Advances in Child Development and Behavior Volume 26

ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR

Volume 26

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR

edited by

Hayne W. Reese Department of Psychology West Virginia University Morgantown, West Virginia

Volume 26

ACADEMIC PRESS San Diego London Boston New York Sydney Tokyo Toronto

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

@

Copyright 0 1996 by ACADEMIC PRESS All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Academic Press, Inc.

525 B Street, Suite 1900, San Diego, California 92101-4495, USA http:l/www.apnet.com Academic Press Limited 24-28 Oval Road, London NWI 7DX. UK http://www .hbuk.co.uk/ap/ International Standard Serial Number: 0065-2407 International Standard Book Number: 0-12-009726-5

PRINTED IN THE UMTED STATES OF AMERICA 96 97 9 8 9 9 00 0 1 B B 9 8 7 6

5

4

3 2 1

Contents Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

Preparing to Read: The Foundations of Literacy I. 11.

ELLEN BIALYSTOK Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. Social Context ....................................

................................ IV. Cognitive Context ......................... ................... V. The Acquisition of Literacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI. Summary and Conclusions . . . . . ............................... References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................

I 3 5 13 22 21 28

The Role of Schemata in Children’s Memory DENISE DAVIDSON Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Role of Schemata in Children’s Everyday Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Role of Schemata in Children’s Memory for Narratives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. The Role of Schemata in Children’s Memory for Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. The Role of Schemata in Children’s Memory: Where Do We Go from Here? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. 11. 111.

35 36 41 48

52 54

The Interaction of Knowledge, Aptitude, and Strategies in Children‘s Memory Performance I. 11.

Ill. IV. V.

V1.

DAVID F. BJORKLUND AND WOLFGANG SCHNEIDER Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Knowledge and Memory Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Knowledge and Individual Differences in Children’s Memory Strategies and Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Advantages of High IQ . . . . . . . . . . ...................... Summary and Conclusions ....................... References ............................................. V

60 60 65 15 81 84 84

vi

Contents

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development USHA GOSWAMI 1. Introduction

.......................................................

I1 . The “Relational Primacy’’ View of Analogical Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111. The Importance of the Knowledge Base in Analogical Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . .

IV. Performance Factors in Analogical Reasoning . . . V. Halford’s Structure-Mapping Theory of Logical De VI . The “Relational Primacy” View of Analogic and the Development of Logical Reasoning VII . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92 94 100 106

I14 I24 133 135

Sex-of-Sibling Effects: A Review Part I1. Personality and Mental and Physical Health MAZIE EARLE WAGNER. HERMAN J . P. SCHUBERT

I. I1. Ill . IV. V. VI .

AND DANIEL S . P. SCHUBERT Introduction ............................................. Personality .......................................... Physical an .......................................... The Large Monosexual Sibships and the Large Sibship with Only One Cross-Sexed Sibling ................................... Final Conclusions ............................................. Research Needed . . . . . . . . . . ......... References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

140 140 155 168 172 173 174

Input and Learning Processes in First Language Acquisition I. I1 . Ill . IV. V. VI . VII . VIII .

ERNST L . MOERK Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Modeling and Imitation ... Corrective Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Analytic and Synthetic Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Abstracting and Generativity Training . . . . . . . . . . Book Reading and Literacy Acquisition Combinations of Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . .................................... . . . . . . . . . . . References .....................................

Author Index

....................................................

182 183 186 191 196 202 208 209 217

229

Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

241

Contents of Previous Volumes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

247

Contributors Numbers in parentheses indicate the pages on which the authors' contributions begin.

ELLEN BIALYSTOK

Department of Psychology, York University, North York, Ontario, Canada M3J IP3 ( I ) DAVID F. BJORKLUND

Department of Psychology, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida 33431 (59) DENISE DAVIDSON

Department of Psychology, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60626 (35) USHA GOSWAMI

Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, England (91) ERNST L. MOERK

Department of Psychology, California State University-Fresno, Fresno, California 93740 (181) WOLFGANG SCHNEIDER

Department of Psychology, University of Wiirzburg, 0-97074 Wiirzburg, Germany (59) DANIEL S. P. SCHUBERT

Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine and Department of Psychiatry, MetroHealth Medical Center and Cleveland Metropolitan General Hospital, Cleveland, Ohio 44109 (139) HERMAN J. P. SCHUBERTI

Department of Educational Psychology, State University College at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York 14222 (139) MAZIE EARLE WAGNER

Department of Educational Psychology, State University College at Buf falo, Buffalo, New York 14222 (139)

'Deceased vii

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

Preface

The amount of research and theoretical discussion in the field of child development and behavior is so vast that researchers, instructors, and students are confronted with a formidable task in keeping abreast of new developments within their areas of specialization through the use of primary sources, as well as being knowledgeable in areas peripheral to their primary focus of interest. Moreover, journal space is often simply too limited to permit publication of more speculative kinds of analyses that might spark expanded interest in a problem area or stimulate new modes of attack on a problem. The serial publication Advances in Child Development and Behavior is intended to ease this burden by providing scholarly technical articles serving as reference material and by providing a place for publication of scholarly speculation. In these documented critical reviews, recent advances in the field are summarized and integrated, complexities are exposed, and fresh viewpoints are offered. They should be useful not only to the expert in the area but also to the general reader. No attempt is made to organize each volume around a particular theme or topic, nor is the series intended to reflect the development of new fads. Manuscripts are solicited from investigators conducting programmatic work on problems of current and significant interest. The editor often encourages the preparation of critical syntheses dealing intensively with topics of relatively narrow scope but of considerable potential interest to the scientific community. Contributors are encouraged to criticize, integrate, and stimulate, but always within a framework of high scholarship. Although appearance in the volumes is ordinarily by invitation, unsolicited manuscripts will be accepted for review. All papers-whether invited or submitted-receive careful editorial scrutiny. Invited papers are automatically accepted for publication in principle, but usually require revision before final acceptance. Submitted papers receive the same treatment except that they are not automatically accepted for publication even in principle, and may be rejected. The Advances series is generally not a suitable place of publication for reports of a single study, or a short series of studies, even if the report is necessarily long because of the nature of the research. The use of sexist language, such as “he” or “she” as the general singular pronoun, is not acceptable in contributions to the Advances series; and the use of “they” as a singular pronoun is incorrect. The use of “he or she” (or the like) is acceptable. ix

X

Preface

I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the aid of my home institution, West Virginia University, which generously provided time and facilities for the preparation of this volume. I also thank Dr. Rente Baillargeon for her editorial assistance and Mrs. Ann Davis for her excellent secretarial services. Hayne W. Reese

PREPARING TO READ: THE FOUNDATIONS OF LITERACY

Ellen Bialystok DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY YORK UNIVERSITY NORTH YORK,ONTARIO, CANADA M3J IPE

I . INTRODUCTION 11. SOCIAL CONTEXT

A. READING AT HOME B. ENVIRONMENTAL PRINT 111. LINGUISTIC CONTEXT A. THE LANGUAGE OF TEXT B. PHONOLOGICAL AWARENESS C. RESOLVING THE CONTRADICTIONS IV. COGNITIVE CONTEXT A. SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION IN CHILDHOOD B. WRITTEN LANGUAGE AS A SYMBOLIC SYSTEM V. THE ACQUISITION OF LITERACY A. ASSESSING THE READINESS TO READ B. IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTRUCTION VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES

To be a well-favoured man is the gift of fortune; but to write and read comes by nature. -Shakespeare, Much Ado abour Norhing (111, iii, 14).

I. Introduction Watch young children struggle to read their first storybook, sound out a long word, or write a letter to their grandparents. You will see intense concentration 1 ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR. VOL. 26

Copyright 0 1996 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

2

Ellen Bialystok

and focused effort. Completing the task imparts tremendous satisfaction to the child, but this success is the product of hard work and learning. It does not appear to “come by nature.” In this point at least, Shakespeare seems to have gotten it wrong. If it were true, then no group of children would struggle in their efforts to read even as well as their classmates; no societies would be virtually devoid of literate members; and no formal institution of schooling would be needed to teach children how to read. The fact is that written language is an artifact-a humanly created system of symbols for recording information. The encoded information in this case is spoken language, and although spoken language may well “come by nature,” nothing compels that the corresponding written forms should be so endowed. We must learn how to read, and in our culture, mastering this skill is one of the essential achievements of childhood. Although learning to read may not come by nature, it relies nonetheless on an array of prerequisite skills and knowledge, some of which do develop naturally, the way children learn to speak. Others develop through the exposure to relevant experiences. Still others seem to come only with instructional tutoring, although some children reach even these insights through their own cognitive reflection. What are the component skills underlying literacy and how do they develop? Some of the skills that are part of the requirements for reading emerge naturally. Children’s knowledge of oral language develops during the preschool years and becomes a model for written language through its structure and discourse forms. This model grows out of such varied aspects of language as syntax, discourse, and vocabulary (e.g., Garton & Pratt, 1989; Klein, 1985). Specific forms of discourse that reflect the style of written language, such as the language used to tell stories, is also an important preparation for literacy (Purcell-Gates, 1988) and are familiar to preschool children. Unlike this growing proficiency with the oral forms, certain skills, some of which follow from special experiences, seem necessary to help children focus on the structure of language that is the basis of the written system. Phonological awareness is one such skill. In oral uses of language, one need not attend to the sound structure of language that creates meaningful communication, and perhaps as a result, phonological awareness develops slowly. Its emergence is aided by such activities as word games that help children to focus on the structure of spoken language. Early experiences with books are needed to explicate the mechanics of print and the procedures for reading: Where is the front of the book? What is the relation between text and pictures on the page? What is the sequential layout of books? Finally, children must learn to deal with the rules and regularities (and irregularities) of written language. To this end, instruction is a useful means for clarifying the system and providing some strategies for interpreting the written forms. Although a battle wages over the correct method of reading instruction and shows no signs of subsiding (e.g., Adams, 1990; Chall, 1967), some mea-

Preparing to Read

3

sure of instruction is needed for children to master the coded system that translates familiar speech into arcane scribbles. Regardless of how the debate over instruction is eventually resolved, it is undeniable that formal teaching constitutes only part of the child’s preparation for literacy. In this chapter I review three contexts that contribute to the foundation upon which children develop literacy skills. These contexts are the social, linguistic, and cognitive aspects of development experienced by preschool children. Even if nature has a hand in each of them, their importance in setting the groundwork for children to become literate is so complex and interrelated that nature alone cannot have the credit.

11. Social Context A . READING AT HOME

By and large, children learn to read at home. They may not learn the mechanics, they may not uncover the subtleties of writing systems, and they may not complete their first storybook without help, but they learn about reading. They learn that written language carries meaning, that people can use it to communicate by leaving notes for each other, that it can be used to remember things, for example, by making shopping lists, and that it provides an enjoyable leisure activity-curling up with a book. Downing (1979) was forceful in pointing out both the importance and the difficulty for young children of simply learning these functions of print. 1 . Exposure to Print

Some of the crucial early concepts of print are imparted from the child’s first experiences with storybooks (Mason, 1992). Families differ in the extent to which these literacy activities are part of the child’s early experiences, and these differences lead to imbalances in the quantity and quality of literacy experiences children have long before they even begin to read (Heath, 1983; Teale, 1986). In fact, the mere exposure to print and the availability of written materials in the home has such a profound influence on children’s development that Stanovich and his colleagues (Stanovich, 1993; Stanovich & Cunningham, 1992) have shown that it continues to account for variance in reading and spelling ability for children in the third and fourth grades. Accepting the formative role of these early home experiences, Teale (1986) claimed that learning to read is much more than simply a cognitive skill; it is the acquisition of culture. Put this way, the social context of reading is part of children’s identity. Studies of the family context of language use have left no doubt that the family support and the exposure to literacy from the earliest time in

4

Ellen Bialystok

a child’s life have profound influence on the child’s development of literacy skills (Dickinson & Tabors, 1991; Heath, 1982; Snow, 1983; Snow & Goldfield, 1983; Wells, 1985). Parent-child storybook reading seems to be particularly potent among these experiences (Irwin, 1960; Snow & Ninio, 1986).

2. Literate Language What aspect of home storybook reading prepares children for literacy? One part of the answer may be the type of language and discourse structures that children are exposed to during these activities. Watson and Shapiro (1988) reported that the language used by both parents and children during book reading includes more “mental state words,” such as “think,” “remember,” and superordinate category terms, leading to greater cognitive organization. A study by Bus and Van IJzendoorn (1988) corroborated these findings by identifying the linguistic interactions surrounding book reading as the source of cognitive benefit. Their results extended the interpretation, moreover, by adding the importance of social interaction. The instructional interactions occurred primarily between mother-child pairs in which the child was securely, as opposed to insecurely, attached to the mother. Early reading, in other words, is as much a part of the child’s early social interaction as it is a part of preschool education. B. ENVIRONMENTAL PRINT

Whether or not children receive directed exposure to print and storybooks at home, print is all around them. They learn quite early to recognize the print on their favorite cereal box, the logos of the popular fast-food restaurants, and the information on the ubiquitous road signs. They know that these signs are read, and they are even able to imitate that feat by some reading of their own. Harste, Burke, and Woodward (1982) reported that children do this kind of reading frequently and went on to suggest that it is formative in the development of literacy skills. They also reported, however, that alterations in the familiar form of these names, such as removal of the logo, disrupt performance, and children often fail to recognize the name simply by the text alone. But what do these children understand about the written forms of the words they can identify in context?

1 . Efects of Familiar Print Masonheimer, Drum, and Ehri (1984) examined this question by investigating the ability of preschoolers who could read environmental text to read actual words. They selected their sample by asking children to identify the majority of a set of 21 familiar labels and signs and to identify all the letters of the alphabet in both upper and lower case. The children who could do this were included in the study and were asked to read the 10 most familiar labels from the screening survey but in altered forms, such as color or font changes, incorrect letters (Xepsi

Preparing

to Read

5

for Pepsi), or without the logo. Although color made no difference, the other changes disrupted children’s ability to read these names. No continuum of success was evident. The majority of the children were unsuccessful, even though a few could read virtually all of the altered names. In other words, the group exhibited no middle stage in which familiarity with environmental print somehow gave the children a cue or a strategy for actual reading. Instead, environmental reading was based purely on the recognized graphics and not on the letters that appeared in the signs. These children were in a stage that Mason (1980) called “contextual dependency,” reading that is based on the peripheral help of the context and not on the written relation between letters and sounds. Lomax and McGee (1987) also reported that the 3-year-olds in their extensive study of the predictors for reading were expert “environmental readers” but had very poorly developed concepts of print and little knowledge of letters. 2 . Limitations of the Social Context The social context of literacy is undoubtedly a crucial link in the acquisition of reading, but its effect appears to be more supportive, or facilitative, than instructive. McLane and McNamee (1990) described this social context in terms of the relationships children develop: “Literacy development begins in children’s relationships with their immediate caretakers, and is expressed and elaborated in increasingly wider communities-at home, in the neighborhood, and in preschool, daycare, and kindergarten settings” (p. 7). In this way, children learn about reading, they learn what can be read, and they likely begin to understand why to read. However, without more direct effort focused on the mechanics of reading, the social context alone provides little guidance in the problem of how to read.

111. Linguistic Context A. THE LANGUAGE OF TEXT

If learning to read comes at all by nature, it does so because reading is built out of a language system that children already know. In spite of the many cognitive and social developments that prepare children for learning to read, they already know the essential part-the language that is encoded in the written word. Yet, knowing how to speak does not guarantee that children can read. What else do children need to know about language in order to read, and how does that knowledge differ from what they needed to know in order to speak? 1 . Role of Spoken Language

Because literacy is very likely an extension of oral language, Crain-Thoreson and Dale (1992) tested the plausible idea that children who were verbally preco-

6

Ellen Bialystok

cious were more advanced as well in their literacy skills than were their less talented peers. After all, if speaking and reading both “come by nature,” it would be reasonable to expect that they should come sooner to those who are verbally gifted. Crain-Thoreson and Dale studied a group of precocious talkers over a period of several years and found virtually no correlation between oral language skills and literacy knowledge at 46 years old. The single exception was that the early talkers had enhanced phonological awareness. This exception is significant and most certainly not accidental, as will be discussed in section 1II.B. Instead of supporting the influence of verbal precocity, the study found that reading was consistently more advanced for children who had received instruction in letter names and sounds and for children who had more extensive experience in storybook reading at home, irrespective of their level of verbal fluency. Oral language as the basis for literacy, however, is not so easily dismissed. In a review of the language historically used in both oral and written culture, Egan (1987) suggested that Western schools fail in teaching literacy because oral language is not fully developed before children are taught to read. The prerequisite for achieving complete literacy, according to Egan, is a rich orality. This argument is reminiscent of one made at the beginning of the century by Huey ( 1908/~96s), who advocated postponing reading instruction until late childhood to allow greater development in oral language. A more current claim was made by Garton and Pratt (1989), who virtually entwined oral and written language into a single definition of literacy: “literacy . . . refer[s] to a mastery of the language, in both its written and spoken forms, which enables an individual to exercise control over its use” (p. 152). Oral language leads inextricably into literacy. What links could attach oral language to its written forms? Pelligrini and Galda ( 1990) proposed a functional connection between the type of oral language used in symbolic play situations and the style of language used in literacy. Both are characterized by “the use of arbitrary symbols . . . , linguistic verbs, explicit language, and narrative structure.” (p. 82). The argument is similar to one cited earlier (section 1I.B) by Watson and Shapiro (1988) regarding the kind of oral language children have access to during storybook reading. The point is that potentially facilitative effects on literacy acquisition come from certain features of oral language rather than from an undifferentiated estimate of its quantity. The functional similarities between the language used in such activities as play and storybook reading on the one hand and literacy on the other prepare children for literacy by exposing them to the specific style of language, or linguistic register, used in text. Pelligrini and Galda (1993) made a stronger connection between symbolic play and literacy. Symbolic play on its own has minimal effects on literacy, but the representational aspects of this play are predictive of writing, and the verbal interactive aspects, especially in terms of the use of metalanguage, are predictive of reading. The linguistic context of literacy still requires a specification of much clearer

Preparing

io

Read

I

connections between children’s knowledge of language and their developing literacy skills. Children certainly need to be able to use and understand oral language, even in its more specialized discourse functions, but in order to read, they must go beyond that control over the oral forms. They must come to understand the forms and structure of oral language as a system. They must acquire metalinguistic knowledge of the oral forms.

2. Metalinguistic Ability In the broadest view, metalinguistic abilities include explicit knowledge of language forms and functions. The term, however, has been used more specifically to refer to a variety of skills and tasks, some of which have little apparent commonality with each other (for discussion, see Bialystok, 1993). Some of these metalinguistic abilities seem logically to be involved in the acquisition of literacy skills, and studies of metalinguistic development have sought evidence for these links (Bowey, 1986; Ehri, 1979; Mattingly, 1972; Ryan, 1980; Ryan & Ledger, 1984; Siege1 & Ryan, 1988; Tunmer & Bowey, 1984; Tunmer, Herriman, & Nesdale, 1988; for review see Bowey, 1994). This research, however, has produced mixed support for the connection between metalinguistic ability and reading development. For example, Ryan and Ledger (1984) found connections between reading ability and judgments of grammaticality, but in the study by Tunmer et al. (1988), word reading was not well predicted by any of a large number of metalinguistic tasks. Again the single exception was phonemic awareness, the sensitivity to the individual sounds of language. In fact, much of the evidence converges on the importance of some type of phonemic awareness. Phonemic awareness, and not a more undifferentiated notion of metalinguistic awareness, is likely the effective principle in the development of literacy skills. B. PHONOLOGICAL AWARENESS 1 . Empirical Evidence

Bruce (1964) seems to have done the first systematic investigation of children’s ability to manipulate the sound constituents of spoken language. He asked children who ranged in mental age from 5 to 9 years to delete a specified phoneme in a given word. The results showed a developmental increase in the ability to solve the task and to recognize the relation between words and sounds. Bruce called the processing “phonetic analysis” and he noted that the problem was not solved successfully by prereaders. In early follow-up to this research, Bruce’s task was simplified and conflicting results began to emerge. Liberman, Shankweiler, Fischer, and Carter (1974), for example, found that preschool children were unable to solve the problem, but Fox and Routh (1975) found that children as young as 3 years old had some success in the task. Research on the relationship between phonological awareness and reading

8

Ellen Bialystok

development has proliferated enormously since the time of Bruce’s study (for overviews, see collections by Brady & Shankweiler, 1991; Gough, Ehri, & Treiman, 1992; Rieben & Perfetti, 1991). This research has produced virtually no challenge to the claim that phonological awareness plays an important role in reading, at least for alphabetic scripts. The nature of the relation between phonological awareness and reading, however, is very much at issue. 2 . Controversy over Causality The controversy centers on the direction of causality between phonological awareness and reading. Considerable evidence and argument have been amassed to defend both the view that children must learn to segment speech before reading can be mastered (e.g., Gleitman & Rozin, 1977; Mann, 1984, Rozin & Gleitman, 1977; Stanovich, Cunningham, & Cramer, 1984; Wagner & Torgesen, 1987) and the opposite claim that segmentational ability follows from experience with alphabetic literacy (e.g., Ehri, 1979; Gattuso, Smith, & Treiman, 1991; Hohn & Ehri, 1983; ’hnmer & Bowey, 1984). Bryant and his colleagues (Bradley & Bryant, 1983, Bryant, MacLean, Bradley, & Crossland, 1990; Goswami & Bryant, 1990; Kirtley, Bryant, MacLean, & Bradley, 1989), have been among the most ardent defenders of the first view. Much of their research has been based on the “oddity task” that they developed. Children are presented a series of three words in which one word differs from the others in a specific phoneme, for example, the initial sound, and are asked to select the word that does not fit with the others. In addition to the authors’ involvement in the theoretical debate, their development of this instrument has been an important methodological contribution to the field. They have also studied children’s knowledge and awareness of rhyme in the early preschool years and have produced causal models from their data in which preschool competence with these indices of phonological awareness predicted children’s progress in learning to read several years later. The opposite view, that phonological awareness is a consequence of reading, follows from the general idea that schooling and literacy training enhance metalinguistic skills (Donaldson, 1978; Scribner & Cole, 1981). This view leaves an unanswered question: How can some preschool children succeed in tasks of phonological awareness without instruction and without being able to read? The explanation generally offered from this perspective is that these children were able to profit from some preschool literacy experience, even if it did not lead to reading; truly naive subjects do not have phonological awareness prior to some involvement with literacy. 3. Historical Evidence An extension of this debate is applied to the historical development of alphabetic literacy. In most interpretations, the genius of the ancient Greeks in invent-

Preparing

to

Read

9

ing the alphabet is assumed to have been their noticing that both vowel and consonant sounds were equally capable of being transcribed into a written record of the language (e.g., Gelb, 1963). The Greek achievement in recognizing this possibility prior to literacy is taken as evidence that the human ability to segment speech into phonemic units and transcribe these units with individual letters is a spontaneously developing natural skill (Studdert-Kennedy, 1987). Consequently, given that the Greeks could achieve phonological segmentation prior to inventing the alphabet, preschool children could master the same insight before the mysteries of alphabetic writing were formally revealed to them. However, Faber ( 1992) developed a plausible scenario in which the phonetically complete Greek alphabet was invented by accident because of misunderstanding, or more properly, mishearing, the letter names of the Canaanite predecessors for the Greek vowels. The implication of this alternative story is clear: Phonological segmentation may well be an artifactual by-product of alphabetic writing systems. Just as the ancient Greeks did not develop the ability spontaneously, neither do modem children. They must be brought to this skill through some measure of instruction and exposure to the basics of the system. C. RESOLVING THE CONTRADICTIONS

1. Unit of Sound When well-reasoned compelling arguments that are rooted in sound experimental evidence stand diametrically opposed to each other, the solution is usually not to choose between them but to understand the context in which both can be true. Even from the beginning of this research, Liberman et al. (1974) pointed out a critical distinction that turned up in task differences and profoundly determined whether or not children could solve the problems. Alas, this distinction needed to be reinvented several times in the ensuing two decades. Liberman et al. noted that the important difference across the tasks is in the unit of sound analysis. If sound is taken to be a syllable, then preschool children can solve the problems; if sound is taken to be an individual phoneme, then the problem is much more difficult and seems to require some knowledge of print. Together, the research showed that preschool children can successfully report the number of syllables in a word, but only older literate children can attend to the individual phonemes. Although not resolving the problem of phonological ability as a cause or consequence of reading, the distinction divides the skill into two distinct parts and allows each to enter a different kind of relationship with literacy. Specifically, it lays the groundwork for interactive models in which some minimal phonological competence permits reading, and reading promotes higher levels of phonological awareness. The broad distinction between syllable and phoneme has been extended into a more detailed analysis of the structure of syllables in terms of the distinction

10

Ellen Bialystok

between segmentation of syllables into their major constituents and complete segmentation into individual sounds. Mackay (1972) long ago identified a natural break in a syllable between the “onset,” which is the initial consonant or consonant cluster, and the “rime,” that is, the vowel and final consonant sounds. Preliterate children have no problem in dividing syllables or monosyllabic words in this way. Trieman and her colleagues have used this distinction productively to trace the development of children’s segmentational abilities and their relation to learning to read (Treiman, 1985, 1991; Treiman & Weatherston, 1992; Wise, Olson, & Treiman, 1990).

2 . lnteractive Models This analysis of the sound structure of words has provided the framework for interactive models of the relationship between phonological skills and learning to read (Ellis, 1990; Liberman, Shankweiler, Liberman, Fowler, & Fischer, 1977; Morais, Bertelson, Cay, & Alegria, 1986). These models provide the most parsimonious fit with the data from all sources, as well as the most complex interpretation of the child’s path to literacy. The complexity nonetheless remains well within the bounds of the acceptable (and is unthreatened by Occam) and the models have the additional virtue of intuitive appeal. One of the most prominent of the interactive models is that developed by Morais and his colleagues. Its value is in its well-articulated description and the large body of data that has been offered in its support. Morais (1987) made a strong distinction between the segmental (individual sounds) and syllabic (syllable) units of speech. The bulk of the literature shows that preschool children are unable to isolate the segmental units, but they are often successful with syllables. On this basis, Morais distinguished between two aspects of phonological awareness. Phonemic awareness is the ability to identify the major syllable units in speech. Phonetic awareness requires both the capacity to focus on the sound properties of speech and the segmentational abilities to isolate the sounds. This distinction allows the relation between phonological awareness and reading to be stated more precisely. Specifically, with at least two components forming the general ability in phonological awareness, a reciprocal relationship can be reasonable posited. Phonemic awareness sets the stage for literacy, and literacy, particularly alphabetic literacy, leads to the emergence of phonetic awareness. 3. Other Readers and Other Scripts The posited reciprocal relationship between phonological awareness and reading has sound empirical evidence from research on children’s learning to read (e.g., Ellis, 1990; Perfetti, Beck, Bell, & Hughes, 1987; Stuart & Coltheart, 1988). More interesting, though, is the evidence for these interactive relationships that is obtained by examining the emergence of phonological awareness in a variety of special populations. Such studies have been reported for dyslexics

Preparing to Read

11

(Morais, 1987), learning-disabled children (Liberman & Shankweiler, 1987), adult illiterates (Morais, Alegria & Content, 1987; Morais, Cary, Alegria, & Bertelson, 1979), Chinese adults who read characters but not pinyin alphabetic script (Perfetti & Zhang, 1991; Read, Yun-Fei, Hong-Yin, & Bao-Qing, 1986), and Japanese children who could read kana (syllabary) and kanji (characters) but not an alphabetic script (Leong, 1991; Mann, 1986). In all these cases, preliterates, illiterates, and nonalphabetic literates were able to manipulate sounds at the larger syllable level, that is, phonemic awareness. None of them, however, demonstrated phonetic awareness at the level of individual sound units. This appears to be a special skill that functions only in reading an alphabetic script. At the same time, alphabetic literacy enhances these skills and promotes phonetic awareness. 4 . Reading by Analogy The persuasiveness of the interactive view has not been lost on Bryant and his colleagues (Goswami & Bryant, 1992; Goswami, 1990; Kirtley, Bryant, MacLean, & Bradley, 1989). Without abandoning their position regarding the important predictive value of phonological awareness for young prereaders, they have elaborated their explanation by introducing the strategy of analogy. Phonological categories are formed on the basis of similarity of sound and spelling patterns. These categories can be used to include new members, and reading can proceed on the basis of similarity to this set. This strategy of analogy, on their view, is the missing link between phonological awareness and reading because it provides a means for children to proceed with reading before detailed phonological skills have been developed. Specifically, awareness of the larger phonological units indirectly affects children’s knowledge of the sound-grapheme relationships by helping children to identify groups of words that contain common sounds. 5 . Individual Diyerences Another means of reconciling contradictions in experimental outcomes is to consider the role of individual differences among children. Wimmer, Landerl, Linortner, and Hummer (1991) identified two kinds of children who did very well on reading and spelling tasks at the end of first grade when they were 6-7 years old. One was a group of children who already showed high levels of phonemic awareness prior to reading instruction in grade 1. This group supports the idea that phonemic awareness is a necessary precursor to literacy. The second successful group had no preschool ability with phonemic awareness but quickly developed it shortly after reading instruction was introduced. Even very early experience with alphabetic reading, and sometimes such minimal knowledge as letter-sound relations, was sufficient to enable children to solve a phonemicawareness task based on medial vowel substitution. A broader but compatible claim is made by Bentin, Hammer, and Cahan (1991), who demonstrated that

12

Ellen Bialystok

schooling alone is sufficient for the development of phonemic awareness. Wimmer et al. suggested that the relevant factor in accounting for their results is not when phonemic awareness is acquired but the ease with which children can learn it. Children who displayed low levels of this skill throughout the first grade struggled with the reading and spelling tasks administered at the end of the year. In this way, phonemic awareness is related to literacy, but the direction of effect is less important than the assurance that phonemic awareness will develop to sufficiently high levels. Stuart and Coltheart (1988) appealed to another difference among individual children to help resolve disparities in research findings. They pointed out that children pass through different stages as they are learning to read because their knowledge and skills develop at different rates. They suggested that children who are phonologically skilled before learning to read might use their phonological skills from the beginning, and those lacking in these skills might initially treat reading as a visual memory task. In a longitudinal study, they showed that children’s phonological awareness in conjunction with their letter-sound knowledge prior to literacy was a significant predictor of reading age within the first year of schooling. The children who differed in their phonological awareness prior to reading made different kinds of errors once they were reading by the end of the first year of schooling. 6. Analysis of the Testing Instruments Another ingredient in resolving the disparity between studies that appear to be mutually contradictory is to examine in more detail the instruments that were used to assess children’s ability. An empirical contribution to this problem was made by Yopp (1988). In an extensive survey of the literature, she classified tasks used to assess phonological awareness into one of three categories. These categories, broadly defined, are sensitivity to rhyme, blending and counting phonemes, and phoneme segmentation. These categories are progressively more difficult for young children to solve and therefore place the tasks in a hierarchy of difficulty. A similar effort by Adams (1990) yielded five levels of phonological awareness tasks, but the proliferation is a consequence of more precise boundaries on essentially the same distinctions. The same procedure can be applied to the cognitive abilities rather than task differences involved in phonological awareness. Wagner, Torgesen, Laughon, Simmons, and Rashotte (1993) also used factor analytic methods and were able to show both that phonological ability is a coherent and stable cognitive ability and that it consists of five correlated phonological processing abilities that can be measured individually. Tho of these, analysis and synthesis, contributed independently to explanations of the more general construct of phonological processing.

Preparing

to

Read

13

7 . Complexity of Phonological Awareness These kinds of studies that reveal the sheer complexity of the ability involved in solving phonological tasks and, by implication, in reading, are important in shaping the understanding of the cognitive and linguistic basis of reading. They are also important in refining the methodologies used to study these difficult questions. The analyses indicate latitude in definitions that have been used to operationalize phonological awareness and the sensitivity of specific tasks in assessing particular interpretations of this broad construct. Simple individual tests with unidirectional models of a small number of factors are clearly inadequate if our goal is truly to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of reading. A clear implication from all these studies is that some specifically defined interpretation of phonological awareness carries causal significancein learning to read. Without some progress towards developing this awareness, children’s reading suffers. At the same time, the ability to read helps consolidate this knowledge and enhances children’s level of linguistic awareness. What aspect of phonological awareness is responsible for its important effect on learning to read? A reasonable answer to this question can be found in the work of Byrne and his colleagues (Byrne, 1991, 1992; Byrne & Fielding-Barnsley, 1989). They also took an interactive view of the relation between phonological awareness and learning to read, but interpreted their findings in terms of children’s understanding of what they call the “alphabetic principle.” This principle is the explicit understanding of the relation between sounds and letters. Phonological awareness of the sound segments of words alone is not sufficient for reading; it must be accompanied by knowledge of the alphabetic principle. Following the distinction between the levels of phonological awareness described above, the alphabetic principle presupposes phonetic awareness. The alphabetic principle is a cognitive achievement that goes beyond the more limited domain of phonological awareness. Such cognitive foundations of literacy are discussed in the next section.

IV. Cognitive Context Learning to read seems obviously to require learning the forms in which a text is represented. Thus, children learning to read English need to know the letters in the roman alphabet, children learning to read Russian must be familiar with the Cyrillic alphabet, and children learning to read Chinese must be able to recognize the characters (and the constituent graphs that make up the characters). Nevertheless, children who have learned the required forms are not necessarily yet able to read. Put simple, if children can identify the letter d and report that it says duh, and so on for o and g. they still may not report that d-o-g says dog. Written language is a representational system, and children must learn what

14

Ellen Bialystok

the written marks represent and how they represent that information. They must understand the general symbolic function by which written text represents language and the specific correspondences that underlie that representation in the language they are learning. In alphabetic languages, for example, they need to know both that the print signifies the text and that each of the letters represents a sound (more or less). Both of these insights into representation might be difficult for young children. First, preschool children have had little relevant experience with symbolic representation, and so the conventional correspondence between arbitrary written forms and meanings may be difficult to understand. Second, the phoneme as a meaningful unit has not served any importance in their language experiences so far and its central role in written language may be difficult to grasp. A. SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION IN CHILDHOOD

I . Symbolic Play and Symbolic Representation From an early age, children actively engage in symbolic play, letting common objects stand for other objects not present or available (Nicolich, 1977). A broom can be a horse, an empty box can be a house, and a pencil can be a racing car. Writing, although symbolic, is different from this symbolic play in two important respects. First, writing is based on a set of conventions that determines what the symbols are and what meaning is represented by each. Second, the symbols themselves give no indication as to what that meaning is. In symbolic play, children are free to choose the correspondence that meets their need. Moreover, the chosen symbol is connected in some nonarbitrary way to the referent it denotes. As Pellegrini (1985; Pellegrini & Galda, 1993) pointed out, in spite of a certain similarity in the processes involved in both symbolic play and literate behavior, symbolic play in itself has not been shown to facilitate literate behavior. This difference between the two illustrates a distinction offered by Goodman (1968) as part of a general theory of symbolic reference. Symbols that denote their referent through shared properties between the two exemplify the referent. Symbols that share no properties with their referent but are linked metaphorically express the referent. Exemplification requires that a shared property link the symbol with the intended referent. For this reason, symbols that refer through exemplification can be interpreted directly, through perception. The visual similarity in overall form creates a sense in which a broom can refer to a horse. Exemplification, therefore, is restricted by the need to preserve some formal similarity between the symbol and its referent. Expressive symbols, conversely, can be created so that any symbol is taken to refer to any concept. Words are the primary example of this kind of reference as the relation between the word we

Preparing

to

Read

15

use and the concept we intend is wholly arbitrary within a given language. There is no visual basis on which the properties of letters and words can convey meaning. Children’s early experiences with symbolic play are based on exemplification; learning about written language requires understanding expressive symbols. 2 . Expressive Symbols and the Arbitrariness of Referring Even the rather ordinary expressive relation that is the basis of oral language eludes children. Piaget (1929) demonstrated that young children attribute the names of things to the objects themselves. In the “sun-moon’’ problem, he asked children to comment on the consequences of switching the names for the sun and the moon. Until 6 or 7 years of age, children were unable to separate the linguistic from the celestial implications: If the names were switched, then night would be light and day would be dark. For oral uses of language, this misinterpretation can easily pass unnoticed. Children are never asked to change the names of things, and therefore the misinterpretation is of little consequence in their use of language. Furthermore, if they believe that a cat is called cat because it has whiskers and it meows, no counterevidence could challenge this claim (unless children also learn another language, in which case the arbitrary nature of the naming relation is learned earlier, see Bialystok, 1988). The failure to understand the expressive symbolic relation in written language is more serious, however. Children do need to understand how written words can refer, and the process of even beginning to read, at least beyond the recognition of some familiar and instantly identifiable words, depends crucially on this understanding. This difference in the way oral and written language refer to meanings is captured in part by a distinction made by Vygotsky (1978) between first-order and second-order symbolism. In first-order symbolism, meaning can be extracted directly from the forms. Pictures, models, and brooms masquerading as horses are examples of this kind of representation because visually accessible properties signify what the symbol is intended to refer to. In second-order symbolism, meaning is derived from a representation of a representation. Written language is a second-order symbol system because written letters stand for sounds; letters do not alone convey meanings. To be skilled in using this system, therefore, children must not only learn the forms, that is the written letters, but also learn how the forms represent language. 3 . Representation in Other Domains Language, of course, is not unique in being a representational system. Children like to draw, to sculpt, and to build-all representational activities. Do they have cognitive barriers that prevent them from seeing the relation between their

16

Ellen Bialystok

facsimile and its referent in these modalities as they seem to have for written language? How do children begin to understand the symbolic relation in other domains? DeLoache has investigated the development of children’s ability to understand how pictures (DeLoache, 1987), models (DeLoache, 1989), and to some extent maps (Marzolf 8z DeLoache, 1994) represent space. Models refer to space in a direct and transparent way: Points on the model signify points in the space. For Goodman (1968), this is exemplification par excellence; for Vygotsky (1978), it is first-order symbolism. Nonetheless, this research has shown that children less than about 3 years old are not able to use a model to decide where a toy is hidden in an identical but larger room. The problem children have is that they are unable to represent the model as a symbol that stands for, or signifies, something about the larger room. DeLoache and Marzolf (1992) claimed that part of the problem is that young children cannot assign two different representations to the model, one that treats it as an interesting toy, and the other that treats it as a symbol for the larger space. For this reason, presenting the spatial information in a picture is easier, because the picture is not itself an object, and children can solve the picture problem at about age 24. More detailed research on children’s understanding of maps has shown similar limitations in their ability to understand representation. Liben and Downs (1989, 1992) have shown that children under the age of about 6 years fail to see the markings on a map as symbolic representations. Rather, they consider such features as roads and landmarks drawn on a map to be iconic representations of objects that have the same visual properties. Yellow areas mean that cities are covered in eggs, and a drive along a red line would surely be on a red road. Another domain in which developments in children’s symbolic representation can be observed is drawing. Although drawing is largely iconic, to a certain extent it is also built out of a set of conventional forms, such as circles, squares, and triangles. Stiles (1989) reported evidence that a 2-year-old child was able to draw pictures using specific conventional forms before he was able to copy those forms in isolation. For example, the child could draw a sailboat built out of triangles at least 1 month before he could successfully copy a triangle in isolation. On a larger scale, Stiles, Tada, and Whipple (1990) showed that children were more successful in copying geometric forms if those forms were given meaningful labels. These children were able to produce forms as drawings, using first-order symbolism, but not as abstract representations. 4 . Concepts of Number The representational system with the greatest affinity to written language, however, is numbers. Letters and numbers have many correspondences for young children gaining entry to these symbol systems. In both cases, arbitrary symbols (letters, numbers) stand for abstract referents (sounds, quantities). The

Preparing ro Read

17

symbols must follow a conventional sequence (alphabet, counting) that is learned early in childhood. Moreover, these sequences are eventually used (usually in the first grade) as the basis of complex computations (reading, arithmetic). For these reasons, one might expect similarities in children’s acquisition of these systems. Research on children’s acquisition of number concepts in both the conceptual and written forms provides converging evidence with language studies regarding the nature of children’s limitations in symbolic representation. Specifically, children initially fail to treat the numbers as symbols that represent particular quantities. Cardinality is the idea that numbers have this symbolic function, and several studies have shown that children who know numbers and can count fail to recognize their cardinal meaning. Although some researchers have credited children with this knowledge by 3 years of age (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Sophian, 1988), other researchers, using more stringent criteria, have shown that older children continue to struggle (Baroody, 1992; Frydman & Bryant, 1988; Fuson, 1988; Marx & Kim, 1990; Wynn, 1990, 1992). Our own research has confirmed these more conservative views (Bialystok & Codd, 1996a). These examples show that understanding that representational systems can be used symbolically is a difficult achievement for preschool children. Representation, rather, is built up gradually out of symbolic activities in which a first-order or transparent relation between the symbol and its referent is used. B . WRITTEN LANGUAGE AS A SYMBOLIC SYSTEM

1 . Play with Writing Symbolic play becomes an important activity in which children between about 2 and 5 years of age explore what McLane and McNamee (1990) called the “tools of literacy” by applying the concept of pretence to writing (Jacob, 1984; Pellegrini, 1985). During these play activities, children frequently produce written forms that resemble writing (usually cursive writing) and assume that they have meaning and can be read by adults. These are the same scribbles that had previously been used as part of the forms for drawing but are now exercised as the forms of writing (McLane & McNamee, 1990). Moreover, Roskos (1991) pointed out that children modify the forms of writing they produce according to the situation they are pretending to engage in; banking, letter writing, doctor, and school play situations, for example, each elicited specific forms of scribbled writing. These symbolic play activities with writing differ in an important way from play activities in which objects stand in for other objects. Although children never actually believe that the broom is a horse, they appear to believe that their scribbles are actually writing and can be read by others (Fields, 1989; Hill, 1989; Klein, 1985, McLane & McNamee, 1990; Roskos, 1991; Sulzby, 1986). This apparently innocent illusion in fact reveals a profound misunderstanding. If

18

Ellen Bialystok

children know letters, and they know what the symbolic function of letters is in writing, then why would they believe that writing that does not contain letters could be read? We investigated this question by assessing what children know about the forms of written language at the time they are producing these meaningless scribbles (Bialystok, 1995). Prereaders who could name printed letters from flashcards were involved in a series of tasks. First, a game situation was created and provided the opportunity for the child to produce scribbles. The remaining tasks involved formal knowledge of letters and the difference between printed and cursive writing. All the children eagerly produced samples of scribbling in the game situations and insisted they could be read by adults. At the same time these children demonstrated fairly sophisticated knowledge of the forms and conventions of writing in the formal tasks. The point is that these children did not make a connection between the written forms about which they knew a great deal and the product of their scribbling in terms of the features that make the written outcomes meaningful. The forms of writing were not representational to these children because they carried no symbolic function. 2. Status of Written Forms Why do children have so much difficulty in seeing written letters as symbols? Written language is probably the first expressive symbolic relation that children encounter. Their previous experiences have been based on exemplification in which items have stood for other objects or concepts with which they shared properties. Different writing systems change the correspondence rules by which language is recorded in writing, such as sound to symbol (English), syllable to symbol (Korean), or morpheme to symbol (Chinese), but in all cases the symbolic relation is expressive. The ability to use symbols expressively is a cognitive advance. If children fail to interpret written language as symbolic, then what do they consider the relationship to be between the written forms they have learned and language? The most comprehensive research on this problem has been carried out by Ferreiro (1978, 1983, 1984). Through careful study using both formal questioning and informal observation, she investigated what preschool children who were learning to print believed about the way printed words indicated meanings. She identified several constraints that children apply to writing systems. Some of these constraints are arbitrary rules that children believe must be followed if writing is to be meaningful, such as their belief that any word must have at least three letters that are all different from each other or it cannot be a real word. Others are derived from attributing properties of the represented object to the written representation of the name for that object. Children believe, for example, that bigger things or a greater quantity of things need to be written with larger letters or more letters respectively. Other researchers have reported

Preparing to Read

19

similar findings. Levin and Tolchinsky-Landsmann (1989) extended Ferreiro’s ideas and showed that children also preserved such features as object size, shape, and color in their early writing. Similarly, Dyson (1984) reported that children are concerned with preserving the size relation between the intended object and the written word. Research of this type has revealed a developmental progression in the way in which children interpret written linguistic forms. Initially, letters are graphemes that have about the same status as drawings. Nonetheless, children can reliably distinguish between writing and drawing (Lavine, 1977; Vukelich & Golden, 1984) and even between writing and numbers (Tolchinsky-Landsmann & Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). These perceptual categories, however, do not indicate conceptual distinctions. The first advance in their understanding occurs when children consider written words to be substitute objects, that is, objects that are used to represent something else. This is the tentative beginning toward appreciating that letters have a representational function. In the absence of representation, letters are simply objects in the world like all other objects with a name of their own and do not stand for anything else.

3. Transition to Symbolic Representation If children understand that written language is symbolic, that the letters signify sounds, and that the reference between the written word and its meaning is based on this symbol-sound relation, then they will understand that the identity of a written word is determined solely and invariably by virtue of the letters that are written in it. A word can say only what its letters allow. If the relationship between the written word and the meaning were not symbolic but representational in some other way, for example, object correspondence, then the word might indeed take on different meanings or different identities depending on a variety of factors, such as how it is written, where it is positioned, and what the story happens to be about. Only a symbolic recording of language through its sounds (in the case of alphabetic scripts) will stubbornly lead to the single identity of each written word. One way of determining the extent to which writing serves a symbolic function for children is to examine the uses children are willing to assign to written language. If writing is symbolic, then it can be used as an aid to memory. Klein (1985) collected writing samples from children between 3 and 5 years of age and found that they knew a great deal about the forms of writing but did not understand how writing could be used to help future memory. Writing, he claimed, was not a symbolic representation for those children. Instead, the symbolic function developed over time in stages, through experience and instruction. The same limitation was demonstrated by Luria (1977) with 5-year-old children. They were asked to write down sentences that were told to them so that they could remember the sentences later. Some children began writing before

20

Ellen Bialystok

they even heard the sentence, revealing a complete misunderstanding of the relation between writing and what it represents. For these children, writing clearly served no symbolic function. Other children, however, showed the beginning of understanding the need for some symbolic relation to be preserved in writing. Although the marks they made were all very similar to each other, they used position and order cues to represent certain features of the sentences. Some children used longer squiggles to represent longer sentences and others used flowing lines to indicate aspects of rhythm. Although they have not realized the significance of the sound-symbol correspondence for an alphabetic system, they have at least understood that something about the spoken language needs to be preserved symbolically in the written text.

4 . Evidence for Symbolic Representation of Print We developed two tasks to assess the extent to which children who knew letters understood the connections that determined the meaning of a printed word (Bialystok, 1991). Children need to learn both the general and specific ways in which print represents language. The general representational function is that the word derives its meaning from its written form and so its meaning does not change after irrelevant changes in the position or appearance of the word. The specific representational function is that in alphabetic systems, that letters stand for sounds, so each sound in a word needs to be represented by a letter in its written form (ignoring dipthongs and silent letters). Children were screened for their ability to recite the alphabet, identify printed letters, and say what sound was made by each. Children who passed all these tests but could not read then participated in two tasks. The first, the Moving Word Problem, was a test of the general representational function. The children were shown two pictures, for example, a king and a goat, placed side by side on the table. A card was introduced containing the printed name of one of the pictures, for example, king. The children were told what the card said. The card was placed under the corresponding picture and the child was asked to tell the experimenter what the card said. All the children said “king.” Two stuffed toys were then introduced and were staged in a brief race around the table, “accidentally” kicking the card so that it was under the other picture. The experimenter asked the child for a second time what the card said, but this time two-thirds of the children said “goat.” The experimenter then remarked that things seem to have been messed up by the visiting toys and put the card back to its original position under the king. For the third time, the experimenter asked the child what the card said. Children were again unanimous that the card said “king.” Why did the children change their answer when the card was moved to the new picture? They very likely had not forgotten what the word was because they changed their answer back to “king” again for the third question. Rather, children seem not to understand that words say what they do because of the letters they

Preparing to Read

21

contain, not because of the context, the pictures they accompany, or the nature of the typeface. The second task, the Word Size Problem, was based on the specific correspondences that are used in alphabetic writing. Because sounds are represented by individual letters, words with more sounds, that is longer words, need more letters to write them. Although dipthongs and vowel combinations reduce the accuracy of the assertion, the generalization remains true. However, if children are attributing object properties to written words, then the size of the object should be more significant for the child than the length of the word in deciding how many letters are needed to write its name. The children were asked to match big objects and small objects with cards containing their printed names. In half the cases, the big object had the longer name and in the other half, the big object had the shorter name. The problem was easy when object size and word size corresponded, but extremely difficult when the values were conflicting. Children were unable to use the information in the letters to decide what was written on a card. What all these examples point to is that children up to at least 5 years of age do not understand the manner in which written language represents meanings. Their usual assumption is that written language represents meaning directly, through its visual features, and not through its correspondence to spoken language. Hence, the written symbols need to preserve the properties of the meanings, not the properties of the words. What would be required for children to begin to understand the form as a symbol? All children eventually do come to represent language in this way and, indeed, could not learn to read if they did not accept some aspects of this representational function of written language. But not all children learn to represent language in this way at the same rate or at the same time, and some experiences seem particularly useful in accelerating this insight. One of these is bilingualism and especially the exposure to biliteracy. 5 . Role of Bilingualism Understanding the symbolic function of written language is a metalinguistic and metacognitive insight. A large literature documents the specific aspects of language awareness that bilingualism seems to enhance (Ben Zeev, 1977; Bialystok, 1988; Cummins, 1987; Hakuta, 1986). Is the awareness of the symbolic function of written language one of these insights that is promoted by bilingualism? We repeated the study described above by giving both the Moving Word Problem and the Word Size Problem to bilingual children (Bialystok, 1996) One group was Chinese-English bilingual and had experience with both written Chinese characters and written English. The other group was French-English bilingual. This group had also been read stories in both French and English, but

22

Ellen Bialystok

because they are both written in the same alphabet, they knew only one writing system. In all other respects, these bilingual children were similar to each other and to the monolingual children who participated in the original study. Both groups of bilingual children performed better than the monolingual children in the Moving Word Task. However, only the Chinese-English bilingual children performed significantly better than the others in the Word Size Task. The bilingual experience conferred an advantage to all the bilingual children in understanding the general symbolic relation between writing and meanings. However, only the bilingual children who had experience with a different writing system had also adduced the more detailed principles that govern the nature of that symbolic correspondence. The fact that the Chinese-English bilinguals knew two different representational systems gave them a clearer understanding of representation. They had significantly more advanced knowledge of the way in which English is represented in written text than did English monolingual children or even French-English bilingual children. The study with bilingual children points to some of the experiences that help children achieve this insight about representation. All the children in the studies had comparable formal knowledge of the constituents of the writing system and considerable experience with stories and writing. However, the bilingual children had made more progress toward understanding how these forms carry out their functions. The children in these groups certainly had different linguistic experiences and hence different linguistic contexts. However, the insight about symbolic representation came earlier to the bilingual children and was an important cognitive development.

V. The Acquisition of Literacy The foregoing review of the social, cognitive, and linguistic contexts of preschool children has revealed many factors that conspire to bring the prereading child into literacy. For Shakespeare to have been correct in his attribution of literacy to the natural path of development, we would need to assure that childhood includes a large number of specific experiences, some of them highly specialized. This notion of a sort of biological birthright to literacy in the sense alluded to by Shakespeare is, I believe, categorically false. Children are brought to literacy by culture and by experience, and the quality of that experience is undoubtedly one of the preeminent factors in determining how smoothly and efficiently that path will lead to literacy. We know a great deal about the kinds of home experiences that help children along this path. Two remaining issues, then, are how one can monitor and predict children’s path to literacy in order to ease their way and how instruction contributes to the journey.

Preparing

10 Read

23

A . ASSESSING THE READINESS TO READ

I . Reading Recovery How do the concepts of print relate to children’s readiness to learn how to read? One successful attempt to identify children at risk of reading failure and then to provide effective intervention is the Reading Recovery program developed by Clay (1979, 1985). Children are identified in first grade (hence it is not strictly a measure of readiness to read) on the basis of a battery of tasks that include many of the formal measures described earlier in this chapter, such as letter knowledge and sound awareness. These diagnostics become the basis for a remedial program of storybook reading in a supportive context with an individual teacher. One interpretation of why the program works is that it provides the child the proper scaffolding to progress into the “zone of proximal development” that Vygotsky (1978) proposed was the most effective basis of teaching (Clay & Cazden , 1990). For the present purpose, however, the important point is that children who fail the diagnostic tasks are in fact at risk. At least part of the conditions for reading lies in the child’s knowledge of the forms and functions of print. In fact, more focus on this part of the program might increase its effectiveness. Iversen and Tunmer (1993) showed that the addition of explicit instruction in phonological awareness to the program significantly shortened the length of time required for children to reach the program goals. Furthermore, in a path analysis examining the contribution of the various program components to word reading at the end of the year, only phonological recoding was significant. 2 . What Factors Predict Reading? Some researchers have used longitudinal designs to develop regression models as a means of investigating the relationship between concepts of print and reading (Day & Day, 1981; Kontos, 1988). They included assessments of such concepts of print as knowledge of purposes and functions of print, soundsymbol correspondences, reading conventions, and terminology. Children were followed over the period from kindergarten through grade 1, from approximately 5 to 7 years of age, and their early scores were used to predict their level of reading at the end of the study. Not surprisingly, a large correspondence was found between performance in kindergarten on the various specific tests of language and reading and their level of reading later. Most of these studies do not provide a means of more closely examining the relative ability of each of these measures to describe the prereading skills of children across particular age groups. Although all these things may be ultimately responsible for reading, each may or may not provide meaningful assessment of children’s concepts of literacy at a particular point in time.

24

Ellen Bialysrok

The methods for assessing the readiness concepts need to be considered as well. Spector (1992) showed that a dynamic assessment of phonemic awareness improved the predictability of phonemic awareness for reading progress in kindergarten children. The dynamic assessment provided the child with a supportive context and a series of prompts to aid in answering the questions. As in Clay’s (1979) program, a context that draws on the kind of interactive principles promoted by Vygotsky (1978) plays an important role in early literacy. The point is that assessment of reading readiness should provide the same opportunity for the child to profit from this context. Even having established the advantages of interactive testing, there remain many candidates for the formal prerequisites for children to learn to read. The concepts that have been described in this chapter are generally broad conceptual notions that can be operationalized and measured in a variety of ways. The research tends to show that everything can be found to contribute in some measure to children’s readiness to read. But clearly, not all these skills are equally significant in determining the point at which children are prepared to pick up their first book and begin reading independently. A hierarchy of various skills needs to be identified in order to understand the difference between those that are simply helpful and those that are truly necessary for reading.

3. Comparing Standardized Tests and Experimental Measures The relative importance of various measures of children’s preliteracy concepts for learning to read was addressed in a study in our laboratory (Bialystok & Cddd, 1996b). We used a cross-sectional design to compare the effectiveness of standardized reading readiness tests and our two tasks, the Moving Word Problem and the Word Size Problem, for their assessments of children’s abilities at different points in their progress in reading. (A longitudinal design would have been preferable but was not feasible). A reasonable test of reading readiness would be one in which 6-year-old readers perform nearly perfectly, 4-year-old prereaders find it difficult, and 5-year-old prereaders lie somewhere in between. If the oldest children, who are already reading, struggle with the measure of reading readiness, then clearly the assessment is too conservative to predict reading readiness. Conversely, if 4-year-olds are classified by the results as ready to begin reading, then the measures are too liberal. The major distribution of scores should be among the 5-year-old prereaders, because clearly some portion of these children are indeed ready to learn to read. The results showed this pattern of difficulty for our two symbolic representation tasks. The cognitive skills assessed by these tasks were consistent with the age-related development expected for prereading children. The standardized tests of reading readiness, however, did not conform to this pattern. One of them, the Metropolitan Reading Readiness Test (Nurss & McGauvin, 1986), was solved correctly by most of the

Preparing to Read

25

4-year-olds, and the other, the Linguistic Awareness Reading Readiness Test (Downing, Ayers, & Schaeffer, 1984), remained difficult even for the 6-yearolds . A far more comprehensive study was conducted by Lomax and McGee (1987) to test a development model of factors that predict reading. Their study included children from 3 to 6 years of age who were tested on 18 different measures of reading readiness that represented five categories, or components. Using structural modeling to determine the relationships among components and their interrelatedness, they found that a complex model including all five components provided a better fit to the data than did simpler models using fewer components. The five components were concepts about print, graphic awareness, phonemic awareness, grapheme-phoneme correspondence knowledge, and word reading. Mason (1990) used factor analysis to address a similar question. She tested a three-component model of reading proficiency-knowledge of the functions and purposes of literacy, technical features and conventions of written language, and processing written language. Each of these components included four or five logical functions. For example, the purposes of literacy included recognition of written language and awareness of purposes for writing; technical features included awareness of letter forms and directionality; and processing included awareness of variation in letter patterns and orthographic knowledge. Again, the best assessments for children’s readiness to read came from the most inclusive interpretations of these preconditions. Learning to read draws on a number of different abilities, and these are developing by the time children are 3 years old. The foundations of literacy include a broadly based set of skills and knowledge about reading whose inception long precedes the time that children will pick up their first storybook and begin to read. B . IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTRUCTION

How does an understanding of the foundations of literacy contribute to the debate over teaching methods? The instructional options for teaching reading hinge primarily on the linguistic context. In this sense, the resolution to the problem of the relationship between phonological awareness and reading has far greater consequence than simply academic edification. Clearly, if phonological awareness is a prerequisite to reading, then trying to teach children to read will be futile without first assuring that these skills are somehow in place. Conversely, if phonological awareness is a clear consequence of reading, then this skill will take care of itself once children have become literate. Results from studies comparing instructional methods have generally shown two things. First, children tend to learn what they are taught, so posttests that resemble the concepts directly trained during instruction are handled better than they are by children in groups receiving the instruction in a different way. This

26

Ellen Bialysiok

principle was illustrated in a study by Perfetti, Beck, Bell, and Hughes (1987). First-grade children, about 6 years old, were given different instructional methods and were later tested on a number of phonological awareness tasks. The only group to reach criterion levels of performance was the one that had received direct phonics instruction. In another study, Hohn and Ehri (1983) found that children could be trained to segment words into phonemes by giving them markers that contained the individual letters. Children who received blank markers to represent the sounds, or no training at all, did not learn the segmentation task. Second, explicit training in phonics has the most generalizability beyond the instructional set to new reading problems. Ball and Blachman (1991) divided a group of kindergarten children into three groups. One group received training in phonemic awareness and letter-sound correspondences, the second received training in letter-sound correspondences only, and the third received no special training. Consistent with the first point, posttest results showed that the children could demonstrate the skills they had been taught. However, only the phonemic awareness group was able to match written symbols to the sound segments of a word. Further evidence for this point was reported by Alegria, Pignot, and Morais (1982). They showed that children who received reading instruction using a phonics approach were able to invert a sequence of two sounds and say what it would be backwards. Children receiving whole-word instruction for the same period of time could not manipulate these sounds. Both groups, however, were equally capable of inverting two syllables and saying them back in reversed order. This preliteracy training in phonemic awareness is preparing these children in an important way for learning to read. A point that seems abundantly clear is that explicit attention to the phonological structure of words that are written in an alphabetic script is an essential part of effective reading instruction. The old distinctions that polarize “whole word” and “phonics” instruction misrepresent the complexity of reading. Reading instruction must include the development of children’s phonological sensitivities. This point was made forcefully and with impressive empirical support by Vellutino (1991) in the introduction to a set of studies that had been conducted independently but concurred with this conclusion and Adams (1990) in her comprehensive review of the literature of children’s development of literacy. However, the most passionate spokesperson for this view has undoubtedly been Liberman (e.g., Liberman & Liberman, 1990; Liberman & Shankweiler, 1991). Leaving no room for ambiguity, Liberman and Shankweiler (1991) said the current vogue for the so-called . . . “whole language,” “psycholinguisticguessing game,” or “language experience‘‘ approaches are [sic] likely to be disastrous. Children taught this way are likely to join the ranks of the millions of functional illiterates in our country who stumble along, guessing at the printed message from their little store of memorized words, unable to decipher a new word they have never seen before. (p. 14)

Preparing

to

Read

21

VI. Summary and Conclusions The importance of strong literacy skills for children in schools today is probably more decisive in their futures than it was at any earlier time. Anderson (1993) explained how success in learning to read has traditionally been a means by which children from disadvantaged environments could break the “cycle of ignorance and poverty” (p. 17). As society increases its requirements for specialization and technological expertise, the demands on high levels of literacy as a guarantee that an individual will not be left behind as a disenfranchised member of society may well extend to all children irrespective of their social position. Understanding how children develop literacy skills, then, has impact beyond educational research and planning and into social and political policy. The literature I have reviewed in this chapter deals with the skills and experiences children have before they begin to read that contribute to the success of that endeavor. The assumption is that some relevant aspects of these early experiences account for achievement in reading. It is, of course, just an assumption that prereading experiences are decisive in the acquisition of literacy. After all, children encounter a variety of linguistic environments that vary in ways that seem relevant, yet all children make reasonably similar progress in learning to speak and rarely fail to achieve this skill altogether. Uniform success is not the case with learning to read, and so descriptions of the variation in prereading experiences is a reasonable place to seek an explanation. Three areas were examined for their role in preparing children for learning to read. In the first, social context, the research showed that children’s early experiences with books provide them with important concepts about the mechanics of reading. The print that appears around them in familiar signs and lettering does not seem to help them figure out reading, but it probably does make them more comfortable with reading and more aware of the nature of reading, for example, in understanding what kinds of things can be read. The second, linguistic context, converged on the unique importance of children’s ability to isolate the sounds of language if they are to learn to read an alphabetic script. Although there is some controversy about the exact nature of the relationship between these phonological skills and reading, there is virtually no debate about their significance. The third, cognitive context, focussed mainly on children’s understanding of the nature of the relationship between print and language. The cognitive advance children need to make before they are able to read is to accept the written forms as symbols that indicate the sounds of language. Finally, some of the implications that these skills have for instruction in reading were discussed. The foundations of literacy lie in the broad range of conditions and skills that can be found in children in the preschool years. Some children have a more supportive home and family context, with more exposure to the uses and joys of reading, and this scaffolding provides them the basis for wanting to become part of the literate culture around them. Some children have more highly developed

28

Ellen Bialysrok

verbal abilities and can hear the small differences in the sounds that change words or create innuendos, and this skill serves them well in preparing their conceptions of speech for the written code. Some children have a more abstract concept of representation and can accept arbitrary squiggles as all that are left of the cat once it is committed to the page, and these children have an easier time focusing on the text to extract its hidden meanings. But all children have the capacity to learn these ideas and, more astonishingly, to learn most of them before their seventh birthday. They do so by their nature. And in this, at least, Shakespeare seems to have gotten it right. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Preparation of this manuscript was supported by Grant A2559 from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Council of Canada (NSERC). I am grateful to Judith Codd and Shilpi Majumder for their assistance during the writing of the chapter.

REFERENCES Adams, M. J. (1990). Beginning lo read: Thinking and learning about print. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Alegria, J., Pignot, E., & Morais, J. (1982). Phonetic analysis of speech and memory codes in beginning readers. Memory and Cognition, 10, 451-456. Anderson, R. C. (1993). The future of reading research. In A. P. Sweet & J. I. Anderson (Eds.), Reading research inro rhe year 2aK) (pp. 17-36). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Ball, E. W., & Blachman, B. A. (1991). Does phoneme awareness training in kindergarten make a difference in early word recognition and developmental spelling? Reading Research Quarterly, 26, 49-66. Baroody, A. J. (1992). The development of preschoolers’ counting skills and principles. In J. Bideaud, C. Meljac, & J.-P. Fischer (Eds.), Pathways to number: Children’s developing numerical abiliries (pp. 99- 126). London: Wiley. Bentin, S., Hammer, R., & Cahan, S. (1991). The effects of aging and first grade schooling on the development of phonological awareness. Psychological Science, 2, 271-274. Ben-Zeev, S. (1977). The influence of bilingualism on cognitive strategy and cognitive development. Child Development, 48, 1009-1018. Bialystok, E. (1988). Levels of bilingualism and levels of linguistic awareness. Developmenral psycho log^ 24, 560-567. Bialystok, E. (1991). Letters, sounds, and symbols: Changes in children’s understanding of written language. Applied Psycholinguisrics. 12, 75-89. Bialystok, E. (1993). Metalinguistic awareness: The development of children’s representations of language. In C. Pratt & A. F. Carton (Eds.), Sysrems of represenration in children: Development and use. London: Wiley & Sons. Bialystok, E. (1995). Making concepts of print symbolic: Understanding how writing represents language. First Language, 15, 317-338. Bialystok, E. (1996). The effects of bilingualism and biliteracy on children’s emerging concepts of print, Developmental Psychology, (in press).

Preparing to Read

29

Bialystok, E., & Codd, J. (1996a). Cardinal limits: Evidence from language awareness and bilingualism for developing concepts of number. Unpublished manuscript, York University, Toronto, Canada. Bialystok, E., & Codd, J. (1996b). Evaluating concepts of written language for reading readiness. Unpublished manuscript, York University. Bowey, J. A. (1986). Syntactic awareness and verbal performance from preschool to fifth grade. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 15. 285-308. Bowey, J. A. (1994). Grammatical awareness and learning to read: A critique. In E. M. H. Assink n and social context (pp. 122-149). London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf. Brady, S . A., & Shankweiler, D. P. (Eds.). (1991). Phonological processes in literacy: A tribute to Isubhlle K Liberman. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Bradley, L., & Bryant, P. E. (1983). Categorizing sounds and learning to read-a causal connection. Nature, 301, 419-421. Bruce, D. J. (1964). The analysis of word sounds by young children. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 34, 158-170. Bryant, P. E., MacLean, M., Bradley, L. L., & Crossland, J. (1990). Rhyme and alliteration, phoneme detection, and learning to read. Developmental Psychology, 26. 429-438. Bus, A. G., & Van IJzendoorn, M. H. (1988). Mother-child interactions attachment and emergent literacy: A cross-sectional study. Child Development, 59, 1262- 1272. Byrne, B. (1991). Experimental analysis of the child’s discovery of the alphabetic principle. In L. Rieben & C. A. Perfetti (Eds.), Learning to read: Basic research and its implications (pp. 7584). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Byrne, B. (1992). Studies in the acquisition proced ale, hypotheses, and data. In P. B. Gough, L. C. Ehri, & R. Trieman (Fkis (pp. 1-34). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Byrne, B., & Fielding-Barnsley, R. (1989). Phonemic awareness and letter knowledge in the child’s acquisition of the alphabetic principle. Journal of Educarional Psychology. 81, 313-321. Chall, 1. S. (1967). Learning to read: The great debate. New York: McGraw-Hill. Clay, M. M. (1979). Reading: The patterning of complex behavior. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. (3rd ed.). Portsmouth, NH: Clay, M. M. (1985). The early detection of reading di’culries Heinemann. Clay, M.M. & Cazden, C. B. (1990). A Vygotskian interpretation of Reading Recovery. In L. C. Moll (Ed.), Vygotsky and education: Instructional implications and applications of sociohistorical psychology (pp. 206-222). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crain-Thoreson, C., & Dale, P. S. (1992). Do early talkers become early readers? Linguistic precocity, preschool language, and emergent literacy. Developmental Psychology, 28, 42 1-429. Cummins, J. (1987).Bilingualism, language proficiency, and metalinguistic awareness. In P. Homel, M. Palij, & D. Aaronson (Eds.), Child bilingualism: Aspects of linguistic, cognitive. and social development (pp. 57-74). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Day, K. C., & Day, H. D. (1981). The development of orthographic linguistic awareness in kindergarten children and the relationship of this awareness to later reading achievement. Reading Psychology, 2 , 76-87. DeLoache, 1. S. (1987). Rapid change in the symbolic functioning of very young children. Science, 238, 1556-1557. DeLoache, 1. S. (1989). Young children’s understanding of the correspondence between a scale model and a larger space. Cognitive Development, 4 , 121-129. DeLoache, J. S., & Marzolf, D. P. (1992). When a picture is not worth a thousand words: Young children’s understanding of pictures and models. Cognitive Development, 7 , 3 17-329. Dickinson, D. K., & Tabors, P. 0. (1991). Early literacy: Linkages between home, school and literacy achievement at age five. Journal of Research in Childhood Education. 6 , 30-46.

30

Ellen Bialystok

Donaldson, M. (1978). Children’s minds. Glasglow: Fontana. Downing, J. (1979). Reading and reasoning. New York: Springer-Verlag. Downing, J., Ayers, D., Schaeffer, B. (1984). The linguistic awareness in reading readiness test. Slough, UK: NFERUNelson. Dyson, A. H. (1984). “N spell my Grandmama”: Fostering early thinking about print. The Reading Teacher, 38, 262-27 I . Egan, K. (1987). Literacy and the oral foundations of education. Harvard Educational Review, 57. 445-472. Ehri, L. (1979). Linguistic insight: Threshold of reading acquisition. In T. G. Waller & G. E. MacKinnon (Eds.), Reading research: Advances in theory andpractice (pp. 63- I 11). New York: Academic Press. Ellis, N. (1990). Reading, phonological skills and short-term memory: Interactive tributaries of development. Journal of Research in Reading, 13, 107-122. Faber, A. (1992). Phonemic segmentation as epiphenomenon: Evidence from the history of alphabetic writing. In P. Downing, S. D. Lima, & M. Noonan (Eds.), The linguistics of literacy (pp. 11 1134). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Ferreiro, E. (1978). What is written in a written sentence? A developmental answer. Journal of Education, 160, 25-39. Ferreiro, E. (1983). The development of literacy: A complex psychological problem. In F. Coulmas & K. Ehlich (Eds.), Writing in Focus (pp. 277-290). Berlin: Mouton. Fields, M. V. (1989). Literacy begins at birth. ’kcson, AZ: Fisher Books. Fox, B., & Routh, D. K. (1975). Analysing spoken language into words, syllables, and phonemes: A developmental study. Journul of Psycholinguistic Research, 4 , 331-341. & Bryant, P. (1988). Sharing and understanding of number equivalence by young Frydman, 0.. children. Cognitive Development, 3, 323-339. Fuson, K. C. (1988). Children’s counting and concepts of number. New York: Springer-Verlag. Garton, A,, & Pratt, C. (1989). Learning to be literate: The development of spoken and written language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Gattuso, B., Smith, L. B., & Treiman, R. (1991). Classifying by dimensions and reading: A comparison of the auditory and visual modalities. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 51, 139-169. Gelb, 1. J. (1963). A study of writing (3rd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gelman, R., & Gallistel, C. R. (1978). The child‘s understanding of number. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gleitman, L. R., & Rozin, P. (1977). The structure and acquisition of reading. I: Relations between orthographies and the structure of language. In A. S. Reber & D. L. Scarborough (Eds.), Towards a psychology of reading (pp. 1-53). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Goodman, N. (1968). Languages of art: An approach to a theory of symbols. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Menill. Goswami, U. (1990). Phonological priming and orthographic analogies in reading. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 49, 323-340. Goswami, U., & Bryant, P. E. (1990). Phonological skills and learning to read. London: Erlbaum. Goswami, U., & Bryant, P. E. (1992). Rhyme, analogy, and children’s reading. In P. B. Gough, L. C. Ehri, & R. Trieman, (Eds.), Reading acquisition (pp. 49-63). Hillsdale, N1: Erlbaum. Gough, P. B., Ehri, L. C., & Trieman, R. (Eds.). (1992). Reading acquisition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Hakuta, K. (1986). Mirror of language: The debate on bilingualism. New York: Basic Books. Harste, J. C., Burke, C. L., & Woodward, V. A. (1982). Children’s language and world: Initial encounters with print. In J. Langer & M. Smith-Burke (Eds.), Bridging the gap: Reader meets author (pp. 105-13 I). Newark, DE: International Reading Association.

Preparing to Read

31

Heath, S . B. (1982). What no bedtime story means: Narrative skills at home and school. Language in Society8 11. 49-78. Heath, S. B. (1983). Ways with words: Language, life, and work in communities and classrooms. New York:Cambridge University Press. Hill, M. W. (1989). Home: Where reading and writing begin. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. Hohn, W. E., & Ehri, L. C. (1983). Do alphabet letters help prereaders acquire phonemic segmentation skill? Journal of Educational Psychology, 75, 752-762. Huey, E. B. ('w'n/~96n). The psychology and pedagogy of reading. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Irwin, 0. C. (1960). Infant speech: Effect of systematic reading of stories. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research. 3, 187-190. Iversen, S.. & Tunmer, W. E. (1993). Phonological processing skills and the Reading Recovery Program. Journal of Educational Psychology, 85, 112- 126. Jacob, E. (1984). Learning literacy through play: Puerto Rican kindergarten children. In H. Goelman, A. Oberg, & F. Smith, (Eds.), Awakening to literacy (pp. 73-83). Exeter, NH: Heinemann. Kirtley, C., Bryant, P., MacLean, M . , & Bradley, L. (1989). Rhyme, rime, and the onset of reading. Journal of Experimenial Psychology, 48, 224-245. Klein, M. L. (1985). The development of wriiing in children: Pre-K through grade 8. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Kontos, S. (1988). Development and interrelationships of reading knowledge and skills during kindergarten and first grade. Reading Research and Instruction, 27, 13-28. Lavine, L. D. (1977). Differentiation of letterlike forms in prereading children. Developmental PSyChOIOgy, 13, 89-94. Leong, C. K. (1991). From phonemic awareness to phonological processing to language access in children developing reading proficiency. In D. J. Sawyer & B. J. Fox (Eds.), Phonological awareness in reading: The evolution of current perspectives (pp. 2 17-254). New York: SpringerVerlag. Levin, I . , & Tolchinsky-Landsmann, L. (1989). Becoming literate: Referential and phonetic strategies in early reading and writing. International Journal of Behavioural Development, 12, 369384. Liben, L. S., & Downs, R. M. (1989). Understanding maps as symbols: The development of map concepts in children. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child developmeni and behavior (vol. 22, pp. 145-201). San Diego: Academic Press. Liben, L. S., & Downs, R. M. (1992). Developing an understanding of graphic representations in children and adults: The case of CEO-graphics. Cognitive Development, 7 , 33 1-349. Liberman, I . Y., & Liberman, A. M. (1990). Whole language vs. code emphasis: Underlying assumptions and their implications for reading instruction. Annals of Dyslexia, 40, 5 1-76. Liberman, I . Y.. & Shankweiler, D. (1987). Phonology and the problems of learning to read and write. In H. L. Swanson (Ed.), Advances in learning and behavioral disabilities: Memory and learning disabiliiies (pp. 203-224). London: JAI Press. Liberman, 1. Y., & Shankweiler, D. (1991). Phonology and beginning reading: A tutorial. In L. Rieben & C. A. Perfetti (Eds.), Learning io read: Basic research and its implications (pp. 317). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Liberman, I. Y., Shankweiler, D. P., Fischer, W. F., & Carter, B. (1974). Explicit syllable and phoneme segmentation in the young child. Journal of Experimenial Child Psychology, 18, 201212. Liberman, 1. Y., Shankweiler, D. P.,Liberman, A. M., Fowler, C., & Fisher, F. W. (1977). The structure and acquisition of reading: 11. The reading process and the acquisition of the alphabetic principle. In A. S. Reber & D. L. Scarborough (Eds.), Towardapsychology of reading (pp. 207225). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

32

Ellen Bialystok

Lomax, R. G., & McGee, L. M. (1987). Young children’s concepts about print and reading: Toward a model of word reading acquisition. Reading Research Quarterly, 22, 237-256. Luria, A. R. (1977). The development of writing in the child. Soviet Psychology, 16. 65-113. Mackay, D. G. (1972). The structure of words and syllables: Evidence from errors in speech. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 210-227. Mann, V. A. (1984). Longitudinal prediction and prevention of early reading difficulty. Annals of Dyslexia, 34, 117-136. Mann, V. A. (1986). Phonological awareness: The role of reading experience. Cognition, 24,65-92. Marx, M. M., & Kim, Y. C. (1990). Discovery of basic ordinality and cardinality by preschoolers. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Sociew, 28, 461-463. Manolf, D. P., & DeLoache, J. S . (1994). Transfer in young children’s understanding of spatial representations. Child Development, 65, 1- 15. Mason, J. (1980). When do children begin to read: An exploration of four-year-old children’s letter and word reading competencies. Reading Research Quarterly, 15, 203-227. Mason, J. (1990). The development of concepts about written language in the first three years of school. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 60, 266-283. Mason, J. (1992). Reading stories to preliterate children: A proposed connection to reading. In P. B. Gough, L. C. Ehri, & R. Trieman, (Eds.), Reading acqu on (pp. 215-241). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Masonheimer, P. E., Drum, P. A., & Ehri, L. C. (1984). Does environmental print identification lead children into word reading? Journal of Reading Behavior, 16, 257-271. Mattingly, I. G. (1972). Reading, the linguistic process, and linguistic awareness. In J. E. Kavanaugh & I. G. Mattingly (Eds.), Language by ear and by eye (pp. 133-147). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. McLane, J. B., & McNamee, G. D. (1990). Early literacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press. Morais, J. (1987). Phonetic awareness and reading acqu on. Psychological Research, 49, 147152.

Morais, J., Alegria, J., & Content, A. (1987). The relationships between segmental analysis and alphabetic literacy: An interactive view. Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive. 7 , 415-438. Morais, J., Bertelson, P., Cary, L.,& Alegria, J. (1986). Literacy training and speech segmentation. Cognition, 24, 45-64. Morais, J., Cary, L., Alegria, J., & Bertelson, P. (1979). Does awareness of speech as a sequence of phones arise spontaneously? Cognition, 7 , 323-331. Nicolich, L. (1977). Beyond sensorimotor intelligence: Assessment of symbolic maturity through analysis of pretend play. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 23, 89-99. Nurss, J. R., & McGauvin, M. E. (1986). The Metropolitan Reading Test. San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation. Pellegrini, A. D. (1985). The relations between symbolic play and literate behavior: A review and critique of the empirical literature. Review of Educational Research, 55, 107-121. Pellegrini, A. D., & Galda, L. (1990). Children’s play, language, and early literacy. Topics in Language Disorders, 10, 76-88. Pellegrini, A. D., & Galda, L. (1993). Ten years after: A reexamination of symbolic play and literacy research. Reading Research Quarterly, 28, 163-175. Perfetti, C. A., Beck, I., Bell, L. C., & Hughes, C. (1987). Phonemic knowledge and learning to read are reciprocal: A longitudinal study of first-grade children. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 33, 283-3 19.

Perfetti, C. A., & Zhang, S. (1991). Phonological processes in reading Chinese characters. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 17, 633-643. Piaget, J. (1929). The child‘s conception of the world. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Preparing to Read

33

Purcell-Gates, V. (1988). Three levels of understanding about written language acquired by young children prior to formal instruction. In J. Niles & R. Lalik (Eds.), Solving problems in literacy: Learners. teachers. and researchers (pp. 259-265). Rochester, NY: National Reading Conference. Read, C., Yun-Fei, 2.. Hong-Yin, N., & Bao-Qing, D. (1986). The ability to manipulate speech sounds depends on knowing alphabetic spelling. Cognition, 24, 31-44. Rieben, L., & Perfetti, C. A. (Eds.). (1991). Learning to read: Basic research and its implications. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Roskos, K. (1991). An inventory of literary behavior in the pretend play episodes of eight preschoolers. Reading Research and Instruction. 3, 385-398. Rozin, P., & Gleitman, L. R. (1977). The structure and acqu on of reading: 11. The reading process and the acquisition of the alphabetic principle. In A. S. Reber & D. L. Scarborough (Eds.), Toward a psychology of reading (pp. 55-141). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Ryan, E. B. (1980). Metalinguistic development and reading. In L. H.Waterhouse, K. M. Fischer. & E. B. Ryan (Eds.), Language awareness and reading (pp. 38-59). Newark, DE: International Reading Association. Ryan, E. B., & Ledger, G. W. (1984). Learning to attend to sentence structure: Links between metalinguistic development and reading. In J. Downing & R. Valtin (Eds.), Language awareness and learning to read (pp. 149-171). New York: Springer-Verlag. Scribner, S., & Cole, M. (1981). The psychology of literacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Siegel, L. S., & Ryan, E. G. (1988). Development of grammatical-sensitivity, phonological, and short-term memory skills in normally achieving and learning disabled children Developmental Psychology, 24, 28-37. Snow, C. E. (1983). Literacy and language: Relationships during the preschool years. Harvard Educational Review, 53. 165-189. Snow, C. E., & Goldfield, B. A. (1983). Turn the page please: Situation-specific language acquisition. Journal of Child Language, 10, 551-569. Snow, C. E., & Ninio, A. (1986). The contracts of literacy: What children learn from learning to read books. In W. H. Teale & E. Sulzby (Eds.), Emergent literacy: Wrifing and reading (pp. 116138). Nonvood, NJ: Ablex. Sophian, C. (1988). Early development in children's understanding of number: Inferences about numerosity and one-to-one correspondence. Child Development. 59. 1397- 1414. Spector, J. E. (1992). Predicting progress in beginning reading: Dynamic assessment of phonemic awareness. Journal of Educational Psychology, 84, 353-363. Stanovich, K. E. (1993). Does reading make you smarter? Literacy and the development of verbal intelligence. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior, (Vol. 24, pp. 133-180). San Diego: Academic Press. Stanovich, K. E., & Cunningham, A. E. (1992). Studying the consequences of literacy within a literate society: The cognitive correlates of print exposure. Memory and Cognition, 20, 51-68. Stanovich, K. E., Cunningham, A., & Cramer, B. (1984). Assessing phonological awareness in kindergarten children: Issues of task comparability. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 38. 175-190. Stiles, J. (1989). The use and development of graphic formulas in the early preschool period: Two longitudinal case study reports. Unpublished manuscript, University of California at San Diego. Stiles, I., Tada, W., & Whipple, T. (1990). Facilitative effects of labeling on preschool children's copying of simple geometric forms. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 70, 663-672. Stuart, M., & Coltheart, M. (1988). Does reading develop in a sequence of stages? Cognition, 30, 139- 18I . Studdert-Kennedy, M. (1987). The phoneme as a perceptuomotor structure. In A. Allport, D.Mack-

34

Ellen Bialystok

ay, W. Prinz, & E. Schreerer (Eds.), Language perception andproduction (pp. 67-84). London: Academic Press. Sulzby, E. (1986). Writing and reading: Signs of oral and written language organization in the young child. In W. H. Teale & E. Sulzby (Eds.), Emergent literacy: Writing and reading (pp. 50-89). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Teale, W. H. (1986). Home background and young children’s literacy development. In W. H. Teale & E. Sulzby (Eds.), Emergent literacy: Writing and reading (pp. 173-206). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Tolchinsky-Landsmann, L. & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Children’s understanding of notations as domains of knowledge versus referential-communicative tools. Cognitive Development, 7 , 287300.

Treiman, R. (1985). Onsets and rimes as units of spoken English: Evidence from children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 39, 161-181. Trieman, R. (1991). The role of intrasyllabic units in learning to read. In L. Rieben & C. A. Perfetti (Eds.), Learning to read: Basic research and its implications (pp. 149-160) Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Treiman, R., & Weatherston, S. (1992). Effects of linguistic structure on children’s ability to isolate initial consonants. Journal of Educational Psychology, 84, 171-181. ’lbnmer, W. E., & Bowey, J. A. (1984). Metalinguistic awareness and reading acquisition. In W. E. Tunmer, C. Pratt, & M. L. Hemman (Eds.), Mefalinguistic awareness in children (pp. 144- 168). New York: Springer-Verlag. Tunmer, W. E., Hemman, M. L., & Nesdale, A. R. (1988). Metalinguistic abilities and beginning reading. Reading Research Quarterly, 23, 134-158. Vellutino, F. R. (1991). Introduction to three studies on reading acquisition: Convergent findings on theoretical foundations of code-oriented and whole-language approaches to reading instruction. Journal of Educational Psychology, 83, 437-443. Vukelich, C., & Golden, J. (1984). Early writing: Development and teaching strategies. Young Children, 39, 3-8. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in sociery: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wagner, R. K., & Torgesen, J. K. (1987). The nature of phonological processing and its causal role in the acquisition of reading skills. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 192-212. Wagner, R. K., Torgesen, J. K., Laughon, P.,Simmons, K., & Rashotte, C. A. (1993). Development of young readers’ phonological processing abilities. Journal of Educational Psychology, 85, 83-103.

Watson, R., & Shapiro, J. (1988). Discourse from home to school. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 37, 395-409. Wells, G . (1985). Language development in the pre-school years: Vol. 2. Language at home and at school. London: Cambridge University Press. Wimmer, H., Landed, K., Linortner, R., & Hummer, P. (1991). The relationship of phonemic awareness to reading acquisition: More consequence than precondition but still important. Cognition,40, 219-249. Wise, B. W., Olson, R. K., & Treiman, R. (1990). Subsyllabic units in computerized reading instruction: Onset-rime vs. postvowel segmentation. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 49, 1-19. Wynn, K. (1990). Children’s understanding of counting. Cognition, 36, 155-193. Wynn, K. (1992). Children’s acqu on of the number words and the counting system. Cognitive Psychology, 24, 220-251. Yopp, H. K. (1988). The validity and reliability of phonemic awareness tasks. Reading Research Quarterly, 23, 159-177.

THE ROLE OF SCHEMATA IN CHILDREN’S MEMORY

Denise Davidson DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60626

1. INTRODUCTION 1 I . THE ROLE OF SCHEMATA IN CHILDREN’S EVERYDAY MEMORY

A. GENERAL EVENT REPRESENTATIONS AND MEMORY B. DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES RAISED BY GENERAL EVENT REPRESENTATION THEORY C . THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL EVENT REPRESENTATIONS AND CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR NATURALISTIC EVENTS D. CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR SCHEMATIC DEVIATIONS: THE NOVEL EVENT E. CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR DOCTOR VISITS 111. THE ROLE OF SCHEMATA IN CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR NARRATIVES A. CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR SCRIPT-BASED STORIES

B . CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR ATYPICAL ACTIONS IN NARRATIVE C. LIMITATIONS OF NARRATIVE STUDIES D. THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENTAL STUDIES ON LIFE SPAN RESEARCH IV. THE ROLE OF SCHEMATA IN CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR OTHERS A. CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR MALES AND FEMALES: THE IMPACT OF GENDER SCHEMATA B. CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR ELDERLY INDIVIDUALS: THE IMPACT OF AGE SCHEMATA V. THE ROLE OF SCHEMATA IN CHILDREN’S MEMORY: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? REFERENCES

I. Introduction Numerous studies have been conducted on the role of schemata in children’s memory (e.g., Bauer & Mandler, 1992; Davidson & Hoe, 1993; Fivush, 1984; Hudson, 1988; Martin, 1991; Nelson, 1986). Broadly defined, schemata are 35 ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVEUIPMENT AND BEHAVIOR. VOL. 26

Copyright 0 1996 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reprcduction in any form reserved.

36

Denise Davidson

knowledge structures that consist of temporally and spatially organized sets of expectations about what things will look like and the order in which events will proceed (Hudson & Nelson, 1983). Initially, researchers questioned whether such structures existed for children, particularly children younger than age 7 or so. However, numerous studies have shown that at least some of children’s knowledge is organized as schemata for familiar events, objects, people, and places (e.g., Bauer & Mandler, 1992; Fivush, 1984; Mandler, 1979; Martin, 1991; Nelson, 1986; Nelson, Fivush, Hudson, & Lucariello, 1983). Subsequently, given the often reconstructive nature of memory, the inevitable question has become, How much do schemata influence what children remember? Several kinds of research have been conducted in an attempt to answer this question, including but not limited to, the role of schemata in children’s everyday memory (section 11), children’s use of schemata to understand and remember narratives (section 111), and children’s use of schemata in processing and recalling information about other people (section IV). The purpose of this chapter is to highlight and review some of the findings in these areas. Prior to a discussion of these findings, a few definitions are in order. First, the term schemata refers to generic knowledge structures that can be divided into subcategories that guide different domains (Adams & Worden, 1986). For example, a script (section 111) is a specific type of schema that consists of a sequence of frequently enacted and conventional activities (e.g., a script for what typically happens in a restaurant). In contrast, stereotypes (section IV) represent specific types of schemata for particular groups of individuals.

11. The Role of Schemata in Children’s Everyday Memory As in many domains of psychology, a desire to go beyond the laboratory setting has motivated researchers to examine what children naturally remember. Children’s memory for real-world events has emerged as an important area of developmental research for two reasons. First, there is widespread concern that laboratory studies may underestimate young children’s true memory abilities, and second, researchers need to know whether children can accurately recall real-world events, such as child abuse, that may have legal ramifications (Hudson, 1990). A. GENERAL EVENT REPRESENTATIONS AND

MEMORY

Examination of children’s real-world memory has clearly revealed that familiarity with an event, or more specifically, a child’s schema for an event, has a powerful influence on what children will actually remember about the event. For

Children’s Memory

31

example, at least a handful of studies have shown that as children continue to experience an event, the amount of general information reported often increases, whereas the amount of specific details reported decreases (Hudson, 1990; Hudson & Nelson, 1983; Myles-Worsley, Cromer, & Dodd, 1986). Nelson (1986) has argued that with repeated experience, children extract enough information about the event to form a general event representation. In turn, these general event representations can influence what children subsequently remember about future encounters with the event, both in terms of the encoding and storage of the event and in terms of the retrieval of the event. According to general event representation theory, routine episodes that do not deviate substantially from the expected sequence of events are not stored separately as an individual autobiographical memory, but instead become absorbed by the general event representation (Hudson, 1986). This phenomenon would explain why many of the details of our lives, such as what we had for lunch last Tuesday, or from a young child’s perspective, what happened at preschool last week, are often difficult to recall. Indeed, Hudson (1986) found that when young children were asked to report what happened during a routine event such as snack time, they often said, “Nothing” or “Nothing happened. We just had snack. That’s all.” (p. 108). As Hudson (1986) noted, these responses provide evidence that even young children’s general event representations can absorb memory for details of particular episodes, provided those episodes are relatively routine. B. DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES RAISED BY GENERAL EVENT REPRESENTATION THEORY

Several important developmental issues are raised by general event representation theory. First, how can one know whether children form general event representations and, from a developmental point of view, when can one expect them to be a part of children’s knowledge? Second, how do one’s schemata, or general event representations for everyday events, affect what children will recall about deviations or novel episodes of an event? Both of these questions have been addressed in numerous developmental studies (e.g., Fivush, Hudson, & Nelson, 1984; Hudson & Fivush, 1991; Hudson & Nelson, 1986; McCabe & Peterson, 1991 ; Nelson & Gruendal, 1981; Sheingold & Tenney, 1982). C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL EVENT REPRESENTATIONS AND CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR NATURALISTIC EVENTS

In answer to the first question, initial studies revealed that children as young as 3 years of age have spatially and temporally organized knowledge (schemata) about events with which they are familiar. When asked to report about activities such as going to the grocery store, baking cookies, or what happens at a birthday

38

Denise Davidson

party, even 3-year-olds structured their narratives using the general pronoun and the timeless present tense, “You do X,” and reported actions in their correct temporal sequences (Nelson et al., 1983; Nelson & Gruendal, 1981). Indeed, Fivush (1984) found that young children formed a schema very quickly for what happens during the school day, as kindergarten children were found to have general and well-organized reports about what happens even on the second day of school. In addition, Fivush found that with increasing experience children reported more acts and conditional statement, suggesting that their general event representation became more elaborate and more temporally complex over time. In contrast, children had more difficulty in recalling specific episodes of the day before, providing evidence that these routine events were being assimilated by their general event representation (Fivush, 1984). Other studies have shown that even younger children form schemata or general event representations of everyday events. Using a novel procedure that does not depend on verbal reports-the elicited imitation task-Bauer and her colleagues have shown that children as young as 12 months of age form general event representations for repeated, multistep events (Bauer & Mandler, 1989; Bauer & Shore, 1987). During the elicited imitation task, the experimenter uses props to model an action or sequence of actions. The props are then given to the child, who is encouraged to imitate (Bauer, 1993; Bauer & Mandler, 1989, 1992; Meltzoff, 1988). The elicited imitation task capitalizes on young children’s tendency to imitate, and therefore little or no verbal instruction is necessary (Bauer, 1993). Depending on when children are given the props, children’s subsequent imitation of target actions can be used as a measure of immediate or delayed recall. Using the elicited imitation task, Bauer and her colleagues have documented a number of results that are important to developmental psychology (e.g., Bauer, 1993; Bauer & Mandler, 1989, 1992; Bauer & Shore, 1987). Immediate recall of multistep sequences has been found in children as young as 11 months of age (Bauer & Mandler, 1992), as well as delayed recall (up to 6 weeks) of multistep sequences by children 16-24 months old. In addition, Bauer and Mandler (1989) found that 1- and 2-year-olds remembered both the individual components of a test sequence (such as brushing one’s teeth) and the temporal order of the components (you apply toothpaste to the toothbrush before you brush your teeth). Young children also had better memory for more familiar schematic-type sequence of events than less familiar events. Finally, as will be discussed in section IV.A, the elicited imitation task has also been used by Bauer (1993) to assess how well 24- to 26-month-old children remember consistent and inconsistent gender-based, sequenced activities. Another important aspect of Bauer’s results, and the findings of other developmental studies on children’s general event representations, is the general lack of developmental differences. Most developmental differences found reflect differ-

Children’s Memory

39

ences ir. :he amount of information younger and older children recall, and not differences in the type of information recalled (Hudson & Nelson, 1986). Thus, in contrast to initial expectations, little evidence has been found that children’s memories are more schema-bound when their schemata are first developing (Hudson, 1986). For example, in a study of 3-, 5 ,and 7-year-olds’ memory for everyday events, Hudson and Nelson (1986) found no evidence that younger children’s recall is more schematic than older children’s recall. In addition, both younger and older children’s memory can be distorted by their schematic knowledge (Hudson & Nelson, 1984; Myles-Worsley et al., 1986). Schematic knowledge can also lead to confusions in memory. For example, Myles-Worsley et al. (1986) found that with increased school experience, grade school children confused current school memories with past preschool memories. However, the results of several studies suggest that children’s memory for novel events, or events that deviate from their schematic knowledge, may actually be well recalled. D. CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR SCHEMATIC DEVIATIONS: THE NOVEL EVENT

Schemata for real-world events also affect how younger and older children (and adults) remember deviations from schematic knowledge. In order to examine these effects, several developmental studies have examined children’s memory for a novel event (e.g., Fivush et al., 1984; Hamond & Fivush, 1991; Hudson, 1990; Hudson & Fivush, 1991; Jones, Swift, & Johnson, 1988). One of the first of these studies was conducted by Fivush et al. (1984), who examined kindergarten children’s memory for an unusual variation of a familiar event: a class trip to an archaeology exhibit at the Jewish museum in New York City. The children had often visited museums, so presumably they had a museum schema, but their experiences at the Jewish museum included activities very different from the activities that routinely occur at a museum. For example, at the Jewish Museum the children participated in hands-on types of experiences such as digging for “artifacts.” Fivush et al. (1984) found that children recalled specific details about this trip 6 weeks and 1 year after their visit, suggesting that this unusual occurrence of a familiar event was not incorporated into a general museum script. In addition, Hudson and Fivush (1991) assessed some of these children’s memory for this event 6 years later, and found no decrease in the accuracy in their memory for the event. Although their longitudinal results were quite clear-cut, some limitations may exist in their methodology and subsequent interpretations. Although the event took place in a museum setting, no evidence was presented to indicate that the children thought of this event as a “museum” experience. If they did not, they would not have assimilated it to their museum script. In addition, this museum

40

Denise Davidson

experience may have had certain features that made it more interesting than the usual museum experience. That is, anecdotal evidence suggests that children will often not remember details of their first trip to a museum, even if that experience has occurred only once and therefore is novel. However, children’s experience at the Jewish Museum also involved activities very different from what often happens at museums (e.g., digging for “artifacts”). The issue is whether children would have recalled the events to the same extent if the activities at the museum were not so hands-on. For example, Jones et al. (1988) found that preschool children’s memory was better for activities in a novel setting-a tum-of-thecentury playhouse-than for objects they encountered in the playhouse. Finally, photographs used as cues in the experiments, and repeated questioning about the novel events, could have affected the children’s memory of the trip, particularly after the long delay. Nevertheless novel event studies have shown that young children’s memory may be more accurate than previously estimated. Novel event studies also provide clues as to how repeated exposure to an event enables children to develop a schema for the event. For example, Jones et al. noted that better memory for activities than for objects should not be reduced to a simple “active-passive distinction” (p. 645), because children had physical contact with the objects. Instead, they suggest that knowing and remembering what the self or others have done in an event in turn become the necessary elements in the formation of a schema for the event. It should be noted that children’s quite good recall of naturalistic events have been found not only when the event is pleasant (Fivush et al., 1984; Hamond & Fivush, 1991; Hudson, 1990; Jones et al., 1988), but also when the events are more neutral, such as well-child visits to the doctor (Baker-Ward, Gordon, Omstein, Lams, & Clubb, 1993; Clubb, Nida, Merritt, & Omstein, 1993), and even quite negative, such as invasive medical procedures (Goodman, Hirschman, Hepps, & Rudy, 1987; Merritt, Omstein, & Spicker, 1994). E. CHILDREN’SMEMORY FOR DOCTOR VISITS

In a series of studies, Omstein and his colleagues (e.g., Omstein, Gordon, & Baker-Ward, 1992) have examined children’s memory for visits to the doctor. Such visits provide researchers with an opportunity to examine children’s memory for a naturally occurring, salient event in their lives. Because not all aspects of the visit are pleasant, it also provides researchers with the opportunity to assess children’s memory under naturally occurring conditions of stress. The accuracy of children’s memory can then be assessed by asking the attending nurses and physicians to fill out checklists indicating which particular features were included in the examination. The studies on children’s memory for doctor visits and medical procedures

Children’s Memory

41

have shown that children’s memory for these events is not simply the result of children’s reporting their scripts for visiting the doctor (Baker-Ward et al., 1993; Clubb et al., 1993). For example, Baker-Ward et al. (1993) found virtually no intrusions in children’s responses to open-ended questions about a particular visit to the doctor. According to Baker-Ward et al., if children had been relying on their scripts, they would have reported acts that were absent from their individual examination but a part of their script knowledge. Perhaps more compelling, children accurately denied those events that they did not experience in a particular visit, but which were typical of pediatric exams. On the surface, these results provide some problems for general event representation theory. At the very least, they suggest that routine episodes are not absorbed by one’s general event representation to the extent that details about a specific episode are completely inaccessible. Nevertheless, although children’s memory reports about visits to the doctor did not reflect a simple relaying of script information, children’s prior knowledge did affect their memory for the events. In the Baker-Ward et al. (1993) study, prior knowledge presumably aided children’s quite accurate denial of incongruous questions (e.g., “Did the doctor cut your hair?’) about their visit to the doctor. In addition, children more readily recalled standard features than novel features about the event in response to open-ended questions. It may be that prior knowledge and schemata for events affect the encoding and storing of the events, and not just the reconstructive process that might occur at the time of recall (Clubb et al., 1993). Thus, the results of naturalistic studies (for both pleasant and less pleasant events) suggest that schemata influence a range of cognitive activities, from encoding and storing of information to the retrieval processes that may occur at retrieval. The results of these naturalistic studies suggest that even young children’s memory can be quite good for personally experienced events, particularly those that might deviate from one’s schema. The results of more laboratory-type experiments (i.e., with stories and other types of narrative materials) provide further evidence that deviations from schemata are well recalled by even young children (Davidson & Hoe, 1993; Davidson & Jergovic, 1996; Hudson, 1988). In fact, although “laboratory” experiments may underestimate children’s memory for schema-based events, these same experimentsprovide evidence that children can recall deviations from their schemata quite well.

111. The Role of Schemata in Children’s Memory for Narratives Numerous studies have addressed the influence of schemata on adults’ memory for narrative information (e.g., Bower, Gordon, & Black, 1979; Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Davidson, 1994a; Maki, 1990; Smith & Graesser, 1981).

42

Denise Davidson

These studies have subsequently influenced how we examine children’s memory for similar types of information. For example, quite a few studies have dealt with how adults remember schematic information embedded in stories, as well as information that deviates from schematic knowledge (e.g., Ahn, Brewer, & Mooney, 1992; Bower et al., 1979; Davidson, 1994a; Graesser, Woll, Kowalaski, & Smith, 1980; Smith & Graesser, 1981). Many of these studies, for instance, examined how adults recognize and recall typical (i.e., script) and atypical actions from script-based stories. In turn, the results have yielded a better understanding of how schematic knowledge affects adults’ retention of both schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent information. A. CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR SCRIPT-BASED STORIES

Perhaps taking a cue from research with adults, several researchers have examined how well children remember similar types of typical and atypical actions from script-based stories (e.g., Adams & Worden, 1986; Davidson & Hoe, 1993; Davidson & Jergovic, 1996; Hudson, 1988). These developmental studies have not only provided further evidence that schemata play a role in childrenTs memory, but also provided some insights into how well deviations from schemata are remembered. In turn, these developmental studies have influenced research with adults (Davidson, 1994a). In an initial study, Adams and Worden (1986) had preschool (Cyear-olds) and first-grade (7-year-olds) children remember script-based stories. These scriptbased stories consisted of an underlying scripted event, such as going to a grocery store, and actions specific to the scripted event. Adams and Worden found that typical actions were less well recognized than atypical actions, because children often confused stated script actions with script actions that were not in the story but were, in all likelihood, part of children’s underlying script knowledge. That is, 4-year-old and 7-year-old children were equally poor at discriminating items rated typical of the script. According to Adams and Worden, these results provide evidence that children not only possess script knowledge, but use, at least on some basic level, script knowledge in understanding and retrieving text. B . CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR ATYPICAL ACTIONS IN NARRATIVE

Young children’s memory for actions that disrupted the script have been examined in addition to children’s memory for scripted actions (Davidson & Jergovic, 1996; Hudson, 1988). For example, in Hudson’s (1988) study, a “grocery store” story was presented that contained scripted actions such as getting a shopping cart and going up and down the store aisles, as well as actions that

Children’s Memory

43

disrupted the script, such as a character dropping a carton of eggs. In addition, atypical actions that did not disrupt the script, and were essentially irrelevant to the script, were also presented (e.g., “John tied his shoe.”). Both recognition and recall were assessed. Hudson (1988) analyzed hit and false-alarm rates in recognition and found that children had a difficult time discriminating between script actions that were in the stories and script actions that were rated equally typical but were not in the stories. This finding not only corroborates those of Adams and Worden (1986), but also provides further evidence that children’s script knowledge influences what children will remember. The high false-alarm rate for script actions also provided evidence that schemata sometimes lead to inaccuracies in children’s memory. However, little difference was found in the recognition of disruptive and irrelevant atypical actions, perhaps because both were distinctive enough that they could be readily recognized. In contrast to the recognition data, the recall data indicated that disruptive atypical actions were remembered better than all other actions. According to Hudson ( 1988), disruptive actions may be well recalled because disruptions often set up situations or problems that must be remedied in order for the events of the story to proceed. As shown by the results of text comprehension studies, actions that have more causal connections with other actions are perceived as more important, and are better remembered, than actions with fewer connections (e.g., Trabasso & Sperry, 1985; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985). In contrast, irrelevant actions may not only have fewer connections, but may in fact be “dead-end” statements with few if any connections (Davidson, 1994a). Script-disruptive actions may also be perceived as more important than scriptirrelevant actions because stones containing disruptions may conform more closely to the expectations of what constitutes a good story. That is, these disruptions often provide a point, or a goal, to the story, and often make the story more interesting. Indeed, previous research has shown that even young children use the presence of goals and goal-directed actions in judging the goodness of stories (Stein & Policastro, 1984), as well as their knowledge of goal-directed actions in story comprehension and story production (Goldman & Varnhagen, 1985; Stein & Trabasso, 1982). In essence, even children may have a general story schema about what constitutes a good story (Mandler, 1978). C. LIMITATIONS OF NARRATIVE STUDIES

Hudson’s (1988) finding of a disruption effect replicated a similar effect found with adult research participants by Bower et al. (1979). However, several potential limitations in these previous studies have been noted by Davidson and her colleagues (Davidson, 1994a; Davidson & Hoe, 1993; Davidson & Jergovic, 1996). One potential limitation is that memory for disruptive actions was compared to memory for irrelevant actions that were relatively pallid and routine.

44

Denise Davidson

Perhaps more descriptive or vivid irrelevant actions would be better recalled, and perhaps as well recalled as disruptive actions. In fact, Bower et al. constructed their irrelevant actions to be pallid and routine, because they believed that more descriptive and vivid irrelevant actions would more readily lead to a von Restorff (or isolation) effect and consequently be better recalled. Briefly, the von Restorff effect refers to the phenomenon where isolating an item against a homogeneous background facilitates the learning and retention of the isolated item (Hunt, 1995; Robinson-Riegler & McDaniel, 1994; Wallace, 1965). In script-based stories, typical actions may form a homogeneous background whereby atypical actions may stand out from the script actions, particularly if they are vivid in some way. Indeed, the von Restorff effect may explain part of the findings of Davidson and Hoe (1993). As shown in Table I, irrelevant actions were better recalled than script actions (no disruptive actions were used), provided that the irrelevant actions were implausible in their subject-verb or object-verb relations (e.g., “At the movies, a cat was eating pickles.”). According to Davidson and Hoe, implausible (irrelevant) actions were better recalled than more plausible actions, because the implausible actions may have stood out more, and were consequently better attended to and processed, than the plausible actions. As Davidson and Hoe noted, this advantage for implausible actions has also been found with adults in studies of the bizarre-imagery effect (e.g., Hirshman, Whelley, & Palu, 1989; Wollen & Cox, 1981). However, Davidson and Hoe’s findings were inconclusive because memory was examined for only script and script-irrelevant actions. In addition, the plausible irrelevant actions were relatively pallid. The issue is whether, for example, within the context of going to the movies, an irrelevant action that was rather mundane (e.g., “They saw a boy from school.”) would be better recalled if it was presented in a more vivid form (e.g., “They saw a boy from school whom they both liked a lot.”). Furthermore, would the disruption effect persist when these more vivid irrelevant actions were included in the stories? These issues were addressed by Davidson and Jergovic (1996). As shown in Table 11, their initial experiment revealed that irrelevant actions were better recalled when they were presented in a vivid form than a pallid form. Perhaps more importantly, vivid irrelevant actions were sometimes as well recalled as disruptive actions. As shown in Table 11, vivid irrelevant actions were as well recalled as disruptive obstacles but were not as well recalled as disruptive distractions. In this study, distractions were actions that led to unexpected mishaps or interruptions in the episode (e.g., “Their dad tripped and his popcorn flew everywhere.”), and obstacles blocked or impeded the flow of the episode in some way (e.g., “Some people blocked their view and they could not see very well.”). In Experiment 2, Davidson and Jergovic studied factors that may have accounted for the memory difference, such as typicality ratings and the number of

45

Children’s Memory

TABLE I Mean Recall for Script (Qpical) and Script-Irrelevant (Atypical) Actions in Immediate and Delayed Conditionso Q p e of actionb Immediate

Delayed

s

P

PWS

1

s

P

4-year-olds

.28

.52

.58

.77

.I9

.37

.48

.67

6-year-olds

.3 1

.57

.66

.85

.26

.44

.5 I

.76

Age

I

PWS

GFrorn Davidson and Hoe, 1993, Table 2, p. 114. Used by permission. *S, script; P. plausible script-irrelevant; PWS, plysible within the sentence script-irrelevant; 1. implausible

script-irrelevant story actions.

potential consequences children could generate from the disruptions, and altered the wording of the original distractions so that they were less compelling. For example, the distraction, “Their father tripped and spilled his popcorn all over” was changed to “Their father tripped and one piece of popcorn fell from his box.” The wording for the obstacles was the same as in Experiment 1. The rationale was that the disruption effect may reflect not the type of disruption, but the potential results of the disruption (e.g., the number of consequences and the emotional quality of the consequences). The children generated fewer potential consequences for the new distractions than for the original ones, and as shown in Table 11, they did not recall the new distractions differently from the obstacles. These findings suggest that the important variable is not the type of disruption (i.e., obstacle or distraction) that leads to the disruption effect, but the importance children assign to the disruptions and their potential consequences. However, the number of potential consequences TABLE I1 Mean Delayed Recall of Spical and Atypical Actions in Experiments 1 and P Script-irrelevant Age

Script-disruption

script

Pallid

Vivid

Obstacles

Distractions

Experiment I 6-year-olds 8-year-olds

.49 .47

.09 .I I

.35 .43

.23 .38

.64 .64

Experiment 2 6-year-olds 8-year-olds

.40 .43

.18

.35 .43

.45 .50

.50

.28

.Adapted from Davidson and Jergovic, 1996. Used by permission.

.55

46

Denise Davidson

the children generated for the actions was confounded with the number of emotional consequences they generated for the actions. For example, spilling an entire box of popcorn was seen by the children not only as resulting in more potential consequences than spilling one piece of popcorn, but also as resulting in more consequences of an emotional nature (e.g., “He would be really mad if he spilled his entire box.” “He’d have to go back for more and wait in a long line again and that would make him upset.”). D. THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENTAL STUDIES ON LIFE SPAN RESEARCH

I . Research with Young Adults The results of these developmental studies have also influenced memory work with adult subjects. For instance, assessing long-term free recall of schematic information is much more difficult in child research than in research with adults. Although the scope of this chapter can not encompass adult studies, one noteworthy finding is that the disruption effect occurs in young adults at delays even up to 1 week (Davidson, 1994a). Another noteworthy finding reported by Davidson (1994a) is that disruptive actions that are not explicitly resolved in the story text are better recalled than other types of actions, provided that during the course of reading the story, the reader has to draw some type of inferences about resolutions of the disruptions (i.e., story events following a disruption suggested that it was resolved in some specific way). Specifically, in an initial experiment, uncorrected disruptions were better recalled than corrected disruptions, particularly at delays of 2 days and 1 week (see Figure 1). Although the corrected and uncorrected disruptive actions shared many similar properties (e.g., typicality ratings, vividness ratings, length of sentence), one difference between the corrected disruptions and the other disruptions was that the former were explicitly corrected in the story (e.g., “They started the wrong movie but then they got it right.”). Therefore, in a second experiment, the disruptions were not explicitly corrected in the story (e.g.. “They started the wrong movie.”), although the reader would have had to assume some resolution took place because of future story events (e.g., “They watched the movie.”). As shown in Figure 2, these new uncorrected disruptions were now as well recalled as the other disruptions. In both experiments, the disruption effect was found at all retention intervals, 1 hour, 48 hours, and 1 week after the presentation of the stories. These results with adult subjects are consistent with research indicating that recall is facilitated by not only the number of causal connections, but also by the type of connection (Myers, Shinjo, & Duffy, 1987). That is, sentence pairs with the strongest causal relations do not necessarily produce the best memory; rather, recall seems to be better for moderately related sentence pairs than highly related

Children's Memory

10

1

47

1000

100

Hours (Log)

+ Script

-E-

Pallid

*-Vivid

-0- Obstacle

--A--Distraction

-B-Error ~

Fig. I . Adults' mean recall of script and each type of atypical action used in Davidsc men1 I . (Adapted .from Davidson. 1994a, Figure 1 , p. 766. Used by permission.)

Experi-

sentence pairs. According to Myers et al. (1987), participants will more readily generate an elaboration, or causal bridge inference, between moderately related pairs than highly related pairs, and this extra elaboration aids recall. This elaboration hypothesis may explain, in part, the memory advantage found for disruptive actions used in our developmental and adult studies, given that the disruptions had to be resolved by the reader in order for the event to fit in with the remaining content of the story. 2 . Research with Older Adults Research on children's memory for script-based narrative has also influenced research with considerably older adults. In one study, Davidson (1994b) found evidence for a disruption effect in the recall of the elderly participants (mean age 75). However, in contrast to the results obtained with young adult subjects, a significantly smaller difference was found between elderly subjects' recall of

48

Denise Davidson

1

0.8

-a '0

% d

0.6

C

0 .t:

8 0.4

e

a 0.2 48

168

0 1

10

100

1000

Hours (Log)

-+

Script

-8- Vivid

Distraction

.-QO-.

-0-Obstacle

Error

Fig. 2 . Adults' mean recall of script and each type of atypical action used in Davidson's Experiment 2 . (Adapted from Davidson, 1994a. Figure 2 , p . 769. Used by permission.)

disruptive actions and script actions, suggesting that elderly subjects may rely more on their script knowledge in recalling a text. This suggestion is consistent with Hess's (1990) proposal that adults may increase their reliance on readily available knowledge structures as basic cognitive skills become less efficient with age (see also Pascual-Leone, 1984). We are currently conducting additional studies with elderly subjects to get a better understanding of the role schemata play in memory across the life span.

IV. The Role of Schemata in Children's Memory for Others Children's schematic knowledge can take many forms, from their knowledge of everyday life to their more specific understanding of script-based events (such

Children’s Memory

49

as going to the grocery store or eating at a restaurant). Children’s schematic knowledge can also take the form of stereotypes about other people. Indeed, previous studies have shown that even young children form stereotypes on the basis of gender, race, and age, and unfortunately, these stereotypes are often negative (e.g., Biernat, 1991; Bryant & Zillmann, 1986; Fagot, Leinbach, & O’Boyle, 1992; Huston, 1985). Of interest to memory researchers is how children’s stereotypes affect their memory for specific individuals. A . CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR MALES AND FEMALES: THE IMPACT OF GENDER SCHEMATA

Most researchers who have studied the influence of children’s stereotypes on their memories have done so by examining children’s memory for information that is consistent or inconsistent with gender stereotypes (e.g., Bauer, 1993; Carter & Levy, 1988; Koblinsky & Cruse, 1981; Koblinsky, Cruse, & Sugawara, 1978; Martin & Halverson, 1983; Nesdale & McLaughlin, 1987). For example, Koblinsky and Cruse (198 1) found that children were more likely to remember information that was consistent, rather than inconsistent with gender-role stereotypes, although inconsistent information was better recalled if a description of an individual was presented that was counter to the stereotype. That is, when stories about boys and girls were preceded by descriptions suggesting that traditional gender-role stereotypes were inappropriate, children’s retention of gender-role inconsistent information was actually greater than their retention of gender-role consistent information. A number of studies have also shown that children will often distort genderinconsistent information so that it is consistent with stereotypes (e.g., Carter & Levy, 1988; Martin & Halverson, 1983; Signorella & Liben, 1984). These distortions can occur in at least two points in time: as information is received and processed, and as it is recalled (Martin, 1991; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). As Martin (1991) noted, most research has focused on distortions in recall, but several studies have also shown that distortions can occur as children encode information (Martin & Halverson, 1983; Signorella & Liben, 1984). For example, in one study children were asked to describe pictures they were looking at. In doing so, they often described the pictures so that they matched stereotypes; for example, they described a picture of a male secretary as a typewriter repairman (Signorella & Liben, 1984). Memory for schema-inconsistent information has also been assessed in very young children (Bauer, 1993). Using the elicited imitation task, Bauer (1993) examined 25-month-old girls’ and boys’ immediate and delayed recall of sequences depicting female-stereotyped, male-stereotyped, and gender-neutral activities. The girls showed equivalent levels of recall of all three sequences, but the boys showed better recall of male-stereotyped sequences than female-stereotyped sequences (but not better recall of gender-neutral sequences). These results

50

Denise Davidson

indicate the use of gender schemata by boys by at least 25 months of age, and provide no evidence of the use of gender schemata by girls at this age. This pattern is consistent with research showing that boys demonstrate same-sexstereotyped toy preferences somewhat earlier than girls (Fagot, Leinbach, & Hagan, 1986). However, all sequences were demonstrated by a female experimenter, which might have influenced how the children responded. B. CHILDREN’S MEMORY FOR ELDERLY INDIVIDUALS: THE IMPACT OF AGE SCHEMATA

Although most research on children’s memory and stereotypes has dealt with memory for gender or racial stereotypes, some researchers have examined how children’s stereotypes about the elderly affect their recall of elderly individuals (Davidson, Cameron, & Jergovic, 1995). The premise for the latter research was based on the findings of numerous studies showing that children of all ages, and from many backgrounds, have negative concepts about the elderly (e.g., Carstensen, Mason, & Caldwell, 1982; Jantz, Seefeldt, Galpher, & Serlock, 1977; Krause & Chapin, 1988; Mitchell, Wilson, Revicki, & Parker, 1985). Indeed, children as young as 3 years of age display negative stereotypes about the elderly (Jantz et al., 1977). Thus, two issues were of interest in our research: (a) If children have a common set of expectancies or stereotype for a particular group of individuals (e.g., the elderly), do these expectancies influence how new information about an individual from this group is organized and retained in memory? (b) How is memory for new information about a person affected by whether the information is congruent or incongruent with prior information or prior schematic knowledge? In order to address these questions, we asked first-, third-, and fifth-grade children to recall positive or negative information about individuals labeled elderly and individuals not labeled at all (Davidson et al., 1995). We found that children recalled more negative than positive description information about individuals, regardless of the age of the character, the length of the delay (immediate or 24 hours later), and the age of the subjects. However, recall of additional statements differed depending on the age of the character. In this study, children were read either an all-positive or all-negative description of an individual, designed so that they could form some initial impression about the person. These positive and negative descriptions were essentially the same for the elderly and nonelderly characters, although in the latter case, all references to the age of the character were removed. Following this initial description, the children were told four additional statements, two positive and two negative. Of interest was how statements that were incongruent with the descriptions, and children’s impressions, would be recalled. When the character was labeled as elderly, more negative than positive state-

51

Children’s Memory

ments were recalled regardless of the valence of the description (see Table 111). When the age of the character was not specified, the first graders exhibited the same pattern of recall, but the third and fifth graders recalled more statements with the same valence as the description. These findings can be interpreted to indicate that (a) all the children had a negative schema of the elderly and responded on the basis of this schema regardless of the description of the character; and (b) the older children had no schema of characters with indefinite age and responded on the basis of the descriptions, that is, initial impressions. Children’s negative stereotypes about the elderly also led to distortions of the input information. Specifically, positive input information about the elderly (e.g., the person was healthy), was sometimes recalled in its negative form (the person was sick). Although this kind of distortion was more common in the delayed condition than in the immediate condition, some of the youngest children (first-grade children) showed these distortions on the immediate recall test. These results are consistent with studies on children’s gender stereotypes, which have shown similar types of stereotype-consistent distortions. However, our findings suggest that stereotypes in general, and not just gender stereotypes, influence and sometimes distort what information children remember about others. In our laboratory, the role of children’s age schemata on memory for individuals is also being examined in relationship to a “positivity bias.” Previous research has shown that children younger than 8 or 9 years of age sometimes display a positivity bias toward others; for example, Rholes and Ruble (1984) found that young children have a tendency to attribute positive or socially desirable behaviors to others, regardless of what behaviors they had previously observed and

TABLE 111 Mean Delayed Recall of Negative and Positive Statements following a Negative or Positive Description of Elderly and Nonelderly Characters” Description Age

Negative

Positive

Negative

Positive

Age condition (elderly label) 6-year-olds .28 8-year-olds .38 10-year-olds .40

.I5 .20 .25

.30 .40 .40

.I8 .20 .23

N o age condition (no age label) 6-year-olds .28 8-year-olds .28 10-year-old5 .30

.09 .I6 .23

.38 .32 .28

.28

~~

~

‘,Adapted from Davidson. Cameron. and Jergovic. 1995. Table 2. p. 82. Used by permission.

.40

.35

52

Denise Davidson

remembered about the individual. Furthermore, following a negative description of an individual with just one positive statement actually led young children to view the individual positively (Rholes & Ruble, 1986). However, in these studies children were judging child characters. Thus, we are currently examining the extent to which young children’s stereotypes about the elderly influence the positivity bias, particularly because these stereotypes are generally negative.

V. The Role of Schemata in Children’s Memory: Where Do We Go from Here? Clearly, developmental studies have shown that children form schemata, scripts, and stereotypes about the world around them. Indeed, with use of the elicited imitation task, Bauer and her colleagues have been able to show that children as young as 2 years of age have some schematic knowledge (Bauer, 1993; Bauer & Mandler, 1989). Taken together, the results of the research described in this article provide definite evidence that children’s schematic knowledge affects how children remember their world. In addition, developmental research on the role of schemata in children’s memory has also led to a reexamination of how adults throughout the life span use schematic knowledge to remember their world. The results of developmental research have also provided the impetus to reevaluate current memory models. For example, the results of developmental studies (e.g., Davidson & Hoe, 1993; Hudson, 1988) have shown that at least one memory model widely cited in memory research, the script-pointer-plus-tag model, needs to be modified in order to account for differences with which various atypical actions are remembered. Specifically, the results of developmental (Davidson & Hoe, 1993; Davidson & Jergovic, 1996; Hudson, 1988) and adult studies (Davidson, 1994a) are incompatible with at least some of the predictions of the script-pointer-plus-tag model. According to the assumptions of the script-pointer-plus-tag model, the memory representation for script-based prose consists of (a) a pointer, or link, to a script of the event that interrelates both stated and inferred typical actions as a whole, (b) a set of tags that link moderately typical actions to the script, and (c) a set of tags that link atypical actions directly to the memory representation (Graesser et al., 1980; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Smith & Graesser, 1981). Based on these assumptions, the script-pointer-plus-tag model makes at least three predictions about memory. First, the script-pointer-plus-tag model predicts that the linkage with an underlying script will lead to confusions and distortions in memory, as subjects should confuse script actions that are a par of their generic script with actions they have

Children’s Memory

53

actually encountered (Schank & Abelson, 1977; Smith & Graesser, 1981). In addition, the false-alarm rate for script actions that are not in the story should increase with delay. However, memory discrimination between atypical actions should be much better. Second, as specific tags become less accessible with time, and memory becomes more reconstructive, atypical actions should be less well recalled than typical actions. That is, script actions from the story can be provided by generic script knowledge, but atypical actions cannot. Finally, because atypical actions are assumed to be tagged to the memory representation in the same way (i.e., directly to the memory trace), atypical actions should be equally well recalled. At the very least, no specific predictions about memory for different types of atypical actions can be drawn from the model. Several of the finding obtained with children are consistent with the above predictions. First, the results of recognition tests have demonstrated that children do confuse actions present in the story with script actions not in the stories but a part of their script knowledge. In addition, children’s memory discrimination scores are usually much higher for atypical actions. Nevertheless, the recent finding of a disruption effect with both children (Davidson & Jergovic, 1996; Hudson, 1988) and adults (Davidson, 1994a) suggests that (a) some atypical actions continue to be better recalled than script actions at least up to 2 weeks in delay, and (b) not all atypical actions are equally well recalled. Contrary to the predictions of the script-pointer-plus-tag model, this latter finding suggests that not all atypical actions are tagged in the same way, or with the same strength, to the memory representation. Nevertheless, at this point only preliminary information has been provided about the factors that underlie how deviations from schemata are remembered. Davidson and her colleagues’ work suggests that enhanced memory for deviations occur when subjects have to think about the deviations in order to make sense out of them. For example, atypical actions that temporarily disrupted the flow of the story were better recalled if they were not explicitly corrected in the story text, but because of subsequent events in the story, the reader presumably had to infer that these actions were corrected in some way. Consequently, “causal bridge inferences” may have been drawn by the reader between these disruptions and other story actions. According to Davidson (1994a), these additional inferences may have led to enhanced recall of disruptive actions. Such a proposal is compatible with research on the role of causal connections in memory (e.g., Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Myers et al., 1987). Additional research is needed to permit more thorough examination of other potential factors underlying memory for schematic deviations (such as the emotional content of the material). Modifications of several promising techniques used to understand how adults encode and retrieve text, such as reading times, think-aloud protocols (Suh & Trabasso, 1993), and question-answering tech-

54

Denise Davidson

niques (Graesser & Clark, 1985), may provide more insight into how children (at least of grade-school age) process, understand, and remember deviations from schemata. More research is also needed on how factors related to the memory of schematic information, such a the type and number of causal connections, are affected by development. Importantly, this continued research should not only tell us about how deviations from schemata are remembered, but also provide a more adequate picture of the role of schemata in children’s memory. Finally, developmental research on schematic knowledge and memory may also raise important issues for more real-world issues, such as children’s eyewitness memory (Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Indeed, the research on children’s memory for medical procedures discussed earlier in this chapter was begun, in part, because the medical procedure provides a means for assessing unusual factors that have some analogous component to what may happen in sex abuse cases, such as a stranger touching a child’s private body parts. Clearly, children’s quite accurate recall of medical procedures has some important ramifications for the potential of children to serve as eyewitnesses regarding their own abuse (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Merritt et al., 1994). Research on the role of schemata in memory has perhaps some more subtle implications for “child as an eyewitness” issues. For example, Davidson and Hoe’s ( 1993) research suggests that children can accurately recall events that may seem implausible to them. Our research also suggests that as an event becomes a part of everyday life, and essentially becomes schematic or scripted in nature, children may actually have more trouble recalling the event. This possibility raises an important issue about how children may remember abuse that occurs on a routine or regular basis. In addition, given the extent to which children acquire gender schemata, one may question the extent to which children who are exposed to abuse by only one gender incorporate that information in their gender schemata. Thus, previous research not only provides insight about the role of schemata in memory, but also provides some impetus for understanding how regularly experienced events, particularly those that might be traumatic in nature, are processed and remembered by children. REFERENCES Adams, L. T.,& Worden, P. E. (1986). Script development and organization in preschool and elementary school children. Discourse Processes, 9, 149- 166. Ahn, W., Brewer, W., & Mooney, R . J. (1992). Schema acquisition from a single example. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memoryt and Cognition, 18, 391-412. Baker-Ward, L . , Gordon, B. N., Ornstein, P. A , , Larus, D. M., & Clubb, P. A. (1993). Young children’s long-term retention of a pediatric examination. Child Development, 64, 1519- 1533.

Children’s Memory

55

Bauer, P. J. ( 1993). Memory for gender-consistent and gender-inconsistent event sequences by twenty-five-month-old children. Child Development, 64. 285-297. Bauer, P. I., & Mandler, 1. M. (1989). One thing follows another: Effects of temporal structure on I and 2-year-olds’ recall of events. Developmenral Psychology, 2 5 , 197-206. Bauer, P. J., & Mandler, J. M. (1992). Putting the horse before the cart: The use of temporal order in recall of events by one-year-old children. Developmental Psychology, 2 8 , 441-452. Bauer, P. A . , & Shore, C. M. (1987). Making a memorable event: Effects of familiarity and organization o n young children’s recall of action sequences. Cognitive Development, 2, 327338. Biernat, M. (1991). Gender stereotypes and the relationship between masculinity and femininity: A developmental analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 35 1-365. Bower, G . H., Black, .I.B., &Turner, T. J. (1979). Scripts in memory for text. Cognitive Psychology, 11, 177-220. Brewer, W. F., & Nakamura, G . V. (1984). The nature and functions of schemas. In R. S. Wyer, Jr., & T. K . Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. I , pp. 119-160). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Bryant. J . , 8r Zillmann, D. (Eds.). (1986). Perspectives on mass media efects. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Carstensen, L . , Mason, S. E., & Caldwell, E. C. (1982). Children’s attitudes toward the elderly: An intergenerational technique for change. Educafional Gerontology, 8 . 291 -301 . Carter, D. B., & Levy, G.D. (1988). Cognitive aspects of early sex-role development: The influence of gender schemas on preschoolers’ memories and preferences for sex-typed toys and activities. Child Developmenr. 59, 782-792. Ceci. S. J., & Bruck, M. (1993). Suggestibility of the child witness: A historical review and synthesis. Psvchological Bullerin. 113, 403-439. Clubb. P. A,, Nida, R. E., Merritt, K . , & Ornstein, P. A . (1993). Visiting the doctor: Children’s knowledge and memory. Cognitive Development, 8 , 361 -372. Davidson, D. (1994a). Recognition and recall of irrelevant and interruptive atypical actions in scriptbased stories. Journal of Memory and Language. 33, 757-775. Davidson, D. (I994b, May). Memory for typical and atypical actions in script-based text: A lifespan perspective. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, 1L. Davidson. D., Cameron, P., & Jergovic, D. (1995). The effects of children’s stereotypes on their memory for elderly individuals. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 41, 70-90. Davidson. D.. & Hoe. S. (1993). Children’s recall and recognition memory for typical and atypical actions in script-based stories. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 55. 104- 126. Davidson. D.. & Jergovic, D. (1996). Children’s memory for atypical actions in script-based stories: An examination of the disruption effect. Journal of Experimental Childfsychology,61, 134- 152. Fagot. B . I . , Leinbach, M. D., & Hagan, R. (1986). Gender labeling and the adoption of sex-typed behaviors. Developmentul Psychology, 22, 440-443. Fagot. B . I . , Leinbach. M. D., & O’Boyle, C. (1992). Gender labeling, gender stereotyping, and parenting behaviors. Developmental Psychology, 28, 225-230. Fivush. R . (1984). Learning about school: The development of kindergartners’ school scripts. Child Developmen/. 5 5 , 1697- 1709. Fivush, R . , Hudson, J.. & Nelson, K . (1984). Children’s long-term memory for a novel event: An exploratory study. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 30, 303-3 16. Goldman. S . , & Vdrnhagen, C. K . (1985). Memory for embedded and sequential story structures. Journal of Memory and Language, 25, 401 -418. Goodman, G. S.. Hirschman, J. E., Hepps, D., & Rudy, L. (1987). Children’s memory for stressful events. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 37, 109-158.

56

Denise Davidson

Graesser, A. C., & Clark, L. F. (1985). Structures andprocedures of implicit knowledge. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Graesser, A. C., Woll. S. B., Kowalaski, D. J., & Smith, D. A. (1980). Memory for typical and atypical actions in script activities. Journal of Experimental Psychology; Human Learning and Memory, 6, 503-515. Hamond, N. R., & Fivush, R. (1991). Memories of Mickey Mouse: Young children recount their trip to Disneyworld. Cognirive Development. 6, 433-448. Hess, T. M. (1990). Aging and schematic influences on memory. In T. M. Hess (Ed.), Aging and Cognition: Knowledge organization and ufilization (pp. 93-160). Amsterdam: North-Holland. Hirshman, E., Whelley, M. M., & Palu, M. (1989). An investigation of paradoxical memory effects. Journal of Memory and Language, 28, 594-609. Hudson, J. (1986). Memories are made of this: General event knowledge and the development of autobiographical memory. In K. Nelson (Ed.), Event knowledge: Structure and function in development (pp. 97- 118). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Hudson, J. (1988). Children’s memory for atypical actions in script-based stories: Evidence for a disruption effect. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 46, 159- 173. Hudson, I. (1990). Constructive processing in children’s event memory. Developmental Psychology, 26, 180-187. Hudson, J., & Fivush, R. (1991). As time goes by: Sixth graders remember a kindergarten experience. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 5 , 347-360. Hudson, J., & Nelson, K. (1983). Effects of script structure on children’s story recall. Developmental Psychology, 19. 625-635. Hudson, J., & Nelson, K. (1986). Repeated encounters of a similar kind: Effects of familiarity on children’s autobiographical memory. Cognitive Development, I , 253-271. Hunt, R. R. (1995). The subtlety of distinctiveness: What von RestorlT really did. Psychonomic Bulletin L Review, 2 , 105-1 12. Hudson, A. C. (1985). The development of sex typing: Themes from recent research. Developmental Review, 5 , 1-17. Jantz, R. K., Seefeldt, C., Galper, A., & Serlock, K. (1977). Children’s attitudes toward the elderly. Social Education, 41, 518-523. Jones, D. C., Swift, D. J., &Johnson, M. A. (1988). Nondeliberate memory for a novel event among preschoolers. Developmental Psychology, 24, 641-645. Koblinsky, S . , & Cruse, D. F. (1981). The role of frameworks in children’s retention of sex-related story content. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 31, 321-33 1. Koblinsky, S., Cruse, D. F., & Sugawara, A. 1. (1978). Sex-role stereotypes and children’s memory for story content. Child Development, 49. 452-458. Krause, D., & Chapin, R. (1988). An examination of attitudes about old age in a sample of elementary school children. Gerontology and Geriatrics Education, 7, 81-91. Maki, R. H. (1990). Memory for script actions: Effects of relevance and detail expectancy. Memory and Cognition, 18. 5-14. Mandler, J. M. (1978). A code in the node: The use of a story schema in retrieval. Discourse Processes, I, 14-35. Mandler, J. M. (1979). Categorical and schematic organization in memory. In C. R. Puff (Ed.), Memory organization and structure (pp. 259-299). New York: Academic Press. Martin, C. L. (1991). The role of cognition in understanding gender effects. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (vol. 23, pp. 113- 149). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Martin, C. L., & Halverson, C. F. (1983). The effects of sex-typing schema on young children’s memory. Child Development, 54, 563-574. McCabe, A,, &Peterson, C. (Eds.). (1991). Developing narrative structure. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Children’s Memory

57

Meltzoff, A. N. (1988). Infant imitation and memory: Nine-month-olds in immediate and deferred tests. Child Development, 59, 21 7-225. Merritt, K. A,, Ornstein, P. A,. & Spicker, B. (1994). Children’s memory for a salient medical procedure: Implications for testimony. Pediatrics. 94, 17-23, Mitchell, J., Wilson, K., Revicki, D., & Parker, L. (1985). Children’s perceptions of aging: A multidimensional approach to differences by age, sex, and race. The Gerontologist, 25, 182- 187. Myers, J. L.. Shinjo, M.,& Duffy, S. A . (1987). Degree of causal relatedness and memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 26. 453-465. Myles-Worsley, M., Cromer, C. C., L Dodd, D. H. (1986). Children’s preschool script reconstruction: Reliance on general knowledge as memory fades. Developmental Psychology, 22, 22-30. Nelson, K . (Ed.). (1986). Event knowledge: Structure and function in development. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Nelson, K., Fivush, R., Hudson, J., & Lucariello, J. (1983). Scripts and the development of memory. In M. T. H. Chi (Ed.), Contributions to human development (Vol. 9, pp. 52-70). New York: Kargar. Nelson, K., & Gruendal, J. (1981). Generalized event representations: Basic building blocks of cognitive development. In A. Brown & M. Lamb (Eds.), Advances in developmental psychology (Vol. I , pp. 131-158). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Nesdale, A. R., & McLaughlin, K. (1987). Effects of sex stereotypes on young children’s memories. British Journal of Developmental Ps.w-hology, 5 , 23 1-241. Ornstein, P. A . , Gordon. B. N., & Baker-Ward, L. E. (1992). Children’s memory for salient events: Implications for testimony. In M. L. Howe, C. J. Brainerd, & V. F. Reyna (Eds.), Development of long-term retention (pp. 135- 158). New York: Springer-Verlag. Pascual-Leone, J. (1984). Attentional, dialectic, and mental effort: Toward an organismic theory of life stages. In M. L. Commons, F. A. Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.), Beyond formal operations: Late adolescent and adult cognitive development (pp. 182-21 5). NY: Praeger. Rholes, W. S.. & Ruble, D. N. (1984). Children’s understanding of dispositional characteristics of others. Child Development. 55, 550-560. Rholes. W. S., & Ruble, D. N. (1986). Children’s impressions of other persons: The effects of temporal separation of behavioral information. Child Development, 57, 872-878. Robinson-Riegler, B., & McDaniel, M. A. (1994). Further constraints on the bizarreness effect: Elaboration at encoding. Memory & Cognition, 22, 701-712. Schank, R. C., L Abelson, R. (1977). Scripts. plans. goals, and understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Sheingold, K . , & Tenney, Y. 3. (1982). Memory for a salient childhood event. In U. Neisser (Ed.), Memory observed: Remembering in natural contexts (pp. 201-21 2). San Francisco, CA: Freeman. Signorella, M. L . , & Liben, L. S. (1984). Recall and reconstruction of gender-related pictures: Effects of attitudes, task difficulty, and age. Child Development, 55, 393-405. Smith, D. A., & Graesser, A. C. (1981). Memory for actions in scripted activities as a function of typicality, retention interval, and retrieval task. Memory & Cognition, 9, 550-559. Stein, N. L., & Policastro, M. (1984). The concept of a story: A comparison between children’s and teacher’s perspectives. In H. Mandl, N. L. Stein, & T. Trabasso (Eds.), Learning andcomprehension of text (pp. 113-155). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Stein, N. L., & Trabasso, T. (1982). Children’s understanding of stories: A basis for moral judgment and dilemma resolution. In C. J. Brainerd & M. Pressley (Eds.), Verbal processes in children (vol. 2, pp. 213-267). New York: Springer-Verlag. Suh, S., & Trabasso, T. (1993). Inferences during reading: Converging evidence from discourse analysis, talk-aloud protocols, and recognition priming. Journal of Memory and Language, 32. 279-300.

58

Denise Davidson

Taylor, S. E., & Crocker, J. (1981). Schematic bases of social information processing. In E. T. Higgins, C. P. Herman, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Social cognition: The Ontario symposium on personaliry and social psychology (pp. 89- 134). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Trabasso, T., & Sperry, L. L. (1985). Causal relatedness and importance of story events. Journal of Memory and Language, 24, 595-61 1. Trabasso, T., & van den Broek, P. (1985). Causal thinking and the representation of narrative events. Journal of Memory and Language, 24, 612-630. Wallace, W. P. (1965). Review of the historical, empirical, and theoretical status of the von Restorff phenomenon. Psychological Bulletin, 63, 4 10-424. Wollen, K. A., & Cox, S. (1981). Sentence cuing and the effectiveness of bizarre imagery. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning & Memory, 7 , 386-392.

THE INTERACTION OF KNOWLEDGE, APTITUDE, AND STRATEGIES IN CHILDREN’S MEMORY PERFORMANCE

David F. Bjorklund DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY BOCA RATON. FLORIDA 33431

Wolfgang Schneider DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY UNIVERSITY OF WURZBURG D-97074 WURZBURG, GERMANY

1. 1NTRODUCTION 11. KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY DEVELOPMENT

A. ITEM-SPECIFIC EFFECTS B . NONSTRATEGIC ORGANIZATION C. FACILITATING STRATEGIES D. KNOWLEDGE AND MENTAL EFFORT 111. KNOWLEDGE AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN CHILDREN’S MEMORY

A. MEMORY SPAN B. KNOWLEDGE, APTITUDE, AND STRATEGY USE C. EXPERTISE AND INTELLIGENCE D. EXPERTISE AND APTITUDE ON MORE AND LESS STRATEGIC TASKS IV. STRATEGIES AND INTELLIGENCE A. STRATEGIES, IQ, AND TRANSFER OF TRAINING B. STRATEGY USE AND THE SUPERGIFTED

V. ADVANTAGES OF HIGH 1Q A. IS INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE? B . COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE C . REFORMULATION OF KNOWLEDGE-BASE THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE V1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES

59 ADVANCES IN CHILD D E V E D P M E N T AND BEHAVIOR. VOL 26

Copyright 0 1996 hy Academic Press. Inc. All rights of reproductinn in any form reserved.

60

David F. Bjorklund and Wolfgang Schneider

I. Introduction Children’s memory has been a favorite topic of cognitive developmentalists and educational psychologists, and appropriately so. Memory is at the center stage of cognition, varying as a function of both basic-level mechanisms, such as speed of processing and working-memory capacity (so-called bottom-up processes), as well as more constructive mechanisms involving inferences and schemas (so called top-down processes). Moreover, how accurately children retain what they experience influences how effectively they think and deal with the world in general. Because of the role memory plays in human cognitive functioning, individual differences in memory take on important theoretical and applied significance. We have conducted research on individual differences in children’s memory, both separately (e.g., Bjorklund & Bernholtz, 1986; Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1990a; Schneider, Gruber, Gold, & Opwis, 1993; Schneider, Korkel, & Weinert, 1989) and collaboratively (e.g., Bjorklund, Schneider, Cassel, & Ashley, 1994; Schneider & Bjorklund, 1992), and have developed some ideas on factors that affect this pedagogically and theoretically important domain. However, our interests and ideas about individual differences in children’s memory have their origins in our earlier and continuing work on developmental function. Although we do not deny the possibility of qualitative changes in the ontogeny of memory, most of the developmental research from our laboratories has emphasized the role that quantitative changes in underlying cognitive processing play in agerelated changes in memory, primarily declarative knowledge. From this perspective, developmental differences become a special form of individual differences that vary reliably with age. Our ideas about the nature of individual differences are thus a natural consequence of our developmental theories and findings concerning the influence of the knowledge base on children’s memory, with findings in one area of research informing the other. We thus begin this chapter with a brief overview of research on the role of the knowledge base on children’s memory development. The remainder of the chapter chronicles our research and changing conceptions of the nature of individual differences in children’s memory. As will be seen, we have shifted our emphasis somewhat, realizing that where memory is concerned, knowledge may be powerful but not all-powerful. Other factors, particularly intellectual aptitude, can contribute significantly beyond the influence of knowledge to individual differences in children’s memory.

11. Knowledge and Memory Development Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing into the 1990s, age differences in a variety of types of memory performance have been attributed to corresponding

Knowledge. Aptitude, and Strategies

61

age differences in the knowledge base. What children know influences how they encode and interpret new information and how efficiently they categorize, store, and retrieve that information (Bjorklund, 1985; Flavell, 1985; Schneider & Bjorklund, in press; Schneider & Pressley, 1989). Whether the task is one of memory span (e.g., Dempster, 1978), free recall (Lange, 1973), or event memory (Fivush, 1993; Fivush & Hudson, 1990), the more background knowledge children possess about the to-be-remembered information, the better their memory performance tends to be, with older children generally knowing more than younger children. A . ITEM-SPECIFIC EFFECTS

Bjorklund ( 1987) proposed that knowledge can influence children’s memory performance in one of three general ways: (a) by increasing the likelihood of retrieving individual items (item-specific effects); (b) by activating automatically relations among items (nonstrategic organization); and (c) by facilitating the use of strategies. Item-specific effects can be observed in studies in which children are asked to recall sets of unrelated words. Age differences are typically found in these experiments, although no differences in strategy use are typically observed (Laurence, 1966; Ornstein, Hale, & Morgan, 1977). One interpretation of such findings is that older children’s long-term memory representations of individual items are more elaboratively encoded and thus have a greater number of semantic features, which facilitates retrieval. This interpretation is bolstered by experiments in which developmental differences in levels of recall are eliminated when the familiarity or meaningfulness of items for children of different ages are equated (Chechile & Richman, 1982; Ghatala, 1984; Richman, Nida, & Pittman, 1976). That is, when age differences in knowledge are eliminated, age differences in memory performance are also eliminated. In other research, item-specific effects were found for sets of related items. For example, Bjorklund and Bjorklund (1985) required first-, third-, and fifth-grade children (approximately 7-, 9-, and 11-year-olds, respectively) to recall the names of their current classmates, either in any way they wished (free recall) or according to a specified organizational scheme (by sex or by rows). Clustering in recall was nearly perfect for children who were instructed to use an organizational scheme, but levels of recall were no greater than when children recalled the names in any order they wished, a condition that produced substantially less than perfect clustering. Further analyses indicated that who was recalled was not influenced by how recall was organized. Some children’s names were found in the recall protocols of most children, and the names of others were rarely mentioned, regardless of how recall was constrained. These findings reflect itemspecific effects, in that the frequency of remembering some names was independent of strategy use.

62

David F. Bjorklund and Wolfgang Schneider

B. NONSTRATEGIC ORGANIZATION

With respect to nonstrategic organization, we have proposed that associations among entries in semantic memory become more numerous and stronger with increasing age, resulting in the relatively automatic activation of these relations in memory tasks; the result is a highly organized output without any deliberate strategy (Bjorklund, 1985, 1987; Bjorklund, Muir-Broaddus, & Schneider, 1990; Schneider, 1993a; Schneider & Pressley, 1989). For example, in research by Bjorklund and Zeman (1982, 1983; Bjorklund & Bjorklund, 1983, 7-, 9-, and 1 1-year-old children were asked to recall the names of their current classmates (class recall). Levels of recall were understandably high, but so were levels of clustering, with children organizing their recall on the basis of reading groups, seating patterns, sex, or social groups, among other bases. However, few children were aware of using an organizational strategy, and some evidence indicated that many children switched classification schemes during recall. Bjorklund and Zeman interpreted these and related findings as reflecting the relatively automatic activation of well-established semantic relationships. An intentional, conscious memory strategy was not necessary for high levels of organized output on this task. Children’s current classmates represented an elaborated knowledge base, and once the task of retrieving all members was begun, no further strategy was required. In other work, developmental differences have been found in the strength of associative relations among sets of words, and these differences are related to differences in organized recall (e.g., Bjorklund & Jacobs, 1985; Bjorklund & de Marchena, 1984; Frankel & Rollins, 1985; Hasselhorn, 1990; Lange, 1973; Schneider, 1986). For example, in an experiment by Schneider (1986), secondand fourth-grade children (approximately 8 and 10 years old) were asked to sort and recall one of four sets of word lists varying in degree of category relatedness (i.e., the extent to which items from the same category were similar to one another, high versus low) and associativity (i.e., the extent to which one item would bring to mind other items, high vs. low). Examples of the lists used in this experiment are shown in Table I. Of importance here are the results for clustering TABLE I Examples of Lists Used in Schneider (1986) Experiment List type

Exemplars

High associatedlhigh related

dog, cat, pig, horse, cow, mouse

High associated/low related

goat, deer, buffalo, hippopotamus, monkey, lamb

Low associatedlhigh related

tiger, elephant, cow, pig, bear, dog

Low associated/low related

beaver, rat, alligator, camel, squirrel, giraffe

Knowledge. Aptitude. and Strategies

63

(an indication of organization), which are shown in Figure 1 . As can be seen, clustering was generally greater for the high-associative lists and the older children than for the low-associative lists and the younger children. Most compelling, however, was the interaction of grade and list associativity, with lowassociative lists especially penalizing the younger children. The clustering of the second graders was apparent only for the highly associated items and may not reflect a deliberate strategy, per se, but only the relatively automatic activation of semantic memory relations. C. FACILITATING STRATEGIES

An alternative interpretation of Schneider’s (1986) results (as well as those of Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982) is that strategies are used, or are most readily used, only when young children have an elaborated knowledge base (e.g., Folds, Footo, Guttentag, & Omstein, 1990; Hasselhom, 1995; Naus & Omstein, 1983; Ornstein, Baker-Ward, & Naus, 1988; Omstein & Naus, 1985; Rabinowitz & Chi, 1987). In fact, Bjorklund and Zeman (1982) suggested that sets of strongly related items are most likely to induce children to discover strategies, noticing categorical relations among items that were recalled together via the relatively automatic activation of semantic memory connections, and proceeding from that point to deliberate use of an organizational scheme (see also Bjorklund &Jacobs, 1985). Other research has shown that children are most likely to use a strategy

Fig. I . Mean clustering for second- and fourth-grade children by associativity (high vs. lowH A I L A ) and relatedness (high vs. low-HRILR). (Adapted from Schneider, 1986.)

64

David F. Bjorklund and Wolfsang Schneider

spontaneously, to benefit from strategy instruction, and to extend a trained strategy to a new task, when highly familiar and related as opposed to less familiar and less related items are used as stimuli (e.g., Best, 1993; Bjorklund, 1988; Bjorklund & Buchanan, 1989; Gaultney, 1995; Hasselhorn, 1992; Kee & Davies, 1990, 1991; Rabinowitz, 1984; Rabinowitz, Freeman, & Cohen, 1992). Moreover, when metamemory knowledge is predictive of memory behavior in young children, it is usually limited to sets of items for which children have an elaborated knowledge base (Schneider, 1986; Schneider et al., 1989; Schneider & Sodian, 1988). Thus, although knowledge base is certainly not the only factor to influence age differences in both strategic and nonstrategic memory performance, it is one of the most important. This interpretation has been supported by research showing that differences in knowledge account for more variance in children’s memory performance than any other factor (Alexander & Schwanenflugel, 1994; Hasselhorn, 1992; see also Schneider, 1993a, 1993b). D. KNOWLEDGE AND MENTAL EFFORT

Our primary interpretation for the effects of the knowledge base on strategic memory centered around speed and efficiency of processing. Researchers using dual-task paradigms have found that younger children require greater mental effort to execute a strategy than older children, or younger children experience less gain in memory performance when comparable amounts of mental effort are expended to execute a strategy (e.g., Bjorklund & Hamishfeger, 1987; Guttentag, 1984; Kee & Davies, 1990; see Kee, 1994, for a review). Mental effort is reduced when highly familiar stimuli are used, leaving more of one’s limited capacity to retrieve individual items or to execute a strategy (Bjorklund, 1987; Kee, 1994; Rabinowitz & Kee, 1994; Schneider, 1993). Figure 2 shows the relatively simple information-processing model we introduced to account for the developmental findings. Increases in domain-specific knowledge result in faster speed of processing, which translates directly into increased retrievability of individual items (item-specific effects) and greater efficiency of processing. This leads to an increase in the availability of one’s limited resources, which can be devoted to metacognition and to the execution of strategies (at first, domain-specific ones), resulting in enhanced memory performance. Effective strategy use itself yields increases in knowledge, feeding back into the system and producing further processing efficiency and improving task Performance. The model seemed to tie together nicely the results of the extant developmental literature, at least as we interpreted it at that time. However, results of some later experiments (e.g., DeMarie-Dreblow, 1991), critiques of our underlying hypotheses (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1990), and reexaminations of older data

65

Knowledge. Aptitude, and Strategies

.

I

Availability

t Metacognition Strategies ItemSpecific Effects 4

Fig. 2. Model of the effects of knowledge on information processing and acquisition of subsequent knowledge. (From Bjorklund, Muir-Broaddus. & Schneider. 1990.)

(e.g., Miller, 1990; Miller & Seier, 1994) made us realize that this model was not perfect. We have modified our views in the several years since the publication of this model (e.g., Bjorklund & Coyle, 1995; Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1993; Schneider, 1993b), but we believed at the time that this model represented a good description of many aspects of memory development, and we continue to believe that it serves as a good heuristic for understanding children’s memory functioning, even if we disagree today with some of the specifics. Perhaps more importantly for the purposes of this chapter, we believed that this model could also account for individual di$erences in memory performance. Children of the same age could have different levels of knowledge for a given topic (for example, experts vs. novices), and these differences could affect how and how much they remember. Moreover, the difference in memory performance between children of different aptitudes (e.g., good vs. poor readers, high IQs vs. low 1Qs) may be attributed to differences in the knowledge base, to the extent that when such differences are controlled, differences in how much is remembered disappear. Essentially, we were proposing that “knowledge is omnipotent,” a rather extreme position, but one that, given our developmental findings, seemed reasonable.

111. Knowledge and Individual Differences in Children’s Memory A. MEMORY SPAN

Although most of the early research from our laboratories was addressed to the role of the knowledge base in developmental function, individual differences in

66

David F. Bjorklund and Wolfgang Schneider

children’s memory was the focus of some of the earliest knowledge-base research in the field. Perhaps the best known of these studies is that of Chi (1978), who demonstrated that chess-expert children had significantly better memory spans for legal chess positions than did chess-novice adults, despite the fact that adults showed superior memory spans for digits. This result, and others like it (e.g., Horgan 8z Morgan, 1990; Roth, 1983), were interpreted as reflecting that knowledge can play a critical role even in tasks that are primarily nonstrategic in nature and that the effects of knowledge are domain specific. Being a chess expert does not produce an overall expanded working-memory capacity, but it does afford one an advantage when the task is in one’s domain of expertise. Despite the importance of Chi’s study, it has been criticized because of a small sample size (only six child experts), adult experts and child novices were not included, generalization to chess-like domains was not examined, and some important comparisons were not statistically significant. Schneider and his colleagues (1993) responded to these criticisms, providing an important replication and extension of Chi’s study. In addition to child experts and adult novices, child novices and adult experts were included. A second extension concerned the memory tasks under investigation. Like Chi (1978), Schneider et al. included a digit-span task and a chessboard reconstruction task using meaningful chess positions. In addition, a chessboard reconstruction task requiring recall of random chess positions and a control-board task were given. The control-board task involved placing geometric blocks on a patterned board. The task was similar to chess in that it involved spatial memory for distinctive items on a patterned board, although neither the forms nor the board were like those used in chess. Schneider et al. hypothesized that factors such as the experts’ greater familiarity with the constellation of chess pieces on the board and their greater familiarity with the characteristics of the chessboard (e.g., the geometrical pattern, the form and color of chess pieces) all contribute to the experts’ superiority. Accordingly, they expected the greatest expertise effects for the meaningful board reconstruction task, followed by a somewhat reduced effect for the reconstruction of the random chess positions. In contrast, they expected no effect of chess knowledge on performance on the control-board task because all important characteristics of the chessboard tasks were eliminated in this task. Similarly, they expected no effect of expertise on digit span. The results basically confirmed these predictions. As can be seen in Table 11, both child and adult experts outperformed the two novice groups on both immediate and repeated recall. As expected, effects were greater for meaningful chess positions than for random positions, and expertise did not affect digit span nor immediate recall on the control-board task. As can be seen from the repeated recall data, however, experts of both ages learned faster than novices across trials on the control-board task. The authors concluded that experts’ familiarity with both the meaningful patterns of chess pieces and the geometrical features of the

67

Knowledge, Aptitude, and Strategies

TABLE I1 Mean Number of Items Recalled in the Chess and Control Task@ Children

Adults

Novices

Experts

Novices

Experts

Meaningful chess positions Immediate recall Repeated recall

4.95 15.90

8.78 19.52

4.58 15.28

7.10 20.85

Random chess positions Immediate recall Repeated recall

3.25 12.80

5.00 17.25

2.70 10.40

3.60 15.80

Control-board task Immediate recall Repeated recall

2.55 8.65

3.33 1 1.33

3.00 10.65

3.15 13.33

Memory-span task Immediate recall

5.75

6.25

7.05

7.65

Variable

.tData lrom Schneider. Gruber. Gold, & Opwis. 1993. ”Five trials were given on each reconstmction trial. “Immediate recall” is on the first trial; “Repeated recall” is the mean across the five trials.

board enabled them to process information faster and in larger semantic units, which allowed them to remember and learn much more than novices on the control-board task. Although these findings are generally consistent with those of Chi (1978) and indicate that the memory-span superiority of the chess experts is primarily limited to their domain of expertise, the findings of greater recall over trials for experts relative to novices on the control-board task suggests some small and limited domain generality of the spatial memory developed in the acquisition of chess expertise. Also, expertise accounted for significantly more variance in the meaningful chessboard reconstruction task on both the immediate (32%) and delayed (24%) tests than did age (3% and less than 1% for the immediate- and delayed-recall tasks, respectively), suggesting that age differences that are customarily found on memory-span tests are attributed mainly to differences in knowledge between older and younger subjects. In other memory-span research, differences between learning-disabled (LD) and nondisabled (non-LD) children have been shown to be related to differences in their knowledge bases. In a study by Krupski, Gaultney, Malcolm, and Bjorklund (1993), LD and non-LD 10- through 12-year-old boys were given three memory-span tests: one for digits, one for the familiar faces of children in their school, and one for unfamiliar faces of children from another town and school. The non-LD children demonstrated their expected advantage on the digitspan test (3.56 vs. 3.10 items), and also when unfamiliar faces served a stimuli (2.60 vs. 2.23 items). However, the LD and the non-LD children did not differ

68

David F. Bjorklund and Wolfgang Schneider

significantly when familiar faces were the target stimuli (2.77 vs. 2.86 items, respectively). This pattern of differences suggests that the non-LD children’s advantage on the digit-span task is related to their greater knowledge of numbers and relations among numbers, similar to that shown by older relative to younger children (see Dempster, 1978). When the to-be-remembered stimuli are highly familiar, as in the familiar face condition, LD children do as well as non-LD children. Group differences appear only when the stimuli are less well known, as in the unfamiliar face condition and presumably in the digit condition. These findings suggest that LD children have difficulty dealing with novel stimuli (the unfamiliar faces) and have not developed the familiarity with digits (or relations among digits) that non-LD children have. B . KNOWLEDGE, APTITUDE, AND STRATEGY USE

The design of the Krupski et al. (1993) study was similar to that used by Bjorklund and Bernholtz (1986) in examining the role of the knowledge base on strategic memory in groups of good and poor readers in middle school (approximately 12 to 15 years old). When these children evaluated exemplars from familiar natural-language categories in terms of category typicality (as defined by Rosch, 1975; Uyeda & Mandler, 1980), the good readers were found to have more adultlike ratings than the poor readers for each of 12 categories that were tested. In fact, when contrasted with developmental norms (Bjorklund, Thompson, & Ornstein, 1983), the poor readers’ ratings were found to be similar to those of children 5 years their junior. Children were then given two free-recall tasks with lists of categorically related words. One list (adult-generated) consisted of sets of typical and atypical exemplars from familiar categories, with the typicality of the items based on adult norms. The other list (self-generated) was based on the typicality ratings of each individual child. Thus, although unlikely to totally eliminate knowledge-base differences between the two groups of children, the good and poor readers’ knowledge should have been roughly equal for the self-generated lists, particularly in comparison to the adult-generated lists. Consistent with our knowledge-base perspective, the good readers remembered significantly more than the poor readers on the adult-generated lists, but no significant differences were found between the groups on the self-generated lists. Smaller differences were found in clustering and strategic classification. The good readers showed greater clustering than the poor readers on the adult-generated lists only for the atypical items, and the groups did not differ on the selfgenerated lists. Similarly, no differences were found in any condition in the number of good and poor readers classified as strategic, based on patterns of clustering (at least one intracategory cluster of three or more words) and interitem latencies (faster within- than between-category latencies). Consistent with

Knowledge, Aptirude, and Strategies

69

the clustering data, slightly more good readers were classified as strategic than poor readers for the atypical items on the adult-generated list, but this difference did not reach significance. We did not make much of the lack of differences in strategy use at the time, and still held to the belief that differences in knowledge base play a critical role in differences in strategic functioning. In retrospect, we see these results as indicating that much of the benefit that knowledge afforded children on this task was item-specific in nature and not mediated by strategic operations. Other research from our laboratories also demonstrated the marginal effect of knowledge on strategy use. For example, in a study with the same design as the one used by Bjorklund and Bernholz (1986) but contrasting gifted and nongifted children (Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1990a), a recall advantage was found for gifted children for atypical items, but no corresponding differences in clustering were observed. Moreover, when the children were classified as strategic versus nonstrategic, only one significant difference was found: nongijted children were more likely to be classified as strategic than gifted children on the self-generated lists for the typical items. That is, although strategy use was more frequently observed for the sets of typical than atypical items (an unambiguous effect of knowledge base on strategy use), differences in strategy use and recall were not coordinated and did not correspond to differences in recall observed between the gifted and nongifted children. In later research (Gaultney, Bjorklund, & Schneider, 1992), 1 I-year-old baseball experts and novices were given a series of sort-recall trials with sets of categorizable baseball words (e.g., types of plays, equipment, players). In a first, single-trial experiment, experts recalled significantly more than novices, although no differences were found in terms of sorting (i.e., grouping items according to adult-defined categories) or clustering. A second experiment, with a multitrial procedure, again revealed large differences in recall between experts and novices and small differences in sorting and clustering. Experts had a slight but not significant (p = . I I ) advantage over novices in overall clustering (means = .46 vs. .32), and had a significant advantage in sorting on only two of the four trials. Yet, the greatest magnitude of difference between the experts and novices was in recall, not in the strategy measures of sorting or clustering. Such findings are a bit perplexing for knowledge-base theorists. Knowledge clearly had a strong effect on the principal dependent measure (recall), but not by way of the mechanisms we had originally proposed (strategies). Before focusing more closely on the role of knowledge in individual differences in children’s strategic behavior, we will discuss a line of related research we conducted-the interaction of expertise and aptitude. Not surprisingly, experts remember more than novices when tested in their domain of expertise; but more in line with research contrasting children of different academic aptitudes

70

David F. Bjorklund and Wolfgang Schneider

(e.g., Bjorklund & Bernholtz, 1986; Krupski et al., 1993) is the question of whether being an expert can compensate for low aptitude or intelligence when children are tested in their domains of expertise. C. EXPERTISE AND INTELLIGENCE

The answer to this question is yes, at least in some contexts. This point is demonstrated in studies contrasting differences in text recall between children who differ both in levels of expertise in some domain and in levels of IQ. Schneider and his colleagues (Schneider & Korkel, 1989; Schneider, Korkel, & Weinert, 1989, 1990) contrasted soccer expert and novice German children in grades 1, 3, and 5 (approximately 7-, 9-, and 11-years old). Half of the children in each expertise group was further classified as high-IQ and half as low-IQ, yielding four distinct groups (high-IQ experts; low-IQ experts; high-IQ novices; and low-IQ novices). IQ classification was based on median splits of the verbal aptitude component of the cognitive abilities tests developed by Heller, Gadike, and Weinlader (1976). All children were read a story about a boy and an important soccer game. Children were later asked questions about the game, including recognition of events that occurred, fill-in-the-blanks (cloze) questions, and free recall. The recognition questions were answered correctly at a high level by all groups of children, indicating that even the novices understood the story reasonably well. Differences were large, however, for other dependent measures, particularly the recall of idea units in free recall. Although performance increased with age, the relation between expertise and IQ was the same at each grade level, and so Figure 3 presents data collapsed across grade. As can be seen, experts recalled more than novices. What is particularly compelling, however, is the lack of an effect of IQ on performance. Low-IQ experts recalled as much as high-IQ experts and low-1Q novices recalled as much as high-IQ novices. Similar findings have been reported for the domain of baseball for adults (Walker, 1987) and young adolescents (Recht & Leslie, 1988). These finding demonstrate quite dramatically that individual differences in IQ account for essentially none of the variance in text recall when expertise is controlled. One conclusion that may be drawn from these findings is that the reason IQ typically predicts academic performance so well is that high-IQ children usually have more school-related knowledge than low-IQ children. High-IQ children may be generally better at acquiring knowledge than low-IQ children, but these results suggest that knowledge is the proximal cause of differences in text memory. Contrasts of experts and novices provide an excellent paradigm for assessing the effects of knowledge on children’s memory performance, but they are not perfect. One criticism is that children who become experts at chess, soccer,

Knowledge, Aptitude, and Srraregies

71

Fig. 3. Mean number of idea units recalled by high- and low-IQ experts and novices, collapsed over grade. (Data .from Schneider, Korkel, & Weinerr, 1989.)

baseball, or whatever have special motivation to perform well when tested in their domain of expertise, and that children who devote the time and effort required to become experts are different from the general population of children. This problem was partially addressed in a study of memory in high-IQ (average IQ = 117) and low-1Q (average IQ = 92) 7-, 9-, and 1 I-year-old children, who were asked to recall the names of their current classmates (cf. Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982) and to sort and recall sets of categorically related words (Bjorklund et al., 1992). Most children can be considered experts about their current classmates, and although classmates are probably important to children, the motivation to excel when recalling classmates’ names is probably less than the motivation of soccer or chess experts to recall information from their domain of expertise. If knowledge and not motivation is the reason behind the performance of the children in the Schneider et al. studies, recall of classmates’ names should be comparable between high- and low-1Q children. In contrast, performance on the sort-recall task should be good but sensitive to differences in IQ, because high-1Q children should have more knowledge of the to-be-remembered words than low-IQ children. The pattern of results was identical for the three age levels. Differences in recall between the high- and low-IQ groups were significant for the sort-recall task (mean recall: high-1Q = 85.1%; low-IQ = 76.7%), but not for class recall (mean recall: high-IQ = 75%; low-IQ = 74%). Similar to the soccer experts, when knowledge is uniform among a group of children, levels of memory perfor-

12

David F. Bjorklund and Wolfsang Schneider

mance are comparable, independent of differences in IQ. A strong interpretation of these findings is that whatever IQ is measuring, it is not as important as declarative knowledge for predicting children's memory performance. D. EXPERTISE AND APTITUDE ON MORE AND LESS STRATEGIC TASKS

We must admit that we were pleased with the findings from this series of experiments indicating that knowledge can override the effects of IQ on a variety of memory tasks. When children are experts or are highly familiar with the target information, the customary effects of IQ or educational classification (e.g., learning or reading disabilities) can be eliminated totally. This conclusion is true for memory span (Krupski et al., 1993; Schneider et al., 1993), text recall (Schneider et al., 1989, 1990), and class recall (Bjorklund et al., 1992). Each of these tasks, however, involves only the marginal use of strategies as customarily defined (Bjorklund & Douglas, in press; Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1990b; Pressley & van Meter, 1993). Stimuli in memory-span tasks are presented rapidly, making the implementation of a memory strategy for the unpracticed person difficult (Dempster, 1985). With respect to class recall, Bjorklund and Zeman (1982) proposed that most children approach the task in a nonstrategic way, and that recall is mediated by the relatively automatic activation of semantic memory relations. Also, text recall is a form of story memory that is developed early in childhood and executed with seemingly little in the way of deliberate memory strategies (e.g., Nelson, 1993). Strategies may not be absent in any of these tasks, but children can achieve high levels of performance without using the more effortful and conscious strategies that are necessary for good performance on free- and sort-recall tasks. To assess the effects of knowledge and IQ on a strategic memory task, we adapted the expert-novice paradigm used in the Schneider et al. (1989) experiment for text recall to a more deliberately strategic sort-recall task (Schneider & Bjorklund, 1992). As in the text-recall studies, second- and fourth-grade German children (approximately 8 and 10 years old) were classified as soccer experts and novices and further divided into high- and low-IQ groups, based on median splits of the verbal aptitude components of the cognitive abilities test developed by Heller et al. (1976). Each child was then given a single trial on two sort-recall tasks: one with a soccer list consisting of items from four soccer categories (positions, types of plays, equipment, and parts of the field) and one with a nonsoccer list consisting of items from natural language categories (mammals, vehicles, tools, and fruits). We expected experts to perform better than novices on the soccer list, and we expected high- and low-IQ children in both expertise groups to perform comparably, paralleling the findings of Schneider et al. (1989) for text recall. In contrast, we expected no difference between expertise groups

Knowledge, Aptitude. and Strategies

73

on the nonsoccer lists, and we expected high-1Q children to perform better than low-IQ children. Such findings would support the well-documented domainspecific effect of expertise and demonstrate that knowledge can eliminate IQ effects on highly strategic as well as less strategic memory tasks. Patterns of recall were similar at the two age levels, and these groups were therefore combined in Figure 4, which shows the effects of expertise and IQ groups. Our hypothesis of domain specificity was confirmed: within each IQ group, experts outperformed novices on the soccer list but not on the nonsoccer list. An unexpected finding, however, was the main effect of IQ: High-IQ children remembered more than low-IQ children for both lists and for both the experts and the novices. Examination of the strategy measures of sorting and clustering revealed no differences between the experts and novices for either list; the expert’s superiority in recall was apparently not mediated by strategic operations. The main effect of IQ was significant, however, for clustering, with high-IQ children clustering more (.46) than low-IQ children (.38). This effect was obtained for both the experts and the novices and on both the soccer and nonsoccer lists. The implication of these findings is that the effects of knowledge and IQ on children’s memory performance vary as a function of the strategic nature of the memory task. Unlike memory span, class recall, and text recall, sort recall is influenced by IQ, and this influence is not reduced by knowledge. Experts remember significantly more than novices, illustrative of the strong impact knowledge has on memory performance; but the potent effect of knowledge is apparently not mediated via strategies and does not eliminate or even reduce the effect of 1Q on task performance.

Fig 4 . Mean recall (collapsed over grade) by experttse and nonsoccer lists (Adapted from Schneider & Bjorklund. 1992.)

IQ

groups for the soccer and

74

David F. Bjorklund and Wougang Schneider

Before accepting the full implications of these findings, we felt that replications and extensions were needed. For example, the differential effects of knowledge and IQ on strategic and nonstrategic memory tasks would be more impressive if a within-subjects analysis was done, demonstrating no IQ effects for text recall and 1Q effects for sort recall in the same group of children. We used this design in two experiments with 10-year-old soccer experts and novices, who were further classified as high- or low-IQ, based on median splits of the verbal aptitude component of the cognitive abilities tests for fourth graders developed by Heller et al. (1976) (Schneider, Bjorklund, & Maier-Briicker, 1996). Each child (a) was read a soccer story and questioned about his or her recollections of the story, similar to what was done in the Schneider et al. (1989) study, and (b) given a sort-recall task consisting of the soccer-related words used in the Schneider and Bjorklund study (1992). The designs of the two experiments were identical, except that the tasks were administered to children in small groups in one experiment and individually in the other. The major pattern of results was nearly identical for the two experiments, so only the results from the group-administered study will be reported here. Mean recall by expertise and IQ group is shown for the sort- and text-recall tasks in Figure 5. The results replicated our earlier findings: Experts within each 1Q group remembered more than novices on both tasks, and the effects of IQ were significant only on the sort-recall tasks. Also, similar to the findings of Schneider and Bjorklund (1992), no significant differences in sorting or clustering between experts and novices were found on the sort-recall task, suggesting that experts’ superior memory performance was not mediated by greater strategy use.

Fig. 5. Mean recall by expertise and IQ groups for sort recall and text recall. (Adapted from Schneider. Bjorklund, & Maier-Briicker, 1996.)

Knowledge. Aptitude, and Strategies

75

These studies forced us to draw some conclusions that we were reluctant to make. Despite our initial beliefs otherwise, knowledge is not powerful enough to overcome the effects of low IQ on sort-recall and presumably on other highly strategic tasks. Moreover, although having a detailed knowledge base does influence strategy use, the advantage of expert children over novice children on strategic memory tasks seems not to result from increased strategic functioning. Knowledge plays a critical role in children’s memory and can enhance performance substantially, but its influence on strategic memory tasks is mainly in terms of nonstrategic, item-specific components.

IV. Strategies and Intelligence Strategies make a contribution to individual differences in memory performance that seems largely independent of the contribution made by knowledge. However, the nature of that contribution is much debated. For example, many studies have dealt with the effects of strategy use and training on the memory performance of high- and low-IQ children (often gifted vs. nongifted), and most of these studies have indicated that high-IQ children are more strategic and display greater transfer of training than low-IQ children (e.g., Bjorklund et al., 1992; Borkowski & Peck, 1986; Schneider & Bjorklund, 1992; Scruggs & Mastropieri, 1988; Scruggs, Mastropieri, Jorgensen, & Monson, 1986). However, some studies have indicated no effect of IQ (e.g., Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1990a; Muir-Broaddus & Bjorklund, 1990; Schneider, 1986), and others have indicated an effect only under certain experimental conditions (e.g., Black & Rollins, 1982). Consistent with the model of developmental function presented in Figure 2, knowledge and intelligence may interact; higher-IQ children are more apt to use strategies when the target stimuli are not part of a wellintegrated knowledge base (e.g., sets of atypical as opposed to typical items). A. STRATEGIES, IQ, AND TRANSFER OF TRAINING

We investigated this issue in a training and transfer study involving 9- and 10year-old children, classified as high IQ (average IQ = 112) or low IQ (average IQ = 87) (Bjorklund, et al., 1994). The children received four sort-recall trials with categorized items, with different items and categories in each list. Because different items and categories were used, an increase in strategy use over trials could not be attributed to familiarity with the materials, but would more likely reflect the extension of an acquired strategy. On trials I (baseline), 3 (near extension), and 4 (far extension), the lists consisted of three categories of moderately typical items (6 items per category). On trial 2 (training), half of the children received lists consisting of category-typical items, and the other children received lists of

76

David F. Bjorklund and Wolfgang Schneider

category-atypical items. Half of the children given the typical and half given the atypical items on trial 2 received explicit instruction in the use of an organizational strategy (trained subjects), and the other children received standard sortrecall instructions (control subjects). The near extension trial followed immediately after trial 2, and the far extension trial was given approximately 1 week later in a separate session. Overall levels of recall, sorting, and clustering were significantly greater for high-IQ than low-IQ children. As expected, recall performance and strategy use on trial 2 were greater for children given the typical than the atypical lists, both for trained and control subjects, consistent with previous research (e.g., Bjorklund & Buchanan, 1989; Rabinowitz, ‘1984). For the trained subjects, recall, sorting, and clustering all increased on trial 2 relative to the preceding baseline trial, an indication of successful training, and improvements were somewhat greater for the high-IQ than the low-IQ children, although the latter difference was not statistically significant. Also, sorting and clustering increased on the extension trials for the high-IQ control subjects but not for the low-IQ control subjects. In general, high-IQ children were more strategic and remembered more than the low-IQ children. An inference one is likely to make from these findings is that high-IQ children remembered more than low-IQ children because of a greater use of strategies. Is the memory advantage of high-IQ children due to their greater tendency to use strategies, or are there some benefits associated with high IQ independent of strategy use? To answer this question, we contrasted the recall of high- and low-IQ children who were perfectly strategic in sorting. The mean recall of children who had perfect sorting scores (i.e., who sorted all items according to adult-defined categories, ARC scores = 1.0) is presented in Table 111, separately for the training, near extension, and far extension trials. As can be seen, high-IQ children had higher levels of recall than comparably strategic low-IQ children on each trial, although the difference was statistically significant only on the training trial. These findings make it clear that, just as expertise is not enough to eliminate IQ effects on a strategic-memory task, neither is strategy use. Whatever IQ is measuring, it is contributing something beyond knowledge and strategy use to children’s memory performance. B. STRATEGY USE AND THE SUPERGIFTED

To get a better picture of IQ and strategy effects on strategic memory, we looked at the memory performance of a group of academically supergifted children (Gaultney, Bjorklund, & Goldstein, 1996). The children were attending a 3-week program at Duke University (“Talent Identification Program”) and had been selected from a pool of nearly 60,000 seventh graders (approximately 13

Knowledge, Aptitude, and Strategies

77

TABLE I11 Mean Recall by High- and Low-IQ Children Who Exhibited Perfect Sorting (ARC = 1.0) on the Training, Near Extension, and Far Extension Trials*

High I Q

Low IQ

Training

12.39 (n = 41)

1 I .73b ( n = 33)

Near extension

12.29 ( n = 45)

1I . 3 6 ~ (n = 33)

10.92

10.17 ( n = 35)

Far extension

(n = 50)

.Adapted from Bjorklund. Schneider, Cassel, & Ashley, 1994.

bDifference between high- and low-IQ groups, p > .05. .‘Difference between high- and low-IQ groups, p > .lo.

years old) from 16 states in the southern and midwestern United States who scored at or above the 97th percentile on a nationally standardized test of achievement or intelligence and scored at least 550 on the math portion of the Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT) (approximately the 70th percentile) or 500 on the SAT Verbal test (75th percentile) or on the American College Test (ACT) equivalent. These children were contrasted with groups of nongifted 13-yearolds, selected from public schools in Florida and North Carolina. In a first experiment, the children were given five free-recall trials, with different sets of items and categories on each trial. Gifted children had higher recall than nongifted children, although the difference reached significance on only two trials, and they had significantly higher levels of clustering (ARC scores, gifted: .67; nongifted: S6). Children were classified as strategic or nonstrategic using a modification of a procedure developed by Bjorklund and Bernholtz ( 1986): “strategic” children exhibited at least one intracategory cluster of four or more words and faster within- than between-category interitem latencies. More gifted than nongifted children were classified as strategic on every trial, although the difference was significant on only 2 of the 5 trials. Of primary interest here is not the suggestion that the supergifted children were more strategic than their nongifted peers, but rather the relation between giftedness, strategy use, and memory performance. Put another way, what is the advantage to memory of being gifted, and what is the advantage to memory of being strategic? To answer this question, children were classified into one of four

78

David F. Bjorklund and Wolfsang Schneider

giftedness X strategy groups (gifted and strategic; gifted and nonstrategic; nongifted and strategic; nongifted and nonstrategic), separately for each trial. The results of a series of analyses, performed separately for each trial, indicated that nongifted children experienced a greater advantage from being classified as strategic than gifted children, and conversely, that nonstrategic children generally remembered more if they were gifted. These relations are presented graphically in Figures 6 and 7.

1 . The Advantage of Being Strategic Figure 6 shows the advantage of being strategic for gifted and nongifted children. Mean recall differences were computed for each trial between children classified as strategic and nonstrategic, separately for the gifted and nongifted children. A positive score indicates an advantage for strategic children. As can be seen, all scores were positive, indicating that for both groups of children for all trials, strategic children recalled more than nonstrategic children. However, this difference was smaller for the gifted children on four of five trials. Overall, being strategic afforded the nongifted children with about a three-word benefit on

Nongifled

Gifted

c

al a

z

1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Trial

Fig. 6 . Mean strategic-nonstrategic dijference in recall for gifted and nongifted children by trial. (Fmm Gaultney. Bjorklund, & Goldstein, 1996, Experiment I .)

I

79

Knowledge, Aptitude, and Strategies

Q)

u c

?!

a,

r

'c

0

-

I

u

Q)

a U

Q)

L

'c

0 C

0

z U

a,

.-

r c

(3

--*-Nonstrategic

+ Strategic

2 -

1 -

-1 0 -

-1

0

1

I

2

3

4

5

6

Trial Fig. 7. Mean gifted-nongifred difference in recall for strategic and nonstrategic children bv trial. (From Gaulrney. Bjorklund. & Goldsrein, 1996, Experiment I ,)

most trials, with this benefit being about half as great on most trials for the gifted children. 2. The Advantage of Being Gijted Figure 7 shows the advantage of being gifted for strategic and nonstrategic children. Here each score reflects the mean difference between gifted and nongifted children's recall, separately for strategic and nonstrategic children and for each trial. A positive score indicates a recall advantage of being gifted. For nonstrategic children, all scores were positive, and nonstrategic gifted children had a one- to two-word advantage over nonstrategic nongifted children for the first four trials. In contrast, for strategic children, the differences were negative on three of the five trials, and the recall advantage for gifted children exceeded one word only on the initial trial. These findings indicate the not surprising importance of both strategy use and giftedness for free recall, but also show that these two variables make independent contributions to memory performance. Gifted children were more likely to

80

David F. Ejorklund and Wolfsang Schneider

be strategic than nongifted children, but being strategic had greater consequences for the memory of nongifted than gifted children. Furthermore, some of the recall advantage shown by the gifted children was unrelated to strategy use. In fact, strategy use and recall were generally independent for the gifted children. Correlations between recall and clustering were significant on only two of five trials for the gifted children, suggesting that these children’s high levels of recall were not mediated by strategy use (Bjorklund & Jacobs, 1985; Frankel & Rollins, 1985; Schneider, 1986). In contrast, the correlations for the nongifted children were significant (p < .01) on all five trials, again suggesting that strategy use is more important for nongifted than gifted children’s memory performance.

3. Gijted Children Become Strategic before Nongifed Children In a second experiment, new groups of gifted and nongifted 13-year-old children were given different sets of items over five trials, identical to what was done in Experiment 1, but in a sort-recall paradigm. In this way, we could assess a broader range of strategic behaviors, including the incidence of rehearsal during the sorting phase of each trial. The results were striking, in that all the gifted children immediately saw the benefit of the sorting paradigm and grouped the items according to adult categories perfectly on every trial (i.e., ARC scores = 1.0). Moreover, clustering in recall was also nearly perfect, with mean ARC scores ranging from .95 on trial 2 to .99 on trials 4 and 5 . The nongifted children similarly took advantage of the sorting phase, but required more trials before they reached ceiling levels of performance (mean sorting = .26, .58, .90,.88, and .90, and mean clustering = .39, .64,.83, .75, and .87 for trials 1 through 5, respectively). Furthermore, levels of recall approached ceiling performance for the gifted children on all trials (means ranged from 16.1 to 17.1, with maximum possible = 18) and always exceeded by a substantial margin the recall of the nongifted children, even on trials with no significant difference in sorting or clustering (mean recall for nongifted children = 10.9, 12.4, 13.4, 12.8, and 12.6 for trials 1 through 5, respectively). The gifted children exhibited more rehearsal than the nongifted children, indicating that they combined strategies (sorting and rehearsing) to a greater degree than the nongifted children, which may account in part for their overall higher levels of memory performance (cf. Geary & Brown, 1991). These finding indicate that gifted children were quicker to identify the strategic advantages of the sort-recall procedure than were nongifted children. Levels of recall in Experiment 2 (sort recall) were greater than those in Experiment 1 (free recall) for both the gifted and nongifted children, consistent with past research (e.g., Hasselhorn, 1992). However, gifted children showed a greater advantage on the sort-recall task, remembering an average of 4.8 more words per trial than

Knowledge. Aptitude, and Strategies

81

other gifted children had remembered in the free-recall experiment; the corresponding advantage for the nongifted children was only 1.7 words. These results suggest that one advantage gifted children have on strategicmemory tasks is in metamemory. In this experiment, gifted children recognized immediately the benefits afforded by the easier sort-recall task. They also used combinations of strategies (sorting and rehearsal) to a greater extent than nongifted children, suggesting that part of high-IQ children’s memory advantage is through strategies, although, as the results of our previous experiments indicate, IQ effects extend beyond any benefit provided by strategies. In the rest of the chapter, we examine what high-IQ children have that makes them better rememberers and what role knowledge may play.

V. Advantages of High IQ A. IS INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE?

Why are high-IQ children better rememberers than low-IQ children in some contexts but not in others? What advantage does a high IQ afford children on learning and memory tasks? Our earlier answer to these questions was reasonably straightforward: greater knowledge. Intelligence as measured by IQ was an artifact, we believed, and knowledge was really responsible for proficient learning and memory. High-IQ children generally have greater knowledge about the things they are asked to learn and remember, and as a result they learn and remember better. When differences in knowledge between children of different aptitudes are minimized, eliminated, or reversed, different patterns of learning and memory are found. IQ tests tap a person’s knowledge. Some of them also tap processing ability, which we now understand cannot be evaluated independently of processing context, which includes knowledge (Bjorklund et al., 1990; Ceci, 1990; Schneider, 1993a). From this perspective, we believed learning and memory were influenced more by domain-specific than by domain-general factors. Based on over a decade of research from our laboratories and those of others, we felt confident that although IQ may be measuring something other than knowledge, differences in knowledge, and not some higher-order mental factors, were the proximal cause for differences in memory performance between high- and low-IQ children (Ceci, 1990, 1993; Schneider, 1993b). Later results from our laboratories have required a modification of this interpretation. We continue to believe that knowledge is the single most important factor in what is called “intelligence,” particularly as it affects learning and memory. But knowledge is not enough to compensate for differences in psychometrically measured intelligence on strategic-memory tasks. And perhaps even more surprising, most of the advantage of high-IQ children on these strategic

82

David F. Bjorklund and Wolfsang Schneider

tasks can be attributed to nonstrategic processes. Having detailed knowledge aids performance, as does being strategic; but high-IQ children often outperform lowIQ children even when knowledge and strategies are equated. B. COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE

Given the acknowledgment of some domain-general component of intelligence, the question becomes, What is intelligence? We believe that intelligence is multifaceted, and that some (perhaps most) of its facets are highly dependent on the specific contexts in which intelligent behavior occurs, but that other facets are domain general, independent of specific contexts or domains, influencing performance comparably across a wide array of tasks (cf. Anderson, 1992). Probably all intellectually important tasks are influenced by knowledge and context. What we know and the conditions in which we think and solve problems probably always affect cognition and intelligent behavior. However, on many strategic tasks, high-IQ children (and presumably adults) have an advantage that is relatively independent of domain, suggesting a g-like, domain-general mechanism. 1 . Metacognition and Novelty Many candidates for this mechanism can be identified. One is metacognition. Experiment 2 by Gaultney et al. (1996) demonstrated that supergifted children recognized immediately the advantage of sorting items into meaningful groups and used this technique to attain nearly perfect memory performance. The task was also an easy one for the nongifted children, but they needed several trials to leam what was immediately obvious to their gifted counterparts. However, the gifted children in the Gaultney et al. study were at the extreme of the 1Q population, making generalizations about the effect of differences in IQ on metacognition to a broader population problematic. In fact, we suspect that metacognition may not account for the majority of the domain-general variance in cognition between high- and low-IQ children. Evidence for this comes from a review by Alexander, Schwanenflugel, and Carr (1993, who reported inconsistent relations between giftedness and metacognition. A related and possibly better candidate would be high-IQ children’s greater ability to identify novel aspects of a task (such as the sorting component on the sort-recall task) and to make good use of this information (cf. Stemberg, 1985), giving them a head start on any new task. In either case, some general executive-type ability seems to underlie differences between high- and low-IQ children on memory tasks, at least when considering the extreme end of the IQ spectrum.

2 . Speed of Processing Our top candidate for a domain-general mechanism, however, is speed of processing, a component of our earlier model (Bjorklund et al., 1990). Individual

Knowledge, Aptitude. and Strategies

83

differences on simple reaction-time tasks are highly predictive of more complex measures of cognition and intelligence (Jensen, 1993), and research by Kail and Salthouse indicates robust developmental differences in speed of processing across the life span, with highly consistent patterns of reaction times over a wide range of tasks (Kail, 1991; Kail & Salthouse, 1994; Salthouse, 1988). How quickly one processes information is influenced by knowledge, accounting for low-IQ experts’ high performance on some tasks. On other tasks, however, when processing demands are greater or the strategies involved are novel, faster processing of information should produce better performance, with most of the benefit occurring independently of strategy use. C. REFORMULATION OF KNOWLEDGE-BASE THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

We believe that these findings and interpretations require reformulation of knowledge-base theories of intelligence. For example, Ceci (1990, 1993) has emphasized the role of knowledge and context as the primary determiners of intelligent functioning. Like Gardner (1983), Ceci rejects a domain-general component of intelligence. Ceci has demonstrated how important the role of context can be in cognitive performance and has shown that people of vastly different IQ levels can perform complex cognitive tasks comparably when they possess the elaborated and integrated background knowledge characteristic of true experts (which Ceci referred to as cognitive complexity). For example, Ceci and Liker (1986) worked with a group of expert racetrack handicappers, who varied considerably in IQ and education levels, and found the experts apparently derived odds by use of a complex, multiplicative model involving multiple interactions, although they could not state exactly how they went about the process. Ceci and Liker generated a score reflecting how well the experts used this model and correlated it with their IQ. The correlation was -.07, indicating virtually no relationship between performance on this complex cognitive task and psychometrically measured intelligence. We find much to agree with in Ceci’s ideas, but we can no longer cling to the belief that knowledge is everything. Ceci may be correct in his statement that IQ contributes nothing beyond knowledge for true experts with cognitively complex mental representations. At the extremes, knowledge may be omnipotent. However, most people most of the time do not have the cognitively complex representations of Ceci and Liker’s racetrack handicappers. The soccer and baseball experts in our studies clearly were only “relative” experts with only relatively elaborated knowledge bases. But this is the level of expertise, we believe, that most people attain for a large number of domains, and we believe that assessments of relative experts such as these will inform us how individual and developmental differences in knowledge base interact with other factors, such as intelligence, to affect cognitive performance.

84

David F. Bjorklund and Wolfgang Schneider

VI. Summary and Conclusions Our current perspective on the relations among knowledge, aptitude, and strategic functioning is not as simple as our earlier perspective. Based on results from our initial studies (e.g., Bjorklund & Bernholtz, 1986; Schneider et al., 1989), we once felt confident that most of the variance in developmental and individual differences in memory performance could be attributed, directly or indirectly, to differences in knowledge. Knowledge fostered faster processing, made possible or enhanced the use of strategies, elevated levels of performance without the need of strategies, and, under certain conditions, eliminated any effects attributed to aptitude or IQ. Although we believe that much of our strong knowledge-base perspective was correct, we see now that it was incomplete. We continue to believe that knowledge is the most important single factor in intelligence, and certainly in memory. However, intelligence includes other important factors that exert an influence on memory and learning that is largely independent of knowledge. Chief among these, we believe, are metacognition and speed of processing. We can specify the types of tasks on which psychometrically measured intelligence will or will not influence performance beyond that of knowledge, and we can state that the influence of IQ on these tasks is only marginally expressed through greater strategic functioning. We are not yet in a position to specify, however, exactly what aspect of cognitive processing by high-IQ children contribute to these patterns or exactly how these aspects influence strategic-task performance. Answers await further research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank Barbara Bjorklund and Elizabeth Kennedy for comments on earlier versions of this article, and Claudia Roebers for technical assistance in transatlantic communication. Correspondence should be sent to either David F. Bjorkiund, Department of Psychology, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida 33431; e-mail: [email protected]; or Wolfgang Schneider, Department of Psychology, University of Wiirzburg, Wittelsbacheplatz 1, D-97074, Wiiaburg, Germany; e-mail: psy4020@abox .UNI-WUERZBURG. D400.DE.

REFERENCES Alexander, J. M., & Schwanenflugel, P. J. (1994). Strategy regulation: The role of intelligence, metacognitive attributes, and knowledge base. Developmental Psychology, 30, 709-723. Alexander, J. M., Schwanenflugel, P.J., & Cam, M. (1995). Development of metacognition in gifted children: Directions for future research. Developmental Review, 15, 1-37. Anderson, M. (1992). Intelligence and development: A cognitive theory. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Knowledge, Aptitude, and Strategies

85

Best, D. L. ( I 993). Inducing children to generate mnemonic organizational strategies: An examination of long-term retention and materials. Developmental Psychology, 29, 324-336. Bjorklund, D. F. (1985). The role of conceptual knowledge in the development of organization in children’s memory. In C. J. Brainerd & M. Pressley (Eds.), Basic processes in memory development: Progress in cognitive development research (pp. 103- 142). New York: Springer-Verlag. Bjorklund, D. F. (1987). How age changes in knowledge base contribute to the development of children’s memory: An interpretive review. Developmental Review, 7 , 93- 130. Bjorklund, D. F. (1988). Acquiring a mnemonic: Age and category knowledge effects. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 4 5 , 7 1-82. Bjorklund, D. F., & Bernholtz, J. F. (1986). The role of knowledge base in the memory performance of good and poor readers. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 41, 367-373. Bjorklund, D. F.. & Bjorklund, B. R. (1985). Organization versus item effects of an elaborated knowledge base on children’s memory. Developmental Psychology, 21, 1120-1 131. Bjorklund, D. F., & Buchanan, J. J. (1989). Developmental and knowledge base differences in the acquisition and extension of a memory strategy. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 48. 45 1-471. Bjorklund, D. F., & Coyle, T. R. (1995). Utilization deficiencies in the development of memory strategies. In F. E. Weinert & W. Schneider (Eds.), Research on memory development: State of the art and future directions (pp. 161-180). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Bjorklund, D. F., & de Marchena, M. R. (1984). Developmental shifts in the basis of organization in memory: The role of associative versus categorical relatedness in children’s free-recall. Child Development, 55. 952-962. Bjorklund, F. F., & Douglas, R. N . (in press). The development of memory strategies. To appear in N. Cowan (Ed.), The development of memory in childhood. London: London University College Press. Bjorklund, D. F., & Jacobs, J. W. (1985). Associative and categorical processes in children’s memory: The role of automaticity in the development of organization in free recall. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 39, 599-617. Bjorklund, D. F., & Harnishfeger, K. K. (1987). Developmental differences in the mental effort requirements for the use of an organizational strategy in free recall. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 44, 109- 125. Bjorklund, D. F., Muir-Broaddus, J. E., & Schneider, W. (1990). The role of knowledge in the development of strategies. In D. F. Bjorklund (Ed.), Children’s strategies: Contemporary views of cognitive development (pp. 93- 128). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Bjorklund, D. F., Schneider, W., Cassel, W. S.,& Ashley, E. (1994). Training and extension of a memory strategy: Evidence for utilization deficiencies in the acquisition of an organizational strategy in high- and low-IQ children. Child Development, 65, 951-965. Bjorklund, D. F., Schneider, W., Hamishfeger, K. K.,Cassel, W., Bjorklund, B. R., & Bernholtz, 1. E. (1992). The role of IQ, expertise, and motivation in the recall of familiar information. Contemporary Educational Psychology9 17, 340-355. Bjorklund, D. F., Thompson, B. E., & Ornstein, P. A. (1983). Developmental trends in children’s typicality judgments. Behavior Research Methods & Instrumentation. 15, 350-356. Bjorklund, D. F., & Zeman, B. R. (1982). Children’s organization and metamemory awareness in their recall of familiar information. Child Development, 5 3 , 799-810. Bjorklund, D. F., & Zeman, B. R. (1983). The development of organizational strategies in children’s recall of familiar information: Using social organization to recall the names of classmates. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 6 , 341-353. Black, M. M., & Rollins, H. A. (1982). The effects of instructional variables on young children’s organization and free recall. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 31, 1- 19. Borkowski, J. G., & Peck, V. A. (1986). Causes and consequences of metamemory in gifted

86

David F. Bjorklund and Wolfgang Schneider

children. In R. J. Sternberg, & J. C. Davidson (Eds.). Conceptions of giftedness (pp. 182-200). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (1990). Gist is the grist: Fuzzy-trace theory and the new intuitionism. Developmental Review, 10, 3-47. Ceci, S. J. (1990). On intelligence . . . More or less: A bio-ecological treatise on intellectual development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Ceci, S. J. (1993). Contextual trends in intellectual development. Developmental Review, 13, 403435. Ceci, S. J., & Liker, J. (1986). A day at the races: A study of IQ, expertise, and cognitive complexity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 115, 255-266. Chechile, R. A., & Richman, C. L. (1982). The interaction of semantic memory with storage and retrieval processes. Developmental Review, 2 , 237-250. Chi, M. T. H. (1978). Knowledge structure and memory development. In R. S. Siegler (Ed.), Children’s thinking: What develops? (pp. 73-96). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. DeMarie-Dreblow, D. (1991). Relation between knowledge and memory: A reminder that correlation does not imply causality. Child Development, 62, 484-498. Dempster, F. N. (1978). Memory span and short-term memory capacity: A developmental study. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 26, 419-43 1. Dempster, F. N. (1985). Short-term memory development in childhood and adolescence. In C. J. Brainerd & M. Pressley (Eds.), Basic processes in memory development: Progress in cognitive development research (pp. 209-248). New York: Springer. Fivush, R. (1993). Developmental perspectives on autobiographical recall. In G. S. Goodman & B. L. Bottoms (Eds.), Understanding and improving children’s testimony (pp. 1-24). New York: Guilford. Fivush, R., & Hudson, J. A. (1990). Knowing and remembering in young children. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Flavell, J. H. (1985). Cognitive development (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Folds, T. H., Footo, M., Guttentag, R. E., & Omstein, P. A. (1990). When children mean to remember: Issues of context specificity, strategy effectiveness, and intentionality in the development of memory. In D. F. Bjorklund (Ed.),Children’s strategies: Contemporary views of cognitive development (pp. 67-91). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Frankel, M. T., & Rollins, H. S. (1985). Associative and categorical hypotheses of organization in the free recall of adults and children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 40, 304-318. Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. New York: Basic Books. Gaultney, J. F. (1995). The effects of prior knowledge and metacognition on the acquisition of a reading comprehension strategy. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 59, 142- 163. Gaultney, J. F., Bjorklund, D. F., & Schneider, W. (1992). The role of children’s expertise in a strategic memory task. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 17, 244-257. Gaultney, 1. F., Bjorklund, D. F., & Goldstein, D. (1996). To be young, gifted, and strategic: Advantages for memory performance. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 61, 43-66. Geary, D. C., & Brown, S. C. (1991). Cognitive addition: Strategy choice and speed-of-processing differences in gifted, normal, and mathematically disabled children. Developmental Psychology, 27, 398-406. Ghatala, E. S. (1984). Developmental changes in incidental memory as a function of meaningfulness and encoding condition. Developmental Psychology, 20, 208-21 I . Guttentag, R. E. (1984). The mental effort requirement of cumulative rehearsal: A developmental study. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 37, 92- 106. Hamishfeger, K. K., & Bjorklund, D. F. (1990a). Memory functioning of gifted and nongifted middle school children. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 15, 346-363.

Knowledge, Aptitude, and Strategies

87

Harnishfeger, K. K., & Bjorklund, D. F. (1990b). Children’s strategies: A brief history. In D. F. Bjorklund (Ed. ), Children’s strategies: Contemporary views of cognitive developmenr (pp. 1-22). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Hamishfeger, K. K., & Bjorklund, D. F. (1993). The ontogeny of inhibition mechanisms: A renewed approach to cognitive development. In M. L. Howe & R. Pasnak (Eds.), Emerging themes in cognirive development, Vol. I : Foundations (pp. 28-49). New York: Springer-Verlag. Hasselhorn, M. (1990). The emergence of strategic knowledge activation in categorical clustering during retrieval. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 50, 59-80. Hasselhorn, M. (1992). Task dependency and the role of category typicality and metamemory in the development of an organizational strategy. Child Development, 63, 202-214. Hasselhorn, M. ( 1995). Beyond production deficiency and utilization inefficiency: Mechanisms of the emergence of strategic categorization in episodic memory tasks. In F. E. Weinert & W. Schneider (Eds. ), Research on memory development: State-of-the-art and future directions. (pp. 141-159). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Heller, M. S., Gadike, A. K., & Weinlader, H. (1976). Kognitiver FuhigkeitstestfiirKinder (KFT 413). Weinheim: Beltz. Horgan, D. D., & Morgan, D. (1990). Chess expertise in children. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 4 , 109- 128. Jensen, A. R. (1993). Test validity: g versus “tacit knowledge.” Current Perspectives in Psychological Science. 2 , 9-10. Kail, R. (1991). Development of processing speed in childhood and adolescence. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (vol. 23, pp. 151- 185), San Diego: Academic Press. Kail, R. V., & Salthouse, T. A. (1994). Processing speed as a mental capacity. Acta Psychologica. 86, 199-225. Kee, D. W. (1994). Developmental differences in associative memory: Strategy use, mental effort, and knowledge-access interaction. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (vol. 25, pp. 7-32). San Diego: Academic Press. Kee, D. W., & Davies, L. (1990). Mental effort and elaboration: Effects of accessibility and instruction. Journal of Experimenral Child Psychology, 49, 264-274. Kee, D. W., & Davies, L. (1991). Mental effort and elaboration: A developmental analysis of accessibility effects. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 52, 1- 10. Krupski, A., Gaultney, J. F., Malcolm, G . , & Bjorklund, D. F. (1993). Learning disabled and nondisabled children’s performance on a serial recall task: The facilitating effect of knowledge. Learning and Individual Direrences, 5 , 199-210. Lange, G. W. (1973). The development of conceptual and rote recall skills among school age children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 15, 394-407. Laurence, M. W. (1966). Age differences in performance and subjective organization in the freerecall learning of pictorial material. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 20, 388-399. Miller, P. H. (1990). The development of strategies of selective attention. In D. F. Bjorklund (Ed.), Children’s strategies: Contemporary views of cognitive development (pp. 157- 184). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Miller, P. H., & Seier, W. L. (1994). Strategy utilization deficiencies in children: When, where, and why. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (vol. 25, pp. 105-156). San Diego: Academic Press. Muir-Broaddus, J. E., & Bjorklund, D. F. (1990). Developmental and individual differences in children’s memory strategies: The role of knowledge. In W. Schneider & F. E. Weinert (Eds.), Apritudes, strategies and knowledge in cognitive performance (pp. 99- 133). New York: SpringerVerlag.

88

David F. Bjorklund and Wolfeang Schneider

Naus, M. J., & Omstein, P. A. (1983). Development of memory strategies: Analysis, questions and issues. In M. T. H. Chi (Ed.), Trends in memory development research (Contributions to human development, vol. 9, pp. 1-30). Basel: S. Karger. Nelson, K. (1993). The psychological and social origins of autobiographical memory. Psychological Science, 4 , 7-14. Omstein, P. A., Baker-Ward, L., & Naus, M. J. (1988). The development of mnemonic skill. In M. Weinert & M. Perlmutter (Eds.), Memory development (pp. 31-50). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Omstein, P. A., Hale, G. A., &Morgan, J. S. (1977). Developmental differences in recall and output organization. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Sociew, 9, 29-32. Omstein, P. A., & Naus, M. J. (1985). Effects of the knowledge base on children’s memory strategies. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (vol. 19, pp. 113148). New York Academic Press. Pressley, M., & van Meter, P. (1993). Memory strategies: Natural development and use following instruction. In R. Pasnak & M. L. Howe (Eds.), Emerging themes in cognitive development: Vol. 2. Competencies (pp. 128- 165). New York: Springer-Verlag. Rabinowitz, M. (1984). The use of categorical organization: Not an all-or-none situation. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 38, 338-351. Rabinowitz, M., & Chi, M. T. H. (1987). An interactive model of strategic processing. In S . J. Ceci (Ed.), Handbook of cognitive, social, and neuro-psychological aspects of learning disabilities (pp. 83-102). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Rabinowitz, M., Freeman, K.,& Cohen, S. (1992). Use and maintenance of strategies: The influence of accessibility to knowledge. Journal of Educational Psychology, 84. 21 1-218. Rabinowitz, M., & Kee, D. (1994). A framework for understanding individual differences in memory: Strategy-knowledge interactions. In P. A. Vernon (Ed.), The neumpsychology of individual diferences (pp. 135-148). San Diego: Academic Press. Recht, D. R., & Leslie, L. (1988). Effect of prior knowledge on good and poor readers’ memory of text. Journal of Education, 8 , 16-20. Richman, C. L., Nida, S . , & Pittman, L. (1976). Effects of meaningfulness on children’s free-recall learning. Developmental Psychology, 12, 460-465. Roth, C. (1983). Factors affecting developmental changes in the speed of processing. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 35, 509-528. Rosch, E. H. (1975). On the internal structure of semantic and perceptual categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 7 , 192-233. Salthouse, T. A. (1988). Resource-reductions interpretations of cognitive aging. Developmental Review, 8, 238-272. Schneider, W. (1986). The role of conceptual knowledge and metamemory in the development of organizational processes in memory. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 42, 3 18-236. Schneider, W. (1993a). Domain-specific knowledge and memory performance in children. Educational Psychology Review, 5 , 257-273. Schneider, W. (1993b). Acquiring expertise: Determinants of exceptional performance. In K. A. Heller, F. J. Monks, & A. H. Passao (Eds.), International handbook of research on giftedness and talent (pp. 3 1 1-324). Oxford: Pergamon Press. Schneider, W., & Bjorklund, D. F. (1992). Expertise, aptitude, and strategic remembering. Child Development, 63, 46 1-473. Schneider, W., & Bjorklund, D. F. (in press). Memory. In R. S . Siegler & D. Kuhn (Eds.), Cognitive, language, and perceptual development, Vol. 2, in B. Damon (General Editor), Handbook of child psychology. New York: Wiley. Schneider, W., Bjorklund, D. F., & Maier-Briiker, W. (1996). The effects of expertise and IQ on children’s memory: When knowledge is, and when it is not enough. International Journal of Behavioral Development.

Knowledge, Aptitude, and Strategies

89

Schneider, W., Gruber, H., Gold, A., & Opwis, K. (1993). Chess expertise and memory for chess positions in children and adults. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 56, 328-349. Schneider, W. & Korkel, J. (1989). The knowledge base and text recall: Evidence from a short-term longitudinal study. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 14. 382-383. Schneider, W., Korkel, J., & Weinert, F. E. (1989). Domain-specific knowledge and memory performance: A comparison of high- and low-aptitude children. Journal of Educational Psychology, 81, 306-312. Schneider, W., Korkel, J., & Weinert, F. E. (1990). Expert knowledge, general abilities, and text processing. In W. Schneider & F. E. Weinert (Eds.), Interactions among aptitude strategies. and knowledge in cognitive performance (pp. 235-25 1). New York: Springer-Verlag. Schneider, W., & Pressley, M. (1989). Memory development between 2 and20. New York: Springer. Schneider, W., & Sodian, B. (1988). Metamemory-memory behavior relationship in young children: Evidence from a memory-for-location task. Journal ofExperimenta1 Child Psychology, 45, 209233. Scruggs, T. E., & Mastropieri, M. A. (1998). Acquisition and transfer of learning strategies by gifted and nongifted students. The Journal of Special Education, 22, 153-166. Scruggs, T. E., Mastropieri, M. A., Jorgensen, C., & Monson, J. A. (1986). Effective mnemonic strategies for gifted learners. Journal ofthe Education for the Gifted, 9, 105-121. Sternberg, R. J. (1985). Beyond IQ: A triarchic theory of human intelligence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Uyeda, K. M., & Mandler, G. (1980). Prototypicality norms for 28 semantic categories. Behavior Research Methods & Instrumentation. 12, 561-595. Walker, C. H . (1987). Relative importance of domain knowledge and overall aptitude on acquisition of domain-related information. Cognirion and Instruction, 2 , 25-42.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

ANALOGICAL REASONING AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT Usha Goswami DEPARTMENT OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE CAMBRIDGE CB2 3EB, ENGLAND

1 . INTRODUCTION

A. RELATIONAL MAPPING B. ANALOGIES IN EVERYDAY REASONING 11. THE “RELATIONAL PRIMACY” VIEW OF ANALOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

A. THE RECOGNITION OF RELATIONAL SIMILARITY AND DISSIMILARITY IN INFANCY B. RELATIONAL REASONING IN INFANCY C . ANALOGY AS A PRIMARY BUILDING BLOCK FOR COGNITION Ill. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE KNOWLEDGE BASE IN ANALOGICAL REASONING A. RELATIONAL REASONING ABOUT FAMILIAR RELATIONS B. CLASSICAL ANALOGIES BASED ON THEMATIC RELATIONS C. CLASSICAL ANALOGIES BASED ON CAUSAL RELATIONS D. TEACHING CHILDREN RELATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IV. PERFORMANCE FACTORS IN ANALOGICAL REASONING A. THE ROLE OF PERCEPTUAL OR OBJECT SIMILARITIES B. “LEARNING-TO-LEARN EFFECTS AND INSTRUCTION ABOUT PROBLEM SIMILARITY C. POSITIVE VERSUS NEGATIVE ANALOGIES V. HALFORD’S STRUCTURE-MAPPING THEORY OF LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT A. RELATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND ANALOGICAL DEVELOPMENT B. STRUCTURE-MAPPING THEORY VERSUS RELATIONAL PRIMACY C. STUDIES OF TERNARY RELATIONAL MAPPINGS IN YOUNG CHILDREN VI. THE “RELATIONAL PRIMACY” VIEW OF ANALOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOGICAL REASONING A. THE NATURAL KINDS EXPERIMENTS B. NATURAL KINDS EXPERIMENT 1: BINARY RELATIONAL MAPPINGS ABOUT INCREASE IN A DIMENSION C. NATURAL KINDS EXPERIMENT 2: BINARY RELATIONAL MAPPINGS ABOUT INCREASE AND DECREASE WITHIN DIMENSIONS AND ACROSS DIMENSIONS D. NATURAL KINDS EXPERIMENT 3: TERNARY RELATIONAL MAPPINGS ABOUT INCREASE AND DECREASE ACROSS DIMENSIONS

91 ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR, VOL. 26

Copyright B 1996 by Academic Press. Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

92

Usha Goswami

VII. CONCLUSION REFERENCES

I. Introduction Reasoning by analogy involves using what you already know about the world to reason about what you do not yet know or what you need to understand. If analogical reasoning is important for cognitive development, as it surely must be, then children should be able to reason by analogy from early in childhood, or even from infancy. Yet although analogies are widely believed to be ubiquitous in learning in adults, and are a central component of adult cognition (e.g., Holyoak, 1984), their ubiquity in children’s learning has been the focus of some dispute. According to Piagetian theory, analogy is a sophisticated reasoning strategy that emerges only in adolescence (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Piaget, Montangero, & Billeter, 1977). More recently, analogical reasoning has been accepted as a basic reasoning strategy that is available early in childhood, and that must play an important role in cognitive development (e.g., Brown, 1989; Chen & Daehler, 1989; Gentner, 1989; Goswami, 1989; Goswami & Brown, 1989, 1990; Halfokd, 1987, 1993; Inagaki & Hatano, 1987, 1991; Vosniadou, 1989). The nature of this role and the potential power of analogies for young children’s learning, reasoning, and knowledge acquisition are the focus of this chapter. The argument will be that reasoning by analogy plays a central role in children’s cognitive development and that the potential power of analogy may even offer an alternative way of conceptualizing cognitive development to that proposed by structural theorists such as Piaget. A. RELATIONAL MAPPING

Analogies involve the mapping of relations. The hallmark of analogy is the recognition of relational similarity, which is classically expressed as an equality of proportions A:B::C:D (e.g., wide: narrow:: high: low)-a “classical” or ‘‘item” analogy (Goswami, 1992). The current consensus is that children’s use of analogy is knowledge-based (e.g., Brown, 1989; Gentner, 1989; Goswami, 1991; Vosniadou, 1989). According to knowledge-based theories, once children understand the relations in a domain, they can use analogies within that domain to solve new problems. For example, in the classical analogy wide: narrow:: high:?, a child who understands the relation of an opposite end of a dimension can map this relation to the C term high in order to generate the correct D term low (see Halford, 1993, for further discussion). In the problem-solving literature, analogies usually depend on structural sim-

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

93

ilarities between the base problem (the problem whose solution is known) and the target problem (the problem whose solution is not known). These are called “problem” analogies. The important structural similarities in problem analogies may depend on analogous systems of relations. Problems are analogous when the structure of the relations linking the objects in the base is similar to the structure of the relations linking the objects in the target (Gentner, 1983, 1989). An example of similarity in relational structure (which Gentner calls systematicity) is the similarity between the cause-effect relations governing the structure of the atom and of the solar system (Gentner, 1983). Both Halford and Gentner have described analogical reasoning as structure mapping (e.g., Gentner, 1983, 1988; Halford, 1987, 1993). B. ANALOGIES IN EVERYDAY REASONING

Researchers in both the classical analogy and problem analogy fields agree that the ability to map relational similarity is available fairly early in development, and that its use depends on relational knowledge. They agree less, however, about the role that analogies may play in cognitive development. For example, many authors have assumed that analogical reasoning makes a contribution to cognitive development simply by being one of the general reasoning processes available to the young child for acquiring, structuring, and restructuring knowledge (e.g., Carey & Gelman, 1991). Yet the potential power of analogical reasoning for cognitive development is far more wide-reaching. As Halford et al. (1995) have succinctly pointed out, analogies have the advantage of permitting concrete instances of concepts to be used as a basis for inferences that go beyond those instances. If one assumes that children use analogies in everyday reasoning, then one can construct a model of cognitive development that does not depend on knowledge of abstract, universally valid, logical rules or principles, as Piaget’s model does. Instead, children could make analogies from known structures (specific instantiations of logical principles) to solve reasoning problems that are similar in relational structure to stored instances-as long as they are able to recognize the requisite relational similarities. According to such a model, if analogical reasoning is present from early in development, then the pacesetter for developmental change would be the acquisition and restructuring of knowledge, rather than the acquisition of certain principles of logic. The power of an analogy-based theory of cognitive development is thus considerable. If analogical reasoning is the basis of many types of logical reasoning, as Halford has argued, then analogy could form the basis of a theory of cognitive development that has important differences from structural theories that postulate stage-like intellectual change. As Halford (1993) made clear, the demonstration that very young children can reason by analogy means that cognitive development can be modeled more closely along the lines of currently popular theories of

Usha Goswumi

94

logical reasoning in adults, particularly those involving pragmatic reasoning schemas and induction (Halford, 1993; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986). In these adult theories, current knowledge structures are used as a basis for solving structurally isomorphic problems by analogy. Such “instance-based’’ reasoning enables the subsequent extraction of general solution principles that are then stored (e.g., Ross, 1987), and could be one source of the abstract logical rules proposed by Piaget. This proposal has some similarity with Piaget’s model, as his notion of “reflective abstraction” is also constructionist in nature. However, the Piagetian child constructs more general, abstract rules of thought at certain ages, and these rules then apply across the board. An analogy model of cognitive development would predict local rather than global cognitive change, and changes in reasoning would be knowledge-dependent rather than age-dependent. Although it has been argued that age-linked changes in mental processing capacity can preserve the notion of Piagetian stage-like change in an analogical reasoning model (Halford, 1993), the analogical reasoning model of cognitive development being proposed here would depend on experience rather than on maturation. Children’s analogies would depend primarily on the richness of their representations.

11. The “Relational Primacy” View of Analogical Development A. THE RECOGNITION OF RELATIONAL SIMILARITY AND DISSIMILARITY IN INFANCY

To justify postulating an analogy-based theory of cognitive development, one needs evidence that children, like adults, use instance-based reasoning to solve problems by analogy. The age at which instance-based analogical reasoning develops has been a matter of some debate, but in fact, the roots of relational competence can be found in infancy. We already know that babies are not passive observers of their worlds. Instead, they are developing conceptual knowledge about that world from the everyday instances of concepts that they see around them, and they partly develop this knowledge by processing relations. 1. Instance-Based Processing

A theory of conceptual development based on relational processing was first proposed by Rosch (e.g., Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). She argued that by observing the world, one can learn that such features as feathers, birds, and wings typically occur together, and so can learn that when these features are interrelated they correspond to instances of the natural kinds category birds. Experimental work confirms that infants can form concepts by

Analogical Reasoning and Cognirive Development

95

processing relations. Younger and Cohen (1983) have shown that when infants are habituated to certain configurations of artificial features, such as the body parts making up cartoon animals, they extract a mental prototype based on an average of those features. Furthermore, babies who are habituated to a set of stimuli based on two sets of correlations of extreme features (such as long legs always occurring with short necks, and short legs always occurring with long necks) form two prototypes, one for each set of covarying features, rather than a single prototype with an average-length neck and legs. Infants are thus sensitive to relationships between perceptual features, as well as to variation in the features themselves. This finding is suggestive of instance-based relational processing. Perception and conceptual development are therefore intimately linked (see Mandler, 1992). In fact, structural similarities among perceptual stimuli can be demonstrated, and they may well form the basis of relational representations of those stimuli at a conceptual level (e.g., Smith & Heise, 1990). For example, structural similarities in auditory and visual perceptual events could convey relational information. A tone of music may be ascending because of acoustic properties such as timbre. A visual stimulus may have properties that convey ascension, such as a locus of highest density at its uppermost point (e.g., an arrow). These inherent perceptual properties of rising tones of music and of arrows pointing upwards could convey the shared relation ascending, which is part of our mental representation of these physical events. Infants may first notice the similarity between the inherent structure of physical events, and then eventually represent them as relationally similar. 2 . Processing Spatial Relations Young infants are known to respond to relational similarities and dissimilarities. For example, in a recent experiment, Quinn (1994) familiarized 3-month-old infants with the spatial relations above and below. Half of the infants were given repeated presentations of a black horizontal bar with a dot above it in four different positions, thus habituating them to the spatial relation above, and half were given repeated presentations of a black horizontal bar with a dot below it in four different positions, habituating them to the spatial relation below. At test, the infants were given a choice between a novel exemplar of the familiar relation (a dot in a new position above or below the bar, depending on the habituation condition), and an exemplar of the unfamiliar relation (a dot on the other side of the bar). Both groups preferred to look at the stimulus depicting the unfamiliar relation, suggesting that they recognized the relational similarity between the novel exemplar of the familiar relation and the previously experienced instances of this relation. Quinn argued that this finding indicates early categorical representation of spatial relations, but it may also indicate an early responsiveness to relational similarity and dissimilarity.

96

Usha Goswami

3 . Processing Numerosity A similar paradigm has been used with older infants by Cooper (1984). Cooper habituated 10- and 14-month-old infants to pairs of arrays of colored squares that depicted the relations “greater than” and “less than.” For example, for the greater than relation the infants might be shown a pair made up of 4 squares in array 1 versus 2 squares in array 2, then 4 squares in array 1 versus 3 squares in array 2, and then 2 versus 1 squares. At test, the infants received either a reversed relation (less than; 3 squares in array 1 vs. 4 squares in array 2), an equal relation (2 vs. 2), or a novel exemplar of the same relation (3 vs. 2). At 10 months, the infants dishabituated to the equal relation only, showing that they could differentiate equality from inequality. By 14 months, the infants dishabituated to the less than relation as well, showing an appreciation of relational reversal. At both ages, however, dishabituation depended on sensitivity to relational dissimilarity. B. RELATIONAL REASONING IN INFANCY

1 . Relational Comparisons This experimental evidence implies that infants can recognize relational similarities from an early age (see Goswami, 1992, for further examples). To justify the assertion that analogies play an important role in cognitive development, however, one needs evidence that infants can go beyond the recognition of relational similarity to make logical inferences on the basis of these relational similarities. So far I have established that the underpinnings of an analogy mechanism are in place relatively early in development, but I have not shown that infants use analogies in acquiring knowledge about the world. However, a series of carefully designed studies carried out by Baillargeon and her colleagues shows that infants actually rely quite heavily on relational comparisons in acquiring knowledge about the physical world (e.g., Baillargeon, 1995). Baillargeon has found that when making judgments about the physical properties of objects, infants consistently reason on the basis of relational information before they reason on the basis of absolute information. Infants begin by making physical judgments on the basis of relative cues, such as the relative heights of two stimuli (“qualitative reasoning”), and progress to comparisons based on absolute cues (object features), such as the absolute heights of the stimuli (“quantitative reasoning”). Thus, relational comparisons precede absolute judgments. Qualitative inferences based on relational comparisons can be seen as an early form of relational mapping, although Baillargeon herself has not made this claim (Goswami , 1992). One example of the developmental progression from qualitative to quantitative reasoning is the development of infants’ ability to judge the size of a hidden object (Baillargeon & DeVos, in press). In these “hidden object” studies, infants were shown an object covered by a cloth, and this array was subsequently

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

91

occluded by a screen. The infants then watched as a hand reached behind the screen and first reappeared holding the cloth cover, then reached again and subsequently reappeared holding a very large toy dog. At 12.5 months, the infants relied on relational comparisons to decide whether the dog could have been the object underneath the cloth. The judged the dog as being impossibly large only in the trials where a second, identical protuberance under a cloth was provided next to the screen as a reference point. By 13.5 months, however, infants reliably showed surprise (measured by increased looking time) at the emergence of the impossibly large toy dog, even without a reference point to use as a basis for a relational comparison. They were now able to make quantitative judgments. Baillargeon has demonstrated a similar precedence for qualitative reasoning over quantitative reasoning in experiments on infants’ ability to infer when a screen should stop rotating after hitting a hidden barrier (4.5 months), and where an object should come to rest following a collision event (1 1 months). Bryant (1974), in a set of experiments with older children, has also argued that making a relational comparison may be cognitively simpler than making a comparison based on absolute quantities. 2 . Relational Inferences The studies by Baillargeon clearly show that infants are using relational information in order to make judgments about objects that are hidden from view. In order to demonstrate that relational reasoning is involved in such judgments, however, it could be argued that one requires evidence that the infants are generating solutions to novel problems based on the application of relational similarity. As noted earlier, problem analogies involve the application of a solution strategy that is successful in one problem (the base) to a new problem that shares a similar relational structure (the target). Although problem analogies for young infants are difficult to devise, Chen, Campbell, and Polley ( 1995) have succeeded in examining the transfer of analogous means-ends solutions across toy acquisition problems in 10- and 13-monthold infants. In their study, attractive toys such as an Ernie doll were placed out of the infants’ reach, and behind a barrier (a box). The toys could only be brought within reach if the infants performed a series of actions. They had to remove the barrier, pull a cloth to bring a string attached to the toy within reach, and then pull on the string to bring the toy itself within reach. Each problem scenario used identical tools (cloths, boxes, and strings), but varied the perceptual similarity of the tools. In addition, in each problem two strings and two cloths were provided, only one pair of which could be used to attain the toy. The problem scenario presented to the infants is depicted in Figure 1. Few infants solved the first toy acquisition problem on their own. However, once their parents had modeled the solution to the first problem, Chen et al. found that the 13-month-olds readily transferred an analogous solution to the

Usha Goswami

98

0 0

0 Infant

0 Infant

0 Infant

Fig. 1 . The problem scenario in the toy acquisition task used by Chen, Campbell and Polleyp 1995. (Reproduced with permission.)

second and third problems. The younger infants (10 months) tended to need more than one problem example for generalization and transfer to occur. However, when the perceptual similarity between the problems was increased (for example, by using the same goal toy), then even the 10-month-olds were able to transfer the solution from the first to the second problem. Similar results with older toddlers (20-30 months) have been reported by Brown (1989), in a paradigm requiring children to use analogies to select the correct tool out of a varied set of tools to reach for a toy. C. ANALOGY AS A PRIMARY BUILDING BLOCK FOR COGNITION

The infancy research leads to the conclusion that the ability to recognize and use relational similarity may be an innate human skill, and other experiments show that this skill may even be present in some primates (Premack, 1983). Along with associative learning and cause-effect reasoning, it may be an important building block for cognitive development. According to this “relational primacy” view, analogical reasoning (relational or structural mapping) can actively be used to solve problems and to acquire new information as soon as the infant or the young child has represented the relevant relational knowledge. If an analogical reasoning mechanism is present from birth, then its use in

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

99

reasoning and learning will depend crucially on knowledge acquisition and knowledge representation. As children’s knowledge about the world grows, so the structure of their knowledge will change, and deeper or more complex relationships will be represented, enabling deeper or more complex analogies. The argument is not that individual differences in analogical reasoning will not be found. The ability to solve analogies may well vary between individuals of the same age, and between children of different ages. Children with a deeper conceptual understanding of a domain will have represented more of the relationships that hold within that domain, and will be able to solve more complex analogies than children with a shallower understanding. A deeper conceptual understanding may come with age, or with intelligence, or both.

I . Analogies and Conceptual Change The use of analogies in everyday reasoning would in itself be a powerful way of acquiring knowledge about the world. Analogies enable young children to expand their current knowledge of the world by using what they know to make inferences and build hypotheses about what they do not know, and to deepen and extend existing knowledge structures by making relational links within and across domains. Analogies can also enable current knowledge to be restructured, as the right analogy can lead children to appreciate new relationships between familiar concepts. This in turn may result in the emergence of a new and superior conceptual system to describe a certain domain (see Carey, 1985, for an example). Although the role of analogies in promoting conceptual change remains largely unexplored, analogies are known to be important vehicles for conceptual change in the history of science. Here, analogical reasoning has been shown to be at the heart of many important breakthroughs (see Gentner & Jeziorski, 1993; Gordon, 1979). The same may well be true in everyday conceptual development. As analogy continues to be an important vehicle for intellectual change across the life span (Clement, 1981), its developmental role in cognition is not limited to childhood. The role of analogy in the history of science can also be explained in a knowledge-based fashion. Scientific breakthroughs often depend on the right analogy (Gordon, 1979), but the scientists who make the breakthroughs seldom have extra information that is unavailable to their colleagues. Instead, the analogy occurs to them and not to their fellow scientists because of the way that their conceptual understanding of their field is structured, and the richness of their representations. This in turn may be correlated with their intelligence. If intelligence is important, then its importance may explain why classical analogy performance is a good correlate of IQ. We turn now to studies of the role of knowledge acquisition and knowledge representation in children’s analogical reasoning.

Vsha Goswami

III. The Importance of the Knowledge Base in Analogical Reasoning A. RELATIONAL REASONING ABOUT FAMILIAR RELATIONS

The hallmark of analogy is the recognition and application of relational similarity (see Goswami, 1992). Unless children can recognize when problem analogies share relational structure in the base problem and in the target problem, or when the A:B and C:D terms in classical analogies are linked by similar relations, they cannot use an analogy. Children’s ability to apply this “relational similarity constraint” to classical and problem analogies thus provides a measure of analogical understanding. However, in order to study the role of knowledge acquisition and knowledge representation in young children’s analogical reasoning, researchers need to design analogy problems around familiar relations. We need a pure measure of children’s use of the relational similarity constraint, without the impediment of not understanding the relations themselves. Problem analogies do not provide a pure test of relational reasoning, even when relations are familiar, as children may fail to recognize that a particular problem can be solved by an analogy. Classical analogies avoid this problem of knowing that an analogy is required. As the A:B relation is provided for the subject, the requirement to use an analogy is made obvious. Thus as long as familiar relations are used as the basis of classical analogical tasks, a pure test of relational reasoning should be possible. Classical analogies thus provide a measure of children’s merucognitive understanding of analogy. B. CLASSICAL ANALOGIES BASED ON THEMATIC RELATIONS

Goswami and Brown (1990) used the classical analogy method in a study designed to examine the recognition and application of relational similarity by 4and 5-year-old children. In their study, Goswami and Brown designed a series of pictorial A:B::C:D analogies around familiar thematic relations such as fives in. They then tested young children’s ability to choose the correct solution term to each analogy from a set of four pictures, three of which were distractor solutions that destroyed the analogy. This task is a pictorial correlate of the multiple-choice analogies found in IQ tests. For example, for the analogy bird: nesr:: dog: ?, the correct solution was a picture of a dog house (response D in Figure 2). The incorrect solutions were a bone (an associative distractor, response E), a cat (a semantic category distractor, response F), and another dog (a perceptual similarity distractor, response G). The choice of one of these distractors would result in a C:D relation that was dissimilar to the A:B relation, thereby failing to fulfill the relational similarity constraint. In order to select the correct completion term for the analogy, the children

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Developmeni

101

Fig. 2 . The piciure cards used in ihe analogy based on the relation lives in. (From U.Goswami and A . L. Brown, 1990. “Higher-order siruciure and relaiional reasoning: Contrasting analogical and ihemaiic relations.” Cognition, 36, p . 207-226. Copyright 0 1990 by Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. Reprinted by permission.)

had to use the relation linking the A and B terms (lives in) to reject these distractors, thereby reasoning that the dog house was the only correct answer to the analogy. Of the different distractors, the associative match was the most important theoretically, as Piaget had argued that prior to reaching formal operations, younger children solve analogies by using associative strategies (Piaget et al., 1977; see also Sternberg & Nigro, 1980). Children 4, 5 , and 9 years old were tested in the experiment, and all performed at levels significantly above chance, successfully resisting the associative, category, and perceptual distractors. Mean performance levels were 59% correct for the 4-year-olds, 66% correct for the 5-year-olds, and 94% correct for the 9-year-olds.1 The conclusion that the children were selecting the analogical response on the basis of its relational similarity to the A:B pairing was supported by performance in the control condition. In this condition, the children were simply shown the C term of each analogy (e.g., the picture of the dog), and the different solution terms in random order (e.g., the pictures of the bone, dog house, car, and other dog). They were then asked which picture “went best” with the C term. In this control condition, no preference for the analogical response over the associative distractor was found. The frequencies with which the “analogical” response versus the associative response were selected respectively were 39% versus 3 1% (9-year-olds), 32% ’The experiment used a within-subject design, so that half of the children received the analogy condition followed by the control condition, while the other half received the control condition followed by the analogy condition. As significant order effects were found, the analogy data reported are for those children who received the analogy condition first, and the control data reported are for those children who received the control condition first.

102

Usha Goswami

versus 30% (5-year-olds), and 32% versus 23% (4-year-olds). Additionally, although the children readily agreed that another match could be correct in the control condition (9-year-olds: 76%,4-year-olds: 82%), they were not so flexible in the analogy condition, where most of them said that only one answer could be correct (9-year-olds: 89%, 4-year-olds: 60%). These findings provide further evidence that young children understand the relational similarity constraint. 1 . Attributing Analogical Success to Relational Familiarity One drawback of the methodology in this study, however, was that relational familiarity was not measured independently in a separate control task. We simply assumed that familiar relations had been selected for the analogies. This design leaves open the possibility that the younger children may have failed to choose the correct response in some analogy trials because the relations used in those particular analogies were unfamiliar to them. Another possibility is that some children may have failed some analogies because they were actually reasoning about relations that were diferent from those intended by the experimenter. The latter possibility in fact occurred in at least one child, as illustrated by the following verbal protocol from one of our 4-year-olds, Lucas. Lucas was trying to solve the analogy bird: nest:: dog: ?. We had asked him to predict the correct solution to the analogy before looking at the distractors, and Lucas first told us that the correct solution was puppy. He argued, quite logically, “Bird lays eggs in her nest [the nest in the B-term picture contains three eggs]dog-dogs lay babies, and the babies are-umm-and the name of the babies is puppy!” Lucas had used the relation type of ofspring to solve the analogy, and was quite certain that he was correct. He continued, “I don’t have to look [at the distractor pictures]-the name of the baby is puppy!” Once he looked at the different solution options, however, he decided that the dog house was the correct response. This cognitive flexibility displays a full understanding of analogy, and provides evidence of truly mental operations. Lucas first applied the relational similarity constraint to a relation that he had generated himself from the A:B pictures, and then changed his answer according to this constraint when shown that the solution choices did not include a picture of a puppy. As Lucas was unusual in the completeness of his explanations for his choices, however, we cannot tell how frequently other children in the study were failing to solve some of the analogies because they were reasoning about the wrong relations. In order to establish that children’s use of analogical reasoning is knowledge-based, relational knowledge as well as analogical ability needs to be assessed. One way to satisfy this need is to include a control condition designed to assess children’s knowledge of the relations being used in the actual analogies that are presented in the A:B::C:D task.

103

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

C. CLASSICAL ANALOGIES BASED ON CAUSAL RELATIONS

A set of relations that are acquired early in development are physical causal relations. Knowledge of relations like melting, cutting, and wetting is known to develop between 3 and 4 years of age (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982), and so these relations form a useful knowledge base around which to design analogies. Goswami and Brown (1989) took advantage of this early-developing relational domain by using it as a basis for a series of pictorial analogies of the form A:B::C:D, such as chocolate: melted chocolate:: snowman: ?, and Playdoh: cut Playdoh:: apple: ?. Children 3, 4, and 6 years old were tested and asked to select the correct answer to each analogy from a set of five solution pictures presented in a different random order on each trial. In addition to the correct answer (e.g., a cut apple for the cutting analogy, response D in Figure 3), the distractors depicted a different object with an analogical causal change (cut bread, response E), the correct object with a nonanalogical causal change (a bruised apple, response F), a semantic associate of the C term (a banana, response H), and an object of similar appearance to the C term (a ball, response G). Feedback was given on each trial. The knowledge about physical causality that is required to solve such analogies should be present even in the youngest age group tested (3-year-olds). However, in order to make sure, Goswami and Brown included a causal reasoning control condition in their study. In this condition, the children were required to select the causal agent for a particular causal transformation from a set of five pictures. For example, for the cutting analogy they had to select a picture of a

A

B

C

D

Fig. 3. The picture cards used in the analogy based on the cutting relation in the Appearance Same Analogies. From I/. Goswami and A. L. Brown, 1989. Melting chocolate and melting snowmen: Analogical reasoning and causal relations. Cognition, 3 5 , p. 69-95. Copyright 0 1989 by Elsevier Science Publishers 6 .K Reprinted by permission.)

104

Usha Goswami

knife to match a three-picture sequence of a picture of cut Playdoh, a picture of a cut apple, and a picture of cut bread (these pictures were the B and D terms of the relevant analogy, and the wrung object, correct causal change distractor, term E). The important theoretical question was whether individual analogical performance would be significantly related to the children’s knowledge of the relations in the individual analogies. 1 . Correlating Relational Knowledge

with Analogical Success The results showed that both analogical success and causal relational knowledge increased with age. The 3-year-olds solved 52% of the analogies with feedback and 52% of the control sequences, the 4-year-olds solved 89% of the analogies with feedback and 80% of the control sequences, and the 6-year-olds solved 99% of the analogies with feedback and 100% of the control sequences. There was also a significant conditional relationship between performance in the two conditions. The conditional probability of solving a particular analogy sequence given successful performance in the related control sequence was compared to the probability of solving a particular analogy sequence given unsuccessful performance in the related control sequence for the 3- and 4-year-olds, and the relationship was significant for the 4-year-olds, t(22) = 2.25, p < .05, and almost significant for the 3-year-olds, t(26) = 1.91, p < .lo. This finding shows that individual performance in the analogy task was intimately linked to children’s individual knowledge of the corresponding causal relations, and thus supports a fundamental assumption of the “relational primacy” view: Analogical success is highly dependent on relational knowledge. D. TEACHING CHILDREN RELATIONAL KNOWLEDGE

If analogies play a key role in knowledge acquisition as well as being dependent on current knowledge representation, then one can predict that (a) children should make analogies from knowledge that they already possess about a domain to knowledge that they are acquiring, and (b) these analogies may in themselves lead to changes in the structure of the knowledge that the children already possess. One way to test these predictions is to teach children new knowledge about a domain that they already have some knowledge about, and then to study the kinds of analogies they make within this domain. One domain that children begin to learn about early in life is that of natural kinds, and logical reasoning about natural kinds emerges at an early age. Children as young as 3 and 4 years of age can make logical inferences and logical deductions about natural kinds, such as that dogs must have a spleen if people do, and that a shark must breathe under water like other fish do, even if it looks like a dolphin, which comes out of the water to breathe (e.g., Carey, 1985;Gelman

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

105

& Markman, 1986, 1987). The biological domain has a rich causal structure, and young children seem to find it intrinsically interesting. Brown and her colleagues decided to exploit these advantages experimentally, and used the domain of biology to teach 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds new knowledge about natural kinds. 1 . Animal Defense Mechanisms

In one set of studies using the problem analogy paradigm, Brown and Kane (1988) taught the children about animal defense mechanisms such as mimicry and camouflage. For example, the children were told about the hawkmoth caterpillar, which has markings that resemble a poisonous snake on its underside, the porcupine fish, which puffs itself up to twice its normal size and raises spikes to deter its predators, and the crested rat, which can mimic a skunk by parting its hair to reveal skunk-like markings. The children were then questioned to see whether they had reflected on the analogies among these methods of selfdefense. For example, the children were asked whether the stories about the hawkmoth caterpillar and the porcupine fish were the same. Aaron, a 3-year-old, was quite clear that they were. He told the experimenters, “Yes, they are the same-because these guys [the caterpillar and the fish]-both have the same kind of problem-both of them have a mean guy that wants to eat them all up [so] they both get mean and scary so they [predators] run away!” As this protocol makes clear, Aaron had extracted the relational similarity among the stories, and had included analogous relational information such as “make themselves more scary” when storing the factual knowledge that he had acquired about the different animals. Aaron apparently found it easy to integrate this new knowledge with his existing knowledge about the biological domain, and could grasp the relational similarities between the stories without any explicit prompting or instructional hints from the experimenter. Aaron’s extraction of the relation “make themselves more scary” suggests that he was using analogies to structure his knowledge representation. In order to examine children’s use of analogies in knowledge acquisition, Brown and Kane went on to determine whether the children in their study could use analogies to devise solutions for new biological problems.

2 . New Biological Solutions In these analogy transfer studies, Brown and Kane taught children about either the animal defense mechanisms or natural pest control. In the pest control stories, the children learned that farmers use ladybirds to kill aphids on their crops, and that a large weed-eating underwater mammal (the manatee) is used by river authorities to keep waterways clear for boats. This information was imparted through stories about each animal, which also contained information irrelevant to the pest control analogy, such as information about the animal’s habitat and eating preferences. To test analogical transfer, the children were then told about

Usha Goswami

I06

the purple martin, a bird that eats mosquitoes. The story about this bird included the crucial information that it will live in ready-made bird houses. Having heard this story, the children were asked questions such as, “How can a gardener get rid of his mosquitoes?’ The measure of interest was whether the children would realize that the gardener could use an analogous solution to those applied to aphids and water weeds. Eighty percent of the 3- to 5-year-old children in the study made the pest control analogy. An example is given by Jeremy, who said, “Well, he could build a bird house for these purple martins at the bottom of the garden-but I think Raid [an insect spray] is best-but it’s just like the others we talked about, like the ladybugs eating the farmer’s bugs-we talked about this.” These children apparently had little difficulty in appreciating the relational similarity among the different problems, and easily generated analogous solutions in this problem analogy paradigm. Brown (1989) concluded that when knowledge to be transferred consists of a coherent theory or a causal explanation that is understood, the flexible application of prior knowledge to new problems is made very readily. In other words, when relational knowledge is present, the use of analogies in knowledge acquisition and knowledge representation is widely found, even in young children. Nevertheless, both in the studies reported by Brown and in the classical analogy studies reviewed earlier in this section, young children made fewer analogies than older children. Although the research with classical analogies showed that this developmental effect was partly due to younger children’s lower levels of relational knowledge, Brown’s research with problem analogies relied on teaching all the children the relevant relational knowledge, and yet age effects were still found. How can we explain the fact that, even when they possess the requisite relational knowledge, younger children do not always reason by analogy? The answer seems to be a matter of performance rather than a matter of competence. Research has found that a number of different performance factors can prevent spontaneous analogizing, and these performance factors seem to affect younger children more than older children, and older children more than adults. However, the same performance factors affect analogical reasoning across the life span. Some of the most important performance factors are discussed in the next section.

IV. Performance Factors in Analogical Reasoning A. THE ROLE OF PERCEPTUAL OR OBJECT SIMILARITIES

1. The Genie’s Problem

The importance of perceptual similarity as a performance factor in young children’s analogizing first became apparent in studies of problem analogies. In a

Analogical Reasoning and Cognifive Developmenf

107

landmark study of this kind, Holyoak, Junn, and Billman (1984) asked 4- to 6-year-old children to use a base problem involving a genie to solve a target problem involving the transfer of some small rubber balls from one location to another. The balls had to be moved from one bowl on a table, placed within the children’s reach, to another bowl that was out of reach, and the children were not allowed to leave their seats to move the balls. Various tools were provided to help them solve this transportation problem, including scissors, a sheet of paper, string, an aluminum cane, and a cardboard tube. The genie had a transportation problem similar to the children’s. He needed to transfer some precious jewels from one bottle within his reach to another bottle out of reach. One of his solutions (the magic carpet analogy) was to command his magic carpet to roll itself into a tube, so that he could use it as a passage for the jewels. Another (the magic staff analogy) was to use his magic staff to pull the goal bottle nearer to the initial bottle, so that he could transfer his jewels from one to the other. The children were told stories about how the genie solved his problem, and were then asked to devise as many ways of moving the rubber balls as they could imagine. The analogous solutions to the stories were meant to be rolling up the sheet of paper to form a tube through which to roll the rubber balls, and using the cane to pull the distant bowl within reach. Holyoak et al. found that the children were much better at using the Magic Staff analogy than the Magic Carpet analogy, even after receiving strong hints that the genie’s story could help them solve their problem. They concluded that this difference was due to greater perceptual and functional similarity between the Magic Staff and the aluminum cane than between the Magic Carpet and the sheet of paper. The low perceptual and functional similarity between the carpet and the sheet of paper made seeing the analogy difficult, even after a strong hint that the two problems were similar. Holyoak and Koh (1987) later demonstrated similar facilitatory and inhibitory effects of perceptual similarity and dissimilarity on analogical reasoning by adults.

2 . A Relational Shqt from Objects to Relations? The role of perceptual similarity in young children’s analogies has been most comprehensively addressed by Gentner, however, who has proposed that the ability to process object-based commonalities precedes the ability to process relational commonalities (Gentner, 1989). She argues that there is a relational shqt in the development of analogy and metaphor, in which young children focus on common object descriptions (perceptual similarity), whereas older children and adults focus on common relations (Gentner & Rattermann, 1991; Gentner, Rattermann, Markman, & Kotovsky, 1995). Gentner argued that the earliest similarity matches are based on object similarity, such as the similarity between a round red ball and a round red apple. Next, children recognize similarities between object attributes, for example, they recognize that a red ball is like a red toy car. The ability to recognize that relations are similar develops next, begin-

108

Usha Goswami

ning withfirst-order relations. For example, a ball rolling on a table is like a toy car rolling on the floor. Finally, children recognize similarities between higherorder relations. Higher-order relations are relations between first-order relations, such as an apple falling from a tree permitting a cow to reach it, and a book falling from a table permitting a child to reach it (examples from Gentner et al., 1995, pp. 264-265, and Gentner & Rattermann, 1991, p. 228-229). The relational shift is said to be knowledge-based, occurring in different domains at different times. Gentner’s relational shijit theory thus defines a number of different types of object and relational similarity. The emergence of each new type of similarity depends on the acquisition of the preceding type. This sequence is called the logic of representation, and is discussed further in Kotovsky and Gentner (1994). However, the shift is not all-or-none: “The relational shift does not imply the disappearance of object similarity as a psychological factor. Rather, it refers to the possibility of making purely relational matches” (Gentner et al., 1995, p. 275). When an early-developing type of similarity conflicts with a laterdeveloping type of similarity, then Gentner finds that younger children have more difficulty in mapping the higher level of Similarity. For example, when object similarity and the similarity of first-order relations conflict, then younger children’s ability to respond on the basis of relational similarity seems to be impeded, even in a familiar domain (see Rattermann, Gentner, & Deloache, 1987, 1989). Similarly, younger children’s ability to respond to higher-order relations in the face of conflicting first-order relational similarity also seems impeded (see Kotovsky & Gentner, 1990, 1994, reported in Gentner et al., 1995). These effects are quite predictable if perceptual similarity (and possibly first-order relational similarity) are seen as performance factors in relational mapping tasks.

3. “Cross-Mapping” Studies Gentner and Rattermann (1991) also argued that the important role played by object similarities in younger children’srelational reasoning has been obscured in most current analogy research via the reliance on analogies in which object similarity and relational similarity are correlated (p. 235). In order to try to disentangle the effects of object similarity and relational similarity in younger children’s analogical mappings, Gentner and her group have conducted a series of problem analogy experiments using cross-mapping tasks. In cross-mapping tasks, object similarities support one base-to-target mapping, and relational similarities support another. Correct performance depends on ignoring the misleading object mappings and responding on the basis of relations. For example, in one of the first cross-mapping studies, Gentner and Toupin (1986) asked 6- and 8-year-old children to map stories based on animal characters involving a hero, a villain, and a friend to new sets of animal characters by acting out the stories with the new characters. In the correlated perceptual

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Developmeni

109

similarity condition, the new animals looked similar to the original cast; for example, the hero role (seal) was filled by a walrus, thefriend role (penguin) was filled by a seagull, and the villain role (dog) was filled by a cat. In the crossmapping condition, the new animals looked similar to the members of the original cast, but were assigned conflicting roles (e.g., seal role filled by cat, penguin role filled by walrus, dog role filled by seagull). In a low perceptual similarity control condition, the animals in each story did not resemble each other at all. Relational similarity was manipulated by selectively including a causal or moral summary statement at the end of each story that explained the characters’ behavior. In line with the relational shift hypothesis, the 6-year-olds had much more difficulty in mapping the story to the new animal characters in the cross-mapping condition. They tended to transfer the story to the new characters on the basis of similarity of appearance, for example erroneously assigning the seal role to the walrus rather than to the cat. The 8-year-olds did not show an effect of object similarity. They were able to make relational mappings in the cross-mapping condition almost as frequently as in the correlated similarity condition (in which the analogy could be solved correctly by using object similarities). However, this apparent relational shift may have occurred because the children had to understand the moral or causal summary statement at the end of the story in order to use the relational similarity as a basis for correct mappings. In the story example given by Gentner and Toupin, the moral is based on the complex emotion of jealousy, which is not well understood by 6-year-olds, although it is understood by 8-year-olds (e.g., Harris, 1989). In the absence of relational knowledge, not surprisingly, the younger children relied on object mappings-after all, they had no other basis for transferring the stories to the new characters. To test the idea that object similarities are a performance factor in younger children’s analogies, one really needs a cross-mapping study based on familiar relations. 4 . Cross-Mapping Familiar Relations Such a study was conducted by Rattermann et al. (1987, 1989), who used a find-the-sticker task to investigate cross-mappings in 3- and 4-year-old children. In this task, both the child and the experimenter were given a row of three objects that increased monotonically in size. The child had to find a sticker hidden under one object in their row of three objects by mapping from the corresponding hiding place in the experimenter’s row. The correct mapping was meant to be based on the presumably familiar relation of relative size. If the two arrays contained objects (e.g., plastic boxes) of sizes 1, 2, 3 and 2, 3, 4 respectively, and the sticker was under object 2 in the first array, then the child was meant to look under object 3 in the second array (these being the two boxes of medium size). The rows were arranged so that the objects fanned out along two sides of an imaginary triangle, thereby potentially obscuring the 1:1 spatial correspondence between the hiding locations (spatial location was an alternative relation that

I10

Ushu Goswami

could have been used to find the sticker). In this neutral object condition, the 3-year-olds made relational mappings on 54% of trials, and the 4-year-olds on 62% of trials, suggesting that the relation of relative size was not particularly salient in this task. To create a cross-mapping condition, highly distinctive objects were used in each row, and were again placed in a staggered order. For example, if the child’s row contained a toy car (size l), a coffee mug (size 2), and a model house (size 3), then the experimenter’s row might contain an identical coffee mug (size 2), an identical model house (size 3), and a flowerpot (size 4). The experimental task is shown in Figure 4. To make relational mappings, the children were meant to ignore the similarity in the appearance of the noncorresponding objects, and to search for the sticker on the basis of relative size (e.g., car, mug,house maps to mug, house, flowerpot). The results showed that object similarity did not affect the relational mappings of the 4-year-olds, but had a devastating effect on the 3-year-olds, who responded on the basis of object similarity. This finding is in line with relational shift theory. Rattermann et al. concluded that younger children’s performance was impeded when object similarity did not support the intended relational mappings. However, the relational shift in this case may be more apparent than real. In the original find-the-sticker task, the children were not explicitly told that the correct solution was to map relative size, although they were given feedback about the correct hiding location on each trial. In a later experiment, when Rattermann et al. did make it explicit that the sticker was always under the object

3

4

0

0

1

2

Fig. 4 . A mapping trial from the cross-mapping task used by Rattermann, Gentner, and Deloache, 1989. (Reproduced with permission.)

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

111

of the same relative size (by labeling both sets of objects as Daddy, Mommy, Baby), the 3-year-olds mapped relations very efficiently. Gentner and Toupin’s study and the work of Rattermann et al. thus point to the conclusion that younger children’s relational mapping ability may only decline in the face of competing object similarity when the relations underlying the analogies have not been grasped or understood. This would be in line with a strong knowledge-based account of the relational shift, which would not predict agedependent performance decrements in tasks using highly familiar relations, even when lower-order similarity conflicts with higher-order similarity. This interpretation of Gentner’s data supports Holyoak’s conclusion that perceptual similarity is a p e ~ o r m a n c efactor rather than a competence factor in young children’s relational reasoning (see Daehler & Chen, 1993; Pierce & Gholson, 1994, for other studies of the effects of perceptual similarity on relational mappings). Perceptual similarity can facilitate relational reasoning, but it is not a prerequisite for analogy when relations are familiar. B . “LEARNING-TO-LEARN EFFECTS AND INSTRUCTION ABOUT PROBLEM SIMILARITY

The provision of multiple exemplars of an analogy is another factor that can help to facilitate the use of analogical reasoning by children (and by adults, Gick & Holyoak, 1983), especially if explicit instruction in problem similarity is also provided. Again, the importance of this performance factor in young children’s relational reasoning was discovered in experiments on problem analogies. I . The A-B-A-C Paradigm In one set of such experiments, Brown, Kane, and Long (1989) used an extension of the genie paradigm introduced by Holyoak et al. (1984). Brown et al. devised variants of the “rolling” solution used by the genie, namely an Easter Bunny transporting eggs through a rolled-up blanket and a farmer transporting chemes through a rolled-up rug. Seven-year-old children were given the original genie problem (Problem A), and children who faltered were given the Easter Bunny problem (Problem B) and were shown how the bunny solved his problem by rolling up his blanket. They were then retested with the genie problem, and were told that now they knew how to help the genie, as the two problems were just the same. Finally, they were given the Farmer problem (Problem C) to solve unaided. Brown et al. called this the A-B-A-C paradigm, arguing that this paradigm modeled the use of analogies in classroom teaching. In the classroom, children who fail a particular kind of problem are usually given an example of a similar problem along with its solution, and are then given increasingly strong hints about problem similarity until they succeed in solving the first problem.

112

Usha Goswami

They are then expected to show spontaneous transfer to new, analogous problems. The children in the Brown et al. study showed a strong learning-to-learn effect. Analogical transfer was measured by the children’s use of the rolling solution. By the third problem (Problem C), transfer of the rolling solution was at 98%. With only one prior analog of the “rolling” solution, transfer was at 46%. A control group who did not receive hints that the problems were the same showed only 20% transfer with one prior analog, and 39% transfer with two prior analogs. These results suggest two conclusions. One is that transfer is greater when two analogies are provided instead of one. The other is that providing multiple exemplars of an analogy is not necessarily in itself sufficient to generate high levels of transfer. In order to learn by analogy, children may need instruction about problem similarity as well as multiple exemplars of analogous problems (see also Chen & Daehler, 1989; Gholson, Eymard, Morgan, & Kamhi, 1987). 2. The A1A2 - BIB2 - C1C2 Paradigm In the A-B-A-C paradigm, however, the solution to be transferred is always the same (the rolling solution). Thus, the learning-to-learn effect could be specific to learning and applying a particular solution, or it could be more general, teaching the children to look for analogies. To examine this issue, a paradigm is needed in which the solution to be transferred changes as the children learn more analogies. Brown and Kane (1988) devised a new story-mapping paradigm, the Al-A2, B1B2, Cl-C2 paradigm, to find out whether learning-to-learn effects are specific or general, and used simple physical relations as bases for the analogies. The physical relations chosen for the analogy pairs were stacking (e.g., stacking hay bales or tires to reach something high up), swinging (e.g., using a tree branch or a telephone wire to swing over a divide), and pulling (e.g., using a spade or a fishing rod to pull someone to safety). The children were first told about problem A1 and its solution (e.g., stacking), and were then given problem A2, which required an analogous solution (also stacking). Next they heard about problem B 1, and then tried to solve problem B2 unaided, and finally they heard about problem C 1, and then tried to solve problem C2 unaided. After solving each problem pair, the children (3- to 5-year-olds) were asked to tell how the problems in the pair were alike. Brown and Kane were most interested in performance on problem C2, by which time they reasoned that the children should have formed a learning set to look for analogies. The results showed that children of all ages were highly successful on problem C2: Problem C2 was solved by 85% of the 3-year-olds, 95% of the 4-year-olds, and 100% of the 5-year-olds. Brown and Kane concluded that in addition to learning to use relational similarity within each problem pair (using A1 to solve A2, B 1 to solve B2, and C 1 to solve C2), the children were abstracting a general notion of problem-solving-by-analogy by being in the experiment, and that this

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

113

abstract general notion explained the extremely high levels of transfer in the final problem pair. Brown and Kane’s work thus suggests that learning-to-learn effects occur at more than one level. Multiple examples of a single analogy benefit learning (A-B-A-C), but so do multiple examples of analogy (Al-A2, Bl-B2, Cl-C2). C. POSITIVE VERSUS NEGATIVE ANALOGIES

A third important performance factor in young children’s analogizing is whether the analogy is positive or negative. Some analogies can be misleading, as they may appear to be relevant to the target problem (perhaps because they share perceptual similarities with it), but may actually be quite inappropriate as a basis for solving the problem. In fact, accessing a negative analogy to a given problem can impede a correct solution. 1 . Devising Negative Analogies Chen and Daehler (1989) investigated the effects of positive and negative analogies on young children’s analogical reasoning in a problem analogy paradigm that required 6-year-old children to extract a bead from a narrow glass cylinder without inverting it. The cylinder was 12” deep and 2” wide, and the bead was floating in a small amount of water at the bottom. Various tools were provided, including a cup of water, scissors, a hammer, two sticks, and a short spoon. Two different solutions were possible with these tools. One involved adding more water to the cylinder until the bead floated to the top and could be manually removed, and the other required connecting the spoon to one of the sticks to make a tool long enough to reach the bead. Two groups of children were informed about one or other of these solutions via analogy stories. One analogy story was about someone retrieving a Ping-Pong ball from a hole by pouring water into the hole, and the other was about a monkey that retrieved food placed outside its cage by joining two sticks together so that it could reach the food. The valency of these analogies to the target problem was manipulated by varying the adequacy of the solution tools provided. For one subgroup of children who had heard the Ping-Pong ball story, sufficient water was provided in the cup to bring the bead to the top of the cylinder (positive analogy group), and for a second subgroup (negative analogy group) the water was insufficient. Similarly, for one subgroup of children who had heard the monkey story, the spoon could be attached to the stick that was provided (positive analogy group), and for a second subgroup it could not (negative analogy group). Chen and Daehler predicted that hearing one solution when only the other was practicable would impede solution of the target problem. This prediction was confirmed. Sixty percent of the children who received a positive analogy solved the bead extraction problem, compared to 29% of children in a control group

114

Usha Goswami

who heard a neutral story, and only 8% of the children who received a negative analogy solved the problem. Positive analogies significantly enhanced the children’s performance, and negative analogies significantly impeded it.

2 . Negative Analogies in the Real World Negative analogies can also have serious consequences for real-world reasoning. Spiro, Feltovich, Coulson, and Anderson (1989) showed that medical students are sometimes taught about the human body by misleading analogies that then seriously affect their understanding of conditions like heart disease. For example, a popular analogy for the failing heart is to liken it to a stretched-out, saggy balloon. This analogy gives the students a good mental image of a failing heart (it has high surface similarity), yet it leads the students to form an incorrect picture of the causal mechanisms underlying heart failure (as it has no relational similarity). The failing heart actually gains passive tension, and an overstretched balloon loses it. Thus, students who infer from the analogy that stretching of the heart wall causes the heart to fail in the same way as a balloon are incorrect. Another example of the influence of negative analogies in students’ incorrect causal inferences is given by Lamsfuss and Wilkening (199 l), who studied children’s intuitive understanding of physics. They showed that the children’s understanding of certain elementary physical properties could be seriously impeded by their spontaneous generation of inappropriate analogies. For example, in a problem about the action of two forces on an object, in which the forces were represented by weights, many children used a balance scale analogy. They wrongly assumed that only the greater force would affect the object, by analogy to the fact that only the greater weight affects a balance scale. In fact, both forces must be considered when computing the net effect on the object. As in the Spiro et al. example, high surface similarity resulted in the selection of a misleading analogy, and this negative analogy led to inappropriate inferences about causal structure. Given the strong likelihood that children (and adults) possess much knowledge that is actively misleading in analogical terms, this performance factor may be particularly important for the role of analogies in cognitive development and deserves further study.

V. Halford’s Structure-Mapping Theory of Logical Development A. RELATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND ANALOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

Having established that analogy is an early-developing reasoning ability that is available in infancy, and having shown that the use of analogy is affected by a

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

115

variety of performance factors, let us now consider in more detail how analogies may facilitate cognitive development. As noted in the introduction, an elegant theory of how analogical reasoning may contribute to cognitive development has been proposed by Halford (1987, 1992, 1993). Halford’s basic claim is that much logical reasoning is analogical. According to his theory, children can use representations of everyday relational structures as a basis for analogies to new, isomorphic problems that share the same relational structures. As pointed out in the Introduction, such instance-based reasoning would enable the extraction of general solution principles, which in turn could be one source of the abstract logical rules proposed by Piaget. 1. Relational Complexity and Transitive Inference Problems

Halford’s most comprehensive application of structure-mapping theory to logical development concerns the solution of Piagetian transitive inference problems. He pointed out that in order to solve a transitive inference problem of the form Tom is happier than Bill, Bill is happier than John, who is happiest? a child can use an analogy from a familiar ordered structure that may already be represented in memory, such as the ordering structure A above B above C . To make the analogy, the child must process these relations in parallel in active or primary memory (the memory which holds any information actively being processed), mapping the relation higher than into the relation happier than. This mapping operation is crucially dependent on the processing capacity that is available in active memory. Processing capacity is thought to increase with age (see also Pascual-Leone, 1987; and Case, 1985, for related but different accounts of processing capacity). According to Halford, as younger children lack the capacity to represent complex relations such as, “A above B above C” in parallel, information-processing capacity limitations will constrain the kinds of analogies that children can make at different points in development. 2 . Relational Complexity and Processing Capacity In Halford’s account, therefore, knowledge of an appropriate relational structure like A above B above C does not in itself enable logical development via analogies. The key developmental factor is the relational complexity of the analogy. If relational complexity overloads available processing space, then children cannot make relational mappings. Relational complexity is determined by the number of relations in an analogy. Simple relational reasoning is claimed to emerge at around age 2, when sufficient processing capacity has developed for analogies based on single relations (Halford called these relational or binary mappings). The processing capacity needed for analogies based on pairs of relations develops at around age 5 (system or ternary mappings), and the processing capacity needed for analogies based on more than two relations develops only in early adolescence (multiple system mappings). So according to Halford, analo-

I16

Usha Goswami

gies with a progressively more complex relational structure can be solved only as children get older and the processing capacity that they have available in active memory increases. However, capacity limitations may be circumvented in certain situations by conceptual chunking (see Halford, 1993, for an explanation of this). I can illustrate the implications of Halford’s theory for the role of analogies in cognitive development by returning to the transitive inference problem about Tom, Bill, and John. In order to use an analogy from the ordered structure A above B above C to solve this transitive inference problem, the children need to process two relations at once, the relation that A is above B, and the relation that B is above C. As the processing capacity required to map ordered pairs of relations does not develop until around 5 years of age, Halford’s theory predicts that children will not solve transitive inference problems until around 5 years of age (Halford, 1993). Many experimental studies support this second conclusion (see Breslow, 1981). In fact, the solution of problems based on most of the Piagetian concrete operations require analogical mappings involving pairs of relations (another example discussed in detail by Halford is class inclusion). Halford’s analogical model of logical development is thus quite in keeping with Piaget’s central notion of age-based cognitive change: The age-related advances in logical development proposed by Piaget are preserved by the age-related changes in processing capacity proposed by Halford. B. STRUCTURE-MAPPING THEORY

VERSUS RELATIONAL PRIMACY

Halford’s structure-mapping theory of logical development is thus rather different from the relational primacy theory of analogical development put forward so far in this chapter. Although both theories agree that knowledge plays a role in analogizing, that analogies from known structures can be used as a basis for solving structurally similar problems, and that this analogizing is a crucial process in cognitive development, relational primacy theory proposes that analogical reasoning is present from birth, and that its role in cognitive development is knowledge-dependent. Halford accepts that analogy is a very basic process, but his theory proposes that age-related changes in processing capacity govern analogical success. The main point of disagreement between the two theories, therefore, concerns the role accorded to relational complexity in determining children’s ability to use relational mappings. According to relational primacy theory, relational mapping is governed by the richness of the representation of the relations in the analogy in semantic memory and their familiarity to the child. If children have represented the relations required for the analogy, such as the hypothetical spatial ordering structure A above B above C, then analogical ability per se should not be affected by the fact

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

I17

that this representation is relationally complex. Relationalfamiliarity may vary with relational complexity, of course, as complex relations may be more difficult to represent. The performance factors discussed in section I11 may also affect analogies based on complex relations to a greater extent than analogies based on simpler relations. However, these problems should affect the eficiency of analogical reasoning rather than prevent its use altogether. According to Halford’s theory, in contrast, it is the representation of complex relations in active memory that is the problem for young children who wish to use analogies. Halford predicts that only older children should be able to solve relationally complex analogies, irrespective of the familiarity of the relations in these analogies. According to Halford’s theory, the effects of relational familiarity are moderated by processing capacity. C. STUDIES OF TERNARY RELATIONAL MAPPINGS

IN YOUNG CHILDREN

I . Ternary Relational Mappings about Spatial Relations In order to decide which view of analogical development is better supported, it is necessary to look in some detail at when children begin to solve “relationally complex” analogies. Unfortunately, very little relevant research has been done. All of the examples of analogy discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter involved single (binary) relations, and thus Halford would expect them to be well within the competence of children as young as 2 years of age. A binary relation relates two elements, as in larger than (dog, lump), or higher than (dot, line). Analogies that are relationally more complex involve pairs of relations, or ternary relations. Ternary relations relate three elements, as in taller than (Daddy, Mummy, Baby), or happier than (Tom, Bill, John). The examples of ternary relational mappings discussed by Halford all require the mapping of ordered triples, and hence require enough processing capacity to process pairs of relations in parallel. As outlined above, according to Halford’s theory relational complexity should interact with age (see Halford et al., 1995). Halford’s own experiments on the development of ternary relational mappings indeed indicate such an interaction. The most widely cited of these experiments concerns the transitive inference task. For example, Halford (1984) asked children to map the spatial relation “left of” to the relation “longer than” by mapping the spatial relations between colored pegs on a peg board to the length of colored rods concealed in tubes. If a red peg was to the left of a blue peg (R,B), and a blue peg was to the left of a green peg (B,G), the children had to work out that the red rod was longer than the blue rod (R > B), and the blue rod was longer than the green rod (B > G). Integration of the two spatial relations RLB and B,G gave the ordered triple RLBLG, and so the answer to the rod problem was that R > B > G. Most children under 7 could not map this complex spatial relation to

118

Usha Goswami

the rods, although they could solve analogies based on single relations, such as that if R,B, then R > B. Halford concluded that younger children could not make analogies on the basis of integrated pairs of relations because of limitations in available processing capacity. However, another possibility is that young children may have a special difficulty in integrating pairs of left-right spatial relations. Ding (1995) has shown that even 7-year-old children have difficulty in combining binary premises that involve a left-right ordering. She used a task in which children were asked to determine the order of people in a bus queue. The children were shown pictures of pairs of people in the queue, facing to the left, and had to work out the order of the complete queue from three premise pairs. Ding found that successful orderings of the whole queue depended critically on the order in which the premise information was given. Even 9-year-olds found the bus queue task extremely difficult when certain premise orderings were presented, despite the fact that premise presentation was serial, and thus enabled sequential relational integration. Left-right spatial relations may thus be particularly difficult relations for young children to integrate. In contrast, Pears and Bryant (1990) have shown that even 4-and 5-year-olds can integrate pairs of up-down binary spatial relations, and will use these as a basis for a transitive inference that results in an ordered triple. In their task, children were shown pairs of colored bricks that were placed one on top of the other, such as red-on-top-of-blue (RTB), and BTG. The children had to integrate these relations to build an ordered stack of three bricks, such as RTBTG, and they did so very successfully. The ability to combine binary premise information into an ordered triple appears to be well within the spatial reasoning power of young children when the spatial relation is up-down or on top-beneath. 2 . Ternary Relational Mappings about Family Relations Another way to examine the development of ternary relational mappings is to use highly familiar relational schemas that are already represented in semantic memory as a basis for the required mappings. Family relations are a rich source of relational schemas. Family members provide a familiar example of an ordering schema based on size, as in most families the father (F) is taller than the mother (M), and the mother is taller than the young child (C). Families also provide a familiar example of an inclusive relationship, as family members can be divided into two distinct subsets, parents and children, both of whom are members of the total set of family members. If knowledge of the familiar relational structures F > M > C or parents 3 family C children are sufficient to support ternary relational mappings, then according to the relational primacy view of analogical development, children younger than 5 who have mentally represented these relational structures should be able to use them as a basis for analogies to different types of logical problems.

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

119

a. Goldilocks and the Three Bears. I have examined this hypothesis using Goldilocks and the Three Bears as a familiar example of family size relations (Daddy Bear > Mummy Bear > Baby Bear, see Goswami, 1995), and families of toy animals as familiar examples of class inclusion relations (Goswami, Pauen, & Wilkening, 1996). For example, in the third of three experiments on family size relations, 3- and 4-year-old children were asked to use the relational structure represented by the Three Bears as a basis for solving serial ordering problems involving perceptual dimensions such as temperature, loudness, intensity, and width. The test of ternary relational mapping was to ask the children to imagine going to the Three Bears’ house, and then to imagine looking at their different belongings. This imagination task formed the basis of the relational mappings. For example, the imaginary bowls of the Three Bears’ porridge could be either boiling hot, hot, or warm, and the child had to decide which bowl of porridge belonged to which bear. In order to give the correct answer, the child had to map the transitive height ordering of Daddy, Mummy, and Baby Bear to the different porridge temperatures, giving Daddy Bear the boiling hot pomdge, Mummy Bear the hot porridge, and Baby Bear the warm porridge (these mappings do not follow the original fairy tale, in which Daddy Bear’s porridge was too salty, and Mummy Bear’s was too sweet). The percentage of correctly ordered mappings approached ceiling for the 4-year-olds for most of the dimensions used (see Table I). The lowest levels of performance occurred for width (of beds, 62% correct), and hardness (of chairs, 76% correct), and the highest occurred for temperature (of porridge, 95% correct). Performance with the hardness dimension seemed to be affected by a mapping from the Three Bears story, in which Mummy Bear owns the soft chair. In our ordering (hard chair, chair that is a bit hard and a bit soft, soft chair), the soft chair was intended for Baby Bear. Performance with the width dimension

TABLE I Percentage of Correct Relational Mappings by Age Three Bears Perceptual Dimensions Task, Goswami (1995)

4-year-olds Correct Inverse Other 3-yedr-olds Correct Inverse Other

Loudness

Pitch

Hardness

Temperature

Salty

Width

Height

86 0 14

95 5 0

76 5 19

95 0 5

95 0

81

5

62 5 33

15 0 85

31 0 69

15 8 77

31

8 15 77

15 8 77

62 0 38

15

54

5 14

I20

Usha Goswami

(wide bed, medium bed, narrow bed) was possibly affected by worries that a baby could fall out of a narrow bed, as many children allocated the medium bed to Baby Bear. They were then left without a bed for Mummy Bear. The 3-year-olds produced correctly ordered mappings for only some of the dimensions, performance being above chance (17%) for the dimensions of temperature of porridge (31% correct), pitch of voice (31% correct), and height of mirrors (62% correct, but an isomorphic relation). Relational familiarity and real-world knowledge about family size relations might have helped the 3-yearolds with these particular dimensions. They may have believed that grown-ups in general like to eat hotter food, and they would know from experience that daddies have deeper voices and that a daddy would need a mirror that was higher up. The children are unlikely to have based their correct mappings on the story, as none of these dimensions was mentioned in the Three Bears book that was read to them as part of the study. b. Family membership as an inclusive set. Successful relational mappings were also found in a class inclusion study which used the family as a familiar example of inclusive relations (Goswami, Pauen, & Wilkening, 1996). All of the subjects (4- and 5-year-olds) had first been given the traditional class inclusion task as a pretest (based on red and white flowers), which they had failed to solve correctly. Half of the children (experimental group) were then introduced to four families of toys, which could be used as a basis for analogies to further traditional class inclusion problems based on collections of balloons, drinking straws, and building blocks. The other half of the children (control group) were given the new class inclusion problems without experiencing the toy families. The children who had learned the family analogy were significantly better at solving the new class inclusion problems than the control children. However, performance only differed significantly from that of the control group after the experimental group were given a hint about problem similarity by the experimenter (a performance factor-see section IV). Prior to receiving the hint, very few children thought of using the analogy. These sets of studies appear to contradict Halford’s idea that capacity limitations prevent younger children from using system mappings involving complex relational structures prior to certain ages. However, it should be pointed out that some of the 4-year-old children in experiment 3 of the Three Bears study were nearly 5 , with a mean age of 4 years 11 months, range 4 years 8 months to 5 years 1 month (G. S. Halford, pers. comm., October 1994). Halford also argues that it is possible that the children in this study may have been “chunking” pairs of relations into a single relation, thereby reducing the relational complexity of the task (for example, comparing Daddy Mummy Bear to Baby Bear). Finally, as noted in Goswami (1995), transfer from previously experienced mapping tasks could have aided mapping performance in the imagination task. The children in

+

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

121

the Three Bears experiment had previously mapped bear size to cup size (using plastic stacking cups) and to proportional stimuli (using pictures of glasses of lemonade and pieces of pizza). Experience of these concrete ternary relational mappings prior to making the mental mappings may have boosted performance in the perceptual dimensions task (see Goswami, 1995, for a fuller discussion). 3 . Ternary Relational Mappings about Causal Relations A different way of testing Halford’s claim that age and relational complexity should interact is to examine children’s ability to map pairs of relations in the classical analogy task. The classical task provides a pure test of mapping ability, as the need to map the relation linking the A and B terms in the analogy to the C and D terms is made clear by the task format, thereby avoiding the problems of access that are inherent in problem analogy tasks. Prior studies with the classical task have required children to map a single relation from the A:B pair to the C:D pair (binary relational mappings). However, the task can easily be extended to investigate the mapping of pairs of relations by linking the A and B terms by two relations rather than one. Children’s ability to make ternary relational mappings can then be compared with their ability to map binary relations. Goswami, Leevers, Pressley, and Wheelwright (1996) designed a set of analogies based on pairs of physical causal relations, extending the technique used by Goswami and Brown (1989). We asked 3-, 4-, 5 - , and 6-year-old children to make relational mappings based on either single causal relations like cut, paint, and wet, or pairs of causal relations, like cur wet and mend + painr.-Halford’s capacity limitation theory and Goswami’s relational primacy theory lead to different predictions about performance in this paradigm. Halford’s account predicts an interaction between age and relational complexity, as already noted. In contrast, Goswami’s account predicts that younger children should make analogies based on pairs of relations as successfully as analogies based on single relations, as long as they have the requisite relational knowledge. Knowledge about physical causal relations can be assumed to be present by at least age 4 (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Goswami & Brown, 1989). Our experiment had four conditions, a single-relation analogy condition (e.g., apple: cut apple:: hair: cut hair), a double-relation analogy condition (e.g., apple: cut, wet apple:: hair: cur, wet hair), a single-relation control condition (requiring the children to reason about single relations in a nonanalogy task), and a double-relation control condition (requiring the children to reason about pairs of relations in a nonanalogy task) (Figure 5). The conditions were administered in a within-subject design in a counterbalanced order.2 In the analogy condition,

+

*We had initially planned to ask the 3-year-olds to complete all four conditions in order to maintain the within-subject design. However, it proved impossible to persuade most of the children to persevere with the task throughout four sessions, and so the 3-year-old children either received the two single relation conditions, or the two double relation conditions.

122

Usha Goswami

C

B

A

D

E

F

G

Fig. 5 . The picture cards used in the analogy based on the relation cut + wet in the Two Causal Relations task used by Goswami. Leevers, Pressley. and Wheelwright, 1995.

the children had to select the correct solution picture to each analogy from a set of four possible answers presented in a random order. These depicted respectively (a) the correct pair of causal changes (e.g., cut, wet hair, response D in Figure 5 ) , (b) an incorrect pair of causal changes (e.g., cut hair and made-up face, response E), (c) a single causal change (e.g., cut hair, response F), and (d) the other single causal change (e.g., wet hair, response G). The same distractors were used in both analogy conditions, and so the only difference between the two types of analogy lay in the number of relations depicted in the A:B pairing. Close attention to the A:B pair was thus required in order to decide whether the correct solution was picture D (double-relation analogy condition) or picture F (singlerelation analogy condition). In the control conditions, the children were asked to select the picture of the causal agent or the pair of causal agents responsible for the causal changes shown in the analogies, following Goswami and Brown (1989). Children’s performance in the analogy and the control conditions as a function of Condition and Age is shown in Table 11. The table shows that the older children were almost as good at solving analogies based on pairs of relations (ternary relational mappings) as analogies based on single relations (binary relational mappings). The 3-year-olds performed at chance levels in all of the conditions except the single-relation control condition. An analysis of the data for the 4-, 5,and 6-year-olds showed that relational complexity did not interact with age, although the older children solved more analogies than the younger children. This pattern of performance appears to support the relational primacy knowledge-based account of analogical development over Halford’s capacitylimitation account. The study revealed no change in processing capacity at age 5 ,

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

123

TABLE I1 Number of Correct Responses in the Goswami, Leevers, Pressley, and Wheelwright Experiment as a Function of Age and Condition out of 6 Age 3 Yr 4 Yr 5 Yr

6 Yr

Single relation analogies

Single relation control

Double relation analogies

Double relation control

2.00 (1.20) 3.08 (1.35) 4.29 (1.71) 5.31 (0.95)

2.75 (1.39) 3.75 (1.54) 4.58 (1.35) 5.25 (1.13)

0.75 (0.89) 3.00 (1.96) 3.71 (1.78) 4.69 (1.49)

1.88 (1.64)

3.00 (1.47) 4.42 (1.14) 5.44 ( I .03)

Norr. Standard deviations in parentheses

suggesting that relational complexity does not affect children’s ability to perform a relational mapping per se. Once familiar relations form the basis of a relational mapping, then relational complexity does not appear to be a competence factor in younger children’s analogical reasoning. Relational complexity did affect the e@ciency of the children’s analogical mappings, however, and this effect was found across the different age groups included in the analysis (4-, 5- and 6-year-olds only). Relational complexity affected performance via the order in which the different conditions were received. This is shown in Table 111. Children who received the double-relation

TABLE Ill Percentage of Correct Responses in the Goswami, Leevers, Pressley, and Wheelwright Experiment as a Function of Condition and Order (4-, 5 - , and 6-Year-Old Data)u Order

Single relation analogies

Single relation control

Double relation analogies

Double relation control

I

64.8

2 3 4

72.2 65.7 79.2

69.4 69.9 83.3 79.2

68.1 52.3 78.2 54.6

73. I 66.2 76.4 69.6

,

4 A . single analogy; SR. single relation; DA, double analogy; DR. double relation. Order 1-SA. Order 2-DA, DR. SA. SR; Order 3-SR, SA. DR, DA; Order 4-DR. DA. SR. SA.

SR. DA, DR;

I24

Usha Goswumi

analogies prior to the single-relation conditions showed depressed performance levels with the double-relation analogies. A similar effect occurred for the singlerelation analogies when they were received first, although the magnitude of the effect was much smaller. These order effects suggest a learning-to-learn effect of being in the experiment. As seen in section IV, learning-to-learn effects are a performance factor in young children’s analogies. However, precisely because learning-to-learn is a performance factor rather than a competence factor, this effect of relational complexity does not support Halford’s limited capacity theory of analogical development. Although relational complexity may affect the ease and e#ciency of relational mapping in young children, it does not prevent younger children from making ternary relational mappings.

VI. The “Relational Primacy” View of Analogical Development and the Development of Logical Reasoning The research discussed so far has shown that when familiar examples of ternary relational structures are used as a basis for ternary relational mappings, such as family size relations, or when these mappings depend on familiar pairs of relations, such as causal relations, then processing capacity does not constrain analogical reasoning in any simple way. These findings appear to indicate that no currently proposed competence factors prevent the use of analogies by young children. Thus, although children’s analogical performance can be constrained by perjiormance factors, such as perceptual similarity and relational complexity, analogies are available very early in the development of everyday reasoning and learning. Perhaps the best way to decide whether the relational primacy view really does provide the best description of the role of analogies in cognitive development is to choose a domain of early-developing knowledge, and then to examine children’s use of analogies with a fixed set of relations within that domain. By using the same relations as a basis for the analogies, factors such as relational complexity and lower-order similarity can be varied while holding knowledge constant. As noted in section II, a useful domain of early-developing relational knowledge is that of natural kinds. A. THE NATURAL KINDS EXPERIMENTS

Familiar real-world natural kinds such as plants and animals offer many opportunities for relational comparisons. For example, all these natural kinds increase in height and width as a result of growth, and some change in color saturafion. A

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

I25

growing tree gets taller and wider, and a ripening tomato gets redder. Experimental work by Rosengren, Gelman, Kalish, and McCormick (1991) has shown that 4-year-olds expect bears and squirrels to get larger as they grow older, but not tea kettles or lightbulbs (artifacts). Children’s developing ontological knowledge about natural kinds thus provides a useful basis for designing a relational mapping task. The relations of height, width, and saturation can be depicted by using familiar natural kinds, and can be represented either as binary relations (e.g., pig: fat pig), or as ternary relations (e.g., pig: fat pig:fattest pig). According to Halford’s limited capacity theory of analogical development, analogies based on the former should be easier than analogies based on the latter.

I . Natural Kinds and the Relational Shifi Natural kinds analogies also allow one to investigate the effects of lower-order and higher-order relational similarity as defined by Gentner. Gentner’s definition of relational complexity depends on predicate structure. As shown in section 111, Gentner argued that a relational shift occurs in children’s similarity-based reasoning, first from object-based similarity to relational similarity, and then from simplerfirst-order relational similarity to more complex higher-order relational similarity. First-order relational similarity is present when relations take objects as arguments, as in bigger than [a, b]. Higher-order relational similarity is present when relations take propositions as arguments, as in bigger than (a, b) and bigger than (b, c). Although Gentner’s first-order relations are defined in a very similar way to Halford’s binary relations, and her higher-order relations are defined in a very similar way to Halford’s ternary relations, Gentner differed from Halford in her claims about the role of relational complexity in analogical reasoning. For Gentner, relational complexity affects younger children’s analogies because only individuals who have knowledge of higher-order structure can make relational mappings when lower-order relations conflict with this structure. The relational shift thus derives from the acquisition of higher-order structure. As younger children tend to lack higher-order domain knowledge, they have difficulty in mapping higher-order relations when lower-order relations do not support the higher-order mapping. This is the logic of representation, in which command of the higher levels of similarity-based reasoning depends on command of the lower levels (in Gentner’s model, higher-order relations are represented as taking lower-order relations as arguments, although this idea is in itself controversial, see Palmer, 1989. A fuller description of Gentner’s model can be found in Gentner et al., 1995, and Kotovsky & Gentner, 1990, 1994). Gentner’s relational shift theory predicts that within-dimension analogical mappings, such as taller than (beanstalk 1, beanstalk 2) and taller than (beanstalk 2, beanstalk 3) + taller than (tree 1, tree 2) and taller than (tree 2 , tree 3) should be easier than cross-dimension analogical mappings, such as taller than

126

Ushu Goswami

(beanstalk 1, beanstalk 2) and taller than (beanstalk 2 , beanstalk 3) + darker than (tomato 1, tomato 2) and darker than (tomato 2, tomato 3). In other words, younger children should find it easier to reason by analogy that a growing beanstalk is like a growing tree (height --* height), than that a growing beanstalk is like a ripening tomato (height + color saturation). Although the higher-order structure is the same in both cases (increase along a dimension) the lower-order relations in the cross-dimension analogy differ, and so a child who had not acquired the higher-order relation of increase along a dimension should experience mapping difficulties in this type of analogy. Gentner has some experimental evidence that this may be so, from work using ternary relational mappings. In her work with Kotovsky, 4-year-old children could not recognize the higher-order similarity between three circles increasing in size, and three squares increasing in saturation (this is comparable to the cross dimension mappings described above, see Kotovsky & Gentner, 1990, 1994, reported in Gentner et al., 1995). However, Kotovsky and Gentner’s experiments were based on geometric shapes that changed in height and saturation, which may account for the mapping difficulties that they found. Although these abstract shapes were specifically chosen so that “relational structure could be grasped without presupposing extensive conceptual knowledge” (p. 275), according to the relational knowledge view it is difficult to appreciate relational structure in the absence of any domain or conceptual knowledge. Thus the children may not have understood that the shapes were meant to provide abstract representationsof the higher-order relation increase along a dimension. In the domain of natural kinds, conceptual knowledge is more likely to be present, and so according to the relational knowledge view, relational structure is more likely to be grasped. B. NATURAL KINDS EXPERIMENT 1: BINARY RELATIONAL MAPPINGS ABOUT INCREASE IN A DIMENSION

We conducted three experiments using natural kinds stimuli to investigate the development of relational mapping in a familiar domain (Goswami & Leevers, 1996). Our first experiment was on binary relation analogies based on the same dimension (height, width, or saturation), in order to establish whether children did have knowledge of these different dimensions for both natural kinds and artifacts. In this experiment, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children were given two conditions, an analogy condition and a relational knowledge condition. In the relational knowledge condition, the children were shown three pictures of an object increasing along a dimension (e.g., tree; same tree, taller; same tree, taller still), and were asked to pick the correct picture to finish the pattern. The distractors, presented in a randomized order, either showed the same object with an increase along the correct dimension (fullest tree), the same object with a decrease along the correct dimension (smaller tree), or the same object with an

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

I27

increase along an incorrect dimension Vatter tree). Successful performance in this condition required extraction of the relation increase along a dimension. In the analogy condition, the children were presented a pair of pictures showing the relation of increase with one object (e.g., short tree: tall tree), and a third picture showing a new object (:: short sunflower: ?), and were asked to complete the analogy by choosing the correct picture from three distractors. The distractors were presented in random order, and were constructed using the same logic as the relational knowledge condition (i.e., tall sunflower, response D in Figure 6 , shorter sunflower, response E, and fatter sunflower, response F). In order to select the correct response (tall sunflower), the children had to make a relational mapping from the A:B pair. Examples of analogies based on width and saturation are toadstool: fatter toadstool:: pig: fatter pig, and pale yellow pear: deep yellow, riper pear:: pale orange autumn leaf: deeply colored autumn leaf. We also had an equivalent set of analogies based on artifacts. An example of an analogy based on a pair of artifacts would be short lighthouse: tall lighthouse:: short lightbulb: tall lightbulb. Finally, we had a set of natural kinds analogies in which growth led to changes in appearance rather than to changes in height, width, or saturation. An example is acorn: oak tree:: bud:flower. These “Appearance Differs” natural kinds analogies were included as a strong test of Gentner’s relational shift hypothesis about objects and relations. If a child can complete an analogy of this form, then object similarities cannot be necessary for successful relational mapping. The results of this first experiment are shown in Table IV, as a function of

D

E

F

Fix. 6. The picture cards used in a Natural Kinds analogy based on the relation of height, from Goswami and Leevers. 1996.

I28

Usha Goswami TABLE IV Percentage of Correct Responses in Natural Kinds Experiment 1 (Binary Relational Mappings) as a Function of Age and Stimulus Vpe

Relational knowledge NKa 44 72 89

Artifact 59 85 93

Analogy NK 42 65 88

Artifact 61 84 90

Appearance differs analogy

Age

45.8 70.0

3 Y’ 4 Yr 5 Yr

*NK. Natural Kinds.

condition and stimulus type (natural kinds vs. artifacts). Performances with the ‘appearance differs’ natural kind analogies (e.g., caterpillar: butterfiy:: tadpole: frog), which were not presented to the 3-year-olds, are shown in a separate column. The pattern of results shows that younger children can make relational mappings on the basis of the perceptual dimensions of height, width, and saturation. Even the 3-year-olds demonstrated a high level of success, and no significant differences emerged in reasoning about the different dimensions, although saturation was slightly more difficult than height and width (mean analogy performance across groups = 60% vs. about 70% correct). Contrary to expectation, however, performance with the artifacts was significantly better than performance with the natural kinds. This may have been because the relational changes (e.g., increase in height) were very easy to pick out for the artifacts. Performance with the Appearance Differs natural kinds analogies additionally showed that the children could make relational mappings in the complete absence of object similarity. C. NATURAL KINDS EXPERIMENT 2: BINARY RELATIONAL MAPPINGS ABOUT INCREASE AND DECREASE WITHIN DIMENSIONS AND ACROSS DIMENSIONS

Another factor that can be manipulated using the relations of height, width, and saturation is that of real-world knowledge. This can be achieved by contrasting analogies depicting natural kinds showing increases in height, width, and saturation with analogies depicting natural kinds showing decreases in these dimensions. The latter type of relational change does not occur in the real world. Plants and animals do not get smaller and thinner as they grow. In fact, Rosengren et al. (1991) showed that children were aware of this distinction by 4 years of age. Hence, analogies based on increases in height, width, and saturation

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

I29

should be easier than analogies based on decreases in height, width, and saturation, as the latter conflict with the children’s real-world relational knowledge. Our second experiment extended the required relational mappings across dimensions, and also varied the direction of the mapping to depict decrease as well as increase. In the cross-dimension analogy condition, 4- and 5-year-old children were presented analogies in which the A:B picture pair showed either an increase or a decrease in one dimension (such as width), and the C:D picture pair showed an increase or a decrease in another (such as height). An example of a crossdimension analogy is fat toadstool: thin toadstool:: girl: short girl. The distractors were a picture of the correct dimension with the wrong direction of change (e.g., fuller girl) and a picture of the wrong dimension with the wrong direction of change (e.g.,fatter girl). The relational knowledge condition required recognition of either increase or decrease in height, width, or saturation, similar to Experiment 1 (e.g., completing the set of four pictures showing a very fat toadstool, a fat toadstool, a toadstool, and a thin toadstool). Half of the children in study 2 received the relational knowledge condition followed by same-dimension relational mappings (similar to all the children in Experiment 1), and half received the relational knowledge condition followed by cross-dimension relational mappings. According to Gentner’s theory, the children in the first group should perform better than the children in the second, because the perceptual similarity between a toadstool that decreases in width and a girl that also decreases in width is at a lower level than the similarity between a girl that decreases in height and a toadstool that decreases in width. In the latter kind of analogy, lower-order similarity is not supporting the higher-order relational mapping, which is that both pairs of pictures represent the higher-order relation decrease along a dimension. The results of Experiment 2 are shown in Table V. As the effect of stimulus type (natural kinds vs. artifacts) was not significant in this experiment, the data are presented added across stimulus type. As can be seen, the 4-year-olds performed at a lower level than in Experiment 1 (compare to increase analogies, same dimension), but relational level (within- vs. cross-dimension) had no overall effect on performance. In fact, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed no significant differences between performance with the same-dimension and the cross-dimension analogies, at either age. The fact that relational level did not affect analogy performance does not support the predictions made by the logic of representation view of analogical development. The younger children in this experiment did not show stronger performance with same-dimension matches than with cross-dimension matches. The comparison of analogies based on increase with analogies based on decrease did reveal differences, however: The younger children’s performance with the decrease analogies was not significantly greater than chance, in both analogy conditions. Although the effect of Direction of Relation did not reach signifi-

I30

Usha Goswami TABLE V Percentage of Correct Responses in Natural Kinds Experiment 2 (Binary Relational Mappings) as a Function of Age and Direction of Relation

Relational knowledge

Same dimension analogy

Cross-dimension analogy

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Age

48

45 68

50 97

47 67

53 70

47 67

4 Yr 5 yr

80

cance in an ANOVA and did not interact with age, the finding concerning chance level performance supports the view that real-world knowledge does have an effect on relational mappings. However, stimulus type (natural kinds vs. artifacts) did not interact with condition, even though increases in the height, width, and saturation of artifacts do not occur naturally in the real world. This could either imply that the children did not interpret the left-right ordering of the pictures to mean early-later changes to the same object, or that when the objects in an analogy are highly familiar, as is the case with the natural kinds and artifacts used, then children can reason about artificial relations imposed upon the stimuli by the experimenter as well as about natural relations between the stimuli that occur in the real world. The latter has important implications for the use of analogies in teaching, as it suggests that, if the domain is a familiar one, then analogy can be used as a mechanism for instructing children about new relations (see Goswami, 1992, for a discussion of the use of analogies based on familiar objects to teach mathematics). D. NATURAL KINDS EXPERIMENT 3: TERNARY RELATIONAL MAPPINGS ABOUT INCREASE AND DECREASE ACROSS DIMENSIONS

In our final experiment, we extended the classical A:B::C:D analogy task so that the children were required to make cross-dimensional mappings based on sets of ordered triples (A:B:C::D:E:F). In this way, we changed the task from one that was based on binary relational mappings to one that was based on ternary relational mappings. The children were now required to map an ordered relation, such as monotonic increase or decrease, across diferent perceptual dimensions, a task that is relationally complex according to both Halford’s and Gentner’s theories. Halford would predict that the younger children should have difficulty in making relational mappings in this task because of the need to map an ordered set of relations. Gentner’s predictions are less straightforward. On one hand, she would predict that the younger children should have difficulty in making relation-

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

131

a1 mappings in this task because the higher-order relation of increase or decrease along a dimension conflicts with the lack of lower-order relational similarity (this task is formally equivalent to that used by Kotovsky & Gentner, 1994, who found chance-level performance by 4-year-olds). On the other hand, however, if there is a good higher-order match, then children who understand the higher-order structure in a domain should be able to overlook mismatches in lower-order similarity, as the global match is more inherently satisfying (the preference for systematicity). Thus Gentner would predict that the older children, who are more likely to understand higher-order structure, should perform better with the ternary relational mappings than with the binary relational mappings (D. Gentner, pers. comm., May 1995). For the analogy task, we used the same stimulus sets and dimensions as in Experiment 2, extending them to triples of pictures. The children were shown one triple of pictures depicting increase or decrease in a given dimension (A:B:C), and were asked to complete a second triple depicting increase or decrease in a different dimension (::D:E:?) by selecting the appropriate final picture from three possible solution terms. For example, for the width-height analogy based on toadstools and girls used in Experiment 2, the corresponding triple was fat toadstool: medium toadstool: thin toadstool:: girl: shorter girl: shortest girl (see Figure 7 ) . The distractors again depicted either the correct dimension with the wrong direction of change (e.g., tall girl), or the wrong dimension with the

0

1 -

A

I I

C

B

F

E

D

G

H

Fig. 7. The picture cards used in a Natural Kinds ordered triple based on the higher-order relarion of decrease along a dimension. From Goswami and Leevers, 1996.

Vsha Goswami

I32

wrong direction of change (e.g. ,fat girl). Relational knowledge was measured in a separate condition that required the completion of sequences of four pictures depicting an increase or decrease in a single dimension, as before. A new group of children took part in the study, and their performance in the analogy and the control conditions is shown in Table VI. The table shows performance separately for the relations of monotonic increase and monotonic decrease, added across natural kinds and artifacts (which again did not differ significantly, although the interaction between condition and stimulus type almost reached significance). This time, performance was significantly different for these two relations for both age groups, in contrast to Experiment 2. Mappings based on monotonic increase were significantly easier than mappings based on monotonic decrease, although this effect was somewhat stronger for the 4-year-olds (the interaction between Age and Direction of Relation in the ANOVA just missed significance). The difference between increase and decrease was also shown by an interaction between Direction of Relation and Condition. The analogy condition was significantly easier than the relational knowledge condition when it was based on increase, but not when it was based on decrease. This implies that real-world relational knowledge does have an impact when the mapping task is made more complex. The children’s real-world knowledge that natural kinds usually increase rather than decrease in height, width, and saturation was apparently supporting successful analogical mapping performance in the relationally complex triples task. Again, however, an equivalent effect was found for increase analogies based on artifacts. It is also interesting that the analogy condition was significantly easier than the relational knowledge condition in this experiment. For the first time in this series of experiments, there was a significant interaction between age and relational complexity (condition). Post hoc inspection of the interaction showed that whereas the 4-year-olds found the relational knowledge task and the analogy task equally difficult, the 5-year-olds found the analogy task significantly easier than the relational knowledge task. This implies that the presence of the analogy (the

TABLE VI Percentage of Correct Responses in Natural Kinds Experiment 3 (Ternary Relational Mappings) as a Function of Age and Direction of Relation Relational knowledge condition

Analogy condition

Increasing

Decreasing

Increasing

Decreasing

Age

55 44

32 46

64 83

21 62

4 Y* 5 vr

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

133

triple A:B:C as a basis for mapping) facilitated performance for the older children. It also supports Gentner’s prediction about the importance of higher-order structure, which is present in the analogy task in this experiment, but not in the relational knowledge task. However, it does not support Halford’s prediction about why there should be an interaction between age and relational complexity, as the interaction arose from depressed performance by the older children in the less relationally complex relational knowledge task. In fact, a comparison of analogy performance levels across experiments 2 and 3 demonstrates that the cross-dimension “triples” mapping task was actually easier for both age groups than the binary relation (classical) cross-dimension analogy task when the relation was increase along a dimension, but not when the relation was decrease along a dimension (which does not occur naturally in the domain of natural kinds). This finding is particularly striking because both tasks were based on the same stimuli and the same relations, and appears to be at variance with the predictions made by Halford’s theory of analogical development. When the results of the natural kinds experiments are considered in conjunction with the results of the ternary relational mapping experiments described in section IV, it seems safe to conclude that analogical development does not depend on the development of sufficient capacity to represent relations at one level of complexity rather than another. Relational complexity will affect the efficiency of younger children’s relational reasoning, but it does not seem to affect their ability to use analogies per se. In contrast, these findings can be accommodated within Gentner’s theory if it is accepted that even the younger children had represented the higher-order structure of monotonic increase within the domains of both natural kinds and artifacts. Once children have developed understanding of a domain, then the different levels of similarity in the logic of representation affect analogical performance rather than competence within that domain. Thus, whichever metric of relational complexity is adopted, relational knowledge rather than relational complexity appears to play the key developmental role in determining which analogies are within the processing competence of younger children.

VII. Conclusion The research reviewed in this chapter suggests that the most powerful version of an analogy-based theory of cognitive development is one that couples Halford’s view that much of logical reasoning is analogical (Halford, 1993) with a relational primacy knowledge-based view of young children’s use of analogies (Goswami, 1992). According to this hybrid theory, analogical reasoning (relational or structure mapping) is available from infancy, and is actively used to

134

Usha Goswami

solve problems and to acquire new information as soon as the infant or the young child has represented the relevant relational knowledge. Relational reasoning is usually based on known structures that are already represented in semantic memory; therefore a child who has the requisite relational knowledge can use analogies from concrete instances of concepts or specific instantiations of logical principles to solve reasoning problems that share relational similarities with those already-represented concepts or specific instantiations, unless performance factors intervene. It is less clear whether children abstract and use general structural descriptions based on these specific instantiations, although if they do, then this could be one source of the abstract logical rules proposed by Piaget. The tendency or ability to abstract these general solution principles could also be an important source of individual differences in intelligence, and an important focus for instruction and classroom teaching. This hybrid model of analogical development is directly applicable to children's use of analogies in intellectual development. ,In the few available studies of this topic, a common theme is the availability of the relevant relational knowledge. For example, young children will make analogies between the spelling patterns of words to help their reading development (Goswami, 1993), will use people-based analogies in the acquisition of biological knowledge (Carey, 1985; Inagaki & Hatano, 1987, 1991), and will (mis)use analogies to counting segments of pies in the acquisition of knowledge about fractions (Goswami, 1992). Teachers may play a key role in helping children to reflect on and use their relational knowledge in situations where the relevant knowledge has been represented, but is embedded in concrete instances (Brown, 1989). A final point worth noting is that comprehensive investigation of the role of analogies in cognitive development will necessarily complicate the kinds of questions that developmental psychologists ask about cognitive change. Questions about individual variation in the depth and richness of knowledge acquisition, questions about the causes of individual differences in the restructuring of current knowledge given equivalent exposure to new information, and questions about the quality of the knowledge base become as important as questions about which logical principles are necessary for the acquisition of certain concepts, and which kinds of logical rules underlie certain behaviors. In fact, questions related to the quality of the knowledge base have begun to receive increasing research attention in cognitive developmental psychology (e.g., Carey, 1985; Farrar, Raney, & Boyer, 1992; Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987; Keil, 1989; Rogoff, 1990; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). These questions about individual differences in knowledge acquisition and learning are reminiscent of some of the central concerns of Vygotsky (1978). Nevertheless, a knowledge-based approach to cognitive development is still in its infancy. Perhaps the growing interest in the role of analogies in children's cognitive development will go some way towards redressing this late start.

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Developmen!

135

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Renee Baillargeon, Judy Deloache, Jim Russell, Graeme Halford, Laura Kotovsky, Dedre Gentner, and Hayne Reese for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article, Alex Cutting and Sally Wheelwright for their help with the figures, and Nicole Honvitz, Paul Colman, and Judith Skiming for their help with the natural kinds experiments.

REFERENCES Baillargeon, R. (1995). Physical reasoning in infancy. In M. S . Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences (pp. 181-204). Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press. Baillargeon, R., & DeVos, I. (in press). Object permanence in 3.5 and 4.5-month-old infants: Further evidence. Child Development. Breslow, L. (1981). Re-evaluation of the literature on the development of transitive inferences. Psychological Bulletin, 89,325-35 1. Brown, A. L. (1989). Analogical learning and transfer: What develops? In S . Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp. 369-412). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Brown, A. L., & Kane, M. J. (1988). Preschool children can learn to transfer: Learning to learn and learning by example. Cognitive Psychology, 20, 493-523. Brown, A. L., Kane, M.J., & Long, C. (1989). Analogical transfer in young children: Analogies as tools for communication and exposition. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 3 , 275-293. Bryant, P. E. (1974). Perception and understanding in young children. London: Methuen. Bullock, M.,Gelman, R., & Baillargeon, R. (1982). Development of causal reasoning. In J. W. Friedman (Eds.). Psychology of time (pp. 209-254). New York: Academic Press. Press. Carey, S . (1985). Conceprual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Carey, S . , & Gelman, R. (1991). The epigenesis ofmind: Essays on biology and cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Case, R. (1985). Intellectual development: Birth to adulthood. New York Academic Press. Chen, Z., Campbell, T., & Polley, R. (1995, March). From beyond to within their grasp: The rudiments of analogical problem solving in 10- and 13-month-old infants. Poster presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Indianapolis, IN. Chen, Z., & Daehler, M. W. (1989). Positive and negative transfer in analogical problem-solving. Cognitive Development. 4 , 327-344. Clement, J. (1981). Analogy generation in scientific problem solving. Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 137- 140). Berkeley, CA. Cooper, R. G . (1984). Early number development: Discovering number space with addition and subtraction. In C. Sophian (Ed.), The origins of cognitive skills (pp. 157-192). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Daehler, M., & Chen, Z. (1993). Protagonist, theme and goal object: Effects of surface features on analogical transfer. Cognitive Development, 8, 2 1 1-229. Ding, S. L. (1995). Developing structural representations: Their role in analogical reasoning. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Nottingham, England. Farrar, M. J., Raney, G. E., & Boyer, M. E. (1992). Knowledge, concepts and inferences in childhood. Child Development, 63. 673-691. Gelman, S . A., & Markman, E. M. (1986). Categories and induction in young children. Cognition. 23. 183-208.

I36

Usha Goswami

Gelman, S. A., & Markman, E. M. (1987). Young children’s inductions from natural kinds: The role of categories and appearances. Child Development, 58, 1532-1541. Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7, 155- 170. Gentner, D. (1988). Metaphor as structure-mapping: The relational shift. Child Development, 59, 47-59. Gentner, D. (1989). The mechanisms of analogical learning. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), Similarify and analogical reasoning (pp. 199-241). London: Cambridge University Press. Gentner, D., & Jeziorski, M. (1993). The shift from metaphor to analogy in western science. In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and rhoughr. 2nd ed. (pp. 447-480). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Gentner, D., & Rattermann, M. J. (1991). Language and the career of similarity. In S. A. Gelman & J. P. Bymes (Eds.), Perspectives on thought and language: Interrelations in development (pp. 225-277). London: Cambridge University Press. Gentner, D., Rattennann, M. J., Markman, A., & Kotovsky, L. (1995). TWOforces in the development of relational similarity. In T. Simon & G. S . Halford (Eds.),Developing cognitive competence: New approaches to process modelling (pp. 263-313). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Gentner, D., & Toupin, C. (1986). Systematicity and surface similarity in the development of analogy. Cognitive Science, 10, 277-300. Gholson, B., Eymard, L. A,, Morgan, D. & Kamhi, A. G. (1987). Problem solving, recall and isomorphic transfer among third-grade and sixth-grade children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 43, 227-243. Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K . I. (1983). Schema induction and analogical transfer. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 1-38. Gordon, W. J. J. (1979). Some source material in discovery-by-analogy. The Journal of Creative Behaviour, 8, 239-257. Goswami, U. (1989). Relational complexity and the development of analogical reasoning. Cognitive Development, 4 , 251-268. Goswami, U. (1991). Analogical reasoning: What develops? A review of research and theory. Child Development, 62, 1-22. Goswami, U. (1992). Analogical reasoning in children. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Goswami, U. (1993). Towards an interactive analogy model of reading development: Decoding vowel graphemes in beginning reading. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 56, 443-475. Goswami, U.(1995). Transitive relational mappings in 3- and 4-year-olds: The analogy of Goldilocks and the Three Bears. Child Development, 66, 877-892. Goswami, U.,& Brown, A. L. (1989). Melting chocolate and melting snowmen: Analogical reasoning and causal relations. Cognition, 35, 69-95. Goswami, U.,& Brown, A. L. (1990). Higher-order structure and relational reasoning: Contrasting analogical and thematic relations. Cognition, 36, 207-226. Goswami, U. & Leevers, H. (1996). Relational mappings about natural kinds and artifacts. Manuscript submitted for publication, Department of Experimental Psychology. University of Cambridge, England. Goswami, U., Leevers, H., Pressley, S., & Wheelwright, S. (1996). Causal reasoning abourpairs of relations and analogical reasoning in young children. Manuscript submitted for publication, Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, England. Goswami, U., Pauen, S., & Wilkening, F. (1996). The efecrs ofa ‘family’analogy in class inclusion tasks. Manuscript in preparation, Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, England. Halford, G. S. (1984). Can young children integrate premises in transitivity and serial order tasks? Cognitive Psychology, 16. 65-93.

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive Development

137

Halford, G . S. (1987). A structure-mapping approach to cognitive development. International Journal of Psychology, 22, 609-642. Halford, G. S. ( 1992). Analogical reasoning and conceptual complexity in cognitive development. Human Development, 35, 193-217. Halford, G. S. (1993). Children’s understanding: The development of mental models. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Halford, G. S., Smith, S. B., Campbell Dickson, J., Maybery, M. T., Kelly, M. E., Bain, J. D., & Stewart, J. E. M. (1995). Modelling the development of reasoning strategies: The roles of analogy, knowledge and capacity. In T. Simon & G. S. Halford (Eds.), Developing cognitive competence: New approaches to process modelling (pp. 77- 156). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Harris, P. L. (1989). Children and emotion. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Holland, J. H..Holyoak, K. J., Nisbett, R. E., & Thagard, P. R. (1986). Induction: Processes of inference. learning and discovery. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Holyoak. K. J. (1984). Analogical thinking and human intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of human intelligence (vol. 2. pp. 199-230). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Holyoak, K. 1.. Junn, E. N., & Billman, D. 0. (1984). Development of analogical problem-solving skill. Child Development, 55, 2042-2055. Holyoak, K. J., & Koh, K. (1987). Surface and structural similarity in analogical transfer. Memory and Cognition. 15. 332-340. Holyoak, K. J., & Thagard, P. (1995). Mental leaps. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Inagaki, K., & Hatano, G . (1987). Young children’s spontaneous personification as analogy. Child Development. 58, 1013- 1020. Inagaki, K., & Hatano, G. (1991). Constrained person analogy in young children’s biological inference. Cognitive Development. 6, 219-23 1. Inhelder, B., & Piaget, J. (1958). The growth of logical thinkingfrom childhood to adolescence. New York: Basic Books. Keil. F. C. (1989). Concepts, kinds and cognitive development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kotovsky, L. L., & Gentner, D. (1990). Pack light: You will go farther. In Proceedings of the Second Midwest Artijcial Intelligence and Cognitive Science Society Conference (pp. 60-72). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Kotovsky, L. L., & Gentner, D. (1994). Progressive alignment: A mechunismfor the development of relational similarity. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Lamsfuss, S., & Wilkening, F. (1991, April). False analogies in children’s reasoning about interaction offorces. Poster presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Seattle, WA. Mandler, J. (1992). How to build a baby 11: Conceptual Primitives. Psychological Review. 99, 587604. Palmer, S. E. (1989). Levels of description in information-processing theories of analogy. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp. 332-345). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pascual-Leone, J. ( 1987). Organismic processes for neo-Piagetian theories: A dialectical causal account of cognitive development. International Journal of Psychology, 22, 53 1-570. Pears, R . , & Bryant, P. E. (1990). Transitive inferences by young children about spatial position. British Journal of Psychology, 81, 497-510. Piaget, J., Montangero, J., & Billeter, J. (1977). Les correlats. In J. Piaget (Ed.), L‘abstraction refechissante. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Pierce, K. A., & Cholson, B. (1994). Surface similarity and relational similarity in the development of analogical problem solving: Isomorphic and nonisomorphic transfer. Developmental Psychology, 30. 724-737.

138

Usha Goswami

Premack, D. (1983). The codes of man and beasts. The Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 6 . 125167. Quinn, P. C. (1994). The categorization of above and below spatial relations by young infants. Child Development, 65, 58-69. Rattermann, M. J., Gentner, D., & Deloache, J. S . (1987, April). Young children’s use of relational similarity in a transfer task. Poster presented at the biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Baltimore, MD. Rattermann, M. I., Gentner, D., and Deloache, J. S. (1989). Efects of competing surface similarity on children’s performance in an analogical task. Poster presented at the biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Kansas City, MO, April 1989. Rogoff, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in social context. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Rosch, E., Mervis, C. B., Gray, W. D., Johnson, D. M., & Boyes-Braem, P. (1976). Basic objects in natural categories. Cognitive Psychology, 8. 382-439. Rosengren, K. S., Gelman, S. A., Kalish, C. W., & McCormick, M. (1991). As time goes by: Children’s early understanding of growth in animals. Child Development, 62, 1302- 1320. Ross, B. (1987). This is like that: The use of earlier problems and the separation of similarity effects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memoryp and Cognition 13, 629-639. Smith, L. B., & Heise, D. (1992). Perceptual similarity and conceptual structure. In B. Bums (Ed.), Advances in Psychology-Percepts, concepts and categories: The representation and processing of information (pp. 233-272.) Amsterdam: Elsevier. Spiro, R. J., Feltovich, P. J., Coulson, R. L., & Anderson, D. K. (1989). Multiple analogies for complex concepts: antidotes for analogy-induced misconception in advanced knowledge acquisition. In S . Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.),Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp. 498-531). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Sternberg, R. J., & Nigro, G. (1980). Developmental patterns in the solution of verbal analogies. Child Development, 51, 27-38. Vosniadou, S . (1989). Analogical reasoning as a mechanism in knowledge acquisition: A developmental perspective. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp. 413-437). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wellman, H. M., & Gelman, S . A. (1992). Cognitive development: Foundational theories of core domains. Annual Review of Psychology, 43, 337-375. Younger, B. A., & Cohen, L. B. (1983). Infant perception of correlations among attributes. Child Development, 54, 858-867.

SEX-OF-SIBLING EFFECTS: A REVIEW PART 11. PERSONALITY AND MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH

Mazie Earle Wagner and Herman J . P . Schubertt DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOUXY STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE AT BUFFALO BUFFALO, NEW YORK 14222

Daniel S . P . Schubert CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE AND DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHIATRY METROHEALTH MEDICAL CENTER CLEVELAND, OHIO 44109

I. INTRODUCTION 11. PERSONALITY

A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I.

SOCIABILITY SIBLING-SEX EFFECTS ON ADULT MALE-FEMALE INTERACTIONS THE ELDERLY CONFORMITY AND IMITATION RESPONSIBILITY SELF-ESTEEM INTERNALITY-EXTERNALITY NEED FOR AUTONOMY AGGRESSION, DOMINANCE, AND RISK TAKING

111. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH

A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J.

LONGEVITY HEART AILMENTS SIBLING-SEX EFFECTS ON ANXIETY AND STRESS MINOR MALADJUSTMENTS CONSISTENCY O F PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS SIBLING-SEX EFFECTS ON PSYCHOPATHY AND DELINQUENCY HOMOSEXUALITY ALCOHOLISM SUICIDE MAJOR PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS

'Deceased. 139 ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR. VOL. 26

Copyright 0 1996 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of repduction in any form reserved.

Marie Earle Wagner et al.

140

1V. THE LARGE MONOSEXUAL SIBSHIPS AND THE LARGE SIBSHIP WITH ONLY ONE CROSS-SEXED SIBLING A. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF MONOSEXUAL SIBSHIPS B. POSITIVE EFFECTS OF MONOSEXUAL SIBSHIPS AND OF BEING THE LONE ' MEMBER OF AN OTHERWISE CROSS-SEXED SIBSHIP V. FINAL CONCLUSIONS

VI. RESEARCH NEEDED REFERENCES

I. Introduction This review is written both for those interested in the effects of sex of siblings on infants, children, adolescents, and adults, but also as a means of shortening literature search for those researching some aspect of this field, and will suggest topics of research. Other articles by the present authors are similarly directed both to those desiring knowledge regarding effects of family size, of sibling spacing, and sex-of-sibling effects on IQ achievement, and success, and to those wishing to know what research has been done, by whom, and what remains to be investigated.

11. Personality Many diverse characteristics are subsumed under the rubric of personality. For many of the characteristics studied, meaning is ill defined, weakly measured, with corresponding low validity. Many personality characteristics and the sibling-sex effects have not been studied at all (e.g., introversion and extraversion). The present review starts with sociability, one of the better researched areas, and, begins with the youngest subjects for whom data are available. A. SOCIABILITY

1 . Very Young Children

Several research teams have explored behavior of very young children. Nadelman and Begun (1982), studying the effects of a new baby on 2.5-5.5-year-old firstborns found no sex-of-sibling effects, although there were considerable sex differences in response to the new baby. Corter, Pepler, and Abramovich (1982) studied 32 cross-sexed dyads with the mother present. Older sisters were found more prosocial, and there was more

Sex-of-SiblingEffects:Part I1

141

negative interaction when the mother was present, especially when the younger initiated agonistic behavior. Dunn and Kendrick (1981) observed 40 sibling pairs when the younger was 8 months old and again at 14 months. Same-sex pairs exhibited more positive social behavior and cross-sex pairs more negative. The more interaction between the mother and the infant, the more negative sibling interaction. The mothers of cross-sex infants played with their infants more than mothers of same-sex infants did. In a later paper (Dunn & Kendrick, 1982) they reported that when the younger was 14 months old, the older same-sex child made twice as many friendly approaches to the younger than did the cross-sex older children. Goebel (1985) studied 154 female and 54 male first- and second-born infants and found females were higher than males in social cognition, and that subjects with female siblings were higher than those with male sibs. Abramovich, Pepler, and Corter (1982) observed for a second time 34 samesex and 36 cross-sex dyads, the younger at 1.5 years of age and the older at 4.56 years old. They used two spacing groups, those spaced 2 years or less and those over 2 years apart. The children directed much behavior to each other. In same-sex pairs boys were more physically aggressive than older girls, and girls responded more with prosocial behavior than did boys. This was not true in mixed-sex pairs; in the latter agonism increased, which was not true in the samesex pairs. In mixed-sex pairs imitation decreased sharply. Youngers in cross-sex pairs were significantly more aggressive. In 1986, these same researchers (Abramovich, Corter, Pepler, & Stanhope, 1986) again reported for 24 same- and 24 cross-sexed pairs from the original sample for a final observation. Youngers in same-sex dyads and olders in crosssexed dyads increased aggression from observations 1 to 2 and again from observations 2 to 3. Same-sex dyads were more prosocial than cross-sexed dyads. There was a marked decrease in imitation over time for the mixed-sex but not for same-sex pairs. Their comparisons indicate that the effective tone of the same-sex dyads is more stable over time with a less positive interaction between cross-sex dyads. This indeed also summarizes the sex-of-sibling effects for young children.

2 . School-Aged Children Deutsch (1981) investigated the popularity of 46 kindergarteners as related to ordinal position and sex of siblings. She found that first- and later-borns were more popular than second-borns and that those in same-sex dyads were more popular than in cross-sex dyads. Koch (1955) in her comprehensive investigation of the characteristics of sibling size of 2 (SS2) 5- and 6-year-olds states teachers rated those with an elder brother as popular, friendly, expansive, most stimulated, and self-confident. She found children with cross-sexed siblings were more friendly to children and

142

Mazie Earle Wagner et al.

adults. She also found (Koch, 1960) that the elder girl of two girls was less quarrelsome and both were “sociable creatures,” who did not want to lose their siblings. The older sister with a younger brother was rated socially expansive, a good leader, very affectionate, and sought a teacher’s help most. However, among boys, the younger boy with a brother was less quarrelsome, more friendly with peers, and a more popular leader than other boys. The older boy with a cross-sex sibling was high in leadership. She noted that the older sibling, boy or girl, with a cross-sex younger sibling was more exhibitionistic and more jealous than cross-sex youngers. The younger girl with an older brother was higher in leadership and had more confidence than the younger sister of two girls. Barnett (1986) compared second-, fourth-, and sixth-grade children’s perceptions of boys’ and girls’ reasons for helping others. In contrast to the younger subjects, sixth graders rated the helping of a same-sex other as more self-serving than the helping of an opposite-sex other.

3. Adolescents Hancock (1967) gathered data on socialization of one- and two-child sibships of middle-class adolescents to observe the effects of having no sibling as well as that of having either a same- or opposite-sex younger or older sib. She gathered much data on the need to affiliate (nAffi1). She found same-sex pairs felt closer than opposite-sex pairs, and that seconds were more aware of firsts than firsts were of seconds. She found that those in like-sex pairs, similar to like-sex twins, searched for individuality. Regarding nAffil, Hancock found that only boys were lower than only girls or than girls in a like-sex pair. SS2 oldest boys and girls and younger boys with a sister score higher than others. Oldest girls with a younger brother were most affiliative. Sutton-Smith (1968) reviewed 16 articles on nAffil and conformity. The older boy of two brothers was more affiliative, conformative, and dependent; the younger boy was not. The older sister with a younger brother also was more affiliative and conforming, whereas the younger sister with an older brother was not. The older sister of two sisters did not conform; the younger sister did. 4 . High School and College Students and Young Adults Dobash (1972) studied the affection that junior and senior high school students felt for their siblings and concluded that sex of sibling, ordinal position, and size of sibship were each related to some aspect of sibling affection. As socioeconomic level increased and as affection and value orientation of mother increased, sibling affection also increased, and the latter was greater, on average, in sibships of two. Younger sisters liked older sisters more than they did older brothers. Junior high school younger brothers were liked more by an older

Sex-of-SiblingEffects: Part II

143

brother than by an older sister. On the average, older sisters and younger brothers were liked most. Sawyer (1966), in his study of cooperation and individualistic and competitive interpersonal relations, found that altruism was correlated with number of sisters. Oberlander, Frauenfelder, and Heath (1970) studied Koch’s sample at age 18 years, originally SS2s, but additional siblings had been born in some sibships. They conclude that the eldest of two benefits intellectually, whereas the younger benefits socially; the latter was significantly more active in groups. The presence of a male sibling was related to greater interest in ideas and in avoidance of conflict. Firstborns had greater interest in directing others. Dielman, Barton, and Cattell (1974) investigated 298 junior high school students: 43% girls, 19% Blacks, with mean number of sisters 1.82 and mean number of brothers 2.0. The girls scored higher on social boldness and selfsentiment; the boys scored higher on excitability, guilt proneness, and active tension. Children with more sisters and higher guilt and those with more boys had higher scores on self-sentiment. Family size related significantly and positively with active tension. Zuber, Nystedt, and Smari (1985) examined 64 17-year-olds for self-consciousness. They found that subjects from small sibships and with siblings of the opposite sex showed higher public self-consciousness than those from larger families and same-sex siblings. Arvis (1979), on the basis of discussions with students and colleagues, found that brother-brother patterns of social exchange were based on competition and loyalty more frequently than on sibling rivalry. Toman (1969) found the older of two brothers was very dominant, efficient, and autocratic, described as serious, sometimes as lacking spontaneity and empathy, and more masculine than his younger brothers, “a man’s man,” (p. 46) He found the older brother with a younger sister to be responsible, independent, and efficient at work, but less power oriented and dominant than the older brother with a younger brother. Similar relations were found for women. With 101 enlisted Navy men, Sterner (1973) found that weak nAffil as seen especially in low self-esteem, narrow-gap later-borns, and that this low nAffil was related to negative relations with peers and older brothers. However, on thewhole, low self-esteem men were higher in nAffil than were high self-esteem men. Gray (1984) administered the Sixteen Personality Factors (16PF) test to 641 college students, aged 17-59. She found girls overall were more outgoing than men. In SS2s where sex-of-sibling effects were stronger than in larger sibships, having a younger sister led to being more outgoing. Firstborns with a younger brother were more trusting as well as more timid than those with a younger sister. Klockars ( 1968), studying personality of underachieving community college SS2 men, found older brothers with a next younger brother were more affiliative,

144

Mazie Earle Wagner el al.

dependent, and unemotional than other men students. Youngest girls were found least intelligent and least impulsive and active but most cooperative. In summary 1. The sex-of-sibling effect on sociability, which began in very early childhood, grew stronger in adolescence and young adulthood. 2. Firstborn males are more affiliative. 3. Same-sex siblings grew closer socially, whereas cross-sex siblings grew further apart as they aged. 4. Sisters increase the altruism and guilt in their siblings; brothers increase their siblings’ self-sentiment and avoidance of conflict. 5 . Cross-sex siblings increase public self-consciousness in their brothers and sisters. The relation of same-sex males was more loyal than rivalrous. 6. Men with sisters were more open and better able to get along with women. 7. When men have negative relations with older brothers they tend to have low self-esteem and peer affiliation. 8. With increase in age, cross-sexed siblings grew further apart, aggression increased, and imitation decreased. This seems not to occur in same-sex sibling pairs. B. SIBLING-SEX EFFECTS ON ADULT MALE-FEMALE INTERACTIONS

Among the various sex-of-sibling research areas, adult male-female interaction has been comparatively popular. However, the findings are not always consistent and many questions still remain. 1 . General Social Behavior Arvis (1979) discussed with students and colleagues their avenues of socialization. They found the sister, rather than the mother, more frequently was the socializing influence. Men with sisters were more open, sharing, and able to maintain relationships with women, whereas men who only had brothers or were only-boms indicated difficulty in establishing and maintaining intimate relationships with women. Burker, Goldstein, and Caputo (1981) studied the reactions of 38 female and 42 male undergraduates who either had or did not have an opposite-sex sibling. They were asked how comfortable they felt interacting in various social situations with friends of the opposite sex. Females were significantly more comfortable than males. However, a significant interaction effect showed that although females with brothers felt more comfortable, males with sisters felt least comfortable interacting with opposite-sex friends. The measures used by Arvis (1979) apparently were not the same as those of Burker et al., possibly explaining apparent discrepancies between the two researchers.

Sex-of-SiblingEffecrs: Purr II

145

Feldman (1976) compared only-born college women with eldest with a sister or with a brother. She found older girls with a brother were more interested in the opposite sex and that the older of two girls was most conventional, traditionally feminine, though she was against being so, felt she could not please her parents, and sometimes was impatient and withdrawn. Hollender, Duke, and Nowicki (1973) reported that college women with older brothers kept a greater distance from the opposite sex. Allmon (1974) with approximately 400 men and women subjects, found that the older brother with younger brother(s) was less of a party goer than the older brother with younger sister(s). The older sister with a sister(s) rated higher as a party goer and had more personal confidence than the female norm. The older sister with both younger brother(s) and sister(s) rated higher in opinion leadership and party going than the younger sister with an older brother and than middle-born girls, the latter two approximated the overall female norm. Older sisters with both younger sisters and brothers were less party going than the general female population. In a study of attitudes toward female managers, Beutell (1984) found women were most in favor of them, and eldest males, especially those with a younger sister, were most antagonistic. Similarly, Freyn ( 1976) found that teachers who had older sisters gave significantly higher marks to girls than did those who had only younger brothers or sisters. Ickles and Turner (1983) found, among 47 graduate couples, that men with older sisters have a feminine social style; that later-borns-especially lastborns-fare better with the opposite sex; men with older brothers tend to dominate social exchange with women; and that the best social interactions were the province of last-boms and poorest by firstborns. In a second study, they found that men with older brothers hold their own in initiating and controlling interactions; that men with older sisters tend to excel in nonverbal skills (making eye contact, smiling, and nodding), and that results were not as clear for women. However, female partners of last-born males looked at them more, reinforced them more, and reported liking them more. Grosz (1968b, vide infra) found among psychiatric patients that SS3 middleborns with both a brother and sister were less frequently married than those with either two brothers or two sisters. He considered being unmarried at their average age of 30+ as an indication of maladjustment. 2 . Sex Complementarity in Dating and Marriage In a study of carefully paired college students in Psych-a-date, Mendelsohn, Linden, Gruen, and Curran (1974) paired volunteers so that there were carefully paired groups with exact complementarity (e.g., older brother with a younger sister with the younger sister of an older brother); rank complementarity paired (e.g., older brother of a brother with the younger sister of a sister); sex comple-

146

Mazie Earle Wagner et al.

mentarity (older brother with a younger sister with older sister of a younger brother); and one group paired for neither rank nor sex. Fully paired couples were more successfully paired than the other groups as measured by their rating of the date and the number of subsequent dates they had. Furthermore, sexcomplementarity and rank-complementarity pairs were more successful than those dyads with no complementarity. Hall (1965) followed the lo00 engaged couples studied by Burgess in 1953. Of these, 131 broke their engagement. The status of the remainder were ascertained 15-20 years later. Eighty had subsequently been separated or divorced. Only-born men and women broke their engagements more frequently. Regarding divorce and separation, only-born women had the lowest rate, whereas eldest women had the highest rate. Oldest men had a low divorce rate, which decreased with family-of-origin size. Youngests have the highest divorce rate for all women and for SS2 men. The divorce rate by sex of older sibling was 14% for an older brother and 23% for an older sister. Rosenberg and Sutton-Smith (1973) studied the choice of mate of SS2s. They found both men and women SS2s marry one of a similar family size. Younger sisters prefer only-born or eldest males. Older sisters of a brother prefer husbands with older brothers, whereas older sisters with a younger sister prefer those with an older sister. Younger sisters with an older brother prefer husbands with an older brother, men with an older sister marry only-born girls, and the older of two brothers prefers later-borns with a sister, whereas the younger of two brothers prefers an eldest with a sister, and older brothers of a sister prefer later-borns with brothers. Complementarity is fairly substantiated as preference of a spouse it would seem. Trudy Bush (1977) followed 2026 persons, originally tested and interviewed in 1947 as high school students. Of the original group, 1834 had married only once and were living with their spouse, She used these subjects and tallied the number of children by the parents’ religion (Catholic vs. Protestant), number and sex of siblings, and ordinal position. For both religious groups, the size of family of origin determined in part the number of children they had. Sex of siblings has a direct effect on family size for both Catholics and Protestants, but in opposite direction. For Protestants, having only sisters (no brothers) depresses family size; for Catholics, it increases fertility. These directions in fertility were true for each family size, and for both men and women. Critelli and Baldwin (1979) compared the duplication theory for success in dating relations for 123 couples. Birth orders were classified into five types. Results did not support the duplication homogamy theory, although evidence exists of duplication on marital longevity and homogamy on marital success. For instance, two eldests tend to have a longer (i.e., firmer) marriage. An eldest of two would choose a younger of two for marriage. Toman (1969) has written much on the positive effects of complementary sex

Sex-of-SiblingEffects: Part It

147

positions on the apparent good social relations between married pairs as well as among friends. Toman, Gasch, and Schmidt (1972) reported that friendships of similar or identical positioned individuals tended to end sooner than those of complementary sibship roles. Preferences were for friends of complementary age, rank, and sex. However, both men and women name more of their own sex as friends. On this same topic, Levinger and Somheim (1965) studied 60 couples who were parents of schoolchildren and 24 couples coming for marriage counseling. They felt that having the same ordinal and sibling-sex position would avoid reenactment of juvenile sibship rivalries. They cited three studies indicating that similarity was predictive of marital success. The normals (parents of schoolchildren) had a higher percentage of eldests than did the disturbed group. More women with opposite-sex siblings were in the disturbed group. No support was found for the argument that ordinal position is associated with actual or desired social influence. Ortiz (198 1 ) reviewed research on birth order and sex of sibling as related to marital satisfaction in later life. Although complimentarityof sex and birth ranks appeared to provide the basis for a more satisfactory relationship, the findings were inconclusive because both partners were not uniformly included and terms were not well defined. Psychiatrists Char and McDemott (1980) stated that childhood brother and sister roles shape future attitudestoward the opposite sex and that complementary sex roles aid in good marital adjustment and provide a “fit” for later years. Regarding brother-sister incest, they quote Meiselman (1978) that an older brother-younger sister with parental loss of supervisory control provide necessary conditions of brother domination of his younger sister. Molested sisters tend to be masochistic and usually have been neglected and abused in their families of origin. C. THE ELDERLY

On the topic of social effects of sex of siblings on the lives of the elderly, Cicirelli (1977, 1982) has written several reports. A high percentage of both middle-aged and elderly persons keep at least weekly contact with their siblings, even when living in distant cities. This is especially true for the elderly with their children dispersed, parents deceased, and a possible spouse’s death. Later-boms felt more positively than firstborns in sibships; sisters were closest, cross-sexed siblings next, and brothers least. Sisters had greater social effect than brothers. Same-sex siblings helped each other more than cross-sex pairs. The number and proportion of female siblings has greater influence than male siblings on an elderly person’s feelings and concerns. For men, sisters appeared to be emotionally supportive, whereas for women, sisters were more challenging especially regarding social concerns.

148

Mazie Earle Wagner el al.

In summary, the sex of sibling(s) has important long-lasting effects, some negative, more positive, on the social and sexual adjustment of both men and women-effects that last into old age. Antagonisms between opposite-sex siblings are carried to adult relationships. Researchers are inconsistent regarding effects of no siblings or only-borns. Some indicate poorer marriages, whereas others indicate more broken engagements but fewer divorces. As frequency of only-boms by choice increases in more recent years with fewer unwanted only-borns, their social success may be expected to improve overall. Youngest males, using nonverbal cues, elicit best responses from women. However, both youngest males and females are more frequently divorced along with eldest girls, who had the poorest marital relations, which these reviewers suspected is limited to those eldest daughters with a next younger brother. Regarding fertility, large families of origin beget large sibships in families of procreation. However for fertility there is interaction between religion and sex of sibling. Among Protestants, having sisters leads to reduced fertility for women, whereas among Catholics, sisters increase fertility. Ordinal position and sibling-sex complimentarity have noticeable effects on choice of mate and success in marriage. Among the elderly, with children dispersed, parents deceased, and a spouse often deceased, sibling relations are more important than earlier. Elder sisters particularly increase the well-being of their siblings. D. CONFORMITY AND IMITATION

We are troubled by the variety of meanings given to and measures used to gauge conformity. A further difficulty is with the term itself, which does not indicate to which rules one conforms (e.g., those of specific socioeconomic level, religion, the parental norms, the peer pressures, or a mixture of several or an absence of all). Without further ado, our review. Sutton-Smith (1968) reported that the older of two brothers was more affiliative, conforming, and dependent, as indeed was also the older sister with a younger brother. The younger siblings for both sexes did not have these characteristics. Sampson and Hancock (1967) sent questionnaires to 400 SS2 1 1th graders of whom 251 replied (62.7%). Older males were significantly more conforming, especially when the older of two boys. Only-born males were conforming: onlyborn females, less. If conformity and answering questionnaires is related, which it may well be, obviously the results would be seriously flawed. Indeed, Copra and Dittes (1962) and Ebert (1974) reported that firstborns volunteer significantly more often than later-borns. Gray (1984) administered the 16PF to 641 college students, ages 17-59, in

Sex-of-SiblingEffects: Parr II

I49

sibships of two through five, together with gathering sibling constellation data. This resulted in a plethora of material. Regarding conformity, males were fairly consistently more conforming and conservative than females. However, she found no sex-of-sibling effects for Conformity. Whether this is due to the measure used or to the wide age distribution, to the selectivity of her sample, or whether indeed there is no relation is not clear as of now. Sutton-Smith (1968) and Rosenberg and Sutton-Smith (1973) used SS2 college students to study conformity. They found that boys were more conforming than girls, and that younger with a same-sex older sibling were less conforming than both older males and females with a younger brother. The older girl with a younger brother was also highly achieving and dependent. Both boys and girls with a younger brother were more conforming than with a younger sister. Olson (1973) reported concerning 99 male and 182 female college students. He found middle girls were highest on social desirability and youngest girls lowest. He suggests that the youngest females have an absence of social conformity set. Highest Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) F-scores (non-conformity) were found among same-sex and opposite-sex sibships, and lowest (i.e., most conforming) in mixed-sex sibships. With 51 female college students as subjects, Schmuck (1963) administered a three-picture projective test for a 5-minute story writing to measure defiance versus compliance (i.e., conformity). Fifteen were only-boms and eight each had an older brother, younger brother, younger sister, and older sister. Female college students with a sister showed less tendency to conform than those with a brother, and Bales (1955) found that girls with a brother tended to develop more feminine characteristics, therefore a tendency to conform, and girls with sisters developed more masculine characteristics, therefore to defy. Dielman et al. (1974) with 295 junior high school students found children with more sisters were higher in guilt proneness. Langenmayr (1966, 1976) studied the behavioral characteristics of 286 sixth, seventh, and eighth-grade children in Germany. Older siblings were less often influenced by group pressure, middle siblings, more often, and only-boms and those from families of four or over were more easily influenced by group pressure than those from sibships of two. Children who had suffered loss of a parent were less affected by the group. The older of two boys was less susceptible than the older with a younger sister; the younger of two boys was less susceptible than the younger with an older sister. Generally, children with opposite-sex siblings were more susceptible to peer pressure than same-sex siblings, both boys and girls. Children with parents who were in incompatible sex roles were more resistant to peer pressures of classmates. With 73 male and female SS2 college students, Bragg and Allen (1970) found the older of two brothers was less conforming than the elder with a younger sister, and that the elder of two sisters less than the elder with a younger brother.

150

Mazie Earle Wagner er al.

They found the younger of two SS2 girls was most conforming. Oldest boys and oldest girls with same-sex siblings were less conforming than those with crosssex siblings. This sex similarity, however, does not hold for youngests. Youngest girls with sisters were most conforming, whereas youngest males with brothers were least so. Hodapp and LaVoie (1974) studied SS2 first and second graders in white, intact middle-class families and found second-borns were more imitative of a male sib model and of a male parent, scoring higher on the sibling model than on the parent model. This was especially true for the girls. Both males and females in cross-sex dyads were more imitative of their older sibling than of their parent. Second-born females with an older brother showed most extensive imitation of the older sibling, more than those with an older sister. Data for the girls support the imitation rather than the contrast theory. In summary, results are far from uniform. Firstborns are more conforming than youngers, and those with opposite-sex siblings are more conforming than with same-sex siblings. Oldests of two, both male and female, seem more conforming when the younger is a brother. The use of various measures of conformity clouds findings, as does the use of conformity to societal norms versus peer pressures, which are especially strong for males. The use of volunteer questionnaire returns, where the sample is incomplete, seriously flaws results. The wide use of college students biases the sample for education, ability, and possibly other characteristics, leaving results nongeneralizable. E. RESPONSIBILITY

Other than for sociability, not many researchers have examined personality characteristics, including responsibility. However, in her study of the work habits of SS2 5- and 6-year-olds, Koch (1956) includes findings regarding responsibility. Although girls were uniformly judged by teachers as being more responsible, she obtained little difference by sex of sibling or spacing between children. The younger girls with an older brother and older girls with sisters were especially responsible, particularly when spaced less than 4 years apart. The older brother with a younger sister is the least responsible. Harris and Howard (1968) questioned high school boys and girls and college men, some 1200 of upper-middle socioeconomic status (SES), for age at which responsibility for conduct was accepted and age at which prerogatives should be allowed. They studied mainly first-of-sex versus later-borns-of-sex. rather than actual firstborns. However, they do report that firstborns more resemble those first-of-sex than those later-borns-of-sex. They agreed with Koch that girls accept responsibility earlier than boys do, indicating the earlier maturity of girls. They found that first-of-sex and firstborns both accepted responsibility earlier than

Sex-of-Sibling Effects: Part II

151

later-borns and later-borns-of-sex. Later-boms in general expected prerogatives earlier than firsts and first-of-sex. The effect of an earlier cross-sex sibling was different than the absence of earlier siblings; first and first-of-sex were found alike, or at least both different from later-borns. Schwartz ( 1 975) administered Kohlberg’s stages of moral development to 100 SS2 male college students. The older of two boys scored significantly lower than the other three SS2 groups. Second-borns or those with a sister scored higher on the Moral Judgment Scale. Subject’s age, age spacing, and SES had no effect. “Moral development” as measured by Kohlberg’s test is evidently not equivalent to responsibility, possible being related more to dependency. In summary, girls accept responsibility earlier than boys, and first-boms and first-of-sex accept responsibility earlier than later-borns. SS2 first-born girls with sisters and second-born girls with an older brother are especially responsible. This latter older brother (with a younger sister) was rated lowest of males in responsibility. First-borns, especially males, were lower on moral development than youngers, indicating that responsibility and moral development, as measured by these researchers are not equivalent. F. SELF-ESTEEM

With Baltimore school children as subjects, Van Cleave (1982) found no direct relation between self-esteem and ordinal position, family size, spacing between siblings, nor “gender mix.” Self-esteem increased for white children with increase in SES and age; for black children, it was higher for intact homes than for children from broken homes. M. Rosenberg (1965) found sons with only sisters usually had high selfesteem and concluded that this was due to being exceptionally highly valued by his parents. Kidwell (1982), in her elegant study of 2,207 male adolescents, found middleborns were significantly lower in self-esteem than both oldests and youngests and that these differences increase as spacing narrows. Specifically for sex-of-sibling effects, she found only brothers with all sisters (no brothers) had significantly higher self-esteem than for mixed sibships or for all brothers. She notes that sexof-sibling, spacing, family size, and ordinal position all interact. Kohn and Schooler (1969) found no self-esteem difference. They divided their sample into eldests, eldest half in an odd-numbered sibship, youngest half in an odd-numbered sibship, and last-borns. This unusual selection makes comparison with other findings impossible. Nystul (198 1) administered the Tennessee Self-concept Scale to 106 SS2 and SS3 18- to 20-year-olds. The SS2s did not have significantly different self-

152

Mazie Earle Wagner et al.

concepts whether they came from same- or cross-sex sibships. The SS2 subjects did not have significantly more negative self-concepts with one opposite-sex sibling than those from three same-sexed sibships. Howarth (1980) administered the Howarth Personality Scale to 170 women and 140 men undergraduates. He found self-regard higher for those not dominated by an older sibling. Regarding self-esteem, results are inconsistent for sex-of-sibling effects. Methodologies are variable with new tests tried. Effects of SES and broken homes on self-esteem is underlined. However, an only brother with several sisters seems to have high self-esteem, probably due to the high value his parents place on him. G . INTERNALITY-EXTERNALITY

Cicirelli (1982), in the investigation of birth-order subgroups, found regarding happiness among the elderly that those with more living brothers were more frequently external in their attribution of causality; fewer brothers led to internality. Also those with sisters and with contact with siblings were more internal (i.e., had a greater sense of efficiency in life). McDonagh (1971) reported concerning 132 male high school students that when the ratio of males to females in a sibship was three to one the student was more field dependent and less self-assured. Gray (1984), using the 16PF test found males were more tough-minded than females, and that having an older brother led to tough mindedness. First-borns with a younger brother were more trusting than with a younger sister. She found SS3 middle-borns more impulsive and careless of protocol, and that first-borns with a younger brother were more venturesome. Chrenka (1983) examined the sense of uniqueness among 133 S S 2 and SS3 college women from intact homes. The sense of uniqueness was greater when the neighboring sibling was a male. This was true for all ordinal position groups in these sibships of two and three except the second-born of three who felt least unique and most competitive. First- and third-borns felt most competitive with seconds than with others. College women felt greater affinity to sisters than to brothers. SS3 firstborns had a greater sense of uniqueness and least competitiveness. Schachter, Shore, Feldman-Rotman, Marquis, and Cambbell (1976) investigated 383 college students for the amount that adjacent siblings deidentified (claimed to be different from each other). Same-sex siblings deidentified more than cross-sex siblings. They felt that such deidentification was a mechanism that resolved sibling rivalry. In summary, brothers make for externality and field dependence. Same-sex siblings, resembling same-sex twins, strive for uniqueness.

Sex-of sibling Effects: Part II

153

H . NEED FOR AUTONOMY

In her fairly exhaustive study of personality characteristics of SS2 adolescents Hancock ( 1967) reports that first-boms have a higher need for autonomy than later-boms, only-born boys have a lower need than all other males, olders with a brother desire autonomy more than olders with a sister, only girls have a lower need for autonomy than same-sex girl dyads, and, overall, older boys and younger girls are less threatening than younger boys and older girls. Regarding power tactics, Sutton-Smith (1968) reported that SS2 eldests are rated most bossy and nonoldests show power reaction (i.e., run to adults, cry, pout, complain, although the younger girl with an older sister does not show this. Younger brothers with an older sister and older sisters with a younger brother score high on getting angry and shouting. He further stated that no easy generalization can be made. Klockars ( 1968) found among male underachievers at a community college that firstborns with brothers were more status and prestige seeking, detached, and unemotional. In summary, here, as in several personality characteristics, we agree with Sutton-Smith that no easy generalizations can be made. Perhaps the hostility between an older sister-younger brother sibship might be noted. I. AGGRESSION, DOMINANCE, AND RISK TAKING

I . Aggression Koch (1954, 1955) found an SS2 boy with a younger sister was less rivalrous, less daring, and tended to exhibit more feminine traits than with older sisters. She concluded that the vigorous, aggressive, competitive younger male sibling was more aware of his environment than the more passive female sibling (1954, pp. 209-223). The older of two brothers was less rivalrous than the younger, but more secretive than the boy with a younger sister. Corter, Abramovich, and Pepler (1982), with 28 pairs of same- and oppositesex SS2 siblings, wide-spaced (2.5-4 years) and close spaced (1-2 years), found that the older of two boys was less aggressive and the younger more so when the mother was present. All groups were more prosocial in their mother’s absence and more agonistic in her presence. They reported a trend for mothers to direct more negative behavior to the younger brother with an older sister. Minnett, Vandell, and Santrock (1983) reported on aggression in 78 7-9-yearolds and their 4- 12-year-oldsiblings. The highest level of aggression occurred in boys with brothers. Girls with sisters were higher on cheating and general negative behavior. Smalley (1930) found more rivalry for same-sex siblings, especially for girls. Allmon (1974), using 241 male and 167 female young adults in a very sophis-

154

Mazie Earle Wagner et a1

ticated statistical analysis, reported on many personality factors. He categorized his subjects by sex, sex of sibling, ordinal position, and sibship size. His cells were oldest brother with a sister or with a brother, and with both a brother and a sister, with similar cells for women. Additional cells were for middle-borns and only-borns. For men, the numbers ranged from 65 middle-boms to 19 eldests with a sister and eldests with both a brother and sister. For women, there were 37 only-borns and 8 oldest sisters of a sister. All other numbers were between these extremes. Of the men, youngests with an older brother were most aggressive and least compliant. Oldest men with both a brother and a sister were equally aggressive, were low in compliance, and were most detached. Only-boms (those without siblings) were most compliant and least detached. For women, oldest sisters with a brother were most compliant and least aggressive. Youngest sisters with a brother tied for lowest aggressiveness, whereas youngest sisters with a sister were most aggressive. Only-born women were most compliant, tied for low aggressiveness, and were least detached. The greatest differences were between the only-born male and the oldest male with both brothers and sisters, the latter being less compliant and more likely to be detached. The middle girl ranked fairly high in aggressiveness with lowest rating on compliance. These differences bordered on p < .05 t-score significance.

2. Risk Taking Nancy Newbert (1969) studied the middle-born among 120 children in 40 SS3 sibships, dividing them by sex of siblings into eight subgroups. She found the middle-boms more vigorous than the younger and older boys. The middle boy was also more venturesome than the younger, who was more shy. Eldests and only-borns have generally (Wagner, Schubert, & Schubert, 1974) been found to be low in risk taking, although they are overrepresented among astronauts. Allmon (1974) explored this characteristic among 409 young adults. He found that the older brother with a younger sister ranked highest of all in risk taking and lowest in personal confidence. Except for these two variables, the older brother with a younger sister was very similar in personality characteristics to the average male. The youngest brother with an older brother and the middleborn male were low in risk taking. The statistical program was able to classify these groups with considerable success. Among college students age 17-69, using 16PF test, Gray (1984) also found that eldest with a younger brother were more venturesome. In summary, it should be noted that, for instance, the younger of two males differs in aggressiveness from the youngest of three males. This underlines that sibsex findings for one sibship size unfortunately cannot be generalized to others. Also, the lack of consistency between aggressiveness and risk taking may indicate that aggressiveness, at least at times, acts as a cover for fear of failure

Sex-of-Sibling Effecis:Part I1

155

with actual lack of risk taking. Lack of consistency in definition of aggressiveness further adds to lack of consistent results. However, in spite of these caveats, the researchers seem to agree that SS2 youngest with a same-sex older sibling are most aggressive and least compliant. Singleton girls are least aggressive, as are older girls with a younger brother. Only-born boys are least detached. Middle-boms seem fairly aggressive and vigorous. In summary, personality in general suffers from a paucity of research; siblingsex-effect study is especially sparse. Poorly defined instruments with low validity further contribute to the lack of definitive results. Furthermore, the frequent use of samples (e.g., college students) for which results cannot be widely generalized adds to the lack of finalizing conclusions. Similar aged noncollege samples, for instance, would strengthen conclusions. Sibship size, spacing between siblings, and ordinal position all interact with sex of sibling, requiring that they be held constant, which adds to the problems of research in this area. And finally, demographic factors such as SES, intactness of family, religion, and culture also have effects on personality, not the least of which are the attitudes and beliefs of parents and other significant persons, including peers. This combination leaves the area of sex-of-sibling effects on personality characteristics poorly investigated and greatly in need of statistically sophisticated, well-planned research using large samples of the general population. The areas of social and occupational interest, of sibship sizes of more than two, lower SES subgroups, and women hold promise for exciting results. Fifty years ago, Schubert and Wagner (1936), administering the Woodworth Personal Data Sheet to 229 male and 248 female high school seniors, concluded that individual items (e.g., “Do you feel tired most of the time?’ or “Do you even feel very wicked?’) was superior to using average of items. Obviously they were looking for improved measures, the greatest need today in the field of personality research.

111. Physical and Mental Health In the area of relation of sex of siblings and physical health, there is little research. However, the small amount that does exist contains exciting and stimulating hypotheses. A. LONGEVITY

At the turn of the century (1901) Beeton and Pearson published a study on the longevity of 1784 pairs of male siblings. They found eldest males, especially

156

Mazie Earle Wagner et al.

when well spaced from the next younger sibling, to be more longevous than laterborns, and that longevity decreased with birth rank. Lawrence (1940) found the sex ratio (proportion of males) increased with longevity of grandparents, especially the grandmother. The ratio of males to females was significantly higher for the longevous. The ancestry of the longevous were also more fertile and physically fit as well as having more male progeny. Parenthetically, he also found that experiments on Drosophiliu melungaster (the red-eyed fruit fly) reproduced the findings that sex ratio and fertility were related to longevity. Wyshak (1978), in her study of longevity, found cross-sex twins had the lowest correlation of age at death. The highest correlation was between same-sex female cotwins. Same-sex siblings had a higher correlation between age of death than cross-sex siblings. She also found a high relationship between the longevity of individuals and their parents, and that for her Mormon sample that does not use birth control, a high correlation between fertility and longevity. B. HEART AILMENTS

Death from heart disease, our number-one killer, has much interest, and research, particularly regarding the ’&pe A characteristics. Strube and Ota (1982) found among 99 University of Utah undergraduates that the larger the sibship the more ’I).pe A behavior and that earlier-borns were more n p e A. He notes that as the family increases the less time is spent with the earlier-borns, thus creating rivalry. Recently, Williams, Barefoot, and Shekelle (1984) have reanalyzed the Jenkins ’Qpe A scale and have explored one aspect of it, the effect of hostility and cynicism as measured by the Ho subscale of the MMPI. They found cynicism and hostility scores, at least for men, “are associated cross-sectionally with prevalence of coronary artery disease (CAD) and prospectively with risk of coronary heart disease and with total mortality” (p. 18). They describe cynicism as an attitudinal set that stems from an inadequately developed sense of basic trust and centers around beliefs that other persons generally are mean, selfish, and undependable. Wagner, Schubert, and Schubert (unpublished)found for 275 male college entrants of a then tuition-free northeastern teachers’ college an average MMPI Ho scale of 15.7 (SD 7.5). For total eldests, the average HO scale was 17.4 (SD 6.9). However, when these eldests were subdivided by sex of next younger, the average Ho for the cases with a brother next younger was only 15.8 (SO 5 . 3 , and for those with a sister was 19.7 (SD 7.5, t 2.60, p C .01). The average of the 67 onlyborns was 16.7, SD 7.26, not significantly different from eldests with a younger brother. Total youngests averaged 14.05 (SD 5.25) and total 25 middle-borns 15.7 (SD 7.65). Neither was significantly different from eldests with a younger

Sex-of-SiblingEffects: Part I1

157

brother. Eldest men with a younger sister were significantly different from all others. However, the youngests and middle-borns are highly selected: (i.e., 85 eldests vs. 67 youngests and 24 middle-borns). For males with no older sister(s) dethronement by a younger sister seems to produce cynicism and hostility. Wagner et al. also found that of the 275 male college freshmen, those who dropped out of college with failing grades, as well as failing stay-ins, averaged higher Ho scores than those stays and drops with passing grades: 18.4 for the failures versus 15.7 for those who were making passing grades, a highly significant difference. Those who were not successful might be expected to rationalize their failures by projecting them cynically onto the world. However, we should note that the five with very high average grades (3.00 B or better) had the high average Ho score of 19.01. Perhaps this indicates that the high Ho scorer also has high need for achievement. C. SIBLING-SEX EFFECTS ON ANXIETY AND STRESS

1. Children

Koch in her exhaustive study (1956) of 5- and 6-year-old SS2s found those from cross-sex sibships were more stressed. She also reported that the older boy with a younger sister rated high in leadership and was more jealous and exhibitionistic than the older son with a younger‘brother. The younger of two with a cross-sex older sibling was less jealous and exhibitionistic. She also found children with cross-sex siblings were more self-confident, direct, expansive, and stimulated, but less apprehensive. The younger girl with an older brother was also found to be higher in leadership, self-confidence, and drive than the younger girl with an older sister. Dunn and Kendrick (1981, 1982) observed 40 pairs of siblings with their mothers when the younger was 8 months old and again at 14 months. Tivice as many positive social interchanges between the same-sex pairs were noted, as well as more frequent negative interaction between the cross-sex pairs. These writers note that frequent mother-infant interactions, at 8 months of age, were negatively related to positive sibling interactions at 14 months of age. Also, mothers of cross-sex infants played more with them then did mothers of samesex infants. Mothers of daughters converse more with them than do mothers of sons. Mothers generally identify more with their daughters. We observed one mother crooning to her infant daughter, “My little me.” Her 3-year-old son looked on. Another mother with three older sons and an infant daughter remarked: “We had to get the backyard full of boys to get a girl,” in the presence of the boys. Solomon, Parellus, and Busse (1969) observed 72 sets of parents of SS2 sixthgrade lower-SES black intact sibships. For both father and mother, the parental

158

Mazie Earle Wagner ei al.

interest factor score was higher for children of the parent’s sex. Mothers tended to participate more with firstborn girls than with later-born girls, but more with later-born girls than with firstborn sons. Rothbart (1971) concluded that mothers pressured all firstborns for achievement but identified most closely with firstborn daughters and showed most anxious intrusiveness toward them. With a sample of lower- to middle-class children ages 9-12, B. G. Rosenberg and Sutton-Smith (1964,a,b) found that firstborn SS2s of both sexes were less anxious and impulsive with a same-sex sibling than those with a cross-sex sibling; that SS3 children with same-sex siblings were less anxious than those with cross-sex siblings. Boys with older brothers were less anxious and less impulsive than boys with older sisters, but boys with younger brothers were more anxious than boys with younger sisters. Boys with older brothers were less anxious than boys with younger brothers. Girls with older sisters tended to be less anxious than girls with older brothers. In general, as Koch found, same-sex siblings were less anxiety producing than cross-sexed siblings. Kaplan (1970) found female children were less self-derogatory than males and that those girls with all female siblings were less self-derogatorythan those with at least one brother. Youngests and lower SES children were less self-derogatory than others. Dielman, Barton, and Cattell (1974) found among 295 junior high school students that children with more sisters rated high on feelings of guilt. Adler (1930) reported that the older brother, with the early development of a close-spaced younger sister during childhood and adolescence, becomes confused, discouraged, unproductive, and anxious. He is better able to accept his sister when they are spaced four or more years apart. Zuber, Nystedt, and Smari (1983) studied 64 17-year-olds and found those from smaller families and with cross-sex sibs showed higher public self-consciousness than those from larger families and same-sex siblings. Weintraub (1976) explored the personality integration of 119 high school girls. He found that second-borns were significantly better integrated than firsts and thirds. Adjacent siblings of opposite sex had a more highly integrated personality than those with siblings of the same sex.

2 . College Students With their ready accessibility as subjects, here as in other research areas, college students have been subjects for sex-of-sibling effects on anxiety and other personality characteristics. In such studies, the selectivity of the sample should be kept in mind, because the less adjusted, the less academically able, and those of a lower SES are apt to be eliminated. With this caveat, a review of sex-ofsibling effects on the anxieties of college students is presented. McCormick and Baer (1975) found among 82 college men that the older brother with a younger sister had higher neurotic scores than with a younger brother and was more introverted than the younger brother with an older sister.

Sex-of-Sibling Effects: Purr I1

159

Howarth (1980), studying 170 women and 142 men undergraduates found hypochondriasis higher in those with an older brother, although anxiety was higher for eldests than for only-borns, middle-borns, and youngests. Toman (1976) found that the older of two males worried more about the future than other SS2s. Klockars ( 1968) used underachieving community college males as subjects. He found middle-boms with older sisters were less anxious and dependent (i.e. generally more secure). Hancock (1967) found the older of two girls has lowest test anxiety, whereas the younger of two girls has highest test anxiety. The younger girl with an older brother is high on test anxiety and risk taking, and avoids easy tasks. Leventhal(l970) administered the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) to 218 SS2 male college students. He found the younger brother with an older sister was higher on the IPAT Anxiety Scale and the Maudsley Neurotic Scale, whereas the younger brother with an older brother was lowest. The older brother with a same-sex sibling was also high on the IPAT Anxiety Scale and was second highest on the Maudsley Neurotic Scale. The youngest with a sister was highest on interest in outdoor activity, the Indiana Motor Fitness and engineering, and in interest in joining a social fraternity, whereas the younger with a brother was lowest in these measures. In a fashion, Beutell’s (1984) finding of negative reactions of the older brother to his younger sister supports the general findings. Among business college undergraduates, he found that women were most in favor of women managers and that the eldest males, particularly those with a younger sister were most unfavorable. In summary, cross-sex siblings are generally more stressed, anxious, and neurotic, particularly the older boy with the younger sister. However, the older of two girls is lowest on test anxiety and the younger of two, the highest. Brothers tend to make girls more self-derogatory. In general, cross-sex siblings have more negative interactions. The elder’s negative interactions seem proportional to the mothers early attention to the younger sibling. D. MINOR MALADJUSTMENTS

lbming to other aspects of health, several authors have related MMPI scores to sex of adjacent siblings. Olson (1973) administered the MMPI to 99 male and 102 female undergraduates. Oldests and youngests with sibs all of the same or all of the opposite sex were most likely candidates for elevated MMPI scores, indicating maladjustment. Oldest brothers were most concerned with health (high HS scores); middleborn males were lowest in paranoia (Pa) (i.e., were most trusting). Youngest girls were lowest on Social Desirability, with suggested absence of social conformity.

I60

Marie Earle Wagner et al.

Vaughn (1975) factor-analyzed four personality tests with sibling constellation data for 102 undergraduates and labeled one factor “socially maladjusted laterborn males.” He found later-born males and males with a number of sisters were more likely than early-born males and males with few sisters to be poorly socialized, to have high need for autonomy, high awareness of their own needs and feelings, and to be aggressive. They were low in need for nurturance, sociability with peers, and emotional stability. A second factor found by Vaughn was titled “Independent Male Only,” which included only-born males and males with no sisters. This factor included emotional stability and independence, with few school or family problems. Being male with a greater number of sisters is moderately related to the Test-taking Defensiveness factor. Ferrari (1984) examined the adjustment of siblings of children with developmental disabilities (diabetes, other chronic illnesses) and found that same-sex siblings seemed more vulnerable than cross-sex siblings to negative effects of such handicapped brothers or sisters. Evidently, same-sexed siblings identify more with each other. With 134 pregnant women, Uddenberg, Almgren, and Nilsson (1971) found women with older sisters but no younger sisters both identified more with their mothers and showed as adults fewer mental symptoms in contrast with those with older sisters and younger sisters. Grosz (1968a) studied 268 SS3 depressed patients in several English hospitals and found middle-borns were significantly overrepresented (p < .001) and youngests underrepresented when they had opposite-sex siblings. No significant differences were found when the three siblings were of the same sex. In a second article (1968b) he reported for these same patients that the middle-born with opposite-sex siblings was less frequently married, which he took as an indication of poor adjustment because the patients’ average age was in the thirties. He did not separate the sexes. In summary, same-sex siblings identify more with each other and deidentify less, resulting in greater vulnerability to each others’ problems and generally less psychological well-being. When this problem of identification is solved, or when same-sex siblings are more widely spaced, they can support each other and reach fine adjustment (see next section on the monosexual sibship). E. CONSISTENCY OF PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS

Rosenberg (1965) followed 33 males and 34 females from 1920 to 1971 for physical, social, and psychological measures, comparing them at early adolescence, late adolescence, early adulthood, and middle adulthood. Same-sex dyads were more stable than cross-sex dyads, but only males were more stable than those with siblings. Both only-born males and females were more consistent over the periods studied than those with siblings. Males with sisters were more consis-

Sex-of-Sibling Effects: Part II

161

tent than males with brothers, but females with brothers tend to have more profile stability. Men with sisters were more concerned with appearance, more dependable, productive, valued intellectual matters more, and were more overcontrolled and ambitious. An older or younger brother predisposes a girl to emphasize traditional female sex role behavior rather profoundly. These sex-of-sibling effects attenuate by middle adulthood. F. SIBLING-SEX EFFECTS ON PSYCHOPATHY AND DELINQUENCY

The relation of sex-of-siblingeffects on delinquency has been more thoroughly researched than most other areas, and on the whole the results are amazingly consistent. As is our rule, we start with the youngest group researched and progress to older groups. Minnett, Kendell, and Santrock (1983) videotaped 78 7- and 8-year-olds with their 4- to 12-year-old siblings as they interacted in cooperative, competitive, and neutral situations. Eldests were more likely to praise and teach; seconds showed more positive behavior when wide spaced. Girls were more likely to praise and teach their sibling, whereas boys were more likely to engage in neutral behavior. Cheating, aggression, and dominance were more characteristic of 7- and 8-yearold behavior with a same-sex sibling than with a cross-sex sibling. Keller (1964) found that male adolescents who came from all-male sibships displayed more physical aggression than the remainder of their sample. Those with more siblings (from larger families) showed less verbal aggression. And for females, Schmuck (1963) stated that in SS2s “a sister with a brother is more compliant; a sister with a sister is more defiant.” Tolman (1939) reported that among 116 SS2 delinquent boys, boys with a younger sister were nonsignificantly underrepresented. Riess ( 1976) reported that in SS2s the boy with either a younger or older sister had reduced character disorder; in SS3s, an older sister reduced psychopathy in males, and in SS4s, two older brothers increase psychopathy in males. Furthermore, youngest boys with two older sisters were underrepresented among character-disordered males. Ostapiuk, Momson, and Porteus (1974) reported that delinquent boys usually came from homes where most of the children were males and that large sibships were a further disadvantage. Sprouls (1978), using 1886 boys and 1765 girls from middle SES suburban high schools, found girls better adjusted academically and socially than boys. She also found that girls with sisters were behaviorally better adjusted than girls with brothers, or with brothers and sisters. No similar differences were found for boys. Sletto (1934) obtained data regarding 1045juvenile delinquents. He found an interaction of sibling sex and ordinal position in which the middle child of either

I62

Mazie Earle Wagner et al.

sex was more often delinquent when the opposite-sex sibling was younger and the same-sex sibling was older. These reviewers would suggest that when the second-born is the same sex as the first, he or she is less wanted and that this position of comparativeunwantedness contributes to delinquency as well as other maladjustment. We do not mean to detract from the effect of all males as a delinquent macho effect. Sletto also found that girls whose siblings were all brothers were more likely to be delinquent than with all sisters. The larger the sibship the greater the likelihood. Hogan and Kitagawa (1982), using very sophisticated statistics, compared 690 black girls, age 13-19, from very low SES in Chicago with 188 same-aged black girls from all over Chicago. Among their findings they state that a low SES black teenager with a sister who is a teenage mother is 25% more likely to be sexually active and has a 68% greater likelihood of pregnancy. Johnson and Peck (1978) studied 122 11-17-year-old predominantly white runaways at a counseling center. The runaways tended to come from homes with large sibships, and 55% were either from an all cross-sex sibship or had a very young sibling. In England, several studies report the sex-of-sibling effect on likelihood of delinquency. Jones, Offord, and Abrams (1980) in a study of the brothers of 73 delinquent boys found the brothers to be more antisocial than brothers of 73 matched control boys. Furthermore, the average antisocial score of probands’ brothers increased with the number of brothers in the family while holding the number of sisters constant. And, holding the number of brothers constant, the antisocial score declined with the number of sisters. They concluded that the male potentiates and the female suppresses antisocial behavior in boys. Clarke and Softly, (1975) also in England, reported the ratio of number of brothers to number of sisters for three data compilationsof adolescents. The ratio was 118:lOO for all three, ages 10-13, 13-15, and 10-17. All three groups were adolescents remanded to approved schools for delinquents. Number of cases were 289,491, and 384. No control data were given for the ratio of boys to girls for the general population. Jones et al. (1980) reported on Canadian delinquents for 70 boys and 75 girls. The female delinquents differed from their controls only in being antisocial with no sibling-sex differences. The male delinquents had more dead siblings, came from larger sibships, and had significantly more brothers than their controls. Their number of brothers was greater than the number of sisters for all family sizes. For the control boys, three sibship sizes had more brothers, and three did not. The brothers of the delinquent boys were more antisocial than the brothers of the control boys. These authors argue that boys develop delinquent behavior rather than it being contagious from one delinquent brother. Also Toman, Preiser, Gasch, and Plattig (1967) in Germany reported that parents of delinquents and neurotics had themselves suffered early losses and showed high incidence of non complementary sex roles.

Sex-of-Sibling Effects: Part I1

163

In Germany, Gasch (1964) reported that the male juvenile delinquent who committed heterosexual offenses (e.g., rape, sexual assault of minors) frequently came from monosexual sibling configurations (i.e., from families of boys only). Keller (1964), also in Germany, found that males who came from all-male sibships displayed more physical aggression than the remainder of their sample, and those from larger sibships showed less verbal aggression. Hartog (1972) found 41 delinquent boys in 300 Malaysian families (about 1600 persons). Among the delinquents, oldest and oldest among brothers were overrepresented (p < .lo) (anxious delinquents were also overfrequently the eldests). The Malaysian delinquents were different from English, German, and American delinquents in their sex-of-sibling effects. The stress placed on the Asian eldest may be related to these findings. Burton and Whitesell (1979) examined the relationship of outcome criteria (prior incarcerations, months of incarceration) as related to sex and number of siblings (to number of older and younger sisters and to older and younger brothers). Their results indicate that the older-sisters variable is significantly related to each outcome variable. Wilkinson, Stitt, and Erickson (1982) compared the rate of self-reported delinquent behavior of more than 700 high school students to their ordinal position and sex of siblings. They concluded that there was an interaction effect between ordinal position and sex of siblings. Subjects sharing the same ordinal position but with brothers rather than sisters were not equally delinquent. They concluded both imitation and contrast behavior help explain the relation between sibling status and delinquency, and that the delinquency of second-born girls was best explained by contrast behavior, whereas second-born boys by imitation. However, examination of the data suggest that girls do not always contrast nor do boys always imitate. For instance, the third girl of three girls may imitate the eldest sister, whereas a third-born boy with two sisters may contrast his siblings. They concluded that the subject’s sex, sibling’s sex, ordinal position, and size of sibship were all critical determinants of their need to imitate or contrast an older sibling. 1 . Summary and Conclusion Researchers in the United States, Canada, Germany, and England all agree that brothers are overfrequent and sisters are underrepresented in the sibships of delinquent males, especially in large sibships. In fact, the monosexual sibship of all boys is frequently mentioned as the background of the delinquent male. There were no nays. Also, studies of males for self-reported delinquency, antisocial behavior, physical aggressiveness, cheating, and dominance character disorder and psychopathic disorder, all show preponderance of males in the sibship. One author theorizes that a sibship of males develops delinquency, that the delinquency is not caused by one delinquent (the one rotten apple in the barrel theory). The present reviewers, however, see this amazing consistency of a plurality of males

164

Mazie Earle Wagner et al.

in a sibship causing delinquency as resulting from a crescendo of competitive machismo behavior. Males are supposed to be brave, bold, venturesome, productive, and not hemmed in by the environment. In groups with lower SES, where business and politics are not available, delinquency is an expression of such cultural demands on males. With few avenues for obtaining goods and power, the lower SES youth turns to delinquency. As is so often found in sibship constellation research, the clear findings for males do not hold for females, nor does any other relationship of female delinquency with sibship constellation variables readily appear. It may be that the girl’s greater interaction with the mother and the greater protection of the girl gives the girl resistance to the influence of her siblings and peers. G . HOMOSEXUALITY

Although homosexuality has been studied long and intensely, including a goodly number on ordinal position, carefully controlled studies including sex-ofsibling effects, sibship size, and spacing between siblings are not plentiful. The interaction of these variables in the simple comparison of firstborns with laterborns, for instance, tends to cancel out meaningful differences. Siegelman (1973), with a sample of 106 male and 97 female homosexuals, and a like number of controls of same age and academic level, reported that homosexuals came from larger sibships and that most heterosexuals had only younger sisters. However, homosexuals more often than heterosexuals had two or more sisters, presumably older. More homosexuals had brothers 5 or more years older with no such spacing for the girls. Lesbian and heterosexual girls did not differ on sibship variables. Schubert, Wagner, and Riess (1976) compared the sex of siblings, sibship size, ordinal rank, and sibling spacing of 86 self-described homosexuals from a total of 1040 clients, all of whom attended a paying mental health center, and a normal control of 278 college freshmen. All were male. Regarding sibship size for homosexuals, they reported that a greater proportion of individuals from large sibships (4and over) become homosexual sex-of-sibling effects, the frequency of homosexual outpatients, sibling size held constant, is greater for eldest men (B) with a sister ( G ) next younger (BG) or of second next younger (BBG) than for those with an older sister (GB) in SS2s; boys with either a younger or older brother are intermediate. This held also for SS3s in that men with a younger sister were significantly more frequent (.05) than for those with an older sister. For each sibship size, in this clinical population, the percentage of men with a younger sister is significantly higher than for those with an older sister. Men with two younger sisters are excluded due to findings that men in this situation tend to react with greater masculinity (Rosenberg & Sutton-Smith, 197 1). The all-male sibships were found to significantly produce more homosexuals, especially for middle-borns and youngests. Excluding firstborns, the all-male sibships were

Sex-of-Sibling Effects: Part II

165

found to have the highest percentage of homosexuals. The youngest of three boys (SS3s) was the highest percentage of homosexuals. Kahn, Mahrer, and Bernstein (1972) administered a 208-item sex questionnaire to 32 BBs, 37 BGs, 31 GBs, and 28 BBs college student volunteers and factor analyzed the answers by sibling sex positions. They found that the younger brother with a sister 1-5 years older (G 1-5 years B) differentially related to homosexuality, sexual repugnance, and avoidance of the heterosexual role. These characteristics were shared by the brother with a younger sister (BG). However, for the latter, the male with the younger sister was characterized by sexual potency, sexual involvement, but avoidance of sexual relations. The male with a younger brother (BB) was characterized by masturbatory guilt and sexual fantasies, and the male with an older brother (BB) by sex-role insecurity. Kahn et al. speculated that some brother-sister dyads may be so close that each sib is the object of the other’s sexuality. To defend against such a threatening relationship, the younger brother especially develops general avoidance, actual repugnance, or a homosexual orientation. This is indeed not true for many younger brothers of an older sister. As with other rare incidence (suicide, etc.) there are many false positives, individuals who do not show such characteristics. It may be, however, with a less-developed similar characteristic, they are somewhat troubled. We should not close this section on homosexuality without again mentioning John Money (1970). He explored the gender role of individuals reared from birth as males or females with opposite-sex hormones, chromosomes, and glands due to external physical abnormalities. From his data he concluded that it is the sex assignment that determines the gender identity, not the basic physical characteristics. In summary, it would seem that members of large sibships are especially vulnerable to homosexuality and that many brothers is conducive to this deviancy. Also in SS2s, the cross-sexed male, especially when younger, is at risk of homosexuality as a defense against sexual involvement with the sister. It should be remembered that homosexuality is a rare incidence and that many described above do not become homosexuals. H. ALCOHOLISM

Although the alcoholic is frequently subsumed under the general category of psychopathy and character disorder, as indeed delinquency is subsumed under this rubric, they do not fully share sex-of-sibling effects. Two authors have written on this topic. Parker (1959) reported that alcoholics were frequently the later-born or especially the last-born male with older brothers. The ordinal position of the alcoholic here is different from that of the delinquent. Blane and Barry 111 (1975) examined the sex-of-sibling effect of 410 men and

166

Mazie Earle Wagner el al.

92 women consecutive admissions to a 25-bed detoxification facility. They too found a younger brother more likely to be alcoholic if he had a second older sister, with whom the alcoholic male had a warm relation. They argued that competition is frequent among adjacent siblings but that this older sister would give semifemale identification to these frequently poorly fathered men. Two other authors found youngest sons at greater risk of alcoholism. deSaugy ( 1967) studied hospitalized alcoholics in France, predominantly psychiatric cases with hepatice-digestivesymptoms, and found youngests overrepresented, as well as their wives. Bahr (1969) found youngests overrepresented among skid-row drinkers versus skid-row nondrinkers. In summary, alcoholics are overfrequently last-borns, especially with older brothers. However an older sister once removed also increases risk of alcoholism. I. SUICIDE

Kemper ( 1966) suggested that firstborn girls with younger brothers have the least satisfactory sibling relationship during their developmental years. Wolf (1964) found a younger son with sisters was more favored. Sutton-Smith and Rosenberg (1965) reported that firstborn girls with younger brothers are most deviant of females and were found (Sutton-Smith & Rosenberg, 1970) to be most submissive, dependent, anxious, and competitive of females. In 1968, SuttonSmith reported that although eldests tend to use power tactics more than laterborns, this is not true of the younger brother with an older sister. He uses bribery, blackmail, breaking and taking things, and makes her feel guilty. The older sister was found to be preoccupied with the mother-child relationship as well as being jealous of her younger brother, whom she sees as getting more attention. Cantor ( 1972) specifically hypothesized that among adolescent suicide attempters, firstborn girls with younger brothers would be overrepresented. She found of 17 attempters, 12 were girls, of whom 10 were firstborn. Of this 10, 7 had a younger brother. Of the total (boys and girls) 14 were eldests and 13 came from broken homes, all with the father absent. Haldane and Haider (1967) studied 30 child and adolescent suicide attempters, of whom 10 were boys and 20 were girls. Of the boys, 30% were eldests, and of the girls 50% were eldest. They did not report sex of siblings. GraE and Mallin (1967) studied 20 females hospitalized for wrist cutting, with an average age of 23 and usually quite intelligent. All but one had had several psychiatric hospitalizations. Of the 20, 30% were firstborns and 60% were first girls (evidently with an older brother[s]), fitting in with Cantor’s and Haldane and Harder’s findings. In summary, we again see that the eldest (this time females) with a cross-sexed younger sibling is significantly under greater stress.

Sex-of-SiblingEffects: Part I1

167

I. MAJOR PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS

Fewer researchers have investigated the relationship between sex-of-siblings effects on the major psychiatric disorders than they have for psychopathy. Also, the later studies have been more extensive and insightful. Birtchnell ( 1971) compared familial factors for 2407 patients hospitalized 28 days or more with 3425 subjects from the general population. He found more inpatients bereaved by age 20 ( p < .001) and before age 10 ( p < .01). He noted that early bereavement results in fewer siblings (i.e., the early bereaved came from smaller sibships). He found more early mother-bereaved women inpatients as well as more father-bereaved male inpatients. More mother-bereaved women and more father-bereaved male inpatients had younger siblings. Finally, he found the presence of an older sibling of the same sex as the lost parent tends to alleviate the loss and reduces the number of such patients. Hare and Lyster (1980) examined the sex ratio of full siblings for 279 schizophrenic patients, 416 with affective psychosis, and 1259 with other psychiatric diagnoses. They found an overall excess of brothers, which they suggest may have been due to an excess of males in the general population. They had no control. They found no significant difference in the “sibling ratio” in any of the psychiatric groups, but did not separate the sexes except for the grand total, thus possibly canceling out differences. Lindsay (197 1) examined the sibships of 400 consecutive psychiatric admissions. The sibships showed an increase in same-sex siblings preceding the patient and an overrepresentation of the penultimate as the patient. This latter may be due to a series of same-sex children born into a family with a child of the desired sex finally completing the family. The patient thus was an unwanted child by virtue of sex. Others have reported an increase of psychiatric disorder toward the end of large families. Because it has been found that in large sibships, the welcome accorded each child decreased with the ordinal rank, again implicating unwantedness as related to mental health. Sims (1974), studying 34 girls and 64 boys receiving psychiatric treatment for emotional disturbances, states that the majority of the children had sibs only of the same sex. Studying neuropsychiatric patients, Birtchnell (197 1) states that both sexes find older sibs of the same sex to be more disturbing. Olson (1973) found the oldest brother from an all-male sibship scored highest of all males on seven basic MMPI scales; the youngest from the all-male sibship was next highest, with four high MMPI scales and a peak on the MF (femininity) scale. He found oldest and youngests with both sisters and brothers less likely to have elevated MMPI scales than from same-sex sibships. Middle-boms with both brothers and sisters were relatively less maladjusted. Wagner and Schubert (1976) examined the sibship patters of 274 inpatients in a psychiatric institute, 80 veteran inpatients, 985 paying outpatients, as well as

168

Mazie Earle Wagner et al.

124 college student veterans. Of the outpatient sibships of three, 32% were allmale contrasted with 25% expected (significant at p < .05). The inpatients also showed an overrepresentation of all males (nonsignificant). For SS3 males with two sisters, no significant difference was found, However, for SS4+ sibships, males were significantly overrepresented at p < .05. Effect of all brothers or all sisters on males increases with family size. Miller (1967) studied 85 consecutive admissions for schizophrenia, 44 males and 41 females, for duration of onset before hospitalization. He found a near younger or older sister increased this duration as did the number of sisters and closeness of age of sister(s). For female patients, the effects were similar but less pronounced. Hartog (1972) studied 97 Asian schizophrenics for sibships differences from the general population. Among the psychotics, male eldests and eldest of brothers were overrepresented ( p < .lo). Women eldest were also overrepresented though not significantly. Youngest males among brothers were underrepresented, whereas youngest sisters among sisters were overrepresented. The eldest males were more often paranoid; the youngest sister, depressive. He found that the male firstborn patients tended to come from large sibships and the youngests from small families. The pressures are culturally different for the various sibship positions in Asian society than in the United States and Europe, hence there is difference in ordinal position as related to psychiatric disorders. Caudill and Schooler (1969) compared the eldest in the sibship with the eldest among same-sex siblings and found the latter had more potent effect. This seems validated by several of the preceding studies described. Schooler, Boothe, Goldberg, and Chase (1971) found among hospitalized schizophrenicsthat women in an otherwise all-male sibship were more severely ill. In summary, the above studies of the relation of sex of sibling to major psychiatric disorders, although diverse in attack, all make similar points; that such disturbances occur at stress points in the sibship: undue expectations and pressures (e.g., eldests in Asia, or eldests of one’s sex); unwantedness (e.g., the last of a series of same-sex siblings, sometimes followed by an opposite-sex sibling); or those particularly suffering from parental loss (especially when there is no older sibling of the lost parent’s sex). Researchers have found that with increase in ordinal position, each child is less cherished.

IV. The Large Monosexual Sibships and the Large Sibship with Only One Cross-Sexed Sibling The special case of the all-male and all-female sibship and its relative, the sibship with one cross-sex sibling, are among the most rewarding to researchers. Indeed Toman (1976) and Olson (1973) conclude that effects of a sibship pattern increase with the number of siblings influencing the individual. Such research

Sex-of-Sibling Effects: Part I1

169

frequently not only sheds light on intersibling exchange but perhaps even more so on parental leadership and guidance-or lack of it. Perhaps it is the latter together with the modeling of older siblings, where monosexuals identify and trust and rely on each other, that produces the unexpected finding that predominantly male sibships are overfrequently found among those receiving both high and low social approval. They are found both among the most successful and among delinquents and socially, mentally, and emotionally maladjusted. Findings regarding all-female sibships are few, possibly because girls are more protected and because a majority of them are occupied as housewives, for which pursuit accolades and censure are but rarely meted out. We review negative effects first and start with the males. A. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF MONOSEXUAL SIBSHIPS

In sections 1II.F on delinquency and 1II.J on major mental health disorders, numerous research findings on the all-male sibship and fewer on the lone male with sisters are reviewed. For delinquency, it is quite clear that those from large all-male sibships are at greater risk (Clarke & Softly, 1975; Hogan and Kitazawa, 1982; Jones et al., 1980; Ostapuik et al., 1974; Riess, 1976; Sletto, 1934), and that sisters deter in proportion to their number. For academic achievement, sibships of predominantly males are at greater risk of having reading difficulties and learning disability, as well as lower IQs. The eldest male seems relatively unaffected by this risk. For mental health in general, and schizophrenia in particular, the monosexual male sibship is not as conspicuous as for delinquency, but there is definite evidence of the mental hazards of having many brothers, particularly for the penultimate male with all older brothers and a single younger sister (Hare & Lyster, 1980; Lindsay, 1971). For women, those with all brothers and no sisters are also at greater risk of schizophrenia (Schooler, Boothe, Goldberg, & Chase, 1971). Males who committed rape and sexual assault on male minors more frequently came from monosexual sibships (Gasch, 1964). High rates for homosexuality were also found for the youngest of two and three brothers and middle-borns of three in both SS3 and SS4+ sibships. Alcoholics are also more frequent among younger males with older brothers (Blane & Bany 111, 1975; Parker, 1959). Younger brothers with older male sibs are then found in an unfavorable position; firstborns in all-male sibships seem not to be greatly disadvantaged. The absence of a same-sex parent also has negative effects. A same-sex older sibling seems to alleviate such negative effects (Birtchnell, 1971). Toman (1976) and Olson ( 1973) emphasize that effects of sibship patterns will generally increase with number (two brothers will have more effect than one; three, more than two), and so indeed it seems. We turn now to less extreme negative effects of the all-male sibship on its

170

Marie Earle Wagner et al.

members (See section II., Personality and its subentries for elaboration). Such men tend to be physically overly aggressive (Keller, 1964), in line with their tendency toward delinquency. Sims (1974) reported all same-sex siblings led to emotional disturbances for both boys and girls. Olson (1973) found among undergraduates that oldests and youngests with all-same-sex or all-cross-sex siblings were most likely candidates for elevated MMPI scores indicating emotional difficulties. The period of time before neuropsychiatric hospitalization for male patients increased in proportion to the number of sisters and their nearness in age (Miller, 1967). Sisters’ presence tended to alleviate psychiatric difficulties. Male patients with chronic emotional problems had more males in their sibships. Patients with chronic emotional problems (anxiety, depression, and maladjustment) had significantly more brothers (Patrick, Coleman, Eagle, & Nelson, 1978). Middle-born girls showed poor social adjustment in proportion to the size of the sibship, nearness to adjacent siblings, and sex of next siblings. Same-sex siblings were more disadvantageous (Newbert, 1969; Wagner, Schubert, & Schubert, unpublished). Kaplan (1970) found girls with all-female siblings were less self-derogatory. However, Dielman, Barton, and Cattell (1974) found children with more sisters were higher in guilt, whereas those with more brothers were higher in ego strength, boldness, self-sentiment, and excitability. Klockars ( 1968) reported that middle-born SS3 men with an older and younger sister were less anxious and more dependable. Olson (1973) found lowest MMPI F scores (nonconformity) among large sibships of mixed-sex composition. Highest F scores were among both those allsame and all-opposite-sex sibships. Vaughn (1975) found early-born males and males with several brothers were more likely to be poorly socialized than laterborn males with sisters. Grosz (1968a) found middle-borns with opposite-sex siblings were less often married (which he considered maladjustment). Cicirelli (1982) found elderly persons with more living brothers were more external, and McDonagh (1971) found that male high school students with three brothers to each sister were more field dependent. In summary, Toman (1976) and Olson (1973) both pointedly state that the effects of sibship pattern will increase as the number of males increases, to which these reviewers quite agree. Females have less cumulative effect. For negative effects then, an increase of male siblings makes the male at greater risk of delinquency, schizophrenia, other major mental disturbances, homosexuality, rape, child molestation, and alcoholism. He is also at risk of increased physical aggressiveness, poor self-esteem, anxiety, feelings of guilt, and of not marrying. They are less conforming. Sisters seem to reduce the likelihood of these untowards attitudes and behavior. For females, although there are some similar effects, such effects are much less severe and consistent. Caveat: As with all rare occurrences, there will be many false positives; many

Sex-of-Sibling Effects: Part I1

171

who derive from all-male (or all-female) sibships will not come to these unfortunate ends, though they may be unhappy, somewhat maladjusted, and less than fully functioning. Indeed some may be unusually successful, even eminent, as we shall see in the next section. B . POSITIVE EFFECTS OF MONOSEXUAL SIBSHIPS AND OF BEING THE LONE MEMBER OF AN OTHERWISE CROSS-SEXED SIBSHIP

By the number of studies published, it would seem investigators are more interested in studying failure than success. At any rate, the number reporting the advantages of same-sex sibships are far fewer than those reported above regarding the poorly adjusted and nonsuccessful. However, a few are available. As is our preference, we start with the males. And for want of a better direction, we start with the presidents of the United States. Wagner and Schubert (1977) reported that the sibship size of presidents is large, averaging just under six; that eldests are overfrequent, followed by middle-borns, and low for only-boms and youngests. On a 9-point scale, the median SES of their families of origin is 8, their mode 9, the highest level. Of the 39 presidents, from families of three, 40% were all male; of four and over, 10% were all male or predominantly male, including Ford, Eisenhower, Nixon, and Taft, with Reagan the younger of two brothers, Of 26 also-rans, two derived from predominantly male sibships. One might almost say that male sibships produce successful politicians-at least U .S. presidents! For a more complete discussion of the following, the reader is referred to the section on Achievement in Part I of our study. Toman and Toman (1970) found for the 127 elite men whose pictures appeared on the covers of Time magazine that they had 102 sisters and 214 brothers. Including the pictured individuals, these were indeed male-dominated sibships. Kelley and Boutilier (1978) found for 36 elite political women, that they were significantly unlikely to have a brother (were all female). Similarly, Helson ( 1971) found eminently successful female mathematicians tended to have no brothers. Their fathers, however, were mathematically inclined and seemingly influenced their daughters in choices of math as a vocation. Wagner, Schubert, and Schubert (unpublished) reported an overfrequency of male-dominated sibships among male actors (except dancers), especially with comedians and big band leaders. No sibling-sex effects appeared, however, for actresses. No significant sibling-sex effects were found by these researchers for artists. However, among nationally and internationally known authors, they found for both male and female writers, that an excess of brothers was an advantage. Schubert ( 1986) found a significant overfrequency of all-male and predomi-

172

Marie Earle Wagner el al.

nantly male sibships among 103 nationally known business founders and organizers, as well as among 32 outstanding expanders and developers. Three of nine famous inventors derived from all-male sibships; this contrasted with one allmale labor leader among a total of nine. Schubert noted that in observing these all-male sibships, they work together and complement each other (e.g., one searches out new business, a second tends the office, another is a planner for the future). As an associate of the Guggenheim brothers regretfully remarked, “While you’re outsmarting six of them, the seventh is already two jumps ahead of you. ” For athletes, Wagner, Schubert, and Schubert (unpublished) also found a significant overfrequency of all-male and predominantly male (a large sibship with an oldest or youngest sister) families. That there is an overfrequency of males from all-male and predominantly male sibships among the elite of many professions and occupations seems indeed very clear. A sample of less eminent would be most valuable, although many athletes and actors, business tycoons, and some others come up from the ranks. How sexof-sibling affects success among the upper-middle and middle classes should provide interest findings. And indeed, a large number of occupations have not been as yet surveyed at all for such effects. In summary, Koch (1954) said the presence of a male in the sibship of two energizes the entire family. Such energy may lead to maladjustment or increased productivity. Lawrence (1940) found the ratio of males to females was significantly higher for the longevous. The ancestry of the longevous were also more fertile (when not using contraceptives) and physically fit. The large sibship the all-male sibship in relation to occupations are areas for which more research should provide fascinating results.

V. Final Conclusions The sex of siblings has powerful and pervasive effects, changing the expression of intellect, achievement level, behavior, and personality of cross-sex siblings and emphasizing that of same-sex siblings. Brothers increase their siblings’ culturally assigned male behavior, physical activity, aggressiveness, mathematical and spacial astuteness, venturesomeness, and risk taking, among other things. The sisters’ effect is to reduce the above masculine characteristics (e.g., increase law abidingness) and to interest her siblings in feminine-approved behavior (e.g., verbal ability, creativity [by increasing number of choices], and nurturance). Sex of siblings has its effects through the transfer of such behavior to siblings, both male and female. Sex-of-sibling effects are much stronger for the male. The sex of an older sibling has a much stronger effect than that of a younger sibling. The affect is greater as well for a near-spaced than for one far-spaced. Eldests and widely spaced are less affected by sex of siblings.

Sex-ofsibling Effects: Part I1

173

Sex-of-sibling effects are cumulative (e.g., two brothers have more effect than one, three, more than two). However, the culture’s strong dictum that the male behave in a sex-appropriate manner leads to reaction formation against his sister’s effect, especially with two or more older sisters, in which case he becomes excessively masculine. However, the younger sister with several older brothers also behaves in a very feminine manner. Sibling-sex effects interact with ordinal position, spacing between siblings, and size of sibship as well as with SES, religion, race, family atmosphere, and wantedness. This review does not include the effects of siblings, male or female, one or more, as contrasted with that of no sibling (the only child). For such comparisons, the reader is referred to the voluminous literature on characteristicsof onlyboms versus nononlyboms. Care should be taken that studies of this comparison include controls for wantedness and intactness of family, because more onlyborns are illegitimate and more reside in one-parent homes; these two variables have strong effects that could wash out or produce illusionary results. For the specifics of sibling-sex effects, the reader is referred to the summary statements the end of each section of this article.

VI. Research Needed As with other sibling constellation research, research is very limited regarding females in general, sibships of three and over, lower SES, and the many personality variables. Research might best use large general population samples other than college students, clinical, and suburban samples because generalizations from these groups are not valid beyond the specific sample studied. Measures of personality characteristics need to be carefully detailed (e.g., not “conformity,” but conformity to what?-To the lower SES peer culture, the law of the land, a religious creed-and if so, which?). Indeed conformity to a lower SES peer culture may be quite different than conformity to the law of the land. The researcher’s interest may well dictate the subject and lend grease to his or her wheels. However, the best techniques should be used. Acquaintance with earlier research will help identify directions. Conclusions must be generalized only to similar samples. As the variety of samples increases, broader generalizations may be made. There is no area in sibling constellation research for which the answers are all in. Happy researching.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This research was supported in part by a grant from NICHD #2 R01 HD 07551-03.

174

Mazie Earle Wagner et al.

REFERENCES Abramovich, R., Corter, C., Pepler, D. J., & Stanhope, L. (1986). Sibling interaction: A final follow-up and comparison. Child Developmenr, 57, 217-229. Abramovich, R., Pepler, D., & Corter, C. (1982). Patterns of sibling interaction among pre-school age children. In M. Lamb & B. Sutton-Smith (Eds.), Sibling relationships (pp. 81-96). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Adler, A. (1930). The Education of Children (E. Jensen and F. Jensen, translators). London: Allen and Unwin. Allmon, D. E. (1974). An inquiry into the interrelationship of birth order, personality, and innovativeness. (Doctoral dissertation, Florida State University, 1973.) Disserrarion Abstracts International, 35, 643. Arvis, W. (1979). Prolegomenon to the study of “brother” as a male family role. Family Coordinaror, 28, 630-637. Bahr, H. M. (1969). Family size and stability as antecedents of homelessness and excessive drinking. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 40, 331-335. Bamett, M. S.(1986). Children’s perception of others’ motives for helping in same and opposite sex dyads. Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting, Midwesrern Psychological Association. Beeton, M., & Pearson, K. (1901). Inheritance of the duration of life. Biometrica, L. 50-89. Beutell, N. J. (1984). Correlates of attitudes toward American women as managers. Journal of Social Psychology, 124, 57-63, Birtchnell, J. (1971). Early parent death in relation to size and constitution of sibship, in psychiatric patients and general population controls. Acra Psychiarrica Scandinavia, 47, 250-270. Blane, H. T., & Barry, H. 111. (1975). Sex of siblings of male alcoholics. Archives of General Psychiatry, 32, 1403- 1405. Bragg, B. W.,& Allen, V. L. (1970). Ordinal position and conformity: A role-theory analysis. Sociomerry, 33, 371-381. Burker, E. J., Goldstein, M. W.,& Caputo, G. C. (1981). Effects of siblings of the opposite sex on friendship. Psychological Reports, 48, 190. Burton, A., & Bird, J. W.(1963). Family constellation and schizophrenia. Journal ofPsychology. 55, 329-336. Bush, T. L. (1977). The influence of family constellation variables on completed fertility: A longitudinal analysis of the effects of birth order, sex of the respondent, sex of siblings and size of family of orientation in conjunction with certain personality factors. (Doctoral dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1977.) Dissertation Absrracrs International. 38, 7584. Cantor, P. (1972). The adolescent attempter: Sex, sibling position, and family constellation. LifeThreatening Behavior, 2, 252-261. Caudill, W., & Schooler, C. (1969). Symptom patterns and background characteristics of Japanese psychiatric patients. In W. Caudill & Tsung-Yi Lin (Eds.),Menial healrh research in Asia and the PaciJic. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii. Char, W. F., & McDermott. J. F. (1980). How childhood sister-brother relationships affect adult sexual relationships. Medical Aspects of Human Sexualiq, 14, 32-48. Chrenka, R. A. (1983). Family structure and self-definition: Effects of birth order and sibling gender on sense of uniqueness. (Doctoral dissertation.) Dissertation Absrracts Inrernational, 44, 8324156. Cicirelli, V. G. (1977). Relationship of siblings to the elderly person’s feelings and concerns. Journal of Geronrology, 32, 317-322. Cicirelli, V. G. (1982). Sibling influence throughout the lifespan. In M. Lamb & B. Sutton-Smith (Eds.), Sibling relationships (pp. 267-284). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Clark, R. V. G., & Softly, P. (1975). Male-female ratio among the siblings of delinquents. British Journal of Psychiatry, 126, 249-25 1 .

Sex-of-Sibling Effects: Part 11

175

Copra, P. G., & Dittes, J. E. (1962). Birth order as a selective factor among volunteer subjects. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 64, 302-305. Corter, C., Abramovich, R., & Pepler, D. J. (1982). The role of the mother in children inferacrion. Unpublished manuscript. Corter, C., Pepler, D., & Abramovich, R. (1982). Effects of situation and sibling status on sibling interaction. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, 14, 380-392. Critelli, J. W., & Baldwin, A. C. (1979). Birth order: Complementarity vs. homogamy as determinants of attraction in dating relationships. Perceptual & Motor Skills, 49, 467-471. Deutsch, F. (1981). Birth order effects on observational and sociometric measures of popularity for kindergarten children. Journal of Generic Psychology, 138, 313-314. Dielman, T. E., Barton, K., & Cattell, R. B. (1974). Adolescent personality and intelligence scores as related to family demography. Journal of Generic Psychology, 124, 151-154. Dobash, R. E. (1972). Sibling affection: An exploratory study. (Doctoral dissertation, Washington State University, 1972.) Disserrarion Absrracts International, No. 73-39. Dunn, J., & Kendrick, C. (1981). Social behavior of young siblings in the family context: Differences between same-sex and different-sex dyads. Child Developmenr, 52, 1265-1273. Dunn, J., & Kendrick, C. (1982). Siblings and their mothers: Developing relationships within the family. In M. Lamb and B. Sutton-Smith (Eds.)Sibling Relationships (pp. 39-60). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Ebert, R. K. (1974). The reliability and validity of a mailed questionnaire for a sample of entering college freshmen. (Doctoral dissertation.) Dissertarion Absrracrs Inrernarional. No. 73-30, 151. Feldman, G . C. (1976). The only child as a separate entity: An attempt to differentiate only females from other firstborn females. (Doctoral dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1976.) Disserrarion Abstracts Internarional, 37. 2633-2634. Ferrari, M. (1984). Chronic illness: Rychosocial effects on siblings: I. Chronically ill boys. Journal of Child Psychology, Psychiatry & Allied Disciplines, 25, 459-476. Freyn, W. (1976). The dependence of pupil performance and grades on the sibling-constellation of pupil and teacher. Psychologie in Erziehung and Unterrichr, 23, 215-223. Gasch, B. (1964).Die Familienkonstellationen von jugendlichen Srrafgefangenen. Unpublished dissertation, Universitat Erlangen-Nurnberg. Goebel, B. A. (1985). Relation between social cognition and sibling constellation. Psychology: A Quarterly Journal of Human Behavior, 22, 58-65. Graff, H. A., & Mallin, R. (1967). The syndrome of the wrist cutter. American Journal ofPsychiaty, 124, 74-81. Gray, C. M. (1984). The relationship of birth order, sex, sibling sex, and spacing between siblings to personality traits (groups). (Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1984.) Dissertarion Abstracts International. 45. 84-27400. Grosz, H. J. (1968a). The depression-prone and the D-resistant sibling: A study of 650 three-sibling families. British Journal of Psychiatry, 114, 1555-1558. Grosz, H. J. (1968b). The depression-prone and the depression-resistant sibling: A follow-up note on marital state. British Journal of Psychiatry, 114, 1559- 1560. Haldane, J. D.. & Haider, I. (1967). Attempted suicide in children and adolescents. British Journal of Clinical Practice, 21, 587-591. Hall, E. (1965). Ordinal position and success in engagement and marriage. Journal of Individual Psychology, 21. 131-138. Hancock, F. T. (1967). An empirical investigation of the relationship of ordinal position, sex, sex of sibling to socialization, personality, and choice behavior among adolescents in one- and two-child families. (Doctoral dissertation, University of California Berkeley, 1965.)Dissertation Abstracts, 28. 781-782A. Hare, E. H., & Lyster, R. W. (1980). Sex ratio of siblings of psychiatric patients. Biological Psychiatry* 15. 495-498.

176

Marie Earle Wagner et al.

Harris, I. D., & Howard, K. J. (1968). Birth order and responsibility. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 30, 427-432. Hartog, J. (1972). Sibling rank of Malay psychiatric patients and juvenile delinquents. Southeastern Asian Journal of Tropical Medicine & Public Healrh, 3 . 124-131. Helson, R. (1971). Women mathematicians and the creative personality. Journal of Counseling and Clinical Psychology, 38, 210-220. Hodapp, A. F.. & LaVoie, J. C. (1974). Imitation by second-boms in adult-sibling dyads. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 93, 113- 128. Hogan, D. P., & Kitagawa, E. M. (1982). Family factors and ferrility of Black adolescenrs. Unpublished manuscript, Population Research Center, University of Chicago. Hollender, W., Duke, P., & Nowicki, S. (1973). Interpersonal distance: Sibling structure and parental affection antecedents. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 123. 35-45. Howarth, E. (1980). Birth order, family structure and personality variables. Journal of Personality Assessment, 44, 299-301. Ickles, W., & 'hmer, M. (1983). On advantages of having an older, opposite-sex sibling: Birth order influences on mixed-sex dyads. Journal of Personaliry and Social Psychology, 45, 210-222. Johnson, N. S., & Peck, R. (1978). Sibship composition and the adolescent runaway phenomenon. Journal of Yourh and Adolescence, 7 , 301-305. Jones, M. B., Offord, D. R., IQ Abrams, N. (1980). Brothers, sisters and antisocial behavior. British Journal of Psychiatry, 136, 139-145. Kahn, M. H., Mahrer, A. R., Bemstein, R. (1972). Male psycho-sexual development: Role of sibling sex and ordinal position. Journal of Generic Psychology, 121, 187-196. Kaplan, H. B. (1970). Self-derogation and childhood family structure: Family size, birth order, and sex distribution. Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, 151, 13-23. Keller, R. ( 1964). Dererminanren der Familienkonsrellarion in ihren Beziehungen zu aggressiven Verhalrensweisen. Unpublished dissertation, Universitat Erlangen-Numberg. Kelly, R. M., & Boutilier, M. A. (1978). Mothers, daughters, and the socialization of political women. Sex Roles, 4 , 415-443. Kemper, T. D. (1966). Mate selection and marital satisfaction according to sibling type of husband and wife. Journal of Marriage and Family Living, 28. 346-349. Kidwell, J. S. (1982). The neglected birth order: Middleboms. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 44, 225-235. Klockars, A. J. (1968). Relationships between personality dimensions and the familial variables of birth order, sex of siblings and family size. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 1967.) Dissertation Abstracts, 29, 327A. Koch, H. L. (1954). The relation of primary mental abilities in 5- and 6-year-olds to sex of child and characteristics of his sibling. Child Development, 25, 209-223. Koch, H. L. (1955). Some personality correlates of sex, sibling position, and sex of sibling among five- and six-year-old children. Generic Psychology Monographs, 52, 3-50. Koch, H. L. (1956). Children's work attitudes and sibling characteristics. Child Development, 27, 289-310. Koch, H.L. (1960). The relation of certain formal attributes of siblings to attitudes held toward each other and toward their parents. Child Developmenr Monographs, 25, No. 4. Koch, H. L. (1956b). Sissiness and tomboyishness in relation to sibling characteristics. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 88, 231-244. Kohn, M. L., & Schooler, C. (1969). Class, occupation, and orientation. American Sociological Review, 34, 659-618. Langenmayr, A. (1966). Der Einfluss der Familienkonsrellarion auf die Urteilsbildung im sozialen Kraf~eld.Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Universitat Erlangen-Numberg. Gemany. Langenmayr, A. (1976). Family constellation and behavioral judgments in group dynamics. Gruppendynamik, 7 , 46-60.

Sex-of-Sibling Effects: Purr I1

177

Lawrence, P. S. (1940). Ancestral longevity and the sex ratio of the descendants. Human Biology, 12, 403-429. Leventhal, G. S. (1970). Influence of brothers and sisters on sex-role behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 452-465. Levinger, G., & Sonnheim, M. (1965). Complementarity in marital adjustment. Journal oflndividual Psychology, 21. 137-145. Lindsay, J. S. B. (1971). Sex distribution in sibships. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 5 , 286-288. McCormick, K., & Baer, D. J. (1975). Birth order, sex of subject, and sex of sibling as factors in extraversion and neuroticism in two-child families. Psychological Reports, 37, 259-261. McDonagh, J. M. (1971). The relationship between familial characteristics and two measures of dependency. (Doctoral dissertation.) Dissertation Abstracts International, 32. 542B. Mendolsohn, M. B., Linden, J., Gruen, G., & Curran, J. (1974). Heterosexual pairing and sibling configuration. Journal of Individual Psychology, 39, 202-2 12. Miller, L. (1967). Family structure and conditions of hospitalization for schizophrenia. Community Mental Health, 3 , 125-132. Minnett, A. M., Vandell, D. L., & Santrock, J. (1983). The effect of sibling status on sibling interaction: Influence of birth order, age spacing, sex of child, and sex of sibling. Child Development, 54, 1064-1072. Meiselman, K. C. (1978). Incest. San Francisco: Jossey Bass. Money, J. (1970). Factors in the genesis of homosexuality. In G. Winokur (Ed.), Determinants of human sexual behavior (pp. 19-43). Springfield, IL: C. Thomas. Nadelman, L., & Begun, Z. (1982). The effects of the newborn on the other sibling. In M. Lamb and B. Sutton-Smith (Eds.), Sibling relationships (pp. 13-37). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Newbert, N. (1969). A study of certain personality correlates of the middle child in a three-child family. Dissertation Absrracts, 29, No. 69-7826. Nystul, M. S. (1981). Effects of siblings’ sex composition on self-concept. Journal of Psychology, 108, 133-136. Oberlander, M. I., Frauenfelder, K. J., &Heath, H. (1970). Ordinal position, sexof sibling, sex, and personal preferences in a group of eighteen-year-olds. Journal of Consulting & Clinical Psychology, 35, 122-125. Olson, T. D. (1973). Family constellation as related to personality and achievement. (Doctoral dissertation, Florida State University, 1973.) Dissertation Absrracrs International, 33, No. 7310, 333. Ortiz, B. E. (1981). Birth order and marital satisfaction: A review of the literature. Family Therapy, 8, 29-32. Ostapiuk, E., Momson, N., & Porteous, M. A. (1974). A brief numerical summary of some family variables among boys in an assessment centre. Community Schools Gazette, 67, 571-580. Parker, F. B. (1959). A comparison of the sex temperament of alcoholics and moderate drinkers. American Sociological Review, 24, 366-374. Patrick, D. L., Coleman, J. V., Eagle, F., & Nelson, E. (1978). Chronic emotional problems: Patients and their families in an NMO. Inquiry, 15, 166-180. Riess, B . F. (1976). Character disorder and sibling constellation. Paper presented at the XVI InterAmerican Congress of Psychology, Miami Beach, Florida. Rosenberg, B. G., & Sutton-Smith, B. (1964a). Ordinal position and sex-role identification. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 70, 297-328. Rosenberg, B. G., & Sutton-Smith, B. (1964b). The relationship of ordinal position and sibling sex status to cognitive abilities. Psychonomic Science, I, 81-82. Rosenberg, B. G., & Sutton-Smith, B. (1971). Sex-role identity and sibling composition. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 118, 29-32. Rosenberg, B. G., & Sutton-Smith, B. (1973). Family structure and sex-role variations. In I. K. Cole

178

Mazie Earle Wagner er al.

& R. Dienstbier (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (pp. 195-220). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rothbart, M. K . (1971). Birth order and mother-child interaction in an achievement situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 17, 1 13- 120. Sampson, E. E., & Hancock, F. T. (1967). An examination of the relationship between ordinal position, personality, and conformity: An extension, replication, and partial verification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 398-407. Sawyer, J. (1966). The altruism scale: A measure of cooperative, individualistic, and competitive interpersonal orientation. American Journal of Sociology, 71, 407-416. Schachter, F. F., Shore, E., Feldman-Rotman, S., Marquis, R., & Campbell, S. (1976). Sibling deidentification. Developmental Psychology, 12, 41 8-427. Schmuck, R. (1963). Sex of sibling, birth order position, and female dispositions to conform in twochild families. Child Development, 34, 913-918. Schooler, N. R.,Boothe, H., Goldberg, S. C., & Chase, C. (1971). Life history and symptoms in schizophrenia: Severity at hospitalization and response to phenothuazines. Archives of General Psychiatry, 25, 138-147. Schubert, H. J. P. (1986). Sibling constellations of eminent business founders, developers, and top executives. Unpublished data. Schubert, H.J. P., & Wagner, M. E. (1936). The relation of individual personal data responses and transiency, place among siblings and academic ability. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 30, 373-483. Schubert, H. J. P., Wagner, M. E., & Riess, B. F. (1976). Sibship size, sibsex, sibgap, and homosexuality among male outpatients. Transitional Mental Health Research Newsletter, 18. 18. Schwartz, B. A. (1976). The relationship between birth order, sex of sibling, and Kohlberg’s stages of moral development in a sample of college freshmen males from two-child families. (Doctoral dissertation, New York University, 1975.) Dissertation Abstracts International. 37, 3625-B. Siegelman, M . (1973). Birth order and family size of homosexual men and women. Journal of Consulting & Clinical Psychology, 41. 164. Sims, C. A. (1974). Kinetic family drawings and the family relations indicator. Journal of Clinical PSyChOlOgy, 30, 87-88. Sletto, R. F. (1934). Sibling position and juvenile delinquency. American Journal of Sociology, 39, 657-669. Smalley, R. E. (1930). Two studies in sibling rivalry: 11. Influences of age, and sex, and intelligence in determining attitudes of sibs toward each other. Smith College studies of Social Work. I , 2340. Solomon, D., Parellus, R. J., & Busse, T. V. (1969). Dimensions of achievement-related behavior among lower-class Negro parents. Genetic Psychorogy Monographs, 79, 163- 190. Sprowls, F. S. (1978). A study of the relationship among birth order, family size, and sibling constellation and high school behavior and academic adjustment. (Doctoral dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1978.) Dissertation Abstracts International, 39, 3483. Sterner, G . A. (1973). Birth order and self-esteem as determinants of affiliative behavior under egothreatening conditions. (Doctoral dissertation, Wayne State University, 1972.) Dissertation Abstracts International. 33, 55018. Strube, M., & Ota, G . (1982). Type A coronary behavior pattern: Relationship to birth order and family size. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 8, 3 17-323. Sutton-Smith, B. ( I 968). Modeling and reactive components of sibling interaction. Paper presented at the Symposium on Child Psychology, Institute of Child Development, Minnesota.

Sex-of-Sibling Effects: Part II

179

Sutton-Smith, B., & Rosenberg, B. G. (1970). The sibling. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Tolman, R. S. (1939). Note of family position of certain delinquent boys. American Journal of Orthopsychintry, 9 , 635-638. Toman, W. (1969). Family constellation: Theory and Practice (3rd ed.). New York: Springer-Verlag. Toman, W. (1976). Family constellation: Its effects on personality and social behavior. New York: Springer Publishing Co. Toman, W., Gasch. U., & Schmidt, R. (1972). Individuelle Freundschafrssysteme. Bad Godesberg: Deutsche Forschungsgerneinschaft. Toman, W., Preiser, S., Gasch, B., & Plattig, G. (1967). Die wirkungen von familienkonstellationen auf die person, ihre sozialen bezienungen und die nachfolgende generation. Bad Godesberg: Deutsche Forschungagemeinschaft. Toman, W., & Tornan, E. (1970). Sibling positions of a sample of distinguished persons. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 31, 825-826. Uddenberg, N., Almgren, P. E., & Nilsson, A. (1971). Birth order and sex of siblings: influence of parental identification. ACTA Psychiatria Scandinavia 47, 324-333. Van Cleave, E. F. (1982). Family composition and children’s self-esteem: The effect of birth order, family size, birth gender-mix of siblings, and parents’ marital status. (No. GAX 83-08134). University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. Vaughn, C. S. (1975). Birth order effects on personality dimensions. (Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 1975.) Dissertation Abstracts International. 36. 3017. Wagner, M. E., & Schubert, H. J. P. (1976). Relation of ordinal position, sibship size and sex composition to success among composers, the US Military Actors, Athletes, Artists, Authors, and Educators. Presented at the Inter-American Congress of Psychologists, Miami, Florida. Wagner, M. E.,& Schubert, H. J. P. (1977). Sibship variables and the United States presidency. Journal of Individual Psychology, 33, 89-95. Wagner, M. E., Schubert, H. J. P., & Schubert, D. S. P. (1974, September). Efectofsibling spacing on psychosocial adjustment of middle girls. Paper presented at the 82nd Annual American Psychological Association Convention, New Orleans, LA. Weintraub, Z. (1976). Personality integration as related to family constellation. Dissertation Abstracts International, 37, 48 1-482. Wilkinson, E . , Stitt, B. G., & Erickson, M. L. (1982). Siblings and delinquent behavior: An exploratory study of a neglected family variable. Criminology: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 20, 223-239. Williams, R. B., Barefoot, J. G., & Shekelle, B. (1984). Health as sequences of hostility. Chesney, Goldstone, & Rosenman (Eds.), Anger, hostility, and behavioral medicine. New York: Hemisphere McGraw Hill. Wyshak, G. (1978). Fertility and longevity in twins, sibs, and parents of twins. Social Biology, 25, 315-339. Zuber, T., Nysted, L., & Srnari, J. (1985). Social conditions in the family, self consciousness and attribution style: An exploratory study. Reports from the Deparrment of Psychology, University of Stockholm.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

INPUT AND LEARNING PROCESSES IN FIRST LANGUAGE ACQUISITION

Ernst L. Moerk DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY-FRESNO FRESNO. CALIFORNIA 93740

I. INTRODUCTION 11. MODELING AND IMITATION A. THE UBIQUITY AND GENERALIZABILITY OF IMITATION B . VARIETIES OF IMITATION C. VARIABILITY IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN MODEL AND IMITATION D. IMITATIONS AS PARTS OF LONGER INTERACTION SEQUENCES 111. CORRECTIVE FEEDBACK A. THE EXISTENCE OF CORRECTIVE FEEDBACK B. THE GENERALITY OF CORRECTIONS C. EFFECTS OF CORRECTIONS IV. ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC SEQUENCES A. ANALYTIC PROCEDURES B. SYNTHETIC PROCEDURES V. ABSTRACTING AND GENERATIVITY TRAINING A. THE TRAINING AND LEARNING OF ABSTRACTION B. STRUCTURAL VARIATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONAL FXEXIBILITY VI. BOOK READING AND LITERACY ACQUISITION A. ATTENTIONAL ASPECTS B. MOTIVATING ASPECTS C. MULTIPLE OCCASIONS FOR REHEARSALS D. A SYMBOLIZATION GRADIENT AND THE DISTANCING FUNCTION E. FEATURES OF THE VERBAL CHANNEL F. DEMONSTRATED CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONSHIPS G . MICROANALYSES OF THE IMPACT O F BOOK READING VII. COMBINATIONS OF FORMATS VIII. CONCLUSIONS A. THEINPUT B. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 181 ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVEWPMENT AND BEHAVIOR. VOL. 26

Copyright 8 1996 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of repduction in any form reserved.

Ernsr L. Moerk

I82

C. EXPLANATORY SUFFICIENCY D. A PROGRESSIVE THEORETICAL PARADIGM E. REMAINING CHALLENGES REFERENCES

I. Introduction The title of this chapter is partly intended to establish a link to Brown and Bellugi’s (1964) seminal work, “Three Processes in the Child’s Acquisition of Syntax.” Process analyses can provide microanalytic evidence demonstrating how input is transformed into knowledge in a three-term contingency pattern with processes serving as the central element. They can therefore potentially furnish the answer to questions regarding cause-effect relationships and the sufficiency of input and learning processes to explain language performance. This chapter surveys accomplishments and open problems in first language acquisition research since the publication of Brown and Bellugi’s (1964) article. The literature on language acquisition has become enormous during this period. Careful delimitations of the topic are therefore needed for a brief survey. This chapter is restricted to empirical aspects, more specifically, human-behavioral ones. That is, the focus is on verbal behavior rather than the underlying meanings and general cognitive bases in a Piagetian or other theoretical sense. The main focus is on research dealing with naturalistic expert-apprentice interactions and normal language development. However, it includes some aspects of remedial language training, which increasingly employs findings from naturalistic interactions and therefore approximates the latter (Warren & Kaiser, 1986; Warren & Rogers-Warren, 1985). Some questions of educational language instruction needed to be included to consider higher levels of language development. Although first language learning provides the basis of the analyses and arguments, some comparisons with second and foreign language learning are made because both fields deal with the same subject matter, although partly on different levels of complexity. With the emphasis on processes that relate input and acquisition, only studies that include input and learning are included and not those that merely document changes in children’s competence. Five behavioral interactional processes for which extensive information has been accumulated are highlighted. They are (a) Modeling and Imitation, (b) Corrective Feedback, (c) Analytic and Synthetic Sequences, (d) Abstracting and Generativity Training, and (e) Book Reading and Literary Training. Because these five interaction formats can be combined in multiple ways, such integrations are surveyed under a sixth heading, (f) Combinations of Formats.

First Language Acquisition

183

These five processes are specific forms of “scaffolding,” that is, of interactions between expert and apprentice as found in all skill training and learning. They permit flexible variations in specific linguistic contents, in finer details of form, and in length and complexity. The specific “formats” (Bruner, 1981) are adjusted to the changing informational needs of the apprentice and also entail motivating aspects. Although general patterns can be abstracted, differences between diverse families, social classes, and cultures are certainly expected and await further exploration (e.g., Heath, 1982). The concept of format and of the training episode in skill learning involves entire patterns of behavior that are contingent on each other. Much or most of the pattern of a format has to occur in order to constitute an effective training episode. The patterns in their slightly varying forms are then to be considered the independent variables, whose impact on acquisition has to be evaluated. Kuntay and Slobin (1966) have presented similar findings under the label variation sequences and have drawn related conclusions. Such training formats result in patterned skills, that is, language behavior. Any causal explanation relies, of course, on concomitant variation between independent and dependent variables over a range of values of each variable. In first language acquisition research, participants came predominantly from uppermiddle-class backgrounds, often children of researchers or college students, and in fewer cases from deprived backgrounds. Few systematic efforts have been made to cover the entire potential range of the variables; the Bristol project (Wells, 1985) and Hoff-Ginsberg (1991) are exceptions. Because the only evidence is often from the opposite poles of the independent variables, this chapter will repeatedly rely on the contrast between the modus ponens, that is, enriched background, and the modus tollens, that is, relative absence of the presumed causative variables. In this way, evidence derived from enriched language contexts can be compared with that from deprived ones, as in a chi-square design, even if the evidence stems from different sources.

11. Modeling and Imitation “Modeling” and “imitation” should be considered as superordinate categories, with diverse subcategories possible in both categories. In accordance with common usage, “modeling” is defined as the display of a pattern of behavior, whether this display is provided intentionally or not. Imitation is defined as the reproduction, with varying degrees of similarity and after varying intervals, of the modeled behavior pattern. As E. L. Moerk (1989a) has argued, both categories are fuzzy sets and entail fuzzy subsets. The nature of the sets would be distorted if concise demarcations were imposed. Imitation has recently been reviewed in The

I84

Ernst L. Moerk

Many Faces oflmitation (Speidel & Nelson, 1989). The following brief survey is based on this book, and the evidence is interpreted in respect to the overall goals of this chapter. A. THE UBIQUITY AND GENERALIZABILITY OF IMITATION

Imitation can occur spontaneously, as is often the case in Western middle-class families, or parents can urge it in every instance. This is the elema pattern (the word elema being a contraction of ele, “Like this” and sama “Say”) of frequent prompting, such as “Say like this” described by Schieffelin (1979) for nonWestern societies and by Gleason and Weintraub (1978) in the case of politeness formulas in Western societies. Defebach and Adamson (1994) reported that Westem mothers also used such prompting in about 26% of all metalingual utterances. Spontaneous imitation has been discussed as generalized imitation by Gewirtz and Stingle (1968) and Baer and Deguchi (1985). The evidence is strong (e.g.. Folger & Chapman, 1978; Masur, 1989; Uzgiris, 1984), though not completely unambiguous (Uzgiris, Broome, & Kruper, 1989), that generalized imitation is a product of learning to learn. Kuczaj (1982) remarked that parental modeling of imitation might result in filial imitation strategies, and Masur (1989) reported correlations between maternal and filial imitations of about .65. Once this interaction pattern is learned it can be applied flexibly, especially in order to build utterances that are more complex than the child could achieve spontaneously (Speidel & Herreshoff, 1989). A very fascinating report by Shirai (1994) showed that an incorrect form, the overgeneralization of the progressive inflection -ing, such as in I am watching, to stative verbs, such as to see, to hear, to know, (which should not occur because of presumed innate knowledge constraints), is also a function of the mother’s frequently producing the same type of mistake. That is, both correct and incorrect forms can be learned through imitation. B . VARIETIES OF IMITATION

Imitation can take many forms. It changes with the age and the linguistic level of the child. Identical imitation (Ervin, 1964) is rare and almost unattainable for the young child due to perceptual- and even more to motor-processing limitations. The older child employs imitation as a strategy to attain various ends, that is, with multiple variations. During the early stages, the child often repeats the imitation and thereby approximates the form of the model. With longer intervals between the imitation and the model and with increasing mastery of language, the similarity decreases again and new items are added to the imitated ones (E. L. Moerk, 1989a). Perez-Pereira ( 1994) has demonstrated how such modifications contribute to the analysis of the modeled phrases and to progress in language

First Language Acquisition

185

development. Dowker (1991) and E. L. Moerk and Moerk (1979) have shown how children modify poems or other literary texts when repeating them. This insight into children’s versatility in imitating is in close accord with experience from skill learning: Imitated skills are also applied flexibly to new situations and challenges. Underlying this flexibility is Whitehurst’s (1977) “selective imitation,” labeled “abstract modeling” by Bandura (1986, pp. 503-508). These labels refer to an underlying principle of structural imitation, a form of pattern abstraction. Once a pattern has been abstracted and stored, its production can involve differences in surface form when employed in new situations. The underlying patterns can be simple sentence structures, broad classes of behavior such as a referential versus expressive style (Hampson & Nelson, 1993), or specific morphological structures. C. VARIABILITY IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN MODEL AND IMITATION

Given that children’s memory is not restricted to a few seconds, intervals between a model and imitation can vary widely. They can be especially wide if the model has been repeated frequently and is therefore stored in long-term memory, as in the repetitive interactions of mothers and young children and in the reading of texts from picture books (E. L. Moerk & Moerk, 1979). Whether a pattern has been abstracted or a formula has been learned by heart, the interval between the model and the imitation can be hours and days. The delayed imitation is generally functionally matched to the purpose of the communicative interaction and is therefore adapted to it. Research on formulaic speech (Bolinger, 1976) and various schema theories of grammar development (Arbib, Conklin, & Hill, 1987; Schlesinger, 1971) suggest that much more of language performance is based on such rote-remembered constituents and frames than the presently predominant constructivist perspective admits. For young children (about I &years old), Ninio (1992) reported that out of 17,471 utterances 97% had been used by the mother for the same communicative purpose. For this age group the percentage of such imitation could not easily be higher. D. IMITATIONS AS PARTS OF LONGER INTERACTION SEQUENCES

Modeling and imitation should be conceived as formats that can be integrated in relatively long sequences of interactions. Incomplete imitations of the child are “corrected” by the mother through feedback. Such feedback cycles are often repeated until the mother decides the discrepancy between model and imitation

186

Ernst L. Moerk

has become tolerable-or until the child shifts the topic suddenly. However, the child often returns spontaneously to a newly learned item in renewed imitations of the original model. These reinstatements can also result in corrective feedback cycles. Sections of picture books are learned by heart and employed playfully or functionally in varying contexts, often with situationally required variations, followed by varying maternal evaluative feedback and extensions. Having focused on spontaneous “generalized imitation” learned by Western middle-class children, the contrast to the efema pattern, that is, continued reminders that imitation is required, might require further consideration. This contrast could represent a profound cultural and social class difference. Although in many middle-class families generalized imitation is trained in turn-taking babble dialogues long before the appearance of the first words (Masur, 1989; Uzgiris, 1984), these ideal learning strategies might be less or not at all developed in other families, social classes, or cultures. A continuous reminder (e.g., “Say . . .”) might be needed to induce verbal behavior in the children. Such lack of spontaneous imitation might result in briefer and less constructive interaction sequences and less learning. The varying degrees of spontaneity of imitation should be related to the finding pertaining to “generation” (Slamecka & Graf, 1978), a finding that was confirmed by Snow (1983): Verbal models that are imitated are remembered much better than items heard but not employed productively. Generalized imitation might therefore be a central strategy for enhancing retention of new linguistic materials. Lower-class children might be deprived not only of input but also of an important learning-to-learn strategy. Imitations can be and mostly are combined with all or most of the formats discussed in the following sections. They can be corrected, expanded, or shortened, and items can be replaced to demonstrate the underlying patterns in repeated feedback cycles. Rehearsal through imitation might even be needed as a basis for such analytic and abstracting exercises (Perez-Pereira, 1994).

111. Corrective Feedback Although multiple terms are employed in the field, such as negativefeedback, negative evidence, corrections, and expansions, recasts, correctivefeedback, the terms corrections or corrective feedback are predominantly used here because almost all the arguments in the literature center on correction. Only when specific studies on “expansions” and “recasts” are referred to, are the original terms of the authors retained. In any type of skill learning, feedback as to incorrect or suboptimal performance is central. Satisfactory performances are acknowledged and rewarded, often in the form of praise. Incorrect or suboptimal performances receive improv-

First Language Acquisition

187

ing feedback (e.g., Newell, 1981, 1991), which specifies those aspects of the performance that need improvement by providing “knowledge of performance.” A distinction between knowledge of per3cormance and knowledge of results is important for the understanding of the learning dynamics involved. Knowledge of results is equivalent to trial-and-error learning and provides no detailed information about causes of failure. In contrast, knowledge of performance is based on cognitive comparison processes (Simon, 1978) between a standard and a present level of performance and therefore provides detailed information. The differences exhibited by comparison of the current state and the desired state can be at least partially eliminated in multiple feedback cycles. Mostly, the feedback is not simply an either-or reaction. Every early success has also a failure component in that no performance is perfect. Accordingly, most feedback to a learner can be expected-and is commonly found-to have two components: It is generally a “Yes, but . . .” response. That is, both confirmation and correction are provided. Depending upon motivational and emotional exigencies of the learner, these components are differentially emphasized in the trainer’s responses. With increasingly competent performance by the learner, the trainer will “raise the ante,” as discussed by Bruner (1983), and will employ increasingly severe standards for positive as well as corrective feedback. Corrections are important theoretically (Gold, 1967), especially if language learning is conceived as rule learning. Much controversy has therefore focused on corrections. This controversy has been framed under three major headings: The existence question, the generality question, and the effectiveness question. The denial of generality can take two forms: generality for diverse language aspects to be learned, such as vocabulary, bound morphemes, and syntax, or generality for all the children of the world. The latter denial serves generally as a fall-back position when factual evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates the existence of corrections. In this last form-generality for all the children in the world, past and future-no definitive proof is ever possible, and the denial can be maintained indefinitely. The major answer to this and other denials based on generality is that probably no single training format is absolutely necessary, although it might be conducive to speedier learning. From a broad learning perspective, generality is therefore not required. A. THE EXISTENCE OF CORRECTIVE FEEDBACK

Corrective feedback has been widely used in educational settings (Faerch, 1985; Kasper, 1984; Speidel, 1987, 1993) where foreign languages and standard English are trained. Correction of mistakes is generally one of the cornerstones of all education, whether in languages or otherwise. For first language acquisition, denial of corrections was quite common until recently. It goes back to basically one source, two statements of Brown and

I88

Ernsr L. Moerk

associates (Brown, Cazden, & Bellugi, 1969; Brown & Hanlon, 1970). Brown et al. (1969) asserted that “there is not a shred of evidence that approval and disapproval are contingent on syntactic correctness” (p. 70). And Brown and Hanlon (1970) reaffirmed that “explicit approval or disapproval of either syntax or morphology is extremely rare in our records and so seems not to be the force propelling the child from immature to mature forms” (p. 48). Much of the recent literature (e.g., Arbib, Conklin, & Hill, 1987; Atkinson, 1986; Bowerman, 1987; Leonard, 1989; Platt & MacWhinney, 1983) took this denial of differential approval to mean that no feedback exists-sometimes toned down by the assertion that it is not effective in producing improvements (MacWhinney, 1987). The extensive denials contrast with impressive factual reports of much corrective feedback in many studies. European researchers such as Soederbergh (1974), Ruke-Dravina (1977), van der Geest (1977), and Lieven (1978) reported corrections, including syntactic corrections. Lefebvre-Pinard and Reid (1980) reported that corrective feedback combined with modeling and social interactions was more effective in improving language skills than the other techniques by themselves. E. L. Moerk (1974, 1975, 1976, 1983a) established systematically and quantitatively the fact and the conditions of the occurrence of corrections. He also elaborated the conceptual argument as to why Brown’s “expansions” necessarily imply corrections: Expansions are most common when the child omits obligatory elements, such as prepositions, bound morphemes, and so on, and contrast thereby the adult’s correct form with the child’s incorrect one. This realization indicates that Brown’s denial of disapproval pertained really only to a small subset of emotionally damaging corrections. With the work of Snow and Goldfield (1983), Hirsh-Pasek, Treiman, and Schneiderman (1984), Demetras, Post, and Snow (1986), Penner (1987), and Bohannon and Stanowicz (1988), the topic of corrections and negative evidence received a more sympathetic hearing in the United States. Snow and Goldfield (1983) reported that vocabulary mistakes of children were followed by maternal corrections 80 out of 82 times and were ignored only once. The percentage of corrections was 98.8%. Hirsh-Pasek et al. (1984) by “revisiting Brown and Hanlon” found that “virtually all repetitions of the ill-formed sentences included a correction of the child’s error.” Demetras et al. (1986) refined the conceptualization of implicit corrections, and Penner (1987) extended the study of negative feedback to larger samples of dyads. Penner especially showed the differential contingency of parental corrections: Ungrammatical utterances were responded to with corrections and grammatical utterances were responded to with topic extensions. Children therefore receive both “negative” and “positive” feedback contingently, telling them whether corrections are needed and then providing these corrections in the form of expansions. Speidel (1987) has accordingly argued that this feedback is really a “model/feedback,” (i.e., very positive and informative).

First Language Acquisition

189

Even authors quite averse to learning approaches, such as Morgan (Morgan & Travis, 1989), have begun to acknowledge that “negative feedback may occasionally be available”-but they qualified it immediately by a strong denial: “The contention that language input generally incorporates negative information appears to be unfounded” (p. 531). In their most recent extensive factual analysis, Morgan, Bonamo, and Travis (1995) acknowledged that corrections are provided with impressive consistency. Bohannon and Stanowicz ( 1988) showed fine-tuned differential responsiveness of adults to well-formed and ill-formed utterances. They concluded “the assumption that adults ignore grammatical errors is clearly false” (Bohannon & Stanowicz, 1989, p. 142). E. L. Moerk (1991) has shown, through abundant verbatim examples, how much of this corrective feedback is available in a middle-class dyad. Also, he (E. L. Moerk, 1994) demonstrated by means of a review of 50 studies reporting corrections how widespread and also how effective corrections are. In spite of minor differences in results or interpretations, all these investigators concluded that the evidence for the existence of corrections is quite impressive and that “the question of negative feedback . . . should not have been closed after Brown and Hanlon’s (1970) study” (Demetras et al. 1986, p. 288). Corrective feedback might be more prevalent than is immediately obvious. Becker (1988) showed that errors need not be directly identified. She found that preschoolers corrected their errors in 59% of 174 instances in which their parents’ indirect comments indicated that something had been less than perfect in the preceding message. She concluded that the dyads had routinized criticism-response sequences. Because the children themselves corrected their mistakes, they coped successfully with a considerable linguistic challenge. Such accomplishments of learning to learn, or deuterolearning in Bateson’s (1972) terminology, will differ in different families. An open-minded search for diverse and often indirect forms of corrections is therefore needed. B . THE GENERALITY OF CORRECTIONS

The existence of corrections having been demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt, the question as to its generality needs to be explored. As indicated in section 111, generality as to all children of the world, past and future, is not a scientifically valid issue and does not need to be addressed because no training format is seen as absolutely necessary. Generality as to linguistic aspects is the main focus to explore here. An extended section on corrections in vocabulary learning could be provided here, but it appears unnecessary. For vocabulary acquisition, in his earliest discussion of “the original word game” Brown (1958) argued for the importance of corrections. Even Brown and Hanlon (1970) admitted that “truth value” (i.e., vocabulary correction) is conveyed through maternal feedback. Vocabulary cor-

190

Ernsr L. Moerk

rection is generally accepted and is therefore not reviewed here. A larger potential for this research domain might, however, be indicated in the report of Mervis (1988), who found that demonstrations of children’s errors had an impact also on category formation. That is, more than simple vocabulary items are learned on the basis of this correction. Bound morphemes, such as the plural -sor the regular past tense -ed, and other minor grammatical elements, for example, articles, prepositions, and conjunctions, are equally well established in factual studies as the sources of corrections. Even the earliest reports of Brown and associates about expansions entailed corrections of omission of obligatory grammatical morphemes. The same applies to recasts in the Nelson tradition. E. L. Moerk and Vilaseca (1987) reported corrections of future morphemes, and Penner (1987) of past-tense markers and other grammatical morphemes. Very similar evidence was provided by Farrar (1990, 1992), by Furrow, Baillie, McLaren and Moore (1993), and even by Morgan et al. (1995), although Morgan et al. argued against corrections and their effectiveness. Syntactic mistakes as sources of corrections have been reported since Soederbergh (1974), Ruke-Dravina (1977), van der Geest (1977), and Lieven (1978). Bohannon and Stanowicz (1988) provided numerical evidence as to the intensity of these corrections: 32% of the instances of syntactic errors were corrected. This percentage is much lower than the 98.8% reported by Snow and Goldfield (1983) for vocabulary mistakes, but still a large percentage. E. L. Moerk (1991) provided many verbatim examples of consistent syntactic corrections. Most authors agree also that syntactic corrections increase with age and language level of the child. This evidence, although not yet derived from many verbal communities, shows that corrections of all forms of verbal mistakes are generally found when looked for objectively. C. EFFECTS OF CORRECTIONS

The accumulating evidence for the existence and generality of corrections has led to a shift of the denial position from existence to effectiveness (Morgan et al., 1995). However, effectiveness is also supported by much evidence, as summarized extensively by E. L. Moerk (1994) in a meta-analysis of 50 studies. Only a few examples can be mentioned here. Evidence from observational studies goes back to the report of Slobin (1968) that “Adam” and “Eve” incorporated some information provided in expansions in about 50% of the instances in which they responded to expansions. Also, in a more recent report, Sokolov (1993) found a R2 of .53 between maternal corrective feedback and filial language improvement. In the interval between these studies, many other observational studies revealed the same kind of immediate effects, although lasting effects have been more easily detectable through experi-

First Language Acquisition

191

mental approaches to be discussed presently. For example, E. L. Moerk (1983b, 1990) showed that expansions and corrections were rehearsed in up to 50% of the cases, which agrees with Slobin’s (1968) finding. Becker’s (1988) report of 59% of self-corrections after parental indirect indications of mistakes also corresponds closely with these numerical findings. Scherer and Olswang (1984) found that mothers’ expansions led to an increase in filial imitations. Farrar’s (1990) study of naturally occurring recasts that included corrections revealed correlations up to .8 1 between maternal provisions of recasts of six grammatical morphemes, including the plural, the article, and auxiliaries, and the children’s use of them. These correlations were considerably higher than those resulting from other forms of parental responses. Morgan et al. (1995) reported highly impressive correlations in the range of .71 to .87 between cumulative number of recasts and proportional grarnmaticality in children’s speech. These correlations indicate that between about 50 and 75% of variance is accounted for by correcting recasts. Experimentally, McLean and Vincent (1984) have shown that even after only 4 weeks with 20 min of expansions a day, which generally involved corrections, language-delayed children showed significant increases in the production of the expanded structures. Chapman, Leonard, and Mervis (1986) and Lefebvre-Pinard and Reid (1980) emphasized the additive and variable nature of the causal factors: In these studies, corrections with explanation were most effective, corrections with joint labeling were next in effectiveness, and single interventions were least effective. Further supporting evidence comes from the experimental research on “recasting” of Nelson and associates (e.g., Nelson, Carskaddon, & Bonvillian, 1973). Pemberton and Watkins (1987) found that recasting was as effective as modeling in furthering language acquisition. In a similar comparison, Goldstein ( 1984) reported that corrected practice produced faster learning than modeling. Tomasello and Herron (1988) obtained similar results for foreign language learning: College students learning French gained more from corrections of mistakes than from simple teaching. The above brief summaries suggest that the evidence strongly favors the existence, the generality, and the effectiveness of corrections. This evidence could be enormously expanded if the practices of second language training and learning were included. Part of this evidence is surveyed by E. L. Moerk (submitted for publication, a) and does not need to be repeated here. A point worth emphasizing is that these findings accord closely with findings known from research on skill learning, that is, with widely applicable principles of learning.

IV. Analytic and Synthetic Sequences One of the basic challenges for comprehension and therefore a central task for language learning is to analyze the stream of speech into elements. This chal-

I92

Ernsr L. Moerk

lenge is experienced by every beginning learner of a foreign tongue who listens to native speakers. Werner’s (1940) and Gibson’s (1969) research on developmental progress from global and diffuse to differentiated and articulated perception is closely pertinent to this challenge. Peters (1977, 1983) and Nelson (198 1) have analyzed differences between global and analytic styles in the field of language development. Pine and Lieven (1993) have explored how young children, employing first a holistic expressive style, learn to break down the phrases they have learned into elements that then can serve for building new constructions. This phenomenon was already discussed by Brown and Fraser (1963) and is well established. More immediately obvious are children’s efforts in synthesizing two-word and longer sentences. The same effort is experienced by any adult learning to produce new utterances in a foreign language. Compilation of subroutines (Anderson, 1987) is, of course, a central goal of skill training. Only such integrated subroutines make performance automatic and therewith quick and relatively effortless. The help children receive in the challenging task of first analyzing the input and then synthesizing analyzed elements into syntactic structures deserves close study. A. ANALYTIC PROCEDURES

Analysis comes logically before synthesis, and Heinz Werner’s (1940) orthogenetic law of development has substantiated the early tendency toward global and diffuse functioning. Therefore, analytic procedures are addressed first in the following discussion. That analysis presents a formidable task for children is demonstrated by reports, such as Chaney’s (1989), that the ages of 4.5-6.5 years are periods of intense development of word-segmentation skills. Further segmentation is, of course, trained still later in educational settings over several years of schooling.

I . Prosodic Support for the Analysis of the Speech Stream Research on prosodic aspects of the input, or of motherese, has been very extensive during the last decades. As early as 1963, Braine argued the fairly strong position that intonation is a means for the learning of syntax. Then the early work of Ferguson (1 964) on “baby talk in six languages,” and the excellent analysis by the Papouseks and associates (e.g.. Papousek & Papousek, 1983, 1989; Papousek, Papousek, & Bornstein, 1985), as well as the publications of Fernald (e.g., Fernald, 1984; Fernald & Simon, 1984), demonstrated many analytic functions of early input. Colombo (1986) complemented these studies in summarizing findings on early auditory pattern perception and receptive language development, that is, general principles of intake. This distinction between input, the stimulus, and intake, the processing of this stimulus, made by

First Language Acquisition

193

Corder (1967), is important because intake is the filter between input and learning. Only the conceptually most relevant points can be selected from the wide range of both the primary and the secondary literature. Motherese marks segments in the flow of speech (Kemler-Nelson, HirshPasek, Juscyk, & Wright Cassidy, 1989). More specifically, in motherese prosodic and syntactic boundaries coincide almost invariably (Fernald, 1984). Motherese stresses specific syllables and makes them highly salient (Gleitman & Warner, 1984). Kemler-Nelson et al. (1989) found that “the prosodic qualities of motherese provide infants with cues to units of speech that correspond to grammatic units of language” (p. 55). Specific pitch contours of motherese go together with specific sentence types (Stem, Spieker, Barnett, & MacKain, 1983), and motherese clarifies first content words through vowel modification and only later clarifies function words (Ratner, 1984). Considered from the intake perspective, deCasper and associates (deCasper & Fifer, 1980; Spence & deCasper, 1982) have reported that even fetuses can learn the intonation patterns of their mothers’ voices and they can differentiate and store long-term the prosodic patterns of stories. These findings were confirmed repeatedly (Mehler et al., 1988), leading to the firm conclusion that the earliest steps of prosodic learning begin even before birth. Fernald and Simon (1984) showed that mothers use motherese to babies as young as 3 to 5 days old. Looking at possible effects, Karzon (1985) demonstrated that 1- to 4-month-old infants benefited from the characteristics of typical infant-directed speech and could differentiate three-syllable sequences (marana vs. malana), if produced with motherese prosody, that is, enunciated slowly and with exaggerated intonation contours, but not when produced with adult-directed intonation contours. Infant-directed speech functions here as a perceptual catalyst (Karzon, 1985) and infants orient longer to such speech (Kemler-Nelson et al., 1989). Stem, Spieker, Barnett, and MacKain (1983) have demonstrated changes in maternal prosodic features of speech directed to infants between birth and 6 months (i.e., that maternal input is fine-tuned to the growing capacities and requirements of the infant). Hirsh-Pasek et al. (1987) have shown the same principles for 7- to 10-month-old infants. All these findings, which have been confirmed by additional studies, justify the strong assertion of Gleitman and Wanner (1984) that motherese provides prosodic guidance for syntax acquisition. They confirm therefore Braine’s (1963) original proposal. 2 . Semantic and Syntactic Phenomena That Facilitate Analyses of Verbal Input Both within and without the verbal realm, Bruner has shown in a wide range of studies (e.g., 198 1) that mothers conspicuously mark subroutines in the larger routines they model for their children. He described this “semantic sequencing”

194

Ernst L. Moerk

for many play situations. E. L. Moerk (1983a,b; 1985a,b) has explored in detail these analytical techniques in verbal interactions. They are reflected in “breakdown sequences,” wherein mothers first produce longer utterances and then, in two- or three-step sequences, shorten them by omitting elements or by repeating only some of the elements. In the case of the mother of “Eve,” Brown’s famous research participant, these break-down sequences appeared with a frequency of around 27 per hour, that is one every 2 min-certainly a case of considerable analytical modeling. Children soon follow this maternal example and receive feedback to their own analytic exercises. Often both partners in the dyad contribute alternately in performing such break-down sequences. The maternal analytic procedures are, however, much more ubiquitous and are not reflected only in one specific technique. The simple act of labeling-“This is a . , .”-wherein only the noun label carries stress, is an almost extreme form of analysis. As far as the outstanding acoustical properties of the input are concerned, and also from a figure-ground perspective, the mother presents to the child a single-word utterance: the label. Similarly, the well-known fact that mothers speak to their young children in short sentences that are much simpler than those employed in adult-adult conversations, reflects maternal analytic procedures. From this perspective, the sentence fragments and single constituents often reported as part of motherese are not an obstacle to language acquisition (as previously often argued), but a special strength of maternal input; mothers demonstrate thereby most clearly the constituents of complex structures. In sk,illtraining and learning, this principle is well known as the “part-whole method.” In Anderson’s (1987) theory of skill learning, such mastered subroutines are prerequisites for subsequent compilation into larger routines. In a later section (section IV. A.2), maternal substitution sequences are shown to clarify the underlying patterns that are stable in spite of varying surface strings. These same substitution exercises also necessarily fulfill an analytic function: Replacing elements makes the replaced elements stand out from the unchanged background. In the course of interactional turns, mothers often successively substitute several elements in a single sentence. They thereby mark and separate out all these elements within one specific pattern. These elements may be major constituents, such as nouns or verbs, but can also be minor functors. Similar substitution exercises are found in children’s speech (Braine, 1976; E. L. Moerk, 1983a; Pine & Lieven, 1993) and serve also to analyze longer phrases into elements. The field of first language development does not seem to have been focused in detail on this analytical function on the verbal level, although it is implicit in many studies when specific features of motherese and mother-child interaction are described. Although the general phenomenon is therefore well established, its full range and its variations are not yet known. Nevertheless, a justifiable conclusion is that analytic procedures in maternal speech are common and that these analytical strategies are adopted by many children.

First Language Acquisition

I95

This evidence, together with the findings described below, indicates that motherese is a phenomenon analogous to the anthropologically well-established “kissfeeding” in pretechnological societies. In kiss-feeding the mother takes (mostly solid) food and masticates it until it is well broken down and mixed with her saliva, then feeds it mouth-to-mouth to the baby. The baby can quite easily swallow and assimilate this premasticated food, which he or she otherwise could not have coped with. In an analogous manner, the mother not only breaks down long strings of utterances into clearly marked units, she also adds her own “lubricant” by employing exaggerated intonation contours that make the semantic and syntactic elements more perceptually and attentionaly salient for the infant. This “premasticated” input is transmitted to the baby in closest person-toperson contact by means of frequent routines, and it is assimilated, in the cognitive sense, relatively effortlessly by the infant. B . SYNTHETIC PROCEDURES

Synthetic procedures in maternal speech have been described for several decades, though under diverse labels. Roger Brown’s well-known expansions, upon which much later interactional research has been built, exemplify such syntheses: The child has produced an abbreviated utterance, missing even obligatory elements, and the mother supplies the missing elements in her repetitive expansions. She thereby shows her child how to produce longer and more appropriate sentences. Cross (1977) added to these expansions the concept of extensions, which reflect a very similar principle. R. Clark (1974, 1977) has provided many vivid examples of how children soon imitate this adult strategy by adding elements to their imitated formulas and thereby produce more complex utterances. The experimental research by Nelson and associates (Nelson, 1977; Nelson, Denninger, Bonvillian, Kaplan, & Baker, 1984) with recasts provided not only improved models but also additional elements, that is, examples of synthesis. Nelson has reported repeatedly how much these recasts contribute to language acquisition. Nelson, Welsh, Camarata, Butkovsky, and Camarata (1995) demonstrated also from the modus rollens perspective how closely the absence of recasts is related to specific language impairment and how provision of recasts can have remedial effects. Seitz and Stewart (1975) showed that expansions are effective at least with respect to immediately subsequent productions by the child. McLean and Vincent (1984) demonstrated a significant increase in the production of targeted structures after only about 400 min of expansion training spread over 4 weeks. In natural settings, expansion training can be much more extended. E. L. Moerk (1983a,b, 1985a), in his extensive differentiation of maternal instructional techniques, arrived at 11 categories that have a synthetic function. Eve’s mother modeled a total of 2,161 instances of syntactic synthesis in the 20 hours that were

196

Ernst L. Moerk

analyzed, which is 108 instances per hour and almost 2 per minute. The equivalent numbers for Adam’s mother were 1,565 total, 88 per hour, and about 1.5 per minute. (Eve and Adam are the two well-known children first studied by Roger Brown and associates.) Picture books are an outstanding tool for demonstrating both analyses and syntheses. Ninio and Bruner (1978) and Ninio (1983) documented such analyses and syntheses in detail. E. L. Moerk (1979), Snow and Goldfield (1983), and Wheeler (1983) provided further supporting evidence. E. L. Moerk (1985b) summarized evidence on the progress from analytic to synthetic exercises in picture book-related interactions of parents and children. He also elaborated the contribution of the synthetic exercises to grammar learning. In browsing through picture books with their children, mothers at first label only new and unfamiliar objects, that is, they home in on the major element. After children have learned the labels, mothers describe the activities or relations applying to the objects in question (Goodsitt, Raitan, & Perlmutter, 1988; Snow & Goldfield, 1983), that is, they model conceptual and linguistic syntheses. These syntheses can be built up gradually to incorporate more elements and to lead to quite complicated and elaborate syntactic constructions. To summarize, the research demonstrates an instructional value of synthetic procedures, which provide a wealth of teaching or learning opportunities, but these matters have not yet been exhaustively explored in connection with picture books and even less so in connection with the wide range of everyday pragmatically based interactions. Nevertheless, the phenomenon can be considered as securely established and its informational potential is obvious.

V. Abstracting and Generativity Training The fact of “generativity” in verbal behavior, or “the novelty problem” (R. Schmidt, 1975) in all skilled performance, is a challenge for learning-based explanations. More specifically formulated for the domain of language, the combination of consistency in basic grammar and variety in surface form and message content needs to be explored and explained. Because of its theoretical centrality, this issue deserves especially critical treatment. However, neither the label “creativity” nor mysterious and unproven innate knowledge provides a satisfactory explanation. They are merely instances of the nominal fallacy. Conceptually, Cassirer’s ( 1994) introduction of the mathematical concept of invariance over a group of transformations can serve as a starting point. Cassirer argued that the combination of invariances and transformations is the basis for perceptual constancies. Gibson (1966, 1979) argued in a similar vein that invariants can be abstracted from the flux of information. Applied to language learning, the syntactic structures are the invariants, and the flux of information is

First Language Acquisition

I97

represented by the surface forms of the diverse utterances. As children hear thousands of utterances that are based on a mere two basic syntactic structures in English, the copula sentence and the subject-verb-object sentence, they have abundant experience with the principles formulated by Cassirer and Gibson. Sections V. A and B explore the abstraction and generation problem in language. E. L. Moerk (1986) has related linguistic abstraction and generation to the abstraction of schemas that underlie motor skills and enable the generation of structured behavior patterns that are flexibly adjusted to changing contingencies. A. THE TRAINING AND LEARNING OF ABSTRACTION

1 . Metric Bases of Syntactic Structure One basis of syntactic abstraction, which is exhibited in the metric patterns of early mother-child interactions, has been neglected in research on language development. Although the prosodic suprasegmental features of baby talk have been well substantiated, their metric structure that could serve as the basis for syntactic structure needs to be explored further. A widely accepted finding is that the metric structure of poetry greatly facilitates the retention of the surface form of successive verses or stanzas. This principle has especially been argued for epic’ poetry, such as Homer’s (Parry, 1971). A principle that applies across ages and historical periods should not be neglected as a potential basis for syntactic structure. E. L. Moerk’s (1992) reports provide some preliminary indications of this potential. During the first sample of Eve’s recordings, when Eve was just beginning to produce syntactic structures, Moerk counted 327 instances of Eve’s verbobject constructions that consisted of a monosyllabic verb and it: have it, get it, did it, see it, find it, taste it. All these constructions were based on the trochaic meter, that is, a stressed syllable followed by an unstressed one, a very common meter in almost all simple poetry and epic literature. These were the only verbobject constructions Eve emitted during the first sample. The subject appeared rather optional and was either another trochaic meter (Mommy, Papa) or a singlesyllable item ( I , Eve, you). Similarly, in the training of prepositional phrases, two trochees in sequence are common: in the kitchen, on the counter, on the table. In one sequence, these three prepositional phrases followed each other in the same sentence and in the kitchen was repeated. That is, four patterns of two trochees succeeded each other immediately. The child, being sensitized to the prosodic qualities of baby talk and infant-directed speech, could barely miss these underlying structures. Another sequence was, There’s a cookie on the table in the room on the table with the rest ofyour crackers. Even the copula sentence before the string of prepositional phrases was composed of two trochees: there’s a and cookie; so that 12 trochees (with two ellipses) follow each other. As exemplified, most prepositional phrases

198

Ernst L. Moerk

follow this trochaic pattern (sometimes with ellipsis of the unstressed syllable): on the wagon, with your pencil, from a cup, of the top, after Sarah, for your meal, and so forth. The trochaic pattern is also encountered in many deictic sentences that are frequent in mother-infant interactions: That is Fraser. That’s a bunny. See the doggie, etc. Wijnen, Krikhaar, and Den 0 s (1994) provided references and fine-grained empirical data for a more extensive consideration of the trochaic stress pattern in early language acquisition. Such a “trochaic bias” might combine with a contrasting iambic predominance in the case of poetry and of polysyllabic verbs (Kelly & Bock, 1988). For example, in simple copula sentences, The man is big. The girl is nice, two iambs follow each other in the same regular pattern as two heartbeats. The general principles can be briefly summarized: English has only two basic syntactic frames: the copula sentence and the subject-verb-object sentence. Words in mother-infant interaction are often one or two syllables, and the copula is generally unstressed or elided when followed by an article, so that only a small variety of metric patterns, perhaps composed predominantly of trochees and iambs, will be very common and could serve as one perceptual basis for the abstraction of syntactic patterns. E. L. Moerk (1992) has discussed metric bases for syntax development more extensively, but the topic needs much further exploration as Trehub, Trainor, and Unyk (1993) have shown.

2 , Multiple Abstracting Exercises Research implicating the principle of abstraction is often hard to trace because the principle is encountered under a variety of terms. This variety is due partly to the contrasting paradigms from which the principle is derived. In remedial language training studies it is referred to as multiple exemplars and the concurrent method. Both terms were proposed by Baer (Stokes & Baer, 1977). These methods were developed when the goal of generalization proved difficult to attain for some children. Bunce, Ruder, and Ruder (1986) and Roth (1984) conducted studies in this tradition. For second language training Levelt ( 1977) and McLaughlin ( 1983) recommended exactly the same training procedure, though without using Stokes and Baer’s label. This principle is widely applied in the substitution drills common in most foreign language teaching programs. Under a different label, that of substitution or replacement sequences, generalization exercises are also widely found in the behavior of young children acquiring their first constructions containing more than one word. Braine’s (1963) pivot grammar implies a relatively invariant pattern, wherein one element is rather stable and the other element changes (i.e., invariance is combined with transformations and multiple messages can be formulated in this manner). Even before Braine, Weir ( 1962) reported replacement sequences in the presleep monologues of her son. Bloom’s (1970) differentiation between “pivotal” and “categorical”

First Language Acquisition

199

types of word combinations makes a finer differentiation but pertains to the same phenomenon; and Hatch (1976) reported spontaneous substitution drills from a 4-year-old Chinese child who was acquiring English as a second language. Rich evidence for such substitution exercises is also provided by various contributors to Nelson’s (1989) Narratives from the Crib. Similar phenomena have been reported by other authors, even though the emphasis of their arguments was sometimes different. Whitehurst and associates, for example Whitehurst (1977) and Whitehurst and Vasta (1975), have discussed selective imitation, which is the imitative use of a modeled syntactic structure with different fillers in the slots. This selective imitation shows that children have already incorporated maternal teaching techniques (i.e., the abstracting) into their own learning strategies. In mainly experimentally oriented research, the phenomenon reappears as “modeling,” for example in the work of Connell (1982), Schwartz, Chapman, Prelock, Terrell, and Rowan (1985), and Pemberton and Watkins (1987), or in the recasting studies in the tradition of K. Nelson. The latter studies are discussed in Section I11 in the context of corrections. Several interventions, such as that of de Villiers (1980), Goldstein (1984), and Lembert (1984), were effective in training new syntactic constructions, predominantly the passive form, through simple modeling, During such concentrated modeling of diverse passive constructions, the sentence frame remains the same while the elements in the slots change. Such multiple models are therefore typical substitution exercises with multiple exemplars. They result in the abstraction and generative use of the underlying invariant patterns. Stemmer (1987) has presented an eloquent theoretical argument for an empiricist approach to syntax acquisition employing similar principles. Hill ( 1983), Hill and Arbib (1984), and Arbib et al. (1987) focused upon such pattern abstraction using schema theory. Schema theory is also the central concept in R. A. Schmidt’s (1975) analyses of skill learning in general. Analysis of naturalistic discourse features that facilitate syntactic learning have been performed by Hoff-Ginsberg (1985, 1986) and by E. L. Moerk (1983a,b, 1985a). Moerk (1985a) employed finer differentiations of abstracting phenomena in mother-child interactions. In his 39 categories of maternal instructional techniques, 8 appeared to have abstracting functions. A total of 4,339 and 4,094 maternal interventions with abstracting characteristics were counted for Eve’s and Adam’s mothers, respectively. This is a rate of 217 and 227 abstracting interactions per hour, or 3 to 4 per min. These frequencies might be somewhat elevated because the families were aware that Brown’s research team visited in order to record their verbal interactions. Yet a comparison with Wagner’s (1985) reports of daylong observations confirms the intensity of verbal exchanges. Wagner found that children of differing ages uttered between 1 1,700 and 37,700 words per day. In adult-child interactions, adults generally produce more-up to double the amount-speech than children. In middle-class fami-

200

Ernst L. Moerk

lies, adults and children in their interactions might therefore produce between 25,000 and up to 100,OOO words per day. These frequencies are not substantially different from those established from Brown’s corpora. Certainly, additional instructionaltechniques for demonstrating the underlying abstract syntactic structures will be discovered by other investigators. Whatever the adjustments of the exact numbers might be, once larger samples of children are studied, maternal abstracting interventions and children’s abstracting exercises have to be considered potentially important factors in the learning of syntactic schemas. 3. Abstracting of the Structure of Single Words Close scrutiny of dyadic interactions indicates another pattern that trains abstraction, but on the word level: Mothers often replace word stems while retaining endings. For example, when talking about past activities, several verbs are employed with the regular past ending -ed (Moerk & Vilaseca, 1987). The same applies to nouns and plural endings. In this procedure, mothers analyze one single acoustic complex into two elements and also show through the replacements that a structure underlies these elements and remains unchanged even though one element, the stem, changes. In other sequences it is not the word stem that is replaced but the ending (e.g., “Yesterday you played at school. Today you will be playing at home. Johnny always plays in the yard.”). To explore the frequencies of all these replacement procedures, their systematic character, and their possible effects, extensive studies still need to be performed. Obviously, however, these exercises closely resemble the systematic training that is performed later in school settings. One to two decades of abstracting training are therefore experienced by most children. To conclude, even though the evidence is incomplete concerning abstractions, their occurrence is amply demonstrated in both maternal and filial verbal behaviors and in both informal learning situations and, even more so, in formal language teaching. These facts provide an important and resoundingly positive answer to the argument about the “learnability of syntactic structure.” Just as a child’s glance can sweep over many trees and discern the invariability over transformations (i.e., of stem plus crown) reflected in them, so the child’s verbal input provides, often in very close temporal succession, a combination of invariances and transformations from which underlying patterns become obvious. No extensive long-term memory storage is needed to extract the underlying structure, and no profound and spontaneous analytic work needs to be performed by the child. This conclusion is inconsistent with the assumptions of Maratsos and Chalkley (1980), who postulated such complex cognitive processing as to make abstracting appear impossible for the young child. The mother initially does the abstracting work for the infant through the many repetitions with variation she provides. The above-discussed analogy of kiss-feeding applies here again in that

First Language Acquisition

20 I

the mother or another “expert” prepares the input for the child to be assimilated as easily as possible. B. STRUCTURAL VARIATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONAL FLEXIBILITY

The contrast between the preceding section and the present one is somewhat subtle. In both sections invariances over transformations are explored. Yet in the present section the invariances are largely contenti;e, whereas the variations occur in the syntactic structures employed. This section is therefore a mirror image of the preceding one and is focused on another form of generativity. The structural variations discussed in this section include the transformations in the sense of Harris (1957) and his student, Chomsky (1963, but they are more encompassing. Many of the recasts, as explored by Nelson and associates, also involve structural variations. Generally, structural variations are extremely common in nursery conversations-and probably in all human conversations, though the latter case has not been explored to the knowledge of this writer. Because structural variations are broadly modeled, they can readily be learned from the input in the same manner as the structural invariances of the preceding section. These variations exemplify relationships between surface structures, such as questions and affirmative sentences, statements and negations, and so on. The occurrence of many of these variations is largely pragmatically based, such as assertions and negations, requests and prohibitions, shifting of prepositional phrases for emphasis, and so forth. I . Question-Answer Interactions Question-answer interactions are widely employed by parent-child dyads in Western societies. They can serve to keep a conversation moving with somebody who is not very skilled verbally and are therefore also found in conversations of natives with foreigners, as well as in second language teacher-talk. In the earliest “conversations”of mothers with their infants, mothers both ask the questions and answer them (Snow, 1977). In later periods, most reports on picture book interactions mention intensive questioning by the adult, at least for the early stages, often also with the answers provided by the questioner.

2 . Constraints and Demands A second common phenomenon in the nursery is the adult’s endeavor to constrain the child. The constraints might be expressed positively-“Eat your cereal” and the like-or negatively-“Don’t throw your food” and the like. Variations are found, such as, “Let’s take a bath,” “Will you eat your cereal,” but these kinds of statements undoubtedly occur very often. The demands and constraints are interspersed in the flow of normal verbal

202

Ernsr L. Moerk

interactions with affirmative statements and with questions pertaining to the same topics. The child can therefore rely on the similarity in content and focus on the minor differences in form. Parents employ forms in order to communicate about pragmatic goals, thus providing frequent rehearsals of an intensively instructional format. 3. Assertions and Negations Assertions and negations, such as, “No, we won’t have dinner now,” “This isn’t a cat, it is . . .,”and “You can’t have candy now,” are extremely common in child-directed speech. During the years when parents negotiate with their children household routines and the meanings of words, these concentrated variations might total tens of thousands or more. But exact frequencies are quite irrelevant as long as the incidence is high and the variations occur contiguously. These contiguous pairs of utterances can be encompassed within the memory span even of the young child. Children can therefore perform the comparison processes emphasized by Simon (1978) as to similarities and differences. They have, therefore, abundant opportunities to learn the negation transformation. 4 . Multiple Frame Variations In addition to these often discussed transformations in the sense of Harris and Chomsky, an almost unlimited variety of other syntactic variations is possible. Syntactic functions of constituents can change. For example, in the sequence, You want a sandwich? I’ll J;x it for you, the syntactic function of you has changed. Often prepositional phrases or adverbs are moved for purely emphatic purposes. Frequently, progressions from a copula sentence to a subject-verbobject sentence occur. This is a bunny. The bunny is eating a carrot. Shifts from transitive to intransitive verb use are common: Daddy is eating his lunch. Mommy is eating too. E. L. Moerk (1983b) reported 781 instances of such variations for the 20 hours of interactions analyzed for Eve. This rate is about 40 per hour, reaching in some samples 1 per minute. It reflects much training of syntactic flexibility and generativity, accompanied by continuity of content. These exercises provide for the child opportunities to differentiate contentive invariances from structural transformations. That children take several years to learn some of these more complex aspects of transformations is also well established. Ample training has therefore occurred before mastery is attained.

VI. Book Reading and Literacy Acquisition Literacy is of central value for occupational success in technological cultures. Profound differences exist between social classes in the attainment of both high literacy levels and occupational success. The topic of literacy acquisition has therefore received much attention during the last decade and a half. A review of

First Language Acquisition

203

this topic published in 1985 (E. L. Moerk, 1985b) covers the older literature. An excellent survey of more recent research was provided by Scarborough and Dobrich (1994). The much more encompassing topic of how the transition from orality to literacy impacts cognitive functioning was examined by Stanovich (1993). Two major roots of literacy are nursery rhymes and picture books. Nursery rhymes mainly train the sound structure of language but entail also attentional and motivational aspects; picture book reading entails multiple features that are conducive to language training. They are attention training, motivating factors, rehearsals, the distancing function, and linguistic complexity. A. A’ITENTIONAL ASPECTS

The normal context in which mothers and children spend time with books is ideal for focusing the attention and expanding the attention span of the child, that is, for “socializing” attention (Zukow-Goldring & Ferko, 1994). Support for this common observation derives from one of Whitehurst’s students (Lonigan, 1994), who found an impressive correlation of r = .65, between a history of reading to the child and the attention span of the child in maintaining interest until a book is finished. Wells (1985) reported a similar correlation, r = .56, between children’s degree of concentration on book reading and later literacy. The book-reading situation also increases the likelihood that the mother knows the content of the momentary focus of the child because both share the same overall focus of attention. The mother can therefore correctly match her verbal comments to the child’s focus, and the child is likely to interpret the mother’s verbal comments correctly. Ninio and Bruner (1978) referred to this aspect of scaffolding, and Tomasello and Todd (1983) and Tomasello and Fmar (1986) demonstrated that the mother’s correct perception of the child’s visual focus, combined with labeling, has a decisive influence on vocabulary development. Similar reports are common in the literature and do not need to be detailed here. The almost identical context that is encountered with repeated readings results in repeated arousal of the same neuronal networks and produces facilitation and priming effects. As research on encoding specificity (e.g., Tblving & Thomson, 1973) has shown, memory for vocabulary items can be strongly enhanced if the recall context is similar to the context of the original encounter with the word. Nonverbal contexts, pictorial contexts, and verbal contexts are highly similar if picture books are read repeatedly. Multiple priming effects are therefore to be expected, although they have not been explored. B. MOTIVATING ASPECTS

The motivating or rewarding aspects of the reading situation are probably as important as the attentional ones. Children will associate language with a feeling of general comfort when they receive the mother’s undivided attention, mostly in

204

Ernst L. Moerk

close physical contact with her (contact-comfort), and when they are rewarded reliably for good performance with contingent praise (Ninio & Bruner, 1978). The Bristol project (Wells, 1985) focused on such motivational factors. They were also emphasized in the recent review by Scarborough and Dobrich (1994). Arnold and Whitehurst (1994) and Lonigan (1994) also found that early initiation into reading is related to higher interest in reading in later years. Malinowski’s (1923) concept of verbal communion (i.e., the emotional closeness inherent in dyadic communication) is especially relevant to this aspect of book reading. But in book reading the intrinsic motivation becomes associated with cognitively complex verbal behavior, as discussed later in sections VI. D and E. C. MULTIPLE OCCASIONS FOR REHEARSALS

Frequent reading often implies frequent returns to the same books and even the same pages of books, as known from many reports (e.g., Snow & Goldfield, 1983; Snow, Perlmann, & Nathan, 1985). These rereadings provide ideal opportunities for rehearsal, for analysis of complex passages, and for all types of transforming exercises in the comments of mother and child. The pictures provide the semantic stimuli, and the repetition provides the memory support for the children so that the latter can assume a larger share of the verbal interaction. Frequency of shared book reading has been found in some-but not all-studies (Scarborough et al., 1991) to be a differential predictor of good versus poor reading skills. Correlation coefficients in the range of .57 to .69 were obtained, as summarized by Scarborough and Dobrich (1994). That frequent rehearsals are central for all language learning and also for the automatization of other skills has been widely substantiated (Bilodeau, 1966; Moerk, submitted for publication, b). D. A SYMBOLIZATION GRADIENT AND THE DISTANCING FUNCTION

More cognitively important than mere repetitions might be the fact that in the picture book situation the child almost optimally encounters a symbolization gradient (E. L. Moerk, 1977, 1985b). Pictures are, of course, one level of symbolization, though still on the analogical level. Picture symbolization has to be learned too, as cross-cultural research has shown (Cole & Scribner, 1974). The captions of the story and the parental comments reflect the verbal level of symbolization on the arbitrary level. Pictures and their captions mostly are closely matched, and parental comments provide enriching variations to the themes depicted (Peterson & McCabe, 1994). Children have therefore an optimal opportunity to relate levels of symbolization and to become familiar with the forms of symbolization employed in their culture. A further point is that this symbolizationgradient entails a distancing function

First Language Acquisition

205

(Sigel, 1986; Sigel & McGillicuddy, 1984). Comprehension is supported by nonlinguistic cues, but these cues are less immediate than when objects and activities in the environment are the topic of discussion. Picture books can therefore support gradual decontextualization of the language function, and they demonstrate the utility of language to communicate about the there and then. Even within the reading situation, progressive distancing occurs, as Goodsitt, Raitan, and Perlmutter (1988) have shown: During the early readings of a book, the dyad focuses only on the pictures in view. In later readings, preceding and subsequent pages are often referred to. These discussions of distant pictures have been reported to be increasingly accompanied by additional patterns of decontextualizing interactions, as, for example, parental questions or statements about past events, and so forth (Peterson & McCabe, 1994). These multiple influences contribute jointly to the development of narrative skills and the establishment of one basis for school success, as suggested by the studies surveyed in section VI .F. E. FEATURES OF THE VERBAL CHANNEL

As a step into literacy, picture books provide advantages as learning tools, specifically in the verbal channel. Often they present rhythmic and rhyming text and thereby facilitate the mastery of the sound structure of the language. The importance of this mastery has been demonstrated repeatedly (Bryant, Bradley, MacLean, & Crossland, 1989; Bryant, MacLean, & Bradley, 1990), as is discussed next. Books often display rare vocabulary items and can therefore be employed for vocabulary training and rehearsal. E. L. Moerk and Moerk (1979) reported a much higher proportion of new and rare words in utterances derived from books as compared to those in spontaneous speech. These principles were confirmed by Elley (1989) and many others (Snow, 1993). DeLoache and De Mendoza (1987) added another important aspect, pertaining to maternal corrections of vocabulary items even for I-year-olds. They reported that “mothers always responded to incorrect responses by the child, they never ignored or accepted a child response that was wrong” (p. 118; italics in original). As mentioned in section 11. A, Snow and Goldfield (1983) reported 98.8% corrections in the same context. Additionally, mothers first provided information and corrected the child when needed and switched later to testing questions, thus using a combination of multiple teaching methods. Even relatively simple texts in picture books are subject to the overall principle of written text, that is, that they are syntactically more complex than spoken language, especially the child-directed speech that deals with everyday exigencies. More complex syntactic models are therefore provided already during the preschool age both through the texts themselves and through the parental comments that utilize elements of the text. Dunn and Wodding (1977) reported that

206

Ernst L. Moerk

mothers’ speech is not only more complex but also involves more “explicit teaching.” K. C. Moerk and Moerk (submitted for publication) showed that rather complex grammatical constructions are frequent in even simple picture books, such as Winnie the Pooh. Multiple determiners of noun phrases, multiple prepositional phrases per clause, often combined with adverbs, more subordinate clauses, and frequent noncanonical sentence forms are some of the grammatical complexities that child and mother can exercise when reading even these simple picture books. This increase in syntactic complexity when focusing on texts, which will continue during all of schooling and in future private reading, resolves the “projection problem” (Baker, 1979) that was claimed to make nativistic assumptions necessary. Because children can be shown to receive more complex input with their advancing language skills, Baker’s and others’ argument from a “poverty of the input,” which was focused on early input only, is empirically refuted. F. DEMONSTRATED CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONSHIPS

Given the almost ideal nature of picture book reading for language and literacy acquisition, demonstrations of cause-effect relationships are to be expected. Bryant et al. (1989, 1990) showed that experience with rhymes predicts many aspects of preschool language skills as well as reading and spelling level in first grade. Long-term effects on academic skills are almost necessarily implied by these facilitative impacts (McLean, Bryant, & Bradley, 1987), and they can be assumed to increase in a nonlinear manner if enrichment is maintained. Such a positive conclusion cannot, however, be generalized to some forms of book reading. As Scarborough and Dobrich (1994) showed, the reported sizes of cause-effect relationships often differ even within projects and more often differ between projects (relevant discussions can be found in Volume 14, Number 3 of the Developmental Review.) Payne, Whitehurst, and Angel1 (1994) found that between 12% and 18.5% of general language scores were accounted for by the home literacy environment. Scarborough and Dobrich (1994), in contrast, concluded that only 8% of the variance in literacy outcome was accounted for by book reading. Several correlations obtained in the Bristol project (Wells, 1985) ranged between .47 and .77. Similarly, Snow, Barnes, Chandler, Goodman, and Hemphill (1991) reported a correlation of .62 between literacy experience and reading achievement. These are very respectable correlations, indicating relatively large percentages of variance accounted for. As the widely varying data summarized by Scarborough and Dobrich (1994) indicate, large and unexplained differences must exist in the methodologies of the diverse studies. Lonigan (1994) and Dunning, Mason, and Stewart (1994) have analyzed many of these methodological problems, and, although the detailed controversies cannot be’summarizedhere, the quality of the book-reading inter-

First Language Acquisition

201

actions almost surely influences their effectiveness. Book reading can consist of mere labeling, as often found in lower social classes (Dickinson, de Temple, Hirschler, & Smith, 1992), and would therefore contribute minimally to more complex narrative skills. In families experiencing stress, book reading is often performed as a disagreeable obligation. Mothers then react angrily to children’s questions and comments (Heath, 1982) because they delay finishing this “chore.” Book reading can, however, consist of complex narrative elaborations and linguistic expansions and extensions, which should further the development of language and literacy skills. In brief, both sets of factors discussed above need to be ascertained when the effects of book reading are to be evaluated: the linguistic contents trained and the procedural features, such as the attentional and motivational ambience, the spacing of the repetitions, or the fine-tuning of adults’ comments to the level of the child’s mastery. The intervention programs based on research by Whitehurst (Valdez-Menchaca & Whitehurst, 1992; Whitehurst et al., 1988; Whitehurst et al., 1993) prove that positive effects can be attained in varying populations. With a well-designed interactive reading program and after relatively short-term interventions, effects on various aspects of verbal skills have been demonstrated both immediately and after intervals of up to 9 months. Similarly, Scarborough and Dobrich (1994) reported that in nine intervention studies, performed by different investigators and yielding 33 comparisons of immediate posttest language skills, 52% showed statistically significant effects and the correlation was about .28. These figures indicate both the potential impact of book reading and also how far research and interventions are from optimally and reliably employing optimal procedures. Detailed attention needs therefore to be focused on the minor procedural aspects. G . MICROANALYSES OF THE IMPACT OF BOOK READING

Microanalyses illustrate more specifically the effective interactional features as well as the specific aspects that are acquired through book reading. Schumacher (1976) and Dunn and Wodding (1977) described the elaborations and expansions, that is, grammar teaching, that mothers provide in storybook-reading situations. E. L. Moerk and Moerk (1979) reported both acquisition of new and rare vocabulary items and morphological and syntactic progress based on picture books. Although both Ninio (1980) and Wheeler (1983) described vocabulary teaching, Wheeler also showed a change from mostly vocabulary teaching (83%) at 1.5 years to complex comments and interpretationsbetween 2.5 and 3.5 years and a corresponding decline in vocabulary teaching to 22%. Ninio (1983) and Snow and Goldfield (1983) emphasized the extensive maternal corrections supplied in this situation. Snow (1983) also reported delayed repetition, or deferred imitation, across

208

Ernst L. Moerk

intervals of one or more days. Deferred imitation occurred 23% of the time when the child had not immediately repeated an item that had been mentioned by the mother, and almost 52% of the time if the child had repeated it immediately. Delayed repetition occurred 79% of the time for items spontaneously mentioned by the child. Snow et al. (1985) reported that up to 100% of information units that had been repeatedly discussed by mother and child were introduced by the child when reading the same book to a puppet. Finally, Harkins, Koch, and Michel(l994) focused on maternal story telling and included filial generalization to new stories. They reported effects of varying maternal repetitions of stories on the number of clauses in children’s stories and on the use of evaluatives, even if children were required to tell stories different from the maternal model. These three studies combined tell a preliminary story of successful interactional procedures in book reading and story telling: (a) Maternal repetitions are conducive to retention; (b) filial productions are an additional factor for long-term retention; (c) the larger the number of maternal repetitions, the higher the probability of filial generalization to new stories. Shifting to a different context, school settings with minority children, Speidel (1987, 1993) combined microanalyses of immediate impacts of the teacher’s reading and corrective feedback with macroanalyses of the general impact of these interventions. Both sets of results indicated that book reading and discussion can be employed successfully and effectively in small group settings in school. This conclusion accords fully with the mainly macroanalytic findings of Whitehurst and associates discussed in section VI. F. Beals, De Temple, and Dickinson (1994) and most of the authors in Dickinson (1994) similarly summarized the impact of home book reading and its continuity with reading in preschools and schools. School settings have the additional advantage that they involve cooperative learning of the children, and that the more advanced children provide consmctive corrections for their peers. This is, however, too extensive a field of research to be surveyed here.

VII. Combinations of Formats As mentioned in the discussion of modeling and imitation (section 11), the formats often occur not in isolation but in multiple combinations. Structural exercises often integrate buildups and breakdowns with substitution sequences and other forms of abstraction. Imitations are often corrected through feedback, followed by various forms of structural variation. Such combinations have been frequently reported in the literature under various terms: as “occasional questions” (Brown, et al., 1969, p. 55) in communication checks, as “repair sequences” (Shonerd, 1994, p. lOOC Vilaseca & Moerk, 1989, p. 66ff) after communication breakdowns, or as variation sets (Kiintay & Slobin, 1996). The controversial corrections, discussed in section 111, are also

First Language Acquisition

209

subroutines (Bruner, 1983; E. L. Moerk, 1976) that are inserted in the flow of discourse. Generally, extensive experience with mother-child interactions shows that the flow of discourse generally follows not a straight channel but a meander. Themes and structures undergo multiple changes, and the discussion often returns to topics raised previously. Discourse is more like a musical piece in which a theme is taken up repeatedly with variations and in which this repetition contributes to the familiarity and pleasantness of the presentation. Even if only the five major training and learning formats surveyed in sections I1 to VI are taken into account-and more will almost certainly be discoveredand if combinations of up to four formats in one training episode are likely, then the number of possible combinations is five to the fourth power, or 625. Multiple combinations of only four, only three, and only two formats combined with variations within formats are also likely, resulting in an enormous diversity of possible training episodes. A challenge for empirical research is to explore the structure and prevalence of these episodes containing “packaged variables” and their effectiveness for diverse learning tasks. The separate effects of formats and their varying interactions (also in the statistical sense) in producing effects, perhaps differently for diverse subject populations, need to be ascertained in the same manner as drug effects and interactions are explored in medical research.

VIII. Conclusions This survey of empirical evidence showed that much progress has been made in demonstrating the wealth of responsive language input and the learner’s use of it. This evidence on input and on learning and training processes is sufficient-in broad outline though not yet in all detail-to demonstrate that the two antecedent variables influence the temporally proximate language productions of the children. Because input and learning do not end at any arbitrary point during the preschool years, the cumulative input and learning over decades has to be taken into account to explain all the phenomena of advanced language competence. A. THEINPUT

Well-known denials about the input and contrasting factual conclusions are summarized in this concluding section.

1 . “The Input Is Too Impoverished.” The input is generally not impoverished but very rich (Cross, 1978; E. L. Moerk, 1983b, 1985a). Without exception, whenever well-documented evidence of impoverishment has been reported (modus tollens), evidence of slower devel-

210

Ernsr L. Moerk

opment and lower levels of the end product have also been documented. Pearson, Fernandez, Ledeweg, and Oller (1996) reported correlations between .68 and .77. 2 . “Negative Feedback Is Negligible.” “The negative evidence problem” does not exist. An abundance of corrections is provided by parents and teachers, contingently on the mistakes of the learner, so that the difference between the standard and the actual level of performance can be analyzed by comparison. 3 . “Input Cannot Be Projected to Later Output.” The “projection problem” derives from a conceptual problem of its proponents. They attempted to match early, simplified input with late, complex performance. However, advanced skill has to be studied on the basis of advanced input. Those constructions not encountered by the toddler are extensively trained during the subsequent decades of learning. This training begins with the captions in, and the comments about, picture books, is extended during elementary school, and is further enhanced in secondary and tertiary education. Additionally, intelligent fine-tuning of input to the language level and the learning needs of the children can be demonstrated (E. L. Moerk, submitted for publication, b). Input also entails many attention-focusing and motivation-maintaining aspects. The established evidence justifies concluding that output can be fully accounted for through input and through well-known general psychological processes, such as pattern abstraction and generalization. B . THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

Past dogmatic assertions can again be contrasted with empirical evidence. 1 . “Language Acquisition Proceeds Very Quickly. ”

Children do not acquire language with extraordinary speed. They take 2-3 years to learn even the two basic and simple three-element frames of English, the copula sentence and the subject-verb-object sentence. Also, as Slobin (1992) pointed out, linguistic errors increase in the fourth year of life. Early embeddings appear only between 4 and 6 years, and transformations require up to 12 years to be acquired (Ingram, 1975). All teachers know that language skills generally do not attain a high level for many years. That is, language learning is a slow skilllearning process (C. Chomsky, 1969) that depends on decades of input of incrementally increasing complexity. 2 . “Language Is an Abstract System.” An increasingly common view (expressed by e.g., Clark, 1974, 1977; Hickey, 1983; E. L. Moerk, 1992; E. L. Moerk & Moerk, 1979; Perez-Pereira, 1994; Peters, 1983; Snow, Dubber, & de Blauw, 1982; Snow et al., 1987; Youssef,

21 1

First Language Acquisition

1994) is that early language is predominantly based on formulas. At most, some basic schemas or patterns are abstracted and provide slots for substitutions of fillers. The demonstrated abundant and repetitive input provides ample opportunity for the gradual abstraction of underlying structures, schemas, patterns, or templates, as it has been explored by Braine (1963), Schlesinger (1971), and Hill (1983). Reber (1967) and Reber and Allen (1978) showed experimentally how easily patterns are abstracted. This fact is well known to everybody who has recognized someone’s tone of voice or a simple melody played with diverse instruments. In recognizing their mother’s voice, infants achieve nonverbal pattern abstraction already during the first weeks after birth. Language input and learning is therefore mainly a surface-to-surface process and is subject to wellknown principles of perceptual (Gibson, 1969) or observational (Whitehurst & DeBaryshe, 1989) learning. N o conscious knowledge of underlying principles is required for such abstraction. 3 . “Language-Learning Processes Are Language-Spec$c. The learning processes known from 100 years of psychological research are also encountered in both first and second language learning. Basic principles that apply consistently in all learning are well supported, such as intense rehearsal, fine-tuning of input to the level and needs of the children, and attentional as well as motivational factors. Specific principles that have been documented in this study are imitation, responding to feedback, analyses and syntheses, abstracting, and multiple combinations of these in casual conversations and in picture book reading. The extensive literature that has been surveyed has revealed no single process that is not also known from many other domains of learning. This strong statement does not, however, imply that language performance is based on a unitary process. The distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge that is applicable to most skill learning seems to be pertinent to language as well. As Ronda1 (1994, 1995) argued convincingly on the basis of abnormal developmental histories-and as also known from language decayformulaic phrases and emotional expressions as well as rhythmic aspects seem to be subject to differential learning, storage, and retention. Yet, as Tulving (1984) has shown, language shares such dissociations with memories in other domains and with other skills. Therefore, these dissociations argue against one languagespecific modularity and for multiple aspects that make up verbal behavior and are shared with other domains. ”

C. EXPLANATORY SUFFICIENCY

As to explanatory sufficiency, the question is, of course, what is to be explained: The verbal productions of children or those of linguists to illustrate a theory. For the former, careful longitudinal microanalyses show that the combi-

212

Ernst L. Moerk

nation of input and basic principles of learning are sufficient to account for all the phenomena of language acquisition on each level of development. Howe (1993) came to similar conclusions, though from quite different starting points. To explain adult competence, the multiple levels attained between infancy and the teen years and increasingly those attained through college instruction need to be superimposed, with due consideration of how earlier achieved or missed levels affect later progress. John-Steiner (1994) and most of the investigators discussed in this survey emphasized “social interaction as the generative context for language mastery” (p. 1; italics in original). This social interaction obviously does not cease as long as a person lives; it can therefore continue generating new levels of skill. If “novelty” is found in young children’s verbal productions, it can be based in part on abstracted schemas being supplied with new fillers, as in Chomsky’s “Green ideas . . .” Novelty can also reflect combinations of learned fragments in functional productions, as so extensively documented by R. Clark (1974, 1977) for first and by Fillmore (1976) for second language acquisition. In brief, it is the “novelty problem” (Schmidt, 1975) how are new goals (when language is employed functionally) attained by means of variations of old schemas. This problem is also encountered in other domains of skill learning; domains as simple as walking, where one stepping pattern can be adjusted to an infinite variety of terrains and tasks, from mountain climbing, to dancing, and to roller skating. For psychologists strongly relying on linguistic theories, the state of the art, as surveyed, is probably still unsatisfactory. They would prefer not only to account for the behavior but also for language-specific processes underlying this behavior. To account for such processes, these processes need first to be validly demonstrated-as against being merely postulated. As the many rapidly shifting and conflicting linguistic theories demonstrate, linguistics is still at a loss as to the validity of most of its constructs. The enterprise to demonstrate this validity through multiple measurement procedures has not even begun. Bolinger (1976) has argued that many seemingly constructed phrases might really represent rote formulas. The processes responsible for the same productions might also vary within short time spans. Shortly after a pertinent model, an utterance may be produced as a rote imitation though it might be constructed at other times. Ruth Clark (1974, 1977; E. L. Moerk & Moerk, 1979) and others have shown that young children freely combine formulas and spontaneous constructions. As indicated in section V. A, many of their constructions might also utilize iambic and trochaic stress patterns as metric supports and might therefore be partly based on rote memory of the underlying pattern. Also, similar products, derived from different learning histories, might be based on very different processes. For example, some college students, who generally master the construction, “I would have . . .” are found to write in their essays “I would ofthought . . .”. Obviously, the latter construction is a rote formula based upon lack of grammatical analysis.

First Language Acquisition

213

In a very different field, Havelock (1963) and Parry (1971) have shown that the rhapsodes (e.g., Homer) of epic poetry employed in one verse or sentence the schema of the metric verse (e.g., the hexameter), verbal formulas that fit the open feet of the verse, and something else that could possibly be labeled “rules,” if this concept were clearly defined (see Root, 1973, for a critical discussion). These multiple strands of evidence indicate that diverse procedures may be employed in producing single utterances. The challenge for linguists and psychologists is to validate their hypothetical constructs about multiple underlying processes through measurement operations instead of simply postulating one fixed “competence.” D. A PROGRESSIVE THEORETICAL PARADIGM

A useful theoretical paradigm exists, that of skill learning (Anderson, 1982; Fischer, 1980; Levelt, 1977; E. L. Moerk, 1986; A. Newel1 & Simon, 1972; Schmidt & Paris, 1984). The processes are theoretically the same for motor skills and cognitive skills-analysis, synthesis (compilation), and schema abstraction, preparing the underpinning for response generation. The very gradual advance in most skills and the impact of rehearsal frequency are well known, as is the effect of feedback in expert-apprentice interactions. A close convergence can be seen between, for example, E. L. Moerk’s (1986) discussion of language as skill learning, Thelen’s (1995) exploration of repeated cycles of perception and action in motor-skill learning, and Zukow-Goldring’s ( 1995) ecological approach to cultural transmission. Moerk’s and Zukow-Goldring’s positions are based on Gibson’s theory of direct perception and of invariances over transformations in input and intake. With progressing skill level of the learner, the input changes and enables the learner to proceed iteratively to higher levels. Skills are highly functional and the highest level attained is normally that which suffices for the purposes of the learner, that is, is functionally sufficient. This principle can partly explain the enormous differences in language level that exist between an illiterate laborer and the Pulitzer or Nobel Prize winner as due to differences in learning and motivational variables. Universal innate principles could not account for the astounding differences in language levels attained. Kuhn’s (1962) and Lakatos’s ( 1971) conceptualizations can be combined to formulate a skill-learning-based paradigm for language acquisition that entails a progressive research program of elaborating the diverse training and learning processes. Although much evidence has been accumulated, “normal science” still needs to accumulate further understanding on the gradual progress from infancy, during childhood and youth, and into adulthood. Then intervention studies need to translate the insights into effective training methods for remedial and second language instruction. Research, as this chapter has shown, is well on the way toward accomplishing some of these tasks (e.g., Warren & Kaiser, 1986).

214

Ernst L. Moerk

E. REMAINING CHALLENGES

I . Methodological Tasks The major immediate challenge is on the methodological level, that is, the exploration of a learning process that extends for about 20 or more years. The learning dynamics need to be followed over seconds in the feedback patterns between master and apprentice; they need to be studied over minutes and hours to explore rehearsal and reinstatement phenomena, and they need to be analyzed over days, months, and years to understand the hierarchical processes through which simple acquisitions provide the bases for more advanced learning. The learning of mathematics from simple counting to calculus would be a close analogy. Simple number concepts and understanding of addition and subtraction are acquired in everyday living, whereas advanced skills require extensive training, as do sophisticated stylistic skills of prize-winning authors. Because the competence of the children changes continuously, both the input and the learning processes will change in complexity from, for example, rote learning of formulas, to pattern abstraction, and much later to metalinguistic awareness. In long-term development, phenotypic discontinuity will be more often the case than phenotypic continuity, although this discontinuity might be based on genotypic continuity, although this discontinuity might be based on genotypic continuity (both terms, phenotypic and genotypic, being employed in their epistemological and not in their biological sense). This point implies that topological identity between the causative input and its effects in filial mastery cannot be taken for granted. Generalization or transfer has to be expected. “Indirect effects’’ (in the sense of path analysis) will occur frequently. As these paths are still largely unknown, many cause-effect relationships might be missed in single studies. Reese and McCluskey (1984) have discussed some of these complexities in much more detail than is possible here. Measurement operations for the documentation of the hypothetical constructs reflected in linguistic theories, whether they postulate rote performance, schemas, or rules, still need to be developed. This task will be especially challenging if it takes into account that one sentence might integrate a formula, a schema with filler replacement, and a rule application. 2 . Learning-to-Learn Phenomena One theme that should be central in the study of language acquisition but that has been widely neglected is the phenomenon of “learning to learn” or the formation of “learning sets.” As is known since Harlow’s (1959) work, even monkeys readily develop learning sets and become more efficient learners with previous exercise on similar tasks. Learning set formation has also been broadly observed in children (Reese, 1989) and it has been described from anthropological perspective by Bateson (1972) as “deuterolearning.” It would therefore be

First Language Acquisition

215

expected to come into play also in language development, in which children encounter an abundance of similar interactional experiences, spaced over long time periods. As Reese (1991, p. 158) pointed out, the young Chomsky (1959, p. 57) admitted this possibility, which he later seems to have forgotten. Two types of learning set formation can be distinguished: The first and simpler one appears to be more based on automatized perceptual and associative processes. This is often referred to as “tacit knowledge” (e.g., Neisser, 1983, p. 3). It would appear in the form of speedier acquisition of new items. Increasing learning speed is well attested, even if it has not been systematically explored. The infant’s excruciatingly slow advance to the mastery of the first few words takes up to 15 months. It later changes to rapid learning or “fast mapping,” as it has been known since the work of Carey (1978). Even language-delayed children catch on to general principles and more readily learn subsequent constructions that are similar to the earlier ones (Campbell & StremeLCampbell, 1982). On the advanced end of the mastery continuum, new languages are known to be learned more easily when a person has already previously learned other languages-a form of positive transfer even if the languages themselves are very dissimilar. A second form of learning to learn is found in the intentional utilization of learning strategies-often in interpersonal interaction. This form is often referred to as explicit learning or strategy utilization (e.g., Chamot & O’Malley, 1994). Miller and Seier (1994) have provided a comprehensive survey of such developments in areas not pertaining to language development. Several aspects of this learning have been explored also in the field of developmental psycholinguistics. First, “generalized imitations” (Baer & Deguchi, 1985; Baer & Sherman, 1964; Gewirtz & Stingle, 1968) provide evidence for such learning to learn. Kuczaj (1982) commented that “some parents . . . seem to provide children with a model of imitation as well as with model sentences to imitate. In this sense, children’s tendency to imitate may be socially determined” (p. 214). Scherer and Olswang (1984) provided experimental evidence for such learning processes: In a multiple baseline treatment design, increases in the mothers’ expansions (which are imitations) were systematically related to increases in the children’s imitations. In a similar vein, E. L. Moerk (1989b) surveyed the older literature that indicates that imitation per se is subject to a learning process. With the learning of optimal strategies of imitation an almost infinite range of social learning experiences (Bandura, 1986) is accessible to the child. E. L. Moerk (1985a, 1992) has provided more extensive investigations of the learning-to-learn strategies, and he has shown through bivariate time series how one child seemed to learn the strategies of asking for vocabulary items and of their rehearsal, as well as eight strategies for syntactic exercises. In all these cases, the mother led temporally and in frequency by using each strategy, then the child gradually caught up with the mother, and often the child surpassed the mother in the use of the specific

216

Ernsr L. Moerk

strategy she had just learned. If the mother discontinued her modeling of the strategy too rapidly, the child’s utilization of it declined precipitously. Renewed modeling was needed for consistent utilization by the child during the early stages of mastery. After some time, the incidence of specific strategies that served easier learning tasks declined, and more complex ones were exercised in similar lead-lag relationships. Such learning to learn applies also to more general cognitive domains. Merriman and Bowman (1989) concluded that children acquire the “exclusivity bias” between the ages of 2 and 3 years (i.e., 1-2 years after producing their first words), The “exclusivity” bias suggests that children have acquired a cognitive rule to keep the sets of referents of different words from overlapping. In this case, a cognitive principle that facilitates the delimitation of the extension of new words is established through considerable experience. Ninio (1983) remarked upon how children learn about the general requirement to remember and not only the need to remember one specific item. The development of memory strategies proceeds for many years, and the learning of text comprehension strategies continues up to the university level (Cunningham, Stanovich, & Wilson, 1990). Conceptually similar principles can be found in many discussions of “metalinguistic” aspects and their acquisition. Some of these learning-to-learn phenomena have been well known at least since the turn of the century, such as when the child goes through a stage of asking for names of objects (Stem & Stem, 1907), and when older children engage in language games and word play (Chukovsky, 1963). Self-corrections and overcorrections in polite speech are also widely known. Parental pressures, as explored by Berko-Gleason and Weintraub (1978) and as known from cross-cultural work (Oksaar, 1988), are known to contribute to the development of such metalinguistic evaluation strategies. Those are, however, developments that pertain largely to later stages of language skills and require a special essay. 3. The Learner’s Spontaneous Exercises Motivation (Howe, 1981) and expertness (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988) affect spontaneous learning activity and are presumably involved in language games and spontaneous linguistic exercises. Solitary exercises of the learner had to be neglected in the present essay, which is focused on input, interactions, and their effects. Beginning with Weir (1962), and continuing with Cazden (1974), Craig and Gallagher (1979), Kuczaj (1982, 1983), and Nelson (1989), rich evidence has been accumulated for the early stages of solitary training exercises. However, an entire chapter or even several books would be needed to discuss the topics of language play, crib monologues, and their effect on the development of metalinguistic mastery.

First Language Acquisition

217

4 . Neurological and Biochemical Bases Another long-term challenge is to substantiate the psychological processes through neurological and biochemical evidence. Although promising beginnings have been made with models based on parallel distributed processing and neural networks, these domains differ in subject and methods from the present emphasis and require separate extensive reviews. In general, many challenges remain for empirical research. But future research needs to build on the knowledge and the acknowledgment of the impressive achievements that have already been accomplished, some of which were reviewed in this chapter.

REFERENCES Anderson, J. R. (1982). Acquisition of cognitive skills. Psychological Review, 89, 369-406. Anderson, J. R. (1987). Skill acqu on: Compilation of weak-method problem solutions. Psychological Review, 94, 192-210. Arbib, M. A., Conkin, E. J . , & Hill, J. (1987). From schema theory to language. New York: Oxford University Press. Arnold, D. S.,& Whitehurst, G. J. (1994). Accelerating language development through picture book reading: A summary of dialogic reading and its effects. In D. K. Dickinson (Ed.), Bridges to literacy. Children, families. and schools (pp. 103- 128). Oxford: Blackwell. Atkinson, M. (1986). Leamability. In P. Fletcher & M. Garman (Eds.), Language acquisition (2nd ed., pp. 90- 108). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Baer. D. M., & Deguchi, H.(1985). Generalized imitation from a radical-behavioral viewpoint. In S. Reiss & E. Bootzin (Eds.), Theoretical issues in behavior therapy (pp. 179-217). New York: Academic Press. Baer, D. M., & Sherman, J. A. (1964). Reinforcement control of generalized imitation in young children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, I , 37-49. Baker, C. L. (1979). Syntactic theory and the projection problem. Linguistic Inquiry, 10, 533-581. Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. New York: Ballantine. Beak, D. E., DeTemple, J. M., & Dickinson, D. K. (1994). Talking and listening that support early literacy development of children from low-income families. In D. K. Dickinson (Ed.), Bridges to literacy (pp. 19-40). Oxford: Blackwell. Becker, J. A. (1988). The success of parents’ indirect techniques for teaching their preschoolers pragmatic skills. First Language. 8, 173-182. Berko-Gleason, J., & Weintraub, S. (1978). Input language and the acquisition of communicative competence. In K. E. Nelson (Ed.), Children’s language (Vol. 1, pp. 171-222). New York: Gardner. Bilodeau, E. A. (Ed.). (1966). Acqu on of skill. New York: Academic Press. Bloom, L. M. (1970). Language development: Form and function in emerging grammars. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bohannon, J., & Stanowicz, L. (1988). Adult response to children’s language errors: The issue of negative evidence. Developmental Psychology, 24, 684-689.

218

Ernst L. Moerk

Bohannon, J., & Stanowicz, L. (1989). Bidirectional effects of imitation and repetition in conversation: A synthesis within a cognitive model. In G.E. Speidel & K. E. Nelson (Eds.), The many faces of imitation in language learning (pp. 121- 145). New York: Springer-Verlag. Bolinger, D. (1976). Meaning and memory. Forum Linguisticum, I, 1-14. Bowerman, M. (1987). Commentary: Mechanisms of language acquisition. In B. MacWhinney (Ed.),Mechanisms of language acquisition (pp. 443-466). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Braine, M. D. S. (1963). On learning the grammatical order of words. Psychological Review, 70, 323-348.

Braine, M. D. S. (1976). Children’s first word combinations. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 41(1, Serial No. 164). Brown, R. (1958). Words and things. New York: Free Press. Brown, R. (1973). A j r s t language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Brown, R., & Bellugi, U. (1964). Three processes in the child’s acquisition of syntax. Harvard Educational Review, 34, 133-151. Brown, R., Cazden, C., & Bellugi, U. (1969). The child’s grammar from I to 111. In J. P. Hill (Ed.), Minnesota Symposia on Child Psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 28-73). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Brown, R., & Fraser, C. (1963). The acquisition of syntax. In C. N. Cofer & B. Musgrave (Eds.), Verbal behavior and learning: Problems and processes (pp. 158-201). New York: McGraw-Hill. Brown, R., & Hanlon, C. (1970). Derivational complexity and order of acquisition in child speech. In J. Hayes (Ed.), Cognition and the development of language (pp. 11-53). New York: Wiley. Bruner, J. S. (1981). The pragmatics of acquisition. In W. Deutsch (Ed.), The child‘s construction of language (pp. 39-55). New York: Academic Press. Bruner, J. (1983). Children’s talk: Learning to use language. New York: Norton. Bryant, P. E., Bradley, L., MacLean, M., & Crossland, J. (1989). Nursery rhymes, phonological skills and reading. Journal of Child Language, 16, 407-428. Bryant, P. E., MacLean, M., & Bradley, L. (1990). Rhyme, language, and children’s reading. Applied Psycholinguistics. 11 237-252. Bunce, B. H., Ruder, K. F., & Ruder, C. C. (1985). Using the miniature linguistic system in teaching syntax: TWOcase studies. Journal of Speech and Hearing Disorder, 50, 247-253. Campbell, C. B., & Stremmel-Campbell, K. (1982). Programming “loose training” as a strategy to facilitate language generalization. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 15, 295-301. Carey, S. (1978). The child as a word learner. In M. Halle, J. Brenan, & G. A. Miller (Eds.), Linguistic theory and psychological reality (pp. 264-293). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Cassirer, E. (1944). An essay on man. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Cazden, C. (1974). Play with language and metalinguistic awareness: One dimension of language experience. The Urban Review, 7 , 23-29. Chamot, A. L., & O’Malley, J. M. (1994). Language learner and learning strategies. In N. C. Ellis (Ed.), Implicit and explicit learning of languages (pp. 371-392). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Chaney, C. (1989). I pledge a legiance tothe flag: Three studies in word segmentation. Applied Psycholinguistics, 10, 261-281. Chapman, R. S., Leonard, L. B., & Mervis, C. B. (1986). The effect of feedback on children’s inappropriate word usage. Journal of Child Language, 13, 1010-1 17. Chi, M. T. H., Glaser, R.. & Farr, M. J. (Eds.). (1988). The nature of expertise. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Chomsky, C. (1969). The acquisition of syntax in childrenfrom 5 to 10. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of Verbal Behavior. By B. F. Skinner. Language, 35, 26-58. Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of a theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chukovsky, K. (1963). From fwo t o j v e . Berkeley: University of California Press. I

First Language Acquisition

219

Clark, R. (1974). Performing without competence. Journal of Child Language, I , 1-10, Clark, R. (1977). What’s the use of imitation. Journal of ChildLanguage, 4 , 341-358. Cole, M., & Scribner, S. (1974). Culture and thought. New York: Wiley. Craig, H. K., & Gallagher, T. M. (1979). The structural characteristics of monologues in the spee6h of normal children: Syntactic nonconversational aspects. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research. 22, 46-62. Colombo, J. (1986). Recent studies in early auditory development. In G. J. Whitehurst (Ed.). Annals of Child Development (vo1.3) (pp. 53-98). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Connell, P. J. (1982). On training language rules. Language, Speech, and Hearing in Schools, 13, 23 1-240. Corder. S . P. ( 1967). The significance of learners’ errors. International Review of Applied Linguistics 4 . 161-169. Cross, T. (1977). Mothers’ speech adjustments: The contribution of selected child listener variables. In C. E. Snow & C. A. Ferguson (Eds.), Talking to children: Language input and acquisition (pp. 151- 188). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Cross, T. (1978). Mothers’ speech and its association with rate of linguistic development in young children. In N. Waterson & C. E. Snow (Eds.), The development of communication (pp. 199216). Chichester, NY: Wiley. Cunningham, A. E., Stanovich, K. E., & Wilson, M. R. (1990). Cognitive variation in adult students differing in reading ability. In T. C a n & B. A. Levy (Eds.),Reading and its development: Component skills approaches (pp. 129-159). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. deCasper, A. J., & Fifer, W. P. (1980). On human bonding: Newborns prefer their mothers’ voices. Science, 208, 1174-1176. Defebach, K. P., & Adamson, L. B. (1994). Teaching referential and social-regulative words to toddlers: Mothers’ use of metalingual language. First Language, 14, 249-261. DeLoache, J. S . , & De Mendoza, 0. A. P. (1987). Joint picture book interactions of mothers and 1 -year-old children. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 5 , 1 1 1-123. Demetras, M. J . , Post, K. A., & Snow, C. E. (1986). Feedback to first language learners: The role of repetitions and clarification questions. Journal of Child Language, 13, 275-292. de Villiers, J. G . (1980). The process of rule learning in child speech: A new look. In K.E. Nelson (Ed.), Children’s language (Vol. 2, pp. 1-44). New York: Gardner Press. Dickinson, D. K. (Ed.) (1994). Bridges to literacy. Oxford: Blackwell. Dickinson, D. K., deTemple, J., Hirschler, J., &Smith, M. (1992). Bookreading with preschoolers: Co-construction of text at home and at school. Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 7 , 32-346. Dowker, A. D. (1991). Modified repetition in poems elicited from young children. Journal ofchild Language, 28, 625-639. Dunn, J., & Wodding, C. (1977). Play at home and its implications for learning. In B. Tizzard & D. Harvey (Fds.), The biology of play (pp. 45-58). London: Heinemann. Dunning, D. B., Mason, J. M., & Stewart, J. P. (1994). A response to Scarborough and Dobrich ( I 994) and recommendations for future research. Developmental Review, 14. 324-339. Elley, W. B. (1989). Vocabulary acquisition from listening to stories. Reading Research Quarterly, 24, 175-187. Ervin, S . (1964). Imitation and structural change in children’s language. In E. Lenneberg (Ed.), New directions in the study of language (pp. 163-189). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Faerch, C. (1985). Metatalk in foreign language classroom discourse. Studies in Second Language Acquisition, 7 , 184- 199. Farrar, M. J. (199O). Discourse and the acquisition of grammatical morphemes. Journal of Child Language, 17. 607-624. Farrar, M. J. (1992). Negative evidence and grammatical morpheme acqu Psychology. 28, 90-98.

220

Ernsr L. Moerk

Feagans, L., & Farran, D. C. (Eds.). (1982). The language of children reared in poverty. New York: Academic Press. Ferguson, C. A. (1964). Baby talk in six languages. American Anthropologist, 66 (6 part 2). 103114. Fernald, A. (1984). The perceptual and affective salience of mothers’ speech to infants. In L. Feagans, C. Garvey, & R. Golinkoff (Eds.), The origins and growth of communication (pp. 529). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Fernald, A,, & Simon, 1. (1984). Expanded intonation contours in mothers’ speech to newborns. Developmental Psychology, 20. 104- 113. Fillmore, L. (1976). The second time around: Cognitive and social strategies in second language acquisition. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA. Fischer, K . W. (1980). A theory of cognitive development: The control and construction of hierarchies of skills, Psychological Review. 87, 477-531. Folger, J. P., & Chapman, R. S. (1978). A pragmatic analysis of spontaneous imitation. Journal of Child Language, 5, 25-38. Furrow, D., Bailie, C., McLaren, J., & Moore, C. (1993). Differential responding to two-and threeyear-olds’ utterances: The role of grammaticality and ambiguity. Journal of Child Language, 20, 363-375. Gewirtz, J. L., & Stingle, K. G. (1968). Learning of generalized imitation as the basis for identification. Psychological Review, 75, 374-397. Gibson, E. J. (1969). Principles of perceptual learning and development. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts. Gibson, J. J. (1966). The senses considered as perceptual systems. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Gleitman, L. R., & Wanner, E. (1984). Current issues in language learning. In M. H. Bornstein & M. E. Lamb (Eds.), Developmental psychology: An advanced texrbook (pp. 181-240). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Gold, E. M. (1967). Language identification in the limit. Information and Control. 10, 447474. Goldstein, H. (1984). Effects of modeling and corrected practice on generative language learning of preschool children. Journal of Speech and Hearing Disorders, 49, 389-398. Goodsitt, J., Raitan, J. G., & Perlmutter, M. (1988). Interaction between mothers and preschool children when reading a novel and familiar book. International Journal of Behavioral Development. 11, 489-505. Hampson, .I.& ,Nelson, K. (1993). The relation of maternal language to variation in rate and style of language acquisition. Journal of Child Language, 20, 3 13-342. Harlow, H. F. (1959). The development of learning in the rhesus monkey. American Scientist. 47, 459-479. Harkins, D. A., Koch, P. E., & Michel, G. F. (1994). Listening to maternal story telling affects narrative skill of 5-year-old children. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 155, 247-257. Hams, Z. S. (1957). Co-occurrence and transformation in linguistic structure. Language, 33. 283340. Hatch, E. (1976). Language teaching and language learning. In E. C. Carterette & M. P. Friedman (Eds.), Handbook of perception: Vol. 7. Language and speech (pp. 363-386). New York: Academic Press. Hatch, E. (1983). Psycholinguistics: A second language perspective. Rowley, MA: Newbury House. Havelock, E. A. (1963). Preface to Plato. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Heath, S. (1982). What no bedtime story means: Narrative skill at home and school. Language in Society, 1. 49-76.

First Language Acquisition

22 I

Hickey, T.(1983). Identifying formulas in first language acquisition. Journal of ChildLunguage, 20, 27-41. Hill, 1. C. (1983). A computational model of language acquisition in the two-year-old. Cognition and Brain Theory, 6 , 287-317. Hill, J. C., & Arbib, M. A. (1984). Schemas, computation, and language acquisition. Human Development. 27. 282-296. Hirsh-Pasek, K., Kemler-Nelson, D. G., Jusczyk, P. W., Cassidy, K. W., Druss, B., & Kennedy, L. (1987). Clauses are perceptual units for young infants. Cognition, 26, 269-286. Hirsh-Pasek. K., Treiman, R., & Schneiderman, M. (1984). Brown and Hanlon revisited: Mother’s sensitivity to ungrammatical forms. Journal of Child Language, 11, 81-88. Hoff-Ginsberg, E. (1985). Some contributions of mothers’ speech to their children’s syntactic growth. Journal of Child Language, 12, 367-385. Hoff-Ginsberg. E. (1991 ). Mother-child conversation in different social classes and communicative settings. Child Development. 62, 782-797. Howe, C. J. (198 I). Acquiring language in a conversational context. London: Academic Press. Howe, C. J. (1993). Language learning. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Ingram, D. (1975). If and when transformations are acquired by children. Monograph Series on Language and Linguistics, 27, 99- 127. Washington, DC: Georgetown University. John-Steiner, V. (1994). Introduction. In V. John-Steiner, C. P. Panofsky, & L. W. Smith (Eds.), Sociocultural approaches to language and literacy (pp. 1-33). New York: Cambridge University Press. Karzon, R. G. (1985). Discrimination of polysyllabic sequences by one- to four-month-old infants. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. 39, 326-342. Kasper, G. (1984). Repair in foreign language teaching. In G. Kasper (Ed.), Learning, teaching and communication in the foreign classroom (pp. 2 13-24 I). Arhus: Arkona. Kelly, M. H., & Bock, J. K. (1988). Stress in time. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 14. 389-403. Kemler-Nelson, D. G., Hirsh-Pasek, K., Juscyk, P., &Wright Cassidy, K. (1989). How the prosodic cues in motherese might assist language learning. Journal of Child Language. 16. 55-68. Kuczaj, S . A. (1982). Language play and language acquisition. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 17, pp. 197-232). New York: Academic Press. Kuczaj, S. A. (1983). Crib speech and language play. New York: Springer. Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kiintay. A., & Slobin, D. 1. (1996). Listening to a ’hrkish mother: Some puzzles for acqu D. 1. Slobin, 1. Gerhardt, A. Kyratzis, & J. Guo (Eds.). Social interaction, social context. and language: Essays in honor of Susan Ervin-Tripp (pp. 265-286). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Lakatos, 1. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In 1. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the gmwrh of knowledge (pp. 91- 195). London: Cambridge University Press. Lefebvre-Pinard, M., & Reid, L. (1980). A comparison of three methods of training communication skills: Social conflict, modeling, and conflict-modeling. Child Development. 51. 179-1987. Lembert, M. (1984). Topic as a starting point for syntax. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Developmenr, 49. (3, Serial No. 208). Leonard, L. B. (1989). Language learnability and specific language impairment in children. Applied Psycholinguistics. 10, 179-202. Levelt, W. J. M. (1977). Skill theory and language teaching. Studies in Second Language Acquisition. I , 53-70. Lieven, E.V. M. ( 1978). Conversations between mothers and young children: Individual differences and their possible implication for the study of language learning. In N. Waterson & C. Snow (Eds.), The development of communication (pp. 173-187). New York: Wiley.

222

Ernst L. Moerk

Lonigan, C. J. (1994). Reading to preschoolers exposed: Is the emperor really naked? Developmental Review, 14,303-323. MacWhinney, B. (1987). Preface. In B. MacWhinney (Ed.), Mechanisms of language acquisition (pp. ix-xii). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Malinowski, B. (1923). The problem of meaning in primitive languages. In T. A. Sebeok, A. S. Hayes, & M. C. Bateson (Eds.),Approaches to semiotics (pp. 296-336). The Hague: Mouton. Maratsos, M., & Chalkley, M. A. (1980). The internal language of children’s syntax: The ontogenesis and representation of syntactic categories. In K. E. Nelson (Ed.), Children’s language (Vol. 2, pp. 127-214). New York: Gardner Press. Masur, E. F. (1989). Individual and dyadic patterns of imitation: Cognitive and social aspects. In G . E. Speidel & K. E. Nelson (Eds.), The many faces of imitation in language learning (pp. 5371). New York: Springer. McLaughlin, B. ( 1983). Second language learning: An information processing perspective. Language Learning, 33, 135-158. McLean, M., Bryant, P., & Bradley, L. (1987). Rhymes, nursery rhymes, and reading in early childhood. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 33, 255-281. McLean, M., & Vincent, L. (1984). The use of expansions as a language intervention technique in the natural environment. Journal of the Division of Early Childhood, 9 , 57-66. Mehler, J., Jusczyk. P. W., Lambertz, G.,Halsted, N., Bertoncini. J., Amiel-Tison, C. (1988). A precursor of language acquisition in young infants. Cognition, 29. 143- 178. Memman. W. E., & Bowman, L. L. (1989). The mutual exclusivity bias in children’s word learning. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, W(3-4, Serial No.220). Mervis, C. B. (1988). Role of adult input in young children’s category evolution: I. An observational study. Journal of Child Language, 13, 257-272. Miller, P. H., & Seier, W. L. (1994). Strategy utilization in children: When, where, and why. In H. W. Reese (Ed.),Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 25, pp. 108-156). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Moerk, E. L. (1974). Changes in verbal child-mother interactions with increasing language skills of the child. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 3 , 101-1 16. Moerk, E. L. (1975). Verbal interactions between children and their mothers during the preschool years. Developmental Psychology, I I , 788-794. Moerk, E. L. (1976). Processes of language teaching and training in the interactions of mother-child dyads. Child Development, 47, 1064-1078. Moerk, E. L. (1977). Pragmatic and semantic aspects of early language development. Baltimore, MD: University Park Press. Moerk, E. L. (1983a). A behavioral analysis of controversial topics in first language acquisition: Reinforcements, corrections, modeling, input frequencies and the three-term contingency pattern. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 12. 129-155. Moerk, E. L. (1983b). The mother of Eve-As afirsr language teacher. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Moerk, E. L. (1985a). Analytic, synthetic, abstracting and word-class defining aspects of verbal mother-child interactions. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 14,263-287. Moerk, E. L. (1985b). Picture-book reading by mothers and young children and its impact upon language development. Journal of Pragmatics. 9 , 547-566. Moerk, E. L. (1986). Environmental factors in early language acquisition. In G.J. Whitehurst (Ed.), Annals of child development (Vol. 3, pp. 191-235). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Moerk, E. L. (1989a). The fuzzy set called “imitations.” In G.E. Speidel & K. E. Nelson (Eds.), The many faces of imitation in language learning (pp. 277-303). New York: Springer. Moerk, E. L. (1989b). The LAD was a lady and the tasks were ill defined. Developmental Review, 9 , 21-57.

Firsr Language Acquisition

223

Moerk, E. L. (1990). Three-term contingency patterns in mother-transmission and acqu Journal of rhe Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 54, 293-305. Moerk, E. L. (1991). Positive evidence for negative evidence. Firsr Language, 11, 219-251. Moerk, E. L. (1992). Ajirsr language raughr and learned. Baltimore, MD: Paul Brookes. Moerk, E. L. (1994). Corrections in first language acquisition: Theoretical controversies and factual evidence. International Journal of Psycholinguistics, 10, 33-58. Moerk, E. L. (submitted for publication, a). Convergencies in first and second language training and learning. Moerk, E. L. (submitted for publication, b). Language learning or language development. Moerk, E. L., & Moerk, C. (1979). Quotations, imitations, and generalizations: Factual and methodological analyses. Inrernarional Journal of Behavioral Developmenr, 2 , 43-72. Moerk, E. L., & Vilaseca, R . M. (1987). Time-binding in mother-child interactions: The morphemes for past and future. Papers and Reports on Child Language Development, 26, 8087. Moerk, K. C., & Moerk, E. L. (submitted for publication). Language developmenr: Piaget’s theory and environmental ailments. Morgan, J. L., Bonamo, K. M., & Travis, L. L. (1995). Negative evidence on negative evidence. Developmental Psychology, 31 180- 197. Morgan, J. L., & Travis, L. L. (1989). Limits on negative information in language input. Journal of Child Language, 16. 531-552. Neisser, U. (1983). Toward a skillful psychology. In D. Rogers & J. A. Sloboda (Eds.), The acquisition of symbolic skills (pp. 1- 17). New York: Plenum. Nelson, K. ( 1981). Individual differences in language development: Implications for development and language. Developmenral Psychology, 17, 170- 187. Nelson, K. (1989). Narratives from rhe crib. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nelson, K. E. (1977). Facilitating children’s syntax acquisition. Developmental Psychology, 13. 10 I - 107. Nelson, K. E., Carskaddon, G.,& Bonvillian, J. D. (1973). Syntax acquisition: Impact of experimental variation in adult verbal interaction with the child. Child Developmenr. 44, 497-504. Nelson, K . E., Denninger, M. S . , Bonvillian, J. D., Kaplan, B. J., & Baker, N. D. (1984). Maternal input adjustments and nonadjustments as related to children’s linguistic advances and to language acquisition theories. In A. D. Pellegrini & T. D. Yawkey (Eds.), The developmenr of wrirren and oral language in social contexts (pp. 31-56). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Nelson, K. E., Welsh, J., Camarata, S . M., Butkovsky, L., & Camarata, M. (1995). Available input for language-impaired children and young children of matched language levels. First Language. IS, 1-17. Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Humanproblem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Newell, K. M. (1981). Skill learning. In D. Holding (Ed.), Human skills (pp. 203-225). New York: Wiley. Newell, K. M. (1991). Motor skill acqu on. Annual Review of Psychology, 42, 213-237. Ninio, A. (1980). Ostensive definition in vocabulary teaching. Journal of Child Language, 7. 565573. Ninio, A. (1983). Joint book reading as a multiple vocabulary acquisition device. Developmental Psychology. 19, 445-45 1. Ninio, A. (1992). The relation of children’s single word utterances to single word utterances in the input. Journal of Child Language, 19, 87-110. Ninio, A., & Bruner, J. (1978). The achievement and antecedents of labeling. Journal of Child Language. 5, 1-15. Oksaar, E. (1988). Aspects of creativity: Interactional strategies of mono- and multilingual children. ~

Ernsr L. Moerk

224

In R. Soderbergh (Ed.), Children’s creative communication (pp. 82- 102). Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press. Papousek, H., & Papousek, M. (1983). The psychobiology of the first didactic programs and toys in human infants. In A. Oliverio & M. Zapella (Eds.), The behavior of infanrs (pp. 219-239). New York: Plenum. Papousek, M., & Papousek, H. (1989). Forms and function of vocal matching. First Language, 9, 137-174.

Papousek, M., Papousek, H., & Bornstein, M. H. (1985). The naturalistic vocal environment of young infants. In T. M. Field & N. Fox (Eds.),Social perception in infanrs (pp. 269-297). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Pany, M. ( 197 1). The making of Homeric verse: The collected papers of Milman Parry. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. Payne, A. C., Whitehurst, G. J., & Angel], A. L. (1994). The role of home literacy environment in the development of language ability in preschool children from low-income families. Early Childhood Research Quarierly, 9, 427-440. Pearson, B. Z.. Fernandez, S. C., Ledeweg, V., & Oller, D. K. (1996). The relation of input factors to lexical learning by bilingual infants. Applied Psycholinguisiics. Pemberton, E. F., & Watkins, R. V. (1987). Language facilitation through stories. FirstLanguage, 7, 79-89.

Penner, S. G. (1987). Parental responses to grammatical and ungrammatical child utterances. Child Developmenr, 58, 376-384. Perez-Pereira, M. (1994). Imitations, repetitions, routines and the child’s analysis of language: Insights from the blind. Journal of Child Language, 21. 317-337. Peters, A. M. (1977). Language learning strategies. Language, 53, 560-573. Peters, A. M. (1983). The unirs of language acqu n. Cambridge, UK. Cambridge University Press. Peterson, C.. & McCabe, A. (1994). A social interactionist account of developing decontextualized narrative skill. Developmental Psychology, 30, 937-948. Pine, J. M., & Lieven, E. V. (1993). Reanalysing rote-learned phrases: Individual differences in the transition to multi-word speech. Journal of Child Language, 20, 551-571. Platt. C. P., & MacWhinney, B. (1983). Error assimilation in language learning. Journal of Child Language. 10, 401-441. Ratner, N. B. (1984). Patterns of vowel modification in mother-child speech. Journal of Child Language, 11, 557-578. Reber, A. S. (1967). Implicit learning of artificial grammars. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour, 6. 855-863. Reber, A. S., & Allen, R. (1978). Analogy and abstraction strategies in synthetic grammar learning: A functionalist interpretation. Cognirion, 6 . 189-221. Reese, H. W.(1989). Discrimination learning set in children. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 21, pp. 153-189). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Reese, H. W. (1991). Mentalistic approaches to verbal behavior. In L. J. Hayes & P. N. Chase (Eds .), Dialogues on verbal behavior: The jrsr inrernaiional institute of verbal relations (pp. 151-177). Reno, NV: Context Press. Reese, H. W., & McCluskey, K. A. (1984). Dimensions of historical constancy and change. In K. A. McCluskey & H. W. Reese (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Hisrorical and generarional efecrs (pp. 17-45). Orlando, FL: Academic Press. Rondal. J. A. (1994). Exceptional language development in mental retardation: Natural experiments in language modularity. Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive, 13, 427-467. Rondal, J. A. (1995). Exceptional language development in Down’s syndrome. New York Cambridge University Press.

First Language Acquisition

225

Root, M. D. (1973). Language, rules, and complex behavior. In K. Gunderson (Ed.), Language, mind, and knowledge: Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (Vol. 7, pp. 321-343). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Roth, F. P. (1984). Accelerating language learning in young children. Journal of Child Language. 11. 89-107. Ruke-Dravina, D. V. (1977). Modifications of speech addressed to young children in Latvian. In C. E. Snow & C. A. Ferguson (Eds.), Talking to children: Language input and acquisition (pp. 237-253). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Scarborough, H. S . , & Dobrich, W. (1994). On the efficacy of reading to preschoolers. Developmental Review, 14. 245-302. Scarborough, H . S . , Dobrich, W., & Hager, M. (1991). Preschool literacy experience and later reading achievement. Journal of Learning Disab Scherer, N. J., & Olswang, L. B. (1984). The role of mother’s expansion in stimulating children’s language production. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 27, 387-396. Schieffelin, B. B. (1979). Getting it together: An ethnographic approach to the study of the development of communicative competence. In E. Ochs & B. B. Schieffelin (Eds.), Developmental pragmatics (pp. 73-108). New York: Academic Press. Schlesinger, 1. M. (1971). Production of utterances and language acqu on. In D. 1. Slobin (Ed.), The ontogenesis of grammar (pp. 63-102). New York: Academic Press. Schmidt, C. R., & Paris, S. G. (1984).The development of verbal communicative skills in children. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in childdevelopment and behavior (Vol. 18, pp. 1-47). Orlando, FL:Academic Press. Schmidt, R. A. (1975). Aschema theoryofdiscretemotorleaning.PsychologicalReview, 82,225-260. Schumacher, J. B. (1976). Mother’s expansions: Their characteristics and effects on the child. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Kansas, Lawrence. Schwartz, R. G., Chapman, K.,Prelock, P. A,, Terrell, B. Y., & Rowan, L. E. (1985). Facilitating early syntax through discourse structure. Journal of Child Language, 12, 13-26. Seitz, S., & Stewart, C. (1975). Imitations and expansions: Some developmental aspects of motherchild communications. Developmental Psychology, I I , 763-768. Shirai, Y. (1994).On the overgeneralization of progressive marking on stative verbs: Bioprogram or input? First Language. 14. 67-82. Shonerd, H. (1994). Repair in spontaneous speech. In V. John-Steiner, C. P. Panofksy, & L. W. Smith (Eds.), Sociocultural approaches to language and literacy (pp. 82-108). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Sigel, I. E., (1986). Early social experience and the development of representational competence. In W. Fowler (Ed.), Early experience and the development of competence (pp. 49-65). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Sigel, 1. E., & McGillicuddy-Delisi, A. V. (1984). Parents as teachers to their children: A distancing model. In A. D. Pellegrini & T. Yawkey (Eds.), The development of oral and written language in social contexts (pp. 71-92). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Simon, H. A. (1978). Information processing theory of human problem solving. In W. K. Estes (Ed.),Handbook of learning and cognitive processes: Vol. 5 . Human information processing (pp. 27 1-295). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Slamecka, N. 1.. & Graf, P. (1978). The generation effect: Delineation of a phenomenon. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4 , 592-604. Slobin, D. I. (1968). Imitation and grammatical development in children. In N. S. Endler, L. R. Boulter, & H. Osser (Eds.), Contemporary issues in developmental psychology (pp. 437-443). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Slobin, D. I. (1992). Introduction. In D. I. Slobin (Ed.), The crosslinguistic study of language acquisition (Vol. 3 , pp. 1-13). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

226

Ernst L. Moerk

Snow, C. E. (1977). Mother’s speech research: From input to interaction. In C. E. Snow & C. Ferguson (Eds.), Talking to children: Language input and acquisition (pp. 3 1-49). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Snow, C. E. (1983). Saying it again: The role of expanded and deferred imitation in language acquisition. In K. E. Nelson (Ed.),Children‘s language (Vol. 4, pp. 29-58). Hillsdale, NJ: Erl baum . Snow, C. E. (1993). Families as social contexts for literacy development. In C. Daiutte (Ed.), The development of literacy through social interaction (pp. 1 1-23). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Snow, C. E., Barnes, W., Chandler, J., Goodman. I., & Hemphill, L. (1991). Unfurfilled expecrations: Home and school influences on literacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Snow, C. E., Dubber, C., & de Blauw, A. (1982). Routines in mother-child interaction. In L. Feagans & D. C. Farran (Eds.), The language of children reared in poverty (pp. 53-72). New York: Academic Press. Snow, C. E., & Goldfield, B. A. (1983). Tbrn the page please: Situation-specific language acquisition. Journal of Child Language, 10, 551-569. Snow, C. E., Nathan, D., & Perlmann, R. (1985). Assessing children’s knowledge about book reading. In L. Galda & A. D. Pellegrini (Eds.), Play. language, and stories: The development of children’s literate behavior (pp. 167-181). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Snow, C. E., Perlmann, R., & Nathan, D. (1987). Why routines are different: Toward a multiplefactors mode of the relation between input and language acquisition. In K. E. Nelson & A. van Kleeck (Eds.),Children’s language (Vol. 6, pp. 65-97). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Soederberg, R. (1974). Language development of the child and its consequences. Stockholm: Stockholm University, Institute for Nordic Languages. Sokolov, J. (1993). A local contingency analysis of the fine-tuning hypothesis. Developmental Psychology. 29, 1008-1023. Speidel, G. E. (1987). Conversation and language learning in the.classroom. In K. E. Nelson & A. van Kleeck (Eds.), Children’s language (Vol. 6, pp. 99-135). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Speidel, G. E. (1993). The comprehension reading lesson as a setting for language apprenticeship. In R. N. Roberts (Ed.), Advances in applied developmental psychology (Vol. 7, pp. 247-274). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Speidel, G. E.,& Herreshoff, M. J. (1989). Imitation and construction of long utterances. In G. E. Speidel & K. E. Nelson (Eds.), The many faces of imitation in language learning (pp. 181-197). New York Springer. Speidel, G. E.,& Nelson, K. E. (Eds.). (1989). The many faces of imitation in language learning. New York: Springer. Spence, M. J., & deCasper, A. J. (1982). Prenatal experience with low-frequency maternal-voice sounds influence neonatal perception of maternal voice samples. Infant Behavior and Development, 10. 133-142. Stanovich, K. E. (1993). Does reading make you smarter? Literacy and the development of verbal intelligence. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (pp. 133-180). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Stemmer, N. (1987). The learning of syntax: An empirical approach. First Language, 7. 97-120. Stern, D. N., Spieker, S., Barnett, R. K., & MacKain, K. (1983). The prosody of maternal speech: Infant age and context related changes. Journal of Child Language, 10, 1-15. Stern, C., & Stern, W. (1907). The language of children. A psychological and theoretical linguistic investigation. Leipzig: Barth. Stokes, T. F., & Baer, D. M. (1977). An implicit technology of generalization. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis. 10, 349-367. Thelen, E. (1995). Motor development: A new synthesis. American Psychologist, 50, 79-95.

First Language Acquisition

227

Tomasello, M., & Farrar, M. (1986). Joint attention and early language. Child Development. 57, I 454- 1463. Tomasello, M., & Herron, C. (1988). Down the garden path: Inducing and correcting overgeneralization errors in the foreign language classroom. Applied Psycholinguistics. 9, 237-246. Tomasello, M., & Todd, J. (1983). Joint attention and lexical acquisition style. First Language, 4 , 197-212. Trehub, S . E., Trainor, L. J., & Unyk, A. M. (1993). Music and speech processing in the first year of life. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 24, pp. 1-35). San Diego: Academic Press. Tulving, E. (1984). Multiple learning and memory systems. In K. M. J. Lagerspetz & P. Niemi (Eds.), Psychology in the 1990's (pp. 163- 184). Amsterdam: North-Holland. Tulving, E., & Thomson, D. M. (1973). Encoding specificity and retrieval processes in episodic memory. Psychological Review, 80, 352-373. Uzgiris, I. C. (1984). Imitation in infancy: Its interpersonal aspects. In M. Perlmutter (Ed.),The Minnesota Symposia on Child Psychology: Vol. 17. Parent-child interaction and parent-child relations in child development (pp. 1-32). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Uzgiris, I. C., Broome, S., & Kruper, J. C. (1989). Imitations in mother-child conversations: A focus on the mother. In G. E. Speidel & K. E. Nelson (Eds.), The manyfaces of imitation in language learning (pp. 9 I - 120). New York: Springer. Valdez-Menchaca, M. C., & Whitehurst, G. I. (1992). Accelerating language development through picture book reading: A systematic extension to Mexican day care. Developmental Psychology, 28. 1106-1114. van der Geest, T., (1977). Some interactional aspects of language acquisition. In C. E. Snow & C. A. Ferguson (Eds.), Talking to children: Language input and acquisition (pp. 89- 107). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Vilaseca, R., & Moerk, E. L. (1989). Discourse repair strategies in three linguistic communities. Revista Logopedia, Fontiatria y Audiologia, 9, 66-7 I . Wagner, K. R. (1985). How much do children say in a day? Journal of Child Language, 12. 475487. Warren, S. F., & Kaiser, A. P. (1986). Incidental language teaching: A critical review. Journal of Speech and Hearing Disorders, 51, 291-299. Warren, S. F.. & Rogers-Warren, A. K. (Eds.). (1985). Teaching functional language. Baltimore: University Park Press. Weir, R. (1962). Language ofthe crib. The Hague: Mouton. Wells, G. (1985). Language development in the preschool years. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Werner, H. ( 1940). Comparative psychology of mental development. New York: International Universities Press. Wheeler, M. A. (1983). Mothers' speech in context: Age changes and language lessons. Journal of Child Language, 10, 259-263. Whitehurst, G . J. (1977). Imitation, response novelty, and language acquisition. In B. C. Etzel, J. M. LeBlanc, & D. M. Baer (Eds.), New developments in behavioral research: Theory, method, and application. In honor of Sidney W. Eijou (pp. 119- 132). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Whitehurst, G. J., Arnold, D. S., Epstein, J. N., Angell, A. L., Smith, M., & Fischel, J. E. (1993, March). A picture book reading intervention in daycare and home for children from low-income families. In G. J. Whitehurst (Chair), Interventions in shared reading for children from low income families. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, New Orleans. Whitehurst, G. J., & DeBaryshe, B. D. (1989). Observational learning and language acquisition:

228

Ernst L . Moerk

Principles of learning, systems, and tasks. In G.E. Speidel & K. Nelson (Eds.), The many faces of imitation in language learning (pp. 251-276). New York: Springer. Whitehurst, G.J., Falco, F. L., Lonigan, C. J., Fischel, J. E., De Baryshe, B. D., Valdez-Menchaca, M. C.. & Caulfield, M. (1988). Accelerating language development through picture book reading. Developmental Psychology, 24. 552-559. Whitehurst, G.J., & Vasta, R. (1975). Is language acquired through imitation? Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 4 , 37-59. Wijnen, F., Krikhaar. E., & Den 0 s . E. (1994). The (non)realization of unstressed elements in children’s utterances: Evidence for a rhythmic constraint. Journal of Child Language, 21, 59-83. Youssef, V. (1994). “To be or not to be”: Formulaic and frame-based acquisition of the copula in Trinidad. First Language, 14, 263-282. Zukow-Goldring, P. (1996). Educating attention: An ecological approach to achieving consensus. In C. Dent-Read & P. Zukow-Goldring (Eds.), Changing ecological approaches to development: Organism-environmentmutualities. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Zukow-Goldring, P., & Ferko, K. R. (1996). An ecological approach to the emergence of the lexicon: Socializing attention. In V. John-Steiner, C. P. Panofsky, & L. W. Smith (Eds.), Sociocultural approaches to language and literacy (pp. 170-190). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Author Index Numbers in italics refer to the pages on which the complete references are cited.

A Abelson, R., 52-53, 57 Abramovich, R., 140-141, 153, 174-175 Abrams, N., 162, 169, 176 Adams, L. T., 36, 42-43, 54 Adams, M.I., 2, 12, 26, 28 Adamson, L. B., 184, 219 Adler, A,, 158, 174 Ahn, W., 42, 54 Alegria, J., 10- 1 I , 26, 28, 32 Alexander, I. M.,64,82, 84 Allen, R., 211, 224 Allen, V. L.,149, 174 Allmon, D. E., 145, 153-154, 174 Almgren, P. E., 160, 179 Amiel-Tison, C., 193, 222 Anderson, D. K., 114, 138 Anderson, J. R., 192, 194, 213,217 Anderson, M., 82, 84 Anderson, R. C., 27,28 Angell, A. L., 206-207, 224, 227 Arbib, M.A,, 185, 188, 199, 217, 221 Arnold, D. S., 204, 207, 217,227 Arvis, W., 143-144, 174 Ashley, E., 60,75, 77, 85 Atkinson, M.,188, 217 Ayers, D., 25, 30

B Baer, D. J., 158, 177 Baer, D. M.,198, 215, 217, 227 Bahr, H. M.,166, 174 Bailie, C., 190, 220 Baillargeon, R.,96, 103, 121, 135 Bain, J. D., 93, 117, 137 Baker, C. L.,206, 217 Baker, N. D., 195,223 Baker-Ward, L. E., 40-41, 54, 57, 63, 88 Baldwin, A. C., 146. 175

Ball, E. W., 26, 28 Bandura, A., 185, 215, 217 Bao-Qing, D.,11, 33 Barefoot, I. G., 156, 179 Barnes, W., 206, 226 Barnett, M.S., 142, 174 Barnett, R. K., 193,226 Baroody, A. J., 17.28 Barry, H.111, 165, 169, 174 Barton, K., 143, 149, 158, 170, 175 Bateson, G., 189, 214, 217 Bauer, P. A,, 38, 55 Bauer, P. I., 35-36, 38, 49, 52.55 Beak, D. E., 208, 217 Beck, I . , 10, 26, 32 Becker, J. A., 189, 191, 217 Beeton, M.,155, 174 Begun, 2.. 140, 177 Bell, L. C., 10, 26, 32 Bellugi, U., 182, 188, 208, 218 Bentin, S., 11, 28 Ben-Zeev, S., 2 I , 28 Bernholtz, J. E.,71-72, 75, 85 Bernholtz, J. F., 60,68-70, 77, 84.85 Bernstein, R., 165, 176 Bertelson, P., 10-11.32 Bertoncini, J., 193, 222 Best, D. L., 64,85 Beutell, N. J., 145, 159, 174 Bialystok, E., 7, 15, 17-18, 20-21, 24, 28-29 Biernat, M.,49, 55 Billeter, J., 92, 101, 137 Billman, D. 0..107, 111, 137 Bilodeau, E. A., 204, 217 Bird, J. W., 174 Birtchnell, J., 166-167, 169, 174 Bjorklund, B. R., 61-62, 71-72, 75, 85 Bjorklund, D. F., 60-65, 67-82, 84, 85-88 Blachman, B. A., 26, 28 Black, J. B., 42-44, 55

229

230

Author Index

Black, M. M., 75, 85 Blane, H. T., 165, 169, 174 Bloom, L. M., 198, 217 Bock, J. K.,198, 221 Bohannon, J., 188-190, 218 Bolinger, D., 185, 212, 218 Bonamo, K. M.,189-191, 223 Bonvillian, J. D., 191, 195, 223 Boothe, H.,168-169, 178 Borkowski, J. G., 75, 85 Bornstein, M. H., 192, 224 Boutilier, M. A., 171, 176 Bower, G. H., 42-44,55 Bowerman, M., 188, 218 Bowey, J. A., 7-8, 29, 34 Bowman, L. L., 216, 222 Boyer, M. E., 134, 135 Boyes-Braem, P.,94, 138 Boyle, T. R.,65, 85 Bradley, L., 8, 11, 29, 31, 205-206, 218, 222

Brady, S. A., 8, 29 Bragg, B., 149, 174 Braine, M.D.S.,192-194, 198, 211,218 Brainerd, C. J., 64,86 Breslow, L., 116, 135 Brewer, W. F., 41-42,54-55 Broome, S.,186, 227 Brown, A. L., 92, 98, 100-101, 103, 105106, 111-112, 121-122, 134, 135-136

Brown, R.. 182, 188-189, 192, 208, 218 Brown, S. C., 80, 86 Bruce, D. J., 7, 29 Bruck, M., 54, 55 Bruner, J., 196, 203-204, 209, 218, 224 Bruner, J. S., 183, 187, 193, 218 Bryant, J., 49, 55 Bryant, P. E.,7-8, 11, 29-31, 97. 118, 135, 137, 205206,218,222

Buchanan, J. J., 64,76, 85 Bullock, M., 103, 121, 135 Bunce, B. H., 198, 218 Burke, C. L., 4, 30 Burker, E. J., 144, 174 Burton, A,, 174 Bus, A. G., 4.29 Bush, T. L., 146, 174 Busse, T. V., 157, 178 Butkovsky, L., 195, 223 Byrne, B., 13, 29

C Cahan, S., 11, 28 Caldwell, E. C., 50, 55 Camarata, M., 195, 223 Camarata, S. M., 195, 223 Cameron, P., 50-51.55 Campbell, C. B., 215, 218 Campbell, S., 152, 178 Campbell, T., 97, 135 Campbell Dickson, J., 93, 117, 137 Cantor, P., 166, 174 Caputo, G.C., 144, 174 Carey, S., 93, 99, 104, 134, 135, 215, 218 Can; M., 82, 84 Carskaddon, G., 191, 223 Carstensen, L., 50, 55 Carter, B., 7, 9, 31 Carter, D. B., 49, 55 CarY, L., 10-11, 32 Case, R.,115, 135 Cassel, W. S., 60,71-72, 75, 77, 85 Cassidy, K. W., 193, 221 Cassirer, E., 196, 218 Cattell, R. B., 143, 149, 158, 170, 175 Caudill, W., 168, 174 Caulfield, M., 207, 228 Cazden, C., 188, 208, 216,218 Cazden, C. B., 23, 29 Ceci, S. J., 54.55. 81, 83,86 Chalkley, M. A., 200, 222 Chall, J. S., 2, 29 Chamot, A. L., 215, 218 Chandler, J., 206, 226 Chaney, C., 192, 218 Chapin, R.,50.56 Chapman, K., 199, 225 Chapman, R. S., 184, 191,218, 220 Char, W. F., 147, 174 Chase, C., 168-169, 178 Chechile. R. A,, 61, 86 Chen, Z., 92, 97, 111, 135 Chi, M.T.H., 63, 66-67, 86, 88, 216, 218 Chomsky, C., 210, 218 Chomsky, N., 201, 215,218-219 Chrenka, R. A., 152, 174 Chukovsky, K.,216, 219 Cicirelli, V. G., 147, 170, 174 Clark, L. F., 54, 56 Clark, R., 195, 210, 212, 219

Author Index Clark, R.V.G., 162, 169, 174 Clay, M. M., 23-24, 29 Clement, J., 99, 135 Chbb, P. A., 40-41, 54-55 Codd, J., 17, 24, 29 Cohen, L. B., 95, 138 Cohen, S., 63, 88 Cole, M., 8, 33, 204, 219 Coleman, J. V., 170, I77 Coltheart, M., 10, 12, 33 Conkin, E. J., 185, 188, 199, 217 Content, A,, 11. 32 Cooper, R. G., 96, 135 Copra, P. G., 148, 175 Corder, S. P., 193, 219 Corter, C., 140-141, 153, 174-175 Coulson, R. L., 114, 138 Cox, S., 44,58 Craig, H. K., 216, 219 Crain-Thoreson, C., 5 , 29 Cramer, B., 8, 33 Critelli, J . W., 146, 175 Crocker, J., 49, 57 Cromer, C. C., 39, 57 Cross, T., 195, 219 Crossland, J., 8, 11, 29, 205-206, 218 Cruse, D. F., 49, 56 Cummins, I., 2 I , 29 Cunningham, A. E., 3, 8. 33, 216, 219 Curran, J., 145, 177

231

Demetras, M. J., 188-189, 219 Dempster, F. N., 61, 68, 72, 86 Denninger, M. S . , 195,223 Den Os, E., 198, 228 DeTemple, J. M . , 207-208, 217, 219 Deutsch, F., 141, 175 De Villiers, J. G., 199, 219 De Vos, J., 96, 135 Dickinson, D. K . , 4, 29, 207-208, 217, 219 Dielman, T. E., 143, 149, 158, 170, 175 Ding, S. L., 118, 135 Dittes, J. E., 148, 175 Dobash, R. E., 142, 175 Dobrich, W., 203-204, 206-207, 225 Dodd, D. H., 39.57 Donaldson, M., 8, 30 Douglas, R. N., 72, 85 Dowker, A. D., 185, 219 Downing, J., 3, 25, 30 Downs, R. M . , 16, 31 Drum, P. A,, 4, 32 Druss, B., 193, 221 Dubber, C., 210, 226 D~ffy,S. A,, 46-47, 53,57 Dunn. J., 141, 157, 175, 206-207, 219 Dunning, D. B.. 206, 219 Dyson, A. H., 19, 30

E D Daehler, M. W.,92, 1 1 1, 135 Dale, P. S . , 5, 29 Davidson, D., 35, 41-48, 50-54, 55, 78 Davies, L., 64,87 Day, H. D., 2 3 , 2 9 Day, K. C., 23, 29 DeBaryshe, B. D., 207, 211,228 de Blauw, A., 210, 226 deCasper, A. J., 193, 219,226 Defebach, K. P., 184, 219 Deguchi, H., 184, 215, 217 DeLoache, J. S . , 16, 29, 32, 108-110, 137138, 205, 219 de Marchena, M. R., 62, 85 DeMarie-Dreblow, D., 64,86 De Mendoza, O.A.P., 205, 219

Eagle, F., 170, 177 Ebert, R. K., 148, 175 Egan, K., 6, 30 Ehri, L. C., 4, 7-8, 26, 30-32 Elley, W.B., 205, 219 Ellis, N., 10, 30 Epstein, J. N., 204, 207, 227 Erickson, M. L., 163, 179 Ervin, S., 184, 219 Eymard, L. A,, 112, 136

F Faber, A., 9, 30 Faerch, C., 187, 219 Fagot, B. I . , 49-50, 55 Falco, F. L., 207,228

232

Author Index

Farr, M.J., 216, 218 Farran, D. C., 220 Farrar, M. J., 134, 135, 190-191, 203,219220, 227

Feagans, L.,220 Feldman, G. C., 146, 175 Feldman-Rotman, S., 152, 178 Feltovich. P. J., 114, 138 Ferko, K. R., 203, 228 Femald, A., 192-193.220 Femandez, S. C., 210, 224 Ferrari, M.,160,175 Ferreiro, E., 18.30 Fielding-Bamsley, R., 13, 29 Fields, M. V., 17, 30 Fifer, W. P., 193, 219 Fillmore, L., 212, 220 Fischel, J. E., 207, 227-228 Fischer, K. W., 213, 220 Fischer, W. F., 7, 9-10, 31 Fivush, R., 35-40,55-57, 61, 86 Flavell, J. H.,61, 86 Folds, T. H.,63, 86 Folger, J. P., 184, 220 Footo. M.,63, 86 Fowler, C., 10, 31 Fox, B., 7,30 Frankel, M.T., 62, 80, 86 Fraser, C., 192, 218 Frauenfelder, K. J., 143, 177 Freeman, K., 63,88 Freyn, W., 145, 175 Frydman, 0.. 7,30 Furrow, D., 190,220 Fuson, K. C., 7, 30

G Gadike, A. K.,70, 72, 74, 87 Galda, L., 6, 14, 32 Gallagher, T. M.,216, 219 Gallistel, C. R., 17, 30 Galper, A., 50.56 Gardner, H.,83,86 Carton, A., 2, 6. 30 G U h , B., 162-163, 169, 175, 178 Gasch, U., 147, 178 Gattuso, B., 8.30

Gaultney, J. F., 64, 67-70, 72, 76, 78-79, 82, 86-87

Geary, D. C., 80.86 Gelb, 1. J., 9. 30 Gelman, R., 17,30, 93, 103, 121, 135 Gelman, S. A., 104-105, 125, 128, 134, 135-136, 138

Gentner, D., 92-93, 99, 107-110, 125-126, 131, 136-138

Gewirtz, J. L., 184, 215,220 Ghatala, E. S., 61, 86 Gholson, B., 111, 137 Gibson, E. J., 191, 211,220 Gibson, J. J., 196, 220 Gick, M. L., 111, 136 Glaser, R., 216, 218 Gleason, J. B.. 184, 216,220 Gleitman, L. R., 8,30.33, 193,220 Goebel, B. A., 141, 175 Gold, A., 60,66-67, 72, 89 Gold, E. M.,187, 220 Goldberg, S. C., 168-169, 178 Golden, J., 19, 34 Goldfield, B. A., 4, 33, 188, 190, 196, 204205, 207, 226

Goldman, S., 43, 55 Goldstein, D., 76, 78-79, 82, 86 Goldstein, H.,191, 199, 220 Goldstein, M.W., 144, 174 Goodman, G. S., 40,55 Goodman, I., 206,226 cioodman, N., 14, 16, 30 Goodsitt, J., 196, 205, 220 Gordon, B. N., 40-41.54.57 Gordon, W.J.J., 99, 136 Goswami, U.. 8, 11, 30, 92, 96,100-101, 103, 119-123, 126-127, 130-131, 133134, 136 Cough, P. B., 8, 30 Graesser, A. C., 41-42. 52-54.56-57 Graf, P., 186, 225 Graff, H. A., 166, 175 Gray, C. M.,143, 148, 152, 154, 175 Gray, W. D., 94, 138 Grosz, H.J., 145, 160, 170, 175 Gruber, H.,60, 66-67, 72,89 Gruen, G.,145, 177 Gruendal, J., 37-38,57 Guttentag, R. E., 63-64, 86

Author Index

H Hagan, R., 49-50,55 Haider, I . , 166, 175 Hakuta, K., 21, 30 Haldane, J. D., 166, 175 Hale, G. A., 61, 88 Halford, G. S . , 92-94, 115, 117, 119-120, 133, 136-137 Hall, E., 146, 175 Halsted, N., 193, 222 Halverson. C. F., 49, 56 Hammer, R., I I , 28 Hamond, N. R., 39-40, 56 Hampson, J., 185,220 Hancock, F. T., 142, 148, 153, 159, 175, 177 Hanlon, C., 188-189, 218 Hare, E. H., 167, 169, 175 Harkins, D. A., 208. 220 Harlow, H. F., 214, 220 Hamishfeger, K. K., 60,64-65, 69, 71-72, 75, 85-87 Harris, I. D., 150, 176 Harris, Z. S.,201, 220 Harste, J. C., 4, 30 Hartog, J., 163, 168, 176 Hasselhotn, M.,62-64, 80, 87 Hatano, G., 92, 134, 137 Hatch, E., 199, 220-221 Havelock, E. A , , 213, 221 Heath, H., 143, 177 Heath, S. B., 3-4, 31 Heller, M.S., 70, 72, 74, 87 Hemphill, L., 206, 226 Hepps, D., 40.55 Hemeshoff, M. J., 184, 226 Heniman, M. L., 7.34 Herron, C., 191. 227 Hickey, T., 210. 221 Hill, J. C., 185, 188, 199, 211, 217, 221 Hill, M.W., 17, 31 Hirschler, J., 207, 219 Hirschman, J. E.,40, 55 Hirshman, E.,44,56 Hirsh-Pasek, K., 188, 193, 221 Hodapp, A. F., 150, 176 Hw, S., 35, 41-45, 52, 54, 55 Hoff-Ginsberg, E.,183, 199, 221 Hogan, D. P., 162, 169, 176

233

Hohn, W.E.,8, 26, 31 Holland, J. H., 94, 137 Holyoak, K. J., 92,94, 107, I 1 1, 136-137 Hong-Yin, N., 11.33 Horgan, D. D., 66,87 Howard, K. J., 150,176 H o w ~ h E., , 152, 159, 176 Howe, C. J., 212, 216, 221 Hudson, A. C., 52, 56 Hudson, J. A., 35-43, 53.55-57, 61, 86 Huey, E. B., 6.31 Hughes, C., 10, 26.32 Hummer, P., 11-12, 34 Hunt, R. R., 44,56

I Ickles, W., 145, 176 Inagaki. K., 92, 134, 137 Ingram, D., 210, 221 Inhelder, B., 92, 137 Irwin, 0. C., 4, 31 Iversen, S., 23, 31

J Jacob, E., 17, 31 Jacobs, J. W., 62-63, 80, 85 Jantz, R. K., 50, 56 Jensen, A. R., 83, 87 Jergovic, D., 41-43, 45, 50-51, 53.55 Jeziorski, M.,99, 136 Johnson, D. M.,94, 138 Johnson, M.A., 39-40.56 Johnson, N. S . , 162, 176 John-Steiner, V., 212, 221 Jones, D. C., 39-40, 56 Jones, M. B., 162, 169, 176 Jorgensen, C., 75, 89 Junn, E. N., 107, 111, 137 Jusczyk, P. W., 193,221-222

K Kahn, M. H., 165, 176 Kail, R. V.,83, 87

234

Author Index

Kaiser, A. P., 182, 213, 227 Kalish, C. W., 125, 128, 138 Kamhi, A. G., 112, I36 Kane, M. J., 105, 111-112, 135 Kaplan, B. J., 195, 223 Kaplan, H. B., 158, 170, 176 Karmiloff-Smith, A., 19.34 Karzon, R. G., 193,22I Kasper, G., 187,221 Kee, D. W., 64,87-88 Keil, F. C., 134, 137 Keller, R., 161, 163, 170, 176 Kelly, M. E., 93, 117, I37 Kelly, M. H.,198,221 Kelly, R. M., 171, 176 Kemler-Nelson, D. G., 193, 221 Kemper, T.D., 166, 176 Kendrick, C., 141, 157, I75 Kennedy, L., 193, 221 Kidwell, J. S., 151, 176 Kim, Y. C., 17.32 Kirtley, C., 8, 11.31 Kitagawa, E. M.,162, 169, I76 Klein, M. L., 2, 17, 19, 31 Klockars, A. J., 143, 153, 159, 170, 176 Koblinsky, S., 49, 56 Koch, H.L., 141-142, 150, 153, 157, 172, I76 Koch, P. E., 208, 220 Koh, K., 107, 137 Kohn, M. L., 151, 176 Kontos, S., 23, 31 Kiirkel, J., 60.64,70-72, 74, 84, 89 Kotovsky, L. L., 107-108, 125-126, 131, 136-137 Kowalaski, D. J., 42, 52, 56 Krause, D., 50, 56 Krikhaar, E., 198,228 Kruper, J. C., 186, 227 Krupski, A., 67-68, 70, 72, 87 Kuczaj, S. A., 184, 215-216,221 Kuhn, T. S., 213, 221 KLlntay, A., 183, 208-209, 221

L Lakatos, I., 213, 221 Lambertz, G., 193,222

Lamsfuss, S., 114, 137 Landed, K., 11-12, 34 Lange, G. W., 61-62, 87 Langenmayr, A., 149, 176 L~UUS, D. M., 40-41,54 Laughon, P., 12,34 Laurence, M. W.,61, 87 Lavine, L. D., 19, 31 LaVoie, J. C., 150, I76 Lawrence, P. S., 156, 172, 176 Ledeweg, V., 210, 224 Ledger, G. W., 7, 33 Leevers, H.. 121-123, 126-127, 131, 136 Lefebvre-Pinard,M., 188, 191, 221 Leinbach, M. D., 49-50.55 Lembert, M., 199, 221 Leonard, L. B., 188, 191, 218, 221 Leong, C. K., 11.31 Leslie, L., 70, 88 Levelt, W.J.M., 198, 213, 221 Leventhal, G. S., 159, 176 Levin, I., 19, 31 Levinger, G., 147, I77 Levy, G. D., 49.55 Liben, L. S., 16.31, 49,57 Libennan, A. M., 10, 26.31 Libennan, I. Y.,7, 9- 1 I , 26, 31 Lieven, E. V., 192, 194, 224 Lieven, E.V.M., 188, 190, 222 Liker, J., 83, 86 Linden, J., 145, 177 Lindsay, J.S.B., 167, 169, 177 Linortner, R., 11-12.34 Lomax, R. G., 5 , 25, 32 Long, C., 111, I35 Lonigan, C. J., 203-204, 206-207, 222, 228 Lucariello, J., 36, 38, 57 Luria, A. R., 19,32 Lyster, R. W., 167. 169, 175

M MacKain, K.,193, 226 Mackay, D. G., 10, 32 MacLean, M., 8, 11, 29.31, 205-206, 218 MacWhinney, B., 188, 222,224 Mahrer, A. R., 165, I76 Maier-Baker, W., 74, 88

235

Author Index Maki, R. H., 41. 56 Malcolm, G., 67-68, 70, 72, 87 Malinowski, B., 204, 222 Mallin, R., 166, 175 Mandler, G . , 68, 89 Mandler, J. M., 35-36, 38, 43, 52, 55-56, 95, 137 Mann, V. A., 8, 11, 32 Maratsos, M.. 200, 222 Markman, A., 107-108, 125-126, 136 Markman, E. M., 104-105, 134, 135-136 Marquis, R., 152, 178 Martin, C. L., 35-36, 49, 56 Marx, M. M., 17.32 Marzolf, D. P., 16, 29, 32 Mason, J., 3 , 5, 25, 32 Mason, J. M., 206, 219 Mason, S. E . , 50, 55 Masonheimer, P. E.,4, 32 Mastropieri, M. A,, 75, 89 Masur, E. F., 184, 186, 222 Mattingly, 1. G . , 7, 32 Maybery, M. T., 93, 117, 137 McCabe, A., 37,56, 204-205, 224 McCluskey. K . A., 214, 224 McCormick, K . , 158, 177 McCormick, M., 125, 128, 138 McDaniel, M. A,, 44,57 McDermott, J. F., 147, 174 McDonagh, J. M., 152, 170, 177 McGauvin, M. E., 24, 32 McGee, L. M., 5, 25, 32 McGillicuddy-Delisi, A. V., 205, 225 McLane, J. B., 5, 17, 32 McLaren, J., 190, 220 McLaughlin, B., 198, 222 McLaughlin, K.,49, 57 McLean, M., 191, 195, 206, 222 McNamee, G. D., 5 , 17.32 Mehler, J., 193, 222 Meiselman, K . C., 147, 177 Meltzoff, A. N., 38, 56 Mendolsohn, M. B., 145. 177 Merriman, W. E . , 216, 222 Merritt, K . A., 40-41, 54, 55, 57 Mervis, C. B.,94, 138, 190-191, 218,222 Michel, G. F., 208, 220 Miller, L., 168, 170, 177 Miller, P. H., 65, 87, 215, 222

Minnett, A. M., 153, 161, 177 Mitchell, J., 50, 57 Moerk, C., 205-207, 210, 212, 223 Moerk, E. L., 183-185, 188-191, 194-200, 202-210, 212-213, 215, 222-223, 227 Moerk, K. C., 185, 223 Money, J., 165, 177 Monson, J. A., 75, 89 Montangero, I., 92, 101, 137 Mooney, R. J., 42, 54 Moore, C., 190, 220 Morais, J., 10-1 1, 26, 28, 32 Morgan, D., 66, 87, 112, 136 Morgan, J. L., 189-191, 223 Morgan, J. S., 61, 88 Morrison, N., 161, 169, 177 Muir-Broaddus, J . E.,62, 65, 75, 81-82, 85, 87 Myers, J. L., 46-47, 53, 57 Myles-Worsley, M., 39, 57

N Nadelman, L., 140, 177 Naer, D. M., 184, 215, 217 Nakamura, G. V.,41, 55 Nathan, D., 204, 208, 210, 226 Naus, M. J., 63, 88 Neisser, U., 215, 223 Nelson, E., 170, 177 Nelson, K., 35-40.55-57. 72, 88, 185, 192, 195, 199, 216, 220,223 Nelson, K . E., 184, 195, 223,226 Nesdale, A. R., 7, 34, 49.57 Newbert, N., 154, 170, 177 Newell, A,, 213, 223 Newell, K . M., 187, 223 Nicolich, L., 14, 32 Nida, R. E.,40-41.55 Nida, S.,61, 88 Nigro, G., 101, I38 Nilsson, A., 160, 179 Ninio, A., 4.33. 185, 196, 203-204, 207, 216, 223-224 Nisbett, R. E., 94, 137 Nurss, J . R., 24, 32 Nysted, L., 143, 158, 179 Nystul. M. S., 151, 177

236

Author Index 0

Oberlander, M.I . , 143, 177 O’Boyle, C., 49,55 Offord, D. R., 162, 169, 176 Oksaar, E., 216, 224 Oller, D. K.,210, 224 Olson, L. B., 191, 215, 225 Olson, R. K., 10. 34 Olson, T.D.,149, 159, 167-170, 177 O’Malley, J. M., 215, 218 Opwis, K.,60,66-67, 72,89 Omstein, P. A., 40-41, 54-55.57, 61, 63, 68, 85-86, 88 Ortiz, B. E., 147, 177 Ostapiuk. E., 161, 169, 177 Ota,G.,156. 178

Pignot, E., 26, 28 Pine, J. M., 192, 194, 204-205.224 Pittman, L., 61, 88 Platt, C. P., 188, 224 Plattig, G.,162, 178 Policastro, M.,43, 57 Polley, R., 97, 135 Porteous, M. A., 161, 169, 177 Post, K. A., 188-189.219 Pratt, C., 2, 6, 30 Reiser, S., 162, 178 Prelock, P. A., 199,225 Remack, D., 98, 137 Ressley, M., 61-62, 72, 88-89 Purcell-Gates, V., 2, 33

Q P Palmer, S. E., 125, 137 Palu, M.,44,56 Papousek, H.,192, 224 Papousek, M., 192, 224 Parellus, R. J., 157, 178 Paris, S. G.,213, 225 Parker, F. B., 165, 169, 177 Parker, L., 50, 57 Parry, M.,197, 213, 224 Pascual-Leone, J.. 48, 57, 115, 137 Patrick, D. L., 170, 177 Payne, A. C., 206, 224 Pears, R., 118, 137 Pearson, B. Z., 210, 224 Pearson, K., 155, 174 Peck, R., 162, 176 Peck, V. A., 75, 85 Pellegrini, A. D., 6, 14, 17, 32 Pemberton, E. F., 191, 199, 224 Penner, S. G.,188, 190, 224 Pepler, D. J., 140-141, 153, 174-175 Perez-Pereira, M.,184, 186, 210,224 Perfetti, C. A., 8, 10-11, 26,32-33 Perlmann, R., 204, 208, 210,226 Perlmutter, M.,1%, 205, 220 Peters, A. M.,192, 210, 224 Peterson, C., 37, 56, 204-205, 224 Piaget, J., l5,32, 92, 101, 137 Pierce, K. A.. 11 I , 137

Quinn, P. C., 95, 137

R Rabinowitz, M.,63-64, 88 Raitan, J. G.,196, 205, 220 Raney, G.E., 134, 135 Rashotte. C. A., 12, 34 Ratner, N. B., 193,224 Rattermann, M. J., 107-110, 125-126, 136138 Read, C., 11.33 Reber, A. S., 211, 224 Recht, D. R., 70, 88 Reese, H.W., 214-215, 224 Reid, L., 188, 191, 221 Revicki. D., 50. 57 Reyna, V. F.,64, 86 Rholes, W. S., 51-52, 57 Richman, C. L., 61, 86, 88 Rieben, L., 8, 33 Riess, B. F., 161, 164, 169, 177-178 Robinson-Riegler, B., 44,57 Rogers-Warren, A. K., 182, 227 RogolX, B., 134. 138 Rollins, H.A., 75, 85 Rollins, H. S., 62, 80, 86 Rondal, J. A., 211, 224-225 Root, M. D., 213, 225 Rosch, E., 94, 138

Author Index Rosch, E. H., 68, 88 Rosenberg, B. G., 146, 149, 158, 164, 166, 177-178

Rosenberg, M.,151, 177 Rosengren, K. S., 125, 128, 138 Roskos, K., 17.33 Ross, B., 94, 138 Roth, C., 66, 88 Roth, F. P., 198, 225 Routh, D. K., 7, 30 Rowan, L. E., 199, 225 Rozin, P.,8, 30, 33 Ruble, D. N., 51-52, 57 Ruder, C. C., 198, 218 Ruder, K. F., 198, 218 Rudy, L., 40.55 Ruke-Dravina, D. V., 188, 190, 225 Ryan, E. B., 7, 33 Ryan, E. G., 7,33

S

Salthouse, T. A., 83, 87-88 Sampson, E. E., 148, 177 Santrock, J., 153, 161, 177 Sawyer, J., 143, 178 Scarborough, H.S., 203-204, 206-207, 225 Schachter, F. F., 152, 178 Schaeffer, B., 25.30 Schank, R. C., 52-53,57 Scherer, N. J.. 191, 215, 225 Schieffelin, B. B., 184, 225 Schlesinger, 1. M.,185, 211, 225 Schmidt, C. R., 213, 225 Schmidt, R. A , , 147, 178, 196, 199, 212, 225 Schmuck, R., 149, 161, 178 Schneider, W.,60-67, 69-75, 77, 80-82, 84, 85-86, 88-89

Schneiderman, M.,188, 221 Schooler, C., 151, 168, 174, 176 Schooler, N. R., 168-169, 178 Schubert, D.S.P., 154, 156-157, 170-172, 179

Schubert, H.J.P., 140, 154- 157, 164, 167, 110- 172, 178-1 79

Schumacher, J. B., 207, 225 Schwanenflugel, P. J., 64, 82, 84 Schwartz, B. A , , 151, 178 Schwartz, R. G., 199. 225

237

Scribner, S., 8, 33, 204, 219 Scruggs, T. E., 75, 89 Seefeldt, C., 50. 56 Seier, W.L., 65, 87, 215, 222 Seitz, S., 195, 225 Serlock, K., 50, 56 Shankweiler, D. P., 7-11, 26, 29, 31 Shapiro, J., 4, 6, 34 Sheingold, K., 37, 57 Shekelle, B., 156, 179 Sherman, J. A., 215, 217 Shinjo, M.,46-47, 53, 57 Shirai, Y.,184, 225 Shonerd, H., 208, 225 Shore, C. M.,38.55 Shore, E.,152, 178 Siege], L. S., 7, 33 Siegelman, M.,164, 178 Sigel, 1. E.,205, 225 Signorella, M. L., 49, 57 Simmons, K., 12, 34 Simon, H. A , , 187, 202, 213, 223, 225 Simon, I., 192-193.220 Sims, C. A , , 167, 170, 178 Slamecka, N. J., 186, 225 Sletto. R. F., 161, 169, 178 Slobin, D. I., 183, 190-191, 208-210, 221, 225-226

Smalley, R. E.,153, 178 Smari, J., 143, 158, 179 Smith, D. A., 41-42, 52-53,56-57 Smith, L. B., 8, 30 Smith, M.,207, 219, 227 Smith, S. B., 93, 117, 137 Snow, C. E., 4, 33, 186, 188-190, 196, 201, 204-208, 210, 219, 226

Sodian, B., 64.89 Soederberg, R., 188, 190, 226 Softly. P., 162, 169, 174 Sokoiov, J., 190. 226 Solomon, D., 157, 178 Sonnheim, M.,147, 177 Sophian, C., 17, 33 Spector, J. E.,24, 33 Speidel, G. E., 184, 187-188, 208, 226 Spence, M.J., 193,226 Sperry, L. L., 43,58 Spicker, B., 40, 54, 57 Spieker, S., 193. 226 Spiro, R. J., 114, 138

238

Author Index

Sprouls, F. S., 161, 178 Stanhope, L., 141, 174 Stanovich, K. E., 3, 8,33, 203, 216,219, 226

Stanowicz, L., 188-190, 218 Stein, N. L., 43, 57 Stemmer, N., 199, 226 Stem, C., 216, 226 Stem, D. N., 193. 226 Stem, W., 216, 226 Stemberg, R. J., 82, 89, 101, 138 Sterner, G. A., 143, 178 Stewart, C., 195, 225 Stewart, J. P., 206, 219 Stewart, J.E.M., 93, 117, 137 Stiles, J.. 16, 33 Stingle, K. G., 184, 215, 220 Stitt, B. G., 163, 179 Stokes, R. F., 198, 227 Stremmel-Campbell, K.,215,218 Strube, M., 156, 178 Stuart, M., 10, 12, 33 Studdert-Kennedy, M.,9, 33 Sugawara, A. I., 49,56 Sulzby, E., 17, 34 Sutton-Smith, B., 142, 146, 148-149, 158, 164, 166, 177-178

Swift, D.J., 39-40,56

T Tabors, P. O., 4, 29 Tada, W., 16, 33 Taylor, S. E., 49, 57 Teale, W. H.,3, 34 Tenney, Y.J., 37.57 Terrell, B. Y.,199, 225 Thagard, P. R., 94, 137 Thelen, E., 213, 227 Thompson, B. E., 68, 85 Thomson, D. M., 203,227 Todd, J., 203, 227 Tolchmsky-Landsmann, L., 19, 31,34 Tolman, R. S., 161, 178 Toman, E., 171, 179 Toman, W., 143, 146-147, 159, 162, 168171, 178-1 79

Tomasello, M., 191, 203, 227 Torgesen, I. K.,8, 12, 34

Toupin, C., 108, 136 Trabasso, T., 43, 53, 57-58 Trainor, L. J., 198,227 Travis, L. L., 189-191, 223 Trehub, S. E., 198,227 Treiman, R.,8, 10,30,34, 188.221 'hlving, E., 203. 211. 227 'hnmer, W. E., 7-8, 23, 31, 34 h e r , M., 145, 176 'hmer. T. J., 42-44, 55

U Uddenberg, N., 160, 179 Unyk, A. M., 198, 227 Uyeda, K. M., 68, 89 Uzgiris, 1. C., 184, 186, 227

V Valdez-Menchaca, M. C., 207, 227-228 Van Cleave, E. F., 151, 179 Vandell, D. L., 153, 161, 177 van den Broek, P.,43.58 van der Geest, T., 188, 190, 227 Van IJzendoorn, M. H.,4, 29 van Meter, P.,72, 88 Vamhagen, C. K.,43, 55 Vasta, R., 199, 228 Vaughn, C. S., 160, 170, 179 Vellutino, F. R.,26, 34 Vilaseca, R. M., 190, 200, 208, 223, 227 Vincent, L., 191, 195, 222 Vosniadou, S., 92, 138 Vukelich, C., 19, 34 Vygotsky, L. S., 15-16, 23-24, 34, 134, 138

W Wagner, K. R.,199, 227 Wagner, M. E., 140, 154-157, 164, 167, 170- 172, 178-1 79

Wagner, R. K.,8, 12,34 Walker, C. H.,70, 89 Wallace, W. P.,44, 58 Wanner, E., 193, 220

Author Index Warren, S. F., 182, 213, 227 Watkins, R. V., 191, 199, 224 Watson, R., 4, 6.34 Weatherston, S.,10, 34 Weinert, F. E., 60,64,70-72, 74, 84, 89 Weinliider, H., 70, 72, 74, 87 Weintraub, S . , 184, 216, 220 Weintraub, Z., 158, 179 Weir, R., 198, 216, 227 Wellrnan, H. M.,134, 138 Wells, G., 4, 34, 183, 203-204, 206, 227 Welsh, J., 195, 223 Werner, H., 192,227 Wheeler, M. A., 196, 207, 227 Wheelwright, S., 121-123, 136 Whelley, M.M . , 44,56 Whipple, T . , 16, 33 Whitehurst, G. J., 185, 199, 204, 206-207, 211,217, 224, 227-228 Wijnen, F., 198, 228 Wilkening, F., 114, 137 Wilkinson, E., 163, 179 Williams, R. B., 156, 179 Wilson, K.,50, 57 Wilson, M. R., 216, 219 Wimrner, H.,11-12, 34

239

Wise, B. W., 10, 34 Wodding, C., 206-207, 219 Woll, S . B . , 42, 52, 56 Wollen, K. A., 44,58 Woodward, V. A., 4, 30 Worden, P. E., 36, 42-43, 54 Wright Cassidy, K., 193, 221 Wynn, K.,17, 34 Wyshak, G., 156, 179

Y Yopp, H. K., 12.34 Younger, B. A,, 95, 138 Youssef, V., 210, 228 Yun-Fei, Z., 11, 33

Z

Zeman, B. R.. 62-63, 71-72, 85 Zhang, S . , 11.32 Zillmann, D., 49, 55 Zuber, T., 143, 158, 179 Zukow-Goldring, P., 203, 213, 228

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

Subject Index

A

Animal defense mechanisms, use in teaching relational knowledge, 105-106 Anxiety, 157-159 Assertions, in child-directed speech, 202

AlA2-BIB2-ClC2 paradigm, 112-113 A-B-A-C paradigm, I 1 1-1 12 Abstraction training, 196- 197 metric bases, 197-198 multiple abstracting exercises, 198-200 single word structure, 200-201 Adolescents sex-of-sibling effect on conformity, 148-149 imitation, 148-149 sociability, 140- 142 Adults developmental studies on, 46-48 sex-of-sibling effect on anxiety and stress, 158-159 conformity, 148-149 imitation, 148-149 longevity, 155- 156 sociability, 142-148 Age schemata, memory for, 50-52 Aggression, 153- 154 Alcoholism, sex-of-sibling effect, 165- 166 Alphabets, 8-9 Analogical reasoning causal relation-based, 104 classical, 103- 104 classical method, 100-102 everyday, 93-94 knowledge-based, importance, 100 natural kinds experiments, 124- 125 binary relational mapping, 126- 130 relational shift and, 125- 126 ternary relational mapping, 130- 131 negative devising, 113-1 14 real world, 114 performance factors, 106-108 Analytic procedures, in first language acquisition, 192-195

B Bilingualism, 21-22 Binary relational mapping, 126-130 Biological solutions, 105-106 Book reading literacy acquisition and, 202-203 attentional aspects, 203 motivation aspects, 203-204 rehearsal and, 204 as symbolization gradient, 204-205 Books, see Picture books; Story books

C

Causal relations analogical success correlation with, 104 classical analogies based on, 103-104 ternary relational mapping for, 121-124 Classical analogy method, in thematic relations 100-102 Class inclusion study, 120-121 Cognition, 13-14 Communications, 201-202 Conformity, 148-149 Corrective feedback, 186-187 effects, 190-191 existence, 186- 187 generality, 189- 190 Cross-mapping studies, 108-109 familiar relations, 109-1 11 24 1

242

Subject Index

D Delinquency, 161-163 Development analogical, 1 14- 1 I5 relational primacy view, 94-99 general event representation, 37-39 logical, see Halford's structure-mapping theory memory, knowledge and, 60-61 natural kinds experiments, 124- 125 binary relational mapping, 126- 130 relational shift and, 125-126 ternary relational mapping, 130- 131 Disabled, see Learning disabled

E Elderly children's memory for, age schemata effects,

50-52 sex-of-sibling effect internality-externality, 152- 153 sociability, 140- 147 Exercises, see Learner's spontaneous exercises

F Feedback, see Corrective feedback Find-the-sticker task, 109-1 1 1 First language acquisition acquisition process, 210-211 analytic procedures, 192- 195 analytic sequences, 191-192 corrective feedback, 186-187 effects, 190-191 existence, 187-189 generality, 189- 190 explanatory sufficiency, 21 1-213 imitation, 183- 184 input, 209-210 leamer's spontaneous exercises, 216-217 learning-to-learn effect and, 214-216 methodological tasks, 214 modeling, 183-184 progressive theoretical paradigm, 213 synthetic sequences, 191-192

G Gender schemata, 49-50 Generativity training, 196-197 The Genie's problem, 106-107

H Halford's structure-mapping theory analogical development, 114-1 15 processing capacity, 115-1 16 relational complexity, 114-1 15 vs. relational primacy theory, 116-1 17 ternary relational mapping, I 17-124 transitive inference problems, 115 Heart ailments, sex-of-sibling effect, 156-157 Homosexuality, sex-of-sibling effect, 164- 165

I Imitation definition, 183 first language acquisition, 183-186 generalizability, 184 interaction sequences and. 185-186 and models, interval between, 185 sex-of-sibling effect, 148-149 ubiquity of, 184 varieties, 184 Infants, analogical development, 94-99 Information-processingmodel, 64-65 Instance-based processing, 94-95 Instruction, see also Training literacy, 25-26 problem similarity, 1 1 1-1 13 Intelligence components, 82 knowledge-base theories, reformulation, 83 Intelligence quotient less strategic tasks and, 72-75 memory strategies, 75-78 text memory and, 70-71 Interactions, question-answer, 201 Interactive models, relationship between phonological skills and learning to read, 10 Item-specific effects, in knowledge and memory development, 61

243

Subject Index J Jewish museum study, 39-40

K Knowledge memory development and, 60-61 memory span and, 65-70 reading ability and, 68-70 relational, teaching, 104- 105 strategic memory and, 64-65 Knowledge-base theories, 83

L Language, see also First language acquisition oral, role in literacy development, 5-7 written vs. oral language, 15 status of, 18-19 as symbolic system, 17-18 Learner’s spontaneous exercises, 216-217 Learning disabled, memory span, 67-68 Learning-to-learn effect language acquisition and, 214-216 problem similarity instruction and, 11 1-1 13 in ternary relational mappings, 124 Literacy, see also Reading acquisition, 22-26 book reading and, 202-203 attentional aspects, 203 motivation aspects, 203-204 foundations, 25-26 importance, 27-28 picture books and, 206-209 Logical reasoning natural kinds experiments, 124- 125 binary relational mapping, 126-130 relational shift and, 125- 126 ternary relational mapping, 130- I3 I Longevity, sex-of-sibling effect, 155- 156

M Mapping, see specific types Maternal speech analytic procedures. 192-195 synthetic procedures, 195- 196

Memory adult, developmental studies, 46-48 for elderly, age schemata effects, 50-52 development, knowledge and, 60-61 for doctor visits, 40-41 everyday, schemata in, 36-41 facilitating strategies, 63-64 gender schemata and, 49-50 general event representation and, 36-37 knowledge and, 64-65 metamemory, novelty and, 82 for narratives, 41-43 for naturalistic events, 37-38 nonstrategic organization in, 62-63 for others, 48-49 schemata in, 52-54 for schematic deviations, 39-40 for script-based stones, 42 span knowledge and. 65-70 learning disabled, 67-68 strategies advantages, 78-82 gifted and, 75-76 IQ and, 75-82 reading ability and, 68-70 transfer of training, 75-76 text, IQ and, 70-71 Metalinguistic ability, 7 Minor maladjustments, 159- 160 Modeling definition, 183 first language acquisition, 183- 186 Models, see specific types Moving word problem, 20, 24-25 Multiple abstracting exercises, 198-200

N Narratives memory for, 41-43 studies, limitations, 45-46 Natural kinds experiments binary relational mapping in, 126-130 ternary relational mapping in, 130- 131 Natural pest control, 105-106 Negations, in child-directed speech, 202 Numbers, concepts of, 16-17 Numerosity processing, 96

244

Subject Index 0

Oral language role, 5-7 vs. written language, 15 Organization, nonstrategic, 62-63

P Performance factors, 106-108 Personality, 140 characteristics, consistency, 160- 161 Phonological awamness causality, controversy over, 8 complexity, 13 empirical evidence, 7-8 historical evidence, 8-9 individual differences, 11-1 2 testing instruments, 12- 13 units of sound, 9-10 Picture books impact, microanalyses, 207-208 literacy and, 206-209 verbal channel and, 205-206 Play, symbolic, 14-15 Print environmental, effects, 4-5 exposure to, 3-4 Problem analogy paradigm, 105 Procedures, see Analytic procedures; Synthetic procedures Processing, see specific types Processing capacity, 115-1 16 Progressive theoretical paradigm, 213 Psychiatric disorders, major, 167- 168 Psychopathy, 161-163

R Rational shift theory, 107-108 Reading. see olso Book reading; Literacy distancing function, 204-205 impact, microanalyses, 207-208 learning bilingualism, 21-22 cognitive context, 13- 14 developing skills, 2-3 environmental print, 4-5 factors predicting, 23-24 phonological awareness, 7-13

readiness, 23 social context, 3-4 Story books and, 3-4 strategic memory in, 68-70 symbolic representation, 16-17, 20-21 Reading by analogy, 11 Reasoning, see Analogical reasoning; Logical reasoning Referring, arbitrariness of, 15 Relational mapping, 93-93 Relational primacy view natural kinds experiments, 124-125 binary relational mapping, 126- 130 relational shift and, 125-126 ternary relational mapping, 130- 131 VS. Halford’s structure-mapping theory, I 1 6 117 Relational reasoning, 96-97 Relational shift, 125-126 Relations causal, see Causal relations complexity, 114-1 16 familiar, cross-mapping studies, 109- 11I primacy, see Relational primacy view thematic, classical analogies, 100- 102 Representations general event developmental issues, 37 memory and, 36-37 print, evidence for, 20-21 symbolic, see Symbolic representation Responsibility, 150- 151

S

Schemata age, in memory for elderly persons, 50-52 deviations, 39-40 in everyday memory, 36-41 gender, 49-50 in memory for others, 48-49 narratives, memory for, 41-42 Script-pointer-plus-tag-model,52-53 Self-esteem, 151- 152 Sex-of-siblingeffect aggression, 153- 154 alcoholism, 165-166 anxiety, 157-159 conformity and, 148-149

Subject Index delinquency, I61- 163 heart ailments, 156-157 homosexuality, 164- 165 imitation and, 148-149 longevity and, 155-156 minor maladjustments, 159- 160 monosexual sibships, 169- 170 personality characteristics, 160-161 psychiatric disorders, major, 167- 168 psychopathy, 161-163 responsibility, 150-151 risk taking and, 154-155 self-esteem, 151-152 sociability adolescents, 140- 142 adults, 142-148 children, 140-142 stress, 157-159 suicide, 166-167 Sibships monosexual and one cross-sexed negative effects, 169-170 positive effects, 171- 172 Social context limitations of, 5 in reading, 3-4 Sociability sex-of-sibling effect adolescents, 140- 142 adults, 142- 148 children, 140-142 Sound structure interactive models, 10 units of, 9-10 Spatial relations processing, 95-96 Speech stream analysis, 192-193 Speed of processing, 82-83 Standardized tests, 24-25 Stones, script-based, 42 Story books exposure to, 3-4 literate language and, 3-4 Stress, 157-159 structures single words, abstracting, 200-201 syntactic, metric bases of, 197-198 variations, communicational flexibility and, 201-202 Suicide sex-of-sibling effect, 166- 167

245

Symbolic representation numbers, concepts of, 16-17 other domains, 15-16 in reading, 14-15 transition to, 19-20 Symbolization gradient, 204-205 Symbols, expressive, 15 Syntactic structures, 197-198 Synthetic procedures, in first language acquisition, 195-196

T Tasks find-the-sticker, 109- 1 I1 less strategic, 72-75 IQ and, 72-75 methodological, 214 word size problem, 21, 24-25 Ternary relational mapping about causal relations, 121-124 family relations, 118-120 natural kinds experiment, 130- 131 in young children, 117-118 Testing instmments, 12- 13 Texts language, 5-7 memory for, IQ and, 70-71 Training, see Abstraction training; Generativity training; Instruction Training transfer, 75-76 Transformations. 201-202 Transitive inference problems, 115

V Variations, multiple frame, 203 Verbal channel, features, 205-206 Verbal input analysis, 193- 195

W Word size problem, 21, 24-25 Word structures, 200-201 Written language vs. oral language, 15 status of, 18-19 as symbolic system, 17-18

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

Contents of Previous Volumes

Volume 1

Social Reinforcement of Children’s Behavior

Responses of Infants and Children to Complex and Novel Stimulation

Delayed Reinforcement Effects

Harold W. Stevenson Glenn Terrell A Developmental Approach to Learning and

Gordon N. Cantor

Word Associations and Children’s Verbal Behavior

Cognition

David S. Palermo

Eugene S. Gollin

Change in the Stature and Body Weight of North American Boys during the Last 80 Years Howard V. Meredith Discrimination Learning Set in Children

Evidence for a Hierarchical Arrangement of Learning Processes Sheldon H . White

Selected Anatomic Variables Analyzed for Interage Relationships of the Size-Size. Size-Gain, and GainGain Varieties

Hayne W. Reese

Learning in the First Year of Life Lewis P. Lipsirt

Howard

Some Methodological Contributions from a Functional Analysis of Child Development

V. Meredith

AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Sidney W. Bijou and Donald M. Baer

The Hypothesis of Stimulus Interaction and an Explanation of Stimulus Compounding Charles C. Spiker

The Development of “Overconstancy” in Space Perception Joachim F. Wohlwill Miniature Experiments in the Discrimination Learning of Retardates Betty 1.House and David Zeaman

Volume 3 Infant Sucking Behavior and Its Modification Herbert Kaye

The Study of Brain Electrical Activity in Infants Robert J. Ellingson

Selective Auditory Attention in Children Eleanor E. Maccoby

AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Stimulus Definition and Choice Michael D. Zeiler

Volume 2 The Paired-AssociatesMethod in the Study of Conflict

Experimental Analysis of Inferential Behavior in Children Tracy S. Kendler and Howard H . Kendler Perceptual Integration in Children Herbert L. Pick, Jr.. Anne D. Pick, and Robert E. Klein

Alfred Castaneda

Transfer of Stimulus Pretraining to Motor PairedAssociate and Discrimination Learning Tasks

Component Process Latencies in Reaction Times of Children and Adults

Joan H. Cantor

Raymond H. Hohle

The Role of the Distance Receptors in the Develop ment of Social Responsiveness Richard H . Walters and Ross D . Parke

AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

247

248

Contents of Previous Volumes

Volume 4 Developmental Studies of Figurative Perception David Elkind The Relations of Short-Term Memory to Develop ment and Intelligence John M. Eelmont and Earl C. Butterfeld Learning, Developmental Research, and Individual Differences Frances Degen Homwitz Rychophysiological Studies in Newborn Infants S. J. Hun, H. G. Lenard. and H. F. R. Prechtl Development of the Sensory Analyzers during Infancy Yvonne Erackbill and Hiram E. Fitzgerald The Problem of Imitation Justin Amnfreed AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 5 The Development of Human Fetal Activity and Its Relation to Postnatal Behavior Tryphena Humphrey Arousal Systems and Infant H m Rate Responses Frances K. Graham and Jan C. Jackson Specific and Diversive Exploration Corinne Hutt Developmental Studies of Mediated Memory John H. Flavell Development and Choice Behavior in Probabilistic and Problem-Solving Tasks L. R. Goukt and Kathryn S. Goodwin AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

Volume 6 Incentives and Learning in Children Sam L. Witryol Habituation in the Human Infant Wendell E. Jefrey and Leslie 8. Cohen Application of Hull-Spence Theory to the Discrimination Learning of Children Charles C. Spiker Growth in Body Size: A Compendium of Findings on Contemporary Children Living in Different Parts of the World Howard V. Meredith

Imitation and Language Development James A. Sherman Conditional Responding as a Paradigm for Observational, Imitative Learning and VicariousReinforcement Jacob L. Gewirtz AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

Volume 7 Superstitious Behavior in Children: An Experimental Analysis Michael D. Zeiler Learning Strategies in Children from Different Socioeconomic Levels Jean L. BrcSMhaII and Martin M. Shapim Time and Change in the Development of the Individual and Society Klaus F. Riegel The Nature and Development of Early Number Concepts Rmhel Gelman Learning and Adaptation in Infancy: A Comparison of Models Arnold J. Samemf AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

Volume 8 Elaboration and Learning in Childhood and Adolescence William D. Rohwer, Jr. Exploratory Behavior and Human Development Jum C. Nunnally and L. Charles Lemond Operant Conditioning of Infant Behavior: A Review Robert C. Hulsebus Birth Order and Parental Experience in Monkeys and Man G. Mitchell and L. Schmers Fear of the Stranger: A Critical Examination Harriet L. Rheingold and Cam1 0. Eckerman Applications of Hull-Spence Theory to the Transfer of Discrimination Learning in Children Charles C. Spiker and Joan H. Cantor AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

Contents of Previous Volumes Volume 9 Children's Discrimination Learning Based on Identity or Difference Betty J. House, Ann L. Bmwn. and Marcia S. Scott 'nvo Aspects of Experience in Ontogeny: Development and Learning Hans G. Furth The Effects of Contextual Changes and Degree of Component Mastery on Transfer of Training Joseph C. Campione and Ann L. Brown Psychophysiological Functioning, Arousal. Attention, and Learning during the First Year of Life Richard Hirschmon and Edward S. Katkin Self-ReinforcementProcess in Children John C. Masters and Janice R . Mokms AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 10 Current Trends in Developmental Psychology Boyd R. McCandless and Mary Fulcher Geis The Development of Spatial Representationsof Large-Scale Environments Alexander W. Siege1 and Sheldon H. White Cognitive Perspectives on the Development of Memory John W Hagen, Robert H.Jongeward. Jr.. and Robert V. Kail. Jr. The Development of Memory: Knowing, Knowing About Knowing, and Knowing How to Know

249

Autonomic Imbalance to Hyperactivity, Psychopathy, and Autism Stephen W. Porges Constructing Cognitive Operations Linguistically Earry Beilin Operant Acquisition of Social Behaviors in Infancy: Basic Problems and Constraints W. Stuart Millar Mother-Infant Interaction and Its Study Jacob L. Gewirtz and Elizabeth F. Boyd Symposium on Implications of Life-Span Develop mental Psychology for Child Development: Introductory Remarks Paul B. Baltes Theory and Method in Life-Span Developmental Psychology: Implications for Child Development Aletha Huston-Stein and Paul B. Baltes The Development of Memory: Life-Span Perspectives Hayne W. Reese Cognitive Changes during the Adult Yew. Implications for Developmental Theory and Research Nancy W. Denney and John C . Wright Social Cognition and Life-Span Approaches to the Study of Child Development Michael J. Chandler Life-Span Development of the Theory of Oneself: Implications for Child Development Orville G . Brim. Jr. Implications of Life-Span Developmental Psychology for Childhood Education Leo Montada and Sigrun-Heide Filipp AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Ann L. Brown

Developmental Trends in Visual Scanning Mary Cam1 Day The Development of Selective Attention: From Perceptual Exploration to Logical Search John C. Wright and Alice G . Vlietstra AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJEa

INDEX

Vdumc 11 The Hyperactive Child: Characteristics, Treatment, and Evaluation of Research Design Gladys B. Baxley and Judith M. LeBIanc Peripheral and Neurochemical Parallels of Psychopathology: A Psychophysiological Model Relating

Volume 12 Research between 1%0 and 1970 on the Standing Height of Young Children in Different Parts of the World Howard V. Meredith The Representation of Children's Knowledge David Klahr and Robert S. Siegler Chromatic Vision in Infancy Marc H. Bornstein Developmental Memory Theories: Baldwin and Piaget Bruce M. Ross and Stephen M. Kerst Child Discipline and the Pursuit of Self An Historical Interpretation Howard Gadlin

250

Contents of Previous Volumes

Development of Time Concepts in Children William1. Friedman AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

Neurological Plasticity, Recovery from Brain Insult, and Child Development Ian SI. James-Roberts

INDEX AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

Volume 13 Coding of Spatial and Temporal Information in Episodic Memory Daniel B. Berch A Developmental Model of Human Learning Barry Gholson and Harry Beilin The Development of Discrimination Learning: A Levels-of-Functioning Explanation Tracy S.Kendler The Kendler Levels-of-Functioning Theory: Comments and an Alternative Schema Charles C. Spiker and Joan H. Cantor Commentary on Kendler's Paper: An Alternative Perspective Barry Gholson and Therese Schuepfer Reply to Commentaries Tracy S. Kendler On the Development of Speech Perception: Mechanisms and Analogies Peter D . Eimas and Vivien C. Tartter The Economics of Infancy: A Review of Conjugate Reinforcement Carolyn Kent Rovee-Collierand Marry J. Gekoski Human Facial Expressions in Response to Taste and Smell Stimulation Jacob E. Steiner AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

Volume 14 Development of Visual Memory in Infants John S. Werner and Marion Perlmurrer Sibship-Constellation Effects on Rychosocial Devel. opment, Creativity, and Health Marie Earle Wagner, Herman J. P. Schubert. and Daniel S.P. Schubert The Development of Understending of the Spatial Terms Front and Back Luuren Julius Harris and Ellen A. Srmmmen The Organization and Control of Infant Sucking C. K. Crwk

Volume IS Visual Development in Ontogenesis: Some Reevaluations Jiiri Allik and Jaan Valsiner Binocular Vision in Infants: A Review and a Theoretical Framework Richard N. Adin and Susan T. Dumais Validating Theories of Intelligence Earl C. BunerJeld, Dennis Siladi, and John M . Belmont Cognitive Differentiation and Developmental Learning William Fowler Children's Clinical Syndromes and Generalized Expectations of Control Fred Rothbaum AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 16 The History of the Boyd R. McCandless Young Scientist Awards: The First Recipients David Palermo Social Bases of Language Development: A Reassessment Elizabeth Bates. lnge Bretherton, Marjorie Beeghly-Smith. and Sandra McNew PercepNal Anisotrophies in Infancy: Ontogenetic Origins and Implications of Inequalities in Spatial Vision Marc H. Bornsrein Concept Development Martha J. Farah and Stephen M. Kosslyn Production and Perception of Facial Expressions in Infancy and Early Childhood Tiffany M. Field and Tedra A. Walden Individual Differences in Infant Sociability: Theii Origins and Implications for Cognitive Development Michael E. Lumb The Development of Numerical Understandings Robert S. Siegler and Mitchell Robinson AUTHOR INDEX-SUBIECT

INDEX

Contents of Previous Volumes Volume 17 The Development of Problem-Solving Strategies Deanna Kuhn and Erin Phelps Information Processing and Cognitive Development Robert Kail and Je&y Bisanz Research between 1950 and 1980 on Urban-Rural Differences in Body Size and Growth Rate of Children and Youths Howard V. Meredith Word Meaning Acquisition in Young Children: A Review of Theory and Research Pamela Blewitt Language Play and Language Acquisition Stan A . Kuczaj I1 The Child Study Movement: Early Gmwth and Development of the Symbolized Child Alexander W. Siegel and Sheldon H. White AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 18 The Development of Verbal Communicative Skills in Children Constance R. Schmidt and Scott G. Paris Auditory Feedback and Speech Development Gerald M. Siegel, Herbert L. Pick, Jr., and Sharon R. Garber Body Size of Infants and Children around the World in Relation to Socioeconomic Status Howard V. Meredith Human Sexual Dimorphism: Its Cost and Benefit James L. Mosley and Eileen A. Stan Symposium on Research Programs: Rational Altematives to Kuhn's Analysis of Scientific ProgressIntroductory Remarks Hayne W. Reese, Chairman World Views and Their Influence on Psychological Theory and Research: Kuhn-Lakatos-Laudan Willis F. Overton The History of the Psychology of Learning as a Rational Process: Lakatos versus Kuhn Peter Barker and Barry Gholson Functionalist and Structuralist Research Programs in Developmental Psychology: Incommensurability or Synthesis? Harry Beilin In Defense of Kuhn: A Discussion of His Detractors David S. Palermo

251

Comments on Beilin's Epistemology and Palermo's Defense of Kuhn Willis F. Overton From Kuhn to Lakatos to Laudan Peter Barker and Barry Gholson Overton's and Palermo's Relativism: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back Harry Beilin AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECI'

INDEX

Volume 19 Response to Novelty: Continuity versus Discontinuity in the Developmental Course of Intelligence Cynthia A. Berg'and Robert J . Sternberg Metaphoric Competence in Cognitive and Language Development Marc Marschark and Lynn Nall The Concept of Dimensions in Developmental Research Stuan I. Offenbach and Francine C. Blumberg Effects of the Knowledge Base on Children's Memory Strategies Peter A . Ornstein and Mary J. Naus Effects of Sibling Spacing on Intelligence, Interfamilial Relations, Psychosocial Characteristics, and Mental and Physical Health Mazie Earle Wagner. Herman J. P. Schubert. and Daniel S.P. Schubert Infant Visual Preferences: A Review and New Theoretical Treatment Martin S.Banks and Arthur P. Ginsburg AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

Volume 20 Variation in Body Stockiness among and within Ethnic Groups at Ages from Birth to Adulthood Howard V. Meredith The Development of Conditional Reasoning: An Iffy Proposition David P. O'Brien Content Knowledge: Its Role, Representation, and Restructuring in Memory Development Michelene T. H. Chi and Stephen J. Ceci Descriptions: A Model of Nonstrategic Memory Development Brian P. Ackerman

252

Contents of Previous Volumes

Reactivation of Infant Memory: Implications for Cognitive Development Carolyn Rover-Collier and Harlene Hayne Gender Segregation in Childhood Eleanor E. Maccoby and Carol Nagy Jacklin Piaget, Attentional Capacity. and the Functional Implications of Formal Structure Michael Chapman INDEX

Volume 21 Social Development in Infancy: A 25-Year Perspective Ross D. Parke On the Uses of the Concept of Normality in Developmental Biology and Rychology Eugene S. Gollin. Gary Stahl. and Elyse Morgan Cognitive Psychology: Mentalistic or Behavioristic? Charles C. Spiker Some Current Issues in Children's Selective Attention Betty J. House Children's Learning Revisited The Contemporary Scope of the Modified Spence Discriminstion Theory Joan H. Cantor and Charles C. Spiker Discrimination Learning Set in Children Hayne W. Reese A Developmental Analysis of Rule-Following Henry C. Riegler and Donald M. Baer Psychological Linguistics: Implications for a Theory of Initial Development and a Method for Research Sidney W. Bijou Psychic Conflict and Moral Development Gordon N. Contor and David A. Parton Knowledge and the Child's Developing Theory of the World David S. Palenno Childhood Events Recalled by Children and Adults David B. Pillemer and Sheldon H. White INDEX

Volume 22 The Development of Representation in Young Children Judy S. Debache

Children's Understanding of Mental Phenomena David Estes. Henry M. Wellman, and Jacqueline D. Woolley Social Influences on Children's Cognition: State of the Art and Future Directions Margarita Azmitia and Marion Perlmutler Understanding Maps as Symbols: The Development of Map Concepts Lynn S.Liben and Roger M. Downs The Development of Spatial Perspective Taking Nora Newcombe Developmental Studies of Alertness and Encoding Effects of Stimulus Repetition Daniel W. Smothergill and Alan G. Kraut Imitation in Infancy: A Critical Review Claire L. Poulson. Leila Regina de Paula Nunes. and Steven F. Warren AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

INDEX

Volume 23 The Structure of Developmental Theory Willis F. Ovenon Questions a Satisfying Developmental Theory Would Answer: The Scope of a Complete Explanation of Development Phenomena Frank B. Murray 'Ihe Development of World Views: Toward Future Synthesis? Ellin Kofsky Scholnick Metaphor, Recursive Systems. and Paradox in Science and Developmental Theory Willis F. Overton Children's Iconic Realism: Object versus Property Realism Harry Beilin and Elise G. Pearlman The Role of Cognition in Understanding Gender mects Carol Lynn Martin Development of Processing Speed in Childhood and Adolescence Robert Kail Contextualism and Developmental Psychology Hayne W.Reese Horizontality of Water Level: A Neo-Piagetian Developmental Review Juan Pascual-Leone and Sergio Morra AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

Contents of Previous Volumes Volume 25

Volume 24 Music and Speech Processing in the First Year of Life Sandra E. Trehub. Laurel J. Trainor. and Anna M. Unyk

Effects of Feeding Method on Infant Temperament John Wombey

The Development of Reading Linda S. Siege1 Learning to Read: A Theoretical Synthesis John P. Rack, Charles Hulme. and Margaret J. Snowling Does Reading Make You Smarter? Literacy and the

Development of Verbal Intelligence Keith E . Stanovich Sex-of-SiblingEffects: Part 1. Gender Role, Intelligence, Achievement, and Creativity Mazie Eorle Wagner, Herman J. P. Schubert, and Daniel S.P. Schubert

The Concept of Same Linda B . Smith

Planning as Developmental Process Jacquelyn Baker-Sennett. Eugene Matusov, and Barbara Rogoff

AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT

253

INDEX

In Memoriam: Charles C. Spiker (1925-1993) Lewis P. Lipsitt

Developmental Differences in Associative Memory: Strategy Use. Mental Effort, and Knowledge Access Interactions Daniel W. Kee A Unifying Framework for the Development of Chil-

dren’s Activity Memory Hilary Horn Ratner and Mary Ann Foley Strategy Utilization Deficiencies in Children: When, Where, and Why Patricia H. Miller and Wendy L. Seier The Development of Children’s Ability to Use Spatial Representations Mark Blades and Christopher Spencer

Fostering Metacognitive Development Linai~Baker

The HOME Inventory: Review and Reflections Robert

H. Bradley

Social Reasoning and the Varieties of Social Experiences in Cultural Contexts Elliot Turiel and Cecilia Wainryb

Mechanismsin the Explanationof DevelopmentalChange Harry Beilin

AUTHOR INDEX-SUBJECT INDEX

I S B N O-L2-009726-5