and place in history, there are some child development imperatives tli;it affect one’s beliefs about personality change. Studies of children u p to 6 yeai-s of ag,e show that some boys still believe they can be mothers when they grow u p and that children believe they can be black or white when they get older. Later, the realization comes that one cannot change color or sex, and it is reminiscent of stories of children who fall from second floor windows while trying to fly after reading or seeing Peter Pan. The child starts down the path of a lifetime of “ontogenetic disappointments,” as my colleague Carol Ryff has put i t , and one’s theories about the changes that are open to the self swing from optiinisrn t o pessimism. On the other hand, there is also great satisfaction from the sense of continuity, allaying fear that one is being a1tered or coming to pieces. Consider the following from Epstein (1973, p. 405): This is well illustrated in the following description by Lauretla Bender of the reactions of a schizophrenic girl o n meeting her psychiatrist: Ruth, a five year old, approached the psychiatrist with “Are you the bogey man? Are you going to fight my mother? Are you the samr mother? Are you the s a n e father’? Are you going to be another mother?” and t i i u l l y screaming in terror, “I am afraid I am going to be someone else.”

The “ontogenetic disappointnients” probably lead to the development of legends and myths about hurnaii mutability; but also, one of their functions is t o calm the fears of personal disintegration which otherwise might destroy one. With a colleague, Charlotte Dari-ow, the present author is compiling a collection and interpretation of great legends of human metamorphosis, primarily in Western culture. This includes the classics-Faust; Jekyll and Hyde; Samson Agonistes; Paul, on the road to Damascus-as well as many modern selections

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from such as Thurber, Kafka, and Philip Roth. We examine these first in terms of causal agent, e.g., biochemical, magical, or possession by spirits or gods, and also by the content of the legendary change, e.g., in body, in mind, or in personality. We then consider in turn such matters as whether thc change is voluntary or not, its abruptness or radicalness, and most significantly, whether it is permanent or reversible. Manifest throughout is man’s hunger to foresee and to transform his personal future, while a t the same time he exhibits his terror of forces beyond him. The treasured stories and legends about nietamorphosis in children, for example, Alice in Wonderland, Peter Pan, and Snow White, are especially poignant because they engage children’s fascination with possible transformation of self and at the same time make them realize there will be inescapable continuities with what they are now.

V. Setting the Research Agenda What we need is a child development research agenda to take us farther down the road toward creating a life-span human developmental theory that deals with the life course, with the continuity and change in components of one’s theories about oneself, and how these vary ainong cultural groups. Think of a grid which intersects age and module and which portrays components of self theories moving through the experience of the life-span. We could examine the life-course trajectory of any one of these components, these modules of self theory; and we could look across the grid at any age for the developmental profile of the child’s, 01- adolescent’s, or the middle-aged or older person’s theory of self. To illustrate, we might look across the developmental profile during the period from age 40 to 50 for United States’ males and thus gain some perspective on the “male midlife crisis” (Brim, 1976). We know a number of self-theory changes are required in this period of life (“developmental tasks,” we could say) in regard t o declining personal control, to shifting beliefs about one’s body capacities, t o changing hypotheses about one’s future achievements; these are all changes which if demanded t o o rapidly, or simultaneously, yield a crisis in one’s theory about who he is (Epstein. 1973). But this is prospective at the present time, for the open question is whether or not these life-span developmental charts of aspects of self theory would show any pattern over time, would really have enough similarity across individuals t o permit us t o generalize about life history. Perhaps even after getting the most significant and sophisticated concepts describing human self theories, the experiences through the life-span still would consist primarily of idiosyncratic ups and downs, so that while change clearly occurs, it would remain unpredictable.

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We can find out only if we move forward in our life-span developmental theory of people’s theories of themselves REFERENCES Beebe, J. S. Self-concept and internal-cxternal control in children and adolescents. Disscrtation Abstracts International, 1971, 3 1 , 4 9 6 6 A 4 9 6 7 A . Brim, 0. G. American beliefs and attitiitlcs about intelligcrzcc (with D. C. Glass, J. Neulinger, & I. J. Firestone). New York: Russell Sage k:oundation, 1969. Brim, 0. G. The sense of personal control over one’s life. Invited address to Divisions 7 and 8, 82nd annual convention of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans, September 1974. Brim, 0. G. Theories of the male mid-life crisis, Courzseling Psychologist: Counsclirig Adults, Special Issue, 1976. Brooks, J., & Lewis, M. Mirror image-stimulation and self-recognition in infancy. Paper presented at the biannual meeting o f the Society for Research in Child Development, Denver, April 1975. Epstein, S. The self-concept revisited or a theory of a theory. American Psychologist, 1973, 28,405-416. Gurin, G., & Gurin, P. Personal efficacy and the ideology of individual responsibility. I n H. Strumpel (Ed.), A system of social itidicators of economic well-being. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Survey Research Center, Institutc c)f Social Research, 1976, in press. Gutmann, D. The country of old m e n (’ross-cultural studies In the psychology of later life. In W. Donahue (Ed.), Occasional p a p w s in gerontology. Ann Arbor. Mich.: Institute of Gerontology, University of Michigan-Wayne State University, 1969. Hoyt, D. P. The relationship hctween college grades and adult achie~wrnent:A review o f the literature. Report No. 7. Iowa City. Iowa: American College Testing Research, 1965. Lewis, M., & Brooks, J. Infants’ social perception: A constructivist view. In L. Cohen & P. Salapatek (Eds.), Infant percqition Froin sensation t o cognition. Vol. 2. New York: Academic Press, 1975. Milgram, N. A. Locus of control in Ncgro a n d white children at four age levels. P ~ ~ c h o l o g i cal Reports, 1971, 29, 4 5 9 4 6 5 . Miller, J. A. (Ed.) Psychoanalysis and wornen. Ihltimore: Penguin Books, 1973. Munday, L. A., & Davis, J. C. Varirtic,s o f accomplishinents aftcr collcge. Report No. 62. Iowa City, Iowa: American College Testing: Research, 1974. Neugarten, B. L. Personality and aging. In J. E. Birren 8r K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Handbook of the psychology of aging. New York. Reinhold-Van Nostrand, 1976. Tapp, J. L. (Issue Ed.) Socialization, thc law. and society. Journal of Social Issues, 1971, 27. Tapp, J. L., & Levine, F. J. Legal socialization: Strategies for an ethical legality. Sfanford Law Review, 1974, 27, 1-72. Witkin, H. A. Social influences in the development of cognitive style. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socializatiori theor.),and research. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969.

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IMPLICATIONS O F LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR CHILDHOOD EDUCATION

Leo Montuda und Sigrtin-Heide Filipp U N I V I ~ R S I T YO F TRIER

I. INTRODUCTION . . . 11. CONTRIBUTIONS O F DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY TO T H E ESTABLISHMENT OF EDUCATIONAL GOALS . . . . A. ON DEFINING SOClALlZATION GOALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENT AND CHILDHOOD SOCIALIZATION GOALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111. DESIGN O F INTERVENTION PROCRAMS

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A. A TAXONOMIC SCHEME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. LIFE-SPAN PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. PROBLEMS IN TRANSFORMING EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE INTO INTERVENTION PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. MATCHING DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY AND DESIGN METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. SOME PROPOSALS ON DESIGN METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . .

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V. TOWARD RESEARCH IN CIIILDHOOD INTERVENTION FROM LIFE-SPAN PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS . . . . . . . . . REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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I. Introduction Baltes (1 973) has outlined the ingredients of research paradigms derived from a mechanistic model (Reese & Overton, 1970) and discussed these paradigms

with respect t o research on behavioral development across the life-span. Baltes’s formulation states that behavior is a function of response, organismic, and/or stimulus variables in present (i.e., concurrent) and earlier (i.e., historical) temporal periods. This view of research paradigms in developmental psychology does not lead t o life-span research programs which are conceptually novel. Rather, it is the extension of the time perspective and the search for more distal antecedents that distinguishes a life-span view from traditional developmental conceptions (Baltes & Schaie, 1973). In this sense, a life-span view thrusts the developmental approach t o its extreme form. An implication resulting from a life-span developmental view for childhood intervention is that an educational or interventional program should be designed with special attention directed t o the long-range, distal consequences of the intervention. This consideration is important for each of the three major classes of intervention: (a) corrective; (b) preventive; and (c) optimizing. Corrective intervention is aimed at modifying “problematic” or disturbed behavior. The earlier in childhood that corrective intervention is instituted, the more likely it is that one can stop the disorders from being prolonged or becoming more severe and resistant to modification in later years. However, more empirical evidence is still needed about child-adult continuity of maladaptation or disorders (see, e.g., Clarizio, 1969; Robins, 1966). Preventive intervention may be designed either to control (or hinder) the development of problem behavior or to promote behavioral characteristics which may facilitate the modification of disorders that would possibly develop in later years. Preventive programs with children are often based on the assumption that plasticity in the childhood years yields better “investment-payoff rates” (e.g., Cowen, 1973). Optimizing intervention is aimed at the establishment of external conditions and/or internal prerequisites which would allow the “optimal” realization of certain “developmental goals” insofar as such goals can be formulated and justified. If one agrees with Jahoda (1958) that psychological well-being is more than being free from disorders, then this type of intervention will become more important. Optimizing intervention implies, moreover, the establishment of goals for “optimal human development”-a formidable new problem. It may be argued that life-span developmental psychology has yet to offer enough data or empirically validated hypotheses to substantiate intervention programs. At the same time, however, life-span developmental psychology does offer viewpoints and questions which are very provocative and should have consequences for future research. Some of these questions and some of the

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attendant theoretical and methodological problems are addressed from the perspective of childhood education in the following sections.

11. Contributions of Developmental Psychology to the Establishment of Educational Goals A. ON DEFINING SOCIALIZATION GOALS

As long as one supports the notion of “programmatic developmental models” (Brandtstadter, 1975), developmental psychology can at the utmost contribute to the derivation of developmental goals from “ultimate goals.” The establishment of ultimate goals for human development is primarily an extrinsic concern 01‘ psychology. The goals, rather, are rooted in historical, cultural, religious, and anthropological traditions (e.g., Riegel, 1973) and may lead t o one of three major viewpoints focusing on: (a) requirements of a future society and its ecology (e.g., individuals should be enabled t o adapt smoothly to future external conditions); (b) conceptions and models of the ideal personality or ideal human being (e.g., the “autonomous nonconformist,” the “emancipated woman,” the “cultivated man”); and (c) conceptions of the ideal man-environment interaction (e.g., the “socialistic individual in the socialistic society”). Developmental psychology will not prescribe what the ultimate goals o i individuals should be but may contribute by providing knowledge about how individuals can develop toward any of these ultimate goals. These developmental routes may be mapped by first deriving “subgoals” from ultimate goals through technological transformations of developmental theories and, then, by hierarchically ordering the subgoals defining them on different levels of goal hierarchy in terms of a behavioral network. Studer (1970) has demonstrated such an approach in the area of environmental design. Socialization goals cannot be derived in the strict sense of the word because o i the lack of empirically formulated laws. Moreover, postulating the implications of ultimate goals is not a process of logical deduction, because the assumption of functional or implicative relationships between subgoals and ultimate goals is required before a logical relationship can be hypothetically construed. Thercfore, it is an act of classification rather than one of deduction (Meyer, 1972). Currently, subgoals can be related to ultimate goals on the basis of developmental laws in only a few cases. The relationship is hypothesized instead by using arguments of plausibility. This can be illustrated, for example, by reference t o the first of the aforementioned viewpoints: (a) Neither ecological conditions, nor political organizations, nor occupal ional requests, nor means and ways o f social interaction in a future society can be predicted reliably. (b) Decisions about developmental goals and new behavioral standards in response to changing

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socioecological circumstances can be made more easily in tlie future than today. (c) No authority (person or institution) can be named that could serve as an orientation mark in the future. B. LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENT AND CHILDHOOD SOCIALIZATION GOALS

Under a life-span perspective, the conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that individuals themselves will have t o make decisions about their own developmental goals throughout their entire lives. Therefore, intervention in cliildliood must be guided by a primary goal of preparing individuals for the necessities of continuous decision making and planning over the whole life-span. Thus, the development of characteristics which are assumed to hinder autonomous planning and rational decision making (e.g., rigid emotional attitudes or habits, low levels of information processing, uncritical acceptance of authorities, o r dependence on interaction partners and on external control), should be prevented. Since little is known about the stability and changeability of these characteristics in adulthood, it appears reasonable to assert that preventing their establishment in childhood is a generally desirable endeavor. Developmental psychology of the life-span type contributes to tlie establishment of educational goals in still other ways. The traditional orientation in child development focuses on universal developmental trends during childhood and adolescence and specifies directions that are considered to be “natural” and are often elevated to an “ideal norm” referring to a “natural law” (Hoermann, 1963). Characteristics such as formal-logical reasoning, moral autonomy, cognitive complexity, and genital sexuality are conceived of as natural developinental end points or goals. Descriptive developmental psychology leads t o the formulation of age-specific norins (with regard to specific populations or groups) which serve as age-specific developmental goals and are treated as a valid basis for the evaluation of an actual developmental state. The observation and analysis of developmental processes permits the designation of developmental subgoals or intermediate goals by outlining the sequential order of behavioral development and by pointing to various internal prerequisites for further development in different domains. In this sense, a life-span perspective emphasizes that childhood educational goals are only a subset of a series of goals extending throughout the life-span. While traditional developmental psychologists of childhood and adolescence would probably argue that the developmental end product is achieved at the beginning of adulthood, a life-span developmental approach points t o processes which continue t o change during adulthood. Such a vantage point challenges cultural “self-evidences’’ and consensual expectations concerning the changeability of characteristics in adulthood and old age. This viewpoint, by extending the time perspective of development, allows for the formulation and establish-

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ment of new developrnental “optinla” which may or should be accomplished in later years. In many ways, the formulation of developmental goals during adulthood comes closer to clinical-psychological categories such as individuation, self-actualization, self-acceptance, and prevention of disengagement (see, e.g., Brim, 1968; Looft, 1973). In addition, a life-span developmental theory focuses not only on universal trends o f change (a perspective which is niore characteristic of the traditional child and adolescent developmental approach) but also on individual- and group-specific patterns atid rates of change (Neugarten, 1969). Ths is primarily due t o the observation that interindividual differences in behavior show continuous increases with age and development. Finally, life-span theory and research are centered on the dynamic interplay between individual ontogenetic and historical-evolutionary change (e.g., marked cohort effects). The rediscovery of generation or cohort differences and secular change not only allows for the establishment of certain developmental goals for different generations but also points to the possibilities of formulating developmental goals w h c h reduce, maintain, or sttengthen generation differences (see, e.g., Birren & Woodruff, 1973: Schaie, 1973). In brief, the outcome of a discussion of educational goals depends heavily on the point of view about human development. From a life-span perspective the goals for intervention in early cliildhood might be dramatically different than those adopted from a child developnient approach. The substantive foci of life-span theory lead t o considerations which go beyond the age-specific vantage point of most childhood educators.

111. Design of Intervention Programs Having discussed possible contributions of life-span developmental psychology to the establishment of educational goals, recommendations for the design of intervention programs and their evaluation from a life-span perspective will be offered. A. .4 ’TAXONOMIC SCHEME

A taxonomic scheme may serve as a guide for planning intervention research and practice. Interventive efforts may be classified according to the following criteria: 1. Target areas-persons (socializatiori agent, “socializee”); settings (institutions, communities) 2. Procedures-formal attributes (duration, intensity, frequency, etc.); degree of complexity including the sequential versus nonsequential ordering of techniques

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3. Hvpothesized relationships between intervention procedure and target behavior-unidirectional versus interactional; deterministic versus stochastic 4. Hypothesized moderating conditions-characteristics of persons (age, sex, generation, biography, etc.); characteristics of settings (cultural system, ecological variables, etc.) 5. Aspecrs ofevaluation-univariate versus multivariate control of effects or side effects; short- versus long-term control of effects or side effects.

Different research prograins derived from this taxonomic scheme require different strategies of data gathering and data processing (Buss, 1974). B. LIFE-SPAN PERSPECTIVES

I n planning and evaluating intervention programs under a life-span perspective number of issues should be considered. First, a life-span approach programmatically avoids an insular consideration of single segments of life. Thus, introducing antecedent variables through an intervention program in early years implies not only observing their immediate effects but also across the whole life-span. That is, the relative influence of the intervention on consequent variables has t o be estimated by repeated measurennents at different age levels. By observing a variation in the relationships between the antecedent and consequent variables across the life-span, inferences can be made regarding the importance of such issues as: (a) the age and time when the antecedent variables are introduced; (b) the duration and intensity of the antecedent variables; and (c) interactions between different antecedent variables introduced at different ages. Secondly, from a life-span perspective the effects of intervention may be seen as a function of the period of time since the initiation of the program. The effects may be immediate or delayed, temporary or permanent, and they may influence the developmental process in terms of level changes or slope changes (Wohlwill, 1973). Finally, life-span developmental psychology points t o the interactions between intervention procedures and certain characteristics of the target person, especially generation and age membership (conceived of as an indicator variable). Lntervention strategies cannot be assumed to operate in identical ways on subjects of different developmental levels or historical periods. :I

IV. Problems in Transforming Empirical Knowledge into Intervention Programs When seeking empirical knowledge which is applicable t o the construction of intervention programs, we hope to be able to rely on some experimental work.

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This appears t o be possible especially for the area of cognitive and linguistic development. There is also a great deal of research that is concerned with the description of intraindividual change by using cross-sectional, longitudinal, and mixed designs and with the investigation of relationships between early life events or organismic variables and the development of certain characteristics in later years (see, e.g., Bayley, 1964: Kagan & Moss, 1962) by using correlational analyses. The questionable usefulness of developmental data has been clarified by a variety of contributions from life-span research which typically has accentuated some methodological design problems that are easily overlooked if an age-specific view, such as a child developmental one, is applied. For example, with regard t o the applicability of empirical findings t o the construction of intervention programs, the available experimental and correlational data are of restricted value for a number of reasons, such as the possibility of cohort effects, experimental mortality, practice effects, etc. A. MATCHING DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY AND DESIGN METHODOLOGY

Developmental psychology has been defined as dealing with the description, explanation, and modification of intraindividual change and interindividual differences in intraindividual change (Baltes, 1973). Much of the child development research, however, does not converge on this ideal. Starting with a discussion of correlational methods, it must be reemphasized that they d o not permit the identification of causal (explanatory) relationships. Since every intervention attempt requires knowledge about the variables that produce change using valid “if-then” statements, our efforts first have t o be aimed at the construction of causal models. The existing correlational data in developmental psychology are based on interindividual variation-a fact that is often overlooked. The interventionist is confronted with a severe problem of generalization when he/she at tempts to produce intraindividual change in a target attribute by manipulating variables which are correlated with the target attribute on the basis of interindividual differences. Thus, the correlational pattern derived from interindividual variation cannot be assumed to show up when it is calculated from intraindividual variation. Even if high maternal control, for instance, were strongly related t o obedience in the child, as inferred from research on interindividual variation, intraindividual variation in maternal behavior (i.e., an increase/decrease in maternal control) may not produce the expected effect-perhaps because of the child’s interpretations and causal explanations of the change in maternal behavior (Schneewind, 1974). Furthermore, the interventionist cannot rely on the assumption that the change (i.e., intraindividual variation) in a target variable can be explained by the same set of predictors as the interindividual variance of the variable can be.

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!:or example, by using hypotheses derived from developmental psychology (e.g., seiisi tive periods), learning theories (e.g., stabilization of behaviors), and symbolic interactionism (e.g., preserving identity), we can expect varying resistance t o change. We d o not know, though, whether a modification of the variables Iiaving predictive value for interindividual variation will produce analogous in ti-eindividual variation (change). This issue is occasionally discussed under the concept of explanatory discontinuity (Baltes & Schaie, 1973). Finally, we are not sure whether spontaneous and “manipulated” change in an iridividual have the same correlates. Even if spontaneous variation (which, for instance, could be explained by the transactional character of the parent-child i-clationship) were measured and its correlates were defined, the problem of whether the manipulation of such correlates in an intervention program would produce the same effects (i.e., intraindividual change) remains unsolved. The iiitcrvention attempt itself may produce side effects (e.g., divergent evaluation of the former and the new educational behavior; inconsistencies between attitudes : I I ~d behavior), which in turn could modify the assumed covariation in an unkiiown manner. I t may appear, then, that the applicability of most developmental research t o intervention planning is doubtful because: (a) it does not sufficiently focus on tlir‘ key parameters of developmental research and theory, i.e., the explicit and dir-ect assessment of intraindividual change (Baites, 1973); and (b) isomorphy :jlld/clr homology (Baltes & Goulet, 1971) between experimental laboratory and iisturalistic settings cannot easily be assumed. To overcome such methodological ihortcomings, it is proposed to emphasize research strategies which are inore e~plicitlyrelated t o the intrinsic goals of developmental research than is true for inlist current work.

R. SOME PROPOSALS ON DESIGN METHODOLOGY

11s pointed out in the early 1960s by Zigler (1963) and reemphasized recently bq Risley and Wolf (1973), Hoyer (1974), and others, the experimental approacli to problems of developmental psychology should be considered whenever possible. This approach would enable us to distinguish more precisely between causes and effects and would yield more information on the factors pi-oducing change instead of those merely correlated with change. Since developmental psychologists often lack full control over experimental conditions, however, quasi-experimental designs (Campbell & Stanley, 1963) should be applied iiioi-e frequently. Time series studies, for example, would show whether or not an intcrvention 111 o y a m indeed produced a developmental change (e.g., Campbell, 1969; Worti w n , 1975). In case utilization of experimental and quasi-experimental strategies is limited, o r nonexperiinental designs are preferred (because of their heuristic

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value in theory construction), the identification of causal relationships should be stressed, nevertheless, according to methodological models such as those proposed by Blalock (1964) and Coleman (1971), among others. Such models are especially appropriate for the investigation of developmental processes because of the conceptual distinction between di.rect versus mediated causal relationships or between external versus internal causes of change. Explanatory studies are needed which, from a life-span perspective, are aimed at identifying not only temporally proximal but also temporally distal causes of intraindividual change and which will provide more information about the “when” and “how” of intervention in developmental processes. Aside from this, the interventionist needs more information on the applicability of group data t o single cases. In order t o avoid what Hoyer (1974) has called the “paradox of ‘discovering’ laws of behavioral development that d o not generalize t o the individual” (p. 824), i t may be preferable to use small-sample methodologies or single-subject designs more frequently. When using large-group designs, it is important t o examine those subjects who are represented inexactly by the group data obtained and to identify the variables, step by step, which distinguish them from those subjects who more closely fit the data. The systematic investigation of moderator variables that contribute t o treatment-byperson interactions will sharpen the interventionist’s ability to design the best treatment for each individual. A last problem to be mentioned here is the control of the possible side effects of any intervention program. To be able to handle our empirical data, it is necessary to confine our design to a limited number of variables, e.g., the complex net of psychological variables must be neglected and an isolated subset of some of them must be chosen in a somewhat arbitrary way. Thus, by observing treatment-produced change in the variables under study, change in other variables not included in the design may be overlooked. For example, according t o Barker’s (1968) behavior setting theory, an increase in social activities and responsibility (defined as an intervention goal) produced by environmental change may be accompanied by a decrease in freedom of movement and autonomy (defined as an unwanted side effect). In other words, interventions in complex “systems” (persons, institutions, or environments) have multiple effects which can be registered only by successively enlarging the number of variables under study and by trying to approximate the experimental situation to the natural one. Since in the area of long-range processes like psychological development it is iinpossible t o include all relevant variables in any empirical design or construe an isornorphic relationship between experimental and natural conditions, an incrcase in the use of simulation experiments (see, e.g., Baltes & Goulet, 1971 ) o r coniputer simulation models (e.g., Harbordt, 1974) is encouraged. Such models have been successfully applied in other research areas.

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V. Toward Research in Childhood Intervention from Life-Span Perspectives The issues raised lead to a number of specific suggestions. For example, from a life-span perspective the interventionist is concerned with long-range and distal effects of the preventive and optimizing types of intervention in childhoodeffects which may under certain circumstances occur at later ages. However, a longitudinal tracing of the effects of intervention would require that we wait for decades in order to get a final evaluation of the efficacy of the program (unless estimates of intervention effects are obtained from retrospective reports). In addition, the effects of the program might be generation specific and, thus, would lead to the questionableness of its effectiveness for current and/or future generations. At this point it should be asked what possibilities are available for an evaluation of long-term effects within a reasonable and practical length of time. What is needed is a short-term estimation of long-term effects and efficiency; this can be accomplished only by reference t o a theory of development that covers at least the period between intervention (preventive or optimizing) and the criterion age. Such a theory should include variables in close temporal connection with the intervention point, i.e., variables which may serve as early check marks for the estimation of long-term effects. The use of growth curves, for instance, provides developmental psychology with one possibility to control for long-term effects. Suppose an intervention program is designed to correct individual deviations from the “ideal”: an approximation to a test section of the curve could then be viewed as an indicator for long-term success [see Wohlwill(l970) for a discussion of this approach]. As early childhood intervention on cognitive behavior has shown, the estimation of long-term effects is as valid as the knowledge about conditions and determinants of the ideal developmental curve and its realization for the group under treatment. (The programs actually indicate that a single intervention effort is insufficient to raise the “normal” intelligence level but rather that intervention has to be maintained over time.) In summary, estimations of distal consequences will become increasingly more reliable (a) the higher the validity of causal hypotheses about intervention effects; (b) the greater the proportion of controlled causal factors; (c) the more accurate and complete the information on growth curves and change trends; (d) the more reliable the anticipation of events w h c h may support or interfere with intervention effects; and (e) the greater the control over side effects of the intervention. Returning to life-span theory, the lack of proof in such tentative models will often be tremendous. Without an attempt to construct developmental theories which can be validated by combining the available fragmentary information into

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a “developmental puzzle ,” modification programs in childhood education that develop from a life-span perspective involve some element of risk. However, the conceptual proposals appear to be worth both the gamble and the effort.

VI. Concluding Comments Childhood education derives its rationale not only from knowledge about children and child development but also from views of and knowledge about subsequent periods of the human life-span. Thus, a life-span developmental approach offers programmatic implications concerning the goals and conditions for optimal human development in childhood as well as in later age periods. Even though every concrete empirically grounded suggestion concerning goals for programs in childhood education would require an extremely careful analysis and a cautious and critical use of research data, generic contributions of a life-span perspective can be delineated on a conceptual level. Concerning the formulation of educational goals, a life-span perspective leads the interventionist to consider developmental tasks and goals characteristic of the adolescent, adult, and older person in the design of childhood education. Furthermore, in contrast to child and adolescent psychology, where universal change trends are stressed, a life-span perspective suggests not only such universal changes but also interactions of ontogenetic with sociohistorical changes in which both individual and group-specific goals and modes of man-environment interaction are emphasized. Such a vantage point focuses on diversity and multidirectionality of goal systems and sequences. As far as intervention procedures are concerned, it must be stated that educational strategies under a life-span approach cannot be assumed to operate in identical ways for subjects who are at different developmental levels. Moreover, intervention effects are not static or time specific, but rather they involve long-term, distal side effects. The nature of such intervention effects in childhood education requires a life-span approach to program planning and evaluation. A life-span point of view, then, provides us with information aimed at minimizing any long-term negative transfer effects from a childhood to an adult and/or gerontological educational program. Special emphasis is also directed to the discussion of some problems inherent in the application of research data to the planning and development of intervention programs; this discussion applies to any intervention effort, whether designed from a child or a life-span clevelopmental perspective. Childhood education efforts should be based on research of the direct and valid assessment of intraindividual change and the associated antecedent conditions, rather than on developmental research conducted using individual differences methodologies. Furthermore, the research strategies utilized should be ones which

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permit a definite identification of causal factors in intraindividual change. An attempt must also be made to construct developmental theories t o provide early check marks for long-term effects. A final observation proposes to relate the available data (normative, correlational, experimental, quasi-experimental, etc.) in putting together “developmental puzzles,” even if they remain for the most part fragmentary. Such efforts will provide the most valid recommendations that are possible for educationally guided development. It is concluded that a life-span perspective can be helpful in clarifying and accentuating a series of issues which need explicit consideration in the planning and evaluation of early educational efforts. In fact, the issues raised by a life-span view are easily overlooked if an age-specific approach is applied t o childhood education, as is favored in most current models used in childhood education. ACKNOWLEDGMENT The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful editorial comments and suggestions offered by MI. Steven Cornelius.

REFERENCES Baltes, P. B. Prototypical paradigms and questions in life-span research on development and aging. Gerontologist, 1973, 1 3 , 4 5 8 4 6 7 . Baltes, P. B., & Goulet, L. R. Exploration of developmental variables by manipulation and simulation of age differences in behavior. Human Development, 1971, 14, 149-170. Baltes, P. B., & Schaie, K. W. On life-span developmental research paradigms: Retrospects and prospects. In P. B. Baltes & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Lije-span developmental psychology; Personality and socialization. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Barker, R. G. Ecological psychology: Concepts and methods f o r studying the environment of human behavior. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968. Bayley, N. Consistency of maternal and child behaviors in the Berkeley Growth Study. Vita Humana, 1964, 7,73-95. Birren, J. F., & Woodruff, D. S. Human development over the life-span through education. In P. B. Baltes & K . W. Schaic (Eds.), Li,fe-spaii developmental psycholo~y:Personality and socialization. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Blalock, H. M. Causal inferences in non-exprrimental research. Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1964. Brandtstsdter, J. Zur Bestinimung eines Tabugcgenstandes der Psychologic: Bcnierkungen zum Problem der “Verb rung” menschlichen Erlebens und Verhaltens. I n G. Eberlein enstandl Frankfurt: Herder & Herder, 1975. (Ed.), Psychologie ohne Brim, 0. B. Socialization through the life cycle. In C. Gordon & K . J. Gergen (Eds.), The self in social interaction. New York: Wiley, 1968. Buss, A. R. A general developmental model for interindividual differences, intraindividual differences, and intraindividual changes. Developmental Psychology, 1974, 10, 70-78. Campbell, D. T. Reforms as experiments. American Psychologist, 1969, 2 4 , 4 0 9 4 2 9 .

Campbell, D. T., & Stanley, J. C. Fxperimenlal and quasi-expcriinental designs for research on teaching. In N. L. Gage (Ed.), Haarzdbook of research on teachirig. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963. Clarizio, H. F. Stability of deviant behavior through time. In H. F. Clarizio (Ed.), Merital health and the educative process. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969. Coleman, H. S. The mathematical study o f change. In M. M. Blalock (Ed.), Methodology in social research. London: McGraw-Hill, 197 I . Cowen, E. L. Social and community interventions. Aniittal Review ofPsychology, 1973, 24, 208472. Harbordt, S. Conzputersimulatiorr it7 tlcrr Sozialwisset7schafterl. Reinbck, Germany: Rowohlt, 1974. Hoermann, H. Die Wissenschaft und die Gescllscliaft. In F. Borinski (Ed.), Dic Wissenschaf! und die Gesellschafr. Berlin: Dunckcr & Humblodt, 1963. Hoyer, W. J. Aging as intraindividual change. D~velopmer7talPsychok~gy,1974, 10, 821826. Jahoda, M. Current conceptions oJpositii'e iirc'iitnl health. New Yark: Basic Books, 1958. Kagan, J., & Moss, H. A. Birth t o rnntriritj'.' A stud), ir7 psychological dei~elopnzerii.New York: Wiley, 1962. Looft. W. R. Reflections on intervention in old age: Motives, goals, and assumptions. Geroritologist, 1973, 13,6-10. Munich: Koscl-Verlag, 1972. Meyer, H. L. Eirifuhmng iri die Cirn.ic.irliiiri-Mt/i~)cfolo~ie. Neugarten, B. L. Continuities and discontinuities of psychological issues into adult life. Huriiari Developnient, 1969, 23, 121 -I 30. Reese, H. W., & Overton, W. F. Models of dcvelopinent and theories of development. In L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltes (Eds. I.ife-.spun developniental psvchology: Research ar7d theory. New York: Acadcmic I'ress. 1970. Riegel, K . Developmental psychology and society: Some historical and ethical considerations. In P. B. Baltes & J. R. Nessrlroade (I,ds.), Life-sparr developrizcrztal psychology: Merhodological issuc>s. New Yoi k ' Academic Press, 1973. Risley, T. R., & Wolf, M. M. Strategies f o r analyzing behavior change over time. In J . R. Nesselroade & H. W. Reese (Eds.), /,ijc,-spatr developmental psychology: Methodological issues. New York: Academic Press. 1973. Robins, L. M. Deviarit children groivrr f l p Ilaltiniore. Williams & Wilkins, 1966. Schaie, K. W. Intervention toward ;in :igelcss society? Geroritologist, 1973, 13, 31-38. Schneewind, K. A. Auswirkungen v o i i I'rzirhungsstilen. h e r b l i c k iibcr den Stand der I-'orscliung. In H. Luckesch (ed. .Ausrvirkungen i'on Erziehurzgsstilen. Giittingen: Hogrefe, 1974. Studer, R. G. The dynamics of behavior-contingelit physical systems. In H.M. Proshansky et al. (Eds.), Envirorrrnental psvc'lrolo,yr Mar? and his physical setting. New York: Holt, 1970. Wohlwill, J. F. The age variable in psychological research. Psychological Review, 1970, 77, 49-64. Wohlwill, J. F. The study o f behavioral ~li.i.clol~r}r"izf. New York: Academic Press, 1973. Wortman, P. Evl. Evaluation research: A psychological perspective. Ainericarr Psychologist, 1975, 30,562-575. Zigler, E. Metatheoretical issues in dcvelopniental psychology. I n M. Marx (Ed.), Theories in contemporary psychology. New York: Macmillan, 1963. )?

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AUTHOR INDEX Numbers in italics refer to the pages on which the complete references are listed. A Abrahamson, D., 133,136 Acito, M., 218,223 Ackerman, P. R., 37,63 Adcock, C., 84,103 Adelson, J., 176,185 Aebli, H., 95,102 Ahrens, R., 114,137 Aldridge, V. J., 57,65 Alexandris, A., 14, 16, 19,29 Allen, T. W., 81,103 Ambrose, J. A., 114,137 Anders, T. R., 200,209 Anisman, H., 37,38, 39,62 Anton, A. H., 17,19,29 Apostel, L., 72,102 Arenberg, D., 195,197, 198,209, 221,222 Arnold, C. R., 10,30 Attewell, P., 214,224 Axelrod, R., 58,64 Axelrod, S., 199,210 Aymat, F., 24,32

B Baer,D. M., 176,137, 205,209 Bakwin, H., 13,29 Bakwin, R. M., 13,29 Balfour, G., 93,103 Ball, S., 174,184, 205,209 Baltes, M. M., 146, 154,160 Baltes,P. B., 170, 171, 172, 73, 76, 177, 178,179,180,181,182,183, 185,186, 187, 204,205,206,209, 211, 214, 218, 222,223, 225,228,238, 254,259,260, 261,264 Bandura, A., 180,184

Banikotes, F. G., 123,137 Barahal, G. D., 11,32 Barcai, A., 14, 19,30 Barclay, C. R., 173, 181,185 Barker, R. G., 261,264 Barnes, K. E., 176,184 Barnes, K. R., 15, 16, 1 9 , 3 3 Bartsch, T. W., 181,186 Basowitz, H., 200,211 Battle, E. S., 177,185 Baumrind, D., 175,184 Baxley, G. G., 16,25,29 Bayley, N., 118,137, 170, 177,184, 259, 264 Bazell, R. J., 2,29 Bearison, D. J., 231, 234,238 Becker, W. C., 1 0 , 1 2 , 2 9 , 3 0 Beckwith, L., 145,160 Beebe, J. S., 247,251 Beilin, H.,69, 71, 72,13,74,15,76,78, 79,82,83, 85,86,90,92,93,95,96, 99,102, 178,184, 217,222 Bell, R. Q., 10,30, 144, 145,160 Belmont, J. M., 191,196,203,209 Bengtson, V. L., 173,184 Berberich, L. P., 145,160 Bergeron, J., 214,224 Berlyne, D. E., 49,62 Bernal, M. E., 57,62 Bernard, C., 61,62 Bever, T. G., 81,104 Bhagavan, H. N., 59,62 Bielby, D. D., 214,222 Bijou, S. W., 137, 205,209 Binet, A., 69,102 Birch, H. G., 7, 12, 13,30, 31 Birren, J. F., 257,264 Bisler, I., 15, 34 267

268

Author Index

Bjork, R. A., 191,209 Black, K. D., 173,184 Blalock, H. M., 261,264 Block, J., 229,238 Bloom,K., 115,116, 119,121,124, 136, 137 Bloom, L., 76,96, 103 Bloom, M., 170,184 Blum, A. H., 84, 103 Boelsche, A., 1 1 , 3 0 Bogatz, G. A., 174,184, 205,209 Boldrey, E. E., 25,32 Bolles, R. C., 134, I 3 7 Boren, J. J., 28,30 Bortner, M., 7 , 3 1 Botwinick, J., 199, 209 Boullin, D. J., 5 8 , 5 9 , 6 2 Bovet, M.,72, 74, 1 0 4 , 8 2 , 8 6 , 8 7 , 9 1 , 9 5 , 96,101,104 Bowers, K. S., 182,184 Bowers, M., 5 9 , 6 3 Bowlby, J., 143, 144, 160 Box, G. E. P., 4 4 , 6 2 Boyd,E. F., 154, 155, 156,160, 161 Brackbill,Y., 109, 111, 112, 113, 123, 124, 125, 126, 132, 133, 135, 136,136, 137, 139, 143,154,160 Bradley, C., 2, 3 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 3 0 Brainard, C. J., 217,222 Braine, M. D. S., 79,103 Brainerd, C. J., 75.81, 82, I 0 3 Brandsfidter, J., 255,264 Brazelton, T. B., 151, 152,161 Brim,O. G., 170, 173,184, 226,238, 242, 247,248,250,251, 257,264 Bromley, D. B., 171,184 Bronfenbrenner, U., 175,184 Brooks, J., 245,251 Brossard, L. M., 109, 122,137 Broverman, D. M., 37, 3 9 , 4 3 . 6 2 Brown,A. L., 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 199, 205,209 Brown, G. W., 1 3 , 3 0 Bruner, J. S . , 8 0 , 9 5 , 9 8 , 1 0 3 Bryan, J. H., 182,184 Bryant, P., 8 1 , 1 0 3 Biihler, C., 170, 184 Burks, H. F., 3 , 4 , 6 , 7 , 8, 1 3 , 3 0 Buss,A. R., 173, 180,185, 204,209, 258, 264

Bussaratid, S., 3, 13,34 Butterfield, E. C., 191, 193, 196, 203,209

C Calaresu, F. R., 44, 6 3 Caldwell, B. M., 175,185 Campbell, D. T., 182,185, 260,264, 265 Campbell, IT., 128, 138 Canestrari, R. E., Jr., 198, 199,209 Cannon, W. B., 61, 6 3 Cantwel1,D. P., 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 5 , 1 8 , 2 4 , 2 6 , 27.33 Carlson, J. S., 83, 1 0 3 Carlton, P. L., 4 1 , 6 5 Carpenter, Y., 133, 136 Chandler, M. J., 229,238 Charles, D. C., 170, 185, 214, 224 Charlesworth, W. R., 217,223 CIESS,G. r:., 4 4 , 6 3 Chess, S., 3, 13,30 Cheung, M. N., 50,63 Clarizio, H. F., 254, 265 Clausen, J. A., 226,238 Cleckley, H., 38, 6 3 Clements, S. D., 3, 7, 11,22,28,30, 37,63 Clifton, R. K., 6 3 Clynes, M., 4 4 , 6 3 Cohen, D. J., 5 9 , 6 3 Cohen, N. J., 1 7 , 3 0 Cole, J. O., 15,31 Cole, M., 216,223 Coleman, H. S., 261,265 Coleman, M., 5 8 , 5 9 , 6 2 Conialli, P. E. Jr., 214,223 Conily, H. H., 3 , 4 , 5 , 7 , 8 , 9, 1 3 , 3 0 Connerly, R. J., 145, I 6 1 Conners,C. K., 3, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20,22, 24,30, 31 Cooper, R., 5 7 , 6 5 Coppinger, N., 214,223 Corbit, J . D., 4 0 , 6 5 Cornelius, S. W., 214,223 Cowcn, E. L., 254,265 Cowen, P. A., 180, 185 Craig, A , , 13, 3 4 Craik, F. I . M., 196,200,209 Crandall, V. C., 177,185 Creager, R. D., 17,31

A u tlior hidex

Crook, W. G., 1 3 , 3 1 Cruickshank, W. M. (Ed.), 28,31

D Daniels, G. J., 10,31 Danzger, B., 145,162 Datan, N., 173,186 Davis, J . C., 246,251 Davis, J. M., 4 2 , 6 0 , 6 3 Davis, K., 2 0 , 3 3 Dawson, M. E., 33, 3 7 , 6 5 Day, R. H., 143,162 Decarie,T. G., 109, 122,137 DeGeest, H., 4 4 , 5 0 , 6 3 DeLucia, C. A . , 131,139 Denhoff, E., 3, 4 , 5 , 6 , 8 , 9 , 11, 19.31, 32, 37,63 Denney, D. R., 214,217, 219,223 Denney, N. W . , 2 1 4 , 2 l 6 , 2 l 7 , 2 1 8 , 2 1 9 , 223 Dennis, W., 214,223 DeWitt, S., 85, 103 Dieruf, W., 13,34 Domino, E. F., 59,64 Donaldson, M., 93,103 Doubros, S . G., 1 0 , 3 1 Douglas, V. I., 3,4, 5 , 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,30, 31, 34, 3 7 , 6 3 Douvan, E., 176,185 Duffy, D. M., 216,223 Dulit, E., 228, 229,238 Dumitru, J., 193,211 Dykman, R. A., 3 7 , 6 3

E Eccles, A,, 2, 32 Eckoldt, K., 4 4 , 6 3 Egan, R. A., 2 4 , 3 2 Ehrhardt, A., 174, 175, 186 Eisdorfer, C., 199,210 Eisenberg, L., 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 24,30, 31 Elder,G. H., 173,185, 226,238 Elkind, D., 75, 8 0 , 1 0 3 E%s, N. R., 1 0 , 3 1 El-Yousef, M. K., 4 2 , 6 0 , 6 3 Emde, R. N., 114,138 Emerson, P. E., 179,187 Emmerich, W., 178,185

269

Englemann, S., 12,29 Eppinger, H., 36, 6 0 , 6 3 Epstein, L. C., 15, 18,31 Epstein, S., 242, 249, 250,251 Erikson, E. H., 185, 228,238 Eron, L. D., 175,182,186 Esposito,A., 115, 116, 119, 121, 124, 136, 137 Estes, W. K., 24,31 Etzel,B.C., 110, 113, 125,137, 143,161 Eveloff, H. H., 4, 11,31 F

Farrow, B. J., 204,210 Feingold, B. I;., 13,31 Feldman, S. S., 178,186 Ferguson, C. A., 145,161 Ferriero, E., 99,103 Figurclli, J. C., 85, 1 0 3 Finnerty, R. J . , 15,31 Fisher, S., 1 5 , 3 3 Fitzgerald,H.E., 126, 127, 132, 133, 136, 136,137 Flavell, J. H., 72,103, 178,185, 191, 192, 205,210, 211, 212, 214,216,218,223, 231,232,234,238 Foner, A., 170,187 Fournier, M., 1 5 , 3 1 Fowler, G. W., 3,32, 3 7 , 6 4 Fozard, J. L., 200,209 Franklin, I., 73, 102 Freedman, D., 5 8 , 6 5 Freedman, D. G., 114,137 Freeman, R. D., 20,31 Freibergs, V., 16,31, 37, 63 Friedlander, B. Z . , 127, 129,137 Friedrich, D., 193,210 Frohring, W. R., 206,211 Furth, H. G., 230,238 G

Gay, J., 216,223 Geisse,, S., 2 3 , 3 1 Geller, E., 5 5 , 5 8 , 5 9 , 64, 65 Gellhorn, E., 37,40, 5 6 , 6 3 Gelman, R., 236,239 Gewirtz, H. B., 150,161 Gewirtz, J. L., 110, 112, 113, 114, 115,

270

Author Index

116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 137, 139, 143, 144, 150, 154, 155, 156,

160, 161, 162, 176, 179,185 Glass, G. V., 182, 185 Glick,J.,75,96, 103, 104 Glick, J. A,, 216,223 Glousman, R., 59, 65 Goldberg, A. M., 4 , 3 3 Goldberg, S., 128, 138 Gottman, J. M., 182, 185 Goulet, L. R., 170, 171, 172, 173, 181, 183, 185, 204,205,206,209, 210,211, 260,261,264 Graham, F. K., 6 3 Grant, Q. R., 20,31 Greenfield, P. M., 80, 95,98,103 Greenhouse, S. W., 23,31 Greer, M., 17, 19,29 Greitzer, G., 75, 103 Gribbin, K., 170, 176,187 Griffiths, J. A., 76, 91, 93, 1 0 3 Grinder, R. E., 177, 185 Grinspoon, L., 1 1 , 3 1 Groffmann, K . J., 170,185 Grossman, J. L., 197, 198,199,210 Gruen, G. E., 80 , 1 0 3 Gurin, G., 247,251 Gurin, P., 247, 251 Gutmann, D., 248,251 H

Haan, N., 229,238 Hagen, J. W., 191, 192,210 Halverson, C. I., 145, 161 Hamel, B. R., 85,94,103, I 0 4 Hamilton, L. W., 41, 65 Harbordt, S., 261,265 Harper, L. V., 144,161 Harris, A. E., 236,238 Harris, C., 118, 140 Harris, D. B . , 227, 238 Hartup, W. W., 150,151, I 6 1 Harvey, J. A., 6 0 , 6 3 Haugan, G. M., 123, 135,137, 143,162 Havighurst, R . J., 185, 228,238 Hay, C. M., 173, 181, I85 Heavenrich, J., 180, I85 Henry, C. E., 13,32 Hershey, G. L., 171,186

Hcrtzig, M. E., 7 , 3 1 Hcss, L., 36,60, 6 3 Hetherington, E. M., 175,185 Hieger, L., 128, I38 Himwich, H. E., 5 9 , 6 4 Hinde, R. A., 131,138 Hinton, G. G., 15, 16, 18,32 Hoerniann, H., 256,265 Hofstatter, P. R., 170,185 Hogan, J. A., 131,138 Hoijer, B., 8 4 , 1 0 5 Hooper, F., 75,103 Horka, S. T., 204,210 Horn, J . L., 177,10^5, 195, 196, 197, 199, 210 Hornblum, J . N., 217,223 Howard, C., 5 8 , 6 4 Hoyer, W. J., 218,223, 260, 261,265 Hoyt, D. P., 246,251 Hubley, P., 134, I 3 9 Huesmann, L. R., 175,182,186 Hulicka, I. M., 197,199,210, 220,223 Hultsch, D. F., 199,200,210, 211 Hunt, J . McV., 126,139 Hutt, C., 4, 1 0 , 3 2 Hutt, S. J., 4, 1 0 , 3 2

I Inhelder, B., 68, 70,72, 74, 77, 82, 86, 87, 9 1 , 9 5 , 9 6 , 9 9 , 101,104, 105, 190,204, 210,211, 213,224, 234,239 J Jacobs, P. I., 217,223 Jacobsen, L . , 145,162 Jahoda, M., 254,265 James, W., 4 9 , 6 3 Janowsky, D. S., 4 2 , 6 0 , 6 3 Jeffrey, W. E., 75,103, 210 Jenkins, G . M., 4 4 , 6 2 Jenkins, J. J., 205,210 Jerome, E. A., 195,210 Jih, F., 4 4 , 6 3 Johnson, R . C., 9 3 , 1 0 5 Johnson, W., 1 7 0 , 1 8 7 Johnson, W. T., 5 9 , 6 3 Jones, R., 3, 10,33 Jongeward, R. H., 191, 192, 193,210

Author Index

K Kagan, J., 119,138, 177,186, 259,265 Kail, R.V., 191,192, 193,210 Kales, A., 58, 64 Kaluger, G., 171,186 KdlUger, M. F., 171,186 Kanner, L., 55,58,63 Kaplan, B., 218,224 Karduck, W.A., 3, 13,34 Kaspar, J. C., 7, 13,33 Katona, P. G., 44, 6 3 Keller, H.R.,8 5 , 1 0 3 Keniston, K., 170,186 Kessen, W., 144,162 Kimmel, H.D., 113,138 Klaiber, E. L., 37, 39,43,62 Klebanoff, L. B., 145,162 Kling, J. K., 93,104 Klisz, D., 128,138 Knights, R.M., 15, 16, 18,32 Knobel, M., 3,5, 11, 12.32 Kobayashi, Y., 37, 39,43,62 Koch, J., 125,138 Koegel, R.,56,64 Kohlberg, L., 174, 178, 181,186, 216,223 Koivisto, E., 145,163 Kominski, C., 214,223 Konorski, J., 131,138 Korb, R.J., 18,27,33, 37,46,50,64 Korchin, S. H., 200,211 Korner, A. F., 144,162 Koslowski, B., 151, 152,161 Krager, J. M.,2,32 Krause, R.R.,59,64 Kuhlen, R. G., 170,187 Kupietz, S., 15,34 Kurtz, M. A., 15,31 Kuypers, J., 176,186 Kvale, S.,204,210 L Labouvie, E. W., 181, 182,186 Labouvie,G. V., 206,211, 218,223, 228, 238 Lacey, J. I., 6 3 L'Allier, 114 Lanaro, P., 90,97,106 Langer, J., 180,185, 227,232,239 Laroche, J. L., 114,138

27 1

Larsen, K . W., 24,32 Lasagna, L., 15, 18,31 Laufer, M. W., 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 11, 19,32, 37,63 Laurendeau, M., 214,224, 231,239 LeBlanc, J. M., 16,25,29 Lee, D., 10,32 Lee-Painter, S., 146, 150, 151,162 Lekowitz, M.M., 175,182, I86 Leiderman, P. H.,145,163 Leiman, B., 193,211 Lempers, J. A., 150,151,161 Lennon, M.L., 214,223 Lesser, L. I., 11, 13,15, 18,24,33 Levin, H.,144,163 Levine, F. J., 245,25I Levinson, B., 206,211 Levy, M. N.,44,50,63 Lewis, M., 119, 127,138, 145,146, 150, 151,162, 245,251 Liebert, R.M., 86,105 Lilienfeld, A. M., 11,32 Lillyquist, T. D., 200,209 Lind, J., 145,163 Lindsley, D.B., 13,32 Linn, 182 Lintz, L. M., 132, 133,137 Lipman, R. S., 15,33 Lippert, W. W., 39,64 Lipps, L., 79,104 Lister, C. M., I 0 4 Looft, W. R.,170,186, 214,223, 224, 257, 265 Lovaas, 0. I., 56, 64

Lowe,R.C.,72,106 Lucas, A , , 7 , 3 3 Lucas, A. R.,59,64 Lugo, J. O., 171,186 Lumsden, E. A., 93,104 Lundell, F. W., 14, 16, 19,29 Lykken, D.T., 39,64 Lyle, J., 174,188 Lynn, R.L., 188 Lytton, G. J., 11, 12,32

M Maas, H., 176,186 Mdallum, C., 57, 65 McCarthy, J. J., 127,137

212

Author Index

Maccoby, F. E., 144,163, 178,186 McDonald, F. J., 180, 184 McFarland, J . N., 1 0 , 3 2 McIntire, R. W., 123, 135,137, 143,162 McKenzie, B., 143, 162 Madsen, C. N.,J r . , 1 0 , 3 0 Main, M., 151, 152, I 6 1 Mallinger, B., 214,223 Manto, P. G., 4 1 , 6 4 Marks, L. A., 16,2Y Martin, D. M., 13, 32 Martin, J., 3, 4, 5 , 9, 10, 13,34 Massarik, F., 170, 185 Matsuno, D., 5 9 , 6 5 Meacliani, J . A., 192, 193, 202, 205,211 Mchler, J., 81,104 Menkes, J . H., 6, 1 1 , 3 2 Mcnkcs, M. M., 6, 1 1 , 3 2 Mco, G.: 1 5 , 3 1 Mcyer, 13. L., 255,265 Milgram, N. A , , 247,251 MiI1ar.W. S., 114, 115, 117, 120, 121, 122, 123, 127, 129,130,131,134,138 Miller, J. A., 245,251 Miller, S. A,, 79,104, 205,211, 229,239 Miller, W. H., 57,152 Millichap, J. G., 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 24, 25,32, 37,64 Milstein, V., 4 , 7, 34 Minde, K. K., 3, 11, 15, 17,32, 34, 37,65 Moerk, E., 236,239 Molitch, M.,2, 32 Mone), J., 174, 175,186 Mongc, T. H., 199,211 Montgomery, A. A , , 123, 1 3 7 Morf, A., 72,104 Morgenstern, G., 7 , 3 0 , 34 Moss, H. A., 144,145, 177,162, 259,265 Moynahan, E., 75, 104 Munday, L. A , , 246,251

N Ndiasimhdchar~,N., 59, 64 Nathanson, M., 180, 185 Nedk, J . M., 182,186 Necselroade, J. R., 170, 171, 173, 176, 179, 181,183, 186, 204,205,206, 20Y, 211

Ncugarten, B. L., 170, 173, 177, 186, 226, 239, 246,251, 257,265 Newnian, B. M., 171, 1 8 7 Newnian, P. R., 171, 187 Nichamin, S. J . , 1 1 , 3 2 Novack, 1-1. S., 8 , 9 , 3 1 Nunnally, J. C., 206,211

0 O’Brien, R. A., 5 8 , 5 9 , 6 2 O’Connell, E. J . , 144, 145,162 O’Gorman, G., 5 7 , 6 5 Oleron, P., 72, 104 Olson, J. P.,145, 1 6 3 Olsson, I., 84, 1 0 5 Olver, R. R., 8 0 , 9 5 , 9 8 , 1 0 3 Ornitz, E. M., 5 5 , 5 6 , 5 8 , 6 4 , 65 Osofsky, J. D., 144, 145, 162 Ounstead, C. A., 4 , 1 0 , 3 2 Ourth, L. L., 117,138, 143, 162 Overbeck, C., 84,104 Overton, W. F., 48,49,64, 98, 146, 147, 148,162, 178,187, 205,211. 217,223, 227,239, 254,265

P Paasonen, M. K., 5 8 , 6 4 Paine, R. S . , 5 , 6 , 7 , 3 2 Paivio, A., 199, 211 Palerrno, D. S., 93,104 Palmer, B., 122, 124,139 Papalia, D. E., 214,222, 224 Paris, S. G., 195, 199,212 Park, L. C., 1 5 , 3 3 Puke, R. D., 179,187 Parker, E. B., 174,188 Partcn, M. B., 176, 1 8 7 Pasanianick, B., I 1 , 3 2 Patterson, G. R., 3, 1 0 , 3 3 Peacock, L. J., 10,32 Pearson, M. E., 118,140 Peters, D. L., 84,104 Peters, J . E., 3,30, 3 7 , 6 3 Peterson, D. R., 9 , 3 3 Piaget, J., 68, 70,72, 73, 78,80, 81, 83, 91,

99,104, 114, 126,138, 190.211, 213, 224, 2 2 9 , 2 3 0 , 2 3 4 , 2 3 5 , 2 3 9 Pinard, A., 231,239 Pitts, r., 1 3 , 3 4 Pletscher, A., 5 8 , 6 4 Plotkin, S., 55, 58,64, 65 Podosin, R. D., 11, 13, 15, 18,3.? Polak, R. R., 114, 119, 138 Pollack, R. H., 172,188 Porges, S. W., 18, 27, 33, 37, 46, SO, 61, 64. 65. 1 2 7 , 1 3 7 Pratoomraj, S., 9 3 , 1 0 5 Prechtl, H. F. R., 145,162 Pressey, S. L., 1 7 0 , 1 8 7 Pryer, R. S., 1 0 , 3 1

Q Quay, H. C., 7, 10,32, 34, 3 8 , 6 0 , 6 4 Quetelet, A., 1 7 0 , 1 8 7

R Rabban, M., 181, 1 8 7 Rabbitt, P., 200,211 Raniey,C.T., 117, 121, 125, 120, 128, 132,138,139, 143,162 Rashkis, S., 58, 64 Raskin, D. C., 50,64 Rech, R. H., 4 1 , 6 5 Reese, H . W., 4 8 , 4 9 , 6 1 , 8 1 , 9 8 , 6 4 , 146, 147,148,154,160, 162, 170, 178,186, 187, 193,194, 1 9 5 , 1 9 9 , 2 0 0 , 2 0 2 , 2 0 3 , 205,206,210,211, 212,227,239, 254, 265 Rehm, R., 56, 6 4 Reinert, G., 181, 184, 206, 211 Reisman, J. M., 1 0 , 3 3 Rescorla, R. A., 119,138 Rheingold, H. L., 112, 115, 116, 1 1 7 , 118, 120,121,122,124, 125,139, 143,162 Richards, M. P. M., 146,162 Rlckels, K., 1 5 , 3 3 Riegel, K., 255,265 Riegel,K. F., 171, 173, 178,187, 214, 215, 224, 228,230,231,234,235,231,239, 255,265 Riegel, R. M., 214,224

Riksen, R. 0. M., 85, I 0 3 Riley, M. W., 170,187 Rimland, 8 . , 5 5 , 5 6 , 5 8 , 5 9 , 6 2 , 64 Risky, T. R., 260,265 Ritvo, E. R., 55, 5 6 , 5 8 , 5 9 , 6 4 , 65 Robins, L. M . , 254, 265 Robinson, E., 1 5 , 3 1 Robson, K. S., 145,162 Rodin, E., 7 , 3 3 Rodriguez, A., 15, 1 8 , 3 / Rogers, M., 1 1 , 3 2 Rosc, J. S., 6, 1 I , 3 2 Rosenberg, D., 123, 124, 139 Rosenfeld, H. M., 1 0 8 , 1 3 9 Rosenthal, M. K., 133,139 Rosenthal, R., 1 4 5 , 1 6 2 Roscnthal, T. L.,88, 89, 97, 105, 106, 217, 224 Ross,Il. W., 112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 124,139, 143,162 Rothschild, G . H . , 15, 1 6 , 3 1 Routh,D.K., 116, 118, 119, 136.13Y, 143, 154,162 Rovee, C. K., 121, 125,139 Rovee, D. T., 121, 125,139 Rowe, 6. J., 1 9 7 , 2 1 2 Rubin, K. II., 214, 224 Rubin, L. S., 56, 57, 65 Russell, J., 93, 105 Rust, L. D., 197, 210 Rutter, M., 13, 30, 56, 65

S Sachdev, K., 4,7 , 3 4 Saeger, K., 5 5 , 5 8 , 6 5 Safer, D. J., 2 , 3 2 Sainz, A . , 3 , 4 , 3 3 Salatas, H., 192,212 Salzen, E. A . , 118,139 Sameroff, A . J., 131, 133, 139 Sanders, S., 214,224 Satterticld, 8.T., 12, 13, 18, 26, 2 7 , 3 3 Sattertield, J. H., 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 24, 26, 27,33 Satterfield, J . R., 3 7 , 6 5 Saul, R. E., 1 8 , 2 4 , 3 3 Schack, M . L., 8 1 , 1 0 5

274

Author Index

Schaffer, H. R., 121,130,138, 179,187 Schaie, K. W.,170, 171, 173, 176, 178, 180,181,182,184, 187, 204,212, 214, 224, 225,228,238, 239, 254,257,260, 264, 265 Schain, R. J., 5 8 , 6 5 Sharp, D. W., 216,223 Shatz, M., 236,239 Schicor, A., 5 8 , 6 4 Schlosberg, A. J., 6 0 , 6 3 Schneewind, K. A,, 259,265 Schneiderman, G., 5 9 , 6 5 Schnore, M. M., 197,212 Schramm, W., 174,188 Schreibman, L., 5 6 , 6 4 Schubert, E., 4 4 , 6 3 Schulman, J. L., 7, 10, 1 3 , 3 3 Schwartz, A., 123, 124,139 Schwartz, L. S., 15,31 Schwartz, M., 84, 104 Scott, K. G., 1 6 , 3 3 Scott, P. M., 144, 145,163 Scribner, S., 194,212 Sears, R. R., 143, 1 4 4 , 1 6 3 Sekerke, H. J., 4 2 , 6 0 , 6 3 Seligman, M. E. P., 131, 132,139 Senter, M. G., 122,140 Senter, R. J., 39,64 Sevinc, M., 92, 105 Shannon, W. R., 1 3 , 3 3 Shantz,C. U., 76, 91, 93,103, 105 Sharpe, L., 12,30 Shaywitz, B. A., 5 9 , 6 3 Sheeran, L., 134,139 Shelton, J., 205,211 Sheppard, W . C . , 117, 119, 128, 136,139 Sherman, J. A., 174,188 Shettleworth, S. J., 131, 132,139 Sidman, M., 24, 2 8 , 3 3 Siegel, G. M., 145,163 Siegler, R. S., 8 6 , 8 7 , 1 0 5 Sigel, I. E., 76,91, 93,103, 105, 221,224 Silbergeld, E. K., 4 , 3 3 Simeonsson, R., 118,140 Simon, H. A., 193,212 Simson, C., 7 , 3 3 Sinclair, H., 72, 74, 7 7 , 8 2 , 8 6 , 8 7 , 9 1 , 9 5 , 96,101,104, see also Sinclairde Zwart, H.

Sinclair-de Zwart, H., 83, 91, 92,105, see also Sinclair, H. Singer, S. B., 1 1 , 3 1 Siqueland, E. R., 131,139 Sjoberg, L., 84, 105 Sjostrom, K. P., 172,188 Sleator, E. K., 25,33, 4 6 , 6 5 Sly, W. S., 3, 13,34 Small, J. G., 5 7 , 6 5 Smedslund, J., 7 2 , 7 3 , 7 9 , 1 0 5 Smith, I., 84,106 Smith, K. U., 128,139 Smith, M. B., 229,238 Smith, N. J., 128,139 Smith, S., 181,188 Snow, C. E., 145,163, 236,239 Soforenko, A. Z., 127, I 3 7 Sokolov, E. N., 50,65 Solomon, R. L., 4 0 , 6 5 Solomons, G., 3 , 7 , 11,13,19,32,33, 37, 63 Soltys, J. J., 1 5 , 3 1 Sorenson, E. R., 205,212 Spitz, R. A., 114,138 Sprague, R. L. 3 , 9 , 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 27,33, 34, 37,46, SO, 64, 65 Stanley, J. C., 260,265 Steiner, G., 95,106 Steinhardt, M. H., 122,140 Stern, D. N., 146,163 Sterns, H., 199,210 Stevens, J. R., 4, 7 , 3 4 Stewart, M. A. 3,4, 13,34, 3 7 , 6 5 Studer, R. G., 255,265 Sturgis, L. H., 24,32 Sullivan, E. V., 88,106 Swonger, A. K., 4 1 , 6 5 Sykes, D. H., 3, 15, 1 7 , 3 4 Szeminska, 234,239

T Tam, M. K., 4 4 , 6 3 Tapp, J. L., 245,251 Tautermannova, M.,110,139 Taylor, E., 15, 31 Tcheng, F., 114,138 Teitelbaum, P., 126,139 Thomae, H., 170,288

Author Index

Thoman, E. B., 145,163 Thomas, A., 1 3 , 3 0 Thomas, D. R., 10, 12,29, 3 0 Thong, T., 72,104 Throne, J. M., 7, 1 3 , 3 3 Tierney, M., 214,224 Tobias, J., 1 5 , 3 4 Todd, G . , 122,124,139 Tomlinson-Keasey, C., 129,139, 214, 217, 224 Toppe, L. K., 1 0 , 3 3 Treat, N. J., 199,212 Trevarthen, C., 134,139 Tulving, E., 190,212 Tumolo, P., 214,224 Turner, C., 9 2 , 1 0 5 Turner,T., 232,234, 235, 236, 237,239 U Uhlenhuth, E. H., 1 5 , 3 3 Upton, L. R., 195,211 Uzqiris, I. C., 126,139 V Van den Daele, L. D., 230,239 Van Der Veer, M. A. A., 94,104 Vandeventer, M., 217,223 Van Riper, C., 1 7 , 3 1 Vine, I., 110, 135,139 Vogel, W., 37, 3 9 , 4 3 , 6 2 Vuorenkoski, V., 145,163 W

Waghorn, L., 88,106 Wahler,R.G., 109,112, 118,139 Walder, L. O., 175,182,186 Waldrop, M. F., 145,161 Walter, G. F., 1 8 , 2 7 , 3 3 , 37,46,50,64, 6s Walter, G . W., 57, 65 Wambold, C., 191,203,209 Wapner, S., 214,223 Warren, R. J., 3, 1 3 , 3 4 Wasz-HGckert, O., 145,163 Watson, J. A., 1 0 , 3 2 Watson, J. S., 117,121, 125, 126, 127, 128, 132,138,139

275

Waxler, C. Z., 144, 1 4 5 , 1 6 3 Webb, G . , 11,32 Webster, R. L., 121, 122, I 4 0 Weiner, S. L., 93,106 Weisberg,P., 115, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 127, 133,140, 143,163 Weiss, G . , 3 , 4 , 5 , 7 , 9 , 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,31, 34, 3 7 , 6 5 Weiss, R. L., 197,210 Wenar, C., 144,163 Wenar, S. C., 144, I 6 3 Wender, P. H., 3, 7 , 8 , 9 , 3 4 Wenger, M. A., 36,60,6S Werner, H., 214, 218,223, 224 Werry, J. S., 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 9 , 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20,32, 33, 34, 37, 6S Werts, C. E., 182, 188 Westerhof, R., 94, 104 Wheeler, C. A., 38,6S Wheeler, S., 226,238 White, M. S., 177,188 Whittier, J., 3, 10, 33 Wiegerink, R., 118, I 4 0 Wilder, J., 36, 6 0 , 6 5 Wilkie, F. L., 199,210 Williams, J. M., 4 1 , 6 5 Willis, S. L., 171, 173, 176, 177,184, 228, 238 Wilson, V. C., 182,185 Winer, B. J., 26,34 Winsberg, B. G., 1 5 , 3 4 Winter, A. L., 57, 65 Witkin, H. A., 247,251 Wohlwill, J. F., 72, 13, 106, 178, 182,188, 205,212, 231,234,238, 258,262,265 Wolf, M. M., 260,265 Wolfs, P., 145,163 Woodruff, D. S., 257,264 Wortman, P. M., 260,265 Wright, M. A., 3, 1 0 , 3 3 Y

Yarrow, L. J., 145,163 Yarrow, M. R., 144, 145,163 Yendovitskaya,T. V., 190, 193, 195,212 Youdim,M.,59,62 Youniss, J., 229,234, 237,239

216

Author Index

Yunger, L. M., 6 0 , 6 3 Yuwiler, A., 5 5 , 5 8 , 5 9 , 6 4 , 65 Z

Zelazo, P. R., 111, 112, 113,140 Zentall, S., 5 , 1 2 , 3 4

Zieske, H., 44, 50,63 Zigler, E., 174, 181,186, 260,265 Zirniles, H., 73,106 Zirnmernian,B. J., 8 8 , 8 9 , 9 0 , 9 7 , 1 0 5 , 106, 211,224 Ziobrowski, M. J., 219,223 Zwerg, C., 128,139

SUBJECT INDEX A

Academic performance, of hyperactive child, 5 drugs and, 19-20 Acquisition, constraints on, 131-133 Age, developmental change and, 176-177 Associative memory, in adulthood and old age, 197-200 Attention, 47-50 two-component model of, 50 autonomic and neurotransmitter activity and, 5 1-55 Autism, 55-60 Autonomic activity attention and, 47-55 central and peripheral, 4 0 4 3 statistical model of balance in physiological assumptions of, 4 3 4 4 statistical techniques, 44-45 test with hyperactive children, 4 5 4 7

B Behavioral factors in hyperactivity diagnosis of, 9-10 drug effects on, 17-1 8 C Caregiver, child influence on, 144-146 Cognition adult, 213-215, 225-226 in children, 220-222 developmental theory and, 215-220 multilinear development and, 229-232 social versus impersonal, 233-237 Conditioning, social, see Social responses Conservation, 69-71 linguistic structuralism and, 99-100 Piagetian training, 7 1-75 representative functionalism and, 98-99

social learning theory and, 97-98 training model for, 75-82 verbal-rule instruction and, 83-90. 100102 Contextual factors, in social conditioning, 122-1 2 s Continuity, developmental, 177-1 79 Culture, theory of self and, 244-245

D Development, mechanistic and organismic models of, 146-147 mother-infant interaction and, 147-149 Developmental psychology, see Life-span developmental psychology Drug(s), hyperactivity and academic performance and, 19-20 behavioral measures, 17-1 8 laboratory task performance, 16-17 physiological measures, 18-19 psychological measures, IS-16 research designs for, 20-28 symptom ratings, 14-15

E Education, life-span developmental psychology and, 254-264 Expectancies, interactional, 134-1 35

F Feedback, social, reinforcement of social responses by, 109-1 1 I Functionalism, representative, 98-99

H Hyperactivity, 2-3, 37-38 autonomic balance and, 4 5 4 7 217

278

Subject Index

characteristics of, 3-5 diagnosis of, 5-1 1 etiology of nonorganic factors in, 13-14 organic factors, in, 11-1 3 pharmacotherapeutic effects in academic performance, 19-20 behavioral measures, 17-18 laboratory task performance, 16-17 physiological measures, 18-1 9 psychological measures, 15-16 research, 20-28 symptom ratings, 14-15

I Interactional expectancies, social responses and, 134-135 lntervcntion programs, design of, 257-261

K Knowledge, lexical, 91-95

L

ontogenetic and historical-evolutionary sources of change, 173-176 , 1 theory of ~ c l f 241-25 Linguistic structuralism, 99-100 Linguistic training lexical factors in, 91-95 verbal rule instruction in, 83-90

M Memory adult developnient of, 195-200 childhood compared with, 200-201 childhood dialectical model, 202-204 interrelatcdncss of attributes in, 205-207 life-span perspective, 204-205 old age compared with, 200-201 Mother-infant intcraction direction of influence in, 142-146 developmental and organismic models and, 147-149 experimental analysis of, 153-159 in natural settings, 149-152 simultaneous behaviors and, 152-153 N

Language, as representation, 68-69 Lexical training, 91-95 Life-span developmental psychology, 169-171 cognition, 21 3-222,225-226 in adulthood, 226-229 multilinear development, 229-232 social versus impersonal, 233-237 education and, 254-264 memory, 190,207-208 in adulthood and old age, 195-200 in childhood, 190-195 childhood and old age compared, 200-201 methodology, 179-180 change versus differences, 180-1 8 1 time-lag and distal-cause effects, 181-183 theory, 171-173 age irrelevance of change, 176-177 continuity versus discontinuity, 177-179

Neurological factors, in diagnosis of hyperactivity, 6-8 Nonsocial responses, social reinforcement of, 129-1 3 1 Personal control, in theories of oneself, 247-248 Physiological factors in hyperactivity diagnosis of, 6-8 drug effects on, 18-19 Piagetian training, 7 1-75 Psychological factors in hyperactivity diagnosis of, 8-9 drug effects on, 15-16 Psychopathy, 38-40

R Reciprocal performance factor, social responses and, 135 Reinforcement nonsocial. 127-1 29

Subject Index

social, 109-1 1 1 of nonsocial responses, 129-1 3 1 Reinforcer salience of, 133-134 social, 122-1 25 Representation, language as, 68-69 Representative functionalism, linguistic construction and, 98-99 Response mode, changes in, 21 8-220 Retrieval, deficits in adulthood and old age, 200 S Self, development of theory of, 241-242 in childhood, 245-247 culture and socialization in, 244-245 life-span changes in, 247-250 sense of self in, 242-244 research in, 250-251 Simultaneous behaviors, learning analysis of, 152-15 3 Smiling conditioned, elicited, and habituated, 111-113 elicitation of, 114 Social behavior, of hyperactive children, 4-5 Social cognition in adulthood, 226-229 impersonal cognition versus, 233-237 multilinear development and, 229-232 Socialization direction of influence in, 142-146

279

mechanistic and organismic models and, 147-149 educational goals and, 255-257 theory of self and, 244-245 Social learning theory, linguistic construction and, 97-98 Social responses constraints on acquisition of, 131-133 interactional expectancies and, 134-1 35 nonsocial reinforcement of, 127-129 reciprocal performance factor in, 135 reinforcer salience and, 133-134 smiling conditioned, elicited, and habituated, 11 1-11 3 elicitation of, 114 social reinforcer and contextual factors in conditioning, 122-125 vocalization conditioned versus elicited, 116-1 1 8 elicitation of, 118-1 22 social conditioning of, 115-1 16 Structural complexity , 2 36-2 3 7 Structuralism, linguistic, 99-1 00 Subject-object interactions, role of object in structuring, 235-236 V Verbal rule instruction, 83-90, 100-102 Vocalization conditioned versus elicited, 116-1 18 elicitation of, 118-122 social conditioning of, 115-1 16

Contents of Previous Volumes Volume 1 Responses of Infants and Children to Coniplex and Novel Stimulation Gordon N. Cantor Word Associations and Children’s Verbal Behavior David S.Palermo Change in the Stature and Body Weight of North American Boys during the Last 80 Years Howard I< A4eredith Discrimination Learning Set in Children Hayne W. Reese Learning in the First Year of Life Lewis P. Lipsitt Some Methodological Contributions from a Functional Analysis of Child Development Sidney W. Bijou and Donald M. Baer The Hypothesis of Stimulus Interaction and an Explanation of Stimulus Compounding Charles C. Spiker The Development of “Overconstancy” in Space Perception Joachini F. Wohlwill Miniature Experiments in the Discrimination Learning of Retardates B e t t y J. House and David %earnan AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

Volume 2 The Paired-Associates Method in the Study of Conflict Alfred Castaneda Transfer of Stimulus Pretraining in Motor Paired-Associate and Discrimination Learning Tasks Joan If. Cantor The Role of tlie Distance Receptors in the Development of Social Responsiveness Richard H. Walters and Ross D. Parke Social Reinforcement of Children’s Behavior Harold W. Stevenson Delayed Reinforcerricnt Effects Glenn Terrell 280

A Developmental Approach to Learning and Cognition Eugene S. Collin Evidence for a Hierarcliial Arrangement of Learning Processes Sheldon H. Wliitc, Selected Anatomic Variables Analyzed for InteraFe Relationships of tlie Size-Six, SizeGain, and Gain-Gain Varieties Howard V. Meredith AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

Volume 3 Infant Sucking Behavior and Its Modification Herbert Kaye ‘The Study of Brain tlectrical Activity in Infants Robert I. Elliizgson Selective Auditory Attention in Children Eleanor E. hfaccohy Stimulus Definition and Choice Michael D. Zeiler Experimental Analysis of Inferential Behavior in Children Tracy S. Kendler and Howard H. Kendler Perceptual Integration in Children Herbert L. Pick, Jr., Anne D. Pick, and Robert I?. Kleirz Component Process Latencies in Reaction Times o f Children and Adults Raj~moridH. Hohle AIJTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX Volume 4 Development Studics of Figurativc Perception David Elkind The Relations of Short-Term Memory to Development and lntclligenee John M. Belmont and Earl C. Butterfield Learning, Developmental Research, and Individual Ilifferences Frances D q e n Horowitz

Contents of Preiwus Volumes

Psychophysiological Studies in Newborn Infants S.J. Hurt, H.G. Lenard, and H.F.R. I’rechtl Development of the Sensory Analyzers during Infancy Yvonne Brackbill and Ifiram E. FitzKerald The Problem Of Imitation Justin Aron freed AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

Volume 5 The Development of Human Fetal Activity and Its Relation to Postnatal Behavior Tryphena Humphrey Arousal Systems and Infant lleart Rate Responses Frances K. Graham and Jail C. Jackson Specific and Diversive Exploration Coriiitie I h t t Developmental Studies of Mediated Mcmory John H. Flavell Development and Choice Behavior i n I’robabilistic and Problem-Solving Tasks L.R. Goulet and Kathryn S.Goodwin AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDI’X

Volume 6 Incentives and Learning in Children Sam I,. Witryol Habituation in the Human Infant Wendell E. Jeffre), arid Leslie B. Cohcn Application of Hull-Spence Theory l o thc Discrimination Learning of Children Cliarles C. Spiker Growth in Body Size: A Compcndiurn 01’ Findings on Contemporary Children Living in Different Parts o f the World Howard V. Meredith Imitation and Language Developmcnt James A. Sherman Conditional Responding as a Puradigirl lor Observational, Imitative Learning and Vicarious-Reinforcement Jacob I,. Gewirtz AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

28 1

Volume 7 Superstitious Behavior in Children: An Experimental Analysis Michael D. Zeiler Learning Strategies in Children from Different Socioeconomic Levels Jean L. Bresnahan and Martin M. Shapiro Time and Change in the Development of the Individual and Society Klaus F. Riegel The Nature and Development of Early Number Concepts Rochel Geltnati Learning and Adaptation in Infancy: A Comparison of Models Arnold J. Samerqff AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDFX Volume 8 Ilaboration and Learning in Childhood and Adolescence William D. Rohwer, Jr. Exploratory Behavior and Human Devclopnient Jum C, Nunnallv arid L. Charles Leinorid Operant Conditioning of Infant Behavior: A Rcview Robert C. Hulsebus Birth Order and Parental Experience in Monkeys and Man G. Mitchrll and I.. Scliroers Fear of the Stranger: A Critical Examination Harriet I.. Rheingold and Carol 0. Eckermati Applications of Hull-Spence Theory to the Transfer of Discrimination Learning in Children Charles C. Spiker and Joan If. Cantor AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX Volume 9 Children’s Discrimination Learning Based on ldcntity or Difference Betty J. House, Ann I,. Browti. and Marcia s. Scott

282

Contents of Previous Volumes

Boyd R. McCandless and Mary Fulcher Geis The Development of Spatial Representations of Large-Scale Environments Alexander W. Siege1 and Sheldon H. White Cognitive Perspectives on the Development of Memory John W. Hagen, Robert H. Jongeward, Jr., and Robert V. Kail, Jr. The Development of Memory: Knowing, Knowing About Knowing, and Knowing How to Know A n n L. Brown Developmental Trends in Visual Scanning AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX Mary Carol Day The Development of Selective Attention: From Perceptual Exploration t o Logical Volume 10 Search John C Wright and Alice G. Vlietstra Current Trends in Developmental PsycholAUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX ogy

Two Aspects of Experience in Ontogeny: Development and Learning Hans G. Furth The Effects of Contextual Changes and Degree of Component Mastery on Transfer of Training Joseph C. Campione and Ann I,. Brown Psychophysiological Functioning, Arousal, Attention, and Learning During the First Year of Life Richard Hirschman and Edward S. Katkin Self-Reinforcement Processes in Children John C. Masters and Janice R. Mokros

A E C D

6 l 8 9

E O F

1

G

2

H

3

1 4 J 5