Taiwans Defense Reform (Routledgecurzon Security in Asia)

Taiwan’s Defense Reform

The stand-off across the Straits of Taiwan continues to be one of the most dangerous confrontations in Asia. The technical superiority of the Taiwanese forces has been a major factor in maintaining balance, but, as mainland China’s armed forces modernize, Taiwan’s advantages are being eroded. In response, Taiwan has recently undertaken a major reform of its armed forces. This book, which brings together a wide range of experts, including people involved in defense policy-making in Taiwan, presents a comprehensive analysis of these reforms and assesses their likely effectiveness. With chapters devoted to WKH&KLQHVHWKUHDWWKHGRPHVWLFFRQWH[WRIUHIRUPWKHUROHRIWKH86DQGVSHFLÀF defense issues, this is an invaluable guide to the changes undertaken and under way within Taiwan’s strategic environment. With a foreword by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan’s Defense Reform brings together the leading experts on Taiwan and will interest policymakers and academics working in this vital strategic area. Martin Edmonds is the Director of Studies and Publications Editor of the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, and an honorary professorial fellow emeritus in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University. He is also the founding editor-in-chief of the journal Defense and Security Analysis. Michael M. Tsai is Taiwan’s Vice Minister of Defence. Prior to that post, he served LQ:DVKLQJWRQDV7DLSHL·V GHSXW\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHZLWKVSHFLÀFUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRU relations with the US Department of Defense. As a member of the DPP, he served as a legislator in the Legislative Yuan and was advisor to the Organizational Planning Committee of the Ministry of National Defense. He is also the founder of the journal Taiwan Defense Affairs and the Institute for Taiwan Defense and Strategic Studies.

Routledge Security in Asia Series

Taiwan’s Security and Air Power Taiwan’s defense against the air threat from mainland China Edited by Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai $VLD3DFLÀF6HFXULW\²9DOXHVDQG,GHQWLW\ Leszek Buszynski Taiwan’s Defense Reform Edited by Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai

Taiwan’s Defense Reform

Edited by Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2006 selection and editorial matter, Martin Edmonds and Michael M.Tsai; individual chapters, the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Taiwan’s defense reform / edited by Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai. p. cm. – (RoutledgeCurzon security in Asia series ; 3) Includes bibliographical references and index.1. Taiwan–Defenses. 2. National security–Taiwan. 3. Taiwan–Military policy. 4. Taiwan–Armed Forces–Reorganization. I. Edmonds, Martin, 1939– II. Tsai, Michael M., 1941– III. Series. UA853.T28T36 2005 355’.033051249–dc22 2005003595 ISBN10: 0-415-36802-2 ISBN13: 9-78-0-415-36802-5

Contents

List of illustrations List of contributors Foreword Preface Acknowledgments List of abbreviations

vii viii xi xv xviii xx

PART ,

The challenge of defense reform

1



3

,QWURGXFWLRn: Taiwan’s defense reform MARTIN EDMONDS AND MICHAEL M. TSAI

2

Taiwan’s defense reform: questions and observations

16

ANDREW L. ROSS

3$57,,

The external threat: mainland China 

&KLQD·VPLOLWDU\WKUHDWWR7DLZDQLQWKHWZHQW\ÀUVW century: coercion or capture?

27

29

ANDREW SCOBELL

4

China’s military modernization and Taiwan’s defense reforms: programs, problems, and prospects

41

DENNIS V. HICKEY

3$57,,,

The domestic context of defense reform

61

5

63

An overview of Taiwan’s defense reform YORK W. CHEN AND MARTIN EDMONDS

vi Contents 6

Defense policy-making and civilian roles

79

CHING-PU CHEN

7

An analysis of the Republic of China’s military organization and force structure

96

MING-SHIH SHEN AND CHEN-TIN TSAI

8

The development of Taiwan’s revolution in military affairs after the implementation of the 2002 National Defense Act

124

WEN-CHUNG LEE

3$57,9

The role of the US in Taiwan’s defense reform

141

9

143

The role of the United States in Taiwan’s defense reforms MICHAEL PILLSBURY

10 Arming Taiwan for the future: prospects and problems

150

ERIC A. MCVADON

PART 9

6SHFLÀFGHIHQVHUHIRUPLVVXHV

71

11 Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform

173

MICHAEL M. TSAI AND JASON C. LIN

12 The Republic of China armed services’ human resource policy

191

PING-HSIUNG LO

13 Military education and defense reform

207

WEN-CHUNG CHAI AND TZU-YUN SU

Index

221

,OOXVWUDWLRQV

Figures 5.1 The proportion of the ROC defense budget as a percentage of the total government budget and of the gross national product 6.1 The path from mission to execution  &ODVVLÀFDWLRQRIVWUDWHJLFOHYHOVPLOLWDU\H[DPSOH  &ODVVLÀFDWLRQRIQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\OHYHOV 6.4 The structure of national defense 6.5 Diagram of Taiwan’s defense policy network 12.1 Operations of the Military Policy Branch 12.2 Defense personnel policy operation procedures  0LOLWDU\PDQSRZHUUHVRXUFHPDQDJHPHQWÁRZFKDUW 12.4 Numbers of men available for the draft 2003–12

68 81 3 5 87 89 193 196 7 200

Tables 7.1  7.3 7.4 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 12.1 12.2 13.1 13.2 13.3

ROC counter-operations in response to the PRC military threat &KDQJLQJEDWWOHÀHOGUDQJHVDQGDOWLWXGHV Previous invasion strategies on Taiwan compared ,VODQGDQG$VLD3DFLÀFQDWLRQV·PLOLWDU\VWUXFWXUHV 1999–2004 annual related defense budget analysis Taiwan’s arms acquisition and deliveries over the past ten years Structure of Taiwan’s annual national defense budget 1995–2004 Country-based sample of defense spending, 2002 Annual related defense budget as percentage of GNP ROC force objectives 1949–6 Number of draftable men 2003–12 Major military education institutions in Taiwan Taiwan’s military education system Professional military courses

99 2 103 3 175 180 182 183 184 195 199 211 211 215

Contributors

Wen-Chung Chai received his MA degree from the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tam-Kang University. He is a member of the Institute for Taiwan Defense and Strategic Studies. Ching-Pu Chen is currently the Associate Professor and Director of the Graduate School of Defense Decision Sciences at the National Defense Management College. He is also a Counselor of the Institute for Taiwan Defense and Strategic Studies. He earned a PhD in Decision Sciences from Harvard University. His research interests are decision analysis, military strategy planning, and crisis management. York W. Chen is Executive Editor of Taiwan Defense Affairs. He holds a Master’s degree from the Graduate Institute of International Affairs, Tam-Kang University, and served as Congressional Assistant to Dr Michael M. Tsai from 1996 until 1999. He has recently served as a Research Fellow on the National Security Council and is an Associate of CDISS. He recently completed his PhD on Taiwan’s Strategy and Defence Reform, at Lancaster University. Recent publications include (with Michael Tsai) “Submarines and Taiwan’s Defense,” in Warfare in the Information Age (2001). Martin Edmonds is the former Director of the Centre for Defence and ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HFXULW\6WXGLHV&',66 DQRWIRUSURÀWUHVHDUFKRUJDQL]DWLRQ based in Henley-on-Thames. He is also Honorary Professorial Fellow in the Department of Politics and International Relations, at Lancaster University, and Editor-in-Chief of Defense and Security Analysis. He is co-editor with Michael M. Tsai of Defending Taiwan (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), Taiwan’s Maritime Security (RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), and Taiwan’s Security and Air Power (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 'HQQLV9+LFNH\ is Professor and Research Fellow in the Department of Political Science at Southwest Missouri State University. He earned a PhD from the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of The Armies of East Asia: China, Taiwan, Japan and the Koreas (Lynne Riener Press, 2000).

Contributors

ix

Wen-Chung Lee is a ROC legislator. He is also a director of the Institute of Taiwan Defense and Strategic Studies. He has been a member of the Legislative <XDQ1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH&RPPLWWHHVLQFHKLVÀUVWWHUPDVDOHJLVODWRU+HLVQRZ studying in the Master’s program for continuing education at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tam-Kang University. Jason C. Lin received his Master’s degree from the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tam-Kang University. He is a Research Fellow of the Institute for Taiwan Defense and Strategic Studies. 3LQJ+VLXQJ /R is an instructor at the Institute of Strategy and Defense Management, National Defense University. He received his Master’s degree from the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, in 1997, and completed the National Defense University, Institute of Strategy Management, course in 2003. (ULF $ 0F9DGRQ was the US Defense and Naval Attaché at the American Embassy in Beijing until July 1992. He retired from the Navy with the rank of Rear Admiral and is now a consultant on East Asia security issues and partWLPH 'LUHFWRU RI $VLD3DFLÀF 6WXGLHV ,QVWLWXWH RI )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\ $QDO\VLV USA. Admiral McVadon is a distinguished graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, the US Naval War College, and the National War College. He has a Master’s degree in international affairs from George Washington University. Michael Pillsbury is a Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council of the United States and an Associate Fellow of the Institute for National Strategic Studies. He was the Assistant Under-Secretary of Defense for policy planning and a Special $VVLVWDQWIRU$VLDQ$IIDLUVDWWKH1HW$VVHVVPHQW2IÀFHLQ0R'+HHDUQHGD PhD in political science from Columbia University, and is the author of China Debates the Future Security Environment (National Defense University Press, 2001). Andrew L. Ross is Professor and Director of Studies in the Strategic Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. Andrew Scobell is an Associate Research Professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College. He earned a PhD in political science from Columbia University. He is the author of China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge University Press, 2003). Ming-Shih Shen is a PhD candidate in political science at the Fu Hsing Kang College and a member of the Institute for Taiwan Defense and Strategic Studies. His publications include Women and Military (2003), An Analysis of US–Iraq War: A Political Warfare Aspect (2003), The Intangible Combat Power in the US–Iraq War (2003), and The Army’s Relations with Congress (2002).

x

Contributors

Yang-Jou Shiah has retired from the ROC Air Force with the rank of General. :KLOHDVHUYLQJRIÀFHUKHZDVWKH3UHVLGHQWRIWKH1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH8QLYHUVLW\ and a Strategy Advisor to the President. General Shiah is now the Chairman of the Institute for Taiwan Defense and Strategic Studies and the Editor-in-Chief of Taiwan Defense Affairs. Tzu-Yun Su received his MA degree from the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tam-Kang University. He is a member of the Institute for Taiwan Defense and Strategic Studies. With Wen-Chung Chai, he co-authored The New Genes of the War (in Chinese: 2001). Chen-Tin Tsai is a PhD candidate in political science in the Fu Hsing Kang College. His papers include “PSYOPs During the Iraq War” and “The Decision Making of ROC Defense Budget,” in An Analysis of US–Iraq War: A Political Warfare Aspect (2003). His translated works include “Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier” in The Army’s Relations with Congress (2002) and “The Nature of Political War” and “The Nazis.” in On Political War (2003). Michael M. Tsai, prior to being appointed Vice Minister of Defense after the 2004 election, was the Deputy Representative in the Taipei Economic and Cultural 5HSUHVHQWDWLYH·V 2IÀFH LQ WKH 86 DQG D OHJLVODWRU IRU WZR WHUPV +H HDUQHG a JD degree from the California Western School of Law. He is the Honorary Deputy Chairman of the Institute for Taiwan Defense and Strategic Studies and the founder of the journal Taiwan Defense Affairs.

Foreword

This is the publication in English of the proceedings of the Fourth Annual Taiwan National Defense Seminar organized by the Institute of Taiwan Defense DQG 6WUDWHJLF 6WXGLHV ,W KDV DOVR EHHQ DOPRVW VL[ \HDUV VLQFH , WRRN RIÀFH DV President of the Republic of China. During these six years, national security and the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been my two foremost concerns. :HPXVWXQGHUVWDQGWKDWQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\VWDQGVDVDÀUHZDOOWRSUHYHQWGLVruption from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It must also guarantee the security of the people of Taiwan and their property, not to mention the stability and prosperity of Taiwanese society. If we cannot provide that guarantee, the wealth and prosperity we enjoy today could vanish overnight. :KHQ,ÀUVWWRRNRIÀFHLQ,LVVXHGP\´)RXU1RHVDQG2QH:LWKRXWµ pledge of goodwill. Over the last four years, the PRC has, in response to our overtures of goodwill, actually accelerated and expanded its military build-up against Taiwan. In the face of the PRC’s military threat, which is growing more serious day by day, our national forces must remain keenly aware of the danger on its doorstop, strengthen the national defense capability, and speed up national defense reform if they are to accomplish the sacred mission of protecting Taiwan’s 23 million inhabitants. The PRC poses a multidimensional threat to Taiwan. According to conventional combat scenarios, the PRC must gradually gain domination of the seas and skies before it can put into effect an amphibious attack against Taiwan. Taiwan’s national forces have endured years of training and preparation to prevent such a VFHQDULRDQGKDYHVLJQLÀFDQWO\LQFUHDVHGWKHGLIÀFXOW\RIDQLQYDVLRQRI7DLZDQ thereby reducing the likelihood that the PRC might act rashly. Nonetheless, the government of the ROC cannot overlook the fact that the rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, especially the improvements to the accuracy of its ballistic missiles, as well as its vast deployment of those missiles, has undoubtedly changed the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. Not only may the PRC’s missiles be used to launch a sudden strike and swiftly attain air and naval dominance over the Taiwan Strait, but they may also be used as weapons of terror in an ‘unrestricted war.’ Without engaging in large-scale combat, the PRC could threaten to use these missiles in a determined effort to weaken Taiwan’s morale and combat capability,

xii Foreword thereby forcing it to surrender. If Taiwan does not take effective and immediate measures to accelerate the modernization of its national defenses and strengthen its anti-missile capability, the People’s Liberation Army will grow even more FRQÀGHQWWKDWLWVPLVVLOHVDUHXQVWRSSDEOHWRROVIRUWKHLQYDVLRQRI7DLZDQDQG thus conceivably become even more trigger-happy. This would further jeopardize the stability of the Taiwan Strait. From 1995 until 2003, the number of PRC tactical missiles increased elevenIROGDQGLWLVVWLOOLQFUHDVLQJDWWKHUDWHRIRQHPLVVLOHHYHU\ÀYHGD\V7KLVLVDQ unmistakable warning. Taiwan must act with determination, strengthen awareness of threat, and create a sense of common purpose and resolution among its citizens. We must modernize our national defense and build anti-missile sites; otherwise, we are only indirectly encouraging China to continue deploying missiles against us. This would exacerbate the military imbalance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and put Taiwan’s national defense forces in a vulnerable position. In the face of the ever-increasing threat posed by the growth in PRC military power, we have no choice but to reach an internal consensus to accelerate national defense modernization and reform our national defense. In addition to the modernization of our weaponry and equipment, we must attend to the development of a modern, high quality workforce. As the leader in that process, manpower is the most important component of defense reform. Some 140 years ago, Prussia, which ZDV VXUURXQGHG E\ VWURQJ DQG WKUHDWHQLQJ QHLJKERUV XQGHUWRRN D YHU\ VLJQLÀcant military reform. General Moltke the Elder once said, “advantage in a battle does not come from weapons, but from the men who operate the weapons.” One hundred and forty years later, General Norman Schwarzkopf, who successfully completed the military reform of the US Army and led it out from the shadows of the Vietnam War, stated in his memoirs that, “In this age of information, the most crucial challenge to the state of war is in the men, not the technology.” For a long time, many experiences of military reform have pointed out that the advantages in weaponry will soon be surpassed but only advantages in the “quality of personnel” are long lasting. This is the reason why, during my speech on Veterans’ Day ,VSHFLÀFDOO\VWDWHGWKDW´SHUVRQQHOSOD\WKHPRVWVLJQLÀFDQWUROHµ It is the “people” who should be the focus and core of our national defense reform. To them, we should then add “two developments” and “two establishments.” These are (a) the “development of a professional military” and the “development of a learning organization” and (b) the “establishment of the concept of human resources” and the “establishment of the concept that family and work are equally important.” With the development of a professional military following the implementation of the new National Defense Law and National Defense Organization Law, thanks WRWKHKDUGZRUNRI0LQLVWHU7DQJDQGRWKHUGHIHQVHH[SHUWVZHKDYHODLGDÀUP foundation for the depoliticization of the military. Thanks also to Minister Tang’s efforts during this timeframe, the professionalization of the military has also proceeded apace. At present, our military is without a doubt more professional than the People’s Liberation Army. However, we must constantly remind ourselves that professionalization is more a process for the pursuit of excellence. It is a

Foreword

xiii

never-ending process and we must never become complacent. The results of this SURIHVVLRQDOL]DWLRQZLOOXOWLPDWHO\EHUHÁHFWHGLQZKHWKHURUQRWWKHPLOLWDU\ZLOO be able to achieve “effective deterrence during times of peace, and decisiveness during times of war.” To achieve this result, military professionals must not only gain vast and extensive expertise in their specialties but also undergo rigorous training and exercises that can expose real problems. Only by solving these problems can the military professionals hone their problem-solving skills and boost their determination. In RWKHUZRUGVSURÀFLHQF\QRWRQO\OLHVLQWKHLPSURYHPHQWRIEDVLFDFDGHPLFDELOLties but should also include improvements in thinking, training, and willpower. The “tri-service joint offensive exercise” held in 2003 was a practical and realistic drill. Even though we faced numerous challenges and problems during it, I was moved by our strength and determination to overcome those obstacles without becoming discouraged or being in fear of hardship. This is a perfect demonstration of what a truly professional force should strive for and demonstrate. The second development is the “development of a learning organization.” A professional military is also a learning organization. In the future, national security will entail a so-called “knowledgeable defense.” From tactical operations to strategic planning, every aspect of national defense requires the consolidation of a massive amount of information and knowledge. Therefore, as I have emphasized before, the function of military education is not merely one of gathering skills but also of cultivating the ability of soldiers to acquire, consolidate, and utilize knowledge. We should therefore combine all levels of military education into a single integrated body of knowledge. We must seek to work toward lifetime learning and education in order to generate sharp, informed, and intelligent soldiers. I hope that, in the future, the Ministry of National Defense will alter and improve its personnel management system to encourage initiative and learning so that young soldiers who wish to continue their studies will not have to worry about the risk of missing chances of promotion or performance evaluation. As for the EMBA courses, held together by the Ministry of National Defense and the XQLYHUVLWLHVPRUHORZDQGPLGGOHUDQNLQJRIÀFHUVDQGHYHQQRQFRPPLVVLRQHG RIÀFHUV1&2V VKRXOGEHHQFRXUDJHGWRHQUROOVRWKDWRXUFDSWDLQVDQGOLHXWHQants can have academic opportunities and assistance during their peak learning years. I also hope that our armed forces will consider taking a more humane approach WRLWVVWULFWSHUVRQQHOSROLFLHV7KHÀUVWHVWDEOLVKPHQWWKDW,SURSRVHGZDV´HVWDElishing the concept of human resources.” We hope to value every professional soldier as an essential national resource. Only when we begin to treat soldiers as resources, rather than as mere numbers, will every solider be employed to best effect. This is also why I frequently instruct the Ministry of National Defense to take notice of this issue when recruiting new personnel and avoid neglecting outVWDQGLQJSHRSOHWKDWWKHFRXQWU\KDVFXOWLYDWHGPHUHO\IRUWKHVDNHRIVXSHUÀFLDO equality. We hope that the Ministry will put more effort into the formulation of a human resource policy, so that every soldier is held in esteem and can take pride in performing such an important responsibility. We also hope that young NCOs and

xiv Foreword RIÀFHUVZKLOHIROORZLQJPLOLWDU\GLVFLSOLQHFDQDOVRH[SUHVVWKHLURSLQLRQVDQG creativity and, thus, improve their leadership abilities and effectiveness. The slogan “treating talented people as talented people” should be realized in all aspects of daily affairs. “The establishment of the concept that family and work are equally important” is an extension of the “Three Safe Policy,” which I proposed previously. This “Three Safe Policy” has shown initial results under the efforts of the Minister of National Defense, though I do not think it has been entirely adequate. Many veterans have often expressed regret that they were not able to spend more time with their wives and children. Though serving their country is their duty, they VKRXOGQRWKDYHWRVDFULÀFHWKHLUIDPLOLHV:HVKRXOGEHDEOHWRGREHWWHUWKDQ this. I hope that the Ministry of National Defense will take this entire matter in hand, including well-organized shifts and task assignment systems, and establish more comfortable and convenient family visiting arrangements, so that soldiers FDQDWWHQGWRERWKIDPLO\DQGRWKHUPDWWHUVZKLOHPDLQWDLQLQJHIÀFLHQWPLOLWDU\ preparations. ,ZRXOGOLNHWRHPSKDVL]HDJDLQWKDW´SHRSOHSOD\WKHPRVWVLJQLÀFDQWUROHµ Our objective is to reform our national defense by cultivating truly professional servicemen and women. Downsizing is only one method. Improving quality is the foremost goal and the entire process must be completed without jeopardizing national security, especially as the PRC engages in a military build-up in hope of Taiwan showing some sign of weakness. As for the issue on the time period of compulsory military service, I have, as the Commander of the three Services, a responsibility to ensure national security. Based on professional advice from the Ministry of National Defense, I will not blindly follow an unattainable promise made for election purposes. The all-volunteer system is what we are working WRZDUG²DQLGHD,ÀUVWSXUVXHGWHQ\HDUVDJR1HYHUWKHOHVV,KDYHDOVRLQVLVWHG that the process must be gradual and that national security must remain our main consideration. In closing, I hope that this volume of the proceedings of the National Defense Reform Conference will be well received. Hopefully, under the guidance of Chairman Shiah and the editorial skills of Dr Michael M. Tsai and Professor Martin Edmonds, it will be able to provide suggestions for our country’s future national defense reform and modernization and the enhancement of our national defense capabilities. President Chen Shui-bian

Preface Democratization and regional security Yang-Jou Shiah

It is indeed a great honor for me to write the preface to this volume on Taiwan’s defense reform. On the eve of the second anniversary of the implementation of the two defense laws, this volume represents something special. When I look back to the days I served as Vice Chief of General Staff, Executive (VCGS, Executive), and President of the National Defense University, I was appointed Chief Executive 2IÀFHURIWKH3UHSDUDWRU\&RPPLWWHHE\'HIHQVH0LQLVWHU:XDQGSDUWLFLSDWHGLQ the design and planning of these two defense laws. During that time, Deputy Representative Michael Tsai, then a member of Defense Committee in Legislative Yuan, together with other legislators, gave us great support to put these two defense laws though their third readings in legislature on 15 January 2000. The laws took effect on 1 March 2002, earlier than scheduled. I thank those who devoted their wisdom and efforts to making it happen and, in so doing, take this opportunity to share my views on issues pertinent to the two defense laws in the hope that my opinions will invite more insightful responses to prompt better suggestions for the implementation of Taiwan’s future defense reforms.

The concept of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) ,Q WKH WZHQW\ÀUVW FHQWXU\ PDQ\ FRXQWULHV KDYH LQWURGXFHG LQQRYDWLYH UHIRUPV LQWRWKHLUPLOLWDU\DIIDLUV7DLZDQKDVDOVRLGHQWLÀHGWKLV50$WUHQGDQGIHOWDQ urgency and need for defense reform. Being a democratic country, the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) has to work within a democratic framework and every administrative action has to conform to the letter of the law. It was only four years ago, before there were the two defense laws, that the ROC initiated its defense reform process with a view to building a more institutionalized, democratized, modernized, and professionalized defense system. We started with organization reform in order to make the three branches of defense authority – namely the PLOLWDU\ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH FRPPDQG DQG DUPDPHQWV DXWKRULWLHV ² FOHDUO\ GHÀQHG and functionally enhanced.

xvi Preface

The manifestation of nationalized armed forces and organizational reform The implementation of the two defense laws, on the one hand, is a manifestation of the achievement of our democratic system and of our nationalized armed forces; on the other hand, Taiwan has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of its administrative system and operational capability through such measures as structural reorganization and downsizing. In fact, the purposes of the two defense laws are not just reorganization or downsizing, the more important purpose is to smooth the interaction between military operational command and the defense administrative departments. Above all, the key factor is whether the quality RI VHUYLFHPHQ DQG ZRPHQ DQG WKH FDSDELOLW\ RI WKH 52& DUPHG IRUFHV ÀW WKH demands of Taiwan’s national security and development.

The implementation and effectiveness of the two defense laws 7KHÀUVWLPSDFWRIWKHWZRGHIHQVHODZVLVWRLQWHJUDWHPLOLWDU\DGPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG command systems and to realize civilian control, which is the common practice among democratic countries. The second impact is to make each and every department perform its duties better. Since modern warfare has greatly changed and the time for early warning is extremely short, decisions have to be made in a short timeframe when encountering imminent threats. The two defense laws will KHOSWRUHGXFHFRPPDQGOHYHOVDQGHVWDEOLVKDÁDWWHUMRLQWRSHUDWLRQDOFRPPDQG V\VWHP 7KH\ KDYH DOVR FOHDUO\ GHÀQHG WKH GLIIHUHQW DXWKRULW\ RI WKH PLOLWDU\ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH FRPPDQG DQG DUPDPHQW EUDQFKHV DFFRUGLQJ WR WKHLU VSHFLÀF functions. With the two defense laws, a solid foundation for future development has been laid. The third impact is to allocate defense resources better. Following the end of the Cold War, the concept of ‘security’ has been extended from purely defense security to a more comprehensive concept. The security of the economy, technology, and society are also now included. The design of the two laws certainly addresses these concerns and is going to improve on our use of resources to safeguard our security. With an effective decision-making mechanism and supported with related regulations, such as defense preparedness and civil defense, the two defense laws will seamlessly integrate these defense elements to respond to national threats whilst at the same time making a more reasonable arrangement for defense personnel, equipment, and budget to meet the demands of national security. As is well known, implementing the two laws and conducting organizational reform are extremely challenging tasks. In the process of this re-engineering, KRZHYHUFKDQJLQJDÀ[HGPLQGVHWLVHYHQPRUHGLIÀFXOW,QDOHJDOVHQVH7DLZDQ now has two defense laws; in a practical sense, it has made some progress with regard to overall performance. There is still room for improvement in our thinking, which, I believe, is the most important factor to the success of the two defense laws. Furthermore, we also need to examine and verify the actual execution along

Preface xvii the process of reform. When planning the defense laws and related regulations, we considered these factors as thoroughly and extensively as possible. However, they are new systems, after all, and we still need to evaluate their performance and make further amendments so they better serve their intended purposes. I am very pleased that many scholars and specialists have contributed to this important issue and to this volume on Taiwan’s defense reform. I hope their expert contributions will stimulate discussion and generate comments and suggestions. Taiwan has presented and is implementing an important defense reform agenda. With help, it can achieve these fundamental reforms and avoid serious mistakes. This volume will contribute to its reaching this goal.

Acknowledgments

The contents of this volume are made up of revised papers presented at a conference entitled Taiwan’s Defense Reform: The Key Issues, held in Taipei in January 2004. The conference was the fourth in a series of annual defense conferences organized by the Taiwan Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, with the cooperation of the Graduate Institute for International Affairs and Strategic Studies, TamKang University, the National Defense University in Taiwan, the journal Taiwan Defense Affairs, and the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies now based in Henley-on-Thames, Oxfordshire, UK. No international conference would be possible without generous sponsorship. The conference organizers and the publishers of this volume of the contributions by the principal speakers acknowledge the generous support of the Republic of China National Security Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Mainland Affairs Council. Many people were involved LQWKHSUHSDUDWLRQDQGH[HFXWLRQRIWKHFRQIHUHQFHDQGE\GHÀQLWLRQWKHLUFRQWULEXWLRQVLQ-DQXDU\DUHUHÁHFWHGLQWKHFRQWHQWVRIWKLVYROXPH$VZLWKWKUHH previous conferences and with the preparation of this volume, the tireless efforts of York W. Chen, the Executive Editor of Taiwan Defense Affairs, are again acknowledged with gratitude. Drawing together papers and chapters written in two very different languages is a challenging task, the more so as they involve technical vocabulary and expresVLRQV 7KH ÀUVW VWDJH KRZHYHU LV WR PDNH D OLWHUDO WUDQVODWLRQ HLWKHU &KLQHVH into English or English into Chinese, a more or less thankless task whichever the direction. As editors, we would wish to record the contributions made by sevHUDOWUDQVODWRUVPRVWVSHFLÀFDOO\IURP&KLQHVHWR(QJOLVK'U.XDQJ+XD/LX 'LUHFWRURIWKH5HVHDUFKDQG3XEOLVKLQJ2IÀFH1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH8QLYHUVLW\DQG from English into Chinese, Ms Yun-Yu Cheng at the Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Taiwan University, and Mr Eric K. Yang at the Graduate Institute of National Development, National Taiwan University. ,WLVKRZHYHUQRWVXIÀFLHQWVLPSO\WROHDYHFKDSWHUVLQDOLWHUDOO\WUDQVODWHG form since expressions in Chinese are very different when written in native English. The task of further interpretation of the written word fell on the experienced shoulders of Pauline Elliott, the Publications Coordinator at the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies and Editorial Assistant of the interna-

Acknowledgments xix tional journal Defense and Security Analysis. She also undertook the particular task of proofreading the whole volume, and, for this and other assistance, we express our sincere thanks. Martin Edmonds and Michael Tsai

Abbreviations

AAMRAM AB AEGIS AFIT AFRC AIDC AIT ASTEPP ASW CAN CCP CGS CIS CMA CMC CAN C2 C4ISR DCGS DDG DOD DPP EMBA EMP GDP GNP GSH HRB IDF IDF IO JOC

advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles Armaments Bureau ship-borne long-range radar system Air Force Institute of Technology Armed Force Recruiting Center Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (Taiwan) American Institute in Taiwan Air and Space Technology Education Promotion Program anti-submarine warfare computer network attack Chinese Communist Party Chief of General Staff Central Institute of Science Chinese Military Academy Central Military Commission (in mainland China) Chinese Naval Academy command and control command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Deputy Chief of General Staff destroyer Department of Defense (US) Democratic Progressive Party Master in Business Administration electromagnetic pulse gross domestic product gross national product General Staff Headquarters Human Resources Bureau Indigenous Defense Fighter Israeli Defense Force information operations Joint Operations Centre

Abbreviations xxi KMT MEA MND MOFA MPA MRBM NDPCC NDU NSC NTU 225 26' PAC-3 PFP PLA PLAAF PLAN PPBS PRC RC RMA ROC ROCA ROCAF ROCMC ROCN 527& SRBM SSK TIDSS UAV UCAV VCGS

Kuomintang Ministry of Economic Affairs Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs maritime patrol aircraft medium-range ballistic missile National Defense Private Contract Committee National Defense University National Security Council National Taiwan University 2IÀFHRI5HVRXUFHV 2IÀFHRIWKH6HFUHWDU\RI'HIHQVH86 Patriot Advanced Capability/3 People First Party People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army Air Force People’s Liberation Army Navy Planning Programme Budgeting System People’s Republic of China Reserve Command Revolution in Military Affairs Republic of China Republic of China Army Republic of China Air Force Republic of China Marine Corps Republic of China Navy 5HVHUYH2IÀFHU7UDLQLQJ&RUSV short-range ballistic missile conventional diesel-electric submarine Taiwan Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies unmanned aerial vehicle unmanned combat aerial vehicle Vice Chief of General Staff

3DUW,

The challenge of defense reform

 ,QWURGXFWLRQ Taiwan’s defense reform Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai

The new international security environment 2YHU WKH SDVW ÀIWHHQ \HDUV WKH ZRUOG KDV ZLWQHVVHG UDGLFDO FKDQJHV LQ WKH international security environment. Before then, a bipolar world was dominated by two diametrically opposed ideologies, each championed by a superpower operating within a tightly knit military defensive alliance. Paradoxically, although each side of the confrontation had the means with which to destroy the world with nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, the world as a whole enjoyed a degree of nervous stability. States more or less, whether aligned or non-aligned, could anticipate world developments with a degree of certainty. Many people today look back on those more or less predictable days with a certain amount of nostalgia for, since the break-up of one of the superpower alliances and, indeed, the collapse of the superpower itself, the world has become less stable and the future more uncertain and unpredictable. The collapsing bipolar Cold War world, however, has left legacies that have threatened to unsettle and destabilize regions of the world by unleashing national, ethnic, religious, and cultural forces that for decades had been more or less quiescent and controlled. Moreover, it has left many states, some of them newly FUHDWHGWRWKHLURZQGHYLFHVZKHQÀQGLQJZD\VWRSURWHFWWKHLUVRYHUHLJQW\DQG territorial integrity, and defend their national interests. The challenge of trying to manage and control this potentially volatile heterogeneous mix of peoples, states, races, and religions has fallen primarily to the United Nations, with only the one remaining superpower, the US, able to lend it any meaningful operational credibility.

US dominance in world affairs For the past decade or so, the international community has displayed by and large an ambivalent attitude toward the US. Moreover, the US has not been particularly forthcoming toward them over a number of political, economic, and security issues, either. Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, US PLOLWDU\ SRZHU DQG HFRQRPLF LQÁXHQFH SDUWLFXODUO\ XQGHU 3UHVLGHQW *HRUJH W. Bush’s ultra-conservative and heavily laden ideological leadership, have

4

Edmonds and Tsai

increased substantially to the extent that it can act unilaterally and almost with LPSXQLW\,WLVDSRZHUDQGLQÁXHQFHWKDWKDVHQDEOHGWKH86DGPLQLVWUDWLRQWR adopt such policies, for example, as anticipatory self-defense and to intervene around the world at times and in places of its own choosing. President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in the spring of 2003 without the VSHFLÀF endorsement RIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV6HFXULW\&RXQFLOZDVWDNHQLQWKHIDFHRIVLJQLÀFDQWDQG strong international opposition. In the event, it was done on grounds that have subsequently proved to be unsubstantiated and which are arguably contrary to international law. Correspondingly, international organizations such as the United Nations and even former close-knit military defensive alliances such as NATO have become weaker – and not just as a consequence of differences over the invasion of Iraq. On the one hand, nevertheless, many states continue to look, albeit somewhat warily, to the US to perform the role as a form of surrogate “world policeman.” Furthermore, they expect it either to contribute an arbitration role in both LQWHUQDWLRQDO DQG GRPHVWLF FRQÁLFWV RU WR LQWHUYHQH LQ UHJLRQDO RU LQWHUQDWLRQDO disputes in order to restore peace and stability. The US interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan serve as two prominent examples where US intervention, in the absence of any like initiative on the part of the rest of the world, helped to prevent an already unstable situation affecting neighboring states or spilling over into wider regions and beyond. On the other hand, many are also very aware RI WKH H[HUFLVH RI 86 JOREDO LQÁXHQFH DQG RI WKH PRWLYHV EHKLQG LW WKH\ VHH US intervention more in terms of interference, particularly when it is recognized that President Bush made it clear on appointment that US national interests were paramount. This was a foreign policy stance that was evident, for example, in his administration’s decision not to endorse the Kyoto Treaty on the Environment and its going back on earlier nuclear arms control treaties with the former USSR. The rest of the world has to take note of these developments since the US VLJQLÀFDQWO\QRWRQO\LVWKHPRVWSRZHUIXOPLOLWDU\LQWKHZRUOGEXWDOVRKDVDW its disposal levels and varieties of military technology that are decades, if not more, ahead of that of any other state. Indeed, the US is the driver behind the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ about which so much has been written and which ZDVPDQLIHVWLQWKHÀUVW*XOI:DUDQGPRUHVSHFWDFXODUO\LQWKHLQYDVLRQRI,UDT in 2003. Such is the lead exercised by the US that it sets the agenda with regard to the forms and manner by which future wars are likely to be fought. All other states, no matter how developed or ‘emergent,’ cannot afford to ignore these new GHIHQVHWHFKQRORJLHVDQGDVIDUDVWKH\DUHDEOHÀQDQFLDOO\DQGSROLWLFDOO\QHHG to absorb them into their own future defense postures.

The all-inclusive ‘global war on terrorism’ (GWOT) The one phenomenon that has to some extent halted the US in its tracks and served further to render the world an ever more uncertain and unstable place has been the threat of terrorism on an international scale. Though many have been aware of the threat of international terrorism for some considerable time, and there have been

Introduction 5 many instances that have signaled a warning of terrorist incidents to come, its full potential and wider implications for the security of individual states, as well as the world at large, was not fully appreciated until the events of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington (9/11). Almost at a stroke, a small group of determined and skillful people demonstrated that they could penetrate the defenses of the PRVWSRZHUIXOVWDWHLQWKHZRUOGDQGQRWMXVWLQÁLFWLPPHQVHPDWHULDOGDPDJHDQG cause several thousand casualties but more pertinently single out symbolic targets that differentiate the liberal, capitalist West from the third and developing world. For the Americans, and to an almost equal degree the other advanced states of the western world, the era of asymmetric warfare had arrived. 9/11, as the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington have come to be known, had a number of knock-on effects. First, it introduced an asymmetry into IXWXUHSRWHQWLDOFRQÁLFWZLWKZKLFKH[LVWLQJFRQYHQWLRQDODUPHGIRUFHVDQGFXUrent military doctrines were ill prepared to cope. In a manner of speaking, most states, certainly the wealthier liberal-democratic ones, were forced to return to the drawing board and reassess and restructure, yet again after only twelve years, the SRVWXUHRIWKHLUGHIHQVHIRUFHV6HFRQGLWLQWURGXFHGDQHZGLPHQVLRQWRFRQÁLFW in which the adversaries were no longer nation states, but the established military forces of states arraigned against any number of loose, almost elusive, groups of religiously and ethnically motivated fanatical people whose modus operandi fell outside international humanitarian norms and the laws of war. Third, 9/11 has blurred the boundaries between internal and external security and broadened the division of responsibilities between government agencies and departments. The simple explanation is that neither the new security environment nor today’s terrorist or international crime syndicate is a respecter of national political boundaries. Terrorism and asymmetrical warfare doctrine has meant that there is no longer a clear distinction between defense, in the sense of defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the wider security of the state against an external threat and threats emanating from within the state. This, in WXUQKDVPHDQWWKDWQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\EURDGO\GHÀQHGLVQRORQJHUWKHH[FOXVLYH responsibility of the armed services, coupled with the state intelligence services and the diplomatic corps. Today, such government departments as those of the Interior, Finance (Treasury), Inland Revenue, Emergency Services, Health, Police, National Utilities, Transport, Coast and Border Guards, Immigration, Customs, and so on, have all assumed or had allocated additional duties oriented toward providing protection of the state and its citizens.

Taiwan’s security in today’s world No state in today’s world can exist in splendid isolation. Some twenty years ago Burma (Myanmar) cut itself off politically from the rest of the world and effectively closed its borders to no obvious advantage either to its citizens or to the political regime. Today, North Korea is in a more or less similar situation, though it has sought assistance from states – mostly of a similar socialist or communist political orientation – prepared to engage with it in pursuit of its ambition to

6

Edmonds and Tsai

develop a nuclear capability. To an undernourished population, such ambition would appear to be somewhat misguided. For a brief period, negotiations between the North Korean regime and the US were initiated, the purpose of which was for the US to help the North Koreans on the one hand address the problems of its extreme poverty, starvation, and lack of development in return for which, on the other, the North Koreans would abandon their nuclear weapons program. This initiative, however, was short-lived primarily as a consequence of a change in US foreign policy by a new Bush administration. This shift in policy was made more emphatic after 9/11, when the administration became convinced that the North Koreans were aiding and abetting terrorists, making available weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This led the President to include North Korea among his “Axis of Evil” group of states deemed to be hostile to the US. Taiwan, however, is a very special case in today’s world of security uncertainty. It is special inasmuch as it receives scant diplomatic recognition from the rest of the world’s states. This degree of diplomatic isolation is all the more frustrating for the Taiwanese, bearing in mind that the country meets all the normal internationally accepted legal criteria of statehood: a territorial boundary, an effective JRYHUQPHQW D OHJDOO\ HQGRUVHG FRQVWLWXWLRQ )XUWKHUPRUH 7DLZDQ IXOÀOV ZKDW has increasingly come to be expected as an important characteristic of statehood, namely a democratic political system, an elected government, and a respect for +XPDQ 5LJKWV DV GHÀQHG LQ WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV &KDUWHU 1RU LV LW LUUHOHYDQW WR acknowledge that Taiwan, a major trading nation, also has the eighth largest economy in the world. Realpolitik, however, has determined that, no matter how much these criteria properly apply to Taiwan, the rest of the world would fall in line behind mainland China’s “One China” policy. They do so on account of China’s geographical size, demographic numbers, political clout, increasing military power, and, perhaps above all, enormous economic potential. Mainland China has made it abundantly clear that it not only does not recognize Taiwan as an independent state, but also sees the island as a “renegade province” of the mainland. It has made it clear that it would oppose by whatever means, including the use of military force, any attempt by the Taiwanese to pursue any policy that might lead to a unilateral declaration of independence. On embarking on this “One China” policy, the government of the People’s Republic of China has also made it clear that it would disapprove of any state, in the sense of a national government as distinct from commercial enterprises, having any exchange with the Taiwanese government. That disapproval could well be in the form of restricting trade relations as well as any number of other initiatives such as withdrawing diplomatic representation. These embargoes and restrictions would especially apply to any sale of military equipment to Taiwan, as the Netherlands discovered when it initially agreed to sell its Walrus-class SSKs to Taiwan in the early 1990s. 7DLZDQ·V GLIÀFXOW\ WKHUHIRUH LV KDYLQJ WR FRSH ZLWK PDLQODQG &KLQD·V VXEVWDQWLDODQGLQFUHDVLQJLQÁXHQFHLQWKHUHVWRIWKHZRUOGRQHWKDWGLVFULPLQDWHV against the island. Coupled with this handicap is the simple fact that mainland China has never disguised its intention to regain the island of Taiwan and restore

Introduction 7 LWDVSDUWRIPDLQODQG&KLQD7RDVLJQLÀFDQWH[WHQWWKH35&DGPLQLVWUDWLRQKDV painted itself into a corner, as so often happens with policies that allow little or no scope for compromise or variation. No PRC Communist Party leader would wish to go down in history as being the person who ‘lost’ Taiwan. For the PRC, “One China” as a policy is a total policy; the best outcome for Taiwan, as far as the mainland is concerned, is an arrangement not dissimilar to that worked out for Hong Kong: one China, two systems. For this reason, mainland China watches all political, economic – and military – developments in Taiwan with an eagle eye. The policies of the incumbent President, Chen Shui-bian, and the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) regarding Taiwan’s future independence have, without question, attracted attention and on occasion caused loud condemnation. When President Chen conducted a referendum within the Taiwanese electorate on March 20, 2004, the same day as the presidential election, on an anti-missile missile program and the resumption of talks with mainland China on a “peace and stability” framework, Beijing was not at all pleased. Immediately after the election, China was quick to dismiss the results on account of the narrow margin in Chen’s favor. Furthermore they argued that the support for the President was distorted on account of the public sympathy expressed after President Chen was wounded in an attempted assassination the evening before the poll. ,QGHHG WKLV ZDV QRW WKH ÀUVW WLPH WKDW WKH 35& KDG DWWHPSWHG WR LQÁXHQFH the outcome of Taiwan’s presidential and general elections. In the past China’s leaders have simply issued warnings and threats and, on occasion, ordered direct demonstrative action, such as conducting military exercises that were patently directed at either an amphibious invasion of the island, as was the case in 2004, or a missile bombardment of the island, as happened in 1996. More than anything else – Beijing’s apparent deep dislike of President Chen aside – there has been the steady modernization of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as detailed in Andrew Scobell’s chapter in this volume. The effect of this drive by the PRC to modernize its armed forces has been to generate some alarm in the ROC and, especially, among the Taiwanese military. For the past two decades, the Taiwanese armed forces have managed to retain a military capability that is superior to that of the Chinese PLA. This advantage has been due primarily to military support from the US under the terms of the 1979 US–Taiwan Relations Act. This support has mostly taken the form of the sale of advanced weapons V\VWHPV ² WKRXJK VRPH DGGLWLRQDO HTXLSPHQW VXFK DV 0LUDJH ÀJKWHUV DQG /D Fayette frigates from France, has also been made available. The US equipment, however, had to conform to the provisions under the Act and should only be sufÀFLHQWIRUWKHGHIHQVHRI7DLZDQDQGQRWFRQVWLWXWHRUEHFRQVWUXHGDVDGLUHFW military threat to the PRC. Nevertheless, the standards of training and exercising E\DOOEUDQFKHVRIWKH7DLZDQHVHPLOLWDU\ZHUHVLJQLÀFDQWO\VXSHULRUWRDQ\WKLQJ of which the opposition was capable, largely because the PLA was hamstrung by antiquated military doctrine and ideological constraints. With an emphasis on the latest information technology and new doctrines, the general consensus is that the PLA’s modernization program, which has encom-

8

Edmonds and Tsai

passed a new generation of advanced military and, especially, naval equipment, either has, or will shortly, eliminate the capability advantage hitherto enjoyed by Taiwan. Unless something radical is done, and done as a matter of some urgency, Taiwan will be at a distinct disadvantage. President Bush responded in 2001 with an arms sales package to Taiwan that was intended to address what was perceived to be a potentially unstable situation emerging in cross-Strait relations caused directly by the PLA’s modernization program. The package included proposals to make available a range of equipment, including diesel–electric (SSK) patrol submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, Kidd-class air defense destroyers, and Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles. Not all the equipment requested by the Taiwanese armed services was made available; in particular, Taiwan was refused the Aegis long-range radar and battle management system carried on Ticonderoga-class destroyers. Mainland China is unquestionably Taiwan’s most pressing defense and security problem. The Communist leadership in Beijing has made it abundantly clear that China would resort to military means were Taiwan to move toward declaring independence and has made no attempt to disguise the fact that the PLA has been training and equipping itself, should that eventuality arise. Taiwan can do no other than respond, and to do so is heavily dependent on the US, a situation that leaves the Americans with something of a dilemma. Committed though the current American administration is to help Taiwan in a time of need, it also has to take into account the degree to which the US also needs PRC support for its policies on the global war on terrorism (GWOT) and on constraining those states WKDW3UHVLGHQW%XVKKDVGHÀQHGDVWKH´$[LVRI(YLOµ7DLZDQLVQRWLQDSRVLWLRQ to offer that degree of support, partly for geographical reasons and partly because LWKDVQRLQÁXHQFHRQVXFKVWDWHVDV1RUWK.RUHDXQOLNHWKH35& Another dilemma that the Americans face is the increasing capability of the PLA, one that could pose a threat to US armed forces stationed in the East Asia region. Already, the PLA Navy operates Russian Kilo-class submarines, and Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with the supersonic ‘Sunburn’ anti-ship missiles, both of which could pose a serious military threat to any American carULHUWDVNIRUFHRSHUDWLQJLQWKH:HVWHUQ3DFLÀF,QWKHHYHQWRIWHQVLRQRUKRVWLOLWLHV between Taiwan and the mainland, the US would expect initially to deploy that task force. Without question, American support for Taiwan has to be undertaken cautiously, the more so as China’s overall strategic economic, military, and political strength increases.

Addressing the issue of reform In his overview of Taiwan’s defense reform, Andrew Ross raises a number of fundamental questions that Taiwan’s policy-makers need to address. The most VLJQLÀFDQWRIWKHVHTXHVWLRQVDQGWKHRQHXSRQZKLFKDOORWKHUVIROORZLVZKHWKHU or not Taiwan’s defense reform is actually needed. The general conviction is that it is, because the immediate adversary, mainland China, has forced the issue with its own set of reforms and force modernization. As Ross also points out, neither

Introduction 9 the purpose of defense reform nor the object of reform will be evident unless Taiwan is sure that the PLA represents a new and substantially enhanced threat to the island. This leads then to the questions: what should be reformed? what should be the extent of that reform? and what are the primary components of reform? In summary, the reform process needs to address the requirement for new defense technologies; the military doctrines that prescribe defense operations and the new technologies that ought to be deployed to make them feasible; the organizational structures that manage future defense capabilities; and the trained manpower that can bring the reform process to fruition. The PRC embarked on the modernization of the PLA soon after the UN coaliWLRQIRUFHVGHIHDWHGWKH,UDTLDUPHGIRUFHVLQVSHFWDFXODUIDVKLRQGXULQJWKHÀUVW Gulf War in 1990–1. It was then that the performance of the US forces was seen as a harbinger of things to come. Indeed, it sparked off the concept of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs,’ one that any state that aspired to be a world leader could not afford to ignore. For the past decade, the PLA has thought through the implications of that experience as it has the conduct and performance of US and allied forces in Kosovo, Afghanistan and the War on Iraq, drawing their own conclusions regarding such concepts as Information Warfare, Battlespace Dominance and Network-centric Warfare. In line with China’s rapidly expanding economy, so also have the policy objectives of the PRC broadened especially with regard to power projection and sea power. All this has happened within a relatively short period of time. With external KHOSIURPWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQWKH3/$KDVPDGHUDSLGDQGVLJQLÀFDQWSURJress, as Dennis Hickey so emphatically points out in Chapter 4. It is the PLA’s rate of change, however, that is putting particular pressure on Taiwan and its armed forces and imbuing the reform process with a sense of urgency. This in itself, however, raises its own problems: any reform that is hurried can prove destabilizing and unsettling and might well involve taking risks that should better be avoided. Conversely, if the process is too slow, Taiwan runs the risk of falling further and further behind mainland China and becoming increasingly vulnerable. These questions, teleological in nature, focus attention on the purpose, manner, and content of Taiwan’s defense reform. The more critical questions address the implementation of that reform once a consensus has been arrived at regarding its direction and outcome. Here, issues such as the receptivity of the Taiwanese armed services to the idea of reform and its extent have to be addressed. Conservative by nature, and accustomed over the years to determining their own priorities and structures, the Taiwanese armed services will have to accept a new decision-making structure and a novel way of doing things, and in the process recognize that these will have profound implications for the future of Taiwan’s civil–military relations. Such reforms as will be introduced will probably impinge on the past high degree of autonomy enjoyed, and expected, by each of the three branches of the Services. They will in future have to become accustomed not only to engaging with civilian defense advisors and decision-makers but also to working together in a joint, shared vision of defense reform that focuses on Taiwan’s overall security interests rather than those of an individual Service.

10

Edmonds and Tsai

Taiwan’s defense reforms The PLA manifestly is the driver behind Taiwan’s defense reforms. There is, however, another factor, namely the political changes that have occurred within Taiwan since the election of President Chen Shui-bian, the emergence of the DPP as the ruling party, and the introduction of democracy within the country after several decades of KMT authoritarian rule. For political reasons and to meet the expectations of a democratic system, changes were necessary. This was particularly with respect to civilian control over the armed services. According to the 2002 Defense White Paper, there was a need for better coordination and cooperation among the various government departments with security interests through the National Security Council. Taiwan’s defense reforms can be bracketed under four different headings: new weapons systems; a reduction in overall numbers of military personnel and streamlined force structures; the integration of, and improvement in, military education and training; promotion of more “jointery” among the three armed services; and a strengthening of the country’s overall command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, and reconnaissance capability (C4ISR). The overall reform agenda is, therefore, extensive. Indeed, it could best be seen from a holistic perspective: no element in Taiwan’s defense and security posture should EHLPPXQHIURPFKDQJHRUDGMXVWPHQW(DFKKDVDV\PELRWLFLQÁXHQFHRUHIIHFW on all other elements. Though each element of any potential or possible reform can be treated separately, its links with the defense and security structure as a whole should not be overlooked. It is accepted within Taiwan that, since the initial move to introduce defense UHIRUPLQZLWKWKH´$UPHG)RUFHV·5HÀQLQJ3URJUDPµIXUWKHUGHIHQVHUHIRUP is urgently needed. As York Chen and Martin Edmonds point out, however, this cannot be conducted in a vacuum; nor can reforms be carried out without costs and penalties. For decision-makers, the process has to be seen in terms of a numEHURIWUDGHRIIV7KH\QRWHWKDWWKHÀUVWLVDWUDGHRIIEHWZHHQ7DLZDQ·VGHIHQVH and security policy and Taiwan–US relations. Under President Chen, Taiwan’s strategy was changed from “resolute defense and effective deterrence” to one of ´HIIHFWLYHGHWHUUHQFHDQGVWURQJGHIHQVHSRVWXUHµ6XSHUÀFLDOO\WKHWZRVWUDWHJLHV PLJKWDSSHDUVLPLODUEXWWKHDGGLWLRQRIDIHZH[WUDZRUGVVLJQDOVDVLJQLÀFDQW change of emphasis: “resolute defense” restricted Taiwan to a purely defensive strategy based on the protection of the island from external attack. The change to “strong defense posture” has opened up possibilities for alternative scenarios and operations. For example, the change in wording allows for a possible second strike on mainland China, one that also has to be credible if it is also to act as a deterrent. There is much support for this scenario, but it is one that could put in jeopardy Taiwan’s relations with the US, upon which Taiwan heavily depends. A second trade-off is between Taiwan’s military policy and economic development. In recent years, Taiwan’s economy has not performed as well as previously. Defense reform should not put pressure on the island’s economy by siphoning off scarce resources. A third trade-off is between military change and political sta-

Introduction 11 bility, particularly in respect of ideological differences between opposing camps within the Legislative Yuan. Finally, some balance has to be made between the defense reform process and levels of military readiness. Defense reform, which will entail changes, inter alia, in structures, weapons systems, decision-making processes, operational procedures, and training, will happen over a ten-year period at a minimum. It will doubtless be disruptive and have an impact on overall operational readiness. The trade-off will have to be between an evolutionary process and one that is more radical, even revolutionary. Either way, the transition will have to be one carefully managed involving an agreed, and recognized, strategy, perhaps with an incremental, bottom-up approach preferred. Military reform has to start somewhere and the most obvious place is to consider what Taiwan already has by way of existing military organization and force structures. Ming-shih Shen and Chen-tin Tsai analyze those factors that KDYHVKDSHG7DLZDQ·VDUPHGIRUFHVLQWKHSDVWDQGDVVHVVKRZWKHVHZLOOLQÁXence future reform. They also emphasize the nature of the military threat from the PRC as the focal point and make a judgment as to the appropriate military strategy to meet it. The factors that have shaped Taiwan’s defenses in the past and which will in the future are Taiwan’s geography, historical tradition and VWUDWHJLF FXOWXUH WHFKQRORJLFDO FDSDELOLWLHV ÀQDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV GHPRJUDSK\ and current structures. On the strength of their analysis, they make a number of practical recommendations, including changing the role of the Taiwanese Marine Corps; raising the pay of servicemen and women to enhance military technical professionalism; restructuring the reserve system; raising the status of non-comPLVVLRQHG RIÀFHUV DQG HQKDQFLQJ MRLQW SODQQLQJ DQG RSHUDWLRQV ,Q FRQFOXVLRQ they see Taiwan’s defense strengthened by “integrating effective conventional deterrent and counterattack capabilities by establishing a missile command and information/electronic combat units.” The institutional foundation of Taiwan’s future defense reform lies in its “Two Defense Acts,” namely the “Organization Act of the Ministry of Defense” and the “2002 National Defense Act.” The latter is the main focus of Wen-chung Lee’s FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKLV YROXPH +DYLQJ LGHQWLÀHG WKH UHOHYDQW UHTXLUHPHQWV RI WKH $FWKHWXUQVKLVDWWHQWLRQWRWKHGLIÀFXOWLHVLQYROYHGLQLPSOHPHQWLQJ7DLZDQ·V own ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’. Some of these are strictly structural, involving command authority, functional overlaps among and between higher command units, and problems with recruitment and the reserve mobilization system. Lee makes a number of prudent and thoughtful suggestions for the future development of Taiwan’s armed services, including enhancing the authority of the Commander-in-Chief and of civilians in the MND; reducing the length of military national service; focusing on structural reform and functional integration; raising military salaries; investing in military education; introducing joint operational SULQFLSOHV DQG ÀQDOO\ HVWDEOLVKLQJ D 1DWLRQDO 'HIHQVH &RQWUDFW &RPPLWWHH Whether these recommendations, built on the foundation of the two ROC Defense Acts, will be adopted is open to debate, but they at least help highlight some of WKHGLIÀFXOWLHVLQYROYHGDVZHOODVVRPHRIWKHH[LVWLQJSUREOHPVWKDWKDYHWREH to be solved.

12

Edmonds and Tsai

7KH86LVFUXFLDOWRWKHIXWXUHGHIHQVHRI7DLZDQLQWKUHHUHVSHFWVÀUVWLWLVD friend in need and Taiwan has relatively few at hand. Were the PRC ever to choose to attempt a pre-emptive strike against Taiwan, the US would be an essential element in the island’s defense. This was graphically demonstrated when President Clinton ordered a US carrier task force into the region following China’s missile saber-rattling activities prior to Taiwan’s 1996 presidential election. Second, the US is the primary source of the defensive weapons systems that are necessary for 7DLZDQWREHDEOHWRSURWHFWLWVHOIIRUDVXIÀFLHQWWLPHEHIRUHWKH86FDQFRPH to its aid. Third, the US military is also the provider of advice and instruction to the Taiwanese armed services, not merely because the ROC employs US military equipment, but more because for decades Taiwan has followed US military practices and procedures. It should be expected, therefore, that the US would play some role in Taiwan’s defense reform, the subject of Michael Pillsbury’s chapter. It has been written from a recent historical perspective, tracing how the US has given assistance to Taiwan since 1997. It is an important account because it points to reasons why the US has been committed to Taiwan for the past seven years and why it is likely to stand by the island in the future. In three stages, the US has become closer to Taiwan on defense matters, even though it has raised criticism in some quarters that such ties run contrary to the 1979 agreement to normalize relations between the US and the PRC. Other critics have argued that, in the light of the progress in the PLA’s modernization process, US assistance to Taiwan has been “too little, too late”. Since 2001, however, the US has taken relations with Taiwan WZR VWDJHV IXUWKHU ÀUVW E\ VXSSRUWLQJ7DLZDQ·V GHIHQVH UHIRUP DQG VHFRQG E\ recommending in 2003 that Taiwan should invest in missile defense and command and communication systems as a matter of defense priority. Since then, a sixth stage in US–Taiwan defense relations, the US has openly praised Taiwan for the initiatives it has already taken regarding defense reform. Perhaps it is only a matter of time, now that President Bush, a strong and vocal supporter of Taiwan, has been re-elected for a second term, until Taiwan may yet get the Aegis system it so emphatically wants. It may also have the chance to buy into the US/Japan ship-borne anti-missile defense system. Translating US support for Taiwan’s defense reform is another challenge, one that Eric McVadon addresses. He asks the basic question: what does Taiwan want by way of future weapons systems that address its defense and security needs and its anticipated military adversary? The answers are complicated by a number of IDFWRUVVRPHDUHKLJKO\SROLWLFDOVLQFHWKH35&XVHVLWVLQÁXHQFHZKHQDQGZKHUever it can on the US administration in order to drive a wedge between Washington DQG7DLSHL7KLVLQÁXHQFHLVKHOSHGQRWPHUHO\E\WKHH[SDQGLQJWUDGHUHODWLRQV between the two countries but also by the fact that Washington needs China’s help LQWKH3UHVLGHQW·VSULRULW\SROLF\WRÀJKWLQWHUQDWLRQDOWHUURULVP2WKHUGLIÀFXOWLHV LGHQWLÀHGDUHWKHWUDGHRIIVEHWZHHQWKHFRVWVRIGHIHQVHDQGWKHHIÀFDF\RIQHZ weapons, and between weapons priorities and their availability. Taiwan’s leaders need to establish a clear overall security strategy against which to identify its future weapons needs and to establish their priority. One element

Introduction 13 in this is to recognize that all new weapons systems will require new standards and levels of training if they are to be operationally ready when required. Some concern in this respect has been voiced with the introduction of new equipment – the Kidd-class destroyers, for example. Indeed it has been suggested that, even if Taiwan were to receive the Aegis systems, it was doubtful whether the ROC Navy had the skills available to operate it successfully. The standard of training of Taiwan’s conscript naval personnel is not thought to be up to the standard required for the Kidd-class DDG, let alone one equipped with Aegis, for them to EHHIIHFWLYHÀJKWLQJYHVVHOV Furthermore, before drawing up a “wish-list” of equipment, a range of factors KDYH WR EH WDNHQ LQWR DFFRXQW ÀUVW VXFK DV WKH TXHVWLRQ RI KRZ D QHZ V\VWHP integrates with other systems in Taiwan’s weapons inventory. To illustrate the complexities involved when acquiring new weapons systems, Eric McVadon examines in detail Taiwan’s hopes for an anti-submarine warfare capability, a missile defense system, and an offensive counter-strike capability. He concludes that the US is crucial to any security strategy that Taiwan might conjure up and DUJXHVWKDWLWVÀUVWSULRULW\VKRXOGEHWRGRZKDWLWFDQWRSUHVHUYHWKDW86FRPmitment. 3DUW9RIWKLVYROXPHSLFNVXSRQWKUHHVSHFLÀFLVVXHVWKDWHDUOLHUFKDSWHUVKDYH LGHQWLÀHG WKH LVVXH RI IXQGLQJ 7DLZDQ·V GHIHQVH UHIRUP WKH PDWWHU RI KXPDQ UHVRXUFHV DQG PLOLWDU\ SHUVRQQHO DQG ÀQDOO\ WKH UHIRUP RI 7DLZDQ·V PLOLWDU\ HGXFDWLRQDQGWUDLQLQJV\VWHPVRWKDWWKHUHZLOOLQIXWXUHEHTXDOLÀHGDUPHGVHUvicemen and women capable of operating the new systems and structures that the reform process will provide. The funding for Taiwan’s defense reform, the subject of Michael Tsai and Jason C. Lin’s chapter, is arguably the most important element of the whole reform process. Nothing is possible without adequate resources and this applies not merely to defense. Indeed, as different elements in the overall defense structure vie with one another for funding, so also has the Ministry of National Defense to argue its case in competition with other government spending GHSDUWPHQWV7KH\QRWHKRZHYHUWKDWWKHUHLVDVHULRXVGHÀFLHQF\LQWKHGHIHQVH budget, with the MND recording a yearly shortfall for some time. To accommodate this dearth of funds, they point to three options that could be employed as part of the defense reform process: for example, changes to the structure of the Taiwanese armed forces; changes to the organization of the armed VHUYLFHVDQGFKDQJHVWRPLOLWDU\HTXLSPHQWDQGZHDSRQV7KHÀUVWZRXOGLQYROYH downsizing the Taiwanese armed forces and improving the quality of their personnel, a departure from earlier initiatives, which only considered the numbers and not the quality of servicemen and women. The second would address the nationalization of the armed forces and the convergence of the defense administrative arrangements with the military command system. 7KHODVWLQLWLDWLYHZRXOGDGGUHVVZD\VRIHQKDQFLQJWKHÀUHSRZHURI7DLZDQHVH forces, increasing their mobility, and improving their command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Together, these should be enhanced by concentrating them in joint operations. This would be an initiative that would help to reduce a current rigidity in the defense budget that concentrates

14

Edmonds and Tsai

on the needs of the separate services and on spending categories such as personnel, operations, and equipment. Nevertheless, the authors claim that Taiwan’s defense EXGJHW LV LQVXIÀFLHQW WR PHHW WKH FXUUHQW WKUHDW GHIHQVH UHIRUP RU QR GHIHQVH reform. The more convincing the case for defense reform, however, the greater the probability is that those needed funds would be forthcoming. It has always been argued that manpower is the most important asset in any armed force, but in practice it tends to be that element that receives least attention and the lowest level of funding. With the focus shifting from massed armies to high-technology systems operated by fewer, but more highly trained and qualiÀHGPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHOWKHKXPDQUHVRXUFHHOHPHQWLQDUPHGIRUFHVKDVWDNHQRQ a new salience. This is no less the case with regard to Taiwan’s defense reforms than with the forces of other nations. Indeed, one capability edge that Taiwan has enjoyed in the past over the PRC has been the superior quality of its military personnel. That advantage has been steadily eroded as the PLA concentrates increasingly on the education, training, and exercising of its new, modernized forces. Ping Hsiung Lo examines closely Taiwan’s defense force proposals and the demands WKDWWKHVHZLOOPDNHRQIXWXUHPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHO,QVRGRLQJKHLGHQWLÀHVDQXPber of policies for human resource management, including revising recruitment SROLFLHVFKDQJLQJWKHSURSRUWLRQRIRIÀFHUVWRRWKHUUDQNVLQFUHDVLQJWKHQXPEHU of volunteers; recruiting more female personnel; employing more defense civil servants; modifying regulations; adjusting promotion criteria; and offering more EHQHÀWVWRVHUYLFHPHQDQGZRPHQ7KLVLVDGHPDQGLQJOLVWEXWLI7DLZDQLVWR achieve its defense reform objectives, it ignores human resource management at its peril. 7KH ÀQDO FKDSWHU E\ :HQFKXQJ &KDL DQG 7]X\XQ 6X DGGUHVVHV WKH LVVXH of military education and defense reform. Education and training are crucial to Taiwan’s ability to meet the requirements of future war, one that will involve high-tech weaponry, real time intelligence, new operational concepts and network-centric capabilities executed by joint forces. In the light of future battle FKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKHDXWKRUVFRQVLGHUKRZZHOOSODFHG7DLZDQLVWRHGXFDWHRIÀcers, NCOs and other ranks to meet these new demands. From their observations, it would appear that Taiwan’s existing military education system falls far short of the ideal. As part of the defense reform process, changes will have to be introduced to combat the level of ignorance of military and operational issues in WKHFLYLOJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHLQÁH[LELOLW\RIWKHFXUUHQWVWUDWHJLFFXOWXUH7KLVFDQ be achieved only through improvements in education and training at all levels. They offer a number of recommendations, amongst which are to diversify military education, use civilian educational establishments more, and substantially improve NCOs’ educational opportunities. They conclude, “With patterns of war and social trends changing rapidly, Taiwan’s military education has to adjust as quickly as possible.” Defense reformers would doubtless agree.

Conclusion on Taiwan’s defense reform Taiwan embarked on a process of defense reform in 1997. This process accelerated when the leader of the Democratic People’s Party, Chen Shui-bian, was elected

Introduction 15 3UHVLGHQW7KHVLJQLÀFDQFHRIKLVDSSRLQWPHQWIURPD7DLZDQHVHGHIHQVHUHIRUP perspective lay in the fact that he had for a long time been a demanding critic of the state of the Taiwanese armed forces. Whilst in the Legislative Yuan, he was HOHFWHGDVWKHÀUVWFRQYHQHURILWV1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH&RPPLWWHHDSRVLWLRQWKDW brought him to political prominence on the strength of his “sharp performance”. His appointment was no coincidence, for he had earlier in 1991 used his knowledge and expertise on defense issues to propose draft legislation on a National Defense Organization Law. That draft proposal later became the basis for the National Defense Law that was passed in 2000. His draft proposal was then followed by a 500-page study, written with Chen-heng Ko (currently Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council), in which they presented their own case for a comprehensive reform of Taiwan’s defenses. All this, of course, happened before the PRC embarked on the PLA’s modernization, which makes, in a manner of speaking, the need for Taiwan’s defense reform today all the more urgent. The die is now cast, and Taiwan, with the assistance of the US, has embarked on a much needed and comprehensive process of defense reform. As the contributors to this volume have demonstrated persuasively and in great depth, the transition will not be an easy process. Nothing should be taken for granted. A number RIIXQGDPHQWDODQGVHULRXVTXHVWLRQVKDYHÀUVWWREHDVNHGEHIRUHVROXWLRQVDUH sought and found. It is evident, however, that there is an enthusiasm for change and a strong determination to ensure that the reform process is carried through to successful fruition.

2

Taiwan’s defense reform Questions and observations Andrew L. Ross1

Taiwan’s national security and defense planners have embraced change. If the Taiwan Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (TIDSS) conference on “Taiwan’s Defense Reform: Key Issues” is any indication, they are both quite enthusiastic about change and deadly serious. Of course, Taiwan’s planners are not alone in championing change. National security and defense planners the world over are seeking to bring about change, often under the rubric of “transformation” and/or the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). In Taiwan, however, the emphasis is on “reform.” Despite tremendous variations in strategic circumstances and political, economic, and military conditions (domestic as well as international), a common set of issues and challenges confront all agents of change in the national security DQGGHIHQVHDUHQD&RQWULEXWRUVWRWKLVYROXPHKDYHLGHQWLÀHGDQGJUDSSOHGZLWK a number of those issues and challenges. Four issue areas have explored several critical issues, such as Taiwan’s security environment; the operationalization of reform; civil–military relations and resource requirements; organizational change; and professional military education. All the contributors are certainly to be commended for their breadth and depth of coverage. A particularly noteworthy set of contributions was presented by those concerned with the “Operational Aspects of Taiwan’s Defense Reform.” Among them, Eric McVadon has properly emphasized the strategic context of Taiwan’s defense reform. His discussion of the profound mix of strategic certainties and uncertainties (“mostly troubling certainty” and “unquestionably worrisome uncertainty”) with which Taiwan’s planners must contend, was very much on the mark. Planners must be aware that particular reforms may unintentionally heighten the uncertainty they confront rather than reduce it. In a nuanced assessment of Taiwan’s defense reform, York Chen and Martin Edmonds properly distinguished between “reform,” “modernization,” and “transformation” and dealt admirably with alternative approaches to reform, critical tradeoffs, budgetary constraints, risk, and the need to establish priorities. Since the advocates of change, whether in the guise of reform, transformation, or revolution, typically attempt, and promise, too much, their insistence that priorities be established is particularly apt. Ming-Shih Shen and Chen-Tin Tsai appropriately highlighted the complexity of defense reform. Their discussion of the strategic and tactical objectives of

Questions and observations 17 reform, the impact of geography and strategic culture, budgetary issues, social factors – such as conscription and alternative service – and their comparative approach to force structure implications provided an array of valuable insights.

Questions for Taiwan’s defense reformers It is critical for Taiwan that its defense reform efforts succeed. That requires clear thinking about the objectives, scope, components, implementation, costs, and ULVNVRIUHIRUP0RVWLPSRUWDQWO\SODQQHUVPXVWHQVXUHWKDWWKHUHLVDFORVHÀW between Taiwan’s security strategy and defense reform. Some of what I have read and heard gave me cause for concern: on some issues there were mixed, or at least unclear, messages; other issues appeared to require more attention. These concerns have been raised here in the form of questions for Taiwan’s defense reformers.

The objectives and scope of reform Why is reform needed? Reformers are obliged to explain why something more than routine change is QHHGHG$UHWKHUHPDMRUVWUDWHJLFFKDQJHVWKDWZDUUDQWDVLJQLÀFDQWGHIHQVHUHIRUP effort by Taiwan? Do ongoing or anticipated improvements in the capabilities of an adversary necessitate an ambitious reform program, or merely normal modernization? What are the military shortcomings that stimulated the call for UHIRUP" ,V GHIHQVH UHIRUP DQ HIIRUW WR GHÁHFW H[WHUQDO SUHVVXUHV IRU FKDQJH" Without a clear and persuasive rationale, neither the purpose of reform nor the object of reform will be evident. What is the purpose of defense reform? Neither the purpose of reform nor what is to be reformed can be assumed to be self-evident. The possible purposes of reform are many and varied: operational military capabilities might be improved; a higher priority could be placed on research and development; military readiness, current or future, could be increased; a new doctrine might be developed or existing doctrine revised; organizational KLHUDUFKLHV FRXOG EH ÁDWWHQHG DQG GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ SURFHVVHV VWUHDPOLQHG UHVRXUFHVFRXOGEHVKLIWHGIURPRQHFDWHJRU\RISURJUDPVWRDQRWKHUHIÀFLHQFLHV could be implemented so that a smaller proportion of the people’s resources need be devoted to defense; and the relationship between society and the military PLJKWEHUHFWLÀHGWKURXJKWKHDVVHUWLRQRUUHDVVHUWLRQRIWKHSULQFLSOHRIFLYLOLDQ control. This multitude of possible purposes requires that choices be made. What is to be reformed? The purpose of reform will dictate what is to be reformed: military strategy; ZDUÀJKWLQJ FDSDELOLWLHV ZKHWKHU RIIHQVLYH GHIHQVLYH RU ERWK UHVHDUFK DQG

18

Ross

development priorities; military readiness; military doctrine; relationships within and between the armed services; the military personnel system; the role of women in the military; the weapons acquisition system; civilian personnel management; and civil–military relations. As indicated by even such a partial listing of what PLJKW EH UHIRUPHG LW FDQ SURYH GLIÀFXOW WR NHHS UHIRUP HIIRUWV IRFXVHG 7KDW GLIÀFXOW\LVDPSO\LOOXVWUDWHGE\WKHH[SHULHQFHRIWKHRQJRLQJDQGHYHUH[SDQGLQJ military transformation enterprise in the US. If ‘reform’ is a term used to justify everything and anything defense planners are interested in, as has occurred with the concept of ‘transformation’ in the US, Taiwan’s defense reform will lose all meaning. What is the scope or extent of reform? How ambitious is Taiwan’s defense reform to be? What kind of change do its political and military leaders envision? Change can be extensive and far-reaching or limited and focused, even small-bore. It can be revolutionary or evolutionary, radical or conventional, paradigm-shifting or incremental, or somewhere in between. It could require leaping ahead (without necessarily knowing where one is leaping to or looking before one leaps) or merely crawling ahead. The slogan might be “out with the old and in with the new” or, more cautiously, “look before \RXOHDSµRUHYHQ´VWLFNZLWK>PRGLÀFDWLRQVWR@WKHWULHGDQGWUXHµ The use of the term ‘reform’ does not suggest a revolution in military affairs, a phenomenon that is relatively rare. But it implies something more than an evolution in military affairs or, essentially, that a routine change is being suggested. 5RXWLQHLQFUHPHQWDOFKDQJHZRXOGVHHPWREHLQVXIÀFLHQWEXWSUHFLVHO\ZKDWLV LWWKDWZRXOGEHVXIÀFLHQW"2QWKLVSRLQWWKHDXWKRUVLQWKLVYROXPHKDYHQRWEHHQ entirely consistent. Most authors have emphasized reform, distinguishing clearly between reform, on the one hand, and transformation or a revolution in military affairs, on the other. Deputy Minister General Chao-Min Chen, however, spoke of “our military transformation” and seemed to equate reform with a revolution in military affairs. Even President Chen Shui-bian, with his call to bring Taiwan’s armed forces into the information age, employed the language of transformation. Some of the changes sought by Taiwan’s defense reformers are more ambitious than others. A successful planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) for defense reform requires greater clarity on this point. It also requires that the reformers identify the metrics, particularly any new metrics, which should be used to measure the progress of reform. What kinds of wars against what kinds of opponents do reformers expect? Reformers cannot afford to lose sight of the military’s central purpose: to deter, ÀJKWDQGZLQZDUV%XWZKDWNLQGVRIZDUVPXVWWKHDUPHGIRUFHVEHSUHSDUHGWR GHWHUÀJKWDQGZLQ":KDWNLQGVRIDGYHUVDULHVPXVWWKH\EHDEOHWRGHWHUÀJKW and defeat? Wars and adversaries alike come in a variety of shapes and sizes. In

Questions and observations 19 Taiwan’s case, it is clear that the opponent is expected to be the People’s Republic RI&KLQD/HVVDSSDUHQWLVZKDWIRUPPLOLWDU\FRQÁLFWZLWKWKH35&ZLOOWDNH$VD number of authors have pointed out, the PRC’s military capabilities are evolving.2 The PRC currently has a range of options and is likely to have even more options in the future. Unfortunately, how, and precisely under what circumstances, it might employ its military capabilities against Taiwan is not entirely clear. This uncertainty means that Taiwan’s defense planners must prepare for a variety of contingencies. Possible scenarios range from the PRC’s coercion of Taiwan to one of attempted conquest. Whether Taiwan’s defense reform program will provide its military with the capabilities required to be successful across this spectrum of FRQÁLFWLVQRW\HWHYLGHQW

The primary components of reform What are the technological requirements of reform? Technology, as several authors have pointed out, is one of the three primary components of defense reform.3 Technological change, however, can take different forms. It can be revolutionary or evolutionary, discontinuous or incremental (or some combination of the two). Disruptive innovation or sustaining innovation may be required.4 Taiwan’s defense reformers can choose to invest in new technologies that represent a leap ahead or in routine, marginal improvements of current technologies.5 Similarly, they may elect to replace existing weapons systems or to upgrade them.6 If planners decide to replace ‘legacy’ systems, they ZLOOQHHGWRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUPRYLQJRQWRQH[WJHQHUDWLRQV\VWHPVLVVXIÀFLHQW or they should seek to skip a generation. Particular capabilities may emerge as critical – C4ISR, precision strike, and missile defense have been frequently mentioned. Defense planners must ensure that research and development priorities and funding levels are brought into alignment with reform efforts. They must also determine the preferred balance between the public and private sectors, and between indigenous and foreign sources of the technology and systems required for defense reform.7 What are the doctrinal requirements of reform? Doctrinal change is the second of the three primary components of defense reform. It is not enough to introduce new or improved technologies and weapons V\VWHPV :DUÀJKWHUV PXVW GHWHUPLQH KRZ WKRVH WHFKQRORJLHV DQG V\VWHPV DUH WREHXWLOL]HGQHZRSHUDWLRQDOFRQFHSWVZKHWKHUVHUYLFHVSHFLÀFRUMRLQWFRXOG even drive the development of new technologies and systems. As with technology, doctrinal change can be far-reaching or limited. The extent of doctrinal change UHTXLUHG ZLOO EH LQÁXHQFHG E\ FRQFHSWLRQV RI WKH QDWXUH RI IXWXUH ZDUV WKH technological opportunities exploited and challenges met, and the changes introduced by adversaries. If future wars will indeed differ fundamentally from past wars,8GRFWULQDOLPSURYHPHQWVRUPRGLÀFDWLRQVDUHOLNHO\WREHLQDGHTXDWH

20

Ross

New operational concepts will be required. Taiwan’s defense planners cannot ignore the possibility, even likelihood, that the People’s Liberation Army’s modernization will require Taiwan to respond not only with new hardware but with new ‘software.’ A radical rethinking of military doctrine, if not strategy (military strategy as well as security strategy), may be necessary. What are the organizational requirements of reform? The third primary element of reform is organizational change. Along with technological and doctrinal innovation, of whatever form, it is an integral component of defense reform. Like technological and doctrinal change, organizational change can be profound and extensive or cautious and circumscribed. The extent of technological and doctrinal innovation sought by defense reformers and the UHVLVWDQFH RI H[LVWLQJ RUJDQL]DWLRQV WR FKDQJH ZLOO LQÁXHQFH WKH UHDFK RI DQ\ organizational reforms. The more reformers push technological and doctrinal envelopes, the more likely it is that extensive, even disruptive, organizational change will be needed. At the very least, existing organizational structures and processes will be ‘tweaked.’ Reform that leads to the establishment of new warÀJKWLQJ VSHFLDOWLHV ² LQIRUPDWLRQ ZDUIDUH IRU LQVWDQFH ² FDQQRW EXW KDYH DQ organizational impact. More fundamentally, service roles, missions, and functions could be realigned. New organizations, even new services, have emerged out of defense reform efforts in the past. Taiwan’s defense reformers must not only come to terms with each of the three central components of defense reform and their inherent interdependence, but they must also determine the appropriate balance among technological, doctrinal, and organizational change. New technologies and weapons systems should not be emphasized at the expense of doctrinal innovation and organizational change. Should there be changes in the balance among force components? Technological, doctrinal, and organizational change may well require shifts9 in the balance and relationships among the land, naval, and air components of Taiwan’s total force. A force component, such as the Army, that has had pride of place for historical or political reasons, may well be displaced by another component (or components). Ground forces that in the past were supported by airpower may in the future support airpower. A particular component of the total force could emerge as the leading edge of Taiwan’s military power (as special operations forces have for the US in the ‘War on Terror’). Balance, or equality, of force components need not be the objective; an imbalance may be appropriate. Will reform alter the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities? Should it? Shifts in the balance among total force components brought about by technological, doctrinal, and organizational change may, intentionally or unintentionally, affect the relationship between offensive and defensive capabilities. No less importantly,

Questions and observations 21 external perceptions of Taiwan’s strategic posture may be altered, perhaps for the worse. Taiwan’s reformers appear to favor a military posture that might be characterized as strategically defensive but tactically offensive. The distinction between strategic and tactical is not always clear, however; parties often disagree about where the line between the two is located. Taiwan’s defense reformers should be wary of acquiring potentially provocative offensive counter-force capabilities – ballistic missile capabilities to counter the PLA’s short-range (SRBM) and intermediate-range (IRBM) ballistic missiles, for instance. Not only can it expect to come out the loser in a missile-building contest with the PRC, Taiwan may well ÀQGLWVHOILQD¶XVHRUORVH·SRVLWLRQZKLFKZRXOGHURGHUDWKHUWKDQHQKDQFHLWV security and cross-Strait stability. The acquisition of what is likely to be perceived as strategic, rather than tactical, offensive capabilities may well alarm not only the PRC but also Taiwan’s few supporters. Planners might instead emphasize the development of less provocative tactical offensive capabilities and defensive capabilities, particularly perhaps innovative anti-access capabilities. After all, the US, even with its vaunted offensive conventional superiority, is concerned about emerging anti-access capabilities, including those of the PRC. Taiwan’s planners should be cautious as well when using transformation/RMA rhetoric. Transformation and RMA, particularly in the US, are decidedly offensive phenomena. Will reform yield new advantages? Technological, doctrinal, and organizational change can entail building on existing advantages or creating new ones.10 Reformers with relatively modest objectives are inclined to build upon current comparative or competitive advantages; those with more ambitious objectives may attempt to create new comparative or competitive advantages. Might reform provide Taiwan with an asymmetrical advantage? If so, the implications must be carefully considered. The nature of the asymmetry will matter. PRC responses cannot but be considered in advance. The challenges KHUHVKRXOGQRWEHXQGHUHVWLPDWHG,WZLOOSURYHGLIÀFXOWIRU7DLZDQWRGHYHORSDQ asymmetrical military capability vis-à-vis the PRC without an unacceptable turn to weapons of mass destruction. However, Taiwan does possess an asymmetrical strategic advantage: its relationship with the US. This asymmetrical advantage must be carefully tended. Above all, it should not be taken for granted; nor should it be thought that anything resembling the tail wagging the dog would be tolerated.

The implementation of reform How is resistance to change to be overcome? Where there is change, there is resistance to change. That resistance can take various forms. It could, for instance, be organizational and/or cultural. Many organizations and individuals have a vested interest in the status quo. In the past, organizational and cultural resistance within major powers’ navies had to

22

Ross

be overcome as aircraft carriers displaced battleships as capital ships. In the US today, many aviators, even some of those who are among the leading advocates of transformation, have failed to enthusiastically embrace unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and, particularly, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Organizations, their bureaucracies, and the individuals who populate them tend to change slowly in the absence of an external shock. Taiwan’s defense reformers must determine how resistance to reform will be overcome. What are the implications of reform for civil–military relations? The demand for change may be generated by either military or civilian leaders. Whatever the source, military resistance to change, particularly far-reaching change, is to be expected. Opposition within the military can be particularly ÀHUFH KRZHYHU LI WKH DJHQW RI FKDQJH LV WKH FLYLOLDQOHDGHUVKLSZKHWKHU IURP the executive or legislative branches or from society at large. As experience with the congressionally imposed “jointness” requirement mandated by the 1986 *ROGZDWHU²1LFKROV$FWDQGWKHFXUUHQW2IÀFHRIWKH6HFUHWDU\RI'HIHQVH26'  led transformation enterprise in the US indicates, resistance to civilian-led change surfaces in militaries long accustomed to civilian control, let alone among those unaccustomed to civilian ‘meddling’. The reluctance, if not recalcitrance, exhibited by Taiwan’s armed forces in the face of civilian-driven change should come as no surprise, particularly since the assertion of civilian control is a prominent feature of defense reform. Indeed, the establishment of unambiguous civilian control of a professional, ‘nationalized’ military is the central political feature of Taiwan’s defense reform. A civilian leadership that is asserting its prerogatives in the defense planning arena is obliged to get up to speed. But the burden of adapting falls no less on the armed forces than on civilians. Military decision-making must become much more transparent. The condescending attitude toward civilians exhibited by some RIÀFHUVVKRXOGQRWEHWROHUDWHG0LOLWDU\FDOOVIRU¶WUDLQLQJ·FLYLOLDQVLQWKHZD\V of defense planning are off the mark. Civilians may have a lot to learn, but that requires education, not training. Both the civilian and military leadership must recognize that civilians are no longer outsiders in the defense establishment. Civilians should make no apologies for their presence. They are not second-class citizens in this new defense and security world, even though many may be new to it. Indeed, civilians are in command. Nor should civilians allow themselves to be intimidated by ‘military experience’. Those with ‘military experience’ often disagree about how particular defense problems should be resolved and those disagreements will frequently be resolved by civilians. Should there be a joint, shared vision of reform or separate service visions? In the US today, there are both. Unfortunately, service visions are not entirely in alignment with the joint vision; nor are service visions entirely in alignment with

Questions and observations 23 each other. Of course, this lack of full alignment may not be such a bad thing. There are advantages to competition among the services. One service getting it wrong is not as bad as all of the services getting it wrong. The additional costs RIVHUYLFHFRPSHWLWLRQPXVWEHZHLJKHGDJDLQVWLWVSRWHQWLDOEHQHÀWVMXVWDVWKH SUHVXPHGEHQHÀWVRIDMRLQWYLVLRQWRZKLFKDOOPXVWFRQIRUPPXVWEHZHLJKHG against the costs that will be incurred if the joint vision proves to be wrong. Have priorities been established? The multiple possible purposes of reform, the long list of what could be reformed, the potential scope or extent of reform, and the range of scenarios for which Taiwan’s defense planners must be prepared all point to the need for establishing priorities. In an undertaking as complex as Taiwan’s defense reform, it is impossible to achieve all objectives simultaneously. Priorities – primary, secondary, and tertiary, for instance – must be established and linked to a time line. Temporal priorities are no less important than substantive priorities. Taiwan’s defense planners must EHVSHFLÀFQRWRQO\DERXWZKDWLVWREHUHIRUPHGEXWDOVRDERXWWKHWLPLQJDQG VHTXHQFHRIUHIRUPV7KHHIIHFWLYHDQGHIÀFLHQWLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIUHIRUP²DQG WKH HIIHFWLYH DQG HIÀFLHQW DOORFDWLRQ RI UHVRXUFHV IRU UHIRUP ² ZLOO EH JUHDWO\ facilitated by the establishment of clear and explicit priorities. Is there (should there be) a sense of urgency? Like a driver on a long trip, reformers have a choice of moving fast, slow, or somewhere in between. Reforms can be introduced quickly or gradually. National Security Council Secretary General Ning-Hsiang Kang has spoken of a stable and gradual approach. President Chen Shui-bian, however, called for speeding up the defense reform process. Of course, some changes may be more urgently needed than others. The feasibility of implementing far-reaching reforms quickly is, of course, open to question. Too much urgency, like driving too fast, can be a problem. Speed can be fatal to reformers and to the target of their reforms. As the current US approach to ballistic missile defense illustrates, too great a sense of urgency can lead to the acceptance of risks best avoided. What are the resource implications of reform? Reform is not cost-free. Whether pursuing extensive or limited change, Taiwan’s defense planners must beware the costs of reform. Resources for defense are VHOGRP XQOLPLWHG 7KHUHIRUH LQ DGGLWLRQ WR GHPRQVWUDWLQJ WKDW WKH EHQHÀWV of reform will outweigh its costs, reformers are obliged to determine how the changes they envision will be paid for.11 :LOO UHIRUP EH ÀQDQFHG RXW RI WKH existing defense budget or will additional resources be required? If the former, ZKDW GHIHQVH SURJUDPV DQGRU FDSDELOLWLHV VKRXOG EH VDFULÀFHG IRU WKH VDNH RI reform? If the latter, what non-defense programs should be cut in order to free up additional resources for defense? Or is it that total central government spending

24

Ross

LV WR EH LQFUHDVHG WR ÀQDQFH GHIHQVH UHIRUP" 5HIRUPHUV QHHG WR DGGUHVV WKHVH questions and their implications.

Unintended consequences What are the risks of reform? Reform and transformation focus on the next military and the military after next rather than on today’s armed forces. That focus on the future poses risks. In Taiwan and elsewhere, the advocates of reform highlight the risks of not reforming – the risks associated with, for instance, emphasizing current readiness rather than future readiness. The potential risks of reform – those associated with HPSKDVL]LQJIXWXUHUHDGLQHVVRYHUFXUUHQWUHDGLQHVVIRULQVWDQFHRURIVDFULÀFLQJ force structure to pay for reform – and of different approaches to reform should also be acknowledged. A thorough and systematic risk assessment that reveals unacknowledged trade-offs and potential unintended consequences must be an integral part of the reform process. Reformers, of course, tout the intended EHQHÀWVRIFKDQJH3ODQQHUVPXVWH[SOLFLWO\VHHNWRGLVFHUQLWVXQLQWHQGHGDGYHUVH consequences. Discussion within the Taiwan defense community of the notion of “deterrence by denial,” seemingly without recognition of the Cold War baggage associated with the term, illustrates the need for considering the potential adverse consequences of defense planning decisions. “Red teaming” exercises could be particularly valuable tools. Only by explicitly recognizing risk can planners come to terms with, and manage, it.

Reform and Taiwan’s security strategy What is the security strategy that defense reform supports? There has been little discussion of Taiwan’s security strategy, and of the linkages between that strategy and defense reform. Defense reform, like defense planning, FDQQRWSURFHHGSURÀWDEO\LQHLWKHUDVWUDWHJLFYDFXXPRUDVWUDWHJ\YDFXXP,W has not been made clear what ‘big picture’ security strategy Taiwan’s defense reform is intended to support. Defense reform is not general purpose or generic. Different strategies require different reforms; nor is defense reform a substitute for seriously and systematically addressing broader security strategy challenges. Taiwan’s security cannot be assured through military means alone.

Notes 1 The author would like to thank Roger Cliff and Peter Dombrowski for their comments and suggestions. The views expressed here are those of the author; they do not QHFHVVDULO\UHÁHFWWKRVHRIWKH1DYDO:DU&ROOHJHWKH861DY\WKH'HSDUWPHQWRI Defense, or any other US government department or agency. 2 On this point see Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 2003, available at http://www.

Questions and observations 25

3 4 5 6 7

8   10 11

defenselink.mil/pubs/20030730chinaex.pdf; Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000; Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security, 28 (4), Spring 2004; Michael Pillsbury (ed.), Chinese Views of Future Warfare, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998; Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (eds), China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, Conventional Capabilities, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, September 2002; and Larry M. Wortzel (ed.), The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, December 1999. For a discussion of these central components, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” The National Interest, 37, Fall 1994, pp. 30–42. Or some combination of the two. On the distinction between discontinuous innovation and sustaining innovation, see Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, New York: Harper Business, 2000. Or both. Or, again, both. For an examination of this issue in the US context, see Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and Andrew L. Ross, Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next: The Defense Industrial Implications of Network-Centric Warfare, Newport Paper no. 18, Newport: US Naval War College Press, 2003, available at http://www. nwc.navy.mil/press/npapers/np18/np18.pdf. As argued by the advocates of concepts such as network-centric warfare/operations. 2ULQWKHFDVHRIRUJDQL]DWLRQDOFKDQJHUHÁHFWVKLIWV Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive. Claims that reforms will generate savings should be met with skepticism. Here, as elsewhere, reformers should avoid promising too much.

3DUW,,

The external threat: mainland China

3

China’s military threat to Taiwan LQWKHWZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\ Coercion or capture? Andrew Scobell1

,QWURGXFWLRQ The most serious military threat Taiwan faces is that from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Any analysis of Taiwanese defense reform should proceed from an evaluation of the threat posed to the island by the armed forces of the PRC. 7KLVFKDSWHURIIHUVDWHQWDWLYHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHQDWXUHRIWKLVWKUHDW²LGHQWLÀHG as coercion or capture – and draws some basic implications from this assessment. One aspect of the military threat from China will be excluded from consideration: the use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction.2

China’s strategic intent A fundamental question must be addressed at the outset: what is China’s strategic LQWHQW YLVjYLV7DLZDQ"7KH 35&·V VWDWHG JRDO IRU7DLZDQ LV FOHDU XQLÀFDWLRQ ZLWKWKH&KLQHVHPDLQODQG1DWLRQDOXQLÀFDWLRQLVLGHQWLÀHGDVRQHRI´WKHWKUHH historical tasks of the Chinese people in the new century”.3 Since the late 1970s, Beijing has proposed that this be accomplished peacefully through dialogue DFURVV WKH7DLZDQ 6WUDLW7KH 35& DGRSWHG D ORQJWHUP KRUL]RQ IRU XQLÀFDWLRQ DQG HPSKDVL]HG ÁH[LELOLW\ ,Q WKH PLQGV RI WKH 3HRSOH·V 5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD·V leaders, they have been remarkably patient, forward-thinking, and magnanimous. Moreover, Beijing has offered Taipei “a high degree of autonomy” and promised that the island could keep its economic and social systems intact following XQLÀFDWLRQ Despite China’s more conciliatory policy toward Taiwan during the post-Mao HUD%HLMLQJKDVVWLOOUHIXVHGWRUHQRXQFHWKHXVHRIIRUFHWRDFKLHYHXQLÀFDWLRQ &KLQDVHHVDUROHIRUPLOLWDU\IRUFHLQEULQJLQJDERXWXQLÀFDWLRQZLWK7DLZDQEXW what kind of role would this be? The question seems to boil down to whether or not Beijing intends to coerce, or capture, the island. Coercion involves employing VXIÀFLHQWPLOLWDU\IRUFHRUWKHWKUHDWRIPLOLWDU\IRUFHLQRUGHUWRGHWHU7DLZDQ from pursuing a policy of independence, or to compel Taiwan to move toward XQLÀFDWLRQ&DSWXUHLQYROYHVXVLQJVXIÀFLHQWPLOLWDU\IRUFHWRVHL]HSK\VLFDOFRQtrol of the island. 7RDQVZHUWKHTXHVWLRQRIKRZWKHXVHRIPLOLWDU\IRUFHÀWVLQWR&KLQD·VLQWHQtions for Taiwan, one must carefully assess Chinese thinking at the strategic level.

30

Scobell

Particularly important to Chinese leaders and strategic analysts are the questions how they see the “overall situation” (daju) and the key “trends” (qushi) of the times.4 How does Beijing assess, therefore, the overall situation and fundamental trends in the Taiwan Strait? According to the PRC’s Defense White Paper of December 2002, the “basic pattern and trend of development in the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship remained XQFKDQJHGµ 7KH GRFXPHQW LGHQWLÀHV SRVLWLYH WUHQGV ´7DLZDQ FRPSDWULRWV DUH more vocal in their demands for: peace; tranquility and development; cross-Straits economic, trade, cultural and personnel exchanges, which have become more IUHTXHQWWKHRSHQLQJRI>WKH@WKUHHGLUHFWOLQNVLQPDLODLUDQGVKLSSLQJEHWZHHQ the two sides represents the popular will and trend of the times.” However, the GRFXPHQW DOVR LGHQWLÀHV GLVWXUELQJ QHJDWLYH WUHQGV ´WKH URRW FDXVH RI WHQVLRQ between the two sides has not been eliminated”; and the “leader of Taiwan” [perVLVWVLQ@´UHIXVLQJWRDFFHSWWKH¶2QH&KLQDSULQFLSOH·DQGVWXEERUQO\FOLQJLQJWR WKHSRVLWLRQRI¶7DLZDQLQGHSHQGHQFH·HYHQ>JRLQJ@VRIDUDVWRGLVKXSWKH separatist proposition of ‘one country on each side,’ and carried out all sorts of separatist moves employing an incremental tactic.”5 Despite these negative trends, Beijing nevertheless appeared to believe until the mid-1990s that the overall thrust of cross-Strait relations was very promising: Taiwan was being drawn inexorably closer to China by the sinews of trade and LQYHVWPHQWDQGE\WKHÁRZRISHRSOHEDFNDQGIRUWKDFURVVWKHVWUDLW What appear to have prompted a reassessment of the overall situation and the direction of trends were political changes within Taiwan itself. These changes over the past approximately quarter of a century (i.e. since the late 1980s) entail a gradual, but dramatic, transformation of the island’s political system from a repressive authoritarian regime to a burgeoning democratic one. Democratization provided the impetus for the island’s political leaders to establish a stronger Taiwanese identity that is markedly distinct from the Chinese mainland and to SXVKPRUHDVVHUWLYHO\IRUDKLJKHULQWHUQDWLRQDOSURÀOHIRU7DLZDQ6LJQLÀFDQWO\ episodes of rising tension between the two sides have correlated with impending elections on the island, the results of which Beijing fears will move Taipei further down the road to independence in the absence of muscular PRC action. Also of concern to Beijing in the mid-1990s were the stepped-up efforts by President Lee Teng-hui at so-called “vacation diplomacy”. Especially incendiary was Lee’s ostensibly private visit in June 1995 to the US to attend an alumni reunion at his Alma Mater, Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. This event, along with the run-up to Taiwan’s presidential election of March 1996, prompted China to re-evaluate the Taiwan Strait situation and determine that serious and negative trends were emerging: namely that the island appeared to be moving toward a declaration of independence. These trends had to be checked and this required saber-rattling to make crystal clear to Taiwan the consequences of such actions.6 The most recent development to raise the ire of mainland China’s leaders was the referendum arranged by President Chen Shui-bian and scheduled for the same date as the presidential election in March 2004. Did China see this as a disturbing,

&KLQD·VPLOLWDU\WKUHDWWR7DLZDQLQWKHWZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\ 31 but isolated, episode, or part of a larger, more ominous, trend? The latter would seem to be the case. Beijing has viewed this development as merely the latest in a carefully conceived scheme by anti-China activists to move Taiwan ever closer to independence.7 Chinese leaders see the current efforts as linked to the earlier efforts by Lee Teng-hui in the mid-1990s and Lee’s highly publicized 1999 articulation of his conception of cross-Strait relations as being “state-to-state”.8 There are indications that some Chinese leaders are growing impatient and have begun to conclude that the overall situation and major trends do not seem to be favoring China any longer.9 Beijing may have also quietly instituted rough GHDGOLQHVRUWLPHOLQHVIRUPDNLQJSURJUHVVWRZDUGXQLÀFDWLRQ7KLVLVQRWQHFessarily cause for alarm, but it does suggest that Chinese leaders of the early WZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\DUHOHVVLQFOLQHGWRWDNHWKHORQJWHUPYLHZWKDQZHUHWKHLU predecessors.10

The role of military force But what will Beijing do about what it perceives as Taiwan’s gradual, but QRQHWKHOHVV GHOLEHUDWH PRYH WRZDUG LQGHSHQGHQFH LQ WKH ÀUVW GHFDGH RI WKH WZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\":LOO&KLQDEHPRUHZLOOLQJWRXVHPLOLWDU\PHDQV"6SHDNLQJ LQ1RYHPEHU0DMRU*HQHUDO:DQJ=DL[LRIWKH35&·V7DLZDQ$IIDLUV2IÀFH declared: “If the Taiwan authorities collude with all ‘splittist’ forces to openly engage in pro-independence activities and challenge the mainland and the ‘One China’ principle, the use of force may become unavoidable.”11 Would Chinese saber-rattling be enough to deter Taiwanese leaders from proceeding along the separatist path? Or is there no dissuading the island from continuing down a road that would lead toward eventual independence? In other words, in the minds of PDLQODQG&KLQD·VOHDGHUVZLOOFRHUFLRQVXIÀFHRUZLOOWKHPLOLWDU\FDSWXUHRIWKH island be necessary? One cannot say for sure, but it is likely that Beijing hopes desperately that a little saber-rattling will be all that is required to bring Taiwan’s leaders around. This notion has strong appeal in Beijing, because it implies that China can achieve its goals vis-à-vis Taiwan relatively easily, at minimal cost, and more or less with existing People’s Liberation Army (PLA) capabilities. The coercion option is what a number of analysts have long assumed to be the focus of Beijing efforts, rather than the more daunting and ambitious capture scenario.12 China’s political leaders must still also contemplate the unthinkable: a military operation to conquer the island and the leadership of the PLA must be prepared to execute such an operation if so ordered. First, the coercive option will be considered and then the capture option will be explored.

The coercive option It is important to consider how China’s leaders assess the results of earlier FRHUFLYH HIIRUWV %HLMLQJ LQLWLDOO\ DSSHDUHG VDWLVÀHG WKDW LWV VKRZ RI IRUFH LQ ²KDGEHHQDTXDOLÀHGVXFFHVV13 The less forceful saber-rattling response to the “state-to-state” episode of 1999 and the lead-up to the 2000 presidential

32

Scobell

HOHFWLRQ ZHUH DOVR YLHZHG DV D TXDOLÀHG VXFFHVV7KH ZDU JDPLQJ DFWLYLWLHV RI the PLA Air Force aircraft in the Taiwan Strait, and the launching of the February ´SDSHUPLVVLOH·:KLWH3DSHURQQDWLRQDOXQLÀFDWLRQLQ%HLMLQJ·VYLHZKDGD very sobering effect on Taiwan at the time and, moreover, for a while afterwards. As a consequence, China remained conspicuously quiet on the subject of Taiwan until late 2003. Would similar measures have the desired effect a second time around? On the one hand, at least some Chinese leaders seem to recognize that the kind of coercive diplomacy practiced in 1995–6 was somewhat counter-productive in that it may have actually increased support for pro-independence forces within Taiwan and made China look like a bully to much of the world.14 On the other hand, %HLMLQJ·VORJLFFRXOGEHWKDWWRJHW7DLZDQ·VDWWHQWLRQLQWKHWZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\ and achieve the desired result might require China to ratchet up its saber-rattling. That is to say, Taiwan might not be so alarmed by a reprise of China’s 1995–6 show of force – which was a series of war games in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait and a handful of missile tests off the coast of the island. Indeed, Taiwanese might almost expect as much and be unfazed by this. Therefore, in order to get 7DLSHL·VDWWHQWLRQLQWKHÀUVWGHFDGHRIWKHWZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\%HLMLQJPLJKWQHHG to raise its saber rattling to a higher level.15 What kind of escalation in coercive behavior might China consider? The challenge for Beijing would be to ratchet up the pressure without triggering actual hostilities or wider foreign military intervention. Among the coercive measures China might consider employing are: 1 2

3

4

Testing ballistic missiles in greater numbers than in 1995–6.16 Establishing a limited sea blockade around Taiwan (but calling it a “quarantine”) enforced by surface ships, submarines, aircraft, and mines.17 The declared rationale might be to prevent deliveries of military equipment from abroad. Beijing could publicly declare “no-go areas” with the expressed intent of inhibiting “anti-China” Taiwan naval operations. The PLA could announce that these areas had been mined and were being heavily patrolled by PLA Navy submarines.18 The blockading of an outlying Taiwan-occupied island, such as Taiping Dao or the Pratas Islands. Such a step would carry a low risk of escalation and failure when compared with blockading Quemoy or Matsu. The seizure of an outlying Taiwan-occupied island, such as Taiping Dao or the Pratas Islands. As with option (3) the operation would carry a relatively low risk compared with seizing Quemoy or Matsu but still send a very powerful and unmistakable message to Taipei.19

Capture But China cannot assume that any of these coercive means would achieve its intended goal given the uncertain overall situation and unfavorable trends. Beijing needs to have other viable options. While it is highly unlikely that Chinese

&KLQD·VPLOLWDU\WKUHDWWR7DLZDQLQWKHWZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\ 33 leaders would actually want to launch a military operation to capture Taiwan, this possibility cannot be ruled out. What if the coercion option fails in Beijing’s view? China’s leaders may feel that they have no alternative but to launch an attack.20 A military effort to capture Taiwan would be extremely costly, not to mention risky, ZLWKQRJXDUDQWHHRIDVXFFHVVIXORXWFRPH1HYHUWKHOHVVEDVHGRQDFWXDOÀHOG H[HUFLVHV DXWKRULWDWLYH PLOLWDU\ SXEOLFDWLRQV DQG YHULÀDEOH PLOLWDU\ SODQQLQJ efforts, we know that the PLA is preparing for Taiwan attack scenarios.21 What are the fundamental factors that China’s civilian and military leaders almost certainly keep in mind when planning the capture of Taiwan? There seem to be at least three key guiding principles that would inform their thinking: .HHSLQJDFWXDOÀJKWLQJDQGZDUGDPDJHWRDPLQLPXP $V ZLWK XQLÀFDWLRQ ZLWK +RQJ .RQJ %HLMLQJ GRHV QRW ZDQW WR NLOO WKH ´JRRVH that lays golden eggs”. If much of Taiwan’s infrastructure were destroyed and its economic value were devastated in the course of the conquest then this would constitute a Pyrrhic victory. Moreover, China would seek to minimize the costs RISRVWFRQÁLFWUHFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGZRXOGQRWZDQWWRFUHDWHXQQHFHVVDU\KDWUHG for the PRC in Taiwan. The more brutal and bloody the battle, the more anger and resentment the Taiwanese would have for their new occupiers. .HHSLQJWKHGXUDWLRQRIWKHFRQÁLFWEULHI A quick win is the preferred option so that foreign forces would have minimal response time to show up to support Taiwanese defenders. China’s civilian and military leaders assume they will have to factor in the involvement of armed forces from other countries and presume these will include US military components. 6LQFH WKH LQYROYHPHQW RI VXFK H[WHUQDO IRUFHV ZRXOG VLJQLÀFDQWO\ GHFUHDVH WKH odds of an outright Chinese military success, ideally the battle for Taiwan would be over before outside forces arrived on the scene.22 Second, a short war would NHHSWKHFRVWVRID7DLZDQFRQÁLFWWRDORZOHYHOSODFLQJPLQLPDOVWUDLQRQ&KLQD·V defense budget and taking fewer casualties, and incur a lower toll on equipment DQGZHDSRQV\VWHPV7KLUGDZDURIVKRUWGXUDWLRQZRXOGVLJQLÀFDQWO\OLPLWWKH negative impact on China’s economy and its foreign economic relations. Chinese OHDGHUVUHFRJQL]HWKDWD7DLZDQFRQÁLFWFRXOGLQÁLFWVLJQLÀFDQWDQGPDMRUGDPDJH WR WKHLU HFRQRP\ DQG VHULRXVO\ KDUP IRUHLJQ LQYHVWRU FRQÀGHQFH DQG &KLQD·V relations with other countries, etc.23 Hence, if a war were considered absolutely necessary, then a quick one would be best. Keeping operational requirements manageable When approaching the conquest of Taiwan, all military planning must be bounded E\WKH3/$·VVLJQLÀFDQWFDSDELOLW\FRQVWUDLQWV&KLQD·VPLOLWDU\KDVVHULRXVOLPLWV on its power projection capabilities: one analyst has characterized the PLA as having “short arms and slow legs.”24 Nevertheless, its force projection abilities

34

Scobell

continue to improve and, although a Taiwan operation would undoubtedly stretch these, such an operation would not necessarily prove a bridge too far. To offset the limited military logistical resources, wherever possible it would be essential for the PLA to utilize available Chinese civilian assets, and they plan to do so.25 In any Taiwan operation it is important not to get too complicated: keep operations familiar and close to the comfort zone of the troops. This means keeping it simple and sticking to what they train for. Most of these guiding principles favor a fait accompli – a military operation that will bring swift military surrender and political capitulation. The emphasis would be on surprise and daring through such steps as: •

‡ ‡

•

•

•

Massed missile strikes against key military targets such as air bases and PLVVLOHVLWHVWRZLQDLUVXSHULRULW\DWWKHRXWVHW3UHYHQWLQJ7DLZDQHVHÀJKWHUV from getting airborne would be an extremely high priority.26 6DERWDJHDQGGLVLQIRUPDWLRQFDUULHGRXWE\ÀIWKFROXPQIRUFHV27 6SHFLDOIRUFHVLQÀOWUDWHGE\VXEPDULQHVPDOOERDWSDUDFKXWHRUSDUDJOLGHU to secure key command, control, communication, computers, intelligence (C4I) installations, radar, missile, and early warning sites and perhaps even to capture high-level civilian and military leaders. The PLA reportedly has perhaps 1,000 Special Forces soldiers.28 Inserting at least 10,000 airborne troops to seize and hold airports, air bases, and communications hubs. Presently the PLA possesses only one corps-size airborne unit – the 15th Airborne. The 15th is estimated to be 35,000 strong. However, transporting the entire unit across the Taiwan Strait in a single operation might prove too much.29 Information operations (IO), electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and computer network attacks (CNA) to paralyze or otherwise disable critical infrastructures C4ISR.30 Submarines to keep Taiwanese naval vessels bottled up in port. Mines might not be used, or used sparingly in a capture scenario, because of concern that PLA Navy vessels might unwittingly stumble upon these in subsequent operations.

Still another option would be a more conventional all-out invasion of Taiwan.31 How likely is this? In the past, the author has argued that it is an “extremely unlikely” eventuality, but as of early 2004 is inclined to be less dismissive of this option.32:HGRNQRZWKDWWKH3/$LVGHÀQLWHO\WKLQNLQJSODQQLQJDQGH[HUFLVLQJ for such a scenario.33 Aspects include amphibious landings. Formally, the PLA has an extremely limited amphibious capability. China has a small Marine Corps – reportedly two brigades totaling about 12,000 personnel and at least several dozen landing craft (with estimates running anywhere from 70 to 700), most of which tend to be very small and unable to navigate the open sea.34 Still, in a major naval/logistical operation across the Strait, the PLA plans to co-opt civilian YHVVHOVVXFKDVSDVVHQJHUIHUULHVFDUJRVKLSVDQGÀVKLQJERDWVLQZKDWFDQEH viewed as an updated application of People’s War.35 The result has been called a

&KLQD·VPLOLWDU\WKUHDWWR7DLZDQLQWKHWZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\ 35 “Dunkirk in reverse”.36 In the Taiwan case, rather than an evacuation of troops to accomplish a withdrawal, there would be a massive ferrying operation by all manner of available watercraft to land forces for an attack. The operation has been dubbed the ‘Million Man Swim’ because the nature of the vessels and coastline of Taiwan would almost certainly require soldiers to swim or wade ashore before VWHSSLQJRQWHUUDÀUPD37

Assessing the options Two strategic level factors and two operational level factors are worthy of consideration in assessing the likelihood of the PRC and the PLA’s pursuing option 1 or 2. The strategic level 1

2

The PRC has demonstrated a propensity for risk-taking in its use of force. Allen Whiting and other pioneers in the study of Beijing’s use of military power since 1949 stressed caution, careful calculation, and use of signaling. These early studies were based on limited evidence and skillful use of deductive logic.38 More recent studies based on extensive primary sources reveal a far greater willingness by China’s leaders to take substantial – albeit calculated – risks.39 Many studies assessing an attack on Taiwan stress the GDXQWLQJ FKDOOHQJHV DQG DVVXPH WKH HQRUPRXV GLIÀFXOWLHV ZRXOG GHWHU WKH PLA from even attempting any of these scenarios.40 Nevertheless, as Harlan Jencks observes, “wild speculation is . . . necessary when talking about the Taiwan Strait, given the vast range of variables which most studies about the ‘military balance’ assume away.” Moreover, Jencks adds, “If one disregards all the sensible assumptions then . . . anything is possible.”41 PRC leaders appear adamant in their belief that China always uses military force in self-defense. I argue that PRC civilian and military élites are under the sway of a “Cult of Defense” whereby even a pre-emptive strike can be MXVWLÀHGDVEHLQJDVWUDWHJLFDOO\GHIHQVLYHDFW,QGHHGWKHVWUDWHJLFSULQFLSOH of “active defense” (jiji fangyu) appears to blur the line between offense and defense in the minds of Beijing strategists to such an extent that no distinction exists.42 For China’s leaders, any military operation involving Taiwan ZRXOGZLWKRXWDGRXEWEHSHUFHLYHGDVSXUHO\DVHOIGHIHQVHRSHUDWLRQÀJKWing to “defend” or to “protect” Chinese sovereignty; certainly Beijing would never think of such an operation as constituting an “attack” on Taiwan!43 If a nation’s leaders believe they are acting defensively, they will tend to be more willing to authorize the use of force.

The operational level The PLA, like the armed forces of other states, is often considered to be a cautious and conservative institution averse to risk-taking and highly resistant to change

36

Scobell

and innovation. Two factors, however, serve to admonish those who would be so dismissive of the PLA. 1

2

When an organization, including a military organization, focuses all its attentions toward one goal, it can improve relatively quickly, as James Q. Wilson argues. Once a new doctrine has been adopted, operational requirements, tactics, and logistical needs can readily be brought into line.44 Taiwan is the VFHQDULRXSRQZKLFKWKH3/$LVIRFXVHGDQGÀWVFRPIRUWDEO\LQWRWKH´OLPited war under high-technology conditions” that its political masters have GLUHFWHGWKHPLOLWDU\WRSUHSDUHWRÀJKW6LQFHWKHHQGRIWKH&ROG:DUWKH environment on China’s periphery has become more complex and uncertain, requiring the PLA to consider and plan for a greater range of contingencies, including countering “terrorists, separatists, and extremists”.45 Nevertheless, it is still Taiwan that remains the consuming focus for China’s armed forces. The PLA’s traditional stress on the ability of the weak to overcome the strong underscores the belief that force of will and seizing the initiative can “offVHW >D@ JURVV LPEDODQFH RI SRZHUµ46 In other words, just because the PLA does not have the capabilities that other militaries might consider essential to launch a lightning assault or major seaborne invasion of Taiwan does not mean the PLA would not dare to attempt it. The PLA would proceed even if the attack were against a more heavily armed and far more technologically advanced foe. The PLA’s history of making do with what it has means that the Chinese military searches for “make-do” solutions and is instilled with a “come-as-you-are” mentality.47 The US was dismissive of the Chinese intervening in Korea in late 1950, notably General Douglas MacArthur. Even Chinese generals confessed to being daunted by the challenges of leading a force composed largely of light infantry into a confrontation with the world’s most powerful military. But the bravado and audacity of Mao Zedong combined with the PLA’s record of overcoming tremendous obstacles and defeating more powerful adversaries inspired Chinese soldiers to cross the Yalu and perform with great heroism and military effectiveness.48 The Chinese military intervention surprised United Nations Command Forces and turned the tide of the Korean War.

Moreover, the PLA has been labeled a “Junk-Yard Army”. Some observers have mistakenly assumed this is a pejorative term but it is not. The term was originally applied to the earliest days of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) as an accolade, a tribute to the IDF’s ability to scour the military junk-yards of the world, to mix and match different weapon systems, and to cannibalize parts and ammunition. 6RPHKRZWKHUDJWDJ,')SXWLWDOOWRJHWKHUDQGZDVDEOHWRZLQRQWKHEDWWOHÀHOG and thereby ensure that the state of Israel was not stillborn. So one should not be too quick to write off the PLA as incapable of surmounting the daunting challenges of a military attack on Taiwan.

&KLQD·VPLOLWDU\WKUHDWWR7DLZDQLQWKHWZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\ 37

Conclusion Capture and coercion by China constitute military threats to Taiwan and both should be taken very seriously. Yet, in practice, the line between coercion and FDSWXUHPD\EHIX]]\DQGH[WUHPHO\GLIÀFXOWWRGLVFHUQ,QGHHGWKHVHVFHQDULRV are not mutually exclusive and could be used in combination. For example, PLA saber-rattling in the Taiwan Strait could morph into an actual invasion of the island. The latter could constitute probing exercises and/or deception. And, in a capture scenario, quick missile and air strikes could be used in combination with a slower seaborne invasion providing follow-on forces. China may prove impossible to deter.49 Nevertheless, Taiwan must be prepared to demonstrate that any Chinese attack will meet with immediate, stiff, and spirited resistance. To this end, regularly displaying a heightened sense of military readiness, as evident through periodic exercises designed to counter the kinds of military threats outlined above, is particularly important.50 Taiwan’s armed forces ought to work to counter all PLA feints whether by air or sea; anti-submarine and minesweeping capabilities must be given high priorities. Regular demonstrations of high esprit de corpsZRXOGDOVRVHUYHWRGHÁDWHRFFDVLRQDOUXPRUVRIORZ morale in the ranks of the island’s military. Taiwan’s best hopes of dissuading the PLA are shows of strength and determination, without being unduly provocative. Beyond this, Taiwan defense planners should focus on sustainability – the DELOLW\WRFRQWLQXHWKHÀJKWEH\RQGVHYHUDOGD\V²HYHQLQWKHHYHQWRIDQDFWXDO LQYDVLRQ ZKHUH VLJQLÀFDQW HOHPHQWV RI 7DLZDQ·V DUPHG IRUFHV PD\ KDYH EHHQ destroyed and the situation looks grim. Every effort should be made to ensure DOO VXUYLYLQJ IRUFHV FRXOG FRQWLQXH WKH ÀJKW7RZDUG HQKDQFLQJWKLV FDSDELOLW\ decentralized command and control would be essential. This would help ensure that the destruction or disabling of a few key command centers did not destroy the coordination and control capabilities of all Taiwan’s military forces. The longer forces were able to hold out in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, the more likely it would that foreign military help would arrive to help turn the tide. Meanwhile, at the strategic level, Taipei’s leaders should continue to stress – as they already have – that Taiwan’s response to a military attack would be an immediate unilateral declaration of the island’s independence. This sends the message loudly and clearly that China’s best assurance of Taiwan’s not taking the VWHSWKDW%HLMLQJGUHDGVPRVWLVWRDYRLGKRVWLOLWLHVLQWKH6WUDLWLQWKHÀUVWSODFH To make this assurance more credible Taipei ought to demonstrate an unmistakable willingness to pursue an ongoing dialogue with Beijing on issues of mutual concern.

Notes   7KLVFKDSWHUUHSUHVHQWVWKHYLHZVRIWKHDXWKRUDQGGRHVQRWLQDQ\ZD\UHÁHFWWKH policies or positions of the US Army, Department of Defense, or the US government. 2 WMD will not be discussed because the author believes there is a low probability of China using them against Taiwan. Nevertheless such use should not be completely ruled out. See the discussion by various authors in James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs

38

3 4

5 6 7

8 9

10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17

Scobell (eds), Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997 and Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan” International Security 25 (2), Fall 2000, pp. 51–86. See, for example, the foreword of China’s National Defense in 2002, Beijing: ,QIRUPDWLRQ2IÀFHRIWKH6WDWH&RXQFLORIWKH3HRSOH·V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD'HFHPEHU 2002. On the importance of the concept of “overall situation” see Ron Christman, “How Beijing Evaluates Military Campaigns: An Initial Assessment,” in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry Wortzel (eds), The Lessons of History: The PLA at 75, Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003, pp. 252– 392. The importance of assessing the key trends in deciding PRC grand strategy is well known. For a study that highlights this aspect, see David M. Finkelstein, China Reconsiders Its National Security: The Great Peace and Development Debate of 1999, Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses Corporation, December 2000. China’s National Defense in 2002, pp. 7–8. Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 176–7. In an assessment written prior to the referendum episode of late 2003, Tom Christensen and Michael Glosny write that Beijing analysts see the key trends going China’s way. Thomas J. Christensen and Michael A. Glosny, “Sources of Stability in U.S.–China Security Relations,” in Richard J. Ellings, Aaron L. Friedberg with Michael Wills, Strategic Asia 2003–04: Fragility and Crisis, Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003, p. 60. This is essentially an extrapolation of Christensen’s assessment contained in the previous volume of Strategic Asia. See Thomas J. Christensen, “China,” in Richard J. Ellings, Aaron L. Friedberg with Michael Wills, Strategic Asia, 2002–03: Asian Aftershocks, Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002, pp. 59–61. On the state-to-state episode, see Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “ ‘State to State’ Tension Rises Again Across the Taiwan Strait,” Chinese Perspectives, 25, October 1999, pp. 4–13. See, for example, Kurt M. Campbell and Derek J. Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?,” Foreign Affairs, 80 (4) July/August 2001, p. 23; Andrew Scobell, U.S. Army DQGWKH$VLD3DFLÀF Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, April 2001, pp. 8–10. Scobell, 86$UP\DQGWKH$VLD3DFLÀF, p. 10. Cited in John Pomfret, “China Warns Taiwan That Attack May be ‘Unavoidable’: General Condemns President’s Moves Toward Independence,” Washington Post, 20 November 2003. See, for example, Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China’s Challenge to U.S. Security Policy,” International Security, 25 (4), Spring 2001, pp. 5–40; Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, Chapter 8. Even analysts who focus on the invasion scenario acknowledge that such an option is not necessarily likely. See, for example, O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” p. 53. Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, p. 189, and Robert S. Ross, “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” International Security, 25 (2), Fall 2000, pp. 87–123. Christensen, and Glosny, “Sources of Stability in U.S.–China Security Relations,” p. 62. John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997, p. 162. Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, pp. 190–191; Eric A. McVadon, “PRC Exercises, Doctrine, and Tactics Toward Taiwan: The Naval Dimension,” in Lilley and Downs (eds), Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, pp. 271–2. This scenario is discussed in some detail in O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” pp. 75–9.

&KLQD·VPLOLWDU\WKUHDWWR7DLZDQLQWKHWZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\ 39 18 By using mines and submarines, the PLA would be playing to its strengths. See McVadon, “PRC Exercises, Doctrine, and Tactics,” pp. 262, 272. “The mainland’s VLQJOHELJJHVWQDYDODGYDQWDJHRYHU7DLZDQOLHVLQLWVODUJHÁHHWRIVXEPDULQHVµ'DYLG A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait?: Military Aspects of the China Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000, p. 40. 19 Andrew Scobell, “China’s Strategy Towards the South China Sea,” in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (eds), Taiwan’s Maritime Security, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 47. On the challenges of PLA operations against the off-shore islands, see You Ji, The Armed Forces of China, London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999, p. 183. 20 Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up,” passim. 21 See, for example, the discussion in the following PLA publications: Lt. Gen. Wen Guangchun, Jidong zuozhan houqin baozhang [logistical support for mobile RSHUDWLRQV@%HLMLQJ-LHIDQJMXQ&KXEDQVKH;X*XR[LQHG), Zhanqu zhanyi houqin baozhang >WKHDWHU FDPSDLJQ ORJLVWLFDO VXSSRUW@ %HLMLQJ *XRIDQJ 'D[XH Chubanshe, 1997; Lt. Gen. Wang Houqing and Maj. Gen. Zhang Xingye (chief eds), Zhanyi Xue>FDPSDLJQVWXGLHV@%HLMLQJ*XRIDQJ'D[XH&KXEDQVKH6HHDOVR Dennis J. Blasko, People’s War Lives On: Chinese Military Logistics in the War Zone, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004. 22 Harlan W. Jencks, “Wild Speculation About the Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” in Lilley and Downs (eds), Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, p. 150. 23 For more extensive discussion of the economic fallout for China of a war over Taiwan, see Andrew Scobell (ed.), The &RVWVRI&RQÁLFW7KH,PSDFWRQ&KLQDRID)XWXUH:DU, Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, September 2001. 24 Russell D. Howard, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army: ‘Short Arms and Slow Legs,’ INSS Occasional Paper no. 28, Colorado Springs, CO: US Air Force Academy Institute for National Security Studies, 1999. 25 The PLA, for example, uses civilian vessels in exercises as transports as well as in amphibious operations. See Dennis J. Blasko, People’s War Lives On, and Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the 21st Century, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001, p. 103. 26 On the importance of achieving air superiority, see Shlapak et al., Dire Strait?, O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” and You Ji, The Armed Forces of China, p. 129. 27 Jencks, “Wild Speculation on the Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” p. 149. 28 Michael S. Chase, “China’s Special Operations Forces: ‘Hawks in the Sky, Dragons Underwater and Tigers on Land’,” Chinese Military Update, 1 (4), September 2003, pp. 9–12. 29 O’Hanlon thinks that the PLA’s airlift capability is “about 2 brigades.” O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” p. 69. Exercises in the late 1980s and the 1990s KDYHUHSRUWHGO\LQYROYHGWURRSGURSVE\DVPDQ\DVDLUFUDIWLQGLIÀFXOWWHUUDLQ PLA leaders aspire to the capability to parachute in as many as 100,000 soldiers but recognize that a more realistic number may be half of that. See You Ji, The Armed Forces of China, pp. 143–6. 30 Jencks, “Wild Speculation About the Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” pp. 154– 6. 31 O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan.” 32 For the earlier assessment, see Scobell, “China’s Use of Military Force,” p. 190. 33 See for example Wen Guangchun, Jidong zuozhan houqin baozhang; Xu Guoxin (ed.), Zhanqu zhanyi houqin baozhang; Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, Zhanyi Xue. See also Blasko, People’s War Lives On. Blasko details a series of PLA logistics exercises undertaken in 2000, 2001, and 2002 involving the use of civilian vessels to transport troops, vehicles, and equipment in various scenarios including amphibious operations.

40

Scobell

34 On the marines, see Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, pp. 114–15, and You Ji, The Armed Forces of China, p. 193. The latter source given the size of the marines as one brigade. On landing craft, O’Hanlon contends there are 70 whereas You Ji asserts there are ten times this number. See O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” p. 62, and You Ji, The Armed Forces of China, p. 194. See also Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 80. 35 Blasko, People’s War Lives On; Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, p. 103. 36 See, for example, Shlapak et al., Dire Strait?, p. 11. 37 McVadon, “PRC Exercises, Doctrine, and Tactics,” pp. 254–5. 38 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968; Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1975. 39 Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, p. 193; Allen S. Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan,” International Security, 26 (2), Fall 2001, pp. 103–31; David Finkelstein, Mark Ryan, and Michael McDevitt (eds), &KLQHVH:DUÀJKWLQJ7KH PLA Experience Since 1949, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003. 40 See, for example, O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan”; and McVadon, “PRC Exercises, Doctrine, and Tactics.” 41 Jencks, “Wild Speculation About the Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” p. 160. Jencks is quoting Ellis Joffe in the latter sentence. 42 Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, especially pp. 34–5. 43 See the similar logic outlined in Thomas J. Christensen, “The Contemporary Security 'LOHPPD'HWHUULQJD7DLZDQ&RQÁLFWµWashington Quarterly, 25 (4), Autumn 2002, p. 12. 44 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, New York: Basic Books, 1989, pp. 5–6, 14–15; Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, p. 190. 45 China’s National Defense in 2002, passim. 46 Whiting, “China’s Use of Force 1950–96, and Taiwan,” p. 130. 47 Conversation with a foreign defense attaché in Beijing, May 2002. 48 Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, Chapter 4, especially pp. 90–1. 49 Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up,” p. 36. 50 The implications and recommendations in this essay should merely be considered illustrative and not comprehensive or exhaustive. For more complete recommendations for Taiwan defense planners, see Shlapak et al., Dire Strait?, and O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan.”

4

China’s military modernization and Taiwan’s defense reforms Programs, problems, and prospects Dennis V. Hickey

The Republic of China’s (ROC or Taiwan) military has changed dramatically since it retreated to the island of Taiwan in 1949. So, too, has Taiwan’s national security strategy. Despite these changes, however, one fact remains constant: the ROC continues to be confronted by a powerful foe determined to engineer its demise as a sovereign state. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), “over the next WHQ\HDUVWKHDUPHGIRUFHV>ZLOO@FKDQJHFRPSOHWHO\EHFRPLQJDZKROHQHZ force.”1 Following a brief overview of People’s Republic of China’s (PRC or China) drive to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) this study examines the recent initiatives launched in an effort to reform the Taiwanese military. The chapter suggests that, although Taiwan is making some headway in this camSDLJQLWFRQWLQXHVWRFRQIURQWVLJQLÀFDQWFKDOOHQJHV,WVDELOLW\WRRYHUFRPHWKHVH obstacles may determine whether or not its armed forces will be able to tackle the numerous threats that lie ahead.

China’s military modernization and reform In some respects, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) defense policy appears to have remained remarkably consistent over the past decades. As Shi Yin-hong, Professor of International Relations at China’s People’s University lamented, “our military structure is basically what Mao Zedong used in his war with Chiang Kai-shek 70 years ago.”2 In other senses, however, Chinese security policy also is in a state of transition. The PLA’s doctrinal evolution during past decades is a VLJQLÀFDQWGHYHORSPHQW In June 1985, the PRC’s Central Military Commission (CMC) concluded that the possibility of a major confrontation with either of the superpowers was remote. Deemed more likely was the possibility of small or local wars erupting VRPHZKHUHDORQJ&KLQD·VYDVWERUGHUV7KHVHFRQÁLFWVZRXOGUHTXLUHDGLVWLQFWO\ different strategy than the principles of protraction and attrition that had guided 0DR=HGRQJ·V´3HRSOH·V:DUµRUHYHQWKHPRGLÀHG´3HRSOH·V:DUXQGHUPRGHUQ conditions”. Consequently, the PLA embraced a new doctrine – the doctrine of “limited and local Wars”. Today, this doctrine is often described as “local war under high-tech conditions.”

42

Hickey

China’s new approach to security – with its emphasis on quick decisive results and high technology – represents a “complete break” with the past.3 The doctrine ´HPSKDVL]HVUDSLGUHDFWLRQOLPLWHGFRQÁLFWÁH[LEOHUHVSRQVHSUHHPSWLYHDFWLRQ and limited power projection to China’s strategic boundaries.”4 Inspired by the 1990– *XOI:DUDQGWKH.RVRYRFRQÁLFW%HLMLQJODXQFKHGDVHULHVRIPLOLWDU\UHIRUPV under the broad rubric of the “Two Transformations”. The objective of the reform campaign was to turn China’s armed forces into a military that was actually capable RIÀJKWLQJDQGZLQQLQJ´ORFDOZDUVXQGHUKLJKWHFKFRQGLWLRQVµDQGWUDQVIRUPLW from a land army based on quantity to a multifaceted force based on quality.5

A modern military As part of the effort to construct a modern military, units in the PLA Navy (PLAN) and Air Force (PLAAF) are being strengthened – larger ships are being FRQVWUXFWHGDQGPRUHDGYDQFHGÀJKWHUSODQHVDUHEHLQJDFTXLUHG0XFKRIWKLV equipment – including Su-27 and Su-30 warplanes, Kilo-class submarines and Sovremennyy-class destroyers – is being purchased from Russia. The military also is developing or seeking to acquire force multipliers – including mobile ballistic missile systems, land-attack cruise missiles, advanced surface-to-air missiles, space-based weapons, and attack submarines – and has made some VLJQLÀFDQWDGYDQFHVLQLWV&4I capabilities (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence). Especially worrisome for Taipei are the 450 shortrange ballistic missiles (SRBMs) that Beijing has deployed directly opposite 7DLZDQ7KLV QXPEHU LV H[SHFWHG WR JURZ E\ URXJKO\ VHYHQW\ÀYH PLVVLOHV SHU year during the next several years.6 According to the US Department of Defense, “China’s conventional SRMB force is the most credible and immediate threat to Taiwan.”7 Jiang Zemin, Chair of China’s CMC, has called on the PLA to “step up its military reform and to set the target of fully equipping itself with information technology by the middle of the century.”8 Indeed, China has displayed an exceptional interest in the development of an advanced information operations/information warfare (IO/IW) capability and views IO/IW as a strategic pre-emptive weapon for use outside of traditional operation boundaries.9 As one Taiwanese military RIÀFLDOH[SODLQHG´WKH3/$KDVIRUPHGDF\EHUDUP\µ10 It is also noteworthy that China is “pursuing research and development programs to introduce so-called ‘new concept’ weapons system into the PLA inventory.”11 These include kinetic energy, laser and radio frequency weapons. Finally, while China’s leaders claim to oppose the deployment of weapons systems in space, “they probably view antisatellite systems – and offensive counter-space systems, in general – as well as space-based missile defenses as inevitable.”12 Downsized and streamlined military 6RPHPLOLWDU\DQDO\VWVFRPSDUHWKH3/$WRRQHRI&KLQD·VKXJHLQHIÀFLHQWVWDWH owned corporations. Indeed, by the early 1990s, it was estimated that the PLA was

China’s military modernization and Taiwan’s defense reforms

43

involved in over 20,000 commercial ventures. In 1998, Jiang Zemin, then China’s SUHVLGHQWRUGHUHGWKH3/$WRDEDQGRQLWVSURÀWPDNLQJHQWHUSULVHVDOEHLWZLWK limited success. More recently, the PLA has been ordered to close, or merge, dozens of military hospitals, military academies, and other organizations.13 Reductions in force levels represent a crucial component in China’s military reforms. As Jiang Zemin explained, “to shrink China’s armed forces is not only in accordance with the world military reform trend but also out of the necessity of the national economic construction.”14 In late 2003, Beijing announced that the 2.4 million strong PLA would be cut by 200,000 troops. This follows a reduction of 500,000 troops during the Ninth Five-Year Plan period (1996–2000). Analysts believe that another large-scale reduction may occur within several years. China’s goal to is reduce the quantity of troops (particularly those serving in infantry divisions) while increasing the quality of the armed forces. As Major General Peng Guang-qian, a leading Chinese military strategist, explained, “professionalism is the great trend of the PLA . . . we will demand ever higher eduFDWLRQDO OHYHOV RI RXU UHJXODU UHFUXLWV DQG RIÀFHUV .QRZOHGJHEDVHG KLJKWHFK warfare demands that the PLA modernize.”15 In order to achieve this objective, incentives have been introduced to recruit university students and thousands of RIÀFHUV KDYH FRPSOHWHG JUDGXDWH VWXGLHV LQ WKH QDWLRQ·V LQVWLWXWLRQV RI KLJKHU learning.16 As part of the effort to increase professionalism within the armed forces, the 3/$LVDOVRVHHNLQJWRFUHDWHDPRGHUQQRQFRPPLVVLRQHGRIÀFHU1&2 FRUSV Since the PLA relies primarily upon conscripts from China’s poorer rural areas, it is hoped that the NCO system will provide the troops with much needed professional experience and leadership.17 In addition to downsizing the PLA, there is a concerted effort to streamline the organization. Some years ago, the number of military regions was cut from eleven to seven (Shen-yang, Beijing, Lan-zhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu), and analysts believe that all of these regions may be abolished eventually. The move would FXUWDLOVXSHUÁXRXVEXUHDXFUDFLHVDQGVWDIISUHYHQW SRZHUIXOUHJLRQDOFRPPDQGHUVIURPEXLOGLQJXSORFDOÀHIGRPVFHQWUDOL]HGHFLsion-making authority in the CMC, and help build a more integrated command hierarchy.180RUHRYHUPLOLWDU\WUDLQLQJKDVEHHQLQWHQVLÀHGpOLWHUDSLGUHDFWLRQ units have been organized and inter-service coordination is being emphasized. The PLA hopes eventually to achieve real-time integration among combat units. 6SHFLDODWWHQWLRQLVGLUHFWHGWRZDUGWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDZDUÀJKWLQJFRPPDQG structure that can integrate the armed forces deployed near Taiwan.19 Summary The PLA has experienced a series of organizational and structural reforms in recent years that Beijing describes as “military reforms with Chinese characteristics”. On balance, it should be viewed as a military in transition. The PLA is a force that is seeking to gain the capabilities that will enable it to shift away from the focus on large-scale, defensive warfare that characterized PLA doctrine and tactics under Mao

44

Hickey

Zedong. Although it remains a military that is antiquated and obsolete in many ways (it remains at least two decades behind the US in military technology and ability), it also contains a growing number of what some military analysts describe as “pockets RI H[FHOOHQFHµ 0RUH IXQGLQJ ZLOO EH DOORFDWHG WR WKHVH VSHFLÀF DUHDV EDOOLVWLF missiles, aeronautics, electronic surveillance, IO/IW warfare, etc) and the selected purchase of advanced Russian military systems. China’s strategic planners fully realize that the PLA cannot match the power of many potential adversaries – including the US – plane for plane and missile for missile. But they have no intention of so doing. Rather, the 1991 Persian Gulf War and 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis prompted Chinese defense planners to concentrate on ways to confront a technologically superior enemy. The 2003 Iraq War only served to reinforce this view and prompted even greater PLA interest in IO/IW warfare. As one Chinese military theorist exclaimed, “informational technology VXSHULRULW\GHWHUPLQHVEDWWOHÀHOGVXSHULRULW\µ20 The PLA hopes to ‘leapfrog’ a full generation in its military modernization campaign and develop abilities in certain critical areas – particularly missile technology, nuclear warheads, information warfare, computer warfare, electronic warfare, and anti-satellite programs. Like Mao’s doctrine of People’s War, this is reportedly part of an ‘asymmetric strategy’ that would enable a weaker power to prevail over a stronger one. Whether China succeeds in this drive may have an enormous impact on Taiwan’s security and the security equation in East Asia.

Taiwan’s defense reforms Taiwan’s military must be prepared to counter the military build-up of the PRC and its increasingly hostile posture toward the island. In order to achieve this goal, Taiwan is seeking to undertake a series of military reforms. These include an effort to reorganize and restructure the national defense system, a drive to add more advanced weapons into the military’s arsenal, a push to downsize force levels and streamline the force structure and a series of other measures designed to create a small, but élite, armed forces. The discussion below examines these projects. Defense reorganization and restructuring During the Chiang era in Taiwan (1949–88), the President of the ROC exercised almost unlimited power over national security policy.21 Other actors played a very circumscribed role in the policy-making process. Major military decisions were made after consultation with a small number of trustworthy senior advisers, PLOLWDU\RIÀFHUVDQGKLJKRIÀFLDOVZLWKLQWKHUXOLQJ.XRPLQWDQJ.07 2QFHD decision was made, the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, issued orders directly to the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), who commanded the troops. This meant that the CGS, rather than the defense minister, was “the most important person in Taiwan’s military structure”.22 Moreover, as the CGS was not a member of the cabinet, he did not have to answer to the legislature or consult with other government agencies.

China’s military modernization and Taiwan’s defense reforms

45

Under this arrangement, the defense minister was relegated to a position of secondary importance and was responsible for handling “administrative matters.” Thus, the CGS was in charge of the military command system, whereas the defense minister was responsible for the military administration system. As Dr Lin Chong-pin, Deputy Defense Minister of the ROC, explained during an interview with the author, the defense minister was so weak he “could not even SXVKKLVRUGHUVEH\RQGKLVRIÀFHµ23 Ironically, during this authoritarian era, the KMT-dominated military resembled the PLA, which, even today, remains little more than an armed extension of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For decades, Taiwanese troops were indoctrinated with a heavy dose of KMT propaganda: Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People and Chiang Kai-shek’s dream of retaking mainland China. In 1987, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s son, President Chiang Ching-kuo, lifted martial law and paved the way for the democratization of Taiwan. Shortly after this move, things began to change in Taiwan. The armed forces were not immune to these changes. As Taiwan’s MND observed, the old military system “did not meet the requirements of democratic politics.”24 Voices began to call IRUDVLJQLÀFDQWUHVWUXFWXULQJRIWKHQDWLRQDOGHIHQVHV\VWHPWKDWZRXOGHVWDEOLVK the clear supremacy of civilian control over the military. Others pressed for the ‘nationalization’ of the ROC military. In April 2002, legislation drafted to achieve these goals – the National Defense Law and the Organizational Law of the MND – went into effect.25 Under the new national defense system, the defense minister, a cabinet PHPEHUZKRPXVWEHDFLYLOLDQE\ODZLVWKHPRVWSRZHUIXOÀJXUHLQWKHDUPHG forces and no less than one-third of the MND employees must be civilians.26 The VHSDUDWHPLOLWDU\V\VWHPVKDYHEHHQXQLÀHGDQGWKHGHIHQVHPLQLVWHU´GLUHFWVDQG oversees the national defense system formed by the three systems responsible for military administration, military command, and military armament.”27 The CGS now serves as the defense minister’s Chief of Staff, and the General Staff Headquarters (GSH) has been moved into the MND. The GSH functions as the MND’s “military command staff and the command institution for joint operations of the ROC armed forces.”28 Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan’s President, has praised the restructuring of the ROC military establishment as “the most important change in our national defense system.”29&KHQDQGRWKHUVFRQWHQGWKDWWKHVHVWUXFWXUDOPRGLÀFDWLRQVGRPXFK more than reinforce the principle of civilian leadership. They promote integration and cooperation among the government’s numerous departments and agencies – moves that will enhance national security. As Taiwan’s 2002 Defense White Paper explained, “through the National Security Council, various departments DQGDJHQFLHVXQGHUWKH([HFXWLYH<XDQ>FDELQHW@FDQEHLQFOXGHGLQWKHQDWLRQDO defense policy-making mechanism so that the nation’s resources can be integrated, the national strength fully utilized and the goal of all-out defense achieved.”30 The new system also promotes transparency and accountability within the MND. During an interview with the author, Parris H. Chang, chair of the Taiwan legislature’s Committee on Foreign Relations and an authority on the island’s defense PDWWHUVRXWOLQHGWKHVLJQLÀFDQFHRIWKLVGHYHORSPHQW

46

Hickey The military used to be a black box. Under the authoritarian regime of the KMT, the military was a sacred cow and no one dared to touch it. Now, it’s a democracy and the issues of war and peace are too important to be left to the generals.31

Finally, it is noteworthy that the new defense laws clearly impose political neutrality on Taiwan’s armed forces – a process initiated during President Lee Tenghui’s administration (1988–2000) – and no longer operates as a KMT institution. As President Chen explained, “the military has the task to protect the country and the people, be loyal to the government and the people, take an unprejudiced stance and be free from control by any political group.”32 New weapons systems In addition to the reform of the national defense system, Taiwan has sought to ERRVW WKH PLOLWDU\·V ÀUHSRZHU 2YHU WKH SDVW GHFDGH WKH WKUHH VHUYLFHV KDYH updated their respective weapons systems. Like the PRC, much of the equipment has been purchased from abroad. Weapons systems in the ROC Army’s inventory include M48 and M60H tanks; M109 and M110 self-propelled artillery; M-113, V-150 and CM-21 armored personnel carriers; UH-1H helicopters and AH-1W attack helicopters; Kung-feng 6A rocket systems; TOW-type anti-tank guided weapons; Chaparral SP, Hawk, Tien-kung (Sky Bow) and Tien-chien (Sky Sword) air defense missile systems; vehicle-mounted Avenger missiles; man-portable Stinger missiles; and Hsiungfeng I and Hsiung-feng II anti-ship missile systems. The ROC Army also operates the island’s Patriot Air Defense System. In June 2003, the MND announced that it would move forward with plans to purchase three Lockheed-Martin PAC-3 units and upgrade its two PAC-2 Plus units to PAC-3 standards.33 In March 2004, the MND announced that it plans to increase its order to six batteries of PAC-3 V\VWHPVWREHSXUFKDVHGZLWKLQWKHQH[WÀIWHHQ\HDUV34 Like other branches of the ROC military, the Navy is being modernized. The Navy is acquiring technology and equipment designed to enhance its ability to engage in warfare at three levels – air, sea and below the ocean’s surface. It has also formed an anti-submarine command to study ways to counter a possible PRC blockade. In order to enhance its naval forces, Taipei has purchased American minesweepers, anti-submarine helicopters, Knox-class destroyers, MK-46 torpedoes and Harpoon anti-ship missiles. It also has acquired La Fayette-class frigates from France and a variety of domestically manufactured frigates, fast-attack craft and sophisticated missiles. With respect to future acquisitions, Taiwan’s Navy has not yet moved forward with plans to purchase eight conventional submarines and twelve submarine-hunting 3&2ULRQDLUFUDIWIURPWKH86LQWKH7DLZDQHVHOHJLVODWXUHÀQDOO\DSSURYHG the lease of four Kidd-class guided missile destroyers that was included in the original package). President George W. Bush approved the sale of these big-ticket items in April 2001. In early 2004, the Taiwanese media reported that the Navy plans to

China’s military modernization and Taiwan’s defense reforms

47

replace its Knox-class frigates with six to eight 2,000 ton ships over the next ten years.35 It remains unclear, however, whether these vessels would be purchased from a foreign supplier or manufactured domestically. Finally, Taiwan is putting more muscle into its Air Force. In January 1994, the armed forces began to take delivery of 135 domestically manufactured Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF), a new warplane designed originally to replace Taiwan’s aging stock of 80 Lockheed F-104G and 300 plus Northrop F-5E/F aircraft. Perhaps PRVW VLJQLÀFDQW 7DLZDQ DFTXLUHG  )$% ZDUSODQHV IURP WKH 86 DQG  0LUDJHÀJKWHUVIURP)UDQFHLQWKHHDUO\V6LQFHSXUFKDVLQJWKHVHMHWV 7DLZDQKDVVRXJKWWRXSJUDGHWKHP6RPH\HDUVDJR7DLZDQREWDLQHGXSJUDGHGÀUH control radars and countermeasure pods for the F-16s. More recently, the Air Force took delivery of US-made AIM-120 medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs) WKDWZLOOERRVWWKHÀUHSRZHURIWKHZDUSODQHV36 It is noteworthy that Taiwan also has purchased four American-built Grumman E-2T Hawkeye early-warning planes. Downsize force levels and streamline force structures Like China, Taiwan is seeking to establish a military that is “compact, delicate, and highly capable.”37 The ROC military has been downsized into a defensive force of roughly 385,000 troops.38 Again, like China, a majority of the recent cuts have affected the Army. But the Army continues to make up almost 50 percent of Taiwan’s total armed services (the Navy and Air Force each comprise roughly 25 percent). The MND plans for a second stage of downsizing that will lead to additional cuts. Force levels could ultimately drop as low as 270,000 troops.39 Nevertheless, some law-makers argue that “Taiwan spends too much of the military budget on the outlay for personnel when compared with the advanced countries,” and contend that manpower should eventually be cut to 256,000.40 /LNHWKH3/$7DLZDQ·VPLOLWDU\LVYHU\¶RIÀFHUKHDY\·41 As part of the drive to downsize the armed forces, the proportion of ‘top brass’ is being reduced gradually.42 The number of generals and admirals has been cut but, at the same time, the military is also seeking to boost the number of NCOs within the ranks. Numerous incentives have been introduced to recruit and retain the NCOs, the skilled personnel who make up the backbone of any modern military organization. In addition to a reduction in force levels, training programs are being redesigned to meet the requirements of joint services operations and to familiarize personnel with the high-tech elements of modern warfare. Like China’s PLA, primary emphasis is being placed on building a more integrated (and effective) military. For example, Army combat units are being both modernized and restructured. MND plans call for incorporating traditional Army divisions into new joint service brigades. Indeed, Tang Yiou-ming, Taiwan’s Defense Minister, has revealed that “the ROC armed forces will be transformed into defense forces with the combined services brigade as the main operational unit to meet the nation’s demands.”43 The ultimate objective is to make Taiwan’s three military branches interoperable and for them to be able to function as an integrated team within ten years.

48

Hickey

Other developments The discussion above outlines only three broad components in Taiwan’s drive to reform its military. A more complete discussion would include numerous other initiatives as well. Once again, a number of these developments mirror those occurring in the PRC. For example, military academies are being downsized and integrated. Moreover, the armed services hope to recruit more professional or career military personnel, and reduce overall reliance on conscripts. As President Chen explained, “in the face of shortening service terms for conscripts, the military QHHGVWRDWWUDFWKLJKO\VNLOOHGSURIHVVLRQDOVWREHFRPHDPRGHUQHIÀFLHQWIRUFH that is able to make use of advances in high-tech and information technology.”44 There are even calls for a gradual shift to an all-volunteer force.45 Other developments also merit brief discussion. For example, unlike the PRC, the mission of Taiwan’s élite forces has been revised. For decades, the ROC marines’ training focused largely on seizing beachheads as the vanguard of an invasion force. But military strategy has shifted from retaking China to defendLQJ 7DLZDQ 7KH FXUUHQW PLOLWDU\ VWUDWHJ\ LV GHVFULEHG RIÀFLDOO\ DV ´HIIHFWLYH deterrence and resolute defense.”46 Consequently, the marines will now defend QDYDOEDVHVDQGWKHRIIVKRUHLVODQGVDQGHQJDJHLQRWKHUXQVSHFLÀHGFRPEDWPLVsions.47 3HUKDSVPRVWVLJQLÀFDQWO\7DLZDQLVVHHNLQJWRVWUHQJWKHQLWVRYHUDOO&4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) system. Following China’s 1996 missile exercises, the Taiwanese military “opened secret command and control installations to US experts who conducted site surveys and prepared reports on Taiwan’s Air Force, Army and Navy.”48 Since that time, Taiwan’s military has sought to make some headway in its effort to enhance its C4ISR capabilities. With respect to IO/IW warfare, ROC GHIHQVHRIÀFLDOVUHSRUWWKDW´ZHDUHPDNLQJSURJUHVV>DQG@ZHKDYHDORWRI potential because these young people, they may not be good at basket ball, but they are good at cyber operations – they are very good.”49 Finally, it is noteworthy that Taiwan is seeking to improve the living standards of troops in order to boost morale and attract a higher caliber of military personnel. As President Chen noted, “military reform needs to be based on more humanistic values.”50

Challenges to Taiwan’s military reform Critics charge that the pace of change within the ROC armed forces might best be described as ‘glacial’.51 They contend that the Taiwanese military is gradually losing its qualitative edge over mainland China. There is a growing concern that, should present trends continue, the Taiwanese military will be unprepared to cope with the escalating PRC threat. Defense reorganization and restructuring As described, one of the chief objectives of the restructuring of the ROC military establishment is to reinforce the principle of civilian leadership and promote the

China’s military modernization and Taiwan’s defense reforms

49

nationalization of the armed forces. In this respect, the reorganization program PLJKW EH GHVFULEHG DV D VXFFHVV %XW WKH UHFHQW PRGLÀFDWLRQV DUH VXSSRVHG WR accomplish much more than that. They should also promote integration and cooperation among the government’s numerous departments and agencies – moves that will enhance Taiwan’s national security. Restructuring Taiwan’s national defense system is proving to be a major challenge. Defense analysts suggest that the military establishment still needs to work on coordinating its operations with the civilian bureaucracy: The MND must also be an integral part of Taiwan’s broader governmental bureaucracy. A degree of cooperation between the military and other departments within the government would enhance Taiwan’s ability to react rapidly DQGHIÀFLHQWO\WRFULVLVVLWXDWLRQVRUHYHQQDWXUDOGLVDVWHUV$XQLW\RISXUSRVH and synergy of effort between the civilian bureaucracy and the Taiwan defense establishment is needed and, indeed, required in the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency.52 In short, despite the passage of legislation intended to reorganize and restructure the armed services, Taiwan’s military still resembles what some describe as a ‘stove-piped bureaucracy’. New weapons systems 7KH52&DUPVSURFXUHPHQWSROLFLHVKDYHGUDZQDORWRIÀUHIURPFULWLFVERWK at home and abroad. Some charge that the MND has purchased a host of bigticket armaments, ranging from gigantic tanks to huge warships, which are either LPSUDFWLFDO RU XVHOHVV LQ DQ\ PLOLWDU\ FRQÁLFW ZLWK &KLQD 6KXDL +XDPLQ D former two-star general in the ROC army, is typical of those who question the motives for such acquisitions: It’s like the end of the Qing dynasty, when the emperors bought fancy weapons, but there was no change in thinking. They don’t care whether the weapons systems are useful or not. It’s become purely political to show China how close Taiwan is to the United States.53 *HQHUDO 6KXDL DQG RWKHUV DUH FDOOLQJ IRU D PRUH UDWLRQDO DQG HIÀFLHQW DUPV acquisition process that will match defense procurements with the nation’s defense strategy. They are also pressing for more advanced training of personnel (or ‘software’) rather than relying solely upon new hardware. But as General Shuai observed, “no one wants to study how to re-engineer ourselves. They only care about rank and power.”54 Whereas some criticize Taiwan for buying the wrong weapons systems or too many arms, others complain that the island is not buying enough. As described, Taipei has yet to move forward with plans to purchase submarines or anti-submarine aircraft from the US. In 2003, Richard Bush, former chair of the American

50

Hickey

Institute in Taiwan (AIT), shared his sense of frustration with his Taiwanese hosts during a visit to the island: Taiwan is not moving fast enough to purchase weapons systems that the US has agreed to sell. We agreed to sell them because you needed them. Taiwan needs to move faster to purchase advanced weapon systems. This is to deter some kind of attack we hope will never happen. If you increase the cost of an attack, it is less likely to occur. If the deterrent fails, you will have a better chance to defend yourself.55 Randall Schriver, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 3DFLÀF $IIDLUV VKDUHV %XVK·V FRQFHUQ +H IHDUV WKDW 7DLZDQ LV OHDYLQJ LWVHOI vulnerable to a PRC attack: The PRC is engaged in an accelerated force modernization program. Taiwan is vulnerable to air and missile threats from the PRC. Taiwan’s lack of an integrated Anti-Submarine War capability is another vulnerability. We urge Taiwan to take the steps needed to acquire defensive weapons and system VXIÀFLHQWWRDGGUHVVWKHHYHULQFUHDVLQJWKUHDWSRVHGE\WKH35&56 Rather than moving forward with the arms purchases, some believe that Taiwan’s top leadership appears to be “in the grip of indecision”.57 6HQLRU 86 RIÀFLDOV also suspect that some members of the Taiwan government may be operating XQGHUWKHLPSUHVVLRQWKDWDUPVSXUFKDVHVPD\EHSRVWSRQHGLQGHÀQLWHO\EHFDXVH the US will protect the island in any crisis with the PRC.58 William S. Cohen, IRUPHU 86 6HFUHWDU\ RI 'HIHQVH DSSHDUHG WR UHÁHFW WKH RSLQLRQV RI PDQ\ 86 RIÀFLDOVZKHQKHZDUQHG7DLZDQWKDW´\RXFDQQRWH[SHFWWKH$PHULFDQSHRSOHWR burden ourselves the way we are, to carry out responsibilities for other countries if there is no corresponding effort being made for self defense . . . you must be a contributor.”59 Downsize force levels and streamline force structures As described, the ROC military has been downsized. But analysts charge that the 7DLZDQHVH$UP\UHPDLQVIDUWRRODUJHDQGWRRLQÁXHQWLDO&RQVHTXHQWO\LWFODLPV too large a share of the overall defense budget. For roughly three decades, the ultimate goal of the ROC military was to take back by force the Chinese mainland. Military planners concentrated on building DQ$UP\FDSDEOHRIÀHOGLQJIRUW\RUPRUHGLYLVLRQV7KHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHDUPHG IRUFHVUHÁHFWHGWKDWPLVVLRQWKH52&PDLQWDLQHGRQHRIWKHZRUOG·VODUJHVWODQG armies. Despite the fact that the ROC government no longer has any intention of returning to mainland China, the Army continues to make up roughly 50 percent of the Taiwanese military. The Army’s resistance to proposed reform measures has exacerbated inter-service rivalries:

China’s military modernization and Taiwan’s defense reforms

51

Considerable tension exists between the Taiwanese Army, Air Force and the Navy. While it is apparent both to those in Taiwan as well as outside that Taiwan’s air defense and naval operations are increasingly important to the island’s security, the army believes that air superiority and sea denial cannot be held for long. It is the army’s view that it is therefore necessary to plan for a land battle on the island’s western shores. It has fought hard to ensure that it continues to have a major say in defense planning and budgetary allocation.60 In other words, it appears that, since the Army may not justify its privileged SRVLWLRQ ZLWKLQ WKH 52& DUPHG IRUFHV E\ FODLPLQJ WKDW LW PXVW ÀJKW DQG ZLQ D ODQG ZDU LQ &KLQD LW QRZ LQVLVWV WKDW LW PXVW EH SUHSDUHG WR ÀJKW DQG ZLQ D land war in Taiwan. However, as Parris Chang observed, “I think the army has to really take a reduction in its role. The Navy and the Air Force are the course of the future.”61 The ROC military is making moves to make Taiwan’s three military branches LQWHURSHUDEOH DQG DEOH WR IXQFWLRQ DV D WHDP %XW 86 RIÀFLDOV FRPSODLQ WKDW progress in this area is too slow and remind the Taiwanese that “today’s military challenges require coordination across military service lines and joint perspective of military operations.”62 According to a 2003 US Department of Defense study, 7DLZDQ·V´$UP\VWLOOKDVPDMRUVKRUWFRPLQJVDVDÀJKWLQJIRUFHSDUWLFXODUO\LQ WKHDUHDRIMRLQWZDUÀJKWLQJ>DQG@1DY\RSHUDWLRQVDUHQRWZHOOLQWHJUDWHG with those of either the army or the Air Force and joint training is infrequent and rudimentary.”63 In addition to expressing concerns about the ROC military’s ability to meet the requirements of combined services operations, American authorities are disappointed with Taiwan’s lack of progress in strengthening its overall C4ISR system. The US approved the sale of the Link-16 C4ISR system to Taiwan in 2001. In ODWH 7DLZDQ ÀQDOO\ DQQRXQFHG WKDW LW ZRXOG PRYH IRUZDUG ZLWK SODQV WR purchase a scaled-down version of it (code-named Posheng by the Taiwanese). The initial US recommendation that Taipei put all of its major weapons systems of the three services in the C4ISR system was rejected as too expensive.64 In November 2003, Therese Shaheen, Chairperson of the AIT, infuriated Taiwan’s defense establishment during a gathering honoring President Chen. She suggested that it is “silly to talk about submarines that won’t get into the water for 10 more years . . . when you only have so much money, you need to have what’s most important . . . like C4ISR – command and control systems.”65 This ZDVQRWWKHÀUVWWLPHWKDW6KDKHHQKDGZDUQHG7DLZDQDERXWWKH&4ISR problem. In October 2003, she cautioned that “if something is not done, the balance [of SRZHU@ZLOOFKDQJHDQGQRWLQ>7DLZDQ·V@IDYRUµ66 Other concerns American and Taiwanese analysts have expressed numerous other concerns about the campaign to reform Taiwan’s military. These range from a propensity to ‘leak’

52

Hickey

sensitive information about the expansion of US–ROC military cooperation for political gain to an inability to recruit and retain the highly skilled professionals required to become a modern military able to make use of advances in high technology and information technology. It is becoming increasingly common, however, for analysts to go so far as to question the basic tenets of Taiwan’s defense strategy. As described, during the Chiang era the ROC prepared for a war on the Chinese mainland. At times, the regime even deployed guerrilla forces and special operations forces to harass the PLA in coastal provinces. In subsequent years, however, military strategy shifted to focus largely on defense. According to the MND, the current strategy is “to defeat incoming enemies in stages so as to ensure national VHFXULW\µ>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@67 The MND still claims that it will “conduct operations to attack the enemy’s key nodes of C4ISR so as to eliminate the enemy’s ability to launch its joint operations,” but it remains unclear how the military plans to accomplish this mission without any of the requisite weapons platforms.68 In other words, Taiwan’s military lacks offensive capabilities. Taiwan’s overall approach to defense is criticized on several grounds. First, the dependence on defensive military equipment – ranging from PAC-3s to early warning radar systems – is too expensive. Lieutenant General Fu Wei-ku, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the ROC Air Force, explains: According to calculations by the US military, the cost-effectiveness of offensive operations against defensive ones is one to nine. It means that if the enemy spends US $100 million on developing missiles to attack us, we have to spend nine times the money on building defensive measures . . . The actual cost that the defensive side might have to spend could be more than 180 times that of the enemy. To defend against the enemy’s missiles, we have to build defensive systems ranging from early warning aircraft, C4I systems, as well as low-tier, high-tier and sea-based missile defense systems. All of these systems would cost more than US $18 billion. Furthermore, they are not enough to help us escape from the missile threat from China.69 It is General Fu’s recommendation that “given these conditions, I suggest that the military should develop the capability of launching counter operations against the enemy.”70 Others agree with General Fu’s assessment, but add that the present approach to defense does little to actually deter the PRC from launching military operations against Taiwan. They argue that, in order to dissuade Beijing from attacking the island, Taipei must possess a credible second-strike capability. Holmes Liao, a professor at Taiwan’s National Defense University and an adviser to Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, suggests that “a longer range precision-strike land attack cruise missile may be one of the solutions Taiwan can and should pursue.”71 Liao contends that Taipei should seek to deter Beijing with a threat to destroy Shanghai and Hong Kong. He reasons that “unlike many Third World regimes, the current Chinese leadership values the population and economy since

China’s military modernization and Taiwan’s defense reforms

53

its economy requires a labor force and industrial base to produce and sustain national power.”72 Finally, some argue that Taiwan should borrow a page from PLA military doctrine and consider launching pre-emptive strikes. It is noteworthy that all three major Taiwanese presidential candidates raised the possibility of adopting this approach to national security during the 2000 election – over a year before President Bush embraced the policy of pre-emptive military strikes. According to one MND study, “before an enemy commences an attack on Taiwan, Taiwan’s armed forces need to use necessary force from the Air Force, the Navy, the special forces and artillery forces on offshore islands to conduct ‘pre-emptive war’ and attack the enemy chain of command, missile facilities, airports and sea ports” (emphasis added).73 As might be expected, shifting from a defensive strategy to an offensive VWUDWHJ\DVSDUWRI7DLZDQ·VPLOLWDU\UHIRUPSURJUDPPDNHV86RIÀFLDOVQHUYRXV Some view the proposition as yet another factor that could destabilize peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Nevertheless, a small number of Americans appear to cautiously endorse Taiwan’s development of a limited offensive military capability.74 Indeed, according to press reports, the US has quietly eased controls on the transfer of some technologies to Taiwan that “would help improve the survivability of ROC Air Force strike packages carrying out penetration strikes against Chinese targets.”75

Analysis As Defense Minister Tang observed, Taiwan’s defense reforms are being accompanied by “growing pains”.76%XWWKHVHGLIÀFXOWLHVVKRXOGQRWEHH[DJJHUDWHG All militaries encounter resistance to reform. The MND concedes that “restructuring national defense organization is so FRPSOH[ DQG GLIÀFXOW DQG FDQQRW EH GRQH RYHUQLJKWµ77 But progress is being made. Establishing civilian rule over the MND proved to be an enormous task, but it was accomplished. Unlike the PLA, where some units still spend as much as 30 percent of their training time studying politics, Taiwan must be given high marks for its successful efforts to nationalize the armed forces.78 As Defense Minister Tang noted, the military now maintains strict neutrality in the island’s elections – a practice that enjoys widespread support among the population.79 7DLZDQHVHGHIHQVHRIÀFLDOVHPSKDVL]HWKDWWKH01'ZLOOXOWLPDWHO\DFKLHYHD greater degree of cooperation and coordination of its activities with other departments. As Dr Lin Chong-pin explained, defense reorganization and restructuring require time and patience: We are making gradual progress. Because of the huge legacy of the past, if one goes too fast, the boat may be tipped over. Therefore, with that as a prerequisite, we go as fast as we can.80 He also noted that within the MND itself, “other agencies in the ministry now have

54

Hickey

DPRUHLQÁXHQWLDODQGSRZHUIXOSRVLWLRQWKDQWKHDJHQFLHVLQWKH*HQHUDO6WDIIµ81 7KLV LV D VLJQLÀFDQW GHSDUWXUH IURP SDVW SUDFWLFH 0RUHRYHU LW LV QRWHZRUWK\ that a cross-ministerial organization to study defense reforms was established in February 2004. As General Chen Ti-tuan explained, this “military reform WDVNIRUFHµ>ZLOO@´UHYLHZDOOLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHIRUPVUHODWHGWRPLOLWDU\VHUYLFHµ82 This new body includes military specialists, scholars, and representatives from numerous government agencies. In the past, Taiwan made some unsound choices with respect to arms acquisitions. Indeed, all militaries make mistakes in the procurement process. But it is inaccurate to suggest that Taiwan is now hesitating to purchase arms because it hopes to be a ‘free rider’ with respect to its defense. In fact, a variety of considerations prompted Taiwan to postpone the purchase of American submarines, warships and planes. As Taiwan is now a democracy, the island’s law-makers must approve major arms purchases, and this can prove to be a time-consuming and contentious process. Moreover, issues related to defense – particularly major arms acquisitions – are now subject to widespread discussion and debate in Taiwanese society. This means that the media, interest groups, and other actors may all play a role in the procurement process. Furthermore, the MND must follow certain legal procedures when acquiring armaments: “Since the passage of the two defense laws and since Defense Minister Tang was appointed, he said, ‘no more – we are going to do the whole thing according to a legal process.’”83 The evaluation would take twenty-four months; like the twenty-two months taken by the US; like the about twenty-two months taken by Singapore or South Korea. As Parris Chang observed, “now the procurement process has become more institutionalized and more transparent, so it takes more time. But I think we are making some progress.”84 In addition to changes in the procurement process, Taiwan’s economic slowdown has contributed also to a slowdown in arms purchases. Further complicating matters, spending on social programs, such as the national health care system, is accelerating while the military’s share of the budget is shrinking. To state it VXFFLQFWO\7DLSHLLVH[SHULHQFLQJUHDOGLIÀFXOWLHVSXUFKDVLQJDOOWKHZHDSRQVWKDW it hopes to add to its inventory due to budgetary constraints. Ironically, some of the present procurement problems may be traced to the past policies of the US. During the early to mid-1990s, the ROC sought to purchase a variety of expensive weapons platforms – including submarines – from the US. At the time, Taiwan still had the money to buy them. Rather than sell submarines or other state-of-the-art weapons systems to Taipei, however, Washington either refused to sell the equipment or sold what one US Congressional study describes derisively as “Model-Ts” (for Taiwan).85 These “dumbed-down” weapons systems included American-built tanks, warplanes, and AWAC planes. Consequently, some Taiwanese law-makers argue that “the US cannot shake its share of blame for the lopsided cross-Strait military might.”86 Having refused such sales during the early 1990s, the US is now urging Taiwan to acquire submarines and other sophisticated arms. Americans cry out that “the

China’s military modernization and Taiwan’s defense reforms

55

87

wolf is at the door.” Although the procurement process is being slowed by governmental procedures, budgetary constraints, and the fact that Washington KDV\HWWRÀQGDPDQXIDFWXUHUIRUVRPHLWHPVWKHUHDUHLQGLFDWLRQVWKDW7DLZDQ ultimately will go ahead with the purchases.88 For example, Taiwan already has paid a deposit for the submarines (US $5.5 million in ‘obligating funds’) and the Taiwanese media reports that construction will begin soon on secret underground harbors for the new submarines in southern Taiwan.89 Taiwan is achieving some progress in downsizing the military, strengthening its C4ISR system and making the three military branches able to function as a team. As described, force numbers already have dropped to unprecedented levels. Furthermore, American advisers are now helping the Taiwanese military enhance its C4ISR system and Lockheed-Martin Tactical Systems reportedly signed a deal to provide data-links and other elements of an integrated C4ISR system to Taiwan in December 2003.90 Moreover, the MND is making moves to transform the armed services into an integrated unit. Indeed, Defense Minister Tang has reported that the military’s recent Hankuang 18 and Hankuang 19 training exercises have laid a “solid basis” for combined services operations.91 Finally, Taiwan may seek to revise its military strategy and more aggressively VHHN WR GHWHU D 35& PLOLWDU\ VWULNH DJDLQVW WKH LVODQG 7KHUH DUH XQFRQÀUPHG reports that Taiwan plans to resume production of ballistic surface-to-surface missiles in response to China’s provocative 1995 and 1996 missile tests and the growing arsenal of missiles that Beijing has deployed directly opposite Taiwan.92 The Taiwanese missiles – which could be armed with conventional or nuclear warheads – would be capable of striking targets in southern and south-eastern China (although Taiwan does not possess nuclear weapons, it admits that the 01'KDVWKHFDSDELOLW\WRSURGXFHWKHP 2IÀFLDOVUHDVRQWKDWWKHGHSOR\PHQWRI the missiles might help deter a PRC attack.

Conclusion: coping with a rising China To be sure, Taiwan’s military might is becoming stronger with the reform of the national defense system, the addition of advanced weapons systems into its arsenal and the streamlining and downsizing of its force structure. But many, if not most, security analysts see the military balance shifting steadily in China’s favor. After all, China is also reforming and modernizing its military. According to RIÀFLDOVLQ7DLZDQ·V01'WKH3/$PD\VXUSDVV7DLZDQLQERWKWKHTXDQWLWDWLYH and qualitative comparison of forces as early as 2005.93 But what does this development portend for Taiwan? Estimates of China’s military budget vary widely from roughly US$20 billion to over US$65 billion. As Defense Minister Tang explained, Taiwan “is not entering an arms race with China.”94 Rather, Taiwan hopes to deter a PRC attack upon the island and calculates that its defense reforms may play a role in this strategy. $OWKRXJK7DLZDQHVH RIÀFLDOV FRQFHGH WKDW ´WKH PRGHUQL]DWLRQ RI WKH 3/$ ZLOO inevitably improve,” they claim that “our military reforms will outpace theirs.”95 But Taiwan’s defense reform program represents only one part of the security equation.

56

Hickey

In order to deter a PRC attack, blockade or other hostile acts, Taiwan must keep the cost of such actions prohibitively high. According to the US Department RI 'HIHQVH D FRQMXQFWLRQ RI IDFWRUV ZRXOG LQÁXHQFH DQ\ &KLQHVH GHFLVLRQ WR initiate hostilities against Taiwan. These include the following: • • • • •

Taiwan’s will to resist PRC intimidation; Beijing’s assessment of the PLA’s capability to achieve its goals; the PLA’s capabilities to deter the US; the CCP’s concerns that a failed military operation against Taiwan would threaten the regime’s survival; the potential economic and political costs that China could incur from a FRQÁLFWZLWK7DLZDQ96

At the present time, it would appear that all of these factors are working in Taiwan’s favor and render any major PLA military operation against Taiwan unlikely. Public opinion polls reveal that the overwhelming majority (75 percent) of the Taiwanese population will actively resist PRC aggression and would be ZLOOLQJWRÀJKWIRU7DLZDQ97 Moreover, most studies (including those conducted by the US Department of Defense) concede that the PLA lacks the capability to launch an invasion of the island and that all other available military options – including a blockade – would prove to be very risky ventures. The likelihood of US intervention in a cross-Strait crisis also remains high and the international fallout from an attack against Taiwan could be incalculable. These considerations may help explain why many Taiwanese do not agree with the oft-stated American proposition that “the wolf is at the door”. The likelihood of a PRC military action against Taiwan remains low. But this is not cause for complacency or recklessness. A PRC military action is not beyond the realm of SRVVLELOLW\²HVSHFLDOO\LI7DLSHLSURYRNHV%HLMLQJ,QWKHÀQDODQDO\VLVPXFKPRUH than military reforms, hardware, high morale, international pressure, and US support ZLOOEHQHHGHGWRSURWHFW7DLZDQ$VRQH86RIÀFLDOH[SODLQHGVRPH\HDUVDJR´LQ the end, stability in the Taiwan Strait will be contingent on the ability of the two sides of the strait to come to terms with each other on a political basis.”98 Despite the passage of time, this fact has not changed.

Notes 1 See “Taiwan Military Overhaul to Enable Preemptive Strike,” Taiwan News, 27 January 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www.taiwansecurity. org/. 2 John Ruwitch, “China to Chop Half Million Jobs – Analysts,” Reuters, 16 June 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at at http://www.taiwansecurity.org. 3 For more information, see Harlan W. Jencks, “China’s Defense Buildup: A Threat to the Region?,” in Richard H. Yang (ed.), China’s Military: The PLA in 1992/92, Boulder: Westview, 1993, pp. 97–8. 4 Robert J. Skebo, Gregory K. S. Man, and George H. Stevens, “China’s Military Capabilities: Problems and Prospects,” in China’s Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems of Reforms, Modernization and Interdependence, Vol. 2, Study

China’s military modernization and Taiwan’s defense reforms

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15  17 18 19 20 21

22

23 24  26 27 28 29 30

57

Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, :DVKLQJWRQ'&86*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2IÀFH$SULOS See Susan Lawrence, “They Just Fade Away,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 2000, available at http://www.feer.com. US Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress, Pursuant to the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 28 July 2003, p. 5. Ibid. p. 18. See “Jiang Calls for Military Reforms of Chinese Army,” People’s Daily, 11 March 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www.taiwansecurity.org Annual Report on the Military of the People’s Republic of China, p. 34. Author’s interview with Dr Lin Chong-pin, Deputy Minister, Ministry of National Defense, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, 28 November 2003. Annual Report on the Military of the People’s Republic of China, p. 36. Ibid. See John Pomfret, “Beijing Plans to Reorganize Its Armed Forces,” Washington Post, 11 June 2003, p. A16, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www. taiwansecurity.org “China’s Jiang Zemin Says Troop Reduction to Accelerate Modernization Drive,” Xinhua News Agency, 3 September 2003, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 3 September 2003, in Lexis/Nexis. David Hsieh, “Wanted: Ph.D Holders to Join the Army,” Straits Times, 21 April 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www.taiwansecurity.org. 6HH´&KLQD%HJLQV+LJK7HFK7UDLQLQJIRU6HQLRU0LOLWDU\2IÀFHUVµXinhua News Agency, 14 October 2003, in Lexis/Nexis. See Lawrence, “They Just Fade Away.” See Willy Lam, “PLA Seeks A New Leap Forward,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, 3 June 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www. taiwansecurity.org. See Pomfret, “Beijing Plans to Reorganize Its Armed Forces.” Lam, “PLA Seeks A New Leap Forward.” As John F. Copper, a leading authority on Taiwan’s domestic politics, observed, during the Chiang era Taiwan’s political system was “authoritarian, based as it was on oneparty rule, a strong executive, pervasive police, and military control.” See John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province, Boulder, CO: Westview, 2003, p. 109. Chih-heng Yang, “The Evolution and Adaptation of Taiwan’s Military Strategy,” in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (eds), Defending Taiwan: The Future Vision of Taiwan’s Defense Policy and Military Strategy, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 72. Author’s interview with Dr Lin Chong-pin, Deputy Minister, Ministry of National Defense, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, 28 November 2003. ROC Ministry of National Defense, 2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China, Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2002, p.228. 7KHODZVZHUHSDVVHGLQEXWGLGQRWJRLQWRHIIHFWXQWLO6HH6RÀD:X “President Presides Over Inauguration of Restructured MND,” Central News Agency, 1 March 2002, in Lexis/Nexis. 2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China, p. 235. Ibid. p. 75 Ibid. p. 231. See Susanne Ganz, “Taiwan Places Military Under Civilian Leadership,” Japan Economic Newswire, 1 March 2002, in Lexis/Nexis. MND, 2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China, Taipei: MND, 2002, p. 230.

58

Hickey

31 Author’s interview with Dr Parris H. Chang, Chair, Foreign Relations Committee, Legislative Yuan, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, 24 November 2003. 32 Susanne Ganz, “Taiwan’s Chen Reviews Troops, Woos Military,” Japan Economic Newswire, 16 June 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 33 See “Taiwan May be Forced to Develop Ballistic Missiles,” Agence France Presse, 19 June 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/. 34 See Tai-jing Wu, “Taiwan Plans to buy PAC-3 Missile Systems from US,” Taiwan News, 4 March 2004, p. 2. 35 Brian Hsu, “Navy Looking for a Replacement for its Knox-class Frigates,” Taipei Times, 3 January 2004, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www. taiwansecurity.org/. 36 See “US-Made Air-to-Air Missile Delivered to Taiwan: Report,” Agence France Presse, 15 November 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www. taiwansecurity.org/. 37 2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China, p. 87. 38 See “Taipei Needs Leaner, Meaner Armed Forces, Agence France Presse, March 31, 2003, in Taiwan Security Research on the world wide web at http://www.taiwansecurity. org/. 39 See “Taiwan Armed Forces to be Turned into Defense Forces – Minister,” Central News Agency, 26 September 2003, in British Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring International Reports, 26 September 2003, in Lexis/Nexis. 40 Lee Wen-chung, a DPP law-maker, made this suggestion. Ibid.  )RU PRUH LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ HIIRUWV WR UHGXFH WKH QXPEHU RI RIÀFHUV LQ WKH 3/$ VHH Richard McGregor, “China to Trim 200,000 Troops from PLA,” Financial Times, 2 September 2003, p. 12, in Lexis/Nexis. 42 As Dr Lin Chong-pin explained, “we have to do that very gradually.” Author’s interview with Dr Lin Chong-pin, Deputy Minister, Ministry of National Defense, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, 28 November 2003. 43 “Taiwan’s Armed Forces to be Turned into Defense Forces – Minister.” 44 Susanne Ganz, “Taiwan’s Chen Reviews Troops, Woos Military,” Japan Economic Newswire, 16 June 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 45 According to some reports, conscripts will soon be required only to serve one year in the armed forces. See Brian Hsu, “Taiwan: Compulsory Military Service to be Shortened to One Year,” Taipei Times, 28 July 2003, in Lexis/Nexis. 46 For more information, see 2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China, p. 71. 47 Ibid, p. 128. 48 John Pomfret, “Also on Taipei’s Radar: Reform, US Weapons Only Part of Security 1HHGV2IÀFHUV6D\µ Washington Post, 25 April 2001, p. A26, in Lexis/Nexis. 49 Author’s interview with Dr Lin Chong-pin, Deputy Minister, Ministry of National Defense, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, 28 November 2003. 50 See Taijing Wu, “National Security, Cross-Strait Ties Vital, Says Chen,” Taiwan News, 1 March 2004, p. 3. 51 John Pomfret and Philip Pan, “US Effort to Restructure Taiwan Military Hits Snags,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), 31 October 2003, p. 1. 52 Peter Brooks, “US–Taiwan Defense Relations in the Bush Administration,” Heritage Lecture #808, 14 November 2003, available at http://www.heritage.org. 53 See Pomfret and Pan “US Effort to Restructure Taiwan Military Hits Snags.” 54 John Pomfret, “Also on Taipei’s Radar, Reform; US Weapons Only Part of Security 1HHGV2IÀFHUV6D\µ Washington Post, 25 April 2001, p. A26, in Lexis/Nexis. 55 Brian Hsu, “Weapons Purchases ‘Too Slow’,” Taipei Times, 28 February 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/.  ´86 2IÀFLDO 8UJHV %DODQFHG $SSURDFK WR 35&7DLZDQ 'LIIHUHQFHVµ UHPDUNV E\ 5DQGDOO6FKULYHU'HSXW\$VVLVWDQW6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHIRU(DVW$VLDQDQG3DFLÀF$IIDLUV US–Taiwan Business Council, Defense Industry Conference, San Antonio, TX, 14

China’s military modernization and Taiwan’s defense reforms

57 58 59 60

61  63 64 65 66 67 68  70 71 72 73 74

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 

59

February 2003, available at http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn/state/2003/021403. htm. See Chris Cockel, “US Frustrated by ROC’s Military Dithering: Scholar,” China Post, 25 January 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www.taiwansecurity. org/. See S. C. Chang, “Pentagon Reviews Taiwan Ties: US Magazine,” Central News Agency, 19 January 2003, in Lexis/Nexis. See Amber Wang, “Cohen Urges Taiwan to Beef Up Self-Defense,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), 19 November 2003, p. 1. Damon Bristow, “Taiwan’s Defense Modernization – The Challenges Ahead,” in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (eds), Defending Taiwan: The Future Vision of Taiwan’s Defense Policy and Military Strategy, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 81. Author’s Interview with Dr Parris H. Chang, Chair, Foreign Relations Committee, Legislative Yuan, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, 24 November 2003. 6HH´862IÀFLDO8UJHV%DODQFHG$SSURDFKWR35&7DLZDQ'LIIHUHQFHVµ Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, p. 50. See Brian Hsu, “Taiwan Military Increasing C4ISR Budget,” Financial Times, 2 November 2003, in Lexis/Nexis. Chris Cockel, “Taiwan Must Get Serious About Defense: Shaheen,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), 17 November 2003, p. 1. Chris Cockel, “US State Department Shrugs off Shaheen’s ‘Silly’ Remark,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), 20 November 2003, p. 1. MND, 2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China, Taipei,: MBND, 2002, p. 71. Ibid. p. 235. %ULDQ+VX´2IIHQVH%HVW'HIHQVH2IÀFHU6D\VµTaipei Times, 10 January 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/. Ibid. Fiona Lu, “Paal Urges Narrowing of Arms Gap,” Taipei Times, 27 August 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/. Ibid. “Taiwan Military Overhaul to Enable Preemptive Strike,” Taiwan News, 23 January 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/. Peter Brooks has suggested that “a number of trends should encourage Taiwan toward a defensive strategy that contains a limited offensive element to deter the PRC use of force and, if necessary, deny or at least complicate execution of a PRC campaign . . . effective self-defense, particularly against the growing PRC threat, may require strikes against PRC forces offshore.” See “Preface: The Challenges and Imperatives in Taiwan’s Defense,” in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (eds), Taiwan’s Security and Air Power: Taiwan’s Defense Against the Air Threat from Mainland China, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, pp. xii–xviii. “US Reviews Defense Ties with Taiwan,” Central News Agency, 20 January 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/. See “Taiwan’s Armed Forces to be Turned into Defense Forces – Minister.” 2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China, p.235. See “Beijing Plans to Reorganize Its Armed Forces.” Flor Wang, “Taiwan: Defense Minister Sends New Year Wishes to Military,” Central News Agency, 7 February 2002, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 7 February 2002, in Lexis/Nexis. Author’s interview with Dr Lin Chong-pin, Deputy Minister, Ministry of National Defense, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, 28 November 2003. Ibid. 6HH 7DLMLQJ :X ´¶0LOLWDU\ 5HIRUP 7DVN )RUFH· WR 3DYH :D\ IRU PRUH (IÀFLHQW Institutions, Says MND,” Taiwan News, 2 March 2004, p. 2.

60

Hickey

83 Author’s interview with Dr Lin Chong-pin, Deputy Minister, Ministry of National Defense, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, 28 November 2003. 84 Author’s Interview with Dr Parris H. Chang, Chair, Foreign Relations Committee, Legislative Yuan, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, 24 November 2003. 85 See US Defense Policy Toward Taiwan: In Need of An Overhaul, Staff Trip Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, )LUVW6HVVLRQ$SULO:DVKLQJWRQ'&86*RYHUQPHQW3ULQWLQJ2IÀFHSS 8–9. 86 For example, the US claimed that it could not sell submarines to Taiwan at that time because they were “offensive weapons.” See “US Report Pushes Taiwan to Review Defense Abilities,” Taiwan News, 2 August 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/. 87 David Lague, “This is What It Takes,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 April 2002, available at http://www.feer.com. 88 The P-3C Orion ASW aircraft is no longer manufactured by Lockheed-Martin and the US has not constructed a diesel submarine in 50 years. 89 Taijing Wu, “Media Reports US to Evaluate Taiwan’s Anti-Submarine Skill,” Taiwan News, 25 November 2003, p. 3. 90 According to Jane’s Navy International, this occurred in late 2003. See Chinese Military $YLDWLRQ )RUXP DYDLODEOH DW KWWSZZZVWRUPSDJHVFRPMHWÀJKWZZZERDUG html. 91 See “Defense Tactics Based on Asymmetric Warfare Method,” Central News Agency, 17 September 2003, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www. taiwansecurity.org/. 92 The original drive to manufacture Tien-Ma (Sky Horse) missiles was scrapped under US pressure in the 1980s. 93 See Benjamin Kang Lim, “Taiwan Sees Military Balance Tipping to China by Next Year,” Reuters, 11 January 2004, in Taiwan Security Research, available at http://www. taiwansecurity.org/. 94 “ROC to Buy Military Equipment from US, Says Defense Minister,” China Post, 31 August 2003, in Lexis/Nexis 95 Ibid. 96 Annual Report on the Military of the People’s Republic of China, p. 46.  $FFRUGLQJ WR SXEOLF RSLQLRQ SROOV  SHUFHQW ZRXOG EH YHU\ ZLOOLQJ WR ÀJKW IRU 7DLZDQSHUFHQWZRXOGEHZLOOLQJWRÀJKWIRU7DLZDQSHUFHQWGLGQ·WUHVSRQG DQG  SHUFHQW ZRXOG EH XQZLOOLQJ WR ÀJKW IRU WKH LVODQG7KH SROOV ZHUH SURYLGHG courtesy of Dr Lin Chong-pin, Deputy Minister, Ministry of National Defense, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, 28 November 2003 Other polls commissioned by Dr Emerson Niou of 'XNH8QLYHUVLW\WHQGWRVXSSRUWWKHVHÀQGLQJV  -D\&KHQDQG6RÀD:X´5RWK5HDIÀUPV86&RPPLWPHQWWR7DLZDQ·V6HFXULW\µCentral News Agency, 19 June 1998, in Lexis/Nexis.

3DUW,,,

The domestic context of defense reform

5

An overview of Taiwan’s defense reform York W. Chen and Martin Edmonds

Military institutions, after all, are not objects isolated in political and social space; they are not only responsive to their surroundings, but also responsible to them. They themselves are part of reality; they also create situations to which they must react. Innovation and reform in warfare touch on numerous issues in the military and civilian spheres.1

,QWURGXFWLRQ (YHQ EHIRUH 3UHVLGHQW &KHQ 6KXLELDQ DVVXPHG RIÀFH LQ  KH KDG EHHQ one of few contemporary politicians in Taiwan who were familiar with defense affairs and had considerable personal connections with the armed forces. In 1992, 3UHVLGHQW&KHQ6KXLELDQWKHQDOHJLVODWRUZDVWKHÀUVWRSSRVLWLRQPHPEHUWREH elected as the National Defense Committee Convener in the Legislative Yuan; his incisive performance on the Committee not only made him a favorite among the local media, but also established something of a precedent and a tradition. Since his time on the Committee, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators have concentrated on defense affairs and their commitment to the reform of the military has already become something almost of a crusade. Three generations of reformminded DPP legislators mark a period of constant pressure to get Taiwan’s military to reform: Chen Shui-bian (between 1990 and 1996) and Huang-Hsiung Huang ²DQG² ZHUHLQWKHÀUVWZDYH3DUULV+&KXQJVLQFH DQG Michael M. Tsai (from 1996 until 2002) were in the second wave. Since then, the tradition has been continued by Chung-Shin Chen (since 1999) and Wen-Chung Li (since 1999), who together mark the current wave. Many achievements of Taiwan’s defense reform to date in fact emanated from Legislator Chen Shui-bian’s ideas. Indeed, many parts of Taiwan’s National Defense Law (passed in 2000) were grounded in his draft of the National Defense Organization Law of 1991 – an ice-breaking initiative regarding defense organization reform at the time. He and his staff colleague, Chen-Heng Ko (now Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council), published a White Paper entitled Black Box of Defense in 1992, a 500-page volume that exhibited their comprehensive vision of future Taiwan’s defense reform. Even today, that volume is still essential for an understanding, or moreover an undertaking, of Taiwan’s defense reform.

64

Chen and Edmonds

Since then, Chen-Heng Ko maintained a close relationship with some of the PRUHRSHQPLQGHGVHQLRURIÀFHUVVXFKDV$LU)RUFH52&$) *HQHUDO)HL7DQJ who was Chief of General Staff between 1998 and 1999, Minister of National 'HIHQVHIURPXQWLODQGVXEVHTXHQWO\3UHVLGHQW&KHQ·VÀUVW3UHPLHU and also Tan-Yu Li, who is currently Commander-in-Chief of the ROCAF. When Chen took over the Presidency 2000, the National Defense Law was already in place and provided a new framework for the civilian leadership to embark on defense reform. For many observers, given this new framework, Chen’s connections with the senior military leadership and, more importantly, the fact that the new President himself was reform minded as well as having extensive knowledge of defense affairs, dictated that they were determined that Taiwan’s defense reform was indeed about to happen. Nevertheless, the expectations of Taiwan’s defense reform began to evolve into impatience and even criticism after 2002. Earlier, in December 2001, high-rankLQJ86RIÀFLDOVDQGGHIHQVHH[SHUWVZHUHXUJLQJ7DLZDQWRUHIRUPLWVQDWLRQDO defense. They made it clear that they regarded the success or failure of Taiwan’s defense reforms as key to the future of US–Taiwan military exchanges.2 In the US–Taiwan Business Council’s Defense Industry Conference in San Antonio, Texas, in 2003, Randall Schriver, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Sate for (DVW $VLDQ DQG 3DFLÀF $IIDLUV WROG WKH 7DLZDQHVH GHOHJDWLRQV WKDW ´7DLZDQ·V political and military leaders have recognized Taiwan military needs to reform. There are several elements of this reform program that are under way and we realize you are still adjusting to this reorganization as your military carries out ongoing transitions. But much still needs to be done.”3 In particular, Taiwan’s prevarication on the procurement of an arms package proposed by the Bush administration in 2001 induced Americans to doubt whether the Taiwanese were willing to defend themselves. The Washington Post journalist John Pomfret’s article in October 2003 recounted sharp criticism of 7DLZDQ IURP D 86 SHUVSHFWLYH ´86 RIÀFLDOV VDLG PDQ\ 7DLZDQHVH RIÀFLDOV including President Chen Shui-bian,” he asserted, “are reluctant to lock horns with the powerful military to push the reforms; others have not acknowledged WKDW7DLZDQQHHGVWRLPSURYHLWVZDUÀJKWLQJFDSDELOLWLHV7DLZDQHVHJRYHUQPHQW RIÀFLDOVDQGOHJLVODWRUVDFNQRZOHGJHGWKHSDFHRIFKDQJHZDVJODFLDOµ7KH86 he noted, had done whatever it could to assist Taiwan’s defense. “The US has put a lot efforts into this project” (quoting Nelson Ku, the Commander-in-Chief of ROC Navy between 1994 and 1997 and now a legislator) “but there’s really no improvement.”4 Explicitly mentioned in Pomfret’s report were incompetent civilians and a conservative military; together they represented two genuine obstacles to Taiwan’s defense reform. 3RPIUHW·V DUJXPHQW LV PLVOHDGLQJ DQG RYHUVLPSOLÀHV WKH FRPSOH[LW\ RI WKH decision-making environment within which Taiwan’s defense reform has to take place. The overarching goal of this chapter, however, is not to refute him; rather, it is an attempt to observe the complexities embedded in Taiwan’s defense reform from a broader societal and political context and then to assess the reform strategies that civilian and military leadership might or plan to adopt. It argues that,

An overview of Taiwan’s defense reform

65

although the development of Taiwan’s defense reform has been far from a total success to date, it has not failed. Under the leadership of President Chen and Defense Minister Yiou-Ming Tang, a sound foundation of Taiwan’s defense reform has already been established in that they have created a nationalized and professional military, the foundation for lasting reform. Of course, for those who prefer to see Taiwan’s defense reform in terms of a breakneck pace or along Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) lines, progress may well be frustrating and a disappointment. Like the so-called ‘quiet revolution’ precedent of Taiwan’s political reform, however, both President Chen and Minister Tang have acted strategically and adopted an evolutionary, cooperative approach. Given the complex decisionmaking environment within which they must operate, this may well have been the only real option available to them.

Myths and realities In researching and conducting defense reform, the use of the term ‘reform’ frequently produces a number of profound myths. Although much of the literature has treated this term interchangeably, with the use of such terms as ‘adjustment,’ ‘innovation,’ ‘transformation,’ ‘modernization,’ or, simply, ‘change,’ the linguistic implications of using the notion of ‘reform’ and other similar terms are still heavily burdened with positive or normative values. The meaning of ‘reform’ is still associated with the idea of improvement. From an historical perspective, such an implication can be questionable. French military reform during the inter-war period, for example, proved to be a false one and its introduction only made the disaster in 1940 all the more likely. Similarly, a ‘reform’ could be irrelevant to the problems at hand. The US Army introduced some impressive and radical reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, based upon the assumption of a general war in Europe against the former Soviet Union, ZKLOVWDWWKHVDPHWLPHLWVDUPHG6HUYLFHVZHUHORVLQJDJXHUULOODVW\OHFRQÁLFWLQ Vietnam. In short, the term ‘reform’ may be politically attractive, but it would be worth recognizing that it may equally be false, irrelevant, and, more frequently, ÁDZHG )URP WKLV SRLQW RI YLHZ ¶UHIRUP· GRHV QRW QHFHVVDULO\ JXDUDQWHH DQ improvement of a state’s relative military capabilities or a solution to the problems at hand. Well-intentioned reform still could easily fail unless the ideas behind it are convincing and smoothly diffused. Unless reforms are skillfully managed and whole-heartedly and convincingly implemented, they are likely to founder. It is widely recognized that reform, change, or innovation is not a singular event, but a process. It “is more the result of accretion than of any single decision.”5,QUHDOLW\WKHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHVVLQJHQHUDODQGWKHVSHFLÀFGHIHQVH reform decision itself, particularly in peacetime, rarely occur in a vacuum. More probably, the decision is taken in a complex political context where decisionPDNHUVJHQHUDOO\ÀQGWKHPVHOYHVIDFHGZLWKDPXOWLSOLFLW\RIYDULRXVGHPDQGV simultaneously. The priority of these different and variable demands is hard to GHFLGHXSRQVLQFHWKH\PD\ZHOOEHLQFRQÁLFWLIQRWWRWDOO\LQFRPSDWLEOH First, a desirable outcome for one may be a less desirable outcome for another.

66

Chen and Edmonds

&KDQJHLVLQKHUHQWO\FRQÁLFWXDOEHFDXVHLWLPSRVHVFRVWVRQVRPHDQGSURYLGHV EHQHÀWVLQWHUPVRIIDYRUDEOHSROLF\RXWFRPHVRQRWKHUV6HFRQGUHIRUPXQGHUtakings “instituted to solve one problem often create others because effectiveness in an organization depends on many factors, some of which are incompatible with others; hence, the dilemma.” The very improvements in some conditions that further the achievement of the organization’s objectives often interfere with other conditions equally important for this purpose. New problems are often internally generated in organizations in the process of solving old ones.6 Meanwhile, “decisions about change have always been risk-laden. History abounds with examples of armies which lost because they did not change or because they made the wrong change.”7 Change is not a free lunch; it imposes costs. It causes debates and struggles. $FWRUVQHHGWRWDNHWLPHSD\DWWHQWLRQDQGPRELOL]HUHVRXUFHV´&KDQJHLVGLIÀcult because it involves doing something new. The introduction of reform practices into a social system implies actions that entail a certain amount of uncertainty, risk, or hazard.”8 Change has both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, change implies experiment and the creation of something new. On the other hand, change means discontinuity and the destruction of familiar structures and relationships. Despite their positive attributes, changes can be resisted because they involve confrontation with the unknown and loss of the familiar. Additionally, changes do not always achieve the goals intended by their proponents; and even if they do, they may bring with them unintended and unwelcome consequences. Some dilemmas may induce unpredictable political consequences, while others, evidently, constitute weighty obstacles to reform. The advocacy group is OLNHO\WRVHHWKHEHQHÀWVRIWKHSURSRVHGUHIRUPZKLOHWKHUHVLVWDQFHJURXSYLHZV things differently, often by emphasizing the costs of such an undertaking. To deciVLRQPDNHUVKRZHYHUERWKEHQHÀWVDQGFRVWVPXVWEHWDNHQLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQ together. Therefore, cost, risk, and uncertainty further complicate the decisionmaking on reform. For these two reasons, it is not uncommon that decision-makers will, in order to preserve room for political maneuver or keep open a line of UHWUHDWGHOLEHUDWHO\DYRLGPDNLQJÀUPFRPPLWPHQWV$VDFRQVHTXHQFHQRWRQO\ to make a decision but also the decision itself is complicated and is open to subjective interpretations. Rather than being clear-cut, the substance of the decision is often ambiguous and hazy. Dilemmas can occur at two different levels: at the (grand) strategic level, where the priority settings are military considerations, diplomatic goals, economic development, and political stability on the one hand; and at the operational (tactical) level, which often involves profound dilemmas for civilian leadership, on the other. For example, the purpose of defense reform can be to achieve improvements in the military effectiveness of a state’s armed forces, but such military improvements sometimes are not feasible or are even harmful to those whom the armed forces exist to protect – for example, the state’s polity, economy, or society. Even in the (purely) military realm, military effectiveness has many different facets. Military activity takes place on many levels: for example, the political, strategic, operational, and tactical. Each level generates its own demands, which

An overview of Taiwan’s defense reform

67

the effectiveness that military organizations may need to meet. However, “the SUHUHTXLVLWHV IRU HIIHFWLYHQHVV DW RQH OHYHO PD\ FRQÁLFW ZLWK WKRVH DW DQRWKHU :KHQVXFKFRQÁLFWVRFFXUWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQPD\KDYHWRPDNHDGHOLEHUDWHFKRLFH to diminish effectiveness at one level in order to enhance effectiveness at other levels.”9 Moreover, for an army that faces conceivable external threats, but is ZDQWLQJIRUVXIÀFLHQWUHVRXUFHVDWUDGHRIIEHWZHHQUHDGLQHVVDQGLQQRYDWLRQLV a particularly painful choice.10 Organizations may be driven to innovate in order to attract more resources (manpower, equipment, budget, etc.), but the luxury of a generous defense budget does not guarantee successful military innovation. Diminishing resources often allow less ‘slack’ for non-traditional tasks and experiments.11

Trade-offs Taiwan’s ongoing defense reform is emerging within complicated external and internal contexts. There are at least four different sets of trade-offs that civilian or military decision-makers need to take into consideration when contemplating defense reform: The trade-off between Taiwan’s military policy and Taiwan–US relations The position of the US, as the principal external provider of Taiwan’s security, is not so clear when considering Taiwan’s defense reform options. Although the US encourages Taiwan’s armed forces to show more initiative in reform, it often disapproves of some of the options proposed by the Taiwanese, particularly those that could be construed to carry offensive implications. The Americans’ discomfort when receiving these proposals has been manifest either in terms of an expression of concern or, simply, by rejecting Taiwan’s requested weapons systems. When this happens, it often leads to diplomatic nervousness and crushes the Taiwanese military’s innovative concepts. For example, the ROCAF’s current novel operational concept of ‘Counter-measure Operations’ – namely to attack mainland China’s inland targets immediately after (or just before) Taiwan has been attacked – aroused US suspicion. The US military repeatedly expressed its profound concern about this idea and urged their Taiwanese counterparts to clarify its meaning. The trade-off between Taiwan’s military policy and economic development Since the late 1990s, Taiwan’s economy has been relatively in decline at a time when domestic political pressure has been mounting for increases in spending on social welfare. As Figure 5.1 shows, Taiwan’s defense budget declined sharply WREHORZSHUFHQWRIJURVVQDWLRQDOSURGXFW*13 LQÀVFDO\HDUDQGWKHQ GURSSHGIXUWKHUWRLWVORZHVWSRLQWKLVWRULFDOO\RISHUFHQWRI*13LQÀVFDO\HDU

68

Chen and Edmonds 30 25.32 24.28

25

24.51 22.76

22.51

22.43 21.6

20

17.41 16.48 16.37

16.59

15

10

4.72

4.11

3.69

5

3.47

3.33

3.14

3.09

2.76

2.78

2.61

2.5

2002

2003

0

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Percentage in Central Government Budget Percentage in Gross National Product

Figure 5.1 The proportion of the ROC defense budget as a percentage of the total government budget and of the gross national product: Source: The MND (September  7KHÀJXUHVOLVWHGDERYHDUHVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWIURPWKRVHLQNational Defense Report 2002.

2002. The civilian leadership believes that economic development should be the ÀUVWSULRULW\RIWKH''3JRYHUQPHQWDQGQRWPHUHO\IRUGRPHVWLFUHDVRQV Facing China’s rapid and extensive economic absorption strategy directed against Taiwan,12 the DDP government has perceived the need to restore vigorously Taiwan’s economic competitiveness in order to safeguard Taiwan’s overall security position. Ing-Wen Tsai, Chairperson of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, argued in 2003 that Taiwan should focus on the cross-Strait economic and trading issues in the short term and, later, shift to military issues in the intermediate term (2006–7).13 As a result of Taiwan’s declining defense budget in recent years, some of the armed forces’ experiments and procurement projects, as proposed by reformists, have been received as being highly indulgent and regarded as unpromising. Meanwhile, since the existing size of the defense budget cannot accommodate large military investment programs, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) has had no other choice than to lobby for a special budget bill for funding, an initiative that has proved to be highly controversial. The trade-off between military change and political stability &RPSRXQGLQJ WKH GLIÀFXOWLHV LQKHUHQW LQ 7DLZDQ·V GHIHQVH UHIRUP LV WKH complex, if not chaotic, domestic political arena. First, following in the wake of

An overview of Taiwan’s defense reform

69

democratization, the defense policy-making process in Taiwan has become more open and transparent. But there has been a backlash inasmuch as the system of defense policy-making has “became more complex, less co-ordinated, and often subject to internal wrangling.” As a result, “this situation has arguably weakened the decision-making capacity of the central government.” 14 Second, the ideological confrontation between the Pan-Green and Pan-Blue factions in the Legislative Yuan often spills over into defense issues, particularly over issues of vital military procurement. For example, although Taiwan’s civilian and military leadership had endorsed the procurement of four Kidd-class destroyers (DDGs), they still encountered stiff opposition in the Legislative Yuan during 2002–3. The Opposition successfully delayed the passage of a related budget and nearly halted the program completely until the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) intervened. Third, the institutional design of Taiwan’s government does not encourage change. On the one hand, the design places a greater emphasis on stability and IDLUQHVVWKDQRQUHIRUPDQGÁH[LELOLW\7DLZDQ·VULJLGFLYLOVHUYLFHV\VWHPPDNHV the transition from one regime to another almost meaningless. An incoming government could only make approximately ten new appointments (including the minister, his (her) deputy, and no more than ten political appointees) in any given ministry. The old bureaucracy would remain largely intact. Their jobs are well protected by law and they cannot even be sacked even for poor performance. Such a design not only prompts more or less internal resistance when a new minister tries to drive through a new policy, but also has a profound impact on military reform. The amended Organizational Act of the MND requires that one-third of the staff in the MND (202 in total, excluding the Minister and one Deputy Minister) should be civilians. Under the new administration, the MND enthusiastically tried to introduce forty political appointees to take charge of defense policy planning and decision-making. However, the civilian Central Personnel Administration and Examination Yuan used an obsolete civil service regulation to veto this innovative and open-minded initiative from a supposed ‘conservative’ MND. Article 7 of the National Defense Law, KRZHYHU UHÁHFWV WKH DPELJXLW\ RI WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ of the Republic of China. It states, for example, that Taiwan’s national defense system is structured according to the following elements: the President, the National Security Council, the Executive Yuan, and the MND. The President has WKHDXWKRULW\WRDVVLJQKLJKUDQNLQJRIÀFHUVDQGH[HUFLVHVLQÁXHQFHRYHUGHIHQVH decision-making through the mechanism of military meetings. The Executive <XDQLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUUHVRXUFHDOORFDWLRQDQGSROLF\LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ7KHLQÁXence of the National Security Council on defense issues is always blurred, since it has no authority over policy execution. As a result of this dispersion of authority, any consultation and cooperation required by defense reform becomes a very laborious and attenuated affair. Finally, military changes always have an impact on the armed services. If poorly managed, they could possibly have appalling effects, such as stimulating inter-service rivalry. At present, the possibility of a military coup d’état to topple the civilian government in Taiwan is negligible. However, the harmony and cohe-

70

Chen and Edmonds

sion of the armed services are often regarded as the critical index of military effectiveness, as well as the criterion for outsiders to judge the style and capacity of the civilian leadership. Any reform undertaking must therefore be highly sensitive to possible responses from the military. Some have argued that President Chen’s decision to appoint the former Minister of National Defense, Fei Tang, to the position of Premier in 2000, was blatantly political. His motive behind Tang’s appointment was to attract the loyalty of the military to his administration and to cultivate a healthy civil–military relationship.15 Also, for much the same reason, President Chen chose the former Chief of Staff, General Tang, who had substantial LQÁXHQFHZLWKLQWKHPLOLWDU\DVKLV0LQLVWHURI1DWLRQDO'HIHQVHHYHQWKRXJKKLV party, the DPP, had long fought for a civilian as the Defense Minister. On defense issues, Defense Minister Tang was delegated considerable autonomy. The trade-off between reform and readiness 3UHVVLQJHYHUPRUHKHDYLO\RQ7DLZDQ·VGHIHQVHUHIRUPKDVEHHQWKHVLJQLÀFDQW build-up and modernization of the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It is not surprising that one of the main driving forces for Taiwan’s military to embark on a program of military modernization has been the PLA’s recent acquisition of advanced air and naval platforms and its ever-increasing missile deployment, purportedly aimed at Taiwan. Consequently, Taiwan’s military is hard pressed to catch up, or match, the PLA’s build-up as quickly as possible and has been encouraged to do so by both the civilian leadership and by the US. Many analysts, both in Taiwan and the US, believe that the PLA is outpacing Taiwan weapons in quality and it is no longer an issue of possibility, but merely one of time. A recent study, for example, concluded that the PLA would complete its preparations to present a credible conventional threat to Taiwan by 2007.16 Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) has admitted that the PLA’s air and naval combat power might “qualitatively surpass that of ours by 2010.”17 This time pressure, perhaps counter-intuitively, has proved to be a mixed blessing ZKHUH7DLZDQ·VGHIHQVHUHIRUPLVFRQFHUQHG7KHFRQÁLFWLQJPRPHQWXPEHWZHHQ advocacy and resistance is based upon a common motivation: on the one hand, opponents conceive the imperative of strengthening readiness and argue that the current military effectiveness to deal with the currentHQHP\ZRXOGEHVDFULÀFHG by possible instability caused by reform. Proponents, on the other hand, believe radical change is needed and propose that a capability to deal with the future enemy may have higher returns in the future. Many ROC military personnel may be familiar with the ‘logic of interconnection’: when developing a weapons system, a change to one part is likely to call for a series of related alterations that consume much time and money. Similarly, the adoption of one weapon often requires changes in other weapons, in tactics, and in organization. A single set of trade-offs requires a single choice. However, when various sets of trade-offs function together, it produces a complexity where both linear causality and proportional relationships between inputs and outputs are largely absent.

An overview of Taiwan’s defense reform

71

The procurement of the Kidd-class DDGs is a typical case of interconnecWLRQLQYROYLQJWKHÀUVWWKLUGDQGIRXUWKVHWVRIWUDGHRIIV,QWKHDUPVVDOH package, the US agreed to sell Taiwan four 9,000-ton Kidd-class DDGs – much larger ships than the ROCN had ever operated before – in order to strengthen the 7DLZDQHVHVXUIDFHÁHHW7KH.LGGFODVV''*VDUHQRWQHZVKLSVWKHSHUIRUPDQFH DQG IXQFWLRQ RI WKHVH WZHQW\\HDUROG YHVVHOV DUH RI FRXUVH VLJQLÀFDQWO\ LQIHrior to the US Navy’s Aegis-equipped ships, the preferred choice of the ROCN. However, proponents in the Navy believed that the Kidd-class DDGS were much cheaper and easier to acquire. These ships could be assigned into the Navy’s order RI EDWWOH LQ D VKRUWHU SHULRG RI WLPH )LUVW WKH VKLSV FRXOG IXOÀOO WKH 52&1·V new concept of ‘Ocean-Going Maneuver,’ as outlined in Navy Vision, which had been proposed by Admiral Jei Lee, the Commander-in-Chief of ROCN between 1999 and 2002 (and later appointed Chief of General Staff in 2002). Second, the ships could replace the existing obsolete Yang-class DDGs within a very short time frame. They argued that, even though the design of Kidd dates back to the 1970s, its strong capabilities in air defense, battle management, and power projection were still far better than many current, but smaller, frigates (FFGs) such as the Chengkung-class (Perry), Kangding-class (La Fayette) and Chinyang-class (Knox) FFGs.18 The Kidd-class DDG procurement triggered inter- or even intra-service rivalries and led, later, to a head-on confrontation in the Legislative Yuan. In April DQ2SSRVLWLRQOHJLVODWRUGLVFORVHGWZHOYHGHÀFLHQFLHVVRPHRIWKHPFRQWDLQLQJFRQÀGHQWLDOPDWHULDOWKDWKDGEHHQGHOLEHUDWHO\OHDNHGE\FHUWDLQTXDUWHUV within the military) of the Kidd-class ships and argued that the MND should not buy these “useless giants,” as they were described. The voice of opposition soon spread. In June, the MND announced that the procurement of Kidd-class DDGs ZRXOGQRWEHLQFOXGHGLQWKHQH[WÀVFDO\HDU EXGJHWELOOLQRUGHUWRJLYHWKH Navy more time to persuade the legislators. In April 2002, the admirals explained the Navy’s stance on the Kidd Class DDG procurement, seeking the legislators’ support. It failed again. Worse still, the Navy was dubbed “the last prodigal left in the world.” Meanwhile, the urge to save the Kidd-class DDG budget and for the program to continue coincided with the Navy’s request for AEGIS-equipped ships. In June, a computer simulation conducted in the Han Kang exercise revealed that all four Kidd-class ships would be sunk consequent upon a determined attack E\WKH3/$7KLVÀQGLQJZDVDJDLQSXUSRVHO\OHDNHGRXWLQWRWKHSXEOLFGRPDLQ Even the Chairman of the People First Party (PFP) came out against the Kiddclass program. After the Kuomintang (KMT) and PFP parties had both decided WR ER\FRWW WKH .LGGFODVV ''* SURFXUHPHQW EXGJHW LQ 6HSWHPEHU D GRJÀJKW between the two camps ensued. After the DPP’s mobilization of support in the Legislative Yuan, the American Institute in Taiwan paid a visit to key members in the Pan-Blue camp. The outcome was that the Kidd-class DDG budget was ultimately endorsed in January 2003, but with one condition – that the MND was required to negotiate for a 15 percent discount with the US.19 )URPXQWLOWKH.LGGFODVV''*ZDVWKHÀUVWDQGWKHRQO\ ODUJH

72

Chen and Edmonds

defense procurement program in the Chen Administration sanctioned by the /HJLVODWLYH<XDQ$VWKHÀUVWFDVHXQGHUWKHDUPVSDFNDJHWREHUHYLHZHGLQ the Legislative Yuan, the Kidd-class DDG program was soon confronted with a very complex political situation. The differences between two camps over program preferences and their respective perceptions of the various potential trade-offs led the discussion in the Legislative Yuan to become more passionate and heated than objective and rational. Given the prolonged domestic political tug-of-war over the Kidd-class DDG program, the DDP government came under considerable criticism from its US counterparts. As President Chen explained to Richard Bush, the former Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, “We have differences of opinion about the timetable for the delivery of US arms and on which weapons should receive priority.”20 7KH SURFHGXUH RI WKH .LGGFODVV ''* SURJUDP ZDV VLJQLÀFDQWO\ GLIIHUHQW from that of weapons acquisition during the KMT era. In the past, in order to complete the procurement as quickly as possible, the KMT operated under a cloak of secrecy. But with the Kidd-class DDG acquisition, such an approach was impossible, either because the DPP rejected outright such an authoritarian practice, or because Chen’s minority government did not have such luxury. During the past WZR \HDUV WKH 1DY\ ZDV OHIW WR ÀJKW DQ XSKLOO EDWWOH DORQH ZLWKRXW VLJQLÀFDQW assistance or support from other civilian sectors or the other two military services. )RU52&1OLDLVRQRIÀFHUVLWZDVD´IUXVWUDWLQJQLJKWPDUHµ21 However, the Kiddclass story is just a beginning; a more complicated case for the SSK submarine procurement now awaits them.

Strategies and focuses From a linguistic perspective, organizational change comes in different ways with GLIIHUHQWRXWFRPHV$VWRWKHW\SHRIFKDQJHWKHUHLV¶ÀQHWXQLQJ·FKDQJHDWRQH extreme end of the spectrum, which is aimed at doing better what is already done ZHOO1H[WWKHUHLV¶LQFUHPHQWDODGMXVWPHQW·ZKLFKLQYROYHVGLVWLQFWPRGLÀFDWLRQV to strategies, structures, and management processes, which are not radical enough to be described as ‘strategic.’ It appreciates the existing frame of reference and is designed to strengthen it by some minor changes. At the other extreme, the purpose of so-called ‘transformation’ change is to alter and overthrow the existing frame of reference by proposing another set of roles, missions, or strategies that are novel to those within the organization. Most authors view such innovation, transformation, or revolution as a kind of radical departure from the status quo. In WHUPVRIWKHVFDOHRIWUDQVIRUPDWLRQWZRW\SHVFDQEHIXUWKHULGHQWLÀHG¶PRGXODU transformation’ and ‘corporate transformation’ (or strategic change). The former UHIHUVWRDWUDQVIRUPDWLRQWKDWLVFRQÀQHGWRGHSDUWPHQWVRUGLYLVLRQVZKLOVWWKH latter means a transformation throughout the organization. 22 $VIRUWKHDSSURDFKWRFKDQJHWKHUHDUHWZREURDGFDWHJRULHVWKHÀUVWLV¶WRS down’ versus ‘bottom-up’ approaches in terms of the agent of change. A ‘topdown’ orientation presents a directive/coercive style of reform management. A directive style involves the use of authority in reaching decisions about reform,

An overview of Taiwan’s defense reform

73

whereas a coercive orientation means the top, or senior, leadership forcing, or imposing, the reform process. With regard to defense reform, the ‘top-down’ orientation focuses on leadership, civilian or military, that sets the tone of reform and then drives the military to accept it. In contrast, a ‘bottom-up’ orientation portrays a collaborative/consultative style of reform management. A collaborative style entails widespread participation in key decisions that affect the organization and practice, whereas a consultative style means a limited involvement in deciding UHIRUPV WKDW DUH UHOHYDQW WR VSHFLÀF VSKHUHV RI UHVSRQVLELOLW\ 7KH ¶ERWWRPXS· RULHQWDWLRQ VWUHVVHV WKH DFFHSWDQFH RI D UHIRUP FRPLQJ IURP WKH RIÀFHU FRUSV especially through the process of organizational learning or as a result of a collective identity.23 The second category – which has some ontological implications – is the ‘planned approach’ as opposed to the ‘emergent approach.’ The ‘planned approach’ believes that organization change, by its nature, is a rational process. Reform, therefore, is both controllable and predictable. “Planned change involves common sense, hard work applied diligently over time, a systematic, goal-oriented approach, and valid knowledge about organizational dynamics and how to change them.”24 The ‘emergent approach’ to change starts from the assumption that change is a continuous, open-ended, and unpredictable process of aligning and re-aligning an organization to its changing environment. Advocates of emergent change argue that it is more suitable to the turbulent environment in which modern organization now have to operate. This is because, unlike the ‘planned approach,’ it recognizes that it is vital for organizations to adapt their internal practices and behavior to changing external conditions. Furthermore, it sees change as a political process in which different groups are engaged in an organizational struggle to protect or enhance their own interests. The emergent school in particular emphasizes: (a) the interconnectedness of change over time; (b) how the context of change shapes and is shaped by action; and (c) the multicausal and non-linear nature of change. Generally speaking, the ‘emergent school’ is the driving force behind the adoption of a ‘bottom-up,’ rather than a ‘top-down,’ approach to initiating and implementing change.25 However, emergent change is not random; its essence is as follows:26 •

•

•

Effective managers do not manage strategically in a piecemeal manner. They have a clear view of what they want to achieve, and where they are trying WRWDNHWKHEXVLQHVV7KHÀQDORXWFRPHLVWKHUHIRUHGHOLEHUDWHDQGFOHDUO\ LGHQWLÀHG The route to that destination, however – the strategy itself – is not intended from the start or understood in any comprehensive way. Effective managers know that the environment they have to operate in is uncertain and ambiguous. 7KH\ WKHUHIRUH PDLQWDLQ ÁH[LELOLW\ E\ KROGLQJ RSHQ D UDQJH RI RSWLRQV E\ which to reach their goal. The strategy itself then emerges from the interaction between different groups of people within the organization. These are different groupings, which have different amounts of power, different requirements for, and access to,

74

•

•

Chen and Edmonds LQIRUPDWLRQDQGGLIIHUHQWWLPHVSDQVDQGUHÁHFWPDQ\SDURFKLDOLQWHUHVWV These different pressures are then orchestrated by senior managers, who are always reassessing, integrating, and organizing. The strategy emerges or evolves in small incremental, opportunistic steps; but such evolution is neither piecemeal nor haphazard because of the agreed purpose and the role of the top management when reassessing what is happening. It is this that provides the logic behind incremental action. The result is an organization that is feeling its way toward a known goal, opportunistically learning as it goes.

This chapter has deliberately refrained from using such terms as ‘evolution’ or ¶UHYROXWLRQ·,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWVLJQLÀFDQWRUJDQL]DWLRQDOFKDQJHFRXOG have been achieved at an evolutionary pace. Most scholars, however, acknowledge that an evolutionary process is the best possible way to accomplish the goal of fundamental change to an existing system. In a defense context, the frame of UHIHUHQFHLVRQHWKDWLVGHHSO\HPEHGGHGLQDPLOLWDU\LQVWLWXWLRQ$VLJQLÀFDQW change, such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), does not happen in an instant, or overnight. Historians have argued that “even in war – the most SRZHUIXODFFHOHUDWLQJIRUFHFRQFHLYDEOH²PRVW>50$V@WDNHFRQVLGHUDEOHWLPHWR develop. Twentieth-century peace-time RMAs have sometimes required decades to come to eventual fruition and delays of that magnitude have inevitably led to arguments over the appropriateness of the term revolutionary.”27 During the period of the presidential campaign in 1999, President Chen put forward many proposals for defense reform in his White Paper on Defense Policy. He promised: 1

2

3

4

5

To streamline the defense organization, trim down the chain of command, and ensure the integration of military command and administration systems with the principle of civilian control. To adjust Taiwan’s current military strategy of ‘pure’ defense to one of ‘offensive’ defense by abandoning the operational concept of ‘annihilate enemy at the water’s edge’ and engage in attrition warfare, which he proposed to replace with one of ‘paralyzing’ warfare. To establish, in Taiwan’s war preparations, an offensive capability with which to attack the enemy at source. This would give priority to the ROC Navy and ROC Air Force; build up a ‘joint’ operations capability; develop an information operations capability; strengthen the integration of C4ISR systems; and encourage technological cooperation between private and military sectors. These initiatives would be based upon the principles of conducting war as part of a strategy of ‘the decisive battle outside the territory.’ To optimize a proper force structure, reduce the length of conscript service, and establish high-quality and professional armed services as personnel policy priorities. To implement, in the event of an emergency, the concept of ‘all-out defense’

An overview of Taiwan’s defense reform

75

by building up the population’s will to resist the enemy as part of a multidimensional protection of the country. In short, the paper concluded that the overall goal was “To engineer the WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ IRU D PRGHUQL]HG GHIHQVH LQ RUGHU WR HQVXUH7DLZDQ·V VXIÀFLHQW defense capability into the 21st century.”28 Considering both the substance and the rate of change, President Chen’s proposals conveyed a commitment for a major transformation of Taiwan’s defense. For example, he clearly put forward an innovative operational concept – the ‘decisive battle outside territory’ – and declared his intention to discard the dominant doctrine of ‘annihilate the enemy at the water’s edge.’ His initiative will, surely, register a chain of major sequential changes to such things as military strategy, force structures, and even arms procurement. As mentioned above, a ZHOOLQWHQWLRQHGUHIRUPVWLOOFRXOGIDLOXQOHVVÀUVWWKHUHIRUPLGHDVDUHFRQYLQFing and smoothly diffused and, second, reform undertakings are skillfully manDJHGDQGZKROHKHDUWHGO\LPSOHPHQWHG$IWHU3UHVLGHQW&KHQWRRNRIÀFHLQ the challenge lay in the skill, determination, conviction, and effort behind the persuasiveness, diffusion, management, and, ultimately, implementation of his initial commitments. :LWK WKH EHQHÀW RI KLQGVLJKW 3UHVLGHQW &KHQ GLG QRW DGRSW D ULJLG VWUDWHJ\ for defense reform after his inauguration. This was because the policy to initiDWHDQGLPSOHPHQWDSODQQHGDSSURDFKKDGWREHPRGLÀHGIROORZLQJDKHDGRQ confrontation with the Opposition. Meanwhile, except for a few occasions when a ‘top-down’ approach was used symbolically for setting the agenda, President Chen broadly delegated and encouraged, most of the time, ‘bottom-up’ initiatives for reform. One relatively constant pattern in President Chen’s defense reform undertakings has been his attention to personnel matters. His ‘Three Assurance 3ROLF\·IRUH[DPSOHKDVEHHQKHOSIXOIRUVHUYLFHPRUDOHDPRQJWKHUDQNDQGÀOH )RU SURPRWLRQ WR RIÀFHUV· KLJKHU UDQNV WKH SDWK LV PXFK PRUH RSHQ WKDQ HYHU EHIRUHDQGRSSRUWXQLWLHVKDYHQHYHUEHHQJUHDWHU0DQ\\RXQJSURIHVVLRQDORIÀcers have achieved the rank of General over the past four years. An estimate of the QXPEHURIWRSPLOLWDU\RIÀFLDOVSURPRWHGE\&KHQKDVDFFRXQWHGIRUPRUHWKDQ three-quarters of the total number of top-level staff by the end of 2003.29 In order to reduce the risk and uncertainty associated with defense reform, however, the MND has introduced a new interpretation of the wording of the phrase “evolution in military affairs.” This has been done in order to lessen the implications inherHQWLQ¶UHYROXWLRQDU\FKDQJH·DQGWRSODFDWHWKRVHPLOLWDU\RIÀFHUVZKRKDGEHHQ deliberately targeted under the RMA approach advocated by civilian scholars. 7KHGLOHPPDFDXVHGE\WKHFRQÁLFWVLQWKH/HJLVODWLYH<XDQZLWKDPLQRULW\ government largely reduced the capacity for risk-taking. Under such constraints, those reform undertakings that required the legislators’ support, or a large budget, – especially those arms procurement programs in which legislators had personal interest – encountered serious hurdles. Here, the consideration of political stability would appear critical. Although the political context and the Legislative Yuan OHDQWKHDYLO\RQWKHJHQHUDOVDQGDGPLUDOVWKHLQFUHDVHLQOHJLVODWRUV·LQÁXHQFH

76

Chen and Edmonds

over defense policy-making and a more transparent defense policy-making process, were reforms that the DPP had proposed, paradoxically, whilst they were still in Opposition. The situation was dramatically different in other areas where the MND could escape from the political mêlée in the Legislative Yuan. Many substantial reform initiatives have begun to emerge. Some could even be described as being radical. For example, in order to generate a culture for ‘jointness,’ the MND proposed a rather ambitious scheme to integrate three basic military academies into a single university by 2007.30 Some initiatives may well have profound strategic implications: the ROC Army, for example, was reported to be studying the possibility of handing over its missile units in support of the establishment of an independent missile service. In these schemes, parochial (service) interests, which are considHUHGWREHWKHPRVWVLJQLÀFDQWREVWDFOHVIRUUHIRUPKDYHVHHPLQJO\JLYHQZD\WR more advanced, innovative ideas. Perhaps the most remarkable achievement comes from the establishment of nationalized and professionalized armed services. During the 1990s, the armed IRUFHVZHUHJUDGXDOO\VKHGGLQJWKHLUDIÀOLDWLRQWRWKH.07DVSDUWRI7DLZDQ·V SDWKWRGHPRFUDF\%HDULQJLQPLQGKRZHYHUWKDWQHDUO\DOOKLJKUDQNLQJRIÀFHUV are KMT members who have been indoctrinated to oppose those who have advocated Taiwan’s independence from mainland China, it was an outstanding accomplishment not only that the military immediately and unconditionally announced its loyalty to the new President; equally impressive was that they also obeyed the election result, once Chen Shui-bian, who was perceived as a pro-independence advocate, had won the presidential campaign in 2000. Over the past four years, based upon the National Defense Law, the role and mission of Taiwan’s armed services have become more professionalized. Further, the principle of military disengagement from politics has been institutionalized, even to the degree that the armed services are being regarded as apolitical. All this demonstrates that Taiwan’s armed services not only respond to the broad societal environment that WKH\ ÀQG WKHPVHOYHV LQ EXW DOVR DUH GHWHUPLQHG WR GHYHORS WKHPVHOYHV LQWR D FDSDEOHUHOHYDQWDQGSURIHVVLRQDOÀJKWLQJIRUFH

Conclusion Although political factors limit the range of possible options for reform, the civilian and military leadership have adopted an ‘emergent’ approach to reform, namely WRJUDVSHYHU\RSSRUWXQLW\WRVKDSHWKHHQYLURQPHQWDQGWRDFKLHYHVLJQLÀFDQW SURJUHVVLQDQ\QXPEHURIGHVLUHGLQLWLDWLYHV)RUPDQ\RIÀFHUVZKRKDYHEHHQ used to take and follow orders, this ‘bottom-up,’ ‘emergent’ approach has been unfamiliar. But observing from the perspective of the many innovative schemes mentioned above, many imaginative servicemen have tried to out-maneuver institutional and systematic constraints and achieve some local successes in VSHFLÀFDUHDVRIGHIHQVHUHIRUP This kind of reform is not a wholesale one, but incremental. It is not rapid, but steady. Considering the complications caused by the interconnection among

An overview of Taiwan’s defense reform

77

various trade-offs, this approach is proving a viable solution, without causing an already fragile political situation to erupt, precipitate a major upheaval within the military, or be forced to abandon the overall vision of defense reform. In fact, to some extent, it works.

Notes 1 Peter Paret, Innovation and Reform in Warfare, Colorado Springs: United States Air Force Academy, 1961, p. 2. 2 Taipei Times, December 2003, p. 2. 3 See www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/liberary/news/taiwan/2003/taiwan-0302014-dos17796pf.htm. 4 John Pomfret and Philip P. Pan, “US Hits Obstacles in Helping Taiwan Guard against China,” Washington Post, 30 October 2003, p. A01. 5 Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 287. 6 Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963, pp. 250–1. 7 Huba Wass de Czege, “How to Change an Army,” Military Review, LXXVII (1), 1997, p. 162. 8 Lawrence B. Mohr, “Determinants of Innovation in Organizations,” American Political Science Review, 63 (1), 1969, p. 114. 9 Allan R. Millett, Williamson R. Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of Military Organization,” in Allan R. Millett and Williamson R. Murray (eds), Military Effectiveness, Vol. 1: The First World War, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 3. 10 The idea of trade-offs between readiness and innovation is drawn from Jeffrey Record, Ready for What and Modernized against Whom: A Strategic Perspective on Readiness and Modernization, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995, pp. 1–3. 11 Mohr, “Determinants of Innovation in Organizations,” p. 122. 12 See Chui-Cheng Chiu, “The Construction and Deployment of China’s Economic Absorption Strategies toward Taiwan under the WTO,” in Taiwan Defense Affairs, 3 (3), 2003. The author argues (see p. 21) that the purpose of China’s economic absorption is to “cultivate pro-China groups and isolate the Taiwanese government. With this strategic operation, China can not only improve its government’s permeation into Taiwanese industries, but also create contradiction and problems between the Taiwanese civilian and authorities. Thus, it softens Taiwanese insistence on its sovereignty.” 13 United Daily News, 30 September 2003, p. 13. 14 Michael D. Swaine and James C. Mulvenon, Taiwan’s Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and Determinants, Santa Monica: RAND, 2001, p. 78. 15 Financial Times, 30 March 2000. Quoted from Peter Richard, “Civil–Military Relations in the Republic of China: A Conceptual Approach to Evaluating the Stability of Taiwan Civil–Military Dialogue,” E-Journal of the Center for the Study of Democracy, 1, 2002, p. 27. 16 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, p. 329. 17 ROC MND, National Defense Report 2002, p. 55. 18 See Martin Edmonds and York W. Chen, “Assessment of the ROCN’s Modernization: Views from Strategic and Operational Consideration,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 2 (2). Also in Martin Edmonds and Michael Tsai (eds), Taiwan’s Maritime Security, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. 91–109. 19 United Evening News, 25 April 2001, p.2; Taiwan News, 20 June 2001, p. 2; Central Daily News, 25 April 2002, p.4; United Evening News, 17 May 2002, p. 7; China Times,

78

20 21 22

23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Chen and Edmonds 29 June 2002, p. 4; United Daily News, 3 June 2002 p. 2; China Times, September 8 2002, p. 4; China Daily News, September 12 2002, p. 5; China Times, 16 October 2002, p. 6; Central Daily News, 17 October 2002, p. 5; China Times, 2 November 2002, p. 4; China Times, 27 March 2003, p. 4. Taipei Times, 26 February 2003, p.3. Interview with a ROCN Captain, December 2003. Andrzej Huczynski and David Buchman, Organizational Behaviour: An Introductory Text, London: Financial Times/Prentice Hall, 1985, reprinted 2001, p. 606; Barbara Senior, Organizational Change, London: Financial Times/Prentice Hall, 1997, reprinted 2000, pp. 39–40; Michael L. Tushman, W. H. Newman, and E. Romanelli, “Convergence and Upheaval: Managing the Unsteady Pace of Organizational Evolution,” in Michael L. Tushman and William L. Moore (eds), Readings in the Management of Innovation, New York: Ballinger, 1988, pp. 712–13. Huczynski and Buchman, Organizational Behaviour, p. 606. The former (top-down orientation) vein can be seen in Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, whereas the latter (bottom-up orientation) is the main theme of Emily O. Goldman, “Mission Possible: Organizational Learning in Peacetime,” in Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Rhodes (eds), The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests, New York: Columbia University, 1999. Wendell L. French and Cecil H. Bell, Organization Development: Behavioral Science Intervention for Organization Improvement, Uppper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1995, pp. 1–2. Bernard Burnes, Managing Change: A Strategic Approach to Organizational Dynamics, London: Pearson Education, 2000, pp. 280–284. Ralph D. Stacey, “Strategic Management and Organizational Dynamics: The Challenge of Complexity,” Financial Times, 2000, p. 92. Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, “Thinking about Revolutions in Warfare,” in MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds), The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300–2050, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 12. Commanding Center for Chen Shui-bian Presidential Campaign, Chen Shui-bian’s Blueprint for Sate, Vol. 1: National Security, Taipei: Commanding Center for Chen Shui-bian Presidential Campaign, 1999, pp. 49–51. Taipei Times, 23 December 2003, p. 8. See ROC MND website: www.mnd.gov.tw.

6

Defense policy-making and civilian roles Ching-Pu Chen

,QWURGXFWLRQ As the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu put it, “War is a matter of vital LPSRUWDQFHWRWKHVWDWH>LWLV@DPDWWHURIOLIHRUGHDWKWKHURDGHLWKHUWRVXUYLYDO or to ruin. Hence, it is imperative that it be studied thoroughly.”1 National security is not only the collective responsibility of all the people, but it is also the basis, and one of the major goals, of national development and policy implementation. As a result, without exception, all countries around the world invest a huge amount of scarce resources on building up a reliable defense force. However, as the resources that these countries possess, and the threats that they face, can vary, the formulation and employment of their defense policies need to be carefully GHÀQHG Since the Republic of China (ROC) is a democratic and open society, it is difÀFXOWIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQWWRIRUPXODWHVLQJOHKDQGHGO\DQGDGYRFDWHSROLFLHVWKDW concern the population at large. But national defense is a matter that concerns the entire nation. The formulation of defense policy, therefore, involves a wide range of considerations in addition to purely military ones, the impact of which on the nation as a whole is even more far-reaching. National defense cannot be decided, therefore, by purely military considerations alone. Planning national defense needs diverse and creative thinking that infuses new ideas into the defense decision-making system, something that in the ROC has been relatively conservative. Elites from all sectors of society must participate in the formulation of national defense policies. Only then will the formulation of defense policy be more exhaustive, extensive, and forward-looking. This is one reason why civilians have been brought into the defense system. Generally speaking, civilian control and civilian participation in defense affairs has been the normal practice in advanced countries. The National Defense Law and Organization Law of the MND of the ROC also now manifest this important principle. $V VRFLHW\ EHFRPHV PRUH GLYHUVLÀHG DQG DV PHPEHUVKLS RI WKH 7DLZDQHVH legislative branch has recently become more varied, the formulation process of defense policy and the roles of decision-makers have changed greatly since the National Defense Law and Organization Law of MND were brought into practice. This chapter will discuss ROC defense strategy and policy system, as well as operating relationships between the defense decision-making mechanisms on the

80

Chen

one hand and civilian roles on the other. It will also offer suggestions on ways to improve the quality of defense policy-making.

'HÀQLWLRQRIWHUPV As has been pointed out in The Military Thinking of the ROC, issued by the Ministry of National Defense, ‘national defense’ means safeguarding the national security. It is a generic term that not only refers to war preparation measures, which are primarily military, but also includes political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and technological considerations. These are adopted by an independent country to protect territory, national sovereignty, and the people’s safety from invasion.2 In other words, it is a defensive action based on the principle of ‘maintain internal security and repel foreign invasion’ conducted by a country to protect national security. To conclude, ‘national defense’ is action aimed to ensure the survival and security of a nation and to advance its prosperity and interests. ¶1DWLRQDO GHIHQVH· FDQ EH GHÀQHG IURP WZR SHUVSHFWLYHV ² LQ D EURDG RU D narrow sense. The National Defense Law passed by the ROC Legislative Yuan and promulgated by the President on January 29, 2000, is a defensive concept in the broader sense. It represents the entire system and the concept of national security, including all aspects ranging from politics to the economy, military, sociHW\DQGWHFKQRORJ\7KLVLVWKHÀHOGWKDWEHORQJVWRWKH3UHVLGHQWDQG([HFXWLYH Yuan. In the narrower sense, ‘national defense’ refers to military goals achieved through military strength in order to protect the territorial integrity of the nation DQGWKHZHOOEHLQJRIWKHSHRSOH7KLVLVWKHÀHOGWKDWEHORQJVWRWKH0LQLVWU\RI the National Defense (MND). Accordingly, the Organizational Law of the MND is part of the defensive concept in a narrow sense, for it regulates the organizational planning charged by the MND to achieve national security goals through the acquisition and deployment of military capability. 6LQFHWKHWHUPVDSSOLHGLQWKHÀHOGVRI¶QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\·DQG¶VWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJ·DUHRIWHQDPELJXRXVDQGFRQIXVHGWKLVFKDSWHUZLOOÀUVWGHÀQHWHUPVDQG FODULI\ WKH UHODWLRQVKLSV EHWZHHQ WKHP 7KHUH LV QR GHÀQLWLRQ IRU D ¶QDWLRQDO defense strategy’ or a ‘national defense policy’ in the Dictionary of US Military Terms.3 Thus, they should not be treated as proper nouns, but seen in terms of being a generic concept. If so, then it is possible to clarify the relationships between them by using terms such as ‘mission,’ ‘goal,’ ‘strategy,’ ‘policy,’ ‘planning,’ and ‘budget.’ ‘Mission’ refers to the purpose and value that justify the existence of an organization. ‘Goal’ refers to the objective, or effect, that an organization plans to achieve. ‘Strategy’ refers to the description used by an organization as to how it would achieve the overall conception of its missions and goals: that is to say, “to achieve the guidance and concept of the organization mission by all possible means.” ‘Military strategy’ is, then, the “use, or threat to use, all possible military means to achieve the guidance and concept of the military goals of a nation.”4 More often than not, ‘mission,’ ‘goal,’ and ‘strategy’ are descriptions or concepts of a generic nature and are unable to give explicit directions to executive units for the distribution of resources, daily decision-making, or planning.

Defense policy-making and civilian roles

81

It is necessary therefore to formulate the directions for execution according to a strategic concept, or ‘policy.’5 As a result, ‘policy’ is both the direction and the interface that connect strategy and execution. A ‘plan,’ therefore, comprises a set of activities and procedures. It is for the executive units to formulate and select ‘plans’ to achieve organizational missions and goals according to the direction of policy. A ‘budget’ is made according to an organizational plan and submitted in terms of estimated expenditure. Finally, an organization adopts the necessary activities and steps to achieve its missions and goals within a range of approved budget expenditure and according to standard operating procedures. The procedures are shown in Figure 6.1. Structures such as this could be used to connect the upper decision-making level with the lower execution level and is switched level by level. Since the policy on the upper level is the guidance and basis for the formulation of the goal and strategy on the lower level, it is often misunderstood that policy comes before strategy.

The place of national defense policy As is pointed out in the 2002 National Defense Report, ROC, “national security policy is national defense policy in a broad sense, which is divided into political, economic, military, psychological, technological, and diplomatic polices and is formulated by related ministries and agencies. After being integrated by the Executive Yuan, defense policy will then be promulgated by the President, whereas national defense policy is national security policy in a narrow sense, which is military policy – the primary part of national security policy – and is formulated and employed by the Ministry of National Defense.”6 According to Huang Lu-shin, national defense policy is “the aggregate of plans, initiatives, and actions adopted by a nation in order to achieve security goals in peacetime and wartime for resisting external military threats and suppressing internal riots.”7

Figure 6.1 The path from mission to execution.

Budget

Plan Transferring connection

Operating procedures

Policy

Strategy

Goal

Mission

Formulating strategy

Executing strategy

82

Chen

In other words, it is the comprehensive directing and guiding principles adopted by the government in its pursuit of national security goals, the content of which widely includes all decisions and instructions of the major measures concerning the military.8%RWKGHÀQHQDWLRQDOGHIHQVHSROLF\DVPLOLWDU\SROLFLHVWKDWHPSOR\ military means. As mentioned above, the National Defense Law is a fundamental defense law in a broad sense. As the third article of the Law puts it, “the national defense of the Republic of China is all-out defense”,9 including defense in all aspects of political, economic, military, psychological, and technological matters. According to the seventh article of the National Defense Law, the defense structure of the ROC includes the President, the National Security Council (NSC), the Executive Yuan, and the Ministry of National Defense (MND). The basic idea is that the President, with the help of the NSC, is responsible for formulating national defense guidelines and national security strategy. According to the tenth article of the National Defense Law, the duties of the Executive Yuan in defense affairs are to “formulate defense policy, integrate the whole national power, and supervise agencies under its jurisdiction to conduct defense-related affairs.” According to the Constitution, the Executive Yuan possesses authority over all other administrative organizations. The essence of the National Defense Law is that the Executive Yuan should integrate national power and formulate all-out defense policies that include political, economic, military, psychological, and technological policies. In addition, it should integrate resources of all other agencies to help the Ministry of National Defense to achieve the military goals of national security by military means in order to ensure both national security and the people’s well-being. According to the eleventh article of the National Defense Law, the Ministry of National Defense should “develop the professional functions of military administration, military command, and military armament, provide suggestions on defense policy, and formulate military strategy based on the needs of national defense security.” Since the MND is responsible for national defense in a narrow sense, or the military part of it, the MND should formulate military strategy and provide suggestions concerned with the military policy element of national defense policy. In other words, the scope of national defense covers the entire range of national power, including all defense-related strengths and capabilities, including political, economic, psychological, and military ones, which directly or indirectly contribute to achieving the purpose of national defense and are aimed at achieving the defense goal to “safeguard national security and maintain the world peace.”10 ‘Defense policy’ is the comprehensive operating path and guiding principle adopted by the government to safeguard national security by employing the nation’s political, economic, psychological, and military strengths. Such considerations, therefore, as: “promote benign interaction between two sides of the Taiwan Strait”; “actively practice all-people diplomacy”; “develop a sound economic base”; “reach the consensus on all-out defense”; “promote R&D to attract investment”; “establish a force with autonomous defense technologies”; and “realize democracy to protect

Defense policy-making and civilian roles 83 11

human rights” all become fundamental concepts of Taiwan’s national defense policy. According to the 2002 National Defense Report, ROC, the President is required to promulgate national security policy, which is national defense policy in a broad sense, whereas the MND is required to formulate and carry out national defense policy. This, however, is an obvious, but understandable, misinterpretation of the meaning and authorization of the National Defense Law.

The system and thinking behind Taiwan’s national defense strategy The role of the national defense policy, the system and thinking behind Taiwan’s national defense strategy, is described in terms of a theoretical structure and the standards of the National Defense Law and the Organization Law of the MND, which are as follows. Generally speaking, there will be several decision-making levels within any organization or government. A commercial organization is usually divided into corporate, business, and functional levels; a government could be divided into overall, division, and execution strategic levels (Figure 6.2).12 National defense policy is one of the national security issues and the establishPHQWRIDV\VWHPLVWKHEDVLVIRUWKHIXOÀOOPHQWRIWKDWSROLF\2QFHWKH1DWLRQDO Defense Law and the Organizational Law of MND came into effect, the ROC military security system could be divided into (national defense) strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The tactical level could be further divided into tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).13 At the national level, strategy could National defense strategy

National (corporate) mission/goal National Security Strategy

5 1 Military strategy of the MND

Service, joint, and functional strategy

Overall corporate strategy

4 3

1 Political 2 Military 3 Economic 4 Psychological 5 Technological

2 Division (business) strategy

Execution (functional) strategy

Figure 6.2 &ODVVLÀFDWLRQRIVWUDWHJLFOHYHOVPLOLWDU\H[DPSOH

84

Chen

be divided into national security strategy, national defense policy, and military strategy, connecting national defense (in a broader sense) to that of the military (in a narrower sense), as shown in Figure 6.3.

Tactics, techniques, procedures (TTP) This chapter, in a general sense, considers national security strategy, national defense policy, and military strategy in terms of a ‘national defense strategy.’ According to the seventh article of the National Defense Law, the national defense system of the Republic of China includes the President, National Security Council, Executive Yuan, and Ministry of National Defense. So also does the national defense strategy decision-making mechanism. The President, with the help of the National Security Council, designs the ways to employ synthesized national power to develop policy guidelines and a national security strategy in order to achieve the goals of national security and safeguard national interests.14 According to the third article of the National Defense Law, “the national defense of the Republic of China is all-out defense, including political, economic, psychological, technological affairs, which are concerned with national defense, the military, all-people national defense, and contribute directly or indirectly to achieving the goals of national defense.” As a result, national defense, in a broad sense, is all-out national defense, for which the MND neither is able nor should be responsible. According to the tenth article of the National Defense Law, the Executive Yuan is required to “formulate defense policy, integrate the whole national power, and supervise agencies under its jurisdiction to conduct defense-related affairs.” Under the direction of the national security strategy, the MND “provides suggestions on national defense policy and formulates military strategy based on the needs of national defense security.”15 As for the military part of the national defense policy, its responsibility is to develop ways to build up and employ armed forces and military strategy to achieve national military goals. As for the operational level,16 Article 13 of the National Defense Law regulates that “the MND should establish a General Staff Headquarters as the military command staff and command institution for joint operations under the jurisdiction of the minister.” Taking his orders from the Defense Minister, the Chief of General Staff is responsible for military command affairs and is in direct command of the armed forces. Thus, at the operational level, General Staff Headquarters, under the instruction of the Minister of the Ministry of the National Defense and Chief of General Staff, develops and prepares joint operational concepts, formulates related operational plans, and executes joint operations in crisis.17 At the tactical level, the General Staff Headquarters directs all operational units to carry out missions through Army level commands. As the interface between strategy (MND) and joint operations (General Staff Headquarters), military strategy (especially its operation plans) serves as the connecting link between the three levels. At operational and tactical levels, it is the joint operational plans, formulated by the General Staff Headquarters, that connect armies and operational

Defense policy-making and civilian roles 85

Goals of National Security National Policy Guideline

Nation

President/National Security Council

National Security Strategy

National defense strategy

Synthesized national power

Executive Yuan

National Defense

National defense policy

The establishment and employment of military strength

MND Military

Military strategy Operationss

General staff headquarters

Joint operations

Operation plans/orders

Unit operation and tactics

Army level command Join arms brigade/battalion

Detachment/ platoon

Brigade/ battalion

Special forces

Tactical

Tactics, techniques, procedures (TTP)

Figure 6.3 &ODVVLÀFDWLRQRIQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\OHYHOV

units. The deployment and employment of operational units are regulated by their tactics, techniques, and procedures, which in turn are in accordance with the principles of “central planning (joint high command), dispersed execution (force profession),”18 target management, and decentralized authorization. Like customary management mechanisms, a complete strategy management mechanism should include planning, execution, and supervisory functions. According to the two laws, therefore, the security strategy mechanism at the

86

Chen

national level is composed of the National Security Council (planning organization), the Executive Yuan (executive organization), and the elected bodies (supervision organization). The military division is composed of a military administrative system (planning), military command and armament systems (executive), DQGDVXSHUYLVRU\RIÀFHRYHUVLJKW 7KLVNLQGRISODQQLQJDUUDQJHPHQWFDQPHHW the democratic principles of the division of three branches of government and check and balances.

The thinking behind Taiwan’s national defense strategy planning :LWKWKHKHOSRIWKH1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\&RXQFLOWKH3UHVLGHQWÀUVWVHWVWKHJRDOV of national security based on national interests and then formulates the national security strategy according to his judgment of the comprehensive national situation. The Executive Yuan formulates national defense policy by integrating all other agencies. The MND, in accordance with the goals of national security (military), national security strategy, and the military situation, formulates military strategy, and forwards suggestions on national defense policy (especially military policy) for reference to the Executive Yuan. Military strategy and policy development formulated by the MND are a part of the whole strategic concept of national security and are aimed at developing overall military strength. They also provide the fundamental plan for directing service strategy and all other military plans. Meanwhile, both military strategy and military policies are incorporated in the ‘national security strategy’ and ‘national defense policy.’ Therefore, in theory, the military strategy of the ROC is consistent with national strategy, as shown in Figure 6.4. The importance of national defense policy is obvious, for it is the concrete guideline that can transfer strategy planning at the higher level into action at the lower level.

The formulation of national defense policy at the national level In terms of government decision-making, or policy formulation, the American scholars Allison and Zelikow offer three models – the rational actor, the organizational process, and the governmental politics.19 According to the rational actor model, government decision-making is a matter of rational choice; the decision-makers of an organization are rational actors, who will select a choice WKDWFRVWVOHDVWEXWEHQHÀWVPRVWDPRQJYDULRXVSROLF\FKRLFHV$VDUHVXOWWKH rational actor’s choice could be predicted from an analysis of his perception of the goals, options, and consequences. According to the organizational process model, organizational policies are the product of loose procedures; policy choices, therefore, are the ‘under-the-counter’ product of the power, culture, abilities, and standard operating procedures embedded in a loose bureaucratic organization. Leaders’ policy choices are correspondingly limited by the options offered by the organizational structure.

Defense policy-making and civilian roles

87

MND Classification Departments National mission and interest

President/ NSC

National security goals

Security military goals

Judgment on national situation

Judgment on military situations Military strategy

National Security Strategy

Executive Yuan

Military strategy planning

National defense strategy

National defense policy Military

Technological

Psychological

Economic

Political

The whole system incorporated

Military policy

Service Mission

Joint operations

Armament goal

Strategy

Joint op strategy

Armament strategy

Policy

Joint op policy

Armament Policy

Planning

Joint op planning

Budget

Joint op budget

Ex ecution function

Armament planning Armament budget

Execution

Figure 6.4 The structure of national defense.

According to the governmental politics model, government decision-making is usually not the result of a single and rational choice; rather it is the product of QHJRWLDWLRQVFRPSURPLVHVDQGFRQÁLFWVDPRQJVWDNHKROGHUVDQGLQWHUHVWJURXSV None of the participants is rational. The very compromising policy decision comes out only when a certain unit takes control. Government decision-making can be reviewed from certain different perspectives: interest groups or people involved LQGHFLVLRQPDNLQJWKHLUSHUFHSWLRQVSUHIHUHQFHVVWDNHVLQÁXHQFHVDQGFKDQnels of action; and the ‘rules of the game’. Policy networking is one of the policy formulation theories concerned with the governmental politics model. The basic idea about policy network theory is that, during the process of policy formulation, a network will be formed from the aggregate of strengths from various participators in both public and private sectors, including agencies and departments within the government and different interest and pressure groups in society. As an aggregate of these differing strengths, the forming of the network,

88

Chen

however, is not to construct a power or policy guiding center; nor does it need to EHFRRUGLQDWHGE\DVSHFLÀFDXWKRULW\5DWKHULWLVIRUPHGWKURXJKFRRSHUDWLRQ and interdependence among the participants.20 The participants in the policy network are those from government agencies and various interest groups in society whose interests are concerned with a particular policy. With their participation, resources (including authority, capital, legitimacy, LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG RUJDQL]DWLRQ  DQG VSHFLÀF LQWHUHVWV WKH SDUWLFLSDQWV FRQGXFW interest exchange, cooperate, or create interdependencies in a game that is full of complicated motives in order to formulate, and subsequently execute, policy.21 5KRGHVDQG0DUVKKDYHLGHQWLÀHGÀYHHOHPHQWVLQSROLF\QHWZRUNUHVHDUFKWKH policy environment; network members; the degree of network integration; the distribution of network resources; and the power interaction relationships among the network members.22 By making a revision of the Rhodes and Marsh model, Read believes that it should be divided into central network and marginal network layers, according to the degree and importance of the members’ involvement in and commitment to the policy. The central network can be further divided into a network core and a network margin. By far the most important layer is the public policy environment, serving as an arena within which policy network members can conduct their activities.23 With reference to Rhodes and Marsh’s policy network analysis and Read’s central and marginal policy network, this chapter will discuss the policy network around the ROC’s national defense planning from a policy environment, member, degree of integration, resources, and power perspective, as shown in Figure 6.5. Figure 6.5 is a general, or approximate, conceptualization. The exact network SRVLWLRQ ZLOO YDU\ DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH LQÁXHQFHV RI D VSHFLÀF SROLF\ LVVXH DQG RI people whose interests are involved. The policy environment of the national defense policy includes the international (principally East Asian) strategic environment, cross-Strait relations, economic development, social development, and population structures. For example, factors such as the form and degree of the environmental threats, public opinion, GHPRJUDSK\DQGÀQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVPXVWEHFRQVLGHUHGEHIRUHGHFLGLQJZKHWKHU to adopt, for example, a change in the system of armed services’ recruitment. The central network of national defense policy includes the President, National Security Council, Executive Yuan, MND, and Congress, of which the President and MND form the core of the central network and possess the largest amount of resources. According to the Law, the President owns the right to formulate the policy guidelines of national defense; in fact, the President has always led the policies concerned with national defense, diplomacy, and cross-Strait relations. Swaine points out in his research that the formulation of ROC’s national defense SROLF\DQGZHDSRQSURFXUHPHQWSROLF\SRVVHVVHVFHUWDLQVSHFLÀFFKDUDFWHULVWLFV Defense decision-making is centralized among a small number of civilian and PLOLWDU\OHDGHUVLWLVWKHUHIRUHVRPHWLPHVLQÁXHQFHGE\WKH3UHVLGHQW·VSHUVRQDO viewpoint and his personality. The decision-making process also lacks the coordination effect of a formal mechanism, and thus it is sometimes conducted by the

Defense policy-making and civilian roles

89

Policy environment

Marginal network

Central network

National Security Council Executive Yuan

Think tank and scholars

Core

President MND

Congress Media Public opinion

Party Interest groups

Figure 6.5 Diagram of Taiwan’s defense policy network.

MND only and sometimes it is the result of a loose or even private interaction between the President and his important senior staff members.24 Since the MND possesses such resources as professional information, funds, legitimacy, and orgaQL]DWLRQLWKROGVDNH\SRVLWLRQLQIRUPXODWLQJGHIHQVHSROLF\RULQLQÁXHQFLQJ and supporting the President’s policy options. The National Security Council is a consultant organization to the President. Since the Council is responsible for helping the President formulate defense policy guidelines that are concerned with national security, it is reasonable for it to possess a research capability and planning information that are concerned with national security policy and to assist the President when handling national security policy issues to do with human and material resources. In the past, the NSC KDG KRZHYHU RQO\ RQH VHFUHWDULDW DQG ÀYH WR VHYHQ FRQVXOWDQWV DQG QR SRZHU over the members of the other agencies. As a result, it failed to perform its proper function in the role of national security strategy. On June 25, 2003, however, the Legislative Yuan revised the Organization Law of the National Security Council

90

Chen

and enhanced the research capability of the Council. It is expected that in the future the Council will help the President direct the military strategy formulated E\WKH01'WKURXJKDQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\VWUDWHJ\DQGEULQJLWVLQÁXHQFHIXOO\LQWR play. In addition to enhancing the planning and research function of the Council, it is appropriate for the civilian Defense Minister to participate in, or provide suggestions on, the planning of national security strategy, thereby bringing a closer connection between the national security strategy and military strategy. As public opinion and the Congress have begun to care more about defense SROLF\ WKHLU LQÁXHQFHV KDYH JUDGXDOO\ HPHUJHG DQG GHYHORSHG %DVLFDOO\ WKH &RQJUHVV LQÁXHQFHV GHIHQVH SROLF\ WKURXJK OHJLVODWLRQ DQG EXGJHWDU\ UHYLHZ For example, in the reviewing process of the procurement budget for Kidd-class destroyers, submarines, and anti-missile systems, the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) Legislator Chang Shu-cheng said, after the approval of the two laws, that the military was but an executive unit. “This is a big change. The military might not be happy about it, but we already let the military interpret the policy and then they have to decide: why they need to buy a certain kind of weapon; what kind of ZDUDUHWKH\JRLQJWRÀJKWDQGZKDWNLQGRIWKUHDWVDUHWKH\JRLQJWRFRSHZLWK $OOWKHVHGHFLVLRQVPXVWEH>WDNHQ@WKURXJKUDWLRQDOGHEDWHV6RZHZLOOJUDGXDOO\ ÀQGRXWWKDWLWLVSHRSOHHOHFWHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQGFLYLOLDQVZKRSDUWLFLSDWHLQ deciding defense policy. The military is just executing policies formulated through this process.” Nonetheless, for the time being, the Congress is usually dominated by the opinions of particular individuals or by a small number of legislators. The resources both sides possess also vary. Eventually, the MND, more often than not, is able to bypass this legislative obstacle and effect a compromise. Although the National Defense Law regulates that the Executive Yuan should formulate defense policy, in the past it was the President who did it. Besides which, there is only one agency in the Executive Yuan, the Economic Construction Committee, that is responsible for coordinating and integrating economic development policies. No agency is in charge of coordinating and integrating political, economic, military, psychological, and technological policies; the Executive Yuan therefore intends to accept the advisory role that the MND plays in the formulation of national defense policy. Since the MND is not in a position to coordinate with other agencies, however, it can only put forward a defense policy in favor of the military – not a defense policy in a broad sense. This is the link that is lost in Taiwan’s current defense strategy system. The marginal network members include political parties, interest groups, the media, public opinion, think-tanks, and scholars. Parties and interest groups often H[HUWDGLUHFWLQÁXHQFHRQGHIHQVHSROLF\WKURXJKNH\RIÀFLDOVOHJLVODWRUVDQG activities in the Congress. Basically, parties play a role of informing and gathering public opinion and coordinating policies. In terms of defense policy, there has been a shortage of proper channels for the expression of public opinion or WRH[HUWLQÁXHQFH7KHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKLQNWDQNVDQGVFKRODUVLQ7DLZDQLVQRW \HW PDWXUH HQRXJK WKHLU LQÁXHQFH FRQVHTXHQWO\ LV XVXDOO\ WKURXJK WKHLU FRQnections with the members in the central network – a passive role in the marginal network.

Defense policy-making and civilian roles

91

The mass media, the so-called Fourth Estate, are a very important instrument WKDW FDQ FRQYH\ VFKRODUV· RSLQLRQV DQG SOD\ WKH UROH RI D ÀOWHU RI RSLQLRQ DQG analysis. The MND, however, assumes a conservative attitude toward mass media, PDNLQJLWGLIÀFXOWIRUMRXUQDOLVWVDQGRWKHUSURIHVVLRQDOVWREULQJXSUDWLRQDODQG REMHFWLYHDQDO\VLVZLWKRXWWKHEHQHÀWRIIXOOLQIRUPDWLRQ,QDGGLWLRQWKHHIIHFW of the media is often transient because of the nature of the issues involved. It is therefore not easy to have a continuous impact on the core and central network members. Even so, in the process of policy formulation, marginal network memEHUVFDQRIWHQZRUNWRJHWKHUWRLQFUHDVHWKHLUUHVRXUFHVDQGLQÁXHQFHWRFKDOOHQJH WKRVHZKRVHLQWHUHVWVDUHLQFRQÁLFWZLWKWKHLUVDQGWRLQFUHDVHWKHLULQÁXHQFHRQ policy formulation. What has happened in the Legislative Yuan in recent years is a typical example of the situation mentioned above. $FFRUGLQJWRWKHDQDO\VLVDERYHFLYLOLDQVZKRDUHDEOHWRDVVHUWLQÁXHQFHRQ Taiwan’s defense policy are: the President; the Minister for Defense; the Vice Minister for Defense; the Secretary General of the NSC; consultants to the NSC; the Premier; and Legislators in the Congress Defense Committee. Among them, the President and Minister of the MND are the core civilians. According to the National Defense Law, the Minister of the MND should be a civilian and one-third of the MND headquarters personnel should be civilians. Given that, the civilian LQÁXHQFHRQGHIHQVHSROLF\LQWKHIXWXUHZLOOEHFRQVLGHUDEO\HQKDQFHG

Suggestions on defense policy at MND level As mentioned above, the MND plays a core role in defense policy formulation LQDGGLWLRQWRWKH3UHVLGHQW7KHLQÁXHQFHVRIWKHUDWLRQDODFWRURUJDQL]DWLRQDO process, and governmental politics models can all be seen in the formulation of MND’s defense policy. In terms of the bureaucratic organizational process model, this chapter will discuss recent efforts to formulate defense policy and civilian roles within the MND. The formulation of MND military strategy planning and weapons acquisition policy follows a rational procedure. The emphasis is on how to build up a cycliFDO V\VWHP EDVHG RQ ZDUÀJKWLQJ HTXLSSLQJ RUJDQL]LQJ DQG WUDLQLQJ 2Q WKH principle of civilian control, the strategic planning division (Strategic Planning Department), under the instruction of the civilian minister, takes into consideration environmental threats and opportunities; the strong and weak points of the enemy and of Taiwan; and the general situation and available resources (human, PDWHULDO ÀQDQFLDO WHFKQRORJLFDO UHVHUYH FDSDFLW\ HWF  7KHVH IDFWRUV DUH intended to help decision-makers, according to the national military goals in the President’s national strategy, formulate military strategy on how to conduct any future war, and identify the means with which to employ resources. In addition, the Department is required to issue executive units with defense guidelines and policies for military action. This is also regulated in Item 2, “Matters concerned with the planning, reviewing and executing of the military strategy,” of Article 4, “MND responsibilities,” of the Organizational Law of the MND. The executive units (including Service Headquarters and General Staff

92

Chen

Headquarters) then bring forward their planning requirements according to the planning guidelines of the build-up promulgated by the MND. Major plans proposed by executive units must then be sent to an independent assessment unit ,QWHJUDWLRQ (YDOXDWLRQ2IÀFH IRUFRVWHIIHFWLYHSODQQLQJLQWHJUDWLRQDQGVWUDtegic support analyses. In addition, when making its assessment, the Integration  (YDOXDWLRQ 2IÀFH FDQ SURYLGH DOWHUQDWLYH RSWLRQV IRU WKH FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI decision-making leaders.25 After taking all relevant factors into consideration, the decision-making leaders decide on the planning requirements for national defense. Given limited resources, the Manpower Department and Resource Department must then conduct an analysis of the distribution of resources needed to meet the requirements of these plans. The policy guideline is then formulated on human, PDWHULDO DQG ÀQDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV UHTXLUHG26 Following that, where weapons acquisition is concerned, the Military Armament Bureau is the executive management agency for weapons and equipment acquisition.27 The services’ headquarters will then organize and train the personnel, weapons, and equipment.28 The General Staff Headquarters gives orders to strategic units prepared by the Service Headquarters to carry out missions.29 Thus, the whole military thinking on war ÀJKWLQJHTXLSSLQJRUJDQL]LQJDQGWUDLQLQJDWWKH01'OHYHOLVFRPSOHWHG The Service Headquarters, the Military Armament Bureau, and the Political Warfare Bureau within the MND have to work together to formulate related defense plans and resource distribution according to the strict operating process. As described in the organizational process model (above), these kinds of policy products are usually dominated by the culture of bureaucratic organization, secWLRQDOLVPDQGSHUVRQDOLQÁXHQFHVDQGDELOLWLHV In addition to the defense policies formulated according to operating procedures, it is possible for the members or leaders within the organization, or outsiders such as the President, elected representatives, and the media, to bring up impromptu policy issues. To those impromptu policy issues, the attitudes of the MND are based on the principle of communicating, accepting, and consensusbuilding. The department in charge will bring up the issues, invite staff units and institutions to discuss them, carry out research, report the issues in meetings, LQWHJUDWHRSLQLRQVDQGEXLOGDFRQVHQVXVWRÀQGRXWWKHEHVWSROLF\LQLWLDWLYHIRU decision-makers. Elected representative and scholars will be invited, if necessary, to participate in the discussion and bring up suggestions to make sure that the direction of the policy is correct and it is accepted by the people. The policy issues discussed in and passed through meetings will be then sent to the Ministry Affairs Meeting hosted by the Minister for approval. If further discussion is necessary, WKH0LQLVWHUZLOOFRQYHQHWKH3ROLF\*URXS0HHWLQJDWWHQGHGE\RIÀFHUVRIWKH rank of General and above. If necessary, the issues will then be brought up in the Military Talks and Executive Yuan Meeting for the President or the Premier to make the decision. &LYLOLDQLQÁXHQFHVRQURXWLQHGHIHQVHSROLFLHVZLWKLQWKH01'DUHSULPDULO\ H[HUFLVHG WKURXJK QRPLQDWHG RIÀFLDOV VXFK DV WKH 0LQLVWHU 9LFH 0LQLVWHU DQG VHQLRUFLYLOLDQRIÀFLDOVLQWKH01'+HDGTXDUWHUV$FFRUGLQJWRWKH2UJDQL]DWLRQDO

Defense policy-making and civilian roles

93

Law of the MND, the MND was required to bring one-third of the prescribed QXPEHU RI SHUVRQQHO LQWR WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ  RIÀFLDOV  E\ -DQXDU\   $VRI2FWREHUWKH01'KDGEURXJKWLQRIÀFLDOVDPRQJWKHPVL[ have PhDs and thirty-seven have Master’s degrees. The MND expects to raise the SHUFHQWDJHRIFLYLOLDQRIÀFLDOVWRSHUFHQWLQWKHIXWXUH 30 According to the supplementary resolution of Article 12 of the National Defense Law, “in the future the priority in selecting candidates for the Minister of the MND should be given to those with civilian backgrounds so as to manifest the principle of ‘civilian control.’” Obviously, civilians will play more crucial roles in the formulation of national defense policy in the future.

Conclusion To conclude, according to the two laws, the defense policy decision-making mechanism is through the President, the NSC, the Executive Yuan, and the MND to ensure the correct direction of the policy and win over the consent of SHRSOH 7KXV WKH 0LQLVWHU RI 1DWLRQDO 'HIHQVH E\ WKH DXWKRULW\ RI KLV RIÀFH reports policy suggestions to the President and the Premier in Military Talks and Executive Yuan Meetings in order to put defense policy into effect. The President is at the core of ROC defense policy and the major decisionmaker who decides on the direction of defense policy. Since the President has the SRZHURIPDNLQJGHFLVLRQVDQGQRPLQDWLQJWKH3UHPLHUDQGRWKHUVHQLRURIÀFLDOV involved in the planning of national defense policy, once he has made his decision, rarely can other members of the government alter it. Of course, if the President does not have a clear policy, the MND, with its professional resources, has more URRPWRH[HUWLQÁXHQFH$VDUHVXOWWKH3UHVLGHQWDQGWKH0LQLVWHURI'HIHQVHDUH in reality at the core network in defense policy network. 7KH UDQJH RI GHIHQVH SROLF\ LV QRW FRQÀQHG WR WKH PLOLWDU\ SURIHVVLRQ %\ bringing in outstanding civilians to participate in defense affairs, it is helpful to PLWLJDWHWKHLPSUHVVLRQWKDWWKHPLOLWDU\LVFRQVHUYDWLYHDQGLQÁH[LEOH7KLVFDQ not only improve the quality of defense policy-making but also bring the whole national intellectual power into play. Of course to ‘militarize’ civilians needs training in the defense profession, and it is government’s responsibility to make VXFK D SURYLVLRQ 0RUHRYHU FLYLOLDQ UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV VKRXOG QRW EH FRQÀQHG WR routine work only. They should participate in the formulation of policy in due FRXUVHLQRUGHUWRIXOÀOOWKHSULQFLSOHRIEULQJLQJFLYLOLDQVLQWKHQDWLRQDOGHIHQVH system, as required under the two defense Laws. After the passing of the two laws, a large number of civilians were brought into WKH01'7KHVHOHFWLRQDQGHPSOR\PHQWRIFLYLOLDQRIÀFLDOVEHFDPHDQLPSRUWDQW and urgent issue. The coordination and cooperation between the military and civilians is an even more urgent and important issue. Taiwan should pay close attention to how the more advanced states recruit and employ civilians in the defense ÀHOG,I7DLZDQIDLOVLQWKLVUHVSHFWLWZLOOKDYHDSUREOHPZKHQVHOHFWLQJTXDOLÀHGFLYLOLDQPLQLVWHUVLQWKHIXWXUH,QWKLVUHVSHFWWKHJRYHUQPHQWFDQLPSURYH the environment for defense civilians through the interaction and exchange of

94

Chen

personnel among the MND, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Mainland Affairs Council, and the NSC. In the meantime, something should be done to improve the environment of the Defense Committee in the Legislative Yuan and enhance the research capacity for civilian scholars and think-tanks. Only by establishing a personnel-training environment of ‘militarizing the civilian and civilianizing the PLOLWDU\·FDQWKHLGHDRIDOORXWGHIHQVHEHIXOÀOOHG Defense affairs are closely linked with the people. Recent modernization and transparency in defense affairs have indirectly aroused the people’s interest in and understanding of defense affairs. As defense affairs become more transparent and open, civilian institutes’ research interest in defense affairs will be stimulated, which will add a positive and deeper meaning to the improvement and growth of interest in defense affairs.

Notes 1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translation available at http://www.onshi.com/Sun3.html. 2 Ministry of National Defense, The Military Thinking of the ROC, Taipei: MND, 2001, pp. 2–15. 3 DOD, Dictionary of US Military Terms, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, as amended May 2004. 4 Ching-Pu Chen “A Review of the framework of R.O.C. Strategic Planning – from the Perspective of the Two National Defense Acts,” Defense Journal, 18 (15), 2003, p.17. 5 Policy can be a separate document or included in the strategic plan. 6 Ministry of National Defense, 2002 National Defense Report, ROC, Taipei: MND, 2002, p. 71. 7 Huang Lu-shin, Military Politics, Taipei: Rye Field Publishing Co., 2002, p. 36. 8 Ministry of National Defense, The Military Thinking of the ROC, pp. 2–16. 9 The concept of ‘total defense’ is a defense mechanism of collecting people’s perception, will, and action of a nation to confront outside threats, from Ministry of National Defense, Guideline for Military Commander in Chief, Taipei: MND, 2001, p.6. 10 Ministry of National Defense, The Military Thinking of the ROC, pp. 2–15, 19. 11 Ministry of National Defense, 2002 National Defense Report, ROC, pp. 71–3. 12 Sen-Chung Nou, An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Taipei: Rye Field Publishing Co., 1998. 13 Joint Staff College, -RLQW6WDII2IÀFHU·V*XLGH, Taipei: JSC, 2000, p. 2. 14 “The President can summon the National Security Council meeting to decide on defense guidelines for national security, or in time of major security emergency.” The National Defense Act, Article 9. 15 The National Defense Act, Article 11.  2SHUDWLRQDOOHYHOLVVLPLODUWRWKHÀHOGOHYHORIRSHUDWLRQ  7KH UROH RI *HQHUDO 6WDII +4 DV GHÀQHG LQ WKH 7ZR 1DWLRQDO 'HIHQVH$FWV LV QRW like the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US since the JCS are the military advisers to the National Command Authority (NCA); it has no military command authority. The wording for the role of the General Staff HQ had been changed from “military affair staff” to “military command staff” during the legislative process to emphasize its role as the command staff for joint operations, like the PACCOM. 18 Ching-Pu Chen, “US Joint Operation Command Mechanism,” Defense Journal, 17 (11), 2002, p. 96. 19 Graham Allison, and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, 1999.

Defense policy-making and civilian roles

95

20 Juan-Han Chu, “Structure and functional analysis of policy network,” Articles in Administrative Management, 15, pp. 145–66. 21 Bernd Marin and Renate Maymtz, Policy Networks, Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, Frankfurt-am-Main: Campus Verlag, 1991. 22 David Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes (eds), Policy Networks in British Government, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 23 Melvyn D. Read, “Policy networks and Issue networks: the politics of smoking,” in Marsh and Rhodes (eds), Policy Networks in British Government, p. 129. 24 Michael Swaine, Taiwan’s National Security, Defense Policy, and Weapons Procurement Process, Santa Monica: RAND, 1999, p. 73. 25 The main reasons to create the new Strategic Planning Department and the Integrated $VVHVVPHQW2IÀFHLQWKH1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH$FWDUHWRVHSDUDWHWKHVWUDWHJLFHQYLURQPHQW WKUHDWWUHQGDVVHVVPHQWRIWKH6WUDWHJLF3ODQQLQJ'HSDUWPHQWIURPWKHFRVWEHQHÀW V\VWHPDQDO\VLVHYDOXDWLRQRIWKH,QWHJUDWHG$VVHVVPHQW2IÀFHVRWKH\FDQFRQGXFW independent evaluations. In the past these two functions were the responsibilities of J-5 of the General Staff HQ. Recently, the function of net assessment had been UHDVVLJQHGWRWKH,QWHJUDWHG$VVHVVPHQW2IÀFHDQGLVDPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHUROHV of net assessment and integrated assessment. 26 The Ministry of National Defense Organization Act, Articles 3 and 4. 27 Ibid. Article 4. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. Article 10. 30 Ibid. Article 12.

7

An analysis of the Republic of China’s military organization and force structure Ming-Shih Shen and Chen-Tin Tsai

,QWURGXFWLRQ The term ‘military organization’ refers to the basic structure of armed forces. It integrates soldiers, equipment, and armament to operate effectively and to combine the efforts of different military structures into effective combat strength.1 A military organization could be generally categorized into: a command system; a combat system; a logistic system; an armament system; and a military education system. Each of these systems has its own rules to enable it to operate smoothly. Military organizations and systems must meet the dictates of military strategy in order to carry out combat missions and to adapt themselves to military reforms and developments. Military organizations are composed of units that perform different functions. As each military unit and its place in an overall force structure are subject to the directives of military strategy, its construction and operation sometimes can UHÁHFW WKH RYHUDOO IRUFH VWUXFWXUH RI WKH FRXQWU\ %XW DV WKH HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI D V\VWHPOLHVLQLWVGHÀQHGVWUXFWXUHVDQGGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRIZDUFDOOIRUGLIIHUHQW military organizations, military force structures have constantly to be adaptable to WKHFKDQJLQJUHDOLW\RIFRQÁLFWZLWKWKHSDVVDJHRIWLPH,QWKH5HSXEOLFRI China (ROC) introduced military reform. It then started further reforms according to a new National Defense Law that fell within the framework of the 2002 National Defense Organization Law. This was unprecedented and, moreover, revolutionized Taiwan’s military organizations and force structure.3:LWKLQWKHGHÀQLWLRQRI the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), there are four necessary elements: new technologies; new weapon systems; new operational concepts; and, of course, a new force structure. That said, if a force structure does not evolve in line with the other elements of the RMA, not only will the other three elements fail to function properly, but the effort to implement a RMA will also be incomplete.4 To ensure WKDWPLOLWDU\XQLWVUHFHLYHWKHLQWHQGHGEHQHÀWVRID50$FORVHDWWHQWLRQPXVWEH paid to military organizations and force structures as the essential element – the sine qua non – of the RMA. 7KLVFKDSWHUDVDFRQVHTXHQFHZLOOLGHQWLI\WKRVHIDFWRUVWKDWKDYHLQÁXHQFHG the military organization and force structures of the ROC’s armed services. It will then seek to offer some suggestions regarding future force structures in an attempt to help increase the combat effectiveness of military organizations as a reference for policy analysis.

ROC’s military organization and force structure

97

Elements of military organization and force structure The reform of any military organization and force structure has to go through a comprehensive planning process.5 The process has to be comprehensive in that the distribution and planning of defense resources are complex and multidimensional with results that will have impacts on national security. Hence, it may be argued that military strategy and force structure help reach the objectives of national defense. Lloyd took strategy and force structures as the rationale for force planning.6 He was of the view that a force structure, which proves most effective in implementing courses of action, has to be repeatedly assessed, revised, and practiced against both national security and military strategies. In other words, after stipulating national security strategy, defense policy, and military strategy, the planner has to take an adequate force planning approach in order to set up a corresponding military strategy and force structure. In the planning process of military organization and force structure of the ROC armed services, a number of different factors, including historical, geographical, social, economic, and cultural RQHVFDQEHLOOXVWUDWHG7KHVHDUHLGHQWLÀHGEHORZ

The military threat In planning strategy and military organization, the potential threat from the enemy is one of the constant factors. In this respect, the PRC’s military threat is characterized by asymmetric operational capabilities and conventional combat power. Asymmetric operational capabilities include strategic mini-satellites that can intercept GPS signaling in outer space. In information warfare, the PRC is capable of using its electromagnetic pulse capability. In acupuncture warfare, it is expected that, by 2010, the PRC can launch precision strikes against Taiwan by using both cruise and guided missiles. Finally, when it comes to unlimited warfare, if the PRC were to succeed in integrating military, non-military, and quasi-military means, the armed services of the ROC would be under tremendous pressure when conducting its defense.7 According to the Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, issued by the US Department of Defense, the PRC, by adopting a coercive strategy, would use decapitation as a strategy against the Taiwanese leadership that, in turn, could be isolated and forced to acquiesce.8 In respect of conventional combat power, the US contends that the PRC may consider the following courses of operational actions aside from direct military attack against Taiwan:9 • • • • •

provocative military exercises and missile tests; provocative air activities around Taiwan; small-scale guided missile attacks; medium-scale guided missile attacks in order to destroy Taiwan’s economic systems and defense capabilities; deployment of water mines and launching submarine attack against commercial vessels with a view to blockading Taiwan’s lines of sea communication;

98

Shen and Tsai

•

the seizure of the offshore islets of the Pescadores, Paracel, and Spratly Islands; the attack and destruction of Taiwan’s guided missiles and air defense capabilities.

•

Aside from the above, unlimited warfare, Special Forces campaigns, and acupuncture warfare preceded by precision strikes should be disregarded.10 The Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China described the military imbalances across the Taiwan Strait, including the PRC’s superior capability in guided missiles compared with Taiwan’s, the quantitative superiority RI WKH 3/$1·V VXEPDULQHV LWV IRXUWKJHQHUDWLRQ ÀJKWHUV ZLWK WHFKQRORJLFDOO\ advanced weaponry, pilot training, tactics, and C2; all of these developments have effectively eclipsed the relative advantages once enjoyed by Taiwan’s armed services. However, it has to be admitted that PRC is weak when it comes WRÀJKWLQJDZDULQWKHH[WHQGHGDUHDRIWKH$VLDQ3DFLÀF,WZRXOGEHLQFDSDEOH RISURWHFWLQJLWVVHDOLQHVRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQV6/2& DQGDLUWUDIÀF,WDOVRKDVD limited amphibious warfare capability. Its guided missiles are in short supply, and its logistic support system ineffective. More importantly, the PRC relies heavily on imports from Japan and the US.11 Table 7.1 illustrates potential countermeasures that have been taken by Taiwan’s armed services against the possibility of a PRC invasion. The missions of Taiwan’s armed services are, in fact, supported by the countermeasures illustrated in Table 7.1. Any military organization that aims to conduct missions with appropriate force structures has to meet the requirement to take countermeasures. In addition to conventional military action, including antiair, anti-sea, and counter-amphibious operations, Taiwan’s armed services have to cope with the PRC’s military threats that have stemmed from a new kind of military strategic thinking. These military threats, including unlimited warfare, acupuncture warfare, and precision strikes, have not only changed operational modes, obscured the fault lines between peace and war, and orientated missions toward non-conventional means but also emphasized the need to integrate their planning with other government departments. These new missions, as the result of meeting new threats, call for at least partial adjustments to force structures, as the military organizations take on new duties. For example, take the ROC Marine Corps: the superiority of the Marine Corps WR WKH$UP\·V GHIHQVH DQG VWULNH EULJDGHV OLHV LQ WKHLU PRELOLW\ ÀUHSRZHU DQG IDPLOLDULW\ZLWKMRLQWZDUIDUH7KHFXUUHQWPLVVLRQRIWKH0DULQHVLVFRQÀQHGWR garrison protection of naval bases and certain offshore islets in peace and serving as an expedient reinforcement in time of war.12 Worse is the suggestion that the Marines should be cut in number. Seeing that after the 9/11 incident the US Marine Corps was to commission an 8,000-strong contingency brigade and take charge of homeland security, the US administration quickly realized the importance of the anti-terrorism and contingent responses role played by the Corps. To conduct antiterrorist activities, a Special Service Group from the ROC Marine Corps has been transferred to the Joint Warfare Command.13 Both the Marine Corps’ organization and its force structure will need adequate reinforcement, if it intends to expand its anti-terrorist contingency role.

ROC’s military organization and force structure

99

Table 7.1 ROC counter-operations in response to the PRC military threat PRC military threat Direct attack on Taiwan by parachute troops, special forces, and amphibious assault forces Missile attack on small scale

ROC counter-operations Counter-aerial, counter-sea, counter-parachuting, counter-special forces operations, counter-landing, and ground battle Missile and air defense operations; preservation of combat power 3URYRFDWLYHPDQHXYHUVOLYHÀUHWHVWRI Strengthening combat preparedness, missiles psychological warfare, counter-missile operations Provocative actions in the air near Taiwan Tight monitor, interception operations Saturation bombardment by missiles Missile defense operations, preservation of combat power Blockading Taiwan straits by laying mines Mine countermeasures and counter-sea and launching submarines operations Seizure of the offshore islands and islets Solidifying position defense of islets, offshore islands to support operations Precision missile surprise attacks, acupunc- Missile defense, air defense operations, ture warfare preservation of high-valued assets Information warfare via saturation attack by Defensive information warfare and counter electromagnetic waves electronic warfare Hyper-warfare by integrating banking, Strengthening mobilization system and information, economy, and politics carrying out all counter-actions

Military strategy Military strategy is a part of national strategy. According to the US publication, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, strategy can be paraphrased as both art and science to realize national policy objectives through armed services of the state either by using military means or by threatening to use military means.14 In other words, strategy is a kind of art and science to use military means in order to reach national policy objectives. The main missions of military strategy are deterrence or transition to war, on the one hand, and winning the war if deterrence were to fail, on the other.15 To VXPPDUL]HPLOLWDU\VWUDWHJ\LVWRÀQGRXWWKHEHVWZD\WRLQWHJUDWHZHDSRQU\DQG PDQSRZHULQRUGHUWRFRSHZLWKYDULRXVIRUPVRIFRQÁLFWDQGDFKLHYHYLFWRU\6HHQ in this light, military strategy is not merely a set of rational arguments. Military strategy should consist of both force structures and force planning. Basically, military goals and strategic concepts are the two drivers behind force planning, whereas force structure is the integration of the two. Force arrangements combine the three elements and constitute overall strategic thinking. It has to be stressed that military strategy may have either substances or symbols. This is because military strategy is likely to change within a short period of time and it may always be elusive since military objectives often suddenly change. Nevertheless, it takes quite a long while to upgrade troops’ capability to accommodate new objectives and conceptions.16

100 Shen and Tsai What makes military strategy relevant to force structures is the means to achieve military strategy. ‘Means,’ here, refers to the military resources that help GHÀQH VWUDWHJLF FDSDELOLW\ 7KH PLOLWDU\ UHVRXUFHV LQFOXGH UHJXODU IRUFHV LQ D traditional sense; strategic and tactical nuclear forces; conventional offensive or defensive forces; weaponry and equipment; and personnel. Furthermore, military strategy should also consider the role taken by the allies and allies’ combat support functions. When it comes to overall force combinations, it should also take into account the relative capability of combat, combat support, and service capaELOLWLHV,QWKLVYHLQVWUDWHJ\FDQEHGHÀQHGDVDSODQZLWKZKLFKWRXVHDYDLODEOH resources to reach designated goals. In a goal-oriented plan, decision-makers plan an affordable strategy with the goal that can be achieved with available resources. The objective of force planning stems from the national security objective and H[WHQGVLQWRVSHFLÀFPLOLWDU\PLVVLRQVZLWKDQDSSURSULDWHVWUXFWXUH To sum up, military strategy consists of three elements: the military goal; strategic concepts that can give guidance how to achieve that goal; and, lastly, the combination of force structure and utilization of military resources. Ideally speaking, military goals and strategic concepts decide force structures and methods of deployment. Caution, however, is needed here because, once force structures have been decided, military capability may, on the one hand, become structurally LQÁH[LEOHZLWKWKHUHVXOWWKDWPLOLWDU\JRDOVDQGVWUDWHJLFFRQFHSWVDUHVHULRXVO\ impeded. On the other hand, although the contents of military strategy do not dramatically change, its focus may change with the turnover of senior executives. There can exist only one military goal. Whereas strategic concepts can have several sets of courses of action and tactics, static strategic concepts will have to take maneuver action, if dictated by the enemy. This is because force structures HPSKDVL]H IXQFWLRQDOLW\ DQG ÁH[LELOLW\ ZLWKRXW WKHP IRUFH VWUXFWXUHV FDQQRW meet the requirements of strategic concepts. The ROC has witnessed various stages of transformation in its military strategy as a result of different national strategic objectives. The current directive of the Taiwan government’s military strategy is “effective deterrence and resolute defense”. This strategy emphasizes a strong defensive posture and even a certain amount of offensive strike capability with which to engage the enemy across national political boundaries and to serve as a deterrent against a possible PRC invasion. This strategy can be seen as active/defensive, since it is a mixture of both offense and defense. In terms of military organization and force structures, the strategy implies a need for an effective strike capability – a key warfare capability across the borders with a view to embarking on offensive theater operations. In addition, the strategy implies the need for strong garrisoned troops so that an invading enemy can be intercepted and neutralized in certain predetermined areas.

Geography 7KH ÀUVW WKLQJ LQ WKH FRQGXFW RI RSHUDWLRQV DQG LQ WKH SURFHVV RI VWLSXODWLQJ D PLOLWDU\VWUDWHJ\LVWRÀQGRXWZKDWNLQGRIZDULVWREHIRXJKW,QDGGLWLRQWRWKH

ROC’s military organization and force structure

101

weaponry, the choice of war depends upon the battle-space, such as characters and limitations of geography within which strategy and tactics are operated. *HRJUDSKLFDOIDFWRUVWKDWFDQLQÁXHQFHIRUFHVFDOHDQGVWUXFWXUHLQFOXGHKRPHODQG space, human resources, and geographic locations.17 In the case of a defensive operation, a commander, with a limited force at his or her disposal, will take advantage of geography and space to address the enemy’s forces and neutralize its offensive. In an attempt to reverse the situation to Taiwan’s advantage, the commander will seize the opportunity to destroy the enemy by shifting from the defensive to the offensive. The reasons for taking a defensive posture lie mainly in mission requirements or superior commanders’ LQWHQWLRQV ,W PD\ EH DOVR EHFDXVH WKH HQHP\ KDV WDNHQ WKH RIIHQVLYH ÀUVW VR that ROC troops have not had time adequately to mobilize, or because there is a marked capability gap between the two adversaries so that the inferior force has to adopt a defensive posture.18 To carry out a defensive campaign, as a result, the following factors have to be analyzed for the purpose of winning battles. These include geographic features of theaters; the enemy’s course of action; operational modes; and the battle-space itself within which force deployments and operation planning can be settled. Taiwan’s defensive campaigns are not an exception to this decision-making process. Elements that will have an impact on operational modes and force structures in defending Taiwan include a disconnect in combat power. This disconnection stems from a natural division of the island’s geography characterized by extended coastal lines and the horizontally oriented rivers cutting across Taiwan proper, leading to several combat zones. With the technical advances in weaponry, the battle-space has increasingly extended wider and further. Cavalry and, later, armor, for instance, was the branch RIWKH$UP\ÀUVWWRH[SDQGWKHEDWWOHVSDFHLQPRGHUQKLVWRU\1DYDOYHVVHOVWKHQ brought the battle space into rivers, seas, and oceans, a two-dimension idea that was then extended much later with the added third dimension of airspace made possible through aviation technologies. Later and more important still were satellite systems that expanded the frontiers of war into outer space. Figures shown in Table 7.2 demonstrate that the extended space of the theatre of combat has increased by a factor of four and the altitude at which combatants engage from ground level to 36,000 feet. Taiwan’s strategic value has long been seen as an indispensable command of VHD OLQHV RI FRPPXQLFDWLRQ FKRNH SRLQW LQ WKH ZHVWHUQ 3DFLÀF7KH UHJLRQ KDV witnessed the Netherlands’ colonization of the island, General Cheng’s resuming control, and the Ching Dynasty’s administration and development. Although there have been some arguments posited by China-centered strategists that Taiwan was better off not being a part of mainland China, the majority of opinion was that Taiwan was an important strategic key that could had an impact on the four littoral provinces along the east coast of China.19 After the middle of the Ching Dynasty, when the Chinese hegemonic power declined, Taiwan became the desired target RIERWKWKH:HVWHUQSRZHUVDQG-DSDQDQGOHGWRFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQWKHPRQVHYHUDO occasions.207KHLVODQG·VVWUDWHJLFYDOXHZDVPRVWVLJQLÀFDQWLQWKH3DFLÀFWKHDWHU

102 Shen and Tsai Table 7.2 &KDQJLQJEDWWOHÀHOGUDQJHVDQGDOWLWXGHV Phase BC–eighteenth century Eighteenth century to nineteenth century Early twentieth century World Wars I and II 1973 Yom Kippur War Gulf War 1990–1

Battle-space measured in km2 1 20

%DWWOHÀHOGKHLJKW ft) 0 0

25 2,700–3,000 3,500 736,842

0 10 30 360

Source: Ze-sheng Deng, Zhong-xing Bao, Wen-qing Wang, The 21st Century Tendency of Local Wars Under High-Tech Conditions, Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1997, p. 78. Note In the 1991 Gulf War, multinational troops totaled 700,000. Iraq’s troops were 1,200,000. The grand total was 1,900,000 men.

toward the end of the Second World War, when US forces intended to take Taiwan under their control.21 Looking back over the past four hundred years, despite the differences in military strategy of the foreign forces one thing is evident – the strategic value of Taiwan remained unchanged over time. In greater detail, if an attack came from the west, such as that of General Chang Shi-lun, the direction of the invading forces had to go along the Kinmen–Pescadores–western part of Taiwan, with the Pescadores taken as the strategic mid-point. General Chang’s collapse was inevitable once the Pescadores had been seized by the Ching Dynasty’s invading force.22 If the attack came from the north, such as Japan’s taking Taiwan after the Treaty of Shimonoseki had been signed in 1895, the attacking formation was GLYLGHGLQWRWKUHHVSHDUKHDGVRQHZDVWRWKHQRUWK7KHVHFRQGVSHDUKHDGÀUVW seized the Pescadores, from where the Japanese forces were divided into two groups, one which seized the mid-west of Taiwan and the another approached the island from the south west.23 If an attack came from the south, such as the US IRUFHV·RSHUDWLRQDOSODQVLQWKH3DFLÀFWKHDWHULQWHQGHGGXULQJWKH6HFRQG:RUOG War, it was expected that the invading force would launch a surprise attack and, once control of the south was secure, a second wave would be directed at the Pescadores and Kinmen24 (Table 7.3). Although there are different strategies for the defense of Taiwan developed for different purposes, geopolitical thinking has been a constant factor. Taiwan is surrounded by sea. Its total coastline is 1,139 kilometers. There are four kinds of coastal geography including a collapsing coastline in the north, a faulty coastline in the east, an expanding coastline along the west, and coral reefs in the south.25 As important cities and strategic installations are located in the west of Taiwan, anyone planning to launch an attack from that direction would have to start by ÀUVWRFFXS\LQJ.LQPHQDQGWKH3HVFDGRUHV²WZRVWUDWHJLFSRLQWV+RZHYHUWKH west coast is characterized by sand and mud. The coastline north of the Da-du

Japan

863DFLÀF Command

Japanese invasion

US plans to attack Taiwan in 1945

Operational strategy Result of the battle After occupying Zheng recovers Peng-hu, ChengTaiwan in the gong Zheng name of the attacks Tainan, Ming Dynasty the capital From west toward 3DFLÀFDWLRQDIWHU After Peng-hu east Qing Dynasty occupied, Jing Zheng surrenders occupies Peng-hu to the Qing Dynasty First route north to Three routes sweep After a four-month across Taiwan battle against south; second Japan, the west to east, after Taiwan DemoPeng-hu taken; cratic Republic third from south surrenders to north From south to north Twin routes: one Not implemented. attacks Taiwan; The US only other attacks attacks from the Hsia-men and air Kin-men

Direction of main attack From west toward east

Sources  0LQJVKLK6KHQ´$PHULFDRIIHQVLYHDQG-DSDQGHIHQVLYHVWUDWHJ\RQ7DLZDQGXULQJWKH3DFLÀF:DUµYouth Daily, 25 October 2003, p. 3. 2 Shen-an Chiou, Taiwan Historical Talks, Taipei: Li-ming Cultural Enterprises Co., 1992, p. 104. 3 Military Intelligence Bureau of the MND+LVWRULFDO6WXG\RI(PSHURU.DQJ[L8QLÀHG7DLZDQ, Taipei: Military Intelligence Bureau, 1997. 4 Taiwan Province Bibliography Association (eds), Taiwan Province A Comprehensive History, and Taichung, Taipei: Taiwan Province Bibliography Association, 1987.

Taiwan Democratic Two divisions and Republic one combined brigade to carry out landing operations, with 30,000 soldiers Japanese regime on Two corps (six Taiwan divisions) landed on the western plain of Taiwan; one corps (two Marine divisions) plus US Navy, and Air Force

Qing Dynasty, Ming Dynasty Jing Over 20,000 Navy, Zheng regime Emperor Kang-xi mainly 300 battleships

Number of Attacker Defender participants Cheng-gong Zheng, Netherlands regime 25,000, mainly Ming Dynasty on Taiwan Navy

Shi-lun attacks Taiwan

War Cheng-gong Zheng recovers Taiwan

Table 7.3 Previous invasion strategies on Taiwan compared

104 Shen and Tsai 5LYHULVÀOOHGZLWKVDQGZKHUHDVWRLWVVRXWKWKHUHDUHPXGG\VDZPS\EHDFKHV %HFDXVHRIWKHVHVZDPSVDQDPSKLELRXVODQGLQJZRXOGEHH[WUHPHO\GLIÀFXOW and virtually impossible. The Japanese and the US, having become acquainted with these unique geographical features, chose to land their forces on the southern part of Taiwan’s western coast. There has, so far, been no instance in history when invading forces have attempted to attack the island from the eastern side, with its coastline characterized by steep, rising rocks. Other geographic factors that would have an impact on the military organization and force structures of both the offensive and defensive forces are the ports and harbors in the neighborhoods of major cities. Before amphibious landing craft were fully developed, these ports became strategically important once a decisive battle offshore engagement had been won and a beachhead securely established. This suggests that an invading force would probably refrain from launching the amphibious attack until its maritime forces had sufÀFLHQWFDSDELOLW\:LWKWKLVLQPLQGLWLVH[SHFWHGWKDW7DLZDQIRUFHVZRXOGEH heavily deployed along the west coastlines of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the two decisive campaign areas. Taiwan’s Navy and Homeland Defense forces will therefore become a central element in any major force structure.

+LVWRULFDOWUDGLWLRQDQGVWUDWHJLFFXOWXUH Every military unit stresses the importance of its own history and strategic culture. The impact of historical tradition and strategic culture is threefold: the interpretation RIWKHVWUDWHJLFHQYLURQPHQWWKHLGHQWLÀFDWLRQRIVWUDWHJLFJRDOVDQGWKHFKRLFH of operational modes.26 Judging from Table 7.3, a defensive strategic culture,27 as the result of geography and geopolitics, has been an historical tradition in Taiwan. Throughout the island’s history and, even, today, troops garrisoned in Taiwan do not consider themselves as power projection forces.28 In terms of military organization and force structure, the armed forces of the ROC, since their establishment in 1924, and after having gone through varied stages of warfare, operational modes, sources of threats, and military assistance KDYHLGHQWLÀHGWKHPVHOYHVDVSUHGRPLQDQWO\ODQGEDVHG7KLVLQLWLDOO\DPRXQWHG to several millions of men organized at corps level. These troops, having evacuated mainland China and migrated to Taiwan, failed to adjust and adapt to Taiwan’s geographical features. As they intended to keep the command structure at the corps level, their tactical courses at the Command and Staff Colleges remained deeply involved with the scenarios of launching an offensive counterattack against the Chinese Mainland’s PLA. This kind of strategic contradiction comes, in the main, from their strategic culture and historical tradition. Historical tradition in Taiwan has been dramatically transformed since 1997 in RUGHUWRUHÁHFWVWUXFWXUDOQHHGVRIMRLQWRSHUDWLRQVDQGFRPELQHGDUPV%HFDXVHRI their institutionalized character rooted in the military, customary operational rules remained virtually unchanged until doctrines were standardized in annual combat exercises. When the question of how to win a defensive war across the Taiwan Strait became an important issue in military courses and operational exercises,

ROC’s military organization and force structure

105

various doctrines and new tactics were developed. Subsequently, the historical tradition and strategic culture were gradually transformed. Seen in this light, it is safer to argue that the culture of a military organization often proves to be the decisive factor that determines institutions’ organizational structures.29 Better traditions inherited from those in mainland China certainly helped to stabilize the military’s value systems. Nevertheless, these traditions could become an obstacle in the process of organization reform.30 In other words, historical traditions and strategic culture may prove to be both positive and negative factors in transforming military organizations and force structures.31 Their effects are debatable. As a consequence, seen from the perspective of any restructuring process, a QHZRUJDQL]DWLRQQHHGVVXIÀFLHQWWLPHWRDGMXVWLWVHOIVRWKDWQRUPDORSHUDWLRQV and intended objectives are not impaired.32

Missions and objectives In the process of delineating missions and objectives, the operational functions RIDPLOLWDU\RUJDQL]DWLRQQHHGWREHLGHQWLÀHGLQFOXGLQJFRPEDWUHFRQQDLVVDQFH strategic deterrence, power projection, and air/sea command. These can be detailed in terms of such actions as anti-submarine warfare and defensive mop-ups. The IXQFWLRQVRIDQRUJDQL]DWLRQFDQEHPLVVLRQRULHQWHGRUVSHFLÀHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKH threats they face. Further, the force structures can be prioritized by the resources available and by systematic methods. The thought patterns of a planner dealing with force structure are normally mission-oriented. The objectives at the highest level are related to national interHVWVWKDWFDQEHGHÀQHGLQWHUPVRIJHRSROLWLFDOVWUDWHJLHVDQGDFFRUGLQJWRLQWHUnational political and economic interests. These are relatively long-term interests that have a strategic impact on available resources. In addition, considerations regarding a state’s economic sustainability have to be placed within the realm of national interests. Although any event could have potential impact on national interests, objectives related to these interests may be elevated from a national level up to a regional and even a global level. Another approach is to list missions during wartime and then evaluate and analyze the required force structures. With this approach, it is possible to compare the different capabilities illustrated by different force structures; alternatively, resources can be allocated according to mission priorities. It is also helpful to adopt an approach whereby resources and combat capability are allocated. For example, the US has two types of missions that determine force scale: general PLVVLRQVDQGUHJLRQDOPLVVLRQV*HQHUDOPLVVLRQVDUHGHÀQHGE\VSHFLÀFVWUDWHJLF elements upon which the sizes of forces are based. Alternatively, if missions are based on strategic directives, the size of force will be dictated by missions and courses of action determined at the strategic level. These missions and operations can include war in main theaters; homeland security; overseas stationing of forces; rules of engagement; small-scale contingencies; and counter-insurgency. After missions and courses of action have been determined, they are prioritized in accordance with strategic requirements, as is the composition of force structures.

106 Shen and Tsai ,IFHUWDLQPLVVLRQVRYHUODSWKRVHSDUWVWKDWDUHGXSOLFDWHGKDYHWREHLGHQWLÀHG and their priority established in the planning process. This approach has the advantage of taking into account views of both top-level strategic considerations and assigned missions. The disadvantage, however, is a lack of adaptability in force maneuvers. A military unit can focus its attention on one mission, but be incapable of coping with an unexpected switch in the enemy’s strategy.33 The US armed services, in missions at the regional level, take regional requirements as their principal concern where force structures are concerned. There are two principles for force structure designs at the various US regional headquarters. 7KHÀUVWLVWKDWLWIROORZVRUGLQDU\GHIHQVLYHPLVVLRQVLQFOXGLQJJHQHUDOUXOHVRI engagement and deployment. The second is that when in charge of contingency plans the requirement is to call in homeland units and strategic reserves.34 Given these two principles, the US military in every theater must be structured in a way that is capable of conducting these two missions simultaneously. The missions of the ROC armed services are not as complicated as those of the US. As the operational objective lies in effective deterrence and determined defense, the main mission of the ROC military is to win battles across the Taiwan Strait. In spite of the changes in Taiwan’s military strategy that have taken it from the offensive, through the integration of offensive and defensive to, currently, the defensive,35 it is nevertheless understood that its missions and objectives should not simply be restricted to defense. Instead, Taiwan has to build enough strength and capability to launch a campaign outside its borders, i.e. a military strategy of active defense. Although Taiwan is strategically defensive, it can tactically undertake an offensive campaign. It is also likely that were it to do so, it would launch a pre-emptive strike against the enemy – the PRC – during their mobilization period. To do this, Taiwan would have to emphasize that pre-emption is also part of PRC’s military strategy. The PRC is emphatic that strategic defense, containment, and an interior line of engagement all have to be integrated with tactical offense, surprise attack, and an external line of engagements. This effort at integration of the counter- and frontal attack that always characterize strategic defense is designed to enable the PRC to launch a decisive battle with its enemy’s main force, but under conditions favorable to itself.36,QWKHOLJKWRIWDFWLFDOÁH[LELOLW\DQGVWUDWHJLFLQLWLDWLYHV the ROC’s strategic concept of “engagement outside the homeland”37 raised by President Chen can be seen as essentially the same as the PRC’s strategic doctrine mentioned above. 7KLVLGHDORIGHYHORSLQJDÁH[LEOHVWUDWHJ\DQGPLOLWDU\REMHFWLYHVKRZHYHU despite having the capability of seizing the initiative on the battlegrounds, will pose a major challenge to any military force. This is especially the case among forces that are accustomed to defensive doctrines in their force structures, in their coordination and cooperation among military units, or in their combat effectiveness. To cope with these kinds of operational modes, a military planner, when FRQVWUXFWLQJPLOLWDU\RUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGIRUFHVWUXFWXUHVDOVRKDVWRWDNHÁH[LELOLW\ LQWRDFFRXQW,QVWHDGRIÁH[LELOLW\LQFRPPDQGFRQWURODQGOHDGHUVKLSWKHPLOL-

ROC’s military organization and force structure

107

tary planner has to consider how to make a military organization, as well as force VWUXFWXUHDVÁH[LEOHDVSRVVLEOHWRFRSHZLWKDQ\H[WHUQDOWKUHDWVDQGFKDQJLQJ environments.

The development of technological capabilities Technology, as a factor in the planning process, aims at reducing the traditional strengths of military forces by means of introducing high-tech weapons. This is based on the reasoning that the quality of weapons systems can eclipse the quantitative capabilities of conventional troops. For Taiwan, a small state with limited resources, technological advantages can dramatically elevate the effects of military organizations and force structures, but only as long as the relative advantages lie in breakthroughs or potential breakthroughs in defense and stateof-the-art technologies. Technological development, however, can be both a positive and a negative factor. Positively, the capability of high-tech weapons systems can enable Taiwan to seize the initiative by exploiting dominant force against its enemy and by maintaining the impulse for innovation. Conversely, too much emphasis on technology could lead to overinvestment in certain military weapons systems to no avail and to the extent that other meaningful objectives are traded off. Alternatively, it is also likely that in pursuit of a force structure to suit the technology, disproportionate expenditure on defense occurs that is tantamount to more waste.38 When considering the capabilities of military organizations, the importance of current military capabilities and assessments of threats have to be stressed. A PLOLWDU\SODQQHUKDVWRÀQGDZD\WRFRSHZLWKDWKUHDWZLWKIRUFHVLQEHLQJDQG in accordance with extant realities. The current condition of forces-in-being is a necessary precondition; it is a variable that helps to temper unrealistic expectations of future capabilities under consideration. Force-in-being helps planners to face realities and makes them fully aware of precise force requirements. The impact of military technologies developed by the Taiwanese armed services on military organizations and force structures lies in the combat capabilities of counter-operations and integrated information systems. Combat capabilities in counter-operations are strategically valued. They represent combat utilities that are more effective than conventional forces and their importance in force planning comes before conventional forces. That said, force structures assisted by military technologies have to be introduced in cooperation with other conventional military troops in the process of conducting military missions. Competence in integrating information technologies is also vital to the success of military organizations and force structures. This is because at the center of information technology lies new technology, which is the backbone of the Revolution (Transformation) in Military Affairs (RMA). It proves that the ROC armed services are well versed in the military application of information technologies. These applications will make indispensable contributions to future military organizations and force structures.

108 Shen and Tsai

'HIHQVHEXGJHWVDQGÀQDQFH The impact of defense budgets on military organizations can be varied. Shortfalls in defense budgets over a long period of time will undoubtedly have a major impact on the size of military organizations. In order to reduce defense expenditures and transfer the budget to social welfare items, the Taiwanese government has had to scale down military establishments. To reduce the size of military organizations, however, force proportions have to be taken into account. Other factors that ZLOO KDYH LPSDFWV RQ WKH GHIHQVH EXGJHW DQG ÀQDQFH LQFOXGH EUHDNWKURXJKV RI technologies, changes of threat, and alterations to missions and objectives. Since military organizations are sustained by defense budgets, their effectiveness and VWUXFWXUHVZLOOEHOLQNHGWRWKHULVHDQGIDOORIÀQDQFLDOIUDPHZRUNV 'HIHQVHEXGJHWVDUHSULPDULO\EDVHGRQÀQDQFLDOIDFWRUVVXFKDV*13OHYHOV of taxation, and the size of the government’s budget. Restricted by the available EXGJHWÀQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVFDQEHXVHGWRWKHEHVWHIIHFWWKURXJKFDUHIXOSURJUDPming. In other words, force structures have to be decided by budgets available. As the defense budget limits often cause tension between the military services, approaches based on GNP or government budgets can be instrumental- rather than objective-oriented. Instead, an integrative approach could prove a better approach because the essential step in force programming lies in searching for the meetLQJSRLQWRISROLF\VWUDWHJ\ÀQDQFLDOOLPLWDWLRQVDQGULVNV:LWKWKLVDSSURDFK the maximization of combat power and the best use of scarce resources can be achieved. 7KHPDLQVWUHQJWKRIDQDSSURDFKEDVHGRQGHIHQVHEXGJHWVDQGÀQDQFHLVWR tie defense resources to government economies and politics with a strong emphaVLVRQHIÀFLHQF\YDOXHIRUPRQH\DQGXWLOLW\%HFDXVHWKHFRVWVRIPDLQWDLQLQJ a force-in-being will place a heavy limitation on research and innovation, it is necessary to focus on combat effects.39 This approach, however, does not meet long-term requirements in coping with threats. When allocating resources, the planner may have to narrow attention solely to the effects of defense technology. The military services will also compete for budgetary allocation, instead of DGGUHVVLQJ DQG GHDOLQJ ZLWK HQHP\ WKUHDWV DQG PLOLWDU\ VWUDWHJ\$V ÀQDQFH LV the priority concern in military and strategic planning, the ideal solution would be based on allied efforts in military organizations, and replace basic resource allocation or the services taking their share in turns. Resources are limited and can never fully satisfy the requirements of military modernization and force structures. This happens both at the governmental and the individual level. As a consequence, decisions have to be made from among competing alternative courses of action. That said, a military organization not only has to compete for its resources with many other government departments and civil enterprises, but it also has to share its budget with its counterparts from other armed services, a process that is subject to the Congress’s strict supervision. This is especially true during peacetime in any democratic country. In order to settle the priority in force planning that is related to resource allocation, the most LPSRUWDQWWKLQJVWRGHFLGHRQÀUVWDUHWKHREMHFWLYHDQGVWUDWHJLFGLUHFWLYHV

ROC’s military organization and force structure

109

)RU LQVWDQFH WDNH ÀQDQFLDO IDFWRUV %HFDXVH RI WKH LQFUHDVLQJ VWULFWQHVV RI Congressional supervision, defense budgets are expected to have maximum utilities. Nevertheless, badly affected by the recent economic recession at home and abroad, the Taiwan government will politically emphasize the need to invest in public infrastructures and social welfare, policies that will unintentionally exclude defense budgets. In the light of this, it is necessary to be aware of the limits to defense resources when planning a military strategy and force structures. This is especially the case when it comes to the political concerns within Congress. By contrast, in the process of planning military organizations and force structures, it is essential to set up healthy channels of communication with both political representatives in Congress and independent think-tanks. This raises, of course, WKHLQWULJXLQJGLOHPPDRIKRZWRUHGXFHWKHFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQUHVRXUFHDOORFDWLRQ and political obstacles.

Social factors A planner dealing with military organizations and force structures often overlooks social factors. They are worthy of attention, however, because social support for the military and benign interactions between the military and society are highly relevant to troops’ morale. Conversely, operational military systems could have effects on society that are either positive or negative. For example, military exercises may prove detrimental to the local environment;40 military sites may be inaccessible for local economic development, as they prevent, or place limitations on, civil constructions; and military exercises may cause inconvenience (e.g. noise pollution) or even physical injury to the local people. All these negative LPSDFWV HYHQ WKRXJK WKH\ ZLOO QRW GLUHFWO\ LQÁXHQFH WKH SODQQLQJ RI PLOLWDU\ organizations and force structures, will have a negative impact on civil society. 7KH\PD\LQVWHDGWXUQRXWWREHFDWDO\VWVIRUFLYLO²PLOLWDU\FRQÁLFW$SSURSULDWH measures have to be taken to neutralize any unexpected effects or, at least, to avoid unnecessary disputes. Among the social factors, draft (conscription) systems are directly related to military organizations and force structures. A state with compulsory national miliWDU\VHUYLFHFDQEHVWUHÁHFWWKHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQDVRFLHW\DQGWKHPLOLWDU\DV the sources of military personnel, extensively and equally, come from compulsory recruitment. Recruiting systems, however, can also lead to a disjointed situation between a society and the military, one that diminishes the utility of military force and distorts military professionalism.41 This happened to the US armed services in the Vietnam War. During the 1960s, the US military went through a period of identity crisis in the sense that the social identity of the US Army in particular could not automatically depend on the support of American society. Put differently, American social culture, as an extensive force, rejected the US government’s policy toward, and the actions of the US military in, Vietnam.42 The US armed services force as a consequence decided to address the draft system by calling off UHFUXLWLQJDUHÁHFWLRQRIVRFLDOLPSXOVHDQGVHWWLQJXSDV\VWHPRIVHOILGHQWLW\

110

Shen and Tsai

With the need to scale down the military, the US military was later pressured to change its structures and organizations and to introduce the all-volunteer force. The draft system of the ROC armed services has also undergone transformation with the change in the political environment. When the armed services were evacuated from mainland China, there was no need to carry out recruiting systems because the huge number of military personnel were capable of undertaking military tasks and responsibilities for homeland security, despite the personnel cuts. ,WZDVQRWXQWLOWKHSHULRGRIWKH.LQPHQ&ULVLVLQZKHQH[FKDQJHRIÀUH between the two sides occurred in late August, that a new recruiting system came into effect in which all Taiwanese males of a certain age were sent to the front line. As the result of the recruiting system then introduced, most Taiwanese males in practice had to receive military training and discipline so that the country’s EHGURFN GHIHQVH ZDV VLJQLÀFDQWO\ UHLQIRUFHG 7RGD\ WKH OHQJWK RI FRPSXOVRU\ military service has been reduced and there are alternatives to serving in the military. With these changes, the issue of whether or not Taiwan adopts a voluntary system has been widely discussed in Congress and the strategic community. To test the validity of the policy, the Ministry of National Defense tentatively began to enlist private soldiers in 1993 and dispatched them into the different services IRUREVHUYDWLRQ$OWKRXJKWKHHIIHFWRIWKLVWHVWSURYHGLQVLJQLÀFDQWLWVHHPVWKDW the trend to adopt a fully voluntary system has become irresistible. If the trend of a voluntary system emerges as a reality, the immense impact it will have on military organizations and force structures will be the need for the services to scale themselves down. Furthermore, it is expected that the quality of the new enlisted men will be low during the initial period.43 Given the practice at present that gradually adopts a voluntary system, the need is to start these new YROXQWHHUVLQÀUVWUDWHXQLWVZKHUHWKHWUDLQLQJSHULRGDQGOHQJWKRIVHUYLFHLVORQger than elsewhere. This indirect approach, however, will lead to an asymmetry in quality among military units each with different missions and combat capability.

The security environment 7RDVVHVVWKHVWUDWHJLFDQGVHFXULW\HQYLURQPHQWLVWKHÀUVWVWHSLQSURJUDPPLQJ IRUFHVWUXFWXUHV1HYHUWKHOHVVDVVHVVPHQWLVDGLIÀFXOWWDVNDQGFRQVHQVXVLVKDUG to achieve because it involves personal knowledge and strategic preferences. Furthermore, variables abound that may change the strategic interests of a state within certain regions. That said, assessment has to be performed from various perspectives. These security factors include a change in the locus of power within the international political economy; trends in economic interdependence; domestic QHHGV FXOWXUH UHOLJLRXV EHOLHIV SRSXODWLRQ DQG GHPRJUDSK\ HWKQLF FRQÁLFWV environmental degradation; and technological breakthroughs. An assessment of the security environment is related to strategic choices, which are also seen as part of a game plan that aims at achieving ideal objectives with limited resources. The effect of strategy lies in making choices among alternative courses of action, with the common requirement of competing at mini-

ROC’s military organization and force structure

111

mum cost to achieve high-value objectives. When it comes to national interests, expertise is characterized by a ‘give-and-take’ characteristic that can be termed a national security strategy, or a grand strategy. In the process of selecting the optimal choice, a strategic planner has to keep a close eye on enemy threats and fully understand and appreciate the strengths and weakness of his or her own state’s capabilities. In other words, a state’s national strategy can reveal, more or less, how a state attains its objectives and policies through economic and foreign policy and military means. It can also expose how a strategic planner assesses the overall security environment of that state, since these are important components of a state’s national competence. Another criterion for force structure is to pre-set scenarios of the battle environment and military operational modes. This approach is future-oriented in that it takes perceived threats and opportunities into account when planning and programming future force structures.44 To follow this force structure approach, it is QHFHVVDU\WRFOHDUO\GHÀQHWKHIXWXUHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHVHFXULW\HQYLURQPHQW and the mission priorities of the armed services, as well as scenarios in theaters RIFRQÁLFW$OWKRXJKWKHHPSKDVLVLVRQIXWXUHWKUHDWVDVDUHVXOWRIWKHFKDQJLQJ security environment, this approach can be only partially effective in its ability WR GHWDLO DQWLFLSDWHG HYHQWV 7KH GLIÀFXOW\ LQ RWKHU ZRUGV OLHV LQ SUDFWLFH QRW in the scenarios. Instead of military challenges characterized by elusive factors, planning scenarios can be loaded with political implications.45 Because there are many variables in the future international and domestic security environments, LWLVKDUGWRWHOOZKLFKDUHWKHPRUHLQÁXHQWLDODQGZKLFKDUHDERXWWRFKDQJH Strategic planners, therefore, should not be bound by any one single factor in the programming process; they should, instead, focus on short-term issues and threats and then extend their attention toward the mid- and longer term. This kind of mentality helps them clarify national objectives. Although force structures, which are VSHFLÀFDOO\GHVLJQHGWRPHHWWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRISDUWLFXODUVLWXDWLRQVUHVSRQGWR hostile action by the enemy and help strengthen any weakness on Taiwan’s side, WKH\PD\DOVRUHÁHFWQRWKLQJPRUHWKDQZLVKIXOWKLQNLQJRURYHUFRQÀGHQFH The military security environment of the ROC armed services has been deeply LQÁXHQFHG E\ 35&·V GHIHQVH PRGHUQL]DWLRQ 7KH 35& KDV RSHQO\ GHFODUHG LWV intention to resolve the issues across the Taiwan Strait peacefully, but its relentless efforts to modernize the PLA unnerves Taiwan and makes the situation fraught with uncertainty. On the issue of Taiwan, the PRC’s main objectives are to force Taiwan to accept the terms of the “One State, Two Systems” peace talks, or resort to force when necessary or in the event of intervention by foreign powers.46 6XEVHTXHQWO\ WKH 35& PLOLWDU\ VWUDWHJ\ LV DLPHG DW FRSLQJ ZLWK D FRQÁLFW involving Taiwan effectively and speedily before the US responds. It relies on developing the so-called ‘assassin’s mace’ (shashoujian) and on setting the tempo and objectives of operations in the process of carrying out military action against Taiwan. Likewise, the US is also thinking about certain ‘what-if?’ scenarios in which the US could defeat the invading force or assist in the defense of Taiwan.47 From a US perspective, the PRC’s course of action is aimed at undermining the social morale in Taiwan and causing such fear and chaos that Taiwan could be

112

Shen and Tsai

IRUFHGWRDFFHSWWKHFRQFHSWRI¶2QH&RXQWU\7ZR6\VWHPV·7KHÀUVWSULRULW\RI US policy lies in preventing the PRC from taking Taiwan without having to shed blood or engage in direct combat. To do this, the US has to ensure that, once the PRC has determined to take military action, it should make its military moves in a limited way, as dictated by American political objectives. Seen in this light, military organizations and force structures, when they come to addressing the requirements of the changing security environment, have to take foreign assistance and coordination with allied forces into consideration. The strengths and weaknesses of various factors in the planning and designing processes of military organizations and force structure need to be clearly understood. In practice, whether all these factors can, or should, be wholly, or partially, taken into account so that sound decision-making can emerge, will depend upon contingent needs and technological breakthroughs. It is best argued that Taiwan VKRXOGFRPELQHWKHVWUHQJWKVLGHQWLÀHGDERYHDQGFRQVWUXFWDWEHVWDQLQWHJUDWHG force structures program.

Other countries’ military organizations and force structures Island countries have been selected as case studies for analysis because each has the same type of military geographical factors to take into account. It is recognized, however, that each has different external threats and military strategies. Nevertheless, they all offer useful insights for Taiwan’s future military organizations and force structures. After summarizing force structures of some FRXQWULHV LQ WKH $VLD3DFLÀF UHJLRQ 7DEOH   LW ZDV IRXQG WKDW WKH IRUFH structures of these states were dictated by military strategies, whereas their military strategies diverged due to different geopolitical strategies, historical traditions, external threats, levels of economic development, and political institutions. In island states it is generally understood that maritime capabilities and ocean navigation are vital interests and that a navy plays an important role. Ground forces, however, still remain statistically the dominant branch. Even in Britain, a traditional sea power, only 21 percent of the total number of men and women in the Royal Navy are under arms. The US Navy occupies the dominant position among the four armed services, even although the US is not an island country. 7KLVLVSDUWO\EHFDXVHLWLVDZLGHVSUHDGWHUULWRU\WKDWVWUDGGOHVWKH3DFLÀFDQG Atlantic Oceans, and partly because its role as a maritime trading nation promotes an international policing role that requires it to be able to project power into appropriate places within an appropriate time period. Without a powerful and VLJQLÀFDQW SURSRUWLRQDWH 86 1DY\ WKHVH PLVVLRQV FRXOG QRW EH DFFRPSOLVKHG Viewed in this light, it is debatable to argue from a geopolitical perspective that a Navy and sea power is the major military capability of an island country. From the perspective of external threat, military establishments exist to deter, or reduce, perceived external threats. If the threats come from the sea, the defendLQJ FRXQWULHV KDYH WZR RSWLRQV LQ VHTXHQFH ÀUVW WKH\ KDYH WR QHXWUDOL]H WKH invading force from the sea and in the air; second, they need to take and hold ground in the process of destroying amphibious landing forces where the invading

297 239.8

683

100.5 9.23 107 60.5

1,367.7

211.43

Indonesia Japan

Korea

Malaysia New Zealand Philippines Singapore

USA

UK

113.95 (54%)

477 (35%)

80 (80%) 4.45 (48%) 67 (63%) 50 (83%)

56 (82%)

230 (77%) 148.7 (62%)

43.53 (21%)

366 (27%)

12.5 (12%) 1.98 (21%) 24 (22%) 4.5 (7%)

60 (9%)

40 (14%) 44.2 (18%)

53.9 (25%)

352.5 (26%)

8 (8%) 2.8 (31%) 16 (15%) 6 (10%)

63 (9%)

27 (9%) 45.4 (20%)

Services distribution proportion Army Navy Air Force 24.15 (48%) 12.5 (25%) 14.05 (27%) 1600 (69%) 250 (11%) 420 (18%)

Source: IISS, Military Balance 2001–2, London: IISS, 2001.

Military personnel 50.7 2,310

Nation Australia PRC

4.4 Coastguard 9.4 Police, Civil Defense 36 Marine corps 171.3 (12%) 9 Strategic Missile

1,500 MP, 100 2nd Artillery (2%) 195 Police 12.25 Coastguard 4.5 Waterside Police 20.1 Police

Others

Table 7.4 ,VODQGDQG$VLD3DFLÀFQDWLRQV·PLOLWDU\VWUXFWXUHVÀVFDO\HDULQWKRXVDQGV

All-volunteer

All-volunteer

58,930

281,000

22,000 3,920 77,310 3,690

47,290

23% conscripts All-volunteer All-volunteer All-volunteer 66% conscripts

216,000 127,000

Population 19,000 1,293,000

All-volunteer All-volunteer

Military service Recruit 43% conscripts

23.4

34.3

12.9 19.1 3.4 26

15

4 24.6

GNP 86= 1,000) 24.5 4.3

114

Shen and Tsai

forces are at their weakest. This kind of scenario can be most convincing in the Australian case. The main sources of threat of Australia come from Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, the latter of which is also faced with the danger of internal ULRWV,QRUGHUWRSUHYHQWUHIXJHHVIURPWKHVHDUHDVLOOHJDOO\LQÀOWUDWLQJWKHFRXQtry, and to protect her long coastlines, a large Australian Navy would be expected; but it is relatively small. By contrast, some island states, such as Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines have large ground forces of up to 60 percent of their services. $QRWKHUÀQGLQJWKDWLVZRUWK\RIQRWHLVWKDWWKHKLJKHUWKHGRPHVWLFSHUFDSLWD income, the larger the proportion of the Navy in a country, with Singapore a notable exception. These include Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Britain, the US, and Denmark, each of which has a navy higher than 10 percent. This is perhaps because maintaining a navy requires a large capital outlay and high annual running costs. If the national economy bodes ill, a country cannot afford a powerful navy, Coincidentally, the countries mentioned above are all democratic. It could well be argued that the larger the number of democratic institutions, the higher the proportion of sophisticated air and naval forces. For example, the Philippines, despite its low gross domestic product (GDP) and low per capita income, has a Navy higher than 20 percent of total defense spending. It has to emphasize its need for a Navy because, geographically, it is composed of hundreds of small islets and is entangled with sovereignty and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. However, the overall combat capaELOLWLHVRIWKH3KLOLSSLQHV1DY\DUHLQVLJQLÀFDQWVLQFHWKHPDLQIRUFHFRPSULVHV minor vessels with none much larger than a corvette or coastal patrol boat. The Philippine ground forces, by contrast, remain above 80 percent of total personnel. This has to be attributed to its historical tradition and a number of domestic rebellions. South Korea is another example: virtually surrounded by sea with the only exception in the north, its force structure is characterized by conventional troops. This is because the invading force from North Korea continues to emphasize surprise attacks by ground forces. By way of strategy, South Korean troops expect to engage in ground battles, whereas the US force stationed in the Korean Peninsula shoulders the principal security responsibility at sea and in the air.48 7KHIRUFHVWUXFWXUHVRILVODQGFRXQWULHVLQWKH$VLD3DFLÀFUHJLRQDQGWKHUHVWRI WKHZRUOGVXJJHVWWKDWWKHUHLVQRVWDQGDUGL]HGDSSURDFKRUVFLHQWLÀFFULWHULRQWKDW indicates the reasons for their states’ military organizations and force structures. The process of producing force structures can be more related to geopolitical strategy, historical tradition, main threats, economic development, and political institutions. When it comes to the degree of emphasis, Lloyd’s analysis can be helpful for further understanding. There are limitations in his analysis also. First, each country considers data UHJDUGLQJIRUFHVWUXFWXUHVDVFRQÀGHQWLDOVRSHUWLQHQWLQIRUPDWLRQLVYHU\KDUGWR ÀQG)DFWRUVVXFKDVJHRSROLWLFDOVWUDWHJ\KLVWRULFDOKHULWDJHDQGVWUDWHJLFFXOWXUH DUH GLIÀFXOW WR TXDQWLI\$OO WKHVH OLPLWDWLRQV LQFOLQH WKH GHFLVLRQPDNHUV WR EH LQÁXHQFHGE\VXEMHFWLYHIDFWRUVDQGSHUKDSVPLVWDNHQO\WDNHFHUWDLQIDFWRUVDV their prior concern. More disturbing is the ‘black box’ in the defense and security

ROC’s military organization and force structure

115

decision-making process that not only is always elusive to an outside observer but also leads to conclusions that have little or nothing in common. Because of these OLPLWDWLRQV WKLV FKDSWHU RQO\ ORRNV DW WKH IRUFH VWUXFWXUHV RI VRPH$VLD3DFLÀF states, threats from potential enemies, and national incomes for comparative analysis.

The development of the ROC armed services’ organization and force structure Change of national interests has brought about the evolution of the ROC’s national strategy and force structure, which can be divided into several phases.49 7KHÀUVWSKDVHFDQEHFDOOHGWKHSKDVHRI¶FRXQWHUDWWDFNWKHPDLQODQG·'XULQJ this period, national interests and the overall objectives were to regain sovereignty over the mainland. The main scenario, as a result, was conditioned by events on the mainland, as were the ROC’s military strategy, force organizations, tactics, and combat skills. As the war plans took on an offensive posture, surprise attack and airborne campaigns were the focus, while schemes of ground battles were set at a strategic level. Despite their defeat on the mainland by the PLA, the ROC armed forces during that period did not launch any thorough organizational reform; defense, strategic and security-related decisions instead were restricted to personnel cuts without any radical changes in military strategy and tactics. Subject to international structures, however, the objective of a counterattack against mainland China became a remote ideal, despite the commitment of many KLJKUDQNLQJRIÀFHUV,WVUHPRWHVHQVHRIUHDOLW\EHFDPHHYHQPRUHDFXWHZKHQLW came to the military organization of the troops in Taiwan because they were formerly structured in accordance with the geography of the Chinese mainland and proved unsuited when deployed in a defensive campaign on the Taiwan proper. The six corps-level headquarters under this defensive arrangement turned out to be of little purpose or relevance and ended with being abandoned. With a gradual decrease in the defense budget and public suspicion of huge defense expenditures from the opposition increasing, the ROC armed services conducted organizational reform and imposed cuts in military personnel to various extents every few years.50 The implementation of the “ROC Armed Forces 5HÀQLQJ3URJUDP·ZDVWKHELJJHVWHYHUPLOLWDU\UHRUJDQL]DWLRQHVSHFLDOO\IRUWKH $UP\3ULRUWRWKLV¶UHÀQLQJ·SURJUDPWKHUHZDVDWRSOHYHOVWUHDPOLQLQJSURJUDP among divisional headquarters in order to cope with the dearth of soldiers in ÀHOGXQLWVDVDUHVXOWRIWKHVLJQLÀFDQWGHFUHDVHLQUHFUXLWHGPDOHV7KHH[SHGLHQW resolution at that time was to change several ‘heavy’ divisions into ‘mobilization’ divisions. The force-to-organization ratio for active units was increased, as was the number of reserve units. 7KH SUREOHP RI LQVXIÀFLHQW VHUYLFHPHQ LQWHQVLÀHG DQG SUHVVXUHV IURP WKH WRSOHYHOPLOLWDU\&RQJUHVVDQGVRFLHW\SURPSWHGWKH¶UHÀQLQJ·SURJUDP$IWHU QXPHURXV H[SHULPHQWV IRUPDWLRQV YHULÀFDWLRQV DQG FRPEDWUHDGLQHVV PLVsions over a three-year period, the problem of the force-to-organization ratio was resolved. However, there is an excess of draftees, due to the efforts of the new approach to recruiting.

116

Shen and Tsai

The evolution of the ROC’s defense policy, military organization, and force structure suggests that the threat faced by the island has remained the same. The focus of the PLA’s threat has been oriented toward the offshore islands, which would lead to the launch of an amphibious assault against Taiwan. Consequently, the ROC’s armed forces have been forced to respond by laying emphasis on strengthening the defense of the offshore islands and preparing a counteramphibious assault on the island of Taiwan proper. Recent discussions on China’s unrestricted, asymmetric warfare tactics have attracted wide attention. Whether or not the current ROC force structure will again be altered in order to cope with these non-conventional threats requires further assessment. The review of the above developments indicates that the planning of ROC forces and military strategy have been mainly based on objective judgments by top political and military leaders. After the top leaders’ decisions, the Congress had little power to check them and the priority for resource distribution had already been determined. From a political perspective, where overall re-election to the Congress has taken place and the civil oversight of defense matters can be built on, defense policy, strategy, and force programming will all have to face a thorough process of enquiry.51:LWKRXWWKLVSURFHGXUHZKLFKUHÁHFWVWKHGLIIHUHQW parties’ interests to a certain extent, force programming could be seen as objective, just, transparent, or even publicly supported. :LWKUHJDUGWRWKH52&DUPHGVHUYLFHV·IXWXUHVWUXFWXUHVWKHPLOLWDU\¶UHÀQing’ program reduced their total combat strength from 450,000 to 385,000 personnel. The ROC Army received the biggest cut, leaving it with 200,000 people. The resultant basic strategic organization becomes a combined arms brigade. A counter-amphibious assault remains the key mission for the ground forces, but the Army’s poor joint operational capability and inexperienced NCOs continue to be the weak links. The Navy was reduced to 45,000 people, but its basic organizaWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHÁHHWVL]HDQGNH\PLVVLRQRIFRXQWHUEORFNDGHDQGVHFXULQJWKH sea lines of communication remain the same. The organization and operation of the ROC Navy are sound, and its equipment well maintained. Navy combat strength has been greatly improved since acquiring the LaFayette and Knox-class vessels. New weapons platforms are also to be added. The Navy’s surface and subsurface strength would be even more powerful after the purchase of SSK submarines and the Kidd-class destroyers. However cooperation and integration between Navy, Air Force, and Army still need improvement. Current joint training and instruction are not enough; the major problem is that the Navy cannot execute multiple missions at the same time. The ROC Air Force was also reduced to 45,000 personnel. It has retained its basic organizational structure and primary mission of defensive air interdiction. In numbers, the ROC Air Force is not comparable with China’s PLAAF and Naval Aviation Force; nevertheless, its weapon systems and training quality remain superior. Its training emphasizes defensive air interdiction, but it lacks other types of mission training.52 According to current threat scenarios, the major missions of the ROC armed services include command of the air operations, command of the sea operations,

ROC’s military organization and force structure

117

and ground defensive operations. The ROC armed services, however, have faced the same threat scenarios from the PLA for decades. As terrain, geographic feaWXUHVDQGFRDVWOLQHVKDYHQRWVLJQLÀFDQWO\DOWHUHGWKHWKUHDWDQGPLVVLRQVJHDUHG to the ROC services should theoretically have remained the same. However, the nature of the threat changes, as does the mode of engagement, in the light of changes in the international security environment, the development of new weapons systems, and the likely means of a Chinese military attack on Taiwan. For instance, the PLA considers surprise and deception to be critical means to the success of operations. It will not launch war until it can be sure that certain surprise effects can be achieved. It is highly likely that the PLA’s missile and air ERPEDUGPHQWFRXOGVHYHUHO\GDPDJHWKH52&·VÀJKWHUMHWVDLUGHIHQVHV\VWHPV and C4ISR, and the PLA’s Navy could certainly attack the ROC Navy’s surface ships without warning. If these offensive operations were to succeed, the PLA could invade and occupy Taiwan through the use of massive air, sea, and amphibious forces. In addition, therefore, to strengthening its conventional capabilities, WKH52&QHHGVWREHDZDUHRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIPLVVLOHGHIHQVHFRXQWHULQÀOWUDtion, and counter-PLA surprise attack capabilities. Also, the ground maneuver force has a critical role to play as the island’s contingency force. Its capability to counter non-conventional or airborne attacks will greatly neutralize PLA’s momentum when conducting landing operations.

Recommendations After analyzing the above factors that have a potential impact on the ROC’s military organization and force structures, recommendations for future programming are listed as follows. Introduce a new regular and professional technological weapons unit If the future procurement programs can go ahead smoothly, high-tech weapons will enter service with many military units. These include new submarines, naval combat vessels, gun ships, digitized self-propelled guns, surface-to-surface missiles, and other third-generation weaponry. With the gradual decline in numbers of military personnel, organizational problems remain. Faced with the reality that KLJKO\HGXFDWHGKXPDQUHVRXUFHVRIWHQÀQGLWGLIÀFXOWWRÀQGDSSURSULDWHSRVWV in a relatively shrinking labor market, it may well be appropriate to create hightech weapons units in the military, staffed by all-volunteer recruits. By granting military professionals salaries in accordance with their technological specialties, it would be possible to retain professionals in the military and ensure a high-tech combat power at home. Change to the ROC Marine Corps’ function and role The ROC Marine Corps has long been highly valued by its peer services in Asia on WKHJURXQGVRILWVÀUVWUDWHWUDLQLQJPRUDOHDQGGLVFLSOLQH$OWKRXJKWKH0DULQHV

118

Shen and Tsai

today have no longer assumed an offensive role, as the vanguard of the Army and the amphibious arm of the Navy, its deterrent and contingency functions remain intact.53 The Marines, today, is the only service capable of a rapid response at sea that can both perform a power projection role overseas and a rescue operation on the offshore islands. With these capabilities, the Marines are able to penetrate domestic political and economic circles and directly launch a counter-offensive. It is also possible for the Marines to carry out operations against international terrorists and perform rescue and evacuation roles. In addition to these roles, the Marines can be taken as a reinforcement or HPHUJHQF\UHVFXHWDVNIRUFHGHSOR\HGIURPWKHVHDLQWKHHYHQWWKDWURDGWUDIÀF in Taiwan is blocked, for example by swollen rivers or debris from hurricanes or earthquakes, or where rescue missions are hard to undertake at certain critical geographical points. Seen in this light, there is a need to keep a two-brigade-level Marine Corps capable of a surprise attack and able to maneuver at sea. Reserve forces or the Army should take the place of the Marines and shoulder its former defense missions. Marines, instead, should focus their effort on surprise attack missions and a rapid response capability. If Taiwan is to move to a voluntary UHFUXLWLQJV\VWHPWKH0DULQHVVKRXOGEHFKRVHQDVWKHVHUYLFHZLWKÀUVWSULRULW\ The integration of the reserve brigade and the Army’s defense brigade’s missions The function of skeleton battalions and mobilization battalions in active combined arms brigade and reserve battalions in reserve command cannot meet the country’s defense needs either in theory or reality. The purpose of designing the above units was to reduce the impact of military organizational reengineering. These units were originally organized to achieve the goal of re-engineering and to retain PLGGOHOHYHO RIÀFHUV LQ RUGHU WR UHVROYH WKH SUREOHP RI GRZQVL]LQJ54 The fact that these units exist among the Army, the Marines, and the Reserve Command, however, indicates that a number of outstanding problems need to be resolved. According to the 2002 National Defense Law and Defense Organization Law, the Reserve Command will take charge of defense bridges that currently come the under the Army’s responsibility and a joint command will take operational control of all regular standing forces. The issues here, however, are as follows. The missions assumed by brigades under the Reserve Command overlap with those of the Army’s defense brigades. Also, as the two military organizations – defense brigades and reserve brigades – rely on mobilized resources to perform their tasks, the issues remain. What kind of brigade will defend coastal areas and which will defend towns and mountain areas? These issues need to be sorted out from an integrated perspective, after the effort to cut the size of the military organization as a whole. In its annual report for 2003, the Ministry of National Defense proposes to adjust its force structure and organizational objectives in accordance with the directives – standing forces in charge of strike and reserve force responsible for homeland security – to cope with future types of warfare. The reserve forces

ROC’s military organization and force structure

119

under this directive, it has been decided, should be separated from the standing force. In fact, from April to June 2004, reserve ground troops under the three conventional services will be transferred to a Reserve Command whose missions in turn will be transformed into coastal defense; rural defense; garrison defense; and mobilization. The Reserve Command will also take on the responsibility for combat readiness; this will encompass organizational, management, equipment, recruitment, and training matters. All these come into shape before the end of 2004.55 After integrating the links of command and control, the armed services must not stop there. They still need to integrate the defense capabilities of the different task forces, strengthen both the standing strike forces and the defense units, and, more importantly, enhance coordination among all the services. 0RYHWRZDUGDSURIHVVLRQDOZDUUDQWRIÀFHUV·FRUSV 7KH ODFN RI SURIHVVLRQDO QRQFRPPLVVLRQHG RIÀFHUV 1&2V  LQ WKH RYHUDOO SHUVRQQHOUHVRXUFHVRIWKH52&IRUFHVFRXSOHGZLWKDÁRRGRIUHWLUHPHQWVDPRQJ the older generation of sergeants who evacuated from mainland China in 1949, has caused an imbalance among experienced senior NCOs. With the exception of the Air Force, where NCOs have quite stable careers, there is a serious shortage RI KXPDQ UHVRXUFHV DW WKH 1&2 OHYHO LQ$UP\ ÀHOG XQLWV DQG RQ WKH VKLSV RI the ROC Navy. Having opened up access to a military career for females, the sources of recruitment have become stable and the quality has indeed improved. However, with advances in the technologies currently in use, the quality of NCOs LVLQVXIÀFLHQWWRPHHWUHTXLUHPHQWV,QVWHDGRIFRQWLQXLQJWRH[WHQGUHFUXLWPHQWWR potential candidates, there is a case for elevating NCOs’ educational backgrounds to polytechnic level and constructing a professional NCO corps by granting more generous pay to those with proven ability. Enhance the joint operational system in time of war In the past, when at war, the operational headquarters was the superior command over the corps and divisions. Having been gradually scaled down at the divisional and corps levels, commands would be issued, when at war, from the Joint Operations Center; these would give direct command over more than ten combined brigade forces. The tall pyramid of military organizations of the past KDVEHFRPHÁDWWHQHGDVDUHVXOW Mechanized combat in built-up, industrialized urban areas generated almost unlimited scope with linear battlegrounds in depth, with sizable mobile forces ZLWK ÀHOG DUP\ RU FRUSV HQJDJHG LQ GHFLVLYH JURXQG FDPSDLJQV RYHU H[WHQGHG terrain. This kind of warfare necessitated a hierarchical organization for ground combat. However, with the application of information technologies in today’s wars, hierarchical forms of command and control will be an impediment to comEDWHIÀFLHQF\%DVHGRQWKLVUHDVRQLQJWKHUHLVDFDVHWKDWDÁDWWULDQJXODUPLOLWDU\ RUJDQL]DWLRQZRXOGEHLQVXIÀFLHQW7KHUHLVDQHHGWRGHYHORSDFRPPDQGDQG

120 Shen and Tsai control capability into a network. By networking command and control, C4ISR could come into full effect. Additionally, each operational zone needs a characteristic that would enable it to launch an operation independently. Independent capability in war has to be emphasized in that combat zones on Taiwan and on its offshore islands have diverJHQWJHRJUDSKLHVDQGDUHVLJQLÀFDQWO\GLYLGHGE\ULYHUVDQGPRXQWDLQV+HUHDQ LQGHSHQGHQW FRPEDW FDSDELOLW\ LV GHÀQHG DV ÀUVW WKH FRPSHWHQFH RI D FRPEDW headquarters that can take effective counter-measures to engage the enemy in that zone, and second, one that can carry out non-operational missions, such as national emergencies and natural disasters. In other words, both conventional military thinking and command and control based on ground campaigns have to upgrade themselves with the advent of information technologies.

Conclusion 7KH52&·VDUPHGVHUYLFHVXVHGWRWDNHWKUHDWDQGPLVVLRQVDVWKHLUÀUVWFRQFHUQ They forecast the PLA’s threat and courses of action and used this as the basis XSRQZKLFKWKH\GHFLGHGKRZWRÀJKWWKHZDU+RZHYHULWLVLPSRUWDQWWRVWUHVV WKHQHFHVVLW\RIUHDOL]LQJZKDWNLQGRIIXWXUHFRQÁLFWDFURVVWKH7DLZDQ6WUDLWWKH ROC will have to face.562QO\ZKHQWKHTXHVWLRQRIKRZWRÀJKWWKLVFRQÁLFWLV answered can Taiwan’s decision-makers proceed with the questions of weaponry, equipment, and organizational structures to maximize military capabilities. More important is the effort of integrating the above three elements that are the major SDUWVRIDVHTXHQWLDOORJLFRI´KRZWRÀJKWHTXLSRUJDQL]HDQGWUDLQµ Because of the ROC’s current situation, the threat and military missions have had to be emphasized more. First, the threat from PLA and the scenario of its attacking Taiwan have been thoroughly assessed. The question of how best to defend the island and its population will be the next step. In other words, the SODQQLQJF\FOHLVDVIROORZV:KDWNLQGRIZDUGRHV7DLZDQZDQWWRÀJKW":KDW kinds of armament and weapon will be needed? How does it operate the system and its organizational structure so that military personnel and their weapons can be more effective? How can the armed services integrate the functions of training, V\VWHPDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQ"7KHWKLQNLQJSURFHVVZLOOEHRQHRIÀJKWLQJHTXLSSLQJ organizing, and training. The PLA’s threat to Taiwan comes mainly from the sea and the air. However, an eruption leading to total war across the Taiwan Strait is considered less likely. A planner of ROC military force structures should refrain from setting a program based on an all-out war scenario, as this would massively deplete the nation’s resources. On the other hand, although technological capabilities are important in Taiwan’s future force structure programming, research and development represents DQLQVLJQLÀFDQWSURSRUWLRQRIWKHGHIHQVHEXGJHW7KLVORZVKDUHZLOOSUREDEO\ remain because Taiwan relies on foreign procurement for its advanced weaponry; and, because the foreign acquisition has so far been smooth and overseas arms deals can sometimes boost Taiwan’s foreign relations, indigenous technological effort has been less urgent.

ROC’s military organization and force structure

121

,QDQDWWHPSWWRÁDWWHQWKHFKDLQRIFRPPDQGDQGUHLQIRUFHMRLQWRSHUDWLRQDO capabilities, the ROC armed services in the future will set up a joint command. They also seek to integrate effective conventional deterrent and counterattack capabilities by establishing missile command and information/electronic combat units. All these initiatives, taken together, can be seen as an important step toward OD\LQJWKHIRXQGDWLRQIRUDQHIIHFWLYHPLOLWDU\RUJDQL]DWLRQPDQQHGE\ÀUVWUDWH WURRSVLQWLPHRIFRQÁLFW In terms of force structures, the ROC armed services have begun in 2004 a second wave of organizational reform starting with an annual reduction of 15,000 personnel aimed at lowering the total to 340,000 in 2006 and ending at 300,000 two years later. To do this, the armed services must try to strike a balance among three principles – cuts in personnel, improved overall quality, and strengthening combat power. With the objective of effective deterrence, the ROC armed services are emphatic of a multidimensional, balanced, and adaptable defensive force structure by turning themselves into an effective, mean and lean strike force capable of a rapid response to the enemy’s potential invasion.

Notes 1 Hai-hao Qian, Jundui Zuzhi Bianzhixue Jiuocheng [Course on Military Organization 6FLHQFH@%HLMLQJ0LOLWDU\6FLHQFH3XEOLVKHUS 2 The defense organization refers to the policy affairs of the Ministry of National Defense; the military structure includes the armed services’ structure and relevant institutions. 3 Richard O. Hindley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What Can the History of Revolutions in Military Affairs Tell us about Transforming the US Military? Santa Monica: RAND, 1999. 4 At present, the developed country’s armed forces planning manners include six types: macroscopic aspect; conditions; comprehensive scenario; threat mission; overall FRQVLGHUDWLRQ VFLHQFH DQG WHFKQRORJ\ DQG ÀQDQFH FDSDELOLW\ 6HH 7DL6KLQJ )X “Armed Forces Planning Theory and Reality in Information Age,” National Policy Dynamic Analysis, February 1995, pp. 7–9. 5 Richmond M. Lloyd, “Strategy and Force Planning Framework,” in NWC Strategy and Force Planning Faculty (ed.), Strategy and Force Planning, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995, pp. 1–14. 6 National Defense Department, Defense Report Republic of China National, 2002, Taipei: Li-Ming Culture Co., 2002, pp. 63–4. 7 US Department of Defense, Annual Report on The Military Power of The People’s Republic of China, Washington, DC: DOD, 30 July 2003, p. 46. http://www.defenselink. mil/pubs/20030730chinaex.pdf. 8 Zalmay Khalilzad, David Orletsky, Jonathan Pollack, Kevin Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David Shlapak, Abram Shulsky, and Ashley Tellis, The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture, Santa Monica: RAND, 2001. 9 On PLA’s “Acupuncture Warfare,” see Chong-Pin Lin, China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy, Taipei: Student Publishing House, 1999. 10 See US Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Washington, DC: DOD, 2003, pp. 51–2. 11 National Defense Department, Defense Report Republic of China National, 2002, p. 139.

122 Shen and Tsai 12 Ming-Jie Wu, “Marine Corps’ Reconnaissance Members Take on the Anti-Terror Special Operations,” The Liberty Times, 18 October 2002, p. 2. 13 JCS Pub. 1: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 1 June 1987, p. 232. 14 W. T. T. Pakenman, D. G. Kiely, R. E. Legate, and D. Whitehead, Naval Command and Control, London: Brassey’s Defense Publisher, 1989, p. 1. 15 Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr., translated by Yi-Chong Gao, US Army War College Guide To Strategy, Taipei: Military History Affairs and Translation Bureau, MND, 2001, p. 357. 16 Li Chen, On Geographic Strategy, Beijing: PLA Press, 1990, p. 273. 17 Ming-Shih Shen, “Discussing the Defense Deployment and Force Crevasse,” National Defense Monthly, 17 (2), August 2001, pp. 75–80. 18 Cited from Lang Shi Report to the Emperor of the Qing “Abandon or Conserve Taiwan Report.” See Shen-An Chiou, Taiwan History, Taipei: Li-Ming Cultural Enterprises Co., 1992, p. 104. 19 Such as in the Sino-France War, the Mu-dan Commune event, and, after the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the resistance of the Taiwanese people to the Japanese military invasion. 20 In 1945, the US Army planned “Operation Causeway” to conduct landing operations in southern Taiwan, but their operational strategy was changed to “Operation Induction” to attack the Philippines. The US Army only conducted air attacks on Taiwan. See Ming-Shih Shen, “America offensive and Japan defensive strategy on Taiwan during WKH3DFLÀF:DUµYouth Daily, 25 October 2003, p. 3. 21 Taiwan Province Bibliography Association (eds), Taiwan Province Comprehensive History, Taichung: Taiwan Province Bibliography Association, 1987, p. 11. 22 Taiwan Province Comprehensive History, Taipei: Zhong-wen Publishing House, 1987, p. 657. 23 Feng-Han Liu, Japanese Military on Taiwan, Taipei: National History Museum, 1998. 24 Su-Fang Lee, Taiwan Coastland, Taipei: Yuan-zu Cultural Co., 2001, pp. 8–9. 25 The Research Department of Military Science Academy (eds), The Science of Military Strategy, Beijing: Military Science Press, 2001, pp. 80–2. 26 Da-Hua Mo, “Strategic Culture and Defense Policy: Taiwan Strategic Culture and Military Culture,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 1 (4), 2001, p. 41. 27 During the Japanese occupation, Japanese military’s ‘Kamikaze’ suicide airplanes took off from Taiwan to attack US naval vessels. It could have been a kind of “Decisive Battle Outside the Territory,” but there was a defensive strategy. 28 Ming-Shih Shen, “On the Analysis of the Design of Military Organization,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 3 (4), Summer 2003, p. 85. 29 For example, some people thought that by combining the military academies the purpose was to ‘de-sinolize’ and to cut down Chinese military traditions. 30 For example, does Taiwan need a Marine Corps on the defensive operations? The DPP was of the opinion that Marine Corps should be eliminated in 2002. However some strategy scholars thought it was the essential troop to accomplish the “effective deterrence and resolute defense posture” strategic concept. See Wen-Cheng Chai and Fu S. Mei, “A Cast of R.O.C. Marine Corps,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 3 (1), 2002, pp. 90–112. 31 “The Pursuit of Security: Conversation with General Shiah, Yang-Joy,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 1 (2), Winter 2001, p. 144. 32 Troops who are familiar only with conventional war, while the enemy conducts ‘Hyper Warfare’ or ‘Acupuncture Warfare,’ will experience the painful and costly lesson of building ‘Anti-Acupuncture Warfare’ and ‘Anti-Hyper Warfare’ force structures and operations.

ROC’s military organization and force structure

123

33 After 11 September 2001, US Northern Command was established to strengthen Homeland security, which is a strategic command institution for integrating domestic anti-terrorism operations. 34 Chin-Chiang Su and Ming-Shih Shen (eds), “ROC’s National Defense Policy Review and Prospect,” National Security and Taiwan Straits Interaction Conference Essay, New York: Taiwan New Century Foundation, April 2000, pp. 15–38. 35 Wan-Nian Zhang, Dangdai Shijie Junshi Yu Zhongguo Guofang [Modern Global 0LOLWDU\ $IIDLUV DQG 35& 'HIHQVH@ %HLMLQJ 0LOLWDU\ 6FLHQFH 3XEOLVKHU  S 176. 36 See “Suggesting ‘Decisive Battle Outside the Territory’: Abstract of President Chen’s Address at the Chinese Military Academy,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 1 (1), 2001, pp. 129–31. 37 Zai-Chun Wen, “The Method of Forces Design,” ROC Navy Science Monthly, January 1997, p. 18. 38 James W. Abellerad and Rolf Clark, “Forces of Habit: Budgeting for Tomorrow’s Fleets,” AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, 3 (2–3), 1981, p. 5. 39 Melanie Bright, “ Armed Forces and the Environment: Part II – The US Army,” JDW, 1 October 2003. 40 Richard Lock-Pullman, “Military Reform and Cultural Complexity,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 2 (4), Summer 2002, p. 33. 41 Ibid. p. 10.  $FFRUGLQJ WR 86 H[SHULHQFH WKH ÀUVW SKDVH RI DQ DOOYROXQWDU\ VHUYLFH XVXDOO\ KDV quality control problems. 43 SWOT analysis uses the same method. 44 For example, put an enlarged association of nations as a supposed enemy. That would strengthen the original security threat. 45 See Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, pp. 46– 7. 46 Zalmay Khalilzad, David Orletsky, Jonathan Pollack, Kevin Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David Shlapak, Abram Shulsky, and Ashley Tellis, The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture, Santa Monica: RAND, 2001. 47 Natalie Crawford and Chung-in Moon, Emerging Threat, Force Structures and the Role of Air Power in Korea, Santa Monica: RAND, 2000. 48 Chin-Chiang Su and Ming-Shih Shen, “ROC’s National Defense Policy Review and Prospect,” pp. 16–30. 49 For instance, the ROC Army had cut down and merged organizations at least six times. 50 The Minister of National Defense and the Chief of General Staff briefed Congress on the Kidd-class DDG procurement evaluation and made it known to the public. It was a revolutionary communication with Congress. 51 The ROC Armed Forces’ shortcomings were cited from the Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Washington, DC: DOD, 2003. 52 Tong-rong Tsai, “The Marine Corps Existence is essential.” The Commons Daily, October 2002, p. 7. 53 Chong-Lian Gu, “ROC National Defense Decision Process Analysis After ‘Two Defense Laws’ Carried out,” Taiwan Straits Security and National Defense Strategy Conference Essay, New York: Taiwan New Century Foundation, October 2002, pp. 6-21–6-22. 54 United Daily News, Taipei, 27 January 2004, p. 5. 55 Richmond M. Lloyd and Dino A. Lorenzini, “A Framework for Choosing Defense Forces,” Naval War College Review, Jan.–Feb. 1981, pp. 6–58.

8

The development of Taiwan’s revolution in military affairs after the implementation of the 2002 National Defense Act Wen-Chung Lee

,QWURGXFWLRQ 7KHDGYDQFHGKLJKWHFKQRORJ\ZHDSRQVÁH[LEOHPLOLWDU\RUJDQL]DWLRQLQWHJUDWHG combat forces, advanced command, management and intelligence systems, and innovative combat strategies exhibited by the US and its allies in the 1991 Gulf War forced the national defense decision-makers of all countries to rethink how to build their country’s national defense to suit the wars of the future. The success of the US military administration thereby became a goal to aspire to for many countries. It is a fact that Taiwan has had to face powerful military threats from mainland China, especially during the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait Missile Crises, which revealed that Taiwan’s military forces could no longer effectively deter China’s military threats. As a consequence, and under pressure (a) to adjust its defense strategies to meet the expectations of the civilian government, (b) to respond to American urgency for change, and (c) to accommodate limited – and dwindling – defense resources, the Taiwanese military gradually introduced and initiated a number of military reforms. Among these was the National Defense Act of 2002, which serves as a link between the past and future. It not only addressed the predicament generated by earlier, chaotic national defense reforms, but also clearly laid out the directions for the future development of Taiwan’s national defense, such as organizational adjustments, civilian control, the nationalization of the military, single-unit military administration and command, joint operational command mechanisms, independent arms procurement systems, national defense self-determination, and a nationwide national defense structure. The 2002 National Defense Act demonstrates that the development of the country’s national defense both complies with the spirit of democracy and will assist the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to expedite a ‘Revolution in 0LOLWDU\$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ· ZKLFK LQ WXUQ ZLOO KHOS WRZDUG EXLOGLQJ XS D VXIÀcient force to defend the country against China. In the light of this assertion, WKLVFKDSWHUZLOOÀUVWGHVFULEHWKHSODQVDQGDFWLRQVLQWKHUHYROXWLRQRI7DLZDQ·V military administration; second, it will attempt to verify their feasibility within the framework of the National Defense Act; and, lastly, it will offer suggestions for future developments.

Taiwan’s revolution in military affairs 125

Plans and actions behind the revolution of Taiwan’s military affairs Bringing the nationalization of the Taiwanese armed forces into effect National armed forces are the common practice in most democratic countries. That is to say, the armed forces are owned by the state, and not by a single political party or by a few individuals exercising power within an autocracy or dictatorship. In democracies, military actions are taken in response to the democratically HOHFWHGJRYHUQPHQWWRIXOÀOOWKHZLOORILWVFLWL]HQV,QYLHZRIWKHKLVWRU\RIWKH development of the Taiwanese armed forces, the issue of how to ‘nationalize’ the military became the priority of the political leadership in the country’s GLIÀFXOW SURFHVV RI GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ ,Q UHFHQW \HDUV WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI 1DWLRQDO Defense has strictly prohibited military personnel from becoming involved in political intelligence work, and clearly laid down a policy that prohibited military administrative units from forcing the personnel whilst in service from joining a VSHFLÀFSROLWLFDOSDUW\RUIURPSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQSDUW\DFWLYLWLHV7KH0LQLVWU\DOVR prohibits military personnel from mobilizing large crowds for election campaign purposes in its drive to promote the political neutrality of the armed services. Implementing a single-unit military administrative and command structure Single-unit military administration and command put the power of command, management, subordinate relationships, and authority into the hands of the Minister of National Defense in order to avoid divergences in administration and command as well as unclear authority. Currently, both the power of administration and command are in the hands of the Minister of National Defense. The Minister of Defense is commanded by and answerable to the ROC President, and the Chief of General Staff becomes the Chief of Staff under, and is accountable to, the Defense Minister. Implementation of a civilian command system and adjustments to civil–military relations Civilian command does not simply mean having a civilian Defense Minister. It is even more important to bring into the national defense system more civilian thinking and non-military personnel who are specialized in military affairs. Through the injection of both civilian and military thinking, defense units will become less conservative and rigid and, in turn, become part of a national defense organization that better suits the needs of the country. From 2003, therefore, the Ministry of National Defense began to recruit civilians through interviews, and military personnel through transfer examinations and open public service examinations, in the hope of reaching the government’s goal of one-third civilian RIÀFHUVHPSOR\HGLQWKH0LQLVWU\RI1DWLRQDO'HIHQVHE\0DUFK

126 Lee Reducing the size of the armed forces and increasing the ratio of volunteers Although the total number of military personnel has been reduced from 450,000 WRDIWHUWKH¶&RQVROLGDWLRQ3URMHFW·RIWRFRQFHQWUDWHVSHFLÀFDOO\ on the defense of the Taiwan Strait, the ratios of servicemen and women and RIÀFHUV DUH VWLOO QRW EDODQFHG $ IXUWKHU UHRUJDQL]DWLRQ DQG FRQVROLGDWLRQ LV therefore needed. In response, the Ministry of National Defense proposed in 2003 a ‘Military Administrative Reform’ and expects to reduce further the total number of military personnel to 300,000 in two stages over a period of ten years.1 At present, since most of the military – soldiers, sailors, and airmen – are drafted, that is to say they are subject to compulsory national service, the ratio of compulsory national servicemen to service volunteers is approximately 64:36, or two-thirds to one-third. However, when confronted with future developments in KLJKWHFKQRORJ\FRPEDW7DLZDQQHHGVPRUHYROXQWDU\VHUYLFHRIÀFHUVZKRFDQ be trained to operate complex equipment over long periods of time if Taiwan’s overall combat force is to be its most effective. When reducing the number of servicemen and women, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) must also promote recruitment through the various military academies. The MND hopes to attract more young volunteers to join the armed forces and alter the ratio of compulsory to voluntary service to 4:6 in the future. Consolidate the higher command units and reorganize staff ranking The consolidation of higher command units can be categorized in two parts: units under the Ministry of National Defense; and the Command Centers of each of WKH DUPHG VHUYLFHV )LUVW WKH 01' LV SODQQLQJ WR UHGXFH WKH FXUUHQW  ÀUVW class units under its control to twenty units.2 As for the Command Center of each service, they are at present part of the military administrative system because the joint operational command mechanism separates the command centers of all three services from the chain of command. The combat and intelligence bureaus of the three services will therefore be reorganized separately. Since future operations will probably be transformed into a professional battle group that is capable of bolstering the morale of the military internally and weakening that of the enemy externally – other than consolidating existing operational organizations – the role of the force commander will be lowered to that of Lieutenant General. The annexation of military academies to maximize investment in military education In order to maximize the return on investment in military education and strengthen basic training for joint operations, the Ministry of National Defense, in line with the ‘Consolidation Project,’ has annexed military academies at all levels into the 1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH8QLYHUVLW\DQGLWV*UDGXDWH6FKRRO7KLVDUUDQJHPHQWÀUVWRIDOO breaks down the services’ independent education and the barriers that have been in existence for entry into further education. The move will expand opportunities

Taiwan’s revolution in military affairs 127 for servicemen and women to change subjects in their various academic training as well as take on new specializations. Second, the arrangement has consolidated the utilization of military education resources and thereby avoids duplication of effort and repeated investment. Third, through this annexation, the MND has been able to push forward the basic education for joint operations. Establish a joint operations mechanism and strengthen joint operational capabilities ‘Joint Operations’ is one of the major formats for future wars. To strengthen and enhance the quality of joint operations, the MND must integrate simultaneously the characteristics of the different services from two perspectives: software and hardware. First of all, as regards software, the MND is currently reducing the number of major strategic levels of command to ten, including three military groups: the Hualien-Taidong, Kinmen, Mazhu, and Penghu command centers, an Air-Operations Department, and the 62/63 Special Fleet.3 In time of war, these ten united operational units are commanded directly by the Chief of General Staff. Computer war simulation systems will also be introduced for training during peacetime. Second, with respect to hardware, the MND is planning to continuously proFXUHQRQVHUYLFHVSHFLÀFFRPPDQGPDQDJHPHQWLQWHOOLJHQFHDQGVXUYHLOODQFH facilities, as planned in the ‘Sheng Bo’ Project. This will enable it to construct an LQVWDQWDQGXQLÀHGFRPPXQLFDWLRQVV\VWHPIRUMRLQWRSHUDWLRQV Promote purchases from local businesses in support of Taiwan’s defense industry. 7RIXOO\UHDOL]HWKHFRQFHSWRIVHOIVXIÀFLHQF\LQ1DWLRQDO'HIHQVHDQGWRVXSSRUW local defense industry and manufacture, the Minister of National Defense, Mr Tang, has repeatedly assured the Legislative Yuan that the MND considers local defense equipment design, development, and manufacture a priority. If defense equipment were available locally, which includes large items such as tactical reconnaissance and army eight-wheel armored vehicles, they would be SURFXUHG6WDUWLQJLQWKH01'EHJDQWRUHOHDVHXQFODVVLÀHGSXUFKDVHDQG maintenance contracts to private businesses and corporations. Currently, the total amount contracted out annually to Taiwanese companies is around NT$6 billion and is expected to reach NT$9 billion by 2011. Readjust the mobilization system and establish a nationwide defense structure Owing to the uniqueness of Taiwan’s security situation and changes in the mode RIFXUUHQWDQGIXWXUHZDURSHUDWLRQVRQFHFRQÁLFWEUHDNVRXWLQWKH7DLZDQ6WUDLW there is no longer any distinction between the frontline and the rear. Therefore, a nationwide defense should place heavy emphasis on an effective reserve

128 Lee mobilization system in addition to educating the general public about Taiwan’s national defense and current developments. As for the mobilization system, Taiwan’s current policy is to draft a reserve force from among healthy male citizens to the age of thirty years, with the \RXQJHURQHVEHLQJFDOOHGXSPDOHVÀUVW,QWKLVZD\WKHODVWWREHGLVFKDUJHG IURPQDWLRQDOVHUYLFHZLOOEHWKHÀUVWWREHFDOOHGXS5HWLUHGH[VHUYLFHPHQDQG women will be required to attend four recalls over a period of eight years from the day of their discharge. The policy is to control the number of reserves to around one million personnel. With regard to the establishment of a nationwide defense system, other than regularly opening military bases for educational and training purposes, the MND proactively provides and distributes information regarding the military developments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The intention here is to inform the general public of the respective military capabilities of the two sides of the Taiwan 6WUDLWDQGUDLVHWKHLUJHQHUDODZDUHQHVVDQGFRQÀGHQFH

'LIÀFXOWLHVLQLPSOHPHQWLQJ7DLZDQ·V revolution in military affairs From the contents of the 2002 National Defense Act, a blueprint is clearly laid out for the armed forces’ administrative revolution. As long as it is pragmatically LPSOHPHQWHG WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ ZLOO GHÀQLWHO\ DFKLHYH FLYLOLDQ FRPPDQG DQG control. Under a single-unit administration and command system and in the light of the regulations introduced under the 2002 National Defense Act and monitored by the citizens, the armed services will certainly get on track with the development of democracy within Taiwan. Human resource reductions and organizational consolidation and rationalization are effective means with which to DFKLHYHLPSURYHGDQGPRUHHIÀFLHQWUHVRXUFHDOORFDWLRQ7KH\ZLOOKHOSWRPDNH massive savings in battle training, weapons procurement, military education, and technological development, whilst, in turn, upgrading the capabilities of Taiwan’s armed services when responding to high-tech warfare. Undeniably, however, in the process of implementing the core concepts of the Military Administration Revolution that is embedded in the 2002 National Defense Act, many problems have been encountered due to the absence of a set of well-established measures and procedures. Whereas some of these problems are structural in nature, others DUHRIFRXUVHGLIÀFXOWLHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHLUH[HFXWLRQDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ Structural problems Before the 2002 National Defense Act, the military in Taiwan was allowed to act without political permission or discretion and could make its own rules if these ZHUHMXGJHGWREHQHFHVVDU\IRUFRPEDW7KHVHSUDFWLFHVODVWHGIRUDOPRVWÀIW\ years, during which time the military set a number of precedents, and fell into a number of ‘habits.’ The most obvious example of these largely unquestioned practices would be the large High Administration Unit operating with functional

Taiwan’s revolution in military affairs 129 overlaps without any law regulating its competency. It was not an easy task, therefore, to correct such abnormal ‘habits’ overnight, even after the 2002 National Defense Act had been introduced. In such a situation, a set of further measures is needed to reform the system from the bottom up. Generally speaking, the types of structural problems include: Command authority Unquestionably, the ROC President is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. According to the current political system, however, he and the Prime Minister are both superior to the Minister of National Defense. The power relationship, both formal and informal, among these three is unclear. Moreover, at the present time LWLVUDWKHUGLIÀFXOWIRU7DLZDQHVSHFLDOO\WRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQSHDFHWLPHDQG ZDUWLPH,WLVQRWFOHDUWKHUHIRUHZKHQWRGHÀQHZKRVKRXOGEHLQFRPPDQGWKH 3UHVLGHQWRUWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU,WLVQHFHVVDU\WRKDYHDFOHDUO\GHÀQHGFRPPDQG authority, eliminate the functional distinction between peacetime and wartime, DQGUHPRYHIX]]LO\GHÀQHGIXQFWLRQVDVFULEHGWR¶FRPEDWFRPPDQG·DQG¶JHQHUDO national defense affairs.’ The functional overlap problem of Higher Command After the 2002 National Defense Act was implemented, the Higher Command within the MND carried out much rationalization and consolidation work. Since then, current measures have focused more on the lower staff ranks; that is to say it has vertically consolidated subordinate units under the Higher Command. This consolidation has only converted two jobs into one, with the effect that lowerranking staff have more work to do since consolidation than before. Nevertheless, the same types of jobs are also being performed by other higher command units. The reorganization process has only looked at the vertical consolidation internally and overlooked horizontal overlapping external functions. This kind of function overlap still widely exists, pointing to the need for a functional consolidation and the regrouping of units with similar jobs. Problems with combat unit command 7LPHHIÀFLHQF\LVLPSRUWDQWLQPRGHUQFRPEDWDUDSLGUHVSRQVHLVHVVHQWLDOWR combat troops. Revolutions in military administration and adjustments to military organization in most countries around the world are geared toward shortening levels of command as well as combining and scaling down combat units. For example, take Taiwan’s principal adversary, mainland China: in 2003, the Chairman of the PRC Central Military Committee, Jiang Zemin, proposed to reduce the size of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by 200,000 men by 2005. The PLA took this opportunity to carry out their rationalization and consolidation work in cutting back the command levels of their combat units. In practical terms, the PRC government is planning to reduce the frontline

130 Lee PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) combat forces. For the PLAN, WKLVPHDQVFXWWLQJWKUHH1DY\EDVHFRPPDQGFHQWHUVDQGÁHHWFRPPDQGVGLUHFWO\ IURPWKHFHQWUDO1DY\)OHHW&RPPDQG&HQWHULQRUGHUWRPD[LPL]HFRPEDWHIÀciency and enable a rapid response time. In addition, the PLAAF is also planning to cut back on a number of lower command units and hand over the commands of troops and regiments to larger Regional Command Centers. The PRC has a wide expanse of territory and yet they are still cutting back the levels of command. Taiwan is a small island and has a much shorter time for reaction, once mainland China’s forces approach its shores. It is therefore certainly necessary for Taiwan to compress its combat command levels. Problems in recruitment and terms of service With the current size of the Taiwanese armed services since the 2002 National Defense Act was implemented, Taiwan can currently be considered to have VXIÀFLHQWDUPHGVHUYLFHPHQDQGZRPHQ7KHUHIRUHPDQ\SHRSOHFDQQRWVWDUWWKHLU FLYLOLDQMREVEHFDXVHWKH\KDYHÀUVWWRZDLWWREHGUDIWHGIRUFRPSXOVRU\VHUYLFH Furthermore, in order to have a more stable supply of conscripts, professional RIÀFHUVDQGRWKHUUDQNVWKH01'KDVDOVRFRQWLQXRXVO\DGMXVWHGXSZDUGVWKH quota for voluntary service. This is the right direction to go because the country needs to rely less on non-specialized manpower provided by compulsory service. The MND should objectively and pragmatically project the size of the armed services needed in Taiwan before the length of service is considered. This will help to consolidate the armed forces, as planned in the ‘Consolidation Project,’ and raise combat morale. Strengthen the reserve mobilization system and be more pragmatic The implementation of a nationwide defense has always been one of the major goals in the revolution of military administration. In this respect, the hard work and attention of Defense Minister Tang has been acknowledged. However, the current reserve mobilization system has not yet fully played its assigned role as the lead in the ROC’s nationwide defense, especially from a psychological morale perspective. There is still room for discussion, from the point of view of system as well as execution. System-wise, does Taiwan really need to maintain such a large reserve, which is equipped with inferior weapons to those issued to the regular troops? Furthermore, does the period of mobilization need to be so long – another subject worthy of debate? Execution-wise, is it possible to provide the citizenry with an education in defense matters through a mechanism of reserve mobilization? Does the MND have effective channels with which to communicate with the civilians and is the latest knowledge relevant to Taiwan’s defense accessible by regular citizens? These are problems that need to be solved before a nationwide defense is fully implemented.

Taiwan’s revolution in military affairs 131

Problems in execution In fact, the current 2002 National Defense Act has provided a sound structure for the military administration revolution. Whether the armed services are capable of upgrading their overall combat capability through the National Defense Act GHSHQGVRQKRZZHOOWKHSODQVDUHH[HFXWHG+HUHWKHUHDUH\HWPRUHGLIÀFXOWLHV and problems. 7KHULJKWVDQGEHQHÀWVRIPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHO The Ministry of National Defense once again has strictly prohibited military personnel from becoming involved in any party or political activities. At present, nobody questions the nationalization of the military. However, the Constitution also protects the political rights of military personnel. The issue of the right of military personnel to participate in politics should therefore be taken into account in the Military Administration Revolution and the problem addressed from a OHJDO PLOLWDU\ PDQDJHPHQW SHUVSHFWLYH )XUWKHUPRUH WKH ULJKWV DQG EHQHÀWV RI military personnel should also include salaries and wages, and the training and work environment. No matter whether military personnel are conscripts or volunteers, they are all SXEOLFVHUYDQWV7KHTXHVWLRQKRZHYHULVÀUVWZKHWKHUWKH\DUHWUHDWHGHTXDOO\ and with equal respect to other government workers and civil servants. This also raises the issue of whether or not they are fairly and reasonably rewarded and respected by society for working in a hard and compulsory work environment involving antisocial hours, and frequently uncomfortable conditions? These are also subjects that require further discussion. Second, whilst acknowledging that military educational facilities are modern and of a very high standard, a question mark hovers over the quality of the teaching staff and the curricula. A subject well worth discussing in detail is whether or not Taiwan’s provision for military education can produce talented men and women talents who are well versed in all areas relevant to their country’s defense and security. All these problems are relevant to the true spirit of the Military Administration Revolution and whether they are effectively infused into the system. Problems of cooperation between the military and private corporations 7RUHDOL]HVHOIVXIÀFLHQF\LQQDWLRQDOGHIHQVHWKH3UHVLGHQWDVZHOODVWKH0LQLVWHU of National Defense stressed the importance of supporting the domestic defense industry. The experience of Singapore in this respect serves both as a useful guide DQG DV DQ LQGLFDWLRQ RI WKH PHULWV RI VHOIVXIÀFLHQF\ ,Q RUGHU IRU LWV GRPHVWLF defense technology industry to develop and correspond to the needs of its armed IRUFHVWKH6LQJDSRUH*RYHUQPHQWRIWHQDUUDQJHVIRUUHWLUHGKLJKUDQNLQJRIÀFHUV to work as senior executives in defense technology companies, like the Aerospace ,QGXVWULDO'HYHORSPHQW&RUSRUDWLRQLQ7DLZDQ7KHVHUHWLUHGRIÀFHUVDUHDEOHWR lead and offer professional military analysis on defense equipment production,

132 Lee armament supply and maintenance, weapons systems upgrades, and even the research and development of combat weapons. 7KHUHDUHDQXPEHURIEHQHÀWVHPHUJLQJIURPFRRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQWKHPLOLtary and private corporations in Singapore. First, this cooperative relationship can avoid technology development companies becoming annexed into the military system and in so doing creating a major burden for the national defense budget. Second, private companies can participate in joint developments with foreign companies without the inconvenience of having to deal with the government. Third, this relationship helps the Singapore Ministry of Defense to gain access to advanced technologies developed by other countries. These private corporations can indeed serve as the technological leader for the government.

Taiwan’s RMA and the ‘two defense laws’: suggestions for future development The 2002 National Defense Act serves as the basis for the development of national defense in the country; the military administration revolution in Taiwan must therefore comply with the principles of the law. The actions taken within the FRQWH[W RI WKH PLOLWDU\ DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ UHYROXWLRQ ZLOO EH GLVFXVVHG DQG YHULÀHG one by one, together with some suggestions for future development. The authority of the Commander-in-Chief $OWKRXJKWKH1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH$FWFOHDUO\GHÀQHGWKHVWUXFWXUHRIQDWLRQDO defense, including the President as Commander-in-Chief, the National Security Committee, the Executive Yuan, and the MND, the authority and duties of the President and Premier in actual operations are still not clear. This ambiguity can EHFODULÀHGLQWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQWRHQGRZWKH3UHVLGHQWZLWKWKHXOWLPDWHDXWKRULW\ over all matters pertaining to national defense, foreign affairs, and cross-Strait relationships. It is also feasible to state clearly that the decisions made by the National Security Committee should be carried out by the Executive Yuan to DYRLGFRQÁLFWVEHWZHHQWKHVHWZRJRYHUQPHQWRUJDQV Increase the number and decision-making authority of civilian RIÀFHUV &LYLOLDQDXWKRULW\LVWKHÀUVWVWHSLQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIPLOLWDU\QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQ +DYLQJDFLYLOLDQ0LQLVWHURI1DWLRQDO'HIHQVHLVQRWVXIÀFLHQW7KHSULQFLSOHLV to have defense policy and planning made directly by civilians and executed by the military. Although the government is currently proactively recruiting civilian RIÀFHUVWKHQXPEHUVLQYROYHGUHPDLQVPDOODQGWKHLUGXWLHVFHQWHUHGSULQFLSDOO\ on administrative duties. The government should tackle the problems in a number RIZD\VÀUVWWKHJRYHUQPHQWFRXOGHPXODWHWKH86FRPELQHGFLYLOLDQDQGPLOLWDU\ joint training system and gradually increase the ratio of civilian to military staff in the national defense system, including the MND, the Military Headquarters,

Taiwan’s revolution in military affairs 133 and regimental units. Second, the government should raise the acceptance rate IRUPHPEHUVIURPWKH5HVHUYH2IÀFHU7UDLQLQJ&RUSVDQGDVVLVWWKHPLQFDUHHU development. Finally, the government should appoint civilians to non-combat positions or executive duties, such as human resources; administration; military education; strategic planning; and political operations. Expedite the “Consolidation Project” and reduce the length of compulsory services Currently, the MND is planning to cut down the number of military personnel by 85,000 over a ten-year period. The time period for this process is too long and the numbers involved too few. In fact, if we discount the evaluation process IRUWKHÀUVWVWDJHLQWRWKHVFKHGXOHIURPXQWLOHYDOXDWHRQWKHVDPH year), Taiwan should be able to enter the second stage in 2007 and complete the whole project by 2010. With this timetable, completion of the reduction could be achieved in two years and the total number of serving personnel cut down to VXIÀFLHQWIRU7DLZDQ·VGHIHQVH In planning to shorten the terms of compulsory service, the reductions in numEHUVRIPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHOZLOOGHÀQLWHO\DIIHFWWKHFXUUHQWWHUPVRIVHUYLFH7KH 01'LVVFKHGXOHGWRLQWURGXFHQHZWHUPVDIWHUWKHÀUVWVWDJHKDVEHHQFRPSOHWHG However, personnel reductions and plans for alterations to terms of service can be introduced simultaneously, as has been done by the author in his study of “The Size of Military Forces in Taiwan.” In that study, when the number of personnel in the force forces was 340,000, the length of compulsory service was approximately fourteen months. When the forces numbered 300,000 members, the service term was reduced to 11 months; and when the forces were down to 250,000 members, the service term reduced further to around nine months.4 The suggestion here is that the MND should reassess the feasibility of expediting the ‘Consolidation Project’ and plan to shorten the length of compulsory military service immediately. Reducing the number of higher command units should focus on functional integration $OWKRXJKWKH01'LVFXUUHQWO\UHGXFLQJWKHQXPEHURIVWDIILQÀUVWFODVVXQLWV and the headquarters of each of the services, this rationalization should focus on functional integration and the functional rankings of the different units. Functional integration 7KHRSHUDWLRQDOGXWLHVRIWKHRIÀFHVFDPSDLJQURRPDQGMRLQWGHSDUWPHQWVORFDWHG in the Staff Headquarters currently overlap and duplicate each other’s work. The 2IÀFHRIWKH'HSXW\&KLHIRI,QWHOOLJHQFHDQGWKH0LOLWDU\,QWHOOLJHQFH%XUHDX also have overlapping duties in the collection of intelligence and information. &XUUHQWO\ LQ WKH MRLQW ORJLVWLFV RUJDQL]DWLRQWKHUHDUH WKH 2IÀFH RI 5HVRXUFHV

134 Lee WKH 2IÀFH RI WKH 'HSXW\ &KLHI RI 0LOLWDU\ /RJLVWLFV WKH $UPDPHQWV %XUHDX ORJLVWLFRIÀFHVDQGORJLVWLFFRPPDQGLQJRIÀFHVLQWKHKHDGTXDUWHUVRIHDFKRIWKH VHUYLFHVDQGWKHMRLQWORJLVWLFFRPPDQGLQJRIÀFHHDFKSHUIRUPLQJPRUHRUOHVV the same military logistics duties. A joint logistics unit should be adopted under a single-unit administration and FRPPDQGV\VWHP7KHORJLVWLFRIÀFHLQWKHKHDGTXDUWHUVRIHDFKVHUYLFHWRJHWKHU ZLWKWKHORJLVWLFFRPPDQGLQJRIÀFHVKRXOGWKHUHIRUHEHLQWHJUDWHG,QWKHIXWXUH the joint logistics department should only be responsible for supplying general equipment and providing maintenance. Other specialized functions should be provided separately by each of the three services. Although the scope is widened, the execution of logistics support becomes simpler, and there would no longer be QHHGRIDQRIÀFHURI*HQHUDOUDQNEHLQJUHVSRQVLEOH Functional equivalents For those performing similar duties, the arrangement should be based on their functions instead of consistency.5 Furthermore, since the defense provisions for Kinmen and Matsu have changed,6 the MND should coordinate them with the development of joint operations and reduce the levels of command in these remote islands in order to shorten their combat reaction time. For this reason, the command levels of the Kinmen and Matsu regiments should be adjusted downwards. Increase professional military pay, invest in education, and attract quality personnel The third chapter of the 2002 National Defense Act describes the rights and duties of servicemen and women. It clearly states that military personnel should be highly respected. However, the social status of military personnel can be enhanced in two important ways: better pay and enhanced personal qualities. These considerations received least attention in the National Defense Reform discussions, so the following are suggested: Increase the salaries of professional military personnel The nature of the military is very different from that of general public service workers. They have to spend long hours on duty, have potentially to be permanently available, and are more constrained in what they can and cannot do. In peacetime, WKHUHIRUHZKHQWKHHFRQRP\LVÁRXULVKLQJYHU\IHZSHRSOHDUHZLOOLQJWRMRLQWKH forces, especially the élites in society. In acknowledgment of the contribution of military personnel to society, and recognizing their professional knowledge, long hours of training, and mental and physical preparations for combat, the pay of military personnel should be increased gradually by up to 20 percent. Through a higher remuneration, the country would be able to attract higher quality applicants into military service, whilst recognizing the need to reduce overall the armed services’ numbers.

Taiwan’s revolution in military affairs 135 ,QFUHDVHLQYHVWPHQWLQPLOLWDU\HGXFDWLRQDQGJHWPRUHTXDOLÀHGWHDFKHUV Having the best education facilities and teaching staff are the main incentives to attract quality applicants. The MND should increase its investments in military education to a level that should not be less than that of Taiwan’s national universities.7 The military academies should increase the ratio of professorial staff to the same level as regular public universities. The academies should replace unsuitable teachers and invite recognized professors in all relevant subjects to give lectures and conduct seminars with a view to upgrading the quality of basic education in both military and non-military subjects. Increase the admission ratio for ROTC candidates The ROTC was set up originally to attract talented university students into the armed services. However, the admission rate into the military academies for ROTC students in 2003 was around 9 percent, which is low by any standards.8 The ratio of those promoted to the rank of General from the ROTCs is even lower. The ratio of ROTC students should, therefore, be raised to 30 percent after a fair promotion and career development path has been installed. In this way, the military should be able to attract talented young people into the military. 5HTXLUHSURYHQOHYHORITXDOLÀFDWLRQVIRUSHRSOHDSSRLQWHGWRVHQLRUSRVWV &XUUHQWO\SURPRWLRQWR*HQHUDORUVHQLRUUDQNLVPDLQO\EDVHGRQWKHTXDOLÀFDWLRQV gained from the College of the Armed Forces. Although a College of the Armed Forces degree is equivalent to a Master’s degree at regular universities, the nature of the degree is, obviously, very different. To increase the level of knowledge of RIÀFHUVLQVHQLRUSRVLWLRQVWKRVHSURPRWHGWR*HQHUDOUDQNRUWDNLQJXSPDMRU SRVLWLRQVVKRXOGKDYHWKHSURIHVVLRQDOTXDOLÀFDWLRQRIWKH&ROOHJHRIWKH$UPHG Forces or the College Affairs Department and an academic knowledge equivalent to a Master’s degree or a doctorate from a regular university. Reduce the levels of command in joint operations and improve software infrastructure The 2002 National Defense Act clearly states that the Staff Headquarters is in command of the Command Headquarters for joint operations. Its organizational structure and chain of command contains ten major strategic command levels, involving expanded joint intelligence operations, and the acquisition of nonVHUYLFH VSHFLÀF WHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQ V\VWHPV IRU FRPPDQG PDQDJHPHQW DQG intelligence. The Ministry of Defense should, however, eliminate unnecessary levels of commands, draft the basic principles of joint operations, and procure IDFLOLWLHVDQGHTXLSPHQWVWKDWDUHQRWVSHFLÀFWRRQHVLQJOHVHUYLFH7KHUHIRUHZH offer the following suggestions:

136 Lee Reorganize the ten major levels of command The units in Kinmen and Matsu should be relocated to the command centers managed by the National Defense Penghu Headquarters. The Missile Command Center should also be part of the command levels. The Chief of General Staff may directly or simultaneously jointly command a combined military brigade, a Navy VSHFLDOÁHHWDQGDQ$LU)RUFHFRPEDWXQLWZKHQQHFHVVDU\7KHGLYLVLRQDOOHYHO of command should be dissolved. Introduce British and US joint operational principles The MND should send military and civilian staff to the joint operational units of foreign countries to learn about their practices. Alternatively, it should invite members involved in joint combat operations in the US to Taiwan to conduct seminars and classes in the military academies in order to strengthen the basics of joint operations and doctrine. Establish a ‘United Operation Equipment Procurement Committee’ This Committee would evaluate purchasing contracts of all three services. It should be authorized with the power to reject proposals that cannot be proved essential for joint operations. Establish a cross-departmental national defense contract committee Article 22 of the 2002 National Defense Act clearly states the principles of ‘National Defense Self-Determination.’ The MND has also been conducting relevant work by releasing contracts to private corporations and increasing the budget for domestic purchases. At present, however, the National Defense SelfDetermination principles lack a cross-departmental committee to organize and plan matters related to private contracts. The Ministries of National Defense and Economic Affairs and other relevant Departments and organizations should, WKHUHIRUHÀUVWEHLQWHJUDWHGXQGHUWKHGLUHFWLRQRIWKH([HFXWLYH<XDQWRHVWDEOLVK a dedicated organization or department to oversee matters relating to private contracts. This mechanism will enable the government to effectively connect with WKHSULYDWHVHFWRUDQGSURYLGHVXIÀFLHQWLQIRUPDWLRQWRKHOSLQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI a private defense industrial sector. Second, when buying defense equipment from foreign countries that involves competition with local defense manufacturers, the National Defense Private Contract Committee, the Central Institute of Science, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the National Science Committee should also be invited to compete for a reasonable quota on behalf of local industry. The MND could also consult Singapore’s purchase discount policies for its domestic defense industry; that is to say, if the domestic defense industry is capable of producing the items needed and the quality is competitive to that of foreign products, the Singapore Government gives the local companies preference in order to raise the capability of defense manufacturers in furthering the development of the country.

Taiwan’s revolution in military affairs 137 Change the reserve mobilization system and enhance nationwide defense Chapter 5 of the 2002 National Defense Act states that total mobilization requires an Emergency Order from the President. This necessitates a system of nationwide mobilization, resources mobilization, the establishment of civilian emergency defense organizations, and the promotion of public awareness through a process RI QDWLRQDO GHIHQVH HGXFDWLRQ ,Q D VLWXDWLRQ ZKHQ DUPHG FRQÁLFW RFFXUV RYHU the Taiwan Strait, the lead-time before the engagement would be short and there would be no distinguishing between the frontline and the rear. The mobilization of the population, the provision of material resources, and access to equipment and facilities must be ready and to hand almost instantly. The current large-scale mobilization of the population, the availability of only old equipment, and ineffective training will not be able to protect Taiwan in the event of a war over the Taiwan Strait if the system is not adjusted. The numbers in the reserves should be reduced to a size approximately equal to that of the regular forces. The period during which people should be available to serve in the reserves should also be limited to two to three years after discharge. The recall training period, however, should be extended, and old, obsolete equipment be replaced with weapons equivalent to that used by the regular services. With the DERYHLPSURYHPHQWV7DLZDQ·VPRELOL]HGUHVHUYHVZRXOGKDYHVXIÀFLHQWFRPEDW power to assist the regular troops in a defensive war. Although the 2002 National Defense Act urges central and local governments to promote National Defense Education to raise the level of knowledge and awareness of national defense among the general population, very little by way of a practical nature has been done. Currently, the MND publishes a White Paper every two years to explain to the citizens the developmental status of Taiwan’s National Defense. In addition, the Ministry has made its ‘Arming, Building, and Reorganization Report’ available to the public after each defense budget meeting. Besides the above, the military’s interactions with the civilian population is OLPLWHGRQO\WRUHJXODURSHQGD\VZKLFKGRQRWKDYHDVLJQLÀFDQWHIIHFWRQUDLVLQJ the awareness of the citizens about national defense. The MND should therefore raise the level of seniority among central and local JRYHUQPHQWRIÀFLDOVZKRDUHPDQGDWHGWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQH[HUFLVHVLQRUGHUWRUDLVH WKHDZDUHQHVVRIWKHFLWL]HQVDQGVWUHQJWKHQWKHLUFRQÀGHQFHLQ7DLZDQ·VQDWLRQDO defense. Every few years, the MND should also arrange for regular emergency H[HUFLVHV LQ ZKLFK FHQWUDO DQG ORFDO RIÀFLDOV VKRXOG EH LQYLWHG ² UHTXLUHG ² WR participate. This would also help to upgrade the crisis management knowledge DQGDELOLWLHVRISXEOLFRIÀFLDOV Finally, the Ministry of National Defense should publish the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) military developments and report on the PLA’s exercises targeted against Taiwan. This would raise the citizens’ awareness of Taiwan’s enemies and their capabilities. The military should also proactively propose plans for the future development of the national military and invite the general public to observe the regular military exercises. This would increase not only the citizens’ FRQÀGHQFHLQWKHLUDUPHGIRUFHVEXWDOVRWKHLUFRQÀGHQFHLQWKHSURYLVLRQVIRU national defense.

138 Lee

Conclusion The effect of the 2002 National Defense Act on Taiwan’s military administration revolution is as important as that of the Goldwater–Nichols Act on the development of joint operations of the US. The 2002 National Defense Act not only outlines the goals for the development of National Defense;9 it is even more important for the consistency of the direction in building the ROC’s national military forces. From the ten-year plan drafted for the military administration revolution, the legal basis DQGJRDOVRIHDFKRIWKHSODQVFDQFOHDUO\EHLGHQWLÀHG Although there is still much to be done by way of improvements and many problems have yet to be solved in the actual process of implementation, overall, the quality of the national defense infrastructure, military force development, equipment improvement, combat doctrine, and human resources has notably been upgraded. The combat forces will be even more enhanced if their joint operational abilities are further strengthened, an effective missile defense system is installed, and counterattack weapons are developed. As Taiwan is facing the continuously expanding military forces of mainland China and its assertion never to renounce an armed invasion of the island, all that LWFDQGRLVWRÀQGWKHPHDQVZLWKZKLFKWRPDLQWDLQDUHODWLYHPLOLWDU\DGYDQWDJH This can only be achieved through more a proactive, rapid reaction, and organized military administration revolution. Equipped with this reform, Taiwan might be able to deter the military threat from China and secure the safety of the Taiwan Strait.

Notes 1 The MND is going to make a reduction of 45,000 people from 2004 to 2005, and another 40,000 people from 2008 to 2011. The establishment goal of the armed force is to have 300,000 people.   01' ´5HSXEOLF RI &KLQD·V ÀYH \HDUV PLOLWDU\ HVWDEOLVKPHQW DQG JRYHUQLQJ SODQ report,” Taipei: MND, 8 October 2003, p. 11. 3 An Admiral is in charge of the 62nd Special Detachment and a Vice Admiral is in charge of the 63rd Special Detachment. Depending on their tasks, they supervise several detachments and take military action. 4 Democratic Progress Party, The Size of Military Forces in Taiwan, Taipei: DPP, March 2003, pp. 36–9.   ,I ZH WDNH WKH 86 0LOLWDU\ -RLQW 6WDII DV DQ H[DPSOH ZH FDQ ÀQG WKDW WKH\ JUDGH position by the appanage of its function. The important or commanding positions are upgraded to Major General (Two Stars, Taiwan’s Lieutenant General); other administrative positions were downgraded to Colonel. Therefore, there are different JUDGHVRIFRPPDQGRIÀFHUVLQWKH-RLQW6WDII+RZHYHULWLVTXLWHDGLIIHUHQWVLWXDWLRQ in Taiwan. Most of the command positions in the MND are at Lieutenant General. The MND should also grade one’s position by the appanage of its function, not by personal arrangement considerations. 6 In the conduct of the strategy of ‘effective deterrence, resolute defense,’ the goal of the armed forces in the Kinmen and Matsu areas (about 20,000 people) is now transformed from one of counterattack to self-defense. Because the threats from PLA are not directly against Taiwan, the focus of the defense effort in the Kinmen and Matsu areas ought to be adjusted to ones of early warning time and disrupting PLA

Taiwan’s revolution in military affairs 139 forces from assembling. It will be enough to deploy one brigade each on Kinmen and Matsu. In addition, these brigades should be equipped with enhanced surveillance systems, reconnaissance systems, and long-range artillery. 7 The national schools with the highest funding from the Ministry of Education are Taiwan University (NT$4.58 billion), Cheng Kung University (NT$2.46 billion), and Chengchi University (NT$1.78 billion). In 2004, military education investment has only NT$2,953,522,000. 8 In 2003, the military academies had 1,834 newly registered students. The ROTC had signed only 166 new contracts. 9 The MND thinks the reform of Taiwan’s defense should be gradual, not radical. This is why they use the phrase, “ Reform in Military Affairs.”

3DUW,9

The role of the US in Taiwan’s defense reform

9

The role of the United States in Taiwan’s defense reforms Michael Pillsbury1

7KH SXUSRVH RI WKLV FKDSWHU ZKLFK LV D SHUVRQDO QRW DQ RIÀFLDO RSLQLRQ LV WR describe the US’s role in Taiwan’s defense reform. It uses the public testimony RI VHQLRU 86 RIÀFLDOV IRU LOOXVWUDWLYH SXUSRVHV 7KH FKDSWHU LV ZULWWHQ IURP DQ historical perspective and to ascertain what has happened so far. It is an important story.

“President Chen understands this danger” First, the context: American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Director Doug Paal put it very well in a speech when he said, “the Taiwan Strait remains one of the ZRUOG·VPRVWGDQJHURXVÁDVKSRLQWVDQGSUHYHQWLQJFRQÁLFWWKHUHUHPDLQVDYLWDO US national security concern.”2 In the same speech, the AIT Director provided the context when he said, “President Chen Shui-bian has demonstrated that he understands this danger, and we salute his recent initiative to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities.” The remarkable progress Taiwan has made in defense UHIRUPLVZRUWK\RI86SUDLVHDQGKDVEHHQDFKLHYHGLQHLJKWVSHFLÀFDUHDV,Q AIT Director Paal’s strong words, America is “hopeful that China will not slide back to a stance of confrontation. But until Beijing abandons its authoritarian political structure and forswears the use of force in the Taiwan Strait, it would be irresponsible for either Taipei or Washington to let down our guard.”

A chronology of the Unites States’ role ,WPLJKWEHPRVWKHOSIXOÀUVWWRSURYLGHDVSHFLÀFOLVWRIZKDWWKH86·VUROHKDV EHHQVLQFHIRUWZRUHDVRQVÀUVWWKHUHQHYHUKDVEHHQVXFKDOLVWEHIRUHDQG a scholarly debate and discussion of Taiwan defense reform ought to start with a few basic facts before reaching issues of interpretation; second, the chronology may come as a surprise because the story begins when the seeds of defense reform were planted during the administrations of President Clinton and of Lee Tenghui, the Democrats and the KMT. Republican President George W. Bush and Chen Shui-bian have taken the question of reform much further and made more remarkable progress, but they had a solid foundation upon which to build. The chronology may be all the more surprising because the views of some US China experts, who still oppose a US role in Taiwan’s defense reform, have been rejected repeatedly, but their opposition continues.

144 Pillsbury 7KHÀUVWVWHSWKH0RQWHUH\7DONV 7KHÀUVWEUHDNWKURXJKZDVDGHFLVLRQIRU86RIÀFLDOVDQG7DLZDQ·VPLOLWDU\DQG civil leadership to meet in Monterey, California, in December 1997 for strategy discussions, but to avoid discussing arms sales. “Software, not hardware” was the slogan. There have now been nine rounds of these Monterey Talks. Participants on both sides have said that remarkable progress was made in mutual understanding and that defense reform was an important subject. Just as Doug Paal said that he saluted President Chen Shui-bian’s initiatives to enhance defense, also to be recognized and saluted are the roles of Kurt Campbell, Randy Shriver (later Deputy $VVLVWDQW6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH DQGHVSHFLDOO\0DUN6WRNHVLQWDNLQJWKLVÀUVWYLWDO step. On the Taiwan side, Lieutenant General Herman Schwai, Generals Fu Tai[LQJ DQG /LX ;LDQJELQ D \RXQJ VWDII RIÀFHU QDPHG<X +VLDRSLQ ´<X·VWHUµ  DQGVHYHUDOFLYLOLDQVPDGHVLJQLÀFDQWHIIRUWV5DQG\6KULYHUDQG0DUN6WRNHV head of the Pentagon’s China desk, have continued to play the key roles in the US effort to support Taiwan’s efforts at defense reform. 7KHVHFRQGVWHSWKHWDONVRQWKHVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJSURFHVV In 1998, the second major step was the quiet visit paid by a special DOD delegation to Taiwan headed by the acting (now permanent) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy. General Tang Fei invited this DOD team to present to a JURXSRIPRUHWKDQVHYHQW\7DLZDQPLOLWDU\RIÀFHUVNH\86FRQFHSWVRIWKHUROH of civilians in developing military plans and the process of developing a national military strategy. Concepts of Net Assessment (Integrated Threat Assessment) and strategic planning were discussed in detail. It was apparent from the personal sponsorship of General Tang Fei that Taiwan would one day set up the equivalent RIWKHVHWZRRIÀFHV%\ERWKZHUHLQH[LVWHQFHDQGERWKSOD\DQLPSRUWDQW SDUWLQ7DLZDQ·VGHIHQVHUHIRUP6RPH7DLZDQHVHRIÀFHUVQRZHYHQVD\WKDWWKHVH WZRQHZRIÀFHVDUHWRRVPDOODQGQHHGWREHH[SDQGHGVRWKDWWKHSODQQLQJSURFHVV will move faster. That is a long way in a few years. 7KHWKLUGVWHSWKHVXUYH\WHDPV In 1999, the third major step came after a shift in US thinking about how to obtain information about Taiwan’s defense priorities. A simple, but brilliant, idea was to VHQG86PLOLWDU\¶RSHUDWRUV·WRWDONWR7DLZDQ·V¶RSHUDWRUV·LQWKHÀHOGDQGDWEDVHV free of policy constraints or prejudices about Taiwan’s capabilities, to master new systems. These US military teams began in 1999 and focused on Taiwan’s three NH\ZDUÀJKWLQJDUHDVDLUGHIHQVHDQWLVXEPDULQHRSHUDWLRQVDQGFRXQWHUODQGLQJ operations. Eventually, more than a dozen highly sophisticated DOD military survey and assessment teams were dispatched to assess Taiwan’s weaknesses and military needs in all relevant sectors. They left their recommendations with the Taiwan military authorities as well. Over time, nearly 300 such recommendations accumulated, which Taiwan began to address as a part of the reform process. 3ULRU WR WKLV LQLWLDWLYH WR VHQG VR PDQ\ ÀUVWWLPH PLOLWDU\ VXUYH\ WHDPV WR

The role of the United States in Taiwan’s defense reforms

145

Taiwan, it is a little mysterious how decisions to deny or delay weapons sales had been made since the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. In spite of that Act, which requires the maintenance of Taiwan’s self-defense capability, it was well known that many, perhaps even the majority, of Taiwan’s requests to purchase expensive US weapons had been denied, in some cases for many years, and without explanation either to Taiwan or to the US Congress. For example, the sale RI)VWKDWÀQDOO\RFFXUUHGLQZDVSXWLQWRHIIHFWRQO\DIWHUDGHFDGHRI urgent requests from Taiwan, without a single US survey team visiting the island. Similarly, diesel submarines had been called “offensive” and denied for a decade until after the visit of an expert survey team in 2000. The subsequent approval of submarines was made in 2001. Taiwan’s request for Apache attack helicopters KDGEHHQVHHQDVQRWRQO\XQQHFHVVDU\EXWDOVR´RIIHQVLYHµWKLVÀQGLQJZDVDOVR reversed after a survey team visit. It is important to recognize that these more WKDQDGR]HQWHDPVRI86PLOLWDU\RIÀFHUVPHWH[WHQVLYHO\ZLWK7DLZDQPLOLWDU\ RIÀFHUVDWWKHLUEDVHVDQGXQLWVWKH\FRQGXFWHGUHDODQGH[WHQVLYHVXUYH\VUDWKHU than hold conference room seminars or engage in abstract policy discussions. Both sides said that this had not been done before; Taiwan they said had been too isolated. There was still a limit, of course, in that no admirals or generals ever came with these teams. Some US China experts claimed that the rank of general RIÀFHUVPLJKWKDYHRIIHQGHG&KLQD(YHQWXDOO\WKLVVHQLRULW\OLPLWZLOOKDYHWR be crossed as well. 6\QHUJ\EHWZHHQWKHÀUVWWKUHHVWHSV There was a synergy among these three steps. All three required much closer and more frequent consultations between the US military and the Taiwanese military of a type that some US China experts had argued should be ruled out of bounds by the terms of the normalization of relations between the US and the PRC in 1979. This view was rejected. The increased consultation between Taiwan’s forces and WHDPVRI86RSHUDWLRQDORIÀFHUVHQGHGWKHPRQRSRO\RQFRQWDFWVZLWK7DLZDQ·V military being infrequent and managed solely by security assistance authorities DQGUHWLUHGRIÀFHUVDVVLJQHGWRWKH$PHULFDQ,QVWLWXWHLQ7DLZDQ $IWHUWKHHIIHFWRIWKHVHDVVHVVPHQWDQGVXUYH\WHDPVZDVPDJQLÀHGE\ the annual Monterey Talks, which began to include as many as twenty substantive experts on each side and tended to last several days. At the same time, after 1999, the continuing US defense dialogue over the issues of strategic planning and integrated threat assessment was enhanced, based on the foundation laid in 'HFHPEHUE\$QG\+RHKQDQGKLVWHDP([SHUWVDIÀOLDWHGZLWKWKH'2' 2IÀFHRI1HW$VVHVVPHQWDOVREHJDQWRYLVLWLQDQGWRHQFRXUDJH7DLZDQWR develop such an analytic capability. 7KHVHÀUVWWKUHHLQLWLDWLYHVPD\VRXQGLQUHWURVSHFWOLNHFRPPRQVHQVHEXW many at the time opposed them. It is important to note that these DOD initiatives in 1997–8 were undertaken in spite of the calls from many US China experts for a multi-year moratorium, or at least a pause, on major arms sales, and the imposition of a clear number of limits on too frequent contacts with the Taiwan military.

146 Pillsbury This recommendation was clearly rejected; the view was seen as silly that such contacts would somehow restore the Mutual Security Treaty with Taiwan, from which the US had withdrawn in 1979. Too little, too late? 6RPHFULWLFVVDLGWKHVHÀUVWWKUHHVWHSVZHUHWRROLWWOHWRRODWH7KH3/$PLVVLOH build-up, which began slowly in the early 1990s, accelerated after 2000. The PLVVLOH ÀULQJV LQ  WKDW EUDFNHWHG 7DLZDQ ZKLFK 86 6HFUHWDU\ RI 'HIHQVH Perry called “reckless,” were followed by large PLA exercises in later years. The US Congress not only passed a resolution calling for a missile defense system to be sold to Taiwan, but also began to demand that the US DOD made public, annually, any increase in China’s threat toward Taiwan. There had never been such a Congressional reporting requirement before. The subsequent DOD reports to Congress suggested that the balance was shifting against Taiwan and even listed weaknesses in Taiwan’s defenses. 7KHIRXUWKVWHSUHIRUPLQJWKHDUPVVDOHVSURFHVVUDLVLQJFLYLOLDQ control In April 2001, the US took a fourth major step in its role of supporting defense reform in Taiwan. It announced that arms sales would be discussed not just for one day a year, but on a rolling basis, as needed. At the same time, the US decided to approve most major weapons systems that Taiwan had requested in prior years in a single, dramatic batch. In a related development, Deputy Secretary of 'HIHQVH3DXO:ROIRZLW]ÁHZWR)ORULGDWRPHHWSULYDWHO\ZLWK'HIHQVH0LQLVWHU Tang Yiou-ming at a conference organized by the US–Taiwan Business Council. Again, Mark Stokes and other experts attended and the media were informed that civilian control of the military would be a major subject the US side would be discussing. 7KHÀIWKVWHSUHFRPPHQGLQJGHIHQVHSULRULWLHV²&4ISR and missile defense *UDGXDOO\LQDÀIWKVWHSEHFDPHDSSDUHQW7KH86SXEOLFO\UHFRPPHQGHG that Taiwan focus on certain key priorities in its defense spending. These priorities ZHUHVSHFLÀFVRPHWKLQJWKDWKDGQHYHUKDSSHQHGEHIRUHDVIRUH[DPSOHRYHUWKH FRQWURYHUV\FRQFHUQLQJWKHPLVVLOHGHIHQVHRI7DLZDQ6HYHUDOVHQLRU86RIÀFLDOV between 1995 and 1998 had been overtly skeptical. Eventually, the US DOD RIÀFLDOV SXEOLFO\ XUJHG WKDW LQYHVWPHQW LQ D EDVLF PLVVLOH GHIHQVH DUFKLWHFWXUH should become a defense priority for Taiwan. A second example of the US publicly and directly urging a new priority for Taiwan’s military occurred in the January 2003 speech by the senior DOD manager for Asia. He recommended a new command and control system to enhance the “jointery” among all Taiwan’s forces. This project has not yet actually been

The role of the United States in Taiwan’s defense reforms

147

LPSOHPHQWHGEXWLWLVFOHDUIURPVHYHUDOSXEOLFVSHHFKHVE\'2'RIÀFLDOVWKDW there is no higher priority. They criticized the fact that Taiwan had been progressing far too slowly in command and control and protection of these assets from missile attack. This US recommendation is not just common sense; everyone knows forces should have good command and control. But there is another factor involved, ZKLFKZDVFODULÀHGD\HDUODWHUZKHQDVHQLRU'2'RIÀFLDOWHVWLÀHGSXEOLFO\WKDW Taiwan’s own interoperability among its forces in command and control would EULQJDPDMRUQHZEHQHÀW²WKHDELOLW\RI7DLZDQWREHJLQWRFRRSHUDWHZLWKWKH US forces and other potential security partners, if necessary, in wartime. Once again, the advice of some US China experts had been rejected who had wrongly invented a false straw man, crying wolf that interoperability would somehow be equivalent to restoring the Mutual Security Treaty with Taiwan and deeply offend Beijing. The DOD’s public testimony of February 6, 2004, stated clearly that “We also suggest that Taiwan enhance interoperability among its Services, and with the US and other potential security partners.” The sixth step – praising Taiwan’s progress in eight areas There is a sixth step that began to be taken in early 2004. This was to praise Taiwan, rather lavishly, for the remarkable progress that it has made in the years since 1997 and, especially, since the implementation began after the new defense laws had been passed in 2000. This praise for Taiwan’s progress has also been RIIHUHGE\6WDWH'HSDUWPHQWRIÀFLDOVDQGE\$,7LQSXEOLFVSHHFKHV2EYLRXVO\ E\DQGLQVHQLRURIÀFLDOVKDGWDNHQVWRFNRI7DLZDQ·VSURJUHVVDQG UHDOL]HGWKDWZKDWWRRNWKH86ÀIW\\HDUV²WKH$FWWKDWVHWXSD'HIHQVH Department and a National Security Council – had been accomplished in Taiwan in the short time of only three years. Taiwan is scheduled to implement on time its Law requiring one-third of the newly empowered Ministry of National Defense to be civilians. From 2004, the NSC and the MND of Taiwan are at work to produce WKHÀUVWSXEOLFQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\VWUDWHJ\GRFXPHQW 7KH SUDLVH ZDV VSHFLÀF LW ZDV QRW PHUHO\ D PDWWHU RI PHUH SROLWHQHVV )RU H[DPSOH D VHQLRU '2' RIÀFLDO ZKHQ WHVWLI\LQJ LQ SXEOLF WR WKH 86 &KLQD &RPPLVVLRQ RQ  )HEUXDU\  OLVWHG HLJKW VSHFLÀF H[DPSOHV RI 7DLZDQ·V remarkable progress. These were: 1

2  4 5

Taiwan is developing an integrated national security strategy; joint doctrine; and integrated capabilities for training, employing, and sustaining joint forces. Taiwan has succeeded in focusing attention on critical steps that must be WDNHQLQRUGHUWRHQKDQFH7DLZDQ·VGHIHQVHLQWKHQH[WWKUHHWRÀYH\HDUV )RUWKHÀUVWWLPHLQWHQ\HDUV7DLZDQKDVLQFUHDVHGLWVGHIHQVHEXGJHWDVD proportion of its gross domestic product. Taiwan has taken positive steps to modernize its C4ISR system. It is undercutting the political and military utility of the PRC’s most effec-

148 Pillsbury

6 7 8

tive means of coercion – its growing arsenal of increasingly accurate and lethal conventional ballistic missiles and ever more capable submarine force, thereby investing in passive defense systems. Taiwan has streamlined its military force. Taiwan has addressed pilot shortages. Taiwan has drafted and implemented a detailed plan for the recruitment and retention of civilian personnel.

So, these are the six steps. Obviously, that is not necessarily the whole story of the US role in Taiwan’s defense reforms. Additional steps may well have been taken that should remain to be discussed at a future date. Both sides have told the media that the details of US–Taiwan cooperation must not be publicly disclosed.

Six reasons for the US role in Taiwan’s defense reform There are six points about why the US has played this role in defense reform in Taiwan. All six points are drawn from public testimony given by the DOD in 2004. 1

2

3

4

The PRC’s ambitious military modernization casts a cloud over Beijing’s declared preference for resolving differences with Taiwan through peaceful means. Taiwan faces an increasingly powerful PRC with an accelerated military modernization program aimed at improving its force options versus Taiwan, and deterring or countering US military intervention. As the PRC rapidly modernizes its military in order to provide its leadership with credible options for the use of force, Taiwan’s relative military strength will deterioUDWHXQOHVVLWPDNHVVLJQLÀFDQWLQYHVWPHQWVLQWRLWVGHIHQVH As the PRC accelerates its force modernization program, Taiwan remains isolated in the international community, especially in the area of security cooperation. Although several states quietly collaborate with Taipei on security matters, the US stands alone in its political courage, strategic imperative, and sense of moral responsibility in assisting the security of Taiwan’s democracy. Taiwan’s defense establishment faces a wide array of other challenges as it attempts to keep pace with developments across the Taiwan Strait. Opinion polls consistently indicate a lack of popular concern about attack from China, so Taiwan is faced with an increasingly constrained defense budget. Over the last ten years, Taiwan’s defense budget has shrunk in real terms and as a proportion of its gross domestic product (GDP). Taiwan’s challenges are serious, but not insurmountable. The US defense relationship with Taiwan seeks to reverse negative trends in the island’s ability to defend itself, possibly obviating the need for massive US intervention in a crisis and allowing Taiwan’s political leaders to determine the island’s future from a position of strength.

The role of the United States in Taiwan’s defense reforms 5 6

149

If deterrence fails, Taiwan, supported by the US and its allies, must be prepared to swiftly defeat the PRC’s use of force. The PLA’s growing sophistication, including its efforts to complicate US intervention, calls for more consistent strategic harmonization between the US and Taiwan to improve Taiwan’s ability to defend itself and reduce the danger to US forces, should intervention become necessary.

Notes 1 This chapter was reviewed for security and cleared for public release by the US Defense Department on February 26, 2004. 2 Posted at www.ait.org, September 30, 2003.

10 Arming Taiwan for the future Prospects and problems Eric A. McVadon

,QWURGXFWLRQ Taiwan’s leaders, civilian and military, have in the past been accused of procuring weapon systems in the absence of a broad security strategy. It has been pointed out that such a strategy could better guide acquisition decisions, become a means for measuring progress, and serve as a sound basis for answering dissenting voices. Taiwan has initiated defense reforms1 and instituted means to formulate overall security and military strategy and policies.2 These are not easy or simple steps for Taiwan, and making the decisions on weapon systems and related items to conform to the strategy will also not be easy. The prudent arming of Taiwan for the future extends beyond the development of strategy and policy; it also depends on overcoming truly vexing problems, dilemmas, and obstacles. This chapter H[DPLQHVWKHRYHUDUFKLQJGLIÀFXOWLHVRIWKHSURFHVVDQGWKHQH[SORUHVVSHFLÀF warfare areas as a means to illustrate how Taiwan might better deal with its uniquely complex process of making security and defense acquisition decisions.

A unique environment for security decision-making The process of structuring and arming Taiwan’s military forces is exceedingly challenging because of an array of complexities and uncertainties about the threat, US support, and domestic factors including the economy. Some observers in the US seem to think the process is (or should be) straightforward, with essentially self-evident goals.3 In this author’s view, those critics are as wrong as those advocates in Taiwan who have in the past thought that the next acquisition of a major weapon system would be the ‘silver bullet’ to do the trick and make Taiwan VHFXUH7RSXWDÀQHUSRLQWRQWKLVPDNLQJ7DLZDQDVVHFXUHDVSRVVLEOHLVQRWD process that simply awaits better analysis or insight to eliminate the complexity and uncertainty – as some seem to think or hope. Instead, the uniquely complex and challenging nature of the process is a characteristic that Taiwan’s strategists are likely to have to cope with for the foreseeable future. Taiwan does not have a reasonable prospect of resolving these problems in the near future, but rather must live with them in the best way feasible. Although, taken broadly, this array of complexity and uncertainty is a long-standing major problem familiar to many, it warrants examination here because it, in large measure, shapes the context for arming Taiwan for the future.

Arming Taiwan for the future 151

The mix of certainty and uncertainty Taipei faces a daunting combination of mostly troubling certainty and unquestionably worrisome uncertainty WKDW ZRXOG EH GLIÀFXOW WR PDQDJH IRU a much more populous and geographically extensive country – even one with an existing large and fully modern, well-equipped military. There is, to begin with, the distasteful and enduring certainty that the PRC poses a formidable threat to Taiwan.4 There is, however, uncertainty as to the political and military circumstances that might bring about the actual employment of that military force by Beijing – in the form of a ‘shooting war,’ not just intimidation. As unpleasant as this reality may be, Taiwan, it seems, must work to reduce the risk rather than WKHPRUHGHVLUDEOHUHFRXUVHRIÀQGLQJDZD\WRGRDZD\ZLWKLW5 Taipei can only hope that the threat will be eliminated; it cannot, however, base a strategy on hope. Beijing attempts to appear resolute, to present an unwavering position on Taiwan,6 but the reality of this is far less certain. China’s leaders confront major domestic and economic issues that make the prospect of dealing with a rising crisis over Taiwan unappealing. Moreover, on the one hand, there has been acknowledgment in the Chinese leadership, albeit mostly private, that China and its all-important national economic growth could be severely damaged as a consequence of an attack on Taiwan – that China would be badly hurt. On the other KDQGWKHUHLVWKHMXVWLÀDEOHIHDUWKDWWKHHPHUJHQFHRIPDMRUGRPHVWLFSUREOHPV and consequent impending chaos on the mainland could cause Chinese leaders to use a military response to a real or contrived Taiwan crisis to rally nationalistic support behind the Chinese Communist Party. Stated succinctly, we do not know what China’s leaders may do and neither do China’s leaders. For Taiwan, that cuts ERWKZD\VDORRPLQJWKUHDWEXWWKHUHDOSURVSHFWRIDYRLGLQJFRQÁLFW²LIKDQGOHG skillfully. So, as described, the uncertainty surrounding all this is compounded by the LQÁXHQFH WKDW 7DLZDQ·V DFWLRQV PD\ KDYH ² IDYRUDEO\ DQG XQIDYRUDEO\ ² RQ %HLMLQJ,QRQHZD\RIYLHZLQJWKLVFRQYROXWHGPDWWHUWKHUHLVDQDLURIDUWLÀFLDOLW\WR7DLZDQ·VGLOLJHQWO\SUHSDULQJIRUDFRQÁLFWWKDWQHLWKHUSDUW\ZDQWVWRRFFXU and where many factors, other than military readiness, can serve to avoid military FRQÁLFW 2U YLHZHG REYHUVHO\ D 7DLZDQ IRUPXOD IRU SUHVHUYLQJ SHDFH WKDW LV primarily composed of indigenous military components would almost certainly SURYH WR EH LQRUGLQDWHO\ H[SHQVLYH GLIÀFXOW WR DFKLHYH DQG PDLQWDLQ DQG SRVsibly counterproductive. In sum, an absorption in Taiwan with self-reliant military means to counter the threat, no matter how ardently pursued, is almost certainly doomed to fall short, or even be detrimental.7 Possibly the salient lesson in this for the arming of Taiwan is a recognition that neither the next study group formed nor some future report by a strategic planning body will eliminate the uncertainties. Indeed, it is a major step forward to recognize that Taiwan’s decisions must be made in the absence of a desired greater degree of certainty. Uncertainty in this environment is unavoidable and yet cannot be permitted to halt the decision-making process. Recognition of this state of affairs can be helpful in avoiding the policy and planning paralysis that pervasive

152 McVadon uncertainty might otherwise bring about. Such recognition may not make the job of decision-making any easier, but it can make a workable process possible. Having argued that the process must proceed despite prevailing uncertainty, it is appropriate to examine those uncertainties a bit further. There is one especially unpleasant central certainty: a relatively small Taiwan almost certainly cannot cope with the much larger China with respect to military strength; and the relative disadvantage seems certain to increase with the passage of time. The mainland has the people, the growing economy, the technological advances, and the general wherewithal to prevail, whether quickly or eventually, in a bilateral military conÁLFW,WLVDOVRFHUWDLQWKDW7DLZDQKDVWKHVXSSRUWRIWKHZRUOG·VRQO\VXSHUSRZHU Equally important is that Taiwan must have US support to deter China, to defend DJDLQVWD&KLQHVHDWWDFNRUWRGHIHDW&KLQD²GHSHQGLQJRQKRZVRPH¶ÀQDOFULVLV· PLJKWGHYHORS+RZHYHU%HLMLQJZLOOIRUDQ\LPSHQGLQJFRQÁLFWFORXGWKHSLFture and attempt to make far less certain just how effectively the US can and will react. Beijing also has the added advantage that it is likely to control the timing of VXFKDQLPSHQGLQJFRQÁLFW

&RSLQJZLWK%HLMLQJ·VHIIRUWVWRLQÁXHQFH:DVKLQJWRQ Chinese leaders will almost certainly try in several ways to complicate Washington’s decision-making. Beijing, for example, would probably attempt to make it appear that Taiwan has acted to destabilize the situation. In this regard, China, as it has done in the past, would most likely point to actions by Taiwan as examples of conduct contrary to statements made, agreements reached, and positions taken previously by Washington and Taipei. Thus, these statements, agreements, and positions used as leverage by Beijing become more than just historical factors in decisions made by the US and Taiwan in managing the triangle of relationships and the arming of Taiwan’s armed forces. Beijing will take full advantage of any opportunity to drive a wedge between the American public and that of Taiwan, and between the governments in Taipei and Washington. Focusing on the record of arms transfers and procurement decisions between the US and Taiwan as an example, it is clear that Beijing’s interpretations of these documents and declarations will not necessarily affect American decisions. 6SHFLÀFDOO\ %HLMLQJ·V REMHFWLRQV KDYH QRW LQ WKH SDVW VWRSSHG :DVKLQJWRQ·V offering, and Taiwan’s accepting, the various systems in question. It is also clear, nevertheless, that both Washington and Beijing should take into account the range of reactions that might emanate from Beijing. For example, Beijing has not, so far, overreacted to the Bush administration’s stunning April 2001 package of potential arms sales to Taiwan. But this action early in the Bush administration would probably not have been accepted by Beijing so benignly had the US and the PRC governments not dramatically (and surprisingly) improved their bilateral relations from 2001 to the present. The lesson here is that, if Washington and Taipei want to avoid untoward reaction by Beijing to such actions, Beijing’s likely reaction has to be both understood and neutralized or countered. Washington does not give Beijing a veto on matters concerning Taiwan, but Beijing will aggressively

Arming Taiwan for the future 153 and obnoxiously seek every opportunity to push its interests. Taipei need not and should not exacerbate that predictable tendency. To the degree that Taipei ignores or dismisses Beijing’s likely reaction on controversial matters, it can expect that Beijing will attempt to use such actions to assert that Taipei is acting irresponsibly. Beijing will contend that Taipei is not the victim of Chinese heavy-handed actions but rather the perpetrator of the incident. As Taiwan makes its decisions about arming its forces for the future, it must take into account that Beijing will relentlessly try to confuse the situation by portraying to Washington that American and Taiwanese leaders are violating past commitments. Moreover, in a crisis, Beijing will zealously seek ways to suggest to the world that it was left without recourse in the face of some action or acquisition by Taiwan. A particularly onerous aspect of this wholly predictable course of action by Beijing is the potential for undermining a decision by Washington to support Taiwan promptly and effectively in a military crisis. Put succinctly, Taiwan’s security strategy, arms acquisitions, and actions related to an impending crisis need to foster and facilitate the essential US support and intervention (in whatever form may be appropriate), rather than giving Beijing leverage to confuse the issue and possibly discourage or delay American action. In the eyes of many in Taiwan, this may be seen as a highly undesirable state of affairs – having to take into account Beijing’s effect on Washington. However, assuring US support is essential to Taiwan’s security and clearly warrants the swallowing of this unpleasant bit of reality.8

Trying to give Washington pause China’s actions to complicate a prompt decision by Washington will go beyond blaming Taiwan for the crisis. The PLA’s modernization, especially that of the 3/$1DY\LVSRLQWHGDWFDXVLQJ:DVKLQJWRQDQG86KHDGTXDUWHUVLQWKH3DFLÀF to hesitate or delay in making a decision to dispatch forces to the region of Taiwan in a time of tension that could lead to hostilities.9 China’s large and diverse submarine force10 seems intended to saturate the undersea warfare environment and overwhelm reportedly dropping US anti-submarine assets. Very potent and elusive anti-ship cruise missiles, both already acquired and being sought from 5XVVLDVHHPLQWHQGHGDVDQWLFDUULHUZHDSRQV\VWHPVZLWKWKHVSHFLÀFSXUSRVH of complicating decisions to deploy aircraft-carrier battle groups and their support ships.11 The PLA is also working hard to be able to detect and track US naval forces at extended ranges and eventually to put them under attack, conceivably with ballistic missiles with improved accuracy and novel warheads. The PLA has focused on a strategy and weapon systems to complicate and conceivably delay or deny US access to the region. One might, after this examination of the perplexing security environment, despair of being able to do something that really matters and that is not likely to MHRSDUGL]HUDWKHUWKDQEHQHÀW7DLZDQ·VVHFXULW\5DWKHUWKDQGHVSDLURQHPLJKW look for the opportunities and implications that may not be immediately evident in

154 McVadon this rather grim picture. The implications for arming Taiwan for the future might, MXVWIRUH[DPSOHEHVHHQDVWZRIROGÀUVW7DLZDQFRXOGJLYHFDUHIXOFRQVLGHUDWLRQ to tailoring its forces to help counter the Chinese anti-access delaying strategy aimed at US forces; and second, it should be prepared to hold out by itself in the event of a delay in the arrival of US support because of some degree of success for the expected Chinese actions. (It must be emphasized that the assumptions and arguments that have led to stating these implications as possible imperatives for Taiwan security policy are intended to be illustrative of a process Taiwan might employ to cope with the many uncertainties it faces. They are not the answers, EXW UDWKHU D SRVLWLYH DSSURDFK WR GHDOLQJ ZLWK DQ H[FHHGLQJO\ GLIÀFXOW VHFXULW\ situation.) 7RVXPPDUL]HWKLVLOOXVWUDWLRQWKHÀUVWVWUDWHJLFSRLQWWREHPDGHLVWKDWOHDGers in Taipei can, indeed, be instrumental in dealing more effectively with the virtual certainty that Taiwan cannot handle the PRC threat without US support. 7DLZDQFDQFKRRVHWKHFUHDWLYHRSWLRQWRKHOSWKH86JHWWRWKHÀJKWSURPSWO\DQG effectively. Arguably, the most critical uncertainty likely to arise is the degree of US readiness and decisiveness to come thoroughly to the support of Taiwan in a given time of crisis. A close second among the uncertainties is what the PLA can do to deter and delay a US decision to intervene effectively. If these illustrative assumptions are accepted by Taiwan’s leaders, then the overall strategy should include an important role for a doctrine and appropriately equipped forces that both improve the prospects for a US intervention and reduce the appeal to the PRC of attempting to deny access to the US forces. Taiwan’s leaders may, in examining this matter, not agree with the prudence of being a part of an antiaccess strategy. Nevertheless, using this approach, they will have examined the basis for considering such a move and the repercussions of not doing so. As will be stated many times in various ways in this chapter, that there are no right and wrong answers in this complex situation, but there should be a sound, defensible method to approach the making of decisions. The second point in this illustration of dealing effectively with the unique combination of certainty and uncertainty is that Taiwan must, through the appropriate combination of military and civil readiness and cautious actions, be able, temporarily standing alone, to achieve an appropriate degree of security – one not GHULYHGVROHO\IURPPLOLWDU\SURZHVV7DLSHLFDQQRWEHDEVROXWHO\FRQÀGHQWRIDQ early or effective American intervention, regardless of how important that may be in absolute terms or what words of assurance have been spoken. Beijing may turn out to be sly enough, or effective enough, to cause Washington to delay decisions and the movement and employment of forces. Washington could be distracted or divided. Indeed, a decision by Washington to delay so as to avoid major losses or risks may be a very prudent course of action, one destined in the long run to be most effective to support Taiwan. But, in the interim, Taiwan must support its own cause by the most suitable means available. So, if Taiwan’s leaders accept this premise, Taiwan must have the guile and means to hold out for a reasonable period (probably a matter of weeks at most) while awaiting effective aid. Another aspect – and arguably an equally important

Arming Taiwan for the future 155 aspect – of this effort is that, to deter an attack by China, Beijing should be conYLQFHGLQDGYDQFHWKDW7DLZDQFDQKROGRXWIRUDVXIÀFLHQWSHULRGWRDZDLWGHOD\HG US aid and that, consequently, attempts by Beijing to bring about Taiwan’s prompt capitulation are doomed to fail. This is a very different strategy from Taiwan’s KROGLQJRXWLQGHÀQLWHO\²VRPHWKLQJLWZRXOGEHYHU\KDUGWRFRQYLQFH%HLMLQJ could occur. It is true that this method of striving for the survival of Taiwan (holding out for a period of weeks) is hardly a novel concept; it has long been discussed. But the critical matter is whether this element of strategy has been incorporated into a coherent whole – or, alternatively, evaluated and discarded because some more viable means of dealing with these aspects of certainty and uncertainty have been devised.

&RVWVYHUVXVHIÀFDF\SULRULWLHVYHUVXVDYDLODELOLW\ 7KHUH DUH RWKHU DV \HW XQH[DPLQHG UHDOPV RI VLJQLÀFDQW XQFHUWDLQW\ 7KH ÀUVW LV EXGJHW OLPLWDWLRQV YHUVXV WKH HIÀFDF\ DQG IHDVLELOLW\ RI WKH YDULRXV PLOLWDU\ V\VWHPV 7DLZDQ PLJKW SURFXUH ,Q UHFHQW \HDUV 7DLZDQ·V GLIÀFXOW HFRQRPLF situation has directed added attention to the costs of systems and the inherent trade-offs (the options to use the funds for other purposes). These real concerns about costs have appropriately drawn intense attention to how well systems would work and how important they would be as part of an overall security strategy. Deputy Minister of Defense Lin Chong-pin, in December 2003, made the point to a visiting group of foreign defense specialists, including the author, that Taipei now insists that future defense procurements be based on obtaining a fair price and ensuring a real need.12 Establishing procurement priorities for Taiwan is an unusually complex proFHVV QRW RQO\ EHFDXVH 7DLSHL KDV WR ÀQG WKH IXQGV WR EX\ WKH LWHPV DQG DZDLW development, design, and manufacturing delays, but also because, for many critical systems, it must obtain US agreement and then wait in line at least behind US forces for delivery to operational units.

An overall security strategy: a tool for facilitating the arming of Taiwan for the future An essential step in ensuring (and being able to debate and defend) the real need for various systems and establishing meaningful priorities is the development of the overall security strategy that has been alluded to previously. Taiwan’s leaders have moved in that direction13 by forming in recent years at least two bodies to undertake such work. Not unexpectedly, their work is complicated by such things as inter-service rivalries for defense roles and limited funds. There is urgency in getting past, to the greatest extent possible, these rivalries and squabbling, but one has to be realistic about how rapidly and well that can be achieved, especially as the process and Taiwan’s armed services undergo the pains of growing and changing. The persistence of problems of this sort as part of the complex security environment may have to be accepted to some degree for at least the near future.

156 McVadon In this regard, it may help to appreciate that the establishment of a security strategy for Taiwan should be more like the children’s game of assembling a structure made of Lego pieces, rather than pouring concrete. It is a ‘living’ formulation that changes with the perception of the threat and with emerging opportunities and means to meet that threat. Moreover, it is almost certain to mature as Taiwan’s civilian (and military) leaders mature in the security arena. This realization is especially important for Taiwan. Taiwan’s armed forces have been largely isolated from the modern, advanced militaries of the world in every way except the procurement of several major weapon systems and the limited conduct of training in their use. Taiwan’s armed forces have not over recent decades been a part of the vital changes in military transformation, including doctrine and strategy. Some efforts have been initiated by Washington and Taipei to close this gap. The problem has, by some accounts, been compounded in recent years because the governing party has not been rich in mature people who are well grounded in defense affairs and who could bring experience to the senior appointments in this area. There is, according to some sources, also a need for a cadre of civilian defense professionals to take jobs below the policy level, professionals and specialists who would not change as the government changes. 7KLV UHSRUWHG SDXFLW\ RI H[SHULHQFH LQ WKH GHIHQVH ÀHOG FRXOG H[DFHUEDWH another problem that the author has perceived in the past in the development by Taiwan of a dynamic security strategy. Voices from pseudo-experts, or those motivated by political party rather than national interests, have been heard that should have been stilled, and ideas have been given attention that should have been ignored.14 Too often, as Taiwan’s democracy developed, well-intentioned people have stitched together concepts derived from bad ideas and have been part of the strategy formulation process. It is, of course, hard to weed out those who are not making valuable contributions, but a method should be found to ensure that DPDWHXULVKHIIRUWVDQGDQDO\VHVDUHFXOOHGZLWKRXWFXWWLQJRIIWKHLPSRUWDQWÁRZ of new and different ideas. This is a crucial time in the formation of a dynamic security strategy for Taiwan and it will be important to have in place the means to get the best ideas from the best people. 7KLVHIIRUWWRJXDUGDJDLQVWWKHLQÁXHQFHRIXQTXDOLÀHGRUHYHQDPDWHXULVK elements could start with top-down efforts in the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan to establish unfailingly serious and non-partisan direction of Taiwan’s secuULW\VWUDWHJ\,WLVH[FHHGLQJO\GLIÀFXOWWRIRUPXODWHDVHFXULW\VWUDWHJ\IRU7DLZDQ JLYHQ WKH XQFHUWDLQWLHV WKDW KDYH EHHQ GHVFULEHG 7KDW GLIÀFXOW\ LV LQWROHUDEO\ FRPSRXQGHGZKHQWKRVHZKRDUHQRWZHOOVXLWHGRUTXDOLÀHGKDYHLQÁXHQFHRU can distort critical debates with ill-founded concepts and ‘cockamamie’ solutions. There is no perfect solution to this matter for any government, but the bar should be set high for those who aspire to be part of the serious debate on security and defense for Taiwan.

Arming Taiwan for the future 157

Training and readiness Standards for the training of personnel and the readiness for operations and combat of both personnel and equipment should be an integral part of Taiwan’s approach to an overall security strategy. As a consequence of acquiring more technologically advanced combat and support systems, better educated and more highly trained people are required. Equipment maintenance long ago came to mean much more than the likes of lubrication and changing oil or preventing corrosion. Logistic support must be seen as an integral part of force readiness and a goal of the training of personnel for a modern armed force. To use the ROC Navy as an example, moving up to operate Kidd-class destroyers, and on to P-3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft and modern submarines,15 will necessitate taking giant steps forward in training people and maintaining the equipment to prevent letting these advanced, complex platforms operate at a fraction of their designed capabilities. If Aegis-equipped ships are eventually obtained that incorporate systems more advanced than the current US Aegis systems, even more will be required of the ROC Navy’s dedication to training and high standards of equipment condition. Proper maintenance is important from the outset; it would be exceedingly hard to play catch-up with sophisticated systems that initially have been poorly maintained and operated. 7RH[DPLQHDVSHFLÀFSRLQWLQWKLVUHJDUGREVHUYHUVLQWKH86KDYHYLHZHG with concern the shrinking period of obligated service for the enlisted personnel of the ROC armed forces. In this situation of very short obligated service by junior enlisted personnel, a great deal will be asked of the cadres of professional and FDUHHUQRQFRPPLVVLRQHGDQGFRPPLVVLRQHGRIÀFHUVWRHQVXUHWKHSURSHURSHUDtion and maintenance of advanced systems. Many weeks or months of specialized training are required to learn to operate the modern military systems such as those Taiwan is obtaining. After that initial training, to reach a high level of capability as part of a combat team, more time, experience, and participation in realistic exercises are often required. A period of service of less than two years is not compatible with including these personnel in such a training and readiness cycle. Taiwan’s small armed forces will almost certainly not have the luxury of learnLQJ DV WKH ÀJKW SURJUHVVHV ,QLWLDO KHDY\ ORVVHV EHFDXVH RI LQDGHTXDWH WUDLQLQJ failure to be ready, uncoordinated responses, and inoperative equipment could be devastating.

Acquisition in an environment of uncertainty There are, as has been argued, no simple, black and white, right and wrong answers to the serious major acquisition issues that confront Taipei now and for the coming decade or more. No outsider or indigenous expert can hope to do PRUH WKDQ WU\ WR KHOS WR HQVXUH WKDW D PHDQLQJIXO SURFHVV LV LQ SODFH 6SHFLÀF recommendations for equipment acquisitions, in the absence of such a process, are almost sure to be found wanting. As with the more general matter of formulating an overall security strategy for Taiwan, it is essential for decisions

158 McVadon RQZDUIDUHDUHDVLQWHJUDWHGV\VWHPVDQGVSHFLÀFPDMRUZHDSRQVDQGHTXLSPHQW to understand the uncertainties involved, the role the system would play in the dynamic overall strategy, the complex variables and key factors, and the tradeoffs and consequences. A single simple but general illustration may aid at the outset in appreciating the importance of approaching acquisition decisions for Taiwan in this way: important acquisition decisions will always face opposing arguments, both before and after a decision is made. A process that publicly and demonstrably takes into account the uncertainties and opposing arguments and does so early on, as well as in later deliberations, is far less subject to being undermined by those with political motives or who simply disagree with the decision on substantive strategic or technical grounds. Failure to take as fully into account as possible the many elements, pro and con, and to acknowledge, in some cases, that the decisions KDGWREHPDGHGHVSLWHSHUSOH[LQJXQFHUWDLQWLHVLVOLNHO\WREHDIDWDOÁDZLQWKH acquisition process. There are currently pressing issues with respect to three critical warfare areas that can serve as examples: a) antisubmarine warfare (ASW); b) missile defense; and c) the prospect of an offensive counter-strike capability. An examination of these three issues can shed more light on how Taipei might approach the future arming of its armed forces.

The antisubmarine warfare issue The author, who was an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) specialist in the US Navy, has been asked frequently in Taiwan whether the ROC Navy should procure P-3 antisubmarine and reconnaissance aircraft and new submarines. Never in Taiwan has the author been asked whether it is appropriate and feasible for Taiwan to counter the PLA Navy submarine threat and, if so, how that might be managed – especially how Taiwan and the US together might manage the ASW problem. Never has the author been asked about the necessary components of a comprehensive ASW system, although he has several times offered suggestions in this regard. The point is that, although such discussions may have occurred in other forums, the matters raised with the author have always been essentially whether to acquire another weapon system, not whether or how to cope with all or part of the threat posed by the large and formidable PLA Navy submarine threat. The wrong question has been asked repeatedly for over a decade. %HLMLQJFRXOGGHSOR\LWVODUJHÀIW\RUVL[W\VXEPDULQHV DQGYDULHGROGDQG new, noisy and quiet, nuclear SSN and diesel–electric SSK, armed with ballistic missiles, mines, homing torpedoes, and anti-ship cruise missiles) submarine force in various ways. It could attempt to deter or deny US Navy access to areas within several hundred miles from the coast of China. Beijing could send its most modern and capable submarines in pursuit of high-value US Navy targets, such as aircraft carriers, Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers, and ammunition and fuel replenishment ships. It is conceivable that PLA Navy submarines might be used to interdict shipping that was part of a major US reinforcement of the region;

Arming Taiwan for the future 159 or they could threaten the US homeland or Taiwan with a WMD attack. The submarines could form all or part of an effort to blockade Taiwan and to bottle up the ROC Navy in port. There is even the possibility that the submarines could be used to protect an attempt at an amphibious assault on Taiwan, as risky as such a PLA assault might be.16 This long list (probably not exhaustive) of possible missions and the growing size and capability of the PLA Navy submarine force raise the question whether it is reasonable for the ROC Navy to attempt seriously to offer more than narrowly VHOHFWLYHFRXQWHUVWR3/$1DY\VXEPDULQHV:KDWVLJQLÀFDQWSDUWVRIWKHWKUHDW if any, does the ROC Navy wish to try to counter, with how high a priority, and at what cost? Or, alternatively, should all or most of the ASW problem be left to the 861DY\"7KLVTXHVWLRQLVPDGHPRUHGLIÀFXOWEHFDXVHRIWKHPDQ\UHSRUWVWKDW the US has lost its edge in ASW since the end of the Cold War. This chapter cannot be a vehicle for conducting such complex analyses, but a brief look at one possible conclusion with respect to P-3s and submarines may help illustrate how the uncertainties can be dealt with. To begin with an answer to the major question raised, it is not within the realm of reason to assume that the ROC Navy can cope with all these submarine threats from the mainland. If a component of Taiwan’s overall strategy, as suggested previously, is to reduce the effectiveness of a PRC anti-access strategy, then the use of maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) such as the P-3 could be effective, in part, in making Beijing feel OHVVFRQÀGHQWWKDWLWFRXOGSUXGHQWO\VHQGLWVVXEPDULQHVWRORFDWLRQVZKHUHWKH\ could confront US forces entering the area. With the expected further reduction of US MPA, this might be a particularly promising prospect. So a strong argument can be made for acquiring P-3s or other MPA. On the other hand, the relatively small number of SSK diesel-electric submarines that might reasonably be acquired would not be effective over the large areas in which an anti-access strategy might be conducted. (Moreover, sorting out friendly from enemy submarines with three navies involved would require considerable coordination. This issue of ‘waterspace management’ is not trivial.) It would, however, be reasonable to assume that the ROC Navy and Air Force operating together would play a major role in acting against a blockade or preventing the sealing of ROC Navy ports. New diesel-electric SSK submarines and other forces, even in relatively small numbers as would almost certainly be the case, could give the PLA Navy considerable pause in sending its submarines on mining or torpedo missions in focused areas near Taiwan’s ports. Were the PLA Navy to employ submarines over extended periods in stations to facilitate the intercept of shipping into Taiwan, much of the advantage of submarine stealth PLJKWEHVDFULÀFHG7KHVH3/$1VXEPDULQHVZRXOGWKHQEHFRPHPRUHYXOQHUable to attack by a few ROCN submarines, and Beijing might be deterred from dispatching its submarines on such missions. However, submarines alone are not the answer. To make its submarines effective, Taiwan should, to the extent feasible, complement that force, for example, with hydrophone arrays on the seabed in critical areas to detect the presence of enemy submarines and cue other forces, surface ships with hull-mounted and

160 McVadon towed sonars and helicopters with dipping sonar, and MPA (P-3s) using sonobuoys and other mainly passive detection methods. Even in the limited role of deterring or countering a blockade and protecting ports, ASW by a single type of platform, such as submarines, would not produce good odds for the detection, tracking, and GHVWUXFWLRQRILQWUXGLQJHQHP\VXEPDULQHV0XOWLSOHW\SHVRISODWIRUPVZRXOGÀW such a strategy. An important aspect of both these possible acquisition decisions is that they tend further to discourage Beijing from thinking that success can be achieved readily and quickly in a military adventure against Taiwan. They do not tend to force the hand of the PLA and encourage it to act in desperation. They recognize the advantage in number and capability of the PLAN submarine force. There is no suggestion here that all, or most, missions of the PLAN’s submarines can be neutralized. The expectations are realistic and less subject to the policy paralysis that can result from the criticism that the acquisition was a waste of money and HIIRUW,QVKRUWDFFHSWLQJOLPLWHG$6:UROHVWKDWÀWLQWRDQRYHUDOOVWUDWHJ\ERWK PDNHVVHQVHDQGFDQEHMXVWLÀHGZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHEXGJHW%H\RQGWKDWWKHVH systems, such as the maritime patrol aircraft and SSK diesel-electric submarines, could also probably serve well in other roles in a dynamic strategy with emerging new requirements. The point must be repeated that Taiwan’s leaders could conceivably decide that they want nothing to do with curbing the PRC’s anti-access efforts and that it would, for example, depend on international pressure and US power to bring a blockade of Taiwan to a halt. Put another way, Taiwan does not need MPA and submarines because the PRC and the US have such systems. Taiwan’s security situation does not resemble that of these countries. Its strategy and consequent acquisition decisions must always be made in the context of the uncertainties described and the inherent limitations that exist.17 Given these complexities and severe limitations, great care must be taken to ensure that resources go to support the dynamic overall security strategy.

The saga of missile defenses The PRC missile threat and the corresponding prospect of missile defense by Taiwan offer another worthwhile illustration – but with very different characteristics. The PLA’s approximately 500 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and a number of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), all with conventional warheads, pose the most immediate military threat to Taiwan and, consequently, serve as a prime intimidator for Beijing to try to keep Taipei in line – as China’s leaders see it. Not only has the number of missiles deployed facing Taiwan steadily increased (and continues to do so), but also the accuracy of these missiles has been improved. 1RZ RU LQ WKH QHDU IXWXUH WKH\ DUH YHU\ OLNHO\ WR EH XVHIXO DJDLQVW VSHFLÀF targets, not just useful as weapons of terror. Beijing is also developing a longUDQJHORZÁ\LQJFUXLVHPLVVLOHWKDWIXUWKHUFRPSRXQGVWKHWKUHDWDQGLVOLNHO\WR have even better accuracy than the improved ballistic missiles. This combination of missiles re-entering from space together with sea-skimming cruise missiles

Arming Taiwan for the future 161 greatly compounds the problem of missile defense. The fact that all these missiles DUHÀWWHGZLWKFRQYHQWLRQDOZDUKHDGVPDNHVWKHPDUJXDEO\PRUHWKUHDWHQLQJWKDQ missiles armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. This is because it is more conceivable that Beijing would make a decision to use non-WMD warheads LQFURVV6WUDLWFRPEDWHYHQLQWKHYHU\HDUO\VWDJHVRIVXFKDFRQÁLFW18 These missiles could be used with considerably less visibility to surveillance systems and resultant much shorter warning time than that likely available for the PLAN’s deploying a submarine force or putting a sizable force of surface warships to sea. The technology to detect and destroy these missiles before they are launched is not yet available. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) defensive missile system that Taiwan is to acquire has a good capability against SRBMs but very limited capability against MRBMs and cruise missiles. There is, therefore, the prospect that largely invulnerable MRBMs could be launched from deep within China to destroy or degrade any missile defense system, thus giving follow-on SRBMs an essentially unopposed path to the targets. In any case (with or without using MRBMs), the large number of available PLA SRBMs could overwhelm defenses by saturation (through near-simultaneous arrivals of a large salvo of missiles) and by sheer overall numbers. These missiles, each the equivalent of a large, accurate bomb, would not, even in large numbers, devastate the island of Taiwan, but, even unlaunched, they cause considerable concern and give Beijing leverage. If employed effectively, those missiles with improved accuracy could destroy crucial facilities and cripple important elements of Taiwan’s defenses, thereby facilitating supplementary and follow-on attacks by other means. As is clear, the issue of missile defense is not only serious but also fraught with uncertainty. Beijing wants it to be that way to heighten the effects of intimidation stemming from this strong and growing missile threat. The government in Taipei will not be able, by acquiring missile defenses, to offer the people of Taiwan complete assurance that they are safe from PLA missiles. There are, nonetheless, some things that can be done: passive defenses – such as hardening, burying, dispersing, and the like – for important assets can be undertaken at relatively low cost, as has been long discussed, and with little risk of untoward reactions from Beijing. PAC-3 systems for the protection of some assets are expected to augment earlier Patriot (PAC-2) batteries. This could occur in the near term. Indigenous Tien Kong systems may also prove capable in some instances. Eventually, the US and then Taiwan may have sea-based ballistic missile defenses. The US is developing other systems, including an airborne laser that holds the promise of destroying missiles soon after they are launched. The dates of attaining operational capability are quite uncertain because of the complexity of various technologies involved.19 Even assuming success for all these programs in coming years, Taiwan is almost certain to continue to face the fact that China will have many more misVLOHVWRÀUHDW7DLZDQWKDQWKH86DQG7DLZDQFDQGHIHQGDJDLQVW'HFLVLRQPDNers should acknowledge this unpleasant but apparently inescapable situation in deciding what to do. It must be stated, however obvious it may seem to some, that one element

162 McVadon of a strategy of missile defense for Taiwan should be to discourage Chinese use of the missiles (or at least not to encourage such use). That may not be a very satisfying start to the formulation of a strategy, but it is an essential element given the situation. Another possibly less obvious element of Taiwan’s strategy for missile defense VKRXOGEHWRUHWDLQDQGIRVWHULWVFORVHOLQNVZLWKWKH86LQWKLVÀHOG²ZKHWKHURU not it decides on robust missile defense acquisitions. The US is the clear leader in the development and deployment of missile defenses. Severing or allowing deterioration of good relations with the US in the area of missile defense would be highly imprudent. Instead, Taiwan needs to protect these ties in the missile defense arena as a hedge for future acquisitions and for the sake of nurturing the all-important relationship with the US. Moreover, Taiwan needs the US to provide any system it elects to procure, to augment (directly with US forces) Taiwan’s missile defense capability, and to deter the Chinese use of its missiles for fear of US retaliation or, when such technology is available to the US, the possible destruction or neutralization of the missile force before it is launched or while it is en route to the target. Put another way, no location in the world today is more threatened by missiles than Taiwan; as a result, no method that holds promise in reducing that threat can prudently be ignored. These include skillful discouragement of Beijing’s resorting to the use of the missiles and thoughtful cooperation with Washington to ensure WKDW 7DLZDQ EHQHÀWV ERWK IURP :DVKLQJWRQ·V FDSDELOLW\ GLUHFWO\ WR DXJPHQW 7DLZDQ·VPLVVLOHGHIHQVHVDQGIURPIXWXUHGHYHORSPHQWVLQWKHÀHOGRIPLVVLOH defense that could be shared with Taiwan. But enough of ‘strategizing’; what about acquiring missile defenses? If Taiwan cannot successfully repulse a full-scale missile attack from the PRC, as seems certainly to be the case for the foreseeable future, what considerations apply to expenditures of resources to provide partial defense? Several factors of uncertainty, unsurprisingly at this point, are at play. The deployment of partially effective defenses (the best available in any case) may make Beijing: a) slightly less inclined to use its missiles because they may be somewhat less effective, especially if Beijing for some reason does not want to expend large numbers of missiles at the outset; b) more inclined to use a large number of missiles to overcome missile and air defenses (rather than conduct a very limited intimidating attack); or c) more inclined, even short of any other motivation to use its missiles, to attempt to destroy a newly acquired missile defense. So, on balance, the general effect on Beijing is uncertain at best and could be sharply negative for Taiwan’s security. For Taiwan, what vital buildings and institutions warrant protection? Should critical defense nodes and assets be afforded extensive protection beyond hardening against attack? What is it worth to the people of Taiwan to feel they have at least some active defense in place against the PLA missile threats? Should any GHIHQVHV\VWHPSURFXUHGEHYLHZHGDVSULPDULO\DÀQLVKHGSURMHFWRUWKHEDVLVIRU continuing expansion? No outsider should pretend to be able to make these sensitive decisions for the Taiwan leadership. Taipei, in its debates on this exceedingly complex issue, should, however, make clear to the public and opponents that a

Arming Taiwan for the future 163 decision is being made with all these and other factors being given appropriate ZHLJKW7UDGHRIIVDQGFRVWVPXVWEHFOHDUDVZHOODVWKHEHQHÀWVSRVVLEO\EXWIDU from certainly, to be derived. No suggestion is made that Taiwan should drop out of the picture with respect to missile defense. It is suggested that the debate on missile defense be conducted on a realistic basis. Billions of dollars are involved, as well as the fundamental security of Taiwan and the psychological well-being of its people. To the greatest H[WHQWSRVVLEOHWKHPRVWPDWXUHMXGJPHQWVVKRXOGEHEURXJKWWREHDUÀOWHULQJ out those arguments, political and other, that do not inform the debate. There is no right or wrong answer, but rather a decision to take a path toward a destination, ZLWKEHQHÀWVWREHUHDSHGDQGFRQVHTXHQFHVWREHHQGXUHG%RWKWKHSDWKDQGWKH destination may later be changed, as circumstances and opportunities change, but 7DLZDQÀUVWPXVWNQRZZKHUHLWLVJRLQJQRZRQPLVVLOHGHIHQVHDQGwhy it is doing so. This perplexing issue of missile defense has discouraging aspects, but it serves as an excellent illustration of dealing with the complex uncertainties involved in arming Taiwan for the future.20

The offensive counter-strike debate The issue of developing a deterrent capability that is able to strike at the PRC PDLQODQGKDVLQFUHDVLQJO\EHHQGLVFXVVHGE\7DLZDQRIÀFLDOVDQGVWUDWHJLVWVRYHU the last year or more.21 The combination of an imposing threat from the mainland, a more limited ROC defense budget than in previous decades, and concerns about how well expensive defensive systems would work are major motivations for this LQWHQVLÀHGLQWHUQDOGHEDWH0RUHRYHUVRPHVXSSRUWHUVRI7DLZDQLQWKH86DUH said to have spoken words interpreted in Taiwan as supportive of such an action. The frustrations for Taipei of a cross-Strait situation wherein the mainland steadily improves its capability to intimidate, threaten, and actually attack Taiwan must be recognized as a strong rationale for contemplating such an offensive counter-strike capability.22 Beijing and Washington should not be surprised that some in Taipei are grasping for concepts that would effectively counter the existing and growing PLA capability to threaten Taiwan and possibly to employ military means with a high degree of impunity – such as ballistic and cruise missile strikes and sabotage and information warfare attacks. As described previously, Beijing has discovered, developed, and deployed such a capability in the form of LWVPHGLXPDQGVKRUWUDQJHEDOOLVWLFPLVVLOHVDQGLVH[SHFWHGVRRQVLJQLÀFDQWO\ to augment that capability with long-range land-attack cruise missiles. Ironically, each of these missiles is all the more threatening and has greater utility for the PLA EHFDXVHLWLVÀWWHGZLWKFRQYHQWLRQDOUDWKHUWKDQQXFOHDU ZDUKHDGVDVPHQWLRQHG previously. In other words, the use of these missiles is ‘thinkable’; employing them against Taiwan is not beyond the pale. So, some in Taiwan, because of this threatening PRC conduct, understandably seek a workable remedy. When discussing the potential development of a strike capability against the PDLQODQG7DLZDQHVHRIÀFLDOVDUHTXLFNWRHPSKDVL]HWKDWWKHLGHDLVLQIDFW²QRW just rhetorically – not to attack China but rather to deter Beijing by the possession

164 McVadon of such a capability and to give Chinese leaders an additional reason to pause and contemplate the full spectrum of possible consequences of attacking Taiwan. There is no suggestion that such a capability would be used short of an actual attack on Taiwan. However, with the recent intense attention given to the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy, the issue of pre-emptive strike inevitably crosses the minds of those who ponder the prudence of developing such a capability. Consequently, the worldwide interest in this matter since the latest US actions against Iraq is unavoidably a factor – whether actually appropriate to this situation or not. In short, China will probably feel even more threatened than might previously have been the case. The type of warhead contemplated is another unavoidable element of this discussion. The world has witnessed both the open and the unannounced proliferation of nuclear weapons to several countries and sees that other countries have the ability to develop such weapons in a short time. When the perils to the region and world of North Korea’s becoming a nuclear weapon state are described by the PRC and other specialists, there is almost always concern expressed that 6RXWK.RUHD-DSDQDQGSRVVLEO\7DLZDQZRXOGÀQGLQWKH1RUWK.RUHDQQXFOHDU program motivation or excuse to proceed with their own programs. The depth of Chinese concern and the harshness of the possible reaction to Taiwan’s renewed pursuit of a nuclear capability should not be taken lightly. Those who are not persuaded of the folly of challenging the PRC in this way may see examples in the region that they consider are arguments for Taiwan to have such a capability. The stalemate or, arguably, improved situation between India and Pakistan since their 1998 nuclear tests might be looked upon as an example of nuclear deterrence working in a stand-off that resembles the cross-Strait issue in some ways. North Korea might be seen as an example of a small country’s being taken more seriously because of its alleged nuclear-weapon status. Most observers would, in the case of North Korea, quickly point out that Pyongyang’s most effective deterrent is not nuclear but rather its thousands of dug-in artillery SLHFHVWKDWWKUHDWHQWRWXUQ6HRXOLQWRD´VHDRIÀUHµDVKDVEHHQWKUHDWHQHG%XW this North Korean capability to threaten South Korea, by whatever means, could in the minds of some bolster the argument that a small country with a narrow offensive capability, nuclear or conventional, can deter a larger country with a broader military base. This last argument seems a good place to stop describing the various facets of the issue of a prospective offensive counter-strike capability and start analyzing the concept and its implications. Probably the most important point is that Taiwan already has a unique and invaluable military deterrent capability in the stand-off with the PRC: the military forces of the world’s only superpower – far and away the most capable, potent, and ready military force that has ever existed. This is not a matter of American braggadocio but rather a real, ready, and invaluable asset for Taiwan that must be fully appreciated, nurtured, and protected from erosion.23 Beyond that, the US, despite persistent complaints and worse from the PRC, has been instrumental in the structuring of carefully balanced ROC armed forces that give Beijing additional reasons not to undertake a military attack. None of

Arming Taiwan for the future 165 this US commitment to Taiwan should be taken for granted just because it has been long-standing and endured past stresses. To put it bluntly, even the Taiwan Relations Act leaves much maneuvering room for a US President in deciding how to respond to a crisis across the Taiwan Strait. Even the strongest advocates of this possible new deterrent capability for Taiwan must weigh the potential effects of it on Taiwan’s far-and-away best deterrent: the prospect of US military intervention. If Taipei pursues an offensive counter-strike capability, Beijing and Washington will be confronted with troubling new issues. Chinese leaders will feel compelled both for policy and domestic political reasons WR UHVSRQG HIIHFWLYHO\ ,W ZRXOG EH YHU\ GLIÀFXOW IRU DQ\ &KLQHVH SUHVLGHQW WR ignore or not react very aggressively to such developments in Taiwan. The best plausible outcome from the Taiwan perspective might be for China to do no more than radically improve its defenses against whatever Taiwan has developed and, further, to attempt to deploy effective means of destroying Taiwan’s capability as an initial stroke in an attack – since the PRC, it would seem, continXHVWREHWKHOLNHO\GHWHUPLQDQWRIZKHWKHUDQGZKHQDQDFWXDOPLOLWDU\FRQÁLFW starts. Near the other extreme of the spectrum of possible PRC reactions might be a focused ‘pre-emptive’ attack against that capability along with a statement from Beijing that, if the attack is successful, no further attacks would follow. The effect of this latter action might be as though Beijing had said, “We told you not to do it. You did, and we reacted as promised. Now, Taipei and Washington, what are you going to do about it – engage in a war with China?” In other words, Beijing would react as the victim of provocation and try to sell that argument to Washington and the world. This strange situation would confront Washington with a real dilemma as to how best to respond, given the potential for conventional escalation, devastation of Taiwan, and other imponderables. As reprehensible as this PRC tactic might be to those who are concerned with the welfare of Taiwan’s people, it just might work for Beijing. If so, the Taiwan development, intended as a deterrent, would have brought about the very effect it was intended to prevent. Put another way, there is a persuasive argument that should be part of the debate in Taiwan whether developing such a capability ends up providing Taipei greater leverage in the cross-Strait issue or, on balance, Beijing derives more leverage from such a move. Of course, these scenarios are neither exhaustive nor predictive, but rather intended better to inform what should be a very serious debate in Taiwan about proceeding along an offensive counterstrike path. As to the matter of the cost to Taiwan of defensive systems, compared to a relatively inexpensive offensive capability, there is no question that many of the most prominent defensive systems offered by the US, or those that might be developed indigenously, are very costly. They are also, indeed, much more costly than PLA missiles – and there are the real doubts about how well they work against existing Chinese weapons as well as how readily they might be improved to keep up with countermeasures and enhanced capabilities likely for the attacking missiles. It is hardly a complete answer, but, as mentioned in the section on missile defenses, less expensive defensive measures such as hardening of facilities and

166 McVadon dispersal of key assets are available. Furthermore, some of the expensive defensive systems Taiwan is acquiring, or considering, should also be viewed as part of the modernization process of any military that is attempting to be effective in the battle-spaces of the future. The ROC military probably does not want to stand still in areas that permit it to offer a combination of modern military effectiveness in the eyes of Beijing and salving psychological effect on the citizens of Taiwan. In VKRUWWKHRGGVKRSHIXOO\UHPDLQORZWKDWWKH52&IRUFHVZLOOÀJKWWKH3/$EXW unfortunately, the need for maintaining a good measure of deterrence and instilling and building doubt in the minds of PRC and PLA leaders is a constant – with QRIRUHVHHDEOHHQG6RRQWKLVGLIÀFXOWLVVXHRIFRQWLQXLQJWRDFTXLUHH[SHQVLYH defensive systems that fall short of perfection, the conclusions are, once more, unsatisfying. As argued at the outset, however, this is the nature of the condition with which Taipei and Washington must cope. 7KHUHLVWKHDGGLWLRQDOPDWWHURIWKHHIÀFDF\RIDQ\FRXQWHUVWULNHFDSDELOLW\7R state the obvious, China is a big country with respect to territory and population. At times since China’s development of nuclear weapons in 1964, part of Chinese nuclear doctrine has allegedly been that China could much more readily absorb nuclear attacks than could the US.24 Regardless of the rationality or veracity of such a position, it illustrates that there is a mindset among some Chinese leaders that could lead to the conclusion that any counterattacks from Taiwan would be HDVLO\DEVRUEHGDQGWKDWWKHVHDWWDFNVZRXOGEHSLQSULFNVLQÁLFWHGRQDQDQJU\ giant – whether conventional or nuclear! There may be psychological satisfaction to be derived from an anticipated capability to lob missiles at Shanghai, Beijing, or other mainland targets. If such DWWDFNV DUH IRUHVHHQ E\ %HLMLQJ DV SRWHQWLDOO\ LQVLJQLÀFDQW UHJDUGOHVV RI ZKDW might be the actual effect), the deterrent effect is minimized and the PRC asserWLRQRIKDYLQJEHHQSURYRNHGWRDFWSUREDEO\ZRXOGÀJXUHFHQWUDOO\LQWKHGHEDWH in Beijing about how to react. If such attacks are actually feared, Beijing may be either deterred from attacking or provoked into pre-emptive action, as alluded to previously. Once again, analysis provides no satisfying clarity, but it does make clear that there is no distinct advantage to be gained by a strike capability for Taiwan. For the author, an offensive counter-strike capability seems to have a very dubious role in an overall strategy that weighs objectively the effects on Taiwan’s security from attack by the PLA.

Conclusion To end on a somewhat dramatic note, deciding that Beijing’s positions and actions are wrong, reprehensible, and obnoxious does not make a security strategy for Taiwan. Deciding on how best to deter and discourage Beijing is an important element of the strategy. Believing that the US will, regardless of the circumstances, be both willing and able to rescue an imperiled Taiwan is an unacceptably risky element of strategic thinking for Taipei. Yet, recognizing that Taiwan cannot defend itself without the support of US must be part of the strategic thinking. Consequently, Taiwan’s strategic thinking should encompass how best to preserve

Arming Taiwan for the future 167 and facilitate that American support, as well as the capability to persevere for a limited time if the US is tardy or less than lavish in providing support. If much of this sounds like the experience of the past several decades, it should be remembered that these have been decades of peace, stability, and prosperity for Taiwan, the PRC, and the US. That may not be the most glowing goal imaginable for arming Taiwan for the future, but it may be the noblest goal attainable. That goal, with respect to the arming of Taiwan, can then contribute (or at least not detract from) the truly noble goal of an ultimately peaceful resolution of relations between the mainland and Taiwan, a goal to be shaped, not through arms and military strategy, but rather in economic, political reform, cultural, and social terms.

Notes 1 MND, 2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China, Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, July 2002, p. 227. 2 Ibid. pp. 59–77. 3 John Pomfret and Philip Pan, “US Hits Obstacles in Helping Taiwan Guard Against China,” Washington Post, 30 October 2003, p. A1. 4 MND, 2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China, pp. 52–7. This document states: “In recent years, the Comprehensive National Power (CNP) of the PRC has increased continuously with its fast-growing economy. In addition, it has spared no effort in expanding military force, posing greater threats to our national security in political, military, economic and diplomatic dimensions. Thus, our survival and development are confronted with gruesome threats.” 5 Ibid. p. 63. 6 John Pomfret, “China’s Military Warns Taiwan,” Washington Post, 4 December 2003, S$3RPIUHWLQWKLVDUWLFOHÀOHGIURP%HLMLQJTXRWHVWKH´OHDGLQJ&KLQHVHPLOLWDU\ strategist” at the Academy of Military Sciences, Major General Peng Guangqian, as writing in Outlook Weekly that, in response to recent initiatives by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian, China will not be deterred from attacking by such things as fear of loss of foreign investment and the 2008 Olympics. Peng, in a very threatening tone, calls such thinking “schoolchildren’s logic” and goes on to state: “If the Taiwan ‘splitists’ want to make a wager, if the international anti-China forces want to make a wager, then they inevitably will pay a heavy price.” Peng’s article was followed in two weeks by my most recent visit to Shanghai and Beijing, where I was constantly DVVDLOHG E\ P\ LQWHUORFXWRUV 7KHLU IRUFHIXO UHPDUNV DW ÀUVW VSHFLÀFDOO\ WKUHDWHQHG cessation of Beijing’s cooperation with Washington on the North Korean nuclear issue if Washington did not curb Taipei; later, the specter of military action against Taiwan was added. 7 MND, 2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China, in the section entitled “National Security Policy,” p. 63, states: “We have to put aside disputes, expand the scale of cooperation, promote exchange, strengthen mutual trust and assure stability between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Based on the principle of ‘good-will reconciliation, proactive cooperation, and perpetual peace,’ we have to create a benign interaction across the strait to continue pushing for the normalization of cross-strait UHODWLRQVµ>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@ 8 Michael Swaine and Min-xin Pei, “Where Taiwan Support Stops,” Washington Post, 7 December 2003, p. B2. This op-ed piece in the Sunday Outlook section of the Post by two prominent specialists, states near its beginning: “The Beijing regime has long warned that it would respond militarily if Taiwan were about to establish formal independence.” Near the end, it states: “Taiwan’s democracy would not exist without

168 McVadon

9 10 11 12 13

14

15 16

17

18

19 20 21

the United States . . . If Taiwan’s behavior exposes the United States, and Asia, to military confrontation, the United States deserves a voice in that behavior.” Bernard D. Cole, “The Modernizing People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) and Taiwan’s Security,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 2 (2), Winter 2001/02, p. 115. Te-Men Chen, “Assessment of the PLA Navy Modernization Based upon Its Development of Naval Strategy,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 2 (2), Winter 2001/02, pp. 12–13. Also, see Bernard D. Cole, “The Modernizing People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) and Taiwan’s Security,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 2 (2), Winter 2001/02, p.90. ROC Deputy Minister of Defense Chong-Pin Lin explained this policy to the author and others in meetings in Taipei and then again in his Washington visit, both in December 2003. Michael M. Tsai, “Organizational Reinvention and Defense Reform,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 2 (3), Spring 2002, p. 3. Dr Tsai wrote: “the MND is facing a huge public demand to re-examine its current military strategy and operational concepts. Do we need to change military strategy and operational concepts and what needs to be changed? I believe that there will be a proper and rational solution after the establishment of our new defense organization.” Tsai, “Organizational Reinvention and Defense Reform,” p. 2. Dr Tsai writes: “We DOONQRZWKDWGXHWRVHYHUDOKLVWRULFDOHOHPHQWVRXUDUPHGIRUFHV>ZHUH@XQDEOHWR disengage from politics in the past. Our armed forces were used to serve certain party and, thus, became the captive of party’s ideology.” Martin Edmonds and York W. Chen, “Assessment of the ROCN’s Modernization: Views from Strategic and Operational Considerations,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 2 (2), Winter 2001/02, p. 165 Cole, “The Modernizing People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) and Taiwan’s Security,” pp. 109–18. This portion of his chapter in the Winter 2001/02 TDA publication (cited previously) examines more fully PLA options for using its submarine force against Taiwan. Michael M. Tsai, “Naval Strategy for a Maritime State,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 2 (2), Winter 2001/02, p. 3. Dr Tsai wrote: “To establish a navy, to a large degree, depends on foreign assistance and takes time. However, these constraints should not limit the imagination of our defense planners. Especially after the USA agreed to sell us a considerable amount of advanced naval assets in April 2001, the research/development of new naval operational concepts and doctrine and the follow-on integration as an element of joint operation becomes a pressing issue. Navy has no excuse for any delay. 7KH RSLQLRQV WKDW WKH FRQIHUHQFH >DQ HDUOLHU FRQIHUHQFH LQ WKLV VHULHV@ SURYLGHG DUH nothing more than clues or starting points for further study. They may be right. They could be wrong. They need to be speculated and debated on a wider and deeper scale E\RXUGLVWLQJXLVKHGÁDJRIÀFHUVDQGVWDIIV,WLVH[DFWO\ZKHUHWKHUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVRI professional sailors rest.” For a comprehensive description of the PLA ballistic and cruise missile threat to Taiwan, see Eric A. McVadon, “Joint Air and Missile Defense for Taiwan: Implications for Deterrence and Defense,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 3 (2), Winter 2002/03, pp. 199– 204. Ibid. pp. 207–16. A thorough examination of missile defense issues and prospects is provided. The author has been telling PRC audiences and interlocutors and others in the US for several years that those who seem to have all the answers on missile defense are either not asking the tough questions or being disingenuous. During the author’s December 2003 visit to Taiwan for a conference on security at Tamkang University, the issue of an offensive counter-strike capability was raised by VHQLRU 52& RIÀFLDOV GXULQJ PHHWLQJV KH DQG GHOHJDWHV IURP RWKHU FRXQWULHV KDG DW both the NSC and MND.

Arming Taiwan for the future 169 22 This concept was explained extensively at a session of the conference in this series in January 2003 by Lt. Gen. Wei-Ku Fuh, Deputy Commander in Chief of the ROCAF. 23 The recent contretemps centered on the issue of a referendum held in conjunction with the ROC presidential election and put undesirable stress on the US commitment to Taiwan. President Bush privately and then publicly, with the PRC Prime Minister at his side, attempted to discourage what he described as unilateral action that could cause instability and made it appear that Washington was leaning toward Beijing on the issue. It was later revealed that President Bush had privately warned PRC Premier Wen Jiabao “in no uncertain terms” that “we, the United States, would have to get involved if China tried to use coercion or force to unilaterally change the status of 7DLZDQµ7KHTXRWHIURPDVHQLRUDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIÀFLDOZDVREWDLQHGIURP6XVDQ9 Lawrence and Jason Dean, “A New Threat,” Far East Economic Review, 18 December 2003, pp. 16–20.) Some supporters of Taiwan in the US thought both that President Bush was not adequately supportive of Taiwan initially and that he had to make up lost ground in the form of the public announcement. There is also concern about how the conduct of the referendum and such future stresses might try the patience of Americans and lead to erosion of US support for Taiwan – especially if allegations of unilateral provocation become an element of some future controversy of this sort. This episode revealed the perils of inducing such problems in this relationship that is so critical to the arming of Taiwan for the future and directly to the prospects of employment of US forces to assure Taiwan’s security. 24 Chinese strategists generally word this in a somewhat less direct fashion. For example, Sr. Col. Wang Nai-ming, writing in the 1990s as a member of the Strategy Department of the Academy of Military Science in Beijing, stated: “Under the circumstances, our armed forces must adhere to the strategic thought of winning against a strong force with a weak one, and winning against a superior force with an inferior one.” This quote is extracted from Wang’s chapter entitled “Adhere to Active Defense and Modern People’s War,” in Michael Pillsbury (ed.), Chinese Views of Future Warfare, Washington: National Defense University Press, 1997, p. 39.

3DUW9

6SHFLÀFGHIHQVHUHIRUPLVVXHV

11 Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform Michael M. Tsai and Jason C. Lin1

,QWURGXFWLRQ Past efforts made in reforming Taiwan’s defense have proved to be remarkably effective and this effectiveness is manifested from three different perspectives. 7KHÀUVWFRQFHUQVPLOLWDU\RUGQDQFH7KH52&$LU)RUFHLVQRZHTXLSSHGZLWK DPRGHUQÁHHWRIÀJKWHUDLUFUDIWDVZHOODVXSWRGDWHZHDSRQV\VWHPVDQGDVHW of replacement components; moreover, it is able to make use of this ordnance WRJHQHUDWHDFWXDOÀJKWLQJSRZHU7DLZDQ·V1DY\KDVVLPLODUXSWRGDWHZHDSRQ V\VWHPVDVZHOODVDQLQWHJUDWHGDQGHYHQPRUHDGYDQFHGEDWWOHVKLSÁHHWDQG accompanying weapon systems. The island’s land forces have implemented the ÀUVW VWHSV LQ LQWURGXFLQJ D PLVVLOH GHIHQVH SURJUDP DQG KDYH XSJUDGHG WKHLU JURXQGWRDLUÀJKWLQJFDSDELOLWLHV The second perspective relates to the organization of the Taiwanese armed IRUFHV7KHUHIRUPLQLWLDWLYHRIWKH$UPHG)RUFHV5HÀQLQJ3URJUDPWKDWEHJDQLQ June 1997 and ended in July 2001 effectively reduced the administrative functions DQGQXPEHURIÀJKWLQJXQLWVLQ7DLZDQ·VDUPHGIRUFHVDVZHOODVVLPSOLI\LQJWKH system of personnel quotas. The third perspective of reform is the most important of the three: in implementing revisions to the National Defense Act and the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense, Taiwan’s legislature made WKHQHFHVVDU\SURYLVLRQVIRUDGHIHQVHV\VWHPZLWKDGHÀQHGVHWRIRUJDQL]DWLRQDO norms and a clear future direction. However, in view of the accelerated upgrading, in terms of both number and effectiveness, of the People’s Republic of China’s military, and the continuance of its use of the People’s Liberation Army’s military might as a means of intimidation, Taiwan has no choice but to continually implement a reform program with the required specialist degrees of effectiveness. Otherwise, Taiwan will not be able to realize its aim of maintaining strategic deterrence through its tactical capability and superiority, and the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait could be in danger. 7KHSUREOHPLVWKDWGHIHQVHUHIRUPLVRQO\SRVVLEOHLIUHVRXUFHVDUHVXIÀFLHQW this, in turn, requires a corresponding degree of budgetary appropriation as a basic fundamental support. Every country is alike in ascribing a high degree of importance and priority to defense expenditure – unless, that is, the right of self-defense and the means to carry this out are deliberately abandoned. A proportion of defense expenditure is allocated in the national budget as a whole, and is directly related to

174 Tsai and Liu the perceived seriousness of external military threats. In this respect, Taiwan can be seen to be facing the threat of a large-scale invasion – a degree of threat that continues to enlarge – and it should, therefore, allocate a correspondingly higher proportion of its overall budgetary resources. In recent years, however, Taiwan’s defense expenditure has not kept pace with the growth of the national budget as a whole; conversely, the trend has been heading in a downward direction especially when the special budget is included. This can be seen in the light of a slight overall increase in defense budget in 2004 (Table 11.1). &OHDUO\WKHUHLVDGHÀFLHQF\LQWKHEXGJHW:LWKUHJDUGWRWKHWKUHHPDLQW\SHV of defense expenditure and because constant expenditure over time is required to maintain personnel, cost cutting is no easy task. Accordingly, savings must be made by cutting costs in respect of the two other expenditure categories, namely operating costs and military investment costs. Over the past ten years, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) has recorded a total shortfall of NT$2.54 billion.2,QWKHFDVHRIWKHWZRODVWFDWHJRULHVVXFKGHÀFLHQFLHVLQWKHDOORFDWLRQ RIIXQGVGLUHFWO\DIIHFWWKHRYHUDOOÀJKWLQJFDSDELOLW\RIWKHDUPHGIRUFHVHLWKHU in the maintenance of that capability in the sense of preventing the deterioration in effective use of modern weapon systems or in causing a marked decline in new investment projects. The effectiveness of Taiwan’s defense system has declined in this way and, in particular, it has lost the capability edge that it previously held in the race toward modernization. The gloomy implications of such an assessment should act to spur the implementation of new defense reforms. According to this analysis, budgetary shortfalls will increase to reach NT$30.99 billion within the QH[W ÀYH \HDUV3 ,I 7DLZDQ·V FXUUHQW OHYHO RI ÀJKWLQJ FDSDELOLW\ LV WR EH PDLQtained, a new approach must be developed, one able to circumvent the problem of a growing shortage of funds. Using as a basis an examination of Taiwan’s defense reform in general, this chapter includes an analysis of the kinds of problems likely to be met with when pushing through defense reform as well as determine (a) how best to utilize available funds and (b) how to ensure that the funds made available are as plentiful as possible. By so doing the objective is to encourage the implementation of further defense reform, thereby enabling Taiwan to maintain its current strategic defense capabilities and prevent the situation in the Taiwan Strait from becoming unstable.

The content of Taiwan’s defense reform Although Taiwan’s defense reforms are extremely wide-ranging in scope, there are WKUHHDUHDVLQSDUWLFXODUWKDWDUHHVSHFLDOO\VLJQLÀFDQWLQWHUPVRIWKHLUFRQWHQW4 7KHÀUVWRIWKHVHFRQFHUQVWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHDUPHGVHUYLFHVD topic that includes such issues as: appropriate organizational models; proportions RISHUVRQQHOLQWKHYDULRXVEUDQFKHVRIWKHDUPHGIRUFHVWKHSURSRUWLRQRIRIÀFHUV to serving men and women; and the organization of a system of service volunteers. Each of these issues is concerned with a single theme: the level of competence of the available human resources.

'HIHQVHEXGJHW01' Amount GB 2,585 24.3 2,523 24.5 2,583 22.8 2,688 22.5 2,748 22.4 2,845 21.6 4,027 17.4 2,698 16.5 2,604 16.4 2,572 15.8 2,650 16.5

Special budget GHIHQVH Amount 399 363 608 1,224 589 1,398 1,074 366 550 326

Related defense budget analysis Sum: DB + SB DB + SB/GB + SB 2,984 27.0 2,886 27.1 3,191 26.7 3,912 29.7 3,337 25.6 4,243 29.1 5,101 21.1 3,064 18.2 3,154 19.2 2,898 17.5

Sources 1 Ministry of Defense 2004 Budget Introduction Report. 2 Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics Executive Yuan annual budget statistics (http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas01/dgbas01.htm). 3 Legislative Yuan Budget Center (Ministry of Defense) 2004 Annual Budget Report 4 2004 annual statistics were not budgeted by Legislative Yuan. The special budget is not introduced in the Legislative Yuan.  7KH´6SHFLDO%XGJHWµLQFOXGHVRQO\VSHFLDOEXGJHWVUHODWLQJWR´ÀJKWHUDLUFUDIWµIURPWRDQGWKHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIROGPLOLWDU\OLYLQJTXDUWHUVIURP to 2005.

Fiscal year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1999.5–2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Government total EXGJHW*% 10,648 10,292 11,348 11,942 12,252 13,172 23,148 16,371 15,907 16,280 16,113

Table 11.1 1999–2004 annual related defense budget analysis (unit: 0.1 billion NT$)

176 Tsai and Liu Military organization includes the organization of both serving and reserve units. As such, any analysis should include discussion of mobilization procedures – although the most important questions here concern both military organization and the proportions of servicemen serving in the differing branches of the armed services. The second area of concern is that of the organizational system of the armed services. It includes such topics as: combined military/civilian structures; PLOLWDU\FRPPDQGWKHÀQHWXQLQJRIPLOLWDU\ORJLVWLFDOV\VWHPVDQGWKHUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRIKLJKOHYHOFRPPDQGVWUXFWXUHVDQGPRGLÀFDWLRQVWRWKHFRPPDQG structure of the various branches of the armed services. The third area is that of military ordnance and includes such issues as: acquisition of and research into new types of weaponry; the repair and acquisition of new HTXLSPHQWWKHXVHRIPLOLWDU\RUGQDQFHWRLQFUHDVHÀUHSRZHUPRELOLW\DQGLQWHOligence capabilities. Looked at from a broader perspective, the aims underlying these three areas of reform can be said to be the establishment of a well-ordered, highly skilled, and technologically resource-rich armed force with the capability to operate effectively – in joint and possibly combined operations – in today’s EDWWOHÀHOG FRQGLWLRQV )XUWKHUPRUH VXFK D IRUFH VKRXOG KDYH WKH FDSDELOLW\ WR operate effectively in arenas of combat on land, at sea, and in the air. Thereby, it should be endowed with the ability to deter or, if necessary, defeat any Chinese invasion of Taiwan. This can be said to encapsulate the essence of Taiwan’s defense strategy.

Downsize the armed forces and improve the quality of personnel 'HVSLWHDQDOPRVWFRQWLQXRXVVHULHVRIPRGLÀFDWLRQVPDQ\XQUHVROYHGVWUXFWXUDO problems still exist in respect of the organization of Taiwan’s armed forces and have attracted frequent criticism as a result. These structural problems, moreover, have GLUHFWO\LQÁXHQFHGWKHSURSRUWLRQDODPRXQWVRIWKHEXGJHWDOORFDWHGWRGHIHQVH Thus the question of whether or not Taiwan deploys and utilizes its resources in an appropriate manner must be addressed, which can also help determine whether or not the future direction of defense reform is an adequate response to the strategic requirements existing in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s armed forces have frequently been criticized for an alleged bias in favor of land-based forces.5 Despite the near continuous – and varying in kind ²PRGLÀFDWLRQVPDGHWRWKHVWUXFWXUHRI7DLZDQ·VDUPHGIRUFHVWKHSURSRUWLRQ of land-based forces to the other branches remains markedly high. Moreover, international and domestically produced research that has focused on the question of the strength of Taiwan’s armed forces has invariably emphasized the need for a OHDQHUDQGÀWWHUPLOLWDU\PRGHODQGIRUDGMXVWPHQWVLQWKHSURSRUWLRQVRIWKHGLIferent types of troops. Seen from the perspective of the revolution that has taken SODFHLQDSSURDFKHVWRPLOLWDU\SUREOHPVWKHFKDQJHVLQPRGHUQEDWWOHÀHOGFRQGLtions, and the subsequent need for innovation and ‘brainpower’, ‘technological power’ is expected to replace ‘manpower’ as the main focus and requirement of the modern military. The rationale, therefore, behind the desire to modify the

Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform

177

H[LVWLQJIRUFHVWUXFWXUHLVWRUHGXFHVLJQLÀFDQWO\WKDWSURSRUWLRQRIWKHGHIHQVH budget needed for the upkeep of troops. The objective is to shift the focus away from them to military investments that favor the enhancement of the ‘brainpower’ and ‘technological power’ of Taiwan’s armed forces.6 As well as being an island surrounded on all four sides by the ocean, Taiwan’s land mass is characterized by mountainous and hilly terrain. In the event of the realization of a threat emanating from the other side of the Taiwan Strait, and if a speedy and appropriate response were deemed necessary, the most important UHTXLUHPHQWZRXOGEHVXIÀFLHQWQDYDODQGDLUSRZHUWRLQFOXGHPLVVLOHGHIHQVH  6HFRQG WR WKLV ZRXOG EH D PRELOH ORFDOO\ GHSOR\HG DQG VXIÀFLHQWO\ SRZHUIXO land-based force. Therefore, in view of the need to bolster air and naval power, it would not be appropriate to use the same yardstick in determining the proportional amounts of differing categories of personnel. Instead, the main focus should be on increasing the proportional role of the Navy and Air Force in the military as a whole. Additionally, emphasis should be placed on further enhancing the hi-tech skills of personnel so as to be able to respond appropriately to the changed EDWWOHÀHOGFRQGLWLRQVRIWKHIXWXUH 7KHSUHYLRXVYHUVLRQRIWKH$UPHG)RUFHV5HÀQLQJ3URJUDPRQO\VXFFHHGHGLQ laying the groundwork for future reform. Already in its planning stages, the next JHQHUDWLRQUHÀQLQJLQLWLDWLYHZLOOSURYLGHIRULWVDFWXDOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ7 What is disappointing, however, is that the new reforms deal only with the issue of quantity. What is needed is simultaneously – and with an equal degree of stress – to GHDOZLWKWKHSUREOHPVRIHQKDQFLQJERWKTXDQWLW\DQGTXDOLW\7KHÀUVWSULRULW\ is to modify the organizational structure of Taiwan’s armed forces, which would include changing the proportional amounts of differing types and categories of personnel. The second priority is to enhance both the technological skills of DUPHGIRUFHVSHUVRQQHODQGWKHFRQYHQWLRQDOVNLOOVDQGDELOLWLHVRIÀJKWLQJXQLWV This should be accompanied by aiding the process of ‘professionalization’ and by ERRVWLQJ WKH SURSRUWLRQ RI YROXQWHHU QRQFRPPLVVLRQHG RIÀFHUV 1&2V  6XFK reforms, however, will not generate much in the way of budgetary savings in the short term; the costs of reorganizing personnel, as well as those of education and training, may even result in a net increase. Furthermore, the increase in the proportion of professional armed service personnel will also increase costs and generate even greater demands on the budget.8

Reorganize the military administration and command system The two Defense Laws were designed with two crucially important aims in PLQG WKH ÀUVW RI WKHVH ZDV WR FRPSOHWH WKH SURFHVV RI WKH ´1DWLRQDOL]DWLRQ RI the Armed Forces” (depoliticizing the military); the second was to establish the “convergence of military administration system and military command system.” In a democratic society, a politically autonomous military is the norm. Here, “politically autonomous” can be interpreted to mean that all decisions are determined according to the national interest and that the military acts to represent the nation as a whole. Because the process of building and developing the armed

178 Tsai and Liu services is independent of political considerations, it should be able to represent the true security interests of the nation. The political environment and climate of Taiwan in the past were not conducive to defense reform; inappropriate political LQÁXHQFHRQGHIHQVHSROLF\OHGWRWKHFUHDWLRQRIDPLOLWDU\FXOWXUHWKDWKDGDQ DGYHUVH HIIHFW RQ PLOLWDU\ RUJDQL]DWLRQ 7KLV QHJDWLYH LQÁXHQFH ZDV HVSHFLDOO\ strong in respect of organizational reform. Because of the problems existing in the defense sector, the workings of its civilian and military wings were out of synch with each other. In order to tackle this problem, the two defense laws laid out, in a series of clearly explicit regulations, the combining of command structures, management structures, and all UHODWHGDUHDVRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\LQWRDVLQJOHXQLÀHGFRPPDQGXQGHUWKH0LQLVWHU of Defense. This helped to avoid the possibility of divergences between the civilian and military sectors and ambiguous allocations of responsibilities. Article 8 of the National Defense Act states that “the President shall assume the supreme command of Army, Navy, and Air Force of Taiwan, and is the Commander-in-Chief of Taiwan’s Armed Forces. He exerts executive authority over the Minister of National Defense and the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) comes under the command of the Minister to lead Taiwan’s Armed Forces.” The “MND is in charge of RYHUDOOQDWLRQDOGHIHQVHDIIDLUV>DQG@VKDOOZHOOSHUIRUPLWVSROLF\FRPPDQGDQG armament functions. Furthermore, it shall submit suggestions on defense policies and formulate military strategies accordingly.” The position of the Minister of 1DWLRQDO'HIHQVHLVWKDWRIDFLYLOLDQRIÀFLDO´7KH0LQLVWU\RI1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH has under it the General Staff Headquarters (GSH), serving as the staff organization of the command system and the command mechanism of joint operations to the Minister. The GSH is headed by the CGS, who is in charge of the military affairs of the command system, and assumes the authority to command the ROC Armed Forces under the order of the Minister.”9 In order to create a new model on which to base the organization of defense, especially in respect of the high-level command organization, Article 6 of the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense stipulates the establishment RID´*HQHUDO6WDII+HDGTXDUWHUVµZLWKVSHFLÀFDUHDVRIDXWKRULW\$OVRLQ$UWLFOH 6, “the MND has under it the General Staff Headquarters (GSH), serving as the staff command system, and the commanding mechanism of joint operations to the Minister. The GSH is responsible for: submitting proposals for any military build-up and levels of preparedness; making recommendations on the allocation of defense and military resources; supervising military readiness and military training; setting up the order of battle; and planning and implementing combat plans and other relevant commanding affairs. The structure of the General Staff Headquarters will be stipulated by law.”10 Also, in a process to be completed in a limited time period, “the General Political Warfare Bureau shall be restructured as the Political Warfare Bureau11 and the Army GHQs, Navy GHQs and Air Force GHQs shall be restructured into Army Command, Navy Command and Air Force Command within three years. Such restructuring process is allowed to have one-year extension, if necessary.”12 Most importantly, the “General Army Command,” the “General Navy Command,” the “General Air Force Command,”

Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform

179

the “Combined Logistics Command,” the “Reserve Forces Command,” and the “Military Police Command”, as well as other related military bodies, whose functions are involved with commanding forces, are to be led by the GSH.13 The purpose of simplifying, or rationalizing, the structures of the various high level command is to create, within Taiwan’s system of defense as a whole, an DSSURSULDWHV\VWHPRIRUJDQL]DWLRQDVZHOODVDVLPSOLÀHGDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQDOO\ effective chain of command.14 These types of changes may not have much of an obvious or fast-acting effect in terms of actually reducing the costs of personnel PDLQWHQDQFHEXWIURPDORQJWHUPSHUVSHFWLYHDVLPSOLÀHGFRPPDQGVWUXFWXUH DQGWKHXQLÀFDWLRQRIYDU\LQJOHYHOVRIVWDIIRUJDQL]DWLRQZLOOFUHDWHDQ¶RUJDQLzational mold’ capable of reducing the administrative demands of staff on every OHYHO,WZLOOWKXVKDYHDEHQHÀFLDOHIIHFWLQWHUPVRIFKDQJHVLQWKHVWUXFWXUHRI defense budgets.15

(QKDQFLQJÀUHSRZHUPRELOLW\DQG&4,65 Acquiring new weaponry is an important part of the defense reform process. In the past ten years, Taiwan has been working hard to acquire new weaponry and its efforts have often met with some success. It can be seen from Table 11.2 that Air Force and naval weaponry accounted for most of the weapons procured,16 and that the equipment procured for the Army included such weapons as attack helicopters, artillery, and air defense missiles. By DFTXLULQJWKHVHZHDSRQV7DLZDQKDVEHHQDEOHWRJUHDWO\LQFUHDVHLWVÀUHSRZHU and mobility – and this has been exactly what was required in terms of Taiwan’s strategic requirement. However, replacing existing weaponry requires the outlay of large sums and, as the expiration of existing weapon nears, their maintenance costs increase. Moreover, a new generation of weaponry also must eventually be replaced. Thus, maintaining fully modernized armed forces is necessarily an extremely expensive business. Combined Air Force and Navy weapon system platforms are also extremely expensive. For these reasons, weapons and equipment budgets for a given period usually account for upwards of 30 percent of the defense budget as a whole.17 In ‘off-peak’ periods, however, this proportion drops to around 20 percent. If Taiwan is unable to increase these proportions, the end result may be a serious decline in strategic capability.18 Even if the US were able to supply fully appropriate weapon systems, it may well be that Taiwan would not able to afford or make full use of them. Enhancing its C4ISR capability will prove to be an expensive business for Taiwan, as illustrated by two recent arms acquisition cases. One such case is the ‘Vanquisher’ Project (Bo-sheng Project),19 which involved a total expenditure of NT$50 billion, funds supplied by six different government bodies over a period of six years. The other case is that of the long-range Detectable Radar, involving an expenditure of NT$30 billion to be supplied from budgets stretching over four \HDUV8QOHVVWKHDOORFDWLRQV\VWHPDQGRUVL]HRIWKHEXGJHWFKDQJHVLJQLÀFDQWO\ the huge costs of C4ISI systems will ultimately have the effect of squeezing out other types of military investment.

Designation IDF Knox Lafayette F-16A/B Mirage 2000 Patriot SAM M-109A5 Avenger Stinger S-70C OH-58D Anchorage Chengkung E-2T AMRAAM

Quantity 130 8 6 150 60 6 28 70 1,996 11 39 1 8 4 200

Order date – delivery date 1994–9 1993–9 1996–8 1997–2002 1997–9 1997–8 1998 1998 1998 2000 1994–2001 2000 1991–8, 2003 1995 2000

Notes a All are taken over. b It is reported that these have been delivered.

Source: The Military Balance 2002/2003, London: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 306–7.

Country of supplier Domestic USA France USA France USA USA USA USA USA USA USA Domestic USA USA

Table 11.2 Taiwan’s arms acquisition and deliveries over the past ten years

Only to be delivered if under military threatb

Seven constructed and one under construction

To be delivered in two periods of time

Current holdings quantity: 146 Current holdings quantity: 57

Comment Current holdings quantity: 128 Lease programa

Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform

181

Joint operations -RLQWRSHUDWLRQVDUHZLWKRXWGRXEWGHVWLQHGWRSOD\DPDMRUUROHLQIXWXUHFRQÁLFW and war. As far as the future of joint operations in Taiwan is concerned, it would be impossible to imagine a scenario in which all three branches of Taiwan’s DUPHGIRUFHVDUHERWKODUJHDQGHTXLSSHGZLWKDKLJKGHJUHHRIJHQHUDOÀJKWLQJ skills. Given Taiwan’s highly varied terrain, and in the event that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army was able to launch an attack using its full amphibious capabilities, Taiwan would need to utilize its joint operations capabilities through the simultaneous deployment of its air, sea, and land forces, irrespective of the need also to make full use of both its sea and air capabilities to repel the attack. The ability to launch a successful ‘Initial Point Counter-strike’ against a Mainland Chinese force would presuppose an ability to make use of joint operational capabilities.20 As explained above with respect to the organizational requirements necessitated by a joint operational capability, it should be made absolutely clear that the command structures of the various forces would need to be joined together under a separate and external command structure. Moreover, this command center would also need to be a part of the military/civilian command structure and to bring together a combination of various units, such as operational and intelligence units, under one single authority. With the intention of simplifying and downsizing the command structure, the Defense Department plans are to combine ten large regional structures, including the Hwa Dung, Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu Defense Command Centers, the Air Fighting Unit, and the 62nd and 63rd Naval Units,21 under a single Command. Also included in this plan is the aim of establishing two separate joint operational commands: the Joint Operations Command and the Operations and Support Command. These two command systems will make use of a ‘multilevel communications channel,’ thereby aiding the process of implementing Taiwan’s Four Military Modernizations plan.22 The essence of joint operational tactics lies in establishing a delicate, quick UHVSRQVHDQGKLJKO\HIÀFLHQWSUHFLVLRQVWULNHFDSDELOLW\*HQHUDOO\VSHDNLQJWKH FRPELQHG XVH RI OLPLWHG QXPEHUV RI ÀJKWLQJ SHUVRQQHO DGYDQFHG WHFKQRORJ\ and state-of-the-art weaponry, represents the most appropriate long-term aim of Taiwan’s armed forces. In realizing this aim, two projects in particular – the Multilevel Communications Project and the ‘Vanquisher’ Project – will have an important role to play. These two projects alone will require the outlay of 17PLOOLRQRYHUWKHQH[WÀYH\HDUV23DGGLQJDQHQRUPRXVÀQDQFLDOEXUGHQ to an already heavy defense outlay.

The rigidity of the budgetary structure Another internal problem with the Taiwan defense budget, one that has been the subject of debate for many years, is its structural imbalance. Table 11.3 analyzes the structure of the ROC defense budget over the last ten years. It clearly shows that personnel costs have been the highest in both proportional and absolute

182 Tsai and Liu Table 11.3 Structure of Taiwan’s annual national defense budget 1995–2004 (unit: 0.1 billion NT$)

Fiscal year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Personnel expenditure Amount % 1108 43.9 1155 44.7 1237 46.0 1326 48.2 1423 50.0 1492 54.0 1392 51.6 1425 54.6 1456 56.6 1327 50.1

Operating expenditure Amount % 497 19.7 510 19.7 507 18.9 532 19.4 550 19.3 573 20.8 569 21.1 536 20.5 526 20.5 597 22.5

Military investment Amount % 918 36.4 918 35.6 944 35.1 890 32.4 872 30.7 628 22.7 628 23.3 551 21.1 530 20.6 677 25.5

Sources 1 Ministry of Defense (2004) 2004 Budget Introduction Report, Taipei, MND. 2 Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics Executive Yuan, Annual Budget Statistics (http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas01/dgbas01.htm). 3 Legislative Yuan Budget Center, Ministry of Defense 2004 Annual Budget Report. 4 The 2004 annual statistics were not budgeted by the Legislative Yuan.

terms over the time period shown and that, following the recent peak in military investment, the proportion has risen to above 50 percent, staying at about that OHYHOHYHQDIWHUWKH$UPHG)RUFHV5HÀQLQJ3URJUDP24 Although the proportion for operating costs has remained around 20 percent, the absolute cost is nevertheless gradually trending upwards, mostly due to recent updating of advanced military equipment, and the maintenance of technology and material, each of which is relatively expensive. As for military investment, the following pattern can be seen in the table. Expenditure peaked from 1995 to 1999 before falling suddenly but, since 2004, it has started to increase again, whilst averaging throughout around 20 percent of the total defense budget. Looking at the overall structure of the annual defense budget, it can be seen that reductions have been concentrated mostly on military investment. Operating costs have not changed much over the period shown, which can for the most part be attributed to the fact that the costs of maintaining the readiness of military equipment are relatively constant. At the same time, the effect of personnel costs on squeezing out military investment is conspicuous, as the former now take up DERXWKDOIRIWKHWRWDOGHIHQVHEXGJHW3HUVRQQHOFRVWVDUHLQIDFWTXLWHGLIÀFXOW to reduce, since the government must, in accordance with the law, provide salaries DQGEHQHÀWVWRPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHOLQSURSRUWLRQWRWKHLUQXPEHUV:KHUH7DLZDQ·V defense reform needs the greatest infusion of economic resources is investment in additional military programs. Since operating costs will have gradually to increase, some other means will have to be sought to accomplish this end, given that personnel costs will remain about the same.

Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform

183

The funding sources of Taiwan’s defense reform Given the armed threat from mainland China, Taiwan has no choice but to push forward defense reform. Defense reform requires an input of economic resources, HVSHFLDOO\ IRU LPSURYLQJ ÀUHSRZHU PRELOLW\ DQG &4ISR capability, those areas that require the greatest amount of additional military investment. However, the crux of the problem is that defense funding is inadequate in the face of these increasing requirements, given the external and internal constraints on Taiwan’s defense budget mentioned above. This chapter offers a number of suggestions, which can hopefully provide a way out of the predicament posed by Taiwan’s defense reform.

,QFUHDVHWKHGHIHQVHEXGJHW How large should a country’s defense budget be? What is a reasonable defense burden for its people? There is no universally applicable standard that can answer these questions. Take, for example, the US: it has an annual defense budget larger WKDQWKDWRIWKHWRWDORIWKHQH[WÀYHFRXQWULHVZLWKWKHKLJKHVWGHIHQVHEXGJHWV (Table 11.4), but its budget is still continually increasing. The war on terrorism has only added public support to increasing American military strength. The 2003 defense budget saw an increase of 14 percent, bringing it to a total of US$347.9 billion, which the Washington Post referred to as a “War Budget,” and the 2004 budget has increased to US$401.3 billion.25 Nevertheless, one standard that can be considered acceptable is whether or not a country’s defense expenditure is able to meet the needs of its strategic goals. As a matter of fact, although Taiwan’s total defense budget is not much, the budget percentage of GNP is relatively high. In the face of China’s never-ending public threats of military force, Taiwan cannot determine with complete accuracy what a reasonable defense burden for the country should be. As shown in Table 11.5, however, we can see that the percentage was over 3 percent before 2003, and was not much less than that percentage in 2003.

Table 11.4 Country-based sample of defense spending, 2002 Country USA China Japan UK Russia France

'HIHQVHEXGJHW86 347.9 65.0 42.6 38.4 31.5 29.5

Rank 1 2 3 4 5 7

Sources 1 The Military Balance 2002/2003, London: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 306–7. 2 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, p. 38.

184 Tsai and Liu Table 11.5 Annual related defense budget as percentage of GNP Fiscal year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Defense budget as percent RI*1301' 4.11 3.69 3.47 3.33 3.14 3.09 2.76 2.78 2.61 2.50

6SHFLDOEXGJHWGHIHQVH DV percent of GNP 0.63 0.53 0.82 1.52 0.67 1.52 0.74 0.38 0.55 0.32

Total 4.74 4.22 4.29 4.85 3.81 4.61 3.50 3.16 3.16 2.82

Sources  7DLSHL(FRQRPLFDQG&XOWXUDO5HSUHVHQWDWLYH2IÀFHLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV 2 Statement by Deputy Minister of National Defense, Dr Chong-Pin Lin, in the US. 3 The US Congressional Research Service.

Increasing the national defense budget cannot be accomplished by going through the Ministry of National Defense. From past experience, the Ministry of National Defense has always found ways of dealing with these problems, even DOWKRXJKWKHUHKDVEHHQDQLQVXIÀFLHQWEXGJHW26 In the 1992 Republic of China Defense Report, the Ministry of Defense merely stated that it “earnestly hopes that while the government strives to achieve the steady expansion of the national economy, it may keep the national defense budget at a reasonable level to achieve the goals of maintaining combat readiness and ensuring national security.”27 Expansion of the national defense budget, therefore, must instead be led by the central government, which can work toward this goal in the following two direcWLRQVÀUVWZKHQIRUPXODWLQJDW\SLFDOEXGJHWWKHJRYHUQPHQWKDVWKHGXW\DQG responsibility to explain to its citizens its overall strategic goals, the quantitative and qualitative aspects of China’s developing military threat, and the importance of increasing the defense budget. It must also provide complete and honest answers to its citizens regarding any defense-related questions. The initiative for lowering cross-Strait tensions does not lie with Taiwan. All Taiwan can do is try to avoid mutual misunderstandings in a situation in which mainland China uses military force, by means of national defense reform, its strengthening defensive power, and maintaining a partial military superiority. Second, Taiwan must effectively utilize a special budget formulation to accelerate the pace of reform. The typical case of budget formulation ultimately needs to be considered in coordination with the overall budget allocation, whilst adhering to proper administrative procedures; but it is also unavoidable that this sometimes is met with blocking procedures. Therefore, when considering the need for especially large or necessary reform outlays, the ‘special budget’ should be utilized in WKHLQWHUHVWVRIWLPHHIÀFLHQF\28 For example, the government used the special EXGJHWWRSXUFKDVHWKH)ÀJKWHUV29 As shown in Table 11.1, the special budget did not increase the percentage of total defense budget too much. Conversely, it

Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform

185

helped to complete in good time one of the military’s most important acquisitions, which was highly valuable. In the future, this approach could be considered to accelerate the defense reform.30

Downsized armed forces Funding for national defense reform should come not only from expanding the budget, but also from implementing programs to reduce existing costs. The Report of the ROC 5-Year Force Restructuring Project and Policy Implementation Plan proposes a number of measures to ameliorate shortcomings in defense funding, LQFOXGLQJ´WURRSUHÀQLQJµSHUVRQQHOPDLQWHQDQFHFRVWVHFRQRPL]LQJRSHUDWLRQDO PDLQWHQDQFHFRVWVDQGFORVHPRQLWRULQJRIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHHIÀFLHQF\31 Although the general direction of these measures is correct, various problems with them merit further discussion. Firstly, with regard to rationalizing the upkeep of personnel, it will prove very GLIÀFXOWWRHIIHFWVDYLQJVLQWKHVKRUWWHUPPRUHRYHUWKHFKDQJHVDOUHDG\LPSOHPHQWHGLQWKH´UHÀQLQJSURJUDPµPD\ZHOOKDYHDOUHDG\H[KDXVWHGSRVVLELOLWLHV for further cost cutting. Three main questions should be focused on here. The ÀUVWLVWKDWWKHLQGLVFULPLQDWHOD\LQJRIIRISHUVRQDOZLOOQRWUHVXOWLQDQ\DFWXDO savings. Second, any rationalization of personnel numbers cannot be restricted WR ORZHU OHYHO RIÀFHUV DQG QRQFRPPLVVLRQHG RIÀFHUV DQG PXVW DOVR LQFOXGH PLGOHYHO DQG KLJKUDQNLQJ RIÀFHUV 7KLV PD\ LQFXU KHIW\ VHYHUDQFH SD\PHQWV to volunteer professionals. Third, in order to attract new volunteers, it will be necessary to offer further skills training for those personnel still remaining, as ZHOO DV LPSURYLQJ WKH V\VWHP RI VWDII EHQHÀWV LQ JHQHUDO 2I FRXUVH WKLV ZLOO LQYROYHWKHIXUWKHURXWOD\RIÀQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHV1RQHWKHOHVVUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQLV an undisputed necessity and though it will not have the effect of cutting costs in the long term, even if the process is accelerated, it will at least have the effect of preventing further cost increases. If the government were able to reduce the number of people serving in the armed forces to 256,000, despite the extra costs RILPSURYHGEHQHÀWVDKLJKHUSURSRUWLRQRIRIÀFHUVQRQFRPPLVVLRQHGRIÀFHUV and volunteer servicemen, a saving of NT$36.3 billion could still be made, funds which could then be made available for the purpose of other defense reforms.32

Prioritizing military acquisition Secondly, the priority of procurement needs to be introduced because of the need for a change in tactics. Taiwan’s defense reform needs a variety of equipment and LWLVLPSRUWDQWÀUVWWRLPSURYHWKHDUPHGIRUFHV·DELOLW\IRUMRLQWRSHUDWLRQVDQG its anti-missile capability. The ability to break through a Chinese blockade comes next.33 This planning priority is a natural reaction when faced with an inadequate defense budget. The Ministry of National Defense has introduced its own procurement priorities: (a) the long-range radar Pave Paws – for which the defense budget has made provision from 2004; (b) the C4ISR automatic system – again the defense budget

186 Tsai and Liu has allocated funding from 2004; (c) the PAC-3 systems – for which a special budget it will be introduced in 2004; (d) the SSK diesel submarines – again a special budget will be introduced in 2004; and (e) the P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft – with its own special budget starting in 2004.34 :KHQWKH01'LQWURGXFHVDZHDSRQVSXUFKDVHSULRULW\HYHQWKRXJKLWVRIÀcials have their own professional background and experience, they have to engage SURSHUO\LQSROLWLFDOGLVFXVVLRQDQGGHEDWHZKHUHFRVWO\VLJQLÀFDQWDQGZHLJKW\ defense acquisition is concerned. The level of Taiwanese civilian research is relatively high when engaged in political discourse over future weapons acquisition; indeed public debate on the subject will assist and support major military procurement programs and help toward gaining national support for the defense budget. This in turn will surely help toward negotiating preferential weapons bargains. The procurement of the Kidd-class destroyer is a good illustration.35 These GLVFXVVLRQVZLOOEHRIEHQHÀWZKHQWKH01'WKRURXJKO\DQDO\VHVSURFXUHPHQW requirements and looks to break the obstacle of military egoism.36

Develop defense technology Third, the establishment of a domestic defense research, development, and manufacturing industry would be a most desirable objective. Taiwan has no defense industry on an economical scale. Most of its major defense acquisitions come from abroad. Article 22 of the National Defense Act states that “Government agencies under the Executive Yuan shall follow national defense policies to consolidate efforts in the private sector to develop defense technology industries. 7KH DFTXLVLWLRQ RI ZHDSRQV DQG  HTXLSPHQW VKDOO ÀUVWO\ EH FRQVLGHUHG IURP domestic construction. When it is necessary to pursue outsourcing channels, the acquisition activities shall pursue a technology transfer policy, so as to establish an autonomous national defense infrastructure. The MND may cooperate with, or mutually entrust to, domestic or foreign public or private corporate bodies the implementation of research and development, production, maintenance and the disposal of defense technological products. In order to develop defense technology industries and their relevant corporate bodies, the MND may entrust the private sector with the management of the MND’s subordinate research and development, production and maintenance infrastructures and their relevant facilities. The above-mentioned two conditions will be stipulated by law.”37 This does not mean that Taiwan has to develop a complete defense industrial sector that can totally support Taiwan’s defense requirements. However, the establishment of a proper scale defense industry would have a positive effect on WKHTXDOLW\RIXWLOLW\RIWKHZHDSRQVXVHGIRUWKHVSHFLÀFUHDVRQWKDWLWZRXOGPHDQ reduced costs and a shortened time period for war readiness Take, for example, the acquisition of conventional diesel submarines. Without doubt, the “build our own submarines domestically” policy should be supported. Nevertheless, if the domestic shipbuilders are unable to demonstrate their abilities to design DQG FRQVWUXFW D FRQYHQWLRQDO VXEPDULQH ZKLFK LV PRUH GLIÀFXOW WR EXLOG WKDQ other warships, the policy mentioned above should be reconsidered. Cooperation

Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform

187

between the military and the civilian defense manufacturers is, however, a very positive way to create a military equipment maintenance system. And it also could be envisioned that if a well-organized defense industry were to be established, a ÁRZRIFDVKLQWRWKHHFRQRP\FUHDWHGE\GHIHQVHH[SHQGLWXUHZRXOGQHFHVVDULO\ follow, which in turn would be an ideal way to reduce overall defense costs.38

Conclusion In the past, Taiwan’s military doctrine has been “commanding air, sea, and countering landing operations.”39 Most of the acquisitions therefore have focused on improving the quality and quantity of Air Force and Navy weapons and equipment. The doctrine has now been adjusted to one of “obtaining information and electronic superiority, keeping hostile unlimited warfare at bay, combining operations to command the air and the sea, ensuring ground operations, and defeating an intruding enemy.” Therefore, Taiwan has to meet all the demands generated by this new doctrine. Past military weapons and equipment have been described and new items are listed in this chapter. In fact, Taiwan should have the foresight of further acquisition. First, the MND, though it has introduced a shortfall within its defense budget of about NT$300 ELOOLRQLWZLOOKDYHWRÀQGDERXW86ELOOLRQWRSD\IRUWKHZHDSRQV\VWHPVSURvided by the US. Second, from the viewpoints of command, control, and theater missile defense, the AEGIS system will be one of the most important items in the future. It is essential therefore for Taiwan to make plans well in advance. Regional security cooperation is another reason for Taiwan to increase its GHIHQVHEXGJHW6HFXULW\LVDSXEOLFJRRGDQGDOOEHQHÀFLDULHVVKRXOGVKDUHWKH cost. The Taiwan Strait situation is a key to East Asian security and from there to global security. When the US, Japan, and South Korea are building the security system, not only will Taiwan be able to offer its support and cooperation, but its allies should be able to support Taiwan with resources. For example, this could be done by cutting down the price of the Pave Paws long-range radar or by sharing more intelligence. It will help Taiwan to perform a valuable role in the international security system. Obviously, there is a limit to the amount of funding available for defense reform. In respect of the workings of the military, the pursuit of ‘quality’ involves DQHOHPHQWRIÀQHWXQLQJDEDODQFHPXVWEHVWUXFNEHWZHHQLQFUHDVLQJPLOLWDU\ strength on the one hand and the utilization of resources on the other. There is also a limit to the degree to which defensive strength can be increased, as there is also a limit to the amount of the government’s limited economic resources that can be channeled into defense. It is thus the government’s responsibility to determine the amount of resources needed in order to achieve a correct balance. Moreover, in doing this, it is required that, by the application of a method of allocating budget resources, it do its utmost to support defense reforms and ensure that these reforms are as extensive as possible. In instances when the amount of funds allocated for defense are increased, therefore, policy objectives involving clearly delineated DQGÀ[HGVWDJHVVKRXOGEHHVWDEOLVKHG7KLVDSSURDFKVKRXOGEHDSSOLHGLQHYHU\

188 Tsai and Liu relevant case, including administrative practices; military structures; and organi]DWLRQDOPRGLÀFDWLRQV,WLVWKXVUHTXLUHGWKDWEXGJHWDOORFDWLRQVFDQRQO\EHPDGH in cases involving actual concrete improvements in the system of defense.40 It can also be said that the incentive for funds is determined by the degree of cost saving involved. Beginning with an analysis of the issues involved in defense reforms, this chapter then goes on to describe the pressing shortage of funds available and provides, also, various suggestions how to acquire further funding. It does this with the hope in mind that, through the mechanism of defense reforms, Taiwan will be able to continue developing its defensive capabilities in order to PHHWIXWXUHFKDOOHQJHV,QWKHFRQWH[WRIÀUP86VXSSRUWDQGDVVLVWDQFHLQKHOSLQJ Taiwan maintain an adequate level of defensive capability,41 Taiwan should be making every effort to ensure that as much funding as possible is made available for defense purposes. At the same time, however, it needs to make sure that the most effective use is made of those funds that are available.

Notes 1 This chapter presents the personal views of the authors and does not represent the RIÀFLDO SRVLWLRQ RI HLWKHU WKH7DLZDQ JRYHUQPHQW RU WKH 52& 0LQLVWU\ RI 1DWLRQDO Defense. 2 MND, Republic of China’s Five Years Military Establishment and Governing Plan Report, 8 October 2003, p. 20. 3 Ibid. 4 A similar suggestion could be found in US evaluation of Taiwan’s military reform, see The Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, pp. 54–5. Available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf 5 Ibid. 6 Democratic Progress Party, Study of Taiwan’s Armed Force Scale, Taipei: DPP, March 2003, p. 29. 7 The MND had proposed a schedule of downsizing process, but did not explain how it will be practiced. MND, Republic of China’s Five Years Military Establishment and Governing Plan Report, Taipei: MND, 2003, p 10.   ´7KH 52& $UPHG )RUFHV 5HÀQLQJ 3URJUDPµ 7KH SODQ LQYROYHV WZR VHSDUDWH implementation periods: in the period 2002 to 2004 an annual downsizing of 45,000 personnel will be effected; in the period 2008 to 2011 a further annual downsizing of 40,000 personnel will be effected, bringing the total number of downsized personnel to 300,000. However, the Ministry of National Defense has not yet provided a detailed explanation of how it will enhance personnel quality, or deal with the organizational problems arising as a result of the loss of 300,000 personnel. See Ministry of National Defense, Report of the ROC 5-Year Force Restructuring Project and Policy Implementation Plan, Taipei: MND, p. 10. 9 National Defense Act, Chapter 2. Available at: http://lis.ly.gov.tw 10 Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense. Available at: http://lis.ly.gov. tw 11 Article 8 of Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense. 12 Article 10 of Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense. 13 Ibid. 14 Although the MND has set up a deputy Minister of Military Armament and Military Armament Bureau, the whole armament system that includes logistics, R&D, and weaponry acquisition cannot be built up at present. 15 Another way to spend the defense budget economically is to combine or close some military schools.

Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform

189

16 At present Taiwan’s Army has 62 AH-1W Cobras, but The Military Balance 2002/2003 did not put them on the list. 17 The Budget Center of Legislature, National Defense Administration Budget Estimation Report 2004, Taipei: Legislature, November 2003, p. 39. 18 “In case the budget cannot continue with military procurement, our advantage will be in fear of loss,” China Times, 15 July 2002. 19 The Bo-sheng Project is to build the armed forces’ advanced digital chains and air– sea informational amalgamated operation command system, according to the MND’s GRFXPHQWDU\H[SODQDWLRQDQGZLOOVWUHQJWKHQWKHHIÀFLHQF\RIDPDOJDPDWHGRSHUDWLRQV simultaneously. MND, Republic of China’s Five Years Military Establishment and Governing Plan Report, p. 7. 20 Initial Point Counter-strike aims to assail and demolish the enemy’s command systems, but Taiwan’s tactical design for defense has been faced with political restrictions that mean that the Taiwan armed forces can only undertake an immediate counterattack, UDWKHUWKDQDSUHHPSWLYHÀUVWVWULNH 21 An Admiral is in charge of the 62nd Special Detachment, a Vice Admiral is in charge of the 63rd Special Detachment, depending on their tasks, to supervise several detachments and take military action. 22 MND, Republic of China’s Five Years Military Establishment and Governing Plan Report, p. 16. 23 The Defense Department has not stated yet that future investments may rise again. MND, Report of the ROC 5-Year Force Restructuring Project and Policy Implementation Plan, p. 18. 24 The reduction in personnel expenditure of 2004 defense budget occurs because some budget subjects are adjusted. 25 It was the highest expenditure in Taiwan’s history. 26 See Republic of China’s Five Years Military Establishment and Governing Plan Report, The Ministry of Defense 2004 Budget Introduction Report, and The Ministry of Defense 2003 Budget Introduction Report. 27 Defense Report Republic of China, Taipei: MND, July 2002, p. 116. 28 Article 83 of the Budget Act: “In any of the following circumstances the Executive Yuan may, outside of the annual general budget, propose a special budget. 1. National defense emergency facilities or war.” Article 84 states that “For the review or overdue for special budget, the provisions regarding the general budget in this Act shall apply mutatis mutandis: provided, however, that part of the budget many be appropriated in UHVSRQVHWRHPHUJHQF\QHHGVXQGHUWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVDVVSHFLÀHGLQSDUDJUDSKV2QH to Three of the preceding Article.”  ,W ZHQW WKURXJK QLQH ÀVFDO \HDUV DQG EXGJHWHG IRU 17 ELOOLRQ$YDLODEOH DW http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas01/87xdoc/87k3.htm 30 The MND has some plans about it. See Report of the Ministry of National Defense, Taipei: MND, 18 February 2004, pp. 22–4. 31 MND, Republic of China’s Five Years Military Establishment and Governing Plan Report, Taipei: MND, pp. 28–9. 32 Study of Taiwan’s Armed Force Scale, pp. 73–4. 33 Gregg Rubinstein, “Defense Acquisition Priorities for Taiwan,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 3 (3), Spring 2003, pp. 22–3. 34 MND, Report of Ministry of National Defense, Taipei: MND, 2004, pp. 22–4.  7KH.LGGFODVV'HVWUR\HUGHEDWHLVWKHÀUVWPLOLWDU\DFTXLVLWLRQDPRQJDOOZKLFKKDG EHHQGLVFXVVHGEURDGO\,WVKRZVWKDW7DLZDQLVQRZDGHPRFUDWLFFRXQWU\DQGUHÁHFWV the autonomy of Taiwan’s military acquisition. 36 See Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, p. 54; IISS, The Military Balance 2002/2003, London: ISS, 2003, p. 139. 37 Article 22 of the National Defense Act.

190 Tsai and Liu 38 The MND is going to release a NT$128 billion business to the civilian economy. See Report of Ministry of National Defense, Taipei: MND, 2003, p. 31. 39 Defense Report Republic of China, Taipei: MND, August 2000, p. 67. 40 The Legislative Yuan had made a resolution, which required the MND must lower the proportion by 3 to 5 percentage points each year. It is a good example of pushing the defense reform. MND, National Defense Administration Budget Estimation Report 2004, Taipei: MND, 2004, p. 11. 41 Pin Liu, “US: We have to assist Taiwan to enhance its defense,” Taipei Times, 8 February 2004, p. A1.

12 The Republic of China armed services’ human resource policy Ping-Hsiung Lo

,QWURGXFWLRQ Human resources are concerned with personnel and employees within an organization. They can be categorized by gender, number, age, ability, knowledge, VNLOOVPRWLYDWLRQDQGDWWLWXGH7KHPDQDJHPHQWRIKXPDQUHVRXUFHVZLOOEHQHÀW employees, enterprises, organizations, and society.1 All activities within a corporation or organization need to be implemented and managed by staff.2 The PLVVLRQV RI DQ RUJDQL]DWLRQ DUH FRPSOHWHG WKURXJK ÀYH IXQFWLRQV RI SHUVRQQHO management: planning; organizing; leadership; employment; and control. US President J. F. Kennedy once said, “Manpower is the fundamental source LQHYLWDEOHLQFRQYHUWLQJRWKHUW\SHVRIUHVRXUFHVIRUWKHEHQHÀWRIKXPDQEHLQJVµ In other words, manpower is the resource of all resources. Economic development of any given country, albeit related to its natural resources, relies heavily on its workforce. The quality and quantity of a capable workforce in a certain nation directly affect that nation’s economic development. This kind of intellectual and physical capacity of human beings to nurture, exploit, and utilize all resources is called human resources.3 Force planning is based upon national security strategies and national military strategies. Force planning involves manpower requirements and logistic supply and is said “to provide human resources in appropriate timing, quality and quanWLW\WRPHHWVSHFLÀFUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUWKHDFKLHYHPHQWRIPLOLWDU\PLVVLRQVJLYHQ overall national development and enemy threats.” According to Peter Ducker, the competitiveness of states in the future depends upon the quantity, quality, and output of an educated workforce. Human resources, therefore, are important in that they contribute to the conversion and exploitation RIRWKHUUHVRXUFHVDQGDOVREHFDXVHWKHLUDFTXLVLWLRQDQGVRXUFHZLOOVLJQLÀFDQWO\ impact on organizational growth and development.

Organizational reform &RQVLGHULQJ WKH ÁXFWXDWLRQV LQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO HQYLURQPHQW DQG LQ GRPHVWLF political and economic situations, the Republic of China (ROC) has striven to ÀQHWXQHLWV QDWLRQDOGHIHQVHPDQSRZHUSROLFLHVDFFRUGLQJO\7KHVHPDQSRZHU policies, in concert with efforts to restructure national defense organs, adjust

192 Lo national defense strategies, and replace obsolete weapons, are aimed at properly streamlining national defense manpower, enhancing the quality of military personnel, and establishing a modernized force that is “compact, elite and highly capable.” The current military strategies and force concepts are based on the guidance of “predominant EO and IW, suppressing unrestricted warfare, conducting joint air-control and sea-denial, ensuring ground security, and annihilating invading enemies.” The objective is to establish a small, crack, highly responsive and effective force to achieve deterrence. In terms of force structures, the policy of “elite troops” is implemented and the principles of “reducing head accounts, improving quality, and enhancing combat capabilities” are upheld.4 As a result, the ROC’s armed forces have streamlined their organization and force in phased approaches. In order to cope with China’s military threats, ensure national security, and establish a defense system in which “authority complies with responsibilities,” and “division of labor are adequate and professional,” the Ministry of National Defense proposed drafts of the Defense Law and revised Defense Organization Law in April 1998. In 2000, legislative process for the two laws was completed and “a XQLÀHG DXWKRULW\ IRU PLOLWDU\ SROLF\ DQG FRPPDQGµ ZDV HVWDEOLVKHG 7KH QHZ laws mark a new era of a professional defense organization. After the two laws, the operation of the military policy branch is shown in Figure 12.1.

+XPDQUHVRXUFHV Human resources planning is to determine the future manpower objectives of the organization in order to facilitate development against the backdrop of a changing environment.5 Based on those objectives, a forecast on manpower requirements is necessary and a formulation of the measures to cope with manpower supply is UHTXLUHGLQRUGHUWRHQVXUHFRQWLQXLW\RIPDQSRZHUVXSSO\'HÀQLWLRQVRIKXPDQ resource planning vary among scholars and experts, although most have much in common. Smith has indicated that human resource planning is a comprehensive planning of how human resources impact on a corporation in the future; he argues that it is an unceasing process that incorporates the scheduling phases in strategic planning.6 According to Joanne, Kerry, and Quaitance, human resource planning is a procedure in management; efforts in this procedure will enable an organization WRDFTXLUHSHUVRQQHORIDGHTXDWHTXDOLÀFDWLRQVLQDSSURSULDWHQXPEHUVWLPLQJ and location so that the manpower can serve the purposes of the organization.7 To Hall and Goodale, human resource planning is a set of procedures to link human resource management with the overall strategy of an organization; it is also to assign appropriate personnel with work at the right time.8 *XWWHULGJH GHÀQHV human resource planning as the prediction of usable manpower requirements within a certain period of time in the future. Accordingly, the formulation of a manpower action plan is to achieve the manpower objectives of an organization.9 Nkomo holds that human resource planning is to establish human resource goals, develop strategies for achieving those goals, and identify how to acquire, employ, develop, and maintain manpower.10

Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform

193

Defense strategies and policies f( orce concept)

Military strategy planning (f orce concept)

Integrated assessment

Force planning

Defense resource allocation

Implementation plan

Figure 12.1 Operations of the Military Policy Branch.

Huang Ying-zhong thinks that human resource planning is a process, in compliance with corporate strategy, to assess external opportunities and risks for human resources and identify any internal advantages and disadvantages; the objective is to come up with an action plan and ensure the effective use of manpower.11 According to Zhang Tien-zhou, human resource planning is to analyze past and existing human resources so that an accurate prediction of future changes in human resources can be conducted and arrangements made in advance.12 According to Zhang Weiliang, human resource planning is based upon the growth and development needs of an organization, and the need both to calculate the quantity and quality of manpower required in different time points in the future and to have courses of action to meet organizational needs.13 ,Q WKH DIRUHPHQWLRQHG GHÀQLtions, human resource planning, in a broad sense, involves “the planning and arrangement of all activities from the entrance of employees into an organization, their movement and development in the organization, to their leaving the organization.” Generally speaking, human resource planning is the control of manpower requirements within an organization and the measures to meet current and future needs.

+XPDQUHVRXUFHSODQQLQJ Human resource planning emphasizes the analysis and calculation of manpower requirements. It is also concerned with the ways to acquire manpower, their balance and effects. In their “Practical Studies on Military Human Resource Planning”14, Liu Hsing-yue and Zhong Guo-hua indicate that military human resource planning includes: manpower supply analysis; demand analysis; the balance of supply and demand; the dynamic balance of supply and demand; manpower forecasts; and the trend and planning methodologies for military manpower development. Currently, the strategic concept of the ROC Armed Forces is “effective deterrence

194 Lo and resolute defense.” Force demand planning is based on enemy threats, national human resources, the nature of future warfare, mobilization capacity, and national ÀQDQFLDO FDSDELOLWLHV &RUUHVSRQGLQJO\ PLOLWDU\ PDQSRZHU UHTXLUHPHQWV QHHG to be in accordance with force planning objectives and national security goals. When conducting thorough manpower planning, effective recruitment, training, employment, evaluation, and the retirement of personnel are important so that a young and strong military force can be maintained.15 On account of different missions in various phases, the ROC military has had to modify its organic structure and force objectives several times. The following chart illustrates the evolution of force objectives since the administration moved to Taiwan in the 1940s (Table 12.1).16 The Ministry of National Defense (MND) has been promoting a Ten-Year Force Planning policy, starting from 1993. The Ten-Year Force Plan was revised DQG UHSODFHG E\ WKH 2UJDQL]DWLRQDO DQG )RUFH 0RGLÀFDWLRQ 3ODQ RI WKH 52& Military (the ‘Streamline Project’) with the object of reducing the total ROC armed forces to 400,000 men by 2001. In 2003, the Guidance for Organizational DQG )RUFH 5HÀQHG 3ODQ ZDV SURPXOJDWHG WKH 6WUHDPOLQH 3URMHFW 3KDVH ,,  IRU further implementation. Recently, an MND spokesperson described the planning of Streamline Phase II. He stated that the project not only takes into account the enemy threat, strategic concepts, defense resource limitations, and defense technology, but also incorporates the strategies, measures, and methodologies of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA). The Streamline Project Phase II was to be implemented in two SKDVHVSKDVHLVIURPWRZLWKWKHJRDOWR´UHÀQHWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ and upgrade overall combat capabilities” and to reduce the armed forces further to 340,000 men (organic 300,000; others 40,000). Phase 2, from 2008 until 2012, had as its goal to “transform the military and enhance deterrence” and to reduce the armed forces even more, to 300,000 men (organic 270,000; others 30,000) in total.

+XPDQUHVRXUFHPDQDJHPHQW The purpose of human resource planning is to locate appropriate personnel for an organization to effectively utilize those human resources to support all kinds of operations and, by so doing, achieve the goals of that organization. In earlier years, human resource planning was called “personnel management” or “manpower management”.17 In his “Introduction to Defense Manpower Management,” Yung Cheng-liang established the process of defense human resources policy and planning as detailed below. Yung also explained in detail the factors concerning defense manpower supply and demand (Figure 12.2). Defense personnel management is to organize, plan, employ, and review the use of personnel and to ensure that, in their terms and conditions of service, all RIÀFHUVDQGVHUYLFHPHQWKHLUWDOHQWVDQGH[SHUWLVHDUHHIIHFWLYHO\XVHGWRVHUYH the interest of the nation. Military personnel management is a continual process emanating from defense personnel management. It seeks to recruit, train, use,

Year Force objective Note

1949–58 600,000 Personnel came from mainland China

1958–62 560,000 Organized mainland force

Table 12.1 ROC force objectives 1949–6 1972–80 520,000 Adopt a “crack force” policy

1981–4 500,000 Force reform plan

1982–92 400,000 Ten-year force plan objective

1986–91 400,000 “Streamline Project” objective

1992–6 340,000 “Streamline Project Phase II” objective

196 Lo National interest National goal

Estimate of the national situation Estimate Estimate of Analysis Estimate of the the regional of of the world situation national enemies’ situation power situation

Concept of national security strategy

Manpower structure Economy development requirement

Concept of national security strategy Politics

Economy

Military

Psychology

Officers service system Draft system Mobilization system Labor market competition

Enemy operation strength Concept or military establishment of the Armed Forces

Weapon equipment acquisition development Manpower quality

National defense manpower supply

National defense manpower demand

Financial time space

Adjust

No

Supply–demand equivalence?

Adjust

National defense manpower goal National defense manpower organization National defense manpower planning National defense manpower deployment

National defense manpower review

Figure 12.2 Defense personnel policy operation procedures.

and maintain all available talents. The content of military personnel management includes the recruitment of manpower, its development, employment, encouragement, and maintenance. In his “Analysis on Defense Human Resource Integration after the Two Defense Laws,”18 Zhong Guo-hua outlined the ROC armed forces’ military human resource management in Figure 12.3. The chart provides a comprehensive picture of defense human resource planning. The Ministry of National Defense has a long-term and integrated manpower plan. Through the implementation of policies and measures in recruitment, training, promotion, tours of duty, retirement, reserve, evaluation, rewards, and SXQLVKPHQWV RIÀFHUV DQG VHUYLFHPHQ DUH DEOH WR GHGLFDWH WKHPVHOYHV WR WKHLU

Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform Office of personnel affairs

National interest

Guidance Assistance

Pacify

National goal

Strategy concept

Manpower requirement planning

Troop planning

A

Select Retire

Manpower planning Requirement Apply Punishment

Store

Reward Manpower resource civilian retirement

Military strength goal

197

Career guide

Performance

Vacation

Personnel Data

Promotion

Appraise

Insurance Solace

Benefit

Commission Transfer

Train

Marriage

Personnel service Personnel Uniform Salary deployment Banner Mark and development

A

Obtain

Distribution Re-distribution

Placement

Test

Mobilize Manpower acquisition and draft mobilization

Personnel Training quality control Category Re-category

Personnel Management

Figure 12.3 0LOLWDU\PDQSRZHUUHVRXUFHPDQDJHPHQWÁRZFKDUW

GXWLHV SXUVXH D FDUHHU GHYHORSPHQW SDWK DQG ÀQG FRQWHQW LQ WKH PLOLWDU\ OLIH 2IÀFHUV DQG VHUYLFHPHQ DUH DOVR HQFRXUDJHG WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ OLIHORQJ OHDUQLQJ and vocational training so that they are equipped with professional skills that will contribute to the nation’s development.19

Force structure and defense human resources Force structure The concept of armed force, the foundation of a national military strategy, means to plan for the future, assess global trends, study strategies and technologies of the main powers around the world, and provide ‘military’ suggestions to national VWUDWHJ\ EDVHG RQ HQHP\ WKUHDWV DQG QDWLRQDO ZDUÀJKWLQJ FDSDELOLWLHV$UPHG force also includes the prediction of future warfare and formulation of strategic concepts to determine the capabilities required by the nation. The evolution of ROC defense policies and military strategies can be described in four stages: (a) “recapture the mainland”; (b) “recapture the mainland and defend the island”; (c) “resolute defense; effective deterrence”; and (d) “effective deterrence; resolute defense”.20 Force planning is an essential part of military strategy and is based on force concept and policies; in turn, it will design and plan for future combat capabilities, including service force objectives, force structures, and major investments.21)RUFHSODQQLQJDOVRLQFOXGHVWKHDVVHVVPHQWRIDÀYH\HDUWUHQGD mid-term strategic re-evaluation, and the prioritization of force objectives that are to be implemented in the future. The force structure of a given period of time is derived from the prevailing national and military strategic objectives. According to a MND study, the principal factors affecting the ROC’s force structure include: (a) China’s military threats; (b) security concerns under globalization; (c) US global military strategies and deployment; (d) domestic security

198 Lo concerns; (e) the feasibility of non-human engagement in war; (f) reviews of force structures and combat capabilities in the past; and (g) the threats of global terrorism.22 The ROC force structure therefore directly affects defense human resource planning and personnel management. The thorough planning of force structures is the key to the success of defense personnel management. Defense human resources Human resource planning requires that an organization predict the demand and supply of men and women so that it is neither over- nor understaffed. In the case of the organization being understaffed, appropriate human resources need to be provided in a timely manner; in the case of it being overstaffed, redundant personnel need to be dismissed.23 Defense human resources are planned following the principle of achieving a balance between the supply and demand of manpower. Military personnel supply Under the defense strategic guidance, the total number of men and women in the ROC armed forces has been reduced from 450,000 in 1997 to 400,000 in 2001 after the Streamline Project.24 According to the statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the population of Taiwan amounts to 22,339,536. The expected number of draftees in the coming decade (2003 to 2012) is shown in Table 12.2 and Figure 12.4, with an average of 137,745 men being recruited each year. As VKRZQLQWKHÀJXUHWKHQXPEHURIGUDIWHHVDIWHUWDNLQJRXWWKRVHPHGLFDOO\XQÀW prohibited, probated, and waived from service as well as those volunteered in professional military academies, will gradually decrease by year. This will affect the supply of human resource in the military. Military personnel demand 7KH VRXUFH RI RIÀFHUV DQG 1&2V LQ WKH 52& PLOLWDU\ LQFOXGHV FRQVFULSWV DQG volunteers, whereas servicemen come from the conscription system every year in numbers as planned to meet the defense personnel requirements. The number of draftable personnel is higher than those actually drafted, therefore indicating an oversupply of military personnel. Over the next ten years, Taiwan will have 156,000 draftees available for regular service. With the demand for volunteers at 15,000 men and conscripts at 129,000 (including 5,000 for coastal patrol and 3,000 for substation service), there will be a surplus over the period of 11,000 men. In order to address the issue of oversupply, the MND started to implement Streamline Project Phase II in 2004. The project will reduce the number of existing personnel by 15,000 men and draftees by 9,000 men every year, making a reduction in the number of personnel of more than 20,000 men.25

2003 2004 2005 1972 1973 1974 193,187 187,929 174,286 80% (non-draftable males are 20%) 154,550 150,343 139,429

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Year Year of birth Male births Draft (%) Draftees

Table 12.2 Number of draftable men 2003–12 2007 1976 160,724 128,579

2006 1975 155,523 124,418

142,081

2008 1977 177,601 129,582

2009 1978 161,977

140,326

2010 1979 175,407

133,501

2011 1980 166,876

134,645

2012 1981 168,306

200

Lo

Figure 12.4 Numbers of men available for the draft 2003–12.

Balance of supply and demand *LYHQWKHPRGLÀFDWLRQLQVWUDWHJLFFRQFHSWVDQGERWKIRUFHDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQDO structures, the Ministry of National Defense continues to implement Streamline Project II as part of its efforts to balance personnel supply and demand. Currently, HQOLVWHGPHQLQWKH52&DUPHGIRUFHVDUHPDLQO\GUDIWHHVZKHUHDVRIÀFHUVDUH mainly volunteers. When personnel supply is more than demand, the MND can adopt the following measures to avoid redundant manpower: 1

2 3 4 

to have the Military Medicine Bureau and Human Resource Department set higher physical standards for draftees, allow a suspension of service because RILOOQHVVDQGVWULFWO\HQIRUFHWKHGLVFKDUJHRIXQTXDOLÀHGQHZHQOLVWHHV for the Ministry of Internal Affairs to study how to relax the differences in standards between the different branches of the armed services; for the Human Resource Bureau to modify regulations on prohibited service and shortened service terms; starting on January 1, 2004, to reduce volunteer service to one year and eight months and allow enlistees to retire two months earlier; WRLQFUHDVHWKHQXPEHURIVXEVWLWXWLRQVHUYLFHDQG527&RIÀFHUVDQG1&2V to relieve the pressure of oversupply of draftees.

Policies for defense human resources management Organizational reform for human resources ´7RGRDJRRGMRERQHPXVWÀUVWVKDUSHQRQH·VWRROVµ(IIHFWLYHQHVVHIÀFLHQF\ and successful management of an organization rely upon “centralized authority DQG FOHDUO\ GHÀQHG DQG GLYLVLRQ RI UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV DQG ODERUVµ %HIRUH WKH promulgation of the Defense Law and the Defense Organization Law, staff units under the Minister of National Defense included Human Resource Bureau (Policy) and the Deputy Chief of General Staff (DCGS) for Personnel (personnel policy

Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform

201

planning, implementation, and evaluation). After the two laws, in accordance ZLWK WKH SULQFLSOH RI ´D XQLÀHG DXWKRULW\ RI PLOLWDU\ FRPPDQG DQG SROLF\µ UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV RI WKH DERYHPHQWLRQHG VWDII XQLWV KDYH ODUJHO\ EHHQ PRGLÀHG In the military policy branch, the Human Resource Bureau is in charge of crossbranch human resource affairs (including servicemen and women and civilians). In the military command branch, the DCGS for Personnel (J1) is in charge of manpower service support, recruitment, and personnel management within the branch. Within the military armament branch, the Human Resource Division is LQFKDUJHRISHUVRQQHOPDQDJHPHQW%HFDXVHKXPDQUHVRXUFHXQLWVDUHÁRDWLQJ between three branches and their responsibilities overlap to a large extent, confusion occurs when implementing human resource policies.

Policies for defense human resources Defense personnel policies and their implementation follow the cycle of ‘select, recruit, train, use, retire, and counsel’ to meet force requirements. This study explores further existing or proposed future policies for defense human resources: Establish credibility of human resource policies Human resource policies provide guidance for daily operations and for formulating and modifying related regulations. However, the credibility of a sound personnel system will be questioned if its implementation does not comply with regulations. )RUH[DPSOHWKHTXDOLÀFDWLRQVIRUSURPRWLRQWRUHJXODUSRVLWLRQVRULPSRUWDQW positions vary from service to service, subject to subject, or unit to unit. In other ZRUGVWKHVWDQGDUGVIRUFDQGLGDWHV·HGXFDWLRQTXDOLÀFDWLRQVDQGH[SHULHQFHDUH inconsistent. This has seriously undermined the credibility of the personnel system. Therefore, it brooks no delay to have an equal, open, and fair system that resorts WRWKHUXOHRIODZZKHQPDQDJLQJRIÀFHUV·DQG1&2V·FDUHHUV$Q\DPELJXRXV contradictory, or controversial regulations should be revised immediately. Revise personnel recruiting policy A stable and high-quality personnel supply is the key to an organization’s development. In recent years, the ROC Ministry of National Defense has been acquiring and deploying a new generation of high-tech weapon systems that require high-quality personnel to operate in order to bring that technology to full effect. However, effective combat capabilities cannot be maintained, for two reasons: WKHVKRUWHQHGVHUYLFHSHULRGVIRUGUDIWHGRIÀFHUV1&2VDQGVHUYLFHPHQDQGWKH low ratio of organic to actual manpower. Since there is an urgent demand for longWHUPMXQLRUJUDGHRIÀFHUV2DQGEHORZ DQG1&2VPHDVXUHVVKRXOGEHWDNHQWR UDLVHWKHRUJDQLF²DFWXDOPDQSRZHUUDWLR,QWHUPVRIWKHTXDOLW\RIRIÀFHUV SHUFHQWRIYROXQWHHURIÀFHUVDQGSHUFHQWRI1&2VKDYHDFROOHJHGHJUHHRU above, indicating that the education level of NCOs can be further improved.26 In

202 Lo recent years, the Ministry of National Defense has done the following to enhance its personnel recruitment: 0RGLI\WKHSURSRUWLRQRIQHZRIÀFHUV 7KHVRXUFHRIQHZRIÀFHUVLQFOXGHVWKRVHJUDGXDWLQJIURPWKHPLOLWDU\DFDGHPLHV VSHFLÀHGGXW\RIÀFHUVHOHFWLRQSURIHVVLRQDORIÀFHUVDQGYROXQWHHUDQGFRPSXOVRU\ 527&V7RGD\RIÀFHUVKDYHGLIIHUHQWWHUPVRIHQJDJHPHQWGHSHQGLQJRQZKHUH they come from. It is now necessary to unify and simplify the terms of service of all personnel in order to consolidate the overall defense manpower structure and its management and, by so doing, meet the demand for short-, mid-, and long-term RIÀFHUV7KHUHFUXLWPHQWRI1&2VLVEDVHGRQDFDUHIXOO\FDOFXODWHGQXPEHURI long-term personnel; control of the number of mid-term servicemen; and widely recruited short-term NCOs. In recent years, the ROC armed forces have implemented the NMD’s Streamline Project and Streamline Project Phase II to adjust their force structures and reduce WKHLUQXPEHUVRIRIÀFHUVDQG1&2V\HDUE\\HDU7RFRSHZLWKIXUWKHUUHIRUPLQ the future, human resources have to be ‘smartly’ employed. Personnel shortages at the grass-root levels need to be addressed; and the training time to foster military specialties needs to be shortened by using more civilian experts in the military. %\XVLQJVSHFLDOL]HGRIÀFHUVDQG1&2VDFFRUGLQJWRWKHLUH[SHUWLVHLQYHVWPHQW in education can be made more cost effective and a limited defense budget can achieve maximum results. Increase the number of volunteer service personnel 7KH52&DUPHGIRUFHV·UHFUXLWLQJSROLF\KDVDOVREHHQUHFHQWO\PRGLÀHGDQGWKH percentage of volunteer service manpower will gradually increase. In the future, the recruitment system will become the primary source to enlist the regular armed forces with the conscription system acting as the primary source for the reserves. *UDVVURRWFDGUHVZLOOFRPHIURPVSHFLÀHGGXW\RIÀFHUVDQG1&2VUHFUXLWPHQW The Army has also increased the number of ROTC candidates to be recruited from XQLYHUVLW\JUDGXDWHVLQLWUHFUXLWHGYROXQWHHUHQOLVWHGPHQIRUWKHÀUVWWLPH Although this kind of approach is still at an experimental stage, the practice will FRQWLQXHWREHHQKDQFHGLQRUGHUWRDFKLHYHDVSHFLÀFHIIHFW Recruit more female service personnel The MND continues to recruit females and to improve their career prospects. 6WDUWLQJLQPRUHIHPDOHRIÀFHUVDQG1&2VKDYHEHHQUHFUXLWHG&XUUHQWO\ WKH 01' KDV  IHPDOH RIÀFHUV DQG  IHPDOH 1&2V DFFRXQWLQJ IRU  SHUFHQW RI WRWDO RIÀFHUV DQG  SHUFHQW RI WRWDO 1&2V27 The level of female participation in the military is no lower than that found in other nations, demonstrating that gender equality and effective utilization of female servicemen are fully achieved.

Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform

203

Employ more civil servants, as stipulated by law As stipulated in Article 15 of the ROC Defense Organization Law, one-third of the personnel in the Ministry of National Defense have to be civil servants. Therefore, it is planned to recruit civil servants via three channels: national examination; PLOLWDU\ RIÀFHU WUDQVIHU H[DPV DQG RSHQ VHOHFWLRQ28 The goal of one-third of SRVWVÀOOHGE\FLYLOVHUYDQWVZLOOEHDFKLHYHGDVVFKHGXOHG$OVRWKHFLYLOVHUYDQW SURJUDPZLOOEHUHYLHZHGLQÀYHWRWHQ\HDUV,ILWSURYHVHIIHFWLYHPRUHFLYLOLDQV ZLOOEHUHFUXLWHGLQFKDUJHRISROLF\SODQQLQJDQGGHFLVLRQPDNLQJWRIXOÀOOWKH goals of ‘civilian control over the military’ and ‘total defense’. Establish the rank of brigadier general The brigade system is another important focus of the ROC military reform. It is also a resolution attached in the Defense Organization Law. The establishment of the rank of Brigadier General in Taiwan has taken reference from other militarily advanced nations (the US, the UK, Germany, France, South Korea) and is incorporated in the ‘Streamline’ efforts. By having a brigade system, the UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVRIJHQHUDORIÀFHUVFRXOGEHGHÀQHGPRUHFOHDUO\DQGWKHLUSDWKV to promotion made more comprehensible.29 Beside which, the Executive Yuan SDVVHG D PRGLÀHG GUDIW IRU WKH ´6HUYLFH 5HJXODWLRQV IRU 2IÀFHUV DQG 1&2V in the Army, Navy, and Air Force” in which the maximum age of service for a brigadier general was to be 54. This was introduced in order to restructure the ROC military manpower system and improve cadre quality. The Regulations were to be implemented in parallel with the Enlistee Service Law, to introduce a more sound personnel structure for the ROC military. Integrate military education Military education resources need to be reviewed given the dwindling defense budget, the resources required to maintain the quality of education, and the GHFUHDVHG GHPDQG IRU IUHVK RIÀFHUV DIWHU WKH 6WUHDPOLQH 3URMHFW 3KDVH ,, 7KH National Defense University is the center of future military education; thorough planning should be in place for it to cultivate talents for the military, become an academic powerhouse, and lead all defense think-tank efforts. The quality of teachers and education software/hardware should be improved; for example, more RSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUSXUVXLQJ0DVWHU·VGHJUHHVLQWKHÀHOGRIPLOLWDU\DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ and national security strategy should be offered.30 Modify regulations The successful implementation of human resource policies relies on consistency in understanding and practice. Should there be false comprehension about policies and confusion caused, the credibility of the human resource system will EHTXHVWLRQHG7KHUHIRUHSROLFLHVUHJXODWLRQVDQGODZVVKRXOGEHFOHDUO\GHÀQHG

204 Lo DQGFRPSUHKHQVLEOHDQGRSHUDWLRQDOSURFHGXUHVVKRXOGEHVLPSOLÀHGVRWKDWWKH\ are easily followed and implemented. Creating specialty-oriented promotion channels ‘Specialty-oriented promotion channels’ lay the keel for sustaining combat capabilities. Problems, however, exist at this moment. Force subjects, specialties, and responsibilities are confusingly tangled; as a result, specialty-oriented promotion cannot be facilitated and cultivation and promotion cannot be enhanced in the same pipeline. This problem is mainly contributed by the fact that the control RIDQRIÀFHU·VSURPRWLRQLVLQWKHKDQGVRIWRRPDQ\XQLWV6HUYLFH+HDGTXDUWHUV 6HUYLFH6XEMHFWLYH8QLWV-RLQWVDQG6WDIIVDVZHOODVRWKHUVXEXQLWVWKDWDQRIÀFHU belongs to. Furthermore, personnel units are in charge of training, employing, appointing, and relinquishing personnel, forming an overly centralized managing DXWKRULW\ DQG FDXVLQJ D YLFLRXV F\FOH RI UHGXQGDQW PDQSRZHU DQG XQVSHFLÀHG responsibilities. In addition, superiors tend to attach more importance to the FRPPDQGLQJRIÀFHUDQGLJQRUHSURIHVVLRQDORIÀFHUVVLJQLÀFDQWO\LPSDFWLQJWKH FRQÀGHQFHRIVSHFLDOL]HGSHUVRQQHODQGPDNLQJWKHPEHOLHYHWKDWWKHUHLVDYHU\ ORZFHLOLQJIRUFDUHHUGHYHORSPHQWLQWKHPLOLWDU\$OVRLQVXIÀFLHQWNQRZOHGJH about the personnel system generates doubts and cynicism, causing disintegration EHWZHHQFRPPDQGLQJDQGSURIHVVLRQDORIÀFHUVDQGWKXVQHJDWLYHO\DIIHFWLQJWKH overall military strength. As a series of new-generation technology is commissioned into service, the ROC military is in urgent need of high-quality professional manpower. It is important to review the employment and promotion of specialized and comPDQGLQJRIÀFHUVVRWKDWWKHWZRFDQEHSHUIHFWO\FRPSOHPHQWDU\WRHDFKRWKHU Promotion controlling authorities should be assigned clearly. ‘Specialty-oriented promotion channels’ will enable dual-track development in general and specialized skills as well as alternation between commanding and staff positions. Only a reasonable personnel structure with vision can upgrade the quality of the ROC military servicemen. ,PSURYLQJEHQHÀWVIRUVHUYLFHPHQDQGZRPHQ %HQHÀWVDQGRWKHULQGLUHFWJDLQVDUHRQHZD\WRLPSURYHPRUDOHDQGHIÀFLHQF\ $FFRUGLQJ WR $UWLFOH  RI WKH 'HIHQVH /DZ ´$FWLYHGXW\ RIÀFHUV VKRXOG EH UHVSHFWHG WKHLU SD\ LQVXUDQFH EHQHÀWV DZDUGV DQG SXQLVKPHQW DV ZHOO DV other rights should be protected by law.” The Legislative Yuan promulgated the Defense Law with an attached resolution: “when streamlining the defense organs and its manpower, the Ministry of National Defense should at the same WLPH UHYLHZ EHQHÀW SDFNDJH IRU VHUYLFHPHQµ7KH 5HJXODWLRQV IRU 6HUYLFHPHQ %HQHÀWV31 were drafted accordingly, taking a lead from the Regulations for Civil 6HUYDQWV DQG 3XEOLF 6FKRRO 7HDFKHUV %HQHÀWV IRU VHUYLFHPHQ LQFOXGH EDVLF EHQHÀWVDQGÁH[LEOHEHQHÀWV$%HQHÀW&RPPLWWHHVKRXOGEHHVWDEOLVKHGLQHYHU\

Funding for Taiwan’s defense reform

205

XQLW WR HQVXUH WKH VHUYLFHPHQ FDQ HQMR\ PD[LPXP ÁH[LEOH EHQHÀWV &XUUHQWO\ the Ministry of National Defense is expediting the revision of Regulations for 6HUYLFHPHQ·V3D\DQG5HJXODWLRQVIRU6HUYLFHPHQ·V%HQHÀWVVRWKDWRIÀFHUVDQG enlistees involved in high-risk jobs can have more protection and thus attract more youthful manpower into the military.

Conclusion In determining the manpower demand of the ROC armed forces, force planning and IRUFHVWUXFWXUHPRGLÀFDWLRQVVKRXOGEHWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW,QWKHIXWXUHZLWKDQ increased percentage of volunteer servicemen and a lower proportion of draftees, experienced personnel will be retained and thus the training cost for newcomers reduced. The number of volunteer servicemen will be increased annually to transit from the current conscription system to the voluntary recruitment system in the future. Since the establishment of the ROC Armed Force Recruiting Center, the quanWLW\DQGTXDOLW\RISHUVRQQHOUHFUXLWHGKDYHLPSURYHGVLJQLÀFDQWO\7KHUHFUXLWment efforts require more integrated planning and resources in order to attract more talents into the military. To cope with Streamline Project Phase II and future military education, it is planned to combine military academies at all levels. With teaching staff in reduced QXPEHUV \HW RI KLJKHU TXDOLW\ FHQWUDOL]HG HGXFDWLRQ UHVRXUFHV D PRUH UHÀQHG designed curriculum, and better educational equipment, the quality of education FDQEHHQKDQFHGDQGDÀUVWUDWHHGXFDWLRQHQYLURQPHQWFUHDWHGIRUWKHFXOWLYDWLRQ of a wealth of talents for the ROC armed forces. Defense human resource management needs to adopt a strict discipline and act in accordance with the law in order to build credible human resource policies, to recruit, use and retain talents, and therefore to create new image for the ROC military. It is essential to establish a promotion system that is specialty-oriented and to incorporate with it the appropriate educational resources. Of equal importance DUH D FOHDU GHÀQLWLRQ RI UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV LQ WHUPV RI SHUVRQQHO PDQDJHPHQW KLJKHU VWDQGDUGV DQG TXDOLÀFDWLRQV LQ UHFUXLWLQJ SHUVRQQHO LPSURYHG PDQDJHment; a reasonable selection process; appointments according to expertise; and a transparent assignment distribution process. By doing these, the goal of placing appropriate talents and expertise where they can contribute effectively can be achieved. In future, a combination of human resource units will be the focus of reform. The Ministry of National Defense should combine units that have similar funcWLRQVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVVRWKDWWKHUHLVDXQLÀHGDXWKRULW\GHDOLQJZLWKKXPDQ UHVRXUFH DIIDLUV %\ GRLQJ WKLV WKH SULQFLSOH RI ¶RSHUDWH DV \RX ÀJKW· FDQ EH observed and the goal of streamlining the organization can be achieved. The integration and combination of human resource staff units is therefore a task that demands immediate attention.

206 Lo

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Li Zheng-gang and Huang Jin-yin, Human Resource Management – New Century Perspective, Taipei: FCMC, 2001, p. 17. Chang Huo-tsan, Strategic Human Resource Management, Taipei: Yang Chih Publishing Co., 1997. Kuo Kuen-mo, Corporate Management, Taipei: Hwatai Publishing Co., 1984. Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, Taipei: MND, 2002, p. 82. Zhang Tien-zhou, Human Resource, Taipei: Wunan Books, 1999. E. Smith, “Strategic Business Planning and Human Resources,” Personnel Journal, 1982, pp. 606–10. M. M. Joanne, Y. L. Kerry, and M. K. Quaitance, “Human Resources Planning, in the Public Sector,” Personnel Journal, 1985, pp. 22–7. D. Hall and J. Goodale, Human Resources Management. Illinois: Scott, Foreman, 1986. T. G. Gutteridge, “Organizational Career Development System, The State of the Practice,” Career Development in Organization, pp. 50–94. S. M. Nkomo, “Strategic Planning for Human Resources – Let’s get started,” LongRange Planning, 21 (1), February 1988, pp. 66–72. Huang Ying-zhong, Human Resource Management, Taipei: Sanmin Books, 2000. Zhang Tien-zhou, Human Resource. Zhang Weiliang, Human Resource Management, Taipei: Hwatai Publishing Co., 1999. Liu Hsing-yue and Zhong Guo-hua, Military Human Resource Planning – Practical Research, Thesis of the First Defense Management Seminar, Taipei: National Defense Management College, 1993. MND, Military Dispensation, Taipei: MND, 1991. Zhong Guo-hua, Defense Human Resource – Analysis and Integration After the New Defense Laws, Thesis of the Ninth Defense Management Seminar, Taipei: National Defense Management College, 2001. Zhang Weiliang, Human Resource Management. Liu Hsing-yue and Zhong Guo-hua, Military Human Resource Planning – Practical Research. MND, Defense White Paper, Taipei: MND, 2002, p. 163. MND, Military Strategy Development and Reasonable Architecture, Taipei: MND, 2002, p. 132. Guidelines for the ROC Military Strategies, Taipei: MND, 2000. MND, Military Strategy Development and Reasonable Architecture, pp. 143–55. Chang Zhi-yu, Management, Taipei: FCMC, 2000, pp. 295–313. MND, Defense White Paper, Taipei: MND, 2002. Mid-term Policy Implementation Plan – 2002–2005, Taipei: MND, 2002, pp. 4–8. MND, Press Conference Materials – 5th Week, July 2003. MND, Press Conference Materials – 1st Week, July 2003. MND, Press Conference Materials – 2nd Week, September 2003. MND, Press Conference Materials – 2nd Week, August 2003. US Military Education, Taipei: Defense Language Institute, 1997, p. 196. MND, Press Conference Materials – 2nd Week, August 2003.

13 Military education and defense reform Wen-Chung Chai and Tzu-Yun Su

,QWURGXFWLRQ 7KH SXUSRVH RI PLOLWDU\ HGXFDWLRQ LV WR IRFXV RQ SURYLGLQJ RIÀFHUV DQG QRQ FRPPLVVLRQHGRIÀFHUV1&2V ZLWKWKHNQRZOHGJHDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJWRHQDEOH them to plan and execute future war. Future war, operational scenarios, and joint operational requirements are all important considerations in military education. Because the international strategic environment has changed dramatically in recent years and military technologies have improved rapidly, the understanding of the nature of war and operational concepts must adjust accordingly. Under these circumstances, states have embraced the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA), or ‘Defense Transformation,’ in order to create armed forces capable of dealing with both existing and future threats. For most countries, strengthening combat effectiveness and the purchase of advanced weapons and platforms are the major means of defense transformation. For the more advanced countries, the cultivation of high quality manpower is judged to be more important than just the research and development of weapons and platforms. Today, the Taiwan Ministry RI1DWLRQDO'HIHQVHKDVLQWURGXFHGVLJQLÀFDQWRUJDQL]DWLRQDOUHIRUPVLQRUGHUWR promote combat effectiveness and military readiness from 2004 until 2013. This chapter provides some suggestions for future military education planning.

)XWXUHEDWWOHÀHOGDQGGHIHQVHUHTXLUHPHQWV ,QSULQFLSOHIXWXUHEDWWOHÀHOGVZLOOGHSHQGKHDYLO\RQMRLQWRSHUDWLRQDOFDSDELOLWLHV From the perspective of defense planning and practice, the adversaries – and there may well be more than two – must possess forward-looking and comprehensive views and decision-making skills; correspondingly, the allocation of resources should avoid service-oriented biases. In order to escape previous abuses, most advanced states require that their high-ranking commanders should have held General Staff and Defense Ministry positions some time in the course of their military careers. With this background, therefore, they should understand the characteristics of individual services’ organizational culture and operational features that could make for a better policy on military build-ups and states of readiness. Special joint service personnel are referred to as wearing ‘purple clothing,’ which means serving in organizations where there is a mix of Army, Navy

208 Chai and Su and Air Force personnel. Joint staffs possess a range of expertise and capabilities that enable them to coordinate and command any one of the three services, or any combination. They can demonstrate, therefore, the effective capabilities for joint RSHUDWLRQVDQGLQFRDOLWLRQRSHUDWLRQVLQDQ\FRQÁLFWLQWKH7DLZDQ6WUDLW Otherwise, as Power Games indicated, Senator Barry Goldwater made the folORZLQJFULWLFLVPLQWKH866HQDWHLQWKDWLIWKH86ZHQWWRZDUWKHFRQÁLFW ZRXOGOHDGWRDPDMRUVDFULÀFHIRUWKH$PHULFDQSHRSOH0RUHRYHULWFRXOGSRWHQtially lead to a US defeat. He was profoundly concerned that the interests of an individual service could override national interests. Under those circumstances, WKHUHZHUHWZRSUREOHPVÀUVWWKHODFNRIDFUHGLEOHXQLÀHGFRPPDQGDQGVHFond, the conduct of a joint command that lacked the appropriate coordination and cooperation between the (four) branches of the US military. The lack of a credible XQLÀHGFRPPDQGLQYLWHGPLOLWDU\GHIHDWLQZKLFKHDFKVHUYLFHZRXOGJRLWVRZQ ZD\ZKLOVWWKHXQLÀHGFRPPDQGHUSXUVXHGDGLIIHUHQWFRXUVH7KHLQGLYLGXDOVHUvice may still prevail in the battle, he said, but the US would lose. Historically, the armed forces of many states have been defeated by internal factors, inter-service rivalry and lack of cooperation often being among them.

Future battle characteristics Today, the advanced states are engaged in a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) that could strengthen their military capabilities and enable them to conduct a wide variety of both traditional and new combat missions. The RMA not only stresses the importance of advanced weapons and platforms, but also the quality of military personnel. The US armed services are an example of this new generation military force. From the 1990s until the year 2003, US forces have been engaged in the First Gulf War (1990–1), the war over Kosovo; the war in Afghanistan, and the war RQ,UDTHDFKRIZKLFKUHÁHFWVIRXUGLIIHUHQWSDWWHUQVRIDUPHGFRQÁLFW1RUGRHV this take into account either US operations in Somalia or the current ‘War on Terrorism’ since 11 September 2001. Respectively, the First Gulf War represents a “two-and-half level civilization against a two-level civilization” war; the Kosovo :DUUHSUHVHQWVWKHÀUVWZDUWKDWGHSHQGHGRQO\RQDLUSRZHUWRREWDLQYLFWRU\WKH $IJKDQLVWDQ:DUUHSUHVHQWVWKHÀUVWZDULQZKLFKFRPELQHGDLUIRUFHVDQGVSHFLDO operations forces were deployed against a guerrilla force; and the second Gulf War – the War on Iraq – demonstrates a “third-level civilization against a one-anda-half level civilization” war.1 All four wars revealed distinctly different political objectives and each drew up indicators of future battle-space characteristics and future defense requirements. In general, compared with the preceding century’s wars, today’s and projections of future wars manifest the following characteristics: asymmetric situaWLRQV EHWZHHQ WKH FRPEDWDQWV DUH LQFUHDVLQJ WKH GXUDWLRQ RI DUPHG FRQÁLFW LV decreasing; the number of troops engaged has diminished; the range and scope of DUPHGFRQÁLFWKDVZLGHQHGPXQLWLRQVKDYHEHFRPHPRUHSUHFLVHDQGFROODWHUDO damage reduced; command and control in real time has been enhanced; and the

Military education and defense reform 209 deployment of Special Forces has become more prevalent. In the meantime, the differences in weapons capabilities – their range, accuracy, destructive power, size, lethality, stealth, etc. – have been expanding rapidly. The side with technological superiority can orchestrate an order of battle that FRRUGLQDWHV XQLW FRPEDW FDSDELOLWLHV WR EULQJ HIIHFWLYH ÀUH RQ VSHFLÀF WDUJHWV simultaneously. For example, during the Afghanistan War, the US seized absolute command of the air; this enabled the US Air Force (USAF) to combine precision air strikes with Special Forces operations against time-sensitive guerrilla forces’ WDUJHWV7KHLPSRUWDQWIDFWRUVRIVXFFHVVIXORSHUDWLRQVWRGD\DUHÁH[LELOLW\SUHFLVH objectives, and the modern aircraft’s high maneuverability and precision strike capabilities. In the meantime, technological superiority has enabled the forces of the DGYDQFHGVWDWHVWRFRQGXFWUHDOWLPHEDWWOHÀHOGUHFRQQDLVVDQFHFRPPXQLFDWLRQ intelligence exchange, command and control (C2), and battle damage assessment. In addition, modern digitized electronics have enabled those states to intercept enemy communication systems and give them absolute information superiority. In other words, the side with technological superiority has the maximum opportunity to shape the situation to its advantage, a situation that could establish the foundation for victory. The systems and the equipment operators are the two critical factors for the development of advanced weapons’ maximum effectiveness.

New and essential defense requirements %DWWOHÀHOG FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQG WKH GHIHQVH HQYLURQPHQW DUH WKH WZR PDMRU factors when formulating defense requirements. In the light of the above, future UHTXLUHPHQWVWKHUHIRUHLQFOXGHD DKLJKO\ÁH[LEOHUHVSRQVHFDSDELOLW\WRGHDO with multidimensional threats; (b) a reduced chain of command time gap to speed up operational tempo; (c) advanced system integration to promote joint RSHUDWLRQDOHIÀFLHQF\DQGG GLYHUVLÀFDWLRQRIPDMRUZHDSRQV\VWHPVWRLPSURYH FRVW²EHQHÀWUDWLRVDQGUHGXFHGHIHQVHH[SHQGLWXUH,QRUGHUWRLPSURYHRQSDVW capabilities, the focus of effort must be on high-technology weapons, intelligence management, and an effective organization. Notably, future defense requirements ZLOODOVRLQYROYHVRPHQRQPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVDQGORZLQWHQVLW\FRQÁLFWV7KHVH activities properly belong to an area of non-traditional warfare, but, considering their evident increase in frequency and intensity, the national defense planner should take serious notice of related issues and prepare for the armed services to become involved. With anti-terrorism, anti-drugs smuggling, anti-piracy, border protection, natural disaster assistance, and humanitarian aid operations all on the increase, the armed services must be able to adjust rapidly to conduct missions from those of a purely military nature to those that are strictly non-military. These new missions possess ‘uncertain’ and ‘unpredictable’ characteristics. Taiwan must be prepared to establish a new capability to deal with these sorts of non-military tasks, including peacekeeping, support for the civil authority, maintenance of law and order, calamity relief, and so on. Much professional military knowledge, including such

210 Chai and Su skills as combat in urban areas, multinational peacekeeping, surveillance and SURWHFWLRQSDWUROVHDUFKDQGUHVFXHDQGYHULÀFDWLRQDQGDUPVFRQWUROVKRXOGEH introduced into the different levels of the military educational system. This would enable the Taiwanese armed forces to acquire the related knowledge necessary to contribute to, and perform, a variety of these non-military missions. 7KHIXWXUH7DLZDQHVHZDUPDFKLQHFRQVWLWXWHVDFRPSOH[V\VWHPZLWKUHÀQHG technological characteristics. These special characteristics lead to a national defense community being highly knowledgeable and intellectually able. By way of an example to illustrate this point, a traditional typist knew only the location of the lettering on the keyboard and an awareness of a simple mechanical function that enabled the smooth operation of the typewriter. The modern typist, however, must not only remember the keyboard’s layout but also possess knowledge of the hardware and software that enables the effective and smooth operation of the system – either the electronic typewriter or a computer word processor and associated ancillary equipment. Indeed, the quality of personnel, both for typewriting and for military service, has become more important than ever. As explained above, the pattern of future war changes, as does the high-technology military operational environment. Under these circumstances, high quality personnel are needed to conduct a wide variety of traditional, conventional, and new missions. In addition to the increase in non-military activities and Operations Other Than War (OOTW), armed forces throughout the world face many challenges in the foreseeable future. In particular, relevant knowledge is no longer provided by the traditional military educational systems. The system must thereIRUHFRPELQHZLWKWKHFLYLOLDQV\VWHPWRGHYHORSVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVÁH[LEOHDQG adaptable and which will enable armed service personnel of all ranks to cope with dramatic new strategic changes.

Taiwan’s current military educational system Except for military training, Taiwan’s military education is similar to the civilian in that it focuses on general knowledge courses.2 Basically, its military education system comprises seven elements: (a) the Military Academy; (b) the Reserve 2IÀFHUV 7UDLQLQJ &RUSV 527&  DWWDFKHG WR XQLYHUVLWLHV F  FLYLOLDQ VFKRROV· military training courses; (d) recruit training; (e) public defense education and training; (f) national strategic education; and (g) civilian colleges and universities (Tables 13.1 and 13.2).

$QLQÁH[LEOHVWUDWHJLFFXOWXUH In the opinion of the military educational organization, Taiwan’s military education system is considered complete. Any member of the public who questions the educational content of his courses and the professional authority and competence of the instructors always causes offense to Taiwan’s military academies. In particular, the political course overrides professional military ones. The former Chief of General Staff (CGS), General Luo Ben-li, seriously

Military education and defense reform 211 Table 13.1 Major military education institutions in Taiwan Organization/ function Military academy ROTC Civilian school military training courses Recruit training Public defense knowledge education National strategic education Civilian strategic education

Supervisor MND, Service HQ MND MTD, Ministry of Education

Members Cadre University/college students High school and university students

Services HQ OTD&D, MND

Recruit Public

NDU

Particular military and JRYHUQPHQWRIÀFHUV

Some civilian universities

Postgraduate students

Comments

Military–civilian exchange education

Table 13.2 Taiwan’s military education system Supervisor Army HQ

Academy CMA

Navy HQ

Army High School CNA

Air Force HQ MND

Chinese Air Force Academy Air Force Technology Institute MND CCIT NDMC

PWS NDMC CCAFPS

Period of schooling Four years Two years Three years Four years Two years Four years Two years Varies Four years, Master’s Two years Seven years, Master’s and PhD Six years Four years Four years, Master’s and PhD Two years Four years, Master’s Two years High School Department Junior High School Department

suggested that “political departments arranged political courses in order to prevent anyone to becoming involved in a revolutionary struggle. However, they were short of professional courses that would lead to the acquisition of professional knowledge.”3 From an examination of the early records, this view frequently appeared. For example, the Political War School changed its name and boasted,

212 Chai and Su “The armed forces’ political education that provides a particular foundation in support of The Three Principles.”4 This sort of education underscored political thought, but neglected professional educational objectives and deviated from the students’ intellectual development. There are many reasons behind these phenomena including: 1

2

3

Taiwan’s strategic culture. In the civil war period, many Kuomintang (KMT) generals revolted against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and, when the KMT regime withdrew to Taiwan, military education focused only on SROLWLFDOWKRXJKWVWKDW¶SXULÀHG·PLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHO The military circles were self-centered and virtually closed to outside access; RIÀFHUV DQG QRQFRPPLVVLRQHG RIÀFHUV FDPH IURP VLPLODU V\VWHPV DQG avoided contract with civilians on the grounds of national security. As a consequence, the military lacked exposure to the civilian world whilst at the same time the study of military affairs by civilians was considered ‘taboo.’ Military science was not addressed in academic circles, to its, and the military RIÀFHUV·GHWULPHQW

)RU WKHVH UHDVRQV PLOLWDU\ HGXFDWLRQ EHFDPH RVVLÀHG IRU D ORQJ WLPH Consequently, Taiwan’s military educational system failed to respond quickly to VRFLDOVWUDWHJLFDQGHQYLURQPHQWDOFKDQJH$IWHUWKHÀUVW*XOI:DUWKLVSKHQRPenon was worse than ever.

The ignorance of the civilian government Fortunately, since the mid-1990s, many people have emerged who were committed to the reform of the military educational system. For example, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) began to amend the Military Education Regulations, which had advanced the view that military academies were not responsible for military training.5 The following year, the Control Yuan submitted a Report on its Survey of Military Education Regulations, which indicated that WKHPLOLWDU\DFDGHPLHVZHUHWRRVPDOOWREHQHÀWIURPHFRQRPLHVRIVFDOH7KH recommendation was that they would have to merge.6 Further research revealed that the total expenditure of the twenty-four military academies was less than half that of the National Taiwan University’s (NTU’s) spending per year.7 Put VLPSO\7DLZDQ·VPLOLWDU\HGXFDWLRQV\VWHPIDFHVPDQ\GLIÀFXOWLHVLQFOXGLQJDQ LQDSSURSULDWHRUJDQL]DWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHDQGLQHIÀFLHQWXVHRIUHVRXUFHV,QDGGLWLRQ the military education system’s position and value to society have not been correctly recognized by the civilian government. There is currently some concern over military education problems among civilians. For example, President Chen Shui-bian supports an increase in funding for the military education system and has requested that the Ministry of Education provide some additional funds.8 Legislators on the Legislative Yuan Armed Forces Committee have also requested the MND to increase the budget for military education in line with the nature of future war and new defense and military opera-

Military education and defense reform 213 9

tional requirements. Given the comparative gap that academics and others circles have recognized in the provision of military education between Taiwan and other advanced states, this author has argued that it is important for military education to be given widespread support among the civilian community.

Defense transformation has to accelerate In order to improve teaching quality, the MND give an impetus for academic faculty to attend rotational training.10 In addition, the MND intends to merge the military academies in order to simplify the military educational system. Through the MND’s continuing efforts, the Air Force Department of the National Defense 8QLYHUVLW\ 1'8  DFTXLUHG WKH ,62  7HDFKLQJ 4XDOLW\ &HUWLÀFDWLRQ11 In addition to the military academies, civilian colleges and universities have gradually turned their attention to military education. Following the lead of the NTU, several other universities have introduced military-related science courses. In 2004, one university will even have started “advanced military education study classes” that FRXOGKHOSQRQFRPPLVVLRQHGRIÀFHUVDFTXLUHPLOLWDU\NQRZOHGJH12 US reform measures have emphasized the need to adjust military education policies, merge training institutions, and improve education and training systems WKDWFRXOGKHOSSURPRWHRYHUDOOHIÀFLHQF\%HFDXVH7DLZDQ·VGHIHQVHUHVRXUFHVDUH VLJQLÀFDQWO\OHVVWKDQWKRVHRIWKH86LWLVXQDEOHWRDGRSWWKHVDPHDSSURDFKWR its reform of the military education system. Even so, Taiwan could adapt another FRXQWU\·VH[SHULHQFHVLQWKLVUHVSHFWEXWPXVWDWOHDVWFRQVLGHUÀUVWWKHIROORZLQJ basic principles: The NDU’s major objectives 7KH1'8·VPLVVLRQLVWRSURGXFHKLJKO\TXDOLÀHGDQGDEOHFRPPDQGHUVIRUHDFK of the three services. The NDU’s administration and development should follow this objective. It must devote every effort to cultivate high-ranking decisionPDNLQJDQGVWDIIRIÀFHUV,QWKHYLHZRIWKLVDXWKRUZKDWHYHUHOVHKDSSHQVWKH NDU’s transformation process should not neglect this fundamental objective. Creating professional military personnel The community must respect the professional serviceman and woman. The art of ZDUQRWZLWKVWDQGLQJEDWWOHÀHOGPDQDJHPHQWLQYROYHVGHFLVLRQPDNLQJUHVRXUFH allocation, and personnel management. This in itself demands a high degree of professionalism. In addition, communications, mechanical, and engineering RIÀFHUVUHTXLUHRWKHUSURIHVVLRQDOTXDOLÀFDWLRQVDQGVNLOOV Rebuilding the authority of the military science academy For a long time, Taiwan’s military science has been undervalued and limited to “the study of aircraft, tanks, and artillery.” In fact, military science research is not

214 Chai and Su dissimilar to other social sciences, which have their own theory, methodology, and models. The NDU and others should endeavor to strive to teach and research both military theory and principles. Integrate military and civilian strategic education Currently, Taiwan’s civil servants lack any strategic perception or knowledge. In SDUWLFXODUPDQ\PLGGOHDQGKLJKUDQNLQJRIÀFHUVDUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUGLSORPDF\ and mainland affairs, but lack any training and teaching on related strategic courses. Under these circumstances, they consequently deal with diplomacy and decision-making on mainland affairs from one narrow perspective. This approach has meant that Taiwan fails to coordinate or integrate its diplomatic, national defense, and mainland affairs policies. Again, in the view of this author, the Executive Yuan and the Examination Yuan should coordinate their policies and add courses on strategic studies to the civil servants’ educational and training systems. Courses can be given by correspondence prepared and taught by NDU IDFXOW\RUWKHFLYLOLDQRIÀFHUVFDQVWXG\GLUHFWO\DWWKH1'8 Simultaneously, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and MND middleand high-ranking civil servants must establish mutual trust and understanding between them if they are to deal effectively with critical national security threats. In addition, Taiwan’s future military education should include some professional courses to strengthen the knowledge and understanding of military, defense, security, and strategic issues among military personnel. These professional courses should include the areas listed in Table 13.3.

Taiwan’s future military education Considering that the threat from mainland China is increasing, Taiwan’s military education needs urgent and necessary adjustment. Through qualitative superiority acting as a substitute for quantitative inferiority, Taiwan has been able to maintain the military balance across the Taiwan Strait for over a half a century. Since 1990, Taiwan has introduced into its military inventory a number of advanced platforms and weapons, including the Perry-class frigates, the Knox-class destroyers, PAC DLU GHIHQVH PLVVLOHV (7 DLUFUDIW ) ÀJKWHUERPEHUV DQG 0LUDJH  ÀJKWHUV7UDLQHGPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHORIWKHKLJKHVWDELOLW\DUHQHHGHGWRRSHUDWH and maintain these new platforms and weapons and keep them at instant levels of readiness. Otherwise, they would not be able to operate effectively and would also be potentially dangerous. For these reasons, it is fundamental that professionally WUDLQHG SHUVRQQHO PXVW EH PDGH DYDLODEOH LQ VXIÀFLHQW QXPEHUV WR EHFRPH WKH essential core of Taiwan’s military build-up. In the face of the military threat posed by a modernized PLA, Taiwan lacks the numbers of personnel to deal with the enormous size of the PLA. The only alternative is to enhance military professional training and improve the quality of each serviceman and woman. Military education is, therefore, much more important than simply introducing modern ships, aircraft, and missiles. The issue now is the question of how to promote and improve Taiwan’s military education.

Military education and defense reform 215 Table 13.3 Professional military courses Field Comprehensive security

Major contents Traditional and non-traditional Trans-dimensional security

Strategic assessment

International political situation Intelligence, judgment, and analysis Strategic culture Military thought and force comparisons

Strategic planning

Military strategic introduction Revolution in military affairs Strategic and geopolitics Net assessment Political–military simulation and war games

Policy-making

Comparative national defense policies Military cooperation and exchange Military and legislative sector relations Enemy-and-foe relation management The laws of war and treaties

Budgetary allocation

Comparative national defense budget Budgetary framework and PPBS

Force build-up

Services’ development Force structure and joint operations Force planning approaches

The transformation of Taiwan’s military education For a long time, Taiwan’s military education has been isolated from the national educational system. This arrangement has neither encouraged or fostered military reform nor supported a military build-up. On the contrary, it has determined that military education has neither had a share of the nation’s educational resources nor been supervised by the national educational system. Military education has hardly been in a position to adjust to rapid change in society. It is hardly VXUSULVLQJWKHUHIRUHWKDWH[SHQGLWXUHRQPLOLWDU\HGXFDWLRQKDVEHHQVLJQLÀFDQWO\ less than on the national university, alone. Spending on military education has EHHQLQVXIÀFLHQWHYHQIRUWKHPLOLWDU\DFDGHPLHVWRDIIRUGHQRXJKVRIWZDUHDQG computer hardware that could enhance the quality of their teaching and research. In future, military education must merge with the national education system and accept Ministry of Education appraisal and periodic inspections. Were this to KDSSHQPLOLWDU\HGXFDWLRQZRXOGRYHUFRPHLWVIXQGLQJGLIÀFXOWLHVDQGFRPELQH its military concerns with those of society. In another words, military education would, of necessity, have to adjust in order to attract the best scholars to teach the challenges and patterns of future war and of social change.13 The Chinese Military Academy (CMA), Chinese Naval Academy (CAN), Chinese Air Force Academy (CAFA), Services’ Staff College, and War College

216 Chai and Su would then be brought into the national education system. In fact, the top US Military Academies – Annapolis, West Point, and Colorado Springs – fall within the US national higher educational system. In another words, candidates must achieve the required national Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores to be accepted and the military cadets acquire the same credits as those that civilian universities require to graduate. Many can also continue studies to earn their master’s degree at either a civilian or a military institution. This can enhance the quality RIWKHIDFXOW\ZLWKLQWKHPLOLWDU\DFDGHPLHVDQGDOVRHQFRXUDJHPLOLWDU\RIÀFHUV to attend advanced study courses. Because of its semi-closed military education V\VWHP7DLZDQGRHVQRWSRVVHVVVXFKDQLQQRYDWLYHVSLULWDQGÀQGVLWGLIÀFXOWWR respond to either the strategic environment or new and rapidly changing operational developments.

Correcting Taiwan’s military education policy The current “training for application” and “training combines application” FRQFHSWVUHÁHFWWKHFRUHSULQFLSOHVWKDWJXLGH7DLZDQ·VPLOLWDU\HGXFDWLRQSROLF\ This policy employs “the cultivation of a military career” and “advanced academic study” approaches to achieve its objectives and does so at “basic”, “advanced”, and “further” levels, or stages.14 In theory, these military education policy principles are fairly comprehensive, but many problems have surfaced in practice. First, in a military education system that stresses “training for application” principles, there are more compulsory courses than optional ones and the focus is on applied work to the neglect of theory and research. As the civilian universities move forward with their “general knowledge” and “integration” courses, military education must, out of necessity, review its own curricula.15 In particular, for the senior RIÀFHUV´WUDLQLQJIRUDSSOLFDWLRQµLVWKHEHWWHUPRGHOOHDYLQJMXQLRURIÀFHUVWR get on ahead with their own work. Although this approach also meshes with cost– EHQHÀWFRQVLGHUDWLRQVLWPD\DOVRHQFRXUDJHPHGLRFULW\DQGOHDYHWKHVHUYLFHV ZLWKSRRUO\HGXFDWHGDQGHYHQLQFRPSHWHQWRIÀFHUV7KHDGYDQWDJHVWR7DLZDQ·V military of emphasizing “training for application” principles would appear to be less than the disadvantages.16 With advanced technology, the patterns of war and international environment are constantly changing. Many states, therefore, are planning for “the army after next”. Technological advances tend to break military missions and organizations down into a number of professional specialisms. Future warfare, for example, now depends heavily on non-military professional knowledge.17 Military educational objectives must, therefore, develop cultivated, open-minded, and all-round RIÀFHUVIRUZKRP´JHQHUDONQRZOHGJHµDQG´LQWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\LQWHJUDWLRQµDUH the core elements of their education and training. For example, the course content of a basic military education and a school system should be similar, as should the course contents of military academies, civilian colleges, and universities. Military education ought to stress theory and diverse learning and, through this approach, military personnel should develop independent judgment and professional

Military education and defense reform 217 NQRZOHGJH7KHVHDWWULEXWHVFRXOGWKHQKHOSRIÀFHUVWDNHRSWLPXPGHFLVLRQVLQDQ ambiguous and uncertain environment.

0LOLWDU\HGXFDWLRQGLYHUVLÀFDWLRQWKURXJKWKH527& 'LYHUVLÀFDWLRQ H[LVWV LQ WKH FRQWHQW RI PLOLWDU\ HGXFDWLRQ FRXUVHV DQG FDQ DOVR EHIRXQGLQFRXUVHVIRUMXQLRURIÀFHUV&XUUHQWO\WKRVHDWWHQGLQJMXQLRURIÀFHUV· courses include, inter alia, graduates from the military academies, the ROTC, QDWLRQDOVHUYLFHRIÀFHUV\RXQJRIÀFHUVDVVLJQHGWRDWWHQGE\WKHLUXQLWVDQGVR RQ(YHQZLWKRIÀFHUVFRPLQJIURPVXFKDZLGHYDULHW\RIGLIIHUHQWHGXFDWLRQDO HVWDEOLVKPHQWVPRVWRI7DLZDQ·VKLJKHVWUDQNLQJRIÀFHUVFRPHIURPWKHPLOLWDU\ academies – for example, the Chinese Military Academy (CMA), the Chinese Naval Academy (CAN), the Chinese Air Force Academy (CAFA), and the Political Warfare School (PWS). Because the military education system is inadequate to meet the requirement for military personnel with diverse backgrounds, the MND ÀUVWLQWURGXFHGWKH527&V\VWHPLQ7KH\H[SHFWHGWKH527&ZRXOGDWWUDFW able younger university students to dedicate their time toward national defense. Taiwan’s ROTC system has been in operation since 1999 and was based on the US ROTC system, which has operated successfully for a long time. There, ROTC VWXGHQWVKDYLQJÀUVWFRPSOHWHGDQRIÀFHUEDVLFWUDLQLQJFRXUVHDUHDVVLJQHGWR WKHUDQNRIDVHFRQGOLHXWHQDQWZLWKDFRPPLWPHQWWRVHUYHIRUDIXUWKHUÀYH\HDUV When reaching the point where they can volunteer to join the armed forces, they can either choose to retire or continue serving.18 7DLZDQ·VH[SHULHQFHZLWKWKH527&V\VWHPKDVEHHQVRVKRUWWKDWLWLVGLIÀFXOW to judge whether or not it has been effective. In the case of the US, the ROTC system has produced many distinguished military professional servicemen, including the former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell (later US Secretary of State), and General and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, General M. Shalikashvili. On the basis of US experience, it is expected that Taiwan’s ROTC will deliver excellent results over time. Due to scarce defense resources, however, Taiwan’s military education LVXQDEOHWREHQHÀWIURPHFRQRPLHVRIVFDOHIRUWKLVUHDVRQWKH527&V\VWHP can help reduce the costs of military education and promote military educational GLYHUVLÀFDWLRQ%DVHGRQSDVWH[SHULHQFH7DLZDQ·V527&V\VWHPVKRXOGJUDGXally expand in scope and numbers and produce more professional personnel able to address the challenges of future high-technology warfare.

Enhance civil and military educational exchange Currently, cooperation between the military academies and civilian colleges and universities includes academic exchanges, cooperative plans, and strategic alliance partnerships. Both sides, for example, combine in running ROTC programs and the EMBA for military personnel. For example, the NDU and NTU came together to put on a Master’s Degree Credit Class and establish a Military Education Center of Excellence.19 Other examples include the NDU and NTU signing a

218 Chai and Su Management Academic Cooperation Agreement; the Chinese Naval Academy and NTOU working together on new educational courses; and AFIT participating in an Aircraft Maintenance Strategic Alliance with the Ministry of Education’s ASTEPP.20 The Ministry of Education has indicated that concrete measures have been taken to enhance civil–military cooperation, broaden academic exchanges, encourage cross-academic cooperation, increase faculty resources for military education, and so on.21 )URP WKH LQLWLDWLYHV LGHQWLÀHG DERYH H[LVWLQJ FLYLO²PLOLWDU\ H[FKDQJH KDV essentially been a one-way process. Nevertheless, many military personnel have enrolled on civilian educational courses and attend a variety of advanced study classes. This practice can disturb civil–military exchanges and also lead to some confusion. To address this problem, the NDU brought together in November 2002 WKLUW\ VHQLRU PLOLWDU\ RIÀFHUV DQG FLYLOLDQ RIÀFLDOV WR DGGUHVV D ´+LJK 5DQNLQJ Civil–military Strategic Education Exchange”. The objective was to elicit governPHQWRIÀFLDOV·YLHZVRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODQGVWUDWHJLFGHYHORSPHQWV7KLVLQLWLDWLYH effort was an early step in expanding collaboration among senior government RIÀFLDOV DQG PLOLWDU\ FRPPDQGHUV22 In fact, the military must be more proactive when engaged in civil–military exchanges of this nature. For example, in the US, the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, DQGWKH1DYDO:DU&ROOHJHFDQH[HUFLVHLQÁXHQFHWKDWLVFRPSDUDEOHWRDQ\RWKHU governmental agency. The MND can build on this US experience and open up the opportunity for civil servants or strategic researchers to contribute to the work of the NDU. These measures could strengthen civil–military exchange and establish a foundation for cross-agency operations.

,PSURYHQRQFRPPLVVLRQHGRIÀFHUV·HGXFDWLRQ 7DLZDQ·V 01' KDV QRW JLYHQ PXFK DWWHQWLRQ WR QRQFRPPLVVLRQHG RIÀFHUV· HGXFDWLRQ IRU D ORQJ WLPH ,W UHFHQWO\ SXW IRUZDUG D 6\VWHP RI 3HWW\ 2IÀFHU Promotion that depends heavily on the quality of NCO’s performance. However, vacancies among NCOs in all three services have meant that promotion could not be decided through competition or evidence of professional knowledge. Furthermore, the shortfall of NCOs is too large for them to be able to oversee the work of other ranks. These developments threaten to be to the detriment of effective leadership, undermine the military build-up (particular in the Navy and Air Force, where there is a high dependence on high technology), and hamper equipment maintenance for operational effectiveness. In order to meet the requirements of future war and guarantee the effectiveness of modern, high-technology weapons, the Taiwanese armed services must review and assess the existing NCO system. ,QWKHSDVWWKH1&23HWW\2IÀFHU3URPRWLRQ6\VWHPFRQFHQWUDWHGRQVDODULHV and promotion. This helped to improve and shape the image of the NCO, but contributed little to strengthening operational readiness or effectiveness. In view RI7DLZDQ·VPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQV1&2VDUHXQOLNHFRPPLVVLRQHGRIÀFHUVLQWKDW they must rotate in and out of other units. In other words, the quality and training of NCOs lies at the core of Taiwan’s military build-up. As a consequence, the need

Military education and defense reform 219 to improve and enhance the competence of NCOs is as important as, if not more WKDQWKDWRIRIÀFHUV Currently, NCOs’ education is about the same level as high school or college graduates. For a long time, their education has been expanding and levels are now roughly equivalent to college and university entrance standards. As future draftees may well often possess a Bachelor’s, Master’s, or doctoral degree, NCOs must soon be able to adjust to and match the challenges of leadership and management. In addition, in the expectation that the effectiveness of modern weapons will increase, NOCs’ professional knowledge and competence will also become a critical factor. Recently, the MND decided to bring NCOs’ education into the military academies. This is a welcome and entirely proper development.23

Conclusion With the patterns of war and society changing rapidly, Taiwan’s military education has to adjust accordingly and as soon as possible. Because of sharp reductions in defense expenditure, the budget for military education is hardly likely to increase in the near future. Under these circumstances, the MND must tap into civilian education resources to enhance military professionalism. In order to meet RMA ambitions, innovation is the critical element and one that could EHDFKLHYHGWKURXJKPLOLWDU\GLYHUVLÀFDWLRQ$QLPSRUWDQWDSSURDFKWR7DLZDQ·V military modernization is to introduce bright young people to the armed forces. Furthermore, the MND must also enable NCOs to operate advanced weapons and enhance weapons effectiveness. The fundamental objective is to generate a spirit of innovation through a diverse range of educational experiences and military GLYHUVLÀFDWLRQERWKRIZKLFKDUHHIIHFWLYHPHDQVZLWKZKLFKWRGHDOZLWK&KLQHVH military threats. It is through the application of creative thought that Taiwan’s available national defense resources can be used to deter or, if necessary, defeat the enemy.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

The author assesses the Second Gulf War, in which the Iraqi army lost mechanization capabilities, so they had to heavily depend on bicycles. Based on this fact, the author called it a “one-and-a-half level civilization.” Youth Daily, 27 September 2003, p. 3. United Daily, 19 October 1997, p. 1. Youth Daily, 6 January 1971. United Daily, 8 August 1994, p. 1. China Times, 14 January 1995, p 7. Youth Daily, 14 November 1996, p. 3. Youth Daily, 7 February 2001, p. 1. Youth Daily, 15 October 2002, p 3. Youth Daily, 2 September 2003, p. 3. Youth Daily, 26 September 2001, p 1. Youth Daily, 10 December 2003, p. 11.

220 Chai and Su 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23

Zhou Zhu-in, “ROTC System and Taiwan Military Education: From Taiwan 'LYHUVLÀHG6RFLHW\$VSHFWµLQArmed Forces and Society Conference Proceedings, Taipei: National Policy Research Center, 1996, pp. 8.4–8.5. Ma Lung-hwa, “Following ‘Training for Application’ to Discuss CMC’s professional and military division connection mechanism,” Military Education Conference Proceedings, 2002, Taipei: National Defense University, 2002, p. 18. Zhu Rong-sing, “A Study of Major and Auxiliary Courses,” Armed Forces Education System and Course Framework, in Military Education Conference Proceedings, Taipei: National Defense University, 1994. Ma Lung-hwa et al., “Following ‘Training for Application’ to Discuss CMC’s professional and military division connection mechanism,” p. 21. A.F. Krepinevich, Jr., “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment,” in War Theory Course Book, Vol. 3, Maxwell, AL: Air University Press, 1995; Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War, London: Oxford University Press, 1999; S.J. Cimbala, “Accidental/Inadvertent Nuclear War and Information War,” Armed Forces and Society, 25 (4), Summer 1999, pp. 653–75. Ma Lung-hwa et al., “Following ‘Training for Application’ to Discuss CMC’s professional and military division connection mechanism,” p. 6. “NDU and NTNU Sign Contract to Strengthen Cooperation,” Youth Daily, 12 March 2003, p. 3. “Wu Da-Pen: Military Education No Limitation,” Youth Daily, 3 June 2003, p. 11. Youth Daily, 3 June 2003, p. 11. Youth Daily, 23 October 2002, p. 1. Youth Daily, 7 January 2003, p. 1.

,QGH[

administrative reorganization 177–9 AEGIS long-range radar system 8, 12, 13, 71, 157, 158 Afghanistan 4, 9, 208, 209 air defense missile systems 46, 98, 99, 117, 162, 179, 214 air force modernization 47 American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) 49–50, 51, 69, 143, 145, 147 anti-carrier weapon systems 153 anti-ship missile systems 8, 46, 153, 158 anti-submarine: assets 153; war issue 158–60; warfare (ASW) capability 13, 37, 46, 49, 50, 105, 144, 153, 158 anti-tank guided weapons 46 Armaments Bureau 92, 134 ¶$UPHG)RUFHV5HÀQLQJ3URJUDP· 115–16, 173, 177, 182, 185 armed services: future structures of 116– 21; impact of military reform on 69–70; organizational development of 115–17 armored personnel carriers (M-113, V-150 and CM-21) 46 arms acquisitions: deliveries (past 10 years) 180; past focus of 187; prioritization of 185–6; procurement policies 49–50, 54–5 Australia, military organizations and force structures 113, 114 AWAC aircraft 54 ballistic missiles: MRBMs 160, 161, 163; PLA capabilities 20; SRBMs 21m 42, 160, 161, 163; Taiwan’s capabilities 21 battle characteristics: battle-space H[WHQVLRQGHIHQVHDQGEDWWOHÀHOG requirements in future 207–8; future view 208–9 Battlespace Dominance 9

brigadier general, establishment of rank 203 budgets and funding: budget analysis (1999–2004) 175; budgetary appropriation, fundamental nature of 173–4; budgetary structure, rigidity of 181–2; cost-effectiveness in PLOLWDU\UHIRUPFRVWVYVHIÀFDF\ GHÀFLHQF\LQEXGJHW military budget of PRC 55; MND budget shortfall 13; PPBS (planning, programming, and budgeting system) 18, 215; Taiwan, defense budgets of 108–9, 183–4; see also funding of reform Burma (Myanmar) 5 Bush, George W. 3, 6, 8, 12, 46, 53, 143 Bush, Richard 49–50, 72 business corporations, problems of cooperation with military 131–2 C4I (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence) installations 34, 42 C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capability 10, 19, 34, 74, 117, 120; cost of, expensive nature of 51; defense priority 146–7, 185–6; defense reform 10, 48, 55; enemy key nodes of 52; enhancement of 48, 55, 179, 183 CAFA (Chinese Air Force Academy) 215, 217 Campbell, Kurt 144 CAN (Chinese Naval Academy) 215, 217 Central Military Commission (CMC) in PRC 41, 42, 43 central network of national defense policy 88–91

222 Index certainty and uncertainty, mix of 151–2, 153–4, 162 Chai, Wen-Chung 14 Chang, Parris H. 45, 51, 54, 63 Chang Shu-Cheng 90 Chang, Shi-Lun, General 102, 103 change: balance changes in force components 20; complete change in armed forces, MND call for 41; costs of 66; emergent change 73–4; planned change 73, 74–5; political change in Taiwan 30; political stability and military change, trade-off between 68–70; rate of 75; resistance to change 21–2; top-down/bottom-up approaches to 72–3 Chen, Chao-Min, General 18 Chen, Chung-Shin 63 Chen Shui-bian, President 7, 10, 30, 48, 51, 70, 72, 106; Defense Policy, White Paper on 10, 45, 74–5; election as President 14–15, 76; initiatives to enhance defense 18, 23, 63–5, 143–4; on military restructuring 45–6; personal connections with armed forces 63; ‘President Chen understands this danger’ 143; referendum arranged by 30–1; support for military education 212 Chen, Ti-Tuan, General 54 Chen, York 10, 16 Chiang, Ching-Kuo, President 45 Chiang Kai-Shek 41, 44, 45, 52 China, People’s Republic of (PRC): airborne troops for attack on Taiwan 34; ‘assassin’s mace’, strategy against Taiwan 111; assessment of options ²EUHYLW\RIFRQÁLFWGXUDWLRQ for planned capture of Taiwan 33; capture of Taiwan, option of 32–5; Central Military Commission (CMC) in PRC 41, 42, 43; coercive option 31–2; downsized and streamlined military 42–3; escalation in coercive behavior 32; evolving military capabilities 19, 41–4; independence dialogue ZLWK7DLZDQLQÁXHQFHRQUHVWRI world of 6–7; information operations (IO) in planned attack on Taiwan 34; invasion, all-out, in planned attack on Taiwan 34–5; military budget of 55; military force, role of 31–5, 41–4; military organizations and force structures 113; military reforms,

‘Two Transformations’ 42; military regions, cuts in 43; military threat posed to Taiwan by 97–9, 116, 120–1; PLQLPL]DWLRQRIÀJKWLQJDQGZDU damage in planned capture of Taiwan 33; missile strikes in planned attack on Taiwan 34; nuclear capability 164, 166; ‘One China’ policy of 6–7, 30; ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy 7, 111– 12; operational assessment of options 35–6, 37; operational requirements, manageability in planned capture of Taiwan 33–5; option scenarios in respect of Taiwan 31–5; PRC HIIRUWVWRLQÁXHQFH86²UROHLQ convincing US of need for reform in Taiwan’s defenses 148–9; sabotage and disinformation in planned attack on Taiwan 34; self-defense posture 35; special forces in planned attack on Taiwan 34; strategic assessment of options 35, 37; strategic intent of 29–31; submarines in planned attack on Taiwan 34, 158–60; surprise and daring in planned attack on Taiwan 34; Taiwan HOHFWLRQVDWWHPSWVWRLQÁXHQFHDQG US, attempts to give US pause 153–5 China People’s University 41 Ching Dynasty 101 civil–military relations 22, 125 civil servants, employment of more 203 civilian command system, implementation of 125 civilian control of nationalized military 93–4; central political feature 22 civilian government, ignorance of 212–13 FLYLOLDQRIÀFHUVLQFUHDVHLQQXPEHUVLQ decision-making 132–3 civilianizing the military 93–4 clarity in strategy for defense reform 12–13 Clinton, Bill 143 CMA (Chinese Military Academy) 215, 217 Cohen, William S. 50 Cold War 3, 24, 36, 159 collective responsibility for national security 79 combat unit command problems 129–30 Combined Logistics Command 179 command and admin structure, implementation of single-unit 125 FRPPDQGDXWKRULW\GLIÀFXOWLHVZLWK command levels, recognition of 136

Index 223 command system reorganization 177–9 Commander-in-Chief, authority of 132 competitiveness and human resources 191 computer network attacks (CNAs) 34 conscription in Taiwan 109–10, 133 ‘Consolidation Project’, expedition of 126, 133 content of defense reform 174–6 continuous reform, importance of 173–4 costs see budgets and funding counter operations capability 52–3 credibility of policies 201 cross-departmental defense contract committee 136 decision-making: dilemmas in 66; environment for 64–5, 75–6; governmental politics model of 86–7; LQFUHDVHLQQXPEHUVRIFLYLOLDQRIÀFHUV in 132–3; models of process 86–7; organizational process model of 86–7; on security, uniquely complex and challenging environment for 150, 153–4 defense human resources 198 defense policy network, diagram of 89 defense reform 44–8, 96; addressing the issue of 8–9; advantages of? 21; ballistic missile capabilities 21; C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capability 10, 48, 55; civil–military relations, implications for? 22; civilian control of nationalized military, central political feature of 22; clarity in strategy for 12–13; conclusion on 14–15; content of 174–6; decisionmaking environment for 64–5, 75–6; deterrence and defense, effective and resolute 48; doctrinal requirements? 19–20; economic development and 10–11; economic development and military policy, trade-off between 67–8; education and training 10, 14; elite forces, mission revision for 48; extensiveness of agenda for 10; ÀUHSRZHUHQKDQFHPHQW²IRFXV of? 17–18; force components, balance changes? 20; force level downsizing 47; funding for 13, 68, 108–9; ‘growing pains’ in 53–4; institutional foundation of 11; IO/IW warfare, progress on 48; living standards and troop morale 48; manpower 14; myths

and realities 65–7; need for? 17; nuclear option 164; observations on 17–24; offensive/defensive capabilities, balance between? 20–1; opponents and kinds of wars, what do reformers expect? 18–19; organizational requirements? 20; overview of 63–77; personnel reductions 10; political stability and military change, tradeoff between 68–70; prioritization? 23; purpose of? 17; questions concerning 17–24; readiness and reform, tradeoff between 70–2; reorganization and restructuring 44–6; resistance to change, implementation of? 21–2; resource implications? 23–4; risks? 24; scope and extent of? 18; services’ co-ordination 10; starting point for 11; strategic implications? 24; strategies and focuses 72–6; strong defense posture 10; structural streamlining 10, 47; sustainability, focus on 37; technological requirements? 19; trade-offs 67–72; United States and 12; urgent requirement for? 23; US relations and military policy, trade-off between 67; vision of, shared or service discrete? 22–3; weapons systems 10, 46–7; weapons systems, future requirements 12–13; see also education and defense reform; funding of reform; future of reform; human resources; military reform; policy-making for defense; Taiwan Denmark, military organizations and force structures 114 destroyers: Kidd-class DDGs 8, 13, 46, 69, 71–2, 90, 116, 157, 186; Sovremennyyclass DDGs 42 deterrence: and defense, effective and resolute 48; importance of 155, 165, 166–7 GLYHUVLÀFDWLRQWKURXJK527& doctrinal requirements for defense reform 19–20 downsizing of armed forces 176–7, 185 DPP (Democratic People’s Party) 7, 10, 63, 70–2, 76, 90 draftable manpower 199 Drucker, Peter 191

E-2T early-warning planes 47, 180, 214 economic development and defense reform 10–11

224 Index economic development and military policy, trade-off between 67–8 Edmonds, Martin 10 education and defense reform 10, 14; battle characteristics in future 208–9; EDWWOHÀHOGDQGGHIHQVHUHTXLUHPHQWV in future 207–8; civilian government, ignorance of 212–13; current system of military education 210, 211; GLYHUVLÀFDWLRQWKURXJK527& educational exchange, enhancement of civil and military 217–18; essential new defense requirements 209–10; future of military education 214–15; integration of military education 203; investment in 126–7, 134, 135; military education policy, correction of 216–17; military science academy, rebuilding authority of 213–14; National Defense University (and major objectives of) 213; NCO education, improvement in 218–19; Operations Other Than War (OOTW) 210; Presidential support for military education 212; professional military courses, contents of 215; professional military personnel, creation of 213; purpose of military education 207; Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) 216; strategic culture, LQÁH[LELOLW\LQ²VWUDWHJLF education, integration of civilian and military 214; transformation of defense, acceleration required in 213–14; transformation of military education ²XQLÀHGFRPPDQGVWUXFWXUHV 208 effectiveness of past and current reforms 173 electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks 34 elite forces, mission revision for 48 execution: path from mission to 81; problems of, in revolutionizing military affairs 131–2 Executive Yuan 45, 69, 132, 136, 156, 186, 203, 214; and national defense strategy 80–82, 84–90, 93 extensiveness of agenda for defense reform 10 F-16 warplanes 47, 145, 180, 184, 214 female service personnel, recruitment of 202 ÀQDQFHsee budgets and funding ÀUHSRZHUHQKDQFHPHQW²

ÁH[LELOLW\LQVWUDWHJLFFDSDELOLW\² force components, balance change in 20 force level downsizing 47, 50–1, 55 force objectives (1949–96) 195 force planning 191 force size reduction 126 force structure 197–8 Foreign Affairs, Ministry of (MOFA) 214 foresight in procurement 187 France 7, 46 frigates: Knox-class FFGs 46, 47, 71, 116, 214; La Fayette class FFGs 7, 46, 71; Perry-class FFGs 71, 214 Fu, Tai-Xing, General 144 Fu, Wei-Ku, Lieutenant General 52 functional equivalents 134 functional integration 133–4 funding of reform 13, 68, 108–9; administrative reorganization 177–9; arms acquisitions, deliveries (past 10 years) 180; arms acquisitions, past focus of 187; arms acquisitions, prioritization of 185–6; budget analysis ² EXGJHWGHÀFLHQF\ 174; budgetary appropriation, fundamental nature of 173–4; budgetary structure, rigidity of 181–2; C4ISR capability, enhancement of 179; command system reorganization 177–9; content of defense reform 174–6; continuous reform, importance of 173–4; defense budget increase 183–4; downsizing of armed forces 176–7, 185; effectiveness of past DQGFXUUHQWUHIRUPVÀUHSRZHU enhancement of 179; foresight in procurement 187; joint operations 181; limits on 187–8; mobility, enhancement of 179; personnel, improvement in quality of 176–7; personnel costs 182; prioritization of procurement 185–6; professionalization of personnel 177; regional security cooperation 187; sources of funding 183; technology for defense, development of 186–7; see also budgets and funding future of reform: acquisition of assets in environment of uncertainty 157–8; antisubmarine war issue 158–60; certainty and uncertainty, mix of 151–2, 153–4, FRVWVYVHIÀFDF\GHFLVLRQ making on security, uniquely complex and challenging environment for 150, 153–4; deterrence, importance of 155,

Index 225 165, 166–7; maturity in security arena 156; military education, future of 214– 15; missile defenses 160–3; objective of 166–7; offensive counter-strike debate 163–6; PRC attempts to give US SDXVH²35&HIIRUWVWRLQÁXHQFH US 152–3; priorities vs. availability 155; procurement in uncertainty 157–8; readiness 157; security strategy to facilitate future defense 155–6; suggestions for future development 132–8; training 157; uncertainty, mix of certainty and 151–2, 153–4, 162; US support, vital nature of 152 General Staff, Chief of the (CGS) 44–5, 84, 178, 210 General Staff Headquarters (GSH) 45, 84, 178–9 geography, strategic implications of 100–104 Goldwater, Barry 208 ‘growing pains’ in defense reform 53–4 Gulf War 4, 9, 42, 44, 101, 124, 208 GWOT (‘global war on terrorism’) 208; all-inclusive nature of 4–5 helicopters (and attack helicopters) 46, 145, 160, 179 Hickey, Dennis 9 higher command: consolidation of units 126; functional integration of 133; functional overlap problems 129; reduction in number of units 133 historical tradition in Taiwan 104–5 Hoehn, Andy 145 Hong Kong 7, 33 Huang, Huang-Hsiung 63 Huang, Ying-Zhong 193 Human Resource Bureau 200–201 KXPDQUHVRXUFHVEHQHÀWVIRUVHUYLFH personnel, improvement of 204–5; brigadier general, establishment of rank of 203; civil servants, employment of more 203; competitiveness and human resources 191; credibility of policies, establishment of 201; defense human resources 198; demand for military personnel 198; draftable manpower 199; female service personnel, recruitment of more 202; force objectives (1949–96) 195; force planning 191; force structure 197–8; management 194–7, 205;

management policies 200–1; manpower as resource 191; manpower objectives and requirements 192–3; manpower UHVRXUFHPDQDJHPHQWÁRZFKDUW military education, integration of 1&2UHFUXLWPHQW²RIÀFHU SURSRUWLRQPRGLÀFDWLRQRI organizational reform, PRC threat and 191–2; organizational reform for 200–1; personnel policy operation procedures 196; planning 192–4; policy in armed services 191–205; promotion system, specialty-oriented 204, 205; recruitment policy, revision RI²UHJXODWLRQVPRGLÀFDWLRQRI 203–4; specialty-oriented promotion channels, creation of 204, 205; supply and demand, balance of 200; supply of military personnel 198; volunteer personnel, increased numbers of 202 Hwa Dung Defense Command Center 181 LPSOHPHQWDWLRQGLIÀFXOWLHVLQ revolutionizing military affairs 128–30 independence dialogue with PRC 37 India 164 Indonesia, military organizations and force structures 113 information operations/information warfare (IO/IW) capability 42, 44, 48 Information Warfare 9 institutional design of government of Taiwan 69 institutional foundation of defense reform 11 integration of military education 203 Internal Affairs, Ministry of 200 international security, new environment of 3 invasion strategies previously adopted against Taiwan 103 investment in education and defense reform 126–7, 134, 135 Iraq 9, 208 ,627HDFKLQJ4XDOLW\&HUWLÀFDWLRQ 213 Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 36 Japan 101, 102, 103, 164; military organizations and force structures 113, 114 Jencks, Harlan 35 Jiang Zemin 42, 43, 129 joint operations: funding of reform 181;

226 Index mechanism for joint operations, establishment of 127; services’ co-ordination 10; strengthening capabilities of 127, 135; system for, recommendation for enhancement in time of war 119–20 Joint Operations Command 181

living standards and troop morale 48 Lo, Ping Hsiung 14 local procurement, promotion of 127 long-range detectable radar 179 long-range land-attack cruise missiles 163–4 Luo, Ben-Li, General 210

Kang, Ning-Hsiang 23 Kennedy, John F. 191 Kidd-class DDGs 8, 13, 46, 69, 71–2, 90, 116, 157, 186 Kilo-class submarines 8, 42 Kinmen 102, 110, 127, 134, 136 Kinmen Crisis (1958) 110 Kinmen Defense Command Center 181 Knox-class FFGs 46, 47, 71, 116, 214 Ko, Chen-Heng 15, 63, 64 Korea, South 164; military organizations and force structures 113, 114 Korean War 36 Kosovo 4, 9, 42, 208 Kuomintang (KMT) 44, 71, 212 Kyoto Treaty on the Environment 4

MacArthur, Douglas, General 36 McVadon, Eric 12, 13, 16 Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan 68 Malaysia, military organizations and force structures 113, 114 management: of human resources 194–7, 205; manpower resource management ÁRZFKDUWSROLFLHVLQUHVSHFWRI human resources 200–1 manpower: in defense reform 14; objectives and requirements 192–3; as resource 191; resource management ÁRZFKDUW Manpower Department 92 Mao Zedong 36, 41, 43–4 Marine Corps function and role 98, 117–18 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) 8, 157, 159, 160, 186 mass media (Fourth Estate) 91 Matsu 32, 134, 136 Matsu Defense Command Center 181 maturity in security arena 156 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) 160, 161, 163 militarization of civilians 93–4 military academies, annexation of 126–7 0LOLWDU\/RJLVWLFV2IÀFHRI Military Medicine Bureau 200 military organizations and force structures: Australia 113, 114; China, People’s Republic of 113; Denmark 114; Indonesia 113; island countries 112, 114–15; Japan 113, 114; Korea, South 113, 114; Malaysia 113, 114; New Zealand 114; North Korea 114; Philippines 113, 114; Singapore 113, 114; United Kingdom 112–14; United States 112–14 military pay 134 Military Police Command 179 military reform: air force modernization 47; armed services, impact on 69–70; arms procurement policies 49–50, 54–5; business corporations, problems of cooperation with military 131–2; civilian command system,

Lee, Teng-Hui, President 30–31, 46, 143 Lee, Wen-Chung 11 Legislative Yuan in Taiwan 11, 15, 63, 69, 91, 175, 182; Defense Committee LQOHJLVODWLYHLQÁXHQFH over defense policy 75–6, 156; local defense procurement a priority for 127; National Defense Law 15, 76, 118, 192, 196, 200, 204; crucially important aims of 177; defense policymaking and civilian roles 79–94; and GHÀQLWLRQRI¶QDWLRQDOGHIHQVH· on formulation of defense policy 79, 89–90; fundamental nature of 11, 82–3, 132–8; implementation and revolution in military affairs 45, 63–4, 124–38; link between past and future UHÁHFWLQJDPELJXRXVQDWXUHRI Taiwan’s constitution 69; revisions to 173; ‘Self-Determination in National Defense’ 136; suggestions for future development 132–8; reform and readiness, trade-off between 71–2 Li, Tan-Yu 64 Liao, Holmes 52 Lin, Chong-Pin, Dr 45, 53–4, 155 Lin, Jason C. 13 Liu, Hsing-Yue 193 Liu, Xiang-Bin, General 144

Index 227 implementation of 125; civilian RIÀFHUVLQFUHDVHLQQXPEHUVRI decision-making 132–3; combat unit command problems 129–30; command and admin structure, implementation of single-unit 125; command authority, GLIÀFXOWLHVZLWKFRPPDQGOHYHOV recognition of 136; Commander-inChief, authority of 132; compulsory service, reduction in length of 133; ‘Consolidation Project,’ expedition of 126, 133; coping with a rising China 55–6; cost-effectiveness 52; counter-operations capability 52–3; cross-departmental defense contract committee, establishment of 136; GHFLVLRQPDNLQJFLYLOLDQRIÀFHUV increase in numbers of 132–3; defense primary focus for 52; education, investment in 126–7, 134, 135; execution problems in revolutionizing military affairs 131–2; force level downsizing 50–51, 55; force size reduction 126; functional equivalents 134; functional integration 133–4; future development, suggestions for 132–8; higher command, functional integration of 133; higher command functional overlap problems 129; higher command units, consolidation of 126; higher command units, reduction in number of 133; implementation GLIÀFXOWLHVLQUHYROXWLRQL]LQJPLOLWDU\ affairs 128–30; joint operational capabilities, strengthening of 127, 135; local procurement, promotion of 127; mechanism for joint operations, establishment of 127; military academies, annexation of 126–7; military–civilian relations, adjustments to 125; military pay, improvements in 134; mobilization system readjustment 127–8; nationalization of armed forces 125; nationalized and professionalized armed forces, establishment of 76; nationwide defense structure, establishment of 127–8; naval modernization 46–7, ²¶RIÀFHUKHDYLQHVV·GHDOLQJ with 47; operational principles, introduction of UK and US type 136; plans and actions behind revolution in military affairs 125–8; pragmatism in mobilization, call for 130; PRC

attack, making cost prohibitively high 56; pre-emptive strikes, adoption of SROLF\IRUTXDOLÀFDWLRQVRIVHQLRU RIÀFHUVSURYHQOHYHOUHTXLUHPHQW 135; quality personnel, attraction of 134; recruitment problems 130; reorganization of defense 48–9; reserve mobilization system, recommendation to strengthen 130, 137; restructuring of defense 48–9; revolution in military DIIDLUV²ULJKWVDQGEHQHÀWV of military personnel 131; ROTC candidates, admission ratio increase 135; salaries of personnel, increase in 134; sensitive information, leaks of 51–2; software infrastructure, improvement in 135; staff ranking, reorganization of 126; structural problems in political accountability 128–9; structural streamlining 50–1; terms of service, problems with 130; training programs, redesign on 47; ‘United Operation Procurement Committee’, establishment of 136; volunteers, increase in ratio of 126; weapons systems, improvements in 49– 50; see also defense reform; education and defense reform; funding of reform; future of reform; human resources; policy-making for defense; Taiwan military science academy 213–14 military strategy of Taiwan 99–100 military threat against Taiwan 97–9, 116, 120–1 0LUDJHÀJKWHUDLUFUDIW missile defenses 160–3 mission integration 118–19 MND (Ministry of National Defense, Taiwan) 11; budget shortfall 13; complete change in armed forces, call for 41; defense policy-making 82–3; funding for 13, 68, 108–9; integration into governmental bureaucracy 49; Organization Law of the 15, 63, 79–80, 90, 96, 118, 192, 200, 203; policy suggestions at level of 91–3; shortfall in funding for 174; Streamline Project 194, 195, 198, 200, 202, 203, 205; tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) in defense policy-making 83–6; Ten-Year Force Planning Policy 194 mobilization system readjustment 127–8 Multilevel Communications Project 181 myths and realities 65–7

228 Index QDWLRQDOGHIHQVHGHÀQLWLRQRIWKHWHUP National Defense Contract Committee 11 National Defense Law 15, 76, 118, 192, 196, 200, 204; crucially important aims of 177; defense policy-making and civilian roles 79–94; and GHÀQLWLRQRI¶QDWLRQDOGHIHQVH· on formulation of defense policy 79, 83–4, 90; fundamental nature of 11, 82–3, 132–8; implementation and revolution in military affairs 45, 63–4, 124–38; link between past and future UHÁHFWLQJDPELJXRXVQDWXUHRI Taiwan’s constitution 69; revisions to 173; ‘Self-Determination in National Defense’ 136; suggestions for future development 132–8 National Defense Organization Law, Taiwan 15, 63, 79–80, 89, 96, 118, 192, 200, 203 National Defense Private Contract Committee, Taiwan 136 National Defense University (NDU) 52, 102, 126, 203, 213 National Science Committee, Taiwan 136 National Security Council (NSC) 82, 86, 89–91, 93, 94, 147 QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\OHYHOVFODVVLÀFDWLRQRI 84–5 National Taiwan University (NTU) 212, 213, 217 nationalization of armed forces 76, 125 nationwide defense structure, establishment of 127–8 naval modernization 46–7, 71–2 NCO education 218–19 NCO recruitment 201–2 Netherlands 6, 101, 103 Network-centric Warfare 9 New Zealand, military organizations and force structures 114 North Korea 5–6, 164; military organizations and force structures 114 nuclear weapons, proliferation of 164 offensive counter-strike debate 163–6 offensive/defensive capabilities, balance in 20–1 ¶RIÀFHUKHDYLQHVV·GHDOLQJZLWK ‘One China’ principle 30 OOTW (‘Operations Other Than War’) 210 operational principles, introduction of UK and US type 136

Operations and Support Command 181 organizational reform: for human resources 200–1; PRC threat and 191– 2; requirements? 20 Paal, Doug 143, 144 PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles 8, 46, 52, 58, 161, 186 Pakistan 164 Paracel Islands 98 Patriot Air Defense System 8, 46, 52, 58, 161, 180, 186 Peng, Guang-Qian, Major General 43 Penghu Defense Command Center 181 Perry, William 146, 217 personnel see human resources Pescadores Islands 98, 102, 104 Philippines, military organizations and force structures 113, 114 Pillsbury, Michael 12 PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 42, 116, 130 PLA Navy (PLAN) 42, 98, 130, 153, 158–9, 160 PLA (People’s Liberation Army): ballistic missile capabilities 20; critical areas, development of abilities in 44; doctrinal revolution in 41; downsizing and streamlining of 42–3; exercises targeted against Taiwan 137; focus on Taiwan 36; intimidatory might of 173; ‘Junk-Yard Army’ 36; modernization of 7–8, 9, 14, 20, 111; non-commissioned RIÀFHU1&2 V\VWHP rationalization of 129; threat to Taiwan of 97–9, 116, 120–1; weak overcoming strong, traditional stress on 36 planning: defense strategy, thinking behind 86; force planning 191; human resources 192–4; MND Ten-Year Force Planning Policy 194; plans and actions behind revolution in military affairs 125–8; PPBS (planning, programming and budgeting system) 18, 215; strategy and force structures 97; US strategic planning process, talks on 144 policy-making for defense: central network of national defense policy 87–90; civilianizing the military 93–4; collective responsibility for national security 79; decision-making process, models of 86–7; defense policy QHWZRUNGLDJUDPRIGHÀQLWLRQ of terms 80–1; execution, path from mission to 81; formulation at national

Index 229 OHYHO²JRDOGHÀQLWLRQRIWKH term 80; governmental politics model of decision-making 86–7; mass media (Fourth Estate) and 91; militarization RIFLYLOLDQV²PLVVLRQGHÀQLWLRQRI WKHWHUPQDWLRQDOGHIHQVHGHÀQLWLRQ of the term 80; national security levels, FODVVLÀFDWLRQRI²RUJDQL]DWLRQDO process model of decision-making 86–7; participation in, democratically widespread 79; place of national defense policy 81–3; planning defense strategy, thinking behind 86; policy, GHÀQLWLRQRIWKHWHUPSROLF\ environment of national defense policy 88; policy network theory 87–8; policy suggestions at MND OHYHO²VRFLHWDOGLYHUVLÀFDWLRQ and 79–80; strategic levels, military H[DPSOHVWUDWHJ\GHÀQLWLRQRI structure of national defense 87; system of national defense strategy 83–4; tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) 84–6; thinking system behind defense strategy 83–4; see also defense reform; education and defense reform; funding of reform; future of reform; human resources; military reform; Taiwan political change in Taiwan 30 political stability and military change, trade-off between 68–70 Political Warfare Bureau 92, 178 Political Warfare School (PWS) 217 Pomfret, John 64 Powell, Colin 217 PPBS (planning, programming and budgeting system) 18, 215 Pratas Islands 32 prioritization: C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capability 146–7, 185–6; in defense reform 23; local defense procurement 127; priorities vs availability 155; of procurement 185–6; US defense priorities, recommendations for 146–7 procurement: in environment of uncertainty 157–8; foresight in 187; local procurement, promotion of 127; policies in arms acquisition 49–50, 54–5; in uncertainty 157–8; ‘United Operation Procurement Committee,’ establishment of 136 professionalization: nationalized and professionalized armed forces,

establishment of 76; of personnel 177; professional military courses, contents of 215; professional military personnel, creation of 213; warrant RIÀFHUFRUSVUHFRPPHQGDWLRQRIPRYH to professionalization of 119 promotion system, specialty-oriented 204, 205 TXDOLÀFDWLRQVRIVHQLRURIÀFHUV quality personnel, attraction of 134 Quemoy 32 readiness 157; and reform, trade-off between 70–2 Realpolitik 6 recruitment see human resources regional security cooperation 187 Republic of China (ROC) see Taiwan reserve brigade mission, integration with defense brigade 118–19 Reserve Forces Command 179 reserve mobilization system 130, 137 resistance to change 21–2 Resource Department 92 resource implications of defense reform 23–4 Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 4, 9, 11, 65, 74, 96, 107, 194, 207, 208; suggestions for future development 123–8 ULJKWVDQGEHQHÀWVRIPLOLWDU\ personnel 131 Ross, Andrew 8 527&5HVHUYH2IÀFHU7UDLQLQJ&RUSV  135, 200, 202, 210, 217 Russian Federation 9, 42, 44, 153, 183 salaries of personnel 134 Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) 216 Schriver, Randall 50, 64, 144 Schwai, Herman, Lieutenant General 144 Science, Central Institute of 136 Scobell, Andrew 7 scope and extent of defense reform 18 security environment 110–12 security strategy to facilitate future defense 155–6 self-propelled artillery (M109 and M110) 46 sensitive information, leaks of 51–2 Services’ Staff College 215 Shaheen, Therese 51 Shalikashvili, M., General 217

230 Index Shen, Ming-Shih 11, 16 ‘Sheng Bo’ project 127 Shimonoseki, Treaty of 102 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) 21, 42, 160, 161, 163 Shuai, Hua-Min, General 49 Singapore 132; military organizations and force structures 113, 114 social factors affecting defense 109–10 VRFLHWDOGLYHUVLÀFDWLRQDQGSROLF\PDNLQJ for defense 79–80 software infrastructure 135 sources of funding 183 Sovremennyy-class DDGs 42 specialty-oriented promotion channels 204, 205 Spratly Islands 98 staff ranking 126 Stokes, Mark 144, 146 VWUDWHJLFFXOWXUH²LQÁH[LELOLW\LQ 210–12 strategic education, integration of civilian and military 214 strategic implications of defense reform 24 strategic levels, military example 83 strategic value of Taiwan 101–2 Streamline Project 194, 195, 198, 200, 202, 203, 205 strong defense posture 10 structural problems in political accountability 128–9 structural streamlining: in defense reform 10, 47; in military reform 50–1 structure of forces: Taiwan 96–121; development of 115–17 structure of national defense: policymaking for defense 87 Su, Tzu-Yun 14 Su-27 and -30 warplanes 42 Sun Tzu 79 Sun Yat-Sen 45 supply and demand, balance in human resources of 200 surface-to-air missiles 8, 46, 52, 58, 161, 186 sustainability, focus on 37 tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) 84–6 Taiping Dao 32 Taiwan: armed forces, future structures RI²¶$UPHG)RUFHV5HÀQLQJ Program’ 10, 115–16, 173, 177, 182, 185; armed services’ organization,

development of 115–17; conscription in 109–10; defense budgets 108–9, ²ÁH[LELOLW\LQVWUDWHJLF capability 106–7; geography, strategic implications of 100–4; historical tradition 104–5; independence dialogue with PRC 37; institutional design of government of 69; invasion strategies previously adopted against 103; joint operational system, recommendation for enhancement in time of war 119–20; Marine Corps function and role, change recommended 98, 117–18; military organization 96–121; military strategy of 99–100; military threat against 97–9, 116, 120–1; mission integration, recommendation for 118–19; missions and objectives 105–7; ‘One China’ principle, refusal to accept 30; planning, strategy and force structures and 97; political change in 30; PRC exercises targeted against, publication of 137; PRC most pressing defense and security problem 8, 29; recommendations for future programming in defense 117–18; reserve brigade mission, integration with defense brigade recommended 118–19; security environment 110–12; sergeant corps, recommendation of move to professionalization of 119; social factors affecting defense 109–10; strategic culture 104–5; strategic value of 101–2; strategically defensive 106; structure of forces 96–121; development of 115–17; tactically offensive 106; technological capabilities, development of 107; technological weapons unit, introduction recommended 117; voluntary system of recruitment to armed forces, emergence of 110; see also defense reform; education and defense reform; funding of reform; future of reform; human resources; military reform; policy-making for defense Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis (1996) 44, 124 Taiwan–US relations 10, 143–9 Tang, Fei, General 64, 70, 144 Tang, Yiou-Ming, Defense Minister 47, 53–5, 65, 70, 127, 130, 146 tanks (M48 and M60H) 46 technology: for defense, development

Index 231 of 186–7; technological capabilities, development of 107; technological requirements in defense reform 19; technological weapons unit 117 terms of service, problems with 130 thinking system behind defense strategy 83–4 TIDSS (Taiwan Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies) 16 Tien Kong indigenous missile defense system 161 torpedoes (MK-46) 46 trade-offs in defense reform 67–72 training: future of reform 157; programs, redesign of 47 Tsai, Chen-Tin 11, 16 Tsai, Ing-Wen 68 Tsai, Michael 13

Mutual Security Treaty Taiwan 146, 147; national security, responsibility for 5; 9/11 attacks on 5; praise for Taiwan’s reform progress 147–8; prevention RIFRQÁLFWLQ7DLZDQ6WUDLWYLWDO86 concern 143; reasons for US role in Taiwan’s defense reform 148–9; role in Taiwan’s defense reforms 143–9; special forces 209; strategic planning process, talks on 144; survey teams of US military ‘operators’ 144–5; synergy in reform process between US and Taiwan militaries 145–6; Taiwan Relations Act (1979) 145; ‘transformation, concept in 18; vital nature of support from 152 US Air Force (USAF) 209 US–Taiwan Business Council 64, 146

UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) 22 UCAVs (unmanned combat aerial vehicles) 22 uncertainty, mix of certainty and 151–2, 153–4, 162 XQLÀHGFRPPDQGVWUXFWXUHV United Kingdom, military organizations and force structures 112–14 United Nations Charter 6 ‘United Operation Procurement Committee’ 136 United States 102, 103; armed forces, XQLÀHGFRPPDQGLQDUPVVDOHV reformation of process of 146; Bush administration 3–4, 58, 64, 152, 164; chronology of US involvement in Taiwan defense 143–8; defense priorities, recommendations for 146–7; defense reform and 12; defensive weaknesses in Taiwan, appreciation of 146; Department of Defense (DOD) 144–8; dominance of world affairs 3–4; Goldwater–Nichols Act (1986) 22, 138; ideological leadership 3–4; military force, new generation in 208; military organizations and force structures 112– 14; military policy and relations with, trade-off between 67; missile defenses, leadership in 162; missions and force scales 105–6; Monterey Talks 144, 145;

‘Vanquisher’ project 179, 181 Vietnam War 65, 109 voluntary system of recruitment to armed forces 110, 126, 202 Wang, Zaixi, Major General 31 War College 215, 218 ZDUUDQWRIÀFHUFRUSVUHFRPPHQGDWLRQRI move to professionalization of 119 Washington Post 64 weapons systems: defense reform 10, 46–7; future requirements 12–13; improvements in 49–50; logic of interconnection in development of 70; sophistication in 101 Whiting, Allen 35 Wilson, James Q. 36 Wolfowitz, Paul 146 world affairs, United States dominance of 3–4 world of today, Taiwan’s security in 5–8 World War II 102 Yu, Hsiao-Pin (‘Yu’ster’) 144 Yung, Cheng-Liang 194 Zhang, Tien-Zhou 193 Zhang, Weiliang 193 Zhong, Guo-Hua 193, 196

eBooks – at www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk

A library at your fingertips!

eBooks are electronic versions of printed books. You can store them on your PC/laptop or browse them online. They have advantages for anyone needing rapid access to a wide variety of published, copyright information. eBooks can help your research by enabling you to bookmark chapters, annotate text and use instant searches to find specific words or phrases. Several eBook files would fit on even a small laptop or PDA. NEW: Save money by eSubscribing: cheap, online access to any eBook for as long as you need it.

Annual subscription packages We now offer special low-cost bulk subscriptions to packages of eBooks in certain subject areas. These are available to libraries or to individuals. For more information please contact [email protected] We’re continually developing the eBook concept, so keep up to date by visiting the website.

www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk