Advances in Child Development and Behavior Volume 23

ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR

Volume 23

Contributors to This Volume Harry Beilin

Willis F. Overton

Robert Kail

Juan Pascual-Leone

Carol Lynn Martin

Elise G. Pearlman

Sergio Morra

Hayne W. Reese

Frank B. Murray

Ellin Kofsky Scholnick

ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR

edited by

Hayne W. Reese Department of Psychology West Virginia University Morgantown, West Virginia

Volume 23

ACADEMIC PRESS, INC. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers

San Diego New York Boston Tokyo Toronto London Sydney

This book is printed on acid-free paper. @

Copyright 0 1991 BY ACADEMIC PRESS, INC. All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher

Academic Press, Inc. San Diego, California 92101 United Kingdom Edition published by ACADEMIC PRESS LIMITED 24-28 Oval Road, London NW I 7DX

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number:

ISBN 0-12-009723-0 (alk. paper)

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 91

92 93 94

9

R

7

6

5

4

3 2

I

63-23237

Contents

Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

Preface ...........................

xi

The Structure of Developmental Theory 1. 11. 111.

IV. V. VI. VII.

WILLIS F. OVERTON lntrc~duction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Science and Values.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............................. Philosophy and Sci ................................... Aims of Science . . ........................................ The Origin of Scien .............................. From Common Sense t o Scienti .............................. Developmental Theories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R e f ~ r ~ n c e. .s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........

I 2 6 6 7

8 22 34

Questions a Satisfying Developmental Theory Would Answer: The Scope of a Complete Explanation of Development Phenomena FRANK B. MURRAY Intrc~duction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. A Good Developmental Theory.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Refrrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I.

39 40 47 47

The Development of World Views: Toward Future Synthesis? ELLlN KOFSKY SCHOLNICK Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. Developmental Changes in Overton's Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.

V

49 51

57

vi

Contents

Metaphor, Recursive Systems, and Paradox in Science and Developmental Theory WILLIS F. OVERTON Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. Murray’s and Scholnick’s Commentaries , , . , . , , . . . , , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 111. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I.

59 60 69 71

Children’s Iconic Realism: Object versus Property Realism 1. 11. 111. IV. V. VI. VII.

HARRY BEILIN AND ELISE G. PEARLMAN Introduction: Piaget’s Childhood Realism and Its Critics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Photographic Knowledge . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . Pictorial Perception: Empirical Evidence , , , . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Dual Nature of Pictures . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . , , A Study of Iconic Realism.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _..._..... ,............. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . I

References . . . . . . . .

................... .......................................

73 77

79 88 89 93 104 108

The Role of Cognition in Understanding Gender Effects 1. 11. 111. IV. V.

CAROL LYNN MARTIN Introduction, _ _ _ _. . . ............................... Overview of Schematic ...................... Development of Gender Schemas.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Early Origins of Stereo .................. Summary and Conclusions.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................................... References . . . . . . . . . .

113

114 127

135 142

144

Development of Processing Speed in Childhood and Adolescence I. 11. 111. 1V.

ROBERT KAIL Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Research on Developmental Change in Processing Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nature of the Mechanisms Underlying Developmental Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Implications of Global Developmental Change in Processing Speed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . References .............................................................

151

156 111 180 183

Contextualism and Developmental Psychology HAYNE W. REESE I. Introduction. . . . . . . ........................ .......... 11. The Contextualistic ........................ 111. Basic Characteristic ..................... .,......... IV. Dispersiveness of Contextualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. The Concept of Contradiction in Contextualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................... VI. Truth in Contextualism, , , . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. VII. Causality in Contextualism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

188

188 191 197 203 21 1 214

Contents

Adequacy of C’ontcxtu.dism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX . I n Lieu of Summary: An Application of Contextualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Refcrenccs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VIII .

vii 21 CI 224 225

Horizontality of Water Level: A Neo-Piagetian Developmental Review JUAN PASCUAL-LEONE AND SERGIO MORRA 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

II . Some Post-Piagetian Theories about the Water Level Invariant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ill . Post-Piagctian Data . . . . . . . . .......................................... IV . Gender Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V . Evidence f o r Physical and Geometric Knowledgc as a Factor in Horizontality

...................................................

232 233 234 239

VI . .... Bias o r Stimulus-Response Compatibility . . . . . VII . ors in the Water Level Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII . o f t h e Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX . Other Empirical Studiea Supporting the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X . In Lieu of Conclusions: Comparison with Other Current Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reference .; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

247 248 253 262 265 268 270

Author Index

277

Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

285

Contcnts of Previous Volumes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

293

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

Contributors Numbers in parentheses indicate the pages on which the authors’ contributions begin.

HARRY BEILIN Developmental Psychology Program, Graduate School of the City University of New York, New York, New York 10036 (73) ROBERT KAIL Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue Universiy, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907 (151) CAROL LYNN MARTIN Department of Family Resources and Human Development, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287 ( I 13) SERGIO MORRA Dipartimento di Psicologia Generale, Universitu di Padova, 35139 Padova, Italy (231) FRANK B. MURRAY College of Education, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716 (39) WILLIS F. OVERTON Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122 (1, 59)

JUAN PASCUAL-LEONE Department of Psychology, York University, North York, Ontario M3J IP3, Canada (231) ELISE G. PEARLMAN Developmental Psychology Program, Graduate School of the City University of New York, New York, New York 10036 (73) H A Y N E W . REESE Department of Psycholoo, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia 26506 (187) ELLIN KOFSKY SCHOLNICK Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742 (49)

ix

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

Preface The amount of research and theoretical discussion in the field of child development and behavior is so vast that researchers, instructors, and students are confronted with a formidable task in keeping abreast of new developments within their areas of specialization through the use of primary sources, as well as being knowledgeable in areas peripheral to their primary focus of interest. Moreover, journal space is often simply too limited to permit publication of more speculative kinds of analyses that might spark expanded interest in a problem area or stimulate new modes of attack on a problem. The serial publication Advances in Child Development and Behavior is intended to ease this burden by providing scholarly technical articles serving as reference material and by providing a place for publication of scholarly speculation. In these documented critical reviews, recent advances in the field are summarized and integrated, complexities are exposed, and fresh viewpoints offered. They should be useful not only to the expert in the area but also to the general reader. No attempt is made to organize each volume around a particular theme or topic, nor is the series intended to reflect the development of new fads. Manuscripts are solicited from investigators conducting programmatic work on problems of current and significant interest. The editor often encourages the preparation of critical syntheses dealing intensively with topics of relatively narrow scope but of considerable potential interest to the scientific community. Contributors are encouraged to criticize, integrate, and stimulate, but always within a framework of high scholarship. Although publication in the volumes is ordinarily by invitation, unsolicited manuscripts will be accepted for review if submitted first in outline form to the editor. All papers-whether invited or submitted-receive careful editorial scrutiny. Invited papers are automatically accepted for publication in principle, but may require revision before final acceptance. Submitted papers receive the same treatment except that they are not automatically accepted for publication in principle and may be rejected. The Advances series is usually not a suitable place of publication for reports of a single study, or a short series of studies, even if the report is necessarily long because of the nature of the research. The use of sexist language, such as “he” or “she” as the general singular pronoun, is not acceptable in contributions. The use of “he or she” (or the like) is acceptable. I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the aid of my home institution, West XI

xii

Preface

Virginia University, which generously provided time and facilities for the preparation of this volume. I also thank Drs. RenCe Baillargeon, Michael J. Chandler, Michael W. Chapman, Judy S. DeLoach, Robert P. Hawkins, and Lynn S. Liben for their editorial assistance, and Mrs. Ann Davis for her excellent secretarial services. Hayne W. Reese

THE STRUCTURE OF DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY

Willis F. Overton DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY TEMPLE LINIVERSITY PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19172

1. INTRODUCTION 11. SCIENCE AND VALLJES 111. PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

IV. AIMS OF SCIENCE V. THE ORIGIN OF SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITY

VI. FROM COMMON SENSE TO SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE A. ROUTE OF REALISM B. ROUTE OF RATIONALISM VII. DEVELOPMENTAL THEORIES A. MATERIAL EXPLANATION AND REALISM B. PATTERN EXPLANATION AND RATIONALISM C. HERMENEUTIC. NARRATIVE, AND SC’IENTIFIC EMPIRICAL KNOWING REFERENCES

I. Introduction An important question facing anyone interested in development is: What would a good theory of development look like? We know that a theory is an interrelated set of propositions that are designed to explain some domain, but how would we know that we had a good theory if we were faced with one? The general aim of this paper is to explore some answers to this question. As a preliminary to examining issues concerning the nature of a good theory, it is important to recognize that theory concerns knowledge and there are several 1 ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR. VOL. 23

Copyright 0 1991 hy Academic Press. Inc. All rights of reprcductm in any form reserved

2

Willis F. Overton

valid forms of knowledge, including historical, theological, political, rhetorical, hermeneutic, narrative, and empirical scientific knowledge. In fact, there are as many forms of potentially valid knowledge as there are agreed-on criteria for the establishment of that knowledge. As a consequence, the knowledge context within which a “good” developmental theory will be understood must be established immediately so as to avoid later confusion. That is, one might offer a “good” theological theory of development, or a “good” historical theory of development, but for each of these the criteria for “good” knowledge would be different. For purposes of this essay then, a good theory of development will be understood in the context of empirical scientific knowledge. However, as will be discussed later, a fully adequate understanding of a good empirical scientific theory of development requires an analysis of the relation of this form to other forms of knowledge. The question to be addressed, then, is what would a good empirical scientific theory of development look like and how would we know that it is good? At a time not too terribly distant (i.e., the 1950s) this question would have been easily answered. A good developmental theory, like any good scientific theory, was one that corresponded with the observed facts; one that contained no excess meaning beyond the facts; one that was induced from the facts; one that was tested and confirmed or falsified by the observed facts; and one that allowed the prediction of new observed facts. The requirement of “no excess meaning” had a twofold function. It not only kept theory close to the observed facts but it also ensured that general philosophic ideas would not intrude on the purity of empirical science. Over the past 30 plus years, however, there have been radical changes in the way that science and scientific theory have come to be understood. These changes, which emerged out of an absolutism of “hard facts,” have seemed at times headed for a relativism and solipsism unchecked by any bounds (see Overton, 1991a). It is not surprising, therefore, that many who wish to be considered empirical scientists have clung to the old absolutism in sometimes implicit and unreflective fashions while others have rejected empirical science altogether and have moved to other modes of knowing such as narrative knowing (e.g., Ricoeur, 1984; Sarbin, 1986), hermeneutic knowing (e.g., Habermas, 1971, 1979), or rhetorical knowing (e.g., Harre, 1986).

11. Science and Values In addressing the question of the form or structure of a good empirical scientific theory of development, I observe that both the old absolutism of facts and the new relativism of unchecked interpretation are yielding, at least in some areas of science, to more reasoned and rational approaches. However, and this is a key point, these approaches recognize that the establishment of scientific norms or rules necessarily entails philosophic values, and these values have a profound

Siriicture of Developmental Theory

3

impact on the aims, methodology, theories, and observational techniques of science. A major problem with claiming that philosophic assumptions are intricately intertwined in our scientific activity is that psychologists, and particularly American academic psychologists, have operated-and generally continue to operateon the principle that philosophy is, at best, irrelevant to their discipline. This attitude establishes a paradox because this antiphilosophy “faith” itself arises out of the philosophy of absolutism. Given this prevailing sentiment, a number of other paradoxes emerge in the field. One is that while there has been a recent proliferation of “theories” or “models” in developmental psychology, and particularly in cognitive developmental psychology, there is an absence of clear-cut explicit standards by which to evaluate them. “Explicit” is used here with reason, because the other pole of this paradox is that most psychologists implicitly employ some standards of evaluation. However, without reflective criticism, such standards become folkways and vary in the most subjective of fashions. Thus, while adhering to a philosophic value of absolutism, these psychologists tend to act in a most relativistic fashion. A further paradox is that although virtually all developmental psychologists assert that their discipline is an “empirical science,” few articulate any very clear statements about exactly what this means today. The result is a consistently shared value and a relativism of the meaning of that value. Despite the problems involved in communicating such a message, I will attempt to articulate the thesis that any rational empirical scientific theory of development entails as much choice of philosophic values as it does empirical support of observation. To be explicit, this claim is that an understanding of the normative features of science, as they include both metaphysical and epistemological commitments, is a necessary prerequisite for the construction of any developmental theory. Further, these normative features are central to an understanding of the relation between developmental theory and observational/experimental techniques or methods. I would further suggest that many of the conceptual issues that are prevalent in developmental psychology would be resolved or at least ameliorated if the general claim regarding the normative features of science were taken seriously. Within the context of this general claim, 1 will discuss several value issues as they apply to the construction and assessment of theory. However, before systematically examining these issues, I offer a concrete example of just how philosophic values influence theory assessment (i.e., our judgment of what a good theory looks like) to serve as a preview to the general discussion. Following this example, a more detailed schema will be elaborated in an effort to describe the role of philosophic values in contemporary empirical scientific theory. An example of the relation of value and theory assessment derives from a criticism that is frequently heard today concerning Piaget ’s developmental theory.

4

Willis F. Overton

In essence, this criticism asserts that the theory is critically flawed because it proposes universal explanations in the face of the empirical observation that individual performance is highly variable across tasks, situations, and occasions. Siegler articulates this form of criticism in his assertion that “cognitive and developmental psychologists often have phrased their models in terms that suggested that all people, or at least all people of a given age, performed a given task in a given way. These models defy the every day observation that people often perform a given task in different ways on different occasions” (Siegler & Shipley, 1987, p. 73). This criticism involves a conflict between the universals contained in Piaget’s theory, as well as in a number of other developmental theories, and the particulars emphasized by critics. Although the criticism appears to be a simple statement of objective fact, at a deeper level it reflects a basic difference between philosophic values associated with conflicting approaches to theory construction. In other words, the stated conflict between universals offered as explanations in Piaget’s theory and particulars found in observation is a conceptual conflict, not a perceptual one. To put the matter quite directly, the conflict here is a surrogate for the ancient philosophic conflict over universalism versus nominalism. This is the question of whether abstract universals are to be taken as “the real” and particulars taken as “appearance,” or vice versa. If it is accepted that contemporary science begins from an initial value assumption of maintaining that abstract universals are the real (i.e., that which is not dependent on something else), then universals are to be offered as theoretical explanations of the particulars. In this case, Piaget, Werner, and others (e.g., proponents of contemporary psychoanalytic theory in both its object relations and ego psychology versions) who frame explanations as universals offer a viable scientific approach, and the original criticism is absurd. If, on the other hand, it is accepted that contemporary science begins from an initial value assumption of maintaining that particulars are the real, then theoretical explanation must ultimately remain at the level of the particular. In this scenario, universals could be considered at best nothing more than complex particulars that are completely reducible to simple particulars. As a consequence, if the particulars-as-real assumption were accepted, bottom-up models such as the one described by Siegler would be viewed as offering a more viable scientific approach. In either case it is clear that it is philosophic value assumptions and not empirical observations that frame and determine the debate. In considering this discussion on the relation between universals and particulars in contemporary developmental theory, readers should recognize that I do not necessarily identify the real with material existence as is frequently done today when people speak of metaphysical realism. That is, particulars in the foregoing argument refers to items that are present to consciousness at some time and/or place. No philosopher that I know of, whether universalist or nominalist, denies material existence. However, material existence may or may not be the real,

Slructure of’Developmmtul Theory

5

depending on the philosophical system in which it is considered. Thus, as discussed by Stace (1924). depending on initial value assumptions, it is quite reasonable to have the case in which material existence is not the real, and the real does not have material existence. This does not deny the existence of tables, chairs, persons, or even thoughts and emotions. It simply claims that these particulars are explained by universals, and this indeed is the position of both Piaget’s theory and a number of other contemporary developmental theories. On the other hand, it is also reasonable, given a different set of initial value assumptions, to have the case in which only material existence is considered the real, and this appears to be the basic, if often implicit, position of several contemporary information-processing approaches. The whole issue just discussed in tcrms of universalism versus nominalism could just as easily be reframed as a debate between idealism and materialism. Here again the question is what is to be taken as the real. Contrary to popular opinion, idealists do not argue that only ideas exist. On the contrary, idealists argue that matter exists but universal forms constitute the real. Materialists argue that matter constitutes the real. If space allowed, I would elaborate on the influence of the value assumptions of universalism versus nominalism and idealism versus materialism in other areas of contemporary theory construction. For example, these values also frame the issue of why some psychologists argue against gencral (universal) theories and in favor of limited (nominal) theories; and why some argue against theory entirely and maintain that description is the legitimate goal of the science; and why some argue against general principles that explain development such as the “equilibration process” or the “orthogenetic prinicple” (universalism) and maintain that such principles must themselves be explained by individual causal agents (see, e.g., Flavell, 1985, p. 290). However, a more productive approach to considering philosophic assumptions as they impact on developmental theory and method is to turn more directly to the general questions of what a good theory of development should look like and how we would know it. These questions will be examined by developing a schema concerning the nature, aims, and methods of empirical science. In discussing aims and methods, it is again important to point out that my comments will be limited primarily to empirical science rather than to other knowledge forms or even other types of scientific knowledge forms such as historical-hermeneutic or critical hermeneutic science (Gadamer, 1977; Habermas, 1971, 1979). This is not meant to deny the important contemporary impact that hermeneutic philosophy is having on the social sciences, nor is it to deny that insights from hermeneutic (i.e., interpretation of meaning) reflections will influence our understanding of development. However, most investigators who have produced or conducted research in the context of contemporary theories of development also subscribe to the view that they are empirical scientists. A discussion of the standards of this form of knowledge therefore represents at least

6

Willis F. Overton

a “practical,” if not an “emancipatory,” interest in communicating with this group. Finally, I should note that I will make no major distinctions between the physical sciences, the biological sciences, and the social sciences. Although such distinctions are often made (e.g., Habermas, 1971; Mayr, 1982), 1 suspect that they originate primarily from a historical rather than a contemporary reflection on the norms of science and the changes that have occurred in these norms are specifically one of the issues of this essay.

111. Philosophy and Science The philosophy of science is that arena of inquiry devoted to the discovery of norms or general rules of science. These are rules that propose to distinguish science from other human activities and that offer guidance for choosing among competing theories. The philosopher of science begins from the asumption that science is a rational activity (i.e., that scientists do follow reasons or rules even if they are implicit and not consciously articulated). If this initial assumption of the philosophy of science is rejected, then science becomes a random or irrational activity in which “anything goes” and anything can occur under the rubric “science.” Such a state of affairs would obviously not only undercut the philosophy of science, it would make vacuous the very idea of science. It is for this reason that various forms of apparent scientific relativism such as those proposed by Kuhn and Feyerabend have been subjected to intense criticism (Putnam, 1983).

IV. Aims of Science Among philosophers of science and empirical scientists alike one finds virtual agreement that science is a human activity directed toward the general aim of establishing a systematic body of knowledge controlled by observational evidence. That is, science aims at organized knowledge that represents patterns of relationships among phenomena and processes of the observed world. These patterns constitute explanations of the phenomena and processes under consideration. Further, to be properly scientific, the explanations must have implications that are at least indirectly accessible to observational/experimental testing. This statement about empirical testing does not mean or imply that the explanations are directly confirmable or falsifiable. Indeed, it is generally agreed today that theoretical propositions cannot be confirmed or falsified. This position-known as the Duheim-Quine thesis-runs counter to the more traditional falsification position proposed earlier by Popper, and it represents a rather strong consensus among contemporary philosophers of science (see Overton, 1984). The position does not assert that theories cannot be evaluated empirically and it does

not assert that specific experimental hypotheses cannot be falsified. Indeed, they can be (O’Brien, Costa, & Overton, 1986). It asserts that theories themselves cannot be falsified and hence theory falsification cannot be used as a method of appraising whether a theory is good or bad. Thus, to suggest that a theory or some portion of a theory (e.g.%psychoanalytic theory, Piaget’s equilibration principle, or Werner’s orthogenetic principle) is irrefutable or nonfalsifiable is tautological and not in itself relevant to the issue of the value of the theory. To state the general aim of science in a broader context: It is to bring order and organization to the chaos of everyday experience. There are also more specific aims of science but, as we will see, these bring in controversial features and must be discussed following a consideration of the origin of scientific knowledge.

V. The Origin of Scientific Activity Where does this systematic knowledge that constitutes science begin? Again, there is uniform agreement across a wide spectrum of philosophic systems that this knowledge begins in the chaos and flux of what we call “common sense” (see Nagel, 1967, 1970; Pepper, 1942; Wartoksky, 1968). As Nagel states, “All scientific inquiry takes its departure from common sense beliefs and distinctions. and eventually supports its findings by falling back on common sense” (1967, p. 6). In contemporary jargon, comnion sense is generally referred to as our “folk psychology” (see Bruner. 1990). Pepper (1942) articulated the nature of the common sense that forms the starting point. Common sense occurs with respect to some domain of interest or domain of inquiry. Thus, for example, the domain that leads to the scientific discipline called psychology begins from commonsense beliefs and distinctions concerning behaviors, emotions, and mental processes. The discipline called developmental psychology begins from commonsense beliefs and distinctions concerning changes in the behaviors, emotions, and mental processes. Given these general domains of interest or inquiry, commonsense, or folk, knowledge includes the following examples: adults have a language and young children do not; young children reason differently from adults; children imitate their parents; children avoid imitating their parents; the adolescent is more responsible than the child; the adolescent is less responsible than the child: children learn through rote training; children learn through active discovery; children become the kinds of adults they do because of the way parents train them; children become the kinds of adults they do as a product of their genetic makeup. The three primary characteristics of such commonsense, o r folk psychology as suggested by Pepper are (1) common sense is not cognizable, (2) common sense is secure, and (3) common sense is cognitively irritable. By not being cognizable, Pepper means that any attempts to describe or clearly specify common sense takes

8

Willis F. Overton

us away from it. Thus, for example, behavior is common sense, but neither Skinner’s nor Piaget’s representations of behavior are common sense. By being secure, Pepper means that it is never lacking. When one gives up actively attempting to know, it is then that one knows in a commonsense fashion. In fact, it seems to be this security that people equate with “the real world” or “reality.” That the real or actual world is a significant feature of common sense whereas philosophic realism is an arguable abstract doctrine generates a great deal of confusion. That is, it is extremely difficult for people to recognize that one can reject the doctrine of realism while at the same time accepting the commonsense security of a real or actual world. This is an important point to keep in mind when the doctrine of realism is discussed in a later section. The final characteristic of common sense is that it is cognitively irritable. That is, if one tries to focus attention on it, it becomes vague, contradictory, and muddled. Or, to say the same thing in a slightly different way, common sense is the flux or the chaos.

VI. From Common Sense to Scientific Knowledge The path of empirical science, then, is relatively straightforward and, again, noncontroversial. There is uniform agreement that science begins in commonsense observations or folk psychology (the empirical feature of empirical science) and moves to systematized knowledge that brings order and organization to this flux. This systematized knowledge is composed of patterns of relationships constituting explanation. The next question is how or by what route does scientific activity move from common sense to scientific knowledge. It is here, however, that specific philosophic value assumptions and conflicts begin to assert themselves in a much more critical fashion. Although the story is actually more complex, it may without serious injustice be said that two general routes have been proposed for the journey from common sense to scientific knowledge. These routes are presented graphically in Fig. 1. The first route implicates values of metaphysical realism, naturalism, empiricism, materialism, induction, nominalism, physicalism, positivism, and reductionism. The second implicates values of pragmatism, rationalism, idealism, universalism, abduction, and retroduction. These routes will be called (1) the route of ontological and epistemological realism, and (2) the route of epistemological rationalism. Each of these routes will now be considered in turn.

A. ROUTE OF REALISM

The route of ontological and epistemological realism begins with the assertion of the philosophic value assumption that there lurks beneath the flux of common

Structure of Developmental Theory

9

SCIENCE Establishing Order h Organization from Chaos of Common Sense Experience

A.

ROUTE

OF

REALISM

Common

Sense

Observation [Observation] I

Fixed

Unchanging

t

Reality

[Data-Test]

/

[Theory]

ntecedent-Consequent

B.

ROUTE

OF

:

Antecedent-Consequent

RATIONALISM

Guiding

Metaphor

[Theory]

17

Observational/Experimental Hypotheses

L Common

Sense

[Data-Test]

Observation

Fig. 1. Alternative routes from common seme to bcientific knowledge.

10

Willis F. Overton

sense an ultimate fixed, stable, invariant base that is independent of any observer. Armed with this assumption the path to scientific knowledge becomes quite clear. The job of the scientist is to cut through or peel away the chaos or flux until arriving at the stable, fixed, objective base. At this point, the “the real” order will appear and neutral propositions describing particular causal, antecedent-consequent, or functional relations will constitute explanation. The assumption of an ultimate fixed base is the assumption called metaphysical realism or objectivism. As an ontological position, this assumption generally involves the claims that (1) matter or substance is the ultimate existent (i.e., materialism); (2) the nature of matter is ultimately fixed, stable, and invariant; and (3) “the real” and this matter are identical. The ontological position has also been referred to as the philosophy of “being” (Heisenberg, 1958; Overton, 1984; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). Ontological realism constitutes the underlying basic assumption of this route to scientific knowledge. Indeed, this route makes ontology logically an antecedent to epistemology. That is, the ontology determines the kind of statements that have epistemic warrant. However, because science concerns knowledge, it is the epistemological aspect of realism that often becomes the focus of philosophic attention. Epistemological realism is the position that what we know and perceive exists independently of our cognitive and perceptual activity. When it is added that this knowledge comes through observation (and only through observation), the epistemological position is referred to as empiricism. Thus, on this assumption, because knowledge is conceptual, the propositions, terms, and sentences that constitute explanations must match or correspond with the ultimate ontological fixed substance. Truth is defined with respect to this correspondence. This has traditionally been referred to as the correspondence theory of truth. Whether to employ the assumptions of metaphysical and epistemological realism has been and continues to be a hotly contested issue in both philosophy and science (see, e.g., Harre, 1986; Lepin, 1984). In support of asserting this value the philosopher Suppe, for example, argues that “underlying most contemporary work on the growth of scientific knowledge . . . is the basic assumption that science can and does yield knowledge descriptive of how the world really is. . . . Thus a strong commitment to both a metaphysical realism and an epistemological realism is characteristic of the new philosophy of science today” (1977, p. 652). The particular version of realism supported by Suppe (see also Shapere, 1977) is entirely consistent with the position that has been sketched here but it is referred to as historical realism. This version maintains that the constraints exerted by the underlying fixed substance on explanatory propositions increase across history. Thus, according to this position, historically earlier explanatory efforts are rough approximations of the truth and these approximations become more and more accurate as science progresses. This version shows some contrasts to earlier versions which as a group were referred to as logical empiricism or logical

Structure of’Developmental Throly

I1

positivism. Logical empiricism attempted to tie terms and sentences to the fixed base in an unambiguous fashion and failed. Historical realism offers more subtle arguments concerning a theory of reference. These arguments maintain that, as Johnson (1987) points out, “Since science does progress, we must be getting closer to telling the truth about the way the world is; so there must be some mapping relation connecting our language to ‘the world”’ (p. 201). In contrast to Suppe’s positive assessment of the contemporary role of realism, Fine (1984) maintains: “Realism is dead. . . . Its death was hastened by the debates over the interpretation of quantum theory, where Bohr’s nonrealist philosophy was seen to win out over Einstein’s passionate realism. Its death was certified, finally, as the last two generations of physical scientists turned their backs on realism and have managed, nevertheless, to do science successfully without it” (p. 83). In the scientific arena, Monod (1974) was a recent champion of the realistic, objectivist assumption in biology; P. M. Churchland (1979, 1981) and P. S. Churchland (1986) used the realist assumption to argue for an eliminative materialism designed to reduce all psychological explanation to the physical explanation of neuroscience; and Beilin (1984) in his endorsement of the position of Suppe and Shapere, suggested that the assumption of realism is basic to the new functionalism appearing in cognitive and developmental psychology. Of those philosophers opposing the assumptions of ontological and epistemological realism, Rorty (1979, 1982, 1989), Fine (1984), Laudan (1984), and Johnson (1987) have, in different ways, developed major critiques of realist claims. Also, Hilary Putnam (1981, 1983, 1987, 1988), once a strong advocate of metaphysical realism, now rejects this perspective, which he calls the “God’s eye” view. Putnam states that “on this perspective, the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of ‘the way the world is”’ (1981, p. 49). However, with respect to this view, Putnam asserts, “1 concluded that metaphysical realism . . . is incoherent” (1983, p. 85) and “There is no God’s Eye point of view that we can know or usefully imagine” (1981, p. SO). In science, arguments against realist assumptions have been made by Eddington (1985). Heisenberg (1958), and Davies (1980, 1983) in physics; Prigogine (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) in thermodynamics; Stolzenberg (1984) in mathematics; Bertalanffy (1968) and Maturana and Varela (1980. 1987) in biology; and von Foerster (1984) in neurophysiology. In social psychology, Gergen and Gergen (1986) critiqued realist assumptions, as did Barratt (1984) with respect to contemporary psychoanalytic theory. And in cognitive and developmental psychology, Overton (1984, 1985, 1991a) suggested alternative approaches to the realistic functionalism described by Beilin. However, perhaps the most extensive recent critiques of realist assumptions are those presented by George Lakoff (1987) in his analysis of the nature of categorical thought and reasoning, and by Jerrold Katz (1 990) in his antinaturalist critique of contemporary approaches to language.

Willis F. Overton

12

I . Realism and Aims,Methods, and Theories of Science It was suggested earlier that the adoption of specific philosophic assumptions influences the specific aims of science, the nature of scientific theories, and the methods of theory appraisal. Laudan (1984) articulated a general schema-called the reticulated model of scientific rationality-that identifies the interdependency among aims, theories, and methods. Figure 2 represents an elaboration of that schema to include the influence of epistemological and metaphysical factors on the scientific. Figure 3 illustrates the influence of realist assumptions on the formulation of specific aims of science, specific methods of theory appraisal, and the nature of scientific theory. With respect to aims, realist assumptions operate to inject new meaning into, and hence transform, the relatively neutral scientific aim described

EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL VALUES

THEORIES 6, TECHNIQUES

~-,

must harmonize

AIMS OF SCIENCE

APPRAISAL

Fig. 2. Relations among components of scientific activity. (AdaptedfromLaudan, 1984.)

Structure of Developmental Theory

13

ONTOLOG ICAL S EP ISTEMOLO GIC AL REAL1S M

EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATIONS DRAWN FROM FACTS BY + OBSERVATIONAL a EXPERIMENTAL TECHNIOUES

TRUTH (Corr.8pondrnce)

exhibit reliability exhibit reliabilit

REDUCTIONISM CAUSAL ANALYSIS

Fig. 3. Realism among components of’scietitific activit).

earlier (i.e., systematized body of knowledge controlled by observational experience). Through this transformational effect, the aim of science becomes that of attempting to achieve ever truer theories about the world (Popper, 1959). This aim, in turn, establishes the defining context for a set of aim-appropriate methodology rules for theory appraisal. That is. in addition to broad criteria-not included in Fig. 3 4 o n c e r n i n g scope, depth, empirical support, and fruitfulness that are rather directly implied by the original relatively neutral definition, realistic criteria include the following: (1) the meaning of explanations must be limited to a specific reference (i.e., excess or surplus meaning or interpretation is avoided), and ( 2 ) explanations must involve particularistic material causal terms or direct inductive generalizations from these. Therefore it is no accident that the type of theories generated within this overall schema will be understood to entail only empirical generalizations drawn from the facts via direct observation and experimental manipulations. It is also not accidental that exactly these realist criteria for theory appraisal of material reductionism and strict induction formed the rules designed to demarcate

14

Willis F. Overton

science from nonscience during the eras of positivism and conventionalism (see Lakatos, 1978; Laudan, 1977, 1984; Overton, 1984, 1985). Finally, the realistic assumptions and the realist-generated rules for theory appraisal have led directly to various forms of machine “functionalism” (Beilin, 1984) and many information-processing approaches.

2. Realism and Developmental Theory If this path from common sense to scientific knowledge is taken, what does our good developmental theory begin to look like? Most significantly, given the realist-generated pressures for analysis, reduction, and particulars over synthesis, integration, and universals, the theory will quite clearly be one that is generated from ever closer observations of “what children actually do.” In other words, it will increasingly be based on further and further microanalyses of specific behaviors under specific circumstances. Whether these analyses are labeled contextualist, functionalist, or interactionist will have little impact on the nature of the theory thus generated. In the most extreme case, theory will, in fact, be denigrated completely and attempts will be made to enlist support for greater descriptive efforts (Sugarman, 1987a). Here, the realist belief that if we just look closely enough (i.e., describe) we will eventually see the order of cause-effect relations finds its ultimate, if scientifically anachronistic, expression. Task analysis and rule assessment techniques as employed by informationprocessing approaches (e.g., Kail and Bisanz, 1982) are prototypical of the types of microanalytic techniques that are favored in generating theory from assumptions of realism. It is also the case that realism influences investigators to employ newly developed correlational techniques such as causal modeling for purposes of data snooping rather than hypothesis testing. That is, because realism directs the investigator away from interpretation and toward observational analysis and reduction, both these newer correlational techniques as well as traditional experimental techniques tend to be treated as methods of observation rather than as methods of testing interpretations. Here, the methodological situation is not unlike the case described by Eddington (1958) ofzhe sculptor who claims that there is a horse hidden inside his block of marble. Then taking his tools (methods), he chips away until he finally “finds” the horse. It is fair to say then that developmental theory generated via realism as mediated by correlational and experimental techniques will not be a general theory. Because of the necessity of remaining close to observations-descriptions and because observations-descriptions vary across situations, developmental theory virtually must, from this perspective, consist of a multiplicity of minigeneralizations about minidomains. The hope here, of course, is that these minis will ultimately generalize and provide the broad or universal scope of explanation that is necessarily implied in an understanding of science as “systematic” or “organized” knowledge.

Structure of Deidopmental Tlrrory

1s

In an examination of contemporary theories of cognitive development, Kessen (1984) captures the spirit of both the hope and the skepticism demonstrated here: “Psychologists often make obeisance toward the notion of a summary integration, a grand synthesis. . . . But the historical fact is that analysis begets further analysis. . . . The zest for analysis and for particulars may lie close to the center of American psychology’s unspoken creed” (p. 11). Indeed, this often unspoken creed is the “faith” called ontological and epistemological realism. The failure to arrive at generalizations, a summary integration, or a grand synthesis is seldom understood as a failure of this creed of realism and hence a potentially flawed faith that the totality of science is an analytic, reductionistic, inductive enterprise. Instead the failure has tended to spur realist-inspired investigators to further creed consistent action. Like treasure hunters who are convinced that pearls are to be found by mining deep in the ground, one group relentlessly continues digging in the same hole or domain while proclaiming that with the assistance of newly developed digging tools they will soon reach the treasure. A second group also uses the new digging tools but tries a new hole. Thus. as frustrations increase and the hope for the treasure fades, this group switches from the cognitive hole to the social hole, from the thinking hole to the emotional hole, to the action hole. A third group abandons all searches for the pearls of empirical scientific knowledge and declares that other goals are worthier. For this group, the ultimate goal remains a precious commodity called systematic knowledge, but it is no longer the pearls of empirical knowledge. Another way of expressing this view of the nature of developmental theory as framed within the context of realistic assumptions is to say that explanations of development will be quite compatible with the old ideals of positivism and conventionalism (Overton, 1984). They will consist of sets of propositions that (1) correspond with particular observed facts, ( 2 ) present at least the promise that excess meaning beyond the facts will ultimately be reduced to the trivial, (3) are induced from the facts, (4) are directly tested and confirmed or falsified by the observed facts, and (5) allow the prediction of new observed facts. 3 . Meanings of Realism

Before concluding this discussion of the path from common sense to scientific knowledge by way of realist metaphysical and epistemological assumptions, a point of clarification needs to be made concerning the multiple meanings of the term real in philosophy. The quest to establish “the real” (i.e., that which is not dependent on or reducible to anything other than itself [Stace, 1924, p, 301]), as distinguished from “appearance,” has a history as long as written philosophy. As mentioned earlier, across the course of this history there have been systems in which “the real” has been identified with material existence, as in the cases just discussed. There have also been systems that have identified “the real” with forms

16

Willis F. Overton

(universals) that purport to explain existence (particulars) (see, e.g., Katz, 1990). Kant’s critical realism, for example, asserts an ontological identity between “the real” and existence (the thing in itself), but this was considered unknowable and hence of little value to science. Kant’s epistemology, on the other hand, asserts an identity between “the real” and forms of knowing. As a consequence, this epistemology is not a “realism” as discussed earlier, but a form of rationalism (i.e., knowledge as the product of both the activity of mind and the context of material existence). The reason it is important to understand that “the real” and hence “realism” can have these divergent meanings is that influential contemporary authors such as Putnam, Johnson, and Lakoff retain the label “realism” while moving their position to Kant’s epistemology. Putnam, in fact, is explicit in acknowledging his move to a Kantian position (1983, p. 85) but he calls his newly developed position internal realism and states: 1 shall refer to it as the infernulist perspective, because it is characteristic of this view to hold that what objects does the world consist of? is a question that it only makes sense to ask within a theory or description. . . . “Truth,” in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability-some sort of ideal coherence of our heliefs with each other and with our experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our beliefsysrem--and not correspondence with mind-independent “states of affairs.” (1981, pp, 49-50)

Lakoff (1987) takes an almost identical position and calls it experiential realism. The important point to remember is that in these latter usages of the term “realism” stand in direct opposition to the meaning of “realism” that identifies “the real” with material existence. On the other hand, both Putnam’s and Lakoff‘s meanings are highly compatible with the route to scientific knowledge to be discussed next. I suspect that retaining the term realism for an antithetical position represents a desire to demonstrate that the new forms of empirical science are not turning away from the “real world” (i.e., the secure world of common sense) or from a similar “reality.” Johnson provides support for this suspicion when he states that “Putnam is not an idealist, or an anti-realist, for whom there is nothing ‘outside us.’ To deny that there are things existing independent of us (of perceivers) is a ridiculous view. Putnam . . . grants, of course, that we live, move, and have our being within an environment populated with physical things’’ (1987, p, 202). The problem with retaining the label while changing the value is that it increases the difficulty in making clear-cut and important distinctions. No one, whether confirmed idealist or antirealist, denies a real or actual world (the world of common sense) although each may deny that this is the “real” in the philosophical sense. It is also the case that this real world of common sense needs to be explained. As Bruner says, “folk psychology needs explaining” (1990, p. 32). “Realism” is an arguable doctrine that maintains how this world is to be explained.

Structure of Developmental Theory

17

The next section offers a different doctrine with implications that diverge significantly from this one. To call both positions “realism” might offer a sense of security, but it is cognitively disruptive. B. ROUTE OF RATIONALISM

1. Interpretation Let us then turn to the second route-the route of epistemological rationalismin the movement from commonsense understanding to scientific knowledge (see Fig. 1). This route, of course, involves a rejection of metaphysical and epistemological realism. Or, to put it slightly differently, this route eschews the doctrine of naturalism (see Kdtz, 1990). As a consequence, this route does not lead to attempts to discover the order and organization within finer and finer observational-descriptive analyses. Instead, it begins with the acceptance of the philosophic value that it is through human activity, and specifically the human activity of constructing interpretations, that order and organization will be established in the flux and chaos of everyday reality or everyday commonsense experience. Interpretation provides the order, and interpretation constitutes the explanation, that will itself be accessed in an observational context. Accepting interpretation as a basic irreducible value in this route to scientific knowledge has several consequences. First, it demonstrates a clear and definitive epistemological conflict with the realist route. In the realist route, an essential component of methodology was to ultimately drive out any interpretation in order to arrive at a bedrock of hard, unchanging, “descriptive” facts. In the present route interpretation is a necessary feature of methodology. The epistemological assumption that establishes the necessity of interpretation is rationalism. This, following Kant rather than Descartes, asserts that all forms of human knowing originate in human activity, and scientific knowing is as much a product of the activity of mind as a product of the activity of observation. Although the rationalist assumption has a long history, its impact on the norms of science has been most influential since the early 1960s (see Overton, 1984). It was at that time that Hanson (1958) began a process that ultimately led to a reformulation of the norms of science by arguing that all data, including the data of observation, are theory-laden (i.e., necessarily interpretative). hence erasing the realist’s clear demarcation between descriptive facts and interpretations. Following this, Kuhn (1962, 1977) presented his now famous-r infamous, depending on one’s interpretation-thesis that science is dominated by interpretative paradigms and that these influence both observational data and the methodology of theory choice. This argument has in turn been critically analyzed and further developed in works by Lakatos (1978), Laudan (1977, 1984), and Putnam (1981, 1983, 1987, 1989).

18

Willis F. Overton

The conflict between the realist methodology of driving out interpretation to arrive at an absolutistic objective fixed base of descriptive facts and the rationalist methodology of insisting on the necessity of interpretation is reflected in debates on subjectivity and relativism in science (see Overton, 1991a). Clearly, if any interpretation were acceptable then the rationalist assumption would lead to an ultimate solipsism. This issue of relativism and subjectivity has been the realist point of attack against the rationalist assumption, and it has been the rationalist point of departure for further elaborations. The realists Suppe (1977) and Beilin (1984), for example, have argued that historically the interpretative-paradigms approach to science-also called Weltanschauung or “world view” approachrepresents a critically flawed attempt to remedy problems with earlier realist approaches-called the “received view”-which were identical with logical empiricism, positivism, and conventionalism. From their realist position, these authors argue that the rationalist world view approach has been recognized for its subjectivist and relativistic inadequacies and has come to be replaced by the more adequate historical realism described earlier. On the other hand, the more rationalistically inclined Laudan (1977, 1984), for example, while recognizing the potential relativistic dangers of a world view approach, rejects realism and argues for the modified Weltanschauung described earlier and presented in modified form in Fig. 2. This modified position greatly reduces the potential relativism while recognizing that it can never be eliminated.

2. Relationship of Epistemology to Ontology A second consequence of accepting interpretation as an irreducible value in the route from common sense to scientific knowledge is that epistemology explicitly comes to take logical precedence over ontology. That is, if interpretation is basic, then science must indeed be, first and foremost, an epistemic activity. As an epistemic activity, science cannot be reduced to some particular ontological substance. In fact, from this position, the ontological entities that are presumed to populate the world must be the products of epistemic activity rather than the other way around. This logical priority of epistemology over ontology is extremely important for an understanding of any science, and perhaps an example will clarify the point. Physics has at various times and various places understood the ultimate nature of substance to be either fixed, permanent, and unchanging, or to be active, impermanent, and changing. From a realist perspective, one of these is the ultimate discoverable “really real.” However, from a rationalist perspective, both are epistemic constructions. Thus, an ontological fixed substance (i.e., the philosophy of being) and an ontological flux of impermanent activity (i-e., a philosophy of becoming) are both, according to the rationalist assumption, products of particular interpretative frameworks. Physicists decide (an epistemic activity) that one or the other ontology (or perhaps both, as in issues of complementarity) is the most

S~ructitreof Developmrti~alTheory

15,

adequate with respect to various unsolved problems. They do not perceive that one

or the other presents “the real.” The priority of epistemology over ontology also invalidates any proposed scientific approach that suggests ontological reduction as a methodological goal. Thus, as Putnam (1983) points out. from this perspective, both positivism and historicism were “heroic attempts to do the impossible, to reduce epistemic notions to non-epistemic notions” (1983, p. 290). A major implication here that should be strongly underscored is that scientific explanation in general is an epistemic activity and consequently is not susceptible to ontological reduction. Acceptance of this point forces recognition that scientific explanation need not be limited to material causal factors such as genes. brain states, environmental forces, or social-political contexts. In other words, scientific explanation may take place outside of the “causal nexus” (see Katz, 1990). Scientific explanation may quite legitimately employ pattern-type explanations in the sense of general noncausal principles. This important issue will be elaborated later.

3. Rationalism and Aims, Methods, and Theories of Science Figure 4 illustrates the influence of the assumption of epistemological rationalism on the formulation of specific aims of science, specific methods of theory appraisal, and the nature of scientific theory. If interpretation constitutes an irreducible starting point in the rationalist route and if, as a consequence, epistemic notions take logical precedence over ontology, then the notion of truth as a correspondence between theoretical propositions and an underlying fixed reality loses meaning. With this loss of meaning, the correspondence definition of truth fades as a formative influence on the defining characteristics of the aims of science, methods of theory appraisal, and nature of scientific theory. Rather than science having the specified aim of developing ever truer theories, within the rationalist route the aim of science takes a more pragmatic turn. Science aims at empirical and conceptual problem solutions (Laudan, 1977). Here again, as was the case with realism, the specific scientific aim that derives from epistemological and metaphysical commitments in turn influences the nature of methodological rules employed in judging theory. Here, in addition to broad criteria-not included in Fig. 4+oncerning scope, depth, empirical support, and fruitfulness, pragmatic criteria require that explanations be coherent (coherence criteria of truth), logically consistent, intelligible, and that they reduce the proportion of unsolved to solved conceptual and/or empirical problems in a domain (Laudan, 1977).

4. Rationalism and Developmental Theory We now return to the question of what our good scientific theory of development begins to look like when it is formulated within this rationalist scientific path (see

20

Willis F. Overton EPISTEMOLOQICAL RATIONALISM

INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLES via IMAGINATIVE SPECULATIONASSESSED BY OBSERVATIONAL 8 EXPERIMENTAL TECHNIOUES

-

must harmonize

PROBLEM SOLVING

exhibit reliability

COHERENCE INTELLIQIBILITY MAXIMUM PROBLEM REDUCTION

Fig. 4. Rationalism and components of scientific activity.

Figs. 1and 4). Here, as in the realist route, we begin from everyday commonsense observation, folk psychology, or the “real world.” But here, rather than greater and greater microanalyses of tasks and situations, or greater and greater description, we are encouraged to generate interpretations, principles, or rules that bring coherence and intelligibility to our observations and reduce their problem content. Consider, for example, the following possible commonsense observation: The reasoning of the young child tends to be fragmentary, concrete, and easily influenced by perceptual events while the reasoning of adults tends to be logically coherent, is less easily swayed by perceptual events, and often involves matters of principle. As we reflect on this commonsense observation-i.e., as we move away from it as a commonsense observation-we can readily understand that it is contradictory and confusing. It appears that the adult is somehow different from the child, but yet the same as the child. Further, this observation may also clash with the common sense of others. This state of affairs clearly constitutes a general problem that demands a scientific solution.

Structztre of Devrlopnieritul Theory

21

What kind of interpretation, explanation, or theory might be offered here? Rather than giving a specific interpretation at this point we will explore some of its gencral characteristics as framed by the rationalist scientific perspective. First, the interpretation would not be an empirical generalization arrived at by inductive inference, nor would it be the product of hypothetical-deductive inference. The primacy of these modes of inference is a story told by realists in their efforts to reduce interpretation to an objectivist, fixed. external reality, or to make interpretation extrascientific. The primary mode of inference employed in the rationalist path has been called, following C. S . Pierce and N. R. Hanson, rctroductiott (also called the logic of abduction by Pierce), and a modified version of this is called itiference to the best explatiution. In this mode, the scientist observes phenomena and actively constructs interpretations that, in the light of all the available background information, would most plausibly explain the phenomena. The assertion that retroduction is the primary mode of inference employed in the rationalist path for the formulation of explanations is not meant to deny the validity of inductive or deductive inferential processes in other areas of empirical science. For example, given that theories are constructed in a retroductive manner, it is quite reasonable that in some circumstances deductions might be drawn from these principles and these dcductions assessed according to observational methodology. In a similar fashion, there is no attempt to deny that one type of observational methodology, the experiment, is predicated on the eliminative inductive principles framed by Mill’s canons. The inductive and deductive inference, according to the rationalist formulation, are tools for the assessment of intcrpretations already formed: they are not the vehicle of hypothesis generation. A second characteristic of explanations offered from a rationalist perspective is that such explanations involve breadth or scope as an immediate concern. While the realist takes an atomistic stance and assumes that broad or universal explanations will ultimately result from a bottom-up methodology, the rationalist maintains a holistic posture and claims that explanatory breadth is itself a necessary prerequisite for a systematic knowledge of individual components. Individual features, it is maintained here, can only be understood in the context of general explanatory principles. A third characteristic of an explanation offered from a rationalist perspective relates to the fact that it need not be directly tied to any causal statements or to statements expressing contingent antecedent-consequent relations. The rationalist perspective would strongly disagree with the statement that “investigation of the possible causes of development ought to be a primary goal of developmental research” (Sugarman, 1987b). It is often maintained that science attempts to discern patterns in the domain of investigation and that these patterns constitute explanation. This statement is essentially correct. However, the realist perspective interprets discertz to mean “directly observe” and putterti to mean “sequence of causal events” or “antecedent-consequent relations“ (see Fig. 1). From the ration-

22

Willis F. Overton

alist perspective, discern implies both mental construction and active perception, whereas pattern refers as much to the form, organization, or structure of the domain of interest as it does to causal relations or contingent antecedent-consequence relations. The creation of interpretations that constitute explanation and that are designed to reduce the problem content of an area does not, of course, mark the end of scientific inquiry. It marks the beginning, but a crucial beginning that frames the continuing process. From here, assessments must be made of the consistency and reasonableness of any given interpretation in relation to sets of other interpretations. Further, implications must be drawn from these interpretative or explanatory sets, and these implications, which take the form of empirical hypotheses, require assessment via correlational and experimental methods of hypothesis testing. Of course, this assessment takes place in the arena of the world of common sense and not in a world of ultimate, fixed, stable, invariant entities that are independent of any observer. Confirmation of hypotheses so drawn increases the plausibility of the general explanations or theory. Falsification may decrease plausibility. It is, however, plausibility-not the probability of correspondence truth-oriented realist approaches-that provides the criteria1 frame for the assessment. It was described earlier how the rationalist assumption of the necessity of interpretation in scientific knowledge set the debate between realists and rationalists concerning subjectivity and relativism in science. In a similar fashion, the issue of the relation between interpretation and the empirical world of common sense forms the context for a different debate. This is the debate between rationalists who claim that theory is a form of empirical scientific knowledge and hermeneutically inspired authors who claim that interpretation, while necessary to knowledge, necessarily leads to alternative forms of knowing. Before dealing with this issue, which entails a discussion of empirical scientific knowledge in relation to various forms of hermeneutic and narrative knowledge, it may be helpful to consider more specifically the nature of explanation along with some concrete examples of our good scientific theory in the light of the foregoing reflections.

VII. Developmental Theories Theories are sets of propositions designed to explain some domain. There are two general categories of explanation that have historically had cyclical levels of scientific support since the time of Aristotle (see Overton, 1985). One category of explanation, which we will refer to as material explanation, contains all those explanations that specify material cause-and-effect relations or contingent antecedent-consequent relations. Traditionally, this category has been subdivided into specific material explanations, in which the cause or antecedent term is understood as some inherent material factor such as (in theories explaining human behavior

Siriicrure of Drrrlopnreritul Tiic~isy

23

and development) heredity, genetics, physiology, and neurology; and tfficierit explanations, in which the cause or antecedent term is understood as some environmental. cultural, or situational event. The second general category of explanation, which we will refer to as pattern explunutioti, contains all those explanations that are neither causal nor contingent and that attempt to formulate the pattern, organization, or form of the phenomenon under study. Traditionally, this category has been subdivided into purtertzconservative explanations. which represent a momentary organization or structure of the phenomenon; and puttc.rri-progres.sii,c explanations, which represent a progressive or directional organization or progrcssive structure of the phenomenon.

A. MATERIAL EXPLANATION AND REALISM

Given the earlier developed schema concerning the role of philosophic values in empirical scientific theory, it should be evident that realist-directed theories will ultimately include only material explanation and theorists who follow the realist creed will accept only material explanation as having ultimate scientific legitimacy. Material explanation constitutes the causal nexus and explanation beyond that nexus is by definition nonscientific. That is, it is only this type of explanation that presents the possibility of direct observation-description and, as described earlier, the realist path of science consists of cutting through the flux of behavioral variability to find the “real” in an order of observed antecedent-consequent relations. In fact, this type of explanation finds its roots in the realism of what has traditionally been known as the Newtonian mechanical explanation. This defines explanation in three steps, consisting of ( I ) the analysis or reduction of the phenomenon of interest down to its particularistic, material essence (i.e., the invariable directly observable-describable behavior); ( 2 ) the observation of forces, causes, or contingent antecedent events as they relate to this material essence; and (3) the inductive generalization of this relationship into a law (see Overton, 1991b). Although only the category of material explanation is ultimately acceptable. realist-inspired individual theorists will differ over whether they emphasize specific material factors, efficient factors, or some combination of the two. Skinner, for example, proposes to reduce all psychological explanation to the relation between emitted behaviors and stimuli that come to control the behavior. Within this approach, development is a matter of the way in which the environment shapes behavior. As he states, “The experimental analysis of behavior goes directly to the antecedent causes in the environment” (Skinner, 1974, p. 30). Thus, not only does Skinner operate within a realist context, but his realism favors the ultimate “reality” of the stimulus. On the other hand, a number of neurophysiologicdl theories

24

Willis F. Overton

such as Churchland’s (1986) operate within the realist assumptions but favor a complete reduction to specific material explanations. Eleanor Gibson’s (1983) developmental theory as well as James Gibson’s (1979) perceptual theory represent realist-generated views that strongly favor efficient determination by the environment but also permit some specific material determination such as a general capacity for exploring and detecting invariance in the environment (see Harre, 1986 for an extended discussion of the realist character of J. Gibson’s theory). Given that realist-inspired theories as a group admit only efficient and specific material explanations, it should be clear that the naturenurture or nativism-empiricism issue concerning “determinants” of development must always be a kind of either/or issue when addressed within this creed (Lerner, 1978; Overton, 1973). Alternative solutions require a movement beyond the nominalism and materialism of this position. Finally, it should be noted that many “functional” explanations of development (see Beilin, 1983, 1984; Overton, 1984, 1991b), especially those defined as “machine functionalism” (see Overton, 1991a), as well as some “contextual” explanations (see, e.g., Perlmutter, 1986) are themselves defined by the realist program. For example, although contextualism can have several meanings (see Lerner & Kauffman, 1985; Overton, 1984; Overton & Reese, 198l), it is often today used in a limited realist fashion to denote potential or actual environmental, cultural, social, and situational determinants. Thus, “context” here is identical to “efficient explanation.” While ultimately accepting only material explanation as scientifically legitimate, the realist theorist will admit the introduction of pattern explanation under the condition that this will eventually be reduced to, and thus explained by, material explanation. This strategy of introducing pattern as a kind of second-class citizen (Bowers, 1973) is sometimes accomplished explicitly and sometimes implicitly. On a fairly explicit level, Mischel (1973), while proposing the pattern explanation of “self regulating systems and plans,” (i.e., structures) went on to assert that such explanations “cannot be adequately understood without linking them to cognitive social learning conditions through which they are developed and maintained” @. 278). Arguments that a pattern explanation, such as Piaget’s equilibration process, must itself be explained by causal factors (Flavell, 1985, p: 290) or arguments that this pattern explanation is itself explained by specific existential cognitive conflict (Rosen, 1986) represent cases in which the realist strategy is introduced in a more implicit fashion. This implicit realist opposition to pattern explanations also operates in cases in which contemporary theorists accept pattern explanations but insist on their constriction to increasingly narrow domains of application and generality. (See Liben, 1987, for an extended discussion of this strategy in contemporary information-processing approaches.) If a pattern explanation is thus constricted, at some point it becomes a description of the specific behavior under investigation

and at this point, indeed, itself needs an explanation. This both takes the pattern out of pattern explanations and transforms them from universals to particulars. A tinal method of implicitly reducing pattern explanation to material explanation is accomplished by changing the meaning of the specific explanatory concept. For example, a good deal of the emphasis today on “knowledge structures” in fact makes reference not to patterns or forms of knowledge but to specific knowledge content that is joined with other knowledge content in an associative fashion. A typical example of this approach is presented by Mandler (1983). who redefines the Piagetian pattern explanation of “schema” into a combined efficient and specific material causal explanatory concept that “consists of a set of units connected by various spatial and/or temporal relationships, which have been learned by experiencing co-occurrences of things in time and space” (p. 100). Here, as Mandler goes on to discuss, the associationistic efficient causes of contiguity, similarity, and proximity are offered as the primary explanation, while secondarily specitic material cause explanation is offered for the “tendency of organisms to segment the world in certain ways and to respond to some kinds of information in the environment rather than others” (p. 100).Thus, what was originally a pattern explanation in Piaget’s system becomes reduced to material explanation in Mandler’s system. (See also Scholnick, 1983, for an analysis of the different understandings of schema in different theoretical systems.)

B. PATTERN EXPLANATION AND RATIONAI-ISM

The primary explanatory category for rationalist-directed theories is pattern explanation. That is, given the understanding that order and organization are not found in direct observation or descriptions thereof, but in the construction of principles of order and organization, rationalist-directed theorists begin the explanatory process, using retroductive inference, to generate such principles, These rationalist-directed theorists therefore construct structural explanatory principles within which functioning operates. The structure of the atom, the structure of DNA. the structure of the solar system, and the structure of the universe are all familiar examples of patternconservative explanations drawn from the natural sciences. Kinship structures, mental structures, mental organization, structures of language, ego and superego, dynamisms, schemes, operations, and cognitive structures are familiar examples of pattern-conservative explanations drawn from the human sciences. The commonality among all these examples is that, given an underlying activity (functioning), there is an attempt to formulate the pattern of this activity, and this pattern is treated as explanation (Overton, 1975). It is explanation in that it introduces order and organization into the domain under investigation. Structure (or pattern, form, system, or organization-all used interchangeably here) is not directly

26

Willis F. Overton

observable and cannot, in principle, be reduced to observables. Pattern is inferred from observables; but, as already stated, the method of inference is not induction but retroduction. And as a retroductive inference, pattern depends as much on the creative internal sources of the scientist as on the external source of observation. Stephen J. Gould (1987) articulates this point in his discussion of the discovery of “deep time” in geology: “The interplay of internal and external sources-of theory informed by metaphor and observation constrained by theory-marks any major movement in science. We can grasp the discovery of deep time when we recognize the metaphors underlying several centuries of debate” (Gould, 1987, p. 8). And “deep time . . . imposed a vision of reality rooted in ancient traditions of Western thought, as much as it reflected a new understanding of rocks, fossils, and strata” (P. 10). These pattern explanations-as well as the pattern-progressive explanations to be discussed next-are indeed abstract universals, and they do not directly entail causes. In fact, from this perspective, causes (i.e., material explanations) acquire their meaning only in the context of pattern explanation. Numerous illustrative examples could be drawn from Werner’s or Piaget’s developmental theories; from Chomsky’s linguistic theory; or from the many varieties of contemporary psychoanalytic theory-including both object relations and ego theory varieties (e.g., Erikson, Sullivan, Bowlby, Fairbairn, Winnicott, Kernberg, Kohut) (see Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Overton & Horowitz, 1991). However, Bowlby’s (1987) concepts of “attachment” and “behavior system” are chosen because they provide explicit affirmation of pattern explanation that is of relevance to a wide range of behavioral developments. For Bowlby, “explanations draw on such interrelated concepts as organization, pattern, and information” (p. 64). And Hinde (1982), in elaborating on the explanatory value of the “behavior system,” points out that “while the scheme is based on behavioral observations, it is used in an explanatory sense to refer to systems postulated as controlling the behavior. However, there is no necessary implication that there are mechanisms in the brain isomorphous with the systems postulated: The explanation is a ‘software’ one” (p. 64). In a similar vein, both Ainsworth and her colleagues (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) and Sroufe and Waters (1977) stress the position that attachment is to be understood as an organizational (i.e., pattern) explanatory concept. An important point about rationalist-defined pattern explanation concerns the frequently raised criticism that pattern explanations such as structure, organization, form, and the like are static in nature and therefore inadequate for describing the activity and change that is characteristic of humans and human development. This is a totally misplaced criticism that confounds the relation between that which is to be explained and that which does the explaining. Pattern explanation does the explaining, and patterns of activity and patterns of change are what are explained. Constancy is introduced through the inference of pattern, but it is the constancy

of explanation and not a constancy of “that-which-is-to-be-explained.” If, as virtually everyone agrees, empirical science is about “systematic” or “organized” empirical knowledge, o r about “patterns” of relationships, then invariance must be established in sonic realm. For the realist, constancy will be ultimately observed in the existential arrangement of antecedent-consequent material relationships found i n thc natural world. For the rationalist, constancy is established through the construction of pattern explanation and not observed in the phenomena to be explained. Although pattern-conservative explanations establish order. constancy, and coherence of activity at any point in a series, it is pattern-progressive explanations that establish order. constancy, and coherence across the series. Put simply, pattern-progressive explanations are explanations of development itself whereas pattern-conservative explanations are explanations of what develops. Patternprogressive explanation represents organization of the series just as pattern-conservative explanation represents the organization of any point in the series. Because a theory alway consists of explanations of something (i.e,, some topic or domain). a developmental theory must articulate what it is that is developing. Recently, realist-guided investigators have criticized the positing of endpoints of development and argued that more adequate description is needed (e.g., Sugarman, I987a). The question is what would one possibly describe if one did not understand development as tending toward some end or other? If one wishes to explain the course of acquiring language, then adult language is of necessity the endpoint. In fact, no “description” of the language of the child would be possible without this ideal endpoint. In a similar fashion, if one wishes to explain the derdopment of reasoning, or thought, or problem solving, or personality, or anything, the endpoint must serve as the ideal. There is no mysterious force operating in the articulation of endpoints; it is simply the case that development is not comprehensible unless a direction is articulated, and a direction cannot be articulated without an ideal endpoint. Such endpoints may be as general as those involved in concepts such as “adaptation,” “maturity,” and “integration,” or they may be more specific. In fact, in general theories such as Piaget’s and Werner’s, the specific will be nested within the general. Further, it is important to note that there can be as many ideal endpoints as there are domains to be explained. The concept of an ideal endpoint does not limit the multiplicity of human development; rather, it establishes order in the domain under investigation. Thus, for example, arguments that Piaget limited development to logical thought are quite misplaced. Piaget’s theory is an attempt to explain how individuals come to acquire a certain form of logical thought, just as Freud’s theory was an attempt to explain how individuals come to acquire a certain form of psychosexual maturity, and Erikson’s theory is an attempt to explain how individuals come to acquire a certain form of psychosocial identity.

28

Willis F. Overton

One may criticize that the end is poorly or inadequately defined, or that the path is different than that proposed, but an explanatory developmental psychology requires a concept of direction, and hence it requires ideal endpoints. Given that a theory articulates endpoints and hence a direction, pattern-progressive explanation consists of principles that establish the path according to which the development occurs. Here again, as in pattern-conservative explanation, the principles thus constructed introduce order and organization into the ongoing active processes. In developmental psychology, Piaget and Werner present the clearest examples of pattern-progressive explanation (see also, however, Erikson’s epigenetic principle). Werner’s orthogenetic principle is the more general of the two and Piaget’s equilibration process might be thought of as nested within Werner’s and providing greater specificity. Werner’s (1957) explanation asserts that any developmental series proceeds from initial states of globality and lack of differentiation to states of increased differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic integration. Piaget’s (1976) principle is completely compatible with Werner’s, but it focuses its field of application on logical thought and asserts that this series constitutes “a progressive equilibration from a lesser to a higher state of equilibrium” (1976, p. 3). For Piaget, specificity is achieved by defining “equilibrium” as a relationship between the active processes of assimilation and accommodation; “state” as the structures (pattern-conservative explanation) of equilibrium; and “lesser to higher” in terms of the mobility of the structures and the cognitive territory they cover (present action, representation, logical representation). Further, both Werner and Piaget introduce dialectic polarities into their explanations, with one pole of the dialectic being conservative (e.g., scheme, operation, assimilation) and the other being progressive (e.g., equilibration, accommodation, adaptation). Two issues that arise with respect to such pattern explanations are (1) the extent to which they are explanatory rather than descriptive, and (2) the question of what role is left for traditional material causal explanation in such schemas. Both of these questions can be best addressed by briefly considering another developmental pattern explanation. This principle comes from the field of heat dynamics; it is the second law of thermodynamics. Stated in its most intuitive form, the second law asserts that isolated systems tend toward diffuse or random states-that is, such systems demonstrate increasing entropy where entropy is itself a measure of probability. In other words, the universe, the earth, animals, plants, and inanimate objects are all moving in a direction from order to disorder. Several characteristics of this explanation are worth noting. First, it is an explanation in that it brings order to a number of commonsense experiences as well as bringing order to some very technical experiences constructed on common sense. Cities, buildings, humans, lower animals, and inanimate objects do seem to tend toward decay or randomness; some chemicals dissipate when containers are opened; if one puts dye into water, the two will

mix through the random movement of molecules, but the process will never reverse itself. On the other hand, the second law cannot be an inductive generalization derived directly from observation, i.e., it cannot be descriptive. Inductive generalizations fail in the case of a single counterexample and there are many such examples in which, on commonsense grounds, order emerges out of disorder rather than the reverse (e.g., cities and buildings are constructed; animate birth and the buildup of structure occurs). Despite these counterexamples, it has not been proposed that the law has been falsified. Instead, recent proposals (e.g., Gleick, 1987; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) have attempted to build out from this principle to other principles that show a similar irreversible developmental direction, but one that also accounts for the commonsense observation of order arising out of disorder. As Gleick (1987) says concerning these new proposals, “Somehow, after all, as the universe ebbs toward its final equilibrium in the featureless heat bath of maximum entropy, it manages to create interesting structures” (1987, p. 308). The second law, then, is an explanation arrived at through retroductive inference. Specifically, it is a pattern-progressive explanation that articulates an ideal endpoint and hence a direction to development (ix., randomness) and presents a principle concerning the path according to which the development occurs. The second law is thus directly analogous to Werner’s orthogenetic principle and Piaget’s equilibration process. All are developmental explanations, and they differ primarily in that Werner and Piaget focus on the progression of irreversible order rather the progression of irreversible disorder. The second law and Werner’s and Piaget’s pattern-progressive explanations are also directly analogous i n the way they deal with the relation between pattern and material explanation. The second law postulates a direction, and this direction is not to be found in or explained by material causes. So, also, Werner’s and Piaget’s pattern-progressive explanations postulate directions that are not found in or explained by material causes. In each case, the pattern-progressive explanation deals with the system as a whole, and the emergent properties (i.e., direction) of the system cannot be reduced to or completely explained by other determinants. B u n g (1963) describes the situation concerning the second law in terms of theoretical category levels. The second law concerns systems as a whole, and at this level categories of material causation and chance are not employed. This level is partially explained by two more molecular levels. At the most molecular level (i.e., particle dynamics) there is a strong material causal component. Here, single molecules bumping into other molecules serve to account for dispersion. At the next level (i,e., statistical mechanics) random motion is introduced. This noncausal notion deals with the overall behavior of large collections by statistical means. However, and this is the main point. these two molecular levels are in principle not adequate to yield the utiidir-ectiotial character of the second law. That is, the molecular levels never yield the irreversible character of the second law. When dye is placed in a container of water, the random motion of molecules may account

30

Wcllis F. Overton

for the dispersion of the dye throughout the water, but the same random motion would also as readily predict an eventual return to nondispersion. The second law, on the contrary, asserts that such a return will in principle never occur and this assertion is not accounted for by any material determination. The analog to Werner’s and Piaget’s pattern-progressive explanations is that in these cases, too, the pattern explanations deal with the system as a whole, and the emergent direction cannot be reduced to, or completely explained by, material causes. To take the equilibration process again as an example, although it is possible to partially understand this progression in terms of biological determinants and in terms of experiential determinants such as cognitive conflict, none of these singly or additively can account for the unidirectional character of the equilibration process. In essence, the material causes can be understood only as operating within the systematic framework given by the pattern explanation. Understanding this relation of pattern to material causes clarifies Piaget’s rationalist position that a complete explanation of mental development must involve the necessary organic, practice (or exercise), and social factors all of which constitute material explanation, but that these are not sufficient. Complete explanation of mental development involves the consideration of these factors as they operate in the context of the pattern explanations of equilibration and structure. Just as Aristotle asserted that an object must always involve both content and form, so too function (material explanations) and form (pattern explanations) are necessary components of any developmental theory that begins from the contemporary rationalist position.

C. HERMENEUTIC, NARRATIVE, AND SCIENTIFIC EMPIRICAL KNOWING

The claim has been developed that the route of epistemological rationalism in the movement from commonsense knowledge to scientific knowledge requires interpretation as a necessary and irreducible feature of explanation. A problem arises, however, when it is recognized that from the perspective of epistemological rationalism, all knowing and hence all knowledge forms must necessarily involve interpretation. Thus, the necessity of interpretative activity in constituting the objects of knowing does not in itself distinguish scientific from other knowledge forms such as hermeneutic knowing and narrative knowing. A practical distinction between these forms entails an understanding that empirical scientific knowledge requires both the tools of interpretation (e.g., retroduction, metaphor) and the tools of empirical assessment (i.e., observational and experimental research methods). It needs these tools not in the way they were introduced by conventionalism (Overton, 1984) wherein interpretation was cast as an adjunct and ultimately disposable “context of discovery” related to the generation of hypotheses, while research methods were cast as the “real” activity of science. Rather, empirical

scientific knowing needs a deep level commitment to the principle that every feature of the process is infused with interpretation and that the research methods themselves, while also necessary, do not occupy a privileged domain. Traditional and contemporary research methods play an essential role in assessing the plausibility of our explanatory concepts in the world of commonsense observation, but this commonsense observation is itself a way of knowing. Thus, the research methods are, in the final analysis, means for assessing the coherence of the relation between reflective critical interpretations called theoretical explanations and less formal interpretations that reach all the way down to commonsense interpretations. Within epistemological rationalism, coherence is accepted as a primary criterion of theory appraisal. The coherence introduced by the outcome of the application of research methods expands the scope of the explanatory model. It does this by demonstrating coherence. not just among the set of reflective or theoretical interpretations, but also between this set and the less reflective levels of interpretations ranging down to commonsense observations. Hermeneutic knowing is that area of knowing directly concerned with interpretation and the meaning of what is interpreted. One of the domains that the hermeneutic approach interprets is science itself. Through critiques by philosophers like Husserl and Heidegger, the hermeneutic approach (or at least some subset of the various hermeneutic approaches) concludes that the “true” meaning of science has become distorted by a failure to recognize the historical and social dimensions of science. The route of ontological and epistemological realism y, in fact, becomes the focus of the hermeneutic critiques, and the failure of realism to include the historical and social context evokes the pejorative label ”scientism.” However, rather than moving to the epistemological rationalist path to empirical scientific knowledge, recent hermeneutic approaches have tended to redefine the aims of science in ways that eliminate any necessity for empirical research methods. Thus, for example, Habermas (1979) asserts a practical and emancipatory aim (i.e., an analysis of contemporary capitalism that will permit the acknowledgment of suppressed possibilities and desires for emancipation). Although it is difficult to argue against such an approach on any assumptive grounds except for those of realism itself, it should be noted that this emancipatory aim clearly distinguishes this form of knowledge from that of empirical scientific knowledge. There are a number of substantive areas of agreement between the rationalistderived understanding of empirical science and the various hermeneutic critiques. Both epistemological rationalism and hermeneutics agree that knowledge is activity; both critique the realist understanding of science offered by the empiricism of positivism and conventionalism; both argue that science begins in common sense or Heidegger’s “ready-to-hand” mode of engagement and that science moves to critical reflective interpretations o r Heidegger’s “unready-to-hand” and “present-at-hand” modes o f engagement.

32

Willis F. Overton

However, despite the areas of agreement between science in the context of epistemological rationalism and the hermeneutic approaches, the latter-following Heidegger and Gadamer-tend to ultimately ground their interpretations in a privileged, ontological materialism. Thus again, as was the case with realism, ontology subsumes epistemology. And it is here that epistemological rationalism parts with hermeneutics. To understand this last point, consider how we determine whether an interpretation (explanation) is good or bad. That is, again consider the problem of methods of theory assessment. From the perspective of empirical scientific knowledge framed by epistemological rationalism, plausibility is established by assessing the target explanation in relation to other extant theory level interpretations (coherence) and by assessing the target explanation in relation to commonsense interpretations (observations) via empirical research methods (coherence). From the perspective of hermeneutics, a good interpretation is one that is in conformance with historical and social determinants. Here, however, we have the situation described earlier by Putnam (see 1983, p. 34) as the attempt of both historicism (i.e., the perspective that all thought is determined by and cannot transcend its historical antecedents) and culturalism (i.e., the perspective that all thought is determined by and cannot transcend its social context) alike to reduce epistemic notions to nonepistemic notions. The hermeneutic approaches, then, are ultimately attempts to introduce a new realism. This is often the realism of Marxist dialectic materialism, which frequently hovers in the background as a spoken or unspoken assumption. But regardless of the variety of ontological realism that is evoked, the hermeneutic approaches do close the “hermeneutic circle” by first objecting to the ontological realism of the positivists and conventionalist and then reasserting an ontological realism that eliminates any necessary reliance on research methods. Recent developments in the general area of hermeneutics, which go under the rubric “deconstructionism” as originally articulated by Derrida (Silverman & Ihde, 1985), continue this trend toward explanation in terms of cultural and historical material determinants. The strategy here, however, is to deny that there is such a thing as a “good” or “plausible” interpretation. Interpretations according to this view simply are, and the question becomes what cultural and/or historical determinants explain interpretations? Given the way these approaches have circled back to complete material explanation, it is no wonder that some contemporary realists in cognitive and developmental psychology applaud their introduction (see Keating, 1990). Narrative knowing, like hermeneutic knowing, focuses on interpretation. In fact, to the extent that varieties of narrative knowing establish their origin and justification in the ultimate realism of hermeneutics and deconstructionism (see Gergen & Gergen, 1986; Spence, 1982), little needs to be added here. However, to the extent that narrative knowing disclaims such a realism and the attendant

Structure of Developmental Theory

33

reduction of all explanation to material explanation, it offers some interesting insights into the relationship of rationalistically framed empirical scientific knowing and other forms of knowing. Narrative knowing, like hermeneutics and epistemological rationalism, begins with critiques of the idea of an absolutistic, knower-independent reality as presented by empiricism. In narrative knowing, the domain of inquiry is initially-as in epistemological rationalism-roughly explained or interpreted according to some guiding metaphor that frames the construction of a story or narrative that presents the more specific domain-relevant explanations. Thus, for example, Piaget’s equilibration theory can be understood as a progressive narrative formulated within an organismic root metaphor (Gergen & Gergen, 1986). Having established the narrative, interpretation, or theory in this manner, the issue then becomes the criteria according to which theory assessment will proceed. Here, as with hermeneutics, empirical research methods (i.e., traditional criterion of empirical support) are essentially written out of the theory assessment process. This is accomplished both through the widely accepted recognition that theories are underdetermined by empirical observations and through the claim that research methods represent tools for the discovery of the objective real. With the elimination of the objective mind-independent real, the argument goes, the tools no longer serve any necessary function in the scientific process. From the perspective of narrative knowing, then, the criteria for theory assessment become encapsulated in the set of, and in the relations among, the explanations themselves. The primary and overarching criterion is the narrative form itself (i.e., coherence). Following from this, more specific criteria such as logical consistency, agreement with other accepted theories, and parsimony are admitted as they contribute to the narrative coherence. Within epistemological rationalism, then, narrative knowing can be seen as a truncated form of empirical knowing. Both agree that coherence of explanation and subsidiary criteria that contribute to this coherence (and hence to plausibililty) is a primary criterion of theory acceptance. This means that both agree that ultimately “scientific theory is governed in substantial degree by what are essentially aesthetic forms” (Gergen & Gergen, 1986). However, empirical scientific knowing insists that coherence extend to the idea of empirical support, not as a mere ornamental device but as a necessary feature of the knowing process. Possibly there is some room for further agreement on this; it should be noted that some recent narrative proposals (Gergen & Gergen, 1986; Spence, 1982) have suggested that mature narrative explanations will include causal components. When it is recognized that research methods provide the means for increasing the plausiblity of causal-r, more generally, associative-components, the two forms of knowing become integrated. This integration provides powerful support to the structure of an empirical scientific developmental theory that entails both universal and particular, pattern and material, and eternal and historical explanation but that does

34

Willis F. Overton

not offer these in the context of an absolute, fixed, unchanging, mind-independent, objective reality. The integration also offers such a developmental theory as one that adheres to the general aim of empirical science, that is, the establishment of a systematic body of knowledge controlled by observational evidence.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank Jay Efran. Bonnie Howard, and Robert Ricco for their critical comments on earlier drafts. I also thank Elsa Efran for her helpful editorial assistance.

REFERENCES Ainsworth, M. S. D., Blehar, M. C., Waters. E., and Wall, S. (1978). Parterns of attachment. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Barratt, B. B. (1984). Psychic reality and psychoanalytic knowing. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Beilin, H. (1983). The new functionalism and Piaget's program. In E. K. Scholnick (Ed.), New rrends in conceptual representation: Challenges to Piaget 'stheory? (pp. 3-40). Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum. Beilin, H. (1984). Functionalist and structuralist research programs in developmental psychology: Incommensurability or synthesis? In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 18, pp. 245-257). New York: Academic Press. Bertalanffy, L. (1968). General system theory. New York: George Braziller. Bowlby, J. (1987). Defensive processes in the light of attachment theory. In J. L. Sacksteder, D. P. Schwartz, and Y. Akabane (Eds.), Atrachment and the therapeutic process. Madison, CT: International Universities Press. Bowers, K. S. (1973). Situationism in psychology: An analysis and a critique. Psychological Review, 80,307-336. Bruner, J . (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bunge, M. (1963). Causalify: The place of rhe causal principle in modern science. New York: Meridian. Churchland, P. M. (1979). Scientific realism and the plasticiry of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67-90. Churchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy. Cambridge, M A MIT Press. Davies, P. (1980). Other w r l d s . New York: Simon and Schuster. Davies, P. (1983). God and the new physics. New York: Simon and Schuster. Eddington, A. (1958). The philosophy of physical science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Fine, A. (1984). The natural ontological attitude. In J. Lepin (Ed.), Scientific realism (pp. 83-107). Berke1ey:University of California Press. Flavell, J. H. (1985). Cugnifive development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Gadamer, H. (1977). Philusuphical hermeneutics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gergen, K. J. and Gergen, M. M. (1986). Narrative form and the construction of psychological science. In T. R. Sarbin (Ed.), Narrative psychology (pp. 2 2 4 4 ) . New York: Praeger. Gibson, E. J. (1983). Development of knowledge about intermodal unity: Two views. In L. S . Liben (Ed.), Piaget and the foundation of knowledge (pp. 1 9 4 1 ) . Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological upproach to visual perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Gleick, J. (1987). Chuov: Making o f u new science. New York: Viking. Gould, S. J. ( 1987). Time’smrow rime’scycle: Myth and metaplior in the discoirry of gecilogical time. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Greenberg, J. R., and Mitchell. S. A. (19x3). Object relurions in ps\:chocriia!\~tic/lieor\:. Cambridge. MA: Haward University Press. Hanson, N. R. ( 1958). Putterns of discovery. London: Cambridge University Press. Harrr, R. (1986). Vurieries of rcalism. New York: Basil Blackwell. Habermas, J . (1971). Knowledge and hutnun interests. (J. J. Shapiro. Trans.). London: Heinemann. Habermas. J. (1 979). Communicu/ion and the etalittion of sncirty. Boston: Beacon Press. Heisenberg, W. (1958). P/iy.sics and phiki.sof~hy.Ncw York: Harper and Row. Hinde, R. A. (19x7). Attachment: Some conceptual and biological issues. I n C. M. Parkcs and J. Stevenson-Hinde (Eds.), Tlic place of uttuclimcrtt in Iritmnn heltai~iar.New York: Basic Books. Johnson, M. (1987). The body in fhe mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Katr, J. (1990). The metaphysics of meuning. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. Kail. R., and Bisanz, J. (19x2). Cognitive development: An information-processing perspectivc. In R. Vasta (Ed.), Srruregit~sand techniques of child study. (pp. 209-243). New York: Academic Press. Keating, D. P. (1990). Structuralism, deconstruction. reconstruction: the limits of reasoning. In W. F. Overton (Ed.), Reasoning, necessity, and logic: dei~elopmen/ul per.specrives (pp. 299-3 19). Hillsdalc, NJ: Erlbaum. Kessen, W. (1984). Introduction: ‘The end of the age of development. In R. J. Sternherg (Ed.), Mecliariisms of cognitive dtwlopmenr (pp. 1-1 7). New York: W. H. Freeman. Kuhn. T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific reidurionr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kuhn. T. S. (1977). The e.wntiul tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Vol. I). Lakatos. 1. ( 1978). The methodology of .scientific rcsurch pro~rumtws:Philo.sc~pphicalpu/~rr:s London: Cambridge University Press. Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fir<,, and dangerous t l i i n p : LV/iur catc~gariesreveal about the mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Laudan. L. ( 1977). Progress und its pr(iblems: Towrrrcic a 1heor.y of .scieri/ific growth. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lauditn, L. (19x4). Science and i:ulues: The aims of sc~ienceund their role in scienrific debate. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Lepin, J. (Ed.) (1984). Scientific. reulisn. Berkeley: University of California Press. Liben. L. A. (1987). Information processing and Piagetian theory: conflict or congruence? In L. S. Liben (Ed.), Dei.eopment und learning: Conflict or congruence (pp. 109-132). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Lerner, R. M. (197X). Nature, nurture, and dynamic interactionism. Human Developmcwt, 21, 1-20. Lerner. R. M., and Kauffman, M. B. (19x5). The concept of development in contextualism. Developmental Rrliew, 5, 309-333. Mandler, J. (1983).Structural invariants in dcvelopment. I n L. S. Liben (Ed.), Piaget and tliefouttdution ofktrow1t~fg:r~ (pp. 97-124). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Maturana. H., and Varcla. F. (1980). Autopoiesis arid cognition. Boston studies in philosophical science (Vol. 47). Boston: Keidel. Maturana, H., and Varela, F. (1987). The tree of knowledge: The hiologicol roots of itndersfanding. Boston: New Science Library. Mischel. W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization of personality. P.sycho/ogical Review! 80, 152-283. Mayr, E. (1982). The growth of biological thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Monod, J. (1974). Chance arid necessity. London: William Collins Kr Sons. Nagel. E. (1967). The nature and aim of science. In S . Morgenhesser (Ed.), Philosophy ofscience today (pp. 5-13). New York: Basic Books.

36

Willis F. Overton

Nagel, E. (1979). The sfructure of scimce (2nd Ed.). Cambridge, MA: Hackett. O’Bricn, D. P., Costa, G. and Overton, W. F. (1986). Evaluations of causal and conditional hypotheses. Quarterly Journal of Experinienfa/P-sychology, 38A, 493-5 12. Overton, W. F. (1973). On the assumptive base of the nature-nurture controversy: Additive versus interactive conceptions. Human Development, 16, 74-89. Overton, W. F. (1975). General systems, structure and development. In K. F. Riegel and G. C. Rosenwald (Eds.), Sfructure and transformation (pp. 61-81). New York: John Wiley & Sons. Overton, W. F. (1984). World views and their influence on psychological theory and research: Kuhn-Lakatos-Laudan. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 18) (pp. 191-226). New York Academic Press. Overton, W. F. (1985). Scientific methodologies and the competence-moderator-performance issue. In E. D. Neimark. R. De Lisi. and J. L. Newman (Eds.), Moderators of competence (pp. 1 5 4 1 ) . Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Overton. W. F. ( I Y Y la). Competence, procedures, and hardware: conceptual and empirical considerdlions. In M. Chandler and M. Chapman (Eds.), Criteria for competence: Controversies in /he assessment of children ’s abilities. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Overton, W. F. (I99 Ib). Historical and contemporary perspectives of development and research strategies. In R. Downs, L. Liben. and D. Palermo (Eds.), Visions ofaesthetics, the environment, and development: The legacy ofdoarhirn F. Wohlwill. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Overton, W. F., and Horowitz, H. A. (1Y91). Developmental psychopathology: Differentiations and integrations. In D. Cicchetti and S. Toth (Eds.), Rochester symposium on developmental psychopatholugy (Vol. 3). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Overton. W. F.. and Reese, H. W. (1981). Conceptual prerequisites for an understanding of stabilitychange and continuity-discontinuity. Iiirmiational Journal of Behurioral Development, 4, Y9123.

Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheres. Berkeley: University of California Press. Perlmutter, M. (Ed.) (1986). Perspectives on intellectual developmenf: The Minnesota symposia on child psychology (Vol. 19). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlhaum. Piaget, J. (1967). Six psychological studies. New York: Random House. Popper, K. (195Y). The logic ofscientific discovery. New York: Basic Books. Prigogine, I., and Stengers, 1. (1984). Order ouf of chaos: Man’s new dialogue with nature. New York: Bantam Books. Putnam, H. (lY81). Reason, truth and hisro,:y. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Putnam. H. (1983). Realism arid reason. Philoso~~hicalpapers (Vol. 3). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Putnam. H. (1987). The marly faces of realivm. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, H. (1088). Representation and reulity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ricoeur, P. (1984). Time and narrative (Vol. 1). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rorty, R. (1982). The consequences of pragma/i.sm. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Rorty, R. ( 1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge. MA: Cambridge University Press. Rosen, H. (1986). Piagetian dimensions of clinical relevance. New York: Columbia University Press. Sarbin, T. R. (Ed.) (1986). Narrative psychology. New York: Praeger. Scholnick, E. K. (1983). Why are new trends in conceptual representation a challenge to Piaget’s theory? In E. K. Scholnick (Ed.), New trends in conceptual representation: Challmges to Piuget ‘.s theory (pp. 41-70). Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum. Shapere. D. (1977). Scientific theories and their domains. In F. Suppe (Ed.), The structure ofscientific theories (2nd Ed.). Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Siegler, R. S. and Shipley, C. (1987). The role of learning in children’s strategy choices. In L. S. Liben (Ed.), Developmeni and learning: Conjiict or congruence (pp. 7 1-108). Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum.

Silverman. H. J., and Ihde. D. (Eds.) ( 1985). Herrrrcnruric.s und duconrrrrrcriorr. Albany: State University of New York Press. . York: Macmillan. Skinner, B. F. (1974). Scri~ncrt r n d / n r m d n h P / l U i ~ I ( J ~New Sprncr, D. P. (1YX2). Nurrutiw /ru/h untl /ii.s/oric-ul frnrh. Ncw York: Norton. , , 1 184-1 190. Sroufc. I.. A ( 1977). Attachment as a n organizational construct. Child I > e l , i , l o / ~ r ~ t i , t r48, Stacc, W. T. (1924). ThP plriloao~phyof Hegel. New York: Dover. Stolzenberg. G. (19x4). Can an inquiry into the foundations of mathematics tell us anything intercsting about mind” In P. Watzlawick (Ed.). 7lte im,enrcd reufity (pp. 257-308). New York: Norton. Sugarman. S . ( 1987a). The prioirty of description in developmental psychology. I~r/enrufioNulJo~tr,rul of Bc~ltui~iorul Dc~idoptnenr.10, 30 1 3 14. Sugarman. S. (1087h). Reply to Peter Brymt. In[ernufionu/Journul (11Be/iai~roru/D~,i,c.lol,rtlcrr/, 10, 123121. Suppr. F. (Ed.) (IY77). Tlw W w ’ f i r r cofscieMific rhrorio (2nd Ed.). Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Von Foerster. H , ( I Y X J ) . On constructing 21 reality. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.). The i r r i ~ c ~ n l crcwliry tl (pp. 41-61). New York: Norton. Toronto: Macmillan. Wartofsky. M. ( IOhX). Conctprrul finordution,s of .scicwti/ic t/rou~/~:ltr. Werner, H. (1957). The concept of development from a comparative and organismic point of view. In D B Ihrris (Ed.). Tlw c i i n w p f of tliwk~pmctir:.Ail i r r u e in //re S / I U / J of Intrnun hdicwior. Minneapolis: Univrrsity of Minnesota Press.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

QUESTIONS A SATISFYING DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY WOULD ANSWER: THE SCOPE OF A COMPLETE EXPLANATION OF DEVELOPMENT PHENOMENA

Frank B. Murray COLLEGE O F EDUCATION LlNlVEKSlTY OF DELAWARE NEWARK. DELAWARE 19710

I. INTRODUCTION I I . A GOOD DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY 111. SUMMARY

REFERENCE

No philosophy will permanently be deemed rational by all men which (in addition to meeting logical demands) does n o t . . . make a direct appeal to all those powers of our nature which we hold in highest esteem. (William James, 1960. p. 36)

I. Introduction Overton raises the question of how we can distinguish a good scientific theory of development from a merely adequate, or plainly inadequate, theory of development. The question is not unlike the issue raised in 1879 by the American philosopher-psychologist William James. In his Sentiment of Rationality he examined the features of philosophic theories that would lead to some being believed and taken as true because they generated a sentiment of rationality, while others were rejected as irrational because they did not generate such a sentiment. These theories would fail because they included some critical aspect that blocked the unimpeded flow of thought that gives rise, in the first place, to the feeling of 39 ADVANW('ES IN CHILD D t V t L O P M t N l AND BEHAVIOR. VOL 2 3

('r,pyright 0 I W I hy Acadcniic Prc% Inc. All riphic 01 reproductiiin in any form reserved.

40

Frank B. Murruy

rationality (James, 1960).James concluded that no theory could or would ever win universal acceptance because there are intractable and pervasive differences in the ways human beings know things. These differences inevitably favor some theories over others. Consequently, no single theory could be seen as rational by all persons, even all competent investigators and thinkers, because the criteria for what is rational and reasonable, like the criteria for what is beautiful or fearsome, are rooted in sentiment and preference. Large numbers of people-the toughminded, action-oriented, practical, as James saw them-will always “feel” that some propositions are irrationally held by others-and tender-minded, idealist, humanistic in James’s account-who see these same propositions as self-evident necessities. The tough-minded and tender-minded will quarrel because the judgment that an argument or assertion is rational is essentially an emotional response, or an aesthetic response, rooted in each group’s strong preferences to see the world in ways different from the other’s. In Overton’s terms both the rationalist and realist researchers think the other has irrationally missed the point of science and consequently their subsequently derived experiments and theories are seen by the others as contaminated and flawed by their respective views of what is real, true, and important. It is not so much that each sees the other’s theory as wrong as it is that each sees the other’s theory as irrelevant and therefore irrational. Overton comes to a conclusion similar to James’s about the criteria for a good scientific theory of development. The choice between rival theories of development inevitably entails a choice between philosophical tough- and tender-minded values. These values, in Overton’s account, are rooted in the realist and rationalist traditions, each of which has the consequences Overton clearly spells out for developmental theory insofar as each takes a differing and distinct view of what is the “real”-either as what is discovered or what is invented-and the “true”either as what conforms to nature or what is consistent with other propositions.

11. A Good Developmental Theory Nevertheless, can science go beyond the apparent incompatibility of the realist and rationalist assumptions and traditions, as Overton has portrayed them, to the establishment of a good developmental theory that captures and makes sense of what is known and firmly established in each research tradition? How can the admitted limitations of each tradition be overcome to produce a good developmental theory, namely, a satisfying, complete, and plausible account of developmental phenomena that will generate the sentiment of rationality? Phenomena, no matter how precisely measured, envisioned, or determined, still beg for explanation and a way for scientists to think about them that will yield the feeling that the phenomenon is understood fully. Can there not be a set of interrelated propositions whose truth could rest as much in their correspondence with empirical events as

in their coherence and consistency with other propositions and systems of thought‘? To use Overton’s example (p. 14), if the equestrian sculpture in Eddington’s illustration is beautiful and satisfying, does it really matter whether the sculptor (i.e., the scientist) acted as though he or she were merely “finding” the horse within the marble block by chipping away until it was discovered, or whether the sculptor felt instead that the horse was, by the very same acts, constructed and invented by the sculptor? In other words, if a difference doesn’t make a difference in something, perhaps it doesn’t make any difference! An academic discipline advances and develops when long-standing polarities and dichotomies within the discipline-like qualitative and quantitative change or correspondence and coherence-come to be seen as having a common dimension that ties them together in some respect. Owing to the invention of a common dimension, which makes the polar opposites similar in some respect, our thinking can move beyond the putative contradictions that otherwise block our thinking and problem solution. For example, the “realistic” notion of objectively received commonscnse facts gives way easily, as Overton documents, in the face of evidence from several sources that all objective “facts” are theory-laden and subjective. Evcn the notion of “common sense” is itself a theoretical abstraction of the data from all the senses. It is an invention, a construct, for what each sense held in common with the othcr senses but which was not experienced directly by any sense modality. The bedrock objective facts of psychology (e.g., the scientific building blocks of “stimulus” and “response”) can only be determined in reference to some other set of propositions that tell us such basic things as how many stimuli and responses there are in a situation. Consider, for example, the prototypical case of Piagetian conservation, namely, that after an experimenter spreads five marbles over a wider area, the child observes and asserts, “There are as many marbles as before.” Has the child given one response, two responses (one for the subject and one for the predicate of the statement), seven responses (one for each word), five responses (one for each marble), or some other number’? Apart from the number of responses, what kind of response is it‘? Is it primarily a perceptual response, a linguistic response, a logical response, a cognitive-developmental response, a learned response, and so forth? Similarly, how would we know how many stimuli were responded to by the child in this instance without recourse to some other view of what the child was thinking about when confronted with this problem? Thus, the question we are really dealing with is the degree of surplus, o r nonoperationalized, meaning that inevitably attaches itself to every empirical observation, not whether there is any nonoperationalized or surplus meaning. At the outset of our scientific inquiry, regardless of our theoretical orientation, we take an interpretation of both the identity and quantity of the stimulus and response as the basic datum of the science. The issue is not whether the science begins with interpretive, as opposed to objectively given, data but the degree and

42

Frank B. Murray

clarity of the interpretation. The question of what makes a good developmental theory in this instance comes down to an issue of the magnitude of interpretation and the degree of surplus meaning that, under the rules of parsimony, must be accommodated within the theory to give a satisfying and problem-free account of the phenomena the theory is constructed to explain and make intelligible. What must we have from a good developmental theory? What questions must it answer about the phenomena it attempts to explain? What problems must it resolve or eliminate? All developmental phenomena have more or less the same basic form-there is some change in behavior that takes place over a relatively long period of time (weeks, months, and years as opposed to seconds, minutes, hours, and days). What must a good theory tell us about this change? Contemporary scholarship points to 10 categories of information that a good theory must address: 1. The Form or Pattern. We need to have a way to identify, name, or define the phenomenon, i.e., a way to distinguish it from other phenomena. This inevitably means that we must have a way to measure it and perhaps produce it. The act of naming or defining carries the risk that more may be thought to be known and understood than really is, but it is an essential part of any theory, particularly at the beginning, to delineate and name the phenomenon in this way. Thus, we call the child’s response to the shifting marbles “conservation” and thereby mark it off from other phenomena and begin the act of knowing and making sense of it. More than the name of the phenomena, we ask the good theory to tell us the underlying structure, pattern, and organization of the stimuli and responses that make up the phenomenon. What criteria must be met before a pattern of behavior can legitimately claim the label “conservation?” Furthermore, we ask that more inclusive and powerful structures and patterns be identified because these would show how conservation might be connected with other developmental phenomena, like seriation, class inclusion, transitivity, decentration, horizontality, and so forth. Piaget’s theory, for example, provided such a structure, the construct operativify, to hold together these apparently separate collections of responses to stimuli. These very different responses to stimuli are claimed to be the same response insofar as each is claimed to be a manifestation of the same underlying structure or pattern of organization. 2. Efficient Cause. We ask the good theory to tell us the causes of the phenomenon, the necessary and sufficient conditions for it (i.e., the eliciting conditions). This is not to say that the specifications of the necessary and sufficient conditions constitute the whole account or explanation, but only that they are a part of the story, so to speak, and without their specification a theory would not be satisfying. Thus, we want to know under what conditions the child will assert that there are as many marbles as there were before, and under what conditions the child will claim there are more or fewer marbles as a result of the experimenter’s actions.

3. Mechaizisms. The good theory will tell us what mental mechanisms produce the phenomenon. HOWdo these mechanisms function and how, over the time span during which the change takes place, do they actually produce the change? In the conservation of number example, what role do the mechanisms of learning, social interaction, imitation, cognitive dissonance. mediation, maturation, perception, and so forth play in the child’s exhibition of the phenomenon of conservation? How do they lead the nonconserving child to give conservation responses’? Moreover, are there mechanisms that are uniquely developmental? Are there new mechanisms that simply must be invented (or discovered) to account for the phenomenon; or will more parsimonious mechanisms, mechanisms that are at work in nondevelopmental phenomena, suffice to account for the events researchers document? 4. The Developmental End-point. We assume that the changes we label as developmental are unidirectional, that they lead to a final stage, that there is a developmental goal, and we ask that the good theory have a way to specify what the developmental end state is. The earlier steps or stages in a developmental sequence of behaviors are made more intelligible by our knowledge of the endpoint toward which they are progressing even though the later perids cannot in any way be the efficient cause of the earlier events because of the unidirectional character of time. Later events cannot cause earlier events, but they can help us make sense of the earlier events by showing what the earlier events lead to. A child’s nonconservation response, for example, that the number of marbles changed as they were spread out would make more sense if we had a way to see what role these “errors,” which are consistent with each other, played in the child’s subsequent error-free and mature evaluation of the same problem. The very placing of a phenomenon in a developmental sequence and process confers a high degree of intelligibility on it by virtue of securing a place for it in a high-level pattern. Conservation, for example, makes more sense when seen as an instance of a child’s newly acquired notion of logical necessity and not merely as an episodic peculiarity of a young child’s thought. The illumination of the endpoint of the developmental chain often demonstrates the inadequacy of the “nondevelopmental” mechanisms to account fully for the phenomenon because usually none has a way to capture the direction of the changes. While the mechanisms mentioned above are adequate in most instances to account for the nonconserving child’s eventual acquisition of conservation, they are in a sense too primitive and powerful because they also require that, often as not, the conserving child acquire nonconservation. They account for all changes symmetrically, without regard to a particular direction. Like Overton’s lovely example of the dispersed dye, which, owing to the higher order principle of increased entropy, never reconfigures itself into a concentrated drop of dyedespite the fact that Brownian motion would permit it-the conserving child simply does not become a nonconserving one even though the conserver’s “acqui-

44

Frunk B. Murray

sition” of nonconservation is permitted by all the known nondevelopmental mechanisms. Thus, some higher order mechanism or principle must account for the large-scale movement of cognitive structure in a single direction-preoperativity to operativity in the case of Piagetian theory, for example. We expect a good theory of development to illuminate the nature of this higher order guiding mechanism. In fact, the good theory is largely about this higher order principle because it makes sense of the directional movement of development. The nature of this principle, or higher order mechanism, is an area of research and theorizing that has stubbornly remained in doubt and contested in contemporary work in the field. It must be conceded that the specification of the endpoint of an open-ended system is nonbinding with respect to any particular outcome. In the same way, the principles of biological evolution are adequate to account for a chain of species development, but they are not of sufficient power to predict the final outcome of species development. Similarly, we would not expect the good theory of cognitive development, for example, to specify the content of thought, but only its general form and power. The specification of the endpoint of development entails, by implication, the specification of the other end of the developmental scale, namely, the point of departure. It is helpful to know why the earlier periods fail to hold the developing mind at that point or stage for a longer time even without knowing the character of the next stage or period. Because of the open-ended character of development and the potential for inherently unpredictable outcomes of mental functioning and accomplishment, it may be inevitable that theorists will always understand more of where the mind has been, so to speak, than where it is going. Moreover, the good theory may provide a way to think about better developmental outcomes. Given that many developmental outcomes are possible, and that just as many evolutionary solutions are possible for species development, the good theory could be asked to account for, identify, explain, and clarify the better of the available outcomes, outcomes that maximize what it means to be human. We ask that the good theory critically examine the developmental outcomes that appear to be necessary and unalterable to determine whether they are really just one of a range of possible developmental outcomes. 5. The Meaning of the Phenomenon. Unlike other natural phenomena, behavioral phenomena have the attribute of intentionality insofar as it makes sense to raise the question of what a child, for example, meant or intended by an action. We expect the good theory to address the questions of what the actor intended or meant and what the behavioral phenomenon signifies or means because its uniqueness as a phenomenon resides in its meaning. Apart from what the child may have meant or intended in his claim that the number of marbles was the same, for example, the question of the meaning or significance of the phenomenon is a microversion of the question of the endpoint of development. It is an inquiry into the purpose and significance of some aspect of development. In this sense the

meaning of the behavioral change may be quite different from what the child meant or intended just as the meaning of a work of art may be, in the end, quite different from what the artist intended. Just as there is no single interpretation of a text, apart from a framework of interpretation, one would not expect that there could be a single meaning of a behavioral phenomenon that is unrelated to a theory or an interpretative framework that could give meaning to the event. To raise the question of what passages in the Bible or U.S. Constitution mean is to raise precisely the same question as what a particular developmental change means. Transliteration is not translation of text and is unsatisfying because meaning is lost-even though transliteration, like positivism, assumes ii unique, objective, and straightforward connection between the texts in question (or between theory and fact, or one reality and another). While many different theories, interpretations. translations, and so forth may be compatible with the same “facts” or texts, progress is made because it can be shown that some theories and interpretations are incompatible with them and must be discarded because they simply will not work as interpretations and translations. They lead to inconsistencies and incoherence in the relationships between the facts or text and the interpretation, and also within the components of the interpretation itself. 6. Reductionist Mrchuriistns. Owing only to the universal commitment to the principle of the unity of science, we would expect that the mental mechanisms that heretofore had a place within the good developmental theory would become tied to physical events and processes within the body. In a similar way the constructs “gene” and “vitamin,” initially proposed as wholly hypothetical constructs, eventually came to be seen as physical entities. This is not to say that the truth of a good developmental theory lies in its physical verification because the findings of developmental research, and all behavioral research for that matter, are true on their own terms. They simply happen that way. It is only to say that the good theory must have the potential for coherence with the other sciences, particularly the biological sciences. The link between the onset of conservation, for example, and a marked increase in brain lateralization, brain surface, the completion of myelination, increases in EEG alpha activity, and increases in working memory is undoubtedly part of the complete scientific account of the conservation phenomenon. 7. Deductive Formalism. Virtually every scientific researcher knows that the way the science is actually conducted is not adequately captured by school accounts of the scientific method. While the logic of discovery and the logic of justifcation arc different, we do expect that the good theory will at some point have a form such that items to be explained are explained by virtue of their being implications of general principles of the theory. The fact that the Pythagorean relation was known and established independently of the formal system i n which it finally came to have a place as a theorem does not take away from the point that

46

Frank B. Murray

a greater degree of understanding is conferred by virtue of the fact that it can be deduced from 47 prior propositions in Euclid’s system. The appeal for a deductive formalism in the good developmental theory does not mean that theory building needs to proceed by that route, but only that there be a version of the theory that can be expressed in the fashion of the hypothetical-deductive sciences-again in conformity with the unity of science principle. 8. Cohort Specification. The life-span research community has documented that generational effects compromise the generality of many developmental findings, like the shape of the growth of intelligence function, for example. Thus, the good developmental theory would not view cohort membership as merely a noisy source of experimental error to be methodologically corrected but rather as an integral part of the phenomenon under consideration. Of course, one would expect that cohort, or time of the subject’s birth, is merely a proxy variable for some yet-to-be discovered factors that operated during a particular historical period, and that these factors would significantly alter the scientific findings that are reported in research paradigms that were not sensitive to generational factors. The good theory would have addressed these. For example, to continue with the nonconservation/conservation literature, it remains to be explained why the very same experimental procedures that failed to train nonconservers to conserve in the 1960s succeeded to a much greater degree in the 1980s. 9. Cultural and Social Determinants. The identification of factors and mechanisms that operate uniquely in particular historical periods, but not in other periods, has led researchers to consider a much wider range of contextual and interactive factors, factors that in earlier research paradigms would have simply been controlled experimentally or statistically because they were viewed either as uninteresting noise, however potent, or as factors whose investigation had to be postponed until more powerful research techniques became available. The pervasive character of these context-specific factors, however, demonstrated in virtually every area of developmental psychology, has meant that consideration of these troublesome factors can no longer be postponed or ignored. At thc moment we are hard pressed to understand why the conservation problems, for example, are more difficult when they are about length rather than number, continuous rather than discontinuous materials, or why the weight of a clay ball would be seen by a young child to change in different amounts when the ball was made colder rather than warmer, rougher rather than smoother, longer rather than wider, in familiar rather than unfamiliar shapes, and so on. We are equally hard pressed to see how and why some groups of children, e.g., American Indians in the Southwest, are not “fooled” as much by these problems about the clay bail’s weight as other children appear to be, or why Bedouin children are not “fooled” its much as others about conservation of liquid amount. In virtually every domain of developmental psychology, substantial effects can be attributed to factors that appear to be features of a particular context, social or cultural group, geographic location,

historical time period, and so forth. Obviously the successful theory will find a way to make sense of this-at the moment-bewildering array of context-specific influential factors. 10. The Theorist. The interdependence of fact and theory or text and interpretalion leads to an examination of the theorist as a person and thinker. The interpretive framework that allows events to he “facts” in a science is shaped presumably by personal features of the theorist that heretofore were considered irrelevant when science was viewed exclusively iis objective and self-correcting. At the moment we can only speculate how Piaget’s account of moral development would differ had it been formulated outside Protestant Geneva. or how Skinner’s account of learning would differ had it not been formulated by an American, and so forth. However, as theories are invariably written and otherwise promulgated, their meaning is also subject to all the hermeneutic issues implicated in the attempt to specify the meaning and significance of a developmental change in mental functioning in the first place.

111. Summary The good theory of human development is a complete theory, a theory that addresses the 10 points cited above. While the good theory cannot be about a set of a priori and objective facts, i t is ncvertheless about a set of facts that control the degree to which theory and interpretation correspond to them and are also consistent with other propositions in the theory and with other theories. Correspondence and consistency are compatible attributes of the good theory and are achieved through a dialectical exchange between a community o f investigators that demands, in the end, that some theories and accounts be discarded because they fail to conform to the facts, as they were established in the theory, or because they lead to a r-eductio ahsurdurn with regard to other established propositions. They fail, in other words. because they fail to sustain a sentiment of rationality.

REFERENCE James. W. (1960). The sentiment of rationality. In Auhrey C;istell (Ed.). Es.~aysIn prugnimi.vn (pp. 3-36). New York: Hafner.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD VIEWS: TOWARD FUTURE SYNTHESIS?

Ellin Kojiky Sctiolnick DEPARTMENT OF PSYC‘HOLOCII’ UNIVERSITY 01:MARYLAND (‘OLLEGE PARK. MARYLAND ?1)71?

1. INTRODUCTION

II. DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGES IN OVERTON‘S THEORY A. DEFINING WORLD VIEWS B. ELABORATING THEIR IMPLICATIONS C’. DEALING WITH INHERENT TENSIONS REFERE;NCES

I. Introduction Developmental psychologists have a definitional problem. Although they study the course of change, they have competitors who also study change, labeling it as learning, personality reorganization, history, or even measurement unreliability. Since psychology often divides itself into content areas like personality or perception, those subdivisions may subsume or ignore another framework that examines changes from a unified temporal perspective. So developmental psychologists often find themselves members of a threatened species in danger of being identified solely as students of other processes of change such as learning, or as members of other disciplines studying perception, cognition, or social processes in exotic organisms such as the infant. The self-reflective developmentalist, therefore, confronts the problems of defining what is unique and valuable about the discipline and of understanding why that discipline is always on the verge of extinction. Willis Overton’s chapter (“The Structure of Developmental Theory,” this volume) is an explicit and elegant analysis of the developmentalist’s quandry. In it he argues persuasively that the controversy over the definition of developmental 49 ADVANCLS IN (’HILI> DEVELOPMtNl AND BEHAVIOK. VOL 2 3

Copyright 0 I Y Y I hy Acadeiiiic Prcts. Inc All rights 01 reproducrion in any kirm rcsewud

50

Ellin Kofsky Scholnick

psychology is not just a fight over turf, but a battle over appropriate ways to see the world and to validate claims about it. He also asserts that one particular world view is most conducive to the preservation of developmental psychology. The very question, what should a good scientific theory of development look like‘?sets up the argument because it reflects a world view. Overton’s characterization of science as a “search for systematic patterns of knowledge” and the title of his chapter, “The Structure of Developmental Theory,” are most meaningful from a perspective that values system, pattern, and knowledge, and that seeks to explore the criteria defining a good system. As he points out, realist-empiricists minimize the role of theory, and thus find the question irrelevant. Overton’s chapter shifts the focus of scientific inquiry from the correspondence of data with generalizations to evaluations of scientific theory as a body of axioms to be judged by consistency, coherence, parsimony, and so forth. If theories are judged to be good because they are coherent and well organized, and they account for a world that is badly in need of organization, then a developmental theory must account for the origin and course of organization. In contrast, if thc organism is seen as a set of modules, not a system, and change is seen as externally imposed rather than internal, there is no discipline of developmental psychology. It would be better to study the operation of external variables and the patterns they produce in different domains and in different organisms. Developmental psychology would simply be a synonym for experimental child psychology or learning. Several chapters have been written challenging Overton’s perspective (see the Overton-Beilin-Gholson-Palermo debate in Reese, 1984). The debates lend credence to Reese and Overton’s (1970) claim that metaphysics, definitions of science, and approaches to development are intertwined. The attacks on an analysis of world views often arise from perspectives that are not subjectivist in their conceptions of psychology, science, or philosophy. To concede that there are world views would require a psychological theory accounting for subjectivity. Hence the debate is external to the framework of Overton’s analysis. There are provocative internal questions. Are there rationalist theories that are not organismic or that are based on a theory of the organism different from the one Overton describes? In terms of its own criteria of evaluation, how good an analysis of development is it? Because Overton’s analysis is metatheoretical, he does not explicitly claim that one organismic theory has developmental priority and he does not contrast competing organismic approaches in great detail. The reader is referred to Lakoff (1987) and McCauley (1987) for such analyses. I wish to focus primarily on evaluating the developmental analysis on its own terms, although it may be difficult to do so without being accused of changing perspectives out of that framework. In that framework, a good theory is coherent, intelligible, and capable of reducing the ratio of problems solved to problems left unresolved. 1 begin by describing the development of Overton’s analysis of developmental theory and illustrate how it has broadened in scope and led to a deeper under-

standing of developmental theory and method. This framework has also produced problems for Overton. 1 explore how he has handled the challenges and discuss alternative means of resolving them.

11. Developmental Changes in Overton's Theory A. DEFINING WORLD VIEWS

In the early 1970s Reese and Overton (1970; Overton & Reese, 1973) began to apply contemporary analyses of the philosophy of science to bring order to developmental theory. They noted that two opposing, mutually exclusive metaphysical views dictated different approaches to developmental psychology. One uses the machine as a metaphor, and the other. the growing organism. Overton and Reese spelled out the implications of these metaphors or world views for the content of development that was to be explained and the kind of explanations chosen. The mechanistic metaphor carries with it a focus on static parts that are assembled and then launched into motion by external forces. In the mechanistic program. developmentalists define the forces that both initiate the process and guide its direction. Development is never self-propelling, and its direction is not determined in advance but is responsive to the nature of forces operating at any given time. Because machines are not living or self-starting, once a machine is built it can merely increase or decrease its efficiency and speed of operation. A machine cannot reorganize itself. Development is quantitative and the best (most developed) machine operates more efficiently in situations in which users employ it. Maybe the most mature person is most knowledgeable about which machines to employ. The organic metaphor is based on animacy, and that metaphor carries with it self-propelled or intrinsically governed growth that is determined by some overall, initial ground plan built into the organism. Because organic systems are inherently organized, dynamic, and at some level purposive, the task of an organismic developmentalist is to capture the pattern of the individual at any one time and the pattern of change over time. The organic metaphor, which applies to the emergence of flowers and fruit from seeds and toads from tadpoles. also implies that the patterns that emerge will be novel (not predictable from past components) and yet regulated (predictably better than its predecessors). The two views lend themselves to different scientific methodologies. The mechanistic view leads to simulation of development by training experiments, use of stimulus complexity to index developmental challenge, causal modeling, and analysis of variance. Correlational analyses and multidimensional scaling may be favored tools of the organismic researcher although psychology seems sadly lacking in powerful methods of detecting how patterns change over time (see Porges, 1979).

52

Ellin Kojsky Scholnick B. ELABORATING THEIR IMPLICATIONS

As Overton developed these metaphors for developmental theories, the analysis became more consistent, coherent, and generalizable. He elaborated the implications for categorizing families of developmental theories (Overton, 1985) and for predicting the location of theoretical controversies (see Bandura, 1986 as a prototype of a mechanistic attack on Piaget). Recently, Overton (1982, 1984,1985) emphasized how these metaphors are tied to different levels of explanation and different characterizations of science. The machine metaphor implies reductionism and particularism. Each part is composed of other parts, which are in turn composed of other parts, down to some primitives. Similarly, variables or forces are in turn the composite of other variables, acting in particular ways in particular situations. The emphasis on analysis favors objectivism and inductive science. The scientist uses lenses to peer ever more closely into nature to find elements not apparent to the naked eye and measures the forces that govern how those elements are set in motion. Science is a matter of simply focusing the lens down to the appropriate level. A theory is a lens that gives the finest grained picture with the minimum of distortion. It should correspond as closely as possible to the data under the assumption that the theory maker could directly and accurately apprehend the data. Disconfirming data lead to abandonment of a theory unless it can be demonstrated that the instrumentation and conditions of the experiment are at fault. In contrast Overton suggested that the organismic view, which describes progressive changes in systems, requires synthesis. Organismic theories become more powerful as they gain universality. In Overton’s perspective, the environment is not inherently organized and never changes predictably in that direction. Organisms do become organized. In order to deal with the environment, the observer must impose organization. That organization is inherently constrained by the observer’s own capacities for producing a synthesis or divining the pattern. Just as ontogenetic development is characterized by the construction of better theories of the environment, scientific theories develop and become more useful as they exhibit better organization (Le., become more coherent, more consistent, and broader in scope). Since theories do not grow from nature but from the interpreter of nature, an organismic theory ultimately must incorporate not merely a theory of a domain but a theory of theorizers and theory construction. So Overton increasingly focused on the implications of the “rationalist view” for descriptions of theory production and change. Scientists construct a set of core assumptions, ways to translate those core assumptions into testable experiments, and a research program defining interesting places to test those assumptions. As long as those assumptions yield fruitful problems and a reasonable number of confirmations, the theory remains intact. The core assumptions are never refutable by data, although the data may affect the way the hard core is translated into theories and research.

Creating u Synthesr.\

53

If the particular theory instantiating the hard core fails to solve problems or generate new problem areas, that theory might have to be reformulated. Whether theory change and cognitive development are similar is an interesting issue. Overton and Reese began with a categorization of world views and worked out its implications for developmental psychology. They claimed that a metaphysical view worked downward to influence definitions of science, of psychology, of developmental psychology, and the choice of methods used to study each. Each of Overton's successive chapters made more explicit these ramifications, adding new distinctions, e g , that organismic approaches are linked to explanations focusing on the universals while the mechanistic approach emphasizes the particulars of individual differences and contexts. Overton incorporated contemporary views of philosophy o f science consistent with the organismic view. He also broadened the definitional problem for developmental psychology. From the mechanistic perspective, developmental concerns are assimilated to the search for continuity. particularity, and realistic representational models. From an organismic view, renamed epistemological realism, scientific developmental psychology can be confused with hermeneutic and narrative ways of knowing.

C. DEALING WITH INHERENT TENSIONS

However, there are muted tensions within the analysis arising from the proposal of dichotomies and the incompatibilities these dichotomies produce. How does one reconcile opposites? The basic tension is not between organism and mechanism. but between descriptions of the knower and the known. Theories of the mind postulate a relationship between people and the environment they seek to understand. Knowledge is the product of the data and the cognizer. Mechanistic approaches usually downplay the role of the cognizer while exaggerating the impact of the environment, reducing cognition to perception and deduction to induction. Thus Overton has attached the label ontological reulism to these approaches. Rationalist-epistemologists may exaggerate the role of the cognizer at the expense of environmental determinants. The realist-rationalist controversy could be understood as a tug of war between the cognizer and the cognized. The two polar views are only incompatible under the assumption that discontinuity is pervasive and the environment and the knower are fundamentally different in kindl (even when we are trying to understand one another). This is Overton's perspective. He adopts the view that science usually aims at imposing order and organization onto the chaos of everyday experience. We can apprehend ' A deeper, correlated issue underlies these debates. Is definitional categorization. which create5 mutual exclusion and incompatibility, a good characterization of theories and concepts? (See Lakoff. 1987.)

54

Ellin Kofsky Scholnick

our experience directly through common sense, but the chaotic flux is not directly cognizable. Data are particular, unstable, and disorganized; the mind generates universal, stable systems of organization. Hence the knower and the known are qualitatively different, and perhaps the course of development can be described by transformations of the environment into forms compatible with the mind. Without a fundamental incompatibility between mind and matter, there would be no problem in the choosing between or reconciling world views. Overton and Reese also noted how the two world views generate incompatible language about science and incompatible ways of evaluating evidence. Hence there are scientific paradigms proliferating incompatible evidence and solving problems that seem important from one perspective but trivial to the other. Another incompatibility is evident in the data. Organismic theories are not faring well of late. It is very easy to find a situational, task, or individual variation that affects performance. Universal patterns of performance are harder to find in data. They remain as ideals. Like developmental psychology, the quest for universals seems endangered. Both the mechanistic and the organismic program eventually produce more problems than they can solve unless they are in some ways constrained by one another. A mechanistic, antecedent-consequent approach tends to generate lists of variables and tasks in minidomains. The fractionation leads to theories as diverse as the domains they model. There is the danger that an organismic theory can become so abstract that it explains everything and nothing. The realist-reductionist and rationalist-holistic theories are flying away from one another. The variables in the reductionist tradition need themselves to be patterned, and the patterns in the rationalist tradition need to be systematically tied to particulars. When two programs of research have entirely different agendas, different problem definitions, irrefutable core assumptions, and no common language, it is hard to evaluate either of them on neutral grounds. Each may capture a particular part of reality, so that the temptation to incorporate one set of findings into another is irresistible. Dichotomies present incoherence and inconsistency for theorizers who value just the opposite. Overton (1989, p. 629) states: Any general theory of behavior must ultimately offer explanations for change and stability, variation and constancy. . . . Explanations of the nature of variation and constancy-and the relationship between them-form the bedrock on which all othermore local+xplanations stand.

I . Organismic Imperialism The absence of means to resolve theoretical incompatibilities limits Overton’s analysis to a description of the current state of developmental theory. Overton clearly has broader aims. He wishes to advocate a program of research. His latest papers propose one way of resolving the incompatibility, an imperialist approach.

c'rruting a Synrliesis

55

That solution contrasts with two others: resolution by magnification and synthesis through emergence. The current essay reveals one attempt to reconcile opposing world views. Opposing world views can give rise to relativism without providing unbiased means of choice. The aim of the current Overton article is to describe a good scientific theory of development so that we can make a choice. Scientific theories always have an empirical component. Although theory is qualitatively different from data and not reducible to data, Overton states that scientific theory is constrained by the data gathered by observational methods. Hence a scientific theory must incorporate data and hypotheses. Yet the data have second-class citizenship. Cognizers invent the theory. Data exemplify the theory but cannot falsify it. The initial Overton-Reese analysis has also been extended and elaborated in discussions of competence as it is moderated. activated, and utilized in performance ( e g , Overton, 1985; Overton & Newman, 1982). Even in the original Overton-Reese analysis, the mechanistic and organismic views were not mutually exclusive. They included overlapping explanatory principles. Reese and Overton claimed that static mechanism requires an initiating force that instigates change (efficient cause) and a medium that embodies the force and is the target of that force (material cause). In contrast, the organismic position, which accounts for directed patterns, bases explanations on detection of organization (formal cause) or endpoint (final cause). However, it would be ironic if an organismic view existed without organs, and if growth, a process of transforming external nutrients into an inner system, existed without external influence. Hence, the organismic position is privileged because it really allows for all four forms of causation. Mechanists and organismic theorists also differ in their approach to structure (the organization that gives meaning to events and a perspective to the behaver) and function (the actions of a behaver). Presumably a purely mechanistic view eschews structure and only focuses on function in a particular environment, whereas a pure organismic position focuses on structure. By a slight change of meaning from use to purpose for which something is used, the organismic view can incorporate function and structure as well as particularism and universalism, external and internal forces into its perspective. Then the organismic view contains everything the mechanistic view does and more. But Overton limits the scope of mechanistic influences to slowing down, blocking, or moderating the activation and use of patterns. The environment can never create the patterns themselves. Being quantitative variables, external influences affect the rate of development. They lack the privileged status of organismic factors, to be partners in reciprocal causality or creation. In the next two sections, I present two other views that attempt to reconcile organism and mechanism through reciprocal causality and creation. When we adopt the moderator-activationiutilizationview, there is overlap between mechanism and organism and a neutral language for describing data and experiments.

Elliti Kofsky Scholnick

56

2. Magnification A mechanistic perspective can also incorporate an organismic approach. Overton describes world views metaphorically as lenses, each with different colors or distortions. The part-whole, predictive-teleological opposition might be reconciled through a different lens metaphor, based on levels of magnification. This quantitative metaphor has been used by Hofstadter and Dennett (1982; Hofstadter, 1980) to explore the feasibility and implications of simulating human intelligence by computers. Like Overton, Hofstadter posits two world views: the mechanism of hard sciences which values reductionism and antecedent-consequent relations, versus the soulism of soft science, which incorporates holism and teleology. However, among the many metaphors he uses to describe the relation between world views, Hofstadter cites reversible figures in which perspectives continually change. He also presents diagrams of words in which half of the letters spell holism, and these letters are in turn composed of parts spelling reductionism, which in turn are made up of elements composed of holism, etc. The other half of each word has levels in the opposite patterns, with reductionism the highest order element. The diagram illustrates reciprocal determination. Hofstadter argues that a shift in frames of reference can induce a shift of perceptions and concepts-a ways of perceiving causes and effects. (Hofstadter, 1980, p. 196)

shift in

The brain needs this multileveled structure because its mechanisms must be extraordinarily flexible in order to cope with an unpredictable, dynamic world. . . . An intelligent system must be able to reconfigure itself-to sit back, assess the situation and regroup-in rather deep ways; such flexibility requires only the most abstract kind of mechanisms to remain unchanged. A many-layered system can have programs tailored to very specific needs . . . at its most superficial level, and progressively more abstract programs at deeper layers, thus getting the best of both worlds. Examples of this deeper type of program would be ones for recognizing patterns; for evaluating pieces of evidence; for deciding which, among rival systems clamoring for attention, should get higher priority. (Hofstadter & Dennett, 1982, p. 201)

Shifts in perspective need not reflect changes in level of analysis but simply changes in the purposes of the individual (see Lakoff, 1987). Then we need a theory providing an organized framework linking purposes and perspectives.

3. Emergence When Hofstadter noted that a change of level brings with it a shift in perspective, he did not characterize that shift. The word composed of holism and reductionism was MU. It refers to a Zen tactic of unasking a question by seeking a larger context in which, in this case, both holism and reductionism fit. But he did not specify that context. He implied that the context might be an emergent since MU is neither reductionism nor holism. Emergence is, of course, intrinsic to Piaget’s organismic theory. In one of his books on equilibration, Experiments in

Creating o Svnrkesis

57

Coiitradicrion, Piaget (1980) cited numerous examples of children who had two local laws they reconciled through an emergent structure. Piaget posits a mind that abhors inconsistencies and so creates new structures to reconcile them.? According to Overton and Reese (1973), the organismic view incorporates reciprocal causality and emergence. Is it possible to have a theory with truly reciprocal influences and with constraints that are not located wholly in the organism or the world but are emergent from their interaction’?Within that viewpoint the challenge would be to reconcile epistemology and ontology. The challenge to cognitive psychology would be to figure out the emergent processes or new meanings by which the mind adapts what it knows to the contingencies of particular events. The puzzle for a developmental psychologist would be to ascertain how children construct a working model enabling them to transform what they have learned into what they think must necessarily be true and reciprocally fit their necessary principles to what they have learned. The hallmark of a good developmental analysis, such as Overton’s, is that it enables us to see inherent contradictions that need to be resolved by an emergent structure and to see some directions that resolution might take.

REFERENCES Bandura, A. (1986). Sociul foicndtirioris of rlrought wid U ( ‘ I I U I I . Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prcntice-Hall. Hofstadter, D. R. (19x0). Godel, E.sc/irr, Buck New York: Vintage Books. Hofstadter. D. R.. and Dennett. D. C . (1982) The mind’s I. New York: Bantam Books. d thing,$.Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Liikoff, G. (1YX7). W(JIWII.fire ~ i i clungeroirs McCaulcy, R. N. (1987) The role of theory in ii theory of concepts. In U. Neisser (Ed.). C‘oncqit.\ u d coiicrptuul cie~dopnienr:Eciilogicul arid irrtt~llectuulfuctors in cutc~gorization(pp. 2x8-309). Cambridgc: Cambridge University Press. Overton. W. F. ( 19x2). Hi.~ruricu/and contemporary per.specriivs oj’deivhprnenr. Unpublished manuscript. Overton. W. F. ( 1 Y W ) . World views and their influence o n psychological thcory and research: Kuhn-Lakatos-Laudan. In }-I. W. Rccse (Ed.). Adi,unre.s i n rliild dciv4opmwr and heltm’ior (Vol. l X , pp. 101-776). New York: Academic Presh. Overton. W. F. (19x5). Scientific methodologies and the competence-moderator-performance issue. In E. D. Neiniark, R. DeLisi. and J. L. Newman (Eds.) Mudr.rarors of cumpererici’ (pp. 1 5 4 1 ) . Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum. Overton. W. F. (1989). Piaget: The logic of creativity and thc creativity of logic. Commporury Ps~~rlrology. 34. 629-63 1. Overton. W. F.. and Newinan. J. ( 1982).Cognitive development: A competence-activationiutitizalion approach. I n T. Field, A. Houston, H. Quay, L. Troll, and G . Finley (Eds.) RevRw of ltumari derrlopmmr. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Overton. W. F., and Reese, H. W. (1973).Models of development: Methodological implications. In J. W. Nesselroade and H. W. Reese (Eds.) Lrfe-.s~iaiideidopmcwtul psycho lo^: Merliodologicul issiies (pp. 65-86), New York: Academic Press. Piaget. J. (1980). Eqwrinients iii contradiction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ’But is organismic theory the emergent or the world view that needs to be reconciled with mechanism in \ome other emergent conceptualization?

58

Ellin Koj3iy Schoitrick

Porges, S. (1979). Developmental designs for infancy research. In J. D. Osofsy (Ed.), Handbook of infant development (pp. 742-765). New York: John Wiley and Sons. Reese, H. W. (1984) (Ed.). Symposium on research programs; Rational alternatives to Kuhn’s analysis of scientific progress. Advances in child development and beiiuvior (Vol. 18, pp. 187-291). New York: Academic Press. Reese, H. W., and Overton, W. F. (1970). Models of development and theories of development. In L. R. Goulet and P. B. Bakes (Eds.), Lqe-spun dewlopmentulpsychology (pp. 115-145). New York: Academic Press.

METAPHOR, RECURSIVE SYSTEMS, AND PARADOX IN SCIENCE AND DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY

Willis F. Ovcrtori DEPARTMENT 01;PSY(‘H0LOGY TEMPLE L J N I V E I W T Y I’HILA1)ELPHIA. I’ENNSY I.VANIA I Y I12

I

INTRODUCTION

11. MURRAY‘S AND SCHOLNICK’S COMMENTARIES 111. SUMMARY

REFERENCES

I. Introduction In the article “The Structure of Developmental Theory” (Overton, this volume), 1 argued that the way we tlccide thc value of any theory depends to a significant

degrec on abstract philosophic assumptions that we bring to the evaluation. Specifically, I claimed that the assumptions of ontological and epistemological realism set one context for theory evaluation; the assumptions of epistemological rationalism or interpretationism set a diffcrent context. My general point was simply that the rules define the game, and decisions ahout whether a game is being played well or poorly necessarily require understanding of the rules. A North American who watches Europeans play “football“ can be excused for thinking that Europeans play poorly-indeed insanely-if he is not aware that the rules of North American and European football differ significantly. A realist who watches a rationalist play “science” must have similar unkind thoughts. I situated my exploration at this particular abstract level of metatheoretical assumptions primarily for three reasons. First, I wanted to show that it is only at this level that it is clear how the rules of the game called science and those called developmental psychology are necessarily interrelated. For example, it is not

ADVANCES IN (‘HII-D L)tVf.I.OPMENT AND BEHAVIOR. VOL. 23

60

Willis F. Overton

accidental that a realist understanding of science and a realist understanding of development combine to support the position that theory is secondary to, and inconsequential in the face of, empirical observations. Similarly, a rationalist understanding of both science and development supports the position that empirical observations, while important and necessary, have no such privileged status. A concern about what developmental psychology will accept or not accept as legitimate scientific explanation was my second reason for basing my exploration at this level. It is impossible to overemphasize the point that realism demands that ultimately all explanations in science must be phrased in the language of material causes (e.g., “hardware” explanations, “semantic” explanations, “heredity,” “efficient” cause, “proximal and distal” causes, “social and cultural determinants,” “stimuli”). Rationalism or interpretationism, on the other hand, asserts that there are levels of explanation that require pattern explanation (e.g., “structure,” “design,’’ “formal,” “syntactic” explanation) as an irreducible and necessary feature of the game of science. My final reason for situating the discussion at the level of the metatheoretical assumptions of realism and rationalism is that I wanted to try to fill in, and expand on, some of my earlier writings on related topics. These earlier writings, as Ellin Scholnick rightfully points out in her excellent commentary (Scholnick, this volume), examined the role of metaphor and world views as they influence conceptual, theoretical, and methodological approaches to developmental psychology. In working on the “Structure” chapter I believed that by moving to the higher (ie., more abstract) ground of philosophic realism and rationalism I might, to repeat a theme that runs through that article, introduce greater coherence, generality, and plausibility into my earlier stories.

11. Murray’s and Scholnick’s Commentaries Both Frank Murray and Ellin Scholnick have presented very thoughtful commentaries. Most of Murray’s commentary (this volume) details several specific elements he argues would be required for a “statisfying” theory of development. In general, I find nothing to quarrel with in the list of 10 “categories of information” that he suggests are important for maintaining a “sentiment of rationality” about a theory of development. My own list might drop some of these categories (e.g., “the theorist”) and it might alter the meaning of some others (e.g., “reductionist mechanisms”). However, I would certainly agree that any theory that is going to find wide acceptance must ultimately present the reader with much of the information contained in these categories. If I were able to enter directly into a dialogue with Murray about his commentary, I would focus attention on the argument that ultimately, decisions about what is rational are determined by emotional responses; hence the need to generate a sentiment of rationality concerning any theory. I suspect that Murray would not

Mi>taphor, Recursion, and Paradox

61

want to press any narrow interpretation of this position because it leads directly to the worst of subjectivism and solipsism. If Theory x is a good or bad theory because of my emotional response to it, and Theory y is good or bad because of Murray’s emotional response to it, and Theory z is good or bad because of your emotional response to it, we have no basis for making comparative evaluations among the theories. Further, you or I can dismiss Murray’s 10 categories out of hand because they are based on his “feel” and not your feel or my feel. It is exactly this problem of extreme relativism and subjectivism that, as I described in my chapter, led to the attacks on Kuhn’s proposals about the nature of science. An interpretationist position avoids this problem by developing an interlocking set of criteria, including empirical observation, that increase the coherence and hence the stability of the overall system. It is possible, of course, that Murray would reply that we will one day find out exactly what determines or causes an emotional response. This discovery would then provide a common standard from which to make evaluations about the quality of judgments a person makes and, hence, about the quality of a theory that is based on the person’s judgments. Although this argument avoids solipsism, it also lands us directly back in the context of metaphysical and epistemological realism. That is, the argument maintains that in the future theories will in fact be reduced to specific material causes (i.e., emotional responses). However, it is only realism that demands that ultimately all explanations in science be phrased in the language of material causes. It is also possible that Murray would argue that he did not intend such a narrow interpretation of rationality. In fact, at one point he suggests that the emotional response itself may derive from preference. Here, however, we have the case where the choice of a theory is based on the sentiment of rationality that, in turn, is based on an emotional response that, in turn, is based on a preference. And how are we to understand the nature of this preference’? Is preference itself to be explained by some particular material cause(s), or is preference based on some set of interlocking reasons? These questions return us again, at a new level of analysis, to the conflict between realism and rationalism, because whichever answer is given, that answer is consistent with one position and not the other. My general point here goes beyond a dialogue with Murray about his specific comments. The point is that there seems to be no way of reducing rationalism to realism, or vice versa, unless this reduction is done from a rationalist, or from a realist, perspective. An important implication of this general point is the idea that a movement beyond contradiction-which both Scholnick and Murray would like to see-is not possible. No matter what level of abstraction one uses to develop an analysis of the problem, the “other” position asserts itself as a potentially viable but contradictory frame. Compromise, in the sense of eliminating contradiction, is possible if and only if the core integrity of the “other” position is destroyed in the process (see Overton, 1984). But this is exactly the process of attempting to use one position to reduce

62

Willis F. Overton

the other to its tenets. Within this process, I certainly can offer and have offered (Overton, 1984)-from an interpretationist position-a compromise. This compromise permits, in fact demands, the integrated features suggested by Scholnick including synthesis and analysis, whole and part, universal and particular, change and stability, and emergence and continuity. While the compromise eliminates contradiction at the level of analysis offered, the realist, when he moves to the next higher level of abstraction, notes that this compromise stands in contradiction to his own basic principles. Specifically, the compromise that I suggested involves acceptance of the idea that both material and pattern explanation form an irreducible matrix of explanation. The concept of material reductionism or eliminative materialism is totally abandoned in this compromise. When the concept of reductionism is absolutely abandoned, a theory like Werner’s, or Piaget’s, or Bowlby’s provides universal pattern explanations involving the development of competence. Various social learning theories, or Gibson’s theory, or Skinner’s theory, or neurophysiological theory, on the other hand, provide particularistic (part analytic) material explanations that operate in the context of the universal (whole synthetic) patterns. The problem with this compromise-and the point I am trying to make-is that once the realist moves up one level of abstraction it will be recognized that the absolute abandonment of reductionism has destroyed the integrity of the realist position. In effect, what seemed like a compromise at one level turns out to be a capitulation to rationalism at the next higher level. Another implication of this inherent and irreducible rivalry between rationalism and realism is the notion that the whole knowing enterprise entails iterations of recursive conceptual rule systems. Recursive rule systems are like stories inside stories, or movies inside movies, or boxes inside boxes inside boxes, etc. (Hofstadter, 1979). Consider the several levels of abstraction of recursive rule systems shown in Fig. 1. Here the aim of the knowing activity is to offer scientific explanations of persons. The ellipses at each level suggest recursive systems, and the bidirectional arrows through the levels indicate that the levels themselves form a recursive system. At the 0 level there is the person to be explained. This is the person of our commonsense understanding or our folk psychology. At the first-order abstract level of scientific knowing-that of specific psychological theories-some theories offer concepts that describe organisms as operating realists (e.g., information-processing devices). Other theories describe organisms as interpretationists (e.g., assimilation processes, where meaning is a creation that emerges from the activity of the organism, and not a fixed unit extracted from another source). At the next iteration, or second level of recursion, metatheoretical assumptions frame the context for the theories themselves. Here, for example, it is possible to point to the realist metatheoretical assumptions of Gibson’s theory and the interpretationist metatheoretical assumptions of Piaget’s theory (e.g., constructivism). At the third level of recursion resides the demarcationist strategies that present the

Metaphor, Recursion, arid Paradox

KNOWING PERSONS: SCIENTIFIC LEVELS

RATIONALISMAND REALISM 5

SOPHIES OF KNOWING A

DEMARCATIONISTSTRATEGIES

3

cl3

w METATHEORETIC ASSUMPTIONS

THEORY

0

PERSON

0

Fig. I . Letds of dxtructiori (1-5) of recursi,~e.systems of scientific knowing.

rules of the game of science, within which metatheories and theories are formulated. Here the strategies of positivism, conventionalism, and contemporary neopositivism all reflect the image of realism as it is worked out at this level. The strategies of paradigm-guided research, research programs, and research tradition\ (Overton, 1984) similarly reflect the working out of the images of interpretationism. Perhaps the fourth level of recur5ion is the specific realist philosophies of knowing, or world views. such as those of Locke and Hurne, and the interpretationist philosophies of knowing or world views, such as those of Kant and Hegel. Then the fifth level of recursion is the level of epistemology and metaphysics, and these are defined by the concepts of realism and rationalism as discussed in the structure article. It was. in fact. at this level that 1 left my analysis in the article itself. That is, I presented this fifth level of recursion, described the contradictions between realism and rationalism, and suggested ways that the fifth level was reflected-boxes

64

Willis F. Overton

within boxes-at the other levels. In a sense I felt that I had provided a basic conceptual foundation for earlier papers where I had developed ideas about the impact of world views, and strategies of science, on developmental theories and on scientific research methodologies. However, in her commentary Scholnick makes an important point. She suggests that my analysis was, in fact, conducted from a sixth level of recursion, and at that level I was operating wholly from a rationalist or interpretationist position. As Scholnick describes it, even my title“Structure of Development Theory”-and my basic question-What should a good scientific theory of development look like?-betray my implicit sixth level interpretationist position. I certainly don’t disagree with Scholnick about this. However, I would like to note that this is exactly the “synthesis through emergence” solution to the problem of resolving incompatibilities that she suggests in her commentary. Of course, while the movement to the next higher level of analysis reconciles the lower level, it leaves in place the contradictions at this higher level. If compromise-in the sense of eliminating contradictions-is impossible, another strategy of reconciliation might be considered. This strategy would accept contradiction, or paradox, as an inherent feature of complex systems and use this paradoxical feature to further understanding. This is somewhat similar to Scholnick’s suggestion that a kind of reconciliation could be achieved through understanding contradictory positions on the analogy of reversible figures in which perspectives continually change. An exploration of this strategy first requires mention of the relationships between metaphors, organismic and mechanistic world views, and rationalist and realist epistemologies. Scholnick suggests that rationalist and realist epistemologies reflect the renaming of the organismic and mechanistic world views that 1 have discussed in several earlier publications. In an important if incomplete sense she is entirely correct about this. That is, I believe that the metaphor that emerges from the image of organic system and the metaphor that emerges from the image of the machine impact on the formation of those perspectives that are called the organismic world view and the mechanistic world view. Further, I believe that these metaphors and world views impact on the formation of the conceptual systems called rationalist epistemology and realist epistemology, respectively. However, it is also the case that at each level of knowing novel systemic features emerge that cannot be captured if the process is thought of as merely that of renaming. My reasons for using rationalist and realist epistemological terminology were twofold. First, this terminology makes contact with a significantly larger body of both historical and contemporary philosophic and psychological literature than does the terminology of organismic and mechanistic world views. Therefore, the arguments tend to be clearer and more familiar in this context. Second, and more importantly, as suggested earlier, by framing the discussion in the context of

Metuphor, Recursion, arid Porudm

65

epistemology I thought that a high ground might be established from which to examine the role of metaphor and world views as they impact on our understanding of science, psychology, and development. In essence, I felt that for both of these reasons, the scope and precision of the general argument would be increased by framing the discussion within the context of rationalism and realism. Scholnick's point is that to accomplish these aims I used the organic metaphor and organismic world view as yet a higher level (sixth recursive level; see Fig. 1).

To avoid moving to a seventh level, I will return to a more middle position and consider what this process has been all about. The nucleus of the proposal I have been making throughout this and earlier papers is that, no matter what the level, metaphor is necessary and central to the knowing process and to all forms of knowing. Given the context of the "Structure" chapter, then. metaphor is particularly necessary in that form of knowing called scientific knowledge. Metaphor here is not viewed as simply a heuristic device, or simply a matter of taking a concept or image that is used in one domain and applying it in another. Metaphor is a process of knowing. Specifically, it is the process of knowing that proceeds from the known to the unknown, and gives meaning to the unknown. Metaphor is the recursive process that Piaget called assimilation/accommodation,and Heinz Werner called integration/differentiation. It is the act of construction; the act of giving meaning to the world. If the metaphorical process is central to knowing, then the organization and content of the specific metaphorical entities used in illuminating the unknown are central to understanding the resulting knowledge. From this perspective, the image of the organic system with inherent activity-organization-change, and the image of the machine with inherent reactivity-uniformity-fixity, have each been fertile sources and resources for the elaboration of general systems of thought about the nature of the world, called world views. Obviously, rationalism and realism are a part of the warp and woof of this fabric of metaphor and world views. Rationalism begins from organismic activity in the basic assertion that all knowledge ultimately originates from, and is the product of, the activity of the organism. Realism begins with the assertion of ultimate fixity, invariance, and stability of knowledge, and of its basic independence from the knower. With this discussion of the relationships between metaphor, world views, and epistemologies as context, it is now possible to describe the strategy of reconciliation between contradictory positions at any given level of analysis. An earlier paper (Overton, 1984), explored the way the several scientific demarcationist strategies (ix., systems of rules offered as ways to demarcate science from other knowing activities) had been formulated in the context of either a mechanistic realism (positivism, conventionalism strategies) or an organismic rationalism (i.e., paradigms, research programs, research traditions and strategies). The paper further examined the reasons that each strategy either does not admit metaphor and

Willis F. Overton

66

world views as a central and necessary component of the scientific process (i-e., the mechanistic-realist strategies), or does admit them (i.e., the organismicrationalist). A schematic illustrating the results of this paper appears in Fig. 2. This figure again illustrates the view that abstract levels of knowing (i.e., machine-organic, realism-rationalism) influence the formation of less abstract levels (i.e., the demarcationist strategies). For the present argument, however, the most important feature of this figure is the contradiction between the bottom-up analysis required by the realist strategies and top-down analysis required by the rationalist strategies. Consider what happens to the contradiction between the strategies, however, when a simple transformation is introduced that converts the lines of knowing of Fig. 2 to the recursive cycle of knowing of Fig. 3. Here the top-downbottom-up contradiction appears as two related components of the same general process not unlike the earlier mentioned recursive assimilation/accommodation and integration/differentiation processes. Similar effects occur for other contradictions. Observations do lead to concepts if one looks only at the part, but only as they are processed through metaphor and world views when one recognizes the whole. Metaphor does lead to observation in a part view, but the observation then influences the metaphor in a whole view. This transformation also has an interesting effect on the analysis of the demarcationist strategies themselves. Although positivism, with its complete rejection of any scientific value of metaphor and world views, is still a historical

Machine

Organic

Realism

Rationalism

Positivism

Conventionalism

I

Context 01 Discovery

Metaphor

Metaphor

1

World View Context of Justification

Concepts

Concepts

1

Observation Experiment

I

Observation Experiment

Research Programs Research Traditions

World View

I I

4 4-

ConceDts

Observation Experiment

I

Fig. 2. Lines of knowing: distinctions among several demarcationist strategies in science.

Metaphor, Recursion, und Paradox

0BSERVATION

WORLD VIEW

Experiments

\

67

J

CONCEPTS Theory

Fig. 3 . Recursiw c y l i ~of knowing.

aberration from this perspective, Conventionalism becomes at least compatible with contemporary research program approaches. That is, conventionalism does not completely reject metaphor and world views but it gives them an epiphenomenal status by admitting them only to an extrascientific “context of discovery.” Once the recursive cycle idea is accepted. conventionalism becomes a true historical antecedent to a strategy that maintains the necessity and centrality of metaphor and world view. Conventionalism’s “error” then becomes that of not recognizing that each component of the cycle is necessary. The reconciliation of contradiction, then, consists primarily of understanding the contradictory units not as isolated antagonists but as features of the same whole or recursive cycle. This can be done at any level of analysis. For example, Winnicott explored the theoretical question (first level of abstraction; see Fig. 1) of whether the child constructs the mother or the mother constructs the child. His solution was that “the baby creates the object, but the object was there waiting to be created” (1971, p. 89). Winnicott was a strong proponent of using related contradictions or paradox as a positive and creative feature of knowing. He urged that paradox be accepted and respected, and that attempts not he made to resolve or eliminate it. This reconciliation of contradiction into productive paradox is illustrated in the famous lithograph by M. C. Escher titled Drawiizg Haizds (see Fig. 4). Here, a left hand is drawing a right hand, while at the same time a right hand is drawing a left hand. Which hand is doing the drawing, and which hand is being drawn? Both. Are the hands identical then? Yes. Is there any difference between them? Yes, the left hand is the left hand, and the right hand is the right hand. A theory of the left hand, like a theory of the child who constructs the mother, is an important component of knowing. A theory of the right hand, like a theory of the mother who constructs the child, is also an important component of knowing. Bringing the two into a recursive cycle permits a recognition that the one cannot be reduced to the other any more than rationalism and realism can be reduced to one or the other. The paradox stands, and through the paradox the contradiction is reconciled.

68

Willis F. Overton

Fig. 4. Druwing Hurzds by M. C . Escher: a recursive cycle. Q 1948 M.C. Escher/Cordon Art, Baarn, Holland.

The movement of contradictory elements into recursive cycles is the primary method of reconciling contradictions and transforming them into productive paradoxes. However, no less important to this process is the acceptance of something like recursive cycles as legitimate to all forms of knowing, including scientific knowing. Hegel (see Stace, 1924) identified two modes of knowing, or stages of mind, that he called understanding (Verstund) and reason (Vernunft).When knowing operates only in accordance with Verstand, contradictions must be eliminated, and recursive cycles constitute illegitimate and nonscientific forms of knowledge. When knowing proceeds according to Vernunfi, contradiction or paradox is maintained as the source of both differences and identities, and recursive cycles find an indispensable role articulating the knowing process. Verstund operates in terms of exclusive eithedor categories. Every question put to Verstund is answered in terms of either/or. Either the phenomena involved are different and thus they are not identical, or they are identical, in which case they are not different. In this mode categories are static and fixed. In Verstund opposites

Metaphor, Recursion, and Paradox

69

are mutually exclusive and absolutely cut off from each other. The Aristotelian law of identity holds absolutely: A = A and it is never the case that A = not A. Both identities and differences are considered, but each is taken separately. As a consequence, concepts are either identical (A = A ) or they are different [not ( A =

BN. This mode of knowing implicates linear thinking where contradictions are resolved by showing that the one or the other oppositions is mere appearance. Hegel accepts Verstund as a valuable mode of knowing. It is the mode of knowing that searches for precision and clear distinctions. It is the mode of thinking that has characterized methods of justification in science. Subject+bject, chance-necessity, object+oncept, appearance-reality are all important distinctions that need to be made if thinking is not to become fuzzy and lost in vagueness. However, analytic philosophy and positivist forms of science have been trapped in the exclusivity of this mode of knowing, and as a direct consequence they have insisted that this, and only this, mode constitutes scientific knowing. In Verstund, opposites or contradictions absolutely exclude each other. Vernunft, or reason, on the other hand, is the mode of knowing that asserts the principle of the identify of opposites ( A = not A). Here categories break up and flow into each other. Both modes consider identity and difference, but Vernunft rejects the exclusive nonrelational either/or and considers identity and difference simultaneously. Thus, reason requires that opposites be placed in a relational matrix like the recursive cycles described earlier. In Vernunft what is identica1 is also different, and what is different is also identical. Categories in Vernunfr are both identical and distinct. In Drawing Hands (see Fig. 4) there is identity; both hands are drawing and both are being drawn. But in identity there is the difference that the left hand is the left hand while the right hand is the right hand. For infant and mother there is identity in that each constructs the other, each provides for the other. But in this identity there is also difference; the infant is not the mother, and the mother is not the infant. Hegel pointed out that there is no necessary opposition between the understanding and reason. Reason is only opposed to the exclusivity of the understanding, Because it involves both identities and differences, reason includes principles of the understanding. Reason is the mode of knowing that characterizes discovery in scientific discourse and provides the meaning context for justification. Thus, it is the mode of knowing that establishes the legitimacy of recursive cycles as a necessary component of scientific knowledge.

111. Summary The contradictions found at any level of abstraction among concepts such as subject-object, whole-part, synthesis-analysis, metaphor-observation, organ-

70

Willis F. Overton

icism-mechanism, and interpretationism-realism cannot be eliminated or resolved at that level. They can, however, be reconciled into productive paradoxes by recognizing them as components of recursive systems. The resolution of the paradox occurs only at the next higher level of abstraction where a synthesis can be established. However, this synthesis at the next higher level entails its own contradictions. These can again be reconciled into productive paradoxes through the recognition of broader recursive systems. This progressive solution continues at each iteration, or level or recursion, and it is illustrated in Fig. 5. In the figure, the innermost cycle represents the knowing organism, knowing in the paradoxical cycle of metaphor-assumptions-concepts-observations. This knowing organism is explained and hence understood, and the paradoxes reconciled, only by moving to the next level of recursive cycle. At this next level, the first level of abstraction, psychological theories operate to explain the phenomenological knowing organism of the first cycle. In fact, it is only by moving to this level that we transcend the paradox of man knowing and explaining himself. And only by moving to this level do we avoid the vicious circularity that could befall the use of recursive systems. However, the theories themselves involve a new paradoxical cycle of metaphor-assumptions-concepts-observation. Thus, explanation of this level re-

WORLD VIEW

0BSERVATlON

Concepts Fig. 5. Levels or iterations of recursive cycles of knowing.

quires movement to the next level of abstraction or next outer cycle. Here metatheoretical assumptions provide the transcendence and the opportunity to reconcile the paradoxes of psychological theory. But this level too operates in a cycle of paradoxes and consequently the process continues as it does for any dialectic process. In closing, I should in fairness note that I have outlined only one type of solution to contradictions that are found among approaches to the game called science and the game called developmental psychology. I t is a solution that draws heavily on the categories of dialectical method, and it is just this method that is both the reason for, and the consequence of, the organismic metaphor. Thus, my solution generates its own contradiction for I have again, as Scholnick argues, based my solution at some level of organicism; a point that will not escape the discerning realist or, for that matter, the discerning rationalist.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I cxpresh my appreciation to the members of thc Epi\ternology. Development, and Psychotherapy Seminar at the Institute of Pennsylvania Hospital where aevernl of the ideas in this paper were first expressed and worked through. Also my special thank\ to Harvey Horowitz for our ongoing discussions about epistemological issues. and to Carol Groves. Richard Lerner, Lynn S. Liben. Nora Newcornbe. and Mary Winn for critical comments on an earlier draft. To Ellin Scholnick, my thanks for keeping the discussion going.

REFERENCES Hofstadter. D. K. ( 1979). Godel. Escher. Huch: An erer-nu/ gu/k.n h i d . New York: Basic Books. Overtcin, W. F. (1984).World views and their intluence on psychological theory and research: brschild cleidopnewr urrd hc/iui,ior (Vol. Kuhn-Lakatos-Laudan. In H. W. Reese (Ed.). A r l i w m ~ ~ I N . pp. IY 1-226). New York: Academic Press. Stace, W. T. (lY?4).The p/ri/o.wp/rr. ofHefic,/. New York: I>over. Winnicott. D. W. (1971). P/uyirr,q urrd reu/itx. New York: Routledge.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

CHILDREN’S ICONIC REALISM: OBJECT VERSUS PROPERTY REALISM

Hurry Beilin und Elise G. Pearlman DFVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOG1 PROGRAM GRADUATE SCHOOL OF T H E CITY llNlVERSlTY OF NEW YORK NEW YORK. NEW YORK IOO3h

I. INrRODUCTION: PIAGET‘S CHILDHOOD REALISM AND ITS CRITICS

II. PHOTOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE 111. PICTORIAL PERCEPTION. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

A. DEVELOPMENTAL STUDIES B. CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES C. INFRAHUMAN STUDIES IV. THE DUAL NATURE O F PICTURES V. A STUDY OF ICONIC REALISM A. SUBJECTS AND DESIGN B. MATERIALS c‘. PROCEDURE

V1. RESULTS A. PHASE I: PICTURE-REFERENT DATA B. PHASE II: COUNTERICONIC CHALLENGES C. PHASE. 111: PHOTOGRAPHIC‘ KNOWLEDGE VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES

I. Introduction: Piaget’s Childhood Realism and Its Critics In one of his earliest books, The Child’s Coizception of the World (1029), Piaget declared, “The child is a realist, since he supposes thought to be inseparable from its object, names from the things named, and dreams to be external. His realism 73 ADVANC’t-S IN CHILD DEVtl.OPMEU7 AND t3tHAVIOR. VOL. 23

74

Hurry Beilin und Elise G. Pearlman

consists in a spontaneous and immediate tendency to confuse the sign and the thing signified, internal and external and the psychical and the physical” (p. 124). The research on which this conclusion is based was carried out on children from 4 to 12 years of age by Piaget and his students. The characterization of the child, prior to the age of 6 or 7 years, as a realist has been challenged in different ways over the years, but the most serious challenges have been most recent and have been mounted by Flavell (1988), Wellman (1988), and others. In the new view (Estes, Wellman, & Woolley, 1989) children as young as 2% to 3 years of age do make covert distinctions between mental and physical phenomena. The more recent research is based on methods quite different from Piaget’s (e.g., Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983), but other studies based on responses to stories and children’s explanations very much like Piaget’s also yield results strikingly different from Piaget’s. On one score, the Estes et ul. (1989) characterization of Piaget’s position should be treated with caution. They made the following statements: “The construct of childhood realism as used by Piaget, and subsequently by others, confounds two distinguishable possibilities. We will term these possibilities ontological (childhood) realism and epistemological (childhood) realism. Piaget failed to distinguish clearly between them because he believed young children to be afflicted with both, . . he did not consider the possibility that children might be afflicted with one form of realism and not the other. . . we think it unlikely that children are ontological realists, but they might still be epistemological realists” (pp. 43-44). First, Piaget did in fact note this distinction. He called the latter logical realism rather than epistemological. Second, if he considered children to be “afflicted” with both he must have made the distinction, even if not clearly enough for Estes ef al. Third, and most tellingly, Piaget said, “Nominal realism of the ontological form is discarded after the age of 9 or 10, but realism of the logical form does not start to disappear before 1 1 or 12. In short, logical realism arises from ontological realism but lasts longer” (1929, p. 85). Consequently, the Estes et al. distinction is parallel to Piaget’s. Piaget’s clinical method of inquiry, although flexible in its conduct, was based on careful and thorough analysis of children’s responses in a variety of modes, verbal and nonverbal, by Piaget himself or his trained assistants who had no less than 1-2 years of training in the method. Piaget (1929) offered a highly detailed analysis and justification of the method, its assets and pitfalls, and recorded that the research conclusions were based on 600 observations by Piaget alone, supplemented by a “large number” of observations by his collaborators on specific points. How can the results, then, be so different? Wellman argued that the differences in results were due in part to differences in method, but more importantly, to differences in interpretation of the data. Following Laurendeau and Pinard (1 962), they claimed that Piaget’s method entails a global evaluation of the child’s responses, utilizing a subject-centered holistic approach. In contrast, Estes

C’k I Idren ’F Irori i i H eu 1r.c ni

75

al. argued that their own approach is more analytic in that it is based on an item-centered analysis. Piaget goes into great detail as to how he arrives at his inferences concerning the validity of a child’s responses to questions, including that of countersuggestions, which have become standard in many types of child interviews and testing. Piaget was also evidently cognizant of variability in children’s responses to questions, as the following quotation indicates, “By interviewing a large number of children of the same age we find either that the suspected answer is very general or else that it is peculiar to one or two given children” (p. 20). Again, “As a matter of fact the majority of children are not aware of this internal activity . . . but some children do note the existence of the voice” (p. 46). Piaget did not report numerical data o r statistical analyses, but he was evidently aware of the differing proportionalities of responses to his questions. This point is not to deny that conclusions may be quite differently drawn when data are laid out precisely, but Estes and Wellman’s data do not differ from Piaget’s in subtle ways; the differences are large and compelling. At lcast two other possibilities can account for the differences. One is that Piaget simply found what he was looking for. Piaget makes quite clear his belief that the clinical method, as all scientific methods, have explicitly or implicitly a working hypothesis. “The good experimenter must, in fact, unite two often incompatible qualities; he must know how to observe. . . and at the same time he must constantly be alert for something definitive, at every moment he must have some working hypothesis, some theory, true or false, which he is seeking to check” (p. 9). Long before Kuhn and welturiscliuuurzg philosophies of science, Piaget held, ‘‘In psychology, as in physics, there are no pure ‘facts’; if by ‘facts’ are meant phenomena presented nakedly to the mind by nature itself, independent respectively of hypotheses by means of which the mind examines them . . . and of the systematic framework of existing judgments into which the observer pigeon-holes every new observation” (p. 23). But before we jump to the conclusion that Piaget, like Pygmalion, had created his own ideal conception, we need to be aware of his injunction to others and himself “But the contrary danger of prejudging the nature of the results before they have themselves been analyzed, must also be avoided” (p. 23). Thus, we are left with no certain conclusion of a possible Pygmalion effect. Another possibility is that childhood has changed between the 1920s and the 1980s insofar as the content of children’s understanding of reality and their own minds is concerned. One need not detail how children’s environments between then and now have changed in information availability, communication, and even child-rearing practices. We are not asserting that the processes of acquiring knowledge have changed, only the content. Research on “the child’s theory of mind,” for example, deals primarily with the content of child thought and knowledge. Interest in the processes of mind is not lacking. Quite the contrary; very little progress has been made in understanding the process of knowledge acquisition ef

76

Harry Beilin and Elise G. Pearlman

or construction in the early years. Nonetheless, Estes et af. believe that both process and content considerations explain the differences of their results from those of Piaget and of Laurendeau and Pinard. Their refutation is based on evidence that the responses of children tested both earlier and later were in fact similar. Because Laurendeau and Pinard (1962) had a more precisely spelled out response coding system than Piaget, and because their results were said to replicate Piaget’s, Estes et al. compared their own data on children’s knowledge of dreams with Laurendeau and Pinard’s utilizing their classification system. With these reclassified data the Estes et al. results were very similar to those of Laurendeau and Pinard. The Estes group reasons that Piaget and Laurendeau and Pinard interpreted young children’s explanations literally; for example, a child response dreams are smoke was treated as though the child meant that dreams are actual smoke rather than dreams are like smoke. Estes et al. claim that such an interpretation is incorrect and imply that their own interpretation, which is to see children making “informative analogies” and pointing out similarities, is more appropriate. This claim could lead to considerable interpretive argument over whether young children (at age 3 years) are capable of making informative analogies. A second claim, however, and a more methodological one, is that Piaget’s method avoided pressing children to make critical contrasts between various kinds of physical and mental entities. Whether Piaget can be fully faulted on this point is not clear inasmuch as Piaget does describe offering children countersuggestions to test their understanding of mental phenomena. Without question, however, Estes et al. offer important new evidence and extended methods of analysis that have opened up to examination and debate the early claims of Piaget, and others, concerning children’s realism. On another score, the Estes group reports that the youngest children (3- and 4-years-old) in their study gave some “apparently” realist responses, such that they could touch their mental images and another person could see their mental images. This phenomenon is said to be akin to Piaget’s reports of nominal realism, which Markman (1 976) interpreted as a failure to understand the questions posed to them. Estes et a/. consequently claim the existence of a general phenomenon in which young children interpret questions about representations (mental images, etc.) as about their referents, and not about the representations themselves. To test this claim they conducted a study in which they asked children to make judgments about their mental images of objects and also of the same object’s photograph housed in a closed container. Among the questions asked was one specific to photographs, in which they inquired about the possibility of using the representation (mental image or photograph) to carry out a function (cup: used to get a drink of water) for which the actual object could be used (the function question). The results showed that all children (with no age trend) were consistently correct in responding to questions about representations and objects, which resulted in the claim that children do not believe that the mental image of an object is simply an

Children’s Iconic Realism

77

inaccessible picture of the object. A question directed to whether the photograph of an object in the box could be transformed without opening the box was responded to at a chance level by 3-year-olds. These data are accounted for by Estes et al. as due to a presentation order effect. They note improved performance on photograph-related questions when subjects were asked whether the mental image or the object itself had the property in question. From these data they conclude again that errors on questions about mental images specifically, and about representations generally, are due to the subject’s assumption that the questions are about the referents, and do not indicate misconceptions about the nature of mental images. The Estes et al. study with photographs reflects a trend in psychological research to test certain assumptions concerning children’s understanding of photographs through their functions and their embodied meanings (e.g., DeLoache, 1989). Unfortunately, although photographs are used extensively in psychological research as a form of pictorial representation, the photograph as such has received little attention as to whether it functions in accord with the usual assumptions made for it. DeLoache (1989) was one of the few investigators to question some of these assumptions in her studies of 2%- and 3-year-olds’ responses to photographs as ostensive symbolic instruments. In this paper, we will attempt to redress, at least partially, the lack of attention to the nature of photographic depiction. The study to be discussed, which was addressed to the nature of childhood realism, involved photographs and assessments of various aspects of children’s knowledge of this type of representational object.

11. Photographic Knowledge Some investigators have explored the language used by children in describing their photographic practices (e.g., Strandsberg & Griffith, 1969), their understanding of the technical side of photography (e.g., Grossman, 1976; Young & Wright, 1973), and the type of subject matter that attracts the eye of the young photographer (e.g., Grady, 1970; Young & Wright, 1973). Although such studies have yielded intriguing suggestions as to how children’s understanding of photographs might relate to their developing cognitive and perceptual capacities, they have shed little light on the very basic question of how photographs come to act as representations of reality. Whether it is immediately apparent to the child, for example, that objects and their photographic counterparts share only a superficial physical resemblance, as some theorists hold, with photographs serving merely as symbols of the objects, or whether this relation is something that must be learned, is not known. In contrast to the lack of empirical attention devoted to this question, the nature of the relationship between picture and pictured reality has stimulated a great deal

78

Harry Beilin and Elise G. Pearlman

of theory, as evident in the differing characterizations of this relationship in various accounts of pictorial representation. For example, according to Gibson (1979), the relationship between picture and reality is founded on the idea that a photograph imparts the same kind of information as its corresponding real-world display. A quite different view is held by Goodman (1968) who contests the notion that pictures and their referents are in any way linked by resemblance, arguing instead that pictures represent more of an arbitrary, conventionally determined sign system analogous to language. Somewhere between these realist and conventionalist extremes is the view stated most explicitly by Sigel (1978), but also shared in part by Franklin (1973) and Buhler (1930), that photographs bear a symbolic relationship to their referents, one that conserves meaning as well as key morphological features of their referents. Sigel’s view differs from both Gibson’s and Goodman’s in that it asserts that the relationship between picture and referent does not remain stable across development. Rather, for a time pictures function as semisigns, in the sense that young children treat them as they would real objects. Despite offering different conceptualizations of the relationship between picture and pictured reality, these theories concern similar features that would seem to make photographic representation a special phenomenon worthy of investigation and one that might pose differential difficulty developmentally. As pointed out by Gibson (1979), Goodman (1968), Sigel (1978), and others (Franklin, 1073; Gregory, 1970; Hagen, 1978), the status of photographs (and pictures in general) is paradoxical in that although on one level they represent an object, person, or scene, they are simultaneously objects in their own right, with their own textural and spatial features. As Gregory (1970) puts it, “We see both a pattern of marks on a piece of paper, with shading, brushstrokes, or photographic grain, and at the same time, we see that these compose a face, a house, or a ship on a stormy sea. . . . Pictures are both visibly flat and three-dimensional. They are a certain size, yet also the size of f x e , house or ship” (p. 32). The pictorially sophisticated adults who serve as the models for Gibson’s and Goodman’s theories have no problem coping with the dual reality of pictures (e.g., Gibson’s photomural study, in which subjects were capable of estimating distance from the picture itself as well as from a tree pictured within). However, this feature of photographs may pose a difficulty for children. In addition, photographs and other forms of pictorial representation differ in their degree of “realism” or fidelity to their real-world referents. As will be seen, realism means different things depending on one’s theoretical perspective. As with the notion of the dual nature of pictures, the developmental implications of varying amounts of realism remain. How does varying pictorial realism affect children’s conceptions of the relationship between picture and reality? This seems to be a particularly important question for photographs, inasmuch as photographs are often viewed as capturing reality more fully than other pictorial forms (Amheim, 1974; O’Connor, Beilin, & Kose, 1981; Sontag, 1977).

Childroi’, Iconic Kcwlisrn

7Y

111. Pictorial Perception: Empirical Evidence Although photographs and other pictorial forms have served as stimuli in many experiments with both humans and animals. relatively little is known about how pictures come to act as representations of reality. Instead, much research has been conducted on the seemingly tacit assumption that pictorial materials, particularly realistic forms such as photographs, are automatically “read off’ and pose no difficulties of interpretation whatsoever (Beilin, 1983; Franklin. 1973; Sigel, 1978). In recent years, however, pictorial material has become a focus of investigation in its own right. A number of these studies bear on the question of how children come to know what pictures represent. To illuminate this question, the following review is organized around the response to photographs of the three traditionally studied pictorially naive groups: infants and children, individuals from cultures having little or no exposure to pictorial material, and animals.

A. DEVELOPMENTAL STUDIES

Hochberg and Brooks (1962) demonstrated the ability of a 19-month-old to recognize photographs and line drawings despite previous shielding from pictorial materials. Investigators have since gone beyond this pioneering study by inquiring into the nature of pictorial recognition and the differentiation of picture from referent in very young infants (e.g., Barrera & Maurer, 1981a, 19Xlb; DiFranco, Muir, & Dodwell, 1978; Dirks & Gibson, 1977; Rose. 1977; Slater, Rose, & Morison, 1984). The most widely used means of gauging the ability of such young subjects to recognize pictorial representations has been the familiarization-novelty paradigm, based on the visual preference of infants for novel stimuli (Fantz. 1956) and the paired comparison technique. The stimuli employed with this technique have ranged from “ecologically valid” objects, such as colored, life-size photographs of faces (Barrera & Maurer, 1981a, 1981b; Dirks & Gibson, 1977), dolls (DeLoache. Strauss, & Maynard. 1979), and teething rings (Friedman, 1975), to black and white photographs of geometric designs (Rose, 1977). Traditional habituation procedures indicate that recognition of objects pictured in photographs begins at 5 months of age (e.g., DeLoache et af., 1979; Dirks & Gibson. 1977). However, recognition of photographs has been demonstrated as early as 3 months of age in studies where infants controlled the course of habituation such that the stimulus was presented until subjects themselves turned away (the infant control technique; e.g., Barrera & Maurer, 1981a, 1981b). These findings of early pictorial recognition are supported by work on recognition memory and selective attention in infants, also employing the familiarization-novelty paradigm and photographs

80

Harry Beilin and Elise G. Pearlman

of human faces (e.g., Cohen, DeLoache, & Pearl, 1977; Cornell, 1974; Fagan, 1972, 1977). Although pictorial recognition studies offer some indication of the infant’s ability to see similarities between a photograph and its real-world referent, investigations of the ability to differentiate pictures from their referents are informative of the infant’s awareness of the underlying differences between the two forms. In addition to using the familiarization-novelty paradigm (Friedman, 1975; Rose, 1977; Slater et al., 1984), investigators have studied differentiation by means of the smiling response (Polak, Emde, & Spitz, 1964) and visually guided reaching (DiFranco, Muir, & Dodwell, 1978; Dodwell, Muir, & DiFranco, 1976; Rader & Stern, 1982). The age at which such differentiation emerges varies with the particular response system and test stimuli examined. DiFranco ef al. (1978), testing 9- to 21-day-old infants, found that they did not differentiate in their reaching between a color picture and a graspable solid object (an orange ball against a blue background). Rader and Stern (1982) report the same findings using a similar subject sample and similar stimuli. In contrast, at least some indication of visual differentiation between photograph and referent has been reported in newborn infants. Slater et al. (1984) examined newborns’ (mean age, 2 days, 21 hours) visual discrimination of geometric figures (circles and crosses) and their photographs. They found that newborns looked significantly longer at the objects. Other studies of visual discrimination between photograph and referent indicate emergence of this ability between 3 months (Cook, Field, & Griffiths, 1978) and 6 months of age (Rose, 1977), Polak et al. (1964) found that by 3 months of age, infants’ smiles indicate discrimination between a photographic representation and a real face. These studies of infant’s responses to objects and their photographic counterparts imply that from an early age children recognize photographs as representations of reality yet are aware that the two forms are not equivalent. Various investigations, involving tasks of a less “perceptual” nature conducted with older subjects, also appear to support the assumption that children’s understanding of the representational status of photographs develops at an early age. For instance, studies have shown that children as young as 3 years experience little difficulty in matching photographs with the objects they represent (Mapper & Birch, 1969). In addition, Daehler, Perimutter, and Myers (1976) found that children 2,2%, and 3% years old were able to transfer discriminations learned in relation to objects to their photographic counterparts and vice versa. Similarly, DeHaan and Wischner (1963), in comparing the ease with which two groups of retarded youngsters (with mental ages of less than 6 years) formed learning sets, one group using objects and the other photographs, found that the two groups performed equally well. These studies have been interpreted to mean that the young child is able to recognize the representational function of photographs.

Cliildretr *.Y Icotiic Reulisni

81

Up to this point, the findings reviewed have been consistent in suggesting that the child’s understanding of the photographic mode of representation assumes the adult form at an early age. However, we will now consider a series of reports, mostly anecdotal, suggesting that the aforementioned findings may actually mask a tendency of the child to confuse photographs with the objects they represent. There is some indication that even though young children will not mistake a photograph for a real object, they may make the more “subtle” error of behaving as if photographs have some of the properties of their referents. An early reference to the tendency to attribute the properties of real objects to their photographic representations, which we refer to as iconic realism, occurs in Piaget’s (1929) The Child’s Conception of the World. In the context of a discussion of realism as manifested in children’s understanding of dreams, Piaget mentions that several of his subjects seemed to believe that photographs and statues possess properties normally attributed to only animate beings. He cites the case of a 2-year-old who, upon seeing a photograph of some women fall to the ground, began crying for fear the “ladies” had been hurt. Another child related to Piaget his belief that not only were statues and pictures alive, but they could think and see. According to this subject, “one was not alone so long as there was a picture in the room” (Piaget, 1929, p, 103). Another early reference to instances of iconic realism is Buhler’s (1930) discussion of the development of pictorial appreciation. According to Buhler, once children are capable of recognizing what is represented in a picture, they pass through a stage during which they treat “pictures of objects just like the objects themselves” (Buhler, 1930, p. 77). As indicative of this stage, Buhler cites the case of a child who was just as frightened of a picture of a cat as of the real cat itself, refusing to touch the picture. Similarly, he noted another child’s desire to touch the eyes of people in photographs in the same way that he tried to touch those of real people. Buhler had the following to say with respect to the factors that might cause a child to abandon these early beliefs and make a more “practical” distinction between picture and reality: In the first place the child originally grasps at any spots of liglil o r shade on the floor and through repeated failure learns to distinguish these plane and fleeting objects of vision from the solid and unchanging ones. In the same way it will lcarn to manipulate sheets of paper o n which pictures are drawn in a different way to rral objects. (1930, P. 77)

Buhler also indicated that, in addition to the role of manipulative activity, the realization that pictures have a “representational” function contributes to an understanding of pictures as objects in their own right. Unfortunately, Buhler did not explain what he meant, nor did he present any further corroborating evidence. We are also left uninformed as to the fidelity of the “pictures” to their referents and

82

Hurry Beilin and Elise G. Pearlmun

with respect to what role, if any, Buhler would assign to fidelity in understanding the relationship between picture and reality. Scattered references to behavior suggestive of iconic realism also appear in Werner and Kaplan (1963) and Church (1961). Werner and Kaplan (1963, p. 74) cite the work of Muchow, who was interested in children’s perceptions of graphic objects. Muchow found that her young subjects often had a strange reaction to drawings of angular forms. For example, one 4-year-old, upon examining the pictures, exclaimed, “Ugh! What a lot of prickles and thorns,” and indicated that she felt that the “thorn” might stick into her fingers if she picked up the pictures (Werner & Kaplan, 1963, p. 74). Like Buhler, Church (1 961) observed that children, upon first confronting two-dimensional patterns such as designs on playpens, spots of sunlight on the floor, or stains on woodwork, may persistently attempt to pick up the patterns. Such efforts are also applied to representations in books, accompanied by attempts to pet pictured animals and listen to pictured watches. Church viewed such failures of adequately distinguishing between pictures and the objects they represent as a reflection of realism in the Piagetian sense, of experiencing all things as “equally real and real in the same sense and on the same plane: pictures, words, people, things, energies, dreams, feelings” (Church, 1961, p. 15). Church also saw such observations as possibly supporting Gibson’s 1960s view (1960) that three-dimensional perception is primary, and the ability to perceive two-dimensional forms develops as cues for two-dimensionality are learned, such as the contrast between the level of illumination “in” the picture and that in the room. Church seems to imply that observed instances of iconic realism reflect a failure on the part of the child to attend to or “pick up” cues for bidimensionality. Lastly, some behaviors indicative of iconic realism have been reported in studies involving picture book reading with very young children (e.g., Murphy, 1978; Ninio & Bruner, 1976). Murphy (1978), who was interested in the role of pointing within shared activity, tested subjects ranging in age from 9 to 24 months. She found that the younger infants “hit the pictures in the book and scratched at the pages as if trying to lift the picture from the page” (p. 379). Murphy also commented that the older infants appeared to be “acting on the book” rather than looking at it, but unfortunately she did not provide any examples. Ninio and Bruner (1976) used joint picture book reading in an investigation of the development of lexical labels. A single child was observed interacting with his mother from the age of 8 months to 18 months. Ninio and Bruner noted that pictures elicited behaviors from the child normally directed only toward objects. The child would scratch and finger the pictures, run his hand across the picture surface, and try to look behind the pages. Ninio and Bruner interpret these behaviors, which became less frequent with age, as attempts to check on the “dual nature” of pictures. That is, inasmuch as pictures can be perceived as both two-dimensional objects and three-dimensional scenes, they create a conflict for the child that is

Children’s Iconic Realism

83

resolved by realizing the unique status of pictures as visual objects. According to Ninio and Bruner, this status is achieved through motoric exploration of the properties of pictures as objects and maternal inquiries that require the child to maintain an “as if’ attitude toward pictorial representations. In conclusion, a comparison of developmental findings for photographic stimuli yields an inconsistent picture as to the status of children’s understanding of photographic representation. On one hand, studies conducted with infants demonstrate differential responding to photographs and their real-world referents (e.g., Polak et al., 1964), implying that from an early age children recognize photographs as representations of reality, despite being aware that the two forms are not equivalent. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence (e.g., Buhler, 1930; Church, 1961) and findings from two observational investigations (Murphy, 1978; Ninio & Bruner, 1976) suggest that even beyond infancy children may believe that photographs share properties with their referents. Unfortunately, studies demonstrating the capacity of children to transfer responses from objects to photographic equivalents (e.g., Daehler et al., 1976) while seemingly supporting the claim that children’s understanding of the representational nature of photographs develops at an early age, actually do not clarify the issue. This is so because the basis for transfer is not clear: Are children transferring because of their awareness of the symbolic relationship between photograph and referent, or because on some level there is lack of differentiation or else confusion between the two forms? We will examine results from research in non-Western cultures where exposure to pictorial materials differs from that in industrialized societies, to see whether the ambiguities in developmental research findings are in any way reduced or resolved.

B. CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES

The original impetus for studying pictorial perception cross-culturally was the desire to test whether the processes of picture perception were universal or were affected, if not determined, by cultural factors. The Hochberg and Brooks (1962) study, for example, could be taken as evidence for universal (i.e., innate) recognition processes unaffected by culture, and Sigel’s (1971) study of subcultural differences in the ability to process information from pictures relative to real objects could be taken to show that the same processes, even if universal, could still be affected by culture. A debate around a target article by Deregowski (1989) on the relation of real space and pictorially represented space shows that the terms of the original argument between universal and culture-based views has changed. Deregowski was one of the early champions of the culture-oriented view. If his view is typical, then some aspects of picture perception are now taken to be universal. To achieve this

84

Harry Beilin and Elise G. Pearlman

rapprochement, Deregowski distinguishes between two types of two-dimensional pictures that depict three-dimensional space. One type contains cues such that three-dimensional space can be perceived directly; the other leads to three-dimensional perception without direct three-dimensional cues. Although he equivocates, he says that Biederman “may be right that individuals living in nonpictorial or minimally pictorial cultures do not require a special theory of pictorial perception” (Deregowski, 1989,pp. 99-IOO), but he remarks further that that may be so for direct picture cues (Biederman, 1987) but does not hold for the indirect picture cues. He claims, contrary to the views of Biederman and other commentators, that the “available data do not allow us to evaluate the relative magnitude of genetic and environmental contributions to perceptual skills, nor do they permit an unbiased assessment of the effects of either education or maturation” (1989,p. 73). If Deregowski is to be taken as evidence, after many years of often contentious crosscultural research, we are no nearer to a clear-cut answer to whether picture perception depends on universal or conventionally determined processes. Despite the haphazard nature of some cross-cultural research and the variety of tasks and types of pictures used, the consensus with respect to the ability to recognize photographic representations is clear: The perception of color photographs is virtually culture-free, but the translation into shades of grey in blacMwhite photographs is more problematic for the naive perceiver, although black and white photographs are generally recognized, too. As Jones and Hagen (1980) point out, the problem that people from less pictorial cultures face is basically one of attentional deployment rather than a case of their perceiving the photograph as a random array. With evidence for the seemingly universal (adult) ability to recognize objects pictured in photographs, is there evidence of the tendency to attribute the properties of real objects to photographs that has been reported for young children? Here evidence is hampered by a widespread tendency of investigators engaged in cross-cultural research to avoid using color photographs because they are too much like the real thing (Jones & Hagen, 1980).Despite this difficulty and the failure of cross-cultural investigators to study the possible confusion of picture and reality as an interesting question in its own right, some anecdotal evidence suggests that iconic realism does occur in other cultural contexts. For example, Thomson (cited in Deregowski, 1976) showed photographs of women to members of the Wa-njemp tribe and noted that not only did the viewers recognize the photographs, but they seemed to think that the photographs were living beings. As mentioned earlier, Piaget (1929) reported that children had similar beliefs. In addition, individuals from nonpictorial cultures, like children in picture-rich cultures, engage in behaviors seemingly directed toward checking on the “dual nature” of pictures. Deregowski, Muldrow, and Muldrow (1972),reporting earlier work conducted in a remote Ethiopian settlement, observed that “when a drawing of an animal. . . was presented to the subjects, they would take the paper, feel, smell, taste, and listen to it whilst flexing it” (p. 418), seemingly

Childrrn 's Iconic Rra lism

85

ignoring the content of the drawing itself. Deregowski et ul. do not report any attempt to gauge the Ethiopians' recognition of the picture once exploration of the pictorial surface ceased. Instead they interpret this sort of behavior as representing a reaction to paper, a foreign medium for these subjects. Consequently, in later work a familiar coarse whitish cloth was substituted for the paper. Deregowski et ui. did not report attempts to explore the familiar cloth material. However, an alternative explanation remains untested inasmuch as, as Hagen and Jones (1978) note, Deregowski et al. did not test a comparison group for recognition of drawings printed on paper. It is possible that the Ethiopians attempted to manipulate and explore the drawings done on paper as opposed to those on cloth because the former presented less information for the picture as an object (Le., less surface information), prompting the subjects to check on the dual nature of the picture. The importance of pictorial surface characteristics for this population has been noted by Deregowski (1976). In contradiction to earlier reported failures of pictorially naive individuals to recognize pictures: Given sufficiently rich pictorial cues and a decrease of ambient cues which convey the llatness of the surface on which a picture i s made, such as occurs in projection of transparencies in the dark. even unsophisticated.. . viewers respond with vigour. ( 1976. p. 20)

Deregowski quotes an anecdote by Lloyd (1904) concerning the reaction of a tribe of Africans to a slide depicting an elephant projected on a suspended cloth: The wildest excitement immediately prevailed, many people jumping and shouting. , . while thosc nearest 10 the sheet sprang up and Red. The chief himself crept wx4thily forward and peeped behind the sheet.. . and when he discovered that the ;inimel's body was only the thickness of the sheet, a great roar broke the stillness of the night. (Deregowski, 1976, p. 70)

In conclusion, cross-cultural work. similar to developmental research, suggests a tendency of naive observers to confuse picture and reality. Unfortunately, the degree to which this occurs in nonpictorial cultures is not as clear as in developmental research due to the scanty information available and the fact that although developmental studies indicate an ability to discriminate pictures from objects even in infancy, investigators engaged in cross-cultural work have not examined such differentiation on the part of their subjects. The data, although meager, are suggestive, however-especially the implication that the characteristics of the pictorial surface may play an important role in picture perception. C. INFRAHUMAN STUDIES

As in human research, photographs and other pictorial forms have been used to study perception and learning in animals on the assumption that pictures are

86

Hurry Beilin and Elise G. Peurlman

suitable stand-ins for objects, events, and features of layout (Cabe, 1980). Recently, investigators have begun to test the sensitivity of nonhuman subjects to pictorial information as such. As Cabe (1980) points out, such findings are of interest for several reasons. First, because humans habitually produce and use pictures and animals do not, animals may differ from humans in their ability to understand certain objects, events, or aspects of a layout presented pictorially, or their understanding may vary with the form of pictorial representation. They may also be informative of the role of experience in picture perception. Lastly, from a practical standpoint one needs to know whether for animals the equivalence relation between pictures and their referents is such that pictures can be employed as convenient surrogates for aspects of the three-dimensional world. Because of the inability of animals to verbalize, researchers have had to devise various nonverbal indicators of their subjects’ pictorial capacities. Three commonly used indicators include transfer of discrimination (e.g., Cabe, 1976; Hayes & Hayes, 1953; Zimmerman & Hochberg, 1970), matching to sample (e.g., Davenport & Rogers, 1971; Davenport, Rogers, & Russell, 1975), and concept formation (e.g., Herrnstein & Loveland, 1964). The species serving as subjects in these investigations have varied from primates to birds, lizards, and fish. Working within the generalized discrimination paradigm with pigeons. Cabe (1976) found evidence of transfer of discrimination, and thus recognition, 101both photographs and silhouettes, but not for line drawings. Davenport and Rogers (1971) also obtained evidence of recognition of objects depicted in photographs, both color and black and white, using a cross-modal matching technique with an orangutan and two chimpanzees. Although studies such as these provide evidence for spontaneous, unlearned perception of photographs, some data suggest that the capacity of animals to process information conveyed via pictorial displays may extend beyond mere recognition. Herrnstein and Loveland (1964), Herrnstein, Loveland, and Cable (1 976), and Lubow (1974), for example, demonstrate capability on the part of pigeons for forming concepts based on photographic exemplars. Findings from a study of chimpanzee problem solving, conducted by Premack and Woodruff (1978), yielded similar results. A chimpanzee viewed a black and white videotape depicting a human confronted with various problems, such as obtaining an inaccessible banana. The chimpanzee’s task was to choose which of the two color photographs illustrated a possible solution. Premack and Woodruff found that the correct photograph was almost always chosen, indicating a capacity on the part of the chimpanzee for integrating information from “moving pictures” and still photographs, two very different forms of pictorial representation. The findings clearly indicate that some primate and avian species are capable of recognizing objects depicted in photographs. However, although these studies provide strong evidence for the seemingly human facility of animals in dealing with photographs, Cabe (1980) asserts that most investigations are marred by

Children’s lconic Reulism

87

failure to rule out simple nondiscriminability of object and picture, Cabe’s own (1976) study being a notable exception. Thus, according to Cabe, at least for animals, “the special representational nature of pictures remains unproven” (1980, p. 317). We will now consider some studies treating the unlearned responses of animals to photographs, which, although not as sound methodologically as those already reviewed, relate to the question of the representational status of pictures for animals. Such studies are generally concerned with the responsiveness of animals to conspecific (i.e., same species member) social displays presented via photographs (e.g., Katzir, 1981; Mendelson, Haith, & Goldman, 1978; Mendelson, Haith, & Goldman-Rakic, 1982; Sackett, 1965, 1966) and motion pictures (e.g., Jenssen, 1970; Turnbough & Lloyd, 1973). The basic premise underlying this research is that when a picture evokes the response usually elicited only by the conspecific, some degree of “picture-bject equivalence” is indicated (Cabe, 1980). However, as both Kennedy (1974) and Cabe (1980) point out, such conclusions are problematic in that these responses could be triggered by the content of the picture as a whole or by some small feature. One area in which photographs are typically used is in the investigation of the relationship between social responsiveness and early experience. Such studies (Mendelson et al., 1978; Sackett, 1965, 1966) often indicate that monkeys react emotionally to pictures of conspecifics and caretakers. Sackett (1965, 1966), for instance, found that infant monkeys isolated from birth showed interest upon viewing color slides of other infant monkeys, and signs of disturbance for adult monkeys exhibiting a threatening posture. Slides depicting monkeys engaged in other activities, those containing humans, and those with nonsocial content did not elicit such reactions. Similarly, Mendelson et al. (1978) found that infant monkeys differentially scanned pictures depicting conspecifics seemingly looking away as opposed to those showing monkeys looking toward the viewer. Marton and colleagues (cited in Cabe, 1980) note the occurrence of emotional responses and specific motor reactions to photographs of caretakers, conspecifics, food, and other objects. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that at least chimpanzees confuse pictures and their referents, just as children and individuals from nonpictorial cultures reportedly do. Kohler (1925) showed chimpanzees photographs of themselves and other apes, and reported behaviors such as passing their hands over the surface of the pictures and repeatedly turning from the picture to the blank side. The famous Sultan, upon viewing a photograph of himself, is reported to have “greeted” the picture. Similarly, Hayes and Hayes (1953) report that their home-reared chimp, Viki, spontaneously put her head to a magazine picture of a wristwatch as if listening for “ticking.” Viki, however, also seemed to have some understanding that a picture is not its referent in that she often pointed to pictures as a means of communicating her desires (e.g., for a candy bar) and did not attempt to eat the

88

H w r y Beilin and Elise G. Pearlman

pictures. Thus, as a whole, the evidence indicates that animals are capable of pictorial recognition, but the level at which they understand photographs as representations of reality is not clear. Also, although Cabe (1976) found that pigeons are able to discriminate between photographs and their referents, most researchers have not paid attention to the question of picture-referent differentiation. Thus, findings suggesting that animals attribute the properties of objects to their photographic counterparts can have implications for theories of pictorial perception, but most cross-species researchers have evidently ignored these possible implications.

IV. The Dual Nature of Pictures Consideration of both theoretical and empirical research presented thus far concerning photographs suggests the following: On the theoretical level, the work of Gibson (1971, 1980), Hagen (1978), and others (e.g., Haber, 1979, 1980; Kennedy, 1974) implies that pictures have a dual reality (what Gibson refers to as information for the “graph” as opposed to information for the surface beneath the graph), but whether both kinds of information are equally available to the young child is unclear. Gibson (1980) maintained that adults and children differ in their awareness of these features, with the latter only “dimly aware” of the surface on which a graph is displayed. However, Gibson did not specify the factors that might cause children to become fully aware of the surface beneath the graph. Clearly, experience in perceiving the real world cannot directly help the child learn about the properties of pictures as objects. This is information one must obtain from experience with photographs or other forms of pictorial representation themselves. Kennedy (1974) and Haber (1979, 1980) similarly maintained that during initial pictorial encounters pictures are not looked on as objects in their own right. Thus, according to Kennedy (1974, p. 57), the uneducated or very young “deal with the thing depicted, not the particular slant and unique viewpoint or design of the picture.” Haber (1979, 1980), noticing the relative insensitivity of children to pictorial properties such as flatness, hypothesized a stage in development during which pictures are experienced not in terms of a dual reality but rather as “windows opening into space.” Thus, like Gibson, Haber (1979) proposed that young children may approach pictures as scenes and only later perceive both kinds of reality they represent (1979, p. 89). However, Haber also was vague as to the course of development culminating in the dual reality of pictures. In particular, the role played by the sources of information for pictorial properties, such as flatness, is not clear. As Haber indicates, children must have some access to sources of information of flatness because the same sources also supply information about depth. Yet children do not seem to be applying the available flatness information to pictures.

Children’s Iconic Realism

89

In reported instances of iconic realism, researchers note that children frequently try to manipulate, scratch, grasp, and “look behind” pictured surfaces (e.g., Church, 1961; Ninio & Bruner, 1976), but no one has attempted to analyze the purpose behind such behavior. These behaviors may in fact represent attempts to obtain information for pictures as objects in their own right. As previously indicated, such behavior is also seen cross-culturally in people shown pictures for the first time (Deregowski er ul., 1972) and in animals (e.g.. in a chimpanzee; Hayes & Hayes, 1953).Thus, the argument can be made that iconic realism results from the child’s attempts to comprehend the dual reality of pictures, with the lack of such comprehension resulting in a tendency to focus on the properties of the objects represented. Thus, the question as to whether children are realists cannot be answered effectively without consideration of the nature of the pictorial medium and how children understand its properties and uses. The study described in the next section dealt with the question of realism and that of the child’s understanding of the nature of photographs. (The data to be referred to are from Pearlman, 1989.) In the study, young children were shown photographs as well as familiar objects. They were asked about the photographs and about the objects themselves, and were also questioned about their knowledge of the photographic medium.

V. A Study of Iconic Realism Two types of photographs were used: photographic prints and photographic slides presented by back projection. The variation of types is denoted as represerrturionul medium. The photographs (prints or slides) were in color or black and white-r~prrsetifutional mode. The decision to test response to both prints and slides was based on earlier reports that pictorial surfaces (prints versus backprojected slides) differentially affect judgment of photographic properties. Crosscultural research has shown too that color photographs present fewer obstacles to recognition than black and white photographs, which have been argued to be less ”true” to the reality they depict (Yonas & Hagen, 1973).

A. SUBJECTS AND DESIGN

The final sample included 120 subjects, sixty 3-year-olds (26 boys, 34 girls. mean age = 3.7; range: 3.0-3.1 I ) and sixty 5-year-olds (28 boys, 32 girls, mean age = 5.3; S.O-S.11), who attended preschool and kindergarten classes in Long Island, New York. The subjects were predominantly white and middle class. A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Representational Medium x Representational Mode x Age x Sex) factorial design was employed. Each child within a given age group was

90

Harry Beiliri and Elise G . Pearlinan

randomly assigned to one of four conditions (i.e., prints/color, printsiblack and white, slides/color, slidesiblack and white).

B. MATERIALS

1 . Photographic Prints (“Prints”) and Transparencies (“Slides”) The following 10 objects or sets of objects were photographed: an ice cream cone, a glass of orange juice, a rose in a vase, a lighted candle, a baby’s rattle, a wristwatch, a crayon, a banana, a ball, and a truck. Borderless, matte finish 8 x 10 in. (20.3 x 25.4 cm) photographic prints were made in both color and black and white. Each print was dry-mounted and sprayed to provide a uniform and protective finish. The resulting photographs formed two sets: (1) Color life-size prints, consisting of color prints that closely approximated, if not matched, the size of the depicted objects, and (2) black and white life-size prints, consisting of black and white versions of the color prints. The photographic prints were duplicated for the “slide” conditions. The size of the projected image matched that of the photographic prints. Duplicate slides and prints were made for certain stimuli and altered for use in the countericonic phase of the questioning. For the print conditions, these stimuli consisted of photographs of the rattle, watch, and ball cut in half on the diagonal. For the slide conditions, a thick black line drawn across transparencies of the rattle, watch, and ball simulated a diagonal cut.

2. Other Materials A Kodak carousel projector was used to project the slides onto a white plastic screen measuring 30 x 22 in. (76.2 x 55.9 cm). A Sony audiocassette recorder was used to record the interview sessions with the children. The actual objects pictured in the prints and slides were used as props in assessing the child’s understanding of the relationship between pictures and their real-world referents.

C . PROCEDURE

After a pretest that introduced the idea that questions would be posed concerning “pictures” (or “photographs”) and objects, three phases of questioning were given: Phase 1 involved picture-referent questioning, i.e., picture questions, about the photographs, and referent questions, about the objects that were depicted in the photographs. Phase 2 involved countericonic challenges, and Phase 3 involved photographic knowledge questions.

C‘hildreti ‘.v Icor I ic Reu li.stn

91

I . Phase I: Picture-Referent Questiorring Each child was tested individually. If the child appeared confused or made an error. the experimenter supplied the correct response and the questions were repeated. Children who persevered in giving “picture answers” when asked about referent objects, and vice versa, were not retained as subjects, nor were those with communicative difficulties. Twenty-three potential subjects (twenty 3-year-olds; three 5-year-olds) were dropped from the study for these reasons. Those who passed the pretest received instructions regarding haptic exploration of the photographic stimuli to the effect that they could touch, turn, or look behind the pictures if they thought it would help them answer the question. a. Pictiire Questioris. After the pretest the child wa ked 18 questions that required judging whether the properties of a real object could also be attributed to its photographic representation with the photograph (either print or slide) of the object placed before the child. Two questions were asked for each of nine pictures. The questions were about function, existence, or physical property. For example, Cali you eut this picture of an ice cream cone? (functional question); If you took tliis rose [real rose] and tore some leave off would ariytliing lzuppen in this pictiirc~?(existence question); I f you cut this picture [of a ruttle] in liulf would anything liuppen to this rattle [the reul object] ? (existence question); I f you sliook tliis picture would you hear the rattle? (physical property question). Upon presentation of each picture, whether photographic print or projected image, theexperimenter pointed to the object of interest in the photograph and asked, Wlzat is this a picture of? The child was asked six questions of each type, and then was asked questions that pertained to the objects depicted in the photographs. After each response, the child was questioned regarding the reasons for his or her answer and an attempt was made to clarify ambiguous responses. In particular, with respect to the physical property questions, the experimenter attempted to elicit descriptive information regarding the pictures. If the child responded either by spontaneously attributing the property of a real object to a picture (e.g., for the photograph of the ice cream cone, if the child said cold when asked, Ifyou roucliecl the picturc here, Iiow would the picture feel?) or by denying that a photograph possessed the properties of real objects (e.g.. by saying iiot cold), the more specific probe (i.e., Would the picturc feel cold if you touched tlie picture h c w ? ) was omitted. For example, with respect to whether one can eat a picture of an ice cream cone, a child who responded affirmatively was asked, If I let you eat the picture o f the icc>cwum cotie, would the picture taste? Woirld tlic picturc taste like strawberry ice cream? An effort was made to discourage the children from manipulating a picture until they had answered the question. Once the child responded, he or she was allowed to freely manipulate the picture. This behavior and any comments made by the subjects regarding the outcome of their manipulation were noted (e.g., It’s not h

o

~

t

92

Harry Beilin and Elise G. Pearlman

cold). If a child failed to comment, the experimenter did not question the child and did not probe for justifications.

b. Referent Questions. The referent questions paralleled the picture questions, except that the existence questions were omitted because they dealt with the relationship between picture and referent and therefore had no parallel with respect to the real objects. The objects of the referent questions were present in all cases, with the exception of the lighted candle and the ice cream cone for practical reasons. As before, children were asked to justify their answers, and ambiguous responses were clarified with modifications of the follow-up questions used with the pictorial stimuli. As in the case of pictures, attempts to manipulate objects were noted.

2. Phase 11: Countericonic Challenges The purpose of the countericonic challenges was to ensure that when iconic realism responses occurred they reflected true confusions of picture and referent objects or properties, and to reach a better understanding of picture-referent meaning for the child. Also, a child with a vague or tentative belief might, when challenged, reflect and clarify or modify that belief. After the picture-referent questioning, children were given a 5-minute break during which they played with a plastic puzzle provided by the experimenter. During this time, the experimenter determined whether the child had exhibited iconic realism during Phase I. Only those questions to which the child responded with iconic realism during the initial phase of the questioning were challenged. The stimuli serving as the basis for the challenges came from the set of pictorial materials to which the child responded in the first phase. The form of the challenge varied with the form of the original question as follows.

a. Functional Challenges. Challenges to the functional questions involved asking subjects to use the picture to fulfill the functions served by the actual objects. For example, in reference to the picture of the ice cream cone, the child was told: Before, you told me that you could eat this picture of an ice cream cone. Would you like to eat the picture now? Similarly, the child was asked if he or she wanted to try to blow out the flame on the picture of the candle. The child’s behavior was noted, with care being taken to prevent the child from going so far as to destroy the stimulus (e.g.. by eating the picture). Following the child’s attempt, or comments to the effect that such action would prove futile, the child was asked to provide an explanation and was questioned in respect to the reasons behind his or her remarks. If the child hesitated or failed to respond, he or she was told, for example: You don’t seem to want to eat this picture of an ice cream cone. Why not? If the child still did not respond, he or she was asked: Which would you rather eat, a picture of an ice cream cone, or an ice cream cone from the candy store, or are both just as good for eating?

b. Exisfence Challenges. The experimenter reiterated the child’s initial response and then performed the act specified in the existence question. In one case (i.e., does destruction of the referent affect the picture?), the act took the form of actually altering the state of the referent (e.g., spilling out the juice or breaking the crayon in two). The child was told, for example: You told me that i f 1 broke this crayon in ha& the picture would break. too. Now here is the crayon and here is the picture. The picture was then hidden from the child’s sight. The experimenter then broke the crayon and said, I just broke the crayon in two. Do you think that anything has happened to the picture of the crayon? The picture was then shown to the child, and he or she was asked, Did anything happen to the picture? Why [or Why nor]? In another case (i.e., does destruction of the picture affect the referent’?) the experimenter showed a print that was already cut in half or a slide on which a black line had been drawn to simulate a break in the picture. The referent was then hidden from the child’s view, and the child was told: I just cut the picture of u rattle in hulf: Do you think that anything hu.v huppened to the other rattle? The child was then shown the intact referent and asked. Has anything happened to this rattle? Why [or Why not]’

c. Physical Property Challenges. The child was shown the stimulus in question and his or her initial response was reiterated: Before, you told me you thought the picture would feel cold if you touched the picture here. You can touch the picture now to see how the picture feels. The child was then asked: How does the picture feel? Does the picture feel as cold as ice c*reumfrom the candy story? Why [or Why not]? 3. Phase Ill: Photographic Knowledge Questions The final phase of the session consisted of questions designed to assess the child’s familiarity and experience with the medium of photography. For subjects who exhibited iconic realism, this phase was administered following Phase 11. For subjects who did not participate in Phase I1 (i.e., did not exhibit iconic realism), Phase I1 followed Phase I. To accommodate differences in subjects’ attention spans, the third phase was either given at the end of the first session or administered separately during a second session with the child.

VI. Results A. PHASE I: PICTURE-REFERENT DATA

1. Iconic Realism As indicated, each child was asked a series of 18 (functional, existence, physical property) questions to probe the child’s beliefs about the relationship between

04

Hurry Beilin and Elise G. Peurlmun

photographs and reality. In general, questions were phrased so that an affirmative response indicated iconic realism. However, for certain pictures (i.e., ice cream cone, rose, banana, candle), the physical property question consisted of an openended probe (e.g., ice cream cone: If you touched the picture here, how would the picture feel?) followed by a more specific probe (Would the picture feel cold?). If the child responded definitively on the initial probe (i.e., the child spontaneously attributed the property of the real object, such as coldness, to the picture, or denied that photographs possess properties of real objects, such as not cold), the more directed probe was omitted. Thus, in scoring, one point was credited for each affirmative response or spontaneous attribution of a property of a real object to a photograph. A score of 18 indicated complete belief in iconic realism, as measured by this task. Pilot testing revealed that children sometimes changed their answers during questioning, and for the purpose of the present investigation, when this occurred, the child’s final response was the one that was scored. Sometimes children did not respond either affirmatively or negatively to a question ( e g , I don’t know, or simply no response) and the number of times this occurred was recorded. In addition, on several occasions children’s responses were unclear in that they contradicted later comments made about the photographs (e.g., justifying an affirmative response by saying, It’s a picture). If further questioning failed to clarify the meaning behind the child’s response, it was scored as “ambiguous.” Cases in which children responded affirmatively to existence questions yet could not specify how destroying the referent or picture would affect its counterpart were also included in this category. The overall mean for total iconic realism scores was 2.34 (Table I), with individual scores ranging from 0 to 14 (Table 11). Few 5-year-olds had more than four iconic realism responses, but the total iconic realism scores of 3-year-olds were more widely distributed. A four-way analysis of variance, Representational Medium (prints, slides) by Mode (color, black and white) by Age (3 years, 5 years) by Sex (male, female), was performed on the iconic realism score. The only significant effects were for representational medium, F (1, 104) = 3.98, p c .05, and age, F (1, 104) = 28.18, p < .001. Thus, 3-year-olds’ total iconic realism scores were significantly higher than those obtained by 5-year-olds, supporting the prediction of a decreasing tendency to attribute the properties of real objects to photographs with increasing age. Representational medium significantly influenced children’s tendency to engage in iconic realism, but in the opposite direction from what was originally anticipated. That is, instead of prints eliciting more iconic realism than slides as predicted, on the assumption that back-projected surface properties would be less salient than paper print surfaces, the opposite effect was found. Also contrary to prediction, the mode of the pictorial stimuli (i.e.. black and white, or color) did not significantly influence iconic realism scores. As can be seen in Table I, color and black and white pictures elicited almost identical amounts of iconic realism.

Cliildriw ’sIconic Reulism TABLE I

Means and Standard Deviations of Total Iconic Realism Scores and Suhscores for Representational Medium x Mode x Age x Sex Conditions” Representational medium Statistic ~~

~

Mean SD

(I1 ~.

(10)

Slides ( I 1 = 60)

~

Color (I1 = 60)

.. .-- --

1.87

2.31

Age

Mode ~~

Prints

Mean SD

.. .. .

~~

5 Ycars (I1

~~

1.82 3.26

Sex

~~~~~~~

3 Years (n = 6 0 )

BiW (11 = 60)

Boys Girls ( n = 54) ( n = 6 6 )

= 60)

~~

.. .

~~~

Total lcoriic Rculi.cm Scow 2.35 2.33 3.OO 2.92 231 3.lX

1.OX

2.15

1.75

2.X6

7.50 2.80

Furic~ionulSubscow 25 33 .54 .73 .77

.I0

44

.10 .4x

24 .75

.I0 .54

.48 1.37

I .32

2.3x

.EX

1.48

1.79

1.52

1.65

.IX

E.Yi.ste,lce S l r t n c ’ 0 r . e

Mean

.I5

SD

.SX

.X3 1.73

1.50 1.70

1.76 1.93

Mean SD

58 1.46

.8X

.40 1.20

P l ~ ~ s i cProprrF c~l 1.58 1.6X 1.82 I .n3

1.73 .~llh.\(.fJl.L’

“Maximum score = 18. for total iconic re;ilism score: f o r subscores. 6

TABLE II Nuniber of Subjects Having One or More Iconic Responses as Number of iconic responses

3-Year-oltls ..

1

ii

Function of Age

S-Yex-olds ~

~

~~~~~~~~~~

X 11

4

2 3

7

0

3 5

7 3

3

h

>

7 8 9

3

I0 11

1

1 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21

12 13 14 Total

7

I

2 0 0 I 51

.so

2

1

1.70 1.9s

96

Harry Beilin and Elise G.Pearlman

2. Iconic Realism Properties. Whether an individual child is an iconic realist can be approached in two ways. In one, iconic realism is viewed as an all-or-none affair. Even one iconic realism response marks the child’s conception of pictures but does not always manifest itself in his or her responses. In the other, iconic realism, more as a perceptual than as a conceptual phenomenon, can admit to variation in “strength.” Considered as a perceptual phenomenon, the magnitude of the iconic realism effect, i.e., how much of the phenomenon is manifest in 3- and 5-year-old children, shows that they are not realists. The finding that 75% of the 3-year-olds gave iconic realism responses to fewer than a third of the questions is evidence that iconic realism is not the norm for this age group. This finding alone supports the work of Wellman (1988), Markman (1976), and Flavell (1986) on this issue. Nonetheless, even though mean iconic realism was significantly less at age 5 than at age 3, some of the children could be said to be realists. A child who offers 14 of 18 realism responses is very likely to be a realist, but is a child with 2 such responses? According to a conceptualist view the child could; in the perceptualist view her or she would not be likely. However, the present study offers a view of the issue that differs from other accounts. Subjects’ total iconic realism scores were analyzed in respect to subscores associated with the different question types (functional, existence, and physical property). Three additional four-way analyses of variance were performed on these scores. The effect of age proved significant in all three analyses of variance, consistent with the overall age difference in iconic realism scores (see Table I). Although the preceding findings were concerned with effects within individual question types on the tendency to engage in iconic realism, additional analyses dealt with comparison across question types. Physical property questions elicited the most iconic realism, followed by existence and functional questions, respectively (see Table I). Correlated t tests indicated significant differences between functional and physical property subscores (p < .OOl), functional and existence subscores f$ < .OS), and physical property and existence subscores (p c .OOl). Correlated t tests performed within the two age groups revealed that these findings held true for 3- and 5-year-olds, with the exception that for 5-year-olds the mean iconic functional and existence subscores were identical. In the overall decline of iconic realism scores elicited by the various question types (functional, existence, physical property) only the existence question type was affected by the representational medium, indicating that existence questions alone were responsible for the effect of representational medium seen on total iconic realism scores. There was also a significant Age x Representational Medium interaction associated with existence subscores. Thus, although both 3-yearolds and 5-year-olds were more likely to engage in iconic realism upon viewing slides as opposed to prints, the difference between the two representational media was greater for the 3-year-olds.

Chilrlrm ‘s icoiiic Reulistn

97

3. Referent Scores Referent scores were based on a parallel set of questions regarding the functions and properties associated with the pictures’ real-world referents. The child was credited with one point every time he or she correctly attributed a property or a function to a referent, with 12 the maximum score. The overall mean for total referent scores was 11.64, with individual scores ranging from 9 to 12. Thus, in contrast to knowledge of the properties of photographs, knowledge of the properties of object referents was very high. Nevertheless, variability was sufficient to provide a significant age effect such that the knowledge of 5-year-olds was better than that of 3-year-olds. Subtask analyses of variance with referent scores yielded findings that correspond to performance on the picture task where functional questions proved “easier” in that they were less likely to elicit iconic realism and physical property questions were more difficult in that they were more likely to evoke this tendency. (Mean referent scores to functional questions was 5.94, to physical property questions 5.70. Standard deviations were .24 and .62, respectively.)

4. Haptic Behavior The haptic behavior of children in the picture and referent phases was noted and analyzed. The following classification system was derived from a list of haptic and related motoric behaviors observed in 168 children who served as pilot subjects prior to this study, and on the basis of the videotaped performance of five additional pilot subjects.

a. Behavior Directed toward Pictures. (1) Specific touching (touching a specific part of the picture), ( 2 ) exploring surface, (3) attempting to “pick out” objects, (4) turning over or looking behind, (5) shaking, (6) listening, (7) blowing, ( 8 ) smelling, (9) kissing, (10) exploring circumference, (1 1) bouncing (with prints). (12) blocking light (with slides). b. Behavior Directed toward Objects.

(1) smelling, ( 2 ) listening, (3)

bouncing, (4) shaking, ( 5 ) drawing.

c. Anticipatory Movements. Action, such as listening, smelling, or touching, that was initiated but not completed. d. “Misplaced”Manipulation. Instances where, during questioning about the photograph, the child manipulated the referent.

e. No Referent Present. Here the manipulation was performed in the absence of a referent (e.g., blowing when questioned about a candle on a real birthday cake).

Harry Beiliri and Elise G. Peurlman

98

In the scoring, the child was credited with one point for each behavior that occurred within the context of picture-referent questioning. As a reliability check, an independent rater viewed and rescored the videotaped performances of 13 subjects. The agreement between the experimenter and the rater was 92%. The means, standard deviations, and ranges associated with the various categories of haptic behavior appear in Table 111. Based on performance in categories pertaining to “behavior directed toward pictures,” each child was assigned a total haptic picture score. The means and standard deviations associated with total haptic picture scores appear in Table IV. Analysis of variance performed on these data revealed that, in general, haptic exploration of pictures varied as a function of age and sex, with 3-year-olds TABLE 111 Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges of Categories and Subcategories of Haptic Behavior ~~

Category and subcategory

Mean

SD

Range

Behavior directed toward pictures (total) Specific touching Exploring surface Attempting to “pick out” objects Turning overilooking behind Shaking Listening Blowing Smelling Kissing Exploring circumference Bouncing Blocking lighP Behavior directed toward objects (total) Smelling Listening Bouncing Shaking Drawing Anticipatory movements Toward pictures Toward objects Misplaced manipulation No referent present Haptic picture scores Functional Existence Physical property

2.92 1.27 .28 .I5

&12

.08 .23 .02

2.93 1.31 .70 .5h .43 .37 .35 .41 .63 .I3 .30 .13 .32 1.24 .62 .42 .26 .42 .13

.13 .04 .I8 .I0

.36 .20 .44 .33

0-2 0-1 0-2 0-2

.78 .18 1.96

I .24 52 1.76

0-3

.I3 .I6 .14

.22 .37 .02 .08 .02 .09 .90

.35 .22

0-10 (L 5 (W

@2 0-1

0-1 0-1 0-3 0-1 0-2 0-1 0-2 0-5 0-2 0-1

0-1 0-1 0-1

0-6 0-6

‘The mean and standard deviation for blocking light behavior that occurred out of the context of picture-referent questioning were .07 and .25, respectively.

Childreri ’.P Iconic licwli.rrn

99

TABLE IV Means and Standard Deviations of Total Haptic Picture Scores and S u h x o r e s for Rcprexxtational Medium x Mode x Age x Sex Conditions Reprewntational Mode

nictli urn

Prints Statistic ~~~

= 60)

(ti ~~~~

Color

SI&S (ti

~

= 60) ( P I = 60) ~~

~~~~

(ti

Sex

Age ~~

B/W= 60)

3 Yc;irh (ti

= 60)

~~

~~

5 Years = 60)

(ti

~~

~ a ~ e ~ s e m a G (ti

= 54) ~

(11

= 66)

~~~~~

Tortrl Hoptic .Si.rir.v Mean

SD

1.77 2.81

3.07 3.07

3.17 3.14

Mean SD

55 1.02

1 .(I0 1.40

.80 1.31

Mean SD

2.03 1 .x2

I.XX 1.72

3.67 2.72

3.58

3.10

2.25 2.62

331 2.0‘1

2,lX 2.69

1.15

Fllll(.flOllN/ L ~ l I h . \ i ’ t J l t ’

1’11ySilYi

2.15 1.85

.75

I .02

33

1.17

1.32

1.11

I .02 1.31

1.57 1.50

1.52 1.73

I Pro/JE)’rys1 I IJ \ i,flrl, 1.77 2.35 1.93 l.h7

.5x

1.50 I.57

significantly more likely to manipulate pictures than 5-year-olds, and males more apt to touch pictures than females. A significant Representational Medium x Age x Sex interaction indicated that for a given age group, pictorial manipulation varied according to both sex and representational medium. Thus, for example, among 3-year-olds. males in the print condition exhibited the most manipulation and among 5-year-olds, males in the slide condition exhibited the most manipulation. Inasmuch as both haptic picture and iconic realism scores represent responses to the same sequence of questions. correspondence between these findings is instructive. While haptic behavior showed grcater diversity, both total iconic realism and haptic picture scores were similarly related to age differences. Scores on both measures were significantly higher for 3-year-olds than for 5-year-olds. This age effect was upheld for all three iconic subscores as well as functional and physical property haptic subscores. Of the three question types, physical property questions elicited the most iconic realism and haptic behavior. Functional questions elicited the least iconic realism and were associated with little haptic exploration. The findings on existence questions differed from those on other question types on both verbal and haptic measures. In terms of iconic realism, existence questions were the only ones significantly affected by the representational medium. In respect to haptic behavior, existence questions were again unique in eliciting almost no haptic exploration and evidencing no effects or interactions.

100

Hurry Beilin and Elise G. Pearlmun

5. ConfirminglDisconfirmingBehavior Pilot work revealed that during questioning, children sometimes modified or reaffirmed their responses while manipulating pictures. These responses represent a subset of children’s iconic and noniconic responses and could be categorized as ‘‘confirmation’’or “disconfirmation,” depending on their relationship to the manipulation the child performed. Analysis of iconic and noniconic responses that occurred in conjunction with manipulation revealed that such behavior often allowed the child to modify or to reaffirm his or her original response. Few positive confirmations occurred, suggesting that children rarely reaffirmed iconic responses. Positive disconfirmations were also infrequent in that children rarely changed noniconic responses to iconic on the basis of manipulating pictures. In contrast, negative confirmations and disconfirmations occurred frequently. Negative confirmations were the most common form of confirmatory/disconfirmatory response, and they varied significantly with age, suggesting that 5-year-olds were proportionately more likely to use physical manipulation to reaffirm noniconic responses than 3-year-olds. Negative disconfirmations were also associated with a significant main effect for age. Here the age effect was reversed, with 3-year-olds proportionately more likely than 5-year-olds to change responses from iconic to noniconic in the face of what can be considered contradictory manipulative input. The findings with respect to children’s iconic scores should be interpreted in light of these results, in that 3-year-olds’ iconic realism scores would have been even higher were it not for the corrective role played by physical manipulation.

6. Justifications Three types of justifications were provided by children during the course of picture-referent questioning. This classification scheme was developed in a study that served as a pilot for the present study. 1. Reasons for attributing the properties of real objects to photographs (iconic justifications),

2 . Reasons for not attributing the properties of real objects to photographs (noniconic justifications), and 3. Reasons for attributing properties or functions to referents (referent justifications). The three major types of justifications provided in the course of picture-referent questioning were associated with several subcategories. Among children’s reasons for attributing the properties of real objects to pictures, the content-related responses (e.g., The ice cream cone was in the freezer) and no-justification subcategory were found to be most frequent. Although no main effects in the analyses

Children’s Icatiic Reulism

101

of variance proved significant in either case, the content-related and the nojustification responses were each associated with several significant two-way interactions. A significant Mode x Age interaction indicated that although 3-yearolds provided the same proportion of content-related justifications for iconic responses regardless of pictorial mode, 5-year-olds were more discriminating in that they tended to reserve their content-related justifications for color pictures. Of children’s reasons for not attributing the properties of real objects to photographs, representational explanations (e.g., can ’t en1 picture of banana because it’s not real) were the most frequently used of the noniconic justifications. Age was a significant factor here, with 5-year-olds providing representational justifications for their noniconic responses proportionately more often than 3year-olds. Finally, of children’s reasons for attributing properties or functions to object referents, the content-related and “real” (e.g., Ifyou took the watch arid woitnd it up it u!ould tick because it’.s real) responses were the most commonly used. Of the two, content-related justifications might be considered the less sophisticated, as emphasis was placed on properties and actions associated with one form (referent), although in “real” justifications the explanation entailed an implied, if not explicit, juxtaposition of both picture and object. As with children’s total referent scores, both content-related and real justifications were significantly influenced by age and sex. Thus, 5-year-olds were more likely than 3-year-olds to offer “real” justifications. Although 5-year-olds had significantly higher total referent scores than 3-year-olds, 3-year-olds were more likely to offer content-related justifications than 5-year-olds.

B. PHASE 11: COUNTERICONIC CHALLENGES

Children with one or more iconic responses (“iconic” subjects, N = 72) were challenged with information contrary to their belief in iconic realism.

1. Residual Iconic Realism As in the case of picture-referent questioning, the countcriconic challenges were structured in terms of three question types, with the exception that existence challenges were differentiated into e~vpectcrland actual phases. In the expected phase of the challenge, the child performed an action on either the picture o r the referent, and had to anticipate whether anything happened to its counterpart. This phase was followed by the actual phase, in which the child actually witnessed the outcome of the predictions. All three question types were scored in such a way that each response was credited as a unit and one point was given for each affirmative answer or spontaneous attribution of the property of a real object to a photograph.

102

Harry Beilin and Elise G. Pearlmati

Sometimes children refused to perform the action (e.g., touching the picture) that would constitute the countericonic challenge, and the number of times these refusals occurred was recorded. Finally, as indicated earlier, physical property challenges consisted of two parts. First, the child tested the picture and decided whether an attributed property (e.g., coldness) was present in the representation. A child who responded affirmatively or spontaneously attributed the property of the real object to the photograph was asked whether he or she thought that the property was present in the picture to the same extent as in the real-world referent (e.g., Does the picture of the ice cream cone feel as cold as ice cream from the candy store?). These two-part questions were scored as follows: If the child responded affirmatively to both parts, he or she was credited for the question. If the child responded negatively to the initial question, he or she was not questioned further and did not receive credit for the item. A number of subjects responded affirmatively to the first question yet did not believe that the picture possessed the quality in question (e.g., coldness) to the same extent as the referent. When this reaction occurred, the child was categorized as equivocal for that item. In the analysis of children’s responses to the countericonic challenges, we devised a number of measures to indicate the amount of residual iconic realism remaining after the countericonic challenges. In terms of total residual iconic realism, the overall mean was .99; thus, on the whole, 30%of the total iconic realism originally elicited during Phase I (1= 3.90, for subjects in Phase 11) remained after the countericonic challenges. An analysis of variance revealed no significant effects or interactions associated with total residual iconic realism scores. The residual functional iconic subscores indicated no functional iconic responses remaining after the countericonic challenges. Thus, when children are actually confronted with using a picture to fulfill the functions of its real-world referent, they deny that this use can be done. For residual “expected” subscores, the overall mean was S O ; thus, approximately 53% of the iconic realism originally elicited in response to existence questions in Phase I ( X= 2 2 ) remained following the anticipatory phase of the existence challenge. The representational medium provide significant, F (1, 56) = 7.10, p < .O1, indicating that slides were more than nine times more likely than prints to be associated with residual expected iconic realism. The analysis revealed no other significant effects or interactions pertaining to residual expected iconic realism. In contrast to residual expected iconic realism, the overall mean for residual actual iconic realism was .06, indicating that, on the whole, 8% of the iconic realism originally elicited in response to existence questions ( 1= 232) remained after the second segment of the existence challenge. The overall mean for residual physical property subscores was .93, indicating that 37%of the iconic realism originally elicited in response to physical property questions in Phase I ( X = 2.72) remained after the physical property challenges.

A tinal group of analyses dealt with comparison across challenges. As already indicated, physical property challenges were associated with the most residual iconic realism, followed by actual (existence) and functional challenges. Correlated t tests performed on mean residual iconic realism scores indicated that residual physical property iconic realism ( .93) differed significantly from both residual actual (existence) ( = .06) and residual functional iconic realism ( = .OO) at the .OO1 level. The remaining comparison between residual functional (X= .OO) and residual actual (existence) iconic realism ( X = .06) was significant at the .(IS level. In summary, analysis of residual iconic realism following the countericonic challenges indicated that substantial iconic realism remained despite a reduction in the tendency to engage in iconic realism. The effect of exposure to physical evidence contrary to the belief in iconic realism varied with the question type. Although a small amount of iconic realism was elicited in response to functional questions during Phase I, no residual functional iconic realism remained after the countericonic challenges. Thus, when children are actually challenged with using a picture to fulfill the functions of its real-world referent, they deny that this can be done. In contrast, for residual physical property iconic realism, a substantial 37% of the iconic realism originally elicited in response to physical property questions in Phase I remained following the countericonic challenges. Analyses indicated no significant effects or interactions associated with residual physical property subscores. The most intriguing consequence of the countericonic challenges was seen in conjunction with the two-part existence challenges. Examination of the data of the subgroup exhibiting iconic realism revealed that this subgroup was more homogeneous than the sample as a whole. One of the few significant effects that remained for this subgroup when Phase I performance was considered was the effect of representational medium associated with existence questions. Exactly this result was reflected in the significant effect associated with the residual expected (existence) subscore. Thus. as in Phase 1, when asked to anticipate the results of their actions on either a picture or an object, children were significantly more likely to engage in iconic realism with slides than with photographic prints. However, once the consequences of their actions on either the picture or the object were observed, representational medium no longer had a differential effect as reflected in the findings pertaining to the residual actual (existence) subscore. In comparisons among countericonic challenges, physical property challenges were associated with the most residual iconic realism, followed by actual (existence) and functional challenges, respectively. This pattern echoes the findings obtained in Phase I with respect to the amount of iconic realism elicited by thc various question types. Lastly, results associated with total residual iconic realism indicated that, as a whole, 30% of the iconic realism originally elicited during Phase I remained following the countericonic challenges.

x

x=

104

Harry Beilin and Elise G. Pearlman

2. Justifications Three types of justifications were provided by the children during the course of the countericonic challenges: (1) reasons for attributing the properties of real objects to photographs (iconic justifications), (2) reasons for not attributing the properties of real objects to photographs (noniconic justifications), and (3) explanations associated with equivocal responses. The same classification system applied to justifications in Phase I was used here, with a few changes. In terms of children’s reasons for attributing the properties of real objects to pictures, each justification category accounted for approximately the same proportion of iconic justifications as it did in Phase I. The content-related and nojustification categories were again found to be most popular. No significant effects or interactions were associated with content-related justifications, but the proportion of no justifications was significantly affected by age, with 5-year-olds more likely than 3-year-olds to offer no justification for their iconic realism responses. C. PHASE 111: PHOTOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE

In contrast to Phase 11, all subjects participated in the final phase of the study, responding to a series of questions concerning their experience and familiarity with the photographic medium. Children received one point for each response generally viewed as correct by adults. On the whole, the proportion of correct responses was only .34, indicating substantial gaps in children’s knowledge about photographs. Age was the only significant source of variance, with 5-year-olds exhibiting more knowledge than 3-year-olds. Photographic knowledge was also significantly and negatively correlated with total iconic realism scores and with both functional and physical property iconic subscores. Analysis of patterns of incorrect responses revealed consistent tendencies of children to focus on pictorial subject matter as opposed to the representational medium, and to confuse drawing and photography.

VII. Discussion and Conclusions Two theoretical frameworks bear on the results of this study. One is defined by the literature on children’s theory of mind, particularly that part concerning questions of child realism. As asserted by Estes eta!. (1989), among others, ostensibly convincing evidence shows that young children are not realists in the way that Piaget (1929) characterized them. The evidence from the present study leads to the conclusion that the issue is not as clear-cut as they asserted and that in at least one sense young children are realists. The problem as we see it is that heretofore the

Children’s Iconic Realism

105

focus has been on object realism, and in this sense the present data substantially confirm others’ findings of no, or relatively little, realism. However, when looked at asproperfy realism, we found convincing evidence of realism in the range from 3 to 5 years. The second framework that informs the present research derives from theories of pictorial representation, which concern the dual nature of photographic depiction. In this case, the question addressed is when children are able to discern that photographs are objects in their own right, with properties that relate to the nature of the representational medium itself, and as objects that depict other objects with properties that differ from those of the representational medium. Determining whether children are in fact realists, utilizing pictures of known materials, clearly depends on their knowledge of both the properties of the medium and the objects depicted in that medium. The evidence from the present study shows that the young child, particularly the 3-year-old, confuses these two kinds of knowledge, and that this confusion accounts for the phenomenon of child property realism. The evidence for child property realism comes first from the iconic realism scores that indicate the number of instances of confusion between the photograph of an object and the properties of the objects themselves. The absolute numbers of such scores for both 3- and 5-year-olds is not sufficient to conclude that realism is a predominant quality of the young child’s thought in the manner suggested by Piaget. However, it is a significant phenomenon in other respects. The iconic realism scores showed a statistically significant difference between the 3- and 5-year-old groups. Second, these scores were affected by the medium of representation (from projected slides more than from prints), although they were not affected by photographic mode (the contrast between black and white versus color forms). The iconic realism scores were obtained from three types of questions: physical property questions (How wouldX feel?), functional questions (Could you eut X?), and existence questions (What would happen to X if we tore up the picture of X ? ) . Correct responses to all question types differed with age, although the greatest difference was with the physical property questions, which had yielded the most iconic realism responses. Thus, iconic realism was manifested primarily in the responses to questions about the properties of objects and the properties of pictures, and less in the responses to questions about objects qua objects. The distinction is important and we conclude from our review of the literature that it has been overlooked in most of the discussions of childhood realism. One can believe that a represented object is the object itself, as seen in a chimpanzee’s trying to eat the picture of a banana or a child’s licking the picture of an ice cream cone; but such a one may or may not believe that a picture of an ice cream cone would be wet and cold just as the object itself. The evidence from the present study supports the view that by 3 years of age, the principal form of iconic realism refers primarily to properties and less, if at all, to objects as such.

106

Harry Beilin and Elise C . Pearlman

Further evidence of property realism is in the haptic behavior of the subjects. The haptic behavior evidenced was “spontaneous” behavior rated by the experimenter in the course of the children’s responses to iconic realism questions. This behavior could have been an artifact of instructions, given prior to the administration of the tasks, in which children were told they could touch, turn, or look behind the pictures. These instructions were included because pilot work showed that children sometimes expressed a desire to touch the pictures but were reluctant to handle the experimenter’s materials. The findings argue against the artifactual interpretation. Although the instructions were general, 12 different haptic behaviors were observed, behaviors that bear a striking similarity to those reported in the literature, from placing a single finger on a spot in the photograph to “pincer” movements to pick up an object or part of a picture. In addition, the movements were fine-tuned to the particular properties of the objects, such as smelling the rose or banana photograph, shaking the rattle photograph, and listening to the picture of the watch. These behaviors were never specified or alluded to in the instructions. The nature of the instructions also cannot explain why certain question types elicited more haptic behaviors than others and why certain haptic responses are linked to certain question types (e.g., specific touching and physical property questions). Finally, the findings associated with confirming and disconfirming behavior show that in some cases the haptic behaviors provided “evidence” in favor of maintaining or denying an original iconic realism belief. Consistent with the pattern of iconic realism scores, the haptic behavior of the 3-year-olds reflected iconic realism more than that of the 5-year-olds. Specific touching and smelling occurred more for physical property questions than for others; picking up and blowing were associated more with functional questions than with physical property questions. No specific haptic behaviors were associated with the existence questions, which was anticipated because any appropriate haptic responses to such questions would have destroyed the pictures or objects placed before the subject. Additional evidence for property iconic realism came from the justifications children offered in response to realism questions. Thus, when asked why a photograph of an ice cream cone would feel cold, as the child had asserted, the child commonly answered, “Because ice cream is always cold” or “Because it was in the freezer;” that is, the child did not distinguish the relevant property of the photograph from the real property of the object depicted. Of the five types of justifications given, content-related (Lea,property-related) justifications were most frequent (mean proportion .41). Three-year-olds provided the same proportion of content-related justifications regardless of pictorial mode; 5-year-olds were more discriminating in that they reserved these justifications more for color pictures. In contrast, when subjects gave noniconic realism responses (i.e., distinguished the pictorial representation from the object), their justifications were “representational.” Thus, [You can’t eat a picture of a banana] because it’s not real, and

Children ’s Iconic Heolisrn

I07

you’ll get sick if you ecit this picture. Representational justifications were more likely to be given by 5-year-olds than by 3-year-olds. Challenges from the experimenter to subjects’ iconic realism responses provide further evidence of iconic realism. Countericonic challenges were directed to the three question types, with the addition of a category for existence questions. The last referred to a possible action performed on the photograph or its object referent (tearing or cutting each) with the subject’s anticipation of the consequences. Analyses of the residual iconic realism after the challenges revealed that significant iconic realism remained despite evidence contrary to this belief. However, this outcome was not obtained for some categories of questions. Although a limited amount of iconic realism was evident in response to functional questions, none remained after countericonic challenges. Thus the children denied that one could write with the picture of a crayon or bounce the picture of a ball. In contrast, substantial iconic realism remained after physical property challenges (37%). Existence questions, which elicited an intermediate amount of iconic realism, provided an intermediate level of residual realism following challenges (6%).A difference in results between slides and prints in respect to existence question challenges suggests that engaging in manipulation of representations provides children with sufficient knowledge of the properties of the objects to reduce belief in iconic realism. Children’s justifications with respect to countericonic challenges were consistent with their explanations of their original iconic and noniconic responses. The basic questions about children’s realism arc whether it exists and, if so, why it exists. In Piaget’s account, “realism is the consequence of the relative nondifferentiation between the self and the outside world in child thought” (Chapman, 1988, p. 48). Estes er ul. (1989) characterized Piaget’s position as asserting that prior to 6 or 7 years of age children are incapable of distinguishing between mental and physical phenomena. Estes et ul., in distinction, proposed that “even very young children, from around 2% years on, make a fundamentally correct distinction between mental and physical phenomena.” Our claim is that by 3 ycars of age children have not fully made these distinctions. However, our studies were confined to iconic realism with respect to the processing of photographic depictions, and therefore we make no general claim about the child’s knowledge of all mental events. Within the present constraints, we conclude that the child’s knowledge of mental representation (whether imaginal or conceptual in form), inferred from the processing of an external representation such as a photograph, is dependent on knowledge of the properties of the external objects and the properties of the depicting medium. That is, any claim about mental events that assumes some representational medium, be it language or some form of iconic representation, depends on knowledge of that represented medium, at least to some degree. This is not merely a methodological claim; it refers to how knowledge of internal events is in fact acquired.

108

Harry Beilin and Elise G. Pearlman

In the Gibsonian realist view, information about pictorial qualities of surface and object depicted are directly picked up from the picture surface, but there are exceptions, even for Gibson. Gibson acknowledged (1980) that with artifacts such as drawings and even photographs, knowledge of pictorial conventions may enter into the perception of pictures. In our view, children do not come into the world with knowledge of the properties of objects, as an “affordance” view, on the contrary, might suggest. For the most part, the child must learn about such properties either from his or her own activities or from instruction. This kind of knowledge may come rapidly from commerce with objects, or slowly. The present study clearly indicates that knowledge of photographic objects some slowly, as Gardner, Winner, and Kircher (1975) found for a variety of media. In the present study, children show considerable confusion in their understanding of photographs and drawings. In addition, their knowledge, or lack of it, appears to be related to their iconic realism responses, in particular to their physical property realism responses, and parallels the substantial difference in knowledge of these media between 3 and 5 years of age. We thus conclude that iconic realism is a real phenomenon, although by 3 years of age it is relatively weak. Nonetheless, in the children who evidence it, the phenomenon appears to be robust and resistant to counterevidence, at least as this knowledge bears on physical properties. The phenomenon appears to be related to knowledge of object properties that is most likely acquired through commerce with the world and by way of instruction. Thus iconic realism is a type of property realism rather than a kind of object realism. Children at the ages tested appear to distinguish real from represented objects without difficulty, but they apparently do not distinguish between some real and represented properties.

REFERENCES Arnheim, R. (1974). On the nature of photography. Critical Inquiry, 9, 149-161. Barrera, M. E., & Maurer, D. (1981a). Discrimination of strangers by the three month-old. Child Development, 52, 558-563. Barrera, M. E., & Maurer, D. (1981b). Recognition of mother’s photographed face by the three month-old. Child Development, 52, 714-716. Beilin, H. (1983). Development of photogenic comprehension. Ar/ Educarion, 36, 28-33. Biederman, I. (1987). Recognition by components: A theory of image understanding. fhyschological Review, 94, 115-147. Buhler, K. (1930). The mental development of fhr child. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Cabe, P. A. (1976). Transfer of discrimination from solid objects to pictures by pigeons: A test of theoretical methods of picture perception. Perception and fsychophysics, 19, 545-550. Cabe, P. A. (1980). Picture perception in nonhuman subjects. In M. Hayen (Ed.). The perception of pictures (Vol. 2, pp. 305-343). New York: Academic Press. Chapman, M. (1988). Constructive evolution: Origins and development of Piager’s thought. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Children’s Iconic Realism

109

Church, J. (1961). Language and the discovery of realiry. New York: Random House. Cohen, L. B., DeLoache, J. S., & Pearl. R. A. (1977). An examination of interference effects in infants’ 48, 88-96, memory for faces. Child De~~elopment, Cook, M., Field, J., & Griffiths. K. (1978). The perception of solid form in early infancy. Child Development, 49, 8664369. Cornell, E. H. (1974). Infants’ discrimination of photographs of faces following redundant presentations. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 18, 98-106. Daehler, M . W., Perlmutter, M., & Meyers, N. A. (1976). Equivalence of pictures and objects for very young children. Child Development, 47, 96-102. Davenport, R. K., & Rogers, C . M. (1971). Perception of photographs by apes. Behavioirr, 39, 318-320. Davenport, R. K., Rogers, C. M., & Russell, 1. S. (1975). Cross-modal perception in apes: Altered visual cues and delay. Neuropsychologia, 13, 229-235. DeHaan, H. J., & Wischner, G. J. (1963). Three-dimensional objects versus projected color photographs of objects as stimuli in learning set formation by retarded children.Journa1 of Comparative and Physiological Psycholom, 56,440-444. Debache, J. S. (1989). The development of representation in young children. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in Child Development and Behavior (Vol. 22, pp. 1-37). New York: Academic Press. DeLoache, J. S., Straws, M. S., Xr Maynard, J. (1979). Picture perception in infancy. lnfarzr Behalior and Dei~eloptnent,2, 77-89. Deregowski, J. B. (1976). On seeing a picture for the first time. Leonardo, 9, 19-23. Deregowski. J. (1989). Real space and represented space: Cross-cultural perspectives. Behatioral and Brain Sciences, 12, 5 1-1 19. Deregowski, J., Muldrow, E. S., & Muldrow, W. F. (1972). Pictorial recognition in a remote Ethiopian population. Perception, 1, 417425. DiFranco, D., Muir, D. W., & Dodwell, P. C. (1978). Reaching in very young infants. Perceprion, 7, 385-392. Dirks, J., & Gibson, E. (1977). Infants’ perception of similarity between live people and their photographs. Child Development, 48, 124-130. Dodwell, P. C.. Muir, D., & DiFranco, D. (1976). Responses of infants to visually presented objects. Science, 194, 209-2 1 1 . Estes, D., Wellman, H. M.,& Woolley, J. D. (1989). Children’s understanding of mental phenomena. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child behaviur and dewlopment (Vol. 22, pp. 41-87). New York: Academic Press. Fagan, J. F. (1972). Infants’ recognition memory for faces. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 14,4534176. Fagan, J. F. (1977). Infant recognition memory: Studies in forgetting. Child Development, 48, 68-78, Fantz, R. L. (19.56). A method for studying early visual development. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 13-15. Flavell, J. H. (1988). The development of children’s knowledge about the mind: From cognitive connections to mental representations. In J. W. Astington, P. L. Harris, & D. R. Olson (Eds.). Developing rheories of mind (pp. 244-270). New York: Cambridge University Press. Flavell, J. H., Flavell, E. R., & Green, F. L. (1983). Development of the appearance-reality distinction. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 95-120. Franklin, M. R. (1973). Non-verbal representation in young children: A cognitive perspective. Young Children, 11, 33-53. Friedman, S. 1. (1975). Picture perception by three and one half month old infants. Doctoral dissertation, George Washington University. Dissertation Abstracts Infernational, 36, (2B), 93Y. Gardner, H., Winner, E., & Kircher, M. (1975). Children’s conceptions of the arts. JournalofAesrhefic Education, 9, 6&77.

Harry Beilin and Elise G. Pearlman

110

Gibson, J. J. (1971). The information available in pictures. Leonardo, 4, 27-35. Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Gibson, J. J. (1980). Foreword: A prefatory essay on the perception of surfaces versus the perception of markings on a surface. In M. Hagen (Ed.), Theperception ofpictures (Vol. 1, pp. xi-xviii). New York Academic Press. Goodman, N. (1968). Languages of art. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Grady, E. L. (1970). The use of photography with inner-city children to develop visual literacy. In C. M. Williams & J. L. Debes (Eds.). First national conference on visual literacy. New York: Pitman. Gregory, R. L. (1970). The intelligent eye. New York: McGraw-Hill. Grossman, B. (1976). The uses of media in early childhood education. Young Children, 31, 256262. Haber, R. N. (1979). Perceiving the lay-out of space in pictures: A perspective theory based upon Leonardo da Vinci. In C. Nodine & D. Fisher (Eds.), Perception andpictorial representation (pp. 84-99). New York: Praeger. Haber, R. N. (1980). Perceiving space from pictures: A theoretical analysis. In M. Hagen (Ed.), The perceprion of picrures (Vol. 1, pp. 3-31). New York: Academic Press. Hagen, M. (1978). An outline of an investigation into the special character of pictures. In H. Pick & E. Saltzman (Eds.), Modes of perceiving and processing informatiori (pp. 23-38). New York: John Wiley and Sons. Hayes, K. J., & Hayes, C. (1953). Picture perception in a home-reared chimpanzee. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 46, 4 7 M 7 4 . Herrnstein, R. J., & Loveland, D. H. (1964). Complex visual concept in the pigeon. Science, 146, 549-551.

Hemstein, R. J., Loveland. D. H., & Cable, C. (1976). Natural concepts in pigeons. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 2, 285-302. Hochberg, J., & Brooks, V.(1962). Pictorial recognition as an unlearned ability: A study of one child’s performance. American Journal of Psychology, 15,624-628. Jenssen, T. A. (1970). Female response to filmed displays of “Anolis nebulosus” (Sauna, Iguanidae). Animal Behavior, 18, 640-647. Jones, R. K.. & Hagen, M. (1980). A perspective on cross-cultural picture perception. In M. Hagen (Ed.), The perception of pictures (Vol. 2, pp. 193-226). New York: Academic Press. Katzir, G. (1981). Visual aspects of species recognition in the damselfish (Pisces Pomacentridae), Animal Behavior, 29, 842-849. Kennedy, J. M. (1974). A psychology of picture perception. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Klapper, 2.S., & Birch, H. G. (1969). Perceptual and action equivalence to objects and photographs in children. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 29, 763-771. Kohler, W. (1925). The rnentaliry of apes. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Laurendeau, M.,& Pinard, A. (1962). Causal thinking in the child. New York: International Universities Press. Lloyd, A. B. (1904). Acholi country: Part 11. Ugunda Notes, 5, 18. Lubow, R. E. (1974). High-order concept formation in the pigeon. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 21, 475483. Markman, E. M. (1976). Children’s difficulty with word-referent differentiation. Child Development, 47, 742-749. Mendelson, M. J., Haith, M. M., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1982). Face scanning and responsiveness to social cues in infant rhesus monkeys. Developrnental Psychology, 18, 222-228. Murphy, C. M. (1978). Pointing in the context of shared activity. Child Developmnr, 49, 371-380. Ninio, A., & Bruner, J. (1978). The achievement and antecedents of labelling. Journal of Child Language. 5, 1-15.

Children’s Iconic Realism

111

O’Connor, J., Beilin. H., & Kose, G. (1981). Children’s belief in photographic fidelity. De~vlopmental Psychology, 17, 859-865. Pearlman, E. G. (1 989). Iconic realism: Vrzderstanding the relutionship hetween photographs and realir).. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, City University of New York Graduate School. Piaget. J. ( 1929). The child’s contqvion ofrhe world. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams. (Original French edition 1925.) Polak, P. R.. Emde, R. N.. & Spitz. R. A. (1964). The smiling response, 11: Visual discrimination and the onset of depth perception. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 139, 407415. Premack. D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Chimpanzee problem-solving: A test for comprehension. Science. 202, 532-535. Rader, N., & Stern, J. D. (1982). Visually elicited reaching in neonates. Child Det&pment, 53, 1004-1007. Rose. S. A. (1977). Infants’ transfer of response hetween two-dimensional and three-dimensional stimuli. Child Development. 48, 1086-1091. Sackett, G. P. (1965). Response of rhesus monkeys to social stimulation presented by means of colored slides. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 20, 1027-1028. Sackett. G. P.(1966). Monkeys reared in isolation with pictures as visual input: Evidence for an innate releasing mechanism. Srienre, 154, 1468-1473. Sigel. 1. E. (1978). The development of pictorial comprehension. In S. Bikkar. B. S. Randhawa, & W. E. Coffman (Eds.). Visual learning thinking, and communication. (pp. 93-1 11). New York: Academic Press. Slater, A,. Rose, D., & Morison, V. (1984). New-horn infants’ perception of similarities and differences between two- and three-dimensional stimuli. British Journul of Developmental Psychology, 2, 2X 7-294. Sontag, S. (1977). On photography. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. Strandsberg, T. E., & Griffith. J. (1969). A study of the effects of training in visual literacy on verbal language behavior. Journal of Communication Disorders, 2,252-263. Turnbough, P. D., & Lloyd, K. E. (1973). Operant responding in Siamese fighting fish “Betta splendens”) as a function of schedule reinforcement and visual reinforcers. Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 20, 335-362. Wellman, H. M. (19x8). First steps in the child’s theorizing about the mind. In J. W. Astington, P. L. Harris. & D. R. Olson (Eds.), Developing theories ofmirrd (pp. 64-92). New York: Cambridge University Press. Werner, J., & Kaplan. B. (1963). Symbol formation. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Yonas. A., & Hagen, M. (1973). Effects of static and kinetic depth information on the perception of size in children and adults. .lournu/ of Experimenral Child Psychology, 15. 254265. Young. V., & Wright, E. N. (1973). “The free looked lonely so I took its picture“: Visuul awareness in children’s photography. (Report No. RR- 1 17.) Ontario, Canada, Toronto Board of Education Research Department. (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. E D 089 697.) Zimmerman, R. R.,& Hochberg, J. (1970). Responses of infant monkeys to pictorial representations of a learned visual discrimination. Psychonomic Science. 18, 307-308.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

THE ROLE OF COGNITION IN UNDERSTANDING GENDER EFFECTS

Carol Lynn Murtiri DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY RESOURCES AND IIIJMAN DEVELOPMENT ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY TEMPE. ARIZONA K5287

1. INTRODUCTION

I1 OVERVIEW OF SCHEMATIC PROCESSING THEORY A THE COGNITIVE BASIS FOR THE THEORY B WPES OF SCHEMAS <' FUNCTIONS OF SCHEMAS D LIABILITIES OF SCHEMATIC PROCESSING ! iISSUES CONCERNING SCHEMATIC PROCESSING 111

DEVELOPMENT OF GENDER SCHEMAS A OVERVIEW B CONCEPTIONS OF GENDER KNOWLEDGE C' ACQUIRING GENDER LABELS L) ACQUIRING GENDER-RELATED ASSOCIATIONS

IV. EARLY ORIGINS OF STEREOTYPES A. LIFE ON BORKA: AN ANALOGUE STUDY OF STEREOTYPE DEVELOPMENT R. IMPLICIT THEORIES OF GROUPS: EXPLAINING HOW DIFFERENCES ARE NOI'ICED AND CREATED C.. EVIDENCE OF IMPLICIT THEORIES OF GENDER GROUP DIFFERENCES V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

REFERENCES

I. Introduction A broad range of gender effects is evident in what children do and in what they know. Infants can discriminate between the faces of women and men. Not only do toddlers know whether they are girls or boys, they can also identify others' sex as well. Children prefer playmates of their own sex and they prefer playing with 113 A D V A N E S IN C 1IIL.D IX~.VII.OI'Ml:N I AND DFHAVIOR. VOI.. 23

114

Carol Lynn Martin

sex-typed toys, Even very young children are able to classify many activities according to cultural gender stereotypes. During the period from 3 to 10 years, children broaden their gender knowledge to include the subtle personality and social attributes that are associated with each sex. By adulthood, gender stereotypes are extensively elaborated and pervasively applied. Despite the overwhelming evidence that children’s worlds are organized and influenced by gender, little is known about why gender is so predominant in children’s thinking and in their behavior. The purpose of this paper is to review the evidence of gender effects in children and to elaborate a cognitively based theory that has been developed to describe how children socialize themselves into the adult gender-oriented world. This paper includes a review of the ideas that form a basis for schematic processing theory (Section 11), one of the cognitively oriented theories used to understand gender effects. The types, functions, and liabilities associated with gender schematic processing theory will be discussed. This section ends with a discussion of the roles of gender cognition and how these cognitions might exert their influence. Section 111contains an outline of a model of how gender cognitions may best be conceptualized. The model is then used to describe the development of children’s gender understanding. In Section IV, I discuss how cognitive approaches can be broadened so that they can be used to answer questions about the early origins of all sorts of stereotypes. Specifically, I propose that stereotypes may form, in part, because children develop abstract conceptual schemas about groups that essentially provide a basis for noticing differences as well as for creating differences between groups. A few words need to be said about terminology. First, the terms sex and gender are used interchangeably in this article. Although some writers prefer to distinguish between sex (used for biologically based characteristics) and gender (for socially based characteristics), others believe that it is important not to prejudge bases of differences and thus do not distinguish between these terms (e.g., Maccoby & Jacklin, 1987). Second, the terms sex-appropriate and sex-inappropriate are not meant to connote value judgments; that is, they do not imply agreement with stereotypes. Instead, the terms refer to stereotypic beliefs about the activities traditionally associated with one’s own sex versus the other sex. Third, to integrate terminology used across studies, the words schema, stereoqpe, and stereotype knowledge are used interchangeably (see Section II,E),

11. Overview of Schematic Processing Theory In this section of the paper an overview of schematic processing is presented. In the first part of the section, the underlying assumptions shared by cognitive theorists are described. In the second part, different types of gender schemas are discussed. In the third part, the evidence concerning the functions of schemas is

Cognrriori aird Gander E f f i ~ t s

11s

outlined. In the fourth part, some of the liabilities associated with gender schematic processing are reviewed. Finally, some of the general issues concerning cognitive approaches and the use o f schema-based explanations are addressed.

A. THE COGNITIVE BASIS FOR THE THEORY

Cognitive theorists assume that individuals take an active role in perceiving and interpreting information in their environments. Because organisms are assumed to be active, cognitive theorists tend to focus on “top-down” processing where concern is about what kinds of naive theories people hold and how those theories influence the information individuals attend to, perceive, and remember. An enormous amount of gender-related information is available to children, but, according to cognitive theorists, gender effects largely result from how children process that information rather than from its sheer availability. Interest in the cognitive processes underlying stereotypes can be noted in some of the earliest writings about stereotypes (Allport, 1954; Lippmann, 1922; Vinacke, 1957). Applications of cognitive approaches in the area of gender-role development began with Kohlberg’s chapter i n Maccoby’s (1966) influential book o n gender-role development. Since then, many excellent papers and books have been devoted to the topic (e.g., Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979, 1981; Carter, 1987; Constantinople, 1979; Hamilton, 1981; Liben & Signorella, 1987; McCauley, Stitt, & Segal, 1980; Miller, 1982). More recently, the cognitive perspective has been adopted and elaborated in schema-based theories concerning gender-role development (Bem, 1981; Markus, Crane, Bernstein, & Siladi. 1982; Martin & Halverson, 1981). These theories are similar in that they share the assumption that gender schemas have specific effects on memory and behavior. They differ mainly in their emphasis. The emphasis in Martin and Halverson’s (1981) schematic processing theory is on developmental changes in schemas and their functions and resulting biases. In the theories proposed by Bem (1981) and Markus et al. (1982), the emphasis is on individual differences in gender schemas, particularly in adults.

B. TYPES OF SCHEMAS

The basic unit of the Martin and Halverson (1981, 1987) schematic processing theory is the schema. Although the exact nature of gender schemas has not yet been determined, the working assumption is that children and adults have clearly defined schemas, that is, they have theories, or organized knowledge structures about the sexes. These schemas directly influence behavior and thinking. Charles Halverson and I defined two different types of schemas. The first type, the superordinate schema, consists of all the general information children need to

116

Curol Lynn Martin

categorize objects, behaviors, traits, and roles as being related to either females or males. Essentially, the superordinate schema encompasses the stereotypes that children and adults have about how the sexes differ. For example, the superordinate schema consists of list like information about characteristics associated with each sex (e.g., girls sew). The second type, the own-sex schema, is a subordinate schema that is a narrower and more detailed version of the first, containing detailed scripts and plans of actions necessary for carrying out traditionally sex-appropriate behavior. For example, because children believe that sewing is a behavior appropriate for females, girls may learn the action patterns involved in sewing better than boys. Although Halverson and I (Martin & Halverson, 1981) did not explicitly mention in our original formulation the flipside of the own-sex schema, that the “other-sex schema,” such schemas surely exist. Other-sex schemas contain plans of action for the activities appropriate for the other sex. The level of detail of the information in the two subordinate schemas likely varies depending on the degree to which children identify with their own gender group. For most children, who have been raised to strongly identify with their own sex, we would expect that information in the other-sex schema would be much less detailed than that in the own-sex schema. For that reason, Halverson and I originally emphasized only the development of the own-sex schema. By allowing for individual and developmental differences in the level of information in each of the schemas, however, it is possible to account for a broader range of children’s behavior. For example, children who adopt cross-sex behaviors to the extreme (e.g., children with gender identify disorders) likely identify with the other sex and thus form extensive other-sex schemas yet fail to form extensive own-sex schemas. Distinguishing between the types of gender schemas has been helpful for understanding gender effects and yet the relation between the types of schemas is not yet clear. Halverson and I assumed that both types of schemas generally develop together but that the content of the superordinate schemas (e.g., boys fix cars) lays the groundwork for the development of the own-sex schema (e.g., a boy’s finding out how to fix a car) (Martin & Halverson, 1981). Based on script development research (Nelson, 1981), Levy (1989) suggested the opposite-that the script knowledge in the own-sex schema is the building block from which taxonomic concepts in the superordinate schema emerge. A third possibility is that the influence is bidirectional such that each can build on the information in the other. Regardless of how the two types of schemas develop, the most important point is that they represent two distinct forms of knowledge (Levy, 1989).

C. FUNCTIONS OF SCHEMAS

Gender schemas influence the kind of information perceivers notice as well as what they learn (see Taylor & Crocker, 1981 for review of functions of social

Cogriiriorr and Gender Eflects

117

schemas). Once acquired, the information in gender schemas may be used in making decisions and/or in guiding behavior. The overall pattern is schematic consistency: Perceivers generally notice, remember, and behave in ways that are consistent with their gender schemas. Similar to other types of schemas, gender schemas provide cognitive economy, that is, they facilitate the processing of the complex array of social information that surrounds each individual.

1. Gender Sciiemas Guide Behavior One function of gender schemas is to regulate behavior. According to schematic processing theory, the information supplied by the superordinate schema guides children’s behavior toward traditionally sex-appropriate roles and activities and away from sex-inappropriate roles and activities. The empirical evidence is clear: Children consistently show preferences for sex-appropriate activities. In natural settings, children tend to play with sex-appropriate toys rather than with sexinappropriate ones (e.g., Eisenberg, Murray, & Hite, 1982; Fagot, 1974; Fein, Johnson, Kosson, Stork, & Wasserman, 1Y75). Furthermore, when children have been asked about their toy preferences, the results again support the idea that children prefer sex-appropriate to sex-inappropriate toys (Bradbard, 1Y85; Bradbard & Parkman, 1Y83; DeLucia, lYh3; Edelbrock & Sugawara, 1078; Nadelman, 1974; Robinson & Morris, 1986). Despite the consistency in findings, neither play patterns nor preferences are absolute: the amount of sex-appropriate versus sexinappropriate play or toy preferences depends on the available alternative activities, the age of the child, and the sex of the child. For instance, boys generally show more sex-appropriate choices than do girls (e.g. Nadelman, 1974). Studies in which real toys have been used can provide only limited support for the idea that schemas influence behavior. In these studies, rather than being guided by gender schemas, children may simply choose to play with toys that are more familiar (usually sex-appropriate toys) and choose not to play with toys that are less familiar (usually sex-inappropriate toys). Thus, the more compelling demonstrations of the influence of gender schenias have involved cases where children were given novel or unfamiliar objects with experimenter-supplied sex-typed labels (“for boys,” “for girls,”, “for both boys and girls”). The novel object mediodulogy minimizes the problems related to prior experience and to differential exposure. Using the novel ohject method, Bradbard and Endsley (1Y83) found that when toys were labeled as being for their own sex, children explored them more and later remembered their names better than they did for toys labeled as being for the opposite sex. Similarly, when novel activities have been used, children’s performance has been best when a game was labeled as being sexappropriate, intermediate when labeled as being sex-neutral, and worst when labeled as being sex-inappropriate (Montemayor, 1974). The novel object methodology has also been used to explore the “hot potato” effect. Several years ago a colleague mentioned that he observed a young boy

118

Carol Lynn Murtin

happily playing with a toy race car until the child realized that the driver of the car was a blonde female doll. Then he dropped the car like a hot potato (D. B. Carter, personal communication, April 29, 1987). Although researchers have shown that children often avoid playing with sex-inappropriate toys (e.g., Hartup, Moore, & Sager, 1963), the question remained whether gender labels are so powerful that they alter children’s desire for unfamiliar and very attractive toys. Lisa Eisenbud and I explored this question (Martin & Eisenbud, 1990). Through pretesting, we selected three novel toys that 4- to 6-year-old children find attractive (they really want to play with them) and three that they find unattractive. We next examined whether toy desirability changed as a function of the sex-typed labels provided to the children. Because an important requirement was that the child’s ratings not be influenced by the situational demands, two experimenters were used; one provided the sex-typed labels and the other interviewed the child about toy desirability. Specifically, in the first session, an experimenter showed the child the six toys and said that she knew that boys really liked two of them (one attractive toy, one unattractive toy), girls really liked two of them (one attractive, one unattractive), and for the remaining two toys she did not know who would like them best. The experimenter left the room on a pretext and a second experimenter entered the room to take over. The new experimenter explained that she did not know anything about these toys but wanted the child to help her decide how much he or she and others would like each toy. To do this, children rated how much they liked each toy (on a 4-point scale). Memory for the labels was also assessed. Children who remembered the sex-typed labels strongly showed the hot potato effect. When a very attractive toy was labeled as being for the other sex, children rated it as being extremely undesirable ( M = 2.65, as undesirable as the unattractive toys labeled for the same sex, M = 2.74). In contrast, when toys were labeled as being for their own sex, the attractive toys were found to be desirable ( M = 3.67) and the unattractive ones much less desirable ( M = 2.98) (p c .002). The novel object method has been very useful for more clearly demonstrating the effects of gender stereotypes on children. Apparently, the sex-typed labels that make up the superordinate schemas provide children with guidelines for behavior. They tend to approach and explore toys that are sex-appropriate and avoid those that are not. The own-sex schema provides a different type of information to regulate behavior, namely, information about the behavioral routines or scripts necessary to carry out plans and activities. Although some work has been done to assess the kinds of script information children of each sex know, little research has been done to relate children’s script knowledge to actual behavior.

2. Gender Schemas Organize Information The second function of gender schemas is to provide the structure by which information is organized. Because of this structure, schema-consistent information

is made more salient than schema-inconsistent information (Taylor & Crocker. 1981). Specifically, gender schemas direct attention, influence how information is encoded, and bias memory recall. For example, social psychological research on

adults supports the organization function of schemas in that information consistent with schemas is generally remembered better than information that is not (Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 197Y; Snyder & Cantor, 1979; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978; Zadny & Gerard, 1974). Not all studies, however, provide support for the idea that schema-consistent information has privileged status in memory. In some cases, distinctive information or schema-inconsistent information is well remembered (Hastie & Kumar, 1979). Whether consistent or inconsistent information is remembered better probably depends on the salience of the information (Mandler, 1978) and the amount of time between the presentation of information and memory testing (Hastie & Kumar, 1979). In either case, the use of the construct of a schema is important for understanding how information is organized in memory. Without appropriate schemas, some information will never be encoded. The importance of schemas in encoding information has been demonstrated in a variety of experiments (e.g., Ausubel, 1960; Bartlett, 1932). The consistent conclusion from these studies has been that information is not encoded in memory unless it can be fit to an organizing structure. The organizing structure, or schema, allows for the information to be subsumed, acting to “incorporate the unfamiliar into the familiar” (Brown. Smiley, Day, Townsend, & Lawton, 1977, p. 1454). For gender schemas, the type of organization that occurs depends in part on the type of schema being employed. Specifically, the superordinate schema (which contains general information about each gender group) should influence learning about the behaviors stereotypically associated with each sex. Children should selectively remember information about both sexes if the information is consistent with their schema and forget information that is inconsistent with their schema. As such, children learn about both males and females. Empirical evidence has supported these contentions (e.g., Carter & Levy, 1988; Koblinsky, Cruse, & Sugawara, 1978). In contrast, use of the own-sex schema (which contains detailed plans of action for sex-appropriate behavior) should produce a different kind of selectivity in learning. In accord with schematic processing notions, children should learn more about carrying out sex-appropriate activities than sex-inappropriate activities. Not surprisingly, children know more about the names and the uses of toys that are sex-appropriate than they do for sex-inappropriate toys (Halverson & Martin, 1975). Another type of in-depth knowledge is the plans of action, or “scripts,” concerning the temporal ordering of events or actions involved in activities. Levy and colleagues (Levy, 1989; Levy, Boston, 6t Burlew, 1989) found that script information differs for girls and boys. Children were given a series of four drawings depicting familiar sex-typed activities in scrambled order and were asked to arrange the pictures in order. As expected, children were more accurate

120

Carol Lynn Martin

in sequencing sex-appropriate activities than sex-inappropriate ones. For instance, girls sequenced the activities involved in doing laundry more accurately than boys. Again, selective learning is apparent: Children attend to and remember the ordering of sex-appropriate events better than the ordering of sex-inappropriate events.

3. Gender Schemas Serve an Inferential Function The third function of gender schemas is to provide an information base. The information base can be used in situations where information is missing or ambiguous as well as in familiar situations. When we do not attend to all details of a familiar situation or when the information is unclear, the details are often reconstructed by the schema itself rather than by actual perception (Mandler, 1978; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This has been termed default processing, meaning that the most expected value of a variable is used to fill in the gaps. The inferred information may become indistinguishable from the original information (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). The inferential functions of gender schemas have been examined in a number of studies. The results consistently show that children make stereotypic inferences based only on knowledge about a person’s sex. When told about unfamiliar girls and boys, children guess that the unknown others prefer toys or exhibit personality characteristics that are traditionally sex-appropriate (Berndt & Heller, 1986; Haugh, Hoffman, & Cowen, 1980; Martin, 1989b). Furthermore, children infer how much they will like others based on sex. Children assume they will like others of their own sex more than others of the opposite sex (Martin, 198913; Berndt & Heller, 1986).

D. LIABILITIES OF SCHEMATIC PROCESSING

Schematic processing is considered to be efficient and generally accurate. However, because schematic processing involves selective attention, encoding, representation, and retrieval, information loss and distortion also occur (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). This tendency for information to be “made to fit” the schema is the source of both the efficiency and the distortions associated with schematic processing.

1. Evidence of Memory Distortions Although schematic processing can bias children’s views of the world in a number of ways (Martin & Halverson, 1981, 1987), most of the research on the liabilities associated with schematic processing have focused on Type I errors. Type I errors occur when perceivers accept information as schema-consistent when in fact

Cognition and Gender Effects

121

it is inconsistent or neutral. In other words, the original information is distorted to be consistent with the schema. Distortions can occur in several ways. A child who sees a boy cooking at a stove is confronted with a situation that fails to fit stereotypic beliefs. The information can be distorted by either changing the sex of the person cooking or by changing the way in which the activity is construed. That is, the child may later remember seeing a girl cooking rather than a boy, or may remember seeing a boy fixing the stove, both of which are schema-consistent. A third possibility is that the child may accurately remember the information but change the way he or she evaluates the actor. For instance, the child may believe that the boy, who is cooking, is a sissy and therefore devalue him. The earliest study of gender-based distortion was done by Cordua, McGraw, and Drabman (1979). They showed children videotapes of males and females portraying stereotype-consistent and inconsistent occupations. The children tended to distort stereotype-inconsistent occupations into stereotype-consistent ones. Children shown a female doctor, for example, relabeled her as a nurse. Other researchers have assessed the kind of distortions involving changing the sex of the actor. For instance, my dissertation research (Martin & Halverson, 1983a) was designed to assess such memory distortions. Five- and 6-year olds were asked to describe pictures of females and males (both adults and children) performing stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent activities (e.g., a boy playing with a train; a girl sawing wood). A week later, a variety of measures were used to assess children's memories for the pictures they had seen. As predicted, children tended to distort information by changing the sex of the actor on stereotype-inconsistent pictures, hut they did not do so on stereotype-consistent pictures. For instance, children who were originally shown a picture of a girl sawing wood were three times more likely to change her sex and remember seeing a boy sawing wood than they were on stereotype-consistent pictures. Furthermore, children were as confident of their memories when they distorted stereotype-inconsistent information as when they correctly remembered stereotype-consistent information, These findings have since been replicated in a number of other studies (e.g., Cann & Newbern, 1984; Carter & Levy, 1988; Signorella & Liben, 1984). Research is now being conducted to assess whether distortions will occur in other information domains. For instance, preliminary evidence indicates that distortions occur in remembering emotional displays: Children more often distort the sex of actors who portray stereotype-inconsistent emotions than stereotype-consistent emotions (e.g., they remember a sad girl instead of a sad boy; Martin, Fabes, Eisenbud, Karbon, & Rose, 1990).

2. Implications of Memory Distortions Several issues have arisen regarding gender-related distortion. One issue concerns the situational constraints that may influence the likelihood of distortion.

122

Curol Lynn Murtin

Certain situations, such as using delayed recall tasks rather than immediate ones, influence the likelihood of distortions just as do different methods of memory assessment (Liben & Signorella, 1980). Another issue about gender-related distortions has to do with when the distortion of information occurs. Based on the adult literature reviewed by Taylor and Crocker (1981), distortions would be expected to occur in two points in time: as information is perceived and as it is recalled. Although most research has focused on recall distortions, some evidence indicates that children also misperceive information as they encode it. For instance, in one of our studies (Martin & Halverson, 1983a), children mislabeled only about 5% of the pictures during their presentation, but of those pictures that were mislabeled 84% showed an actor performing a sex-inconsistent activity. Further evidence of encoding errors was found by Signorella and Liben (1984). They found, for instance, that children described a picture of a male secretary as a typewriter repairman. The consequences of gender-related distortions are far reaching. Every time stereotype-inconsistent information is converted into stereotype-consistent information, the child is confirming the stereotype rather than using this information to disconfirm it. These distortions may account for why gender stereotypes are maintained in the face of often overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Additional research on distortions should be helpful in discovering how to minimize distortions and, subsequently, in developing intervention programs to teach children more egalitarian gender roles. In most intervention programs, the assumption has been that children experience the information to which they are exposed. Schematic processing views have been important in demonstrating that such an assumption is faulty. To the extent that children inaccurately remember and distort gender information, simply showing stereotype-inconsistent information is not enough to change children’s stereotypes. Instead, more active types of intervention strategies are necessary to produce change (Liben & Bigler, 1987).

E. ISSUES CONCERNING SCHEMATIC PROCESSING

1. How Important Is Cognition Anyway? Although numerous studies suggest that children’s behavior is guided by their gender schemas, questions about the extent to which gender schemas or cognitions direct behavior still remain (Huston, 1985). Two types of findings are difficult to explain using schematic processing notions. The first concerns the age at which sex-appropriate behavior appears. If knowledge about the sexes influences behavior, we would expect these cognitions to precede sex-typed behavior (Huston, 1985). In the few studies of early gender-role acquisition, sextyped preferences for activities and toys are apparent about 6 months prior to the

C ’ogriitioii arid Gerider

Effects

123

time that children demonstrated gender stereotype knowledge about toys and activities (Blakemore. LaRue, & Olejnik, 1979; Perry, White, & Perry, 1984; Weinraub et af.,1984). The second type of finding that is difficult to explain using schematic processing notions concerns individual differences. If gender schemas influence behavior, then we would expect children who know more about the sexes to show more sex-typed behavior. Such a relation does not always hold, however. For boys, but not girls, stereotype knowledge has been found to be related to sex-typed choices in one study (Edelbrock & Sugawara, 1978), but in other studies no relation has been found (Hort, Leinbach, & Fagot, 1991; Weinraub et al., 1984). For several reasons, however, one cannot yct conclude that gender knowledge is unrelated to children’s behavior. First. little research has been done on the topic and the research that has been done has produced mixed evidence. Second, none of the studies has assessed children’s knowledge regarding a particular content area while also assessing their behavior concerning that content. For instance, a boy may be assessed as having a relatively low level of gender stereotype knowledge but may know the part of the stereotype that says boys are more likely than girls to play with trucks. Because he knows about the sex typing of trucks. he may be very interested in them. In this case, his behavior may appear to precede his level of gender stereotype knowledge although his behavior may be guided very directly by the little knowledge he has (Martin, IY91). Although more research is needed on the topic, even when the necessary studies have been done, we will probably not find that children’s behavior is solely determined by their gender knowledge. Certainly adults’ behavior is not solely determined by their stereotypes. Most adults have pervasive gender stereotypes, but they do not always use them. For instance. according to our cultural stereotypes, men are more likely than women to be dominant, and yet few of us prepare for a power struggle each time we meet a man. This example illustrates ri paradox in the field of stereotyping: One can hold a stereotype and not necessarily use it. This knowledge paradox probably occurs in children as well. Therefore, to generate a better explanation of the development of gender effects, we need to consider factors that may increase the likelihood that gender knowledge will be used (Deaux & Major, 1987; Levy, 1987. 1989; Martin, 198%; Signorella, 1989). As a step in that direction, 1 have outlined an expanded version of schematic processing theory, called clytinmic .scliemcrricpr-ocesdng (Martin, 1990), in which 1 suggested some factors that likely influence the use of gender knowledge. For instance, people should be more likely to use gender knowledge if gender is salient lo them (Carter & Levy, 1988; Higgins & King. 1981; Ruble & Stangor, lY86; Stangor, 1YX8), if their values are traditional (Antill, 1987; Devine, 1989; Feathers, 1984; Huston, 1983; Signorella, 1980; Signorella B Liben, 1984), if the situation is perceived as threatening or little time is available for processing information (Devine, 1989), and if the consequences of the action on others are of

124

Carol Lynn Martin

little importance. Furthermore, each of these factors is seen to contribute dynamically to the way in which information about gender is processed.

2. How Might Cognitions Exert Influence over Behavior?

a. Performance versus Competence Limitations. When gender knowledge exerts an influence over behavior, how does it do so? One possibility is that gender knowledge provides information related to the performance of behaviors. That is, children may choose to perform sex-appropriate behaviors because they are rewarded for them (Mischel, 1966), because they value them more (Kohlberg, 1966), or because the stereotypes serve as a knowledge base from which they select those behaviors considered sex-appropriate (Martin & Halverson, 1981). Another possibility is that stereotypes influence behavioral conformity by affecting competence, that is, by limiting the acquisition and/or retention of information relevant to performing sex-inappropriate behaviors (Martin & Halverson, 1981). If attention is not paid to sex-inappropriate behaviors and if information about these behaviors is not retained, then the child’s competence concerning these behaviors would be limited. Although the consensus is that gender knowledge influences both performance and competence, much more emphasis has been given to performance inhibition than to competence limitations. Specifically, the argument has been that children learn extensively about how to perform both masculine and feminine behaviors rather than only about sex-appropriate behaviors (e.g., Bussey & Bandura, 1984). Such views imply that competence is not an influence on behavioral conformity. In contrast, schematic processing views suggest that competence plays a role. Halverson and I (Martin & Halverson, 1981) argued that at the level of the superordinate schema, children generally learn about both masculine and feminine things. In other words, they have about the same amount of knowledge about the roles, behaviors, and so forth associated with each sex. In contrast, at the level of the subordinate schemas (i.e., own-sex and other-sex), differential learning is much more likely to occur. That is, most children will learn more detailed information about own-sex activities than about other-sex activities. b. A Test of Competence versus Performance Limitations. An adequate test of the idea of competence limitations requires devising an in-depth learning procedure in which performance limitations are controlled. Using toys or wellknown activities can provide only limited support for the idea of competence limitations because children’s differential knowledge may be attributable to differential exposure to the information rather than a failure to remember it. Ideally, novel information would be used rather than familiar information. Several years ago, my colleagues and I (Bradbard, Martin, Endsley, & Halverson, 1986) devised a method for assessing competence and performance limita-

Cogrzitiori arid Gender Effects

12s

tions in children’s behavior. We used a modification of the novel object methodology used by Bradbard and Endsley (1983). Children were presented novel objects that were given one of three sex-typed labels (e.g., for boys). Unlike the Bradbard and Endsley study, however, in our study children were also given four bits of in-depth information about the functions of each object (e.g., to use this, you pull this srring). The children were allowed to play with and ask questions about the objects for 6 minutes. One week later, memory for information presented in the first session was assessed. Furthermore, to assess the role of competence versus performance deficits in behavior, some children were given incentives for remembering (a small toy of their choice) and some were not. The idea was that if only competence deficits occur, then recall in the incentive and no-incentive conditions should be similar. That is, incentives to remember sex-inappropriate information will be ineffective if the child did not originally learn the information. If only performance limitations occur, then recall in the two incentive conditions should differ. In other words, if children happen to learn sex-inappropriate information, in the incentive condition they should recall more of this information than the children not given an incentive. The results supported the idea of competence limitations. Children who were given incentives for remembering during testing did not recall more information about sex-inappropriate toys than did no-incentive children. Also, children in the incentive condition did not recall equal amounts of information about sex-appropriate and sex-inappropriate objects. Instead, same-sex information was remembered better than other information. One could argue that the incentives we used were not rewarding enough for children to overcome performance limitahms. The incentives appeared to be powerful, however: The incentive toys were very appealing to the children. Another possible weakness is that we did not use enough instances of reward to “undo” children’s sex-typed tendencies. The use of novel toys should have minimized this problem because children did not have strong prior sex-typing associations with these objects. Nonetheless, the finding of no performance effects is somewhat surprising, Further research is needed to design experimental situations that may be more sensitive to picking up the influence of performance factors in behavioral conformity.

c. Implicutions of Competerice versus Performance Limitations. Different implications can be drawn depending on whether gender knowledge imposes competence or performance limitations. To the degree that performance is limited, we would assume that sex-inappropriate activities could be encouraged in children by changing reward contingencies. In this case, to encourage a girl to fix cars would require only that she be rewarded for this behavior, with knowledge already acquired about cars called on to facilitate performance. In contrast, competence deficits are more difficult to overcome. The girl would not be able to fix

126

Carol Lynn Martin

cars regardless of how attractive the reward because she would lack the requisite knowledge about cars. The only effective method of changing her behavior would be to teach her about cars or to teach her that fixing cars is “for girls.” Thus, intervention must occur much earlier, preferably when the information is first learned (Bradbard et al., 1986).

3. The Nature of Schemas One important issue that has yet to be resolved is determining the nature of gender schemas. How a gender schema or, for that matter, any type of schema might best be described is not yet clear. The term schema is considered to be a sloppy construct in that many meanings can be attributed to it. Even so, Fiske and Linville (1980) have argued that using the term has also bought psychologists certain advantages, such as being able to notice consistent patterns in findings from areas that might otherwise be considered unrelated. In the area of gender, the term schema has been interpreted in both a broad and a narrow sense. By the broad interpretation, I mean that many different types of constructs and many different operational definitions of schemas have been employed. This broad interpretation has had the advantage of allowing work on gender identity, gender roles, and gender stereotypes to be integrated with the more inclusive work on prediction, concept acquisition, category formation, and information processing (Martin & Halverson, 1987). The broad perspective has also led, however, to a disregard for differences among these areas and, most importantly, to a failure to distinguish among various constructs and measures related to gender. To rectify this problem, researchers need to begin formulating ideas about how different areas within gender relate to one another and/or how they differ (Huston, 1983). The term schema has also come to acquire a relatively narrow meaning. That is, much more attention has been given to the idea of schemas as static asocial knowledge structures than to the idea of them as richly elaborated structures sensitive to the social context (Levy, 1987). A full understanding of gender effects will require that researchers focus more on the relation between information processing and the context of situations.

4. Having Schemas versus Being Schematic Another issue about schemas has been the failure to distinguish between having a schema and being schematic. Much confusion has been and continues to be associated with such terminology. For instance, in the adult literature, some controversy has arisen about what is meant by being gender-schematic versus aschematic. Does being gender-aschematic mean that the person has never developed gender-related knowledge structures, as Bem (1981, 1984) has often im-

Cognition and Gender E@crs

I27

plied‘! Or does being gender-aschematic mean that a person has schemas for both masculine and feminine attributes, as Markus and colleagues (1982) implied‘? To complicate the issue further, does being gender-aschematic refer to one’s knowledge about others or only to one’s own gender identity? Finally, we seldom distinguish between being schematic in general and being schematic in a particular task. One way to begin to clarify this issue is to provide more strict definitions of the terms that are being used. For example, one helpful refinement is to restrict the meaning of schema to simply a knowledge structure. As such, having a schema simply means that the perceiver has a certain type of knowledge. Being schematic, however, is different. It means that the perceiver has demonstrated some evidence of both possessing the schema and applying it. Being schematic on a consistent basis is also different. People who are often gender-schematic likely have very accessible gender schemas, that is, their gender schemas are “top of the bin” for processing incoming information and so they are more prone to showing their schematicity (Wyer & Srull, 1981). People who are seldom gender-schematic have less accessible gender schemas and so they are less likely to use gender for processing information. Finally, gender schematicity may change depending on situations. Some people may be schematic in some situations but not others.

111. Development of Gender Schemas In this section of the paper, the discussion focuses on the development of gender schemas. First, I describe the hierarchical structure of the superordinate gender schema and the different types of associations that link information within gender schemas. Second, the empirical research concerning how children learn to identify members of each gender group is reviewed. Third, the idea that gender group labels mediate all gender inferences is outlined and recent evidence concerning developmental changes in the complex associative links within gender schemas is reviewed.

A. OVERVIEW

The development of gender schemas is believed to be influenced by both characteristics of the perceiver and characteristics of the environment (Bem, 1981, 1983; Martin & Halverson, 1981; Martin, 1985). The perceiver is assumed to have some predisposition to categorize events in order to simplify a complex environment. And indeed, research on infants suggests that they have a readiness to categorize (Cohen & Stauss, 1979). A tendency to categorize information is not sufficient, however, to result in the formation of gender schemas. A second

I28

Curol Lynn Martin

condition necessary for the formation of gender schemas is that gender must be salient for the perceiver. Salience is partly determined by the functional significance of the category; in other words, gender must be perceived to be correlated with other attributes (Bem, 1981; Martin & Halverson, 1981). Because our society strongly emphasizes the links of behavioral, social, physical, and psychological characteristics to gender, gender takes on functional significance for the child. Once a category has acquired functional significance, presumably the child begins to acquire information about how to distinguish group members and what those group members are like. Thus, to understand the development of gender schemas, we must consider how children learn to identify and discriminate the sexes and how they associate attributes with the sexes.

B. CONCEPTIONS OF GENDER KNOWLEDGE

1. The Hierarchical Structure of Gender Schemas To understand how children come to identify members of each gender group and how they relate attributes to those members, we need to take a closer look at the way in which gender knowledge has been conceived. Most researchers have adopted, at least implicitly, an associative network view of gender knowledge (i.e., gender stereotypes). Specifically, gender stereotypes are considered to be organized knowledge structures containing a wide variety of information related to the sexes (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981). They are assumed to be organized similarly to other kinds of schemas, specifically in a hierarchical manner. The top level includes category labels (i.e., females, males) and the lower levels include genderrelated attributes (e.g., long hair). Category labels are presumed to be the organizers of the other features. Furthermore, other characteristics of associative networks are also apparent in that some type of spreading activation is assumed to occur within the schemas and the strength of the links between various types of information is considered to be an important influence on memory. Further elaboration of the gender associative network has been proposed by Deaux and Lewis (1984) based on their research on adults’ gender stereotypes. Their component model is particularly useful for identifying the different types of associations involved in gender knowledge and for this reason it has been used in studies of children (Martin, Wood, & Little, 1990). In addition to the hierarchical structure outlined above, the component model includes explicit organization of attributes. Specifically, gender-related attributes are organized into content domains termed components of gender stereotypes: role behaviors, occupations, traits, and physical appearance (Deaux & Lewis, 1984; see Huston, 1983, for another way of modeling gender knowledge). Although the content domains differ, all attributes can be broadly classified into two groups, one containing the

Cognition wid Ceiidrr E’ficr.c

129

items traditionally associated with the male label (i.e., masculine attributes) and the other containing the items associated with the female label (i.e., feminine attributes). The gender concepts of masculinity and femininity link information within and hetween each content domain as well as providing links between labels and attributes (Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Martin et ul., 1900).

2. Associutive Links within Gender Schemus From the evidence obtained with adults (Deaux & Lewis. 1984), we know that three types of associations link the information within gender stereotypes. These types are illustrated in Table I. The most simple type, the label-component association, is essentially a vertical link between gender labels and information in each component. Even when we know only the sex of ;I person. we can make predictions about the person’s behavior, appearance, etc. The second type of association, within-component associations, is essentially a horizontal link between information within components. By knowing a characteristic about someone in one content domain, such as an interest (e.g., likes dolls), we can make inferences about the person in the same content domain (e.g., likes tea sets) based on the gender concepts of masculinity and femininity that link information within each content domain. The third type of association, between-component associations, is also a horizontal link that occurs between components. When we know a characteristic about someone in one content domain, we can make inferences about the person in other content domains (e.g., knowing someone likes to cook leads to the inference that this person likely has long hair). Because of these associative links, we can infer much about a person. albeit sometimes erroneously, based on a single piece of information. The component model provides a heuristic tool for investigating the development of gender stereotypes by outlining the structure of gender knowledge as well as providing a description of how different aspects of gender knowledge are

TAI3L.E I Examples of Types ~

Associativc Links in Gendcr Stcrcotypes Domains

Examples

Types of links ~

(if

~~~~~

. .

~~

~~~~

-

.

Gender label+..omponent

Woman-has long hair Man-likes sports

Label-appearance Label-role behavior

Within-~oniponrnl

Has short hair-wearb a suit Is nurturant-is sympathetic

Appearance-appearance Trait-trait

Between-component

Is nurturant-likes sewing

Trait-role behavior Appearance-trait

Has short hair-is assertive

130

Carol Lynn Martin

interrelated. To understand gender effects more fully, two different but related issues need to be considered. The first is how children learn to identify and label members of gender groups and the second is how children learn to associate various characteristics with each gender group.

C. ACQUIRING GENDER LABELS

1. Discriminating the Sexes How do children learn to divide people into females and males? Gender information is readily available: From the moment of birth, children are bombarded with information that makes the sexes easy to distinguish. For instance, boys and girls are dressed differently; adult men and women often have different hairstyles, voices, and body shapes (Fagot & Leinbach, 1989; Katz, 1983). Furthermore, although any and all of these cues may be involved in how children learn to distinguish the sexes, visual cues have been most often studied. Infants are able to distinguish between the faces of females and males (e.g., Fagan & Singer, 1979; Fagot & Leinbach, 1989). Clothing, hairstyle, and body shape are the markers of sex that young children (2-7 years) notice (e.g., Thompson & Bentler, 1971; Intons-Peterson, 1988) and genital information is generally not used until children are older (8-9 years) (McConaghy, 1979).

2. Labeling the Sexes Once the sexes can be discriminated, the next important aspect in acquiring gender stereotypes is reliably labeling members of each sex. Many, but not all (e.g., Kohlberg, 1966), cognitively oriented theorists have assumed that only a rudimentary knowledge of the sexes is needed for influencing the development of gender-related behaviors and thinking (e.g., Constantinople, 1973; Fagot, 1985; Fagot & Leinbach, 1989; Levy & Carter, 1989; Martin & Halverson, 1983b; Martin & Little, 1990). The assumption is that once labels are acquired, learning about gender is facilitated in two ways: (1) by providing organizational nodes in memory and ( 2 ) by providing children an opportunity to learn through direct observation of males and females. As Fagot and Leinbach (1991) stated, “we see labeling as a milestone on the road to gender understanding, a milestone that signals a change from perceptual discrimination and tacit knowledge to conscious awareness of the separate categories and ability to use this information deliberately” (p. 15). Empirical evidence confirms the importance of gender labeling. Gender labeling affects peer preferences. Children who accurately label the sexes spend about 80% of their time in same-sex groups versus about 50% of the time for other children

of the same age who are not yet accurate in labeling the sexes (Fagot, 1985). Gender labeling also affects sex-typed activity preferences. Children who can distinguish between males and females at a very young age are more likely to adopt sex-typed hchavior than those who cannot (Fagot & Leinbach, 1989; Fagot, Leinbach, & Hiigan, 1986). Children who acquire gender labels early (before 27 months of age) tend to be more aware of gender stereotypes at age 4 years than those children who acquire gender labels later (Fagot & Leinbach, 1989). Even with older children, those who more accurately distinguish the sexes have stronger sex-typed preferences and know more about gender stereotypes than those who are less accurate in making this distinction (Fagot, Leinbach, & O'Boyle, 1990; Martin & Little, 1990).

3. Gender Group Memhership Children's recognition that they are members of one gender group and not the other is also important in the development of gender understanding (Martin & Halverson, 1981). Once children recognize their gender group membership, they realize that they belong to one group (the in group) and not the other (the out group). From the research o n group effects with adults (e.g., Tajfel. 1981; Wilder & Allen, 1974), we would then expect to see group biases. For instance, children should become motivated to be like members of their own group and learn more of the details for carrying out sex-appropriate activities. The selective learning of sex-appropriate activities should act to form a basis for developing the own-sex schema. Finally. recognizing one's own gender group probably accounts for in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination: Members of the in group and their activities acquire a positive evaluation and members of the out group and their activities take on a negative evaluation (e.g., Kuhn et ol., 1978; Reese, 1966). Given its presumed importance in gender understanding, surprisingly little is known about how children come to recognize their own gender group or the correlates of that recognition. However. some evidence suggests that group membership is acquired early in life and that it relates to children's preferences and to their gender knowledge (Martin & Little, 1990).

D. ACQUIRING GENDER-RELATED ASSOCIATIONS

I . Sources of Information about Gender Boys hit people. Girls crx N lot. These are examples of children's earliest ideas about how the sexes differ. Even children young as 30 months old have some rudimentary ideas about what kinds of behaviors are associated with each sex (Kuhn CI al., 1978). Kindergartners have even more extensive beliefs about the

132

Curd Lynn Murtin

sexes, especially concerning the kinds of activities they think boys do versus what they think girls do. How do children learn to associate these characteristics selectively with each sex? One seldom studied source of information is the social transmission of gender-related information to children by their peers, teachers, parents, and the media. For example, gender group members are conveniently labeled by adults in the child’s environment (e.g., Look at that little girl) (Katz, 1983). Furthermore, associations between gender groups and attributes are commonly transmitted by others (e.g., Boys don’t cry). Another source of information about gender is likely to be direct observation of females and males. Children abstract rules and draw inferences from covariations they observe. For instance, when shown novel behavioral routines, children will decide which ones to imitate based on whether they saw more girls or more boys performing the routine (Perry & Bussey, 1979). Also, the sex of a child who introduces a toy in the classroom influences play patterns: Children of the same sex as the child who introduces the toy are more interested in the toy than children of the other sex (Serbin, Connor, & Iler, 1979).

2. The Assumption of Gender Mediation: A Constraint on Understanding Stereotype Development Despite the many sources of gender-related information available to most children, we still know little about the ways in which children learn all the complex associations that make up their gender schemas. One constraint on understanding has been a reasonable but faulty assumption about stereotypes. Specifically, based on an associative network conception of stereotypes, most researchers (myself included) have assumed that gender labels mediate all stereotypic inferences within the knowledge structure. For instance, consider the case of a child who understands four simple gender associations: (1) boys play with cars, ( 2 ) boys play with trucks, (3) girls play with dolls, and (4) girls play with kitchen sets. From this limited knowledge base, researchers have reasonably assumed that children use the two gender groups (boys and girls) to mediate all possible inferences. As such, the child can easily infer, for example, that people who like cars will probably also like trucks through the mediated inference that those people who like cars are probably boys. Because of the gender mediation assumption, the typical method of assessing gender stereotype knowledge has been to assess whether children associate females or males with various toys, jobs, traits, and physical characteristics. For instance, research has shown that very young children associate gender labels with appearance cues (Thompson, 1975), with activities and toys (Blakemore et al., 1978; Martin & Little, 1990; Thompson, 1975), and with occupations (Kuhn et al., 1978, O’Keefe & Hyde, 1983; Papalia & Tennent, 1975). Even kindergarten children know the sex typing of some personality traits, and the extent of this

Cognition and Gender E f t c ~ ~ s

I33

knowledge increases with age (Hall & Halberstadt, 1980; Williams, Bennett, & Best, 1975). Having assessed the simple associations between gender labels and genderrelated attributes, developmental researchers have assumed that the entire content of gender stereotypes has been tapped. Furthermore, the major conclusion that has been drawn from such research is that stereotype knowledge “reaches ceiling” at a very young age, thereby making the study of gender stereotype knowledge a relatively uninteresting construct for understanding gender effects.

3. Recerit Evidence Concerning Age-Reluted Chutiges in Stereotype Kmwledge The basic assumption of gender mediation does not hold, however. Surprisingly, children do not always draw “logical” inferences based on gender. In two studies designed to assess the development of gender stereotype knowledge, we found that young children (4-6 years) have more difficulty with these inferences than older children (8-10 years) (Martin et ul., 1090). Young children do not automatically associate two pieces of information even when each is associated with one gender group. Nor do they automatically assume that two pieces of information, one related to each gender group, do not co-occur. For instance, even when children understand that boys play with cars and boys play with airplanes, they do not necessarily believe that those children who play with cars are also likely to play with airplanes (and not with dolls). Young children do not fail completely to make gender-mediated inferences. Instead, they seem to make stereotypic inferences selectively: They make them when given own-sex relevant cues and not when given opposite-sex relevant cues. For instance, girls make gender-mediated inferences when given feminine cues (e.g., plays with dolls) but not when given masculine cues (e.g., plays with cars). By the time children are 8 years old, they make the full range of gender-mediated inferences. Why do young children not use gender consistently to mediate inferences’? One possibility is that they have a general difficulty making “bottom-up” inferences, that is, making judgments about a category based on an attribute (Gelman, Collman, & Maccoby, 1986; Rholes & Ruble, 1084). This cognitive constraint probably does not completely account for the results. however, because children make bottom-up inferences in some cases (i.e., when given own-sex relevant cues) but not in others (i.e., when given opposite-sex relevant cues). A second possibility is that social experience influences the types of associations children learn. As children acquire more experience with girls and boys, their associative links may strengthen such that gender-mediated inferences become easier. Our results suggest that social experience does not simply aid children’s learning of which things co-occur, it also helps children learn which things do not co-occur.

134

Carol Lynn Martin

Contrary to the popular assumption that children’s stereotype knowledge reaches ceiling in early childhood, these recent studies suggest that stereotypes continue to develop into middle childhood. Specifically, stereotypes appear to develop through a series of stages. Children in the first phase (the one that has been emphasized by most researchers) learn what kinds of things are directly associated with each sex, such as girls play wirh dolls and boys play wirh cars. At least for the domains that have been tested, around the ages of 4-6, children seem to move to the second phase where they begin to develop the more indirect and complex associations for information relevant to their own sex but have yet to learn these associations for information relevant to the opposite sex. By the time they are 8, children move to the third phase, where they have also learned the associations relevant to the opposite sex. At this point, children have mastered the gender concepts of masculinity and femininity that link information within and between the various content domains (Martin et al., 1990). Children who have reached phase 3 have at their disposal the full range of stereotype knowledge. This phase marks the complete emergence of the psychological constructs of masculinity and femininity, which are distinct (but not entirely independent) from actual gender labels. One might expect that children who understand the distinction between gender labels and gender concepts (e.g., between female and femininity) might lessen their gender stereotyping. They do not. Older children simply have more levels of information (i-e., gender labels and gender concepts) on which judgments can be based, and they clearly use both of these types of information when making social judgments (Berndt & Heller, 1986; Martin, 1989b). Having an understanding of gender concepts, however, may effectively decrease the salience of accessibility of gender labels because children can develop subtypes of individuals within gender groups (e.g., masculine girls“tomboys”) that have more predictive value than either the label or the gender concept alone. Several issues have emerged from our research program on the development of stereotype knowledge. One issue concerns the kind of gender associative knowledge structure that very young children have. Do 2-and 3-year-olds fail to make any type of gender-mediated inference, even from own-sex relevant cues? A second issue concerns reconsidering how developmental changes in gender stereotype knowledge influence behavior (Martin, 1991). Are children’s behaviors more likely to be influenced by simple gender labels or by the more complex (i.e., from either labels or attributes) fully formed associative network? A third issue concerns the development of other types of knowledge structures. The surprising way gender knowledge evolves suggests the possibility that other types of knowledge may also evolve in unexpected ways. Having basic associative links does not guarantee the full range of possible associations. Instead, the more complex associative links appear to develop later. Additional research is needed to address these issues.

IV. Early Origins of Stereotypes Ycars ago, Brigham (1971) argued that despite the widespread popularity of stereotyping research, little was known about the origins of any type of stereotype. The situation has remained virtually unchanged. We still know little about how stereotypes develop. The majority of research on gender stereotyping has not been useful for understanding the origins of stereotypes because most of it has dealt only with the content of stereotypes. To gain knowledge about the origins of stereotypes, researchers need to focus on the ways in which cognitive processes underlie the acquisition of information about social groups. For this reason, one aspect of my research program has been to look back to the very early stages of stereotype formation. Two questions have been of particular interest to me. The first question is, given the tremendous amount of available information, why do perceivers ever notice co-occurrences of group membership and group attributes, especially since such covariation is often minimal? The second question is, why do perceivers often believe groups differences exist when in fact they do not? Despite acknowledgment that stereotypes are often inaccurate (e.g., Mackie, 1973), little attention has been paid to understanding why inaccuracies exist. My first step in tackling these questions has been to focus on the cognitive processes involved in stereotype formation while, at this point, disregarding developmental changes that may occur in these processes. Two of the three studies described in this section were done with adults. The decision to study adults was based on the assumption that many basic cognitive processes are similar in adults and children, and thus research on adults informs us about children. Furthermore, information about adults was lacking; therefore no standard of comparison was available. Finally, the kinds of information I wanted to study (e.g., probability estimates) would be difficult to obtain from young children. Once the basic cognitive processes underlying stereotyping can be pinpointed, then work on developmental changes can begin. The first study described in this section of the paper was designed to investigate how adults learn stereotypes of new unfamiliar social groups. The second study was designed to explore the role of implicit theories in the creation of stereotype knowledge. In that study, physical appearance differences between unfamiliar groups were varied to assess whether appearance differences trigger implicit theories of group differences thereby causing perceivers to create illusory group differences. The third study was designed to investigate children’s implicit theories of gender group differences. A. LIFE ON BORKA: AN ANALOGUE STUDY OF STEREOTYPE DEVELOPMENT

Many of the most interesting questions concerning the development of stereotypes (of all sorts) cannot be easily answered by studying real-world stereotyped

136

Carol Lynn Martin

groups. For instance, it is difficult to assess the early origins of stereotypes because when real groups are studied, we have no control over either the nature of the stereotype or the exposure the perceiver has had to the stereotypic information. For this reason, there is no way to compare the stimulus information to the perceiver’s cognitive structuring of that information. Yet to understand how stereotypes form and how they change, we need to make these comparisons. One solution is to create new stereotypes so that the appropriate control can be maintained. That is the strategy Merry Bullock and I adopted (Martin & Bullock, 1986). Specifically, we wanted to develop concepts that were novel and yet mimicked to some extent the complexity of real-world stereotypes. To accomplish this aim, we created two groups of creatures-Algers and Glimphs-who live on the mythical planet Borka. As can be seen in Fig. 1, the creatures resemble humans in that they have arms, legs, a head, and a body. They differ from humans in their body shape, head shape, and the way they dress. By manipulating the characteristics of the creatures, we have been able to monitor the kinds of information people learn about Borkans. In the original study, the Borkan world was fairly complex. Each creature group had six distinctive features (i.e., features that occurred only in one group and never in the other group). For example, some Algers had hexagonal heads and no Glimphs had hexagonal heads. These features varied in how frequently they occurred in the groups. Some features occurred in 80% of the relevant group members, some occurred in 50%, and some occurred in 20%. The two creature groups also had six characteristics in common. These characteristics are neutral or nondistinctive because they are unrelated to group membership. For instance, some Algers wore tennis shoes and some Glimphs wore tennis shoes. These

Alger

Glimph

Fig. I . Examples of AIgers and Glimphs: Life on Borka study.

137

Cogrritiotr and Gender Effects

neutral features also varied in frequency; some occurred in 80% of both groups, some in SO%, and some in 20%. Adult subjects were shown labeled members of both groups in five sessions. During each slide presentation of creatures, they heard detailed taped travelogues about the planet Borka and the culture of its inhabitants. After each presentation, subjects performed a variety of tasks so that we could assess classification abilities, concept formation, the perception of covariation of features in groups, and the typicality of characteristics. Given the complexity of the information, we were somewhat surprised to find that subjects were able to make rudimentary distinctions between Algers and Glimphs even after the first trial. Learning improved steadily over sessions, and by the end of the fifth session subjects were very accurate in recognizing the differences between Algers and Glimphs. We also found that both the distinctiveness of features and the frequency of their occurrence contributed to learning. Subjects tended first to learn to discriminate groups on the basis of highly frequent and distinctive features. Only later were less frequent distinctive features uscd. The most provocative finding was that subjects showed a very unusual bias, which we called the fre~~urtic~-di.sti~z~'tiv~tie.s~ effect. When asked to estimate the frequency of occurrence of features within each creature group, subjects rated high-frequency distinctive features as occurring more often than high-frequency neutral features, as shown in Table 11. This finding is particularly intriguing because both types of features, distinctive and neutral, occurred with the same frequency (i.e., in 80% of the creatures). From this pattern of results, we concluded that perceivers find categorical covariation particularly salient. Contrary to findings that show adults to be accurate frequency accountants (Hasher & Zacks,

TABLE I1 Mean Frequency Estimates (%') a\

B

Function of Distinctiveness of Feature and Session" Session -

Feature type .. -

Positively distinctive (XO%) Neutral (80%) Negatively distinctive (0%)

-

~~

1 ~

..

7

~

32

51

18 0

43 1s

.-

_

~~~

3

~

~~~

51 40 10

5

4 ~

59

SO 10

63 45 6

"Subjects estimated the frequency of occurrence of the features for each group in terms of percentages of each group with the feature. Positivcly distinctive feature estimates were those made for the group in which the feature actually occurred. Neutral feature estimates were made for both groups hecause the features occurred i n both groups. Negatively distinctive feature estimates were those made for the group in which the feature did not occur. The percentages in parentheses next to the feature type represent the actual occurrence of the feature. depending on the type of rating being made.

138

Carol Lynn Martin

1984) who chalk up points for each occurrence of a characteristic in a group, our subjects appeared to show categorical biases. That is, they were more likely to chalk up points for characteristics that were distinctive of a group, while not giving points (or giving fewer points) for characteristics occurring in both groups. Thus, differences between groups were exaggerated and similarity between groups was ignored. From the first Borkan experiment we have learned some basic information about how complex social concepts are acquired. First, learning about social concepts improves with continued exposure to members of groups. Second, individuals’ social concepts do not accurately reflect the information in the environment. Instead, specific kinds of features-those high in frequency and high in distinctiveness for a group-are noticed first and are first used in identifying group members. Overall, the creature method has been useful in helping us to understand one kind of cognitive bias that may influence how stereotypes originate.

B. IMPLICIT THEORIES OF GROUPS: EXPLAINING HOW DIFFERENCES ARE NOTICED AND CREATED

1. Role of Physical Appearance Differences and Implicit Theories In addition to the potent combination of perceivers’ tending to categorize and their being surrounded by functional information, the development of stereotypes may be facilitated by physical appearance differences between groups (McArthur, 1983). Many groups commonly stereotyped (e.g., racial groups and the sexes) differ in physical appearance as well as in their group labels. The co-occurrence of group labels and physical differences may act in concert to increase perceivers’ vigilance in noticing group differences. This enhancement may happen because perceivers develop implicit “theories” about groups that guide their thinking. For instance, one theory might be called a group difference theory: When we know that groups differ in one way (e.g., physical appearance), we are likely to assume that they differ in other ways that we do not yet know about. One possible outcome of this type of theory is the exaggeration of small but true group differences. Small differences may normally go unnoticed; but if groups differ in physical appearance, such small differences may be selectively attended to and therefore exaggerated. Some evidence indicates that perceivers are vigilant in this way. When adults’ stereotypes about the sexes have been assessed for accuracy (Martin, 1987a), they have been found to be exaggerations of very small real differences. For instance, groups of women and men report that they are somewhat different in terms of their being compassionate (a 12%difference: 84% of men and 96% of women reported being compassionate). When other adults were asked to estimate to the best of their ability the percentage of women and men

Cognition und Gender Ejfects

139

who are generally compassionate (ix., when their stereotypes were assessed), their judgments showed a 20% difference (49% of men and 69% of women were believed to be compassionate). Similar patterns of exaggerations were found for other masculine and feminine characteristics. An even more intriguing idea is that physical differences may trigger perceivers’ theories so that they will construct between-group differences that do not exist at all. In other words, simply because two groups differ in physical appearance, perceivers may believe that the groups also differ on other dimensions such as personality characteristics.

2. Evidence of Physical Appearunce Dijjferenccs Triggering Implicit Theories Even if groups differing in physical appearance lead perceivers to create stereotypes, this idea is difficult to test. The difficulty lies in separating a general theory of difference from preexisting stereotypic notions about physical appearance. In the real world, physical differences are often related to other kinds of differences; and even when they are not, perceivers may believe they are. Implicit personality theories link together specific physical characteristics with specific personality characteristics so that, for example, when we see a red-headed person, we are likely to think that person is highly emotional even if we know nothing about his or her personality. A number of studies have shown that facial appearance, body type, and hair color elicit specific expectations about others (e.g., Berry & McArthur, 1985; Kiker & Miller, 1967). Physical appearance stereotypes complicate direct assessment of whether physical differences trigger implicit theories of difference. What is needed is a world where physical differences are not, in reality, confounded with any other differences between groups and where physical characteristics carry no psychological expectations. A method I have used (Martin, 1987b) is a variation of the original Borka method. For this particular study, two relatively simple but different Borkan worlds were created. One group of adult subjects in the control condition was presented a Borkan world in which Algers and Glimphs were identical in the distribution of physical attributes (ix., Algers and Glimphs looked alike, as shown in Fig. 2, top panel). The other group of subjects, in the experimental condition, was presented a Borkan world in which Algers and Glimphs differed in one characteristic, head shape (bottom panel). Head shape was used on the assumption that adults do not have specific expectations about what creatures with triangular versus hexagonal heads might be like. Other than head shape, the distribution and types of features were identical in the two groups (and the groups were identical to the groups used in the control condition). For instance, hair color varied but the distribution of hair colors was identical for Algers and for Glirnphs. During a presentation in which subjects viewed slides of individual

Carol Lynn Martin

140

Alger

Glimph

Alger

Glimph

Fig. 2. Examples of Algers and Glimphs in the control condition (top panel) and the experimental condition (bottom panel): Group differences study.

Algers and Glimphs labeled according to their groups, they simultaneously listened to a travelogue about the planet Borka telling them about the lifestyles of the Borkans. The travelogue contained detailed information about interpersonal characteristics of these creatures, and the information was not said to be related more to one group than the other. Upon completion of the slidehape presentation, the subjects were asked a number of questions about physical appearance, occupational preferences, activity preferences, and personality characteristics of the creatures. A manipulation check was done to assess whether head shape carried excess psychological meaning. Neither head shape was found to carry spontaneous psychological meaning for the subjects (i.e., no particular quality was assigned to one head shape more than the other). Despite the lack of meaning for head shapes, this one physical difference between groups influenced the creation (misperception) of other group differences. For instance, subjects in the experimental condition believed that the Algers and Glimphs differed in their occupations more than did subjects in the control

Cognition urid Grritkr Effec~s

141

condition (p c .OOS). Furthermore, regardless of condition, the more the subjects believed that physical appearance differences existed between the groups, the more they also believed that other kinds of differences existed. In the imaginary Borkan world in which physical appearance differences were not associated in any way with other differences, subjects who saw groups that differed in one physical characteristic assumed that the groups also differed in other ways. Although subjects were probably somewhat overwhelmed by the amount of information they had received about Borkans, none of the information gave reason to believe that Algers and Glimphs differed in their personalities or in any other way. Despite the lack of directly relevant information, subjects were willing to assume that the creatures did differ. The differences were not attributable merely to the labeling of the groups. The critical component in this study was whether or not the groups differed in the shape of the head. The mere presence of one minor difference in appearance was enough to cause perceivers to construct group differences. Not surprisingly, the triggering effect was quite weak; not many illusory differences were constructed and not all subjects created these kinds of differences. However, even a weak type of triggering of theories of difference may help to account for the early formation of stereotypes. Faced with incomplete evidence, the judgments children and adults make are likely to be based on their conceptual schenias. In the real world, people often perceive social groups as looking different and acting differently from one another (whether accurate or not). Not surprisingly, after many experiences of this type. people form the conceptual schema groups differing in physical uppearutice are likely to differ ulso in other wuys. This schema may provide the default option for making judgments until such time that similarity between groups is clearly demonstrated.

C. EVIDENCE OF IMPLICIT THEORIES OF GENDER GROUP DIFFERENCES

Many studies have illustrated that children believe the sexes differ; however, the source of their beliefs is unclear. Any time children attribute differences to males and females, they may be reporting on what they believe to be real differences or they may be relying on a more abstract theory of group differences. To understand whether children have formed abstract theories of gender differences, an unfamiliar situation must be used. For instance, if a young girl is given an attractive novel toy-ne she does not know to be sex-linked-and she likes the toy, what inferences does she make about who else might like the toy? If she relies on an abstract theory of gender differences, she may infer that because she likes the toy, children of the opposite sex might not like the toy. Furthermore, she may also rely on an abstract theory of within-group similarity (similar to Medin's, 1989. idea of concept essentialism), thereby inferring that because she likes the toy, other children of the same sex might also like the toy.

142

Carol Lynn Martin

Lisa Eisenbud and I (Martin & Eisenbud, 1990)have done preliminary research to determine whether or not children use abstract theories of gender. In two studies, preschoolers were asked to help us find out how much children like various unfamiliar toys. For each toy, children rated how much they liked it, how much they thought girls would like to play with it, and how much they thought boys would like to play with it (order varied). Children’s responses showed the influence of gender. Their own liking of toys did not differ from their prediction of how much others of the same sex would like the toys, but their own ratings differed from their predictions about how much others of the opposite sex would like the toy (p c -05). Although preliminary, our results suggest that children use gender theories to make inferences about others. One implication of our findings is that they illustrate a way specific gender information may be acquired. Children may add information to their gender stereotypes based on what they like (and dislike) merely by generalizing their own preferences to members of their own group. Usually, the direction of influence of gender schemas has been discussed in the reverse order, that is, children’s preferences being influenced by gender stereotypes. Given children’s tendencies to make gender-matched inferences about others, however, we must also consider the possibility of influence occurring in the other direction as well. Another implication of these findings concerns the nature of children’s implicit theories about gender groups: (1) Members of the different gender groups are different in their interests and (2) members of the same gender group are similar in their interests. These theories go beyond the specific bits of gender knowledge children hold; they include what is yet to be known. Furthermore, they may act similarly to the physical appearance theories discussed in Section IV,B by making children more vigilant in detecting differences and in constructing illusory ones. In addition, these group-related theories may underlie some aspects of behavior that have been difficult to explain, such as children’s segregation into same-sex groups. Such behavior can be explained from children’s preferences for same-sex activities but only if children in same-sex groups tend to engage in these sorts of activities. Most of the time, however, children engage in sex-neutral activities, and yet they still prefer same-sex playmates (Maccoby, 1990; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1987). Further research is needed to discover whether one basis for same-sex preferences is the assumption that others of the same sex are like me and thus more fun to play with (no matter what they are doing) and others of the opposite sex are not like me and thus less fun to play with.

V. Summary and Conclusions Cognitive approaches, such as schematic processing theory, have been heuristic in a number of ways for bettering our understanding of how and why gender effects are so apparent in childhood. First, they provide a new and different

Cognition und Getidrr EJfict.5

143

perspective. Rather than concentrating on discovering all the instances of gendered information in our worlds and then assuming that this overwhelming amount of information accounts for children’s behavior and thinking, cognitive theorists studying gender have reversed the emphasis. That is, we assume that thinking processes influence the world of information that is available to children. Furthermore, the nature of that world of information is then seen to influence behavioral choices. Second, cognitive approaches have been heuristic in providing some understanding of the mismatches that occur between available information and children’s gender cognitions. More broadly stated, such approaches have been useful for discovering the reasons that gender cognitions are inaccurate-why some information is misperceived. misremembered, and selectively learned. Third, cognitive approaches have been useful for elaborating the development of children’s gender knowledge. Finally, cognitive approaches have been useful for illustrating how cognition may influence behavior. If we go beyond gender for a moment, we see that cognitive approaches can also be useful for our understanding of the broader realm of all types of stereotypes. For instance, they are helpful in understanding the early origins of stereotypes. Why do children and adults develop stereotypes‘? Given the overwhelming amount of information we must deal with every day, how do we ever notice real but usually minor co-occurrences of group membership and attributes? Furthermore, why do stereotypes contain information that is not grounded in reality? To begin to answer these questions, we need to move cognitive approaches to a higher order of generality, that is, away from the specifics of gender and on to the broader case of concept formation about social groups. When cognitive notions are used in this way, children and adults appear to form higher order schemas concerning the nature of social groups. One such schema is the “if they differ in one way, they differ in other ways” schema. Another such schema represents the flip side: “If they are in the same group, they are the same in many other ways.” Exposure to information about groups surely must lead to the formation of these higher order schemas. Once formed, they surely must influence how new information about specific groups is acquired by increasing perceivers’ vigilance in noticing and creating supportive information. In such a way, these schemas may be the early cognitive precursors to the more specific schemas concerning gender, race, and ethnic differences.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The research reported in this paper was supported by grants from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (A1038). the University of Britkh Columhia Humanities and Socinl Science Research Grant (2-56042), and Arizona State University Research Grants (SF89-16). I appreciate the helpful comments made on earlier drafts of this manuscript by Nancy Eisenberg, Richard Fabes, Gary Levy, and Hilary Rose.

144

Carol Lynn Martin

REFERENCES Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, M A Addison-Wesley. Antill, J. K. (1987). Parents’ beliefs and values about sex roles, sex differences, and sexuality: Their sources and implications. In P. Shaver & C. Hendrick (Eds.), Review of personaliv arid social psychology: Sex and Gender (Vol. 7 . pp. 294-328). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Ashmore, R. D., & Del Boca, F. K. (1979). Sex stereotypes and implicit personality theory: Toward a cognitive-social psychological conceptualization. Sex Roles, 5, 219-248. Ashmore, R. D., & Del Boca, F. K. (1981). Conceptual approaches to stereotypes and stereotyping. In D. L. Hamilton (Ed.), Cognitiveproce.~.se.s in stereoryping and intergroup behuvior (pp. 37-82). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Ausubel, D. P. (1960). The use of advanced organizers in the learning and retention of meaningful verbal material. Journal of Educational Psychology, 51, 267-272. Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bern. S. L. (1981). Gender schema theory: A cognitive account of sex typing. Psychological Review, 88, 354-364. Bern, S . L. (1983). Gender schema theory and its implications on child development: Raising genderaschematic children in a gender-schematic society. Signs, 8, 598-616. Bem, S. L. (1984). Androgyny and gender schema theory: A conceptual and empirical integration. In T. B. Sonderegger (Ed.). Nebraska symposium on motivation: Psychology and gender (pp. 17%226). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Berndt, T., & Heller, K.A. (1986). Gender stereotypes and social inferences: A developmental study. Journal of Personality arid Social Psychology, 50, 889-898. Berry, D. S., & McArthur, L. 2. (1985). Some components and consequences of a baby face. Journal of Personaliry and Social Psychology, 48, 3 12-323. Blakemore, J. E., LaRue, A. A., & Olejnik, A. B. (1979). Sex appropriate toy preference and the ability to conceptualize toys as sex-role related. Developmental Psychology, 15, 339-340. Boston, M. B., & Levy, G. D. (1991). Developmental and individual differences in preschooler.$‘ under.7tanding of gender .scripts. Manuscript submitted for publication. Bradbard, M. R. (1985). Sex differences in adults’ gifts and children‘s toy requests at Christmas. Psychological Reports, 56, 969-970. Bradbard, M. R., & Endsley, R. C. (1983). The effects of sex-typed labeling on preschool children’s information seeking and retention. Sex Roles, 9, 247-260. Bradbard, M. R., Martin, C. L., Endsley, R. C., & Halverson, C. F. (1986). Influence of sex stereotypes on children’s exploration and memory: A competence versus performance distinction. Developmental Psychology, 22, 481486. Bradbard, M. R., & Parkman, S. A. (1983). Gender differences in preschool children’s toy requests. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 145, 283-285. Brigham, J. C. (1971). Ethnic stereotypes. Psychological Bullefin, 76, 15-38. Bussey, K., & Bandura, A. (1984). Influence of gender constancy and social power on sex linked modeling. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1292-1302. Brown. A. L., Smiley, S. S., Day, J. D., Townsend, M.A. R., & Lawton, S. C. (1977). Intrusion of a thematic idea in children’s comprehension and retention of stories. Child Development. 48, 1454-1466. C a m , A., & Newbern, S. R. (1984). Sex stereotype effects in children’s picture recognition. Child Development, 55, 1085-1 090. Carter, D. B. (Ed.). (1987). Current conceptions ofsex roles and sex typing: Theory and research. New York: Praeger. Carter, D. B., & Levy, G. D. (1988). Cognitive aspects of children’s early sex-role development: The influence of gender schemas on preschoolers’ memories and preferences for sex-typed toys and

Cogtiifion atid Gender EfjCL'cts

I45

activities. Child Delvlopmenr. 59, 782-793. Cohen. L. B.. & Strauss, M. S.(1979). Concept acquisition in the human infant. Child I ~ e v e l o ~ ~ m c ~ n t . 50. 419-424. Constantinuple. A. (1979). Sex-role acquisition: I n search of the elephant. Se.r Roles. 5, 121-131. Cordua. G . 13.. McGraw. K. 0..& Drabman. R. S. (1979). Doctor or nurse: Children's perception of scx typcd occupations. Child D e d p w w t . 50, 59lk-593. Deaux. I<.. & Lewis. L. L. ( 1984). Structure of gender stereotypes: Interrelationships among components and gender label. Jourriul of Perronulrt~~ and Sociul I'.svckology. 46, 99-lUO4. : interactive model of gcnder-related Deaux. K., 6i Major, B. (1987). Putting gender into C O I I ~ C X ~An hrh;ivior. I's\.(./iol(~~ic.r~l Rivicw. 94, 369-389. DcLucia, L. A. (l963), The toy preference test: A measure of sex-role identification. Child I>cwlol)merit. 34. 107-1 17. Devinc. P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. Journul oJ Pi~rsorrulityuntl Sociul P.\ych(~log,~. 56, 5- IS. Edelbrock, C , , rYr Sugawarn. A. 1. ( I 978). Acquisition of hex-typed preferences in preschool children. Devekop~nen fa1P.~yclrolocgy.14, 6 14423. Eiscnhcrg. N.. Murray. E.. S: Hire. T. (1982). Children's reasoning regarding sex-typed toy choices. Child L)i,i'elo~)in,,nr,trt, 53. X 1-86,

Fagan, J. F.. & Singer. L. T. (197')). The rolc of simple feature differences in infant recognition of faces. Infant Bt*fru~ior trnd Dcrelr~p~nent. 2. 39-46, Fagot. B. I . ( 1974). Sex differences in toddlers' hehavior and parental reaction. Dcidopmentul "\yc/lology, 10. 554-55X. Fagot. B. I. (1985). Changes in thinking about early sex role development. Drvdopniental Rer:iewr, 5. X3-98.

Fagot. B. I., LYC Leinbach. M. D. (1989). The young child's gender schema: Environmental input, ~ i ~hh3G672. ii~tit. internal organization. Child ~ i ~ ~ ~ e l o ~ 60. Fagot. B. 1.. & Leinhach. M. D. (199 I). Gender-role deidopment in vocrrrg children; Front diccritnirration t o laheling. Mtinuscript submitted for puhlication. Fagot. B. I., Leinbach. M. D., & O'Boyle. C. (I9YO). Geirdcrr lubeling gender .srereohpirrg, und purrriting helial,ior.s.Unpublished manuscript. Fagot. B. 1.. Leinbach. M. D., & Hagan. R. (1986). Gender labeling and the adoption of sex-typed I'\yc/iohgy. 22, 44(W43. hchaviors. Del~e/opin,,neIttfi~ Feathers. N . T. (1984). M ulinity, femininity, psychological iindrogyny. and the structure of values. Journul o f Personalig arid Social Psvclrolop. 47. 6 0 4 4 2 0 . Fein, G., Johnson. D., Kosson, N.. Stork, L., & Wasserman. L. (1075). Sex stereotypes and preferences in the toy choices of 20-month-old hoys and girls. ~ [ ~ l , i ~ l ( ~ ~ t i t P.syc~hology, c,iifu/ 11, 527-528. Fiske. S.T., & Linville. P. W. (19x0). What does the schema concept buy us? fersonulity and Sociul Psycholog! Bulletin, 6, 543-557. Gelman. S. A,. Collman. P., & Maccoby. E. E. (1986). Inferring properties from categories versus inferring categories from properties: Thc case of gender. C'hrkl De~~cdopnlenl. 57. 3 9 6 4 0 4 . Hall, J . A., & Halberstadt, A. G . (1980). Masculinity and femininity in children: Development of the children's personal attribute questionnaire. DL.r,rlr~~men/ril I'syckology. 16. 270-280. Halverwn. C. F.. & Martin, C. L. ( 19x5). Set-typed know,ledgc,: CVho reirietnhrrs whuf:) Unpuhliahed manuscript. Hamilton, D. L. (Ed.). (1'181). Cqyriitilv processes in srereogping and intergroup hrhubior. Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbiium. Hartup. W. W., Moore. S. G., bi Sager. G. (1963). Avoidance of inappropriate sex-typing by young children. .lournal of Consulting Psychology. 27. 4 6 7 4 7 3 . Hasher. L.. & Zacks. R. T. (19x4). Automatic processing of fundamental information: The case of frequency of occurrence. Ainericaii P.i).chologist. 39, 1372- 1388.

Carol Lynn Martin

146

Hastie, R., & Kumar, P. A. (1979). Person memory: Personality traits as organizing principles in memory for behaviors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 25-38. Haugh, S. S.. Hoffman, C. D.. & Cowen. G. (1980). The eye of the very young beholder: Sex typing of infants by young children. Child Development, 51, 5 9 M W . Higgins, E. T., & King, G. (198 I). Accessibility of social constructs: Information-processing consequences of individual and contextual variability. In N. Cantor & J. F. Kihlstrom (Eds.). Personality and social interaction (pp. 69-12 I). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Hort, B. E., Leinbach, M. C., & Fagot, 5.1.(1991). Is there coherence among components of gender acquisition? Sex Roles, 24, 195-208. Huston, A. C. (1983). Sex-typing. In E. M. Hetherington (Ed.). Handbook of chi/dpsycho/og.v. Vol. 4: Socialization, per.sonality, and sociul development (pp. 387-467). New York: John Wiley and Sons. Huston. A. C. (1985). The development of sex typing: Themes from recent research. Developmental Review, 5 , 1-17. Intons-Peterson. M. J. (1988). Children’s concepts of gender. Nonvood, NJ: Ablex. Katz, P.A. (1983). Developmental foundations of gender and racial attitudes. In R. L. Leahy (Ed.), The child’s construetion of social inequahy (pp. 4 1-78). New York: Academic Press. Kiker, V. L., & Miller, A. R. (1967). Perceptual judgment of physiques as a factor in social image. Perceptud arid Motor Skills, 24. 1013-1014. Kohlinsky, S., Cruse, D. F., & Sugawara, A. 1. (1978). Sex-role stereotypes and children’s memory for story content. Child Development, 49, 452-458. Kohlberg, L. A. (1966). A cognitive-developmental analysis of children’s sex role concepts and attitudes. In E. E. Maccoby (Ed.), The development of sex differences (pp. 82-173). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Kuhn, D.. Nash, S. C., & Brucken, L. (1978). Sex role concepts of two- and three-year-old children. Child Development, 49, 445-45 I. Leinbach, M. D., & Fagot, B. I. (1986). Acquisition of gender labeling: A test for toddlers. Sex Roles, 15,655466.

Levy, G. D. (1 987. May). When is a schemu not a schema? The case of gender schema. Paper presented at the meeting of the Jean Piaget Society, Philadelphia, PA. Levy. G. D. (1989, April). Gender schematizution and gender scripts: Sometimes a little knowledge can be dangerous. Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Kansas City, MO. Levy. G. D., Boston, M. B., & Burlew, J. C. (1989, June). Preschool children’s knowledge of gender-reluted scripts and schemata. Paper presented at meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, Boston, MA. Levy, G. D., & Carter, D. 5.(1989). Gender schema. gender constancy, and gender-role knowledge: The roles of cognitive factors in preschoolers’ gender-role stereotype attributions. Developmental P,sychology, 25. 4441149. Liben, L. S., & Bigler, R. S. (1987). Reformulating children’s gender schemata. I n L. S. Liben & M. L. Signorella (Eds.), Children’s gender schemara (pp. 8S104). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Liben, L. S., & Signorella. M. L. (1980). Gender-related schemata and constructive memory in children. Child Development, 51, 11-18. Lippmann, W. (1922). Public opinion. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Maccoby, E. E. (Ed.) (1966). The development of sex differences. Stanford, C A Stanford University Press. Maccoby, E. E. (1990). Gender and relationships: A developmental account. American Psychologist, 45, 5 13-520. Maccoby, E. E., & Jacklin. C. N. (1987). Gender segregation in childhood. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 20, pp. 239-287). New York: Academic Press.

Cognition and Gender Effects

147

Mackie, M. (1973). Arriving at ‘‘truth’’ by definition: The case of stereotype inaccuracy, Social Problems, 20, 431447. Mandler, J. M. (1979). Categorical and schematic organization in memory. In C. R. Puff (Ed.), Memory, organization, and .structure (pp. 259-299). New York: Academic Press. Markus, H., Crane, M., Bernstein. S., & Siladi, M. (1982). Self-schemas and gender. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 38-50. Martin. C. L. (1985, July). The development of gender roles. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development, Tours, France. Martin, C. L. (1987a). Applications of a ratio measure of sex stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 489499. Martin, C. L. (l987b). The priming effecfs ofphysical differences on stereolyping. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psjchological Association, New York, NY. Martin. C. L. (1989a, April). Beyond knowledge-based conceptions of gender schematic processing. Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Kansas City, MO. Martin, C. L. (1989b). Children’s use of gender-related information in making social judgments. Developmental Psychology, 25, 80-88. Martin, C. L. (1990). Dynamic schematic processing: Moving beyond knowledge-based conceptions of information processing. Unpublished manuscript. Martin, C . L. (1991). New directionsfor assessing children ‘sgender knowledge. Manuscript submitted for publication. Martin, C. L., & Bullock, M. (1986, August). Learning strreolypes: Biases in judging group characteristics. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC. Martin, C. L.. & Eisenbud, L. (1990). Gender marching: Effects on children’s toy preferences and attributions about others. Unpublished manuscript. Martin, C. L., Fabes. R. A,, Eisenbud, L., Karbon, M. M., & Rose, H. A. (1990. March). Boys don’t cry: Children’s distortions of others’ emotions. Paper presented at the meetings of the Southwestern Society for Research in Human Development, Dallas, TX. Martin, C. L., & Halverson, C. F. (1981). A schematic processing model of sex typing and stereotyping in children. Child Development, 52, 1119-1 134. Martin, C. L., & Halverson, C. F. (1983a). The effects of sex-typing schemas on young children’s memory. Child Development, 54, 563-574. Martin, C. L., & Halverson, C. F. (1983b). Gender constancy: A methodological and theoretical analysis. Sex Roles, 9, 775-790. Martin, C. L., & Halverson, C. F. (1987). The roles of cognition in sex role acquisition. In D. B. Carter (Ed.), Current conceptions of sex roles and sex typing: Theory and research (pp. 123-137). New York: Praeger. Martin, C. L.. & Little, J . K. (1990). The relation of gender understanding to children’s sex-typed preferences and gender stereotypes. Child Development, 61, 1427-1439. Martin, C. L., Wood, C. H., & Little, J. K. (1990). The development of gender stereotype components. Child Development, 61, 1891-1904. McArthur, L. Z. (1982). Judging a book by its cover: A cognitive analysis of the relationship between physical appearance and stereotyping. In A. H. Hastorf & A. M. ken (Eds.), Cognitive social psychology (pp. 149-21 1). New York Elsevier. McCauley, C., Stitt, C. L., & Segal, M. (1980). Stereotyping: From prejudice to prediction. Psychological Bulletin, 87, 195-2023, McConaghy, M. J. (1979). Gender permanence and the genital basis of gender: Stages in the development of constancy of gender identity. Child Development, 50, 1223-1226. Medin, D. L. (1989). Concepts and conceptual structure. American Psychologist, 44,1469-1481. Miller, A. G. (1982). In the eye of the beholder. New York: Praeger.

148

C a r o l Lynn Martin

Mischel, W. (1966). A social-learning view of sex differences in behavior. In E. E. Maccoby (Ed.), The development of sex differences (pp. 57-81). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Montemayor, R. (1974). Children's performance in a game and their attraction to it as a function of sex-typed labels. Child Development, 45, 152-156. Nadelman, L. (1974). Sex identity in American children: Memory, knowledge, and preference tests. Dewlopmenfal Psycliology, 10, 4 1 3 417. Nelson, K. (1981). Social cognition in a script framework. In J. H. Flavell & L. Ross (Eds.), Social cognitive development: Fronriers and possible selves. New York: Cambridge University Press. Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). The halo effect: Evidence for unconscious alterations of judgments. Journal of Per.soriality and Social Psychology, 35, 250-256. O'Keefe, E. S., & Hyde. J. S. (1983). The development of occupational sex-role stereotypes: The effects of gender stability and age. Sex Roles, 9, 481492. Papalia, D. E., & Tennent, S. S. (1975). Vocational aspirations in preschoolers. Sex Roles, 1, 197-199. Perry, D. G., & Bussey, K. (1979). The social learning theory of sex differences: Imitation is alive and well. Journal of Personality and Social P.sychology, 31, 1699-1712. Perry. D. G.. White, A. J., & Perry, L. C. (1984). Does early sex typing result from children's attempts to match their behaviors to sex role stereotypes'? Child Developmenr, 55, 21 142121. Reesz, H. W. (1966). Attitudes toward the opposite sex in late childhood. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 12, 157-163. Rholes, W. S., & Ruble, D. L. (1984). Children's understanding of dispositional characteristics of others. Child Deiwlopment, 55, 55C560. Robinson, C. C., & Morris, J. T. (1986). The gender-stereotyped nature of Christmas toys received by 36-, 48-, and 60-month old children: A comparison between nonrequested versus requested toys. Sex Roles, 15. 21-32. Rothbart, M., Evans, M., & Fulero, S. (1979). Recall for confirming events: Memory processes and the maintenance of social stereotypes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 15, 343-355. Ruble, D. N., & Stangor, C. (1986). Stalking the elusive schema: Insights from developmental and social-psychological analyses of gender schemas. Social Cognition, 4, 227-261. Serbin, L. A., Conner, J. M.. & Iler. I. (1979). Sex stereotyped and nonstereotyped introductions of new toys in the preschool classroom: An observational study of teacher behavior and its effects. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 4, 261-265. Surbin. L. A., & Sprafkin, C. (1986). The salience of gender and the process of sex typing in threeto seven-year-old children. Child Development, 57, 1188-1 199. Signorella, M. L. (1989. April). Gender-role attitudes \twus knowledge in the sfudy of children's gender schemas. Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Kansas City, MO. Signorella, M.L. (1987). Gender schemata: Individual differences and context effects. In L. S. Liben & M. L. Signorella (Eds.), Children's gender schemata (pp. 23-37); New directions for child development, No. 38. San Francisco: Jossey-B Signorella, M. L., & Liben, L. S. (1984). Recall and reconstruction of gender-related pictures: Effects of attitude, task difficulty, and age. Child Development, 55, 393405. Snyder, M., & Cantor, N. (1979). Testing hypotheses about other people: The use of historical knowledge. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 11,330-342. Snyder, M., & Uranowitz, S. W. (1978). Reconstructing the past: Some cognitive consequences of person perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 94 1-950. Stangor, C. (1988). Stereotype accessibility and information processing. Persorialily and Social Psychology Bulletin, 14, 694708. Tajfel, H. (1981). Human groups and social categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, S.E., & Crocker, J. (1981). Schematic bases of social information processing. In E. T. Higgins, C. P. Herman, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Social cognition: The Ontario symposium on personality and social psychology (pp. 85)-134). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Cognition and Gender Ejfects

149

Thompson, S. K. (1975). Gender labels and early sex-role development. Child Drve/opmerrr, 46. 339-347. Thompson. S. K.. & Bentler, P. M.(1971). The priority of cues in sex discrimination by children and adults. Dei~eloj)rnerim/P . T ~ c / I u /5. < J181-1x5. ~~, Vinacke. W. E. (1957). Stereotypes as social concepts. . / ~ J I ~ I X U /of Social P.syc/io/og)',46. 229-243. Weinraub, M.. Clemens. L. P.. Sockloff. A,. Etheridge. T., Gracely, E., & Myers. B. (1984). The development of sex role stereotypes in the third year: Relationships to gender labeling. gender identity, sex-typed toy prefercnces, and family characteristics. Child Drvr/i,pmmt, 55. 149.V 1503. Wildcr. D.. B Allen. W. (1974). E5ffects of social categorization and belief similarity upon intergroup hehavior. Personulit). mid Sociul P,sychology Bu//i,rin, 1, 28 1-283. Williams, J. E.. Bennett, S. M.. Sr Best, D. L. (1975).Awareness and expression of sex stereotypes i n young children. D e W / O [ J l ~ e l i f U~/ ? s ) ' c / I o ~11. J ~635-647. ~. Wyer, R. S., & Sntll. T. K. (19x1). Category accessihility: Some theoretical and empirical issues concerning the processing o l social stimulus information. In E. T. Higgins, C. P. Herman. B M. P. Zanna (Eds.). Soc.iul cogtiirion: The Unrurio symposium ti personulit). und socid pyciiology (pp. 161-197). Hillsdale. NJ: Erlhaum. Zadny. J.. B Gerard, H. B. (1974). Attributed intention and informational selectivity. Jounrol of Experirnmral Sociul P.sycho/ogy. 10. 3-1-51.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

DEVELOPMENT OF PROCESSING SPEED IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

Rohert Kail DEPARTMENT O F PSYCHOLOGICAL. SC'IENCIIS PURDLIE UNIVERSITY WEST LAFAYETTE, INDIANA 47'107

1. INTRODUCTION A. WHY STUDY SPEEDED PERFORMANCE'?

B ORGANIZATION OF THE ARTICLE II. RESEARCH ON DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE IN PROCESSING SPEED A EXPLANATIONS O F DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE B. STUDIES OF DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE IN PROCESSING SPEED C LIMITS O F THE RESEARCH 111

NATURE O F THE MECHANISMS (JNDERLYING DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE A PROCESSING RESOURCES

B CYCLETIME IV. IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE IN PROCESSING SPEED REFERENCES

I. Introduction I t is truc that all throughout life individuals arc constantly being called upon to act with the utmost celerity. (Philip, 1Y.34. p. 37Y).

Despite claims by Philip and other major figures (e.g., Galton, 1883; Spearman, 1927) for the importance of mental speed, the development of mental speed during childhood and adolescence has not been studied extensively. In two early studies (Philip, 1934; Goodenough, 1935), response times (RTs) were shown to change substantially between age 3 years and adulthood. However, in the ensuing 20 years, the topic was abandoned altogether. For example, Wickens' (1974) comprehensive review of age-related limits on processing speed included no devel-

AIIVANC'FS IN C1iII.D DEVFI.0PMENT AND BEHAVIOR. VO1. 23

152

Robert Kail

opmental studies published in the 1940s and 1950s. The dearth of studies reflects the fact that learning theory, which dominated the era, did not lead to critical predictions about the speed with which children perform cognitive tasks. Instead, critical predictions concerned qualitative rather than quantitative change (e.g., the transition from single-unit to mediated stimulus-response connections). The situation began to change in the 1960s and 1970s. reflecting the gradually increasing influence of the information-processing perspective on cognitive developmental psychology (Kail & Bisanz, 1982, in press). Studies of RT (response time), rate of processing, and the like became more frequent, though not in the mainstream of the field. Typical are results reported by Bisanz, Danner, and Resnick (1979), who used a name retrieval task in which subjects determined whether pairs of pictures were identical physically or in name. Subjects judged name similarity more slowly than physical similarity, and the difference was used to estimate the time needed to retrieve the name of the stimulus. Eight-year-olds retrieved the names of common objects in 282 msec; times for lo-, 12-, and 19-year-olds were 210, 142, and 115 msec, respectively. Thus, in this study, 19-year-olds retrieved names in less than half of the time needed by 8-year-olds.

A. WHY STUDY SPEEDED PERFORMANCE?

The renewed interest in processing speed can be traced, in part, to a central construct in the information-processing approach, limited processing resources, which is sometimes referred to as attentional resources, or mental effort (Kail & Bisanz, 1982). This construct refers to the fact that many cognitive activities require a person’s deliberate efforts and that people are limited in the amount of effort they can allocate. In the face of limited processing resources, the speed of processing is critical because it determines in part how rapidly limited resources can be reallocated to other cognitive activities. A developmental difference in processing speed would have widespread effects on children’s performance because younger children would not be able to reallocate resources as rapidly as older children and adults. Much of my own interest in age-related change in processing speed stems from the fact that I have been a proponent of the information-processing approach to cognitive development (Kail & Bisanz, 1982, in press) and, consequently, have attempted to understand mechanisms of change such as processing speed that are provided by this framework. Three other idiosyncratic reasons should be mentioned. First, processing speed changes throughout the life span. As shown in Fig. 1, speed increases throughout childhood and adolescence, reaches a peak in young adulthood, and declines slowly thereafter (Salthouse & Kail, 1983). This pattern of continuous change throughout the life span means that research on cognitive slowing can be used to generate hypotheses and provide paradigms concerning more rapid processing during childhood and adolescence.

Development of Processing Speed

153

E

F 2.0 c fn a 4-

fn

I2 .c

~

0

c 1.5 .-0

-

r

0

Q

2 a

1.0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Age (years) Fig. 1. RT across the life span, expressed as a proportion of the fastest time across all ages. From ‘‘Memory development throughout the life span: The role of processing rate” by T. A. Salthouse and R. Kail, 1983. In P. B. Baltes and 0. G. Brim (Eds.), Life-span development and behavior, Vol. 5, p. 90. New York: Academic Press. Copyright 0 1983 by Academic Press. Reprinted by permission.

A second reason for my interest in processing speed is that the age differences are substantial. These differences can be illustrated by expressing performance by children at age i in standard deviation units of young adults: z, =

(Xi - X,)/sd,

(1)

where ziis the standardized mean for children at age i, Xiis the mean for children at age i, X , is the mean for young adults (typically college students) and sd, is the standard deviation for young adults (Salthouse, 1985). Such standard scores are shown in the top panel of Fig. 2 for performance on a modified version of the coding task from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised. In this task, a code consists of five geometric figures, each with distinctive lines in the interior (e.g., single vertical line in a star). In the modified version, the response measure was the time to draw the correct lines on 45 geometric figures like these (Kail, 1 9 9 1 ~ )The . youngest children, who were 8- to 10-year-olds, performed 5-6

Robert Kail

154

6 -

0

5 w

'a,\

4 -

CL

0 0 u)

0 3 -

a.

0

1 -

0 -

= 0

t3

m

2n 4 t i

F &

10)

"

"

"

1

"

"

'

0.9

0.8

-

0.7

-

0.6

0.5-

/@\

0

0.4 0.3

0.1

il_

o.27 0.0

a-•

8

9 10 1 1 1 2 13 1 4 15 16

17 18 1 9 20 21

AGE (YR)

Fig. 2. Age differences in performance on a modijied version of the coding tusk of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised, expressed as z scores (top panel) and as the percentage of the adult distribution that is exceeded by the mean performance at each age (bottom panel). The data are from Kail (1991d).

standard deviation units above the young adult mean; in early adolescence (12-13 years), performance was still more than a full standard deviation above the young adult mean. The bottom panel of Fig. 2 shows the results expressed in terms of the proportion of the adult distribution that is exceeded by the younger subjects' mean level of performance. Children's performance was exceeded by the entire adult distribution until age 12. These illustrative data show that although the absolute times involved may be small-often fractions of a second-relative to the adult norm, substantial age-related change is involved.

A third reason for my interest in processing speed is a response to the current resurgence of contextual views within developmental psychology. Historically, Vygotsky (1934/1978) and Mead (1934) were among the theorists who argued that cognitive development can be understood only by carefully considering the particular culture in which development proceeds. More recently, Cole (198S), Wertsch (1984). Keating and MacLean (1987), and, especially, Rogoff (1990) have argued effectively for contextual perspectives on development. Rogoff (199O), for example, wrote: I view the individual child. sociiil partners. and the cultural milieu :IS insepar;ihlc contributors to the ongoing activities in which child development takes place. . , , Instead of working as separatc or interacting forces. individual efforts, social intcraction. and the cultural context are inherently bound togethcr in the overall developmeni of children into \killed participants in society. (pp. I t k I Y )

Contextual views like this one have forced developmental psychologists to move away from monolithic views of development and to recognize that thc exact course of development depends on contexts such as family, school, and culture. Although many important aspects of cognitive development are culture-bound, 1 am reluctant to accept the view that cultural context influences the development of all cognitive processes. I presume that some facets of cognition and its development are universal, reflecting the biological heritage shared by the human species. Just as the central processing unit of a microcomputer can run programs in different languages that accomplish an incredible variety of tasks, the fundamental processes of cognition are almost certainly the same for all humans, despite the fact that the organization of these fundamental processes to perform more complex acts is strongly culture-hound. A working assumption in my research is that the speed with which fundamental cognitive processes can be executed may well be one of those aspects of cognition that is universal rather than culture-bound. Of course, the speed at which people prefer to respond or habitually respond certainly varies across individuals and cultural contexts. In Western cultures generally, “smart” is often “fast” (Sternberg, 1985. chap. 1 1). Also, obviously, not all cultures subscribe to this view, and even within the United States, subcultures may differ in the views of time as a limiting factor in performance (e.g.. Heath, 1983). Such culture-bound beliefs about the virtues of performing rapidly o r carefully are conceptually distinct from the maximum speed with which people can execute fundamental cognitive processes.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARTICLE

In the rest of this article, I describe research that I have conducted on developmental change in processing speed. I begin, in Section 11, with two explanations for this developmental change and then describe research conducted to evaluate

156

Robert Kail

these explanations. Most of this work is consistent with the view that some global mechanism (i.e., one that is not specific to a particular task or domain) is responsible for these developmental changes. In Section 111, I examine possible candidates for this global mechanism. Finally, in Section IV, I consider the implications of this work for other aspects of cognitive development.

11. Research on Developmental Change in Processing Speed I begin this section by describing general views of the nature of developmental change in processing speed. A review of research designed to evaluate these views is presented in Section II,B. Limiting conditions of this research are described in Section II,C.

A. EXPLANATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE

Two general explanations of developmental change in processing speed have been proposed. One explanation emphasizes experiences that lead to change in speeds of processes in specific domains; the other explanation emphasizes more global changes-those that are not linked to specific domains-that are thought to be maturationally based. The first hypothesis is that age differences in processing speed reflect changes that are specific to particular processes, tasks, or domains. For example, age differences in processing speed may reflect acquisition with age of more efficient strategies for task solution (e.g.. Chi, 1977). Similarly, age differences in processing speed might reflect the fact that knowledge in specified domains becomes more elaborate (Roth, 1983), providing multiple paths by which the information can be accessed more rapidly (Anderson, 1983; Chi & Ceci, 1987). Logan (1988) was one theorist who emphasized the role of specific experiences in speeded performance. In his instance theory, increased speed of performance with practice is represented as a shift from performance based on algorithms, which is relatively slow, to performance based on rapid, direct retrieval of the appropriate task response. That is, individuals initially respond using an algorithm (e.g., in addition, a counting procedure). However, each time a task is performed, the stimulus and the subject’s response are stored in memory. Repeated task performance increases the number and strength of these representations, so that ultimately the presentation of a problem leads to automatic retrieval of the response. According to instance theories, change associated with repeated task performance should be negatively decelerated: Early phases of practice produce substantial change; later phases, relatively modest change. An alternative to theories in which specific experiences are emphasized is the view that age differences in processing speed result from more general develop-

Development of Processing Speed

157

mental change. The prototypic developmental theory of this sort would be Piaget’s, but this theory does not yield hypotheses concerning age-related change in performance on speeded tasks. However, in information-processing theories, performance on many cognitive tasks requires processing resources or attention (Shiffrin & Dumais, 1981). Increasing resources typically increases speed of processing, even when all other factors are held constant (Anderson, 1983).Hence, age-related increases in the amount of processing resources could produce agerelated increases in processing speed. Developmental change of this sort has been proposed by neo-Piagetian theorists. Pascual-Leone (1970), for example, proposed that “the size of central computing space M . . . increases in a lawful manner during development” (p. 304). Systemic change of this sort would lead to age-related change in performance on most speeded tasks.

B. STUDIES OF DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE IN PROCESSING SPEED

Three types of research are described in this section: studies of expertise, studies of the rate of change with age in speed of processing, and studies of the relation between adults’ RTs and those of children and adolescents.

1. Studies of Expertise According to the specific-skills view, older children, adolescents, and adults are more likely to have extensive task-relevant experience than younger children, and therefore they should have more task-appropriate strategies and more elaborate representations that could result in retrieval of task responses (Logan, 1988). Put another way, the age-speed correlation is spurious in this view, in that it reflects correlations (1) between age and task experience and (2) between task experience and speed. The specific-skills view leads to the prediction that age differences in processing speed would be eliminated if children and adults had the same task-relevant knowledge. That is, the age-speed correlation should be 0 if the age-experience correlation is also set to 0. This prediction has been tested only once, by Roth (1983). I discuss this experiment in some detail, to highlight some of the limitations of these results. The subjects in Roth’s study were 11-year-old and adult chess experts and chess novices. For each of three measures of chess knowledge, the child and adult experts did not differ significantly from one another and both groups had significantly higher scores than child and adult novices. Consequently, Roth assumed that child and adult experts had comparable chess knowledge. To assess speed of processing, subjects were tested on a visual search task that involved comparing pairs of chessboards that included either 10, 18, or 26 chess

Robert Kuil

158

pieces per board. On “same” pairs, all pieces on the two boards matched (i.e., matching pieces in the same location); on “different” pairs, one piece was placed in different locations on the two boards. Three types of search tasks were used: In one, chess pieces were placed in meaningful positions on the board (Lea,as they would appear in a game); in another, chess pieces were placed randomly on the board; in the third, each piece from a meaningful position was replaced by a digit. In all conditions, RTs increased linearly as a function of the number of pairs of pieces to be compared. Consequently, a reasonable assumption is that most subjects used a strategy of comparing boards square by square until either they found a mismatch or they had searched the entire board. The slope of the function relating RT to number of pairs was used to estimate the speed of search and comparison. On meaningful boards, this value did not differ for child and adult experts, a result that appears to be consistent with the prediction that age differences in processing speed should be eliminated when children and adults are matched for task-relevant knowledge. This conclusion is not warranted, for the results preclude any straightforward interpretation of the difference between child and adult experts’ search of meaningful boards. The mean slopes for the child and adult groups are shown in Table I. Experts’ knowledge of chess configurations applies only to organized boards; experts’ knowledge cannot be invoked on random boards and digits. This leads to the following predictions. With organized boards, an interaction of age and expertise is expected, reflecting the usual age differences for novices and the absence of age differences for experts. With random boards and digits, age differences are expected, without effects of expertise. In fact, the predicted pattern was found for digits, but not for random and organized boards. With these boards, there were significant main effects of age and expertise and no significant interactions.

TABLE I Mean Slopes (msecipiece)‘ Organized chess pieces

Group ~

~

~~~

Random chess pieces ~

Digits

~

Novices Children Adults Difference

574 366 208

734 452 282

679 369 310

Experts Children Adults Difference

449 326 123

515 383 132

49 1 368 123

“From Roth (1983).

Dtdopmenr of Proce.ssirig Speed

IS9

Another problem concerns comparisons across the three types of boards. Differences between child and adult experts should be negligible on organized boards but substantial on random boards and digits. However, the pattern of differences between child and adult experts was virtually identical across the three types of boards. Thus, Roth's results do not conform to the pattern expected in studies of expertise. As a consequence, the finding that child and adult experts search meaningful boards at the same rate cannot be interpreted as providing unequivocal support for the hypothesis that age differences can be attributed, at least in part, to age-related change in task-relevant knowledge. I have conducted research that, like Roth's study, was designed to examine the impact of task-relevant knowledge on processing speed. The domain of interestknowledge of bascball players-was chosen. first. because experimental tasks could be devised for which the critical aspect of performance was knowledge of the player's name and face, and, second, because, unlike the domain of chess, child experts wcre readily available. Two large preliminary studies were completed to evaluate the impact of knowledge o n performance within the adult population. Undergraduates were administered a questionnaire assessing their knowledge of baseball generally. In addition, to measure their knowledge of 1 0 specific players, cued recall questions were asked for each player. The recall cues were the name of ti team, a position, and an event associated uniquely with the pliiyer. After cued recall. subjects were shown photographs of the 10 players and asked to namc each one. Experts were defined as individuals with 7S% accuracy on general knowledge of baseball, 90% accuracy on cued recall, and 100% accuracy in naming faces. Novices were no more than 25% accurate on general baseball knowledge, 10% accurate on cued recall, and 0% o n naming faces. In one study, the task involved mental rotation of faces. The subjects were 21 experts and 21 novices; they judged whether pairs of photographs presented in different orientations depicted the same or different individuals. The photograph on the left, the standard, was always upright; the one on the right, the comparison face, was rotated 0-160" in 40" increments. Half of the trials depicted the 10 players from the questionnaire; half, unfamiliar persons from a yearbook. In addition, half of the trials at each orientation involved photographs of different people: half involved different photographs of the same person. Different photographs of the same person were used so that mismatches could not be detected from a local perceptual feature. That is, individuals presumably must encode a face more exhaustively if they have to judge whether it depicts the same person instead of merely deciding if it is identical to another photograph. Thus, this procedure should have enhanced the effect of knowledge of players' faces on response speed. The results are shown in Fig. 3. As is typical in studies of mental rotation, RT increased as a function of the orientation of the stiniulus. This pattern is usually

Robert Kuil PLAYERS’ FACES

-B 2

CONTROL FACES

2200 EXPERTS r-VNOVICES

3-A

2100

EXPERTS NOVlC ES

A-A

7-V

2000

v

E I-

1900

111

1800

2

1700

W

z

111

1600

/

A

1500 1400 0

40 80 120160 ORIENTATION

0

40 80 120160 ORIENTATION

Fig. 3. RT as a fiirictiorr of stirnirlirs oricwtutiori, separuteb for huseball exjieris arid basrbull novices. Depicied in the left punrl are RTs for pairs offaces of well-known busehull players; depicted in tlic riglit putwl ure RT,s for pairs of fuccs of unfumiliar pcvxms.

interpreted as reflecting the fact that individuals are mentally rotating the comparison face to the vertical, then comparing it to the standard. Compared to novices, experts’ rate of rotation should be faster for players but not for unfamiliar faces. In fact, experts and novices did not differ systematically in rates of rotation for unfamiliar faces (2.2 1 and 2.27 msec/degree, respectively). On players’ faces, rotation was faster for experts ( 1 2 9 ) than novices (1.82), but neither this difference nor interactions involving expertise were significant. In a second experiment, a visual search task was administered to 20 novices and 70 experts. Subjects were shown an array consisting of two columns of five faces. For half the arrays, each row consisted of two different photographs of the same face; for the other arrays, one of the rows consisted of photographs of different faces. Subjects determined whether the array included any rows of different faces. Half of the arrays depicted faces of the 10 players identified in the questionnaire; the remaining arrays consisted of yearbook photographs of individuals who were unknown to both experts and novices. As shown in Fig. 4, RT on arrays with mismatching faces increased as a function of the location of the row containing the mismatching faces, and arrays with no mismatching rows yielded the largest RT. These effects were more systematic for players’ faces than for control faces. However, experts’ and novices’ RTs did not differ significantly overall, and no significant interactions were obtained between expertise and type of face (i.e., photographs of players’ versus unfamiliar faces).

1h I PLAYERS' FACES

CONTROL FACES

6000 EXPERTS

4-A

,--. 0 W U)

5500

T

5000

u

w

r +

4500

w

cn Z

0

4000

n

I n W

w

3500 3000

A-A

EXPERTS

V-V

NOVICES

i

2500 1

2

3

4

5

s

MISMATCHING ROW

1

2

3

4

5

s

MISMATCHING ROW

In a final experiment on the role of expertise in speeded performance, a visual search task was used. but the domain was changed to aviation. Specifically, the task involved scanning pairs of aircraft instrument panels to find mismatching instruments. The intent wits that this experiment would be a prelude to a larger study of young and old pilots and nonpilots, to investigate the role of extensive task experience in cognitive slowing. A standard format is used in aircraft cockpits to display six basic flight instruments: The first row includes, from left to right. the airspeed indicator. attitude indicator. and altimeter; the second row, turn coordinator, heading indicator. and vertical speed indicator. On all trials, the instrumcnts depicted the aircraft in a realistic flight configuration (e.g.. straight and level. climbing right turn). However. o n Iialf of the trials. one of the instruments dcpicted different values on the two panels; on the other half, all readings matched. In addition, trials differed in the number of pairs of instruments presented: Either two, three, or all six pairs of instruments were presented. The logic behind this experiment was as follows. For pilots. each instrument provides a clue concerning the aircraft's configuration in flight and, consequently, it generates expectations that can speed inspection of subsequent instruments. Nonpilots. in contrast, have no basis for expecting readings on any particular instrument; thus, the prediction was that pilots would rcspond more rapidly than

162

Robert Kail

nonpilots, particularly when more pairs of instruments were presented (thus allowing full development of predictions about the aircraft's configuration and readings on subsequent instruments). The results, shown in Fig. 5 , indicated that RTs were quite orderly, reflecting systematic scanning of the instrument panels. However, exactly the same pattern was found for experts (pilots with over 1,000hours of flying time) and for novices (individuals who had never been inside an aircraft cockpit). Thus, in this study as in previous studies with baseball experts, effects associated with expertise failed to emerge within samples of adults. One conclusion is simply that the tasks were not sensitive to the effects of knowledge. I do not find this argument convincing given the large group differences in expertise, the orderly nature of the RT data, and the fact that the same result occurred in different domains of expertise and with both mental rotation and visual search tasks. I believe that a stronger conclusion is warranted: At least in these domains, greater knowledge does not consistently lead to faster processing. Of course, this conclusion is inconsistent with the claim that developmental change in processing speed results from adults' greater task-relevant experience. Put another way, the age-speed correlation on mental rotation and visual search tasks cannot be solely an artifact of age-experience and experience-speed correlations because in the present studies there was no evidence of sizable experiencespeed correlations.

4000

L--

' ' ' ' 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS Fig. 5. RT as a function of the number of pairs of instruments presented, separately for experts (pilots) and no1,ice.s (nonpilots).

1500

2.Studies of'Dcvelopmentul Firnctions In several studies, I have attempted to distinguish the specific-skills and global hypotheses by comparing developmental functions for different cognitive processes. The rationale behind these studies is that if performance on different speeded tasks is limited by a global mechanism, then the same pattern of growth in processing spced is expected across tasks. Specifically, if some global mechanism changes monotonically with age, and if the function that relates decreases in processing time to change in this global mechanism has the same form for two o r more processes, then the form of the developmental function should be the same for those processes (Kail, 1986). In contrast, if performance on different speeded tasks reflects the acquisition of distinct task-specific skills, developmental changes in the speeds 0 1 different processes would not necessarily be related. That is, on the assumption that the events that produce increased speed for two processes are independent, no specific prediction can be made concerning the shapes of their developmental functions. For example, in instance theory (Logan, 1988). an increase in processing speed with age would reflect the number of stimulusresponse associations, which increase with exposure to the task. However, unless cumulative frequency of exposure as a function of age is the same for two tasks, the functions relating processing speed to age should differ for the two tasks. Of course, task-relevant knowledge could develop at the same rate for some tasks. resulting in identical patterns of developmental change, but this pattern is not an a priori prediction of the specific-skills hypothesis. In fact. consistent with the view that some global mechanism is responsible for age differences in spced of processing, performance on many speeded tasks yields the same pattern of development: Processing time decreases steadily in middle childhood and continues to do so in late childhood and early adolescence, but much more slowly. For example, as noted in Section I, Bisanz et al. found that time to retrieve names of common objects decreased 140 msec between 8 and 12 years of age, but only 27 additional msec between 12 and 19 years of age. (The data were cross-sectional i n this study, and all the other studies reviewed in this paper: but for convcniencc and clarity of presentation, the age group differenccs are described as age changes.) Although many other investigators have reported similar findings (e.g., Kail, Pellegrino, & Carter. 1980: Keating Sr Bobbitt, 1078; Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979), these findings are only suggestive because the paitern of developmental change must he compared across studies and because no studies include enough different age groups to determine developmental functions precisely. To remedy these problenis and thereby provide a stronger test of the proposed common limiting mechanism, I have conducted a series of experiments in which several age groups wcrc tested on a number of different tasks. I n the first experi-

I64

Robert Kuil

ment (Kail, 1986, experiment I), subjects were tested on the name retrieval task used by Bisanz et al. (1979) and the mental rotation task from Kail et al. (1980). In the mental rotation task, subjects judge whether stimuli presented in different orientations are identical or mirror images. The subjects were from 12 different age groups (8-21 years), thereby providing ample data to determine the shape of growth functions. Name retrieval was estimated from the difference in the times to judge physical and name similarity; rate of mental rotation was estimated from the slope of the function relating RT to stimulus orientation. Developmental change in both parameters was well described by a decreasing exponential function of the form:

where Y is processing time (i.e., name retrieval time or rate of mental rotation), a represents asymptotic processing time, e is the base of natural logarithms, a + h is the intercept (for i = 0, e? = l), c is a “decay” parameter that indicates how rapidly the function approaches a, and i is age. Importantly, the decay parameter (i.e., c) did not differ for the two processes, indicating comparable rates of development for mental rotation and for name retrieval. These results were consistent with the view that a general mechanism is involved in developmental change in processing speed. The purpose of a second set of studies (Kail, 1988) was to determine whether the findings are specific to mental rotation and name retrieval or hold more generally. In one study (Kail, 1988, experiment l), the focus was on times for visual and memory search. On the visual search task, subjects studied a single digit and then were shown a set of one to five digits. The subject’s task was to determine whether the set of digits included the study digit. On the memory search task, subjects first studied one to five digits and then were shown a single digit and asked to judge whether that digit was a member of the set studied. The subjects were from 14 different age groups (8-21 years). At all ages, RT increased linearly as a function of set size in both visual and memory search tasks. The slopes of these functions, which provide estiniatcs of visual and memory search times, respectively, decreased rapidly during childhood and more slowly thereafter. These developmental changes were well described by the exponential function in Eq. (2), with a common decay parameter. Specifically, in a six-parameter model a , 6, and c were free to vary for memory and visual search slopes. In a five-parameter model, a and h were free to vary but c was constrained to be the same for memory and visual search. In fact, the fit of the two models was virtually identical, with R2 = .916 for the six-parameter model and .914 for the five-parameter model. That is, constraining c to a common value for memory and visual search provided a fully adequate account of developmental change in these two domains, consistent with the hypothesis that a global mechanism limits performance on speeded tasks.

The second study (Kail, 1988, experiment 2 ) was designed to expand the range of tasks further. A mental addition task, in which subjects determined the accuracy of simple sums, was chosen to extend the work to a domain in which performance depended on the acquisition of well-defined declarative knowled!:c (i.e., addition facts). Furthermore, to extend the work to processing times on complex reasoning tasks, the subjects were tested on figural matrices like those in Raven's Progressive Matrices (from Stone & Day, 1981) in which subjects determine whether a pattern in one element of a matrix is consistent with the rest of the matrix. Two tasks used previously-mental rotation and memory search-were also included as a link to the earlier work. The four tasks were administered to 8- to 22-y ear-olds. The data from the figural matrices task revealed no systematic age differences in the processing parameter of interest. This result is inconsistent with the proposed global mechanism and, consequently, thesc data were not fitted t o developmental functions. This outcome does, however, suggest some limiting conditions on this mechanism, which I discuss in Section II,C. For the other tasks, the first step involved estimating the processing parameter of interest. For the memory search task, the slope of the RT function provides an estimate of the speed with which subjects scan each digit in memory. For the mental rotation task, the slope of the RT function provides an estimate of the specd with which subjects mentally rotate letters to the vertical (Cooper & Shepard. 1973). For the mental addition task, the slope o f the function relating RT to increases in the squared sum provides an index of the specd with which subjects search the network of addition facts. Squared sum was the independent variable because RT does not increase linearly as a function of sum but instead increases more rapidly for larger sunis (Ashcraft, 1982). Developmental change in times for memory search, mental rotation, and mental addition were well described by the exponential function in Eq. (2). Of particular importance is a comparison between a model in which the c parameter was free to vary across the three tasks and a model in which c' was constant across thesc tasks. The former, nine-parameter model accounted for c)S%, of the variance in the data of the three processes: a seven-parameter model in which c was constrained to be the same for all three processes yielded virtually the same fit, with the exponential function accounting for 94%)of the variance. To provide a further test of this hypothesis, these analyses were repcated including all of the data from this series of experiments, that is, the two experiments in the earlier work (Kail, 1986) and the two more recent experiments. This work yields cight separate sets of data for five different processes: mental rotation (three distinct data sets). memory search (two data sets), name retrieval. visual search, and mental addition (one data set each). The contrast in this analysis Lvas between a 15-parameter model, in which a, h, and c varied freely across the five processes, and an I I -parameter model in which u and b varied but c was constant. As in the previous analyses. the two models lit the data comparably, accounting

166

Robert Kail

for 94% of the variance in each case. The values derived from the 11-parameter model are shown in Fig. 6. Thus, the times needed to execute mental rotation, memory search, name retrieval, visual search, and mental addition seem to decline with age at the same rate. This, of course, is the pattern of results expected from the assumption that some mechanism common to all of these processes limits the speed with which they can be executed. The most recent experiment in this series (Kail, 1991d) included perceptual motor tasks as well as some of the cognitive tasks used previously. Here, too, the results provided further evidence that a global mechanism is responsible for developmental change in speed of processing. The sample included subjects at each of 16 different ages (7.5-21 years) as well as college students in an adult comparison group. They were tested on six tasks: simple RT, tapping; a pegboard task in which pegs were moved from one side of a board to the other; the modified coding task from the Weschsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (described in Section I); and the name retrieval and mental addition tasks used before. To assess the fit of these data to Eq. (2), asymptotic performance a was set to the mean performance of the adult comparison group, thereby reducing the number of free parameters by one. Two versions of Eq. (2) were used. In both, the “starting value” b was free to vary. However, in one version, c was also frce to vary; and in the other, c was fixed at 0.334, the value obtained previously. For five of the six tasks, the one-parameter exponential function (with c = 0.334) accounted for essentially the same amount of variance as the two-parameter exponential function (i.e., typically a difference in R? of 1% or less). Only for the simple-RT task did the two-parameter exponential function account for a marginally significant greater amount of variance (94.62% vs. 92.8%; p c .lo). Thus, as shown in Fig. 7, developmental change in five of the six measures was well described by an exponential function with a common rate parameter. These results, like those of the previous studies in this series, can easily be explained by postulating that an exponentially changing global mechanism limits speeded performance. However, another suggestion is that common patterns of development for different tasks could be the result of substantial positive transfer between tasks (e.g., Stigler, Nusbaum, & Chalip, 1988). In this view, skills that are acquired for specific speeded tasks are said to generalize to other domains. For example, acquisition of mental rotation skill might transfer to memory search and visual search. Extensive positive transfer between numerous cognitive processes could result in a common growth function for those processes. A problem for this explanation is that transfer between speeded tasks is typically specific rather than general, varying as a function of the number of shared processes (e.g., Anderson, 1987). Considerable transfer from, for example, mental rotation to memory search is unlikely based on existing evidence (Kail & Park, 1990). Given this relatively limited range of positive transfer between processes,

Development of Processing Speed

i

1

MENTAL ROTATION

.I:.

167 MEMORY SEARCH

(b)

150

1

\.

I

100 w

r + W z cn

7

cn

W

8a 75

25

VISUAL SEARCH

1-

I;‘\.-.

..

c

1

8

1

1

1

NAME RETRIEVAL

I 1

1

1

1

1

I2

16 AGE (YR)

,

715

1

1

1

1

1

8

20

1,.’ 8

12

MENTAL ADDITION

I2

16

16 AGE (YR,

20

1

20

AGE (YR)

Fig. 6. Developmental functions for rates of mental rotation (data from Kaic 1988, experiment 2 and Kail, 1986b),memory search (fromKail, 1988), visual search (fromKail, 1988, experiment I), name retrieval (from Kail, 1986b), and mental addition from Kail, 1988, experiment 2). Rate of mental rotation (a) is estimated by the slope of the function relating RT to the orientation of the stimulus. Rate of memory search (b) is estimated by the slope of the function relating RT to the size of the study set. Rate of visual search (c) i s estimated by the slope of the function relating RT to the sire of the search set. Time for name retrieval (d) is estimated by the difference to judge name and physical similarity. Retrieval of sums on the mental addition task (e) is estimated by the slope of the function relating RT to the sum squared. In each panel, the solid line depicts values derived from the best-fitting 11-parameter exponential function, in which the decay parameter of Eq. (2), c, was 0.334 for all five processes. From “Developmentalfunctions for speeds of cognitive processes” by R. Kail, 1988, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 45, p. 361. Copyright 0 1988 by Academic Press. Reprinted by permission.

Robert Kail

168

.

400

NAME RETRIEVAL

MENTAL ADDITION

. .-I

100.

7

9

11

13

15

_

17

19

21

7

9

AGE (YEARS)

Fig. 7. Mean processing times as a function of chronological age for SLX operutiorrs. The units are seconds for coding and pegboard but millisccorids for all others. The squares depict the data for the 16 age groups. Also shown arc the best-jittirtg e.~j~i?rientialfunctions in which c = 0.334, a was set to the vulue ohrained fi)r the adult comparison groups, and h was free to vary. From "Processing rime dcclines exponentially during childhood and adolescence by R. Kail, 1991, Develoi~mcxtalPsychology, 27, p. 265. Copyrighr 0 1991 by the American Psychological Associalion. Hepriritcd by permission. "

improved skill on the perceptual-motor tasks that were used here (e.g., tapping) would seem unlikely to improvc speed on the cognitive tasks (e.g., mental addition), and thereby to produce a common rate of change with age. Instead, a global limiting mechanism is a more plausible explanation.

3. Studies of Correlations across Conditions In aggregate, studies of developmental functions provide evidence consistent with a global mechanism that limits processing speed. A weakness in this research

Development of Processing Speed

169

is that the principal conclusion is based on accepting the null hypothesis. The aim of another line of research has been to provide additional, converging evidence concerning the nature of the mechanism underlying age differences in processing speed. This resenicli was based on a rationale and paradigm devised to study cognitive agin!: (Birren, 1965; Cerella, 198.5; Salthouse & Somberg, 1982). Specifically, if young adults’ response on a particular task consists of several processes, then RT :.in be defined as

where a is the time to execute process A, h is the time for process B, etc. If older adults execute each process more slowly, by a constant multiple, then the corresponding equation for older adults would be

RT = ma

+ mb + mc ..* = m(a t h + c)

(4)

where m is simply the slowing coefficient, the factor by which older adults are slower than young adults. Simplifying: RT,, = mRT,

(51

where RT, and RT,! denote RTs for older and younger adults, respectively. Equation ( 5 ) leads to predictions for studies with experimental conditions that affect the number of processes included in RT or that affect the duration of those processes. The result is a range of RT values, for both young and older adults. According to the hypothesis that a global mechanism is responsible for age-related slowing, the correlation across these conditions between younger and older adults’ RT values should be 1 because this is simply a correlation between a variable and that same variable multiplied by the constant m. Furthermore, the slope of the function relating older adults’ RTs to younger adults’ RTs from the corresponding experimental conditions provides an estimate of m. This logic can be applied directly to the study of age-related change in processing speed during childhood and adolescence. In Eq. (3, RT,, is simply replaced by RTs from children and adolescents (hereafter referred to collectively as “youth”). Of course, the extent of slowing may depend on the age of the youth; therefore, the symbols RT, and m, will be used to denote RTs and slowing coefficients at a particular age i. Kail (1986b, experiment 3) used data from a mental rotation task to assess the fit of Eq. (5). Specifically, RT values were obtained in 24 conditions that represented orthogonal combination of six orientations, two responses, and two degrees of stimulus degradation. The correlation, across the 24 conditions, between 8-year-olds’ and adults’ RTs was .93, with a slope (i.e., m,) of 1.66.

170

Robert Kuil

The first study in which Eq. (5) was evaluated across a range of tasks was reported by Hale (1990). She tested lo-, 12-, and 15-year-olds and adults on four speeded tasks: choice RT, letter matching, mental rotation, and matching abstract patterns. At each age, eight mean RTs were derived and correlated with adults’ RTs for those conditions. The correlations between youth and adult RTs were greater than .99 at all ages. Values of m, were 1.82, 1.56, and 1.00 for lo-, 12-, and 15-year-olds, indicating a gradual approximation to adults’ processing time. Hale’s results (1990) are consistent with the claim that some global factor is responsible for age differences in processing time. Additional evidence for this claim is based on a meta-analysis of studies of speeded performance published in three primary empirical journals of child developmental psychology: Child Development, Developmental Psychology, and Journal of Experimental Child Psychology (Kail, 1991b). The data base included 72 studies, each with RT values for a sample of youth and a sample of young adults. Studies were included without regard to the specific cognitive task that was used; however, studies were included only if RT values were collected under speeded conditions. The studies included 1,826 pairs of youth-adult mean RTs. That is, each of 1,826 data points consisted of a mean RT for youth and a mean RT for yaung adults for the same experimental condition. Data were divided into 11 sets based on the age of the youth: 3-4, 5 , 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 years. Each of the 11 data sets was fitted to Eq. (5). The fits were uniformly excellent, with values of R2 2.90. As reported by Hale (1990), values for m, became smaller with age, but nonlinearly: m,changed substantially in early and middle childhood, and more slowly thereafter. This pattern of change in m,resembles the change seen in studies of developmental functions, which raises the question of the relation between the two findings. Equation ( 5 ) actually represents a broader version of the hypothesis that processing speed reflects a global limiting mechanism. Specifically, in studies of developmental functions, one component of RT was always isolated and was typically estimated from the slope relating RT to some independent variable. The intercept of this function was ignored because it represented a confounded estimate of several processes that usually included sensory and perceptual processes as well as the time to respond. In contrast, the method of correlations across conditions includes all of the individual processes that compose RT. Consequently, this method assesses a more general version of the hypothesis in which an explicit assumption is that children execute all processes more slowly than adults by the same constant multiplier. Studies involving correlations across conditions lead to no specific predictions concerning age-related change in m,.However, studies of developmental functions suggest that m, might change exponentially. Furthermore, the predicted value of m, at maturity is 1, so Eq. (2) simplifies to

IN, =

1 t he-“

(6)

where h, c, c, and i are defined as in Eq. (2). In fact, as shown in the left panel of the first row of Fig. 8, Eq. (6) provides a reasonable description of age-related change in m,.accounting for 76.92% of the variance with h = 5.16 and c = 0.2 1. Thus, the meta-analysis presented by Kail (199 I b) provides evidence that (1) across a wide range of conditions, youths’ RTs can be expressed as a multiple of adults’ RTs; and ( 2 ) the factor by which youth are slower than adults mi declines exponentially. In the rest of Section II,B,3, additional evidence is presented that is consistent with these findings.

a. Reanalysis of Studies of Developmerital Furzctions. To evaluate predictions derived from Eqs. ( 5 ) and (6), a sample of adults is required, along with multiple younger age groups. In addition, a study must include a large number of experimental conditions (either multiple cognitive tasks with a few within task conditions or a single task with many conditions). The studies of developmental functions described in Section II,B,l are among the few that meet these requirements. To illustrate, in Experiment 1 of the Kail(1986h) study, 8- to 21-year-olds were tested on mental rotation and name retrieval tasks. At each age, 12 mean RTs (6 per task) were fitted to Eq. (5). (For these analyses, the data from 18- to 21-yearolds were pooled to form an adult group.) Equation (5) accounted for no less than 99.6S% of the variance in youths’ RTs at any age. As shown in the middle panel in the first row of Fig. 8, values of rn, declined nonlinearly in the predicted manner: Eq. (6). with b = S.16 and c = 0.21, accounted for 98% of the variance in the observed values of tn,. No free parameters were involved in this prediction. Predicted values of m,were determined from Eq. (6), which was derived independently using data from the original meta-analysis (Kail, 199 1b). This analysis was also performed on the data from two experiments reported in Kail (1988). In Experiment I , 8- to 21-year-olds were tested on visual search and memory search tasks that yielded 12 mean RTs at each age. Equation ( 5 )accounted for at least 99.5% of the variance in youths’ RTs. Here, too, change in m, with age was nonlinear. Equation (6) with b = 5.16 and c = 0.21 accounted for 94% of the variance in observed values of m, (shown in the right panel of the first row of Fig. 8). Experiment 2 by Kail(1988) included four tasks. The analogical reasoning task was deleted for reasons described in Section II,B,2. Each of the remaining three tasks-mental rotation, memory search, and mental addition-provided six mean RT values. The 18 mean RTs at each age were fitted to Eq. ( S ) , with the mean RTs for 18- to 21-year-olds composing the adult group. Equation (5) accounted for at least 97.68% of the variance in youths’ RTs. Furthermore, Eq. (6) accounted for 97.32% of the variance in age-related change in observed m, values (see the left panel in the second row of Fig. 8). In Kail (1991d), each of 16 age groups (7.5-21 years) and a separate adult

172

Robert Kail

3

I 1\

7

Kail

(1991b)

,.

Kail (1986)

0

3

\

Karl ( 199 1 d)

Kail (1988. Exp 2)

\P

G 2

i w n

U w

s’ ” 1 0 3 Kall ( 1 9 9 1 ~ )

Kail (1988, Exp 1)

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

AGE (YR)

Fig. 8. Depicted in each panel is change with age in the slope ofthe function ihat relates increu.ses in youths’ mean RTs to increases in adults’ mean RT.r fiom corresponding conditions, m,. The values in the left panel of the first row are based on urchival data reported in Kail(l991b). The curve correspond.p to the best-fitting exponentialfitnctinn [Eq. (h)] with b = 5.16 and c = 0.21. Each of the other five panels depicts this same exponential function, dong with independent estimates of m,. The source of these fire other data sets is described in the te.xt. Adapted from “Developmental change in speed of processing during childhood and adolescence” by R. Kail, 1991, Psychological Bulletin, 109, pp. 497498. Copyright 0 1991 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted by permission.

comparison group (ranging in age from 17 to 43 years) had 25 mean RT values, derived from performance on six tasks (the number of means per task is indicated in parentheses): simple RT (I), tapping (2), pegboard (3), coding (l), picture matching (6), mental addition (1 2). The mean RTs for the adult comparison group were used to estimate RT,in Eq. (5); means for the age groups were used to estimate RT,. (Because of the separate adult comparison group, data for 18- to

22

Development of Proce.$sitig Spcwl

173

21-year-olds did not need to be pooled to provide a stable estimate of “mature” RTs). The fit to Eq. (S), shown in the middle panel of the second row of Fig. 8, was excellent, R‘ 2 95.0. Equation (6), with 6 = 5.16 and c‘ = 0.21, accounted for 94.1% of the variance in m,(Kail, in press-b). Finally, in Kail (1991c), subjects at 14 ages (8-20 years) and a separate adult comparison group were tested on four tasks: mental rotation, mental addition, figural matrices, and geometric analogies. The tasks yielded 47 mean RT values for each group. These mean RTs were fitted to Eq. (S), which accounted for no less than 94.8% of the variance in age group RTs. As before, change in m, with age was nonlinear: Equation ( 6 )with b = 5.16 and c = 0.21 accounted for 92.71% of the variance in observed m,s (see the right panel of the second row of Fig. 8). Thus, analyses of these data, like the initial rneta-analysis (Kail, 1991b), yielded two key results: (1) At each age, youth-adult RTs are highly related, and ( 2 ) the slope of the function that relates increases in youth RTs to increases in adult RTs, m,,declines exponentially with age.

b. Anulysis of Training Data. Studies of practice represent another means by which to assess the predictions of Eqs. (5) and (6). Improvements associated with practice are often attributed to more efficient processing, where efficiency means that fewer steps are required for task performance (e.g., Anderson, 1983). For example, if performancc prior to practice involved the component times a, b, and c of Eq. (3), performance after practice might be represented by d, the time to execute process D, the single process that is now responsible for task performance. The implications of this analysis for Eqs. ( 5 ) and (6) are straightforward. On the assumption that the impact of practice is qualitatively the same for youths and adults, i.e.. Eqs. (3) and (4) apply before and after practice, then youths’ RTs should be given by m,d. Thus, a single function should relate youths’ and adults’ RTs prior to and after practice. This prediction was evaluated in two studies of the impact of practice on mental rotation. In Kail (1986a), 9-year-olds. 13-year-olds, and adults were tested on a mental rotation task on 16 days, receiving 240 trials daily. The RT values from the first and last days were fitted to Eq. ( 5 ) , using 24 mean RTs for each group (6 orientations x 2 responses x 2 days). The left and center panels of Fig. 9 show mean RTs for 9-and 13-year-olds as a function of adults’ RTs in the same conditions. Also shown is the function with intercept = 0 and slope equal to nz,, which was derived from Eq. (6) with h = 5.16 and c = 0.21. The predicted RTs accounted for 92.66 and 94.54% of the variance in actual RTs, for 9- and 13year-olds, respectively. In a second study on the impact of practice (Kail & Park, 1990), 11-year-olds and adults were first tested on mental rotation and memory search tasks. In 1 1 subsequent sessions, the subjects received a total of 3.168 mental rotation trials. In the final session, the mental rotation and memory search tasks were repeated. For the present analyses, 30 means were calculated for each age group. These

Robert Kail

174

13-YEAR-OLDS

9-Y EAR-OLDS

n 0

1

2

3 0

1

2

30

1

2

ADULTS’ TIME (SEC)

Fig. 9. Depicted in each panel is change with age in youths’ mean RTs as a function of adults’ mean RTs Prom the same conditions. Also shown in the linearfunction with intercept = 0 and with mi determined from Eq. (6) with b = 5.16 and c = 0.21 (mu,s = 1.72, m,.j,.3.j= 1.33, m,,,ox = 1.51). RTs prior to training are denoted by triangles; RTs after training, by squares. The data in the left andcenter panels are from Kail ( I 986a); those in the rightpanel, from Kail and Park ( 1990). Adapted from “Developmental change in speed of processing during childhood and adolescence” by R. Kail, 1991, Psychological Bulletin, 109, p. 499. Copyright 0 1991 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted by permission.

values represented pre- and postpractice means for each of 15 variables. For memory search, a mean RT was calculated at each of three search-set sizes. For mental rotation, a mean RT was calculated at each of six orientations, separately for letters and letter-like characters. The right panel of Fig. 9 shows mean RTs for the 11-year-olds as a function of the adults’ RTs in the same conditions. Also shown is the function with intercept = 0 and slope equal to m,,,,,8,which was derived from Eq. ( 6 ) with b = 5.16 and c = 0.21. The predicted RT values accounted for 98.83% of the variance in the 11-year-olds’ RTs.

c. Meta-analysis of RTs from Retarded Persons. Further evidence for a global factor comes from the application of Eq. (5) to the study of processing speed in mentally retarded persons. The American Journal of Mental Deficiency was searched for studies in which processing speed was assessed in mentally retarded individuals and nonretarded individuals matched on chronological age (CA) (Kail, in press-a). This search yielded 5 18 pairs of RTs from 45 separate studies. These data were divided into five sets based on the age and IQ of the retarded individuals. Each data set was well described by Eq. (5) (R22 .90). C. LIMITS OF THE RESEARCH

The research described in Section II,B is subject to important limiting conditions, which are discussed in the present section.

3

1. Use of Strategies Often, age differences in speeded performance reflect the fact that adolescents and adults use more efficient strategies than do children. Naus and Ornstein (1977), for example, found that 6th graders were more likely than 3rd graders to use an efficient self-terminating search in a memory search task, and 3rd graders typically used an exhaustive search of memory. Similarly. Siegler (1987) found that in solving arithmetic problems, older children are more likely to use a rapid solution strategy such as retrieval and younger children are more likely to use less efficient, slower strategies like counting aloud. This age-related progression toward more efficient strategies clearly shows that the global mechanism implicated by the present results cannot be the sole explanation of age differences in processing speed. A complete account of age differences in processing speed will surely include both global and domainspecific components.

2. Trade-ofi between Speed arid Accuracy Research in which RT is a dependent variable is complicated by a trade-off between the speed and accuracy of responding. Encouraged to respond faster, individuals will usually err more often; askcd to respond more slowly, they err less frequently. This trade-off can increase the difficulty of interpreting RTs and the parameters derived from them, particularly in developmental research. For example, in the Bisanz et al. (1979) study described in Section I, the time to retrieve the names of pictures from semantic memory did not differ significantly for 12- and 19year-olds (97 and 80 msec, respectively); but the 12-year-olds erred more than twice as often (5.1%) as the 19-year-olds (2.15%). To achieve 19-year-olds' accuracy, 12-year-olds might need to respond much more slowly than they did. To determine how speed and accuracy trade off in a mental rotation task, I manipulated speed and accuracy of responses cxperimentally (Kail, 1985). Children ( I l-year-olds), adolescents (lbyear-olds), and adults ( 1 9-year-olds) were tested on a variant of the mental rotation task. Some individuals were told to respond rapidly and accurately; others were told to emphasize accuracy, and others, to emphasize speed. At all ages, the manipulations had the intended effects. Mental rotation was fastest when speed was emphasized and slowest when accuracy was emphasized; just the opposite pattern was found for accuracy. Change in mean RT as a function of mean accuracy was analyzed at each orientation, separately for the three age groups. The slope of this function provides an estimate of the rate with which subjects traded off speed for accuracy. At 60", adults were marginally more willing than adolescents to trade off accuracy for speed. In all other cases, speed-accuracy trade-offs were comparable for the three

176

Robert Kail

age groups. However, the intercept of this function sometimes differed for children, adolescents, and adults, which means that the only way to avoid the speedaccuracy tradeoff is to use the trade-off functions to estimate RT statistically, for a specific level of accuracy. For example, at 120°, the function relating RT to percentage correct was 36X - 1,367 for children and 39X - 2,492 for adults. That is, for both age groups, each percentage increment in accuracy came at the cost of about 35-40 additional msec. Given these functions, RTs can be predicted at a specified accuracy criterion. For example, at 92% correct, adults’ predicted RTs are 1,096 msec compared to 1,945 msec for children, an age difference in RT that is untainted by the speed-accuracy trade-off. The need to consider speed-accuracy trade-offs in developmental data is also illustrated in results by Brewer and Smith (1989), who examined age-related change in trial-by-trial monitoring of speed and accuracy. The prototypic adult pattern is for responses to become progressive faster over trials until an error occurs. On the trial following the error, responses are substantially slower. However, on subsequent trials they again become faster until reaching the maximum speed that will allow errorless performance. This pattern was found for older children and adolescents but not younger children (5- and 7-year-olds). One reason why younger children were less likely to use the adult strategy is that, in the absence of feedback, they were less likely to realize that they had erred. Results such as these make it clear that trade-offs between speed and accuracy can be particularly vexing for developmental researchers who use RT as a dependent variable. Because the research described in Section I1 is based on numerous comparisons across tasks, complications resulting from speed-accuracy trade-offs must always be considered until data are available in which RTs have been adjusted for differing rates of accuracy.

3. Patterns for Groups versus Individuals Throughout this paper, analyses have been based on group means, not RTs for individuals. This approach is potentially problematic because patterns for individuals need not reflect patterns for group means (e.g., Siegler, 1987). This problem is most likely to arise in the developmental functions shown in Figs. 6 and 7: These developmental functions are almost certainly composites that may not reflect patterns of individual growth. For example, the exponential functions may actually be composites of step functions: Individuals rotate stimuli mentally at one of two rates-“childlike” or “adultlike”-and the transition from one rate to the other occurs near the onset of puberty. The exponential function that emerges when individual functions are averaged would be an artifact of the number of individuals at a particular age who have made the transition from childlike to adultlike rates of mental rotation. Hypotheses about distortions introduced by averaging across individuals lead to testable predictions concerning cross-sectional data. For example, the hypothesis

Drvelopmenr of Processing Speed

177

that the exponential group function is a byproduct of individual step functions leads to the predictions that ( 1 ) the distribution of individuals’ rates of mental rotation should be bimodal, reflecting individuals who rotate at the childlike and adultlike rates, and (2) variability of rotation rates should be least for the youngest children and the adults because these groups should consist almost exclusively of individuals with childlike and adultlike rates of mental rotation, respectively. In fact, these predictions are not supported; the distributions are approximately normal and variability tends to decrease with age. Of course, other combinations of individual functions could produce an exponential function, However, the fact that a group curve may not reflect individual curves does not mean that it does not reflect them. In the absence of a plausible psychological rationale for expecting nonexponential individual functions, a more plausible assumption is that functions for individuals are approximately exponential.

111. Nature of the Mechanisms Underlying

Developmental Change A . PROCESSING RESOURCES

As noted in Section I, the quantity of processing resources available to execute speeded processes represents a plausible global mechanism in that performance on any speeded task that requires resources would be similarly age-sensitive. This explanation has the advantage that it can account for exceptions to common rates of developmental change in a principled manner. That is, with massive amounts of practice, children often achieve adultlike rates of mental rotation (Kail, 1986a; Kail & Park, 1990). This variability can be explained using the distinction between controlled and automatic processes. The former are slow and require resources; the latter are faster and do not require resources. (See Sh n & Dumas, 1981, for an extensive discussion of the criteria that can be used to distinguish automatic and controlled processes.) Hence, whenever performance is based on execution of controlled processes. a common rate of developmental change is expected, reflecting reliance on age-limited processing resources. Repeated practice o n a task means that performance is more likely to be automatic, and no longer restricted by age limitations in processing resources (Logan, 1985). The drawback to the process resources explanation is that a growing body of research casts doubt on the idea of a single, generic pool of resources. Some of the most damaging evidence comes from studies of dual-task performance, in which subjects perform a task alone as well as concurrently with another task. If both tasks require limited processing resources, then concurrent performance of the task should be inferior to performance without the concurrent task. In fact, however, many studies of this sort do not reveal the predicted pattern of interference.

178

Robert Kail

Studies of mental rotation are illustrative. For adults, the slope of the mental rotation function is the same when the task is performed alone and when it is performed concurrently with memory tasks (Corballis, 1986). Apparently, mental rotation of letters is automatic for adults; it does not draw on processing resources. Because adults’ rate of mental rotation apparently does not depend on processing resources, age differences in rate of mental rotation cannot result solely from developmental change in processing resources. However, mental rotation might be automatic for adults but controlled for children. In dual-task experiments, the prediction would be an interaction between age, load, and orientation: Children’s but not adults’ rate of mental rotation should be slower when the mental rotation task is performed concurrently than when it is performed alone. This prediction was assessed in two experiments (Kail, 1991a). In each experiment, 9- and 10-year-olds and adults performed a mental rotation task twice: once alone and once in conjunction with a memory task. The memory tasks were digit span and recall of positions within matrices. The mean RTs were larger when the mental rotation task was performed concurrently with the memory tasks than when it was performed alone. However, as shown in Fig. 10, for both children and adults, the slope of the mental rotation function was the same when the task was performed alone and when it was performed concurrently with the memory task. Apparently, neither children nor adults require processing resources to execute the

DIGIT SF’AN

POSITION K f C A L L

3200

-

0

2800

W (/1 -2

y-+ W

2400

2000

U!

L.

2

1600

Ul

LLJ LL

1200 800

-

0 30 60 90 120150 ORICNTAl ION

-

#

I

I

0 30 60 9 0 1 2 0 1 5 0 0R I E NTATlO N

Fig. 10. RT on a mental rotation task as a function of the orientation of the stimulus, separated for children and adults in the alone (filled squares) and concurrent (open squares) conditions. For the results in the lefi panel, the concurrent task was digit span; for the results in the right panel, recalling positions in a matrix. From “Controlled and automatic processing during mental rotation” by R. Kail, 1991, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 51, p . 342. Copyright 0 1991 by Academic Press.

mental rotation component of performance. By this interpretation, age differences in rate of mental rotation cannot reflect a developmental transition from controlled to automatic processing because mental rotation is automatic for children as well as adults. This result is not readily reconciled with the view that increased processing speed reflects increased processing resources. The processing resource explanation could be modified by assuming multiple pools of resources (e.g., verbal and spatial, as suggested by Wickens & Benel, 1982) and further assuming that the memory tasks did not tap the same pool of resources needed to execute the mental rotation task. Under these assumptions, rate of rotation would be unaffected by the presence of the concurrent task. However, with this account, earlier findings of a common rate of developmental change across tasks can be explained only by assuming ( 1 ) that all the processes known to conform to a common developmental function tap the same pool of resources or (2) that the tasks tap distinct pools that develop at the same rate. Alternative 1 is unlikely in light of the range of tasks investigated as well as some of the specific combinations of tasks that fail to produce interference (e.g., mental rotation speed is unaffected by both verbal and spatial memory tasks). Alternative 2 cannot, in my opinion, be dismissed on the basis of any extant findings. However, it seems far-fetched because it requires strong dependencies i n the rate of development of resources that are otherwise thought to be independent.

B. CYCLETIME

The shortcomings associated with the processing resources explanation suggest the need to examine other potential global mechanisms. One candidate is derived from an analogy to computer hardware (Salthouse & Kail, 1983). If two computers have identical software, but one machine has a slower cycle time (i,e., the time for the central processor to execute a single instruction). that machine will execute all processes more slowly, by an amount that depends on the total number of instructions to be executed. The same might be true in cognition and its development. Speed of cognitive processing might be limited by the speed with which the human information processor can execute a fundamental cognitive instruction. The human analog to cycle time might be the time to scan the productions (i.e., condition-action instructions) in working memory or i t might refer to the time to execute the action side of a production (Klahr, 1989). In either case, a developmental decrease in cognitive cycle time would yield decreased time to complete cognitive operations. Findings presented by Surwillo and Titus (1Y76) can be interpreted in terms of such a cycle time hypothesis. The stimuli in this experiment consisted of a sequence of three 1-msec clicks. An initial soft click served a s a ready signal. From 3 to 4 sec later, two louder clicks were presented, separated by 50-500 msec. The

180

Robert Kail

subjects’ task was to ignore the first loud click and to respond as rapidly as possible to the second loud click. The principal result was that RTs decreased exponentially with increases in the interval between the two louder clicks, but more rapidly for adults than for 9-year-olds. This result can be interpreted as follows: With brief intervals between clicks, processing often does not begin immediately because the second louder click arrives during the middle of the processing cycle initiated by the first louder click. Instead, the stimulus is stored until the start of the next cycle, when it is processed and a response is initiated. Because processing cycles are slower in children than in adults, children’s RTs were affected more by longer intervals between clicks than were adults. Based on findings like these, the cycle time hypothesis would appear to warrant additional inquiry. It, too, can accommodate the impact of practice, because the assumption is that with practice, processes become compiled (Anderson, 1987): Processes that prior to training might have consisted of several distinct steps are after practice combined into a single instruction. Neither the processing resource nor the cycle time explanation is inherently developmental. That is, nothing in these explanations directly addresses the questions of why resources or cycle time should change and why the change with age is nonlinear. A number of neurological changes could be invoked to explain this pattern of development, such as age-related elimination of transient connections in the central nervous system (Huttenlocher, 1979, 1990), increased myelinization during childhood and adolescence (Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967), and an agerelated shift in the electroencephalogram spectrum from slow waves such as delta and theta to fast waves such as alpha and beta (John, 1977). Each of these phenomena has the nonlinear change with age that characterizes processing speed, and each can be plausibly linked to processing speed. However, the details of these links remain to be specified.

IV. Implications of Global Developmental Change in Processing Speed The fact that a global mechanism may limit speeded performance is significant for our understanding of typical patterns of cognitive development beyond the domain of speeded tasks. Such a mechanism may be implicated whenever rate of stimulation or pacing of responses is controlled externally, or, more generally, whenever a number of activities must be completed in a fixed period. In these instances, slow processing speed may result in reduced performance because children cannot complete all components of task performance in the time allotted. Consistent with this view, if initial evidence indicates that children do not execute some process, a common rule-of-thumb in cognitive developmental re-

Dcwlopmerrt of Processirrg Speed

181

search is to repeat the task but to allow more time. For example, in free recall, 8-year-olds are unlikely to rehearse actively when words are presented at a rate of 5 sec/word but they will do so with a presentation rate of 1 0 sec/word (Naus, Ornstein, & Aivano, 1977). Similarly, 8-year-olds will semantically integrate sentences and pictures if the information is presented at 15 sec/stimulus but not at a rate of 10 sec/stimulus (Pezdek & Miceli, 1982). In both cases, performance of older children or adults is comparable for the two presentation rates (Naus ~ ' ul., t 1977; Pezdek, 1080). A plausible interpretation of these results is that, given the 8-year-olds' slower processing rate, the more rapid presentation did not allow enough time for these children to complete all the processes involved in active rehearsal or semantic integration (White, 1965). In each of these cases, the amount of additional time to execute cognitive processes was determined on a completely ad hoc basis. We can, however, speculate ahout the nature of the function that relates performance to increased processing time. An example is Pezdek's (1980; Pezdek & Miceli, 1982) semantic integration paradigm in which 8-year-olds integrated information from pictures and sentences when presented at 15 sec/stimulus but not at 8 secistimulus. Apparently, at presentation rates of 8 sec/stiniulus or faster, semantic integration does not occur. At some rate slower than 8 sec/stimulus but no slower than 15 sec/stimulus, semantic integration is found. Finally, presumably at some rate slower than 15 sec/stimulus, semantic integration reaches asymptotic values ( i t . , it no longer increases with additional time). The result would be an S-shaped function like the one shown in Fig. 11. The hypothetical function in Fig. 11 is the logistic function

where u represents the asymptote, u/( 1 + 1 s ) is the intercept. w indicates how rapidly the function approaches the asymptote, and t is presentation time (sec/stimulus). The logistic function first accelerates, then decelerates. The inflection point is determined by setting the second derivative (j")of Eq. (7) to 0 and solving for t':

In the case of the hypothetical data from Pezdek's semantic integration task, t'represents the critical presentation time at which additional presentation time yields diminishing returns in terms of semantic integration performance. Beyond t', semantic integration continues to improve, but less rapidly than before. Put another way. t' corresponds to the minimum rate that is sufficient to support semantic integration performance. Extant work on processing speed leads to a clear prediction regarding change in t' with age. Specifically, if the minimal presentation rate that supports semantic

Robert Kail 100 -

80 -

/

/

i Q 3

0 w

60 -

0 Z 4

2

2 w w D_

40 -

20 -

n "

0

4

8

12

16

20

TIME PER ITEM (SEC)

Fig. 11. Hypothetical increases in performance (measured in arbitrary units) as a function of time per item, separately for children and adults. The curves are logistic functions [Eq. (7)] , with u = 100 and v = 150 for both groups. For adults, w = 0.9; for children, w = 0.45. The vertical lines denote the inflection points for each function.

integration performance at age i, t,', is determined by rate of processing rate at age i, then ti' should approach an asymptotic value o f t ' exponentially in the manner described by Eq. (5). Thus, work on processing time could be used to transform a rule-of-thumb into an exact prediction. Equation (5) can be used to determine the necessary and sufficient time to present information to subjects at a particular age for a given task. The more general point is that some important qualitative-looking changes in cognitive development may be attributable, at least in part, to limitations in the speed with which children process information. Qualitative shifts from nonrehearsal to rehearsal, or from independent storage of stimuli to integrated storage, may reflect age-related change in processing speed. Thus, the impact of processing speed on cognitive development may be widespread and may represent a fundamental mechanism of cognitive developmental change.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The research described in this paper was supported by grant HD 19447 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. During the writing of this paper, the author was supported by a fellowship from the Center for Behavioral and Social Science Research, School of Liberal Arts, Purdue University.

Development of Processing Speed

183

REFERENCES Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Anderson, J. R. (1987). Skill acquisition: Compilation of weak-method problem solutions. Psychologicul Review. 94, 192-210. Ashcraft, M. (1982). The development of mental arithmetic: A chronometric approach. Developmental Review, 2. 213-236. Birren. J. E. (1965).Age changes in speed of behavior: Its central nature and physiological correlates. In A. T. Welford & J. E. Birren (Eds.), Behavior, aging and the nervous system (pp. 191-216). Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas. Bisanz, J., Danner, F., & Resnick, L. B. (1979). Changes with age in measures of processing efficiency. Child Development, 50. 132-141. Brewer. N., & Smith, G. A. (1980). Developmental changes in processing speed: Influence of speedaccuracy regulation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Generul, 118, 298-310. Case, R. (1985). Intellectual development. birth to adulthood. Orlando, FL: Academic Press. Cerella, J. (1985). Information processing rates in the elderly. Psychological Bulletin, 98, 67-83. Chi, M. T. H. (1977). Age differences in the speed of processing: A critique. Developmental Psychology, 13, 543-544. Chi. M. T. H., L Ceci, S. J. (1987). Content knowledge: Its role, representation and restructuring in memory development. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 17, pp. 91-142). New York: Academic Press. Cole, M. (1985). The zone of proximal development: Where culture and cognition create each other. In I. V. Wertsch (Ed.), Culture, communication, and cognition: Vygotskian per.spectives (pp. 145-161). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cooper. L. A., L Shepard, R. N. (1973). Chronometric studies of the rotation of mental images. In W. G. Chase (Ed.), Visual information processing (pp. 75-176). New York: Academic Press. Corballis, M. C. (1986). Is mental rotation controlled or automatic? Memory & Cognition, 14, 124128.

Galton. F. (1883). Inquiries into humun fuculry and its development. hndon: Macmillan. Goodenough. F. L. (1935). The development of the reactive process from early childhood to maturity. Journal of Experimmtal Psychology, 18, 43 1-450. Hale, S . (1990). A global developmental trend in cognitive processing speed in children. Child Development, 61, 653-663. Heath, S. B. (1983). Ways with ~ v r d s New . York: Cambridge University Press. Huttenlocher, P. R. (1Y79). Syntaptic density in human frontal cortexdevelopmental changes and effects of aging. Brain Research, 163, 195-205. John, E. R. (1 977). Neurometrics: Clinical Applications of Quantitative Electrophysiology. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Kail, R. (1985). Development of mental rotation: A speed-accuracy study. Journal of Experimental Child PSyChOhbj, 40. 181-192. Kail, R. (1986a). The impact of extended practice on rate of mental rotation. Journal ofExperimenta1 Child Psychology, 42, 378-391. Kail, R. (1986b). Sources of age differences in speed of processing. Child Development, 57,969-987. Kail, R. (1988). Developmental functions for speeds of cognitive processes. Journal of Experimental Child Ps~chology,45, 339-364. Kail. R. (in press-a). General slowing of information processing in mentally retarded persons. American Journal of Menial Retardation. Kail, R. (in press-b). The role of a global mechanism in developmental change in speed of processing. In R. Pasnak and M. L. Howe (Eds.), Emerging themes in cognitive development (Vol. I). New York: Springer-Verlag.

184

Robert Kail

Kail, R. (l991a). Controlled and automatic processing during mental rotation. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 51, 337-347. Kail, R. (1991b). Developmental change in speed of processing during childhood and adolescence. Psychological Bulletin, 109, 490-501. Kail, R. (1991~).A global mechanism is implicated in developmental change in speed of processing. Unpublished manuscript under editorial review. Kail, R. (1991d). Processing time declines exponentially during childhood and adolescence. Developmental Psychology, 21, 250-266. Kail. R., & Bisanz. J. (1982). Information processing and cognitive development. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 17, pp. 45-81). New York: Academic Press. Kail. R., & Bisanz. J. (in press). The information-processing perspective on cognitive development in childhood and adolescence. In R. J. Sternberg and C. A. Berg (Eds.), Inrellectual development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kail. R.. & Park, Y. (1990). Impact of practice on speed of mental rotation. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 49, 227-244. Kail, R.. Pellegrino, J., & Carter, P. (1980). Developmental changes in mental rotation. Journul of Esperimental Child Psychology, 29, 102-1 16. Keating, D. P., & Bobhitt, B. L. (1978). Individual and developmental differences in cognitive processing components of mental ability. Child Development, 49, 155-169. Keating, D. P.. & MacLean, D. J. (1987). Cognitive processing, cognitive ability, and development: A reconsideration. In P. A. Vernon (Ed.), Speed of informatiori-processing and intelligence (pp. 239-270). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Klahr, D. (1989). Information-processing approaches. In R. Vasta (Ed.). Annuls of child development (Vol. 6, pp. 13S185). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Logan, G.D. (1985). Skill and automaticity: Relations, implications, and future directions. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 39, 367-386. Logan, G. D. (1988). Toward an instance theory of automatization. Psychological Review, 95, 492527. Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, s e e and sociery. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Naus, M. J., & Omstein, P. A. (1977). Developmental differences in the search of categorized lists. Developmental Psychology, 13, 6C-68. Naus, M. J., Ornstein. P. A.. B Aivano, S. (1977). Developmental changes in memory: The effects of processing time and rehearsal instructions. Journal of Experimenfal Child Psychology, 23, 237251. Pascual-Leone, J. (1970). A mathematical model for the transition rule in Piaget’s developmental stages. Acta Psychologica. 32, 301-345. Pezdck, K. (1980). Life-span differences in semantic integration of pictures and sentences in memory. Child Development, 51, 72S729. Pezdek, K., & Miceli, L. (1982). Life-span differences in memory integration as a function of processing time. Developmental Psychology, 18, 485490. Philip, B. R. (1934). Reaction-times of children. American Journal of Psychology, 46, 379-396. Rogoff, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in social context. New York: Oxford. Roth. C. (1983). Factors affecting developmental changes in the speed of processing. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 35, 509-528. Salthouse, T. A. (1985). A rheory of cognitive aging. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Salthouse, T. A,, & Kail, R. (1983). Memory development throughout the life span: The role of processing rate. In P. B. Bakes and 0. G.Brim (Eds.), Lift-spun devebpment and behavior (Vol. 5, pp. 89-116). New York Academic Press.

Development of Processing Speed

185

Salthouse, T. A., & Somberg, B. L. (1982). Isolating the age difference in speeded performance. Journal of Gerontology, 37, 59-63. Shiffrin. R. M., & Dumais, S. T. (1981). The development of automatism. In J. R. Anderson (Ed.), Cognitive skills and their acquisition (pp. 11 1-140). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Siegler, R. S.(1987). The perils of averaging data over strategies: An example from children’s addition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 116, 250-264. Spearman, C. E. (1927). The abilities of man: Their nature and measurement, London: Macmillan. Sternberg. R.J. (1985). Beyond /Q: A triarchic theory of human infelligence.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sternberg, R. J.. & Rifkin, B. (197Y). The development of analogical reasoning processes. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 21. 195-232. Stigler. J. W.. Nushaum. H. C., & Chalip, L. (1988). Developmental changes in speed of processing: Central limiting mechanism or skill transfer? Child Development, 59, 1144-1 153. Stone. B., & Day, M. C. (1981). A developmental study of the processes underlying solution of figural matrices. Child Development, 52, 35%362. Sunvillo, W. W., & Titus, T. G. (1976). Reaction time and the psychological refractory period in children and adults. Developmental Psychobiology. 9, 5 17-527. Vygotsky. L. S. (1934/1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wertsch, J. V. (1984). The zone of proximal development: Some conceptual issues. In B. Rogoff & J. V. Wertsch (Eds.), Children’s learning in the-“zone of proximal development” (pp. 7-10). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. White, S. H. (1965). Evidence for a hierarchical arrangement of learning processes. In L. P. Lipsitt and C. C. Spiker (Eds.). Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 2. pp. 187-220). New York: Academic Press. Wickens, C. D. (1974). Temporal limits of human information processing: A developmental study. Psychological Bulletin, 81, 739-755. Wickens. C. D., & Benel. D. C. R. (1982). The development of time-sharing skills. In J. A. S. Kelso & J. E. Clark (Eds.), The dcr-cdopmentof movement control and coordination (pp. 253-272). New York: John Wiley and Sons. Yakovlev, P. I., & Lecours, A. R. (1967). The myelogenetic cycles of regional maturation of the brain. In A. Minkowski (Ed.). Regional development of the brain in early life. Oxford, BIackwell Scientific.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

CONTEXTUALISM AND DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

Haytze W. Reese DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY WEST VIKGINIA UNIVERSITY MORGANTOWN. WEST VIRGINIA ? h X h

1. INTRODUCTION 11. THE CONTEXTUALISTIC METAPHOR A. ONGOING ACTS AS METAPHORS B. A RICHER VERSION OF THE METAPHOR C. SUMMARY OF THE VIEW 111. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ONGOING ACT-IN-CONTEXT

A. B. C. D.

CONCRETENESS RELATIVISM PURPOSEFULNESS HOLISM

IV. DISPERSIVENESS OF CONTEXTUALISM A. LIMIT ON DISPERSIVENESS B. CLASSIC FLUXERS: HERACLIIWS AND CRATYLUS C. CONTEXTUALISTIC' FLUX V. THE CONCEPT OF CONTRADICTION IN CONTEXTUALISM A. PART-WHOLE CONTRADICTION B. RESOLUTION OF BLOCKED ACTION C. THE CONCEPT OF NOVELTY D. RELATIONS TO ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES VI. TRUTH IN CONTEXTUALISM A. EXPLICATION B. BASIS IN CONTEXTUALISM C. RELATION TO PRACTICE

VII. CAUSALITY IN CONTEXTUALISM A. THE FIVE KINDS OF CAUSES B. BEING AND BECOMING C. CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONS

187 ADVANCES IN ('IiI1.D DEVELOPMENT A N D BEHAVIOR. VOL. 2.1

Copyright 0 lYOl hy Acrdrniic Pro,. Inc All rights of repnidiiction in any forin ruscrvcd.

Hayne W. Reese

188

VIII. ADEQUACY OF CONTEXTUALISM A. PRECISlON AND SCOPE B. EMERGENCE C . THE CRlTERlON OF PREDICTABILITY D. IDENTITY CRISIS

IX. IN LIEU OF SUMMARY: AN APPLICATION OF CONTEXTUALISM REFERENCES

I. Introduction My purpose in this article is to explicate the contextualistic world view and some of its implications for developmental psychology. In two papers published in the early 1970s, Willis Overton and I dealt with developmental implications of the mechanistic and organic world views, which were the predominant world views in American developmental psychology when these papers were published (Overton & Reese, 1973; Reese & Overton, 1970). More recently, the contextualistic world view has gained ground, but some of the gains attributed to it have been misattributions because of misinterpretations of the view. Also, some criticisms of the view reflect misinterpretations, one of which was published in a previous volume of Advances in Child Development and Behavior. One misinterpretation is reflected by the application of the label contextualism to all views in which the context of behavior or cognition is mentioned. As will be seen in the present article, contextualism consists of much more than the recognition that behavior or cognition occurs in a context and is influenced by that context. An analogy is the belief that any psychologist who observes behavior is a behaviorist: Actually, all psychologists observe behavior, but only those who consider it to be the subject matter of psychology are behaviorists; those who consider it to be the empirical basis for inferences about cognitive processes are not behaviorists. Another, more profound misinterpretation is that the dispersiveness of contextualism makes this world view unscientific because a dispersive world view cannot satisfy the predictability criterion of science. As will be seen (Section VIII,C), this misinterpretation reflects the use of a mechanistic or an organic definition of science, which is inapplicable to science as defined in contextualism. The contextualistic world view is described herein in Section 11, basic concepts are considered in Sections 111-VII, the adequacy of the view is considered in Section VIII, and a specific application of the view is briefly outlined in Section IX.

11. The Contextualistic Metaphor Pepper (1942) identified the underlying metaphor of contextualism as a historical event unfolding in its context. This metaphor is misleading, however, because it implies completedness and Pepper himself emphasized that the metaphor is

intended to be a living event, an “active present event” (p. 253). not an event frozen in the dead past. The metaphor is an event “alive in its present,” not “a past event” that is “dead and has to be exhumed” (p. 232). Therefore, a more apt designation of the basic metaphor is a concrete act ongoing in a context. This designation avoids the implication of completedness, and in fact Pepper used such acts to illustrate the contextualistic metaphor. Details of the contextualistic model will vary depending on which specific act is selected to serve as the metaphor (just as details of the mechanistic and organic models will depend on which specific machine or developing organ is selected). In any case, however, all acts ongoing in a context have certain features in common (just as all machines or developing organs have features in common), and these common features define the basic concepts, or “categories,” of the world view. (For detailed discussion of the contextualistic categories. see Hahn, 1942, chap. 1; Pepper, 1934b, 1938, chap. 1; 1942, chap. 10; 1945, chap. 3.) A. ONGOING ACTS AS METAPHORS

Pepper (1942) used the ongoing act of writing a sentence as an example of the contextualistic model. The particular sentence might be I will put u period at the end ofthis Sentence (Pepper used a passive form of this sentence). He remarked that this example is peculiarly instructive because it shows that such a trivial act can serve as the key to understanding the entire universe: Everything is like the ongoing act of writing, in context, I will put u period at the end of this sentence. Other ongoing acts that Pepper ( 1934b) used to illustrate the contextualistic metaphor include the returning of a tennis ball (p. 188) and the reading of a specified sentence (the sentence he specified was from William James: “The feeling of the thunder is also a feeling of the silence as just gone” [p. 1861). However. these metaphors are subject to misunderstanding because the role of context is too easily overlooked. As Pepper (1942) said, the contextualistic metaphor ”is not an act conceived as alone or cut off. . . ; it is an act in and with its setting, an act in its context” (p. 232). Pepper avoided the undesired implications of both the metaphor of the historical event and the metaphor of the ongoing act when he used the act of perceiving a particular Japanese print to exemplify the contextualistic metaphor (Pepper, 1938) and when he used the act of reacting aesthetically to a particular stanza from Coleridge’s “Glycine’s Song” (Pepper, 1945). However, these acts are mental and therefore may fail to convey the concreteness of contextualism. B. A RICHER VERSION OF THE METAPHOR

The richness of the contextualistic metaphor is exposed most clearly in an extended ongoing act described by Pepper (1 942):

190

Hayne W. Reese A hunter starts from his cabin to a meadow where he believes that deer abound. His path

is obstructed by a stream. The strand of his purpose. is thereby blocked. He may give up. But, if he persists, he finds perhaps a log and a pole, and pushes himself across. The activity of pushing himself across has its own initiation as he steps off one bank of the stream, and its satisfaction as he steps up on the other bank. It is set in motion, however, by the obstacle of the stream, and is directed by the meadow he is aiming for. At this stage the action is clearly an interpolation and distinct from the main action of walking to the meadow. But when he returns, he knows just what to do, and the separateness of this action at the stream is scarcely felt. And if thereafter he often goes to the meadow, he will think no more of the ferry across the stream than of any turn or dip in the trail. The ferry across the stream is just one articulation of a total integral act like the other landmarks of the trail. What was originally an obstacle turns into a stimulus for reference that leads right over to the next stage of the journey. (p. 262)

Two points might bear commentary: (1) The meadow he is aiming for is an end-in-view, not a telos. An end-in-view is a consciously held purpose (Dewey, 1933, p. 17). It is not a purpose defined as in teleology, in terms of the actual outcome. Rather, it is in the actor’s mind before he or she acts; it is a cognized purpose, antecedent to an act that may or may not attain the intended end. (2) The integration of a separate act into another act indicates that the expectation of stability occurs despite the expectation of change and further indicates that integration occurs despite dispersiveness. (Pepper, 1942, also used this example to illustrate versions of the truth criterion of contextualism; see his pp. 270, 274, 276.)

C. SUMMARY OF THE VIEW

Pepper (1934b) summarized the view as follows:

b

[Contextualism] takes for its root metaphor the textured event, with its richly qualitied strands fading into a past that dies and guiding the changing pattern of a present duration into a future that dawns. The event through its texture extends sidewise in its present duration into neighboring contexts which are themselves textures extending into still other contexts. And the texture of each event is internally analyzable into strands, which have individual tensions and references into other textures. This is the basic conceptual equipment of contextualism. (p. 183)

Even more succinctly, the main categories of contextualism are: (1) texture, ( 2 ) in an environment of other textures, (3) analyzable into strands which extend into environmental textures, and (4) which have references (senses of direction) to or from environmental textures or (5) towards consummations yet to come, or (6) from iniriations gone by. The (7) quality of a texture is a (8)fusion of its strands and there is no quality more fundamental than this felt or observed quality of the total texture. (Pepper, 1034a. p. 111)

The italicized terms are technical and need explication, but perhaps this quotation and the preceding one adequately convey the essence of contextualism for the present purposes without detailed explication. (1) The texture of an ongoing act-in-context is the details and relations that make up its “quality.” (2) The enviroiznzent is the context of an act. (3) The sfrunds of an act are its elements, or details (e.g., writing at, the, and end are strands of writing ut [he end; and writing u and t are strands of writing at). (4) The references of an act are its course as it unfolds, its ( 5 ) yet-to-be consutnmution, end, or satisfaction, and its (6) now past inifiatiori.s.(7) The qiiulity of an act is the total, holistic meaning of the act ongoing in a context. or as Pepper (1942) said, “its intuited wholeness or total character.” This quality results from (8) a fusion-an integration-f textures, including environmental textures. Having introduced and defined these technical terms, J will hereafter avoid using them insofar as possible, in order to ease the reader’s burden. (For detailed explication of these and other categories, see Hayes, Hayes, & Reese. 1988; and the references cited above, especially Pepper, 1942, chap. 10.) The metaphor of the hunter, described in the preceding subsection, brings out all the basic features of contextualism. However, like the metaphors of historical events and ongoing acts, it also has a disadvantage; the “act” involved is so complex that the metaphor may have more neutral and negative analogy than positive analogy. (Thepositit~eanulogy is the part of a metaphor or model to which the target domain is mapped; the riegative anulogy is the part that must be ignored; and the rteirfral unalogy is the part that seems to make no difference [Hesse, 19661.) Given this disadvantage, the metaphor of writing a sentence is used for the most part in the following explication of the contextualistic world view. The specific metaphor, mentioned in Section II,A, is the writing of the sentence I will put a period at the end of this sentence. The metaphor is not the sentence, however; it is the writing of the sentence after the writing begins and before it ends.

111. Basic Characteristics of the Ongoing Act-in-Context Four basic characteristics of the ongoing act-in-context as conceptualized in contextualism are concreteness, relativism, purposefulness, and holism. These characteristics are discussed in the present section. A. CONCRETENESS

The basic metaphor of contextualism is an ongoing act. All ongoing acts have two essential features: They have a content and they occur in a context. Writing

is not an act; but writing something with something on something in some

192

Hayne W. Reese

situation at some time is an act. Thinking is not an act, and rehearsing is not an act; but thinking something and rehearsing something are acts. All acts-mental as well as physical-are concrete in this sense, and any purported act that has no content or context is an abstraction, a product of analysis rather than of observation. Concrete acts need explanation; abstract “acts” do not need explanation, although the thinking that generates abstract “acts” is concrete in the intended sense and therefore needs explanation.

B. RELATIVISM

The basic metaphor of contextualism requires consideration of the context in which an act is ongoing. An implication of this requirement is that acts are expected to vary with context---otherwise the context could be ignored. That is, the meaning of an act or a task is likely to be relative to the context in which the act or task occurs. For example, laughing may indicate joy in some contexts and fear in others, and crying may indicate fear in some contexts and joy in others. Similarly, the meaning of an arithmetic problem may be different in the contexts of the school and the streets, and a person may react differently to the problem depending on its contextually relative meaning. Max Planck made a point that is relevant here: “Everything that is relative presupposes the existence of something that is absolute” (1949a, p. 46). Baumrind (1989) made the same point: “Instability and discontinuity in human development can only be seen against a background of stability” (p. 187). The alternatives to this point are that nothing is relative, which is inconsistent with contextualism (it is consistent with mechanism), or that nothing is absolute, which is also inconsistent with contextualism (it is Cratylus’s total flux, discussed in Section IV,B,3). Thus, if the meaning of an act or a task is relative to a context, the context must be absolute; and if the context is relative to the person’s perceptions, for example, then the person’s perceptions are absolute. The progression could continue, but in contextualism it is worth continuing only so long as it makes a difference in practice (as shown in Section VI,A).

C. PURPOSEFULNESS

Pittendrigh (1958) commented: “Biologists for a while were prepared to say a turtle came ashore and laid its eggs, but they refused to say it came ashore to lay its eggs. These verbal scruples were intended as a rejection of teleology [i.e., purpose]” @. 393). However, in common sense, most acts are felt to be purposeful, whether performed by a person or an animal. The riddle, “Why did the chicken

cross the road?” is amusing, perhaps, but not because of any felt incongruity in attributing purposefulness to a chicken. The 19th-century novelist and amateur evolutionist Samuel Butler seems to have had no qualms i n attributing purposes to cats and flies (1894/1925. pp. 83-84). Thus. Romanes’s (1885, chaps. 6, 20) attributing consciousness to animals is much more in keeping with common sense than later scientists’ denial of it. Given that in common sense. purpose is attributed to acts by animals, purpose is even more reasonably attributed to human acts. Therefore, purposefulness is categorical in contextualism-it is a basic characteristic of the commonsense root metaphor of the ongoing act. However, in the commonsense view, purpose is i n both the past and the future. It is in the past in the sense that it is antecedent to an act; and it is in the future in the sense that the act is expected to achieve the purpose. This contradiction is resolved in contextualism by the conception of “the present” as having a .spread that is, the present consists of a range of time rather than a point i n time (Kvale, 1074; Mead, 1932/1959, e.g., p. 1; Miller. 1043: Pepper, 1934b, 1942, pp. 239-242). William James (1890, p. 609), who was one of the early contextualists. conceptualized the present as a duration with “a rearward- and a forward-looking end.” That is, the present includes what might be called the immediate past and the immediate future, although these terms are inappropriate because their referents are actually in the present in contextualism. The purpose of a present act reaches into both the immediate past and the immediate future. The meaning of writing period, for example, in the illustrative sentence includes the writing of will put a and at the end.

D. HOLISM

In contextualism, a whole includes an act and its context. (However, as will be seen in Section III,D,2, both the act and the context-conceptualized as parts of the whole-are abstractions.) This basic concept is revealed clearly in the metaphor of perceiving the Japanese print (mentioned in Section II,A),which shows the inseparability of the act from its context. As Pepper (1938, p. 36) said, this inseparability is a fusion of a “personal texture” and an “impersonal texture.” However, the actor seems more active in the metaphor of writing a sentence, and the arbitrariness of isolating the act from the flow of activity seems clearer.

1. External and Internul Relutions in Holism As Kitchener (1982) demonstrated, the thesis of holism is not that “a whole is more than the additive sum of its isolated parts and their external relations,” but rather that “a whole is more than the additive sum of its isolated parts and their

Hayne W. Reese

194

external and internal relations” (p. 244; I would have said “conjunction” rather than “additive sum,” in agreement with Bergmann, 1957, pp. 159ff). Elements are externally related if changing the relation does not change the nature of the elements. As an example, Kitchener noted that a book on a table remains a book if it is removed from the table. Elements are internally related if changing the relation changes the nature of the elements. For example, the husband-wife relation is internal because unless the man and the woman are married to each other they are not husband-and-wife. A whole that included only external relations could exist according to the mechanistic world view, but it would be a mere aggregation rather than a true whole as conceptualized in the organic and the contextualistic versions of holism. In the organic and contextualistic world views, internal relations are constitutive, but a whole that included only internal relations could exist only as an ideal (in organicism) or as an abstraction (in contextualism). However, some relations that are external in organicism seem to be internal in contextualism. For example, in contextualism the location of a book can affect its nature (i.e., its meaning). A book on a table is a book (or a weight for pressing flowers, etc.); but a book is a tool, so to speak, if it is being read as part of the action of studying for an examination, and a book being thrown is a weapon if it is part of an aggressive action. In other words, external relations are irrelevant to the ideal nature or meaning of an item, but they are inextricably involved in the real whole that determines the concrete nature or concrete meaning of the item.

2. Legitimacy of Decomposing a Whole Contextualism is holistic, and Pepper characterized the whole-the in a context-as follows:

act ongoing

[The whole] is not literally composed of elements, even though it may be properly described as a configuration of discriminated analytical properties. The properties into which it is analyzed for any purpose have references to other events in the context of the event analytically described. (Pepper, 1960, pp. 58-59)

That is: The parts of the whole can he adequately described only as parts of the whole. The character of the whole enters into its parts, and unless the function of a part in the whole is exhibited in the description of the part. the part is no longer a part of that whole: it is a part of some other whole. (Pepper, 1934a, pp. 111-112)

In the basic metaphor, then, the act ongoing in a context is a totality, but for some purposes it can be meaningfully analyzed into elements, each of which is itself an act ongoing in its own context. Thus, in contrast to organicism, in which

Coritc.~t~iul~.srn arid Dewlopmental Psychology

19s

the whole cannot be meaningfully decomposed into parts because of strong reciprocal interactions, in contextualism parts can always be examined in meaningful ways because each part is itself an act ongoing in a context. This basic concept of contextualism is well illustrated by the act of writing the sample sentence (and some of the other acts cited by Pepper): Writing the word period is a complete act, and within that act writing the syllable per is an act, within which writing the letter p is an act, within which making a downward loop is an act, and so on. Going in the other direction, writing the entire sentence is an act but is also a part of the larger act that includes writing about the act of writing the sentence, which in turn is part of the larger act that includes writing an entire paper, which in turn is part of the larger act that is the writer’s lifetime, which in turn is part of the larger act that includes others’ lifetimes, etc. A concrete example reflecting this principle is found in the Soviet theory of speech: A word in a contcxt means both more and less than the same word in isolation: more, because it acquires new context: less, because its meaning is limited and narrowed by the context. . . . A word derives its sense from the sentence. which in turn gets its sense from the paragraph, the paragraph from the book. the hook from all the works of the author. (Vygotsky. 1934119h3. p. 146; 1934/1986, p. 245)

Thus, although the act ongoing in a context is a whole in contextualism, it is not a fixed entity as in organicism.

3. Arbitrariness of Defining a Whole The whole in contextualism is elusive because it can shift locations and can contract or expand, depending on the interests of the observer. Its definition is arbitrary and therefore, as Hoffman (1985) said, contextualism has “no final or ultimate units for the analysis of anything” (p. 15). A certain arbitrariness is also discernible in mechanism, but with the understanding that a universal whole is nonarbitrary, or at least nonarbitrary in any mechanism in which “isolated systems” smaller than the universal whole are conceptualized as only relutively isolated. Just as an organicist can sometimes adopt a mechanistic model as a “convenient fiction,” that is, as a model that is adequate for some subdomain even though it is paradigmatically false (Overton, 1973; Reese, 1977a), so a mechanist can sometimes adopt the convenient fiction that a particular subsystem is isolated even though it is paradigmatically open. A case in point is Schrodinger’s comment that “a single day of one’s life, nay even any individual life as a whole, is but a minute blow of the chisel at the ever unfinished statue [of evolution]” (1958, p. 11). However, for many purposes, the single day in a life may be itself a virtually finished statue, but only so as a convenient fiction with respect to these purposes.

196

Hayne W. Rcese

a. “Within-Level” Wholes. As indicated in the preceding subsection (111,D,2), wholes can be defined at different levels, or different ranges or magnitudes. The arbitrariness of the definition of a whole is evident within a given level. In the basic metaphor, the writing of an individual letter-p, for example-is an act at the same level as writing any other letter, and each can be focused on as a whole. No one of these wholes is basic with respect to any other, because although one of them might occur earlier in the writing of the sentence than another, when any one is focused on it is the only one that exists as an ongoing act at the time of observance. In other words, unlike organicism, which specifies an organ that is the real whole, contextualism makes the whole a matter of convenience or interest. Real wholes exist in contextualism but the whole does not exist-no delimited all-inclusive whole exists. Reality is a continuous flux of acts ongoing in an endless range of contexts. The whole, for anyone’s purposes, is that part of the flux that he or she wants to describe, and all other acts and ranges of the context can be legitimately ignored. To move from metaphor to a concrete domain, contextualistic holism can be seen in J. R. Kantor’s (1942) belief that the sciences are unitary but separable and equal: It is assumed that nature comprises an intricate manifold of events-fields in which things (particles, waves, organisms, etc.) operate in certain ways and change under certain specific conditions. Each science including psychology isolates some phase of this manifold for its special object of study. . . . It is assumed here that all sciences are coordinate, none being more basic than any other. Whatever hierarchy of sciences one may set up can only be based upon quantity of achievement. AII are natural and each is as fundamental as any other. (pp. 176-177)

According to Miller, G. H. Mead expressed the same view: “There are different (qualitatively different-and lawfully different) levels of reality, none of which has metaphysical priority over any other” (Miller, 1943, p, 46). A more concrete example is found in speech development. Mounoud (1987) noted that syllables can be studied independently of a whole of which they are parts, but that they do not have the same meaning when studied in isolation (i.e., as wholes) as when studied as parts of a whole. He also said that phonemes are considered to be abstract formal units that cannot exist apart from the whole of which they are parts; however, research on phonemic development demonstrates that in fact they can also be studied as wholes.

b. “Between-Level’’ Wholes. As shown in the preceding paragraphs, wholes can differ “within a level,” such as in the writing of any one letter or word versus another letter or word in the basic metaphor. They can also differ “between levels,” such as in writing a letter versus writing a word versus writing a sentence, etc. The range of levels is endless in both directions, and no one act between levels is basic with respect to any other because each is at the same time a constituted

Contextualism und Developmentul Psychology

197

whole and a constituting part (constituted and constituting are used in weak, nonliteral senses). For example, the writing ofperiod is a whole constituted by part acts such as writing p and at the same time it is a constituting part of writing the sentence. The whole that determines the parts cannot be “more basic” than the parts that determine the whole. (The argument may seem abstruse at this point, or perhaps even specious, but it is obvious and clearly true once the contextualistic metaphor is grasped.) This kind of holism is evident in Kantor’s (1938) concept of a behavior segment: The psychologist is obliged to ccmtruct :I dewiptivr unit simple and stable enough to enable him to understand what is essentially continuous and integrated. Such a descriptive tool he constructs in the form of a behavior segment. Essentially the behavior segment is a n abstraction designed to fixate a dctinite spatio-temporal event. (p, I )

c. The Study of Wholes. The contextualistic conception of the whole avoids a major dilemma of organicism. In organicism the whole is indivisible because it is composed of mutually interpenetrating, reciprocally interacting parts, which are meaningless if examined in isolation (Overton & Reese, 1973) and which may not even be identifiable in isolation (Overton, 1973). Yet examination of the research of organicists reveals clearly that they identify parts and often study the functions of the parts in combination with only a piece of the whole. As Spiker (1966) commented: Frankly, I have never met anyone who could insist with a straight face that he studied his organisms whole. To he sure. some psychologists look at bigger chunks of’the child than do others. But everyone looks at chunks. To he able 10 look at the wholc would require all the knowledge we do not yet have. Even the most avid promoters of the person-as-a-whole approach are forced to deal with manageable chunks when they conduct research. (p. 50)

Thus, organicists are either denying the indivisibility of the whole, and thcrefore denying a basic concept of organicism, or they are admitting that their research strategy is inadequate. This dilemma does not arise in contextualism, in which a whole is always divisible in meaningful ways. Nevertheless, in contextualism the division of the whole is also always artificial, because the value or ”truth” of the division depends on the purpose of doing it (for reasons considered in Section VI).

IV. Dispersiveness of Contextualism Facts can be dispersed and isolated from one another in contextualism. As Pepper (1942) said, “facts are taken one by one from whatever source they come and are interpreted as they come and so are left” (p. 142), and “the universe has

198

Hayne W.Reese

for these theories the general effect of multitudes of facts rather loosely scattered about and not necessarily determining one another to any considerable degree, . . . Pure cosmic chance, or unpredictability, is thus a concept consistent with these theories” (pp. 142-143). However, the dispersiveness category of contextualism has sometimes been overemphasized (e.g., by Dixon & Hertzog, 1984; Lerner, Skinner, & Sorell, 1980; Overton, 1984). The model is synthetic as well as dispersive. Contextualism avoids utter skepticism, according to Pepper, “by rigorously asserting the reality of the structure of the given event, the historic event as it actually goes on” (p. 235, emphasis added). This principle reflects the holism of contextualism (Section 111,D). The source of the dispersiveness category is not that a “historic e v e n t ” 4 r better, ongoing act-exists by itself, isolated from other acts, because in the root metaphor of contextualism the ongoing act is conceptualized as occurring in a context that includes other acts and that is part of the structure of the ongoing act. Rather, the source of dispersiveness is the categorical necessity of novelty. Anything can happen; we see what we see, whether it is structured or dispersed. This particular act (in the root metaphor) may or may not end, and may or may not be followed by another act, which we may or may not expect. The contradiction between the synthesis and dispersiveness categories is resolved by noting that the synthesis category refers to the act considered as a whole, and the dispersiveness category refers to the relations of this act to other acts, each also considered as a whole. The structure is within the act; the dispersion is between acts. Of course, given the aleatory nature of contextualism (Gergen, 1977, 1980), the structure within an act can disperse. However, this occurrence would be consistent with contextualism and not contradict it; the occurrence would be interpreted as an instance in which certain acts expected to be integrated as parts of a whole turned out to be separate wholes.

A. LIMIT O N DISPERSIVENESS

The contradiction between synthesis and dispersiveness in contextualism is resolved pragmatically: Facts come to us in wholes-except when they don’t. Although novelty is categorical in contextualism, it does not demand a ceaseless flux (contrary to Lerner et al., 1980; Overton, 1978; Riegel, 1976). As Pepper (1942) said, “Pure cosmic chance, or unpredictability, is. . . a concept consistent with [contextualistic] theories even if not resorted to or emphasized by this or that writer’’ (p. 143). The unpredictability, or flux, can be down played because, as Pepper said: The categories (of contextualism] must be so framed as not to exclude from the world any degree of order it may he found to have, or to deny that this order may have come out of disorder and may return into disorder again-rder being defined in any way you please, so long as it does not deny the possibility of disorder or another- order in iiuture

Contextualism and Developmental Psychology

199

also. This italicized restriction is the forcible one in contextualism. and amounts to the assertion that change is categorical and not derivative in any degree at all. (p. 134)

Hoffman (1985) said, “The categories of contextualism allow for any degree of order or disorder that may be found” (p. 15). Order, structure, and synthesis are accepted when found; and unpredictable change would be accepted if it were found.

B. CLASSIC FLUXERS: HERACLITUS AND CRATYLUS

The contextualistic position on flux can be explicated by comparing it with the positions of Heraclitus and Cratylus, two ancient Greek philosophers of flux. Their positions are described after a slight introductory digression and then are compared with the contextualistic position.

1. Introduction Hultsch and Pentz (1980) noted that several approaches to learning and memory reflect the contextualistic perspective. According to Hultsch and Pentz, these approaches share several basic assumptions, including the following: Because of the emphasis on a continuing transaction between the individual and the context, contextually based approaches d o not assume the retrieval of a permanent memory trace. Rather, remembering is a reconstruction of past events. This depends, in large measure, on the degree to which the material has been articulated with past experience during acquisition. In addition, memory also depends on events occurring following acquisition. Thus, the individual continually constructs and reconstructs events as the context changes. (p. 305)

This characterization is accurate but perhaps susceptible to two misunderstandings regarding the continuance of change. First, although continual change and context effects are given in contextualism, theorists who assume continual change and context effects are not necessarily contextualists. Continual change and context effects are espoused in many other systems as well. For example, Spinoza (1677/ 1949) said “we live in constant change” (p. 277, Note to Proposition XXXIX, in Pt. V) and a person “is part of Nature” and therefore cannot undergo only change that is entirely self-generated, that is, cannot undergo change that “can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause” (p.193, Proposition IV, in Pt. IV). Second, general knowledge-all of “memory in the not reconstructed each time it wider sense” (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973, p. si-4) comes to consciousness. Rather it exists as a property of the organism, and as such it is permanent. (However, it is not permanent in the sense of fixity or unmodifiability; on the contrary, it is continually being modified by reorganization and updating [Reese, 1977b], or “accommodation” [Piaget & Inhelder, 1973, p. 81.)

200

Uayne W. Reese

This second possible misinterpretation would be consistent with Cratylus: According to Aristotle, Cratylus “criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is impossible to step twice into the same river; for he thought one could not do it even once” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 4, chap. 5 [ lOlOa 11-14]; 1952b, p. 529). (The bracketed material is the number-letter-number designation of page, column, and line in the standard Berlin Greek text, which are given in most editions of Aristotle’s works and can be used to locate the passage in editions other than the one cited here.)

2. Heraclitus’s Position The works of Heraclitus have been preserved only as fragments, and for the most part they are open to diverse interpretations. Heraclitus has been attributed two versions of the “river” statement: (1) “One cannot step twice into the same river” (Kahn, 1979, p. 53) and (2) “As they step into the same rivers, other and still other waters flow upon them” (Kahn, 1979, p. 53), or “Upon those who step into the same rivers, different and different waters flow” (Kirk, 1951, p. 36). These versions are referred to in the relevant literature as (part of) Fragment 91 and Fragment 12, respectively. The first part of Fragment 12 can be translated “into the same rivers, as they step” or “into rivers, as the same [men] step,” according to Kahn (p. 167). Kahn suggested that the ambiguity was deliberate, “to emphasize a parallel between the identity of the human bathers and that of the rivers; and this parallel would suggest that men too remain the same only as a constant pattern imposed on incessant flow” (p. 167). According to Kahn, Heraclitus “does not deny the continuing identity of the rivers, but takes this for granted” (p. 167). The idea, according to Kahn, is “the preservation of structure within a process of flux, where a unitary form is maintained while its material embodiment . . . is constantly lost and replaced” (p. 168). Or, as Kantor (1963) said, Heraclitus was “impressed by the ubiquity and essentiality of change and transformation, of both the partial and temporary and the complete and permanent form, [and] he assumed that there was a law or principle which governed and ordered such changes” (p. 207). That is, “constancy is found in change” (Reese & Overton, 1970, p. 133). Watts (1742) expressed the same idea in saying that the Thames river is formally the same across time but materially different “because it runs between the same Banks, but. . , perhaps, there is not a Drop of the same Water” (p. 271; long s modernized). Kahn’s interpretation is consistent with that of Kirk (1954): “natural changes occur in the same way that rivers change, i.e. in measures, and thereby maintain in spite of change the unity of the whole [cosmos] and the balance of its essential constituents” (Kirk, 1954, p. 379). However, Vlastos (1955a, 195%) argued that Kirk misinterpreted Heraclitus’s position regarding flux. According to Vlastos, the received opinion is that Heraclitus believed that “every individual thing is changing, but the ‘measures’ of change do not” (1955a, p. 312). According to Kirk, He-

Contexrualism and Developmental Psychology

201

raclitus believed that some individual things are stable. Vlastos argued that in Plato’s time the “extreme fluxed’ were self-professed followers of Heraclitus, and that although they may have exaggerated his doctrine regarding flux, “on Kirk’s view there would have been nothing in Heraclitus for them to exaggerate, and the nexus of his professed followers with him would be completely unmotivated” (1955a, p. 313).

3. Cratylus’s Position Kahn (1979) interpreted the Cratylus fragment-ne cannot step into the same river once-to mean the same thing as the Heraclitus fragments (p. 168). Guthrie also interpreted them as the same: Cratylus meant, according to Guthrie (1962), “Between the instant when your foot touched the surface and the instant when it reached the bottom the river at that point had already changed” (note 3, p. 450). However, Lenin (1915/1961) seems to have interpreted Cratylus and Heraclitus differently: [Regarding Heraditus’s aphorism] “it is impossible to bathe twice in the same river”actually, however (as had already been said by Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus), it cannot be done even once (for before the whole body has entered the water, the latter is already not the same as before). (p. 343)

Kirk (1954, p. 373) and Barnes (1979) also believed that the meanings differed. According to Barnes, Cratylus meant that “everything is always flowing in all respects,” and Heraclitus meant that “everything is always flowing in some respects” (1979, p. 69). According to Hegel (1840/1955), Heraclitus’s principle was “change alone, without remaining like self, maintaining self, and going back within self‘ @. 317). However, according to Barnes’s interpretation, this characterization fits Cratylus’s position rather than Heraclitus’s. Cratylus’s position, as Barnes noted, precludes a statement of itself because “I cannot refer to a unless I can assign some property to it” (p. 69) other than change. Some thing in other words must be undergoing the change somewhere. Cratylus was evidently aware of this implication; according to Aristotle, he “finally did not think it right to say anything but only moved his finger” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 4, chap. 5 [1010a 11-14]; 1952b, p. 529). Lenin (1915/1961) interpreted Cratylus’s behavior thus: “Cratylus merely ‘wagged his finger’ in answer to everything, thereby showing that everything moves, that nothing can be said of anything” (p. 343). C. CONTEXTUALISTIC FLUX

Lotze (1884) said that no flux theorist held that “becoming” is accidental or without direction (p. 81), citing Aristotle’s distinction between dynamis and energeia as reflecting this point. However, (1) Aristotle’s distinction between dy-

202

Hayne W.Reese

namis and energeia is irrelevant, not only because these concepts refer to formal causes-potential and actual form, respectively-rather than causes of becoming (Section VII,B), but also because Aristotle was not a flux theorist. (2) Furthermore, Cratylus was a flux theorist who must have held that becoming is accidental and without direction, because otherwise he would have had to acknowledge consistencies and therefore would have had to deny his notion of total flux. (3) Finally, and most importantly for present purposes, Heraclitus must have admitted both accident and direction in becoming, because without accidents flux would be completely predictable (in principle) and therefore it would be an illusion reducible to consistency, and without direction flux would be completely accidental and consistent with Cratylus’s theory. Butler (1957) saw roots of pragmatism (i.e., contextualism) in Heraclitus, but on a wholly superficial basis: “In both philosophies reality is not described as a substance which has some kind of solidity or dependability; instead it is a constant flux, like the ever-changing waters of a river” (p. 419). He also noted that both views make much of dualisms, but he believed that those of Heraclitus were “somewhat unsubtle and crude as compared to John Dewey’s’’ (p. 419). Interpreted as representing total flux, Cratylus’s position is inconsistent with contextualism. The root metaphor of contextualism is an act being performed in a context; but in any specific instantiation of contextualism at the level of theory or of “theoretical model” (Reese & Overton, 1970), some specific act in some specific context is implicated. Cratylus’s position, as interpreted by Barnes (1979), precludes the existence of such an act and such a context; hence it is inconsistent with contextualism. However, Heraclitus assumed continuity (the same rivers, the same bathers) in the face of discontinuity (other waters) and this position is consistent with contextualism because the paradox it expresses is easily resolved in contextualism: The meaning of an act changes continually as the act goes on in its changing context, but it is still the act. Gergen’s (1980) “radical” contextualism, as Baltes (1987) called it, is also consistent with Heraclitus rather than Cratylus, even though Gergen emphasized the dispersiveness category of contextualism. Gergen said: If the individual is in continuous motion and may at any time move in novel ways, the contours of nature become obscure. When experience furnishes continuous flux, and repetition of experiential pattern is difficult to locate, a form of understanding that itself creates the contours of nature is favored. (p. 53)

Had he agreed with Cratylus, Gergen could not have recognized anything stable enough to be called “the individual”; he would have had to say that repetition of experiential pattern is impossible to locate, rather than only difficult to locate; and he could not have envisioned anything more than an instantly transient understanding of experience-not only because the understanding itself would undergo

Contextualism and Developmental Psychology

203

continuous change but a b o because it would have no stable individual in which to reside. The paradox is also easily resolved in organicism: Within-stage development is continuous; between-stage development is discontinuous. Therefore, stages reflect continuity in the face of discontinuity. That both contextualism and organicism are consistent with Heraclitus and not with Cratylus should not be surprising because the Heraclitean contradiction between continuity and discontinuity is the contradiction between being and becoming, which is also a basic contradiction in contextualism and in organicism. Cratylus saw only becoming, hence no contradiction. In short, although Hegel as well as Marx have roots in Heraclitus’s position, as Riegel noted (197.5, p. 239), Riegel erred-along with many other commentators-in attributing to this position the notion of “ceaseless flux.” Riegel (1978) did not err but was misleading about Heraclitus’s position in another respect. He referred to Heraclitus’s “well-known statement, ‘nobody can enter the same river twice,”’ and interpreted it to mean, “As such a person has entered the river once, he or she has already changed and cannot enter it under the same condition again” (p. 28). The problem here is that Riegel seemed to impute change to the person but not to the river. Actually, as Riegel was aware (p. 74), neither the person nor the world is ignored in the dialectical conception, and therefore the river as well as the person has changed before the person can enter it again. Riegel, in fact, did much to popularize the slogan of dialectical developmental psychology: “the developing individual in a changing world” (e.g., Riegel & Meacham, 1976).

V. The Concept of Contradiction in Contextualism The concept of contradiction is basic in the contextualistic metaphor, and it appears in several guises. They are explicated in the present section. A. PART-WHOLE CONTRADICTION

Pepper (1945, chap. 3) discussed four contrasts in contextualism that are categorical (i.e., basic concepts): (1) quality versus relations (quality in contextualism means the intuited wholeness of an event-Pepper, 1938, pp. 22-23; 1942, p. 238); (2) intuition versus analysis; (3) fusion versus diffusion; and (4) unity versus detail. These contrasts are implied in the discussion of the various ongoing acts that illustrate contextualism (Sections II,A and B), but Pepper (194.5) felt that they are especially well revealed by examination of the act of responding aesthetically to the reading of a stanza of lyric poetry (from Coleridge’s “Glycine’s Song,” as

204

Hayne W.Reese

mentioned in Section 11,A). Pepper (1945) summarized the results of this examination as follows: [An ongoing event] is a unity with details. If we intuit the unity of it,. . .we get the quality of the event by a fusion of its interrelated details. If we analyze it to find the relations of its details, we diffuse the unity and lose the quality of the whole, or at least diminish its vividness in following out the details. . . . There is no such thing as a situation having a quality without interrelated details to make it up. And there is no such thing as an analysis of details unless there is a total situation to be analyzed into its details. (pp. 61-62)

That is, as Kant said, the whole exists on account of its parts, and the parts exist on account of the whole: “The organized being is the being in which all is reciprocally end and means” (quoted in Janet, 1884, p. 48). Thus, the whole and the details, or parts, have contradictory statuses: Each is primary in the sense of being necessary for the existence of the other, but neither can be really basic. This contradiction leads to the contradiction about the division of a whole: A whole is always divisible in meaningful ways, but the division is always artificial (as mentioned in Section III,D,3). One way to express this contradiction is to note that the completion of an act as a whole is an end but at the same time it is not an end because more global acts, which form the context within which the completed act was performed, continue with respect to their own ends. A concrete example is provided by Woodworth’s (1918) characterization of the relation between behavioral parts and wholes: [The typical process of observation] starts with unanalyzed wholes and proceeds as far as necessary in the detection of details. The whole with which it starts is not necessarily the largest whole that can be apprehended; and accordingly the reverse process of combining smaller units that have been observed into larger units also goes on, but the movement from the whole to the part is the more characteristic of perceptual acts. Nor is it by any means absent from motor acts. In learning to use a tool, the start is usually made by a rough approximation to the movement as a whole, and progress consists partly in noticing details in the manipulation which are capable of improvement. A complex motor act, performed at first as a rough whole, may next be analyzed into a sequence of elementary acts, and these separately mastered and then recombined into a smooth, continuous process, as already described, so the act becomes a whole again, but a more skillful whole than at first. (p. 97)

B. RESOLUTION OF BLOCKED ACTlON

Contradiction in contextualism is also evident in the concept of instrumental action. The derivation of the concept in contextualism is discussed next (Section V,B,1) and then the implications of the concept for stagewise development are discussed (Section V,B,2).

I. Instrumental Action The concept of instrumental action is derived from the technical concept of referetices: An instrumcntal action is om undcrtakcn ;I> a nicans to it desired end and as it result of some obstacle that intcnrenes between the beginning of thc action and its cnd o r

satisfaction. . . . An instrumental action . . . is guided on the one side by the supervening terminal action which it serves and on the othcr by the hlocking action which it neutralizes. These two laticr action5 arc in the context of'the instrumental action. hut so closely connected with it as to constitute much of its structure. . . . So close are these connections that. when an instrumental action is thoroughly integrated with its end arid its obstacle. dl three work together as one. (Pepper. 1042. pp. 2W-262)

The contradiction here is not between parts and the whole, but between parts-the obstacle and the end-that are integrated in the instrumental action. That is, an instrumental action implies an end and an obstacle to the end. The contradiction is resolved by successful working of the instrumental action. This principle is important for three major reasons: First, it provides the rationale for the truth criterion of pragmatism (contextualism) and thereby makes this criterion undogmatic. The truth criterion is discussed in Section VI. Second, the principle is also important because it appears in dialectical materialism as the law of the negation of the negation. Finally, the principle implies stagewise development, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

2. Stuges of Developmerit An instrumental act, aimed at a particular goal, ends when the goal is attained; but this ending is followed by the initiation of some other act, such as utilization of an obtained goal-object. 'The ending can be interpreted as the end of a stage, and the subsequent initiation can be interpreted as the beginning of a new stage. However, this stage interpretation implies that each act is a whole and therefore, because the definition of ii whole is arbitrary, the definition of a stage is also arbitrary. This arbitrariness of defining stages of development should pose no problem if the purpose of defining the stages in the particular way is made clear. The issue is not whether these are die stages, hut rather whether these stages promote understanding of the development of a specified phenomenon. This concept of stages differs from the concept of stages in organicism. The word stuge is derived from the same Latin root as .smtion:.mm. to stand. Although these words now have a number of meanings, many of them hint at the original meaning in referring to a place of rest in a journey or a marker indicating the degree of progress made in a journey. The two senses are not identical in that the tirst implies that movement is interrupted by periods of rest and the second implies that movement continues without interruption. Both senses have been used by

206

Hayne W. Reese

developmental psychologists, who refer to them as discontinuity and continuity, respectively, The first sense is consistent with organicism, the second is consistent with contextualism. An example of stages in the sense of continuous movement or development is the use of intermediate stations to mark the progress of an express train that does not stop at these stations. (I believe that Freud used this example as an analogy of psychosexual stages of development, but I have been unable to locate a source.) Another example is the artificial separation of a behavior segment from the continuous stream of person-environment interaction (Kantor, 1938). The first of these examples illustrates continuous quantitative change and the second illustrates continuous qualitative change (as does the first example when it is an analogy of psychosexual development). An example of stages in the sense of discontinuous movement or development is the change in performance in a jumpwise learning curve, such as was obtained by Voeks (1954) in a study of eyeblink conditioning. In that such curves reflect frequency, magnitude, or some other measure of response strength, they reflect discontinuous quantitative change. Spence (1956, pp. 108-109) argued that such performance curves can reflect quantitative change in an underlying theoretical variable that changes continuously: The jump in performance occurs when the magnitude of this variable becomes greater than a threshold value. Magnitudes below and above threshold are continuous with one another, but being below and being above threshold are discontinuous stages, analogous to the discontinuity in the form of water that occurs when its temperature changes continuously from below to above 32°F. Another example of stages in the sense of discontinuous development is found in insect development: fertilized egg, caterpillar, cocoon, adult (or fertilized ovum, larva, pupa, imago). These stages are qualitatively different. The prenatal and postnatal stages in mammalian development provide another example of discontinuous qualitative change. (For further discussion and other examples, see Overton & Reese, 1981.) C. THE CONCEPT OF NOVELTY

Contradiction is also evident in the conception of novelty, which is categorical in contextualism (Pepper, 1942). As Labouvie-Vief and Chandler (1978) said: If there is any dogmatism to the contextualist’s attitude,. . . it is the assertion that he must embrace any potential theoretical outcome, even the possibility that all his pluralistic multilinear analyses might, after all, eventually converge and expose one organismic scheme. (pp. 203-204)

Quite so, except that this assertion is principled, or categorical, rather than dogmatic.

1. Self-Contradiction of’ lizevituhle No\dt)! The only inevitability in contextualism is novelty. but if this inevitability is changeless. it is self-contradictory. The thoroughgoing contextualist must admit that the inevitability of novelty is itself subject to change, and that discontinuous development, reflecting novelty, may become permanently continuous. However, the permanent absence of novelty would contradict contextualism, and therefore contextualism is self-contradictory. The contradiction is resolved by noting that at present it exists only as a possibility and that contextualism is concerned with the concrete present, not with abstract possibilities. Evidence that novelty is at present only a possibility is reviewed in the next subsection, and then, in Section V,C,3, implications of this principle are discussed.

2. The Ahseizct. of Novelty One kind of evidence for the absence of novelty is the existence of long-lasting continuities. Two examples are cited here. Kojima (1986) noted that from the mid-l7th to mid-19th century in Japan. “the age of six or seven years was seen as a major turning point in the lives of children. At that age. children began to be assigned tasks, and boys and girls began to be treated differently” (p. 320). Plato also recommended separating the sexes after age 6, and changing from what we would call day care to more formal education (Plato, LuMJ.~, Bk. 7 [794]; 1952, p. 716). In another example of long-lasting continuity, Krutch (1 953)noted that the long survival of the ancient Egyptian dynasties does not necessarily mean that the ancient Egyptian civilization was “the most admirable and ‘right”’ (p. 85); but it is certainly a remarkable example of continuity. It endured longer than the Christian era has so far endured. Of course, the civilization developcd in many ways, but the institution of bureaucracy was stable.

3. lmplicutions of the Absence of‘ Novelty Methodologically, the principle that novelty does not exist at present has two implications. First, the presently established empirical laws or principles can be used to predict findings and to explain failures to confirm predictions (as in any other world view) because we are presently in an era in which these laws or principles are true. Second, however, we should be prepared to find novelty and therefore should not cling too devotedly to the presently established laws in the face of contradictory evidence. We should be prepared for a “scientific revolution” (Kuhn, 1970) not merely because of new discoveries but because old facts are replaced by novel facts. According to Pepper (1932), nature contains no “discoverable stubborn facts that remain unchanged whatever the analysis or inter-

208

Hayne W. Reese

pretation of them” (p. 186). To assume the existence of such facts is to assume indubitables. Bergmann (1957) believed that nature contains some simple characters with which observers can be directly acquainted, without the mediation of analysis or interpretation, but he also believed that this class of characters is “narrowly limited” (p. 19). Aristotle also believed that some facts are directly sensed and true, and that others are generated by analysis or interpretation, with gradations in between. As Aristotle said, “sensations are always true,” “always free from error” (On the Soul, Bk. 3, chap. 3 [428a 11,427b 111; 1952d, pp. 660,659, respectively). However: Perception (1) of the special objects of sense is never in error or admits the least possible amount of falsehood. (2) That of the concomitance of the objects concomitant with the sensible qualities comes next: in this case certainly we may be deceived; for while the perception that there is white before us cannot be false, the perception that what is white is this or that may be false. (3) Third comes the perception of the universal attributes which accompany the concomitant objects to which the special sensibles attach (I mean e.g. of movement and magnitude); it is in respect of these that the greatest amount of sense-illusion is possible. (Ondie Soul, Bk. 3, chap. 3 [428b 16-24]; 1952d. p. 661)

However, contrary to Bergmann and Aristotle, the set of unmediated, error-free observations is probably empty, as indicated by the adaptation-level phenomenon (e.g., Helson, 1964), the transposition phenomenon (e.g., Reese, 1968; Zeiler, 1967), and other phenomena related to simple sensory perception. Kuhn (1977) also considered the error-free class of observations to be nonexistent (pp. 308309); and Kantor (1923) said, “there are no infallible observers or absolutely inerrant scientific methods, and . . . phenomena themselves so far as we can grasp them are not fixed or absolute” (p. 692). “What are accepted as facts at one period of scientific development, at another period lose all claim to such distinction” (p. 692). Thus, although as Bacon and Buffon said, science should be based on experience (Bacon, 1620/1960, p. 67 [Bk. 1,Aphorism LXX]; Buffon, 1791, p. 68), experience should be recognized as fallible (Bacon, idem). (Bacon’s recognition that experience can be fallible has sometimes been overlooked. For example, Skinner cited Bacon’s point that hypotheses and theories should follow data rather than vice versa; but Skinner idolized data in asserting that “the contingencies always come first” [1989, p. 931. The relevant Baconian “idols” are the Idols of the Cave and the Idols of the Theater [Bacon, op. cit., pp. 48, 49; Aphorisms XLII and XLIV].) D. RELATIONS TO ARJSTOTELJAN CATEGORIES

As seen in the preceding three subsections (V,A-C), contradiction has at least three categorical meanings in contextualism. Relations of these meanings to the Aristotelian categories of opposition are analyzed in the present subsection.

Contextua1i.r.mand Developmental Psychology

209

1. Part and Whole The contradiction between parts and the whole is found in Aristotle’s system in the relation between material and formal causality, but the argument for this conclusion is too complex to be explicated here.

2. Blocked Action The contradiction in the resolution of blocked action, or the negation of the negation, is f o u n d - o n close examination-in the Aristotelian concept of contraries.

a. Contraries. According to Aristotle: Things are said to he opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives. . . . An instance of the use of the word “opposite” with reference to [i] correlatives is afforded by the expressions “double” and “half’; with reference to [ii] contraries by “bad” and “good.” [iii] Opposites in the sense of “privatives” and “positives” are “blindness” and “sight”; in the sense of [iv] affirmatives and negatives, the propositions “he sits,” “he does not sit.” (Categories, chap. 10 [ I Ib 16ffl; 1952a. pp. 16-17)

b. Contraries as Causes. The proposition under consideration here is that the negation of the negation involves (ii) contraries. Examples of contraries, in addition to bad versus good, are disease versus health, being heated versus being cooled, and being glad versus being vexed (Aristotle, Categories, chaps. 9-11 [1l b 1-14a 251; 1952a, pp. 16-19). Contrary to the proposition, Planty-Bonjour (1967) asserted: Any attempt to reduce dialectical contradiction to the opposition of contraries is senseless: not only because, in Aristotelianism, contraries exclude each other in such a way that if one is present in a subject the other is necessarily absent; hut also because for Aristotle contraries cannot have the property of being causal agents. (p, 113)

Planty-Bonjour’s first point is correct, but only superficially: On the surface, contraries exclude one another in the same substance, but on penetration they are found at the same time in one substance. Examples are (1) the 14th-century Black Death, which was bad because about a third of the human population died but was good because it contributed to the end of feudalism (Mumford, 1961, pp. 345-346); ( 2 ) the treatment of heroin addiction by methadone addiction, which is a disease because it is an addiction but is healthy in comparison with heroin addiction; (3) the heating of refrigerator coils to produce cooling; and (4) being glad at the safe return of a lost child while being vexed that the child had wandered away. A major thrust of dialectic is to penetrate the surface contradiction of contraries.

210

Huyne W. Reese

Planty-Bonjour’s second point is also correct, but also in a restricted sense. Planty-Bonjour was not denying the possible causal efficacy of the individual poles in a contrary relation; being glad or being vexed, for example, can have causal consequences. Rather, apparently, he was denying that either pole can cause the other. He cited for documentation Aristotle’s statement, “Contraries are not affected by one another” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 12, chap. 10 [1075a 301; 1952b, p. 606). Aristotle also said that “contraries are not in any way interdependent” (Categories, chap. 9 [ l l b 341; 1952a, p. 17) and “it is impossible for the contraries to be acted on by each other” (Physics, Bk. 1, chap. 7 [190b 331; 1 9 5 2 ~ p. . 266). However, “Everything. . . that comes to be by a natural process is either a contrary or a product of contrarid-“colours, for instance, from black and white”(Physics, Bk. 1, chap. 5 [188b 25,241; 1952c, p. 264; emphasis added); and The subject [of change] is one numerically, though it is two in form. (For it is the man. the gold-the “matter” generally-that is counted, for it is more of the nature of a “this,” and what comes to be does not come from it in virtue of a concomitant attribute; the privation, on the other hand, and the contrary are incidental in the process.) (Physics, Bk. 1, chap. 7 [100h 24-27]; 1 9 5 2 ~p. 266)

That is, becoming is a change not in substance but in form or in polarity of contraries; and form or polarity cannot change unless the substance lacked the form or had the opposite polarity prior to the change. Without the opposition (the form attained and its prior privation, or the polarity attained and its prior contrary), the final cause of change (to negate the privation or contrary) could not operate. Therefore, as Aristotle said, contrariety is not a cause of change; but it is nevertheless an essential condition for change.

c. Contraries and Blocked Actiort. Application of the foregoing explication to the contextualistic contradiction in the resolution of blocked action (i.e., the negation of the negation) reveals that the contradiction does not resolve itself-it is not self-moving-but rather it is resolved by an agent responding to the contradiction: The agent performs an instrumental action intended to negate the blocking action. The implication of final causality is not a problem for contextualism if “final cause” is interpreted as an intended goal rather than as an attained goal. Aristotle apparently conceptualized final cause in the sense of intended goal; he said, “in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature ‘prior’ to the effect” (Categories, chap. 12 [14b 10-151; 1952a, p. 20). One might argue that this solution is merely verbal in that Aristotle distinguished between the meaning of prior referring to causal order and its meanings referring to time, irreversible sequence, and order, among other meanings that are

irrelevant here (Catcgories. chap. 12 [ 14a 26-14b 221; 1952a, pp. 19-20). However, Aristotelianism does not guarantee that the potential form (dynamis) implicit in final causality will be the actual form ( e m ~ g c i aor , erztrlecheia) explicit in formal causality. Similarly. contextualism does not guarantee that any particular instrumental action will succeed i n negating any particular blocking action. In fact, the negation may he accomplished not as intended but by chance, as in Aristotle’s example of collecting money subscribed (negating a debt) as a result of a chance meeting with a subscriber (Physics. Bk. 2, chap. 5 [196b 33-197a 41; 1952c, p. 273).

3. Novelty The contradiction inherent in the contextualistic conception of novelty as categorical is found in Aristotle’s concept of incidental causality, which refers to an outcome that is in principle unpredictable beforc it occurs but is explainable after it occurs. However, in contextualism the explainahility of a past event is limited because, as noted i n Section VII,B. the past is as uncertain as the future in contextualism. Any assertion that an event cannot be predicted but can be understood after i t has occurred is thcrefore true only in the contextualistic sense of true-the explanation works. (The contextualistic truth criterion is discussed in the next section.)

VI. Truth in Contextualism The basic principle of pragmatic truth is that nothing is worth considering true, or real, unless it makes a difference in practice (James, 1907, p. 46). That is, the question, Is it true? is the same as Does it work‘! because the “true” course to anywhere is whatever course gets you there. This is the .‘successful working” theory of truth, which Peppcr (1942) believed reflects an overly narrow interpretation of contextualism. He admitted. however, that his broadened conception (“qualitative confirmation”) of the contextualistic theory of truth “comes dangerously near overstepping the categorial limits of contextualism” (p. 270), and that contextualists rely ultimatcly on successful working (“direct verification”-p. 278).

A. EXPLICATION

The truth criterion in contextualism is effective practice, or successful working. John Dewey (1933) said that meaning depends on use in a context (p. 145): “Things gain meaning when they are used as n1ean.s to bring about consequences

212

Hayne W. Reese

(or as means to prevent the occurrence of undesired consequences), or as standing for consequences for which we have to discover means” (p. 146). More clearly, perhaps, William James (1907) said: There can be no difference anywhere that does n’t make a difference elsewhere-no difference in abstract truth that doesn’t express itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere, and somewhen. The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this worldformula or that world-formula be the true one. (pp. 49-50)

A concrete example is Kantor’s (1953) description of science as particular individuals doing particular studies of particular objects in particular places at particular times (pp. 9-25; Kantor did not express the point in this way). James said that pragmatism is “a method only” and “has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method” (pp. 51, 54). However, the method “thickened into a doctrine and thence into a world theory” (Pepper, 1942, p. 268), and in the process the referent or meaning of the concrete criterion changed. Specifically, because the whole is defined arbitrarily, so are concrete fact, conduct, and “somebody, somehow, somewhere, somewhen.” Making a whole at one level the standard for evaluating a whole at another level would be a “category-mistake” (Ryle, 1949, chap. 1). For example, there can be a difference in epistemology that doesn’t make a difference in ontology, and there can he a difference in developmental psychology that doesn’t make a difference in physiological psychology; but there can be no difference anywhere in any domain that doesn’t make a difference elsewhere in the same domain. B. BASIS IN CONTEXTUALISM

The pragmatic truth criterion is undogmatic in contextualism because it is entailed by the contextualistic contradiction of blocked action (described in Sections V,B and V,D,2). Prosch (1964) expressed this notion as follows, explicitly discussing pragmatism: When man is faced with a situation in which his customary or habitual activity is non-effective in reaching its usual end, then this usual ending point of his activity, which he is now unable to reach, begins to glow in his mind as a “goal,” and “end in view.” This “purpose” that he now has forces him to cast about for new means (new activity) likely to accomplish it. If he find these, he has acquired a new set of activities or “principles”; because “principles,” the pragmatists think, are simply activities informed by a sense of direction. If principles are not really held in this form of directioned actions then they are not truly held. They are in such a case only verbally espoused-like the principles involved in the Sermon on the Mount, as far as most Christians are concerned. If a person cannot find new means to reach this blocked goal,

Contextualism and Developmentul Psychology

213

he will have to discover some other goal which he curl reach. This new goal will then induce him to forge other practical principles. In fact. his recognition that certain new principles are practically possible may be what f i s t opens his eyes to a new goal. (p. 337)

C. RELATION TO PRACTICE

The relation of truth to practice in contextualism can be seen in Ryle’s (1949) analysis of “to know” and “to believe” as examples of dispositional concepts. Ryle said: However often and stoutly a skater avers to us or to himself, that the ice will bear, he shows fhat he has his qualms, if he keeps to the edgc of the pond, calls his children away from the middle. keeps his eye o n the life-belts or continually speculates what would happen, if the ice broke. (p. 45)

(The relation between truth and practice in contextualism can also be seen in the dialectical materialist concept of the practice-theory-practice dialectic, which is described in, e.g., Fundumentals, 1961, p. 114; Mao, 1937/1965.) In brief, as Dewey said, knowledge is belief “held with assurance especially with the implication that the assurance is justified, reasonable, grounded” (quoted from Morgenbesser, 1977, p. xii). A principle of human development expressed by Niemczynski (1983) can be interpreted as reflecting this view. According to Niemczynski, “human strivings can not be considered to be definitely formed as long as the possibility of their concrete realization is not known” (p. 1 1 ) or “as long as the applicability of methods of their realization is not known” (p. 13). That is, persons cannot definitely envision (truly hold) an end unless they have in their repertoires a means to attain it. An end without a known means is abstract (and a means without an end is blind-to paraphrase Hegel’s comment that efficient causes without final causes are blind [Hegel, 1830/1892, p. 3441). Relevant to this point, Rescher (1977, pp. 8&8 1) distinguished between moral defect and rational defect. In science, moral defect would be exemplified by deliberate deception and by reckless speculation if anyone other than the perpetrator is adversely affected; rational defect would be exemplified by faulty arguments and incorrect conclusions from the evidence. Both the ethical and the rational ought demand can, but in different senses. Conformity to the ethical ought can be absolute (in principle), but the nearest approach to the rational oughf is successful practice. Beliefs (theories) guide practice, which in turn leads to improved beliefs. Any skeptical position regarding beliefs, and cognition in general, is purely theoretical, and the contextualistic argument against such a position is that it is irrelevant to practice and therefore irrelevant to truth in any useful sense (Rescher, 1977, pp. 94-95). Practice is based on beliefs-otherwise, practice is blind-and

Hayne W. Reese

214

therefore practice provides the only rational basis for determining truth; otherwise, truth is an empty abstraction. Furthermore, this practical criterion of the truth of beliefs is not adopted dogmatically but rather is justified by application of the criterion to the method itself A belief leads to practice that is effective (for some purpose), and according to the contextualistic method, the belief is accepted as true. This method has been effective in yielding beliefs that lead to effective practice (Rescher, 1977, pp. 96-97). However, the contextualist accepts the Humean-like argument that the method’s having worked in the past and in the present does not guarantee that it will work in the future. Nevertheless, the contextualist argues further that the past and present successes of the method provide a reasonable basis for presuming that the method will work in the future. The burden of proof therefore falls on the opponents of the method. If they are skeptics, they have no way to prove that the possibility that the method will not be effective means that it should not be used (Rescher, 1977, pp. 104-109). Rescher (1977) noted that the pragmatic method is involved not only in effective practical behavior but also in rational inquiry. “One should be rational ifone is to be effective and efJicient in the realization of one’s chosen objectives (whatever they may happen to be).” Therefore, the reason for using the pragmatic method is itself pragmatic in terms of “prudence and intelligent self-interest” (p. 99).

VII. Causality in Contextualism The treatment of causality in contextualism can be explicated most easily by reference to the Aristotelian categories of causality. This explication is given in the present section, beginning with a summary of the five kinds of Aristotelian causes, continuing with the classification of these as causes of being and of becoming, and ending with an explication of their relation to the concept of contradiction in contextualism.

A. THE FIVE KINDS OF CAUSES

Aristotle identified five kinds of causes: material, formal, efficient, final, and incidental (e.g., Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 2, chaps. 3-7 [194b 16-198b 91). All except final causes are accepted in contextualism.

I. Material Causality Material causality is obvious; the performance of an act (in a context) is itself concrete, or material, and requires an actor and a substrate to be acted on. The

contextualistic conception of material causality differs from the organic conception in separating the context from the substrate. In contextualistic psychology, for example, the environment is not merely the source of material for developmentthat is, experiences interpreted as material causes-but rather it is part of the efficient cause of development.

2. Forniul Causality Formal causality is implicated by the holism of contextualism: Each act is understood by looking at its whole-quality (in context). For example, the meaning of the act of writing the illustrative sentence is determined by the sentence as a whole. Writing the word period takes its meaning from the sentence that is being written.

3. EfficientCausality Efficient causality is also clearly implicated: The act is produced by antecedent forces or movements, which change the context and at the same time are guided by it. In psychology, this principle appears as the reciprocal interaction between the individual and the environment, including the social environment.

4. Final Causality The treatment of wholes in contextualism implies the denial of final causality. The whole is a fiction of sorts; consequently, it has no end toward which it must develop. It is like a musical composition: “A composer never completes a work; he eventually abandons it” (quoted by Professor Barton Hudson, personal communication, April 1987; Professor Hudson was unsure of its origin). Endings occur, of course, as when the composer abandons the work and when a writer actually puts a period at the end of the sentence, “I will put a period at the end of this sentence”; but any actual ending is only onc of many endings that could happen (Pepper, 1934b), and nothing in the system compels any one particular ending. For example, in the compound complex sentence that I just wrote, I did not put a period at the end of the sentence I will put u period at the end of this sentence; I put a semicolon. 1 may have intended to put a period there; but if so, my intention changed as the act unfolded (and the sentence became a clause, but this change is irrelevant to the point). Contextualism admits purpose, then, but not teleology. Purpose is not as obvious in the perceiving of the Japanese print as i n the writing of the sentenceanother advantage of the latter metaphor. However, a point that is important to understand is that these are only attempts to exemplify the contextualistic world view, which refers actually to whatever is common to all ongoing acts, or act as

Huyne W. Reese

216

a “type” in Pepper’s technical sense (Pepper, 1938, chap. 6). The universe therefore has no End, in this world view; it has only a series of endings. However, these endings are interconnected into “larger” endings and are analyzable into “smaller” endings. A corollary is that the universe has a series of beginnings, or in the catchwords of the University of Iowa Alumni Association, “never-ending beginnings” (Iowa Alumni, 1987). Augustine commented, after finishing his studies, “When a man hath done, he beginneth” (quoted by Brown, 1967, p. 10).

5. Incidental Causality Chance, or incidental causality, is accepted as basic in contextualism. In mechanism, incidental causality is merely an appeal to ignorance (e.g., Bergmann, 1957, p. 122; Pauling & Zuckerkandl, 1972); but in contextualism, it is a basic characteristic of the universe. The universe may change in unexplainable ways. This principle is the same as C . S. Peirce’s tychism: “the doctrine that absolute chance is a factor of the universe” (1898/1935, p. 137). A subtlety in this point may need explication. The contextualistic position does not require that the universe change in unexplainable ways; rather, it requires the possibility of unexplainable change. As Pepper (1942, pp. 258-260) commented, no such change has yet been demonstrated-so far, all unanticipated events that have occurred have been explainable after the fact-but the possibility nevertheless remains open.

B. BEING AND BECOMING

The contextualistic model includes the two causes of being-material and formal causes-and two causes of becoming-efficient and incidental causes. Incidental causality is important in this model, because it implies that the directionality of development is not fixed. As Labouvie-Vief and Chandler (1978) put it: Organismic models presume that all developmental change is ordered and equivalent to progress, [but] contextual theories regard change as simply that, and make no assumptions that such variations are in the service of achieving a particular goal 111 idealized end state. . . . A contextualist, in a way, is an organicist who has peered into the Platonic cavc and found it empty. (p. 201)

Developmental change is not necessarily equivalent to progress in contextualism because incidental causality precludes inevitability of progress-and inevitability of everything else except novelty itself (Pepper, 1942, p. 260; 1934b). Gergen emphasized this aspect of the model in referring to it as an aleatory orientation (1977) and an aleatoric perspective (1980). (The italicized adjectives are derived from the Latin afea, chance.)

Contextualism and Developmentul Psychology

217

An intriguing feature of contextualism is that the denial of necessity, which makes future occurrences of events and completions of events possible rather than inevitable, also makes the past possible rather than actual. Although the past was actual at one time. now that it is past it is no longer actual and any specific past is only one of several possible pasts (Pepper, 1935; for relevant discussion see also James, 1890, p. 609: Kvale, 1974; Pepper, 1934b; Riegel, 1972).

C. CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONS

An especially important difference between integrative and dispersive world views is their perspectives on the one-to-one, many-to-one, and one-to-many conceptions of cause-effect relations.

1. Integrative World Views

a. One-to-one Relations. In integrative world views, the one-to-one conception of cause-effect relations is accepted categorically: One cause can have only one effect because novelty is categorically rejected. h. Muny-to-One Relations. According to the many-to-one conception of cause-effect relations, many causes can have the same effect. This conception seems reasonable; but it is problematic in an integrative view even if each of the many causes has a one-to-one relation to its effect. It is problematic in mechanism because it contradicts the conception of postdiction, or explanation, as formally the same as prediction. That is, in mechanism, given the relevant process laws and assessment of the present state of the system, all future and past states can be equally well predicted and postdicted, respectively. However, in postdiction, many-to-one relations would become equivalent to one-to-many relations, which are denied. (The limitation imposed by the indeterminacy principle is irrelevant to the point because it would affect prediction and postdiction equally.) In organicism, many-to-one relations are rejected as developmental laws because they are inconsistent with final causality. The direction of development is determined by the final cause; that is, the path to the end is a specific sequence of specific stages. Many-to-one relations would allow alternative paths to the end and would therefore leave directionality unexplained.

c. One-to-Many Relations. According to the one-to-many conception of cause-effect relations, one cause can have alternative effects. This conception is inconsistent with an integrative view because it permits novel effects. Novel effects are denied in both mechanism and organicism. Furthermore, in organicism,

218

Huyne W. Reese

one-to-many relations would allow alternative ends and thus would contradict final causality.

2. Dispersive World Views In dispersive world views, the one-to-one conception is held lightly; it is accepted when found but is accepted only tentatively. In contrast, the many-to-one and one-to-many conceptions are accepted categorically: Many causes can have the same effect and one cause can have alternative effects because novelty is categorical. A given effect could always reflect chance causality-an outcome could result from chance encounters as well as from behavior that had this outcome as the goal. Similarly, a given event could always have a novel result. Another way to express these considerations is to say that many-to-one relations make the past uncertain and one-to-many relations make the future uncertain. Mead (1932/1959) said, “We look forward with vivid interest to the reconstruction, in the world that will be, of the world that has been, for we realize that the world that will be cannot differ from the world that is without rewriting the past to which we now look back” (p. 3). He could have said just that the past changes. Mead also said, “There is a finality that goes with the passing of every event. To every account of that event this finality is added, but the whole import of this finality belongs to the same world in experience to which this account belongs” (p. 3). That is, the past is understandable only in the present, and as the “present” changes, so does the understanding of the past. Kvale (1977) made the same point, citing Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, among others. (For other brief discussions of the uncertainty-and changeability-f the past, see Kaplan, 1964, p. 361; Kvale, 1974, 1977.) Empirical evidence is consistent with these conceptions. One example is research reviewed by Wisdom (1989) on the cycle of violence: Retrospective studies show that criminally violent adults are more likely than other adults to have been exposed to family violence and abuse as children, but that by far the majority of criminally violent adults were not exposed to family violence and abuse as children. Thus, the present (criminal violence) has more than one past. Prospective studies show that children who are exposed to family violence and abuse are more likely than other children to become criminally violent adults, but that by far the majority of at-risk children do not become criminally violent adults. Thus, the one present (family violence) can have more than one future. A final point here is that in contextualism, chance is categorically accepted as the possible cause of these multiple paths, but that a contextualist need not and should not presume that chance has a role unless other possible causes have been tested and found to be irrelevant. In the case of the cycle of violence, some of the moderator variables have been identified (Wisdom, 1989).

C‘otitrxtualism and Devt~loptnt~ntul Psychology

2 19

VIII. Adequacy of Contextualism Legitimate criticism of a world view requires evaluation of its adequacy; and in order to compare world views, adeqiiacy needs a universally applicable definition. Pepper (1942, pp. 74-77, 118) defined adequacy in terms ofprecision and scope, which are universally applicable criteria. Precision is the extent to which each phenomenon covered can be given only one interpretation that is consistent with the categories of the world view, or at most only a few alternative interpretations that are consistent with these categories. Scope is the range of phenomena covered. Precision and scope are incompatible, or at least in the extant world views either one is bought at the expense of the other. The different world views differ in both precision and scope; but even so, they can be equivalent in adequacy. Adequacy reflects the trade-off between precision and scope, or, put another way, it is the resolution of the contradiction between precision and scope.

A. PRECISION AND SCOPE

Pepper (1942, chap. 7) noted that contextualism is a dispersive theory. As such, it has great scope, but it is threatened by lack of precision; it is “constantly in difficulty with the number of equally consistent interpretations to which a single ‘fact’ is amenable” (p. 144). As Dixon and Hertzog (1984) said, “There are many ways [in contextualism] of analyzing a given event, none of which may be taken to ultimate completion; analysis, like knowledge, is never final” (pp. 3 4 ) . In contrast, mechanism and organicism are integrative theories: “The world appears literally as a cosmos where facts occur in a determinate order, and where, if enough were known, they could be predicted, or at least described, as being necessarily just what they are to the minutest detail” (Pepper, 1942, p. 143). The price these theories pay for precision, however, is lack of scope; this lack is forced on them, in part, by the need to reject as unreal any appearance of chance or unpredictability.

B. EMERGENCE

Contextualism is dispersive-that is, it lacks high precision-because of the categorical acceptance of novelty: The appearance of novelty may be real (truly emergent) or unreal (attributable to some as yet unknown efficient cause). Overton (1984) argued that this dispersiveness makes contextualism inherently unsuitable as a basis for science because a central aim of all science is systematic organization of knowledge-“integratiori of disparate and seemingly divergent data sources”

220

Huyne W. Reese

(p. 217). Lemer and Kauffman (1985) agreed. However, an implicit premise of the is argument is that the appearance of novelty is just that--appearance-and necessarily unreal. This is a categorical premise in mechanism and organicism; but if one starts with the premise that the appearance of novelty may be real rather than mere appearance, then the mechanistic and organic world views are unsuitable because they explain away novelty rather than explain it.

C. THE CRITERION OF PREDICTABILITY

A second implicit premise of Overton’s (1984) argument that contextualism is unsuitable as a basis for science is that predictability is a benchmark of science or at least is one of the goals of science. Many philosophers and scientists agree with this premise (e.g., Feigl, 1953; Spiker, 1977). However, Popper believed that the goal of science is satisfactory explanation (1983, p. 134). An explanation cannot be satisfactory unless it explains the facts and meets the falsifiability criterion. In order to meet the falsifiability criterion, the explanation must have testable implications, which may be predictions (Popper, 1983, pp. 117, 288). If novelty is denied, then complete predictability is in principle possible, within the limits of the principle of indeterminacy; and if novelty is accepted, then complete predictability is in principle impossible. Therefore, if one accepts the premise that prediction is the benchmark of science, then Overton’s argument is persuasive and compelling, and indeed no world view that accepts novelty can underlie science. However, if one accepts the counterpremise that prediction is not a necessary benchmark of science, then contextualism becomes a legitimate model for science (and so does formism, which is also dispersive).

1. Relation of World Views to the Predictability Criterion Popper (1983) believed that metaphysics should be eliminated from science insofar as possible because metaphysics is untestable; but he also believed that not all metaphysical elements can be eliminated from science (pp. 179-180). Max Planck (1949b, pp. 82-83) pointed out that the definition of science depends on the world view of the person giving the definition, and he commented that the assertion that science has no presuppositions means that scientists have no irrevocable preconceived opinions as to what is true, not that they have no world view (p. 82). Consequently, one can argue that acceptance of the premise that prediction is the benchmark of science depends on a scientist’s world view. Mechanists and organicists will categorically accept the premise, and reject the counterpremise that prediction is not a benchmark of science; contextualists will categorically accept the counterpremise and reject the premise. Mechanists accept

predictive certainty in the literal sense. Organicists accept it in the sense of determinism but not in the sense of continuity. That is, organicists believe that emergence prevents derivation or deduction of the characteristics of any stage from the characteristics of the preceding stage, but they also believe that finality determines a fixed set of stages in a fixed sequence-each stage is a model that integrates the behaviors that appear therein. and the finalistic theory as a whole is a model that integrates these models (Overton & Newman, 1983). Contextualists deny both the predictive certainty of mechanism and the finality of organicism. Why do scientists who adopt contextualism continue to do science, knowing that n o final answers are possible? Because they believe science is the best way to get temporarily effective answers. a. Predictuhility in Mechanism. Predictability is ohviously an in-principle requirement in mechanism. Popper (1974) said. “We live in a universe of emergent novelty” in that solutions of problems “beget new and deeper problems” (p. 281). However. he was referring to problems for the scientist, which are in the methodological or epistemological domain, not in the ontological domain of the universe the scientist is trying to explain. Popper also said that a universe that includes “world 3.’’ which contains the products of the human mind, must be open, indeterminate, and unpredictable. He used as an example a man drawing a detailed map of the room he is working in, including in the map the map he is drawing, which must also include the map in the map. Each line he adds to his map must be added to the maps within each map. The task is not completable because it involves an infinite series; and the drawing of the lines is increasingly imprecise because the lines become increasingly small. The errors in drawing the line ”in principle will be unpredictable and indeterniinate” (p. 380). Aside from his failure 10 specify the principle involved, Popper made a category-mistake (Ryle, 1949) in interpreting the inability to predict, which is in the methodological domain ( a problem with acquisition of information), as being in the epistemological domain (a problem with knowability) or the ontological domain (a problem with real causality). What emerges and is therefore indeterminate is in the domains of methodology and epistemology, not the domain of ontology. That is, the errors that occurred must have had efficient causes, in the mechanistic world view, but either the causes cannot be assessed (a methodological problem) o r their effects cannot be interpreted (an epistemological problem). To be relevant to the mechanistic world view, issues such as Popper raised must refer to ontology. (Another problem with his example is that it is irrelevant to performance in the real world: In practice. the man would stop drawing the lines before they became too small to see. That is, Popper’s example is not in the domain of practice, it is in the domain of abstract logic, like Zeno’s paradoxes of motion and statements such as

222

Hayne W. Reese

I will die at the stake if my next statement is a Lie. I will die at the stake. I leave aside the further question as to whether the errors in drawings of tiny lines are really in “world 3.”)

b. Predictability in Organicism and Contextualism. Predictability is also an in-principle requirement in organicism, in which it means derivability from the four basic Aristotelian causes, excluding incidental causes. However, in contextualism the possibility of true novelty requires that predictability is entirely a matter of practice rather than principle: Predictability is admitted (and no doubt enjoyed) when it occurs (Gergen, 1980), but it is also admitted (possibly without enjoyment) when it does not occur. Gergen (1977) pointed out that the weather forecaster has trouble making predictions from physical theory on any given day, and that the psychologist has a worse job not only because the number of relevant variables is large, but also because the list of relevant variables and the relationships among them are subject to change. He also pointed out, however, that even incorrect predictions can be useful if they are used to guide the revising of a theory. Baltes (1987) characterized Gergen’s approach as “radical” contextualism, but it is radical only in that Gergen was in effect exploring the consequences of taking the dispersiveness category of contextualism seriously. The fact that he was able to develop a basis for science in the face of dispersiveness contradicts Overton’s (1984) assertion that the dispersiveness category is incompatible with science. A more conservative conclusion of the line of reasoning Gergen was pursuing is that theory should not only organize knowledge but also should guide the generation of new knowledge. Even though this position was advanced in a Soviet textbook on Marxism-Leninism (The Fundamentals, 1982, p. 181), it is still conservative-and fully compatible with contextualism, formism, and organicism, lacking only the predictability criterion to be fully compatible with mechanism.

c. Predictability and Scope. If scope rather than predictability is taken as the benchmark of science, then mechanism and organicism are found to be lacking and contextualism comes to the fore (Pepper, 1942, chap. 7). Mechanists and organicists prefer precision; contextualists and formists prefer scope. However, none of the four world views should be said to be deficient in precision or scope. Rather, mechanism and organicism have more precision than contextualism and formism, and the latter have more scope than the former. However, on the one hand, mechanism and organicism are not deficient in scope, because scope is secondary to determinateness (precision) in these world views; and on the other hand, contextualism and formism are not deficient in precision, because predictability is secondary to scope in these world views. Thus, attributing deficiency of one or the other kind to a world view must come from use of the categories of a different world view. For example, the failure of physics to explain the beauty of a rose is not a deficiency because this topic is not included in its scope; and the

C‘oiirruriiuli \in iiriil

Dcvclopmrrrtul Psychology

223

failure of psycholinguistics to explain operant conditioning is not a deficiency because this topic is not included i n its scope. Nevertheless, both precision and scope are important for science, and no world view that is truly deficient-n its own ground rules-in either characteristic can serve as a basis for science. As Pepper (1942) pointed out, all four world views mentioned here are relatively adequate for this purpose.

2. Adequacy of the Predictability Criterion Even when predictability is taken to be an important criterion, it does not yield certainty. The 19th-century philosopher of science William Whewell extolled prediction: “It is a test of true theories not only to account for, but to predict phenomena” (1847/1967, Aphorism XII, p. 468). His argument was: “Such a coincidence of untried facts with speculative assertions cannot be the work of chance, but implies some large portion of truth in the principles on which the reasoning is founded” (p. 64). The phrase “some large portion” is a hedge implying that even verified prediction is fallible. The phrase could have been careless (Whewell habitually published his first drafts-Herivel, 1967, p. xxii). but an indication that the phrase was intended is that Whewell used similar phrases-‘% least to a great extent” and “to a considerable extent”--in the same section: “The truth and accuracy of these predictions [i.e., predictions from the “Epicyclicul Theory of the heavens”] were a proof that the hypothesis was valuable and, at least to a great extent, true; although, as was afterwards found, it involved a false representation of the structure of the heavens” (p. 63). And: “Those who can do this [ i.e., “determine effects beforehand”], must, to a considerable extent, have detected nature’s secret” (p. 64). Herschel (1841) agreed with Whewell, without the hedges but with some euphoria: Another character of sound induction5 is that they enable us to predict. We feel secure that our rule is based on the realities of nature. when it stands us in thc stcsd of new experience; when it crnbodics facts as an experience wider than our own would do. and in a way that our ordinary experience would ncccr rcach; when it will hear not stress. but torture. and gives true results in cases s t u d i o d y different from those which led to its discovery. (p. 133)

Nevertheless, the confirmation of a prediction has long been known to be a logical fallacy-the fallacy of affirming the consequent. The procedure is: Prediction: If theory A is true, then observation B is true. Observation: B is true. Conclusion: Therefore, A is true.

224

Hayne W. Reese

In practice, however, as Whewell’s statements imply, the reasoning is heuristic rather than syllogistic. Polya (1948) said that heuristic reasoning “yields only a plausible indication and not an unfailing certainty,” but “the most important signs of progress are heuristic” (p. 215). For example: If we are approaching land, we often see birds. Now we see birds. Therefore, probably, we are approaching land. Without the word “probably” the conclusion would be an outright fallacy. , , . With the word “probably” the conclusion is reasonable and natural but by no means a proof, a demonstrative conclusion; it is only an indication, a heuristic suggestion. (p. 215)

D. IDENTITY CRISIS

Pepper’s (1942) analysis of contextualism suggests that it has an “identity crisis” in that its categories constantly pull it in two different directions-toward mechanism and toward organicism. Having rejected contextualism as a basis for science, Overton (1984) followed up on this identity crisis by suggesting that self-styled contextualists are actually either mechanists or organicists, and that in order to avoid confusion they should “explicitly acknowledge when they mean mechanistic-contextualistic and when they mean organismic-contextualistic” (p. 219). However, Overton ignored Pepper’s conclusion that contextualism is after all an autonomous world view and therefore he missed the implication that should be drawn: Contextualists should constantly be on guard against slipping over into mechanism and organicism, by testing any new concepts and principles against the categories of contextualism.

IX. In Lieu of Summary: An Application of Contextualism The development of learning, memory, problem solving, and other cognitive processes is more strongly “canalized” during childhood than during adulthood and old age. That is, development in adulthood exhibits more plasticity and stronger environmental influences than in childhood (e.g., Flavell, 1970). Consequently, several investigators have concluded that the contextualistic world view is more appropriate than the mechanistic and organic world views as a model or framework for understanding adult development. Contextualism is more appropriate because of its openness to change and its denial of fixity of antecedentconsequent relations, that is, its insistence on the possibility of many-to-one and one-to-many relations rather than one-to-one or even many-to-one if one-to-many is denied (Labouvie-Vief & Chandler, 1978). (Flavell, 1970, made essentially the same point but without referring to world views as such. Pepper’s, 1942, analysis

was at that time largely unknown i n developmental psychology--or anywhere else.) For the same reasons, the contextualistic world view has also seemed more appropriate than the mechanistic and organic world views as a model or framework for understanding development across the entire life span (Baltes, 1979b, 1987: Baltes & Reese, 1984; Baltes, Reese, & Lipsitt, 1980; Labouvie-Vief & Chandler, 1978: Meacham, 1976; Reese, 1976a, 1976b, I977a, 1982). For example. contextualism can accommodate the change from relative fixity to relative plasticity as a “dialectical leap” from increasing alienation between experience and thinking to a reconciliation of experience and thinking, as Riegel (1978, pp. 108, 199) suggested. The reconciliation, which is a new synthesis, may sound Hegelian-as in the synthesis of the world and thought in the Absolute Idea. However, Hegelians would not agree with Riegel’s interpretation of Piaget’s theory as exhibiting increasing alienation between experience and thinking; they would agree with Piaget that the developmental changes in thinking yield increasing adaptation to experience. The disagreement is based on Riegel’s interpretation of thinking as concrete, which is more Marxist than Hegelian in spite of Riegel‘s attempt to put his interpretation in a Hegelian framework, and Piaget’s interpretation of experience as idealistic. For Piaget, effective experience is not a reflection of the real world; rather, it is a reflection of the mind. That is, although what might be called objective experience is a material cause of thinking for Piaget (Reesc, 1986). experience is effective only after it has been internalized-transfrmed by assimilation or accommodation. Another difference is that Riegel saw the reconciliation as accomplished by a shift from the abstract thinking of Piaget’s formal operational stage to more concrcte thinking (but not a regression to Piaget’s conc’retc op~~rotionul thinking); in contrast, the Hegelian synthesis is accomplished by a shift from concrete experience to more abstract experience. In short, life-span psychological development exhibits a multitude of dialectical contrasts and oppositions, both within and between age periods. The dialectical nature of development is hard to reconcile with mechanism and is more easily and plausibly represented by contextualism than by organicism.

REFERENCES Aristotlc. (1952a). (’uir,yoric\ (E. M. Edghill. trans.). I n R . M . Hutchins (Ed.-in-Chief). C;rcrr/ hooks 01’ rlic, Itiwcw wot-/d (Vol. 8. pp. S-21; W. D. Ross. Ed.). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britmnic;1. Aristotle. (1952b). Me/rrp/tpsics (W. D. Ross. trans.). I n R. M . Hutchins (Ed.-in-Chief). C;t-cwi hook.s o / i / i c ~LVc*.siernw r k l (Vul. 8.pp, 4W-020; W . D. Rosa. Ed.). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. Aristotle. ( 1 9 5 2 ~ )P/i\~sic,\ . (R. P. Hardit! & R. K. Ciayc, trans.). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed-in-Chiet). Grc~ri htdi.s of ilie We.vieni world (Vol. 8, pp. 3 7 - 3 5 ; W. D. Ross. Ed.). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Hritannica

226

Hayne W. Reese

Aristotle. (1952d). On the soul (J. A. Smith, trans.). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.-in-Chief], Great books of the Western world (Vol. 8, pp. 629-668; W. D. Ross, Ed.). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. Bacon, F. (1960). The new organon and related writings ( J . Spedding, R. L. Ellis, & D. D. Heath, trans.; F. H. Anderson, Ed.). Indianapolis. IN: Bobbs-Merrill. (Original work published 1620) Baltes, P. B. (1979, Summcr). On the potential and limits of child development: Life-span developmental perspectives. Newslerter Svciery for Research in Child Developmenr. pp. 1-4. Baltes, P. B. (1987). Theoretical propositions of life-span developmental psychology: On the dynamics between growth and decline. Developmental Psychology, 23, 61 1626. Baltes. P. B.. & Reese. H. W. (1984). The life-span perspective in developmental psychology. In M. H. Bornstein & M. E. Lamh (Eds.), Developmenlal psychology: An advanced lei-thook (pp. 493-531). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Baltes. P. B., Reese, H. W., & Lipsitt. L. P. (1980). Life-span developmental psychology. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 65-1 10. Barnes, J. (1979). The Presocrrrticphilo.sop1irrs: Vol. 1. Thales to Zeno. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Baumrind, D. (1989). The permanence of change and the impermanence of stability. Human Develvpmen:, 32, 187-1’)s. Bergmann, G. (1957). Philosophy vfscience. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Brown, P. (1967). Augustine of Hippo: A biograpli-y. Berkeley: University of California Press. Buffon, Count de. (1 791). Naturalhistory, generulandpurticular (W.Smellie, trans.; Vol. 2). London: Strahan & Cadell. Butler, J. D. (1957). Four philo.sophies: And their practice in education and religion (rev. ed.). New York: Harper & Row. Butler, S . (1925). Thought and language (lecture originally presented in 1894). In The works ofSamuel Butler (Vol. 19, pp. 59-90), New York: AMS Press. (1968 reprint cited) Dewey, J. (1933). How we think: A restatement of the relution of reflective thinking to the educative process. Boston: Heath. Dixon, R. A., & Hertzog, C. (1984, June). A functional approach to metamemory developnient in adulthood. In F. E. Weinert & M. Perlmutter (Chairs), Conference on Memory Development across the Life Span, Munich, West Germany. Feigl, H. (1953). The scientific outlook Naturalism and humanism. In H. Feigl & M.Brodbeck (Eds.). Readings in the philosophy of science (pp. 8-18). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Flavell, J. H. (1970). Cognitive changes in adulthood. In L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Liferpan developmental psychology: Research and theory (pp. 247-253). New York: Academic Press. Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism: Manual (C. Dutt, Ed.). (1961). Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. Gergen, K. J. (1977). Stability, change, and chance in understanding human development. In N. Datan & H. W. Reese (Eds.), Life-span de~elopmentalpsychology: Dialectical perspectives on experimental research. New York Academic Press. Gergen, K. J. (1980). The emerging crisis in life-span developmental psychology. In P. B. Baltes & 0. G. Brim, Jr. (Eds.), Life-span development and behavior (Vol. 3, pp. 31-63). New York: Academic Press. Guthrie, W. K. C. (1Y62). A history of Greek philosophy: Vol. 1. The earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreuns. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hahn, L. E. (1942). A contextualistic theory of perception. Universig of California Publications in Philosophy, 22, 1-205. Hayes, S.C., Hayes, L. J., & Reese, H. W. ( I 988). Finding the philosophical core: A review of Stephen C. Pepper’s World hypotheses: A study in evidence. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 50, 97-1 11.

Contextualism and Developmental Psychology

227

Hegel, G. W. F. (1892). Ttie logic of Hegel (2nd ed.; W. Wallace, trans.). London: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1830; 193 1 impression cited) Hegel, G. W. F. (1955). Hegel’s lectures oii the history ofphilosophy (Vol. 1: E. S. Haldane & F. H. Simson. trans.). New York: Humanities Press. (Original work published 1840) Helson. H. (1964). Aduptatiori-level rheory. New York: Harper & Row. Herivel. J. (1967). Introduction. In W. Whewell. The philo.soph,y oftlie inductive sciences: Founded upon their history (Vol. I , pp. ix-xxxviii). New York: Johnson Reprint Corp. Herschel. J . F. W. (1841). (Review of William Whewell’s Hisiory ofthe inductive .scieiic-esfrom the eurliest to the preserit tinies and The plrilosoptiy of the inductive sciences founded ripon their hi\/ory]. Quurterly Review, 68, 177-2315. Hesse. M. B. (1966). Modek mid uiiu/ogies 111 .scicr7c-r. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Prcss. Hoffman, R. R. (19x5). Context and contextualism in the psychology of learning. In G. Tiberghien (Ed.), Context and cognition. Cahitm de P.syc/iologie Cognitive. Hultsch, D. F.. & Pentz, C. A. (1980). Research on adult learning and memory: Retrospect and prospect. Contemporary Educutiorial I’.syc/iology, 5. 298-320. lowa Ahrtiirii Never-Ending Begirinirigs. ( 1987. October). [Flier from the University of lowa Alumni Association] James. W. (1890). The prinrip1e.s ofpsycliology (Vol. 1). New York: Holt. James, W. (1907). Prugmatian: A iiew nume for . w i n e old ways of thinkiiig. New York: Longmans, Green. Janet, P. (1884). Firinl causes (2nd ed., W. Affleck. trans.). New York: Scrihner’s. Kahn. C. H. (1979). Tlrc art and ttiought of Heraclitiis: An edition of the frugmena with truii.slution uiid commeii~ury.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kantor, J. R. (1923). The organismic vs. the mentalistic attitude toward the nervous system. Psychological Bulletin, 20. 684-699. Kantor, J. R. (1938). The nature of psychology as a natural science. Actci P.sychologicu, 4, 1-61, Kantor, J. R. (1942). Preface to interbehavioral psychology. P.sychologica1Record, 5, 173-193. Kantor, J. R. (1953). The Iogic oj‘niodcrii .scieiice. Chicago: Principia Press. Kantor, J. R. (1963). Ttie scientific evolutioii of psychology (Vol. 1). Chicago: Principia Press. Kaplan. A. ( 1 964). Tlie conduct of inquiry. San Francisco: Chandler. Kirk, G. S . (1951). Natural change in Heraclitus. Mind, 60, 3 5 4 2 . Kirk, G. S. (1954). Heraclitus: The cosmic fraginenrs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Presh. Kitchener, R. F. (1982). Holism and the organismic model in developmental psychology. Huniaii Deve/opiizeiit. 25, 233-249. Kojima. H. (1986). Japanese concepts of child development from the mid-17th to mid-19th century. 9, 3 15-329. birertiational Jourtiul of Betiiivioral Dei~c~lopmeiir, Krutch. J. W. (1953). The ineusirre of innri: On freedoin. liirrnurr r~alues.sirrvival and the moderii temprr. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. Kuhn. T. S . ( 1 970). The striictiwc ofscieiitific rewhttiom (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kuhn, T. S . ( 1977). The essential iension: Selected .srirdie.\ iii scientifictradition and change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kvale. S. (1974). The temporality of memory. Journal oJ Phe~iomeiiologicalPsychology. 5, 7-31. Kvale, S. (1977). Dialectics and research on remernhering. In N. Datan & H. W. Recse (Eds.), Life-spmi der~elopmentalpsyclrology: Dialectical perspectiiles on experimental research (pp. 165-189). New York: Academic Press. Labouvie-Vief, G., & Chandler, M. J. (1978). Cognitive development and life-span developmental theory: Idealistic versus contextual perspectives. In P. B. Baltes (Ed.), Life-span development and behavior (Vol. I. pp. 181-210). New York: Academic Press.

228

Huyiie W.

Hecse

Lenin, V. I. (1961). Conspectus of Lassalle’s book The philosophy of Heraclitus the Obscure of Ephesus. In V. I. Lenin, Collected works. Vol. 38: Philosophical notebvvks (pp. 337-353). Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. (1981 printing cited; Conspectus originally written in 191.5) Lerner, R. M., & Kauffman. M. B. (1985). The concept of development in contextualism. Developmental Review, 5 , 309-333. Lerner, R. M., Skinner, E. A., & Sorell, G. T. (1980). Methodological implications of contextualidialectic theories of dcvelopment. In D. F. Hultsch (Chair), Implications of a dialectical perspective for research methodology. Human Development, 23, 217-267. Lotze, H. (1884). Mefaphysic in three books: Ontology, cosmology, and prychology (B. Bosanquet, Ed.). London: Oxford University Press. Mao Zedong. (1965) On Practice. In Selected works of.. . (Vol. 1, pp. 295-309). Peking: Foreign Languages Press. (Original work dated 1937) Meacham, J. A. (1976). Continuing the dialogue: Dialectics and remembering. Human Development. 19, 304-309. Mead. G. H. (1959). The philosophy oJthe present (A. E. Murphy, Ed.; Vol. 3 in Selected works oJ C. H. Mead). La Salle, IL: Open Court. (Original work published 1932) Miller, D. L. (1943). G. H. Mead’s conception of “present.” Philosophy oJScience, 10, 40-46. Morgenbesser, S. (1977). Introduction. In S. Morgenbesser (Ed.), Dewey and his critics: EssaysfTom The Journal of Philosophy (pp. ix-xlv.). New York: The Journal of Philosophy. Mounoud, P. (1987). Segmentation and integration abilities in cognitive and tanguage development. In China Sardlife ISSBD Conference: Proceedings (Vol. 1, pp. 2-42-2-52). Beijing: Committee of Developmental Psychology, Chinese Psychological Society, & International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development. Mumford, L. (1961). The ciry in history: Ifs origins, irs fransJurmation.s,und its prospects. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Niemczynski, A. (1983, July-August). Processes oJ IiJe-span development: An idealized descripfion. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development, Munich, Germany. Overton, W. F. (1973). On the assumplive base of the nature-nurture controversy: Additive versus interactive conceptions. Hutnun Development, 16,74-89. Overton, W. F. (1978). Klaus Riegel: Theoretical contribution to concepts of stability and change. In F. P. Hardesty & P. B. Baltes (Chairs), The contributions of Klaus F. Riegel(1925-1977). Human Development, 21, 346-369. Overton, W. F. (1984). World views and their influence on psychological theory and research: Kuhn-Lakatos-Laudan. In H. W. Reese (Ed.),Adwnces in Child Development and Behavior (Vol. 18, pp. 191-226). New York: Academic Press. Overton, W. F., & Newnian, J. L. (1982). Cognitive development: A competence-activation/utilization approach. In T. M. Field, A. Huston, H. C. Quay, L. Troll. & G. E. Finley (Eds.), Review ofhuman deidopment (pp. 217-241). New York: Wiley. Overton, W. F., & Reese, H. W. (1973). Models of development: Methodological implications. In J. R. Nesselroade & H. W. Reese (Eds.), LiJe-span developmentul psychology: Methodological issues (pp. 65-86). New York: Academic Press. Overton, W. F., & Reese, H. W. (1981). Conceptual prerequisites for an understanding of stabilitychange and continuity-discontinuity. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 4. 99123. Pauling, L., & Zuckerkandl, E. (1972). Chancc in cvolution-Some philosophical remarks. In D. L. Rohlfing & A. I. Oparin (Eds.), Molecular evolufion:Prebiological and biological (pp. 113-1 26). New York: Plenum. Peirce, C. S. (1935). Collectedpupers of CharlesSanders Peirce (C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss, Eds.; Vol. 6). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Lcctures originally written 1898)

Contextualism and Developmental Psychology

229

Pepper, S. C. (1932). How to look for causality-an example of philosophic method. University of California Publications in Philosophy, 15, 177-203. Pepper, S. C. (1934a). The conceptual framework of Tolman’s purposive behaviorism. Psychological Review, 41, 108-133. Pepper, S. C. (1934b). A contextualistic theory of possibility. University of California Publications in Philosophy, 17, 177-197. Pepper, S. C. (1935). The order of time. University of California Publications in Philosophy, 18,3-20. Pepper, S. C. (1938). Aesthetic quality: A contextualistic theory of beauty. New York: Scribner’s. Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses. Berkeley: University of California Press. (1966 paperbound ed. cited) Pepper, S. C. (1945). The basis of criticism in the arts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pepper, S. C. (1960). A neural-identity theory of mind. In S. Hook (Ed.), Dimensions of mind (pp. 45-61). New York: Collier. Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1973). Memory and intelligence (A. J. Pomerans, trans.). New York: Basic Books. (Original work published 1Y68) Pittendrigh, C. S. (1958). Adaptation, natural selection, and behavior. In A. Roe & G. G. Simpson (Eds.), Behavior and evolution (pp. 39M16). New Haven: Yale University Press. Planck, M. (1949a). A scientific autobiography. In M. Planck, Scientific autobiography and other papers ( F . Gaynor, trans.; pp. 13-51). New York: Philosophical Library. Planck, M.(1949b). The meaning and limits of exact science. In M. Planck, Scientific autobiography and other papers (F. Gaynor, trans.; pp. 80-120). New York: Philosophical Library. Planty-Bonjour, G. (1967). The categories of dialectical materialism: Contemporary Soviet ontology (T. J. Blakeley, trans.). Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel & New York: Praeger. Plato. (1952). Laws. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.-in-Chief), Great books of the Western world (Vol. 7, pp. 640-799; B. Jowett, trans.). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. Polya, G. (1948). How to solve it: A new aspect of mathematical method (5th printing, text “slightly changed” & appendix added). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Popper, K. R. (1974). Scientific reduction and the essential incompleteness of all science. In F. J. Ayala & T. Dobzhansky (Eds.). Studies in the philosophy of biology: Reduction and related problems (pp. 259-284). Berkeley: University of California Press. Popper, K. R. (1983). Realism and the aim ofscience. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. Prosch, H. (1964). The genesis of twentieth century philosophy: The evolution of thought from Copernicus to the present. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Reese, H. W. (1968). The perception of stimulus relations: Discrimination learning and transposition. New York: Academic Press. Reese, H. W. (1976a). The development of memory: Life-span perspectives. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 11, pp. 189-212). New York: Academic Press. Reese, H. W. (1976b). Models of memory development. Human Development, 19, 291-303. Reese, H. W. (1977a). Discriminative learning and transfer: Dialectical perspectives. In N. Datan & H. W. Reese (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Dialectical perspectives on experimental research (pp. 205-252). New York: Academic Press. Reese, H. W. (1977b). Toward a cognitive theory of mnemonic imagery. Journal ofMental Imagery, 1, 229-244. Reese, H. W . (1982). Behavior analysis and life-span developmental psychology. Developmental Review, 2, 150-161. Reese, H. W. (1986). Behavioral and dialectical psychologies. In L. P. Lipsitt & J. H. Cantor (Eds.), Experimental child psychologist: Essays and experiments in honor of Charles C. Spiker (pp. 157-195). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Reese, H. W., & Overton, W. F. (1970). Models of development and theories of development. In L. R. Goulet and P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Research and theory (pp. 115-145). New York: Academic Press.

230

Huyne W. Reese

Rescher, N. (1977). Dialectics: A controversy-oriented approach to the theory of knowledge. Albany: State University of New York Press. Riegel. K. F. (1972). Time and change in the development of the individual and society. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development arid behavior (Vol. 7, pp. 81-1 13). New York: Academic Press. Riegel. K. F. (1975). A manifesto for dialectical psychology. Humun Development, 18, 239-241. Riegel, K. F. (1976). The dialectics of human development. American Psychologist, 31, 689-700. Riegel, K. F. (1978). P.sychology tnon amour; A countertexf.Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Riegel, K. F., & Meacham, J. A. (1976). The developiiig individual in a changing world ( 2 vols). Chicago: Aldine. Romanes, G. J. (1885). Mental evolution in animals. London: Kegan Paul, Trench. Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson's University Library. Schrodinger, E. (1958). Mind and matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Skinner, B. F. (1989). The behavior of the listener. In S. C. Hayes (Ed.), Ruk-goi~ernedbehavior: Cognition, contingencies, and iri.structiona/ currrrol (pp. 85-96), New York: Plenum. Spence, K. W. (1956). Behuwior theory and conditioning. New Haven: Yale University Press. Spiker, C. C. (1966). The concept of development: Relevant and irrelevant issues. In H. W. Stevenson (Ed.), Concept of development: A report of a conference commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota (pp. 40-54). Monugraph.sofrhe Society for Research in Child Development, 31 (5, Serial No. 107). Spiker, C. C. (1977). Behaviorism, cognitive psychology, and the active organism. In N. Datan Rr H. W. Reese (Eds.), Lifr-span dewlopmental psychology: Dialectical perspectives on experimental research (pp. 93-103). New York: Academic Press. Spinoza, B. de. (1949). Ethics. In B. de Spinoza, Erhics preceded by On the improvement of lhe toiderstanding (J. Gutmann. Ed.; pp. 39-280). New York: Hafner. (Original work published 1677) The firndumenrds ofMarxist-Leninist philosophy ( F . V . Konstantinov, Chief Ed.; trans. from rev. ed. by R. Daglish). (1982). Moscow: Progress Publishers. Vlastos, G. (1 955a). On Heraclitus. American Journal of Philology, 76, 337-368. Vlastos, G . (1955b). [Review of Heraclitus: The cosmicfragrnenfs, by G. S. Kirk]. American Journal of Philology, 76, 31LL313. Voeks, V. W. (1954). Acquisition of S-R connections: A test of Hull's and Guthrie's theories.Journal of Experimental Psychology, 47, 137-147. Vygotsky, L. S. (1962). Thought and language (E. Hanfmann & G . Vakar, Eds. & trans.). New York: Wiley. (Original work published 1934) Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). Thought and language (A. Kozulin, Ed. & trans.). Cambridge: MIT Press. (Original work published 1934) Watts, 1. (1742). Philosophical essays, &c. In 1. Watts, Philosophical essays on various subjects [etc.] (3rd ed., pp. iii-xvi, 1-313). London: James Brackstone. Whewell, W. (1967). The philosophy of the inductive sciences: Founded upon their history (2nd ed., Vol. 2). New York: Johnson Reprint Cop. (Original work published 1847) Wisdom, C. S. (1989). The cycle of violence. Science, 244, 160-166. Woodworth, R. S. (1918). Dynamic psychology. New York: Columbia University Press. Zeiler, M. D. (1967). Stimulus definition and choice. In L. P. Lipsitt & C. C. Spiker (Eds.), Advances in child development and behavior) Vol. 3, pp. 125-156). New York: Academic Press.

HORIZONTALITY OF WATER LEVEL: A NEO-PIAGETIAN DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW

Juan Pascual-Leone DEPARTMLNT 01 PSY( HOLOCtY YORK UNIVERSITY N O R T H YORK. ONTARIO M7J 1P.i. CANADA

Sergio Morru DIPARTIMENTO DI PSICOLO(r1A GENERALE UNIVERSITA D I PADOVA 75 I?') PADOVA ITALY

1. INTRODUCTION 11. SOME POST-PIAGETIAN THEORIES ABOUT THE WATER LEVEL INVARIAN'T 111. POST-PIAGETIAN DATA A. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS B. SUMMARY IV

GENDER DIFFERENCES 4 BIOLOGICAL FACTORS t 3 COGNITIVE RESOURCE FACTORS C INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE FACTORS COGNITIVE STYLE AND KNOWLEDGE A S DETERMINANTS O F GENDER DIFFERENC'ES

V. EVIDENCE FOR PHYSICAL AND GEOMETRIC KNOWLEDGE AS A FACTOR IN HORIZONTALITY JUDGMENTS VI. EVIDENCE FOR RESPONSE BIAS OK SIIMIJLUS-RESPONSE COMPATIBILITY A. A PARAMEIRIC STCJDY OF WATER LEVEL A S A PERCEPTUAL-MOTOR TASK B. EVIDENCE FROM PERCEPTUAL ANALOGS O F THE WATER LEVEL TASK C. COPY-THE-STRIPE TASK: A NONCONCEPTUAL TEST OF RESPONSE BIAS VII. PROCESS ANALYSIS O F ERRORS IN THE WATER LEVEL TASK A. THE ROLE O F SCHEME B. THE ROLE O F SILENT HARDWARE OPERATORS C. ENDOGENOUS MENTAL A'ITENTION EXPLICATED D. ROLE O F MENTAL ATTENTION IN MISLEADING SITUATIONS E. ERROR FACTORS O F ATTENTION IN THE WATER LEVEL TASK

23 1 ADVANC'ES IN C.'HII.D I)LVLI.(IPMBN7

AND BEHAVIOR. VOL 23

Juan Pascual-Leone arid Sergio Morra

232

VIII. DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE MODEL A. DEVELOPMENTAL EMERGENCE OF WATER LEVEL SCHEMES AND CONSEQUENT INCREASE OF MENTAL DEMAND B. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS MODEL

IX. OTHER EMPIRICAL STUDIES SUPPORTING THE MODEL X. IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS: COMPARISON WITH OTHER CURRENT MODELS REFERENCES

I. Introduction Piaget and Inhelder (1948/1967) devised the water level task to study children’s progressive understanding of the spatial-coordinate system. Subjects were presented a rectangular-shaped bottle half-filled with water. They were then shown a similar empty bottle, which the researchers tilted at various angles. For each angle of inclination, the subjects had to indicate the direction of the water level, under the assumption that this bottle was half-filled with water. Results showed that different patterns of errors were typical of the preoperational and concreteoperational developmental stages. Much research with this task carried out in the 1960s and 1970s uncovered new facts (such as degree of accuracy of adult subjects and the role of the bottle’s shape and other variables in the task); and it also clarified methodological issues. Prior to the 1980s no developmental model appeared that was incompatible with Piagetian or neo-Piagetian theorizing about the task. More recently, however, models that contradict Piagetianheo-Piagetian theory have been published. In this review, we examine relevant data and the available developmental models. Motivated by the empirical facts that emerge from the review, we also summarize a neoPiagetian model that was proposed in the 1960s (Pascual-Leone, 1969) but that had little impact on subsequent published work. This model actually predicted many of the empirical results obtained in the 1970s and 1980s, facts that other published models cannot explain. The model was based on theoretical assumptions that more recently might be seen as anticipating aspects of the functional architecture that connectionistheural modeling has explicitly brought to the fore. Liben (1988) emphasized the importance of general developmental theories, and their explication of task performances, to clarify the processes that generate the data on spatial cognition. In this spirit we use the neo-Piagetian theory to organize this review. To highlight from the start major controversial issues that the water level task (i.e., the problem of developmental acquisition of its spatial invariant) brings to light, we begin with a brief examination of some recent cognitivedevelopmental theories that were directly addressed to the water level task and are presented as an alternative to Piagetian and neo-Piagetian theorizing.

Horizontulity of Water Lewl

233

11. Some Post-Piagetian Theories about the Water Level Invariant Olson and Bialystok (1983; Bialystok and Olson. 1987; Bialystok, 1989) presented a theory of spatial cognition and suggested that it could account for the errors of children (and adults) in the water level task. They disagreed with Piaget’s claim that children have not yet abstracted the horizontal and vertical axes of Euclidian space; rather, on the grounds of the frequent error of drawing the water line parallel to the bottom of the bottle, they suggested that the difficulty is in the choice of the appropriate set of axes. They wrote: While we agree thiit the child is not using “external” frames of reference, the responses nonetheless systcrnatically honor vertical and horizontal axes. Their axes. however. lire defined on thc hasis of the ohjects themselves. (Olson LQ Bialystok, 1983. p. 241)

Although this interpretation is consistent with Olson and Bialystok’s propositional theory of spatial cognition, it is factually false. Subjects’ responses do not systematically honor the axes, as published studies reviewed in the following two sections have shown. More recently, Kalichman (1988) suggested a list of component abilities that may be involved in performance on the water level task. These process-descriptive components were derived from an interpretation of the pertinent literature. We shall not discuss Kalichman’s model until we have critically evaluated this literature. We devote three sections to this critical review, and begin by discussing cognitive conflict interpretations of the water level task. Some authors have claimed (as did Pascual-Leone, 1966, 1969, 1980, 1989) that cognitive conflict is a major feature of this task. Freeman (1980), for instance, suggested that children are not insensitive to horizontality and verticality cues, but in the water level task cue-conflict prevents them from making full use of this information. A similar view was held by Bialystok in 1989 (personal communication) and it is also held by others (e.g., Liben, 1991). Bremner (1985) believed that the usual performance in the task might be a balance between an attempt to produce the correct orientation and various other factors acting in opposition. He remarked: “The problem is now one of establishing whal the balance is” (p. 329). There are authors, however, who have disregarded this aspect of the task. We review the issue and then give our own interpretation. This interpretation is based on a dialectical constructivist model that accounts for the data and is incompatible with purely propositional theories of spatial cognition. This model partially agrees with Kalichman’s (1988) suggestions, which we discuss in the last section of this review, and gives an answer to Bremner’s (1985) question about the balance of conflicting factors. We discuss the relation of this model to existing evidence and discuss new predictions that it entails.

234

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

111. Post-Piagetian Data A first source of evidence on the water level task is provided by Piaget and Inhelder’s (1948/1967) original study. As noted above, they described different error patterns, the most interesting of which-labeled “substage 11-b or intermediate cases between 11-a and 111-a”-was described thus: Although the child cannot draw the water in the tilted jar as level . . . he is nevertheless able to show it as no longer parallel to the base of the vessel. But he still fails to coordinate his predictions with any fixed reference system outside the j a r . . . and merely connects the water-line with the corners of the jar, tilting it at an angle. (p. 384)

The reader might compare this description with examples reported by Piaget and Inhelder (1948/1967, figure 26). If the difficulty of the task were just to make the appropriate choice between two systems of axes, the type of error cited in the quotation would be difficult to explain. According to Piaget and Inhelder, subjects who make this type of error are, on the average, older (i-e., more advanced) than those who draw the water line parallel to the bottom; and Pascual-Leone’s doctoral work on the water level task (1969) and other unpublished data from his laboratory agree with this observation. Some subjects at substage 11-b draw lines that are almost vertical (see below). We suggest that Olson and Bialystok’s theory, and any other propositional theory, cannot account for such results because no experientially based propositional representation could generate the responses.

A. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS

1. Types of Responses Piaget and Inhelder did not report the frequencies of the various response types at different ages, and therefore one might ask whether the patterns described above constitute rare exceptions. Subsequent research (some of which is reviewed in Sections IV, V, and VI) showed that even adult performance is far from perfect, and one might similarly inquire about the frequency of different error types in adult samples. Most published research is not helpful here because responses are usually scored simply as right or wrong, with a correct response defined as one that deviates from horizontal less than some fixed value (usually 5” for adolescents and adults, and 10” for children, to whom a less accurate motor coordination is granted). Such a procedure conveys the false impression that errors are all of one kind, for example, lines that run almost parallel to the bottom of the bottle. We review the few

235

Horizontulity of Water Level

published articles in which frequency distributions or other appropriate indices of variability were reported, and we supplement them with unpublished data. These different sources yield a very consistent pattern. Rebelsky (1964) reported data from undergraduates who drew a water line on pictures of glasses that had been tilted either 30" or 60" (we shall denote these items as 30" or 60" items). The distribution of kinds of responses was identical for the 30" and 60" items. We pooled together male and female subjects, and glasses tilted 30" and 60" to the left and to the right. We report percentages calculated over the total of 5 12 responses. The relative frequency distribution for Rebelsky's data appears in Table I. For our analysis, which was as accurate as Rebelsky's report allowed it to be, we considered four kinds of response, classified by degree of deviation d from the horizontal: (1) accurate responses (d < 5"); ( 2 ) compromise responses (5" < d 5 25" for 30" items, and 5" < d 5 50" for 60" items), which are intermediate between the horizontal and the inclination of the glass; (3) bottom-driven responses (almost parallel to the bottom of the glass); and (4) excessive responses (d > 50" for 30" items, and d > 75" for 60" items), oriented a good deal more toward the vertical than the glass is tilted. Table I shows that one-half of the responses in the Rebelsky study were "compromise" responses, a result inconsistent with propositional theories and consistent with conflict theories.

TABLE 1 Percentage Distribution of Response Types in Water Level Task" Age (years) and reference

Accuratc

N -. ..

Rebelsky, 1964 Adulls Pascual-Leone. 1969

Bottom

Excessive

37.5

49.8

7.0

5.5

36

28.6

23.X

11.6

72.5

20.x

40.8

15.9

4.9

16.7

62. I

16.3

20.0

53.3 51.7

5.0 3.3

21.7 1.7

256 18")

7-12

Pascual-Leone & Goodman, 1979

Compromise

._. -~

471

5-13

Pascual-Leone, 1969. 1979 S-8

264

Geiringer & Hyde, 1986 10 12

I20 43.0

'Response types are as follows: ( 1 ) uccuruce, within 5-10" from horizontal; (2) bocrom, essentially parallel to the bottom of bottle; (3) compromise, intermediate between (1) and (2); and (4) excessive, beyond (2) and approaching a vertical line. For the quantitative definition of the types, see text.

Juun Puscuul-Leone and Sergio Morra

236

2. Graded Transitions in the Distribution Modes of Cross-Sectional Data Comparable data from children were obtained by Pascual-Leone (1969) and by Pascual-Leone and Goodman (1 979). Because these data are important and have not been published, we summarize them in Tables I and 11. The subjects, aged 7-13 years old in the former study and 5-14 in the latter, had to draw the water level on the paper outline of a rectangular-shaped bottle (see Fig. l), placed upright or upside down but always tilted at 45". Overall results in the two studies are summarized in Table 11. In these studies the response type accurate is defined as a water line deviation from horizontal of less than 10" ( d < 10").The other error responses were defined as follows: compromise (lo" < d < 41"); bottom-driven (40" < d < 51"); and excessive (SO" < d s 90"). Different age groups exhibited different response patterns, as shown in Table 11, which were consistent with the descriptive aspects of Piaget's developmental account. Pooled across studies, the children younger than 9 years (N = 264) obtained the following result: 4.9% accurate, 16.7% compromise, 62.1% bottom-driven, and 16.3% excessive. The anomalous patterns from the point of view of propositional theories are compromise and excessive. These patterns cannot be overlooked because they constitute one third of the responses in this age group. A related but more refined point is illustrated descriptively in Table 11, which shows a unimodal distribution with mode localized at 41" to SO" for children younger than 9 years old; a bimodal distribution with modes localized at
TABLE I1 Distribution of Angle of Deviation of Water Lines in Children's Responses, by Age" Degrees of deviation from the horizontal (% of responses)'
11-20

~~~~~~

21-30 ~

3140

4l-SO

S1-60

61-70

71-80

>81

N

.05 .02 .03

0 0 0

0 .02

SY 60 70

.03 .06 .OY .05 .04

.04 .03

0

,008

0

.03 0

0

.

~

Puscrtal-Leone, 1969

.os

7-8 9-10 11-12

.10 .3S .59

.12 .17

5-6 7-8 9- 10 I la-12

.01 .0S

.01 .03

.18

.I2

.S1 .74

.16 .13

.OY .03

.07

.10 .1S .07

.4Y .23 .03

.12

.08 .04

0

Pascual-Leone & Goodman, 1979

13

0 .05 .08 .06 0

.12 .07 .OS .05

.0s

.70 .64 .38 .07 0

.0Y .07 .09 .06

.04

'Water level task, 45"-tilted bottles. 'Angle of deviation of water line is measured in degrees from the horizontal,

0 ,001

76 12') 130 113 23

Horizontality of Water Level

237

/////////////////// / // a

////////////////./////.A

Fig. I . Copy-the-stripe test. The subject is shown a thick glass bottle standing in front of a striped background, as pictured. (This drawing is made from a photograph of the display. The cross-hatched stripes are black and the hatched stripes are gray in the actual display.) Notice how the bottle distorts the stripes but does not change their overall vertical or horizontal orientation. The task is to draw the stripes as they appear through the bottle, on a bottle outline provided.

238

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

sectional evolution from unimodal distribution, with mode located at the bottomdriven responses, to a bimodal distribution, and then to a unimodal distribution with mode in the accurate responses, is a clear indicator. It shows a radical change in mental processing determined by critical growth in power of one set of conflicting causal factors (the conflicting factors are perception-driven processes versus mental-attentional intellective processes; see Section VII). Catastrophe theory (Gilmore, 1981) would recognize in this pattern of emergent-and-thenresolved bimodality the presence of a qualitative "catastrophe"-an abrupt change and reorganization of the balance among latent continuous causal processes involved. From the perspective of propositional theory, an aspect of this catastrophe pattern is important: The frequency cells intermediate between these modes show a smooth continuous pattern of variation in the size of obtained frequencies. These graded transitions indicate that, even for cells c10 and 40-50, changes from one to the other mode are not all-or-none as a propositional theory would require but rather result from critical changes in continuous, underlying, and conflicting causal factors.

3. Results with the Thomas Appurutus Another frequency distribution was reported by Geiringer and Hyde (1 976). Their subjects were required not to draw but rather to adjust a disk's position inside a half-bottle (the Thomas apparatus). Data reported were the average of 12 individual responses to stimuli tilted at the 12 inclinations of the hour in a clock dial. These data are not directly related to our question, but we can reason that subjects who were consistently correct should have an average deviation of about 0", and subjects responding consistently to the bottom of the bottle would have an average deviation of about 45". With these assumptions, we compute from Geiringer and Hyde's data the accurate, compromise, bottom-driven, and excessive responses produced by 5th graders (about 10 years of age) and 12th graders (about 17 years old). The data are given in Table I. Thomas, Jamison, and Hummel (1973) did not report frequency distributions but did report the 95% confidence interval of the median, which we might take as a reasonable "central slice" of the distribution of responses. These data, too, were obtained with the Thomas apparatus, for two samples of female undergraduates whose responses were not consistently accurate. In Study I, the confidence interval for a pretest reached a minimum of 8.5" across stimuli, and a maximum of 29.0", with virtually no difference between bottles tilted at 30" or 60". In Study 11, the confidence interval had a minimum of 7.5"; the maximum was 16.5 with bottles tilted at 30", and 27.0 with bottles tilted at 60". In a posttest given after two different training procedures, these values decreased somewhat but performance still remained far from perfect. Once again, the data provided no evidence of a dichotomy between accurate and bottom-driven responses.

Horizontulity of‘Water L.cid

239

€3. SUMMARY

Comparing across studies, one can conclude that both accurate and compromisc~ responses are rare before 9 years of age; that in the same age period bottom-driven responses are most frequent; and that excessive responses (i.e., pulled toward the vertical) can be found especially between the ages of 7 and 12. Evidently, subjects’ responses do not “systematically honor vertical and horizontal axes” (Olson & Bialystok, 1983, p. 241). The frequency and age-graded change of compromise and excessive responses argue against Olson and Bialystok’s theory. All four types of responses are found (with different frequencies) at every age, and a valid model must explain them all. Further, graded transitions in the data distribution modes, and their evolution from hottom-driven unimodality to bimodality and then to accurate unimodality, are important. They suggest that a dynamic conflict between sets of continuous contradictory processes is at the root of the water level task acquisition. A shift in space-propositional frames of reference cannot explain these results.

IV. Gender Differences Many investigators have reported that in adolescent or adult samples males perform better than females on the water level task (e.g., De Lisi. Parameswaran, & McGillicuddy-De Lisi, 1989; Geiringer & Hyde, 1976; Golbeck, 1986; Harris, 1981; Kalichman, 1986, 1989a. 1989b; Kelly & Kelly, 1977; Liben, 1978, 1991; Liben & Golbeck, 1984; Ohuche, 1984; Otani & Leonard, 1988; Rebelsky, 1964; Robert, 1990; Robert & Chaperon, in press; Robert & Tanguay, 1989; Thomas et al.. 1973; Willemsen & Reynolds, 1973; Wittig & Allen, 1984). This finding has been obtained across different modes of response and different scoring criteria (Wittig & Allen, 1984). One failure to replicate was reported by Keynon (1984), but the obtained errors offemales were about three times more frequent than those of males and this difference was presumably nonsignificant because the sample size was too small to yield adequate power. An additional finding is that the gender difference holds among samples of undergraduates with different college majors (Kalichman, 1986; Robert, 1989a; Robert & Tanguay, 1989), and may hold across different cultures (De Lisi e f af., 1989; Ohuche, 1984). Developmental researchers (e.g., Geiringer & Hyde, 1976; Liben & Golbeck, 1980) have often found a gender difference in the water level task in children as young as 8 years old, but McGillicuddy-De Lisi, De Lisi, and Youniss (1978) found a gender difference only with 10-year-olds and college students. De Lisi (1983) failed to replicate the gender difference in children aged 7-1 1 (a trend existed in the expected direction) but found significant gender differences in

240

Juan Pascuul-Leone arid Sergio Morra

another horizontality task, called the crossbar task. The crossbar task (a crossbar that remains horizontal irrespective of the position of its support) does not involve the representation of water, nor does it have a misleading perceptual context, as is found in the water level task. Although the difference between males’ and females’ performance on the water level task is well established, at least in adults and older children, little agreement exists regarding its cause. Different explanations have been suggested: (1) biology, with biogenetic factors (e.g., Thomas & Jamison, 1981a) or hormonal factors (Nyborg, 1983; Witelson & Swallow, 1988); (2) cognitive resources and/or processes, as in physical and/or geometric knowledge (e.g., Liben & Golbeck, 1986; Thomas & Jamison, 1975), spatial ability (e.g., Geiringer & Hyde, 1976), and/or cognitive “complexity” (Thompson, Mann, & Harris, 1981); and (3) individualdifference factors, as in field dependencehndependence (e.g., Myer & Hensley, 1984), sex-role orientation (e.g., Jamison & Signorella, 1980; but see MowrerPopiel & De Lisi, 1984, for a failure to replicate), and motivation (Meehan & Overton, 1986). Among these possible explanations, knowledge and spatial ability seem more readily compatible with a purely propositional theory. The eight explanations listed above may not all be basic; some might be secondary effects of more central causal mechanisms. Let us examine the data more closely.

A. BIOLOGICAL FACTORS

Thomas and Jamison (1981a) proposed a biogenetic hypothesis that gave rise to brief controversy (Allen, Wittig, & Butler, 1981; McGee, 1981; Thomas & Jamison, 1981b). According to this hypothesis (which involves an X-linked recessive gene), the proportion of successful performances by females should equal the squared proportion of successful performance by males. We pooled data from all experiments considered by Thomas and Jamison (1981a) and found a squared proportion of .48 for males versus a proportion of .42 for females. Thomas and Jamison (1981b) concluded that the hypothesis is correct, but other variables account for some of the variance-a possible explanation. Without knowing what these variables might be, however, the hypothesis cannot be investigated. A different kind of biological explanation-an endocrine hypothesis-was put forward by Sanders and Ross-Field (1986). They suggested that the level of fetal androgens during a critical prenatal period might be a biological determinant of sexual orientation, of cerebral asymmetry, and of certain cognitive abilities, such as those involved in the water level task. The theory of Geschwind and Galaburda (1987) on the relations between brain lateralization, male hormones, and other biological individual-difference parameters converges with the Sanders and RossField hypothesis in giving a causal role to male hormones in brain lateralization and in some spatial cognitive abilities.

Another line of research congenial to the Sanders and Ross-Field hypothesis is on children with pathological syndromes that affect the level of sex hormones in the organism. One such line of study is the cognitive investigation of Turner's syndrome. This syndrome is an endocrine disorder of the ovaries (a gonadal dysgenesis), which is accompanied by a genetic abnormality of the second X chromosome of the patient (a complete or partial 45-X chromosome constitution) and other congenital anomalies. These females have greatly diminished levels of both testosterone and estrogen from the time of conception. The cognitive deficits in this syndrome, recently reviewed by Rovet (1990; Rovet 6i Netley, 19X2), show three main characteristics: (1) significant deficiencies in spatial abilities, and in particular great slowness in performing visual-spatial mental transformations; (2) significant deficiencies in mental attention, as measured by the WISC backward digit span, arithmetic, and codingidigit symbol; and (3) a verbal intelligence quotient (information, similarities, vocabulary, comprehension) that is practically normal. Rovet (1900) also presented a one-case study suggesting that the spatial ability deficiencies may be due in part to abnormal suppression by the left hemisphere of the patient's right hemisphere. As Witelson and Swallow (1988) emphasized, these data on Turner's syndrome (which are accompanied by low blood levels of androgens) can be contrasted with data from an abnormal condition called congenital adrenal hyperplasia. This disease is characterized by il high level of adrenal androgens, starting prenatally in both males and females. A recent cognitive study of these females has shown that their performance on tests of spatial ability is superior to that of normal females, but males did not show this difference (Resnick, Berenbaum, Gottesman, & Bouchard, 1986). Together, these pathological data suggest what other evidence also suggests: Masculine sex hormones may potentiate the growth of spatial abilities like those found in the water level task (perhaps by selective facilitation of the right hemisphere development and/or its activation). However, more research is needed on this point. Although these other neurobiological factors are important, they will not be discussed further in this review.

B. COGNI1'IVE RESOURCE FACTORS

A different hypothesis about gender differences comes from studies designed to show that gender differences in Piagetian spatial tasks do not reflect differences in competence but rather reflect performance differences resulting from differences in physical knowledge or familiarity with context (e.g., Golbeck, 1986; Liben & Golbeck, 1984. 1086). Using this knowledge-deficit hypothesis, Liben and Golbeck (1984) predicted a gender-by-training interaction in both the water level and the plumb-line tasks; the expectation was that training would bring the

242

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

performance of females closer to that of males. The plumb-line paradigm consists of items with pictures that show vehicles (cars, trains, etc.) with a hook on their body from which objects-light bulbs, clocks etc.-can be hung by means of a string. The vehicles are placed at different inclinations from the horizontal and subjects are asked to draw a string and the object that would be hanging from the hook in question. Liben and Golberg replicated the gender difference in two experiments with different types of training and found that training improved performance of both males and females; the predicted interaction, however, was not significant. Liben and Golbeck (1986) and Golbeck (1986) also used “nonphysical” (i.e., purely geometric) horizontal and vertical tasks in which adults showed ceiling performance. Because a chi-square test failed to distinguish between the performance of males and females in these nonphysical tasks, the authors concluded that physical knowledge is the crucial factor. But alternative interpretations exist. Perhaps the chi-square test was not sufficiently powerful, or perhaps the chosen nonphysical task was too easy; that is, gender differences might exist in nonphysical tasks if subjects do not reach ceiling performance. Other indirect evidence supports our interpretation. Pascual-Leone (1 969) examined within the same subjects (children and adult males preselected as either extremely field-dependent or extremely field-independent) two different versions of the water level task. One version involved a real tilted bottle and the other involved paper-and-pencil bottle outlines; in both versions the subjects had to draw the water line as if the bottle were half-filled with water. Comparison of similar items in the two versions showed that the paper-and-pencil version was much easier than the real-bottle version for field-dependent subjects but not for field-independents, who did better in the real-bottle items. The paper-and-pencil version appeared to reduce the misleading “pull” of bottom-driven responses (Pascual-Leone, 1969, 1989). Clearly, realistic cues hinder field-dependent subjects in this misleading task, but help field-independent subjects. This result had been predicted from Pascual-Leone’s model (see Pascual-Leone, 1969 and Section VII). The prediction was based on the idea that a real bottle, in contrast to a bottle outline, enhances both the task-relevant and the task-irrelevant cues. Because the field-independent subjects rely mostly on mental-attentional executive-driven processes focusing on relevant cues, to the detriment of task-irrelevant sensorial/perceptual and content-cued processes; the real-bottle condition should facilitate their performance. The converse is true for field-dependent subjects who often get caught in irrelevant cues when they are sensoriaVperceptually salient, as is the case with the real bottle (Pascual-Leone, 1969, 1989). Kalichman (1989b) reported results consistent with these 1969 confirmed predictions. He found to his surprise that the use of an ecologically realistic water level context (a human drinking from a glass) makes the water level task more difficult for adult females than the standard task, but this is not so for males. As it is well established that females tend to be more field-dependent than males, this result is consistent with Pascual-

Horizotituliiy of Wuter Levcl

243

Leone’s prediction. One set of results in the literature-Wittig and Allen’s (1984) results-seems not to support these findings; however, their water level treatment conditions may not have been ecologically realistic enough. Pascual-Leone’s findings bear on the results of Liben and Golbeck (1986) and Golbeck (1986) because these authors went beyond the paper-and-pencil reduction of cues by eliminating from their “nonphysical” task any reference to bottles, water, and so on, creating a purely geometric version. This move, and the related changes i n instructions (which directly pointed at the required overt behavior), probably made the new task even more facilitating than the paper-and-pencil water level task used by Pascual-Leone. This interpretation could explain why ceiling performance was reached in the Liben and Golbeck study. This interpretation, which we made independently, is supported by two recent adult studies of Liben (1991). She compared males and females across horizontality tasks of the following three types: (1) the facilitating (“disembedding”) crossbar task introduced by McGillicuddy-De Lisi er a/. (1978). which has no misleading perceptual context; (2) an “embedding” crossbar task that has a misleading perceptual context (i.e., a tilted rectangular frame enclosing the crossbar); and (3) a version of the water level task with jars tilted 2So, 30”, and 40”. In both Study 1 (50 males, 53 females. mean age 19 years) and study 2 (100 males, 100 females, mean age 19 years), results showed statistically significant main effects for gender (males were superior) and for task difficulty (tasks with a misleading perceptual context were more difficult). Interaction between gender and task was not significant. and the misleading crossbar and water level tasks had similar mean scores within each gender.

C. INDIVIDUAI. DIFFERENCE FACTORS: COGNITIVE STYLE AND KNOWLEDGf: AS DETERMINANTS OF GENDER DIFFERENCES

In addition to neurobiological (genetic, hormonal) factors, excluded from this review, two variables emerge as clearly relevant for explaining gender and individual differences. These are domain-relevant knowledge and the cognitivestyle field dependenceiindependence (Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough & Karp, 1962; Witkin & Goodenough. 1981). Numerous correlational studies, using either the rod-and-frame test or the embedded figures test as indicators of field dependencelindependence, have shown that field dependence is related to performance in the water level task. An explanation that is often suggested is that the water level task requires some “disembedding” ability. Pascual-Leone (1966, 1969) showed that for 10-year-olds, performance on a paper-and-pencil version of the water level task correlated .32 ( N = 36; p = ns) with the rod-and-frame test and .60 ( N = 39; p c .001) with the children’s embedded figures test; and a real-bottle version of the same task showed higher

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

244

correlations with these tests (.42; p < .01, and .70, respectively). In addition, he found that field-dependent undergraduates made significantly more errors than field-independent undergraduates, whose performance was almost perfect. In this male sample (constituted by 39 students, 15 of whom had been preselected as being field-dependent), Pascual-Leone found that the water level task correlated .70 (N= 30; p c .001) with the rod-and-frame test and .52 (N= 35;p c .01)with the figure-drawing test-another test of field dependence. Further, principle components analyses with Varimax rotations showed that water level task scores loaded heavily and exclusively on the factor in which all of Witkin's field dependency measures were loaded. Numerous other studies with the same methods have confirmed the correlation between the water level task and the embedded figures test. Examples are summarized in Tables 111 and IV. Table 111 presents correlations between the water level task of Pascual-Leone (45O-tilted rectangular bottles in all four possible positions-thick and thin bottles; either real bottles or paper outlines) and Witkin's Rod-and-Frame Test and/or Embedded Figures Test (or Children's

TABLE I11 Correlations of Water Level Task with Rod-and-Frame Task or Embedded Figures Test" Sex

N

Item context''

RIT

10

M

36

Paper

.32

.60**

10

M

35

Bottle

.42*

.70'*

UG(20)

M

30

Paper

.70**

-

UG(n.a.)

FIM

60

Paper

-

-,42 * '4

7 8 11 7-12

FIM FIM FIM FIM

41

Paper

-

(-.08)

1s 1

Paper

-

5-12

FIM

144

Paper

-

(.6 4*)

6-12

FIM

161

Paper

-

(.70**)

Author

EFT (CEIT) -

Pascual-Leone (1969) Pawual-Leone ( 1969) Pascual-Leone (1 969) Goodman (1971) Van Esch (1978) Goodman (1979) Fabian (1982) Johnson (1 982)

s1

so

(.S9**) (.60**)

(.57**)

~~

'Data from Pascual-Leone's laboratory. UG, undergraduate subjects; G2, G4, Grade 2, Grade 4, . . . subjects; EFT, embedded figures test; CEiT, Childrens embedded figures test; RFT, rod-and-frame test; ma., not available. 'Bottle. a real bottle is used as stimulus; paper, a picture outline of a bottle is used. 'This E l T score is a response latency and thus higher scores mean poorer performance. *p < .01; **p < .oo1.

245

Horuontality of Water Level TABLE IV Correlations of Water Level Tasks with Rod-and-Frame Test or Embedded Figures Test'

N

Item context

RFT

F

30

Bottle

.37*

-

24/26

Bottle

-.43b**

-

-.52** -30

-

-.51**

-

-.44* -.58*

-

G12 (17;6)

FIM F M FIM F M FIM

33/33

Paper

-

-.56**

Signorella & Jamison

G8 (n.a.)

FIM

45/48

Sr. H.S.

FIM

30130

Physical device Paper

-

(1978) Linn & Kyllonen

(1981) DeLisi, R.

G1 (69)

loll0

UG (n.a.)

FIM FIM FIM F M ALL FIM F M F

Sholl

UG (n.a.)

(1989) Liben

UG (19)

Author

Grade (age)

Sex

Willemsen et al.

UG (n.a.)

EFT

(1973)

Abravanel & Gingold

911

(1977)

Study 1 10:2

Study 2 Liben

26124

Bottle

-

(1978)

(1983)

Myer & Hensley

G3 (8:7) G5 (10:7)

UG (19)

(1984)

Barsky & Lachman

.32*

.14/.59** .23

-

10/10

,75*** .41

10/10

.53"

-

.59***

-

-

.55** .59*** -

4414 1

Paper

68

Paper

FIM

60

Paper

FIM

54150

Bottle

-

-.36*

.48** .54*** .40** -.34*

(1986)

.41**

-

-

n.s.

(1991)

'Data selected from the literature. UG, undergraduate subjects; EFT, embedded figures test; CEFT, Children's embedded figures test: RFT, rod-and-frame test; Sr.H.S., senior high school; ma., not available; n.s., not significant. hBottle, a real bottle is used as stimulus; paper, a picture outline of a bottle is used. 'RFT scores are magnitude of deviation from true vertical. * p < .05; **p c 01; ***p < ,001.

Embedded Figures Test). All these studies were conducted in Pascual-Leone's laboratory using the same tasks. As can be observed, all correlations reported for adults and children of 10 years or older are highly significant. There is no correlation of field dependency measures and water level task in younger children (see Van Esch, 1978). Table IV presents similar data collected from the literature. In the table the method of assessing the horizontality of water level varied greatly from

246

Juan Pascuai-Leone and Sergio Morra

author to author and may not always control the degree of misleadingness of the immediate context (see Section VII). For this reason one should expect that the correlations would vary more widely. Inspection of Table IV shows that this is the case but generally significant correlations appear albeit smaller than those of Table 111. When separate correlations are reported for males and females they tend to be of the same magnitude. Two exceptions are Signorella and Jamison (1978) who found significant correlation with embedded figures only with males, and Otani and Leonard (1988) who obtained a significant correlation with Gottschaldt figures (similar to embedded figures) only with females. Liben (1978) obtained a correlation of .56 between water level task and embedded figures in 17-year-olds (grade 12) and the correlation remained high after spatial ability was partialed out. However, she replicated the gender difference on the water level task but failed to find it on the embedded figures test; this result suggests that gender differences on the water level task cannot be attributed to differences in cognitive style. Liben (1991) did not find a relation of water level with cognitive style. Similarly, De Lisi (1983) obtained significant correlations with the rod-and-frame test but failed to replicate the gender difference on the water level task. However, Myer and Hensley (1984) found only small gender differences when the embedded figures test scores were controlled for; thus, gender differences on the water level task might be due to differences in field dependence, at least in their sample. In light of these results, embedded figures tests and water level tasks may not be too strongly related in the processes they elicit. Linn and Kyllonen (1981) showed with factor analysis that the water level task developed by Pascual-Leone is less close to the embedded figures test than it is to tasks, such as the rod-and-frame test, that tap the “perception-of-upright dimension’’ (space coordinates). As Linn and Kyllonen intimate, this finding is consistent with the analyses and the results of Pascual-Leone (1969, 1989), and does not invalidate our claim that the water level task relates to both the rod-and-frame test and the embedded figures test-the greater resemblance to the rod-and-frame test is largely based on contextual similarities. However, field dependencehndependence spans over contexts, as shown by the finding that it has also been demonstrated in language (e.g., Pascual-Leone, 1989; Witkin & Goodenough, 1981). The overall pattern of results suggests that field dependencehdependence is an important factor, but that it leaves unexplained a large proportion of variance in water level task performance. Contradictions in the reported results (e.g., Liben, 1978 versus Myer & Hensley, 1984) argue against the idea that cognitive style might be the sole explanation of gender differences. Furthermore, much research (de Ribaupierre, 1989; Globerson, 1989; McFarland, 1972; Pascual-Leone, 1969, 1970, 1989; Van Esch, 1978) suggests that field dependencehndependence is not a single dimension or trait, but rather a complex processual formula (PascualLeone, 1969, 1989; Pascual-Leone & Goodman, 1979).

Horizontulity of Water Level

247

V. Evidence for Physical and Geometric Knowledge as a Factor in Horizontality Judgments The case of physical and/or geometric knowledge is considered in detail in the present section. Thomas er 01. (1973) showed that subjects’ self-report of the principles they follow in performing on the water level task was a good predictor of performance. They also found, however, that training procedures based on observation produced perfect performance during training but brought about small improvement at posttest and little acquisition of physical knowledge. This finding suggests that acquisition (or nonacquisition) of knowledge must itself be explained but Thomas el ul. had no satisfactory explanation for their results. Thomas and Jamison (1975) found small gender differences when awareness of the physical principle was controlled for; and Howard (1978) obtained almost perfect performance, in a multiple-choice version of the task, in subjects who were able to verbalize the principle of horizontality. Liben and Golbeck (1984), however, obtained an important dissociation: Teaching the horizontality rule improved performance, but some subjects who could state the rule verbally were nonetheless unable to apply this knowledge when performing the task. Liben and Golbeck also reported that even when the relevant information was provided explicitly and emphatically, 34%)of the subjects (males and females) performed very poorly on both horizontality and verticality tasks. In addition, Myer and Hensley (1984) reported that knowledge of the principle, although significantly 0, < .01) related to performance, was far from perfect as a predictor. Barsky and Lachman ( I 986) introduced training methods that combined observation, verbal instruction, use of tools, and production of correct responses. Two methods were used, one emphasizing physical principles and the other geometric relations. Both methods were expected to improve performance on the water level task, but only geometric training was expected to generalize to different tasks involving verticality, spatial ability, and field independence. Contrary to these expectations, both methods of training were effective but neither generalized. The effects of training appeared to be task-specific. suggesting that in adult subjects at least, general knowledge of spatial coordinates is not a determining factor of performance across spatial tasks. This peculiar result argues against Olson and Bialystok’s (1983) hypothesis, which makes ability to select an appropriate system of axes the crucial factor in the water level task-at least when their account is regarded as a sufficient causal explanation. More generally, the studies mentioned show that knowledge of the physical principle of horizontality (indexed either by self-reports or by training) is an important causal factor, but other factors are also needed to explain adult performance differences. Thus far we have shown the importance of physical knowledge and of field dependence for explaining performance in the water level task. Physical knowl-

248

Juan Pasciial-Leone and Sergio Mnrra

edge seems compatible with propositional theories. We are not aware, however, of any propositional theorist who has even attempted to explain differences in cognitive style. We suspect that no explanation of this kind is possible because propositional theories do not incorporate organismic processes that could explain individual differences. Some other formulation is needed to explain the age-graded differences in performance illustrated in Table 11. A similar variation of performance obtains with field dependence/independence when adults or older children are tested. But this field dependencehdependence issue is beyond the scope of our article (see de Ribaupierre, 1989; Globerson, 1989; Pascual-Leone, 1989).

VI. Evidence for a Response Bias or Stimulus-Response Compatibility Before a model of performance on the water level task is presented, another aspect of the available evidence needs to be reviewed. It concerns the role of operative response biases (as opposed to perceptual factors or conceptual deficits) in the performance of this task.

A. A PARAMETRIC STUDY OF WATER LEVEL AS A PERCEPTUAL-MOTOR TASK

A study by Howard (1978) is central in this regard, but its methodological importance has been overlooked. Howard used 17 photographs of a jug placed in a realistic context and tilted 45”. The water appeared inclined from 30” in the opposite direction from the jug’s bottom to 50” in the same direction as the jug’s bottom (at intervals of 5”). Thus, he avoided both abstract materials and response biases introduced by manual performance. He aimed to find the pure effect of a “perceptual schema” (which we interpret as being a set of conceptual and perceptual schemes). In addition, he prepared 17 films in which the jug rotated starting from a vertical position (water being in a horizontal position) and reached one of the positions represented in the photographs in 5 seconds. This position was maintained for 5 seconds more. (The photographs and films were produced with an apparatus in which the camera and jug could be tilted independently.) The subjects were university undergraduate; they had to evaluate whether each of the 17 photographs or films, presented at random, was correct or “tricky”; and after the experiment they were interviewed about mental strategies (criteria) used to solve the task. The method is important because it focuses on perceptual and conceptual components of the task, eliminating the usual manual response requirements-producing a graphic trace, rotating a metal disk, and so on. The interview indicated that about half of Howard’s subjects knew and were able to recall the principle of horizontality of water. The performance of these

Horizoritulih o f Water L o 4

249

subjects in the task was almost perfect; and the performance of the other subjects contained errors. Howard described these errors as a tendency to consider adequate any photograph or film in which water had an inclination from about 10" in the direction of the jug to about 20" opposite to the jug's direction. Yet with photographs or films, the average error of these subjects was little more than 3", inclined in the opposite direction from the jug's bottom. Our interpretation of Howard's results has two parts. First, an inability to recall the principle of horizontality of water or lack of knowledge is an important source of errors. Second, and more importantly, this lack of knowledge may not be the cause (at least in adult subjects) of the common error of drawing or representing the water line as inclined in the same direction as the jug's bottom. Lack of knowledge seems to increase variability of the responses, but the source of the usual average error must be something else, which the method of this experiment eliminated-a perceptual-motor response bias. Evidence congruent with this interpretation has been provided by PascualLeone (1069), who asked subjects to draw the water line on paper outlines and on real specimens of 45"-tilted rectangular bottles. In a sample of children, standard deviations of each subject's responses were very small and were not related to individual or developmental differences. In an adult sample. however, tield-dependent adults not only had a larger average error than field-independent adults, but also a larger within-subject standard deviation of responses, showing a kind of flip-flop between the correct response (that they sometimes could produce) and an incorrect response (not necessarily parallel to the bottom of the container), possibly driven by a manual response bias. This oscilkutiori of field-deperidcwt ,subjc>ctshenveeti two differerit ypes qf respouse sirggests thut they were cuuglit iri u conflict hetweeri diffi7rent proccsses. which led to different response putterm. When the two preselected adult samples (i.e., field-dependent and fieldindependent) were pooled, the Kendall rank correlation between the average error in the water level task and the rod-and-frame test was .56 0, < .001). and the Kentlall rank correlation between the within-subject standard deviation of responses in the water level task and the rod-and-frame test was .48 0, < ,001). In other terms, greater variability seems related not only to lack of knowledge (as shown in Howard's study) but also to field dependence; and the greater average error of field-dependent subjects is explained by a response bias because the method of Pascual-Leone, in contrast to that of Howard, required manual drawing on the real bottle or the paper outline of the bottle--a graphic motor response.

€3. EVIDENCE FROM PERCEPTUAL ANALOGS O F THE WATER LEVEL TASK

Does other evidence in the literature support the posited operative response bias? Yes. and it comes from tasks that have response requirements and perceptual

250

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

features similar to the standard (and Pascual-Leone's) water level task, but that do not imply conceptual knowledge of the physical properties of liquids, gravity, etc. One widely known experiment of this kind is that of Ibbotson and Bryant (1976), who studied a copy task with a rectangle tilted at various orientations, divided in two halves by a line that could be either perpendicular or 45" oblique to the longer sides. The experiment is analogous to a perceptual task originally reported by Piaget (1969). Ibbotson and Bryant reported that the perpendicular was copied more easily than the oblique, which was copied as "more perpendicular" than it actually was. With a rectangle tilted 45" so that the line oblique to its sides came to be horizontal, they found an average error of 25". The standard water level task was used as a control condition, and the same result was obtained: the average error was 25.4". Work by Dadsetan, reported by Piaget (1969), showed that in some age groups, performance on a perceptual version of this task was highly correlated with performance on the water level task-for ages 7, 8, 10, and 11 years (the correlation was not significant at 5, 6, and 9 years). These findings suggest that an operative (perceptual-motor) response bias is an important error factor in the water level task-at least for some ages. Bayraktar (1985) replicated and extended Ibbotson and Bryant's results. Other studies (Bremner, 1984; Bremner & Taylor, 1982; Freeman, 1980) have further distinguished a perpendicular effect from a bisection effect, but this distinction is not important here. Freeman (1980) made a relevant remark. He suggested that young children are unable to coordinate two orientation cues-the horizontal table surface and the tilted jar-because these cues are in conflict with each other; however, in a drawing completion task, where no such conflict is usually involved, children as young as 3 years may simultaneously take into account two orientation cues (e.g., when drawing the body of a man, they take into account the degree of tilt of the head and that of a baseline). These results suggest the importance of cognitive conflict in the water level task. A study by Sommerville and Cox (1988) offers additional evidence for the existence of an operative response bias. They contrasted a normal mug, tilted at 18", with a slanted mug that had a horizontal base and sides sloping at 18" from the vertical. Their purpose was to distinguish a conceptual bias to draw the water parallel to a baseline (the bottle's bottom or an objective horizontal baseline) from a response bias. A perceptual-motor response bias induces subjects to produce a certain response pattern unconsciously, without a cognitive or conceptual intent. In two experiments with 5- to 8-year-old children, Sommerville and Cox obtained a consistent tilt of the drawn water line in a direction predicted by the response bias assumption (responses perpendicular to the walls in the slanted mugs). In one experiment, however, these authors found larger errors with the tilted conventional mug. This finding points to the existence of both a conceptual bias, such as the one discussed in the preceding section, and a perceptual-motor response bias. We believe that properties of the stimuli (e.g., width of the relevant angles, actual

Horizontality clf Water Level

2s 1

presence or absence of liquid in the tilted mug) and characteristics of the subjects (e.g., developmental level, cognitive style) interact in determining the relative importance of these two biases. More research is needed to elucidate these details. Ibbotson and Bryant’s (1976) study has not been replicated with adults. Liben and Golbeck (1986) used a condition similar to lbbotson and Bryant’s, but with the important difference that Liben and Golbeck’s adult subjects were clearly told that they had to draw a horizontal (or vertical) line. The outcome of this study was ceiling performance, even with subjects who had made errors in the standard water level task. Liben and Golbeck’s general conclusion was that the source of errors changes with development: “A competence explanation of the deficit holds in childhood and early adolescence, whereas a performance explanation holds in adulthood” (Liben & Golbeck, 1986, p. 487). Even though we agree that young children (up to about the age of 9-10) have insufficient competence for the conceptual representation of spatial coordinates (ultimately due to a mental capacity-working memory-limitation), we attribute these results to the degree of “misleadingness” o f the chosen experimental conditions. The nonphysical task of Liben and Goldbeck is clearly facilitating because verbal instructions and examples have taught thc: subjects prior to the task that horizontalhertical lines have to be drawn. The original training experiments of Liben and Goldbeck (1984) with the water level task were much less facilitating. Ibbotson and Bryant’s paradigm seems to have an intermediate degree of misleadingness, because, albeit a purely perceptual-motor task, it includes cues integral to the task that activate schemes inducing subjects to error (Pascual-Leone, 1969, 1976, 1980, 1989). Finally, the standard version of the water level task requires conceptual processing and is most seriously disrupted by perceptual saliency of misleading stimuli; this task is maximally misleading. Liben (199 1) compared misleading (embedding) and facilitating (nonembedding) versions of the crossbar task with the water level task in adults. Her results confirm the claim of greater misleadingness of the water level task, and have shown again that this misleadingness is not conceptual but perceptually based. The perceptual-motor origin of this misleadingness was first shown in an older but little known task, to which we now turn.

C. COPY-THE-STRIPE TASK: A NONCONCEPTUAL TEST OF RESPONSE BIAS

One might ask whether the adult literature provides direct evidence consistent with our account of Howard’s and Liben and Golbeck’s data? Good evidence comes from the copy-the-stripe task (Pascual-Leone, 1969, 1974, 1980, 1989). This task was invented to show that errors on the water level task do not depend simply on the conceptual understanding (physical knowledge) of water as a distal object. In the copy-the-stripe task, subjects are shown a pattern of horizontal or

252

Juan Puscuul-Leone and Sergio Morru

vertical lines through a 45”-tilted transparent rectangular bottle. The glass of the bottle distorts the lines somewhat, making them wavy, but does not alter their direction, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The subject’s task is to copy the pattern of stripes in a paper outline of the bottle. Physical knowledge of liquids and of gravity is irrelevant here; the correct response pattern is perceptually given. But the direction of the lines (this is the facilitating cue) is minimally salient because they appear wavy, and no instructions emphasize their horizontality or verticality; in contrast, the misleading tilted-bottle cues are maximized (glass bottle and bottle outlines are tilted 45”). In this task, results showed that virtually all subjects, children and adults, whether field-dependent or field-independent, tended to incline their drawn stripes in the direction predicted by an operative response bias, that is, toward the bottom of the bottle, whether the actual stripes are vertical or horizontal. Furthermore, the size of the error is larger in children than adults, and larger in fielddependent than field-independent subjects (Pascual-Leone, 1969, 1989). Performances on the water level task and copy-the-stripe task were highly correlated; and in a principal components analysis with Varimax rotation, they both loaded in the factor corresponding to Witkin’s field dependencehndependence cognitive style (Pascual-Leone, 1969). In Pascual-Leone’s (1969) study with forty-one 10-year-olds the principal components extraction of five factors, using Kendall rank correlations, showed that Witkin’s field dependencehndependence factor was indexed by high loading of the WISC Block Design Test (.68), Witkin’s Children’s Embedded Figures Test (.65), Witkin’s Rod-and-Frame Test (.65), and Witkin’s Figure-Drawing Test (.60). The water level task with actual bottles had a loading on this factor of .56, and the copy-the-stripe test had a loading of .52. In the adult sample (39 males), a similar analysis, using Kendall correlations, indexed Witkin’s field dependencehdependence with the following factor loadings of marker tests: Witkin’s Rod-and-Frame Test (.73), Witkin’s Analytical Index (Le,, averaged composite score from block design, picture completion, and block assembly of the WASloading .71), Witkin’s Figure-Drawing Test (.62), water level task (.go). Two versions of the copy-the-stripe task loaded on this factor as follows: vertical stripes (.45), horizontal stripes (.4 I). These factor analytic data show that the copy-thestripe task has the same factorial determination as the water level task in both children and adults. We may ask whether a response bias is compatible with propositional (or, more generally, conceptual) theories. It might be. We notice, however, that subjects who draw the water line tilted, influenced by the frame (walls and/or bottom) of the immediate bottle, are not aware of their errors and cannot justify them. Further, these errors are highly correlated with field dependence cognitive style-a style also manifested in tasks that do not involve spatial-coordinate problems (PascualLeone, 1989). To explain these results a propositional (conceptual, rule-governed) theory must satisfy at least these conditions:

Horizonrality of’ Wuter Level

253

1. It must have independent propositional (conceptual) structures for a non-

conscious perceptual-motor response system. 2. It must have a two-way interface between perceptual and/or conceptual figurative structures and operative (motor) response structures, so that the latter can directly affect the former. 3. It must have core propositions (concepts) so defined that they apply across diverse content and structural domains, from space to perception, to motor performance, to problem solving, to various aspects of language (PascualLeone, 1989). We believe that no existing propositional theory meets the requirements.

VII. Process Analysis of Errors in the Water Level Task Process analysis that goes beyond common sense requires some theory of the organism. We will ground our analysis in a neo-Piagetian organismic theory, the theory of constructive operators (Johnson, Fabian, & Pascual-Leone, 19XY: Pascud-Leone, 1969, 1Y70, 1Y80, 1983, 1984, 1Y87, 1989; Pascual-Leone & Goodman, 1979; Pascual-Leone, Goodman, Ammon, & Subelman, 1978; PascualLeone & Johnson, in press).

A. THE ROLE OF SCHEME

Various constructs used in the theory are relevant here. The first sort of construct we discuss is called scheme, derived with some refinement from Piaget’s theory and posited as the basic unit of cognition. Schemes are irtjiortnarional (i.e., information-bearing) psychological units. that is, dynamic components of processes that generate performance (actions, images, memorial dynamic processes, etc.). Neuropsychologically, schemes correspond to manifold collections of neurons (perhaps distributed over the brain) that are cofunctional and often coactivated (or activated in lawful sequences) because they generate together the situatiunspecific components of life-relevant activities. Thus, schemes are minute or large firnction systems (“software” components) that the subject uses to produce performance (Pascual-Leone & Johnson, in press). One basic classification is that between figurative and operative schemes, elaborating a similar distinction made by Piaget and Inhelder (196611971, 196811972). A scheme is figurative when its iipplication in mental processing generates the representation of a perceptual, imaginal, or conceptual state, or the representation of an object, aspect of object, or (mental or physical) entity. A scheme is operative when its application in mental processing enables aprocedrrre or transformation to occur that changes the

254

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

current mental state to a different one. Among operative schemes are included executive schemes, which monitor ongoing goal-directed activity, and which control activation or inhibition of other schemes.

B. THE ROLE OF SILENT HARDWARE OPERATORS

The second sort of construct is constituted by hidden content-free hardware operators. Hardware operators model general mechanisms and constraints (aspects of functional architecture) of the human information-processing system, which are “silent” or “hidden” because their manifestation on performance is only indirect, via the effects they have on the state and evolution of schemes. With these hidden operators we model the idea that schemes are affected by a multiplicity of organismic sources of activation, disactivation, and/or learning. Among these sources we count: 1. Features in the input as coded in the schemes. These features are learned via a content-learning operator (or C operator), which is also a cause of overlearning and subsequent automatization of schemes. 2. Structural learning. An example is the learning of relations among sets of schemes, such that the relations become cues for, or components of, other more encompassing schemes. Structural learning occurs via a logical-structural learning operator (or L operator). 3. Executive controls. The Executive (or E operator) is a set of currently dominant executive schemes that monitor the attentional capacities described below. 4. Gestaltist, and stimulus-response compatibility, internal fieldfacfors. Afield efects operator (or F operator), discussed below, changes (increases or decreases) the processing complexity of encoding and responding to inputs. 5. An endogenous (i.e., prewired) interrupt operator of central attention (I operator). This hardware operator can interrupt (centrally inhibit) informational processes that are not relevant for goals currently pursued by the executive controls. 6. An endogenous attentional mental operator. This operator is also called M capacity (M power is the process latent variable defined to measure this capacity when it is mobilized and cognitively allocated). Mobilized and allocated M capacity hyperactivates (i.e., boosts the activation of) schemes that are relevant to the task at hand. Evidence from neuroscience that cannot be reviewed here implicates the prefrontal lobes as the site of both the interrupt operator and the mental operator. These two hardware operators are essential among processes that constitute mental attention, which in turn is an essential cause (among others) of working memory.

Horizoiirality of’Water Lri,rl

255

7. An endogenous brain mechanism enables the abstraction of spatial “coordinates” (i.e., processes that subconsciously read out spatial relations found among objects). This is a sort of space operutor (S operator) that calculates where objects are located topographically in experience relative to external landmarks. In current neuroscience, this space operator is described as a brain mechanism located in the posterior parietal cortex. This mechanism is often contrasted with another visuospatial mechanism, located in the interior temporal cortex, that serves instead to calculate what the object is (Andersen, 1988; Kritchevsky, 1988; Maunsell & Newsome, 1987; Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983; O’Reilly, Kosslyn, Marsolek, & Chahris, 1990).

In this theory, we construe psychological processes as resulting from the often concurrent. dynamic interplay with schemes of the various different hardware operators (Pascual-Leone, 1980, 1984, 1987; Pascual-Leone & Goodman, 1979).

C. ENDOGENOUS MENTAL A’ITENTION EXPLICATED

In our view, a central causal constituent of the mechanism that produces developmental stages is meriral alterztion. This construct of an endogenous (i.e., innately prewired) mental attention is explicated as a complex functional system resulting from the work in the organism of constructive operators 3. 4, 5 , and 6 just mentioned. Components 5 and 6 of this functional system, that is, the attentional interrupt and the M capacity, are posited to increase with age in normal children (Pascual-Leone. 1969, 1970, 1987). Three-year-olds normally have an M capacity of e + 1 (the attentional interrupt is believed to grow congruently with M capacity). In this expression, the constant e represents the attentional M capacity developed throughout the sensorimotor period (Benson, 1989; Pascual-Leone & Johnson, in press; Pascual-Leone, Johnson, & Benson, 1989). This e amount of capacity can be utilized by 3-year-olds and older children for boosting the activation of a simple Executive (i.e., a small set of cofunctioning executive scheme controls that together constitute a simple or complex tacit plan); “1” stands for one figurative or operative scheme that can be used to implement this Executive. Children aged 5 have a capacity of e + 2; that is, they are able to coordinate two action schrmes (i.e., operative or figurative schemes that directly produce performance) that implement the executive plan. The growth of M capacity continues at the rate of about one “action” unit every second year, until the usual adult capacity of e + 7 is reached at the age of 15 years. Evidence for this rate of increase of M capacity cannot be reviewed here (see Benson, 1989; Burtis, 1982; Burtis & Pascual-Leone, 1980; Fabian, 1982; Goodman, 1979; Johnson et af., 1989; Miller, Pascual-Leone, Campbell, & Juckes, 1989; Morra, Moizo, & Scopesi, 1988; Parkinson, 1975; Pascual-Leone, 1970, 1978, 1987;

256

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

Pascual-Leone & Ijaz, 1989; Scardamalia, 1977). Within cognitive science, M capacity can be interpreted as one endogenous causal determinant of working memory. However, it should not be equated with working memory (as is often done) because other causal determinants-for example, structural learning (i.e., automatization), executive know-how, gestaltist stimulus-response compatibility field factors, affective f a c t o r s 4 a n also influence the working-memory level exhibited by subjects in given situations.

D. ROLE OF MENTAL ATTENTION IN MISLEADING SITUATIONS

An important issue for this theory is the role of hardware operators in misleading situations-the situations where cognitive style differences often emerge. Misleading situations are those in which (1) salient features of the stimulus situation elicit task-irrelevant schemes and ( 2 ) these features cannot be disregarded because they also elicit task-relevant schemes. (A known illustration of this sort is Witkin’s Embedded Figures Test, in which the same features in the complex drawing serve to cue aspects of the irrelevant complex drawing and to cue the relevant simple figure that is embedded in it-Pascual-Leone, 1969, 1989; Pascual-Leone & Goodman, 1979.) Because these irrelevant schemes are incompatible in their application with other relevant ones, but their releasing cues are more salient than those of the relevant schemes, irrelevant schemes usually apply first in misleading situations; and this in turn lowers the probability of subsequent application of relevant schemes to produce the correct response (for this reason the simple figure is hard to see in an embedded figures test). This sort of misleading structure is the one found in tasks used to measure Witkin’s cognitive style, that is, field dependencehdependence. Pascual-Leone (1969, 1980, 1987) and others (e.g., deRibaupierre, 1989; Globerson, 1989; Huteau, 1980) have found that many Piagetian tasks (in addition to the water level task) have a similar misleading structure. Witkin et al. (1962), Witkin and Goodenough (1981), Pascual-Leone (1989), and others have also found that this cognitive-style structure cuts across conventional content and structural domains (e.g.. perception, representation, motor performance, problem solving, and language). For instance, Pascual-Leone and Goodman (Goodman, 1971) showed that this misleading structure applies to semantic linguistic tasks like decoding of ambiguous sentences. Fabian and Pascual-Leone (Fabian, 1982; Pascual-Leone, 1989) showed that it applies to a linguistic task bearing on the use of subordinate conjunctions. Pascual-Leone (1969,1974,1980,1987, 1989) has suggested that performance in this sort of misleading situation can be explained by the following organismic factors caused by the hardware operators mentioned above:

Horizontality of Water Level

25 7

1. Effectsofpreviously overlearned and automatized responses,which may not be appropriate in the current situation. These responses result from scheme structures (chunks) that are produced by content learning in interaction with structural learning. 2 . Internal field efects, descriptively formulated by the gestaltist and stimulusresponse compatibility principles. 3. Menial attentional processes, suggested above, that evaluate misleading factors in a situation and can act to overcome them. These task-relevant attentional processes are constituted by executive schemes or controls, which interrupt (disactivate) the processing of irrelevant information and can activate relevant schemes via allocation of M capacity to them. An implication of this analysis is that performance in a misleading task should vary with the relative strengths of the three sets of organismic factors. When they are similarly strong, the subject’s response may become a “compromise” performance because no factor is strong enough to overcome the others. This compromise is particularly likely in tasks in which performance is dynamically graded, such as the water level task when angle of deviation of the water line is measured in degrees.

E. ERROR FACTORS OF ATTENTION IN THE WATER LEVEL TASK

Several error factors found in the water level task are analyzed in detail in the following subsections.

1. Overlearned Image of Water-is-at-Bottom This error factor is in the first set of organismic factors defined above. It is created by figurative schemes (templates) of previous experiences with bottles in upright positions, where water is at the bottom and parallel to it. This factor is likely to be more misleading in young children because older children and adults can more easily reject this overlearned static image when they develop experientially the physical principles of horizontality of water.

2. Overlearned Scheme of Water-Falls-to-Lower-Region This error factor is also in the first set of organismic factors. When children can keep in mental attention the effects of simple transformational processes in nature, for example, of displacements of objects or personal displacements (the effects of gravity on objects, etc.), they develop schemes that embody the infrastructure of these lawful circumstantial transformations. Thus, children 7 or 8 years old, who

25 8

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergiu Morra

can at will simultaneously M-centrate (i,e., focus mental attention on) three intellective schemes, will rapidly develop with everyday experience the intellective knowledge structure described by the following observer’s rule: “When it is not contained by grounded objects, water tends to fall spontaneously toward the lower region of surrounding space or context.” We call this observed functional invariant the scheme of water-falls-to-lowerregion. To abstract this scheme constructively, children must be able to M centrate simultaneously the following simpler schemes: (1) the initial position of an object, in this case water; (2) its terminal position after the gravity transformation; and (3) the contextual frame-the antecedents and/or circumstances-where the change occurs. Sufficient M capacity for spontaneously keeping these schemes in working memory does not exist prior to 7 years of age, but at this age the scheme in question can rapidly emerge, and the child begins to have an intellective sense of gravity. Performance in the water level task is affected by this water-falls-tolower-region scheme. One dynamic effect of the availability of this scheme will be a “polarization” or dynamic salience of the upper-to-lower direction in context, that is, in the frame constituted by the tilted bottle. Another will be the emergence of a naive “molecular” representation of water as a distal object. According to this “molecular theory,” each drop of water will dynamically tend to move to lower regions of the surrounding context as far as it can reach unimpeded. We attribute this intuition to a naive scheme of molecular-water-as-substance. Notice that the subjective salience of the upper-to-lower dimension, used to construct the scheme waterfalls-to-lower-regions as well as the scheme of molecular-water-as-substance (see Section VIII,A), and also the upper-to-lower salience or resolution of the innate “space operator” (see Section VII,B), may be influenced by the quality of organismic signals coming from the otolith organs in the subject’s vestibular system. In a brilliant series of experiments, Sholl(l989) showed that female subjects who failed the water level task were selectively impaired on tasks that require processing information from the otolith organs. This finding lends indirect support to our process model-a model first presented in 1969.

3. Figurative Field Effects of Symmetry andlor Good Form A gestaltist factor (the field factor operator mentioned above) compels subjects to structure percepts, drawings, and/or imaginal representations congruently with principles of “good form” and/or “symmetry” (e.g., Bremner, 1985; Kanizsa, 1979; Rock, 1983; Zucker, 1988). We regard these principles as manifestations of a more encompassing albeit only descriptive gestaltist “minimum principle” (Attneave, 1972; Attneave & Frost, 1969; Brady & Yuille, 1988; Hochberg, 1964; Zucker, 1988). Our current descriptive formulation of the minimum principle (a processing field factor) is rather pretheoretical; but it agrees with current computa-

Horizontality of Wuter Level

25 9

tionakonnectionist formulations (e.g., Brady & Yuille, 1988) in considering this internal field factor to be an endogenous brain constraint-ne among the many that together determine perceptual and representational processes (cf. Zucker, 1988). In modern connectionist modeling, this minimum principle might be seen as resulting from the brain’s own “relaxation algorithm”-the neurophysiological principles of neuronal summation and of central (cortical) lateral inhibition (Arbib & Hanson. 1988; Rumelhart, McClelland, & PDP Research Group, 1986; Smolensky, 1988). The descriptive rule of the minimum principle can be formulated in the water level task as follows: The subject’s organism will tend to structure the representation of the water line within the tilted bottle so that (within constraints imposed by activated schemes) the resulting form is related as a “good form” or a symmetry to the holistic structure of salient features attended to in the context. Here, stimulus features can be either simple and local, or relational and holistic, i n various degrees depending on the attentional strategy used. A feature is salient when it tends to capture the subject’s attention as soon as the visual system is directed to it.

4. Error Patterns in the Water Level Induced by the Minimum Principle This minimum principle factor can induce subjects to perceive, or remember, the water line in tilted bottles as being perpendicular to the bottle’s wall, parallel to the bottom, whenever the subject’s mental attention focuses on the bottle’s bottom (subjects tend to do so when they possess the overlearned scheme wateris-at-bottom just mentioned); or it will induce the idea of a water line parallel to the walls, when subjects focus on the walls (Pascual-Leone, 1969, 1980). However, the child’s M capacity at 9 and 10 years of age allows simultaneous M centration of both the bottom (or the upper neck) of the bottle and its wall(s). In this case, the minimum principle should make the corners of the bottle very salient because they holistically integrate the walls and the bottom (or neck); and this result will be particularly likely for the upper and lower corners of the tilted bottle because these corners mark a direction emphasized by the scheme water-falls-tolower-region discussed above. Under these circumstances, subjects may be led to perceive or remember the water line as nearly vertical, bisecting the angle of the bottle’s lower corner (error pattern 2 in Fig. 2 ) . This factor may hinder subjects’ inference of the true horizontal by mindlessly inducing them to “follow” (attend to) the direction marked by automatized schemes such as water-is-at-bottom and water-falls-to-lower-region (error patterns 1, 2, 4, and 5 in Fig. 2). This mechanism is present in young children as well as in adults; but in our view certain error patterns produced by this gestaltist factor of symmetry in the water level task are found only in older children and adults (e.g., error patterns 2 , 3, 5 ,

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

260

2

1

4

5

3

6

Fig. 2. Incorrect responses on the water level test. The instructions are to draw the water line as it would appear in a bottle half filled with water, and to mark the water with an “x. ” Some of these errors are examples of truly novel behavior.

and 6 in Fig. 2). The reason is that young children lack the scanning and representational skills for integrating into a single analytical centration the walls, bottom, and corners of the bottle’s pattern. For this reason, they are spared the misleading influence of this integrated pattern, which error patterns 2, 3, 5 , and 6 (Fig. 2) illustrate.

5. Operative Field Effects or Stimulus-Response Compatibility A final factor is stimulus-response compatibility. This is the operative response bias described above, which more or less affects the performance of every subject in the water level task with tilted bottles. It consists of the “automatic” disposition to draw or otherwise construct the water line so that its configuration is congruent with the salient configural pattern of stimulus display that the subject encounters in this performance. All error responses shown in Fig. 2, which are characteristic error patterns found repeatedly, are obedient to this stimulus-response compatibility: In error patterns 1 and 4, only one stimulus element is salient, either the wall or the bottom of the bottle; in patterns 2, 3, 5, and 6, three stimulus elements are salient, that is, the walls, the bottom, and the corners of the bottle. Figure 2 clearly shows that these are indeed the stimulus elements that influence, via organismic factors of gestaltist symmetry and stimulus-response compatibility, the subject’s performance.

Horizonrulity of Water Level

26 1

6. Error Patterns as Dynamic Syntheses An important point is that children’s and adults’ error patterns in the water level task, which are illustrated in Fig. 2, are not just results of simple transfer of learning (automatization). Content learning and/or structural learning interpretations are not sufficient because the angle of deviation of subjects’ water line from the horizontal is in fact predictable from perceptual-motor task performances that have nothing to do with water in bottles. One such task, the copy-the-stripe task, is discussed in Section VIC. These data, as well as data described i n Sections 111, IV, and V, suggest that errors (and initial correct performances in the task) result from dyriumic syritheses, which generate truly novel performances. By “truly novel” we mean performances that are not implicitly or explicitly represented in the subject’s repertoire of habitual schemes (i.e.. his or her long-term memory store). Excellent examples of truly novel performances are the so-called compromise behaviors (displacement, substitution, etc.) and error performances described by ethologists, psychoanalysts, and Piagetians in the context of both affect-free cognitive problem solving and affect-controlled behavior. The error patterns in the water level task shown in Fig. 2 illustrate these truly novel compromise performances. Error pattern 2 seems to be an odd but common compromise performance between patterns 1 and 4 or, leading to similar results, a compromise facilitated by the subject’s knowledge that the water “falls” to the lower part of the bottle. Pascual-Leone’s studies support this conclusion. We shall mention four observations:

1 . Developmentally, error pattern 2 tends to appear after 1 and 4. 2. Subjects’ comments are consistent with the interpretation we just gave. 3. Field-dependent subjects, but not field-independent ones, tend to exhibit error pattern 2 and related responses more often when the bottle has no stopper than when it has a stopper (as though the lack of a stopper in the bottle reinforces the scheme water-falls-to-lower-region). 4. Finally, patterns 3 and 6 were produced by a physical education college student, who was field-dependent and who had excellent academic standing and above normal IQ (Pascual-Leone, 1969). The response patterns were reliable, for he filled a whole set of eight tilted-bottle outlines with them. The experimenter (Pascual-Leone) was so shocked by these responses that he hesitantly asked: “Are you sure that it will be this way?” The subject blushed, reflected briefly, and said: “No, it will be that way!”, proceeding carefully to smooth out the angle from the sharp configuration of 3 to a round one similar to 6. No propositional or conceptual theory can explain these errors.

262

Juun Puscuul-Leone and Sergio Morru

VIII. Developmental Aspects of the Model We believe that performance in the water level task results from a dynamic compromise (a dialectical synthesis) among organismic factors. Some of these factors are relevant; others are irrelevant and often lead subjects to error. Examples of relevant factors are mental-attentional processes, the schemes water-falls-tolower-region and the naive molecular theory of water. Examples of irrelevant factors are the water-is-at-bottom scheme, the gestaltist figurative-field operator or minimum principle, and the gestaltist operative-field operator or stimulus-response compatibility. Performance of subjects in this task does not depend only on the strength of mental attentional processes; rather, it varies with the strength of this attentional factor relative to the strength of misleading factors. PascualLeone (1969, 1980) suggested a developmental analysis of performance in the water level task based on the growth of M capacity and interrupt operatordevelopmentally growing components of mental attention. We summarize this analysis here and let readers compare its predictions against the data examined in this review.

A. DEVELOPMENTAL EMERGENCE OF WATER LEVEL SCHEMES

AND CONSEQUENT INCREASE OF MENTAL DEMAND

Very young children tend not to draw a water line but rather scribble something within the bottle outline, merely conveying the idea that water is “inside.” At about the age of 5 , however, subjects start to draw a water line, approximately parallel to the bottom of the bottle; the M capacity demand of this achievement was said to be e + 2 in the 1969 model. In addition to the general executive, which sets the goal, the two “action” schemes to be boosted with M capacity in this type of response are: (1) an operative scheme to produce the water line (which evokes a vague figurative expectation about the water line to be produced), and (2) the figurative scheme water-is-at-bottom, which serves as a parameter specifying where the operative scheme to produce the water line shall be applied. Improvement occurs when subjects can respond correctly to both vertical (upright, upside down) and horizontal (sideways) bottles (but not yet to tilted ones). This stage emerges around the age of 7 and has an M capacity demand of e + 3. The three “action” schemes needed for this performance are (1) an operative scheme to produce the water line, henceforth called water line operative; (2) a figurative scheme representing the experiential knowledge that water falls to the lower parts of the bottle-this is the water-falls-to-lower-regionscheme, discussed in Section VII,E,2; and (3) a figurative scheme that gives a rough estimate of where the lower region of the bottle is. Such a lower region scheme may be the

Horizuntulity of Wurer L e t d

263

result of a mental computation like the following. An attentional operative scheme produces a visual/representational analysis to categorize the bottle outline by means of the early visuospatial precursor of space coordinates (this is the space operator mentioned in Section VI1,B). In this manner, the lower region in the bottle is identified (constituting the 1owt.r-region-of-holtle.scheme).A consequence of this kind of spatial-analytic processing, which continuously takes place in everyday experience. is the eventual emergence of a dynamic representation of molecular-water-as-substance.This is the scheme of the distal object “water.”In this scheme, water is experienced as a collection of particles that “fall to the lower part” of the container; but calculation of water’s final position of rest is not yet possible with tilted bottles. For tilted bottles, subjects with an M capacity of e + 3 (7- and 8-year-olds) may draw a line that is parallel to the bottom or to the sides, or may draw a compromise “vertical” line that connects two corners. These responses are congruent with the gestaltist field effects factor (figurative-field effects of symmetry and/or good form, and operative-field effects of stimulusresponse compatibility). The need to override the misleading influence of this field effects factor increases the task’s mental demand. The minimum mental demand for responding correctly to tilted bottles is e + 4. The schemes involved in this case are derived from the application to this context of two core structures. Core structures are essential (i.e., “gist,” infrastructural) representations of systems of coordinated schemes (i.e., what in cognitive science is often called complex schemas; the sort of scheme product that Piaget called operational structures). These core structures develop. via reflective or constructive abstraction, from the schemes used in multiple varied expericiiccs within 3 riomain of praxis (cf.I’nscual-Lzvne, 1987; Piaget, 1969; Piaget & Inhelder, 1948/1967). The two core slruclures in question are a spucti coorditzate structure that carries a representation of horizontality, and a rough core structure of molecular-water-as-substance.Children develop the four schemes needed to solve the tilted-bottle problems by abstracting across situations with the help of both their prewired M capacity operator and their prewired visuospatial coordinate mechanism (their space operator). The four schemes are (1) water line operative, which can draw the water line and is now closely associated (structured) with the core structure molecular-water-as-substance (which includes the dynamic anticipation of a water line), (2) water-falls-to-lowerregion, (3) lower-region-of-bottle, and (4) the figurative scheme of a horizontal line. (The horizontal line scheme is subordinate to the space coordinates core structure; i t is a representation of the spatial horizontal line and serves as a template-referent image; often it is replaced by its concrete instantiation, e.g., the tabletop line visible in the water level task item.) As a result of the repeated use of these schemes, children differentiate further their core structure of molecularwater-as-substance. In this more dynamic scheme, molecules of water may be

264

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

experienced as physically distinct, each falling toward the lower part of the bottle, with the water line resulting from a dynamic balance or “equilibration” among the different molecules of water. For subjects who have not fully automatized (or are currently not able to access) a template scheme of the mental horizontal coordinate (and do not yet have a dynamic molecular structure of water), the task’s mental (M) demand will be e + 5. The reason is that the missing horizontal line scheme should be replaced by two figural schemes, namely, the representations of two suitably chosen points (two drops of surface water “falling to lower region”) that are on the two sides of the bottle outline, and are approximately at the same height from the perceived ground line (e.g., equidistant from the table top or, in paper-and-pencil versions of the task, from the bottom edge of the sheet). In this manner, subjects with poor spatial imagery and little experience with liquids might be able to draw the water line correctly. This expectation is of course based on the assumption that subjects’ performances are overdetermined (jointly determined via field-facilitated summation of effects) by all their activated schemes at the moment of responding. This assumption of overdetermination is congenial to the “functional architectural” assumptions found in modern connectionism (Rumelhart et al., 1986) and the neurosciences.

B. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS MODEL

These analyses imply that versions of the water level task with vertical or sideways (horizontal) bottles have a mental demand of e + 3 and items with tilted bottles have a mental demand of at most e t 5 . These mental demands correspond, respectively, to the mental capacity of 7-or 8-year-olds and of 11- or 12-year-olds (Pascual-Leone, 1970, 1987; Johnson et al., 1989). Much empirical research, including two multilingual assessment projects that involved over 3,000 children in the United States (De Avila et al., 1976; Garcia ef al., & Sachse, 1976), has confirmed these water level developmental predictions, supporting Piaget and Inhelder’s (1948/1967) original finding. However, in the Piagetian theory, these developmental levels are attributed entirely to qualitative-structural growth in children’s conception of horizontality. Our neo-Piagetian model sets another condition: The child must have enough mental capacity for coordinating the schemes (3 or 5 depending on the level) needed to solve the task in an act of mental synthesis (Pascual-Leone, 1987). One implication of this model is therefore that the score obtained by children in the water level task should be highly correlated with perceptual measures of M capacity. M capacity measures parametrically increase the M demand of items without changing their qualitative-structural characteristics, and do not involve categorization in terms of logical notions of space (horizontality, verticality). One

Horizontality of Water Level

265

such measure is the Figural Intersections Test (Johnson et al., 1989; PascualLeone & Ijaz, 1989; Pascual-Leone & Smith, 1969), which is a reliable and valid experimental measure of M capacity that has been much used. The reliabilities, both split-half and Cronbach's alpha, have generally been in the .90s, with a few in the high 2 0 s (e.g., De Avila et al., 1976; Garcia et al., 1976; Pascual-Leone & Smith, 1969). The correlations between quantitative scores on the water level task (based on both location of the water and angle of deviation of water level) and scores on the Figural Intersections Test have been invariably high (Arnold, in preparation; Fabian, 1982; Goodman, 1971; Johnson, 1982). In one of the multilingual assessment projects conducted by De Avila et al. (1976), with over 1,180 children ranging from 7 to 14 years, the correlation was S4-higher than the reported correlation between the Figural Intersections Test and chronological age (.47), and equal to the correlation between water level task and chronological age (.56). These and related findings give some credence to our neo-Piagetian developmental analyses of the water level task. From these developmental analyses of the water level task as a misleading situation, and from the M capacity of various age groups, we (Pascual-Leone, 1969, p. 300) long ago derived the following prediction: With regard to the tilted bottles, only small cognitive style (field dependenceiindependence) differences in performance will be found before the age of 9 or 10 years. Furthermore. larger cognitive style differences should be found in 11- or 12-year-olds and perhaps even in adults as compared with young children.

Twenty years of research subsequent to this prediction have corroborated it. The only correction that we could now make results from the fact that the technology of M capacity assessment has improved (see Case, 1985; Globerson, 1983; Miller el a/., 1989; Morra & Scopesi, 1988; Pascual-Leone, 1970, 1987; Pascual-Leone & Ijaz, 1989). Nowadays, we might use the M capacity levels of e + 4 and e t 5 in addition to (or instead of) age thresholds (8 and 11 years) to make this prediction more precise. In what follows, however, we use age-based predictions because published experiments on the water level task do not usually include measures of M capacity.

IX. Other Empirical Studies Supporting the Model In the studies reviewed one finds much evidence in support of this model. The only apparent exception, reported by De Lisi (1983), is a correlation of .75 with the rod-and-frame test at the age of 7. The anomaly, however, is only apparent: De Lisi scored the water level task by averaging performance with stimuli tilted at 30°, 60", and 90" from vertical. According to our theory, 7-year-olds' performance with tilted bottles (30"and 60") should not be related to field independence

266

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

because these children still lack the M capacity needed for a correct solution. However, their performance with the sideways bottles (90") should be strongly related to field independence because they have enough M capacity for coping with the task. If they were field-dependent, the factors of learning, gestaltist figurative-field effects (the minimum principle), and gestaltist operative-field effects (stimulus-response compatibility) should induce them to draw a vertical line parallel to the bottom of the bottle. Thus, De Lisi's data seem consistent with our model. This claim can be easily tested by scoring horizontal and tilted bottles separately. More data directly in support of this developmental model were reported by Foorman (1981), who administered to young children (4 to 5 years old) the water level task and measures of M capacity and field independence. She found that M capacity scores predicted the ability to draw the water line with vertical bottles (even when the bottles were upside-down), and field independence at this age was unrelated to performance with tilted bottles. Data directly relevant to our water level task model were presented by Pennings (1991). Using the original version of our water level task model (Pascual-Leone, 1969) as a guide, Pennings created a series of training tasks that should help to develop the relevant schemes of the water level task that we have discussed. Independently, he assessed the M capacity of his 7- and 8-year-olds using a special M power scale designed for Raven's Progressive Matrices (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1979; Pennings & Hessels, 1989). Comparing the performance of children on the water level task in the pre- and posttraining sessions, he found that performance was better after the training only for children whose M capacity was equal to or greater than the M capacity theoretically predicted for 7- and 8-yearolds. Data obtained by Willemsen and Reynolds (1973) on differently shaped containers also support our model: Rectangular bottles and round flasks were compared, and it was found that rectangular bottles facilitated performance in the horizontal position and hindered it in tilted positions. These data (which agree with unpublished results of Pascual-Leone, 1969, and later studies) can easily be explained by the stimulus-response compatibility factor and the gestaltist field factor already described. Similar considerations apply to Abravanel and Gingold's (1977) results: With triangular bottles performance was even worse because the field factor's perpendicular bias in drawing the water line leads to larger errors in this case. Two final questions remain: Why are correlations with field independence tests often not very high and at times nonexistent (Liben, 1991); and how can the model be reconciled with gender differences in adults, which remain when field dependence is controlled for? Pascual-Leone (1974, 1989) discussed the frequent finding that correlations between the rod-and-frame and the embedded figures tests also are not very high;

Horizoritulity of Water Level

267

the suggested explanation concerned the different nature of misleading aspects in the two tests. The cognitive conflict in embedded figures is at the level of figurative schemes and can be accounted for by gestaltist principles such as the minimum principle; but in the rod-and-frame task the conflict seems to be mainly at the level of operative schemes and can be explicated better using the stimulus-response compatibility principle. Further, although the misleadingness in an embedded figures item can abruptly disappear as soon as the subject “sees” the simple figure inside the complex drawing, in a rod-and-frame item the misleadingness is protracted in the sense that it endures even after the subject has started to respond (Pascual-Leone, 1969, 1974, 1989). This line of reasoning can he extended to account for the specific characteristics of the water level task. As already discussed. when the misleading cues are not eliminated o r reduced (via change in the perceptual context or via learning), the water level task has the general structure of field independence tests (Pascual-Leone, 1989).The cognitive conflict involves schemes as well as hardware field mechanisms. Misleading learning factors (e.g., the scheme water-is-at-bottom) are also important, particularly for children whose experience with upright bottles dictates the water is parallel to the bottom. Women may have fewer opportunities than men to acquire physical and geometric knowledge (see Barsky & Lachman, 1986; Kalichman, 1986; Liben & Golbeck, 1984; Robert, 1990; Windsor, 1983), and this difference might explain the part of the gender difference in the water level task that is not accounted for by field independence. However, this strong environmentalist interpretation of gender differences in the water level task is contradicted by another environmental fact of urban life: Women may have more experience with liquid in bottles than do men (and yet the former often do less well in the water level task). The theoretical explanation of this gender paradox is that gender differences are likely to be found both in the innate determinants that enable space structuring (see Section VII,B and Witelson Br Swallow, 1988) and in the strength of field effects (or the control processes that regulate them-Pascual-Leone, 1089; Witkin & Goodenough, 1981), even though gender differences are not found in M capacity. The recent experiments by Sholl (1989). summarized in Section VII,E.2, might be seen as highlighting an important feedback mechanism for space structuring (the vertical, gravitational dimension of space coordinates), which are also useful in the cognitive regulation of field effects via scheme development. This is the informational feedback coming from the otolith organs of the vestibular system. Sholl reports that females who failed the water level task are selectively impaired on tasks that require feedback from the otolith organs. She seems to interpret these results as suggesting that the primary cause is a structural deficiency in this vestibular feedback. But there is another interpretation that instead makes this deficiency functional and secondary: a field dependencehdependence cognitive style interpretation such as offered by Pascual-Leone (1969, 1989). In this inter-

268

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

pretation the primary cause is a functional bias (a mental strategy bias or formula) that will consistently lead field-dependent subjects to choose more salient modality channels of feedback, such as vision in humans, over nonsalient feedback channels such as vestibular information. In this interpretation females are not structurally deficient in vestibular feedback but are simply more field-dependenta functional disposition. An implication of our model is that when both field dependence and knowledge of relevant physical concepts are controlled, the gender difference in the water level task should disappear or greatly decrease; the remainder, if it exists, might reflect gender differences in innate brain mechanisms for spatial-coordinate structuring (called the “space operator” in Section VILB).

X. In Lieu of Conclusions: Comparison with Other Current Models The actual process mechanisms for space structuration and for construction of spatial coordinates are as yet far from clear. However, the evidence reviewed herein, and much other evidence, favors a multiplicity of determinants that interact dynamically to bring about abstracted space constructions. Among these factors we count familiarity of experience, logical/structural knowledge and learning, figurative (minimum principle) and operative (stimulus-response compatibility) internal field effects, mental processes, and mental-attentional (or working memory) mechanisms, vestibular feedback, and interhemispheric coordinations (Le., in psychological terms, coordination of different modes of processing information). We have intimated that these factors interact dynamically in a dialectical manner-dialectical because at every stage of development, the earlier structural/representational acquisitions (or automatizations) can become misleading factors that hinder emergence of more advanced and encompassing spatial constructions. Endogenous quantitative growth of mental-attentional mechanisms marks the transition to new developmental stages (Pascual-Leone, 1970, 1978, 1987); and at each stage it helps to overcome misleading factors and leads to more encompassing space structurations. In adolescence, after 16 years of age, learning via human mediation and the use of problem solving (self-mediation) replaces endogenous growth of mental attention as a primary mechanism of spatial representational growth . This pretheoretical model can be compared with other psychological models of the water level task. Important to this comparison is the methodological stricture that causal factors must be able to account for individual differences without exceptions (Pascual-Leone, 1987). The account of Piaget and Inhelder (1948/1967) was based only on conceptual and operative competence; it could not explain errors made by adolescents and

Hori:ontali& of Water Lc.r.d

26’)

adults, or cognitive style effects and misleading performance factors, which we have found in the reviewed literature. Olson and Bialystok’s (1983, 1987) theory cannot explain error patterns reviewed in Sections 111, IV. and VI, and it may also have difficulty in explaining performance factors like figurative- (minimum principle) and operative- (stimulusresponse compatibility) field effects. Kalichman (1988) proposed a model with six components: visual perception, disembedding, image generating, mental rotation, spatial coordinating, and recall from long-term memory. The first two Components are functionally connected to (i.e., often used by) the third, and this one to mental rotation, which is similarly connected t o spatial coordinating; finally, recall from long-term memory is functionally connected to all five other components. Although we agree that different component abilities are involved in the water level task, we feel that Kalichman’s model, albeit valuable descriptively, is not explicit enough about basic causal factors. For instance, the model is not clear as to whether links among components represent a transfer of information from one component to another. And if so, the model is not clear as to where. and how, cognitive conflicts like those documented herein can arise in this model’s purely sequential processing. In addition, the role and relative importance of each component in this model are not specified. Some components are descriptively obvious, inasmuch as all tasks involve perception of stimuli, but for other components the evidence is far from clear. For instance, the only evidence reported by Kalichman for imagery and mental rotation (which wc do not question as descriptive constructs) was a gender difference found by Signorella and Jamison (1978): The water level task was positively correlated with a mental rotation test in males, but not in females. Otani and Leonard (1988) found exactly the reverse pattern of gender differences. In addition, Otani and Leonard were unable to induce subjects to take advantage of what they called a rorational scr. Finally, Kalichman’s model is unlikely to be able to explain the response bias and stimulus-response compatibility effects discussed in Section VI. Although Kalichman’s (1988) analysis is descriptively insightful in treating the water level performance as a complex and multidetermined mental process, his model is limited in that it lacks a causal account. We believe that valid causal process components (and relations among them) cannot be inferred from the analysis of single tasks, unless a commitment is made to some valid preexistent theory. As Liben (1988) suggested, analysis of cognitive tasks must he guided by general theory. We wish to add that a general theory must necessarily abstract relevant information (functional process invariants or components) across types of situations as well as across types of subjects. We have done so in this review. But the neo-Piagetian general theory we have used for this purpose (a theory designed for use in task analysis) is only a first step; it needs specification with respect to mental-computational procedures. The merit of our model of the water level task and of this review is to point to hardware devel-

270

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

opmental processes of considerable generality that other current developmental models and the empirical literature have largely neglected.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Preparation of this paper was facilitated by grants from the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (Comitato 04, “Altri Interventi,“ 1987, to the second author) and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (to the first author). We acknowledge the advice of Dr. J. Johnson and of Dr. H. W. Reese, and the assistance of R. Baillargeon, Ho Chee Wee, and Sandra Locke, in preparing the final manuscript.

REFERENCES Abravanel, E., & Gingold, H. (1977). Perceiving and representing orientation: Effects of the spatial framework. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 23, 265-278. Allen, M. J., Wittig, M. A,, & Butler, K. (1981). Comments on Thomas and Jamison’s “A test of the X-linked genetic hypothesis for sex differences on Piaget’s Water-Level Task.” Developmental Review, 1, 284-288. Anderson, R. A. (1988). The neurobiological basis of spatial cognition: Role of the parietal lobe. In J. Stiles-Davis, M. Kritchevsky, & U. Bellugi (Eds.), Spatial cognition: Brain basis and development (pp. 57-80). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Arbib, M. A,, & Hanson, A. R. (1988). Vision, brain, and cooperative computation: An overview. In M. A. Arbib & A. R. Hanson (Eds.), Vision, brain, and cooperative computation (pp. 1-83). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Arnold, C. (in preparation). Educating with cotpuiers: Age-related factors in logo programming. Unpublished master’s thesis, York University, Toronto. Attneave, F. (1972). Representation of physical space. In A. W. Melton & E. Martin (Eds.), Coding processes in human memory (pp. 283-306). New York: Wiley. Attneave, F.. & Frost, R. (1969). The determination of perceived tridimensional orientation by minimum criteria. Perception and Psychophysics, 6, 391-396. Barsky, R. D.. & Lachman, M. E. (1986). Understanding of horizontality in college women: Effects of two training procedures. International Journal of Behavioral Development. 9, 3 1-43. Bayraktar, R. (1985). Cross-cultural analysis of drawing errors. In N. H. Freeman & M. V. Cox (Eds.), Visual order (pp. 333-355). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Benson, N. (1989). Mcnral capacity constraints on early symbolic processing: The origins of lunguage b u m a cognitive perspective. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, York University, Toronto. Bereiter, C., & Scardamalia, M. (1979). Pascual-Leone’s M construct as a link between cognitivedevelopmental and psychometric concepts of intelligence. Intelligence, 3. 41-63, Bialystok, E. (1989). Children‘s mental rotations of abstract displays. Journal of Experimental Child P,~yChOlo~, 47, 47-71. Bialystok, E., & Olson, D. R. (1987). Spatial categories. The perception and conceptualization of spatial relations. In S. Harnad (Ed.), Categorical perception: The groundwork of Cognition (pp. 511-531). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brady. M., & Yuille, A. (1988). An extremum principle for shape from contour. In M. A. Arbib & A.

Horizontalip of Wuter Level

27 1

R. Hanson (Eds.), Visiort, brain, and cooperative computation (pp. 229-360). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bremner, J. G. (1984). Errors toward the perpendicular in children’s copies of angular figures: A test of the bisection interpretation. Perception, 13. 117-128. Bremner, J. G. (1985). Figural biases and youngchildren’s drawings. In N. H. Freeman & M. V. Cox (Eds.), Visual order (pp. 31&332). New York: Cambridge University Press. Bremner, J. G., & Taylor, A. J. (1982). Children’s errors in copying angles: Perpendicular error or bisection error? Perception, 11, 163-171. Burtis, P. J. (1982). Capacity increase and chunking in the development of short-term memory. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 34, 3 8 9 4 13. Burtis, P. J.. & Pascual-Leone, J. (1980, April). The rate of development ofshort-term memory for letter matrices: A test of M-operator theory. Paper presented at the University of Waterloo Conference on Child Development, Waterloo. Ontario. Case, R. (1985). fnrellectual development: Birth to childhood. New York: Academic Press. De Avila, E.. Havassy. B., & Pascual-Leone, J. (1976). Mexican-American school children: A neoPiagetian analysis. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. De Lisi, R. (19x3). Developmental and individual differences in children’s representation of the horizontal coordinate. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 29, 179-196. De Lisi. R., Parameswaran, G.. & McGillicuddy-De Lisi. A. (1989). Age and sex differences in representation of horizontality among children in India. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 68, 739746.

de Ribaupierre, A. (1989). Cognitive style and operational development: A review of French literature and a neo-Piagetian reinterpretation. In T. Globerson & T. Zelniker (Eds.), Cognilir’e style arid cognitive development (pp. 86-1 15). Norwood, NJ: Albex. Evans, J. St. B. T. (1977). Toward a statistical theory of reasoning. Quarterly Journal ofE.tperimental Psychology. 29. 62 1-635. Evans, J. St. B. T. (1983). Linguistic determinants of bias in conditional reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 35A, 635444. Fabian. V. (1982). Language development a j e r 5: A neo-Piagetian investigation of subordinate conjunctions. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley. Foorman, B. R. (1981). A neo-Piagetian analysis of four-year-olds’ performance on Piaget’s waterlevel task. Perceptual and Moror Skills. 52, 63 1-639. Freeman, N. H. (1980). Strategie.y of representafion in young children. New York: Academic Prcss. Garcia, F.. Aragon, A,. Owen, T., & Sachse. T. (1976). A report on t17e Multilingual Assessment Project: An investigation of the large scale use of three neo-Piagetian instruments. Portland, Oregon: Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory (710 S.W. Second Avenue, Portland, Oregon, 97204). Geiringer. E. R., & Hyde, J. S. (1976). Sex differences in Piaget’s water-level task: Spatial ability incognito. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 42. 1323-1 328. Geschwind, N., & Galaburda, A. M. (1987). Cerebral lateralization. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press. Gilmore, R. (1981). Catastrophe t17evry for scientists and engineers. New York: Wiley. Globerson, T. (1983). Mental capacity and cognitive functioning: Developmental and social class differences. Developmenlal Psychology, 19. 225-230. Globerson, T. (1989). What is the relationship between cognitive style and cognitive development’?In T. Globerson, & T. Zelniker (Eds.). Cognitive style and cognitive developmenr (pp. 71-85). Nonvood. NJ: Ablex. Golbeck, S. L. (1986). The role of physical content in Piagetian spatial tasks: Sex differences in spatial knowledge’?Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 23, 365-376.

Juan Pascuul-Leone and Sergio Morru

272

Goodman, D. (1971). Cognitive style factor.v in 1ingui.ttic performance with umbiguous sentences. Unpublished master’s thesis, York University, Toronto. Goodman, D. (1979). Stage transitions and the developmental trace of constructive operators: An investigation of a neo-Piagetian theory of cognitive growth. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, York University, Toronto. Harris, L. J. (1981). Sex variations in spatial skill. In L. S . Liben, A. H. Patterson, & N. Newcomhe (Eds.), Spatial representation and belravior across the life spun: Theory and applications (pp. 83-125). New York: Academic Press. Hochberg, J. E. (1964). Perception. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Howard, 1. P. (1978). Recognition and knowledge of the water-level principle. Perception, 7, 15 1-160. Huteau, M. (1980). Dependence-indipendence i I’egard du champ et developpement de la pensee operatoire. Archives de Psychologie, 48, 1-40. Ibbotson, A., & Bryant, P. E. (1976). The perpendicular error and the vertical effect. Perception, 5, 3 19-326.

Jamison, W., & Signorella, M. L. (19x0). Sex-typing and spatial ability: The association between masculinity and success on Piaget’s water-level task. Sex Roles, 6, 345-353. Johnson, J. (1982). The development of nietaplior comprehension: Irs mental-demand measurement and its proces.~-analyticalmodels. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, York University, Toronto. Johnson. J., Fahian, V., & Pascual-Leone, J. (1989). Quantitative hardware-stages that constrain language development. Human Der~elopment,32, 245-271. Kalichman, S. C. (1986). Horizontality as a function of sex and college major. Perceptual andMoror skill.^, 63, 903-906. Kalichman, S. C. (1988). Individual differences in Water-Level Task performance: A component-skills analysis. Developmental Reiiew, 8, 273-295. Kalichman, S. C. (1989a). Sex roles and sex differences in adult spatial performance. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 150(1), 93-10. Kalichman, S. C. (1989b). The effect of stimulus contex on paper-and-pencil spatial task performance. The Journal of General Psychology, 116(2), 133-139. Kanizsa, G. (1979). Organization in vision: Essays on Gestalt perception. New York: Praeger. Kelly, J. T., & Kelly, G. N. (1977). Perception of horizontality by male and female college students. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 44, 724-726. Keynon, J. (1984). Paper-and-pencil tests of Piaget’s water-level test: Sex differences and test modality. Perceptual und Motor Skills, 59, 739-742. Kritchevsky, M. (1988). The elementary spatial functions of the brain. In J. Stiles-Davis, M. Kritchevsky, & U. Bellugi (Eds.), Spatiul cognition: Bruin basis and development (pp. 111-140). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Liben, L. S. (1978). Performance on Piagetian spatial tasks as a function of sex, field-dependence, and training. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 24, 97-1 10. Liben, L. S. (1Y88). Conceptual issues in the development of spatial cognition. In J. Stiles-Davis, M. Kritchevsky, & U.Bellugi (Eds.), Spatial cognition: Brairr hasis arid development (pp. 167-1 94). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Liben, L. S. (1991). Adults’ performance on horizontality tasks: Conflicting frames of reference. Developmental Psychology, 27, 285-294. Liben, L. S., & Golbeck, S. L. (1980). Sex differences in performance on Piagetian tasks: Differences in competence or performance? Child Development, 51, 594-597. Liben, L. S., & Golbeck, S . L. (1984). Performance on Piagetian horizontality and verticality tasks: Sex-related differences in knowledge of relevant physical phenomena. Developmental Psychology, 20,595406.

Horizontality of Water Level

273

Liben, L. S., & Golbeck, S. L. (1986). Adults’ demonstration of underlying Euclidean concepts in relation to task context. Developmental Psychology, 22, 487490. Linn, M. C., & Kyllonen, P. (1981). The field-dependence-independence construct: Some, one or none. Journal of Educational Psychology, 73. 261-273. Maunsell, J. H. R., & Newsome, W. T. (1987). Visual processing in monkeys’ extrastriate cortex. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 10, 363401. McFarland, R. A. (1972). Information processing in reflective and impulsive children: A test of quantitative developmental model. Unpublished master’s thesis, York University, Toronto. McGee, M. G. (1981). Predictions of X-linked inheritance for human characteristics. Developmental Review, 1, 289-295. McGillicuddy-De Lisi, A. V., De Lisi, R., & Youniss. J. (1978). Representation of the horizontal coordinate with and without liquid. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 24, 199-208. Meehan, A. M., & Overton, W. F. (1986). Gender differences in expectancies for success and performance on Piagetian spatial tasks. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 32, 4 2 7 4 1 . Miller, R., Pascual-Leone, J., Campbell, C., & Juckes, T. (1989). Cross cultural similarities and differences on two neo-Piagetian cognitive tasks. Iniernational Journal of Psychology, 24, 293313. Mishkin, M., Ungerleider, L. G., & Macko, K. A. (1983). Object vision and spatial vision: Two cortical pathways. Trends in Neurosciences, 6, 414417. Morra, S., Moizo, C., & Scopesi, A. (1988). Working memory (or the M Operator) and the planning of children’s drawings. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 46, 41-73. Morra, S., & Scopesi, A. (1988). La memoria operativa e la sua misurazione. Etci Evolutiva, 31.22-33. Mowrer-Popiel, E., & De Lisi, R. (1984). An examination of spatial ability in relation to factors from the BEM Sex-Role Inventory. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 59, 131-136. Myer, K.A., & Hensley, J. H. (1984). Cognitive style, gender and self-report of principle as predictors of adult performance on Piaget’s water-level task. Journal of Generic Psychology, 144, 179-183. Nyborg, H. (1983). Spatial ability in men and women: Review and new theory.Advances in Behaviour Research and Therapy, 5 , 89-140. Ohuche, N. M. (1984). Performance on the coordinate reference system: Are gender differences universal? Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 15, 285-296. Olson, D. R., & Bialystok, E. (1983). Spatial cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. O’Reilly, R. C., Kosslyn, S. M., Marsolek, C. J., & Chabris, C. F. (1990). Receptive field characteristics that allow parietal lobe neurons to encode spatial properties of visual input: A computational analysis. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 2, 141-1 55. Otani, H., & Leonard, S. D. (1988). Judgments of horizontality of still water: Effects of perceptual and cognitive features. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 66, 235-245. Parkinson, G. M. (1975). The limits of learning: A quantitative investigation of intelligence. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, York University, Toronto. Pascual-Leone, J. (1966, June). Piaget ’speriod of concrete operations and Witkin’sfield dependence: A study on colfege students and children. Paper presented at the meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association, Montreal. Pascual-hone, J. (1 969). Cognitive development and cognitive style: A general psychological integration. Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Geneva, Switzerland. Pascual-Leone, J. (1970). A mathematical model for the transition rule in Piaget’s developmental stages. Acta Psychologica, 63, 301-345. Pascual-Leone, J. (1974, July) A neo-Piagetian process-structural model of Witkin’s psychological differentiation. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology, Kingston, Ontario.

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

274

Pascual-Leone, J. (1976). On learning and development, Piagetian style: 1. A reply to Lefebvre-Pinard. Canadian Psychological Review, 17, 27C288. Pascual-Leone, J. (1978). Compounds, confounds and models in developmental processing: A reply to Trabasso and Foellinger. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 26, 18-40, Pascual-Leone, J. (1980). Constructive problems for constructive theories: The current relevance of Piaget's work and a critique of information-processing simulation psychology. In R. Kluwe & H. Spada (Eds.), Developmental models of thinkirrg (pp. 263-296). New York: Academic Press. Pascual-Leone, J . (1983). Growing into human maturity: Towards a metasubjective theory of adulthood stages. In P. Bakes & 0. Brim (Eds.), Life-spun development and behavior (Vol. 5, pp. 117-156). New York: Academic Press. Pascual-Leone, J. (1984). Attentional, dialectic and mental effort: Toward an organismic theory of life stages. In M. L. Commons, F. A. Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.), Beyond formal operations: Late udolescet~rand aduli cognitive dewlopment (pp. 182-215). New York: Praeger. Pascual-Leone, J. (I 987). Organismic processes for neo-Piagetian theories: A dialectical causal account of cognitive development. International Journa! of P.sychology, 22, 53 1-570. Pascual-Leone, J . (1989). An organismic process model of Witkin's field-dependence-independence. In T. Globerson & T. Zelniker (Eds.). Cognitive style and cognitive development (pp. 3670). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Pascual-Leone. J., & Goodman, D. (1979). Intelligence and experience: A neo-Piagetian approach. Instructional Science, 8, 301-367. Pascual-Leone, J., Goodman, D., Ammon, P., & Subelman, 1. (1978). Piagetian theory and neoPiagetian analysis as psychological guides in education. In J. Gallagher & J. A. Easley (Eds.), Knowledge and development (Vol. 2, pp. 243-289). New York: Plenum Press. Pascual-Leone, J.. & Ijaz, H. (1989). Mental capacity testing as a form of intellectual-developmental assessment. In R. J. Samuda, S. L. Kong, J. Cummins, J. Pascual-Leone, & J. Lewis (Eds.). Assessment and placement of minority students (pp. 143-171). Toronto: Hogrefe International. Pascual-Leone, J., & Johnson. J. (in press). Psychological unit and its role in task analysis: A reinterpretation of object permanence. In M. Chandler, & M. Chapman (Eds.), Criteria for competence: Controiwsies in the assessment of children 's abilities. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Pascual-Leone, J.. Johnson, J., & Benson, N. (1989, July). Mental capacity constraints on symbolic processing: The onsef of human language. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development, Jyvaskyla, Finland. Pascual-Leone, J., & Smith, J. (1969). The encoding and decoding of symbols by children: A new experimental paradigm and a neoPiagetian model. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. 8, 328-355.

Pennings, A. (1991). Altering strategies in the embedded figures task and the water level task through instruction. Perceptual and Motor Skills. 72, 639460. Pennings, A., & Hessels, M.(19x9). The application of the item response model of G. Rasch to RalWI7 'S Standard Progressirv Matrices and Pascual-Leone's Figural /n/ersections Test. Unpublished manuscript. Piaget, J. (1969). The mechanisms of perception. London: Routledge & K. Paul. Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (194811967). 777e child's conception of space. London: Routledge & K. Paul. Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (196611971). Mental imagery in the child: A study of the development of imaginal representation. New York: Basic Books. Piaget, J. & Inhelder, B. (1968/1972). Memory and intelligence. New York: Basic Books. Rebelsky, F. (1964). Adult perception of the horizontal. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 19. 371-374. Resnick, S. M., Berenbaum, S. A., Gottesmann, 1. I., & Bouchard, T. J . (1986). Early hormonal influences on cognitive functioning in congenital adrenal hyperplasia. Developmental Psychology, 22, 191-198. Robert, M . (1989, July). Robustness of cognitive gender differences: The case of horuonfulity rep-

Horizontality of Water Level

275

resenration in the water-level task. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development, Jyvaskyla, Finland. Robert, M. (1990). Sex-typing of the water-level task: There is more than meets the eye. International Journal of Psychology, 25, 475490. Robert, M., & Chaperon, H. (in press). Cognitive and exemplary modeling of horizontality representation on the Piagetian water-level task. International Journal of Behavioral Development. Robert, M., & Tanguay, M. (1989). Perception spatiale a l’age miir ou avanci: Les hommes sont-ils sup6rieurs aux femmes? Communication affichCe presentte aux XXIIkmes Journ6es d’htude de I’ Association de Psychologie Scientifique de langue franeaise, Genkve. Rock, I. (1983). The logic of perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Rovet, J. F. (1990). The cognitive and neuropsychological characteristics of females with Turner syndrome. In D. B. Berch & B. G. Bender (Eds.), Sex chromosome abnormalities and human behaviour @p. 38-77). Boulter, CO: Westview Press. Rovet, J., & Netley, C. (1982). Processing deficits in Turner’s syndrome. Developmental Psychology, 18, 77-94. Rumelhart, D.,McClelland, J., & PDP Research Group. (1986). Parallel disrri6uted processing (2 vols.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sanders, G., & Ross-Field, L. (1986). Sexual orientation and visuo-spatial ability.Brain and Cognition, 5, 280-290. Scardamalia, M. (1977). Information processing capacity and the problem of horizontal decalage: A demonstration using combinatorial reasoning tasks. Child Development, 48,28-37. Sholl, M. J. (1989). The relation between horizontality and Rod-and-Frame and vestibular navigation performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 15( l), 110-125. Signorella, M. L., & Jamison, W. (1978). Sex differences in the correlations among field-dependence, spatial ability, sex role orientation, and performance on Piaget’s water-level task. Developmental Psychology, 14, 689-690. Smolensky, P. (1988). On the proper treatment of connectionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11, 1-74. Sommerville, D., & Cox, M.V.(1988). Sources of error in the Piagetian water-level task. Perception, 17, 249-254. Thomas, H., & Jamison, W. (1975). On the acquisition of understanding that still water is horizontal. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 21, 3144. Thomas, H., & Jamison, W. (1981a). A test of the X-linked genetic hypothesis for sex differences on Piaget’s Water-Level task. Developmental Review, 1, 274-283. Thomas, H., & Jamison, W. (1981b). Genetic mediation of sex differences in horizontality: A rejoinder. Developmental Review, 1, 296299. Thomas, H., Jamison, W., & Hummel, D. D. (1973). Observation is insufficient for discovering that the surface of still water is invariantly horizontal. Science, 181, 173-174. Thompson, E. G., Mann, I. T., & Harris, L. J. (1981). Relationship among cognitive complexity, sex, and spatial task performance in college students. British Journal of Psychofogy, 72, 249-256. Van Esch, L. (1978). The measurement of individualprocessing capacity. Unpublished master’s thesis, York University, Toronto. Willemsen, E., & Reynolds, B. (1973). Sex differences in adults’ judgment of the horizontal. Developmental Psychology, 8, 309. Willemsen, E., Bucholz, A,, Budrow, M. S., & Geannacopulos, N. (1973). Relationship between Witkin’s rod-and-frame task and Piaget’s water-line task for college women. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 36, 958. Windsor, A. (1983). Sex and profession as determinants of field dependence. Percephral and Motor Skills, 57, 617-618.

276

Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra

Witelson, S. F., & Swallow, J . A. (1988). Neuropsychological study of the development of spatial cognition. In J. Stiles-Davis, M. Kritchevsky, & U. Bellugi (Eds.), Spafial cognition: Brain basis and developtnent (pp. 373-409). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Witkin. H. A., Dyk, R. B.,Faterson, H. F., Goodenough. D. R., & Karp, S . A. (1962). P.sycho1ogic.d diflerentiation. New York: Wiley. Witkin, H. A., & Goodenough, D. R. (1981). Cognitive styles: Essence and origins New York: International Universities Press. Witkin, H. A., Goodenough, D. R.. & Oltmen, P. K. (1979). Psychological differentiation: Current status. Journal of Prrsonalify wid Social Psychology, 31, 1127-1 145. Wittig. M. A.. & Allen, M. J. (1984). Measurement of adult performance on Piaget's Water Horizontality Task. Intelligence, 8, 305-313. Zucker, S. W. (1988). The diversity of perceptual groupings. In M. A. Arbib, & A. R. Hanson (Eds.), Vision, brain, and cooperative computation (pp. 23 1-261). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Author Index Numbers in italics refer to the pages on which the complete references are cited.

A Abravanel, E., 245, 266, 270 Ainsworth, M. S. D., 26, 34 Aivano, S., 181, 184 Allen, M. J., 239, 240, 243, 270, 276 Allen, W., 131, 149 Allport, G. W., 115,144 Ammon, P., 253,274 Anderson, J. R., 156, 157, 166, 173, 180, I83 Anderson, R. A,, 255, 270 Antill, J. K.,123, 144 Aragon, A., 264, 265, 271 Arbib, M.A., 259,270 Aristotle, 200, 201, 208, 209, 210, 226 Amheim, R., 78, 108 Arnold, C., 265, 270 Ashcraft, M., 165,183 Ashmore, R. D.,115, 128, 144 Attneave, F., 258, 270 Ausubel, D. P., 119, 144

B Bacon, F., 208, 226 Baltes, P. B., 202, 222, 225,226 Bandura, A., 52, 57, 124, 144 Barnes, J., 201, 202, 226 Barratt, B. B., 26, 34 Barrera, M. E., 7,108 Barsky, R. D., 245, 247, 267,270 Bartlett, F. C., 119, 144 Baumrind, D., 192,226 Bayraktar, R., 250, 270 Beilin, H.,11, 14, 18, 24, 34, 78, 79, 108, 1I1 Bem, S. L., 115, 126, 127, 128,144 Benel, D. C. R., 179, 185

Bennett, S. M.,133, I49 Benson, N., 255,270, 274 Bereiter, C., 266, 270 Berenbaum, S. A., 241,274 Bergmann, G., 194, 208,216,226 Berndt, T., 120, 134, I44 Bernstein, S., 115, 127, 147 Berry, D. S., 139,144 Bertalanffy, L., 11, 34 Best, D. L., 133, 149 Bialystok, E., 233, 239, 247, 269, 270, 273 Biederman, I., 84, 108 Bigler, R. S., 122, 146 Birch, H. G., 80,110 Birren, J. E., 169, I83 Bisanz, J., 14, 35, 152, 164, 175, 183, 184 Blakemore, J. E., 129, 132, I44 Blehar, M. C., 26, 34 Bobbitt, B. L., 163, 184 Boston, M. B., 119, 123, 126, 146 Bouchard, T. J., 241, 274 Bowers, K. S., 24, 34 Bowlby, J., 26, 34 Bradbard, M. R., 117, 124, 125, 126, 144 Brady, M., 258, 259, 270 Bremner, J. G., 233, 250, 258, 271 Brewer, N., 176,183 Brigham, J. C., 135,144 Brooks, V., 79, 83, 110 Brown, A. L., 119, 144 Brown, P., 216, 226 Brucken, L., 131, 132, 146 Bruner, J., 7, 16, 34, 82, 83, 89, 110 Buffon, Count de., 208,226 Buhler, K., 78, 81, 83, 108 Bullock, M.,136, I47 Bunge, M., 29,34 Burlew, J. C., 119, 123, 126, 146

277

278

Author Index

Burtis, P. J., 255, 271 Bussey, K., 124, 132, 144, 148 Butler, J. D., 202, 226 Butler, K., 240, 270 Butler, S., 193, 226

C Cabe, P. A., 86, 87, 88, 108 Cable, C., 86, 118 Campbell, C., 255, 265, 273 Cann, A., 121, I44 Carter, D. B., 115, 118, 119, 121. 123, 144 Carter, P., 163, 164, 184 Case, K., 265, 271 Ceci, S. J., 156, 183 Cerella, J., 169, 183 Chabris, C. F., 255, 273 Chalip, L., 166, 185 Chandler, M. J., 206, 216, 224, 225, 227 Chaperon, H., 239, 274 Chapman, M., 107, 108 Chi, M. T . H., 156, 183 Church, J., 82, 83, 89, 109 Churchland, P . M . , 11, 24, 34 Clemens, L. P., 123, 149 Cohen, L. B., 80,109, 127, 145 Cole, M., 155, 183 Collman, P., 133, 145 Conner, J . M., 132, 148 Constantinople, A,, 115, 145 Cook, M., 80,109 Cooper, L. A,, 165, 183 Corballis, M. C . , 178, I83 Cordua, G. D., 121, 145 Cornell, E. H., 80, 109 Costa, G., 7, 36 Cowen, G., 120, 145 Cox, M. V., 250, 275 Crane, M., 115, 127, 147 Crocker, J., 116, 119, 120, 122, I48 Cruse, D. F., 119, 146

D Daehler, M. W . , 80. 83, 109 Danner, F., 152, 164, 175, 183 Davenport, R. K . , 86, 109 Davies, P., 11, 34 Day, J. D., 119, 144

Day, M. C., 16.5, 185 De Avila, E., 264, 265, 271 De Lisi, R., 24, 239, 245, 246, 265, 271, 2 73 de Ribaupierre, A., 246, 248, 256, 271 Deaux, K.. 123, 128, 129, 145 DeHaan, H. J . , 80, 109 Del Boca, F. K., 115, 128, 144 Debache, J . S., 77, 79, 80, 109 Dennett, D. C., 56, 57 Deregowski, J., 83, 84, 85, 89, 109 Devine, P. G.,123, 145 Dewey, J., 190, 202, 211, 226 DiFranco, D., 79, 80, 109 Dirks, J . , 79, 109 Dixon, R. A., 198, 219, 226 Dodwell, P. C., 79, 80, 109 Drabman, R. S . , 121, 145 Dumais, S. T., 157, 177, 185 Dyk, R. B., 243, 256, 275

E Eddington, A,, 11, 14, 34 Edelbrock, C., 117, 123, 145 Eisenberg, N., 117, 145 Eisenbud, L., 118, 121, 142, 147 Emde, R. N., 80, 83, 111 Endsley, R. C., 117, 124, 125, 126, 144 Estes, D., 74, 76, 77, 107, 109 Etheridge, T., 123, 149 Evans, M., 119, 148

F Fabes, R. A,, 121, I47 Fabian, V., 244, 255, 265, 271 Fagan, J . F., 80, 109 Fagot, B. I . , 117, 123, 131, 145, 146 Fantz, R. L., 79, I09 Faterson, H. F., 243, 256, 275 Feather, N. T., 123, 145 Feigl, H., 220, 226 Fein, G., 117, 145 Field, J . , 80, 109 Fine, A,. 11, 34 Fiske, S . T., 126, 145 Flavell, E. R., 74, 109 Flavell, J . H . , 5, 24, 34, 74, 96, 109 Franklin, M. R., 78, 79, 109

Author Index

Freeman, N H.. 233, 250. 271 Friedman, S. I., 79. 80, 109 Frost. R., 258. 270 Fulero. S.. 119, 148

G Gadamer. H.. 5. 34 Galahurda. A. M.. 240, 271 Galton, F., 151, 183 Garcia, F., 264. 265. 271 Geiringer. E. R., 238, 239, 240. 271 Gelman, S. A,. 133, 14.5 Gerard, H. B., 119. 149 Gergen. K. J., 1 1 , 32. 33, 34. 198. 202, 216. 777

. . A ,

?76

_i

Gergen, M. M., 1 I , 32. 33, 34 Geschwind. N., 240, 271 Gibson. E. J., 24. 34, 79. 104 Gihson, J. J.. 24, 34. 78, 88, 110 Gilmore, R., 238. 271 Gingold. H.. 245, 266, 270 Gleick, J., 29. 35 Gloherson. T.. 246. 248. 256, 265, 271 Golheck. S. L., 239, 241. 242, 243. 251, 271 Goldman-Rakic, P. S.. 87, I10 Goodcnough. D. R., 243. 246, 256, 167,275, 2 76 Goodenough. F. L., 151, I83 Goodman. D.. 236. 244. 246, 253, 255. 256. 265, 271, 274 Goodman. N., 78, I10 Gottesmann. I. 1.. 241, 274 Gould, S. J., 26, 3.5 Gracely. E., 123, 149 Grady. E. L.. 77. 110 Green. F. L.. 74, 104 Greenherg, J. R., 26, .?5 Gregory. R. L., 7X. I10 Griffilh. J.. 77, I l l Griffiths, K., 80, 109 Grossman. B.. 77. I10 Guthrie, W. K. C., 201. 226

H Haher. R. N.. 88. I10 Hahermas, J.. 2. 5. 6, 31. 35 Hagan. R.. 131, 145 Hagen, M.. 78, 84. 85. 88, 89. 110. I I I

279

Hahn, L. E., 180, 226 Haith, M. M., 87, 110 Halberstadt. A. G., 133. 145 Hale, S., 170, 183 Hall. J. A,, 133. 135 Halverson, C. F., 115, 116, 119, 120, 121, 124, 126, 127. 128. 131. 144, 145, I47 Hamilton. D. L., 115, 14.5 Hanson, A. R.. 259, 270 Hanson, N. R.. 17. 3.5 Harre. R., 2. 10. 24. 35 Harris. L. J., 24, 275 Hartup. W. W., 118. I45 Hasher. L., 137. I45 Hastie. R., 119, 145 Haugh. S. S., 120, 145 Havassy. B.. 264, 265. 271 Hayes. C.. 86, 87, 89, 110 Hayes, K. J., 86. 87. 80. 110 Heath, S. B., 155, 183 Hegel. G. W. F.. 201, 203. 213. 227 Heisenherg. W., 10. 11, 35 Heller, K. A,, 120, 134, 144 Helson, H.. 208, 227 Hensley, J . H., 24, 245, 246, 247, 273 Herivel. J.. 223, 227 Herrnstein. R. J., 86. 110 Herschel, J. F. W., 223, 227 Hertzog, C., 198, 219. 226 Hesse. M . B., 191, 227 Hessels, M.. 266, 274 Higgins, E. T., 123. 146 Hinde. R. A,, 26, 35 Hite. T.. 117, 145 Hochherg, J.. 79, 83. X6, 110, I19 Hoffman, C. D., 120. I45 Hoffman, R. R., 195, 199. 227 Hofstadter, D. R., 56, 57, 62, 71 Horowitz. H. A,, 26, 36 Hort. B. E., 123. 146 Hultsch. D. F., 199. 227 Hummel, D. D., 238, 239. 247, 275 Huston. A. C., 122, 123, 126. 128. 146 Huttenlocher, P. R., 180, 183 Hyde. J. S., 132, 14X, 238. 239, 240. 271

I Ihde. D., 32, 37 H., 256, 267, 274

IpZ.

Author Index

280

Iler, I., 132, 148 Inhelder, B., 199, 200, 229, 232, 253, 263, 264, 268, 274 Iowa Alumni Never-Ending Beginning\, 216, 227

J Jacklin, C. N., 142, 146 James, W., 40,47, 193,211, 212, 217,227 Jamison, W.. 238, 239, 240, 245, 246, 247, 269, 275 Janet, P., 204, 227 Jenssen, T. A., 87, I10 John, E. R., 180, 183 Johnson, D., 117, 145 Johnson, J., 253. 255, 274 Johnson, M., 11.35 Jones, R. K.. 84, 85, I10 Juckes, T., 255, 265. 273

K Kahn, C. H., 200, 201, 227 Kail, R., 14, 35, 152, 153, 154, 163, 164, 165, 166. 167, 169. 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 183, 184 Kantor, J . R., 196, 197. 200, 206, 208, 212, 22 7 Kaplan, A., 218, 227 Kaplan, B., 82, 111 Karhon, M. M., 121, 147 Karp, S . A., 243. 256, 275 Katz, J., 11, 16, 17, 19, 35 Katz, P. A,, 132. 146 Katzir, G.. 87, I I0 Kauffman, M. B., 24, 35, 220, 228 Keating, D. P., 32, 35. 155, 163, I84 Kennedy, J. M., 87,88. I10 Kessen, W., 15, 35 Kiker, V. L., 139, 146 King, G., 123, 146 Kirk, G. S., 200, 201, 227 Kitchener, R. F., 193, 227 Klahr, D., 179, 184 Mapper, 2. S.. 80, I10 Kohlinsky, S., 119, 146 Kohlberg, L. A., 124, 146

Kohler, W., 87, 110 Kojima, H., 207, 227 Kose, G., 78, 111 Kosslyn, S. M., 255, 273 Kosson, N., 117, I45 Krutch, J . W., 207, 227 Kuhn, D., 131, 132, 146 Kuhn, T. S., 17, 35. 207, 208, 227 Kumar, P. A,, 119, 145 Kvale, S., 193, 217, 218, 227

L Lahouvie-Vief, G . . 206, 216, 224, 225, 227 Lachman, M. E., 245, 247, 267, 270 Lakatos, I., 14, 17, 35 Ldkoff, G., 11, 16, 35, SO, 53, 56, 57 LaRue, A. A,. 123, 132, 144 Laudan, L., 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19.35 Laurendeau, M., 74, 76, 110 Lawton, S. C., 119, 144 Lecours, A. R., 180,185 Leinbach, M. D.. 123, 131. 145, 146 Lenin, V. I., 201, 228 Leonard, S. D., 239, 246,273 Lepin. J., 10, 35 Lerner, R. M., 24. 35, 198, 220, 228 Levy, G. D., 116, 119, 121, 123, 126, 144, 146 Lewis. L. L., 12, 128. 145 Liben, L S., 24, 35. 115, 121. 122, 123, 146, 148 Linville, P. W., 126, 145 Lippmann. W., 115, 146 Lipsitt, L. P., 225, 226 Little, J. K., 128, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 147 Lloyd, A. B., 85, I10 Lloyd, K. E., 87, 111 Logan, G. D., 156, 157, 163, 177, 184 Lotze, H., 201, 228 Loveland, D. H., 86, 110 Lubow, R. E., 86, 115

M Maccoby, E. E., 115. 133, 142, 145, I46 Mackie, M.. 135, 146 Macko, K. A,, 255,273 MacLean, D. J., 155, 184

Author Index Major, B., 123, 145 Mandler, J. M.. 25. 35, 119, 120, 146 Mann, 1. T., 240. 275 Mao Zedong, 213.228 Markkrnan, E. M., 76. 96. 110 Markus, H., 1 IS, 127, 147 Marsolek, C. J., 255, 273 Martin,C. L.. 115. 116, 118, 119. 120, 121. 123, 123, 126. 127, 128. 129, 131, 132. 133. 133, 136, 138, 139, 142, 144, 145. 147 Maturana. H., 11, 35 Maurer, D.. 79, 108 Maynard, J., 79, 109 McArthur. L. Z., 138, 139, 144, 147 McCauley, C., 115, 147 McCauley. R. N., 50, 57 McClelland, 1.. 259, 264, 275 McFarland, R. A., 246, 273 McGee. M. G., 240,273 McGillicuddy-De Lisi, A. V., 239, 243. 271, 2 73 McGraw. K. O., 121, 145 Meacham, J. A., 203. 225, 228, 2.?0 Mead, G. H.. 155, 184, 193. 218, 228 Meehan, A. M., 240. 273 Mendelson, M. J., 87. 110 Meyers. N. A,, 80, 83. 109 Miceli, L., 181, 184 Miller. A. G., 115, 147 Miller, A. R.. 139, 146 Miller, D. L., 1 96, 193, 228 Miller, R., 255. 265, 273 Mischel, W.. 24, 35, 124, 147 Mishkin, M.. 255, 273 Mitchell, S. A.. 26, 35 Moizo, C.. 255, 273 Monod, J.. 1 I,35 Monternayor, R., 117, 147 Moore, S. G., 118, 145 Morgenbesser, S., 213, 228 Morison, V.. 79. 80, I 1 1 Morra, S., 255, 265, 273 Morris, J. T.. 117, 148 Mounoud, P.. 196, 228 Mowrer-Poiel, E., 240, 273 Muir. D. W., 79, 80, 109 Muldrow, E. S., 84, 85, 89. I09 Muldrow, W. F., 84, 85, 89, 109 Mumford, L., 209, 228

28 1

Murphy, C. M., 82, 83, I10 Murray, E., 117. 145 Mycr, K. A.. 240. 245. 246. 247. 273 Myers, B., 123. 149

N Nadelman, L.. 117. 147 Nagel, E., 7. 35 Nash, S. C., 131, 132, 146 Naus, M. J.. 175, 181, 184 Nelson, K., 116, 148 Netley, C., 241, 275 Newbern, S. R., 121, I44 Newrnan, J. L.. 55, 57, 221, 228 Niemczynski. A., 213.220 Ninio, A., 82, 83, 89, 110 Nisbett, R. E.. 12. I48 Nusbaurn, H. C.. 166. 185 Nyborg, H.,240, 273

0 O’Boyle. C., 131. I45 O’Brien. D. P., 7. 36 O’Connor, J., 78. I 1 1 Ohuche, N. M.. 239, 273 O’Keefe, E. S., 132, I48 Olejnik, A. B., 123, 132, 144 Olson, D. R., 233, 239, 247, 269, 270, 273 O’Reilly. R. C., 255, 273 Omstein, P. A., 175. 181, I84 Otani, H., 239, 246, 269, 273 Overton, W. F., 2, 6, 7. 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22. 23, 24, 25. 26, 30.36. 50, 51, 52, 54, 55. 57, 61. 62. 63, 65, 71, 188, 195, 197, 198. 206, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 228, 2 73 Owen. T.. 264, 265. 271

P Papalia, D. E., 132, 148 Parameswaran, G., 239, 271 Park, Y..166, 173. 174, 177, I84 Parkinson. G. M., 255, 273 Parkrnan, S. A., 117, 144

Author Index

282

Pascual-Leone, J., 157, 184, 232, 233, 236, 242, 243, 244, 246, 248, 249, 251, 252, 253. 255, 256, 259, 261, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 271, 273, 274 Pauling, L., 216, 228 Pearl, R. A,, 80, 109 Pearlman, E. G., 89, I l l Peirce, C. S., 216, 228 Pellegrino, J., 163, 164, 184 Pennings, A., 266,274 Pentz, C. A., 199,227 Pepper, S. C., 7, 36, 188, 189, 190, 191. 193. 194, 197, 198. 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 211, 212, 215, 216, 217, 219, 222, 223, 224,229 Perlmutter, M., 24, 36, 80, 83, 109 Perry, D. G., 123, 132, 148 Perry, L. C., 123, 148 Pezdek, K.. 181, I84 Philip, B. R., 151, 184 Piaget, J., 28, 36, 57, 73, 74, 75, 81, 84, 100, 104,111, 200,229, 232, 250, 253,263, 264, 268, 274 Pinard, A., 74, 76, 110 Pittendrigh, C. S., 192, 229 Planck, M., 192, 220, 229 Planty-Bonjour, G., 209, 229 Polak. P. R., 80, 83, 111 Polya, G., 224, 229 Popper, K. R., 13,36, 220, 221,229 Porges, S., 51, 58 Premack, D., 86, 111 Prigogine, I., 10, 11, 29, 36 Prosch, H., 212,229 Putnam, H., 6, 11, 16, 17, 19, 32, 36

R Rader, N., 80, 111 Rebelsky, F.. 235, 239. 274 Reese, H. W., 24, 30, 36, 50, 51, 58, 131, 148, 188, 195, 197, 200, 202, 206, 208, 225, 226, 229 Rescher, N., 213, 214, 230 Resnick, L. B., 152, 164, 175, 183 Resnick, S. M., 241, 274 Reynolds, B., 239, 245, 266, 275 Rholes, W. S., 133, 148 Ricoeur, P., 2, 36

Riegel, K. F., 198, 203, 217, 225, 230 Rikin, B., 163, 185 Robert, M., 239, 267, 274, 275 Robinson, C. C., 117, 148 Rock, I., 258, 275 Rogers, C. M., 86, 109 Rogoff, B., 155. 184 Romanes, G. J., 193,230 Rorty, R., 11, 36 Rose, D., 79, 80, 111 Rose, H. A., 121, 147 Rose, S. A., 79, 80, 111 Rosen, H., 24, 36 Ross-Field, L., 240, 275 Roth, C., 156, 157, 184 Rothbart, M., 119, 148 Rover, J. F., 241, 275 Ruble, D. N., 123, 133, 148 Rumelhart, D., 259, 264. 275 Russell, 1. S., 86, 109 Ryle, G., 212, 213, 221, 230

S

Sachse, T., 264, 265, 271 Sackett, G. P., 87, 111 Sager, G., 118, 145 Salthouse, T. A,, 152, 153, 169, 179, 184, 185 Sanders, G., 240, 275 Sarbin, T. R., 2, 36 Scardamalia, M., 256, 266, 270, 275 Scholnick, E. K., 25, 36 Schriidinger, E., 195, 230 Scopesi, A., 255, 265, 273 Segal, M., 115, 147 Serbin, L. A,, 132, 148 Shapere, D., 10, 36 Shepard, R. N., 165, 183 Shiffrin, R. M., 157, 177, I85 Shipley, C., 4,36 Sholl, M.J., 245, 258, 267, 275 Siegler, R. S., 4, 36, 175, 176, 185 Sigel, I. E., 78, 79, 83, 111 Signorella, M. L., 115, 121, 122, 123, 146, 148. 245,246,269,275 Siladi, M., 115, 127, 147 Silverman, H. J., 32, 37 Skinner, B. F., 23, 37, 208. 230 Skinner, E. A., 198, 228

Author Index Slater, A,, 79, 80. I 1 1 Smrley, S. S.. 119, 144 Smith, G . A,, 176. I83 Smith, J., 265, 274 Smolensky, P., 259, 275 Snyder, M., 119, 148 Sockloff, A., 123, 149 Somberg, B. L., 169. 185 Sommerville, D., 25. 275 Sontag, S., 78, I l l Sorell, G. T., 198, 228 Spearman, C. E., 151, 185 Spence, D. P., 32, 33, 3 7 Spence, K. W., 206, 230 Spiker, C. C., 197, 220, 230 Spinoza, B. de., 199, 230 Spitz. R. A., 80, 83, I l l Sroufe, L. A,, 26, 37 Srull, T. K.. 127. 149 Stace, W. T., 5, 15,37, 68. 71 Stangor, C., 123, 148 Stengers, 1.. 10, 11, 29, 36 Stem, J. D., 80,111 Sternberg. R. J., 155, 163, 185 Stigler, J. W., 166, 185 Stitt, C. L., 115, 147 Stolzenberg, G., 11, 37 Stone, B., 165, 185 Stork, L., 117, 145 Strandsberg, T. E., 77, 111 Strauss, M. S., 79. 109, 127, 145 Subelman, I., 253, 274 Sugarman, S., 14, 21, 27.37 Sugawara,A. I., 117, 119, 123. 145, 146 Suppe, F., 10, 18, 37 Surwillo, W. W., 179, 185 Swallow, J. A., 24, 241, 267, 275

T Tajfel, H., 131, 148 Tanguay, M., 239.275 Taylor, A. J., 250, 271 Taylor, S. E.. 116. 119, 120, 122, 148 Tennent, S. S., 132, 148 Thomas, H., 238, 239, 240, 247, 275 Thompson, E. G., 240, 275 Thompson, S. K., 132, 148 Titus, T. G., 179, 185

283

Townsend, M. A. R., 119. I44 Turnbough. P. D., 87, 111

U Ungerleider. L. G., 255, 273 Uranowitz, S. W., 119, 148

V

Van Esch, L., 244, 245, 246, 275 Varela, F.. 11, 35 Vinacke. W. E., 115, 148 Vlastos, G., 200,201, 230 Von Foerster, H., 11, 37 Vygotsky, L. S., 155, 185

W Wall, S., 26, 34 Wartofsky, M., 7, 37 Wasserman, L., 117, 145 Waters, E., 26, 34 Weinraub, M., 123, 149 Wellman. H. M., 74. 76, 77, 96, 107. 109, 111

Werner, H., 28,37 Werner, J., 82, I 1 I Wertsch, J. V., 155, 185 White, A. J., 123, 148 White, S. H., 181. 185 Wickens, C. D., 151, 179, 185 Wilder, D., 131, 149 Willemsen, E., 239, 245, 266,275 Williams, J. E., 133, 149 Wilson, T. D., 12. 148 Windsor, A,. 267,275 Winnicott, D. W.. 67, 71 Wischner. G. J.. 80, 109 Witelson, S. F., 240, 241, 267, 275 Witkin, H. A., 243, 246, 256, 267, 275, 276 Wittig, M. A., 239, 240, 243, 270, 276 Wood, C. H., 128, 129, 133, 134, 147 Woodruff, G., 86, I11 Woolley, J. D., 74. 76. 77, 107, 109 Wright, E. N., 17, 111 Wyer, R. S., 127, 149

284

Author Index

Y Yakovlev. P. I., 180, 185 Yonas, A,, 89, 111 Young, V., 77, 111 Youniss, J., 239, 243, 27.3 Yuille, A,, 258, 259, 270

2 ZdckS, R. T., 137, 145 Zadny, J., 119, 149 Zimmerman, R. R.. 86,111 Zucker, S. W.. 258, 259, 276 Zuckerkandl. E., 216, 228

Subject Index A

influence of, on behavior, 124-126 in understanding gender effects, 113- 143 Cohort specification in developmental theory evaluation, 46 Common sense as origin of scientific activity, 7-8 to scientific knowledge, 8-22 by route of rationalism, 17-22; see also Rationalism by route of realism, 8-17; see also Realism Competence in behaviors versus performance of behaviors, limitations on, from cognitions, 124-126 Compromise between rationalism and realism, 61-62,64 Confirming/disconfirmingbehavior in data from picture-referent questions, 100 Consummation in contextualism, 190, 191 Contextualism, 24, 187-225 adequacy of, 219-224 application of, 224-225 causality in, 214-218 contradiction in, 203-21 1 dispersiveness of, 197-203 main categories of, 190-191 predictability in, 222 truth in, 21 1-214 Contextualistic metaphors, 188-191 ongoing acts as, 189 richer version of, 189 Contradiction in contextualism, 203-21 1 novelty in, 206-208 Aristotelian categories and, 21 1 part-whole, 203-204 Aristotelian categories and, 209 relations of, to Aristotelian categories, 20821 1 resolution of blocked action in, 204-206 Aristotelian categories and, 209-21 1

Adequacy of contextualism, 219-224 criterion of predictability in, 220-224 emergence in, 219-220 identity crisis in, 224 precision and, 21 9 scope and, 219 Adolescence. development of processing speed in, 151-182; see also Processing speed in childhood and adolescence Appearance, physical, differences in, implicit theories and, 138-141 Aristotelian categories, relations of contradiction in contextualism to, 208-211 Attentional resources, 152

B Behavior guidance of, gender schemas in, 117-1 18 influence of cognition on, 124-126

C Causality in contextualism, 214-218 being and becoming in, 216-217 cause-effect relations in, 217-218 efficient, 215 final, 215-216 formal, 215 incidental, 216 material, 214-215 Cause. efficient, in developmental theory evaluation, 42 Childhood, development of processing speed in, 151-182; see also Processing speed in childhood and adolescence Cognition(s) importance of, 122-124

285

286

Subject Index

Copy-the-stripe task, 251-253 Correspondence theory of truth, 10 Countericonic challenges, 92-93 Cratylus’s position on flux, 201 Critical realism, 16 Cultural determinants in developmental theory evaluation. 46-47

D Deductive formation in developmental theory evaluation, 45-46 Developmental end-point in developmental theory evaluation, 43-44 Developmental theory(ies), 22-34 hermeneutic, narrative, and scientific empirical knowing in, 30-34 material explanation and realism in, 23-25 pattern explanation and rationalism in, 2530 quality of, determining, 39-47 cohort specification in, 46 cultural and social determinants in, 46-47 deductive formalism in, 45-46 developmental end-point in, 43-44 efficient cause in, 42 form or pattern in, 42 meaning of phenomenon in, 44-45 mechanisms in, 43 reductionist mechanisms in, 45 theorist in, 47 rationalism and, 19-22 realism and, 14-15 structure of, 1-34 Discern, 21-22 Dispersive world views, cause-effect relations and, 218 Dispersiveness of contextualism, 197-203 classic fluxers on, 199-201 contextualistic flux and, 201-203 Cratylus’s position on, 201 Heraclitus’s position on, 200-201 limit on, 198-199 Duheim-Quine thesis, 6 Dynamic schematic processing, 123 Dynamic syntheses, error patterns in water level task as, 261

E Efficient cause in developmental theory evaluation, 42 Efficient explanations, 23 Emergence adequacy of contextualism and, 219-220 in handling tensions between world views in developmental theory, 56-57 Emotional response in Murray’s commentary on Overton’s “Structure of Developmental Theory,” 60 Empirical scientific knowledge, 30-31 Empiricism definition of, 10 logical, 10-1 I Environment in contextualism, 190, 191 Epistemological realism, 10 Epistemology rationalist, 64-65 realist, 64-65 relationship of ontology to, 18-19 Existence challenges to iconic realism, 93 Experiential realism, 16 Explanation(s) efficient. 23 material, 22-23 realism and, in developmental theory, 23-25 pattern, 23 rationalism and, in developmental theory, 25-30 pattern-conservation, 23 in developmental theory, 27-28 pattern-progressive, 23 in developmental theory, 28-30 progressive, 23

P Figurative field effects of symmetry and/or form as error factor in water level task, 258-259 Flux, contextualistic, 201-203 Form in developmental theory evaluation, 42 Formalism, deductive, in developmental theory evaluation, 45-46 Functional challenges to iconic realism, 92-93 Fusion in contextualism, 190, 191

287

Sicbject bidex G

Gender knowledge of, conceptions of. 128- 130 labels of. acquiring. 130- 131 sources of information about, in acquiring gender-related associations. 131-132 Gendcr differences implicit theories of, cvidcnce of. 141- 142 understanding. cognition in, 113- I43 on water level task. 239-246 biological factors in, 240-24 I cognitive resource factors in. 241-243 cognitive style as determinant of. 243146 individual difference factors in. 243-246 knowledge a s determinant of, 243-246 Gender group membership in acquiring gender labels, 131 Gender mediation assumption in acquiring gender-related associations, 132- 133 Gendcr schemas acquiring gender labels in. 130-131 acquiring gender-related associations in. 131- 134 associative links within, 129-130 conceptions of gender knowledge in, 128I30 development of, 127-134 functions of, 116-120 to guide behavior, 117- I18 hierarchical structure of. 128-129 to tirganize information. 118-120 to serve as inferential function. 120 Geometric knowledge as factor in horizontality judgments, evidence for, 237-248 Groups, implicit theories of, 138- 141

H Haptic behavior in data from picture-referent questions. 97-99 Heraclitus’s position on flux. 200-201 Hermeneutic knowing, 3 1-32 Historical realism. 10 Holism in ongoing act-in-context, 193-197 arhitrdrineSS of defining whole in, 195-107 external and internal relations in, 193-194

lcgitimacy of decomposing whole in, 194I95 Horizontality judgments, physical and geometric knowledge as. evidence for. 247-248 Horizontality of water level. 23 1-270; .see ulso uridrr Water level

I Iconic realism of children photographic knowlcdge and. 77-78 pictorial perception and, 79-88; see aI.su Pictorial perception dual nature of photographs and. X8-80 study Of, 89-93, 80-108 countericonic challenges in, 92-93. 10I - 104 design of. 89-00 materials in, 90 photographic knowledge questions in, 03. 104 picture-referent questioning in, 91 -92. 93-101

procedure for. 90-93 results of, 93-104 subjects in. 89-90 in data from picture-referent questions, 93-95 residual, in data from countericonic challenges. 101-103 Iconic realism properties in data from picturereferent questions, 96 Idealism versus materialism, 5 Identity crisis in adequacy of contextualism, 224 Imperialism, organismic, in handling tensions hetween world views in developmentdl theory. 54-55 lnlerence to hest explanation. 71 modes of, in rationalism, 21 Inferential function of gender schemas, 120 Information. orgdnization of, gender schemas in, 118-120 Initiiitions in contextualism, 190, 191 Instancc theory of speeded performance. IS6 Instrumental action. contradiction in contextualism and, 205

Subject Index

288

Integrative world views, cause-effect relations and, 217-218 Internal realism, 16

J Justifications in data from countericonic challenges, 104 in data from picture-referent questions, 100101

K Knowing, Versfand and Vernunfi in, 68-69 Knowledge as determinant of gender difference on water level task, 243-246 physical and geometric, as factor in horizont. ality judgments, evidence for. 247-248

L Limited processing resources, 152 Logical empiricism, 10-1 1 Logical positivism, 10-1 1

M Magnification in handling tensions between world views in developmental theory, 56 Material explanation, 22-23 realism and, in developmental theory, 23-25 Materialism versus idealism, 5 Mechanisms in developmental theory evaluation, 4 3 reductionist, in developmental theory evaluation. 45 Mechanistic metaphor in developmental theory, 51 implications of, 52-53 Memory, distortions of, from schematic processing, 120-121 implications of, 121-122 Mental effort, 152 Metaphor(s) contextualistic, 188-191 in knowing process, 64-66

Metaphysical realism, 10 Minimum principle, error patterns in water level induced by, 259-260 Murray, Frank, on Overton’s “Structure of Developmental Theory,” 60-61

N Narrative knowing, 32-33 Neo-Piagetian developmental review, 231-270; see ulso under Water level Nominalism versus universalism, 4-5 Novel object methodology in study of gender schema influence on behavior, 117-118 Novelty, contradiction in contextualism and, 206-208 Aristotelian categories and, 21 1

0 Objectivism, 10 Ongoing act-in-context characteristics of, 191-192 holism in, 193-197 purposefulness in, 192- 193 relativism in, 192 Ontological realism, 10, 5 3 Ontology, relationship of epistemology to, 1819 Operative field effects as error factor in water level task, 260 Organic metaphor in developmental theory, 51 implications of, 52-53 Organicism, predictability in, 222 Organismic imperialism in handling tensions between world views in developmental theory, 54-55 Other-sex schema, 116 Overlearned image of water-is-at-bottom as error factor in water level task, 257 Overlearned scheme of water-falls-to-lowerregion as error factor in water level task, 257-258 Overton, Willis F. developmental theory of, developmental changes in, 51-57 dealing with inherent tensions in, 53-57

Subject index defining world views in, 5 I elaborating implications of world views in, 52-53

on quality of developmental theory, 39-41 Own-sex schema, 116

P Paradox in knowing, 67-68 Pattern, 21 -22 in developmental theory evaluation, 42 Pattern-conservation explanations, 23 in developmental theory, 27-28 Pattern explanation, 23 rationalism and, in developmental theory. 25-30

Pattern-progressive explanations. 23 in developmental theory. 28-30 Performance of behaviors versus competence in behaviors, limitations on, from cognitions, 124-126

Phenomenon, meaning of. in developmental theory evaluation, 44-45 Philosophy, science and, 3. 6 Photographic knowledge, children’s iconic realism and, 77-78 Photographs, dual nature of. children’s iconic realism and. 88-89 Physical appearance differences, implicit theories and. 138-141 Physical knowledge as factor in horizontality judgments, evidence for, 247-248 Physical property challenges to iconic realism, 93 Piaget’s childhood realism and its critics, 73-77 Pictorial perception, 7-88 cross-cultural studies of. 83-85 developmental studies on, 79-83 infrahuman studies of, 85-88 Picture questions in children’s iconic realism study. 91-92 Picture-referent questioning in children’s iconic realism study, 91-92 Positivism, logical, 10-1 1 Precision, adequacy of contextualism and, 21Y Predictability in contextualism, 222 criterion of, adequacy of contextualism and. 220-224

289

in mechanism, 221-222 in organicism. 222 scope and. 222-223 Processing speed in childhood and adolescence developmental change in, 151-182 global implications of, 180-182 mechanisms underlying cycle time as, 179-180 nature of, 177-180 proccssing resources as. 177- I79 studies of, 157-177 of correlations across conditions, 168174

of developmental function, 163-168 of expertise, 157-162 limits of, 174-177 study of organization of, 155-156 reasons for, 152-155 Productive paradoxes, 67-68 Prototypic developmental theory of speeded performance, 157 Purposefulness in ongoing act-in-context. 192193

Q Quality in contextualism. 190. 191

R Rationalism aims. methods, and theories of science and, 19, 20

developmental theory and, 19-22 interpretation of, 17-18 pattern explanation and, in developmental theory, 25-30 route of, from common sense to scientific knowledge, 17-22 Rationalist epistemology. 64-65 Realism aims. methods, and theories of science and, 12-14

childhood, Piaget’s, and its critics. 73-77 critical, 16 developmental theory and, 14-15

Subject Index

290

Realism (conrirrued) epistemological. 10 experiential, 16 historical, 10 iconic. of children, 73-108; see ubo Iconic realism of children internal, 16 material explanation and, in developmental theory, 23-25 meanings of, 15-17 metaphysical, 10 ontological, 53 routc of, from common sense to scientific knowledge, 8-17 Realist epistemology, 64-65 Rccursive cycles, contradictory elements in. 68 Recursive rule systems of scientific knowing, 62-64 Reductionist mechanisms in developmental theory evaluation. 45 References in contextualism, 190, 191 Referent questions in children’s iconic realism study, 92 Relativism in ongoing act-in-context, 192 Reticulated model of scientific rationality, 12 Retroduction, 21 Rule assessment techniques in generating developmental theory from realism, 14

S

Scholnick, Ellin, on Overton’s “Structure of Developmental Theory.” 60-65 Schema(s) gender; see Gender schemas having, versus being schematic, 126-127 nature of, 126 Schematic processing dynamic, 123 Schematic processing theory, 114-127 cognitive basis for, 115 functions of schemas in, 116-120 issues concerning, 122-127 liabilities of, 120-122 types of schemas in, 115-1 16 Science aims of, 6-7 with methods and theories of rationalism and, 19, 20 realism and, 12-14

philosophy and, 3, 6 values and, 2-6 Scientific activity, origin of, 7-8 Scientific knowing empirical, 30-31 metaphor in, 65 recursive rule systems of, 62-64 Scientific knowledge, from common sense to, 8-22; see alsu Common sense to scientific knowledge Scope, adequacy of contextualism and, 219 Sexes discriminating, in acquiring gender labels, 130 labeling, in acquiring gender labels, 130-131 Social determinants in developmental theory evaluation, 46-47 Stereotypes early origins of, 135-142 knowledge of, age-related changes in, 133134 Stimulus-response compatibility as error factor in water level task, 260 Strands in contextualism, 190, 191 Superordinate schema, 115-1 16

T Task analysis in generating developmental theory from realism. 14 Texture in contextualism, 190, 191 Theorist in developmental theory evaluation, 47 Thomas apparatus, results of water level tasks with, 238 Truth in contextualism, 21 1-214 correspondence theory of, 10

U Universalism versus nominalism, 4-5

v Values, science and, 2-6 Vernuiifi, 68-69 Verstand, 68-69

Subject Index

W Water level, horizontality of, 231-270 Water level invariant, post-Piagetian theories about, 233 Water level task errors in, process analysis of, 253-261 endogenous mental attention explicated in, 255-256 error factors of attention in, 257-261 mental attention in misleading situations in, 256-257 scheme in, 253-254 silent hardware operators in, 254-255 gender differences on, 239-246 as model comparison of other current models with,

29 1

268-270 developmental aspects of, 262-265 empirical studies supporting, 265-268 implications of, 264-265 perceptual analog of, evidence from, 2492s 1 as perceptual-motor task, parametric study of, 248-249 post-Piagetian data on, 234-239 frequency distributions of, 234-239 response bias on, evidence for, 248-253 stimulus-response compatibility on, evidence for, 248-253 Weltanschauung, 18 World views in Overton’s developmental theory, 51 implications of, 52-53

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

Contents of Previous Volumes Volume 1 Responses of Infants and Children to Complex and Novel Stimulation Gordon N. Cantor Word Associations and Children’s Verbal Behavior David S. Palermo Change in the Stature ano axly Weight of North American Boys during the Last 80 Years Howard V. Meredith Discrimination harning Set in Children Hayne W.Reese Learning in the First Year of Life Lewis P. Lipsilt Some Methodological Contributions from a Functional Analysis of Child Development Sidney W. Bijou and Daniel M. Boer The Hypothesis of Stimulus Interaction and an Explanation of Stimulus Compounding Charles C. Spiker The Development of “Overconstancy” in Space Perception Joachim F. Wohlwill Miniature Experiments in the Discrimination Learning of Retardates Betty J . House and David Zeaman AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 2 The Paired-Associates Method in the Study of Conflict Alfred Castaneda Transfer of Stimulus Pretraining to Motor PairedAssociate and Disfrimination Learning Tasks Joan H. Cantor The Role of the Distance Receptors in the Development of Social Responsiveness Richard H. Wallers and Ross D. Parke

Social Reinforcement of Children’s Behavior Harold W. Stevenson Delayed Reinforcement Effects Glenn Terrell A Developmental Approach to Learning and Cognition Eugene S. Gollin Evidence for a Hierarchical Arrangement of Learning Processes Sheldon H. White Selected Anatomic Variables Analyzed for lnterage Relationships of the Size-Si, Size-Gain, and GainGain Varieties Howard K Meredith AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 3 Infant Sucking Behavior and Its Modification Herbert Kaye The Study of Brain Electrical Activity in Infants Robert J . Ellingson Selective Auditory Attention in Children Eleanor E. Maccoby Stimulus Definition and Choice Michael D. Zeiler Experimental Analysis of Inferential Behavior in Children Tracy S. Kendler and Howard H. Kendler Perceptual Integration in Children Herbert L. Pick, Jr.. Anne D. Pick, and Robert E. Klein Component Process Latencies in Reaction Times of Children and Adults Raymond H. Hohle AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

293

INDEX

294

Contents of Previous Volumes

Volume 4 Developmental Studies of Figurative Perception David Elkind The Relations of Short-Term Memory to Development and Intelligence John M . Belmonr and Earl C. Burrerfield Learning, Developmental Research, and Individual Differences Frances Degen Horowifz Psychophysiological Studies in Newborn Infants S. J. Hurt, H. C. Lenard, and H. F. R. Prechtl Development of the Sensory Analyzers during Infancy Yvonne Brackhill and Hiram E. Fifzgerald The Problem of Imitation Jiisrm Aronfierd AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 5 The Development of Human Fetal Activity and Its Relation to Postnatal Behavior Tryphena Humphrey Arousal Systems and Infant Heart Rate Responses Frances K. Graham and Jan C. Jackson Specific and Diversive Exploration Corinne Huff Developmental Studies of Mediated Memory John H. Flavell Development and Choice Behavior in Probabilistic and Problem-Solving Tasks L. R. Coulet and Kathryn S. Coodwin AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJEa

INDEX

Volume 6 Incentives and Learning in Children Sum L. Witryol Habituation in the Human Infant Wendell E. Jeffrey and Leslie B. Cohen Application of Hull-Spence Theory to the Discrimination Learning of Children Charles C. Spiker Growth in Body Size: A Compendium of Findings on Contemporary Children Living in Different Parts of the World Housard V. Meredith

Imitation and Language Development James A. Sherman Conditional Responding as a Paradigm for Observational, Imitative Learning and VicariousReinforcement Jacob L. Gewiru AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 7 Superstitious Behavior in Children: An Experimental Analysis Michael 0.Zeiler Learning Strategies in Children from Different Socioeconomic Levels .Jean L. Bresnuhan and Marlin M . Shapiro Time and Change in the Development of the Individual and Socicty Klaus F. Riegel The Nature and Development of Early Number Concepts Rvchel Gelman Learning and Adaptation in Infancy: A Comparison of Models Arnold J . Sumeroff AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 8 Elaboration and Learning in Childhood and Adolescence William D. Hohwer, Jr. Exploratory Behavior and Human Development Jum C. Nunnally and L. Charles Lemond Operant Conditioning of Infant Behavior: A Review Robert C. Hulsebus Birth Order and Parental Experience in Monkeys and Man G. Mitchell and L. Schrorrs Fear of the Stranger: A Critical Examination Harrier I.. Rheingold and Carol 0. Eckerman Applications of Hull-Spence Theory to the Transfer of Discrimination Learning in Children Charles C. Spiker and Joan H. Cantor AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

295

Contents of Previous Volumes Volume 9 Children’s Discrimination Learning Based on Identity or Difference Betty J. House. Ann L. Brown. and Marcia S. S o f t Two Aspects of Experience in Ontogeny: Develop men1 and Learning Hans G. Furth The Effects of Contextual Changes and Degree of Component Mastery on Transfer of Training Joseph C.Campione and Ann L. Brown Psychophysiological Functioning, Arousal, Attention, and Learning during the First Year of Life Richard Hirschman and Edward S. Kat&in Self-Reinforcement Process in Children John C. Masters and Janice R. Mokros AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 10 Current Trends in Developmental Psychology Boyd R. McCandless and Mary Fulcher Ceis The Development of Spatial Representations of LargeScale Environments Alexandrr W. Siege1 and Sheldon H. White Cognitive Perspectives on the Development of Memory John W. Hagen, Robert H. Jongeward. Jr.. and Robert V. Kail. Jr.

The Development of Memory: Knowing, Knowing About Knowing, and Knowing How to Know Ann L. Brown Developmental Trends in Visual Scanning Mary Carol Day The Development of Selective Attention: From Perceptual Exploration to Logical Search John C. Wright and Alice G. Vlietstra AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 11 The Hyperactive Child: Characteristics, Treatment. and Evaluation of Research Design Gladys B. Barley and Judith M. LeBlanc

Peripheral and Neurochemical Parallels of Psychopathology: A Psychophysiological Model Relating Autonomic Imbalance to Hyperactivity, Psychopathy, and Autism Stephen W. Porges Constructing Cognitive Operations Linguistically Harry Beilin Operant Acquisition of Social Behaviors in Infancy: Basic Problems and Constraints W. Stuart Millar Mother-Infant Interaction and Its Study Jacob L. Gewirtz and Elizabeth F. Boyd Symposium on Implications of Life-Span Developmental Psychology for Child Development: Introductory Remarks Paul B. B a l m Theory and Method in Life-Span Developmental Psychology: Implications for Child Development Aletha Husron-Stein and Paul B. Baltes The Development of Memory: Life-Span Perspectives Hayne W. Reese Cognitive Changes during the Adult Years: Implications for Developmental Theory and Research Nancy W. Denney and John C. Wright Social Cognition and Life-Span Approaches to the Study of Child Development Michael J. Chandler Life-Span Development of the Theory of Oneself Implications for Child Development Owille C.Brim, Jr. Implications of Life-Span Developmental Psychology for Childhood Education Leo Montada and Sigrun-Heide Filipp AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Vdume 12 Research hetween 1960 and 1970 on the Standing Height of Young Children in Different Parts of the World Howard V. Meredith The Representation of Children’s Knowledge David KIahr and Robert S. Siegler Chromatic Vision in Infancy Marc H. Bornstein Developmental Memory Theories: Baldwin and Piaget Bruce M. Ross and Stephen M. Kerst

296

Contents of Previous Volumes

Child Discipline and the Pursuit of Self: An Historical Interpretation Howard Cadlin Development of Time Concepts in Children William J. Friedman AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

The Development of Understanding of the Spatial Terms Front and Back Lauren Julius Harris and Ellen A. Strommen The Organization and Control of Infant Sucking C. K. Crook Neurological Plasticity, Recovery from Brain Insult. and Child Development Ian S/.James-Roberts AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 13 Coding of Spatial and Temporal Information in Episodic Memory Daniel B. Berch A Developmental Model of Human Learning Burry Gholson and Hurry Beilin The Development of Discrimination Learning: A Levels-of-Functioning Explanation Tracy S. Kendler The Kendler Levels-of-Functioning Theory: Comments and an Alternative Schema Charles C. Spiker and Joan H. Cantor Commentary on Kendler's Paper: An Alternative Perspective Barry Gholson and Therese Schuepfer Reply to Commentaries Tracy S. Kendler On the Development of Speech Perception: Mechanisms and Analogies Peter D. Eimas and Vivien C. Tarrter The Economics of Infancy: A Review of Conjugate Reinforcement Carolyn Kent Rovee-Collier and Marry J. Gekmki Human Facial Expressions in Response to Taste and Smell Stimulation Jacob E. Steiner AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 14 Development of Visual Memory in Infants John S. Werner and Marion Perlmutter Sibship-Constellation Effects on Psychosocial Development, Creativity, and Health Mazie Earle Wagner, Herman J. P.Schubert, and Daniel S. P. Schubert

Volume I5 Visual Development in Ontogenesis: Some Reevaluations Juri Allik and Jaan Valsiner Binocular Vision in Infants: A Review and a Theoretical Framework Richard N. A s h and Susan T. Dumais Validating Theories of Intelligence Earl C. Butterfield, Dennis Siladi, and John M. Belmonr Cognitive Differentiation and Developmental Learning Willium Fowler Children's Clinical Syndromes and Generalized Expectations of Control Fred Rorhbaum AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 16 The History of the Boyd R. McCandless Young Scientist Awards: The First Recipients David Palermo Social Bases of Language Development: A Reassessment Elizabeth Bates, Inge Brefherton, Marjorie Beeghly-Smith, and Sandra McNew Perceptual hisotrophies in Infancy: Ontogenetic Origins and Implications of Inequalities in Spatial Vision Marc H. Bornstein Concept Development Martha J. Farah and Stephen M. Kosslyn Production and Perception of Facial Expressions in Infancy and Early Childhood Tiffany M.Field and Tedra A. Walden

Contents of Previous Volumes 1ndividu;il Differences in Infant Sociability: Their Or!gins and Impliutions for Cognirivc Dcvclopment Michurl E. Lumb The Development of Numerical Understandings Robert S Siegler ond Mitchell Robitt.wti AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 17 The Development of Prohleni-Solving Strategies Deutinu Kuhn ond Erin Phelps Information Processing and Cognitive Development Roherr Kuil otid J e f i e y Bi.wtiz Research hetween 1950 and 1980 on Urban-Rural Differences i n Body Size arid Growth Rate of Children and Youths Howorii V. Mrredith Word Meaning Acquisition in Young Children: A Review of Theory and Research Pumelu Bkwirt Language Play and Language Acquisition Stan A. Kiiczuj II The Child Study Movement: Early Growth and Development of the Symbolized Child Alrxonder W Sirgel uncl Shrldoti H . White AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 18 The Duvelopmrnt of Verbal Communicative Skills in Children Consrunce R. Schmidt atid Srotr G.Poris Auditory Feedback and Speech Development Gerald M. Sicgel, Herbert L. Pick, Jr.- and Shuron R. Gorber Body Size of Infants and Children around the World in Relation to Socioeconomic Status Howurd V. Mrredirh Human Sexual Dimorphism: I t s Cost and Benefit Jum1.s L. M u d q utid Eilrrti A . Stun Symposium on Research Programs: Rational Alternatives to Kuhn's Analysis of Scientific ProgressIntroductory Remarks Hoynr W. Reeve, Chuirmun

297

World Views and Their Influence on Psychological Theory and Rcscarch: Kuhn-hkatos-Laudan Willis F, Ov(woti The History of the Psychology of Learning as a Rational Procew lakatos versus Kuhn Pcwr Burkrr und Riirrv Gholson Functionalist and Structuralist Research Programs in Developmental Psychology: lncommensurahility or Synthcsis? Hurry Bciliii In Dcfensc of Kuhn: A Dihcussion of His Detrac1131s Dui~idS. Pulrrnio Comments on k i l i n ' s Epistemology and Palermo's Defense of Kuhn Willi.\ I: Overton From Kuhn to Lakatos to Laudan P i w r Burker and Burn Ghol.soti Overton's and Palermo's Relativism: One Step Forward. Two Steps Back Hurry B d i t i AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 19 Response to Novelty: Continuity versus Discontinuity in the Dcvclopmenlal Course of Intelligence Cynrhiu A. Brrg mid Robert J. Sternberg Metaphoric Competence in Cognitive and Language Development Mure Mwsrhurk arid I,.vtin Null The Concept of Dimensions in Developmental Research Sricart 1. Offrnbuch and Fruncitir C'. Blumbwg Effects of the Knowledge Basc on Children's Memory Strategies Peter A. O m ~ t e i nmid Mury J . Nuus Effects of Sihling Spacing on Intelligence. Interfamilial Relations, Psychosocial Characteristics. and Mental and Physical Health Mime Eurlt Wagner. Hermun .I P. Schuhrrt, und Duniel S. P. Schuherr Infant Visual Preferences: A Review and New Theoretical Treatment Murrin S. Bonks and Arrhur P. Citishtrg AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

298

Contents of Previous Volumes

Volume 20 Variation in Body Stockiness among and within Ethnic Groups at Ages from Birth lo Adulthood Howard V. Meredirh The Development of Conditional Reasoning: An Iffy Proposition David P. O’Brien Content Knowledge: Its Role, Representation, and Restructuring in Memory Development Michelene T. H. Chi and Srephen J . Ceci Descriptions: A Model of Nonstrategic Memory Development Brian P. Ackerman Reactivation of Infant Memory: Implications for Cognitive Development Carolyn Rme-Collier and Harlene Hayne Gender Segregation in Childhood Eleanor E. Maccohy and Carol Nagy Jacklin Piaget, Attentional Capacity, and the Functional Implications of Formal Structure Michael Chapman INDEX

Volume 21 Social Development in Infancy: A 25-Year Perspective Ross D. Parke On the Uses of the Concept of Normality in Developmental Biology and Psychology Eugene S. Collin, Gary Srahl, and Elyse Morgan Cognitive Psychology: Mentalistic or Behavioristic? Charles C. Spiker Some Current Issues in Children’s Selective Attention Berry J. House Children’s Learning Revisited: The Contemporary Scope of the Modified Spence Discrimination Theory Joan H. Cantor and Charles C. Spiker

Discrimination Learning Set in Children Hayne W. Reese A Developmental Analysis of Rule-Following Henry C. Riegler and Donald M. Boer Psychological Linguistics: Implications for a Theory of Initial Development and a Method for Research Sidney W. Bijou Psychic Conflict and Moral Development Gordon N. Cantor and David A. Parron Knowledge and the Child’s Developing Theory of the World David S. Palermo Childhood Events Recalled by Children and Adults David B. Pillemer and Sheldon H. White INDEX

Volume 22

The Development of Representation in Young Children Judy S. Ddwche Children’s Understanding of Mental Phenomena David Esres, Henry M. Wellman. and Jacqueline D. Woolley Social Influences on Children’s Cognition: State of the Art and Future Directions Margarita Amitia and Marion Perlmurrer Understanding Maps as Symbols: The Devclopment of Map Concepts Lynn S. Liheii and Roger M . Downs The Development of Spatial Perspective Taking Nora Newcambe Developmental Studies of Alertness and Encoding Effects of Stimulus Repetition Daniel W. Smothergill and Alan G. Kraut Imitation in Infancy: A Critical Review Claire L. Poubon, Leila Regina de Paula Nune.s, and Steven F. Warren AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX