Reconstructing Security after Conflict: Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone (New Security Challenges)

New Security Challenges Series General Editor: Stuart Croft, Professor of International Security in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, UK, and Director of the ESRC’s New Security Challenges Programme. The last decade demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in their causes and manifestations, and that they invite interest and demand responses from the social sciences, civil society and a very broad policy community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective, but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of security, in terms of human security, economic security and environmental security. The topical New Security Challenges series reflects this pressing political and research agenda.

Titles include: Jon Coaffee, David Murakami Wood and Peter Rogers THE EVERYDAY RESILIENCE OF THE CITY How Cities Respond to Terrorism and Disaster Tom Dyson NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND DEFENCE REFORM IN POST-COLD WAR EUROPE Christopher Farrington (editor) GLOBAL CHANGE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS Implementing the Political Settlement Kevin Gillan, Jenny Pickerill and Frank Webster ANTI-WAR ACTIVISM New Media and Protest in the Information Age Andrew Hill RE-IMAGINING THE WAR ON TERROR Seeing, Waiting, Travelling Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin TELEVISION AND TERROR Conflicting Times and the Crisis of News Discourse Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht RECONSTRUCTING SECURITY AFTER CONFLICT Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone Bryan Mabee THE GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITY State Power, Security Provision and Legitimacy Janne Haaland Matlary EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY DYNAMICS In the New National Interest

Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Mandy Turner (editors) CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PEACEBUILDING Brian Rappert and Chandré Gould (editors) BIOSECURITY Origins, Transformations and Practices Brian Rappert BIOTECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND THE SEARCH FOR LIMITS An Inquiry into Research and Methods Brian Rappert (editor) TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY Governing Threats in the New Millenium Ali Tekin and Paul A. Williams GEO-POLITICS OF THE EURO-ASIA ENERGY NEXUS The European Union, Russia and Turkey Lisa Watanabe SECURING EUROPE

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Reconstructing Security after Conflict Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone Paul Jackson Director of the School of Government and Society, University of Birmingham, UK

Peter Albrecht PhD Candidate, Danish Institute for International Studies, Denmark

© Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht 2011 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries ISBN 978-0-230-23900-5

hardback

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 20

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Peter would like to thank his mum and dad for always being supportive – and Paul for a long, bumpy ride! Paul would like to thank his long-suffering wife Anne, his two children Sam and Andrew and his dog, Dexter for dragging him away from the computer. Both authors would like to thank all those in Sierra Leone and in the UK who have been extremely supportive of this work from the very beginning.

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Contents List of Tables and Figures

viii

Acknowledgments

ix

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

x

Chapter 1

Introduction

1

Chapter 2

How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR?

27

Chapter 3

Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict

51

Chapter 4

The Development of an SSR Concept, 2002–2005

95

Chapter 5

Consolidation and Development, 2005–2007

133

Chapter 6

Cross-Cutting Themes Throughout the Period in Sierra Leone and Beyond

171

Chapter 7

Conclusions

195

Notes

209

References

222

Index

227

vii

List of Tables and Figures Tables 3.1 3.2

The Image of the SLP Headline Statistics of the Military Reintegration Programme

53 81

Figure 4.1

The National Security Architecture

viii

120

Acknowledgments This book on Sierra Leone’s security system transformation process is the extension of a piece of work that the two authors produced during 2007 and 2008. It is appropriate to thank the many individuals who were part of this process. In particular, the member of that project’s Working Group should be thanked, including: Desmond Buck, Emmanuel Osho Coker, Kellie Conteh, Kadi Fakondo, Aldo Gaeta, Garth Glentworth, Barry Le Grys, Rosalind Hanson-Alp, Anthony-Howlett-Bolton, Al-Hassan Kondeh, Christopher Rampe, James Vincent, Alfred Nelson-Williams and Mark White. Input from the following individuals was greatly valued: Robert Ashington-Pickett, Karen Barnes, Keith Biddle, Robert Bradley, Geoff Bredemear, Piet Biesheuvel, Iain Cholerton, Andrew Cordery, Mike Dent, Ray England, Claire Fitzroy, Adrian Freer, Chris Gabelle, Emmanuel Gaima, Garry Horlacher, Liz Horlacher, Adrian Horn, Richard Hogg, Gordon Hughes, Brima Acha Kamara, Lynette Keogh, Nick Killick, Phil King, Mariama Konneh, Sarah MacIntosh, Adele McGookin, Simon Mills, Richard Moncrieff, Desmond Molloy, Emma Morley, Robert Musk, Abdullah Mustapha, Jana Naujoks, Witek Nowosielski, Peter Penfold, Mark Ravnkilde, David Richards, Paul Richards, David Santa-Olalla, Oliver B. M. Somasa. Institutionally, a special thank you to the Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, International Alert, Conciliation Resources, University of Birmingham, Danish Institute for International Studies and Copenhagen Business School. The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any of the agencies or individuals mentioned throughout. Analysis and interpretation have been added to all sources, primary and secondary.

ix

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ACPP AFRC AFRSL AFTC AIG APC B2B BMATT CCSSP CDF CDS CHAD CHASE CHISECs CID CISU CPDON CPDTF CPP CSSP DACO DCAF DDR DfID DG DIG DISECs DSRSG EC ECOMOG ECOWAS ESF

Africa Conflict Prevention Pool Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Armed Forces of Sierra Leone Armed Forces Training Centre Assistant Inspector-General All People’s Congress back to basics British Military Training Advisory Team Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project Civil Defence Force Chief of Defence Staff Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department Conflict and Humanitarian and Security Affairs Chieftaincy Security Committee Criminal Investigation Department Central intelligence and Security Unit Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation Network Commonwealth Police Development Task Force Conflict Prevention Pool Community Safety and Security Project Development Assistance Coordination Office Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Department for International Development Director-General Deputy Inspector-General District Security Committee Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General European Community Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS Standby Force x

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms xi

FCO FISU FSU GAF GCPP GDP GF GFN-SSR GID GoSL HBTC HMG HR IASJP IGP IMATT IMF IRC ISATT ISD ISS JCSP JFC JFTHQ JIC JSC JSDP JTF JTFC KAIDCSO KIA LCU LDP LNP LO LPPB MACP MaSSAJ MATT MDAs MIA

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Force Intelligence and Security Unit Family Support Unit Guinean Armed Forces Global Conflict Prevention Pool Gross Domestic Product Government Forces Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform Government and Institutions Department Government of Sierra Leone Holding and Basic Training Centre Her Majesty’s Government (UK Government) Human Resources Improved Access to Security and Justice Programme Inspector-General of Police International Military Training Advisory Team International Monetary Fund International Rescue Committee Integrated Security Advisor and Training Team internal security division Intelligence and Security Service Joint Country Strategy for Sierra Leone Joint Force Command Joint Task Force Headquarters Joint Intelligence Committee Joint Support Command Justice Sector Development Programme Joint Task Force Joint Task Force Commander Kailahun District Civil Society Organisation Killed-in-Action Local Command Unit Law Development Programme Local Needs Policing Liaison Officer Local Policing Partnership Board Military Aid to the Civil Power Malawi Safety, Security and Access to Justice Programme Military Advisory Training Team Ministries, Departments and Agencies Ministry of Internal Affairs

xii List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

MIB MODAT MoD MODEP MoF MoU MRP MTEF NCDDR NCO NDI NEC NEO NGO NPRC NSA NSC NSCCG ODA OECD OLRT ONS Op PEBU ORBAT OSD PASCO POCDI&PA PRA PROSECs PRSP PSC Psyops RSLAF RSLMF RUF S&J SB SILSEP

Military Intelligence Branch Ministry of Defence Advisory Team Ministry of Defence Ministry of Development and Economic Planning Ministry of Finance Memorandum of Understanding Military Reintegration Plan Medium Term Expenditure Framework National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Non-Commissioned Officers National Democratic Institute National Electoral Commission Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation Non-Governmental Organization National Provisional Ruling Council National Security Adviser National security Council National Security Council Coordinating Group Overseas Development Assistance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team Office of National Security Operation Pebu Order of Battle Operational Support Division Poverty Alleviation Strategy Coordinating Office Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Defence, Internal and Presidential Affairs Participatory Rural Appraisal Provincial District Security Committee Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Personnel Screening Centre Psychological Operations Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force Revolutionary United Front Security and Justice Special Branch Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms xiii

SEA SLA SLE SLP SLPP SSD SSR STTT TDF THC TRC UK UN UN CIVPOL UNAMSIL UNDP UNICEF UNIOSIL UNOMSIL UPP VAT WIA

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Sierra Leone Army Spearhead Land Element Sierra Leone Police Sierra Leone People’s Party Special Security Division Security Sector Reform Short Term Training Team Territorial Defence Force Temporary Holding Centre Truth and Reconciliation Commission United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Civilian Police Force United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone United Nations Development Programme United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone United Nations Observer Mission United Progressive Party Value Added Tax Wounded-in-Action

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1 Introduction

This book is partly a history of the United Kingdom (UK) intervention in Sierra Leone and partly a reconstruction and critique of efforts made to reconstruct a state. Between 1997 and 2007, the UK Government, along with other international partners including the United Nations (UN), fought a losing struggle to prop up a collapsing state, watched as it completely fell apart, and then intervened to prevent further bloodshed. They then committed themselves to a long-term intervention with the aim of reconstructing the Sierra Leonean state from scratch. By the end of the war in 2002 there was, in fact, very little of any state left to reconstruct. In the countryside the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) had targeted firstly the Paramount Chiefs and then anyone and anything representing the central government, a central state. This included civil servants, local government officers, buildings and records. By 2002 there were very few government records remaining and most officials had fled, particularly from the countryside. The Sierra Leonean state had effectively ceased to exist. In 2007, for the first time in two decades, Sierra Leone conducted a generally peaceful national election without international peacekeeping assistance. This successful election earned the praise of international election observers as relatively free, fair and credible. Most important, these elections were conducted by and for the people of Sierra Leone, who exercised their right to vote in a generally orderly environment made possible by their own security forces. Seen within the context of the levels of violence experienced by the people of Sierra Leone in the previous 20 years, the fact that Sierra Leone conducted this generally violence-free election only seven years after the end of a civil war is a remarkable transformation. This transformation is due to improved personal security that resulted from substantial UN and 1

2 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

UK intervention and assistance, but also the leadership by a core of Sierra Leonean government officials who have sustained the security reform effort over an extended period of time, often in difficult circumstances. What is often referred to as ‘political will’ in policy parlance, effectively meaning willingness to take on external ideas about best practices, has been present, if not in abundance then at least in critical positions.

Why Sierra Leone? In many ways Sierra Leone is a small and insignificant country on the west coast of Africa. Covering around 72,000 square miles it is roughly the size of the US state of South Carolina. It shares border with Guinea in the north and Liberia in the southeast. To the southwest it has an Atlantic coastline. As Pham points out in his introductory section, Sierra Leone has been the subject of a number of historical studies, not least the impressive History of Sierra Leone, one of a number of publications by the eminent historian Christopher Fyfe.1 Yet, even in a review of this monumental work, Paul Hair asked rhetorically whether this small state was worthy of a single country study, implying that it was too insignificant to merit academic scrutiny.2 This is a view that would probably (indeed has been already) find much acceptance with contemporary publishers seeking to sell books. So why is Sierra Leone so significant? The first reason for this is that Sierra Leone is firmly rooted to the bottom few countries in the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index. Until the 2009 index Sierra Leone ranked 177 out of 177 countries included in the index. In 2009 this has improved to 180 out of 182, with only Niger and Afghanistan below Sierra Leone.3 The statistics that back up this analysis are harrowing. Whilst Purchasing power parity gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is around US$679, life expectancy is only 47.3 years, and there is a 30% probability of living until 40 years old. The adult illiteracy rate is over 60% and the female literacy rate is half the male. Through almost any measure Sierra Leone is a very poor country. Secondly, is the levels of violence experienced during a protracted war and also the nature of that war itself. In a seminal article, Robert Kaplan identified Sierra Leone as a key area of study since it was representative of the ‘coming anarchy’ of collapsing states.1 In Kaplan’s analysis the world was divided into a small group of very rich countries and chaos. Sierra Leone represented the chaos; a mixture of demographic, environ-

Introduction 3

mental and social factors epitomised by the gangs of rootless youth with no social ties to control them. Forced out of ancestral lands in the forests due to logging, with no prospects and no education, Kaplan identified these gangs as barbarians with no appreciation of social ties that would have prevented extreme violence. Indeed, Kaplan used Sierra Leone to introduce the entire article in saying that: Sierra Leone is a microcosm of what is occurring, albeit in a more tempered and gradual manner, throughout West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world: the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war. West Africa is reverting to the Africa of the Victorian Atlas. It consists now of a series of coastal trading posts, such as Freetown and Conakry, and an interior that, owing to violence, volatility and disease, is again becoming, as Graham Greene once observed, ‘blank’ and ‘unexplored’. However, whereas Greene’s vision implies a certain romance, as in the somnolent and charmingly seedy Freetown of his celebrated novel The Heart of the Matter, it is Thomas Malthus, the philosopher of demographic doomsday, who is now the prophet of West Africa’s future. And West Africa’s future, eventually, will also be that of most of the rest of the world.5 This provides a picture of the florid language used in Kaplan’s piece and his rather liberal interpretation of Malthus, but the paragraph conveys the thrust of his argument well.6 Despite his lack of historical knowledge of pre-Victorian Africa which of course did contain a patchwork of complex polities and proto-states, his thesis is basically that the modern state is dying and Africans are reverting to ‘traditional’ forms of organisation that are not constrained by modern laws and human rights. Unsurprisingly perhaps, this thesis has been subject to withering criticism from all quarters, and yet the core thrust of the argument seemed to provide a logical explanation for what several policymakers were seeing in the aftermath of the Cold War and the end of the old certainties.7 Whilst Kaplan’s analysis is clearly problematic, it managed to get Sierra Leone on to the agendas of several western countries and to puncture the smug satisfaction of the liberal victory over all alternatives that was supposed to produce the end of history. In many ways, Sierra Leone seemed to represent a microcosm of all that was falling apart in the

4 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

post-Cold War world, particularly in Africa. Warlords, shadow economies, collapsing states and the ensuing violence were all present in Sierra Leone, along with environmental degradation, illegal trading, child soldiers and extreme violence against civilians. Certainly within the UK it became a country that could not be allowed to disappear since if the international community could not save Sierra Leone then where could it save? Along with the violence, Sierra Leone is probably best known for diamonds. The alluvial diamonds that should have made the country rich have given the world the phenomenon of ‘blood diamonds’ or ‘conflict diamonds’. Whilst analysts such as Richards and Keen point out that attributing the war to diamonds is a gross oversimplification, the alluvial diamond fields certainly did play a role in prolonging the conflict and motivating certain of the leaders of both sides.8 The ease of digging the diamonds, their smuggling potential and an international market willing to allow the diamonds on to open markets and also willing to pay for them, certainly prolonged the conflict and allowed the RUF to maintain a violent uprising beyond its initial expected life. At the same time, the two kimberlite diamond mines in central Sierra Leone were ceded to mining companies affiliated to the international mercenary company Executive Outcomes following their successful intervention during the Strasser regime. Today, diamonds remain a critical element of governance. They are influential in terms of corruption and ethics and they remain a threat in so much as they are still located in one of the most unstable geographical areas of the country and are easily smuggled between the Mano Region countries. Lastly, the Sierra Leone war was renowned for violence beyond the norms found in previous wars. Estimates vary, but around 70,000 civilians are estimated to have died during the conflict with over half of the five million population being displaced. The deliberate targeting of civilians became a characteristic of a war that left many traumatised either mentally or through the physical removal of limbs. Hundreds of thousands were maimed deliberately by the RUF on top of human rights abuses carried out by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) but also Government forces, kamajor and Civil Defence Force (CDF) fighters, peacekeepers and mercenaries many of which were detailed by the Special Court in Freetown. A frequently cited Human Right Watch report explains the approach adopted by the rebels on entering Freetown in 1999: The rebel occupation of Freetown was characterised by the systematic and widespread perpetration of all classes of gross human rights

Introduction 5

abuses against the civilian population. Civilians were gunned down within their houses, rounded up and massacred on the streets, thrown from the upper floors of buildings, used as human shields, and burnt alive in cars and houses. They had their limbs hacked off with machetes, eyes gouged out with knives, hands smashed with hammers, and bodies burned with boiling water. Women and girls were systematically sexually abused, and children and young people abducted by the hundreds. The rebels made little distinction between civilian and military targets. They repeatedly stated that they believed civilians should be punished for what they perceived to be their support for the existing government. Thus the rebels waged war against the civilian population through their perpetration of human rights abuses. While there was some targeting of particular groups, such as Nigerians, police officers, journalists and church workers, the vast majority of atrocities were committed by rebels who chose their victims apparently at random… …The atrocities were often planned and premeditated. Victims and witnesses describe well-organized operations to round up civilians who were later executed, attacked with machetes, or raped. On several occasions rebels gave advance warning that atrocities were to be committed later. Witnesses describe the existence of distinct units for committing particular crimes like the Burn House Unit, Cut Hands Commando, and Blood Shed Squad. Some of the squads had a trademark way of killing, such as Kill Man No Blood Unit, whose method was to beat people to death without shedding blood, or the Born Naked Squad, who stripped their victims before killing them.9 All of this violence and the entrance into Freetown was then broadcast globally when a journalist in the city managed to film the rebels and then the peacekeepers in action. He filmed the rebels burning a family to death in their house having refused to become human shields, but he then also filmed paranoid Nigerian peacekeepers beating a mentally disturbed child they had mistaken for a sniper. All of this is in the seminal film Cry Freetown. Following all of these high profile events, particularly the brutality of the violence visited on the civilian population the international community was eventually spurred into action. This included the UK Government, whose Prime Minister, Tony Blair knew Sierra Leone because his father had been a school teacher there. A central group of senior UK politicians effectively decided that they could not allow the

6 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

country to completely fall apart and the UK eventually intervened militarily in 2000 when the UN peacekeepers were threatened and the UN commander in the field, General Jetley, openly accused the Nigerian troops within the previous Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) command of colluding with the RUF to profit from illicit diamond mining. The arrival of the British troops galvanised the UN and secured parts of Freetown and immediate area. They also gave confidence to the people who promptly began demonstrating outside Foday Sankoh’s house in Freetown. Nigerian peacekeepers opened fire on the crowd causing a surge on the house whereby Sankoh’s bodyguards also opened fire, Sankoh himself fleeing out of the back. The later capture of Sankoh and his incarceration by the British broke the remains of the RUF and by July 2001 the British Expeditionary Force and the reinforced United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) contingent took the offensive and gradually pacified the country. So why Sierra Leone? Diamonds, international intervention, violence, atrocities and poverty. It may be a small country in West Africa but it is no accident that following the war a small cottage industry of work on Sierra Leone began to develop.

Politics and conflict in Sierra Leone In many ways, Sierra Leone is a representative case for those who see the series of conflicts in post-colonial Africa as being rooted in statesupported injustice and sustained marginalisation both of particular social groups and also of periphera regions.10 Over-centralised and in many cases, personalised rule exacerbated this marginalisation and this created a form of predatory rule whereby small groups of elites grabbed power and used the state to appropriate resources. Since independence from Britain in 1961, the ethos of Sierra Leone’s political system has been characterised by centralisation of power and resources in Freetown coupled with a deep dualism between Freetown and the rest of the country. At independence in 1961, Sierra Leone became a unitary state politically dominated by chiefs with their urban allies, the Margai brothers forming the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP). The SLPP itself saw itself as a more democratic and representative party than the krio dominated United Progressive Party (UPP). After the rule of the Margai family ended in elections in 1967, the then mayor of Freetown, Siaka Stevens, became Prime Minister. However, Margai and the SLPP encouraged the military to

Introduction 7

intervene and thereafter the military became progressively politicised. Following a series of other military interventions, Stevens assumed full presidential powers in 1968 and effectively held sway until his appointed successor, Major General Joseph Momoh, took over following a one-party referendum in 1985. (Stevens was 80 years old at the time.) This one-party state was marked by further centralisation of resources and power in Freetown and a growing alienation, amongst youth in particular, in the countryside. Also by this time, the regime was almost entirely reliant on a mixture of a security agreement with Guinea and various armed groups within the country who were paid off by Stevens and then Momoh. Over this period, the state was systematically plundered by Stevens and his cronies effectively undermining every state institution in the process. With the state about to collapse Stevens handed over power and Momoh continued the slide, until finally a demoralised civil service, a collapsed military and a degraded police force were unable to counter Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh and the RUF. A detailed history of Sierra Leone is beyond the scope of this paper and is dealt with elsewhere.11 However, it is critical to understand that Sierra Leone’s history is dominated by the colonial bifurcation of a coastal colony run on modern lines and a larger protectorate ruled indirectly, with Chiefs subject to the supervision of a small civilian staff. This has profound effects in terms of governance and has created and perpetuated a core-periphery split that is at the heart of Sierra Leone politics. The institutional bifurcation has led to a continued juxtaposition of state police and Chiefdom police, magistrate’s courts and customary courts, national tax and Chiefdom tax, etc., as well as a colonial legacy of the District Officer administration. In essence, this bifurcation meant limited powers to state officials outside Freetown, dominated either by Paramount Chiefs, who continue to hold considerable power in Sierra Leone’s countryside, or the centre. Indeed, all of this was only recently sought tackled in a comprehensive effort to reform local government based on decentralisation following the war.12 As Fanthorpe points out, no aspect of the conflict in Sierra Leone has provoked more discussion than the murky dealings of the supposed adversaries, the national army and CDF fighters on one hand and the RUF on the other, in terrorising civilians and looting and destroying private property.13 In fact the only subject to come close to the same level of exposure is the role of the diamond trade in colluding with combatants on both sides.14 Most analysts agree that the basis of the violence was contained within a social cohort of disenfranchised and alienated youth that found itself open to mass consumption but socially

8 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

excluded.15 Certainly, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) regard the fluidity of the combatants, their tendencies to change sides and to reinvent themselves as a means of disenfranchised individuals to empower themselves as militiamen.16 The cause of this alienation is regarded as clear by the TRC: a political elite that descended into a kleptocracy that maintained its power through disempowering youth and engaging in corruption. This is clearly evident from the targets of much of the early violence. Usually the first target was the chief, then his buildings and then the government offices. The consistency of this pattern is very telling within Sierra Leone, and the symbolism difficult to evade.17 Hostility to the chiefs and authority more generally is to be found very clearly in the notes taken during the various stages of the participatory exercise carried out under the auspices of what came to be called the Chiefdom Governance Reform Project.18 These discussions strongly imply that many youths joined the war out of frustration at previous bad government. This has very clear implications for the reconstruction of postwar governance in those areas where youth may use their ability to exercise their violent exit strategy as a political football.19 Whilst there was a very high casualty rate amongst chiefs during the war, and a very large rate of absence amongst chiefs (many of whom fled the RUF), Fanthorpe is correct in pointing out that the attitude to chiefs varied across rebel held areas. In fact, in the immediate post-war period, with the only exception being some urban areas, government and donors confronted a situation where restoration of the chiefdoms was seen as a priority for restoring stability and security in the countryside. Whilst the Sierra Leone government acknowledges the issues with corruption that contributed to the war, it also talks of restoring the ‘glory’ to the chiefs and returning to an imagined pre-war state.20 Paul Richards has been a long-term advocate of an approach built on class conflict in the countryside. He cites at length examples of statements by youths relating to resentment of chiefs due to labour demands and ‘community work’ and control over marriage.21 Those not complying with the wishes of wealthier families in terms of ‘bride prices’ are fined at local chiefdom courts where youths who are unable to pay are liable for further labour for the chief. Richards explores these relationships further, and ultimately draws a picture of a rural agricultural elite descended from local warlords with hegemony over slaves and dependent populations. This historical slave structure is perpetuated by a series of ‘customs’ or ‘traditions’ including a bridal and court system structured to extract labour. Given these structures of forced

Introduction 9

labour, Richards follows Durkheim in seeing the war as a form of slave revolt.22 For Richards then, the reinstatement of the chiefdom system represents a reconstruction of the historical model of forced labour in the countryside that led to the war in the first place, something that has been echoed by subsequent analysts.23 Clearly there are significant issues about how the state functioned under Stevens and then Momoh. The creation of large groups of excluded youth in particular, the exclusion of different classes in the countryside and then the neglect of the non-Freetown population was exacerbated by a predatory state that relied on alliances between high level politicians close to the regime, chiefs in the countryside and Lebanese traders who were able to access external diamond markets in particular, but who were also responsible for importing many of the consumables that came into the country. Once the match had been lit by Sankoh it was only a matter of time before the degraded machinery of the government entirely collapsed. In Freetown in 1992, the regime itself began to implode when a military coup brought a group of young officers, headed by Captain Valentine Strasser to power. The rule of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), headed by Strasser and later his deputy, Julius Bio, although generally supported by the population, was largely ineffective. One of the people close to the events in the early to mid-1990s, and still a central figure in Sierra Leone’s security architecture, captured the atmosphere well: ‘They thought they knew all about war. It’s like all of us, when we are junior officers, we think we know everything. We don’t know anything. Honestly. That was exactly how those boys were. They were coming from the front, and quite frankly, many of them performed brilliantly on the front. That’s fine, but you can be a very good platoon commander on the front, but it doesn’t make you a general.’24 Indiscipline inevitably prevailed. The lack of control over the government, and the armed forces in particular led to an increase in RUF control in the east of the country until the South African mercenary firm Executive Outcomes was contracted by the government in 1995 to drive out the rebels. Eventually, growing internal and external pressure to hold democratic elections persuaded the NPRC to hand over power to a civilian government. Following two conferences in the Bintumani Hotel in Freetown, in which civil society representatives played an important role expressing views of the population, elections were held in 1996.25 Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was elected President. Two months later, discussions between the SLPP and RUF began and

10 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

eventually led to the Abidjan Peace Accords of November 1996. The unwillingness of either party to agree to disarmament or monitoring arrangements led to a breakdown of peace by early 1997. This contributed to another coup led by junior army officers, toppling the elected government of Kabbah, bringing the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Johnny Paul Koroma to power. Unlike the NPRC which had been predominantly from Kenema and Daru barracks and were sympathetic to the SLPP, other units in the south were reputed to have been sympathetic to the RUF itself and the AFRC was certainly rumoured to have been loyal to Stevens’ party the All People’s Congress (APC) and partly consisted of young officers who had served in Freetown under the NPRC and originated in the northern and western areas of Sierra Leone.26 The coup happened on May 25th 1997 and the AFRC invited the RUF to become part of the government. This AFRC/RUF alliance managed to rule for eight months. During this period the exiled Kabbah Government and the ECOMOG force allied themselves with the local militias known as the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) along with urban militias and finally managed to muster enough resources to launch an effective counter-attack, ousting the AFRC/RUF from Freetown in early 1998. The RUF retreated into its rural heartland whilst the AFRC fractured, a number of troops ending us as refugees in Liberia whilst others formed other splinter groups. The most notorious of these groups became known as the ‘West Side Boys’ and was formed around Kono, carrying out hit and run raids across the interior.27 Horrific atrocities against civilians in rural areas were reported throughout 1998. RUF and former AFRC soldiers seeking to impose their will in the countryside perpetrated many of these atrocities, but there were also reports of acts of violence by the CDF and ECOMOG. In effect, rural Sierra Leone was prey to a variety of armed groups, having little coherence and no formal status. The Government of Sierra Leone, although internationally regarded as legitimate by virtue of its electoral mandate, depended on Nigerian troops, the CDF, and government forces referred to as the ‘Loyal Troops.’ This latter faction was composed in large part of loyal soldiers and police trained by ECOMOG in Lunghi, whilst Kabbah was in Freetown. Under the command of ECOMOG, they constituted the front lines in the fight to retake Freetown in February 1998. In June 1998, the UN established an Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), composed of 40 military observers to oversee the beginning of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). From July 1998 to January 1999, 1600 combatants went through the process.

Introduction 11

However, in early January 1999, AFRC and RUF combatants nearly seized control of Freetown. Appalling atrocities were inflicted on civilians and widespread destruction of property took place. An estimated 3000–5000 people are believed to have been killed or abducted during this period and hundreds were mutilated. The spiralling decline in security implicit in Sierra Leone’s descent into virtual anarchy is critical to the context of what has been achieved in Sierra Leone since the end of the war. Such a descent into anarchy as Sierra Leone experienced in the 1990s cannot be reversed by a three- or five-year development programme. This reality is at the heart of the group of reforms that eventually produced Security Sector Reform (SSR) – or, in our terms, security system transformation – in Sierra Leone. The pattern of the country’s recovery from civil war and transformation of its security structures began with fire-fighting (immediate responses to threats despite the lack of comprehensive policies and strategies), moved to medium-term reorganisation and reform and finally, to long-term commitment to security transformation by both country and international advisors. At the same time, it is imperative that in taking a critical historical view that we bear in mind the extreme circumstances under which those decisions were taken. This narrative explains how this evolution occurred and the consequences of actions taken.

The security context in the late 1990s and early 2000s A series of political and security crises had affected Sierra Leone since the early 1990s. Ostensibly these came to an end with the Abidjan Peace Accords of 1996 and the subsequent Sierra Leonean elections of 1997. The international community, led by the UK and UN, became more fully involved in the country following these elections and a series of UK-funded programmes followed on with the aim of supporting the newly elected democratic government recognised by international law. These programmes were very wide-ranging, incorporating a comprehensive overhaul of the whole of the Sierra Leonean government machinery, including Parliament, the judiciary, police and civil service, as well as support for a military that was seen as having been ineffective in dealing with security outside Freetown. Despite the impressive list of supported activities, this was not matched by resources. The entire budget for armed forces support was a mere £150,000 and the initial funding was provided at a time when, according to the then High Commissioner, ‘no integrated funding and

12 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

we could only draw from limited Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) funding. There was no Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) or full Ministry of Defence (MoD) commitment other than providing personnel’.28 This proved to be inadequate to create a functioning military, or even to improve the conditions of the Sierra Leonean troops, many of whom were under or even unpaid, poorly supplied and equipped and inadequately housed. The consequences were obvious. In May 1997 there was another coup, this time staged by Major Johnny Paul Koroma.29 This led to the ousting of President Kabbah, who was exiled to Conakry in Guinea. A military junta was established by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which invited the RUF to participate in the government. All reform initiatives ground to a halt. While President Kabbah was exiled in Conakry, serious talks ensued about disbanding the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) altogether and expanding the police force.30 The fact that the armed forces had been discredited so completely in the eyes of the public substantiated these considerations. ‘There was a strong feeling from people around Kabbah to do away with the army…. The argument was that if you looked at history, military coups had prevailed. We came back [to Freetown] with those ideas still going around.’31 It was the Nigerian-led, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-mandated military force which became decisive in combating rebel forces in Sierra Leone and in ‘kick[ing] the junta [AFRC] out of Freetown’.32 It was also the Nigerians who were instrumental in arguing for a reconstruction rather than a complete destruction of the Sierra Leonean armed forces. Following the return of Kabbah in February 1998, reform initiatives quickly resumed and in October of that same year, a Department for International Development (DfID)-funded preliminary diagnostic study of the civil service was conducted.33 Around the same time Brigadier General Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, Sierra Leone’s Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff (a loan service officer), called for external assistance to build up a ‘small, highly mobile, properly equipped Armed Forces that is highly motivated, disciplined, loyal and committed to the State’.34 Following Kabbah’s return the Government did disband the army for a short period of time. However, following considerable debate, by December 1999 the Government relented and reinstated the army. In short, as one participant in the critical Cabinet meeting noted: ‘The government simply could not afford at the time to let all these excombatants out. The decision was taken in that meeting to take the army onboard again’.35

Introduction 13

Khobe argued that it would be unwise to disband a body of men who were battle tested and hardened.36 ‘His line was clear: better to keep them in the army, being fed and trained, rather than becoming another band of rebels to fight. Don’t forget that Johnny Paul [Koroma] and [Foday] Sankoh were returned to Sierra Leone in 1999 to participate as members of government. A lot of the people [including past and serving soldiers] were in fact loyal to Johnny Paul’.37 A military plan was produced, identifying the ideal size of Sierra Leone’s army to be 6000.38 While ideas on the table could not be implemented due to ongoing conflict, they formed the core of a post-war plan for the stabilisation of Sierra Leone. As an informed outsider observed: ‘The fact that he was overthrown, that he came back and that he still wanted to work with them [the armed forces] helped Kabbah to gain support. They said, ‘This man, even though he’s back, he still wants to work with them, let’s give him a chance’.39 All of this took place against a background of continuing conflict leading up to the rebel invasion of Freetown in early January 1999. During the conflict, Kabbah more or less controlled two separate sets of military actors, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring group (ECOMOG) and the Civil Defence Force (CDF).40 Reports from around 2000 suggest that the CDF played a key role interdicting RUF supply lines in the south. These units received very little material support from the Government; yet the Kamajor41 units were regarded as amongst the most effective (though never completely trusted) forces available to the Government. In 1999 the RSLMF consisted of the equivalent of two battalions armed with AK-47s, Chinese munitions and traditional hunting weapons; the rest of the armed forces had either been discredited during military coups or the AFRC rule of 1997–98. Uniforms were non-existent; equipment was in poor repair. Since the units relied on ECOMOG for combat support, their role was restricted mainly to guard duty. In June 1999 the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP) team of three UK personnel were deployed to Freetown with producing a study of the level defence and security management needs of the Government of Sierra Leone. By July 1999, UK political involvement and logistical support to ECOMOG in the form of weapons, ammunition and vehicles had produced at least a partial victory over the RUF. This led to the Lomé Peace Agreement, which turned into a milestone in the development of peace. In its wake, a number of different SSR and development activities ensued, taking advantage of the relative stability of the country. However, these were all taking place

14 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

within a very shaky power-sharing arrangement between the RUF/AFRC and SLPP. It soon became clear that ‘he [Sankoh] couldn’t cope with the situation. He would adopt two different poses, either slump on the sofa and pretend he was asleep or he would shout and scream. The only people he showed respect were the people who stood up to him …. He would shout about everybody letting him down. I stopped him in full flow: “Hang on a minute, Mr. Sankoh, British taxpayers have just paid for refurbishing your house, the bed you’re sleeping on.” Sankoh replied: “And it’s not even that comfortable,” and I said: “Then give it back!” People pampered to the delusions that he had about himself’.42 While Sankoh and members of the RUF took up key positions in the new administration, including membership on the National Committee for DDR, it became apparent that they did not intend to honour the Lomé Peace Agreement in the long run and ‘Sankoh became more aggressive’.43 This volatile post-conflict political environment was also affected by the deployment of a new peacekeeping force, UNAMSIL, which had expanded from the UNOMSIL, took over from ECOMOG and almost immediately inherited a hostile situation. The turning point and terminal blow to the RUF came in early 2000, when people marched to Sankoh’s house to protest RUF activities and approximately 20 demonstrators were shot by RUF supporters. The Sierra Leone Police (SLP) captured Sankoh on 17 May. He was subsequently handed over to government security forces and together with several senior RUF commanders taken into custody. The RUF were expelled from the government. This led to a stalemate with the RUF, which had come to believe that they were invincible and in effective control of most of the country outside of Freetown. At this time, UNAMSIL was not able to exercise any effective control outside of the city. The context was one of widespread deterioration in security (there were several incidents involving the humiliation of UN military personnel) and a real danger of UNAMSIL collapse. The UK’s intervention, officially brokered in November 2000, acted as a catalyst for a new ceasefire, this time signed in Abuja. Another key event occurred when Issa Hassan Sesay took over RUF leadership. Following events of May 2000, Sankoh was incarcerated by the Government at an undisclosed location in Freetown. In the meantime, the Government, supported by international actors, sought to find an RUF successor to Sankoh, preferably someone amenable to negotiation: The Government of Sierra Leone started to send feelers out – if Sankoh was not available, who would be? There was a suggestion that Issa

Introduction 15

Sesay might be the one. Eventually, it was decided that a letter would be sent to Sesay from Sankoh. We took Sankoh to Lunghi by helicopter, blind-folded, and placed him in the Presidential suite – he thought he was on the way to becoming the President! At Lunghi he was seen by President [Olusegun] Obasanjo of Nigeria and President [Alpha Oumar] Konaré of Mali, then the Chairman of ECOWAS. In the end, Sanoh signed a letter which effectively handed the command of the RUF to Issa; he signed off. Issa Sesay negotiated the RUF into DDR and massive numbers went into the process. A lot of weapons were surrendered by the RUF from August [2001] to January 2002.44 Another observer close to the events has noted that by ‘by 2001, most of the steam had been taken out of the RUF, especially when [Sankoh’s] followers started to agree with Sesay. The germ of politicizing the RUF came with him.’45 The overall context of Sierra Leone of the late 1990s remained extremely unstable, unpredictable and difficult in terms of security. The country was still subject to civil war involving the RUF and Government at one level, but then also incorporating a number of groups, including the AFRC, the West Side Boys and other less well-defined groups. There was virtually no rule of law or sustainable security outside Freetown except in isolated pockets such as Bo and the army was dysfunctional, underequipped and incapable of carrying out offensive operations. Despite this, external military intervention from the UN, ECOWAS and the UK had resulted in the creation of the roots of reform initiatives and the reinstatement of Kabbah following his return from exile.

SSR in Sierra Leone Since the late 1990s, the post-civil war experience of Sierra Leone has become synonymous with a cluster of policies known in the international community as SSR. Indeed, Sierra Leone is frequently seen as the example of SSR, as it provides many examples of SSR best practices. However, to date, there has been no comprehensive study of how this process was conducted in Sierra Leone between the late 1990s and the 2007 elections. This narrative documents Sierra Leone’s security system transformation during the conflict and post-conflict period of 1997–2007. It chronicles the UK Government’s intervention, including the evolution of its role from direct implementer to advisor. In addition, it analyses key security issues that arose during the period, some of which remain current. In

16 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

particular it aims to puncture the mythology around SSR in Sierra Leone that has been developed in the absence of a comprehensive study that in some way SSR is completed in that country. SSR, as it turns out, is as much about a continuous process as it is about short or even mediumterm development programming. It is a truism in the small world of SSR to say that there are as many different ways of undertaking SSR as there are contexts of doing so. Clearly any account of SSR in Sierra Leone is going to be very heavily contextualised by the situation at that time and the effects of the war. In Sierra Leone’s case it also relies on a context whereby the former colonial power, the UK, intervened and was able to provide significant leadership over a long period of time. Indeed, it is striking how welcoming the Sierra Leonean executive was of its former colonial masters, appointing Keith Biddle as police chief, and suggesting that David Richards should become the Chief of Defence Staff. This makes Sierra Leone an exception rather than a rule. And yet this case remains important for a number of reasons, not least because if SSR fails in a state like Sierra Leone then it rather begs the question of where this particular bundle of policies might actually succeed. It is in this regard worth pointing out, as we do elsewhere in the volume that never before and never since has the UK attempted such a comprehensive set of reforms under the banner of SSR. It is also true that the nature of this work is open to subjective analysis. Both of the authors of this volume have themselves worked in Sierra Leone, and although neither were part of the UK Government – one from a university the other from a non-governmental organisation (NGO) – clearly both have particular views on what was happening at the time. Our work in collating this book has been greatly enhanced by our reliance on those who were involved in the process. Indeed, much of the fieldwork involved in researching this book was effectively interviewing UK and Sierra Leonean policy-makers, technical experts and other practitioners involved in the country over the entire period. As a result this book deliberately aims to be subjective rather than technical or objective in tone. Because of these factors any policy recommendations drawn from the Sierra Leone experience need to be viewed with caution when applied to other contexts. Sierra Leone’s entire infrastructure, including buildings and records, had been destroyed during the civil war and whilst the Government of Sierra Leone, with the substantial support of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the UK, was struggling to establish basic security across the country, it was simultaneously restructuring

Introduction 17

non-existent intelligence and security systems. This is very rare in postconflict periods, indeed, in development environments in general, and may explain why, in the case of Sierra Leone’s security system, initial SSR was a top-to-bottom process. There are many reasons for this, but two of the most important were the urgency of the tasks required in the capital of Freetown and the fact that international advisers had little technical understanding of regional and local security actors outside the formal government structure located in the capital. Thus, any conclusions drawn as to the implementation of SSR top-to-bottom reform efforts in other contexts should recognise that Sierra Leone’s specific needs and the understanding (or lack thereof) of international actors at the time dictated this approach. Other contexts may call for alternative strategies.

SSR and the security system in Sierra Leone One of the key characteristics of the security system transformation in Sierra Leone is the idea that Sierra Leone shaped the concept of SSR as it was evolving in the international community at the time just as much as SSR came to shape Sierra Leone. While the term ‘security sector reform’ is used in both Sierra Leone and UK Government documentation, there was no clearly concept outlined by DfID of what SSR entailed when SILSEP was initiated in 1999. There was certainly no idea of an overarching concept of linking security with governance that would be recognisable. According to one definition, SSR only dealt with the management of security and defence and specific institutions, including the National Security Advisor (NSA)’s office, overseeing and managing their actions. An alternative definition discussed at the time included the intelligence services and coordinating security sector actors, such as the NSA’s Office. However, one of the key elements in the development of security system transformation in Sierra Leone was the expansion away from these narrow definitions to encompass a broader range of defence and security activities that could be supported by DfID. It was a modification of the 1980 Overseas Development Act by then Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short that allowed DfID to engage in not only expanding the concept but also the implementation of security-related programming. Any assistance given at the time would have to fall under section 1 of the 1980 Overseas Development Act, i.e., the promotion of the development or maintenance of the economy of a country, or the welfare of its people. The question

18 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

faced by DfID in the spring of 2000 was whether contributing to the establishment of the infrastructure for military reintegration, the relocation of a new, civilian-led MoD and the establishment of accountable intelligence services were likely to have this effect. As expressed by the Treasury Solicitor in 2000, the rationale was ‘the welfare of the people of Sierra Leone will be placed on surer foundation if the armed forces and intelligence services are properly established within the democratic framework of the country rather than being allowed to operate outside it’.46 Avoiding DfID’s direct involvement in working with the armed forces and intelligence agencies, which was seen as inappropriate for development agencies, was to be ensured by seeing its contribution as ‘ringfenced to advisory and implementation posts within the Ministry of Defence and subordinate headquarters’.47 However, as one anonymous DfID officer noted in one of the early drafts of the proposed role of a Military Advisory Training Team (MATT) in Sierra Leone: ‘In principle, we can support MoD in exercising civilian control of the military but not the military itself. Once we have the terms of reference we can consider whether to make the case to senior management. I am not optimistic’.48 Steering clear of operational matters and logistical support was one way for DfID to draw a clear line between what it could and could not get involved in. The reluctance within DfID to fully engage in defence and national security initiatives constituted a tension between the Government of Sierra Leone and the UK. At the same time, there was a clear recognition that transforming Sierra Leone’s security system required the application of precisely the same approaches: principles and processes that apply to any other public sector reform programme. This tension has been characteristic of the entire security transformation process in Sierra Leone and still continues. Within Sierra Leone, the origins of SSR were not in ‘hard security’, but public administration, civil service reform and governance. In 1998, as Kabbah returned to Freetown, the Government of Sierra Leone contacted DfID and requested assistance in conducting a review of the civilian management of the armed forces. This included legal and constitutional requirements and the relationship between the MoD and the Defence Headquarters. Following two joint DfID, FCO and UKMoD missions in 1998, a security sector package was designed with input from all three departments. The total expected cost to DfID was £1.6 million and the stated reason for this focus on the military and its management was the Sierra Leonean military’s historical role in staging coups and counter coups.

Introduction 19

While this was the initial point of departure in June 1999, the SILSEP team of two, embedded in the MoD with four Sierra Leonean staff, soon realised that it would be impractical to restructure the MoD alone. Reforms were required across the Defence structure and included the need for a Defence Review to identify roles and to inform a structure for the armed forces down to sub-unit level. They proposed an expansion in terms of reference to UK MoD, FCO and DfID. This recommendation was accepted by MoD and FCO; initially, it was not supported by DfID. By mid-2001 following the introduction of several ongoing activities it was observed that the SILSEP project would benefit from a more holistic approach. This would mean more coordination and interface with other governance and security sector reform activities, as well as more engagement with Parliament, civil society and the media. Parliamentary and civil society oversight of the armed forces in particular, as well as activities of the intelligence community and Office of National Security (ONS), were identified as being weak points. Given the history of the politicised military within Sierra Leone, it is perhaps unsurprising that civil control over the military was regarded as weak. This was partly a function of the military feeling that they should not be subject to civil control, which created difficulties in establishing operational approaches within a MoD, but also significant mistrust of military personnel who were identified with the excesses of history by many civilian staff. Differential pay and conditions of service further added to this divide. At the same time, the exercise of civil control requires some degree of experience and skill, which was certainly lacking at this time within those organisations expected to take up these roles, including Parliament. At the inception of SILSEP in 1999, civil society’s role in securityrelated transformation had not been formally defined and engagement was ad hoc. In fact civil society had not played a significant part in security and was outwardly wary of involvement with security services. In fact, comprehensive, structured involvement of civil society in the security system transformation process only began as late as 2006. However, it was recognised early on that checks and balances would be necessary if the democratic process in Sierra Leone was to be enhanced, even if it was extremely difficult to act on this at that time. With the UK Government’s 2000 White Paper on International Development, Eliminating World Poverty, approaches in Sierra Leone received a boost. DfID clearly recognised security as an essential condition for sustained development and poverty elimination.49 At the core of this was an acknowledgement that without effective civil control over accountable and effective armed forces, long-term peace and stability would be difficult

20 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

to achieve and sustain. This was also backed up by significant evidence on the ground that the general population frequently put ‘security’ at or near the top of their concerns, even when the term ‘security’ may be defined very broadly. In Sierra Leone this definition of what security has meant to the general population has shifted from fear of being victims of conflict and the RUF in particular, to a more conventional fear of organised crime and smuggling, coupled with an increasing concern with economic security, specifically unemployment creating alienation amongst youth. This has created synergies and tensions within the UK Government approaches to Sierra Leone and the roles of the different programmes and agencies in supporting the Government in combating these issues.

The importance of labels Having mentioned above that Sierra Leone has become important for the spread of SSR, it may seem a little incongruous that we have chosen the term ‘security system transformation’ for the title. Whilst the term ‘reform’ remains in use, it is true to say that this means different thing to different people. In the absence of a definitive definition of what SSR means, we take the view that what happened in Sierra Leone was a transformation from a non-existent security system to a functioning security system rather than a reform of an existing system. Comprehensive reform of security structures in Sierra Leone since the end of the war has spread across a wide breadth of institutions. It reached deep into internal and external security institutions, altered command structures, provided topto-bottom training and established staffing policies, procedures and behaviour. It created agencies to coordinate security information and facilitated a two-way flow of that security information from the community level up to the President. It also reached out to the people of Sierra Leone, who had experienced horrific violence at the hands of their own security forces during the war, and began the difficult task of reversing public suspicion of security forces and involving citizens in their own security. Thus, in its title and narrative, this book stresses that what happened in Sierra Leone was not merely sector reform, but a comprehensive transformation of the objectives of security provision, the mission, management and coordination of security institutions and reform of not just the sector, but of the system whereby and through which security is provided. While the term ‘SSR’ is used here when discussions centre on international debates (conceptual debates in particular), we posit that the history of the security transformation process in Sierra Leone since 1997 deserves the more comprehensive term.

Introduction 21

The phases of reforms in Sierra Leone The period 1997–2007, which forms the core focus of this book, can be roughly divided into a series of distinct phases, each with its own changing set of policies and responses to changing context. This does not imply that there was no continuity between these phases, but rather that each phase tended to be governed by a changing contextual situation governing the activities within each phase. Events in the first period, 1997–2002, were determined by the overriding context of open conflict. The state of emergency in Sierra Leone at the time left no space for sitting back and developing a strategy. The country was in urgent need of support and decisions needed to be taken quickly. Programmes started in collaboration between the UK and the Government of Sierra Leone were shaped as responses to consecutive crises until 2002, when the war and accompanying disarmament and demobilisation were declared over. During this period, the lack of any capacity to oversee the armed forces (which had staged two coups since 1992) and the inability to properly coordinate responses to security threats and collect intelligence were addressed by the establishment of the SILSEP. Given that police primacy in addressing internal security threats had been the priority of President Kabbah since 1996, the SLP were given a new ethos of Local Needs Policing, gender-based violence was addressed through Family Support Units, and vehicles, communication equipment and uniforms were provided. Finally, the judiciary was supported through the Law Development Programme (LDP). At the time, as a result of the context in which operations began and because of the personalities involved, there was almost no integration of these programmes. There was no coherent concept of the security sector, and thus, no organised sense of which institutions needed to be reformed. However a general sense of direction emerged that began to take on a life of its own in subsequent phases. The initial phase until 2002 was therefore dominated by attempts to begin a security reform process in the context of fighting a war and enforcing a stuttering peace punctuated by repeated ceasefires and resumptions of conflict. Even when the conflict ended officially in January 2002, there were significant areas of the countryside where conflict continued and certainly many areas that were not under the direct control of the government. The first post-war presidential and parliamentary elections were held that year, made possible by deployment of what was the biggest UN peacekeeping mission (17,000 foreign troops) to date and assisted by the SLP. The election results were a triumph for President Kabbah, who by then

22 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

had come to be seen as the man who brought peace to Sierra Leone after a decade of war. These elections marked the beginning of the second phase of Sierra Leone’s security transformation process. In 2002, the nascent agencies and programmes that had helped win the war were faced with a set of challenges very different from the emergency operational planning they had conducted until then. Emerging issues included substantial rivalries between security agencies and ministries and the thorny issue of whether the UK should continue to perform direct military operational command duties or adopt an advisory role. The Government of Sierra Leone also had to deal with large numbers of armed former combatants without a functioning military and only a partly-developed SLP. An additional key development in this phase centred on producing (and linking) security strategy and development objectives for Sierra Leone. In practical terms, this was reflected in the completion of the partlyinterrelated Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and Security Sector Review processes, where the latter was reflected in the former’s Pillar One, which promotes good governance, peace and security thus integrating security into mainstream development policy within the country. The importance of the Security Sector Review carried out during this period cannot be underestimated in terms of setting future policy direction. First, it gave much needed conceptual clarity to the institutions involved in or contributing to the security sector, institutions that had a stake in defining what security meant for Sierra Leone. Second, the ONS established in 1999 as a mechanism for coordination of input from the security sector, matured during this phase and became one of the most capable and trusted security institutions in the country. Third, the fact that the Security Sector Review was integrated into the PRSP aligned security and development to a degree that they had not been before in Sierra Leone or elsewhere. This last point in particular has had repercussions outside Sierra Leone in terms of bringing two different agendas – security and development – very explicitly together. Whilst the two had coexisted for some time, Sierra Leone was instrumental in redefining security as a broader governance issue rather than a policy area contained within the purview of MoDs and security institutions themselves. In addition it brought security programming out of an approach based on providing training and equipment and into an area where governance, civil control and linkages between security institutions became critical. This not only has implications for the military but also for intelligence, penal, justice and police systems, as well as how external donors may or may not fund activities in

Introduction 23

these areas. Particularly for DfID, which is constrained by what overseas development aid can fund, this agenda created a set of difficulties, despite the obvious benefits for the poor of Sierra Leone. We will return to this later. The final period of this study, 2005 to 2007, was a consolidation and development phase culminating in the successful general elections of 2007. In 2005, the UK moved its DfID Sierra Leone offices from London to Freetown. One of the most important innovations of UK support for security system transformation at the time was the broadening of its support to the justice sector as a whole, rather than to the police more narrowly. Prior to the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP), little assistance had been given to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and prison services, in particular. Questions emerging regarding the future direction of security system transformation in Sierra Leone also arose during this period. The sustainability of some of the measures deemed necessary during a war was questioned more strongly. One of the core issues was the affordability, future size and shape of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). Whether the country needed a military capability at all had been questioned for many years; indeed, the Security Sector Review, produced between 2003 and 2005, identified the main threats to the country as being generated internally. Issues raised in the Security Sector Review continue to be of relevance.

What have we learnt? What does the experience of transforming the security system in Sierra Leone tell us about SSR? What worked and what did not work? First, perceptions of the people of Sierra Leone, the most important stakeholder for both Sierra Leone and UK governments, indicate that there has been a significant positive change in levels of security on the ground. This was made clear by a survey of the general population in a number of districts that was carried out as part of this study, the results of which are included in this narrative. One of the core conclusions from the study is that getting the right people on the ground and taking action is more valuable than detailed, extensive and time-consuming planning. When capable people are empowered to make decisions, they devise ways to work together. As a consequence, subsequent reforms are more effective. National ownership is also critical, even when there is a relatively weak government at the start of a process. One of the most positive elements of

24 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

the UK intervention was evolution of the role of most UK staff as advisers, not as implementers. As leaders of actual security system reform processes, Sierra Leonean staff was endowed with confidence and provided the necessary space to build institutions in a politically tense environment. The development and maintenance of a good, national team is critical, since the turnover of international advisers is chronically high. However, this relatively simple statement belies the difficulties of recruiting and retaining qualified national staff, particularly given historically inadequate conditions of service. Sierra Leone lacked a SSR strategy at the beginning of the security system transformation process. There was a good reason for this: the Government of Sierra Leone was effectively at war and individuals needed to make rapid decisions without being constrained by strategies. This was accompanied by the lack of an exit strategy, which may be as much down to the nature of the process as anything else. It is clear that SSR is not ‘finished’ and there remain significant weaknesses in the governance of security in Sierra Leone. Without the development of reliable civil governance mechanisms, reliance on a small pool of nationals is positive in terms of leadership, but negative in terms of sustainability and potential risk. The risk is that a professional security system emerges that can then be misused if the country becomes unstable. If the number of qualified staff does not reach a critical mass, it may not be adequate to sustain progress in unstable periods. One of the core questions for security system transformation – or SSR – in light of the Sierra Leone experience – is whether or not SSR can be referred to as a coherent cluster of activities. As the experience in Sierra Leone attests, there is an element of SSR as a post-hoc rationalisation of events that happen on the ground. It can be argued that initial SSR efforts, particularly those that occur in an immediate post-conflict environment, are, by definition, fragmented and incoherent. Only after experience on the ground can enough specific context and information be gathered and analysed in order to begin the construction of a coherent and appropriate set of SSR strategies. SSR was a relatively new approach for development agencies in the late 1990s; the international community was only beginning to come to terms with what SSR actually entailed. Evolution of international approaches to SSR and transformation of the security system in Sierra Leone were occurring at the same time. Thus, Sierra Leone provided the international community with an on-the-ground example of the need to allow enough ad hoc reform to occur in order to construct subsequent institutional linkages and integrated reform strategies and pro-

Introduction 25

grammes. Early reform activities conducted by international and national actors in Sierra Leone contributed to international learning about the timing of SSR and the fundamental need to structure SSR based upon the foundation of context. Thus, in many ways, while SSR came to shape Sierra Leone, the transformation process in Sierra Leone came to shape international approaches to SSR – as a concept, a set of policies and an integrated set of programmatic approaches. Above all, it has to be recognised that SSR is a political project for national and international politicians, policy-makers and practitioners that requires a long-term commitment by both national actors and international agencies.

The structure of this book The book is designed partly to provide an analysis of what happened and partly to provide a chronological narrative across the different periods of intervention outlined above. It is divided, consequently into different types of chapter. Having provided a brief contextual study of the war and how Sierra Leone got to where it found itself in this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 goes on to outline the importance of the Sierra Leonean case for the development of security sector reform and the conflation of security and development more broadly. It provides a narrative history of the development of SSR as a policy approach and outlines some of the mythology that has grown up around the Sierra Leonean case. Chapter 3 begins the narrative of SSR within Sierra Leone. Beginning with the war situation it outlines the conflict context of the beginning of the reform process and the decisions taken on the ground to develop some elements of the security structures. It also discusses the initial SLP reform measures and attempts at reforming the legal backlog that was paralysing the judiciary. The chapter then describes the development of the MoD and the reformation of the RSLAF. Finally, it also covers initiatives in the field of intelligence, with the development of the ONS and the Central intelligence and Security Unit (CISU), along with the formation of a locally-based intelligence system. Chapter 4 continues this pattern of analysis, tracing through the three security institutions – police and justice, military and intelligence – and looks at the beginning of the articulation of a SSR concept in Sierra Leone and the increased interaction amongst these institutions. This increased interaction was due, in part, to the changed context due to post-2002 peace arrangements and to the growing realisation on the ground that there were overlaps in activities that should be removed

26 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

or resolved. Core features of this period were the expansion of the SLP beyond the government-controlled areas surrounding Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Moyamba, Bonthe, Pujehun and Port Loko, the comprehensive reform and retraining of the RSLAF, establishment of an effective MoD HQ and development of a workable intelligence architecture. Again Chapter 5 continues to follow this through and looks at the consolidation of these activities in the lead up to the 2007 election. It also unpacks some of the weaknesses in the previous approach, particularly focusing on the introduction of the JSDP. The JSDP was introduced to further take on the limited work of the LDP and to develop the work of the justice sector in terms of backing up the front line services that had been the previous focus of reform efforts. Chapter 6 brings the themes together in a chapter that attempts to pick out and analyse trends over time and to look at some of the results of the reform process. In particular it looks at the implications of the process within Sierra Leone and also on the donor agencies involved in implementing the reforms. It aims to puncture the mythology of SSR in Sierra Leone and to use the historical evidence to show that the bundle of reforms introduced in the country looked far more coherent in retrospect than they did at the time. It contains sanguine lessons for donor agencies in terms of managing to get the right people into the field at the right time and allowing people to take decisions on the ground. In addition, it also shows the paralysing influence of overly bureaucratic planning procedures within larger organisations like DfID. Lastly, the conclusion traces the actions that were then taken in this context to rebuild a state and then draws on this experience to pull out lessons from that experience. In particular, it concentrates on the construction of a security apparatus and the importance this gained for broader development of the state within the country. Sierra Leone has also been seen as an paradigm of a collapsed state and hence its reconstruction was viewed as more generally important than just for that country alone. Apart from the implications for the rest of the Mano River region, particularly Guinea and Liberia, the example of what later came to be known as Security Sector Reform has been employed internationally, not least by the UK’s DfID. Indeed, in some ways, the example of Sierra Leone has become over-used and a mythology has grown up around what happened in the absence of a detailed reconstruction of events following the war.

2 How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR?

One of the key elements of security system transformation in Sierra Leone is the idea that Sierra Leone shaped the evolving international concept of SSR in the late 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time, SSR certainly also shaped attempts to build peace within Sierra Leone, which was part and parcel of a broader process of building a state that had collapsed. The state, DfID argued in its 2010 policy paper on state-building and peacebuilding1 ‘…equates with: (a) the institutions or rules which regulate political, social, and economic engagement across a territory and determine how power and authority are obtained, used and controlled (e.g., constitutions, laws, customs)…’ (DfID, 2010). The paper also acknowledges the central role of non-state actors, but they are predominantly defined as either marginal to decision-making (civil society organisations) or as ‘informal groupings’ (e.g., gangs and drug cartels). If peacebuilding and state-building today are explicitly considered two sides of the same coin by the donor community, this was also the underlying rationale of UK support to Sierra Leone in the late 1990s. That support should be directed towards an identifiable central authority was never questioned – not even as that authority’s power and reach across the territory of Sierra Leone was weak, indeed, partially nonexistent. SSR as interlinked with development was initially introduced in March 1999 in a rather narrow sense by the UK Government, and by Clare Short, the first Secretary of State for International Development, specifically. Notably, this was only three months before SILSEP in Sierra Leone began implementation. Thus, in quite literal terms policy development around what was implied by ‘security sector reform’ and implementation took place in parallel. The comprehensiveness of reforms as they unfolded in Sierra Leone, cutting across intelligence and defence governance and policing and 27

28 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

military transformation, was due to a unique combination of circumstances. Of central importance were the personalities involved at the executive level in the UK, including Tony Blair and Clare Short, who recognised early on the links between security and the broader process of development, including poverty reduction. At a general level, she noted: ‘We can not build good government without effective and democratically accountable security sectors.’ (Clare Short, March 1999, Speech). In this way security institutions became central to state-building processes and also to steering the PRSP process where security formed a key element of the country’s overall post-conflict strategy. From the perspective of the UK Government, SSR in Sierra Leone is frequently presented as ‘a success’ and as being important in terms of generating lessons for good practice. Indeed, SILSEP is referred to as a ‘flagship’ in rebuilding Sierra Leone’s security architecture, which by Sierra Leoneans and donors alike is regarded as the best managed and led set of institutions in the Government of Sierra Leone. Indeed, one of the UK Government’s key lessons from their intervention in Sierra Leone, repeated in several policy documents in Sierra Leone and in Whitehall, was the importance of a comprehensive and holistic approach to transforming the security system – also referred to as SSR. The fact of the matter remains, however, that the UK has never again attempted to design and implement a set of SSR programmes similar to those used in the case of Sierra Leone. One reason, no doubt, is the sheer breadth of the intervention, and the unusual circumstance that the UK was the primary and dominant intervening power. The BBC captured the uniqueness of UK-Sierra Leone relations in 2002, when Tony Blair made his first visit to the small West African country, following the official end of conflict: ‘When President Ahmed [sic] Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone walked up to the British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s jet to greet him, he was flanked, along with several ministers, by two white men in uniform. The two men were Brigadier Patrick Davidson-Housten, President Kabbah’s British security adviser, and Keith Biddle, the British Inspector General of the Sierra Leonean Police.’2 The UK not only supported, but was also considered a legitimate, integrated part of the core security institutions defining national sovereignty. Apart from the uniquely close relationship between the UK and Sierra Leone, other reasons for British reluctance to engage in a similar breadth of SSR-related activities have to do with the security environment and priorities emerging in the wake of 9/11, and subsequent interventions into Afghanistan and Iraq. As alluded to elsewhere in this volume, these two interventions that came to define wars of the 2000s,

How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR? 29

have, according to Clare Short, led to a loss of legitimacy in using military instruments together with those of foreign policy and development. However, reluctance to engage in SSR is also a reflection of a development community’s reluctance to engage with what is considered the ‘hard edge’ of national security, including defence and intelligence governance. Instead, the focus is on what may be considered the ‘core business’ of any bilateral development agency: bettering conditions for the poor. Indeed, as we enter the 2010s the concept of SSR is disappearing altogether from DfID discourse, and being replaced by ‘S&J’ (Security and Justice) as indicated in the 2009 White Paper Building our Common Future. In short, SSR is considered to be too security-orientated, and to be dominating issues related to the broader justice sector, particularly judicial reform. In brief, SSR is for the state, and indirectly for the poor; S&J is for the poor, and indirectly for the state. These are semantics with very real and practical implications for how programmes in the field of security and justice are devised. In this chapter, we wish to show how the concept of SSR developed internationally, driven primarily by the UK, and how international thinking shaped and was shaped by experiences in Sierra Leone. From a point of departure of relative fragmentation in programming, attempts were made to join up and coordinate the various elements of security transformation in Sierra Leone. This move towards what is often referred to as a ‘holistic approach’ was directly reflected in activities on the ground in Sierra Leone, including through the production of a Security Sector Review in 2003–2005. The chapter shows how, through this process, a disparate set of actors were brought into Sierra Leone’s SSR process. The chapter also looks at how support to the justice sector, specifically, changed through experiences on the ground, and how these lessons informed international policy debates. Specifically, we do this by exploring the change from a narrow focus on making the SLP more effective to a focus on making the justice sector, as a whole, more responsive to the population. Furthermore, we look at the shift from an almost exclusive focus on efforts on state institutions to much more robust attempts to engage with what is now referred to as non-state actors. SSR, not defence or police reform per se, is inherently developmental in approach. It is aimed towards strengthening accountability of those actors that provide internal as well as external security. Nonetheless, it is often said that this process of merging security and development has led to the ‘securitisation of development.’ The lack of development came to be seen as a cause of insecurity instead of an issue of inequality and injustice. However, because SSR is not a matter of military implementation of

30 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

train-and-equip programmes, the core argument of this chapter is that SSR was as much a process of the ‘developmentalisation of security.’ However, it is still worth emphasising here that while DfID continues to work on issues around security and justice, they have almost entirely disengaged from defence and intelligence-related programming.

Early days, narrow definition The debate on the development of SSR as a policy concept is relatively recent. If it was a novelty for a development agency, in this case DfID, to engage in security-related programming, it has always remained on the margins of dominant development discourse and practice. For instance, the importance of providing support to Ministries of Finance is not questioned to the same degree and direct budget support is seen somewhat of a necessary evil. However, robust DfID support to ministries of defence is rare. Uganda, Sudan and Sierra Leone spring to mind, but support to the security sectors of these countries is ultimately regarded as being at odds with good practice, indeed, doing so is instinctively taken to be an unbalanced securitisation of scarce development resources. SSR has often been presented as ‘too political’ compared to the ‘a-political’ conventional interventions around building schools and roads. The history of SSR as somewhat of an anomaly among the instruments at the disposal of development agencies has meant that implementation of activities under its heading has taken place and in relative isolation from broader development (Albrecht and Buur, 2009:392). The key period in making DfID policy around SSR explicit was undoubtedly the late 1990s. At this point in time Sierra Leone was in the midst of conflict and the country’s security apparatus had all but collapsed. Combined with a general understanding in 1990s that conflict was the main obstacle for development to take place in the aftermath of the Cold War, new ways of thinking international assistance were necessary. In support of Sierra Leone at the time, the UK therefore, rather uniquely, deployed military, development and foreign policy instruments, building up the Government’s capacity to fight a war. With a certain sense of urgency, and a Minister who wanted to set her own footprint, one of the first and most significant statements on SSR came in 1999 from Clare Short as she presented the concept of SSR at King’s College in London. Indeed, it is the one policy event, which gave birth to the ‘developmentalisation’ of security, and from which all other significant developments of SSR-related thinking and pro-

How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR? 31

gramming and practice has flowed. Short defined the security sector in the context of its importance to long-term, sustainable development. The definition that she presented at the time was, however, rather narrow in scope. First, it centred on the intelligence services, and second it emphasised the civilian structures responsible for oversight and management of the security forces. The police and wider civil and criminal justice systems were explicitly excluded from SSR, standing outside the remits of classic overseas development assistance. Short said: By security sector, I mean those who are responsible, or should be responsible for protecting the state and communities within the state. This includes the military, paramilitary and intelligence services, as well as those civilian structures responsible for oversight and control of the security forces. I am not today discussing the police or the wider criminal justice system (Clare Short, March 1999, Speech). In general, the definitional exercise that has surrounded SSR represents a significant degree of pull and push between theory and practice, in London and abroad and with direct effects on the ground regarding which institutions to involve in SSR exercises, and more importantly which institutions to exclude. SSR, which was only vaguely defined at the time, became closely aligned to key processes of stabilisation, centring on concepts such as ‘conflict prevention’, ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘sustainable development’. And Short herself, probably thriving on the potential controversy, never hesitated. ‘I don’t remember feeling very under attack,’ Short recalls, ‘I think it was put to me that this was the right thing to do, that it might be controversial, that we had to be brave, etc. I was just convinced of the case’ (Clare Short, June 2008, interview, UK). Short was not a development expert, but she very much had a political agenda. In Sierra Leone in the late 1990s, support was given variously to contain the armed forces which had staged two coups during the 1990s, fight a war against rebel forces, re-establish the SLP, which had collapsed, and set up coordination mechanisms of the security sector and intelligence collection capacity. Specifically with respect to UK’s involvement in Sierra Leone Clare Short (June 2008, interview, UK) recalls: The army is gone, we are trying to rebuild the state and it doesn’t have any armed forces, so that was the obvious role for the British, to

32 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

help train the new Sierra Leonean army. By then, because Britain sort of accidentally had taken this straight forward position, there was a committee set up, chaired by Robin Cook [UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1999–2001], to say how do we do this Sierra Leone policy? But this was all done – believe what I am saying – it wasn’t planned in advance (Clare Short, June 2008, interview, UK). There is little doubt that Short – referred to as ‘an elemental force’ by her staff – was instrumental in pushing DfID into the hitherto foreign territory of defence and intelligence reform. She acted on instinct rather than principle regarding the type of activities that DfID, as a development agency, could become involved in (Albrecht, Stepputat and Andersen, 2010).

Fragmentation in policy and fragmentation in practice Short’s decision to support SSR in Sierra Leone, and her speech at King’s College on DfID’s intention to engage in security-related programming beyond policing took place during a time that witnessed somewhat of a seismic shift in development thinking. Needless to say that while DfID – emerging as the UK’s new and powerful development agency – was at the frontline of thinking around the development-security nexus, they did not take this decision in a political vacuum internationally. Four donor meetings had taken place during 1992–1993 in The Hague, Tokyo, Berlin and Paris, where it was decided that limits could be imposed on the military spending of developing countries. At an OECD-DAC conference in Ottawa in 1997, however, it was recognised that merely imposing limits on military spending would not be effective. By extension, an important step was taken towards emphasising the need to strengthen budgetary decision-making processes (Omitoogun and Hutchful, 2006; Albrecht, Stepputat and Andersen, 2010). This was the initial stages of a process towards ‘developmentalising’ donor approaches to military expenditure, which was further advanced in 2000 at a DfID meeting held around that very topic. From this latter meeting it emerged that defence should be treated no differently than other parts of the public sector in terms of policy formulation, budgeting, and implementation. In brief, the key principles of transparency, accountability and comprehensiveness in planning should apply. This new approach, dubbed as the ‘process’ or ‘governance’ approach, combined good governance practices and sound financial principles with

How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR? 33

security considerations. Attention was directed towards the institutional framework for managing trade-offs between different sectors and for the effective management of the resources devoted to the defence sector as well as the oversight and governance of security bodies. The debates on military expenditure taking place during the 1990s and Short and DfID’s distinction between the ‘security sector’ and the ‘criminal justice system’ remained relatively far removed from current conceptions of the ‘holistic approach’ to SSR. The separation of security and justice was reflected in the approach pursued on the ground in Sierra Leone, however, and also in the budgetary separation of different financial and management streams within DfID itself, which did not always work together. In fact, and perhaps unsurprisingly, at times the separate justice and conflict groups within DfID were more rivals than representatives of the same organisation, fighting over both resources and power to define policy direction. At the level of the individual, the insistence on maintaining bureaucratic separations is one of the unproductive ways, but depressingly common ways of safeguarding one’s turf. In sum, it should therefore always be assumed that individual interest conditions approaches to institutional reform, indeed, ideological conviction is often irrelevant in this regard. This partly explains the fragmented picture that emerges when policy statements are being discussed, because, as a rule, some degree of collateral damage always follows institutional change. Within Sierra Leone itself, this fragmentation was a result of the context in which operations began, and not least because of the personalities involved in the process. This affected the discussions that took place about which institutions were to be reformed and also how. With respect to the police, for example, tension remains today about whether the primary organisation of internal security falls within the justice sector or the security sector, where the former is seen as relating to human or individual safety and the latter to state/government security (Howlett-Bolton, 2008). The fact that this conceptual conviction was upheld by the JSDP in the face of those Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) advisers that remained had real impact on the direction of justice sector reform after 2005. Against all identified ‘best practices’ the programme was split in two between security-related programme activities (mainly Operational Support Division (OSD)) and public safety components (Family Support Units (FSUs), judicial capacity, and so forth). Only today in 2010, as a new security and justice programme is being developed, the Improved Access to Security and Justice Programme (IASJP), are the links between security and justice explicitly recognised.

34 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

As already alluded to, this conceptual rivalry papers over individual power struggles in Sierra Leone and in London, and reflects institutional turf wars. Tension continues between the SSR community within DfID, surprisingly small, and justice development experts that stand firmly on keeping the policing as a public service separate from oversight of the armed forces and democratic control of intelligence agencies. Indeed, with DfID’s 2009 Development White Paper, it appears that the former ‘school of thought’ has succeeded in all but remove SSR from development discourse. It notes in passing: ‘Through approaches such as security sector reform – for example working with Minister of Defence or parliamentary committees – we will help the poor benefit from accountable and effective security organisations they can trust, operating within the rule of law and adhering to human rights standards.’ By comparison, security and justice, and treating them as basic services, are discussed in detail under its own heading (DfID, 2009). In the late 1990s policing was the responsibility of what at the time was called the Government and Institutions Department (GID), whereas SSR, military matters and intelligence essentially, fell within the remit of the Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD), now referred to as Conflict and Humanitarian and Security Affairs (CHASE). Justice remained a separate area for intervention within DfID for a number of years publishing its own policy documentation and maintaining separate budgets. In terms of training, for example, DfID established an ‘SSR Practitioners Course’ for all those engaged in SSR activities in the first half of the 2000s. As late as 2006, it was decided, by the protagonists of security and justice narrowly focused on basic service delivery that a more specifically justice-orientated course was necessary. The fact that they were established as separate courses is a reflection of the fact that justice and SSR, respectively, were never entirely integrated. It is the SSR community, relatively small at DfID, which has been most adamant in promoting what has become a growing trend to conceptualise and operationalise connections between security, development, justice and democracy. ‘Holistic’ and ‘comprehensive’ reform or a ‘system-wide’ approach to reform of the security sector have in this regard been used as concepts to describe hitherto separate fields of intervention. Looking back on the late 1990s and early 2000s, the separation of what may broadly be referred to as internal and external security provision within DfID had real consequences in Sierra Leone. Keith Biddle recalls from this period: We actually queried DfID about this. CHAD was running the show regarding security in the military, and came out on visits. On the

How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR? 35

other hand, you had the Government and Institutions Department doing the police. And we said: ‘Why isn’t CHAD doing all of this?’ The argument had been in the Government and Institutions Department that they would retain all policing aspects throughout the world under all circumstances. The argument was that policing was about governments and communities. It wasn’t about military solutions to conflict. There was a lot of turf war involved in this. Logically, the police should have been part of the security sector reform part, and DfID, in 1998, in fact issued a book (sic) that stated that the police are actually dealt with on their own provisions. So security sector reform was not part and parcel of what we were doing and never formally became part and parcel of what we were doing. There was clearly a lack of integration of thought in London. [Cross-departmental initiatives such as] the conflict pools and the Stabilisation Unit [managed by DfID, FCO and MoD in collaboration] have been informed by some of the disputes and problems that we had (Keith Biddle, June 2009, interview, France). The fact that direction of police and defence programming, respectively, did not come from the same department in DfID had, as mentioned, real consequences. An example is the battle between advisers over Paramount Hotel and whether it should house the SLP’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID) or the MoD. This was really a consequence of rivalry in London, and by extension in Sierra Leone. In both places decisionmaking and thinking was only partly joined up, directly conditioned by personalities rather than a comprehensive framework for security sector reform. Biddle recalls: The reporting through separate desks eventually manifested itself with the tension over Paramount Hotel. [The adviser to Sierra Leone’s MoD] was reporting that everything was okay and that the IG can easily clear this building. I was served with a letter saying: ‘In 5 days’ time we intend to start work, so get your people out of there.’ [The other adviser] was not telling any lies. I could’ve cleared them if I’d said: ‘Yes, okay, I’ll send them all down the road. They’ve got nowhere to live, but let’s forget that.’ He didn’t tell them any lies. He didn’t tell the truth, but didn’t tell any lies. No one was coordinating this in DfID, because we were reporting to separate desks, some dealing with country specific issues, other with humanitarian matters. DfID didn’t regard community policing

36 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

as part of SSR at that stage. And so that eventually manifested itself with the nonsense over Paramount Hotel, which we could write up as mere fuss now, but at the time it was pretty dangerous because we were all out there. Somebody had made plans for the place [Paramount Hotel] and got the President to agree. The problem was that we could not deliver on this, because the coordination in London hadn’t provided any for me to find somewhere for my people to go. The fact that 300–400 policemen were housed in this place hadn’t crossed anybody’s mind in London (Keith Biddle, June 2009, interview, France).

International momentum The fragmentation that was visible in Sierra Leone’s SSR process, backed up by policy as it was presented by Short in the late 1990s, would in the coming years, in international policy at least, become less evident. This push towards what is now referred to as ‘holistic,’ ‘comprehensive,’ ‘system-wide’ approaches to SSR came, as indicated above, from CHASE within DfID. However, even within CHASE there has never been a substantial number of staff advocating for DfID’s involvement in programming around ‘hard security,’ meaning inclusive of defence, the military and intelligence services. In reality, it was only a very small number of people within CHASE, at times just an individual, who drove this agenda. At times there have been none at all pushing forward a comprehensive SSR agenda. Nonetheless, it was this concept of SSR that was to gather momentum in international policy-making circles, partly because of those individuals and allies that have been SSR Advisers in the so-called S&J Team in CHASE, but also because DfID backed them up with funding through the Conflict Prevention Pools (CPP). SSR, as it was emerging, was thus part of a move towards integrating security and development, and the UK played a major role in promoting and formulating this agenda. Short captures the undeniable perception in the international community following the end of the Cold War, stating a common perception at the time: ‘There was a massive growth in conflict within and between countries, causing enormous suffering and preventing development. I mean, you couldn’t be intelligently interested in development in Africa and not be focused on how you bring all these conflicts to an end.’3 During the first half of the 2000s, and based on concrete experiences from post-conflict reconstruction, it was the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that became the international

How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR? 37

organisation most heavily involved in developing a SSR policy concept, initially by producing the 2005 reference document Security System Reform and Governance. There should be little doubt that it was the UK, and CHASE in DfID specifically, that was the central player in directing the production of this and subsequent SSR-related documents. This is not least indicated by the fact that during this period DfID’s Senior SSR Advisor chaired the OECD DAC’s Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation Network (CPDON). OECD-DAC thus became a platform from which the UK could influence the future direction of SSR thinking internationally. This was not done by the UK Government in isolation, but, as Jennifer Sugden (2006:2) has argued, also involved a range of experts, primarily from the UK, from academia, international organisations and NGOs. The OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, which followed two years later in 2007 and had strong UK backing, was produced to provide ‘guidance to operationalise the OECD-DAC guidelines on SSR and close the gap between policy and practice’ (OECD, 2007a:15). Unlike the early formulations of SSR described above, the police and judiciary were placed together with the military and intelligence services within a seamless security framework – or system as referred to by the OECD. It is within these two documents from 2005 and 2007 that the clearest articulation of a holistic approach to SSR can be found. The overall aim of SSR, it is stated, is to ensure that the security sector in a given country is capable of meeting the security needs of both state and people in a manner consistent with democratic norms, good governance the rule of law (OECD, 2005b). In addition, the OECD emphasises the necessity of approaching not any one security provider in particular, but security providers as a system of actors, thus addressing the overlapping fields of security, law enforcement and justice simultaneously (Andersen, 2006). It should be noted here that whilst the UK did play a leading role, there were other institutions that were important in bringing SSR to the attention of a number of international actors. The OECD was a chief player and along with them DCAF in Geneva also played, and continues to play, a leading role in developing the SSR agenda. In addition, the UK established a Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) with an explicit brief to provide support for Southern security networks. Whilst some of these have eventually fallen by the wayside, largely as a result of internal changes within DfID, they have all had a profound impact on SSR thinking. Having said that a number of institutions were involved, it should also be noted that there was a very British core to a number of them, with a close network of individuals, many of whom

38 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

were British or at least English speakers (Canadian and Irish) who knew each other and this group was influential in driving forward initiatives.

Defining scope of SSR – in Sierra Leone and internationally The concept of ‘security sector reform’ existed and was used in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s, but there was some lack of clarity about which institutions to include when attempting to define the concept. One definition reflected Short’s concept in the late 1990s of what the security sector entailed, involving only the armed forces and the institutions overseeing and managing their actions. Another definition included the intelligence services and, particularly, the institutions with a mandate to coordinate responses from the various actors of the security sector, including the NSA’s Office (the predecessor to the ONS). Neither of these definitions encompassed the SLP, the MIA, the judiciary, prison services, parliament, civil society or chiefdom institutions, all of which have important roles regarding the provision of security and justice to the population. Producing Sierra Leone’s security sector review between 2003 and 2005 forced through a need to clearly define those institutions that should contribute to SSR in the country. As explained in greater detail elsewhere in this book, the security sector review’s primary aim was to assess potential and actual threats to realising Sierra Leone’s Vision 2025, a document framing a vision for long-term development. Furthermore, the security sector review was produced to identify the institutions which could counter these threats, and to make recommendations on how they could do so. For practical reasons, it therefore became of central importance to have a clearly outlined working definition of the agencies that were encompassed by the security sector. This was not only the case because of sensitivities around making an authoritative claim on threats to Sierra Leone, but also because of the political consequences of including some actors and excluding others. In the second half of 2003, a definition of the security sector was proposed as a precursor to initiate the review process. Under the heading ‘What is the Security Sector?’ the following institutions were considered relevant to defining threats to Sierra Leone security (Defence Advisory Team, 2003): • Governance and oversight mechanisms, including parliamentary committees.

How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR? 39

• The ONS and the CISU. • Government departments, including interior, justice, defence, foreign affairs, and finance. • Uniformed services: the military, police, prison service, customs and immigration. • The judicial system, including the Anti-Corruption Commission. • The TRC. • Private security companies. • Non-state paramilitary forces. • Civil society stakeholders and NGOs. There is little doubt that the security sector review process helped to conceptually clarify the boundaries of the security sector. Indeed, as noted by one of the leading figures within the Sierra Leone Police who was a member of the security sector review secretariat in the ONS, the review process ‘in 2003 sort of harnessed all the other transformations that were taking place. From then on it became clear cut that all institutions should be involved. It became clear that there were other institutions than the police and armed forces’ (Desmond Buck, Working Group meeting, 2008). This process of clarification in Sierra Leone, which had a practical purpose, was reflected in a similar parallel process within the OECD, which culminated in the publication of the 2005 reference document Security System Reform and Governance. According to OECD-DAC’s definition, which has become an authoritative blueprint for external actors, four clusters of actors fall under the heading of the ‘security system’: • Core security actors: armed forces, police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security services, coast guards, border guards, custom authorities, and reserve and local security units. • Security management and oversight bodies: parliament/legislature, including committees, ministries of internal affairs, foreign affairs and defence, national security advisory bodies, customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies and civil society actors, including the media, academia and non-governmental organisations. • Justice and rule of law institutions: ministry of justice, correction services, criminal investigation and prosecution services, the judiciary (courts), other customary and traditional justice systems, human rights commissions and ombudspersons.

40 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

• Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private bodyguard units, private security companies, private military companies and political party militias. In the Handbook, published in 2007, the security system was also described as being made up of several smaller systems, where the police services fall within both criminal justice and state security, albeit within an overarching security framework (Albrecht and Buur, 2009:394). These two processes of conceptual clarification, which took place in parallel in the first half of the 2000s, have not, however, led to a set definition of the security sector or SSR. Different actors continue to embrace broad or narrow understandings, and a variety of terms are often used interchangeably, including security sector reform, security system reform, security sector modernisation, security sector transformation, and so forth. In addition, as set out above, DfID has never been unequivocally in favour of supporting the breadth of security institutions listed above, while, somewhat contradictory, also being the agency which has pushed a comprehensive approach to SSR. The main point to keep in mind here is that SSR, as it was pursued in Sierra Leone from the late 1990s, was politically motivated from the very top of the UK Government. In other words, the decision to engage did not come from within any one specific Department, although Short’s decision to engage in SSR as the head of DfID was decisive. The most important evidence of the driving force of engagement is difficult to locate is DfID’s general reluctance to engage in defence or intelligencerelated programming outside the Sierra Leonean context. However, within Sierra Leone, there is also evidence of how DfID’s reluctance was consolidated concurrently with decrease of political interest in Sierra Leone. One case in point, which will be explored in greater detail below, is the transition from a police-focused CCSSP to the broader focus of JSDP, encompassing the justice sector more comprehensively. Re-establishing Sierra Leone’s justice sector has so far spanned more than a decade and has informed international thinking and best practices of justice sector transformation as it is designed today. Indeed, many advisers who built their career in Sierra Leone, including Biddle, remain central to developing police programmes, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, the Sierra Leone process has helped to change the focus from separate police and justice reform programming towards the justice sector as a whole. JSDP was a response to this broadened understanding of what is needed to enhance people’s security and justice. The police and justice experience in Sierra Leone has also generated increased attempts to incorporate non-state providers of security and

How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR? 41

justice into programming. In 2010, a programme to this effect was designed in Sierra Leone, referred to as the IASJP. As part of its rationale, the paper that presents the various options for future programming, emphasises that ‘13 of JSDP’s 17 components focus on state and institution-building.’ In turn, it argues, ‘it is deemed unlikely that additional HMG support to state and institution building will, by itself, sufficiently transform the MDAs [Ministries, Departments and Agencies of the Sierra Leone state] to enable them adequately to meet the needs of vulnerable and marginalised groups.’ The mid-2000s witnessed somewhat of a shift in the acknowledgement of who the main providers of security and justice are in the Global South (DfID, 2004; Scheye and McLean, 2006). This was not least a reflection of donor agencies’ disillusionment with host governments that did not appear to take state-centric reform efforts forward with sufficient speed. In addition, these developments fit neatly with DfID’s mantra of ‘providing services to poor, marginalised and vulnerable people, in a nonpartisan, equitable, and accountable manner.’ The following two sections show how justice sector programmes have been informed, and in turn themselves informed what has been considered best practices in justice sector development.

JSDP – representing a DfID approach Until 2005, while the SLP had received considerable support, support to the judiciary and the broader justice sector did not receive the same level of resource. There is no denying the significant impact of Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF) and CCSSP – on the police. However, as indicated by one of the advisors to the JSDP, arriving in Sierra Leone in 2005: ‘The SLP is the only functional unit in MIA, there is a huge imbalance. The SLP is frustrated in terms of the judiciary, which is better, but not functioning’.4 It was the strength of the CCSSP that it resurrected the SLP, but also its weakness, because other institutions in the justice sector were regarded as of secondary importance or simply neglected. Leading figures within CCSSP have been adamant about how they sought to establish a police directorate within the MIA, but that consecutive ministers – Charles Margai, Prince Harding and Sam Hinga Norman – were not in favour of substantial changes to the Ministry. The fact remains, however, that early support to the justice sector was fragmented, and heavily biased towards strengthening the state police. The JSDP constituted a fundamental break with both the approach and management of the projects that were meant to support justice

42 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

sector development. The most radical change was the switch from a focus on efficient internal security provision to a focus on the governing structures of the justice sector on the one hand, and on the delivery of service at the local level (and outside Freetown) on the other hand. This was ultimately a shift from supporting a ‘police force’ to developing security and justice as ‘public services.’ The CCSSP and Law Reform Programme had started implementation during a period with little appreciation of what a holistic approach to SSR might look like. Certainly, the need for mutual support of programming around the judiciary and the police were not readily accepted. In the reports of CCSSP consultants the tone is outright hostile and impatient towards the judiciary, which was regarded as corrupt, unprofessional and inefficient. In other words, the CCSSP leaders did not regard it as their responsibility to support judicial reform – and, indeed, strictly speaking it was not (Albrecht, 2010:69). With a focus on the justice sector within JSDP, priority reform areas were clearly expanded to a disparate number of activities and institutions. The approach became both more about development, i.e. public service delivery, than security, i.e. making the state more effective, and more about looking at the justice sector within one framework of programming. These developments had been long underway, recognised as early as 2002 by Biddle, while he was still the IGP of Sierra Leone and the CCSSP was still being implemented. At the end of the day, however, Biddle was a police officer. The fairly radical shift from reform under CCSSP and the Law Reform Programme into JSDP, and the apparent cohesion in what effective support to the justice sector might look like, coincided with the publication of the 2005 OECD reference document Security System Reform, which was heavily influenced by the UK, DfID and experiences in Sierra Leone specifically. The changes in programme that came with JSDP were reflected in a fundamental shift of attention, and reflected ‘developmentalisation’ of the security agenda in Sierra Leone. In 2007, it had become clear that there was a general move away from direct support to securityrelated programming by DfID. Priority reform areas included outof-date and inaccessible laws and procedures, including a defined need to begin a process of indexing customary law, overcrowding of prisons, delays in courts, absence of adequate juvenile justice provision, lack of support mechanisms which meet the ‘needs of the poor, vulnerable and marginalised’ to access justice, lack of connection between community needs and police operations, and so forth (JSDP OPR, 2007:9–10).

How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR? 43

The focus on the SLP as an institution, ensuring that it would be able to perform effectively as provider of internal security, was definitively and understandably, perhaps, being taken over by a focus, which fit DfID’s preoccupation with development. This had to do with the fact that direction was now coming from DfID rather than the Cabinet. Tony Blair, Robin Cook and Clare Short based their decision to support Sierra Leone on the assumption that ‘it was the right thing to do.’ Whatever was good practice in development – and dealing with security actors was not it – had been changing throughout this time period. However, the JSDP reflected both the SSR concept that was evolving, and simultaneously, the inherently hesitant approach of a development agency to security-related programming. This shift in focus has been held consistently by the JSDP, both at the central level and in Moyamba District, which came to be regarded as the programme’s ‘pilot district’ outside Freetown and the Western Area. It was therefore almost a given that there would be a number of complications involved in broadening the focus from what was predominantly a police project – CPDTF/CCSSP – to a sector-wide justice sector project – JSDP. First of all, the £25 million were now earmarked not for the police alone, but for the police, judiciary, prisons and MIA. The CCSSP had focused heavily on supporting SLP equipment procurement and this focus disappeared with JSDP. As already noted above, the Government of Sierra Leone has, for various reasons, not been able to replace this equipment. In turn, the JSDP supported infrastructure such as prisons and separate office space for Family Support Units. This change in programming signified a shift in external advice, which became much less personalised. Keith Biddle, Adrian Horn and Ray England had played an integral role in stabilising Sierra Leone in close collaboration with Sierra Leone’s executive, not only through advice, but through active involvement. Indeed, certain members of CCSSP, who had practically become core staff members of the SLP according to some sources, actively fought against a broader focus on justice sector institutions, because it clearly had negative consequences for the SLP – and for their own positions. A focus on the justice sector was nonetheless in line with concepts of best practices at the time of a ‘holistic’ approach to SSR-related activities. The next change of direction in justice reform has been underway almost since JSDP began implementation, culminating in the design of IASJP in 2010. Before looking at the shift in focus from the state to those actors that have been perceived as non-state, it is worth exploring some of the policy-thinking

44 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

that has informed current debates on non-state actor inclusion in SSR or as it is now referred to, ‘security and justice programming’.

Moving away from the state Debates in international circles around how security and justice may be enhanced at the local level, have been quite far-sighted with respect to engaging non-state actors. However, because practice in many ways preceded theory, very little guidance was available to practitioners on the ground, including during the periods when CCSSP and even JSDP began implementation. In the case of Sierra Leone, the SSR process began in the midst of conflict in 1999. It was above all focused on supporting the democratically elected government in winning a war, building up the capacity of the state to do so, and to provide internal security. The overall SSR process was therefore relatively ad hoc until 2002, when conflict was officially declared over, and implementation at District level only began in earnest thereafter. In 2004, DfID published its first coherent briefing on the issue, called Non-state Justice and Security Systems. It states that security and justice institutions presided over by non-state actors are ‘critically important in the context of DfID’s pro-poor approach to security and justice’. These actors, the note continues, ‘deal with the vast majority of disputes’ and are ‘widely used in rural and poor urban areas, where there is often minimal access to formal state justice’ (DfID, 2004:1). The briefing recognises that this approach to reform is politicised, neither neutral nor solely technical, but one that raises broader governance issues. There often is no separation between providing security and justice, on one hand, and local governance institutions on the other: ‘[A] person who exercises judicial (or quasi judicial) authority through a non state justice system may also have executive authority over the same property or territory’ (DfID, 2004:3). In other words, those very mechanisms that are being used to seek redress are often also deployed to control the distribution of land and resources by local elites. Unsurprisingly, as in the case of reforming state policing agencies, intervening locally, and engaging with nonstate actors such as paramount chiefs is a highly political endeavour and will undoubtedly confront resilient structures of authority that are likely to yield considerable legitimacy. As part of DfID’s design of Primary Justice Pilots in Malawi, tensions arose because chiefs saw an inherent threat from the programme, as other types of dispute resolution mechanisms would be used, challenging their de facto monopoly to settle such

How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR? 45

cases. In the specific case of the MaSSAJ, officially commenced in January 2002, which the Primary Justice Pilots were part of, 60% of funding was, according to one of the advisers to the project, spent on non-state actors. In 2006, OECD published a report which called for what was referred to as a ‘multi-layered’ approach to reforming those actors and institutions that provide security and justice (Scheye and McLean, 2006). Drawing on the definition of non-state actors purported by DfID’s policy briefing, it is concluded that statutory as well as non-statutory providers of security and justice should be encompassed by reform efforts. This approach, it is stated, ‘targets the multiple points where service occurs and strengthens the linkages between state institutions and local justice and non state providers’ (GFN-SSR, 2007). In the Security System Reform Handbook, published just after in 2008, this line of thinking was consolidated, stating that a multi-layered approach ‘helps respond to the short-term needs of enhanced security and justice, while also building the medium-term needs of state capacity and critical governance structures’ (OECD DAC, 2007). The multi-layered approach is, however, not avoiding state engagement and can even be considered state-centric. In the 2006 report that presents the most radical outline of the multi-layered approach, it is stated that whatever support is provided ‘to non-state systems, however, ought to be balanced by the establishment of mechanisms to link them to state systems’ (Scheye and McLean, 2006:32). Similarly, the Security System Reform Handbook is predominantly preoccupied with the capacity of state institutions.

Non-state actor involvement in security and justice In December 2005, a National Policy Framework for the Justice Sector in Sierra Leone was presented within the framework of the JSDP. It represented a ‘holistic sector-wide approach to support the development of an effective, efficient, impartial and accountable Justice Sector that is capable of meeting the needs of all the people of Sierra Leone’ (JSDP, December 2005:2). The document is not short of formulations around the importance of including what are referred to as ‘Customary/Traditional Laws and Practices.’ These include, inter alia, development of policies on the judicial role of traditional leaders, implementation of initiatives that promote Constitutional principles and human rights and enhanced accountability of traditional leaders to the public. Likewise, the Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Investment Plan, launched in February 2008, has as one of six targets to ‘improve public satisfaction levels with Local Courts,

46 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

Paramount and Local Chiefs’ (GoSL, December 2007:V). As one of the initial advisers to the JSDP notes: ‘Each system will have its own advantages and disadvantages and both need support, even if the state system will inevitably require a greater share of financial resources’ (HowlettBolton, 2008:8). Under JSDP, substantive work has been and is still being undertaken in Freetown, where the focus is on distribution of power among the recognisable institutions of the state. Inevitably, as the focus moves to Chiefdom level, as it has done in Moyamba District in the case of the JSDP, any attempt of JSDP programmes to impact institutions controlled by the chiefs touches on local level distribution of power, and is therefore deeply political. During JSDP implementation there have been no attempts to fundamentally alter the institution of the Local Court. Rather, focus has been on how to confine chiefs to their legally defined role in arbitrating cases, a management role which presumably can only be played by state institutions – the Local Councils and the SLP. In Moyamba, apart from supporting the Magistrates Court, direct work with the Chiefs has channelled through human rights training. Inevitably, conflicts occur; a 2009 assessment reported a Local Court Chairman complaint about cases no longer being reported to him. Such complaints could reflect redistribution of power in the Chiefdom, but also could be due to the fact that local court fines are a source of income for court employees, who are not paid regularly, if at all. This implies, of course, that the JSDP has had some impact on how justice is delivered. As the assessment suggests, however, this is also partly due to civil society activities in the District, in particular in Local Courts, where officials have presided over cases that were not under their jurisdiction. The question remains, however, whether the balance of power in Moyamba has been fundamentally altered. Given the role of chiefs as providers of 80% of local level justice (according to common in-country estimates), and also the identification of chiefdom justice as being influential in the road to conflict in the first place (Richards, 1998; Jackson, 2005, 2007) it is still striking how little direct attention they appear to have received from the JSDP. Apart from providing support to the drafting of a Local Courts Bill and a restatement programme around customary law (in Moyamba District), the JSDP has not prioritised support to Local Courts and traditional justice systems. The 2007 assessment quoted above notes that ‘the majority of disputes are resolved through the informal system outside the Local Courts (headmen, section chief, village elders or paramount chief). This is

How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR? 47

a weakness of the programme, which has put greater emphasis on formal justice institutions’ (JSDP OPR, April 2007). This circumstance ultimately reflects the difficulty of working directly with chiefs to change their practices. This is also reflected in assessments of the JSDP carried out in 2007, 2008 and 2009, where remarkably little space is devoted to this layer of primary powerbrokers in Sierra Leone’s local communities. There are several reasons for this, some of which has been discussed elsewhere at a general level and with a specific reference to Sierra Leone’s SSR process (Albrecht and Buur, 2009). First of all, the function and rationale of how chiefs operate is not well-understood by external actors. While they understand and accept the importance of including Chiefs in justice programmes, donors and their consultants have difficulty designing appropriate programmes targeting Chiefs. Second, because Chiefs are obliged constitutionally to serve the ‘government of the day’ and because they are deeply political in their own right, it is difficult for donor agencies to find the appropriate balance between support of state and non-state actors. This in turn leads to the vital issue of state sovereignty: while national actors might agree that Chiefs are vital leaders in Sierra Leone, national-level officials might not accept that donor support is not passed through them. In 2009, DfID/Sierra Leone produced a document, proposing a ‘new intervention,’ IASJP in Sierra Leone, which is meant to run for a threeyear period until 2013. At the time of writing, the project design process has not taken place, but the document, outlining terms of reference for that process, suggests that the programme will place delivery of improved access to security and justice in Sierra Leone ‘at both the centre of our ongoing state-building and human development interventions’ (IASJP TOR, 2009). The document also suggests that among the six key threats to building sustainable peace in Sierra Leone is ‘a lack of individual or community legal redress or rights’ (IASJP TOR, 2009). The programme is expected to support achievements and the ongoing activities of the JSDP, which is described as ‘operating in several districts’ (IASJP TOR, 2009). The most important aspect of the document, however, is that for the first time in the context of Sierra Leone’s SSR process, there is a recognition in programme design documentation that informal security and justice providers are at least as vital as formal providers. However, apart from referring to ‘informal’ and ‘traditional’ security and justice service providers, and indicating that they will be consulted

48 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

and engaged in the new programme, they are not dealt with in any depth. Therefore, even if paramount and sections chief and village headmen are not mentioned in this short document, it must be assumed that these are the actors that are referred to. For the first time it looks like Sierra Leone will have a programme that focuses on the ‘non-state’ and the ‘state,’ but what this will look like in practice, and what the impact will be, remains to be seen. So whilst the importance of engaging Chiefs, or more generally the actors holding the power to govern and provide security and justice at the local level, cannot be underestimated, it is clear that much work needs to be done to understand these local issues, particularly the politics of local governance (Jackson, 2007).

Conclusion This chapter has explored how the concept of SSR through practical programmes on the ground was shaped by experiences in Sierra Leone, and vice versa, how SSR came to shape the country’s peacebuilding process. There are three main reasons for this. First, is the fact that within the UK Government, consensus prevailed that the foreign policy instruments at its disposal had to be deployed simultaneously. DfID’s establishment in 1997 as a Department separate from FCO was crucial in this regard, as development was considered on par in importance with military and political power. Second, Short’s ambitions as a politician – rather than as an agent of for development per se – meant that breaking new ground was of high priority. Merging security and development certainly fit this agenda. Third, and on this backdrop, DfID came to play an absolutely central role in defining SSR policy internationally, most notably through OECDDAC. It is striking, however, that SSR in the comprehensive way that it was pursued in Sierra Leone has never been attempted in the same way in other parts of the world. 9/11 and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have played their role in complicating the merger of security and development within one framework. In these places, to state the obvious, military force has by far been the most important instrument. By extension, and as Short argues elsewhere in this volume, the legitimacy of using military power in support of development programmes has been greatly limited. More importantly, however, is the underlying and fundamental reluctance among development agencies to engage robustly in SSR, which is considered marginal to core development issues. As soon

How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR? 49

as Sierra Leone stopped being a Cabinet issue, a more traditional development agenda took over. Developments of international thinking around SSR are well-reflected in both Sierra Leone’s attempts to coordinate the security sector and the country’s consecutive justice-related programmes, which have informed and been informed by international policy-thinking. In the early stages of Sierra Leone’s SSR process, little impetus was given to joining up the different programmes – and personalities – that ran programmes in support of the police and judiciary, defence and intelligence agencies. It was not until 2003, one year after the war officially ended in Sierra Leone, that there was a conscious realisation of the fact that the security sector was broader than the police and military. The reason for this realisation was the production of the security sector review, which was coordinated by the ONS, and drew in a wide range of security sector institutions. In parallel to this process, OECD-DAC was, with UK input, developing its own thinking around SSR. Incidentally, Sierra Leone’s security sector review and OECD-DAC’s reference document, Security System Reform and Governance, were both published in 2005. The pull and push between international policy-thinking and justice reform in Sierra Leone can be seen in two crucial developments. When CCSSP and the Law Reform Programme began implementation in the late 1990s, they were very much regarded as separate endeavours. The fact that the CCSSP legacy is very much still debated today is a token of its impact – discussed in detail throughout this book. One of the great criticisms of the CCSSP, however, was that it was too narrowly focused on the police, and neglected crucial links to the governance system, prisons, courts, civil society, etc. The JSDP, much broader in scope, and more explicitly orientated towards better service delivery to the population, reflected both lessons in Sierra Leone and internationally about the need for being more ‘joined up’ and ‘holistic’ in approach. Parallel to this process, the SSR community has been on a steep learning curve with respect to the need for engaging the rather ephemeral layer of ‘non-state’ actors. International thinking on this started before 2005, and was integrated to a limited degree into the JSDP framework. It is, however, only in 2010, with the IASJP that actors at the local level have taken centre stage in policing and justice programming. What the consequences of this for Sierra Leone and for international thinking around SSR-related programming will be remains to be seen. While the process of justice reform began almost exclusively as a state-building project, it has slowly moved away from this agenda, and started to focus

50 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

on security and justice providers that are not directly conditioned by the state. This is a move that most development agencies, who hesitate to engage in intelligence and defence reform, are more comfortable with. There is no doubt also some disillusionment, among donor agencies, with the slow pace of progress made in the security sector by state institutions. Consequently, they are seeking out other organisations, state or non-state, to seek impact.

3 Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict

In the late 1990s and certainly after 1997, the overarching context of security in Sierra Leone was chaotic. The existing interventions and support provided by the UK were provided in a situation characterised by continuing conflict, state collapse, military instability and a lack of political control in many parts of the country. Outside Freetown, the Government was unable to project political power and security for most of the population was fragile. The RUF, along with several additional political groups were proving to be significant political rivals to the legitimate government of President Kabbah, particularly in the countryside. At the same time, the Government of Sierra Leone was facing a succession of crises, not least the exile of the President in Conakry. At the same time, the Government also had a number of external agencies willing to provide support to what was a democratically elected President. It was clear that any long-term development strategy would be dependent on a return of the Government in exile and that this was not possible given the poor security situation. Without security and stability, Sierra Leone could not begin to recover. From the outset, the UK acknowledged that security was central to any recovery, and as one adviser to the Government of Sierra Leone stated: ‘In our [Sierra Leone’s] case the entry point was clearly the police and armed forces. We need to understand that SSR is a political process and the entry point into SSR is based on the circumstances in a country. You don’t need an overarching strategy to start’.1 Early interventions were therefore reactive in that the UK Government was compelled to act quickly in response to events on the ground and without the luxury of a significant planning lead time. In many ways, this was not seen as a problem, except in so far as DfID was relatively short of 51

52 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

experienced staff to put on the ground. As a core DfID adviser stated: ‘the great thing was that we got on with it, supported the Government and avoided obsessions about planning at the expense of actually doing things’.2 In this situation, it became clear that security and development were becoming entwined on the ground. Whilst Sierra Leone at this time was a long way from the later, coherent picture of SSR and even from the close links that have been articulated in relation to security and development, this reactive approach did lead to a situation where security and development became closely associated on the ground. This then sowed the seeds for the later development of Sierra Leonean governance and of SSR as a concept. This chapter deals with the first phase of the intervention in Sierra Leone. It begins with a description of the context of initial support, including the importance of the particular set of circumstances that arose during the latter part of the 1990s. It then goes on to describe the wide range of interventions undertaken by the UK Government in the security sector, including the military intervention, Operation Palliser and the reformation of UNAMSIL. It then goes on to look at the issues entailed in reforming an army that was ostensibly still at war but in reality had fallen apart, a police force that did not exist outside the capital city and the construction of an overarching security architecture with a functioning intelligence wing and civilian oversight.

Reforming the police and legal sector Early work with the police and legal sector was initiated in 1997/78, around the same time as civil service reform. However, these interventions were characterised by a lack of coordination, even if specific sets of reforms became very successful. A key element of these initial reforms was re-establishing a functional SLP, not just to reinstate security for the civilian population, but to re-establish state legitimacy in terms of providing that security. These considerations were behind an earlier Government of Sierra Leone request to DfID in 1996 for total reform of the SLP by the newly-elected President Kabbah.3 Project appraisal activities began in 1997, but were disrupted by the AFRC coup but then reinvigorated when Kabbah returned from exile.4 In August 1998, President Kabbah announced the Sierra Leone Policing Charter, which established the primacy of the police in the provision of security for the people of Sierra Leone and acted as a catalyst for police reform. This charter established a set of general guide-

Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict 53

lines, almost a contract with the people of Sierra Leone, governing the conduct of the SLP in dealing with the general population. In particular it set down lists of expectations based on primacy of the police, respect for human rights, increased effectiveness of the officers and an anti-corruption message. Significantly, in the same year and at this very early stage of the police reform process, the future policing doctrine of Sierra Leone was first defined as Local Needs Policing (LNP). A development of UK Community policing (but not exactly the same), this approach still governs the ethos of policing in Sierra Leone. In its basic form, LNP was defined as: ‘Policing that meets the expectations and need of the local community and reflects national standards and objectives’.5 The key was to find an approach that provided some simple, key statements on what the Government and the police wanted and valued, and a policing model for the future. Given the need to completely restructure the police service in Sierra Leone, this required far more than just a new organisational structure. In particular, one adviser who is credited with developing this approach stated that it was about ‘alteration in the attitudes and behaviour of all police officers, together with a critical shift in the management culture of the organisation’.6 Critically, whilst several officers had some experience of different models of community policing, these could be significantly different and what was required was not a model from outside but something that could be consistent within the country and also cope with the different demands of different areas of Sierra Leone. The doctrine of LNP was largely based on the establishment of Local Command Units (LCUs) designed to be locally accountable and also responsive to local needs. This was something that was a complete

Table 3.1 Total number

The Image of the SLP7 Is the SLP corrupt?

YES

How do you view the SLP generally?

Do the SLP ask for money in police stations? NO

Should the SLP be more polite to civilians?

BAD

YES

NO

YES

30

30

0

5

25

27

3

30

0

30

0

TOTAL

30

0

5

25

27

27

30

0

30

0

100

0

16.7

83.3

90

10

100

0

100

0

%

NO GOOD

Do the SLP victimise people?

YES

NO

54 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

departure from the experience of policing in Sierra Leone. An important survey conducted by the CPDTF (summarised in Table 3.1) confirmed that the SLP were not well regarded by the public. Although this is a relatively small survey, the lack of public confidence in the SLP at the time, particularly the perception that the SLP were totally corrupt, was pervasive among the people. Attacking institutional corruption, especially prevalent amongst higher ranks of the SLP, became one of the main targets of reform and was one of the central challenges of the new LNP doctrine. Clearly, police reform had a lot to accomplish before the people began to see their police force as their protectors. 1998 was a time where, as one senior DfID advisor noted, ‘the security sector did not exist. Not only did we not tackle the military in DfID generally, or in the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), we also were not considering the legal sector or the police as part of the security sector at that time.’8 Thus, while being vital, developments within the SLP were treated in relative isolation to other security-related programming. This is not to say that regular meetings and informal coordination were not taking place, but programmes were not integrated, and at the time, the need to do so was not clearly articulated. Following the 1999 deployment of the SILSEP team to the MoD and NSA office, by 2000, there was a recognition, at least on paper, that SLP reforms should be linked with reforms under SILSEP as well as the newly developed LDP (see below). It was also accepted that links needed to be established to the Anti-Corruption Programme, the rebuilding of professionalism and efficiency in the civil service, and – because of the complementary role of traditional and customary systems of policing and justice – work conducted to restore civil society and support amongst paramount chiefs and local government. However, without formalised linkages between the different programmes, a joined up approach could not be realised and each programme continued largely in isolation. When rebels invaded Freetown in January 1999, the CPDTF was forced to leave the country and all activities effectively ground to a halt. Only in August that year, following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, was the full CPDTF able to redeploy and recommence work. It was clearly and urgently understood that while the process of transforming the security system initially had been initiated out of concern over the involvement of the armed forces in politics, the brunt of security tasks in a stable Sierra Leone would fall on the SLP. This policy has been followed consistently ever since. At the same time, with respect to the implementation of DDR in 1999 and beyond, it had become clear that the SLP would be instrumental in enabling conflict prevention and providing stability in the resettle-

Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict 55

ment and rehabilitation process. The task at hand was substantial, not least in logistical terms. For instance, all personnel files had been destroyed and, as recalled by one of the procurement advisors involved at the time, a police force of several thousands existed in name, but with ‘12 working vehicles and no reasonable uniforms’.9 One of the most critical issues was that there was very limited SLP presence outside of Freetown. This meant that apart from the security issue for those living in the countryside, there were also issues in establishing the rule of law and sovereignty of the Government, let alone gathering criminal intelligence and opening lines of communication to the leadership in the capital. The establishment of a working police force in rural areas was therefore regarded as urgently needed. This was important, both in terms of establishing security, but also in terms of establishing the legitimacy of the state as a security provider across the country. In several areas there were also reports of criminal gangs moving into the legal ‘empty space’ where the SLP or the military did not have a real presence. The process of rolling out the SLP picked up from 1999 and accelerated through 2001–2002. Initially this spread to Port Loko, Moyamba, Kenema, Pujehun and Bonthe, areas that were relatively stable at the time, but were unable to roll out to those areas like Kono and Makeni that were less stable. The first push led to DfID support of the SLP through a procurement programme for vehicles and communications equipment to support for civilian policing.10 The CPDTF was transformed into the CCSSP in 2000. Although initially referred to as a ‘Commonwealth Project’, in reality funds for the project were provided entirely by DfID and, after 2001, through additional funding from the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP). The main focus of the CCSSP – as had been the case with the CPDTF – was to support operational activities of the SLP, including capacity-building. As part of this process, Operation Phoenix was implemented to introduce ‘effective visible policing’. As the title of the operation suggests, its focus was on re-establishing the SLP’s: …rightful primacy in the maintenance of public tranquillity and law enforcement […]. There is a need for visible targeted policing to be introduced on a twenty-four hour basis every day of the year. Such policing will be essential to the peace process by increasing public confidence in the rule of law and indirectly encouraging inward investment to the country.11 The general breakdown of state institutions and infrastructure during the war had also had a fundamental impact on the SLP. Almost all

56 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

police buildings, neglected before the war, suffered further damage by the rebel forces. In fact one of the first actions taken by groups of RUF rebels as they entered almost every settlement was to destroy any infrastructure identifies with authority, including District offices, chief palaver huts and any police station. Lines of command had been cut and pockets of SLP officers worked without guidance from headquarters. Whilst the police force had not been implicated in coups in the direct way that the armed forces had, the SLP had in large measure lost the confidence of the population through a combination of perceptions of corruption and impotence in the face of the rebels. Tasks were, as noted by one of the police officers engaged in reform efforts, performed ‘with blatant disregard for Human Rights […]. The Sierra Leone Police was considered a spent force at the time, with little or no logistical support to enhance its capability […].’12 The police had effectively become a self-enclosed organisation, lacking in openness, proactivity and orientation towards community accountability with no plan and no doctrine. This was the state of affairs in the SLP when the then President, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, appointed expatriate and retired UK Police officer Keith Biddle as Inspector-General of Police (IGP) in November 1999. Biddle was appointed to the position for an initial two-year period (which was extended until June 2003). He had come to Sierra Leone as head of the CPDTF and planned to launch the programme in 1997, but was delayed until 1998 due to the AFRC coup. Biddle’s appointment as IGP was a far less contentious choice than, for example, appointing a UK national as the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Biddle’s leadership and direction proved vital in a difficult environment. He played a crucial role developing confidence in the rebuilding of the SLP, since all parties viewed him as not subject to political interference and loyalties. This role as an external catalyst helped develop confidence amongst younger officers and was undoubtedly aided by Biddle’s own strong personality and willingness to be both visible and to make decisions on the ground. Biddle’s leadership meant that difficult decisions were made, including restructuring of the rank structure, which had become extremely top-heavy. As one senior SLP officer noted ‘we needed a neutral person to come in. He cleaned up.’13 Another SLP officer noted that ‘If outsiders had not come, there would have been a lot of political pressure on the IGP at the time’.14 The decision to reduce the number of SLP ranks from 22 to 10 provided much needed space to clarify and redefine the roles and responsibilities of police personnel. The ranks of Sub-Inspector and Corporal

Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict 57

were removed completely; those affected were demoted to Sergeants and Constables, respectively, a move that was extremely sensitive given the SLP’s military-style rank-conscious organisation. One of the key effects of reducing the number of ranks was the shortening of internal lines of communication and flattening of the hierarchy. It also affected the extremely centralised command system in which the Office of the Inspector General controlled virtually all police matters. The situation was summed up by one officer as ‘when the phone rings and the IGP calls, one salutes the phone’.15 Two disciplinary codes existed, reflecting colonial Sierra Leone, one for the lower and senior ranks, respectively. The latter group was exempt from being put on trial before the disciplinary court. Indeed, Brima Acha Kamara recalls: ‘There was the complete lack of communication and there was this tension at work when junior officers saw senior officer – they would run away! The police chief was like a demi-god.’16 Kamara continues: ‘The IGP would take almost all call for every little matter that happened. So the day revolved around him, and that was how he became so powerful – more than ministers.’17 This centralisation within the SLP also narrowed the decisionmaking structure; indeed, Biddle also instituted the development of a strong management team that included, in part, younger officers promoted up the hierarchy. ‘From the outset of the CPDTF we asked DfID to earmark £350,000 for senior management training and development. Well-educated officers with reputations for integrity and hard work were selected for the programme which was centred on a series of special courses delivered at the UK Police Staff College at Bramshill. Some 60 SLP officers went through this training, which produced a mainly young and vibrant senior management cadre. Thus, in order to ensure sustainable, improved SLP management, the traditional seniority system of promotions and appointments was broken.’18 With the formation of what became known as the Executive Management Board, the highest decision-making body in the SLP was put in place and a culture of open debate around decisions and policies was instituted that proved invaluable in creating a sense of community among SLP’s leadership. This further developed confidence amongst the SLP, as expressed by Kadi Fakondo of the SLP: ‘we knew what we wanted, we were advised, mentored, we were very confident at that [senior] level. It could easily have been “yes sir, yes sir, yes sir” if they had come in uniform. The fact that they consulted before taking anything to the Police Council made all the difference. There was this sense that we knew where we wanted to go.’19 This clear management

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structure and more open officer-management communications were crucial in getting SLP officers to buy in to the new service that was being established. One of the key innovations in the immediate aftermath of the conflict was the establishment of Family Support Units (FSUs) within the SLP. They were a direct response to urgently needed public services and were spearheaded by current SLP Assistant Inspector-General Kadi Fakondo, one of the SLP’s key figures in post-conflict Sierra Leone. The FSUs started as a domestic violence unit based in Freetown. As Fakondo states: After the January 6th 1999 invasion of Freetown I was posted as Commander of Kissy Division, which was home to thousands of ex-combatants and their ‘wives’ and other relatives. As their so-called ‘wives’ struggled to regain their freedom (for jungle justice was no longer applicable in the city) there was stiff resistance on the part of the ex-combatants who wanted to retain them. This was what caused the high rise in domestic violence cases, which overwhelmed my personnel, and I decided to create a special unit to handle them.20 By 2000, the CCSSP brought in CID trainers from the UK along with Keith Biddle and the FSU was developed as a specialised unit tasked with handling sexual offences and cruelty towards women and children under CID. There were major sensitisation efforts amongst the population and significant efforts on training and in developing partnerships with other organisations tasked with protecting women and children, including international organisations like the International Rescue Committee (IRU) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), which also provided additional funding. Fundamentally, the core requirement of any police force is that it should be able to identify and deal with threats against the state, including violent disorder and armed criminality, regardless of broader democratic concerns of accountability, responsiveness and being representative of society. This, therefore, leads to a recognition that the police needed to work on sensitive issues, including intelligence gathering and armed response. In Sierra Leone this led to the reorganisation of Special Branch (SB) and the somewhat controversial rearming of the Operational Support Group within the Special Security Division (SSD).21 The decision to make substantial investment in the SSD in the late 1990s was very controversial. Up until the 1992 coup, the SSD had more or less been Siaka Stevens personal security force and there was a strong move within the Sierra Leonean hierarchy to dismantle this force because

Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict 59

of its history. However, when the RUF and elements of the AFRC attacked Freetown in January 1999, the SSD played a significant role in the defence of the city. The display of loyalty led to a shift in perception regarding the SSD and in fact led to a debate surrounding the disbandment of the armed forces, replacing them with an expanded police force with armed capability through the SSD.22 At the same time a series of events was beginning to affect the debate regarding police primacy. In particular, ECOMOG was beginning to withdraw from policing and military activity and Sierra Leone was more or less left without an army, except a small Nigerian residual force. In these circumstances, the ECOMOG commander stated that the SLP needed to start policing immediately given the large number of former combatants turned out on the streets – many of which remained armed. The security situation left by the withdrawal of the military coupled with this influx of former combatants produced an incendiary situation that required a robust police response. Keith Biddle, the senior British policeman stated later: ‘Can any of these people (currently criticising the attention given to the SSD) say that this could have been done without armed police?’.23 Certainly many of the unarmed, uniformed police refused to go on the streets, despite calls from the executive for a police force that was ‘part of the people’. What was required at this point was a robust, armed police force capable of dealing with large groups of armed combatants. As noted in hindsight the issue was that ‘the army was unreliable, therefore from a Government point of view, the SSD was the protection.’24 It was also somewhat limited. Freetown was the initial focus, but it was also acknowledged that the SLP needed to be expanded across the country, partly just to establish security, but also to reinforce the legitimacy of the state. It was not until January 2002 that the SLP finally started to roll out beyond Freetown, establishing a police presence in Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Port Loko, by which time vehicles and communication equipment allowed a centralised and coordinated communication system to be maintained.

The Justice system and the Law Development Programme One of the unintended consequences of the CCSSP programme’s heavy focus on policing was that reforms of other institutions forming part of the justice sector moved forward more slowly. This lag in the development of justice alongside security has been a characteristic of the reform process right from local courts, formal legal systems, prisons and

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Ministerial development. Even by 2008 ‘the police themselves regularly comment that weaker capacity across justice institutions is undermining their own effectiveness’.25 In particular, the SLP regularly complain that they can catch criminals but the judicial system cannot either process them fast enough or obtain a high enough ratio of convictions to arrests. Support to the justice sector can basically be divided into two periods; before and after 2005. After 2005, the development of the JSDP brought together the SLP, the judiciary, the prison service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in a comprehensive programme across the sector. Before 2005, the main involvement of external donors in the justice sector was the LDP. Started in January 2001, parallel to the CCSSP, the first eighteen months were spent on reconstructing infrastructure and developing logistics including refurbishment of the main court in Freetown and magistrates courts in Bo and Kenema. In 2002, it was noted that this process ‘had a major psychological effect – symbolising the restoration of normality and the rule of law’.26 However, the capacity to use these courts had not necessarily been developed and it was relatively late that training of some twenty registrars and administrators, under-sheriffs and bailiffs began. This was all relatively late, and the legacy of a failing justice system that had built up over several years was still being felt in Sierra Leone as late as 2008. In particular, this manifests itself by a huge backlog of cases, including those awaiting trial, imprisonment or even actioning decisions, poor record keeping and insufficient space in prisons. At the same time, the formal court system has been used sparingly in prosecuting corruption cases, testament not only to the intransigence of corruption within the system, but also the level of evidence and skill required to make successful prosecutions. In common with many countries, particularly in Africa, there have also been issues in incorporating traditional systems within the justice system as a whole. The common, but statistically difficult to verify figure was that around ‘80% of the SL population will only find judicial access and redress from the Customary Courts or from the informal (and presently illegal) alternative dispute resolution mechanisms operated by the Paramount and Lesser Chiefs’.27 In some ways this is surprising and in some ways not. The surprising element o this is that the legitimacy of the chiefs has remained despite their role in the failing governance system that led to the war. The unsurprising element is that ‘traditional’ justice systems are not only present in the countryside, but they are also cheaper than hiring formal lawyers and are understandable to most of the popu-

Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict 61

lation. In particular there has only been limited use of traditional systems to affect reconciliation and peacebuilding within local communities, although the extent of this remains under-researched.28 Whilst it remains very easy with hindsight to criticise the lack of progress in this area, it should be recognised that the long-term nature of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone is exacerbated within a sector that had such a long decline. Constructing an entire legal system from scratch cannot be done within a five-year planning horizon. For example, by 2008 there were approximately 200 members of the Sierra Leone Bar Association and virtually all of them reside in Freetown. This leaves access to justice extremely difficult for those who live in the countryside. Given the fact that the RUF may be seen as a rural-based organisation, the lack of justice in the countryside must be seen as extremely risky in a fragile country. This is clearly where non-formal justice mechanisms need to play a role.

The Sierra Leone armed forces before and during the war Before the conflict, Sierra Leone’s armed forces consisted of two infantry battalions with no motorised or mechanised capability and without armour or air support. The armed forces could accurately be described as a ‘ceremonial and conservative Army’ and consisted of approximately 3500 personnel. However, one of the indicators of the parlous state of the army at this time is that there are no reliable statistics available for the rate of decline of the army during the war. What is clear is that the 3500 strength was the nominal on paper strength and it is likely that the actual numbers of troops available were far lower and by the end of the war the army had more or less ceased to exist as an effective fighting force.29 In addition, the military itself had become deeply politicised and its operational capability had declined significantly since independence. The APC Government under President Siaka Stevens appointed the Force Commander – and the IGP – as members of Parliament. A recruitment policy based on a ‘card system’ gave powers to the executive and other politicians and powerful individuals to enlist loyal and faithful people into the police and the military who bore allegiance to individuals rather than to institutions. Army as well as police officers of all tribal backgrounds approached politicians to try and influence the IGP and were – for a fee – given a politician’s ‘calling card’. On the reverse side of these cards there was an instruction that the officer was to be appointed to such and such a position or that he or she was to be recruited into the

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security forces. Merit mattered, but not nearly as much as personal loyalty and conformity.30 Furthermore, prior to the first RUF attacks in the early 1990s, International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionalities prevented Momoh from expanding the army in an ordered manner. Kellie Conteh recalls from this period: ‘He [Momoh] needed more people and IMF is saying: “you can’t recruit.” So that was the situation until the [NPRC] coup itself happened. And when they came in, obviously they wanted to recruit quickly; grabbed every Tom, Dick and Harry in the streets without proper screening – brought them onboard.’31 The haphazard way in which recruitment took place, specifically under NPRC, affected the basic effectiveness of the army and also the motivation of those who were at the higher levels of the structure. What the RUF exposed was the whole sorry edifice and the inability of the army to devise an effective counter-insurgency strategy. The army was ill-equipped, badly led and had no real intelligence capability. As alluded to above, this state of affairs also dominated prior to NPRC taking over. The way information was gathered, collated and the presented as intelligence was genuinely pacifying and created mistrust within and between the security agencies. Indeed, as one actor close to the events in the early 1990s has noted: You know, the NPRC coup perhaps would not have succeeded if our house was in order. In other words, if we had had the right commander and headquarters was doing the right thing by referring issues to the appropriate departments, this would have made the whole difference. For instance, the G Branch [in the military headquarters] is in charge of operations and intelligence assessments – all information should be passed through that branch to be factored into the planning of operations. None of that happened because they had a political hierarchy to serve; structures for reporting intelligence, which usually meant going straight to the President. This is where you need the assessment team which we now have, they didn’t have it, it was just a single source something they picked up – and because they had direct linkages to the President they could just go and say Peter did that, and Peter will be grabbed and taken to prison. The G branch, the operations branch, was starved of vital intelligence reports to run their operations. All plans in the G branch were based on what they received directly from the front, not from any

Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict 63

intelligence unit. So the MIB [Military Intelligence Branch] was simply there supporting, you know, serving the political regime, the President, the Government – not the country. The argument has been put forward that the coup was in fact not planned, but happened as an afterthought to protests by junior officers to their conditions. However, ‘that’s completely rubbish; they planned it’, it has later been argued, ‘they planned it fully and executed it. I don’t know whether it was supposed to be on the day that it happened, but it was planned, and they were successful because of lapses in the security architecture of the day.’ The frustration with Momoh and ineffectiveness of the country’s security institutions was further compounded by a tribal dimension. Momoh was a Limba by a tribe, and he gathered advisers of his own tribe around him. In fact, true to tradition in Sierra Leone, he was, in the late 1980s and early 1990s building up Limba-dominated parallel decision-making structures. As a consequence of the fractures that were occurring, the army was unable to respond effectively to RUF incursions across the border from Liberia. The APC Government had deliberately used appalling conditions of service to undermine the capability of the armed forces in recognition of it being a political threat, something that, paradoxically, increased the likelihood of coups in general and led directly to an NPRC coup amongst others. The NPRC, however, failed to stop the further collapse of the armed forces. Most card bearers deserted the army, the majority of which remained in the Western Area and in Freetown. The rapid haemorrhaging of personnel led to a rapid recruitment campaign that led to a swelling of numbers to around 15,000 minimally trained armed personnel, who, despite their raw training, were then thrown in to battle with the RUF. With frequent political arguments amongst senior officers and no criteria recruitment or promotion for other ranks, the net result was often the recruitment of criminals, no operational control and deteriorating conditions of service. Inevitably, this led to increased lawlessness, looting and attacks on civilians, development of the ‘Sobel’ (‘soldiers by day rebels by night’) and the total collapse in discipline that finally destroyed any remnants of trust between the army and the civilian population.32 The infantry battalions had only platoon level support weapons, there was no artillery, no intelligence capability, no mobile capability and a complete lack of engineering or signals capability and the lack of logistical support effectively meant that they had to prey on the civilian population.

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The lack of a meaningful command structure effectively meant that during the latter days of the war centralised control of the military became very difficult. The MoD itself, as the apex institution had suffered from a history of neglect over a long period of time. From the antAPC Government coup in 1971 through to the NPRC coup in 1992 the Ministry was effectively neglected, and then post-1992 this was compounded by militarisation by an increasingly ineffectual military. This completely undermined any accountability within the armed forces and during the war itself it became increasingly obvious that the institutional structures supporting the collapsing military needed urgent attention. The MoD in particular required complete reconstruction. Following the expulsion of the AFRC/RUF from Freetown in January 1999, the UK’s Brigadier David Richards33 arrived at the head of the Operation Basilica Operational Liaison Team. Brigadier Richards initially came to Sierra Leone to assess what UK assistance was required and to establish relations with key players in the Government of Sierra Leone, including President Kabbah. It is a common, and frequently held, misconception that his main task in 1999 was to prepare for evacuation procedures of UK citizens in the country, unlike in 2000 when he returned to Sierra Leone.34 In this capacity, Brigadier Richards was instrumental in resurrecting the original concept of SILSEP, which he saw as a critical complement to the military reforms that he was supporting. Around £10 million was secured to reboot military reform activities in Sierra Leone, when it was on the brink of collapse in 1999. Mike Dent, one of the advisors who was part of the initial UK team sent to establish SILSEP describes the atmosphere in Freetown at the time as follows: On our arrival we found Freetown in complete disarray and still in a state of virtual war. The functions of state were practically collapsed, with ministries in confusion and officials lacking clear aims and direction. Most businesses and government offices had been looted and vandalized during the January 1999 RUF/AFRC attack and had not been repaired. Much of the city’s infrastructure had been destroyed or badly damaged. We were taken by car to the MoD in Freetown to meet the Deputy Minister of Defence. On the journey from our accommodation we passed through seven checkpoints manned by various groups of armed persons. From their dress it was difficult to ascertain if they were military, civilian or police. The rule of law and order appeared to have broken down completely.35 During this period, as part of Operation Basilica, the UK Government had agreed to provide some military training for new Sierra Leone Army (SLA)

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recruits and trainee officers and in the late spring of 1999, a six-man UK military training team began working with the SLA. The UK also provided some vehicles, weapons and other materiel that were handed over initially to ECOMOG and the SLA respectively, with the proviso that they would be passed on to the SLA when ECOMOG departed. Training was provided for a wide spectrum of personnel and positions, from physical training instructors to platoon commanders’ courses for young officers. The initial deployment of DfID’s SILSEP in June 1999 took place during a ceasefire. It consisted of three people. Two advisers, one military and one civilian, were tasked with designing and implementing the plan to restructure and reorganise the MoD. The third adviser was charged with advising on the restructuring of the office of the NSA. The MoD-based elements designated themselves as the MoD Advisory Team (MODAT). After undertaking fact-finding visits to government ministries, civil society organisations and the SLA, MODAT concluded that root-and-branch reform would be required to ensure the introduction of accountability, transparency and civilian control across the defence sector.36 It argued that the transformation of the MoD could not be undertaken in isolation and recommended to the Government of Sierra Leone and the UK that a complete review of the roles, functions and organisation of the armed forces be conducted. The proposal was accepted by the Government of Sierra Leone; MODAT was subsequently given the responsibility to conduct a mini-Strategic Defence Review. The signing of the Lomé Peace Accord in July 1999 formalised the ceasefire and brought the civil war to an end. There was widespread jubilation in Freetown. At this stage, the core MoD staff consisted of four employees and its office was little more than a ‘post box’. There were two executive officers whose main function was to sign cheques for the CDS, along with around 20 support staff, some of which were employed to support the CDF. CDS Khobe was supported by a small team of senior Nigerian officers and commanded the armed forces. There was no budgeting or financial planning in place and the system largely consisted of the CDS going to the President for money and being directed to the Ministry of Finance (MoF), where he was given cash. The armed forces themselves were in a terrible state, with no personnel records and little or no equipment. The full picture was not initially available to MODAT, as the CDS and support staff were reluctant to discuss any military issues with them. The Minister of Defence was the President, as constitutionally prescribed; the Deputy Minister of Defence,

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Captain (Retired) Sam Hinga Norman, who was also the leader of the CDF and therefore ‘double-hatted’ also occupied offices in the MoD. By October 1999 MODAT had completed the Strategic Defence Review; by December it had finished the project definition stage and initial design. This work produced a set of recommendations, including an outline Defence Policy with Defence Missions and Military Tasks, new defence structures and a detailed organisation for the MoD and armed forces. To implement these new structures, MODAT proposed the establishment of a BMATT to support planning and restructuring of the armed forces and MoD. It was also proposed that BMATT should fill some key staff and command appointments that were required to ensure effective implementation. As MODAT emphasised in October 1999: ‘[I]n our view, deployment of BMATT is key to the sustainable implementation of SILSEP reforms.’37 It was observed that to avoid a dependency culture, the period of BMATT support ‘should not be more than 3 years’.38 Even if this was true at the time, that dependency could only be avoided with a relatively short period of deployment; it is difficult to envisage three years as a realistic length of time given the amount of work to be done to reconstruct the entire army. And, indeed, it was a political suggestion by MODAT, advised by UK MoD and FCO supporters, that to propose anything of a longer duration would cause ‘flutters’ back in London. Nonetheless, it was the integration of hard security, public administration and civil service reform that broke new ground in terms of cooperation between DfID, FCO and the MoD. Funding for a conventional BMATT would come from FCO and MoD and, given that the BMATT was to not only advise and train, but also to implement the SILSEP-designed reforms, it effectively became engaged in institutionbuilding. In other words, the governance components of the reform process at the programme design level were joined up on the ground when the UK funding pools came into being institutionalising ties between the UK Government departments. As part of defence reform activities, a proposal initially suggested that the UK should provide the CDS (double-hatting as Commander BMATT). The idea was eventually discarded, despite its coming from President Kabbah, on the basis of his personal distrust of the armed forces. However, the Commander, a British officer, was to be designated ‘Military Adviser to the Government of Sierra Leone’. This was deemed important in terms of presentation, particularly from a UK perspective, and also operationally important from the point of view of building confidence and developing a sustainable defence establishment in-country.

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These initiatives were explicitly referred to in MODAT’s Future UK military commitment in support of DfID’s security sector reform programme (SILSEP) produced in November 1999.39 BMATT was to be viewed as the ‘logical extension of the SILSEP MoD Project,’ as the detailed implementation phase. DfID’s SILSEP Mission Statement at the time – agreed to by the Programme Steering Group was: To work with the Government, national and local institutions of Sierra Leone to design and implement a sustainable policy, institutional and legal framework for the creation of acceptable National Security and Defence Strategies enshrining the principles of civilian control, accountability and transparency.40 MODAT also produced a Military Reintegration Plan (MRP) to reintegrate ex-combatants from all former warring factions into the new armed forces. Due to manpower constraints and a desire to internationalise the solution, the UK decided to solicit support from other nations for what was to subsequently to become International MATT (IMATT). In January 2000, the UK MoD arranged a conference in London to brief Commonwealth and Overseas Defence Attachés and Advisers on the IMATT project. Attendees were invited to participate in the project by providing personnel to fill command and staff appointments.41 Apart from staffing concerns, the UK also concluded that the involvement of the ex-colonial power on its own was morally contestable, Commonwealth countries, including Canada and Australia, contributed staff, as did the United States. At the core, however, the formalisation of the internationalised MATT was, in the words of one of its commanders, ‘very much a “we are now stable, let’s think longer-term” initiative’. In December 1999 relations between the armed forces and the police took a downturn, as did relations between CCSSP and MODAT. The two sides were vying for the old Paramount Hotel in Freedom to house the new Sierra Leone MoD whilst CCSSP wanted to place the CID headquarters in the same building. Adding to this tension was that, since January 1999, following the destruction of the headquarters of both the CID and the SSD, the two police organisations had been housed at the Paramount due to lack of viable alternatives.42 In the end the MoD won the argument and was allocated the building, which was then just a shell and had to be completely refurbished.43 There is no doubt that significant progress was made within the MoD at this time. In June 1999 Government forces were linked to the executive effectively by a post box. Two years later civilian staff had

68 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

been trained to take up key positions in the Ministry. By 2001 the MoD was regarded as leading the way in public service reform, setting standards and providing a role model for other ministries. In addition, whilst this was happening conflict had again broken out and then intensified during 2000. Immediate decisions were again needed that overtook some of the reforms aimed to achieve national planning, ownership and long-term sustainability. The proposals for the restructuring of the MoD HQ and armed forces were submitted to government and subsequently endorsed by President Kabbah in March 2000. The endorsement immediately preceded a visit from the UK Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, who had been a key player in the establishment of the UK’s Security Sector Reform Policy and SILSEP. However, funding for restructuring became a potential ‘show-stopper’. It was clear from the outset that the expectations of the Sierra Leone government, civil servants and military were far in excess of the funding available for the SILSEP restructuring process. Additional funds were eventually made available by DfID for the refurbishment of the old Paramount Hotel building, but only after personal appeals by MODAT directly to Ms Short. Restructuring was planned to take place over a 2- to 3-year period. First was refurbishment of the new MoD, at the Paramount Hotel. This was to be followed by the establishment of the Joint Support Command (JSC) and the Joint Force Command (JFC), replacing the Defence Headquarters. Concurrently, it was planned that all SLA soldiers, together with CDF and RUF ex-combatants, were to have joined the DDR programme and possibly entered into the MRP. Once the MRP process had been completed, personnel selected for the new RSLAF would have been trained and inducted into the Armed Forces. It was anticipated at the time that this process would be undertaken in a benign environment and that there would be no pressure of time on the selection, training of individuals and implementation of unit establishments. The issue of funding and in particular equipping the new RSLAF was anticipated to be well within the capability of the Government of Sierra Leone to manage.44 Involvement with the armed forces grew quickly from this initial position and was further consolidated with UK military intervention in May 2000. In mid-April, the RUF progressively started taking UN detachments hostage and seizing their vehicles and weapons. In late April of that year, exploiting ECOMOG’s (effectively Nigeria’s) departure and UNAMSIL’s unwillingness to confront the RUF, rebels took 500 hostages at Makeni and started advancing on two axes, one towards Freetown, one towards Lunghi. By early May, the RUF was reportedly in the area to the east of Waterloo, some 40 miles from Freetown.

Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict 69

Operation Palliser The UK military intervention became designated as Operation Palliser. As David Richards recalled at the time: On Thursday 4 May 2000, I was looking forward to flying to an exercise in Ghana the next day, when I learnt that the RUF in Sierra Leone was once more on the offensive. ECOMOG, the Nigeriandominated regional force, had left Sierra Leone a few weeks earlier. UN forces there – UNAMSIL – were under considerable pressure, with hundreds of troops detained by the RUF. The SLA was very weak, having mostly disarmed and begun disbandment under the terms of the Lomé Peace Accord. As the situation deteriorated, I found myself bound for Sierra Leone within 24 hours, on orders to find out what was happening and to prepare to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), should it be necessary. […] What started as a NEO developed into something that had all the characteristics of a small- to medium-scale war-fighting operation. Whilst we came under fire on only a few occasions, over the following six weeks we found ourselves de facto closely involved with the direction of a campaign at the operational level.45 These developments were not directed by London – in fact orders had been to do an evacuation exercise and get out quickly. Indicative for a highly political and tense context such as Sierra Leone at the time, it was individuals on the ground that transformed the rules of engagement and gained support of political leaders back in London, ‘cutting out all the layers in between’.46 Support came from the highest level of Government, including Number 10, the Foreign Office, and DfID. This rather ad hoc twin-track operation (support to the UN on the one hand and assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone and its loyal armed groupings on the other) rapidly supplanted the evacuation exercise and soon became official UK strategy.47 David Richards added later that: On Saturday 6 May, we requested that a Special Forces detachment and the Lead Company of the Spearhead Land Element (SLE) be deployed immediately. Whilst the lead elements were en route the following day, there was a real danger that, in addition to the RUF advance, an incident in Freetown between the factions could have triggered a spiralling level of violence ending in a coup. Accordingly,

70 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

I went to great lengths to meet the faction leaders and attempt to bring them together, with a view to maintaining their support for the SL Government and boosting their confidence in the ability of UNAMSIL to defend Freetown. To support this, we dispatched some UK liaison officers (LOs) to advise the UN troops around Hastings and Waterloo to adopt a more defensive posture. Meanwhile, the Lead Company quickly helped secure those areas that we assessed to be vital ground for any NEO: Lunghi airfield and the Aberdeen Peninsula. Simultaneously, the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) became a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) (Fwd), and I was appointed Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC).48 In the context of genuine fears that the Government of Sierra Leone as well as UNAMSIL would collapse, UK Forces coordinated and sustained the efforts of disparate groupings of loyal Sierra Leoneans. This group of Government Forces included the SLA and what came to be known as the ‘Unholy Alliance’, which began to form after the arrival of UK troops in May 2000 in response to a call to arms by [Johnny Paul] Koroma. Scaled-down and disarmed under the Lomé Accord, the SLA numbered 2000–3000 personnel with a further 3000 being trained at that time by a UK Short Term Training Team (STTT) as part of Operation Basilica. The force was re-organised into three brigades, each including three battalions. The so-called ‘Unholy Alliance’ consisted of a loose coalition of SLA, ex-SLA, AFRC and CDF combatants, but also elements of the West Side Boys, a group of ex-combatants and criminals operating near Freetown.49 Together, these different force units were directed by a Government Joint Force Operations and Support Committees with representation from the factions and chaired by British officers.50 Unholy they may have been but, guided as they were at every level by British officers and Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs), over the next few weeks they succeeded in securing much of the inland road route between Freetown and Lunghi, relieving the military and, of course, political pressure on Freetown and its beleaguered government. This twin-track operation rapidly supplanted the NEO and soon became official Her Majesty’s Government – UK (HMG-UK) strategy.51 By late May, events had taken a turn for the better: the last of the RUF’s detainees was in the process of being released; and Government Forces were not only poised to take Lunsar, they were raiding RUF Lines of Communication in the East and pushing towards Mange. Sankoh was

Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict 71

isolated in custody, and – in his absence – Liberia’s President Taylor was trying to exert increasing political influence over the RUF. Militarily, the RUF was on the back foot, with numerous reports of low morale and desertion and an ever-widening split between the Eastern and Northern Commands. By mid-June 2000, the security situation had been sufficiently stabilised to allow Operation Palliser to be terminated. Following visits by the UK CDS and the Foreign Secretary, the UK agreed to provide additional military support in the form of financial and training assistance to the SLA. The UK agreed to commit a total of £21.27 million to reequip the SLA and deployed a UK infantry battalion to implement a retraining programme that became known as the STTT package.52 The decline in the security situation that led to robust international engagement in security reform was critical in reinforcing the idea that development could not be possible in Sierra Leone without transformation of Sierra Leone’s security system. As one Senior DfID Adviser noted: ‘That’s how it started…DfID’s involvement in security sector reform’.53 Along similar lines, as recalled by Ms Short: Some people say that Britain had a war there and was victorious, this is all false. What happened was: there is some sort of deal amongst European countries about who will do evacuations in crises. And it seems to be that the former colonial power often takes the lead for all Europeans in terms of emergency responsibility. Obviously, in Sierra Leone it would be Britain. So when the British troops went in, it was to evacuate Europeans. That’s how it was triggered.54 IMATT deployment had started in June 2000 as part of the UK’s response to the re-emergence of the RUF and the need to deliver training and staff support to the SLA, which at that stage was in a state of virtual collapse. By early 2001, 65 personnel staffed IMATT, operating in parallel with STTTs and, as planned, filling key appointments in the MoD and command appointments in the armed forces. One of the drawbacks of the rapid deployment of IMATT, effectively an emergency response, was that many of the personnel were shortterm assignees. Some had completed six-month tours, some even less. This led to a lack of continuity and ‘short-termism’, where staff wanted to complete a task and see results rapidly, a circumstance which has characterised perceptions of some of IMATT’s work in Sierra Leone. In addition, at this stage, because not all IMATT posts were filled, there was also a lack of oversight, which resulted in the implementation of

72 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

only partial solutions for some difficult issues. Kellie Conteh, a leading figure in Sierra Leone’s security system transformation process and head of the Sierra Leonean ONS throughout the period states: Sometimes when officers are appointed it’s there first time ever out of the UK, and they do not understand the culture. There are things that go slowly, that’s how they see it, but they need to understand why things are going slowly. The fact that they didn’t understand the ‘why’ led to a lot of things in the MoD that were unacceptable. There was a lot of wasted time and effort in the two first years of SILSEP. UK officers who were supposed to be advisers took up command roles. I don’t know how the transfer of knowledge (from advisers to the advised) could have been done in the first years. Consultants were shooting themselves in the foot, giving different names to structures that previous consultants had already set up. Quite a number of consultants wanted to design the wheel from scratch. The police had Sierra Leonean officers encouraged by the IGP and CCSSP to start changing things themselves. In the army and the MoD they categorized all above Lieutenant Colonel as bad, and below as right. I saw clearly that senior officers were pushed aside; that didn’t go down well.55 By early October 2000 the security situation was deteriorating again. The RUF remained in control of over half the country and were strengthening their grip on key areas, including Makeni and the diamondiferous areas needed to finance their operations. They showed no sign of returning to negotiations, and indeed were expanding their operations into Guinea. President Charles Taylor continued to actively support the RUF and seemed impervious to ill-coordinated attempts by the international community to bring him into line. The UK decided to bolster IMATT once again with the JFHQ from Northwood charged with developing a coherent plan that would ensure the RUF’s defeat while protecting and building on the MODAT’s vision of a long-term solution that would ensure stability for the future. The JFHQ returned to Freetown in mid-October; shortly thereafter the Commander IMATT departed and his function was subsumed by the recently-arrived JTFC. The primary purpose was to bring the RUF back to the negotiating table, having been convinced of the ‘inevitability of their defeat’. Together with UNAMSIL, the mission proved successful and RUF restarted talks in Abuja. A new agreement was signed in November.

Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict 73

UNAMSIL and UK support The emerging role of the UN in Sierra Leone was encouraged and supported by the UK and was based on UN Security Council Resolution 1270, adopted on 22 October 1999, established United UNAMSIL to oversee implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement signed in July 1999, and relieve ECOMOG, deployed since 1997. One of the senior British commanders deployed at the time, Brigadier Barry Le Grys, observed: ‘The troubles experienced by the ECOWAS force were passed onto the UN, whose blue helmet troops came under attack on the official handover day […]. With the UN Mission in severe jeopardy, UK support became vital.’56 As RUF hostilities came to an end in 2000–2001, UNAMSIL was regaining confidence, rebalancing and building strength after earlier, almost catastrophic setbacks. A large part of the country remained out of the Government’s control, which hampered UNAMSIL access and Makeni, Kabala and Koidu were all under the control of RUF. The UN accepted a UK offer of seven military officers to serve with the UN Force HQ in Freetown. Their primary task was to give UNAMSIL planning capability that hitherto had been lacking. Their secondary task was to ensure that coordination with the UK Joint Task Force (JTF) was seamless. The result of this infusion was a far better collaborative effort to roll out security across the country. The ties between UNAMSIL’s provision of wider ‘area’ security and support, the UK-led SLA and the SLP were greatly strengthened. The most significant stride forward for UNAMSIL was the implementation of a plan to put a coherent, one-nation combined arms brigade into the east of the country, centred on Koidu. After a tremendous diplomatic effort involving Freetown, New York, Washington, London and Islamabad, Pakistan provided the required brigade.57 Subsequently, the deployment of UK’s JTF to provide support to UNAMSIL while they were in the process of stabilising took place. In parallel, the UK provided military and operational planning and logistical support to the SLA.58 The psychological effect on the RUF of a UK-sponsored SLA advancing from the west and a robust UN brigade in the heart of their revenue source was hugely positive. Violent confrontation was no longer an option for the RUF.59 Eventually, the presence of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone with its 17,000 peacekeepers helped provide time and space to begin reconstructing the security forces and build up governance structures. The major logistical task and tactical challenge involved deploying what at the time

74 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

was the biggest ever UN peacekeeping mission. This meant that UNAMSIL had no interest in reforming or building the internal security institutions. In sum, ‘the UN was looking inwards; it wasn’t until 2001 that it started to look out, and when it did, it was very much with a focus on the 2002 elections’.60

Parallel developments within the MoD By this time, the process of establishing a functioning MoD, which had begun in late 1999, was well underway. In order to ensure transparency and civilian oversight of the armed forces, a modified basic UK MoD organisational structure, designed by MODAT, was used as a template. New management practices based on UK/Western models, but reflecting local requirements, were introduced. This model was subsequently amended in late 2000 and early 2001 by new members of IMATT from UK who represented ‘the latest Western thinking’.61 Throughout 2001, reviews of the roles and deployment of the armed forces were undertaken. It was decided that there was a need to increase the size of the proposed future RSLAF to deal with additional security tasks and to apply lessons learnt from recent and ongoing operations. These decisions were directly linked to the May 2000 events. With the implementation of the military reintegration plan, the RSLAF was anticipated to expand in size to just under 15,000 military personnel. Whilst there were a number of control mechanisms that could be implemented, such as the discharge of unfit and over-age personnel, there was a need to manage these in a sensitive manner. It was planned that by 2005 RSLAF, through the imposition of retirements and other initiatives, would have reduced to around 10,600 personnel. At the time this was perceived to be the optimum size for the Sierra Leone armed forces.62 The construction of the MoD HQ building and implementation of its military and civilian organisation was led by UK military advisers who were members of the IMATT. IMATT, in turn, had been mobilised quickly as a result of the return to hostilities in May 2000. Some of the officers coming in were not very mindful of cultural issues or the need for sustainability and national ownership. As one British Officer on the ground, serving in Sierra Leone during 2003, stated later: You design an MoD on the basis that you’ve got fifty British officers running it, and then the next week there is going to be four British officers. And you say: what? They haven’t got the capacity for that? And arguably, do they need that? Do they need something as com-

Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict 75

plicated as that? So you have to be careful not to take the blueprint that was written in London, change the date and time and reproduce the model. You’ve actually got to design the model for what they require, and we had an MoD where we made exactly that mistake.63 The complexity of the context in which these operations were taking place was daunting. First, there were pressures of operational expediency, as the war was ongoing. Second, at the time, there was a perceived need to put in place appropriate levels of civilian oversight as quickly as possible. Third, corruption, especially in the procurement area, was a major concern. In addition to these immediate concerns, there were also organisational issues between MODAT and IMATT. The UK civil advisers working in the MoD were not part of IMATT; they were reporting directly to DfID and living in separate, private accommodation. While, at an informal level, some mixed socially, some did not. This personal and professional distance resulted in poor coordination and communication. During restructuring of the MoD and RSLAF and their operational and management processes, there were occasional clashes with other branches of government and within the Sierra Leone public services. Isolating one Ministry and developing it along specific lines with a lead by external advisers meant that MoD reforms, strictly speaking, were not operating within the regulations, rules and constraints of Sierra Leone public service. Whilst Sierra Leonean counterparts would frequently accept that IMATT procedures were more efficient, they also felt that many changes were introduced without proper consultation. This was undoubtedly necessary in the emergency of 2000. However, once the security situation had been stabilised and peacebuilding efforts began to overtake fire-fighting by the end of 2001, this became more of a concern to Sierra Leonean civil servants and military staff in the MoD and to overall sustainability and ownership of the process. At the same time, recruiting and sustaining the presence of UK civilian advisers to the MoD proved to be extremely difficult, effectively leaving armed forces reform under an IMATT lead. The formation of the new MoD was therefore being driven by the military through the placement of IMATT officers in key staff appointments. Coupled with the need for IMATT officers in key operational command positions within the armed forces, this created an ‘informal’ command structure from IMATT officers, through Commander IMATT and directly to the President, as his designated military adviser. There is no question that such a structure helped to speed up decision-making at critical times, but it also had the effect of undermining the overall project purpose

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through bypassing the formal chain of command and the MoD civilian staff. This circumstance was fortified by the fact that there was lack of representation of armed forces issues at the ministerial and cabinet level. Over the entire period of this study, but addressed by the APC Government elected in August 2007, the President was also the Minister of Defence and there was no additional defence representation at cabinet level or in the National Security Council Coordinating Group (NSCCG) by his deputy. Consequently, senior MoD staff lacked direct leadership and representation at the top level. In times of emergency or civil war, the role of the President as Minister of Defence, had major advantages. In peacetime, it was becoming increasingly clear that the lack of separation of these two positions was weakened the democratic process in Sierra Leone broke links between the armed forces and civilian oversight at a strategic level. It was clear, however, that continued fear of a coup at the highest executive level stalled the hand-over of control of the armed forces to a separate minister of defence. From June 2000 to early 2001, the substantial deployment of international military personnel in Sierra Leone led to an imbalance in power between Defence Headquarters and the MoD, with the IMATTsupported Defence Headquarters carrying out tasks that fell under the MoD’s remit. Negotiations in early 2000 over a pay rise for soldiers to bring them to police and civil service salary levels, for example, took place between the MoF and Defence Headquarters, rather than the MoD. Because the appropriate channels were not used, this caused tension with the police and civil service, who felt that the military had ignored appropriate procedures and any general policy of restraint on pay increases. By early 2001, there was a perception amongst some civil servants that this imbalance had recreated conditions of the 1980s and early 1990s, when pay and other financial management issues were subject to private deals between the Force Commander and the MoF or the President. Equally, the Director of Estates was only peripherally involved in the refurbishment of the Paramount Hotel and the Director of Procurement was excluded from purchases of uniforms and equipment. The comparatively entrenched tradition of the military dealing directly with the President and with the MoF over their budgetary and off-budgetary financial needs was taking considerable time to overcome.64 Virtually everywhere across the public service (not just in Sierra Leone) the pay of public servants is a key source of friction. Despite the new

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pay structures devised in 1998, by 2001, Director-level personnel earned Le160,000 (around $80 per month). This was the same salary as an officer cadet after the recent military pay rises. Understandably, this discrepancy between civilian and military staff salaries caused significant tension between the civilian and military MoD staff and remains a concern. Whilst salary increases in isolation from the rest of the civil service were not seen as helpful, there were attempts made to recompense staff within the MoD in different ways, particularly through refurbishment of the State House and improvements in conditions of service.65

The Civil Defence Force As important as the Government forces at the time were the nonregular forces, the CDF. This was a combat group comprising a mix of civilian hunter groups dedicated to protecting their communities from enemy attacks. Its founder and leader, Sam Hinga Norman, was also the Deputy Minister of Defence from 1998–2002, which undoubtedly underlined the importance of the CDF. Although no official numbers existed, the Government estimated their complement at around 50,000 combatants, though they were only lightly armed, had limited logistical support, and did not fit into one organisational framework. Their command structure, based in Freetown, was headed by the CDF Central Coordinating Committee, chaired by the Vice-President and including directors for major functions such as logistics, communications and public relations. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there were considerable concerns expressed about the CDF and their potentially destabilising role. Equally strong was a political recognition of the importance of CDF in supporting the Government and also of their crucial role in fighting the RUF.66 While Sam Hinga Norman was Deputy Minister of Defence at the time, recognition of the CDF’s pivotal role cut across the whole political spectrum of Sierra Leone was acknowledged by the Government. In the Government of Sierra Leone’s National Security Policy – Proposals and Recommendations, there was serious consideration of the establishment of a reserve force that should fall ‘within the holistic approach of the security sector and […] complement the requirements of the fulltime units of both the Armed Forces, the Police and Civil Authority generally.’67 The document was produced about the same time as MODAT’s proposals for restructuring the MoD and the armed forces. The idea was for a Territorial Defence Force (TDF) to constitute a reserve force (not unlike the UK’s Territorial Army). Its mission would be in the spirit of

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the CDF’s role during the conflict constituting a civil militia and contribute to local area security for villages and chiefdoms. Different scenarios were envisioned, including TDF provision of first-level response, and, with their local knowledge, intelligence and support, assistance to the armed forces. In times of crisis, the civil militia was viewed as potentially supporting the regular armed forces in territorial defence. In 1999 and early 2000, an 8,500 person armed force was recommended and the additional TDF option which was seen as relatively cost-free. The issue, however, became politicised with the question of which Ministry – defence or interior – the CDF would be responsible to developing into a major obstacle. As the MRP gathered momentum, with no budget for the existing RSLMF forces and the resumption of hostilities, the idea of the TDF faltered. During the hostilities of 2000, the CDF were integrated under full military command through an interim command structure. When fighting stopped and the DDR process was initiated, the CDF were officially recognised as combatants, technically alongside RUF fighters. Those who chose to do so could apply to join the emerging armed forces through the MRP. Following this, the idea of a TDF was effectively mothballed due to lack of funding and other, more pressing, considerations such as accommodation and equipment for the regular army. No formal decision was ever made, but the reality in late 2001 was that the resources available simply did not allow for a TDF to be formed and the CDF eventually melted away.68

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration In Abuja in early May 2001, an agreement was finally reached to implement the accord of November 2000. At the time of the signing of ‘Abuja 2’, as it became known, the RUF were continuing to be resupplied by Liberia and actively involved in offensive operations in Guinea with the aim of destabilising the government of President Lansana Conte. The Guinean Armed Forces (GAF) undertook an aggressive defence of Guinea’s territory in the areas to the north of Kambia and to the east of Kailahun, using newly acquired Mi-24 helicopter gunships and indirect fire weapons, including artillery. The RUF paid dearly for its actions and, following a GAF offensive into Sierra Leone, the RUF were subsequently forced to retreat back into Kambia where they came under pressure from Government Forces. As already noted, this forced the RUF to review their position and to agree to observe the terms of the ceasefire and start instructing their combatants to disarm through the DDR

Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict 79

Programme. At the same time members of the CDF joined the DDR process. In late 2001, the DDR process throughout Sierra Leone was, if not finalised, then assessed to be making good progress, particularly regarding disarmament and demobilisation. The National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) was supported by a CHAD Operations team that established an effective registration system, oversaw the payment of reinsertion benefits and performed technical aspects of the process. By November 2001, 35,700 ex-combatants had been disarmed; 24,800 of these were discharged and nearly 24,000 paid reinsertion benefits. Reintegration was the weak link of the DDR process, primarily because of lack of private sector income-generating opportunities for excombatants. But reintegration also rankled the civilian population, which had suffered at the hands of these ex-combatants and was now expected to welcome them back into their communities. It also suffered from a lack of suitable implementing partners and, due to institutional issues, the inability of the NCDDR to implement reintegration proposals. A delayed European Community (EC) contribution through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund69 also led to further delays. Potential threats that are still raised as universal weaknesses of DDR processes were identified early on in Sierra Leone by NCDDR, including the potential for tension in the future if the large pool of unoccupied youth and ex-combatants in the country reacts violently to disappointments or the lack of reintegration, including education and employment opportunities. At the same time, political campaigning proved divisive in processes of reconciliation and the absence of substantial and sustained foreign investment to kick-start the economy in Sierra Leone and consolidate the benefits of reintegration programmes into progress and ultimately, sustainable economic development, created a large pool of unemployed former combatants. Whilst these points were all identified in the early 2000s, they continue to be important issues in some parts of the country today, reaching into broader issues of sustainable economic development.

The military reintegration programme The Lomé Peace Accord of July 1999 required a plan for the integration of all ex-combatant groups, including the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (AFRSL), into a single military force for Sierra Leone. The MRP was originally produced by MODAT in April 2000 in response to a formal

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request from the Government of Sierra Leone and the NCDDR to conform to this agreement. However, the MRP sparked controversy. In 2000, a collaboration between the Sierra Leonean NGO Campaign for Good Governance, the SLP, the Ministry of Defence, and the Office of National Security Advisor (ONS was not yet established at the time) provided the opportunity for civil society to engage in discussions on how best to take the MRP forward. An obvious public concern was raised around the implication of reintegrating ex-combatants into the military and the future role of the CDFs who, like the army, were accused of committing human rights abuses during the war.70 The new cease-fire, signed in May 2001, revitalised the DDR programme. Planning for the implementation of the previously endorsed MRP, which had been held in abeyance since April 2000, became a high priority. The MRP was reviewed, amended, endorsed and formally initiated in early June 2001 with the opening of the Temporary Holding Centre (THC) at Kabatha Junction. The formal MRP selection process started at the newly established Personnel Screening Centre (PSC) at Lunghi in mid-June. The first of the successful ex-combatants arrived at the Holding and Basic Training Centre (HBTC), which had been built by SLA Engineers, at Mape on a few days later. The reintegration plan itself was carried out in six phases, listed below: • Stage 1 – Disarmament and demobilisation: a country-wide process, recommenced in Kambia and Port Loko in May 2001 and closed in Pujehun, Kenema and Kailahun in January 2002. At this stage all excombatants were briefed on the military reintegration programme as part of the pre-discharge orientation process. Despite wide publicity, many ex-combatants missed the deadline to disarm in their own region. • Stage 2 – Potential recruit decision: temporary holding camps opened in June 2001 and closed in March 2002. Potential recruits were brought into a military environment. They were placed in syndicates of 30 to undergo drills and formal screening based on their medical and marital status and age. Background checks were also conducted by both SLP and RSLAF intelligence agencies. • Stage 3 – Individual assessment: a personnel selection centre opened at Lunghi in early June 2001; the final Selection Tribunal was held in early March 2002. Potential recruits completed a full medical to existing RSLAF entry standards, plus physical, education and military experience tests. At culmination of the personnel selection centre all potential recruits attended a selection tribunal. This

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was normally chaired by a UNAMSIL Colonel and included RUF and CDF liaison officers employed by NCDDR. IMATT officers provided the secretariat, acted as impartial observers and indeed Chairman on several occasions. Successful applicants were offered entry to RSLAF. • Stage 4 – Holding and basic training group: opened in mid-June 2001 and closed in March 2002. Recruits were put in platoons. Now formally soldiers and paid as such, they were subjected to military discipline and undertook basic military training. • Stage 5 – Integrated bridging training: the first ex-combatant recruits started training in late July 2001; and the last passed training in mid-May 2002. Recruits were now issued with uniform, weapons and equipment for the first time. A subsequent 9-week programme delivered basic infantry training within a platoon framework. • Stage 6 – Posting to first RSLAF unit: trained soldiers joined units as individual reinforcements, posted as manning priorities dictated. Subject to satisfactory performance and recommendation in their first report at the 6-month point, their temporary rank was substantiated. The military reintegration plan aimed to implement an RSLAF recruit selection process from ex-combatant groups. It was to provide a credible alternative to the civilian reintegration plan and in the process establish apolitical professional armed forces. It was assumed that a maximum of 3000 ex-combatants from RUF, CDF and AFRC would enter the RSLAF via the programme. A total of 2091 ex-combatants had graduated from the IMATT-supported Armed Forces Training Centre in May 2002 as the last basic intake. A commissioning parade for platoon commanders in

Table 3.2

Headline Statistics of the Military Reintegration Programme

Number entering the military reintegration programme (processed by temporary holding camps and personal selection centres)

2982

Overall pass rate at personal selection centres (varied from 55% to 90%)

80%

Numbers starting formal military training

2385

Overall RUF/CDF ratio joining RSLAF (varied from 51:49 to 79:22)

65:35

Total passing basic training

2349

Overall pass rate in training

98%

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August brought the programme to a close with a total of 2600 trained. Headline statistics for the MRP are provided in Table 3.2. Due to the long-term developmental implications of reintegration into civilian life, entering the new armed force of Sierra Leone became one of the most viable reintegration opportunities, not least because it proved to be relatively successful. It provided one meaningful form of vocational training for those disarmed and demobilised who wanted to pursue a military career. Furthermore, while numbers were fairly modest, the programme was significant as it lent credence to the notion of the future RSLAF as an army of reconciliation. A number of concerns were raised about the rigorousness of the screening of candidates, including their human rights record, psychological suitability to hold arms and willingness to abide by the concept of civilian management and oversight of the armed forces. Screening processes appeared to focus primarily on physical health and criminal record. It should be noted here that the process was taking place in a framework of generally very few records existing at all, let alone dating from period of the war. Given that down-sizing of the armed forces was such a key issue, there were concerns about entrants to the programme only being offered one-year contracts with little prospect of alternative employment. Because there was no detailed long-term strategy in place setting out the overall objectives for the security system transformation process, including in the MRP, there was no plan for the end goal of a down-sizing exercise either. In the early 2000s, no one was willing to make the politically sensitive decision of a complete overhaul of the armed forces, not least IMATT, which held an executive mandate during this period. While making this decision certainly did not become easier later on, it remains an issue which Sierra Leone needs to address, including out of affordability concerns. It has been said that the number of RUF, AFRC and CDF combatants integrated into RSLAF was small and thus insignificant. Yet, as noted above, the symbolic value of the Military Reintegration Programme was critical. All soldiers were mixed up in their various units and subunits; thus, no elements of the RSLAF that ended up exclusively ‘ex-SLA’, ‘ex-RUF’ or ‘ex-CDF’.

The Office of National Security (ONS) and the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU) The key feature of the cluster of reform measures that eventually became known as SSR, or security system transformation in Sierra Leone was that

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reforms were implemented during a conflict. In the case of ONS and CISU, the challenge also included the building of new institutions. A visitor noted, plainly, after a visit in September 1999: ‘Sierra Leone does not currently have a Security or Intelligence Service. Responsibility for security (counter-espionage, counter-terrorism and counter-subversion), as well as for public order, rests with the SB of the Sierra Leone Police Service.’71 At this point in time, however, the information gathered focused mostly on monitoring opposition political parties, student organisations and trade unions. Nonetheless, the demands from Sierra Leone’s intelligence services and national security coordination organisation were immediate. There was an urgent need for intelligence to be made available, assessments to be made and policy advice to be submitted. The intelligence community, such as it was, was therefore going to have to transform itself whilst also providing intelligence material to inform policy and actions – which it did. Therefore, despite extremely trying circumstances, progress was made during 1999–2000 in establishing a number of key platforms on which later success was built. SILSEP began to contribute towards a functioning National Security Council (NSC), the outline of a National Security Act and the drafting of a National Security Policy. In 2000 a draft Sierra Leone National Security Policy Paper was circulated. The process of producing this document was initiated in 1997 and, at that time, it was seen as a strong statement that the Government is serious about planning for the future in this area. Notably there was limited, if any buy-in from the Defence Headquarters.72 The aim of the National Security Policy Paper – as with the future Security Sector Review – was to establish a basis for a National Security Policy that would provide an overarching framework within which more detailed policy papers relating to the main security agencies, including military, police and intelligence services, could fit. There was also an expectation, which was never realised, that the National Security Policy would lead to a White Paper on National Security, outlining government policy and any legislation necessary to support it. The paper itself defines security and sets the context for national security policy development. It considers key security issues, including geographical, political and economic factors, historical causes of instability, including previous security lapses, and the security forces and agencies available to the Government of Sierra. It then considers internal and external threats to national security, leading to a set of policy recommendations.

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The paper takes a holistic approach to security, covering ‘traditional’ security issues such as the integrity of the state and sovereignty. It also guarantees of democratic rights and freedom of the civilian population from threats to persons and property. In addition, it states a commitment to freedom from war, poverty and social injustice. Security was viewed as integral to wider governance issues; inclusion of other government agencies was seen as key to this comprehensive security strategy. In practice, this was difficult to realise, partly because of the different pace of reform undertaken by different Ministries and because the overarching controlling Committee, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), did not include several Ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as permanent members. In operations, CISU and other intelligence agencies supported the defeat of the RUF and the establishment of security in post-conflict Sierra Leone. CISU, despite its small size, was able to make a substantial contribution to understanding the intentions and capacities of RUF leadership and to have an impact on the will of that leadership to maintain armed conflict. CISU and its partners were also able to contribute to an understanding and tracking of the other hostile and destabilising forces in Sierra Leone as well as in neighbouring countries. This intelligence was shared with Sierra Leone’s allies and considered to be of good value.73 Also of considerable value was the new ability of the reformed security sector to evaluate outside sources of information for the Government, in particular, for the Office of the President. CISU was now able to clearly evaluate external sources as peddling disinformation or rumour, and communicate this clearly to the relevant authorities. In early 2001, there were officially three intelligence collecting agencies: SLP’s SB; the Force Intelligence and Security Unit (FISU) and CISU, formerly known as the National Intelligence Unit. Of these, CISU was the newest creation and existed largely only on paper. (In addition, in 1999–2000, an intelligence branch of the CDF existed). The first meetings of the JIC in 2001 indicated that it would be necessary to carry out radical restructuring of all three collecting agencies in order to achieve a workable level of intelligence production, which in turn would be able to provide the JIC with a minimum of reliable and actionable intelligence. Such a process had already begun in FISU under the guidance of British Army Intelligence Corps advisors, but was not part of a wider strategy for restructuring and integrating Sierra Leone’s intelligence machinery. This meant that a new and substantial task had already emerged, but it was equally clear that there was no point in building

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capacity in the JIC and a Joint Assessment Centre if there was no usable intelligence to action. This immediately caused problems for programme management, since the original timetable and resource allocation had not foreseen the need to develop intelligence collection capacity. Moreover, DfID did not believe that developing such ‘operational’ capacity was part of its charter. In the event, it was agreed that the British intelligence community would support the development of operational capability in parallel with SILSEP by developing analytical ‘non-operational’ capacities. Early thinking on state security had been focused around a centralised system with power concentrated in the Office of the President that covered everything from military intelligence to organised crime.74 The SLP would lose its SB and the military its intelligence unit. However, the President dismissed this idea in favour of the creation of a central coordinating mechanism – later to become the ONS – that responded to the notion that ‘there were elementary things that were missing’ in terms of intelligence coordination.75 As the first, and still serving, National Security Coordinator recalled about this period: …we started from a clean slate, I had a view on coordinating the security sector. Basically, I was recommending a structure at the national level, coordinating the security sector. [Previously, the] military were given political power, there was no leadership from the political class. I was finally, with ONS, given a chance to put coordination in place.76 The ONS, a state security agency, was seen as having the benefit of being a ‘new start’. It would be a government institution which, due to the new selection process and security vetting of recruits, had a good chance of maintaining standards of incorrupt and apolitical behaviour in its staff. Indeed, it was regarded as having the potential to become a flagship model for other government and public sector departments. Certainly, it represented an improvement on previous intelligence organisations and coordination of responses by the security sector. Prior to the rebel attacks on Freetown in January 1999, information on the incursions had been available to the executive, but without an effective system of tasking, coordination, analysis and assessment. It was not ‘intelligence’ and it failed to influence the actions of policymakers. There had been many reports, often rumours, but they were not processed and policy-makers therefore had no means of deciding

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between useful information and gossip, just as had been the case when rebel attacks on Sierra Leone began in the early 1990s. The main concern identified, which remains valid to this date, was whether building up an efficient ONS could tempt the executive (or opposition leaders) to put pressure on the organisation to use confidential information to discredit political opponents. However, ONS has, since its establishment, been able to guard against political interference into its affairs, largely due to the robustness and persuasiveness of the personalities guiding the organisation. Poor intelligence systems had early on in SILSEP led to the formal creation of a JIC that met weekly and included representatives of the existing intelligence agencies and appropriate Ministries; it was chaired by the National Security Coordinator. The breakdown of the security forces during the war was similar to that of the rest of the public service and, like the military, many intelligence operatives had become politicised and, as noted above, carried out by the SLP’s SB. Individual officers were poorly trained and resourced and the quality of gathering, coordinating, collating and managing intelligence suffered as a consequence. In 1999–2000, their focus was primarily on opposition political parties, student organisations and trade unions on behalf of Government. Most intelligence consisted of little more than gossip; there was virtually no meaningful intelligence on key security threats, including criminal activity and the RUF. In addition, several intelligence agencies were frequently involved in parallel intelligence gathering with virtually no coordination of their activities. Because there was no SSR blueprint in 2001, a National Security Architecture and the ONS were established before any formal strategy or supporting legislation was produced. In fact, the legislation was first developed in embryonic form to incorporate the key elements of limitations, transparency, accountability, oversight and responsibilities and then developed further in response to events on the ground. An example of this was the late inclusion of paragraphs relating to the control and licensing of private security companies in drafts of the National Intelligence and Security Act. In particular, the ONS began a programme of engagement with key stakeholders with the aim of identifying answers to critical questions, including definitions or perceptions of the nature of the ‘security sector’, but also consideration of which components should be incorporated into it. From these initial discussions it became clear that there was the need for a central coordinating function of Sierra Leone’s system of security actors. The establishment of the ONS also drove the

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development of a national security policy and a national security doctrine. However, the process of engaging with a wide range of stakeholders itself was relatively ad hoc, at least partly because this was not really about reforming an existing institution, but more about designing a new architecture on a blank sheet of paper.77 Robert Ashington-Pickett, one of the key advisers to the ONS and CISU in the early 2000s, recalls the process of separating intelligence gathering and assessment: The beginning of 2001 saw the clear division between the MoD and ONS/CISU elements of SILSEP and the arrival of intelligence specialists from the UK (the latter event reflecting a greater sense of acceptance within DfID to draw on UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) expertise). The split in SILSEP was echoed in the departure of the former National Security Advisor, Sheka Mansary, and his replacement by Kellie Conteh. Two days after this changeover, the National Security Adviser title was replaced by that of National Security Coordinator. This was significant, as it marked the departure from the traditional personality-based system in which the National Security Advisor had been a personal advisor to the President. Kellie Conteh, on the other hand, as National Security Coordinator, was first and foremost the head of a government agency, not a personal advisor. This move took national security and intelligence out of the realm of intimate, personal chats at ‘the Palace’ and into the process of pro fessionalising an arm of government. Working relations between ONS and the Office of the President have been characterized as such ever since. It is worth noting that the transition from intimate personal adviser to professional government agency is a critical issue for Intelligence and Security Service (ISS) components of SSR, but has elsewhere been avoided as being too politically difficult, with subsequent negative consequences for the SSR process as a whole. The timeline of establishing the ONS was not neat. The organization inherited a group of senior political figures who were part of the former personality-based arrangements of the Office of the National Security Adviser. This caused some initial confusion over the role of the ONS, since these legacy figures were still in the former mode of rumour peddling and, as such, apparently in competition with CISU. However, this was more apparent than real, since CISU was about to be made into a secret intelligence service, whose methods would be on a different scale and level of sophistication.

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By early 2002, ONS and CISU had clearly separate roles. There was no overlap or conflict of roles during my tenure. One of Kellie Conteh’s strengths was that he grasped the significance of clear separation between ONS and CISU immediately and gave it his full support, despite the cultural-political challenges this would bring with it.78 As the ONS progressed, it became clear that there were strong political interests opposing the establishment of security sector coordination. Since such a process is fundamentally about the distribution of power, Sierra Leone’s sector coordination process included many perceived threats to power and actual threats to people who were threatening that power79. There remained a legacy of politicising intelligence and reliance on an intelligence service that existed to carry out internal political security rather than any technical intelligence function. Senior political players at the executive level at the time relied on their own trusted informants, people who, in turn, relied on questionable and unevaluated sources, were unable to collate and assess different sources effectively and often reluctant to give bad news. The political establishment simply pursued traditional highly-personalised security assessment – they felt more comfortable sitting in a room and making decisions in a thoroughly non-transparent and dysfunctional way.80 These entrenched patterns of behaviour had to be overcome to move forward. In particular, it was crucial that the ONS and CISU, and newly recruited staff to these institutions, be able to build trust and support from the highest executive level. As one high-level representative in Sierra Leone noted, ‘the Government had its own perception in the beginning – gradually, it got rid of a politicized approach to the security sector’81 Creating the ever-elusive political space for ONS to perform its task became crucial. The fact that intelligence experts were recruited to support the process of building up CISU and the ONS was an important watershed in the use of DfID resources, even though DfID shied away from operational matters. SILSEP’s security coordination and intelligence components remain the only really significant intelligence capacity-building programme in any DfID programme, and yet it created a politically neutral space for the further development of security and governance institutions. These sensitivities were all the more significant since the ONS (in its strategy coordination role) and CISU (in its operational role) came to play an important role in the final phase of the war by supporting counter-insurgency activities, obtaining reliable intelligence from inside

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the RUF organisation and by assisting in breaking down the RUF from within. There were perceptions from outside the two organisations that ONS and CISU rivalries were emerging, not least due to perceived overlaps between them. However, it never was the function of the ONS to collect secret or covert intelligence. Later, as it became more sophisticated, ONS did gather ‘open source intelligence’ and ‘confidential information’, including information from Provincial Security Committees (PROSECs) and District Security Committees (DISECs) that functioned effectively. However, this was not an example of overlap but a central part of the emerging design of the National Security Architecture. Secret intelligence collection was the function of CISU; open source intelligence gathering fell to the ONS. In turn, CISU also undertook surveillance, psychological operations (psyops) and disruption operations, and did so successfully. An entirely new intelligence agency concept was emerging beyond anything that ONS or, previously, the Office of the National Security Advisor or the National Intelligence Unit, ever attempted or, indeed, aspired to. While CISU had a low profile and purposefully hid behind the ONS, CISU’s operational successes provided ‘proof of concept’ for the Intelligence and Security Service model as a whole.82 Thus, the different forms of intelligence and information gathering were meant to complement each other. Their fusion into the Joint Assessments Group would over time lead to a more balanced and rounded intelligence product. At first, as mentioned above, this process was not well understood by outsiders (or indeed by early ONS staff members). It was made more confusing by the overlap that had existed pre-2001 between the Office of the NSA and the National Intelligence Unit. But by late 2001 the differences were clear to those inside the intelligence agencies. Moreover, they were becoming better understood and appreciated by the President’s Office and wider government. At the same time, the idea of CISU was to create a politically neutral civilian intelligence collection organisation to work alongside the FISU and the SB of the SLP, all reporting to the JIC. This created tensions, not only with ONS, which was seen to have too many tasks, but also between SB and CISU. Some clear definitions of responsibility were required to allow proper and effective coordination of intelligence agencies. The draft National Security and Central Intelligence Bill provided these high-level definitions. By 2002, the ONS had gone very far very quickly, which generated a number of challenges in terms of institutional memory, organisational culture and procedures. Meeting such challenges is part of building

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institutional confidence; it is not possible to cut corners in this process. Substantial achievements, such as establishing political space for ONS, a legislative framework and ONS and CISU operating procedures were all vital in establishing a basis for the organisations to operate effectively.

Decentralising security coordination – Provincial and District Security Committees (PROSECs and DISECs) Within the new national security architecture in-the-making the development of PROSECs and DISECs became critical in developing an architecture that functioned beyond Freetown. Having been a District Security Officer before the war, President Kabbah’s memories of ‘how security operated in his youth’ became critical in achieving buy-in from the highest political level. The President’s familiarity with a system that functioned at local level helped secure his direct support. Thus, PROSECs and DISECs became a means to decentralise the security apparatus. One UK adviser close to the events noted that, in fact Kabbah in particular had a tendency to ‘go back to the colonial era when things were perceived to have worked…I suppose we quite unashamedly capitalized on that’.83 At the same time it was generally noted that: …conflicts start out in rural areas where a person has a grievance that can’t be addressed. It will start by him hoping that the native police and courts will help; if they don’t work, he will go to the magistrate courts. By the time it [the grievance] comes to Freetown, if ever, you’ve almost lost the opportunity to quell problems arising. Sankoh could come and feed on these problems: ‘you’re not getting justice, come and join me.’ It is way before military coups become an issue.84 Clearly one of the lessons learned in the latter stages of the war and in transforming Sierra Leone’s security system was that establishing a workable security structure outside Freetown was critical in order to prevent any new rural-based insurgency or border issue with either Guinea or Liberia. In 2000 security committees were set up with basic functions in Bo and Kenema with the expectation of establishing them in every province and district. The institutional set-up of the PROSECs/DISECs is not drawn from an international blueprint outside Sierra Leone, but from previous colonial models in the country and also experiences in Ghana. ‘We would literally sit around the table, and one thing that we did realize

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was that we could not simply import a model from the UK or anywhere else, and say: here we are, let’s slap this one in and see if it works’.85 In addition, the emphasis on strong links between central and local government institutions provided a critical element to the intelligence structure which had been non-existent up to this point. (Remember, one of the key deficiencies of the security architecture before the war was the lack of structured early warning mechanisms. Given their origin, the PROSECs/DISECs represent one of the more novel approaches of the Sierra Leone experience. They were a pragmatic response to the reality that security and intelligence coordination at provincial and district levels were needed to counter internal threats to security (which predominantly originated from the provinces). A key element of the development of this system was that these district and provincial committees represented a shift away from the idea of ‘security’ as a purely national concern towards security as a fundamental community issue. There was a very early recognition within the security system transformation process in Sierra Leone that security and intelligence coordination at the provincial and local levels, along with local data collection, could be decisive. Clearly the idea of ‘holistic national security’ had taken root. What this meant by 2001, as the conflict was coming to an end, was that if national security was to work in Sierra Leone, it had to have buy-in by the people at the grassroots level. In retrospect, district and provincial involvement in security not only satisfied accountability and transparency standards, but also helped to consolidate democratic national security institutions.86

SILSEP, security and the rivalry of security agencies The original idea of SILSEP had been to build ‘something that could oversee the armed forces. The Office of the President, including the NSC, was not being given reports. The original idea behind SILSEP was improvement in those two areas. Very soon, the programme mutated slightly into reforming the intelligence services as well.’87 The SILSEP delineation between ‘security’ and ‘defence’ at a conceptual level produced practical implications. The understanding of ‘security’ called for a holistic, multi-agency approach to national security that included the NSC, the NSA, relations between the contributing agencies and incorporation of the military, police and intelligence agencies. ‘Defence,’ on the other hand, was limited to the MoD and armed forces, including military and militia groups. This distinction was made in July

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1999, one month after the three-member SILSEP team arrived in Freetown for an initial 12-month period. The definitional exercise between ‘security’, linked to the NSA and ‘defence’ linked to the MoD led to discussions about splitting the SILSEP programme components rather than managing them as seamlessly as possible. (The former approach opposes current good SSR practices.) Ultimately, this differentiation between the defence and intelligence components also papered over a fall-out amongst the international military advisers involved. ‘Rank might not matter in DfID’, an observer noted at the time, ‘but it does in the military’.88 Indeed, it proved of great significance that the first SILSEP team included both serving and retired UK officers. Similarly, it was a reflection of the circumstances that there was very little in the way of a clear reform strategy that substantiated the importance of linking all UK security-related programmes together in anything that could recognisably be called SSR. Eventually this conceptual differentiation led to a paper that constructed two separate scoping statements for the ‘security project’ and the ‘defence project,’ respectively. Within the former, a National Security Policy Paper, the NSA, the National Intelligence Unit, human resource and training requirements and other developmental management requirements were outlined. The latter ‘defence’ paper concentrated on the creation of a National Defence Policy for Sierra Leone. This paper also addressed the establishing a system for higher management of Defence, including training requirements, legislative reform requirements and operational frameworks. In addition, SILSEP also ‘…left out key institutions such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The international community did not want to touch the military. They paid a lot of attention to the police. Ancillary ministries should have been covered as well but weren’t.’89 This comment should be seen in the context of debates at that time about holistic concepts of and approaches to SSR, which were neither clearly understood nor employed internationally in the late 1990s. Nonetheless, the point does speak to the important issue of integrating programming. Furthermore, as noted by a key player involved in the security transformation process in Sierra Leone at the early stages, ‘you can only do what the climate allows you to do. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was not seen as SSR. The development of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was included in the CCSSP with the Permanent Secretary as Project Director. However, due to the political dynamics at the time, work with the MIA wasn’t taken forward, it just didn’t happen.’90 Consequently, from late 2000 until 2002, the political interface between the SLP and the Executive was through the

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Vice President (who is the Chairman of the Police Council), as well as the President directly, rather than being mediated by the MIA. While this may not reflect democratic ideals, it was a methodology that reflected current Constitutional arrangements on police management. At the time, it was hoped, and expected, that this Constitutional anomaly would be dealt with, as it effectively gave the Minister of Internal Affairs no power over the direction of police policy.

Conclusions This chapter has given an overview of the breadth of initiatives taken and programmes implemented in support of security sector institutions from the late 1990s until 2002. The context in which these initiatives took place was open conflict and the all but complete collapse of Sierra Leone’s state institutions and the actions taken should be assessed in that light. It was a period when events frequently overtook the desires of longer-term planning horizons and individuals on the ground had to take quick decisions in the light of, for example, the reanimation of the RUF. What started out as a routine NEO by the UK in 2000 developed into a small-to-medium scale war-fighting operation in support of and in collaboration with the Government. Subsequently, support to training, indeed, support to re-establishing the armed forces was given under the slogan ‘serving the nation’. As Clare Short noted about this period: ‘We are trying to build the state and it doesn’t have any armed forces, so that was the obvious role for the British then, to help train the new Sierra Leonean army.’ At the same time, ‘there was a whole issue of conflict in Africa. We were in that phase after the Cold War where there was a massive growth in conflict within and between countries, causing enormous suffering and preventing development. I mean, you couldn’t be intelligently interested in development in Africa and not be focused on how you bring all these conflicts to an end.’91 Development and security were coming together as a means of making, keeping and consolidating peace – an entirely different context in which to operate that existed before 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq. ‘The possibility of absolutely merging commitments to development with all your other instruments of foreign policy, including the military, which was conceivable in those days, is now sort of lost.’92 The general state of emergency in Sierra Leone at the time left no space for sitting back and developing a strategy; the country was in urgent need of support. Thus, prior to 2002, when the war and accompanying

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disarmament and demobilisation were declared over, collaborative UKGovernment of Sierra Leone programmes were very much shaped as responses to consecutive crises. The lack of any capacity to oversee the armed forces, which had staged two coups since 1992, was addressed by SILSEP. So was the inability to properly coordinate responses to the security situation and to collect coherent intelligence. Police primacy had been the priority of President Kabbah early on; in fact, from 1996 establishing a police force had been given priority. The SLP was given a new ethos, LNP, gender-based violence was responded to through FSUs, and vehicles, communication equipment and uniforms were procured. Finally, the judiciary was supported through the LDP. At the time, predominantly as a result of the context in which operations began, but also partly because of the personalities involved, integration of these various security-related programmes did not take place. However, it was also a time with no coherent concept of the security sector, and thus no real sense of which institutions to be reform. This was emerging, however, particularly during the period from 2002 until 2005. Thus, in many ways, SSR came to shape Sierra Leone just as Sierra Leone came to shape SSR – as a concept, a set of policies and an integrated set of programmatic approaches.

4 The Development of an SSR Concept, 2002–2005

This chapter moves on to look at the specific example of Sierra Leone and the period immediately after 2002 when the peace had finally been signed. In particular it looks in detail at the effect of this on the programmes that were run on the ground and addresses the issue of differences between reforms undertaken during war and just after conflict. It looks specifically at the re-establishment of the police force, the rebuilding of a military, expansion of civilian control and the development of a Security Sector Review to involve civil society in security issues following the advent of peace in 2002 and maps the development of the concept of security sector reform and the linkages between security and development activities that began to form throughout this period. The year 2002 was pivotal for Sierra Leone. Officially the conflict ended in January, but it would be misleading to say that peace had descended over the entire country. There were still significant areas of the countryside where conflict continued and many areas remained beyond the direct control of the government in Freetown. To all intents and purposes Sierra Leone was still engaged in a conflict and the troops of UNAMSIL, supported by the British military viewed themselves as existing in a conflict situation. Despite the uncertain situation in the countryside, Sierra Leone managed to hold presidential and parliamentary elections, which the SLPP won comfortably. The margin of around 70% of the vote gave President Kabbah an electoral triumph and also a powerful political mandate to enact much of the planning that had been taking place in exile in Conakry. In short, Kabbah was seen as the man who had brought peace to the country and had managed to persuade the international authorities, particularly the UK and the UN, to intervene in 95

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the conflict. Indeed, the election itself took place within the context of a deployment of the biggest UN peacekeeping force in history (some 17,000 international troops). However, within this overall context, the day to day policing of the elections was carried out by the revamped SLP. The set of agencies and programmes that had started before or during the war were something of a hotchpotch of different activities with some part completed and some ongoing. The uncertainty around the end of the war, the limitation of control in some areas and the difficult security situation in the countryside produced a set of challenges beyond the emergency planning that had already taken place in 2002. The rivalry between some agencies and ministries, the balance between command and advising faced by the UK military, the lack of development of many security agencies, including a non-functioning military and a partially developed SLP, were all exacerbated by continuing uncertainty and also the arrival of large numbers of armed former combatants. By early 2004, findings of the Security Sector Review being produced at the time noted that the economy – as opposed to more traditional security threats – was a key threat to achieving the future vision for the country.1 This is still true today. As the outgoing Commander IMATT noted in late 2003: Within Sierra Leone, although the current situation is calm, the failure of the Government to stimulate the economy and address the resultant levels of unemployment and under-employment are of great concern […] Without this, and despite security sector reforms, neither long-term stability for the country nor the foreign investment necessary for economic recovery can be assured.2 Even at this early stage, therefore, it was becoming obvious that the key issue that would affect long-term security was the lack of economic development. In particular, the lack of economic alternatives available to former combatants and to large numbers of disaffected youth posed a significant security threat even if the security agencies could be developed into effective organisations. In addition, the only available agency capable of developing economic planning on that scale was the state, hence direct budgetary support and a programme of rehabilitation of the economic infrastructure supported by the international community was integral to the development of security in the long term.

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The Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Sierra Leone In 2002, the UK Government made an unusual, far-reaching decision, spearheaded by then UK Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short. The UK agreed to a ten-year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Government of Sierra Leone binding both parties to a series of commitments until 2012. It is important to point out here that this is extremely unusual within UK development policy, even if it is periodically used by some Scandinavian aid agencies to provide long-term frameworks and to signal a long-term commitment to the development of Sierra Leone. The agreement itself was a consequence of the alignment of UK national and development interests. It was also part of a broader geopolitical UK commitment to demonstrate that a joined-up defence, diplomatic and development effort could deliver stability. This was also backed up by the creation of a UK government funding system constructed around the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the African Conflict Prevention Pool that brought finance and expertise from across DfID, the FCO and MoD. In other words, paraphrasing Aristotle, the pools could demonstrate that UK Government intervention could amount to more than the sum of its parts.3 One CCSSP adviser involved with the pools at the time remarked that it was: something that helped us enormously, at least you knew that you had the support. In ’98–’99 real, serious risks were taken. Also some very serious personal decisions – this is the reality. If somebody is going to commit to a change process, my horizon is 15–20 years.4 The MoU was constructed around a series of key principles along with the long-term perspective. In particular, the core of the MoU, which is rarely pointed out, is the issue of national ownership. The UK Government presented all of the proposed UK Government activities within the country to the Sierra Leonean Government in writing in advance, together with details of the UK sectoral and financial commitments required to deliver them. At the same time, in signing the document, the Government of Sierra Leone demonstrated buy-in at the very highest political level to a stra-tegy that included objectives on reshaping the military, the police and other security agencies, along with implementing a national anticorruption strategy. It amounted, in many ways, to a form of benevolent

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donor conditionality, with the Government of Sierra Leone being provided with a series of political and financial guarantees deemed necessary to lay the foundations for a comprehensive post-conflict development programme. The MoU also provided a mechanism for conditionality in the form of performance-related budget support, another usual aspect of a development programme in a country with as high fiduciary risk as Sierra Leone. Despite the potential carrot-and-stick of the risk of up to £5 million per year being either provided or withheld based on Government performance, this mechanism of conditionality was ultimately not used as effectively as it could have been. Departments responsible for delivering against the benchmarks contained within the MoU often were not aware of their deliverables. In addition, at least with respect to the MoD that was only coming into being, the MoU was signed without its involvement. With the added weakness of not having a Minister of Defence involved in the daily business of the ministry, the political guidance on how to implement the aspects of the MoU relevant to RSLAF, such as producing a long-term plan for down-sizing, simply was not there. Since decisions made regarding the allocation of the performance tranche were in-year, they were never incorporated into the document. Moreover, deliverables were often not clear. Eventually, this form of strategic engagement gave way to crisis management, and the urgent overcame the important.5 Despite this, it is difficult to overestimate the impact of the MoU in providing a long-term commitment to Sierra Leone that went way beyond the usual programming horizons of three to five years. Despite its shortcomings, those involved with the construction of programming on the ground always had this overarching framework to draw on and for the local partners in particular, they were able to take confidence in the fact that the UK was going to be around for some time. This was particularly important in providing impetus to the development of other programming and development objectives in the 2002–2005 period. The PRSP and Security Sector Review were being prepared in this period, and Justice sector programming, which had largely focused on enhancing police capacity under the CCSSP, was broadened into a more holistic approach to encompass the courts and prison services under JSDP, which was being planned during these years. Thus, a recognisable SSR approach began to be developed and linkages that had been formed in the prior period began to be operationalised. Serious issues of the geographical reach of security forces and their lack of capacity began to be addressed.

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Establishing the SLP outside Freetown and the western area Prior to 2002, police reform and consequent security had largely been defined to Freetown and to the development of a strategic framework, largely because it was very difficult to move outside the capital. One of the core themes at this stage was the emphasis on building capacity amongst the senior levels of the SLP, including training at the UK police college at Bramshill. The emphasis on Freetown at the time was also precipitated by the security situation, particularly the high number of internally displaced people occupying any large building that was available, including areas such as the derelict factory area and railway shed area in the East end of Freetown. The context changed around 2002 following the end of the war. It became possible to deploy the SLP beyond Freetown and to operationalise some of the strategic concepts that had been developed by the senior management. One key actor pointed out: The context changed dramatically right about 2002. From then on we were able to access Makeni, Kabala, Koidu, Kailahun, etc. We were able to go into these places and start re-establishing policing. The context changed from maintaining law and order in Freetown to having to do it throughout the country. That in itself presented a whole lot of new challenges in terms of communications, mobility and so forth. Because it was the police that got in first, there was very little in terms of infrastructure – they had completely ruined all our premises. In Kambia there was nothing, Makeni, everything was wrecked. In Kono they dug [for diamonds] under the police stations. We needed money to rebuild the infrastructure, which we didn’t have much of because, at the time, we expected other donors to come in to support. Alan Doss came into his own as the DSRSG (Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General). He started to mobilize UNDP (United Nations Development Programme); we went through a period of building makeshift barracks. That was the immediate pressure, establishing some kind of effective policing. We had to take well-armed and professionally-trained OSD personnel with us to enable us to keep these places under control.6 Deployment across the country, however, would not have been possible without a massive investment in a vehicle fleet and nationwide communication systems, investments that the Government could not have afforded. By 2004, ‘…the SLP has improved its responsiveness and

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its visibility. A major factor in achieving this situation has been the communications, vehicles and infrastructure support provided through the Community Safety and Security Project (CSSP)’.7 However, despite this success, concerns about the long-term sustainability of these massive investments began to be raised ‘…the SLP now have a large vehicle fleet – around 700 vehicles – … but in time these vehicles will need replacing’. However, ‘no government replacement plan or a budget to achieve this’ was in place, raising clear issues around sustainability.8 The push for a police presence outside Freetown not only came from the Government, but from UNAMSIL as well. With limited or no infrastructure in or around Kono, for example, it became a massive logistical undertaking to get both human resources and equipment shipped to the area: ‘The Pakistani army (UNAMSIL peacekeepers) wanted us in Kono. We had to get vehicles in there. Large MI–26 transport helicopters took vehicles and equipment there with 200 police officers. Links were established into HQ and radio communications for local operations.’9 Despite these efforts, the consolidation of police presence outside the Western Area faced the ongoing threat of hostile groups, warring factions, RUF combatants, CDF fighters and criminal gangs. Consequently, some internal competition about who should deal with these threats emerged. The situation dictated ‘policing by consensus’, as negotiation and management of these groups were necessary until reintegration as part of the DDR process gathered momentum. At this point, the SLP simply did not have the power to establish a monopoly on delivering security to the population.10 The CDF, for instance, according to Briam Acha Kamara, acted ‘as if they were a government by themselves. If a policeman was sent, and they [CDF] did not like him, there was nothing he could do.’ By early 2003, it became clear that SLP force levels were still inadequate. It had also become clear that given the role of the SLP under the pre-war regime, and more importantly, the complete breakdown of state institutions during the extended period of conflict, basic training, as opposed to retraining, was required. The SLP needed to increase in size from 6000 to 9500 personnel. To achieve this, it would be necessary to train 1000 new recruits per year until 2005. The obvious need to develop a police training strategy and training itself eventually involved infrastructure investment in the Police Training School, the OSD Training Centre and establishing three regional training centres. By the end of 2004, 900 new recruits per year were undergoing training. Training itself was provided by Sierra Leoneans and by joint initiatives involving the SLP, CCSSP and United Nations Civil Police Force (UNCIVPOL).11

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The rebuilding of the SLP was based on Comprehensive SLP training and the philosophy of ‘Back to Basics’ (B2B). Some of the skills originally outlined in B2B give a good impression of the SLP training needed: completing entries in notebooks; interviewing skills and identifying key points; recording statements from complainants, witnesses and suspects; compliance with rules of evidence; and obtaining accurate descriptions of persons and properties. The B2B concept was later noted as not very popular among the police force, which regarded it as imposed from outside. This may say more about the notion of what is basic than it does about the actual need to reintroduce these skills to the SLP. In June 2003, Keith Biddle, IGP since 1999, was replaced by the first Sierra Leonean post-war IGP, Brima Acha Kamara. Not surprisingly, with the ‘handover of leadership came public fears that the police would resort to what it was (before the conflict)’,12 and that British support would disappear. Indeed, access to funding did change significantly in the sense that a Sierra Leonean IGP could not make the same demands as those of an expatriate IGP. At the same time there was a sense that Sierra Leonean police officers would fare well, because they knew Sierra Leone better:13 It became easier because we started to own the thing – everybody became involved in a very active way. The umbrella (of international leadership) was gone, and the message that had very much been conveyed to us was that in any situation there must be one leader, but that we could only make it as a team. There was that awareness among us and we should be seen to sustain what had been done. We started to review some of the policies, whether they suited us, and the Executive Management Board became much livelier. Before, we said that whatever Keith decided was the right thing – without much discussion. Confidence started to come; we became bolder and dismantled a lot of the check points that existed across the country. Our own situation in the SLP had been unique. Keith was British, but the whole team was Sierra Leonean. In our various roles we were able to assist him; he worked through us. If you take Keith out, all the key players were still in place.14 The SLP rebuilding process discussed here has been described as similar to ‘an aircraft that is about to be airborne. It takes a lot of speed, the structures were put in place and strong leadership was a necessity.’15 Before Kamara took over there was some leadership fatigue and a

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degree of uncertainty and power struggles about the succession that involved allegations of tribalism and political affiliation. These struggles influenced relations between the SLP and the political leadership. However, the sense that the political leadership had listened to Keith Biddle because he was an expatriate and that such privileges would not necessarily be granted to a Sierra Leonean IGP proved unfounded. A President was in place who ensured operational independence for the SLP and consequently limited political interference into the organiszation’s affairs. Brima Acha Kamara recalls: ‘We had the backing of the President – in this country if you don’t have the backing of the President it becomes very difficult.’16

Handing over the SLP IGP succession plan had been in the making since early 2001. The President and the Police Council, together with the Minister of Internal Affairs, approved the final plan: the IGP is appointed by the President on the advice of the Police Council, with approval of Parliament. Police officers were placed in three categories: • Those with the potential to fill the highest positions of IGP, Deputy Inspector-General (DIG) and Assistant Inspector-General (AIG). • Those with the potential to advance into the first category. • Those in junior ranks with the potential to succeed to the higher levels. In the Police Council, full discussions took place on the strengths and weaknesses of potential candidates for various high-level positions. Identified potential candidates were subsequently observed by Police Council members and the President. Those having potential for IG ranks were frequently tasked by the serving IGP to present to the Police Council, for instance. The leading group was also tasked to brief the President and accompany him on official functions throughout the country. Another means of preparing the transition was the provision of professional training opportunities, awarded to those individuals with the potential to succeed. For example, the current IGP, the DIG and three of the AIGs have all attended the UK Senior Command Course, designed to train future UK chief constables. The mix of potential candidates was across the ethnic spectrum, but was also limited in terms of gender equality, as there were only two officers of sufficient seniority available for consideration.17

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Immediately following the 2002 General Election, the serving IGP indicated to the President and Vice president, Chairman of the Police Council, that his contract would have to end no later than November 2003. Procedures to decide on the succession were also drawn up by the Chairman and the Secretary of the Police Council. Keith Biddle recalls: In the event the selection procedure was professionally conducted with some nine candidates being thoroughly scrutinized and analyzed. Neither political consideration nor tribal preferences were brought into the selection equation. For my appointment, I had gone through the same process that culminated with an extremely thorough panel interview before a Parliamentary Select Committee, and I have to say that it was the most rigorous interview to which I was ever subjected. My successor’s interview was equally thorough and more stressful, as it was televised and broadcasted on the radio – live! The selection process was as professional and as politically independent as those for selecting chief constables in the UK. There were some who tried to take the SLP backwards through lobbying politicians and encouraging press stories by paying journalists to write ‘paid up’ stories, but I can say that they were not in the highest echelon. In any case, the parties to the process decided to ignore such activities.18 One of the most contentious issues of the immediate post-war period was the retention of the armed support unit know as the Special Security Division within the SLP. This Division changed its name to the OSD in March 2002 with the intention of signifying a new start for the unit, but also to escape the rather shady reputation of the unit from earlier political regimes. The OSD were regarded as critical for the front line of policing by the external advisers, particularly given the aim of police primacy and the then state of the military. By 2004 the OSD consisted of several different groups trained in firearms, policing public order, close protection, convoy protection and escorts and also mobile armed response. Its role had become regarded as critically important and the OSD was actually expended during 2004 from its 2900 establishment in order to man some 600 protection posts. During the UNAMSIL withdrawal from the Eastern Region in September 2004, it was the OSD that took over responsibility for security. However, despite the need for such a unit within the police service, particularly in filling the security gap left by the UN, there were concerns raised amongst some SLP officers and amongst the external advisers of

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the CCSSP and its successor, the JSDP that the heavy focus on the OSD as an operational unit was damaging general duties policing by diverting resources. At the same time, the presence of the OSD in those areas previously occupied by the UN troops led to an improvement in community relations and a reconstruction of confidence in the Sierra Leonean state with regard to security. Indeed, in 2003 the OSD was cited by the outgoing Inspector General of Police as being ‘…the critical success factor in developing improved relations with the community’.19 It was also clear that the investment of resources in the OSD was risky. In particular the creation of a well-trained and armed police unit required careful monitoring and management, as well as effective civil control and it was not clear that these existed within the country at this time. In particular there was a risk that the OSD could become an alternative elite force acting in competition with the military and, more particularly the SLP. This could lead to internal conflict and political rivalry thus further destabilising the state. In addition, the OSD was part of the SLP and the creation of a separate ethos may lead to the neglect of its primary purpose of acting in support of the local needs policing ethos. In 2003 it was noted by an external team that: ‘To ensure that the new human rights-based training and operational procedures, including safeguards such as rules of engagement, are institutionalised, support from the CCSSP needs to continue.’20 In other words, the safeguard in terms of maintaining the loyalty of the OSD was the external involvement of the UK advisers rather than the developing Sierra Leonean civil control mechanisms.

Rivalry, the RSLAF and the SLP By 2004 the perceived difference in treatment between external and internal security providers was creating tensions between the RSLAF and the SLP. This circumstance was directly linked to the stated aim of creating police primacy within Sierra Leone and the related infrastructural and logistical benefits – vehicles, uniforms, equipment – accruing as a result. However, the rivalry went beyond the ability to procure uniforms and equipment. The principle of police primacy was a cultural change within the RSLAF as much as the SLP and, although it is often mentioned, it is rarely discussed. In short, the principle of police primacy requires the police to be able to take the lead in dealing with domestic disturbances, i.e. within the country, whilst the army would take the lead in dealing with external threats, i.e. invasion from another country. Whilst this is a relatively simple idea, it incorporates a number of complex ideas.

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Firstly, there is a question in many African countries, not only Sierra Leone, of what precisely is external and what is internal? In particular, given that much of the war against the RUF took place primarily across international borders and yet was not a war between states, this type of intrastate conflict provides a grey area of responsibility. Of course, both the SLP and RSLAF are responsible for countering insurgencies, and yet the false dichotomy of internal police primacy used as a blunt instrument does little to help. At the same time, there are clearly areas where the SLP need to take the lead. In particular, the security of clearly domestic situations such as elections is very clearly within the remit of the SLP rather than the military. The point here is that although some areas are clear, much security management of this type is not so black and white in nature. The other side of this coin in the fear of military intervention in domestic political affairs. Given the history of the military in Sierra Leone and, indeed, elsewhere on the continent, setting a clear mandate for the military that was outside interference in domestic military affairs was very important. In Sierra Leone the prospect of Johnny Koroma and the AFRC making some kind of return remains a worry and whilst many people in Freetown believe him to be dead, there are still whispering campaigns about sightings of him in the countryside. This may be nonsense, and indeed it probably is, but the fact that these rumours can spread so quickly and can gain such credibility amongst people in the capital must say something about the day-to-day fears of Sierra Leoneans. Thirdly, once a framework is established between internal and external security, it leads to direct competition between the two services for resources, support and perceived power. We will examine this debate somewhat below, but in short this represents rivalry over the conditions, equipment and pay of police and military, with any differences taken as being illustrative of who is regarded as being more or less important. It also leads to a dangerous political competition if politicians become involved in creating political power bases in one or the other. On one side this leads to the building up of capabilities on one side, but on the other it may lead to dangerous underinvestment in one or other of the services. Given that poor conditions of service have been influential in several rebellions amongst both police and military, this is a politically dangerous strategy. Rivalry can also be reflected in the attitude and political stances of army and police commanders. Politicisation at these levels is dangerous and represents a huge risk in post-conflict environments where the

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linked development of civil and civilian controls is weak or undeveloped. In this type of situation there are few checks and balances around well-organised militaries or police and they can have a direct effect on the political settlement through organisation and force of arms – the very situation the initial intervention was prompted by. In Sierra Leone by 2004, the perceived difference in treatment between external and internal security providers was creating tensions between the RSLAF and the SLP. The insistence of police primacy on behalf of the SLP in providing internal security was misinterpreted (on both sides) as meaning exclusivity or supremacy. Thus the need for a responsible lead (the real meaning of ‘primacy’ in this instance) became confused with the SLP somehow being ‘more important’ than the RSLAF. This was not helped by the confusion of what constituted external or internal as discussed above. Despite this, the reform of the SLP continued from 2003 and the new SLP leadership embarked on a restructuring programme. However, the strategic guidance that had been provided by the UK programme through the CCSSP became disjointed and the failure to quickly appoint a successor to the project manager in 2003 led to a slowing of impetus in supporting the reform process. The delay in appointing one person highlights the relationship that existed between the SLP and the individuals running CCSSP and also the importance of the strategic support provided by external advisers in this context. This slowing in impetus was further exacerbated by the view of some SLP officers that the ranks of many of the external advisers now coming in to the country was insufficiently high. In a hierarchical organisation rank matters and the fact that both the CCSSP and then the SILSEP advisers were getting younger and lower in rank had a negative impact on the perception of SLP officers who were expected to take their advice. The management hiatus led to an increasing fragmentation of activities carried out by a variety of individual consultants. By this time, the IGP himself was not involved in discussions about terms of reference and it became clear that there were diminishing returns in the numbers of consultants arriving in the country. Whilst some of the CCSSP staff had been in post for some time, many were young and inexperienced and the IGP was not informed of what they were doing. As he himself stated: ‘At one point I insisted to see copies of the reports that they were doing and that they should be given to me. They would say that ‘when the advisers come, they would do this and this’ and I started to object and say that ‘we don’t really want this and this.’21

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The weakening of direction and the weakening of the link between the external advisers and the Sierra Leone Government and SLP was keenly felt by the incoming advisers in the new JSDP programme, designed to follow on from the earlier interventions: Under Keith [Biddle] and Adrian [Horn] there had been more of a balanced approach. Operations had been supported, but so had ISD (Internal Security Division), FSUs, etc. By the time I arrived, there was no balance and there were arguments. Clearly there was an absence of a controlled hand and I didn’t find any strategic direction. You could argue they were at the end of CCSSP, so there wouldn’t be, but I then immediately asked the senior governance adviser, about the closure report for the CCSSP. The answer I got was that ‘we don’t talk about closure’. The first decision I made in agreement with the IGP, he gave me a list of people who he felt were helping, were useful, and in the main kept them on. I also made it clear to the consultant that I’d ring them. The migration from CCSSP to JSDP was going to be a break. Some people did get continuation.22 Many people inside the CCSSP programme would simply assume that CCSSP would roll into JSDP, a message instinctively taken onboard by the SLP. There was limited engagement with the idea that the new programme was going to cover far more ground than the narrow focus of the CCSSP on policing per se. The aim of JSDP was to address questions relating to the justice sector as a whole, a very different remit. At the same time, by the end of 2004, full-time management of CCSSP had give way to temporary management by DfID staff with a wide-ranging portfolio of diverse programmes. In reality, DfID came to oversee the closure of CCSSP as occurring over an extended period of time due to delays in the start-up of JSDP implementation. Strategic and day-to-day management were consequently not happening and CCSSP consultants filled the gap themselves. In the management vacuum, differences began to appear between the old and new guards, i.e., those who had been present from the beginning and relatively recent arrivals, also between operations and general policing. The CCSSP ended in June 2005, some four months after the commencement of JSDP in March. It had run its course.

Local needs Policing and the Family Support Units (FSUs) Whilst all of these political and strategic machinations were ongoing, the SLP itself continued to reform itself and to introduce innovative

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forms of policing. Following a successful pilot programme in 2001 the concept of LNP was introduced to the Freetown Divisions and then across the Western Region from February 2002. Whilst this concept is loosely based on the UK principles of community needs policing, it has significant local differences and the establishment of Local Policing Partnership Boards (LPPBs) and FSUs were two particularly important aspects of this Sierra Leonean innovation that deserve further attention and were certainly generally regarded as extremely successful. Both of these institutions represent important attempts to construct trust between the SLP and the general population and to develop accountability mechanisms for the police. Crucially, both the FSUs and parternship boards were promoted by key drivers in the SLP. Indeed, Brima Acha Kamara, the first post-war IGP, considered ‘community partnership’ to be at the very core of rebuilding the SLP: When you look at policing functions, it is a partnership. Investigation is a partnership also. We changed the police from always being reactive to being proactive. That was the new concept, trying to prevent crimes before they take place. So therefore we said, in order for the people to assist us, we must have local policing partnership boards. In 2002–2003, LPPBs were established in each police division. As recalled by the current (2008) IGP: I went to Northern Ireland twice when I did my MSc at Exeter University. When I went there, they were also going through the same change process (as Sierra Leone). I picked up the idea of policing boards there, as a form of accountability to the public. The LPPBs were set up as a way of ensuring stakeholder participation in the process, that the needs and expectations of normal people are heard. We were going to change the way we did criminal investigations. How could we involve the locals in policing, a shared vision, shared values, shared resources? When we do that, they own the process.23 The LPPBs were an almost entirely Sierra Leonean driven activity, reflecting a desire to transform the SLP into a ‘force for good’. It was – and still is – also a pragmatic response to the need to engage the population in their own security provision, particularly in those areas that are not easily accessible to the SLP. Communities even come to play an important role in recruitment and promotion, ‘because’, Brima Acha

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Kamara has noted, ‘we don’t have criminal records. We go to the community, because this is where services are being delivered. The community people, how do they see their performance? So this was how they became part of the promotion board, and we also make them part of the recruitment process.’ The main obstacle to the development of the LPPBs was a financial constraint. LPPBs do not have their own budgets but rely on the commitment of police officers and community representatives to attend meetings and contribute to discussions about their own security. In many rural areas, including Kenema and Kailahun, the huge spaces and poor roads make it very hard to exercise SLP control and for the LPPBs to meet. The consequence of this is a continued reliance on local security mechanisms through the chiefs or other local security or justice providers. In these areas, continued understaffing within the SLP and a lack of vehicles and communications equipment severely hampers the investigation of crimes and effectively many people cannot access formal police and justice mechanisms and an element of ‘policing by consensus’ remains in the absence of a formal presence.24 Thus whilst the LPPBs have been successful where they are able to operate, they are by no means universal and their success is limited to those areas where they can afford to meet and, indeed, get to a central meeting point. This is clearly within the urban areas rather than the rural districts, which is an issue that the JSDP is seeking to address. The FSUs have been mentioned above, but in this period the number of units expanded and began to operate in many areas of the country. The existence of a specialist unit dealing with domestic and sexual abuse within Sierra Leone is in itself a huge leap forward, but their influence in developing strong relations between the SLP, the community, NGOs and civil society was extremely strong. In fact the success of the FSUs was regarded as being so positive that it was reflected amongst the NGO community more broadly and several NGOs actively sought association with the newly established SLP institution. In November 2002 an observer noted that ‘…when one considers that, two years ago, there was open hostility and distrust of the police by almost all NGOs, particularly those working in the area of sexual abuse, the success of the FSUs becomes even more apparent’.25

The Ministry of Defence and the military The organisation of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had its roots in the 10th iteration of the Order of Battle (ORBAT) of the RSLAF produced in

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February 2000.26 Since this period, the security situation had changed and, consequently, a new structure of the armed forces had been established, along with a design for a new MoD. In January 2002, President Kabbah opened the new MoD building in the former Paramount Hotel on Tower Hill in Freetown. It was inaugurated as a ‘joint Civilian/ Military organisation’ led by a Director General (DG) and a CDS. The armed forces were officially renamed the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), announced by the President at the opening ceremony, in recognition of a new beginning for a new force.27 On the same day, restructuring of the Defence Headquarters was begun, essentially splitting it into two new organisations: the Joint Force Command (JFC) and the Joint Support Command (JSC). Both were subordinated to the MoD and both were under the command of IMATT to steer initial development and help build capacity.28 The design of this twin-force structure was aimed at reducing the chances of a coup by introducing a division of command responsibility based on the premise that it would be much more difficult for a single force commander to be able to exert control over operational troops and support elements, particularly in terms of access to combat supplies and ammunition. By mid-2002 the UK re-equipment and training programmes continued. By May, the last MRP training course was completed at the Armed Forces Training Centre (AFTC) Benguema. Following this, UK military presence in the country was reduced in preparation for the transition to the new IMATT structure, which became effective in late July 2002. The final tranche of the UK-funded RSLAF Re-equipment Programme, ordered in April/May 2002 was due for delivery by August 2002 and this ended the most visible and tangible part of the UK’s programme of direct military support to the RSLAF.

The Defence White Paper and Staffing of the MoD The new structure of the armed forces was clarified in the 2003 Defence White Paper, which included definitions of roles within RSLAF, between the MoD and JFC and also between civilian and military personnel. A key element of the Paper was a complete overhaul of the staff grading system, which raised a number of issues that are still of concern today. In particular, there were significant issues surrounding their relative pay, conditions and standing of civilian officials in relation to their military counterparts within the MoD. Emmanuel Osho Coker and Alfred Nelson-Williams were key figures in this regard-

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ing from both the civilian and military perspectives, and they describe the process as follows: One of the key elements in reorganising a functioning MoD along UK lines (at least initially) was the definition of a workable grading system for officers. For example, the DG (Director-General) is Grade 13, while deputies are Grade 9. The DG is Grade 13, the CDS (Chief of Defence Staff) is Grade 14. However, while the Deputy DG is on Grade 9, the Assistant CDS is still on Grade 13. Senior Assistant Secretaries are Grade 8, while their military counterparts are Grade 10. We have to look at the grading system itself in the MoD, creating balance to get the system running.29 The grading system was a reflection of the urgency with which the MoD had been established and had broader implications for how the filling of civilian posts was handled. ‘The arrangements for MoD were merely ad hoc; in 1999–2000, I was responsible for HR (Human Resources) when the SILSEP advisors came and said I should identify some bright young men. However, at the time, there was no directorate in place. They wanted to transform Paramount Hotel, and here I was talking about job descriptions. What would happen when people were moved away (especially considering that the civil service is controlled centrally, rather than within line ministries)? It was an ad hoc arrangement, and as the army was being trained, civil servants in the MoD suffered. We did an assessment of structures in the MoD in October–November 2003, because of this’.30 The general issue of establishing a whole new ministerial structure within the MoD also caused some tension with military counterparts: …some of the civilians were not properly trained or qualified for their appointments. They were given positions as Deputy Secretaries, the equivalent of Brigadiers (10 years service); Senior Assistant Secretaries were the equivalent of Colonels (7 years service). The Director General was assessed as a Major General. There was no juxtaposition between the Director General and the Chief of Defence Staff, with the Deputy Minister caught in the middle. Inevitably, this created tension at MoD.31 In terms of remuneration, differences were also significant, with some military staff being paid over 400% more than their civilian colleagues

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occupying posts at the same level. Indeed, in 2003, it was noted that ‘in our view, it is difficult to envisage a fully-integrated structure of civilian and military staff working successfully together if the present anomalies (regarding disparity in conditions of service) remain in place’.32 At its inception, there was no anticipation that the MoD would be involved in any operational planning or administration. The project plan assumed its establishment in a benign environment, since the Lomé Peace Agreement had been signed and the RUF/AFRC and elected SLPP were ‘sharing’ government. However, as it turned out, the actual implementation of the MoD was undertaken in a situation of conflict. It was accepted that external actors, particularly IMATT and SILSEP advisers, followed a rapid implementation timetable, which was driven by operational imperatives. Little room was left for effective consultation, review and validation of new structures and processes. In 2003, the then Deputy Minister of Defence, J. C. Blell, and other international advisers concluded that that the MoD ‘was far too complex for Sierra Leoneans to grasp, both for the military and civilians’.33 This had been acknowledged already from mid-2002 and took into account the ‘significant achievements already delivered in a relatively short space of time’.34 Based on the Defence White Paper, a Command Structure Review Committee was established to review the structure of the MoD/RSLAF as established by MODAT and IMATT, respectively.35 The review process was initiated in late 2003 and led by Sierra Leoneans. It aimed to lay out an organisation that they could work with, understand and run, and to move away from the pattern of advisers coming in and doing the actual work. Other results of the January 2004 Command Structure Review were the disbandment of the JSC and restructuring to two headquarters, namely a new MoD and a new JFC headquarters. The review process did not fundamentally alter MoD structures, but it did help to simplify the organisation. The UK blueprint that had been its point of departure, however, had not been fully implemented and it was also weak in terms of understanding the historical and cultural context in Sierra Leone, which had as much to do with taking Sierra Leoneans onboard and ensuring national ownership as anything else. The overall objective of the Review was to adapt the structure as designed by the UK Government by taking on board local needs and the culture of Sierra Leone – in other words, to recognise the need for local participation and ownership.

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During this period, there was a more joined-up approach amongst the different UK programme components, not because of direction from the UK, but because of the cohesion of people on the ground.36 It became obvious that a strategy was needed that could help fill MoD posts with Sierra Leonean civilians and RSLAF personnel and move IMATT and SILSEP advisors into purely advisory and mentoring posts. The development of the Defence White Paper partly reflected this joined up approach along with the desire to increase Sierra Leonean involvement in MoD planning. The process of developing the 2003 Defence White Paper is an excellent example of Sierra Leonean owned policy-making and a MoD that was no longer a ‘clearing house’ for the military and civilian staff, but was establishing itself as an overarching governance mechanism for the military.37 One of the core aims of the White Paper process to engage the population in a discussion about the nature of their armed forces. The process of developing the paper itself was based on participatory meetings conducted through a wide range of consultations with actors both inside and outside the defence sector. Although the NGO sector was not extensively involved in the paper itself, the Sierra Leonean NGO, Campaign for Good Governance, supported by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), held meetings in the towns of Kono and Kabala. From these meetings it became clear that troops stationed in these towns were enduring extremely poor living conditions. At the same time, the local population also voiced their opinion on the poor state of RSLAF logistical and transport support and communications within the RSLAF operational area. This was adversely affecting the civilian population’s views regarding their own security since these issues had undermined the previous army’s ability to conduct a war against the RUF in these areas. The population were therefore concerned that a continuation of these poor conditions would badly affect their own security. Within the Government, the White Paper process also engaged all of those Ministries and agencies that had been involved with the military, including Parliamentary Committees on defence and finance and these consultations allowed for an in-depth analysis of the reform process that was able to incorporate realistic future strategies as well as communicating the mission, tasks and conditions of the military and the mechanisms through which civil and political control was going to be exercised. It was in this spirit, and particularly in terms of making the military accountable to democratic processes, that President Kabbah launched the Defence White Paper in the presence of all of the

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Paramount Chiefs and other traditional leaders in the country. Their importance in designing the size and shape of the armed forces was explicitly emphasised.

Ownership of the Defence White Paper In keeping with the concept of national ownership of the reform process, MoD advisers, particularly the Civilian Adviser, sought to enhance the capacity of Sierra Leonean civil servants through mentoring. In particular, the Director of Defence Policy was focused on policy design and analysis, whilst the Deputy Minister and other senior staff at the MoD were encouraged to cooperate, support and participate in the process of collating information for the White Paper. Meanwhile, the UK provided opportunities for overseas study trips to research the production of comparative country case studies in South Africa and the UK. The most fundamental role of advisers in the writing of the White Paper was that of editing the final version for publication. This role allowed an incisive review of the issues raised as against the pre-, post-, and future roles and management of the RSLAF before the document was launched by the President. From the outset, the Director of Policy was determined to ensure that work on the White Paper was fully managed by Sierra Leoneans, whilst recognising the vital input of UK advisors. However, the Director of Policy was faced with the challenge of making the UK advisors understand the Sierra Leone context in terms of the content, and more importantly, in terms of the process of development and delivery of the White Paper. For example, one London-based advisor observed at the time, ‘…the Paper appeared to us to contain the kind of detail and direction that we would expect to see in a completed White Paper, written after a Defence Review and full country-wide consultation’.38 What they did not understand at the time was that the people had not been involved or informed about reforms of Sierra Leone’s military structures. Hence, any attempt to undertake a Defence Review would mean, in the first instance, informing them of developments undertaken so far. Equally, in Sierra Leone, whilst the MoD’s civilian advisor supported the idea of continuing work on the White Paper, the Commander of IMATT wanted a Defence Review to precede it, a situation that created a rift between the two personalities. These differences notwithstanding, the civilian adviser supported the development of the White Paper, as

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it was what the Sierra Leoneans wanted. This support strengthened the determination of the Director of Policy.39 Following publication of the Defence White Paper, the MoD produced an implementation plan in 2004, known as ‘Plan 2010’, which was developed by the Commander IMATT. It states a common theme expressed by actors affected by the security system transformation process during this period: ‘Hitherto, driven by the security situation, IMATT (SL) has been largely reactive. Greater stability has allowed the development of the IMATT (SL) staff effort. Failure to act will have negative implications for the development of the RSLAF and IMATT (SL)’s credibility.’40 Indeed, external threats to stability were deemed to be low, whilst existing challenges were regarded as being largely internal. The Plan’s aim was to deliver a smaller, better RSLAF with capable Maritime and Air Wings and hand over training responsibility to RSLAF ‘in all but the most specialist areas’, rather than rely on STTTs. In 2004, structured training had begun at platoon and company level in some units, ‘despite the constraints of resource shortages and the distraction of Op PEBU [Operation Pebu]’.41 Similarly, substantial training, including at the senior level, was provided to RSLAF officers at the IMATT-sponsored Horton Academy. With Plan 2010, a more structured approach to RSLAF and how it was to become self-sustaining emerged, along with a clearer picture of IMATT’s role and eventual drawdown. Simultaneously, the Plan secured a funding profile out to 2010 from the UK ACPP for IMATT. The plan was an important step in the direction of a more joined-up approach by IMATT. In the words of the Commander who took over the year after it had been produced: ‘It shaped a lot of what I did. I tried to give IMATT plans some shape. Before there was a plan, but it hadn’t been written down, and was basically tied to immediate goals.’42 Indeed, in London, all subsequent deviations from the direction set out in Plan 2010 would have to be qualified. It was the first time that a comprehensive strategy was written down. Previously, the direction of IMATT had been much more personality-driven.43 The Plan was not so much owned by the Sierra Leone MoD as consented to. It resulted in raised expectations among RSLAF officers. What the UK saw as an objective in the Plan, the RSLAF saw as something to be provided by the UK. Critically, financial assumptions regarding contributions by the Government of Sierra Leone were flawed. If the Plan was to be followed to the letter, it was ultimately undeliverable. Realisation of this resulted in the Sierra Leone MoD instigating a Core Review at the end of 2005. This was effectively a Defence Review by

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another name, but in the lead up to the 2007 elections a formal Defence Review was not achievable.44 Development of the capacity and skill levels of Sierra Leonean MoD staff was always one of the key objectives of both SILSEP and IMATT. Training, however, was often supply- rather than demand-driven and delivered in a piecemeal manner. In addition, because there was no overall training strategy (although one was being formulated), competition for training resources occurred amongst the various SILSEP components. Essentially, this boiled down to a lack of openness and transparency over decisions and resource management. More importantly, the ability to send local staff to UK courses was seen as a powerful form of patronage and caused tension between civilian staff, managed by Civil Service Regulations and under Sierra Leone Civil Service pay rates, and military staff, which weren’t. One key issue was how to invest in improving conditions of service for RSLAF, something that had been identifies as a security risk since it had been raised by several of the consulting groups in the countryside. An RSLAF that was undersupplied and living in poor conditions represented a threat to the local population as well as a poor protection from potential threats. This concern led directly to the high profile reorganisation of the logistical and accommodation needs of the RSLAF, including the need to concentrate RSLAF locations from over 50 HQ/company/platoon sites to nine battalion barracks and three brigade HQs.45 Operation Pebu46 led to the development of battalion sites with technical infrastructure (offices and stores) and family quarters. The brigade HQs would have similar technical infrastructure, including wells and deep trench latrines. The battalion sites were to be self-build projects, while the brigade HQs were to be built by contractors. The operation was initiated in support of this process and was envisioned to be completed by May/June 2004. Apart from the immediate need for accommodation, the intent of the project was to facilitate better control, direction and sustainability of RSLAF units and improve the morale and welfare of soldiers and dependants. The initial costing of Operation Pebu was in excess of US$200 million. Since it was expected that most of the required funding would come from the international community and given the magnitude of the amount required, there was no attempt from within the Government to build these costs into expenditure plans. DfID was approached through IMATT for assistance in January/February 2003 and the amount agreed upon was £3 million, with DfID contributing £1.9 million and the Government of Sierra Leone contributing £1.1 million. Although some of

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the funding was used to pay contractors building the Brigade HQs, most of it was to be spent on material and rudimentary tools, since construction on the Greenfield sites was to be carried out by RSLAF personnel. DfID funds were spent both locally and through an international procurement contract. Funding provided by the Government was all spent locally on the procurement of materials. Between 2003 and 2004, rapid inflation in Sierra Leone had a major impact on available funding. Although Operation Pebu was jointly funded, the project was owned by the Government of Sierra Leone. The Project Director was the Joint Support Commander; the Project Manager was a RSLAF Lieutenant Colonel. IMATT engineers embedded within the RSLAF Engineer Regiment supervised and advised the construction process, but DfID’s limited presence in Freetown at the time meant that they provided no dedicated engineering support. DfID’s main link to Operation Pebu was through DfID-funded civil and financial advisers in the Sierra Leone MoD. An Operation Pebu Steering Committee was formed under the leadership of JSC and met for the first time in early May 2003. From this, an integrated project team emerged which would deal with the practical aspects of the project, taking its direction from the Steering Committee and an ‘Operation Pebu Cell’ created within the Joint Force HQ. However, there was no senior or significant involvement from the MoD in Operation Pebu committees, which resulted in a lack of commitment and control throughout the project, but most notably in the early stages. Whilst the refurbishment of Teko and the construction of the Brigade HQs were carried out by local construction companies, the bulk of the building work was to be performed by soldiers as labourers which, ideologically, appeared to have benefits. The flaw in this plan to self-build, however, was that the Commanding Officer of the Engineer Regiment, responsible for the development of the project, had no responsibility for the manpower, which remained with the Commanding Officers of the individual battalions. Responsibility for the productivity was thus vested in an individual who had no defined role in the project; consequently, it was not possible to know in advance how many labourers would be available at any given time. This was further complicated by a lowering of soldiers’ morale when they realised that through a DfID-funded programme, the SLP was having accommodation built commercially to a much higher standard, thus adding to the rivalry between the RSLAF and the SLP. The fact that the seven greenfield sites had to be cleared first, that the country had limited infrastructure and that there was severe lack of mechanical transport all conspired against the project. It was also naïve

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to think that RSLAF soldiers would be enthusiastic about spending their time on labouring duty. The change in accommodation envisioned with antecedent changes in costs and the change of building technology to Hydraform machines made it close to impossible to keep to time plans. While an assessment suggested that no more than 12% of the married quarters would be completed by the 2004 rainy season, the original Operation Pebu plan envisaged 100% completion by that time. A recalculation suggested that the project would end up taking at least another six years. In May 2004 Commander IMATT and the senior UK Civil Adviser to the MoD approached DfID for additional funding. This time the request was put forward with several options to accelerate project progress. With an estimated cost of some £3.8 million, the request was rejected by DfID, which was becoming concerned with the lack of progress. Pebu was to become something of a running sore throughout much of this period and we will pick this story up again below.

Sustainability of reforms A key question for the security system transformation process and for the security of Sierra Leone as a whole is whether the Government of Sierra Leone would have sufficient resources available to sustain a newly-established and equipped RSLAF into the future. The proposed defence review was to provide a formal vehicle for debate within the country about what people required from their armed forces and would include discussions about affordability. However, for political reasons, including the prospect of significantly reducing the armed forces, the process of undertaking a defence review did not happen. While a window of opportunity existed for the Government of Sierra Leone to do so, political will was not there given the highly political nature of security system transformation and SSR in general. Moreover, the eventuality of a coup was by all measures unlikely, particularly by RSLAF whilst a UK one-star general was shadowing.47 As part of the process of downsizing, at the end of September 2002, the Defence Council approved the new RSLAF establishment of around 10,500 military posts against the 2003 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) submission had a baseline of 14,367, but also assumed a completely stable state. ‘From the start it was deliberately incremental…’ one high-level officer who served with the UN and IMATT has noted: …as there were significant concerns that putting ex-combatants on the streets was too dangerous. Political will to go there, knowing

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elections were coming, did not exist. Did we miss the trick? No, we didn’t, because we wanted to do it from within, not from outside. We could have gone the Liberia way [and disbanded the army], but we didn’t. Sustainability was not the priority question of the day.48 Challenges remained with respect to securing adequate funding for the MoD and had a serious impact on the implementation of some of the issues contained in the Defence White Paper. Momentum of the Defence White Paper was also, to a certain extent, overtaken by the process of producing the more comprehensive security sector review. In 2004, the MoD placed a bid for Le58.8 billion (approximately US$20.1 million) to run its business, but the MoF announced an allocation of Le42.7 billion (approximately US$14.6 million), thus leaving MoD with a shortfall of Le16.1 billion (approximately US$5.5 million). At the same time, the MoD found itself unable to access the funds it had been allocated, leaving the MoD with a significant set of challenges in running its day-to-day business providing equipment and paying staff, but also in dealing with the growing issue of payments related to soldiers killed or wounded in action.

The issue of Killed-in-Action (KIA) and Wounded-in-Action (WIA) Due to the nature of injuries sustained by individuals during the war, it would be difficult and in some cases, impossible for a number of WIAs to find further employment once discharged from the RSLAF. Therefore, during the restructuring process, it was agreed individuals classified as WIA would be assessed to ascertain the level of disability in order to attract an enhanced benefit payment over and above the normal benefits they were entitled to under their Terms of Service. A technical committee was formed to devise a formula for fair and equitable payments to qualified WIAs. The proposal was forwarded to the Chief of Defence Staff that a WIA’s salary should continue to be his monthly pension. Conscious of the fact that KIAs paid the supreme price, a KIA committee was formed to ensure that only KIA families and relations would receive benefits. A verification exercise was conducted to curb possible fraudsters and ensure that only eligible beneficiaries would be paid. Other restructuring activities included payments of KIA, WIA and natural death beneficiaries. In 2004, 3029 beneficiaries were paid for personnel killed-in-action. In WIA phase one, 290 personnel were paid terminal and disability benefits in 2005. In phase two, 345 personnel

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were certified as medically disabled, but are still awaiting payment. Given the Government’s poor financial situation, IMATT and DfID have been instrumental in handling KIA and WIA payments. In addition, DfID ensured payments for all officers retrenched under the rightsizing programme. The rationale for this DfID support is obvious. Having disaffected former personnel on the streets could have precipitated a serious security situation at a time when UNAMSIL was withdrawing and the SLP and the RSLAF remained fragile.

ONS, CISU and the security architecture When the conflict in Sierra Leone was declared officially over, the process of consolidating the ONS structure came to the forefront, as did all the challenges that the task entailed. Obstacles started to emerge, including withholding of staff funding, difficulties recruiting new entrants and delays in passing of primary legislation. Concerns also emerged about the level of politicisation of these institutions, including the fact that some of the staff members were political appointees. As the National Security and Central Intelligence Act was being formulated, political activities of ONS NSC NSCCG Strategic Situation Group

JCC

JIC W/Area COORD CTEE WACC

JAT

PROV SY CTEES

Incident Command Centres (ICCs)

ICC East

ICC West

ICC North

ICC South

Intelligence Agencies

PROSEC West

CISU

PROSEC/DISEC East

FISU

PROSEC/DISEC North

SB

PROSEC/DISEC South

F/Liaison

Forward Control Points (FCPs)

OPERATIONS

Figure 4.1

INFORMATION

The National Security Architecture49

INTELLIGENCE

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staff fundamentally undermined the neutrality of the national security architecture. This architecture is laid out in Figure 4.1. In addition, ONS and CISU personnel in particular did not have direct professional experience with national security coordination and intelligence production, which prompted a number of training courses. Given these challenges and the concomitant need to build the capability of the intelligence architecture, it was particularly impressive that so much progress was made in this period. Much of the credit for what was accomplished is due to the individuals that staffed the organisations. By 2003, an ONS organisation had begun to take shape, including structured management, which prompted reconsideration of the future of SILSEP. As noted by the National Security Coordinator serving at the time: I was in London in 2002–2003 and was asked a question about how long we would need advisers in the ONS. I said that we would need them for an extensive period of time – far beyond 2007. They were thinking about withdrawing in 2002. Our adviser had been fighting wars in the sense that much of their job was to protect the institution (from political interference) and allow it to grow. Election time (in 2007) showed security was still an issue and the entire system could have been thrown down.50 The critical role of the adviser in opening political space within which the ONS could develop at its own speed is likely the single most important role that an external actor can play (which was also reflected in the role of the expatriate IGP). Indeed, in late 2002, elements within the Government continued to try to undermine the newly-established ONS by attempting to establish a parallel security apparatus. Sierra Leone’s National Security Coordinator further explains: I will talk to one important, but elusive point of the SSR process in Sierra Leone: creating the political space. As I saw it, if that space is not created, it is not going to work. I was the National Security Adviser for two days and the on the third day I became Coordinator. People came in with their own views, five people who picked up stories here and there. I wasn’t going to work with all of them, since some of them were clearly political and I had a problem with that. If interventions are going to be made by external actors, then there has to be a structure in place – advisers, and so forth – to provide the space so actors within the country can perform. We didn’t know

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how to do it, but Kabbah knew what he wanted to happen. The structures that are being put in place should be answerable to the President alone, but through committees, not through ministries. It should be apolitical. Maybe we need more than one adviser. There are wars around to keep the process going. Intelligence has to be brought to a central point first (not the President). I was a victim myself when I was in the military, where officers would go straight to the President. Some were killed, some were put in prison. I was therefore very, very fuzzy about a central body, an assessment team, which Ghana did not have. We picked up the idea from the UK, which has a central body in the Cabinet Office. However, Kabbah clearly stated that he did not want it in Cabinet. Gradually, people who could do sound assessments emerged. In 2003 it started to make sense.51 External actors would often emphasise the benefits of creating a wholly new organisation from a blank sheet of paper. While the ONS and its functions were a novelty in Sierra Leone’s security architecture, the function of the NSA had existed. However, the critical shift from ‘personal adviser’ to ‘government agency’ was decisive, and a whole range of functions were introduced, including coordination, intelligence assessment and tasking. Similarly, there had been no idea of how CISU should be structured or of how to recruit and train staff. The functions of the ONS were thus a distinct break with the previous strategic direction of the security sector; the focus became the education of security sector actors, including discussion of a clear idea of the roles and responsibilities of the ONS. The 2002 National Security and Central Intelligence Act had the potential to help in this regard. The Act was seen as a way of fully establishing the provincial and district security committees, PROSECs and DISECs, which at the time existed predominantly in name only. Equally, there was a need to clarify their reporting relationship with the national level. On paper, the Act is today seen as an exemplary piece of legislation for intelligence collection and handling and also for reporting to political leadership and Parliament.52 With the work of advisers and the passing of the National Security Central Intelligence Act, a national requirement-setting system was gradually created. The core aims of the Act were designed to lead to a decrease of political pressure on security services, or at least its dissipation, through a series of intermediary structures. It was also designed to delineate the relationship between ONS and CISU and to boost the confidence of staff in terms of the permanence of these organisations. The proposed Act was available and gazetted in late 2000, but continued to go through various review processes, including input from

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London-based experts until it was put before Parliament in October 2001. The length of time that it took for the law to be promulgated was not immediately explicable; however, because the Act would clarify the roles of the ONS and CISU, it was seen as having significant political implications. The ONS had not only requested that the issue be treated with greater urgency, but also declared themselves available at any time to support the Act’s introduction.53 The issue was critical at the time, as the delay in promulgation halted further development of the ONS, and from the perspective of the UK Government, progression of the SILSEP project specifically. Delays in recruitment and restrictions on operations were seen as a direct result of the absence of enabling legislation and without the passing of the National Security and Intelligence Act, a number of secondary pieces of legislation, such as Counter-terrorism and Money Laundering, were delayed. While its promulgation was important, not least in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the ONS and CISU, this did not have a direct impact on the critical issue of capacity in either CISU or ONS, both of which remained short of both human and financial resources. In the early stages of SILSEP (before 2002), a lot of emphasis had been placed on putting appropriate vetting procedures in place; work was carried out with the Public Service Commission to create a National Vetting Agency. The aim at the time was to require that ONS and CISU appointments be made on recommendation from the National Security Coordinator and the Director-General of CISU after a transparent recruitment process overseen by the Public Service Commission. Despite some successes in recruiting, in keeping with the dire financial situation of most of Sierra Leone’s government institutions, the issue of unreliable funding was surfacing as a destabilising and stifling concern. While the staffing budget for the fiscal year may have been agreed to with the MoF, in 2002, the MoF would inform the ONS that there was no funding available for any further recruitment for at least the remainder of the first quarter (until April 2002). Such announcements would be made at the last minute and had a debilitating effect on other activities such as planned training of new intakes. Nonetheless, the ONS managed to continue the establishment of PROSECs/DISECs across the country. The National Security Coordinator outlined the process for engaging the civilian population and paramount chiefs in the district and provincial committee system as follows: Civilians needed to start participating in their own security. We had a lot of problems with bringing in the paramount chiefs. We also

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met resistance to ONS coming in from the military and the police. Colleagues who had served as District Officers before had certain ideas about what intelligence was, and this (PROSECs/DISECs) was not exactly it. They were designed as a forum to discuss security in the local communities. It was not very easy; the police, for instance, had had their structures before (and thus a point of departure for building strength). Over time, by 2002, when the war was over, we had recruited our second batch, divided between CISU and ONS. At the end of 2002, we had quite a few people in ONS, but we couldn’t afford to have them up-country. In each of the DISECs we had the paramount chiefs. As long as the paramount chief agreed to share information with his colleagues, this worked well. From the onset, the chiefs were keen to be involved, but it took quite a lot of time for them to become comfortable sitting with soldiers. Here civil society was important, to convince them (paramount chiefs) that they (the military) are not devils. The more you join in, the better. They started to discuss a wide range of issues, sometimes outside their mandate. In the beginning, it was about getting people to discuss.54

The National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Council Coordinating Group (NSCCG) After the 2002 elections, the political will to convene the National Security Council slowly started to diminish, above all because immediate concerns about conflict were gone. Since it was established in 1998, the NSC had met regularly as a forum for focused debates and decisionmaking concerning security issues. In addition, the NSC, as prescribed, exercised some oversight of the security sector. Up until 2002, the NSC had been meeting regularly, once a week at an appointed time. However, as the war came to an end and elections loomed, the President’s priorities changed – his focus was on his re-election campaign. Since then, the NSC was not regarded as useful and was convened less regularly. Indeed, advisers around the President came to see the NSC as a distraction from the task of campaigning. As recalled by one of the senior advisers to the Office of the President: ‘NSC meetings were taking place regularly, there was no NSCCG then. Close to the 2002 elections, the President brought along a lot of advisers and saw no need to convene the NSC. Kabbah had brought a number of advisers around him – that group was meeting each morning. These people said that they covered everything.’55 Effectively, these circumstances stifled free communication between the higher echelons of gov-

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ernment and the institutions that had been established to serve Sierra Leone’s national interests. Thus, there was no clear command, strategy, control or direction from the top on how decisions were made, which manifested itself in indecision below. Politicised and individualised decision-making increased at lower levels. Lack of strong direction also meant that the JIC would not know which areas to actively investigate; lack of capacity at lower levels meant that the information being processed was either inaccurate or did not provide clear guidance on areas requiring further investigation. In addition, the executive chose to take up a range of issues with a number of trusted advisers informally. Despite various Cabinet briefings on the proper use of the ONS as a conduit for all incoming intelligence and the NSC as the proper forum for discussion of its implications, the traditional informal system began to re-emerge, as it appeared to have more utility for the task of electioneering. Simply put, with the war over, security seemed less important. In direct response to this situation, the NSCCG was established to serve as a coordinating and oversight mechanism. This body managed to get the heads of the implementing, rather than political, institutions together and incorporated the ONS, NSCCG and the heads of the military, police, and their civilian counterparts. Its chief aim became to share and coordinate information and increase the professionalism of intelligence tasking, collection, assessment, and collation across all concerned services and Government. Yet its establishment and the way it was operated reflected limited political will at the top and it was the National Security Coordinator who really kept it going as a group.

The Sierra Leone Security Sector Review and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper In late 2004 and early 2005, the reform climate in Sierra Leone was ready for the establishment of firm SSR concepts and strategies; the development and security dichotomy was more closely aligned than they had ever been.56 Two imminent events – UNAMSIL withdrawal and publication of the findings of the TRC – elevated security again to the status of a central issue. The launch of the PRSP (with security as one of its three central Pillars) and the Security Sector Review provided the element in Sierra Leone’s security system transformation process missing to date, namely an overarching strategy for the security transformation process. Despite the sometimes strained relations between ONS and the Poverty Alleviation Strategy Coordinating Office (PASCO),57 the organisation

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developing the PRSP, the two processes manage to become somewhat collaborative and it was agreed that the Security Sector Review would provide input to the PRSP. The Review strategically supported Pillar One of the PRSP, ‘promoting good governance, peace and security’ and it examined the security architecture required to provide a safe and enabling environment within which economic, social and political development of Sierra Leone could occur. There were clear similarities between the two processes, at both conceptual and practical levels. Relevant actors within the security system, above all in the ONS, had recognised the value of an integrated and consultative approach for the development an effective, evidence-based Security Sector Review. The same had been the case with respect to the Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO) leading PRSP preparations. The PRSP attempted to combine implementation at the national and regional level through newly-elected local government mechanisms working in parallel with departments of state, while the ONS employed the PROSECs and DISECs.58 Sierra Leone became the first country in the world in which the central function of security as facilitating economic development was recognised explicitly. Effectively, transforming the security system was seen as inherently linked with poverty alleviation, governance and how a government operates and is led. The immediate implication of this was that security became embedded in the PRSP, which was able to put forward a vision of ‘a Sierra Leone safe enough for the Government to undertake whatever policies it wanted through its PRSP’.59 It was not that many of the concerns raised in the Review were new, but the inclusion of security within the PRSP certainly was. This perception of securitisation of the PRSP in fact may have impacted negatively on ensuring financial support from the wider international community for PRSP implementation. Of the $260 million that the actors within the security system were bidding for, ‘a sizeable proportion was going towards activities that should actually be dealt with by the Ministry of Health or the Anti-Corruption Commission or the Ministry of Trade and Industry. And you have got the Office of National Security doing it.’60 It could be argued that the Government of Sierra Leone was actually far more harmonised at the time than the international community. The rationale of the Security Sector Review process being led by the ONS was that the Government needed to act together because it had a long, unsuccessful history of divisive approaches to governance. The ONS viewed itself as providing a coordinated response to the security

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challenges for Sierra Leone; it was committed to the proposition that a secure and safe environment would provide the greatest opportunity for the achievement of wider development goals. In 2005, there was a perception within the ONS that because they had coordinated the Security Sector Review, they would also coordinate implementation of security-related aspects of the PRSP in Pillar One. The ONS was well-placed to contribute to the process because of its oversight position and also its experience with the Review. After a framework document was endorsed by the NSC, the process of producing the Review itself began in late August 2003, led by the ONS. A Security Sector Review Working Group was established, consisting of a Secretariat operated from the ONS and a number of Government ministries and departments, ranging from the Office of the President and the Immigration Department to the Sierra Leone Airport Authority. Civil society was also engaged, specifically the Campaign for Good Governance and Fourah Bay College. A critical element in the process was providing a clear definition of ‘security’ as a precursor to the review process proper. In addition, to carry out a review of this nature was decisive in clarifying the approach to security, inherent to the security system transformation process, and what form engagement with civil society and the public in general could take.61 Late in 2003, a definition of security institutions was proposed under a heading of ‘What is the Security Sector?’ This included:62 1. Governance and oversight mechanisms, including parliamentary committees. 2. The ONS and the CISU. 3. Government departments, including Interior, Justice, Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Finance. 4. Uniformed services: the military, police, prison service, customs and immigration. 5. The Judicial system, including the Anti-Corruption Commission. 6. The TRC. 7. Private Security Companies. 8. Non-state paramilitary forces. 9. Civil society stakeholders and NGOs. This is a very broad definition of security stakeholders and, as noted at the time, ‘…2003 sort of harnessed all the other transformations that were taking place (with the onset of the security sector review). From

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then on it became clear that all institutions should be involved. It also became clear that there were other security institutions than just the police and armed forces.’63 The Review’s primary aim was to assess potential and actual threats to Sierra Leone’s National Vision 2025,64 to identify the institutions which could counter these threats and to make recommendations on how they could do so.65 It was therefore important to have a clearly working definition of the security sector, not only because of political sensitivities in making an authoritative overview of security threats to Sierra Leone, but also because of the Review’s very concrete aims. In brief, those who were engaged were to define what security was – and is – for Sierra Leone. The Review was also aiming to support the PRSP objective of making difficult choices about the use of scarce resources. Whilst there was certainly no desire to undermine security within the country, funding of the ongoing security system transformation process had to compete for a share of the budget with other priority sectors, such as health and education. Consequently, the Review addressed relevant questions related to allocation of resources, relative budgetary allocations, efficiency and effectiveness. For much of 2003 and 2004, the Review production process was carried out via workshops involving wide participation across government and civil society. Consultative workshops in the provinces were very successful in attracting media and public attention and participation. This was in contrast to the 2000 National Security Policy, which had been produced in a period of open conflict and with a necessarily limited external consultation process. It had also been written largely by international advisers rather than relevant national authorities, and thus, while being important, it was limited in its inclusiveness. The process of producing the Review included a detailed methodology constructed around a series of specific steps. These steps are outlined below and they have to a large degree been followed:

Steps of the Security Sector Review STEP 1: Conduct a Strategic Environment Review – determine ‘drivers’ that will shape the future of the country. STEP 2: Determine National Threats – identify and build consensus on specific and generic threats, internal and external, to the future security of Sierra Leone and its citizens.

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STEP 3: Develop Security Policy Framework – when consensus on national threats has been reached, establish which institution will counter these threats. This will include identifying areas where effective coordination is required between security sector agencies and how such coordination can be delivered. STEP 4: Develop Individual Institutions/Agencies Policy Framework – each relevant agency will identify the roles and capabilities it will need to effectively counter identified threats. STEP 5: Conduct a Gap Analysis – in order to establish the nature and level of the transformation required, produce a valid assessment of the current capabilities of the institutions within the security sector. STEP 6: Develop Transformation Strategies – Identify where the organisation is now and where it should be. Develop a strategy on how to bridge that gap. STEP 7: Address Cost and Affordability – Produce recommendations for the transformation and development of the security sector calibrated against affordability. STEP 8: Implement Transformation Strategies. Threats to security identified in the Review were almost all developmental in nature representing a change in the way that security came to be perceived within Sierra Leone. As one adviser present at the time remarked: Perhaps unsurprisingly, many of the threats identified by the population were not of the traditional ‘national security’ variety. In effect, little reference was made to Guinean border disputes or Charles Taylorbacked rebel incursions from Liberia. Instead, threats covered topics from youth unemployment and bad governance to corruption and lack of economic opportunities.66 Using the structured approach of the steps outlined above, the ONS managed to develop a clear national consensus on a vision for the future of Sierra Leone, the threats to achieving the vision and the required responses and capabilities necessary to mitigate these threats. ONS findings were validated at NSC and through district-level consultations. What followed was a gap analysis to identify discrepancies between current capabilities and those required before developing transformation strategies.

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The Review process became a thoroughly Sierra Leonean-driven process based on the underlying assumption that findings should be ‘peopledriven, not done by experts in isolation’.67 Having identified threats to security within the country, the ONS then worked with national security institutions and other government departments to develop an overarching national security framework. Following this, a series of institutional security frameworks were developed to assess the capacity of the institutions concerned to respond to threats identified by the population. This involved identification of each institution’s visions and perceived threats, their current capabilities and a gap analysis between the threats and their capabilities to respond. What emerged at the end of 2004 was a series of draft recommendations for each of the institutions on how best they could address the disparities between their current capabilities and those required to deal adequately with the threats they and the population they served faced. The external push to sign off on the Review was strong. An initial target date was set for the end of March 2004. Regarding the PRSP, in 2002, it was expected that the PRSP would be completed and accepted during 2004. However, both the Review and the PRSP were not published until March 2005. Considerable difficulties remained over recognition and ownership of the PRSP, ultimately because increasingly competitive Government ministries and specialist agencies were chasing donor funding. Other reasons why the Review was delayed included lack of political buyin and lack of relevant skills. One international adviser, an IMATT Wing Commander, who had the necessary skills and understanding to assist in pushing the Review process forward, left his position, which was a significant set-back. It was not until an appropriate Sierra Leonean national was recruited that the Review process gathered momentum again. Similarly, towards the end of 2003, there was a delay in funding for the programme, in particular for workshops in the provinces. Finally, it was a continuous challenge to ensure active participation from the range of SSR Working Group members. For example, certain ministries or agencies did not understand their role in the Review process and sent junior staff to working group meetings, thereby providing limited input and buy-in to the process. The process of integrating security into a broader development process, namely the PRSP, is one of the lasting legacies of the Sierra Leone experience. Making a direct link between the Security Sector Review and a PRSP became identified by the UK’s ACPP, and Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP), and more broadly the international community as emerging good practice. Merging security and development in this way is not easy

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and there was significant opposition from both sides, particularly from civilians fearing securitisation of more traditional components of the development agenda.

Conclusion The period of 2002–2005 was, above all, characterised by the end of open conflict and transition from emergency mode to peacebuilding, including consolidation of security sector gains. The first post-conflict elections were held with the SLPP and Kabbah as the clear winners. A MoU was signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the UK, which bound both parties to an agreement until 2012. As an expression of long-term commitment, the assurance this MoU gave to the transformation process was crucial. In particular it provided confidence that the UK would support Sierra Leone over the long term and not just intervene on the basis of two or three-year programme horizons. It is important to emphasise the importance of this commitment to a country that felt it had been left to the RUF without effective international intervention, and to the security of the people in particular. It is also important to emphasise what an unusual move this was on the part of the UK Government. This is not a usual methodology for governing the UK’s bilateral aid and support mechanisms. One of the effects of the long-term commitment was the effective transformation of security institutions and with this, a transformation in the day-to-day security concerns of the people of Sierra Leone as viewed through the ONS. In particular the move to more developmental security concerns and the explicit link between security strategy and development objectives should be seen as one of the lasting elements of the Sierra Leone experience for UK policy. It was this period of consolidation coming out of war that led to those developments. In itself, the importance of the Security Sector Review cannot be underestimated. First, it gave much needed conceptual clarity about the institutions comprising the security sector, and thus who had a stake in defining what security meant for Sierra Leone. Second, the function of ONS as coordinator of input from the security sector and producer of a strategic security document was illustrated. Third, the fact that the Review was integrated into the PRSP aligned security and development to a degree that they had never existed before. These developments reflected significant strides forward across the security system where the political space for new organisations such as the ONS and MoD was widening. In the SLP, the priority now became

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to deploy across the country and to move from a relatively theoretical, strategic position to a more practical approach. Leadership of the police was also handed over to a Sierra Leonean in June 2003, and with it, full national ownership. The MoD was inaugurated as a ‘joint Civilian/ Military organization’ in January 2002. While there were continued struggles between international advisers (IMATT officers in particular) and MoD staff around ownership issues, there were clear signs that the MoD existed as a viable institution. A thoroughly nationally-owned Defence White Paper was being produced, MoD structures were being reconsidered and IMATT produced Plan 2010, a long-term plan for their engagement with RSLAF. At the same time, considerable challenges remained including issues such retaining and recruiting qualified staff and general levels of corruption. The most substantial challenge was emerging and continues to be a major concern, namely the affordability and therefore the sustainability of the reformed security services. A key question for the security system transformation process and for the security of Sierra Leone as a whole was and is whether the Government of Sierra Leone can sustain the RSLAF, SLP, ONS and CISU, in both human and technical terms into the long-term future.

5 Consolidation and Development, 2005–2007

The initial security system transformation period of 1997 to 2002 was characterised by attempting a series of systematic reforms within a hostile conflict environment. The first involvement in the security sector took place in a desperate fight against the RUF who then negotiated a ceasefire and then reanimated, plunging the country back into conflict. Following UK military intervention and the reformation of UNAMSIL, the period following the eventual peace agreement from 2002 to around 2005 became largely concerned with immediate postconflict reconstruction of the security apparatus and the deployment of security actors, including the SLP, RSLAF and ONS across the countryside. However, the nature of the rapid reaction to the conflict meant that there had been a lack of detailed planning in the operationalisation of the security reforms and each reform seemed to move forward at its own pace. The final period of study within the remit of this research, 2005–2007, was marked by a consolidation of the previous reforms and the development of the SSR concept into a series, or bundle, of reforms. The security situation improved to the extent that peaceful elections were held in 1997, the end point of this period of study, and yet there remain a series of questions about the general security situation and also the means by which the security institutions got to the point where they now find themselves. In particular, the development of a coherent strategy to security and development and the issue of sustainability of the reforms carried out to date have come to the fore in contemporary discussion about the future of Sierra Leone. This became marked towards the end of this period, in 2006 and 2007 when the Government of Sierra Leone appeared to become complacent about security within the country and phrases such as ‘security is now completed’ entered the 133

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lexicon. Above all, there are clear questions about sovereignty and the role of an external power. The complacency of some politicians may be brought about by the fact that there remains a strong UK military presence in terms of IMATT along with a coterie of advisers within other security institutions. This does raise questions about how sustainable the structures would remain should those advisers leave, let alone issue of the potential politicisation of the security structures once the checks and balances of UK advisers return home. In fact, one interpretation of this final period of the study could be that there has been a generally declining amount of attention and resources being channelled into the security system transformation process and a reliance on external intervention to maintain the security services. Within this interpretation, the UK becomes a pseudo-imperial power providing an external security guarantee and senior advisers within the security institutions on the ground. This allows the Sierra Leonean politicians to effectively leave security alone, i.e., leave it to the UK. There is clearly some evidence that supports this particular view. By 2005 Defence Council meetings were postponed so frequently that they hardly happened at all. By 2006 it became clear that the Government had lost interest in security, regarding it as having been ‘fixed’. As one key stakeholder pointed out: By 2003 (there was) some attention (paid to general issues of security and the security sector), in 2004 less. In 2005, they (government officials) were so comfortable that they didn’t listen at all. Defence Councils were postponed several times. The NSC had not been held for two years until we pushed for one major meeting where we said that the Government needed to be aware of the issues around (the 2007) elections. By 2007, most ministries cared less about security. This was due, in part, to other more pressing priorities, such as the faltering economy, but also, it has been argued, to a degree of hubris on the part of the SLPP. There is no doubt that Sierra Leone’s executive, particularly President Kabbah himself, was committed to transforming the security system in order to establish control of external and internal security provision. At the same time, however, there was also a sense among some that the executive were ‘not necessarily [committed] to the structures that came with it’.1 The executive was also preoccupied with the upcoming general elections, which the country was to organise for the first time without external support. However, while Government-led reforms were stifled,

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the reality was that security system institutions would need to prepare for the elections to ensure they were held in a secure environment. At the same time, there was also an argument that supported the view that the security services were immune, at least temporarily, from political interference and therefore security was something external to the political process. 2005 was also an important year for the development of UK advisers on the ground. In particular, DfID devolved power to a fully fledged office in Freetown, having previously managed all of its interventions from Whitehall. Richard Hogg, Head of DfID Sierra Leone, arrived in Freetown in March 2005 and the office was fully devolved in July. This country office not only made management more effective, but also enhanced the DfID’s assistance and presence in-country. By virtue of being far closer to operations, DfID’s local presence enhanced communication and management on the ground, improved clarity and allowed DfID to play a more direct role in the security system transformation process. In particular, the presence of a DfID office on the ground meant that the Ministry was far better able to make a political impact, both in terms of negotiating with sister UK Ministries in Sierra Leone, but also in dealing with a Government that was becoming increasingly accused of corruption and was clearly in need of support in terms of civil service reform, governance systems, service provision and procurement procedures. Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that conflicts with the Government of Sierra Leone also increased as DfID began to address these issues. DfID’s ability to coordinate its activities with IMATT and the High Commission was also enhanced. What has been referred to as the ‘Freetown troika’ emerged amongst the three organisations, which met bi-weekly to construct coordinated responses to the Government of Sierra Leone. As one of the IMATT Commanders serving during this period noted: ‘During my time, better coordination of response became a reality. I left Sierra Leone with a positive feeling about that’.2 It was also clear that good personal relations equalled good co-ordination. By the time Sierra Leone’s PRSP was published in spring 2005, the security sector had managed to convince the politicians that the security sector remained critical to the further development of the country. The importance of the security sector was laid out in the Security Sector Review, which had been led by the ONS. This Review was launched by the President in May 2005 and he also publicly noted the several links with the PRSP. Given this public encouragement, the security sector in general began the process of developing a series of planning activities to

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support the Review recommendations in the hope of gaining additional external support for their implementation. These recommendations needed to be adapted slightly in light of the new links with the PRSP. A multi-stakeholder approach to solve the challenges identified at both a national and regional level also needed to be developed. It was clear at the outset that the costs of delivering against the recommendations of the Review would be huge. Careful prioritisation was therefore required to ensure both the realism of their funding as well as their contribution to poverty reduction. Activities were ranked on a scale of 1 to 5, based on whether they would be able to deliver against security objectives outlined in the PRSP framework. The primary, stated objective of the Review was to build security forces able to prevent and respond to external and internal security threats and provide an enabling environment for poverty reduction. Only activities scoring 1 or 2 had a realistic possibility of being funded. At the same time, however, from 2006, the UK had been engaged in discussions about how to develop a realistic exit strategy from Sierra Leone. In particular, the emphasis of DfID on poverty alleviation, the fact that DfID was the primary source of funding for many of the security activities and also the change in security priorities on the ground towards more ‘traditional’ development activities (crime and unemployment rather than insurgency and conflict), meant that the UK stakeholders were developing an exit strategy in 2006–2007. The development of this strategy was further influenced by an increasing volatility in funding streams for the Sierra Leonean activity, and whilst there had been some progress on a joint DfID/IMATT work plan in 2006 that had come to be regarded as a DfID exit strategy, it was never finalised or implemented. The final, but in many ways defining event of the period was the election of 2007. The success of these elections for the security services cannot be underestimated and should be seen as a real achievement for the security reforms instigated throughout the entire period. The elections themselves were seen by many inside and outside of Sierra Leone as a serious test of SLP and RSLAF capabilities in providing appropriate support to the National Electoral Commission (NEC). SILSEP was planned to terminate in 2008, and DfID had begun to show signs of wishing to disengage from the security sector reform process as a whole. Therefore had the elections gone badly in terms of security, there was an element of ‘back to square one’ for the reforms. The last section of the chapter looks briefly at one of the weaknesses of transforming Sierra Leone’s security system as well as what the future may hold for the continuation of this

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process: inclusion of Paramount and lesser chiefs who preside over Local Courts and generally secure the country’s communities.

Justice, law and the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) By 2004, it had become obvious that whilst the LDP had provided infrastructural improvement and training for the judiciary, huge capacity problems remained and the justice sector as a whole remained the poor relation of the security programmes to date. Despite the fact that discussions regarding the integration of the justice and security systems had taken place as early as 2002, other elements of the justice sector, namely prisons, probation, legal reform, non-state justice3 and legal advice, had not benefitted from any external support or development assistance. Both the CCSSP and the LDP had not included any support for these elements and, whilst this was clearly a result of the security priorities at the time, it was becoming clear, for example, that finding former RUF members guilty of war crimes required somewhere to incarcerate them. Furthermore, the much quoted, but not empirically verified, statistic of 80% of Sierra Leoneans accessing justice through non-state avenues, particularly the chiefs, required attention. This became increasingly important once the DDR programme began to send former fighters back into the countryside, where one of the stated reasons for revolt in the first place was lack of access to justice through these same mechanisms. It was in the field of justice sector reform that the chief influence of the more formal planning process began to be seen through the DfID office on the ground. This more formal approach to development planning led to a further set of delays and support for the justice sector. Although eventually approved in 2004, there was a further year’s delay and implementation did not actually start until March 2005. At the same time, prior to the JSDP, no assistance had been given to the MIA, which governed the justice sector and SLP. This may have been the result of the heavy focus on establishing the SLP, first at HQ level in Freetown and subsequently throughout the country. More importantly, however, advisors at the time were aware of a lack of political will at the executive level to effect comprehensive change, even though attempts were made in 1998, to engage the Ministry in policy formulation, ministerial oversight, performance management and financial provision to ensure the sustainability of police developments. In fact, at this time the CPDTF had proposed that a Police Directorate

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should be set up in the Ministry to provide effective advice to the Minister in his oversight of the SLP.4 Though still grappling with the fundamental issue of proper political leadership and striking the right military-civilian balance, a MoD had been established, leading the way in civil service reform. This Ministry was able to provide political leadership in designing and governing the reform process, and it was clear that a similar arrangement was necessary to improve representation of the SLP and other justice institutions at a high level. The early reforms had left the SLP without direct ministerial support and a limited capacity for policy development and oversight within the MIA. As Keith Biddle explained: In comparing MIA (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and MoD (and reform initiatives within the two departments in Sierra Leone), there are two things to keep in mind. One is that the MoD was externally driven by some very professional and determined people. They did a super job. They capitalized on the fear of the army again overthrowing the government. They were able to achieve something very quickly. If you take the MIA in 1998, the oversight of the police should be with the MIA. However, the supremacy of the ministry was rubbed out by the Constitution of 1991, which removed the minister’s accountability that had been within the provision of the almost defunct Police Act 1964. The Constitution is supreme law and its provisions take precedence. The Constitution dictated that the Police Council would be the place where police policy, discipline issues and promotions were decided. The police had effectively gone outside of the Civil Service Commission. When it came to police budgeting, decisions were made in the Police Council.5 This lack of ministerial support had fundamental implications for the operation of the justice sector, and particularly for the SLP, as reforms had moved from a predominantly operational focus to one of refining the system and policies already in place. In 2007–2008, the whole ministry has to be rehabilitated with respect to overseeing institutions. It was partially accidental that the Chairman of the Police Council at this time was also the Vice President so there was some representation, but without that informal link there would have been no direct representation of the SLP at ministerial level. As it was, several papers prepared to rationalise legislative or institutional changes as well as SLP budget

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proposals, which should have been within the portfolio of a MIA, became stalled or delayed due to lack of representation or advocacy. The budgetary and policy discussions were beginning to have an impact on issues of sustainability within the SLP. Initially emerging in 2006, many issues related to the age and maintenance of equipment. Typically in any one year the SLP require replacement of around 100 vehicles out of their total fleet of 800, but by 2006 they were able to replace only ten. As DfID’s Deputy Programme Manager, coordinating SILSEP and other security-related programming noted at the time: ‘…the only thing worse than not having any capacity is having temporary capacity and it then being taken away’.6 This pattern was repeated for both vehicles and communication equipment and, given the nature of policing in Sierra Leone, the uncertainty surrounding these key elements threatens the very means through which the SLP maintains a presence in some districts and, by extension, maintains the sovereignty of the Sierra Leonean state, let alone manages to maintain security for rural people. The core idea of the JSDP was to take over the reins from the CCSSP, which ended in June 2005. The JSDP was due to start in March 2005, and was designed to support the PRSP process of the Government of Sierra Leone by facilitating access to affordable justice systems, provide support for the rule of law, help to prevent further conflict and improve safety and security, particularly for the poor, marginalised and vulnerable. The planning blight that accompanied the implementation of the JSDP and the formal planning process now decentralised from Whitehall, not only prevented a timely intervention in non-police agencies integral to the justice sector, but also created significant impatience and frustration amongst key stakeholders. Tensions arose following the uncertainties around the ending of the CCSSP and LDP and the continuation of some of the sub-projects but not others. In the end, the JSDP incorporated some elements of both previous interventions and not others.7 By 2005, according to international and national stakeholders, the CCSSP had lost much of its strategic direction. Although the JSDP represented a welcome change in strategic direction, it was also something of a missed opportunity. At the end of the CCSSP, there was a genuine need to look strategically at what should happen in the justice sector as a whole. This would have involved a wide range of actors, including IMATT, local government, Ministries, the legal profession and others, but this broad-based consultation did not happen and the JSDP had to pick up some of these issues as it developed. Similar opportunities to

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reflect on strategy were also missed during the PRSP process and when United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) replaced UNAMSIL. It should be noted here that despite all of the planning delays involved in the now more formal planning process, none of this strategic thinking and planning was done. In many ways this is a generic development planning issue. Where several programmes end more or less at the same time, it is rare to carry out a comprehensive review across a whole sector. Rather, the most common method is to evaluate separate programmes and projects as stand-alone elements, reflecting the funding boundaries of donors rather than the situation on the ground. In the case of DfID at this time and in this sector, the early planning and implementation of the JSDP was severely hampered by the lack of a senior DfID presence on the ground in Sierra Leone and also by severe ‘planning blight’. In particular, despite the months of delay, there appeared to be no strategic consideration of the situation based on experience, as opposed to relative importance being given to correcting the logical framework in Whitehall. By the time JSDP began implementation in 2005 the ONS, using the Security Sector Review as its vehicle, had managed to establish sound ground rules for cooperation across the security sector at national, provincial and district levels. However, within the formal justice sector, let alone the informal sector, there were no similar coordination mechanisms. Hence, while collaboration did take place between the various justice sector institutions, coordination between the MIA, prison services, courts and the SLP was limited. Moreover, before JSDP began implementation, external advisers had treated these institutions in relative isolation from one another. Indeed, by 2007 the SLP had serious concerns about whether it could effectively fulfil its own mandate without external support for developing systems for trying, processing, holding and rehabilitating criminals. Despite the efforts of the formal planning process to strangle it at birth, the JSDP represents an important shift in thinking and development within the security sector reform process. In particular, the JSDP was designed to significantly broaden the idea of security sector reform to encompass justice. This is an achievement partly because within the DfID budgeting system at this time, they were regarded as separate entities with all the consequent internal management rivalries that implies. However, despite this, whilst SILSEP and IMATT in combination had covered defence, security sector coordination and intelligence gathering, by 2005, the JSDP became regarded as the first broad, sectorwide programme in Sierra Leone.8

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The transformation from CCSSP to JSDP also reflected the central role that the judicial component now has within particular conceptualisations of SSR. Under the CCSSP, the focus had predominantly been on tactical and operational support to the SLP, which had been critical in the immediate post-conflict period. It gave the police a much needed boost of confidence in their role as internal security providers and ultimately led to the development of an organisation owned and driven forward by the SLP itself. It also represented a clear need for a functioning SLP as the basic building block of security and development. The JSDP represented a new stage in the development of justice more broadly and, for the SLP, whilst it recognised their operational effectiveness, it sought to develop a more strategic approach. From the beginning, the JSDP emphasised the provision of assistance to the SLP in improving community relations and also the integration of the SLP into the justice delivery system as a whole. The ethos remained LNP with LPPBs, but the JSDP emphasised engagement with community representatives and civil society organisations with the overall aim of working jointly to improve security and tackle criminal behaviour, thus enhancing community safety. One aspect of justice reforms that had been neglected prior to the JSDP was penal reform, a critical element in any justice system and now being severely stretched within Sierra Leone.9 Before and during the conflict, there had been a tendency to marginalise prisons and their importance was only emerging as significant to security, safety and rule of law in the late stages of Sierra Leone’s security system transformation process. Indeed, in the past, prison services were effectively treated as a ‘dumping ground’ for unwanted elements of society.10 Support to the prison services has been primarily in areas of infrastructure rehabilitation and development. In particular, prisoner accommodation in Moyamba and officer’s quarters in Bo, Makeni and Kenema. There have also been ad hoc initiatives by UNDP and UNIOSIL to procure medicine for all prisons. Due to prison overcrowding and the destruction of many prisons during the conflict, there was a critical need to increase prisoner accommodation. Pademba Road Prison in Freetown, for example, as at 2008, is operating at approximately 350% capacity. At the same time, while adult literacy classes for prisoners have also been part of JSDP, comprehensive training of prison officers only began in a structured manner in March 2008.11 By 2005, significant organisational reforms were taking place to strengthen the strategic direction and cohesion of SLP. A comprehensive fiveyear Medium Term Strategic Plan was produced, which acknowledged

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linkages to the PRSP and sound financial management procedures. A change management group was established to deal with the development of professional police leadership. A culture of open debate and space to voice opinions without fearing repercussions, was consolidated at the top level of the SLP, a space which had not existed prior to, during, or immediately after the conflict. It was also clear that the difficulties inherent in ensuring a joined-up approach to security system transformation in 1999 still existed in 2005–2007. The SLP’s Medium Term Strategic Plan, for instance, had not been firmly connected to the Security Sector Review process. This was in part due to the timing of its publication, but also to an alleged lack of proper cross-referencing with the ONS. In September 2005, it was noted that ‘some of the perceived difficulties between differing security sector institutions have been exacerbated by necessary programmatic separations between SILSEP and the rest of the sector’.12 However, the decision within the SLP to merge the SB and the CID into a coherent unit to provide intelligence on security and criminal activity improved internal coordination and reduced political rivalry. It was also recognised that if the SLP was to be a truly intelligence-led force, information gathering, analysis and collation needed to be enhanced. The SLP were still deploying outside of Freetown and, in 2005, although the police were now up to their authorised strength of 9500, police deployment was had yet to be completed in all the provinces. In December 2005, it was estimated that 60% of the deployment plan had been implemented. While vehicles, uniforms and equipment remained in short supply, the major logistical problem was in fact the chronic shortage of police accommodation, particularly in the countryside. This affected the ability of the SLP to deploy, but also to get police officers to accept difficult postings in more remote areas, where they were needed – a perpetual problem across all government agencies in Sierra Leone. In what was referred to as the ‘migration’ from CCSSP to JSDP, concerns were raised about the changes in approach taking place and whether important security-related programming would continue to be addressed. While CCSSP had been strong on support of operational activities, the move from largely tactical/operational police support to holistic justice sector support would inevitably leave gaps. This led to a split in support of the SLP, which saw SILSEP assuming responsibilities for gathering and analysis of criminal and security intelligence and strengthening capacity to deal with operational planning, event management and public disorder.13 These activities, combined with work on media training, community liaison and asset manage-

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ment, were linked to the SLP’s Election Policing Strategy. By extension, impact was felt within the SILSEP programme as well. Given the continued level of commitment to RSLAF through IMATT, the UK could not be viewed as neglecting the central importance of the SLP. It was vital that their role in maintaining internal security, and their ability to do so, were sustained. For this reason, security aspects of the SLP’s core business were absorbed into the SILSEP programme, whilst JSDP maintained the lead for the broader organisational development of the Police. This split between ‘security’ (placed within SILSEP) and ‘justice’ (placed within JSDP) ‘…encouraged security and justice to be seen as interrelated rather than integrated, just as security and development more broadly were struggling with the same conceptual issue’.14 The split was compounded by difficult decisions that had to be made about the future of the OSD and tensions arising from a conceptual divide between security- and justice-oriented policing. There was no denying the fact that in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the OSD was seen as a bulwark for the Government. As one senior adviser stated: ‘…if the army kicked up, the OSD was there to support. It has an establishment of seven rifle companies [approximately 3,000 officers]. The army is infantry, and in many ways, so is the OSD. Given that elections to be led solely by the Government of Sierra Leone for the first time were on the horizon, there were several potential areas of conflict that could have led to violence’.15 A threat register prepared by the SLP identified factors such as closely-contested constituencies, history of disorder, geographic isolation, ex-combatants, strategic economic importance and border security. Indeed, it was the threat register that would dictate the actual deployment of resources during the elections. The 2007 elections generally held much greater challenges for the SLP than previous elections, as it was operating with a reduced logistic capability and thus less ‘background security’ support due to UNAMSIL’s withdrawal.16 The framework of the elections also did much to assert police primacy in policing issues internally. The use of a Military Aid to Civil Power (MACP) instrument had allowed the political powers to engage the RSLAF in domestic policing matters, and in the lead up to the elections it was regarded as critical that the police capability was supported in order to minimise RSLAF involvement in domestic affairs. Given this, the ONS supported the further development of the OSD as a specialist response unit. As the then Coordinator of the ONS stated later: …sometimes you just need normal officers to enforce the law. We wholeheartedly support the strengthening of the OSD. Overusing

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the MACP because people claim that the police are not able to do A, B and C is inappropriate. We hope that messages to the NSC are heard: refrain from using the RSLAF too much. We want to keep in the police – if guns are needed, strengthen the OSD rather the RSLAF.17 The critical issue within all of this was that the ONS did not want the RSLAF on the streets dealing with domestic police issues. The capacity of OSD meant that police capability as a whole was greatly boosted and also wide-ranging, and, above all, the political leadership trusted the OSD more than Sierra Leone’s other security forces, including the RSLAF. The ONS also tried to avoid the lack of role clarity that had led to interservice rivalry and conflict that had characterised the historical relationship between the army and police in particular.18 In practice, the need for armed police was less than expected and there was a strong argument that the OSD, numbering almost one-third of the total complement of the SLP at over 3000, should take up ‘normal’ policing duties.

Transition, funding and the FSUs Inter-service rivalry was not helped by the position taken by external donors, particularly DfID. The transition from SILSEP to the JSDP brought the issue of programme coordination back to the fore. It became clear that having two separate programmes with separate funding within a single organisation was difficult to coordinate and almost impossible to manage coherently. In addition, it nurtured an impression in the MoD that the SLP had an ‘unfair advantage’ in access to DfID funding, since, in effect, the SLP had two pools of funding.19 Equally, within the SLP, it was not very clear how, as it was by far the greatest beneficiary of CCSSP, it should be part of JSDP, precisely because of the latter’s much broader focus. This problematic was partly reflected in the lack of clarity about where the SLP sits in terms of ‘justice’ or ‘security’, whilst at one level it sits in both. In terms of funding this is significant, due in part to internal DfID funding arrangements. In the words of one DfID staff witnessing the transition from CCSSP to JSDP: It was not beyond the realm of foresight to predict that expanding a programme entirely focused on one institution into a broader sector starved of resources would cause a level of animosity within the criminal justice sector. The Sierra Leone Police felt aggrieved at having to share donor resources with the prison service, the judiciary, the Minis-

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try of Internal Affairs and others, at the opportunity cost of further progress being made within the SLP. The other criminal justice institutions, in turn, were reluctant to share their newly-acquired funding access with the Sierra Leone Police, to whom it was felt the lion’s share of the development assistance to date had already been provided.20 However, one of the critical effects of the JSDP was that it took some earlier initiatives and expanded them. In particular, this happened in the area of gender and justice reform, largely through the expansion of FSUs, which had begun implementation in 2000. Further details of the continued development of FSUs are summarised by the main driver of the programme, Kadi Fakondo: In 2006 I was appointed chairperson of the JSDP Task Force, which was comprised of managers and middle management members of the justice sector institutions. We met once a month to work with the JSDP team on the development of a strategic plan for the justice sector that reflected the needs of sector institutions and civil society. The JSDP constructed FSU offices at Police stations in Lumley, Ross Road, Kissy, Calaba Town, Waterloo, Tombo and Goderich. They had earlier built the pilot office at the Moyamba Police station. The programme not only supported construction work, but also supplied all the pieces of furniture, including television and video sets for victims of abuse (especially children). They also supplied toys for our interview rooms. Even though there was much delay in dealing with FSU cases in courts, we still had convictions that sent clear messages to the public that sexual offences and other types of violence against women and children are unacceptable. With the help of two British Judges in the High Courts, convictions with up to 16 years imprisonment were handed down. Another major success case involved an international. Sierra Leoneans now knew that nobody would be spared in the dispensation of justice […]. Convictions have also been achieved in the provinces, which not only increased the population’s confidence in the FSUs, but led to an increase of cases reported. By 2005, the development of the FSUs was regarded as being so successful that the UN was taking notice and started to develop the FSU

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programme as a regional example of good practice, involving the Sierra Leoneans in undertaking training and strategic development with sister police forces. As Kadi Fakondo went on to state: In June 2005, UNICEF Liberia requested the Sierra Leone Police to train the Liberia National Police (LNP) in the investigation of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) in order to counteract increasing occurrences of sexual offences in that country. The SLP was contracted after careful observation of police institutions in West Africa in their handling of women and children protection from various forms of abuse. Liberia wanted to have a taste of the post-war experience Sierra Leone already had, and similar socio-cultural ties paved the way for that. The IGP, Kamara, approved the contract to proceed to Liberia to train the Liberia National Police. The SLP spent two months doing research and preparing a training package of international standards for Liberia and in August 2005, it was carried out. UNICEF Liberia requested the heads of NGOs and specialists in handling sexual abuse issues from the United Nations Mission in Liberia to read and critique the training manual and eventually the document Training in the Investigation of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Liberia trained around 25 officers – both male and female. It also led to the establishment of the Women and Children Protection Section at the Liberian National Police HQ. This, in turn led to further work: We went back and trained 50 Police Officers, bringing the total number of trained personnel to 75. We established units and deployed personnel in Monrovia and its immediate environs. Each time we went, we did mentoring with the officers to see whether the concepts we taught were being applied.21 This positive example of regional learning was made possible in part by earlier CCSSP policies of promoting promising younger officers faster than they would have been promoted in the pre-war system. This generation of officers had a different set of values and were less tainted by earlier practices within the SLP. At the same time, there were significant opportunities for both male and female officers to be promoted on merit, rather than on seniority or political connections. The most eloquent statement of what this meant in practice comes from Ms Fakondo: There were people that were benefiting from the system, how it used to work. We were yearning for change, we had an idea about what

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change should be. We had three groups of people standing, those who were ready to jump onboard, those who were confused and those who didn’t want to see change. It was the responsibility of those who wanted change to lead the way. Even if we don’t have the funding, we have put in place systems. We need to look at the terms and conditions of the SLP. We have tried to convince the executive board to have a female committee. The executive board is saying that we have a police board. However, this is the policy of gender mainstreaming. Why are we able to bring this up? Because the foundation has been laid. I have always wanted to be a proud police officer; I have been to forums where I’ve been pushed aside, where someone would be verbally highly abusive of the police. Because I had support, I had the confidence to speak up – and you can only speak your case when others are listening. I knew what I wanted. I wanted to be a proud police officer. Where else would I go? The war in fact made it possible for people to speak up.22 It had become evident during the succession planning period of 2001–2003, that many candidates for the highest positions did not have experience managing all the functions of the SLP. In consequence of this realisation, Assistant Inspector-Generals have been frequently rotated through the various disciplines of the force. This has helped ensure that in the future, the highest ranks are likely to be populated by senior personnel who understand and have experience managing all disciplines at the strategic level.

Further development of the Ministry of Defence The period following 2005 within the RSLAF was dominated by the lack of an overall strategy, caused in part by the UK withdrawing from developing such a strategy and the inability of the RSLAF to develop its own approaches and a plan. This latter issue had as much to do with the general political buy-in, which was vital with a Deputy Minister who was engaged, but lacked authority. The Cabinet, which had the authority, was not engaged and in fact, it had only been engaged to a limited degree since 2003. Effectively, without political top-cover, the MoD and the RSLAF leadership would not commit.23 The bare fact of the matter was that with no agreed strategy in place, strategic development itself took place only where there were strong and committed individuals. In other words, strategic development and vision was not systematised but individualised. Overall this meant that strategic development was extremely patchy since not everyone involved

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in the RSLAF or the MoD was a strong individual. By 2007 there was still no single programme management document containing details of an overall vision with accompanying activities, timelines, budgets, objectives and other management planning tools. However, by 2005, the gains of building a MoD essentially from scratch were obvious. For all the difficulties facing a new Department with new responsibilities, MoD’s image as a cutting-edge institution was now intact. It was now an organisation under visible and identifiable civil control and civilian and military staff were working side-by-side. RSLAF input into the 2003 Defence White Paper, PRSP and security sector review was indeed perceived to be limited, but had nonetheless been clear. The MoD was now seen as a critical member of the security community and playing a key role in articulating security strategy issues and planning implementation activities. For example, the MoD was central to the drafting of the Security Sector Review Implementation Plan. Compared to other government departments, the MoD was also seen as being ‘ahead of the game’ in terms of financial management. Advice from MODAT in the early stages of transforming the security system, and later on the presence of a dedicated DfID-funded financial management adviser and an IMATT counterpart, played a significant role in this. As late as 2005, these two posts, which had executive powers, were seen as vital by an external review. Had they been removed, it would have been highly questionable whether the MoD would enjoy its current reputation for its comparatively competent approach to financial management.24 At the same time, however, it was deemed necessary that MoD officials take full responsibility for financial management in the near future. It was these considerations that led to the transitioning of a post dedicated to financial management into that of an assistant civilian adviser post with general responsibilities for advising and mentoring across a range of different defence management issues. This push was necessary in order to transfer competencies, as it had become clear that the legitimacy of expatriates making executive decisions had decreased significantly. Indeed, RSLAF and its veterans and demobbed soldiers were likely to react strongly to a Core Review regarded as having been driven by external actors that would inevitably have financial implications for them. 2007 was the ninth year of UK support to Sierra Leone’s MoD. During this period, residual executive powers were being handed over; those remaining were de facto legacies of long-running projects, such as

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refurbishing the Paramount Hotel and Operation Pebu (see below). In 2007, it was also becoming clear that there was much less disparity in the approach of SILSEP advisers versus IMATT officers, which hitherto had created tension between civilian and military staff. However, this period was also characterised by criticisms levelled at expatriate advisers for the lack of an audit of DfID funding, poor communication and failure to learn lessons.25 One of the lingering cases that engendered a good deal of criticism was the aforementioned Operation Pebu, a MoD-managed project to provide RSLAF accommodation. As Aldo Gaeta, a MoD advisor close to the events recalled: By the end of 2005, all efforts of Operation Pebu were focussed on achieving completion of accommodation in two sites – Kailahun and Pujehun. As one senior officer serving with IMATT at the time noted, 70% of the project was cancelled and focus was on the remaining 30%. It was time to draw a line under Pebu. The original plans were never going to work. A lot of time was spent making sure that IMATT credibility was not lost.26 The decision to dramatically scale down the project had come in response to DfID’s rejection of additional funding and the fact that a team of independent consultants had suggested that Operation Pebu’s accommodation could possibly result in ‘the creation of new slums’. There was no proposal on what would happen after completion of these sites because nobody could predict what materials would still be available or what the chances of additional funding would be. From late 2004 to early 2006 work progressed on both the sites, but again, the planned timescale for completion was not achieved. During 2005, two significant events happened. Firstly, the demarcation that existed between Government and DfID funding was removed, allowing all the funds to be pooled for the benefit of the project. Secondly, DfID, which now had a Country Office, released the remainder of DfID funds to the project and also made it clear that no further funding would become available for Operation Pebu. The sites of Kailahun and Pujehun were not completed during the period covered in this narrative. The sheer scale of Operation Pebu was never appropriately considered. In the original plans of seven construction sites, the estimated population to be housed would be in excess of 2,500 per site. To

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achieve 100% completion within one year, bearing in mind Sierra Leone’s infrastructure and a rainy season of five months, defies logical explanation. There is no single organization involved in the project to blame. It was jointly funded by DfID and the Government of Sierra Leone. In addition, IMATT played a significant part in the management and on-site supervision of the project.27 Operation Pebu terminated in the spring of 2008. It had delivered two completed sites at Pujehun and Kailahun – the agreed revision to the original programme in 2005. Despite the gains over almost a decade of building the MoD, it is clear that it takes a substantial amount of time to consolidate civil management of an institution that for a decade had been a ‘clearinghouse’ for the armed forces and before that, had been deliberately neglected by the executive. During 2005–2007, many officials who had been drawn from across the civil service and trained and advised to build the MoD had been transferred to other ministries, departments and agencies or had left the civil service altogether. Their vital institutional memory left with them. Without appropriate recording systems, training opportunities and induction, this has had some impact on the balance between civilian and military staff, which in 2005 was referred to as ‘fully-integrated’ by the UK.28 Change is fragile and can easily be undone. In 2005, there was a concern that gaps in key financial management posts would lead to the loss of all institutional memory on some of the systems that had been established. This is one of many examples of the fact that human resource management is the single most critical component of the security system transformation process in Sierra Leone. Ultimately, no institution-building or external financial support can alter this reality. Changing institutions and patterns of behaviour through SSR – and development more broadly – is a long-term, messy, endeavour. Throughout the period covered in the narrative, one considerable challenge has been to ensure that members of the army would accept the principle of civilian oversight. In particular, the existing culture and experience of the army dictated some degree of resentment at civilians taking ‘their’ jobs. At the same time, there was a lingering perception that the main reason for dismantling the military HQ had been to prevent future military coups. Whilst this is true, in the longer term, dismantling the military HQ was also an important part of the

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reform process that engaged the RSLAF into a broader process of democratisation within Sierra Leone. To a certain extent, suspicion of the implications of civil oversight still persists within the MoD and impacts the integration of the principle of civil-military into defence management. Many of the military tend to see civilians as inexperienced in defence and security matters and therefore lacking the necessary competence to oversee the army. On the other hand, many civilians see the military as an obstacle to the reform pro-cess, including expenditure management. Mutual distrust along these lines still means that there is a potential to undermine the authority of the MoD – for example, if there is limited commitment by senior RSLAF officers to effectively participate in Procurement Committee meetings. In conclusion, it is clear that within the MoD, the process of working to create an organisational culture that ensures accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in defence management, is a very difficult and slow one. The continuing differences and culture clashes between the military and civilians need careful management in the long term.

Creating a role for RSLAF There is no denying that results achieved by 2005 in terms of establishing democratically-accountable forces in Sierra Leone were impressive. As noted by one of RSLAF’s senior officers: ‘After UNAMSIL left, everybody cried out that the military was going to make a coup, but because of the reform process, no one would do that.’29 Furthermore, a perception survey carried out among RSLAF staff and published in early 2007 noted the stark reality that in their past professional identity, it would have been difficult, if not outright impossible, to identify who was a soldier and who was a rebel. This was clearly not the case anymore. In addition, there were further indications that RSLAF officers now regarded themselves as generally heading in the right direction.30 Yet, while RSLAF reforms have been significant, deep-seated suspicion of the armed forces on the part of the executive remained. As a consequence, Government funding of the RSLAF was minimal. As noted by the 2005 Commander IMATT: Despite the fact that their [RSLAF] capacity was close to zero, they were just feeding themselves, and they were almost unable to do that; every month they got down to the last Leone. The defence

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budget was tiny, and the only time they got something was from IMATT – training, accommodation.31 These observations resemble the Government’s treatment of the armed forces before the war. He continues: …the Government and civil service take control that way, by keeping the armed forces living at a bare minimum. It was also one of the reasons why conflict started in the first place.32 While the reform process was rendering RSLAF more professionally focused, the force continued to be plagued by continued lack of equipment, low levels of operational activity and welfare and perceptions of being comparatively worse off in terms of salary and training than their neighbours in the region. Not surprisingly, the government was seen as failing to honour them. In 2006, it was noted that ‘…a clear commonality with the wider population […] is perception of the government…as a hindrance rather than an “enabler”’.33 A clearly identified role for the RSLAF and its mandate in Sierra Leone was also needed – and sought for. The security system transformation process had been designed to contain the army and enhance policing as the unambiguous providers of internal security. However, the other side of the coin was to provide the army with a clear and well-defined purpose, which had not happened. In short, the army had come out of the process lacking in a true professional identity, which was required to enhance military morale and a suitable ethos. This issue was exacerbated by comparisons between RSLAF and SLP performance. The two organisations had received fundamentally different types of external assistance through IMATT and CCSSP, respectively. In 2005, there was a distinct perception within the SLP that RSLAF achievements had been delivered or driven by IMATT, ultimately making reform efforts less sustainable in the long run. Nonetheless, a qualitative perception survey among RSLAF officers conducted in 2006, also showed that since 2004, relations ‘…had become, if not stronger, more accepting… In 2004, it was suggested that although aware of the message of police primacy, participants perceived RSLAF and police roles to be unclear and overlapping… Furthermore, tension between the RSLAF and the police was a result of a perceived discrepancy in reward levels rather than an RSLAF desire to take back elements of the police’s domestic security role.’34 The same report noted that such vagueness in roles and responsibilities appeared

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less pronounced in 2006, with RSLAF members ‘perceiving their role in relation to the police more clearly with less need to make direct comparisons between themselves and the police’. One reason for this perception shift no doubt related to ONS formulation of the policy defining MACP. Previously, in the words of one of RSLAF’s senior officers ‘acrimony, misconception and rancour’ existed between the two security organisations.35 During a seminar for key security sector actors held in December 2005 in Accra, slight puzzlement over the centrality and weight conferred upon the MACP was expressed. Yet, the MACP gave much needed clarity to relations between the SLP and RSLAF, and as such was crucial in outlining precisely when and how the armed forces may play a role in internal security in Sierra Leone. And certainly, the balance of power between the army and the police had been in favour of the armed forces, when Stevens favoured the chief of staff of the army, Momoh, to succeed him in November 1985. During his reign, the army became more and more dominant, culminating in the NPRC coup in 1992. The NPRC, in turn, immediately sought to weaken the police further, initially by disarming them. Subsequently, the NPRC truncated the leadership of the police in one sweep, taking out the top tier. According to Keith Biddle, this effectively ‘meant that the competent police officers, who had been to police colleges around the world, in Africa and outside, were sacked’. MACP was therefore important in dealing with the immediate as well as more distant past. The policy itself revolves around when and how the RSLAF may be employed in support of the ‘civil power’ in conditions of relative peace, stability and normality and in the absence of any substantive threat to the territorial integrity of Sierra Leone. Its functions are defined by ‘standing’ and ‘emergency’ categories: • A standing MACP task is one where authority is granted by the NSC for the RSLAF to conduct a defined operation in support of civil power agencies for an indefinite period. The period will end when the relevant government authorities, the NSC specifically, decide that military support is no longer required. • An emergency MACP task is one where specified support is provided to the civil power by the RSLAF after a specific request and NSC authority has been granted. Each task will be considered on a caseby-case basis. Tasks in this category will only be conducted in specific situations of dire emergency and where the civil power is unable to deploy sufficiently appropriate resources to cope with the

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emergency confronting them (including counter-terrorism and crime in the event that the SLP is unable to provide sufficient resources in a timely manner). This type of MACP also includes point security, providing armed or unarmed RSLAF personnel to secure installations (e.g., the Presidential Lodge or a critical infrastructure site) and specialist assistance to the police in dealing with civil disturbances. It was within the MACP framework that RSLAF supported the SLP during the 2007 elections. After the request for RSLAF assistance by the SLP through the NSCCG was granted, RSLAF played an essential role providing pre-positioning troops before, during and after the elections, even though apprehensions about its success were expressed by major stakeholders. Involvement of the RSLAF in such internal security situations was made public knowledge through a press statement. Another means of investing RSLAF with a stronger identity has been through its potential contributions of troops to the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). Indeed, RSLAF aspires to participate in ECOWAS as well UN and AU peacekeeping missions. In 2006, RSLAF contributions to international military operations was seen as ‘…an important mechanism for reinforcing national pride and developing operational capability’.36 However, while providing international peacekeeping forces was noted as one of RSLAF’s priorities the RSLAF lacked several of the important capabilities essential for successful involvement. IMATT noted its willingness to support the development of some of these capabilities, but this assistance was to be preconditioned on what was referred to as a ‘comprehensive and sustainable plan’ for an appropriately-sized and trained force, effectively a Core Review, which could have paved the way for a defence review after the elections. This remains an unresolved issue at the time of this writing. Nonetheless, the RSLAF has already contributed a staff officer to the ESF Headquarters in Nigeria, led by a Nigerian Brigadier. Whilst currently not deployable, a force structure has also been prepared, which sees Sierra Leone generating at least an infantry company and possibly a battalion to the ESF. The debate in 2006 revolved around whether to select the company or battalion as a whole, which would be based on the best operational evaluation reports, or whether it should be done by selecting the best individuals to make up the company/battalion. Either way, there was an obvious incentive in the possibility, through ESFs contributions, of being employed on UN subsistence rates. Indeed, as noted in 2005, income generation could in the long run emanate from RSLAF contributions to peacekeeping missions,37 although the

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possibilities to do so should not be over-estimated (and the African Union would be unlikely to generate any). Of greater potential have been the perceived gains from patrolling the seas for illegal fishing, an idea that surfaced since ‘Plan 2010’ was produced in 2004. This would be accomplished by collaborating with the Government of Sierra Leone to establish a Joint Maritime Authority, but despite preliminary planning, this initiative has not been implemented. From the very outset of the defence reform process, support to build capacity, educate and train was guided by the wish to see young, motivated officers emerge in the same manner as occurred in the SLP. It was obvious that there were good lieutenants and captains. They had undergone training in Ghana and at the Horton Academy at Leicester Peak, but they had limited or no opportunity for promotion.38 From the perspective of senior RSLAF officers, however, such perceptions, even if not explicitly communicated, were clearly understood: ‘IMATT personnel were tempted to turn to these officers (i.e., young officers) as the best chance for consolidating reform. IMATT believed that these officers had the flexibility, open-mindedness and idealism of young officers everywhere. They were recruited specifically to wash away the stains left by their predecessors, i.e., most senior officers still serving.’39 This approach understandably led to tension between a new generation of up-and-coming officers and those officers who had served through the years of conflict, including, in some cases, under the AFRC. It was a fine balancing act, but by 2005, a drive for voluntary retirements was initiated with economic and political support from the ‘Freetown troika’ (DfID, the High Commission and IMATT). Several Brigadiers and Colonels were removed and paid the amount that they would get had they stayed in service until retirement age. From the perspective of IMATT, the focus was on ‘people who they knew were corrupt. RSLAF had no disciplinary mechanisms, even with all the evidence. We were able to bring through Majors who were more competent.’40 At the same time, the issue of further downsizing the armed forces to an affordable and sustainable size continued to be hotly debated. RSLAF and the MoD had already experienced a considerable drop in numbers between 2000 and 2006, from around 15,000 to less than 11,000 personnel. However, there is a continuing tension between the need to produce a Core Review of Defence and political resistance to do so, partly because this may imply significant further reductions. It may even imply revisiting the original figures of 6000 for the armed forces envisaged in the 1990s before security-related programming took off, but the more likely level would be 8500 (close to the target discussed from the early 2000s),

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as is currently being discussed. The need to produce a Core Review had been identified by some of the civilian staff in the MoD as a UK-driven constraint on the future size and shape of RSLAF. However, issues of sustainability and affordability could not be addressed without it. In 2007, it became clear that whatever decision was to be made about the size of RSLAF had to come from the incoming Government. The executive powers held by expatriates, civilian and military, had been greatly reduced in 2007; reluctance to enforce difficult decisions on behalf of Sierra Leonean counterparts was increasing. In conclusion, by 2007 RSLAF had come a long way and was continuing to consolidate its own position, even if affordability issues remain a primary concern. The development of MACP and the turnover of senior officers helped define more clearly a new mandate for a democratically accountable institution to make changes in the organisational culture to reflect this. These developments are critical in the RSLAF’s ability to develop a clear picture of its own identity outside of domestic political involvement and the provision of internal security where the SLP has primacy. At the same time, the MACP sets down a clear framework for RSLAF support to SLP activities. The RSLAF was beginning to see a clear, democratic framework within which to operate and a target (peacekeeping) as something to aim for in the long term as a measure of how far they had come.

Development of the ONS and CISU, 2005–2007 In the run-up to elections in August 2007 there was a degree of distance between the ONS and the Office of the President. Part of the initial establishment of the ONS was in fact separation between these two institutions, designed as such to avoid political capture. At the same time, the role of the UK adviser remained critical as a guarantor of independence. Certainly the ONS viewed advisers as protectors of their political independence against external interference, given the slow implementation of the recommendations in the Security Sector Review. As noted by the National Security Coordinator: ‘We need to maintain the level of advisers, whether they are visiting or permanent. They are still that protector. Perhaps after the next elections (we can do without advisors), because we are still transforming, we are still reforming, and we need those checks and balances. The things that we identified in the Security Sector Review have not been dealt with even 10%.’41 Adding to the overall issues within the country, the PRSP process had stalled and a potentially dangerous stalemate was brewing during this

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period. With no new money appearing, the Government appeared to have little interest in governing and the stable security environment lessened the immediate imperatives to lead. There was a danger that a small elite would be propped up by a competent security sector – a partial return to the pre-war situation. Whilst security was dropping down on the list of immediate priorities, it was clear that little or no poverty reduction had been achieved and that there were closer links between politics, business and corruption. Several high-profile corruption cases around minerals and marine resources involving Ministers became public; no action on these cases was taken by the Government. The symptoms of the conflict may have been dealt with, but the root causes were again becoming evident amongst the elite of Freetown as they resumed business as usual.42 This was an obvious frustration for all concerned and the lack of financial support for the PRSP hit the security sector very hard. Effectively, security institutions would not receive any funding through the official PRSP trust fund. The sector itself had clear ideas about which activities to prioritise, including organised crime, drug and diamond smuggling, fisheries, customs and border control. However, none of these activities could be undertaken in isolation, and the government departments concerned were either unable or unwilling to take the initiative required to develop a comprehensive strategy needed to incorporate the role of the security sector. This was a lesson for both the UK and Sierra Leone in that developing competent security provision and coordination in a vacuum was becoming as much of a threat as a benefit to security, since there effectively was no accompanying plan for the rest of the Government. The main challenge within the PRSP process was how to build the capacity of weakened and inexperienced institutions to the point where they could bid for funding in a professional manner. Frequently, the organisations themselves did not know their own capacity weaknesses and, whilst this put the security sector at an advantage, it also handicapped them in the eyes of the Government, who knew that they needed to realign their priorities but did not know how. Rather than the security sector being the leader in enabling the environment necessary for poverty reduction to occur, it now needed to be a follower. But lead institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, the National Revenue Authority, the Ministry of Mineral Resources and the Ministry of Marine Resources did not appear capable or willing to take on this role. This presented all concerned with a quandary – how could a set of institutions contribute to broader government when there was no broader government to contribute to?

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One of the assets of the 10-year MoU between the UK and Sierra Leone was that rather than being subject to standard donor three-year bidding cycles, UK aid allocation to Sierra Leone was fixed at £40 million a year for the duration of the MoU. This is a sizeable amount of money – the UK’s largest aid per capita programme in the world – but once allocated, it allows no additional flexibility for filling development spaces created by success in other sectors. The work undertaken in the security sector, for example, created opportunities for work in trade, the diamond industry, healthcare, education and local government, but the funding was not there to take advantage of the opportunities. Compared to the inception phase of security sector-related reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a process of disengagement by the Government from international advisers was taking place in 2006–2007. The ONS, however, played a central role before and during elections as an objective source of advice to the political establishment. As stated by National Security Coordinator, Kellie Conteh: The leadership that was provided by ONS was consistent, it was focused. It also provided a general opportunity for all of us to participate. That bond, camaraderie, was very, very critical at elections. We needed to tell the public that there was no fraction, and that politicians could not use one against the other. (Before, politicians would split the security sector, and exploited the vacuum created). ONS largely provided the leadership. Political tolerance – we did several statements on the radio, to get people to work together. At the end of the day, both the military and police realized that a storm had blown over.43 At the same time, the perceived disengagement of the executive made it difficult to address fundamental problems, including an exit strategy by donors from the security system transformation process, however long that exit might take. SSR is fundamentally a political process, and in some ways politics is more important that capacity-building. Without high level political support, the security architecture was in a difficult position. The ONS, however, remained politically adroit and whilst it is fundamentally dependent on the current national security coordinator, in 2007 a number of officers have emerged who are able to take on a variety of different tasks and take over from the National Security Coordinator when necessary. As already mentioned, institution-building is a slow and incremental process, requiring periods of consolidation where staff can

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learn political skills. While the ONS had gone far very quickly, new institutions with a very short historical memory embodied and a new organisational culture need time to take root. This process cannot be short-cut. It was true for the MoD and it was true for the ONS. The success of the ONS is reflected in the wide range of issues that the organisation has dealt with which have not always, strictly speaking, been within its original mandate. The ONS has been involved in coordinating refuse collection from the streets and responding to the water crisis in the summer of 2006; it has also dealt with organised crime, as well as establishing a workable security framework and a localised system of intelligence gathering. Similarly, the security sector implementation plan that followed the Security Sector Review became the responsibility of the ONS rather than different Departments of Government contributing their specific expertise (which was the case with the PRSP). However, because the Government seemed disinterested, it was very much external actors, DfID specifically, that stepped in to help. By 2007 the ONS was clearly identified as a success story. It had established itself as one of the ‘…most effective Government agencies in Sierra Leone and…fully capable of performing the core requirements originally envisaged for it: preparing joint intelligence assessments; acting as a secretariat for national, provincial and district security committees; and providing strategic security advice to the President’.44 Indeed, one could argue that the ONS has been a victim of its own success. A review in 2007 concluded that ‘…the ONS is now evolving into a de facto Cabinet Office with a much wider remit than intelligence assessment and national security coordination’.45 Because of the Government’s adoption of ‘human security’ as a guiding principle, the ONS has started to aim to provide policy research as well as coordination to much of Government. The centralisation of risk and intelligence analysis as well as broad crisis response coordination carries both benefits and risks with it. ONS may be in danger of crowding out other government institutions by being too effective, even beyond their mandate, partly due to the relative weakness of other ministries, departments and agencies. At the same time, the strength of the ONS, particularly its ability to rise above political infighting, is embodied in its leader, the National Security Coordinator, or, more to the point, the specific individual in that position. Whilst security is frequently about human resources, the danger of this is that once independence becomes embodied in one person, this can develop into a sustainability problem brought about by the lack of a succession strategy. This can be particularly dangerous when

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the strength of the ONS could, potentially, be exploited by future political leadership. An organisation is only as unbiased as the individuals who lead it. In the case of Sierra Leone, the absence of current effective Ministerial and Parliamentary oversight compounds the vulnerability of the ONS. With the change of the security situation in Sierra Leone by 2007, CISU moved its attention from paramilitary organisations to serious crimes, particularly organised crime. Criminal organisations are adept at infiltrating and undermining security organisations, partly due to their command of economic resources, such as diamonds or drugs. However, the relative weakness and corruption of the overall justice system means that arrests made on the basis of leads provided by CISU would not necessarily lead to successful prosecutions. In addition, lack of funding for CISU reflected the lack of executive political will to support the organisation appropriately. It had also become clear that in 2005–2007, many Government officials and parliamentarians did not understand the difference between ONS and CISU. The relative strength of the ONS had created difficulties for CISU in terms of establishing its own identity and legitimacy, something that remains an issue externally, if not internally, vis-à-vis the two organisations. Discussions taking place during 2007 of moving ONS from the State House to a separate, new building was seen as enhancing the ONS neutrality, but also separating ONS and CISU and thus enhancing CISU’s profile. Despite the continued difficulties establishing CISU’s legitimacy between 2005 and 2007, it was able to play a critical role during the election period by exhibiting that several damaging and destabilising rumours about coup plots and rigging of the elections were fabricated. Given that ‘intelligence’ of this nature had been a highly politicised tool just eight years before and had led to executive and security sector inaction in general, makes this a considerable achievement. The charged political environment in the 2007 pre-election period cannot be over-emphasised. Even the ONS, the primary advisor on security matters to the President, came to be regarded with some suspicion during the run-off period between the SLPP and APC. To some extent this was due to arrogance on the part of the SLPP, who became so sure that they would win the elections that any information to the contrary became viewed as a conspiracy. The President’s preference for only listening to a small group of trusted advisers, coupled with a general distrust of security institutions and intelligence institutions in particular, would make the roles of the ONS and CISU increasingly difficult as they

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sought to balance the delivery of objective advice and gain the trust of the political executive. At the same time, there was widespread consensus among both Government officials and UK advisers that the PROSECs/DISECs had come to play an important role in coordination and conflict resolution at the local level. ONS had established representatives in nearly all of the security committees at provincial and district levels. They had become an undeniably important player by acting as a secretariat and communicating important issues to Freetown. Even in 2005 there was considerable local involvement in preparing the ground for the 2007 elections; PROSECs and DISECs came to play an important role by inhibiting and monitoring Paramount Chiefs and security officials who sought to discriminate against specific political parties. In addition, their presence on the ground further allowed a far greater outreach to civil society and a greater participation and consolidation of the PROSECs and DISECs as part of local communities. Critically, the two organisations’ coordinating role at regional and district levels has, when effective, performed the same function as ONS at the national level in bringing together individuals in key positions who, if isolated, could be vulnerable to political pressure. One observer close to the events has noted: Such figures ‘found strength and support from being part of a collaborative structure’.46 The focused engagement of civil society in the security system transformation process as an integrated component of SILSEP begun in 2006, also had an impact. With the project Strengthening Citizens’ Security, the NGO Conciliation Resources began implementation of a project with the explicit aim of ensuring enhanced civil society engagement in securityrelated matters, and by extension, the security transformation process itself. Conciliation Resources facilitated open meetings between civil society and security sector personnel initially in Kailahun District with the aim of improving local understanding of security structures and dialogue between security personnel and civil society. During the first meeting, when security personnel presented the structure of national security, including the function and membership of Kenema’s DISEC, it became evident that most civil society participants did not know that there was someone representing them in the DISEC. As one civil society participant stated, ‘He does not represent us and we are not aware he sits on DISEC on our behalf.’47 At the same time, security personnel stated that this member was currently suspended from the DISEC while investigating the alleged allegation that he was a political aspirant, which, if true, would breach the criteria of political impartiality. In turn, the security personnel used this civil

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society representative to argue that civil society was neither serious nor committed to participating in security issues. This issue highlighted some of the challenges of collaboration and at their own admittance civil participants acknowledged that civil society was fragmented. As a result they did not have a strong voice, which made it difficult for security personnel to identify civil society partnerships. The meetings conducted by Conciliation Resources covered a wide range of issues that gave people the chance to express their views on security and directly interact with security personnel. As one participant expressed, ‘this initiative is an eye opener for us. I have the feeling that the frank discussions around how we perceive ourselves will go a long way to bridge the gap between them (security) and us (civil society).’48 It was agreed that there was dire need for civil society to coordinate as a forum from which they could nominate representation on the DISEC. Security personnel acknowledged the importance of improving communication to the public. As the ONS representative said, ‘I think the issue of DISEC going to the radio to discuss issues on security that is of use to the public will be an issue to be discussed at the next DISEC meeting. I consider this to be crucial.’49 As a response to recommendations, within a month of the meeting, the Kailahun District Civil Society Organisations (KAIDCSO) was formed and one of its members nominated and accepted by DISEC to represent civil society on the committee with the directive to report relevant information back to KAIDCSO. In the ensuing year, KAIDCSO members and security personnel have collaborated on a number of events and information gathering activities, both as part of CR’s Strengthening Citizens Security project and independently. The relationships developing between security personnel and civil society in Kailahun has noticeably helped to ‘demystify’ security and create information resources that are mutually beneficial to civil society and the security sector.

Oversight of the security sector Oversight of the security sector remains a big political issue within Sierra Leone. As one adviser stated: ‘One wonders where the oversight and accountability exist, because I have seen no evidence of oversight or accountability in any of these institutions.’50 While the MoD represents the main civil oversight mechanism for the RSLAF, a similar process was never initiated with respect to the SLP. The reasons for this relate both to the Constitution and personalities of advisers as well as

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consecutive Ministers of Internal Affairs. Charles Margai, Prince Harding and Sam Hinga Norman were all regarded as corrupt, and indeed, Biddle was personally involved in the arrest of Norman. There was also sense among external advisors that a Police Directorate, for instance, that was set up to be transparent and accountable was resisted because it would enforce similar discipline regarding budgets of immigration and prisons that the Permanent Secretary of the MIA also managed. Another stumbling block has undoubtedly been that the top level of the executive – i.e., the President and the Vice President – was reluctant to cede their powers over the police to a separate ministry. As noted, a Police Council exists, chaired by the Vice-President, not the Minister of Internal Affairs. As a Constitutional body, the Police Council is responsible for the police service, essentially performing the functions of the non-existent police directorate, including dealing with expenditure and personnel issues. Regardless of the professionalism of the Police Council, this organisation of police affairs and centralisation of decision-making power does of course, to the outside observer, call into question whether appropriate mechanisms for accountability are in place. This is not a novel observation, indeed, it was recognised in 1999: ‘At the heart of the difficulty [of reform] lies the Police Council (whose existence is entrenched), a body made up of members who represent both wide strategic policy and resource interests, others who are responsible for operation deployment of police officers and other police service assets, and yet others with presumably a wider “social” remit (such as the Sierra Leonean barrister and the two presidential nominees). No matter how good the intentions or formidable the abilities of its members, the Police Council thus itself stands firmly in the way of effective police governance’ (CPDTF Report, December 1999). The fact that the Police Council has not been dealt with, and that it was not consistently dealt with from the outset of reform efforts when they began in the late 1990s, has meant that weak oversight of the police has been consolidated. Just as down-sizing the army has proven increasingly difficult because there is limited political will to do so there is little appetite within the executive to give up control of the police. This is further entrenched by the fact that a Constitutional change would require a referendum (the current arrangements mirror the 1964 Police Act). In 2007, the mandate of the MIA remained unchanged: oversight of the SLP, prison services, immigration department, national registration department, fire service and coroner’s office. This ministry, however, in

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stark contrast to the MoD, only received limited attention and support during the security system transformation process. While initial cooperation between the CCSSP and the MIA had been strong, for example, when the CCSSP project memorandum was produced, collaboration was not nurtured long-term. This was partly a consequence of the lack of political will to institute radical changes within the ministry. The net result has been that the SLP continue to operate in the accountability regime set out by the Police Council. Of equal importance has been the converse issue of the SLP not being appropriately represented in Cabinet due to a weak MIA. At the same time, the separation of the ONS from the Office of the President remains both a core strength and an Achilles’ heel. The current professional reputation of the National Security Coordinator means that the ONS remains apolitical, but in terms of sustainability there is a long way to go to create the kind of internal culture that would allow the ONS to develop a comprehensive succession strategy and build on the considerable successes of the ONS. This is particularly important, given that the ONS is an island of competence amongst a number of Government institutions that lack capacity to lead. There is a danger that the ONS will step beyond its mandate, and whilst a strong ONS is necessary to the successful future of Sierra Leone, it cannot do everything. The Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Defence, Internal and Presidential Affairs (POCDI&PA) is specifically mandated to oversee the security sector. However, the Committee faces a number of substantial challenges to performing its role effectively. As point of departure there is a lack of clarity surrounding the Committee’s functions, noticeable in the Committee’s name. In addition, while the Committee’s mandate is restricted to issues of defence, internal and presidential affairs and does not include security (police) and intelligence, it has effectively extended its remit to these areas. Nonetheless, the police, MoD and NSC continue to approve national security policies. There has also been an overlap between the POCDI&PA mandate and other parliamentary oversight, as the former does not have exclusive power and authority over defence appointments or budgetary issues. Other challenges to the efficient work of POCDI&PA include the lack of human financial and material resources. Finally, the selection of the 16 Committee members, of whom only one is a woman, is not based on knowledge of the security sector – appointments occur through consultation with party leaders in Parliament.51 In concluding this section on oversight mechanisms, the critical role of civil society in promoting accountability and contributing to decision-

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making processes around security should be noted. Important initiatives have been taken through mechanisms such as the Security Sector Review and programmes such as Conciliation Resources’ Strengthening Citizens’ Security programme. As with the rest of the security actors in Sierra Leone, the issue of lack of resources and at times operational capacity has been decisive and remains a substantial challenge to the reform process. It is also an issue that we will revisit below.

Non-state actors in security and justice Before concluding this chapter, we look at one of the weaknesses of transforming Sierra Leone’s security system as well as what the future may hold for the continuation of this process: inclusion of Paramount and lesser chiefs who preside over Local Courts and generally secure the country’s communities. How to incorporate this layer of actors – often referred to as nonstate actors – in security and justice programming is hotly debated internationally, among policy-makers and academics alike. While JSDP has had a focus on chiefs, it is only with the IASJP that institutions that do not easily fit the ‘state category’ are taking centre stage in security and justice programming, if not overtaking the role of state institutions, then at least being considered on par with them. In December 2005, a National Policy Framework for the Justice Sector in Sierra Leone was presented within the framework of the JSDP. It represented a ‘holistic sector-wide approach to support the development of an effective, efficient, impartial and accountable Justice Sector that is capable of meeting the needs of all the people of Sierra Leone’ (JSDP, December 2005:2). The document is not short of formulations around the importance of including what are referred to as ‘Customary/Traditional Laws and Practices’. These include, inter alia, development of policies on the judicial role of traditional leaders, implementation of initiatives that promote Constitutional principles and human rights and enhanced accountability of traditional leaders to the public. Likewise, the Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Investment Plan, launched in February 2008, has as one of six targets to ‘improve public satisfaction levels with Local Courts, Paramount and Local Chiefs’ (GoSL, December 2007:V). As one of the initial advisers to the JSDP notes: ‘Each system will have its own advantages and disadvantages and both need support, even if the state system will inevitably require a greater share of financial resources’ (HowlettBolton, 2008:8).

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Even if Paramount Chiefs would be considered ‘non-state’ in current SSR policy-thinking, they certainly cannot be considered, in discourse or in practice, as separate from the state. A 2007 assessment says, ‘[l]ocal courts constitute the lowest level of the formal system’ (JSDP OPR, April 2007). They are under oversight of, but not managed by, the Ministry of Local Government, which remains too weak – and apparently lacks the will – to actively regulate the local courts. At the same time, as suggested by the current IGP: ‘our own role is quite different from the Chiefdoms, because we are accountable to the law’ (interview, Brima Acha Kamara, June 2009). This point was further developed by one state official: It is the Minister of Internal Affairs that can recommend his [i.e., the chief’s] suspension, okay? But the Minister of Internal Affairs does not have much by way of a structured link to the chief – only if he decides to visit some locality. In turn, there is no requirements for the chief to communicate with him. In fact, strictly speaking, there is no requirement for the chief to communicate with anybody. The chief would listen to the District Officer, but we’ve removed him [in place before decentralisation began, and managed by the centre]. So maybe slowly we can bring the District Officers back; because district officers by the National Security Act should be the Chairperson of the DISEC. I think we should reintroduce that role. Chiefs are in other words, almost by default, autocratic leaders of their locality because state institutions are too weak manage Paramount and lesser chiefs. This matter reaches far beyond security and justice matters, ‘far beyond the security sector itself’, the state official noted, ‘it’s looking at transforming an entire culture, an entire society’. As noted above, substantive work has been and is still being undertaken in Freetown, where the focus is on distribution of power among the recognisable institutions of the state. Inevitably, as the focus moves to Chiefdom level, as in Moyamba District in the case of the JSDP, any attempt of JSDP programmes to impact institutions controlled by the chiefs touches on local level distribution of power, and is therefore deeply political. During JSDP implementation there have been no attempts to fundamentally alter the institution of the Local Court. Rather, focus has been on how to confine chiefs to their legally defined role in arbitrating cases, a management role which presumably can only be played by state institutions – the Local Councils and the SLP. Programmes in local communities occur within the context of national-level politicians, who want to dominate the local communities enough to access political (voters)

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and economic (e.g., diamonds) resources. However, it is doubtful that state institutions would take it upon themselves to openly interfere in dealings of Paramount Chiefs. In Moyamba, apart from supporting the Magistrates Court, direct work with the Chiefs has channelled through human rights training. Inevitably, conflicts occur; a 2009 assessment reported a Local Court Chairman complaint about cases no longer being reported to him. Such complaints could reflect redistribution of power in the Chiefdom, but also could be due to the fact that local court fines are a source of income for court employees, who are not paid regularly, if at all. This implies, of course, that JSDP has had some impact on how justice is delivered. As the assessment suggests, however, this is also partly due to civil society activities in the District, in particular in Local Courts, where officials have presided over cases that were not under their jurisdiction. The question remains, however, whether the balance of power in Moyamba has been fundamentally altered. Given the role of chiefs as providers of 80% of local level justice (according to estimates), it is still striking how little direct attention they appear to have received from the JSDP. Apart from providing support to the drafting of a Local Courts Bill and a restatement programme around customary law (in Moyamba District), the JSDP has not prioritised support to Local Courts and traditional justice systems. The 2007 assessment quoted above notes that ‘the majority of disputes are resolved through the informal system outside the Local Courts (headmen, section chief, village elders or paramount chief). This is a weakness of the programme, which has put greater emphasis on formal justice institutions’ (JSDP OPR, April 2007). This circumstance ultimately reflects the difficulty of working directly with chiefs to change their practices. This is also reflected in assessments of the JSDP carried out in 2007, 2008 and 2009, where remarkably little space is devoted to this layer of primary powerbrokers in Sierra Leone’s local communities. There are several reasons for this, including the political context in which SSR is undertaken, pressure to achieve results, and lack of conceptual clarity (Albrecht and Buur, 2009). In 2009, DfID/Sierra Leone produced a document, proposing a ‘new intervention’, IASJP in Sierra Leone, which is meant to run for a three-year period until 2013. At the time of writing, the project design process has not taken place, but the document, outlining terms of reference for that process, suggests that the programme will place delivery of improved access to security and justice in Sierra Leone ‘at

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both the centre of our ongoing state-building and human development interventions’ (IASJP TOR, 2009). The document also suggests that among the six key threats to building sustainable peace in Sierra Leone is ‘a lack of individual or community legal redress or rights’ (IASJP TOR, 2009). The programme is expected to support achievements and the ongoing activities of the JSDP, which is described as ‘operating in several districts’ (IASJP TOR, 2009). The most important aspect of the document, however, is that for the first time in the context of Sierra Leone’s SSR process, there is a recognition in programme design documentation that informal security and justice providers are at least as vital as formal providers. However, apart from referring to ‘informal’ and ‘traditional’ security and justice service providers, and indicating that they will be consulted and engaged in the new programme, they are not dealt with in any depth. Therefore, even if paramount and sections chief and village headmen are not mentioned in this short document, it must be assumed that these are the actors that are referred to. For the first time it looks like Sierra Leone will have a programme that focuses on the ‘non-state’ and the ‘state,’ but what this will look like in practice, and what the impact will be, remains to be seen.

Conclusion Elections in 2002 were held in the immediate aftermath of conflict and in an environment that had not yet fully stabilised. Moreover, they were held when there was significant in-country security and logistics support from the UN. Even so, it was a testament to how far the SLP in particular had come that they were able to ensure that the elections were a success. The 2007 elections, on the other hand, held much greater challenges, both for the SLP and Sierra Leone’s security system as a whole. In simple terms, they operated with less ‘background security’ support. The SLP published their Election Strategy in April 2006, its main thrust being working with the National Security Architecture.52 At the strategic level, the ONS had initiated discussions by mid-2006 regarding the security needs of the electoral process. As the elections drew closer, the coordination forum provided by the ONS for the NEC, the SLP and other security institutions initiated a structured approach that covered all aspects of the elections throughout the entire process. In the rather tense atmosphere surrounding the elections ONS leadership was vital in ensuring that the Sierra Leonean security sector was

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capable of speaking with one voice and of coordinating its own response effectively. In the end the SLPP lost the elections to the APC and a new Government took over. When the situation at the end of the war in 2002 is considered, it is no mean feat to be able to conduct a fair and open election without significant violence and represents a very important milestone in the development of the security system since the end of the war. It becomes all the more significant when one considers that political buy-in to the security transformation process had all but dissolved by 2005 when the Government had assumed that security had been ‘done’, and National Security Committee meetings had not taken place for two years. While general commitment to the process may have been there, the 2007 general elections had become the main preoccupation of the political leadership. The success of the elections should not mask the ongoing issues within the security sector. In particular the role of the UK requires further strategic thinking, not least for sustainability reasons. Any strategic considerations on behalf of the UK into 2008 must involve the development of a strategy for its exit from the security system transformation process. This is an extremely difficult and sensitive process. The role of the UK in Sierra Leone, particularly for the last eight years, has created a strong tie between the two Governments. In some cases, the UK acts both as an important catalyst for change, but also as a guarantor of political independence amongst a set of institutions that became heavily politicised in the pre-war period and were all but destroyed during the conflict. Any exit strategy has to be planned carefully and phased in, so as to prevent the lack of oversight and civilian capacity across government leading to a further politicisation of organisations in a position to abuse power. If this occurs, Sierra Leone will find itself back in the same set of circumstances that led to the war in the first place. Moreover, as ONS and CISU create more distinct identities, what cooperation is going to look like needs to be carefully considered. This is all the more stark when the lack of resources is considered. Sierra Leone has no resources. The state is virtually bankrupt and it is almost entirely dependent on external resources both in terms of ongoing budget support and support for equipment and vehicles as well as for virtually all its capital budget. The only reason why the country is stable is that external resources provide funding. Unrealistic expectations of progress driven by planning imperatives of development agencies remain a key issue. As one participant notes: ‘We throw

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it into Sierra Leone and expect it to be sorted in three or four years. I think we need to be realistic with the time frames involved’.53 One of the key features of the successes in Sierra Leone is the long-term nature of the initial involvement of the UK and the MoU. This has been an unusually long commitment, but the result has been to instil confidence in the future that is all too absent in several other development environments. Once the period of the MoU is over, a return to a threeyear project cycle with the accompanying uncertainty could have a significantly negative effect on security sector confidence.54

6 Cross-Cutting Themes Throughout the Period in Sierra Leone and Beyond

This chapter goes on to discuss the key themes that come out of the experience of UK involvement in Sierra Leone. In particular it raises a number of questions about the overall external coordination of reforms and the relative roles of donor and recipient in the process of security sector reform. The experience of Sierra Leone is a particularly good example of intervention over a long period of time and the lessons learned from the experience have broader implications for donor interventions in general and for the importance of institutional memory and knowledge transfer. Much recent literature on state-building in Afghanistan,1 for example, emphasises the importance of more technical knowledge in carrying out reform, whereas the experience of Sierra Leone over a period of time, we believe, shows that whilst technical knowledge is important, ‘reading more management textbooks’ is no substitute for experience on the ground or a full political engagement in the processes that are being affected. In other words, technical and managerial expertise is a necessary but not sufficient condition for effecting actual change. The chapter begins by raising questions about the overall coordination and oversight of security institutions, the position of Whitehall and coordination between UK Ministries, planning and improvising in conflict conditions, the importance of local ownership and what that means in practice, financial management and sustainability, and the important role that key individuals can play in a transformation process. As such this chapter represents an analysis of the cross-cutting themes that run across the core historical narrative of what actually happened. This chapter is divided into sections. The first section discusses issues surrounding the UK’s involvement in the process that emerge from UK 171

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policy itself, including discussing technical and process issues, many of which changed as the process progressed and most of which remain relevant not only to SSR programmes, but also to development programmes overall. The next section discusses the issue of national ownership that has been critical to the success of Sierra Leone’s security system transformation. And last, we identify key issues in moving forward in Sierra Leone.

The difficulty of being an international donor: UK government issues There can be no doubt that one of the key reasons why the intervention in Sierra Leone was as successful as it was over a long period of time was buy-in to the process by key UK institutions and the consistent involvement of the UK over a long period of time. This was influenced by strong emotional and historic ties between the UK and Sierra Leone and by a vocal Sierra Leonean diaspora in the UK which was very effective at lobbying for political support for intervention and raising public awareness of the war. There were also a series of personal commitments to Sierra Leone by influential politicians who had some degree of connections to the country. Even the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, had a link through his father, who had been a school teacher in Sierra Leone in his youth. Indeed, apart from the decision to intervene in the Sierra Leone conflict, generally speaking, UK engagement in African affairs, was relatively limited in the first term (1997–2001) of the Labour Government.2 In many ways, therefore, Sierra Leone was a special case within UK policy towards Africa, notwithstanding later developments and interest on the continent. UK involvement had been growing in Sierra Leone during the war and it increased after the scandal resulting from the involvement of a former senior British Officer, Tim Spicer, and his private military company, Sandline, which was accused of organising an illegal arms shipment to the country in 1998. The arms shipment had been sanctioned, in part, by the then British High Commissioner in Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold, as an emergency support to a failing military. There was a clear understanding at the highest political level (as Robin Cook, Secretary of State, mentioned to David Richards at a chance meeting between the two immediately before the 2000 UK military deployment) that a similar situation could not occur again.3 Given that the then UK Government had proposed an ‘ethical foreign policy’, this scandal caused a significant amount of UK press attention and thus, a response

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from the UK Government, even though Penfold had acted to support a legitimate, democratically elected Government faced with a rebel group that was able to procure arms itself. The personality of the then Development Secretary, Clare Short, cannot be underestimated in terms of developing the political drive to intervene in Sierra Leone. As one UK Government source noted, she was ‘…almost an elemental force…she was very, very committed personally – she met Kabbah and took this upon herself as a kind of personal crusade’.4 It is hard to overestimate the power of personality at the centre of the UK’s commitment to Sierra Leone. Indeed, in Clare Short’s own words: And then, there were people like me, ringing Tony Blair, and – I think I was somewhere else in Africa, I can’t remember exactly where I was – and saying: ‘we must not go [i.e. leave Sierra Leone]’. Blair, to his credit, decided yes, they wouldn’t just evacuate and leave, but stay there, which is what they did.5 On a more pragmatic level, apart from the obvious moral imperative to aid Sierra Leone on the verge of conflict, there was also the perception that if the UK could not achieve its conflict prevention/stabilisation objectives in a country such as Sierra Leone, where, then, would the development instruments available to the UK Government be effective? The UK, therefore, saw much at stake in Sierra Leone, including exactly how it could put together its own strategy across a number of different UK departments and a continuing struggle to achieve joinedup Government in terms of overseas intervention. Although the High Commission is the principal political authority among UK institutions overseas, this was not reflected in the relationship between the High Commission, DfID and IMATT in Sierra Leone. Each organisation reported back to London separately, and ‘not necessarily in a single package…. In my view, we were all reporting to our own’.6 The lack of any one Department in charge meant that there was no ultimate responsibility or accountability vested with any one UK actor vis-à-vis the reform process. This led to a lack of leadership, with no one institution able to ‘get everybody together and say: right, what are we doing in-country? Is it joined-up? How do we report back to London to ensure that the various strings are being played?’7 This was arguably a personality issue, not necessarily one of process and procedure, but the fact remains that there was no one Department able to take the lead in taking forward the process in a coordinated manner. This is an issue

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across many external interventions, but is particularly prescient in a conflict or post-conflict situation where those involved in the intervention need to coordinate across several departments in the absence of a local equivalent of the Cabinet Office. Thus, coordination became a function of individuals collaborating effectively on the ground in the absence of an overall agreed framework or, in many cases, clear guidance and coordination from Whitehall. This type of coordination on the ground between individuals who recognised the need for it and were in a position to make a difference, became the hallmark of the early development of security sector reform. There was no guidance and no policy. Whereas the CCSSP Project Memorandum stated that the project would be linked to the SILSEP, the LDP and the AntiCorruption Programme, there was no indication of how this would be achieved. The failure to address project coordination, referred to in 2004, was also evident in the design of the LDP and SILSEP, and was effectively down to individuals. In hindsight it is easy to criticise such an approach, however, the context is critically important here. The situation on the ground was extremely unclear, the local military was collapsing and there was no intelligence. Effectively there was no knowledge about what was happening outside Freetown and Bo. The overall context, therefore, was one of continual crisis management, which placed extreme demands on time and did not allow for the luxury of planning horizons over several months, let alone planning based on meaningful data or baseline studies. In such a situation, Whitehall was unable to carry out its usual function of planning and programme control and far more de facto power was granted to individuals on the ground who needed to make decisions rapidly in the face of a constantly changing situation. There are clearly advantages and disadvantages to this approach. At its simplest where there were good people who understood the situation the decisions made were generally very good. However, at the same time, there were some people on the ground who were in difficulty, for one reason or another, and there were a number of decisions made that were less than optimal. The advantage that Sierra Leone had for much of the time of this study was that there were enough good people on the ground to keep the overall direction of the reforms going positively and these people were empowered to take decisions because they were not constrained by overarching frameworks. If there is one clear lesson to take from Sierra Leone for donors, it must be that getting the right people on the ground at the right time is critical, and these people, in order to be

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the ‘right’ people must be experienced and knowledgeable about their technical area and the politics surrounding it. This is also important because inexperienced people without these abilities find difficulty in taking decisions and also in maintaining any institutional memory within the intervention. It is true to say that in the case of Sierra Leone the level of engagement from the High Commission, DfID and IMATT on the ground all varied considerably with individuals who happened to be there and met at the ‘weekly prayers’.8 Indeed, the issue of institutional memory and the need for the creation of relationships is made more complex by the turnover of staff in the field. DfID’s average tenure is between two and three years, whereas IMATT commanders change annually, for example. This has created issues of lack of institutional memory, continuity and personality. The constant changes in personnel from the UK side, however, have created the situation where the institutional memory lies almost exclusively within the Government of Sierra Leone. Changes in IMATT were particularly difficult, given that each IMATT Commander came in with specific sets of aims and objectives. Many came from radically different backgrounds within the military and brought with them a variety of personal styles. This was particularly the case before Plan 2010 was produced in 2004, but also later on when questions around an exit strategy were brought up by one IMATT Commander and DfID Manager, but not taken up by their successors. In brief, getting up to speed became a real problem, which was also reflected in how output to purpose reviews and the evaluation of SILSEP in particular, were not necessarily picked up by successive staff coming in. How to retain and pass on institutional memory remains a real issue. In the early days, it was also certainly clear that the elevation of DfID to a new position and its development as a new Department clearly meant that it wanted a distinct identity, ‘we are DfID, we are not the Foreign Commonwealth Office’.9 This was true in London and it was true in Freetown. In addition, the move into more security focused activities was also a new activity set for DfID that proved to be problematic within the Ministry and continues to be the subject of considerable debate. At the same time, within Freetown, DfID did not have a full office with a senior DfID presence, which hampered DfID participation in debates within Sierra Leone. This was important given the level of localised decision-making that had to happen within the volatile security context, and the fact that several SILSEP staff were effectively involved in a conflict situation. Overall this also meant that planning and

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policy remained – at least nominally – in Whitehall, whereas operational decisions were being taken on the ground in Freetown. The fact that DfID managed its activities in Sierra Leone from Palace Street in London until 2005 clearly had consequences for coordination with the Government of Sierra Leone as well as FCO, represented by the High Commission, and MoD, represented by IMATT. In turn, this circumstance created some confusion in-country as to the actual role of DfID in Sierra Leone. The DfID representative in Sierra Leone during the years when the DfID office was in the High Commission compound ‘was more a management position than a decision-making position’.10 Pre-2005, before DfID devolved programme decision-making authority to Freetown, and as early as 2002, the need for a relatively senior DfID programme coordinator (based either in Freetown or visiting more regularly from London) to supplement the DfID Freetown office was emphasised.11 The purpose would be to build bridges between the various elements of the programmes put in place to transform the security system, as well as with London. Because of remoteness from theatre and bureaucratic hurdles in London, it was difficult to respond to urgent requests for help or contribute towards the resolution of problems in a timely and effective manner. This was compounded by long gaps between civilian advisor deployments. Relations between the team working in Freetown and London were always tense: ‘They (DfID in London) were unaware of the real issue and generally lived in the past…. They did not understand the dynamics of the Sierra Leone Civil Service’.12 Indeed, there was an acknowledgement of the fact that there was no professional resource in-country for project management and coordination of SILSEP specifically, and all the elements of security system transformation, generally speaking. In the early days, within DfID, there were also separate desks dealing with SILSEP and CCSSP, the CHAD and the GID, respectively. One important reality of the security system transformation process in Sierra Leone – or put differently, the collection of projects that were initiated in Sierra Leone around security-related issues – is that no overarching strategy guided efforts. The development of security system transformation in Sierra Leone was not a joined-up process, certainly in the early stages. Even by 2003 one UK Government official stated: ‘When I went to Sierra Leone at the end of 2000, what I was presented with was not a strategy, it was a vision. And, basically, I was told: “Make it up when you get out there”. When I asked about a blueprint

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for SSR, I was told: “Well, you are going to write it.” Effectively, we did.’13 In the absence of a strategic plan, it was clear that security system transformation was an evolving set of programmes, neither carefully planned nor sequenced. However, it is also clear that a vision was developing, however opaque, and that the group of people on the ground implementing its different parts were making decisions broadly in line with what has later come to be referred to as SSR, even if they did not always call it that. The UK’s involvement in Sierra Leone at the time was largely based on political motivation rather than technical needs assessments: ‘We could not – we, being the British – could not let this fragile, but democratically-elected government collapse. Now, I don’t think there was much theory behind that.’14 Indeed, Ms Short, referring to this period, put it: ‘I was just doing it because it was disgraceful. No one was planning anything.’15 This had an impact on the kind of activities that could realistically be undertaken at the time. There was no space to sit back and develop a strategy, since the country urgently needed support. UK intervention was very much shaped by consecutive crises prior to peace in 2002, particularly with a military junta in power from 1997–1998, the invasion of Freetown in 1999 and 2000, the RUF attacks on UNAMSIL, and so forth. UK staff had to try to react to that which forced them into action. Given this, it was not surprising that activities on the ground were not particularly joined-up. In fact a report written as early as 2002 concluded that in ‘…the absence of clear guidelines and precedents for SL-type situations, the strategy follows the pattern of needs as they occur and are recognized, rather than vice versa’.16 In 2002, when the MoU was signed between the Governments of Sierra Leone and the UK, a number of activities were outlined, effectively within a first phase of engagement. However, the MoU framed a ten-year commitment of the UK to spend £40 million a year and there was no re-evaluation of MoU commitments to adjust according to changing priorities. There was a vision, but no real evolving strategy to underpin that vision. The lack of an overarching strategy and a clear end-state also meant that the same concerns kept emerging again and again. For example, within the MoD, each time a new IMATT Commander was deployed he had to ask the same questions: This lack of overall vision: Where do we want to go with this? The end-state: when do we know when we’ve succeeded? When do we know that we have something that is good enough? Ultimately this

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boiled down to the issue of: – against what are we judging success? Are we judging success on the basis of people being able to make their own decisions? Are we judging people on their effectiveness? There are all sorts of criteria.17

Sierra Leone’s role in the establishment of the conflict prevention pools The different interventions in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s conflated with and impacted on the pooling of resources among MoD, FCO and DfID. Regarding the police, there were certain types of support that simply were not feasible with the funding streams available at the time. Rearming the SSD, for instance, would not have been possible, and indeed only happened in the late 1990s, because CCSSP staff went straight to the UK Chief of Defence Staff for support, albeit with DfID blessings.18 ‘Until then [when the GCPP and ACPP were established], we had steered away from anything to do with weaponry [support to the SSD came from MoD on the initiative of CCSSP staff]. Not that we [DfID] could do anything with weaponry, but at least the Conflict Pool mechanism got us into that.’19 The new 2001 Overseas Development Act and the establishment of the joint conflict pools were seen as enabling SILSEP to encompass activities, such as specialist training for intelligence services that were previously considered inappropriate for ODA funding. The inter-Departmental pool mechanism allowed for thinking about operational issues, including training for the Anti-Corruption Commission, Special Branch and FISU, which had been resisted by DfID. The division simply became that in those areas were there was a clear operational aspect to the training, funding was provided by the ACPP, rather than DfID, development funds. Prior to the integration provided by the pools, the UK Government was only able to draw on a relatively small pool of FCO funding; no ODA funding was available for many of the relevant activities. After the Abidjan peace agreement and democratic elections in 1997, the country was relatively peaceful and the window of opportunity was used by the UK Government. A number of projects were begun ‘to nurture the infant democracy, including the judiciary, police, the public sector, media and a military training programme, the budget was something like £150,000’.20 Following this, the patchwork of activities outlined in the narrative was enacted utilising different pools of support. However, in 2001 UK Government concluded that it could make coordination much more formal. The three relevant ministers, Clare Short (DfID), Jack Straw (FCO) and Jeff

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Hoon (MoD), jointly decided to establish two joint-funding mechanisms, the GCPP and the ACPP. In fact, the idea of the ACPP had initially come from DfID, immediately followed by the FCO’s idea of a GCPP. As recalled by Clare Short: Gordon Brown and the treasury came up with this idea, putting lumps of money up to encourage cross-departmental working so somebody in Africa Division said, let’s go for an Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, and we were up for it, we’d done some work on conflict in Africa. The idea then was that the Treasury would put in their £20 million (it wasn’t much) on the table and then the other Departments would match it, but then that money would be run jointly. The point from the Treasury’s point of view was leveraging better inter-departmental working. For us, of course, it meant, really getting into the policy-making, including the security services.21 The idea of the pools was to provide a formal indicator that the three departments were willing and able to work together, and, as such, they were at least partially positioned to respond to political pressure within Whitehall. The idea was that the accounting officers of the departments would remain accountable for the expenditure, whilst the Ministers engaged in joint policy decisions. Apart from the fact that each of the pools dealt primarily with post-conflict, rather than ‘conflict prevention’, there were additional problems in making the pools genuinely joined-up. In particular, the different cultures amongst the different ministries were exposed within the operational mechanism of the pools, as well as continuing bureaucratic obstacles to meaningful collaboration. While there might not have been a clearly outlined strategy for security system transformation process in Sierra Leone, meetings in the Cabinet Office about UK engagement in the country took place regularly. However, the evolution of joined-up work in Whitehall is a relatively recent phenomenon. In the days of ODA, the ‘…idea that you would have anything to do with “nasty” Ministry of Defence was deeply resisted’.22 At the same time, whilst resistance remains strong among development agencies to engage in security-related programming, it is important to recognise that people have travelled a long distance since 2000 in terms of working jointly: ‘This period will in the future be looked at, probably not as seismic, but as a quite significant shift in the whole ethos. The idea of being involved in intelligence is strange – I mean, talking to people in Vauxhall Cross, it was dangerous.’23

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Cabinet meetings aside, there was little evidence in 2007 of coherent cross-departmental strategic direction from the key departments in London.24 This could have a significant negative effect in terms of changes to current programming or on devising an exit strategy. Without a clear consensual notion of where Sierra Leone lies on the spectrum between a ‘post-conflict’ and ‘developing’ country contexts, it is difficult to make a proper assessment of whether executive roles of international staff should be considered or whether a developmental approach would be more appropriate. Similarly, the current lack of a clear definition of what the realistic end-state for Sierra Leone might be has made it difficult to properly assess which programmes to scale down or what actions are needed to allow for a measured handover of responsibilities over time. Political will and momentum in the UK and at country level will dictate future engagement.

Technical and process issues The experience of Sierra Leone’s security system transformation process is primarily one of individuals. In the absence of an overarching strategy and an unequivocal decision-making structure, the issue of personalities rises to the surface and becomes instrumental in achieving successes or failures. That was certainly the case in Sierra Leone. What made the transformation process so effective in Sierra Leone was the lucky combination of individuals who shared common views and approaches. It could, of course, have gone disastrously wrong. Whilst it is sometimes, at least conceptually, difficult to distinguish people from institutions and organisations in this way, it is clear from fieldwork involving workshops with most of the people engaged in security system transformation, that there is a great deal of mutual respect on all sides, even when there are strong differences of opinion. International advisers had unprecedented access to officials occupying key positions, both in Cabinet and the security sector. It ultimately boiled down to the personality of any given adviser whether he or she would be able to add value to the ongoing reform process: ‘Mr. President, might I add a word – and you add a word on the basis that hopefully it will be a good word, and if it is a good word, then next time you do that, everyone stops and listens’.25 The danger here is that the international adviser would end up usurping a role that essentially was meant for Sierra Leonean institutions and staff. At times, there was pressure from London to bypass the Sierra Leonean hierarchy, to ‘get things done’. It is also clear that there was a perception

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pressure, i.e. ‘if it doesn’t look like the UK, it is a failure’, which sometimes forced immediate decision-making. The effects of this personalitydriven approach could also have the undesirable effect of advisers working on different agendas. This was largely overcome in Sierra Leone by a significant critical mass of advisers working in a similar general direction and also by increasingly strong national ownership (see below) by a relatively stable team of Sierra Leonean counterparts. The role of the personality of the head of state, Kabbah, clearly is a key issue, and anything that has to do with SSR has to take that into account. Any SSR strategy must take the leading personalities into account. Kabbah had to be brought onboard. Part of this process was to identify those key individuals who we found capable and understood what we were driving at. The key was to convince both the President and the broader political environment that this was going to work.26 In fact, in all of this, the role of the President as an individual is frequently forgotten in much of the analysis of Sierra Leone. However, his personal commitment, until at least the latter part of the period when his attention turned to the upcoming elections, was constant. Indeed, it is to his credit that the room was made for many of these institutions to be established in the first place. Kabbah himself stated in a speech in May 2005 at the official launching of the Security Sector Review, together with two other SSR-related documents: As you are aware, my government, since the end of the civil conflict, has been faced with many challenges, including the need to transform the security sector to make it respond adequately to threats to the state and its citizenry, especially in the face of UNAMSIL’s final withdrawal. I also appreciate the creation of the enabling environment for poverty reduction. The underlying tenet is that security is the umbrella under which peace and development can thrive. It is therefore no accident that the Security Sector Review forms the detail of the first pillar of the PRSP – and this is for the first time ever.27 Within all of this, the critical role of the UK Government advisers was to act primarily as both catalysts and as guarantors of independence. It was clear that the role of the expatriate IGP, serving between 1999 and 2003, was one of instilling confidence in the public but also, critically, in the ranks of the police, particularly the lower ranks, of whom a lot

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was expected. The main benefit of an international adviser to the ONS was also independence. In an organisation that in popular perception could have easily succumbed to political interference, the presence of an international adviser acted as an important symbol of political independence, and protector of the independence of the National Security Coordinator in the conduct of his work. Apart from the obvious protection role played, there was also a key role of instilling confidence within a system that had completely broken down during the 1990s. Acting as a catalyst is frequently an underrated role, but it is a critical one. In a system that needs to look hard at itself, an outsider can frequently say and do things that would be unacceptable to local staff. Initiating a process of open criticism can then lead to systems beginning to reconstruct themselves, construct internal cultures and therefore evolve. There is significant evidence of this in some parts of the Sierra Leonean Government now; this is a tangible positive effect of international involvement over the past ten years.

Financial management A critical issue throughout the period covered in the narrative has been the challenge of financial management, which has been, and continues to be, centrally controlled through the MoF. Financial management systems in Sierra Leone require departments to make bids for funds in line with costed strategies and plans. However, financial allocations from the MoF tend to be based on last year’s allocation rather than bids presented. In addition, indicative ceilings and final allocations would, as a rule, fall well below bids and earlier allocations. This circumstance, impacting across the civil service, may boil down to the general lack of available resources, but it has severe repercussions for strategic planning. The allocation process is complicated by the fact that funds are released gradually through the financial year. This gradual release of funds is neither consistent nor predictable. This means that funding released in the final quarter, for example, might be significantly above that released in, say, the second quarter. Inconsistency within the financial system makes budgeting particularly difficult and even in a well-functioning department like the MoD, the motivation to plan properly is significantly undermined when existing plans are frequently stalled as a consequence of the inconsistent release of funds.28 These circumstances are compounded by two additional issues. Firstly, reallocation of funds is not possible without the permission of the MoF;

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even if the MoD wishes to make a decision over funding during the budget year, it cannot do so without permission. Secondly, the unpredictable nature of funding also applies to certain types of donor funding that may not appear in the official defence budget, e.g., certain types of equipment. Apart from the unpredictability of this expenditure, its off-budget nature has also led to its invisibility to the MoF, who, since its budgets are based on the previous year, will not include the expenditure in its estimates. Over time, this also leads to a significant resource gap between actual consumption and budgeted figures, weakening the potential sustainability of initiatives. For the Government, revenue collection lies at the heart of sustainable fiscal policy. This became evident as ‘donor fatigue’ began to be felt in Sierra Leone, especially given the expenditure requirements of the PRSP. It was clear however, that while revenue collection had improved in absolute terms from US$123 million collected in 2003 to US$145 million by 2005, revenue collection had remained relatively static as a proportion of GDP. In 2003 it had been 12.4% and by 2005 it was 12.2%.29 While the challenges to the economy remain substantial and entirely unrelated to the security sector, in and of themselves they are potentially destabilising. Weak capacities in tax administration, a relatively narrow revenue base, high levels of inflation and domestic and external debts still threaten to cripple government. Indeed, during 2006, a growing deficit in security sector funding was detected. As noted above, almost all increases were in the off-budget segment of the expenditure. These circumstances have directly impacted one of the key concerns raised at the very beginning of this narrative: the conditions of personnel service in the security sector itself, and across MDAs more broadly. In 2003, it was assessed that the disparity in conditions of service between pay and emoluments received by uniformed personnel and civilian staff employed at the same grade level was a clear source of discontent.30 In the second half of 2006, it was assessed that annual wage increases were below inflation – around 10% each year. Whilst modest gains had hitherto been made, improvement of the fiscal situation was vital. Because of the slow speed with which general tax reform initiatives such as the introduction of value-added tax (VAT) was undertaken, ‘efforts through the security sector to foster an enabling environment for the private sector’ appeared ‘all the more justified; to move progressively towards a virtuous cycle’.31 And, indeed, during 2006, the ONS and CISU were focusing increasingly on security measures that would be revenue enhancing, e.g., through the consideration of strengthening integrated border management and maritime policing. In other words,

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apart from ensuring national security, there may be ways in which security actors can be explicitly engaged in economic recovery and generation.

The critical importance of national ownership One of the key reasons why the security system transformation process stayed on track in Sierra Leone was that citizens as well as leaders bought into the overall idea of UK engagement in the country. In short, ‘there was no appetite to go back. It worked because the local population wanted us [the UK] to be there.’32 Indeed, had this fundamental buy-in not existed, ‘it would not necessarily be the success story that it has become’.33 For obvious reasons, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, security remained a top priority. At the state opening of Parliament on 22 May 1999, President Kabbah noted that ‘I take the security of this country as my number one priority and intend to pursue this objective with all necessary vigour.’ Similarly at the state opening of Parliament on 11 June 1999, Kabbah adopted ‘peace, security and development’ as his theme, pointing out that in ‘developed countries of the world, peace and security had provided the foundation for their progress’ and that in Sierra Leone ‘human needs and human security must be the basis for our development’.34 As is evident from this narrative, there were fundamental obstacles, including political interests, standing in the way of establishing well-functioning security sector institutions. However, it is also evident that at the executive level there was the political will to allow security institutions to be established as part of immediate post-conflict reconstruction (the MoD and ONS being cases in point). There are several important features of the local ownership issue within Sierra Leone that deserve further attention. First, it is impossible to overestimate the importance of finding capable people at both the national and the international levels. National ownership requires some confidence on the part of the external actors, but also a degree of control on behalf of the national owners. In Sierra Leone, there has been a core group of individuals who have exercised collective ownership of the transformation process, even when they have had internal disagreements. Most importantly, on both international and national sides, there has been a critical mass of good people who have managed to keep the process going, also under extremely trying circumstances. At a political level, there has been powerful and consistent buy-in to the overarching principle of security system transformation by the President and senior civil servants. This leadership has been important

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not only in terms of its ability to accept occasional intervention by its international partners, but also in terms of developing a professional environment and garnering public support for the security system. Critically, there has also been a pool of operations personnel at senior ranks of the army, intelligence and police, who have managed the process very effectively, including the interface with external advisers, throughout the whole time period covered in this article. Secondly, the overall direction of the process has been driven by consistency within a core group of Sierra Leonean actors. Whereas international staff changed frequently, many of the key Sierra Leonean staff engaged in the process remained remarkably consistent. While the role of international advisers cannot be underestimated, it is incorrect to conclude that the security system transformation process was simply ‘externally driven’. It is Sierra Leoneans, not external actors, who have invested almost a decade – or longer – in the process of transforming the security system and with it, the country as a whole. This continuity over a significant period of time has meant that a number of the key drivers of the process remained in place and provided both policy and operational consistency.

Sierra Leonean continuity and oversight This continuity of Sierra Leonean staff, holders of valuable institutional memory, has also enabled the GoSL to manage external donor relationships coherently and increased trust between UK and GoSL actors. This smoothly working UK-GoSL relationship was also aided by the UK’s consistent support and the absence of other significant donors. Of course, there is a danger in this particular approach, in that a small group of powerful individuals can have the political and financial clout to see their decisions implemented, while hijacking the process and preventing other input. This is a particular concern in a young democracy with few consolidated checks and balances. While this is a point well taken, our rejoinder to it relative to Sierra Leone is ‘what other choice is/was there?’ The development of civil society as an effective oversight mechanism in Sierra Leone has been driven in part by some of the institutions encompassed by the security system. In particular, the ONS and SLP have been instrumental in engaging civil society through institutions like the PROSECs, DISECs and LPPBs, but the RSLAF have also sought to engage the public in terms of improving public perceptions of the army. The results from the survey produced in support of the project

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that this article is based on indicate clearly that these efforts have had a positive impact. Generally speaking, Sierra Leoneans no longer feel threatened by the army or the SLP, whereas before the transformation process started, they certainly did. This change in popular perception, while not conclusive, indicates that the engagement with civil society has had at least some success. It is worth pointing out here, however, that only in 2006 was a structured attempt made to engage civil society as part of the programming in support of the country’s security system transformation process. Civil society’s security system oversight role is still in the nascent stage. By far the least developed element of oversight within is at the political, including parliamentary, level. Due to issues with and between Ministries and Ministers and the lack of functioning parliamentary structures, one of the key oversight mechanisms within the Government is the ONS. The question remains, however: who monitors the ONS? In the longer term, the issue of ONS oversight may become politically risky. Without proper parliamentary oversight and UK support, the security system may be hindered from developing into a truly democratically-led set of institutions.

The continuing role of the UK in the security sector Particular ways of doing things in reform programmes frequently take on lives of their own with unintended downstream consequences. The advantage of carrying out research over a long time – in this case ten years – is that some of these downstream consequences are revealed. In the case of Sierra Leone several core themes have developed that will require additional support or work as the reforms develop. Certainly in the early stages, the development of security system transformation in Sierra Leone was not a joined-up process and there is still a legacy of this lack of coherence. Rivalry between some political institutions may have calmed down following the elections in August 2007, (while always remaining a significant threat), but these rivalries remain between security institutions and between security and nonsecurity political and government organisations, and tensions remain between, for example, military and civilian staff within the MoD. The ONS continues to be a key actor in the security architecture and yet, despite all of the developments over ten years, there remains a need for a UK adviser to protect the organisation from accusations of political bias and to continue to effectively act as guarantor of political independence. Indeed, although unfounded, an indication of the

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general mistrust of security institutions is the frequent appearance of accusations of political bias that appear in local media. Ironically, one of the other key issues affecting the security sector is probably the lack of interest shown by politicians. In many ways the security sector reform process has been a victim of its own success, with a prevailing mood amongst many politicians that security has ‘been done’ and security is ‘solved’ in Sierra Leone. The agenda does need to move on, particularly to economic development issues, but this attitude represents a risk to the security sector as a whole, particularly if UK support is cut back. This raises the issue of sustainability of many of the reforms that have taken place. At the minute, IMATT and the UK advisors provide a guarantee of sorts, of political independence and a reassurance regarding capacity of the security services. However, this has meant that Government has been able to leave the security sector alone. This lack of commitment towards the end of the period of study is a risk in that several of the overarching oversight mechanisms involved in providing civil control, have not been operational in practice even if they exist on paper. If the poor economic situation continues there is clearly a security risk created by large pools of unemployed youth in particular. Without a clear commitment from Government or the external agencies willingness to maintain, a questionably sustainable security apparatus, a decline in services provided by the security infrastructure is likely. The key threat here is probably the growth of criminality and associated criminal gangs since their economic power makes them relatively influential and also able to soak up the unemployed. This is clearly a threat on a regional level, not just a national one, particularly given the increase in cocaine and other drugs coming in from Latin America and supplementing the extensive West African transit of heroine from South and South East Asia.35 Given the regional nature of the series of conflicts within the 1990s and early 2000s, it is important to the region as a whole that the security institutions of each country are able to operate. From the point of view of an international donor, maintaining them at the current level may in fact be cheaper than allowing them to collapse again, thus plunging an entire region into violence and provoking another military intervention.36 This quasi-imperial strategy could further be enhanced by encouraging increased regional security mechanisms, including joint security strategies, liaison over intelligence and also through the development of ECOWAS as a regional security player.

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The issue of backing individuals has resulted in a group of Sierra Leonean staff which is committed to security system transformation, individuals who have excellent relationships with their international counterparts. However, the downside to this approach is that a great deal is invested in these specific individuals. This is probably less problematic in the SLP and RSLAF, where there has been a huge effort to deliberately construct a cohort of capable officers. In the intelligence architecture in particular, the success of the ONS relies on a very small group of people; how long these individuals can be expected to continue in these roles and who would succeed them is an ongoing issue. In the case of intelligence, so much relies on culture that it is impossible to simply build a cohort of intelligence officers to take over. It is inevitable that some form of international support needs to continue to ensure their independence. Similarly, in the case of civilian oversight of defence, institutional memory in the MoD goes back to 1999; with only a few civil servants trained to staff the Ministry, the civil-military balance is inevitably fragile. At the same time, having said that the SLP and RSLAF are operational – which they are – issues of sustainability have haunted many of the developments over the whole time period. It is clear that the current establishment of the RSLAF is too big and ambitions for greater capability may well be the result of raised expectations rather than planning based on sound principles of revenue or sustainability. The question of sustainability raises the difficult issue of an exit strategy. At some point, the long-term commitment of the MoU with the UK will need to be replaced, but the danger is that a rapid removal of support for the security sector will destroy the confidence built up over the previous ten years. In practice, this would result in a situation where poor economic conditions are compounded by an unsustainable security sector where conditions of service decline and there are few prospects for servicemen outside the military or police. Different models for sustained advisory support could be considered, which is not institutionally or programmatically embedded in IMATT or SILSEP, but centred around a team of advisors with experience in different areas of relevance to the institutions that comprise the security system.37 Indeed, this may be the most realistic way of constructing an exit strategy, while ensuring that ‘political space’ is maintained to continue Sierra Leone’s security system transformation process.

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Does the UK have a practicable exit strategy? One of the critical questions that remains after ten years of intervention is how much longer the UK is prepared to spend engaged in continually reforming the Sierra Leone security system and directly engaging in security support for that sector. It is perhaps surprising to note, given the usual time-span of development programmes, that the idea of the UK exiting at all from Sierra Leone was only really thought about late in the day. In late 2006 a working group was formed to develop a workable model for a future programme merging IMATT and SILSEP and working across all of the security architecture. The initial authors of this proposed Integrated Security Advisory and Training Team (ISATT) left shortly after setting up the working group and their successors in DfID, the High Commission and IMATT failed to fully agree to the proposed structure. Consequently the ISATT was not taken forward at that point in time. What did come out of the discussions however was an agreement that the next phases of SSR in Sierra Leone needed to involve closer working and coordination between IMATT, SILSEP, JSDP and the High Commission. A security sector coordinator was appointed to both fulfil this role, coordinating UK Government activities and act as an adviser to the ONS. The UK did not begin exit planning around security-related programming in that point in time as it was widely expected that SILSEP would be extended to give time for greater funding and ownership of the programme post-elections by the Government of Sierra Leone. DfID had recently signed a joint country strategy with the EU committing them to increase support to health, water and education and draw down programme in minerals and security. The rationale for this change in direction was the human development statistics in Sierra Leone, including the highest infant and maternal mortality rates in the world, and the state of stability and peace in the country. The argument followed that long-term stability could only be guaranteed if citizens were given basic services and opportunities, the lack of which had led to widespread dissatisfaction and the start of the civil war to begin with. In fact, much of the debate and, indeed, discussion of the war itself effectively revolved around social exclusion and alienation of large parts of the community. Much of the ONS security information and planning also showed that the concerns of people on the ground were changing from immediate security concerns like the RUF and moving towards ‘traditional’ development threats, including crime, unemployment and governance. Consequently, although drawing

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down security-related programming, DfID’s new direction was focused on service delivery to reduce poverty and prevent a return to conflict. In autumn of 2007, the result of the resource allocation round was announced, and DfID Sierra Leone was given a lower than expected budget. This led to a cost-cutting exercise, the result of which was a decision to reduce spends in 2008/09 by accelerating the direction laid out in the Joint Country Strategy for Sierra Leone (JCSP), developed with the EU. At the same time, the Head of DfID Sierra Leone made the decision to not extend SILSEP post-2007. A bid was submitted to the ACPP, which was accepted, giving, as a point of departure, one extra year of support to ONS and CISU primarily. However, it was becoming clear that the issue of sustainability and of an acceptable exit strategy was to dominate discussions within the UK Government for some time. In parallel with these developments, as part of the process of beginning the development of an exit strategy, meetings were held across the UK Government and with ONS, CISU and the MoF on how to ensure sustainability of the institutions established under SILSEP since 1999, including Government of Sierra Leone ownership and funding. The APC Government was finding its feet, and the core priority of the ONS was to prove its effectiveness. With this in mind, the ONS submitted a budget for the use of ACPP funding to DfID, and instigated discussions with the Ministry on funding after March 2009. A big focus of ONS, as already noted in this book, was revenue generation, for instance by increasing capacity of the Joint Maritime Authority, and by supporting the combat of trafficking. DfID also made a subsequent bid to the ACPP to build new accommodation for ONS and CISU allowing them to move outside of State House, and create a physical space for the organisations’ continuity post-DfID support. Recognising the urgent need for an exit strategy, in early 2008, the UK Government began work on a strategy for UK government reduction of support to security-related programming. This time, rather than an ISATT, IMATT would follow its proposed glide path and DfID and the High Commission would complement the glide path through reducing budget support and advisory support gradually over the coming three years. Each subsequent bid to what had now become one collective Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP), rather than a GCPP and an ACPP, would match the SSR transition strategy which would be an annex to the overall UK strategy for Sierra Leone. The bid for 2009–2010 was a single bid from UK agencies in Sierra Leone, which requested funding against this agreed exit strategy. The exit strategy will be shared widely

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with the Government of Sierra Leone, in particular the MoF and ONS, to ensure that it will be able to take over UK support as it is drawn down.38

Conclusions: Whither the security reforms in Sierra Leone? There are a number of core themes that have recurred over time and have importance for both the development of Sierra Leone itself, but also for the development of SSR more generally. National ownership and engagement is critical. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of local ownership. Experience shows that it was the Sierra Leonean team that provided the continuity, with only a few external advisers remaining in country for substantial periods of time. Consistent political leadership and support was also present to drive through reforms. Good, capable and committed senior staff have been critical. It is incorrect to say that the whole process has been externally driven, even if elements have clearly been so and the question remains one of balance between local and external control. The danger in maintaining a strong core group of leaders of the process is that once the support mechanisms are removed, then this group becomes extremely powerful. In addition, its removal removes much of the institutional memory of the reform process itself. This is a particular concern in a young democracy with few consolidated checks and balances. In practice, however, there may not be many alternatives to a core team. Engaging civil society is valuable and was operationalised in various ways in Sierra Leone. The police and intelligence services have engaged civil society in a decentralised fashion, whereas the army sought to improve public perceptions. Initial evidence from Sierra Leone shows that this has worked in the sense that generally people no longer feel threatened by security services, whereas before the transformation they certainly were. By far the least-developed element of oversight within is at the political, including parliamentary, level. Due to issues with and between Ministries and Ministers and the lack of functioning parliamentary structures, one of the key oversight mechanisms within the Government is the ONS. The question remains, however: who monitors the ONS? In the longer term, the issue of ONS oversight may become politically risky. Without proper parliamentary oversight and UK support, the security system may be hindered from developing into a truly democratically-led set of institutions.

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Individuals have played an important role in developing SSR in Sierra Leone. This is at least in part a reaction to the lack of a coherent UK Government strategy, which drove a series of disagreements on the ground among UK officials. It is easy in hindsight to trace smooth policy developments, but, briefly much of the policy direction was enabled by the creation of joint funding pools in Whitehall and decision-making of individuals on the ground who were empowered to take professional decisions and who needed to act relatively quickly. There was no overarching SSR strategy at the beginning, just a desire to reconstitute a state and security for the population. Another significant aspect of UK collaboration was the signing of a MoU in 1997, a long-term agreement between the two countries scheduled to last until 2012. Because UK engagement was primarily the result of a coalition of high-level British politicians who were committed to a country they felt could not be allowed to fall further into chaos, there was strong pressure on UK Ministries to work together on Sierra Leone. It should also be emphasised how atypical this is just in UK approaches alone, let alone in the whole donor community. Sierra Leone’s current situation is one where the population are undoubtedly better off before or during the conflict, but the country remains at the bottom of the Human Development Index. Consequently, there are real issues about whose security has actually been secured in broad terms if most of the local population still suffer from insecurity as a result of economic conditions, rising crime and lack of access to basic services. The UN and UK intervened over a long period of time and ten years of sustained investment and work have still left some aspects of SSR unfinished, particularly aspects of democratic accountability and civil oversight. I would argue that a core lesson to take from Sierra Leone is that a three- or five-year project cycle is not enough to change a political culture, certainly without other changes, such as the economy, remaining relatively static. One of the remarkable features of the UK’s intervention in Sierra Leone is how atypical it is. Effectively three Ministers got together and decided that this one country could not fall. They then crafted a MoU for ten years effectively providing not only a security guarantee but also a commitment to rebuild a state more or less from scratch. In fact, as DfID’s own Evaluation Report of September 2008 points out, this MoU remained the only official document setting out DfID’s strategic intentions between 2002 and 2007.39 The threat of returning to some form of violent conflict remains, particularly in the countryside. In urban areas, public concern about

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street crime underscores the need to address the issue of youth unemployment. As in many countries, Sierra Leone is experiencing the issue of unemployed young men becoming the ‘foot soldiers’ of an increasing number of criminal gangs, particularly in the drug trade, and increasing the incidence of street crime. Given the weakness of Sierra Leone following the war, the development of gangs happened relatively rapidly and whilst security has improved, there is no way in which the total security system transformation process could be said to have been ‘completed’, even after ten years. The importance of the justice sector remains an outstanding issue in Sierra Leone. It is clear that for most people in Sierra Leone justice is local; it involves a wide range of non-formal and semi-formal conflictresolution mechanisms, including village elders, religious figures and chiefs. However, reports from across Sierra Leone suggest that some of these mechanisms result in controversial land allocations, an extremely sensitive issue that was one of the social causes of the war. This is likely to remain an issue as long as the chiefs elected for life by a limited suffrage, stand as custodians of the land. Justice reforms need to pay more attention to non-formal justice mechanisms, whilst at the same time encouraging an accessible legal system and rebalancing state-building and SSR. Lastly, the issue of sustainability remains critical and may also leads to a clash between external actors and national owners of the process. It is inevitable that there will be differences between perceptions of what is or is not sustainable in the long run, as well as what operational capability is required or feasible. Like much of SSR this is due in part to questions of political balance and pragmatism and, at some level, of balancing realistic strategic planning with plans that amount to ‘wish lists’. There may be hard decisions to be made about the form and function of defence and policing infrastructures, vehicles and equipment that will need strong leadership at the top. However, there must also be commitment from external donors to retrain and reconfigure security institutions that are fit for purpose, as opposed to mirrors of security systems in the donor country. In fact this sustainability question has to be asked at a number of levels. Firstly, there is the simple question of affordability and whether or not the external donor can continue to support a particular set of reforms, but also whether an establishment of a particular size is feasible for a country like Sierra Leone. Does Sierra Leone really need a military of the current size if it cannot raise the revenue to support it? Secondly, there is the question of whether a quasi-imperial solution of

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widespread posting of UK military and civilian staff is feasible or desirable over a long period of time. Lastly, there is the question of whether it may be cheaper in the long run to continue to ensure security of the Sierra Leonean state and its people rather than letting it collapse and then intervening from scratch.

7 Conclusions

Introduction The key indicator of the success of security system transformation in Sierra Leone has been taken as the conducting of a general election in 2007 without violence. This was the first time a peaceful election had been held since before the war in the 1990s. Even before that elections had been marred by significant violence and intimidation and many people who voted in 2007 had never voted in a peaceful election. This is a significant achievement given the extreme levels of violence experienced by the people of Sierra Leone for a long period of time. However, poverty levels in the country today remain significant and the country’s institutional reforms are still in the nascent stage. Statistically, Sierra Leone is a poor country anchored in the bottom few countries in the UNDP’s Human Development Index. Until the 2009 index, Sierra Leone ranked 177 out of 177 countries. In 2009 this has improved to 180 out of 182, with only Niger and Afghanistan below Sierra Leone.1 Whilst Purchasing power parity GDP per capita is around $679, life expectancy is only 47.3 years, and there is a 30% probability of living until 40 years old. The adult illiteracy rate is over 60% and the female literacy rate is half the male. Through almost any measure Sierra Leone remains a very poor country, which rather begs questions regarding the ‘success’ of the external intervention. At the same time, there can be no doubt that most Sierra Leoneans are far better off in 2010 than they were in the late 1990s. This sense that the country is more secure and thus more capable of conducting democratic processes such as a peaceful election is due in large part to the palpable sense of personal security that Sierra Leoneans feel today. 195

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The question is, of course, whether this is enough, if economic development does not follow suit, and if there is not more equitable distribution of wealth within the country. What happened in Sierra Leone from the late 1990s until 2007 can only be described as a transformation both internally but also externally in terms of how the relationship between security and development changed. This is not entirely down to Sierra Leone, of course, but the experience of this country coming as it did before the experiences of ‘armed state-building’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, influenced policy in terms of integrating systems of reforms that had previously been militant in their separation. In particular, the linking of development to the reform of security services, including intelligence, was something that had been tried in South Africa, but the UK led these changes within Sierra Leone and then applied these lessons, or perceived lessons, elsewhere. Sierra Leone’s uniqueness in this regard lies in the fact that neither diplomacy, military power nor development were dominant, but integrated into one package of delivery. As ‘armed statebuilding’ exercises, Iraq and Afghanistan have been fundamentally different. The transformation itself could not have happened without the intervention of the international community, particularly the UN and the UK and the leadership provided by a core of remarkably consistent Sierra Leonean government officials. Both national and international leaders instituted, guided and managed system-wide reforms and tackled huge problems of reform over a long period of time and often in difficult circumstances. It was this coherence that led to the development of a bundle of policies known in the international community as SSR. Indeed, Sierra Leone is frequently seen as the example of SSR despite its failings and the fact that lessons that are frequently cited as originating within Sierra Leone probably did not. The core purpose of the research that led to this book was to recreate a narrative that represented the twists and turns of security transformation as they unfolded drawing on those who were intimately involved at the time. The research that informed this book draws on a number of people who were involved at various times in the security transformation process within Sierra Leone. It has aimed to highlight the breadth of institutions involved in this transformation and exactly what constitutes an area that might be called ‘security governance’ within the broader ‘security-development nexus’. Sierra Leone is a pivotal example of the development of SSR and the UK Government’s use of the term to develop and then advocate a particular view of security and development. This

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is broadly labelled as the ‘securitisation’ of development, but relates as much to the ‘developmentisation’ of security as seen from a MoD viewpoint. Despite its very effective PR, Sierra Leone is not as straightforward a case as has been suggested. In fact, one of the aims of this book has been to show that the Sierra Leone reforms were not only improvised to some extent, but that they predated the advent of SSR as a coherent policy approach. At the same time, SSR did not really exist as a set of policies within Sierra Leone until relatively late on in the process and it was driven by people on the ground who could see the links, rather than by policy officers in Whitehall or, indeed, academics. In fact a defining characteristic of the Sierra Leone story is its very particularism – the importance of context which we will turn to below, but also the fact that many of the key elements of reforms in Sierra Leone have not been applied elsewhere as part of SSR. The stand-out example of this is the long-term MoU with Sierra Leone committing the UK to longertime horizons. The history of the spiralling decline of the security situation in Sierra Leone is critical to the overarching context of what has been achieved through transformation of the country’s security system. A spiral that started in the 1960s and reached its nadir in 1997 cannot be reversed by a three- or five-year development programme. This is at the heart of the reforms that eventually produced security system transformation in Sierra Leone. The pattern of international assistance that developed was one of fire-fighting at first, moving to increasingly medium-term programmes within an overall framework of long-term commitment to Sierra Leone. It is important to point out that the Sierra Leonean experience is heavily contextualised. For example, virtually all the government infrastructure, including buildings and records, had been either destroyed or overrun by the RUF. UNAMSIL and the UK were in a position to support the Government of Sierra Leone in establishing basic security across the country but those charged with rebuilding the country were faced with a situation where basic security institutions had effectively ceased to function. In the area of intelligence, for example, international and Sierra Leonean officials literally sat around a meeting table and designed an entire intelligence system from scratch. This type of very basic reconstruction of institutions was not limited to intelligence; it was repeated across several other security institutions, including the MoD. This level of starting with a blank sheet of paper is very rare in post-conflict or development environments and may explain why, in the particular case

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of Sierra Leone’s security system, non-state actors such as paramount chiefs were only involved to a limited degree, e.g. in the Provincial and District Security Committees (PROSECs and DISECs) and the LPPBs. Specifically, although the creation of any governance system is ultimately political, the fact that several of the Government’s administrative functions had ceased to exist or had been severely weakened meant that there was relatively less friction and resistance within the civil service than there could have been. Resistance occurred, of course, but it was relatively minor, because there were so few civil servants left. This is not meant to belittle the reconstruction efforts, but it does mean that the Sierra Leone experience may be very different from similar programmes in other countries and that careful attention should be paid to policy transfer carried out in widely different contexts. Whilst the immediate security threat of the RUF had largely dissipated by 2000, the country was faced with a number of additional security issues. These included unstable borders and neighbours, the lack of a security infrastructure and discredited security institutions. In addition, the war had produced a rapidly urbanised population with no immediate prospects for improved economic status, a population that was about to be increased markedly by large numbers of ex-combatants who had been involved in extreme violence during Sierra Leone’s conflict. Fortunately, at the Government level there was a very powerful consensus for reform and reconstruction that incorporated political figures, senior operational leaders and the external community. The commitment of a core team of Sierra Leonean leaders, at political and senior civil service levels, was absolutely critical in driving the reform process and exercising national ownership. Indeed, while international advisers, programme managers and officers came in for short periods of time, it was the Sierra Leoneans themselves who effected positive change. The role of the external community in Sierra Leone is noteworthy in that the UK provided clear leadership, and crucially, was somewhat accepted in this role by the Sierra Leonean executive. As the dominant donor country by a considerable margin, the UK exhibited a remarkable lack of many external harmonisation issues that have occurred in other post-conflict contexts. The leadership provided by the UK, backed up by military involvement, proved critical in establishing credibility not only with the Sierra Leonean population and Government, but also with the international community.

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Key issues and themes emerging from Sierra Leone Several issues arise within interventions that take place over long periods of time. In terms of Sierra Leone, there are a number of core themes that recur over time and have importance for both the development of Sierra Leone itself, but also for the development of SSR more generally. This list does not claim to be exhaustive, but represents some of the conclusions drawn from the research undertaken for the project on security system transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007.

The importance of national ownership and engagement One of the core lessons from Sierra Leone has been that national ownership can become critical from a series of viewpoints, but that this issue may not be straightforward. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of finding capable people at both national and the international levels. National ownership requires some confidence on the part of external actors, but also a degree of control on behalf of national owners. In Sierra Leone, there has been a core group of individuals who have exercised collective ownership of the transformation process, even when they have had internal disagreements. Most importantly, on both international and national sides, there has been a critical mass of good people who have managed to keep the process going under extremely trying circumstances. At the political level, there has been powerful and consistent buy-in to the overarching principle of security system transformation by the President and senior civil servants, reinforced by a number of public pronouncements. This leadership has been important not only in terms of its ability to accept occasional intervention by its international partners, but also in terms of developing a professional environment and garnering public support for the security system again enhanced by the development of positive partnerships with civil society organisations and representative groups, including international NGOs such as Conciliation Resources. Critically, there has also been a pool of operations personnel at senior ranks of the army, intelligence and police, who have managed the process very effectively (including interface with external advisers) throughout the whole time period covered by this project, 1997–2007. Indeed, the process of reform itself included the promotion of usually younger officers who not only were promoted on merit rather than patronage, but also had some loyalty to the new system that promoted them.

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The overall direction of the process has been driven by consistency within the core group of Sierra Leonean actors, particularly within the police, army and intelligence. This created a long-term institutional memory, but also a high level of trust within that group and their UK advisers. However many international staff changed frequently and came and went (International Military Assistance Training Team/ IMATT commanders in particular). While the role of international advisers cannot be underestimated, it is incorrect to simply conclude that the process was ‘externally driven.’ It is Sierra Leoneans, not external actors, who have invested almost a decade – or longer – in the process of transforming the security system and with it, the country as a whole. In fact, on at least one occasion, a UK IMATT adviser made himself so unpopular that the Sierra Leone team effectively ignored him for his short period of tenure and then continued once a new commander arrived. This continuity over a significant period of time has meant that a number of the key drivers of the process remained in place and provided both policy and operational consistency. This continuity of Sierra Leonean staff, holders of valuable institutional memory, has also enabled the GoSL to manage external donor relationships coherently and increased trust between UK and Sierra Leonean actors. This smooth working UK-Sierra Leone relationship was also aided by the UK’s consistent support and the absence of other significant donors.

Risks and oversight There is a risk in establishing a tight-knit group of senior security officers which effectively controls security within a country. This may then be exacerbated when the political authorities effectively regard security as ‘having been done’, as happened in the latter period of security transformation. A reliance on the UK advisers to keep the security institutions in line with international practice and a depoliticised stance within the country has meant that the political elements of SSR have not developed as rapidly as the technical aspects of security. With few checks and balances in a young democracy this has to be a core concern for development more generally, but governance more particularly. There is a counter argument to this that asks – quite realistically – what alternative was there? At the beginning of the process there were very few functioning institutions and very few respected individuals remaining within the security services. Those who took on the leadership roles commanded respect because they stayed during the

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conflict and had been seen to be performing their duty when many were not. In the case of the head of the ONS, he was seen as being biased by both sides, which meant that the UK advisers stood by his integrity as head of that critical unit – something that brought longerterm benefits for the security system as a whole. In the absence of a functioning political system (the elections did not take place until the end of the process, remember) and a weak civil society, precisely who was meant to provide oversight if it wasn’t the UK staff on the ground? The development of civil society as an effective oversight mechanism in Sierra Leone has been driven in part by some of the institutions encompassed by the security system. In particular, the ONS and SLP have been instrumental in engaging civil society through institutions like the PROSECs, DISECs and LPPBs, but the RSLAF have also sought to engage citizens by improving public perceptions of the army. The results from the survey produced in support of this project indicate clearly that these efforts have had a positive impact. Generally speaking, Sierra Leoneans no longer feel threatened by the army or the SLP, whereas before the onset of the transformation process, indeed, before the conflict, they certainly did. This change in popular perception, while not empirically conclusive, indicates that the engagement with civil society has had at least some success. Political oversight remains the least developed of all of the elements of the system. This is partly due to issues between Ministries and Ministers but can also be put down to a view that security ‘has been done’ and that the UK ‘will take care of it’. This has resulted in a lack of interest in the security services rather than attempts to politicise them, which in some ways is good, but in others is a quasi-imperial system where the UK provides a security guarantee. Otherwise, oversight is effectively provided by the intelligence agency (the ONS) as the central agency that has a watching brief and is well organised.

UK approaches and coordination One of the key characteristics of the whole Sierra Leone experience in SSR is the important roles played by individuals at critical times. International advisers, individual politicians and Sierra Leonean actors all played important roles in making key decisions and taking them forward. In Sierra Leone, there has clearly been some development despite the lack of a coherent UK Government strategy, which drove a series of disagreements on the ground among the MoD, the FCO, and DfID officials. This was not helped by the lack of a DfID Country Office

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in Sierra Leone until 2005. DfID decision-making power reflected a wider set of coordination difficulties at the UK Government level that still exist today despite the development of joint pooling mechanisms between departments, including the GCPP. Recent budgetary difficulties have also led to a retrenchment in this innovative approach since it is always more easy to cut funding across departments than within individual ones, and the GCPP and ACPP have been drastically reduced and used to fund different sorts of activities. Many of the innovative and joined-up activities that were funded through these pools have found their funding slashed in the face of the financial crisis of 2009, hence the difficulties of coordination and coherence remain with us. Given these challenges, in some ways the level of coherence reached within Sierra Leone is surprisingly good, due, in large part, due to the crucial role played by individuals. In practice, within Sierra Leone DfID fell back on its professional experience in dealing with these types of situations and placed experienced staff from within and outside DfID in the field to assess and act on needs. These were not people who were necessarily well-versed in formal project management or the intricacies of logical frameworks; they were operations professionals experienced in running projects on the ground rather than experts in developing logical frameworks. This was a critical skill set in a situation where there was no way that the UK Government could have access to all of the relevant information fast enough. Thus, security-related programming in Sierra Leone became a response to immediate needs and SSR developed as the result of incremental decisions made by knowledgeable individuals on the ground.

Sierra Leonean exceptionalism One of the defining characteristics the Sierra Leone experience is its exceptionalism. This is a real issue given how much of the experience of Sierra Leone may be said to have been transferred through policy prescriptions in other places. A significant aspect of UK collaboration with the Government of Sierra Leone was the signing of a MoU in 2002, a long-term agreement between the two countries scheduled to last until 2012. This is not usual for the UK and is primarily associated with Scandinavian donor agencies. Within the UK system it has also caused friction as the UK’s policy shifted from a long-term commitment to a more conventional shortening of planning horizons to threeor five-year cycles. This coincided with a vast and continuous churning

Conclusions 203

of DfID personnel and DfID itself increasing its presence within Sierra Leone. Because UK engagement was primarily the result of a coalition of high-level British politicians who were committed to a country they felt could not be allowed to fall further into chaos, there was strong pressure on UK Ministries to work together on Sierra Leone. When one takes into consideration the general difficulties of cross-department collaboration, this unusual level of UK coordination of efforts is an achievement in and of itself. However, along with the long-term commitment of the MoU approach, the ascendancy of DfID in the later part of the period also led to reduction in meaningful collaboration across departments and the jointed-up government approach that had characterised the early and mid-parts of the intervention effectively collapsed as the UK civil servants began to return to their insular departmental approaches to policy. The final nail in the coffin came with the financial crisis of 2008/9 when funding changes led to changing priorities within the departments and, of course, it was far easier to cut cross-departmental funds than those within the departments. The experience of Sierra Leone influenced the creation of the conflict pool approach to managing aid funding, aimed at enforcing shared strategies across the FCO, MoD and DfID. This approach did lead to an era of unusually jointed-up government within the UK. However, even at this time, this institutional arrangement was blighted by a degradation of institutional memory through the constant churning of UK personnel. With no two meetings of the GCCP containing the same people, it was hardly surprising that the original aims of the departmental coordination disappeared along with any consistency over time in the management of these pools or decision-making on funding priorities. This sometimes dizzying change of UK actors has led at times to a lack of long-term coherence putting the future of security-related programming in Sierra Leone into question. Despite these difficulties, the early UK-Sierra Leone commitment to work together and the development of an overarching framework encompassed by the MoU was critical in establishing trust between the two parties. This was certainly the main driver in developing the increased confidence in the future of a GoSL backed by the UK and allowed UK expatriate staff to play a role as external catalysts in change and guarantors of trust in the government. In turn, the relationship of trust between the UK and Sierra Leone helped develop and nurture a credible group of Sierra Leonean staff as effective counterparts. However, it is important to point out that at times this has been done in

204 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

spite of, rather than because of, policy and interference from Whitehall. In fact the increased stability in Sierra Leone and the increased presence of Whitehall has paradoxically led to greater instability within the SSR process in-country. With stability came personnel changes and an increased emphasis on the planning blight that affects DfID so badly. Instead of people who understood the situation on the ground and who had a sympathy with the Sierra Leonean experience and the experience themselves to deal with making decisions, there were civil servants who were capable of writing detailed project documentation but had no direct experience or knowledge of the actual subject areas they were dealing with. This may sound harsh, but it reflects a broader emphasis on performance indicators over knowledge within the UK Government more generally and DfID more specifically. In this context, Sierra Leone stands as an important example where the situation required real knowledge and DfID actually had to bring people out of retirement to put on the ground because as an institution it had shed that core knowledge and understanding.

Sustainability Sustainability remains a raw issue within Sierra Leone. A purist definition of sustainability dictates that a government should be able to sustain its own security institutions without external interference. However, strict adherence to this definition would preclude any functioning security apparatus in Sub-Saharan Africa. The key word here is ‘functioning’, and it is on the relevant functions that are expected of Sierra Leone’s security system that we need to concentrate. In addition, it should also be pointed out that developing functioning security institutions and keeping them going is far less expensive than external military involvement in states where security institutions have ceased to function. Small amounts of investment over a longer period of time may produce a more functional and sustainable security system than no investment, steady decline and then the inevitable crisis followed by the inevitable intervention. There are specific operational issues about the relative sizes of armies, police and intelligence systems that need to be addressed. In particular, the experience in Sierra Leone of linking the production of a security sector review where threats are identified to transforming the security system to counter these threats can be developed elsewhere. There are a few weaknesses in this approach, particularly the risk of ignoring external regional and international linkages. (For example, the RUF did not

Conclusions 205

exist in Sierra Leone alone, but also in Guinea and Liberia.) Regional dimensions of the conflict and of any potential future conflict imply that a national security strategy should incorporate significant links with regional partners to prevent any future uprisings from falling into grey areas between boundaries and jurisdictions. The issue of sustainability also leads to a clash between external actors and national owners of the process. It is inevitable that there will be differences between perceptions of what is or is not sustainable in the long run, as well as what operational capability is required or feasible. Like much of SSR – and development activities more broadly – this is due in part to questions of political balance and pragmatism and, at some level, of balancing realistic strategic planning with plans that amount to wish lists. There may be hard decisions to be made about the form and function of defence and policing infrastructures, vehicles and equipment that will need strong leadership at the top. However, there must also be commitment from external donors to retrain and reconfigure security institutions that are fit for purpose, as opposed to mirrors of security systems in the donor country.

How has the Sierra Leonean experience affected perceptions of SSR? Whilst many activities are now implemented in the name of SSR, the core concept itself remains rather weak, not only in Sierra Leone, but also within the UK Government and beyond. Given the length of time that the UK has been involved in security system transformation in Sierra Leone and how often this experience is used as an example of how to do SSR internationally, this is in itself a concern that needs to be addressed. However, despite using the SSR brand overseas, the institutionalisation of SSR within the UK Government is extremely weak and has been unable to establish itself as a core issue, partly for budgetary reasons. Within DfID, for example, justice is a different budget stream to SSR, which is a cross-cutting issue. This has led to petty quarrelling within DfID over who has responsibility and who holds the money – everyone agrees that coordination is needed but no one is willing to actually coordinate unless they have control. This has been exacerbated within DfID because of the conflation of the security and development agendas within DfID and disputes as to exactly what that might mean. If there are a plethora of territorial disputes within DfID, introducing the vast territories of the MoD and Foreign Office escalates the rivalries within the UK Government itself.

206 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

There were a number of different factors that led to development of the security system in Sierra Leone, not least the fact that at the beginning of UK involvement there was no strategy or blueprint of what this process would entail. In effect, what SSR policy that exists within the UK Government is in many ways a post-hoc rationalisation of a diverse set of activities that clustered well within Sierra Leone. However, in order to back that conclusion up, we need to unravel this issue even further. The specific experience of people on the ground who are able to react to situation and context is very different to having a coherent plan of SSR. Clearly SSR has taken place in Sierra Leone, but it has done so largely without a framework within which to act. The critical factors appear to have been the existence of a strong group of national owners who have remained relatively constant over time and the existence of a key group of external advisers who were able to work together to support the Sierra Leonean group. Even though the individuals themselves have not been constant, the constant presence of external groups who managed to work together (the UN, World Bank and DfID) and specific support mechanisms (IMATT in particular, as well as individuals supporting key security institutions like the ONS and CISU) have been critical in ensuring a constant upward curve of post-conflict reconstruction. In many ways, the experience of Sierra Leone shows how the right people can, over time, achieve an awful lot. Current debates on SSR emphasise holistic and integrated approaches to the reform of institutions that deliver internal and external security. These debates consider the institutions of security, intelligence, governance and justice. At the same time, there are serious tensions concerning the further development of SSR when normal planning functions of government departments come in to play. The question that Sierra Leone asks today is how far can one actually plan a series of policies that are based in part on activities on the ground in response to immediate needs, activities that are, by definition, in a constant state of flux? This question, in turn, raises a number of questions about SSR programming in general and how far SSR can indeed be programmed into the future. While there is a clear set of activities and principles within SSR, this does not amount to a plan per se. These principles and activities are more like a series of guidelines or a ‘direction of travel’. Whilst this may be an important issue in itself, it does not lend itself to development planning in the sense of neat three-year project cycles. The experience of Sierra Leone, where transformation rather than reform was taking place, shows that SSR is governed by context and

Conclusions 207

entry points and is, above all, an evolutionary process guided by individuals. This emphasises the importance of well-qualified and experienced individuals on the ground empowered to take decisions and to build relationships based on trust.

Conclusion: Was it all worth it? Sierra Leone remains near the bottom of the league in terms of human development. However, it is clear that there have been significant gains in terms of basic living conditions of the majority of the population. In particular, the pattern of security threats faced by most people has changed markedly from an assumed threat from security forces themselves to more ‘conventional’ forms of threat, including domestic violence, violent crime, smuggling, human trafficking and unemployment. It is clear that the security situation for people on the ground has improved in general but that the nature of the security threats facing them has changed. As such the demand for particular types of security has changed and this needs to be reflected in security provision across the country, notably changing protection from extreme violence to a more recognisable set of concerns based around criminal activity. There is also indication that improved civil-military relations and professionalism of security actors produced by the transformation process are being maintained, but are perhaps not spread into every community. This lack of depth is partly related to concerns about youth unemployment and the risk that groups of unemployed youth represented a danger in terms of their ability to take to the bush and reanimate a version of the RUF. The growth of criminal activity and persistence of unemployment and social exclusion also points to a continuing need for an effective SLP presence in the countryside. At the same time, the existence of these gangs engaged in the smuggling of drugs and people, for instance, means that the SLP and other security agencies need to continue to improve their own capabilities and to develop cross-border links. For example, a recent dramatic increase in drug activity in neighbouring Guinea indicates that SLP linkages with their cross-border counterparts should become a priority. All of these current security challenges point to the need to change and enhance the skill sets employed by security services to reflect the changes in the threats faced. Given the weakness of Sierra Leone following the war, the development of gangs happened relatively rapidly and whilst security has improved,

208 Reconstructing Security after Conflict

there is no way in which the total security system transformation process could be said to have been completed, even after ten years. This lack of depth is also reflected in a lack of access to justice mechanisms for elements of the population. In particular, a number of security stakeholders regularly express that woeful delays in processing and sentencing criminals by the justice system have had a widespread negative impact on the morale of the SLP. Clearly, support for continued development of the SLP must be linked with simultaneous development of the criminal justice system, as is currently being done through the JSDP. At the same time, it is clear that for most people in Sierra Leone, justice is local and involves a wide range of non-formal and semi-formal conflict resolution mechanisms, including village elders, religious figures and chiefs. However, reports from Kono, for example, suggest that some of these mechanisms as they are being applied, result in controversial land allocations, an extremely sensitive issue that was one of the social causes of the war. One implication of this study’s findings is that justice reforms should pay more attention to non-formal justice mechanisms, partly addressed through the ongoing JSDP, whilst at the same time encouraging an accessible SLP and magistrates system. One of the issues that remains with ‘traditional justice’ is that traditionally some groups have been excluded from these processes. Overall, it is clear that public perceptions of security in Sierra Leone have markedly improved and that security system transformation has managed to markedly improve public knowledge of and confidence in the security services. The fact that many more people in the countryside understand the functions of local intelligence infrastructures is, in itself, a tremendous success and put alongside the lack of threat from either the SLP or the RSLAF, this is a big change from the decades leading up to war. If the public continues to be informed about and involved with local security infrastructures, Sierra Leone has begun a civil-security sector relationship that could rival those in more developed countries. Finally, public and stakeholder confidence in security and the success of the security system transformation process as a whole resulted in remarkably free and fair elections in 2007, which were conducted without significant violence or the political involvement of security services. An incumbent government left office and a new government took over, which is something that deserves to be applauded loudly in contemporary Africa.

Notes Chapter 1

Introduction

1 Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, London: Oxford University Press, 1962; Peter Pham, The Sierra Leonean Tragedy: History and Global Dimensions, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2006. 2 Paul Hair, ‘A History of Sierra Leone by Christopher Fyfe’, Sierra Leone Studies, 17 (June 1963): 281–96. Note that Hair conveniently forgot that he was writing in a journal dedicated to Sierra Leone. 3 Available at: http://hdrestats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_ fs_SLE.html (accessed on 29th January 2010). 4 Robert Kaplan, ‘The coming anarchy: How scarcity, crime, overpopulation and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet’, Atlantic Monthly, 273(2) (February 1994): 44–76. 5 Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, 5. 6 Malthus of course predicted that population growth would trigger catastrophe because it increased at a faster rate than food production. This is a long way from collapse of a post-colonial state. See Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, London: J. Johnson, 1798. 7 See for example, Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey, 1998 and Lans Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005 and also David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey, 2005, for alternative explanations and criticisms of Kaplan’s approach. 8 It is not an accident that Foday Sankoh became Minister for Mineral Resources in Sierra Leone towards the end of the conflict. 9 Human Rights Watch, Getting Away With Murder, Mutilation and Rape, New York, 1999. 10 See, for example, Berkeley, B., The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa, New York: Basic Books, 2001; Mkandawire, T., ‘The terrible toll of post-colonial “rebel; movements” in Africa: Towards an explanation of the violence against the peasantry’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 40(2): 181–215, 2000; Sawyer, A., ‘Violent conflicts and governance challenges in West Africa: The case of the Mano River basin area’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 42(3), 2004. 11 See, for example, Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest and also Pham, P. The Sierra Leonean Tragedy. 12 See Jackson, P., ‘Reshuffling the deck? The politics of decentralisation in Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, 106: 95–111, January 2007. 13 Fanthorpe, ‘On the limits of liberal peace’. 14 See, for example, Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians’. 15 There is a lot of literature on this, but, for example, see Jimmy Kandeh, ‘Ransoming the state: Elite origins of subaltern terror in Sierra Leone’, Review of African Political Economy, 81(1999): 349–66. 209

210 Notes 16 TRC findings quoted in Fanthorpe, ‘On the limits of liberal peace’. 17 Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians’, also reflected in Karen Moore, Chris Squire and Foday MacBailey, Sierra Leone National Recovery Strategy Assessment, Final Report, UNAMSIL, Freetown, 2003. 18 DfID ‘Summary of Reports on Consultation Workshops’, Chiefdom Government Reform Programme, December 2001, Freetown. 19 It is quite common in the countryside to hear youths threatening to return to the bush if they do not like particular decisions. This is also mentioned by Fanthorpe in ‘On the limits of liberal power’. 20 See Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians’ for a broader discussion of the dangers of going back to a pre-war image of government within Sierra Leone. 21 Richards, ‘To fight or to farm’. 22 Richards, ‘To fight or to farm’. 23 See Hanlon, ‘Is the international community helping to recreate the preconditions for war in Sierra Leone?’ and Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians’. 24 Interview, 2009. 25 Rosalind Hanson-Alp (draft, 2008), Civil Society’s Role in Sierra Leone’s Security Sector Reform Process – Experiences from Conciliation Resources’ West Africa Programme, Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 12, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. 26 This is a complex picture, but see, for example, Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa, for an overview. 27 The West Side Boys were fairly typical of many groups formed across West Africa including a self-mythology based on Tupac Shakur – in this case, the name being taken from a rhyme in a song called Hit’ em up which states: ‘So I ain’t got no friendz, West side bad boys killaz, You know who the realist is, niggaz’. Note that in the early days of the group they called themselves the ‘West Side Niggaz’. There is an excellent history of the West Side Boys: Utas, M. and Jorgel, M. ‘The West Side Boys; military navigation in the Sierra Leone civil war’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 46(3): 487–511, 2008. 28 Peter Penfold, interview, March 2008, Freetown. 29 Johnny Paul Koroma was already in prison for treasonable activity, and the coup was orchestrated by Non-Commissioned Officers who released him and installed him as President of Sierra Leone. It remains, in fact, a moot point whether or not Johnny Paul Koroma orchestrated their actions. 30 Alfred Nelson-Williams (2008), Restructuring the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 3, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. 31 Peter Penfold, interview, March 2008, Freetown. 32 Peter Penfold, interview, March, Freetown. ECOMOG was deployed in 1997 with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) receiving a mandate to restore Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. See Barry Le Grys (2008), Working Paper.

Notes 211 33 Emmanuel Osho Coker (draft, 2008), Governance and Security Sector Reform, Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 2, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. 34 Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe (2 December 1998), Brief for UK Second Security Sector Mission. 35 Kellie Conteh, Working Group meeting, 8 May 2008, London. 36 Alfred Nelson-Williams (draft, 2008). 37 Keith Biddle, Working Group meeting, 7 May 2008, London. 38 Peter Penfold, interview, March 2008, Freetown. 39 James Vincent, Working Group meeting, 8 May, 2008, London. 40 Usually described as a ‘hunter militia’, the CDF was effectively a group of local militias comprised of Kamajors, Donsos, Gbethis, Kapras, Tamaboros and from the Freetown peninsula, the Organised Body of Hunting Societies, that used methods similar to the RUF’s in fighting fire with fire. Their leader, Sam Hinga Norman, was put on trial at the end of the war, but died during the process. 41 Kamajors refer to one of the groups of traditional hunters in Sierra Leone, many of whom joined the Civil Defence Force (CDF). They were predominantly of the Mende tribe, southern-based, and Sam Hinga Norman’s main strength. Other tribal fighters were the Gbethis in the centre of the country, the Donzos in the East, the Kapras in the West and the Tamaboros in the North. 42 Peter Penfold, interview, March 2008, Freetown. 43 Peter Penfold, interview, March 2008, Freetown. 44 Keith Biddle, Working Group meeting, 7 May 2008, London. 45 Kellie Conteh, Working Group meeting, 7 May 2008, London. 46 The Treasury Solicitor (communication to DfID), 6 April 2000. 47 Italics in original. Proposed British Military Advisory and Training Team Sierra Leone (BMATT (SL)), 13 October 1999. 48 Underlined in original note attached to ‘Proposed British Military Advisory and Training Team Sierra Leone (BMATT (SL))’, 13 October 1999. 49 DfID (December 2000), Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor, White Paper on International Development, see http:// www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/whitepaper2000.pdf. Accessed 2 October 2008.

Chapter 2 How did SSR in Sierra Leone Impact on International Policy-Making on SSR? 1 2 3 4

DfID (2010) ‘Building State and Securing the Peace’, Unpublished draft. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1811731.stm. Clare Short, interview, 2008. Interview, Anthony Howlett-Bolton, 2008.

Chapter 3 Security and Sierra Leone Up Until the End of the Conflict 1 Garth Glentworth, Working Group Meeting, 8 May 2008, London. 2 Garth Glentworth, Working Group meeting, 7 May 2008, London.

212 Notes 3 Jeff Bredemear, Roundtable, 18 December 2007. 4 Prior to 1996, the UK had provided training assistance to the SLP for many years. However, this had been as short-term inputs and unrelated to any form of strategic development. Joint DfID and FCO Synthesis and Review of UK Funded Safety and Security Programmes, Sierra Leone Case Study, November 2004. 5 From Crisis to Confidence – Re-establishing the Sierra Leone Police, The Development of a Local Policing Model, Information paper, Police Council Meeting, Thursday 12 November 1998. 6 Notes from various interviews with Adrian Horn, Senior Police Adviser, London, May 2008. 7 CPDTF (1998), Operation B to B (back to basics), p. 3. 8 Garth Glentworth, Roundtable, 18 December 2007. 9 Arie van Roon, interview, 2008, UK. 10 When the project came to an end in mid-2007, a total of £2.3 million had been spent on vehicle and communications equipment through two projects. Project Completion Report, September 2007, Sierra Leone Police Vehicles and Communications Project, and the Sierra Leone Police Infrastructure Project. 11 Sierra Leone Police – Re-Introduction of Effective Operational Policing, internal paper prepared to inform planning meeting to be held at the Commonwealth Task Force Office in Police HQ on 15 September 1999. 12 Kadi Fakondo (draft, 2008), Reforming and Building Capacity of the Sierra Leone Police, 1999–2007, Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 8, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. 13 Desmond Buck, Working Group meeting, 15 January 2008, Freetown. 14 Kadi Fakondo, Working Group meeting, 16 January 2008, Freetown. 15 Kadi Fakondo, Working Group meeting, 16 January 2008, Freetown. 16 Brima Acha Kamara, interview, 2009. 17 Brima Acha Kamara, interview, 2009. 18 Keith Biddle, interview, 2008, UK. 19 Kadi Fakondo, Working Group meeting, 8 May 2008, London. 20 Kadi Fakondo, Working Group meeting, 8 May 2008, London. 21 This was also controversial in terms of donor support, which, before the formation of the conflict pools in 2000, meant that DfID could only support non-arms-related activities and non-covert operations, so funding had to go through the FCO. 22 It has been suggested that the joint RUF-AFRC attack on Freetown happened because they felt that the SLPP government did not honour the Conakry Peace Accord relating to amnesty. After returning from exile, the government oversaw the execution of 24 Senior Officers of the armed forces who had been involved in the coup. Plans were also under way to execute 72 civilians found guilty of treason, including the current Minister of Information and Broadcasting in the APC government. See Alfred Nelson-Williams (draft, 2008). 23 Keith Biddle, interview, 2008, UK. 24 Anthony Howlett-Bolton, Working Group meeting, 15 January 2008, Freetown. 25 Anthony Howlett-Bolton (2008), Aiming for Holistic Approaches to Justice Sector Development, Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 7, Global Facilitation Network for Security

Notes 213

26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

43

Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Sierra Leone Governance Reconstruction and Reform – Progress Report, October 2002. Sierra Leone Governance Reconstruction and Reform – Progress Report, October 2002, p. 40. See, for example, Bruce Baker, ‘The African post-conflict policing agenda in Sierra Leone’, Conflict, Security & Development, 6(1) (2006): 25–50. No official statistics were available to the authors, but numbers as low as 1500 were mentioned. Alfred Nelson-Williams (draft, 2008). Kellie Conteh, interview, UK, 2009. Alfred Nelson-Williams (draft, 2008). Now General Richards. David Richards, interview, 2008, UK. Very few UK citizens were in the country at the time, unlike in 2000, when this was clearly part of the UK forces brief. Mike Dent, notes, 2008. Mike Dent, notes, 2008. SILSEP-MODAT, Project Report for Period 11–24 October 1999 (weeks 18–19). SILSEP-MODAT, Sierra Leone – Future UK Military Commitment in Support of DfID’s Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP), 30 November 1999. MODAT, Future UK military commitment in support of DfID’s SILSEP, November 1999. MODAT, Future UK military commitment in support of DfID’s SILSEP, November 1999. Mike Dent, notes, 2008. Communication between the IGP and DfID, 12 July 2000. In fact, conditions of employment were becoming a broader worry. In 2000, the Government of Sierra Leone noted in its draft National Security Policy – Proposals and Recommendations that the conditions of service of the SLP and army personnel would be crucial to the stability of Sierra Leone in terms of perceived fairness, pride in their profession and provision for their families. However, within the SLP, there was a feeling that the military were benefitting from their rather chequered political history and receiving more resources. The Government, fearing a third military coup within a decade, authorised more resources for the military. About this particular incident, Keith Biddle (September 2008) recalls: ‘The MODAT team decided to refurbish the partially derelict Paramount Hotel to become the new civilian-led Ministry of Defence and Finance – the DfID desk handling MODAT and SILSEP issues made the necessary finances available. There had not been any detailed consultation and communication on this issue with either the IGP or CCSSP or the DfID desk that managed the CCSSP’s affairs. The premises that previously housed the CID and the SSD had been completely destroyed during the events of January 1999. Indeed, several police personnel were murdered by the rebels whilst on duty in the former CID building. In February 1999, in consequence of a Sierra Leone Cabinet directive, the CID and SSD were housed in the Paramount Hotel and SLP budget funds were utilised to make it reasonably waterproof and habitable. The dispute was not that the SLP wanted to remain in the Paramount Hotel, which until the

214 Notes

44 45 46 47 48 49

50 51

52 53 54 55 56

57 58 59 60 61 62 63

decision to use it for the new MoD was intended to be returned to its original purpose. The dispute was around the fact that neither MODAT nor DfID had provided for any alternative accommodation for some 300 police personnel and their administrative requirements. The problem was solved by President Kabbah personally, moving the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of Tourism into smaller and less suitable premises to accommodate the CID. The SSD was housed in temporary barracks, with families, 15 miles outside of Freetown. There were professional tensions between the MODAT team and the IGP, although a sense of humour and personal relations survived! The lesson learned by DfID was that of ensuring cooperation between elements of the SSR process to avoid such embarrassing problems in the future.’ Mike Dent, notes, 2008. David Richards, Operation Palliser (draft article). David Richards, interview, 2008, UK. Mike Dent, notes, 2008. David Richards, ‘Expeditionary operations: Sierra Leone—lessons for the future’, World Defence Systems, 3(2) (July 2001): 134–6. David Richards, interview, 2008, UK. The West Side Boys were a group of ex-combatants and civilian criminals claiming loyalty to the former AFRC regime and its former leader Major Johnny Paul Koroma, living in the bush outside Freetown. Their main area of operations was in the Okra Hills close to the main Freetown-to-Masiaka highway. They predominately relied upon robbery and looting of local villages and other criminal activities, to fund their lifestyle. Mike Dent, notes, 2008. Notes by David Richards on a draft article, later to be published as: Sierra Leone – ‘Pregnant with lessons?’ (2004), in Richard Cobbold and Greg Mills (eds), Global Challenges and Africa: Bridging Divides, Dealing with Perceptions, Rebuilding Societies, RUSI Whitehall Paper 62, Royal United Service Institute. Mike Dent, notes, 2008. Garth Glentworth, Roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. Clare Short, interview, 2008, UK. Kellie Conteh, interview, 2008. Barry Le Grys (draft, 2008), United Kingdom (UK) Military Intervention and Progress in Sierra Leone 2001–2006, Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 11, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Barry Le Grys (draft, 2008). Mike Dent, notes, 2008. Barry Le Grys (draft, 2008). Barry Le Grys, interview, 2008. Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project II, Output to Purpose Review, June–July 2002. Mike Dent, notes, 2008. Adrian Freer, Roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. In fact, it should be added, the original structure was changed in late 2000 and again in 2001 to

Notes 215

64

65 66

67 68 69

70 71 72

73 74

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82

83

reflect the ‘latest UK thinking’ – this was not in the original concept laid out by MODAT in late 1999. In passing, it should be noted that prior to the conflict, there was an operating paymaster in the military, [but] we didn’t have a Ministry of Defence [all matters military were managed from Defence Headquarters]. Before the war, the military would go and discuss their budget with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Finance would determine what they wanted to give to the army – like all of our departments. The difference is that the military had its whole budget in its account, while the rest would have theirs on a monthly or a quarterly basis (Kellie Conteh, Working Group meeting, 8 May 2008, London). Work on State House was completed in 2002. Indeed, among some parts of the population there was a very positive public perception of the CDF as having been far more effective than the RSLMF in combating the RUF. Government of Sierra Leone, National Security Policy – Proposals and Recommendations, 2000. Mike Dent, email communication. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund was the Government of Sierra Leone’s principal mechanism for mobilising donor resources in support of the DDR programme. It was administered by the World Bank, which also provided institutional support to the National Committee for DDR. Rosalind Hanson-Alp (draft, 2008). Visit Report, Sierra Leone Security and Intelligence Service Reform, September 1999. Robert Ashington-Pickett (2008), National Security and Intelligence Reform in Sierra Leone – 2000–2003, Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 10, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Robert Ashington-Pickett (draft, 2008). Similar ideas would resurface in 2006 with the concept of a Ministry of Security. However, this was effectively seen as unnecessary politicisation of the sector, and was rebuffed by the ONS (as well as the UK). Robert Ashington-Pickett, roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. Kellie Conteh, Working Group meeting, 15 January 2008, Freetown. Robert Ashington-Pickett, interview, 2008, London. Robert Ashington-Pickett, notes, 2008. Both Sierra Leonean staff and International advisers faced death threats at this time. Robert Ashington-Pickett, roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. Kellie Conteh, Working Group meeting, 15 January 2008, Freetown. It could be argued that an example of CISU’s efficiency came with the successful anti-narcotics operation against Colombian organised crime in 2008, which netted a substantial haul of drugs and ended in the arrest of a number of Colombians and Mexicans as well as anti-corruption investigations against Sierra Leonean officials implicated in the crime. Robert Ashington-Pickett, roundtable, 18 December 2008, London.

216 Notes 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

Peter Penfold, interview, 2008, Freetown. Robert Ashington-Pickett, roundtable, 18 December 2008, London. Kellie Conteh, interview, 2007, Freetown. Garth Glentworth, interview, 2007, UK. Robert Ashington-Pickett, interview, 2008, UK. Keith Biddle, interview, 2008, UK. Garth Glentworth, interview, 2007, UK. Kellie Conteh, Working Group meeting, 8 May 2008, London. Keith Biddle, Working Group meeting, 8 May 2008, London. Clare Short, interview, 2008, UK. Clare Short, interview, 2008, UK.

Chapter 4

The Development of an SSR Concept, 2002–2005

1 DAT Visit to Sierra Leone 23–27 February 2004 (5 March 2004). 2 Adrian Freer, end-of-tour report (2003). 3 Mark White (draft, 2008), The Security and Development Nexus: A Case Study of Sierra Leone 2004–2006, Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 4, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. 4 Adrian Horn, Working Group meeting, 7 May 2008, London. 5 Mark White (draft, 2008). 6 Keith Biddle, interview, 2008, UK. 7 Community Safety and Security Project (CSSP), Visit Report, June 2004, p. 6. 8 Joint DfID and FCO synthesis and review of UK funded safety and security programmes, Sierra Leone Case Study, November 2004. 9 Keith Biddle, interview, 2008, UK. 10 Brima Acha Kamara, interview, 2008, Sierra Leone. Oliver B. M. Somasa, interview, 2008, Sierra Leone. 11 Since mid-2003, the UK had provided a team of ten police officers to the UN contingent of over 150 police officers (UN CIVPOL). The agreement to provide these officers coincided with a change of emphasis in UN CIVPOL’s mandate from one of ‘mentoring and monitoring’ to one focused more on involvement in SLP capacity-building. UK officers came under the command of the Commissioner of UN CIVPOL. 12 Brima Acha Kamara, interview, 2008, Sierra Leone. 13 Oliver B. M. Somasa, interview, 2008, Sierra Leone. 14 Brima Acha Kamara, interview, 2008, Sierra Leone. 15 Brima Acha Kamara, interview, 2008, Sierra Leone. 16 Brima Acha Kamara, interview, 2009. 17 Both have since risen to AIG rank and have had very prominent and successful careers. 18 Notes from discussions with Keith Biddle, 2008. 19 Output to Purpose Review, 30 May–6 June, Sierra Leone Community Safety Security Project (CSSP). 20 Output to Purpose Review, 30 May–6 June, Sierra Leone Community Safety Security Project (CSSP). 21 Brima Acha Kamara, interview, 2008, Sierra Leone.

Notes 217 22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

36 37

38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45

46 47

Anthony Howlett-Bolton, interview, 2008, UK. Brima Acha Kamara, interview, 2008, Sierra Leone. Rosalind Hanson-Alp (draft, 2008). CCSSP, CID Sierra Leone, 29 November 2002. The February 2000 ORBAT was predicated on the need to provide the military capability required to fulfil the identified and endorsed Defence Missions and Military Tasks, which had been established following the mini-Strategic Defence Review undertaken by MODAT in 1999. This Review was necessary in order to assist with the development of a Defence Policy, which was required to underpin the National Security Policy being developed by the National Security Adviser. It was anticipated that the RSLAF would be established in slow time in a secure and peaceful atmosphere and that the threat level would be minimal. Alfred Nelson-Williams (draft, 2008). Alfred Nelson-Williams (draft, 2008). Emmanuel Osho Coker, Working Group meeting, 8 May 2008, London. Emmanuel Osho Coker, Working Group meeting, 8 May 2008, London. Alfred Nelson-Williams (draft, 2008). Management and Functional Review of the Ministry of Defence, November 2003. Aldo Gaeta, Roundtable, 18 December 2007. Management and Functional Review of the Ministry of Defence, November 2003. Al-Hassan Kondeh (draft, 2008), Formulating Sierra Leone’s Defence White Paper, Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 6, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Aldo Gaeta, Roundtable, 18 December 2007. Much of this analysis is based on interviews and written documentation produced by Sierra Leonean staff, particularly Al-Hassan Kondeh, who was in the Ministry at the time, and also UK staff involved in the process itself. Al-Hassan Kondeh (draft, 2008). Al-Hassan Kondeh (draft, 2008). IMATT, International Military Advisory Training Team (Sierra Leone) Plan 2010, 17 July 2004. IMATT, International Military Advisory Training Team (Sierra Leone) Plan 2010, 17 July 2004. For more information on Operation Pebu, please see Aldo Gaeta (draft, 2008), Operation Pebu, Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 5, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. David Santa-Olalla, interview, 2008, UK. Robert Musk, interview, 2008, UK. Barry Le Grys (draft, 2008). Following negotiations with Paramount Chiefs, it was decided to build Battalion barracks at Simbakoro, Moyamba, Yele, Kambia, Kabala, Pujehun and Kailahun. The Brigade HQs would be at Kenema, Makeni and Bo. Pebu means ‘shelter’ in the mende language. Barry Le Grys, notes, September 2008.

218 Notes 48 49 50 51 52 53

54 55 56 57

58 59 60 61 62 63 64

65 66 67

Barry Le Grys, Working Group meeting, 8 May 2008, London. Peter Albrecht and Mark Malan (2006), p. 117. Kellie Conteh, Working Group meeting, 8 May 2008, London. Kellie Conteh, Working Group meeting, 8 May 2008, London. Andrew Cordery, interview, October 2007, Sierra Leone. The Attorney-General’s Office and Parliament would insist that the delay in the Act’s formal introduction was the result of the failure by the Minister for Presidential Affairs to request a slot on the parliamentary calendar. In turn, the Minister for Presidential Affairs would insist that he had to wait for Parliament to offer him such a slot. In the words of a review at the time: ‘Result: impasse’. Kellie Conteh, Working Group meeting, 8 May 2008, London. Robert Ashington-Pickett, Working Group meeting, 8 May 2008, London. Mark White (draft, 2008). PASCO coordinated the preparation of the Sierra Leone PRSP under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning (MODEP) until January 2004. In February 2004, a Technical Working Group chaired by the Director of the Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO) was established to supervise and fast track the completion of the PRSP. Mark White (draft, 2008). Mark White (draft, 2008). Mark White (draft, 2008). Rosalind Hanson-Alp (draft, 2008). Defence Advisory Team, Draft Terms of Reference for the Sierra Leone Security Sector Review – Briefing Paper on the Security Sector Review, 2003. Desmond Buck, Working Group meeting, 2008, Freetown. Vision 2025 provides Sierra Leone with a national vision for long-term development and projects future scenarios for political and economic progress. It gives direction to the country’s medium–long-term strategies such as Sierra Leone’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Mark White (draft, 2008). Mark White (draft, 2008). Kellie Conteh, interview, 2008, Sierra Leone.

Chapter 5

Consolidation and Development, 2005–2007

1 Robert Ashington-Pickett, Roundtable, 18 December 2008. 2 David Santa-Olalla, interview, 2008, UK. 3 While JSDP has focused a small fraction of its programme on non-state providers – or what DfID refers to as ‘service delivery’ as opposed to ‘statebuilding’ – a project was developed in 2010, which will attempt to engage the chiefs, non-state actors, in justice reform. This is the first time that this happens. The exact outline of the project, let alone the impact of implementation, is not available at the time of writing, since implementation has not begun. project is currently under development, which will begin implementation in 2010. The novelty of the program should not be underestimated, however. For the first time in justice transformation in Sierra Leone, state and non-state security and justice providers will be formally linked in programming.

Notes 219 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

Emmanuel Osho Coker, interview, 2008. Keith Biddle, interview, 2008. Mark White, 2008. For example, it inherited and continued the funding of Commonwealth Judges and Prosecutors as well as, critically, the post of a legal draughtsman. Output to Purpose Review, Sierra Leone Security Reform Programme III (SILSEP III), September 2005. Robert Bradley, January 2008, interview by Alison Thompson, Freetown. Moses A. Showers, January 2008, interview by Alison Thompson, Freetown. Moses A. Showers, January 2008, interview by Alison Thompson, Freetown. Output to Purpose Review, SILSEP III, September 2005. Almost 1500 officers were trained as rapid reaction crowd control units. Mark White, 2008, interview. Anthony Howlett-Bolton, 2008, interview. Sierra Leone Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2007, Sierra Leone Police Policing Plan, presentation to IMATT, Freetown, undated. Kellie Conteh, 2008, Working group meeting, London. In fact the Sierra Leonean Army had been deliberately and explicitly kept out of domestic politics until 2000 through a joint policy between the Government of Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL and IMATT. Output to Purpose Review, 2007, Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme III, April. Mark White, draft, 2008. Kadi Fakondo, draft working paper, 2008. Kadi Fakondo, draft working paper, 2008. This is also echoed by further SLP officers who were promoted through the ranks during this period. Barry Le Grys, notes, 2008. Output to Purpose Review, 2005, SILSEP III, September. Output to Purpose Review, 2007, SILSEP III, April. David Santa-Ollala, interview, 2008. Aldo Gaeta, draft working paper, 2008. Arie Van Roon, interview, 2008. Alfred Nelson-Williams, Working Group Meeting, 8 May 2008, London. Defence Intelligence Report, Sierra Leone: Assessment of Effectiveness of EX GREEN EAGLE in managing perceptions in Sierra Leone, undated. David Santa-Ollala, interview, 2008, UK. David Santa-Ollala, interview, 2008, UK. Defence Intelligence Report, Sierra Leone: Assessment of Effectiveness of EX GREEN EAGLE in managing perceptions in Sierra Leone, undated. Defence Intelligence Report, Sierra Leone: Assessment of Effectiveness of EX GREEN EAGLE in managing perceptions in Sierra Leone, undated. Alfred Nelson-Williams, Working Group Meeting, London 2008. Barry Le Grys, end of tour report, 2007, Freetown. Peter Albrecht and Mark Malan, 2006, p. 138. Note that a small number of officers have already been employed as UN military observers. David Santa-Ollala, interview, 2008. Alfred Nelson-Williams, interview, 2008, Freetown. David Santa-Ollala, interview, 2008. Kellie Conteh, interview, 2008, Freetown.

220 Notes 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

Mark White, interview, 2008, London. Kellie Conteh, interview, Freetown, 2008. Output to Purpose Review, SILSEP III, April 2007. Output to Purpose Review, SILSEP III, April 2007. Gary Horlacher, notes, 2008. Rosalind Hanson-Alp, interview, 2008. Rosalind Hanson-Alp, draft working paper, 2008. Rosalind Hanson-Alp, draft working paper, 2008. Anthony Howlett-Bolton, Working Group Meeting, 15 January 2008, Freetown. Rosalind Hanson-Alp, draft working paper, 2008. This is stated in the Sierra Leone Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2007, Sierra Leone Policing Plan (presented to IMATT) unpublished. Adrian Freer, Roundtable, 18 December 2008, London. This is something that is understood by other donor agencies like Danida, which commit for longer timeframes explicitly to encourage confidence in their presence.

Chapter 6 Cross-Cutting Themes Throughout the Period in Sierra Leone and Beyond 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

For example, see Ghani and Lockhart, ‘Fixing failed states’. Clare Short, interview, 2008, UK. David Richards, interview, 2008, UK. Garth Glentworth, Roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. Clare Short, interview, 2008, London. Adrian Freer, Roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. Adrian Freer, Roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. This phrase was coined early in the process for the joint meetings at the beginning of the week between the different UK departments. It is a phrase that has stuck for some time. Adrian Freer, Roundtable, interview, 2007, London. Garth Glentworth, Roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project II, Output to Purpose Review, 25 June–5 July 2002. Robert Ashington-Pickett, Roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. Robert Ashington-Pickett, interview, 2007, UK. Garth Glentworth, interview, 2007, UK. Clare Short, interview, 2008, UK. Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project II, Output to Purpose Review, 25 June–5 July 2002. Adrian Freer, Roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. Keith Biddle, interview, 2008, UK. Garth Glentworth, Roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. Peter Penfold, interview, 2007, Sierra Leone. Clare Short, interview, 2008, UK. Garth Glentworth, interview, 2008, UK. Garth Glentworth, Roundtable, 18 December 2007.

Notes 221 24 Output to Purpose Review, Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme, April 2007. 25 Adrian Freer, Roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. 26 Robert Ashington-Pickett, roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. 27 Statement by His Excellency, Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah at the Official Launching of Three Key Security Sector Reform Documents for Sierra Leone, 26 May, 2005. See http://www.statehouse-sl.org/speeches/3-key-sec-may26-05.html. Accessed 26 February 2008. The two other documents were the Protective Security Manual and the Standards Response Guidelines for the National Security Architecture. 28 Middlebrock and Miller (September 2006), Sierra Leone Security Sector Expenditure Review (SS-ER). 29 Middlebrock and Miller (September 2006), Sierra Leone Security Sector Expenditure Review (SS-ER). 30 Management and Functional Review of the Ministry of Defence, November 2003. 31 Middlebrock and Miller (September 2006), Sierra Leone Security Sector Expenditure Review (SS-ER). 32 Adrian Freer, Roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. 33 Adrian Freer, Roundtable, 18 December 2007, London. 34 H. E. President Kabbah’s Address on the Occasion of the State Opening of the 3rd Session of the First Parliament of the Second Republic of Sierra Leone, 11 June 1999. See http://www.sierra-leone.org/GOSL/kabbah-061199.html. Accessed 2 October 2008. 35 UNCTAD, Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa, November 2008. 36 David Chandler (2006) Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building (London: Pluto Press), raises the question of whether in fact this is a de facto Empire. 37 The current position, in September 2008, is that the Government of Sierra Leone is aware of the UK’s planned withdrawal from ONS and CISU by 2012, with incremental reduction in donor support commenced in 2008–2009. The National Security Council is discussing with the Ministry of Finance to enable the Government to take over donor elements of the funding from January 2011. Adviser support is planned until 2012. 38 At time of writing this has yet to be finalised within the UK Government. 39 Poate, D., Balogun, P., Rothmann, I., Knight, M. and Sesay, F. Evaluation of DfID Country Programmes: Sierra Leone, Evaluation Report EV690, DfID, 2008. It does point out that there are two informal documents that have informed strategic choices: the draft country strategy paper of 2002, and the Joint EC/DfID Country Strategy for Sierra Leone, drafted in 2006 but approved in January 2008.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

1 Available at http://hdrestats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_ SLE.html (accessed on 29 January 2010).

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224 References Gaeta, A. (2009), Operation Pebu, Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 5, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Gberie, L. (2005), A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. GFN-SSR (Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform) (2007), ‘Supporting State and Non-state Provision of Security and Justice’. Available at: http:// www.ssrnetwork.net/events/state_and.php. Ghani, A. and Lockhart, C. (2008), Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, Oxford: OUP. GoSL (11 June 1999), H. E., The President’s Address on the Occasion of the State Opening of the 3rd Session of the First Parliament of the Second Republic of Sierra Leone. 11 June 1999. See: http://www.sierra-leone.org/GOSL/kabbah061199.html. GoSL (2000), National Security Policy – Proposals and Recommendations. GoSL (August 2003), Vision 2025, Freetown. GoSL (December 2007), Government of Sierra Leone Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Investment Plan 2008–2010. Grys, B. L. (2008), United Kingdom (UK) Military Intervention and Progress in Sierra Leone 2001–2006, Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 11, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Hair, P. (June 1963), ‘A history of Sierra Leone by Christopher Fyfe’, Sierra Leone Studies, 17: 281–96. Hanson-Alp, R. (2008), Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997– 2007: Civil Society’s Role in Sierra Leone’s Security Sector Reform Process Experiences from Conciliation Resources’ West Africa Programme, Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 12, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Howlett-Bolton, A. (2008), Aiming for Holistic Approaches to Justice Sector Development, Working Paper Series, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007, Paper No. 7, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) and International Alert, Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Human Rights Watch (1999), Getting Away With Murder, Mutilation and Rape, New York. IMATT (17 July 2004), International Military Advisory Training Team (Sierra Leone) Plan 2010. Improved Access to Security and Justice Programme Terms of Reference, DfID, London, undated and unpublished. Jackson, P. (2005), ‘Chiefs, money and politicians: Rebuilding local government in post-war Sierra Leone’, Public Administration and Development, 25(1): 49–58. Jackson, P. (January 2007), ‘Reshuffling the deck? The politics of decentralisation in Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, 106: 95–111. Joint DfID and FCO Synthesis and Review of UK Funded Safety and Security Programmes, Sierra Leone Case Study, November 2004.

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Index Abidjan Peace Accords of 1996, 10, 11 Afghanistan, 28 state-building in, 171 Africa traditional systems within the justice system, 60 Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), 55 see also Conflict Prevention Pool All People’s Congress (APC), 10, 61, 64, 76, 160 Anti-Corruption Commission, 157, 178 Anti-Corruption Programme, 54 armed forces, 9, 61–8 disbanding of, 12, 13 G branch, 62–3 support, budget for, 11–12 Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (AFRSL), 79 Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), 4, 52, 56, 105, 155 alliance with Revolutionary United Front, 10–12 Ashington-Pickett, Robert on process of separating intelligence gathering and assessment, 87–8 atrocities against civilians, 4–5, 10, 11 see also violence

Bo, 15, 26, 90, 141, 174 magistrates courts in, 60 working police force in, 59 Bonthe, 26 working police force in, 55 British Expeditionary Force attack on Revolutionary United Front, 5 British Military Training Advisory Team (BMATT), 66, 68 budgetary decision-making processes, 32–3

Back to Basics (B2B), 101 BBC, on UK-Sierra Leone relations, 28 Biddle, Keith, 16, 28, 34–5, 40, 42, 43, 58, 59, 101, 103, 138, 153, 163, 213n43 as head of CPDTF, 56 as Inspector-General of Police, 56 role in rebuilding SLP, 56 Bio, Julius, 9 Blair, Tony, 5, 28, 43, 172 Blell, J. C., 112

Campaign for Good Governance, 113, 127 capacity-building, 55, 88, 158 card system, 61–2 Central intelligence and Security Unit (CISU), 82–90, 120–4 development of, 160–2 Chiefdom Governance Reform Project, 8 Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) UK national as, 56 chiefs attitude in rebel areas, 8 as providers, 46 resentment of, 8–9 role in security/justice, 47, 165–7 Civil Defence Force (CDF), 4, 10, 13, 77–8, 211n40 Central Coordinating Committee, 77 Sam Hinga Norman and, 77 Civilian Adviser, 114 Coker, Emmanuel Osho, 110 Commanding Officer of the Engineer Regiment, 117 Command Structure Review (January 2004), 112 Command Structure Review Committee, 112

227

228 Index Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP), 33, 40, 42, 43, 49, 55, 58, 98, 100, 137, 139 cooperation between MIA and, 164 Project Memorandum, 173 tactical and operational support to SLP, 141, 142, 144–5 transition from JSDP to, 141, 142 Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF), 41, 43, 54, 55, 137 Commonwealth Project, 55 Community Safety and Security Project (CSSP), 100 Conakry, Kabbah’s exile to, 12 Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation Network (CPDON), 37 Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD), 34–5, 79 Conflict and Humanitarian and Security Affairs (CHASE), 34, 36 conflict prevention, 31 Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP), 36, 190 Africa, 55 Global, 179 Sierra Leone’s role in establishment of, 178–80 Conteh, Kellie, 62, 72, 158 Cook, Robin, 32, 43 Criminal Investigation Department (CID), 35, 58 criminal justice system distinguished from security sector, 33 Cry Freetown, 5 Customary/Traditional Laws and Practices, 45, 165 Davidson-Housten, Patrick, 28 Defence Policy with Defence Missions and Military Tasks, 66 Defence White Paper (2003), 110–18 ownership of, 114–18 Dent, Mike, 64

Department for International Development (DfID), 17–19, 51–2, 159 Building the State and Securing the Peace, Policy and Practice Paper (January 2010), 27 coordination with High Commission, 135 design of Primary Justice Pilots, 44–5 as development agency, 30–2 developmentalising donor approaches to military expenditure, 32–3 distinction between security sector and criminal justice system, 33 Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor, White Paper on International Development, 19, 29, 34 funding for civil service diagnostic study, 12 JSDP and, 140 Non-state Justice and Security Systems, 44 Operation Pebu and, 116–17 reforming Sierra Leone Police, 52 SSR Practitioners Course, 34 support to Ministry of Defence, 29 Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG), 99 Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO), 126 Director of Defence Policy, 114 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), 10, 54–5, 78–9 potential threats, 79 problems with reintegration, 79 District Security Committee (DISEC), 89, 90–1, 123–4, 126, 161, 162 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 12, 187

Index 229 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 5, 10, 59, 65 UK political involvement and logistical support to, 13 ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), 154 Election Policing Strategy (Sierra Leone Police), 143 England, Ray, 43 European Community (EC), 79 Executive Management Board, 57 Fakondo, Kadi, 57, 58, 145–7 Family Support Unit (FSU), 21, 33, 43, 58, 107–9, 145–6 development of, 145–6 Fanthorpe, R., 7 financial management, 182–4 Force Intelligence and Security Unit (FISU), 84 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 12, 19, 66, 178, 179 Fourah Bay College, 127 Freetown, 51, 59 courts in, 60 rebels occupation of, 4–5 RUF-AFRC attack on, 212n22 funding, 12, 144–7, 151–2 Multi-Donor Trust Fund, 79, 215n69 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 62 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 58, 146 Fyfe, Christopher, 2 Gaeta, Aldo, 149 G branch, 62–3 gender, and justice reform, 145 Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP), 179 see also Conflict Prevention Pool Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), 37 Government and Institutions Department (GID), 34, 35

Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) Multi-Donor Trust Fund, 79, 215n69 National Security Policy – Proposals and Recommendations, 213n42 see also Sierra Leone Greene, Graham, 3 Grys, Barry Le, 73 Guinean Armed Forces (GAF), 78 Hair, Paul, 2 Harding, Prince, 41, 163 Her Majesty’s Government (HMG), 41 Her Majesty’s Government – UK (HMG-UK), 70 Hogg, Richard, 135 Holding and Basic Training Centre (HBTC), 80 Hoon, Jeff, 178–9 Horn, Adrian, 43 Human Right Watch, on rebels occupation of Freetown, 4–5 Immigration Department to the Sierra Leone Airport Authority, 127 Improved Access to Security and Justice Programme (IASJP), 33, 41, 43, 47, 49, 165, 167–8 institutional reform, 33 institution-building, 158–9 Integrated Security Advisor and Training Team (ISATT), 189 intelligence services, 38 International Military Training Advisory Team (IMATT), 68, 71, 74, 110, 139, 140, 152, 154, 155 coordination with DfID, 135 operational and management processes of, 75 Operation Pebu and, 116–17 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 62 see also funding International Rescue Committee (IRU), 58 Iraq, 28

230 Index Jetley, General, 5 Joint Assessment Centre, 85 Joint Country Strategy for Sierra Leone (JCSP), 190 Joint Force Command (JFC), 69, 110 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 84, 85 Joint Support Command (JSC), 69, 110 Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), 70 Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ), 70 judiciary, 37, 41, 42, 60 justice, 59–61 distinguished from security sector, 33 incorporating traditional systems within, 60–1 non-state actors involvement in, 44–8, 165–8 reform, 137–44 gender and, 145 ministerial support, lacking of, 137–9 within Justice Sector Development Programme, 41–4 Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP), 23, 33, 40, 41–4, 46, 49, 60, 98, 104, 137–44 DfID and, 140 Office of National Security and, 140 planning and implementation of, 140 Sierra Leone Police and, 140, 141–3 support to prison services, 141 transition from CCSSP to, 141, 142, 144–5 transition from SILSEP to, 144 Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Investment Plan, 165 Kabala, 73, 99, 113 Kabbah, Ahmad [sic] Tejan, 9, 20, 28, 51, 52, 64, 95, 134, 181, 184 Defence White Paper (2003), 110–18 distrust on armed forces, 66

exile of, 12 Keith Biddle and, 56 reforming Sierra Leone Police, 52 return to Freetown, 18 Sierra Leone Policing Charter, 52–3 Kailahun, 78, 80, 99, 109, 149, 150, 161, 162 Kailahun District Civil Society Organisation (KAIDCSO), 162 Kamajors, 4, 13, 211n41 Kamara, Briam Acha, 57, 100, 102, 166 ‘community partnership’ and, 108–9 as Inspector-General of Police, 101 Kaplan, Robert, 2–3 Keen, D., 4 Kenema, 10, 26, 80, 90, 109, 141 magistrates courts in, 60 working police force in, 55, 59 Khobe, Mitikishe Maxwell, 12, 13, 65 on disbanding of armed forces, 13 killed-in-action (KIA), 119–20 Koidu, 73, 99 Konaré, Alpha Oumar, 15 Kono, 10, 55, 99, 100, 113, 208 Koroma, Johnny Paul, 10, 12, 105, 210n29 labels, importance of, 20 law development programme (LDP), 21, 59–61, 137 law reform programme, 42, 49 legal sector, reforming, 51–9 Liberia, 63 Liberia National Police, 146 Local Command Unit (LCU), 53 Local Needs Policing (LNP), 21, 53, 107–9, 141 Local Policing Partnership Board (LPPB), 108–9, 141 obstacle to development of, 109 Lomé Peace Agreement, 13–14, 54, 65, 79, 112 Loyal Troops, 10 Makeni, 55, 68, 72, 73, 99, 141 working police force in, 59 Malthus, Thomas, 3

Index 231 Margai, Charles, 41, 163 Margai family, 6 Medium Term Expenditure Framework 2003 (MTEF), 118 Medium Term Strategic Plan (Sierra Leone Police), 141–2 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UK and Sierra Leone, 97–8, 177 Military Advisory Training Team (MATT), 18 Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP), 143, 153–4, 156 emergency, 153–4 standing, 153 military intervention, 61–8 Military Reintegration Plan (MRP), 68 military reintegration programme, 79–82 disarmament and demobilisation, 80 headline statistics of, 81–2 holding and basic training group, 81 individual assessment, 80–1 integrated bridging training, 81 posting to first RSLAF unit, 81 potential recruit decision, 80 Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), 41 Ministry of Defence (MoD), 12, 29, 35, 64, 138 as cutting-edge institution, 148 and Defence Headquarters, imbalance in power between, 76 designing for new, 109–10 development of, 147–51 establishing the functioning of, 74–7 HQ building construction and implementation, 74–5 operational and management process, 75 ‘Plan 2010’, 115, 155 role of President as, 76

Security Sector Review Implementation Plan, drafting, 148 staffing of, 110–14 Ministry of Defence Advisory Team (MODAT), 65–6, 148 Future UK military commitment in support of DfID’s security sector reform programme, 68 Military Reintegration Plan, 68 Ministry of Finance (MoF), 65, 182 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 84 Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), 23, 38, 41, 60, 92–3, 138 cooperation between CCSSP and, 164 Ministry of Marine Resources, 157 Ministry of Mineral Resources, 157 Momoh, Joseph, 7, 62, 63 Moyamba District, 23, 42, 43, 141, 145, 166–7 redistribution of power in Chiefdom justice, 46–7 working police force in, 55 Multi-Donor Trust Fund, 79, 215n69 see also funding National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR), 79, 80 National Democratic Institute (NDI), 113 National Electoral Commission (NEC), 136 National Intelligence and Security Act, 86 National Intelligence Unit, 89 national ownership, 199–200 critical importance of, 184–5 National Policy Framework for the Justice Sector in Sierra Leone, 165 National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), 9, 10, 153 control over armed forces, 62–4 National Revenue Authority, 157 National Security Act, 83 National Security Advisor (NSA)’s Office, 17

232 Index National Security and Central Intelligence Act of 2002, 120, 122–3 National Security and Central Intelligence Bill, 89 National Security Architecture, 86, 89, 120–4, 168 National Security Committee, 169 National Security Council (NSC), 83, 124–5 National Security Council Coordinating Group (NSCCG), 76, 124–5 National Security Policy 2000, 128 National Vetting Agency, 123 Nelson-Williams, Alfred, 110 NGO Conciliation Resources, 162, 199 Strengthening Citizens’ Security, 161, 165 Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), 69 Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO), 70 non-governmental organisation (NGO), 16, 109, 113 non-state actors, 44–5 involvement in security/justice, 45–8, 165–8 Norman, Sam Hinga, 41, 66, 77, 163 Civil Defence Force and, 77–8 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 15 Office of National Security (ONS), 19, 22, 80, 82–90, 120–4 advise to political establishment, 157 development of, 156–62 institution-building, 157–8 intelligence analysis, 159 JSDP and, 140 policy research and coordination, 159 security sector implementation plan and, 158 Office of the Inspector General, 57 Office of the National Security Advisor, 89

Office of the President, 84, 85, 127, 156 Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT), 70 Operational Support Division (OSD), 33, 143–4 Training Centre, 100 Operation Basilica Operational Liaison Team, 64–5 Operation Palliser, 69–72 Operation Pebu (Op PEBU), 115, 116–17, 149–50 costing of, 116–17 Operation Pebu Cell, 117 Operation Pebu Steering Committee, 117 Operation Phoenix, 55 Order of Battle (ORBAT), 109, 217n26 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 36–7 Handbook on Security System Reform, 37 Security System Reform and Governance, 37, 39, 42, 45, 49 Organized Body of Hunting Societies, 211n40 Overseas Development Act of 1980, 17 Overseas Development Administration (ODA), 12, 54 Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), 12 Paramount Hotel, 35, 36, 67, 68, 76, 110, 111, 149, 213n43 Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Defence, Internal and Presidential Affairs (POCDI&PA), 164 peacebuilding, 27, 31, 61 penal reform, 141 Penfold, Peter, 172, 173 Personnel Screening Centre (PSC), 80 Pham, P., 2 ‘Plan 2010’, 115, 155

Index 233 police(ing) by consensus, 109 local needs, 21, 53, 107–9, 141 primacy, 104 Police Act 1964, 138 Police Council, 138, 163, 164 police service, reforming, 51–9 decision-making structure, 57–8 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 54–5 Keith Biddle and, 56–7 Lomé Peace Agreement, 54 Operation Phoenix, 55 reducing ranks and, 56–7 in rural areas, 55 Special Security Division, 58–9 Sierra Leone Policing Charter, 52–3 SILSEP and, 54 see also Sierra Leone Police Police Training School, 100 Port Loko, 26, 80 working police force in, 55, 59 poverty, reduction of, 28 Poverty Alleviation Strategy Coordinating Office (PASCO), 125 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), 22, 28, 98, 125–31, 135, 140, 156–7 challenges within, 157 ONS’s lack of financial support for, 157 President, role as individual, 181 Primary Justice Pilots, 44–5 prison service, 60 JSDP support to, 141 Provincial District Security Committee (PROSEC), 89, 90–1, 123–4, 126, 161 Public Service Commission, 123 Pujehun, 26, 80, 149, 150 working police force in, 55 Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), 23, 69, 74, 109–10, 143, 147 comparison with Sierra Leone Police, 152–3 creating a role for, 151–6

Government funding for, 151–2 ‘Plan 2010’ and, 115–16 Re-Equipment Programme, 110 restructuring of, 75 support to civil power, 153–4 tensions between Sierra Leone Police and, 104–7 Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF), 13 disbanding, 12 Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 1, 4, 7, 51, 56, 59, 61, 62, 70–1 British Expeditionary Force attack on, 5 membership in DDR National Committee, 14 activities, peoples’ protest against, 14 Issa Hassan Sesay and, 14 alliance with Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, 10–12 Richards, David, 16, 64, 69–70, 172 Richards, Paul on reinstatement of chiefdom system, 8–9 Sankoh, Foday, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13–15, 70–1 Issa Hassan Sesay and, 15 membership in DDR National Committee, 14 security, 11–15, 17–20, 51 armed forces, 61–8 coordination, decentralising, 90–1 distinguished from criminal justice system, 33 justice system and law development programme, 59–61 non-state actors involvement in, 44–8, 165–8 police and legal sector, reforming, 52–9 reforms of see security sector reform within Justice Sector Development Programme, 41–4 Security and Justice (S&J), 29, 36 security institutions, definition of, 38–9, 127

234 Index security sector oversight of, 162–5 continuing role of UK in, 186–8 security sector reform (SSR), 11, 15–20, 27–49, 191–4 development of, 30–2, 95 developmentalising donor approaches to military expenditure, 32–3 fragmentation in policy, 32–6 fragmentation in practice, 32–6 Justice Sector Development Programme, 41–4 momentum in international policy-making, 36–8 non-state actor involvement in, 45–8 OECD-DAC guidelines for, 36–7 phases of, 21–3, 158 scope of, 38–41 security–justice separation, 33 sustainability of, 118–19, 193–4, 204–5 Security Sector Review, 22, 98, 125–31, 135–6, 140, 156 Security Sector Review Working Group, 127 Sesay, Issa Hassan, 14–15 Foday Sankoh and, 15 Short, Clare, 27–31, 43, 69, 93, 97, 173, 178 on DfID’s involvement in security-related programming, 30–1 on UK’s involvement in Sierra Leone, 31–2 Short Term Training Team (STTT), 70 Sierra Leone alluvial diamond fields in, 4 atrocities against civilians, 4–5, 10, 11 colonial bifurcation, 7 disengagement from international advisers, 158 election 1997, 11 election 2007, 1 human security as guiding principle, 159

Improved Access to Security and Justice Programme in, 47 independence of, 6 individual power struggles in, 34 international intervention in, 5–6 Ministries, Departments and Agencies, 41 MoU between United Kingdom and, 97–8, 177, 192 National Defence Policy for, 92 National Security Policy – Proposals and Recommendations, 77 National Vision 2025, 128 Operation Pebu and, 117 politics and conflict in, 6–11 role in establishment of conflict prevention pools, 178–80 security in see security security system transformation in see security sector reform significance of, 2–6 UK aid allocation to, 158 UK involvement in see United Kingdom UNDP’s Human Development Index, 2 violence in, 2–3 Sierra Leonean continuity of, 185 exceptionalism, 202–4 experience affecting security sector reform, 205–7 involvement in MoD planning, 113 NGO Campaign for Good Governance, 80 oversight of security institutions, 185–6, 200–1 Sierra Leone Army (SLA), 64–5, 70 Sierra Leone Bar Association, 61 Sierra Leone Civil Service, 116 Sierra Leone National Security Policy, 83 Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), 6–7, 9, 160, 169 Sierra Leone Police (SLP), 29, 31, 38, 39, 46, 137 CCSSP and, 141, 142 contribution of troops to ESF, 154 Criminal Investigation Division, 35

Index 235 Criminal Investigation Department, 58 decision-making structure, 57–8 Election Policing Strategy, 143, 168 Executive Management Board, 57 Family Support Units in, 58 handing over, 102–4 image of, 53 impact of state institutions and infrastructure during the war on, 55–6 as institution, 43 JSDP and, 140, 141–3 lack of ministerial support against reform of, 137–9 Medium Term Strategic Plan, 141–2 military-style rank-conscious organization, 57 Operation Phoenix and, 55 Operational Support Division, 103–4 outside Freetown and the western area, establishing, 99–102 peoples’ protest against RUF activities and, 14 ranks, reducing, 56–7 reforming, 51–9 Re-Introduction of Effective Operational Policing, 212n11 and Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, tensions between, 104–7 sustainability within, 139 Sierra Leone Police Infrastructure Project, 212n10 Sierra Leone Police Vehicles and Communications Project, 212n10 Sierra Leone Policing Charter, 52–3 Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP), 13, 17, 27, 28, 54, 64, 65, 83, 140, 142 delineation between ‘security’ and ‘defence’, 91–3 Sobel, 63 Spearhead Land Element (SLE), 69

Special Security Division (SSP) Operational Support Group within, 58–9 Spicer, Tim, 172 state-building, 27 Stevens, Siaka, 6–7, 61 Strasser, Valentine, 9 Straw, Jack, 178 Sub-Saharan Africa, 40 Sudan, 29 Sugden, Jennifer, 37 sustainability, of social security reform, 118–19, 193–4, 204–5 sustainable development, 31 Taylor, Charles, 7, 72 Temporary Holding Centre (THC), 80 Territorial Defence Force (TDF), 77–8 Training in the Investigation of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Liberia, 146 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 8, 125 Uganda, 29 Unholy Alliance, 70 United Kingdom (UK) aid allocation to Sierra Leone, 158 changes in IMATT, 175 continuing role of, in service sector, 186–8 elevation of DfID to new position, 175–6 engagement in African affairs, 172 ‘ethical foreign policy’, 172 exit strategy of, 189–91 Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), 37 involvement in Sierra Leone, 172–8, 201–2 Joint Task Force, 73 MoU between Government of Sierra Leone and, 97–8, 177, 192 national as Chief of Defence Staff, 56 Operation Palliser, 69–72 peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone, 4–5

236 Index United Kingdom (UK) – continued political involvement and logistical support to ECOMOG, 13 Short Term Training Team, 70 SSR-related activities in Sierra Leone, 28 United Nations (UN), 1, 103 development of Family Support Unit, 145–6 role in Sierra Leone, 73–4 Security Council Resolution 1270, 73 United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), 5, 14, 16, 69, 70, 73–4 withdrawal from Eastern Region, 103 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 58, 146 see also funding

United Nations Civil Police Force (UNCIVPOL), 100 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 99, 141 Human Development Index, 2, 192, 195 United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), 10, 140, 141 United Progressive Party (UPP), 6 value-added tax (VAT), 183 violence, 2–3 see also atrocities against civilians West Side Boys, 10, 210n27, 214n49 wounded-in-action (WIA), 119–20 youths in military coup, 9 resentment of chiefs, 8