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Peter Sloterdijk Theory of the Post-War Periods Observations on Franco-German relations since 1945
With a Foreword by Klaus-Dieter Müller
Translated from the German by Robert Payne
SpringerWienNewYork
Prof. Dr. Peter Sloterdijk This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically those of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, broadcasting, reproduction by photocopying machines or similar means, and storage in data banks. Product Liability: The use of registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. ª4QSJOHFS7FSMBH7JFOOBt1SJOUFEJO"VTUSJB Springer-Verlag Wien New York is part of Springer Science+Business Media springer.at Copy editing: Nadja Schiller (ZHdK) Graphic design: Springer-Verlag, Vienna Printed by: Ferdinand Berger & Söhne Ges.m.b.H., 3580 Horn, Austria Printed on acid-free and chlorine-free bleached paper – TCF SPIN: 12268290 Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar. Library of Congress Control Number: 2008939460 ISSN 1863-6411
ISBN
978-3-211-79913-0 Springer-Verlag Wien New York
Contents
Klaus-Dieter Müller: Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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1 Europe, post-historical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2 Heiner Mühlmann’s Maximal-StressCooperation-Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 Europe after Napoleon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4 Italy 1918: Falsification of the results of war, politics in a big way. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5 France 1945: The double falsification . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6 Germany1945: Metanoia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 7 France 2007: Imperial temptation and the implosion of the left-wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8 Germany 2007: The idiot of the European family in the phase of normalization – the Walser Affair . . . 36 9 Happy disassociation: Polemological prospects with René Girard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Foreword Klaus-Dieter Müller
Following defeat in battle every culture receives the opportunity to re-evaluate its normative basic attitudes or as Sloterdijk puts it ‘its moral grammar’. Procedures of this kind either end in a process assuming energies of revenge or the decision is made to transform the cultural rules ascertained as detrimental to behavioural patterns of a less harmful form. Is there such a thing as a civilizing influence of cultures by reorientation which brings about post-heroic values? Peter Sloterdijk uses the term ‘metanoia’ to describe this process. He does not mean by this Christian repentance but pragmatic relearning in order to increase civilisational viability (see p. 14). Sloterdijk calls the victor’s post-stressory work of evaluation ‘affirmation’. In his, in reference to ‘metanoia’ and ‘affirmation’, exemplary “excursion into the jubilee culture” of Franco-German relations Sloterdijk awards the Germans a “process which at no time complicated but also at no time threatened the metanoethical tranformation process of the vanquished German people”, which in its extreme forms consisted of triumphant self-hate and aggression towards each and every national tradition.This is reflected in the biographies of many Germans. In my case it was the same as in many other families, quarrels arose as to guilt and responsibility. While German criticism spoke to a population which despite all antagonistic tendencies could not deny being guilty of the accusations made, French criticism was directed at a society acquitted and in need of elucidation as to their drôle de libération. “This may well be the reason why the intellectual Ger1
many is the only place in the world where an old-fashioned correspondence theory of truth still dominates. Here defeat is called defeat (and a crime a crime) – and the remaining words are also gauged to this semantic primal scale. It is only here that the religion of the objective referee holds sway. The intellectual France prefers the politically more elegant and rhetorically more attractive position where words and things belong to separate systems.” (see p. 26). Despite disparate post-war processes, in Germany ‘metanoia’ and in France ‘affirmation’ of the imaginary victor, both nations have come a long way together. It is a common belief that nothing will work in Europe unless France and Germany are in agreement. Franco-German relations, Franco-German affairs, Franco-German friendship: What next? The Franco-German methods of dealing with each other are often described as being exemplary; it has almost become a legend. Peter Sloterdijk calls this legend into question by turning the political credo upside down. He talks about Franco-German relations, regardless of the fact that “there is nothing new that can be said on this theme which could not come from audiotape” (see p. 10), Sloterdijk offers a preliminary rehearsal for philosophical commentary on the Franco-German day of commemoration taking place on 8th July 2012 marking the fiftieth anniversary of Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer attending the historical service of reconciliation in the coronation cathedral in Reims. He calls the arrangement made by the French President and the German Chancellor “the healing disentanglement of the two nations” (see p. 45) According to Sloterdijk this represented the termination of a fatally closeknit relationship which reached back to the era of the Napoleonic wars at least. For a long time the Germans and the French had become caught up in an endless cycle of mim2
icry, imitation, one-upmanship and projective empathy with each other. What de Gaulle and Adenauer pledged each other was an everlasting non-attachment and in some ways even a permanent state of indifference. The good relationship, or at least functional relationship, which has existed since then rest on the solid foundations of the non-attachment which has been finally achieved – diplomatically described as friendship between the two nations. The post-war period began with a French policy of occupation, which was strongly characterized by ‘improvisation’1. Nevertheless in the spirit of ‘affirmation’ the objective was unanimously clear: to restore France to its former national greatness. Only as a late occupying power was France able to participate in the post-war policies concerning Germany by means of the concessions made by the other allies – or as Sloterdijk puts it “the re-interpretation of the results of the war”. France was certainly not in a position to prepare for this role in advance. However, there had been considerations on the side of the French in the resistance groups in Algier and London before the end of the war in reference to a re-educational programme for Germany emanating from France2. Right from the very beginning the French policy of occupation was typified by a comprehensive cultural policy, partly as an aspect of the security policy and partly as a demonstration of France’s cultural superiority in comparison with the other
3
Cheval, René: „Die Bildungspolitik in der Französischen Besatzungszone“ in: Heinemann, Manfred (Hg.): Umerziehung und Wiederaufbau. Die Bildungspolitik der Besatzungsmächte in Deutschland und Österreich, Stuttgart 1981, p. 190–200, here p. 190 Gerard, Francis: Que faire de l’Allemagne? Algier 1943, see Ruge-Schatz: „Grundprobleme der Kulturpolitik in der französischen Besatzungszone“ in: Scharf, Claus und Schröder, H.-J. (Hgs.): Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die Französische Zone 1945–1949, Wiesbaden 1983, p. 91–110
Allies. This so-called ‘Machtersatzpolitik’3 which arose from intellectual-cultural Messianism had well-established roots in France. Among these were the Roman legacy, the influence of the Catholic church with its universal pretensions and the very early formation of a powerful central state drawing on the Catholic religion for support4. In addition the French Revolution supplied the values of democracy, liberty and progress. They made the civilisatory consciousness the business of an entire people. The Federal Republic of Germany seemed to France to be a “land in need of cultural missionary work”5. Eighteen French cultural institutes were created in the first ten years after the end of the war in Germany, considerably more than in any other western European country. The Germans on their part were, in the spirit of ‘metanoethical’ re-orientation, initially very interested in the French cultural imports. The scale on which this re-orientation and ‘self-discovery’ in the framework of rebuilding the nation progressed meant that the Germans began to develop a new self-assurance. They also became more confident and independent in their Franco-German initiatives in communication – and a kind of de-fascination emerged. Those actively shaping the Franco-German cultural exchange observed an increasing disinterest in France in general and especially in contemporary French art and culture. Many Germans cling to a specific image of French culture “as if
Clemens, Gabriele: „Die britische Kulturpolitik in Deutschland: Musik, Theater, Film und Literatur“ in: Clemens, Gabriele (Hg.): Die Kulturpolitik im besetzten Deutschland, Stuttgart 1994, p. 200–218, here p. 203 Salon, Albert: L’Action culturelle de la France dans le monde, Paris 1983, p. 31 ff see Hammer (1957): „Gemeinsamer Markt des Geistes“ in: Echo der Zeit 1954, quoted from: Möller, Horst und Hildebrand, Klaus (Hg.), Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich: Dokumente 1949-1963, Bd. 3: Parteien, Öffentlichkeit, Kultur, München 1997, Dok.-Nr. 339, S. 895–898, here p. 896
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the German idea of French culture has simply just stood still.”6 This stagnation is confirmed in the statistics on the atrophy in Franco-German communication skills. While 1950 in a survey in Allensbach 15% of Germans claimed to be able to ‘read’ a text written in French, in 1997 it was 16% according to a survey in the Spiegel. Current studies assume similar results. In France the situation is no different. Since the end of the war German’s status as the first foreign language has dropped from 30% to 10% and as a second foreign language French was overtaken by Spanish long ago. In his speech to the French National Assembly on 30th November 1999 Gerhard Schröder reassured the French people that “French culture and civilisation enjoy an elevated and lasting status in Germany”. Ingo Kolbohm7 exposed this speech as a stereotype and says: “If the Chancellor wishes to be courteous in his statements this is all very well and good, but if this is supposed to reflect the actual facts of the case then he must be contradicted.” With normalisation as ‘euphemism of estrangement’ Sloterdijk applies an apparent paradox: The pragmatic way in a benevolent and non-violent co-existence by means of mutual disinterest and defascination. “Do it the same way that we did, don’t be too interested in each other!” This could be the message that people of Germany and France have the rest of the world to offer. Fixed rituals are no longer adequate to justify the specialness of the Franco-German relationship. They no longer suffice to envigorate this relationship and to capture the interest of present
5
Mehdorn, Margarete, 1995–2007 president of the “Deutsch-Französischen Gesellschaft Schleswig-Holstein e. V.”, since 2005 member of the board of directors of the “Vereinigung Deutsch-Französischer Gesellschaften in Deutschland und Frankreich, VDFG/FAFA” Kolbohm, Ingo: „Plädoyer für eine neue deutsch-französische Nähe: Wider die „Normalisierung“ als Diskurs der Entfremdung“. In: Dokumente. Zeitschrift für den deutsch-französischen Dialog, Heft 3, Juni 2000, p. 207–214
generations. This is because the functioning of the FrancoGerman mechanisms seems have been put into question by the fickelness and impusiveness of the new French President. The new normality will certainly require a bit more than just staging some event on 8th July 2012 where we can expect to hear further speeches “from audiotape”. Peter Sloterdijk’s assumptions could prove to be a valuable contribution to this process of re-orientation. Despite all the attention to detail and interest in the intellectual highlights the brilliant philosopher does not lose sight of the triangular relationships which transcend the bipolar FrancoGerman system. And he does not lose sight of global influences either, for somewhere in the world there is always a post-war period – there should be a theory of post-war periods. And hardly a conflict in the world remains unnoticed. Sloterdijk quite rightly points out that great affective military mobilisations of recent decades could only be implemented by the mass media in the form of coverage and sensationalism – and that these media, as a “vehicle of the dangerous mimesis” are today even more effective than before (see p. 48). Sloterdijk refers to Herbert Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980)8 and postulates: Anybody wishing to get to the bottom of extremism gone global cannot avoid combining the mimetological analysis with the mediological. The medium is the news – the terror is news and medium at the same time. Terrorism in a media driven society turns media into a plaything and into a tool and thus into potential abettor of terror. The terrorists are dependent on the media because they want to trigger off a psychological effect on the greatest number of people possible and
see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: „McLuhan wird wiederentdeckt“, 21.02.2007, Nr. 44, S. N 3 and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: „Mosaiksteinchen”, 19.04.2006, Nr. 91, S. N 3
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add authority to their demands. Seen analytically we are dealing with a functional symbiosis between media and terrorism9. The media driven battle of the cultures which is taking place beyond the borders of the European peace became the new boundary long ago running through all Europe’s territorial order. A new type of stress has arisen which is however fed to the majority of people from virtual space. Its tripping device a images taken from executions and torture or pictures of destruction of towers of power considered to symbolize hubris10. The flow of stress-images will not run dry. The spread of ‘maximal-stress-cooperation’ (MSC) against terror has been reality for a long time now. Its unfolding is undifferentiated and paranoid. It seeks and finds its enemies and turns Huntington’s „clash of civilisations“ into self fulfilling prophecy. Sloterdijk’s Freiburg lecture, available here in the form of a book, is a milestone. He presents to the world a philosophy which is simultaneously German and French. At the same time he presents a new type of ‘consulting philosophy’. A political rhetoric has been developed by means of a new kind of cultural theoretical approach which is capable of having lasting effects. * Prof Dr Klaus-Dieter Müller, born 1951 in Neumünster, Germany, is honorary professor at the Film & Television Academy (HFF) “Konrad Wolf” and head of the IBF “Institut Berufsforschung und Unternehmensplanung Medien e.V.” in PotsdamBabelsberg.
7
Weichert, Stephan A.: „Der inszenierte Terrorist”. In: cover-Medienmagazin, 3, 2002, p. 74–75 see Neverla, Irene in: Michael Beuthner u. a.: Bilder des Terrors – Terror der Bilder?, Köln 2003, p. 158
Th e o r y o f th e P o st-War P erio ds Ob se r v a t i o n s on Franco-G erm an re l a t i o n s si nce 1945 1 Eu r o p e , p o st-h istorical Ladies and Gentlemen, If one were to attempt to summarize in one sentence the shift in consciousness of Europeans in the period after 1945 from a German point of view, then this would have to summarize the following facts. The inhabitants of this continent, exhausted by the excesses and the pressures of the era from 1914 to 1945, turned their backs on historical passion and developed a posthistorical modus vivendi in its stead. By historical I understand ad hoc the unity resulting from the tragedy enacted and written, as well as the unity resulting from the epic both enacted and written. Conceived in this sense ‘history’ for Europeans is a discarded option. By entering the shadow of catastrophe they have decided against an existence in tragic and epic style. They have chosen a form of coexistence in which a civilising force replaces tragedy and negotiation replaces the epic. From another perspective one would say that Europeans have ceased to prepare for war and have become much more concerned with the economic situation and having renounced the gods of warfare converted from heroism to consumerism. It becomes apparent with this very abstract assumption, as in the appearance of the words ‘post-war periods’ of the title, that there is a shift in the meaning as compared to its everyday usage. Indeed, I would like to emphasize and demonstrate the function of the post-war period for the self-regulation of cultures and, on what scale the interpretation of the outcome of wars, by those 8
waging them, becomes a decisive factor for the way in which they conceive themselves. What must above all be emphasized, is the extent to which the victors and those defeated by them tend to attach importance to the fact of their being victorious or being defeated and, how this influences their languages and ways of life subsequently. In the case of this observation the somewhat generalized initial assumptions will disintegrate in more specific information on local post-war cultures. Then, it will be possible to focus clearly on German and French phenomena and then to discuss the so-called relationship existing between them, if such a thing exists – I am already giving a hint as to what my final thesis is, and it is: that, due to strongly disparate post-war processes characterising these two countries, there can be no relations between them and that their relationship which is officially set out in a treaty of friendship is, at best, what could be described as benevolent mutual disregard or benign estrangement as can be observed sometimes between two former partners in love – and why not also then between two former partners in hate. Among the traits of the post-tragic and post-epic ways of life which the Europeans have adopted nolens volens, is the widespread sentiment of living in a disassociated reality in which there are no incidents of any consequence. The only exception is the sequence of political events between 1989 and 1991, which in retrospect, could be titled ‘The collapse of Communism’ – yet even this eventful period which is deeply engraved into the biographies of those born between 1930 and 1975 was, to a certain degree, merely a late sequel to the tragic-epic period which we discarded. This final great event is like a letter, mailed at some time in history, which then got lost in the mail and finally reached the addressee at a much later date. One cannot help thinking of Sergei Krikalev who was at that time, 1990/1991, on the space station Mir and thus took off into outer space from the Soviet Union and found himself in the new Russia when he landed again. 9
As a form of compensation for the post-historic deprivation of events which can be assessed as one of the all in all positive, albeit difficult to understand, traits of the new modus vivendi, contemporary civilisation has produced a number of surrogates apparent on all levels which close the gulf between the differences in higher civilization and mass culture. I will mention only two peculiarities of this tendency which are especially noticeable, firstly the omnipotence of the principle of staging contemporary event culture, and secondly the replacement of events by commemorative events which has given rise to a flourishing jubilee industry – a haute cuisine where there are only warmed up leftovers. In order to avoid any misunderstandings I would like to add that these tendencies, including excrescences, are a part of the price which has to be paid for the emancipation from heroism and tragicism. But we pay it gladly if we consider what the historical alternatives used to look like. I will now take the liberty of taking an excursion into the jubilee culture and will refer to a commemorative event which we on both sides of the Rhine are awaiting. Despite the fact that it still lies four and a half years away, but inasmuch as one feels a certain attraction for hazardous themes, and moreover that one enjoys browsing through the calendar for culture and the arts it will have become evident how it already casts a shadow, or at least the shadow of a shadow. If we speak of Franco-German relations, regardless of the fact that there is nothing new that can be said on this theme which could not come from audiotape, then only because we are already able to think about what should be said at the approaching event instead of the previous event – and these things normally remain unsaid and relatively pressing. The 8th of July of the said year will commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the day when Frenchmen and Germans, represented by their fully justifiably termed statesmen Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer attended a service of recon10
ciliation in the coronation cathedral in Reims which anticipated the signing of a treaty of friendship, the so-called Elysée Treaty of January 1963, which followed shortly afterwards. The solemn proceedings, which we will, when the appropriate time comes, re-enact with a contemporary cast, occurred under the highest symbolic auspices drawn from the traditions which we share. The Te Deum of Reims, commemorated in the presence of the Archbishop François Marty, was carried out under the dais of longstanding Catholic universalism – which was used, for albeit a sentimental instant, in order to declare the chapter of historical excesses between our peoples, the era of infections and mobilisations and jealous murder and armed mass hysteria which crossed the Rhine in both directions, to be closed. One can well imagine what the festivities in Reims, Paris, Berlin and other metropolises will be like around the time of the 8th July 2012. The protocol that the politicians will be required to carry out step by step will be prescribed to a T, leaving practically no room for new gestures. Hardly any fantasy is required to envisage the speeches that we will have to hear given by both presidents and by other incumbent speakers from the fields of politics, culture, economics and religion. A little more fantasy is required in order to answer the question as to whether philosophers and cultural scientists from the two countries concerned should make their own contribution to this anniversary and should this be the case, what form it should assume. What I am about to suggest would serve better as a dry run for a philosophical commentary to the commemoration days which are approaching. A response as such, should in its final form, reconstruct the Franco-German rivalry which lasted a thousand years – from the division of the empire by Charlemagne’s descendants until the disintegration of the Third Reich in the 20th century.
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2 H e i n e r Mü h lmann ’s Maximal- St r essCo o p e r a tion -T heo ry It therefore follows that I can but only touch on a few points of this ambitious enterprise and then only fleetingly and tentatively. I will firstly confine the space of time of my considerations to the last 200 years, or to put it more precisely the era following the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars and then narrow this down to the epoch after 1945. The term postwar period applies eminently to both time spans and that they should be understood not only chronologically but more in regard to the mental and psychopolitical conditions of the times. Now that my analysis is under way the time has come where I must elucidate more clearly what I understand by ‘Post-war period’. The usage of this term prior to now implies that I see reasons to not only apply it in an everyday sense but to attach additional more discriminating meanings to the term. They will become apparent as soon as we transfer the term into the context of a general theory on the ‘Nature of Cultures’. The phrase ‘Nature of Cultures’ stems from the cultural theorist Heiner Mühlmann who with his book of the same name in the year 1996 caused a stir firstly in system-theoretical, polemological, mediological and neurorhetorical circles. Mühlmann’s work is devoted to the extremely ambitious resolution namely to penetrate the interrelationships between war and culture in the light of a generalized model of collective formations generated by stress. This undertaking, which in its descriptive part could also bear the title The Selfish Culture, is initially illustrated by examples stemming from ancient European history, starting with the Greek phalanx and to reveal step by step its ethical implications – ending with the ambitious model of the ‘civilizing impact’ by cultures through reorientation of post-heroic values and to an aesthetics of renouncement. 12
At the centre of the new culture dynamic explanatory model was a theory of stressory processes as discussed by circles associated with Bazon Brock’s Wuppertal school on the basis of the differentiation between eustressory and dysstressory phenomena introduced by Hans Seyle. Mühlmann’s ingenious idea was to employ stress analysis to explain the possibility of social cohesion under maximum pressure. He succeeded in arriving at an extremely original vision in the spirit of eustressory cooperation of the birth of cultural groups resistant to conflict, transgenerational in nature and able to learn. This forms Mühlmann’s basic theory, which he succinctly calls the MSC-model, the abbreviation MSC stands for Maximal-Stress-Cooperation or eustressory fitness in successful groups. Accordingly, cultures are entities whose continuity is safeguarded horizontally by means of MSC-viability and vertically through memoactive fitness procedures (vulgo the creation of tradition through education). In everyday terms this says nothing more than that groups which attach importance to long term success must be able to master existential crises through performance involving a high degree of cooperation under maximum pressure (which normally means proving oneself in war against competing cultures) – at the same time they are also dependent on the ability to remain vigilant in respect to the results of their conflicts with other groups and especially to be able to take the consequences of defeat and to anchor them in the cultural memory. Here one perceives by means of system theoretical alienation a modern echo of the Platonian allegory pertaining to weaving which claims that the arts of state and the arts of kingship consist of plaiting the heroic andreia and moral self-control sophrosyne into the fabric of the polity so as to render it resilient.1
Politikós, 306a–311c.
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After what has been said, it should now be apparent why, within the scope of such a theory, such significance is attached to the post-war period of all things for moderating and controlling cultural units. At the end of bellicose conflicts – Mühlmann speaks of post-stressor phases of relaxation and introspection by the combatants in the wake of stress – the victors and also the vanquished inevitably must evaluate their own cultural assumptions in the light of recent combat. This means that the victors generally construe their own positive result as a reinforcing signal and feel their decorum confirmed, whereas the vanquished, as long as they do not seek refuge in renouncement, resentment and the excuses associated with these, feel prompted to ascertain the causes of their failure. This can lead to revolutionary change in the decorum of one’s own culture i.e. the embodiment of locally defined norms and ways of life, if and inasmuch that the losers introspection arrives at the conclusion that the roots of their defeat not only are to be found in the strength of their opponent, but is also due to their own weakness and failure to adapt to the situation and in the most serious cases their own hubris and distorted picture of the world. Processes of this kind either give way to reform, thanks to moral, cognitive and technical rearmament assume form (as is blatantly obvious in the case of Prussian reforms after the defeat of 1806 in Jena). Or one makes the decision in the phase of post-stressor contemplation to team up with the victorious culture in a peaceful alliance of a higher level – as practised by the Germans after 1945 as they decided to proclaim “Westintegration” as their the maxim. For the willingness to convert cultural rules diagnosed as detrimental into less noxious patterns, I use the term metanoia. In this context it does not mean Christian repentance as such, but the embracing of new thought for the betterment of the viability of one’s civilisation.
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3 E u r o p e after N ap o leo n These intimations will suffice, I hope, to make clear why from a cultural theoretical point of view an analysis of ‘Franco-German relations’, with the interactions of the two cultures whether this be in their changeful history of wars or also their just as changeful consolidatory phase in psychopolitical processes should be of such importance in recent times. If we now look at the potent time span from 1806 to 1945, which is for our theme of the greatest priority, we are confronted by an entire sequence of entangled but yet culturally productive post-war periods, (although this productivity had primarily pathological roots). In his recent book René Girard has provided important stimuli in understanding the mimetic processes of exchange in the Franco-German duel and its extremist dynamic – I will return to this later. Suffice it to say I can only but broadly outline the agenda in such an enterprise as this. We will content ourselves with the fact that it was Napoleon’s appearance that marked a fateful turning point in the relations between the two countries. The abundant consequences of his interventions were literally incalculable for the course of German affairs – and would possibly still be if it had not been for Germany’s and France’s rapprochement and reconciliation under the two previously mentioned statesmen which finally unshackled the two countries from this fatal state of affairs. For it is Napoleon, from a German standpoint, who was not only the liquidator of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, not only the man whose military genius defeated Austria and Russia in the Battle of Austerlitz of 1805, not only the victor of Jena and Auerstedt in 1806 – in short not only the ‘war god’, as according to Clausewitz, through whose intensity France, torn apart by the revolution, succeeded in transforming the transition from monarchy to republic from an internal to an external 15
affair and moreover to a global messianic campaign for the dissemination of French principles in the form of launching a global war of conquest. Through this, his impact became so great, that he created the epoch making archetype of political genius which due to his brilliant successes fatally sowed the seeds of resentment and imitatory rivalry fed by love and hate, and this in all the European countries he had attacked from the Atlantic to the Urals. If one wishes to attach full meaning to the term ‘post-war period’ in regard to the entire European development after 1815 then there is no avoiding the fact that the chain of reactions triggered off by French attacks, despite the influence regional diversity, spanned more than 150 years, was most effective in the antiliberal and anti-modern currents in Germany which lasted until Hitler’s suicide in the spring of 1945, and in Spain where the blockade against political and cultural modernity continued until Franco’s death in 1975. It should also be pointed out in reference to the ‘post-war period’ that Napoleon’s image as role model or bogeyman in the art, in the philosophy and the politics of Europe remained virulent for over a century. From a clinical point of view too, it was not until the second half of the 20th century that the number of patients who considered themselves to be Napoleon began to steadily drop at least in asylums. The way in which the Corsican continued to make his presence felt on the scene is called to account by André Glucksmann in a chapter of his political autobiography which he titled not without a touch of bitter humour “A nous deux, Napoléon!”. Here we learn what price had to be paid but until recently before a French adolescent was healed of the disease of ‘Napoleonitis’ – including homeopathic treatment employing Maoism.2 Historians of political ideas have quite rightly pointed out the fact
André Glucksmann: Une rage d’enfant, Plon 2006, p.104–127
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that reviewing the Napoleon shock in the European countries most effected, led to the separation of nationalistic tendencies from the liberal modernistic currents. This modernising pathology typical of large parts of the 19th and early 20th centuries is due to an immediately transparent but nonetheless irresistible psychopolitical mechanism which was to play an especially important role for the Germans in their catastrophe dictated by the resentments of having been vanquished. Incidentally the outcome of this first European experiment in nation building under French leadership leads one to fear that the results for enterprises along the same lines in our own times will be similarly poor.
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4 It a l y 1 9 1 8 : F alsificatio n s o f t he r e su l t s of w ar, po litics in a big way At this point I do not wish to restrict my focus to the post-war periods of the 20th century. And it is here that attention will be paid to German and French developments which took place after 1945 and their possible correlation. In order to illustrate the conceptual framework of this examination which is becoming more concrete, it will be essential to introduce an analytical intermezzo dealing with certain anomalies of consequence in the post-war period starting in 1918 so that the processes are coherent. We will focus our attention on Italy because it is the key to understanding further considerations, and it is here that the concept of ‘war result falsification’ first materializes clearly. In connection with Mühlmann’s model of post-stressory decorumrevision we have already mentioned that the rule is that after battles fought a culture gets the opportunity to re-evaluate and possibly revise its basic normative attitudes, one could also say its moral grammar, in the light of the results of the combat. The benchmarks for this examination are called affirmation in the case of victory and metanoia in the case of defeat. Now we should remember that in 1918 the Italians found themselves in a position where neither of these two alternatives was applicable. As is generally known the Italians withdrew from the alliance of 1882 with Germany and Austria-Hungary (the so-called Triple Alliance) in August 1914 thus signalling their having become ambivalently neutral. Sometime later as a result of the secret treaty of London (which promised Italy in the event of victory considerable territorial gains) it defected to the Allied camp by declaring war on Austria-Hungary at the end of May 1915. But despite many heroic sacrifices victory was not to be for the Italians. Only thanks to massive allied assistance was it possible that Italy, although it was completely finished 18
militarily and on the verge of political collapse (especially after the disastrous defeat in the 12th Battle of the Isonzo near Tolmein in October 1917), found itself on the winning side at the end of the war. The ambiguity of this position accounts for the troubles of postwar history in Italy. One spoke of vittoria mutilata when one should have termed it a defeat which had turned into a counterfeit victory. This explains why Italy was only in a position to achieve a semi-metanoia. The first signs of this manifested themselves in the initial successes of the Socialists in 1919 and 1920 in which a newly emerged ultra-nationalist party called for an immediate heroic affirmation and shortly afterwards established itself along these lines – Mussolini winning nothing less than 66% of the votes in the elections in January 1924. Out of this situation, which fed the most vehement forms of disclamatory affirmation, emerged the movement of pure activism, mobilization for its own sake, which went down in history under the name of Fascism. Among the countless enquiries devoted to this subject there is hardly one which befittingly sheds light on the basic fact that primary Fascism was the result of a falsification of the actual outcome of the war in which the real or virtual loser presented himself as victor nevertheless, or better still as hypervictor. It wished to indulge in the illusion that it could avoid the work involved in reviewing its cultural decorum and substitute it by reinforcing the pattern which had led to failure. In general terms this merely proves that of all people, it was those who had most reason for a metanoic turnaround contrary to the rules that had applied up till that time, who often most furiously plunged into the affirmation of values which had all but propelled them into total disaster. There is no need to demonstrate in detail that this also applied to the extreme German rightwing of the Weimar Republic. In Germany the falsification of the results of the war 19
had begun shortly after November 1918 with the infamous ‘stab in the back’ of the supposedly undefeated army and as of 1933 displayed the well-known consequences. In the light of these considerations, Fascism in its original form appears not only as the much discussed transfer of modern warfare to the modus operandi of the entire culture and eo ipso as the neutralization of the difference between war and peace under the prefix of permanent mobilization, but moreover its psychopolitical form betrays its wilful falsification of the outcome of war and rejection of metanoia. Its distinguishing marks are the triumphalism of the loser and the forced affirmation of the heroistic code by those, who in view of their recently acquired experience, would have been better advised to radically review their relationship to the set of rules of the heroic life.
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5 F r a n c e 19 4 5 : T he d o u b le fa lsif icat ion At this point of my discussion I can leave the stage of previewing and explication of theoretical premises and turn to the subject matter proper, the comparative examination of the FrancoGerman post-war periods as of 1945. What immediately strikes us is the similarity of the French position after 1945 with the Italian position of 1918. Just as the Allies erected a last front for the Italians as of November 1917 who were then able to stay the course until the German surrender, so did the Allies bear the brunt of the war for the French until the unforgettable day of libération in August 1944 on which de Gaulle, at the head of his own improvised forces, returned to Paris. The decisive difference lies in the fact that the defeat of the French in 1940 turned out to be much more unequivocal than that of Italy in 1917 in that the French ranks (who were absent only in Yalta) were much more conspicuous under the allied powers than the Italians at the end of the 1st World War. It is well known that the latter were only conceded a subordinate role in the peace treaties of 1919. Above all one is astonished at the analogy between the Italian and the French dilemmas as soon as they find their basis in the above-mentioned model of post-stress self-evaluation. In both cases we can see that after being given victory there is an oscillating between metanoethical and affirmative tendencies, an oscillation which finally is neutralized in order to initiate a more or less comprehensive falsification of the results of the war. All the same one can say that the French, while reviewing the shadows of stress after 1945 despite all tendencies to reverse the facts, against all the odds, were lucky, because in the end their form of national reconstruction ‘only’ led to Gaullism. The trivial phrase “de Gaulle was not Mussolini” assumes formidable meaning in this context. It marks, despite all the simi21
larities, the considerable gap between the post-war reactions of these peoples. While the Italians with their near defeat made things much worse by taking flight by marching forwards, the French, after the indecisive and ambivalent interlude of the Fourth Republic, chose the lesser of two evils, the Gaullistic therapy. Furthermore the French interpretation of the defeat of 1940 which miraculously led to victory in 1945 was deeply divided right from the beginning. Running parallel to the Gaullist evasion in the national affirmation the French left-wing developed a second front of falsification according to which the ‘better’ France or the France of the résistance, we may now, evoke German analogies, was supposed to have won the war on the side of Stalin and the Red Army. Only within the framework of such a theory of the post war period is it possible to grasp that the much cited division of the overpolarized political camps, that hermeneutic gallic war between the French post-war right-wing and the French post-war left-wing, was in reality the conflict between two incompatible strategies the purpose of which in both cases was to falsify the results of the war. At this point it is not necessary to expound in detail how the Gaullist departure into neo-grandeur took place. Nor does a mention have to be made of the beginnings of an authentic French metanoia which miscarried during the Fourth Republic mainly due the humiliations the nation suffered in the conflicts in Indochina and North Africa at time of decolonialization. It will have to suffice to point out the main symptom of the French reaction: As de Gaulle returned a second time as a knight in shining armour to the pinnacle of power he dictated the constitution of the Fifth Republic which is still valid today and whose strong presidential fixation was to prove a problem for the country itself and for the rest of Europe. The elevation of 22
the presidency only makes sense if one suspects the Elysée of wanting to be a sort of European White House, or to use examples closer to home, something somewhere between Versailles and Bayreuth. The fantasy had been prevalent in the Elysée Palace for some decades as Parisian students suddenly got it into their heads that their fantasy should replace the prevalent one in a turbulent month of May. The President’s command of France’s newly acquired nuclear weaponry (the Force de dissuasion nucléaire fully operational since 1964) utterly embodies the form of expression which has come to a head of a poststressor strategy of affirmation, or to use clinical terminology a contraphobic compensation. De Gaulle never wanted to be a Gaullist and it would be unjust to simply deny that the General’s work had certain metanoethical qualities – the scene in Reims mentioned at the beginning alone speaks against a one-sided affirmationistic interpretation. Moreover the fact that terms such as détente, entente and coopération increasingly appeared in his vocabulary emphasized like leitmotivs, reveal how he was trying to show the conservative elements in France the way to reviewing their colonial, imperial and heroistic legacy. One of his greatest achievements will always be his reconciling of the old right-wing with modern republicanism. The more interesting as far as the history of ideas are concerned, and in terms of ideology much more alluring form of falsification of results of war took place however on a different side of the inner French front. While the Gaullist departure into semi-imperial affirmation succeeded in getting by with standard emotions and basic processes of accentuation of a national identity, i.e. patriotic enlargement of the self and modernising their weaponry, an ideological and psychopolitical transformation occurred in the left wing which was to have unforeseeable 23
consequences. It was here that as of 1944 a singular form of pseudo-metanoethical literature developed the critical reflection of which has still hardly begun.3 It simultaneously triggered off a large importation of German philosophers such as Hegel and Heidegger or Marx, Nietzsche and Carl Schmitt. This occurred as if to illustrate the observation put forth by cultural theoreticians that romanticism flourishes if, in the realm of ideas, a compensation for political defeat is on the agenda. The main approach of the Left in falsifying war results was not, as was the case of the Right in escaping into the national tradition of greatness, but an escape into socialist super-greatness. This naturally had the grave error that its representative on the world stage in that critical time bore the name of Stalin. Strangely enough this detail hardly seemed to trouble anybody as long as the French left-wing, thanks to this manoeuvre, not only could save its injured conscience but also could construe a victory of its own – simply as if it were possible to reattribute the successes of the Red Army to the left-wing resistance. And by means of this, one was free to pseudo-metanoethically deal with the failure of the Third Republic, with the infamy of collaboration and French colonialism not to mention the internal contradictions of Gaullist reconstruction without ever having to come down from the victor’s high horse. As a result a rhetorical apparatus for the articulation of triumphal self-hate and hypermoralistic aggression against national and bourgeois traditions came into being which lent itself well for use at home and abroad. In the second nucleus of victory falsification a culturally hegenomous scene speedily consolidated and raised the banner
Cf. Tony Judt: Past Imperfect. French Intellectuals 1944–1956, Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford 1992
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of militantism thus managing to make the word ‘commitment’ a synonym for French intellectualism throughout the world. By these means every form of collaboration was to be severely criticized in future including collaboration with the elementary facts. This battling church of belated resistance grasped how to promote itself for the general criticism of the bourgeois society and neo-capitalistic age by blending Marxism, semiology and psychoanalysis into a suggestive amalgam. The export successes of French theoretical literature which continued on into the 90’s relied above all on their polemical utility value for analogous critical subcultures of the countries importing it, notably Italy and Germany. In the USA it was made especially welcome as the young intelligentsia of the country were, after the debacle in Vietnam, suddenly willing to learn a foreign language in order to radically and critically talk about their own culture. Even today the remains of this product under the categories of French Theory or Critical Theory can be acquired in bookshops on American campuses. In these shelves, and only in these shelves by the way, has the only phenomenon occurred which perhaps deserves to be termed a Franco-German relationship – that is the convergence of all those discursive machines purporting to explain everything, which were to be found on both sides of the Rhine in suggestive elaboration and with which young people were taught until recently to see through and to condemn the existing conditions as if they themselves did not have a part in them. Since however, the analogous discourse in German criticism of itself and the world after 1945 arose in an entirely different context and operated in entirely different climate than the French one, then even this seemingly close affinity must be considered to be a misunderstanding.
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What distinguishes French from German criticism is their entirely different types of cultural integration and consequently their diametrically opposed tendency as to policies of the truth. While German criticism speaks to a population which, despite their reluctance, was not able to deny being guilty of the charges, French criticism was directed at a society acquitted, and in need of elucidation as to their drôle de libération. This may well be the reason why the intellectual Germany is the only place in the world where an old-fashioned correspondence theory of truth still dominates. Here defeat is called defeat (and a crime a crime) – and the remaining words are also gauged to this semantic primal scale. It is only here that the religion of the objective referee holds sway. The intellectual France prefers the politically more elegant and rhetorically more attractive position where words and things belong to separate systems.
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6 G e r m a n y 1 9 4 5 : Metano ia It goes without saying that the German population had plenty work to do after 1945 which was generally termed the ‘Wiederaufbau’ (rebuilding the nation). The priorities for rebuilding the nation were something they had in common with their defeated and yet liberated French neighbours even though this assumed an entirely different manner. In its German connotation the word of course particularly signifies the material aspect of dealing with the damage done by the war which was evident enough after the bombardment by allied forces. Furthermore, it signified the sum of the efforts which the Germans subjected themselves to in order to recover morally and culturally. Certainly Adenauer was not de Gaulle – yet another trivial sentence with formidable implifications. The name of the first German chancellor stands for national reconstruction with very little in common with the affirmative arts of Gaullism. He symbolizes the pragmatic and everyday side of the metanoethical work in Germany. In the course of its unwavering progress the Wiederaufbau combined the reconstruction of the towns and cities with a political and moral reorientation. The German economic boom as it was subsequently named, acted as an economic confirmation of the course that had been taken to bring about the metamorphosis. In order to plot the graph showing the progress of this selfreconstruction it will suffice to recall the admission of guilt by all German Protestant Christians in Stuttgart on 19th October 1945 which can be legitimately termed the beginning of spiritual history in what was to become the Federal Republic of Germany. Further points along the curve mark, apart from the treaty of reparation with Israel in 1952, were the scene of 12th July in 1962 in Reims and Willy Brandt kneeling at the memorial in the Warsaw ghetto on 7th December 1970. The inaugu27
ration of Berlin’s memorial to the Jews killed in Europe, the subject of many years of discussion, on 10th May 2005 forms a contemporary cornerstone of this evolution.4 From the point of view of the theory of post-stressor decorum reviews in post-war periods it can be easily seen that the abovementioned events all lie on the same line. They may all be attributed to the same process which at no time was uncomplicated, but at no time threatened by a reversal of the metanoethical tranformation process of the vanquished German people. Seen from today’s standpoint one may justifiably claim that it formed the most reliable of constants in the history of ideas and mentality of Europeans after 1945. Only if we look at the process as a whole can we comprehend how it was possible for Germany to rearm itself without this involving a general remilitarisation of politics, and how social and cultural rebuilding could occur without any connection worth mentioning to nostalgia for antidemocratic traditions, and how there was a boosting of efficiency nationwide without re-germanification, and a West German economic boom without submitting to imperialist temptations, and a national recovery without opinionatedness. Nobody will deny that political and cultural life in Germany did not have to face some hard tests during this period. In the notorious ‘bleak period’ (die bleierne Zeit), the suffocating atmosphere of which those who experienced it recall with the greatest uneasiness, the silence reigned long concerning what had happened. As the silence was finally broken the pendulum suddenly veered in the other direction. Therefore hybrid forms of hate also flourished against their own kind. Here also, outraged later generations exploited their interest in achieving
The fifteen-year debate is well-documented in the book Der Denkmalstreit – das Denkmal? Die Debatte um das ‚Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden in Europa’ (Ute Heimrod, Günter Schlusche, Horst Seferens (eds.), Philo Verlagsgesellschaft, Dresden 1999.
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rapid superiority over the older generations with their complex life stories, and here also as on the other side of the Rhine appeared pseudopolitical ‘Maitre Penseur’ to boot, who treated the distinction between a totalitarian state of the past and a democratic state of the present like something of negligible significance – so that one had the impression of seeing revenants from the NS period everywhere when it would have been enough to observe unpractised democrats learning their roles. Here too there were as was the case in France, a heinous repudiatory hardening on the right-wing and self-righteous pseudometanoethical excesses on the left-wing. One almost anticipated a restaging of left-wing fascism which for the purposes of sidetracking called itself anti-fascism and just like its role model advocated the use of weapons – which is why in the style of Lenin it claimed the right to kill self-proclaimed enemies of the people for the better good. Nevertheless, these eruptions were not able to bring the German post-war process decisively off its basic course. It remained unperturbedly orientated to its task and that was to re-evaluate and review the German decorum handed down complete with its gloomily romantic, heroistic and resentful hereditary burden in the light of the results of the war and, moreover in the light of the catastrophe in which they had been complicit.
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7 F r a n c e 2 0 0 7 : Imp erial tempt at ion and t h e i m p l osio n o f th e left-w ing In front of the backdrop of these observations on French and German post-war periods and the differences which have thus come to light during the cultural evaluation and integration of results of war, I would like to now pursue the question as if one had to give a speech based on the cultural political aspects of both countries. To begin with the case of France, one thing would be appear to be clear especially in the light of 2007, and that is that the Gallic war for the political and ideological appropriation of the Libération has been decided in the meantime. The result lies on the borderline of average psychopolitical plausibilities. With increasing remoteness from the critical events a post-Gaullist moderate left wing has established itself on the broadest of fronts, which no one wishes to call middleclass simply because nobody is really certain what the word ‘middle-class’ means under today’s conditions. The unusually compact centre-right currents in France at present cater for the everyday political Narcissm as a matter of routine and at a safe distance from the dramatic tension of the first post-war period. It is this Narcissm which supplies the material from which patriotism is created in non-neurotic peoples. The rest of Europe including Germany could live with that if it were not for the fact that France’s Gaullist structural heritage has developed a life of its own which is by no means harmless. This ranges from the scantily veiled unilateralism of the French nuclear doctrine, to the anti-European tendencies of France’s sovereignism and on to the sub-imperialistic antics of the French army in Africa and overseas.5 However the most
Which will be compensated for by President Sarkozy’s announcement of France’s return to NATO
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dubious is the hysterogenous potential growing out of the liaison between presidentialism and media populism, a potential with which de Gaulle as a political Nietzschean and illusionist reverted to with great virtuosity in serving the whole. Even with its worn down profile the genetic material of Gaullism poses a volatile risk for Europe. And members of the European Union will be well advised to observe closely the Sarkozy experiment which the French chose in May 2007. After the new president was forced to realize that a Cecilia Ciganer cannot be a second Jacky Kennedy the next lesson for him would be, despite suggestions to the contrary, that there is definitely no room in Europe for a White House. If he really wants to show generosity of spirit and make a big impact by remodelling France in a contemporary manner he could, by introducing the much overdue post-Gaullist constitution and thus becoming the first man of the sixth republic to make the headlines. The clear outcome of the neo-gallic war over the interpretation of Libération contains a historically ideological and remarkable characteristic. Numerous observers have recently unanimously come to the conclusion that the previously high-profile French left-wing has after a prolonged weak phase, beginning in Mittérand’s last years if not earlier, sunk into oblivion within a very short time. This process which was to recently become apparent by the number of ballot boxes, is accompanied by an intellectual erosion which beggars all description. Even the interpretation of the above by those concerned leaves a lot to be desired, (there has been for some time talk of the demise of la Grande Nation as if France had happened to collide with an iceberg one cold night) but this heavy-handedness comes as no surprise in view of its record. All the same the new theoretical nonentity of the left camp in France and its far-reaching practical disintegration represents a serious brainteaser for historians of mentality and ideas. 31
With reference to what was mentioned above we now have a plausible explanation why the implosion of the left-wing in France should not be entirely attributed to local appropriation of the neo-capitalist and postpolitical Zeitgeist which has been impressing every Western nation for well over twenty years. The question with this phenomenon has much more to do with the final collapse of the pseudo-metanoethical system with which the French left-wing understood how to create falsified victories and phantomatic sovereignty in the troubled area of postwar affects and post-war discourse. They continued to defend these achievements for decades without taking contexts into account – well over the best-before-date for illusions. In the meantime however, they too have been overtaken by the change in affairs. The disruption of French discoursal culture becomes apparent simply by the fact that the country’s left-wing has for many years failed to produce a book of any merit not to mention new perspectives. What was left was only the romantic polemical stance which allows it adepts to swear by militancy and deviation as in the good old days. The intellectual decomposition has been most evident during recent years in the media driven witchhunts sweeping the nation against alleged converts or traitors of the progressive cause who one tried to sacrifice to public opinion after pseudo-moralistic propaganda trials on the Place de Grève. For the external observer these attacks were against the new reactionaries as they are derisively called or more recently the conservateurs, unmistakable evidence that the French left-wing having stooped to resorting to helpless and hysterical progressivism has been standing in the rain for a long time and whose day is only brightened by the occasional flash in the pan. The analogy to the German phenomena of scandal of the last fifteen years is obvious – for here in Germany too, the dominant leftist liberal feuilleton was only able to compensate for its ever increasing disassociation from the workings of the world by getting overexcited and moralising. In this connection 32
the number of votes by the Left in the referendum against the European Constitution was symptomatic. Those who appreciated and loved la belle France with its savoir vivre and generosity were well advised, in the view of the predominantly piteous niveau of the ‘nonistic’ propaganda at the time, to spread a cloak of silence over these events. All the same it would be unjust to assess the French left-wing’s attempts to re-evaluate national decorum as being totally negative. It can above all, thanks to its more moderate spokesmen, produce a number of authentic metanoethical achievements, which will have enduring significance, even if they have never managed to secure hegemonic status trapped as they are between rivalling systems of successful, much too successful, falsification of the results of war. In this context Jean Paul Sartre’s bitter defeat of Albert Camus in the 50’s is of special significance. It betrays the precarious status of the energies which were aimed at a genuine intellectual prevention of failed ideological traditions. Voices like those of Camus sought to enforce a theory of human moderation and the symbolic relativity of existence, while all around them neo-revolutionary symbolism and extremist surrealism were running wild. With all their might the authors of this radical tendency attempted to maintain faith in life, above all the defeat of 1940 had proved that the world was in urgent need of French ideas particularly after they had taken an invigorating Stalinist or Maoist bath. In the long run it has become more than clear that it was Camus who had the right answers to the fundamental questions back in the late 40’s. He was the one who, after the excesses of violence of the first half of the century, incorruptibly reminded us to keep our feet on the ground and it was he who raised the banner of the nonnegotiable obligation to civilizing reflection. “Each tells the other he is not God; this is the end of romanticism.” – with 33
this sentence his L’homme révolté of 1951, much maligned and ridiculed by commentators of the left-wing, ends, thereby articulating an axiom which outshone all other metanoethical work. It was Camus who found the words of reconciliation for all of Europe after the war as he wrote, “Today the calamity is we all share the same mother country”. As of 1945, although at a safe distance certainly, Sartre was playing with the fire of armed revolt – from his fatal foreword to Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of this Earth (1961) an anti-colonial manifesto of violence to his foolhardy visit to Stammheim, where to his disappointment he encountered a moron by the name of Baader who was not worthy of a visit of such a great mind. Whether this showed a dubious appetite for understatement or not, Sartre made himself available as a figurehead for French pseudometanoia until the last. I need hardly emphasize that the names of Camus and Sartre in the context of these observations have a purely typological function and imply no judgement as to their literary and philosophical ranking – in the case of both, we raise our eyes to heights which hardly any contemporary author can climb. With the former I associate tendencies which stand for the return of a self-critically level-headed, post-imperial, post-ideological France at the centre of Europe. With the latter however we find a still virulent tendency to neurotic exceptionalism and messianic export of aggression. If I am not entirely mistaken I will conclude by commenting that the Camusian position has gained importance in recent years. The few living authors who, unnoticed by the general intellectual mediocritisation of France, have succeeded in joining the ranks of the country’s glorious era, can be characterized as being Camusians from the typological standpoint. The political moralists, also called the Nouveaux Philosophes, by nature stood typologically closer to the Camus-pole than to the Sartre34
pole. This also applies to Bernard-Henri Lévy who, with his hastily written pamphlet Idéologie française of 1981, produced a sensitive if not, due to its polemic exaggeration, justifiably controversial contribution to French metanoethical literature. In the light of this analysis he now appears as a Camusian who has mistaken himself for a Sartrian.
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8 G e r m a n y 2 0 0 7 : T he id io t of t he Eu r o p e a n family in the p h ase of n o r m a l i z atio n – the Walser Af f air With reference to the German position in the light of the particulars and sentiments of 2007 it is sufficient to recognize the obvious. This country has entered a phase where it may start to reap the benefits of its metanoethical efforts. It has won back the trust of its neighbours – if we ignore a few poisoned depots in England and Poland where anti-German emotions reproduce anaerobically as it were – and there too, where forgiveness is beyond the realms of what is humanly possible, it has evoked a certain respect as to its metamorphosis. There is no better expression of this situation as the election of a German Pope. When on 19th April 2005 the cardinals in Rome elected Joseph Ratzinger as the new head of the Catholic church their main concern may have been expressing the continuity of the Catholic issues in the world, be that as it may, but from a neutral standpoint it is clear that this decision involved more. It set an example at the same time of overwhelming perspicuity which said: German ancestry does not have to be a reason for withdrawal of trust; a German name can signify integrity at the highest level. It is up to each and every expositor to decide whether this was mere coincidence or, that this was the result of purely internal Catholic circumstances, but anybody who takes a closer look at the matter cannot help realizing that this decision has a history outside the realms of Catholicism. It indirectly yet unmistakably throws light on the sixty years of work that the Germans have done on themselves. From this standpoint the election of Benedict XVI, whatever else it may signify, is the external ratification of the political and moral process the beginnings and motives of which have already been mentioned above.
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One of the characteristics of the cultural climate in Germany is that many protagonists in the field of public opinion have difficulties in finding the opportunities and realities to express the hard earned new German integrity appropriately. They cannot and do not want to know and believe that the post-war period in the everyday as well as in the sophisticated sense of the word is coming to an end in Germany too, and this can be attributed to chronological, psychopolitical and, if the expression be permissible, cultural-biological reasons. Yes, it seems an unreasonable demand to be expected to accept that the work the Germans have done on themselves should have led to such exemplary results. If one inverts the angle of observation one might interpret the tenacious continued existence of the opponents to normalisation as a sign of success for their part. Nothing would be more abnormal in Germany than if everybody simultaneously overstepped the threshold of healthy patriotism with some sort of narcissistic cacophony. The German approach to psychopolitical normality therefore unavoidably involves a certain coiling in on oneself. The articulation of which includes the division of labour between those who can experiment somewhat less inhibitedly with the licence of self-love and can make use of the new opportunities of the metanoethically filtered affirmation and those who find any impulse of this nature totally in opposition to their deeply habitualized reluctance.6 If these observations are aimed in the right direction then one may arrive at the conclusion that the long series of typically fiery scandalisations which ranged from Botho Strausz’ essay Anschwellender Bocksgesang and Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s
This reluctance also includes the memory of German victims of the war. When during a service in commemoration of the bombing of Dresden on 13th February 2004 in Munich demonstrators turn out with slogans such as Bomber Harris, do it again! This is more a manifestation of black humour but above all shows how some opponents to normalisation have distanced themselves from the realms of the norms of civil society.
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Aussichten auf den Bürgerkrieg, both stemming from 1993, and Martin Walser’s speech in the Pauluskirche in the autumn of 1998 to the publicizing in 2006 of Günther Grass’ confessions about the Waffen-SS would soon exhaust themselves for reasons resulting from the facts. The fact itself from which the inner laws caused this excitement, namely the psychopolitical constitution of the Federal Republic has, in the course of the last decade, unmistakably entered into a new physical state thus rendering the repetition of such previous storms increasingly less likely. This does not necessarily mean that the semi-totalitarian media which are in effect, would relinquish their power of authority to unleash symbolic lynchings and opportunistic mass psychoses. That which I term the critical ‘facts’ are nothing other than Germany’s long expected entry into the manifest stage of its normalisation – whereby one has to admit that this will be, after such a long deformation of its history, a paradoxical first-timeround normality. One should here avoid reading too much into the expressions ‘normality’ and ‘normalisation’. Although we are talking about a ‘developed’ country of the West, at the same time it exhibits paradoxes which are typical for its phase in development, and the question as to whether there could be anything as stable normality in a world driven by capital is not the subject matter of our investigations. As far as the series of scandals are concerned, they only make sense if regarded as a cascade of temporary crises with which the high tension of German postwar work on itself was lowered to midrange values.7 It heralds the end of the permanent metanoethical state of emergency and the transition into normal everyday patriotic conditions.
Cf. The monography inspired by the systemsatic theories of Günter Sautter, Politische Entropie. Denken zwischen dem Mauerfall und dem 11. September 2001 (Botho Strauß, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Martin Walser, Peter Sloterdijk), Paderborn 2002.
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It might well have been typical for such a transition if in its crisis, the names of authors, who during the German post-war work on ourselves were considered the most reliable new guarantees of integrity, became disputed; I am thinking of Martin Walser and Günther Grass in particular here. But while Grass has only been outrun by his own exaggerated moralism in recent times, whose occasionally hollow tones suddenly resulted in belated indignation, Walser attracted a much more vehement and fundamental resentment, if resentment can be described as being fundamental. This happened because he, somewhat earlier than the others, or too prematurely for some or even unashamedly early for others, took the liberty of announcing the possibility of a normalisation, something which could not be taken lying down in a hypermoral location such as Germany. The conflict didn’t become evident until the 80’s as Walser was so wonderfully imprudent as to declare German reunification as a desirable option, his remark soon proved to be a prophecy, the fulfilment of which many find hard to forgive. And just before the Millenium it happened again as he even more imprudently dared to give an intimistic, literary Sunday speech rich in overtones to the German nation in order to signal that, based on his observations, he considered his audience mature enough to be able to keep at a safe distance from certain pseudo-metanoethical rituals. In this context the metaphor of the moralistic cudgel has its place – and it is still proving to be indigestible for producers of such cudgels as it debilitates their chances in the bazaars of morality. Ten years after the speech in the Pauluskirche we now know that yet again Walser was right a bit too early, and the audience at that time who unanimously gave him a standing ovation knew it in situ, too. With this applause they were ten years ahead of their time and endorsed the rhetorically
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brilliant anticipation of a possible German normalisation which they had just experienced. 8 What followed was, to put it mildly, a phase of confusion. Without doubt the caustic reaction from the incumbent chairman of the central council of German Jews at that time, Ignaz Bubis was the most understandable. Fulfilling his role in that position he warned of the potential dangers of German self-exculpation which might be concealed behind pretences of normalisation. He later withdrew his angry comments about “intellectual arson” which had been applied not only to Biedermänner since Frisch’s time* and admitted that Walser’s intentions had been with integrity despite some unclear formulations. Admittedly the accusatory hyperbole which Bubis resorted to had the advantage of reminding everybody that no normalisation in the sense of ‘forgive and forget’ could possibly occur between Germans and Jews and certainly not prescribed on the part of Germans. A good sense of hearing belongs to the moral privileges and duties of those who have the word for the victims – and Bubis will have had a ‘particularly good sense of hearing’ at this critical moment. On the other hand what occurred on the German side of the tumult around Walser’s speech was unambiguously startling. If one wished to practise positive thinking then one could fall back on the formula so prevalent among homoeopaths i.e., a crisis is often the way to recovery. What was cause for the greatest concern in this orgy of opinions which joined in the BubisWalser collision was without doubt the observation that as in the case of the scandal a strong homogenisation took place by means of which the principle supporting culture, according to which acquired merits do not expire, was temporarily overrid
For Frank Schirrmaccher’s voluminous documentation concerning the speech and the controversy initiated by Ignaz Bubis see: Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, Frankfurt 1999 * Translator’s note – Allusion to Max Frisch’s drama Biedermann und die Brandstifter
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den. The principle of scandal is always the expropriation of perception by means of paraphrase and its consummate form is the annihilation of intention by rumour. The fact that Walser had been one of the most industrious workers in the vineyard of German metanoia and that for several decades, was apparently forgotten overnight by his accusers. In addition the fact that he had spoken in a rhetorically rich, subjective mode was suddenly of no importance. In a frenzy of tendentious reading into ‘what had not been said like that’ and of sadistic delight in adherence to an easily rectified misunderstanding Walser was accused of having wanted to unchain Germany from its obligations, although it was perfectly obvious to any unbiased person who could listen or read that the author had declared a definite, strongly ritualised if not mechanized form of pseudometanoethical German self-reproaching rhetoric as contraproductive – which then again of course provoked hearers anew. By wishing to emphatically remind the inner forum of the individual about their answerability to the horrors carried out by Germans, Walser, who as an observer does not have an advantage over his contemporaries, appeals for a form of metanoia which addresses the event with more authenticity than any form of well-meant maintenance of monuments might do. Whether or not he will satisfy the requirements of commemorative policies in their official form remains yet to be seen, (he himself later conceded somewhat more clearly the eligibility of official acts of commemoration and formal symbols) – however, Walser’s assumption, that without inner integral realization there can be no serious involvement of the conscience in the horrors of German war crimes, forms an essential corrective to the commemorative events seen as a matter of course. Now that the sea has calmed it may be hoped that the activists of this accusation, namely the non-Jewish ones, will at sometime calm down and be fair enough to have another look at this affair. 41
The German feuilleton which was at that time to blame by succumbing to its habitual scandal-loving imitative reflexes would be well advised to reconsider whether there might be a connection between the names Martin Walser and Benedict XVI which deserves to be made explicit. The way I see things there most definitely is one, and viewed from the right perspective it is transparent enough. Both these names represent renewed German symbols of integrity with extraordinary and uninterrupted achievements in the era since 1945. As far as their interests, themes and tendencies are concerned they could not be more divergent. Nevertheless, they stand side by side together with some others like Heuss, Niemöller, Adorno, Dahrendorf, Willy Brandt, Weizsäcker, Grass, Kluge and Enzensberger for nothing less than - the rebound from the depths of despair of German post-war civilization as a whole. If the Pope’s name here in Germany shines brighter than that of the writer this, aside from the added astral value associated with the papal rank, may partly be attributed to the fact that in some places there is still resistance to the obvious; one can reproach an author of Walser’s Balzac-like stature for the duration of a crisis but not if he told the truth, in his rather obstinate southern German way, ten or twenty years too early – the word ‘truth’ is taken here as elsewhere as our knowledge of existence corresponds in perspectives.9 As far as the considerations on the history of mentalities are concerned for the appraisal of future relations between the Germans and the French the answer is obvious. With Germany’s completed metamorphosis into a metanoethical, civilisatory and more or less regenerated nation, the days have come to an end where phrases such as “German interests” can be interpreted as a return to patterns of thought from the NS period. If it was in German interests to show as few interests as pos
Also the criticism raised against Walser due to his satire on Marcel Reich-Ranicki in Tod eines Kritikers remains after scrutiny irrelevant.
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sible over the last fifty years, then the future of the country can only lie in a return to a moderate affirmativity. Incidentally, this is expected by Germany’s foreign partners because in the field of international politics one wishes to be able to rely on a predictable egoism of each and every ally and opponent in the EU and the rest of the world. In fact Germany is in the process of discarding its temporary role as the idiot of the European family and simply developing into an ordinary political egoist. Nobody will be offended if one notes that Germany could learn a lot from France in this respect. It may well appear as if I have taken stock of the metanoethical balance very one-sidedly in favour of Germany and rebuked France for being a breeding ground for two lies about reality. I do not wish to contradict this impression, but by means of an additional comment wish to provide for a more evenly balanced evaluation. The poles of both countries as to post-war truth and post-war lie indeed start reversing as soon as one touches the sensitive points of German as well as French raison. I am talking about the new definition of military functions in both countries after the defeats of 1940 and or 1945. Here it can be seen that France has managed to create a truth from its lie in as much as it has set itself up as a nation willing and able to defend itself. Germany on the other hand has created a lie out of the truthfullness of its metanoia because it bears before it like a standard its total dependence on others for its military defence as if it were a moral achievement. The Germans have tendency to be convinced that on the basis of their previous crimes they have a greater entitlement to live in a world where there is no war. From this has resulted a syndrome of pretentious weakness which will not be able to stand up to the trials that are to come. Therefore we will have to wait and see, if and how, in this basal segment of the new adjustment of cultural decorum a normalisation in the realistic sense will follow on the part of Germany. 43
9 H a p p y d isasso ciation : P olem ological p r o sp e c t s w ith R ené G irard In conclusion I would like to go into the question as to what sense the expression “Franco-German relations” has from the standpoint of what has been considered here. It will presumably come as no surprise if the word “relations” acquires a somewhat ironic aspect here. Of course I have no intention of belittling the multifaceted network of Franco-German interactions which came into being as a result of the Elysée treaty – from the transformation of state visits into routine consultations, to the regular meetings of foreign and defence ministers, from joint economic boards to the production of the Airbus. The exchange of students is also an excellent idea as well as bilingual education wherever it is practised. However, I would at this point like to refrain from dealing with these, in themselves valuable forms of organized contact, leaving them to those in charge and relying on these professionals of such encounters to keep these relations functioning irrespective of any philosophical and cultural theoretical commentary. I would like to conclude by dealing with the question as to the inner distance between both countries after the last war. I believe I have offered arguments for that and why this is much greater than can be expressed by the customary speeches of friendship and cooperation. The reasons for this can be found in both countries’ poststressor evaluations of the results of the war which have been briefly mentioned here. After 1945, the French and the Germans in cultural and psychopolitical terms went each their separate ways while at the same time on the level of official political relations they formed a new mutually beneficial friendship. I contend that these two aspects, the drifting apart and the friendship, signify one and the same.
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This hypothesis requires further explanation. Let us return again to, from the Franco-German perspective, the most moving scene of the second half of the 20th century, de Gaulle and Adenauer’s meeting under the arches of Reims Cathedral. What these two old men in fact negotiated was nothing other than the healing disentanglement of the two nations. It was the disintegration of something fatal, something that had been more than just a relationship going back at least as far as the era of the Napoleonic Wars whereby the Germans and the French had, culturally and politically, become caught up in an endless cycle of mimicry, imitation, one-upmanship and projective empathy with each other. This began acutely with the French importing German romanticism with Germaine de Staël’s influential book De l’Allemagne of 1813 and the Prussians importing the Napoleonic art of war through Clausewitz’ book Vom Kriege (posthumus 1832-1834). In this sense one could say that it was in Reims that the two nations officially parted company and what de Gaulle and Adenauer pledged each other was an everlasting non-attachment and in some ways even a permanent state of not understanding each other, including refraining from any new attempts in this direction. The good relations which since then have been enjoyed between Germany and France rest on the solid foundations of the non-attachment which was finally achieved – diplomatically described as friendship between the two nations. On the 8th July 2012 we will be commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Franco-German reconciliation – in doing so we should remain aware of the fact that this is the date when our salubrious estrangement from each other, our growing disinterest for each other, our serene coexistence, which has remained for the large part unperturbed by any detailed knowledge, assumed
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definite shape.10 It was then, in the talks between the two great elders that the deadly clinch was released which had caught both nations in its spell in a political form of animal magnetism ever since the confrontation at Valmy in September 1792. The cannonade of Valmy not only signified as is well known the moment of neutrality as of which the French Revolution switched from the defensive to the offensive but also the restrained foreplay to the age of the masses which began with the French invention of general mobilization. This led in a straight line to the synchronized excitation of an entire people through national panic, national enthusiasm and national outrage against the common enemy. The French were the firstborn of the new mass dynamic and taught Europe a lesson with after-effects lasting 150 years by overrunning her. Yet Prussia hit back at Leipzig and Waterloo and since that time the spark of reciprocal hypnosis had been jumping to and fro in a dance which René Girard in his recently published work Achever Clausewitz has described as the unification of modèle and repoussoir. For me there is no doubt that the above-mentioned book, which by attempting to unveil the mystery of a pathogenic mutual fascination, is the first to appear for a long time giving new impulses about reconsidering France and Germany. It shows very impressively how Clausewitz enviously emulated Napoleon and, how the highly gifted Prussian officer wished to repeat the unprecedented successes of revolutionary French bellicism for the German side. It suggestively explains how the Napoleonisation of the cultures of conflict in Europe took place via a detour through the book Vom Kriege, and especially the copious use of contingents of young volunteers and later in conscripted armies – a trail leading almost in a straight line from Jena to Verdun.
Crosscheck: It is where there is more knowledge that the irritation significantly increases. Then the maligne fascination continues to act anti-cyclically by means of evoking seemingly indispensable images of an enemy.
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It was in Reims that de Gaulle and Adenauer de-Napoleonized their nations and thus paved the way for a defascinated neighbourhood. One is tempted by Girard’s stimulating insights to go one step further. It would indeed not be difficult to demonstrate how the stress field of our two countries was not only structured by Napoleonic magnetism and its Prussian-Austrian mirror images but also, if not more so, by the stress which the drama called the French Revolution caused on this side of the Rhine. Apart from the imitatio Napoleonis it was above all the imitatio revolutionis which took effect affectively dynamically and ideologically not only in Germany but beyond it on a gigantic and precarious scale. Seen through eyes of studies in mimicry it is finally possible to see Karl Marx for what he really was, namely the central consolidation point of German ambitions provoked by the French. In him both imitations coincide, the commander on horseback embodying the soul of the world and the triumphantly aggressive people of the revolution whose role it was to be filled by the mobilized Proleteriat of the world after the intervention of German intellectualism. Marx’s entire work confirms the thesis proposed by Heinrich Heine that wherever Germans meddled in French affairs these became one degree more universal, acrimonious and disastrous. When finally the double fascination of the Russians through the dual partners of Germany and France intervened and when Germany reciprocated this fascination for the unleashing of violence of October 1917 felt throughout the world, then the facts of the case are fulfilled which Girard calls in the case of Clausewitz la montée aux extrêmes ‘striving for extremes’. If one imagines the Girardian stimuli beyond being a global dramaturgy of mimetic frictions then we begin to understand why it is not possible to simply understand Franco-German ‘re47
lations’ in merely bipolar terms. In truth our relaxed and defascinated bipolar ‘rapport’ is for its part a segment of a domain of some complexity which contains several three-way relationships full of tension. Here the energies of fascination, still strong, flow charged with attraction and repugnance. Among these is especially a triad with a French, a German and a Jewish pole as well as a triad with the US-Americans replacing the third in the above-mentioned constellation. In these triads ‘relations’ actually occur in the real sense of the word, but to describe them here and to fathom their potential for collision is beyond the scope of this work. Let us at least note the battle rancorously fought between French and American spheres which could be described as the jealous duel of two sinking forms of political messianism. If there is anything to be questioned about René Girard’s masterstroke it is the lack of dimensions of theoretical media in his work. This will come as somewhat of a surprise since the huge affective and military mobilisation between the duelling nations, of which the author quite rightly notes: la mobilisation générale est la pure folie,11 could be given more than adequate coverage by the mass media – and these media, as a vehicle of the dangerous mimesis, are today with the addition of electronic technology even more effective than before. More than ever, they present themselves as channels to stimulate the madness, whether it be virtual or real, and only in them can that phantasmal event take place which is called ‘international terrorism’. Anybody wishing get to the bottom of extremism gone global cannot avoid combining the mimetological analysis with the mediological. By this I mean, in order to study Girard seriously, and that will prove to be indispensable, one will also have to reread Karl Kraus (a critic
René Girard: Achever Clausewitz, Paris 2007, p. 242: „Die allgemeine Mobilmachung ist der pure Wahnsinn.“
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of a semi-totalitarian and degenerate press) and to lend our ears to Hermann Broch (the author of Massenwahntheorie). And without further ado we go to Marshall McLuhan and reconsider his elegant theoretical media deductions on nationalism. Then we begin to understand why the global village has not only not found peace, but also why it could not help becoming the all encompassing arena for anger and envy that it has become. Furthermore René Girard emphasizes that the people who shaped the Franco-German reconciliation were sons of the Catholic church, Adenauer no less than de Gaulle and Schumann. We will note this hint. All the same I find I cannot adopt Girard’s convictions as my own, that Europe and the world can only be helped by means of a general conversion to Christian truths which are at the same time the truths of mimetology. The pragmatic way into a benevolent and non-violent coexistence as I have already suggested leads if anything to mutual disinterest and defascination without us misinterpreting the value of the symbolic reconciliatory highlights. Only after detachment from one another has occurred can the good and useful things, which we describe with such contemporary cardinal words such as cooperation and integration, start to gain momentum. If Germans and Europeans have any advice for the rest of the world, especially for those contemporary arenas of conflict where the duellists are hot with fascination for each other, such as India and Pakistan, Israel and its neighbours, the Islamists and the Occidentalists and possibly also the USA and China – then it might well sound like this. Do it the same way that we did, don’t be too interested in each other! And be careful how you choose your foreign correspondents for the newspapers, make sure that those reporting from neighbouring countries are sure to bore their readers to death! Only in this way can those happily separated from one another live in friendship and peace with each other. 49
Ab o u t t h e Autho r P e t e r S l o t e r dijk: 1947: Born in Karlsruhe 1968-74: Studied philosophy, history and German language and literature in Munich. 1975: Postdoctoral studies on the philosophy and history of modern autobiographical literature in Hamburg Since 1980 freelance writer. Publication of numerous works concerning questions on temporal diagnostics, cultural and religious philosophy, artistic theory and psychology Since 1992 Professor of Philosophy and Media Theory at the Karlsruhe University for Arts and Design Since 1993: Director of the Institute for Cultural Philosophy at the Academy of Visual Arts in Vienna Since 2001: Principal of the Karlsruhe University for Arts and Design Since Januar 2002: Chief coordinator of the TV programme (ZDF) “Im Glashaus – Das Philosophische Quartett”, with Rüdiger Safranski 1993: Ernst-Robert-Curtius-Prize for essay writing 2000: Friedrich Märker- Prize for essay writing 2001: Christian-Kellerer-Prize for the future of philosophical thought 2005: Sigmund-Freud-Prize for scientific prose 2006: “Commandeur de l´Ordre des Arts et des Lettres” of the Repulic of France 2008: CICERO-Prize for outstanding rhetoric Guest lectureships at Bard College, New York, at Collège International de Philosophie, Paris and at the ETH “Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule”, Zurich
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