Power, Freedom, and Voting
M.J.H., 35 u 27 cm, water colour / paper, Katharina Kohl, 2007.
Matthew Braham · Frank Steffen (Editors)
Power, Freedom, and Voting
Essays in Honour of Manfred J. Holler
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Dr. Matthew Braham Faculty of Philosophy University of Groningen Oude Boteringestraat 52 9712 GL Groningen The Netherlands
[email protected]
ISBN 978-3-540-73381-2
Dr. Frank Steffen The University of Liverpool Management School Chatham Street L69 7ZH Liverpool UK
[email protected]
e-ISBN 978-3-540-73382-9
DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9 Library of Congress Control Number: 2008922456 c 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Production: le-tex Jelonek, Schmidt & Vöckler GbR, Leipzig Cover design: WMX Design GmbH, Heidelberg Printed on acid-free paper 987654321 springer.com
Preface The chapters in this volume are intended to honour the career and work of Manfred J. Holler by presenting a body of work in economics, political science, and philosophy that is intimately related to some of the major themes that have occupied his attention for the past twenty-five years or so. Some of the chapters are developments of topics that Holler has consistently worked on during his career (power indices, voting rules, principles and applications of game theory); others are on topics that currently occupy his attention (freedom and responsibility). We even include an essay by Holler on the quintessential theorist of power: Niccolò Machiavelli. For those who know Manfred personally, the breadth of viewpoints and methods that can be found in this volume should come as no surprise. His academic career is depicted by intellectual diversity and experimentation: he has published papers in many branches of economics that can be classified as purely theoretical, as applied theory, as empirical, and historical. The person who has provoked this book was born on 25 July 1946 in Munich, Germany, where he grew up and completed his secondary and university education: MA in economics (1971), doctoral degree (1975), and Habilitation (1984), the last of which is a post-doctoral qualification (the socalled ‘second book’) that until recently was generally required by German universities for appointment to a professorship. After a senior research and lecturing position in Munich, Holler took up an associate professorship in economics at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, in 1986. In 1991 he was appointed as full professor of economic theory at the University of Hamburg where, at the time of writing, he still works. The German university landscape has often received bad press for the hierarchical and rigid structures and fiefdoms that Herr Prof. Dr. carves out and jealously guards, even at the expense of the openness and frankness required for healthy academic discourse and development. While this is undoubtedly true, the same landscape -- which is now rapidly disappearing in the process of turning German universities into degree factories – has another side. Depending on the personalities that are able to find their way into the niches of German universities, they could be equally hospitable for an entirely different form of academic life. Holler’s niche is an open and academically and educationally progressive one. In the words of the great American philosopher John Dewey, it is a place of ‘connected experiences’. The autonomy of the traditional German university Lehrstuhl meant that such niches can also be the ideal environment for creative and highly individual endeavour. One of the very important characteristics of the
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Institute of SocioEconomics (the Anglicized name that Holler gave to his Lehrstuhl) is that it is refreshingly free of rules and regulations. As long as we have known Manfred, he has always made every effort to free his staff from unnecessary administrative burdens and he never burdened anyone with his own work. For him, it was important to ensure that there was sufficient time to do what is supposed to be done in universities: read, think, experiment, and write. Even the mundane task of setting exam questions and marking was a collaborative and intellectually stimulating exercise. Manfred has been very suspicious of targets, research clusters, and endless creation of new fangled ways of managing academic life. For him, it is a matter of providing time and encouragement to initiate and organize research activities on one’s own initiative. Over the years we organized workshops from Siena to the Isle of Sylt in the North Sea. Many of the authors in this volume contributed to these events so that in some sense this volume records the recent history of the Institute of SocioEconomics. Both of us have known Holler closely from our days as his doctoral students and have been greatly affected and influenced by his intellectual generosity. We wanted to repay this charity by not only putting together a Festschrift but also an event that is close to his heart: the combination of art and science. Thus the idea of a Festschrift conference with an art event was conceived in the autumn of 2004 and organized as a secret together with Manfred’s wife, Barbara Klose-Ullmann. For the days of 17–20 August 2006, about a month after Manfred’s sixtieth birthday most of the contributors met at the Elsa-Brändström-Haus, a villa and former residence of the Warburg family on the banks of the River Elbe just outside Hamburg, to present and discuss early drafts of the papers. Not only did we exhibit some artworks by a couple of Manfred’s artist friends in the main conference room, but we also dedicated an evening to two artists to present their work. Nicola Atkinson-Davidson presented her piece, ‘Thank You for Shopping with Us! (And Have a Nice Day?)’, which is best described as a piece of social sculpture à la Beuys. The piece centred on an installation: a fan and an empty plastic bag. It was about establishing an interaction among the audience and the social environment. Alex Close presented the ‘essence of a container’. This essence is documented in his essay entitled ‘Container Manifesto: Or Why Boxes Have to be Closed’. We cannot go into detail here about these works, but details can be found on www.nadfly.com and Alex’s manifesto will be published in 2008 in Homo Oeconomicus, a journal that Manfred founded and edits together with one of us (m.b.) and Hartmut Kliemt. As it is not possible to represent the great variety of Manfred’s work in one volume, we decided to restrict our attention to that area of his work which overlaps with our own interests. Hence the focus of this book on foundational issues in the analysis of power, freedom, and voting. However, even such a thematic restriction posed a number of problems. The mere number of friends and colleagues that Manfred has who work in this area
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meant that we could easily have produced a second 400 page tome. With the help of some of his close friends and collaborators down the years we decided to invite those who have either been co-authors, co-editors, or contributors to his numerous and diverse projects. In addition we wanted obtain a representative historical and geographical spread of friends that have spanned his career. We also wanted the book to capture more than Manfred’s past; the idea being that it should also be a continuation of his own projects in this field. 1 Here we took the liberty of inviting a few contributors who in some capacity became closely involved with the Institute of SocioEconomics from 2000 onwards. Although it would have been aesthetically pleasing to compile this volume into distinct parts, the overlapping themes made any division of chapters arbitrary. As readers familiar with the literature on power indices will know, discussions of power are intimately related to discussions of voting rules and vice versa. And we cannot easily separate discussions of power from discussions of coalitions; and nor can we discuss freedom without any reference to power. Thus, at most we have grouped chapters together that are closely related. Otherwise there is no particular order. We can now turn to a brief description of the contents. The Festschrift opens with a chapter that is very close to Manfred’s current interests: the nature and measurement of responsibility. That challenge that is set out in Chapter 1 by one of the editors (m.b.) is a very abstract one: how to untangle ascriptions of social power and causation and explicate the difference in their meaning. As the reader will see from the acknowledgements and references this is the continuation of work that was jointly initiated with Manfred. The main thrust of the paper is the introduction of a game theoretic framework to formulate a demarcation principle and demonstrate that social power is a special case of social causation. One of the interesting results of this analysis for normative theory is that it is shown that an agent can make a causal contribution to some state of affairs although be entirely powerless with respect to that state of affairs. This of course raises the question of whether power is an appropriate criterion for attributing responsibility. In the next chapter (2), written by František Turnovec, Jacek Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz, Felsenthal and Machover’s ‘I-power’ (power as ‘influence’) and ‘P-power’ (power as ‘prize’) distinction is subjected to a penetrating analysis. The authors argue that the classification of the Banzhaf index as I-power and the Shapley-Shubik index as P-power, and therefore Felsenthal and Machover’s disqualification of the Shapley-Shubik index for particular kinds of analyses, does not hold. Both measures can be modelled 1 In the 1980s, he edited two volumes that overlap with this one: Power, Voting, and Voting Power (Physica Verlag, 1982) and Coalitions and Collective Action (Physica Verlag, 1984). More recently, together with Guillermo Owen he edited Power Indices and Coalition Formation (Kluwer, 2001).
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as values of cooperative games and as probabilities of being ‘decisive’ without reference to game theory at all. The basic point being that ‘pivots’ (Shapley-Shubik index) and ‘swings’ (Banzhaf index) can be taken as special cases of a more general concept of ‘decisiveness’. The authors complete their study by introducing a more general measure of a priori voting power that covers the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and Holler’s Public Good indices as special cases. In Chapter 3, Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover continue their studies of the expediency and stability of alliances by examining a co-operative non-transferable utility game that is derived from a simple voting game. In this game, a strategy is the formation of an alliance in the simple game and the payoffs are the Penrose voting powers in the resulting composite voting game. Felsenthal and Machover highlight a number of paradoxical outcomes that can occur under super-majority rules and how a dummy player can be empowered by participating in an expedient alliance. Chapter 4 by René van den Brink and the other editor (f.s.) is the result of a quite a number of years of painstaking investigation. It is a solution to a puzzle that f.s. started working on for both his MA and doctoral theses under Manfred’s supervision. The question is simple, the answer somewhat complicated: how to measure power in a hierarchy given the sequential nature of decision-making in such structures? The solution is an analogue of the Banzhaf index for extensive game forms. Although for some this will not come as a real surprise, deriving such an analogue is not a straightforward affair because the precise meaning of a ‘swing’ in an extensive game form is far from obvious. Understanding power in hierarchical structures requires the integration of a variety of conceptual and formal frameworks. Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach take up one of Holler’s favourite themes in Chapter 5: the construction of new power indices. They define and axiomatize what they call the Public Help Index – although it is questionable if this can really be called a ‘power index’ given that it assigns a positive value to a dummy player. The paper’s significance is that it fills in a logical gap in the axiomatics of power measures based on simple games. The authors also provide an algorithm for their new index as well as for Holler’s Public Good Index. Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén’s (Chapter 6) analysis of power in the UN Security Council is written in a refreshingly unconventional style. They set up their analysis as a football match between two teams: the local Y-team, their own strategic power index, and the renowned Princeton G-team, the Shapley-Shubik index. The match ends in a draw as Napel and Widgén are able to show that the Shapley-Shubik index is a special case of their index – this result is the equalizing goal scored with the last kick of the game. By the assumptions of the model, the values generated by the two indices are the same. But hinting at their belief in the superiority of their index, the Y-team
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calls for extra time. The chapter has all the merits of the perfect Festschrift contribution, being a playful but rigorous analysis that is littered with anecdotes of the intellectual life in Hamburg over the last years and hints at provocative debates among a number of the contributors to this volume. For the record, the presentation of this paper was actually done as a staged performance with two commentators taking on the roles given in the chapter. Chapter 7, by Guillermo Owen, Ines Lindner, and Bernie Grofman, is concerned with modified power indices for indirect voting, such as in the US Electoral College. The authors demonstrate the need, and propose a method for, modifying classical measures such as the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for dealing with this kind of institutional arrangement. The problem with the classical measures for indirect voting is that they generate counter-intuitive results are due to their insensitivity to important features of the voting environment. In the case of the Electoral College, it is the insensitivity to voter correlation in the different US states. In another very original empirical analysis (Chapter 8), Joe Godfrey and Bernie Grofman apply the Shapley-Owen value, the spatial analogue of the Shapley value, to test the hypothesis that lobbying efforts are directed to potentially pivotal voters. To do this they examine the lobbying activities surrounding the 1993 Clinton Health Care reform proposal. Apart from the unique attempt of using the Shapley-Owen value on historical data the value of the study is that the authors are able to pinpoint key players in the process who lobbyists failed to identify as important. Vincent Chua and Dan Felsenthal’s chapter (9) continues the thread of contributions on the empirical analysis of power. They put Robert Aumann’s coalition formation hypothesis to test. In an interview, Auman had hypothesized that a party charged with forming a governing coalition will choose the coalition that maximizes its Shapley-Shubik index value. Chua and Felsenthal examine three versions of the hypothesis and find that for each version the hypothesis is actually outperformed by different conjectures: the Leiserson-Axelrod closed minimal range theory and the GamsonRiker minimum size principle. 2 In their chapter (10), Friedel Bolle and Yves Breitmoser take up the relationships among coalition formation, agenda selection, and power. They develop a model of coalitional bargaining in which a formateur asks the other parties about their aspirations from participating in a government. The authors then show how the value functions can lead to structurally different predictions of the outcome and assessments of power. They tie up their chapter by looking at the relationship between their conception of power and the power index introduced by Napel and Widgrén. Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt, and Stefan Napel’s chapter (11) is a 2 A follow-up to this paper by Chua and Felsenthal can be found in Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 25 (2008).
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game theoretic analysis of an enduring and classical problem of political theory, that of whether or not a democracy can incorporate foes of democracy. They investigate the conditions under which letting the foes of democracy participate (‘have a positive share of political power’) in the democratic system will not pose a serious risk to the system itself and may in fact be beneficial. In particular, it is required that the otherwise democratically competing parties can rein in the foes of democracy by acting as a democratic cartel. In Chapter 12, Steven Brams and Marc Kilgour present three models in which two players agree to share power in a particular ratio, but, as in a duel, either can subsequently ‘fire’ at the other to try to eliminate him. If neither is successful, the agreement remains in place; if one is successful, that player obtains all the power; and if both are eliminated, neither player gets anything. The authors examine three versions of the model: the oneshot version, the repeated version with discounted payoffs, and a version with a damage. Brams and Kilgour’s analysis throws up a very pessimistic conclusion: no matter what the values of any of the parameters are, rational players will be impelled to try to eliminate a partner in a power-sharing agreement. Hence, power sharing appears to be inherently unstable and this is what makes ending conflicts so difficult. 3 Chapter 13 by Donald Wittman is a comparison of proposal and veto power in a majority-rule voting system. In his model, the proposer chooses a position that maximizes his utility subject to the constraint that a majority and a veto player prefer the position to the status quo. Although there may exist many proposers and vetoers, one needs only to concentrate on a few of the players to determine the outcome of the legislative game. Norman Schofield (Chapter 14) studies the relationship between party positions and electoral response. He develops a model of valence that can be used to predict individual voter choice and interpret the political game. The central result of his analysis is that the ‘centripetal’ tendency of political strategy, inferred from the spatial voting model is contradicted by empirical evidence (data from Israeli elections). Schofield thus challenges the generality of a cherished theorem of modern political science: the validity of the ‘mean voter theorem’ depends on a limit to electoral variance as well as bounds on the variation of valence between the parties. Tommi Meskanen and Hannu Nurmi’s chapter (15) brings the topic of voting to a close. They dwell on the question of why there is such a variety of voting rules. They demonstrate that there is in fact a unity in the diversity because most systems are actually related in that they are all characterized by the same goal state: consensus. The different procedures are just different ways of measuring the distance from consensus. 3 This model has been further analysed by Martin Leroch in a forthcoming article in Homo Oeconomicus.
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Chapter 16 is the first of four papers that are explicitly about the relationship between freedom and power. In this chapter, Keith Dowding and Martin van Hees analyse the similarities and differences between the concepts of freedom and power. Their analysis turns on the concept of ‘ability’ that underpins both freedom and power ascriptions. The new contribution of this analysis is that Dowding and van Hees demonstrate that there are cases in which the abilities (powers) of a person fail to coincide with her freedom. Similar to Chapter 1 where it is shown that ‘power’ and ‘cause’ come apart although the two concepts share a common conceptual structure, here it is shown that ‘power’ and ‘freedom’ can come apart despite the common structure. The upshot of this fine-grained analysis is that the precise content of the intuitive relation between these two concepts is anything but clear and this opens up a whole host of new and difficult conceptual and normative questions. In Chapter 17, Marlies Ahlert develops the concept of ‘guarantees in game forms’ as a method of making sense of interpersonal comparisons of freedom, liberty, rights, and power. Starting from the intuition that individuals should have some control over their lives such that they can secure for themselves certain levels of well-being, she uses the construct of a fictitious external observer (the ‘policymaker’) to order game forms. This gives us a ‘personal welfare function’ for the individual’s well-being under specific rules of interaction. Ahlert then applies the concept to dictator and ultimatum bargaining games. Sebastiano Bavetta et al. (Chapter 18) use the Millian idea of ‘autonomy freedom’ as the basis of an empirical analysis of how freedom affects an individual’s attitude towards income inequality. In their study of Italy, they find that there is a negative association between the level of perceived autonomy freedom and the support for redistributive policies. The authors then consider how their results can be used to reconcile views about the classical trade-off between freedom and inequality in liberal democracies. Chapter 19 by Luciano Andreozzi is another new analysis of a canonical problem in normative theory that brings together the problems of power and freedom: is it legitimate to coerce people to contribute to a public good that they have not consented to. More bluntly: ‘do people have a right to punish free-riders?’ Andreozzi emends H.L.A Hart’s ‘principle of fairness’ and uses an elementary game theoretic model to derive conditions for ‘fair’ coercion. In particular he demonstrates that when cooperators cannot punish free-riders the resulting equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, but allowing for mild punishments produces a Pareto superior outcome. The final three chapters differ somewhat in topic and style from the rest of the book. In Chapter 20, Frederick Guy and Peter Skott’s take up a Marxian theme and explore the ways in which employee power (and thus the willingness of firms to pay wages) will be affected by changes in information and communication technology (ICT). Developments in ICT allow manag-
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ers to monitor the actions of employees more closely and act in increasingly discretionary ways. The result of such technology is to reduce the ability of workers to exert power which has a knock-on effect on the functional distribution of income. Chapter 21 by Timo Airaksinen casts a look at the concept of social capital and how it is related to trust, responsibility and power. His short paper is an intuitive study of how we might talk about these concepts. In particular he argues that the existence of social capital depends on an absence of trust and social capital itself implies certain types of coercive power relations. We close the book (Chapter 22) with an essay by Manfred Holler in which he revisits a classical text on political power: Machiavelli’s The Prince. Holler sets out to explore what this text has to offer for modern political theory and shows how Machiavelli actually grappled with problems that has plagued political theory for centuries: the aggregation of preferences, the origin of the state and the law, the status of power and morality in politics, and the dynamics and efficiency of political systems. In a provocative twist, Holler proposes that Machiavelli’s ‘prince’ is none other than Arrow’s dictatorship condition in disguise. On behalf of all the contributors, it is our pleasure to be able to offer Manfred Holler this Festschrift on a series of topics that have an extensive and long-standing place in economics, politics, and philosophy. For, the three concepts of power, freedom, and voting are concerned with the difficulty of coordinating individual and collective activities of the members of a society and the problems associated with such coordination will never cease to exist. These are concepts that find their concrete expression in law and the social practices that are used to allocate scarce resources among competing ends. We hope that readers will find the contributions intellectually stimulating, challenging, and – this is most important for Manfred – be part of an ongoing discussion. As a closing word, we would like to thank the sponsors and colleagues who made all aspects of this project possible. Our sponsors were: the University of Hamburg, the City of Hamburg, Eurohypo AG (Hamburg Branch), and the Alfred Toepfer Foundation (Hamburg). As for direct assistance, special thanks must go to Dr. Harald Schlüter, Division for Research Management and Funding, University of Hamburg, who was always on hand to help us through with the financing not only of this project but many others in the past that led up to it. Lastly, we are indebted to Martin Leroch who provided invaluable assistance in organising and running the conference. Thanks must also go to Nicola Maaser for arranging a piano concert by Hong Chun Youn, one of the most promising young pianists in Germany. m.b. f.s.
Contents Preface 1. Social Power and Social Causation: Towards a Formal Synthesis Matthew Braham
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2. Power Indices Methodology: Decisiveness, Pivots, and Swings František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
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3. Further Reflections on the Expediency and Stability of Alliances Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
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4. Positional Power in Hierarchies René van den Brink and Frank Steffen
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5. A Public Help Index Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
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6. Shapley-Shubik versus Strategic Power – Live from the UN Security Council Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén
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7. Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting Guillermo Owen, Ines Lindner, and Bernard Grofman
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8. Pivotal Voting Theory: The 1993 Clinton Health Care Reform Proposal in the U.S. Congress Joseph Godfrey and Bernard Grofman
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9. Coalition Formation Theories Revisited: An Empirical Investigation of Aumann’s Hypothesis Vincent C.H. Chua and Dan S. Felsenthal
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10. Coalition Formation, Agenda Selection, and Power Friedel Bolle and Yves Breitmoser
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11. Democratic Defences and (De-)Stabilisations Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt, and Stefan Napel
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12. The Instability of Power Sharing Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour
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13. The Power to Propose versus the Power to Oppose Donald A. Wittman
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14. Divergence in the Spatial Stochastic Model of Voting Norman Schofield
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15. Closeness Counts in Social Choice Tommi Meskanen and Hannu Nurmi
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16. Freedom, Coercion, and Ability Keith Dowding and Martin van Hees
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17. Guarantees in Game Forms Marlies Ahlert
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18. Individual Control in Decision-Making and Attitudes Towards Inequality: The Case of Italy Sebastiano Bavetta, Antonio Cognata, Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti, and Pietro Navarra
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19. The Principle of Fairness: A Game Theoretic Model Luciano Andreozzi
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20. Power, Productivity, and Profits Frederick Guy and Peter Skott
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21. Trust, Responsibility, Power, and Social Capital Timo Airaksinen
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22. Exploiting The Prince Manfred J. Holler
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1. Social Power and Social Causation: Towards a Formal Synthesis Matthew Braham Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Power and Cause are the same thing. Correspondent to cause and effect, are POWER and ACT; nay, those and these are the same things. — Hobbes, English Works, 1, X
1. The Challenge An impressive list of economists, political scientists, and philosophers starting with Thomas Hobbes and including Herbert Simon (1957), James March (1955), Robert Dahl (1957, 1968), Felix Oppenheim (1961, 1976, 1981), William Riker (1964), Virginia Held (1972), and Jack Nagel (1975) have claimed that there are key and compelling similarities between what is ordinarily considered to be an ascription of social power and that which is considered under the more general rubric of causality. Hence to say: x ‘i has (had) power to x’ , is to assert that i can (did) cause an outcome x . x ‘i has (had) power over j’ , is to assert that i can (did) cause j to act in a specific way (in a manner that he would not otherwise do). Despite this common recognition, which centres on the reference to the same necessity and sufficiency conditions, there is quite a gamut of views and indeed barely any consensus about the precise nature of the link. In broad terms (and picking only a few of the authors), Riker (1964: 347) for instance, says that the difference between power and causality is one of ‘potential’ and ‘actual’: ‘Power is potential cause. Or, power is the ability to exercise influence while cause is the actual exercise of it’. That is, if i caused some outcome x , then i had power with respect to x ; and if i has power with respect to x, then i can cause x . For March and Dahl the relation is weaker. They assert that ‘power relations are logically a subset of causal relations’ (Dahl 1968: 410). While Oppenheim (1981: 33) judges the relation to be even weaker still: power
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and causal ascriptions come apart completely and are only ‘overlapping categories’. Knowledge of how causal and power ascriptions are related is clearly of fundamental methodological and normative importance. For example, if causal and power ascriptions are two sides of the same coin, as Riker suggests, what descriptive or normative work does the concept of power actually do? Why not follow Riker’s (1964: 348) provocative proposal and delete the concept of power from the vocabulary of social science and political philosophy? 1 If, on the other hand, every power ascription implies a causal ascription but not vice versa as Dahl and March suggest, what exactly demarcates power from causality and makes the set of power ascriptions a proper subset of the set of causal ascriptions? What, if at all, is the normative significance of this distinction for, say, theories of responsibility? 2 For moral judgements are very much dependant upon our understanding of causality and power. Unfortunately, given that none of the above mentioned writers established their claims with any rigour, it is not really possible to evaluate the coherence and veracity of their claims. Riker’s belief, for instance, that a causal ascription entails power is entirely incidental; it is based on the observation of certain ‘parallelisms’ between different concepts of cause and different concepts of power. Or to put it another way, he did not prove that it is not the case that if i is attributed as having been causal for x then i had power with respect to x . (I will demonstrate that Riker’s claim is false.) In a similar fashion, neither March nor Dahl formally demonstrated that the class of power ascriptions is a proper subset of causal ascriptions. March, for instance, only observes that (emphasis added) it appears to be true that any statement of influence 3 that can be just as easily formulated in terms of causality. Since in common parlance (and the present framework) it is not true that all statements of causality can be treated as statements of influence (i.e. influence and causality are not equivalent), the set of all influence relations can be understood to be a proper subset of all causal relations (March 1955: 437).
Yet there is nothing in this argument or the rest of March’s article that guarantees that the set of power relations is a subset and not an intersection 1 Riker’s proposal echoes Bertrand Russell’s (1913) famed argument that philosophers should abandon the concept of causation as being ‘a relic of a bygone age’ and replace it with the concept of ‘functional relationship’. 2 See, for instance, Braham and Holler (2008). This current essay is in fact a further development of that paper. See also the well-known statement by Connolly (1983: 84–137). 3 Here I am following Oppenheim (1960, 1976), and Barry (1976) and taking ‘power’ to be the generic concept, with concepts of ‘influence’, ‘coercion’, and ‘control’ as sub-categories of ‘power’. This corresponds to the ideas in March’s article. In contrast, Dahl (1963) assumes ‘influence’ to be the more general concept, while Riker (1964) considers the concepts to be synonyms.
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of the set of causal relations, as is claimed by Oppenheim. Furthermore, March (and for that matter Dahl as well) ignores entirely the condition that distinguished a power relation from a causal relation. Oppenheim’s claim that there is only an overlap between causal and power ascriptions is by far the most comprehensive and systematic. It is based on two observations. (i) The set of power ascriptions come in two forms: having power and exercising power. Only exercising power is causal. That is, an agent i may have power over j with respect to some outcome x (in the sense of being able to coerce j to do x or punish j for not doing x) but j brings about x for reasons entirely unrelated to i ’s power. (ii) Causal effect does not imply power: i may have performed an action which causally affects j, yet i has no power over j with respect to j performing any action. Although Oppenheim’s set intersection argument is correct in general, his analysis is incomplete. Firstly, it should be noticed that Oppenheim’s set of causal relations is that of ‘actual causation’ and thus the appropriate comparison with power should be restricted to the set of ‘actual’ or ‘exercising of power’ relations. In this case Oppenheim admits that the exercising of power does indeed refer to causation. Agreeing with Simon, he says that ‘cause’ is the ‘defining expression’ of power so that logically speaking the exercising of power is a proper subset of causal relations (and therefore his position is not so far from that of Dahl and March.) However, as with the others, Oppenheim, too, fails to spell out a criterion for demarcating a power from a causal ascription (although this should not be taken to mean that it is not present). In his discussion of what he considers the three basic expressions of ‘exercising power’, that of ‘influencing’, ‘preventing’ and ‘punishing’, he concentrates only on the correspondence between causal language and the definitions of these expressions, and not on the differences between power and cause. That is, Oppenheim restricts his attention to the observation that in one way or another ‘influencing’, ‘preventing’, and ‘punishing’ all are defined in terms of the building blocks of causal ascriptions, that of the necessity and/or sufficiency of one set of events (i ’s actions) in bringing about another event ( j’s actions, or a state of affairs or outcome x). In contrast to all these positions, another other prominent theorist, Alvin Goldman claimed that causal ascriptions and power ascriptions are entirely disjoint categories: Causal terminology is especially unhelpful in dealing with the kinds of cases of paramount interest to a theory of power, i.e., cases in which an outcome is a function of the actions of numerous agents. In thinking about distributions of power and degrees of power among many persons and many groups, the use of causal terminology is likely to obscure the crucial questions rather than illuminate them. It seems advisable, therefore, to avoid all reliance on the concept of causation from the outset (Goldman 1972: 227).
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The challenge of this paper should now be evident. It is simply to untangle ascriptions of social power and causation and explicate the difference in their meaning. I will propose a terse game-theoretic synthesis whereby we can visibly demarcate the two concepts and show their relation – which happens to be one of set-inclusion. Before the discussion begins, three caveats are in order. First, although I use the term ‘social causation’ I am aware that it is conceptually more precise to use the term ‘contributory effect’ or speak of ‘conventional causality’ or ‘conventional generation’ because the term ‘causality’ generally refers to the connection between two events which are related by empirically ascertainable ‘laws of nature’. Social outcomes are governed by law and convention and not merely by laws of nature as such. For example, that a house burns down following the outbreak of a fire of a certain size follows from laws of nature; that a particular policy is implemented following the agreement of a certain number of people follows from legal rules and conventions. 4 However, to use this alternative terminology would unnecessarily burden the discussion without adding anything. Second, as the two expressions that open this paper suggest, power ascriptions come in two forms: ‘power to’ and ‘power over ’. In line with Morriss’ (1987/2002) acute – and much overlooked – analysis, I take the first expression to be the generic form. I will explain the reasons for this later. Third, as my task is primarily analytical I will not undertake a comprehensive survey of the different opinions about the relationship between social power and social causation. I take it that my terse review in this introduction is sufficient to indicate that there is a problem to be dealt with.
2. Causal Ascriptions Let us begin with the concept of causality. 5 A ‘cause’ is a relation between events, processes, or entities in the same time series, in which one event, process, or entity C has the efficacy to produce or be part of the production, of another, the effect x , i.e. C is a condition for x . Arguments among philosophers about what actually constitutes this efficacy are often concerned with whether or not the efficacy be a necessity or sufficiency requirement. There are three senses for each of these. Starting with necessity, in descending order of stringency: Strict necessity
C is necessary for the occurrence of x whenever x occurs.
Strong necessity
C was necessary for x on the particular occasion.
4
The distinction is discussed in more detail in Kramer (2003: 280) This section is summarized from Hart and Honoré (1959), Honoré (1995), Kramer (2003: 277ff), Mackie (1965, 1974), Pearl (2000: 313–315 ) and Wright (1985, 1988). 5
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Weak necessity
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C was a necessary element of some set of existing conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of x .
For sufficiency: Strict sufficiency C is sufficient by itself for the occurrence of x . Strong sufficiency C was a necessary element of some set of existing conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of x . Weak sufficiency C was an element of some set of existing conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of x . There are three remarks to be made here. Firstly, it is obvious that we can instantly dispense with the concept of weak sufficiency for the simple reason that it is trivially satisfied by any condition C by simply adding C to an already existing set of conditions that is sufficient for x , although C is totally irrelevant as regards x . That is, weak sufficiency can fail to satisfy the simple counterfactual test of efficacy known as the ‘but-for’ test in a very unacceptable way. According to this test, C was a cause of some result x only if but for the occurrence of C, then x would not have occurred. Suppose, for example, a house burns down and evidence is found that there was a shortcircuit, there was flammable material nearby, there was no automated and efficient water sprinkler, and all three conditions together are sufficient for the house burning down. Now add the fact that there is also evidence that a Bob Dylan CD was in an unplugged CD player in the house. In absence of some empirically ascertainable laws of nature that govern the spontaneous combustion of unplugged CD players with Bob Dylan CD loaded in the deck, it is entirely unreasonable that the CD player with the Bob Dylan CD should qualify as having causal status for the fire. Secondly, there is no question that if C is strictly necessary for x , then C should be ascribed causal status for x ; and if C is strongly necessary for x then C should also be ascribed causal status for x . 6 In both cases, C obviously satisfies the ‘but-for’ test. Yet strict necessity is inadequate to cover causal relations in general because it will often not be fulfilled. It would mean that evidence of an electrical short-circuit that combined with other conditions and resulted in a house burning down would not qualify for causal status given that it is not true that for all instances of a house burning down there must have been an electrical short-circuit. Strict sufficiency is 6 Note here that necessity can be considered as too ‘weak’ for picking out a cause because it means that the presence of air is a cause of car accidents, rapes, etc. Obviously there is a ‘boundary problem’ to deal with and the problem does not disappear even if we restrict ourselves to those events which are actions, because while we can assume away nomic conditions (‘laws of nature’) we cannot simply assume away past actions as conditions for the present. Here I go along with Mackie’s (1974: 63) concept of the ‘causal field’, which is the background against which causing goes on, i.e. consequents and antecedents do not float about on their own but happen in some setting.
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also inadequate because it too may fail to exist: it is rare that a single condition C is sufficient for x . Strict sufficiency also rules out ascribing the electrical short-circuit causal status for the house burning down given that it alone cannot lead to the fire; the presence of flammable material, etc. is also called for. Moreover, the fact that C may be strictly sufficient for x and was present on the occasion of x’s occurrence does not imply that C actually caused x ; x may have brought about by another strictly sufficient condition that was also present on the occasion. Thirdly, although strong necessity is ostensibly an attractive candidate for ascribing causality, it too can easily crumble in cases of causal over-determination. These are those circumstances in which the causes of an event are cumulatively more than sufficient to generate the effect. That is, there exist situations in which a strongly necessary condition will fail to exist. Causal over-determination comes in two broad types which Wright (1985: 1775) has usefully labelled as duplicative and pre-emptive causation. A case of duplicative causation is one in which two similar and independent causal processes C 1 and C 2 , each of which is sufficient for the same effect x , may culminate in x at the same time. It will be best to turn to some examples. Assassin 1 Assassin1 and Assassin2 independently and simultaneously aim and shoot at Victim such that each shot is sufficient to kill Victim at exactly the same moment. Clearly, neither assassin was strongly necessary for Victim’s death because, ceteris paribus, if either had not fired his shot Victim would have died anyway due to the shot fired by the other assassin. Although one could argue that this example is intuitively resolved by saying that a cause is either strictly sufficient, strictly necessary, or strongly necessary, this will not work for the following case. Assassin 2 Victim is held up in his car by Assassin1, Assassin2, and Assassin3 who together tie him up and lock him in his car and then push the car over a cliff killing Victim. It is sufficient for Victim’s death that only two assassins hold up Victim and push the car over the cliff. To simplify matters, we need only focus on the pushing of Victim’s car over the cliff. Obviously, the pushing of Victim’s car by any assassin alone is neither strictly necessary nor strictly sufficient nor strongly necessary for Victim’s death. The absence of strict sufficiency and necessity is obvious: no assassin pushing alone can kill Victim, and no particular assassin must push so that Victim’s car will go over the cliff. To determine strong necessity we again apply the simple counterfactual but-for test by holding the pushing by the other assassins constant and ask whether the car would have gone over the cliff killing Victim had the third assassin not been pushing. The answer
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is obviously affirmative, because it takes the pushing of at least two assassins for this to happen, and since under the circumstance this is true then the car would have gone over the cliff and killed Victim. Thus, the pushing by the third assassin cannot be attributed as having causal status for Victim’s death. The same holds true for the pushing by the other two assassins. We can now turn to pre-emptive causation. This is the case in which an effect x is brought about by some actual sufficient condition(s) C 1 such that had C 1 not occurred then x would have been brought about by some alternative sufficient condition(s) C 2 . There are two sub-cases of preemptive causation: (i) The alternative set of conditions C 2 emerged after C 1 brought about x. (ii) The alternative set of conditions C 2 did not emerge because C 1 emerged and brought about x. The canonical example of type (i) pre-emptive causation is: Assassin 3 Assassin1 shoots and kills Victim who is embarking on a trek across the desert just as Victim was about to take a swig from his water bottle which was poisoned by Assassin2. Here strong necessity comes to grief given the failure of the but-for test to allocate causal status to either assassin: Assassin1 cannot be said to have caused Victim’s death on the occasion in question because had he not shot and killed Victim, Assassin2’s poisoning would have, given that Victim was just about to take a swig from his water bottle; and Assassin2 cannot be said to have caused Victim’s death because it was in fact Assassin1’s shot that did it and not his poisoning of Victim’s water. A type (ii) case is: Assassin 4 Assassin1 shoots and kills Victim. Assassin2 decides not to poison Victim’s water bottle (but would have had Assassin 1 not shot Victim). In this example strong necessity comes to grief because Assassin1 cannot be considered as having caused Victim’s death on the occasion in question because had he not shot and killed Victim, then Assassin2 would have poisoned Victim’s water; yet Assassin2 cannot be attributed as causal for Victim’s death because he not in fact poisoned the water; he only would have done if Assassin had shot Victim. I come now to the remaining and equivalent criteria of weak necessity and strong sufficiency. These criteria were introduced by Hart and Honoré (1959), Mackie (1965, 1974), and Wright (1985, 1988) in various different forms to deal with causal ascriptions when an outcome is a result of a complex of conditions.
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The idea behind the weak necessity/strong sufficiency requirement is that to be ascribed causal status for an event x a prior event C need not be the cause as in the sense of it being the single sufficient condition present on the occasion or a cause in the senses of strict or strong necessity, but merely shown to be a ‘causally relevant condition’ of x. That is, weak necessity/strong sufficiency drops what can actually be considered a deeply rooted and too narrow presupposition that, to be ascribed causal status for x , C must be directly related to x in that any state of affairs is brought about by some singularly identifiable prior event. This is the idea of ‘cause as authorship’. In its place comes a conception of causality that allows for an indirect relation between a prior event C and its consequence x ; but – and this is important – the indirect relation still maintains a necessity requirement. This is obtained by combining a sufficiency and necessity requirement in a set-based framework. That is, weak necessity/strong sufficiency means it need not be the case that a single condition is sufficient for x but that a set of conditions be sufficient (strict sufficiency is then the special case of a singleton set) on this occasion and combines this with a necessity requirement in that all members of this set are necessary for the set to be sufficient. Mackie (1965) denoted a test of weak necessity/strong sufficiency by the acronym INUS which we he defined as ‘an i nsufficient but n ecessary part of a condition which is itself u nnecessary but sufficient for the result’. In Wright’s (1985, 1988) simpler mnemonic, ‘a n ecessary e lement of a s ufficient s et’ or NESS – a mnemonic which we will use for the rest of this paper. 7 We can formally define the NESS criterion as follows. First define a set of events or states of affairs S as minimally sufficient for x if no proper subset of S is itself sufficient for x. This implies that S is the conjunction of conditions each of which is necessary (non-redundant) for S to be sufficient (i.e. each of the conjuncts in S satisfies the but-for test for the sufficiency of S). If S is not minimally sufficient it means that it contains events that are not an integral part of any set of actual conditions that is minimally sufficient for x and therefore these events could not properly be classified as a cause of x because by being redundant they are devoid of any causal efficacy for x coming about. Next, define the set M \S 1 , S 2 ,!, S n ^ as the collection of every minimally sufficient set of conditions (MSC) for x. An event C is, then, a NESS for x if, and only if, C is an element (conjunct) of some S i . For instance, if x can be written as x (AB or CD ) with (AB or CD ) being the necessary and suf7 There is a formal difference in Mackie’s (1965) initial formulation of INUS and Wright’s formulation of NESS in that in the original formulation of INUS Mackie includes a condition that rules out over-determination (condition 4). Mackie required that to qualify as a cause a condition must be a necessary member of the single sufficient set that was present on the occasion or if more such sets were present the condition was a necessary member of each such set. In his later formulation of INUS, Mackie (1974) dropped this condition.
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ficient condition for x (either for all instances of x or on this particular occasion), then C is a NESS for x by dint of it being a member of a disjunct, CD, which is minimally sufficient for x and therefore C is to be ascribed causal status for x if under the circumstances D were present, i.e.: AB x CD
The attractive feature of weak necessity/strong sufficiency is that it is general enough to cover strict and strong necessity and strict sufficiency: (a) if C is a member of every S i for any instance of x, then C is strictly necessary for x ; (b) if C was a member of every S i for a given instance of x then C is strongly necessary for x ; and (c) if C is sufficient for one S i , then C is strictly sufficient for x. To see how NESS works in cases of duplicative causation the idea is to resolve the excess sufficient set into its component MSCs. Consider again Assassin 1. Each assassin’s act of shooting is a necessary element of some S i and S j and therefore the behaviour of each marksman can be attributed causal status for Victim’s death because the behaviour of each marksman was necessary to complete a set of conditions (the marksman possessing a loaded gun in good working order, the absence of protection to the victim, etc.) sufficient for Victim to die and each of these conditions was present on the occasion in question. In Assassin 2, we see that given that it is true that the pushing of the car by each of the three assassins belongs to at least one S i consisting of pushing by two assassins and each of these MSCs were present on the occasion (the excess sufficient set being a superset of each of these MSCs), then the pushing by each assassin qualifies for causal status for Victim’s death. 8 8
The NESS test is not entirely immune from other problems that but-for causality also suffers from, such as the problem of collateral effects and the problem of causal priority. Kramer (2003: 285–295) provides a succinct overview and a work around the problems. Further, there are additional objections to NESS on the grounds that the inclusion of a sufficiency condition apparently implies that there is no causation without determinism. As many writers note, causation can take place in a probabilistic environment. For a discussion see Suppes (1970); and for the view that a cause is an event C that increased the probability that E occurred, see Vallentyne (2008). I grant that NESS is not the complete story of causation, but it would seem to apply to most social outcomes that we are discussing and therefore we need not be too concerned about this issue here. Here it is worthwhile remarking that Vallentyne’s (2008) proposal that a cause of an outcome is a prior event that increases the probability of an outcome presupposes the NESS test. We cannot go into detail here, but if an event increases the probability of an outcome then that event must be a NESS condition.
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It is similarly easy to disentangle the cases of pre-emptive causation. Here the idea is to check if a particular act is an element of an MSC that forms a pre-empting cause. In Assassin 3, Assassin1’s act of shooting is a necessary element of some S i and therefore a cause, although Assassin2’s poisoning of the water is not because although poisoned water would be sufficient for killing Victim, in the circumstances it cannot be an actual sufficient condition because Victim has already been killed by Assassin1’s shot. In Assassin 4, Assassin1’s act of shooting is a cause of Victim’s death, but Assassin2’s intention to poison Victim’s water is not. What the NESS condition does in cases of pre-emptive causation is to evaluate the claim that C 1 could not be a causal factor of x because of the existence of an alternative cause C 2 that either emerged or could have emerged subsequent to the occurrence of C 1 . This fact does not vitiate the causal status of C 1 . 9 Before tying up this section, there is still a class of problems to deal with that have thus far not been highlighted but are important because they represent so many instances in our social and institutional lives. Very generally, it is the case when one event C 1 is sufficient for x but there is a second simultaneous event C 2 that is neither sufficient for x nor necessary for a sufficient set. Yet, C 2 still ‘contributes’ in some manner. Call this redundant causation. Assassin 5 Victim is held up in his car by Assassin1 who ties and locks him up in his car. Together with Assassin2 the car is pushed over the cliff killing Victim. Assassin1 is sufficient for holding up Victim and pushing the car over the cliff. Assassin2 cannot prevent Assassin1 killing Victim.
To make this example more concrete, suppose that it requires at least 2 units of force to push Victim’s car over the cliff. Suppose further that Assassin1 has the physical strength to push with 0, 1, 2 or 3 units of force, while Assassin2 can only push with 0 or 1 unit of force. Finally, suppose Assassin1 and Assasin2 push the car over the cliff with 3 units and 1 unit of force respectively. The question here is, given that Assassin1 is sufficient for the death of Victim to what extent did Assassin2 contribute to Victim’s death? Is the naïve answer that Assassin2 obviously did not contribute to Victim’s death true? If causal contribution is a necessary (but not sufficient) criterion for moral or legal responsibility, this would mean we could not hold Assassin2 to account for his participation in the events that led to Victim’s death. Here, too, there is a way out using the NESS test. What we are after is to find an MSC such that the pushing by both assassins makes up this set. To accomplish this, we have to replace the but-for 9 In fact the NESS test is a framework for evaluating excuses that are based on ‘alternative cause’.
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test with an alternative counterfactual analysis. In the standard but-for test we hold the actions of all others constant and vary the action of the agent i and check if by doing this whether the remaining actions are still sufficient for the outcome. For the case of redundant causation, however, we have to hold the action of i constant and vary the action of some other agent j and ask if by doing so i would become a necessary member of a sufficient set. That is, we ask if there is a feasible combination of actions such that i satisfies the NESS test. If the answer is affirmative, then we can say that i ’s action is a causally relevant factor for the given outcome. We determine not only the freedom an agent has to perform a specified action, but also the freedom she has to remain passive with respect to that action. 10 In Assassin 5 we hold constant the force that Assassin2 applied to the car (1 unit) and ask if Assassin1 can apply an amount of force such that when combined with Assassin2’s force the combination is just sufficient for Victim’s car to roll over the precipice. In other words, if Assassin1 can regulate his strength, by applying 1 unit of force, which he can, then Assassin2 satisfies the NESS test, and not otherwise. We now have the answer we were looking for. It is worth remarking that this reasoning drives a further wedge between a particular type of counterfactual analysis (the but-for test) and a causal ascription. In cases of causal over-determination it is just too restrictive to only consider the i-variants in actions; we must also consider the j-variants – or the potential causal contributions.
3. Power Ascriptions I can now turn to ascriptions of social power. Two things need to be explained. The first is the generic notion of power that will be used as the basis of a comparison with social causation. The second is the choice of the criterion that demarcates social power from social causation. I start, then, with the generic concept of power. Call this power simpliciter . In very general terms, when we ascribe ‘power’ to a person we are at base referring to an ability of some sort that that the person has: what a person can do under specified circumstances. 11 It is, as Morriss’ (1987/2002: 29ff) acutely observed, the capacity to ‘effect something’ (an ‘outcome’ or ‘state of the world’ x). That is, power is about ‘accomplishing something’. 12 It is in this very basic Hobbsian conception of ‘a power’ that we see why we need only focus on the locution ‘power to’ rather than the very common ‘power over ’ when analyzing the relation between power and causal 10
I thank Martin van Hees for this insight. Note that there is an overlap between causality and action theory here and that while the NESS test works in any environment, this insight only applies to (human) action contexts (I thank Hannu Nurmi for this comment). 11 See in particular Goldman (1972) and Morriss (1987/2002). 12 This is exactly Hobbes’s (1651, Chap. 10) notion in Leviathan.
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ascriptions. For ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ are not two separate concepts, but rather the latter is derivative of the former because we can always cash out ‘power over j’ in terms of the variable x in the locution of ‘power to’. ‘If I want to say that I have the power to get my students to read Leviathan, I can say just that; I don’t have to say that I have power over my students with respect to their reading Leviathan …’ (Morriss 1987/2002: 35). Moreover, not every locution of ‘power to’ can be cashed out in terms of ‘power over’. The fact that the President of the United States can veto a bill passed by Congress with anything less than two-thirds majority does not imply that the President can get anyone to act in a counter-preferential way. And my power to throw a rock of a given size and weight fifty metres does not imply that I can get anyone to act in a counter-preferential way. In addition, ‘power over’ entails ‘power to’ in another respect. If i has power over j with respect to some issue x then it entails that that i has the power to do something such that j will perform an action such that either x occurs or it does not depending on what i wants. 13 I can now turn to the second issue. Our starting point here is the observation that the generic definition of power as effecting something is imprecise. To say that ‘i has power to x ’ means ‘i can effect x ’ helps only in as much as that it it allows us to set off power from the related, but distinct, concept of ‘influence’ which Morriss characterized by the verb ‘affecting’: the ‘altering of’ or ‘impinging on’ something in someway. But defining ‘power’ as merely ‘effecting’ does not help us to distinguish power from causation because a causal ascription can also be said to be about effecting something. A definition of power is in need of more structure. First and foremost, such a definition must establish a correspondence between actions (or a sequence of actions) and outcomes. And given that – as with causes – an agent’s action may effect an outcome only in the presence of certain other antecedent conditions, the generic definition of power must postulate that i has an action (or sequence of actions) that is at least weakly necessary (or strongly sufficient) for the occurrence of x (depending on the stated or implied conditions). Assuming anything stronger than weak necessity – in other words the NESS test – would result in a definition of power that comes to grief on the problems of overdetermination. Without going through motions all over again, recall the example of Assassin 2. In such a case any criterion stronger than weak necessity would result in the conclusion that none of the agents had the ability to effect Victim’s death, although clearly Victim could be, or was, killed. 14 13 The more basic nature of a ‘power to’ ascription is discussed in more detail in Braham and Holler (2005). 14 Note Goldman’s (1972) rejection of causal terminology is in all likelihood connected to the fact that he took such terminology to refer to stronger necessity and sufficiency conditions and was therefore faced with problems of overdetermination. I have pointed out elsewhere (Braham and Holler 2008) that Goldman’s definition of social power is one of weak
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Obviously ‘power’ as the mere ability to effect outcomes appears to be none other than ‘potential’ or ‘actual’ causal contribution, as Riker suggested. If this is the case the only difference between the concepts is linguistic. There is a sense in which this is true; but it is not the complete picture. The problem is that satisfaction of the NESS test does not fully describe the way in which we use the term power. Power is not about a mere potential or actual conditional contributive effect, but an actual or potential contributive effect of a special kind. Return once more to Assassin 5. Here ascriptions of causal contribution and power come apart because intuition says that Assassin1 had the power to kill Victim but Assassin2 did not. Yet, the NESS test can be used to ascribe Assassin2 as having made a causal contribution to Victim’s death. So wherein lies the difference between ‘power’ and ‘causal contribution’? From the story of Assassin 5, the difference is certainly not one of ‘potential’ and ‘actual’ as Riker, and to an extent Oppenheim as well, posited. If this idea would be correct, then we would be committed to saying that from Assassin2’s actual causal contribution it follows that he had some power with respect to Victim’s death. But this cannot be correct because the objective description of the circumstances is such that Assassin2 is not in possession of an action that is sufficient to kill Victim himself or is unquestionably necessary for the death of Victim and nor does he possess an action that is sufficient or necessary to prevent Victim’s death at the hands of Assassin1. For all intents and purposes, Assassin2 appears to be powerless with respect to Victim living or dying. One response is to restrict the ascription ‘i has power to x ’ to those cases in which i is effective for x and not-x (given the stated or implied conditions). This is exactly Goldman’s (1972) approach, and one that is quite widely quoted in the philosophical literature. 15 In summary form, and ignoring the trappings and trimmings of his theory of action such as the time indices, Goldman says that a power ascription takes the following form: ‘i has power to x if, and only if, the following two conditions hold: (i) if i wants x , then i would perform an appropriate act (or sequence of acts) and given the stated or implied conditions x would occur, and (ii) if i wants notx , then i would perform an appropriate act (or sequence of acts) and given the stated or implied conditions not-x would occur.’ But this will not work. It is still too weak. Consider the classic Master and Slave relation in which Slave can only obtain x at the sole behest of Master. That is, Master can physically prevent Slave obtaining x although in absence of Master’s intervention Slave has an action (or sequence of actions) for obtaining x. Now suppose Master is a benevolent soul and with respect to x
necessity/strong sufficiency, i.e. the NESS test in disguise. 15 See, for instance French (1984: Chp. 5), Lukes (1986), and Kernoahan (1989) for acceptance of Goldman’s definitions.
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always wants whatever Slave wants. Hence, if Slave wants x (not-x) then both Slave and Master perform the appropriate action (or sequence of actions) such that Slave obtains x (not-x). This means that under the stated or implied conditions of Master’s preference tracking behaviour, Goldman’s definition of power would ascribe Slave the ‘power to x ’ because whether or not x obtains now depends on the actions that Slave chooses. This cannot be correct because as far as x is concerned, Slave is utterly dependent on Master’s good will. Note that as in Assassin 5, both actors have actions that form a minimally sufficient set of conditions for x : Master’s performance of an action such that Slave in unhindered in his attempt to obtain x , and Slaves action to obtain x. Thus, neither ‘wants’ as such (preferences or desires) nor conditional control over x or not-x are necessary conditions for a power ascription. The distinguishing feature of a power ascription lies elsewhere. The feature of a power ascription that we are hunting for is well-known, but not uncontested. Generally speaking, when we make a power ascription in a social context we are assuming a situation of actual or hypothetical conflict, which means that the demarcation criterion is that of overcoming resistance or opposition. It is worthy of note, here, that Goldman acknowledges that he left out reference to such a criterion in his definitional framework on the grounds that such a criterion is required for making comparisons of power but is not required for a power ascription as such. This may be true in the case of defining personal powers as abilities to do specific things (throw a rock of a specified size and weight a given distance or play the piano to a certain level), but not true of social power. But in a later paper (1974) he claimed that his definitions are designed to capture the conception of power as ‘the ability to get what one wants, or the ability to realize one’s will. More specifically, it is the ability to realize one’s will despite the (possible) resistance or opposition of others’ (emphasis in the original). The Master–Slave example should make it quite clear that satisfying our wants or realizing our will is possible even at the sole behest of a dictator – it only requires that the dictator tracks our preferences, unless of course we add more structure to the meaning of ‘wants’ or ‘realizing our will’. 16 Thus a definition of power must explicitly include resistance or opposition as a variable. Echoing Max Weber’s definition of power, 17 we have: Power ‘i has power to x (not-x)’ if, and only if, i has an action (or sequence of actions) that is at least weakly necessary/strongly sufficient under the 16 Including ‘overcoming potential resistance’ in the meaning of ‘getting what I want’ or ‘realizing my will’ is not an innocent move because rules out the existence of adaptive preferences. 17 ‘In general, we understand by ‘power’ the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action’ (in Gerth and Mills 1948: 180).
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stated or implied conditions for the occurrence of x (not-x) despite the actual or possible resistance of some others to the occurrence of x (not-x). This definition requires further qualification. Firstly the reference to x or not-x ensures generality because it is quite possible that an agent may have power for x or not-x but not both (e.g. in Assassin 1, assuming that neither assassin can kill the other, then both assassins only have the power to kill Victim but not the power to see that he survives). The definition could equally be written as ‘for a particular state of affairs s, i has some power with respect to an outcome if …’ Secondly, that the resistance need not be actual we avoid preferencetracking effects such as in the Master–Slave example. For Slave to have the ‘power to x’, x must occur as a result of Slave’s action even if Master is against x occurring and performs the requisite action to prevent x ; or for Slave to have some power in this relationship he must at least be able to prevent x , i.e. guarantee not-x . As neither of these conditions are met Slave is powerless. Thirdly, the application of the existential rather than the universal quantifier on the resistance variable is to ensure that, given our knowledge of the stated or implied conditions, the agents, and the available actions, we can always identify a powerful agent in any situation. To demand that i must be able to the overcome the possible or actual resistance of all others (universal quantifier) before i can be deemed as having power to x , is to demand too much. It is equivalent to saying that i must at least have a veto with respect to x for i to be ascribed ‘power to x ’ (see section 4). In most circumstances such a condition cannot be satisfied (e.g. as in Assassin 2). So, either we dump the resistance criterion, in which case we could not tell apart a causal from a power ascription, or we can weaken it by applying the existential quantifier. 18 The resistance criterion illuminates a further aspect of the use of ‘power’, that of ‘forcing’ and ‘winning’. If i has the potential to effect x against the will of another, then i can force or guarantee that outcome, i.e. ‘wins in a clash of wills’. Now we have the fuller story: social causality is about contributing to some social outcome; social power is about contributing to forcing it. These are conceptually distinct abilities. These two abilities may or may not coincide. In Assassin 1, for instance, we have the coincidence of power and cause: each assassin can force Victim’s death against the will of the other because each has an action that is sufficient for Victim’s death 18
In a recent article Dowding (2003: 312) rejected the resistance criterion for a definition of power on the assumption that the universal quantifier must be applied. He does not discuss the use of the existential quantifier. Dowding’s intention is to replace the ‘clash of wills’ account of power with a ‘resource-based’ one. It must be said, however, that Dowding does not demonstrate that the inclusion of a resistance criterion in a definition of power is incompatible with his resource account. If it were, he would have to demonstrate how his account could handle the causality–power distinction.
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and on the same account each is a causal condition for his death. In Assassin 2, each assassin can force Victim’s death because each has an action that is a necessary part of a set of sufficient conditions that can force Victims’ death against the will of another (e.g. Assassin1 and Assassin2 against Assasin3). From the construction of this example, power and cause once again perfectly coincide. The sets of actions that are minimally sufficient are precisely those that are minimally sufficient for forcing the outcome. But in Assassin 5 the situation is different: power and cause come apart because there exists a combination of actions that is minimally sufficient for the death of Victim, but this combination does not correspond to a set of agents each of which has an action such that each agent’s action is necessary to force Victims death. In this example Assassin2 can contribute to Victim’s death, but he could not, and cannot, force or preclude anything against the will of Assassin1. Therefore, for a causal ascription we are required to examine any combination of actions (or sequences of actions) that are minimally sufficient for the outcome; but power ascriptions demand more. The resistance criterion focuses our attention on those combination of actions (or sequence of actions) that each agent would choose if each agent wanted to force the outcome against the will of others. It is this restriction that makes the set of power ascriptions a subset of the set of causal ascriptions.
4. Power and Cause Untangled 19 Although we have the result we are looking for and could wind up the analysis here, there is still a useful formal exercise to perform. The task is to illuminate the power–causality distinction exactly so that we can see why the set inclusion conjecture is true. Given that we are dealing with strategic combinations of actions, the natural formal framework to do this is that of game form. Let X be a set of outcomes and N \1,!, n ^ a set of agents. Let G (a 1 ,!a n , Q) be a game form on X. Each a i is a set of actions, Q is a function from the set of action combinations, or plays, onto X. (Note that since the function is onto X, each element is an outcome in at least one play of the game.) Although we have seen that causal ascriptions are more basic than power ascriptions, it is simpler to start with the latter. For this we can make use of the concept of an effectivity function which is a model of power among agents and coalitions. Given X and N, we say that a coalition T N is B-effective for A X if, and only if, (i) T is non-empty: there is an action profile (or combination) a T such that for any action profile a N T of others, 19 This section is a result of close collaboration with Martin van Hees. The idea of ‘coalitional events’ as a way of formalizing the sufficiency condition is due to him.
Social Power and Social Causation
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Q(a T , a N T ) A ; (ii) T is empty: A X . For non-empty T we can also say that T is B-effective for A through a T . 20 Next, we say that a coalition T is a minimal winning coalition (MWC) for A if, and only if, it is B-effective for A and no proper subset of T is as well. We say that an agent ‘i has power to bring about A’ if, and only if, there is a MWC for A that contains i. Note that membership of an MWC guarantees the fulfilment of the resistance condition because if T is an MWC for A, then by definition T \i ^ is not B-effective for A so that ceteris paribus i can force an outcome, X A against the resistance of the remaining members of T; and if T \i ^ is not B-effective for A but T \i ^ is, then ceteris paribus, i can force an outcome, A, against the resistance of the members of N T . We can now turn to causation. In particular we have to find an appropriate game theoretic formulation of the NESS test. Recall from the discussion of causal relations the NESS test checks if certain events are part of a set of conditions that are minimally sufficient for an outcome. In this case the events are ‘actions’ performed by agents. That is we have to translate an MSC into a game theoretic definition. This formalization must be able to capture the fact that in Assassin 5, both assassins have actions that are together an MSC but also that Assassin1 has an action that alone is an MSC. First we need the concept of a sufficient condition, which very naturally is a profile (a 1 ,!a n ) that is sufficient for A. As we are dealing with event causation, call such a profile an event for A. Next, we need the concept of a ‘coalitional event’ or T-event, a T , which is a (possibly empty) set, the elements of which are the actions of members of T (one for each member). A T-event is sufficient for A if, and only if, (i) T is non-empty: T is B-effective for A through a T ; (ii) T is empty: A X . Next, for any i T v , let a T \i ^ denote the T \i ^ -event in which the members of T \i ^ adopt the same actions as in a T . A T-event a T is a minimally sufficient set of conditions (MSC) for A, iff, (i) a T is a sufficient condition for A; and (ii) if T v , then for all i T : a T \i ^ is not a sufficient condition for A. Thus for a given A, i satisfies the NESS test and therefore makes a causal contribution to A if i has an action that is part of an MSC. Note that an MSC says nothing about resistance because all that matters is that the T-event is sufficient for A and not about A being guraranteed. It should now be obvious from comparing the definitions of power (MWC) and causation (MSC), for any A and any T , if T is an MWC for A, then there is a T-event that forms a MSC for A. Hence a power ascription implies a causal ascription. The converse, however, is not true: Assassin 5 is the relevant counter-example. Thus the set of MSCs for A contains the set of 20 I use the term B-effective to distinguish from a weaker concept of effectivity, that of Ceffectivity. Under this definition, a coalition T ’s power is determined not by the coalitions’s ability to realize A directly but by the ability of N T to interfere with T obtaining A. T is Ceffective for A if N T cannot veto A. I will not make use of C-effectivity here.
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Matthew Braham
MWCs for A, but, depending on the game form, there may exist an MSC that does not correspond to an MWC. QED. To cut a long story short, whereas power is about individuals being necessary elements of coalitions that are sufficient for some event A, causality is about actions being necessary elements of events, the action profiles, that are sufficient for A. Both types of ascriptions make use of the NESS test, but in each case the NESS test refers to different objects. 21
5. Concluding Remarks I will now tie up this essay by glancing at the consequences of this analysis. While it could be said that I have done a lot for very little, the very little has broad and fruitful consequences. As I see it, these consequences can be classified into two camps: methodological and normative. Methodologically, the result of this study allows us to finally put to rest the idea that power is a redundant concept, with no separate meaning to that of causality (Riker’s thesis). There is a distinct difference between the two concepts: an ascription of causal contribution contains no reference to resistance and force; and formally speaking cause and power refer to different objects, namely, MSCs and MWCs respectively. And we can also put to rest the idea that power and cause are only overlapping categories (Oppenheim’s thesis) or the idea that causal terminology is not useful for our understanding of power (Goldman’s thesis). The March–Dahl setinclusion thesis is the correct one. 22 Secondly, proving that power ascriptions are a subset of causal ascriptions is, as intimated at the outset, significant for normative theory, in particular to theories of responsibility. This is important, because the allocation of blame or praise is one of the ways in which we judge and regulate the behaviour of our fellows, our institutions, and everyday affairs. I cannot enlarge on this matter here, but I can suggest two domains of responsibility for which the power–cause distinction is of special significance. The first is the domain of what we may call ‘retrospective responsibility’, or responsibility for what has occurred. In such situations, the concept of power is, in general, too narrow because it will exonerate some agents even if they have contributed to a particular state of affairs (e.g. Assassin 5). If a theory of responsibility should connect individual actions to outcomes, then causal contribution appears to be a necessary criterion. The second domain of moral responsibility for which the concept of 21 Note that for certain types of games in which action and outcome sets are binary (simple games) power and causality coincide. This indicates why power can be used in such circumstances to allocate responsibility. See, for instance, Holler (2007). 22 There is another methodological consequence that is related to the construction of power indices, which I cannot discuss here. However, a brief analysis can be found in Braham (2005).
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power has played a vital role is that of prospective responsibility; or that which we owe to others. This domain includes questions of, for instance, who bears positive duties to others in need. In this context, an ethical proposition by Peter Singer (1972) raises its head: ‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought to do it.’ Clearly by ‘power’ Singer means the ‘can of ability’ and his moral proposition turns on the canonical deontic principle of ‘ought implies can’. But is this ‘can of ability’ that of ‘power to’? If it is, then this rendition of ‘ought implies can’ is, with all probably, too strong for the purposes of allocating positive duties. Obviously, if our behaviour does not impinge either actually or potentially on the lives of others then we cannot be thought to have any duty towards others. But we need not have power before we can impinge on the lives of others; we can do so even if we are powerless (see Assassin 5 once more). In this fashion our positive duties towards others should be based on our potential causal contributions, irrespective of our power. If by acting alone Norman can prevent Manfred being harmed (he has power to prevent harm to Manfred), without sacrifice to anything of moral importance but Bernie can only assist Norman in doing so as a causal contribution (and also without any sacrifice), Bernie has an obligation to assist Norman in preventing the harm to Manfred. Not only can powerlessness not be cited as a basis for exoneration from what we have done; it cannot even be cited as a basis of exonerating us from a moral obligation to perform an act that is an overdetermining cause. 23 The only valid basis for being exonerated in this arena is causal inefficacy. But it would be mistaken to think that theories of responsibility can be liberated from the concept of power. It undoubtedly maintains a central importance because being ascribed power places special duties upon us: that of leadership and organization. To have power with respect to preventing a harm (or righting a wrong) implies not only a duty of preventing the harm (or righting the wrong) but of mobilizing the moral community – all those who can, via their causal effects, impinge upon the lives of others. It is the choices of the powerful that govern how effectual the powerless will be.
Acknowledgements This paper grew out of earlier joint work with Manfred Holler to whom I am indebted for endless discussions and inspiration over the last seven years. I would also like to thank Hartmut Kliemt and Hannu Nurmi for written comments as well as the participants at the conference on ‘Power: 23
This position is, admittedly a contentious one. It stands in direct contrast to Parfit’s (1984: 82–83) claim, using an argument that is for all intents and purposes the INUS/NESS test, that a person does not have a duty to perform an act that is an overdetermining cause.
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Conceptual, Formal, and Applied Dimensions’, 17–20 August 2006, Hamburg, for criticisms and suggestions. Special thanks go to Martin van Hees as he really deserves co-authorship because much of the analysis is based on our collaborative efforts to untangle the concepts analyzed here. Section 4, in particular, bears Martin’s footprint and has now found expression in new joint work.
References Barry, B. (1976) Power: An Economic Analysis, in B. Barry (ed.) Power and Political Theory: Some European Perspectives, John Wiley, 69–101. Braham, M. (2005) Causation and the Measurement of Power, Homo Oeconomicus 22: 645–52. Braham, M. and Holler, M.J. (2005) The Impossibility of a Preference-based Power Index, Journal of Theoretical Politics 17: 137–158. Braham, M. and Holler, M.J. (2008) Distributing Causal Responsibility in Collectivities, in T. Boylan and R. Gekker (eds) Economics, Rational Choice, and Normative Philosophy, Routledge. Connolly, W.E. (1983) The Terms of Political Discourse. Martin Robinson. Dahl, R.A. (1957) The Concept of Power, Behavioral Science 2: 201–215. Dahl, R.A. (1963) Modern Political Analysis, Prentice Hall. Dahl, R.A. (1968) Power, in D.L. Sills (ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Macmillan, 405–415. Dowding, K. (2003) Resources, Power, and Systematic Luck: A Response to Barry, Politics, Philosophy and Economics 2: 305–22. French, P.A. (1984) Collective and Corporate Responsibility, Columbia University Press. Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C.W. (eds) (1948) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Routledge. Goldman, A.I. (1972) Toward a Theory of Social Power, Philosophical Studies 23: 221– 268. Goldman, A.I. (1974) On the Measurement of Power, Journal of Philosophy 71: 231– 252. Hart, H.L.A. and Honoré, A.M. (1959) Causation in the Law, Oxford University Press. Held, V. (1972) Coercion and Coercive Offers, in J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds) Coercion, Aldine Atherton. Hobbes, T. (1651) Leviathan, Oxford University Press. Holler, M.J. (2007) Freedom of Choice, Power, and the Responsibility of Decision Makers, in A. Marciano and J.-M. Josselin (eds) Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach, Eward Elgar, 22–42. Honoré, A.M. (1995) Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law, in D. Owen (ed.) Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, Oxford University Press, 363–385. Kernohan, A. (1989) Social Power and Human Agency, Journal of Philosophy 86: 712– 726. Kramer, M.H. (2003) The Quality of Freedom, Oxford University Press. Lukes, S. (ed.) (1986) Power, Basil Blackwell. Mackie, J.L. (1965) Causes and Conditions, American Philosophical Quarterly 2: 245– 264.
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Mackie, J.L. (1974) The Cement of the Universe, Oxford University Press. March, J.G. (1955) An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Power, American Political Science Review 49: 431–451. Morriss, P. (1987/2002) Power: A Philosophical Analysis, Manchester University Press. Nagel, J. (1975) The Descriptive Analysis of Power, Yale University Press. Oppenheim, F.E. (1960) Degrees of Power and Freedom, American Political Science Review 54: 437–446. Oppenheim, F.E. (1961) Dimensions of Freedom, St. Martins Press. Oppenheim, F.E. (1976) Power and Causation, in B. Barry (ed.) Power and Political Theory: Some European Perspectives, John Wiley, 103–116. Oppenheim, F.E. (1981) Political Concepts: A Reconstruction, University of Chicago Press. Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press. Pearl, J. (2000) Causality: Models, Reasoning, Inference. Cambridge University Press. Riker, W.H. (1964) Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power, American Political Science Review 58: 341–349. Russell, B. (1913) On the Notion of Cause, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 13: 1– 26. Simon, H.A. (1957) Models of Man, Wiley. Singer, P. (1972) Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1: 229–243. Suppes, P. (1970) A Probabalistic Theory of Causality, North Holland. Vallentyne, P. (2008) Brute Luck and Responsibility, Politics, Philosophy and Economics (forthcoming). Wright, R. (1985) Causation in Tort Law, California Law Review 73: 1735–1828. Wright, R. (1988) Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, Iowa Law Review 73: 1001–1077.
2. Power Indices Methodology: Decisiveness, Pivots, and Swings František Turnovec Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
Jacek W. Mercik Wroclaw University of Technology, Poland
Mariusz Mazurkiewicz Wroclaw University of Technology, Poland
1. Introduction Three most frequently used measures of a priori voting power of members of a committee were proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954), Penrose (1946) and Banzhaf (1965), and Holler and Packel (1983). We shall refer to them also as SS -power index, PB-power index and HP-power index. There exist also some other well defined power indices, such as Johnston index (1978) and Deegan-Packel index (1979). 1 In this paper we analyse the Shapley-Shubik, Penrose-Banzhaf and Holler-Packel concepts of power measurement the so called I-power (voter’s potential influence over the outcome of voting) and P-power (expected relative share in a fixed prize available to the winning group of committee members) classification introduced by Felsenthal et al. (1998). We show that objections to the Shapley-Shubik index, based on its interpretation as a P-power concept, are not sufficiently justified. The Shapley-Shubik, PenroseBanzhaf and Holler-Packel measures can all be successfully derived as cooperative game values, and at the same time they can be interpreted as probabilities of being in some decisive position (pivot, swing) without using cooperative game theory at all (Turnovec 2004; Turnovec et al. 2004). It is demonstrated in the paper that both pivots and swings can be introduced as special cases of a more general concept of decisiveness based on assumption of equi-probable orderings expressing preferences of com1 For a comprehensive survey and analysis of power indices methodology, see Felsenthal and Machover (1998).
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František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
mittee members’ support for voted issue. New general a priori voting power measure was proposed in Turnovec (2007), distinguishing between absolute and relative power and covering Shapley-Shubik, Penrose-Banzhaf and Holler-Packel indices as its special cases.
2. Basic Concepts Let N (1,!, n ) be the set of members (players, parties) and X i (i 1,!, n ) be the (real, non-negative) weight of the i-th member such that
X
i
U, Xi p 0
i N
(e.g. the number of votes of party i, or the ownership of i in number of shares), where U is the total weight of all members. Let H be a real number such that 0 H b U . The (n 1)-tuple [H , X] = [H , X 1 ,y, X n ] such that n
X
i
U , X i p 0, 0 H b U
i=1
we call a committee (or a weighted voting body) of the size n with quota H, total weight U, and allocation of weights X. Any non-empty subset S N we call a voting configuration. Given an allocation X and a quota H, we say that S N is a winning voting configuration, if i S X i p H and a losing voting configuration, if i S X i H. A configuration S is winning, if it has a required majority, otherwise it is losing. Let n ¯ G ¡(H , X) \ n 1 : X i U , X i p 0, 0 b H b U ° ¡¢ °± i 1
be the space of all committees of the size n, total weight U and quota H. A power index is a vector valued function 1 : G l \ n mapping the space G of all committees into \ n . A power index represents for each of the committee members a reasonable expectation that she will be ‘decisive’ in the sense that her vote (yes or no) will determine the final outcome of voting. The probability to be decisive we call an absolute power index of an individual member; by normalization of an absolute power index we obtain a relative power of an individual member. By 1 i (H , X) and Q i (H , X) we denote the absolute and relative power an index grants to the i-th member of a committee with allocation of weights X, total weight U, and quota H. Minimal requirements usually imposed on power mapping 1 : G l \ n are the anonymity, dummy, and symmetry axioms. Let [H , X] be a committee with the set of members N and T : N l N be a permutation mapping. The committee [H , T X] we call a permutation of the committee [H , X], T(i ) being the new name (number) of the member
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with original name i. The anonymity axiom requires that 1 i (H , X) 1 T(i )(H , T X). This says that power is a property of being a committee member and not of the name or number of the committee member. A member i N of a committee [H , X] is said to be dummy if she cannot benefit any voting configuration by joining it, i.e. the member i is dummy if k S X k p H º k S \ {i } X k p H for any winning configuration S N such that i S . The dummy axiom requires that 1 i (H , X) 0 if and only if i is dummy. Two distinct members i and j of a committee [H , X] are called symmetric if their benefit to any voting configuration is the same, i.e. for any S such that i , j S then k S i X k p H k S j X k p H. This axiom requires that the power of symmetric members is the same. To define a particular power measure means to identify some qualitative property (decisiveness) whose presence or absence in voting process can be established and quantified (Nurmi 1997). Generally there are two such properties related to the position of committee members in voting that are used as a starting point for quantification of an a priori voting power: a swing position and a pivotal position of a member.
3. Pivots and Swings The SS -power index is based on the concept of pivot. Let the numbers 1,!,n be the fixed names of committee members and (i 1 ,!, i n ) be a permutation of the members of the committee. Let us assume that member k is in a position r in this permutation, i.e. k i r . We say that k is in a pivotal position (has a pivot) with respect to a permutation (i 1 ,!, i n ) , if r 1
X j 1
r ij
H
and
X
ij
p H.
j 1
Assume that a strict ordering of members in a given permutation expresses an intensity of their support (preferences) for a particular issue in the sense that, if a member i s precedes in this permutation a member i t , then support by i s for the particular proposal to be decided is stronger than support by i t . One can expect that the group supporting the proposal will be formed in the order of positions of members in the given permutation. If it is so, then the k will be in situation when the group composed from preceding members in the given permutation still does not have enough of votes to pass the proposal, and a group of members place behind her in the permutation has not enough of votes to block the proposal. The group that will manage his support will win. A member in a pivotal situation has a decisive influence on the final outcome. Assuming many voting acts and all possible preference orderings equally likely, under the full veil of ignorance about other aspects of individual preferences, it makes sense to evaluate an
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František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
a priori voting power of each committee member as a probability of being in pivotal situation. This probability is measured by the SS-power index: 1 iSS(H , X)
pi . n!
Here p i is the number of pivotal positions of the committee member i and n ! is the number of permutations of the committee members, i.e. n number of different orderings of n elements. From i 1 p i n ! it follows that Q i (H , X) 1 i (H , X) (i.e. the relative SS-power index is equal to an absolute one). The PB-power index is based on the concept of swing. Let S be a winning configuration in a committee [H , X]. We say that i S has a swing in configuration S if k S X k p H and k S \ {i } X k H. Let s i denotes the total number of swings of the member i in the committee [H , X]. The original Penrose definition of voting power was in the absolute form (the absolute PBpower index) given by: 1 iPB(H , X)
si . 2 n 1
Assuming that all configurations are equally likely this is nothing else but the probability that the given member will be decisive (the probability to have a swing). The PB-power index is frequently used in relative form and is obtained by normalization of the absolute PB-index: Q iPB(H , X)
si
s
. k
k N
The Holler-Packel power index also belongs to the class of swing-based measures. Let S be a winning configuration in a committee [H , X]. We say that S is a minimal winning configuration if for any i S it holds that k S X k p H and k S \ {i } X k H. The HP-power index assigns to each member of a committee the share of power proportional to the number of swings in minimal winning configurations of which he is a member. Let m i denote the total number of swings of the member i in minimal winning configurations in the committee, then the Holler-Packel index in relative form is: Q iHP (H , X)
mi . m k k N
It is assumed that all winning configurations are possible but only minimal critical winning configurations are being formed to exclude free-riding of the members that cannot influence the outcome of voting. The ‘public
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27
good’ interpretation (the power of each member of a minimal winning configuration is identical with the power of the minimal winning configuration as a whole, power is indivisible) is used to justify the HP index. Although Holler and Packel never presented an absolute form of their index, it is possible to do it following the logic of the PB index. Assuming that only minimal winning configurations will be formed and all of them are equally likely, we obtain the absolute HP-power index as:
1 iHP(H , X)
mi N(H , X)
where N(H , X) stands for number of minimal winning configurations in committee [H , X]. The absolute HP-power index gives the probability that given member will have a swing in a minimal winning configuration (ratio of the number of her memberships in minimal winning configurations to the total number of minimal winning configurations). The SS-power index, PB-power index, and the HP-power index satisfy anonymity, dummy and symmetry axioms.
4. I-Power and P-Power Felsenthal et al. (1998) introduced the concepts I- and P-power. By I-power they mean: … voting power conceived of as a voter’s potential influence over the outcome of divisions of the decision making body: whether proposed bills are adopted or blocked. Penrose’s approach was clearly based on this notion, and his measure of voting power is a proposed formalization of a priori I-power (Felsenthal and Machover 2004: 9).
By P-power they mean: … voting power conceived as a voter’s expected relative share in a fixed prize available to the winning coalition under a decision rule, seen in the guise of a simple TU (transferable utility) cooperative game. The Shapley-Shubik approach was evidently based on this notion, and their index is a proposed quantification of a priori Ppower (Felsenthal and Machover 2004: 9).
Hence, the fundamental distinction between I-power and P-power is in the fact that the I-power notion takes the outcome to be the immediate one, passage or defeat of the proposed bill, while the P-power view is that passage of the bill is merely the ostensible and proximate outcome of a division; the real and ultimate outcome is the distribution of fixed a purse – the prize of power – among the winners (Felsenthal and Machover, 2004: 9–10). As a conclusion it follows that SS-power index does not measure a priori voting
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František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
power, but says how to agree on dividing the ‘pie’ (benefits of victory). As the major argument of this classification the authors provide a historical observation: Penrose’s 1946 paper was either unnoticed or ignored by mainstream – predominantly American – social choice theorists, and Shapley and Shubik’s 1954 paper was seen as inaugurating the scientific study of voting power. Because the Shapley-Shubik paper was wholly based on cooperative game theory, it induced among social scientists an almost universal unquestioning belief that the study of power was necessarily and entirely a branch of that theory (Felsenthal and Machover, 2004: 8). The conclusion follows on the grounds that given cooperative game theory with transferable utility is about how to divide a pie, and SS-power index was derived as a special case of Shapley value of cooperative game, the SS-power index is about P-power and does not measure voting power as such. We demonstrated above that one does not need cooperative game theory to define and justify SS-power index. The SS-power index is a probability to be in a pivotal situation in an intuitively plausible process of forming a winning configurations with no division of benefits involved whatsoever. It is interesting to note that the SS-power index appeared as a special case of Shapley value for cooperative games with the transferable utility, but in exactly the same way one can handle the PB-index. Let us make a short excursion into cooperative game theory. Let N be the set of players in a cooperative game (cooperation among the players is permitted and the players can form coalitions and transfer utility gained together among themselves) and 2 N the power set of N, i.e. the set of all subsets S N , called coalitions, including empty coalition. The characteristic function of the game is a mapping v : 2 N l \ with v() 0. The interpretation of v : 2 N l \ v is that for any subset S N the number v(S) is the value (worth) of the coalition S, in terms how much ‘utility’ the members of S can divide among themselves in any way that sums to no more than v(S) if they all agree. The characteristic function is said to be super-additive if for any two disjoint subsets S ,T N we have v(S T ) p v(S ) v(T ) i.e. the worth of the coalition S T is equal to at least the sum of worth of its parts acting separately. Let us denote cooperative game in characteristic function form by [N , v ] . The game [N , v ] is said to be super-additive if its characteristic function is super-additive. By a value of the game [N , v ] we mean a non-negative vector K(N , v ) such that i N K i (N , v ) v(N ). By c(i ,T ) v(T ) v(T \ {i }) we denote the marginal contribution of the player i N to the coalition T N . Then, in an abstract setting, the value K i (N , v ) of the i-th player in the game [N , v ] can be defined as a weighted sum of his marginal contributions to all possible coalitions he is a member of: K i (v ) T N ,i T B(T )c(i ,T ). Different weights B(T ) lead to different values. Shapley (1953) defined his value by the weights
Power Indices Methodology
B(T )
29
(t 1)!(n t )! n!
where t is the cardinality of T. He proved that it is the only value that satisfies the following three axioms: (i) dummy axiom (see above), (ii) anonymity axiom (see above), and (iii) additivity axiom (sum of two games [N ,v ] and [N , u ] is the value K(N , v u ) K(N , v ) K(N , u )). As Owen (1982) noticed, the relative PB-index is meaningful for general cooperative games with transferable utilities. One can define Banzhaf value by setting the weights B(T )
v(N ) . c(k ,T )
k N ,T N
Owen demonstrates a certain relation between the Shapley value and Banzhaf value of cooperative game with transferable utilities: both give averages of player’s marginal contributions, the difference lies in the weighting coefficients (in the Shapley value coefficients depend on size of coalitions, in the Banzhaf value they are independent of coalition size). There is also a similar generalization of the Holler-Packel public good index (which is based on membership in minimal winning configurations, in which each member has a swing) as a cooperative game value (Holler and Li 1995). The relation between values and power indices is straightforward: a cooperative characteristic function game represented by a characteristic function v such that v takes only the values 0 and 1 is called a simple game. With any committee with quota H and allocation X we can associate a superadditive simple game such that £ ¦1 if i S X i p H v(S ) ¦ ¤ ¦ ¦ ¥0 otherwise.
Super-additive simple games can be used as natural models of voting in committees. Shapley and Shubik (1954) applied the concept of the Shapley value for general cooperative characteristic function games to the superadditive simple games as a measure of voting power in committees. Here we demonstrated that PB relative power index can be extended as a value for general cooperative characteristic function games. But we do not need cooperative games to model voting in committees.
5. A Generalized Concept of Decisiveness In a committee [H , X] with the set of members N, let (S 1 ,!, S k ), k b n be a partition of N, i.e. * kj 1 S j N and for any s , t N , s v t it holds that
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František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
S s S t . Let ( j 1 ,!, j k ) be a permutation of numbers (1,!, k ), then S (S j1 ,!, S j k ) we call an ordering defined on N, ordered collection of groups of voters. Considering a particular issue being voted, the following interpretation of an ordering S on N is possible. Let r S j u , t S j v . (a) If u v , then a member r ’s support for the particular proposal is stronger than the support of member t. (b) If u v , then support for a particular proposal by the both r and t is the same. If u v , it is plausible to assume, that if members of S j v vote ‘yes’, then the members of S j u also vote ‘yes’, if the members of S j u vote ‘no’, then the members from S j v also vote ‘no’. From formal reason we denote S j o \0^ and X 0 0. Let S (S 1 ,!, S v ,!, S k ) be an ordering. We say that a group S v is in a pivotal position in ordering S, if v 1
v
X i H
and
j 0 i S j
X
i
p H.
j 1 i S j
Under our assumptions, if the pivotal group votes ‘yes’, then the outcome of voting is ‘yes’ and if they vote ‘no’, then the outcome is ‘no’. We say that a member t S v (v 0) is in a decisive situation (has a swing) in an ordering (S 1 ,!, S v ,!, S k ) if S v is pivotal group and S v \ \t ^ is not a pivotal group. Let the group S v is pivotal and t S v , then t is decisive if and only if either v1
X
i
j 0 i S j
Xi H
i S v \ {t }
(i.e. if the group S v joins preceding groups voting ‘yes’, then by changing unilaterally his ‘yes’ to ‘no’ member t changes the outcome of voting from ‘yes’ to ‘no’), or v 1
X
i
Xt p H
j 0 i S j
(i.e. if the group S v does not join preceding groups voting ‘yes’, then by changing unilaterally his ‘no’ to ‘yes’ member t changes the outcome of voting from ‘no’ to ‘yes’). The generalized concept of decisiveness combines the logic of pivots and swings: member of a committee is decisive, if she has swing in a pivotal group.
6. Partition and Ordering Numbers Let N be a finite set of size n, k a positive integer (1 b k b n ) , and T (N , k ) (T1 ,T 2 ,!,T k ) be a set of k disjoint nonempty subsets of N such that for any k r , s b k , r v s ,T r T s , * j 1T j N (partition of N of the size k). Let
Power Indices Methodology
31
Table 1. Partition Numbers p(n , k ) , Stirling’s Numbers of the Second Kind n k
1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 3 7 15 31 63 127
n k
1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 6 14 30 62 126 254
3
1 6 25 90 301 966
4
1 10 65 350 1701
5
6
1 15 140 1050
1 21 266
7
8
Total
1 28
1
1 2 5 15 52 203 877 4140
7
8
Total
Table 2. Ordering Numbers o(n , k )
3
6 36 150 540 1806 5796
4
5
6
24 240 120 1560 1800 720 8400 16800 15120 5040 40824 126000 191520 141120
1 3 13 75 541 4683 47293 40320 545835
P (N , k ) be the set of all partitions of N of the size k, and p(n , k ) the cardinality of P (N , k ). Then, setting p(n , k ) 1, and p(n , n ) 1 for any positive integers k and n such that 1 k n we have: p(n , k ) p(n 1, k 1) kp(n 1, k ).
The above recurrence relation generates so called Stirling’s numbers of the second kind (we shall refer to them also as partition numbers), which count the number of ways to partition a set of n elements into k nonempty subsets, see e.g. Hall (1967). In Table 1 we provide several values of Stirling’s numbers of the second kind. For instance, the number p(6, 4) 65 in column k 4 and row n 6 , indicating that there exist 65 distinct partitions of 6 elements into 4 nonempty subsets, is given by 65 25 (4 q10), where 25 is the number above and to the left of 65, 10 is the number above 65, and 4 is the number of column containing the 10. The last column provides total number of partitions of n elements. There exists also an explicit formula for partition numbers:
p(n , k )
1 k k (1)k j j j n . k ! j 1
32
František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
Having a partition of N of the size k, there exist k ! ways how to order its elements. Let us denote by O(N , k ) the set of all orderings of the size k defined on N, and P(n , k ) its cardinality. Then, setting P(n ,1) 1 and P(n , n ) n ! for any positive integers k and n such that 1 k n , we have P(n , k ) k P(n 1, k 1) k P(n 1, k ). This recurrence relation directly follows from Stirling’s numbers of the second kind. We shall refer to P(n , k ) as ordering numbers. In Table 2 we provide several values of ordering numbers. For instance, the number P(5,3) 150 in column 3 and row n 3 , indicating that there exist 150 distinct orderings of 5 elements with 3 nonempty indifference classes, is given by 150 3 q14 3 q 36 , where 14 is the number above and to the left of 150, 36 is the number above 150, and 3 is the number of column containing the 150. The last column provides total number of orderings of n elements. There exists also an explicit formula for ordering numbers: k
k P(n , k ) (1)k j j j n . j 1
7. Generalized Power Indices Using definition of decisiveness from section 5, it makes sense to measure a priori voting power of the member of a committee by number of her decisive situations. Assuming that in sufficiently large number of voting acts all orderings (expressing preferences of members’ groups) are equiprobable, then measure of so called absolute power of the member i is given by the ratio of the number of her decisive situations to the number of orderings, and relative power is given by the ratio of the number of decisive situations of the member i to the total number of decisive situations. n In a committee [H , X] with set of members N, let O(N ) * k 1O(n , k ) be a set of all orderings, including the weak ones. By O(n , n ) we denote the set of all strict orderings, and by O(n ,2) the set of all binary orderings. To follow standard logic of voting, we extend the set of binary orderings by two orderings: (, N ) and (N , ), reflecting two bipartitions of ‘no’ and ‘yes’ voters (everybody prefers vote ‘no’, everybody prefers vote ‘yes’). Let us denote extended set of binary orderings by B(N ) O(n ,2) \(, N ),(N , )^ .
Then, for evaluation of a priori voting power, we consider generic set of orderings n
W (N ) * O(n , k ) \(, N ),(N , )^. k 2
Power Indices Methodology
33
Clearly, (S(N )) n ! and (B(N )) 2 n and n
n
k
k (W (N )) P(n , k ) 2 (1)k j j j n 2. k 2 k 2 j 1 Let us define
£ ¦1 if i is decisive in O S i (O ) ¦ ¤ ¦ ¦ ¥0 otherwise where O W (N ) , and R(O ) such that R(O ) p 0, O W (N ) R(O ) 1
which is a probability that ordering O will appear. Then, 1 i ,R(H , X)
R(O )S i (O )
O W ( N )
is a probability that, given a probability distribution R over the set W (N ) , i N will be decisive in a committee [H , X], an absolute general form of power index. The general form of a relative power index of the member i is:
R(O )S (O ) (H , X) R(O )S (O ) i
Q i ,R
O W ( N )
k
k N O W ( N )
which is the share of the i-th member in total power. Considering strict orderings only and selecting £ 1 1 ¦ ¦ ¦ S(N ) n ! R (O ) ¤ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¥0 SS
if O S(N ) otherwise
which is the equi-probability of strict orderings and from which we obtain the absolute SS-power index. From i N O S (N ) R SS (O )S i (O ) n ! it follows that absolute SS-power index is equal to relative SS-power index. Considering the extended set of binary orderings only and selecting £ 1 1 ¦ ¦ ¦ R (O ) ¤ B(N ) 2 n ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¥0 PB
if O B(N ) otherwise
which is the equi-probability of binary orderings, we obtain the absolute PBpower index: the ratio of number of swings to the number of binary orderings. The framework can also be used to define the Holler-Packel index. Let
34
František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
D(N ) B(N ) be a set of such binary orderings in which each member of pivotal group has swing (orderings with minimal pivotal groups). Considering only such binary orderings and selecting R
HP
£ 1 ¦ ¦ ¦ D(N ) (O ) ¤ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¥0
if O D(N ) otherwise
we obtain the absolute and relative versions of this index. Considering all orderings, including weak ones, and selecting £¦ 1 1 ¦¦ n k if S S(N ) ¦ ( ( ) W N k j k n ¦ GW (1) R (O ) ¤ j j 2 ¦¦ k 2 j 1 ¦¦ otherwise ¦¥0
which is the equi-probability of all orderings, we obtain the absolute General Weak ordering index (GW-power index). It is easy to prove that for all power indices defined above (based on a generalized concept of decisiveness and the equi-probability of relevant orderings) satisfy the anonymity, symmetry, and dummy axioms defined above.
8. Illustrative Example To illustrate the concepts introduced above let us use a simple example. Let N \1,2,3^ . Consider a committee [51;50,30,20]. In this case set W (N ) S(N ) B(N ) consists of 14 orderings: (a) The set of strict orderings S(N ) consisting of six orderings (1,2,3),(1,3,2),(2,1,3),(2,3,1),(3,1,2),(3,2,1) ; and (b) the extended set of binary orderings B(N ) consisting of eight binary orderings. Table 3 provides list of orderings and decisive positions. Decisive members in a given ordering by an asterisk. Column T i denotes the decisiveness of the i-th member in a given ordering (1 for decisive, 0 for non decisive). Assuming equi-probable orderings we obtain:
GW-index 10 Absolute: 1 1GW 14 , 1 GW 143 , 1 GW 143 . 2 3 10 3 GW GW GW Relative : Q1 16 , Q 2 16 , Q 3 163 . Shapley-Shubik index (strict orderings only) 4 1 SS SS SS Absolute/relative: 1 1SS Q 1SS 46 , 1 SS 2 Q2 6 , 1 3 Q3 6 . Penrose-Banzhaf index (binary orderings) Absolute: 1 1PB 68 , 1 2PB 28 , 1 3PB 28 . Relative: Q 1PB 106 , Q 2PB 102 , Q 3PB 102 .
Power Indices Methodology
35
Table 3. List of Orderings and Decisive Situations for the Committee [51;50,30,20]
Orderings
T1
T2
T3
Sum
R SS
0
1
0
1
1 6
R PB 0
R HP 0
R GW
(1,2 * ,3)
0
0
1 14
1 14
(1,3 ,2)
0
0
1
1
1 6
(2,1* ,3)
1
0
0
1
1 6
0
0
1 14
1
1 6
0
0
1 14
0
0
1 14
*
(2,3 ,1) *
1
0
0
(3,1* ,2)
1
0
0
1
1 6
(3,2,1* )
1
0
0
0
1 6
0
0
1 14
1 4
1 14
(1,(2 * ,3 * ))
0
1
1
2
0
1 8
(2,(1* ,3))
1
0
0
1
0
1 8
0
1 14
0
1 14
(3,(1* ,2))
1
0
0
1
0
1 8
((1* ,2 * ),3)
1
1
0
2
0
1 8
1 14
1 14
1 14
1 14
((2,3),1* )
1
0
0
1
0
1 8
((1* ,3 * ),2)
1
0
1
2
0
1 8
1 14
1 14
0
1 14
0
1 14
((1* ,2,3))
1
0
0
1
0
1 8
((1,2,3))
0
0
0
0
0
1 8
for GW for SS for PB for HP
10 4 6 3
3 1 2 2
3 1 2 2
16 6 10 7
Holler-Packel power index (binary orderings with minimal pivotal groups) Absolute: 1 1HP 43 , 1 2HP 42 , 1 3HP 42 . Relative: Q1HP 73 , Q 2HP 72 , Q 3HP 72 .
Note that while the SS-power index and PB-power index based on generalized concept of decisiveness provides the same values as the original definitions, it is not the case for HP-index. For instance, the original definition the HP-power index (relative form) is in our case 42 , 41 , 41 , but we obtained 73 , 72 , 72 . This follows from the difference in concepts of minimal winning configurations and minimal pivotal groups. The set of binary orderings with minimal winning configurations is a subset of the set of binary orderings with minimal pivotal groups, and permutation of the same binary partition does not necessarily provide the same decisiveness to the same committee members.
9. Concluding Remarks The primary purpose of this paper was not to introduce a new power index, but rather to demonstrate that there is no contradiction between pivot-
36
František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
based and swing-based measures of voting power: there is no fundamental distinction between pivots and swings. Both concepts appear to be special cases of a more general concept of decisiveness based on full range of possible preferences of individual committee members and their groups; and both follow from the same logic and can be formulated in the same framework. Moreover, we do not need cooperative game theory to define and analyze a priori voting power. In a sense a game-theoretical setting of the problem restricts the set of analytical tools. Nevertheless, it might be of some interest to investigate more deeply properties of generalized concept of power, namely its monotonicity properties: local monotonicity (the member with greater weight cannot have less power than the member with smaller weight) and global monotonicity (if the weight of one member is increasing and the weights of all other members are decreasing or staying the same, then the power of the ‘growing weight’ member will at least not decrease) of absolute and relative forms of power measures. Reconsideration of other power indices (Johnston, Deegan-Packel, spatial modifications of power indices) in the framework of generalized concept of decisiveness might contribute to deeper understanding of quantification of voting power. Also an application of this approach to transferable utility cooperative games and its values can bring new results.
Acknowledgements This research was supported by the Czech Government Research Target Programme, proje ct No. MSM0021620841, and by the joint program of Ministry of Education of the Czech Republic and Ministry of Education of the Republic of Poland, project No. 2006/12. We thank anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions.
References Banzhaf, J.F. (1965) Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: A Mathematical Analysis. Rutgers Law Review 19: 317–343. Deegan, J. and Packel, E.W. (1979) A New Index of Power for Simple n-person Games. International Journal of Game Theory 7: 113–123. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1998) The Measurement of Voting Power, Edward Elgar. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (2004), A Priori Voting Power: What is it About? Political Studies Review 2: 1–23. Felsenthal, D.S., Machover, M., and Zwicker, W. (1998) The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of A Priori Voting Power, Theory and Decisions 44: 83–116. Hall, M. (1967) Combinatorial Theory. Blaisdell Publishing Company. Holler, M.J. and Packel, E.W. (1983) Power, Luck and the Right Index, Zeitschrift fĦr Nationalökonomie (Journal of Economics) 43: 21–29. Holler, M.J. and Li, X. (1995) From Public Good Index to Public Value. An
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Axiomatic Approach and Generalization, Control and Cybernetics 24: 257–270. Johnston, R.J. (1978) On the Measurement of Power: Some Reactions to Laver, Environment and Planning 10: 907–914. Nurmi, H. (1997), On Power Indices and Minimal Winning Coalitions, Control and Cybernetics 26: 609–611. Owen, G. (1982) Game Theory (2nd ed.), Academic Press. Penrose, L.S. (1946) The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109: 53–57. Shapley, L.S. (1953) A Value for n-Person Games, in H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker (eds), Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, 307–317. Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M. (1954) A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System, American Political Science Review 48: 787–792. Turnovec, F. (2004) Power Indices: Swings or Pivots? in Matti Wiberg (ed.) Reasoned Choice, Finnish Political Science Association. Turnovec, F., Mercik, J.W., and Mazurkiewicz, M. (2004), Power Indices: ShapleyShubik or Penrose-Banzhaf? in R. Kulikowski, J. Kacprzyk, and R. Slowinski (eds) Badania Operacyjne i Systemowe 2004, Podejmowanie Decyzji, Podstawy Metodyczne i Zastosowania, EXIT, Warszawa. Turnovec, F. (2007) New Measure of Voting Power, Czech Economic Review (Acta Universitatis Carolinae Oeconomica) 1: 1–11.
3. Further Reflections on the Expediency and Stability of Alliances Dan S. Felsenthal Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Israel
Moshé Machover Department of Philosophy, King’s College, University of London, UK
1. Introduction The study of the formation and dissolution of alliances of voters aiming to increase their voting power is relatively new. The present note is a sequel to our earlier paper on this subject (see Felsenthal and Machover 2002). Since the latter’s publication, we have obtained some new results which can be viewed also as a complement to some of the results obtained by Gelman (2003). We report here our findings regarding the possibility of forming expedient and stable alliances within an assembly of voters under various decision rules, depending on the size of the assembly. We shall also show that sometimes an alliance containing a dummy can be expedient – a fact which may explain a real-life historical puzzle. For the reader’s convenience, we repeat in the next section the relevant definitions used in our earlier paper, which we shall be using in this paper as well. In sections 3, 4 and 5 we report our new results. We conclude in section 6.
2. Preliminaries We assume the reader is familiar with the definitions of simple voting game (SVG) and weighted voting game (WVG) and with the basic definitions and notation pertaining to them, as laid down by Felsenthal and Machover (1998). 1 In particular, we shall use the square-bracket notation for WVGs. 1
In particular we refer the reader to Definitions 2.3.4, 2.3.10, 2.3.23, 3.2.2 and Theorems 3.3.11 and 3.3.14. We use the term ‘game’ in this connection out of deference to common usage. But although an SVG does have the formal structure of a simple co-operative game with
40
Moshé Machover and Dan Felsenthal
We shall denote by ‘M n ’ the canonical simple majority WVG with n voters. That is, M n [n 2 1 ;1,1, !,1].
(1)
n times
By ‘M n ’ we shall denote the dual of M n ; that is M n [ n2 ;1,1, !,1].
(2)
n times
Note that if n is odd, M n M n ( M n is self-dual). But if n is even M n v M n , and the latter WVG is improper. Further, we shall denote by ‘Bn ’ the canonical unanimity WVG with n voters. That is, Bn [n ;1,1, …,1].
(3)
Bn [1;1,1, …,1].
(4)
n times
The dual of Bn is n times
In what follows, the starting point is some given SVG W whose assembly (i.e. set of voters) is N. We shall denote by ‘Z’ the Penrose measure of voting power and refer to it simply as ‘power’, without further qualification. 2 We denote by ‘Za [ W ]’ the power of voter a in W . By a well-known theorem, among all SVGs W with n voters, the sum of the voters’ powers attains its maximum when W ! M n . If n is odd, this condition is also necessary for maximizing the sum of the powers. If n is even, there are several isomorphism types of SVG that maximize the sum; among them, those isomorphic to M n have the lowest number of winning coalitions, whereas those isomorphic to its dual, M n , have the highest. Also, among all SVGs W with n voters, the sum of the voters’ powers attains its minimum if W ! Bn or W ! Bn . For n 2, this condition is also necessary. We recall that ‘W ] & S ’ denotes the SVG that results from W when a coalition S N fuses and forms a bloc & S . The assembly of W ] & S is (N S ) {& S }. If W is a weighted voting game (WVG), then so is W ] & S : take the weight of & S to be the sum of the weights that the members of S had in W , while the weights of all other voters as well as the quota are kept the same as in W . transferable utility, we do not treat it here as such but as a plain decision rule. For a fuller discussion of this point, see Comment 2.2.2 in our book. 2 For its definition see Felsenthal and Machover (1998), Definition 3.2.2, where it is denoted by ‘C a’ and referred to as the ‘Bz [Banzhaf] measure of voting power’.
Further Reflections on the Expediency and Stability of Alliances
41
In our paper (Felsenthal and Machover, 2002: 303), an alliance is defined as a bloc & S together with an SVG W S whose assembly is S, and which is referred to as the internal SVG, or decision rule, of the alliance. We shall denote this alliance by (S ; W S ). Informally, we think of the alliance as formed voluntarily by the members of S. When the members of S N form an alliance (S ; W S ). this gives rise to a new composite SVG, which we denote by ‘W & W S ’. The assembly of W & W S is N, the same as that of W . The winning coalitions of W & W S are all sets of the form X Y , with X S and Y N S , satisfying at least one of the following two conditions: x Y is a winning coalition of W ; x X is a winning coalition of W S and S Y is a winning coalition of W .
3
Informally speaking, W & W S works as follows. When a bill is proposed, the members of S decide about it using W S , the agreed internal SVG of their alliance. Then, when the bill is brought before the plenary, the assembly of W , all the members of S vote as a bloc, in accordance with their internal decision; so that now the final outcome is the same as it would have been in W ] & S with the bloc voter & S voting according to the internal decision. From now on, we put: s S
(5)
Note that each member of S now has direct voting power in the SVG W S , as well as indirect voting power in W & W S , which s/he exercises via the bloc & S . It is easy to prove (Felsenthal and Machover 2002: Theorem 4.1): For every a S Za [W & W S ] Za [W S ]¸ Z& S [W ] & S ].
(6)
However, for voters b N S , the equality Zb [W & W S ] Zb [W ] & S ] does not always hold; it does hold provided the number of winning coalitions of the internal SVG W S is 2 s1 , exactly half of the number of all coalitions (Felsenthal and Machover 2002: 304). In what follows we take W to be exogenously imposed. Its voters are allowed to form alliances but not to change W itself. We shall therefore rule out alliances with S N , because that would amount simply to all members of the assembly agreeing to adopt a new decision rule instead of W . Using the terminology introduced in Felsenthal and Machover (2002: 303), we say that the alliance (S W S ) is feasible if Za [W & W S ] p Za [ W ] for all a S ;
(7)
and expedient if 3 For an equivalent definition of W & W S , which shows it to be a special case of the general operation of composition of SVGs, see Felsenthal and Machover (2002: 310).
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Moshé Machover and Dan Felsenthal
Za [W & W S ] Za [ W ] for all a S .
(8)
Moreover, we say that a bloc & S is feasible or expedient if there exists some internal SVG W S such that the resulting alliance (S ; W S ) is feasible or expedient, respectively. The idea behind these definitions is the following. We may regard a voter’s power as a payoff – not in the original W , or indeed in any ‘voting game’ 4 – but in a new power game P W induced by W . This P W is a genuine co-operative game with non-transferable utility, in which the players are the voters of W , and forming an alliance (in W ) is a strategy that affects the payoffs of all players (not only of members of the alliance). Games of the form P W , induced in this way by some SVG, have a rather intricate structure. As far as we know, they have not been investigated in depth. In Felsenthal and Machover (2002) we merely scratched the surface. Gelman (2003) presents a few additional results. In the present paper we add a few observations concerning some games of this form. In the sequel, we shall make use of the following simple result: Proposition 1 (Felsenthal and Machover 2002: Theorem 4.2) A bloc made up of two voters is never expedient. It is feasible iff originally the two voters have equal powers, or at least one of them is a dummy.
3. Simple and Super Majority In this and the following section we shall consider cases where W is symmetric. In this context, we confine our attention to alliances (S ; W S ) in which all voters are equipotent, that is, have equal power. We shall say that the alliance is optimal if its voters are equipotent and their power attains its maximal value – which equals the power of a voter in M s . Of course, if s is odd then the alliance is optimal just in case W S ! M s . Gelman (2003) considers a simple majority WVG, W ! M n , and within it alliances of m voters with internal decision rule of the form W S ! M m . He is particularly interested in the case where n as well as m and mn are large. He concludes that when these numbers are sufficiently large, then although such an alliance will be expedient, it will nevertheless be unstable because the power of the voters left outside the alliance will be smaller than the voting power of those inside it, so the former will try to form another alliance, possibly with some of the members of the first alliance. But ‘if all voters form coalitions, 5 they become worse off than if they had stayed apart’ (Gelman, 2003: 9). This may imply, in turn, an incessant process of forming and disbanding alliances. In fact, Gelman (2003: 11) conjectures quite ex4 5
See footnote 1 above. By ‘coalition’ Gelman means here what we call an ‘alliance’.
Further Reflections on the Expediency and Stability of Alliances
43
plicitly that ‘the coalition-formation process is inherently unstable … By this we mean that if voters are in an ongoing process of joining and leaving coalitions, with each decision made myopically to immediately increase voting power, then there is no stable equilibrium coalition structure.’ Although it is true that the formation of some alliances may result in instability, stable alliances do exist even where W ! M n and W S ! M m . As we shall see, this happens when m is just larger than n2 – a case not investigated by Gelman (2003). Consider first the following three instructive examples. Example 1 Let W ! M 5 . Here the power of each voter is 38 . In view of Proposition 1, we need only consider alliances (S W S ) of three or four voters. Any such alliance will make the bloc & S a dictator in W ] & S . Hence by (6) for every a S Za [W & W S ] Za[W S ].
(9)
For reasons of symmetry, we need consider only alliances whose voters are equipotent. In fact, it is sufficient to consider optimal alliances, because in this way the members of S maximize their (direct and indirect) power. For s 4 , an optimal (S W S ) gives each a S Za [W & W S ] Za [W S ] 38 . So no alliance of four voters is expedient. 6 But for s 3, we have W S ! M 3 , which gives each a S Za [ W & W S ] Za [W S ] 12 . Such an alliance is expedient, and, once formed, it is stable: no member wishes to defect, and the two voters left out can do nothing to improve their position. 35 Example 2 Let W ! M 9 . Here the power of each voter is 128 . In view of Proposition 1 we need only consider alliances (S W S ) with 3 b s b 8; and as in the preceding example we may assume that W S is optimal. An alliance with s 8 is not expedient, as in this case Za [W & W S ] 35 Za [W S ] 128 . On the other hand, simple calculations show that alliances with s 3 4 5 6 7 are expedient, giving each member of S indirect power 25 45 3 5 5 64 128 8 , 16 and 16 , respectively. However, alliances with s 3 4 6 and 7 are unstable. In the case of s 3 or 4, the voters excluded from the alliance, whose powers decrease as a result of its formation, 7 can retaliate by forming a counter-alliance, reducing the powers of the members of S and even turning them into dummies. In the case of s 6 or 7, five of the six or seven members will be tempted to eject the remaining one or two, thereby increasing their (direct and indirect) power from 165 to 38 .
Note that for all n the power of a voter in M 2n is the same as in M 2n 1. This can be seen without any detailed calculation: it follows from the power-maximizing property of M n . If W ! M n and an expedient alliance is formed, then by definition the powers of its members increase. Hence the total power of all voters excluded from the alliance must decrease, and by symmetry the power of each of them also decreases. 6
7
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If voters behave rationally, they will anticipate the adverse consequences of forming alliances with s 3 4 6 and 7, and hence such alliances will not be formed, although they are expedient according to our definition (see Section 2). 8 But an alliance with s 5 is stable. The four members left out of it become dummies and can do nothing about it. Note that although three of the five alliance members may be tempted to form an internal sub-alliance (in order to raise their indirect power from 38 to 21 ), they are in fact deterred from doing so because they know that, in reaction, the two members of S left out of the three-member cabal will surely dissolve the original fivemember alliance, and may even form a new (dictatorial) alliance with three of the four members that were left out of S. An interesting situation arises when W ! M n with even n, and an alliance that contains exactly half of the members. 35 Example 3 Let W ! M 8 . Here the power of each voter is 128 . Now consider an alliance (S ; W S ) with s 4. As before, we may assume that the alliance is optimal. Then its members’ direct power is 38 and their indirect 45 . So this alliance is expedient. power is 128 However, the remaining four voters, whose power is much reduced, can retaliate by forming their counter-alliance, (T W T ), where T N S . Now the indirect power of members of S will depend on the choice of W T . This indirect power will be greatest if the probability of the bloc & T voting ‘yes’ is greatest, because only if & T votes ‘yes’ will the vote of members of S make any difference. But the probability of & T voting ‘yes’ will be greatest iff the number of winning coalitions of W T is as high as possible – which is the case precisely if W T ! M 4 (that is, two votes sufficient to approve a bill). In this case, which is the best that members of S can hope for, their 33 – less than their original power in W . As indirect power will still be only 128 33 at most, depending on the for members of T: they too will have power 128 rule W S chosen by the first alliance. In any case, all voters are now worse off than originally. This seems to give rise to a kind of prisoner’s dilemma: 9 if one of the two alliances dissolves, its members will be in the worst possible position; but if neither of them dissolves, all voters will still be worse off than in the original W . So the alliances will not dissolve unless they can agree to do so simultaneously. However, this apparent dilemma can be resolved in a more radical way. Every member of each alliance will be tempted to defect and join the opposite camp – thereby making the latter dictatorial, and reducing the remaining members of the former to dummies. Thus alliances of
8
The definition assumes that formation of the alliance is the only change that takes place. Cf. Gelman’s (2003) discussion of situations of this kind. As our analysis shows, the analogy with a true prisoner’s dilemma is incomplete. 9
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size 4 are unstable, and if voters behave rationally they will anticipate this and will not form such alliances. The following theorem surveys in general the expediency and stability of optimal alliances when W ! M n . Theorem 1 Let W ! M n , with n 3. Consider optimal alliances (S W S ) where S N . We distinguish four cases, according to the residue of n modulo 4. Case 0 n 4m . Then the alliance is expedient iff 3 b s b n 1, and expedient as well as stable iff s 2m 1. Case 1 n 4m 1 Then the alliance is expedient iff 3 b s b n 2, and expedient as well as stable iff s 2m 1. Case 2 n 4m 2 Then the alliance is expedient iff 3 b s b n 1, and expedient as well as stable iff s 2m 2 or s 2m 3. Case 3 n 4m 3 Then the alliance is expedient iff 3 b s b n 2, and expedient as well as stable iff s 2m 2 or s 2m 3.
Proof The arguments used in the preceding examples can easily be extended and seen to apply here. As far as the expediency claims are concerned, for small values of n one can perform manually the simple, albeit somewhat tedious, computation for each alliance of size s. For larger values of n, say n p 13. the calculation is still quite simple for extreme values of s (close to 3 or to n). For the general case, see Gelman (2003, Subsection 3.3). 10 An alternative way to prove the expediency claims is to use the so-called Rae index S (where, for any SVG W , S a [W ] is the probability that voter a of W is successful; i.e. that the outcome of a division accords with a’s vote). Since by Penrose’s identity Za 2S a 1 (Felsenthal and Machover 1998: Theorem 3.2.16), it is enough to show that, for the s and n specified by our theorem, S a [W & W S ] S a [W ] for all a S .
(10)
This inequality can be proved using the fact that S a [W S ] is sufficiently greater than 21 . 11 As for the stability claims, the following observations are in order. In Case 0, if m 1 an alliance of size 2m is unstable for the reason illustrated for m 2 by Example 3. The same kind of thing happens for all m 1. 10
By the way, Gelman shows that as n increases, the alliance size that maximizes its members’ indirect power asymptotically approaches a value of approximately 14 n . 11 Intuitively speaking, this means that a ’s vote has a sufficiently good chance of ‘carrying along with it’ all the votes of the other s 1 members of S. This boosts a ’s probability of belonging to the majority camp in W & W S compared to that in W .
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Case 1 is unproblematic: here Examples 1 and 2 are entirely typical. In Case 2, an alliance of size 2m 1 is expedient, but the internal power of its members is less than twice their original power. The 2m 1 remaining voters – whose power is reduced – can retaliate by forming a counteralliance. Now all voters’ indirect power is half of their internal power – which is less than their original power – so the situation is unstable. This is similar to the situation in Case 0 with alliances of size 2m , except that now, since 2m 1 is odd, each alliance of this size can only choose the (self-dual) majority rule as its internal SVG. In Case 2 and Case 3, an alliance of size 2m 3 contains a ‘redundant’ member, because even an alliance of size 2m 2 is dictatorial. However, ejecting one of the 2m 3 members will not change the powers of the re, maining 2m 2, 12 so they have nothing to gain by this. We know that if W ! M n and an expedient alliance is formed, then all the voters excluded from the alliance lose power. 13 The following example shows that this need not happen if W is a super-majority WVG: somewhat surprisingly, formation of an alliance can be Pareto optimal! Example 4 Let W ! [41 1 1 1 1]. Here the power of each voter is 41 , so the total power is 45 . Now suppose an alliance (S ; W S ) is formed, where s 3 and W S ! M 3 . This alliance is expedient, because the indirect power of each of its members is 38 . However, the power of each of the two excluded voters is still 41 , so they are not worse off than before. The total power is now 138 . Moreover, this alliance is stable. On the one hand, no member of the alliance would wish to defect because a defector would lose power (even if the two members left behind were to maintain a – necessarily inexpedient – two-member alliance!). On the other hand, members of the alliance have no incentive to admit one of the two excluded voters, because this cannot increase the powers of the three old members. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that an optimal four-member alliance is also expedient, as the power of each of its members is 38 – the same as in the preceding case. Such an alliance is also clearly stable. Since the single excluded voter is a dummy, the total power is 32 . So if four of the assembly members are vindictive towards the fifth, they will be inclined to form a four-member alliance; otherwise a three-member alliance seems more likely to form. As we have seen, this will maximize the total power, and is in fact Pareto optimal.
This somewhat counter-intuitive example shows that Gelman’s (2003: 5) 12 13
See footnote 6. See footnote 7.
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assertion (clearly made with W ! M n in mind) that ‘[f]orming coalitions 14 is beneficial to those who do it but is negative to ‘society’ as a whole, at least in terms of average voting power’ does not hold in general.
4. Unanimity In this section we shall assume W is an n-voter unanimity WVG: W ! Bn . The power of each a N in W is Za [ W ]
1 2
n 1
.
(11)
We consider alliances (S W S ) where 2 s n ; and, as before, for reasons of symmetry we can confine our attention to cases where the members of S are equipotent. We rule out the cases W S ! Bs and W S ! Bs in which W S itself is a unanimity WVG or its dual, as the alliance would then be inexpedient. 15 On the other hand, any other alliance in which the voters are equipotent is expedient. To see this, let I[W S ] be the Banzhaf score in W S of any a S (that is, the number of winning coalitions in which a is critical). Then the direct power of a is I[ W S ]2 s 1 , and a’s indirect power is Za [ W & W S ]
I[W S ] 1 I[W S ] ¸ n s n 1 s 1 2 2 2
(12)
As we have ruled out W S being a unanimity WVG or its dual, it is clear that I[ W S ] 1, so by (11) the alliance is expedient, as claimed. However, voters excluded from the alliance gain even more power than those inside it. To show this, let us denote by ‘X[W S ]’ the number of winning coalitions in W S . Then it is easy to see that the power of each b N S in W & W S is Zb [ W & W S ]
X[W S ] 1 X[W S ] ¸ ns 1 n1 2s 2 2
(13)
Since W S is not a unanimity WVG, it is impossible for every a S to belong, let alone be critical in, every winning coalition. So clearly X[W S ] I[W S ]; hence Zb [W & W S ] Za[ W & W S ] for every b N S and a S , as claimed. 16 14
See footnote 5. In both cases the indirect power of a member of the alliance is the same as in W . Moreover, forming an alliance with an internal unanimity rule is vacuous, as the composite SVG W & W S would be identical to the original W . 16 We have ruled out W S ! Bs , as in this case the alliance, albeit feasible, is not expedient. If such an alliance were formed, then I[ W S ] 1 and X[ W S ] 2 s 1 . So by (12) the alliance members gain no power, while by (13) those excluded from it do gain power. As power is the 15
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Thus, if considerations of envy were admitted, they would imply that no single expedient alliance in W can be stable. In what follows, we ignore envy. From now on let us make the reasonable assumption that only optimal alliances are formed. We can specify I[W S ] precisely for optimal alliances, distinguishing two cases, according as s is even or odd. As is well known (Felsenthal and Machover 1998: Theorem 3.3.8), £ 1 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦2 I[ W S ] ¦ ¤ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¥
2mm if s 2m, 2mm if s 2m 1.
(14)
By the way, from (12) and (14) it is easy to see that whether s is even or odd, the power of a member of an optimal alliance of size s is greater than that of a member of any expedient alliance of size s 1. Thus Gelman’s (2003: 7) assertion (clearly made with W ! M n in mind) that ‘it is never a good idea to have a coalition 17 with an even number of members: if m is even, it is always as good or better to be in a coalition of size m 1’ does not hold in general. As for X[W S ], we can specify it precisely for odd s. For even s we can specify the two extreme values: for W S ! M s and W S ! M s . It is easy to see that £ 1 ¦ ¦ 2 2m 1 ¦ ¦ 2 ¦ ¦ ¦ 1 X[W S ] ¦ ¤2 2m 1 ¦ 2 ¦ ¦ ¦ 2 2m ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¥
2mm if s 2m and W 2mm if s 2m and W
S
! Ms,
S
! M s,
(15)
if s 2m 1.
What happens if a member of an optimal alliance (S ; W S ) leaves it? Of course, if the alliance were then to disband, all voters would lose power. But we now make the reasonable assumption that if s 3 the s 1 remaining members will re-form an optimal alliance. The possible exception is s 3 , in which case the remaining two members cannot form an expedient alliance, so they may not form one at all. It is easy to see that if a member of an optimal alliance is expelled from it, the remaining members will lose power. So we can rule out expulsion as a source of instability. On the other hand, we saw that when an expedient alliance (S ; W S ) is formed, the voters excluded from it gain more power than (only) payoff in the power-game P W we are considering in this paper, there is no reason – other than pure altruism – for forming such an alliance. This is why we assume it will not form. 17 See footnote 5.
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those included in it. Would this tempt a member of an optimal alliance to defect? To see whether defection from (S ; W S ) is advantageous, let us first consider the case where s is even, s 2m , where m 1. From (12) and (14) it follows that before the defection the power of the prospective defector is 2mm 2 n . After defecting, the defector will be one of the voters excluded from an optimal alliance of size 2m 1, so by (13) and (15) her power will be 2 2m 1 2 n . It is easy to prove by induction on m that 2 2m 1 2mm for all m 1. So defection is indeed advantageous. It follows that optimal alliances of even size are unstable, being vulnerable to defection. Now let us turn to the somewhat more tricky case where s is odd, s 2m 1, where m p 1. In this case the defector deserts 2m partners who will form an optimal alliance, except perhaps in the special case m 1. Let us first assume that these 2m voters form an alliance with internal decision rule isomorphic to M 2m . By (12) and (14), before defecting the power of the prospective defector is 2mm 2 n 1. By (13) and (15), his power after defecting will be 2 2m 1 2 n1. By induction on m it is easy to see that 2 2m 1 p 2mm for all m p 1, so the defector will gain power, and the defection is advantageous. But a prospective defector cannot depend on this calculation, because the 2m deserted partners may not adopt a decision rule isomorphic to M 2m but one with a smaller number of winning coalitions. The worst-case scenario for defection is that the rule they choose is isomorphic to to M 2m . 18 From (12), (13), (14) and (15) it can be seen that in case they do so, the defector will gain power if 2 2m 1 21 2mm 2mm , or, tidying up:
2m 2 2m 3 m ;
(16)
and the defector will lose power if the opposite inequality holds. It is easy to prove (16) by induction for all m p 3. However, for m 1 and m 2 the opposite inequality holds. It follows that all alliances except those of size 3 or 5 are unstable, as a member of such an alliance will be better off defecting. Only alliances of size 3 and 5 can be stable, as defection of a single member from them is ill-advised. For brevity, we shall call an alliance of size 3 with rule ! M 3 a trio, and an alliance of size 5 with rule ! M 5 a quintet. We shall call a voter who is not a member of any alliance a singleton. Once a trio or a quintet is formed, then from the viewpoint of the other voters it behaves as a single voter. For example, if n 3 and one trio is 18 This may even be most likely, because, among all optimal alliances this is the only one with a proper SVG – which has some advantages. If m 1 , the two deserted members have no reason at all to form an alliance (see Proposition 1); and forming an alliance with decision rule isomorphic to M 2 is vacuous, because M 2 B2 (see footnote 15).
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formed, then from the viewpoint of the remaining n 3 voters it looks as if they are in a unanimity WVG with n 2 voters. If there are three singletons left, they may form a new trio. Similarly, five singletons may form a new quintet. Also, two singletons may join a trio and turn it into a quintet. Ultimately there will emerge a configuration in which the original n voters form quintets, trios and singletons. 19 We shall refer to these as ‘5–3–1’ configurations. Which 5–3–1 configurations are stable and therefore likely to form? Of course, if n 4 or n 5, there is only one stable option: the formation of one trio. For n 5 we must distinguish five cases, according to the residue of n modulo 5. Case 1 If n 6, there are two Pareto optimal 5–3–1 configurations: First, one quintet and one singleton. Each member of the quintet has indirect power 163 and the singleton has power 21 . Second, two trios, each of whose members has indirect power 41 . Any other 5–3–1 configuration is Pareto inferior to one of these two, but neither of them is Pareto superior to the other. So we cannot say for certain which of the two is more likely to form. Similarly, for all n 5m 1, where m p 1 : we can have m quintets and a singleton; or m 1 quintets and two trios. Case 2 If n 7, there are two Pareto optimal 5–3–1 configurations: First, one quintet and two singletons. Each member of the quintet has indirect power 323 and each singleton has power 41 . Second, two trios and a singleton. Each member of a trio has indirect power 18 and the singleton has power 41 . Again, any other 5–3–1 configuration is Pareto inferior to one of these two, but neither of them is Pareto superior to the other. So we cannot say for certain which of the two is more likely to form. Similarly, for all n 5m 2, where m p 1 : we can have m quintets and two singletons; or m 1 quintets, two trios and a singleton. Case 3 If n 8, there is just one Pareto optimal 5–3–1 configuration: a quintet and a trio. Each member of the former has indirect power 163 and each member of the latter has 41 . This 5–3–1 configuration is Pareto superior to any other, and is therefore the one likely to form. Similarly, for all n 5m 3, where m p 1 : we have m quintets and one trio. Case 4 If n 9, there are two Pareto optimal 5–3–1 configurations: First, one quintet, one trio and a singleton. Each member of the quintet has indirect power 323 , each member of the trio has indirect power 18 , and the singleton power 41 . 19 We rule out the formation of ‘super-alliances’ one or more of whose members are themselves a trio or quintet, because such a super-alliance would not be optimal as an alliance in W .
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Second, three trios, each of whose members has indirect power 18 . Again, any other 5–3–1 configuration is Pareto inferior to one of these two, but neither of them is Pareto superior to the other. So we cannot say for certain which of the two is more likely to form. Similarly, for all n 5m 4, where m p 1 : we can have m quintets, one trio and one singleton; or m 1 quintets and three trios. Case 5 If n 10, there is just one Pareto optimal 5–3–1 configuration: two quintets, each of whose members has indirect power 163 . This 5–3–1 configuration is Pareto superior to any other, and is therefore the one likely to form. Similarly, for all n 5m , where m 1 : we have m quintets.
5. Alliances with a Dummy In this section we wish to explore the possible role of a dummy in the formation of an alliance. Somewhat surprisingly, a dummy can become empowered via a feasible alliance, as the following example shows. Example 5 During the first period of the European Union (1958–73), the so called ‘qualified majority’ (QM) decision rule prescribed for its sixmember Council of Ministers by the Treaty of Rome (1957) was a WVG that assigned to France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg weights 4, 4,4,2,2 and 1, respectively; and the quota required for passing resolutions on most issues was 12. In this WVG, which is isomorphic to [12;4,4,4,2,2,1], the powers of the members were 165 , 165 , 165 , 163 , 163 and 0, respectively. Although the Treaty stipulated that this decision rule would only become effective in 1966, and in practice it was rarely invoked from 1966 to 1973, as decisions were normally made by consensus, the rule is quite puzzling. What was the point of giving Luxembourg a useless weight of 1, and why did Luxembourg agree to be a dummy? This puzzle has often been mentioned in the literature on decision making in the EU. Of course, it is possible that the original signatories of the Treaty of Rome, including the government of Luxembourg, were simply unaware of the QM anomaly. But there may be another explanation. As is well known, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg had operated a Benelux Customs Union since 1947 (replaced in 1966 by the Benelux Economic Union). It is quite possible that the Benelux countries agreed informally to act as an alliance within the EU. A reasonable internal decision rule could be ! [3;2,2,1] – which is in fact a simple majority rule. It is easy to verify that under this alliance the indirect power of each of the three members would be 163 . Thus the alliance, albeit inexpedient, is feasible – and it would em-
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power Luxembourg! 20 Note that, somewhat surprisingly, a Benelux alliance would benefit the three non-Benelux members: each would now have power 38 . Is it also possible to form an expedient alliance with a dummy? Moreover, is it possible to form such an alliance which will also increase the power of all those excluded from the alliance? The answer to both these questions is positive, as shown by the following two examples. Example 6 Let W [13;5,5,3,3,3,1]. Here the power of each of the first two voters is 167 , that of each of the next three voters is 163 and the last voter is a dummy. Now suppose the last four voters form an alliance with internal decision rule ! M 4 . Then the indirect power of each of these four is 329 . So the alliance is expedient. True, this alliance is not stable, for if the voter with weight 1 is ejected, and the remaining three form an alliance with internal rule ! M 3 , then the indirect power of each of these three will be 38 . 21 Example 7 Let W [10;2,2,2,2,2,1] . Here each of the first five voters has power 161 and the last voter is a dummy. Now suppose the last five voters form an alliance with internal decision rule ! M 5 . Then each of these five has indirect power 163 and the first voter, excluded from the alliance, has power 21 . So the alliance is not only expedient, but also beneficial to the voter excluded from it. Note that in this case ejecting the voter with weight 1 from the alliance will not benefit the remaining four: the best they can do is form an alliance with internal rule isomorphic to M 4 or M 4 – which will still give them indirect power 163 . However, neither of these two alliances is stable. In the case of the alliance of size 5, which includes the [former] dummy, a voter with weight 2 will be better off defecting. Following such defection, the remaining three voters with weight 2 will be better off if they eject the dummy. In the case of the alliance of four voters with weight 2, it will also be advantageous for any of them to defect.
20 We are indebted to Simon Hix for this explanation. We are also grateful to Frank Steffen and Matthew Braham for independently raising with us the question as to whether a dummy can be empowered via an alliance. 21 However, this alliance too is unstable: the two voters with weight 5 excluded from it – whose loss of power would be substantial as a result of its formation – would be able to tempt one of the three alliance members to join them in forming a 3-member dictatorial alliance with an internal decision rule ! M 3 , thereby increasing their power to 12 . This alliance would be stable.
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6. Discussion The results obtained in this paper constitute a modest advance on the ground covered by us in Felsenthal and Machover (2002) and by Gelman (2003). The main result of Section 3, Theorem 1, is not too surprising. It confirms – as well as making more precise – what is intuitively almost obvious: if W ! M n , then only [dictatorial] alliances whose size is just over n2 can be both expedient and stable. A smaller alliance is vulnerable to annihilating retaliation by those excluded from it, whereas a larger alliance is, in a sense, too large for its own good. However, in the cases where n is even, and particularly where it is divisible by 4, the problem of stability of an alliance of size n 2 does require some careful scrutiny. Example 4 illustrates a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon that can occur in a super-majority WVG: a stable expedient alliance may also not hurt those excluded from it. This of course depends on the fact that power games are not constant-sum games. Section 4 dealing with the case W ! Bn , provides a more extreme illustration of this phenomenon. But the main surprise in this section is the exceptional behaviour of quintets and trios, and the unique stability of some 5–3–1 configurations. We think that these results could hardly have been anticipated without detailed analysis. Finally, in Section 5 we illustrate the seemingly paradoxical fact that a feasible, and even expedient, alliance may empower a dummy while at the same time benefiting the voters excluded from it. This is a possible explanation for the acquiescence of Luxembourg in its dummy status under the QM rule of the original 6-member EU Council of Ministers. Nevertheless this paper should not be viewed as an attempt to provide an explanation of actual alliance formation in terms of Penrose power. If this were the case, then it would be important to compare this with explanations based on other measures of power. Rather, our idea was to do a ‘what if’ exercise: what would happen if voters were to play a cooperative ‘power game’, which is played by forming alliances and in which the resulting Penrose power of the players-voters were regarded by them as the payoff (which, by the nature of Penrose power must be a non-transferable ‘utility’). Of course, one could similarly invent other games, based on some other payoff, which could well be some other measure of voting power (e.g. the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index, or the Penrose-Banzhaf power index as modified by Owen (1982) for voting games ‘with a priori coalitions’), and which could well lead to different results than we obtained. Admittedly, the ground covered so far in the study of power games is rather limited. In this paper we have confined ourselves entirely to WVGs rather than dealing with SVGs that may not be weighted. Moreover, we have concentrated for the most part on symmetric WVGs of the simplest kinds:
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those isomorphic to M n or Bn . A more general theory of power games P W remains to be developed. There is also need for studies of the extent to which considerations of a priori voting power can explain the formation, dissolution and [in]stability of real-life alliances, as well as defection of voters from these alliances. So far – apart from a claim by Aumann (see Damme, 1997), unsupported by any detailed data – there are only two proper studies of this kind known to us – one by Chua and Felsenthal (2008), and the other by Andjiga et al. (2006)– both of which are concerned with the formation of governmental alliances, i.e. ruling coalitions within legislatures, and both arrive at negative or sceptical conclusions. 22 Thus, for example, we re-analysed the 77 governmental alliances examined by Chua and Felsenthal (2008), and found that in 49 of them the largest party was a dictator, that in additional 21 governmental alliances at least one member became a dummy or lost some power by joining the alliance, and that only seven of these alliances were either feasible or expedient in comparison to a situation where no alliance was formed. These results clearly indicate that considerations of feasibility and expediency (in the technical sense of the present paper) play no significant role in the formation of governmental alliances. However, in contrast to governmental alliances – which must form in legislatures where no party controls an absolute majority of the votes – considerations of feasibility and expediency in forming alliances may play a more significant role in international organizations or corporate boards of directors, where alliances may but need not form. To verify this one would need to conduct empirical research. But this will not be easy, because the formation of an alliance in such bodies is often tacit and hence difficult to detect.
References Andjiga, N.G., Badirou, D. and Mbih, B. (2006) On the Evaluation of Power in Parliaments and Government Formation, mimeo. http://crem.univ.rennes1.fr/site_francais/doctravail/2006/ie-200618.pdf Chua, V.C.H. and Felsenthal, D.S. (2008) Coalition Formation Theories Revisited: An empirical investigation of Aumann’s Hypothesis, in M. Braham and F. Steffen (eds) Power, Freedom, and Voting, Springer, 159–183. van Damme, E. (Interviewer) (1997) On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann, in W. Albers et al. (eds) Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer. Reprinted in Games and
22
Two additional studies of this kind known to us are those by Riker (1959), and by Felsenthal and Machover (2000), which aim to ascertain whether inter-party migrations of delegates in the French National Assembly during the period 1953–54 can be explained by considerations of voting power. However, both these studies seem to us inappropriate, as they ignore in their calculations the existence of a (dictatorial) governmental alliance.
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Economic Behavior 24 (1998): 181–210. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1998) The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes, Edward Elgar. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (2000) Voting Power and Parliamentary Defections: the 1953–54 French National Assembly Revisited, mimeo. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000594. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (2002) Annexations and Alliances: When are Blocs Advantageous A Priori? Social Choice and Welfare 19: 295–312. Gelman, A. (2003) Forming Voting Blocs and Coalitions as a Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Possible Theoretical Explanation for Political Instability, Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy 2, Article 13, 1–14. http://bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol2/iss1/art13 Owen, G. (1982) Modification of the Banzhaf-Coleman Index for Games with A Priori Unions, in M.J. Holler (ed.) Power, Voting, and Voting Power, Physica Verlag. Riker, W.H. (1959) A Test of the Adequacy of the Power Index, Behavioral Science 4: 120–131. Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M. (1954) A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System, American Political Science Review 48: 787–792.
4. Positional Power in Hierarchies René van den Brink Department of Econometrics, Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Frank Steffen University of Liverpool Management School, UK
1. Introduction Power is a core concept for the analysis and design of organisations. The literature contains a wide variety of contributions from various disciplines dealing with different types and aspects of power in organisations. These can broadly be classified by a combination of two features: the subject of the analysis and its primary origin (Morriss 1987/2002: 107f). The subject is either the possession of power or its exercise and its primary origin is either an individual or a position in an organisation. That is, power is taken to be rooted in an individual or a position. Based on these two features, the literature can, in very general terms, be said to consist of four categories: studies on (i) positional power, (ii) individual power, (iii) the exercise of positional power, and (iv) the exercise of individual power. This paper is devoted to the study of the first category. Positional power is what results from the interplay of two components of an organisation’s architecture: the arrangement of positions in the organisation and the decision-making mechanisms in use. It is well recognized that the organisational architecture and its resulting power structure are essential ingredients for the success of an organisation (Brickley et al. 2004; Daudi 1986; Johnston and Gill 1993; Martin 1998). Although there exists plenty of work addressing the positional power relations in organisational architectures, 1 very little attention has been given to investigating such power relations in hierarchical organisations i.e. where there are dominance relations among the actors. This would be unremarkable if hierarchies would not play a significant role in social life. But the opposite is true: hierarchies can be found in all areas of social life. One of the 1 See, for instance, Felsenthal and Machover (1998), Holler and Owen (2000, 2001, 2002), Holler et al. (2002), Holler and Gambarelli (2006), and the references therein.
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problems with most of the extant literature on positional power in hierarchies is that it is restricted to the analysis of power only in terms of the arrangement of the actors. 2 While such an analysis informs us about the authority structure within an organisation, it ignores the decision-making mechanisms completely. To the best of our knowledge, only a handful of studies on positional power in hierarchies take into account the decision-making mechanisms (van den Brink 1994, 1997, 1999, 2001; Gilles et al. 1992; Gilles and Owen 1994; van den Brink and Gilles 1996; Berg and Paroush 1998; Shapley and Palamara 2000a,b ; and Steffen 2002). All these studies make use of adaptations of well-established approaches for the analysis of power in non-hierarchical organisations such as the Banzhaf (1965) measure; and thus they are all based on the structure of a simple game, i.e. they are ‘membership-based ’. Roughly speaking, in such a set-up power is ascribed to an actor i, if i has the potential to alter an outcome that has been forced by some members of the organisation, by either leaving or joining the subset of actors which has effected the present outcome. In the course of our analysis we will demonstrate that such an approach is in general inappropriate for characterizing power in hierarchies. To deal with the problem of how to characterize power relations in a hierarchy, we develop an action-based approach based on an extensive game form. Here power is ascribed to an actor i, if i has the potential to alter an outcome forced by the members of the organisation by altering his action. A similar action-based approach has been already suggested for decisionmaking mechanisms in non-hierarchical set-ups (Miller 1982), but has so far received only little attention in the literature as it was regarded as an equivalent representation of the membership-based approach. Our analysis will demonstrate that this equivalence only holds for a certain class of decisionmaking mechanisms and that the membership-based approach in contrast to the action-based cannot be extended to a class of decision-making mechanisms which allow certain actors to terminate a decision on behalf of the hierarchy before all other members have been involved. This kind of decision-making mechanism is particularly relevant for hierarchies. The contribution of our paper can be summarized as follows: (i) We argue that the existing membership-based approaches for the analysis of positional power in hierarchies are only relevant for a (less important) subclass of decision-making mechanisms in hierarchies. (ii) We show that an adequate consideration of the more relevant mechanisms requires an actionbased approach represented by an extensive game form. (iii) We extend the existing action-based approach which has been formulated for strategic 2
See, for instance, Copeland (1951), Russett (1968), Grofman and Owen (1982), Daudi (1986), Brams (1968), van den Brink (1994, 2002), van den Brink and Gilles (2000), Mizruchi and Potts (1998), Hu and Shapley (2003), Herings et al. (2005), and the references therein.
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games forms to extensive game forms. (iv) We illustrate that the existing membership-based approaches can be represented as special cases of the action-based approach.
2. Directed Graphs Given that we will represent both the description of the arrangements of the actors and decision-making mechanisms in hierarchical organisations by directed graphs – the two are not necessarily identical – we start by briefly recalling some definitions of such graphs. A directed graph (or digraph) is a set of objects, called nodes joined by directed links called arcs. Formally, a digraph is an ordered pair (V , D ), where V is a finite set of nodes (or vertices) of the graph and D is a set of ordered pairs of V called arcs of the graph, i.e. D V q V is a binary relation on V . An arc (i , j ) D is considered to be directed from node i to node j where i is called a predecessor of j and j is called a successor of i in D . By S (i ) and S -1(i ) , respectively, we denote the set of all successors and predecessors of i V in D ; i.e. S (i ) \ j V (i , j ) D ^ and S 1(i ) \ j V ( j ,i ) D ^. A node i is called a terminal node, if no arc is starting from it, i.e. S (i ) . If (i , j ) D , we say that there exists a path from i to j denoted by P (i , j ) def i l ... l j , if i v j and j can be reached from i by following arcs of the graph, e.g. if (i , h ),(h, j ) D , then P (i , j ) i l h l j . If such a path P (i , j ) exists, we call i and h ancestors of j, and h and j descendants of i. Moreover, the set of all nodes being descendants of a node i is denoted by Sˆ(i ) and the set of all ancestors of i by Sˆ1(i ). If, instead, (i , j ) D , we say that P (i , j ) denotes a direct path, and if (i , j ) D , but i j , we say that P (i , j ) denotes a degenerated path. A directed graph is said to be a tree T if (i) there exists a distinguished node r V (the root of the tree) that has no arcs going into it, and (ii) for every other node i V \ \r ^ there exists exactly one path from r to i. Furthermore, a tree T becomes a labelled tree denoted by the triple ( T ,l V ,l D ), if there exist labelling functions l V : V l L V and l D : D l L D with L V and L D being the corresponding sets of labels. Moreover, a branch of a tree T is a directed graph having nodes starting at a node i V and containing all its descendents together with their original arcs. By T i we denote the branch starting at i. Thus, T i is itself a tree, the root of which is i.
3. Hierarchies Hierarchies form a certain subclass of organisational architectures. Following van den Brink (1994) they distinguish themselves from other architectures by the arrangement of its members being connected via directed relations, which we interpret as dominance (or superior to) relations. Loosely speaking,
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we can say that an actor i in a dominating position has an influence on the ‘powers’ of other actors who are in positions that are dominated by i. Domination can be either indirect or direct, i.e. with or without intermediate actors, respectively. Note, that if we just make use of the term ‘domination’ without further specification, we allow for indirect and direct domination. Actors in dominating positions are called superiors (or principals) - bosses or managers in common parlance -, while the actors in dominated positions are called subordinates (or agents). If we refer to a superior who directly dominates another actor, the dominating actor is called a predecessor, and if we refer to a subordinate who is directly dominated by another actor, the dominated actor is called a successor. Formally, we can represent the dominance structure of a hierarchy as a digraph, where the nodes j V represent the actors i N , i.e. l V : V l N, and the arcs indicate direct dominance relations between the actors, i.e. if there is an arc (i , j ) D predecessor i dominates successor j and that j is dominated by i. Moreover, we say j Sˆ(i ) that j is a subordinate of i, and j S ˆ 1(i ) that j is a superior of i. The dominance relations in a hierarchy are assumed to fulfil the following three properties (see Radner 1992 for a similar set of properties): Property 3.1 (Transitivity) If i dominates j, and j dominates k, then i dominates k. Property 3.2 (Anti-symmetry) If i dominates j, then j cannot dominate i.
Note that by Property (3.1) in combination with (3.2) we assume i N : i Sˆ(i ), i.e. we exclude the case that a dominance structure is cyclic. Property 3.3 (Single Topness) There is exactly one actor, called the top (or root), who is in a position such that he dominates all other actors. Except for the top, every other actor has at least one predecessor. Thus, formally, there exists an i N such that Sˆ(i ) N \ \i ^ and Sˆ1(i ) .
For an illustration Fig. 1 depicts all feasible dominance structures of hierarchies with two and three members (except structures with relabelled members) which fulfil properties (3.1)–(3.3). Formally, for Fig. 1a these are given by S (a ) \b ^ and S (b ) , for Fig. 1b by S (a ) \b ^ , S (b ) \c ^ and S (c ) , and for Fig. 1c by S (a ) \b ,c ^ and S (b ) S (c ) . Note that the dominance relations in a hierarchy cannot always be represented by a tree, i.e. it is not necessarily the case that except for the top each other actor has one and only one predecessor. In other words, dominance relations which can be represented by a tree form a subclass of all feasible sets of dominance relations fulfilling properties (3.1)–(3.3).
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a
b Fig. 1a
a
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a
b b
c Fig. 1c
c Fig. 1b
Fig. 1.
Feasible dominance structures with two and three actors
As a dominance structure is only a partially ordered set, not all actors in a hierarchy are necessarily comparable in terms of their bare dominance relations. For instance, in Fig. 1c, b does not dominate c, nor does c dominate b (Radner 1992: 1391). However, in everyday language, the word hierarchy not only connotes an upside-down-tree-like dominance structure, but also an assignment of rank which allows for a certain mode of comparison of the positions of b and c. By a ranking of a dominance structure we shall mean an assignment of a natural number called the rank (or level) to each actor, such that: Property 3.4 i has a higher rank (larger number) than j, if i dominates j. Property 3.5 i and j have the same rank, if i does not dominate j nor j dominates i, i.e. if i and j are not comparable in terms of the dominance relations, and the length of the longest path to the top is the same for both.
While properties (3.4) and (3.5) are sufficient for existence of a ranking, they are only necessary but not sufficient for a unique ranking. Throughout this paper we will make use of a unique ranking which additionally satisfies the following properties: 3 Property 3.6 There is only one actor with the highest rank k called the top. Property 3.7 Recursively, an actor has rank l b k 1 iff all his predecessors have a rank h p l 1 and at least one of his predecessors has rank l 1. Property 3.8 We fix k such that the lowest ranked actor has rank 1. 3 Note, that with these properties we exclude hierarchies which contain direct dominance relations over more than one rank (Radner 1992: 1391). While we impose this restriction to keep the exposition of our paper traceable, this does not imply that our approach is not capable to take such hierarchies into account.
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An actor is said to be at the bottom (or a leaf ) if he does not dominate any other position, i.e. if he owns a terminal node. Note that this does not imply that such a position necessarily belongs to the lowest rank 1.
4. Decision-Making Mechanisms in Hierarchies Decision-making mechanisms are the other component of an organisation’s architecture that we need to examine. For the definition of a decision-making mechanism let us start with the general definition of a decision: Definition 4.1 A decision is the choice of a non-empty proper sub-set of elements out of a set of elements.
In our case the sets of elements from which an actor can choose is created by proposals submitted to the organisation. The chosen (or selected) elements are outcomes produced by members of an organisation. The choices are made by one or more actors belonging to the organisation where each of these actors has to perform an action to make his individual choice effective. How those actions and the outcomes are linked is given by the decision rule: Definition 4.2 A decision rule is a function that maps ordered sets of individual actions into outcomes.
Thus, a decision rule is an action guiding norm which states which ordered sets of actions generate which outcome. 4 A second component we require for our definition of a decision-making mechanism is that of a decision-making procedure: Definition 4.3 A decision-making procedure provides the course of actions of the actors for a collective decision and determines the actions to be counted, i.e. which actions go into the domain of the decision rule.
Now we can define a decision-making mechanism: Definition 4.4 A decision rule together with a decision-making procedure establishes a decision-making mechanism (DMM).
The canonical set-up for a DMM U in a hierarchy as found in the power literature is characterized by the following set of assumptions: 4
To put it into the language of causality: a decision rule defines the set of all necessary and sufficient conditions for each outcome, i.e. for each outcome it defines a set of sets of actions where each set of actions is sufficient for that outcome.
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Assumption 4.5 Proposals submitted to the hierarchy are exogenous: it is the task of the hierarchy either to accept or to reject the proposal, i.e. we have a binary outcome set O \acceptance , rejection ^. Assumption 4.6 A proposal can be submitted to the hierarchy only once. Assumption 4.7 A hierarchy contains a finite set of members N \a , b ,..., n ^ whose actions bring about the decision of the hierarchy. Assumption 4.8 Each actor i N has a binary action set Ai \yes , no ^ where yes means that i supports a proposal and no that i rejects the proposal.
Assumptions (4.5)–(4.8) are also common in the analysis of power in non-hierarchical organisations. In addition for hierarchies we need to assume: Assumption 4.9 The direction of the decision-making procedure through the hierarchy is bottom-up. Assumption 4.10 New proposals can only be received by those actors N N who have a contact to the outside world, i.e. to actors i N submitting the proposals. Assumption 4.11 Only certain subsets of N can receive a new proposal at the same time. The set of such feasible subsets is given by N 2 N . Assumption 4.12 If N a N receives a new proposal its members have to choose their individual actions. Depending on the DMM, these actions either establish a final decision on behalf of the hierarchy or they imply that the proposal is forwarded to the next higher rank in the hierarchy. Here Sˆ1(N a) defines the set of all superiors who may be involved in the decision about that proposal received by N a until a final decision on behalf of the hierarchy is made. Assumption 4.13 If a proposal is forwarded to the next higher rank, there is a set S min1(N a) of minimal feasible sub-sets of superiors Sˆmin1(N a) Sˆ1(N a) whose actions are required for the decision about a new proposal that has been presented to N a.
Assumptions (4.9)–(4.13) require some justification. Let us begin with the very basic rationale of a hierarchy: why may it be useful to have a hierarchy. Why do we have organisations with dominance structures? A common answer to this question says that hierarchies are cost saving because dominance structures allow for the decentralisation of decision-making (delega-
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tion), i.e. by dividing tasks between the members of the different ranks and positions. In our context delegation means that we can avoid that all members of an organisation are always involved in all decisions. Hence, DMMs in hierarchies imply that in certain instances particular actors are intentionally excluded from decisions (see, for instance, Mackenzie 1976: 103). This is usually achieved by a combination of two basic principles: (i) by reducing the breadth of the hierarchy involved in a particular decision and (ii) by allowing non-top actors to make certain types of final decisions on behalf of the whole hierarchy even before one of their superiors has been involved. It would therefore be natural, that a generic DMM for a hierarchy should take those principles into account. To investigate whether such a generic DMM also satisfies assumptions (4.9)–(4.13) we need to determine if there exists a reasonable example based on the very simple hierarchy given by Fig. 1c that fulfils both principles (i) and (ii) and the assumptions. Example 4.14 Assume that a hierarchy with a dominance structure as given by Fig. 1c is a development agency with a being its head and b and c being representatives in different developing countries. Moreover, assume that b and c receive funding applications for development projects, i.e. they have a contact to the outside world, while a does not. Suppose that the decision-making on these applications is delegated to b and c according to the above two principles. Based on principle (i) each representative is only responsible for the projects in his country, i.e. is not involved in decisions for the other country. If applications arrive at the desk of one of the representatives (b or c), this representative decides on them only together with a. Furthermore, based on principle (ii), if a representative (b or c) receives an application, he is entitled to reject it without contacting a (he can exclude a from the decision-making in this particular instance) although for an approval he requires the consent of a. 5
Thus, due to principle (i) a decision will never require the whole breath of the hierarchy (b and c together) to take part in a decision which implies that never all three actors are involved in a decision. In terms of its DMM the hierarchy is truncated twice, i.e. for each actor with a contact to the outside world we obtain a truncated hierarchy containing this actor and all his superiors. 6 To put it into other words: we have an ensemble of possible games on N with overlapping sets of actors, i.e. N 1 \a , b ^ and N 2 \a ,c ^ . 7 5 For an overview of further DMMs that can be derived from the literature on positional power in hierarchies see the appendix. 6 Formally this phenomenon can also taken as abstention, although in this case it is decreed rather than voluntary. 7 The idea of a possible game has been introduced in the context of abstention (see Braham and Steffen 2002). Assume a DMM under which abstention is permissible for any actor
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Whether b or c will be excluded from the decision-making (which possible game will be played) depends on who receives the new proposal. Moreover, due to principle (ii) all non-top actors are entitled to make a certain type of final decision on behalf of the whole hierarchy. This also means that principle (ii) implies a sequential decision-making procedure as it entitles nontop actors to terminate the collective decision-making, before actors on higher ranks are involved. Now let us determine if Example (4.14) and, thus, the application of the above principles, match with assumptions (4.9)–(4.13). Obviously, Assumption 4.9 is fulfilled. Moreover, the same applies to the remaining assumptions: N \b ,c ^ (4.10), N \\b ^ , \c ^^ (4.11), Sˆ 1 \b ^ S ˆ 1 \c ^ \a ^ (4.12), and S min1 \b ^ S min1 \c ^ \\a ^^ (4.13). However, note that these assumptions do not take into account that principle (ii) implies a sequential decision-making procedure. An essential characteristic of DMMs in hierarchies is overlooked.
5. Decision-Making Mechanisms and Extensive Game Forms For modelling a DMM in a hierarchy the extant literature applies the classical membership-based approach. However, this is inappropriate because it does not allow for the exclusion of agents based on principle (ii) nor does it allow for the bottom-up structure of the decision-making procedure (Assumption 4.9). Both exclusion and bottom-up decision-making require a sequential structure while the membership-based approach is inherently simultaneous (see Section 7). Hence, we suggest the natural method is an action-based approach that makes use of an extensive game form (EGF) as defined below. Let N \1,..., n ^ be the set of actors of a collective decision making body and N * def N R where R denotes ‘nature’ which behaves randomly, i.e. R ’s behaviour represents the exogenous effects of the outside world on N. The actors are part of a tree of a game form. This is a labelled tree ( T ,l V ,l D ) where (i) l V assigns to each non-terminal node j V exactly one i N * and to each terminal node k V an outcome o(k) O with O being a non-empty finite outcome set, and (ii) l D assigns to each arc a move a A where A denotes the set of all possible moves for all i N * . In a tree of a game form a non-terminal node is called a decision node if it is owned by an actor i N , and a chance node if it is owned by R . Moreover, we denote the set of nodes owned by an actor i by V i . An information set for an actor i is a set of nodes h i such that in a deci-
i N . Hence, a decision can be made by any subset N k 2 N . Here any game played on N k is called a possible game on N. Note that the idea of a possible game is different to that of a composed game (Shapley 1962). In case of a composed game all components of the game can be played at the same time, while out of the set of possible games only one will be played.
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sion-making procedure i knows that he must make the ‘next decision’, at some node j h i , but due to his lack of information of the ‘history’ of the decision-making procedure i does not know at which node j h i exactly he must make his decision; i only knows that j h i . Necessary conditions of an information set for an actor i are that (i) all nodes of h i are owned by i; (ii) no node of h i is related to any other node of h i , i.e. if j , h h i , then j is neither an ancestor nor a descendant of h; and (iii) all nodes of h i are equivalent for i with respect to the outgoing arcs, i.e. the number and labelling of arcs starting from each node j h i is the same. Moreover, let us denote the set of all information sets of an actor i by H i , i.e. H i def \h i 1 ,.., h ip ^. Note, that if the set of nodes of a tree of a game form is N * , i.e. it includes R , we follow the convention that nodes belonging to nature are always elements of singleton information sets Now we can characterise an EGF. 8 Definition 5.1 An EGF is a tree of a game form such that the decisionnodes have been partitioned into information sets that belong to the actors.
In an EGF we call C i : V i l 2 V the choice function of an actor i N * , if C i ( j ) = S ( j ) for all j V i . Thus, a choice function assigns to each j V i its corresponding set of successors S ( j ) in the tree of the game form (it assigns to each j V i the nodes that i can reach being in j and making a move). Furthermore, we say that i ‘has chosen’, if i has to make a move in a node j V i and has decided for a move to a node h S ( j ). For all i N we call such choices of a move an action of i in j, denoted by a ij . The set of all actions available to i at a node j V i is called the action set of i at j, denoted by Aij , i.e. Aij def \a ij1 ,...,a ijm ^. The set of all actions available to i at any node in V i is denoted by Ai, i.e. Ai def \ j V i : Aij ^. If instead nature R moves, it’s moves – if they are non-fictitious – are not actions of intention, but just moves (determining which ‘real’ actor has to choose next) which follow a probability distribution resulting from a function p : H R q A R l [0,1] that assigns probabilities to the ‘actions’ at information sets where nature moves, satisfying h R H R : \a Rj A Rj j h R : p(a Rj )^ 1. Next, let us say that for an i N * , j V i . and a ij Ai j in an EGF, h( j ,a ij ) denotes that node h S ( j ) such that l D ( j , h ) a ij , i.e. h( j ,a ij ) is that node that is reached from node j, if i makes the move a ij . Based on this notation we can define an action profile in an EGF: Definition 5.2 An ‘action profile’ a in an EGF is an ordered set of individ8 For more details about extensive game forms we refer the reader to Kolpin (1988, 1989) and for extensive form games to Kuhn (1953) and Selten (1975).
Positional Power in Hierarchies Table 1.
Choice Functions and Related Action Sets
j V i
S ( j)
Aij
j V a j V c
\acceptance , rejection ^ \a , rejection ^ \a , rejection ^
\yes , no ^ \yes , no ^ \yes , no ^
j V R
\b , c ^
–
j V b
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Table 2. Action Profiles and Related Outcomes
aA
oO
(b is allowed to chooseT , yesb, yesa)
acceptance
(c is allowed to chooseT , yesc, yesa)
acceptance
(b is allowed to chooseT , yesb, noa)
rejection
(c is allowed to chooseT , yesc, noa)
rejection
(b is allowed to chooseT , nob)
rejection
(c is allowed to chooseT , noc)
rejection
ual moves, a def (a j1 , ..., a j p ), belonging to a subset of actors N (a ) N * , such that their moves form a path P ( j 1 , j p 1 ) j 1 l j 2 l ... l j p 1 with S 1( j 1 ) , S ( j p 1 ) , and l D ( j q , j q 1 ) a j q for all q \1, ..., p ^. Thus, an action profile a is a ‘path of moves’ within the tree of the game form where the first move begins at the root r j 1 and the last move ends at a terminal node k j p 1. The set of all action profiles will be denoted by A and by A i A we will denote the subset of all action profiles that contain an action of actor i. Notice that the action profiles in an EGF which represents a DMM consider only counted individual actions and not all feasible individual actions. That is, these action profiles ignore those actions which actors have available and can perform but which are not counted by the decision-making procedure. Let us return to Example (4.14) which can now be represented by an EGF with N * \a , b ,c , R^ , j V i ,i N : Ai j \yes , no ^, O \acceptance , rejection ^, i N : # H i # V i , and, thus, j V i : \ j ^ H i . Hence, we have an EGF with perfect information, i.e. the information sets are single-
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yes
acceptance
a no
yes
rejection
b no ½
rejection
R yes
acceptance
a ½ yes
no
rejection
c no rejection
Fig. 2. The DMM as an EGF
tons and there is one information set h i for each node j owned by i. 9 Given the triple (N * , U , S ) with U denoting the DMM as described by Example (4.14) we obtain the choice functions and the individual action sets as given by Table 1. From these we can derive the action profiles containing the counted individual actions and their related outcomes as given by Table 2. What is left to be specified is the probability function determining nature’s moves, p . It determines which actors with a contact to the outside world will obtain a proposal on their desk and, therefore, establishes which possible game will be played. In the absence of any (structural) information regarding the likelihood of N a N to receive a new proposal, we apply the principle of insufficient reason of classical probability theory. 10 This assigns equal probability to all admissible ‘atomic events’, i.e. in the present case equal probability to all N a N for receiving a new proposal: p (N a receives a new proposal) 1/# N 9 Note, that in a hierarchy an actor may own more than one decision node, even if he owns only one node in the dominance structure. 10 In the absence of any information about the outside world the application of the principle of insufficient reason appears to be legitimate here as we fulfil the condition that we have a finite probability space consisting of finitely many clearly distinguished indivisible ‘atomic events’ (Felsenthal et al. 2003).
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which implies that for each actor i N his probability to receive a new proposal is given by pˆ(i N receives a new proposal) # \N a N i N a^ /# N.
We can now give a proper graphical representation of a DMM as an EGF. For Example (4.14) this is given by Fig. 2. From Section 4 we know that we have two possible games with N 1 \a ,b ^ and N 2 \a ,c ^. Moreover, we have N \\b ^ , \c ^^ which implies that each possible game occurs with probability 21 . In the EGF this is reflected by the assignment of this probability to the moves of nature which lead to the branches T b and T c representing the possible games.
6. Measuring Positional Power: An Action-Based Approach Our understanding of ‘power’ is based on Harré (1970) and Morriss (1987/ 2002) who define power as a concept that always refers to a generic (and therefore, in a sense, timeless) ability or capacity of an object. In a social context this object is an actor and a power ascription refers to his ability: what the actor is able to do against the resistance of at least some other actor. Following Braham (2007) we say that an actor i has power with respect to a certain outcome if i has an action (or sequence of actions) such that the performance of the action under the stated or implied conditions will result in that outcome despite the actual or possible resistance of at least some other actor. That is, power is a claim about what i is able to do against some resistance of others irrespective of the actual occurrence of the resistance. Thus, power is a capacity or potential which exists whether it is exercised or not. In our context, this capacity is based on the positions of the actors in an organisation. The measurement of power involves the following steps: (i) The identification of the action profiles within the organisation that are sufficient for bringing about an outcome. (ii) The ascription of power to an individual actor in these action profiles by determining if the actor has an action that if performed will, ceteris paribus, alter the outcome of the collective action. (iii) The aggregation of the individual power ascriptions of each actor, giving us a bare power score. (iv) The weighting of the aggregated power ascriptions yields to a power measure. If this weighting is such that all aggregated power ascriptions sum up to unity we say that we have a power index. The difference between a score and a measure rests in the comparability of power structures: a score allows for ordinal comparisons only, while a measure allows for cardinal comparisons. In Section 5 we already described and illustrated step (i) (see Table 2). Thus, we can immediately proceed with step (ii). To ascribe power to an
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actor we examine for each action profile a whether i has an action, 11 which, if chosen, can make a decisive difference to the outcome against the actual or possible resistance of at least some other actor. That is, we determine if a given actor i has a swing. To define a swing in an EGF let O ˆ(g ) def \o O there is a path P (g , k ) with S (k ) and o = o(k )^, i.e. O ˆ(g ) is a relation between a decision node g V i and the outcome set O ˆ that can be achieved from this node. 12 Based on this relation we have: Definition 6.1 A swing of an actor i is a triple (a , a ij l ,aij l ) with a (a j1 , ..., a j p ) being an action profile and actions a ij l ,aij l Aiil for which there are two decision nodes j l V i and j k S ( j l ) that are reached by profile a and a decision node g S ( j l ) \ \ j k ^, such that l D ( j l , j k ) a ij l , l D ( j l , g ) aij l , and O ˆ(g ) \ \o(a j p )^ v .
Hence, i has a swing, if i can alter the resulting outcome o(a j p ) of an action profile a by, ceteris paribus, changing his action a ij l . At this point it is important to draw attention to the interpretation of the ceteris paribus condition. In the context of collective decision-making it is commonly said to imply that the actions of all other actors remain constant (in all information sets). That is, if i alters his action the only effect that can result out of this is a change in the outcome (then we say that i has a swing and we ascribe power to i ). While this ‘all other things being equal’ interpretation is appropriate for a simultaneous DMM, it no longer applies for our more general case of a sequential DMM, which may allow certain actors to exclude other actors from the decision-making as a result of their choices (see principle (ii) in Section 4). If we have an action profile a A i and we alter i ’s action a ij l in a it can happen that the decision-making process rea quires either the exclusion of actions of other actors a ija l from the domain of the decision rule and, hence, from action profile a , or the inclusion of a actions by other actors aija l in the domain of the decision rule and, therefore, in action profile a . If such information would be ignored, we can end up with an inappropriate power ascription resulting out of the alteration of i ’s action. In order to avoid this problem and to capture this information we have to go back to the idea behind the literal ‘all other things being equal’ interpretation of the ceteris paribus clause. The basic idea of the ceteris paribus clause is a comparison between two possible worlds: the world as it is (our initial action profile a and its associated outcome o(a j p ) ) and the world as it would be if an action were changed (the resulting action profile and its 11 The literature on power commonly uses the term ‘strategy’ as a synonym for an ‘action’ (see Miller 1982; Braham and Steffen 2003; Braham and Holler 2005) even if power is defined as the ability of an actor to effect outcomes by his chosen actions and not by his plan of action. 12 Note, that we allow P (g , k ) to be a direct path, but not to be a degenerated path.
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associated outcome if i ’s action a ij l were altered). In contrast to the standard interpretation of the ceteris paribus clause our analysis does not necessarily require that all other components of the action profile remain constant after we altered i ’s action; it requires that the action profiles after the initial change by one actor are consistent with the DMM. Hence, this interpretation of the ceteris paribus clause which is underlying Definition (6.1) is able to capture the above mentioned aspects of a sequential DMM. 13 If an actor i has a swing, we can distinguish between two different types of swings: Definition 6.2 A swing (a , a ij l ,aij l ) of an actor i is strong if #O ˆ(g ) 1, and weak if #O ˆ(g ) 1, with g as given in Definition 6.1.
Note, that for a swing (a , a ij l ,aij l ) and g as given in Definition 6.1, #Oˆ(g ) 1 implies that the unique outcome in O ˆ(g ) is different from the outcome o(a j p ) of the action profile a since by definition of a swing O ˆ(g ) contains at least one outcome that is different than o(a j p ). Thus, a strong swing enables an actor to alter a unique outcome into another unique outcome, while a weak swing only enables an actor to alter a unique outcome into a non-unique outcome. The distinction between strong and weak swings is novel and becomes necessary due to the sequential structure of our approach. Both swings are immediately comparable if we have set inclusion, i.e. a strong swing (a , a ij l ,aij l ) and a weak swing (a a , a ij l a ,aij l a ) with g and g a, respectively, as given in Definition (6.1) are comparable if O ˆ(g ) O ˆ(g a). In this case which applies to our binary set-up, a strong swing implies more power (or ability) than a weak swing as the outcome that an actor with a strong swing can enforce is more specific. Moreover, for a binary set-up the literature distinguishes between positive and negative swings: Definition 6.3 For a DMM represented by an EGF with j V i , i N : Aij \yes ,no ^ and O \acceptance , rejection ^ an actor i has a positive swing, if i by switching from a ‘no’- to a ‘yes’-action can alter the outcome from a ‘rejection’ to an ‘acceptance’ and has a negative swing, if i by switching from a ‘yes’- to a ‘no’-action can alter the outcome from an ‘acceptance’ to a ‘rejection’. Definition 6.4 Let S i \s i1 , ..., s iz ^ be the set of all swings of an actor i where each s i denotes a swing (a , a ij l ,aij l ), Moreover, let S is and S iw denote the sets of strong and weak swings of i respectively.
13 Note that the ceteris paribus clause in Definition (6.1) also guarantees the fulfillment of the resistance condition (see Braham 2007).
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For step (iii), the individual power ascriptions for each actor given by S i are aggregated in order to obtain a complete and transitive relation ‘at least as powerful as for o ’, Zo , defined over N . 14 To aggregate the individual power ascriptions we have to take into account the existence of nature, or in other words: the potential exclusion of actors from the decision-making due to principle (i) (exclusion due to principle (ii) is already taken into account via the action profiles). We obtain this by weighting each swing on a branch T j with j V i and i N with the likelihood that nature will choose this branch. For the EGF this implies that j V R : S 1( j ) , i.e. that nature owns the root r of the tree of the game form, and, hence, makes the first move. Furthermore, for our analysis we assume # V R 1, i.e. that nature owns only one node being the root. 15 Definition 6.5 Let p (a R a ) be the likelihood that nature chooses the move a R that is part of the action profile a , and a(s i ) be the action profile in a swing s i (a , a ij l ,aij l ). Then p (a R a(s i ) denotes the likelihood that nature chooses the move that is part of the action profile a in swing s i .
Note: (i) If in the (original) EGF j V R : S 1( j ) , # V R 1, and # N a 1 for all N a N , due to the principle of insufficient reason we have p (a R a ) ( p (N a receives a new proposal) 1/# N . (ii) If in the (original) EGF V R , i.e. if nature does not exist, we can represent this EGF by a strategically equivalent EGF with j V R : S 1( j ) , # V R 1, and # A R 1, which implies # N 1, and, hence, p (a R a ) p (N a receives a new proposal) 1. Definition 6.6 The power score of an actor i N in a decision-making situation represented by an EGF is given by I i (N * , U , S ) def \s i S is : p (a R a(s i ))^ \s i S iw : F ¸ p (a R a(s i ))^ with 0 F 1 to take into account the nature of weak swings. 16
Note, that here i , j N : i Zo j is to be interpreted as ‘i ’s degree of power to force o is at least as great as j ’s degree of power to force o ’, with ;o and o denoting the asymmetric and symmetric components of Zo , i.e. ;o denotes ‘the greater degree of power’ and o ‘the same degree of power’. 15 Although this assumption might appear to be quite strong, it does not impose any restriction on the applicability of our approach to DMMs represented by EGFs. Naturally, it can happen that for certain DMMs j V R : S 1( j ) v , i.e. that nature owns also other nodes than the root. However, in these cases, it is easy to proof via a backward induction procedure, that we can represent the original EGF by a strategically equivalent one where we have merged the nodes j V R , such that # V R 1 and S 1( j ) for j V R . 16 Note, that for the binary DMMs which are discussed in the literature (see Appendix) it is not necessary to specify the value of F as these DMMs all include (i) bottom-up procedures which (ii) always requires the presence of the top for an approval: (i) ensures that the top is 14
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From Definition (6.1) it follows that in this case Zo is a cardinality-based ranking such that i , j N : i Zo j l I i p I j . In order to obtain a power measure allowing for cardinal comparisons, we have to continue with step (iv) by applying different weightings to the action profiles and, thus, to the related power ascriptions (to the swings of the actors). From Definition (6.6) we can derive the natural analogue to the Banzhaf measure C a which is formulated in the language of the membership-based approach (Banzhaf 1965, Felsenthal und Machover 1998). 17 We obtain this analogue for an actor i N by weighting the score with the weighted sum of ‘potential swings’ of i in all action profiles a A i . Here the weight of each action profile a is determined by the likelihood that nature chooses this profile, i.e. p (a R a ). The number of potential swings of i in each profile a results out of the sum of alternative actions aij Aij \ \a ij ^ actor i has at hand for each action a ij a : Definition 6.7 The power measure of an actor i N in a decision-making situation represented by an EGF is given by Cia(N * , U , S ) def
\s S : p(a a(s ))^ \s S : F ¸ p(a a(s ))^ \a A : p(a a ) \ j V (a ) : (# A 1)^^ i
s i
R
i
i
R
w i
i
R
i
j
i
i
where V i (a ) is the set of decision nodes j V i that are reached by a . Now let us return to Example (4.14). For the analysis of the power structure of this example we start by exploring the actors’ swings. From Fig. 2 we know that a owns two nodes: one in each possible game, while b and c own one node in ‘their’ possible game. In each node each actor has two actions. Examining the effects of altering, ceteris paribus, the actions for all actors shows that a has a positive and a negative strong swing in each of the two games, whereas b and c only have one positive weak and one negative strong swing each. Let us have a closer look at b’s situation. If b switches from ‘no’ to ‘yes’ b can exclude a straightforward rejection against the resistance of all other actors performing any feasible action, and if b switches from a ‘yes’ to ‘no’, b the only one who owns a positive strong swing, while (ii) guarantees that the top is at least never less powerful than any other actor if a dominance structure satisfies properties (3.1)– (3.8). If we want to specify the value of F, we could be tempted to think about an actor dependent operator Fi . However, this would make the power of an actor i additionally dependent on the actions and, thus, the powers of his subsequent actors in the EGF – something which is in contradiction to our dispositional concept of power, i.e. that the power of an actor i is what i is able to do when he is in the position to act. 17 The derivation of other analogues of well known power measures, such as the ShapleyShubik (1954) index is left to future research.
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can ensure a straightforward rejection against the resistance of all other actors performing any feasible action. Furthermore, and as already indicated above, here the ceteris paribus clause for b implies not only that b has an effect on the outcome but also on a’s action: by switching his action b determines whether a – according to the DMM – has to act or not and whether a’s action is counted, i.e. if b opts for ‘yes’ a is obliged to act and his action is counted, while if b chooses ‘no’ a is neither obliged to act nor his action is counted. Thus, a switch in b’s action forces us either to consider an action performed by a which was not counted or even not existent before, or to ignore an originally counted action performed by a. However, the sole effect of b on a is something which is irrelevant for our analysis which is concerned with the question whether b has the ability to affect the outcome at that decision-making node. Taking into account that each possible game occurs with equal probability, it is obvious that a is more powerful than b and c and that b and c have equal power, i.e. a ;o b o c . Applying Definition (6.6) and (6.7) we obtain the following power distributions which reflect this ordering: I(N * , U , S ) (2.00, 0.50 0.50F, 0.50 0.50F) Ca(N * , U , S ) (1.00, 0.33 0.33F, 0.33 0.33F).
7. Measuring Positional Power: Pathologies of the MembershipBased Approaches We mentioned earlier that the literature on the measurement of positional power in non-hierarchical organisations is usually founded on a membership-based approach. We also stated that the membership-based approach is not suitable to deal with the particularities of DMMs which are typical for hierarchical organisations. To see why, let us start with the canonical set-up of the membership-based approach. This is represented by a simple game. Definition 7.1 A simple game (SG) is a pair (N , W ) where W is a collection of subsets (coalitions) of the set of actors N called the set of winning coalitions, which satisfies the following three conditions: W ; N W ; and (monotonicity) if T W and T T a, then T a W . A subset T N is said to be winning or losing according to whether T W or T W . Furthermore, a subset T is called minimal winning iff T W , but no subset of T is in W . The set of minimal winning subsets is denoted by M
Hence, a DMM represented by a SG can be either represented by W or due to the monotonicity condition by M , where a coalition T can be regarded as an ‘index’ of the actions of the actors which have chosen the same action, for instance, ‘yes’, if T W .
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Now, let us investigate the degree to which a SG is able to meet Assumptions (4.5) and (4.7)–(4.13) and both principles discussed in Section 4. This will provide us with an idea about the limitations of this approach and how we can convert the membership-based approach founded on a SG into a special case of our action-based approach. Like our EGF the definition of a SG is also based on a finite set of actors N (Assumption 4.7). The binary structure of the decision-making situation, i.e. the individual binary action sets (Assumption 4.8) and the binary outcome set (Assumption 4.5) are taken into account via the membership of actors in winning or losing subsets of actors. An actor establishes his membership of such a subset by his individual action, i.e. by either supporting or rejecting a proposal. Thus, what a SG does is that it subdivides all actors subject to their individual actions to belong either to T or N \ T where T contains those actors who “get their way” according to the DMM, i.e. whose individual actions corresponds to the collective outcome. 18 The fact that new proposals can only be received by actors with a contact to the outside world (Assumption 4.10) is taken into account by the requirement that T M : T N v . The assumption that only subsets of N can receive a new proposal at the same time (Assumption 4.11) is currently not taken into account by the existing membership-based approaches but could be incorporated by applying the idea of possible games with overlapping sets of actors. The same applies if a collective decision does not require the whole breath of a hierarchy, i.e. principle (i) (see Example 4.14). The information that in certain instances particular actors i are able to determine the collective decision by their individual action (Assumptions 4.12 and 4.13) can be considered via veto rights, i.e. that T M : i T . What remains is the bottom-up direction of the decision-making procedure (Assumption 4.9) and the assumption that particular actors might be able to make certain types of final decisions on behalf of the whole hierarchy even before one of their superiors has been involved (principle ii). Both cannot be taken into account by a SG because they require a sequential structure while a SG is inherently simultaneous. A SG only considers the memberships of actors in T W or T W , but not when the actors join such subsets. Thus, it implicitly assumes that all actors join the subsets at the same time. Hence, the membership-based SG setup can be represented by an EGF with simultaneous individual actions. Put it differently: by an EGF with imperfect information such that there is one information set containing all nodes owned by i, i.e. i N : # H i 1 and h i V i . 19 18
Note, that this additionally requires the usual assumption that the simple game is selfdual, i.e. that any binary division of actors results in exactly one winning and one losing subset (Taylor and Zwicker 1999). 19 Note, that a DMM represented by a SG can also be represented by a strategic game form (SGF) with unconditional actions (Miller 1982) which implies that a SGF with conditional
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yes
a
c no
yes
a
b no ½
c
yes no
a
a
R yes
a
b
½
no
yes
a
c no
b
yes no
a
a
yes
acceptance
no
rejection
yes
acceptance
no
rejection
yes
acceptance
no
rejection
yes
rejection
no
rejection
yes
acceptance
no
rejection
yes
acceptance
no
rejection
yes
acceptance
no
rejection
yes
rejection
no
rejection
Fig. 3. An EGF representation of a SG
Thus, the major difference between our and the existing approaches is that they differ in the assumptions of the information sets. This has farreaching consequences. Not only are the trees of the game form considerably different (see Fig. 3 for the EGF of Example 4.14 with imperfect information), but also the power structure. Altering the information sets of Example (4.14) in the appropriate way we obtain I(N * , U , S ) (6.00, 2.00, 2.00) and Ca(N * , U , S ) (0.75, 0.25, 0.25). The ordering is the same, but a becomes relatively more powerful than b and c. This is due to the fact that in a simultaneous decision-making structure – in contrast to a sequential structure – all feasible individual actions are counted. However, the effects of ignoring the sequential structure of a DMM in a hierarchy and instead applying an approach with a simultaneous structure might be stronger than in this example, i.e. it might change the power ordering of the actors. Example 7.2 Assume a hierarchy with the dominance structure given by Fig. 1b. Applying the membership-based set-up we have N * N \a , b , c ^ , actions is an alternative of equal rank to the EGF we suggest here.
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j V i ,i N : Aij \yes , no ^, i N : # H i # V i , and j V i : \ j ^ H i , and O \acceptance , rejection ^. Concerning the DMM U let us assume that only c has contact to the outside world, i.e. \N ^ N \\c ^^ , that the decision-making procedure is bottom-up, and that each actor is able to reject a proposal on behalf of the whole hierarchy if it arrives at his desk and he rejects it – which implies that subsequent individual actions should not be counted – while an acceptance of a proposal requires the approval of all three actors. Then we obtain I(N * , U , S ) (2.00, 1.00 F, 1.00 F,) and Ca(N * , U , S ) (1.00, 0.33 0.33F, 0.25 0.25F), while in case of i N : # H i 1 and h i V i , i.e. under a simultaneous structure with W M \\a , b ,c ^^ , we would obtain I(N * , U , S ) (2.00, 2.00, 2.00) and Ca(N * , U , S ) (0.25, 0.25 0.25). Hence, the power ordering a ;o b ;o c based on the power measure taking into account the sequential nature would be misrepresented by a o b o c under the simultaneous structure.
8. Concluding Remarks We would like to tie up this paper with a brief summary and some remarks. We provided an action-based framework for the analysis of positional power in organisational architectures which can account for the particularities of hierarchical structures. For this reason our approach is more general than the usual membership-based approach which does not allow for sequential DMMs. Moreover, we demonstrated that if it is still applied to a sequential DMM it may result in inappropriate cardinal and ordinal power structures as it ascribes power to actors in action profiles which should not be counted. In order to measure an actors’ power we have extended the notion of a swing from a simultaneous to a sequential set-up and aggregated the individual power ascriptions over all action profiles of which an actor is a member. This is in line with our definition of power as a generic ability which is a conditional disposition that exists irrespective whether it is exercised or not. For the derivation of our power measure in Definition (6.7) from our power score in Definition (6.6) we divided the score of an actor i by the weighted sum of his potential swings. Even though this reflects perfectly what the Banzhaf measure is doing for the simultaneous case, it is not so innocent as it seems to be – even for our binary set-up. While under the simultaneous structure all actors are members of all action profiles and, hence, each actor has the same chance to have a swing in each action profile, this is no longer necessarily the case under the sequential set-up. A consequence of this is that our power score and measure are not necessarily co-monotone, i.e. Felsenthal et al’s (1998) price monotonicity postulate is violated. Finally, we have to acknowledge that the suggested approach currently does not take into account the case of differing incentive structures between the actors, i.e. that actors have a damatis personae: they are the bearers of predetermined attributes and modes of behaviour. Actors in hierarchies of-
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ten play predetermined roles, such as salesman, financial officer, head of external affairs, etc., which are equipped with a bundle of incentive structures that also belong to the organisational architecture. Steffen (2002) argues that a proper measurement of power should take such information into account if it is available. For the membership-based approach Straffin’s (1977, 1978) partial homogeneity approach offers a solution to this problem. Even though we expect that the same idea could be applied to our action-based approach, this, as well as the axiomatization of our measure, are issues for future research.
Appendix From Assumptions (4.5)–(4.13) there are 12 DMMs found in the literature on positional power. These differ in terms of N , N , and S min1(N a) as given by Assumptions (4.10), (4.11), and (4.13). They all share the other assumptions with Sˆ 1 (N a) j Sˆ1(i ) i N a for Assumption (4.12). NB: here i and j are actors in a dominance structure and not actors in an EGF.
\
^
Table A.1
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
\N a 2
N
# N a 1^
N
\N a 2
N
# N a 1^
N
\N a 2
N
# N a 1^
\i N
S (i ) ^
N
\i N
S (i ) ^
N
\i N
S (i ) ^
N
\i N
S (i ) ^
\N a 2
N
# N a 1^
\i N
S (i ) ^
\N a 2
N
# N a 1^
\i N
S (i ) ^
\N a 2
N
# N a 1^
S min1(N a)
\\ j Sˆ
(i ) i N a S
1
^^
(j)
1
\P (i , j ) i N a j Sˆ (i ) S ( j ) ^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a^^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a S ( j ) ^^ \P (i , j ) i N a j Sˆ (i ) S ( j ) ^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a^^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a S ( j ) ^^ \P (i , j ) i N a j Sˆ (i ) S ( j ) ^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a^^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a S ( j ) ^^ \P (i , j ) i N a j Sˆ (i ) S ( j ) ^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a^^ 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Positional Power in Hierarchies
79
Acknowledgements We would like to thank Marlies Ahlert, Steve Brams, Franz Dietrich, Keith Dowding, Bernhard Grofman, Thomas Hammond, Marc Kilgour, Hartmut Kliemt, Martin Leroch, Moshé Machover, Stefan Napel, Jan-Willem van der Rijt, Federico Valenciano, Stefano Vannucci, William Zwicker, and in particular Matthew Braham, Manfred Holler, and Pete Morriss for comments and discussions. Forerunners of this paper have been presented at the Meeting of the Dutch Social Choice Group at Tilburg University (January 2006), at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the European Public Choice Society in Turku (April 2006), at the Eighth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare in Istanbul (July 2006), at the conference on ’Power: Conceptual, Formal, and Applied Dimensions’ in Hamburg (August 2006), and at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Philadelphia (August/September 2006). This article was largely written while Frank Steffen was at Tilburg University under a Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship within the 6th European Community Framework Programme. He gratefully acknowledges this financial support.
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5. A Public Help Index Cesarino Bertini Department of Mathematics, Statistics, Computer Science and Applications, University of Bergamo, Italy
Gianfranco Gambarelli Department of Mathematics, Statistics, Computer Science and Applications, University of Bergamo, Italy
Izabella Stach Faculty of Management, AGH University of Science and Technology, Krakow, Poland
1. Introduction As far as we known, the first concept of power index dates back to 1780s and is due to Luther Martin (see Felsenthal and Machover (2005), Gambarelli and Owen (2004) and Riker (1986)). Lionel S. Penrose (1946) gave, probably, the first scientific discussion of voting power where he introduced the concept of a priori voting power (a similar analysis was independently carried out by John F. Banzhaf (1965)). Lloyd S. Shapley, in cooperation with Martin Shubik (Shapley and Shubik 1954), came up with a specialization of the Shapley (1953) value as a power index. Other power indices were introduced later; some derived from existing values, others built exclusively for simple games. The Public Good Index introduced by Manfred Holler in (1978) belongs to the latter category. In this paper the ‘Public Good Index’ is modified as a ‘Public Help Index’ (PHI), which takes into account all winning coalitions. In fact, sometimes every (not only minimal) winning coalition is relevant to bargaining for various reasons: electoral legislation (see, Bertini et al. 2005; Gambarelli 1999), strengthening of weak minimal majorities, social help and so on. The here presented Public Help Index R(v ) follows this philosophy and takes the name from the latter case. Contrarily to the PGI, defined on the simple monotone games, the PHI does not require this restriction of monotonicity. An axiomatic characterization and monotonicity properties of the new index is given. An algorithm for automatic computation of the PGI and the PHI is supplied.
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Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
2. Definitions A game is the set of rules describing a strategic situation. In the cooperative games, players can unite to obtain common advantages. Let N = \1, 2, ..., n ^ be the set of all players indexed by the first n natural numbers. A cooperative n-person game in characteristic function form is an ordered pair (N , v ) , where v : 2 N l R is a real-valued function on the family 2 N of all subset of N such that v() 0 . The real-valued function v is called a characteristic function of the game. Any subset S of N is called coalition and v(S ) the worth of the coalition S in the game. In this paper we denote a cooperative game (N , v ) just by its characteristic function v. A cooperative game v is said to be simple if its characteristic function has a value only in the set \0, 1^ : v(S ) = 0 or v(S ) = 1 for all S N . In the first case the coalition is said to be losing; in the second, winning. A coalition S is called a minimal winning coalition if v(S ) 1 but v(T ) 0 for all T S , T v S . Every player i who belongs to a minimal winning coalition S N is called crucial in S. If player i N belongs to no minimal winning coalition, then i is called a dummy player for game v. A simple game v is monotone if v(S ) b v(T ) whenever S T N . We call zero player every player that does not belong to any winning coalition. A null game v is a simple game in which S N v(S ) 0 . Obviously in null games every player is a zero player. Let G be the set of simple cooperative games v defined on N. Let G * G denote the set of all simple monotone games with exclusion of the null game. For all v G we denote: W (v ) the set of winning coalitions of v; W *(v ) the set of minimal winning coalitions of v; W i (v ) the set of winning coalitions of v containing the i-th player; W i *(v ) the set of minimal winning coalitions of v containing the i-th player. From now on we will omit the indication ‘(v)’ when it does not imply misunderstandings and we will denote by X the cardinality of the set X. Let v 1 and v 2 be two games of G. We define the games v 12(S ) and v 12(S ) as follows: def ¦£1 if v 1(S ) 1 or v 2(S ) 1 v 12(S ) max v 1(S ), v 2(S ) ¦ ¤ ¦¦¥0 otherwise def ¦£1 if v 1(S ) 1 and v 2(S ) 1 v 12(S ) min v 1(S ), v 2(S ) ¦ ¤ ¦¦¥0 otherwise.
Notice that: W i (v 12 ) W i (v 1 ) W i (v 2 ) and W i (v 12 ) W i (v 1 ) W i (v 2 ) W (v 12 ).
We say that v 1 and v 2 are mergeable if no minimal winning coalition of v 1 is or contains a minimal winning coalition of game v 2 and vice versa. In formulae:
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S 2 and S 2 S 1. S 1 W *(v 1 ) and S 2 W *(v 2 ) º S 1
Let (X 1 , X 2 ,..., X n ) be a vector with non-negative components such that
n i 1 X i 1 . For any coalition S, X(S ) i S X i is the weight of the coali-
tion. Let q be the majority quota that establishes winning coalitions. We call a weighted majority game (q ; X 1 ,..., X n ) the simple game: £¦1 if X(S ) p q v(S ) ¦¤ ¦¦¥0 elsewhere. A power index K is a function that maps n-person simple game v, to n-dimensional real vector and it is a measure of the distribution of power in simple games. Let v :(q ; X 1 ,..., X n ) be a weighted majority game. We say that power index K is locally monotonic if X i X j º Ki (v ) p K j (v ).
Let v :(q ; X 1 ,..., X i ,..., X n ) and v a :(q ; X 1a ,..., X ia ,..., X na ) be two weighted majority games such that X i X ia for one i N and X j b X aj for all j v i . We say that power index K is globally monotonic if
Ki (v ) p Ki (v a).
3. The Public Good Index The PGI is a decisive point in the measuring of a priori voting power because it, contrary to previous approaches, considers the coalition value to be a public good and takes in consideration the distinction between power and luck, as introduced by Barry in (1980). Later on the PGI has increased significance by virtue of many important developments and applications: see for instance Holler (1978, 1982a) and Hołubiec and Mercik (1994). The index was axiomatized by Holler and Packel (1983). Napel (1999, 2001) showed the independence and non redundancy of the Holler and Packel axioms. Holler and Li (1995) introduced the ‘Public Value’, changing the ‘mergeability’ axiom. Other developments of the PGI were supplied by Brams and Fishburn (1995), Haradau and Napel (2007), Holler (1982b, 1998, 2002) and Widgrèn (2002). Moreover some properties common to various indices (Holler’s included) were studied by Brams and Fishburn (1996), Felsenthal and Machover (1995, 1998), Freixas and Gambarelli (1997), Gambarelli (1983), Holler (1997), Holler and Napel (2004), Holler and Owen (2002), Holler and Widgrèn (1999), Syed (1990) and Turnovec (1997).
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3.1 Formulation
Let v be a game of G * . As stated above, W i denotes the number of minimal winning coalitions containing the i-th player. The Public Good Index h introduced by Holler in (1978) is defined as follows:
h i (v )
Wi
W
for all i N .
j
j N
3.2 A Leading Example In our treatment we will refer to the 3-person simple monotone game v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(2, 3) = 0; v(1, 2) = v(1, 3) = v(1, 2, 3) = 1. Let’s compute the PGI of our example. The set of minimal winning coalitions is: W * \\1,2^ , \1,3^^ . Since player 1 belongs to both minimal win ning coalitions, then W 1 2 . Since players 2 and 3 belong to only one minimal winning coalition, then W 2 W 3 1 . It follows that j N W j 2 4. Then h 1 4 and h 2 h 3 41 .
3.3 Axiomatization We recall the four axioms introduced by Holler and Packel in (1983) as axiomatization of the PGI for simple monotone games (G *) . A1 (symmetry)
For every permutation π and i N Q : N l N º Ki (v ) K Q(i )(Qv ).
where the game Qv is nothing other than the game v, with the roles of the players interchanged by the permutation π. A2 (efficiency)
K (v ) 1. i
i N
A3 (dummy player)
i is a dummy for v º K i (v ) 0.
A4 (mergeability) For all mergeable pairs v 1 , v 2 G * and for all i N
K i (v 1 )W j (v 1 ) K i (v 2 )W j (v 2 ) K i (v 12 )
j N
W j N
j N
j
j
(v 1 ) W (v 2 ) j N
.
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Table 1. How the PHI changes when dummy players are added
n
R1
R2 R3
R 4 ... Rn
3
3 17
–
4 5
6 17 6 20
2 7 4 17 4 20
3 17 3 20
6
6 23
4 23
3 23
7
6 26
4 26
3 26
8
6 29
4 20
3 29
9
6 32
4 32
3 32
10
6 35
4 35
3 35
4. The Public Help Index Let v G . The Public Help Index ș, for a non-null game v, is defined as: Ri v
Wi W
i N j
j N
while in case of the null game v, Ri v 0 for every player i. Notice that, if S W , then Ri (v ) p 0 for all i N , i N Ri (v ) 1 and R is a normalized power index.
4.1 Examples Consider the game of the leading example. The set W of the winning coalitions is: W = \\1,2^ , \1,3^ , \1,2,3^^ . Since player 1 belongs to all the winning coalitions, then W 1 3. Since players 2 and 3 belong to two winning coalitions, then W 2 W 3 2. It follows that j N W j 7. Therefore R1 73 and R 2 R 3 72 . We report in Table 1 the values of the PHI for cases where some dummy players join the game. For instance, if only one dummy player is added, then the winning coalitions are \1,2^ , \1,3^ , \1,2,3^ , \1,2,4^ , \1,3,4^ , and \1,2,3,4^ and the values of R are 67 , 174 , 174 , 173 . Observe that the dummy player gets always a half of the value of player 1, because he takes part only to a half of the total winning coalitions to which player 1 belongs. In general the computation of Table 1 can be done using the formula: R1
6 14 3(n 3)
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Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
2 4 R 2 R 3 R1 3 14 3(n 3) 1 3 R i R1 for all i from 4 to n. 2 14 3(n 3)
Notice that, for all i from 1 to n (n 3), Ri vanishes for n l d.
4.2 Axiomatization The extension of R(v ), where v G , to all winning coalitions implies that axiom A2 (efficiency) is kept only for non-null games. Axiom A3 (dummy player) cannot be respected, because even non-crucial players can get positive payments (if only the game is not the null game). For analogous reasons even axiom A4 (mergeability) cannot be respected. So, only the first axiom A1 (symmetry) of the PGI will be kept properly extended to G, while A2 (efficiency), A3 (dummy player) and A4 (mergeability) will be replaced with A2bis 8 (PHI-efficiency), A3bis (zero player) and A4bis (PHImergeability). We propose the following axioms as axiomatization of the PHI for simple games G. A1 (symmetry)
For every permutation π and i N Q : N l N º Ki (v ) K Q(i )(Qv )
(where the game Qv is defined as in Section 3.3). A2bis (efficiency)
£¦1 if v is not the null game
K (v ) ¦¤¦0 i
¦¥
i N
A3bis (zero player)
otherwise.
Ki (v ) 0 if and only if the i-th player is a zero player.
A4bis (PHI-mergeability) Ki (v 12 )W j (v 12 ) Ki (v 1 )W j (v 1 ) Ki (v 2 )W j (v 2 ) Ki (v 12 )W j (v 12 ) j N
j N
j N
j N
for all v 1 ,v 2 G and i N .
The first axiom (symmetry) states that the power of a player remains invariant under the permutation of the players. The second axiom normalized the n-tuple of individual powers. The third axiom (zero player) states that zero players have no power and with reference to the dummy player
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axiom we do not only replace dummy player with zero player, but also replace ‘if’ by ‘if and only if’. The fourth axiom (PHI-mergeability) states that the weighted sum of the powers of the merged games v 12(S ) and v 12(S ) is equal to the weighted sum of the powers of the component games. Theorem 1 (Necessity) For all v G , R(v ) satisfies A1, A2bis, A3bis, A4bis.
Proof A1(Symmetry) We have to prove that Ri (v ) R Q(i )(Qv ) for all i N and all permutations Q on N. If v is the null game the proof is trivial, because also the game Qv is the null game and Ri (v ) R Q(i )(Qv ) 0 (for all i N and all permutations Q on N ) from the definition of the PHI. In case of a non-null game v, we have for every permutation Q on N and every i N : Ri (v )
Wi W
W
j
j N
Q(i )
W
R Q(i )(Qv ).
Q( j )
Q( j )N
A2bis (PHI-efficiency) Let v G . If v is the null game , every player is zero player, so Ri (v ) 0 . For a non-null game v we i N have:
R (v ) i
i N
i N
Wi W
j
j N
1 W
W
i
1.
j i N
j N
A3bis (Zero player) We have to prove that Ri (v ) 0 if and only if i is a zero player. The demonstration for the null game is trivial, because in the null game every player is null player. For a non-null game v, from the definition of ș, we have: Ri (v )
Wi W
0 W i 0. j
j N
Then, W i 0 W i S i
v(S ) 0 i is a zero player.
A4bis (PHI-mergeability) We have to prove that, for all v 1 , v 2 G and all i N : Ri (v 12 )W j (v 12 ) Ri (v 12 )W j (v 12 ) Ri (v 1 )W j (v 1 ) Ri (v 2 )W j (v 2 ). j N
In fact:
j N
j N
j N
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Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
W i (v 12 ) W i (v 12 ) W j (v 12 ) W j (v 12 ) 12 W j (v ) j N W j (v 12 ) j N j N
j N
W i (v 1 ) W i (v 2 ) W i (v 12 ) W i (v 12 ) Ri (v 1 )W j (v 1 ) Ri (v 2 )W j (v 2 ) j N
j N
,
which completes the proof.
Theorem 2 (Sufficiency) For all v G , R(v ) is the unique index satisfying A1, A2bis, A3bis, A4bis.
Proof Let K be a generic power index defined on G and respecting A1, A2bis, A3bis, A4bis. We will prove that K R. Consider a game v G . If v is the null game then from A1, A2bis, A3bis we suddenly obtain i N K i (v ) 0 Ri (v ), otherwise let S 1 , S 2 , ! , S W be the winning coalitions of v. For every coalition S k (k from 1 to W ) we construct the game v k such that S k is the only winning coalition of v k . Observe that v(S ) max v k (S ) for all S N . k 1,...,W
Then the original game v can be expressed as v max v k . k 1,...,W
Moreover, min v k
k 1,...,W
is the null game. We can also deduce that
min(max v k , v j 1 ) is the null game for j W 1,W 2,...,1. k 1,..., j
(1)
Every index K respecting A1, A2bis, and A3bis applied to any game v k (k from 1 to W ), owns the following property, for all i N : £ 1 ¦ ¦ Ki (v k ) ¦¤ S k ¦ ¦ ¦ ¥0
if i S k otherwise.
Applying sequentially A4bis to the pairs of games: max v k and v j 1 ( j W 1,W 2,!,1)
k 1,..., j
(2)
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and using (1) we obtain: W
K (v )W i
K i (v ) K i max v k k 1,...,W
k
k 1
j N
W
j
j
¬ (v k ) ®
(v )
.
(3)
j N
Observe that, for all k 1,!,W , S k is the unique winning coalition of W (v k ). Then,
W
j
(v k ) S k .
j N
From the above we obtain: W
K (v )S
K v W (v ) i
k
k 1
i
k
for all i N .
j
j N
Owing to (2) we have that Ki (v k ) v 0 if i S k . Therefore, 1
K i (v )
S S k i
W
¬ S k ®
k j
(v )
j N
Wi Ri (v ) for all i N . W j (v ) j N
which completes the proof.
,
5. Monotonicity There are some properties that are reasonable in power indices and one of them is monotonicity (see Felsenthal and Machover (1995, 1998), Holler (1982a), Holler and Napel (2004), Holler et al. (1999), Turnovec (1997)). It is known that the PGI neither satisfies global nor the local monotonicity, whereas the PHI satisfies both. Theorem 3 (Monotonicity) The power index R is globally monotonic.
Proof Let n p 2 and let v :(q ; X 1 ,..., X i ,..., X n ) and v a :(q ; X 1a ,..., X ia ,..., X na ) be two weighted majority games such that:
X i X ia for one i N and X j b X aj for all j v i . We have to demonstrate that:
(4)
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Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
Ri (v a) b Ri (v ).
(5)
Given that X i X ia (see (4)), then all winning coalitions containing player i in the game v a are also winning in the game v : W ia W i . Thus, we have W i a b W i . From
X
X aj 1
j
j N
j N
we have that at least N is a winning coalition so: W i p W i a p 1, W j p n , W ja p n . j N
j N
We can also observe that
W j N
j
S S W
S b W a b j
S W '
j N
where b is an integer number defined in the following way: b d d : d
and d
S p0
S (W i \ W ia)
S p 0.
S (W a \ W )
Let a W i W i a . Then we can write: Ri (v )
Wi W ia a W j W ja b j N
j N
where a and b are integer numbers and 0 b a b (2 n 1 1). (Note that there are 2 n 1 different coalitions containing player i N ). Let a p 0 . There are two possible cases: (a p 0 b b 0) or (a 0 b 0) . In the first case b d d b 0 so
W a b b W a j
j
j N
j N
and we have Ri (v )
Wi W ia a W ia W ia p p Ri (v a). W j W ja b W ja b W ja j N
j N
j N
j N
It remains to prove (5) in the second case (a 0, b 0). Assume that a 1 and d 0. It implies that b d \n 1, n 2,!, 1^. Every value of b determinates
nb 11
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types of possible weighted majority games v a satisfying (4). These games are different as regards the set W i a . We can observe that W i a must contain all winning coalitions S i such that b 1 b S b n and at most
nb 11 1 coalitions S i of the cardinality b. It is impossible that S W i a and S b because from the monotonicity of the weighted majority games we have that every coalition T S , T b º T W i a. This violates the emergence of the new coalition of the cardinality b. Hence, if we denote by v ba k and v bk the pair of n-person weighted majority games satisfying the condition (4) then for all b n 1, n 2,..., 1 and
n 1 k 0,1,..., b 1 1
we have n b 1 n b 1 ¦£¦ k n 1 n 1 ¯ k , W ja ¡ n l ¸ ¦¦v ba : W ia l l °±° k ¸ b l 0 j N l 0 ¢¡ ¦¤ ¦¦ k ¦¦v b : W i W i a 1, W j W ja b . j N j N ¦¥
(6)
From (6) we obtain:
n 1 Ri (v ' bk 1 ) Ri (v bk ) b n 1, n 2,...,1, k 0, 1,..., b 1 2
and
n 1 1 b n 1, n 2,!,2.
b 1 Ri v ba01 Ri v b
From (6) for b n 1, k 0 and because 1 1 n p 2 n n 1
we have Ri (v ' n0 1 )
1 1 n n 1
n p 2.
(7)
It is easy to demonstrate that for all positive integer numbers c, d, e, f: c c e e c e , whenever . d d f f d f
(8)
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Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
Now, if we start from (7) and for any b n 1,...,2 we sequentially apply (8) with c e 1 Ri (v ba k ), d f b
varying from k 0 to
n 1 k b 1 1
and basing on the trivial inequality 1 1 b b 1
we obtain £ ¦ W ia W ia 1 1 ¦ Ri (v ' bk ) Ri (v bk ) ¦ ¦ b ¦ W ja W ja b ¦ ¦ j N j N ¤ ¦ ¦ n 1 ¦ 1 1 1 . ¦ Ri (v ' b01 ) Ri v b b 1 ¦ ¦ b b 1 ¦ ¥
(9)
If b 1 then
n 1 k b 1 1 0. 1 From (9) for b 2 we have that Ri (v '10 ) Ri (v 2n 2 ) 1 so applying (8) 2 with c e 1 Ri (v 1a 0 ), d f 1
we obtain Ri (v '10 ) Ri (v 10 ).
(10)
So, we have proved (5) in the particular case: a 1 and d 0 (see (9) and (10)). Now, consider the general second case: a 0 and b d d 0 . Let S 1 , S 2 ,..., S a W i \ W i a such that S 1 pS 2 p... p S a p 1 a and l 1 S l d . Then, since (5) holds in the case a 1 and d 0 we get: Ri (v ')
W ia
W a j
j N
W ia 1 W ia 2 W ia a ... W ja S 1 W ja S 1 S 2 W ja d j N
j N
j N
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95
W ia a Ri (v ) W ja d d j N
which completes the proof.
,
Turnovec (1997) proved that any power index which is globally monotonic and symmetric, is also locally monotonic. Because the PHI is symmetric and we have proved that it is also globally monotonic so it is also locally monotonic.
6. Further Developments As suggested by Manfred Holler, a development of the present work could consist in reformulation of the index without normalization. Such reformulation would make the contribution assigned to the dummy players more explicit, without contextually decreasing the contribution of the crucial players. Such a new index would naturally require a specific formalization.
Appendix
An Algorithm for the Computation of the PGI and PHI
We report an algorithm of automatic computation of the Public Good Index and the Public Help Index for weighted majority games.
Symbols Ri PHI of the i-th player (i 1,..., n ). h i PGI of the i-th player (i 1,..., n ). W i number of winning coalitions containing player i (i 1,..., n ). number of winning coalitions. W number of minimal winning coalitions containing player Wi i (i 1,..., n ). number of minimal winning coalitions. W d , j , k , p , s1, s 2, t auxiliary variables (Integer type). S[ j ] auxiliary variable (j-th element of coalition S ( j 1,..., k ) ). Include auxiliary variable of Boolean type (Include = True if player i belongs to coalition S). MWC auxiliary variable of Boolean type (MWC = True if S is minimal winning coalition).
Input
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n q wi
Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
number of players. majority quota. weights of the players, i 1, ..., n .
Begin for i : 1 to n do begin if w i p q then begin W i : 1 ; W i : 1 end else begin W i : 0 ; W i : 0 end; for k 2 to (n 1) do {in this loop k-element coalitions are formed} begin for j 1 to k do begin S[j ]:=j ; t :=t +w j end; {t = total power of S} p : k while p p 1 do begin s1 : 0 ; Include:=False; MWC:=False; for j : 1 to k do begin s 2:=s1 ; s1:=s1+w S[j ] ; if S[ j ] i then Include:= True; if s 2 p q then begin j := k ; MWC:=False end;{S is winning but not minimal} else begin if s1 p s 2 then MWC:=True else MWC:=False if MWC =False and ( j k ) then j := k end; end; if MWC and Include and (s1 p q ) then begin for j :=1 to k do {this loop verifies if S is really a minimal winning coalition} begin d := t - w S[j ] ; if (d p q ) then MWC:=False end; if MWC then W i : W i 1 ; end; if (s1 p q ) and Include then W i : W i 1 ; if S[k ] = n then p := p -1 else p:= k ; if p p 1 then for j := k down to p do S[j ]:= S[p ]+j - p +1 ; end; end;
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W i : W i 1 ; W : W W i ; W : W W i end; for i := 1 to n do begin Ri : W i W ; if W 0 then h i : 1 n else h i : W i W unique winning coalition^ end; End.
\W
97
0 only if N is the
Acknowledgements This paper is sponsored by MIUR 40% (PRIN 2005). We would like to thank Manfred Holler and René van den Brink for their useful suggestions.
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terization, Homo Oeconomicus 24: 257–270. Holler, M.J. (1978) A Priory Party Power and Government Formation, Munich Social Science Review 1: 25–41. Holler, M.J. (1982a) Forming Coalitions and Measuring Voting Power, Political Studies 30: 262–271. Holler, M.J. (1982b) Party Power and Government Formation: A Case Study, in M.J. Holler (ed.) Power, Voting and Voting Power, Physica Verlag. 273–282. Holler, M.J. (1997) Power Monotonicity and Expectations, Control and Cybernetics 26: 605–607. Holler, M.J. (1998) Two Stories, one Power Index, Journal of Theoretical Politics 10: 179–190. Holler, M.J. and Li, X. (1995) From Public Good Index to Public Value: An Axiomatic Approach and Generalization, Control and Cybernetics 24: 257–270. Holler, M.J. and Napel, S. (2004) Monotonicity of Power and Power Measures, Theory and Decision 56: 93–111. Holler, M.J., Ono, R. and Steffen, F. (1999), Constrained Monotonicity and the Measurement of Power, Theory and Decision 50: 385–397. Holler, M.J. and Owen, G. (2002) On the Present and Future of Power Measure, in M.J. Holler and G. Owen (eds.) Power Measures I, Homo Oeconomicus 19: 281–295. Holler, M.J. and Packel, E.W. (1983) Power, Luck and the Right Index, Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie (Journal of Economics) 43: 21–29. Holler, M.J. and Widgrèn, M. (1999) The Value of a Condition is Power, Homo Oeconomicus 15: 497–512. Hołubiec, J. and Mercik, J.W. (1994) Inside Voting Procedures, SESS Vol. 2, Munich: Accedo Verlag. Napel, S. (1999) The Holler-Packel Axiomatization of the Public Good Index Completed, Homo Oeconomicus 15: 513–520. Napel, S. (2001) A Note on the Holler-Packel Axiomatization of the Public Good Index (PGI), in M.J. Holler and G. Owen (eds) Power Indices and Coalition Formation, Kluwer, 143–151. Penrose, L.S. (1946) The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109: 53–57. Riker, W. (1986) The First Power Index, Social Choice and Welfare 3: 293–295. Shapley, L.S. (1953) A Value for n-Person Games, in H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker (eds) Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, 307–317. Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M. (1954) A Method for Evaluating the Distributions of Power in a Committee System, American Political Science Review 48: 787–792. Syed, S.A. (1990) Some Applications of n-Person Game Theory to the Social Sciences, Dept. of Applied Math., Faculty of Engineering Science, Osaka University. Turnovec, F. (1997) Monotonicity of Power Indices, East European Series 41, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna. Widgrèn, M. (2002) On the Probabilistic Relationship Between the Public Good Index and the Normalized Banzhaf Index, in M.J. Holler and G. Owen (eds) Power Measures II, Homo Oeconomicus 19: 373–386.
6. Shapley-Shubik vs. Strategic Power: Live from the UN Security Council Stefan Napel Department of Economics, University of Bayreuth, Germany
Mika Widgrén Turku School of Economics and ETLA, Finland
Reporter 1 Hello, and welcome to Hamburg, where a very good crowd has turned out to watch the local team, wearing a big Y on their shorts, play the renowned G-team from Princeton. The guests are easily distinguished by the dozen or so small but boldprint symbols on their T-shirts, and it’s their first direct encounter in this tournament. Today’s challenge is an analysis of power in the United Nations Security Council. And both teams are still warming up … Reporter 2 Yes, so we have a little time to look at their respective background … The G-team clearly has the longer history, founded back in 1954 by the legendary Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik. They were the first to introduce the ‘axiomatic approach’ to the power circus. It still has many loyal fans all across the globe and, according to hearsay, keeps producing a tenured position every now and then. With its tough training methods and many cooperative games, the G-team scored a couple of important victories in the 1950s and ’60s. I’m sure some older scholars in the audience will still remember what a creative attack they had, with players like William Lucas, Irving Mann, Guillermo Owen, Pradeep Dubey, Bob Aumann, Al Roth, Martin Shubik and, of course, Shapley himself taking skilful measurements of the US Congress, the Electoral College, and many toy examples. Their power-play gave rise to techniques such as the generating function method, power polynomials, and the multilinear extension almost as by-products … Reporter 1 Right, and if it hadn’t been for Straffin’s independence and the emergence of the C-team, coached jointly by Lionel Penrose and John F. Banzhaf … Reporter 2 Of course also enjoying the influential endorsement from the FelsenthalMachover press …
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Reporter 1
They might still be the only team in town!
Reporter 2 Well, we shouldn’t forget about Deegan-Packel’s formation of a minimal winning coalition and, of course, Manfred Holler’s h -fraction that they helped to get started. Did you hear already that it was recently promoted from the F&M Minor Indexship to the Freedom League? But that’s a different story, dear listeners, as I see that the referee is already preparing a number of fair coin tosses behind his veil of ignorance. So we should better have a quick look at the locals: some of them actually started their career as inferior players in the G and C -camps. That their own team is now wearing a Y must be due to coming late, when much of the Greek alphabet had already been used up by others. Their current managers claim that power measurement is all about ‘sensitivity’, which is especially popular with their female supporters. Some of them hold up signs now, saying ‘Preferences for power!’ Reporter 1 Right, provoking the stadium announcer to declare teasingly: ‘Impossible!’ But now the referee’s coins have produced a resounding 7:1 vote in favour of the random proposal. This means that the locals start off – and we will directly tune in to their introductory prose, mathematical assumptions and computations … The United Nations Security Council is the dominant political organ of the United Nations (UN). It is in charge of deciding upon the ‘effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace …’ which are mentioned by the Charter of the United Nations after defining the UN’s prime purpose: ‘to maintain international peace and security’ (Art. 1(1)). The Security Council consists of 15 members altogether. Britain, China, France, Russia, and the US are permanent members, i.e. belong to the Council at any point in time. The remaining ten seats are filled by non-permanent members that, at the time of writing, were: Argentina, Congo, Denmark, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Peru, Qatar, Slovakia, and Tanzania. They are elected by the UN General Assembly according to regional quotas for a term of two years, with five members replaced each year, and no possibility of a direct re-election. Representation in the Security Council is an interesting topic in its own right, with conflicting criteria such as financial contributions, participation in peacekeeping missions, population size, and equitable geographic distribution to be taken into account. Our focus is different, however. We want to investigate the distribution of influence on decisions taken by the Security Council, given its current composition of five permanent members and ten elected members. According to Art. 27(3) of the UN Charter, the Security Council’s decisions ‘…shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members …’. 1 The latter 1
This applies to all matters that are not regarded as ‘procedural.’ On procedural matters,
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provision makes a ‘nay’-vote by any permanent member tantamount to a veto. Though the phrasing ‘including the concurring votes of the permanent members’ would also allow for a different interpretation, it has been the Security Council’s consistent practice to consider a resolution as adopted if permanent members abstain (rather than concur explicitly), provided it otherwise receives the specified support. A key problem in taking this into consideration in power analysis is the almost unavoidable arbitrariness involved with specifying (at least probabilistically) when a voter abstains. 2 Abstention would be a natural response by a voter if a proposal leaves him indifferent. But perfect indifference seems a degenerate case; it should a priori arise only with very low or even zero probability if there are no restrictions on the character of possible proposals. Another source of abstention could be exogenous costs of explicitly supporting a resolution, like an informal obligation to contribute to its implementation or reprisals by the targeted country. This would create a free-rider problem amongst the voters in favor of the resolution, involving abstention by free-riders. 3 Our analysis will, however, avoid such complications and in line with many other authors (see Felsenthal and Machover (1998: 280) for an incomplete list) abstract from abstentions altogether. Adoption of a resolution then simply requires unanimous support of the five permanent members and a four-out-of-ten ‘majority’ amongst the elected members. We assume that decisions of the Security Council are not merely between passing a resolution or not, but they also involve the content of the resolution. We simplify analysis by taking the latter to be reflected by a variable with arbitrary values on a bounded one-dimensional scale. This position of the Security Council regarding a given threat to peace may at an intuitive level represent the quality or quantity of demands that it makes, how hawkishly or dovishly it deals with an aggressor, the level of sanctions that it imposes, etc. We normalize possible positions to the unit interval X [0 1] and also refer to X as the issue-specific policy space. We presume that if no resolution regarding some issue is passed, a status quo q X prevails. This assumption can be artificial when issues are on the agenda for which the Security CounArt. 27(2) specifies an affirmative vote of nine members without special role for permanent members. Whether an issue is to be regarded as procedural or not is usually not specified explicitly; it may, however, itself be the matter of a vote, known as ‘the preliminary question.’ See, e.g. Chapter 4 of the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council (http://www.un. org/Depts/dpa/repertoire). 2 See, for example, Felsenthal and Machover (1998: 286–293) for an explicit treatment of abstentions that assumes somewhat ad hoc that ‘yeah’, ‘nay’, and abstention all have the same likelihood. 3 A preliminary consideration of this case suggests that a voter i is powerful if and only if exactly a minimal winning coalition is in favor of the proposal and includes i, matching the assumptions of Holler (1978) and Holler and Packel (1983).
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cil has never formulated a position before. However, a status quo quite naturally seems to exist for many recurring themes such as resolutions on Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbours. Moreover, there is also a natural status quo regarding decisions about ‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations’ (Art. 41) or ‘[military] action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’ (Art. 42). All members of the Security Council are assumed to rationally pursue their own interests. These take the form of spatial preferences over X. On any given issue with status quo q, we refer to the respective most preferred policy alternative of the five permanent members by Q1 , Q 2 ,…, Q 5 . They have the objective to pass a resolution as close to their respective ideal one as possible. The corresponding positions held by the ten elected members are denoted by F1 , F 2 ,…, F10 . We want to provide an estimate of how much influence the described voting rule a priori generates for the permanent and non-permanent Security Council members. This does intentionally not take into account any information about historical voting patterns or preferences of current Security Council members, and is not meant to identify the critical member(s) on any particular real-world issue, say, the next resolution on the Iranian nuclear program or the situation on the Balkan. We rather care about a quantification of the obvious asymmetry of power that the UN Charter gives to the two classes of members a priori. In line with the general framework developed in Napel and Widgrén (2004), we conceive of power as the ability to affect outcomes. This ability can be operationalized very naturally by looking at predicted outcomes for given behaviour of all agents and then asking: how sensitive is this outcome to a possible variation of an agent’s behaviour? The considered agent i is a priori more powerful or influential than another agent j if outcomes are more responsive to i ’s behaviour than to j’s behaviour on average. We regard agents’ behaviour as a consequence of rational and strategic pursuit of goals, captured by preferences. 4 The actual source of a behaviour variation is then a preference change of the agent in question. Under this view, an agent’s ex post power (referring to a given preference and status quo configuration) gauges how much the predicted outcome would change if the agent’s goals changed. If a preference change of a given magnitude has double the affect for player i than for player j, we consider i twice as powerful as j. Ex ante or a priori power averages this potential outcome change using an appropriate probability measure over all possible preference and status quo configurations. 4 See the debate between Braham and Holler (2005) and Napel and Widgrén (2005) on this issue.
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Members’ ex post and ex ante power are of interest also to outsiders without vote but an interest in the Security Council’s decision, e.g. the conflicting parties or lobbyists. If they can change Council members’ preference by bribe or persuasion, then ex post power indicates how effective (or potentially valuable) ‘good relations’ with a particular Security Council member are for a specific issue. Ex ante power does the same from a long-term perspective. Formally, sensitivity of a collective decision x X to a given member i ’s preferences for the ideal point configuration (Q 1 ,…, Q 5 , F1 ,…, F10 ) and status quo q can be captured by the partial derivative of x with respect to i ’s ideal policy, i.e. sx sQ i or sx sFi . 5 A priori power is then the expected value of sx sQ i or sx sFi . But first we need to make a plausible prediction of the collective decision for a given configuration (Q1 ,…, Q 5 , F1 ,…, F10 ) and q, i.e. specify a mapping x [0,1]16 l [0,1], whose partial derivatives will then capture the 15 members’ respective ex post influence. In general, x can result from very sophisticated strategic interaction, captured by game-theoretic solution concepts such as subgame perfect equilibrium applied to an explicit extensive game (see Napel and Widgrén 2006b). This is the reason why we refer to the indicated sensitivity analysis as measurement of strategic power. Anecdotal evidence suggests that before a resolution is actually put to a vote before the full Security Council, representatives of the permanent members confer and negotiate amongst themselves how encompassing, explicit, far-reaching, etc. it should be. After some preliminary agreement is reached in this ‘inner circle’ of the Security Council, the elected members get involved. Again there is some informal negotiation until a final proposal is drafted and put to a vote, producing the policy outcome anticipated in the preceding deliberations. One way to model this two-step negotiation process is to consider, first, independent preference aggregation amongst the permanent members and amongst the elected members; then, second, analyze bargaining between these two groups based on their respective aggregate opinion. This culminates in a formal vote of approval if a suitable agreement was found, and otherwise the status quo prevails. Let us start by considering preference aggregation amongst the permanent members. Denote the left-most of the respective five ideal points by Q(1) , the second left-most by Q(2) , etc. Then, the permanent members’ aggregate position Qˆ must coincide with the status quo q whenever this falls in between Q(1) and Q(5) : any proposal to the right or left of q would be vetoed by some permanent member strictly preferring to move into the opposite direction. If, in contrast, all five permanent members prefer a new pol5 The derivative focuses on the effect of small preferences changes. See Napel and Widgrén (2004) for a discussion of alternatives.
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icy x X that lies, say, to the right of q, i.e. if q Q(1) , then also q Qˆ . The aggregate position Qˆ cannot lie too far to the right, however, because then the most conservative permanent member (that is, the one closest to q) would rather vote ‘nay’. It turns out to be necessary that Qˆ ¢ Q(1) ,min \2Q(1) q , Q(5) ^¯± , where the first term in the minimum makes sure that Qˆ is not farther from Q(1) than q and the second term guarantees Pareto optimality of the preliminary agreement. In case that all permanent members prefer a new policy x X to the left of q, i.e. q Q(5) , the analogous expression is Qˆ ¢ max \Q(1) ,q 2Q(5) ^ , Q(5) ¯± . The indicated intervals correspond to the core of the respective bargaining problems and are therefore consistent with strategic behaviour (Banks and Duggan 2000). Without specific knowledge about the bargaining process amongst permanent members, no definite prediction regarding where in the core Qˆ is located can be made. One plausible a priori assumption would be that all core elements have equal probability (Napel and Widgrén 2006a). In line with Napel and Widgrén (2006b), we will however assume here that the agreement is always on the smallest common denominator, i.e. the core element that is closest to the status quo, resulting in £ Q(1) if q Q(1) ¦ ¦ ¦ Qˆ ¦ Q ¤ (5) if q Q(5) ¦ ¦¦q if Q b q b Q . (5) (1) ¦ ¥
By analogous reasoning, we obtain £ F(7 ) if q F(7) and q Q(1) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Fˆ ¤F(4) if q F(4) and q Q(5) ¦ ¦ ¦ otherwise ¦ ¥q
as the result of the deliberations amongst the elected members. It is noteworthy here that only four out of ten elected members need to support a resolution endorsed by the permanent members for it to pass. Since there can exist four elected members that want to move to the left of the status quo and simultaneously four others that want to move to the right, it is determined by the permanent members who is actually the pivotal elected member. If, say, the former want to move to the left, they will talk to the four elected members most eager to pass a resolution x q ; amongst these, the elected member with position F(4) is the least eager and thus critical. Similarly, the support by the elected member wanting F(7) brings about the required total majority of nine votes if all permanent members want to move to the right. Negotiations between permanent members and (the critical voter amongst) elected members could be modelled in various ways. If, however, all members of the Security Council are assumed to be risk-neutral, i.e. their
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utility from policy x is falling linearly in the distance between x and their ideal point, then Nash bargaining and hence approximately also many variations of Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating offers game result in the most conservative bargainers’ ideal point (Napel and Widgrén 2006b). Thus we obtain £¦Q(1) ¦¦ ¦¦F(7) ¦ x (Q1 ,…, Q 5 , F1 ,…, F10 ; q ) ¦¤Q(5) ¦¦ ¦¦F(4) ¦¦ ¦¥q
if q Q(1) b F(7) if q F(7) Q(1) if F(4) b Q(5) q if Q(5) F(4) q
(1)
otherwise
as our predicted policy outcome for a given preference configuration of members of the Security Council. This outcome may be a new resolution; it can also be an implicit confirmation of the given status quo since any resolution would fail to obtain the required level of support. The respective ex post power following from (1) is sx £¦¦1 if q Q(1) b F(7) or F(4) b Q(5) q ¤ sQˆ ¦¦¥0 otherwise
(2)
for the whole group of permanent members, and sx £¦¦1 if q F(7) Q(1) or Q(5) F(4) q ¤ sFˆ ¦¦¥0 otherwise
(3)
for the group of elected members. The respective group’s a priori influence following from above ex post considerations will be denoted by Y Qˆ for the permanent and Y Fˆ for the elected group. It is the expected value of (2) and (3). Exploiting the simple structure of (2) and (3) we obtain Y Qˆ Pr(q Q(1) b F(7) ) Pr(F(4) b Q(5) q )
(4)
Y Fˆ Pr(q F(7) Q(1) ) Pr(Q(5) F(4) q ).
(5)
and
From an a priori perspective, which seeks to evaluate the pure effects of institutional rules in ignorance of special historical preference patterns in the Security Council, it is hard to justify any particular probability distribution to be used in the actual evaluation of above expressions. In line with Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and common practice in the literature on binary voting (Felsenthal and Machover (1998: 280), Nurmi (1998)), we deem it a reasonable benchmark to consider all preference and status quo configurations equally likely, i.e. we assume that q, Q i , and F j are inde-
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pendently uniformly distributed on X [0,1] for all i 1,…,5 and j 1,…,10 . Symmetry then reduces (4) and (5) to Y Qˆ 2 ¸ Pr(q Q(1) b F(7) ) 1
2¨ 0
1
¨
Q(1)
(F) F Q(1) (q )> f F(7 ) (F)d F dq
q
and Y Fˆ 2 ¸ Pr(q F(7) Q(1) ) 1
2¨ 0
1
¨
F(7 )
(Q) F F(7) (q )> f Q(1) (Q)d Q dq
q
where F and f refer to the cumulative distribution and density functions of the indicated random variable. Given that all variables are independently [0,1]-uniformly distributed, the above order statistics have beta distributions. For example, the seventh smallest out of ten independent [0,1]-uniform draws is beta distributed with parameters 7 and 4, corresponding to f F(7 ) (x )
10 6 x (1 x )3 6 3
and x
F F(7) (x ) ¨ 0
10 6 s (1 s )3 ds . 6 3
Using this and the analogous expressions for f Q(1) and F Q(1) , we obtain Y Qˆ x 031352 and Y Fˆ x 001632 Given the symmetry within the two groups of members, we can now evaluate the a priori influence of the 15 members of the UN Security Council as Y x (006270,…, 006270, 000163,…, 000163),
where the first five entries indicate the power of individual permanent members and the last ten that of individual elected members. The interpretation of above numbers is as follows: ex ante, when we take all possible configurations of the ideal points and the status quo to be equally likely, a small preference shift of a given permanent member by %x translates into an expected shift of the outcome by 006270%x . In contrast, a corresponding ideal point shift of an elected member moves the outcome by only 000163%x in expectation. So an elected member has an about 40 times smaller effect or influence on the outcome. Or, if we take an out-
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sider’s point of view, bribing a permanent member is on average about 40 times more attractive ceteris paribus than correspondingly shifting the preferences of an elected member. Reporter 1 Not a bad start, but it seems that the referee is unconvinced … He’s discussing with his two linesmen and, yes, he annuls the Y-team’s power vector. It’s still 0:0! The referee explains to the local team’s captain that there was unfair twisting of assumptions, pretty soon after the kick-off. Reporter 2 Well, why didn’t he complain earlier then? But Mika and Stefan seem to admit that the Security Council is an institution with two classes of members but, in fact, no official segregation into two distinct chambers. I guess when it comes to preference aggregation, they still haven’t stopped thinking of their beloved Conciliation Committee … Reporter 1 I see the calculator is blinking again … this time it’s the Princeton G’s making their first computations.
One of the two most commonly used measures of agents’ voting power is the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI), introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1954). It is a special case of the more general Shapley value of cooperative coalitionalform games (Shapley 1953). The SSI is based on the broad idea that an agent that can turn a winning coalition into a losing one, or vice versa, exerts power. More formally, let N be a set of n agents and let S N denote any coalition of agents having s members. Voting games such as that in the Security Council can be characterized by a characteristic function v with value v(S ) 1 when coalition S can pass a proposal and v(S ) 0 otherwise. In this socalled simple game setting, the Shapley-Shubik index Gi of a voter i N can be written as Gi
(s 1)( n s ) ¯ ¢¡v(S ) v S \ \i ^ ±°. n S N st i S
The first term in the summation captures the probability of country i being in a potentially pivotal position in coalition S and the latter term equals one if in fact voter i is able to swing S from winning into losing, i.e. S is winning and the removal of i makes the remaining