Taiwan’s Security and Air Power
Recent concern about Mainland China’s intentions toward Taiwan, and more general concern about the risk of instability in the region, has led to growing interest in Taiwan’s military strategy. This book brings together a range of experts from the West and from Taiwan itself, who examine the key issues connected with Taiwan’s air power, which is a key aspect of the China–Taiwan military balance. During the 1990s, Taiwan invested considerable resources in thoroughly reequipping its air force with modern US and French air defense and strike aircraft equipped with modern guided missiles and American surface-to-air guided missiles, thereby denying China command of the air in any conflict in the short to medium term. These weapons were supplemented with indigenously designed and developed combat aircraft and air defense missiles. In the longer term, air power will remain a crucial influence on the overall balance as China’s efforts to upgrade its own Air Force’s capabilities begin to undermine Taiwan’s current advantages. Martin Edmonds is Professorial Fellow and Director of the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at Lancaster University. He is also (founding) Editor-in-Chief of the international journal, Defence and Security Analysis (Taylor & Francis) and Co-Director (with Professor Keith Hartley) of the Lancaster and York Universities’ Defence Research Institute. Michael M. Tsai is currently the Deputy Taipei Representative in Washington DC with specific responsibility for Taiwan’s relations with the US Department of Defense and the US Armed Forces. A member of the DPP, he served as a Legislator in the Legislative Yuan and also served as adviser to the Organizational Planning Committee of the Ministry of National Defense. He is the founder of Taiwan Defense Affairs, and the Institute for Taiwan Defense and Strategic Studies (ITDSS).
RoutledgeCurzon Security in Asia Series
1 Taiwan’s Security and Air Power Taiwan’s defense against the air threat from Mainland China Edited by Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai
Taiwan’s Security and Air Power Taiwan’s defense against the air threat from Mainland China Edited by Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai
First published 2004 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2004 editorial matter and selection, Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai; individual chapters, the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN 0-203-31643-6 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0–415–32317–7 (Print edition)
Contents
List of contributors Foreword by Shiah Yng Jou Preface by Peter Brookes Acknowledgments Abbreviations 1
Introduction: Taiwan and air power
vii x xiii xix xx 1
MARTIN EDMONDS AND MICHAEL M. TSAI
PART I
Air power and Taiwan’s security
7
2
9
Air power and Taiwan’s security MARTIN EDMONDS
3
Ten pointers for Taiwan on contemporary air power
29
GREG MILLS
PART II
The balance of air power over the Taiwan Straits 4
The shifting balance of air superiority at the Taiwan Strait and its implications on Taiwan’s defense planning
35 37
YORK W. CHEN
5
Command of the air over Taiwan
55
CHIH-HENG YANG AND TZU-YUN SU
PART III
The air threat from Mainland China
71
6
73
PLA Air Force mobile offensive operations KENNETH W. ALLEN
vi
Contents
7 Why a Chinese preemptive strike against Taiwan would fail
89
ROBERT A. PAPE
PART IV
The air defense of Taiwan 8 The air battle strategy in Taiwan’s defensive operations
103 105
CHIH-KUNG YU
9 Joint air and missile defense for Taiwan: implications for deterrence and defense
116
ERIC A. M C VADON
10 Air base defense: Taiwan’s defensive responses to China’s missile threat
140
MING-YEN TSAI
PART V
Taiwan’s Air Force and future requirements
153
11 Military culture and air force restructuring
155
CHIEN CHUNG
12 The ROC Air Force after next: a race to embrace the future
163
RICHARD D. FISHER
Index
187
Contributors
Kenneth W. Allen is a Senior Analyst at the CNA Corporation where he is responsible for analyzing China’s national security issues. Prior to this, he was a Senior Associate at the Henry L Stimson Center, and Executive Vice President of the US–Taiwan Business Council. While serving for 21 years in the USAF, he served for 2 years as an Assistant Air Force Attache at the US Embassy in Beijing. He holds Bachelors Degrees from the University of California, Davis, and the University of Maryland, and a Masters Degree from Boston University in International Relations. Peter Brookes was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Office of Secretary for Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. From 1997 to 2001, he was a professional staff member at the US House of Representatives International Relations Committee. From 1992–1994 he served with the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Operations after which he joined a Washington private technology firm, SAIC. His early career was in the United States Navy where he served as a naval aviator flying intelligence and reconnaissance missions. He is a Commander in the US Naval Reserves assigned to the US Defense Intelligence Agency and is currently Director of the Asian Studies Center, the Heritage Foundation, in Washington DC. York W. Chen is the Executive Editor of Taiwan Defense Affairs. He holds a Master’s Degree from the Graduate Institute of International Affairs, Tam Kang University, and served as Congressional Assistant to Michael M. Tsai from 1996 to 1999. He is now a doctoral candidate at the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, UK, studying Taiwan’s military strategy and doctrine. He is Research Associate in the Lancaster Centre for Defence and International Security Studies. His recent publications include (with Michael Tsai) “Submarines and Taiwan’s Defense,” (2001), Warfare in the Information Age (2000) and (with Martin Edmonds) “An Assessment of the ROCN’s Modernization Program: Strategic and Operational Considerations,” in Taiwan’s Maritime Security (2003). Chien Chung received his PhD degree in nuclear chemistry from McGill University, Canada. He is currently a full Professor at the National Tsing Hua
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University, Taiwan. He is also a Professor Emeritus at both the Military College and the Medical College of the National Defense University, Taiwan. His recent publication includes “A Review of the ROC’s Military Reform: A Case Study of the Taiwanese Navy,” in Defending Taiwan (2002). Martin Edmonds is Professorial Fellow and Director of the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at Lancaster University, UK. He is also the founding Editor-in-Chief of Defence and Security Analysis and a member of the Editorial Board of Taiwan Defense Affairs. He has published over 150 journal articles, book chapters and memoranda on a wide variety of defense and security issues. His most recent books relevant to Taiwan’s security include: (edited with Greg Mills and Chyungly Lee) New Security Paradigms (2001); (edited with Greg Mills and Chyungly Lee) Preventing Insecurity: Lessons for and from East Asia (2003); (edited with Michael M. Tsai) Defending Taiwan: The Future Vision of Taiwan’s Defence Policy and Military Strategy (2003), and (edited with Michael M. Tsai) Taiwan’s Maritime Security (2003). Richard D. Fisher is Adjunct Fellow in Asian Studies at the Center for Security Policy, Washington DC, before which he was Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and before that as Director of the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation. His research interests are in China’s military modernization and its implications for the United States, Russia, and Taiwan. He holds a Bachelor’s degree from Eisenhower College, New York City. Eric A. McVadon retired from the United States Navy with the rank of Rear Admiral. Until July 1992 he served as Defense and Naval Attache at the US Embassy in Beijing. Since then he has served as Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis in Washington DC. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from George Washington University, and is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, and the National War College. Greg Mills is the National Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs based at Wits University in Johannesburg. He holds a BA degree from the University of Cape Town, and an MA and PhD from the University of Lancaster, UK. In addition to being the founding Editor of the South African Yearbook of International Affairs and Editor of the South African Journal of International Affairs, he has published over twenty books, the latest of which have been: The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign Policy and Globalization (2001); Poverty to Prosperity: Globalization, Good Governance and African Recovery (2003); and, with respect to Taiwan, New Security Paradigms (2001) and Preventing Insecurity in East Asia (2003) (both edited with Martin Edmonds and Chyungly Lee) (2001). Robert A. Pape is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, specializing in international security affairs. Before going to Chicago, he was on the Faculty of Dartmouth College and also taught at the
Contributors ix USAF’s School of advanced air power studies. He holds a PhD from the University of Chicago and a Masters degree from the University of Pittsburgh. His publications include Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (1996) and “The Determinants of International Moral Action,” in International Organization (1999). He contributes regularly to the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and the Boston Globe on international security issues. Tzu-Yun Su is the Assistant Editor of Taiwan Defense Affairs. He holds a Master’s Degree from the Graduate Institute of International Affairs, Tam Kang University. He is currently Associate Researcher of the Policy Research and Coordinating Committee of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Michael M. Tsai is currently the Deputy Taipei Representative in Washington DC and publisher of the journal, Taiwan Defense Affairs. He received his MBA from the University of Wisconsin and JD from the University of California Western School of Law. Prior to his appointment in Washington, he served as a Legislator in the Legislative Yuan and was adviser to the Organizational Research and Planning Committee of the Ministry of National Defense in Taipei. He was also the Convenor of the Defense Affairs and Policy Research Committee of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the Legislative Yuan. His recent book publications include Defending Taiwan (edited with Martin Edmonds) (2001) and Taiwan’s Maritime Security (edited with Martin Edmonds) (2003), and, with York Chen an article on “Submarines and Taiwan’s Defense,” in Taiwan Defense Affairs (2001). Ming-Yen Tsai received his PhD degree from Department of War Studies, King’s College, London, UK. He is now Assistant Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsin University, Taiwan. His recent publication includes “PRC–Russia Military Ties: Background, Development, and the Impact on Taiwan’s Security,” in Taiwan Defense Affairs, 2(3) (2002). Chih-Heng Yang was Deputy Director of the Strategic and International Studies Division, Taiwan Research Institute in Taipei. He received his PhD degree from the National Taiwan University. His recent publication includes “The Evolution and Adaptation of Taiwan’s Military Strategy,” in Defending Taiwan (2002). Shiah Yng Jou is an Air Force General and the President of the National Defense University of Taiwan. He was one-time President of the Air Force Academy and Vice Chief of the General Staff. Chih-Kung Yu is a Colonel in the ROC Air Force. He is now the Deputy Director of the Air Force Department, the National Defense University, Taiwan.
Foreword
This volume on Taiwan’s air power is the third in a series that explores Taiwan’s defense and security issues, the first two having looked respectively at Taiwan’s defense, overall, and Taiwan’s Maritime security. It addresses the ROC Air Force’s future development in the light of perceived threats from the People’s Republic of China consequent upon that country’s extensive military modernization program. It is to be hoped that the book will not only prompt and stimulate the interaction between military and civilian personnel in the government, but also encourage the exchange of ideas on the more pressing issue of Taiwan’s defense, security, and air power. The international conference upon which it is based will give leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and those from Asian-Pacific countries a useful point of reference. With its clear message, serious consequences for the security and stability of the East Asian region due to mistake or misjudgment might be avoided. The book has been divided into five parts: the theory and practice of air power; the balance of air power over the Taiwan Straits; the expansion of the PLA Air Force and its effects; the air defense of Taiwan; a review of the ROCAF’s force structure; and Taiwan’s future air power prospects. With regard to the expansion of the PLA Air Force and its effects, many specialists have pointed out again and again that in recent years the PRC, supported by a strong economic development, has increased its defense budget by over 10 percent. This expansion constitutes a serious threat to Taiwan, of which PRC air power is a major element. Today, the PLA has deployed more than 400 missiles directed at Taiwan along its Southeast coast. In respect of current and future combat aircraft developments, the PLA has purchased Su-30s from Russia and has been granted a license by Russia to manufacture the Su-27, domestically. Other than that, the PLA is working on the research and development of the J-10 MG by itself. All these activities are leading to the steady increase in the numbers of air power assets in the PLAAF’s inventory. In addition, the PRC is also actively developing aerospace technologies with the purpose of integrating its overall C4ISR capability, something that has already posed a serious threat to Taiwan’s security. The acceleration in the PLA’s modernization program and the expansion of its military strength has had a huge impact on the military balance between the PRC
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and the ROC over the Taiwan Strait. More seriously, it has not only threatened the stability of the Asian-Pacific region but has also threatened to compromise US interests in the region. The ROC Air Force has excellent, well-trained pilots, the quality of whom is far better than that of PLAAF pilots. Also, within the limited air space over the Taiwan Strait, the ROCAF still maintains its air superiority. The threats generated by the continuous increase in the numbers and quality of PLA fighters and their updated guided missiles cannot, however, be ignored. If the ROC’s fighter aircraft can be equipped with the advanced US AIM120 air-to-air missiles then they should be able to maintain its air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. A legacy of the past, Taiwan’s major military airbases are well within the range of the PLA’s 400 plus short-range D-11 and D-15 missiles. This is a potentially dangerous factor governing the future development of Taiwan’s air power and must also not be overlooked. It also has to be accepted that no country can guarantee protection against a missile attack, and the missile threat facing Taiwan is also a security issue that faces the rest of the world. The issues of air power and the security of the Taiwan Strait are concerned not only with Taiwan’s security, but also with the stability of the Asian-Pacific area. That stability is important to the prosperity of the entire Asian-Pacific region. Even though Taiwan is confronted with the threat of the PRC’s military strength, the ROC government has repeatedly declared that it will never be provocative or take the offensive. It is a matter of fact that the strategic objective of the ROC’s military is to establish a basic force capable of “effective deterrence and resolute defense.” On this premise, the goal of the ROC Air Force’s future strategic development is defensive air power. The Taiwanese government welcomes all those who offer assistance in furthering Taiwan’s national security and regional stability. It also looks for opportunities to cooperate with other countries in the region and to join a regional collective security mechanism. This policy is in accordance with Taiwan’s interest in national security but also with the US commitment to maintaining the region’s peace and stability. In order to maintain the dynamic balance of the military strength across the Taiwan Strait, the ROC’s armed forces have to improve the quality of their personnel in order to offset their lack of numbers in both personnel and equipment. To achieve that goal, they must adopt a complete package measure and, to this end, have introduced various initiatives to promote civilian control of the armed forces and expand civilians’ participation in defense affairs. What is more, the Taiwanese government and armed forces must ensure the transparency of the defense policy and help the population get a better understanding of defense affairs so as to enlist their support. With popular support, the survival and development of the nation and the standard of living of its people can be better established; the concept of defense by people can be made reality; Taiwan’s national security can be better assured; and regional stability can be maintained. As it is well known, a state’s national security alters over time with changes in the environment and with the impact of new technologies. Air power
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developments across the Taiwan Strait are deeply influenced by the Strait’s security environment. It is important to continue to research future Taiwan security issues and to come up with effective suggestions as to how best to contribute to regional stability through collective efforts. This book on air power and Taiwan’s security is a valuable contribution toward that goal. Shiah Yng Jou
Preface The challenges and imperatives in Taiwan’s defense
Introduction Taiwan decision-makers, public opinion leaders, and defense experts on national security affairs face a complex set of variables, influences, and political pressures when considering Taiwan’s security. Among them, air power considerations are critical to the future of Taiwan and for democracy in the Western Pacific. The Taiwan Strait is certainly one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the world, and perhaps – in its complexity – the most challenging in the Asia-Pacific region. It is arguably more complex than the current situation with North Korea. The prospects for stability over the next several years are uncertain. The United States maintains a strong interest in assisting the democratically elected government of Taiwan to deter the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) use of force; and in ensuring that Taiwan has a sufficient self-defense capability to defeat PRC efforts, should deterrence fail. Beijing can have no illusions with regard to the United States’ commitments to Taiwan’s security since they are embedded in US law in the form of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. To this end, the United States also has an interest in ensuring that Taiwan develops a rational, civilian-controlled defense establishment and a highly capable military that is able to function effectively in deterring and defending against aggression.
The challenges It is difficult to overstate the incredible array of challenges that Taiwan faces in the years ahead. There are five in particular: (1) an ambitious PRC force modernization program; (2) Taiwan’s continued international isolation; (3) elements resistant to reform within Taiwan’s defense establishment; (4) a stove-piped bureaucracy; and (5) a restrictive economic environment. PRC military modernization The first and foremost challenge that Taiwan faces is a concerted PRC program to gain the ability to use force decisively sooner rather than later. China is working
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toward multiple options for coercion or physical occupation of the island. The United States stands by the fact that Taiwan’s future must be settled in a peaceful and mutually agreeable manner. The PRC’s force modernization appears to be outpacing Taiwan’s. The dynamic equilibrium in the military balance of power is shifting toward the PRC. Moreover, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is striving to be able to press home their attack before American forces can intervene. This places a new series of requirements upon Taiwan’s military. China’s modernization is focused on exploiting vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s national and operational level command and control system, its integrated air defense system, and its reliance on sea lines of communication as an island nation. It is to be expected that if Beijing does choose a military option, the PRC will make every effort to deter, delay, and deny US intervention and military operations. International isolation Taiwan is challenged by its isolated status in the international community. The United States stands alone among major countries in its declared willingness to assist and help defend Taiwan’s democracy. But while its commitment is strong, Taiwan should nevertheless seek avenues in defense diplomacy with other countries. Despite US efforts and support, Taiwan’s isolation from the rest of the international community impedes its ability to benefit from the knowledge and experience that are derived from interaction with foreign military establishments. Its isolation also limits choices on procurement and force modernization, and limits its ability to exploit technological, organizational, and doctrinal aspects of the on-going revolution in military affairs. Uncertainties with regard to procurement of foreign weapon systems complicate development of a long-term coherent force modernization strategy. Military conservatism Taiwan’s isolation may be related to a third challenge – elements within Taiwan’s defense establishment that appear reluctant to make the requisite changes in order to improve Taiwan’s fighting efficiency and effectiveness and ensure its ability to deter and counter PRC coercion and other forms of aggression. This must be overcome. While “transformation” appears to be the buzzword of the moment in military circles, almost every organization, including many in the United States, resists change – yet change is necessary. Initiative, innovation, and evolution are critical. Stove-piped bureaucracy Another challenge is a defense establishment, including the military, which operates in relative isolation from the rest of Taiwan’s governmental bureaucracy. A greater degree of cooperation between military and other departments within
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the government would enhance Taiwan’s ability to react rapidly and efficiently to crisis situations and other natural disasters. A unity of purpose and synergy of effort is needed and, indeed, required. Economic pressures The Administration of President Chen Shui-bian also faces challenges stemming from the island’s economic downturn. Taiwan’s economic challenges have created a constrained budget environment that requires Taiwan to think more innovatively about its defense needs and develop a more efficient, rational acquisition process that marries strategy and defense system development and procurement. Furthermore, Taiwan’s leadership, both civilian and military, must weigh seriously the dramatic growth in China’s offensive capabilities. Taiwan’s indecision on key defense needs such as increasing the defense budget, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), naval power and maritime surveillance, an integrated air defense and personnel, equipment, and logistics readiness, is giving some the impression that Taiwan does not take its self-defense seriously. Taiwan’s defense budget must reflect its commitment to its own security.
The imperatives These challenges are serious, but fortunately they are not insurmountable. To overcome these challenges, Taiwan must be committed to fundamental reform and willing to commit the necessary financial resources to maintain a rough parity in the cross–Strait balance of power. The ability to withstand any PRC attempt at military coercion, at least until friendly forces can intervene, is the key to Taiwan’s national security. There are at least four imperatives that should guide Taiwan’s approach to self-defense. Many of these imperatives already are being addressed through the implementation of Taiwan’s National and Defense Reorganization Laws. If faithfully executed, these Laws may hold the key to Taiwan’s ability to ensure stability in the Taiwan Strait. Already much progress has been achieved in this respect. Among the most important imperatives are: (1) greater focus on coercive scenarios; (2) prioritization and rationality in Taiwan’s defense planning; (3) force modernization; and (4) the enhancement of civil–military relations. Greater focus on coercive scenarios Taiwan should place greater emphasis on preparing for coercive uses of force, short of a full-scale amphibious invasion by the PRC. In the coercive uses of force, the strategic center of gravity is Taiwan’s political and military authorities. PRC coercion or compellance would seek to undermine the ROC’s national will, morale, and resolve.
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The PRC may seek to affect Taiwan’s national resolve in a number of ways, including targeting its international support, undercutting or denying its military capabilities, attempting to provoke a severe downturn in the economy, sowing dissent within the domestic polity, or “decapitating” Taiwan’s political leadership. Coercive uses of force could take many forms, including information warfare attacks, air and missile strikes, or a naval blockade. In fact, there is a school of thought that says that the PRC’s ability to successfully coerce Taiwan is dependent upon its ability to mount a credible threat of invasion. But while holding this threat over Taiwan, other coercive scenarios, short of a full-scale invasion, can be just as dangerous and even more likely. Greater focus on limited uses of force in a coercive context does not mean Taiwan should not be prepared for a worst-case scenario – the amphibious invasion. But Taiwan must be ready for a wide range of military scenarios and pursue a comprehensive defense posture able to deal with the full spectrum of military threats presented by Beijing. Prioritization and rationalization in defense planning The ROC Ministry of National Defense must prioritize efficient defense planning, acquisition, programming, and budgeting. The establishment of offices, subordinate to the Minister of Defense, responsible for strategic planning, integrated analysis, and the acquisition function is a positive step in this direction. A top-down approach to strategy and force planning normally involves development of a coherent national security strategy and, by extension, should facilitate the drafting of a viable national military strategy. These national strategies in turn will be supported by the necessary acquisition programs that will allow national command authorities to execute defense plans. Force modernization National strategies should guide Taiwan’s force modernization. In the light of PRC military modernization, certain requirements should be readily apparent. Among these are: ●
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The imperative that Taiwan must have a survivable national command and control system with sufficient strategic and tactical warning of hostile action, and survivable national and defense information infrastructures. The island must be able to withstand initial strikes and regain an operational capability quickly and efficiently. Taiwan’s three Services must be interoperable and able to function as a team. Joint operations are vital. Taiwan must be able to protect its critical civil infrastructure and ensure continuity of services to the government, military, and general populace. The island must be able to maintain access to sea and air lines of communication. The military must also be able to defend against an amphibious invasion.
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Taiwan must be able to defend against a PRC air and missile campaign. Taiwan must understand that an integrated approach to air defense is critical and Taiwan should begin now to develop an autonomous missile defense to defend against the growing PRC missile threat. While active missile defenses are important, there should be no misconception, however, that it is the perfect solution. Missile defenses are most effective if they are part of an integrated, layered approach to defending against air and missile threats. A number of trends should encourage Taiwan toward a defensive strategy that contains a limited offensive element to deter the PRC use of force and, if necessary, deny or at least complicate execution of a PRC campaign against the island. In the years ahead, effective self-defense, particularly against the growing PRC threat, may require strikes against PRC offensive forces offshore. Such actions would be intended to disrupt the pace and scope of military operations. To be effective, considerable training and practice are essential. In order to effectively operate its weapon systems and execute its defense plans, Taiwan must foster a highly competent, professional officer and noncommissioned officer corps and enlisted forces. Taiwan also requires a progressive military education system that ensures professionalism and encourages innovation. It must begin to develop future leaders today.
Enhancement of civil–military relations Finally, Taiwan should enhance civil–military relations. Taiwan’s military no longer can operate in isolation. Political considerations will define the nature of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, to include its scope, intensity, and duration. Taiwan needs a transparent and accountable military that is responsive to its democratically elected political leadership. Unity of purpose, maintenance of discipline within the leadership, and the seamless interplay between the political and military leadership is critical for resisting PRC coercion or aggression. There is reason to be confident that the Taiwan military would obey the direction of its democratically elected leadership. Problems in civil–military relations, thus, are not only questions over civilian control of the military, but also civilian participation in the defense policy process. Taiwan must invest in a cadre of qualified civilians experienced in the management of defense affairs. The argument often heard in Taiwan that civilian defense specialists are not qualified to comment on defense matters does not hold much water in the United States, Japan, and other countries, all of which rely heavily on the expertise of civilian defense experts. In addition, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense must be capable of executing combined operations with civil agencies and law enforcement authorities. It also must be responsive to media scrutiny and legislative oversight. Finally, it is essential that Taiwan also develop laws that will establish a common means of protecting classified information. Frequent leaks of sensitive defense
xviii Preface information can undermine national security as well as any relationship with current or future defense partners.
Conclusion In conclusion, the United States has a strong interest in Taiwan’s overcoming the challenges to its national security. The United States should continue to provide necessary defense articles and services, and to help Taiwan along in reforming its defense establishment. The main responsibility for this task, however, lies with Taiwan. The United States will continue to assist Taiwan in deterring the PRC’s use of force and maintain a robust defense capability. Washington does so because it is in the US interest, Taiwan’s interest, and in the best interest of the entire region. But in any actual wartime scenario, the initial combat burden necessarily must be borne by Taiwan’s fighting forces. Taiwan’s armed forces must be ready. There is much work to be done but the people, the armed forces and the political leadership of Taiwan have the wherewithal to get it done and get it done right. Peter Brookes
Acknowledgments
Most of the contents of this volume is made up of revised papers presented at a Conference on “Taiwan’s Security and Air Power” held in Taipei on January 9, 2003. The Conference was organized by the Institute for Taiwan’s Defense and Strategic Studies, with the cooperation of the Graduate Institute for International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University, the National Defense University, and the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, UK. A number of discussants helped ensure the Conference was informed and authoritative as well as giving useful and constructive feedback to the papergivers. This volume acknowledges, therefore, the helpful comments and commentary of Dr Jacqueline K. Davis, Dr Grant T. Hammond, Dr Bernard Loo, Lt Gen Tomohiro Okamoto, Lt Gen Mamoru Sato, Dr June Teufel Dreyer, Maj Gen Peter J. Tzeng, and Dr Ming-Hsien Wong. The Conference would not have been possible but for the very generous sponsorship of The Republic of China National Security Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, the Mainland Affairs Council, the National Security Bureau, the Straits Exchange Foundation, and China Airlines. Many people were involved in the organization of the Conference and, therefore, as precursors, also to the origins of this volume. The assistance of Ms Ju-Yu Chung, Mr Henry S. Liao, Mr Fransisco C. Lin, Mr Brian C. Liu, Mr David C. Wu, and Ms Novia Y. Huang needs to be recorded. In particular, the tireless efforts of Mr York W. Chen, the Executive Editor of Taiwan Defense Affairs, both in respect of the preparation and execution of the Conference and in the preparation of this volume is gratefully acknowledged. Without his contribution in multitudinous ways neither would have been brought to a successful completion. Drawing together articles originally written in different languages and translated literally is no easy task while at the same time honoring the sense of what the authors wished to put across. Finally, the editors would wish to recognize the reassuring contribution of Mrs Pauline Elliott of the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at Lancaster University and Editorial Assistant of Defence and Security Analysis in the preparation of the contributions to this volume and for her assistance with the copy-editing and proof reading. Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai
Abbreviations
AA AAA AAMs ABL ABM ACC ADR AEW AFB AIDC ALCM AMD AMRAAM AOC AOC ARM ASRAAM ASW ATACMS ATO ATT AWACS BM BMD BPI BVR BVRAAM C2 C4I C4ISR CAP
Anti-aircraft Anti-aircraft artillery Air-to-air missiles Airborne Laser Anti-ballistic missile Air combat center Airbase damage repair Airborne early warning Air Force Base Airborne Interceptor Command Channel Air launched cruise missile Anti-missile defense system Advanced medium range air-to-air missile Air Office Commanding Air operation centers Anti-radiation missile Advanced short range air-to-air missile Anti-submarine warfare Advanced tactical missile system Air tasking order Advanced theater transport Air warning and control system Battle management Ballistic missile defense Boost-phase intercept Beyond visual range Beyond visual range air-to-air missiles Command and control Command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence Command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveilance, and reconnaissance Combat air patrols
Abbreviations CBW CC&D CCP CEP CMC CNN CRCs CRPs DCA DMT DoD ECCM EID ELINT EW EW FEL FOFA GCI GEM GHz GLONASS GPS GSH HUMINT IADS IAF IDF IFF IRBMs IW JASSM JDAM JSF LACM LIDAR MEZ MLRS MND MOB MR MRAAM MRAF MRBM NAD
Chemical and biological warfare Camouflage, concealment, and deception Chinese Communist Party Circular error probable Central Military Commission Cable Network News Control and Reporting Center Control and Reporting Post Defensive counter-attacks Distributive mission training Department of Defense (USA) Electronic Counter Counter Measures Electronic identification Electronic intelligence Early warning Electronic warfare Free electron laser Follow-on Forces Attack Ground control intercepts Guidance enhanced missiles Gigahertz Global navigation satellite system Global positioning system General Staff Headquarters Human intelligence Integrated air defense system Israeli Air Force Indigenous Defense Fighter Identification friend or foe Intermediate range ballistic missiles Information warfare Joint air-to-surface stand-off missile Joint Direct Attack Munitions Joint Strike Fighter Land attack cruise missile Laser radar Missile engagement zones Multiple launch rocket system Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan) Mobile offshore base Military Region Medium-range anti-aircraft missile Military region air force Medium-range ballistic missile Naval area defense
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Abbreviations
NATO NCO NMD NOP NTI NTW OCA ONI OTH PGM PLA PLAAF PLAN PLANAF POL PRC RADINT RAF RMA ROC ROCA ROCAF ROCN ROE RP RPV RRR SAM SATCOM SBL SEAD SIGINT SLAM SLOC SLV SOF SRBM SSK SSN STUFT TACAN TBM TEL TERCON TFS
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-Commissioned Officer National Missile Defense Normal Operating Procedure Nuclear threat initiative Navy Theater Wide Offensive counter-attack Office of Naval Intelligence (USA) Over-the-horizon Precision guided munitions People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army Air Force People’s Liberation Army Navy People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force Petroleum, oil, and lubricant People’s Republic of China Radar intelligence Royal Air Force Revolution in Military Affairs Republic of China Republic of China Army Republic of China Air Force Republic of China Navy Rules of engagement Reporting Post Remotely piloted vehicles Rapid runway repair Surface-to-air missile Satellite Communications Space-based laser Suppression of enemy air defenses Signals intelligence Stand-off land attack missiles Sea lines of communication Space Launch Vehicle Special operations forces Short-range ballistic missiles Conventional submarine Nuclear powered submarine Ships Taken up from Trade Ultra high frequency tactical air navigation Theater-anti-ballistic missile Transport-erector-launchers Terrain-contour Tactical fighter squadron
Abbreviations THAAD THEL TMD TRS UAVs UCAR UCAVs USAF USN V/STOL WMD
Theater high altitude area defense Tactical high energy laser Theater missile defense Tactical reconnaissance squadron Unmanned aerial vehicles Unmanned combat armed rotorcraft Unmanned combat aircraft or aerial vehicles United States Air Force United States Navy Vertical / short take-off and land Weapons of mass destruction
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Introduction Taiwan and air power Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai
The defense and future security of Taiwan are closely and inextricably linked to its air power capability. Air power has proved over the past eighty years to be the sine qua non of military success on the battlefields of the world and, ultimately, the determinant of victory in war. Such has been the impact of air power – the third dimension of war – on the conduct of military conflict that it has persuaded some to believe that it alone can be the decider of success. The general consensus, however, is that while air power is the dominant factor in modern war, it alone cannot ensure victory. Ultimately, as Martin Edmonds points out in Chapter 2 of this volume, victory is only secured when armies capture and hold ground permanently. Air power is, arguably, the twentieth century’s most significant military phenomenon. From the time, one hundred years ago in 1903, that the Wright brothers first flew a heavier than air vehicle, the ability to operate in the third dimension has given to military commanders a force multiplier that adversaries found difficult to withstand. Their only option was to develop air power capabilities themselves and bring their confrontations on the ground and at sea also into the air. Thus, the contest for air supremacy was born, a competition that has been one of the major driving forces among industrial and technologically advanced states for almost a century. Once one or other side has gained air supremacy, it is in a position to exploit the numerous operational benefits that the third dimension brings. Among these are the ability to target and destroy any enemy military assets or units on the ground or his vessels at sea, providing they are within range, and to provide air support to ground forces. This is a strategy advocated by Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su in Chapter 5 on Command of the Air over Taiwan. States with air and naval forces that enjoy air supremacy, however, do not necessarily have it all their own way. The adversary has other means than aircraft of defending its military forces against attack from the air. For example, today it can deploy active defense methods through the use of surface-to-air anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAMs) as well as rapid-fire anti-aircraft guns (AA). One effective form of defense is, of course, the ability to destroy the enemy’s aircraft and missile sites on the ground before they are able to take off or alternatively destroy his airfields and launch sites. Alternatively, it can fall back on passive defensive measures to limit the damage that might otherwise be inflicted. Such
2 Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai methods include the hardening of airfields, use of camouflage, and the building of underground shelters. The competition for command of the air and the exploitation of air supremacy, however, is not confined any longer merely to manned, or unmanned, aircraft. As the world moves into the twenty-first century, so the precision-guided ballistic missile has become increasingly the preferred weapon of choice. There are a number of reasons why this is so: first, economically, it is relatively cost-effective; politically, it is less sensitive to public criticism since no pilots or crew are involved, should they be shot down; and socially, it is preferred since with the use of the means of global positioning and modern guidance systems, the missile hits its target with unerring accuracy and reduces the effects of collateral damage. Additionally, the missile becomes more economical, since where one missile can reach and destroy its target, it might well take six or more times that number for manned aircraft to have the same effect. Manned aircraft, for all their high performance and offensive and defensive sophisticated sub-systems, are prodigiously costly and potentially highly vulnerable. They are expensive to procure, whether produced indigenously or purchased from abroad, expensive to maintain, and costly to operate. The pilots who operate them are highly trained but only reach the high levels of skill required in modern air combat after a very lengthy period of instruction. Such are the physical, intellectual, and psychological demands on those who fly modern fast jet combat aircraft that only the very brightest and best are recruited. The cost, however, does not end there. Pilots need to be kept at a high level of air readiness; their essential aeronautical and combat skills are only retained with constant practice both on the ground in simulators and in the air. These considerations, again, add to the huge total cost of having an effective air force. The costs are so high that some air forces around the world are now looking to train younger pilots than ever, specifically in order to get as long a return on their investment as possible. The pilot is a, if not the, crucial asset in the competition for air power. As Chien Chung notes in Chapter 11 in his discussion of military culture and the restructuring of the Republic of China (ROC) Air Force (ROCAF), there is much that still needs to be done by way of training the young Taiwanese combat pilot in the future. Much the same also goes for the mechanics, engineers, and maintenance ground crew who work to keep him and his aircraft in the air and of the ground control personnel who guide him safely and effectively to his target. Manned aircraft are vulnerable to attack from air-to-air guided missiles, or canon fire, from other aircraft; today they may even be hit by a missile fired beyond visual range. Alternatively, they may be targeted from surface-to-air guided missiles launched from the ground or from ships at sea, or shot down by gunfire. Ballistic missiles, in contrast, are a much more difficult target to destroy. They are smaller, fly higher and faster, and are more difficult to identify and intercept. This lesson was learned very quickly during the Second World War, when fighter aircraft were able to intercept and destroy the slow-flying, jet engine propelled V-1 cruise missile, but unable to do anything about the V-2 rocket. At the
Introduction
3
time, the V1 rocket did not leave the earth’s atmosphere and was therefore not, stricto sensu, a ballistic missile, unlike those in service today. This irrefutable fact presents Taiwan’s security with, arguably, its most pressing problem. For almost a decade, as Eric McVadon details in his chapter (Chapter 9) on the joint air and missile defense of Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army PLA have been amassing a formidable inventory of short-, medium-, and longer-range ballistic missiles. All categories have the range to include Taiwan, making shortrange ballistic missiles (SRBM), from Taiwan’s point of view, a strategic threat. China has been concentrating on two SRBM systems, the DF-15 and the DF-11, of which there are now 400 in operational service, and which are projected to reach 1,000 by 2010. Both missiles have solid propellants, can be launched with little preparation from mobile launchers, and are able to deliver their warhead on Taiwan within 6 to 8 minutes of firing. Improved accuracy with global positioning systems and larger 500 kg warheads would mean that relatively few would be needed to inflict heavy damage on the capability of the ROCAF to respond. Indeed, from an active counter-air defense perspective, there is little that can be done to intercept and destroy a Mainland China missile attack on Taiwan. At present, Taiwan’s only defense response is to limit the damage caused as much as possible through prudent preparations as discussed in Ming-Yen Tsai’s chapter (Chapter 10) on air base defense. But it is not only the missile threat that gives the ROC cause for concern. There is also the threat from manned combat aircraft, and the steady change in the balance of air superiority over the Taiwan Straits. The ROCAF’s weakest moment vis à vis the PLAAF was in 1995 when all that was available were obsolete F-15s, F-104s, and a handful of Taiwan’s own Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDFs). The balance of air superiority between the ROCAF and the PLAAF was restored when the former took delivery of the US F-16, French Mirage 2000, and more IDF fighters; indeed it could be argued that until recently the air advantage lay with Taiwan. As York Chen points out in detail in his chapter (Chapter 4) on the balance of air superiority over the Taiwan Strait, the ROCAF is now falling seriously behind as the PLAAF expands in the number and capability of its combat aircraft. The implications for ROCAF counter-air operations and the defense of Taiwan are complex and substantial. Since the turn of the century, however, the air superiority “edge” in Taiwan’s favor has proved to be only temporary. It has steadily been eroded as PLA’s military modernization program has begun to take effect in the field of command of the air with the procurement of Russian designed and Chinese indigenously manufactured Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 advanced aircraft. The estimate is that by 2010, the PLAAF would have amassed some 500 of these aircraft types. The potency of these aircraft has also been considerably enhanced with the addition of an array of beyond visual range (BVRAAM) and medium-range air-to-air guided (AMRAAM) missiles. The air threat to Taiwan, however, does not simply end there. Kenneth Allen points out that it is not merely in land, sea, and weapons systems that the PLA is moving significantly forward, but also in its development of theory and military
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doctrine. In the past, air power was seen only as an adjunct of ground and sea campaigns and essentially defensive in emphasis. The PLA took seriously the lessons learned from their analysis of the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, however, reassessed the importance of air power, and its air campaign theory. In so doing, they differentiated between offensive, defensive, and air blockade campaigns, and set these within the context of the PLAAF’s ability to conduct these campaigns either independently or jointly with other branches of the PLA. More significantly, in recent years, the PLAAF and the PLA have been exercising air campaign theory in respect of three modes of operation, mobile, positional, and guerrilla, with the emphasis increasingly on the first. What this means for Taiwan is that the PLA are acquiring the weapons and equipment, the air power theory, and the military doctrine, to conduct offensive air operations not just in the Taiwan Strait but further afield. To give credibility to these new developments, the PLA and PLAAF are training extensively to be able to implement these theories and doctrines, mostly within the region opposite Taiwan. In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, it is certain from these exercises that the PLAAF would play a central role, as Chih-Kung Yu notes in his chapter (Chapter 8) on air combat in the defense of Taiwan. To keep up the pressure on Taiwan, and to hone the PLAAF pilots’ skills, these exercises have been conducted regularly, with units rotating in and out of front line airfields, and practising across provinces and regions within China. For example, a recent exercise held on Dong Shan Island in 2001 was the PLA’s first large-scale joint exercise of China’s new integrated military force. “The PLA is working to develop the necessary theory and train its forces to be able to reach its goal of conducting simultaneous offensive and defensive campaigns. It is not there yet.” But there is no doubt that it will not be too long before it is, an estimate of which the ROC is fully aware. In the dialectic of air power, Taiwan has to find ways of matching, or countering, both the air threat and the joint forces threat that the PLA poses. In place, it already has an integrated three-tier air defense system of SAM guided missiles in addition to its air defense aircraft deployed in airfields around the island. Such is the air power available to the PLA and the array of weaponry at the disposal of the PLAAF, that the feeling in Taiwan is to draw back from its policy of “not firing the first shot.” Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su argue that this would mean abandoning Taiwan’s Maginot Line mentality and be prepared to adopt an offensive–defensive strategy. This would lead to two options: the first would be to develop a second-strike capability, but this would entail being able to withstand a PLA first strike on Taiwan. The second would be to be prepared to build up an offensive capability to strike, preemptively if necessary, at China’s Air Force capabilities, even at the risk, as Rear Admiral Eric McVadon observes, of losing US support. An analysis of the PLA’s air threat to Taiwan, as conceded by the US Department of Defense in 2002, concluded that it is real today and, in a relatively short period of time, will become overwhelming. Unless something radical and effective is done to counter it soon, the future of Taiwan must be uncertain, if not
Introduction
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bleak. As China’s air power lies at the heart of its capability to inflict harm on Taiwan and its capacity to invade, so, for Taiwan, it forms the basis of its ability to withstand attack and defend its sovereignty. Eric McVadon concludes that there is an urgent need in Taiwan for a joint, combined, and comprehensive defense. The components of these defenses differ according to whether the object against which one is trying to defend oneself is an aircraft or a missile, cruise or otherwise. Whether the former or the latter, there is much to be done by Taiwan to strengthen its defense, some of which can be achieved through changes in tactics and more efficient procedures. In particular, Taiwan should develop a joint air and missile defense, and prepare, in the event that the United States would come to the island’s aid if attacked by China, to be able to engage in combined operations with US armed forces. In addressing the air threat to Taiwan, Robert Pape takes a close look at the likelihood of an attack by the PRC against the Taiwan. He concludes that in the light of historical experience and no matter which of the three options – denial (blockade), decapitation (bombardment), and punishment (invasion) – the PLA might choose to coerce the island, the evidence would suggest that it would be unlikely to succeed. The solution to Taiwan’s problem of how to respond to the threats from the PRC is to work closely with the ROC’s main security asset – the United States. Nevertheless, Taiwan has to consider the best strategy in the short term to counter the threat from the air from China. Of one thing the Taiwanese are certain: the threat posed by China’s air power will neither go away nor diminish in size. Taiwan has therefore also to look to the longer term. Here, Richard D. Fisher offers some innovative and practical propositions. His chapter (Chapter 12) recognizes the new threat from the PLA and identifies the directions where China, and its military strategy, are going. For certain, the evidence is that China has extravagant ambitions for its armed forces particularly in respect of capitalizing on the “revolution in military affairs.” The PLA has embraced the concept of information warfare, for which reason Taiwan must do likewise. This is not, however, to discount the need to upgrade Taiwan’s current force and look to adopting weapons systems currently serving in the front line of the USAF and other Service branches. All of this will impose a significant financial burden on the island’s economy. But it might well be that this is the cost that has to be paid to avoid becoming absorbed into Mainland China. As General Bernard Montgomery noted in 1943, “If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war, and we lose it quickly.” That sentiment is as applicable to Taiwan as it was to the Allied Forces in the North African desert. The only difference is that air power in Montgomery’s day was relatively simple compared with today. As Greg Mills points out in his overview (Chapter 3) of where air power is going today and the ten factors that states should bear in mind if it is to be effective, air power is not a unilateral phenomenon. Air power is almost all encompassing in its demands and in its effects. This book addresses the question why air power is so important to Taiwan’s national security and, through the expert contributions of its eleven authors, offers some potential solutions.
Part I
Air power and Taiwan’s security
2
Air power and Taiwan’s security Martin Edmonds
The peculiarities of air power Air power, it has been said, ‘is the twentieth century’s peculiar contribution to warfare (and) continues to defy our attempts at analysis.’1 The explanation for this somewhat enigmatic statement is that the vocabulary of air power is never constant. Even apparently straightforward concepts, such as air power itself, ‘strategic bombing’, ‘command of the air’, or ‘air supremacy’ mean different things to different people. Adding to the potential for confusion is the extent to which scientific research and advanced technology have tended to concentrate on the air element of modern strategy and tactics. Much of that technology is highly esoteric and spans not merely the branch of the armed forces that traditionally operates in the air and outer space, that is to say, Air Forces, but also encompasses forces at sea and on land. Such is the degree of overlap of the ‘third dimension’ of warfare that the air element of modern strategy has often been a battleground between all branches of the armed services. Each has claimed the residual ‘right’ to own and operate heavier-than-air flying vehicles – generally known as aircraft, helicopters and missiles – independently of the other two. Looking back to the early days of aviation and the idea of flight, the first proponents were not those who saw it as a new dimension of warfare that required a new and separate specialist branch of the armed forces. These were the two existing branches, the Navy and the Army. They saw the application of aircraft as adjuncts to their traditional strategic and operational roles: in the case of the Navy, this was to give capital ships at sea the capability to search, find and locate enemy ships at long distance, and ultimately engage them. Aircraft could also improve communications at sea and allow ship commanders the option of being able to bring concentrated firepower to bear on their adversaries. Aircraft eliminated the limitations imposed by the horizon and the curvature of the earth and widened communications, giving those fleets that had aircraft the tactical and operational advantage. Tactical and operational advantage – very much akin to the notion of the ‘knowledge edge’ that is driving the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) today – was also the asset that aircraft brought to armies during the early days of military aviation. The earliest use of the air was the ability of observers to survey the
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battlefield and locate enemy positions from gas-filled balloons some few hundred feet in the air. From this height advantage, observers could direct artillery fire on targets that otherwise would have been out of sight or give intelligence to commanders where enemy units could be found. However, these balloons were static and had limited range. Aircraft overcame these limitations and widened the area that could be surveyed. In both the early naval and military use of aircraft, the heavy emphasis was on reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and target acquisition that ultimately led to naval and military engagements between fleets and armies. Only towards the end of the First World War was the potential for the use of flying vehicles – and this meant airships as well as aircraft – as the means of bringing firepower, and that meant the war, to the enemy, recognised. If aircraft and airships could observe targets, then they could also be the means by which munitions could be delivered on them. Such bombing raids, however, were not confined to military targets. German Zeppelin raids on coastal towns in the United Kingdom were frequent and thereby added a further dimension to warfare – attacks on civilian populations. Air power effectively made war not only a threedimensional affair but also one that was no longer confined to military forces. Civilians came under the purview of air power, making whole societies, their economic and industrial capacity as well as their cities and towns vulnerable to attack. And with this opening up of the third dimension of warfare and its scope for offence came a new raft of strategic concepts and military operational doctrine.
The dialectic of air power Clearly, air power brought significant operational advantage to those armed forces that had access to the new technology. But, as with the dialectic of war itself, one technological advantage tends to prompt an opposite response that subsequently leads to the development of an equal and opposite military technological developments. In the case of early developments in air power – that of manned aircraft – this meant the development of specialist aircraft and munitions that could intercept and destroy enemy aircraft used for battlefield reconnaissance and aerial bombardment. Such were the advantages of air power to the side that had it, and could thereby enjoy both command of the air and exercise air supremacy, that it soon became, within the relatively short time span of two decades the sine qua non of military success. For this reason, the history of air power has been one of technological competition between states seeking to have command of the air and deny it to their enemies. In the course of this development, the dialectic of air power and the struggle to gain air supremacy has assumed many dimensions and become highly complex. Some of these developments have occurred in space, some in the air – the world’s atmosphere – some on, and even under, the sea, and some on the ground. Furthermore, they have involved, inter alia, scientific and technological developments in aerodynamics, ballistics, radar, stealth, sensors, information technologies, satellite imagery and electronics.
Air power and Taiwan’s security
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Whilst air power alone cannot win wars – this in the final analysis is a matter of capturing and holding ground – or be able to exercise total control of the seas and sea lanes of communication, armies and navies cannot – or are extremely unlikely to – prevail in battle or in war without having either command of the air or air supremacy in that it is denied to the enemy. Air power – by which is meant ‘the total ability of a nation to operate throughout the air and in space’2 – presupposes therefore both command of the air and the ability to exercise air supremacy. To have air power and to be able to exploit it means that armies and navies effectively have an added dimension – the third dimension – to their operations. Not to have command of the air, or the ability to exercise air supremacy, means that they are left at a distinct disadvantage vis à vis their adversary. Not to have command of the air or air supremacy points to a likely defeat, except under certain or exceptional circumstances. The air war in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that even with overwhelming air superiority, the United States with all its air power could not prevail over its adversary. The North Vietnamese, fighting a guerrilla campaign, in what today would be classed as asymmetrical warfare, totally lacked air power but nonetheless were able ultimately to emerge victorious. Air power, therefore, has to be seen in the context of the particular conflict in which states are engaged. It is manifestly the case that against modern forms of international terrorism, air power, whilst useful under certain circumstances, and in particular situations, nevertheless has limitations. Correspondingly, the air dimension of warfare is one over which adversaries also have to compete in order to gain control of the airspace or to acquire air supremacy. In a manner of speaking, states have no alternative. It is for this primary reason that much scientific, intellectual, engineering and technological effort, not to mention scarce national resources, is appropriated for the research, development and manufacture of manned and unmanned aircraft, missiles, satellites, sensors, surveillance equipment, communications and guidance systems – all the artefacts of air power – compared with other military equipment and weapons of war. The vocabulary of air power that causes such confusion as mentioned can be seen in terms of the importance the concept has for all three branches of the armed services. As air power was seen as an essential war-winning asset, all three clearly wanted to exercise control over the means by which it was acquired. This in turn has sometimes proved to be the cause of bitter inter-service rivalry, even to the extent of armies and navies opposing the formation of a separate air force branch of the armed services. This wrangling was much in evidence in the United States during the 1950s, both before and after the formation of the United States Air Force (USAF), replicating an experience that occurred in the United Kingdom some thirty years before. During the period after the Second World War, the theory of strategic bombardment was very much in vogue. It was a legacy of the massive strategic air raids and aerial bombardment against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during the Second World War. It was a strategy that had many advocates, in particular the Italian Army Colonel, Giulio Douhet3 and the American, William ‘Billy’ Mitchell
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after the First World War,4 Basil Liddell Hart in 19255 and the Russo-American strategic theorist, Alexander de Seversky during the Second World War and after.6 From what they had observed, principally, in the First World War, each foresaw aerial bombardment as a war-winning strategy. None envisaged any practical means by which attacks from the air against both military and civilian targets could either be prevented or intercepted. Air power, they argued, had introduced into modern warfare an offensive capability for which there was no effective or guaranteed defence. Bomber aircraft, they concluded, would always be able to penetrate air defences. In 1942, even Hollywood in the form of Walt Disney productions, joined forces with de Seversky to promote his argument for strategic bombing, even to the extent of reducing Japan, and its people, to little more than a pile of rubble.7 The subsequent experience of Britain’s fighter aircraft and early warning radar screen during the Battle of Britain was not sufficient to persuade de Seversky otherwise after the Second World War had ended. After the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the concept of strategic bombardment took on a new dimension, as Bernard Brodie pointed out in his Strategy in the Missile Age.8 It was little wonder, therefore, that all three Services in the United States and, subsequently, Britain and France, wanted to harness the Second World War air power developments in Germany with jet-propelled aircraft and, more importantly, the V2 ballistic rocket. By developing the means – ballistic missiles – strategic and tactical offensive capabilities would be further enhanced. These in turn would help deter the perceived Soviet military threat. The Soviet Union was no different in its embracing strategic rocketry. It also devoted considerable effort in those early postwar years to developing the V2 technology acquired from a defeated Germany. In the process, they even formed a fifth branch of their armed forces, the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. Although ballistic missile technology was in its infancy after 1945, strategic bombing was very much the dominant strategic concept; it was one that was actively promoted by the American, Soviet, British and French Air Forces. Only later were the claims for strategic bombing challenged and proved wanting. At the time and before missile technology fully matured into effective weapons systems, manned strategic bombers (the B-29, Lancaster and, subsequently, the American B-49 and B-52s, Britain’s ‘V’ bomber force and the French Mirage IV), operated by Western Air Forces, were initially the only effective means of delivery. Research and development into missiles, however, stimulated inter-Service competition. This was especially prevalent in the United States. There, all three Services claimed the right to own and exercise strategic air power. The USAF argued that this was their responsibility because missiles were viewed effectively as rocket-powered aircraft. The US Army felt that rockets were merely another form of artillery and therefore missile acquisition was a natural development for them. The US Navy (USN) even saw missiles launched from naval platforms were simply a progression in naval gunnery.9 Only when the vulnerability of strategic missile launch sites became an issue in the 1960s did the submarine-launched solid fuelled strategic missile come into its own (Polaris) and the USN assume the role of delivering the principal US strategic nuclear deterrent.
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The essential characteristics of air power To escape the vicissitudes of air power vocabulary and interpretations of differing technologies, Tony Mason has helped clarify what air power is in his book Air Power in the Nuclear Age, Theory and Practice.10 In it, he defines air power as, The ability to project military force by, or from, a platform in the third dimension above the surface of the earth … (and) is exploited to advantage by the platform or vehicle; rather than simply traversed as by a bullet, a shell or a ballistic projectile.11 The important point in this definition is to recognise the human element in the application of force in the third dimension. Whether or not the platform is manned or unmanned is immaterial; it is man’s exploitation of the third dimension for military advantage that is essential. This is the distinctive feature of the concept of air power. Part of that exploitation is to deny the enemy the ability to do likewise.12 Indeed, air power is concerned with the dialectic of warfare conducted primarily in the third dimension. Once ‘air supremacy’ has been achieved, and providing all conditions are met, a state can be considered to have achieved command of the air. The strategic, operational and tactical advantages that air power can offer can then be applied to combat on land and at sea. Air power is exercised through the deployment and use of platforms, or vehicles, in the third dimension. In plain English, these platforms are heavier-than-air flying vehicles generally operated or flown by trained human beings to perform a range of specific tasks. These platforms can also include, in addition to aircraft, air balloons, unmanned vehicles controlled from ground stations, satellites and space vehicles. Their roles and tasks are either to deny or assist in denying, the use of the third dimension – which includes space – to the enemy, and to exploit it to the advantage of one’s own naval and ground forces.
The major attributes of air power The first thing that has to be recognised is that, whereas 70 per cent of the world’s surface is covered by water, 100 per cent is surrounded by air, or the atmosphere. It is this environment in which air power is exercised. This distinguishes the third dimension from the sea and land power inasmuch as the atmosphere presents no physical barriers or hindrances. Encumbrances such as the weather, clouds, winds, storms, rain, fog and declining oxygen levels with altitude can present constraints and problems, though developments in modern aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles have mitigated most, if not all, of them to a significant degree. This means that, in effect, heavier-than-air air-breathing vehicles, that is to say aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, have the ability to move easily anywhere above the surface of the globe and do so from sea level to operational heights in the order of 60,000 feet and above. The only limitations on this degree of ubiquity is the range of the aircraft, the endurance of its pilot and crew, and the
14 Martin Edmonds fact that ultimately it has to find a suitable place from which to take off and to land. These limitations, through the application of modern technology, have been reduced significantly. This has given aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), satellites and missiles and, therefore, the countries that use them a degree of ubiquity not found either on land or at sea. On land, the nature of the terrain and the requirement to operate only on a two-dimensional plane, presents commanders with major operational problems. Armies cannot always go where they would like. Aircraft do not face such operational barriers; they are not constrained by geography to the same degree. Likewise, navies are limited to water, both on the surface and beneath, and are restricted to navigable channels. Though they can operate in a third dimension, beneath the waves, even then they are still constrained as to where they can operate. From their perspective, when operated from ships at sea or from coastal land bases, aircraft and UAVs, equipped with modern sensors and surveillance technology, can cover most areas where navies are likely to operate, but without the same restrictions. Ubiquity is, therefore, one of the major attributes of air power. It is a capability that states and their air forces are quick to exploit. However, there is one specific consideration that air forces have to bear in mind that presents a significant barrier to unencumbered air operations. Because states see, in international law, the air space above their territories as belonging to them, they resist others overflying what they perceive to be exclusively theirs.13 Aircraft entering the air space of another state therefore require permission to do so. When entering the air space of another state, all aircraft, civil and military, have to conform to both national and international rules and procedures and are under the control of the host state whilst they are there. This includes a unique identification signal to each and every aircraft or UAV. Failure to comply would be construed as a violation of another’s air space. Such an incursion potentially would invite interception by air defence aircraft, or in extremis attack from surface-to-air missiles or ground gunfire and to be shot down. The fate of the Korean Airliner 007 when it strayed into Soviet air space in August 1983,14 or that of the American maritime patrol aircraft off Southern China in March 2001,15 or even the protests from the Greek authorities when Turkish aircraft flew into parts of the Aegean inadvertently, are graphic examples of this principle. A more dramatic case of the principle of no over-flying without permission was when the USAF was ordered to dispatch bombers to attack Tripoli on 16 April 1986. Other than the United Kingdom, no European state was prepared to grant the USAF permission to over-fly its territory on that mission. France, in particular, refused over-flight permission to the US F-111 aircraft detailed to execute the mission, code named El Dorado Canyon. Consequently, the US aircraft had to fly along the Eastern Atlantic Ocean around France and Spain over international waters (and therefore in international air space). From there they entered the Mediterranean, taking advantage of the fact that Gibraltar was a British colony. This lengthy over-sea route was only made possible through the use of in-flight refuelling in both directions, thereby extending the range of each aircraft. The
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task was not impossible, merely inconvenient and involved not only additional flight time, but also, in total, 100 aircraft instead of two-thirds that number.16 A further disadvantage that can limit the ubiquity of air power is the need for aircraft and UAVs to have somewhere to take off and land. Missiles only require one location from where to be launched; their mission is strictly a one-way affair. Depending on their range, this can also prove a logistic problem. Modern aircraft and UAVs also need constant and frequent maintenance to keep operating. They demand extensive logistic support and, in some cases, highly sophisticated ground-based equipment and facilities. In turn, this requires suitably located and equipped airfields. When operating away from one’s own territory, these facilities have to be provided by what is termed ‘host nation support’. Those countries providing such assistance, however, can place operational restrictions on the uses to which the air power of other states aircraft and missiles might be put. This happened when USAF who wanted to launch an air attack from the Italian military airfield of Aviano against Serb forces in Banja Luka. The Italians refused permission, using their prerogative to do so ostensibly in order to gain political leverage to be present at the later peace talks.17 These support facilities are not always available, as has recently (Fall, 2003) become evident in the US build-up for a possible invasion of Iraq. The ability to operate against enemy targets some distance from an aircraft’s or a UAV’s home base necessitates friendly countries or Allies making their airfields and other facilities available. Unlike the 1990–1991 Gulf war when the USAF had unrestricted use of Saudi Arabian airfields to attack Iraq, in 2002 a restriction was imposed that they could only be used for logistic support purposes. Alternatively, air power can be based on large sea-going platforms. These are principally aircraft carriers that can operate independently offshore in international waters. Nuclear powered carriers have the capability to operate for long periods without refuelling which makes them such a potent element of projected air power. Such vessels can also carry their own aircraft logistic and maintenance support, but are inevitably restricted in the number and variety of aircraft and UAVs that it can operate and support.18 Aircraft carriers, however, are not the only vessels to carry heavier-than-air combat vehicles: most naval ships carry one or two helicopters, and assault ships likewise carry a range of heavier-than-air vehicles. Modern technology has even made it possible for aircraft and helicopters to operate independently of home bases. The development of the vertical take-off and land aircraft, such as the British Harrier has enabled land forces to have air support from aircraft located within the theatre of battle. With the development of the attack helicopter, a form or airborne cavalry, land forces again can operate with their own air support without depending on that of their air forces operating from bases some distance away. Even so, these new forms of military support aircraft and helicopters require mobile logistic support systems to sustain their operations. Despite these physical, legal and political limitations, air power remains for the most part ubiquitous within the particular constraints faced by all states with air forces. Military force can be deployed from the air against sea and land targets
16 Martin Edmonds almost anywhere in the world, assuming that the targets can be readily identified and the aircraft, missiles and UAVs have the required range. The aircraft of the more technologically advanced states today carry their own radar and navigation equipment and no longer require, as in early days of air power, to be guided on to their targets. Global positioning systems (GPS) and precision-guided munitions (PGM) can direct aircraft to wherever operational commanders have identified targets. A second distinctive characteristic of air power that differentiates it from war at sea or on land is the speed at which air operations can take place. Many modern aircraft travel at speeds substantially in excess of the speed of sound and can respond to emergencies with very little preparation or warning. Combat aircraft can have an extremely short reaction time and can be deployed over a theatre of war very quickly and much faster than either ground vehicles of naval vessels.19 During the Cold War, it was the ability of combat aircraft to react quickly to the first indications of an attack from the former Warsaw Pact countries that lent credibility to NATO’s strategy of conventional deterrence and its operational tactic of Follow-on-Forces Attack (FOFA) as detailed in the US Army’s Airland battle 2000 military doctrine.20 This speed of air power response therefore helps to minimize exposure to threats and enables commanders to bring air power into action rapidly at tactical, operational and strategic levels, imposing an operational tempo impossible with surface forces.21 This speed of reaction means that air power makes it possible to pre-empt enemies and reduce, or even remove, their ability to respond. This effectively means that without the adversary having either adequate warning or the ability to intercept an air or missile attack, air power can change the balance of forces between adversaries in a short period of time. This happened as a result of the attack in November 1940 on Taranto by aircraft of the British Fleet Air Arm, as a result of which half the Italian fleet was destroyed.22 A similar situation was experienced soon after the start of the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War in 1973 when the Israeli Air Force (IAF) regained the initiative, and during Operation Desert Shield at the beginning of the Gulf War of 1990–1991. During the early stages of what became the Battle of Britain in 1940, the German Air Force almost achieved its objective of eliminating the Royal Air Force (RAF) by concentrating their air offensive against British airfields. By a combination of the early use of radar, effective command and control, accelerated aircraft production, and the good fortune that the Germans changed their strategy at a critical time to target instead the City of London and other provincial cities. As a consequence, the RAF survived the initial onslaught and went on to achieve air supremacy in the skies over the United Kingdom and, ultimately, with the Americans they then exercised command of the air over the continent of Europe. Added to the air power characteristics of speed and ubiquity is that of perspective. Operating from heights over land and sea, aircraft provide commanders with a vision of the theatre of battle that would be impossible to gain
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from the world’s surface. In a manner of speaking, this is the same capability that the first users of aircraft and balloons sought. With the use of modern technology, such as radar, sensors, high speed cameras, and telecommunications and information technology systems, today’s aircraft, satellites and UAVs can provide commanders on the ground with detailed intelligence and pictures of the theatre of battle and beyond in real time. Among the latest in this development is that of the reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle, such as the high altitude Tier 3 American Dark Star and Global Hawk.23 The latter UAV can cruise at 65,000 feet and be linked to ground control anywhere in the world through satellite communications (SATCOM) links. Its performance is impressive: it can survey 40,000 square miles and focus on 1,900 spot targets in a 24-hour period by day or night and in all weathers and send down detailed pictures in real time.24 To these important attributes of air power must also be added the additional benefits of reach, surprise, safety, psychological impact and political attractiveness. Through advances in aerospace technology and techniques of in-flight refuelling, aircraft can fly immense distances giving them impressive reach. Indeed, the US strategic bombing philosophy was predicated on having strategic bomber aircraft capable of reaching almost anywhere in the world from bases located in the United States. The feature of surprise is related to the fact that aircraft can arrive over their target from any direction; armies and navies in contrast are restricted to a linear, frontal approach. Added to the speed with which aircraft operate, aircraft and today’s programmed missiles, such as the Swedish RB12 anti-shipping missile, surprise is a bonus that adds to operational safety. Safety is also a factor that makes air power politically attractive. In an era when the number of war casualties is a sensitive issue, the fact that relatively few personnel – specifically pilots – are involved directly in delivering air power, as opposed to providing land-based maintenance and logistic and operational support, is an added bonus. A further benefit is the fact that it is also easy to disengage quickly from a conflict, unlike armies and navies that need time to withdraw.25 Finally, there is the psychological impact of air power on enemy populations and their will to resist. Whilst many argue that strategic bombardment of London in 1940 – the Blitz – steeled the resolve of the inhabitants to resist – and the same could also be said of the Allied bombardment of German cities in the latter stages of the Second World War – there is a strong case to be made that air power does have a major psychological impact on both enemy citizens and on combat forces.26 To achieve this, however, the argument is that air superiority is essential; air power’s omnipotence undermines the enemy’s confidence in the future, and repeated attacks should both increase in intensity and frequency over time in order to create a cycle of fear. Above all, air power needs to appear pervasive. The leaders in the development of air power have been the United States and, for forty years, the former Soviet Union. Both states recognised that air power was the basis of their being superpowers, and each devoted disproportionate resources to its development. They recognised the distinctive characteristics of air power and their major contribution to national security. If the Cold War arms race was conducted in any one specific area, it was that of air power. Both,
18 Martin Edmonds however, recognised that there was one essential element that had to be developed if air power were to be a reality; this was in aerospace research and development and in establishing a manufacturing base. This was the conclusion of the US Finletter Commission whose Report in 1948 concluded, ‘Our air establishment would be useless unless backed by a manufacturing industry skilful in technological application, efficient in production, capable of rapid expansion and strong in basic financial structure’.27 To this aerospace manufacturing base have also to be added further supporting fundamentals that make a state’s air power potential possible. These were outlined in a paper presented in 1956 at the annual conference of the Institution of Production Engineers in Southampton, UK, by T.P. Wright, Vice President of Research at Cornell University. They included in addition to a trained and professional National Air Force, inter alia, Sea and Ground Forces, Facilities, Civil Aviation, Education (and Training), Economic Stability and, finally, the Moral Fibre of the Population.28 It is not just the moral fibre of the nation that is important: so also is the political will and the quality of leadership to ensure that air power remains a top priority in a state’s defensive posture.29 Moreover, the argument has been put that when the necessary leadership is lacking and public sentiment is allowed to take over, air power becomes undermined and its benefits compromised.30 The message is clear: air power, stricto sensu, is a concept that goes well beyond merely the aircraft and heavier than air flying vehicles operated by air forces. In discussing Taiwanese air power, these other fundamentals must also be borne in mind and their significance not underestimated.31 In recognising these essential facets of air power, it is also necessary to acknowledge one of its major disadvantages – that of the very high costs involved, not merely in continuing research, development and production of air-powerrelated equipment but also in the training, state of readiness and retention of the personnel involved. If a state is committed to having an air power capability, it has also to recognise that it is committed to a heavy financial burden, and one that has constantly to be maintained. The technologies that are linked to effective air power lie at the leading edge of science and technology, and no state can afford to be left too far behind. Once acquired, air power is also demanding in time and effort since, to be fully effective, it needs constantly to be kept up-to-date.
Air supremacy: keeping the enemy at bay ‘Air supremacy’ is an essential element of air power. Without the ability to deny the enemy access to the air space over a state’s territory in the first instance, that state would always be vulnerable. Ideally, a state would wish also to be able to exercise ‘air supremacy’ beyond national boundaries, and specifically to do so over enemy territory and more importantly over the field of battle. ‘Air supremacy’ enjoyed over enemy territory would mean that aerial bombardment of enemy military and even civilian targets becomes a tactical, or even strategic, option. ‘Air supremacy’ over the theatre of war – and more immediately the field of battle – would enable aircraft to provide close air support for military forces on land
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engaged in combat. If the two were combined – ‘air supremacy’ over both enemy territory and the theatre of war – they would enable air attacks against second and third echelon enemy forces, and their logistic support. It was on this assumption of air supremacy that the NATO strategy of follow-on forces attack was developed against Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. Like the concept of air power, ‘air supremacy’ is also subject to semantic debate and requires careful definition. Indeed, ‘air superiority’ is one of the most widely used, and misused, terms in the airman’s vocabulary.32 The problem is that the concept conjures up the notion of a state’s total domination of the skies, a state of affairs that is rarely, if ever, achieved. ‘Total domination of the skies is not a reality. “Air superiority” exists when one side can achieve its purpose while frustrating the purpose of the other side’.33 The means by which air superiority can be achieved rest heavily on a state’s ability to deny the enemy access to the skies. Where aircraft are concerned, the means are a combination of the ‘air superiority fighter’ and the ‘air defence fighter’, both armed with air-to-air guided missiles. In some cases, these anti-aircraft missiles, which can be fired at targets beyond visual range, (BVRAAM) are ‘fire and forget’ in that they are able to seek out their targets independently of the aircraft, or can be guided onto their target. The ‘air defence fighter’ is an aircraft specifically engaged in air defence battle against intruders with offensive intent. The ‘air superiority fighter’ is a combat aircraft that is designed to engage and destroy enemy aircraft that are also seeking to exercise dominance of the sky. The two fighters, once engaged in air combat, have given rise to the epithet, ‘dog fight’. Such is the nature of modern technology that both ‘air defence’ and ‘air superiority’ fighters are assisted in their tasks by ground control radar that guide them on to their targets. It would be wrong to assume that both can operate entirely independently, and that ground control is not an important element in achieving ‘air superiority’. Aircraft and air-to-air missiles are not the only means of achieving ‘air superiority’. Surface-to-air defence missiles also have an important contribution, as does electronic warfare. The offensive counter-air campaign, by which enemy aircraft and missiles are attacked on the ground, is another way of achieving ‘air superiority’. These are air-to-ground operations and depend on surprise attack before any enemy resistance can be generated. Surface-to-air missiles have achieved a sufficient degree of sophistication that offensive aircraft are extremely vulnerable unless they operate at levels higher than the missile can reach or have electronic jamming and other decoy systems that interrupt the anti-aircraft missiles’ guidance systems. The United Nations air offensive over Kosovo relied on high-level (15,000 feet) operations, a tactic that did not enhance the accuracy of target acquisition or its destruction. The major problem where ‘air superiority’ is concerned has less with what to do against enemy aircraft and more with how to cope with enemy surface-to-surface and land, sea and air launched cruise missiles. Not only are offensive missiles difficult to detect, but they are also smaller, faster and very hard to intercept. In addition, they are becoming increasingly accurate. The earliest surface-to-surface
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missiles with ranges beyond the immediate battlefield that were used in a conflict were the German V1 cruise missiles launched against Britain in the Second World War. These missiles – ‘Doodlebugs’ – were slow, noisy and, once detected, could be intercepted by defence fighter aircraft. The ballistic liquid-fuelled German V2 rocket that emerged in September 1944 was of a different order. No effective defence could be found against them at the time.34 With the V2, the issue of ballistic missile defence (BMD) was born; it is one that remains a technological and political challenge to the present day.35 The obvious conclusion with offensive missiles is that they give to those states that possess them an immediate air superiority advantage until the capability of intercepting missiles is perfected. It is for this reason that the steady proliferation of surface-to-surface missiles by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Artillery units is a source of major concern for the Republic of China (ROC). It also explains why Taiwan has placed much emphasis on the Patriot PAC-3 system that has some enhanced capability of intercepting Mainland China’s CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-to-medium range rockets, and the M series of missiles deployed in China’s Fu-jen and Jiang-shi provinces. It also explains why, ideally, Taiwan would like to have access to the American Aegis radar system and, be involved in theatre missile developments in conjunction with the United States and Japan. In August 1999, Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui confirmed Taiwan’s commitment to develop a low-tier TMD system. In pursuit of that policy, Taiwan has been developing an indigenous surface-toair missile system, the Tien-Kung II missile defence system, and the smallscale Aegis-type radar the Kuang-Haw I on board the Chengkung-Class frigate. Nevertheless, to have surface-to-surface missiles alone does not guarantee air superiority since they do not deny the adversary access to the skies. They merely mean, in the absence of any anti-missile defence, the ability to inflict damage on the enemy.
Command of the air: air control Ships at sea and, even, under the sea, are vulnerable to attack from the air. This was demonstrated in the war at sea during the Second World War. Once the Allies had command of the air, the Axis powers’ ships were highly vulnerable to air attack. In the Pacific, aircraft carriers proved themselves to be the critical capability in winning the war against Japan. On the ground, once the Allies had eliminated the ability of the Luftwaffe to protect German forces and cities from Allied air attack, resistance diminished quickly. The converse was true at the beginning of the Second World War when the advantage lay with the German Air Force (Luftwaffe), enabling the implementation of blitzkrieg tactics and the rapid defeat of Allied armies. Indeed, part of the turning of the tide in the Second World War was the slow shift in the balance of ‘air supremacy’ from the Axis powers to the Allies. There are two broad elements to achieving ‘command of the air’: one is ‘air superiority’, as discussed earlier, and the other is the ability to deny the enemy access to the skies. In other words, ‘command of the air’, or ‘air control’, is
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a combination of air freedom on the one hand and air denial on the other.36 It does not matter, therefore, if the enemy has missiles for which there is no effective defence if they do not affect one’s own ability to use the air dimension in a conflict to one’s advantage. Conventionally armed missiles may be targeted at the essential elements of air power – airfields, aircraft hangars and bunkers, ground control systems, early warning radar systems, maintenance and repair facilities, aerospace production lines and counter-air systems such as AA guns and surfaceto-air missiles. If they fail to disrupt the capacity to respond, however, they will not have gained ‘air control’. Without ‘air denial’, no state can claim command of the air. Once this has been achieved, the state, and its armed forces, have freedom of the air and can use all the benefits that accrue from it to operational advantage. Most particularly, freedom of the air provides a significant force multiplier to forces at sea and on the ground. Without opposition in the air, air forces can provide ground support with air-to-ground operations including direct assaults on enemy positions, disruption of enemy movements, provision of reconnaissance and intelligence, the destruction of enemy logistic support and second and third echelon reinforcements, attacks on command and control centres, and generally frustrating enemy operational and tactical options. All of these advantages are replicated at sea, giving naval vessels not only additional protection, but also enhancing their operational effectiveness. The prize for denying the skies to the enemy and having the freedom to operate in the air against enemy targets is immense. It might most usefully be seen in terms of a zero-sum game: for every advantage one side has where the elements of ‘command of the air’ are concerned, the other has an equal – or even greater – disadvantage. It is, therefore, little wonder that states place so much by way of resources, research and development, training and effort into the development of air power. However, air power theorists are at pains to point out that ‘command of the air’, is a multi-dimensional phenomenon; it is never constant and changes all the time with the introduction of new aerospace-related technologies. ‘Air control’, or ‘command of the air’ ‘remains the sine qua non for any military application of force’.37 It prevents the enemy gaining access to his own air space as well as denying him access to one’s own domestic air space. In the event that both conditions apply, a state can be considered as having ‘command of the air’. This would equally apply to aircraft, UAVs and helicopters operated by armies and navies from land bases and naval vessels. National air forces are largely responsible for ensuring both air supremacy and control of the air, since they have the specialised equipment to be able to do so; armies and navies also have air power assets in support of their operational roles and exercise air power. In other words, air power is a joint concept in which the air assets of all three Services are mutually supportive as well as interdependent. ‘Command of the air’ enables a state to bring effective military force to bear against enemy targets without risk of resistance or interdiction. It enables land and sea operations to be conducted with support from the air against enemy forces, thereby providing them with a ‘force multiplier’. However, the degree of
22 Martin Edmonds control will depend on the context and the nature of the armed conflict. Whilst a state may deny an enemy access to the air space over its own territory, it may well find it hard to continue to be able to dominate the air space over enemy territory, especially if the enemy has surface to air missiles. If the nature of the conflict is asymmetrical, in which elements of combat are engaged clandestinely, ‘control of the air’ is of little value since it cannot identify, let alone destroy enemy targets. Furthermore, the indiscriminate use of air power to engage a guerrilla, or terrorist-type adversary can prove counter-productive, as the Americans experienced in Vietnam.
Air power and the PLA threat to Taiwanese security ‘In the past 100 years, air power has evolved to become a decisive mechanism for successfully resolving conflict and achieving political aims. Any party to modern conflict that has lost control of the air has lost the battle’. This was the conclusion of Colonel Michael Mahar in his contribution to a special edition on air power of the Royal United Services Institution Journal. Likening air power to electricity, he noted that it is often taken for granted until it is lost.38 It is evident from the discussion in the previous section that air power – the third dimension of warfare – brings to those states, with the technology, resources and manpower to possess it, immense advantages. But air power does not exist in a vacuum; it is relative to the air assets that any potential enemy has at its disposal. In this respect, the dialectic of warfare – one’s own capability relative to that of the adversary – is played out in full. In respect of air power, the dialectic is even more critical because air power in the sense of air superiority and control of the air is a force multiplier like no other. Opposing forces are engaged in a zerosum conflict where air power is concerned: small advantages in air capability bring about disproportionate differences in offensive and defensive war fighting capability. States with air forces have essentially to achieve two fundamental objectives where air power is concerned: to deny the enemy freedom of the skies and to be able to exploit it themselves. For this reason, research, development and production in aerospace technology has to be conducted concurrently in defensive and offensive systems. This also means concurrent developments in platforms – aircraft, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, spacecraft and satellites, and balloons – and in subsystems – communications, radar, sensors, electronic jamming, navigation systems, precision guided and other munitions, ground control systems, identification friend or foe (IFF) systems, etc. Each new technology that gives the side that possesses it an edge over its adversary can have an impact on the conduct of war that is out of proportion to its cost. This was graphically illustrated in the Yom Kippur War when the IAF initially had no answer to the attacking Egyptian Air Force and in turn were almost defenceless against Egyptian SAM-6s. Only when United States supplied the IAF at short notice with superior air-to-air missiles and the means with which to neutralise the Egyptian SAM-6 missiles was it able to regain the air power, ‘air superiority’ initiative. The story
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was similar during the Falklands War of 1982; without US-supplied Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm would not have been able to regain air superiority over the islands and support the subsequent amphibious assault. The defence of the ROC is predicated on the declared intention of the PLA to try and prevent Taiwan becoming an independent state and to reunite it with the Mainland. How the PLA would hope to achieve these two objectives has been the source of much speculation and analysis, but the general consensus is that it has broadly four options: intimidation, coercion, strategic bombardment and amphibious invasion.39 In each case, Chinese air power would play a proportionately major role. In the case of intimidation, it would involve posturing by the PLA with its six hundred or so surface-to-surface short-range missiles ostensibly targeted against Taiwan. The intention would be to put sufficient psychological pressure on the Taiwanese population to persuade their leadership to capitulate to China’s demands. To add credibility to the threat, China engaged in large-scale exercises along its coastline in 1996 simulating an amphibious invasion and also launched surface-to-surface missiles in the sea areas around Taiwan. The counter to these sabre-rattling antics has to reassure the Taiwanese population that they amount to no more than hollow threats. The counter-offensive capability of the Taiwanese Air Force in particular has to be seen to be effective. This means acquiring the necessary equipment, for which the development of anti-ballistic missile systems is a high priority. Likewise, the development of early air warning systems and beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles for ROC Air Force (ROCAF) air superiority fighters is a further source of reassurance. Perhaps most important is the determination of the Taiwanese leadership and the political will of the population not to be intimidated coupled with the realisation that a missile attack on Taiwan would only serve to destroy much of what China would hope to gain by reuniting with the Island. Attempts by the PLA to coerce Taiwan are generally assumed to be through a naval blockade. There are sound reasons why this should be so since Taiwan, a heavily industrialised country, is almost entirely dependent for its energy on oil imports. To effect such a blockade, China would first be running serious risks with its relations with the international community and, second, by making its naval vessels vulnerable to attack from Taiwanese naval and land-based aircraft. In addition, Taiwan’s submarines and surface vessels armed with anti-shipping missiles would provide an effective counter to Chinese blockading ships. The attack option is probably the most credible, since it would be based on surface-to-surface missiles with, possibly, manned aircraft in support engaged in aerial bombardment of Taiwanese strategic targets, such as command and control centres, early air warning facilities, airfields and naval harbours. Surface-tosurface and air-launched cruise missiles are the most serious form of attack since Taiwan has yet to acquire and perfect a theatre anti-missile defence system. It already has the modified Patriot PAC-2 system, though this was a missile originally designed to intercept aircraft, not missiles, and did not emerge from the 1991 Gulf war with much credit. Taiwan has expressed interest in acquiring
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the improved PAC-3 version. Nevertheless, the PAC-2 it has been modified and, psychologically, as in the Gulf, is a source of reassurance. More persuasive, however, is the argument that the missiles that China currently deploys are inaccurate and carry a modest payload – a mere 500–800 kgs. In all there are around 400–600 of these ‘Scud’-type missiles and although 600 might seem a large number, relatively speaking they total little more in terms of bomb payload than a single sortie by three B-52 bombers, such as those that were flown over Afghanistan in 2002. Manned offensive aircraft are in one sense less of a problem for the ROCAF since the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) do not have many of them. Those that they do have are no match for the ROCAF’s air defence and ‘air superiority’ fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. Furthermore, the PLAAF ‘has not been in the habit of putting large numbers of aircraft in the air simultaneously, controlling large numbers of engagements, or sustaining high sortie rates for extended periods of operation’.40 An additional consideration is that of pilot proficiency; although China’s best pilots are improving, they currently lag far behind ROCAF pilots. How long this will remain the case is open to speculation. The PLAAF’s acquisition of new Sukhoi27/30 fighters will in time erode Taiwan’s advantages in the air unless appropriate counter-measures are developed. One step in the right direction is the reported acquisition from the United States of eleven Lockheed Martin long-range early warning tactical radar.41 Another is, in addition to Taiwan’s indigenous Tien Chien-II and French MICA air-to-air missiles, the acquisition of up to 200 AIM-120 air-to-air missiles, also from the US. In the light of the PLAAF’s acquisition of the AA-12 Adder MRAAM, the sale of the AIM-120 would appear most likely and meet the reservations that were expressed in September 2000.42 The sale would appear even more so in the light of the Bush Administration’s clear commitment to Taiwan under the US Taiwan Relations Act as expressed in the President’s National Security Strategy of the US statement of 17 September 2002.43 Finally, it has to be remembered that, even though the distance across the Taiwan Straits is relatively short, the ROCAF has no distance to travel and would be engaged in aerial combat more or less over its own air space with the benefit of full ground support. The PLAAF would be fighting at a disadvantage unless Taiwanese ground-based air defences, airfields and associated command and control systems were first severely degraded or destroyed. The fourth likely option for the PLA would be an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. This would only be an option if the PLAAF had gained air superiority and command of the airspace over Taiwan. It would not entertain, in addition to the many other encumbrances that an amphibious invasion would have first to overcome, such a course of action if the ROCAF still had ‘command of the air’. The amphibious forces would be highly vulnerable to air attack both at sea, whilst coming ashore – the most vulnerable and exposed stage of all – and even, on Taiwanese soil. In opposing a PLA invasion force, ground-based gunfire, ROC Army helicopters, ROC naval vessels’ missile and gunfire would also be brought to bear.
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An amphibious invasion of the ROC is best deterred by Taiwan’s ability to command the airspace over the Taiwan Straits. Within the framework of the dialectic of war, the likelihood of an invasion is increased exponentially as the PLAAF progressively gains control of the air space between the two countries. In order to enhance its deterrent posture Taiwan would need to maintain a high investment in its air power assets and ensure their protection. As a policy to help prevent an amphibious invasion, Taiwan should also concentrate on improved intelligence on and surveillance over PLA amphibious developments. If these improved capabilities were also coupled with the development of a pre-emptive offensive air capability with which to destroy PLA forces readying for invasion, the deterrent effect would be further enhanced.44
Conclusion Air power is central to the security of Taiwan. It is only through the ability of the ROCAF to command the air space over Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits that the China’s PLA can effectively be deterred. To lose command of the air, or ‘air superiority’, would invite the Chinese authorities to entertain and one of the four most likely options to coerce Taiwan into capitulation. All the evidence is that the Taiwanese government, in conjunction with the Taiwanese armed forces, is sensitive to this fact. The air power capability that has been built up over the years, much of it with the air of the United States, is impressive by international standards. Taiwan has also recognised that air power is not just the aircraft missiles, UAVs and other assets; it is also the ability to support those assets with an indigenous scientific and technological manufacturing and industrial base. Though that base may well be less advanced than that of other states, the United States in particular, it nonetheless makes an important contribution and has demonstrated an ability to design, develop and manufacture advanced combat aircraft – the IDF Ching-kuo – missiles – the Tien-Chien II AAM, the Hsiung Feng II Anti-shipping, and Tien King I and II SAM – as well as a command and control, and early air warning system – Strong Net.45 Areas in future where Taiwan will need to catch up in airpower-related capability are in electronic warfare, information warfare and precision-guided munitions for pre-emptive strikes against a potential Chinese amphibious attack. One Achilles heel of Taiwan’s air power is its vulnerability to PLA missile attack, coupled with aerial bombardment from manned aircraft. Whilst active defence against these weapons would be ideal, the necessary technology remains some way off. The ROCAF and government are addressing the problem, but in the meantime, the emphasis must remain on passive defence. This means ensuring that Taiwan’s air assets are protected from PLA aerial attack, infiltrated Special Forces, and any hostile PLA developments in electronic and information warfare. Physically, Taiwan’s eighteen military air bases must have the means of protecting both aircraft and base facilities – including runways – from bombardment.46 It also means command and control centres and anti-air missile batteries should be hardened, or made mobile so as to escape attack. All the evidence is that this
26 Martin Edmonds is being, or has been, done. Other expedients would be to emulate the Swedes whose air defence systems and logistics could enable aircraft to operate from civilian motorways and hardened roads in the event of an emergency. Another potential Achilles heel of Taiwanese air power is in the availability of motivated and skilled manpower. This is a sensitive problem since traditionally Taiwan has operated a conscript system. Whilst this may make manpower available, it does not necessarily provide the armed forces with the right manpower or for adequate lengths of time. Highly technological forces such as the Air Force need educated and skilled men and women; as has been said before, they man weapons and these weapons are very demanding. It takes many years and a prodigious amount of investment to train a combat pilot. The ROCAF needs to have an enlightened personnel policy for all its armed forces if it expects to be able to train, employ and retain them in the defence of the state. Serious attention will have to be given to personnel matters in future as pay differentials between military and civilian employment widen and terms of military service change. It was noted at the beginning of this discussion that one of the disadvantages of air power was its cost. Air power is not cheap, and the costs of new and sophisticated weapon systems increase both yearly and exponentially. Certainly, these weapons achieve more in terms of performance, but they still have to be paid for. Furthermore, to be effective, expenditure on air power has to be continuous; it is not a national defensive capability that can be allowed to remain static for any length of time. There is no doubt that for Taiwan it is a price worth paying for as long as Mainland China retains its policy of reunification. Air power will continue to place a major demand on the annual Taiwanese defence budget. It must be expected to increase rather than decrease. If Taiwan wishes to be able to deter Mainland China, the money will have to be found. It is not just a matter of increasing the defence budget. A different distribution of the existing budget between the three Services might be a promising start. Neither Taiwan’s Army nor its Navy can operate safely and effectively without air cover and support; the opportunity cost of pursuing Service interests over defence interests is a very high price to pay. Likewise, in an era of joint warfare, the more that the air assets of the three Services can work together the more that Taiwan’s defence capability will be enhanced. At present, Taiwan is well placed in relation to Mainland China with regard to its air power capabilities. But the PLA is engaged in a modernisation programme for its forces. Taiwan’s current advantages may well not remain in the medium term. For this reason, alone, Taiwan will need to invest in that area upon which its deterrence capability and therefore the security of the island ultimately depend – air power.
Notes 1 David MacIsaac, ‘Voices from, Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists’, in P. Paret (Ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 625.
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2 Dik Daso, ‘United States Sir Force Air power Theory and Doctrine: Lessons and Leaps’, in S. Peach and D. Gates (Eds) Air power for the New Millennium. Lancaster, CDISS Bailrigg Study #4, 1999, p. 9. 3 Giulio Douhet, Command of the Air (Il Dominio dell’Aria, Rome 1921), trans. Dino Ferrari, Washington DC, Office of Air Force History, 1983. 4 William (Billy) Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air power. New York, 1925. 5 Basil Liddell Hart, Paris, or The Future of War. London, Kegan Paul and Co., 1925. 6 Alexander de Seversky, Victory through Air Power: Key to Survival. New York, Scribner’s, 1950. 7 Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1987, p. 130. 8 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959. 9 For a fascinating account of this rivalry over strategic missiles, see Michael M. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor–Jupiter Controversy. New York, Columbia University Press, 1969. 10 J. Armitage and R.A. Mason Air Power in the Nuclear Age, Theory and Practice. London, Macmillan, 1985. 11 R.A. Mason, ‘Air power in Taiwan’s Security: Adapting the Revolution’, in Martin Edmonds and Michael Tsai (Eds) Defending Taiwan. London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. 127–8. 12 Timothy Garden, ‘Air power: Theory and Practice’ http://www.tgarden.demon.co.uk/ writings/articles/2002/020215airpbook.html 13 K.A. Kyriakides, ‘Air power and International Law’, in Stuart Peach (Ed.) Perspectives on Air power. London, The Stationery Office, 1998, pp. 81–2. 14 Alvin A. Snyder, ‘The Truth About Korean Airlines Flight 007’ Washington Post, 1 September 1996, p. C02. 15 For details, see: http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/Apr2001/010402-D-0000M002.html 16 For details of the operation, the aircraft employed and the reasons behind the attack, see: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/el_dorado_canyon.htm 17 Tim Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force: The UN and NATO Campaign in Bosnia, 1995. Lancaster, CDISS, 1999, p. 273. 18 H. Crum Ewing and Eric Grove, Aircraft Carriers: Their Current and Prospective Role in Power Projection. Bailrigg Memorandum #35, Lancaster, CDISS, 2000. 19 Colin Gray, Explorations in Strategy. London, Greenwood Press, 1996, pp. 68–9. 20 Ivo Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response, NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967. New York, Columbia University Press, 1991, p. 211. 21 Philip Towl, ‘Distinctive Characteristics of Air Power’, in Andrew Lambert and Arthur Wilkinson (Eds) The Dynamics of Air Power. Bracknell, RAF College, 1996, p. 5. 22 R. Parkinson, The Encyclopedia of Modern War. London, Routledge, 1977, p. 164. 23 Martin Edmonds, ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Discriminating Systems’, in Amy Truesdell (Ed.) Discriminate Warfare: Evolving Military Technologies and Practices. Bailrigg Memorandum 24, Lancaster, CDISS, May 1997, pp. 53–4. 24 Tony Mason, ‘The Technology Interaction’, in Stuart Peach (Ed.) op. cit., pp. 159–60. 25 Tim Garden, op. cit., p. 17. 26 Andrew Lambert, The Psychology of Air Power. London, RUSI Whitehall Papers, 1995, pp. 91–2. 27 Quoted from the Finletter Commission, 1948, in Sir Roy Fedden, Britain’s Air Survival. London, Cassell, 1957, p. 38. 28 T.P. Wright, ‘Air Power Today – A Civilian View’, Maxwell Air Force Base, November 1956. Cited in Sir Roy Fedden op. cit., Appendix III, p. 134. 29 Ira C. Eaker ‘Some Observations on Air Power’, in A. Hurley and R. Ehrhart (Eds) Air power and Warfare. Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1979, p. 359.
28 Martin Edmonds 30 Corelli Barnet, ‘The Fallibility of Air Power’ Royal United Services Institute Journal, October 2000, pp. 59–60. 31 Stuart Peach, ‘British Air Power Doctrine; The Case for Environmental Doctrine for Air Power’ in Gates, D. and Peach S. Air Power for the New Millennium. Bailrigg Study 4, Lancaster, CDISS, 1999, pp. 34–8. 32 Air Vice Marshal J.R. Walker Air Superiority Operations. London, Brassey’s, 1989, p. 1. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. pp. 10–12 35 Jeremy Stocker, Britain’s Missile Defences. PhD Thesis, Hull University, December 2002. 36 P. Sabin, ‘The Counter-air Contest’, in A. Lambert and A. Williamson (Eds) The Dynamics of ‘Air Power’. Bracknell, RAF Staff College, 1996, pp. 21–2. 37 Stuart Peach, op. cit., p. 39. 38 Col. Michael T. Mahar, ‘Air Power to Ensure Victory’, Royal United Services Institute Journal, October 2000, p. 61. 39 These four options are detailed in Tony Mason, ‘Air Power in Taiwan’s Security’, in Martin Edmonds and Michael Tsai (Eds) Defending Taiwan. London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, pp. 141–6. 40 ‘Taiwan has Military Edge in the Air and at Sea, but Vulnerable to Missiles’, Space Daily, Washington, 13 July 2002. At: http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-02zt.html 41 Ibid. 42 Bill Gertz, ‘US Eyes Missile Transfer to Taiwan’, Washington Times, 4 July 2002. http://www.washtimes.com/national/20020704-682683.html 43 President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss8/html 44 Tony Mason, ‘Air power in Taiwan’s Security’ in Edmonds and Tsai op. cit., p. 147. 45 Details of Taiwan’s Air Force and air-power-related assets are taken from Republic of China (ROC) Air Force. http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/2815/af_main.html 46 The figure of eighteen is taken from Republic of China Order of Battle. http:// www.scramble.nl/mil/2/rocaf/orbat/htm
3
Ten pointers for Taiwan on contemporary air power Greg Mills
Introduction Two notable Hollywood films about war appeared in 2002. The first film, Black Hawk Down, detailed what went wrong when a US Ranger-Delta Force mission in the Bakar Market areas in Mogadishu in October 1993, attempted to capture key aides of the Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aidid. This mission cost the lives of 18 US Special Forces soldiers with another 100 wounded. It essentially killed Operation Restore Hope that was aimed at bringing stability and humanitarian relief to the East African nation. The other film, We Were Soldiers, depicts the actions of the US Army 7th Cavalry at Ia Drang Valley in November 1965, an action that cost the lives of more than 1,000 North Vietnamese regulars and 80 US troops. The operation was an early, yet largely unlearnt, lesson for the American military of Vietnamese tactics and, more importantly, their commitment and political will. The latter was summed up by the Vietnamese commander in the film who said: ‘They will think that this was their victory. So this will become an American war. And the end will be the same … except for the numbers who will die before we get there’. Both films are testimony to the limitations of ‘high-tech’ weaponry and firepower in the face of a determined enemy. They also illustrate, yet again, that war has to be, in Clausewitzian terms, ‘the continuation of politics by other means’: that the need for clear, realizable objectives is paramount to the success of military operations. Both send the message that war, whatever the high-flying ideals, is ultimately about the ability to employ decisive, terrible violence and that violence inevitably and invariably comes down to men (and now women) facing each other with weapons and rifles in much the same way they have done for hundreds of years. As Colonel David Hackworth has noted in his book, Hazardous Duty, ‘[y]ou must never go to war unless you clearly intend to win. War is like a marriage. It’s unconditional’.1 Alongside military operations such as Desert Storm in the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, both cinematographic examples also display a modern paradox of war whereby there is, on the one hand, the high-tech, televised, sanitized images of smart bombs and distant, even abstract conflicts and, on the other, the dirty, violent, bloody reality of war on the ground, such as in Iraq,
30
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Somalia, Angola, Bosnia or Afghanistan and, in a conflict from an earlier generation, Vietnam.
Air power in the modern conflict environment With the illustrations in the previous section in mind, it is pertinent to ask the question, what are the pointers behind the use of air power in the modern conflict environment? Ten issues stand out: (1) Smart is not enough. There is more to using advanced military technology in the winning of wars. Technology, however, can be a great asset even an equalizer as, for example, during the initial stages of the conflict in Afghanistan. There was a shift in the use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGM): 97 per cent of bombs in the Gulf were ‘dumb’, but more than 70 per cent of those dropped against Al-Quaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan were ‘smart’. Although there was initially a fear of the Afghan war against terror being a ‘long slog’ given the climate, terrain, history and nature of the opponents, in reality the first part (the second part is still underway) was that the war was over in just 63 days from the start of the bombing campaign to the fall of Kandahar. Certain areas of military technology have become a ‘must have’ capability, notably, command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR). There is also the need to integrate tactics and technology, given the nature of the opposition. As David Hackworth notes with regard to Aidid in Somalia, ‘We had our high-tech intelligence system – all the satellites, all those listening devices – and he did not have high-frequency anything. He used the cheapest stuff going, but with it he could communicate with his commanders. There was no way we could use all our shiny snooping gear to break his electronic communications system because he did not have an elaborate one. … We had few spies on the ground. In warfare, the most important player of all is the spy who breaks bread with the chieftain’.2 (2) It is imperative that technology is applied and correctly aligned. In so doing, it must be done with intelligence and with the technology itself. This raises, in turn, other questions, such as access to satellite time and integration with the civilian agencies that might control it. Joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs), for example, take fixes from four satellites; if one is out of ‘synch’, then the targeting will go awry. Intelligence means nothing in circumstances when the missile or bomb cannot hit the right target. In other words, do not be dazzled by technology. (3) Alliance operations are critical. That is, if you are not the United States. Some 68 nations in the world agreed that something should be done to combat terrorism after the attack on the World Trade Center in New York City’s on 11 September 2001, and 13 coalition partners deployed some 6,600 troops in Operation Enduring Freedom. This tallies with developments in the wider political context. Rather than the unilateral world that we believe that we face, we increasingly operate (as the recent United Nations Security Council resolution 1441 over
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Iraq has demonstrated) in a multilateral environment, even though the United States flexed its muscles in reaching that point. The ability to wage war globally by an international organization such as the United Nations, or a regional collective defence alliance such the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is mainly dependent upon American participation. As in Kosovo, the United States flew the bulk of air missions in Afghanistan up to the time that the Taliban were finally defeated. Although the Kosovo operation was undoubtedly a clear victory for the NATO’s forces, there were clear signs of an increasing ‘capability gap’ in that operation within the alliance between US forces and those of the European partners.3 In fact, NATO’s European armies were only able to deploy 40,000 troops to Kosovo, a total number of troops that represented a meagre 2 per cent of their combined total of 2 million. Moreover, the United States supplied 650 of the 927 – over two-thirds – aircraft engaged in the campaign, fired 90 per cent of the cruise missiles, and used a much higher percentage of PGMs than either their European or Canadian allies combined. As the NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson put it, ‘The Kosovo air campaign demonstrated just how dependent the European allies had become on US military capabilities. From precision guided weapons and all-weather aircraft to ground troops who can get to a crisis quickly and then stay there with adequate logistics support, the European allies did not have enough of the right stuff ’.4 This emerging ‘gap’ partly reflects the extent to which European and American forces have adopted information technologies in the so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) and to the disparity in funding. Whereas the United States spent US$283 billion on defence in 1999, NATO’s European members spent a combined total of US$174 billion. More disturbingly, a substantial proportion of that combined figure was squandered, in a NATO context, on the nationalistic duplication of defence equipment and military capabilities. By the time the Taliban were defeated in Afghanistan, the US Air Force (USAF) and US Navy (USN) had flown 90 per cent of all air missions (totalling more than 14,000 sorties), and had dropped 12,000 (8,500 tons of ) munitions.5 It is important, however, to recognize that the United States, as with many of its NATO and Western allies, is risk averse, with consequent implications for the nature of alliance operations. Despite the events of 11 September 2001, the United States and its allies are increasingly concerned with the loss of life and their leaders sensitive to the political consequences. (The same is probably true for most countries today that have developed, or semi-developed, status, where the media and civil society combine to raise awareness on these issues.) Hence, there is active interest in the use of new technologies, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat vehicles (UCVs) such as the General Atomics Predator, equipped with Hellfire missiles, and the development of other more advanced and capable UAVs, such as the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk. For states that have to work with the United States as an enabling power, raises many political questions; but it also raises technological challenges. In order to work together, nation-states, for example, will have to be able to plug into the same C4ISTAR network as that operated by US forces. This means their having to
32 Greg Mills spend even more on technology, most of which is of American origin. This is all very well, but the United States is currently spending seven times more per soldier on next-generation equipment than the entire European Union, and catching up will be both time consuming and expensive. (4) Air- and sealift are essential. One key lesson from peacekeeping missions, as with other expeditionary and interventionary operations, is the critical importance of sea- and airlift capacities. Indeed, working with the United States still means that states should preferably be able to ferry their own troops rather than rely – or expect – the United States to do it for them. It is likely that, as in Afghanistan, states that offer to contribute combat troops to an international peace-imposing mission might well find their offer declined. Here it is important, too, to integrate civilian assets with those of the military. For example, commercial merchant ships taken up from trade (STUFT) provide the bulk of logistic lift to the war theatre as they did in the Persian Gulf War and earlier in the Falklands War. Also in the Persian Gulf, civilian Boeing 747 airliners proved to be an essential element in the strategic airlift capacity. (5) Integration is imperative. As the notion of ‘jointery’ suggests, cooperation and integration of command structures are imperative. The same could also be said for training schools. In one dramatic anecdote on the importance of inter-service communication and cooperation, Andrew Brookes observed that, ‘the abiding image from the war in Afghanistan was of a US Special Forces soldier astride a horse using his laptop to send a digital burst of target co-ordinates going overhead by satellite link to a circling B-52 bomber, [so that] the bomber overhead could unleash its payload of JDAMs within minutes’.6 The impact of integration and coordination was that fewer and fewer aircraft were needed in Afghanistan, and attack sorties only involving, at times, no more than one or two aircraft. (6) Systems and skills are important, not platforms. The extensive use of the P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, Boeing B52s (which carried out only 10 per cent of all bombing missions but dropped 70 per cent of ordnance over Afghanistan), BAe Nimrod Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft, English Electric Canberras in the photo-reconnaissance role, and Boeing 707 and VC-10 tankers, ‘show that the future lies in systems inside a flying platform rather than the platform itself’.7 Each of the above aircraft had been in service for a minimum of thirty years, with the Canberra alone having first entered service with the British Royal Air Force in the late 1940s. The B-52, is already 50 years old, and scheduled to remain in service until 2040. There is a need, however, as noted earlier, for all systems to be able to talk to each other if they are to remain effective. (7) Do not confuse salesmen with fighters. There is, however, the perennial confusion – apparently – between those (which includes the majority of soldiers) who say the government needs to procure more aircraft and missiles and a minority who have to do the actual fighting. There is therefore a need to defer to those in operational command to see what is required and not solely to listen to those who try to sell these requirements to the policy-makers in parliament and the executive. This problem is not unique, clearly, to those concerned with air power but affects the armed forces as a whole.
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(8) Training and planning is everything. There is an old counter-insurgency warfare truism that still applies – perhaps even more so today in the war against terrorism than ever before. It states that, ‘if you are in a fair fight, you have not planned properly’. There is in particular, as with other branches of the armed forces, a need to attract, train and retain good quality, educated and skilled personnel. Modern war fighting depends heavily on this human resource requirement, especially in cyber-warfare and today’s operational requirements of C4ISTAR. These requirements also place heavy demands on inter-departmental coordination, both within the military and between the three armed services, and between them and other government sectors. (9) Logistics are the key. Air forces, like armies and navies, run on spare parts, food, fuel and ammunition. This is perhaps more important today in a high-tech military environment, and raises also the importance of acquiring the ‘right’, skilled personnel to support sophisticated equipment. The timeless adage – that there are no bad units or soldiers, only commanders – still applies. However, this emphasizes the need for training and selection at all levels. (10) Plan and spend intelligently. Do not neglect homeland defence in a search for an expeditionary or power-projection capacity. For example, the static air defence of key domestic facilities and areas, such as airfields and power stations, is a critical element, particularly in an age of terrorism. There is also a crucial need for balance in air forces, between air defence and ground-attack, for example. The latter is often, surprisingly, the least-attractive aspect of air power for aviators, yet has, in recent operations including the Persian Gulf War, proved indispensable. The A-10 Warthog was arguably the real winner of the Gulf War. There is, to put it simply, a need to procure and deploy the weapons best suited to the task. Key questions that should be posed in this regard include, what sort of war is likely to be fought? Will it be total war, a small-scale engagement or a low-tech conflict? What weapons and capability is the opponent likely to have? What permutations, therefore, apply? Will this, for example, involve high-tech equipment matched against low-tech weapons? Will it be a symmetrical conflict or asymmetrical? Or will small numbers of forces be pitted against a much larger? Perhaps most controversially, wars from Somalia to the attempts to kill Osama Bin-Laden in Afghanistan have demonstrated conclusively that air power is a necessary, but not a sufficient, element in modern war fighting. If anything, air power and, moreover, air supremacy, can cause overconfidence. Patriot missiles could not, for example, neutralize the Iraqi Scud threat during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and probably could not do the same elsewhere today. Air superiority cannot either neutralize well-dug-in (even caved) troops, or submarines for that matter. Above are the ten pointers to which those responsible for the development of air power should give close attention when deciding on the Republic of China (ROC) armed forces’ strategies, tactics and operations. For Taiwan, some are particularly relevant, and perhaps more so than others. On the one hand, an airlift capability is a fairly minor requirement, given the geographical circumstances
34 Greg Mills surrounding the island and sealift largely irrelevant, except to reinforce its offshore islands. Logistic support is also less crucial, since distances on the island are small and supplies relatively easily accessible. Furthermore, there is no longer any likelihood that Taiwan would entertain power projection or interventionary ambitions. The emphasis is clearly on defence. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the ROC Air Force (ROCAF) might have to engage the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces alongside US allies. The question has to be addressed therefore whether ROC forces are in a position to communicate and integrate with the Americans, given the rate at which US military technology is leaving much of the rest of the world behind. Certainly, the situation with which Taiwan is confronted is almost unique in the world. Air power is undoubtedly the military capability that is essential to the island’s defence and, therefore, its survival. Taiwan’s air power alone is not enough; its national security requires the ROCAF to be jointly integrated with both the ROC Army and Navy, to give emphasis to the right quality of personnel, and to provide them with the best possible training. Above all, there has to be a clear sense of the capability, size, equipment and level of technology of the PLA so that it is known well in advance whether the conflict over the Taiwan Strait would be ‘symmetrical’ or ‘asymmetrical’. In particular, Taiwan should not spend too much of its scarce resources on the latest platforms, but on the relevant enabling technologies to the nature of the threat. And finally, it should invest sensibly in new high-tech weapons such as information technology, UAVs and PGMs that would give the competitive ‘edge’ to Taiwan’s air power capabilities.
Notes 1 Colonel David H. Hackworth (retd), Hazardous Duty. New York: Post Road Press, 1996, p. 86. 2 Ibid. 3 See, Strategic Survey, 1999/2000. Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) with Oxford University Press (OUP), 2000. 4 Cited in Andrew Brookes, ‘The Air War in Afghanistan’, Air International. August 2002, pp. 116–20. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.
Part II
The balance of air power over the Taiwan Straits
4
The shifting balance of air superiority at the Taiwan Strait and its implications on Taiwan’s defense planning York W. Chen
Introduction ‘Airpower’ is a leverage of critical importance for the conduct of ground or naval operations in modern conventional warfare. For Taiwan’s defense planners, there are ample lessons from previous conflicts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that without air cover the defender would be left vulnerable and stranded. Both the loss of Ichiangshan Island with some seven hundred defenders slaughtered in January 1955 and the unwilling withdrawal from Tachen Island the following February were due to the fact that the Republic of China (ROC) Air Force (ROCAF) could not provide and sustain air protection over the two distant islands. On August 23, 1958, the PRC shelled Kinmen Islands and the second Taiwan Strait crisis erupted. This time, the ROCAF controlled the air over the theater of operations. From August to October, there were no less than seven major air engagements; the ROCAF shot down thirty Chinese MIGs while only lost one F-86 in air-to-air combat.1 No matter what aims the PRC had in shelling the Kinmen Islands, whether it was to take the Islands or merely to intimidate the Taiwanese and Americans, the ROCAF’s firm control of the air made a significant contribution to the Islands’ defense and indirectly supported President Chiang Kai-shek’s risky political stratagem. From another perspective, the degree of control of the air lies at the core of Taiwan’s overall defense planning. Many, if not all, of the crucial debates over the roles that the ROC Army (ROCA) or the ROC Navy (ROCN) would perform in defending Taiwan inevitably touch the basic issue: control of the air. For example, in the debate between the ‘Grey Water School’ and the ‘Blue Water School’ concerning the ROCN’s future force planning, both schools agree that Taiwan’s air superiority over the Taiwan Strait or, at least, the capability of the ROCAF to cover ROCN operations is critical. Where they differ is in the former’s skepticism that the ROCAF’s air cover would last for very long and therefore, by this reasoning, smaller vessels might have a better chance of survival in the face of a PRC offensive. By contrast, the latter argues that, through increasing air defense capabilities – such as obtaining the Kidd class destroyers equipped with Standard II surface-toair missiles (SAM) and better air defense combat systems – the ROC’s naval fleet
38 York W. Chen could be relieved of being the protégé of air power to becoming an active partner of the ROCAF in providing for the air defense of Taiwan.2 For the ‘Grey school’, the mainstream of the ROCN’s operational concepts emphasizes the concept of ‘Cooperation between Land and Naval Forces’ and inshore naval operations and discourages actively engaging with the enemy in distant waters.3 For the latter, engaging with the enemy some distance from Taiwan is the backbone of the Navy Vision. By increasing the ROCN’s operational radius, as well as improving air defense and battle management (BM) capabilities, the fleet could become floating Air Operation Centers (AOC). It could thus guide the ROCAF’s aircraft in over-the-horizon attacks and also extend Taiwan’s capability for force projection.4 Any literature concerning the formulation of Taiwan’s military strategy should not underestimate the weight of subjective perceptions regarding whether or not air superiority is attainable and how it could be achieved. Particular attention should therefore be given to Taiwanese military writings and debates. The perception of an external military threat is by no means neutral and the feasible solutions to given military threats are subject to the stimulus of Service interests and identities and are invariably the outcome of the power distribution among and between the three Services. Under the present civil–military relations in Taiwan, it is impossible to judge the impact of any given threats upon Taiwan’s defense planning without first considering how the major players in the defense planning process and the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen, interpret and respond to these threats. In so doing, the Taiwan’s military doctrines as well as some published articles written by active or retired officers are cited. Regarding the former, there are some caveats to be borne in mind when referring to military doctrinal writings and documents. First, under the current security regulations of the Ministry of National Defense (MND), all military doctrines are strictly protected; that is to say they are classified secret and above. This effectively, if not totally, rules out any access for civilian defense analysts to such documents and hinders their attempts to gain a comprehensive understanding of, and engage in, a meaningful discussion on Taiwan’s military doctrines. This situation differs greatly from the practices of the Western Democracies, where the authorities publish most of their strategic and military doctrines and encourage their civilians to engage with them in doctrinal debates. As a consequence, no documentary reference in this chapter is directly quoted from original documentary sources but is re-quoted from other published materials. The doctrines to which references are made may, in fact, be no longer in effect. Furthermore, not all militaries have the same attitude toward their own doctrines. It may risk exaggeration to judge the performance of a military organization solely by its formal doctrines either because “changes in the formal doctrine of a military organization may leave the essential workings of organization unaltered,” or “doctrine may be informed by and developed as much for political as for strategic or operational reasons.”5 It has therefore been necessary to refer to some articles published in military journals, such as National Defense Magazine (published by the National Defense University) and Air Force Academic Monthly (published by ROCAF HQ) as major sources. These articles may not necessarily
The shifting balance of air superiority
39
reflect official positions, but, considering the reviewing and editing process of Taiwan’s military journals, these articles, to some degree, do provide an insight as to what Taiwan’s military intellectuals think about the issues of air superiority. This chapter identifies that there are fewer contradictions within Taiwan military circles regarding the importance of air superiority, the extent, and degree of the Chinese air and missile threats, and of the ROCAF’s relative inferiority. However, there are sharp differences concerning how the ROCAF should respond to these Chinese air and missile threats. Those who argue “wings in being” have very different views from the advocates of “active countermeasure” concerning how the ROCAF should employ its inferior force, especially in terms of the possible force size needed to engage in the decisive battle (Li – “Capabilities”), the possible timing for the decisive battle (Shih – “Timing”), and the possible location for the decisive battle (Kung – “Space”). Arguably, these differences in capability, timing, and space would produce profound implications on overall defense planning.
The concepts and contents of air superiority As one cannot occupy the air, the concept of control of the air is akin to that of command the sea. One way of coming to grips with the concept of control of the air is to measure the degree to which one’s forces are able to use the air and correspondingly deprive enemy from doing likewise. This can be classified in terms of three different levels of control. Air neutrality, the lowest level of control of the air, suggests that neither side is able to claim air superiority and be able to conduct freely air, land, and naval operations without running the risk of encountering enemy air or missile prohibitive interception. Air superiority means the situation in which one can conduct air, land, and naval operations without enemy air and missile prohibitive interference. Air superiority is usually confined to a limited area for a finite period time. A case in point is local air superiority. Air supremacy, the highest level of control of the air, means that the enemy’s air and missile forces cannot effectively interfere with one’s air, land, and naval operations.6 In other words, the military advantage that air superiority would provide is “freedom of action” which enables air, land, and naval operations to be conducted without being vulnerable to detection and attacks of enemy’s defensive air and missile forces.7 The core of air strategy is the ability to attain air superiority. Apart from some other urgent priorities, such as when the Israeli Air Force (IAF) immediately implemented close air support, before it had achieved air superiority, to block a Syrian military advance on the Golan Heights during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, counter-air operation should be the primary mission of all air forces. Experience in wartime indicates that the more formidable the opposing air power, the more pressing counter-air operations become. Thus, the counter-air campaign will invariably be the primary air campaign; all others will be subordinate in importance, at least at the outset of a conflict.8
40 York W. Chen The ROCAF’s doctrines fully recognize the importance of air superiority and counter-air operations. For the ROCAF, “air power is the effective control and use of the desired airspace.”9 The ROCAF air strategy regards “the destruction of enemy air force as the top pirority.”10 The conduct of air operations “should first fight for and secure the air superiority. Even if our force is inferior, we also need to strive for local air superiority at the desired space and timing in order to benefit the overall operation.”11 Counter-air operations are both offensive and defensive. Offensive counter-air (OCA) consists of, “offensive operations aimed at destroying, disrupting, or degrading enemy air and missile threats.” Ideally, OCA operations seek to prevent the launch of aircraft and missiles by destroying them and their supporting systems on the ground. OCA targets enemy air defense systems (aircraft, antiaircraft artillery, and SAMs), airfields, theater missiles and their platforms, supporting infrastructures, as well as command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) nodes.12 Therefore, OCA, by nature, is an attack on enemy capabilities at source. Defensive counter-air (DCA) is, “to protect friendly forces and vital interests from enemy air and missile attacks and is synonymous with air defense.” DCA consists of both active and passive air defense. Active air defense is, “to direct defensive action taken to destroy attacking air and missile threats or to reduce their effectiveness against friendly forces and assets.” Engaging attacking enemy aircraft and missiles with manned aircraft and SAMs is an example of an active air defense measure. Passive air defense “includes all measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile attacks or measures used to minimize the effectiveness of enemy attacks.” Camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersal, and some hardening protection are examples of passive air defense measures.13 Traditionally, Western “air power” advocates assert that an air force, by its nature, is an offensive Service. Air operations should concentrate on strategic bombing as well as OCA. If the strategic environment prohibits from attacking at source, they still prefer to use aircraft than SAMs to execute DCA. In other words, Western “air power” theories tend toward using air-to-air or air-toground combat to achieve air superiority. For example, the US forces scarcely launched a single SAM against enemy invading aircraft in major conflicts after the Second World War.
The general air situation across the Taiwan Strait Although the ROCAF enjoys the edge on equipment and pilots over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force (PLAAF), most local military or civilian authors believe that, taking all things into account, the former is inferior relative to the latter because: (1) Taiwan lacks sufficient strategic depth; (2) of the wide gap in aircraft numbers; (3) there are political constraints on the ROCAF; and (4) of the progress of PLAAF’s modernization program.14
The shifting balance of air superiority
41
The width of the Taiwan Straits is between 70 and 140 nautical miles and works to Taiwan’s disadvantage with regard to early warning of a PLA air or missile attack. PLAAF aircraft could fly into Taiwan’s airspace within 8–15 minutes (at speeds of Mach 0.9) after take-off.15 Pressing even more severely on Taiwanese defense planning than the PLAAF’s air strikes is the fact that there are no effective means of defense against the PLA’s missile attacks. A well-trained PLA tactical missile unit, according to their missile raid tactical manual, could complete its launch preparation within some 30 minutes after moving to its launch site. With a flight time of between 7 and 10 minutes and the ability to detect Chinese intentions once their missile units had moved to their launch sites, the time available for the Taiwanese to respond would be no more than 37–40 minutes.16 If Taiwan radar could only detect the invading missiles after launch and after the Taiwanese Chang Bai medium-range radars had calculated their possible points of impact, the available warning time for local field commanders would be sharply decreased to a mere 3–4 minutes.17 Since 1972, the measures that the PLA needed to employ to attain the desired air superiority has gradually taken shape. These measures have included: (1) the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD); (2) the destruction of enemy airbases and airfields; (3) the interception of enemy aircraft in flight; (4) the dislocation of enemy aircraft production factories and training bases; and (5) the bombardment of enemy petroleum industries. The possible forces deployed to achieve these objectives would include, in addition to PLAAF aircraft, missiles, paratroopers, land forces, and Special Forces.18 Considering the cost and risk involved in attaining the desired air superiority over Taiwan, missile raids inevitably become an attractive option: The main task of the PLA tactical missile forces is to gain air superiority at the outset of war. Therefore, the PLA would definitely launch a huge number of missiles to attack us, to tear up our concentrated air defense network. The most likely targets would be our airfields, land-based SAMs, radar sites, and C4I centers. These targets may have been well-protected, but if one enemy missile scores a direct hit, it could break a hole in our air defense network. The PLAAF aircraft would immediately exploit that hole and, by continuous intense air strikes, tear it up into a huge gap … and cause our overall air defense network to collapse.19 The ROCAF airfields located on the Western coast of Taiwan are especially vulnerable to possible PLAAF missile raids. In peacetime, approximately 60 percent of the ROCAF aircraft are stationed at these airfields (see Table 4.1). The ROCAF is also inferior to the PLAAF in terms of numbers of aircraft. The deployment of the PLAAF aircraft is in a “few forward, mass mobile” posture, the opposite of Taiwan’s approach. One estimate indicated that, in 1998, the PLAAF deployed 130 aircraft at 13 airfields within a range of 250 nautical miles from Taiwan, 1,200 aircraft at some 20 airfields within 250–500 nautical miles, 1,400 aircraft within 500–750 nautical miles, and more than 2,100 aircraft beyond
42
York W. Chen Table 4.1 Order of battle of the ROCAF Air bases
Squadron
Aircraft
Total
Taoyuan
4th TRS 15th, 16th TFS 41st, 42nd, 48th TFS 7th, 8th, 28th TFS 14th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd TFS 1st, 3rd, 9th TFS 2nd 6th 101st, 102nd, 103rd 44th, 45th, 46th TFS 17th, 26th, 27th TFS
RF-5Es F-5E/F Mirage 2000s FCK-1s (IDF) F-16s FCK-1s (IDF) E2Ts C130Hes C-130s F-5E/Fs F-16s
24 48 60 60 80 60
Hsinchu Ching Chuan Kang Chiayi Tainan Pengtung Taitung Hualien
72 60
Source: http://www.fas.org and corrected by Mr Stellar Shu.
a 750 nautical mile range.20 One should not underestimate the pressure of quantitative disadvantage on the shoulders of Taiwanese pilots. Nor should we “have any reason to believe that if China’s PLA forces were to invade Taiwan they would not fight initially for air superiority with all the forces at their disposal, at rapid speed, and within the shortest time.”21 If the PLAAF were to launch an all-out attack, there are different estimates of the maximum number of invading aircraft involved in the initial wave. One calculation is that the number of aircraft would be 168 aircraft per wave defined by the airspace capacity of the theater of operation.22 One estimates a number of 390 aircraft per wave by the capacity of the PLAAF front line airfields.23 One, judging by the capacity of the PLAAF BM capabilities, asserts 192–480 aircraft per wave.24 According to one scenario, that of Taiwan’s Han-Kung No. 15 Exercise, the maximum number of aircraft per wave would be 228.25 No matter what number these estimates finally arrive at, it would not be an easy task for the ROCAF to oppose them since it only operates some 340 advanced fighters to overcome the massive numbers of PLAAF invaders. Politically, the rules of engagement (ROE) of “no-first-fire” and the prohibitive instruction of not to fly across the hypothetical middle line of the Taiwan Strait (Middle Line) have profound restraints on the ROCAF’s counter-air operations. The former implies that the ROCAF virtually has been deprived, on the one hand, of any possibility to undertake a strategic pre-emptive attack but has, on the other, to manage to bear the brunt of a Chinese first strike and survive. As to the latter, for some unclear political reasons, ROCAF activities, including training and combat air patrols (CAPs), have been withdrawn from 10 nautical miles off the Chinese coastline to the East of the Middle Line since the missile crisis of 1995/6. Consequently, Taiwan’s shallow strategic depth is now even narrower. Since 1996, in order not to cross the Middle Line, the ROCAF’s CAPs deliberately exclude the airspace over the Kinmen and Matsu Islands, the two main outposts of Taiwan’s defense. It also limits its tactical reconnaissance beyond the
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Middle Line in sharp contrast to the past when the ROCAF’s brave pilots flew deep into Chinese territory inland in order to collect strategic information. Furthermore, the PLAAF now regards the West of the Middle Line as its exclusive airspace and demonstrates its control by turning on its S-300 SAM research radars as soon as any ROCAF aircraft approaches it. Furthermore, China exploits the Middle Line as the mechanism for communicating “coercive” messages. The PLAAF aircraft approach, and on some occasions, cross the Middle Line as a coercive move against Taiwan’s Air Force and have tested the ROCAF interceptor pilots’ nerves when “scrambling” repeatedly after Taiwan had proposed a “special state-to-state relationship” in 1999. The gap in the ROCAF’s combat aircraft reached at peak during 1995–1996. The ROCAF had only aged F-104s, F-5Es and a handful of IDFs (F-CK-1s) to defend the airspace of Taiwan while some of its pilots had to be sent abroad for acquainting themselves with the newly procured F-16 and Mirage 2000 aircraft. After 2000, as a result of the qualitative edge provided by the ROCAF’s new F-16s and Mirage 2000–5s aircraft and the completion of their readiness, the air balance between the ROCAF and the PLAAF became more even. The further development of the balance is now subjected to the progress of the PLAAF’s modernization. As to the future development of the modernization of the PLA as a whole and its impact on Taiwan’s security, there are many different intepretations and assessments. Even the US Department of Defense (DoD) has admitted that it has some “gaps in knowledge” regarding the PRC–ROC military balance.26 However, as far as the issue of the balance of air superiority over the Taiwan Strait is concerned, there are some significant developments since the start of the PLAAF’s military modernization program that would facilitate the PLAAF’s gaining air superiority over Taiwan at less cost and within a shorter period of time. These developments include: 1
2
The total number of the PLAAF advanced aircraft is increasing: after the initial acquisition of Su-27s, the PRC has already established a domestic production line of the aircraft. Meanwhile, the PLAAF keeps introducing Su-30s and other indigenous advanced aircraft into its inventory. Most of these airacraft are equipped with advanced medium range air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) giving them a combat capability that is no less advanced than those of the ROCAF in terms of aircraft quality. An MND contracted research report has indicated that the PLAAF would have approximately 500 advanced aircraft (247 Su-27s, 80 Su-30s, and 165 J-10s) deployed by 2009 (see Table 4.2 for details).27 The accuracy of the PLA’s missiles is improving: the oft-quoted phrase in the US DoD Report of the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait (1999) reports that by 2005, the PLA likely will have deployed two types of SRBMs (short-range ballistic missiles) and a first-generation LACM (land-attack cruise missile). An expanded arsenal of accurate conventional SRBMs and LACMs targeted against critical facilities, such as key airfields and C2I nodes, will complicate Taiwan’s ability to conduct militay operations.28
44 York W. Chen Table 4.2 The estimated number of the PLAAF major counter-air aircraft
FC-1s J-10s Su-27s J-8 Iis J-8 Is J-7s (MIG-21s) J-6s (MIG-19s) J-5s (MIG17s) Su-30s AWACS
Est. no. in 2005
Est. no. in 2009
20 30 181 200 19 1,287 953 263 40 16
40 165 247 200 13 844 625 173 80 22
Source: Chien Chung, The PRC Military Modernization and Its Impact on Taiwan Defense Operation, MND contracted research, 2000, pp. 229–48.
3
The improvements to the accuracy of the PLA missiles means that their combat effectiveness against pinpoint targets and a counter-force ability are considerably enhanced. One estimate has it that, armed with appropriate warheads, the PLA would need, at least, 3–6 missiles with a circular error probable (CEP) at 100 meters to damage 1 ROCAF runway, 3 of the 100 meter CEP missiles to wipe out 1 ROCA SAM site, and 3–5 of the 50 meter CEP missiles to destroy 1 hardened C2 node.29 The vulnerability of the ROCAF airfields on the Western part of the Island of Taiwan thus increases. Even airfields in the rear, such as Taitung Air Force Base (AFB) or the hardened underground airbase at Hualien could possibility be neutralized by the PLA’s accurate missiles raids. The PLA’s capability to conduct information operations is also improving: information dominance, radar intelligence (RADINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) in particular, are some of the key measures to win air superiority. Currently, Taiwan’s joint air defense operations are supervised by General Staff Headquarters (GSH) and commanded by the ROCAF’s Air Officer Commanding (AOC).30 The ROCAF Air Combat Center (ACC) conducts the overall air defense operations and, through the Strong Net system, distributes to air defense fire units the required RADINT and SIGINT intelligence collected by airborne warning and control systems (AWACS, E2Ts), Control and Reporting Centers (CRCs), Control and Reporting Posts (CRPs), and Reporting Posts (RPs).31 Taiwan’s AWACS and land-based radars, therefore, like the eyes and the ears of the Taiwanese armed forces as a whole, play a key role in Taiwan’s air defense. As to SIGINT gathering, Taiwan now has a capability to monitor PLA radio communications at a range of some 300 nautical miles from Taiwan and the ROCAF E2Ts can extend its monitoring range to 400 nautical miles. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s land-based radars have a capability to detect all enemy air targets at a range of some 250 nautical miles beyond the Chinese coastline, including the PLAAF’s 13 front line airfields.32 However, when comparing the ROC’s land-based radars with their
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45
PRC counterparts, one study asserted that in terms of detecting capabilities, Chinese radar is superior to Taiwan’s because the coverage of Chinese radar sites is more dense and overlaps at low, medium, or high levels whereas Taiwan’s still has some dead zones within their radar footprint. In terms of RADINT distribution capabilities, Taiwan’s systems are far better than those of the PLA even though the PLA has already completed its radar battalion semi-automatic management and display systems (known as Lei Ching No. 2) and has thus largely improved the reaction speed of its radar units. Nevertheless, the Chinese Lei Ching No. 2 is still significantly inferior to the Taiwanese ones, which have already been fully automated and digitalized. In terms of BMD, once the Strong Net System was operational, Taiwan had a far superior C2 capacity. Regarding their vulnerability in wartime, Chinese radar sites are more likely to survive under enemy SEAD. The PLA has various types of radar; most are mobile. Taiwan’s radars are more easily destroyed or jammed because most of them are located in fixed sites and their types and frequencies are more homogeneous.33 In other words, although Taiwanese radars generally have better performance than their Chinese counterparts, they are likely to be less reliable in a severe combat environment. Taiwan’s AWACS assets, therefore, become much more important when a situation escalates. Once the PLA had obtained the Kh-31P Anti-Radiation Missile (ARM) from Russia, the ROCAF’s handful of E2Ts had to face a serious threat as well.34 Meanwhile, the PLAAF’s outnumbered electronic warfare (EW) aircraft, whose jamming frequencies cover most operational frequencies of Taiwan’s land-based radars, could also jam Taiwanese BM, early warning, and fire control radars.35 Table 4.3 indicates the general air situation in the Taiwan Strait at three different periods of time. In 1958, because the ROCAF was able to secure the air superiority over the two offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu and the PLA lacked force projection capabilities, all Taiwan’s Western AFBs, rear AFBs, and centers of gravity, such as its leadership and economic infrastructure, were relatively safe. Instead, the PLAAF frontline AFBs were vulnerable to ROCAF air strikes. After nearly fifty years, things have changed. For the above-mentioned military and Table 4.3 The general air situation in the Taiwan Strait center of gravity Case
Blue air fields and rear areas Rear CoG
1958 2002 2010
Rear air fields
Front line air fields
Safe Safe Safe Vulnerable Safe Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable
Note CoG Center of gravity.
Battle line
Red air fields and rear areas
Field forces
Front line air fields
Rear air Rear fields CoG
Reachable Reachable Reachable
Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable
Safe Safe Safe
Safe Safe Safe
46
York W. Chen
political reasons, Taiwan could only secure the operations of the rear AFBs after a PLA first strike. For want of effective anti-missile measures, Taiwan’s rear center of gravity is vulnerable to a PLA missile strategic attack. In 2002, following the deployment of the PLAAF’s long-range advanced aircraft and the introduction of accurate missiles, even Taiwan’s rear AFBs may not be able to withstand the PLA strikes. Debates over ROCAF counter-air operations Cabability, timing, and space The developments of PLAAF air strategies as well as those of the ROCAF are, to a large degree, influenced by each other’s Army counterparts. The main task of the PLAAF, before the early 1990s, was oriented toward air defense. From an overall strategic point of view, the PLAAF was little more than a subordinate force to the PLA Army. The Army’s strategy was the PLAAF’s air strategy. Only after the late 1990s were the concepts of “air power” widely recognized. The PLAAF was then asked to develop independent strategic ideas and concepts and its subordinate status in overall strategy ceased.36 The same situation happened with the ROCAF. After the US forces withdrew in 1979, Taiwan was left with no choice other than to adjust to a strategic defensive posture. In the 1980s, Taiwan launched its “Construction Programs of the Second Generation Force,” the country’s largest military modernization program, which lasted for nearly twenty years. During those years, the Army-centric military thinking became the dominant guideline for Taiwan’s defense planning. The role that the ROCAF could contribute to the overall strategic defensive in the minds of the ROCA generals was built on the following arguments.37 First, a land-decisive campaign is the pivotal concept in the defense of Taiwan. The ROCA, seen as the decisive force, would play the roles of both the decisive defense and the uppermost deterrent. Without defeating Taiwan land forces, the PRC could not conquer and occupy Taiwan. Were the ROCA strong enough, the PLA landing forces would find it very difficult to prevail. If the anticipated cost of a land operation were high enough, it would dissuade the PRC from attacking Taiwan; alternatively it would prolong the war to allow sufficient time for the US forces to intervene. Former President Ching-Kuo Chiang believed it would be essential for Taiwan’s defensive operations to withstand a Chinese first assault because, “things would change after that.”38 As to how long the Taiwanese defenders would need to hold Chinese forces at bay, judging by the sailing time that a US carrier battle group may need from the Pearl Harbor to the local theater of operations, the general estimate was at least two weeks.39 Second, air superiority was critical in defending Taiwan. The ROCA generals, however, doubted whether or not the ROCAF had the capability to exercise control of the air over a sufficiently long period of time when outnumbered by the PLAAF aircraft and also when faced with a full-scale missile attack. Therefore, the ROCAF’s air strategy should be based on endurance. Retired Army General
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Hau, the longest serving Chief of General Staff in the ROC’s history and the key decision-maker of the “Construction Programs of the Second Generation Force,” claimed that the ROCAF should “never gamble our air assets within the first three to five days.”40 He therefore suggested the four principles of: “strategic sustainability”; “preserve our strength”; “maximize gain by minmizing our cost”; and “avoid being committed in a decisive campaign at the initial stage of the campaign and engage a decisive campaign at the most advantageous time.”41 At the operational level, Taiwan’s overall defense posture is based upon the principles “to check the enemy on yonder shore; to strike the enemy in transit; and to annihilate the enemy at the water’s edge.” In sum, this was a defense-in-depth concept. However, under the Army-centric military thoughts “annihilate the enemy at the water’s edge” was the most decisive. Therefore, the so-called “engage decisive campaign at the most advantageous time” would be when the enemy’s forces first set foot on Taiwan’s beaches. Third, is a combination strategy of the first and second arguments discussed in the previous paragraphs. One should not be surprised that the role that the ROCAF is expected to play is to fight for local air superiority in order to safeguard the ROCA operations to “annihilate the enemy at water’s edge.” The conduct of the ROCAF counter-air operation should first combine SAMs and aircraft to “gradually weaken and multi-layer intercept” invading aircraft. Thereafter, it should be to “destroy some enemy aircraft,” and make a good use of our underground AFB in order to “preserve some aircraft for the final decisive anti-landing operation.” The ROCAF should “be alert to the peril of head-on fighting. This is what the enemy expects. Thus, in order to achieve strategic sustainability, we should employ limited countermeasures while avoiding a decisive campaign.”42 This Army-centric concept became the guiding principle behind the development of the ROCAF’s doctrines in the 1990s. The ROCAF Air Force Operation Basic Doctrine (1991) identifies two different operational concepts: superior air force and inferior air force. As a superior air force, the aim of its counter-air operations should to force the enemy into a decisive confrontation and to gain air supremacy. It stated, “the counter-air operation of a superior air force should closely monitor enemy movements, properly deploy friendly forces, and thus constitute an advantageous posture. In order to win total air superiority quickly, a superior air force, guided by the principle of strategic decisiveness, should initiate offensive operations and bring the enemy to engage in a decisive campaign in order to destroy or paralyze his main forces.”43 For a superior air force, the best measures to win the counter-air operations are preemption and surprise.44 In other words, a superior air force gains total air superiority (air supremacy) by OCA operations. However, as mentioned earlier, since the widely shared speculation is that the ROCAF is relatively inferior to the PLAAF, then As an inferior air force, its counter-air operations, instead, should be based upon the principle of strategic sustainability. First of all, it is essential to ‘preserve the strength’ and to ‘avoid decisive campaign at the initial stage’. Alternatively, after gradually committing our forces, to concentrate force at
48 York W. Chen the ‘decisive direction’ and desired timing fights for local air superiority in order to overcome the enemy.45 In other words, an inferior air force wins local air superiority by DCA. The air defense of an island state such as Taiwan, due to its lack of depth, should consider using aircraft first and land-based anti-aircraft measures later in order to effectively extend its defensive depth. However, since the number of the ROCAF aircraft is limited, to prevent dispersed interceptions and to contcentrate on their deployment, the ROCAF doctrine emphasized the concept of joint air defense that combines air and land anti-aircraft forces, using “multi-layer interception to fight for air superiority. The SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery (AAAs) should be the first units to engage the enemy aircraft. The ROCAF aircraft would only engage, at the most advantageous situation, enemy air formations whose number is inferior.”46 Under the concept of “multi-layer interception,” Taiwan’s air-defensein-depth posture would be set by two layers of missile engagement zones (MEZ): one is 70–60 nautical miles off Taiwan’s coastline and the other is 30–20 nautical miles as the first line of defense while the ROCAF interceptors cooperate with field air defense units to engage enemy aircraft that have escaped interception within a range of 20 nautical miles.47 To sum up, in the Army-centric air operational concepts, the ROCAF was regarded as semi-independent flying artillery. The ROCAF existed as the ROCA’s “deterrence multiplier.” In essence it was a “wings in being” and was there principally to increase the credibility of the ROCA in both defense and deterrence. Taiwan’s Army-centric operational concepts encountered challenges in the 2000s because of: (1) the relative decline of the ROCA’s influence; (2) the topdown strategic adjustment; and (3) the influence of the United States through arms sales. The second reason was pivotal. Before the 2000s, only a few military analysts dared question the existing air operational concepts. However, after President Shui-bian Chen introduced a new operational concept, “Jue zhai jing wai (decisive campaign outside the territory),” in May 2000, the ROCAF was encouraged to a large degree to review the existing Army-centric concepts and to develop a new one. “Although initially obscured by the debate over the exact meaning and political implication of President Chen’s ‘decisive campaign outside the territory’, the sense of his new ideas quickly gathered momentum. With the ROCAF and the ROCN as the principal beneficiaries, the ‘decisive campaign outside the territory’ policy soon overcame its initial linguistic shortcomings and became the dominant frame of reference in the development of the new operational concepts of both the ROCN and the ROCAF.” 48 Among the military authors who have criticized the Army-centric air operational concepts are ROCAF Colonel Wei-Kuan Chen and ROCAF Ting-Chung Tien. Colonel Tien’s “Analysis on the Elements of Air Forces Operational Concepts” (1999) is the most clear-cut example of this train of thought. Tien’s article shares the same assumptions as the “wings in being” school. Both agree with the ROCAF’s relative inferiority in terms of strategic depth and aircraft numbers. However, Colonel Tien and other “active countermeasure” advocates believe
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that just because of these shortcomings, the ideas of “wings in being” are not convincing. In essence, the “active countermeasure” school argues that: 1
2
3
Strategic sustainability is neither attainable nor appropriate. Due to Taiwan’s sea lines of communication (SLOC) or air traffic are very vulnerable to an enemy blockade, it is very difficult to achieve strategic sustainability with constrained resources and limited foreign aid. The PRC has overwhelming resources. The PLAAF also enjoys quantitative advantage over Taiwan. It can replace losses quickly and support a prolonged conflict. If the PLA controls the battle space initiative, Taiwan’s combat strength would definitely be worn down and be forced to fight at a disadvantage.49 While the “wings in being” school emphasizes the annihilation of enemy landing forces, attrition, and total war, the “active countermeasure” advocates instead pays more attention to the defeat of the enemy’s amphibious attack intentions beforehand, air blitzkrieg, and a limited war. Territorial defense is not suitable. All of Taiwan’s urban areas, economic centers and industries are located on the Western coast. For its national strategy, that is where Taiwan’s military resources and war potential lie and they should be protected from enemy attacks and damage.50 The concept of “annihilate enemy at water’s edge” would be likely to turn the area into a devastated battlefield. Even if Taiwan’s forces could defeat the enemy on home soil, the harm to Taiwan’s economy could not be recovered in a short time. Fighting on land might well not happen at all. Facing the PLA involves the concept of “Chu Zhan Jue Sheng (to win decisive victory at the initial campaign)” – using overwhelming offensive measures to seize the decisive outcomes quickly. One possible scenario for the PLA is to destroy Taiwan’s air assets, gain air superiority over the Taiwan Strait, and coerce the Taiwanese into accepting the PRC terms at the negotiation table.51 In which event, Taiwan’s land forces that had prepared for the “annihilation enemy at the water’s edge” might not only be deprived of the anticipated function but also of being held hostage for further punishment if Taiwan were to refuse the PRC’s terms.
Issues concerning the conduct of “fan zhi zuo zhan” (countermeasure operations) lie at the heart of the debate over the ROCAF’s operational concepts. In a strategic sense, ‘Taiwan-Penghu defense operations’ means we have no intention of aggression, but it does not necessarily imply that we won’t implement offensive operations. Defense and defensive operations are by no means the same. The best defense is offensive operations… . If the ROCAF only uses its aircraft for air defense, it is not only disadvantageous to the overall operations, but the procurement of new aircraft is also meaningless. The ROCAF should treat counter-measure operations as its main orientation.52 First, the term of “fan zhi,” in its English translation “countermeasure,” seems to suggest some counter moves at the tactical level; this is exactly what the “wings
50
York W. Chen
in being” advocates expect. However, the “actively countermeasure” school treats the terms “countermeasure” and “counter-strike” synonymously. The reason for using the former seems to be less politically controversial. It implies some counter moves at the operational level, if not at the strategic level. Second, even “wings in being” advocates, such as General Hau, agree with “limited countermeasures.” Even the ROCAF does not rule out the possibility “to implement limited countermeasures in order to benefit the overall operation.”53 But the “active countermeasure” school regards “countermeasure operations” as “decisive campaigns” and further proposes a totally different employment of air assets in terms of “Li – (Capability),” “Shih – (Timing),” and “Kung – (Space)” against the notion of “avoiding a decisive campaign at the initial stage” of the “wings in being” school. These assets are, namely: Capability: concentrating maximum force to destroy the enemy. Under the principle of “avoiding decisive campaign at the initial stage,” it would be very difficult to hold the initiative and would very likely to be worn down by the enemy’s continuous challenges. The appropriate use of air assets should commit maximum offensive effort at the right time in order to eradicate residual enemy threats. Concentration is the key to destroying the enemy.54 Timing: as to the timing of “countermeasure operations,” there are two different suggestions in the “active countermeasure” camp. One is the “preemptive countermeasure” notion. The timing of countermeasure operations is when “the enemy army, navy, or air forces are concentrating and their intention is obvious. In other words, it is immediate before their attack against us.”55 The other is the idea of “countermeasures at the appropriate timing.” It should “not be confined to some time or stage of Taiwan’s defense operations,” but depend on the overall situation.56 Space: this is to check the enemy on yonder shore. The targets of the ROCAF “countermeasure operations” should be “enemy targets that pose the most serious threats against us.” Enemy airfields, radar sites and missile sites would be at the top of the target list.57 Table 4.4 lists the difference between “wings in being” school and “active countermeasure” schools.
Conclusion: unfinished debates Regarding the development of the operational concept “active countermeasure,” as a retired ROCN admiral commented, it was “full of fighting spirit while wanting for poker chips.”58 One of the main reasons that the notions of “active countermeasure” have not been fully realized is exactly the inability of the present ROCAF to fulfill all the ideas that the “active countermeasure” school has proposed. For example, one retired ROCAF colonel believes that the need for SEAD, and S-300 SAMs in particular, before “checking the enemy on yonder
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51
Table 4.4 A comparison between the “wings in being” school and “active countermeasure” schools
The nature of Taiwan defense operations Land battle in determining the outcome of war The timing and space for decisive campaign The aim of decisive campaign The employment of the ROCAF Targets of countermeasure operations Type of counter-air operations Role of the ROCAF
“Wings in being” School
“Active countermeasure” School
Attrition, total war
Blitzkrieg, limited war
The PLA cannot conquer Taiwan without defeating the ROCA Annihilate enemy at water’s edge Annihilate enemy landing forces Preserve the strength
The PLA can defeat Taiwan without landing
Enemy landing forces DCA Semi-independent, subordinate to the ROCA
Check enemy on yonder shore; preemptive or at appropriate timing Destroy enemy landing intention before-hand Concentrating full strength to destroy the enemy Enemy key airfields, radar sites, and missile sites OCA Independent strategic results can be achieved
shore,” “would be very difficult now.”59 The United States could add some items that the ROCAF wants, such as ARMs, in Taiwan’s arms package and thereby solve some “tactical” problems. Alternatively, as some authors suggest, Taiwan should immediately reverse the ROCAF’s relative inferior status and build up a “strong air force” or “capable offensive air force.”60 These issues lead to a fundamental question, however: what does the ROCAF expect to be? Within the ROCAF, the concept of “active countermeasure” is not without objections. Outside the ROCAF, the ROCAF could copy the practice of the ROCN’s Navy Vision and communicate its Service views to the civilian leadership or the general public. But the ROCAF seems to refrain from so doing and prefers to adjust its role in overall Taiwan defense gradually and quietly. For example, in the reference to counter-air operations in the National Defense Report, 2002, the term “decisive campaign at appropriate timing” was quietly added.61 In the complicated political environment between three Services, those issues such as the subtle balance between developing an “independent” air strategy and the demand for “jointness” are inevitably involving a distribution between them. These are the determinants to the outcomes of air doctrinal debates.
Notes 1 In China, they claimed a very different combat result that the Taiwanese lost 14 aircraft while the PLAAF only 6. See Yan Hsu, Battle of Kinmen. Beijing: China Broadcast and Television Publishing Co., 1992, p. 272.
52 York W. Chen 2 For details, see Martin Edmonds and York W. Chen, “Assessment of the ROCN’s Modernization: Views from Strategic and Operational Considerations,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 2(2), 157–65. 3 ROCN, Navy Operations Basic Doctrine. Taipei, 2000, chapter 5, p. 4. 4 Martin Edmonds and York Chen, “Assessment of the ROCN’s Modernization”, op. cit., p. 166. 5 Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change,” in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (Eds) The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002, pp. 4–5. 6 These statements are slightly adjusted from Warden’s definition. See John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat. Washington DC, Brassey’s, 1989, pp. 10–11. According to the USAF official definition, air superiority means the degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. While air supremacy means the degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference. See US Department of Defense (DoD), Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1998, p. 23. For further discussion on the levels of the air, see UK MOD, British Air Power Doctrine, 1999, chapter 2.5, p. 2. 7 As USAF Major General MacGhee (Commander, HQ USAF Doctrine Center) states “Air superiority provides enormous military advantages, allowing all our forces greater freedom of action to carry out their assigned missions (freedom to attack) while minimizing their vulnerability to enemy detection and attack (freedom from attack).” See USAF, Counter-air Operation Doctrine, 2002, p. i. 8 Andrew G.B. Vallance, The Air Weapon: Doctrine of Air Power Strategy and Operational Art. Hampshire, Macmillan, 1996, p. 62. 9 ROCAF, Air Forces Operations Basic Doctrine, 1986, p. 115. 10 ROCAF, Air Forces Operations Basic Doctrine, 1991, chapter 5, p. 2. 11 Ibid., chapter 7, p. 2. 12 USAF, Counter-air Operation Doctrine, p. 3. 13 Ibid. 14 For example, Fu-Chen Chen, Defending Great Taiwan: Taiwan’s Security and Grand Strategic Posture. Taipei: Darenwu Publishing Co., 1995, p. 166; ROCAF Lt. Col. YueChih Chung, “Study on the Employment of Inferior Forces: Views from the Gulf War,” National Defense Magazine, 13(12) 1998, p. 51; ROCAF Colonel Ding-chung Tien, “Analysis on the Elements of Air Forces Operational Concepts,” National Defense Magazine, 15(6) 1999, p. 74; ROCAF Colonel Wei-Kuan Chen, “On the Employment and Improvement of the ROCAF’s ‘Air Battle Strategy’: Lessons from the Principles of Modern Air Warfare,” National Defense Magazine, 18(2) 2002, p. 53. 15 ROCAF Col. (retired) I-Ming Zen, “Air Force’s View on Improving Joint Operation Capability for ROC Armed Forces,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, 2(4) 2002, p. 58. 16 ROCA Lt. Col. Haiso-Lung Chen, “Analysis on the Employment of the PLA’s Tactical Missiles Against Taiwan,” National Defense Magazine, 18(1) 2002, p. 109. 17 Chih-Yang Kao, “The War We Can’t See at the Taiwan Strait”, Defense International, No. 215, 2002, p. 53. 18 ROCAF Lt. Col. Chih-Sheng Hung, “How Air Forces Attain Air Superiority: Comparative Views,” Air Force Academic Monthly, No. 495, 1998, p. 18. 19 ROCA Lt. Col. Chen, “Analysis on the Employment of the PLA’s Tactical Missiles Against Taiwan,” op. cit., p. 106. 20 ROCAF Lt. Col. Mao-Sung Hsieh, “The Practical Value of Electronic Warfare in Taiwan-Penghu Defense Operation,” Air Force Academic Monthly, No. 495, 1998, p. 35. 21 Hsun Ming, “New Military Strategic Thinking of Taiwan-Penghu Defense Operation, II,” National Defense Magazine, 17(4) 2001, p. 7.
The shifting balance of air superiority
53
22 ROCAF Lt. Gen. (retired) Lee Fan, “Assessment of Taiwan’s Air Superiority Force Structure,” in Chin-Chiang Su editor, The Force Structure of ROC Armed Forces and Security of Taiwan Strait. Taipei, 1995. 23 China Times, March 8, 1995, p. 11. 24 ROCA Major Ching-Shan Lin, “On Joint Air Defense Operation,” Journal of Communication, Electron and Information, No. 98, 2002, p. 58. 25 ROCA Major Tsung-Lin Huang, “Study on Command and Control of Field Air Defense,” Artillery Academic Quarterly, No. 118, 2002, pp. 46–7. 26 US DoD, Executive Summary of Report to Congress on Implement of the Taiwan Relations Act. Washington, 2000, p. 3. 27 Chien Chung, The PRC Military Modernization and Its Impact on Taiwan Defense Operation, MND contracted research, 2000, pp. 229–48. 28 US DoD, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait. Washington DC, 1999, p. 5. 29 ROCA Lt. Col. Chen, “Analysis on the Employment of the PLA’s Tactical Missiles Against Taiwan,” op. cit., p. 106. 30 ROCMND, Joint Operations Basic Doctrine, 2001, op. cit., pp. 3–106, 3–109. 31 ROCA Major Lin, “On Joint Air Defense Operation,” op. cit., p. 62. 32 Kao, “The War We Can’t See at the Taiwan Strait,” op. cit., p. 53 33 ROCAF Lt. Col. Cheng-Lieh Luo, “Study on the PLA Radar Forces,” Air Forces Academic Monthly, No. 499 (1998), pp. 17, 21–22. 34 ROCAF Lt. Col. Ting-Yen Chiao, “On the Threats of the PLA ARMs against Our E2Ts,” Air Force Academic Monthly, No. 511 (1999), p. 50 35 ROCA Major Lin, “On Joint Air Defense Operation,” op. cit., p. 58. 36 Jen Wan, “The Capabilities of the PLAAF: The Past and the Future,” National Defense Magazine, 12(6) (1996), p. 41. 37 Some of the following notions were proposed before, see Edmonds and Chen, “Assessment of the ROCN’s Modernization,” op. cit., pp. 156–8. 38 Pei-Tsun Hau, Eight-Year Diary as the Chief of General Staff. Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing, 2000, 1, p. 24. 39 Author ‘s interview with a ROCA retired Lt. Gen., November 2002. 40 Pei-Tsun Hau, The Late Years of Ching-Kuo Chiang in General Hau’s Diary. Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing, 1995, p. 59. 41 Hau, Eight-Year Diary as the Chief of General Staff, 1, p. 238. 42 ROCAF, Air Forces Operations Basic Doctrine, 1991, chapter 5, p. 3. 43 Ibid., chapter 5, p. 3. 44 Ibid., chapter 5, p. 4. 45 Ibid., chapter 5, p. 5. 46 Ibid., chapter 5, p. 6. 47 ROCAF Lt. Col. Ting-Yu Chou, “On Air Defense Operations of an Island Type Air Force,” Air Force Academic Monthly, No. 492, 1997, p. 13. 48 Edmonds and Chen, “Assessment of the ROCN’s Modernization,” op. cit., p. 160. 49 ROCAF Col. Tien, “Analysis on the Elements of Air Force Operational Concepts,” pp. 73, 75. 50 ROCAF Col. Tien, op. cit., p. 73. 51 Ibid., p. 77. 52 ROCAF Col. Chih-Kung Yu, “On Air Power and Present National Security,” in Conference Proceeding on National Security and Military Strategy. Taipei: National Defense University, 2000, p. 188. 53 ROCAF, Air Forces Operations Basic Doctrine, 1991, chapter 5, p. 5. 54 ROCAF Col. Tien, “Analysis on the Elements of Air Force Operational Concepts,” p. 76. 55 ROCAF Col. Wei-Kuan Chen, “On the Preparation of the ROCAF: Views from ‘Joint Counter-air Operations’,” Air Forces Academic Monthly, No. 507, 1999, p. 7.Emphases added.
54 York W. Chen 56 ROCAF Col. Tien, op. cit., p. 78. 57 ROCAF Major Shou-Shan Chao, “Study on the Timing, Targeting, and Force Employment for the Conduct of the ROCAF Countermeasure Operations,” Air Force Academic Monthly, No. 492, 1997, p. 18. 58 Authors interview with a retired admiral, December 2002. 59 Authors interview with a retired ROCAF colonel, December 2002. 60 For example, ROCAF Lt. Col. Chien-Te Wu and ROCAF Col. (retired) Chia-Min Chu, “The Determinants and Dilemmas that the PLAAF’s Development Encounters in the Early 21st Century, II,” Air Force Academic Monthly, No. 552, 2002, p. 13. ROCN Commander Hai-Chang Tsai, “Study on the Future Development of the PLAAF Air Strategy,” National Defense Magazine, 17(3) 2001, p. 81. 61 ROC MND, National Defense Report 2002, Taipei, 2002, p. 80.
5
Command of the air over Taiwan Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su
Introduction Zhang Wan-Nian, the Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Deputy Director of the Central Working Group on Taiwan, once said that, “There would be war across the Taiwan Strait in five years.” No matter whether or not his observation should be regarded as a timetable for war, once the military conflict occurs over the Taiwan Strait, given the high intensity of the battlefield environment, the final victory will belong to the side that gains command of the air. Any point in Taiwan is within 300 kilometers of Mainland China. If a war occurs and Taiwan loses its command of the airspace over the Taiwan Strait, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force (PLAAF) would immediately prevent Taiwan’s Navy from being able to put to sea in safety. Furthermore, the Republic of China (ROC) Army’s attack helicopters would also be pinned down by PLAAF ground attack aircraft and the land battle become another Dunkirk disaster for Taiwan’s troops. Taiwan’s armored tanks and vehicles would be destroyed from the air by China’s aircraft and be unable to give protection to the front line troops. Conversely, should the PLAAF expend time and effort and still be unable to gain air supremacy over the Taiwan Strait, the PLA forces would find it difficult to effectively prepare and bring to bear the necessary fire support for an amphibious landing on the shores of Taiwan. Even though the PLAAF would try to support an amphibious landing and be prepared to accept heavy casualties, the PLA’s ground forces would be held down by Taiwan’s firepower. This would make it very difficult, if not impossible, in such a situation for PLA forces to launch an attack in depth from their beachhead. Air power covers both the sea and the land. The targets at sea would be the warships with which the ROC Navy (ROCN) would endeavor to assert maritime control; but control over land is much more complicated. Air power over land not only traditionally aims to attack the enemy’s front line, but also to extend the range of operations to attack the enemy’s rear and to support units by a combination of long range and precision weapons. The objective of air power is to control, or hold up, the enemy’s follow-up echelons, and destroy the key nodes of any logistic support system with the intention of isolating his front line. Additionally, the political purpose of air power is to suppress the enemy’s headquarters and
56
Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su
command and control facilities with the intention of inflicting not just physical, but more especially, psychological damage. The scope of air power means that an air force could potentially exercise command over both sea and land. More importantly, control over the land means that an air force has the ability to engage in conflict independently. This has meant that the doctrine of the “Air-Land Battle” has attracted wide attention. Indeed, the traditional distinctions between land power, sea power, and air power have arguably become anachronistic and, in future warfare, it becomes more meaningful to talk of “air-land power,” instead. Consequently, command of the air would become the key factor in the defense of the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, the ROC Air Force (ROCAF) must focus its efforts on ensuring that it retains air supremacy over the Taiwan Strait and Island of Taiwan battlefield.
The strategic competition across the Taiwan Strait It is reasonable to argue that for many states the security of the Taiwan Strait is something of a delicate strategic game. Geographically, East Asia is the boundary of the Eurasian mainland; geo-politically, it is also where the continental land power and sea power meet, in what James Fairgrieve has categorized as the “shatter-belt,” or “crush zone”.1 More specifically in the East Asian context, it is where Taiwan, China, the United States, and Japan all play an important role. Under the United States’ containment policy during the Cold War, one example of cooperation between sea power and land power was that of the US alliance with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to oppose and contain another major land power, the USSR. Currently, the PRC has become an expanding power in the region, with the effect that the competition for sea power and land power could possibly prove to be a latent source of conflict between the United States, essentially a maritime power, and the PRC, a continental land-based power. The United States and Japan are currently the principal maritime and naval powers in Western Pacific. Although the United States is nearly self-sufficient in natural resources, its regional trade and energy needs are still highly dependent on ocean shipping. Should any possible enemy gain control these crucially important sea lines of communication (SLOCs), the United States’ economy and security would be endangered. For this reason, the United Sates insists that the freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest.2 Besides which, the United States’ military strategy is also predicated on two main themes: the maintenance of its control of the oceans – control of the sea – and the capability to project military force, globally.3 Japan’s Self-Defense Force (JSDF) also followed the same strategic objectives after the Second World War.4 It needed access to the world’s oceans to obtain the natural resources it lacked most, principally energy supplies of oil and gas. Keeping the world’s SLOC open and secure was therefore a key factor in its nation’s security, and remains so today, though constitutionally and politically Japan harbors no ambitions to project military power. Objectively, geographical location plays a very important part in the Western Pacific; however, its strategic value is determined by the international system. Given different times and space, these locations have different strategic values.
Command of the air over Taiwan 57 Their strategic value should therefore be seen in relative terms.5 For example, if Beijing should decide to occupy Taiwan by armed force, there would be many risks involved. In the event that Taiwan withstood the attack, the Taiwanese government might well then declare independence and potentially win worldwide diplomatic recognition. The leaders in Beijing might then even be confronted with an internal ruling crisis. In the event of an attack on Taiwan, the United States and Japan, though they have not made it public, would doubtless be very concerned. Were China to succeed in occupying Taiwan, PLAAF combat aircraft would be able to take off from Taiwan and patrol an area extending to a radius of 800 nautical miles around the island. All the SLOC from the Northeast to the Southeast of the Western Pacific would thus be directly exposed to a threat from the PLAAF. Another possible scenario is that PLAN nuclear submarines could sail from Taiwan directly into the Western, or even the Middle, Pacific Ocean and pose a challenge to the United States’ naval dominance in the area. For both the United States and Japan, China’s control over Taiwan would constitute a serious threat to regional security. Defending Taiwan’s air space, therefore, not only is in the interest of the ROC’s survival, to a significant degree, but also decides whether or not China is restrained from gaining naval access to the Pacific Ocean. It also projects a future strategic vision of the Western Pacific Ocean.
The complexity of air power Due to geo-political characteristics and a matured aerospace technology, the ability to exercise air power over the Taiwan Strait by either side has become more and more difficult to achieve. Air power itself is developing in a complex way. Today, the concept of air power includes not only the traditional perception of gaining air supremacy and controlling the air space, but also control over the whole spectrum of the atmosphere, from very low altitudes (treetop) to the very edge of the atmosphere and beyond into space, using both manned and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs). The changing concept of air power is having a significant impact on the exercise of air power over the Taiwan Strait. The edge of the atmosphere and outer space have already become new areas over which to compete for air power. According to its space plans from 2003 to 2005, which form part of the PLA’s tenth five-year planning period, China will launch more than thirty satellites, including those for intelligence, communications, navigation, and weather forecasting. Currently, the PRC has completed a series of six satellites, which include a re-entry sensor satellite (spy satellite), Dofanhon information satellites, Fonwun weather satellites, and Xijan science exploration and experimental research satellites.6 Two further series of satellites have almost been completed, and include a resource satellite that covers most of the globe and a navigation satellite named Beiduo (Plough). Most importantly, the Beiduo navigation experimental satellite is a first-generation indigenous one to be deployed to an assigned orbit.7 It will certainly help the PRC to identify military targets. According to the Xinhua News Agency, the Beiduo experimental navigation satellite has been designed,
58 Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su developed, and produced by the Technology Research Academy of China Aerospace Group. Since the satellite will have the ability to identify targets and survey the battle space, the PRC will be capable of setting up a command and control system that is independent of national boundaries and limits imposed by the curvature of the earth. It will also contribute significantly to the launch, guidance, and targeting of middle-to-long range ballistic missiles. It represents a major advance in the PRC’s ability to deliver missile-launched, precision-guided munitions. Once it has been upgraded with a Global Positioning System, the PLA’s M-family of ballistic missiles, which operate near the edge of the earth’s atmosphere, will become a major destructive weapon system. Although the ROC military have calculated that an M-type ballistic missile, armed with a traditional warhead, could cause a crater 10 meters deep and 30 meters wide, they have concluded that the PRC would need at least 50–60 such missiles to disable and paralyze one Taiwanese airfield.8 Meanwhile, on the one hand, the PRC remains a major threat to Taiwan’s air bases and military ground facilities, especially once it has improved its offensive capability and added new variants of warheads in the future. Strictly speaking, however, the threat may not come from aircraft or missiles directly, but the delayed effect of a pre-emptive first strike against Taiwan’s airfields and logistic support facilities that would prevent Taiwan’s fighter aircraft from taking off. On the other hand, low altitude and treetop air power operations are also key considerations. “Treetop air power,” or “hedgehopping,” means the ability to fly close to the ground. For example, a terrain-following cruise missile, or a helicopter’s low-level operation, means the ability to fly between 6 and 10 meters above the ground. Low-altitude combat aircraft however, are both difficult to pick up on defensive radar and are hard to intercept and shoot down by gunfire or surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) because of the limits imposed by the curvature of the earth and the speeds at which such aircraft and missiles operate. Except against certain classes of fixed-wing fighter aircraft, most other groundbased anti-aircraft weapons, including the Stinger shoulder-launched missile, are largely ineffective. The side that makes the first strike will therefore probably have the advantage of surprise and momentum, as well as the ability to gain air supremacy. However, in the light of the PRC’s current air power developments, it would seem that cruise missiles have more potential than military helicopters, and are likely to emerge as the greater threat to Taiwan. In order for either side to gain control of the air at low altitudes – the so-called “fifth-dimension of space,” or “treetop air power” – the first battles over the Taiwan Strait would be most likely be fought at high altitudes or on the edge of the atmosphere.
A gradual strategic imbalance Although experts have not yet reached a consensus on whether Beijing would be able to acquire Taiwan by force or not, many Western observers have been
Command of the air over Taiwan 59 gradually modifying their ideas and believe that the PLA may eventually be capable of invading and occupying Taiwan. A military review conducted by the US Defense Department in 1999 mentioned that once China decided to declare a war on Taiwan and initiated a first strike, it could gain air superiority over the Taiwan Strait within 45 minutes. Moreover, an article in the British journal, Air Force, also indicated that the military balance has been gradually tilting in favor of the PLA for some time, and is now quickening its pace under the PRC’s extensive current military modernization program. This imbalance has become a major threat to Taiwan’s strategic development.9 In fact, the PLA is accelerating the modernization of its Air Force, guided missiles, information technology, Navy and Naval Aviation, and Army Special Forces. “Liberation 1,” the military exercise held on the Dong Shan island in 2001, marked China’s first large-scale joint exercise involving new integrated services and military equipment. The exercise revealed some conventional activities, such as the maneuvers by Su-27 fighters and a massive amphibious landing operation. But what was more important were the new activities, such as the socalled “digital wall” that was used to gain an intelligence advantage and military action against aircraft carriers that was obviously aimed at protecting PLA forces from attack from against a foreign force (i.e. the United States). The Review on the National Force of the People Republic of China, published by the US Defense Department in July 2002, indicated that, on the one hand, Taiwan has been losing its military advantages and, on the other hand, the PRC has obtained more and more advantages. The PRC’s current training, however, has been emphasizing naval and amphibious warfare, and has been actively integrating a force made up of ground troops, Marine Corps, airborne troops, and Special Forces. It is estimated that the PRC may well be able to overcome past difficulties and be able to conduct amphibious operations successfully before 2010. If, however, a third party is involved, and Beijing is prepared to meet the political, economic, diplomatic, and military costs involved, the operation may still prove successful. In addition to an armed amphibious attack, the PRC could still employ every means of information technology at its disposal to engage in psychological warfare against Taiwan. For example, a computer virus could be used to destroy Taiwan’s information systems, bring chaos to its traffic systems, break down the social order and the people’s morale, and weaken business enterprises’ confidence and their support for the Taiwan government. There are already many Taiwanese businessmen who invest in both China and Taiwan and who would be prepared to accept a political compromise with the PRC, rather than afford the economic depression. As Eric McVadon, a retired Admiral from the US Navy and one-time Attaché accredited in Beijing, once said, “Even though information warfare does not work, Beijing would not choose other strategies that might lead to casualties and depress its military morale.” This strategy caused him considerable concern. However, if Beijing did not succeed in occupying Taiwan by force, it would face many incipient domestic problems. The new generation of military forces that Beijing is currently building does not just target Taiwan. Its main purpose is to extend China’s strategic borders as
60 Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su well as acquire the ability to project military power and to conduct a military invasion outside its territory. By developing a middle-to-long term military capability, the PLA is killing two birds with one stone. On the one hand, the plan is to deal with China’s right of access to the world’s oceans in the future and, on the other hand, to use these new military capabilities to attack Taiwan, if necessary. Compared with Beijing, Taiwan has no new plans to enhance future ROC Air Force readiness. Under such circumstances, the air balance between the two sides will gradually tilt toward to Beijing.
The PLAAF’s strategic offensive orientation The PLAAF has adjusted its strategic policy and the direction of its force readiness by accelerating the formation of an offensive air force. The indications are that the PRC has gradually transformed the PLAAF from a local air defense force to one with a long-range air defense capability and a middle-to-long range capability that can support wars beyond its borders. Although the new Commander-in-Chief of the PLAAF, Qiao Qing-chen, has not yet issued any statement, the former Commander, Liu Shun-yao, once commented in an exclusive interview with the Xinhua News Agency that the PLAAF was changing direction from one designed only for defense to one that combined both defensive and offensive capabilities.10 Moreover, he added that the PLA’s strategy would try to seize the initiative by means of the offense. PLAAF military training has, as a consequence, introduced the movement of combat aircraft around different airfields. For example, many combat aircraft pilots have been sent to air bases in Fu-jian and Guang-dong in order to familiarize themselves with front-line operations, strengthen their combat skills,11 and engage in integrated middle-to-long range offensive operations. There is clear evidence to confirm Liu Shun-yao’s statement. First, the PRC has purchased Russian Su-30 long-range multi-purpose attack aircraft; second, the PRC is procuring and developing many auxiliary aircraft for in-flight refueling, early air warning, and digital warfare roles. According to the US Military Intelligence Agency, combat aircraft that previously operated only behind the front line, have recently been assigned to the front line and have had their combat readiness preparation time reduced from 10 to 3.5 hours.12 Furthermore, their ability to engage in air combat at some distance from China is designed to support an offensive air threat and surprise attack.13
PLAAF force structures and order of battle The PLAAF has operated in the past with massive clusters of fighter aircraft, most of which were acquired from the Soviet Union in the 1970s. This means that most of these aircraft are reaching the end of their useful operational life and becoming obsolete. They are no longer able to meet the PLAAF’s current, let alone future, operational needs. Consequently, most attention is now being given to the PLAAF’s new equipment and procurement priorities.
Command of the air over Taiwan 61 To improve the situation, the PLAAF has introduced two approaches to the issue of force readiness: either to purchase advanced aircraft from abroad or, to develop and manufacture indigenous aircraft themselves. Priority on overseas purchases has been given to the Russian Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 combat aircraft. Indigenously developed and produced aircraft include the Super JH-7, which is modified from the J-7, and the J-8A/B. Among them, the Su-27/J-11/J-10, which incorporate foreign technology but involve Chinese research and development are the most significant. Many experts consider that the Su-27 fighter’s performance equals that of first variant of the US F-15 air superiority fighter, and the J-10s performance the equivalent of the US F-16A. Since China and Russia reached an agreement on technology transfer associated with the Su-27 family fighters in 1996, Su-27 fighters developed and manufactured in the PRC started to emerge off the production line around 2001–2003. The aircraft’s production rate is estimated to be approximately twenty fighters per year (Table 5.1).14 According to current information, Israel has provided critical technologies for the J-10 fighter. Chinese researchers have now largely overcome such obstacles as the provision of spare parts, titanium alloy welding techniques, and the Kun-Lun jet engine, and have vastly improved aircraft reliability. With regard to weapon systems, the AAM Research Academy has successfully produced a new anti-jamming air-to-air prototype missile. On December 2, 2002, the journal Asian Weekly (Hong Kong) reported that ten J-10 fighters had been deployed to the Nanjing Military Region. It was earlier reported that a number of prototype J-10 fighters were undergoing flight tests, since when production lines may well have been set up in 2003. Notably, the Air Force First Aviation Academy has been testing an airborne voice system.15 When this voice system is successfully incorporated into future PLAAF aircraft, it will help reduce the pilots’ operational load and enhance their capabilities in the worst environments – that is, high-tense air combat, night flying, and ground attack operations.
Table 5.1 Estimate of the PLAAF’s aircraft 1994–2005 Type of aircraft J-6 J-7 J-8 J-10 Su-27/J-11 Su-30 Q-5 J-7 Total
Service life acquisition 28 25 25 25 30 20 25
Product or cycle (year) End of 1970s End of 1970s Middle of 1980s 2002– 2000 – End of 1970s Early 2001
Sources: SIPRI Year Book 2001; IISS Military Balance 2000–01.
1994
Number 2005
2,824 586 205 0 26 630 0 4,297
544 919 466 30 120 324 21 2,424
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Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su
Depending on operational limitations,16 new technologies, and the latest fighter production figures, PLAAN combat aircraft will number approximately 2,500 by 2010. The PLAAN inventory by 2005 is estimated to include: ●
●
●
●
Air superiority fighters: approximately 2,000, including J-7/JH-7 variants, J-8 variants, Su-27/30 family, and J-10 fighters; Ground attack fighters: approximately 450–500, including QJ-5, domestic JH-7, Russian introduction Su-30 attack fighters (estimate 60); Bomber: approximately 125, H-5 (out of commission), modified H-6s, and some air tankers modified from H-6; Auxiliary/support aircraft: including early air warning aircraft, air refueling tanker planes, C4I AWACS aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, fire control aircraft, and medium-range Air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and air-to-surface missiles (ASMs). These aircraft and their weapons systems will significantly improve the operational capability of the PLAAF overall.
The PLAAF’s fighter aircraft are deployed under three categories according to their location: (1) the first line, up to 250 nautical miles from Taiwan; (2) the second line, up to 500 nautical miles from Taiwan; and (3) the third line 500 nautical miles and beyond from Taiwan.17 Within the first line, there are 13 military and civilian airfields;18 within the second line, there are 1,300 combat fighters, of which 600 have a combat radius that enables them also to reach Taiwan.19 The PLAAF’s Second and Third Divisions operate: Su-30 fighters equipped with the air-launched SS-N-22 cruise anti-ship missile, the KH-31 long-range anti-radiation missile; Su-27 fighters, equipped with the AA-10 medium/longrange AAMs, the KH-31 long range anti-radiation missile; and J-8 II fighters, FB-7, An-12, and A-50 AWACS aircraft. In addition, the Air and Naval Aviation also operate electronic warfare aircraft. There are also all sorts of airborne EW systems with electronic support equipment operating on frequencies between 0.7 and 18GHz and active electronic jamming systems that could execute Electronic Counter Countermeasures (ECCM) to A, D, E, F frequencies. First Line and major combat fighters are equipped with an anti-jamming device delivery system.
Doctrine and training The PLAAF conducts training to enhance pilots’ combat skills, and to increase their flying time and operational capabilities in all weather conditions, step by step. Before 1990, the PLA Air Force performed a “subordinate role” in each PLA military exercise, due to the command authority being vested in the PLA Army. After the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, the PLA’s military planning personnel found that 38 days out of the 42-day war were devoted to the air campaign and attitudes changed.20 Depending on the particular fighter, the PLAAF divides its “JiaDivision”(A class) and “Yi-Division”(B class), to train for different threat scenarios. In 1994, the PLAAF conducted its first emergency mobility drill for its new joint-operational requirements across ten provinces. This drill focused on using
Command of the air over Taiwan 63 attack fighters in a quick response to paralyze the enemy’s air defense systems, seize command of the air, and support ground operations. Operational considerations were: first, deploy aircraft and ground ECM forces to launch high-intensity electronic jamming; second, dispatch low-level attack aircraft to attack the enemy’s radar and communication centers; and then launch sorties of attack aircraft to paralyze the enemy’s early warning radar and Command and Control (C2) systems within 20 minutes. At the same time, air superiority fighter aircraft would be responsible for intercepting enemy aircraft, alert aircraft of enemy surface-toair (SAM) sites, and dispatch bombers to follow behind the ground attack aircraft. During the drill, suppression of the enemy’s air defense fighter aircraft on the ground was the first and most important objective.21 For example, the 18th Attack Division deployed J-8D aircraft capable of in-flight air refueling for long-range all-weather operations training objectives. The preliminary flight training courses include night flying, guided missile launches, over-sea flying, low-level flying, and emergency drills, etc. The PLAAF’s purpose behind these training courses is to promote air combat effectiveness for future air campaigns and especially to improve the effectiveness of attacks against ground targets. In ‘A’ class aviation units, approximately 90–95 percent of pilots receive at least all-weather flying training, as do 75 percent of all PLAAF pilots on similar training courses.22 The PLAAF encourages competition between units and uses new replacement fighters as the “prize” for success. “Those who are winners are those who fly the new planes.” For the “Jia-Division,” it is pressure; for the “Yi-Division,” it is a driving force. However, with flying time limited to approximately 100 hours per year, per pilot,23 the PLAAF’s overall training time is much less than for that for pilots in the ROCAF, the USAF, and most European air forces. In addition, PLAAF pilots spend much of their time preparing for long-range strike operations over sea.24 Under these circumstances, training courses provide little time for flight familiarization or combat experience. This is a negative factor for when the PLAAF conducts air campaigns.
Area air defense and anti-missile capability Beijing is a pragmatic regime and does not neglect the possibility of an air attack from an enemy. In August 2000, China’s coastal cities, including Shanghai, held its first air defense exercise since the Chinese Communist regime was established in 1949. Currently, China employs a layered air defense system, including high, medium, and low tiers. The Second Artillery, the Air Force, the Air Force’s Air Defense Force, and the Army Air Defense Force are collectively responsible for the country’s air defense role. Incorporated within these forces are both aircraft and SAMs. The PLAAF has a variety of aircraft and also HQ-variants of SAMs, notably, the HQ-9. Additionally, there is the KS-1 missile that has a potential anti-ballistic missile capability.25 The Second Artillery is responsible for missile defense. In addition to its strategic attack role, it also has a strategic defense responsibility and operates the new
64 Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su S-300 SAM system. In order to prevent an air attack from the ROCAF, the Second Artillery established ten independent air defense brigades each comprising two SAM regiments and four anti-aircraft artillery battalions. The major weapons of these independent air defense brigades include 24 transportation erection launchers (TELs) and 60 anti-aircraft guns. These units are also equipped with the shoulder-launch guided missile, the HQ-7, the surface-to-air SA-15 field air defense missile, the Type-90 35 millimeter self-propelled gun and the advanced Ft-2000 anti-radiation missile. The anti-radiation missile is primarily used to counter air early warning and electronic jamming aircraft.26 Judging from this inventory, it is possible that the PLAAF also has certain C2, and BMC3, across-Strait attack weaknesses. Nevertheless, it will have enough capability to engage in “high-tech” intensive warfare in Chinese surroundings by 2005. The Recapitalization Plan for the Taiwanese Air Force, however, has been put on the back burner and this is a dangerous sign. Furthermore, the PLA is a veteran at asymmetrical warfare. In the Cold War era, the PLA, with inferior weapon systems, was able to shoot down a U-2 high-level reconnaissance aircraft and intercept an unmanned Fire-Bee reconnaissance vehicle. In other words, the PLA is good at performing the unpredictable and has never been slow to exploit a stronger side’s weaknesses.
The ROCAF’s capabilities In response to the threat from Mainland China, the development of Taiwan’s air power capabilities reached its apogee in the mid-1990s. Currently, any further development of its air power has been placed “on hold.” This standstill situation is as a consequence of limited national resources, Taiwan’s young democratic processes, and administrative restrictions. According to the ROC National Defense Report 2002, the ROCAF’s major strategic mission is: to strengthen its combat readiness to protect Taiwan’s territorial air space in peace time; and to seize command of the air and conduct joint operations with the ROC Army and ROCN in wartime. How, then, should the ROCAF’s strategy develop? Should it emphasize active attack or passive defense? And should its combat mission focus on gaining air supremacy or conducting anti-landing missions? These issues have generated tense arguments. Currently, the ROCAF has 50,000 personnel subordinated to the ROCAF’s Headquarters. Its administrative structure includes an Operational Command, a Logistics Command, an Anti-aircraft Artillery and Guarding Command, an Education and Doctrine Development Command, a Base Command, Tactical and Combat Wings, Mixed Wings, Tactical Control Wings, Communication and Aviation Wings, and Weather Wings. The aircraft inventory of the ROCAF includes US-built F-16 fighters, French-built Mirage 2000–5s, and the indigenous IDF fighter. These three aircraft form the basis of the ROCAF’s air power capability. In the ROC’s integrated air defense system (IADS) and air defense troops are subordinated to the ROC Army, and comprise three categories: (1) three Patriot missile companies, which deploy approximately 200 missiles; (2) six Tian-Gong missile companies, which deploy 250 Tian-Gong I and II missiles, respectively;
Command of the air over Taiwan 65 and (3) twenty Hawk missile companies.27 According to the Ministry of National Defense’s (NMD) deployment planning, the air defense network across Taiwan is divided into two, tactical and strategic. Tactical deployment includes the lower tier’s (from 150 to 1,500 meters) Avenger system plus anti-aircraft artillery, and the medium tier’s (1,500–7,600 meters) Hawk, and Tian-Gang (Sky Bow) I, II anti-aircraft/missile systems. The strategic deployment comprises the higher-tier (above 7,600 meters) Patriot 3.28 Purportedly, the Tian-Gong III has an anti-ballistic missile capability and could be effective against China’s M-9 and M-11 lower-tier ballistic missile and cruise missile attacks. This missile interception system has almost been completed, once its associated long-range radar warning system is in place around 2005.29 According to information in the public domain, Taiwan has approximately 40 additional radar stations comprising some 100 radar systems. Most of these radar stations are located in the Western and Central regions of Taiwan. The radar inventories include: the HADR/HR-3000 three-dimensional multi-function longrange air defense and alert radar; the GE-592 three-dimensional long-range search radar; the AN/GPS-43 mobility radar; the An/TPQ-36 three-dimensional low-altitude surveillance radar; and the AN/EPS-89/90 high power long-range high-tier radar. In addition, Taiwan has the indigenous Chang-Bai mobile phasedarray radar. This radar can detect low-altitude targets within a 30 kilometers radius and detect targets over 20,000 meters at a range beyond 450 kilometers. It can also provide 5 minutes warning time. Because most radar can detect China’s coastal regions within 460 kilometers, it could meet some battlefield management requirements.
The key factors for command of the air over Taiwan In modern air campaigns, it is difficult to gain air supremacy just with fighter aircraft. The best and most economic way is to destroy enemy airfields and prevent enemy aircraft from taking off. This was demonstrated in past air campaigns from the Arab–Israeli wars to the Kosovo War. Following a conventional mode of warfare, were Taiwan to experience an air attack from China, the conflict would last a relatively long time – perhaps as long as 2–3 weeks. In the light of recent PLAAF developments, China would most probably attack Taiwan’s air power on the ground as being the best solution. For this, China would acquire standoff AAMs and ASMs in the future.
Paralyzing Taiwan’s air defense capability If a large-scale military conflict were to erupt across the Taiwan Strait, China would have a number of likely tactical options with which to paralyze Taiwan’s air defense capability. These options are as follows: ●
Attack Taiwan’s air defense command system: use soft kill and hard kill means to destroy Taiwan air defense’s surveillance and C2 systems, This would cause the ROCAF to lose their organizational command and battlefield management capabilities;
66 ●
●
Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su Damage and suppress of Taiwan’s airfields. Here China would likely use its Chinese ballistic missiles to attack Taiwan’s military and civilian airfields. The major objective of such attacks would be to paralyze the airfields so that aircraft could not take-off and land. Degrade Taiwan’s “ ‘situational awareness’ ” capability. When attacking command centers and airfields, China would, at the same time, use modified unmanned out-of-date aircraft and UAVs to interfere with Taiwan air defense units and radar, and use its anti-radiation missiles to target radar stations. For these reasons, Taiwan has spent a lot on air defense missiles; in total it has 800 medium and long-range air defense missiles. However, only 100 of these missiles are at a state of combat readiness. Reloading these missiles causes a time gap, one that China can exploit to attack Taiwan’s air defense assets.
Airfields are bolsters Taiwan’s airfields are similar to a US Navy aircraft carrier inasmuch as they perform a key function in Taiwan’s air power capability. Most of Taiwan’s airfields, however, were originally built by the Imperial Japanese. Bearing in mind that in those days an attack on the island would likely come from Mainland China, with threats to Taiwan from its Eastern side unlikely, most airfields were situated along Taiwan’s Western coast. Today, Taiwan still is threatened from the Mainland, but it now means that almost all of its airfields are exposed and vulnerable to a PLAAF and Second Artillery air attack. In addition to a ballistic missile and ground attack fighter attack, Taiwan’s airfields are also likely to be a target for China’s precision guided cruise missiles. Under these circumstances, the defense and survival of Taiwan’s Eastern airfields would become the key factor in the defense of Taiwan’s air power.
The first engagement is the key Recently, the PLA has stressed that the first military engagement across the Taiwan Strait would be decisive. In view of developments in modern warfare, this is probably an accurate assessment. In fact, though Taiwan has a well-founded and equipped Air Force, it will not, for political reasons, fire the first shot. Therefore, as noted earlier, China would likely target Taiwan’s airfields in the first exchange of any attempted attack on the island. For China, this is the key to its assault on Taiwan for, if Taiwan’s fighter aircraft cannot take off, China could quickly gain control the air space over Taiwan and destroy Taiwan’s entire air defense systems. Under these circumstances, China’s sequential operational plans and tempo would bring a high probability of success. Conversely, if the ROCAF can absorb a Chinese first strike and continue to engage PLA forces at sea and in the air, the subsequent “fog of war” would prove a serious blow to the PLA’s chances of success.
Command of the air over Taiwan 67
Defending Taiwan’s air space: “offensive–defense” is the best choice Taiwan is a democratic state. Its defense policy has to contend with a number of limitations and constraints. Based on the international and domestic political environments, strategic culture, and traditional cultural values, an offensive, or an “active defense-orientation” strategy would generate intense public argument and debate. Nevertheless, in view of changes in the international security environment and the PLA’s extensive military modernization program, there is a persuasive argument that Taiwan should adopt an offensive capability in order to achieve the objective of effectively defending Taiwan’s territorial air space. The ROCAF’s force recapitalization plan, should consider the following points: ●
●
Abandon its Maginot Line mentality. The Davis Line is not the Maginot Line. For Taiwan, it defines the strategic limit between Taiwan and Mainland, especially, for the ROCN and the ROCAF. On the one hand, due to the width of the Taiwan Strait, distance no longer provides Taiwan with the necessary protection, given modern weapons systems. At cruising speed, it only takes today’s combat aircraft between 15 and 20 minutes to cross the Strait. At tactical operational speeds, that time is significantly reduced. On the other hand, the island of Taiwan lacks the strategic depth to hold up a Chinese attack. From a strategic planning perspective, the best option is to extend the line of defense and the line of fire and delay the enemy’s onslaught. Disturb the enemy’s operational tempo. In the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan’s war resources are not sufficient to destroy Mainland China’s military capabilities. Taiwan’s war objectives should therefore focus on disrupting the enemy’s operational plans and disturbing his operational tempo in order to put the enemy off balance. The targets for attack should be the enemy’s airfields, ports, command and control centers, and communication nodes.
Technological superiority in battlefield management means that Taiwan can reduce information and undermine the enemy threat. Additionally, there is the opportunity to cut the enemy’s information channels and gain access to his information superiority and undermine his operational initiatives. Technological superiority may lead to information superiority in the future battlefield and under these conditions, information superiority will equate to success in conflict. Clausewitz noted that knowledge must become a capability; his argument remains true today. In short, information superiority not only means acquiring information on the battlefield but also enabling an inferior force to gain the operational advantage over a superior one. On the future battlefield, it is the knowledge-orientated battle space that enables, in some future potential crisis, to open up opportunities for states that have only limited resources. ●
Promote survivability. Through establishing second-strike capability, the ROCAF can reduce the impact of a PRC first strike against Taiwan. This
68 Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su
●
●
●
requires tactical skill involving specific troop training and equipment survivability, and improvements in combat readiness. To achieve these two objectives, the primary task must be to conserve the troops’ combat capability. Then, Taiwan must also improve its capability to withstand air attacks through hardened shelters and underground facilities.30 With these improvements in mind, a second priority must be the creation of an effective passive defense capability in which troops should be dispersed and their camouflage protection improved. On the other hand, ROCAF can adopt active measures to strengthen defense capabilities, including improvements to Taiwan’s electronic detection and electronic warfare equipment. Acquire fourth generation fighter aircraft. As noted earlier, China has continued to introduce advanced combat aircraft and modern weapon systems. Its force recapitalization plan is gradually reaching a pinnacle. Compared with China, Taiwan has acquired the IDF, the F-16, and Mirage fighters, and has no long-term force recapitalization plan to strengthen the ROCAF’s combat effectiveness. Consequently, research and development into future air superiority combat aircraft has diminished and there are fewer scientists and technologists engaged in the ROC aircraft factories. This is not an ROCAF problem in itself; the government administration must put forward a comprehensive plan to strengthen the ROCAF’s capability in order to maintain the military balance across the Taiwan Strait and to preserve the country’s aviation technology base. Adopt an economic approach. As China would use ballistic missiles to attack Taiwan, so Taiwan should also use ballistic missile to attack the PLA’s command and control centers etc. If Taiwan were to extend its defensive line from the center of the Taiwan Strait to Mainland China’s territory, PLA military facilities would become targets for attack within the region in time of war. Offensive weapons would include cruise missiles, standoff land attack missiles (SLAM), and ballistic missiles etc. Targets would include Chinese airfields, C4I systems, radar stations, fixed and mobile ballistic missile stations, logistics stations, tunnels, naval bases, and so on. Taiwan needs to adapt the resources available and use them creatively to defeat the enemy. Establish a “nonlinear air power capability”. Following developments in modern technological development, nonlinear operational measures have become an important method with which to seize command of the air. For example, the USAF’s F-117 stealth fighter can conduct offensive missions behind the enemy’s air defense systems. This operational capability can be viewed as a “nonlinear operational measure.” In addition, cruise missile and UAVs possess a potential nonlinear operational capability.
In the foreseeable future, “nonlinear operational modes” of warfare will become major operational measures. This was the case in the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo War. The trend is inevitable as these new weapon systems are not only used to penetrate enemy’s air defenses, but also provides low cost, highly effective items of equipment. Even if nonlinear operational modes do not replace traditional warfare, its huge potential for future warfare should not be overlooked.
Command of the air over Taiwan 69
Conclusion An offensive–defense strategy is a comparative concept. If the attacker develops a first strike capability, the defender may adopt preemptive counterattack measures against the enemy to frustrate a first strike option. Indeed, it would be difficult in these circumstances to define which state was the aggressor. Indeed, “intention” should be used as the basis of any judgment as to who was the aggressor. A defensive–offensive strategy is not the same as a comprehensive attack. On the contrary, the attack is limited and confined only to military targets. For example, the enemy’s nuclear forces would be singled out in the event of a nuclear war, and his invasion forces in a more traditional, conventional war. As a matter of necessity, Taiwan should consider suppressing the PLA through the application of air power on the principle “anticipatory self-defense.” Given Taiwan’s current strategic environment, the neutralization of China’s air power is the key factor in the defense of Taiwan. Taiwan should build an offensive capability to strike China’s air force capabilities. Within 250 nautical miles from Taiwan, China has deployed 1,200 fighters in the First Line. In addition, the United States estimates that the PLAAF stations about one-third of all its combat aircraft in that region. China deploys a further 1,100 fighters within its First Line and Second Line on a ratio of approximately 3 : 1. Under these circumstances, Taiwan can concentrate its military resources on a limited number of PRC Air Force targets. As a strategy, Taiwan could defeat the PLAAF and frustrate China’s invasion plans. Offensive tactics bring practical military benefits and are of strategic value as an effective deterrence. Offensive capabilities are diverse in nature, and include not merely a direct physical attack, but also involve strategic information warfare. Information technology is an asset in warfare but is also a source of vulnerability; it will inevitably become a priority target for both sides. Taiwan has a solid foundation upon which to develop its information warfare capabilities to counter a Chinese military threat. There is no question that Taiwan faces a tremendous military threat and must use whatever capabilities it can to defeat an enemy invasion and safeguard its national security. Furthermore, in so doing, Taiwan would be of strategic value and be able to contribute to regional security. Initially, however, command of the air across the Taiwan Strait is the cornerstone of Taiwan’s security.
Notes 1 James Fairgrieve, Geography and World Power. London, University of London Press, 1915, p. 329. Cited in, Saul B. Cohen, Geography and Politics in a Divided World. London, Methuen, 1964, p. 83. 2 William J. Perry, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region. Washington: US Department of Defense, February 1995, pp. 5–8. 3 US DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington DC, DOD, September 2001, pp. 2–3. 4 See also Tzu-yun Su, Wen-Zhung Zhai, PLA 2010 Taipei, Wheat Field Press, 2000, edition 3, pp. 41–3.
70 Chih-Heng Yang and Tzu-Yun Su 5 For example, see, Chang Chin, “Taiwan’s Strategic Position: A Conservative Assessment of its Value,” in Martin Edmonds, Chyungly Lee and Greg Mills (Eds) Preventing Insecurity: Lessons For and From East Asia. Johannesburg, SAIIA, 2003. 6 White Paper for China’s Aerospace. http://www.china.org.cn/ch-book/hangtian/ 2000guo.htm 7 China Times, Taipei, May 16, 2002, p. 14. 8 Ettoday Net News, Taipei, March 7, 2002. 9 China Times, Taipei, July 15, 2002, p. 14. 10 “PLAAF adjusted strategy from defensive to offensive,” China Times, Taipei, November 8, 2002, p. 14. 11 China Review 1999, Taipei: Press for China Research, 1999, pp. 8–167. 12 Kenneth W. Allen, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century. Santa Monica: RAND, 1995, p. 3. 13 “PLAAF adjusted strategy from defensive to offensive,” op. cit. 14 “China would produce Su-27,” China Times, Taipei, May 17, 1996, p. 9. 15 Technology Daily, Beijing, Sep. 20, 2002. 16 Kenneth W. Allen, op. cit., pp. 162–3. 17 Kenneth W. Allen, “Military Provocation Over the Taiwan Strait,” Confidence-Building Measure Project, Stimson Center, August 17, 1999, p. 2. 18 Ibid. 19 MND, ROC National Defense Report 1998. Taipei: LiMing Press, 1998, p. 27. 20 China Times, Taipei, April 30, 2000, p. 11. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 China Times, Taipei, October 11, 2000, p. 14. 24 PLA Daily, cited in http://mil.21dnn.com/5051/2002–12–24/
[email protected] 25 Central News Agency, Tokyo, January 2, 1999. 26 China Times, Taipei, November 21, 2000, p. 11. 27 Ibid., May 11, 2002, p. 11. 28 Central News Agency, Taipei, August 14, 1999. 29 Ibid., November 18, 1999. 30 Liberty Times, Taipei, July 18, 2001, p. 2.
Part III
The air threat from Mainland China
6
PLA Air Force mobile offensive operations Kenneth W. Allen
To make training more like actual combat, the Chinese Air Force has combined technical, tactical, and combined arms training, and followed the course of putting tactical programs at the forefront of training. Some troops have successively organized experimental learning projects, such as flying close to strategic points at sea, launching surgical air strikes against enemy troops, waging offensive air campaigns, conducting over-the-horizon air combat, and imposing air and sea blockades. From these projects, they have found a new operational method suited to high-technology conditions, which they have used to improve their ability to perform various combat missions. This has helped improve their tactical and technical levels and to narrow the gap between training and actual combat.1 (Xinhua, March 26 1996)
Introduction This chapter examines the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) mobile offensive air campaign theory to be used to fight and win future local wars under modern high-technology conditions. It then reviews the types of training the PLAAF has been conducting to implement the theory, followed by some conclusions.2
PLAAF campaign theory The PLA describes a military campaign (zhanyi) as “combat operations consisting of a series of battles conducted by juntuan-level organizations under a unified command to achieve a local objective or an overall objective in a war.”3 PLAAF juntuan-level organizations refer to the seven military region air force (MRAF) headquarters. The PLAAF has traditionally conducted its combat operations as a series of air campaigns within the PLA’s overall campaign. The term “air force campaign” is a general term for all types of air force campaign operations.4 The PLA’s National Defense University describes an air force campaign as, “a campaign conducted independently by an air force campaign large formation (zhanyi juntuan) or with the co-ordination of other services and branches.5 An air force campaign is guided by the national military strategy and is limited by the PLAAF’s strategy.
74 Kenneth W. Allen An air force campaign involves various air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface-toair battles to achieve specific military objectives. The campaign determines the battle’s character, goals, missions, and actions, and directly supports the local and overall war.” The PLAAF describes an air force campaign as “using from one to several campaign large formations or campaign tactical formations (zhanyi zhanshu bingtuan) to carry out the integration of a series of battles according to a unified intention and plan to achieve a specific strategic or campaign objective in a specified time. An air force campaign is implemented under the guidance of the national military strategy and the PLAAF’s strategy.”6 PLAAF bingtuan-level organizations include air corps, command post, division, and brigade headquarters. The PLAAF has been methodical in the way it defines its campaign theory and then uses the theory to provide guidance for training and operations. PLAAF campaign theory can be categorized into campaign theory for aviation (aircraft), air defense (Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), Anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and radar troops), and airborne troops.7 Not surprisingly, these three categories reflect the way the PLAAF is organized administratively and operationally in terms of its five branches (aviation, SAM, AAA, radar, and airborne troops) and supporting elements (political structure, logistics, maintenance, communications, etc.) Air force campaigns can be divided into three basic types as follows:8 ● ● ●
offensive air campaigns defensive air campaigns air blockade campaigns.
Based on the command relationships and the services and branches that participate in the war, air force campaigns can also be divided into: ● ●
independent (duli) air campaigns conducted by air force units only; air force campaigns executed within a joint service campaign (lianhe zhanyi).
This remainder of this chapter will focus on the PLAAF’s mobile offensive air campaign theory and how it is training to implement that theory.
Offensive air campaign theory Air offensive campaigns involve carrying out offensive attacks on the enemy’s territory using a variety of aircraft, including airborne early warning and control aircraft, bombers, ground attack aircraft, fighters, and jammers.9 Based on the scale of the operation’s objectives, air offensive campaigns can be divided into strategic or campaign air attack campaigns. In addition, air offensive campaigns can be divided into offensive and counterattack campaigns. Strategic-level air offensive campaigns rely heavily on destroying target systems that influence the entire war. Examples include destroying or severely damaging the enemy’s potential to wage war, especially political and economic
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centers, and the defense industrial base. Strategic-level attacks also cover railroads, transportation nodes, ports, bridges and transportation systems, supply networks, and rear-area troop mobilization areas. This type of campaign involves large numbers of forces, a broader and deeper area of operations, and a longer time to sustain. Campaign-level air offensive campaigns rely on destroying targets that influence operations in the war zone. This includes conducting a series of air attacks to destroy or degrade enemy air defense systems plus aircraft on the ground. Compared to a strategic-level campaign, this type of campaign involves fewer forces, a narrower and shallower area of operations, and has a shorter time of sustainability. Furthermore, these types of campaigns do not influence the war zone and the entire situation of the war quite as significantly as a strategic-level campaign. Although air offensive campaigns are becoming more prevalent, there are several inhibiting factors, including geography, weather, and more effective air defense systems. In addition, command and control of this vast array of offensive and defensive weapons systems is becoming even more complex. Either side of a conflict has two opportunities to counterattack. The first is a preemptive strike that takes place while the enemy is preparing to attack. The second is a retaliatory strike that can take place while the enemy is attacking or while the attacking aircraft are returning home after their strike. Retaliatory strikes will target the airfields and command and control systems, so that the returning aircraft do not have anywhere to land. In order to avoid a preemptive counterattack, the PLAAF stresses the use of camouflage, concealment, and deception, and destroying the enemy’s reconnaissance aircraft. The PLAAF also emphasizes controlling the time that forces are deployed, conducting most attacks from airfields in the rear, and hiding movement to forward airfields. In addition, escort aircraft must be able to meet up with the attacking aircraft en route. In order to avoid severe damage from a retaliatory counterattack, the PLAAF stresses quickly moving the returning aircraft to the rear where they can be dispersed and hidden.
Mobile air operations theory The PLA and PLAAF have three modes of operations – mobile, positional, and guerrilla. In the past, the PLAAF has focused on defensive positional operations, but the emphasis on offensive operations has required the PLAAF to shift its thinking toward mobile operations.10 The PLAAF has identified five types of mobile operations: ● ● ● ● ●
long-range air interdiction support for other services and branches airborne supply ambush.
76 Kenneth W. Allen Long-range operations. According to the PLAAF’s view of mobile operations, bombers and fighter-bombers are the primary means for conducting mobile long-range air attack operations. Normally, these are planned attacks on land or maritime targets by aircraft carrying specific weapons and supported by all types of escort aircraft. Special characteristics include good concealment, suddenness, short time frame, and high operational effectiveness. For the PLAAF to adopt this method, it must take into consideration the current condition of its bomber units. When planning the bomber force’s future attacks, the PLAAF must select the right forward bases. Therefore, it must strengthen the ability of its airfields in peacetime to support bomber operations during wartime. Because the PLAAF expects to have its bomber airfields attacked after its bombers conduct their attack, it must carefully select its targets and decide upon pre- and post-attack procedures. Based on the range capabilities of the bomber and escort aircraft, it must determine the appropriate distance for long-range attacks, so that the attacking task force will have enough time over the target to accomplish its mission and the electronic support aircraft will have enough time to support them. Air interdiction operations. The PLAAF uses its fighters as the primary method for air interdiction operations, which includes air superiority, air defense over key points, and air cover missions. The PLAAF writes that operations in the Gulf War showed that an attacking force cannot destroy completely all of the opposing force’s aircraft on the ground, so the best way to keep aircraft from being destroyed on the ground is to conduct air interdiction operations against the attacking force. In future wars, the PLAAF will adopt the following methods for air interdiction: ● ●
● ●
concentrate force by stressing quality and combat skills; attack aircraft, such as airborne early warning and jamming aircraft, that are supporting the enemy’s attacking aircraft; attack the enemy at all levels along the entire route as far out as possible; pay attention to attacking low and super low level air targets.
The remaining three types of mobile operations – support for other services and branches, airborne supply, and ambush – support both offensive and defensive air campaigns.
PLAAF order-of-battle Unlike public information available about the size and disposition of the US Air Force, no detailed open source information is available about the PLAAF aviation and air defense order of battle. Since 1997, the US Congress has required the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide a report on the PLA. Unfortunately, the format for the PLAAF’s order of battle has not been consistent, but the reports do provide a general overview of the numbers and types of aircraft. Various media organizations, such as Jane’s, have also provided some order of battle information. Although the reports provide air order of battle information, they do not
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provide the number of divisions, brigades, regiments, and organizational structure for the air defense forces – SAM, AAA, and radar troops: ●
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According to the 1999 DoD report, the PLAAF’s combat aircraft are organized into 30 air divisions, plus about 150 transport aircraft organized in 2 air divisions. The PLAAF had a high of 50 total air divisions from 1971 to the late 1980s.11 A June 14, 2000 Jane’s Defence Weekly report stated that the PLAAF consists of 33 divisions, including 27 fighter, 4 bomber, and 2 transport divisions.12 In June 2000, the DoD report stated the PLAAF and Naval Aviation combined number over 400,000 personnel, 4,300 tactical fighters, 1,000 bomber and close air support aircraft, and 650 transport aircraft.13 The 2002 DoD report stated, “Although the PLA has approximately 3,400 aircraft, only about 100 are considered modern, fourth generation fighters. By the end of the decade, China is expected to have a more robust fleet of fourth generation fighters augmented by modern missiles, electronic countermeasures, and several AWACS-type aircraft.”14
Training to implement the theory By early 1995, the PLAAF had begun to absorb some of the lessons from the Gulf War and to test some of the new theories being taught at the PLAAF Command College. One Zhongguo Kongjun (China Air Force) magazine article described how graduates of the college implemented some of the theories during the 1995 exercise opposite Taiwan. According to the article, “Graduates implemented a joint operation plan studied at the college whereby fighters flew cover for ground attack aircraft and bombers in mixed formations to the combat area. Fighter planes no longer use close formations to cover for attack planes. Instead, they now use an open formation with planes flying at a distance from each other.”15 PLAAF aviation and air defense units have also begun to form offensive and defensive exercise teams with the Navy and Army to conduct exercises modeled on possible future warfare. One 1996 Xinhua article stated that in the past the PLAAF had generally considered flying low-altitude bombing raids over the ocean as dangerous, because the water and sky look almost the same to the pilot. According to the article, pilots had overcome this difficulty and were flying large bomber groups less than 100 meters above the sea, hitting all the intended targets. By 1996, Chinese reports indicated these pilots were beginning to experiment with new tactics, such as flying close to strategic points at sea, launching surgical air strikes against enemy troops, waging offensive air campaigns, conducting over-the-horizon air combat, and imposing air and sea blockades.16 These types of missions were new for the PLAAF, because Naval Aviation was previously responsible for supporting the Navy and conducting over-water intercepts of hostile targets. The PLAAF continued to test and develop its theory during the PLA’s largescale exercises opposite Taiwan in March 1996. According to available material,
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“The exercise included 12,000 Air Force and 3,000 Naval Aviation servicemen. More than 280 aircraft deployed to the exercise area and conducted 680 sorties, including 82 transport sorties. Over 800 combat aircraft were within a combat readiness of 550 miles or were on the alert.” Another report said the PLAAF had 226 aircraft at 13 airfields in Fujian Province. The total included 100 aircraft that had deployed from units outside the province.17 Based on a briefing by an official from the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the PLA conducted a total of 1,755 sorties during the exercise.18 According to the ONI briefing, PLAAF and Naval Aviation fighters, and bombers engaged in simulated and live bombing, fighter escort for bombers, air-to-air combat training, and other routine training. The PLAAF’s airborne forces were also involved in airdrop activity.19 Further press reporting stated the PLAAF deployed aircraft from second and third-line airfields to first-line airfields, where they conducted their exercise activity. According to one Chinese report, it took about 3.5 hours for the PLAAF fighters to prepare for takeoff, compared to the 10 hours they had needed previously. In addition, the PLAAF demonstrated rapid aircraft sortie regeneration of 40 minutes, which was considerably quicker than in the past.20 The PLAAF began rotating units to and from border airfields for training and combat operations during the Korean War in the 1950s and the Vietnam War in the 1960s. Following the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, it began rotating fighter aircraft from other military regions to airfields near the southern border. After the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, it began moving designated rapid reaction units in and out of Fujian Province on six-month rotations for similar training. Aircraft from Fujian Province have also been deploying to airbases outside Fujian and returning during the same day, providing them with the ability to move out of the area rapidly if the need arose. As part of the training, some pilots within the Nanjing Military Region (MR) have conducted live air-to-air missile firing over water since 1996. This type of training is designed to allow the PLAAF to move aircraft in and out of border areas quickly and to have them fully prepared for combat in a short period of time. Based on a review of Chinese writings, the current general description for PLAAF fighter, bomber, and ground attack mobile offensive air campaign operations can be summarized as “transregional rapid mobility (quaqu kuaisu jidong) integrated long-distance strikes at night in all weather conditions from multiple levels and different directions under unknown conditions. These bombing raids can be conducted against land or maritime targets, and the navigation routes can be over land or over water.”21 The PLAAF Dictionary defines transregional operations as “fighters crossing air defense areas to conduct operations.”22 Media references to the term imply crossing one or more provincial and military region boundaries. For example, one regiment “conducted a large number of combat aircraft sorties between airfields, which included flying in ‘foul weather conditions’ and crossing three provinces and one municipality, covering a total distance of 1,000 kilometers.”23 Another report stated that “fighter planes took off from a Zhejiang airfield on a mid-summer night for an unfamiliar airspace 2,000 kilometers away. Led by the regiment
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commander, the entire regiment flew to another airfield in East China, and then took off again in two-ship combat formations for an airfield in the central plains. Returning to the home field before midnight, the planes set four new records for fighter planes, including take-off and landing at three airfields in one night, crossing five provinces, maneuvering for 2,000 kilometers, and landing by marker lights.”24 Since 1996, the PLAAF’s bomber divisions have conducted several transregional bombing exercises under unknown conditions. For example, in October 2000, a bomber aviation regiment in the Guangzhou MRAF conducted an integrated long-range maneuver exercise under unknown conditions, covering 4 hours and a distance of more than 2,000 kilometers across 4 provinces.25 During the raid, the weather changed from sunny to rainy. Another exercise conducted by a Jinan MRAF fighter regiment indicates the PLAAF’s trend in training for emergency mobile transregional operations. According to a November 2000 report in Kongjun Bao (Air Force News) A regiment of more than 20 fighters departed its home base in the Jinan MR [Shandong and Henan Provinces] on a rainy night ‘under concealment’ in late October. The aircraft flew to an airfield south of the Yangzi River [probably in the Nanjing MR], to conduct air patrols and render air support to the war zone. This emergency combat mobility drill signified a new breakthrough in its capability for large-fleet, long-range, all-weather operations at all hours and in all air spaces. Every month, the regiment holds simulated drills of emergency take-off and maneuver, and change of alert conditions. It has switched to unfamiliar field targets for target practice, and changes ground markers frequently to enhance aviators’ capabilities for independent navigation and target identification. It flies frequent low- and ultra-low altitude flights, including some under unknown conditions over sea areas. It also subjects aviators to maximum daily flight time training. Training for complicated weather conditions is conducted in minimal weather conditions. On the recent maneuver, the regiment also practiced using Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), penetrating enemy defenses, entering from different directions, coordinating attacks from high and low altitudes, and simulating attacks over water.26 According to the ONI briefing, during the 1996 exercises, PLAAF and Naval Aviation fighters and bombers engaged in simulated and live bombing, fighter escort for bombers, air-to-air combat training, and other routine training. The PLAAF’s airborne forces were also involved in airdrop activity.27 However, the PLAAF has not yet demonstrated the capability to conduct sustained, high intensity operations. Although the PLAAF has been practicing this concept, it is not there yet. The chief difficulty is simply exercising strict ground controlled intercept (GCI) over large numbers of aircraft simultaneously. For example, the PLAAF does not have any real-world experience in planning and executing the kind of high intensity air campaign that has proven so successful in recent US and NATO operations.
80 Kenneth W. Allen During the early stages of the conflict in Kosovo, Allied Air Forces deployed approximately 400 aircraft to the area.28 On the third day of operations alone, allied aircraft flew 249 sorties in one day. By the end of the conflict, the number of US and NATO combat aircraft participating in strike delivery rose from 214 to 590 aircraft. According to Pentagon information, 23,000 bombs and missiles were used. The maximum intensity of operations of Allied Air Forces was reached on May 21, when 1,000 sorties were flown, 800 of which were combat missions. These figures demonstrate the capability needed to ramp up and maintain high intensity operations, orchestrate operations through a unified daily air tasking order (ATO), and the need to sustain intense air operations when faced with a determined adversary. One of the most significant changes for the PLAAF in the last half of the 1990s is that certain units began conducting flight training over the ocean from the Korean border to Vietnam. In April 2000, the PLA Navy’s North Sea Fleet and an unidentified air division in the Jinan MRAF agreed to conduct joint service training for the first time.29 During July, the PLAAF’s attack aircraft, most likely A-5s, conducted single ship and formation attacks on the flotilla as they made tactical maneuvers. The flotilla and the air division also practiced ship-to-aircraft communications, identification friend or foe (IFF), air reconnaissance, and shipborne GCI. The ships also practiced calling in the aircraft for air cover. The aircraft conducted 150 sorties during the two-day exercise. During May 2001, an unidentified PLAAF fighter unit, most likely the Su-27 regiment from Suixi, Guangdong Province, conducted a “real-troops confrontation sea drill” over the South China Sea.30 According to the news article, “Over the past few years, the aviation unit had been making efforts to improve its capabilities of fighting real battles across sea regions under complicated conditions.” Since 1998, the PLAAF and Naval Aviation aircraft have also increased their flight activity near the centerline of the Taiwan Strait.31 Following Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s July 9, 1999 statements about “state-to-state” relations between Taiwan and the mainland, the PLAAF stepped up its flight activity over the Strait.32 Over the following two months, F-8s deployed to Fuzhou airbase and Su-27s flying from their home bases in Guangdong and Anhui Provinces conducted flights over the Strait.33 Although the activity itself was significant, only 12 PLAAF aircraft were airborne at any one time during July and August, not all of which were over the Strait, and the PLAAF flew only about 30 sorties per day.34 The increase in fighter sorties by both sides have may have been limited, given that over 1,000 civil air flights fly through Taiwan’s airspace daily.35
Camouflage, concealment, deception, and dispersion Throughout the PLAAF’s writings, there are references to concerns about secrecy and early detection of its plans for offensive operations given today’s intelligence collection capabilities, including satellite and airborne surveillance. PLA writers have stated, “Major military operations cannot escape from such an intelligence net,”36 so conducting frequent movements and a certain amount of dispersal is an
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effective concealment method.37 “Forces should integrate the use of feints, camouflage, screening, and dispersion to conceal our command, control, communications, and intelligence systems and to deceive and jam enemy information reconnaissance.”38 As a result of the need to conduct undetected offensive operations, at least during the early stages of a campaign, yet provide for survivability in a counterattack, the PLAAF has invested time and money into passive camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D) measures, such as using aircraft cave shelters, small hangars, single aircraft shelters, building false targets, and “concealing the real and making the false obvious.”39 For example, in November 2000, a Beijing MRAF SAM division equipped with three types of SAMs used “mixed deployment, concealing the real and displaying the false, and mobile ambush operations” during a live-fire exercise.40 In an October 2000 exercise, a Nanjing MRAF airfield conducted the CC&D tactic of a complete blackout as their aircraft returned from an air strike.41 While some of these activities will take place during the preparation phase, others will occur during the execution phase. In the late 1980s, the PLAAF also began practicing dispersing its aircraft from permanent bases to alternate runways, including highway and sod landing strips. For example, in September 1989, three F-8 interceptors from the 1st Air Division at Anshan and one Il-14 transport used the Shenyang-Dalian highway as a dispersal runway for the first time ever.42 The F-8s landed singly and took off quickly in a three-ship formation. Although this type of training was rarely noted in the open media until the late 1990s, an exercise in April 2000 provides a good example of recent training.43 At 0615, an unidentified PLAAF airfield in the Jinan MR initiated an emergency dispersal exercise following a simulated cruise missile counterattack on the airfield. Given the scenario, the cruise missile counterattack appears to have occurred while the PLAAF’s aircraft were returning from an attack. One group of support troops and over fifty special vehicles, including fuel trucks, power supply trucks, and oxygen trucks, dispersed to a designated highway landing strip to support the regiment’s takeoff and landings. At the same time, a second group of emergency support personnel begin repairing bombed runways, extinguishing aircraft fires, giving first aid to injured pilots, and repairing oil pipelines. Non-aviation units have also conducted CC&D operations. The PLAAF and Naval Aviation’s radar units have also practiced emergency mobile dispersal operations. For example, a September 1999 Jiefangjun Bao article described a North Sea Fleet Naval Aviation radar brigade exercise.44 On receiving orders to set out, the brigade took only 40 minutes to dismantle its non-mobile radar station and begin a motorized advance of several hundred kilometers. On reaching the combat area, the radars were quickly set up to provide air situation reports to the command post. In addition, decoy radars and positions were set up at the same time to confuse reconnaissance planes. Besides using emergency runways for pre- and post-attack dispersal airfields, the PLAAF has also gradually tried to build up the capability to provide logistics and maintenance support at auxiliary airfields from more than one type of aircraft
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over a sustained period of time. The PLAAF has gradually moved from supporting a few aircraft of a single type at an airfield for increasingly longer periods of time, to supporting multiple types. In doing this, they have had to tackle a number of long-standing problems that undermine support efficiency, including backward plane refueling technology and backward bomb loading technology.45 In 1999, the PLAAF developed and tested a new airfield petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) supply system in the Jinan MR.46 The system is an emergency mobile refueling device capable of supporting transregional air operations, and can be quickly deployed to forward airfields. It is mainly for use on sod airstrips, reserve airfields, and on highway runways opened for wartime operation. It can also be used on fixed airfields in case of damage to POL installations or power outages. During the exercise, the system was brought in and withdrawn after refueling two warplanes in 15 minutes. It can simultaneously refuel two aircraft of any model by gravity or pressure.
Initiating a mobile offensive air campaign Based on PLAAF writings, any future offensive air campaigns will most likely be part of a joint force campaign. At least on the first day of the campaign, the initial offensive air attacks will be a joint service coordinated strike on the enemy’s strategic targets, using what the PLA calls “zero-second arrival,” meaning that all elements of an attack must be timed to the second to achieve the maximum effects.47 According to the PLAAF’s campaign theory, it will begin its attack with a mixed formation of fighters, bombers, ground attack aircraft, and jammers. Over the past few years, pilots have been practicing to conduct their attacks from multiple directions and altitudes in coordination with the Navy’s shore batteries and ships’ guns, and the Second Artillery Corps’ ballistic missile attacks, so that the aircraft are not destroyed as they attack their targets. According to PLAAF writings, because ballistic missiles can arrive at their target within a matter of minutes, the bombers, escort fighters, jamming aircraft, and airborne troops must be airborne a considerable time in advance of the missile launch. Of the PLAAF’s five branches, the aviation troops will be the Air Force’s main branch involved in an air offensive campaign. During the initial attacks, the PLAAF can be expected to engage its bomber divisions and ground attack units supported by fighter escorts of group or regimental size. Although PLAAF reporting generally indicates there will be jammer escorts involved, there is never any mention of the types of aircraft involved.48 A review of reporting on PLAAF exercises shows that, depending on the time of year, notional attacks have taken place in the pre-dawn hours around 0600, with a second wave striking around 0830 and a possible third wave attack occurring between 20.00 and 21.00 hours in the evening. The attack includes bombers, ground attack aircraft, and fighter escorts. Each bomber division uses between 10 and 12 aircraft, which is somewhat larger than a standard group (dadui) of about 8 bombers. In order for bombers from all the divisions to arrive simultaneously, some aircraft depart several hours earlier than others. Depending on where the battle takes place, the bombers could
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pre-deploy to an airfield closer to the front. For example, in early 2001, a bomber division in the Guangzhou MRAF conducted a long-range raid at dawn using a formation of twelve bombers fully loaded with live bombs.49 The bombers took off from and landed on four unidentified airfields, covering a distance of some 3,000 kilometers. It appears from PLA newspaper reports that ground attack A-5s follow the bombers with their own attacks.50 For example, Jinan MRAF A-5s have conducted several exercises over water, and Nanjing MRAF A-5s have conducted similar exercises. In April 2001, a Nanjing MRAF ground attack regiment deployed to an unfamiliar airfield, where it conducted long-distance penetration attacks in formation flights under conditions in which the environment for operational training was suddenly changed and there were many unknown elements on the battlefield.”51 Although there has not been any substantial reporting on activity by the Su-30s the PLAAF began receiving in January 2001, they will undoubtedly be involved in attacks along with or instead of the A-5s. According to the Su-30 division commander in the Nanjing MRAF, “these new-generation combat aircraft are capable of performing long-range air-to-ground attack missions.”52
Rules of engagement Any discussion of future campaigns must begin with a discussion of rules of engagement (ROEs). During the Korean War, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the 1979 border conflict, the PLAAF received strict ROEs from the CMC prior to initiating the campaign.53 During the Korean War, PLAAF aircraft were not allowed to strike below the 38th parallel for fear of retaliatory strikes against airfields north of the Yalu River. In 1979, Beijing did not allow the PLAAF to conduct air support missions over the border and stated that its aircraft were providing a deterrent, but the CMC was really concerned about escalating the conflict, which it planned to end after 45 days. In 1958, the CMC established the following three rules of engagement for the Air Force: ● ●
●
the Air Force could not enter the high seas to conduct operations; if the Nationalist Air Force did not bomb the mainland, the PLAAF could not bomb Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu; the Air Force was not allowed to attack the US military, but could defend against any US aircraft entering Chinese territory.
As in the Korean War, a couple of PLAAF aircraft were shot down over the Taiwan Strait in 1958 by friendly AAA en route home after a mission. As a result of the AAA shootdown, the Air Force and artillery commanders met and came up with the following principles, which guided all future air and ground combat coordination: ● ●
if there is an air battle in progress, the ground artillery will not fire; if PLAAF aircraft cannot take off or if there are no friendly aircraft in the air, the ground artillery will engage the enemy;
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if the enemy is conducting bombing, the ground forces will engage the aircraft even if there is an air battle going on between enemy and friendly forces; coastal forces should not open fire, except when enemy forces are attacking their specific positions.
According to a US Department of Defense analyst, the primary means of coordination between PLAAF aircraft and ground-based air defense units today is airspace differentiation.54 The PLA’s air defense system relies heavily on airspace control measures and procedural control (essentially flying air corridors, adhering to strict altitudes and in-area time limits, or speed controls). Although most, if not all, of the PLAAF’s aircraft have some type of an IFF system, the best method for coordinating aircraft movement with the ground forces or a ground controller is through the use of a secure and reliable electronic identification (EID), which utilizes a reliable IFF or other means. Moreover, it is not clear whether the older F-6 and F-7 aircraft have adequate navigation equipment (inertial navigation system/INS is desirable because it is an on-board system) to maintain a reasonable adherence to air corridors during flights over water. The FB-7 has an INS and doppler navigation, and most likely has TACAN. The PLAAF recognizes these weaknesses and recent PLA news reports have highlighted the PLAAF’s efforts to conduct training over water for their pilots. Undoubtedly, the CMC will establish some type of external and internal ROEs for the PLAAF and promulgate them just prior to any future campaign. Although the PLA initiated most of the previous border “self-defense” campaigns, the PLAAF performed primarily defensive campaigns. In any future campaign, however, the PLAAF will most likely be involved in an offensive air campaign, so the external ROEs will be tailored appropriately.
Conclusions The PLAAF is definitely working to develop the necessary theory and train its forces to be able to reach its goal of conducting simultaneous offensive and defensive campaigns, but it is not there yet. The PLAAF has adopted a formal air defense and air offense campaign theory to guide them toward the future, and is working on strategic guidelines. The PLAAF is starting to acquire the modern weapon systems, including Su-27s, Su-30s, aerial refueling, airborne early warning and control aircraft, and S-300 SAMs to conduct and support an offensive campaign, but may also tend to become too reliant on foreign technology and weapons systems, as it did in the 1950s. The PLAAF has begun moving from exercises involving a single type of aircraft to using multiple types of aircraft in a combined-arms and joint service environment. Whereas the PLAAF rarely flew over water in the 1980s, it is a routine matter today for some units. The logistics forces are beginning to move from being able to support only single types of aircraft at their home base to supporting large numbers and types of deployed aircraft at home and away.
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What is apparent is that the PLAAF is part of a larger PLA campaign process based on coordinated action plans. What is not apparent, however, is whether the PLAAF, which has not had any significant aerial combat since 1958, is capable of sustaining sortie generation in an environment where their own airfields could come under attack from long-range cruise missiles.55 It is also evident the PLAAF realizes it lacks a viable real-time photoreconnaissance capability, hence the emphasis on conducting operations in an unknown environment. According to the 2002 DoD report on the PLA The PLAAF does not appear to have been putting large numbers of aircraft in the air simultaneously, controlling large numbers of engagements, or sustaining high sortie rates for extended periods of time. Pilot proficiency is improving, but China’s best pilots lag behind their Taiwan counterparts in terms of capabilities. PLAAF and Naval Aviation fighter pilot tactical training continues, albeit slowly. During 2001, some of the PLAAF’s more advanced aircraft reportedly conducted advanced tactical training involving fighters of dissimilar types. PLAAF and Naval Aviation exercise activity during 2001 reportedly concentrated on mobility, air defense, and support to amphibious assault forces. Air defense exercises were said to be highly scripted and the scenarios lacked realism, limiting the benefit PLA pilots could have gained from the exercises.56 The PLAAF should be proud of its recent accomplishments, but it should also be careful not to over-emphasize its capabilities to Beijing’s leaders. For example, the PLAAF consistently states that it has shot down 1,474 and damaged 2,344 aircraft of all types since 1949. What it neglects to mention is that the majority of those aircraft were shot down in the Korean War and the Vietnam War by AAA units, and that only about 350 aircraft were downed as the result of air-to-air combat.57 The PLAAF may lack the most sophisticated weapon systems today, but it should not be sold short. Based on interviews throughout Asia over the past 5 years, China’s neighbors are definitely concerned about what the PLAAF will look like in 20 years, especially if China’s economy remains strong and the PLA’s modernization efforts continue at their current pace. As the PLAAF has shown in the past, it could move hundreds of aircraft, SAMs, and AAA, as well as thousands of support troops, near the front in a short period of time if necessary. It may not be as far along as it would like in training to implement its air offensive theory, but it would salute smartly and carry out its orders if required to do so.
Notes 1 Sun Maoqing, “Training Improves Air Force Combat Effectiveness,” Xinhua, 26 March 1996. 2 The primary source material for this chapter comes from several PLA and PLAAF books, newspapers, periodicals, dictionaries, and encyclopedias. 3 Wang Houqing, Zhang Xingye (Eds) The Science of Campaigns [Zhanyi Xue]. (Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2000, p. 9. Zhongguo Junshi Baike Quanshu
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11
12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Chinese Military Encyclopedia]. Beijing, Academy of Military Science Publishers, July 1997, Vol. 3, p. 748. Teng Lianfu and Jiang Fusheng (Ed.) Kongjun Zuozhan Yanjiu [Air Force Operations Research]. Beijing: National Defense University Publishers, May 1990, p. 157. Wang and Zhang, op. cit., p. 346. The Chinese is: Kongjun zhanyi, you kongjun zhanyi juntuan dandu huo zai qita junbingzhong peihe xia shishi de zhanyi. Teng and Jiang, op. cit., p. 152. Wang and Zhang, op. cit., p. 346. Teng and Jiang, op. cit., p. 155. Wang and Zhang, op. cit., p. 346. The information on air offensive campaigns comes mostly from Wang and Zhang, op cit. Information on the PLAAF’s involvement in mobile operations comes from Wen Guangchun, editor, Jidong Zuozhan Houqin Baozhang, [Logistics Support for Mobile Operations], PLA General Logistics Department Headquarters Department, PLA Press, January 1997, p. 7–8. “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report submitted by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the US Senate as directed by the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 17, 1999. Discussions with PLAAF officials indicate that this number (32 divisions) is too low, but they did not specify the total number. Robert Sae-Liu, “PLAAF fixed-wing fleet cut in major restructuring,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 14, 2000, 41. The article says the PLAAF had 43 divisions in 1997 when Jiang Zemin announced a force reduction. In 1998, there were 39 divisions, including 31 fighter, 5 bomber, and 2 transport divisions. It is not sure whether the 38th bomber division at Laiyang, Guangzhou MRAF, is still active or not. If so, that would make 34 active divisions today. The article says the PLAAF has 16 active air defense (AAA/SAM) divisions. Secretary of Defense, Report on the Current and Future Military Strategy of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 23, 2000. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China. Washington, DC, July 2002, p. 15. Hong Heping and Tian Xia, “Head to the New Century,” Zhongguo Kongjun [China’s Air Force] October 1, 1996. Sun Maoqing, “Training Improves Air Force Combat Effectiveness,” Xinhua, March 26, 1996 (FBIS-CHI-99-018, January 18, 1999). 100 aircraft represent 3–4 regiments, depending on their size. The reporting did not discuss what divisions these aircraft came from or whether they deployed in regiments or groups from multiple units. “Chinese Exercise Strait 961: 8–25 March 1996,” briefing presented by the US Office of Naval Intelligence at a conference on the PRC’s military modernization sponsored by the Alexis de Tocqueville Institute, March 11, 1997. ONI Report, 1996. Lo Ping, “It Costs China 3 Billion Yuan to Make a Show of Its Military Strength,” Cheng Ming, Hong Kong, April 15, 1996. Steven Mufson, “China Masses Troops On Coast Near Taiwan,” The Washington Post, February 14, 1996. This description is a compilation of terms taken from numerous PLAAF articles over a five-year period. Zhu Rongchang, (Ed.) Kongjun Da Cidian [Air Force Dictionary], Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, September 1996, p. 30. Jiefangjun Bao, March 9, 1999. Flying in “four weather conditions” means flying under instrument flight rules (IFR) and visual flight rules (VFR) during day and nighttime. It does not have anything to do with actual weather conditions. Kongjun Bao, July 18, 2000. Wang Dinghua and Niu Yingfu, “Certain Bomber Aviation Regiment of Guangzhou Military Region’s Air Force Conducts Integrated Long-Range Manuever Exercise by
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37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
49
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Launching a Long-Range 2,000-kilometers Raid Without Causing Any Errors,” Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version), December 5, 2000. “Air regiment holds transregional night maneuver,” Kongjun Bao, November 23, 2000. “Chinese Exercise Strait 961: 8–25 March 1996,” Briefing presented by the US Office of Naval Intelligence at a conference on the PRC’s military modernization sponsored by the Alexis de Tocqueville Institute, March 11, 1997. Sergey Sokut and Ilya Kedrov, “War in Europe: Yugoslavia: 78 Days Under Missile and Bombing Attacks: NATO’s Limited War Was Uncompromising,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, FBIS, 2–8 July 1999, No. 25, 2. Jiefangjun Bao, July 19, 2000. Tang Baiyun and Hu Liang, “Guangzhou Air Force Aviation Troops Hold Real-Battle Drill Across Sea Regions,” Beijing Zhongguo Xinwen She in Chinese, 22 May 2001, FBIS CPP20010522000158 1137 GMT 22 May 2001. Interview with Taiwan government official. State Department Briefing with James Rubin, Federal Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service, August 3, 1999. Victor Lai, “PRC Jet Fighters Twice Cross Taiwan Strait Center Line,” Central News Agency, Taipei, August 10, 1999. State Department Briefing, August 3, 1999. Interview with Taiwan officials. Huang Xing and Zuo Quandian, “Holding the Initiative in Our Hands in Conducting Operations, Giving Full Play to Our Own Advantages To Defeat Our Enemy – A Study of the Core Idea of the Operational Doctrine of the People’s Liberation Army,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [China Military Science] in Chinese November 20, 96 No. 4, pp. 49–56 (FTS19970619001633, June 19, 1997). Senior Colonel Huang Xing and Senior Colonel Zuo Quandian are research fellows of the Academy of Military Science. Liu Xuejun and Zhang Changliu, “Study of Measures To Counter Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Guoji Hangkong [Flight International], March 1, 1996, (FTS19960301000017, March 1, 1996). Xu Xiangdong, Gu Gang, and Yang Jun: “Mobilize Local Information Warfare Resources to Participate in Anti-Air Raid Combat”, Beijing Guofang, December 15, 2000, pp. 7–8 (CPP20010207000136, February 7, 2001). Chengdu Military Region Campaign Training Office, Jituanjun Yezhan Zhendi Fangyu Zhanyi Kongjun de Yunyong [Air Force Utilization During the Campaign to Defend Group Army Field Positions], February 1982. Guangming Daily, November 22, 2000. “The Aviation Unit Under the Air Force of the Nanjing Military Region Takes a New Step Forward in Tactical Training,” Jiefangjun Bao Internet Version, October 8, 2000. Hangkong Zhishi [Aerospace Knowledge], November 1989, p. 3. Wang Jinyuan and Jin Zhifu, “A Certain Jinan Air Force Unit Focuses on New ‘Three Attacks and Three Defenses’ to Explore Wartime Emergency Support – Warplanes Do TOL’s on Expressways,” Jiefangjun Bao, May 8, 2000. Jiefangjun Bao, September 26, 1999. Jiefangjun Bao, May 15, 1997. Kongjun Bao [Air Force News], December 11, 1999. Zhang Nongke and Gao Aisu, “Chinese Air Force Flight Regiment Commanders and Their Fighter Aircraft,” Zhongguo Kongjun [China’s Air Force], 1996–fourth ediion, p. 6. The 1999 Department of Defense report on the Taiwan Strait states, “PLA electronic warfare operations against air defense radars, disruption of command and control networks, and/or large scale conventional SRBM and LACM strikes against airfields and SAM sites would reduce the effectiveness of Taiwan’s air defenses”; however, the report does not discuss the types of jamming equipment the PLA would use. Kongjun Bao [Air Force News], February 6, 2001.
88 Kenneth W. Allen 50 One example comes from a report in the July 6, 1999 issue of Jiefangjun Bao that described results of the A-5 unit’s training results for the previous year. 51 Yan Xinwen and Jin Congqiang, “Air Force Regiment Organizes Training of Various Combat Methods to Break Through Enemy Defenses,” Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version), April 30, 2001. 52 Jiefangjun Bao, January 16, 2001. 53 Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun [China Today: Air Force], Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1989. Lin Hu (Ed.) Kongjun Shi [History of the Air Force]. Beijing: PLA Press, PLAAF Headquarters Education and Research Office, November 1989. 54 Interview with a Department of Defense analyst. 55 The PLAAF does not have any real-world experience in planning and executing the kind of high intensity air campaign that has proven so successful in recent US and NATO operations. For example, during the early stages of the conflict in Kosovo, Allied Air Forces deployed approximately 400 aircraft to the area. On the third day of operations, allied aircraft flew 249 sorties in one day. By the end of the conflict, the number of US and NATO combat aircraft participating in strike delivery rose from 214 to 590 aircraft. According to Pentagon information, 23,000 bombs and missiles were used. The maximum intensity of operations of Allied Air Forces was reached on May 21, when 1,000 sorties were flown, 800 of which were combat missions. These figures demonstrate the capability needed to ramp up and maintain high-intensity operations, orchestrate operations through a unified daily ATO, and the need to sustain intense air operations when faced with a determined adversary. Sergey Sokut and Ilya Kedrov, “War in Europe: Yugoslavia: 78 Days Under Missile and Bombing Attacks: NATO’s Limited War Was Uncompromising,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, FBIS, No. 25 July 2–8, 1999, p. 2. 56 Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, July 2002, p. 27. 57 According to US Air Force figures, in the course of its operations, UN forces lost a total of 1,986 aircraft, of which 1,041 were destroyed by hostile action and only 147 were lost in air-to-air combat. Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953, Washington, DC: US Air Force, Office of Air Force History, 1983.
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Why a Chinese preemptive strike against Taiwan would fail Robert A. Pape
A Chinese preemptive strike is possible, but not likely Preventive war is now a live issue in international politics. For the first time, the United States has adopted a national security policy that calls for premeditated military attacks against countries that are not currently at war against it. Bush administration officials advocated this game plan for Iraq, and any other country they determine to be a “rogue state.”1 The new Bush doctrine and its application against Iraq are controversial, not least because many fear that the Bush doctrine will encourage other states to launch preventive wars of their own. The Bush doctrine could trigger third party preventive wars either directly – if the United States were to cut a deal with other major powers to gain their support for the preventive wars America wants to fight, or indirectly – if the United States becomes so bogged down in a preventive war that it appears to lose its ability to defend vulnerable allies.2 The very fact of a conference held in Taipei about the possibility of a Chinese preemptive strike against Taiwan is testimony to the broad concerns that the “Bush doctrine” is stimulating. In this case, there was little reason to fear that the United States would abandon Taiwan to gain China’s support for war against Iraq or other “rogue” states. By rhetoric and deed, the Bush administration remains committed to Taiwan’s security and, if anything, the new national security strategy reinforces the Bush administration’s determination to see China accept American military superiority in Asia. Although Iraq, North Korea, and other “rogue states” are the focus of the Bush doctrine, the new national security strategy uses language that puts China on notice: “China’s leaders have not yet made the next series of fundamental choices about the character of their state. In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness.” Instead, the basis for concern is the distraction of America, not double-dealing. The United States might have been preoccupied by waging preventive war against Iraq (or another “rogue” state) and so have created a window of opportunity for China to jump into a war against Taiwan. This scenario is unlikely, but not that far-fetched. It is unlikely because China is already on a trajectory to improve its position relative to Taiwan over the long
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run, and starting an unprovoked war could trigger international consequences that would harm China’s future growth. However, it is not far fetched because the American war against Iraq would consume the attention of American political and military leaders as well as a vast fraction of the force posture that the United States could deploy beyond its borders.3 Under these circumstances, China could have perceived a window of opportunity and Taiwan and other US allies would inevitably worry about the credibility of American guarantees of their security.
How to think about China’s threat to Taiwan The nature of a preemptive threat China can pose three main military threats to Taiwan. The first is an invasion of Taiwan, with the goal of gaining physical control of the territory. The second is a blockade of Taiwan, with the aim to block the sea lines of communication in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and thereby cutting off Taiwan’s access to oil imports and other overseas commerce. The third is missile attack, with the objective of destroying or placing at risk political, economic, population, or military targets. In all cases, the political purpose of the attack would be the same: to compel Taiwan to abandon its status as an independent political entity and to become an integral part of China, accepting the sovereignty of the Chinese government in international, if not domestic affairs. These three military threats operate according to different coercive mechanisms. These coercive mechanisms are important because they determine the military requirements of political success and failure, but they are often difficult to observe because they can become confused with strictly military measures of success. To clarify the coercive mechanisms involved in the threats China poses to Taiwan’s independence, it is helpful to begin with a simple framework for measuring the success of a coercive campaign. Measuring the success of a coercive campaign In general, the effectiveness of military operations can be measured in either of two ways – combat effectiveness or strategic effectiveness. The first, combat effectiveness concerns how well bombs destroy targets, while the second, strategic effectiveness, focuses on whether the destruction of target sets attains political goals. For instance, the most common way to measure the effectiveness of air power is combat effectiveness, which describes how efficiently a given force destroys a given target set. The usual index is the number of sorties needed to deliver enough bombs to cripple a specific target, which is usually measured in terms of visible destruction. When people today think of air power in the Gulf War in 1991, what do they think of? They almost always remember picture after picture of single bombs hitting specific spots on buildings, as if the power of air power is fully represented by the ability of a bomb to hit a ventilation air shaft.
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As technology improves bombing accuracy, air power necessarily becomes more combat effective, because fewer sorties are necessary to destroy targets. Over the past decade, officers in the US Air Force as well as the public have been easily swayed into thinking that measures of physical destruction are the key to measuring the overall effectiveness of air power. Of course, by this definition, air power has become more effective over time. In the Second World War, only 18–25 percent of bombs fell within 1,000 feet of target, even during American so-called “precision” raids that were conducted in daylight. Today, modern precision-guided munitions routinely fall within 3–10 feet of their target about 80 percent of the time, even during cloudy weather at night if Global Positioning System technology is used. However, measuring the overall success of an air campaign only in terms of combat effectiveness is not a good measure of the success of a coercive air campaign. To be sure, some degree of efficiency is usually important in a coercive air campaign, but it is important to remember that combat effectiveness measures physical destruction rather than the political effects of the attack, and the central aim of a coercive air campaign is to achieve a political effect. As a result, trying to calculate the effectiveness of a coercive air campaign by measures of combat effectiveness can cause one futile mission to be swapped for another, while more worthwhile missions are neglected. For instance, precision bombing of Japanese industrial plants in 1944 was condemned as a failure because it produced no visible damage, while incendiary attacks against Japanese cities beginning in March 1945 were hailed as a great success because burned acreage was easy to observe and quick to accumulate. Nonetheless, incendiary bombing ultimately made little difference to the war’s outcome because Japan’s main industries had already been shut down by the naval blockade, so their destruction merely made unused rubble bounce, and because the Japanese government was willing to countenance the civilian costs that the raids caused. Indeed, bombers could have contributed more to the collapse of the Japanese economy had they been dedicated a third mission: mine laying along Japan’s shipping lanes. Alternative coercive strategies Instead, the key to measuring the effectiveness of coercive air power is to assess what I called “strategic effectiveness.” Since the goal of coercion is political change, specific coercive air strategies will be discussed by focusing on strategic effectiveness, not combat effectiveness. In general, there are three coercive strategies: punishment, decapitation, and denial. Each attacks a different main target set and each has its own mechanism by which destruction of those targets is supposed to change the target government’s behavior. Punishment Strategies attempt to inflict enough pain on enemy civilians to overwhelm their territorial interests in the dispute and so cause the public to revolt or the government
92 Robert A. Pape to surrender to avoid future costs. Punishment can impose terrible costs by directly targeting and killing civilians or indirectly by wrecking the civilian economy. In this case, China’s threat to blockade Taiwan is a punishment threat. Decapitation This is the second coercive strategy and has become the coercive strategy of choice for many American Air Force officers and American political leaders today. Starting in the 1980s, the coming of precision guided munitions (PGMs) spawned a new type of coercive strategy in which air power would seek to decapitate leaders. In decapitation, the coercer only inflicts light punishment on the population, in order to increase the willingness of the population to accept a new leader, and uses precision strikes to change the regime, either directly by assassination, or indirectly by triggering a military coup. In this case, China’s missile threat could involve decapitation. Denial The third coercive strategy, denial strikes at an enemy’s military forces, seeking to cause a government to surrender by threatening it with the prospect of military failure. If the state knows it cannot hold or take the territory at issue, then it should give up trying so as not to expend costs pointlessly. In this case, China’s threat to invade Taiwan is a denial threat.
Why punishment and decapitation rarely succeed, but denial does In general, the best road to military coercion in major disputes is largely a function of denial, causing an opponent to lose confidence in his military strategy for taking or holding the territory in dispute. The main alternative coercive air strategies and how their record of accomplishment in all the air campaigns – thirtythree in all – from the First World War through the Gulf War in 1991 are discussed in the book, Bombing to Win. The strategic bombing of an opponent’s government, economy, or population centers rarely generates much coercive leverage and that even as technology has improved, it has generally been necessary to combine air power with at least the threat of ground attack in order to cause an opponent to surrender important pieces of territory.4 In this chapter, the analysis is brought up to the present. Specifically, the main competing coercive air strategies and their record of accomplishment in the first decade of precision air power are discussed, concentrating on what “air power” was effective in Iraq in 1991, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, and Afghanistan in 2001. Second, the question of what coercive air power is likely to achieve – and not achieve – in any future dispute between China and Taiwan will be addressed.
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Punishment rarely coerces Before the precision revolution in “air power,” the main debate was between punishment and denial. From the First World War through the 1980s, “air power” advocates routinely argued that strategic attack against an opponent’s most important economic and political targets would inflict enough pain on enemy civilians to overwhelm their territorial interests in the dispute and so cause the public to revolt or the government to surrender to avoid future costs. “Air power” is an excellent punishment tool because it can impose terrible costs by directly targeting and killing civilians or indirectly by wrecking the civilian economy. It is important to stress especially to audiences that do not know much about air power that the main effect of destroying the civilian economy is on civilians not on military operations. Destroying electric power grids, oil refineries, water and sewer systems, and domestic transportation can substantially lower a nation’s ability to distribute and refrigerate food, purify water, and heat homes, which, over time, increases poverty, disease, and hunger in the general population. Although since the Second World War Western publics have shrunk from direct attacks against civilians, they have not shrunk from attacking economic infrastructure. In Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Kosovo, electric power was always hit. In Bombing to Win, the coercive effects of punishment and threats of punishment in every strategic air campaign from the First World War to the 1991 Gulf War are analyzed. The evidence shows that no matter how the coercer orchestrates punishment and threats of punishment, no matter whether punishment is imposed rapidly and extensively or incrementally and surgically, punishment rarely generates much coercive leverage. In 1940, German bombers killed 50,000 British civilians in the battle of Britain; by 1945, American and British air power killed over 300,000 German civilians; in 1945, American bombers killed 800,000 Japanese civilians before dropping the Atomic bomb; in 1970, the Israelis threatened Egyptian civilians in the “War of Attrition”; and, of course, American “air power” wreaked havoc on the civilian economies in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. Nonetheless, there is not a single case of punishment or threats of punishment causing governments to surrender important goals or of citizens taking to the streets to demand a change of government or surrender.
Decapitating leaders rarely coerces For over a decade, “air power” enthusiasts have argued that PGMs have made possible a new coercive air strategy – decapitation – which attacks leadership and national communications in order to achieve victory by changing or paralyzing an enemy government. Modern nation-states, it is argued, whether First World or Third World, rely increasingly on sophisticated communication systems from elite to elite and from capital to field. As these systems become more sophisticated, they also become more brittle. Central telephone exchanges, TV stations, and radio transmitters are prominent, stationary, and easily destroyed by one or a few weapons. The result is strategic paralysis, which renders battlefield forces
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useless even if undamaged, as well as domestic political vulnerability, as leaders are cut off from internal security organs. Capturing or killing the state’s leader has frequently been decisive. In modern times, however, it has become more difficult – but not impossible – to capture or kill the command element. At the same time, command communications have been more important than ever, and these are vulnerable to attack. When command communications suffer extreme damage, the leadership has great difficulty in directing war efforts. In the case of an unpopular regime, the lack of communications not only inhibits the bolstering of national morale but also facilitates rebellion on the part of dissident elements.5 Vulnerability of the enemy regime can also be enhanced by direct attacks on security forces, their headquarters and, even, their files. The ability of PGMs to modulate punishment also enhances decapitation, because civilian hardship can be timed to coincide with attacks on government anti-coup resources. Decapitation has the advantage of minimizing collateral damage and, more importantly, the critical target sets are so small that a war can be won by a few squadrons of F-117s in a matter of days. Like the Texas Ranger slogan, “One riot, one Ranger,” decapitation promises “One war, one raid.” Accuracy alone cannot make decapitation a viable coercive air strategy, however, because the ability to destroy the target sets is not the problem. Precisely because decapitation target sets are so small, they can easily be destroyed even without precision weapons.6 Decapitation is primarily a problem of intelligence, not combat effectiveness. First, consider political decapitation. The core problem is obtaining the intelligence needed to kill enemy leaders who are making every effort to evade detection. Further, endangering regimes by cutting communications between leaders and their domestic security services requires detailed understanding not only of their formal communication links, but also of backup and informal control systems, as well as the loyalties and motivations of individual leaders and units. Without exact intelligence, precise weapons can destroy targets that are not in use. Unknown to the Coalition, Iraq removed the key equipment from its central telephone exchange in Baghdad before the First Gulf War began, so we destroyed a building, not a system.7 The Iraqis had evidently made plans to do without it. Finally, even if leaders can be hit and communication networks severed, estimating whether military effects can be translated into regime change is a problem of political forecasting, and an uncommonly difficult one. We have no theories that can predict in either democratic or non-democratic polities whether and when military pressure will cause a change of regime or, if it does, in what direction.8 Military decapitation, or “strategic paralysis,” is not feasible for three reasons: strategic direction does not demand high-volume, real-time communication, links cannot be cut for long, and authority can be pre-delegated to theater commanders. PGMs do not change this; as with political decapitation, the problem is one of intelligence, not target destruction. Large and stationary electronic communication systems can be knocked out with relative ease, but nation-states today have so many backup and work-around alternatives (such as dedicated land lines,
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small, mobile radios including cellular telephones, couriers traveling by car, rail, helicopter, or plane, and face-to-face meetings between leaders) that an attacker cannot hope to locate and disrupt them all.9 After the First Gulf War an Iraqi Army corps commander said that he had direct contact with Baghdad only once during the war, not because his links were destroyed but out of fear of being intercepted.10 An additional argument made by strategic bombing proponents is that PGMs advantage strategic air power over theater air power simply because PGMs are expensive, and strategic targets are always limited in number while theater are always virtually infinite. In fact, however, some of the most effective types of PGMs are not expensive; a typical laser-guided bomb (the GBU-12) costs about $10,000. Compared with the cost of building and maintaining the aircraft, training the aircrew, and providing basing, communications, aerial refueling, air superiority, and other support, the difference between this and a cheaper dumb bomb is very small. Theater targets such as a $1.5 million T-72 Soviet-made tank can easily justify their use.11 Of 15,000 PGMs used by US aircraft in Desert Storm, at least 9,500 were against theater targets.12
The evidence In the early 1990s, arguments about the consequences of the precision revolution were conducted largely on deductive grounds or by intense focus on what air power did and did not matter in the Gulf War in 1991 simply because there was not robust empirical evidence to use to evaluate the relative merits of competing coercive air strategies. Today, more than ten years of experience with coercive air power provides a substantial record for such an evaluation. Examination of the first decade and a half of the precision revolution shows that decapitation has not become the effective weapon that air advocates had expected. Over the past sixteen years, decapitation with precision “air power” has been tried five times and has failed or backfired each time. In 1986, the US Air Force bombed President Qaddafi’s tent, missed him, killed his three-year old daughter, and precipitated the Libyan bombing of Pan Am 103 and death of 270 civilians as revenge. Until March 2003, the United States had twice sought to decapitate Saddam Hussein. On January 17, 1991, the air war against Iraq opened with a plan, originally called “Instant Thunder,” which sought to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait by bombing vital political and economic centers. The strategic bombing advocates who developed and promoted this plan expected and confidently predicted that it would isolate Saddam Hussein’s regime from its political and military control structures, possibly leading to a coup or revolt, but certainly leaving Hussein’s regime dangerously vulnerable. Whether Saddam was killed, threatened, over-thrown, or isolated, Iraq would abandon Kuwait. Although the Coalition attacked 235 strategic targets in and near Baghdad in the opening days of the 1991 Gulf War and virtually all of the approximately 300 leadership and other strategic targets in the first two weeks, Saddam’s regime was not overthrown and he was still able to direct his forces and army – launching Scud attacks, organizing several divisions to attack
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Kafhgi, and reorganizing parts of five Republican Guard divisions to serve as a blocking force during the retreat that occurred at the end of February. “Air power” did cause Saddam to change his behavior and to become willing to accept a Soviet-brokered withdrawal plan. However, as we will see later, it was the bombing of Iraq’s army in Kuwait and not the strategic air strikes against Baghdad that caused Saddam to become willing to abandon Kuwait. In 1998, the United States again sought to decapitate Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. During the four-day air war called “Desert Fox” in December 1998, American “air power” struck approximately 100 leadership and other targets in and around Baghdad. Although this effort benefited from covert intelligence gathered by the UN inspection teams on Saddam’s closest Republican Guard and security forces, the air strikes again failed to bring down his regime. In 1996, the Russians successfully used two radar-guided bombs to assassinate Dudayev, the leader of the Chechen rebels. Yet, just months later, the rebels launched a ground offensive that threw the Russian army out of Chechnya. Russia re-conquered Chechnya in 1999, but only after a massive ground invasion with thousands of casualties. Finally, in March 1999, the United States launched what was supposed to be a three-day air campaign against fifty-one targets in and near Belgrade. This failed to coerce Milosevic and triggered the Serbian military to lash back against Albanian civilians in Kosovo, killing thousands and expelling almost a million from the country. Denial and the real precision revolution Before March 2003 United States chalked up a tremendous military record in the precision age. The United States has won four major wars – Iraq in 1991, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, and Afghanistan in 2001 – and suffered about 200 combat fatalities overall. However, the air power that made these victories possible was not decapitating strikes against enemy leadership but air power used along with friendly ground forces like a hammer and anvil against opposing ground forces. This should not be terribly surprising. The US Air Force has long been able to destroy political and economic targets, always few in number and highly vulnerable, with mass air strikes. American bombers often did just this prior to the coming of precision munitions, flattening government buildings in Germany and Korea and electric power plants in Japan and Vietnam. The real precision revolution lies in the new ability for “air power” to easily destroy massed enemy ground troops. Until recently, “air power” could rarely destroy tanks, trucks, battlefield command posts, or important bridges used to supply fielded forces even when hundreds or thousands of bombs were aimed at just a handful of these tiny military targets. Today, US advanced reconnaissance aircraft and other sensors can reliably locate concentrations of enemy fielded forces while precision strikes can blow them to bits. The real precision revolution is revealed in the newly found power of air and ground power to work together like a hammer and anvil against opposing ground
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forces. In essence, precision military power puts the enemy army in a “Catch-22” situation: if the enemy ground forces concentrate in large numbers to form thick and overlapping fields of fire against an American or friendly ground force “anvil,” the “air power” “hammer” can smash the enemy forces to bits. If the enemy disperses to avoid air strikes, the ground force can defeat them in detail, mopping them up with few losses. The “hammer-and-anvil” strategy has played a key role in all four of the spectacular US victories during the precision revolution. Its actual use determined the outcome in three wars and its imminent use probably made the decisive difference in the fourth. Iraq In Iraq in 1991, the “air power” that defeated Iraq was not the bombing of Baghdad that captivated millions of CNN viewers but the direct bombing of Iraq’s army in Kuwait. Before the bombing, Iraq had massed 336,000 troops and many thousands or tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery to confront some 700,000 heavy Coalition ground forces for what Saddam Hussein called the “mother of all battles” in Kuwait. After 39 days of bombing, over 100,000 troops deserted, 20 percent of the heavy military equipment was destroyed, and more was abandoned for fear of air attack. Air Power shattered Iraq’s army, while Coalition ground forces mopped up during what General H. Norman Schwarzkopf called the “mother of all retreats.” Bosnia In Bosnia in 1995, “air power” helped bring Milosevic to the table at Dayton, but without a bomb falling on Belgrade or killing senior Bosnian Serb leaders. Air power was used exclusively against battlefield command posts, military units, and supply bridges in Bosnia at the same time that 100,000 Croatian and Muslim ground forces were attacking the 50,000 troops of Bosnian Serb Army. For the first time, America’s precision “air hammer” worked alongside a strong local ground “anvil,” leaving the Serbs no way out. Americans naturally call attention to the US contribution. However, the Dayton boundaries are, almost to the kilometer, the front lines controlled by the Croatian and Muslim armies. Kosovo In Kosovo in June 1999, we do not know whether Milosevic would have surrendered without the bombing of Serbia, but we do know it took much more to compel his surrender and these additional steps fit the overall pattern. In early June, American engineers were widening the roads in Albania, the British were calling up 30,000 reserves, and the United States and other NATO countries deployed 37,000 heavy ground forces to Kosovo’s borders, all of which posed a credible ground threat that no Serbia leader could ignore. On June 10, Russian forces
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seized the Prestina airport as part of a gambit to seize a portion of Kosovo for Milosevic. When the Russians failed, Milosevic had no choice but to abandon all of Kosovo, which the Serbian Army could not hold on its own. To use Kosovo to justify an air plan to decapitate Saddam Hussein’s regime without the commitment of major ground forces would be to over-read the evidence. Afghanistan In Afghanistan in 2001, the United States won by imitating the template for success in Bosnia. The first month of bombing focused on Taliban senior leaders, which failed to kill Mullah Omar or other enemy leaders. Then, suddenly, “air power” shifted to batter the Taliban’s 40,000 troops, most of whom were concentrated in the front lines and some of whom had been bribed. At the same time, the numerically weaker, but Western-armed Northern Alliance launched ground assaults. Within days, the Taliban’s front lines collapsed and the Northern Alliance over-ran Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul to complete the easy victory.
Why China’s threats are unlikely to coerce Taiwan As stated earlier, China can pose three coercive threats to Taiwan: a denial threat to invade and conquer the Taiwanese homeland; a punishment threat to blockade the Taiwan and cut off its access to international economic commerce; and a decapitation threat to attack political and economic targets on Taiwan in order to threaten and create popular pressure against Taiwan’s political leaders. Although the reasons vary, none of these threats is likely to generate enough pressure to compel Taiwan to capitulate to Chinese demands for unification. At bottom, the main advantage Taiwan has even against a country as large and powerful as China is that it is not highly vulnerable to invasion, while the coercive strategies that Taiwan is most vulnerable to – punishment and decapitation – are in themselves weak strategies that will allow plenty of time for outside assistance to come to Taiwan’s aid. Invasion China cannot pose a serious threat to conquer Taiwan without establishing air and sea dominance of the Taiwan Strait and assembling vast amphibious and airborne assets to cross the Strait en masse. Neither is likely. China’s problem is not gaining air superiority over the Strait but keeping air superiority over the Strait long enough to allow a large-scale amphibious assault to succeed. Even if China concentrated its missile and air forces against Taiwan’s airfields and even if it initially knocked out operations at most of Taiwan’s dozen or so airfields, this is unlikely to keep Taiwan’s Air Force out of action for long. China has only a rudimentary precision bombing capability and so has little chance of destroying many of Taiwan’s aircraft on the ground, many of which are protected in hardened shelters. Accordingly, China would need to focus on
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attacking runways, a notoriously difficult mission because they can be repaired in hours; even the US Air Force could not keep Iraq’s runways down during Desert Storm in 1991. All told, of Taiwan’s 600 or so aircraft, over half would be expected to survive and remain operational following a well-coordinated, largescale Chinese preemptive strike, according to the best available estimates.13 The Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) does not need to do anywhere near this well. Even a highly degraded Taiwanese Air Force is likely to be sufficient to defeat a PRC invasion. To invade Taiwan, China would need to use all 70 of its amphibious ships and these can carry only about 15,000 troops, all of its airborne assets able to carry about another 6,000 troops, and many other ships for followon forces of perhaps 5,000 a day. These core invasion assets are highly vulnerable to air attack and Taiwan would need to destroy only a portion to disrupt and defeat the military operation. As a practical matter, most PRC amphibious ships would need more than a day to reach Taiwan. The initial PRC forces would be highly vulnerable to Taiwanese air attack during the course of the journey, and follow-on forces especially vulnerable because these would be sent to (by then) known destinations. Even a hundred Taiwanese aircraft could probably stop China from landing significant forces on Taiwan and almost certainly interdict the supply and reinforcement of any forces that did land. PRC airborne troops would be even more vulnerable because they would need to get past Taiwan’s 100 or so surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries as well as its Air Force. Airborne troops travel in big, lumbering transports that are highly vulnerable, and attrition rates of 25–50 percent could be expected.14 Blockade China could attack Taiwan’s economy by seeking to blockade the island. China has demonstrated the ability to threaten Taiwanese shipping before and missile, air, or naval attack would not need to sink many vessels before commercial shippers would be scared away for weeks, if not months. However, although it is easier than invasion, a blockade of Taiwan is unlikely to end in anything but grief to China. First, the main effect of a blockade would be to punish Taiwan, causing the standard of living of the Taiwanese people to fall while the blockade continued, but this was too weak a tool to compel Taiwan to surrender. Given that Taiwan’s foreign trade accounts for about two-thirds of its gross domestic product and an even higher portion of its energy needs, a blockade’s economic effects would be significant. However, even these costs would not likely be sufficient to compel Taiwan to surrender. As shown earlier, states routinely countenance this level of civilian costs – and much more – without succumbing to the coercive demands of an opponent. Moreover, the demand to surrender national sovereignty commonly evokes intense national sentiments that provoke extreme reactions against succumbing to coercive pressure. The recent history of Chinese missile strikes in 1996 bears this out. These strikes threatened a blockade, but they had the effect of pushing the Taiwanese public and politics further against China’s demands.
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Second, a blockade would take months to produce a large reduction in Taiwan’s standard of living and this would allow enough time for outside assistance to come to Taiwan’s aid. There is a substantial history of how blockades affect countries and there is a clear pattern. Blockades may sharply reduce foreign trade but the actual negative effect on the domestic economy may take many weeks and months to occur. The reason is substitution. Although trade embargoes create major dislocations in the target state’s economy, modern nation-states have the administrative capacity to re-employ laid-off workers into needed areas, extract large amounts from stockpiles and resources that are not economically viable in peacetime, ration goods to improve the broad distribution of primary goods, and substitute basic for luxury uses of existing goods. Thus, a blockade shrinks an economy, but very slowly. Third, there is every reason to believe that the United States would come to Taiwan’s assistance and that American power and economic might would defeat any blockade that China might impose. Even without firing a shot, the United States could substantially undermine a blockade by declaring an American humanitarian assistance effort akin to the Berlin airlift in 1949. By announcing that US commercial ships and aircraft were carrying economic resources and goods to Taiwan, the United States immediately creates pressure on China to back down. China would have to think more than twice before attacking an American cargo vessel or plane. Even if the United States were engaged in a war elsewhere, only a handful of US carriers would be needed to decimate China’s blockade assets. Especially if China fired the first shot, the Bush administration would more likely break China’s blockade than abandon Taiwan. Decapitation China could use missiles and aircraft to attack political and economic targets on Taiwan in an effort to threaten Taiwanese political leaders. China is continuing to add to its approximately 350 M-9/11 missiles that are stationed within range of Taiwan, and some of these may have precision-guided capability. Given recent history, Taiwan should not be surprised if China became increasingly interested in decapitation as it develops a precision bombing capability. However, decapitation has not worked for the United States and there is no reason to think that China would fare better. The main targets of such an attack would consist of central government buildings, electric power plants, key telecommunication nodes, major bridges, and other elements of Taiwan’s national leadership, power generation, and transportation infrastructure. All told, a decapitation attack on Taiwan could involve some 80–100 targets, probably well beyond China’s ability today, but perhaps not in the near future. Such an attack is unlikely to compel Taiwan to surrender for three reasons. First, decapitation is unlikely to actually harm many Taiwanese leaders. At the first signs of such an attack, leaders typically disperse and this simple remedy works quite well. Moreover, the population is likely to rally behind any leaders
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threatened by China. The attack itself is likely to provoke nationalist sentiments that will strengthen rather than weaken the leader. Decapitation has failed to weaken a leader as despised as Saddam Hussein who was not elected by his own people. It would almost certainly strengthen the government elected by the people of Taiwan. Second, decapitation would have little effect on Taiwan’s core military capabilities. Modern air defense systems and airfields have vast back-up power generation and so can operate even if the national power grid temporarily collapses. In Taiwan’s case, it would have the benefit of the United States as an ally who could back-fill almost any unexpected holes and provide intelligence on the location of Chinese forces if necessary. China’s capabilities for invading Taiwan are so small and Taiwan’s asset in having American support so large that decapitation is unlikely to make much difference to the outcome. Finally, a decapitation attack is likely to increase support for Taiwan broadly in the international community. The United States has used the strategy of decapitation only when it has had the support of international organizations such as the United Nations or NATO, and so has not had to worry that attacking enemy leaders would provoke a political backlash. China would have no international support for such a strike at all. Accordingly, a Chinese decapitation attack has the very real prospect of dramatically increasing support for Taiwan among Japan, Australia, Europe, and many other nations, and this will further improve Taiwan’s ability to maintain its independence.
How should Taiwan respond? Taiwan’s best immediate response to a Chinese preemptive strike is most likely to be no unilateral response. If China launches a decapitation strike, a surprise attack on Taiwan’s airfields, or implements a blockade, there will inevitably be strong domestic pressure for retaliation, either in kind or with greater force. Following China’s missile threats in 1995 and 1996, some politicians publicly called for restarting the “Sky Horse” missile program, which was associated with Taiwan’s defunct nuclear weapons program and so carries a threat much greater than simply the range of the missile. However, bowing to domestic pressure for retaliation would put at risk the main asset for Taiwan’s security – the American commitment. If Taiwan acts without working with the United States, then this, more than any Chinese military pressure, could lead to Taiwan’s downfall.
Notes 1 Although officially called “preemption,” the new Bush national security strategy explicitly redefines the term to highlight the need for premeditated attacks that are unprovoked in the sense that American military action does not depend upon a specific aggression or other overt action by the target state and that have as their chief objective the destruction of the target state’s aggregate military power, rendering it incapable of attacking the United States or resisting American terms for peace.
102 Robert A. Pape 2 Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg, The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation. Washington, DC: Brookings, 2002. 3 Although the United States was almost sure to win a major war to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime, conquering Baghdad is likely to be far costlier and protracted than the proponents of regime change expect. The occupation of Iraq will be even worse. Any independent government of Iraq faces tremendous incentives to develop weapons of mass destruction, if only to offset the nuclear superiority of Israel and rising weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat from Iran. Accordingly, the United States cannot quickly hand over power in Iraq to the Shia majority or other local groups in Iraq without facing a substantial risk that these groups would themselves use Iraq’s oil revenues to develop weapons of mass destruction. 4 Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996. 5 Warden, “Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century,” p. 65. See also Barlow, “Strategic Paralysis,” and Dennis Drew, “Hyperwar.” These ideas are spreading beyond the US Air Force. For example, see Gary Waters, Gulf Lesson One – The Value of Air Power: Doctrinal Lessons For Australia. Canberra: Air Power Studies Centre, 1992, p. 170. 6 PGMs are sometimes said to be essential for destroying hardened targets such as command bunkers. During Desert Storm the United States developed a 5000-pound laserguided bomb to destroy a bunker that 2000-pound LGBs could not penetrate. However, the advantage of PGMs is accuracy, not penetration. An equally heavy dumb bomb can destroy the same targets provided a direct hit is achieved. While this may require dropping considerably more bombs, it is still feasible if the number of such targets is small. This is not to say that PGMs are not desirable for counter-C3I missions. They require fewer sorties, which can be important if air resources are very limited, and they cause far less collateral damage. 7 William M. Arkin, “Defeat of Iraq Sparks Debate,” Los Angeles Times, 1991, p. 62. 8 For an argument that Russia’s assassination of Dudayev would not end Chechnya’s independence movement, see Robert A. Pape “A Surgical Strike that Could Backfire,” New York Times April 27, 1996. 9 Cheap, mobile, and flexible communications technology is proliferating throughout the Third world. Fiber-optic landlines, which can handle thousands of channels, can be dispensed from a reel mounted on the back of a truck. The average per capita GDP of countries launching cellular telephone networks has fallen from $14,500 in 1979–1982 to about $1,500 today and a projected $600 in 1998. In 1994, the command system of the Rwandan Patriotic Front was based on mobile cellular phones. “Survey of Telecommunications,” Economist October 23, 1993. 10 William M. Arkin, op. cit., p. 62. 11 Glosson, “Impact of Precision Weapons,” p. 4. An F/A-18 E/F costs $60 million, plus $111 million in twenty-year operating costs. Assuming that it flies 100 combat missions over its lifetime and that it drops 4 LGBs per mission, the aircraft alone costs $43,000 per bomb dropped. Northrop Corporation, B-2 Stealth Bomber 1992 Fact Book September 1992. 12 These figures exclude some 2,000 anti-radiation missiles. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Performance in Desert Storm. Washington, DC: GPO, April 1991. 13 Michael O’Hanlan, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security 25(2) Fall 2000, pp. 51–86; Kenneth W. Allen, “PLAAF Modernization: An Assessment,” in Lilley and Downes (Eds) Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, Washington, DC, NDU Press, 1997, pp. 224–32. 14 For a full discussion, see Michael O’Hanlan, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security 25(2) Fall, 2000, pp. 51–86.
Part IV
The air defense of Taiwan
8
The air battle strategy in Taiwan’s defensive operations Chih-Kung Yu
Introduction Aerospace technology has developed rapidly since 1903. Aircraft have proved themselves vital in war though, when compared with operations at sea and on land, their experience has been considerably less. When reviewing earlier wars or conflicts, air power theory has offered different explanations for air strategy and combat operations. However, in any conflict in the region of the Taiwan and Penghu islands, the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) must gain air superiority to ensure the freedom of movement of joint ROC armed forces. By obstructing and frustrating the enemy’s offensive movements, the ROCAF would be protecting Taiwan’s national security. However, in the light of technological developments and improvements, the ROCAF’s combat strategy should be changed. How and why it should change is the focus of this chapter. Operations over Taiwan and Penghu would be ‘joint’ between all three branches of the ROC armed forces. Air power and air combat would be very important elements in fulfilling those missions. The question to be asked is, however, how does the ROCAF gain air superiority when there is an imbalance in military, and air power, capability between it and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)? The Republic of China’s (ROC) armed forces are at a distinct disadvantage vis à vis the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This chapter, therefore, will offer a number of suggestions how the future forces of Taiwan might be built. In giving thought to this issue, however, it has to be recognized that there is very little by way of information in the public domain. Much, if not all, relevant operational and structural information is classified. This presents a major limitation on the analysis below, which is an expression of a personal opinion. Even then, it may be possible that what is being proposed here will invite, or encourage, other suggestions and argument.
The Taiwan Strait environment Southeast China comprises nine provinces. In the East, there are Zhe-jiang and Fu-jian; to the South, Guang-dong, and Guang-xi; in the centre, Jiang-xi, Hunan, and Gui-zhou; and to the West, Yun-nan and Sichuan. The region’s Northern
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border is defined by the Yangtze River. Its location is between 105 and 123 degrees longitude and 20 and 30 degrees of Northern latitude. Also to the North and Northeast are two major lakes, the Poyang Hu and the Dongting Hu. To the South there is the Zhu-jiang peninsular reaching out towards the coastline of Vietnam. Its coastline is more than 2,000 kilometres long along the Strait of Taiwan, the Gulf of Tong King and into the South China Sea. Its total land area is 114,704 square kilometers, and accounts for one-tenth of the total area of the PRC. Within this area, there is a lower plain, the Tai-hua, which includes the Yangtze River. Otherwise, the region is mountainous, with the Nan-ling mountain chain running West to East across the middle. It is difficult to access Central China from the Eastern coast, though the road and rail systems are in good condition. The island of Taiwan is about 400 kilometres long from North to South. From East to West, it is about 140 kilometres at its widest. Three-fifths of the island is mountainous, with a mountain chain that runs North to South down the centre of the island. Much of the Eastern side of the mountain chain is mountainous, but the Western side is mostly a flat plain. The rivers flow from East to West across the Western plain where the vast majority of the population live in an essentially urban sprawl. In a nutshell, the island is too small, the terrain too inhospitable, and the topography too urbanized for conventional ground combat. The Penghu archipelago comprises a number of small islands, approximately ten in number. The main islands are those of Ma-gong and Wang-an. Their terrain is flat, and both are very difficult to defend. The archipelago is located almost equidistant from the Mainland and the island of Taiwan. Should the PRC wish to invade and occupy the islands, it would need to have air superiority. By crossing the sea in order to invade, it would also need to have long-distanced firepower and precision-guided munitions. Taiwan would likewise need to have command of the air in its defence of the archipelago. Both sides would have to operate over the seas of the Taiwan Strait.
The revolution in counter-air operations The United States’ (US) joint doctrine for countering air and missile threats has defined the Counter Operation as ‘offensive counter-air and defensive counter-air’. Defensive counter-air is further sub-divided into active air defence and passive air defence. The terminology of counter-air operations is defined as follows: ●
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C4I Systems. The resources of C4I systems can detect, identify and track air targets and efficiently and quickly provide early warning, information and accurate estimates of the targets launch, flight path and likely point of impact. An efficient C4I system can assist commanders organize the separation of offensive and defensive actions from forces widely deployed defensively around the island. Offensive counter-air (OCA). Offensive counter-air operations are designed to destroy, disrupt or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms
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and their supporting structures and systems both before and after the enemy have launched their attack. Defensive counter-air operations (DCA). These operations are designed to detect, identify, intercept, destroy or negate any enemy forces that are attempting to attack, or penetrate, a friendly state’s, or one’s own, air space. Active air defence (AAD). This is when direct defensive action is taken to destroy, nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air (aircraft and uninhabited aerial vehicles – UAVs) or missile threats against one’s own or friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air defence weapons, electronic warfare and other available weapons. Passive counter-air (PCA). This covers all other measures, other than active air defence, that are taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets.
A historical review of active air defence operations Since 1903, when the Wright brothers propelled a motor-driven aircraft into the air, aviation technology has progressed at a rapid pace. Before First World War, it became evident that aircraft offered the military commander on the ground a new tool on the battlefield (mostly as a source of reconnaissance and intelligence on the enemy’s location, disposition and movements). Very soon, there were a number of countries that developed and introduced into military service a range of aircraft. Initially, these heavier than air flying vehicles seemed most suited to military reconnaissance but by the end of the War, they had assumed number of roles in support of the forces on the ground while at the same time developing the means with which to try and deny the enemy use of aircraft and access to the air. In the First World War, both sides started using their air power assets to disrupt or pursue the other’s aircraft. This led to arming aircraft and initiated the introduction of the air campaign. During that War, the Allied forces used single-seat pursuit aircraft to intercept and destroy German aircraft and to be able to exercise air control over the battlefield. Their actions demonstrated for the first time in the history of warfare that air power, and specifically air superiority, had a decisive impact on ground operations. Between the two World Wars, aviation technology progressed at a rapid rate with new inventions and techniques introduced almost yearly. But as soon as one development was introduced, it was superseded by another. Ideas and concepts about the rise of air power were quickly overthrown, though some basic principles about it remained constant and were adapted to the new aircraft being introduced. One constant theme was that air power had become the important factor in warfare. For example, the British used aircraft to suppress Iraq in 1925, and the Italians looked to air power to shorten the war in which it was engaged in Abyssinia in 1935. During the Second World War, campaigns stretching from the Nazi invasion of Poland to the invasion of Normandy, and from the German Luftwaffe’s aerial bombardment of London during the Blitz in 1940 to the Japanese air attack
108 Chih-Kung Yu from aircraft carriers operating in the Pacific Ocean on Pearl Harbor, have demonstrated conclusively that tactical air forces have become a vital factor in any war campaign. Air power, and even during relatively brief periods of time when states have full, or partial air superiority, is the prerequisite of ground, sea and air operations. Victory in any air campaign however, is won as a result of a combination of ground forces, naval forces and anti-aircraft artillery. In the Korean War, the Arab –Israeli conflicts of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the 1990–1991 Gulf War and more recently in Kosovo, air power has played the primary role and proved time and again to be the key to victory. Only in Vietnam was this not the case, for the side that enjoyed almost total air superiority was ultimately unsuccessful in its war aims.1 The circumstances surrounding that war, however, were exceptional and it proved, conclusively, that air power played an important role in the course of the war, but it alone was not sufficient to assure victory. Vietnam revealed another feature about air power: that air defence was one of the most important aspects of military operations, even to the extent that it could be conducted by the simplest and most unsophisticated of weapons employing the right tactics. On 22 May 1967, the President of Egypt, ordered the blockade of Acaba Bay. Israeli ships were prohibited from passing through, thereby causing a crisis within the country. Thereafter, the two countries mobilized their forces and deployed them to the borders of the Sinai desert. At 07.45 in the morning of 5 July 1967, Israel, perceiving herself threatened by an invasion from her neighbours, launched a concentrated surprise air attack. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) caught the Egyptian forces unawares and was able effectively to destroy most of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. The IAF then turned its attention, sequentially, on Israel’s near neighbours, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. Having gained air superiority over the Sinai and the surrounding areas around Israel, the IAF then turned its attention to support for the Israeli Army’s ground operations. In the first day of the War, IAF aircraft took off from six Israeli air bases, flew at an altitude of barely 30 feet and made surprise attacks against nineteen Egyptian Air Force air bases. In all, they destroyed 286 Egyptian aircraft in one day. The following day, the IAF destroyed a further 71 Egyptian aircraft. In the two days, combined, in addition to destroying over 350 enemy aircraft, the IAF also wrecked all the Egyptian air base runways, for the loss of only 26 of their own aircraft. In the Israeli–Syrian conflict over the Bekka Valley, the story was much the same. In 1976, during the civil war in the Lebanon, Syria sent in peacekeeping forces to support the Palestine Liberation Organization’s struggle against the Israeli Army. In 1981, Syria further deployed three Russian made surface-to-air missiles, (SAM) SA-6s battalions into the Bekka Valley East of the Lebanese capital Beirut. Faced with such a formidable defensive screen, Israel recognized the need to destroy the SAM sites at an early opportunity. To do this they built a mock SAM site in the Negev Desert for the purpose of simulating attack. At the same time, the IAF dispatched reconnaissance aircraft to investigate these missile sites and to collect the relevant electronic parameters.
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On 6 June 1982, the IAF judged that the necessary training had been completed and that time was right for a joint operation into the Bekka Valley and to eradicate the Syrian SAM missiles. With the support of electronic jamming aircraft, Israeli fighter-bombers attacked and totally destroyed 17 SA-6 and 12 SA-2(3) SAM sites in the Bekka Valley. In addition, they also shot down 85 Syrian aircraft during these air operations, with only 2 Israeli losses caused by Syrian antiaircraft fire and approximately 10 remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) destroyed by Syrian missiles. Through this action, Israel had successfully achieved its operational goal of neutralizing the threat to its national survival. On 2 August 1990, Iraq attacked and occupied the independent Kingdom of Kuwait. Then the United Nations Security Council convened and passed a Resolution requiring Iraq to evacuate the country. When the Security Council demand proved in vain and the UN embargo against Iraq failed, the United Nations warned Iraq that if it failed to evacuate its troops before 15 January 1991, it would use military force. On 16 January, UN forces, of which the United States contributed the majority, were given the go-ahead by the US President, George Bush, and initiated a full-scale jamming of Iraq’s Command, Control and Computer (C3) systems.2 On 17 January, many different varieties of combat aircraft flew sorties into Iraq and Kuwait from three directions: East, South and West. These all-out air operations were conducted in cooperation with carrier-based aircraft, battleship and submarine launched Tomahawk cruise missiles deployed in the Persian Gulf off Kuwait.3 These aircraft and missiles, the potent symbols of air power, destroyed most of Iraq’s anti-aircraft missile systems, operational command and control systems, air force bases, and C3I capabilities. During the first day of the Persian Gulf War, the UN Allied forces flew in total over 3,000 sorties, making Iraq lose almost all its operational air capability. From the second day of the war, the Allied forces flew on average 2,000 sorties daily in a continuous barrage on Iraq’s principal political and military targets. After thirty-eight days of air operations, the Allied forces launched their ground offensive on 23 February 1991. These ground operations only lasted for 100 hours before the Iraqi government offered to surrender. During the war, the Allied forces successfully implemented a counter-air operations tactics and, in so doing, gained total command of the air, and had air superiority over the battlefield. These two advantages ensured that the ability of the Iraqi Army, the fourth largest in the world, was curtailed.
Future developments Because of the threat of an enemy air strike, it is unlikely that the style of air defence will not affect the style of air combat in the near future. Aircraft can perform multiple roles including counter-air operations and close air support. This is because today they can carry a heavier payload, have much longer ranges and fly at greater speeds. In the future, air combat therefore could be said to be divided into two elements: air defence on the one hand, and air strikes, on the other. Additionally, the same aircraft can perform reconnaissance and escort roles, if required.
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Tactical developments The current generation of aircraft represents a significant advance in technology for which reason the nature of war and of air combat has had to adjust accordingly. Past warfare was horizontal combat, the simple engagement of forces locked in combat either at sea or on land. Modern warfare is total war fought in three dimensions, is joint in nature and exploits technology. Air power is the driver behind the revolution in warfare. As General Bernard Montgomery observed in a speech before the California Institute of Technology, ‘In the next World War, the key is to have control of the sea and of the air … because of air power in war is the decisive weapon. Air Forces must get rid of the old stuff and prepare for the future’. From General Montgomery’s speech, it appears that war starts when air power is developed and ends when a state has control of the air. The future of war lies in a technological competition between states. The future of Air Force thinking and doctrine, no matter whether it is offensive or defensive in character, needs to address the principles of mobility and flexibility, the ability to deploy air power quickly, and put the protection of air power assets from enemy attack as the first priority.
An analysis of China’s possible invasion of Taiwan The PRC at the present time is focused principally on the development of its economy and would appear to be in no hurry to resolve the problem of Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. The Chinese leadership does not appear ready to face the reality that both the PRC and the ROC are two independent states with separate governments. China’s strategic goal is to break through the first and second island chains and break through into the Pacific region sometime in the present century. Japan and Okinawa, and Taiwan as far as the Philippines stand in the way of China fulfilling this ambition. Were China to control Taiwan, however, it could use the island as a base for its fleet, which in turn would enable the PRC easily to achieve its strategic goal. The PRC therefore would never abandon its intention to take over Taiwan by force, which makes the Taiwan Strait a highly likely point of military confrontation. If China chooses to invade Taiwan with the use of military force, its strategic objective would be to effect ‘little damage, through a swift attack, quickly achieved’. It would not wish in so doing to inflict heavy damage on the island or to cause further conflict once the conflict had been terminated. Analysis of the options open to the PRC, and the most probable choice, would be a ballistic missile attack, first to knock out Taiwan’s C4 capabilities and its air power. This would involve targeting Taiwan’s air defence missiles, air bases and radar sites. The objective would be to disrupt and break down Taiwan’s air defence network and its command capability. Second, the PRC would use its fighter, bomber and ground attack aircraft to attack Taiwan. The targets would principally be Taiwan’s military facilities and its objective to disable Taiwan’s Army, Navy and Air Force units, ships and aircraft.
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A subsidiary objective would also be to gain air superiority and use it to destroy Taiwan’s defences. The PLA would then land on the island from any number of directions, set up a beachhead and then land military forces on the island. Once with a foothold on the island, the invading PLA forces would assume a peacekeeping function and take over government and administrative authority. The approach is known within Taiwan as the invasion of the island though the use of an ‘offensive counter, offensive counter-sea and offensive counter-land battle’.
Taiwan’s defensive strategy Taiwan’s military planners are confronted with the threat of a modernizing PRC Army. It has never been in doubt, and it remains the case today, that the PRC will at some stage attempt to reunite the Island of Taiwan with the Chinese Mainland by force, if necessary. Taiwan’s military forces therefore have to address the threat, as they perceive it, and take the appropriate measures. The following four factors have to be taken into account when deciding Taiwan’s defensive strategy: 1
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The operational capability of the opposing forces. This specifically addresses the defensive counter-air and offensive counter-air capabilities of the adversaries. The PLA Second Artillery has deployed the Dong-Feng tactical ballistic missile along the Southeast Mainland of China, and is increasing its number by fifty missiles per year. The ROC lacks an anti-missile capability, and in the absence of a theatre anti-ballistic missile system (TBM), the PLA forces have the advantage. The deployment of both armed forces. Regarding the Taiwan Strait, the PLA operations would be outside the Strait’s centre line whereas Taiwan would be inside it. As far as Taiwan is concerned, therefore, the guiding principles should be: (a) to keep the enemy’s forces separated; (b) to maintain a capability to strike at the enemy’s forces; and (c) to exercise control over the battle space. If these three principles can be employed effectively, Taiwan should gain the strategic advantage. If not, the island would likely lose. Ensure external support. Both the PRC and the ROC are dependent to differing degrees on external support. In both offensive and defensive counter-air operations Taiwan is self reliant to a degree, but in the event of a conflict with the PRC, the island would depend heavily on US support. The PRC has the capability to supply and support its armed forces with an indigenous defence industrial sector, but it is nonetheless reliant on the Russian Federation for the acquisition of and support for the next generation combat fighter. That imported fighter, and the support that the PRC can provide, is superior to anything that the ROC can operate. Look at operational development. In the event that a war over the Taiwan Straits were to break out, the PLA would have to engage in combat quickly and seek a quick outcome. This is because the country’s economy could not meet the costs of a long engagement and it would face public opposition.
112 Chih-Kung Yu The Southeast region of Mainland China is relatively unstable, and a lengthy and costly war with Taiwan would put the Chinese leadership under considerable pressure. For Taiwan, the issue is only one of the political will of the people. Depending on these four considerations, so the counter-air operation strategy favours the PLA more than Taiwan.
The key to Taiwan’s defence When considering Taiwan’s defensive operations and in the light of the fact that Taiwan is an island, the adversary will attempt to get air power, then command of the sea and finally an amphibious landing on Taiwan followed by ground operations, step by step. Given this strategic progression, the question has to be asked when is the decisive moment in the conflict. Is it counter air? Is it counter sea? Or is it counter amphibious landing? These sequential steps in the probable war between Taiwan and the Mainland China are very important, since they influence the structure and roles of the Taiwanese forces and their future war preparations. If a decision regarding force structures, or tactics, proves to be wrong, it will potentially jeopardize military operations in the future. As it is facing an enemy that is better equipped, Taiwan must develop a strategy that must encompass the need to operate over as wide an area as possible, deceive the enemy where and whenever possible to disguise Taiwan’s weaknesses, shorten Taiwan’s supply lines while lengthening those of the enemy, and when the time is right, take the decisive battle to the enemy. But, Taiwan is a mountainous island and does not have the space to fight and therefore should concentrate on preventing the war from being fought on Taiwanese soil. Likewise, consider the notion of the ‘decisive step’, which under the circumstances should be counter-air operations. The PLAAF, however, will do all in its power to gain command of the air, then follow that by sea control and finally carry on with its land operations. In the final analysis, the most important thing for the Taiwanese armed forces to do is to make sure it gains air superiority. If this proves impossible, then the situation would need to be resolved through diplomatic means. Without doubt, however, the key to the defence of Taiwan is counter-air operations.
The goal of air combat Generally speaking, the goal of air combat is to destroy the enemy’s defensive counter-air (DCA)/offensive counter-air (OCA) capabilities. The enemy offensive aircraft have to be destroyed and its air force must not be allowed to gain air superiority. In war, the destruction of the enemy’s main forces is the principal objective for which the Air Force could use DCA or OCA capabilities, or both. When reviewing the Vietnam War, it was noted that air defence combat duties were virtually non-existent among the North Vietnamese. Due to SAMs used by the North Vietnamese forces, the USAF, US Marines and US Navy were forced to direct their F-4 aircraft to try and eliminate the missile sites. Even so, US air power was unable to fully gain air superiority.
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During the Second World War, British forces directed many aircraft as well as its anti-aircraft defence artillery to try and intercept German offensive aircraft and, later in the War, cruise (V1) and ballistic (V2) missiles. Britain at the time was able to develop and manufacture its own aircraft and later had the support of the United States, with the consequence that Britain could always face up to any German attempt at invasion. From these experiences, Taiwan must learn the lesson that it must defend its air power from PRC offensive air attack and try and destroy as many of the PRC’s main force as possible. In the event that Taiwan prevented an attack from the Mainland and destroyed the PLAAF’s capability, could the ROC continue to fight on? The answer is no, even though Taiwan could initially take advantage of having gained control of the air. Taiwan could not sustain the engagement against the PRC’s forces because it would not be able to provide adequate support for the troops engaged in the conflict for a sufficient length of time.
Air combat strategy The factors pertaining to defensive operations in the Taiwan-Penghu island area are detailed below: 1
2
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The international environment. The United Nations recognized the PRC as an independent state. Taiwan is not so recognized for which reason the PRC refers to Taiwan as a ‘Renegade Province’. The attitude of friendly countries. The US and Japanese governments would renounce any conflict over the Taiwan Strait, but there is no guarantee that the United States would come to Taiwan’s aid in that event. Taiwan should therefore always be prepared to defend itself. Intelligence developments. The government of Mainland China has never renounced the use of force to resolve the issue of Taiwan. There is some urgency to reunite Taiwan with the Mainland and any PRC Chinese leader knows his name would be permanently vilified were China to lose Taiwan during his premiership.4 Consistently the PLA have referred to the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and have made significant changes to their weapons inventory, claiming that in future they will win any future ‘high-tech’ war with Taiwan. Threat identification. The PLA have procured SAMs, spy and communications satellites and nuclear weapons with which to threaten Taiwan. Conversely, Taiwan’s defensive capability is insufficient to counter the PLA’s new weapons and its own capabilities are not adequately protected. There is, however, an imbalance on both sides. Scientific and technological developments. Taiwan’s defence industrial sectors can only partially meet the ROC armed forces’ combat requirements. Most Taiwanese weapons systems rely on foreign sources, which leads to the conclusion that in future Taiwan must build up its own defence industry. Defence budgets. Taiwan’s defence budget, as a proportion of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is lower than most other countries, the PRC
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in particular. Taiwan must therefore re-examine its low defence budget and consider restoring the budget to a level that would enable the ROC armed forces to build up their defensive capabilities. Weapon systems requirements. To support and maintain Taiwan’s weapons capabilities, there is need of sound logistic support. The line of support from the United States and Europe is long and vulnerable. Taiwan needs to spend time on building up an indigenous weapons research and supply capability. Taiwan’s environmental considerations. The geography and topography of Taiwan has to be taken into account. The short distance from the East to the West of Taiwan, and the high mountainous terrain (almost 15,000 feet), most of which runs down the Eastern side of the island, has meant that the majority of the population live on the Western side of the island and well within the reach of PLA missiles and aircraft. Military strategy. To gain air superiority is the first consideration in any Taiwan military strategy. Combat requirement. There is an imbalance between the two sides. Taiwan must counter enemy forces aggressively and take the initiative when it becomes evident that the enemy is about to launch an attack. Building force structures. It is essential to build air combat capability. In creating a resolute defensive air capability, it would be important to acquire Beyond Visual Range (BVR) precision guided missiles. Logistic Support. The area of combat would be the Taiwan-Penghu islands. The Headquarters of each Service should be responsible for its own logistic support in order to avoid overlaps but coordinated under a common command. The trigger of war. It is illegal to launch an invasion of another country under UN Law. If the PRC threatened to attack Taiwan, then the Taiwan armed forces would respond with a pre-emptive attack in order to protect the Taiwanese population. The End of the War. The end of the war would be when one or other side had air superiority and had the capability to destroy the other’s land and sea forces from the air at will.
Before the PLA armed forces cross the Taiwan Straits to attack Taiwan, it would have to think first how to gain air superiority. Taiwan’s strategy is to prevent the PRC from achieving this and, in so doing, deter the PRC from trying. When PLA aircraft fly over the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan should dispatch ROCAF aircraft to intercept them, threaten them with air-to-air missiles, deploy duty aircraft to patrol specific areas on a permanent basis and demonstrate that the PLAAF cannot move freely in a combat region without being stopped. If the PLAAF cannot gain air superiority, and is prevented from receiving logistic support, then the PRC government would probably end the conflict and seek to negotiate. The Taiwanese Air Force should follow the guideline, ‘some things we can do, some things we can’t’. Taiwan needs to identify the biggest (and most likely) threat, and concentrate its air defence forces (firepower) to destroy them tactically and quickly. The objective would be to sustain the Taiwanese Air Force’s combat
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capability, and extend its reach and endurance. By defeating the PLA’s land and sea forces, Taiwan territorial integrity is protected. As far as offensive air operations are concerned, the ROCAF should concentrate on firepower, rather than on developing forces that are intended to deter the enemy from attacking Taiwan.
Conclusions Taiwan’s national strategic goal is ‘survival and development’. Though there is some long-term aspiration that China might unite in the future, the PRC at present insists on using military force to attack the ROC on the Island of Taiwan. To date, Taiwan’s military power has been sufficient to ensure the protection of the island’s ‘national security and prosperity’ in addition to its dignity and national interests. The goal of Taiwan’s military strategy is ‘effective deterrence’ and ‘resolute defence’ to prevent the PRC from launching an invasion. However, the situation is such that there is high chance of conflict. The strategy of the ROC is peaceful; the task of the ROCAF is to engage in air defence in order to gain air superiority and, thereby, maintain national security.
Notes 1 Clotfelter, Mark, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of Vietnam. New York, The Free Press, 1989. 2 Frederick Stanwood, Patrick Allen and Lindsay Peacock, Gulf War. London, BBC Publications, 1991, Desert Storm, Day 1. 3 Ibid., Desert Storm Day 2. The battleships armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles were the USS Wisconsin and the USS Missouri. 4 Tony Mason, ‘Taiwanese Air Power’ in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (Eds) Defending Taiwan. London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. 127–52.
9
Joint air and missile defense for Taiwan Implications for deterrence and defense Eric A. McVadon
Introduction: the need for joint, combined, and comprehensive defense For many governments and their armed forces, air and missile defenses are a basic matter of evaluating a readily definable threat and providing the best feasible systems to defend against it. The matter of defining and bounding the threat is not nearly so straightforward for the government and armed forces of Taiwan. Establishing realistic and useful parameters for the pertinent threat is profoundly complicated by the enormous imbalance in size between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland, the very close proximity of this imposing threat to the relatively small Island of Taiwan, and intractable questions about how imminent, probable, or unlikely the threat may be. There is also the extremely relevant issue of whether Taiwan would face the threat alone or with various possible levels of direct or indirect support. Unquestionably, the government in Beijing could bring to bear against Taiwan a very large and increasing number of modern, capable aircraft, missiles, and other forces that are relevant to air and missile defenses. These People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces can operate from locations very near Taiwan or greatly reduce their vulnerability to counterattack by basing at remote locations, thereby protected by great distance, layered defenses, and political considerations. Evaluation of the intensity and immediacy of the threat is further complicated by the prospect that leaders in Beijing may persist in being somewhat constrained (in action if not rhetoric) rather than rashly aggressive. They may continue, as they have for decades, to employ their military power as a coercive or intimidating factor rather than as an active military force. Viewed from a possibly perverse perspective, it may serve Taiwan’s security interests for leaders in Taipei to encourage (or at least tolerate) Beijing’s remaining indefinitely in the role of intimidator rather than attacker – as frustrating as it may be for the Taiwan to endure this state of affairs. Moreover, Beijing may feel its interests are best served, if indeed it should elect to attack Taiwan, by limiting the means, weapon types, and size of the forces it employs. In short, there is, arguably, value in Taipei’s fostering restraint by Beijing – given the long-standing perversity of the cross–Strait situation. Credible arguments have been made, for example, that Beijing is unlikely to use nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads (weapons of mass destruction or
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WMD) against Taiwan, both because such use is generally repugnant, even to authoritarian regimes, and because some influential voices in Beijing would likely oppose the use of WMD against fellow Chinese. This is especially the case in considering possible use against 23 million people Beijing would hope to govern peacefully after a conflict. Again, there is something to be said in favor of encouraging this attitude of restraint among leaders in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), all the while recognizing that contemplating this in Taipei as a favorable factor to be cultivated is a strange twist of logic.1 Beijing may be constrained by other factors. Put crudely, as many have done in the past, Beijing is not likely to want to kill the goose that is laying the golden eggs; that is, to achieve unification with a devastated island would be a highly undesirable outcome when there is the prospect, as seen from across the strait, of folding a highly prosperous, dynamic, internationally respected, and technologically and industrially advanced society into the Chinese economy.2 PRC leaders may consider that a limited attack would achieve the desired results and, importantly, stop short of bringing on a full-scale US intervention that could result in major losses to the PLA Air Force and Navy, significant damage to Mainland civil and military infrastructure, and instability in the region that would prejudice indefinitely the national economic progress so important to the survival of the ruling regime in China. As is stated in the conclusion section of the 2002 annual report on the Chinese military by the US Secretary of Defense: “Should China use force against Taiwan, its primary goal likely would be to compel a quick negotiated solution on terms favorable to Beijing.”3 Thus strategists in Beijing conceivably might calculate that success in reunification would be more likely in a limited attack than a very large one, concluding that the United States might respond less promptly, fulsomely, and effectively – and yet that Taipei might be stunned and demoralized and seek accommodation. Looked at another way, Taiwan conceivably might succumb to a lesser attack while a very large attack could have the primary consequence of loosing the full force of the US military on China and possibly raising greatly the chances that it would be permanently severed from Taiwan rather than unified with it.4 This important matter of US intervention, and the scope and timeliness thereof, is a critical constraining factor for Beijing and consequently a crucial factor in evaluating the air and missile threat to Taiwan. To pose the question simply and coldly, should Taiwan attempt, at enormous cost and with success highly uncertain, to protect itself against the full arsenal of PLA aircraft and cruise and ballistic missiles? Or should Taipei, alternatively, anticipate that US direct assistance will be promptly provided if the PRC attack is a clear assault on Taiwan, the attempt by Beijing to bring about the unification by force that US policy has opposed so strongly and consistently? This line of reasoning leads to an issue currently very pertinent to the Taiwan government: how much is it prudent to spend on defenses, especially in a time of economic difficulty and uncertainty for Taiwan, and to what degree is it prudent to anticipate that the United States would provide adequate aid in the defense of Taiwan? It is highly unlikely that this question can be answered satisfactorily. Consequently, perhaps it is better for the government in Taipei to try to answer an
118 Eric A. McVadon alternative question: given a measure of uncertainty concerning the timeliness and effectiveness of a US response, what should be done about air and missile defense? In other words, if one does not, and likely cannot, know what the United States will do, what is the prudent course for Taipei to take? This approach need not be seen as begging the question but rather as providing the most realistic guidelines for the very undesirable plight of Taiwan. There is more than a subtle difference between this question and the question about what should be done if the United States will not aid in the defense of Taiwan. Taiwan’s defenses, as with almost any country, inescapably will suffer from shortcomings; the question is only about the forms that the compromises must take. This is particularly true as the PLA modernizes its forces and improves its systems, acquires more capable aircraft and makes its missiles more numerous, more accurate, and less vulnerable to defenses. The 2002 report to the Congress of the US Secretary of Defense states: China has approximately 350 short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) already in its deployed inventory, increasing at about 50 missiles per year. The accuracy and lethality of this force also are increasing. The PLA is developing variants of the CSS-6 [DF-15] that enable attacks … against Taiwan when deployed further inland… . China has acquired Su-30MKK fighter aircraft from Russia. China also is producing Su-27 front-line fighter aircraft. Over the past two years, the Su-27s and Su-30s have been more rapidly integrated into operational units… . PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) tactical forces also are developing and acquiring precisionguided munitions (PGMs). The Su-30 is equipped to use anti-radiation missiles (ARMs).5 Given this very daunting set of complications in evaluating the air and missile threat to Taiwan, it should be no surprise that there are no simple, straightforward answers or solutions. Those who clamor for black-and-white clarity in air and missile defense decisions are essentially asking for the impossible. The complex factors involved in evaluation of the threat, as described, simply do not allow satisfying solutions. For the indefinite future, an atmosphere of uncertainty and dynamic dilemmas will cloud the air and missile defense picture. That situation, however, should not be misinterpreted as mandating paralysis. Instead, the missile defense issue specifically should be viewed for what it is: an understandably complex decision-making environment, a challenge demanding – and warranting – the best thinking and efforts from all those involved. One seemingly inescapable conclusion about air and missile defense stems from the described complexities of Taiwan’s situation: no single defensive system, no one method, no one armed service, no single bold diplomatic or political stroke can be expected to deal with the numerical size, geographic scope, great diversity, and considerable uncertainty and complexity of this threat. It is clear that a joint approach is essential, meaning a united effort by Taiwan’s armed forces. But, importantly, these complex factors also suggest both a combined
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approach, meaning the support of, and cooperation with, the United States, and a comprehensive approach, meaning going well beyond the conventional concepts of air and missile defense to include truly diverse means that shall be examined further in this chapter: active and passive military systems and protective measures, civil defense preparations and techniques, and political and international diplomatic initiatives including sound public and private policy. More important than any of these individually will be the imaginative coordination of all these methods into a coherent whole: a fabric of defense and deterrence that prudently protects against the specific threats, positively influences Beijing’s thinking (and instills doubts about the likelihood of easy success), and bolsters Taiwan’s overall security posture and sense of confidence.
Components of the threat Although, as has been demonstrated, evaluation of the air and missile threats confronting Taiwan is exceptionally complex, specific components of the threat can usefully be more readily defined. To begin, the threat confronting Taiwan is from a single source (the Mainland) and to essentially a geographic entity (Taiwan plus outlying islands). This is in contrast to the many-faceted, multiple-source, multi-axis threat environment confronting the United States and its widely dispersed forces overseas, for example. Moreover, the features and fact of the threat to Taiwan are far more clear and obvious than is the case for many other governments where there is doubt about whether there is a threat of a scope worthy of consideration or suspicions that the likelihood of an attack is so slight that it might be simply ignored without undue jeopardy. Despite the complexity described, the PRC, without question, threatens Taiwan and is shaping the very significant modernization of its armed forces, including its military aircraft, ballistic missiles, and, potentially, land-attack cruise missiles, so as to be able more effectively to threaten, intimidate, or attack Taiwan and to cope, as best it can, with the potential of American support and intervention with respect to such adventures. Air. The air threat from the PLA is spearheaded by fourth-generation fighter and attack aircraft that Beijing has purchased over the last decade from Moscow. These Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft will soon exceed 100 in number, if that is not already the case, and will continue to increase.6 These capable Russian-origin aircraft compose four regiments, at four separate bases, thereby avoiding the single-base vulnerability that existed in the early years of the last decade for the Su-27. The new indigenous J-10 and JH-77 aircraft have the potential to add to PLA Air Force and Naval Air Force (PLAAF and PLANAF) different types of modern, capable aircraft in significant numbers. Initial deployments of limited numbers of these aircraft have been reported, but some knowledgeable Western observers doubt the story of the alleged J-10 deployment in late 2002.8 A significant aspect of this continuing increase in the number of fourthgeneration combat aircraft is the question of whether PLA senior officers and
120 Eric A. McVadon Chinese leaders may feel more comfortable in risking these aircraft – in employing their very best airframes in more scenarios where protection of these valuable assets is less assured. Some experts feel that risk averseness in the PLAAF will persist. If, on the other hand, there develops a greater tolerance for risk, this would be in sharp contrast to the situation in the early 1990s wherein Beijing would likely have felt compelled to exercise great caution when it had only a few Su-27s and was reportedly inept at both employing them and protecting them. Observers should be alert to any developing evidence of whether steadily increasing numbers of modern aircraft will make a difference in attitudes toward more aggressive and risky employment. The Chinese government, the all-important Central Military Commission, and the PLAAF all are experiencing the introduction of a new generation of younger leaders who may reflect new attitudes. Supplementing these modern aircraft are several thousand far less modern, but not to be ignored, combat and support aircraft. The US DoD annual report to Congress uses the number 3,400 as the total count of PLA aircraft.9 At the very least, these very numerous aircraft can, at a minimum, greatly complicate, overwhelm, and confuse the air defense picture for Taiwan. There are, of course, also many scenarios wherein these less capable aircraft can be effective, as piloted or even possibly, as some have speculated, unmanned airframes.10 With respect to the matter of Chinese leaders being averse to aircraft losses, by virtue of the sheer numbers available, these older aircraft (whether piloted or not, and possibly piloted by the poorest PLAAF aviators) are just the opposite of the still comparatively scarce fourth-generation models. These aircraft could be readily and aggressively employed even when the risk of loss is very high. It may even be thought that the overall risk to offensive air forces would be reduced by an overwhelmingly large and diverse attack and one that might, for example, early in a conflict, exhaust or significantly deplete air defense missiles. The primary point is that numbers still count in contemplating the situation facing Taiwan’s air defenses. China’s expected acquisition from Russia of airborne surveillance radar aircraft,11 whether primarily simply AEW (airborne early warning) or a true AWACS (airborne warning and control system), could serve as a force multiplier for the PLAAF and PLANAF. Although the PLA could conceivably manage the air situation over the Taiwan Strait and beyond (in both directions, it should be noted) using land-based radar and command and control facilities, considerable advantages could accrue from airborne units. These advantages include flexibility in positioning for optimum detection, direction, and communications; ability to avoid attacks on fixed facilities near the coast; enhanced detection of low-flying aircraft and missiles; longer line-of-sight communications capability; and simply an increase in the total number of detection and control facilities. If the PLA acquires and learns how to employ these radar and control aircraft, Taiwan would be confronted with PLA air operations that could be better directed with respect to targeting and combat interceptions, better protected against attack, and better coordinated in operations involving larger numbers of aircraft. The PLA aviators would have a superior general grasp of the battle space, better specific situation awareness, and more confidence overall operating in a multi-faceted
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combat environment. It is not a foregone conclusion that the transfer from Russia to China of AWACS aircraft or something resembling that will bring about these improvements in PLA air combat capabilities, procedures, and doctrine. It is neither an easy nor a short process to establish the procedures, accomplish the training, and carry out the exercises too bring about an AWACS capability – as demonstrated by the many years the PLAAF has spent trying to develop a true operational capability for air-to-air refueling. However, the potential for advanced air operations coordinated by AWACS aircraft should not be ignored in Taiwan’s air defense thinking. Missiles. The 300–400 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)12 with ranges of 300–600 kilometers deployed by the PLA facing Taiwan along China’s east coast are the most prominent component of the missile threat, but special attention is warranted to the new conventional version of the DF-21 (called CSS-5 in the West) MRBM, as will be explained. Table 9.1 is from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Web page entitled ‘Chinese ballistic missile designations and characteristics’.13 The numbers of these Dong Feng (DF) 11 and 15 missiles, already several hundred although not counted by type in the table, are expected to continue to increase at the rate of about 50 per year. The missile count is not the whole story. An important factor in use of these SRBM systems, regardless of the total quantities of missiles in the arsenal, is the number of launchers available. The operational quantity of these TELs (transporter-erector-launchers) governs, among other things, how many missiles could be fired initially over a short time and how rapidly and compactly follow-on waves of missiles could be launched. (This is an important consideration, for example, with respect to the ability by China to overwhelm defenses by large numbers of incoming missiles and, for the defenders, the feasibility to counterattack before succeeding missile salvoes can be launched.) Current expectations are that there will be a total in the PLA of 120 SRBM launchers assigned to seven brigades, four brigades in the Second Artillery (China’s Strategic Rocket Force under direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC) ) and three assigned to Group Armies (within the PLA’s ground forces and therefore apparently under the command of Military Region commanders). As noted in the comment column of the table for the DF-15, the accuracy of these missiles, with conventional-explosive payloads of 800–950 kilograms, is being improved so that they might be effectively employed against military targets, such as specific airfield facilities (concentrations of aircraft, fuel farms, armament storage, runways, etc.) – reportedly with an accuracy circular error of probability (CEP) better than 50 meters.14 It is often asserted, reflecting particularly on recent and historical US air-war experiences, that several hundred large high-explosive bombs (one way of interpreting these missile warheads) would hardly bring any government and people to its knees – much less the resilient and stable people of Taiwan who have long steeled themselves for such. These missiles, however, with their recently greatly improved accuracy, would serve not only as implements of terror but also as an effective means of destroying key facilities – thereby softening up the island for follow-on attacks by other means. Additionally, this ballistic missile attack could
48
?
?
DF-21/21A [CSS-5] [Mod 1&2]
DF-15/M-9 [CSS-6/ CSST-600]
DF-11/M11 [CSS-X-7]
300 km 800 kg
600 km 950 kg
1,800 km 600 kg
Range and payload
Note CEP: Circular error of probability.
#
System name [US]
Single nuclear warhead, 350 kT – Single or cluster conventional warhead
Single nuclear war head, 50–350 kT – Single or cluster conventional warhead
Single nuclear warhead, 200–300 kT – Single conventional warhead
Warhead and yield
Two-stage; solid propellant; strap-down inertial computerdigitized guidance system with terminal control
Two-stage; solid propellant; gyro-platform inertial guidance with onboard computer; working on terminal guidance system Single-stage; solid propellant; strap-down inertial computerdigitized guidance system with terminal control
Propulsion and guidance
Table 9.1 Selected Chinese ballistic missile designations and characteristics
0.3 km
0.3–0.4 km
Est. CEP
30 minute launch preparation time; M-9 version designed explicitly for export; the nuclear role for the CSS-6 . is as yet unproven; enhancing accuracy with GPS technology 30–45 minute launch preparation time; M-11 version designed explicitly for export
10–15 minute launch preparation time; land – mobile; reportedly replacing DF-3 in some areas; same missile as JL-1 SLBM
Comment
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be simultaneously supplemented by other forms of attack including sabotage by special and fifth column forces, computer network attacks on Taiwan’s civil and military systems, other forms of information warfare (IW), and whatever other means may have been devised by Beijing and a CMC and PLA preoccupied with the Taiwan ‘problem’. There are also other very significant supplemental forms of missile attack that serve to justifiably heighten concern. As mentioned earlier and shown in Table 9.1, China is developing a new version of its already deployed DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that would be armed with a conventional (rather than nuclear) warhead. It has been referred to as the DF-21C. The striking significance of this development is that MRBMs have higher reentry speeds than SRBMs, sufficiently high so that some of the defenses (some lessercapable “lower-tier” ballistic missile defenses)15 built to cope with SRBMs would be wholly ineffective, or almost so, against MRBMs.16 The direct concern is that China could, at the outset of an attack, first use several of the DF-21C MRBMs, also with improved accuracy (as noted in Table 9.1 and estimated to be as good as a CEP of 50 meters17), to attempt to destroy most of Taiwan’s missile defense facilities – radars, command and control units, missile batteries – and consequently offer the prospect that the follow-on DF-11 and 15 short-range ballistic missiles would enjoy essentially a free ride, especially if all of Taiwan’s missile defenses were on land and vulnerable to the MRBMs. (As will be explained later, the newly developed US Patriot PAC-3 missile, initially deployed with some US forces, offers an important capability against the DF-21C and is under consideration for acquisition by Taipei). The missile threat does not stop there, unfortunately. China is also developing long-range land-attack cruise missiles that will almost certainly be deployed in the hundreds facing Taiwan. These missiles do not take soaring ballistic trajectories from atop rockets, exiting the atmosphere and then returning to impact the target. Instead, cruise missiles are low flyers, remaining in the atmosphere as do aircraft, often stealthily flying low over the water and land, complicating detection by trying to stay below the radar detection horizon. Cruise missiles can also be readily fitted with terminal homing devices (such as television scenematching) so that they can be extremely precise in hitting the target – as has been demonstrated by the many such precision weapons used by American forces against Baghdad, amongst other places. The use of dozens or hundreds of these cruise missiles, in conjunction with a ballistic missile attack, could both greatly complicate and overwhelm defenses and allow the precise targeting of many types of facilities against which ballistic missiles might not be the preferable weapon. The US DoD report sums it up as follows: Beijing’s SRBM force also could be used to soften Taiwan’s air defenses and disrupt air base operations, supporting any air campaign designed to cripple the Taiwan Air Force and damage or destroy Taiwan military facilities. Over the next several years, given current trends, China likely will be able to cause significant damage to all of Taiwan’s airfields and quickly degrade Taiwan’s
124 Eric A. McVadon ground based air defenses and associated command and control through a combination of SRBMs, land-attack cruise missiles (LACM)], special operations forces (SOF), and other assets.18 Thus we see that the nature of the PRC air and missile threat to Taiwan is truly daunting, a challenge to imagination, ingenuity, and available resources – certainly not within the scope of a single service and certainly warranting the application of a full range of means to cope with the threat, lessen the threat, and deter the use of the missiles that compose this threat.
Components of air and missile defenses Air and missile defense systems are not, of course, identical or one and the same. For Taiwan, the two, air and missile defenses, have some components in common and experience some common difficulties, as well as having many different features and distinct aspects. Air defense concepts and systems (including defenses against aircraft-like cruise missiles) are generally more readily understood by nonspecialists because of their much longer history and wider current distribution around the world. Air defense This warrants attention in this examination of the combined problem, but considerably greater attention to ballistic missile defenses is appropriate for several reasons: 1
2
3
4
The most severe technological challenges to common components of air and missile defense systems are generally posed by the threats from ballistic missiles. In the case of Taiwan, ballistic missiles are highly likely to compose the initial element of an attack from the Mainland; the ability to cope with an initial onslaught by ballistic missiles (notably including the new DF-21C conventional-warhead MRBMs described earlier) would likely determine whether the air and missile defense network would remain functional or even survive. Mobile ballistic missiles (such as Chinese SRBMs), unlike aircraft, are difficult weapons to discover and neutralize before they are launched. This would continue to be true even after an attack has begun, although restraints on strikes against the mainland would be at least lessened. Therefore, a greater burden would fall on defenses (as opposed to other possible actions) to afford protection against missiles than might be the case in coping with aircraft that had returned to bases that might be struck. Ballistic missile defense, as suggested, is a newer endeavor, less well understood by many who may be involved in decision-making concerning its acquisition, utility, applicability, and specific virtues in various situations. Consequently, subsequent discussion will not ignore air defense, but will focus more on missile defense issues.
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A brief review of some aspects of air defense is useful and appropriate before considering missile defenses. Air defense networks collectively referred to by the abbreviation IADS (integrated air defense system) are widely used by many countries, and the concept is particularly relevant to Taiwan. Among the important components of Taiwan’s air defense network are surface-to-air missiles, interceptor aircraft and the air-to-air missiles they carry, land-based and airborne radar systems, and command and control facilities to direct and coordinate the employment of these components and to form them into an integrated system. The primary land-based air defense missiles are the Improved Hawk (I-HAWK), Tien Kung I, and Patriot (PAC-2); shorter-range missiles include the Chaparral and Skyguard systems.19 Patriot systems (PAC-2 and PAC-3, if acquired by Taiwan) would also be very capable defenders against cruise missiles. Taiwan’s important force of interceptor aircraft includes the 146 F-16s obtained from the United States, the 58 French-built Mirage 2000–5, and the 130 IDF (Indigenous Defense Fighter); Taiwan has 4 E-2T airborne early warning aircraft, in addition to land-based air defense radars.20 Consequently, Taiwan’s air defense components are individually impressive and collectively formidable. By virtue of China’s proximity and the number of aircraft it has available for use against Taiwan, individual defense efforts by isolated units would, of course, be folly. Incoming enemy aircraft as they are detected must be evaluated (without delay) as to the nature and priority of the threat they pose and assigned very rapidly (preferably automatically) to the best means to engage them. The limited number of defensive missiles and intercepting aircraft must not be wasted on undesired redundant engagements, for example. The right system must engage the right target with the right weapon and reengage if necessary – but only if necessary. Because Taiwan is near China and relatively small, detection must be made as soon and as far away from the island as possible, preferably by integrated, coordinated detection and engagement means on land, at sea, and in the air. For example, ships that have capable air search radar and air defense systems that go well beyond self-defense or point defense of the ship and can serve as flexible and re-locatable (not fixed) components of an IADS, as well as providing additional defensive missiles in a location remote from attacks that may be occurring on land. The more desirable situation for Taiwan air defense is IADS with what might be termed a bold ‘I’, meaning that the integration extends to coordination or even full integration with US sea-based and other forces that might be made available. This suggests at least three aspects of such integration that require foresight (problems that must be resolved): (1) employing units with different characteristics effectively together so as to achieve maximum combat effectiveness; (2) achieving a level of interoperability so as to be effective against a formidable enemy force; and (3) avoiding interference and fratricide. Cooperative efforts, as circumstances permit, cannot be delayed until the start of hostilities if these problems are to be resolved or minimized.
126 Eric A. McVadon The military or tactical objective of an IADS or ‘I’ADS would, of course, be to avoid disabling damage to Taiwan in an initial missile attack and then to blunt follow-on PLA air attacks. The “political” or strategic purpose is at least as important: to instill profound doubt among Chinese leaders and PLAAF senior officers that their aircraft can prudently conduct follow-on attacks or establish and maintain air superiority. The goal is for Chinese leaders to justifiably fear that their limited force of modern fourth-generation aircraft, those capable of effective combat operations under the conditions likely to prevail, would probably be subject to intolerable losses. Although these more capable aircraft are becoming more numerous in the PLAAF and PLANAF, most of them cannot be replaced indigenously, and major repairs cannot be effected on many within China. No air defense system likely to be set up for Taiwan will lead to contentment among Taiwan’s leadership, but it should be recognized that PRC leaders are subject to similar concerns about inadequacy and uncertainty of their attacking force – and such anxiety can be bred. Leverage of this sort must be applied on PRC leaders to the maximum and understood to be an element of air defense viewed in the broadest possible context. A certain fraction of the mission of Taiwan air defense decisions will serve a good purpose if, in minds across the Strait, they create reasonable fear of losses and uncertainty about outcome. Such uncertainty in Beijing can have a profound positive impact on Taiwan’s security and future. Missile defense Defense against the PRC’s ballistic missiles must, as with air defense, be viewed in the broadest way – certainly not restricted to a missile-versus-missile mindset.21 There are various components of missile defense for Taiwan and various truly diverse options and combinations of options available. These range from rudimentary missile systems, some now in use (with more effective ones expected soon or under development), all the way to the skillful application of political pressure by Taipei, Washington and regional capitals that serve as a deterrent to hostile Chinese actions. Given the magnitude and seriousness of the threat, no possibly useful component or option can prudently be ignored. It is reasonable to start, however, with the military hardware and software aspects of missile defense. A component that is most familiar and visible consists of defensive missiles launched to intercept offensive ballistic missiles. There must, of course, be a means of detection of the incoming missiles, identification, and tracking. The hardware to perform these functions may be land-based, sea-based, or conceivably air- or space-based. The land-based systems that fall into this category and that seem to be options in the near future for Taiwan include a new form of Patriot missile called PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability 3)22 and, reportedly, the indigenous Tien Kong II (or Sky Bow II ), developed by the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology.23 Other land-based missile systems under development in the United States may become available, including the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).
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Patriot PAC-3 could be available to Taiwan in the very near future. As part of the PAC-2 installations mentioned in the description of air defenses, Taiwan already has the ground support systems for PAC-3 and Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM) that have some capability against SRBMs. Acquisition of PAC-3 missiles and expansion of the Patriot missile sites to include greater coverage of important targets has been discussed as a means to provide rather promptly a much-improved capability against the several hundred DF-11 and DF-15 missiles that threaten Taiwan. Additionally, PAC-3 likely has an important capability against the DF-21C MRBM – particularly important because there does not yet exist a missile with an optimal capability against MRBMs. PAC-3’s hit-to-kill interceptor missiles are expected to be lethal against the DF-21, although the “footprint” or defended area shrinks greatly as the speed of the incoming missile increases. (The speed of a reentering ballistic missile is, in general, a function of the range or distance from which the missile was fired). At the maximum range of the DF-21, the protected area would, by some estimates, be small; but the firing unit and things in its immediate vicinity should be afforded reasonable protection. Other specialists are more optimistic, expecting that the protected area against the DF-21C might be roughly half the size of that for SRBMs and could increase greatly, even possibly to the size of the SRBM footprint, if cued by the early warning radar that Taiwan expects to acquire in the near future. Kill probabilities may also be quite high. In addition to this first step in providing at least some defense against the DF-21, PAC-3 deployments would reduce PLA flexibility in basing its DF-21Cs. Those offensive PLA missiles that might be considerably closer than about 1,700 kilometers from prospective targets in Taiwan should be increasingly vulnerable to intercept by PAC-3, especially if cueing can be provided by early-warning radar. Consequently, the outlook need not be wholly bleak with respect to defense against the new conventional-warhead version of the DF-21, as has seemed in the eyes of many to be the case for the last several years. Because of the expected entry into the PLA’s arsenal pointed at Taiwan of significant numbers of land-attack cruise missiles, it is especially significant that these lower-tier systems, including both types of Patriot missiles and probably both versions of Tien Kong, provide needed excellent capability against these low-flying, air-breathing, highly accurate missiles that could otherwise supplement the DF-21C capability to neutralize defenses and consequently make follow-on SRBM and air attacks more feasible and effective. A sea-based system under development that has received considerable attention consists of naval destroyers that would be equipped with the advanced Aegis battle-management system and armed with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) missiles that are expected to have a reliable capability to intercept ballistic missiles. This system, previously called Navy Theater Wide (NTW) (distinguishing it from the already cancelled Navy Area Defense or NAD,24 that would have covered an area about one-tenth that of NTW) will be an upper-tier system, providing the capability for exo-atmospheric engagement by hit-to-kill interceptors of the DF-21C MRBM with its high reentry velocity. However, capability begins to fall off against
128 Eric A. McVadon ballistic missiles with ranges less than 600 kilometers, and the SM-3 is ineffective against missiles with ranges less than 300 kilometers.25 This points to a natural synergy between lower-tier and upper-tier systems – the former being most effective against SRBMs and the shorter-range MRBMs whereas the latter are most effective against MRBMs and the longer range SRBMs. This characteristic has also been described as follows, “Due to speed limitations (4–5 kilometer/second), the SM-3 is intended to counter primarily medium range ballistic missiles.”26 Two versions of NTW (using Block I and II SM-3 missiles) could become initially operational in 2007–2008 and 2010–2012, respectively.27 Consequently, current systems and those likely to become available to Taiwan in the next several years perform an intercept as the missile nears its target, in the terminal phase of the ballistic trajectory. As other systems are developed, midcourse, exo-atmospheric interception capability is expected. A system that would permit boost-phase interception (immediately after launch of the missile, when the missile has not yet separated from its booster rocket) is foreseen and is highly desirable; this form of intercept would occur over the territory of the attacking nation. In addition to relatively new expectations in the United States for sea- and possibly land-based boost-phase systems, one promising prospect by about 2008 for boost-phase interception is the airborne laser (ABL), also under development in the United States by the US Air Force.28 The extremely large airborne laser device is to be installed in a very large aircraft, such as the Boeing 747 airframe.29 This aircraft, with appropriate full protection, given its great cost and value, would orbit in a safe location but positioned where its systems could detect the flare of the booster rocket and direct a powerful laser to destroy the missile very soon after launch. The range of the laser is expected to be several hundred kilometers; there have been estimates of as few as 20 and as many as 20030 laser “shots” that would be available from a single aircraft before its laser chemicals were depleted and it had to return to a base equipped to replenish it for another mission. Various practical considerations (cost, complex maintenance, protection, etc.) seem to indicate that these aircraft, for the foreseeable future, would likely be operated only by the United States. They would have to be made available in the theater and could then conceivably be operated in the vicinity of Taiwan during a crisis. Studies are also underway to determine the feasibility of a space-based laser (SBL) that would provide a continuous capability and possibly be less difficult to protect. One reason for including the US Air Force ABL development effort in this examination is that layered missile defense is the most desirable combination. With layers, or tiers, of missile defense, there would then be more than one opportunity to engage incoming missiles. For example, the ABL might destroy many rising SRBMs in the first three minutes of their ascent near the coast of China, within the limited range of the laser (taking into account the need for a stand-off distance from Chinese anti-air systems). Other systems could engage incoming missiles in their mid-course phase – conceivably including the dangerous MRBMs that are less vulnerable to intercept by some terminal (lower tier) defensive missiles. Finally, those missiles having made it through these layers would be
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engaged by terminal or lower-tier defenses or might strike hardened targets and do little damage. Because China has so many offensive missiles, with more likely to be deployed, it is also noteworthy that, with this layering of defenses, the terminal-engagement systems (such as Patriot PAC-3) would be far less likely to be overwhelmed by a very large number of incoming missiles arriving in a very short time – plus other distractions such as cruise missiles, information and electronic warfare (IW and EW), and sabotage. Moreover, with the diverse capabilities of layered defense (possibly including ABL), the inventory of defensive missiles at each layer would not be exhausted so quickly. There would almost certainly be valuable further conservation of scarce (and expensive) interceptor missiles because of fewer cases where the urgency associated with specific incoming missiles would dictate that two (or even more) defensive missiles be fired at each to increase the odds of destruction before impact on very high-value target areas. In other words, the problem and frequency of engaging urgently “leakers” that are destined to impact on important targets would be reduced. There is further military value in the redundancy of layered systems. Each of the individual systems is vulnerable to attack. Land-based systems, including their radar, command and control units, and missile batteries are largely fixed targets certain to draw fire themselves. Sea-based systems to be effective are likely to have to be positioned in less-than-optimum, exposed locations in or near the Taiwan Strait – more subject to attack from the Mainland than would be desired. These assets would, consequently, require adequate, continuous protection from PLA Navy submarines, air- and sea-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, and other aircraft and ship attacks. The extraordinary requirements for protection of the large aircraft equipped with the airborne laser have been described. It should not be expected that one or two systems of defensive interceptor missiles would afford adequate protection against a diverse arsenal of ballistic missiles any more than one would expect that to be the case with other combat systems. Complementary systems would almost certainly be required and, even then, there would be “leakers,” incoming missiles that would escape interception. Consequently, consideration of providing complementarity should not stop with layered defensive missile systems. Taipei could choose to intensify efforts to afford itself passive protection. Such efforts might focus on hardening and dispersing military targets and making provisions for rapid repairs to critical items such as runways and fueling facilities. This effort might be concentrated on facilities related to air and missile defenses. But it should also be applied to other facilities, the loss of which would be crucial to the defense of Taiwan, to the morale of the population, and to the effective management of vital and emergency services during a period of war. Civil defense measures could be developed to reduce the number of casualties. These might include, for example, establishing procedures for officials and the public to follow, conducting citizen training, and identifying shelters and relatively safer locations. All this, as well as other defensive measures, are predicated on an effective detection and warning system that would alert authorities, inform
130 Eric A. McVadon command and control networks, and cue “shooters.” Needless to point out, complete protection is unattainable, but the psychological effect of a reasonably effective effort might be beneficial in at least two ways: bolstering the resolve of the citizens of Taiwan and sending the message to Beijing that demoralizing Taiwan is not an easy thing to do. Many leaders in Beijing may be influenced in their deliberations about whether to attack Taiwan with ballistic missiles by the likely effect of such an action on the PRC’s international reputation. The specter of the portrayal globally (popularly termed the CNN factor) of a tiny but determined and plucky Taiwan bullied and pummeled by a big and ruthless China could increase the reluctance of the Chinese leadership to engage in such egregious conduct and thereby serve as a deterrent factor, or at least a modifier of Beijing’s behavior. All these passive defensive measures may serve Taiwan well, but they are likely to be seen by the people of Taiwan and by the leadership in Beijing as empty gestures if they are not done in conjunction with the fielding of the best available active missile defenses. Arguably, Taiwan in the world today is the location most threatened by ballistic missiles, with all that implies for the appropriateness of focusing on the difficult issue of missile defense. There are dramatic, albeit risky and contentious, alternatives to active missile defenses at both ends of the spectrum: Taipei might, at the lower extreme, attempt to deal with the threat altogether (or nearly altogether) through diplomatic and political means; or, at the very high end, Taiwan’s leaders could strive for an offensive posture (striking the Mainland) that might deter Beijing through the fear of counterattack. Introducing these concepts together in stark contrast may help to put them in perspective; both involve considerable risk and are based on assumptions that cause many great discomfort. As to the matter of contemplating attacks on the Mainland, one might first consider the smaller-scale option of attempting to destroy or neutralize the PLA’s ballistic missiles before they are launched, or, for example, to disrupt the launch of subsequent waves of missiles after an initial attack. This scheme would be extremely difficult and complex to carry out because the PLA’s SRBMs are mobile missiles, there are many cleverly constructed TELs and other decoys, and the logistic facilities and launch areas are likely to be well defended. Of course, there are also other political and strategic considerations, even in such a limited offensive effort aimed just at the attacking missile force. However, the greatest practical discouragement probably derives from the lack of American success a decade ago in locating and destroying the TELs of Iraq. Many US specialists believe the task would be even more daunting against China’s SRBMs. These discouraging factors give rise to considering the use of electronic or other special or nondestructive means to disrupt command and control, targeting, in-flight guidance, and terminal homing (if that becomes a reality) for these missiles. In war games and simulations, the localized jamming of the Global Positioning System (GPS) is often suggested, a technique that could be appropriate to Chinese SRBMs; however, GPS is thought not to be the sole precision navigation system employed by these missiles. In short, there is not yet any assurance that these measures could be applied effectively.
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The matter of Taiwan’s developing a grander offensive strike system, one of sufficient effectiveness so as to deter the Chinese use of ballistic missiles, is, of course, a complex, yet often raised, issue. Some have even envisioned development of a capability to inflict intolerable losses or to bring about some catastrophic event that would far exceed even the horror of the World Trade Center attack on September 11, 2001. The troublesome possibility that foreknowledge of such a decision in Taipei would provoke China into conducting a preemptive strike to prevent completion of the effort or to attempt to destroy such a capability before its use is often mentioned when this option is raised. Additionally, such action, it is suggested, might remove self-imposed constraints on Beijing and bring about the use of WMD in some form. With smaller Taiwan far more vulnerable to such a single devastating attack than huge China, such high-end competition with the Mainland surely should be weighed carefully by Taiwan’s decision-makers. Such competition might be evaluated as intolerably risky, counterproductive, or even doomed to failure. Moreover, the likely negative effect of such aggressive action by Taipei on American support for Taiwan also would have to be taken into account in making a decision of this nature. Predicting the effect of such factors is difficult, but it should be noted that many informed observers think Taiwan, without US support, could not prevail in the long term in a conflict with Mainland China. This suggests that any success somehow achieved in using large-scale offensive means to attempt to deter Beijing would probably be temporary, at best, and consequently ultimately counterproductive. It might actually greatly increase the odds of success by Beijing in achieving unification through the use of force.
Additional factors The government in Taipei, including the legislature, faces very complex and difficult decisions concerning air and missile defense for Taiwan. This is especially true for missile defense. The complexities described previously are compounded by at least four specific factors: (1) the extremely high cost of virtually all components of missile defense; (2) the weak economy in Taiwan exacerbated by competing defense and other budget priorities; (3) uncertainties about development and potential availability of missile defense systems; and (4) questions about the efficacy and utility of these systems for Taiwan, even assuming all technological and availability hurdles are surmounted in a timely manner. The administration of President Bush in Washington has offered Taiwan several military systems that may be useful to the Taiwan armed forces. Taipei is thus faced with an opportunity and, at the same time, with difficult decisions. The possibility of acquiring Kidd-Class guided-missile destroyers, P-3 patrol and antisubmarine aircraft, modern submarines, and other assorted items in addition to the prospect for expenditure for expensive missile defense systems during the same time period results in very difficult budgeting dilemmas. There is also the issue of possible future acquisition of destroyers with Aegis systems and SM-3 missiles, as described previously. Compounding all this are additional uncertainties,
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as alluded to earlier, about if and when various missile defense systems will become operational and whether they would promptly or eventually be made available to Taiwan. (As a hedge on these issues of cost and availability, Taiwan is developing its own missile defense system, Tien Kong II or Sky Bow II.) There are more complications for Taiwan’s leaders and legislators to navigate their way through. There are legitimate questions about how effective all these systems would be for Taiwan, assuming their successful development and the achievement of operational capability within a reasonable time – significant assumptions. Some worst-case scenarios have been posed: if the PLA continues to produce and deploy SRBMs and MRBMs, it can remain ahead, in sheer numbers, of any inventories of defensive missiles that most observers envision for Taiwan, or even for the combination of Taiwan and the United States. This matter of the defenders simply “running out of bullets” is exacerbated by the prospect of having to fire more than one interceptor at some incoming missiles to increase the odds of a kill, especially in cases of unfavorable intercept geometry and system–target mismatches. Somewhat similarly, the PLA might choose to fire so many ballistic and cruise missiles with close to simultaneous times on target, that almost any conceivable combination of defenses would be saturated and overwhelmed. These worst-case scenarios tend to focus on only missile-versus-missile engagements and do not take into account the (hard-to-measure) effects of hardening, dispersal, and other factors that are likely to reduce the effectiveness of an attack. They also assume that the PLA would consider it prudent to expend, in one fusillade at the very outset, much of its prime intimidator of Taiwan. Beijing would, thereby, be taking the chance that Taiwan would withstand the initial onslaught un-cowed and that the PLA would then have to resort wholly to more risky means – or back down. Also, an all-out missile assault by the PRC on Taiwan would likely simplify the decision-making of the US president as to how boldly and fulsomely he wishes to intervene. China might then be forced either to back off or accept the risk inherent in the use of other more vulnerable or more problematic forces, now against US and ROC forces. The worst-case scenarios also ignore the possibility that the number and effectiveness of the PLA’s missiles would have been reduced by disruption or destruction by various means of its command and control facilities, launchers, unlaunched missiles, or other support. Nevertheless, truly effective ballistic missile defense is not yet a reality. Even the US government is only beginning to bring together a coherent plan for integrating and deploying the various missile defenses it contemplates, and so, not unexpectedly, many legitimate uncertainties will continue to confront Taipei as it tries to reach decisions on these issues. Issues and disputes between Taiwan’s political parties have further confused this process. Some voices in Washington have expressed or implied impatience that Taiwan is not proceeding more expeditiously with these difficult defense acquisition decisions. Those expressing such views seem to ignore the problems Taiwan faces and the inherent complexities and uncertainties. From the other direction, impatience toward Washington has been expressed in Taipei, especially with respect to what is seen by some in Taipei as keeping
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Taiwan from getting Aegis-equipped destroyers. Those expressing this view seem to ignore that US Aegis-equipped ships are not yet capable of defense against ballistic missiles and that there is uncertainty about when the missiles and other components will reach a stage of development so as to achieve such a capability – something that is certainly not anticipated in the very near future. Additionally, Aegis, even in its present air defense configuration, is a very demanding system with respect to operation, training of personnel, maintenance, and logistics; it would be a big jump for the ROC Navy to go directly from its present systems to Aegis. The anticipated acquisition of Kidd-Class destroyers will provide the ROC Navy with an improved capability to cope with a number of threats and serve as a useful transition should Aegis ships be acquired later. One of the important features of the Kidd-Class ships is more capable air defense, systems that go beyond point defense of the ship. This would possibly permit the introduction of the first steps in integrating air defense facilities at sea, on land, and in the air. This could provide valuable experience in eventually achieving integrated air and missile defenses across the board. There is an even more far-reaching missile defense consideration for Taiwan’s leaders with respect to real and enduring security and the future roles of their armed forces. The United States has made a commitment to a missile defense system to protect the United States and American deployed forces and to work with allies and friends around the world to defend against these threats.31 Freed in 2002 from the constraints of the ABM Treaty, these are realistic outlooks for Washington.32 The United States is now exploring more realistically boost phase and mid-course systems in addition to terminal systems. Cooperation in this sweeping endeavor with friends and allies can take many forms from development programs to technology exploration to shared warning to deployments – and everywhere in between, as might apply to various countries taking into account their varied capabilities and geography, among other things. Moreover, industries in the United States and elsewhere play a vital role in this process where new concepts, technological advances, and unencumbered thinking make such a difference. As allies and friends consider avenues to cooperate with the United States as best suits their individual situations – with technology, testing, exercises, etc. – they may wish to include appropriate cooperation channels with US industry (as well as with the US government agencies including the US military), given the lead role that is now being assigned to US industry in developing post-ABM cooperation in this field with allies. Missile defense appears to be entering a new and very promising era. Taiwan will almost certainly want to preserve and possibly augment its roles in the missile defense arena, simply so that it does not discover a few years hence that it has been left behind in this vital mission area. It is difficult to imagine that modern armed forces in the coming years will be viable without adequate missile defenses, and cooperation in appropriate forms with the United States will almost certainly be a superior way (arguably the only way) to achieve effective missile defense capabilities. As a consequence, Taiwan’s leaders may wish to give full and careful consideration to missile defense decisions on the basis of sustaining
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a position as a truly active participant in the missile defense field. Systems currently under development may not fully satisfy all Taiwan’s needs and desires, but they may well serve as both stepping stones and ways of keeping abreast of capabilities as new developments occur. Missile defense for the near future might be properly viewed as no longer just an adjunct capability for the few but rather an essential and very dynamic area for all armed forces that must take seriously the security of the territory they protect. Serious missile defense must, because of its complexity, scope, and cost, be composed of cooperative efforts, and the United States seeks to be a leader and a partner in that cooperation. Leaders of countries allied or friendly with the United States may wish, to the greatest extent practicable, to ensure maximum interoperability with US systems and with US forces that may be forward-deployed – an interoperability that will exist only if fostered and nurtured over time via acquisitions, exercises, training, etc., all of which is more likely if for active partners, however small, in the larger missile defense endeavor. Washington and Taipei will likely, however, have to go beyond technical cooperation and the sale of systems in cooperation on missile defense. They will have to take into account all the consequences – positive and otherwise – of missile defense cooperation and acquisition. Although neither Washington nor Taipei will bow to Beijing’s wishes with respect to missile defense, there is a very cold and pragmatic facet of Beijing’s deplorable positions that cannot be wished away. Chinese leaders have spoken threatening words about Taiwan and missile defense, suggesting there would be a harsh reaction if Taiwan were to obtain missile defenses. The very conflict that missile defenses are intended to help prevent, by making China less sure of its ability to strike Taiwan, could be brought on as a consequence of missile defense acquisition.33 One speculative scenario (not a forecast or expectation) serves as a dramatic example: were Taiwan to acquire some form of effective missile defense or accept delivery of a major component of a missile defense system about to be acquired, Beijing might attempt a very limited attack to destroy the equipment acquired and say its clear warning had been ignored. Questions about what Taipei and Washington would do faced with that completed action illustrate just how difficult this matter could become. At a minimum, both Taipei and Washington should take very seriously the possible consequences of missile defense system acquisition by Taiwan. This may be as simple as carefully weighing the state of bilateral relations at the time of a transfer and thereby gauging the likely nature of China’s reaction. (In the eyes of many, PAC-3 could be delivered during the present period of warm Sino-US relations and reduced cross–Strait tension without undue risk.) At the other end of the spectrum (and under less favorable bilateral and cross–Strait conditions), it may be prudent in some circumstances to recognize that a missile defense system transferred to Taiwan must be protected until it is capable of self-protection. This might impose some special obligations on the United States in connection with such a transfer. This dramatic example, admittedly quite speculative, serves to illustrate that there are unspoken, embedded considerations that play a generally
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silent role in the already complex decision-making process with respect to ballistic missile defense for Taiwan. The Bush administration has made clear its support for Taiwan, but it has also made clear that it approaches the matter of arms sales to Taiwan pragmatically and with appropriate deliberation. Moreover, time in office and the turn of world events have led to better relations between Washington and Beijing than most observers anticipated. Like earlier US administrations, the Bush White House would probably argue that cross–Strait relations are better and more stable when Sino-American relations are good. Although such notions are difficult for many in Taiwan to accept, preferring instead to see essentially unlimited US support for Taiwan, this situation of improved US–PRC relations may be a very valuable aspect of comprehensive missile defenses for Taiwan: the creation and perpetuation of an environment where it is increasingly difficult to imagine that Beijing would do something so outrageous and self-destructive as to launch missiles, few or many, in the direction of Taiwan.
Joining defense and deterrence The formidable existing and potential threats to Taiwan posed by China’s military air power, growing ballistic missile arsenal, and coming cruise missile force warrant the development of capable joint air and missile defenses, as has been described. The prospect of timely and effective US intervention to form a combined air and missile defense force is crucial, given the scope of the threat. Every effort must be made to convince Beijing that it should stop its buildup of SRBMs and MRBMs that threaten Taiwan, relying heavily on persuading Chinese leaders that their interests would not be served by such actions. All this should be carried out in a calculated fashion so as to keep the risk as low as possible that missile defenses for Taiwan could bring on the conflict they are intended to deter. As these military systems are prudently acquired and deployed, another element must be added so as to strive for comprehensive deterrence. Many Chinese officials and PLA senior officers have come only recently to acknowledge China’s role in the matter of missile defense for Taiwan – that China’s profoundly threatening numerous ballistic missiles deployed facing Taiwan are an integral part of the equation of cross–Strait tension. It has been hard to convince some Chinese that the missile defense issue did not begin with the prospect of Washington’s providing advanced missile defense systems for Taiwan but that, indeed, the problem stems in large measure from the deployment of Chinese SRBMs. In January 2002, in Beijing, in a private conversation with a group of prestigious Americans, Vice President Hu Jintao, now the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (and expected to become China’s president) acknowledged that China would be hurt were it to undertake a military attack on Taiwan.34 The door may have been cracked, and it may now be the right time to urge that Beijing become as realistic, practical, and pragmatic about the missile threat that it poses to Taiwan as it expects Washington and Taipei to be concerning the provision of advanced missile defenses.
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The point must be repeatedly emphasized that China is the country that would be hurt most by a PLA attack on Taiwan, and that unification would be a highly unlikely outcome. Instead, the virtually certain outcome would be disaster for China, and likely disaster for the Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). There are other ominous prospects: China’s truly remarkable accomplishments in the past two decades have been its unprecedented national economic growth, its largely successful aspiration to become a responsible member of the community of nations, and its emergence as a regional and potentially global power. An attack on Taiwan would bring all that progress to a halt or even bring about reversal. China’s economic growth is dependent on trade and investment from the United States, Japan, and Taiwan – economic ties that would be broken. The regional stability so important to China’s sustained economic growth would be indefinitely disrupted. Almost universal opprobrium would sully Beijing’s reputation among the nations of the world. China would likely lose much of its Navy and Air Force and could suffer great damage to its civil and military infrastructure. Embarrassment and military defeat coupled with economic decline would put the CCP’s rule in severe jeopardy. Of course, every element of this descriptive list of possible consequences for China is hardly guaranteed. However, such outcomes are more likely than not. At the very least, Beijing needs to have a full realization of the potential for disaster. Progressive Chinese leaders, a category we hope includes Hu Jintao, need to be armed with this perspective so they can counter the possible arguments of advocates of military action against Taiwan – notably including PLA hard-liners. Steeping Chinese leaders in this realistic appraisal of possible outcomes is not best done by finger wagging and diatribes but rather by quiet, persistent diplomatic contacts, growing trust, and private conversations at all levels. The environment is ripe between the United States and Washington for such exchanges, emphasizing that good Sino-US relations bode well for cross–Strait relations. Opportunities of this nature may take unexpected forms. According to news reports35 and private exchanges of information among China-watchers, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, during his visit with US President George W. Bush at Crawford, Texas, in October 2002, offered to reduce or halt missile deployments that threaten Taiwan if Washington would curb arms sales to Taipei. The precise nature of Jiang’s offer has not been clarified and the proposal has not been officially confirmed by Beijing or Washington. This report, however, may be more significant because months earlier, as recalled by some China specialists, Beijing hinted at removing or reducing the SRBM threat to Taiwan if Taipei were to accept the proposition (or principle) of “one China.” The ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs was quick to respond negatively to the most recent reported proposal, obviously concerned about the potential consequences of a reduction of arms sales.36 Many other concerns have been expressed privately about this alleged Crawford proposal. For example, it is pointed out that the SRBMs are mobile missiles that, if relocated rather than destroyed, could be repositioned in a short time. Nevertheless, some future movement of the missiles returning them to locations within range of Taiwan would provide warning and
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arguably imperil China in a crisis. There is also, among many other such concerns, the matter of whether such an arrangement would constitute consultation by Washington with Beijing about arms sales to Taiwan – an anathema in the conduct of US–Taiwan relations. So it is easy to come up with reasons to dismiss this offer and the earlier one as simply being disingenuous, propagandistic “non-starters” that serve Beijing’s interests only or, worse, are nothing better than tricks to weaken and isolate Taiwan. The worst of these conclusions may be true. Nonetheless, Beijing has now, apparently at least twice, acknowledged that its missiles are (1) a significant negative factor in cross–Strait relations; (2) not necessarily a permanent part of the landscape; and (3) could, under some circumstances, be the subject of negotiations for removal or reduction, thereby greatly lessening the most immediate source of intimidation and threat to Taiwan. In the eyes of many observers, these are startling developments, especially when viewed in light of former denial, intransigence, and obfuscation by Chinese officers and officials on the matter of SRBMs threatening Taiwan. This proposal by Beijing, although admittedly controversial, undefined, and dubious, drives home the point that the long road to reducing and possibly eventually eliminating the missile threat to Taiwan will be tortuous and fraught with dilemmas. Opportunities for progress must be pursued imaginatively or even fashioned by pulling on unlikely threads, sometimes turning frustrating PRC words back on Beijing in ways that become helpful in initially unforeseen ways. More energy must be directed to finding ways, even unlikely paths, to achieve progress; less time should be wasted on demonstrating the negative aspects of overtures by both sides; and more attention must be given to seeking openings than to closing newly unlocked doors. If such efforts seem to some to smack of futility, it should be remembered that Beijing may, and certainly should, be increasingly aware of the dangers to China of an attack on Taiwan. It can be hoped that such apprehension, although unspoken by Chinese leaders of course, is a part of the reasoning behind China’s top leaders’ introducing twice the prospect of missile reductions. Taipei is not alone in suffering apprehension, something that is not always fully appreciated in the ROC. Beijing, with each passing year, has more and more to lose by obnoxious conduct toward Taiwan or by making a stupid decision to attack. The fabric of truly comprehensive missile defense, ranging from military to civilian to diplomatic, should make the most of Chinese concerns about the probability of success and possible consequences of its actions in the military arena, for its economy, and for its international stature. There is a chance that the Mainland’s mantra of Taiwan as an inalienable part of China will become a less prominent feature of its political landscape as that concept competes with these other factors in the minds of at least some of China’s new leaders. To reinforce these prospects, Beijing can be made fully aware and be reminded frequently that Taipei and Washington do not wish it ill. Instead, the people of Taiwan and the United States share the desire that China achieve prosperity and an excellent international reputation, goals not at all in consonance with a ballistic missile attack on Taiwan.
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Notes 1 ROC foreign and security policies have been characterized by many strange twists of logic and innovations since 1949. See, for example, chapter 6, entitled “Foreign and Military Policy” in John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 95–113. 2 Beijing’s preferred outcome is a peaceful unification of Taiwan with the Mainland, as described by Michael R. Chambers, “Rising China: A Threat to Its Neighbors?” in Carolyn W. Pumphrey (Ed.), The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications. Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002, p. 75. 3 US Secretary of Defense, Annual Report on the Military of the People’s Republic of China Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, 2002, p. 56. 4 It is pertinent to this speculation about the thinking of Chinese strategists to take into account that, in a limited attack scenario, Beijing may have the luxury of stopping. It might, for example, simply declare at some point that the lesson has been taught to Taipei. This point is offered as a counter to the suggestion that China would have no viable option but to escalate the conflict if Taipei did not cave in. If things go badly in a limited attack, China could, by ceasing military operations and waiting for “another day,” have a reasonable chance of preventing high military losses and severe attacks on China. 5 US Secretary of Defense, Annual Report on the Military of the People’s Republic of China Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, 2002, pp. 2–3. 6 Ibid., pp. 15–16. 7 The JH-7, as it is termed using the Chinese abbreviation for fighter-bomber, is the aircraft referred to in the Annual Report on the Military of the People’s Republic of China as the FB-7. Similarly, the Chinese J-10 is referred to often in the West as the F-10, as with other PLAAF and PLANAF fighter aircraft. The Russian-origin Su-27s assembled in China are called the J-11. 8 J-10 initial deployment (in the Nanjing Military Region) was reported but not confirmed in late 2002. “J10A Deployed in Chinese Forces,” Kanwa Urgent News, November 26, 2002. 9 The US DoD 2002 Annual Report on the Military of the People’s Republic of China, p. 15. 10 The author is not aware of information that the PLA is converting older airframes to unmanned aircraft. Speculation in this regard is apparently based, at least in part, on simple logic: Employing aircraft with little conventional capability in the modern air battle environment would entail great risk to pilots, who are not easily replaced. Conversion to unmanned platforms would at least be an option available to China. 11 US Secretary of Defense, Annual Report on the Military of the People’s Republic of China Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, 2002, pp. 3, 15. 12 Ibid., p. 2. The DoD 2002 report states: “China has approximately 350 short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) already in its deployed inventory, increasing at about 50 missiles per year. The accuracy and lethality of this force also are increasing.” 13 http://www.nti.org/db/china/wbmdat.htm 14 Mark A. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age of Global Missile Defense: Challenges and Responses,” in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (Eds), China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002, p. 116. 15 Ibid., p. 113.
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16 Evan S. Medeiros, Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Views from Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo. Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2001, p. 12. 17 Mark A. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age of Global Missile Defense: Challenges and Responses,” p. 113. 18 US Secretary of Defense, Annual Report on the Military of the People’s Republic of China, p. 52. 19 For a description of these systems, see Federation of American Scientists, Taiwan Air Defense Overview, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/taiwan/air-defense-over.htm 20 For an inventory of Taiwan Air Force aircraft for selected years from 1985 to 2010 (projections), see Global Security, Taiwan Air Force, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/world/taiwan/airforce.htm 21 For another perspective on, and description of, the military and political options available to Taiwan for missile defense, see Phillip C. Saunders and Lora L. Saalman, Taiwan’s Response to China’s Missile Buildup Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, October 2002, http://www.nti.org/ e_research/e3_17a.html 22 Evan S. Medeiros, op. cit., p. 3. 23 For a Beijing perspective on Tien Kong II, see Qiu Xu: “Taiwan Develops Homemade ‘Patriot’ Missiles To Counter PLA Missiles,” Beijing Qingnian Cankao, FBIS Document ID: CPP20021002000038, Entry Date: 10/02/2002. 24 Mark A. Stokes, op. cit., p. 120. 25 Evan S. Medeiros, op. cit., p. 3, plus amplifying information from private sources. 26 Mark A. Stokes, op. cit., p. 121. 27 Evan S. Medeiros, op. cit., p. 3. 28 Mark A. Stokes, op. cit., p. 119. 29 Evan S. Medeiros, op. cit., p. 4. 30 Mark A. Stokes, op. cit., p. 118. 31 US President George W. Bush in a statement issued by the White House on June 13, 2002, on the occasion of the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The statement includes the following: “I am committed to deploying a missile defense system as soon as possible to protect the American people and our deployed forces against the growing missile threats we face… . Because these threats also endanger our allies and friends around the world, it is essential that we work together to defend against them, an important task the ABM Treaty prohibited.” 32 Ibid. 33 Phillip C. Saunders, Project Strait Talk: Security and Stability in the Taiwan Strait. Monterey, California: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 27, 2000, http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/research/ strait/index.htm), pp. 5, 16. 34 Private correspondence to the author by members of this prestigious (but unofficial) American delegation that spoke at length in January 2002 with Vice President Hu Jintao. Those reports went on to say that Hu did not resort to use of the formula that Beijing could not renounce the use of force, although it seemed in the context of the conversation that he almost certainly would feel the obligation to inject that statement. 35 “MOFA blasts Beijing missile offer,” Taipei Times, November 2002. 36 Ibid.
10 Air base defense Taiwan’s defensive responses to China’s missile threat Ming-Yen Tsai
Introduction Due to its enduring nature, the confrontation across the Taiwan Strait has become to be regarded as one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region. When the Taiwanese had their first ever presidential elections in March 1996, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) carried out military exercises and tested missiles within the vicinity of Taiwan’s territorial waters in an attempt to coerce the Taiwan’s leaders and the general electorate to abandon their independence ambitions. This incident led to the international community taking the potential for a war across the Taiwan Strait more seriously. Consequently, a great deal of literature has examined the different potential military options that the PRC would consider were it either to invade or coerce Taiwan.1 It is generally believed that, were a military conflict to break out in the Taiwan Strait, the absolute prerequisites for the PRC to conduct any successful coercion or invasion strategy would be through the control of the air.2 To China, the first consideration would be to establish air superiority in order to ensure it had the freedom of action to conduct various operations against Taiwan’s forces and to protect the Chinese prosperous coastal areas from the Taiwanese Air Force’s retaliation. In the event of a conflict, therefore, it is highly likely that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would mount surprise assaults against Taiwan’s air bases in an effort to neutralize Taiwan’s Air Force at the very beginning of a war. China would most likely conduct surprise attacks against Taiwan’s air bases and ground installations. However, any large-scale ground attack against Taiwan’s air bases is unlikely to come as a complete surprise. Taiwan’s forces would most probably be well aware of the presence of PLA ground forces through various intelligence channels. The ground threat encountered by Taiwan’s air bases might also include small-scale harassment attacks conducted by terrorists or Chinese special operations forces (SOF). To counter such ground threats would not be that difficult; the most effective way would be to build highly mobile security forces with robust detection capabilities. On the whole, however, the most serious threat to Taiwan’s air bases would come from the PLA’s air assaults, especially were ballistic and cruise missiles used. It is envisaged that these strikes would come at short notice and could seriously disrupt Taiwan’s Air Force.
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This chapter argues that the threat posed to Taiwan’s air bases by PLA missiles is something that deserves increased attention. It has narrowed the scope of the analysis to focus on the following questions: (1) How could China readily use available missiles to effectively attack Taiwan’s airfields? (2) What are the major vulnerabilities of Taiwan’s air bases against China’s missile attacks? And (3) what defensive options could Taiwan take to minimize the impact of Chinese missile attacks on operating airbases? It is suggested here that the PLA has seen control of the air as the prerequisite for any military options against Taiwan. Meanwhile, the PLA has given top priority in recent years to the improvement and deployment of its missiles capability. In the face of the threat arising out of the PLA’s missile systems, Taiwan needs to bolster its active and passive defense capabilities to reduce air bases’ losses and to make every effort to keep the ROC Air Force operable in order to deny China’s command of the air and, thereby, to deter China’s attempt at invasion.
The threat from the PLA’s missiles The Gulf War of 1991 added to Chinese leaders’ sense of urgency in obtaining advanced military technology. United States (US) capabilities in offensive air operations during that war, including its use of advanced conventional and stealth fighters, precision-guided munitions (PGM), and sea and air launched cruise missiles for precision strikes, deeply impressed the PLA. As a consequence, China has increased its investment in developing key technologies, including new types of missiles, fighter aircraft, and C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) systems for future contingencies in the Taiwan Straits.3 With its growing military capabilities, China poses a potential threat of armed coercion or actual assault on Taiwan in at least four major ways: (1) via adopting intimidation tactics, including military exercises, weapons displays, and confrontation with Taiwan forces either at sea or in the air; (2) via a naval blockade or interdiction; (3) via a direct missile and/or air attack on Taiwan’s territory or against strategic targets; and (4) via a full-scale amphibious invasion backed up by strategic bombardment and possibly internal disruption.4 China may have a number of operation alternatives as to the phasing and timing of a coercion strategy or an actual attack on Taiwan. Nevertheless, any military options against Taiwan would require a substantial measure of air superiority; if that air supremacy were lost, the cost in casualties to PLA on the ground, at sea, and in the air would rise dramatically. In order to gain air superiority, the main strategy is to seize the initiative by carrying the war into enemy territory, neutralizing its air power, and thereby establishing control of the air to provide the necessary freedom of action for the subsequent action.5 In the event of the situation becoming tense, the PLA’s priority would be to conduct effective ways to neutralize the ROC Air Force. Since China’s 1995 and 1996 missile tests, Beijing’s arsenal of ballistic missiles has figured prominently as a major coercive instrument vis-à-vis Taiwan. The PLA has emphasized that missile attacks on important enemy assets would enable them to
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seize the battlefield initiative, undermine the enemy’s will to resist, and accelerate the progress of the war.6 Any future Chinese invasion scenario is, therefore, likely to begin with a barrage of Chinese missiles raining down on key military targets on Taiwan. With the Chinese development and deployment of new missile systems, Taiwan’s air bases would be greatly endangered during wartime. Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) China is concentrating on the development of two theater SRBM systems: the DF-15 and the DF-11 (See Table 10. 1). The DF-15 has a solid propellant and a range of 600 kilometers. The missile has a 100-meter circular error of probability (CEP) and is therefore moderately accurate. The DF-15 has an attitude control mechanism that permits steering corrections from launch to impact; its potential maneuverability could complicate any missile defense radar’s tracking system and foil any subsequent interception.7 The DF-11 also has a solid propellant and is a road-mobile SRBM with an estimated range of 300 kilometers. The main advantage of the DF-11 over the DF-15 is its ability to carry a larger payload. Some sources credit the 300-kilometer version with an 800-kilogram warhead and a 150-meter CEP.8 The DF-15 and the DF-11 missiles deployed opposite Taiwan once launched require only 6–8 minutes to reach Taiwan. Given that the missiles would be launched with little prior warning, they would be hard to engage. So far, the PRC has deployed more than 400 DF-15 and DF-11 SRBMs targeted against Taiwan. These missiles are deployed in such areas as Jiangshan (Zhejiang Province), Yongan, Xianyou, Nanping (Fujiang Province), and Leping (Jiangxi Province). (See Map 10.1) Meanwhile, China has stepped up the pace by adding fifty new missiles a year. Some of these new missiles have been identified as DF-15 Mod 2s that have a longer range and can be launched sooner than its original version.9 It was reported that China would have the capacity to produce as many as 1,000 SRBMs before 2010. With each missile at an estimated cost of US $500,000, China could produce up to 1,000 SRBMs at a total cost of $500 million. According to the assessment of the ROC’s Ministry of National Defense, an M-family missile with a 500-kilogram warhead would create a hole 10 meters in depth and 20 meters in width on impact. If this were the case, it would take at least fifty missiles to destroy a military airfield.10 Other sources, however, have Table 10.1 The PLA’s SRBMs System
Range
Payload
Fuel
Initial deployment
DF-15/m-9 SRBM DF-11/M-11 SRBM DF-11/M-11 SRBM Mode 2
600 km 300 km 500 km
500 kg 800 kg 800 kg
Solid/TEL Solid/TEL Solid/TEL
1990 1990 2001
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CHINA
Jiangshan Nanping Yongan Xianyou
TAIWAN
Map 10.1 The range of China’s SRBMs.
pointed out that the DF-15 armed with a high explosive warhead could create a crater as large as 30–50 meters in diameter.11 Moreover, China is currently working on improvements to its existing missile systems that would dramatically reduce the CEP to between 24 and 40 meters.12 It is worth noting that if China increases its warhead efficiency and upgrades the performance of these missiles with a global positioning system (GPS) or global navigation satellite system (GLONASS), the number of missiles needed to destroy Taiwan’s airfields could be achieved with as few as ten ballistic missiles.13 Cruise missiles Apart from ballistic missiles, the PRC is also developing its own cruise missiles. The programs are grouped into two families: the Hai-Ying (HY – Sea Eagle) and Ying-Ji (YJ – Eagle Strike) series. The HY-1 series are derived from the Soviet Styx missile. The air-launched version of the HY-2A has a range of 108 kilometers and is already deployed on PLA Navy (PLAN) H-6D bombers. An extendedrange version of the HY-2 can reach out 134 kilometers, cruising at Mach .8 using active radar guidance and carrying a 500-kilogram warhead. The groundlaunched HY-3 carries a 510-kilogram warhead 130 kilometers using active radar guidance. China’s follow-on generation of cruise missiles, the YJ series, is based on the French Exocet. The YJ-1 entered service in 1985; although limited with a
144 Ming-Yen Tsai range of only 40 kilometers, it has been deployed on the Han-class nuclear attack submarine, which must surface to fire the missile. The YJ-2 uses active radar guidance and cruises at Mach .9 with a range of 120 kilometers carrying a 165-kilogram warhead.14 Cruise missiles have at least two advantages over ballistic missiles and aircraft. Cruise missiles are cheaper to produce – they are generally one-third the cost of ballistic missiles. Assuming an SRBM unit (missile and launch mechanisms) costs $500,000, then the unit cost of an air launched cruise missile (ALCM) could be as little as $175,000. Moreover, with a low weight, they tend to be more easily transportable than ballistic missiles. Unlike ballistic missiles whose flight time is calculated only in terms of minutes, long-range cruise missiles can take several hours to reach their targets. Long flight times within the atmosphere means that unpredictable winds can impact on the missile’s course resulting in the need for GPS or GLONASS guidance to reduce missile route navigation errors.15 So far, the PLA has tried to accelerate the YJ-8A ALCM development program. This weapon is believed to be the first in which China is incorporating GPS/GLONASS guidance into its missiles.16
Anti-radiation missiles The PLA has also devoted significant attention to the development of cruise missiles with passive seekers to counter enemy defensive radar systems. The PLA has considered ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) as “killer weapons” (shashoujian) for priority development. Western sources have designated China’s new family of ARMs as the YJ-9; the missile may have been influenced by Russia’s Kh-31P or Israel’s STAR-1 ARM systems.17 A superior missile capability appears to have become the PLA’s top development priority. This force is being upgraded through aggressive efforts to introduce advanced technologies. What is more, the preceding study of the PLA’s missile inventory makes the threat to Taiwan’s air bases abundantly clear. In any case, to add to a better understanding of this analysis, the varied nature of these threats has been categorized as shown in Table 10.2. Quite clearly, through the employment of various missile systems, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and ARMs, separately or in combination, the PLA would be able to mount decisive attacks on Table 10.2 Options of China’s missile attacks on Taiwan’s air bases Types of missiles
SRBMs
Cruise missiles
z
z
z
z
z
z
Types of attacks Physical attacks on elements in airbases CB warfare (Basewide CB contamination) Information warfare (attacks on EW radar, and C2 facilities)
Anti-radiation missiles
z
Taiwan’s defensive responses to China’s missile threat 145 Taiwan’s air bases. A potential scenario could include: 1 2 3
conventional physical attacks on significant facilities within Taiwan’s air bases; information warfare against early warning (EW) radar and command and control (C2) facilities in Taiwan’s airfields; and chemical–biological warfare (CBW) to inflict base-wide CB contamination. Such attacks would have a deadly effect on operations and the number of sorties by Taiwan’s Air Force.
Taiwan’s airbase vulnerability Air bases are a major source of the ROC Air Force’s fighting potential. The appropriate location and deployment of airbases could enable the country to bring its air force into full play. Taiwan is an island, with Central Mountains rising to almost 14,000 feet, lying in the middle and dividing the country into Western and Eastern sectors. This has led to a situation whereby Taiwan is only able to build its airfields in the flat areas along both Eastern and Western coastal areas (see Map 10.2). Since the PRC is now using satellite guidance technologies to upgrade its missile arsenal, its capability to adopt highly accurate attacks against significant elements in airfields has been improved significantly. Under the current situation, and in the face of the PLA’s missile threats, Taiwanese air bases are vulnerable. In surveying Taiwan air bases’ potential operability under wartime conditions, some studies conclude the major weaknesses as the following.18 First, above ground fuel storage tanks and tanker trucks in Taiwan airfields would attract Chinese missile attacks and be prime targets. In the case of a largescale Chinese missile assault on Taiwan’s airfields, Taiwan’s Air Force fuel supply might be cut and curtailed, having a major impact on its ability to send aircraft sorties. Second, unbuttressed avionics facilities and support systems exposed on Taiwan’s airfields could be put out of action by Chinese missile firepower. Third, Taiwan’s Air Force relies heavily on fixed surveillance radars and unhardened command posts and these facilities also would be vulnerable to missile attack. Fourth, in addition to attacking Taiwan with missiles armed with conventional high explosives, the possibility exists that China may use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against Taiwan. During wartime, the PRC might also employ missiles armed with biological–chemical warheads especially against Taiwan’s large military targets such as air bases. Such an eventuality could inflict major damage to fighters, facilities, and aircrew in Taiwan’s air bases. In order to maintain its Air Force operability during wartime, Taiwan would have to increase aircraft survivability as well as ensure that its support facilities remained operational. In the event of war, Taiwan’s unbuttressed facilities, such as aircraft, runways, fuel supply sites, aircrew, surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, EW radar, and C2 facilities would likely be high-priority targets for Chinese missiles. So far, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) enjoys a greater quantitative edge compared with Taiwan’s Air Force. This makes it imperative for the ROC Air Force to
146 Ming-Yen Tsai
Taoyuan Airbase (F-5E/F; RF-5E) Sungshan Airbase
Hsinchu Airbase (Mirage 2000–5)
CCK Airbase (IDF)
Hwalien Airbase (F-16 A/B) Chiayi Airbase (F-16 A/B)
Tainan Airbase (IDF)
Kangshan Airbase (T-34C; AT-3)
Taitung Airbase F-5E/F Pingtung Airbase (E-2T; C-130)
Map 10.2 Locations of Taiwan’s airbases.
make the most of the smaller force structure by sustaining its ability to generate more sorties during the period of conflict.
Active defenses Active defenses are to detect, identify, track, and destroy offensive systems, that is, the ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that China would use to attack Taiwan’s airfields. In general, it is not that hard to engage slow flying cruise missiles with anti-missile systems and radar-guided air defense guns. In the near term, however, effective anti-ballistic missile systems are unlikely to become available for Taiwan. Land-based air defense has been deployed, mainly supported by the US-made
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PAC-2-plus and the locally developed Tien-Kuang (Sky Bow) systems. These systems are designed to intercept aircraft fighters and cruise missiles and may have only a limited capability against ballistic missiles. Even though Taiwan would be able to deploy more advanced systems such as the PAC-3s in the future, these would only be moderately effective. PAC-3s might help to diminish the number of Chinese missile strikes and thereby reduce the damage absorbed by Taiwan, but they would fail to guarantee total immunity from Chinese missile attacks. Over the medium and long term, Taiwan might have the chance to introduce more sophisticated defenses that could provide more warning time and be more efficient and effective. The current US proposals for dealing with ballistic missile attacks include: “lower-tier Theater Missile Defense” (TMD), “upper-tier TMD,” “National Missile Defense” (NMD), and “Boost-phase Intercept” (BPI). Currently, these air defense projects are not proven technology and will cost billions of dollars to complete. Taiwan has sought US assistance with an upgraded lower-tier TMD to augment its current deployment of PAC-2 and Tien-Kung systems. Taiwan has recently purchased two Raytheon early-warning radar systems, which will be operational by 2005, and has also planned to buy Aegis destroyers from the United States. Meanwhile, it has also considered participating in the US planned TMD system currently under development with Japan. Given that the threat arising from Chinese missile attacks is becoming urgent, Taiwan has announced that it might pursue developing an anti-missile defense system (AMD) on its own if direct foreign support is blocked. Taiwan’s R&D efforts would center on two indigenous projects: the first project could involve the development of an Aegis-type capability by fitting a sea-borne version of the locally developed Chiang-Bai radar on four PFG-7 frigates; the second is to develop a system similar to the US Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. The integration of C4ISR, however, would be a massive undertaking, the completion of which is forecast to take between 10 and 20 years.19 It is clear that exclusive reliance on active defenses against ballistic missile would be extraordinarily costly and time-consuming. Thus, while developing an AMD capability, Taiwan would have also to adopt passive defenses to reduce the effectiveness of Chinese theater ballistic and cruise missile strikes.
Passive defense Passive defenses are defenses employed by the defender to reduce the impact of attacks by enhancing its own ability to absorb and recover from such attacks.20 In the case of the PLA’s missile attacks, Taiwan could at least take the following five passive defense measures to counter the threat. They include: (1) tactical warning and evacuation operations; (2) hardening; (3) dispersion; (4) deception and jamming; and (5) recovery. Tactical warning and evacuation operations The best countermeasure to PLA missile attacks is the upgrading of Taiwan’s early warning capability so as to better enable the evacuation of aircraft to a safer
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shelter. Enclosed in underground shelters in the Eastern terrain of Central Mountains, Taiwan has built sanctuaries for its fighter aircraft in an attempt to shelter its fighters during wartime. The construction of the Chia-shan base, which began in 1985, took seven years to complete and cost about NT$27.2 billion.21 This air base has underground power generators, a microwave landing system to facilitate multiple landing and takeoffs, and several months’ supply of food, fuel, and military stores. The base can contain up to 200 fighter aircraft, and is the largest base of its kind in the Far East. Given this, Taiwan should upgrade its surveillance capability to monitor the deployment and movement of China’s missile arsenal. Should the situation become tense, Taiwan would have to evacuate the main portion of its air fleet, such as the Mirage 2000s and F-16s into the Chia-shan underground base. Evacuation involves complicated operations, including identifying dispersal assets and methods, loading trucks with equipment and materials, and changing dispersal routes as needed to reflect the prevailing situation. This also requires massive manpower and equipment assets for transportation. Thus, the greater the amount of warning time Taiwan can have, the more effective the dispersal will become. Another problem Taiwan should keep in mind is that although the base would be difficult to hit with missiles fired from Mainland China (it faces East, the opposite direction from the Mainland), the PLA has sought to develop the capability to fire air, sea, or submarine-launched cruise missiles from Taiwan’s Northeast. China could acquire such capabilities within a period of between 5 and 10 years. So far, China has only sent marine survey vessels into Taiwan’s Eastern waters many times in an attempt to collect more information on the Chia-shan underground base.22 In anticipation of attacks from PLAN sea launched cruise missiles, Taiwan has incorporated hardened bombproof doors that can withstand the shock of a potential direct hit. Hardening Hardening, in general terms, includes all physical measures employed to prevent or reduce the loss of critical base facilities due to the destructive effects of enemy attacks. Hardened shelters could provide the necessary protection against any missile attacks that the PLA might attempt to shower on Taiwan’s air bases. Taiwan would do well to construct further hardened shelters for its aircraft fighters, fuel supply sites, avionics-repair equipment, and command and control systems. In addition, hardening could also help protect significant airbase elements from contamination in the event of a direct hit by chemical and biological warheads. The threat that Taiwan is facing is essentially similar to that encountered by NATO’s air forces in the 1970s and 1980s. NATO’s air forces were faced with a situation where the opposing Warsaw Pact countries not only outnumbered their own but were also likely to launch the first strike against their air bases. That first move could have included massive air, missile and SOF attacks against significant targets in NATO’s air bases. To ensure air base operability, NATO therefore made enormous investments in passive defense measures. These measures
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included the burying of fuel storage and pipelines so as to enable aircraft fighters to be fueled under their shelters rather than by vulnerable tanker trucks in open ground. Meanwhile, maintenance facilities, engineering equipment, runway-repair materials were all hardened. It was expensive to construct sufficient hardened shelters, but these efforts were critical to keeping NATO’s air forces operational had war erupted in the region of central Europe.23 Deception and jamming In order to increase aircraft survivability, Taiwan could also resort to misinforming the enemy by engaging in camouflage operations; this would reduce the effectiveness of PLA targeting. Camouflage, both natural and artificial, could be used to conceal high-risk target areas and to further complicate enemy targeting. For example, the ROC Air Force could manufacture false runways and “dummy” airplanes to deceive PLA forces and cause them to waste their munitions on nontargets. In addition, critical facilities and targets could be made to appear destroyed with the placement of burning rubble, painted murals or other camouflage operations. Such measures were used by Iraq during the Gulf War and by Serb forces in Kosovo and served to create a highly effective level of deception. In addition, the PLA’s efforts to exploit GPS/GLONASS in the guidance modes for missile systems could improve their accurate strike capability, but they would be also accompanied by a new set of vulnerabilities. Equipment such as GPS, optical systems, radar, and seekers can be jammed. Given this, Taiwan should seek to cooperate with the United States in developing the ability to effectively jam these signals over both Taiwan’s own territory and the Taiwan Straits, so as to disable accurate Chinese missile attacks.24 Dispersion “Dispersal” is the relocation of forces for the purpose of increasing survivability. To deal with the missile threat, the ROC Air Force might need to abandon aircraft operations from fixed operating bases and disperse operations, in groups of between 5 and 10 aircraft, to civilian highway strips. A precedent for this approach was set by Sweden during the period of the Cold War to great effect. The purpose of this option would be to complicate the PLA’s targeting problem by dispersing what was a single large target into many much smaller ones. Military aircraft, nevertheless, are at their most vulnerable when they are exposed on the ground. Given this, Taiwan could build a number of hardstands for aircraft parking ramps along the major highways. The number of hardstands should also exceed that of operating aircraft. The length of the highways would maximize the number of missiles required to attack aircraft. Assuming that China has accurate data on where ROC aircraft are stationed, the number of missiles required to successfully attack and destroy those aircraft increases with the distance between hardstands, until that distance between hardstands is so great that each aircraft must be targeted individually25 (see Figure 10.1).
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Hardstands
Figure 10.1 Additional aircraft parking-ramp along highways to maximize enemy weapons requirements.
Projects on dispersal are involved in complicated logistics and require maintenance manpower and equipment across all the alternate operating sites. Each air wing would need to increase its maintenance personnel in many specialties and be able to transport specialists rapidly from one dispersed operating location to another. Meanwhile, in order to prevent China from identifying the dispersed operating locations through satellite imagery or human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, it would require that these dispersed operating locations be capable of rapidly moving between alternative operating sites. This would require Taiwan to devise completely new logistic concepts and to introduce advanced C2 systems. Though such a strategy would be expensive to complete, it would help increase the Taiwan Air Force’s survivability against missile attacks. Recovery The quick recovery of airbases from enemy attacks is key to maintaining air force operability. Building the capability to conduct airbase damage repair (ADR) in response to Chinese missile attacks will be critical to the ROC Air Force’s operability. This includes the capacity to carry out emergency repair of the air base paved surfaces, which is usually termed “rapid runway repair” (RRR). Following a hostile attack, it is essential that an effective damage assessment operation be completed before any repairs can be accomplished. During wartime, repair departments of Taiwan’s Air Force must be able to accurately identify the areas of damage, the extent of the damage in each area, and make an approximate assessment what will be required to repair the damage. Damage assessment activities are mainly separated into two distinct areas: one is runway damage assessment; the other is facility damage assessment. Runway damage assessment involves the assessment of damage to runway surfaces, taxiway surfaces, and any other collateral damage encountered. Main facility damage assessment includes assessment of damage to all air base facilities and utilities.26 Both repair operations would be of equal importance and, if resources permit, these should be conducted simultaneously during the time of war. Even so, they also require sufficient operational preparation and training practice by Taiwan’s Air Force during peacetime.
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Conclusions With the growing missile threats posed by China, the question of how to ensure air bases remain operational during wartime has become a serious challenge to Taiwan’s Air Force. Following an examination of the PLA missile threat situation and Taiwan’s air base vulnerabilities, this analysis concludes that Taiwan would need to adopt a mix of passive and active defense options to better increase the ROC Air Force’s survivability in the event of Chinese missile attacks. In addition to developing AMD systems, Taiwan’s Air Force would also have to adopt such passive defenses as early warning, evacuation operations, hardening, dispersion, deception, jamming, rapid repair, so as to increase survivability and ensure operability during wartime. Effective completion of all these defensive measures, however, would certainly come at a substantial cost. Given this, Taiwan could also take into account the feasibility for adopting offensive counterforce operations while still persisting with defensive measures. The most economic approach to countering theater missile operations is to attack and destroy these missiles prior to their launch. This requires that Taiwan develop a military force capable of carrying out an attack on the source, aiming at PLA’s missile troops. Whether or not it is advisable to adjust the military strategy and consider adopting tactical preemptive strikes may require Taiwan to make further assessments. After all, the net assessment of offense–defense balance is an aggregate of all the geographic, military, technical, economic, social, and diplomatic factors.
Notes 1 For example, see Roy, Denny, “Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” Survival, 42(1) Spring, 2000, pp. 76–96; Klinworth, Gary, “Chinese Defense Modernization and the Security of Taiwan,” in Pollack, Jonathan D. et al. (Eds) In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development. Santa Monica, RAND, 1998, pp. 153–68. 2 Schlapak, David, Orletsky, David, and Wilson, Barry, Dire Strait: Military Aspects of the China–Taiwan Confrontation and Options for US Policy. Santa Monica, RAND, 2000, pp. 10–11. 3 Cole, Bernard and Godwin, Paul, “Advanced Military Technology and the PLA Priorities and Capabilities for the 21st Century,” in Wortzel, Larry (Ed.), The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century. Carlisle, SSI Army War College, 2000, p. 162. 4 Swaine, Michael and Mulvernon, James, Taiwan’s Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and Determinants. Santa Monica, RAND, 2001, p. 114. 5 Kak, Kapil, “A Century of Air Power: Lessons and Pointers,” Strategic Analysis, 24 (12) March 2001, p. 2115. 6 Christensen, Thomas, “Posing Problems without Catching up,” International Security, 25 (4) Spring 2001, p. 26. 7 Strokes, Mark, “China’s Military Space and Conventional Theater Development: Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait,” in Puska, Susan (Ed.), People’s Liberation Army After Next, Carlisle, SSI Army War College, 2000, p. 29. 8 Ibid., p. 120. 9 Gertz, Bill, “Missiles Bolstered Opposite Taiwan,” The Washington Times, April 29, 2002. 10 “Taiwan Looks to Buy More Patriot Missiles,” Central News Agency (Taipei) December 15, 1998. 11 Strokes, Mark, op. cit., p. 120.
152 Ming-Yen Tsai 12 Ibid., pp. 91–2. 13 O’Hanlon, Michael, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security, 25(2) (Fall 2000) p. 81. 14 Cole, Bernard and Godwin Paul, op. cit., p. 197. 15 Orletsky, David et al., Air Base Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise Missiles and Ballistic Missiles. Santa Monica, RAND, 1999, p. 10. 16 Cole, Bernard and Godwin, Paul, op. cit., p. 198. 17 “Russia Boosts Asian Naval Links,” Jane’s International Defense Review, December 1997, p. 6. 18 Shalpak, David et al., op. cit., pp. 32–3; Also Klinworth op. cit., pp. 161–2. 19 “Taiwan’s Survival Strategy,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 13, 2000, p. 19. 20 Orletsky, Thomas et al., op. cit., p. 29 21 “Military Struts its Stuff before Lunar New Year,” The Taipei Times, January 26, 2000. 22 “China’s Off-shore Defense Surveying Taiwan’s Back Door,” United Daily News (Taipei), October 30, 2002. 23 Shalpak, David et al., op. cit., p. 34. 24 Ibid., p. 56. 25 This idea is a revised version of RAND’s proposal to protect US aircraft deployed in the Middle East from Iraqi missile attacks in theater conflict. See, Orletsky, David et al., op. cit., pp. 35–8. 26 US Department of the Army, Air Base Damage Repair, Washington, US Department of the Army, 1988, chapter 8.
Part V
Taiwan’s Air Force and future requirements
11 Military culture and air force restructuring Chien Chung
Introduction According to the recent Republic of China (ROC) Defense White Paper 2002, the downsized Taiwan Air Force (ROCAF) “shall defend the airspace over land, territorial water, and protect the (nation’s) sovereignty, together with Army and Navy through joint operations.” To protect the national sovereignty, the ROCAF has to flex its muscles to cover the disputed islets of Senkaku Retto and Spratly, though the latter is too far away to be covered from the air. The more practical mission for ROCAF, therefore, is to protect Taiwan’s airspace – Taiwan-ADIZ (21N to 27N and 117.5E to 123E)1 – and to acquire and retain air superiority therein during times of crisis. Four years ago, the Office of Net Assessment of the United States Department of Defense (USDOD) issued a stern warning that the fighting capability of Taiwan’s armed forces would fall well below those of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by 2005. In a recently and somewhat emotional speech the Commander-in-Chief of the ROCAF opined that the PLA would never match the fighting capability of the ROCAF, even by 2500.2 Everyone present, however, noticed that the ROCAF would have to be qualitatively better than their PLA counterparts in order to offset their fewer numbers particularly when compared with the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) across the Taiwan Strait. The question this raises is how can the ROCAF ensure this qualitative superiority? The question is the focus of this chapter. The fighting capability of any armed forces consists of three parts: military hardware; software; and leadership. Military hardware reflects the quantity (such as a “bean count” of aircraft, missiles, radar, etc). Military software is a mixture of both quantity (e.g. joint operations and Command Control Communications and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR); and the quality of leadership that bears on such things as levels and depth of Service morale. The quantity of ROCAF and PLAAF air assets are covered elsewhere in this volume; consequently, this chapter report puts the quality of ROCAF under a diagnostic microscope and in particular focuses on the Taiwanese military culture. The objective is then to take the discussion further and offer suggestions for ROCAF force restructuring.
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Unique culture Military culture is a combination of a tradition, a habit, and a unique character. It is usually dominated and heavily influenced by moral and ethical standards, race identity, and national heritage. Air force culture is a subculture of military or even national culture. In order to cope with the rapid change of the outside world, military culture, and subculture evolve, and are not revolutionized. A culture and subculture, which cannot evolve in time will, by their very nature, face extinction within a relatively short period of time. The ROCAF’s culture consists of a heritage that dates back to the SinoJapanese War of 1937. Today, there are at least ten characteristics of an air force culture that need to evolve in order to cope with a rapid changing world: 1
2
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A nation’s fighting capability is an accumulation of experience, courage, and teamwork, rather than a systematic combination of theory, doctrine, experiment, training, and quality assurance. In addition, the pilots in air forces, and the ROCAF is no exception, they form life-and-death relationships with their aircrew, rather than among all air force personnel. Pilots are the focal point; as a consequence, others in the ROCAF are always defocused. Pilots, in particular the fighter pilots, attract most attention, assimilate most resources, despite the fact that fighter pilots numbered only 0.9 percent of the total personnel. Following a global tradition, pilots and their dependents are segregated from other colleagues in all aspects, military and nonmilitary, of service life: cafeteria, housing, excursion trips for “pilots only,” etc. These arrangements only serve to demoralize others serving in the air force in the absence of sound leadership, by example.3 Half a century ago, US military advisors laid out a strategic plan for the ROCAF. This plan, now largely obsolete, called for passive air defenses and an acceptance of a high attrition rate in the attempt to reduce or destroy the invader’s aircraft. This defensive plan was thought to be sufficient to allow the United States enough time to come to the aid of Taiwan and to limit the damage inflicted from PLAAF aircraft and missiles. Today, the defense of Taiwan with the assistance of allies (if there are any) is considered by many to be both uncertain and unrealistic. They argue that the ROCAF’s strategic plan has to be overhauled. An ensuing war of attrition with the PLAAF would only lead to delays in an inevitable “doomsday” scenario. “A powerful father and an influential wife are worth a gold mine,” is a traditional saying that has been voiced in China for thousands years. The ROCAF is a melting pot; its commissioned officers, male as well as female, are graduates from academies of various disciplines. There should therefore be a fair, open human recruitment and promotion system in place of one that is too prone to interference and nepotism. The concept of quality assurance, following the rules and regulations (i.e. according to “the book”), and strict law enforcement should be loosely followed within the ROCAF. In some cases, the execution of the ROCAF’s
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roles and mission can only be executed as a consequence of habit, memory, attitude, and friendship. In fact, any world class air force, and the ROCAF with its “zero fault” policy, must be governed strictly “by the book.” Instead of serving and listening to his men, the superior Taiwanese Air Force Officer always points his finger at his men. This is a general characteristic of senior personnel’s behavior throughout Taiwanese business, industry, bureaucracy, and the military. If the superior officer can change his attitude to serve and to listen to his men more, he should be able to manage and lead his men more effectively. Any wrongdoing in the ROCAF has become a life-and-death matter. For this there is a heavy penalty right up to a dishonorable discharge, a system that makes officers and men reluctant soldiers. The carrot should accompany the stick at all times. “Hiding the evil and promoting the good” is also a tradition in both family and country. However, the information age has allowed the media to unearth scandals and “dirt” faster than ever. The ROCAF should officially issue press releases at the very outbreak of adverse publicity before the situation gets out of control. “Maintenance, repair, and procurement” should be in that order of preference. Keeping obsolete equipment at a state of combat readiness is essential when there is no other way to acquire modern alternatives. However, the ROCAF has over-reacted in its habit of holding on to everything, from aircraft right down to office equipment. Political warfare and infighting is endemic within the ROCAF. The system should be transformed to serve Taiwan and not pursue the parochial interests of the ROCF itself. Defection is already a common practice. Pilots, ground crew, supporting personnel, and political officers are all in the same boat to which the ROCAF code of discipline should apply equally to all personnel.
Downsizing Taiwan’s armed forces have completed the first phase of personnel reductions from 460,000 to 385,000. Correspondingly, the ROCAF was reduced from 65,000 to 55,000 men and women between 1997 and 2001. In the last phase of military downsizing, the armed forces will be reduced further by an estimated 85,000 to a total of 300,000. The total ROCAF establishment will then drop to a total of 40,000.4 The strength of combat air wings, however, together with the number of aircraft has not been cut on a pro rata basis. That is to say, the supporting personnel in the ROCAF will be reduced by 50 percent if the air force keeps its pilots and service crew intact. The efficiency of the ROCAF support units will be reduced with the following side effects: (a) Without logistic, maintenance, and repair support, pilots will have to share the administrative work of their squadrons, such as non-combat-related paper work.
158 Chien Chung (b) The positions for senior commissioned officers will no longer conform to the normal distribution curve after the downsizing. The lack of vacancies for Major General, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, and Major have produced an imbalance with ratios, respectively, of 1 : 11 : 31 : 62. Bottlenecks have appeared since downsizing, and promotion to one-star General is now next to impossible. (c) Officers and men have to endure endless work after downsizing. In order to keep the combat-readiness of the ROCAF, officers and men have to work overtime most of the time. Job satisfaction has deteriorated and complaints from the families of tired and exhausted air force personnel are not unusual. (d) Reductions to the numbers of Military and ROCAF personnel have not, however, affected bureaucratic complexity. The nightmarish quantity of paper work after downsizing has worsened, arising from the cuts in number of staff both in the ROCAF as well as in the other two armed services. (e) There are many unnecessary tasks and roles that have to be performed for which the civilian sector could assume responsibility with nominal profit (such as aircraft maintenance). These options and alternatives have not been considered as part of the downsizing process. Officers and men in the ROCAF have proved more than willing to enroll, or attend, degree programs in nearby universities or colleges as part-time students. This advanced study by armed service men and women during their spare time is actively encouraged by the ROCAF that offers financial aid in the form of scholarships. Already overworked officers, with virtually little or no spare time for study, are finding it difficult to graduate from their degree programs due to frequent absences from the class. The aim of the ROCAF having more than half of its commissioned officers qualified with a Master’s degree, like those in world-class air forces elsewhere in the world, is still something of a pipe dream. The backbone of ROCAF is the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO). Due to difficulties recruiting NCOs in the civilian labor market, most NCOs in the ROCAF are drawn from among conscripts. To educate and train them to do the job properly, the ROCAF has to teach them on the job. By the time their compulsory service ends (in less than two years), the senior NCOs have only just learned enough to manage effectively the highly technical jobs expected of them. As a consequence, it has become an endless training cycle for NCOs responsible for maintenance and service support of ROCAF equipment and aircraft. Future downsizing programs should avoid these difficulties, otherwise their side-effects will erode the fighting capability.
Team spirit The ROCAF’s personnel, conscripts as well as volunteers, come from the different sectors of society and accordingly they bring with them a wide range of skills, values, and attitudes. Unless the Taiwan government introduces an all-volunteer system for the armed forces by law, the armed forces will not be able to reject all
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those conscripts who are unsuited mentally and physically for military service (such as drug users, criminals, the mentally handicapped, and physically unfit). Transforming both volunteers and conscripts at the same time into trained and useful servicemen is proving an almost impossible task. Supervising and leading these men with complex backgrounds (more than 10 percent of the total strength) in today’s technologically advanced and complex armed forces is far more difficult than it was half a century ago when the ROCAF personnel were more homogeneous, consisting primarily of simple-minded peasants. The average age of the armed forces are 25.2 (among the ROCAF personnel, average age for the commissioned officers is 31.3, NCOs 24.7, and conscripts 22.0). Except for the senior officers, the bulk of ROCAF personnel belong to a younger generation.5 They manifest different values and have different priorities, seeking greater freedoms that in the past, and expect to be able to enjoy life. They do not have the self-discipline and single-mindedness of their predecessors.6 The ROCAF therefore has to confront them and educate them on why they should fight, how they should to fight, and for whom they are fighting.7 Senior officers can lead their men effectively only if the commanding officer, (1) thinks the way the young generation now thinks; (2) convinces his men why they should do things correctly; (3) directs his men away from an “internetting world” to a healthy, disciplined lifestyle; (4) promotes a sense of comradeship within a complex and demanding world; (5) warns in advance that success in the service will come only after a long period of dedication and hard work; and (6) acknowledges that servicemen have a low standard of living and demonstrates that he tries to understand their personal difficulties. The ROCAF has also to take care of their men’s families and dependents. A happy family is a psychological “plus” for all servicemen stationed at an air force base. In fact, husbands in the ROCAF spend relatively little time with their wives and children. The Air Force has to look after every detail of their families: housing, transportation, medical care, insurance, education, employment, and social functions as well. Once family ties break up, the impact on ROCAF personnel can be catastrophic. The current ROCAF retirement plan calls for a minimum of twenty-years service before receiving a full pension for the remainder of one’s life. The effect on some officers and NCOs is to make them passive and reluctant to take any risk that might endanger their future pension, hoping that their twenty-years service in the ROCAF would be uneventful and devoid of danger. The fighting spirit and therefore capability of these men are next to zero. Unfortunately, even though some junior officers are active, enthusiastic, and committed to their job, they may not have the opportunity to serve the ROCAF for as long as twenty years due to a lack of vacancies. Worse still, most retired and early-retired officers are still young, many in their late 30s or early 40s, and have to face a return to civil society without having received resettlement training or advice, or a relocation program. For Taiwan, this is a total waste of manpower, expertise, and experience, since these veterans can contribute positively up to the age of 65 at least. Faced with an uncertain future after retirement, the morale of active duty officers is significantly affected.
160 Chien Chung Team spirit in an information age should be redefined. The ROCAF leaders are confronted with a new era characterized by a younger generation, fragile family relationships, an uncertain future after retirement, and a gradual dissolution of the Service’s heritage and tradition. In order to re-build its team spirit and sense of common purpose, the ROCAF has to conduct a sophisticated restructure program.
Air force restructuring Strategically, the restructuring of the Air Force must be both quantitative and qualitative. Only qualitative factors are considered here. Three steps are suggested with which qualitatively to strengthen the ROCAF’s fighting capability: (a) topdown action; (b) service-mindedness; and (c) professionalism. These are necessary in order for the ROCAF to survive a different culture, reduced numbers, and a diminished team spirit environment.
Top-down action For the younger generation, any development, or restructuring, should not be driven from the bottom up but instead from the top down. First of all, the leaders of the ROCAF should spend all their time with their men on the front line in order to find out what is really going on and resolve any problems on site. Second, a new concept of “active air defense” should be established, replacing the obsolete “passive air defense” operations, such as hourly combat air patrols. Third, the elitist tradition of the “pilot first” should be altered to accommodate all personnel of the ROCAF equally. Last, but by no means least, there should be more encouragement and less compulsion within the service. ROCAF commanders should encourage their men to be creative, allow their men to catch up with the information age, using modern communication links, such as the internet and mobile phones, within the usual security constraints, of course.
Service-mindedness In the past, senior officers were educated to lead their men to serve the country. Now they should lead and serve their men, also. All senior officers have to be serviceminded but they should also change their attitudes and learn to promote the concepts of safety and security, and safeguard the interests of their Service. The information age has opened up formerly closed military circles making the cover-up of any wrong doings or mistakes impossible. Thus, the leaders of the ROCAF must accept that it is their duty to honestly face the public for every incident or accident at an early stage. Most importantly, senior officers should impress upon their men the need to respect and obey all Service regulations and technical procedures.
Professionalism The Air Force is perhaps the most technical-intensive military service branch of Taiwan’s armed forces. The ROCAF should concentrate professionally air
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defense. Labor-intensive, non-combat-related missions (such as cafeteria services, transport, cleaning, etc.) should be contracted out to civilian organizations. If the ROCAF can be computerized and digitized and fully automated, further downsizing becomes feasible, without serious side-effects. The best way to upgrade the fighting capability of the ROCAF, therefore, is to respect professionalism. Airmen who have a civilian driver’s license can legally drive military vehicle; in contrast, birds flying around runways that endanger the safety of operational aircraft can only be driven away by contracted animal experts, not by pilots. The ROCAF is short of pilots both in terms of new recruits and experienced pilots. Physically qualified high school graduates with the necessary aptitude for flying fast jets give little attention, let alone thought, to a career in the ROCAF. At the other end of the spectrum, more than a hundred senior pilots have left the front line for desk jobs simply because air squadrons do not provide enough senior positions.8 The former can be greatly improved by introducing a streamlined enrollment program, and by promoting an air force “ace” tradition in specific high schools. The latter can be resolved simply by organization restructuring.
Conclusion In order to avoid using obsolete ways of addressing future war, the ROCAF needs a subtle force restructuring. This chapter deals mainly with ways of upgrading the quality of ROCAF’s fighting capability. In it, the unique culture of the ROCAF will be addressed, the impact of downsizing of the force assessed, and finally the erosion of team spirit explained. Suggestions for a qualitative restructuring, including top-down action, service-mindedness, and professionalism, have been proposed. If followed, the upgrading of the quality of ROCAF’s fighting capability would not add a single penny to Taiwan’s shrinking defense budget.
Notes 1 Taiwan-ADIZ, 21N to 27N and 117.5E to 123E, was established by the USAF during the Cold War era. The ROCAF has the responsibility to identify, monitor, intercept, protect, or engage flying objects within the Taiwan-ADIZ. There are several restricted airspaces wherein, excluded for military purpose; these restricted airspaces are posted by Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Transportation/Communication in Taiwan. 2 The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 1999. Also see China Times Taipei, August 15, 2002, p. 2. 3 The ROCAF currently has a strength of 55,000, organized in 10 Wings, 4 Ground Commands, and 3 Flying Commands. The personnel ratio of pilots: ground crew: supporting staff is 1 : 25 : 28. See 2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China (English), Taipei, Ministry of National Defense, July 2002, pp. 130–1. 4 The armed forces have completed the first phase of military downsizing: from 460,000 to 385,000 in strength, correspondingly, the ROCAF was cut from 65,000 to 55,000 in 1997–2001 period. In the last phase of military downsizing, the armed forces will be further cut to 300,000 while the ROCAF will be downsized to 40,000. However, the strength of combat air wings together with the number of aircraft has not been cut on a prorated basis. That is to say, the supporting personnel in the ROCAF will lose half its strength in the downsizing if the air force keeps its pilots and service crew intact. Also see China Times (Taipei), October 6, 2002, p. 6.
162 Chien Chung 5 The most popular games for airmen are on the Internet. The side-effect of soldiers indulging in playing internet games are: degraded inter-person relationships, ignorance of the mother tongue, national heritage and tradition, the disintegration of personal values, becoming entrapped in internet crime, and lived-in “virtuality.” 6 The bulk of ROCAF personnel belong to the younger generation, aged between 18 and 30. They seek lawless freedom, dissolute fun, and up-most fancy. Some times they are referred as the “F-generation.” 7 The ROC Armed Forces are highly educated but young. The average age is 25.2, over all the ROCAF personnel; average age for commissioned officers is 31.3, NCOs 24.7 and conscripts 22.0. See 2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China (English), Taipei, Ministry of National Defense, July 2002, pp. 88–9. 8 Nearly 200 senior fighter pilots of the ROCAF have to leave the flight line simply because of no vacancies after downsizing. They can merely fly minimal fly-hours from their desk-job in order to keep their fly-status. An experimental compensation plan is conducted to enlarge the organization of the 1st Fighter Wing to ease the situation. See China Times (Taipei), November 21, 2002 p. 2, and Liberty Times (Taipei), December 4, 2002, p. 2.
12 The ROC Air Force after next A race to embrace the future Richard D. Fisher
Introduction Almost since its inception, Taiwan has relied on its maintenance of superior air power over the Taiwan Strait to form the decisive element in its ability to deter and combat an invasive or coercive use of force by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is seeking to establish air-space superiority over the Taiwan Strait and over Taiwan as part of its current military modernization. While this effort largely focuses on “4th generation” combat systems, it does include new space systems, space weapons, missiles, surface-to-air missiles, information system, naval air weapons, as well as new combat aircraft, plus their weapons and support platforms. In the absence of any response from Taiwan to modernize, the PLA could around the decade’s end achieve a level of air-space superiority necessary to support a range of coercive military operations that could force Taipei to capitulate to Beijing’s dicta on unification.1 However, contrary to those who predict that Taiwan is destined to lose military superiority on the Strait,2 it is certainly possible for Taiwan to acquire the doctrines and capabilities to sustain deterrence or to defeat current and future PLA threats. This requires Taiwan’s military vision and its forces to undergo continuous modernization and even transformation. In short, Taiwan must win the ongoing race to embrace the future of air power.
Importance of “air power” for Taiwan Since the 1950s, Taiwan has historically stressed the maintenance of modern air forces as a first line of defense. The build-up of the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) began in earnest when the United States transferred 76 F-84G jet fighters 150 F-47 piston-engine fighters in 1953.3 Close US–Taiwan cooperation followed the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. In the mid-to-late 1950s and early 1960s, Taiwanese and PRC Air Forces fought a series of aerial skirmishes. These were characterized by Taiwan’s Air Forces conducting fighter sweeps over PRC territory and both short and long-range reconnaissance missions over PRC territory. Washington sought to give the ROCAF a margin of technical superiority. Even when there were fears of compromising secret technology, to allow the
164 Richard D. Fisher ROCAF to thwart PRC defenses, the United States transferred U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft to Taiwan. While skirmishes petered out by the late 1960s, as a matter self-defense and to deter conflict with the Mainland, from the 1960s to the present day, Taiwan has sought to maintain at least a commanding technical level of superiority in air forces, to include professional personnel and highly trained pilots. While economically burdensome for the developing island economy, Taiwan purchased successive waves of then modern US fighters: the F-86 Sabre; F-100 Supersaber; F-104 Starfighter, F-5A, and then F-5E Freedom Fighter. Through the 1980s, these aircraft were more than sufficient to deter the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), which was reliant on large numbers of obsolete Soviet designs such as the J-6 (MiG-19) and smaller numbers of the more modern, but still obsolete, J-7 (MiG-21). In the 1980s, Washington’s fears of angering Beijing resulted in the transfer of technology that enabled Taiwan – at great expense – to build 130 AIDC FCK-1 Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF). In early 1990s, however, when the PLA turned to Russia for new Sukhoi fighters, and Taipei demonstrated its willingness to buy 60 French Mirage-2000 fighters, Washington relented to Taipei’s long-standing requests and sold 150 F-16 Falcon fighters in 1992. While the Mirage-2000Ts carry active-guided Matra MICA medium range air-to-air missiles (AAMs), the F-16s do not yet have the comparable US AIM-120 AMRAAMs.4 As a force multiplier, the ROCAF has four Northrop-Grumman E-2T airborne working and control system (AWACS) radar aircraft. Through the end of the 1990s, the ROCAF remained dominant over the Taiwan Straits. However, as the PLAAF has modernized, it has used opportunities presented by political incidents, starting in the summer of 1999 and several times since, to assert itself over the Taiwan Strait. The PLAAF now flies almost uncontested to the mid-line of the Strait, in contrast to the period when it could not even sustain air superiority over its own Fujian Province coastal areas. In the absence of a clear program of modernization and transformation by Taiwan, the PLA is headed toward a superior military position on the Strait. And when it is convinced of its superior position in the air, in addition to missiles, information systems, naval, and airborne assault forces, Beijing may then be tempted to use military power to advance its goal of “recovering” Taiwan.
The new PLA threat The PLA is rapidly acquiring both the “software” and “hardware” necessary to dominate the airspace over and around Taiwan. Since the early 1990s, when the PRC leadership placed renewed emphasis on forcing unification with Taiwan, it also made Taiwan’s “recovery” the focus of a broad modernization for PLA military capabilities. The PRC’s goal is to pulverize Taiwan’s defenses in military operations characterized by complete surprise and devastating speed. Massive PLA combined Missile-Air-Special Forces attacks, very likely to be followed by limited Airborne and amphibious attacks, would seek to force a political capitulation in Taipei before the United States could produce an effective military
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response. At the same time, the PLA would seek to delay the US response with nuclear intimidation or with attacks on US air and naval forces that might be sent to Taiwan’s aid. The PLA’s modernization and expansion emphasizes the development of modern “software” such as offensive doctrines of “active defense,” training, C4ISR and logistic elements, as well as the procurement of new foreign and domestic weapon systems. Spurred in part by the demonstration of US air dominance in the Gulf War, the PLA, and the PLAAF in particular, have stressed the formation of offensive doctrines and operations.5 While hardware acquisition is only now beginning to fulfill offensive doctrinal goals, realistic training has lagged behind. Nevertheless, limited evidence suggests that the PLAAF is exercising more intensively, frequently, and under more realistic scenarios. There is also a greater effort to build domestic combat aircraft simulators and to build new air combat maneuvering instrumentation devices. Air defense doctrines and operations are also becoming more sophisticated, though it appears that the goal of a national integrated radar-guided surface-to-air-missile (SAM) fighter air defense is somewhat distant. Seeking information superiority Perhaps the most critical element for the PLA’s modernization is its quest for information superiority.6 The PLA’s effort to build a modern command, control, communication, computers, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system will determine whether the PLA can marry modern organization, doctrine, and operational concepts with its new generation precision-capable weapon systems. Key elements of this C4ISR system include a new nationwide fiber optic cable network, which supports numerous web-based networks that facilitate new automatic command and control programs. Redundancy and mobility of command and communications is supported by widespread use of satellite communication links and increasing use of wireless digital links. Future precision offensive targeting will be enabled by new networks of space, air, and radar systems. At the 2002 Zhuhai Air show, the PLA revealed its first radar satellite, the HJ-1C, which is based on the Russian NPO Machinostroyenia Korsar radarsat.7 It will likely have a 1-meter resolution imaging capability, and the inherit ability to penetrate cloud cover. By 2010, up to 4 HJ-1C satellite will be combined with 4 new HJ-1 electro-optical satellites and will provide twicedaily coverage of Taiwan by each type of satellites. As the PLA makes growing use of US and Russian navigation satellite signals, it also plans on developing its own series of navigation satellites to provide precision guidance signals to targets found by its reconnaissance satellites. New stealthy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will enter service later in the decade, such as the Guizhou WZ-2000, which, though smaller, resembles the US Global Hawk. In addition, the PLA is developing very long-range Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar that can locate naval and air targets thousands of kilometers away. As it seeks to exploit all manner of information technology for its own forces, however, the PLA is also preparing to attack Taiwan’s information and electronic
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assets. Anti-satellite weapons will soon be launched from new mobile space launch vehicles based on DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and DF-31 ICBMs. The PLAAF now has 125-mile-range Russian Kh-31P anti-radar missiles and may be developing its own ramjet-powered long-range anti-radar missiles. The Kh-31P can also be used in an air-to-air mode to attack AWACS and other electronic warfare aircraft. The PLA is also deploying Israeli Harpy anti-radar drones that can loiter and attack emitters.8 In addition, the PLA is developing both its doctrine and means for conducting offensive computer network attacks.
Combined missile-air strikes To exploit its growing information assets, the PLA is rapidly building up its missile, cruise missile, and all-weather attack aircraft capabilities. By 2010, the PLA could have 1,000–2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at Taiwan. Pentagon data leaked in 1999 suggested that the PLA could deploy 650 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite Taiwan by 2005, and increase them by 50 a year. This projection appears to be on schedule, so SRBM numbers could reach 700–800 by 2010. PLA SRBMs include the 1000-kilometers range DF-15A, the 600-kilometers range DF-15 and the 500–600-kilometers range DF-11Mod 1. The latter will be able to carry a range of warheads that may include thermobaric and cluster munitions. They will also increasingly have terminal navsat guidance. The 3,000-kilometers range DF-21C is believed to have a radar or navsat-based terminally guided non-nuclear warheads9 that would be useful in attacking underground bases in Taiwan. By 2010, to the PLA’s ballistic missiles currently targeted at Taiwan, should be added hundreds of new land attack cruise missiles (LACMs). The revelation at Zhuhai of a Xian H-6 (Tupolev Tu-16 Badger) bomber armed with 4 wingmounted cruise missiles may confirm an earlier report that 25 H-6s are to be modified with an early TV-guided LACM based on the C-601.10 These bombers would allow the launching of multiple waves of up to 100 LACMs from coastal Fujian airspace protected by new Russian S-300 SAMs. By 2005, Taiwanese sources believe a new LACM comparable to early US Tomahawk LACMs will enter service. These could be launched from land, sea, submarine, and aircraft platforms. AVIC II Third Academy officials claim to have mastered terrain-contour (TERCON) LACM guidance technology but say PLA LACMs will have other guidance systems11 that could include navsat or TV guidance. Also by 2010, the PLAAF could have 600 or more multi-role fighter and attack aircraft. These would include about 300 Russian Su-30MKK Flanker strike fighters and Su-27 multi-role fighters, either purchased from Russia or co-produced by the Shenyang Aircraft Co.12 In addition, the PLA may produce up to 100 multirole versions of the Shenyang J-8II,13 50–100 of the Xian JH-7A fighter-bomber, and perhaps up to 200 of the Chengdu J-10 multi-role fighter.14 All of these fighters may use either Russian or PRC Louyang laser/low-light targeting pods15 to deliver TV or laser-guided bombs,16 anti-runway bombs,17 and several types of either Russian or PRC long-range precision-guided attack missiles.
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In addition, the PLAAF has an active fifth-generation fighter program. Judging by the prominence it was given at the 2002 Zhuhai Air Show and from subsequent reports, Shenyang’s stealthy fighter may be favored.18 A wind tunnel model suggests this aircraft may be similar to the US Office of Naval Analysis projection made in 1997 for an F-15 sized fighter, but it will incorporate stealth shaping similar to the F/A-22A. It will also incorporate internal weapon carriage and vectored-thrust engines. In addition, Chengdu is reportedly considering a stealthy twin-engine canard fighter development of its J-10 that will also use vectoredthrust engines.19 Most of the PLAAF’s new multi-role fighters will also be able to undertake offensive air-superiority missions in that they can engage multiple simultaneous targets with new active-guided AAMs. This capability will be enabled by new AWACS platforms, to include up to four Russian Beriev A-50E Mainstay longrange AWACS, plus two other airborne radar platforms based on the Y-8 transport.20 These may be able to target new active-guided medium range AAMs carried by new multi-role fighters, either the Russian Vympel R-77 (AA-12) or the Louyang Project 129 (SD-10), which in turn uses the missile radar and data link from the R-77.21 For short-range engagements the PLAAF’s Sukhoi and J-10 fighters will use the Russian Vympel R-73 (AA-11) thrust-vectored, helmetsighted short-range AAM. Louyang officials also note that they are working on a smaller helmet-display sighted AAM22 that appears to be similar to the British advanced short range air-to-air missles (ASRAAM). PLA missile and air operations will also be supported by intensive Special Forces attacks in Taiwan and by recently deployed advanced Russian S-300 SAMs on the Taiwan Strait. Highly capable S-300 SAMs may now be placed at three coastal sites in Fujian Province opposite Taiwan. S-300s are very difficult to jam and their high speed and long range pose a grave threat to ROCAF fighters that may try to take the battle to the Mainland side of the Strait. Special Forces could be infiltrated as fishermen23 or long-term visitors, or could be transported by helicopter or low, slow Y-5 (An-2) transports, to conduct raids against air bases, especially targeting key command and pilot personnel. Army airborne threats Should PLA initial and follow-up attacks on key ROC leadership, power, radar, anti-aircraft equipment, air bases, naval bases, and army bases fail to result in Taipei’s surrender, then the PLA will likely employ airborne and amphibious assaults. By 2010, the PLA Army would likely have more than its current three divisions to capture a key city, perhaps Taipei itself, to force a final capitulation. PLA Airborne forces appear to be gaining a sense that they alone can conduct “strategic” projection operations. While dedicated transports such as the Ilyushin Il-76 remain small in number, airborne and regular troop transport will be supplemented by hundreds of modern civilian Boeing and Airbus airliners. In addition, airborne units are now receiving powerful new purpose-build armor such as the Russian BMD-3 airborne tank and new lightweight transport and artillery vehicles.
168 Richard D. Fisher Airborne or Army amphibious operations will be supported by precision DF-11 Mod 1 SRBM strikes and sweeps by new attack helicopters. The PLA Army is developing a new 6-ton heavy attack helicopter that is expected to resemble the Eurocopter Tiger in size and general capability.24 These could be supported by a larger number of new lighter Z-11W attack helicopters.25 Follow-up PLAAF air strikes would be undertaken to pin down any ROC Army forces that manage to respond to the capture of an airfield by PLA Airborne forces.
Naval threats As either a stand-alone option or in concert with other attack operations, the PLA will seek to impose some kind of naval blockade around Taiwan as part of a broader military strategy. There will of course be massive preemptive missile, air, and Special Forces strikes on Taiwan’s naval bases. For Taiwan Navy ships that survive, the main threat will come from the growing number of submarines and from newly improved PLA Navy (PLAN) Air Forces. By 2010, the PLAN could have about 40 relatively modern attack submarines to include 20 Ming-Class SSK, 12 Kilo-Class SSK, 6–8 Song-Class SSK, and 3–5 Han-Class SSNs.26 PLAN submarines will have some surface ship support, especially from four Russian Sovremenniy destroyers armed with Moskit or Yakhont supersonic antiship missiles. In addition, the PLAN Air Force will soon pose a more formidable threat as it incorporates up to 68 new Sukhois, very likely the Su-30MK3 strike fighters with the 300-kilometers range Phazotron Zhuk-M-S radar.27 While intended for naval attack missions with new long-range anti-ship missiles, these fighters will also be able to employ the range of AAMs and precision weapons planned for the PLAAF’s Su-30MKKs. In naval strike mode the Su-30MK3 may carry the subsonic 288-kilometers range Kh-59MK or the supersonic 300-kilometers range Yakhont. The fact that this new PLAN strike capability will be used to counter any potential support from the US 7th Fleet also complicates Taiwan’s security outlook.28
Present and future vulnerabilities The PLA’s on-going modernization highlights several vulnerabilities for Taiwan’s air and missile defense forces. These include: Lack of missile defenses. While Taiwan has purchased about 200 US Raytheon Patriot PAC-2 missiles, which can intercept most PLA SRBMs, and has been approved by Washington to buy the more capable PAC-3, the sheer number of PLA ballistic and cruise missiles will stress any Taiwanese defense that is based simply on anti-missiles. Should PLA missile strikes achieve near-complete surprise there is a great chance that they can take out Taiwan’s fixed radar sites, antiaircraft defenses, unprotected command and control facilities, combat ships in ports, and lightly protected air force and army equipment. Any degradation in
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radar coverage that cannot be immediately restored will make Taiwan even more vulnerable to follow-on missile and air strikes. Taiwan urgently requires large numbers of the PAC-3 and also requires early deployment of any new-principle weapon that can defend against missiles, such as laser-based weapons. The growth of the PLA’s missile and air forces also more than justifies Taiwan’s obtaining a limited offensive strike capability to preempt any gathering PLA strike. Insufficient passive defenses. All of Taiwan’s military forces suffer from insufficient passive defenses to withstand the PLA’s gathering missile and air strike onslaught. The ROCAF has made a great effort to build new underground bases on its less vulnerable East Coast, place some critical command facilities underground, and address the need for new aboveground aircraft shelters. However, most of its air force units remain vulnerable in first-generation protective shelters built in the 1970s and 1980s. In most cases, these shelters were not designed to withstand direct hits by large laser or TV-guided bombs. Some air bases also house key command and control centers in easily targeted aboveground buildings.29 In addition, the ROC Navy has no shelters for its major combat ships upon which it will depend for distant anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and air defense missions. In most cases, these ships were not designed with a requirement for basing in protective shelters. While the Army also has placed many of its main battle tanks and other large assets under protective shelters, from what the author has been able to determine from limited photographic evidence,30 these too are not designed to withstand direct hits by PGMs. Having becoming overwhelmed. Have just recently completed the acquisition and training of its current fourth generation fighter force, at considerable effort and expense, it is now a painful truth that the ROCAF could soon be overwhelmed by the gathering PLA offensive forces. PLAAF Sukhois have already had a longstanding advantage in short-range aerial engagements in that they have the only helmet-sighted AAMs on the Strait. Assuming no significant modernization or expansion by Taiwan, then by 2010, the ROCAF may still have the 400 fourth and third generation fighters it approximately has today. These cannot hold out for long against a possible force of 600 PLA fourth generation multi-role fighters supported by massive ballistic and cruise missile strikes and a sophisticated space-air-ground C4ISR network. The PLA’s advantage would be assured even it the PLAAF only succeeds in obtaining 400 multi-role fighters, due to the potential for massive missile, cruise missile and Special Forces attacks to quickly reduce the ROCAF fighter numbers.
ROC “Air Force After Next” a race to embrace the future When considering Taiwan’s “Air Force After Next” for the remainder of this decade and beyond, it is clear that Taiwan must win several races with the PRC. This challenge will surely stress leadership determination and creativity in both Taipei and Washington. Taipei must be the first to prove that modern democratic governance is, in itself, a decisive military advantage by rapidly producing new
170 Richard D. Fisher doctrine and hardware choices. As it does so, hopefully with Washington’s best advice, Taiwan must decide on how it can preserve the level of superiority in its air and missile defenses necessary to deter and combat the PLA’s gathering combined space-missile-air strike capability. Taiwan is in a race with the PLA to produce the next generation of air-space power. While domestic political and financial constraints may force Taiwan’s Air Forces to rely on upgrades, Taipei can, and must, be able to rapidly incorporate emerging new technologies that can serve to blunt growing PLA strike capabilities. Taiwan must also very quickly obtain the required weapons and develop the additional doctrine necessary to fulfill recent calls for a limited “offensive” strike capability. At the same time, Taiwan must improve transport and anti-submarine aircraft capabilities and explore novel ways to expand combat-related training. As they consider their “Air Force After Next,” Taiwan’s new civilian military leaders and military leaders must also envision how to sustain air superiority well into the next decade. For this purpose, they have plenty of US military “vision” statements and projections from which to gain ideas that may be applicable to Taiwan’s future requirements. The US Department of Defense’s recent Vision 2020, the US Navy’s Seapower 21, and the US Army’s Objective Force all detail how information technologies, sensors, and new weapons will be designed to achieve rapid offensive and defensive results. These “vision” statements all explain how each Service expects to help win and to exploit control of the air. Unlike the United States, Taiwan does not have to deploy globally to protect disparate interests, but needs to defend a fixed territory from an accumulating military menace that assumes it will be able to strike first with massive forces. All of Taiwan’s armed services can contribute to the mission of securing and preserving air superiority over Taiwan. Information vital Like the PLA, Taiwan has also absorbed the lesson that all modern doctrines and operational methods, such as joint operations and precision strikes, are all enabled by superior exploitation of information resources. Taiwan’s current efforts to modernize its command and control systems, in addition to its radar and electronic intelligence assets, remain vital to its future defense. In addition, Taiwan must consider investing in new intelligence sources such as space micro satellites for surveillance and communication missions, unmanned aircraft for the same missions. If outer-space satellites are not a realistic option, then Taiwan should consider inner-space satellites, such as mounting radar or communication payloads on rocket-launched very high altitude balloons. Current SAMs, when air-launched from medium altitudes, should be able to loft such balloons with new micro radar or comlink payloads. Active defense (offensive) options For too long Taiwan has needlessly restricted its forces from being able to conduct offensive operations over the Mainland to preempt or prevent a gathering
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PLA attack. This has been reinforced by the State Department’s restrictive interpretation of the 1979 Taiwan Relation Act, which stipulated that the United States would only sell “defensive” weapons to Taiwan. This has allowed the State Department to consistently refuse the sale of weapons to Taiwan such as the AGM-88 Harm anti-radar missile and submarines, as they would give Taiwan too much of an “offensive” capability. Never mind that since the early 1990s the PRC has welcomed American restraint with one of the most deliberate build-ups of offensive forces in recent history. And never mind that the United States has never denied its forces the option for offensive operations if they would accelerate victory and save lives. It would be logical at this point for Washington to publicly acknowledge that Taiwan requires some ‘offensive’ capabilities as a legitimate part of its national defense. It is thus very welcome to read in the Taiwan’s 2002 Ministry of National Defense report that, “… the ROC Armed Forces will conduct operations to attack enemy’s key nodes of C4ISR so as to eliminate the enemy’s ability to launch its joint operations.” This would require that Taiwan has the ability to attack PLA targets on the Mainland. While apparently a limited offensive mission, it is a necessary one to be able to degrade PLA operational effectiveness. But it will also require precision locating and targeting capabilities that Taiwan today lacks. In addition to substantial human intelligence, Taiwan will require far better imaging intelligence in addition to signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) capabilities. It will also require precision-guided and deep-penetrating weapons to reach underground command and control centers. Other offensive capabilities that should be considered include: Missiles. To target the PLA’s C4ISR complex, Taiwan will require far more capable missile forces. To fully stress PLA command and control capabilities in the Nanjing Theater, Taiwan could easily justify a surface-to-surface missile or an air-launched cruise missile with a 1,000-kilometer range. Forcing the PLA to relocate theater level command and control to that distance would be worth the political risks of angering Washington and even Tokyo. But such risks could be mitigated were its missiles to be exclusively armed with non-nuclear warheads and their development made public. In addition, Taiwan will also require shorterrange missiles. Taipei should consider requesting the US MGM-140 ATACMS, a 300-kilometer range battlefield missile that can be armed with a unitary warhead, or a variety of smart munitions to attack critical C4ISR targets. It would be compatible with Taiwan’s existing multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) and give Washington a confidence-building access to critical missile programs. It is also more capable than missiles Taiwan is reported to be developing. Cruise missiles. A second main offensive weapons option would be to obtain LACMs for the purpose of attacking PLA C4ISR nodes. LACMs are less politically threatening than missiles and capable of greater precision. But if subsonic they would be easier for the PLA to shoot down. In recent years, the PLA has devoted great energy to countering American cruise missiles, and could easily direct this effort against any new ROC cruise missiles. However, both Taiwan and
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the United States are interested in developing supersonic cruise missiles, and the United States, hypersonic cruise missiles as well. Taiwan’s indigenous Hsuing Feng-3 ramjet powered anti-ship missile has a Mach 2 speed and could form the basis for a longer range LACM. There are also US air launched precision-strike capable cruise missiles that should be considered, like the 150 nm range AGM84H SLAM-ER, and the 200 kilometer range stealthy AGM-158 Joint-Air-toSurface Stand-off Missile (JASSM). Deep special operations. Another option for Taiwan to consider is to use highly trained Special Force units to conduct small unit infiltration into the Mainland or be air dropped, either by helicopter or by very high altitude drops. Inasmuch as the PLA is preparing large numbers of its Special Forces for attack operations in Taiwan, it would be appropriate for Taiwan to do the same in order to target PLA C4ISR nodes. To facilitate such missions Taiwan should purchase a number of Russian Mil Mi-17 helicopters on the open market. In the future, should Boeing proposals for a C-130 sized quad-tilt-rotor transport mature, then Taiwan may have the option to consider vertical lift for company size Army units to capture and possibly exploit strategic C4ISR targets.
Upgrading the current force In order to carry out offensive attacks on the PLA’s C4ISR nodes and to sustain its ability to defend against ever more powerful PLAAF capabilities, it is necessary that the ROCAF now undertake upgrade modifications for its combat aircraft. It is also necessary for the ROCAF to upgrade its SAM forces and its AAM weapons. In addition, it is also necessary for Taiwan to begin a massive program of improving its passive defenses as it also seeks novel opportunities to increase the realism of aerial combat training. Aircraft upgrades The ROCAF offensive capability that would be most politically acceptable, but perhaps be the least acceptable militarily, would be to upgrade the attack capabilities of existing ROCAF fighters. Taiwan has recently introduced US Pathfinder low-light navigation pods for its F-16s, but these should also be upgraded to laser targeting pods as well. In addition to new Maverick attack missiles, the United States should offer Taiwan a larger array of attack weapons for its F-16s, to include laser-guided bombs, Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) navsat/global positioning system (GPS) guided bombs, and a long-range attack missile such as the AGM-158 JASSM. The PLAAF’s placement of S-300 SAMs on the Fujian coast has long justified the sale of US AGM-88 Harm anti-radar missiles to Taiwan. Taiwan should seek similar weapons from France for its Mirage-2000 fighters. But Taipei should not wait for Washington or Paris to make up their minds. Such systems should be developed indigenously as quickly as possible for arming current or future versions of the Airborne Interceptor Command Channel (AIDC) FCK-1 Ching Quo fighter.
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Making current fighters more capable of offensive missions will also require that Taiwan consider upgrading their radar and avionics systems. To save time and better allocate resources, Taipei should let it be known that the country that supplies the appropriate radar upgrade will also receive additional business for the required offensive weapons and subsystems. This means that if AIDC is the first to succeed, then the IDF or a more powerful successor version should be the principal attack fighter. Taiwan is already preparing for this option by investing in new versions of the IDF. If this becomes Taiwan’s choice, then Washington should comply with Taiwan’s potential requests for new radar, avionics, engines, and weapons. New SAMs There is no military excuse for Taiwan to delay the purchase of the US Patriot PAC-3 SAMs. Inasmuch as Washington approved its sale in 2001, and if it is the only available option for Taiwan to improve its missile defense capability in the face of a rapidly expanding PLA missile threat, it is critical that Taipei place a far higher priority on obtaining the Patriot PAC-3. However, Taiwan also should be under no illusion that anti-missiles alone will solve the PLA missile threat. Taipei must also invest in massive passive defenses as it seeks to incorporate as soon as possible any US new-principled weapons that could expand its missile defense capabilities. In addition, Taiwan requires new medium range anti-aircraft missiles to supplement fixed-site Hawk SAMs and mobile Chaparal SAMs. These new SAMs should be both mobile and more capable. One attractive system that deserves serious consideration is the Humraam, or Humvee-mounted AIM-120 SAM. This system is now being adopted by the US Marines. The AIM-120 is smaller than the Hawk but very likely has a greater range, and is more sophisticated by virtue of its active-guided radar. Another alternative would be to quickly develop a Humvee- launched version of the TC-2 AAM. This missile is at least reported to be an active-guided missile. If it is not, then Taipei should favor the Humraam.
New AAMs With Vympel R-77 AAMs having been in service with PLAAF Su-30MKKs for about a year, there is simply no excuse for Washington to delay the transfer of AIM-120s to Taiwan, for other than readiness or financial reasons. These should be made available to ROCAF F-16 units as soon as possible. It is also necessary to look beyond the AIM-120 and press Washington for access to any longer-range versions of this missile that may now be in development. Longer range AIM-120s are needed to counter the PLAAF’s R-77s and SD-10 active-guided AAMs. Taiwan’s current active-guided French Matra MICA on its Mirage 2000 fighters, and the TC-2, which is reported to be an indigenous active-guided AAM, lacks the range to overcome the PLAAF’s new AAMs. Furthermore, it is necessary for Taipei to develop a requirement and to request the new Raytheon AIM-9X helmet display-sighted AAM as soon as possible. The
174 Richard D. Fisher ROCAF’s lack of a high off-boresight helmet-sighted AAM has persisted too long in the face of Russian Vympel R-73 armed Sukhoi Su-27s and Su-30MKKs. If the AIM-9X is not quickly approved for sale, then Taipei should seek the Israeli Python-4 helmet display sighted AAM. The Python, in fact, has a longer range and is more maneuverable than the US missile due to a more powerful engine. Upgrading its F-16s with helmet-display technology will also serve to ease the ROCAF’s transition to a next-generation fighter.
Massive passive defenses As mentioned earlier, Taiwan requires a major program to upgrade its passive defense capabilities. While Taiwan has sought to place many important bases underground in recent years much more must be done. A reported Taiwan Navy proposal to build an underground base for new submarines should be expanded to include space for most modern combat ships.31 Taiwan also requires new generation aboveground shelters for all of its combat aircraft and major army assets. Taiwan should also consider modifying navy ships with smaller but more modern antennae so that they can also be placed in reinforced concrete shelters. The goal for new shelters should be to withstand a direct strike by a 2,000 pound rocket assisted penetrating bomb. The construction of such shelters would require a major public works program that should be used to focus public political attention on the threat from the Mainland. Real and distributed mission training While it is encouraging that in 2002 the first two ROCAF pilots have completed USAF Weapons School, where they received advanced training in modern offensive and defensive fighter tactics, the ROCAF has for too long lacked realistic training. The ROCAF should seek novel ways to expand its ability to train pilots while reducing the expense of that training. One method just now being implemented in the United States is the Distributed Mission Training (DMT) of combat aircraft crews, to include fighters and their supporting AWACS and intelligence aircraft. The system so far involves up to 4 simulators at one location linked by fiber-optic cable to 4 simulators at another location. The system will gradually enable fighter simulators to be linked with support aircraft so that full missions involving separately based units can be flown well before they come together in a theater of operations. Boeing so far has constructed a distributed training network for two sets of F-15 simulators while Lockheed is working on a similar system for F-16s.32 The ROCAF should invest in this capability in concert with Taiwan’s other Services. DMT is clearly needed to enable F-16, Mirage-2000T and IDF pilots to practise dissimilar and joint maneuvers in concert with E-2Ts. But DMT should be further distributed to include the Taiwan Navy and Army, at least for basic air defense missions. A robust DMT network would also allow Taiwan’s military to gain something it has lacked for fifty years – the potential to gain near to realistic
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combat experience by interacting with other professional military forces. For example, it would be advantageous for Taipei and Washington to encourage the creation of a private company that would enable ROC and US military personnel to conduct “virtual” exercises without the formal participation of either government. Outside pilots would be paid for their time in private company simulators conducting simulated missions that they would likely fly together in the Taiwan theater of operations. Such a company might set up “offices” in Hawaii, Alaska, and Okinawa. Next-generation combat aircraft: considering vertical options As Taiwan looks toward its next generation of combat aircraft it will have manned and unmanned aircraft options. However, as the appropriate range of unmanned platforms is not yet available, there must be a continued emphasis on manned platforms. To sustain a necessary level of technical superiority, Taipei should consider the feasibility of making the transition from its current fourth-generation combat aircraft to the next-generation combat aircraft. One hopes that Taiwan would have the option of being able to purchase a European next-generation combat aircraft such as the Eurofighter (Typhoon) or the French Dassault Rafale. However, Beijing’s ability to deny European weapons to Taiwan has only grown in the last decade, and Europeans seem much more interested in selling to the PLA than to Taiwan. Russia’s emerging fifth-generation fighter may also prove attractive. But if the PLA is part of that program it will surely be denied to Taipei. Besides, buying Russian technology would require an expensive and time-consuming investment into a whole new military culture. American options for next-generation fighters would include the Lockheed Martin F/A-22A Raptor and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Cost considerations make the latter the only realistic new-generation US fighter option for Taiwan. But as it considers its next-generation air forces, Taipei should consider vertical take-off V/STOL combat aircraft when possible. While such aircraft are inherently more expensive, dangerous to fly and difficult to maintain, causing more accidents, they also offer far greater tactical flexibility to disburse air assets and make them less vulnerable to PLA attack. While Taiwan should use multiple methods to counter the PLA’s growing reconnaissance and surveillance resources, one sure method to counter this network is to be able to constantly move highvalue military assets like combat aircraft. Politically, a more vertical air force conveys a greater determination to survive. Another advantage is that V/STOL aircraft require less basing space, which may be economically attractive. F-35 options Should Washington offer the opportunity then Taipei should join the Lockheed Martin F-35 JSF program. Joining this program at a minimum level guarantees participants access to information on the F-35, signifies intent to purchase the aircraft, but is not in itself a commitment to buy the fighter. While it may
176 Richard D. Fisher be financially preferable for Taiwan to upgrade its F-16s, the F-35 does offer next-generation capabilities, the option for vertical V/STOL operation, and the prospect for long-term commonality/interoperability with US forces. Even if Taipei cannot afford to purchase the F-35 when it becomes available early in the next decade, joining the program now will increase the chances that Washington will commit early to its eventual sale to Taiwan. For the US Air Force, Navy, and Marines, the F-35 is designed primarily as a stealthy survivable strike fighter with secondary counter-air capabilities – albeit formidable counter-air capabilities. Its main advantages over the F-16 are in its stealth shaping, advanced phased array radar, and distributed low-light sensors, and its ability to fuse aircraft derived data and off-board transmitted data for easy pilot reference on a helmet display.33 The F-35’s radar is due to be more advanced than the Northrop Grumman APG-77 on the F/A-22A. Like the APG-77, it will be a phased-array radar incorporating low probability of intercept technology and the ability to combine counter-air, ground-mapping, and electronic warfare missions. As a first strike fighter, the F-35 will carry munitions internally, but can carry a larger next-day payload on wing pylons. Inasmuch as some European F-35 users are opting to make their aircraft less reliant on off-board data and more capable of counter-air operations, that option is also available to Taiwan. British and other F-35s are already to be modified with wing-tip AAM mounts. It may also be possible to increase internal AIM-120 carriage beyond the currently planned two missiles. The US envisions taking the F-35B V/STOL model and replacing the lift fan with a laser weapon, most likely a new solid-state laser powered by the lift fan’s main engine drive shaft. Taipei should give due consideration to the possible option of obtaining the V/STOL F-35B, which will be the main version for the US Marines and the British Future Aircraft Carrier. The US Air Force is also considering this version to replace its unique Fairchild A-10 Thunderbolt ground-support fighters. While the F-35B has a smaller internal payload and a shorter range than the conventional take-off versions, external payload and range can be extended by using a longer take-off run. But the key advantage would be in moving toward a mature V/STOL design that would use advance computer controls to reduce pilot error during vertical take-offs and landings. The F-35B would also have the great advantage of being able to constantly change bases, which is of great utility to Taiwan as long as the PLA can sustain a robust satellite imaging capability.
AWACS options Taiwan’s E-2T AWACS will be immediate targets in any PLA assault. The PLA will surely target them with SRBMs if on the ground and will dedicate a large number of fighters to hunt them down in the air. Dedicated weapons such as the Kh-31P will make that task easier. Nevertheless, it is clear that Taiwan will require an airborne radar capability if it is to survive any PLA onslaught. Taiwan will need warning for successive waves of PLA missile and PLAAF strikes and will require a redundant airborne platform for command and control functions.
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Should Taiwan decide that a manned airborne radar, command, and control capability is preferable, then it should consider a larger AWACS platform than the E-2T. Barring a decision to proceed with a European option like the Swedish Erieye phased array airborne early warning (AEW) system, then one attractive option would be the Boeing 737 AWACS. With the first models to be delivered to Australia in 2006, the 737 AWACS incorporates an advanced phased array radar capable of air and maritime search functions. The use of phased array technology also offers the possibility to be able to perform ground mapping and moving target indicator mission in the future. This platform would also house a larger crew and be able to perform alternate command and control functions and future UAV control missions. While expensive to acquire, the 737 AWACS would offer logistic support advantages in that there would be commonality with domestic 737 airliners and 737 ASW platforms – if also purchased in the future. Another airborne radar option for Taiwan would be to invest in multiple types of unmanned aircraft radar and detection platforms. As this being done by all the US services, all the Taiwan services should consider new long-, medium-, and short-endurance UAVs for surveillance. What is critical is that the data derived by all future UAVs be accessible by a common network shared by all the services.
ASW aircraft options Taiwan’s main aerial ASW forces consist of about 27 Grumman S-2T turboprop powered ASW aircraft, plus 9 Sikorsky S-70 ASW helicopters and 12 shorterrange Hughes 500MD ASW helicopters. Given the large number of PLAN submarines Taiwan will face, it is clear that Taiwan needs effective numbers of both new conventional submarines and new ASW aircraft to meet this threat. The preferred option is up to 12 Lockheed P-3 Orion ASW aircraft, which Washington formally offered to Taipei in 2001. While possessing long endurance, a large weapons load and radar that can contribute to air control or ground battle requirements, the P-3 is also very expensive and not currently in production. Lesser alternatives would be to press for an emergency release of US in-service P-3Cs or Lockheed S-3 Viking jet-powered ASW aircraft. The S-3 is smaller and carries half the weapons load of the P-3, but the S-3, with a folding wing and tail, could better fit into protected shelters. However, S-3s would require some refurbishment as they have been withdrawn from ASW duties for the US Navy since 1999 and many are reaching there the end of their airframe lives. But in their current configurations the S-3s are being modified with new powerful radar to support precision targeting missions.34 The S-3 also offers the option of being supported from US carriers that may still operate the type for some time into the future. Should financial challenges force the continued delay of the P-3 acquisition, then Taiwan might also consider being an early customer for the US Navy’s next generation maritime patrol aircraft. To be based on a Boeing 737 airframe, this new patrol aircraft is set to enter service early in the next decade. It would offer speed advantages over the P-3 and the opportunity for long-term commonality with the next generation US Navy platform.
178 Richard D. Fisher Looking toward the next decade, it may also be possible for Taiwan to consider a melding of both short- and long-range ASW platforms into one based on a future US tilt-rotor aircraft. A large V/STOL ASW platform would also be desirable in that it would have greater flexibility for rapid disbursement to escape attack. The Bell-Boeing V-22 admittedly has an uncertain future in the US armed forces, despite loyal backing by the US Marine Corps.35 But should its current aerodynamic challenges be overcome, this platform could provide a sensorweapon payload and range comparable to the S-3 with the ability to hover and deploy sensitive dipping sonar like a helicopter. And if the V-22 fails, then Taiwan should consider possible US compound helicopters, or helicopters with a ducted prop on the rear fuselage, like the Piasecki/Sikorsky YSH-60F, which could approach the range, payload, and speed of the V-22. Other novel vertical concepts include Boeing’s Canard Rotor Wing, which uses a vertical lift rotor that changes to a fixed wing for conventional flight. In addition, advances in electrical propulsion may make possible significantly smaller engine-transmission systems that may give new life to regular or tilt-rotor helicopters.36
New transports Mobility can make a tremendous difference to Taiwan’s ability to respond to any potential PLA ground operations. For the Taiwan Army, heavy vertical mobility comes from its 7 Army 9 Air Force Boeing CH-47 helicopters. Heavy longrange transport is provided by 19 Lockheed C-130H Hercules transports, which can carry up to 30,000 lbs. To supplement its hard-working C-130Hs, the ROCAF has been considering the purchase of a smaller more economical transport such as the EADS CASA CN-235, CN-295 or the Alenia-Lockheed C-27J. While this program has been delayed for financial reasons, it is commendable for the ROCAF to be able to supplement the C-130 with a smaller transport. However, for the purpose of giving its Army real mobility in wartime, the ROCAF should also be alert to developing US aerial transport concepts that could prove decisive in wartime. At the high end would be the Boeing Phantom Works’ proposal for an Advanced Theater Transport (ATT) that uses a tilting wing to lift 80,000 lbs in just 750 feet of runway.37 For Taiwan, the ATT could move 3–4 heavy wheeled armored vehicles or wheeled artillery to sensitive areas. It would also be better able to contribute to strategic re-supply missions. In addition, the United States is investigating large V/STOL transports. Boeing has a quad-tilt rotor design that can carry as much as a C-130 and a twin-tilt rotor design that can carry up to 80 passengers or 20,000 lbs of cargo. Sikorsky has a compound helicopter design that could also carry about 70 passengers or 20,000 lbs.
The race to incorporate new technologies Another race Taiwan must win with the PLA is to make rapid decisions to adopt appropriate emerging technologies into its force. It is clear that the PLA is aware
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of high technology trends and is seeking to make the best decisions about future military technologies to meet its requirements against Taiwan and the United States. A large body of PLA literature indicates PLA interest in advanced technologies such as space weapons, lasers, high-power microwaves, unmanned combat platforms and microweapons, but is also viewed as “aspirational” literature.38 However, there is also more solid evidence that the PLA is indeed developing space weapons, laser weapons, a range of unmanned combat platforms, and microweapons.39 Several emerging technologies offer Taiwan the opportunity to seize a defensive or offensive initiative over the PLA without recourse to weapons of mass destruction. These technologies need not always utilize aircraft, manned or unmanned, to enable Taiwan to secure its airspace or to conduct offensive aerial operations. As such, it is necessary that Taiwan proceed with giving close attention to new and emerging military technologies and by considering how they could be best used in a joint service context. There is a clear requirement that an appropriate office in the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense be devoted to finding, evaluating, and investing in such emerging military technologies. The highest priority should be placed on obtaining those new technologies that can best be used to counter the PLA’s missile and cruise missile threats. By mastering these new technologies first, Taiwan can also be assured of a level of technological superiority over the PLA that could increase deterrence. Cost will be a key variable in determining the value to Taiwan of such emerging technologies. Some may be prohibitively expensive, while some might have a better assurance of getting to Taiwan if Taipei were to become a co-development partner with the United States or other countries. As its key defense partner, Washington should play a proactive role in making Taipei aware of emerging defense technologies. Space, counter-space As the PLA comes to rely more on space-based information platforms as well exploit a much larger US reliance with asymmetric anti-satellite weapons, there is a clear lesson for Taiwan: follow suit. Taiwan should quickly obtain the necessary technologies to fabricate its own series of micro satellites for communication and reconnaissance. If an international partner cannot be found to quickly launch such microsatellites in times of immediate pre-war tension, then Taipei should investigate its own air-launched space-launch vehicle (SLV) options. SLVs can be launched from the back of an airborne C-130 or from the bottom of a commercial airliner, like the US Orbital Co.’s Pegasus small SLV. To sustain any potential Airborne or amphibious campaign against Taiwan, the PLA will require secure satellite communication (SATCOM) links and constant satellite reconnaissance data. This would present Taiwan with a clear PLA vulnerability that deserves an asymmetrical threat. Taiwan requires an ability both to jam and to attack PLA satellites. Jamming of optical satellites can be accomplished with ground-based laser while there are also options to jam radar satellites.
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While the United States should have the ability to conduct more active in-space operations against PLA satellites, there are relatively inexpensive options open to Taiwan as well. An ability to launch micro or smaller nano-satellites offers the option to be able to covertly launch space “mines” to be placed near a target satellite and activated when needed.
Metal storm For even near-term supplementation of point ballistic missile defenses, Taiwan should consider adapting as soon as possible an Australian technological initiative that is gaining a great following in the United States. In essence, it consists of many tubes stacked like a large multiple rocket launcher, but each tube is full of individual rounds that are fired electronically in split-second succession, hence the name “Metal Storm.”40 This technology holds the potential of a single fire unit to throw thousands of rounds in the path of an incoming missile warhead, shredding it to pieces. It would be highly advisable for Taiwan to adapt Metal Storm technology as soon as possible for defense of key leadership, command and control, naval, air, and underground bases. Laser, microwave weapons Laser and microwave weapons are emerging medium-term options for Taiwan. For long the stuff of science fiction, military lasers have long been a fact of life, being used for targeting and communication. Some laser radar (LIDAR) have entered military service in Russia and the PLA, mainly in chemical warfare units. However, powerful lasers with the ability to kill at significant distances are only now becoming a reality. The US Air Force is just about to begin tests of its Boeing 747-based AL-1A airborne anti-missile chemical laser platform. A US–Israeli Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) chemical has proven its ability to shoot down artillery rockets and artillery shells. The future utility of lasers as weapons, however, depends on the miniaturization of their power source, as the laser’s energy is significantly increased. Chemical lasers do not offer sufficient potential. Solid-state lasers, which convert electrical energy to laser energy, do offer potential improvements in making compact energy sources. Furthermore, they face current problems in resolving cooling issues. Nevertheless, Raytheon believes it can demonstrate a 100 kilowatt solid-state laser by 2007.41 A potential laser that may solve both cooling and power issues is the Free Electron Laser (FEL), which promises to rely on anticipated breakthroughs in superconductive technology. The US Navy estimates that a ship-based FEL weapon may be available in 8–10 years.42 Microwave weapons tune and direct microwave energy for non-lethal missions such as the destruction of computer microcircuits or to force incapacitating reactions in humans. Radio frequency burst weapons designed to attack microcircuits already exist in the form of aerial bombs or hand grenades. The US envisions mounting microwave weapons on unmanned combat aircraft or aerial vehicles (UCAVs) to
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attack the enemy’s electronic systems. One UCAV mounted microwave weapon is projected to be able to attack 100 targets in a sortie.43 The US Marine Corps is about to deploy an initial microwave antipersonnel weapon mounted on a Humvee vehicle. This system can tune microwave energy to incapacitate individuals by causing intense pain in all skin nerves or by inducing vomiting. For Taiwan, lasers and microwave weapons offer the potential to blunt the PLA’s missile, cruise missile, and air forces. High power lasers mounted in pods carried by fighter aircraft, trucks, or combat ships could fire thousands of energy “rounds” against hundreds of incoming missiles. While expensive to procure, the number of laser systems required would be a small fraction of the number of antimissile missiles needed to counter the PLA’s missile forces. It is also possible that a powerful laser system could simultaneously perform the role of targeting radar and kill weapon. A near-term deployment of a solid-state laser, perhaps before 2009, would have beneficial tactical advantages in that it would force the PLA to a mass high number of missiles against some target areas, leaving others less vulnerable. Microwave weapons offer Taiwan the option of acquiring a “non-lethal” offensive weapon, when mounted on an aircraft or a UAV. To facilitate its acquisition of such weapons, Taipei should follow Israel’s example and begin to invest in US development programs that offer the most promise for Taiwan’s defense.
Rail guns Long in the future concept development stage, rail guns seek to use gun barrels lined with magnets to propel artillery-size projectiles to promised new high speeds and ranges. However, such technology has long been inhibited by the inability to develop both compact energy sources and super-conductive magnets sufficient for truck or ship size platforms. It is now significant that the US Navy expects technological hurdles to be overcome “within this decade,” to allow rail guns of sufficient power to loft projectiles at speeds approaching Mach 8, up to 200 nm.44 For Taiwan, such rail guns could serve to greatly extend its defensive perimeter. Their projected speed would be sufficient to intercept current PLA intermediate range ballistic missiles IRBMs and short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). And their reach would allow Taiwan to mass smart supersonic rounds against Mainland bases or gathering forces in coastal Fujian areas. And from underground mountain redoubts in Taiwan, such rail guns could – from great distances – instantly respond to PLA air strikes and airborne assaults. The speed and flexibility of rail guns also warrants investment consideration by Taipei. Unmanned vehicles As envisioned by all the US Services, Taiwan should be actively considering how it would incorporate all potential types of UAVs into their future order of battles. The US Air Force, Navy, and Army anticipate that in the future they will be
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making increased use of unmanned vehicles for reconnaissance, communication, electronic warfare, and combat missions. For their particular missions, unmanned vehicles offer the prospect of high performance without being limited by human physical or financial concerns. For the ROCAF, UAVs are definitely attractive considering the increasing difficulty in finding and retaining professional personnel. And because the learning curve for UAV technology is accelerating rapidly, it would be to Taiwan’s advantage to try to buy into some US programs now in their relatively early stages. So far, a key factor limiting the utility of UAVs is the ability of ground or air controllers to secure the electronic “tether” needed to maintain vehicle control. They will also require near complete situational awareness of the ingress route, target area, and egress routes. Some, however, doubt that unmanned vehicles will ever be able to match the flexibility and discrimination provided by manned control.45 To date, UAVs that are now fulfilling ‘niche’ roles such as reconnaissance are having the most success of all unmanned military vehicles, with the United States and Israel the world technology leaders. American use of its Predator armed UAV also marks the first generation of UCAVs. For strategic reconnaissance, the Northrop Grumman RQ-4A Global Hawk is due to go into production for the US Air Force and Navy. It offers a 36-hour endurance and the ability to carry electro-optical or radar surveillance payloads. Very large mylar-winged solar-powered UAVs like those made by AeroVironment that could remain on very-high altitude station for weeks at a time are under consideration as inner-space communication links and for surveillance missions.46 It is worth Taiwan’s effort to investigate platforms such as these to supplement AWACS and ground-based surveillance systems. For Taiwan they could serve as cheap satellites for reconnaissance or communication missions. In fact, such UAVs would be essential to provide the necessary battle space picture to support all other precision strike weapons. Both the United States and the PRC are interested in UCAVs and so should Taiwan be. The US Air Force envisions its early UCAV, the very stealthy Boeing X-45B, to be used for dangerous missions like attacking radar and missile air defenses. The US Navy seeks a UCAV that would combine airborne surveillance and limited attack duties. The US Army is also developing its unmanned combat armed rotorcraft (UCAR), like the Frontier Systems A160 Hummingbird for battlefield surveillance and ground attack missions, as part of its innovative Future Combat Systems. Boeing is also working on a UCAR concept. However, it appears that Air Force, Navy, and Army UCAV programs may be combined.47 All planned US UCAV programs would offer new opportunities for Taiwan’s defense forces. The US Air Force or Navy UCAVs would give Taiwan a reusable platform that could perform surveillance or attack missions and would be politically more acceptable than ballistic missiles. They would also have the range to attack targets throughout the Nanjing Military Theater. The US Army UCAR would also serve to give the Taiwan Army an additional sensor and attack platform free from crew limitations. Inasmuch as the A160 may have a 40 hour
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endurance, then potential ROC Army UCARs could also perform long-range surveillance and attack missions. Mobile bases To complicate both the military and political calculations of the PLA, Taiwan should also consider building its own large mobile air bases. For many years the United States has been considering construction of very large floating platforms, called the Mobile Offshore Base (MOB), to respond to increasing lack of access to in-country basing. One US concept is an MOB that is 2-kilometers long, houses a brigade or 3,000 troops and equipment,48 and 100–200 aircraft. Taiwan should consider construction of such large-scale basing platforms. During peacetime they could serve as offshore commuter airline airports, but during wartime could be linked and sent into the Eastern seas. Protected by missile or laser defenses, such platforms could host Taiwanese, US, or Japanese combat aircraft, or coalition ground forces gathering to recover Taiwan. Such platforms could also serve as an alternative location for the Taiwan government pending the defeat of PLA forces on Taiwan proper. The knowledge that Taiwan’s government is seeking such a level of survivability could help deter Beijing in that it could remove the assurance of a swift and relatively inexpensive victory over democratic Taiwan. In other words, this would pose an asymmetric threat to the PLA’s gathering strategy against Taiwan. The longer Taiwan’s government survives, the greater the prospect for the United States and other democracies to lead a military, economic, and political campaign to force the PRC to restore Taiwan’s freedom.
Conclusion After having just completed an expensive modernization of its Air Force, Taiwan has little choice but to begin a new program to modernize and even transform its air forces. Absent an adequate Taiwanese response, the PLA could grow in strength to contest control of the skies over the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan itself for the first time in fifty years. Meeting this challenge will require strong leadership from both civilian and military leaders in Taiwan. There must be rapid decisions about doctrines and hardware. Taiwan must win several races with the PLA, to include proving that democracy can produce a smarter and more agile defense posture, and that Taiwan can more rapidly understand and incorporate transformational capabilities into its force. For its part, Washington should quickly accept that Taiwan requires some offensive capabilities and adequate assistance in choosing the proper new technologies to defeat current and future PLA threats. This may require an even greater expansion of US–Taiwanese military cooperation to include encouraging Taiwanese investment in new military technologies. As some fear, it is not a foregone conclusion that Taiwan will lose military superiority on the Strait by the end of this decade. If there is sufficient leadership, it is possible for Taipei and
184 Richard D. Fisher Washington to ensure that Taiwan be defended now and into the future. It is in the interest of both Taipei and Washington to make that happen.
Notes 1 The 2000 Pentagon report to the US Congress on PLA Modernization contains the first US statement that the PLA could challenge air superiority on the Taiwan Strait after 2005. 2 A prominent assessment that questions Taiwan’s long-term military sustainability is by David Shambaugh, “A Matter of Time: Taiwan’s Eroding Military Advantage,” Washington Quarterly, Winter 2000. Quite often those who doubt Taiwan’s long-term defensibility also condemn the people of Taiwan to the best political future they can negotiate under the point of Beijing’s gun. 3 Washington’s role in building up the ROCAF and US–ROC cooperation in conducting offensive operations and reconnaissance operations over the PRC is recounted in John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia. Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997. 4 While Taiwan has purchased the AIM-120, to date they remain in the United States though Taiwanese pilots can train with them. 5 The evolution of PLAAF doctrine and training has been analyzed in great detail by Ken Allen, “PLA Air Force Operations and Modernization,” in Colonel Susan M. Puska (Ed.) People’s Liberation Army After Next. Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2000. 6 The PLA’s quest for information superiority is described in greater detail by Lt. Col. Mark A. Stokes in publications that include: China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States. Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1999, chapter 3; “China Military Space and Theater Missile Development: Implications for Security In the Taiwan Strait,” in Colonel Susan M. Puska (Ed.) People’s Liberation Army After Next. Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, chapter 5; “The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Space and Missile Development,” Conference On The People’s Liberation Army at 75: Lessons Learned, September 14–15, 2002, US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Co-sponsored by AEI and Heritage Foundation (cited with author’s permission). 7 Interview, DFH Co. official, Zhuhai Air Show, November 2002. More information on the HJ-1 series is available from, Richard D. Fisher, “Center for Security Policy Report On The Zhuhai Air Show,” www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org 8 Bill Gertz, “China Deploys Drones From Israel,” The Washington Times, July 2, 2002. 9 The possibility that the DF-21 could be armed with a terminally guided warhead was first suggested to the author by a PRC missile guidance systems engineer at the 1996 Zhuhai Air Show, see author, “China’s Missile Threat,” The Wall Street Journal, December 30, 1996, p. A8. Since then United States, Japanese, and Taiwanese sources have confirmed the existence of this program to the author. 10 “China’s New Cruise Missile Nears Service,” Flight International, August 22–28, 2000, p. 26. 11 Richard D. Fisher, Center for Security Policy, op. cit. 12 So far the PLAAF has purchased and is taking delivery of about 80 Su-30MKK attack fighters. According to a Sukhoi official interviewed in November 2002 at Zhuhai, the PLA Navy may order up to sixty-eight attack fighters, which most likely will be Su-30MK3 variants. The Russian official said Shenyang has so far built 48 Su-27SK fighters from kits, and will modify to multi-role fighters some of the 200 Su-27s being built under a 1996 co-production contract. A recent report indicates that Shenyang may in addition, or instead, build 100–150 Su-30s, which would be multi-role fighters, see, “Russia contracted to deliver over 380 combat planes to China,” Interfax, December 19, 2002, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, CEP20021219000258.
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13 Number based on Russian reports from 2001 noting the PLA will purchase 100 Russian Phazotron ZHUK multimode radar for the J-8II, information that Phazotron officials confirmed to the author at the 2001 Moscow Air Show. It is also possible that other multi-role versions of the J-8II may have radar that is copied or derived from Israeli technology. 14 Author’s estimate. Some sources indicate the PLAAF will have 50 J-10s in service by 2005 while Russian reports indicate the PLA will purchase up to 300 AL-31FN engines to support J-10 production, while one US source estimates eventual production could reach 500. Assuming a production rate of 30 a year, 200 J-10s by 2010 is possible. 15 Russian targeting pods will likely accompany Su-30MKK strike fighters and the Louyang Co. also produces a laser/infrared targeting pod similar to the Israeli LITENING. 16 Su-30MK strike fighters will deliver the Russian KAB series laser-guided bomb, and the PLA is also developing its own laser-guided bombs, most likely from Russian technology. The indigenous laser-guided bomb has been displayed on a mock-up of the Xian JH-7A fighter-bomber. 17 During the 1980s the PLA imported the French DURANDAL runway-penetrating bomb and have very likely produced their own version. 18 Richard Fisher Center for Security Policy, op. cit.; Yihong Chang, “China Launches New Stealth Fighter Project,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 11, 2002. 19 Yihong Chang, “China Promotes Stealthy J-10A,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 9, 2003. 20 Nick Farina, “Missing The Link,” Flight International, November 4, 2002, pp. 45–6. 21 Doug Barrie, “Chinese Weapon Upgrades Reflect Russian Expertise,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 4, 2002, p. 58. 22 Interview, Zhuhai Air Show, November 2002. See also, Doug Barrie, “China Revs Up Its I2R Missile Efforts,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 11, 2002, p. 36. 23 According to one report, 25,000–30,000 Mainland citizens have worked in Taiwan’s fishing industry, indicating one potential avenue for Special Forces infiltration. This danger will only increase as implementation of the “Three Links” allows many more PLA operatives in civilian guise to make direct visits to target areas in Taiwan. See, “China to ban its citizens from Taiwanese fishing,” Taipei Times, January 20, 2002. 24 Nick Farina, “Made In China,” Flight International, August 20–26, 2002, pp. 26–9. 25 The armed version of the Z-11 was only revealed at the November 2002 Zhuhai show. It is not yet clear how many the PLA Army will purchase but it will likely enter PLA Army service before the new 6-ton attack helicopter. 26 By the end of the decade the PLAN may also have the long anticipated Project 093 SSN, but as this program is also often reported to be experiencing difficulties, there have also been persistent reports of PLA interest in purchasing the Russian AKULA SSN and the OSCAR SSGN. 27 This new variant is reported to be in testing, see Douglas Barrie, “Chinese Air Force In Throes Of Cultural Revolution,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 4, 2002, p. 57. At the 2001 Moscow Air Show a Phazotron official confirmed to the author that the Zhuk-M-S radar was intended for a future Su-30 variant destined for the PLA. 28 For analysis of PLAN’s gathering anti-carrier forces, see Richard D. Fisher, “To Take Taiwan, First Kill A Carrier,” China Brief, July 8, 2002, www.jamestown.org 29 Author’s observation made during an April 2000 visit to a ROCAF base. 30 Pictures of ROC Army protective shelters are occasionally found in Taiwan’s major illustrated defense magazines, Defense Technology Monthly and Defense International. 31 Brian Hsu, “Taiwan Navy Reportedly Wants Submarine Base Inside Mountain,” Taipei Times, June 10, 2002. 32 Graham Warwick, “Realism Rules,” Flight International, November 19–25, 2002, p. 41. 33 There is a sizable literature assessing the Joint Strike Fighter program. There are two useful works by Bill Sweetman, Joint Strike Fighter, Osceola WI: MBI Publishing,
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34 35
36 37 38
39
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
1999; and “JSF, X-32 and X-35: Joint Strike Fighter,” International Air Power Review, Summer 2001, pp. 32–67. Jon Lake, “Lockheed S-3B, Versatility Unlimited,” Air International, May 2002, pp. 280–3. Robert Wall and David A. Fulghum, “V-22’s Fate Hinges On Upcoming Tests,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 23, 2002, p. 51; for an unflattering assessment of the V-22, see Alan C. Miller and Kevin Sack, “Storming The Hill: The Few, The Proud, The Politically Wired; The Vertical Vision, Pt. IV,” Los Angeles Times, December 18, 2002. Alex Youngs, “Rotorcraft Propelled Into The Future,” Air International, May 2002, p. 297. Brochure, Boeing ATT, Advanced Theater Transport. Seattle. In the 1990s, PLA authors produced a large body of literature on the Revolution In Military Affairs (RMA) and its possible impact on the PLA. A significant sampling of this literature was given to and translated by Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997. Actual PLA progress in developing these and other next generation military technologies is explored in chapter 2 of the author’s forthcoming book, PRC Military Power. Also see Richard D. Fisher, “The PLA’s High Tech Future,” China Brief, August 28, 2001, www.jamestown.org A useful description of Metal Storm is contained in Popular Science, 21st Century Soldier, New York, NY: Time Inc. Home Entertainment, 2002, p. 92. “World News Roundup,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 4, 2002, p. 22. Andrew Koch, “US Navy Sees The ‘Light,”Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 18, 2002; “Navy Envisions Surface Combatants With Powerful Laser Guns,” Inside The Navy, December 9, 2002, p. 1. David A. Fulghum, “USAF Acknowledges Beam Weapon Readiness,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 7, 2002, p. 27. Koch, op. cit., p. 1. Loren Thompson, “UAVs: How Revolutionary?” Defense News, December 2–8, 2002, p. 17. Michael Sirak, “US Navy Eyes ‘Flying Wing’ Link For Ships And Aircraft,” Jane’s Defence Weekly December 18, 2002. Robert Wall, “Pentagon Bets On Joint UAVs,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 16, 2002, p. 41. Popular Science, op. cit., p. 72.
Index
Abyssinia 107 “active” air defense operations: concept of 40, 67, 106–7, 146–7, 160, 170–1; historical review of 107–9 “active countermeasures” doctrine 49–51 Advanced Theater Transport 178 Aegis system 132–3, 147 Afghanistan 30–2, 96, 98 Aidid, Mohammed Farah 29–30 air bases: location of 66; mobile 183; protection of 140–6; recovery of 150–1 airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) 120–1, 166–7, 174–7 air campaign theory 74–5 air combat: goal of 112–13; strategy for 113–14 air control 20–5, 56 aircraft carriers 15, 20 air defense 124–7, 147 “air-land battle” doctrine 56 airlift capability 32 air power: complexity of 57–8; cost of 2, 18; definition of 11, 13; dialectics of 10–12; as driver behind revolution in warfare 110; effectiveness of 90–1; essential characteristics of 13; importance for Taiwan of 34, 163–4; major attributes of 13–18; in the modern conflict environment 30–4; peculiarities of 9–10; as a punishment tool 93; significance of 1–2, 5, 37; threats to Taiwanese security from 22–5 air superiority 33, 38–43, 46–8, 63, 105–7, 112, 114, 126, 140–1, 163–4, 170; concepts and contents of 39–40; in Taiwan Strait 98 air supremacy 11, 13, 16–20 alliances 30–1
amphibious assault 99, 167–8 anticipatory self-defense 69 anti-radiation missiles 144–5 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 177–8 armed forces, size of 157–8 Battle of Britain 12, 16, 93 Bekka Valley 108–9 biological weapons 145 Black Hawk Down (film) 29 Blitz of London 17, 107 blockade strategy 23, 90, 98–100, 168 Bosnia 96–7 Brodie, Bernard 12 Brookes, Andrew 32 bureaucracy 158 Bush, George W., President 89, 109, 131, 135–6 camouflage measures 81, 149 campaign theory 73–4, 82–4 catastrophic damage 131 Chechnya 96 chemical weapons 145 Chen Shui-bian xv Chiang Kai-shek 37 Chia-shan base 148 Chinese Communist Party 136 Ching-Kuo Chiang 46 civil defense 129 civilians, attacks on 93 civil–military relations xvii–xviii Clausewitz, Karl von 67 “CNN factor” 130 coercive measures xv–xvi, 23, 116, 140–1, 163; China’s threats towards Taiwan 98–101; evaluating success of 90–5 combat effectiveness 90–1
188 Index combat strategy 105 combined air-missile strikes 166–8 command of the air see air control command, control, communication and computer (C4) systems 141, 165, 171 communication networks 94–5 complementarity in defense systems 129 conscription 26, 158–9 conservatism, military xiv counter-air operations 40–50, 111–12; revolution in 106–7 counterforce concept 151 countermeasures 49–51 cruise missiles 123–7, 143–6, 171–2 culture, military 155–7 damage assessment 150 “decapitation” strategies 92–5, 98–101 “defense-in-depth” concept 47 defensive counter-air (DCA) operations 40, 48, 106–7, 112 defensive strategy of Taiwan 111–12 “denial” strategies 92 “Desert Fox” campaign 96 “Desert Storm” campaign 99 deterrence 25, 115, 131, 163–4, 179, 183 DF-11 and DF-15 missile systems 3, 121, 123, 127, 142–3 DF-21 missile system 121, 123–4, 127 dispersal of forces 149–50 distributed mission training 174 doctrine, military 38–40 Douhet, Giulio 11 downsizing of armed forces 157–8, 161
Hackworth, David 29–30 “hardening” of military targets 148–9 hardware, military 155 Hau, General 46–7, 50 helicopters 15, 168, 178 Hu Jintao 135–6 Hussein, Saddam 95–8, 101 Ichiaganshan Island 37 information operations 44–5 information superiority 67 information technology 69, 165–6, 170 information warfare 5, 123 integrated air defense system (IADS) 64–5, 125–6 integration of command structures 32 interdiction operations 76 interoperability 134 invasion of Taiwan, possibility of 24, 42, 90, 98–9, 110–11, 140 Iraq 89, 97, 107; see also Gulf War isolation of Taiwan xiv Israeli Air Force (IAF) 22, 39, 108–9 J-10 fighter aircraft 61, 119, 167 jamming measures 130, 149, 179 Jane’s Defence Weekly 76–7 Japan 56, 91 Jiang Zemin 136 juntuan-level organizations 73 Kinmen Islands 37 Korean War 78, 83, 85, 108 Kosovo 19, 31, 65, 68, 80, 96–8, 108, 149
early warning capability 147–8 economic growth 136 economic pressures on Taiwan xv effectiveness of military operations, measurement of 90 expenditure on defense 2, 18, 113–14
laser weapons 128, 179–81 leaders of states, capture or killing of 93–4 Lee Teng-hui, President 20, 80 Liddell Hart, Basil 11–12 Liu Shun-yao 60 logistic support 33, 114, 150
F-35 fighter program 175–6 Fairgrieve, James 56 Falklands War 23 families of servicemen 159 fighter aircraft 19, 61–34, 77, 166–7 Finletter Report (1948) 18 First World War 93, 107 floating platforms 183 “follow-on-force attack” (FOFA) 16, 19
McVadon, Eric 59 Mahar, Michael 22 manufacturing capability 18, 25 Mason, Tony 13 Metal Storm technology 180 microwave weapons 180–1 Milosevic, Slobodan 96–8 Ministry of National Defense, Taiwan xvi–xvii, 171, 179 misinformation 149 missile defense xvii, 2–5, 12, 19–20, 23, 41–4, 58, 63–8, 82, 90, 111, 117–34, 141–2, 166, 168, 171; components of
Global Positioning System, jamming of 130 Gulf War (1990–91) 15–16, 23, 68, 76–7, 90, 94–6, 99, 108, 141, 149, 165
Index 189 124; consequences of Taiwan’s acquisition of 134–5; layered 128–9 Mitchell, William 11 mobile air operations theory 75–6 mobile offshore bases 183 modernization of military capabilities xiv–xvii, 3, 43, 46, 59, 118–19, 163–5, 183 Montgomery, Bernard, General 5, 110 national air space 14–15 “nonlinear” air power capability 68 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 16, 19, 31, 80, 148 nuclear weapons 69, 101, 116–17, 165 offensive capability 40, 47, 49, 60, 67–9, 106–7, 112, 115, 131, 151, 170–3; mobile PLAAF operations 73–85 Operation Enduring Freedom 30 order of battle: of the PLAAF 76–7; Taiwanese 41–2, 61–2 over-flying, permission for 14–15 passive defense measures 1–2, 25, 40, 68, 106–7, 129–30, 147–51, 169, 172–4 Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 missile systems 20, 23–4, 123, 125–9, 146–7, 168–9, 173 Pearl Harbor 107–8 Penghu archipelago 106 pensions 159 pilots: segregation of 156, 160; training of 161 Polaris system 12 “precision revolution” 95–7 pre-emptive strike against Taiwan, possibility of 89–101, 114, 131 professionalism 160–1 psychological warfare 17, 55–6 “punishment” strategies 91–3, 98 Qaddafi, Moamer 95 Qiao Qing-chen 60 radar systems 20, 44–5, 65, 120, 147, 165, 168–9 rail guns 181 reconaissance 17, 182 regime change 94 retaliation 101 Revolution in Military Affairs 31, 113 risk aversion 120 Robertson, Lord 31 “rogue states” 89 rules of engagement 41, 83–4
SAM missiles see surface-to-air missiles satellites 57–8, 145, 165–6, 170, 179–80 scandals, military 157 Schwarzkopf, H. Norman 97 sealift capability 32 sea lines of communication 56–7 Second World War 12, 16–17, 20, 91, 107, 113 secrecy 38, 105 Senkaku Retto 155 September 11th 2001, events of 30–1 service mindedness 160–1 Seversky, Alexander de 11–12 Shui-bian Chen 48 software, military 155 Somalia 29–30 special forces 172 Spratly Island 155 strategic bombing 11–12, 17, 40, 92, 95 strategic effectiveness 90–1 strategic imbalance 58–60 strategic paralysis 94 strategic sustainability 47–9 Strong Net system 44–5 Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft 3, 24, 43, 60–1, 80, 84, 118–20, 168 submarines 168 surface-to-air (SAM) missiles 4, 108–9, 112, 167–73 passim surveillance 120 Sweden 149 Syria 108–9 Tachen Island 37 Taiwan Strait: air superiority over 98; middle line 41–2, 67–8, 111, 164 team spirit 158–61 technology: emerging 178–80, 183; limits to value of 30 theater capability 95, 142, 151 threat to Taiwan, components of 119–24 Ting-Chung Tien 48–9 top-down restructuring of forces 160–1 training programs 2, 33, 62–3, 77–81, 158, 170, 174 transregional operations 78–9 Tripoli bombing (1986) 14 ubiquity of air power 14–16 underground bases 148, 169, 174 United Nations 109, 113 United States: arms sales to Taiwan 135–7, 171; commitment to Taiwan’s security xiii–xiv, xviii, 5, 24, 100–1, 111–13, 117–18, 131–5, 183–4;
190 Index United States (Continued) cooperation with industry in 133; Defense Department 59, 84, 123–4, 155, 170; integration with Taiwanese forces 125; inter-service competition in 12; military capabilities of 31, 90, 141; and missile defense capability 134–5; relations with People’s Republic 134–6; security policy and military strategy 56, 89; State Department 171 unmanned vehicles 181–3 upgrading of air forces 172–3 V-1 missile 2–3, 20, 113 V-2 rocket 2–3, 12, 113 V-22 platform 178 vertical take-off and landing aircraft 15, 175 Vietnam War 11, 22, 29, 78, 85, 108, 112
“vision” statements 170 vulnerability of Taiwan’s defenses 168–9 “water’s edge” defense 47–9 weapons of mass destruction 116–17, 131, 145; see also nuclear weapons Wei-Kuan Chen 48 We Were Soldiers (film) 29 “wings in being” doctrine 48–51 Wright, T.P. 18 Yom Kippur War 16, 22, 39 Zeppelin raids 10 “zero fault” policy 157 “zero-second arrival” 82 zero-sum games 21–2 Zhang Wan-Nian 55
