Power, Freedom, and Voting
M.J.H., 35 u 27 cm, water colour / paper, Katharina Kohl, 2007.
Matthew Braham · Frank Steffen (Editors)
Power, Freedom, and Voting
Essays in Honour of Manfred J. Holler
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Dr. Matthew Braham Faculty of Philosophy University of Groningen Oude Boteringestraat 52 9712 GL Groningen The Netherlands
[email protected]
ISBN 978-3-540-73381-2
Dr. Frank Steffen The University of Liverpool Management School Chatham Street L69 7ZH Liverpool UK
[email protected]
e-ISBN 978-3-540-73382-9
DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9 Library of Congress Control Number: 2008922456 c 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Production: le-tex Jelonek, Schmidt & Vöckler GbR, Leipzig Cover design: WMX Design GmbH, Heidelberg Printed on acid-free paper 987654321 springer.com
Preface The chapters in this volume are intended to honour the career and work of Manfred J. Holler by presenting a body of work in economics, political science, and philosophy that is intimately related to some of the major themes that have occupied his attention for the past twenty-five years or so. Some of the chapters are developments of topics that Holler has consistently worked on during his career (power indices, voting rules, principles and applications of game theory); others are on topics that currently occupy his attention (freedom and responsibility). We even include an essay by Holler on the quintessential theorist of power: Niccolò Machiavelli. For those who know Manfred personally, the breadth of viewpoints and methods that can be found in this volume should come as no surprise. His academic career is depicted by intellectual diversity and experimentation: he has published papers in many branches of economics that can be classified as purely theoretical, as applied theory, as empirical, and historical. The person who has provoked this book was born on 25 July 1946 in Munich, Germany, where he grew up and completed his secondary and university education: MA in economics (1971), doctoral degree (1975), and Habilitation (1984), the last of which is a post-doctoral qualification (the socalled ‘second book’) that until recently was generally required by German universities for appointment to a professorship. After a senior research and lecturing position in Munich, Holler took up an associate professorship in economics at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, in 1986. In 1991 he was appointed as full professor of economic theory at the University of Hamburg where, at the time of writing, he still works. The German university landscape has often received bad press for the hierarchical and rigid structures and fiefdoms that Herr Prof. Dr. carves out and jealously guards, even at the expense of the openness and frankness required for healthy academic discourse and development. While this is undoubtedly true, the same landscape -- which is now rapidly disappearing in the process of turning German universities into degree factories – has another side. Depending on the personalities that are able to find their way into the niches of German universities, they could be equally hospitable for an entirely different form of academic life. Holler’s niche is an open and academically and educationally progressive one. In the words of the great American philosopher John Dewey, it is a place of ‘connected experiences’. The autonomy of the traditional German university Lehrstuhl meant that such niches can also be the ideal environment for creative and highly individual endeavour. One of the very important characteristics of the
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Institute of SocioEconomics (the Anglicized name that Holler gave to his Lehrstuhl) is that it is refreshingly free of rules and regulations. As long as we have known Manfred, he has always made every effort to free his staff from unnecessary administrative burdens and he never burdened anyone with his own work. For him, it was important to ensure that there was sufficient time to do what is supposed to be done in universities: read, think, experiment, and write. Even the mundane task of setting exam questions and marking was a collaborative and intellectually stimulating exercise. Manfred has been very suspicious of targets, research clusters, and endless creation of new fangled ways of managing academic life. For him, it is a matter of providing time and encouragement to initiate and organize research activities on one’s own initiative. Over the years we organized workshops from Siena to the Isle of Sylt in the North Sea. Many of the authors in this volume contributed to these events so that in some sense this volume records the recent history of the Institute of SocioEconomics. Both of us have known Holler closely from our days as his doctoral students and have been greatly affected and influenced by his intellectual generosity. We wanted to repay this charity by not only putting together a Festschrift but also an event that is close to his heart: the combination of art and science. Thus the idea of a Festschrift conference with an art event was conceived in the autumn of 2004 and organized as a secret together with Manfred’s wife, Barbara Klose-Ullmann. For the days of 17–20 August 2006, about a month after Manfred’s sixtieth birthday most of the contributors met at the Elsa-Brändström-Haus, a villa and former residence of the Warburg family on the banks of the River Elbe just outside Hamburg, to present and discuss early drafts of the papers. Not only did we exhibit some artworks by a couple of Manfred’s artist friends in the main conference room, but we also dedicated an evening to two artists to present their work. Nicola Atkinson-Davidson presented her piece, ‘Thank You for Shopping with Us! (And Have a Nice Day?)’, which is best described as a piece of social sculpture à la Beuys. The piece centred on an installation: a fan and an empty plastic bag. It was about establishing an interaction among the audience and the social environment. Alex Close presented the ‘essence of a container’. This essence is documented in his essay entitled ‘Container Manifesto: Or Why Boxes Have to be Closed’. We cannot go into detail here about these works, but details can be found on www.nadfly.com and Alex’s manifesto will be published in 2008 in Homo Oeconomicus, a journal that Manfred founded and edits together with one of us (m.b.) and Hartmut Kliemt. As it is not possible to represent the great variety of Manfred’s work in one volume, we decided to restrict our attention to that area of his work which overlaps with our own interests. Hence the focus of this book on foundational issues in the analysis of power, freedom, and voting. However, even such a thematic restriction posed a number of problems. The mere number of friends and colleagues that Manfred has who work in this area
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meant that we could easily have produced a second 400 page tome. With the help of some of his close friends and collaborators down the years we decided to invite those who have either been co-authors, co-editors, or contributors to his numerous and diverse projects. In addition we wanted obtain a representative historical and geographical spread of friends that have spanned his career. We also wanted the book to capture more than Manfred’s past; the idea being that it should also be a continuation of his own projects in this field. 1 Here we took the liberty of inviting a few contributors who in some capacity became closely involved with the Institute of SocioEconomics from 2000 onwards. Although it would have been aesthetically pleasing to compile this volume into distinct parts, the overlapping themes made any division of chapters arbitrary. As readers familiar with the literature on power indices will know, discussions of power are intimately related to discussions of voting rules and vice versa. And we cannot easily separate discussions of power from discussions of coalitions; and nor can we discuss freedom without any reference to power. Thus, at most we have grouped chapters together that are closely related. Otherwise there is no particular order. We can now turn to a brief description of the contents. The Festschrift opens with a chapter that is very close to Manfred’s current interests: the nature and measurement of responsibility. That challenge that is set out in Chapter 1 by one of the editors (m.b.) is a very abstract one: how to untangle ascriptions of social power and causation and explicate the difference in their meaning. As the reader will see from the acknowledgements and references this is the continuation of work that was jointly initiated with Manfred. The main thrust of the paper is the introduction of a game theoretic framework to formulate a demarcation principle and demonstrate that social power is a special case of social causation. One of the interesting results of this analysis for normative theory is that it is shown that an agent can make a causal contribution to some state of affairs although be entirely powerless with respect to that state of affairs. This of course raises the question of whether power is an appropriate criterion for attributing responsibility. In the next chapter (2), written by František Turnovec, Jacek Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz, Felsenthal and Machover’s ‘I-power’ (power as ‘influence’) and ‘P-power’ (power as ‘prize’) distinction is subjected to a penetrating analysis. The authors argue that the classification of the Banzhaf index as I-power and the Shapley-Shubik index as P-power, and therefore Felsenthal and Machover’s disqualification of the Shapley-Shubik index for particular kinds of analyses, does not hold. Both measures can be modelled 1 In the 1980s, he edited two volumes that overlap with this one: Power, Voting, and Voting Power (Physica Verlag, 1982) and Coalitions and Collective Action (Physica Verlag, 1984). More recently, together with Guillermo Owen he edited Power Indices and Coalition Formation (Kluwer, 2001).
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as values of cooperative games and as probabilities of being ‘decisive’ without reference to game theory at all. The basic point being that ‘pivots’ (Shapley-Shubik index) and ‘swings’ (Banzhaf index) can be taken as special cases of a more general concept of ‘decisiveness’. The authors complete their study by introducing a more general measure of a priori voting power that covers the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and Holler’s Public Good indices as special cases. In Chapter 3, Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover continue their studies of the expediency and stability of alliances by examining a co-operative non-transferable utility game that is derived from a simple voting game. In this game, a strategy is the formation of an alliance in the simple game and the payoffs are the Penrose voting powers in the resulting composite voting game. Felsenthal and Machover highlight a number of paradoxical outcomes that can occur under super-majority rules and how a dummy player can be empowered by participating in an expedient alliance. Chapter 4 by René van den Brink and the other editor (f.s.) is the result of a quite a number of years of painstaking investigation. It is a solution to a puzzle that f.s. started working on for both his MA and doctoral theses under Manfred’s supervision. The question is simple, the answer somewhat complicated: how to measure power in a hierarchy given the sequential nature of decision-making in such structures? The solution is an analogue of the Banzhaf index for extensive game forms. Although for some this will not come as a real surprise, deriving such an analogue is not a straightforward affair because the precise meaning of a ‘swing’ in an extensive game form is far from obvious. Understanding power in hierarchical structures requires the integration of a variety of conceptual and formal frameworks. Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach take up one of Holler’s favourite themes in Chapter 5: the construction of new power indices. They define and axiomatize what they call the Public Help Index – although it is questionable if this can really be called a ‘power index’ given that it assigns a positive value to a dummy player. The paper’s significance is that it fills in a logical gap in the axiomatics of power measures based on simple games. The authors also provide an algorithm for their new index as well as for Holler’s Public Good Index. Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén’s (Chapter 6) analysis of power in the UN Security Council is written in a refreshingly unconventional style. They set up their analysis as a football match between two teams: the local Y-team, their own strategic power index, and the renowned Princeton G-team, the Shapley-Shubik index. The match ends in a draw as Napel and Widgén are able to show that the Shapley-Shubik index is a special case of their index – this result is the equalizing goal scored with the last kick of the game. By the assumptions of the model, the values generated by the two indices are the same. But hinting at their belief in the superiority of their index, the Y-team
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calls for extra time. The chapter has all the merits of the perfect Festschrift contribution, being a playful but rigorous analysis that is littered with anecdotes of the intellectual life in Hamburg over the last years and hints at provocative debates among a number of the contributors to this volume. For the record, the presentation of this paper was actually done as a staged performance with two commentators taking on the roles given in the chapter. Chapter 7, by Guillermo Owen, Ines Lindner, and Bernie Grofman, is concerned with modified power indices for indirect voting, such as in the US Electoral College. The authors demonstrate the need, and propose a method for, modifying classical measures such as the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for dealing with this kind of institutional arrangement. The problem with the classical measures for indirect voting is that they generate counter-intuitive results are due to their insensitivity to important features of the voting environment. In the case of the Electoral College, it is the insensitivity to voter correlation in the different US states. In another very original empirical analysis (Chapter 8), Joe Godfrey and Bernie Grofman apply the Shapley-Owen value, the spatial analogue of the Shapley value, to test the hypothesis that lobbying efforts are directed to potentially pivotal voters. To do this they examine the lobbying activities surrounding the 1993 Clinton Health Care reform proposal. Apart from the unique attempt of using the Shapley-Owen value on historical data the value of the study is that the authors are able to pinpoint key players in the process who lobbyists failed to identify as important. Vincent Chua and Dan Felsenthal’s chapter (9) continues the thread of contributions on the empirical analysis of power. They put Robert Aumann’s coalition formation hypothesis to test. In an interview, Auman had hypothesized that a party charged with forming a governing coalition will choose the coalition that maximizes its Shapley-Shubik index value. Chua and Felsenthal examine three versions of the hypothesis and find that for each version the hypothesis is actually outperformed by different conjectures: the Leiserson-Axelrod closed minimal range theory and the GamsonRiker minimum size principle. 2 In their chapter (10), Friedel Bolle and Yves Breitmoser take up the relationships among coalition formation, agenda selection, and power. They develop a model of coalitional bargaining in which a formateur asks the other parties about their aspirations from participating in a government. The authors then show how the value functions can lead to structurally different predictions of the outcome and assessments of power. They tie up their chapter by looking at the relationship between their conception of power and the power index introduced by Napel and Widgrén. Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt, and Stefan Napel’s chapter (11) is a 2 A follow-up to this paper by Chua and Felsenthal can be found in Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 25 (2008).
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game theoretic analysis of an enduring and classical problem of political theory, that of whether or not a democracy can incorporate foes of democracy. They investigate the conditions under which letting the foes of democracy participate (‘have a positive share of political power’) in the democratic system will not pose a serious risk to the system itself and may in fact be beneficial. In particular, it is required that the otherwise democratically competing parties can rein in the foes of democracy by acting as a democratic cartel. In Chapter 12, Steven Brams and Marc Kilgour present three models in which two players agree to share power in a particular ratio, but, as in a duel, either can subsequently ‘fire’ at the other to try to eliminate him. If neither is successful, the agreement remains in place; if one is successful, that player obtains all the power; and if both are eliminated, neither player gets anything. The authors examine three versions of the model: the oneshot version, the repeated version with discounted payoffs, and a version with a damage. Brams and Kilgour’s analysis throws up a very pessimistic conclusion: no matter what the values of any of the parameters are, rational players will be impelled to try to eliminate a partner in a power-sharing agreement. Hence, power sharing appears to be inherently unstable and this is what makes ending conflicts so difficult. 3 Chapter 13 by Donald Wittman is a comparison of proposal and veto power in a majority-rule voting system. In his model, the proposer chooses a position that maximizes his utility subject to the constraint that a majority and a veto player prefer the position to the status quo. Although there may exist many proposers and vetoers, one needs only to concentrate on a few of the players to determine the outcome of the legislative game. Norman Schofield (Chapter 14) studies the relationship between party positions and electoral response. He develops a model of valence that can be used to predict individual voter choice and interpret the political game. The central result of his analysis is that the ‘centripetal’ tendency of political strategy, inferred from the spatial voting model is contradicted by empirical evidence (data from Israeli elections). Schofield thus challenges the generality of a cherished theorem of modern political science: the validity of the ‘mean voter theorem’ depends on a limit to electoral variance as well as bounds on the variation of valence between the parties. Tommi Meskanen and Hannu Nurmi’s chapter (15) brings the topic of voting to a close. They dwell on the question of why there is such a variety of voting rules. They demonstrate that there is in fact a unity in the diversity because most systems are actually related in that they are all characterized by the same goal state: consensus. The different procedures are just different ways of measuring the distance from consensus. 3 This model has been further analysed by Martin Leroch in a forthcoming article in Homo Oeconomicus.
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Chapter 16 is the first of four papers that are explicitly about the relationship between freedom and power. In this chapter, Keith Dowding and Martin van Hees analyse the similarities and differences between the concepts of freedom and power. Their analysis turns on the concept of ‘ability’ that underpins both freedom and power ascriptions. The new contribution of this analysis is that Dowding and van Hees demonstrate that there are cases in which the abilities (powers) of a person fail to coincide with her freedom. Similar to Chapter 1 where it is shown that ‘power’ and ‘cause’ come apart although the two concepts share a common conceptual structure, here it is shown that ‘power’ and ‘freedom’ can come apart despite the common structure. The upshot of this fine-grained analysis is that the precise content of the intuitive relation between these two concepts is anything but clear and this opens up a whole host of new and difficult conceptual and normative questions. In Chapter 17, Marlies Ahlert develops the concept of ‘guarantees in game forms’ as a method of making sense of interpersonal comparisons of freedom, liberty, rights, and power. Starting from the intuition that individuals should have some control over their lives such that they can secure for themselves certain levels of well-being, she uses the construct of a fictitious external observer (the ‘policymaker’) to order game forms. This gives us a ‘personal welfare function’ for the individual’s well-being under specific rules of interaction. Ahlert then applies the concept to dictator and ultimatum bargaining games. Sebastiano Bavetta et al. (Chapter 18) use the Millian idea of ‘autonomy freedom’ as the basis of an empirical analysis of how freedom affects an individual’s attitude towards income inequality. In their study of Italy, they find that there is a negative association between the level of perceived autonomy freedom and the support for redistributive policies. The authors then consider how their results can be used to reconcile views about the classical trade-off between freedom and inequality in liberal democracies. Chapter 19 by Luciano Andreozzi is another new analysis of a canonical problem in normative theory that brings together the problems of power and freedom: is it legitimate to coerce people to contribute to a public good that they have not consented to. More bluntly: ‘do people have a right to punish free-riders?’ Andreozzi emends H.L.A Hart’s ‘principle of fairness’ and uses an elementary game theoretic model to derive conditions for ‘fair’ coercion. In particular he demonstrates that when cooperators cannot punish free-riders the resulting equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, but allowing for mild punishments produces a Pareto superior outcome. The final three chapters differ somewhat in topic and style from the rest of the book. In Chapter 20, Frederick Guy and Peter Skott’s take up a Marxian theme and explore the ways in which employee power (and thus the willingness of firms to pay wages) will be affected by changes in information and communication technology (ICT). Developments in ICT allow manag-
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ers to monitor the actions of employees more closely and act in increasingly discretionary ways. The result of such technology is to reduce the ability of workers to exert power which has a knock-on effect on the functional distribution of income. Chapter 21 by Timo Airaksinen casts a look at the concept of social capital and how it is related to trust, responsibility and power. His short paper is an intuitive study of how we might talk about these concepts. In particular he argues that the existence of social capital depends on an absence of trust and social capital itself implies certain types of coercive power relations. We close the book (Chapter 22) with an essay by Manfred Holler in which he revisits a classical text on political power: Machiavelli’s The Prince. Holler sets out to explore what this text has to offer for modern political theory and shows how Machiavelli actually grappled with problems that has plagued political theory for centuries: the aggregation of preferences, the origin of the state and the law, the status of power and morality in politics, and the dynamics and efficiency of political systems. In a provocative twist, Holler proposes that Machiavelli’s ‘prince’ is none other than Arrow’s dictatorship condition in disguise. On behalf of all the contributors, it is our pleasure to be able to offer Manfred Holler this Festschrift on a series of topics that have an extensive and long-standing place in economics, politics, and philosophy. For, the three concepts of power, freedom, and voting are concerned with the difficulty of coordinating individual and collective activities of the members of a society and the problems associated with such coordination will never cease to exist. These are concepts that find their concrete expression in law and the social practices that are used to allocate scarce resources among competing ends. We hope that readers will find the contributions intellectually stimulating, challenging, and – this is most important for Manfred – be part of an ongoing discussion. As a closing word, we would like to thank the sponsors and colleagues who made all aspects of this project possible. Our sponsors were: the University of Hamburg, the City of Hamburg, Eurohypo AG (Hamburg Branch), and the Alfred Toepfer Foundation (Hamburg). As for direct assistance, special thanks must go to Dr. Harald Schlüter, Division for Research Management and Funding, University of Hamburg, who was always on hand to help us through with the financing not only of this project but many others in the past that led up to it. Lastly, we are indebted to Martin Leroch who provided invaluable assistance in organising and running the conference. Thanks must also go to Nicola Maaser for arranging a piano concert by Hong Chun Youn, one of the most promising young pianists in Germany. m.b. f.s.
Contents Preface 1. Social Power and Social Causation: Towards a Formal Synthesis Matthew Braham
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2. Power Indices Methodology: Decisiveness, Pivots, and Swings František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
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3. Further Reflections on the Expediency and Stability of Alliances Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
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4. Positional Power in Hierarchies René van den Brink and Frank Steffen
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5. A Public Help Index Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
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6. Shapley-Shubik versus Strategic Power – Live from the UN Security Council Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén
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7. Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting Guillermo Owen, Ines Lindner, and Bernard Grofman
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8. Pivotal Voting Theory: The 1993 Clinton Health Care Reform Proposal in the U.S. Congress Joseph Godfrey and Bernard Grofman
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9. Coalition Formation Theories Revisited: An Empirical Investigation of Aumann’s Hypothesis Vincent C.H. Chua and Dan S. Felsenthal
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10. Coalition Formation, Agenda Selection, and Power Friedel Bolle and Yves Breitmoser
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11. Democratic Defences and (De-)Stabilisations Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt, and Stefan Napel
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12. The Instability of Power Sharing Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour
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13. The Power to Propose versus the Power to Oppose Donald A. Wittman
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14. Divergence in the Spatial Stochastic Model of Voting Norman Schofield
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15. Closeness Counts in Social Choice Tommi Meskanen and Hannu Nurmi
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16. Freedom, Coercion, and Ability Keith Dowding and Martin van Hees
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17. Guarantees in Game Forms Marlies Ahlert
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18. Individual Control in Decision-Making and Attitudes Towards Inequality: The Case of Italy Sebastiano Bavetta, Antonio Cognata, Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti, and Pietro Navarra
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19. The Principle of Fairness: A Game Theoretic Model Luciano Andreozzi
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20. Power, Productivity, and Profits Frederick Guy and Peter Skott
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21. Trust, Responsibility, Power, and Social Capital Timo Airaksinen
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22. Exploiting The Prince Manfred J. Holler
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1. Social Power and Social Causation: Towards a Formal Synthesis Matthew Braham Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Power and Cause are the same thing. Correspondent to cause and effect, are POWER and ACT; nay, those and these are the same things. — Hobbes, English Works, 1, X
1. The Challenge An impressive list of economists, political scientists, and philosophers starting with Thomas Hobbes and including Herbert Simon (1957), James March (1955), Robert Dahl (1957, 1968), Felix Oppenheim (1961, 1976, 1981), William Riker (1964), Virginia Held (1972), and Jack Nagel (1975) have claimed that there are key and compelling similarities between what is ordinarily considered to be an ascription of social power and that which is considered under the more general rubric of causality. Hence to say: x ‘i has (had) power to x’ , is to assert that i can (did) cause an outcome x . x ‘i has (had) power over j’ , is to assert that i can (did) cause j to act in a specific way (in a manner that he would not otherwise do). Despite this common recognition, which centres on the reference to the same necessity and sufficiency conditions, there is quite a gamut of views and indeed barely any consensus about the precise nature of the link. In broad terms (and picking only a few of the authors), Riker (1964: 347) for instance, says that the difference between power and causality is one of ‘potential’ and ‘actual’: ‘Power is potential cause. Or, power is the ability to exercise influence while cause is the actual exercise of it’. That is, if i caused some outcome x , then i had power with respect to x ; and if i has power with respect to x, then i can cause x . For March and Dahl the relation is weaker. They assert that ‘power relations are logically a subset of causal relations’ (Dahl 1968: 410). While Oppenheim (1981: 33) judges the relation to be even weaker still: power
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and causal ascriptions come apart completely and are only ‘overlapping categories’. Knowledge of how causal and power ascriptions are related is clearly of fundamental methodological and normative importance. For example, if causal and power ascriptions are two sides of the same coin, as Riker suggests, what descriptive or normative work does the concept of power actually do? Why not follow Riker’s (1964: 348) provocative proposal and delete the concept of power from the vocabulary of social science and political philosophy? 1 If, on the other hand, every power ascription implies a causal ascription but not vice versa as Dahl and March suggest, what exactly demarcates power from causality and makes the set of power ascriptions a proper subset of the set of causal ascriptions? What, if at all, is the normative significance of this distinction for, say, theories of responsibility? 2 For moral judgements are very much dependant upon our understanding of causality and power. Unfortunately, given that none of the above mentioned writers established their claims with any rigour, it is not really possible to evaluate the coherence and veracity of their claims. Riker’s belief, for instance, that a causal ascription entails power is entirely incidental; it is based on the observation of certain ‘parallelisms’ between different concepts of cause and different concepts of power. Or to put it another way, he did not prove that it is not the case that if i is attributed as having been causal for x then i had power with respect to x . (I will demonstrate that Riker’s claim is false.) In a similar fashion, neither March nor Dahl formally demonstrated that the class of power ascriptions is a proper subset of causal ascriptions. March, for instance, only observes that (emphasis added) it appears to be true that any statement of influence 3 that can be just as easily formulated in terms of causality. Since in common parlance (and the present framework) it is not true that all statements of causality can be treated as statements of influence (i.e. influence and causality are not equivalent), the set of all influence relations can be understood to be a proper subset of all causal relations (March 1955: 437).
Yet there is nothing in this argument or the rest of March’s article that guarantees that the set of power relations is a subset and not an intersection 1 Riker’s proposal echoes Bertrand Russell’s (1913) famed argument that philosophers should abandon the concept of causation as being ‘a relic of a bygone age’ and replace it with the concept of ‘functional relationship’. 2 See, for instance, Braham and Holler (2008). This current essay is in fact a further development of that paper. See also the well-known statement by Connolly (1983: 84–137). 3 Here I am following Oppenheim (1960, 1976), and Barry (1976) and taking ‘power’ to be the generic concept, with concepts of ‘influence’, ‘coercion’, and ‘control’ as sub-categories of ‘power’. This corresponds to the ideas in March’s article. In contrast, Dahl (1963) assumes ‘influence’ to be the more general concept, while Riker (1964) considers the concepts to be synonyms.
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of the set of causal relations, as is claimed by Oppenheim. Furthermore, March (and for that matter Dahl as well) ignores entirely the condition that distinguished a power relation from a causal relation. Oppenheim’s claim that there is only an overlap between causal and power ascriptions is by far the most comprehensive and systematic. It is based on two observations. (i) The set of power ascriptions come in two forms: having power and exercising power. Only exercising power is causal. That is, an agent i may have power over j with respect to some outcome x (in the sense of being able to coerce j to do x or punish j for not doing x) but j brings about x for reasons entirely unrelated to i ’s power. (ii) Causal effect does not imply power: i may have performed an action which causally affects j, yet i has no power over j with respect to j performing any action. Although Oppenheim’s set intersection argument is correct in general, his analysis is incomplete. Firstly, it should be noticed that Oppenheim’s set of causal relations is that of ‘actual causation’ and thus the appropriate comparison with power should be restricted to the set of ‘actual’ or ‘exercising of power’ relations. In this case Oppenheim admits that the exercising of power does indeed refer to causation. Agreeing with Simon, he says that ‘cause’ is the ‘defining expression’ of power so that logically speaking the exercising of power is a proper subset of causal relations (and therefore his position is not so far from that of Dahl and March.) However, as with the others, Oppenheim, too, fails to spell out a criterion for demarcating a power from a causal ascription (although this should not be taken to mean that it is not present). In his discussion of what he considers the three basic expressions of ‘exercising power’, that of ‘influencing’, ‘preventing’ and ‘punishing’, he concentrates only on the correspondence between causal language and the definitions of these expressions, and not on the differences between power and cause. That is, Oppenheim restricts his attention to the observation that in one way or another ‘influencing’, ‘preventing’, and ‘punishing’ all are defined in terms of the building blocks of causal ascriptions, that of the necessity and/or sufficiency of one set of events (i ’s actions) in bringing about another event ( j’s actions, or a state of affairs or outcome x). In contrast to all these positions, another other prominent theorist, Alvin Goldman claimed that causal ascriptions and power ascriptions are entirely disjoint categories: Causal terminology is especially unhelpful in dealing with the kinds of cases of paramount interest to a theory of power, i.e., cases in which an outcome is a function of the actions of numerous agents. In thinking about distributions of power and degrees of power among many persons and many groups, the use of causal terminology is likely to obscure the crucial questions rather than illuminate them. It seems advisable, therefore, to avoid all reliance on the concept of causation from the outset (Goldman 1972: 227).
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The challenge of this paper should now be evident. It is simply to untangle ascriptions of social power and causation and explicate the difference in their meaning. I will propose a terse game-theoretic synthesis whereby we can visibly demarcate the two concepts and show their relation – which happens to be one of set-inclusion. Before the discussion begins, three caveats are in order. First, although I use the term ‘social causation’ I am aware that it is conceptually more precise to use the term ‘contributory effect’ or speak of ‘conventional causality’ or ‘conventional generation’ because the term ‘causality’ generally refers to the connection between two events which are related by empirically ascertainable ‘laws of nature’. Social outcomes are governed by law and convention and not merely by laws of nature as such. For example, that a house burns down following the outbreak of a fire of a certain size follows from laws of nature; that a particular policy is implemented following the agreement of a certain number of people follows from legal rules and conventions. 4 However, to use this alternative terminology would unnecessarily burden the discussion without adding anything. Second, as the two expressions that open this paper suggest, power ascriptions come in two forms: ‘power to’ and ‘power over ’. In line with Morriss’ (1987/2002) acute – and much overlooked – analysis, I take the first expression to be the generic form. I will explain the reasons for this later. Third, as my task is primarily analytical I will not undertake a comprehensive survey of the different opinions about the relationship between social power and social causation. I take it that my terse review in this introduction is sufficient to indicate that there is a problem to be dealt with.
2. Causal Ascriptions Let us begin with the concept of causality. 5 A ‘cause’ is a relation between events, processes, or entities in the same time series, in which one event, process, or entity C has the efficacy to produce or be part of the production, of another, the effect x , i.e. C is a condition for x . Arguments among philosophers about what actually constitutes this efficacy are often concerned with whether or not the efficacy be a necessity or sufficiency requirement. There are three senses for each of these. Starting with necessity, in descending order of stringency: Strict necessity
C is necessary for the occurrence of x whenever x occurs.
Strong necessity
C was necessary for x on the particular occasion.
4
The distinction is discussed in more detail in Kramer (2003: 280) This section is summarized from Hart and Honoré (1959), Honoré (1995), Kramer (2003: 277ff), Mackie (1965, 1974), Pearl (2000: 313–315 ) and Wright (1985, 1988). 5
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Weak necessity
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C was a necessary element of some set of existing conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of x .
For sufficiency: Strict sufficiency C is sufficient by itself for the occurrence of x . Strong sufficiency C was a necessary element of some set of existing conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of x . Weak sufficiency C was an element of some set of existing conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of x . There are three remarks to be made here. Firstly, it is obvious that we can instantly dispense with the concept of weak sufficiency for the simple reason that it is trivially satisfied by any condition C by simply adding C to an already existing set of conditions that is sufficient for x , although C is totally irrelevant as regards x . That is, weak sufficiency can fail to satisfy the simple counterfactual test of efficacy known as the ‘but-for’ test in a very unacceptable way. According to this test, C was a cause of some result x only if but for the occurrence of C, then x would not have occurred. Suppose, for example, a house burns down and evidence is found that there was a shortcircuit, there was flammable material nearby, there was no automated and efficient water sprinkler, and all three conditions together are sufficient for the house burning down. Now add the fact that there is also evidence that a Bob Dylan CD was in an unplugged CD player in the house. In absence of some empirically ascertainable laws of nature that govern the spontaneous combustion of unplugged CD players with Bob Dylan CD loaded in the deck, it is entirely unreasonable that the CD player with the Bob Dylan CD should qualify as having causal status for the fire. Secondly, there is no question that if C is strictly necessary for x , then C should be ascribed causal status for x ; and if C is strongly necessary for x then C should also be ascribed causal status for x . 6 In both cases, C obviously satisfies the ‘but-for’ test. Yet strict necessity is inadequate to cover causal relations in general because it will often not be fulfilled. It would mean that evidence of an electrical short-circuit that combined with other conditions and resulted in a house burning down would not qualify for causal status given that it is not true that for all instances of a house burning down there must have been an electrical short-circuit. Strict sufficiency is 6 Note here that necessity can be considered as too ‘weak’ for picking out a cause because it means that the presence of air is a cause of car accidents, rapes, etc. Obviously there is a ‘boundary problem’ to deal with and the problem does not disappear even if we restrict ourselves to those events which are actions, because while we can assume away nomic conditions (‘laws of nature’) we cannot simply assume away past actions as conditions for the present. Here I go along with Mackie’s (1974: 63) concept of the ‘causal field’, which is the background against which causing goes on, i.e. consequents and antecedents do not float about on their own but happen in some setting.
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also inadequate because it too may fail to exist: it is rare that a single condition C is sufficient for x . Strict sufficiency also rules out ascribing the electrical short-circuit causal status for the house burning down given that it alone cannot lead to the fire; the presence of flammable material, etc. is also called for. Moreover, the fact that C may be strictly sufficient for x and was present on the occasion of x’s occurrence does not imply that C actually caused x ; x may have brought about by another strictly sufficient condition that was also present on the occasion. Thirdly, although strong necessity is ostensibly an attractive candidate for ascribing causality, it too can easily crumble in cases of causal over-determination. These are those circumstances in which the causes of an event are cumulatively more than sufficient to generate the effect. That is, there exist situations in which a strongly necessary condition will fail to exist. Causal over-determination comes in two broad types which Wright (1985: 1775) has usefully labelled as duplicative and pre-emptive causation. A case of duplicative causation is one in which two similar and independent causal processes C 1 and C 2 , each of which is sufficient for the same effect x , may culminate in x at the same time. It will be best to turn to some examples. Assassin 1 Assassin1 and Assassin2 independently and simultaneously aim and shoot at Victim such that each shot is sufficient to kill Victim at exactly the same moment. Clearly, neither assassin was strongly necessary for Victim’s death because, ceteris paribus, if either had not fired his shot Victim would have died anyway due to the shot fired by the other assassin. Although one could argue that this example is intuitively resolved by saying that a cause is either strictly sufficient, strictly necessary, or strongly necessary, this will not work for the following case. Assassin 2 Victim is held up in his car by Assassin1, Assassin2, and Assassin3 who together tie him up and lock him in his car and then push the car over a cliff killing Victim. It is sufficient for Victim’s death that only two assassins hold up Victim and push the car over the cliff. To simplify matters, we need only focus on the pushing of Victim’s car over the cliff. Obviously, the pushing of Victim’s car by any assassin alone is neither strictly necessary nor strictly sufficient nor strongly necessary for Victim’s death. The absence of strict sufficiency and necessity is obvious: no assassin pushing alone can kill Victim, and no particular assassin must push so that Victim’s car will go over the cliff. To determine strong necessity we again apply the simple counterfactual but-for test by holding the pushing by the other assassins constant and ask whether the car would have gone over the cliff killing Victim had the third assassin not been pushing. The answer
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is obviously affirmative, because it takes the pushing of at least two assassins for this to happen, and since under the circumstance this is true then the car would have gone over the cliff and killed Victim. Thus, the pushing by the third assassin cannot be attributed as having causal status for Victim’s death. The same holds true for the pushing by the other two assassins. We can now turn to pre-emptive causation. This is the case in which an effect x is brought about by some actual sufficient condition(s) C 1 such that had C 1 not occurred then x would have been brought about by some alternative sufficient condition(s) C 2 . There are two sub-cases of preemptive causation: (i) The alternative set of conditions C 2 emerged after C 1 brought about x. (ii) The alternative set of conditions C 2 did not emerge because C 1 emerged and brought about x. The canonical example of type (i) pre-emptive causation is: Assassin 3 Assassin1 shoots and kills Victim who is embarking on a trek across the desert just as Victim was about to take a swig from his water bottle which was poisoned by Assassin2. Here strong necessity comes to grief given the failure of the but-for test to allocate causal status to either assassin: Assassin1 cannot be said to have caused Victim’s death on the occasion in question because had he not shot and killed Victim, Assassin2’s poisoning would have, given that Victim was just about to take a swig from his water bottle; and Assassin2 cannot be said to have caused Victim’s death because it was in fact Assassin1’s shot that did it and not his poisoning of Victim’s water. A type (ii) case is: Assassin 4 Assassin1 shoots and kills Victim. Assassin2 decides not to poison Victim’s water bottle (but would have had Assassin 1 not shot Victim). In this example strong necessity comes to grief because Assassin1 cannot be considered as having caused Victim’s death on the occasion in question because had he not shot and killed Victim, then Assassin2 would have poisoned Victim’s water; yet Assassin2 cannot be attributed as causal for Victim’s death because he not in fact poisoned the water; he only would have done if Assassin had shot Victim. I come now to the remaining and equivalent criteria of weak necessity and strong sufficiency. These criteria were introduced by Hart and Honoré (1959), Mackie (1965, 1974), and Wright (1985, 1988) in various different forms to deal with causal ascriptions when an outcome is a result of a complex of conditions.
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The idea behind the weak necessity/strong sufficiency requirement is that to be ascribed causal status for an event x a prior event C need not be the cause as in the sense of it being the single sufficient condition present on the occasion or a cause in the senses of strict or strong necessity, but merely shown to be a ‘causally relevant condition’ of x. That is, weak necessity/strong sufficiency drops what can actually be considered a deeply rooted and too narrow presupposition that, to be ascribed causal status for x , C must be directly related to x in that any state of affairs is brought about by some singularly identifiable prior event. This is the idea of ‘cause as authorship’. In its place comes a conception of causality that allows for an indirect relation between a prior event C and its consequence x ; but – and this is important – the indirect relation still maintains a necessity requirement. This is obtained by combining a sufficiency and necessity requirement in a set-based framework. That is, weak necessity/strong sufficiency means it need not be the case that a single condition is sufficient for x but that a set of conditions be sufficient (strict sufficiency is then the special case of a singleton set) on this occasion and combines this with a necessity requirement in that all members of this set are necessary for the set to be sufficient. Mackie (1965) denoted a test of weak necessity/strong sufficiency by the acronym INUS which we he defined as ‘an i nsufficient but n ecessary part of a condition which is itself u nnecessary but sufficient for the result’. In Wright’s (1985, 1988) simpler mnemonic, ‘a n ecessary e lement of a s ufficient s et’ or NESS – a mnemonic which we will use for the rest of this paper. 7 We can formally define the NESS criterion as follows. First define a set of events or states of affairs S as minimally sufficient for x if no proper subset of S is itself sufficient for x. This implies that S is the conjunction of conditions each of which is necessary (non-redundant) for S to be sufficient (i.e. each of the conjuncts in S satisfies the but-for test for the sufficiency of S). If S is not minimally sufficient it means that it contains events that are not an integral part of any set of actual conditions that is minimally sufficient for x and therefore these events could not properly be classified as a cause of x because by being redundant they are devoid of any causal efficacy for x coming about. Next, define the set M \S 1 , S 2 ,!, S n ^ as the collection of every minimally sufficient set of conditions (MSC) for x. An event C is, then, a NESS for x if, and only if, C is an element (conjunct) of some S i . For instance, if x can be written as x (AB or CD ) with (AB or CD ) being the necessary and suf7 There is a formal difference in Mackie’s (1965) initial formulation of INUS and Wright’s formulation of NESS in that in the original formulation of INUS Mackie includes a condition that rules out over-determination (condition 4). Mackie required that to qualify as a cause a condition must be a necessary member of the single sufficient set that was present on the occasion or if more such sets were present the condition was a necessary member of each such set. In his later formulation of INUS, Mackie (1974) dropped this condition.
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ficient condition for x (either for all instances of x or on this particular occasion), then C is a NESS for x by dint of it being a member of a disjunct, CD, which is minimally sufficient for x and therefore C is to be ascribed causal status for x if under the circumstances D were present, i.e.: AB x CD
The attractive feature of weak necessity/strong sufficiency is that it is general enough to cover strict and strong necessity and strict sufficiency: (a) if C is a member of every S i for any instance of x, then C is strictly necessary for x ; (b) if C was a member of every S i for a given instance of x then C is strongly necessary for x ; and (c) if C is sufficient for one S i , then C is strictly sufficient for x. To see how NESS works in cases of duplicative causation the idea is to resolve the excess sufficient set into its component MSCs. Consider again Assassin 1. Each assassin’s act of shooting is a necessary element of some S i and S j and therefore the behaviour of each marksman can be attributed causal status for Victim’s death because the behaviour of each marksman was necessary to complete a set of conditions (the marksman possessing a loaded gun in good working order, the absence of protection to the victim, etc.) sufficient for Victim to die and each of these conditions was present on the occasion in question. In Assassin 2, we see that given that it is true that the pushing of the car by each of the three assassins belongs to at least one S i consisting of pushing by two assassins and each of these MSCs were present on the occasion (the excess sufficient set being a superset of each of these MSCs), then the pushing by each assassin qualifies for causal status for Victim’s death. 8 8
The NESS test is not entirely immune from other problems that but-for causality also suffers from, such as the problem of collateral effects and the problem of causal priority. Kramer (2003: 285–295) provides a succinct overview and a work around the problems. Further, there are additional objections to NESS on the grounds that the inclusion of a sufficiency condition apparently implies that there is no causation without determinism. As many writers note, causation can take place in a probabilistic environment. For a discussion see Suppes (1970); and for the view that a cause is an event C that increased the probability that E occurred, see Vallentyne (2008). I grant that NESS is not the complete story of causation, but it would seem to apply to most social outcomes that we are discussing and therefore we need not be too concerned about this issue here. Here it is worthwhile remarking that Vallentyne’s (2008) proposal that a cause of an outcome is a prior event that increases the probability of an outcome presupposes the NESS test. We cannot go into detail here, but if an event increases the probability of an outcome then that event must be a NESS condition.
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It is similarly easy to disentangle the cases of pre-emptive causation. Here the idea is to check if a particular act is an element of an MSC that forms a pre-empting cause. In Assassin 3, Assassin1’s act of shooting is a necessary element of some S i and therefore a cause, although Assassin2’s poisoning of the water is not because although poisoned water would be sufficient for killing Victim, in the circumstances it cannot be an actual sufficient condition because Victim has already been killed by Assassin1’s shot. In Assassin 4, Assassin1’s act of shooting is a cause of Victim’s death, but Assassin2’s intention to poison Victim’s water is not. What the NESS condition does in cases of pre-emptive causation is to evaluate the claim that C 1 could not be a causal factor of x because of the existence of an alternative cause C 2 that either emerged or could have emerged subsequent to the occurrence of C 1 . This fact does not vitiate the causal status of C 1 . 9 Before tying up this section, there is still a class of problems to deal with that have thus far not been highlighted but are important because they represent so many instances in our social and institutional lives. Very generally, it is the case when one event C 1 is sufficient for x but there is a second simultaneous event C 2 that is neither sufficient for x nor necessary for a sufficient set. Yet, C 2 still ‘contributes’ in some manner. Call this redundant causation. Assassin 5 Victim is held up in his car by Assassin1 who ties and locks him up in his car. Together with Assassin2 the car is pushed over the cliff killing Victim. Assassin1 is sufficient for holding up Victim and pushing the car over the cliff. Assassin2 cannot prevent Assassin1 killing Victim.
To make this example more concrete, suppose that it requires at least 2 units of force to push Victim’s car over the cliff. Suppose further that Assassin1 has the physical strength to push with 0, 1, 2 or 3 units of force, while Assassin2 can only push with 0 or 1 unit of force. Finally, suppose Assassin1 and Assasin2 push the car over the cliff with 3 units and 1 unit of force respectively. The question here is, given that Assassin1 is sufficient for the death of Victim to what extent did Assassin2 contribute to Victim’s death? Is the naïve answer that Assassin2 obviously did not contribute to Victim’s death true? If causal contribution is a necessary (but not sufficient) criterion for moral or legal responsibility, this would mean we could not hold Assassin2 to account for his participation in the events that led to Victim’s death. Here, too, there is a way out using the NESS test. What we are after is to find an MSC such that the pushing by both assassins makes up this set. To accomplish this, we have to replace the but-for 9 In fact the NESS test is a framework for evaluating excuses that are based on ‘alternative cause’.
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test with an alternative counterfactual analysis. In the standard but-for test we hold the actions of all others constant and vary the action of the agent i and check if by doing this whether the remaining actions are still sufficient for the outcome. For the case of redundant causation, however, we have to hold the action of i constant and vary the action of some other agent j and ask if by doing so i would become a necessary member of a sufficient set. That is, we ask if there is a feasible combination of actions such that i satisfies the NESS test. If the answer is affirmative, then we can say that i ’s action is a causally relevant factor for the given outcome. We determine not only the freedom an agent has to perform a specified action, but also the freedom she has to remain passive with respect to that action. 10 In Assassin 5 we hold constant the force that Assassin2 applied to the car (1 unit) and ask if Assassin1 can apply an amount of force such that when combined with Assassin2’s force the combination is just sufficient for Victim’s car to roll over the precipice. In other words, if Assassin1 can regulate his strength, by applying 1 unit of force, which he can, then Assassin2 satisfies the NESS test, and not otherwise. We now have the answer we were looking for. It is worth remarking that this reasoning drives a further wedge between a particular type of counterfactual analysis (the but-for test) and a causal ascription. In cases of causal over-determination it is just too restrictive to only consider the i-variants in actions; we must also consider the j-variants – or the potential causal contributions.
3. Power Ascriptions I can now turn to ascriptions of social power. Two things need to be explained. The first is the generic notion of power that will be used as the basis of a comparison with social causation. The second is the choice of the criterion that demarcates social power from social causation. I start, then, with the generic concept of power. Call this power simpliciter . In very general terms, when we ascribe ‘power’ to a person we are at base referring to an ability of some sort that that the person has: what a person can do under specified circumstances. 11 It is, as Morriss’ (1987/2002: 29ff) acutely observed, the capacity to ‘effect something’ (an ‘outcome’ or ‘state of the world’ x). That is, power is about ‘accomplishing something’. 12 It is in this very basic Hobbsian conception of ‘a power’ that we see why we need only focus on the locution ‘power to’ rather than the very common ‘power over ’ when analyzing the relation between power and causal 10
I thank Martin van Hees for this insight. Note that there is an overlap between causality and action theory here and that while the NESS test works in any environment, this insight only applies to (human) action contexts (I thank Hannu Nurmi for this comment). 11 See in particular Goldman (1972) and Morriss (1987/2002). 12 This is exactly Hobbes’s (1651, Chap. 10) notion in Leviathan.
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ascriptions. For ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ are not two separate concepts, but rather the latter is derivative of the former because we can always cash out ‘power over j’ in terms of the variable x in the locution of ‘power to’. ‘If I want to say that I have the power to get my students to read Leviathan, I can say just that; I don’t have to say that I have power over my students with respect to their reading Leviathan …’ (Morriss 1987/2002: 35). Moreover, not every locution of ‘power to’ can be cashed out in terms of ‘power over’. The fact that the President of the United States can veto a bill passed by Congress with anything less than two-thirds majority does not imply that the President can get anyone to act in a counter-preferential way. And my power to throw a rock of a given size and weight fifty metres does not imply that I can get anyone to act in a counter-preferential way. In addition, ‘power over’ entails ‘power to’ in another respect. If i has power over j with respect to some issue x then it entails that that i has the power to do something such that j will perform an action such that either x occurs or it does not depending on what i wants. 13 I can now turn to the second issue. Our starting point here is the observation that the generic definition of power as effecting something is imprecise. To say that ‘i has power to x ’ means ‘i can effect x ’ helps only in as much as that it it allows us to set off power from the related, but distinct, concept of ‘influence’ which Morriss characterized by the verb ‘affecting’: the ‘altering of’ or ‘impinging on’ something in someway. But defining ‘power’ as merely ‘effecting’ does not help us to distinguish power from causation because a causal ascription can also be said to be about effecting something. A definition of power is in need of more structure. First and foremost, such a definition must establish a correspondence between actions (or a sequence of actions) and outcomes. And given that – as with causes – an agent’s action may effect an outcome only in the presence of certain other antecedent conditions, the generic definition of power must postulate that i has an action (or sequence of actions) that is at least weakly necessary (or strongly sufficient) for the occurrence of x (depending on the stated or implied conditions). Assuming anything stronger than weak necessity – in other words the NESS test – would result in a definition of power that comes to grief on the problems of overdetermination. Without going through motions all over again, recall the example of Assassin 2. In such a case any criterion stronger than weak necessity would result in the conclusion that none of the agents had the ability to effect Victim’s death, although clearly Victim could be, or was, killed. 14 13 The more basic nature of a ‘power to’ ascription is discussed in more detail in Braham and Holler (2005). 14 Note Goldman’s (1972) rejection of causal terminology is in all likelihood connected to the fact that he took such terminology to refer to stronger necessity and sufficiency conditions and was therefore faced with problems of overdetermination. I have pointed out elsewhere (Braham and Holler 2008) that Goldman’s definition of social power is one of weak
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Obviously ‘power’ as the mere ability to effect outcomes appears to be none other than ‘potential’ or ‘actual’ causal contribution, as Riker suggested. If this is the case the only difference between the concepts is linguistic. There is a sense in which this is true; but it is not the complete picture. The problem is that satisfaction of the NESS test does not fully describe the way in which we use the term power. Power is not about a mere potential or actual conditional contributive effect, but an actual or potential contributive effect of a special kind. Return once more to Assassin 5. Here ascriptions of causal contribution and power come apart because intuition says that Assassin1 had the power to kill Victim but Assassin2 did not. Yet, the NESS test can be used to ascribe Assassin2 as having made a causal contribution to Victim’s death. So wherein lies the difference between ‘power’ and ‘causal contribution’? From the story of Assassin 5, the difference is certainly not one of ‘potential’ and ‘actual’ as Riker, and to an extent Oppenheim as well, posited. If this idea would be correct, then we would be committed to saying that from Assassin2’s actual causal contribution it follows that he had some power with respect to Victim’s death. But this cannot be correct because the objective description of the circumstances is such that Assassin2 is not in possession of an action that is sufficient to kill Victim himself or is unquestionably necessary for the death of Victim and nor does he possess an action that is sufficient or necessary to prevent Victim’s death at the hands of Assassin1. For all intents and purposes, Assassin2 appears to be powerless with respect to Victim living or dying. One response is to restrict the ascription ‘i has power to x ’ to those cases in which i is effective for x and not-x (given the stated or implied conditions). This is exactly Goldman’s (1972) approach, and one that is quite widely quoted in the philosophical literature. 15 In summary form, and ignoring the trappings and trimmings of his theory of action such as the time indices, Goldman says that a power ascription takes the following form: ‘i has power to x if, and only if, the following two conditions hold: (i) if i wants x , then i would perform an appropriate act (or sequence of acts) and given the stated or implied conditions x would occur, and (ii) if i wants notx , then i would perform an appropriate act (or sequence of acts) and given the stated or implied conditions not-x would occur.’ But this will not work. It is still too weak. Consider the classic Master and Slave relation in which Slave can only obtain x at the sole behest of Master. That is, Master can physically prevent Slave obtaining x although in absence of Master’s intervention Slave has an action (or sequence of actions) for obtaining x. Now suppose Master is a benevolent soul and with respect to x
necessity/strong sufficiency, i.e. the NESS test in disguise. 15 See, for instance French (1984: Chp. 5), Lukes (1986), and Kernoahan (1989) for acceptance of Goldman’s definitions.
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always wants whatever Slave wants. Hence, if Slave wants x (not-x) then both Slave and Master perform the appropriate action (or sequence of actions) such that Slave obtains x (not-x). This means that under the stated or implied conditions of Master’s preference tracking behaviour, Goldman’s definition of power would ascribe Slave the ‘power to x ’ because whether or not x obtains now depends on the actions that Slave chooses. This cannot be correct because as far as x is concerned, Slave is utterly dependent on Master’s good will. Note that as in Assassin 5, both actors have actions that form a minimally sufficient set of conditions for x : Master’s performance of an action such that Slave in unhindered in his attempt to obtain x , and Slaves action to obtain x. Thus, neither ‘wants’ as such (preferences or desires) nor conditional control over x or not-x are necessary conditions for a power ascription. The distinguishing feature of a power ascription lies elsewhere. The feature of a power ascription that we are hunting for is well-known, but not uncontested. Generally speaking, when we make a power ascription in a social context we are assuming a situation of actual or hypothetical conflict, which means that the demarcation criterion is that of overcoming resistance or opposition. It is worthy of note, here, that Goldman acknowledges that he left out reference to such a criterion in his definitional framework on the grounds that such a criterion is required for making comparisons of power but is not required for a power ascription as such. This may be true in the case of defining personal powers as abilities to do specific things (throw a rock of a specified size and weight a given distance or play the piano to a certain level), but not true of social power. But in a later paper (1974) he claimed that his definitions are designed to capture the conception of power as ‘the ability to get what one wants, or the ability to realize one’s will. More specifically, it is the ability to realize one’s will despite the (possible) resistance or opposition of others’ (emphasis in the original). The Master–Slave example should make it quite clear that satisfying our wants or realizing our will is possible even at the sole behest of a dictator – it only requires that the dictator tracks our preferences, unless of course we add more structure to the meaning of ‘wants’ or ‘realizing our will’. 16 Thus a definition of power must explicitly include resistance or opposition as a variable. Echoing Max Weber’s definition of power, 17 we have: Power ‘i has power to x (not-x)’ if, and only if, i has an action (or sequence of actions) that is at least weakly necessary/strongly sufficient under the 16 Including ‘overcoming potential resistance’ in the meaning of ‘getting what I want’ or ‘realizing my will’ is not an innocent move because rules out the existence of adaptive preferences. 17 ‘In general, we understand by ‘power’ the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action’ (in Gerth and Mills 1948: 180).
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stated or implied conditions for the occurrence of x (not-x) despite the actual or possible resistance of some others to the occurrence of x (not-x). This definition requires further qualification. Firstly the reference to x or not-x ensures generality because it is quite possible that an agent may have power for x or not-x but not both (e.g. in Assassin 1, assuming that neither assassin can kill the other, then both assassins only have the power to kill Victim but not the power to see that he survives). The definition could equally be written as ‘for a particular state of affairs s, i has some power with respect to an outcome if …’ Secondly, that the resistance need not be actual we avoid preferencetracking effects such as in the Master–Slave example. For Slave to have the ‘power to x’, x must occur as a result of Slave’s action even if Master is against x occurring and performs the requisite action to prevent x ; or for Slave to have some power in this relationship he must at least be able to prevent x , i.e. guarantee not-x . As neither of these conditions are met Slave is powerless. Thirdly, the application of the existential rather than the universal quantifier on the resistance variable is to ensure that, given our knowledge of the stated or implied conditions, the agents, and the available actions, we can always identify a powerful agent in any situation. To demand that i must be able to the overcome the possible or actual resistance of all others (universal quantifier) before i can be deemed as having power to x , is to demand too much. It is equivalent to saying that i must at least have a veto with respect to x for i to be ascribed ‘power to x ’ (see section 4). In most circumstances such a condition cannot be satisfied (e.g. as in Assassin 2). So, either we dump the resistance criterion, in which case we could not tell apart a causal from a power ascription, or we can weaken it by applying the existential quantifier. 18 The resistance criterion illuminates a further aspect of the use of ‘power’, that of ‘forcing’ and ‘winning’. If i has the potential to effect x against the will of another, then i can force or guarantee that outcome, i.e. ‘wins in a clash of wills’. Now we have the fuller story: social causality is about contributing to some social outcome; social power is about contributing to forcing it. These are conceptually distinct abilities. These two abilities may or may not coincide. In Assassin 1, for instance, we have the coincidence of power and cause: each assassin can force Victim’s death against the will of the other because each has an action that is sufficient for Victim’s death 18
In a recent article Dowding (2003: 312) rejected the resistance criterion for a definition of power on the assumption that the universal quantifier must be applied. He does not discuss the use of the existential quantifier. Dowding’s intention is to replace the ‘clash of wills’ account of power with a ‘resource-based’ one. It must be said, however, that Dowding does not demonstrate that the inclusion of a resistance criterion in a definition of power is incompatible with his resource account. If it were, he would have to demonstrate how his account could handle the causality–power distinction.
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and on the same account each is a causal condition for his death. In Assassin 2, each assassin can force Victim’s death because each has an action that is a necessary part of a set of sufficient conditions that can force Victims’ death against the will of another (e.g. Assassin1 and Assassin2 against Assasin3). From the construction of this example, power and cause once again perfectly coincide. The sets of actions that are minimally sufficient are precisely those that are minimally sufficient for forcing the outcome. But in Assassin 5 the situation is different: power and cause come apart because there exists a combination of actions that is minimally sufficient for the death of Victim, but this combination does not correspond to a set of agents each of which has an action such that each agent’s action is necessary to force Victims death. In this example Assassin2 can contribute to Victim’s death, but he could not, and cannot, force or preclude anything against the will of Assassin1. Therefore, for a causal ascription we are required to examine any combination of actions (or sequences of actions) that are minimally sufficient for the outcome; but power ascriptions demand more. The resistance criterion focuses our attention on those combination of actions (or sequence of actions) that each agent would choose if each agent wanted to force the outcome against the will of others. It is this restriction that makes the set of power ascriptions a subset of the set of causal ascriptions.
4. Power and Cause Untangled 19 Although we have the result we are looking for and could wind up the analysis here, there is still a useful formal exercise to perform. The task is to illuminate the power–causality distinction exactly so that we can see why the set inclusion conjecture is true. Given that we are dealing with strategic combinations of actions, the natural formal framework to do this is that of game form. Let X be a set of outcomes and N \1,!, n ^ a set of agents. Let G (a 1 ,!a n , Q) be a game form on X. Each a i is a set of actions, Q is a function from the set of action combinations, or plays, onto X. (Note that since the function is onto X, each element is an outcome in at least one play of the game.) Although we have seen that causal ascriptions are more basic than power ascriptions, it is simpler to start with the latter. For this we can make use of the concept of an effectivity function which is a model of power among agents and coalitions. Given X and N, we say that a coalition T N is B-effective for A X if, and only if, (i) T is non-empty: there is an action profile (or combination) a T such that for any action profile a N T of others, 19 This section is a result of close collaboration with Martin van Hees. The idea of ‘coalitional events’ as a way of formalizing the sufficiency condition is due to him.
Social Power and Social Causation
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Q(a T , a N T ) A ; (ii) T is empty: A X . For non-empty T we can also say that T is B-effective for A through a T . 20 Next, we say that a coalition T is a minimal winning coalition (MWC) for A if, and only if, it is B-effective for A and no proper subset of T is as well. We say that an agent ‘i has power to bring about A’ if, and only if, there is a MWC for A that contains i. Note that membership of an MWC guarantees the fulfilment of the resistance condition because if T is an MWC for A, then by definition T \i ^ is not B-effective for A so that ceteris paribus i can force an outcome, X A against the resistance of the remaining members of T; and if T \i ^ is not B-effective for A but T \i ^ is, then ceteris paribus, i can force an outcome, A, against the resistance of the members of N T . We can now turn to causation. In particular we have to find an appropriate game theoretic formulation of the NESS test. Recall from the discussion of causal relations the NESS test checks if certain events are part of a set of conditions that are minimally sufficient for an outcome. In this case the events are ‘actions’ performed by agents. That is we have to translate an MSC into a game theoretic definition. This formalization must be able to capture the fact that in Assassin 5, both assassins have actions that are together an MSC but also that Assassin1 has an action that alone is an MSC. First we need the concept of a sufficient condition, which very naturally is a profile (a 1 ,!a n ) that is sufficient for A. As we are dealing with event causation, call such a profile an event for A. Next, we need the concept of a ‘coalitional event’ or T-event, a T , which is a (possibly empty) set, the elements of which are the actions of members of T (one for each member). A T-event is sufficient for A if, and only if, (i) T is non-empty: T is B-effective for A through a T ; (ii) T is empty: A X . Next, for any i T v , let a T \i ^ denote the T \i ^ -event in which the members of T \i ^ adopt the same actions as in a T . A T-event a T is a minimally sufficient set of conditions (MSC) for A, iff, (i) a T is a sufficient condition for A; and (ii) if T v , then for all i T : a T \i ^ is not a sufficient condition for A. Thus for a given A, i satisfies the NESS test and therefore makes a causal contribution to A if i has an action that is part of an MSC. Note that an MSC says nothing about resistance because all that matters is that the T-event is sufficient for A and not about A being guraranteed. It should now be obvious from comparing the definitions of power (MWC) and causation (MSC), for any A and any T , if T is an MWC for A, then there is a T-event that forms a MSC for A. Hence a power ascription implies a causal ascription. The converse, however, is not true: Assassin 5 is the relevant counter-example. Thus the set of MSCs for A contains the set of 20 I use the term B-effective to distinguish from a weaker concept of effectivity, that of Ceffectivity. Under this definition, a coalition T ’s power is determined not by the coalitions’s ability to realize A directly but by the ability of N T to interfere with T obtaining A. T is Ceffective for A if N T cannot veto A. I will not make use of C-effectivity here.
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Matthew Braham
MWCs for A, but, depending on the game form, there may exist an MSC that does not correspond to an MWC. QED. To cut a long story short, whereas power is about individuals being necessary elements of coalitions that are sufficient for some event A, causality is about actions being necessary elements of events, the action profiles, that are sufficient for A. Both types of ascriptions make use of the NESS test, but in each case the NESS test refers to different objects. 21
5. Concluding Remarks I will now tie up this essay by glancing at the consequences of this analysis. While it could be said that I have done a lot for very little, the very little has broad and fruitful consequences. As I see it, these consequences can be classified into two camps: methodological and normative. Methodologically, the result of this study allows us to finally put to rest the idea that power is a redundant concept, with no separate meaning to that of causality (Riker’s thesis). There is a distinct difference between the two concepts: an ascription of causal contribution contains no reference to resistance and force; and formally speaking cause and power refer to different objects, namely, MSCs and MWCs respectively. And we can also put to rest the idea that power and cause are only overlapping categories (Oppenheim’s thesis) or the idea that causal terminology is not useful for our understanding of power (Goldman’s thesis). The March–Dahl setinclusion thesis is the correct one. 22 Secondly, proving that power ascriptions are a subset of causal ascriptions is, as intimated at the outset, significant for normative theory, in particular to theories of responsibility. This is important, because the allocation of blame or praise is one of the ways in which we judge and regulate the behaviour of our fellows, our institutions, and everyday affairs. I cannot enlarge on this matter here, but I can suggest two domains of responsibility for which the power–cause distinction is of special significance. The first is the domain of what we may call ‘retrospective responsibility’, or responsibility for what has occurred. In such situations, the concept of power is, in general, too narrow because it will exonerate some agents even if they have contributed to a particular state of affairs (e.g. Assassin 5). If a theory of responsibility should connect individual actions to outcomes, then causal contribution appears to be a necessary criterion. The second domain of moral responsibility for which the concept of 21 Note that for certain types of games in which action and outcome sets are binary (simple games) power and causality coincide. This indicates why power can be used in such circumstances to allocate responsibility. See, for instance, Holler (2007). 22 There is another methodological consequence that is related to the construction of power indices, which I cannot discuss here. However, a brief analysis can be found in Braham (2005).
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power has played a vital role is that of prospective responsibility; or that which we owe to others. This domain includes questions of, for instance, who bears positive duties to others in need. In this context, an ethical proposition by Peter Singer (1972) raises its head: ‘if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought to do it.’ Clearly by ‘power’ Singer means the ‘can of ability’ and his moral proposition turns on the canonical deontic principle of ‘ought implies can’. But is this ‘can of ability’ that of ‘power to’? If it is, then this rendition of ‘ought implies can’ is, with all probably, too strong for the purposes of allocating positive duties. Obviously, if our behaviour does not impinge either actually or potentially on the lives of others then we cannot be thought to have any duty towards others. But we need not have power before we can impinge on the lives of others; we can do so even if we are powerless (see Assassin 5 once more). In this fashion our positive duties towards others should be based on our potential causal contributions, irrespective of our power. If by acting alone Norman can prevent Manfred being harmed (he has power to prevent harm to Manfred), without sacrifice to anything of moral importance but Bernie can only assist Norman in doing so as a causal contribution (and also without any sacrifice), Bernie has an obligation to assist Norman in preventing the harm to Manfred. Not only can powerlessness not be cited as a basis for exoneration from what we have done; it cannot even be cited as a basis of exonerating us from a moral obligation to perform an act that is an overdetermining cause. 23 The only valid basis for being exonerated in this arena is causal inefficacy. But it would be mistaken to think that theories of responsibility can be liberated from the concept of power. It undoubtedly maintains a central importance because being ascribed power places special duties upon us: that of leadership and organization. To have power with respect to preventing a harm (or righting a wrong) implies not only a duty of preventing the harm (or righting the wrong) but of mobilizing the moral community – all those who can, via their causal effects, impinge upon the lives of others. It is the choices of the powerful that govern how effectual the powerless will be.
Acknowledgements This paper grew out of earlier joint work with Manfred Holler to whom I am indebted for endless discussions and inspiration over the last seven years. I would also like to thank Hartmut Kliemt and Hannu Nurmi for written comments as well as the participants at the conference on ‘Power: 23
This position is, admittedly a contentious one. It stands in direct contrast to Parfit’s (1984: 82–83) claim, using an argument that is for all intents and purposes the INUS/NESS test, that a person does not have a duty to perform an act that is an overdetermining cause.
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Conceptual, Formal, and Applied Dimensions’, 17–20 August 2006, Hamburg, for criticisms and suggestions. Special thanks go to Martin van Hees as he really deserves co-authorship because much of the analysis is based on our collaborative efforts to untangle the concepts analyzed here. Section 4, in particular, bears Martin’s footprint and has now found expression in new joint work.
References Barry, B. (1976) Power: An Economic Analysis, in B. Barry (ed.) Power and Political Theory: Some European Perspectives, John Wiley, 69–101. Braham, M. (2005) Causation and the Measurement of Power, Homo Oeconomicus 22: 645–52. Braham, M. and Holler, M.J. (2005) The Impossibility of a Preference-based Power Index, Journal of Theoretical Politics 17: 137–158. Braham, M. and Holler, M.J. (2008) Distributing Causal Responsibility in Collectivities, in T. Boylan and R. Gekker (eds) Economics, Rational Choice, and Normative Philosophy, Routledge. Connolly, W.E. (1983) The Terms of Political Discourse. Martin Robinson. Dahl, R.A. (1957) The Concept of Power, Behavioral Science 2: 201–215. Dahl, R.A. (1963) Modern Political Analysis, Prentice Hall. Dahl, R.A. (1968) Power, in D.L. Sills (ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Macmillan, 405–415. Dowding, K. (2003) Resources, Power, and Systematic Luck: A Response to Barry, Politics, Philosophy and Economics 2: 305–22. French, P.A. (1984) Collective and Corporate Responsibility, Columbia University Press. Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C.W. (eds) (1948) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Routledge. Goldman, A.I. (1972) Toward a Theory of Social Power, Philosophical Studies 23: 221– 268. Goldman, A.I. (1974) On the Measurement of Power, Journal of Philosophy 71: 231– 252. Hart, H.L.A. and Honoré, A.M. (1959) Causation in the Law, Oxford University Press. Held, V. (1972) Coercion and Coercive Offers, in J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds) Coercion, Aldine Atherton. Hobbes, T. (1651) Leviathan, Oxford University Press. Holler, M.J. (2007) Freedom of Choice, Power, and the Responsibility of Decision Makers, in A. Marciano and J.-M. Josselin (eds) Democracy, Freedom and Coercion: A Law and Economics Approach, Eward Elgar, 22–42. Honoré, A.M. (1995) Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law, in D. Owen (ed.) Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, Oxford University Press, 363–385. Kernohan, A. (1989) Social Power and Human Agency, Journal of Philosophy 86: 712– 726. Kramer, M.H. (2003) The Quality of Freedom, Oxford University Press. Lukes, S. (ed.) (1986) Power, Basil Blackwell. Mackie, J.L. (1965) Causes and Conditions, American Philosophical Quarterly 2: 245– 264.
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Mackie, J.L. (1974) The Cement of the Universe, Oxford University Press. March, J.G. (1955) An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Power, American Political Science Review 49: 431–451. Morriss, P. (1987/2002) Power: A Philosophical Analysis, Manchester University Press. Nagel, J. (1975) The Descriptive Analysis of Power, Yale University Press. Oppenheim, F.E. (1960) Degrees of Power and Freedom, American Political Science Review 54: 437–446. Oppenheim, F.E. (1961) Dimensions of Freedom, St. Martins Press. Oppenheim, F.E. (1976) Power and Causation, in B. Barry (ed.) Power and Political Theory: Some European Perspectives, John Wiley, 103–116. Oppenheim, F.E. (1981) Political Concepts: A Reconstruction, University of Chicago Press. Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press. Pearl, J. (2000) Causality: Models, Reasoning, Inference. Cambridge University Press. Riker, W.H. (1964) Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power, American Political Science Review 58: 341–349. Russell, B. (1913) On the Notion of Cause, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 13: 1– 26. Simon, H.A. (1957) Models of Man, Wiley. Singer, P. (1972) Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1: 229–243. Suppes, P. (1970) A Probabalistic Theory of Causality, North Holland. Vallentyne, P. (2008) Brute Luck and Responsibility, Politics, Philosophy and Economics (forthcoming). Wright, R. (1985) Causation in Tort Law, California Law Review 73: 1735–1828. Wright, R. (1988) Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, Iowa Law Review 73: 1001–1077.
2. Power Indices Methodology: Decisiveness, Pivots, and Swings František Turnovec Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
Jacek W. Mercik Wroclaw University of Technology, Poland
Mariusz Mazurkiewicz Wroclaw University of Technology, Poland
1. Introduction Three most frequently used measures of a priori voting power of members of a committee were proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954), Penrose (1946) and Banzhaf (1965), and Holler and Packel (1983). We shall refer to them also as SS -power index, PB-power index and HP-power index. There exist also some other well defined power indices, such as Johnston index (1978) and Deegan-Packel index (1979). 1 In this paper we analyse the Shapley-Shubik, Penrose-Banzhaf and Holler-Packel concepts of power measurement the so called I-power (voter’s potential influence over the outcome of voting) and P-power (expected relative share in a fixed prize available to the winning group of committee members) classification introduced by Felsenthal et al. (1998). We show that objections to the Shapley-Shubik index, based on its interpretation as a P-power concept, are not sufficiently justified. The Shapley-Shubik, PenroseBanzhaf and Holler-Packel measures can all be successfully derived as cooperative game values, and at the same time they can be interpreted as probabilities of being in some decisive position (pivot, swing) without using cooperative game theory at all (Turnovec 2004; Turnovec et al. 2004). It is demonstrated in the paper that both pivots and swings can be introduced as special cases of a more general concept of decisiveness based on assumption of equi-probable orderings expressing preferences of com1 For a comprehensive survey and analysis of power indices methodology, see Felsenthal and Machover (1998).
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František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
mittee members’ support for voted issue. New general a priori voting power measure was proposed in Turnovec (2007), distinguishing between absolute and relative power and covering Shapley-Shubik, Penrose-Banzhaf and Holler-Packel indices as its special cases.
2. Basic Concepts Let N (1,!, n ) be the set of members (players, parties) and X i (i 1,!, n ) be the (real, non-negative) weight of the i-th member such that
X
i
U, Xi p 0
i N
(e.g. the number of votes of party i, or the ownership of i in number of shares), where U is the total weight of all members. Let H be a real number such that 0 H b U . The (n 1)-tuple [H , X] = [H , X 1 ,y, X n ] such that n
X
i
U , X i p 0, 0 H b U
i=1
we call a committee (or a weighted voting body) of the size n with quota H, total weight U, and allocation of weights X. Any non-empty subset S N we call a voting configuration. Given an allocation X and a quota H, we say that S N is a winning voting configuration, if i S X i p H and a losing voting configuration, if i S X i H. A configuration S is winning, if it has a required majority, otherwise it is losing. Let n ¯ G ¡(H , X) \ n 1 : X i U , X i p 0, 0 b H b U ° ¡¢ °± i 1
be the space of all committees of the size n, total weight U and quota H. A power index is a vector valued function 1 : G l \ n mapping the space G of all committees into \ n . A power index represents for each of the committee members a reasonable expectation that she will be ‘decisive’ in the sense that her vote (yes or no) will determine the final outcome of voting. The probability to be decisive we call an absolute power index of an individual member; by normalization of an absolute power index we obtain a relative power of an individual member. By 1 i (H , X) and Q i (H , X) we denote the absolute and relative power an index grants to the i-th member of a committee with allocation of weights X, total weight U, and quota H. Minimal requirements usually imposed on power mapping 1 : G l \ n are the anonymity, dummy, and symmetry axioms. Let [H , X] be a committee with the set of members N and T : N l N be a permutation mapping. The committee [H , T X] we call a permutation of the committee [H , X], T(i ) being the new name (number) of the member
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with original name i. The anonymity axiom requires that 1 i (H , X) 1 T(i )(H , T X). This says that power is a property of being a committee member and not of the name or number of the committee member. A member i N of a committee [H , X] is said to be dummy if she cannot benefit any voting configuration by joining it, i.e. the member i is dummy if k S X k p H º k S \ {i } X k p H for any winning configuration S N such that i S . The dummy axiom requires that 1 i (H , X) 0 if and only if i is dummy. Two distinct members i and j of a committee [H , X] are called symmetric if their benefit to any voting configuration is the same, i.e. for any S such that i , j S then k S i X k p H k S j X k p H. This axiom requires that the power of symmetric members is the same. To define a particular power measure means to identify some qualitative property (decisiveness) whose presence or absence in voting process can be established and quantified (Nurmi 1997). Generally there are two such properties related to the position of committee members in voting that are used as a starting point for quantification of an a priori voting power: a swing position and a pivotal position of a member.
3. Pivots and Swings The SS -power index is based on the concept of pivot. Let the numbers 1,!,n be the fixed names of committee members and (i 1 ,!, i n ) be a permutation of the members of the committee. Let us assume that member k is in a position r in this permutation, i.e. k i r . We say that k is in a pivotal position (has a pivot) with respect to a permutation (i 1 ,!, i n ) , if r 1
X j 1
r ij
H
and
X
ij
p H.
j 1
Assume that a strict ordering of members in a given permutation expresses an intensity of their support (preferences) for a particular issue in the sense that, if a member i s precedes in this permutation a member i t , then support by i s for the particular proposal to be decided is stronger than support by i t . One can expect that the group supporting the proposal will be formed in the order of positions of members in the given permutation. If it is so, then the k will be in situation when the group composed from preceding members in the given permutation still does not have enough of votes to pass the proposal, and a group of members place behind her in the permutation has not enough of votes to block the proposal. The group that will manage his support will win. A member in a pivotal situation has a decisive influence on the final outcome. Assuming many voting acts and all possible preference orderings equally likely, under the full veil of ignorance about other aspects of individual preferences, it makes sense to evaluate an
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František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
a priori voting power of each committee member as a probability of being in pivotal situation. This probability is measured by the SS-power index: 1 iSS(H , X)
pi . n!
Here p i is the number of pivotal positions of the committee member i and n ! is the number of permutations of the committee members, i.e. n number of different orderings of n elements. From i 1 p i n ! it follows that Q i (H , X) 1 i (H , X) (i.e. the relative SS-power index is equal to an absolute one). The PB-power index is based on the concept of swing. Let S be a winning configuration in a committee [H , X]. We say that i S has a swing in configuration S if k S X k p H and k S \ {i } X k H. Let s i denotes the total number of swings of the member i in the committee [H , X]. The original Penrose definition of voting power was in the absolute form (the absolute PBpower index) given by: 1 iPB(H , X)
si . 2 n 1
Assuming that all configurations are equally likely this is nothing else but the probability that the given member will be decisive (the probability to have a swing). The PB-power index is frequently used in relative form and is obtained by normalization of the absolute PB-index: Q iPB(H , X)
si
s
. k
k N
The Holler-Packel power index also belongs to the class of swing-based measures. Let S be a winning configuration in a committee [H , X]. We say that S is a minimal winning configuration if for any i S it holds that k S X k p H and k S \ {i } X k H. The HP-power index assigns to each member of a committee the share of power proportional to the number of swings in minimal winning configurations of which he is a member. Let m i denote the total number of swings of the member i in minimal winning configurations in the committee, then the Holler-Packel index in relative form is: Q iHP (H , X)
mi . m k k N
It is assumed that all winning configurations are possible but only minimal critical winning configurations are being formed to exclude free-riding of the members that cannot influence the outcome of voting. The ‘public
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27
good’ interpretation (the power of each member of a minimal winning configuration is identical with the power of the minimal winning configuration as a whole, power is indivisible) is used to justify the HP index. Although Holler and Packel never presented an absolute form of their index, it is possible to do it following the logic of the PB index. Assuming that only minimal winning configurations will be formed and all of them are equally likely, we obtain the absolute HP-power index as:
1 iHP(H , X)
mi N(H , X)
where N(H , X) stands for number of minimal winning configurations in committee [H , X]. The absolute HP-power index gives the probability that given member will have a swing in a minimal winning configuration (ratio of the number of her memberships in minimal winning configurations to the total number of minimal winning configurations). The SS-power index, PB-power index, and the HP-power index satisfy anonymity, dummy and symmetry axioms.
4. I-Power and P-Power Felsenthal et al. (1998) introduced the concepts I- and P-power. By I-power they mean: … voting power conceived of as a voter’s potential influence over the outcome of divisions of the decision making body: whether proposed bills are adopted or blocked. Penrose’s approach was clearly based on this notion, and his measure of voting power is a proposed formalization of a priori I-power (Felsenthal and Machover 2004: 9).
By P-power they mean: … voting power conceived as a voter’s expected relative share in a fixed prize available to the winning coalition under a decision rule, seen in the guise of a simple TU (transferable utility) cooperative game. The Shapley-Shubik approach was evidently based on this notion, and their index is a proposed quantification of a priori Ppower (Felsenthal and Machover 2004: 9).
Hence, the fundamental distinction between I-power and P-power is in the fact that the I-power notion takes the outcome to be the immediate one, passage or defeat of the proposed bill, while the P-power view is that passage of the bill is merely the ostensible and proximate outcome of a division; the real and ultimate outcome is the distribution of fixed a purse – the prize of power – among the winners (Felsenthal and Machover, 2004: 9–10). As a conclusion it follows that SS-power index does not measure a priori voting
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František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
power, but says how to agree on dividing the ‘pie’ (benefits of victory). As the major argument of this classification the authors provide a historical observation: Penrose’s 1946 paper was either unnoticed or ignored by mainstream – predominantly American – social choice theorists, and Shapley and Shubik’s 1954 paper was seen as inaugurating the scientific study of voting power. Because the Shapley-Shubik paper was wholly based on cooperative game theory, it induced among social scientists an almost universal unquestioning belief that the study of power was necessarily and entirely a branch of that theory (Felsenthal and Machover, 2004: 8). The conclusion follows on the grounds that given cooperative game theory with transferable utility is about how to divide a pie, and SS-power index was derived as a special case of Shapley value of cooperative game, the SS-power index is about P-power and does not measure voting power as such. We demonstrated above that one does not need cooperative game theory to define and justify SS-power index. The SS-power index is a probability to be in a pivotal situation in an intuitively plausible process of forming a winning configurations with no division of benefits involved whatsoever. It is interesting to note that the SS-power index appeared as a special case of Shapley value for cooperative games with the transferable utility, but in exactly the same way one can handle the PB-index. Let us make a short excursion into cooperative game theory. Let N be the set of players in a cooperative game (cooperation among the players is permitted and the players can form coalitions and transfer utility gained together among themselves) and 2 N the power set of N, i.e. the set of all subsets S N , called coalitions, including empty coalition. The characteristic function of the game is a mapping v : 2 N l \ with v() 0. The interpretation of v : 2 N l \ v is that for any subset S N the number v(S) is the value (worth) of the coalition S, in terms how much ‘utility’ the members of S can divide among themselves in any way that sums to no more than v(S) if they all agree. The characteristic function is said to be super-additive if for any two disjoint subsets S ,T N we have v(S T ) p v(S ) v(T ) i.e. the worth of the coalition S T is equal to at least the sum of worth of its parts acting separately. Let us denote cooperative game in characteristic function form by [N , v ] . The game [N , v ] is said to be super-additive if its characteristic function is super-additive. By a value of the game [N , v ] we mean a non-negative vector K(N , v ) such that i N K i (N , v ) v(N ). By c(i ,T ) v(T ) v(T \ {i }) we denote the marginal contribution of the player i N to the coalition T N . Then, in an abstract setting, the value K i (N , v ) of the i-th player in the game [N , v ] can be defined as a weighted sum of his marginal contributions to all possible coalitions he is a member of: K i (v ) T N ,i T B(T )c(i ,T ). Different weights B(T ) lead to different values. Shapley (1953) defined his value by the weights
Power Indices Methodology
B(T )
29
(t 1)!(n t )! n!
where t is the cardinality of T. He proved that it is the only value that satisfies the following three axioms: (i) dummy axiom (see above), (ii) anonymity axiom (see above), and (iii) additivity axiom (sum of two games [N ,v ] and [N , u ] is the value K(N , v u ) K(N , v ) K(N , u )). As Owen (1982) noticed, the relative PB-index is meaningful for general cooperative games with transferable utilities. One can define Banzhaf value by setting the weights B(T )
v(N ) . c(k ,T )
k N ,T N
Owen demonstrates a certain relation between the Shapley value and Banzhaf value of cooperative game with transferable utilities: both give averages of player’s marginal contributions, the difference lies in the weighting coefficients (in the Shapley value coefficients depend on size of coalitions, in the Banzhaf value they are independent of coalition size). There is also a similar generalization of the Holler-Packel public good index (which is based on membership in minimal winning configurations, in which each member has a swing) as a cooperative game value (Holler and Li 1995). The relation between values and power indices is straightforward: a cooperative characteristic function game represented by a characteristic function v such that v takes only the values 0 and 1 is called a simple game. With any committee with quota H and allocation X we can associate a superadditive simple game such that £ ¦1 if i S X i p H v(S ) ¦ ¤ ¦ ¦ ¥0 otherwise.
Super-additive simple games can be used as natural models of voting in committees. Shapley and Shubik (1954) applied the concept of the Shapley value for general cooperative characteristic function games to the superadditive simple games as a measure of voting power in committees. Here we demonstrated that PB relative power index can be extended as a value for general cooperative characteristic function games. But we do not need cooperative games to model voting in committees.
5. A Generalized Concept of Decisiveness In a committee [H , X] with the set of members N, let (S 1 ,!, S k ), k b n be a partition of N, i.e. * kj 1 S j N and for any s , t N , s v t it holds that
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František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
S s S t . Let ( j 1 ,!, j k ) be a permutation of numbers (1,!, k ), then S (S j1 ,!, S j k ) we call an ordering defined on N, ordered collection of groups of voters. Considering a particular issue being voted, the following interpretation of an ordering S on N is possible. Let r S j u , t S j v . (a) If u v , then a member r ’s support for the particular proposal is stronger than the support of member t. (b) If u v , then support for a particular proposal by the both r and t is the same. If u v , it is plausible to assume, that if members of S j v vote ‘yes’, then the members of S j u also vote ‘yes’, if the members of S j u vote ‘no’, then the members from S j v also vote ‘no’. From formal reason we denote S j o \0^ and X 0 0. Let S (S 1 ,!, S v ,!, S k ) be an ordering. We say that a group S v is in a pivotal position in ordering S, if v 1
v
X i H
and
j 0 i S j
X
i
p H.
j 1 i S j
Under our assumptions, if the pivotal group votes ‘yes’, then the outcome of voting is ‘yes’ and if they vote ‘no’, then the outcome is ‘no’. We say that a member t S v (v 0) is in a decisive situation (has a swing) in an ordering (S 1 ,!, S v ,!, S k ) if S v is pivotal group and S v \ \t ^ is not a pivotal group. Let the group S v is pivotal and t S v , then t is decisive if and only if either v1
X
i
j 0 i S j
Xi H
i S v \ {t }
(i.e. if the group S v joins preceding groups voting ‘yes’, then by changing unilaterally his ‘yes’ to ‘no’ member t changes the outcome of voting from ‘yes’ to ‘no’), or v 1
X
i
Xt p H
j 0 i S j
(i.e. if the group S v does not join preceding groups voting ‘yes’, then by changing unilaterally his ‘no’ to ‘yes’ member t changes the outcome of voting from ‘no’ to ‘yes’). The generalized concept of decisiveness combines the logic of pivots and swings: member of a committee is decisive, if she has swing in a pivotal group.
6. Partition and Ordering Numbers Let N be a finite set of size n, k a positive integer (1 b k b n ) , and T (N , k ) (T1 ,T 2 ,!,T k ) be a set of k disjoint nonempty subsets of N such that for any k r , s b k , r v s ,T r T s , * j 1T j N (partition of N of the size k). Let
Power Indices Methodology
31
Table 1. Partition Numbers p(n , k ) , Stirling’s Numbers of the Second Kind n k
1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 3 7 15 31 63 127
n k
1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 6 14 30 62 126 254
3
1 6 25 90 301 966
4
1 10 65 350 1701
5
6
1 15 140 1050
1 21 266
7
8
Total
1 28
1
1 2 5 15 52 203 877 4140
7
8
Total
Table 2. Ordering Numbers o(n , k )
3
6 36 150 540 1806 5796
4
5
6
24 240 120 1560 1800 720 8400 16800 15120 5040 40824 126000 191520 141120
1 3 13 75 541 4683 47293 40320 545835
P (N , k ) be the set of all partitions of N of the size k, and p(n , k ) the cardinality of P (N , k ). Then, setting p(n , k ) 1, and p(n , n ) 1 for any positive integers k and n such that 1 k n we have: p(n , k ) p(n 1, k 1) kp(n 1, k ).
The above recurrence relation generates so called Stirling’s numbers of the second kind (we shall refer to them also as partition numbers), which count the number of ways to partition a set of n elements into k nonempty subsets, see e.g. Hall (1967). In Table 1 we provide several values of Stirling’s numbers of the second kind. For instance, the number p(6, 4) 65 in column k 4 and row n 6 , indicating that there exist 65 distinct partitions of 6 elements into 4 nonempty subsets, is given by 65 25 (4 q10), where 25 is the number above and to the left of 65, 10 is the number above 65, and 4 is the number of column containing the 10. The last column provides total number of partitions of n elements. There exists also an explicit formula for partition numbers:
p(n , k )
1 k k (1)k j j j n . k ! j 1
32
František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
Having a partition of N of the size k, there exist k ! ways how to order its elements. Let us denote by O(N , k ) the set of all orderings of the size k defined on N, and P(n , k ) its cardinality. Then, setting P(n ,1) 1 and P(n , n ) n ! for any positive integers k and n such that 1 k n , we have P(n , k ) k P(n 1, k 1) k P(n 1, k ). This recurrence relation directly follows from Stirling’s numbers of the second kind. We shall refer to P(n , k ) as ordering numbers. In Table 2 we provide several values of ordering numbers. For instance, the number P(5,3) 150 in column 3 and row n 3 , indicating that there exist 150 distinct orderings of 5 elements with 3 nonempty indifference classes, is given by 150 3 q14 3 q 36 , where 14 is the number above and to the left of 150, 36 is the number above 150, and 3 is the number of column containing the 150. The last column provides total number of orderings of n elements. There exists also an explicit formula for ordering numbers: k
k P(n , k ) (1)k j j j n . j 1
7. Generalized Power Indices Using definition of decisiveness from section 5, it makes sense to measure a priori voting power of the member of a committee by number of her decisive situations. Assuming that in sufficiently large number of voting acts all orderings (expressing preferences of members’ groups) are equiprobable, then measure of so called absolute power of the member i is given by the ratio of the number of her decisive situations to the number of orderings, and relative power is given by the ratio of the number of decisive situations of the member i to the total number of decisive situations. n In a committee [H , X] with set of members N, let O(N ) * k 1O(n , k ) be a set of all orderings, including the weak ones. By O(n , n ) we denote the set of all strict orderings, and by O(n ,2) the set of all binary orderings. To follow standard logic of voting, we extend the set of binary orderings by two orderings: (, N ) and (N , ), reflecting two bipartitions of ‘no’ and ‘yes’ voters (everybody prefers vote ‘no’, everybody prefers vote ‘yes’). Let us denote extended set of binary orderings by B(N ) O(n ,2) \(, N ),(N , )^ .
Then, for evaluation of a priori voting power, we consider generic set of orderings n
W (N ) * O(n , k ) \(, N ),(N , )^. k 2
Power Indices Methodology
33
Clearly, (S(N )) n ! and (B(N )) 2 n and n
n
k
k (W (N )) P(n , k ) 2 (1)k j j j n 2. k 2 k 2 j 1 Let us define
£ ¦1 if i is decisive in O S i (O ) ¦ ¤ ¦ ¦ ¥0 otherwise where O W (N ) , and R(O ) such that R(O ) p 0, O W (N ) R(O ) 1
which is a probability that ordering O will appear. Then, 1 i ,R(H , X)
R(O )S i (O )
O W ( N )
is a probability that, given a probability distribution R over the set W (N ) , i N will be decisive in a committee [H , X], an absolute general form of power index. The general form of a relative power index of the member i is:
R(O )S (O ) (H , X) R(O )S (O ) i
Q i ,R
O W ( N )
k
k N O W ( N )
which is the share of the i-th member in total power. Considering strict orderings only and selecting £ 1 1 ¦ ¦ ¦ S(N ) n ! R (O ) ¤ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¥0 SS
if O S(N ) otherwise
which is the equi-probability of strict orderings and from which we obtain the absolute SS-power index. From i N O S (N ) R SS (O )S i (O ) n ! it follows that absolute SS-power index is equal to relative SS-power index. Considering the extended set of binary orderings only and selecting £ 1 1 ¦ ¦ ¦ R (O ) ¤ B(N ) 2 n ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¥0 PB
if O B(N ) otherwise
which is the equi-probability of binary orderings, we obtain the absolute PBpower index: the ratio of number of swings to the number of binary orderings. The framework can also be used to define the Holler-Packel index. Let
34
František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
D(N ) B(N ) be a set of such binary orderings in which each member of pivotal group has swing (orderings with minimal pivotal groups). Considering only such binary orderings and selecting R
HP
£ 1 ¦ ¦ ¦ D(N ) (O ) ¤ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¥0
if O D(N ) otherwise
we obtain the absolute and relative versions of this index. Considering all orderings, including weak ones, and selecting £¦ 1 1 ¦¦ n k if S S(N ) ¦ ( ( ) W N k j k n ¦ GW (1) R (O ) ¤ j j 2 ¦¦ k 2 j 1 ¦¦ otherwise ¦¥0
which is the equi-probability of all orderings, we obtain the absolute General Weak ordering index (GW-power index). It is easy to prove that for all power indices defined above (based on a generalized concept of decisiveness and the equi-probability of relevant orderings) satisfy the anonymity, symmetry, and dummy axioms defined above.
8. Illustrative Example To illustrate the concepts introduced above let us use a simple example. Let N \1,2,3^ . Consider a committee [51;50,30,20]. In this case set W (N ) S(N ) B(N ) consists of 14 orderings: (a) The set of strict orderings S(N ) consisting of six orderings (1,2,3),(1,3,2),(2,1,3),(2,3,1),(3,1,2),(3,2,1) ; and (b) the extended set of binary orderings B(N ) consisting of eight binary orderings. Table 3 provides list of orderings and decisive positions. Decisive members in a given ordering by an asterisk. Column T i denotes the decisiveness of the i-th member in a given ordering (1 for decisive, 0 for non decisive). Assuming equi-probable orderings we obtain:
GW-index 10 Absolute: 1 1GW 14 , 1 GW 143 , 1 GW 143 . 2 3 10 3 GW GW GW Relative : Q1 16 , Q 2 16 , Q 3 163 . Shapley-Shubik index (strict orderings only) 4 1 SS SS SS Absolute/relative: 1 1SS Q 1SS 46 , 1 SS 2 Q2 6 , 1 3 Q3 6 . Penrose-Banzhaf index (binary orderings) Absolute: 1 1PB 68 , 1 2PB 28 , 1 3PB 28 . Relative: Q 1PB 106 , Q 2PB 102 , Q 3PB 102 .
Power Indices Methodology
35
Table 3. List of Orderings and Decisive Situations for the Committee [51;50,30,20]
Orderings
T1
T2
T3
Sum
R SS
0
1
0
1
1 6
R PB 0
R HP 0
R GW
(1,2 * ,3)
0
0
1 14
1 14
(1,3 ,2)
0
0
1
1
1 6
(2,1* ,3)
1
0
0
1
1 6
0
0
1 14
1
1 6
0
0
1 14
0
0
1 14
*
(2,3 ,1) *
1
0
0
(3,1* ,2)
1
0
0
1
1 6
(3,2,1* )
1
0
0
0
1 6
0
0
1 14
1 4
1 14
(1,(2 * ,3 * ))
0
1
1
2
0
1 8
(2,(1* ,3))
1
0
0
1
0
1 8
0
1 14
0
1 14
(3,(1* ,2))
1
0
0
1
0
1 8
((1* ,2 * ),3)
1
1
0
2
0
1 8
1 14
1 14
1 14
1 14
((2,3),1* )
1
0
0
1
0
1 8
((1* ,3 * ),2)
1
0
1
2
0
1 8
1 14
1 14
0
1 14
0
1 14
((1* ,2,3))
1
0
0
1
0
1 8
((1,2,3))
0
0
0
0
0
1 8
for GW for SS for PB for HP
10 4 6 3
3 1 2 2
3 1 2 2
16 6 10 7
Holler-Packel power index (binary orderings with minimal pivotal groups) Absolute: 1 1HP 43 , 1 2HP 42 , 1 3HP 42 . Relative: Q1HP 73 , Q 2HP 72 , Q 3HP 72 .
Note that while the SS-power index and PB-power index based on generalized concept of decisiveness provides the same values as the original definitions, it is not the case for HP-index. For instance, the original definition the HP-power index (relative form) is in our case 42 , 41 , 41 , but we obtained 73 , 72 , 72 . This follows from the difference in concepts of minimal winning configurations and minimal pivotal groups. The set of binary orderings with minimal winning configurations is a subset of the set of binary orderings with minimal pivotal groups, and permutation of the same binary partition does not necessarily provide the same decisiveness to the same committee members.
9. Concluding Remarks The primary purpose of this paper was not to introduce a new power index, but rather to demonstrate that there is no contradiction between pivot-
36
František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, and Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
based and swing-based measures of voting power: there is no fundamental distinction between pivots and swings. Both concepts appear to be special cases of a more general concept of decisiveness based on full range of possible preferences of individual committee members and their groups; and both follow from the same logic and can be formulated in the same framework. Moreover, we do not need cooperative game theory to define and analyze a priori voting power. In a sense a game-theoretical setting of the problem restricts the set of analytical tools. Nevertheless, it might be of some interest to investigate more deeply properties of generalized concept of power, namely its monotonicity properties: local monotonicity (the member with greater weight cannot have less power than the member with smaller weight) and global monotonicity (if the weight of one member is increasing and the weights of all other members are decreasing or staying the same, then the power of the ‘growing weight’ member will at least not decrease) of absolute and relative forms of power measures. Reconsideration of other power indices (Johnston, Deegan-Packel, spatial modifications of power indices) in the framework of generalized concept of decisiveness might contribute to deeper understanding of quantification of voting power. Also an application of this approach to transferable utility cooperative games and its values can bring new results.
Acknowledgements This research was supported by the Czech Government Research Target Programme, proje ct No. MSM0021620841, and by the joint program of Ministry of Education of the Czech Republic and Ministry of Education of the Republic of Poland, project No. 2006/12. We thank anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions.
References Banzhaf, J.F. (1965) Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: A Mathematical Analysis. Rutgers Law Review 19: 317–343. Deegan, J. and Packel, E.W. (1979) A New Index of Power for Simple n-person Games. International Journal of Game Theory 7: 113–123. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1998) The Measurement of Voting Power, Edward Elgar. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (2004), A Priori Voting Power: What is it About? Political Studies Review 2: 1–23. Felsenthal, D.S., Machover, M., and Zwicker, W. (1998) The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of A Priori Voting Power, Theory and Decisions 44: 83–116. Hall, M. (1967) Combinatorial Theory. Blaisdell Publishing Company. Holler, M.J. and Packel, E.W. (1983) Power, Luck and the Right Index, Zeitschrift fĦr Nationalökonomie (Journal of Economics) 43: 21–29. Holler, M.J. and Li, X. (1995) From Public Good Index to Public Value. An
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Axiomatic Approach and Generalization, Control and Cybernetics 24: 257–270. Johnston, R.J. (1978) On the Measurement of Power: Some Reactions to Laver, Environment and Planning 10: 907–914. Nurmi, H. (1997), On Power Indices and Minimal Winning Coalitions, Control and Cybernetics 26: 609–611. Owen, G. (1982) Game Theory (2nd ed.), Academic Press. Penrose, L.S. (1946) The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109: 53–57. Shapley, L.S. (1953) A Value for n-Person Games, in H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker (eds), Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, 307–317. Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M. (1954) A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System, American Political Science Review 48: 787–792. Turnovec, F. (2004) Power Indices: Swings or Pivots? in Matti Wiberg (ed.) Reasoned Choice, Finnish Political Science Association. Turnovec, F., Mercik, J.W., and Mazurkiewicz, M. (2004), Power Indices: ShapleyShubik or Penrose-Banzhaf? in R. Kulikowski, J. Kacprzyk, and R. Slowinski (eds) Badania Operacyjne i Systemowe 2004, Podejmowanie Decyzji, Podstawy Metodyczne i Zastosowania, EXIT, Warszawa. Turnovec, F. (2007) New Measure of Voting Power, Czech Economic Review (Acta Universitatis Carolinae Oeconomica) 1: 1–11.
3. Further Reflections on the Expediency and Stability of Alliances Dan S. Felsenthal Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Israel
Moshé Machover Department of Philosophy, King’s College, University of London, UK
1. Introduction The study of the formation and dissolution of alliances of voters aiming to increase their voting power is relatively new. The present note is a sequel to our earlier paper on this subject (see Felsenthal and Machover 2002). Since the latter’s publication, we have obtained some new results which can be viewed also as a complement to some of the results obtained by Gelman (2003). We report here our findings regarding the possibility of forming expedient and stable alliances within an assembly of voters under various decision rules, depending on the size of the assembly. We shall also show that sometimes an alliance containing a dummy can be expedient – a fact which may explain a real-life historical puzzle. For the reader’s convenience, we repeat in the next section the relevant definitions used in our earlier paper, which we shall be using in this paper as well. In sections 3, 4 and 5 we report our new results. We conclude in section 6.
2. Preliminaries We assume the reader is familiar with the definitions of simple voting game (SVG) and weighted voting game (WVG) and with the basic definitions and notation pertaining to them, as laid down by Felsenthal and Machover (1998). 1 In particular, we shall use the square-bracket notation for WVGs. 1
In particular we refer the reader to Definitions 2.3.4, 2.3.10, 2.3.23, 3.2.2 and Theorems 3.3.11 and 3.3.14. We use the term ‘game’ in this connection out of deference to common usage. But although an SVG does have the formal structure of a simple co-operative game with
40
Moshé Machover and Dan Felsenthal
We shall denote by ‘M n ’ the canonical simple majority WVG with n voters. That is, M n [n 2 1 ;1,1, !,1].
(1)
n times
By ‘M n ’ we shall denote the dual of M n ; that is M n [ n2 ;1,1, !,1].
(2)
n times
Note that if n is odd, M n M n ( M n is self-dual). But if n is even M n v M n , and the latter WVG is improper. Further, we shall denote by ‘Bn ’ the canonical unanimity WVG with n voters. That is, Bn [n ;1,1, …,1].
(3)
Bn [1;1,1, …,1].
(4)
n times
The dual of Bn is n times
In what follows, the starting point is some given SVG W whose assembly (i.e. set of voters) is N. We shall denote by ‘Z’ the Penrose measure of voting power and refer to it simply as ‘power’, without further qualification. 2 We denote by ‘Za [ W ]’ the power of voter a in W . By a well-known theorem, among all SVGs W with n voters, the sum of the voters’ powers attains its maximum when W ! M n . If n is odd, this condition is also necessary for maximizing the sum of the powers. If n is even, there are several isomorphism types of SVG that maximize the sum; among them, those isomorphic to M n have the lowest number of winning coalitions, whereas those isomorphic to its dual, M n , have the highest. Also, among all SVGs W with n voters, the sum of the voters’ powers attains its minimum if W ! Bn or W ! Bn . For n 2, this condition is also necessary. We recall that ‘W ] & S ’ denotes the SVG that results from W when a coalition S N fuses and forms a bloc & S . The assembly of W ] & S is (N S ) {& S }. If W is a weighted voting game (WVG), then so is W ] & S : take the weight of & S to be the sum of the weights that the members of S had in W , while the weights of all other voters as well as the quota are kept the same as in W . transferable utility, we do not treat it here as such but as a plain decision rule. For a fuller discussion of this point, see Comment 2.2.2 in our book. 2 For its definition see Felsenthal and Machover (1998), Definition 3.2.2, where it is denoted by ‘C a’ and referred to as the ‘Bz [Banzhaf] measure of voting power’.
Further Reflections on the Expediency and Stability of Alliances
41
In our paper (Felsenthal and Machover, 2002: 303), an alliance is defined as a bloc & S together with an SVG W S whose assembly is S, and which is referred to as the internal SVG, or decision rule, of the alliance. We shall denote this alliance by (S ; W S ). Informally, we think of the alliance as formed voluntarily by the members of S. When the members of S N form an alliance (S ; W S ). this gives rise to a new composite SVG, which we denote by ‘W & W S ’. The assembly of W & W S is N, the same as that of W . The winning coalitions of W & W S are all sets of the form X Y , with X S and Y N S , satisfying at least one of the following two conditions: x Y is a winning coalition of W ; x X is a winning coalition of W S and S Y is a winning coalition of W .
3
Informally speaking, W & W S works as follows. When a bill is proposed, the members of S decide about it using W S , the agreed internal SVG of their alliance. Then, when the bill is brought before the plenary, the assembly of W , all the members of S vote as a bloc, in accordance with their internal decision; so that now the final outcome is the same as it would have been in W ] & S with the bloc voter & S voting according to the internal decision. From now on, we put: s S
(5)
Note that each member of S now has direct voting power in the SVG W S , as well as indirect voting power in W & W S , which s/he exercises via the bloc & S . It is easy to prove (Felsenthal and Machover 2002: Theorem 4.1): For every a S Za [W & W S ] Za [W S ]¸ Z& S [W ] & S ].
(6)
However, for voters b N S , the equality Zb [W & W S ] Zb [W ] & S ] does not always hold; it does hold provided the number of winning coalitions of the internal SVG W S is 2 s1 , exactly half of the number of all coalitions (Felsenthal and Machover 2002: 304). In what follows we take W to be exogenously imposed. Its voters are allowed to form alliances but not to change W itself. We shall therefore rule out alliances with S N , because that would amount simply to all members of the assembly agreeing to adopt a new decision rule instead of W . Using the terminology introduced in Felsenthal and Machover (2002: 303), we say that the alliance (S W S ) is feasible if Za [W & W S ] p Za [ W ] for all a S ;
(7)
and expedient if 3 For an equivalent definition of W & W S , which shows it to be a special case of the general operation of composition of SVGs, see Felsenthal and Machover (2002: 310).
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Moshé Machover and Dan Felsenthal
Za [W & W S ] Za [ W ] for all a S .
(8)
Moreover, we say that a bloc & S is feasible or expedient if there exists some internal SVG W S such that the resulting alliance (S ; W S ) is feasible or expedient, respectively. The idea behind these definitions is the following. We may regard a voter’s power as a payoff – not in the original W , or indeed in any ‘voting game’ 4 – but in a new power game P W induced by W . This P W is a genuine co-operative game with non-transferable utility, in which the players are the voters of W , and forming an alliance (in W ) is a strategy that affects the payoffs of all players (not only of members of the alliance). Games of the form P W , induced in this way by some SVG, have a rather intricate structure. As far as we know, they have not been investigated in depth. In Felsenthal and Machover (2002) we merely scratched the surface. Gelman (2003) presents a few additional results. In the present paper we add a few observations concerning some games of this form. In the sequel, we shall make use of the following simple result: Proposition 1 (Felsenthal and Machover 2002: Theorem 4.2) A bloc made up of two voters is never expedient. It is feasible iff originally the two voters have equal powers, or at least one of them is a dummy.
3. Simple and Super Majority In this and the following section we shall consider cases where W is symmetric. In this context, we confine our attention to alliances (S ; W S ) in which all voters are equipotent, that is, have equal power. We shall say that the alliance is optimal if its voters are equipotent and their power attains its maximal value – which equals the power of a voter in M s . Of course, if s is odd then the alliance is optimal just in case W S ! M s . Gelman (2003) considers a simple majority WVG, W ! M n , and within it alliances of m voters with internal decision rule of the form W S ! M m . He is particularly interested in the case where n as well as m and mn are large. He concludes that when these numbers are sufficiently large, then although such an alliance will be expedient, it will nevertheless be unstable because the power of the voters left outside the alliance will be smaller than the voting power of those inside it, so the former will try to form another alliance, possibly with some of the members of the first alliance. But ‘if all voters form coalitions, 5 they become worse off than if they had stayed apart’ (Gelman, 2003: 9). This may imply, in turn, an incessant process of forming and disbanding alliances. In fact, Gelman (2003: 11) conjectures quite ex4 5
See footnote 1 above. By ‘coalition’ Gelman means here what we call an ‘alliance’.
Further Reflections on the Expediency and Stability of Alliances
43
plicitly that ‘the coalition-formation process is inherently unstable … By this we mean that if voters are in an ongoing process of joining and leaving coalitions, with each decision made myopically to immediately increase voting power, then there is no stable equilibrium coalition structure.’ Although it is true that the formation of some alliances may result in instability, stable alliances do exist even where W ! M n and W S ! M m . As we shall see, this happens when m is just larger than n2 – a case not investigated by Gelman (2003). Consider first the following three instructive examples. Example 1 Let W ! M 5 . Here the power of each voter is 38 . In view of Proposition 1, we need only consider alliances (S W S ) of three or four voters. Any such alliance will make the bloc & S a dictator in W ] & S . Hence by (6) for every a S Za [W & W S ] Za[W S ].
(9)
For reasons of symmetry, we need consider only alliances whose voters are equipotent. In fact, it is sufficient to consider optimal alliances, because in this way the members of S maximize their (direct and indirect) power. For s 4 , an optimal (S W S ) gives each a S Za [W & W S ] Za [W S ] 38 . So no alliance of four voters is expedient. 6 But for s 3, we have W S ! M 3 , which gives each a S Za [ W & W S ] Za [W S ] 12 . Such an alliance is expedient, and, once formed, it is stable: no member wishes to defect, and the two voters left out can do nothing to improve their position. 35 Example 2 Let W ! M 9 . Here the power of each voter is 128 . In view of Proposition 1 we need only consider alliances (S W S ) with 3 b s b 8; and as in the preceding example we may assume that W S is optimal. An alliance with s 8 is not expedient, as in this case Za [W & W S ] 35 Za [W S ] 128 . On the other hand, simple calculations show that alliances with s 3 4 5 6 7 are expedient, giving each member of S indirect power 25 45 3 5 5 64 128 8 , 16 and 16 , respectively. However, alliances with s 3 4 6 and 7 are unstable. In the case of s 3 or 4, the voters excluded from the alliance, whose powers decrease as a result of its formation, 7 can retaliate by forming a counter-alliance, reducing the powers of the members of S and even turning them into dummies. In the case of s 6 or 7, five of the six or seven members will be tempted to eject the remaining one or two, thereby increasing their (direct and indirect) power from 165 to 38 .
Note that for all n the power of a voter in M 2n is the same as in M 2n 1. This can be seen without any detailed calculation: it follows from the power-maximizing property of M n . If W ! M n and an expedient alliance is formed, then by definition the powers of its members increase. Hence the total power of all voters excluded from the alliance must decrease, and by symmetry the power of each of them also decreases. 6
7
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If voters behave rationally, they will anticipate the adverse consequences of forming alliances with s 3 4 6 and 7, and hence such alliances will not be formed, although they are expedient according to our definition (see Section 2). 8 But an alliance with s 5 is stable. The four members left out of it become dummies and can do nothing about it. Note that although three of the five alliance members may be tempted to form an internal sub-alliance (in order to raise their indirect power from 38 to 21 ), they are in fact deterred from doing so because they know that, in reaction, the two members of S left out of the three-member cabal will surely dissolve the original fivemember alliance, and may even form a new (dictatorial) alliance with three of the four members that were left out of S. An interesting situation arises when W ! M n with even n, and an alliance that contains exactly half of the members. 35 Example 3 Let W ! M 8 . Here the power of each voter is 128 . Now consider an alliance (S ; W S ) with s 4. As before, we may assume that the alliance is optimal. Then its members’ direct power is 38 and their indirect 45 . So this alliance is expedient. power is 128 However, the remaining four voters, whose power is much reduced, can retaliate by forming their counter-alliance, (T W T ), where T N S . Now the indirect power of members of S will depend on the choice of W T . This indirect power will be greatest if the probability of the bloc & T voting ‘yes’ is greatest, because only if & T votes ‘yes’ will the vote of members of S make any difference. But the probability of & T voting ‘yes’ will be greatest iff the number of winning coalitions of W T is as high as possible – which is the case precisely if W T ! M 4 (that is, two votes sufficient to approve a bill). In this case, which is the best that members of S can hope for, their 33 – less than their original power in W . As indirect power will still be only 128 33 at most, depending on the for members of T: they too will have power 128 rule W S chosen by the first alliance. In any case, all voters are now worse off than originally. This seems to give rise to a kind of prisoner’s dilemma: 9 if one of the two alliances dissolves, its members will be in the worst possible position; but if neither of them dissolves, all voters will still be worse off than in the original W . So the alliances will not dissolve unless they can agree to do so simultaneously. However, this apparent dilemma can be resolved in a more radical way. Every member of each alliance will be tempted to defect and join the opposite camp – thereby making the latter dictatorial, and reducing the remaining members of the former to dummies. Thus alliances of
8
The definition assumes that formation of the alliance is the only change that takes place. Cf. Gelman’s (2003) discussion of situations of this kind. As our analysis shows, the analogy with a true prisoner’s dilemma is incomplete. 9
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size 4 are unstable, and if voters behave rationally they will anticipate this and will not form such alliances. The following theorem surveys in general the expediency and stability of optimal alliances when W ! M n . Theorem 1 Let W ! M n , with n 3. Consider optimal alliances (S W S ) where S N . We distinguish four cases, according to the residue of n modulo 4. Case 0 n 4m . Then the alliance is expedient iff 3 b s b n 1, and expedient as well as stable iff s 2m 1. Case 1 n 4m 1 Then the alliance is expedient iff 3 b s b n 2, and expedient as well as stable iff s 2m 1. Case 2 n 4m 2 Then the alliance is expedient iff 3 b s b n 1, and expedient as well as stable iff s 2m 2 or s 2m 3. Case 3 n 4m 3 Then the alliance is expedient iff 3 b s b n 2, and expedient as well as stable iff s 2m 2 or s 2m 3.
Proof The arguments used in the preceding examples can easily be extended and seen to apply here. As far as the expediency claims are concerned, for small values of n one can perform manually the simple, albeit somewhat tedious, computation for each alliance of size s. For larger values of n, say n p 13. the calculation is still quite simple for extreme values of s (close to 3 or to n). For the general case, see Gelman (2003, Subsection 3.3). 10 An alternative way to prove the expediency claims is to use the so-called Rae index S (where, for any SVG W , S a [W ] is the probability that voter a of W is successful; i.e. that the outcome of a division accords with a’s vote). Since by Penrose’s identity Za 2S a 1 (Felsenthal and Machover 1998: Theorem 3.2.16), it is enough to show that, for the s and n specified by our theorem, S a [W & W S ] S a [W ] for all a S .
(10)
This inequality can be proved using the fact that S a [W S ] is sufficiently greater than 21 . 11 As for the stability claims, the following observations are in order. In Case 0, if m 1 an alliance of size 2m is unstable for the reason illustrated for m 2 by Example 3. The same kind of thing happens for all m 1. 10
By the way, Gelman shows that as n increases, the alliance size that maximizes its members’ indirect power asymptotically approaches a value of approximately 14 n . 11 Intuitively speaking, this means that a ’s vote has a sufficiently good chance of ‘carrying along with it’ all the votes of the other s 1 members of S. This boosts a ’s probability of belonging to the majority camp in W & W S compared to that in W .
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Case 1 is unproblematic: here Examples 1 and 2 are entirely typical. In Case 2, an alliance of size 2m 1 is expedient, but the internal power of its members is less than twice their original power. The 2m 1 remaining voters – whose power is reduced – can retaliate by forming a counteralliance. Now all voters’ indirect power is half of their internal power – which is less than their original power – so the situation is unstable. This is similar to the situation in Case 0 with alliances of size 2m , except that now, since 2m 1 is odd, each alliance of this size can only choose the (self-dual) majority rule as its internal SVG. In Case 2 and Case 3, an alliance of size 2m 3 contains a ‘redundant’ member, because even an alliance of size 2m 2 is dictatorial. However, ejecting one of the 2m 3 members will not change the powers of the re, maining 2m 2, 12 so they have nothing to gain by this. We know that if W ! M n and an expedient alliance is formed, then all the voters excluded from the alliance lose power. 13 The following example shows that this need not happen if W is a super-majority WVG: somewhat surprisingly, formation of an alliance can be Pareto optimal! Example 4 Let W ! [41 1 1 1 1]. Here the power of each voter is 41 , so the total power is 45 . Now suppose an alliance (S ; W S ) is formed, where s 3 and W S ! M 3 . This alliance is expedient, because the indirect power of each of its members is 38 . However, the power of each of the two excluded voters is still 41 , so they are not worse off than before. The total power is now 138 . Moreover, this alliance is stable. On the one hand, no member of the alliance would wish to defect because a defector would lose power (even if the two members left behind were to maintain a – necessarily inexpedient – two-member alliance!). On the other hand, members of the alliance have no incentive to admit one of the two excluded voters, because this cannot increase the powers of the three old members. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that an optimal four-member alliance is also expedient, as the power of each of its members is 38 – the same as in the preceding case. Such an alliance is also clearly stable. Since the single excluded voter is a dummy, the total power is 32 . So if four of the assembly members are vindictive towards the fifth, they will be inclined to form a four-member alliance; otherwise a three-member alliance seems more likely to form. As we have seen, this will maximize the total power, and is in fact Pareto optimal.
This somewhat counter-intuitive example shows that Gelman’s (2003: 5) 12 13
See footnote 6. See footnote 7.
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assertion (clearly made with W ! M n in mind) that ‘[f]orming coalitions 14 is beneficial to those who do it but is negative to ‘society’ as a whole, at least in terms of average voting power’ does not hold in general.
4. Unanimity In this section we shall assume W is an n-voter unanimity WVG: W ! Bn . The power of each a N in W is Za [ W ]
1 2
n 1
.
(11)
We consider alliances (S W S ) where 2 s n ; and, as before, for reasons of symmetry we can confine our attention to cases where the members of S are equipotent. We rule out the cases W S ! Bs and W S ! Bs in which W S itself is a unanimity WVG or its dual, as the alliance would then be inexpedient. 15 On the other hand, any other alliance in which the voters are equipotent is expedient. To see this, let I[W S ] be the Banzhaf score in W S of any a S (that is, the number of winning coalitions in which a is critical). Then the direct power of a is I[ W S ]2 s 1 , and a’s indirect power is Za [ W & W S ]
I[W S ] 1 I[W S ] ¸ n s n 1 s 1 2 2 2
(12)
As we have ruled out W S being a unanimity WVG or its dual, it is clear that I[ W S ] 1, so by (11) the alliance is expedient, as claimed. However, voters excluded from the alliance gain even more power than those inside it. To show this, let us denote by ‘X[W S ]’ the number of winning coalitions in W S . Then it is easy to see that the power of each b N S in W & W S is Zb [ W & W S ]
X[W S ] 1 X[W S ] ¸ ns 1 n1 2s 2 2
(13)
Since W S is not a unanimity WVG, it is impossible for every a S to belong, let alone be critical in, every winning coalition. So clearly X[W S ] I[W S ]; hence Zb [W & W S ] Za[ W & W S ] for every b N S and a S , as claimed. 16 14
See footnote 5. In both cases the indirect power of a member of the alliance is the same as in W . Moreover, forming an alliance with an internal unanimity rule is vacuous, as the composite SVG W & W S would be identical to the original W . 16 We have ruled out W S ! Bs , as in this case the alliance, albeit feasible, is not expedient. If such an alliance were formed, then I[ W S ] 1 and X[ W S ] 2 s 1 . So by (12) the alliance members gain no power, while by (13) those excluded from it do gain power. As power is the 15
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Thus, if considerations of envy were admitted, they would imply that no single expedient alliance in W can be stable. In what follows, we ignore envy. From now on let us make the reasonable assumption that only optimal alliances are formed. We can specify I[W S ] precisely for optimal alliances, distinguishing two cases, according as s is even or odd. As is well known (Felsenthal and Machover 1998: Theorem 3.3.8), £ 1 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦2 I[ W S ] ¦ ¤ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¥
2mm if s 2m, 2mm if s 2m 1.
(14)
By the way, from (12) and (14) it is easy to see that whether s is even or odd, the power of a member of an optimal alliance of size s is greater than that of a member of any expedient alliance of size s 1. Thus Gelman’s (2003: 7) assertion (clearly made with W ! M n in mind) that ‘it is never a good idea to have a coalition 17 with an even number of members: if m is even, it is always as good or better to be in a coalition of size m 1’ does not hold in general. As for X[W S ], we can specify it precisely for odd s. For even s we can specify the two extreme values: for W S ! M s and W S ! M s . It is easy to see that £ 1 ¦ ¦ 2 2m 1 ¦ ¦ 2 ¦ ¦ ¦ 1 X[W S ] ¦ ¤2 2m 1 ¦ 2 ¦ ¦ ¦ 2 2m ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¥
2mm if s 2m and W 2mm if s 2m and W
S
! Ms,
S
! M s,
(15)
if s 2m 1.
What happens if a member of an optimal alliance (S ; W S ) leaves it? Of course, if the alliance were then to disband, all voters would lose power. But we now make the reasonable assumption that if s 3 the s 1 remaining members will re-form an optimal alliance. The possible exception is s 3 , in which case the remaining two members cannot form an expedient alliance, so they may not form one at all. It is easy to see that if a member of an optimal alliance is expelled from it, the remaining members will lose power. So we can rule out expulsion as a source of instability. On the other hand, we saw that when an expedient alliance (S ; W S ) is formed, the voters excluded from it gain more power than (only) payoff in the power-game P W we are considering in this paper, there is no reason – other than pure altruism – for forming such an alliance. This is why we assume it will not form. 17 See footnote 5.
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those included in it. Would this tempt a member of an optimal alliance to defect? To see whether defection from (S ; W S ) is advantageous, let us first consider the case where s is even, s 2m , where m 1. From (12) and (14) it follows that before the defection the power of the prospective defector is 2mm 2 n . After defecting, the defector will be one of the voters excluded from an optimal alliance of size 2m 1, so by (13) and (15) her power will be 2 2m 1 2 n . It is easy to prove by induction on m that 2 2m 1 2mm for all m 1. So defection is indeed advantageous. It follows that optimal alliances of even size are unstable, being vulnerable to defection. Now let us turn to the somewhat more tricky case where s is odd, s 2m 1, where m p 1. In this case the defector deserts 2m partners who will form an optimal alliance, except perhaps in the special case m 1. Let us first assume that these 2m voters form an alliance with internal decision rule isomorphic to M 2m . By (12) and (14), before defecting the power of the prospective defector is 2mm 2 n 1. By (13) and (15), his power after defecting will be 2 2m 1 2 n1. By induction on m it is easy to see that 2 2m 1 p 2mm for all m p 1, so the defector will gain power, and the defection is advantageous. But a prospective defector cannot depend on this calculation, because the 2m deserted partners may not adopt a decision rule isomorphic to M 2m but one with a smaller number of winning coalitions. The worst-case scenario for defection is that the rule they choose is isomorphic to to M 2m . 18 From (12), (13), (14) and (15) it can be seen that in case they do so, the defector will gain power if 2 2m 1 21 2mm 2mm , or, tidying up:
2m 2 2m 3 m ;
(16)
and the defector will lose power if the opposite inequality holds. It is easy to prove (16) by induction for all m p 3. However, for m 1 and m 2 the opposite inequality holds. It follows that all alliances except those of size 3 or 5 are unstable, as a member of such an alliance will be better off defecting. Only alliances of size 3 and 5 can be stable, as defection of a single member from them is ill-advised. For brevity, we shall call an alliance of size 3 with rule ! M 3 a trio, and an alliance of size 5 with rule ! M 5 a quintet. We shall call a voter who is not a member of any alliance a singleton. Once a trio or a quintet is formed, then from the viewpoint of the other voters it behaves as a single voter. For example, if n 3 and one trio is 18 This may even be most likely, because, among all optimal alliances this is the only one with a proper SVG – which has some advantages. If m 1 , the two deserted members have no reason at all to form an alliance (see Proposition 1); and forming an alliance with decision rule isomorphic to M 2 is vacuous, because M 2 B2 (see footnote 15).
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formed, then from the viewpoint of the remaining n 3 voters it looks as if they are in a unanimity WVG with n 2 voters. If there are three singletons left, they may form a new trio. Similarly, five singletons may form a new quintet. Also, two singletons may join a trio and turn it into a quintet. Ultimately there will emerge a configuration in which the original n voters form quintets, trios and singletons. 19 We shall refer to these as ‘5–3–1’ configurations. Which 5–3–1 configurations are stable and therefore likely to form? Of course, if n 4 or n 5, there is only one stable option: the formation of one trio. For n 5 we must distinguish five cases, according to the residue of n modulo 5. Case 1 If n 6, there are two Pareto optimal 5–3–1 configurations: First, one quintet and one singleton. Each member of the quintet has indirect power 163 and the singleton has power 21 . Second, two trios, each of whose members has indirect power 41 . Any other 5–3–1 configuration is Pareto inferior to one of these two, but neither of them is Pareto superior to the other. So we cannot say for certain which of the two is more likely to form. Similarly, for all n 5m 1, where m p 1 : we can have m quintets and a singleton; or m 1 quintets and two trios. Case 2 If n 7, there are two Pareto optimal 5–3–1 configurations: First, one quintet and two singletons. Each member of the quintet has indirect power 323 and each singleton has power 41 . Second, two trios and a singleton. Each member of a trio has indirect power 18 and the singleton has power 41 . Again, any other 5–3–1 configuration is Pareto inferior to one of these two, but neither of them is Pareto superior to the other. So we cannot say for certain which of the two is more likely to form. Similarly, for all n 5m 2, where m p 1 : we can have m quintets and two singletons; or m 1 quintets, two trios and a singleton. Case 3 If n 8, there is just one Pareto optimal 5–3–1 configuration: a quintet and a trio. Each member of the former has indirect power 163 and each member of the latter has 41 . This 5–3–1 configuration is Pareto superior to any other, and is therefore the one likely to form. Similarly, for all n 5m 3, where m p 1 : we have m quintets and one trio. Case 4 If n 9, there are two Pareto optimal 5–3–1 configurations: First, one quintet, one trio and a singleton. Each member of the quintet has indirect power 323 , each member of the trio has indirect power 18 , and the singleton power 41 . 19 We rule out the formation of ‘super-alliances’ one or more of whose members are themselves a trio or quintet, because such a super-alliance would not be optimal as an alliance in W .
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Second, three trios, each of whose members has indirect power 18 . Again, any other 5–3–1 configuration is Pareto inferior to one of these two, but neither of them is Pareto superior to the other. So we cannot say for certain which of the two is more likely to form. Similarly, for all n 5m 4, where m p 1 : we can have m quintets, one trio and one singleton; or m 1 quintets and three trios. Case 5 If n 10, there is just one Pareto optimal 5–3–1 configuration: two quintets, each of whose members has indirect power 163 . This 5–3–1 configuration is Pareto superior to any other, and is therefore the one likely to form. Similarly, for all n 5m , where m 1 : we have m quintets.
5. Alliances with a Dummy In this section we wish to explore the possible role of a dummy in the formation of an alliance. Somewhat surprisingly, a dummy can become empowered via a feasible alliance, as the following example shows. Example 5 During the first period of the European Union (1958–73), the so called ‘qualified majority’ (QM) decision rule prescribed for its sixmember Council of Ministers by the Treaty of Rome (1957) was a WVG that assigned to France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg weights 4, 4,4,2,2 and 1, respectively; and the quota required for passing resolutions on most issues was 12. In this WVG, which is isomorphic to [12;4,4,4,2,2,1], the powers of the members were 165 , 165 , 165 , 163 , 163 and 0, respectively. Although the Treaty stipulated that this decision rule would only become effective in 1966, and in practice it was rarely invoked from 1966 to 1973, as decisions were normally made by consensus, the rule is quite puzzling. What was the point of giving Luxembourg a useless weight of 1, and why did Luxembourg agree to be a dummy? This puzzle has often been mentioned in the literature on decision making in the EU. Of course, it is possible that the original signatories of the Treaty of Rome, including the government of Luxembourg, were simply unaware of the QM anomaly. But there may be another explanation. As is well known, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg had operated a Benelux Customs Union since 1947 (replaced in 1966 by the Benelux Economic Union). It is quite possible that the Benelux countries agreed informally to act as an alliance within the EU. A reasonable internal decision rule could be ! [3;2,2,1] – which is in fact a simple majority rule. It is easy to verify that under this alliance the indirect power of each of the three members would be 163 . Thus the alliance, albeit inexpedient, is feasible – and it would em-
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power Luxembourg! 20 Note that, somewhat surprisingly, a Benelux alliance would benefit the three non-Benelux members: each would now have power 38 . Is it also possible to form an expedient alliance with a dummy? Moreover, is it possible to form such an alliance which will also increase the power of all those excluded from the alliance? The answer to both these questions is positive, as shown by the following two examples. Example 6 Let W [13;5,5,3,3,3,1]. Here the power of each of the first two voters is 167 , that of each of the next three voters is 163 and the last voter is a dummy. Now suppose the last four voters form an alliance with internal decision rule ! M 4 . Then the indirect power of each of these four is 329 . So the alliance is expedient. True, this alliance is not stable, for if the voter with weight 1 is ejected, and the remaining three form an alliance with internal rule ! M 3 , then the indirect power of each of these three will be 38 . 21 Example 7 Let W [10;2,2,2,2,2,1] . Here each of the first five voters has power 161 and the last voter is a dummy. Now suppose the last five voters form an alliance with internal decision rule ! M 5 . Then each of these five has indirect power 163 and the first voter, excluded from the alliance, has power 21 . So the alliance is not only expedient, but also beneficial to the voter excluded from it. Note that in this case ejecting the voter with weight 1 from the alliance will not benefit the remaining four: the best they can do is form an alliance with internal rule isomorphic to M 4 or M 4 – which will still give them indirect power 163 . However, neither of these two alliances is stable. In the case of the alliance of size 5, which includes the [former] dummy, a voter with weight 2 will be better off defecting. Following such defection, the remaining three voters with weight 2 will be better off if they eject the dummy. In the case of the alliance of four voters with weight 2, it will also be advantageous for any of them to defect.
20 We are indebted to Simon Hix for this explanation. We are also grateful to Frank Steffen and Matthew Braham for independently raising with us the question as to whether a dummy can be empowered via an alliance. 21 However, this alliance too is unstable: the two voters with weight 5 excluded from it – whose loss of power would be substantial as a result of its formation – would be able to tempt one of the three alliance members to join them in forming a 3-member dictatorial alliance with an internal decision rule ! M 3 , thereby increasing their power to 12 . This alliance would be stable.
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6. Discussion The results obtained in this paper constitute a modest advance on the ground covered by us in Felsenthal and Machover (2002) and by Gelman (2003). The main result of Section 3, Theorem 1, is not too surprising. It confirms – as well as making more precise – what is intuitively almost obvious: if W ! M n , then only [dictatorial] alliances whose size is just over n2 can be both expedient and stable. A smaller alliance is vulnerable to annihilating retaliation by those excluded from it, whereas a larger alliance is, in a sense, too large for its own good. However, in the cases where n is even, and particularly where it is divisible by 4, the problem of stability of an alliance of size n 2 does require some careful scrutiny. Example 4 illustrates a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon that can occur in a super-majority WVG: a stable expedient alliance may also not hurt those excluded from it. This of course depends on the fact that power games are not constant-sum games. Section 4 dealing with the case W ! Bn , provides a more extreme illustration of this phenomenon. But the main surprise in this section is the exceptional behaviour of quintets and trios, and the unique stability of some 5–3–1 configurations. We think that these results could hardly have been anticipated without detailed analysis. Finally, in Section 5 we illustrate the seemingly paradoxical fact that a feasible, and even expedient, alliance may empower a dummy while at the same time benefiting the voters excluded from it. This is a possible explanation for the acquiescence of Luxembourg in its dummy status under the QM rule of the original 6-member EU Council of Ministers. Nevertheless this paper should not be viewed as an attempt to provide an explanation of actual alliance formation in terms of Penrose power. If this were the case, then it would be important to compare this with explanations based on other measures of power. Rather, our idea was to do a ‘what if’ exercise: what would happen if voters were to play a cooperative ‘power game’, which is played by forming alliances and in which the resulting Penrose power of the players-voters were regarded by them as the payoff (which, by the nature of Penrose power must be a non-transferable ‘utility’). Of course, one could similarly invent other games, based on some other payoff, which could well be some other measure of voting power (e.g. the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index, or the Penrose-Banzhaf power index as modified by Owen (1982) for voting games ‘with a priori coalitions’), and which could well lead to different results than we obtained. Admittedly, the ground covered so far in the study of power games is rather limited. In this paper we have confined ourselves entirely to WVGs rather than dealing with SVGs that may not be weighted. Moreover, we have concentrated for the most part on symmetric WVGs of the simplest kinds:
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those isomorphic to M n or Bn . A more general theory of power games P W remains to be developed. There is also need for studies of the extent to which considerations of a priori voting power can explain the formation, dissolution and [in]stability of real-life alliances, as well as defection of voters from these alliances. So far – apart from a claim by Aumann (see Damme, 1997), unsupported by any detailed data – there are only two proper studies of this kind known to us – one by Chua and Felsenthal (2008), and the other by Andjiga et al. (2006)– both of which are concerned with the formation of governmental alliances, i.e. ruling coalitions within legislatures, and both arrive at negative or sceptical conclusions. 22 Thus, for example, we re-analysed the 77 governmental alliances examined by Chua and Felsenthal (2008), and found that in 49 of them the largest party was a dictator, that in additional 21 governmental alliances at least one member became a dummy or lost some power by joining the alliance, and that only seven of these alliances were either feasible or expedient in comparison to a situation where no alliance was formed. These results clearly indicate that considerations of feasibility and expediency (in the technical sense of the present paper) play no significant role in the formation of governmental alliances. However, in contrast to governmental alliances – which must form in legislatures where no party controls an absolute majority of the votes – considerations of feasibility and expediency in forming alliances may play a more significant role in international organizations or corporate boards of directors, where alliances may but need not form. To verify this one would need to conduct empirical research. But this will not be easy, because the formation of an alliance in such bodies is often tacit and hence difficult to detect.
References Andjiga, N.G., Badirou, D. and Mbih, B. (2006) On the Evaluation of Power in Parliaments and Government Formation, mimeo. http://crem.univ.rennes1.fr/site_francais/doctravail/2006/ie-200618.pdf Chua, V.C.H. and Felsenthal, D.S. (2008) Coalition Formation Theories Revisited: An empirical investigation of Aumann’s Hypothesis, in M. Braham and F. Steffen (eds) Power, Freedom, and Voting, Springer, 159–183. van Damme, E. (Interviewer) (1997) On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann, in W. Albers et al. (eds) Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer. Reprinted in Games and
22
Two additional studies of this kind known to us are those by Riker (1959), and by Felsenthal and Machover (2000), which aim to ascertain whether inter-party migrations of delegates in the French National Assembly during the period 1953–54 can be explained by considerations of voting power. However, both these studies seem to us inappropriate, as they ignore in their calculations the existence of a (dictatorial) governmental alliance.
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Economic Behavior 24 (1998): 181–210. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1998) The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes, Edward Elgar. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (2000) Voting Power and Parliamentary Defections: the 1953–54 French National Assembly Revisited, mimeo. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000594. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (2002) Annexations and Alliances: When are Blocs Advantageous A Priori? Social Choice and Welfare 19: 295–312. Gelman, A. (2003) Forming Voting Blocs and Coalitions as a Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Possible Theoretical Explanation for Political Instability, Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy 2, Article 13, 1–14. http://bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol2/iss1/art13 Owen, G. (1982) Modification of the Banzhaf-Coleman Index for Games with A Priori Unions, in M.J. Holler (ed.) Power, Voting, and Voting Power, Physica Verlag. Riker, W.H. (1959) A Test of the Adequacy of the Power Index, Behavioral Science 4: 120–131. Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M. (1954) A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System, American Political Science Review 48: 787–792.
4. Positional Power in Hierarchies René van den Brink Department of Econometrics, Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Frank Steffen University of Liverpool Management School, UK
1. Introduction Power is a core concept for the analysis and design of organisations. The literature contains a wide variety of contributions from various disciplines dealing with different types and aspects of power in organisations. These can broadly be classified by a combination of two features: the subject of the analysis and its primary origin (Morriss 1987/2002: 107f). The subject is either the possession of power or its exercise and its primary origin is either an individual or a position in an organisation. That is, power is taken to be rooted in an individual or a position. Based on these two features, the literature can, in very general terms, be said to consist of four categories: studies on (i) positional power, (ii) individual power, (iii) the exercise of positional power, and (iv) the exercise of individual power. This paper is devoted to the study of the first category. Positional power is what results from the interplay of two components of an organisation’s architecture: the arrangement of positions in the organisation and the decision-making mechanisms in use. It is well recognized that the organisational architecture and its resulting power structure are essential ingredients for the success of an organisation (Brickley et al. 2004; Daudi 1986; Johnston and Gill 1993; Martin 1998). Although there exists plenty of work addressing the positional power relations in organisational architectures, 1 very little attention has been given to investigating such power relations in hierarchical organisations i.e. where there are dominance relations among the actors. This would be unremarkable if hierarchies would not play a significant role in social life. But the opposite is true: hierarchies can be found in all areas of social life. One of the 1 See, for instance, Felsenthal and Machover (1998), Holler and Owen (2000, 2001, 2002), Holler et al. (2002), Holler and Gambarelli (2006), and the references therein.
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problems with most of the extant literature on positional power in hierarchies is that it is restricted to the analysis of power only in terms of the arrangement of the actors. 2 While such an analysis informs us about the authority structure within an organisation, it ignores the decision-making mechanisms completely. To the best of our knowledge, only a handful of studies on positional power in hierarchies take into account the decision-making mechanisms (van den Brink 1994, 1997, 1999, 2001; Gilles et al. 1992; Gilles and Owen 1994; van den Brink and Gilles 1996; Berg and Paroush 1998; Shapley and Palamara 2000a,b ; and Steffen 2002). All these studies make use of adaptations of well-established approaches for the analysis of power in non-hierarchical organisations such as the Banzhaf (1965) measure; and thus they are all based on the structure of a simple game, i.e. they are ‘membership-based ’. Roughly speaking, in such a set-up power is ascribed to an actor i, if i has the potential to alter an outcome that has been forced by some members of the organisation, by either leaving or joining the subset of actors which has effected the present outcome. In the course of our analysis we will demonstrate that such an approach is in general inappropriate for characterizing power in hierarchies. To deal with the problem of how to characterize power relations in a hierarchy, we develop an action-based approach based on an extensive game form. Here power is ascribed to an actor i, if i has the potential to alter an outcome forced by the members of the organisation by altering his action. A similar action-based approach has been already suggested for decisionmaking mechanisms in non-hierarchical set-ups (Miller 1982), but has so far received only little attention in the literature as it was regarded as an equivalent representation of the membership-based approach. Our analysis will demonstrate that this equivalence only holds for a certain class of decisionmaking mechanisms and that the membership-based approach in contrast to the action-based cannot be extended to a class of decision-making mechanisms which allow certain actors to terminate a decision on behalf of the hierarchy before all other members have been involved. This kind of decision-making mechanism is particularly relevant for hierarchies. The contribution of our paper can be summarized as follows: (i) We argue that the existing membership-based approaches for the analysis of positional power in hierarchies are only relevant for a (less important) subclass of decision-making mechanisms in hierarchies. (ii) We show that an adequate consideration of the more relevant mechanisms requires an actionbased approach represented by an extensive game form. (iii) We extend the existing action-based approach which has been formulated for strategic 2
See, for instance, Copeland (1951), Russett (1968), Grofman and Owen (1982), Daudi (1986), Brams (1968), van den Brink (1994, 2002), van den Brink and Gilles (2000), Mizruchi and Potts (1998), Hu and Shapley (2003), Herings et al. (2005), and the references therein.
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games forms to extensive game forms. (iv) We illustrate that the existing membership-based approaches can be represented as special cases of the action-based approach.
2. Directed Graphs Given that we will represent both the description of the arrangements of the actors and decision-making mechanisms in hierarchical organisations by directed graphs – the two are not necessarily identical – we start by briefly recalling some definitions of such graphs. A directed graph (or digraph) is a set of objects, called nodes joined by directed links called arcs. Formally, a digraph is an ordered pair (V , D ), where V is a finite set of nodes (or vertices) of the graph and D is a set of ordered pairs of V called arcs of the graph, i.e. D V q V is a binary relation on V . An arc (i , j ) D is considered to be directed from node i to node j where i is called a predecessor of j and j is called a successor of i in D . By S (i ) and S -1(i ) , respectively, we denote the set of all successors and predecessors of i V in D ; i.e. S (i ) \ j V (i , j ) D ^ and S 1(i ) \ j V ( j ,i ) D ^. A node i is called a terminal node, if no arc is starting from it, i.e. S (i ) . If (i , j ) D , we say that there exists a path from i to j denoted by P (i , j ) def i l ... l j , if i v j and j can be reached from i by following arcs of the graph, e.g. if (i , h ),(h, j ) D , then P (i , j ) i l h l j . If such a path P (i , j ) exists, we call i and h ancestors of j, and h and j descendants of i. Moreover, the set of all nodes being descendants of a node i is denoted by Sˆ(i ) and the set of all ancestors of i by Sˆ1(i ). If, instead, (i , j ) D , we say that P (i , j ) denotes a direct path, and if (i , j ) D , but i j , we say that P (i , j ) denotes a degenerated path. A directed graph is said to be a tree T if (i) there exists a distinguished node r V (the root of the tree) that has no arcs going into it, and (ii) for every other node i V \ \r ^ there exists exactly one path from r to i. Furthermore, a tree T becomes a labelled tree denoted by the triple ( T ,l V ,l D ), if there exist labelling functions l V : V l L V and l D : D l L D with L V and L D being the corresponding sets of labels. Moreover, a branch of a tree T is a directed graph having nodes starting at a node i V and containing all its descendents together with their original arcs. By T i we denote the branch starting at i. Thus, T i is itself a tree, the root of which is i.
3. Hierarchies Hierarchies form a certain subclass of organisational architectures. Following van den Brink (1994) they distinguish themselves from other architectures by the arrangement of its members being connected via directed relations, which we interpret as dominance (or superior to) relations. Loosely speaking,
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we can say that an actor i in a dominating position has an influence on the ‘powers’ of other actors who are in positions that are dominated by i. Domination can be either indirect or direct, i.e. with or without intermediate actors, respectively. Note, that if we just make use of the term ‘domination’ without further specification, we allow for indirect and direct domination. Actors in dominating positions are called superiors (or principals) - bosses or managers in common parlance -, while the actors in dominated positions are called subordinates (or agents). If we refer to a superior who directly dominates another actor, the dominating actor is called a predecessor, and if we refer to a subordinate who is directly dominated by another actor, the dominated actor is called a successor. Formally, we can represent the dominance structure of a hierarchy as a digraph, where the nodes j V represent the actors i N , i.e. l V : V l N, and the arcs indicate direct dominance relations between the actors, i.e. if there is an arc (i , j ) D predecessor i dominates successor j and that j is dominated by i. Moreover, we say j Sˆ(i ) that j is a subordinate of i, and j S ˆ 1(i ) that j is a superior of i. The dominance relations in a hierarchy are assumed to fulfil the following three properties (see Radner 1992 for a similar set of properties): Property 3.1 (Transitivity) If i dominates j, and j dominates k, then i dominates k. Property 3.2 (Anti-symmetry) If i dominates j, then j cannot dominate i.
Note that by Property (3.1) in combination with (3.2) we assume i N : i Sˆ(i ), i.e. we exclude the case that a dominance structure is cyclic. Property 3.3 (Single Topness) There is exactly one actor, called the top (or root), who is in a position such that he dominates all other actors. Except for the top, every other actor has at least one predecessor. Thus, formally, there exists an i N such that Sˆ(i ) N \ \i ^ and Sˆ1(i ) .
For an illustration Fig. 1 depicts all feasible dominance structures of hierarchies with two and three members (except structures with relabelled members) which fulfil properties (3.1)–(3.3). Formally, for Fig. 1a these are given by S (a ) \b ^ and S (b ) , for Fig. 1b by S (a ) \b ^ , S (b ) \c ^ and S (c ) , and for Fig. 1c by S (a ) \b ,c ^ and S (b ) S (c ) . Note that the dominance relations in a hierarchy cannot always be represented by a tree, i.e. it is not necessarily the case that except for the top each other actor has one and only one predecessor. In other words, dominance relations which can be represented by a tree form a subclass of all feasible sets of dominance relations fulfilling properties (3.1)–(3.3).
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a
b Fig. 1a
a
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a
b b
c Fig. 1c
c Fig. 1b
Fig. 1.
Feasible dominance structures with two and three actors
As a dominance structure is only a partially ordered set, not all actors in a hierarchy are necessarily comparable in terms of their bare dominance relations. For instance, in Fig. 1c, b does not dominate c, nor does c dominate b (Radner 1992: 1391). However, in everyday language, the word hierarchy not only connotes an upside-down-tree-like dominance structure, but also an assignment of rank which allows for a certain mode of comparison of the positions of b and c. By a ranking of a dominance structure we shall mean an assignment of a natural number called the rank (or level) to each actor, such that: Property 3.4 i has a higher rank (larger number) than j, if i dominates j. Property 3.5 i and j have the same rank, if i does not dominate j nor j dominates i, i.e. if i and j are not comparable in terms of the dominance relations, and the length of the longest path to the top is the same for both.
While properties (3.4) and (3.5) are sufficient for existence of a ranking, they are only necessary but not sufficient for a unique ranking. Throughout this paper we will make use of a unique ranking which additionally satisfies the following properties: 3 Property 3.6 There is only one actor with the highest rank k called the top. Property 3.7 Recursively, an actor has rank l b k 1 iff all his predecessors have a rank h p l 1 and at least one of his predecessors has rank l 1. Property 3.8 We fix k such that the lowest ranked actor has rank 1. 3 Note, that with these properties we exclude hierarchies which contain direct dominance relations over more than one rank (Radner 1992: 1391). While we impose this restriction to keep the exposition of our paper traceable, this does not imply that our approach is not capable to take such hierarchies into account.
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An actor is said to be at the bottom (or a leaf ) if he does not dominate any other position, i.e. if he owns a terminal node. Note that this does not imply that such a position necessarily belongs to the lowest rank 1.
4. Decision-Making Mechanisms in Hierarchies Decision-making mechanisms are the other component of an organisation’s architecture that we need to examine. For the definition of a decision-making mechanism let us start with the general definition of a decision: Definition 4.1 A decision is the choice of a non-empty proper sub-set of elements out of a set of elements.
In our case the sets of elements from which an actor can choose is created by proposals submitted to the organisation. The chosen (or selected) elements are outcomes produced by members of an organisation. The choices are made by one or more actors belonging to the organisation where each of these actors has to perform an action to make his individual choice effective. How those actions and the outcomes are linked is given by the decision rule: Definition 4.2 A decision rule is a function that maps ordered sets of individual actions into outcomes.
Thus, a decision rule is an action guiding norm which states which ordered sets of actions generate which outcome. 4 A second component we require for our definition of a decision-making mechanism is that of a decision-making procedure: Definition 4.3 A decision-making procedure provides the course of actions of the actors for a collective decision and determines the actions to be counted, i.e. which actions go into the domain of the decision rule.
Now we can define a decision-making mechanism: Definition 4.4 A decision rule together with a decision-making procedure establishes a decision-making mechanism (DMM).
The canonical set-up for a DMM U in a hierarchy as found in the power literature is characterized by the following set of assumptions: 4
To put it into the language of causality: a decision rule defines the set of all necessary and sufficient conditions for each outcome, i.e. for each outcome it defines a set of sets of actions where each set of actions is sufficient for that outcome.
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Assumption 4.5 Proposals submitted to the hierarchy are exogenous: it is the task of the hierarchy either to accept or to reject the proposal, i.e. we have a binary outcome set O \acceptance , rejection ^. Assumption 4.6 A proposal can be submitted to the hierarchy only once. Assumption 4.7 A hierarchy contains a finite set of members N \a , b ,..., n ^ whose actions bring about the decision of the hierarchy. Assumption 4.8 Each actor i N has a binary action set Ai \yes , no ^ where yes means that i supports a proposal and no that i rejects the proposal.
Assumptions (4.5)–(4.8) are also common in the analysis of power in non-hierarchical organisations. In addition for hierarchies we need to assume: Assumption 4.9 The direction of the decision-making procedure through the hierarchy is bottom-up. Assumption 4.10 New proposals can only be received by those actors N N who have a contact to the outside world, i.e. to actors i N submitting the proposals. Assumption 4.11 Only certain subsets of N can receive a new proposal at the same time. The set of such feasible subsets is given by N 2 N . Assumption 4.12 If N a N receives a new proposal its members have to choose their individual actions. Depending on the DMM, these actions either establish a final decision on behalf of the hierarchy or they imply that the proposal is forwarded to the next higher rank in the hierarchy. Here Sˆ1(N a) defines the set of all superiors who may be involved in the decision about that proposal received by N a until a final decision on behalf of the hierarchy is made. Assumption 4.13 If a proposal is forwarded to the next higher rank, there is a set S min1(N a) of minimal feasible sub-sets of superiors Sˆmin1(N a) Sˆ1(N a) whose actions are required for the decision about a new proposal that has been presented to N a.
Assumptions (4.9)–(4.13) require some justification. Let us begin with the very basic rationale of a hierarchy: why may it be useful to have a hierarchy. Why do we have organisations with dominance structures? A common answer to this question says that hierarchies are cost saving because dominance structures allow for the decentralisation of decision-making (delega-
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tion), i.e. by dividing tasks between the members of the different ranks and positions. In our context delegation means that we can avoid that all members of an organisation are always involved in all decisions. Hence, DMMs in hierarchies imply that in certain instances particular actors are intentionally excluded from decisions (see, for instance, Mackenzie 1976: 103). This is usually achieved by a combination of two basic principles: (i) by reducing the breadth of the hierarchy involved in a particular decision and (ii) by allowing non-top actors to make certain types of final decisions on behalf of the whole hierarchy even before one of their superiors has been involved. It would therefore be natural, that a generic DMM for a hierarchy should take those principles into account. To investigate whether such a generic DMM also satisfies assumptions (4.9)–(4.13) we need to determine if there exists a reasonable example based on the very simple hierarchy given by Fig. 1c that fulfils both principles (i) and (ii) and the assumptions. Example 4.14 Assume that a hierarchy with a dominance structure as given by Fig. 1c is a development agency with a being its head and b and c being representatives in different developing countries. Moreover, assume that b and c receive funding applications for development projects, i.e. they have a contact to the outside world, while a does not. Suppose that the decision-making on these applications is delegated to b and c according to the above two principles. Based on principle (i) each representative is only responsible for the projects in his country, i.e. is not involved in decisions for the other country. If applications arrive at the desk of one of the representatives (b or c), this representative decides on them only together with a. Furthermore, based on principle (ii), if a representative (b or c) receives an application, he is entitled to reject it without contacting a (he can exclude a from the decision-making in this particular instance) although for an approval he requires the consent of a. 5
Thus, due to principle (i) a decision will never require the whole breath of the hierarchy (b and c together) to take part in a decision which implies that never all three actors are involved in a decision. In terms of its DMM the hierarchy is truncated twice, i.e. for each actor with a contact to the outside world we obtain a truncated hierarchy containing this actor and all his superiors. 6 To put it into other words: we have an ensemble of possible games on N with overlapping sets of actors, i.e. N 1 \a , b ^ and N 2 \a ,c ^ . 7 5 For an overview of further DMMs that can be derived from the literature on positional power in hierarchies see the appendix. 6 Formally this phenomenon can also taken as abstention, although in this case it is decreed rather than voluntary. 7 The idea of a possible game has been introduced in the context of abstention (see Braham and Steffen 2002). Assume a DMM under which abstention is permissible for any actor
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Whether b or c will be excluded from the decision-making (which possible game will be played) depends on who receives the new proposal. Moreover, due to principle (ii) all non-top actors are entitled to make a certain type of final decision on behalf of the whole hierarchy. This also means that principle (ii) implies a sequential decision-making procedure as it entitles nontop actors to terminate the collective decision-making, before actors on higher ranks are involved. Now let us determine if Example (4.14) and, thus, the application of the above principles, match with assumptions (4.9)–(4.13). Obviously, Assumption 4.9 is fulfilled. Moreover, the same applies to the remaining assumptions: N \b ,c ^ (4.10), N \\b ^ , \c ^^ (4.11), Sˆ 1 \b ^ S ˆ 1 \c ^ \a ^ (4.12), and S min1 \b ^ S min1 \c ^ \\a ^^ (4.13). However, note that these assumptions do not take into account that principle (ii) implies a sequential decision-making procedure. An essential characteristic of DMMs in hierarchies is overlooked.
5. Decision-Making Mechanisms and Extensive Game Forms For modelling a DMM in a hierarchy the extant literature applies the classical membership-based approach. However, this is inappropriate because it does not allow for the exclusion of agents based on principle (ii) nor does it allow for the bottom-up structure of the decision-making procedure (Assumption 4.9). Both exclusion and bottom-up decision-making require a sequential structure while the membership-based approach is inherently simultaneous (see Section 7). Hence, we suggest the natural method is an action-based approach that makes use of an extensive game form (EGF) as defined below. Let N \1,..., n ^ be the set of actors of a collective decision making body and N * def N R where R denotes ‘nature’ which behaves randomly, i.e. R ’s behaviour represents the exogenous effects of the outside world on N. The actors are part of a tree of a game form. This is a labelled tree ( T ,l V ,l D ) where (i) l V assigns to each non-terminal node j V exactly one i N * and to each terminal node k V an outcome o(k) O with O being a non-empty finite outcome set, and (ii) l D assigns to each arc a move a A where A denotes the set of all possible moves for all i N * . In a tree of a game form a non-terminal node is called a decision node if it is owned by an actor i N , and a chance node if it is owned by R . Moreover, we denote the set of nodes owned by an actor i by V i . An information set for an actor i is a set of nodes h i such that in a deci-
i N . Hence, a decision can be made by any subset N k 2 N . Here any game played on N k is called a possible game on N. Note that the idea of a possible game is different to that of a composed game (Shapley 1962). In case of a composed game all components of the game can be played at the same time, while out of the set of possible games only one will be played.
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sion-making procedure i knows that he must make the ‘next decision’, at some node j h i , but due to his lack of information of the ‘history’ of the decision-making procedure i does not know at which node j h i exactly he must make his decision; i only knows that j h i . Necessary conditions of an information set for an actor i are that (i) all nodes of h i are owned by i; (ii) no node of h i is related to any other node of h i , i.e. if j , h h i , then j is neither an ancestor nor a descendant of h; and (iii) all nodes of h i are equivalent for i with respect to the outgoing arcs, i.e. the number and labelling of arcs starting from each node j h i is the same. Moreover, let us denote the set of all information sets of an actor i by H i , i.e. H i def \h i 1 ,.., h ip ^. Note, that if the set of nodes of a tree of a game form is N * , i.e. it includes R , we follow the convention that nodes belonging to nature are always elements of singleton information sets Now we can characterise an EGF. 8 Definition 5.1 An EGF is a tree of a game form such that the decisionnodes have been partitioned into information sets that belong to the actors.
In an EGF we call C i : V i l 2 V the choice function of an actor i N * , if C i ( j ) = S ( j ) for all j V i . Thus, a choice function assigns to each j V i its corresponding set of successors S ( j ) in the tree of the game form (it assigns to each j V i the nodes that i can reach being in j and making a move). Furthermore, we say that i ‘has chosen’, if i has to make a move in a node j V i and has decided for a move to a node h S ( j ). For all i N we call such choices of a move an action of i in j, denoted by a ij . The set of all actions available to i at a node j V i is called the action set of i at j, denoted by Aij , i.e. Aij def \a ij1 ,...,a ijm ^. The set of all actions available to i at any node in V i is denoted by Ai, i.e. Ai def \ j V i : Aij ^. If instead nature R moves, it’s moves – if they are non-fictitious – are not actions of intention, but just moves (determining which ‘real’ actor has to choose next) which follow a probability distribution resulting from a function p : H R q A R l [0,1] that assigns probabilities to the ‘actions’ at information sets where nature moves, satisfying h R H R : \a Rj A Rj j h R : p(a Rj )^ 1. Next, let us say that for an i N * , j V i . and a ij Ai j in an EGF, h( j ,a ij ) denotes that node h S ( j ) such that l D ( j , h ) a ij , i.e. h( j ,a ij ) is that node that is reached from node j, if i makes the move a ij . Based on this notation we can define an action profile in an EGF: Definition 5.2 An ‘action profile’ a in an EGF is an ordered set of individ8 For more details about extensive game forms we refer the reader to Kolpin (1988, 1989) and for extensive form games to Kuhn (1953) and Selten (1975).
Positional Power in Hierarchies Table 1.
Choice Functions and Related Action Sets
j V i
S ( j)
Aij
j V a j V c
\acceptance , rejection ^ \a , rejection ^ \a , rejection ^
\yes , no ^ \yes , no ^ \yes , no ^
j V R
\b , c ^
–
j V b
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Table 2. Action Profiles and Related Outcomes
aA
oO
(b is allowed to chooseT , yesb, yesa)
acceptance
(c is allowed to chooseT , yesc, yesa)
acceptance
(b is allowed to chooseT , yesb, noa)
rejection
(c is allowed to chooseT , yesc, noa)
rejection
(b is allowed to chooseT , nob)
rejection
(c is allowed to chooseT , noc)
rejection
ual moves, a def (a j1 , ..., a j p ), belonging to a subset of actors N (a ) N * , such that their moves form a path P ( j 1 , j p 1 ) j 1 l j 2 l ... l j p 1 with S 1( j 1 ) , S ( j p 1 ) , and l D ( j q , j q 1 ) a j q for all q \1, ..., p ^. Thus, an action profile a is a ‘path of moves’ within the tree of the game form where the first move begins at the root r j 1 and the last move ends at a terminal node k j p 1. The set of all action profiles will be denoted by A and by A i A we will denote the subset of all action profiles that contain an action of actor i. Notice that the action profiles in an EGF which represents a DMM consider only counted individual actions and not all feasible individual actions. That is, these action profiles ignore those actions which actors have available and can perform but which are not counted by the decision-making procedure. Let us return to Example (4.14) which can now be represented by an EGF with N * \a , b ,c , R^ , j V i ,i N : Ai j \yes , no ^, O \acceptance , rejection ^, i N : # H i # V i , and, thus, j V i : \ j ^ H i . Hence, we have an EGF with perfect information, i.e. the information sets are single-
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yes
acceptance
a no
yes
rejection
b no ½
rejection
R yes
acceptance
a ½ yes
no
rejection
c no rejection
Fig. 2. The DMM as an EGF
tons and there is one information set h i for each node j owned by i. 9 Given the triple (N * , U , S ) with U denoting the DMM as described by Example (4.14) we obtain the choice functions and the individual action sets as given by Table 1. From these we can derive the action profiles containing the counted individual actions and their related outcomes as given by Table 2. What is left to be specified is the probability function determining nature’s moves, p . It determines which actors with a contact to the outside world will obtain a proposal on their desk and, therefore, establishes which possible game will be played. In the absence of any (structural) information regarding the likelihood of N a N to receive a new proposal, we apply the principle of insufficient reason of classical probability theory. 10 This assigns equal probability to all admissible ‘atomic events’, i.e. in the present case equal probability to all N a N for receiving a new proposal: p (N a receives a new proposal) 1/# N 9 Note, that in a hierarchy an actor may own more than one decision node, even if he owns only one node in the dominance structure. 10 In the absence of any information about the outside world the application of the principle of insufficient reason appears to be legitimate here as we fulfil the condition that we have a finite probability space consisting of finitely many clearly distinguished indivisible ‘atomic events’ (Felsenthal et al. 2003).
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which implies that for each actor i N his probability to receive a new proposal is given by pˆ(i N receives a new proposal) # \N a N i N a^ /# N.
We can now give a proper graphical representation of a DMM as an EGF. For Example (4.14) this is given by Fig. 2. From Section 4 we know that we have two possible games with N 1 \a ,b ^ and N 2 \a ,c ^. Moreover, we have N \\b ^ , \c ^^ which implies that each possible game occurs with probability 21 . In the EGF this is reflected by the assignment of this probability to the moves of nature which lead to the branches T b and T c representing the possible games.
6. Measuring Positional Power: An Action-Based Approach Our understanding of ‘power’ is based on Harré (1970) and Morriss (1987/ 2002) who define power as a concept that always refers to a generic (and therefore, in a sense, timeless) ability or capacity of an object. In a social context this object is an actor and a power ascription refers to his ability: what the actor is able to do against the resistance of at least some other actor. Following Braham (2007) we say that an actor i has power with respect to a certain outcome if i has an action (or sequence of actions) such that the performance of the action under the stated or implied conditions will result in that outcome despite the actual or possible resistance of at least some other actor. That is, power is a claim about what i is able to do against some resistance of others irrespective of the actual occurrence of the resistance. Thus, power is a capacity or potential which exists whether it is exercised or not. In our context, this capacity is based on the positions of the actors in an organisation. The measurement of power involves the following steps: (i) The identification of the action profiles within the organisation that are sufficient for bringing about an outcome. (ii) The ascription of power to an individual actor in these action profiles by determining if the actor has an action that if performed will, ceteris paribus, alter the outcome of the collective action. (iii) The aggregation of the individual power ascriptions of each actor, giving us a bare power score. (iv) The weighting of the aggregated power ascriptions yields to a power measure. If this weighting is such that all aggregated power ascriptions sum up to unity we say that we have a power index. The difference between a score and a measure rests in the comparability of power structures: a score allows for ordinal comparisons only, while a measure allows for cardinal comparisons. In Section 5 we already described and illustrated step (i) (see Table 2). Thus, we can immediately proceed with step (ii). To ascribe power to an
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actor we examine for each action profile a whether i has an action, 11 which, if chosen, can make a decisive difference to the outcome against the actual or possible resistance of at least some other actor. That is, we determine if a given actor i has a swing. To define a swing in an EGF let O ˆ(g ) def \o O there is a path P (g , k ) with S (k ) and o = o(k )^, i.e. O ˆ(g ) is a relation between a decision node g V i and the outcome set O ˆ that can be achieved from this node. 12 Based on this relation we have: Definition 6.1 A swing of an actor i is a triple (a , a ij l ,aij l ) with a (a j1 , ..., a j p ) being an action profile and actions a ij l ,aij l Aiil for which there are two decision nodes j l V i and j k S ( j l ) that are reached by profile a and a decision node g S ( j l ) \ \ j k ^, such that l D ( j l , j k ) a ij l , l D ( j l , g ) aij l , and O ˆ(g ) \ \o(a j p )^ v .
Hence, i has a swing, if i can alter the resulting outcome o(a j p ) of an action profile a by, ceteris paribus, changing his action a ij l . At this point it is important to draw attention to the interpretation of the ceteris paribus condition. In the context of collective decision-making it is commonly said to imply that the actions of all other actors remain constant (in all information sets). That is, if i alters his action the only effect that can result out of this is a change in the outcome (then we say that i has a swing and we ascribe power to i ). While this ‘all other things being equal’ interpretation is appropriate for a simultaneous DMM, it no longer applies for our more general case of a sequential DMM, which may allow certain actors to exclude other actors from the decision-making as a result of their choices (see principle (ii) in Section 4). If we have an action profile a A i and we alter i ’s action a ij l in a it can happen that the decision-making process rea quires either the exclusion of actions of other actors a ija l from the domain of the decision rule and, hence, from action profile a , or the inclusion of a actions by other actors aija l in the domain of the decision rule and, therefore, in action profile a . If such information would be ignored, we can end up with an inappropriate power ascription resulting out of the alteration of i ’s action. In order to avoid this problem and to capture this information we have to go back to the idea behind the literal ‘all other things being equal’ interpretation of the ceteris paribus clause. The basic idea of the ceteris paribus clause is a comparison between two possible worlds: the world as it is (our initial action profile a and its associated outcome o(a j p ) ) and the world as it would be if an action were changed (the resulting action profile and its 11 The literature on power commonly uses the term ‘strategy’ as a synonym for an ‘action’ (see Miller 1982; Braham and Steffen 2003; Braham and Holler 2005) even if power is defined as the ability of an actor to effect outcomes by his chosen actions and not by his plan of action. 12 Note, that we allow P (g , k ) to be a direct path, but not to be a degenerated path.
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associated outcome if i ’s action a ij l were altered). In contrast to the standard interpretation of the ceteris paribus clause our analysis does not necessarily require that all other components of the action profile remain constant after we altered i ’s action; it requires that the action profiles after the initial change by one actor are consistent with the DMM. Hence, this interpretation of the ceteris paribus clause which is underlying Definition (6.1) is able to capture the above mentioned aspects of a sequential DMM. 13 If an actor i has a swing, we can distinguish between two different types of swings: Definition 6.2 A swing (a , a ij l ,aij l ) of an actor i is strong if #O ˆ(g ) 1, and weak if #O ˆ(g ) 1, with g as given in Definition 6.1.
Note, that for a swing (a , a ij l ,aij l ) and g as given in Definition 6.1, #Oˆ(g ) 1 implies that the unique outcome in O ˆ(g ) is different from the outcome o(a j p ) of the action profile a since by definition of a swing O ˆ(g ) contains at least one outcome that is different than o(a j p ). Thus, a strong swing enables an actor to alter a unique outcome into another unique outcome, while a weak swing only enables an actor to alter a unique outcome into a non-unique outcome. The distinction between strong and weak swings is novel and becomes necessary due to the sequential structure of our approach. Both swings are immediately comparable if we have set inclusion, i.e. a strong swing (a , a ij l ,aij l ) and a weak swing (a a , a ij l a ,aij l a ) with g and g a, respectively, as given in Definition (6.1) are comparable if O ˆ(g ) O ˆ(g a). In this case which applies to our binary set-up, a strong swing implies more power (or ability) than a weak swing as the outcome that an actor with a strong swing can enforce is more specific. Moreover, for a binary set-up the literature distinguishes between positive and negative swings: Definition 6.3 For a DMM represented by an EGF with j V i , i N : Aij \yes ,no ^ and O \acceptance , rejection ^ an actor i has a positive swing, if i by switching from a ‘no’- to a ‘yes’-action can alter the outcome from a ‘rejection’ to an ‘acceptance’ and has a negative swing, if i by switching from a ‘yes’- to a ‘no’-action can alter the outcome from an ‘acceptance’ to a ‘rejection’. Definition 6.4 Let S i \s i1 , ..., s iz ^ be the set of all swings of an actor i where each s i denotes a swing (a , a ij l ,aij l ), Moreover, let S is and S iw denote the sets of strong and weak swings of i respectively.
13 Note that the ceteris paribus clause in Definition (6.1) also guarantees the fulfillment of the resistance condition (see Braham 2007).
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For step (iii), the individual power ascriptions for each actor given by S i are aggregated in order to obtain a complete and transitive relation ‘at least as powerful as for o ’, Zo , defined over N . 14 To aggregate the individual power ascriptions we have to take into account the existence of nature, or in other words: the potential exclusion of actors from the decision-making due to principle (i) (exclusion due to principle (ii) is already taken into account via the action profiles). We obtain this by weighting each swing on a branch T j with j V i and i N with the likelihood that nature will choose this branch. For the EGF this implies that j V R : S 1( j ) , i.e. that nature owns the root r of the tree of the game form, and, hence, makes the first move. Furthermore, for our analysis we assume # V R 1, i.e. that nature owns only one node being the root. 15 Definition 6.5 Let p (a R a ) be the likelihood that nature chooses the move a R that is part of the action profile a , and a(s i ) be the action profile in a swing s i (a , a ij l ,aij l ). Then p (a R a(s i ) denotes the likelihood that nature chooses the move that is part of the action profile a in swing s i .
Note: (i) If in the (original) EGF j V R : S 1( j ) , # V R 1, and # N a 1 for all N a N , due to the principle of insufficient reason we have p (a R a ) ( p (N a receives a new proposal) 1/# N . (ii) If in the (original) EGF V R , i.e. if nature does not exist, we can represent this EGF by a strategically equivalent EGF with j V R : S 1( j ) , # V R 1, and # A R 1, which implies # N 1, and, hence, p (a R a ) p (N a receives a new proposal) 1. Definition 6.6 The power score of an actor i N in a decision-making situation represented by an EGF is given by I i (N * , U , S ) def \s i S is : p (a R a(s i ))^ \s i S iw : F ¸ p (a R a(s i ))^ with 0 F 1 to take into account the nature of weak swings. 16
Note, that here i , j N : i Zo j is to be interpreted as ‘i ’s degree of power to force o is at least as great as j ’s degree of power to force o ’, with ;o and o denoting the asymmetric and symmetric components of Zo , i.e. ;o denotes ‘the greater degree of power’ and o ‘the same degree of power’. 15 Although this assumption might appear to be quite strong, it does not impose any restriction on the applicability of our approach to DMMs represented by EGFs. Naturally, it can happen that for certain DMMs j V R : S 1( j ) v , i.e. that nature owns also other nodes than the root. However, in these cases, it is easy to proof via a backward induction procedure, that we can represent the original EGF by a strategically equivalent one where we have merged the nodes j V R , such that # V R 1 and S 1( j ) for j V R . 16 Note, that for the binary DMMs which are discussed in the literature (see Appendix) it is not necessary to specify the value of F as these DMMs all include (i) bottom-up procedures which (ii) always requires the presence of the top for an approval: (i) ensures that the top is 14
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From Definition (6.1) it follows that in this case Zo is a cardinality-based ranking such that i , j N : i Zo j l I i p I j . In order to obtain a power measure allowing for cardinal comparisons, we have to continue with step (iv) by applying different weightings to the action profiles and, thus, to the related power ascriptions (to the swings of the actors). From Definition (6.6) we can derive the natural analogue to the Banzhaf measure C a which is formulated in the language of the membership-based approach (Banzhaf 1965, Felsenthal und Machover 1998). 17 We obtain this analogue for an actor i N by weighting the score with the weighted sum of ‘potential swings’ of i in all action profiles a A i . Here the weight of each action profile a is determined by the likelihood that nature chooses this profile, i.e. p (a R a ). The number of potential swings of i in each profile a results out of the sum of alternative actions aij Aij \ \a ij ^ actor i has at hand for each action a ij a : Definition 6.7 The power measure of an actor i N in a decision-making situation represented by an EGF is given by Cia(N * , U , S ) def
\s S : p(a a(s ))^ \s S : F ¸ p(a a(s ))^ \a A : p(a a ) \ j V (a ) : (# A 1)^^ i
s i
R
i
i
R
w i
i
R
i
j
i
i
where V i (a ) is the set of decision nodes j V i that are reached by a . Now let us return to Example (4.14). For the analysis of the power structure of this example we start by exploring the actors’ swings. From Fig. 2 we know that a owns two nodes: one in each possible game, while b and c own one node in ‘their’ possible game. In each node each actor has two actions. Examining the effects of altering, ceteris paribus, the actions for all actors shows that a has a positive and a negative strong swing in each of the two games, whereas b and c only have one positive weak and one negative strong swing each. Let us have a closer look at b’s situation. If b switches from ‘no’ to ‘yes’ b can exclude a straightforward rejection against the resistance of all other actors performing any feasible action, and if b switches from a ‘yes’ to ‘no’, b the only one who owns a positive strong swing, while (ii) guarantees that the top is at least never less powerful than any other actor if a dominance structure satisfies properties (3.1)– (3.8). If we want to specify the value of F, we could be tempted to think about an actor dependent operator Fi . However, this would make the power of an actor i additionally dependent on the actions and, thus, the powers of his subsequent actors in the EGF – something which is in contradiction to our dispositional concept of power, i.e. that the power of an actor i is what i is able to do when he is in the position to act. 17 The derivation of other analogues of well known power measures, such as the ShapleyShubik (1954) index is left to future research.
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can ensure a straightforward rejection against the resistance of all other actors performing any feasible action. Furthermore, and as already indicated above, here the ceteris paribus clause for b implies not only that b has an effect on the outcome but also on a’s action: by switching his action b determines whether a – according to the DMM – has to act or not and whether a’s action is counted, i.e. if b opts for ‘yes’ a is obliged to act and his action is counted, while if b chooses ‘no’ a is neither obliged to act nor his action is counted. Thus, a switch in b’s action forces us either to consider an action performed by a which was not counted or even not existent before, or to ignore an originally counted action performed by a. However, the sole effect of b on a is something which is irrelevant for our analysis which is concerned with the question whether b has the ability to affect the outcome at that decision-making node. Taking into account that each possible game occurs with equal probability, it is obvious that a is more powerful than b and c and that b and c have equal power, i.e. a ;o b o c . Applying Definition (6.6) and (6.7) we obtain the following power distributions which reflect this ordering: I(N * , U , S ) (2.00, 0.50 0.50F, 0.50 0.50F) Ca(N * , U , S ) (1.00, 0.33 0.33F, 0.33 0.33F).
7. Measuring Positional Power: Pathologies of the MembershipBased Approaches We mentioned earlier that the literature on the measurement of positional power in non-hierarchical organisations is usually founded on a membership-based approach. We also stated that the membership-based approach is not suitable to deal with the particularities of DMMs which are typical for hierarchical organisations. To see why, let us start with the canonical set-up of the membership-based approach. This is represented by a simple game. Definition 7.1 A simple game (SG) is a pair (N , W ) where W is a collection of subsets (coalitions) of the set of actors N called the set of winning coalitions, which satisfies the following three conditions: W ; N W ; and (monotonicity) if T W and T T a, then T a W . A subset T N is said to be winning or losing according to whether T W or T W . Furthermore, a subset T is called minimal winning iff T W , but no subset of T is in W . The set of minimal winning subsets is denoted by M
Hence, a DMM represented by a SG can be either represented by W or due to the monotonicity condition by M , where a coalition T can be regarded as an ‘index’ of the actions of the actors which have chosen the same action, for instance, ‘yes’, if T W .
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Now, let us investigate the degree to which a SG is able to meet Assumptions (4.5) and (4.7)–(4.13) and both principles discussed in Section 4. This will provide us with an idea about the limitations of this approach and how we can convert the membership-based approach founded on a SG into a special case of our action-based approach. Like our EGF the definition of a SG is also based on a finite set of actors N (Assumption 4.7). The binary structure of the decision-making situation, i.e. the individual binary action sets (Assumption 4.8) and the binary outcome set (Assumption 4.5) are taken into account via the membership of actors in winning or losing subsets of actors. An actor establishes his membership of such a subset by his individual action, i.e. by either supporting or rejecting a proposal. Thus, what a SG does is that it subdivides all actors subject to their individual actions to belong either to T or N \ T where T contains those actors who “get their way” according to the DMM, i.e. whose individual actions corresponds to the collective outcome. 18 The fact that new proposals can only be received by actors with a contact to the outside world (Assumption 4.10) is taken into account by the requirement that T M : T N v . The assumption that only subsets of N can receive a new proposal at the same time (Assumption 4.11) is currently not taken into account by the existing membership-based approaches but could be incorporated by applying the idea of possible games with overlapping sets of actors. The same applies if a collective decision does not require the whole breath of a hierarchy, i.e. principle (i) (see Example 4.14). The information that in certain instances particular actors i are able to determine the collective decision by their individual action (Assumptions 4.12 and 4.13) can be considered via veto rights, i.e. that T M : i T . What remains is the bottom-up direction of the decision-making procedure (Assumption 4.9) and the assumption that particular actors might be able to make certain types of final decisions on behalf of the whole hierarchy even before one of their superiors has been involved (principle ii). Both cannot be taken into account by a SG because they require a sequential structure while a SG is inherently simultaneous. A SG only considers the memberships of actors in T W or T W , but not when the actors join such subsets. Thus, it implicitly assumes that all actors join the subsets at the same time. Hence, the membership-based SG setup can be represented by an EGF with simultaneous individual actions. Put it differently: by an EGF with imperfect information such that there is one information set containing all nodes owned by i, i.e. i N : # H i 1 and h i V i . 19 18
Note, that this additionally requires the usual assumption that the simple game is selfdual, i.e. that any binary division of actors results in exactly one winning and one losing subset (Taylor and Zwicker 1999). 19 Note, that a DMM represented by a SG can also be represented by a strategic game form (SGF) with unconditional actions (Miller 1982) which implies that a SGF with conditional
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yes
a
c no
yes
a
b no ½
c
yes no
a
a
R yes
a
b
½
no
yes
a
c no
b
yes no
a
a
yes
acceptance
no
rejection
yes
acceptance
no
rejection
yes
acceptance
no
rejection
yes
rejection
no
rejection
yes
acceptance
no
rejection
yes
acceptance
no
rejection
yes
acceptance
no
rejection
yes
rejection
no
rejection
Fig. 3. An EGF representation of a SG
Thus, the major difference between our and the existing approaches is that they differ in the assumptions of the information sets. This has farreaching consequences. Not only are the trees of the game form considerably different (see Fig. 3 for the EGF of Example 4.14 with imperfect information), but also the power structure. Altering the information sets of Example (4.14) in the appropriate way we obtain I(N * , U , S ) (6.00, 2.00, 2.00) and Ca(N * , U , S ) (0.75, 0.25, 0.25). The ordering is the same, but a becomes relatively more powerful than b and c. This is due to the fact that in a simultaneous decision-making structure – in contrast to a sequential structure – all feasible individual actions are counted. However, the effects of ignoring the sequential structure of a DMM in a hierarchy and instead applying an approach with a simultaneous structure might be stronger than in this example, i.e. it might change the power ordering of the actors. Example 7.2 Assume a hierarchy with the dominance structure given by Fig. 1b. Applying the membership-based set-up we have N * N \a , b , c ^ , actions is an alternative of equal rank to the EGF we suggest here.
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j V i ,i N : Aij \yes , no ^, i N : # H i # V i , and j V i : \ j ^ H i , and O \acceptance , rejection ^. Concerning the DMM U let us assume that only c has contact to the outside world, i.e. \N ^ N \\c ^^ , that the decision-making procedure is bottom-up, and that each actor is able to reject a proposal on behalf of the whole hierarchy if it arrives at his desk and he rejects it – which implies that subsequent individual actions should not be counted – while an acceptance of a proposal requires the approval of all three actors. Then we obtain I(N * , U , S ) (2.00, 1.00 F, 1.00 F,) and Ca(N * , U , S ) (1.00, 0.33 0.33F, 0.25 0.25F), while in case of i N : # H i 1 and h i V i , i.e. under a simultaneous structure with W M \\a , b ,c ^^ , we would obtain I(N * , U , S ) (2.00, 2.00, 2.00) and Ca(N * , U , S ) (0.25, 0.25 0.25). Hence, the power ordering a ;o b ;o c based on the power measure taking into account the sequential nature would be misrepresented by a o b o c under the simultaneous structure.
8. Concluding Remarks We would like to tie up this paper with a brief summary and some remarks. We provided an action-based framework for the analysis of positional power in organisational architectures which can account for the particularities of hierarchical structures. For this reason our approach is more general than the usual membership-based approach which does not allow for sequential DMMs. Moreover, we demonstrated that if it is still applied to a sequential DMM it may result in inappropriate cardinal and ordinal power structures as it ascribes power to actors in action profiles which should not be counted. In order to measure an actors’ power we have extended the notion of a swing from a simultaneous to a sequential set-up and aggregated the individual power ascriptions over all action profiles of which an actor is a member. This is in line with our definition of power as a generic ability which is a conditional disposition that exists irrespective whether it is exercised or not. For the derivation of our power measure in Definition (6.7) from our power score in Definition (6.6) we divided the score of an actor i by the weighted sum of his potential swings. Even though this reflects perfectly what the Banzhaf measure is doing for the simultaneous case, it is not so innocent as it seems to be – even for our binary set-up. While under the simultaneous structure all actors are members of all action profiles and, hence, each actor has the same chance to have a swing in each action profile, this is no longer necessarily the case under the sequential set-up. A consequence of this is that our power score and measure are not necessarily co-monotone, i.e. Felsenthal et al’s (1998) price monotonicity postulate is violated. Finally, we have to acknowledge that the suggested approach currently does not take into account the case of differing incentive structures between the actors, i.e. that actors have a damatis personae: they are the bearers of predetermined attributes and modes of behaviour. Actors in hierarchies of-
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ten play predetermined roles, such as salesman, financial officer, head of external affairs, etc., which are equipped with a bundle of incentive structures that also belong to the organisational architecture. Steffen (2002) argues that a proper measurement of power should take such information into account if it is available. For the membership-based approach Straffin’s (1977, 1978) partial homogeneity approach offers a solution to this problem. Even though we expect that the same idea could be applied to our action-based approach, this, as well as the axiomatization of our measure, are issues for future research.
Appendix From Assumptions (4.5)–(4.13) there are 12 DMMs found in the literature on positional power. These differ in terms of N , N , and S min1(N a) as given by Assumptions (4.10), (4.11), and (4.13). They all share the other assumptions with Sˆ 1 (N a) j Sˆ1(i ) i N a for Assumption (4.12). NB: here i and j are actors in a dominance structure and not actors in an EGF.
\
^
Table A.1
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
\N a 2
N
# N a 1^
N
\N a 2
N
# N a 1^
N
\N a 2
N
# N a 1^
\i N
S (i ) ^
N
\i N
S (i ) ^
N
\i N
S (i ) ^
N
\i N
S (i ) ^
\N a 2
N
# N a 1^
\i N
S (i ) ^
\N a 2
N
# N a 1^
\i N
S (i ) ^
\N a 2
N
# N a 1^
S min1(N a)
\\ j Sˆ
(i ) i N a S
1
^^
(j)
1
\P (i , j ) i N a j Sˆ (i ) S ( j ) ^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a^^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a S ( j ) ^^ \P (i , j ) i N a j Sˆ (i ) S ( j ) ^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a^^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a S ( j ) ^^ \P (i , j ) i N a j Sˆ (i ) S ( j ) ^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a^^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a S ( j ) ^^ \P (i , j ) i N a j Sˆ (i ) S ( j ) ^ \\ j Sˆ (i ) i N a^^ 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Positional Power in Hierarchies
79
Acknowledgements We would like to thank Marlies Ahlert, Steve Brams, Franz Dietrich, Keith Dowding, Bernhard Grofman, Thomas Hammond, Marc Kilgour, Hartmut Kliemt, Martin Leroch, Moshé Machover, Stefan Napel, Jan-Willem van der Rijt, Federico Valenciano, Stefano Vannucci, William Zwicker, and in particular Matthew Braham, Manfred Holler, and Pete Morriss for comments and discussions. Forerunners of this paper have been presented at the Meeting of the Dutch Social Choice Group at Tilburg University (January 2006), at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the European Public Choice Society in Turku (April 2006), at the Eighth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare in Istanbul (July 2006), at the conference on ’Power: Conceptual, Formal, and Applied Dimensions’ in Hamburg (August 2006), and at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Philadelphia (August/September 2006). This article was largely written while Frank Steffen was at Tilburg University under a Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship within the 6th European Community Framework Programme. He gratefully acknowledges this financial support.
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5. A Public Help Index Cesarino Bertini Department of Mathematics, Statistics, Computer Science and Applications, University of Bergamo, Italy
Gianfranco Gambarelli Department of Mathematics, Statistics, Computer Science and Applications, University of Bergamo, Italy
Izabella Stach Faculty of Management, AGH University of Science and Technology, Krakow, Poland
1. Introduction As far as we known, the first concept of power index dates back to 1780s and is due to Luther Martin (see Felsenthal and Machover (2005), Gambarelli and Owen (2004) and Riker (1986)). Lionel S. Penrose (1946) gave, probably, the first scientific discussion of voting power where he introduced the concept of a priori voting power (a similar analysis was independently carried out by John F. Banzhaf (1965)). Lloyd S. Shapley, in cooperation with Martin Shubik (Shapley and Shubik 1954), came up with a specialization of the Shapley (1953) value as a power index. Other power indices were introduced later; some derived from existing values, others built exclusively for simple games. The Public Good Index introduced by Manfred Holler in (1978) belongs to the latter category. In this paper the ‘Public Good Index’ is modified as a ‘Public Help Index’ (PHI), which takes into account all winning coalitions. In fact, sometimes every (not only minimal) winning coalition is relevant to bargaining for various reasons: electoral legislation (see, Bertini et al. 2005; Gambarelli 1999), strengthening of weak minimal majorities, social help and so on. The here presented Public Help Index R(v ) follows this philosophy and takes the name from the latter case. Contrarily to the PGI, defined on the simple monotone games, the PHI does not require this restriction of monotonicity. An axiomatic characterization and monotonicity properties of the new index is given. An algorithm for automatic computation of the PGI and the PHI is supplied.
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Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
2. Definitions A game is the set of rules describing a strategic situation. In the cooperative games, players can unite to obtain common advantages. Let N = \1, 2, ..., n ^ be the set of all players indexed by the first n natural numbers. A cooperative n-person game in characteristic function form is an ordered pair (N , v ) , where v : 2 N l R is a real-valued function on the family 2 N of all subset of N such that v() 0 . The real-valued function v is called a characteristic function of the game. Any subset S of N is called coalition and v(S ) the worth of the coalition S in the game. In this paper we denote a cooperative game (N , v ) just by its characteristic function v. A cooperative game v is said to be simple if its characteristic function has a value only in the set \0, 1^ : v(S ) = 0 or v(S ) = 1 for all S N . In the first case the coalition is said to be losing; in the second, winning. A coalition S is called a minimal winning coalition if v(S ) 1 but v(T ) 0 for all T S , T v S . Every player i who belongs to a minimal winning coalition S N is called crucial in S. If player i N belongs to no minimal winning coalition, then i is called a dummy player for game v. A simple game v is monotone if v(S ) b v(T ) whenever S T N . We call zero player every player that does not belong to any winning coalition. A null game v is a simple game in which S N v(S ) 0 . Obviously in null games every player is a zero player. Let G be the set of simple cooperative games v defined on N. Let G * G denote the set of all simple monotone games with exclusion of the null game. For all v G we denote: W (v ) the set of winning coalitions of v; W *(v ) the set of minimal winning coalitions of v; W i (v ) the set of winning coalitions of v containing the i-th player; W i *(v ) the set of minimal winning coalitions of v containing the i-th player. From now on we will omit the indication ‘(v)’ when it does not imply misunderstandings and we will denote by X the cardinality of the set X. Let v 1 and v 2 be two games of G. We define the games v 12(S ) and v 12(S ) as follows: def ¦£1 if v 1(S ) 1 or v 2(S ) 1 v 12(S ) max v 1(S ), v 2(S ) ¦ ¤ ¦¦¥0 otherwise def ¦£1 if v 1(S ) 1 and v 2(S ) 1 v 12(S ) min v 1(S ), v 2(S ) ¦ ¤ ¦¦¥0 otherwise.
Notice that: W i (v 12 ) W i (v 1 ) W i (v 2 ) and W i (v 12 ) W i (v 1 ) W i (v 2 ) W (v 12 ).
We say that v 1 and v 2 are mergeable if no minimal winning coalition of v 1 is or contains a minimal winning coalition of game v 2 and vice versa. In formulae:
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S 2 and S 2 S 1. S 1 W *(v 1 ) and S 2 W *(v 2 ) º S 1
Let (X 1 , X 2 ,..., X n ) be a vector with non-negative components such that
n i 1 X i 1 . For any coalition S, X(S ) i S X i is the weight of the coali-
tion. Let q be the majority quota that establishes winning coalitions. We call a weighted majority game (q ; X 1 ,..., X n ) the simple game: £¦1 if X(S ) p q v(S ) ¦¤ ¦¦¥0 elsewhere. A power index K is a function that maps n-person simple game v, to n-dimensional real vector and it is a measure of the distribution of power in simple games. Let v :(q ; X 1 ,..., X n ) be a weighted majority game. We say that power index K is locally monotonic if X i X j º Ki (v ) p K j (v ).
Let v :(q ; X 1 ,..., X i ,..., X n ) and v a :(q ; X 1a ,..., X ia ,..., X na ) be two weighted majority games such that X i X ia for one i N and X j b X aj for all j v i . We say that power index K is globally monotonic if
Ki (v ) p Ki (v a).
3. The Public Good Index The PGI is a decisive point in the measuring of a priori voting power because it, contrary to previous approaches, considers the coalition value to be a public good and takes in consideration the distinction between power and luck, as introduced by Barry in (1980). Later on the PGI has increased significance by virtue of many important developments and applications: see for instance Holler (1978, 1982a) and Hołubiec and Mercik (1994). The index was axiomatized by Holler and Packel (1983). Napel (1999, 2001) showed the independence and non redundancy of the Holler and Packel axioms. Holler and Li (1995) introduced the ‘Public Value’, changing the ‘mergeability’ axiom. Other developments of the PGI were supplied by Brams and Fishburn (1995), Haradau and Napel (2007), Holler (1982b, 1998, 2002) and Widgrèn (2002). Moreover some properties common to various indices (Holler’s included) were studied by Brams and Fishburn (1996), Felsenthal and Machover (1995, 1998), Freixas and Gambarelli (1997), Gambarelli (1983), Holler (1997), Holler and Napel (2004), Holler and Owen (2002), Holler and Widgrèn (1999), Syed (1990) and Turnovec (1997).
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3.1 Formulation
Let v be a game of G * . As stated above, W i denotes the number of minimal winning coalitions containing the i-th player. The Public Good Index h introduced by Holler in (1978) is defined as follows:
h i (v )
Wi
W
for all i N .
j
j N
3.2 A Leading Example In our treatment we will refer to the 3-person simple monotone game v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(2, 3) = 0; v(1, 2) = v(1, 3) = v(1, 2, 3) = 1. Let’s compute the PGI of our example. The set of minimal winning coalitions is: W * \\1,2^ , \1,3^^ . Since player 1 belongs to both minimal win ning coalitions, then W 1 2 . Since players 2 and 3 belong to only one minimal winning coalition, then W 2 W 3 1 . It follows that j N W j 2 4. Then h 1 4 and h 2 h 3 41 .
3.3 Axiomatization We recall the four axioms introduced by Holler and Packel in (1983) as axiomatization of the PGI for simple monotone games (G *) . A1 (symmetry)
For every permutation π and i N Q : N l N º Ki (v ) K Q(i )(Qv ).
where the game Qv is nothing other than the game v, with the roles of the players interchanged by the permutation π. A2 (efficiency)
K (v ) 1. i
i N
A3 (dummy player)
i is a dummy for v º K i (v ) 0.
A4 (mergeability) For all mergeable pairs v 1 , v 2 G * and for all i N
K i (v 1 )W j (v 1 ) K i (v 2 )W j (v 2 ) K i (v 12 )
j N
W j N
j N
j
j
(v 1 ) W (v 2 ) j N
.
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Table 1. How the PHI changes when dummy players are added
n
R1
R2 R3
R 4 ... Rn
3
3 17
–
4 5
6 17 6 20
2 7 4 17 4 20
3 17 3 20
6
6 23
4 23
3 23
7
6 26
4 26
3 26
8
6 29
4 20
3 29
9
6 32
4 32
3 32
10
6 35
4 35
3 35
4. The Public Help Index Let v G . The Public Help Index ș, for a non-null game v, is defined as: Ri v
Wi W
i N j
j N
while in case of the null game v, Ri v 0 for every player i. Notice that, if S W , then Ri (v ) p 0 for all i N , i N Ri (v ) 1 and R is a normalized power index.
4.1 Examples Consider the game of the leading example. The set W of the winning coalitions is: W = \\1,2^ , \1,3^ , \1,2,3^^ . Since player 1 belongs to all the winning coalitions, then W 1 3. Since players 2 and 3 belong to two winning coalitions, then W 2 W 3 2. It follows that j N W j 7. Therefore R1 73 and R 2 R 3 72 . We report in Table 1 the values of the PHI for cases where some dummy players join the game. For instance, if only one dummy player is added, then the winning coalitions are \1,2^ , \1,3^ , \1,2,3^ , \1,2,4^ , \1,3,4^ , and \1,2,3,4^ and the values of R are 67 , 174 , 174 , 173 . Observe that the dummy player gets always a half of the value of player 1, because he takes part only to a half of the total winning coalitions to which player 1 belongs. In general the computation of Table 1 can be done using the formula: R1
6 14 3(n 3)
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Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
2 4 R 2 R 3 R1 3 14 3(n 3) 1 3 R i R1 for all i from 4 to n. 2 14 3(n 3)
Notice that, for all i from 1 to n (n 3), Ri vanishes for n l d.
4.2 Axiomatization The extension of R(v ), where v G , to all winning coalitions implies that axiom A2 (efficiency) is kept only for non-null games. Axiom A3 (dummy player) cannot be respected, because even non-crucial players can get positive payments (if only the game is not the null game). For analogous reasons even axiom A4 (mergeability) cannot be respected. So, only the first axiom A1 (symmetry) of the PGI will be kept properly extended to G, while A2 (efficiency), A3 (dummy player) and A4 (mergeability) will be replaced with A2bis 8 (PHI-efficiency), A3bis (zero player) and A4bis (PHImergeability). We propose the following axioms as axiomatization of the PHI for simple games G. A1 (symmetry)
For every permutation π and i N Q : N l N º Ki (v ) K Q(i )(Qv )
(where the game Qv is defined as in Section 3.3). A2bis (efficiency)
£¦1 if v is not the null game
K (v ) ¦¤¦0 i
¦¥
i N
A3bis (zero player)
otherwise.
Ki (v ) 0 if and only if the i-th player is a zero player.
A4bis (PHI-mergeability) Ki (v 12 )W j (v 12 ) Ki (v 1 )W j (v 1 ) Ki (v 2 )W j (v 2 ) Ki (v 12 )W j (v 12 ) j N
j N
j N
j N
for all v 1 ,v 2 G and i N .
The first axiom (symmetry) states that the power of a player remains invariant under the permutation of the players. The second axiom normalized the n-tuple of individual powers. The third axiom (zero player) states that zero players have no power and with reference to the dummy player
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axiom we do not only replace dummy player with zero player, but also replace ‘if’ by ‘if and only if’. The fourth axiom (PHI-mergeability) states that the weighted sum of the powers of the merged games v 12(S ) and v 12(S ) is equal to the weighted sum of the powers of the component games. Theorem 1 (Necessity) For all v G , R(v ) satisfies A1, A2bis, A3bis, A4bis.
Proof A1(Symmetry) We have to prove that Ri (v ) R Q(i )(Qv ) for all i N and all permutations Q on N. If v is the null game the proof is trivial, because also the game Qv is the null game and Ri (v ) R Q(i )(Qv ) 0 (for all i N and all permutations Q on N ) from the definition of the PHI. In case of a non-null game v, we have for every permutation Q on N and every i N : Ri (v )
Wi W
W
j
j N
Q(i )
W
R Q(i )(Qv ).
Q( j )
Q( j )N
A2bis (PHI-efficiency) Let v G . If v is the null game , every player is zero player, so Ri (v ) 0 . For a non-null game v we i N have:
R (v ) i
i N
i N
Wi W
j
j N
1 W
W
i
1.
j i N
j N
A3bis (Zero player) We have to prove that Ri (v ) 0 if and only if i is a zero player. The demonstration for the null game is trivial, because in the null game every player is null player. For a non-null game v, from the definition of ș, we have: Ri (v )
Wi W
0 W i 0. j
j N
Then, W i 0 W i S i
v(S ) 0 i is a zero player.
A4bis (PHI-mergeability) We have to prove that, for all v 1 , v 2 G and all i N : Ri (v 12 )W j (v 12 ) Ri (v 12 )W j (v 12 ) Ri (v 1 )W j (v 1 ) Ri (v 2 )W j (v 2 ). j N
In fact:
j N
j N
j N
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Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
W i (v 12 ) W i (v 12 ) W j (v 12 ) W j (v 12 ) 12 W j (v ) j N W j (v 12 ) j N j N
j N
W i (v 1 ) W i (v 2 ) W i (v 12 ) W i (v 12 ) Ri (v 1 )W j (v 1 ) Ri (v 2 )W j (v 2 ) j N
j N
,
which completes the proof.
Theorem 2 (Sufficiency) For all v G , R(v ) is the unique index satisfying A1, A2bis, A3bis, A4bis.
Proof Let K be a generic power index defined on G and respecting A1, A2bis, A3bis, A4bis. We will prove that K R. Consider a game v G . If v is the null game then from A1, A2bis, A3bis we suddenly obtain i N K i (v ) 0 Ri (v ), otherwise let S 1 , S 2 , ! , S W be the winning coalitions of v. For every coalition S k (k from 1 to W ) we construct the game v k such that S k is the only winning coalition of v k . Observe that v(S ) max v k (S ) for all S N . k 1,...,W
Then the original game v can be expressed as v max v k . k 1,...,W
Moreover, min v k
k 1,...,W
is the null game. We can also deduce that
min(max v k , v j 1 ) is the null game for j W 1,W 2,...,1. k 1,..., j
(1)
Every index K respecting A1, A2bis, and A3bis applied to any game v k (k from 1 to W ), owns the following property, for all i N : £ 1 ¦ ¦ Ki (v k ) ¦¤ S k ¦ ¦ ¦ ¥0
if i S k otherwise.
Applying sequentially A4bis to the pairs of games: max v k and v j 1 ( j W 1,W 2,!,1)
k 1,..., j
(2)
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and using (1) we obtain: W
K (v )W i
K i (v ) K i max v k k 1,...,W
k
k 1
j N
W
j
j
¬ (v k ) ®
(v )
.
(3)
j N
Observe that, for all k 1,!,W , S k is the unique winning coalition of W (v k ). Then,
W
j
(v k ) S k .
j N
From the above we obtain: W
K (v )S
K v W (v ) i
k
k 1
i
k
for all i N .
j
j N
Owing to (2) we have that Ki (v k ) v 0 if i S k . Therefore, 1
K i (v )
S S k i
W
¬ S k ®
k j
(v )
j N
Wi Ri (v ) for all i N . W j (v ) j N
which completes the proof.
,
5. Monotonicity There are some properties that are reasonable in power indices and one of them is monotonicity (see Felsenthal and Machover (1995, 1998), Holler (1982a), Holler and Napel (2004), Holler et al. (1999), Turnovec (1997)). It is known that the PGI neither satisfies global nor the local monotonicity, whereas the PHI satisfies both. Theorem 3 (Monotonicity) The power index R is globally monotonic.
Proof Let n p 2 and let v :(q ; X 1 ,..., X i ,..., X n ) and v a :(q ; X 1a ,..., X ia ,..., X na ) be two weighted majority games such that:
X i X ia for one i N and X j b X aj for all j v i . We have to demonstrate that:
(4)
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Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
Ri (v a) b Ri (v ).
(5)
Given that X i X ia (see (4)), then all winning coalitions containing player i in the game v a are also winning in the game v : W ia W i . Thus, we have W i a b W i . From
X
X aj 1
j
j N
j N
we have that at least N is a winning coalition so: W i p W i a p 1, W j p n , W ja p n . j N
j N
We can also observe that
W j N
j
S S W
S b W a b j
S W '
j N
where b is an integer number defined in the following way: b d d : d
and d
S p0
S (W i \ W ia)
S p 0.
S (W a \ W )
Let a W i W i a . Then we can write: Ri (v )
Wi W ia a W j W ja b j N
j N
where a and b are integer numbers and 0 b a b (2 n 1 1). (Note that there are 2 n 1 different coalitions containing player i N ). Let a p 0 . There are two possible cases: (a p 0 b b 0) or (a 0 b 0) . In the first case b d d b 0 so
W a b b W a j
j
j N
j N
and we have Ri (v )
Wi W ia a W ia W ia p p Ri (v a). W j W ja b W ja b W ja j N
j N
j N
j N
It remains to prove (5) in the second case (a 0, b 0). Assume that a 1 and d 0. It implies that b d \n 1, n 2,!, 1^. Every value of b determinates
nb 11
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types of possible weighted majority games v a satisfying (4). These games are different as regards the set W i a . We can observe that W i a must contain all winning coalitions S i such that b 1 b S b n and at most
nb 11 1 coalitions S i of the cardinality b. It is impossible that S W i a and S b because from the monotonicity of the weighted majority games we have that every coalition T S , T b º T W i a. This violates the emergence of the new coalition of the cardinality b. Hence, if we denote by v ba k and v bk the pair of n-person weighted majority games satisfying the condition (4) then for all b n 1, n 2,..., 1 and
n 1 k 0,1,..., b 1 1
we have n b 1 n b 1 ¦£¦ k n 1 n 1 ¯ k , W ja ¡ n l ¸ ¦¦v ba : W ia l l °±° k ¸ b l 0 j N l 0 ¢¡ ¦¤ ¦¦ k ¦¦v b : W i W i a 1, W j W ja b . j N j N ¦¥
(6)
From (6) we obtain:
n 1 Ri (v ' bk 1 ) Ri (v bk ) b n 1, n 2,...,1, k 0, 1,..., b 1 2
and
n 1 1 b n 1, n 2,!,2.
b 1 Ri v ba01 Ri v b
From (6) for b n 1, k 0 and because 1 1 n p 2 n n 1
we have Ri (v ' n0 1 )
1 1 n n 1
n p 2.
(7)
It is easy to demonstrate that for all positive integer numbers c, d, e, f: c c e e c e , whenever . d d f f d f
(8)
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Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
Now, if we start from (7) and for any b n 1,...,2 we sequentially apply (8) with c e 1 Ri (v ba k ), d f b
varying from k 0 to
n 1 k b 1 1
and basing on the trivial inequality 1 1 b b 1
we obtain £ ¦ W ia W ia 1 1 ¦ Ri (v ' bk ) Ri (v bk ) ¦ ¦ b ¦ W ja W ja b ¦ ¦ j N j N ¤ ¦ ¦ n 1 ¦ 1 1 1 . ¦ Ri (v ' b01 ) Ri v b b 1 ¦ ¦ b b 1 ¦ ¥
(9)
If b 1 then
n 1 k b 1 1 0. 1 From (9) for b 2 we have that Ri (v '10 ) Ri (v 2n 2 ) 1 so applying (8) 2 with c e 1 Ri (v 1a 0 ), d f 1
we obtain Ri (v '10 ) Ri (v 10 ).
(10)
So, we have proved (5) in the particular case: a 1 and d 0 (see (9) and (10)). Now, consider the general second case: a 0 and b d d 0 . Let S 1 , S 2 ,..., S a W i \ W i a such that S 1 pS 2 p... p S a p 1 a and l 1 S l d . Then, since (5) holds in the case a 1 and d 0 we get: Ri (v ')
W ia
W a j
j N
W ia 1 W ia 2 W ia a ... W ja S 1 W ja S 1 S 2 W ja d j N
j N
j N
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95
W ia a Ri (v ) W ja d d j N
which completes the proof.
,
Turnovec (1997) proved that any power index which is globally monotonic and symmetric, is also locally monotonic. Because the PHI is symmetric and we have proved that it is also globally monotonic so it is also locally monotonic.
6. Further Developments As suggested by Manfred Holler, a development of the present work could consist in reformulation of the index without normalization. Such reformulation would make the contribution assigned to the dummy players more explicit, without contextually decreasing the contribution of the crucial players. Such a new index would naturally require a specific formalization.
Appendix
An Algorithm for the Computation of the PGI and PHI
We report an algorithm of automatic computation of the Public Good Index and the Public Help Index for weighted majority games.
Symbols Ri PHI of the i-th player (i 1,..., n ). h i PGI of the i-th player (i 1,..., n ). W i number of winning coalitions containing player i (i 1,..., n ). number of winning coalitions. W number of minimal winning coalitions containing player Wi i (i 1,..., n ). number of minimal winning coalitions. W d , j , k , p , s1, s 2, t auxiliary variables (Integer type). S[ j ] auxiliary variable (j-th element of coalition S ( j 1,..., k ) ). Include auxiliary variable of Boolean type (Include = True if player i belongs to coalition S). MWC auxiliary variable of Boolean type (MWC = True if S is minimal winning coalition).
Input
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n q wi
Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, and Izabella Stach
number of players. majority quota. weights of the players, i 1, ..., n .
Begin for i : 1 to n do begin if w i p q then begin W i : 1 ; W i : 1 end else begin W i : 0 ; W i : 0 end; for k 2 to (n 1) do {in this loop k-element coalitions are formed} begin for j 1 to k do begin S[j ]:=j ; t :=t +w j end; {t = total power of S} p : k while p p 1 do begin s1 : 0 ; Include:=False; MWC:=False; for j : 1 to k do begin s 2:=s1 ; s1:=s1+w S[j ] ; if S[ j ] i then Include:= True; if s 2 p q then begin j := k ; MWC:=False end;{S is winning but not minimal} else begin if s1 p s 2 then MWC:=True else MWC:=False if MWC =False and ( j k ) then j := k end; end; if MWC and Include and (s1 p q ) then begin for j :=1 to k do {this loop verifies if S is really a minimal winning coalition} begin d := t - w S[j ] ; if (d p q ) then MWC:=False end; if MWC then W i : W i 1 ; end; if (s1 p q ) and Include then W i : W i 1 ; if S[k ] = n then p := p -1 else p:= k ; if p p 1 then for j := k down to p do S[j ]:= S[p ]+j - p +1 ; end; end;
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W i : W i 1 ; W : W W i ; W : W W i end; for i := 1 to n do begin Ri : W i W ; if W 0 then h i : 1 n else h i : W i W unique winning coalition^ end; End.
\W
97
0 only if N is the
Acknowledgements This paper is sponsored by MIUR 40% (PRIN 2005). We would like to thank Manfred Holler and René van den Brink for their useful suggestions.
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terization, Homo Oeconomicus 24: 257–270. Holler, M.J. (1978) A Priory Party Power and Government Formation, Munich Social Science Review 1: 25–41. Holler, M.J. (1982a) Forming Coalitions and Measuring Voting Power, Political Studies 30: 262–271. Holler, M.J. (1982b) Party Power and Government Formation: A Case Study, in M.J. Holler (ed.) Power, Voting and Voting Power, Physica Verlag. 273–282. Holler, M.J. (1997) Power Monotonicity and Expectations, Control and Cybernetics 26: 605–607. Holler, M.J. (1998) Two Stories, one Power Index, Journal of Theoretical Politics 10: 179–190. Holler, M.J. and Li, X. (1995) From Public Good Index to Public Value: An Axiomatic Approach and Generalization, Control and Cybernetics 24: 257–270. Holler, M.J. and Napel, S. (2004) Monotonicity of Power and Power Measures, Theory and Decision 56: 93–111. Holler, M.J., Ono, R. and Steffen, F. (1999), Constrained Monotonicity and the Measurement of Power, Theory and Decision 50: 385–397. Holler, M.J. and Owen, G. (2002) On the Present and Future of Power Measure, in M.J. Holler and G. Owen (eds.) Power Measures I, Homo Oeconomicus 19: 281–295. Holler, M.J. and Packel, E.W. (1983) Power, Luck and the Right Index, Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie (Journal of Economics) 43: 21–29. Holler, M.J. and Widgrèn, M. (1999) The Value of a Condition is Power, Homo Oeconomicus 15: 497–512. Hołubiec, J. and Mercik, J.W. (1994) Inside Voting Procedures, SESS Vol. 2, Munich: Accedo Verlag. Napel, S. (1999) The Holler-Packel Axiomatization of the Public Good Index Completed, Homo Oeconomicus 15: 513–520. Napel, S. (2001) A Note on the Holler-Packel Axiomatization of the Public Good Index (PGI), in M.J. Holler and G. Owen (eds) Power Indices and Coalition Formation, Kluwer, 143–151. Penrose, L.S. (1946) The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109: 53–57. Riker, W. (1986) The First Power Index, Social Choice and Welfare 3: 293–295. Shapley, L.S. (1953) A Value for n-Person Games, in H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker (eds) Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, 307–317. Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M. (1954) A Method for Evaluating the Distributions of Power in a Committee System, American Political Science Review 48: 787–792. Syed, S.A. (1990) Some Applications of n-Person Game Theory to the Social Sciences, Dept. of Applied Math., Faculty of Engineering Science, Osaka University. Turnovec, F. (1997) Monotonicity of Power Indices, East European Series 41, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna. Widgrèn, M. (2002) On the Probabilistic Relationship Between the Public Good Index and the Normalized Banzhaf Index, in M.J. Holler and G. Owen (eds) Power Measures II, Homo Oeconomicus 19: 373–386.
6. Shapley-Shubik vs. Strategic Power: Live from the UN Security Council Stefan Napel Department of Economics, University of Bayreuth, Germany
Mika Widgrén Turku School of Economics and ETLA, Finland
Reporter 1 Hello, and welcome to Hamburg, where a very good crowd has turned out to watch the local team, wearing a big Y on their shorts, play the renowned G-team from Princeton. The guests are easily distinguished by the dozen or so small but boldprint symbols on their T-shirts, and it’s their first direct encounter in this tournament. Today’s challenge is an analysis of power in the United Nations Security Council. And both teams are still warming up … Reporter 2 Yes, so we have a little time to look at their respective background … The G-team clearly has the longer history, founded back in 1954 by the legendary Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik. They were the first to introduce the ‘axiomatic approach’ to the power circus. It still has many loyal fans all across the globe and, according to hearsay, keeps producing a tenured position every now and then. With its tough training methods and many cooperative games, the G-team scored a couple of important victories in the 1950s and ’60s. I’m sure some older scholars in the audience will still remember what a creative attack they had, with players like William Lucas, Irving Mann, Guillermo Owen, Pradeep Dubey, Bob Aumann, Al Roth, Martin Shubik and, of course, Shapley himself taking skilful measurements of the US Congress, the Electoral College, and many toy examples. Their power-play gave rise to techniques such as the generating function method, power polynomials, and the multilinear extension almost as by-products … Reporter 1 Right, and if it hadn’t been for Straffin’s independence and the emergence of the C-team, coached jointly by Lionel Penrose and John F. Banzhaf … Reporter 2 Of course also enjoying the influential endorsement from the FelsenthalMachover press …
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Reporter 1
They might still be the only team in town!
Reporter 2 Well, we shouldn’t forget about Deegan-Packel’s formation of a minimal winning coalition and, of course, Manfred Holler’s h -fraction that they helped to get started. Did you hear already that it was recently promoted from the F&M Minor Indexship to the Freedom League? But that’s a different story, dear listeners, as I see that the referee is already preparing a number of fair coin tosses behind his veil of ignorance. So we should better have a quick look at the locals: some of them actually started their career as inferior players in the G and C -camps. That their own team is now wearing a Y must be due to coming late, when much of the Greek alphabet had already been used up by others. Their current managers claim that power measurement is all about ‘sensitivity’, which is especially popular with their female supporters. Some of them hold up signs now, saying ‘Preferences for power!’ Reporter 1 Right, provoking the stadium announcer to declare teasingly: ‘Impossible!’ But now the referee’s coins have produced a resounding 7:1 vote in favour of the random proposal. This means that the locals start off – and we will directly tune in to their introductory prose, mathematical assumptions and computations … The United Nations Security Council is the dominant political organ of the United Nations (UN). It is in charge of deciding upon the ‘effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace …’ which are mentioned by the Charter of the United Nations after defining the UN’s prime purpose: ‘to maintain international peace and security’ (Art. 1(1)). The Security Council consists of 15 members altogether. Britain, China, France, Russia, and the US are permanent members, i.e. belong to the Council at any point in time. The remaining ten seats are filled by non-permanent members that, at the time of writing, were: Argentina, Congo, Denmark, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Peru, Qatar, Slovakia, and Tanzania. They are elected by the UN General Assembly according to regional quotas for a term of two years, with five members replaced each year, and no possibility of a direct re-election. Representation in the Security Council is an interesting topic in its own right, with conflicting criteria such as financial contributions, participation in peacekeeping missions, population size, and equitable geographic distribution to be taken into account. Our focus is different, however. We want to investigate the distribution of influence on decisions taken by the Security Council, given its current composition of five permanent members and ten elected members. According to Art. 27(3) of the UN Charter, the Security Council’s decisions ‘…shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members …’. 1 The latter 1
This applies to all matters that are not regarded as ‘procedural.’ On procedural matters,
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provision makes a ‘nay’-vote by any permanent member tantamount to a veto. Though the phrasing ‘including the concurring votes of the permanent members’ would also allow for a different interpretation, it has been the Security Council’s consistent practice to consider a resolution as adopted if permanent members abstain (rather than concur explicitly), provided it otherwise receives the specified support. A key problem in taking this into consideration in power analysis is the almost unavoidable arbitrariness involved with specifying (at least probabilistically) when a voter abstains. 2 Abstention would be a natural response by a voter if a proposal leaves him indifferent. But perfect indifference seems a degenerate case; it should a priori arise only with very low or even zero probability if there are no restrictions on the character of possible proposals. Another source of abstention could be exogenous costs of explicitly supporting a resolution, like an informal obligation to contribute to its implementation or reprisals by the targeted country. This would create a free-rider problem amongst the voters in favor of the resolution, involving abstention by free-riders. 3 Our analysis will, however, avoid such complications and in line with many other authors (see Felsenthal and Machover (1998: 280) for an incomplete list) abstract from abstentions altogether. Adoption of a resolution then simply requires unanimous support of the five permanent members and a four-out-of-ten ‘majority’ amongst the elected members. We assume that decisions of the Security Council are not merely between passing a resolution or not, but they also involve the content of the resolution. We simplify analysis by taking the latter to be reflected by a variable with arbitrary values on a bounded one-dimensional scale. This position of the Security Council regarding a given threat to peace may at an intuitive level represent the quality or quantity of demands that it makes, how hawkishly or dovishly it deals with an aggressor, the level of sanctions that it imposes, etc. We normalize possible positions to the unit interval X [0 1] and also refer to X as the issue-specific policy space. We presume that if no resolution regarding some issue is passed, a status quo q X prevails. This assumption can be artificial when issues are on the agenda for which the Security CounArt. 27(2) specifies an affirmative vote of nine members without special role for permanent members. Whether an issue is to be regarded as procedural or not is usually not specified explicitly; it may, however, itself be the matter of a vote, known as ‘the preliminary question.’ See, e.g. Chapter 4 of the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council (http://www.un. org/Depts/dpa/repertoire). 2 See, for example, Felsenthal and Machover (1998: 286–293) for an explicit treatment of abstentions that assumes somewhat ad hoc that ‘yeah’, ‘nay’, and abstention all have the same likelihood. 3 A preliminary consideration of this case suggests that a voter i is powerful if and only if exactly a minimal winning coalition is in favor of the proposal and includes i, matching the assumptions of Holler (1978) and Holler and Packel (1983).
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cil has never formulated a position before. However, a status quo quite naturally seems to exist for many recurring themes such as resolutions on Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbours. Moreover, there is also a natural status quo regarding decisions about ‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations’ (Art. 41) or ‘[military] action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’ (Art. 42). All members of the Security Council are assumed to rationally pursue their own interests. These take the form of spatial preferences over X. On any given issue with status quo q, we refer to the respective most preferred policy alternative of the five permanent members by Q1 , Q 2 ,…, Q 5 . They have the objective to pass a resolution as close to their respective ideal one as possible. The corresponding positions held by the ten elected members are denoted by F1 , F 2 ,…, F10 . We want to provide an estimate of how much influence the described voting rule a priori generates for the permanent and non-permanent Security Council members. This does intentionally not take into account any information about historical voting patterns or preferences of current Security Council members, and is not meant to identify the critical member(s) on any particular real-world issue, say, the next resolution on the Iranian nuclear program or the situation on the Balkan. We rather care about a quantification of the obvious asymmetry of power that the UN Charter gives to the two classes of members a priori. In line with the general framework developed in Napel and Widgrén (2004), we conceive of power as the ability to affect outcomes. This ability can be operationalized very naturally by looking at predicted outcomes for given behaviour of all agents and then asking: how sensitive is this outcome to a possible variation of an agent’s behaviour? The considered agent i is a priori more powerful or influential than another agent j if outcomes are more responsive to i ’s behaviour than to j’s behaviour on average. We regard agents’ behaviour as a consequence of rational and strategic pursuit of goals, captured by preferences. 4 The actual source of a behaviour variation is then a preference change of the agent in question. Under this view, an agent’s ex post power (referring to a given preference and status quo configuration) gauges how much the predicted outcome would change if the agent’s goals changed. If a preference change of a given magnitude has double the affect for player i than for player j, we consider i twice as powerful as j. Ex ante or a priori power averages this potential outcome change using an appropriate probability measure over all possible preference and status quo configurations. 4 See the debate between Braham and Holler (2005) and Napel and Widgrén (2005) on this issue.
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Members’ ex post and ex ante power are of interest also to outsiders without vote but an interest in the Security Council’s decision, e.g. the conflicting parties or lobbyists. If they can change Council members’ preference by bribe or persuasion, then ex post power indicates how effective (or potentially valuable) ‘good relations’ with a particular Security Council member are for a specific issue. Ex ante power does the same from a long-term perspective. Formally, sensitivity of a collective decision x X to a given member i ’s preferences for the ideal point configuration (Q 1 ,…, Q 5 , F1 ,…, F10 ) and status quo q can be captured by the partial derivative of x with respect to i ’s ideal policy, i.e. sx sQ i or sx sFi . 5 A priori power is then the expected value of sx sQ i or sx sFi . But first we need to make a plausible prediction of the collective decision for a given configuration (Q1 ,…, Q 5 , F1 ,…, F10 ) and q, i.e. specify a mapping x [0,1]16 l [0,1], whose partial derivatives will then capture the 15 members’ respective ex post influence. In general, x can result from very sophisticated strategic interaction, captured by game-theoretic solution concepts such as subgame perfect equilibrium applied to an explicit extensive game (see Napel and Widgrén 2006b). This is the reason why we refer to the indicated sensitivity analysis as measurement of strategic power. Anecdotal evidence suggests that before a resolution is actually put to a vote before the full Security Council, representatives of the permanent members confer and negotiate amongst themselves how encompassing, explicit, far-reaching, etc. it should be. After some preliminary agreement is reached in this ‘inner circle’ of the Security Council, the elected members get involved. Again there is some informal negotiation until a final proposal is drafted and put to a vote, producing the policy outcome anticipated in the preceding deliberations. One way to model this two-step negotiation process is to consider, first, independent preference aggregation amongst the permanent members and amongst the elected members; then, second, analyze bargaining between these two groups based on their respective aggregate opinion. This culminates in a formal vote of approval if a suitable agreement was found, and otherwise the status quo prevails. Let us start by considering preference aggregation amongst the permanent members. Denote the left-most of the respective five ideal points by Q(1) , the second left-most by Q(2) , etc. Then, the permanent members’ aggregate position Qˆ must coincide with the status quo q whenever this falls in between Q(1) and Q(5) : any proposal to the right or left of q would be vetoed by some permanent member strictly preferring to move into the opposite direction. If, in contrast, all five permanent members prefer a new pol5 The derivative focuses on the effect of small preferences changes. See Napel and Widgrén (2004) for a discussion of alternatives.
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icy x X that lies, say, to the right of q, i.e. if q Q(1) , then also q Qˆ . The aggregate position Qˆ cannot lie too far to the right, however, because then the most conservative permanent member (that is, the one closest to q) would rather vote ‘nay’. It turns out to be necessary that Qˆ ¢ Q(1) ,min \2Q(1) q , Q(5) ^¯± , where the first term in the minimum makes sure that Qˆ is not farther from Q(1) than q and the second term guarantees Pareto optimality of the preliminary agreement. In case that all permanent members prefer a new policy x X to the left of q, i.e. q Q(5) , the analogous expression is Qˆ ¢ max \Q(1) ,q 2Q(5) ^ , Q(5) ¯± . The indicated intervals correspond to the core of the respective bargaining problems and are therefore consistent with strategic behaviour (Banks and Duggan 2000). Without specific knowledge about the bargaining process amongst permanent members, no definite prediction regarding where in the core Qˆ is located can be made. One plausible a priori assumption would be that all core elements have equal probability (Napel and Widgrén 2006a). In line with Napel and Widgrén (2006b), we will however assume here that the agreement is always on the smallest common denominator, i.e. the core element that is closest to the status quo, resulting in £ Q(1) if q Q(1) ¦ ¦ ¦ Qˆ ¦ Q ¤ (5) if q Q(5) ¦ ¦¦q if Q b q b Q . (5) (1) ¦ ¥
By analogous reasoning, we obtain £ F(7 ) if q F(7) and q Q(1) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Fˆ ¤F(4) if q F(4) and q Q(5) ¦ ¦ ¦ otherwise ¦ ¥q
as the result of the deliberations amongst the elected members. It is noteworthy here that only four out of ten elected members need to support a resolution endorsed by the permanent members for it to pass. Since there can exist four elected members that want to move to the left of the status quo and simultaneously four others that want to move to the right, it is determined by the permanent members who is actually the pivotal elected member. If, say, the former want to move to the left, they will talk to the four elected members most eager to pass a resolution x q ; amongst these, the elected member with position F(4) is the least eager and thus critical. Similarly, the support by the elected member wanting F(7) brings about the required total majority of nine votes if all permanent members want to move to the right. Negotiations between permanent members and (the critical voter amongst) elected members could be modelled in various ways. If, however, all members of the Security Council are assumed to be risk-neutral, i.e. their
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utility from policy x is falling linearly in the distance between x and their ideal point, then Nash bargaining and hence approximately also many variations of Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating offers game result in the most conservative bargainers’ ideal point (Napel and Widgrén 2006b). Thus we obtain £¦Q(1) ¦¦ ¦¦F(7) ¦ x (Q1 ,…, Q 5 , F1 ,…, F10 ; q ) ¦¤Q(5) ¦¦ ¦¦F(4) ¦¦ ¦¥q
if q Q(1) b F(7) if q F(7) Q(1) if F(4) b Q(5) q if Q(5) F(4) q
(1)
otherwise
as our predicted policy outcome for a given preference configuration of members of the Security Council. This outcome may be a new resolution; it can also be an implicit confirmation of the given status quo since any resolution would fail to obtain the required level of support. The respective ex post power following from (1) is sx £¦¦1 if q Q(1) b F(7) or F(4) b Q(5) q ¤ sQˆ ¦¦¥0 otherwise
(2)
for the whole group of permanent members, and sx £¦¦1 if q F(7) Q(1) or Q(5) F(4) q ¤ sFˆ ¦¦¥0 otherwise
(3)
for the group of elected members. The respective group’s a priori influence following from above ex post considerations will be denoted by Y Qˆ for the permanent and Y Fˆ for the elected group. It is the expected value of (2) and (3). Exploiting the simple structure of (2) and (3) we obtain Y Qˆ Pr(q Q(1) b F(7) ) Pr(F(4) b Q(5) q )
(4)
Y Fˆ Pr(q F(7) Q(1) ) Pr(Q(5) F(4) q ).
(5)
and
From an a priori perspective, which seeks to evaluate the pure effects of institutional rules in ignorance of special historical preference patterns in the Security Council, it is hard to justify any particular probability distribution to be used in the actual evaluation of above expressions. In line with Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and common practice in the literature on binary voting (Felsenthal and Machover (1998: 280), Nurmi (1998)), we deem it a reasonable benchmark to consider all preference and status quo configurations equally likely, i.e. we assume that q, Q i , and F j are inde-
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pendently uniformly distributed on X [0,1] for all i 1,…,5 and j 1,…,10 . Symmetry then reduces (4) and (5) to Y Qˆ 2 ¸ Pr(q Q(1) b F(7) ) 1
2¨ 0
1
¨
Q(1)
(F) F Q(1) (q )> f F(7 ) (F)d F dq
q
and Y Fˆ 2 ¸ Pr(q F(7) Q(1) ) 1
2¨ 0
1
¨
F(7 )
(Q) F F(7) (q )> f Q(1) (Q)d Q dq
q
where F and f refer to the cumulative distribution and density functions of the indicated random variable. Given that all variables are independently [0,1]-uniformly distributed, the above order statistics have beta distributions. For example, the seventh smallest out of ten independent [0,1]-uniform draws is beta distributed with parameters 7 and 4, corresponding to f F(7 ) (x )
10 6 x (1 x )3 6 3
and x
F F(7) (x ) ¨ 0
10 6 s (1 s )3 ds . 6 3
Using this and the analogous expressions for f Q(1) and F Q(1) , we obtain Y Qˆ x 031352 and Y Fˆ x 001632 Given the symmetry within the two groups of members, we can now evaluate the a priori influence of the 15 members of the UN Security Council as Y x (006270,…, 006270, 000163,…, 000163),
where the first five entries indicate the power of individual permanent members and the last ten that of individual elected members. The interpretation of above numbers is as follows: ex ante, when we take all possible configurations of the ideal points and the status quo to be equally likely, a small preference shift of a given permanent member by %x translates into an expected shift of the outcome by 006270%x . In contrast, a corresponding ideal point shift of an elected member moves the outcome by only 000163%x in expectation. So an elected member has an about 40 times smaller effect or influence on the outcome. Or, if we take an out-
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sider’s point of view, bribing a permanent member is on average about 40 times more attractive ceteris paribus than correspondingly shifting the preferences of an elected member. Reporter 1 Not a bad start, but it seems that the referee is unconvinced … He’s discussing with his two linesmen and, yes, he annuls the Y-team’s power vector. It’s still 0:0! The referee explains to the local team’s captain that there was unfair twisting of assumptions, pretty soon after the kick-off. Reporter 2 Well, why didn’t he complain earlier then? But Mika and Stefan seem to admit that the Security Council is an institution with two classes of members but, in fact, no official segregation into two distinct chambers. I guess when it comes to preference aggregation, they still haven’t stopped thinking of their beloved Conciliation Committee … Reporter 1 I see the calculator is blinking again … this time it’s the Princeton G’s making their first computations.
One of the two most commonly used measures of agents’ voting power is the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI), introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1954). It is a special case of the more general Shapley value of cooperative coalitionalform games (Shapley 1953). The SSI is based on the broad idea that an agent that can turn a winning coalition into a losing one, or vice versa, exerts power. More formally, let N be a set of n agents and let S N denote any coalition of agents having s members. Voting games such as that in the Security Council can be characterized by a characteristic function v with value v(S ) 1 when coalition S can pass a proposal and v(S ) 0 otherwise. In this socalled simple game setting, the Shapley-Shubik index Gi of a voter i N can be written as Gi
(s 1)( n s ) ¯ ¢¡v(S ) v S \ \i ^ ±°. n S N st i S
The first term in the summation captures the probability of country i being in a potentially pivotal position in coalition S and the latter term equals one if in fact voter i is able to swing S from winning into losing, i.e. S is winning and the removal of i makes the remaining coalition S \ \i ^ losing. The SSI can be characterized by four axioms. The dummy axiom states that a player without any contribution (swings) to any coalition is powerless. The efficiency axiom states that the value v(N ) of the grand coalition N is fully allocated. For canonic simple games this means that all agents’ SSI-values Gi must sum up to unity. The symmetry axiom states that the names of the players do not affect the allocation but only their voting rights do and,
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finally, the transfer axiom prescribes a way to combine several games. The other major power index, the Banzhaf index (Penrose 1946; Banzhaf 1965), obeys all these except the efficiency axiom (Dubey and Shapley 1979). 6 One intuitive characterization of the SSI refers to all possible orderings (or permutations) of the agents, expressing something like the intensity of their support for a proposal or, related, in what temporal order they endorse the proposal. In a given ordering, the player whose ‘arrival’ or endorsement first establishes a winning coalition and thus passes the proposal is called pivotal. The SSI presumes that the relative shares of the players’ pivot positions capture their influence in a voting situation. In particular, the SSI corresponds to the normalized total number of pivot positions of the players, which implicitly assumes that all orderings are equally likely or at least should carry equal weight in the summation. This makes the computation of the index for members of the UN Security Council in a sense very straightforward: simply look at all 15! different orderings of the 15 players in the UN Security Council and check who is pivotal. A majority requires the support of all five permanent members and at least four other members. In terms of voter permutations, for example, the ninth member is pivotal when all permanent members are in positions smaller or equal than nine. Otherwise the pivot is the fifth permanent member in an ordering. Let us denote the permanent member i by Pi with (i 1,…,5) and the elected member j by E j with ( j 1,…,10). Now, for instance, consider the ordering (P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 , P5 , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 , E 5 , E 6 , E 7 , E 8 , E 9 , E 10 )
In this case, the pivotal player is E 4 : all permanent members P1 ,…, P 5 and elected members E 1 , E 2 , E 3 already gave their endorsement of whatever proposal produced above ordering. Then E 4 ‘arrives’ and swings the losing coalition {P1 … E 3 } into the winning one \P1 ,…, E 3 , E 4 ^. Similarly, E 4 is the pivotal player in the ordering (P1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , E 1 , E 2 , E 6 , E 4 , E 8 , E 3 , E 7 , E 5 , E 10 , E 9 )
which differs from the former one in a way that does not affect with whose support the proposal is first passed. It is easy to see that there is a huge number of orderings where player E 4 is pivotal. In these orderings all permanent members come before E 4 and there are exactly three nonpermanent members before E 4 . By changing the positions of E 4 and E 5 , say, and using the same logic we can write the orderings where E 5 is pivotal like (P5 , P2 , P3 , P4 , P1 , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 5 , E 4 , E 6 , E 7 , E 8 , E 9 , E 10 )
or, for instance, 6
For an alternative characterization Laruelle and Valenciano (2001).
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(P3 , P2 , P1 , P5 , P4 , E 7 , E 2 , E 3 , E 5 , E 10 , E 6 , E 1 , E 8 , E 4 , E 9 )
Permanent member P1 is pivotal in an ordering like (E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 , P5 , P4 , P3 , P 2 , E 5 , E 6 , P1 , E 7 , E 8 , E 10 , E 9 )
and also in many others where four permanent and at least four elected members come before him. Applying some combinatorics, it is fortunately not necessary to explicitly look at all 1307674368000 orderings. Still, direct computation of the SSI in the above fashion requires some paper work. Reporter 2 They might be on their way to an interesting paradox. I can see our colleagues Hannu and Steven scribble down some notes. But this is gonna last too long. Reporter 1 Yes, and a defender of the Y-team has just now appropriated all scrap paper. So the home team is in the offensive. Local fans shout ‘Take the derivative again!’
Returning to an explicit consideration of ideal point and status quo configurations, it is, of course, possible to look at the simultaneous determination of outcome x by all 15 members, rather than the above two-step negotiation format. What was really driving the prediction made in (1) was (a) the UN Security Council’s requirements for passage of a resolution, and (b) the assumption that the respective institution’s most conservative member whose support is necessary to change the status quo determines the content of the resolution. Even if one considers simultaneous deliberations amongst all 15 members of the Security Council, their outcome is by (a) still an implicit confirmation of the status quo q unless either q Q(1) and q F(7) , or q Q(5) and q F(4) , i.e. all permanent members and at least four elected members want to move away from q in the same direction. Considering the cases in which indeed a required majority prefers to replace the status quo by a policy to its right (q Q(1) and q F(7) ) , application of (b) to the full set of members of the Security Council results in either the position Q(1) or the position F(7) , since only these can correspond to the most reluctant necessary supporter of a resolution. By the same logic, q’s replacement by a policy to its left must be either x Q(5) or x F(4) , depending on which of these is more conservative (in the sense of being closer to the status quo). Going through all the cases, one ends up with £Q(1) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ F(7) ¦ ¦ ¦ x (Q1 ,…, Q 5 , F1 ,…, F10 ; q ) ¤Q(5) ¦ ¦ ¦ F(4) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¥q
if q Q(1) b F(7) if q F(7) Q(1) if F(4) b Q(5) q if Q(5) F(4) q otherwise
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– just as before. This time, no assumptions about linearity of preferences and Nash bargaining between representatives of the two groups are actually needed, making (1) more robust than it may have seemed. By the same computations as before, we again end up with the a priori power vector Y x (006270,…, 006270, 000163,…, 000163)
Reporter 1 It’s a GOAL! 1:0 for the local measurers! A frantic noise fills the stadium … They have hit exactly the same spot inside the 15-dimensional unit cube as before – quite an achievement. And this time, the referee did not see any obvious foul. Reporter 2 How will the visitors respond to this? … Their coach indicates that he wants to bring Guillermo Owen into the game, who is now quickly warming up. Reporter 1 Yes, there he is on the field. And he seems to get ready for his famous multilinear extension trick …
The multilinear extension (MLE) of a simple game v was introduced by Owen (1972). It can be seen as aggregating the worths v(S ) of all possible coalitions S N weighted by their respective formation probability under the assumption that any player i a priori accepts a proposal and thus joins the randomly formed coalition with a probability p i [0,1] . The actual acceptance decisions are assumed to be taken independently across players. So, given that a coalition’s worth is either one or zero, the MLE of a simple game with characteristic function v is f v ( p 1 ,…, p n ) p i S N i S
(1 p
j N \ S
j
)v(S )
p (1 p i
S st v (S )1 i S
j
)
j S
When f v is evaluated, it gives the ex ante probability that a winning coalition is formed under the assumptions about p 1 ,…, p n ; and by construction it is also equal to the expected worth of the coalition that will be formed. The first derivative of f v ( p 1 ,…, p n ) with respect to p i , denoted by f i v , is the so-called power polynomial of player i and indicates the contribution that player i makes to this expected worth. By the multilinearity of f v , it also corresponds to the probability of player i having a swing in the random coalition formed according to the so-called acceptance rates p 1 ,…, p n . Power polynomials can be used to efficiently compute various power indices by making suitable assumptions about players’ acceptance probabilities. The reader is referred, e.g. to Owen (1995: chp. XII) for a very accessible presentation. In particular, the SSI results if all acceptance rates p i have the same value t and this value t is a priori uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Then, a player i’s SSI in simple game v is simply the expected value of his power polynomial f i v . 7 7
The Banzhaf index follows similarly by, e.g. assuming that pi 12 .
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The voting game played in the UN Security Council is most efficiently modelled as a compound game v u[w 1 w 2 ] , where w 1 is a five-player simple game involving the permanent members, w 2 is a simple game played by the ten elected members, and u aggregates the two. In w 1 only the grand coalition wins, in w 2 any coalition of four or more members wins, and u equals one if a winning coalition is formed in both w 1 and w 2 (and zero otherwise). In particular, the subgame w 1 has the following MLE f w1(p1, p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 ) p1 p 2 p 3 p 4 p 5 .
Similarly, we have as w 2 ’s MLE f
w2
( p 1 ,, p 10 )
p (1 p i
S {1,…,10} st ]S ]p4 i S
j
).
j S
Finally, the unanimity game u that combines the component games w 1 and w 2 has the MLE f u( f
w1
f
w2
) f
w1
f
w2
.
Using the fact that f iu w
df u sf u sf w 2 w2 ¸ sf sp i dp i
for an elected member i, the corresponding power polynomial under the SSI’s assumption of p i w t for all voters i is f i u (t ,…, t ) f
w1
9 (t ,…, t )¸ f i w 2 (t ,…, t ) t 5 ¸ 3 t 3 (1 t )6 .
Now from the assumption that t is [0,1]-uniformly distributed, under which the expectation of f i u (t ,…, t ) gives player i ’s SSI-value, we obtain 1
Gi ¨ 84t 8(1 t )6 dt 0
4 . 2145
421 It then follows from efficiency and symmetry of the SSI that G j 2145 for each permanent member, resulting in the UN Security Council’s SSI-vector
421 421 4 4 ¬ G , …, , , …, 2145 2145 2145 2145 ® x (019627,…, 019627, 000186,…, 000186).
Reporter 1 This makes it 1:1! The match is open again. Reporter 2 I see that the local team’s captain tries to protest: This is just the result
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of their own measurement if the status quo is fixed to zero! But the referee remains unimpressed. Some critics held that G can produce results only when playing in the Ppower League – but watch this, Felsenthal-Machover! Reporter 1 The referee hands the local’s captain the Powerpoint, suggesting that his team actually demonstrates that the G-vector results as a special case in their framework. I guess they will have a hard time backing up that claim … but no! The coach shouts instructions that sound like ‘Institutional inertia!’, and his players get moving again …
The vector Y computed above by considering independently uniformly distributed status quo and ideal points adds up to slightly less than 0.32984. Noting that for almost every preference and status quo configuration there is either a unique member in the Security Council whose ex post power is 1 (the most conservative supporter of a resolution who was necessary to pass it), or the status quo is confirmed, it follows that 8 1 Y k x 067016 k
gives the probability that, in fact, the status quo is confirmed. It is hence a measure of institutional status quo bias or inertia created by the Security Council’s voting rules. For two thirds of the issues that arise, no agreement can be reached and no member of the UN Security Council exerts any creative influence (in the sense of moderate preference changes translating into any outcome change). Quantification of the UN Security Council’s tendency to not pass any resolution in our view provides a valuable piece of information – one which any index satisfying the efficiency axiom, like SSI, cannot deliver. If one is nevertheless interested in individual members’ relative share of creative power, i.e. wants to abstract from institutional status quo bias, one can normalize Y. This yields Y
Y
k
Yk
x (019011,…, 019011, 000495,…, 000495).
It adds up to unity by construction, but this clearly implies a loss of information relative to the non-normalized Y. Note that even Y differs from SSI-vector G. To see why this must be the case and why, in the class of normalized indices, Y is in our view still a better choice than G, let us consider UN Security Council members’ power conditional on q 0 . So we restrict attention to situations in which by construction all members of the Security Council want to pass a resolution 8 The qualifier ‘almost every’ refers to cases in which several members’ ideal points coincide. These are zero probability events for any continuous distribution.
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that moves to the right of the current status quo. Since in such a situation, any institutional inertia is ruled out, the corresponding power vector Y a must even without normalization add up to unity. In particular, we obtain 1
Y Qˆ Pr(0 Q(1) b F(7) ) ¨ < F Q(1) (F) F Q(1) (q )>f F(7 ) (F)d F 0
421 429
(6)
8 429
(7)
for the group of permanent members, and 1
Y Fˆ Pr(0 F(7) Q(1) ) ¨ < F F(7 ) (Q) F F(7 ) (q )>f Q(1) (Q)d Q 0
for the group of elected members. This results in the power vector 421 421 4 4 ¬ Y a ,…, , ,…, G 2145 2145 2145 2145 ®
i.e. exactly reproduces G. So the SSI in the context of the UN Security Council simply corresponds to a conditional version of our measure of strategic influence Y. It implicitly assumes that the grand coalition N will always be formed (the efficiency axiom thus makes sense), meaning in our context that there will never be any disagreement amongst the members of the Security Council regarding the direction of a resolution. In contrast, the power measures Y and Y take possible disagreement into account. As the differences between Y and Y a (a.k.a. G) show, the rather frequent disagreement amongst Security Council members affects permanent and elected members’ power asymmetrically: it is considerably more often the case that the outcome is x q because Q(1) b q b Q(5) and so that both Q(1) and Q(5) would be vetoed, i.e. permanent members do not have creative power, than that the status quo prevails because a permanent member would block F(4) or F(7) . This asymmetric effect of possible disagreement on influence of permanent and elected members means that the latter are, according to above analysis, roughly three times more powerful in relative terms if one does not restrict attention to matters of unanimous consent. 9 This may be a matter of taste, but we think that institutional inertia created by voting rules such as the one analyzed here is an important issue. Our method captures it when absolute power Y is evaluated and, moreover, its effects are also incorporated when the power of members is compared in relative terms (Y ) . The SSI underestimates relative power by a factor of more than 2.5 because only very special cases are taken into consideration. Reporter 1 We have already heard the first argument in a recent match between 9 Clearly, all members are less powerful in absolute terms when the possibility of disagreement is taken into account.
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the Beta Power Club and their normalized cousins, Beta Prime United, I think. Reporter 2 But the referee accepts this point … he announces that the local team has scored. And it’s on the display: 2:1! This is an unexpected but not undeserved lead in my eyes … The G-vector is carried off the field and the Princeton team’s generating function seems to be in critical condition … But they still have a few minutes to come up with a response – and remember the furious fight that they staged when unidimensionality and ignorance of any preference information were criticized. Reporter 1 Oh yes, they formed an a priori union and Lloyd Shapley plotted an entire power globe with regions of pivotality, in flawless stereographic projection. Or was it Mercator? I can’t remember now, but apparently their team has come up with some idea. Perhaps they will try a variation of the Spanish Attack, splitting the Security Council into a take-it-or-leave-it and a bargaining committee? Reporter 2 Or they might indeed put Nash to the power of Shapley, as our sharpeyed colleagues Annick and Federico saw them practice when they felt unwatched.
While one arguably needs to stretch the simple game framework more than usual, it is possible to capture institutional status quo bias or inertia using the SSI. Namely, one can add an artificial sixteenth ‘player’ Q to the set of agents N, creating the new set N a N \Q ^ . Then player Q can be endowed with status quo-preserving properties similar to the more explicit strategic analysis above. In order to achieve this, one needs to introduce a new characteristic function v a that coincides with the original v for all coalitions not containing Q, but is equal to zero for any coalition S containing Q. In particular, Q’s membership in any coalition S results in v a(S ) 0 even if v a S \ \Q ^ 1 , i.e. v a is non-monotonic. It follows that player Q ’s marginal contribution ¡v a(S ) v a S \ \Q ^ ¯° is either 0 or 1, and its SSI-power ¢ ± (s 1)( n s ) GQ v a(S ) v a S \ \Q ^ ¯° ¢¡ ± n S N a st Q S is negative. Since v(N a) 0 (the new grand coalition includes Q ), the sum of all regular players’ SSI-values is equal to the absolute value of GQ by the efficiency axiom. This value is necessarily smaller than unity because Q has a marginal contribution of 1 only for a strict subset of all coalitions S N a . For illustration consider the player ordering (P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 , P5 , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 , E 5 , E 6 , E 7 , E 8 , E 9 , Q , E 10 )
where Q ‘arrives’ after elected member E 4 has already been identified as a pivotal player. This permutation of player set N a hence contributes 116 to the SSI-value of E 4 – just as it contributed 115 to E 4 ’s power in the
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original game without Q. But Q ’s eventual arrival turns the coalition from a winning into a losing one. So Q is (negatively) pivotal, too, and the same ordering contributes 116 to Q ’s negative power. In contrast, no player in the ordering (P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 ,Q , P5 , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 , E 5 , E 6 , E 7 , E 8 , E 9 , E 10 )
has a non-zero marginal contribution. The intuitive reason for why E 4 ’s pivotal position from the original 15-player game is not counted for this constellation in the modified game with players N a and characteristic function v a is that no resolution can pass because there are permanent members both sides of the status quo (represented by Q ). Similarly, in the ordering (P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 , P5 , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 ,Q , E 4 , E 5 , E 6 , E 7 , E 8 , E 9 , E 10 )
no player is assigned any influence. The interpretation is now that all permanent members and only three elected members prefer a resolution to the left of the status quo and the remaining seven elected members want to move to the right, i.e. no proposal gets the support necessary to pass. All status quo and preference configurations in [0 1]16 from the explicit spatial analysis underlying Y correspond to some ordering of the above type. So going through all 16! permutations would mean looking at every situation that previously entered the computation of Y, the difference being the purely ordinal perspective. Note also that since we assumed that status quo and the ideal points are all independently uniformly distributed, any ordering in which a given voter is determining the size of a change to the left or right of the status quo has an equal probability of 116 . The key difference in computing the Security Council members’ average influence is that both (P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 , P5 , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 , E 5 , E 6 , E 7 , E 8 , E 9 , Q , E 10 )
and its mirror image (E 10 Q E 9 E 8 E 7 E 6 E 5 E 4 E 3 E 2 E 1 P5 P4 P3 P2 P1 )
count towards E 4 ’s power in the cardinal spatial analysis: For the first constellation, an outcome x F 4 to the left of the status quo would be predicted and enter Y E 4 with the probability 116 of this ordinal preference and status quo configuration. Similarly for the second constellation, the outcome x F 4 to the right of the status quo would be predicted and enter Y E 4 accordingly. So above two orderings contribute exactly 216 to elected member E 4 ’s ex ante power of Y E 4 x 000163 . In contrast to this, the SSI of elected member E 4 in the coalitional-form game described by N a and v a would include the pivotal position in the first ordering only, i.e. both would contribute only 116 to G E 4 . In fact, for every ordering in which, say, E 4 determines the outcome, there exists an equiprobable mirror ordering in which E 4 determines the
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outcome in the sensitivity analysis, too. Both enter Y E 4 with a weight of 116, but only one enters G E 4 while the other contributes zero. It follows that the SSI-vector of the modified game is G x (003135,…, 003135, 000082,…,000082, 016492)
where the last entry is the power of artificial player Q. So for all regular players i N 1 Gi w Yi 2
and the institutional inertia identified above is simply 1 2GQ . In particular, the strategic power vector Y for the UN Security Council can be obtained by applying the linear mapping U [0 1]16 l [0 1]15 with U(y 1 ,…, y 15 , y 16 ) 2(y 1 ,…, y 15 )
to the ‘standard’ Shapley-Shubik index G of a suitably defined simple game. Reporter 1 This whole game v a is entirely degenerate rather than simple – but what a prediction. Oh, this is quite innovative … The old fans haven’t seen such a beautiful non-monotonicity and negative power values for a long, long time! And I bet it’s a first for the younger generation. Reporter 2 Yes, so the Princeton Gs have equalized!! Apparently, the Y-team’s captain argues with the referee once more. This factor 2 is a major difference he tells! Well, that’s a matter of taste to me … Reporter 1 And the game is over! The referee points to the Dieze in Bornstraße (at own expense) and the first players leave the field. The Y-team’s captain asks for extra time with an institution for which the equilibrium is simultaneously sensitive to several voters … sounds slightly indecent to me, but risk-aversion might bring this about … In vain, however; this is too late. The game ends 2:2, and Beta Prime is playing next. Their supporters are already entering the stands. Reporter 2 And with this session on strategic power well underway, and the prospects of a good day’s measuring ahead, back to the studio.
Acknowledgements We acknowledge encouraging comments from Matthew Braham. Our research has generously been supported by the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation.
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References Banks, J.S. and Duggan, J. (2000) a Bargaining Model of Social Choice, American Political Science Review 1: 73–88. Banzhaf, J.F. (1965) Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: a Mathematical Analysis, Rutgers Law Review 2: 317–343. Braham, M. and Holler, M.J. (2005) The Impossibility of a Preference-Based Power Index, Journal of Theoretical Politics 17: 137–157. Dubey, P. and Shapley, L. (1979) Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index, Mathematics of Operations Research 2: 99–131. Felsenthal, D. and Machover, M. (1998) The Measurement of Voting Power – Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes, Edward Elgar. Holler, M.J. (1978) A Priori Party Power and Government Formation, Munich Social Science Review 4: 25–41. Holler, M.J. and Packel, E.W. (1983) Power, Luck and the Right Index, Zeitschrift Für Nationalökonomie (Journal of Economics) 1: 21–29. Laruelle, A. and Valenciano, F. (2001) Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited, Mathematics of Operations Research 1: 89–104. Napel, S. and Widgrén, M. (2004) Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis – A Unified Approach, Journal of Theoretical Politics 4: 517–538. Napel, S. and Widgrén, M. (2005) The Possibility of a Preference-Based Power Index, Journal of Theoretical Politics 3: 377–387. Napel, S. and Widgrén, M. (2006a) The European Commission – Appointment, Preferences, and in stitutional Relations, CEPR Discussion Paper (5478). Napel, S. and Widgrén, M. (2006b) The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision, Social Choice and Welfare 27: 129–154. Nurmi, H. (1998) Rational Behaviour and Design of in situtions, Edward Elgar. Owen, G. (1972) Multilinear Extensions of Games, Management Science 5: P64–P79. Owen, G. (1995) Game Theory (3rd ed.), Academic Press. Penrose, L.S. (1946) The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society : 53–57. Rubinstein, A. (1982) Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica 1: 97– 109. Shapley, L.S. (1953) A Value For n-Person Games, in H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker (eds) Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, 307–317. Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M. (1954) A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System, American Political Science Review 3: 787–792.
7. Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting Guillermo Owen Department of Applied Mathematics, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA
Ines Lindner Department of Econometrics, Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Bernard Grofman Department of Political Science, University of California, Irvine, USA
1. Introduction The Electoral College remains a controversial feature of U.S. political decision-making. After most U.S. presidential elections, there are calls for passage of a constitutional amendment to either abolish it or to ‘reform’ it substantially. There are numerous complaints about the Electoral College, of which the most important is the potential for the winner of the Electoral College majority to be a popular vote loser. Consider three assertions that often surface in the debates about the political impact of the Electoral College. First, the Electoral College is alleged to benefit the smaller states. Here the argument is simply that the failure of the Electoral College to satisfy the ‘one person, one vote’ standard by overweighting the seat shares of the smaller states disproportionately advantages those states in terms of their influence on presidential outcomes. An implication of this claim is that, ceteris paribus, candidates should spend more time and money campaigning in the smaller states than their populations would otherwise justify. Second, the winner-take-all feature of statewide voting used in the Electoral College by 48 of the 50 states (and the District of Columbia) is alleged to benefit the larger states. Here, we have the argument, based on game theoretic ideas about pivotal power, that the Electoral College should disproportionately focus candidate attention on the largest states, since it is claimed that, ceteris paribus, the citizens in those states have a likelihood of being pivotal in the election in terms of turning a losing coalition of states into a winning one that is more than proportional to their state’s share of Electoral College votes (Brams and Davis 1974).
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Third, it has recently been suggested that the Electoral College operates to benefit the states experiencing close contests for the presidency, by focusing candidate attention only on the relative handful of potentially competitive states, leaving much of the country barely aware that a presidential election is going on. It might appear obvious that all these assertions cannot be true. In particular, it is far from intuitive how the Electoral College might structure incentives so as to simultaneously make it more likely that candidates would campaign in both the largest states and the smallest states at levels higher than the population of those states would seem to merit. Yet, as we will see, we can construct models in which this underrepresentation of the states of middling population can occur. However, unless closeness and size are perfectly correlated, or unless the effects of state size and level of competition on campaign investments act in a completely additive fashion, then we need to follow up on a point made in Brams and Davis (1974: 132) about the desirability of relaxing the restrictive assumption they make that each state’s already decided voters are divided equally between the two parties on use of poll data about closeness. An important distinction to make here is that between a priori voting power, which is based entirely on the laws and description of the voting process, and the actual power which depends on likely coalitions. Since we are specifically considering political processes, it is clear that certain coalitions (e.g., coalitions among voters with similar ideology, or among voters living in a given area) are more likely than others. We discuss both types of power, but will give modifications mainly for the second (practical) case. There are several power indices in the literature. The best known are the Shapley-Shubik (1954) and Banzhaf (1965)/Coleman (1971)indices. Application of these indices shows that the larger states (California, New York, etc.) have substantially greater power than one would normally expect. Owen (1975; 1995: 302) found that – on the basis of 1970 census figures – a voter in California had, a priori, 2.86 times as much power as a voter in North Dakota. This was so even though North Dakota had then 2.87 times as many electoral votes per capita as California. The question is whether this rather unintuitive result is reasonable; if not, we would like to suggest modifications. We will limit ourselves to discussion and modifications of the ShapleyShubik index. Other power indices give similar results; it is not necessary to discuss them here.
2. Multilinear Extensions Our approach to the power index will be based on the multilinear extension (Owen 1972). Let (N ,v ) be an n-person TU game in characteristic function form. Then the multilinear extension
Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting
¦£ ¦² f (q 1 ,!q n ) ¦¤q j (1 q j )v(S )¦ » ¦¦ j S j N \ S ¦¦ S N ¥ ¼
121
(1)
represents the expected worth, E
, of a random coalition [, given that each player, i, has probability q i of belonging to the coalition, and that all these probabilities are independent. The partial derivative f i sf i sq i represents the expected marginal contribution, v [ \i ^ v [ \i ^ , of i to this random coalition. Now the Shapley value can be obtained by the formula, from Owen (1972), 1
ɲi [v ] ¨ f i (t 1 ,!t n )dt
(2)
0
in which the Russian letter ɲ (sha) stands for the Shapley value. This formula can be interpreted by the following parable: the n players in a game have agreed to meet in a given place, at a given time. Because of random fluctuations in watches, unforeseen delays, etc. they in fact arrive in some random order. Each one’s arrival time is a random variable, X i ; these n random variables are independent and have identical distribution. So long as this is a continuous distribution, there is no loss of generality in assuming that it is a uniform distribution over the unit interval. We assume, as described in (Shapley 1953), that, on arrival, player i is paid his marginal contribution to the coalition consisting of those players who have already arrived. Then the value ɲi [v ] is precisely player i ’s expected payment. Suppose, however, that the n players’ arrival times are not identically distributed. (One is habitually tardy; another is an early riser, etc.) We let g i be the cumulative distribution for i ’s arrival time, i.e. g i (t ) Pr \X i b t ^ , and assume these variables are independent and absolutely continuous (so each can be represented by a density function g ia ). Then B
Zi ¨ f i g 1(t ),!, g n (t ) g ia(t )dt
(3)
A
is the expected payment to i under these assumptions. 1 To see how this works, we give two easy examples, with three players each, and normal distributions for their arrival times. Example 1 Consider a three-person situation, where any two of the voters form a winning coalition. In this case, the multilinear extension is given by 1
In formula (3), A and B should be chosen so that all g i (A ) 0, and all g i (B ) 1. Since this may not be practical (e.g., some distribution may have infinite support), we merely require that they be close to 0 and 1 respectively.
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f (q 1 , q 2 , q 3 ) q 1q 2 q 1q 3 q 2q 3 2q 1q 2q 3 .
The partial derivatives here are f 1 q 2 q 3 2q 2q 3 and similarly for the other two. Let the three voters’ times of arrival be normally distributed, with means and standard deviations N1 0.4, T 1 0.1 N 2 0.5, T 2 0.2 N 3 0.7, T 3 0.1
We will let g i (t ) Pr \X i b t ^ ' (t Ni T i )
where ' is the standard normal distribution function. Thus g 1(t ) '(10t 4) g 2(t ) '(5t 2.5) g 3(t ) '(10t 7)
Note that, for all three, we have g i (0) very close to 0, and g i (1) very close to 1. Thus it should suffice to let A 0 and B 1 in our integration formula above. (If a more precise result were necessary we could let A 1 and B 2.) From the above, we obtain the densities (derivatives) g 1a(t ) 10K(10t t ) g 2a (t ) 5K(5t 2.5) g 3a (t ) 10K(10t 7) 1
where K is the normal density function, K(x ) (2Q) 2 exp \x 2 2^. The integration formula leads to the result : (0.323,0.490, 0.187). Thus, player 2, whose expected time of arrival is in the middle, has the advantage, though he will frequently (more than half the time) shift out of the middle position. Player 1, whose expected position is more moderate than that of player 3, does in fact considerably better than 3. Note that this effectively assumes motion ‘from left to right’, with a coalition forming as the left-most members (those closest to 0) join first, then those in the middle, and finally those on the right (closest to 1). We can imagine as well motion from right to left (the reverse order), but in fact this gives the same results as before. This is to be expected where the voting game is decisive: for every coalition S, either S or N \ S (but not both) is a winning coalition. For such games, an order and the reverse order give the same result.
Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting
123
Example 2 Consider a similar three-person situation, with the same winning coalitions and the same multilinear extension. The difference will be in the three voters’ times of arrival, now characterized by N1 0.5, T 1 0.1 N 2 0.5, T 2 0.2 N 3 0.5, T 3 0.05
We continue as in Example 1. The integration formula now leads to the result : (0.369,0.166,0.465). In this case, we find that player 3 is favored, mainly because his smaller variance means he will generally be closer to the center of the distribution, and thus more frequently in the middle, between the other 2. But note that, if the voting game required unanimity, the situation would be quite different: in this case, we would find : (0.316, 0.417,0.267). Thus, where the expected times of arrival are different (as in example 1), those players with expected positions near the median will be advantaged. Where the expected arrival times of the players are all equal (as in example 2), and a simple majority of the votes is necessary to win, the player with smaller variance is generally advantaged. (On the other hand, with a supermajority necessary, the situation may well be different.) What is not obvious from the example is that, when there are many players, the advantage will (asymptotically) be inversely proportional to the square root of the variance.
2.1 The Electoral College Let us see how this applies to the Electoral College. There are n players (states), with differing numbers of electoral votes, depending on the state’s population. Let v be the n-person game among the states. Let m j be the number of voters in state j, and let r j be the number of votes needed to determine the state’s electors, which is in this case (m j 1) 2. We shall let wj represent the simple game, with m j players, in which the minimal winning coalitions are precisely those with exactly r j members. Let G j (y 1 ,!, y m ) be the multilinear extension of game w j , and define g j (t ) G j (t ,!, t ).
(4)
It is easy to see that g j (t ) is in this case the probability that a binomial random variable with parameters m j and t be at least equal to r j . This means that if each of the m j voters arrives according to a uniform distribution in the unit interval, g j (t ) is the probability that a majority (or more of these has arrived not later than time t : in other words, it is the probability that state j will have its ‘time of arrival’ not later than t (Owen 1975).
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Assuming m j to be large, we can approximate this binomial probability by the normal distribution with mean tm j and variance t(1 t )m j . Approximately, then, tm j r j g j (t ) ' t(1 t )m j
¬ . ®
(5)
Next, we calculate the function f (g 1 ,! g n ). Let state j have w j electoral votes. Then, since g j (t ) is the probability that state j arrives on or before time t, then the number of electoral votes that state j will have contributed by time t can be thought of as a random variable with mean w j g j (t ), and variance w 2j g j (t ) 1 g j (t ) . It will follow that the number of electoral votes Y in the random coalition [ has mean M Y (t ) w j g j (t ) j
and variance TY2 (t ) w 2j g j (t ) 1 g j (t ) . j
Given the number of states, it is possible to approximate Y by a normal random variable having the same mean and variance. Thus f can be expressed in terms of the normal distribution function ', and the calculation is then a straightforward problem in integration (easily carried out with current computer packages, using Simpson’s rule). The reader is invited to read (Owen 1975) for details of this integration. It can also be seen that, since the ratios r j m j are all nearly equal to 21 , then the change of variable U
t 21
(6)
gives us the much simpler expression g j ' U m j
(7)
where ' is the normal distribution function. Thus, the effect of difference in population translates into a difference in variance: the time of arrival of state j is now a normal random variable with mean 0 and variance 1 m j . 2 Now, the Shapley value assumes that (a) all voters have their ‘time of ar2 It should be noted that, under this change of variable, the values 0 and 1 for the original variable, t, transform into –f and +f, respectively, for U. The integral (3) becomes an improper integral, but, in practice, it should suffice to let U run from –K to +K, where K is large enough so that K m i is of the order of 3 for the smallest of the constituencies.
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125
rival’ identically distributed and (b) these are independent, so that, in fact, formula (1) above holds. We will call this the hypothesis of universal population homogeneity and independence (HUPHI). This means that all the state positions have identical means, with variance inversely proportional to the population. The effect of this is that the larger states are more likely to be near the centre, and, as in Example 2 above, are more likely to be pivotal if a simple majority of the constituency weights is necessary to win. If, on the other hand, a super-majority (say, two thirds) is necessary, then these larger states are less likely to be pivotal (though of course they might still be stronger, simply because their voting weights are greater).
2.2 First Modification: Introduction of Undecided Voters Suppose, now, that the HUPHI does not hold. Different states have different distributions for their populations. We shall use a relatively simple model for this; there are of course several other possibilities. We assume that, in each state, part of the population is definitely on the left, part is definitely on the right, and the remaining voters (the undecideds) are the ones in play. In our ‘time of arrival’ parable, the left wing arrives immediately at time 0, the right wing arrives at time 1, and the undecideds arrive according to a uniform distribution in the unit interval. As before, we wish to find gj, the probability distribution of X j , state j’s time of arrival. Let m j be the voting population of constituency j, and let a j and b j be the population of the left- and right-wing blocs respectively. Then the undecideds are c j m j a j b j . Assume, as before, that r j (m j 1) 2 votes are needed to carry the constituency; then the left-wing party requires s j r j a j votes from among the undecideds. 3 We will therefore consider only states for which r j is greater than both a j and b j . . Continuing as above, we would then find that the state ‘arrives’ when exactly s j of the c j undecideds have arrived: tc j s j g j (t ) ' t(1 t )c j
¬ . ®
(7)
¬ . ®
(8)
If we let H j s j c j we obtain (t H j ) c j g j (t ) ' t(1 t ) 3
It may, of course, happen that a j p r j . In such case the left-wing party will certainly carry the state, X j will be equal to 0, g j will be constantly equal to 1, and the voters in this state will, in our analysis, have zero power. Similarly, if b j p r j , then the right-wing party will certainly win the state, X j will be equal to 1, g j will be constantly equal to 0, and once again the voters here have no power.
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The density is then given by
g aj (t )
(t H 2Ht ) c j 2(t t 2 )
3 2
(t H j ) c j K t(1 t )
¬ . ®
(9)
To obtain the modified power, we would then modify the calculations in (Owen 1975; 1995: 298–299), using these values for the functions g j . In principle, there is no great difficulty – given the existence of mathematical packages for computers – in carrying out the necessary integration. Some care must of course be taken to avoid values of t which are too close to 0 or 1, but such values would be of importance only if s j is extremely close to either 0 or c j , and these states will, in our model, have negligible power. We wish, however, to look at some qualitative properties of this modified index, making a simplification similar to the one above (equation 7). Unfortunately, since the H j are not all equal, the simplifying transformation (6) is not available. We note, however, that g j (H j ) 12 , so that the median entry time for constituency j is H j . The calculations at this point become somewhat complicated. Nevertheless, it is not too difficult to prove that, if two constituencies, i and j, have H i H j , and undecided populations c i c j respectively, then
Pr \X i X j ^ b ' [H i H j ] (2c i ) . If we further assume that c i is of the order of 20,000 (a rather small number given the size of today’s electorates), we find that Pr \X i X j ^ b ' 200[H i H j ] .
Now, we know that ' is a strictly increasing function, with '(2) 0.023. Thus, if H i H j 0.01, we find that Pr \X i X j ^ 0.023. We conclude that, unless the quantities H i are very close for several states, the probability of an out-of-order arrival is extremely low, and thus almost all of the voting power will reside in a small number (possibly two or three) of median states. 4
2.3 Discussion of the Above Indices As we have seen, the classical Shapley value (or for that matter the BanzhafColeman index) gives excessive a priori value to the larger constituencies, essentially because the HUPHI (hypothesis of universal population homogeneity and independence) causes all constituencies to have the same expected time of arrival, with smaller variances for the larger ones. When the voting game requires a simple majority (i.e., one half plus one) of the 4
The authors will be happy to provide details of this analysis.
Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting
127
weighted votes, a smaller variance increases the probability that a state lie in pivotal position (see example 2 above.) It is of course also true that, for the Shapley value – though not the B-C index – a requirement for a super-majority will weaken the state with smaller variance. On the other hand, the inclusion of undecideds, etc., which we mentioned above, will give differing expected times of arrival for the states. However, it allots almost all the power to a very few constituencies – those with expected time of arrival nearest the median. It is as if, in this last (2004) presidential election, we need only consider four states: Ohio with 20 votes, Nevada, 5, New Mexico, 5, and Iowa, 7. To see this, note that Ohio was in fact the pivotal state. According to our analysis above, only states with a two-party division of the vote within 1% of Ohio would be considered possible pivots: these are precisely the four states mentioned. Among the remaining states, Bush had 249 votes, while Kerry had 252. To win, Bush needed 269 votes, and Kerry, 270. (This difference is due to the fact that, in case of an Electoral College tie, the election would be resolved in the House of Representatives, where the Republicans had a sizable majority of the states.) Thus whoever carried Ohio would win the election. We should perhaps include Florida and Wisconsin, where the division differed from that of Ohio by about 1.4 %. Then Ohio would not have all the power, but (as discussed above) the probability that Florida would end up to the left of Ohio, or Wisconsin to the right, are of the order of less than 2%. We would conclude that Ohio had perhaps 98% of the total power; the remaining 2% would be divided among Florida, Wisconsin, and the three other states mentioned above. The other 44 states, and the District of Columbia, would have truly negligible power. Now, it is our belief that the greatest problem with the indices thus far considered is that they fail to take into account correlation among the voters of a given state. To see why correlation is important, consider the following straw man: Suppose that, at birth (or on naturalization) each citizen of the United States were assigned a two-letter symbol. There are 51 of these, and they are assigned according to a certain probability distribution. For example, the symbol CA has probability 0.12, the symbol WY has probability 0.017, etc. Otherwise the assignment is totally random: an individual’s symbol has no relation to his family or place of birth, and even twin siblings can have symbols as totally different as MA and UT. These symbols seem to be quite meaningless, except that they are kept in the electoral rolls. Then, for a presidential election, votes are totaled according to symbol, Each symbol is then given a number of ‘supervotes’, proportional to the original probability distribution, and these will be assigned (on a winner-take-all basis) to the candidate with most votes from among those with a given symbol. Now, it is hard to imagine that anyone would espouse this proposal. So
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how is it different from the Electoral College? The answer is that in the Electoral College, people are grouped together by their state of residence rather than by some meaningless pair of letters (akin perhaps to the last two digits in the social security number). Because of this, there is meaningful correlation (of opinion) among voters who are grouped together in the Electoral College system, but not in our straw man proposal. However, the classical voting indices essentially assume that voters’ decisions are totally independent and thus no different from the situation in the straw man proposal.
3. An Alternative Approach Granted that the two methods described above give counterintuitive results, we feel that a different approach, assuming substantial correlation among nearby voters, and especially among voters within a given state, should be considered. With such a correlation, the variance of the state arrival times would be considerably larger than given by our model – certainly much larger than 1 m i or even 1 c i . As Gelman et al. (2004) point out, empirical evidence suggests that the variance is closer to m i0.2 . To model the correlation, we represent this by a partial differential equation, where we represent the voters by points, x, on a line, and time by t. The coordinate x corresponds to physical location: if x y is small, then voters x and y are ‘neighbours’ who can talk to each other. Assume that there are two parties, which we generically call the right-of-center and the left-of-center. We let u(x , t ) represent voter x’s state of mind (his feeling towards the two parties) at time t. Specifically, we assume that x has a ‘usual’ state. Then u(x , t ) 0 means that, at time t, x is more likely than usual to vote for the right-of-centre party; similarly, u(x , t ) 0 means he is more likely than usual to vote for the left-of-centre. Now, we assume that voter x is influenced by the voters near him, and has a tendency to move in the same way that they do. We will represent this by the equation su k s 2 u f (x , t ) dt sx 2 u(x ,0) g (x ) d x d t d
(10)
where k is a constant of proportionality, corresponding to the speed with which political news and opinions spread among neighbours, and where the forcing term, f, represents external events, and may even be split into two parts, one corresponding to random events, and the other to efforts by one or the other of the two parties. To estimate the correlation, assume there is no variation until time 0. As-
Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting
129
sume then a unit shock, concentrated at some point x x 0 , at time t 0. This corresponds to an initial condition u(x ,0) E(x x 0 )
where E is the Dirac delta function. Assume also that there is no forcing term, i.e. f 0. The reader may recognize the above as the heat equation that appears in most courses in partial differential equations. It has the solution ² 1 ¦£(x x 0 )2 ¦ u(x , t ) (4 Qkt ) 2 exp ¤ ». ¦¥¦ ¦ 4kt ¦ ¼
(11)
Of course this shock could happen at any point xo within the state. There may be several such shocks, at possibly different times, but we assume these are uncorrelated. Thus the correlation between different voters can be given by the autocorrelation of this function. Some analysis tells us that the relative correlation is £¦(x y)2 ² ¦¦ S(x , y, t ) exp ¦¤ ». ¦¦¥ 8kt ¦ ¼¦
(12)
Now, for small values of t, this will be a very sharp curve, with a strong maximum at x y, and falling to 0 very quickly. For large t, on the other hand, his will be a very flat curve. Suppose, now, that the population of a constituency occupies a line segment of length c, which we can assume, without loss of generality, to be the interval [0, c ]. Assume also that each individual’s political stance has a variance 1. Then the variance of the sum of their positions is given by c
c
¨¨ 0
0
£¦(x y)2 ²¦¦ exp ¦¤ »dxdy ¦¥¦ 8kt ¦¼¦
(13)
which, after some calculations, reduces to £c 2 ²¦¯ 1 1 Var c(8Qkt ) 2 erf \c(8kt ) 2 ^ 8kt ¡1 exp ¦¤ »° ¡¢ ¥¦¦ 8kt ¼¦¦°±
and the variance of the mean is this same quantity divided by c 2 . 5 We find here that for small c (small compared to kt), then Var, as given above, is almost equal to c 2 . Thus the variance of the mean is only slightly smaller than c 2 , the variance of position for an individual voter. On the other hand, for large c, Var can be significantly smaller than c 2 and is asymptotically proportional to c. To see this behaviour, we calculate the qu5 Note: if each individual’s political stance has a variance of T 2 rather than 1, then the above result should be multiplied by T 2 .
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Guillermo Owen, Ines Lindner, and Bernard Grofman Table 1
c
Var
Var c 2
100 200 300 500 1000 2000 4000 6000 10000 50000 100000
9983 39735 88674 240080 861524 254663 6089800 9634700 16724500 87622500 176245000
0.99830 0.99340 0.98530 0.96030 0.86150 0.63670 0.38060 0.26760 0.16720 0.03505 0.01762
antities Var and Var c 2 for several values of c and for kt 12500 (Table 1). As may be seen, Var c 2 decreases very slowly until about c 500. Afterwards, it decreases much more rapidly, until for c p 10000 it can be approximated reasonably well by 1760 c . In effect, this means that the variance behaves as though the c undecided voters arrived, not independently, but, rather, in independent bunches of 1760. This will hold so long as the actual number of undecideds is at least of the order of 10000. Of course, the numerator 1760, the size of the independent bunches, depends on both k and t. Specifically, for large c, it will be proportional to the square root of kt. It is difficult to decide how large this should be chosen, but in the next section we will try to justify a value chosen.
4. Statistical Analysis We will make the assumption that Republican candidate i ’s share of the two-party vote in state j can be approximated by q ij Ni z j e ij
(15)
where Ni represents the candidate’s personal popularity, z j is state j’s Republican tendency (low for MA and DC, high for UT and WY), and e ij is an additional (random) term, representing perhaps good or bad luck for the candidate in that state. Typically, Ni would be of the order of 0.1 for a very popular candidate (say, Nixon in 1972), 0.1 for an unpopular candidate (Goldwater in 1964) and in between for other candidates. In fact, we will not worry about the µi, since they do not affect the states’ rankings, and we are only interested in the probability that a given state be a pivot. We estimate z j by looking at the Republican share of the vote in the last five elections (1988–2002). Since positions evolve over time, we have discounted past elections by a factor of 0.8 for each cycle. Thus, for each state, we calculate the quantity
Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting Table 2 State
zj
Hj
wj
Cumulative EV
DC MA RI NY VT HI MD IL CT CA ME WA DE MN NJ OR MI PA IA WI NM WV AR MO NH OH FL NV CO LA TN AZ VA GA NC KY MT AL SC IN SD TX MS KS OK ND AK NE WY ID UT
102 368 370 395 418 420 438 440 441 445 452 454 456 458 458 469 472 474 477 482 488 496 497 501 504 506 517 518 520 523 530 536 541 549 549 551 568 570 573 574 575 577 587 596 600 605 632 637 644 658 686
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.100 0.190 0.200 0.205 0.225 0.260 0.270 0.280 0.290 0.290 0.345 0.360 0.370 0.385 0.410 0.440 0.480 0.485 0.505 0.520 0.530 0.585 0.590 0.600 0.615 0.650 0.680 0.705 0.745 0.745 0.755 0.840 0.850 0.865 0.870 0.875 0.885 0.935 0.980 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
3 12 4 31 3 4 10 21 7 55 4 11 3 10 15 7 17 21 7 10 5 5 6 11 4 20 27 5 9 9 11 10 13 15 15 8 3 9 8 11 3 34 6 6 7 3 3 5 3 4 5
3 15 19 50 53 57 67 88 95 150 154 165 168 178 193 200 217 238 245 255 260 265 271 282 286 306 333 338 347 356 367 377 390 405 420 428 431 440 448 459 462 496 502 508 515 518 521 526 529 533 538
131
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Guillermo Owen, Ines Lindner, and Bernard Grofman
zj
s 2004, j 0.8s 2000, j 0.64s 1996, j 0.512s 1992, j 0.4096s 1998, j 3.3616
(16)
where s k , j is the Republican share of the two-party vote in state j, in the year k presidential election. This allows us to give a position to each state. (The numbers should be divided by 1000.) We obtain an ordering for the states, from most Democratic to most Republican. The electoral votes, w j , are those of the 2000 reapportionment (Table 2). We next assume that 20% of the voters in each state are undecideds, and that they have, in the past, divided evenly between the two candidates. Thus, for state j, where the Republican’s share of the vote is yj, we assume that d j 0.9 y j are the Democratic stalwarts, and e j z j 0.1 are the Republican stalwarts. Then, if z j 0.4, the state is not in play, as the Democrats have a majority even without any of the undecideds. Similarly, if z j 0.6, then the Republicans have a certain majority. In our ‘time of arrival’ parable, the former of these arrive at time 0, while the latter arrive at time 1. Thus, there are 7 safe states for the Republicans, and 3 safe states, as well as the DC, for the Democrats. There are 40 states with 0.4 z j 0.6. These states are theoretically in play, though such states as Kansas, at 0.596, and Vermont, at 0.418, seem safe for their parties except in case of a landslide of historical proportions. We then note that, for a state to ‘arrive’, at least a fraction H j of its undecided voters must join, where H j 5z j 2
(17)
As discussed above, this H j is also the median value of X j , state j’s arrival time. As may be seen, Arkansas is the median state in this ordering, with z AR 0.497. Then ( H AR 0.485 is a good approximation to the median time at which a winning coalition forms. It is still necessary to get a distribution for these times of arrival. As mentioned above, the effect of correlation is to decrease the variance of arrivals. Thus, with c j undecideds, and independence, the variance is T 2 c j , where T 2 is the variance of each individual’s time. However, we saw that (under certain assumptions), the group variance was as if the undecideds arrived in bunches of 1760 at a time, these bunches coming independently. Moreover, this bunch size of 1760 depends on certain parameters which are admittedly uncertain. Let us assume, then, that the size of the bunches is, rather, 2500. Now, if we assume that 35% of the state population vote, and that 20% of these are undecided, we find that the undecideds are 7% of p j , the state population. However, these arrive in bunches of 2500. Thus the number of undecided bunches would be cj
0.07 p j 0.000028 p j . 2500
(18)
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Table 3 State
Hj
DC MA RI NY VT HI MD IL CT CA ME WA DE MN NJ OR MI PA IA WI NM WV AR MO NH OH FL NV CO LA TN AZ VA GA NC KY MT AL SC IN SD TX MS KS OK ND AK NE WY ID UT
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.100 0.190 0.200 0.205 0.225 0.260 0.270 0.280 0.290 0.290 0.345 0.360 0.370 0.385 0.410 0.440 0.480 0.485 0.505 0.520 0.530 0.585 0.590 0.600 0.615 0.650 0.680 0.705 0.745 0.745 0.755 0.840 0.850 0.865 0.870 0.875 0.885 0.935 0.980 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p j (in 1000s) 551 6399 1076 19255 623 1275 5600 12763 3510 36132 1322 6288 844 5133 8718 3641 10121 12430 2966 5536 1928 1817 2779 5800 1310 11464 17790 2415 4665 4524 5963 5939 7567 9073 8683 4173 936 4558 4255 6272 776 22860 2921 2745 3548 637 664 1759 509 1429 2470
cj
H j o1 c j
Cumulative EV
15.430 179.170 30.130 539.140 17.440 35.700 156.800 357.364 98.280 1011.700 37.020 176.060 23.630 143.720 244.100 101.950 283.390 348.040 83.050 155.010 53.980 50.880 77.810 162.400 36.680 320.990 498.120 67.620 130.620 126.670 166.960 166.290 211.880 254.040 243.120 116.840 26.210 127.620 119.140 175.620 21.730 640.080 81.790 76.860 99.340 17.840 18.590 49.250 14.250 40.010 69.160
0 0 0 0 [0, 0.33] [0, 0.27] [0.11, 0.27] [0.15, 0.25] [0.10, 0.31] [0.19, 0.26] [0.10, 0.42] [0.19, 0.35] [0.07, 0.49] [0.21, 0.37] [0.23, 0.35] [0.25, 0.44] [0.30, 0.42] [0.31, 0.43] [0.28, 0.49] [0.33, 0.49] [0.30, 0.58] [0.34, 0.62] [0.37, 0.60] [0.43, 0.58] [0.35, 0.69] [0.47, 0.59] [0.54, 0.63] [0.47, 0.71] [0.51, 0.69] [0.53, 0.70] [0.57, 0.73] [0.60, 0.76] [0.64, 0.77] [0.68, 0.81] [0.68, 0.81] [0.66, 0.85] [0.64, 1] [0.76, 0.94] [0.77, 0.96] [0.79, 0.95] [0.66, 1] [0.85, 0.92] [0.82, 1] [0.87, 1] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 15 19 50 53 57 67 88 95 150 154 165 168 178 193 200 217 238 245 255 260 265 271 282 286 306 333 338 347 356 367 377 390 405 420 428 431 440 448 459 462 496 502 508 515 518 521 526 529 533 538
134
Guillermo Owen, Ines Lindner, and Bernard Grofman Table 4 State
Hj
DC MA RI NY VT HI MD IL CT CA ME WA DE MN NJ OR MI PA IA WI NM WV AR MO NH OH FL NV CO LA TN AZ VA GA NC KY MT AL SC IN SD TX MS KS OK ND AK NE WY ID UT
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.100 0.190 0.200 0.205 0.225 0.260 0.270 0.280 0.290 0.290 0.345 0.360 0.370 0.385 0.410 0.440 0.480 0.485 0.505 0.520 0.530 0.585 0.590 0.600 0.615 0.650 0.680 0.705 0.745 0.745 0.755 0.840 0.850 0.865 0.870 0.875 0.885 0.935 0.980 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p j (in 1000s) 551 6399 1076 19255 623 1275 5600 12763 3510 36132 1322 6288 844 5133 8718 3641 10121 12430 2966 5536 1928 1817 2779 5800 1310 11464 17790 2415 4665 4524 5963 5939 7567 9073 8683 4173 936 4558 4255 6272 776 22860 2921 2745 3548 637 664 1759 509 1429 2470
EV.
Piv. prob. :j
Power : j 0.07 p j
3 12 4 31 3 4 10 21 7 55 4 11 3 10 15 7 17 21 7 10 5 5 6 11 4 20 27 5 9 9 11 10 13 15 15 8 3 9 8 11 3 34 6 6 7 3 3 5 3 4 5
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.0000 0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 0.0067 0.0026 0.0024 0.0360 0.0636 0.0838 0.1017 0.1472 0.1984 0.0606 0.1872 0.0583 0.0243 0.0102 0.0051 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.7 0.0 99.9 0.0 0.0 26.3 3.7 2.7 173.3 164.1 623.6 799.6 756.7 488.7 660.9 233.3 46.9 143.7 31.3 16.1 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting
135
We call c j the virtual number of undecided bunches. 6 Of these virtual bunches, a fraction H j must arrive for state j to arrive. Thus we need s j H jc j
(19)
of these bunches. Then, in equation (4), g j (t ) is equal to the probability that a binomial variable, with parameters c j and t, be at least equal to s j . Approximating the binomial by a normal variable, we have the cumulative distribution function g j and its density, g aj as given by equations (8) and (9) above, which we repeat here as (20) and (21): (t H j ) c j g j (t ) ' t(1 t ) g aj (t )
(t H 2Ht ) c j 2(t t 2 )
3 2
¬ ®
(t H j ) c j K t(1 t )
(20) ¬ . ®
(21)
Unfortunately, X j is not normally distributed. The distribution g j is given in terms of the normal distribution, but its ‘variance’ unfortunately depends on t. Nevertheless, we note that, since t(1 t ) b 0.25, then, for all t H j we must have g j (t ) ' ¢¡2(t H j ) c j ¯°±
(22)
while the opposite inequality will hold if t H. Now, we know that '(1.96) 0.975, while '(1.96) 0.025. It will follow that H j 0.98 ¬ g j 0.975, ® cj
H j 0.98 ¬ g j 0.025 cj ®
(23)
and we conclude that H j o 1 c j gives us better than a 95% interval for X j. We now simplify matters by assuming that we can disregard anything outside the 95% interval, H j o 1 c j . In Table 3 we calculate this for all but the 10 states, and the DC, mentioned above as always safe for one or the other of the two parties. The several states’ populations, p j , are the July 2005 Census Bureau estimates (www.factmonster.com). As may be seen, if we consider only the times within each state’s 95% interval, a majority (270 electoral votes) can arrive no sooner than time 0.38 6
To see that this is a reasonable number, note that, for a standard-sized electoral district of 500,000 inhabitants, this gives us a total of 14 virtual bunches. As mentioned above, Gelman et al. (2004) suggest that the variance should behave as the –0.2 power of population, i.e. as if the population should be replaced by its fifth root. But the fifth root of 500,000 is 13.8. This is not to say that our analysis is exact, only that it is not unreasonable.
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(Arkansas’s early time), and will certainly have arrived by time 0.59 (Missouri’s late time). Thus, only those states whose interval overlaps (.038, 0.59) can be pivots under our scheme. We can put the states in five categories: (a) Safe for the Democrats: DC, RI, MA, NY, with 50 votes; (b) Almost safe for the Democrats: VT, HI, MD, IL, CT, CA, WA, MN, NJ, with 136 votes; (c) In play: ME, DE, OR, MI, PA, IA, WI, NM, WV, AR, MO, NH, OH, FL, NV, CO, LA, TN, with 181 votes; (d) Almost safe for the Republicans: AZ, VA, GA, NC, KY, MT, AL, SC, IN, SD, TX, MS, KS, with 141 votes; (d) Safe for the Republicans: OK, ND, AK, NE, WY, ID, UT, with 30 votes. Only the 18 states ‘in play’ have a non-negligible probability of being pivot. Since 186 votes are going to arrive early, the pivot will be that state (among these 18) to complete 84 votes. Thus, for example, Maine, with its 4 votes, must arrive at a time when other ‘in play’ states with at least 80, and not more than 83, electoral votes, have arrived. This number of votes is of course an integer, but we will approximate via a continuous distribution, Then, if Y j (t ) is the number of votes (not counting those of state j) to have arrived by time t, we find that the j-th partial derivative (where j refers to Maine) of the multilinear extension f, evaluated at g 1(t ),! g n (t ) , is given by f j g (t ) Pr <79.5 b Y j (t ) b 83.5 >.
(24)
Thus the probability that ME is in fact the pivot will be given by Z j ¨ Pr <79.5 b Y j (t ) b 83.5 >g aj (t )dt
where the integral is taken over a sufficiently large interval, for example, ME’s 95% interval, [0.10, 0.42]. For other states, the probability is given by a similar integral; the probability in the integrand must however be replaced by f j g (t ) Pr < 83.5 w j Y j (t ) b 83.5 >
(26)
where w j is state j’s electoral weight (number of votes). The integral in (25) should be modified accordingly. It remains to determine the probability that 83.5 w j b Y j (t )83.5. In fact, at time t, state k has arrived with probability g k (t ). Thus it will have contributed w k votes with probability g k and 0 votes with probability 1 g k . Thus the number of votes it has contributed is a random variable with mean w k g k , and variance w k2 g k (1 g k ). Now Y j is the sum of these variables, for all states k other than j. The states are assumed to arrive inde-
Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting
137
pendently, and thus Y j has mean Mj
w
k
gk
(27)
K v` j
and variance V j w k2 g k (1 g k ).
(28)
k v` j
Note that, since all the g k depend on t, so do M j and V j . We will now assume that the number of states in play is sufficiently large that we can approximate Y j by a normal random variable with the given mean and variance. If that is so, then we have the approximation 83.5 M j ¬ 83.5 w j M j ¬ f j x ' ' . Vj Vj ® ®
(29)
Finally, we must determine the individual voters’ power. We note that a resident, k, of state j will be the pivot if (1) j is the pivot among the states, and (2) k is the median voter in state j. Since (apart from states in the two ‘safe’ categories) only undecided voters will be in median position, we divide the state’s pivot probability, Z j , by the number of undecided voters, which we had calculated as 0.07 p j . This gives us the voting power of individuals in state j. Table 4 gives the approximate values. 7 Entries in the last column should be multiplied by 10 9. As may be seen, the power is concentrated among the states near the middle of the order. West Virginia voters are the most powerful, with Arkansas, New Mexico and New Hampshire close behind. Missouri and Ohio seem to be the most important states. There seem to be certain anomalies, e.g. Oregon seems to be more powerful than Michigan, though the latter is more populous and more centrally located. The explanation seems to be that it is easier to ‘move’ the population of Oregon towards the center (there are fewer Oregonians than Michiganders) and so Oregon becomes an easier prize than Michigan. Admittedly these results depend quite heavily on the size of the ‘virtual bunches.’ In a subsequent article we will try to get a better statistical handle on these.
References Banzhaf, J.F. (1965) Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: A Mathematical Analysis, Rutgers Law Review 19: 317–343. Brams, S.J. and Davis, M. (1974) The 3/2ths Rule in Presidential Campaigning, American Political Science Review 68: 113–134. 7
Integrations were done using Maple 10.
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Chamberlain, G. and Rothschild, M. (1981) A Note on the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote, Journal of Economic Theory 25: 152–162. Cox, G.W. (1997) Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems, Cambridge University Press. Duverger, M. (1959) Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, John Wiley. Edwards, G.C. (2004) Why the Electoral College is Bad for America, Yale University Press. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1998)The Measurement of Voting Power. Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes, Edward Elgar. Gaines, B. (1999). Duverger’s Law and the Meaning of Canadian Exceptionalism, Comparative Political Studies 32: 835–861. Gelman, A. Katz, J. and Bafumi, J. (2004) Standard Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work: An Empirical Analysis, British Journal of Political Science 34: 657–674. Good, I.J. and Meyer, L.S. (1975) Estimating the Efficacy of a Vote, Behavioral Science 20: 25–33. Grofman, B., Koetzle, W. and Brunell, T. (1997) An Integrated Perspective on the Three Potential Sources of Partisan Bias: Malapportionment, Turnout Differences, and the Geographic Distribution of Party Vote Shares, Electoral Studies 16: 457–470. Groseclose, T. and Snyder, J.M. (2000) Vote Buying, Supermajorities, and Flooded Coalitions, American Political Science Review 94: 683–684. Kimberling, W.C. (2004) The Electoral College, U.S. Federal Election Commission, Office of Election Administration. Madison, J. (1823) ‘Letter to John Hay, August 23, 1823’, in Max Farrand (ed.) The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed.) vol. 3, Yale University Press (1966). Natapoff, A. (2004) ‘The Electoral College’, Presentation to the Colloquium Series of the Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine, October 2004. Owen, G. (1972) Multilinear Extensions of Games, Management Science 18: 64–79. Owen, G. (1975) Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game, American Political Science Review 69: 947–953. Owen, G. (1995) Game Theory, Academic Press. Shapley, L.S. Mann, I. (1962) Values of Large Games, VI: Evaluating the Electoral College Exactly, RM-3158-PR. The RAND Corporation. Shaw, D. (2003) A Simple Game: Uncovering Campaign Effects in the 2000 Presidential Election. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of Texas, Austin. Tufte, E. (1973) The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems, American Political Science Review 67: 540–554.
8. Pivotal Voting Theory: The 1993 Clinton Health Care Reform Proposal in the U.S. Congress Joseph Godfrey WinSet Group, Fairfax, Virginia, USA
Bernard Grofman Department of Political Science, University of California, Irvine, USA
1. Introduction Theories of lobbying differ considerably about which legislators are most likely to be lobbied by which types of interest groups. In particular, there is not agreement as to whether lobbyists will focus on those likely to be sympathetic to the interest group (their friends), or those likely to be unsympathetic to the interest group (their enemies). 1 Plausible arguments can be made in each direction. One lobbies one’s friends to offer information that will help them draft legislation and fend off criticism, and to remind them of past obligations and future payoffs (carrots); one lobbies one’s enemies because they need to be exposed to arguments and facts countervailing their most likely position, and to alert them that this is an important vote that will be remembered and might cost them the opposition of an interest group in future re-election efforts (sticks). However, regardless of disagreements about whether lobbying is likely to be directed primarily at an interest group’s friends or at its enemies, there does appear to be a high degree of consensus in the interest group literature on the proposition -- one with clear rational choice roots -- that major lobbying efforts by virtually all special interests will include swing voters likely to be pivotal. But, the interest group literature also identifies some complicating factors that are also relevant from a decision-theoretic perspective. For example, some legislators, e.g., those in positions of power, or those seen by their fellow legislators as particularly experienced or knowledgeable, may be more likely to be influential, and thus lobbying efforts di1
See Austen-Smith and Wright (1994, 1996), Baumgartner and Leech(1996a, 1996b).
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rected at them may have a more important impact on outcomes than lobbying directed toward ‘ordinary’ legislators, even if potentially pivotal ones. Also, some legislators may be seen as potentially more pliable than others. For example in the U.S. Senate, with six year terms, legislators up soon for re-election may have election concerns that make them more open to persuasion by interest groups offering either carrots or sticks than those whose next re-election campaign is further away. Also, in the Senate, it may make more sense for lobbyists with limited resources to focus their grassroots lobbying efforts to indirectly influence a Senator my mobilizing forces within his constituency of the Senators from small states. 2 In this essay we make no pretence to test the full range of competing theories of lobbying. Rather, we will focus on one simple hypothesis: that major lobbying efforts will be directed toward potentially pivotal legislators. Moreover, we will not use new data but instead rely almost entirely on data provided by Goldstein (1999) in his chapter looking at special interest lobbying activities on the Clinton 1993 Health Care reform proposal. 3 Goldstein (1999: Chapter 5) reviews lobbying activities and tracks changes in health care reform proposals as they move through Congress. Goldstein interviewed lobbyists on health care reform in 1993 representing a number of the special interest groups (SIGs) active in the debate. 4 Of these SIGs, 8 were pro Clinton’s plan and 13 were against. Trade associations broke down 7 to 1 against Clinton’s plan; and lobbies of individual corporations broke down 3 to 0 against. Ideologically defined groups broke down in the predicted fashion, with the 7 groups on the left in Goldstein’s sample being for the plan, and the 3 groups on the right being against it. 5 Bills concerning health care reform were considered in the House Ways and Means Committee, the House Energy and Commerce Committee, the House Education and Labor Committee, the Senate Finance Committee and the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. Because neither the Labor Committee in the House nor the Labor and Human Resources Committee in the Senate attracted much lobbying attention, 6 both Goldstein and we focus on the three remaining committees which were the focus of the most intense lobbying. 2 Goldstein (1999: 103) quotes a lobbyist on exactly this point: ‘[f]ifty small businessmen are more likely to influence [Senator] Max Baucus in Montana than a lot more than fifty small businessmen are going to influence [Senator] Moynihan in Manhattan.’ 3 Most of the book is on issues related to political participation that are outside the scope of this paper. Moreover the nature of its specialized focus means that the data collected is not ideal for present purposes. Nonetheless, his is the only empirical data set on lobbying activity with which we are familiar that allows us to investigate the usefulness of spatial power score ideas in studying lobbying efforts. 4 He also interviewed party leaders and key figures in Hilary Clinton’s health care taskforce. 5 Goldstein reports this information in Table 5.1, p. 75. Also see the discussion in his book immediately below and after this table. 6 See discussion below.
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For each of these three committees, Goldstein was able to learn which congressional legislators each SIG lobbied (either directly, or indirectly, through lobbying at the grassroots to generate communications with the legislator from his or her constituents). Goldstein also reports information on roll-call voting scores of the members on one standard index (ADA scores) provided by the liberal group, Americans for Democratic Action. This 0– 100 measure is commonly used as a measure of general ideology, with high values indicating liberalism and low values indicating conservatism. Even more importantly, for the period shortly after the Clinton proposal is unveiled, Goldstein reports data on how legislators on key committee are classified by one key lobbying group, the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) in terms of their sympathy for small business concerns. 7 He recodes NFIB data into a 5 point scale, with voters in the middle seen as potentially open to lobbying, while voters at the extremes are expected to vote for or against the Clinton proposal with near certainty. A combination of these two measures will allow us to identify which legislators on each of the three heavily lobbied committees were regarded as potential swing voters. 8 Goldstein (1999) makes a number of important contributions to our understanding of lobbying. 9 For present purposes, however, we will emphasize how his use of lobbying data on health care reform in the U.S. in 1993 leads to ways to test pivotal voter theory. First, Goldstein shows that the committees which attract attention from lobbyists are those where the lobbyists think that they might influence outcomes, and where they regard the outcome of the committee deliberations as likely to be influential on the floor. Goldstein estimates the first of these two factors by looking to see what proportion of the committee Democrats had already signed on as co-sponsors of the Clinton bill, since the partisan climate at the time was such that no Republican in any of these committees was a co-sponsor of the Clinton proposal. Goldstein estimates the second of these two factors by comparing the ADA scores of the Democratic majority in each committee with the position of the overall floor median. His argument, which we find persuasive, is that, given how closely divided the two 7 This issue played itself out in the Clinton health care debate primarily in terms of so-called employer mandates, i.e., requirements that employers provide some kind of health care insurance for their employees. At issue was how large a firm would have to be in order to be subject to this mandate, and whether requirements for firms would vary with firm size. 8 In particular, we combine the information from ADA and NFIB roll-call measures to develop a two-dimensional representation of the legislative space. While the full NFIB scale is a 100 point scale; since only five values occur, at these are at equal intervals apart, it is straightforward to recast that scale as a five point scale. The correlation between the original scale and the recoded scale is 1.0. 9 In general, Goldstein’s chapter on Clinton’s health care proposal focuses on the role of grass roots lobbying, i.e., on the mobilization of constituents by interest groups to influence legislators, a form of indirect lobbying by interest groups.
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chambers were along party lines, and the degree of partisan and ideological polarization around the issue of health care reform, and the great importance and huge potential costs attached to this issue, only proposals close to the views of the median floor voter had any real chance of passage. Goldstein finds that two of the five committees considering health care reform, the Labor Committee in the House and the Labor and Human Resources Committee in the Senate, with ADA means of 87 and 85 for their Democrat members, were somewhat further to the left of the overall floor median than was true for Democrats on the three committee which were the subject of major lobbying efforts (an ADA mean of 77.8). 10 Also, these two labor committees had a much higher proportion of committee Democrats who were already co-sponsors (i.e., introducing signators) of the Clinton bill (53% for Senate Labor and Human Resources, 54% for House Education and Labor, compared to a mean of 30% for the other three committees), thus making the outcome of the vote in the former committees mostly foregone. 11 The combination of these factors leads him to expect that the two labor committees will not be the targets for extensive lobbying, and this is exactly what he finds. Of the 21 SIGs about which Goldstein has data, 15 of 21 lobby House Ways and Means Committee, 16 the House Energy and Commerce Committee, 20 the Senate Finance Committee, but only 4 lobby the House Education and Labor Committee and only 5 of 21 lobby the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. Second, Goldstein’s study of the 21 SIGs reveals that they primarily focus on legislators whom they see as swing voters. For example, he finds that 16 of the 21 special interests groups about whom he gathers data (67%) claim to focus their attention on the ‘undecided’ legislators. 12 Moreover, within each of the three more heavily lobbied committees, when we calculate the correlations between NFIB scores and SIG lobbying efforts directed at individual legislators within that committee, 13 we get very substantial values: .84, 0.81, and 0.70, for the Senate Finance Committee, the House Ways and Means Committee, and the House Energy and Commerce Committee, respectively. 14 10
These differences are statistically significant. See Goldstein (1999: 80, Table 5.3). 12 Of the remaining 5 groups, 3 focus attention on legislators who are already on their side, and 2 on opponents (see Goldstein 1999: 84, Table 5.5). 13 Since NFIB scores were on a scale of 1 to 5, to obtain this correlation we have subtracted the extremism of NFIB ratings (defined as absolute value (NFIB-3)) from 2 to give us a scale which runs from 0 to 2, with 2 indicating maximum centrality. At the level of lobbying groups, SIG values were coded as dummies in that either a committee member was lobbied (coded as one) or s/he was not (coded as zero) . The value for each legislator is simply the sum of his/her scores across the 21 SIGs. 14 Although Goldstein reports various kinds of numerical data, he does not do any form of statistical analysis on his data other than simple tabulations. Thus, these correlations were created by the present authors. 11
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In this paper we build on Goldstein’s work. We see the original contributions of this paper as five-fold: First, we make use of both ADA scores and NFIB roll-call voting scores to locate the Senators and House members on the three most lobbied committees in a two-dimensional policy space which captures, in an a priori fashion, their likely attitudes toward health care reform rather than using one or the other of these measures in isolation from one another. ADA scores may be taken as a rough proxy for the dimension of health care reform that had to do with the role of government in administering the program., e.g., should it be privately administered or should it look more like Medicare, the so-called single-payer option. NFIB scores may be taken as a rough proxy for a slightly different health care reform issue having to do with employer mandates, i.e., how much of the burden of health care insurance would be passed on to employers, and where would the threshold be set in terms of firm size to determine which firms must contribute to the health care insurance costs of their employees. While attitudes on these dimensions tended to be strongly correlated, the correlation was not perfect. Second, we calculate for each committee member the spatial analogue of the well-known Shapley value of pivotal power, the Shapley-Owen value (Owen and Shapley 1989). As far as we are aware, this is the first attempt to calculate Shapley-Owen values for real-world legislative data. 15 Third, we compare the Shapley-Owen calculations of pivotal power to which legislators on these committees were actually lobbied. We illustrate that, while NFIB scores and Shapley-Owen scores generally agree for legislators who appear centrally placed in the policy space, they can differ substantially for outliers in our two-dimensional representation, i.e., legislators who are high in their NFIB rating but low on ADA, or conversely. 16 We also find that lobbyists systematically neglect the legislators located at the fringes of the space that our game-theoretic calculations nonetheless identify as pivotal. Fourth, we test the usefulness of Shapley-Owen scores by looking to see whether legislators missed by unidimensional analysis, but identified as pivotal by their Shapley-Owen scores, behave differently in their voting behavior from those potentially pivotal legislators whom lobbyists did 15
Work in the 1950s for the RAND Corporation by Lloyd Shapley uses an earlier variant of the Shapley index to understand voting patterns in the U.S. Supreme Court; Grofman et al. (1987) calculate Shapley-Owen values in their reanalyses of experimental committee voting games run by economists and others, and examine from a mathematical perspective the connections between Shapley-Owen scores and the social choice solution concept, the Copeland winner; Feld and Grofman (1990) look at the mathematical link between Shapley-Owen values and another social choice concept, the yolk (Mckelvey 1986). 16 While the two measures are very highly correlated, the correlations are not perfect. For examples for the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee, the correlations are 0.94 and 0.79, respectively. Thus, we can identify outliers who are high on one score and low on the other, or vice versa.
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identify and target. Some legislators whom we identify as pivotal but who were left out of lobbying efforts were, in fact, less likely to vote for final passage of the bill within the committee (in the two committees where a bill was reported out) than the highly pivotal legislators identified by more conventional means of analysis who were lobbied. Thus, we argue that lobbyists missed viewing as important, and hence failed to influence, some potentially pivotal legislators whom a two-dimensional perspective using Shapley-Owen scores based both on sympathy to the NFIB position and generalized ideological location could have allowed us to identify. But we also recognize that the small sample and limitations of our data do not allow us to fully test this claim. Fifth and finally, we look at another solution concept, the Copeland winner and show how it can be applied to legislative data. The Copeland winner is the location which can defeat the most other alternatives in paired competition (Straffin 1980). We make use of Shapley-Owen calculations to determine the location of the Copeland winner. 17 The Copeland winner can be viewed as the alternative that is closest to a majority rule core (i.e., majority undominated) outcome in the committee voting space. Thus, it can be taken to be an a priori prediction of where the committee consensus will emerge in a majority rule setting. For the two committees we look at who did report out a bill, we take the location of the Copeland winner as a plausible estimate of the location of the reported bill. In the next section of the paper we briefly review the notion of pivotal power and show, in a relatively intuitive way, how Shapley-Owen scores can be calculated. Then, in the succeeding section we apply the Shapley-Owen measure. First we show the 1993 locations of the members of the three committees on which interest group lobbying efforts were concentrated (the Senate Finance Committee, the House Ways and Means Committee, and the House Energy and Commerce Committee) in the two-dimensional policy space defined by ADA scores and NFIB evaluations. Then, for each of the three committees, we look at measures of lobbying activity vis-a- vis Clinton health care reform proposals, and then we test the pivotal legislator theory of lobbying efforts, and compare what happened in the committee to the prediction based on the location of the Copeland winner.
2. Calculating the Shapley-Owen Value for Senate Committees A standard game-theoretic approach to calculating the power of individual voters or blocs of voters in situations involving voting is to determine the 17
Owen and Shapley (1989; see also Grofman et al. 1987) show that, in spatial voting games, the Copeland winner (also known as the strong point) can be calculated from the policy locations and Shapley-Owen values of the voters. In particular, the strong point can be expressed as a weighted average of the voter ideal points, where each voter ideal point is weighted by that voter’s Shapley-Owen power score.
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expected proportion of time that a given voter or bloc can be expected to be pivotal or decisive on the outcome. For example, in Shapley’s (1953) approach the power of a voter (or bloc) is calculated by looking at the likelihood that a voter (or bloc) will put a given coalition ‘over the top,’ by converting a losing coalition to a winning one as a result of his joining the coalition. Game-theoretic measures of a priori power such as the Shapley value or the Banzhaf index make strongly simplifying assumptions about feasible coalitions in voting situations. The Banzhaf index assumes all combinations of actors are equally likely, while the Shapley value takes all permutations of voters to be equally likely. There have been a number of attempts to build in to power calculations more realistic assumptions about which coalitions are likely to arise. The most interesting of these for our purposes is the Shapley-Owen value. 18 The Shapley-Owen value applies to spatial voting games, i.e., to games where voters and alternatives can be regarded as points in some multidimensional issue or policy space. It estimates the proportion of times that a given actor (or bloc) will be pivotal as we consider possible ‘lines of choice’ in the space. While all choice lines are posited to be equally likely, this does not mean that all coalitions are equally likely. Rather, coalitions involving voters who are ‘central’ to the policy space are going to be more likely, and thus voters who are central are going to have greater pivotal power -- where centrality is a concept that an be defined in a quite precise way. We can illustrate the calculations for a simple three voter example. Consider three (equally weighted) voters, \1,2,3^ , located in a twodimensional space, whose axes we have labelled ‘guns’ and ‘butter’ simply for illustrative purposes. Each voter’s bliss point, represented by a black dot, represents that voter’s preferred combination of spending on guns and butter, respectively. We assume Euclidean distance, so that voters prefer points (i.e., combinations of spending on guns and butter) closer to them to points further away. Imagine that the choice is between two spending alternatives, A and B, which are located somewhere on the line we have labeled ‘choice line 1’ (or located, for that matter, on any line that is parallel to that line: by symmetry we will need to look at only one line in any given direction, since the results we get will be the same for all parallel lines). We can project the voter ideal points onto this choice line by dropping perpendiculars from the voters to the line. It is easy to see that, under the given assumptions, if voters are restricted to choices on this line, the voter i will prefer his projection on this line to any other point on the line, and will prefer points on the line closer to his projection to points on the line further away. 19 We can also identify the median voter on this line. 18
What was to become the Shapley-Owen index in its present form is introduced in Grofman et al. (1987), reporting work of which Guillermo Owen is the author. 19 See e.g. Feld and Grofman (1987).
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Choice line 2
Choice line 3 1
Choice line 1 3 Pivot point p 2
Butter
Fig. 1.
Illustrative three voter example of Shapley-Owen calculations
The location of the two alternatives determines the angle of the choice line. Without loss of generality, because outcomes on all parallel lines are identical, we can consider only choice lines that pass through pivot point p. Looking at Fig. 1 we see that voter 1 is median on choice line 1, since that voter’s projection is the median projection onto the line. But, on choice line 2, it is apparent that voter 2 is the median voter; while on choice line 3, it is voter 3 who is median. But, by Black’s theorem on single-peaked preferences (Black 1958), if voting is by simple majority, we know that on any given line it is the median voter who will be the pivotal voter. The simple intuition behind the Shapley-Owen value is to figure out the proportion of choice lines on which each voter will be median, and thus pivotal. That proportion is their Shapley-Owen value. To obtain this value we consider all angles in the space, and identify which voter is median on each. The measure of those angles (normalized so that the sum across all voters is one) is the voter’s Shapley-Owen value. In a triangle the Shapley-Owen values have a particularly simple form. Each voter’s Shapley-Owen value is simply the arc of the triangle subtended by that voter, normalized by dividing by 180 degrees. Thus, in the three voter case, a voter who is located at an obtuse angle is more powerful (more likely to be pivotal) than a voter who is located at an acute angle. In general, Shapley-Owen values are calculated by finding the star angles associated with each voter, which are the angles within whose range the voter is median. 20 20 For further details see Godfrey (2005) who provides a computer algorithm for calculating Shapley-Owen values for two dimensional spatial voting games based on the theorems in Owen and Shapley (1989). For readers familiar with Krehbiel’s 1998 book, Pivotal Politics, we would note that the idea of pivotal power based on spatial Shapley-Owen values can be thought of as
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3. Three Case Studies In President Clinton’s first term, due to spiraling health care costs and increasing numbers of citizens who lacked medical coverage, and the trigger of Harris Wofford’s upset victory in a special election in Pennsylvania for the U.S. Senate in which he had made health care reform the cornerstone of his campaigning, health care reform became a major priority for the Democrats (Skocpol 1996; Goldstein 1999: 72–73; Hacker 1999). A task force spearheaded by Hillary Rodham Clinton offered an innovative (and complex) scheme that made use of what was called ‘managed competition,’ involving the creation of dozens of new health care entities from among whom voters would choose. While there were multiple policy choices which needed to be made in crafting health care reform, one way to think about the choices confronting Congress in a simple fashion is to consider Clinton’s plan as a compromise between the Republican approach, which was to allow the private market to handle health care, and the approach of the most liberal Democrats, which was to adopt some variant of the Canadian single payer scheme with government regulating and financing of at least some elements of universal health care. Presidential supporters introduced bills into both Houses of Congress that were reported to committee. However, as noted earlier, in neither chamber was the committee assignment unique. In the House, bills were assigned to the Ways and Means Committee, and the Energy and Commerce Committee, and the Education and Labor Committees; in the Senate, bills were assigned for markup to both the Senate Finance Committee and the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, 21 The chairs of the House committees were Dan Rostenkowski, John Dingell, and William Ford, respectively; the chairs of the Senate committees were Daniel Moynihan, and Ted Kennedy, respectively. The failure of Clinton health care reform has been a topic much written about, including at least two book length studies (Skocpol 1996; Hacker 1999). The defeat of the Clinton Health Care reform initiative within Congress was a major watershed in the Clinton presidency, with ramifications that continue to this day in terms of still unaddressed issues involving health care costs and accessibility, and in terms of consequences for voter perceptions about Democrats competence to craft and implement policies in the public interest. the natural extension of ideas of pivotality based on unidimensional party competition. But we will not attempt to directly relate our work on lobbying to Krehbiel’s attempts to model the conditions for legislative gridlock and the breaking thereof. That topic we must reserve for a future paper. The algorithm reported by Godfrey measures star angles with a finite precision. Hence the computed Shapely Owen values are not exact. The Shapely-Owen values reported in this paper have a precision of about 0.005. 21 For present purposes we will not look at the (internal) political considerations that led to multiple referrals in each chamber .
National Federation of Independent Businesses
Joseph Godfrey and Bernard Grofman
Americans for Democratic Action (reversed)
Fig. 2.
US Congress – 103rd Session, 1993–94 (House/Finance/*)
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Americans for Democratic Action (reversed)
Fig. 3.
US Congress – 103rd Session, 1993–94 (House/Ways and Means/*)
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Americans for Democratic Action (reversed)
Fig. 4.
US Congress – 103rd Session, 1993–94 (House/Energy and Commerce/*)
Here we will draw largely from Goldstein’s study of the 1993-94 struggle within these various congressional committees to shape a health care reform package that could pass Congress. That study focuses heavily on the role of grass roots lobbying, and our own research will be limited to the topic of the choices made be lobbying organizations as to which legislators to target for grassroots lobbying activity. The issue of why Clinton’s proposals went down to defeat is of only incidental interest in this paper, and we will discuss the contents of alternative proposals only in passing. While we do identify lobbying targets that were missed, and Goldstein suggests ways of crafting bills that might have attracted broader legislative support, it is clear that, as Goldstein observes (1999: 74): ‘Lobbying efforts in general, and grass roots tactics in particular, alone, cannot explain the demise of the Clinton plan. Some of the credit – or blame – must go to an overreaching plan devised in secret, a divided Democratic party, a determined Republican opposition, and a problemplagued presidency.’ As noted earlier, Goldstein separately used ADA scores and NFIB scores as proxies for legislator’s likely attitudes toward health care reform. As shown in Figs. 2–4, using ADA and NFIB roll call voting evaluations, we can construct a two dimensional plot of legislator positions for the members of the three congressional committees considering health care reform which
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were the main targets of lobbying activity. For each committee member, we show locations on the ADA and NFIB dimension and indicate the ShapleyOwen value (decimal) of each member. In addition, information about the level of lobbying activities of the special interest groups involved with health care issues, for which Goldstein has collected data, is also shown in the figures. Associated with each legislator is the number of firms (out of 21 interviewed by Goldstein) that mobilized for the legislator. Several things should be obvious from those figures. First, since ADA and NFIB scores are correlated, member positions fall largely along a diagonal in the two-dimensional space. Second, once we identify party, it is apparent that, by and large, Democrats and Republicans are located in different portions of the space. In particular, Democrats are in the lower left (low ADA, low NFIB) and Republicans in the upper right (high ADA, high NFIB). Third, as previously suggested, we see that most of the lobbying was concentrated on committee members located in the middle of the NFIB scale, i.e., located in a vertical swath toward the center of each of the figures. Indeed, legislators located at one far extreme or the other of the NFIB scale were essentially never contacted by special interest group lobbyists. Thus, we see strong support for the notion that lobbying will be largely devoted to voters seen as potentially pivotal. However, there are some puzzling anomalies. For example, in the data for the Senate Finance Committee shown in Fig. 2 we see that Senators Danforth and Durenberger are not lobbied, despite their being within the vertical swath of heavily lobbied Senators. 22 Fourth, while high Shapley-Owen scores are by and large found for members whose location is near the center of the unit square shown for each of the four committees, and low Shapley-Owen scores are largely found in members whose location is far away from the center of the unit square, this relationship is far from perfect. In other words, using the Shapley-Owen measure of voting power, we obtain some counterintuitive notions of which members are most likely to be pivotal. For example, in Fig. 2, consider Senators Rockefeller and Prior. With Shapley-Owen values of 0.06 they are almost as pivotal as the centrally located Senator Breaux, with an Shapley-Owen score of 0.08. The lack of good fit between lobbying levels and member’s ShapleyOwen power scores is demonstrated by the fact that correlation between the two are very far from perfect. For the Senate Finance Committee, the Pearson correlation between Shapley-Owen values and SIG lobbying efforts is only 0.26; in the House Ways and Means Committee it is 0.54 , and in the House Energy and Commerce Committee it is 0.51. Recall, however, that the corresponding correlations for an NFIB-based measure of centrality 22 One other anomaly in Fig. 2, the lobbying attention devoted to Senator Moynihan, can be explained simply by recalling that he was then committee chair.
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were 0.84, 0.81, and 0.70. Thus, if we were simply interested in making a priori predictions of which legislators in each of these three committees would be lobbied, then we would have been better off looking not to the Shapley-Owen measures but to our constructed measure of NFIB centrality. 23 Still, the question remains: ‘Does the fault lie with the ShapleyOwen value for failing to be a good indicator of pivotal power, 24 or does the fault lie with lobbyists who wrongly neglected some critical members of the committee whom they should have lobbied?’ In the remainder of this section we will turn our attention to this issue of optimal lobbying by looking at proposals within the three committees and at what type of bill emerged (or did not emerge) from each. In particular, we look at who supported the final bill as a function of their location in the two-dimensional space, their Shapley-Owen value, and whether or not they were lobbied. 25 We will also look at the relationship between the Copeland winner and our estimated location of committee outcomes.
3.1 Senate Finance Committee In the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Moynihan, while personally favoring a government-sponsored health plan, believed that for the health bill to survive a filibuster on the Senate floor bipartisan support was required. He therefore worked to amend the bill in such a way as to attract moderate Republicans. He did so by removing certain language offensive to small business interests (rewriting the section on employer mandates referred to earlier). In the Senate Finance Committee, as shown in Fig. 5, there were 12 yes votes and 8 no votes on final passage, with 2 Republicans and 10 Democrats voting yes, and 7 Republicans and 1 Democrat voting no. Fig. 5 shows voter locations (the same as given in Fig. 2) and votes on final passage of the bill reported out by the committee. The figure also gives our estimate of the location of the amended proposal, namely the Copeland winner (shown as a circle containing a dot). If we look at who voted yes on final passage, in addition to the usual suspects, i.e., the Democrats located in the bottom right hand corner of Fig. 2, 23 However, if we look to ADA centrality we get a more mixed comparison. For example, for the House Energy and Commerce Committee outperforms the Shapley-Owen measure in predicting who will be lobbied, since the correlation between ADA centrality, measured as twice (fifty minus absolute value (ADA score -50)) is 0.63, higher than the corresponding value of 0.51 for the Shapley-Owen correlation. But for the House Ways and Means Committee the advantage goes in the other direction (0.54 for the Shapley-Owen measure but only 0.35 for the ADA measure). 24 Alternatively, does the fault lie with the way in which we operationalized our construction of the Shapley-Owen values? 25 In some instances we also look at idiosyncratic factors identified by Goldstein (1999), or in other research on the 1993–94 struggle for health care reform, that may have influenced the votes of particular Representatives or Senators.
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Fig. 5.
US Congress – 103rd Session, 1993–94 (Senate/Finance/*)
we see unexpected yes votes from Republican Senators Chafee and Danforth, only the former of whom was subject to substantial SIG lobbying, but who each may have been persuaded to vote yes by the changes in the bill made by Senator Moynihan. We also see an unexpected no vote from a Democrat, Kent Conrad, who was also heavily lobbied; but the other two most heavily lobbied Democrats, Sen. Baucus and Senator Breaux, voted with their party. Senator Durenberger, who voted with his party and against the bill, would have seemed to have been, given the final coalition, a possible yes vote that was lost. Senator Durenberger was not up for immediate re-election, so, while having an exceptionally high Shapley-Owen value, the fact that he was not lobbied vindicates Goldstein’s claim that SIGs believe their (grassroots) lobbying efforts will have relatively little influence on Senators who will not soon face the voters, and so expend their resources elsewhere. We regard this as a mistake. Senator Conrad, on the other hand, was up for re-election, and was heavily targeted. Given that his location in the two-dimensional configuration would appear to predispose him to join his fellow Democrats, he is a real anomaly. 26 Another anomaly is that Boren and Bradley were Democ26
Oppositional lobbying seems remarkably efficacious in its effects on Senator Conrad’s vote unless, for some reason, it was unidirectional and he was never lobbied by the pro-Clinton side. Because, for confidentiality reasons, we do know which lobby groups lobbied which legis-
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ratic senators who were subject to comparable levels of lobbying, despite the fact that their high Shapley-Owen scores suggested that only one was likely to prove influential; both, however, voted with the vast bulk of their fellow party members, to accept the Moynihan compromise. Given the observed votes, the maximum likelihood axis of cleavage is one that runs from around (0, 90) to around (100, 70). Such an axis is the line that minimizes the number of mistaken predictions. Only Senator Conrad would be mispredicted, although both Senators Chafee and Durenberger would be very close to the edge of our hypothesized line of cleavage – and thus natural targets for lobbying if this were realized. If we draw in such a line of cleavage, given our estimate of the location of the amended version of the bill, we can identify the hypothetical location of the status quo as the reflection of that point through the axis of cleavage, by dropping a perpendicular from our estimate of the location of the amended version of the bill to the our estimated line of cleavage and extending the perpendicular the same distance above the line as the amended bill is below the line. We would also observe that the location of the Copeland winner that we have calculated from the Shapley-Owen values of the legislators using the Shapley-Owen approach is not very far from where we believe (impressionistically) the final amended bill in the committee to lie.
3.2 House Ways and Means Committee Next we consider the House Ways and Means committee. This committee experienced some turnover during the markup process due to legal difficulties faced by its chairman, Democratic Congressman Dan Rostenkowski, that led to his resignation as chair, but nothing that fundamentally affects our analysis. The vote on final passage was along party lines with all but four Democrats voting YES and all Republicans voting NO. Looking at Fig. 6, we see that the noticeable anomalies among the Democrats are Reps. Andrews, Hoagland and McDermott, who voted no; and Lewis who voted yes. Andrews and Hoagland would seem to be Democrats on the cusp, the first of whom the Democrats may have lost to heavy lobbying, but the other of whom was not heavily lobbied despite his substantial Shapley-Owen score. Rep. Brewer, the other Democratic no vote is a relatively conservative legislator, who looks only somewhat more moderate than a Republican. 27 Thus, perhaps, his vote is not that inexplicable. He, too, was subject to heavy lobbying (see Fig. 3). Rep. Lewis voted yes from a position that would seem to augur for a no vote, but he is African-American, and a well known liberal and loyal Democratic, so his vote may not be that surprising. lators, we cannot resolve that issue. 27 Rep. Payne, a Democrat, with a similar location, voted yes instead of no.
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Fig. 6.
US Congress – 103rd Session, 1993–94 (House/Ways and Means/*)
Rep. McDermott, however, voted no from a position that would seem to augur for a yes vote. Trying to make sense of the voting choice of Rep. McDermott suggests that the assumption of ordinary (Euclidean) distance may not always be appropriate. According to Goldstein, McDermott insisted on a heavily subsidized public health issuance plan and would settle for absolutely nothing less. However, he did not get his desired changes, something not that surprising given what would appear to his limited bargaining power, with a Shapley-Owen value of only 0.007. Insistent on his position, he voted NO. 28 Perhaps, however, the most peculiar vote of all is that of Rep. Coyne, a Republican, who although a co-sponsor of the original bill, voted against the committee version. Still, based on his spatial location and his party, it would seem that the anomaly is not having him vote no on final passage, but having him as a sponsor of the bill in the first place. Another anomaly has to do with lobbying activities. Rep. Coyne and Rep. 28 We do not attempt to account for the apparent special nature of Rep. McDermott’s utility function in the present analysis. We might also note a bargaining game that went the other way despite the relatively low Shapley-Owen bargaining power of the representative (0.041) was that involving Rep. Payne. He was from Virginia, a major tobacco growing state, and objected to certain tax provisions against tobacco in the bill. In exchange for removing those provisions he supported the amended bill.
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Lewis each had very high Shapley-Owen scores relative to the rest of the committee, yet neither was lobbied. Both were cross-pressured in terms of NFIB and ADA score locations (high on each). Representative Lewis voted yes; Representative Coyne voted no. If we assume that a YES vote is the default option for Democrats, then the failure by either proponents or opponents to lobby him to any great degree might not appear to matter that much. Yet, certainly, it would seem from our analysis that there was at least some potential for Representative Lewis to vote NO. Moreover, given Lewis’ Shapley-Owen score, it would have seemed that he should have been an influential player in working out compromises, yet the failure to lobby him would seem to have made that less likely. As for Representative Coyne, the failure to lobby him seems quite clear in that, while he co-sponsored the original bill, a signal of interest in finding a solution to health care problems, he ultimately voted NO! When we look at the Copeland winner in the House Ways and Means Committee and compare it to our (impressionalistically) estimated location of the final amended bill reported out of the committee we find the two to be quite close. However, if we now try to locate an axis of cleavage that will (optimally) separate the legislators into YES and No voters, we find ourselves making more mistakes in absolute numbers, but not in percentage terms, than we did when we considered the Senate Finance Committee. The most plausible possibility is a slightly upward sloping line, from roughly (0, 30) to roughly (100, 55). With that hypothesized axis of cleavage, Reps. Lewis, Pane and McDermott would be erroneously classified and Rep. Jackson would be very close to the cusp.
3.3 House Energy and Commerce Committee The Energy and Commerce committee was one in which the chairman, Rep. Dingle, wanting to push through the health bill with minimal markup, was unable to gain much cooperation. An analysis based on Shapley-Owen values makes the challenge facing Dingle particularly clear. We see from Fig. 4 that Reps. Boucher and Lehman have the same ideal point, each receiving an Shapley-Owen value of 0.306. Between the two them they have 0.612 of the total value. 29 To report the bill unchanged, Dingle would have had to ask Boucher and Lehman to give up a considerable amount of utility, i.e., to support a proposal far from their preferences. And he would still have had Reps. Slattery and Cooper to persuade, whose pivotalness would be strengthened if Reps. Boucher and Lehman shifted position. 29
There are some problems applying our computer algorithm to this committee; because it is an even-numbered committee with many members sharing the same ideal point. However, after experimenting with minor adjustments of ideal points to avoid the compounding of coincidence errors, Boucher and Lehman continue to command well over 60% of the game value. So qualitatively, at least, the representation given in the test is accurate.
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According to our analyses of Shapley-Owen values and policy locations, for Rep. Dingle to insist on reporting out the original bill from his committee with minimal markup was a doomed strategy. The best Dingle could have hoped to accomplish was to ask Reps. Boucher and Lehman to mark up the bill to their satisfaction (perhaps asking them to consult with Slattery and Schenk to draw the ideal point of the proposal more toward the Democratic corner). Had Rep. Dingle, in essence, delegated mark-up to Reps. Boucher and Lehman, the result would have been a bill whose ideal point matched fairly closely the corresponding bills reported by Senate Finance and the House Ways and Means committees, Instead not surprisingly from our analysis, due to internal disagreement, no bill was reported out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.
3.4 Congress as a Whole The impasse in the House Energy and Commerce Committee was an augur for a breakdown of the usual legislative process, since the House Energy and Commerce Committee was widely (and correctly) regarded as a good mirror of the House. In part because of the failure of the House Energy and Commerce Committee to report out a bill, the House leadership asked the Senate to work on the health care reform issue before ordering a floor vote on any health care reform proposal in the House. The Senate Democratic leadership, presumably operating at the behest of President Clinton, chose to disregard the bill reported by the Senate Finance Committee and restored the provisions Senator. Moynihan had, through compromise removed. But the Senate Finance committee was a very good mirror of the Senate as a whole. Thus, ignoring the political information encoded in the Finance committee’s bill was to generate a bill that lacked adequate support. . The Senate Democratic leadership, in effect, followed Rep. Dingle in refusing to compromise and the decided not to allow forward a proposal that they knew would fail to pass on the floor. The result was a stillborn bill in the Senate that, combined with dissensus in the House, ensured the defeat of the Clinton health initiative.
4. Discussion: Pivotal Power Matters There are two issues raised by our work. The first has to do with how well SO value matches interest group lobbying behavior. Here we find (using regression analysis) that the SO value calculations do about as well in predicting who is lobbied as the two types of roll-call scores do when each is taken separately. However, there is also a strong normative component to our work. Here, deviations from the expectations generated by ShapleyOwen scores suggest sub-optimal lobbying choices by special interest
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groups. For example, Rep. Dingle’s disregard of the pivotal power of some members of his committee, is caught by our analysis. This disregard arguably made political compromise about health care impossible in his committee, which in turn was a factor in the breakdown of the political process in the House. Similarly, failing to recognize the need for political compromises about health care reform, the Senate Democratic leadership threw out the information from the bargaining done in the Senate Finance committee. That, too, was a committee that well mirrored the overall Senate, and thus one whose negotiated compromises might have been the basis for majority agreement. In sum, failure to recognize such political realities that Shapley-Owen analyses can capture, and the concomitant inability to compromise, led the Clinton health care initiative to a defeat that had far reaching political implications for the Democratic Party.
Acknowledgements Research support to pursue this research came from the Center for the Study of Democracy at the University of California
References Austen-Smith D. and Wright, J. (1994) Counteractive Lobbying, American Journal of Political Science 38: 25–44. Austen-Smith D. and Wright J. (1996) Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying, American Journal of Political Science 40: 543–564. Baumgartner, F.R. and Leech, B.L. (1996a) The Multiple Ambiguities of ‘Counteractive Lobbying’, American Journal of Political Science 40: 521–542. Baumgartner, F.R. and Leech, B.L. (1996b) Good Theories Deserve Good Data, American Journal of Political Science 40: 565–569. Black, D (1958) The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge University Press. Feld, S.L. and Grofman B. (1987) Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial Voting Games: An Intuitive Geometric Approach, American Journal of Political Science 32: 709–728. Feld, S.L. Grofman, B. (1990) A Theorem Connecting Shapley-Owen Power Scores and the Rof the Yolk in Two Dimensions, Social Choice and Welfare 7: 71–74. Goldstein, K.M. (1999) Interest Groups, Lobbying and Participation in America, Cambridge University Press. Grofman, B., et. al. (1987) Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context, American Political Science Review 81: 539–553. Hacker, J.S. (1999) The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton’s Plan for Health Security, Princeton University Press. Krehbiel, K. (1998) Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking, University of Chicago Press. McKelvey, R. D. (1986) Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice, American Journal of Political Science 30: 283–314. Owen, G. (1995) Game Theory (3rd ed.), Academic Press.
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Owen, G. and Shapley, L.S. (1989) Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space, International Journal of Game Theory 18: 125–142, 339–356. Shapley, L.S. (1953) A Value for n-Person Games, in H. W. Kuhn and A. Tucker (eds.) Contributions to the Theory of Games, II. Annals of Mathematical Studies 28, Princeton University Press. Skocpol, T. (1996) Boomerang, Norton. Straffin, P.D. (1980) Topics in the Theory of Voting, Birkhauser.
9. Coalition Formation Theories Revisited: An Empirical Investigation of Aumann’s Hypothesis Vincent C.H. Chua School of Economics, Singapore Management University, Singapore
Dan S. Felsenthal Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Israel
1. Introduction In one of the earliest attempts to examine the effect of a priori voting power on actual political phenomena, Riker (1959) looked at changes in party affiliation in the French National Assembly in 1953–54, and used these data to test the hypothesis that deputies who switched parties were seeking thereby to increase their a priori voting power. His findings were negative, or at best inconclusive. In his paper Riker used the voting power index proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954) – which was the only measure of a priori voting power known to him at that time. 1 By now there is a large body of literature applying considerations of a priori voting power to political institutions such as the UN, the US Congress, the US Presidential Electoral College, the US Supreme Court and its rulings on the implementation of the ‘Equal Protection’ clause in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution; and of course numerous writings on voting-power considerations in the European Union. But, as far as we know, it took 36 years after Riker’s paper was published before someone has followed Riker's lead in suggesting that the formation (or dissolution) of political coalitions should be examined from the viewpoint of a priori voting power, and using for this purpose the Shapley-Shubik (S-S) index. 2 That 1
Indeed, Riker refers to it throughout – beginning with the paper's title – as ‘the power index’. As a matter of fact, L.S. Penrose (1946) had proposed another measure of a priori voting power; but it did not become widely known until it was reinvented by Banzhaf (1965) after whom it is generally named. For further details see Felsenthal and Machover (1998). 2 Felsenthal and Machover (2000) argue that Riker’s (1959) use of the S-S index is unsuit-
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someone was the renowned game theorist (and the 2005 Nobel laureate in Economics), Robert J. Aumann. On 30 June 1995 Eric van Damme conducted an interview with Aumann on the state of the art in game theory. One of the practical applications of game theory mentioned by Aumann in this interview was the use of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953; Shapley and Shubik, 1954) as an algorithm for predicting which governmental coalition is likely to form. Here are some relevant excerpts from this interview (cf. van Damme, 1997: 11–13; van Damme 1998: 184–87): Q: From these examples, can one draw some lessons about the type of situations in which one can expect game theory to work in applications? A: What one needs for game theory to work, in the sense of making verifiable (and falsifiable!) predictions, is that the situation be structured. … For years I have been predicting the government that will form in Israel once the composition of the Israeli parliament is known after an election. That is a structured situation, with set rules. The parliament has 120 seats. Each party gets a number of seats in proportion to the votes it got in the election. To form a government a coalition of 61 members of parliament is required. The president starts by choosing someone to initiate the coalition formation process. (Usually, but not necessarily, this ‘leader’ is the representative of the largest party in parliament.) The important point is that the process of government formation is a structured situation to which you can apply a theory. … For instance, in the governmental majority matter, one can set up a parliament as a simple game in the sense of Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s cooperative game theory, where we model the party as a player; we get a coalitional worth function that attributes to a coalition the worth 1 when it has a majority and the worth 0 otherwise. And then one can work out what the Shapley values are; 3 the structure is there, it is clear, and one can make predictions. Now there are all kinds of things that are ignored by this kind of procedure, but one can go out and make predictions. Then, if the predictions turn out correct, you know that you were right to ignore what you ignored. … Q: In this example of coalition formation, you make predictions using an algorithm that involves the Shapley value. Suppose you show me the data and your prediction comes out correct. I might respond by saying that I don’t understand what is going on. Why does it work? Why is the Shapley value related to coalition formation? Is it by accident or is it your intuition, or is it suggested by theory? A: There are two answers to that. First, certainly this is an intuition that arises from able in this context. However, they agreed that for the purpose of testing Aumann’s hypothesis the employment of the S-S index was probably more suitable than using the Penrose measure. See footnote 4. 3 In the context of simple voting games the ‘Shapley value’ is usually referred to as the ‘Shapley–Shubik (S-S) index’.
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understanding the theory. The idea that the Shapley value does represent power comes from theory. Second, for good science it is not important that you understand it right off the bat. What is important, in the first instance is that it is correct, that it works. If it works, then that in itself tells us that the Shapley value is relevant. Let me explain this a little more precisely. The theory that I am testing is very simple, almost naïve. It is that the leader – the one with the initiative – tries to maximize the influence of his party within the government. So, one takes each possible government that he can form and one looks at the Shapley value of his party within the government; the intuition is that this is a measure of the power of his party within the government. 4 This maximization is a nontrivial exercise. If you make the government too small, let’s say you put together a coalition government that is just a bare majority with 61 members of [the Israeli] parliament – a minimal winning coalition – then it is clear that any party in the coalition can bring down the government by leaving. Therefore, all the parties in the government have the same Shapley value. So the hypothesis is that a wise leader won’t do that. That is also quite intuitive, that such a government is unstable, and it finds its expression in a low Shapley value for the leader. On the other hand, too large a coalition is also not good, since then the leader doesn’t have sufficient punch in the government; that also finds its expression in the Shapley value. Consequently, the hypothesis that the leader aims to maximize his Shapley value seems a reasonable hypothesis to test, and it works not badly. It works not badly, but by no means a hundred percent. For example, the current (June 1995) government of Israel is very far off from that, it is basically a minimal winning coalition. In fact, they don’t even have a majority in parliament, but there are some parties outside the government that support it; though it is really very unstable, somehow it has managed to maintain itself over the past 3 years. But I have been looking at these things [in Israel] since 1977, and on the whole, the predictions based on the Shapley value have done quite well. I think there is something there that is significant. It is not something that works 100% of the time, but you should know that nothing in science works 100% of the time. In physics also not. In physics they are glad if things work more than half the time. Q: Would you like to see more extensive empirical testing of this theory? A: Absolutely. We have tried it in one election in the Netherlands where it seems to work not badly; but we haven’t examined that situation too closely. The idea of using the Shapley value is not just an accident, the Shapley value has an intuitive content and this hypothesis matches that intuitive content.
4
Note that Aumann regards the Shapley value, interchangeably, as ‘measure of influence’ and as ‘measure of power’. As argued by Felsenthal and Machover (1998:17–19, 35–36; 2005), one ought to distinguish between two types of a priori voting power: power as influence (Ipower) – which is the a priori probability that a player’s vote will be decisive, and power as prize (P-power) – which is the share a player can expect to receive in the prize distributed by a winning coalition among its members. Inasmuch as the Shapley value is a coherent notion, it measures the latter type of power; in the context of political coalitions the ‘prize’ is usually regarded as cabinet portfolios. In this context a similar distinction (between the concepts `officeseeking' and `policy seeking' behavior) is made by Laver and Schofield (1991: 91ff ).
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Although more than a decade has elapsed since Aumann first phrased his above mentioned hypothesis, it has not been subjected, as far as we know, to an extensive empirical verification. The purpose of this paper is to conduct such an investigation. The way Aumann’s hypothesis is phrased makes it easy to verify. This is so because it focuses only on the party charged with forming a (winning) governmental coalition, 5 hence one only needs to know the identity of this party and the distribution of seats of all the parties represented in parliament, or in Aumann’s words: ‘So, one takes each possible government that he can form and one looks at the Shapley value of his party within the government’. 6 In investigating the predictive performance of Aumann’s hypothesis we shall compare its performance with three modified versions of the hypothesis while benchmarking against two selected established theories of coalition formation. In carrying out this exercise, we make use of historical election data from eight European countries and Israel as tabulated in de Swaan’s (1973) book. Motivated by Aumann’s observation that his hypothesis appears to have worked quite well in the case of Israel between 1977 and 1995 as well as by Felsenthal and Machover’s (1998: 205, fn. 32) refutation of this observation, 7 we carried out a further check using detailed election results for Israel from 1949 until 2006. The statistical results do not support Aumann’s hypothesis, but three variations of this hypothesis appear to perform somewhat better: restricting the maximization process to the set of closed majority coalitions, or likewise but with a further requirement that the coalition selected be of minimal size or of minimal range. However, 5
Note that Aumann’s hypothesis is not concerned with situations in which one party has an absolute majority of seats in parliament, nor with situations in which a minority governmental coalition is supported by one or more parties outside the coalition. 6 The second-named author suggested to Aumann in an email message in November 2003 that in practice the party charged with forming a governmental coalition must gain the consent of each of the parties it wishes to incorporate in the coalition – and that some parties may refuse to join a proposed coalition for various political reasons. Hence he proposed that the phrase ‘each possible government that he can form’ should perhaps be replaced with ‘each possible politically feasible government that he can form’. Aumann responded (on 26 November 2003) that ‘[My] original hypothesis did not include the caveat ‘politically feasible’, which may be a little difficult to formulate for the purposes of empirical testing. However, in practice it may indeed be necessary to add such a caveat; or, perhaps, it may not be. It’s a point worth thinking about.’ As is described in the sequel, given the positions of the various parties on a left-right ideological continuum, we defined operationally the concept ‘politically feasible coalition’ as ‘ideologically closed coalition’. 7 Felsenthal and Machover (1998: 205, fn. 32) state that their calculations do not bear out Aumann’s claim: ‘We analyzed all governments formed in Israel during the period 1977–1996 and found that in all these cases the party charged with forming the government could have increased its S-S index within the government by either narrowing or widening the government that it actually formed.’ Our own analysis (see Table A2 and Table A3) supports this conclusion.
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none of these variations achieves a level of predictive performance comparable to Leiserson (1966) and Axelrod (1970: 170 ff.) closed minimal range theory or with Riker’s (1962) minimum size principle when confronted with the data. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the ensuing section, we discuss the hypothesis further and introduce a number of different variations to Aumann’s hypothesis. In Section 3, we describe the data used in the analysis and explain the statistical tests that are used in our evaluation of the worth of each of the hypotheses considered. The results of our empirical analysis are summarized in Table 1 and discussed in Section 4; some concluding remarks follow.
2. Aumann’s Hypothesis and Modifications Aumann’s hypothesis asserts that a party charged with forming a majority government will select that majority coalition that will maximize its ShapleyShubik index. However, before embarking on an empirical investigation of this hypothesis, one key point of clarification requires highlighting. Let us return to the passage where Aumann says: For instance, in the governmental majority matter, one can set up a parliament as a simple game in the sense of Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s cooperative game theory, where we model the party as a player; we get a coalitional worth function that attributes to a coalition the worth 1 when it has a majority and the worth 0 otherwise. And then one can work out what the Shapley values are; …
From the loose way Aumann speaks in this passage – it is after all an interview, not a scholarly paper – it is at first unclear whether, for the purpose of calculating the S-S index, the term ‘majority’ in this passage refers to (i) simple majority within the government (coalition), or (ii) simple majority in the parliament as a whole. But from what Aumann says in a subsequent passage it becomes certain that he means simple majority in the parliament as a whole. In this passage he says: This maximization is a nontrivial exercise. If you make the government too small, let’s say you put together a coalition government that is just a bare majority with 61 members of [the Israeli] parliament – a minimal winning coalition – then it is clear that any party in the coalition can bring down the government by leaving. Therefore, all the parties in the government have the same Shapley value.
From this passage two conclusions can be reached. First, a government with 61 seats in the Israeli parliament is a minimal winning coalition if the required majority is a simple majority of the parliament as a whole but not
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necessarily if the required majority is a simple majority of the coalition members. Second, the conclusion that ‘all the parties in the government have the same Shapley value’ follows only if one assumes that the required majority is a simple majority of all members of parliament. We therefore interpreted Aumann’s description of the maximization process as implying the same threshold (quota) for each winning coalition considered, a threshold that is set equal to a simple majority of the sum of votes of all members of parliament. We shall henceforth refer to this interpretation of Aumann’s hypothesis as the maximal SSQ hypothesis. However, from the perspective of developing a predictive theory of coalition formation, it is important that one has a theory that provides a reasonably sharp or precise prediction as to the likely outcome. Parsimony – in terms of the size of the predicted set of likely coalitions – is an important attribute of a good predictive theory. Just like the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, however, there is a good chance that Aumann’s hypothesis, too, will produce a number of predicted coalitions that is unreasonably large. 8 An alternative route to avoiding the profusion of possibilities under the maximal SSQ hypothesis is to resort to ad hoc restrictions that will decrease the predicted set of coalitions by introducing social standards which, presumably, make some winning coalitions more reasonable than others. 9 To our minds, as long as these restrictions are sufficiently persuasive, due consideration should be given to them. In this spirit, we consider three variations of the maximal SSQ hypothesis.
2.1 Variation I: Restriction to Closed Coalitions In this variation, we consider a restriction of the domain to the set of closed or ideologically connected coalitions. 10 The motivation for introducing this restriction is two-fold. First, as de Swaan (1973: 148) has noted, out of 108 majority coalitions in nine countries which he investigated in his study, 85 (or 8
As can be seen in the 5th column of Tables A2 and A3, more than one coalition – and sometimes considerably more than one – is predicted to form according to Aumann’s hypothesis in almost all investigated elections. Thus, for example, in the 1996 Israeli election (cf. Table A3) fully one-third (246 out of 739) of the winning coalitions in which the leader is a member are predicted to form according to Aumann’s hypothesis. There is a second point. When thinking of the coalition formation process along the line of an n-person non-transferable utility game, it is important to realize that it is reasonable to do so only to the extent that members of the same party in the assembly act in unison, that is, legislators operate strictly along party lines. Thus, Aumann’s hypothesis, if it works at all, should work best in a context where party discipline is strict or tight. In political cultures where this is not the case, it would be unreasonable to expect the hypothesis to perform well. 9 This seems to be the usual practice employed by coalition theorists as noted, for instance, by Luce and Raiffa (1957: 213) and by Gamson (1961: 380). 10 A coalition is ‘closed’ if all its members are adjacent to one another along the ideological continuum; otherwise the coalition is ‘open’.
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79 percent) of these were closed coalitions. Thus, empirically, the evidence appears to indicate a preference by political parties to form closed coalitions. 11 A second and related point is the observation that in a multi-party system, a coalition leader located at one extreme of the ideological continuum is highly unlikely to enter into a political union with a party located at the other extreme even though such a union may result in the highest S-S index for the coalition leader. The restriction to closed coalitions where the S-S index of the party charged with forming the coalition is maximized will help in making the predicted set more parsimonious. We will refer to Aumann’s hypothesis under this domain restriction as the Closed Maximal SSQ hypothesis.
2.2 Variation II: Restricting the Predicted Set of Closed Coalitions to the One with Minimum Size Even with the domain restriction introduced in variation I, the size of the predicted set may still be quite large. Since in the maximization process the stability issue arising from the defection of coalition members has already been factored into the calculation, it appears reasonable to present an argument along the line of the minimum size principle that only the smallest coalition in terms of the number of votes it controls in the closed maximal set will form. This may be so since it is not uncommon to expect that the actual distribution of cabinet positions among coalition members will be approximately proportional to the number of votes they control within the coalition. Like the minimum size principle advocated by Gamson (1961) and Riker (1962), 12 this refinement of the predicted set will almost always yield a prediction that is a singleton or one that involves a relatively small number of coalitions. Such an approach is however distinct from the minimum size principle and it also overcomes the objection raised by Aumann concerning stability of the coalition when the minimum size principle (simpliciter) is invoked. 13 We shall refer to this variation as the Closed Maximal SSQ Minimum Size hypothesis. Of course, under this variation, the predicted sets will be subsets, 11
It is tempting to attribute this to the notion that ideologically closed coalitions have lower levels of conflict of interest than those that are not ideologically closed and are thus preferred; but the evidence reported by Browne et al. (1984) does not appear to support this position. Of the investigated coalitions in this study, France during the Fourth Republic is perhaps one exception to the case – and this, in turn, serves to highlight that it is probably not reasonable to expect one single theory to do well in all instances. 12 Gamson calls the winning coalition controlling the smallest total number of seats (or votes) cheapest winning coalition while Riker calls it coalition of minimal size. 13 This is so because a coalition of minimum size is often also a minimal winning coalition where the defection of any member renders it losing and where the Shapley value of all members is equal.
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not necessarily proper subsets, of those obtained under Variation I, the closed maximal SSQ hypothesis.
2.3 Variation III: Restricting the Predicted Set of Closed Coalitions to the One with Minimal Range As an alternative to the restriction of the predicted set to include only those closed maximal coalitions that are of minimal size or weight, we consider the restriction of the predicted set to the subset of closed maximal coalitions that are of minimal range. 14 Consideration of this variation is largely motivated by de Swaan’s finding that the Axelrod–Leiserson closed minimal range hypothesis appears to fit the historical data rather well. 15 It also adds an additional dimension to the optimization process emphasizing, in addition to power, the desirability of homogeneity in ideological positions of coalition members, an idea that is rather intuitive. Summarizing, in addition to considering the version of Aumann’s hypothesis that we have referred to as the maximal SSQ hypothesis, we will also consider in our investigation the following three variations: (a) the variation of the SSQ version that restricts the maximization process to only those majority coalitions that are ideologically closed; (b) the variation that further restricts the prediction of the Closed Maximal SSQ version to the subset that is of minimal size; and (c) the variation that further restricts the prediction of the Closed Maximal SSQ version to the subset that is of minimal range. While (b) is an analogue to the Riker-Gamson minimum size principle, (c) may be viewed as the analogue to the Axelrod-Leiserson closed minimal range theory. We note that the Riker-Gamson minimum size principle and the Axelrod-Leiserson closed minimal range theory are ideas that are already deeply entrenched in the political science literature.
3. Data and Analysis 3.1 Data Sources In testing Aumann’s hypothesis and its three different variants, the primary source of our data is the tabulation of election outcomes provided in de Swaan’s (1973) book Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations. This data tabulation covers nine countries and selected historical parliamentary elections. For some of these countries, elections from the end of the First World War 14
Briefly, on a policy scale in which any two adjacent parties are regarded as one unit of distance apart, the range of a coalition is the distance between the two parties in the coalition whose positions on the policy scale are furthest apart. 15 Of the 85 closed coalitions in de Swaan’s study, 55 were of minimal range. See also de Swann (1973: 148).
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up to the early 1970s were included. 16 de Swaan’s data is particularly useful because, for each election, in addition to listing the number of seats controlled by parties which gained more than 2.5% of the seats in an assembly, 17 the parties have also been ordered along the left-right ideological continuum ‘according to the share of national income they wish to see redistributed by means of the government budget, military and police expenditures excepted. When this [did] not affect the ranking of the other actors, the criterion of nationalism [was] added to place the Fascist parties. The preference of the party’s cadre [was] taken as indicative of the party’s stand and, in the absence of such information, the judgment of parliamentary historians and other expert observers [were] accepted instead.’ (1973: 142). The rank-ordering of parties rendered the task of identifying closed majority coalitions in each election considerably less onerous. 18 However, whereas the coalitions studied by de Swaan included many interim coalitions, 19 it seems to us that Aumann’s hypothesis – and perhaps all other coalition-formation theories – is (are) concerned only with original coalitions because the formation of interim coalitions cannot be reasonably considered as independent of the formation of the original coalition when the leading party remains the same. Hence, except in one occasion, 20 we limited our investigation only to original coalitions. Our second departure from de Swaan’s approach is in the definition of an admissible majority coalition. For each given election, de Swaan considers every possible winning coalition as a potential candidate for the formation of a government. However, in reality the party charged with forming a governing coalition is normally selected by the head of state, and is usually 16 Specifically, the nine countries and the periods investigated by de Swaan were as follows: Denmark (1918–71), Sweden (1917–70), Norway (1933–36; 1965–69), Israel (1949–69), Italy (1946–72), The Netherlands (1918–72), Finland (1919–72), Germany’s Weimar Republic (1919–32), and France’s Fourth Republic (1945–57). 17 de Swaan (1973: 131) justifies the 2.5% restriction by arguing that parties controlling no more than 2.5% of the seats in an assembly were almost never included in a winning governmental coalition. Nevertheless he took into consideration the number of seats controlled by such small parties in calculating the needed majority to pass decisions by an assembly. 18 Two other studies regarding coalition formations were conducted more or less simultaneously with (and independently of) de Swaan’s study: the study by Taylor and Laver (1973) which dealt with western European coalitions during the period 1945–71, and the study by Dodd (1976) which dealt with coalitions in the early 1970s. Laver and Schofield (1991: 249–50) state that the ideological rankings of parties according to these two studies correspond closely to each other and to de Swaan’s ranking. 19 These are coalitions formed not immediately following a general election (which we call ‘original coalitions’) but as a result of change due to defections from, or broadening of, the original coalition. 20 The exception is the 2001 Israeli direct elections of a prime minister (but not also the Knesset). Although the composition of the Knesset in 2001 remained the same as it was following the 1999 general elections, the new prime minister (Ariel Sharon) belonged to a different party than his predecessor (Ehud Barak), and hence decided to form a new governing coalition.
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the party that, if successful in forming the governmental coalition, assumes the premiership. This is exactly the reason why Aumann’s hypothesis is concerned only with the Shapley value of this party. Hence in our investigation of this hypothesis we consider only those winning coalitions that include the coalition leader which we identify ex post as the party of the prime minister. The above considerations have meant that whereas de Swaan’s conclusions are based on 108 original and interim coalitions formed in nine countries, ours are based, except for Israel, only on 65 original coalitions formed in these countries during the same period. The case of Israel warrants special attention in this study. As we already mentioned, the findings by Felsenthal and Machover (1998) did not corroborate Aumann’s statement that ‘predictions based on the Shapley value have done quite well’ regarding Israeli elections between 1977 and 1995. de Swaan (1973: 237) too noted that ‘Israel is a difficult country for the theories’. However, as de Swaan’s and Aumann’s observations regarding Israel relate to different periods, we decided to investigate all 18 elections conducted in Israel during the period 1949–2006.21 Moreover, because in Israel very small parties were sometime included in governmental coalitions, we included in our analysis all parties that gained representation in Israel’s parliament and, consequently, our classification of some Israeli governmental coalitions diverges from de Swaan’s. (As noted above, de Swaan, in contrast, considered as admissible members of winning coalitions only parties controlling more than 2.5% of the seats in the various parliaments that he investigated.) 22
3.2 Evaluating the Worth of a Theory No theory is expected to correctly predict the outcome all of the time. In some contexts, a theory that performs marginally better than chance may be considered a reasonably good theory if other competing theories can do no better. Intuitively, when a restriction is placed on the set of admissible coalitions resulting in predicted sets that are more precise, it would appear that the frequency of obtaining a correct prediction is likely to be lower compared with the case when the domain is unrestricted. This is certainly the case when the restriction results in predicted sets that are proper subsets of the unrestricted predicted sets. This does not however automatically render the restricted theory a poorer predictive theory. Conversely, for the same 21
As mentioned in the previous footnote, of these 18 elections 17 were general elections to the Knesset and one (conducted in 2001) was a direct election of (only) the prime minister. 22 Because of space considerations we do not list here the parties’ ideological ordering along a left-right continuum, nor the composition of the 65 (original majority) governmental coalitions surveyed by de Swaan and the 18 Israeli elections that occurred to date. These can be found, inter alia, in Appendix Tables 5a and 5b of an earlier version of this paper downloadable from: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000767.
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election, different theories may give rise to predicted sets that differ considerably in terms of size, and the theory that gives rise to a larger predicted set will naturally have a better chance of correctly predicting the outcome. But such a theory is not necessarily a better predictive theory. Somehow, the tradeoff between the probability that the actual outcome is included in the predicted set and the parsimony of the predicted set will have to enter the calculus in determining which theory should be preferred. In determining the worth of each theory in our analysis, we have kept in mind this tradeoff. Instead of attempting a direct comparison of the competing theories, our approach is to compare the different theories with their respective randomized counterparts so that the evaluation of each theory is carried out on a level playing field. For the de Swaan data set, given a sample size of 65 which is reasonably large, we carry out our evaluation by invoking the Central Limit Theorem. For the more detailed investigation in the case of Israel, with a sample size of 18 elections, it appears grossly inappropriate to invoke the Central Limit Theorem. In this case, we computed the exact probability mass function under each theory or hypothesis to assist us in making our evaluation. A brief outline of our approach is provided below. Let N i denote the size of the set of winning coalitions given the distribution of seats secured by the various political parties in the i-th election, i 1,2,!, n . Let S ij denote the corresponding size of the predicted set under the j-th theory, j 1,2,!, m . Then, for any theory, each election may be regarded as an independent Bernoulli trial with probability of success Pij given by S ij / N i . The probability of success here refers to the probability that the prediction of the theory is consistent with the actual outcome. Since N i and S ij vary across elections, the probability of success Pij also varies across elections. For each theory, therefore, the set of elections included in the analysis may be regarded as a sequence of independent Bernoulli trials with unequal probability of success across trials. Given these probabilities, the expected number of consistent predictions under each theory is given by i Pij with associated standard deviation given by 1 i Pij (1 Pij )¯ 2 . The expected number of consistent predictions i Pij is ± ¢ what one would expect if the theory in question is no better than a pure chance mechanism. For sufficiently large n, the Central Limit Theorem for independent random variables postulates that the expected number of consistent predictions will be approximately normally distributed with mean i Pij and 1 standard deviation ¢ i Pij (1 Pij )¯± 2 . In our analysis of de Swaan’s data, we make use of this result to evaluate the worth of each theory. Specifically, a theory that produces a predictive outcome that departs significantly in the positive (negative) direction, measured in standard deviation units, from the mean value of its randomized counterpart would be regarded as one that is better (worse) than a pure chance mechanism and thus worthy
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(unworthy) of further consideration as a predictive theory of coalition formation. In our supplemental analysis of the case of Israel, we have only 18 elections between 1949 and 2006. Because of the rather small sample it would be inappropriate to invoke the Central Limit Theorem here. This is particularly so when the probability of success, Pij , in each of the independent Bernoulli trials, is close to either end of the unit interval as this will cause the probability mass function for the sum of the independent Bernoulli variables to be severely skewed. In this instance, while there are a number of alternative approaches that one may employ to evaluate the worth of each theory, we have opted to compute the exact probability mass function for the randomized schemes under each of the theories considered, noting that the probability mass at k, the number of successes under the j-th theory, is given by: P j (x k )
P (1 P ij
a k A k i a k
ij
i a k
¬ ). ®
(1)
In this expression, A k denotes the set of situations that give rise to k successes and a k is an element of this set. The cardinality of the set A k is n C k (i.e. the number of combinations of size k one can extract out of a population of size n) and the summation in the expression is over each of these nC k different situations. As an illustration, consider a sequence of three elections, that is, n 3. For the j-th theory, suppose P1 j , P2 j , and P 3 j are respectively 21 , 31 , and 41 . If this theory is no better than a chance mechanism, there will be 3C 0 or exactly one instance in which it will fail to produce a consistent prediction. This is the case when k 0 and denoting a consistent prediction by the letter s and an inconsistent prediction by the letter f, the sequence of outcomes referred to in this instance is fff. The probability that this occurs is given by P j (x 0) (1 P1 j )(1 P2 j )(1 P3 j ) 12 ¸ 23 ¸ 43 41 .
Similarly, there will be 3C 1 or exactly three instances in which the theory will produce exactly 1 consistent prediction. These three instances are associated with the outcome sequences sff, fsf, and ffs. Thus the probability that the theory achieves exactly one consistent prediction: P j (x 1) P1 j (1 P2 j )(1 P3 j ) (1 P1 j )P2 j (1 P3 j ) (1 P1 j )(1 2 j )P3 j 11 41 18 121 24 .
It can be similarly verified that P j (x 2) 41 and P j (x 3) 241 . As always, these probabilities sum to unity as the different scenarios are both mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
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With the exact probability mass function for each theory in hand, and supposing the number of successes obtained under the j-th theory is k *j , we are able to calculate the exact probability that this number of successes or higher will be observed under its randomized counterpart scheme, i.e. we can calculate P j (x p k *j ). This, in turn, will allow us to test the hypothesis that the theory in question is no better than the randomized scheme considered. A large value for P j (x p k j* ) is indicative that this is indeed the case, whereas a very small value for P j (x p k j* ) provides strong evidence against the null hypothesis, indicating that the predictive performance of the theory is unlikely to be the result of pure chance. In the latter situation, the theory in question would be regarded as deserving further consideration. We now turn to a discussion of our results based on the tests that we have described.
4. Main Results As is evident from a cursory review of the summary statistics presented in Table 1, Aumann’s SSQ hypothesis resulted in predicted sets that performed poorly both for the de Swaan data and the more detailed Israeli data. For the 65 elections we considered in de Swaan’s data set, the expected number of consistent predictions based on the randomized counterpart to the Maximal SSQ hypothesis is 13.2115, but under this hypothesis the number of consistent predictions obtained was only 8, a performance that is 1.8269 standard errors below its randomized mean. In fact, it is the only theory of the six theories considered that performed worse than its randomized counterpart. For the Israeli 1949–2006 data set, it is also one of five hypotheses that did not achieve a single success while at the same time having the highest randomized mean of the five, thus making it the least attractive theory. These considerations lead us to categorically rejecting the Maximal SSQ hypothesis. Detailed computational results appear in the Appendix: Table A1 and Table A2 for the de Swaan data set, and Table A3 for the Israeli elections from 1949 through 2006. In all these tables there are entries of the type x / y in the columns of the various tested theories. Thus, for example, in the first row of Table A1 under the Maximal SSQ column appears the entry 3/48. This entry should be interpreted thus: of the total 48 possible coalitions in which the leader’s Shapley-Shubik index is maximized over all 17 elections considered in Denmark, only 3 coalitions were actually formed. The same interpretation applies, mutatis mutandis, to all other entries of this form. In Table A4, the exact probability mass functions that we employ in our evaluation of the detailed Israeli data set are tabulated.
172
Maximal SSQ
Closed and Maximal SSQ
Closed Maximal SSQ and Minimum Size
Minimum Size
Closed Maximal SSQ and Minimal Range (Interval)
Closed Minimal Range (Interval)
Mean Number of Successes (Randomized Scheme)
13.2115
7.2973
4.2307
4.6451
4.7588
5.5605
Standard Deviation (Randomized Scheme)
2.8527
2.3299
1.9454
2.0370
2.0411
2.1892
Number of Consistent Predictions
8
13
12
26
13
34
–1.8269
2.4477
3.9937
10.4836
4.0376
12.9910
0.3790
0.0133
0.0132
0.4013
0.0132
0.0195
0
0
0
1
0
2
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.3346
1.0000
0.000159
De Swaan’s Data
Standardized Deviation from Randomized Mean Israel (1949-2006 Data) Mean Number of Successes (Randomized Scheme) Number of Consistent Predictions
P j (x p k *j )
Vincent C.H. Chua and Dan S. Felsenthal
Table 1. Summary Test Statistics on the Predictive Accuracy of the Theories
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All the three variations of the Maximal SSQ version considered, namely the Closed Maximal SSQ variation, the Closed Maximal SSQ and Minimal Size variation, as well as the Closed Maximal SSQ and Minimal Range variation, performed better than the (pure) Maximal SSQ variation both in terms of being more accurate in their predictions as well as in terms of their predictions being more parsimonious. However, these variations, too, are considerably inferior when compared to either the Gamson–Riker minimal size theory or to the Axelrod–Leiserson minimal range theory. Like Aumann’s hypothesis, Gamson–Riker’s cheapest coalition or minimum size principle is simple and its informational requirements are similar. Unlike Aumann’s hypothesis, however, it is extremely parsimonious and often produces predicted sets that are very small relative to the number of winning coalitions. As can be seen from Table 1, this principle works reasonably well for de Swaan’s data set with 26 consistent predictions in 65 elections, or 10.484 standard errors above its randomized mean. As can also be seen from Table 1, this principle was more parsimonious and produced more accurate predictions than any of the three variations of Aumann’s hypothesis that we examined. But its performance is inferior when compared with that achieved under the Axelrod-Leiserson minimal range theory. As pointed by Aumann, as well as by others before him, an apparent key weakness of forming a cheapest coalition (or a coalition of minimum size) is that the defection of even the smallest of its members turns it into a losing coalition, thereby apparently making the prospect of forming such a coalition very unattractive for a coalition leader. Nevertheless, there seem to be also considerable merits in forming coalitions of minimal size, as 40% of the examined coalitions in de Swaan’s dataset were of this type. As can be seen from Table 1, Table A1, and Table A3, both the predictive performance of the Axelrod-Leiserson closed minimal range theory as well as its parsimony were the best: of the 65 elections in de Swaan’s data set, this theory predicted correctly the (original) governmental coalition formed immediately following 34 (52%) of these elections, and was the only theory of those investigated which scored two correct predictions in the detailed 18-election Israeli data set.
5. Concluding Remarks According to the Social Science Citation Index the Shapley–Shubik (1954) paper is still, more than 50 years after it was first published, one of the most cited papers in social science research. Nevertheless, it is very doubtful whether many politicians have read this paper, or even heard about the Shapley–Shubik voting-power index, let alone use it as a tool for deciding which governing coalition they should form, join, or defect from. Aumann, in proposing his hypothesis, was of course aware of this when he responded to his interviewer that ‘… for good science it is not important that you un-
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derstand it right off the bat. What is important, in the first instance is that it is correct, that it works. If it works, then that in itself tells us that the Shapley value is relevant.’ So, does it work? As can be seen from Table 1, as well as from Table A1, Table A2, and Table A3, the answer is clearly ‘no’. Aumann’s hypothesis in its (pure) SSQ version achieved the smallest number of consistent predictions for both data sets considered, it lacks the parsimony required of a good predictive theory and hence should be rejected. However, we wish to note that based on a set of additional calculations that we have performed and which we intend to report in a separate paper, the number of consistent predictions according to the (pure) SSQ version of Aumann’s hypothesis becomes much larger if one calculates the S-S index or Penrose measure of the leading party by setting the quota within each prospective winning coalition it can form equal to a simple majority of the coalition’s members instead of setting it equal to a simple majority of 23 This increase in the number of consistent the entire parliament. predictions is due to the fact that in a large proportion of the actual coalitions formed the party forming the coalition controlled an absolute majority of the votes within the coalition, which in turn made it a dictator with an S-S (maximal) index of 1. But in this case Aumann’s SSQ hypothesis suffers from a further substantial decrease in its parsimony because usually there existed many possible winning coalitions in which the leading party controlled an absolute majority of the votes within the coalition, thus making it, presumably, indifferent among them. In conclusion, it appears that maximizing a priori voting (P-)power by the party charged with forming a governmental coalition – which seems quite reasonable from the point of view of game theory – does not account for which governing coalitions are formed in practice following general elections. This conclusion corroborates the (negative) findings of Felsenthal and Machover (1998) regarding Israeli governing coalitions during the period 1977–96. It is also in line with the (negative) findings by Riker (1959) and by Felsenthal and Machover (2000) who discovered that defections from governing coalitions cannot be accounted for by considerations of a priori voting power. 23
As explained by Felsenthal and Machover (2002), the overall Penrose voting power of a member of an alliance is equal to his voting power within the alliance multiplied by the alliance’s voting power in the entire assembly. When one considers only winning governmental alliances (coalitions) – as is the case in this paper – then the voting power of each prospective winning coalition within the entire assembly (parliament) is, by definition, equal to 1 according to any reasonable voting power index; and the (Penrose) power of each coalition member within the coalition should be calculated by setting the quota equal to the decision rule existing within the coalition (which is usually a simple majority of the coalition’s members), rather than by setting it equal to the quota existing in the entire assembly (according to the manner in which Aumann’s SSQ hypothesis must be interpreted; see explanation at the beginning of Section 2).
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However, recently Andjiga et al. (2006) examined the outcomes of four elections 24 in order to ascertain whether the Shapley–Shubik or the Penrose–Banzhaf power indices as modified by Owen (1977, 1982) for voting games ‘with a priori coalitions’ can be used in order to predict which governmental coalitions are likely to form. Using these modified indices, they examined two alternative hypotheses: 1) that the coalition formed will belong to the core; 2) that the largest party forms the coalition, and that it will choose to form that coalition in which its modified Shapley-Shubik or Penrose-Banzhaf index is maximized subject to several additional constraints. The conclusions of this study are that the core does not always include a coalition in which the largest party is a member, and that the optimal coalition in which the largest party is a member is sensitive to the power index used, to the assumption as to whether the opposition parties act independently of one another, as well as to the ideological ordering of the parties along a left-right continuum. So it seems that the use of the power indices to predict the formation of governmental coalitions according to these alternative approaches is also not very promising.
24
The elections to the Catalan (regional) parliament held in 1980, as well as the parliamentary elections held, respectively, in the Republic of Cameroon, in the Czech Republic, and in the Federal Republic of Germany, in 1993, 2002, and in 2005.
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Appendix Table A1. No.
Country
Maximal SSQ
Closed and Maximal SSQ
Closed Maximal SSQ and Minimum Size
Minimum Closed Maximal Size SSQ and Minimal Range (Interval)
Closed Minimal Range (Interval)
1
Denmark
17
3/48
6/30
6/17
16/18
6/21
16/22
2
Finland
10
3/38
4/16
4/10
1/13
4/10
2/13
3
France
1
0/16
0/1
0/1
0/1
0/1
0/2
4
Israel
6
0/18
0/7
0/7
0/13
0/6
1/10
5
Italy
2
0/10
0/3
0/2
1/2
0/3
1/4
6
Norway
4
0/10
2/5
2/4
4/4
2/5
3/7
7
Sweden
7
1/29
0/13
0/7
3/7
0/8
5/9
8
The Netherlands
15
1/57
1/29
0/15
1/29
1/17
6/21
9
Weimar Republic
3
0/14
0/4
0/3
0/5
0/3
0/5
Total
65
8/243
13/108
12/66
26/92
13/74
34/93
Mean No. of Successes (Randomized Scheme)
*
13.2115
7.2973
4.2307
4.6451
4.7588
5.5605
Standard Deviation (Randomized Scheme)
*
2.8527
2.3299
1.9454
2.0370
2.0411
2.1892
Standardized Deviation from Randomized Mean
*
–1.8269
2.4477
3.9937
10.4836
4.0376
12.9910
Vincent C.H. Chua and Dan S. Felsenthal
Number of Elections
Summary of Predictive Accuracy (de Swaan’s Data)
Table A2. No.
Election Year
Detailed Tabulation of Predictive Performance by Country Maximal SSQ
Closed and Maximal SSQ
Closed Maximal Minimum Closed Maximal SSQ and Size SSQ and Minimal Minimum Size Range (Interval)
Closed Minimal Range (Interval)
(a) Denmark 1 1918 2 1920 3 1920A 4 1920B 5 1924 6 1926 7 1929 8 1932 9 1935 10 1939 11 1945 12 1953 13 1957 14 1960 15 1966 16 1968 17 1971 Total
6 6 6 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 11 14 13 15 14 10 15 *
5 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 5 6 3 7 6 5 7 *
1/4 0/1 0/1 1/4 0/3 1/4 0/3 0/3 0/1 0/1 0/4 0/1 0/2 0/4 0/6 0/2 0/4 3/48
1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 0/1 1/3 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/2 0/2 1/1 0/2 6/30
1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 0/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 1/1 0/1 6/17
1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/2 1/1 0/1 1/1 16/18
1/2 1/1 1/1 1/1 0/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/2 0/2 1/1 0/2 6/21
1/2 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/2 1/1 0/1 1/2 1/1 1/2 1/2 16/22
(b) Finland 1 1924 2 1930 3 1933 4 1939 5 1951 6 1954 7 1958 8 1962
20 12 17 16 24 18 43 23
3 2 6 6 9 5 8 8
0/2 1/8 0/3 0/1 1/9 0/2 0/5 0/3
1/1 1/1 1/1 0/1 0/4 0/1 0/1 0/2
1/1 1/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1
0/1 0/1 1/2 0/1 0/3 0/1 0/1 0/1
1/1 1/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1
1/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/2 0/1 0/2
177
# Closed Winning Coalitions
Coalition Formation Theories Revisited
# Winning Coalitions
Election Year
Detailed Tabulation of Predictive Performance by Country
# Winning Coalitions
# Closed Winning Coalitions
Maximal SSQ
Closed and Maximal SSQ
Closed Maximal Minimum Closed Maximal SSQ and Size SSQ and Minimal Minimum Size Range (Interval)
Closed Minimal Range (Interval)
1966 1970 Total
49 42 *
9 9 *
1/2 0/3 3/38
1/1 0/3 4/16
1/1 0/1 4/10
0/1 0/1 1/13
1/1 0/1 4/10
0/2 0/1 2/13
1947 Total
44 *
9 *
0/16 0/16
0/1 0/1
0/1 0/1
0/1 0/1
0/1 0/1
0/2 0/2
1949 1955 1959 1961 1965 1969 Total
115 226 118 112 54 60 *
16 19 15 15 9 9 *
0/5 0/5 0/3 0/2 0/2 0/1 0/18
0/1 0/2 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/7
0/1 0/2 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/7
0/1 0/6 0/2 0/1 0/2 0/1 0/13
0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/6
0/1 0/1 0/3 1/1 0/2 0/2 1/10
1946 1972 Total
52 29 *
11 9 *
0/9 0/1 0/10
0/1 0/2 0/3
0/1 0/1 0/2
0/1 1/1 1/2
0/1 0/2 0/3
0/1 1/3 1/4
(f) Norway 1 1936 2 1961 3 1965 4 1969 Total
7 31 9 9 *
3 9 3 3 *
0/3 0/5 0/1 0/1 0/10
0/1 0/2 1/1 1/1 2/5
0/1 0/1 1/1 1/1 2/4
1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 4/4
0/1 0/2 1/1 1/1 2/5
0/1 1/2 1/2 1/2 3/7
…/ Finland (cont.) 9 10 (c) France 1 (d) Israel 1 2 3 4 5 6 (e) Italy 1 2
Vincent C.H. Chua and Dan S. Felsenthal
No.
178
Table A2.
Table A2. No.
Election Year
Detailed Tabulation of Predictive Performance by Country
# Winning Coalitions
# Closed Winning Coalitions
Maximal SSQ
Closed and Maximal SSQ
Closed Maximal Minimum Closed Maximal SSQ and Size SSQ and Minimal Minimum Size Range (Interval)
Closed Minimal Range (Interval)
12 7 14 15 7 14 15 *
6 3 6 7 3 6 7 *
1/8 0/3 0/6 0/1 0/1 0/6 0/4 1/29
0/4 0/1 0/2 0/1 0/1 0/2 0/2 0/13
0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/7
0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 3/7
0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/2 0/8
0/1 0/1 1/1 1/2 1/1 1/1 1/2 5/9
95 25 19 48 79 83 24 21 23 24 12 48 192 64 202 *
14 9 8 11 14 15 10 8 8 8 6 14 20 11 15 *
0/1 0/5 0/2 0/2 0/5 0/2 0/2 1/8 0/9 0/1 0/1 0/5 0/10 0/1 0/3 1/57
0/1 0/1 0/1 0/3 0/1 0/2 0/1 0/3 0/4 0/4 0/1 0/2 0/2 1/2 0/1 1/29
0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/15
1/3 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/3 0/1 0/1 0/2 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/4 0/2 0/6 1/29
0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/2 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 1/2 0/1 1/17
1/2 1/3 1/2 1/2 0/1 1/2 1/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 6/21
(g) Sweden 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(h) The Netherlands 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1918 1922 1925 1929 1933 1937 1946 1948 1952 1956 1959 1963 1967 1971 1973 Total
Coalition Formation Theories Revisited
1917 1924 1932 1936 1952 1956 1970 Total
179
180
No.
Election Year
# Winning Coalitions
Detailed Tabulation of Predictive Performance by Country
# Closed Winning Coalitions
Maximal SSQ
Closed and Maximal SSQ
10 12 9 *
0/2 0/11 0/1 0/14
0/1 0/2 0/1 0/4
Closed Maximal Minimum Closed Maximal SSQ and Size SSQ and Minimal Minimum Size Range (Interval)
Closed Minimal Range (Interval)
(i) Weimar Republic 1 2 3
1919 1925 1928 Total
56 150 105 *
0/1 0/1 0/1 0/3
0/1 0/2 0/2 0/5
0/1 0/1 0/1 0/3
0/1 0/2 0/2 0/5
Vincent C.H. Chua and Dan S. Felsenthal
Table A2.
Table A3. No.
Election Year
# Winning Coalitions
# Closed Winning Coalitions
Maximal SSQ
Closed and Maximal SSQ
1949 1951 1955 1959 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2001 2003 2006
1883 15262 1867 1961 929 3733 4069 454 3470 384 12875 12288 440 739 12703 11059 3618 1641 89375
30 42 30 35 25 41 44 25 14 13 27 30 22 12 39 23 16 33 501
0/4 0/21 0/2 0/2 0/1 0/3 0/3 0/2 0/1 0/4 0/3 0/1 0/9 0/246 0/6 0/1 0/3 0/1 0/313
0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/3 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/20
0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/18
0/18 0/193 0/24 0/16 0/17 0/60 0/18 0/13 0/58 0/20 0/587 0/492 0/10 0/20 0/301 0/297 0/57 1/33 1/2234
0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/2 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/19
0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/4 0/1 0/2 0/1 0/1 0/2 0/1 0/1 1/1 0/1 0/3 0/2 0/1 1/1 2/26
*
*
0.3790
0.0133
0.0132
0.4013
0.0132
0.0195
0
0
0
1
0
2
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.3346
1.0000
0.000159
Mean No. Successes (Randomized Scheme) No. Consistent Predictions
P j (x p k *j )
*
*
Closed Maximal Minimum Closed Maximal SSQ and Size SSQ and Minimal Minimum Size Range (Interval)
Closed Minimal Range (Interval)
Coalition Formation Theories Revisited
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Total
Summary of Predictive Accuracy (Israel 1949-2006)
181
182
Vincent C.H. Chua and Dan S. Felsenthal Table A4. Exact Probability Mass Function P j x k for Randomized Scheme under the Minimum Size and Closed Minimal Range Theory
Number of Successes (k) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Sum
Ck
Minimum Size
Closed Minimal Range(Interval)
1 18 153 816 3060 8568 18564 31824 43758 48620 43758 31824 18564 8568 3060 816 153 18 1
0.66543 0.27515 0.052672 0.0062037 0.00050386 3.00E-05 1.35E-06 4.74E-08 1.31E-09 2.85E-11 4.95E-13 6.79E-15 7.32E-17 6.11E-19 3.85E-21 1.77E-23 5.56E-26 1.06E-28 9.31E-32 1.00000
0.98067 0.019176 0.000158 7.31E-07 2.12E-09 4.15E-12 5.68E-15 5.60E-18 4.07E-21 2.21E-24 8.99E-28 2.74E-31 6.25E-35 1.05E-38 1.26E-42 1.05E-46 5.72E-51 1.80E-55 2.49E-60 1.00000
n
Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to Matthew Braham, Aurobindo Ghosh, and Moshé Machover for their helpful comments.
References Andjiga, N.G., Badirou D., and Mbih B. (2006) On the Evaluation of Power in Parliaments and Government Formation, University of Rennes 1 and University of Caen Economics Working Papers (www Archive). Axelrod, R. (1970) Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics, Markham. Banzhaf, J.F. (1965) Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: a Mathematical Analysis, Rutgers Law Review 19: 317–343. Browne, E., Gleiber, D., and Mashoba, C. (1984) Evaluating Conflict of Interest Theory: Western European Cabinet Coalitions, 1945–80, British Journal of Political Science 14: 1–32. Dodd, L.C. (1976) Coalitions in Parliamentary Government, Princeton University Press. van Damme, E. (Interviewer) (1997) On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann, in W. Albers et al.(eds) Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer. Reprinted in Games and
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Economic Behavior 24 (1998): 181–210. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1998) The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes, Edward Elgar. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (2000) Voting Power and Parliamentary Defections: the 1953–54 French National Assembly Revisited’, paper presented at the Workshop on Game Theoretic Approaches to Cooperation and Exchange of Information with Economic Application, University of Caen, France, May 25–27, 2000. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (2002) Annexations and Alliances: When are Blocs Advantageous a Priori? Social Choice and Welfare 19: 295–312. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (2005) Voting Power Measurement: A Story of Misreinvenntion, Social Choice and Welfare 25: 485–506. Gamson, W.A. (1961) A Theory of Coalition Formation, American Sociological Review 26: 373–382. Laver, M. and Schofield, N. (1991) Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe, Oxford University Press. Leiserson, M.A. (1966) Coalitions in Politics: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, PhD dissertation, Yale University. Luce, R.D. and Raiffa, H. (1957) Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, John Wiley. Owen, G. (1977) Values of Games with a Priori Unions, in R. Henn and O. Moeschlin (eds.), Mathematical Economics and Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, Springer, 76–87. Owen, G. (1982) Modification of the Banzhaf-Coleman Index for Games with a Priori Unions, in M.J. Holler (ed.) Power, Voting, and Voting Power, Physica Verlag. Penrose, L.S. (1946) The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109: 53–57. Riker, W.H. (1959) A Test of the Adequacy of the Power Index, Behavioral Science 4: 120–131. Riker, W.H. (1962) The Theory of Political Coalitions, Yale University Press. Shapley, L.S. (1953) A Value for n-Person Games, in H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker (eds) Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, 307–317. Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M. (1954) A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System, American Political Science Review 48: 787–792. de Swaan, A. (1973) Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments After 1918, Elsevier. Taylor, M. and Laver, M. (1973) Government Coalitions in Western Europe, European Journal of Political Research 1: 205–248.
10. Coalition Formation, Agenda Selection, and Power Friedel Bolle Department of Economics, Europa University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder, Germany
Yves Breitmoser Department of Economics, Europa University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder, Germany
1. Introduction In a wide range of political systems, decision making requires the support of a majority. When majorities are backed by coalitions, then they are organized either for a given period of time or on a case by case basis (i.e. for single proposals). In Germany, for instance, minority governments are rare and the first case prevails. In any case, there may be a unique party that is entitled to form a coalition (called formateur), or any party may be entitled to do so. We are interested in the non–cooperative treatment of a formateur model, and based on this, we want to discuss bargaining power. The model that we analyze deviates from the models discussed in the literature, and therefore, let us first outline and discuss it. Briefly, the following applies. The party with the largest voting share is assigned the task of the formateur and asks the other parties about their aspirations with respect to government participation. Given a profile of reported aspirations, he chooses a coalition and an agenda subject to the requirement that the aspirations of all participating parties are satisfied. If the formateur fails to form a coalition, a fixed outside option applies (e.g. new elections). Thus our approach to coalitional bargaining resembles ‘menu auctions’ (Bernheim and Whinston 1986) and ‘team selection’ (Bolle 1995). The model differs in that we rule out side payments, and in that our context may allow us to assume specific valuation functions. For instance, it may be appropriate to assume spatial preferences to model the valuation of political agendas (see also Steunenberg et al. 1999), or to relate the valuations of alternative coalitions to some scalar measure of their respective stabilities (see below). Our main innovation is to include a public element into the model of the communication between the formateur and the coalition candidates. Pre-
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Friedel Bolle and Yves Breitmoser Table 1.
Valuations in Example 1
Agenda, Coalition Partner
Party 0
Party 1
Party 2
x 2 x 1 y 1 y 2
5 4 3 2 1
4 5 2 1 3
2 1 5 4 3
sumably, the public (the electorate) is interested in the parties’ aspirations whenever they bargain about agendas and coalitions, and it requires the parties to outline their aspirations. In addition, the parties themselves are interested in communicating aspirations, as the formateur would have to offer them contracts where their aspirations are satisfied (if possible). Thus, unilaterally, each party is best off announcing aspirations. This positive effect of communicating aspirations comes at a price that appears at first glance negligible: the public expects the parties to accept proposals where their aspirations are satisfied. The aspiration levels thus resemble auction bids, and the coalitional bargaining game approximates an auction. As a result, the parties can find it optimal to announce very low aspiration levels. The models discussed in the literature typically assume that the formateur offers a contract to a coalition of his choice, and the parties decide whether to accept or reject it. There is no binding communication between the players, but the results are typically robust to assuming cheap talk. Examples of such models are Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Baron (1991), Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), and Eraslan (2002). It appears, perhaps, that simultaneous announcements of aspirations are strategically equivalent to simultaneous decisions upon accepting or rejecting a proposal. This is not true, since rejecting a specific proposal invokes the outside option, while the announcement of unrealistically high aspirations only leads to coalitions that do not include oneself, but it does not invoke the outside option. We illustrate this is in a little example. The valuations of the example are given in Table 1. There is the formateur (party 0) who can form a coalition with either of two parties (1 and 2). In addition, the formateur has to decide about the agenda, i.e. about x or y. He prefers x over y, he prefers to implement x with party 2, and if it should be y, then preferably with party 1. In case of failure, the outside option (denoted ) would apply. Party 1 prefers agenda x to the outside option, and the outside option over y, and the opposite applies to party 2. Without communication, the formateur would propose to implement x with party 1. Since 1 prefers it to the outside option, it would accept the proposal, whereas 2 would not accept to implement x (he would reject the respective proposal to invoke the outside option). In these circumstances, the parties would never accept proposals where they are worse off than
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under the outside option. This changes in a model with public communication. We assume that players have to set their aspirations simultaneously,i.e. they are set by the parties’ executive boards uninformed of the others’ aspirations. In our example, if 2 expects that 1 sets aspirations of 5, corresponding with requiring (x ,1) , then its best response would be aspirations of 2. In the eyes of 2, this is worse than the outside option, but these aspirations constitute the unique equilibrium. Thus, public communication matters, and our point of departure is that the public requires the parties to outline their aspirations before the negotiations start. In our model, the coalition and the agenda are negotiated simultaneously. This applies also to the studies of Ray and Vohra (1999) and Jackson and Moselle (2002), but there, the formateur has no opportunity to communicate with the parties before he makes his proposal (as in the above cited Baron–Ferejohn model family). In other studies, coalition and agenda (or, the allocation of governmental positions) are negotiated sequentially; for instance in Diermeier et al. (2002, 2003) and Merlo (1997). Our model can be generalized to allow for such sequentialities, too. Our specification of the model only requires that the expected payoffs of forthcoming negotiations are reflected in the valuations of the coalitional bargaining game that we analyze. In order to keep our analysis tractable, we consider a model that is simplified in other respects. Unlike Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999), we assume that the game ends when a coalition has formed. In more general models, the remaining players might coalesce as well. In political bargaining, this would affect only the way that the opposition is organized, but the respective parties might benefit from such collusion. Our simplification is not restrictive, as the coalitions resulting amongst the remaining players could be induced backwards. Unlike most other models, we assume that a fixed outside option applies if the formateur fails to form a coalition. Usually, it is assumed that another formateur is appointed in cases of failure, and thus, there is a close relationship between the valuation structure of the players and the value of the outside option. In the models of the literature, this relationship is critical, as the outside option restricts the actions of the formateur significantly. For, the formateur is restricted to coalitions where no member is worse off than in the outside option. As shown above, this does not apply to our model. Here, the players may be best off proposing coalition contracts where they are worse off than in the outside option, and generally, the actual valuations of the outside option are far less relevant. Following the analysis of our model, we will discuss the bargaining power of the parties and possible constructions of power indices. This relates our study to analyses of cooperative games (see, e.g., Holler and Illing 1996) and power indices (e.g. Holler and Owen 2001), but in particular, it relates our study to the critiques of traditional power analysis as brought forward by
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Friedel Bolle and Yves Breitmoser
(amongst others) Garrett and Tsebelis (1999a,b), Steunenberg et al. (1999), and Napel and Widgrén (2004). Traditionally, power indices are based solely on the parties’ voting shares and the decision rules of the voting body. The aim is to characterize power abstract of preferences (as political programs), strategies, and institutions. The critics argue that this approach is problematic and we largely agree with them – in particular, we agree with the arguments and approach of Napel and Widgrén (2004). In our eyes, and whenever coalitional bargaining takes place, the parties would bargain in specific non–cooperative frameworks, they would have specific preferences, and probably also detailed knowledge of each other’s preferences (platforms). The framework and the preferences are, of course, of significant relevance for the bargaining outcome. Following Napel and Widgrén (2004), we suggest that if the power of players is to be measured abstract of preferences (ex ante), then it is done by taking expectations of power in generic non–cooperative games. In Section 2, the valuation functions are discussed, the coalitional bargaining game is defined formally, and a second example is provided. In Section 3, we define the equilibria that we find most plausible and discuss their general characteristics (formally). In Section 4, we discuss the existence of equilibria, with an eye on an apparently straightforward case: all parties value participation in any government positively. In Section 5, we characterize the set of equilibrium coalitions, in a model allowing for negative valuations of government participation. In the concluding Section 6, we discuss the model and the application to power indices.
2. Motivation and Definitions 2.1 Preferences and Issues What would the parties negotiate about? There appear three issues: whether to join a given coalition, the political agenda in the period of legislature, the allocation of the governmental positions. Clearly, a party’s willingness to participate in a government depends on the assumed agenda and the allocated positions. Yet, it would also depend on the other parties in the coalition, independently of the agenda and the allocated positions. In particular, it would if the parties committed to specific coalitions in the election campaign (where their reputation would suffer in cases of violations), or from a long–term perspective, if the parties would want to distinguish themselves from other parties (with an eye on forthcoming elections). Our model will recognize the possibility of such valuations. Our model also allows for political positioning in arbitrary spaces. The primitive of our model is a ‘valuation function’ that maps combinations of ‘coalitions’ and ‘agendas’ to valuations. The agenda can be understood literally, i.e. as an outline of forthcoming decisions, but it can also describe
Share of cabinet ministers
Coalition Formation, Agenda Selection, and Power
189
0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0 0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Small party’s share of coalition seats
Fig. 1.
Share of governmental positions allocated to the small party in relation to its voting share (normalized by the voting share of the coalition)
the allocation of governmental positions. In the following, we will illustrate that the allocation of positions appears to be governed by fixed rules rather often. Thus, assuming independence of the allocation of positions from the original bargaining process need not be restrictive. While this paper was written, the two big German parties (SPD and CDU) had been negotiating a ‘grand’ coalition. (In the literature, a grand coalition is understood to include all parties, but in Germany, it refers to a coalition of these two parties.) The last grand coalition was formed in 1966 and it was in office until 1969. Between these grand coalitions, there were 11 periods of legislature where ‘small’ coalitions were formed (or 12, if one counts Willy Brandt’s resignation as the start of a government). There, one of the big parties did coalesce with a small party, with the FDP or the Greens. For these coalitions, we can count the aggregate number of cabinet positions that the small party was allocated, and plot these numbers against the parties’ voting shares. This is done in Fig. 1. Note that the voting share is defined as the number of votes for the small party in relation to the combined number of votes for the whole coalition. While the small number of observations does not allow precise statistical inference, it suggests that the relationship may be captured well by simple functions. An even stricter formulation of this phenomenon is known as Gamson’s Law (Gamson 1961): a party’s share of portfolios is proportional to the amount of resources (seats in the assembly) that it contributed to the coalition. Following empirical analyses strongly supported modified versions of this hypothesis (e.g. Browne and Franklin 1973; Schofield and Laver
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Friedel Bolle and Yves Breitmoser
1985; Warwick and Druckman 2001). With respect to Germany, let us finally note that the fixed rules describing the allocation of governmental positions in Germany can be refined even further. For instance, the big party always named the chancellor and the small party named the foreign minister and the vice chancellor. For these reasons, it appears feasible to assume that the resulting allocations of governmental positions depend only on the resulting coalitions, but are not explicitly negotiated. Thus, the valuation of the allocated positions is part of the valuation of a given coalition. For these reasons, when we consider simplified models below, we will structure the preferences to reflect political positioning (ex post) and valuations of coalitions, excluding a specific valuation of governmental positions.
2.2 The Model Let i 0,…, n describe political parties with voting shares T i . Without loss of generality, let 21 T 0 p T 1 p " p T n . The president, or some other institution, invites a party to form a majority coalition. We assume that party 0 would be assigned this task. The task may turn out impossible. In this case, party 0 would have to choose its outside option and all parties i realize outside values v i . We denote coalitions by the set of parties taking part in addition to party 0. For instance, the outside option does not require party 0 to coalesce with any other party, and we refer to the underlying (non–majority) coalition as the empty set . The set of coalitions that 0 may form contains and all subsets of \1,…, n ^ that lead to a majority coalition (in addition to party 0). We refer to the set of majority coalitions as C and to its elements as c C . The set C 0 C \^ also includes the outside option. C \c {1,…, n } ] T 0 i c T i 12 ^
(1)
A political agenda s S describes a set of consistent parliamentary decisions that a majority could enforce. S is assumed to be finite. The preferences of party i are described by a valuation function v i that maps each combination of agendas and coalitions to a real number, i.e. v i : S qC 0 l \. Note the generality of this definition. It allows that the valuation of a party outside the governing coalition depends on which parties are in the coalition and on which agenda the coalition would enforce. Similarly, it allows that the valuation of a member of the governing coalition depends on the agenda as well as on the coalition that formed. The coalition formation, as we analyze it, has two stages. First, all parties except 0 announce aspiration levels a i . They do so simultaneously and independently. The idea of bargaining through aspiration levels corresponds with assumptions in related auction models: ‘truthful bidding’ in menu auc-
Coalition Formation, Agenda Selection, and Power
191
tions (Bernheim and Whinston 1986) and ‘semisincere strategies’ in proxy auctions (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002). For player i, the set of possible aspiration levels is denoted Ai \. We assume that there are feasible aspiration levels for all possible valuations of i , i.e. Ai
\v i (s , c )(s , c ) S qC 0 ^ .
(2)
The aspiration levels constitute two--sided commitments (as discussed in the introduction). On one hand, party i would not sign a coalition agreement unless participation in the governing coalition and under the announced agenda yields a i . On the other hand, party i will join all governments leading to a valuation of at least a i . Thus, for given aspirations a i of party i, the set of implementable coalitions and agendas is G i (a i ) \(s , c ) S qC 0 i c or v i (s , c ) p a i ^ .
(3)
We refer to a given combination of coalition and agenda, (s , c ) S qC 0 , as a government. In the second stage of the game, party 0 chooses an agenda s and a coalition c to maximize its own valuation v 0(s , c ). Thanks to the above commitments, party i will sign a coalition contract establishing (s , c ) if and only if v i (s , c ) p a i . That is, there is no renegotiation. Thus, under subgame perfectness, party 0 would simply choose the optimal element of the set of feasible coalition–agenda–combinations (governments). For a given aspiration profile (a i ) a , this set is G (a ) i p1G i (a i ), and party 0 maximizes v 0(s , c ) subject to (s , c ) G . Notably, G contains also the outside option of party 0 (c ), as this option does not require the agreement of any other party. The optimal choice of 0 is denoted (s , c ). We assume that there exists at least one majority coalition that all required parties prefer to the outside option. Formally, given the outside valuations v i , there exists (s , c ) S qC such that v i (s , c ) p v i i c \0^ . As shown in Example 1 in the introduction, this relation need not apply to equilibrium outcomes. We will characterize the subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) of this game. An SPE is described by a profile of aspiration levels (a i )i \1,…,n ^ and a function mapping each such profile to the choice of party 0. Notably, the choice of 0 need not be unique for a given profile of aspiration levels, and thus, the actual choice is an integral part of any equilibrium.
3. Realistic Aspiration Equilibrium The existence of subgame–perfect equilibria of the above game follows from the existence of Nash equilibria. To illustrate this, let us fix any set of optimal choices by party 0 (as a function mapping aspiration profiles to 0’s choices). Then, the above game can be reduced to a static, simultaneous–
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Friedel Bolle and Yves Breitmoser
move game where the parties 1,…, n set their aspiration levels. This game is effectively finite, as the set of possible governments and thus the sets of distinguishable aspiration levels is finite. Hence, Nash equilibria must exist. This holds, of course, only as far as we allow for mixed equilibria. Mixed equilibria, in turn, appear rather vulnerable to allowing for (auction–like) dynamic definitions of the game. In the following, we therefore concentrate on pure equilibria, but as far as those are concerned, existence is not trivial. In most cases, pure equilibria have to be constructed explicitly to prove existence. We will do so for a couple of special cases and we characterize the set of governments sustainable in equilibrium through necessary and sufficient conditions. We indicated above that not all pure equilibria appear equally plausible. To illustrate this in more detail, let us distinguish equilibria where all parties have realistic aspiration levels from equilibria with unrealistic aspiration levels. A formal definition follows. Informally, the aspiration level of party i is called realistic if i ’s valuation of the government that party 0 chooses is equal to i ’s aspiration level. Definition 3.1 Fix a pure subgame–perfect equilibrium with aspirations (a i ) and party 0 choices g qi Ai l S qC 0 . It is called realistic aspiration equilibrium (RAE) iff i \1,…, n ^ a i v i g (a 1 ,…, a n )
(4)
We say that the aspirations of a player are unrealistically high if they are greater than the valuation that results in the government chosen in response to a given aspiration profile, and they are unrealistically low if they are less than the resulting valuation. The assumption of realistic aspirations is closely related to the exclusion of ‘blocking bids’ in Bolle (1995) and Ausubel and Milgrom (2002). It is also related to (but weaker than) ‘coalition proofness’ as defined by Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
3.1 Illustrations of the Definition First, we consider equilibria with unrealistically high aspirations. We find (Lemma 1) that either all groups of parties are indifferent with respect to deviations to realistic aspirations, or there is a group of parties that can deviate to realistic aspirations and all parties (in this group) benefit. In the latter case, the parties block each other – what would usually not happen in a dynamic game or under trembling hands. To simplify our arguments, we assume that the valuations of the formateur are generic in the sense that he is not indifferent between any pair of alternative options: (s , c ) v (s a, c a) v 0(s , c ) v v 0(s a, c a)
(5)
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Lemma 3.1 Assume generic valuations, Eq. (5). Consider a government (s , c ) that is sustained in an equilibrium with unrealistically high aspirations and let (s a, c a) denote the (unique) choice of party 0 when all parties had aspirations that are realistic with respect to (s , c ). (1) If (s a, c a) (s , c ), then all groups of parties with unrealistically high aspirations are indifferent with respect to deviations to realistic aspirations. (2) If (s a, c a) v (s , c ), then there exists a group of parties with unrealistically high aspirations that can deviate to realistic aspirations such that all of them are better off.
Proof Case 1 Party 0 does not adapt its choice when all unrealistic parties deviate to realistic aspirations. When a subset of these parties deviates, then the set of possible governments is a subset of the set when all parties deviate. The government (s , c ) is in both sets, and it constitutes the optimum in the superset. Hence, it also constitutes the optimum (generically unique) when only a subset of parties deviates to realistic aspirations. Consequently, it would still be chosen by 0 after any such deviation, and no valuation is affected by the deviation. Case 2 Assume that all parties in c a \ c with originally unrealistic aspirations deviate to realistic aspirations. As a result, the set of governments that party 0 could choose is a subset of the options available when all unrealistically high parties deviate, and it includes (s a, c a). Thus, party 0 optimally chooses (s a, c a) and all parties in c a \ c would be in the coalition after the simultaneous deviation. Hence, their aspirations, which are realistic with respect to (s , c ) , must at least be satisfied in (s a, c a). Generically, indifference is ruled out, and thus, all of the parties in c a \ c are better off. , With respect to equilibria with unrealistically low aspirations, we can say that no group of parties would be worse off deviating to realistic aspirations. However, the corresponding realistic strategy profile need not constitute an equilibrium anymore, and in such a case, there may exist an equilibrium in unrealistically low strategies that Pareto dominates all realistic equilibria. Nonetheless, we can conclude that simultaneous deviations to realistic aspirations are either payoff–irrelevant, or there exists a group of parties outside a given coalition that would benefit (when they originally blocked each other). Now, we shall consider the opposite case (Lemma 2): is there blocking in realistic aspiration equilibria? The answer is no. Lemma 3.2 Consider an outcome (s , c ) that is sustained in an RAE. There is no group of parties outside the coalition that can deviate simultaneously from the equilibrium such that they are all better off.
Proof Let c denote a group of parties outside the chosen coalition c , i.e.
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any c N \ c . When all of the parties in c would increase their aspirations, then the set of feasible governments would shrink but the originally optimal (s , c ) would remain feasible. Hence, it would still be chosen by party 0, and no valuation would be affected. Thus, in order to affect the valuations, at least one of the parties outside c would have to reduce its aspirations, and if this leads to an adapted choice of party 0, then at least one of these parties suffers a loss. , Finally, to conclude our illustrations of the assumption of realistic aspirations, we discuss an issue that concerns the ‘degree of competitiveness’ of the aspirations. In this context, we say that the lower a party’s aspiration, the more competitive is its strategy, and also that parties are more competitive when they decrease their aspirations (in order to be taken into the coalition). Our discussion starts with an observation about the best responses of parties that have realistic aspirations: when they are left out of the coalition despite of being realistic, then they cannot improve their payoffs through decreasing their aspirations. Lemma 3.3 Consider an arbitrary aspiration profile (a i ) and let (s , c ) denote the corresponding choice of party 0. Any i c with realistic aspirations, a i v i (s , c ), may not gain through decreasing its aspiration level.
Proof If party i c decreases its aspiration, then there are (weakly) more governments that party 0 can choose. In all of the additional options, party i is worse off than in (s , c ), as they became feasible only because of i decreasing its aspiration. Therefore, if party 0 deviates from (s , c ) to one of these additional options, party i must be worse off. , Thus, aspiration reductions cannot be profitable – when one is realistic. Does this mean that realism prevents competitive behavior? Rather to the contrary; it shows that being realistic is already as competitive as sensible, and unrealistically low strategies can never be a unique best response. Through assuming realistic aspirations, we rule out cases where a group of parties would profit from simultaneous deviations to more competitive strategies, while unilateral deviations are payoff irrelevant. That is, we rule out (rather implausible) uncompetitive equilibria.
3.2 A General Characterization We now characterize the set of equilibrium outcomes. This characterization rests on two conditions, and those conditions, in turn, can be visualized easily when we rank the formateur’s (i.e. party 0’s) options based on his preferences. To do so, let us denote the set of possible governments, including the outside option, as R S qC 0 . Typical elements are denoted r R .
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The coalition underlying the government r is denoted by c(r ). We now order (p) the elements of R in the following way: r a, r aa R r a p r aa v 0(r a) p v 0(r aa).
(6)
This ordering is complete, transitive, and reflexive. Let us also define r a r aa as being equivalent to r a p r aa and r a b r aa. Valuation profiles are related through the ordering pc (r ) in the following (multiplicative) way: v(r ) pc (r ) v(r a) iff for all parties i in c(r ) we know v i (r ) p v i (r a). The characteristic conditions are defined next. On one hand, given that all parties i v 0 have realistic aspirations with respect to a government r, party 0 should indeed be best off choosing r (i.e. 0 should not be able to deviate to a ‘higher’government r a r ):
r a r , i c(r a) v i (r a) v i (r ).
(C1)
On the other hand, for any party i in the coalition underlying government r, when i increases its aspirations then a government results that i values less than r (it should not be profitable for i to force party 0 to choose a ‘lower’ government r a r ). In turn, for each option r a b r that one of the i c(r ) prefers to r, there either (i) exists an alternative r aa r a that the formateur would choose when i deviates to higher aspirations , or (ii) r a cannot be chosen given the other parties’ aspirations under r. The following formulation combines these cases: r a b r , i c(r ) v i (r a) v i (r ) º r a v max \r aa ] v(r aa) pc (r aa) (v i (r ), v i (r a))^ .
(C2)
In the next statement, we concentrate on generic valuations to reduce the number of cases to be distinguished. Let us note, however, that a similar statement holds for degenerate valuations. Proposition 3.1 Assume generic valuations, Eq. (5). A government r R can be sustained in an RAE if and only if r satisfies (C1) and (C2).
Proof Fix a government r R . First, we show that the conditions are necessary. If (7) is violated then party 0 can deviate from choosing r to a government r a that it prefers (given realistic aspirations), and hence, r would not result in equilibrium. Assume now (7) is satisfied. If any party i c(r ) deviates to higher aspirations, then party 0 would have to choose a government r a b r . If (8) is violated, then there exists a party i and a government r a with the following characteristics. Party i is better off in r a and i can increase its aspirations such that the formateur’s best choice given the aspirations is r a (generically, this best choice is unique). Consequently, this aspiration increment is a profitable deviation for i if (8) is violated.
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Secondly, we show that the conditions are sufficient. Suppose that r would satisfy these conditions without being sustained in an RAE. First, assume that party 0 would be better deviating from choosing r. For all governments r a r that 0 prefers, we know that some of the required parties is worse off in r a than in t . Given realistic aspirations with respect to r, party 0 cannot deviate to any such r a. Consequently some other party, i.e. some i c(r ), must be better off deviating unilaterally from its (realistic) aspirations. Party i can profit only from increasing its aspiration (Lemma 3). On one hand, (7) implies that, for all governments r a r that i prefers to r, 0 cannot choose r a if i deviates to higher aspirations. On the other hand, (8) implies that, for all governments r a r that i prefers to r, 0 would not choose this government if i deviates unilaterally to aspirations v i (r a). Moreover, for any r a r that i prefers, if i deviates to aspirations that are less than v i (r a), the set of options that are feasible for 0 is equal to the set of options feasible under v i (r a) ‘plus’ options that i values less than r a . Hence, the government that 0 would choose is still valued less than r a by i. As a result, no government r a that i prefers would be chosen if i deviates to aspirations v i v i (r ), v i (r aa)¯± , given r aa argmax r v i (r ) denotes the government that i prefers most. Implicitly, when i deviates to v i v i (r ), v i (r aa)±¯ , then no government is chosen that includes i. As a result, the government chosen in these cases is the same as in those cases where i deviates to aspirations v i v i (r aa) that are higher than its maximal valuation (still, a government that i values less than r). Thus no party i c(r ) can profit through deviating unilaterally from aspirations v i (r ) , contradicting the initial assumption that , r cannot be sustained in an RAE.
4. Government Participation is Not Valued Negatively The existence of RAEs is difficult to establish in general. We want to illustrate this for particularly simple valuation functions: all parties associate non–negative valuations with participations in any coalition, under any agenda. This assumption appears strong, but as we see below, it is not sufficient to guarantee the mere existence of RAEs. Below, we show that an equilibrium exists if three specific conditions are satisfied, but first, we want to motivate these conditions by illustrating their relevance. In the following, we assume that the preference functions are additively separable. ¦£h i (s ) p i (c ), if i c \0^ v i (s , c ) ¦¤ ¦¦¥h i (s ), else.
(7)
Here, h i (s ) reflects i ’s valuation of the enforced agenda and p i (c ) i ’s valuation of the governing coalition c (provided i participates). As indicated, we assume that i c p i (c ) p 0 in this section. Equation (7) may be taken as representing the idea that the main effect of participating in a government
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Table 2. No RAE exists (alternative valuations in parentheses)
Agenda, Coalition
Party 0
Party 1
Party 2
X \1^ X \2^ X \1,2^ Y \1^ Y \2^ Y \1,2^ Z \1^ Z \2^ Z \1,2^
10 7 4 8 5 2 6 3 0 0
0 (2) 0 (0) 0 (1) 3 (5) 3 (3) 3 (4) 6 (8) 6 (6) 6 (7) 0
3 (3) 3 (5) 3 (4) 6 (6) 6 (8) 6 (7) 0 (0) 0 (2) 0 (1) 0
is given by the allocation of government positions, which (by assumption) is a function of the coalition. The government positions are valuable, for instance, because they simplify the communication with the electorate.
4.1 RAE Existence Conditions The first example that we give for a game without RAEs suggests that most problems are with party 0. Here, we set p i (c ) 0 for all i but party 0. Notably, the non–existence of RAEs does not depend on this simplification; to underline this, we give a set of alternative valuations that are not thus simplified (in parentheses). The valuations are in Table 2. First, there cannot be an RAE leading to a coalition involving party 2, i.e. neither \2^ nor \1,2^ . Whenever 1 and 2 have aspirations that are realistic with respect to such a government, then party 0 would choose X , \1^ , \Y , 1 ^, or Z , \1^ . If 1 and 2 have aspirations that are realistic with respect to X , \1^ , then party 1 would increase its aspiration level to 3(5), and thus push 0 to choose Y , \1^ . If the aspirations are realistic with respect to Y , \1^ , then party 1 would increase its aspiration level to 6(8), and thus push 0 to choose Z , \1^ . Finally, if the aspirations are realistic with respect to Z , \1^ , then party 0 would rather choose X , \2^ . Hence, there is no pure–strategy equilibrium in this game. Mainly, this is due to the overlapping preferences of party 0. If party 0 has a weakly preferred agenda, i.e. an agenda that it would preferably enforce under any coalition, then most problems disappear. In the following, we shall therefore assume that there is a weakly preferred agenda, called s . That is, for all majority coalitions c 1 , c 2 and all agendas s v s , party 0 does not value the implementation of (s , c 1 ) less than the implementation of (s , c 2 ). Formally, v 0(s , c 1 ) p v 0(s , c 2 )
(A1)
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No RAE exists
Agenda, Coalition
Party 0
Party 1
Party 2
X \1,2^ X \2^ X \1^
3 2 1 0
2 1 3 0
3 2 1 0
Table 4.
No RAE exists
Agenda, Coalition
Party 0
Party 1
Party 2
Party 3
Party 4
X \1,2^ X \2,3^ X \3,4^
3 2 1 0
3 1 2 0
2 3 1 0
1 2 3 0
1 2 3 0
As the next example shows, this condition is not sufficient. In Table 3, there is only one agenda, and it turns out that a second problem may appear: the parties should not prefer larger coalitions to smaller ones. Before we discuss this example, let us note that it appears that there would be an alternative (but less intuitive) assumption to guarantee existence in this example: we might assume that aspirations are realistic when they are less than or equal to the resulting valuations (instead of being precisely equal). As the next example (Table 4) shows, this does not guarantee existence in general. For this reason, we do not discuss it further. In Table 3, if the aspirations are realistic with respect to X , \1^ , then party 0 would choose X , \2^ . If the aspirations are realistic with respect to X , \2^ , then 1 would choose X , \1,2^ . Finally, if the aspirations are realistic with respect to X , \1,2^ , then 1 would increase its aspiration level to 3, and thus force 0 to choose X , \1^ . It appears that this problem does not appear if at most one of the parties would prefer larger coalitions to smaller ones,but this case is (in general) difficult to treat. In turn, it appears rather straightforward to assume that all parties would not prefer large coalitions, as the allocated governmental positions would be less advantageous in large coalitions. Formally, i c 1 c 2 i p i (c 1 ) b p i (c 2 ).
(A2)
Unfortunately, not even combined are the above conditions sufficient. A third problem may appear, as shown in Table 4. Again, the example does not rely on degenerate valuations and again there is only one agenda (which therefore is weakly preferred by all parties). The coalitions listed in the example are the unique minimal winning coalitions for the following
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voting shares: (T 0 , T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 ) 41 41 41 18 18 . We neglect non–minimal coalitions; for any such (s c ) the valuations are assumed to be in (0 1) for party 0, in (1 2) for all i c , and in (0 1) for all i c . Government X , \1,2^ is not sustained in an RAE, as party 2 could increase its aspirations to 3, forcing 0 to choose X , \2,3^ . Government X , \2,3^ is not sustained in an RAE, as party 3 could increase its aspirations to 3. Finally, X , \3, 4^ is not sustained in an RAE, as party 0 would choose X , \1,2^ under realistic aspirations. The same argument applies to the outside option. Thus, there is no RAE. A formalization of a simple condition ruling out such cycles appears difficult. Namely, it appears that we require conditions as strong as those underlying Prop. 1, applied to the coalition structure, to rule out those cases. Therefore, it appears that a general condition for the existence of RAEs would not be very instructive. For this reason, we skip it. In the following, we will concentrate on the existence of RAEs in specific circumstances.
4.2 Cases with Equilibria Sustaining Party 0’s Preferred Government Here, we are interested in sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium sustaining the ideal government for party 0. We distinguish two cases. First, a degenerate one: party 0 does not care about the resulting coalition, i.e. c p 0(c ) 0. In this case, party 0 would be interested only in the resulting agenda, and we denote its most preferred one as s . Proposition 4.1 Assume (A1), (A2), and c p 0(c ) 0. There exists an RAE leading to s in equilibrium.
Proof In the equilibrium that we describe, s is sustained by an arbitrary minimal winning coalition c . Since the game is degenerate, the function mapping aspiration profiles to choices of party 0 is not defined uniquely through subgame perfectness. We refine the optimization through the following hierarchical criteria. (1) if indifferent and (s c ) is a candidate, then it is chosen; (2) else, if indifferent, then (if possible) party 0 chooses a minimal winning coalition; (3) if still indifferent, then 0 chooses a coalition c to maximize the number of players i c with aspirations equal to h i (s ). As these criteria merely refine the optimization, the resulting choice of party 0 would still be compatible with subgame–perfectness. We have to show that no party i \1,…, n ^ would be better off deviating from (a i ). Parties i c may not be better off changing their aspirations, as party 0 would not deviate from (s , c ). Parties i c may not be better off decreasing their aspirations, as the same coalition and agenda could (and
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would) be chosen by party 0. Finally, parties i c may not be better off increasing their aspirations. For, given realistic aspirations of the others, a winning coalition to enforce s can be formed even without i. Since c is a minimal winning coalition, leaving out i destroys the majority. Consequently, leaving out party 0 would destroy the majority, too, implying that a coalition of party 0 with the parties outside c has a majority. Let c a denote any minimal winning coalition of 0 with parties outside c . Choosing c a would satisfy all of the refinement criteria. Hence, whatever coalition 0 actually chooses, it would satisfy all criteria as well. In turn, when i has increased its aspirations, no coalition with i would satisfy all criteria (at least, 3 is violated). Therefore, no coalition with i would be chosen after i ’s deviation, and s would still be implemented. , Thus, no i would profit from a deviation. The second case that we consider is non–degenerate in the following sense: for any pair of governments, parties that are involved in both of them value them differently: (s 1 , c 1 ) v (s 2 , c 2 ) i (c 1 c 2 ) {0} v i (s 1 , c 1 ) v v i (s 2 , c 2 ).
(8)
Let c denote 0’s most preferred coalition. Also, let c(i ) denote the most preferred coalition (to party 0) that does not include i and that all required players prefer to c : c(i ) arg max p 0(c ) using C (i ) \c C 0 ] i C and j c p j (c ) p p j (c )^. (9) c C (i )
c(i ) is well defined, since C(i ) contains at least the outside option . Let us say that c c(i ) iff party 0 prefers c to c(i ). The government (s , c ) can be sustained in an RAE if and only if i c c c(i ) j c c p j (c ) p j (c )
(10)
A rather interesting special case is where the coalition c a that is the best alternative to c has an empty conjunction with c . Here, the coalition c is substituted with c a when any party in c becomes too greedy (i.e. deviates unilaterally). This scenario applies, for instance, if the possible coalition partners of 0 are grouped in the sense that no party from one group would be willing to coalesce with a party from another group. Proposition 4.2 Assume Eq. (10) and generic valuations Eq. (8). There exists an RAE leading to 0’s preferred choice (s , c ) in equilibrium.
Proof Party 0 would not deviate from the equilibrium (as it can choose the unique optimal government). Deviations of parties i c would not lead to different choices of party 0, and hence are payoff irrelevant. Similarly, deviations of parties to lower aspirations i c are payoff irrelevant. Apart
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from this, it is easy to check that (s , c ) satisfies the conditions underlying , Prop. 3.5.
4.3 Cases with Equilibria Sustaining the Median Agenda We show that if there is some ‘median’ agenda sˆ such that for all alternatives s v sˆ a weak majority prefers sˆ over s, then there is an RAE where sˆ is enforced. Formally, we call sˆ a median agenda if s v sˆ cˆ N \0^ T i p 05 and i cˆ h i (sˆ) h i (s )
(11)
i cˆ
To simplify the following argument, let us additionally assume that (for all parties i) the valuation of participating in the government is independent of the actual coalition, i.e. £¦h i (s ) p i , v i (s , c ) ¦¤ ¦¦¥h i (s ),
if i c \0^ else
with p i p 0.
(12)
Note that Eq. (12) constitutes a special case of (A1) and (A2). Thus, the following shows that in a wide range of cases, where the formateur’s preferred choice is sustained in equilibrium, an equilibrium co existsthat sustains the median government. Proposition 4.3 Assume (11) and (12) are satisfied. There exists an RAE where sˆ is enforced.
Proof In the equilibrium that we describe, the aspiration levels are a i h i (sˆ) p i i and party 0 chooses the agenda sˆ whenever it is optimal, and if indifferent between the coalitions, he chooses the largest optimal one. In equilibrium, the grand coalition cˆ \1,…,n ^ is chosen. First, we show that choosing (sˆ cˆ) is optimal under the assumed aspiration profile. Consider any alternative agenda s v sˆ. On one hand, let us consider the case that i prefers s over sˆ. Because of Eq. (11), there is a weak majority that prefers sˆ, and thus, at most 0.5 of the voting share would agree to s. Consequently, the formateur cannot deviate to s . On the other hand, if i does not prefer s over sˆ, then sˆ is less preferred than s by the formateur. As a result, sˆ is an optimal choice of party 0, and since 0 does not care about the actual coalition, an optimal coalition is cˆ. Next, we show that the parties in cˆ (i.e. all parties) are best off sticking to the presumed aspirations. First, if i decreases his aspirations a i , and 0 should adapt its choice in response to this, then it would must be to the disadvantage of i, i.e. it would lead to a government that i values less than (sˆ, cˆ). Secondly, if i deviates and party 0 still chooses (sˆ, cˆ), then i ’s deviation would be payoff irrelevant. Finally, consider any party i cˆ that devi-
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ates through increasing its aspirations a i . As a result, (sˆ, cˆ) cannot be chosen by 0 anymore. A feasible choice is s , cˆ\i ^ , and similarly to the arguments used above, we can show that it also is an optimal choice. Following the above restrictions concerning the choice of party 0, s , cˆ\i ^ would therefore be chosen after i ’s deviation. In i ’s eyes, and given sˆ is enforced, it is optimal to participate in the government. Hence, i cannot profit , through such a deviation. In the following, let us assume that the space of agendas S is embedded in a metric space R . The distance of two elements s , r R is denoted d(s , r ) . We maintain the assumption of separable preferences as above, i.e. v i (s , c ) h i (s ) p i if i c and v i (s , c ) h i (s ) otherwise, for some p i p 0 . We say that party i has spatial preferences if there exists an o i R such that h i satisfies h i (s ) d(s , o i ).
(13)
The reference point o i can be interpreted as an ideal agenda for party i , though it need not be an element of S. In this model, party i ’s valuation of agenda s S is equivalent to the distance of s to o i . In most circumstances, one would assume that R is some space of real vectors, i.e. R \ m for some m. A specific distance function is the Manhatten distance d M . For any pair s , r \ m , with s (s 1 ,!, s m ) and r (r 1 ,!, r m ), it is defined as: d M (s , r ) i s i r i .
(14)
If m 1, spatial preferences are unimodal under any distance function, which guarantees existence of an equilibrium sustaining a median agenda. Similarly, m 2 under the Manhattan distance guarantees existence. The underlying median agendas are defined first. Definition 4.4 N R is a median agenda if for all dimensions j b m , the following holds:
T
i o ij pN j
i
p 21
and
T
i
p 12 .
(15)
i o ij bN j
Note that o ij refers to the value of i ’s ideal agenda in dimension j. Thus, N is the m–dimensional median of all ideal agendas. Proposition 4.5 (1) For R \ a median agenda N exists and is preferred to all alternatives by a weak majority under any distance function. (2) For R \ 2 , a median agenda N exists and is preferred to all alternatives by a weak majority under the Manhatten distance.
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Proof Part 1 is a standard result from social choice theory. For part 2, let us , refer to Kats and Nitzan (1977). As a result, Prop. 4.3 applies. It guarantees that there is an equilibrium leading a government enforcing the median agenda (implying that there is an equilibrium in the first place).
5. Government Participation May be Valued Negatively Generally, also long–term considerations play a role in coalitional bargaining. Parties, for instance, would compete for votes in upcoming elections. In this case, some parties might not want to coalesce with another, or at least one of the parties might associate a negative valuation with such coalitions. In this section, we allow for negative valuations. That is, we stick to additively separable valuations, Eq. (7), but allow for cases where p i (c ) 0 holds for some c and i c . Note that the following arguments hold independently of the assumptions (A1) and (A2). Instead, we impose certain ‘symmetry’ assumptions and concentrate on the coalitions that may result in equilibrium. This sheds some light on the relation of bargaining power to the coalitions that can be sustained in equilibrium. We refer to coalitions that all members value non–negatively as stable coalitions, and the remaining coalitions are called unstable. Thus, a coalition c is stable iff p i (c ) p 0 for all i c . Note that in the context of additively separable valuations, the ‘stability’ of coalitions can be defined independently of the agenda. Occasionally, we also say that parties valuing memberships in a given coalition negatively would destabilize these coalitions. Formally, the set of stable coalitions is denoted C s : C s \c C ] i c \0^ p i (c ) p 0^ .
(16)
We require that C s is not the empty set, i.e. that there are stable majority coalitions. Initially, we shall assume that stable coalitions would be weakly preferred in the following sense: c 1 C \ C s c 2 C s i (c 1 c 2 ) \0^ p i (c 1 ) p i (c 2 ).
(17)
We show that there are no RAEs leading to coalitions that one of the involved parties values negatively. For this reason, we call them unstable. Proposition 5.1 Fix an arbitrary RAE and let (s , c ) denote party 0’s choice in equilibrium. Assume generic valuations, Eq. (8), satisfying Eq. (17). Then, c C s , i.e. c is a stable coalition.
Proof We assumed that the set of potential governments is a set S qC .
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Now, assume that there is an equilibrium (s , c ) that implies an unstable coalition, and let c C s denote an alternative stable coalition. By assumption, all parties in c value participation under c non–negatively. Hence, the parties in c \ c are not worse off in (s , c ) than in (s , c ). The remaining parties, c c , weakly prefer c over c , because of Eq. (17). This extends to party 0. Hence, they are also better off in (s , c ) than in (s , c ). Hence, when all parties are realistic with respect to (s , c ), then (s , c ) is feasible, too, and preferred by party 0. As a result, it would be chosen by party 0, con, tradicting the initial assumption that (s , c ) is sustained in an RAE. The above finding is rather weak if there are several stable coalitions. To shed light on such cases, we shall strengthen the assumption Eq. (17) by assuming that an ordering (stability measure) S(c ) \ exists, refining the above bivariate measure stable/unstable. We understand the ‘stability’ of a coalition to measure the degree of competition between its members in communicating with the electorate, the degree of obstacles in implementing common agendas, and similar points. Thus, we would say that a coalition is more stable (than another one) if there is less competition between its members. Formally, we assume that S(c ) can be defined such that c a v c aa : S(c a) p S(c aa) i (c a c aa) \0^ : p i (c a) p p i (c aa).
(18)
As a result, S(c a) S(c aa) implies p i (c a) p i (c aa) for all relevant i. We show that only most stable coalitions are sustained in equilibria, i.e. only the coalitions c that maximizes S(c ). Proposition 5.2 Assume generic and symmetric valuations, Eq. (8), (17), and (18). The government (s , c ) is sustained in an RAE only if c maximizes S(c ) over all c C (i.e. only if it is most stable).
Proof First, we show that if c is stable and c a is more stable than c, then c a is stable, too. Formally, c C s and S(c a) S(c ) º c a C s
(19)
Suppose to the contrary that there are c , c a where c C s , c a C s , and S(c ) p S(c a). Since it is weakly more stable, player 0 and all parties in c c a weakly prefer c over c a. Because of weak symmetry, they would not prefer c weakly over a stable coalition if c itself is not stable. Therefore, c C s cannot apply if c a C s and S(c ) p S(c a). Hence, c C s would be implied. Now, we show that the most stable coalition must result in equilibrium (generically, it is unique). Suppose that a government (s , c ) is sustained in an equilibrium even though c is not most stable. It must be stable (as shown above), and there must exist a strictly more stable coalition c a. Since c a is
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more stable, all parties in c c a prefer it (plus party 0), and all parties in c a \ c associate positive valuations p i (c a) p 0 with participating in (s , c a) . Hence, (s , c a) is feasible and preferable for party 0, contradicting the , assumption that (s , c ) would be chosen along the equilibrium path. Thus, if the valuations are additive and if the coalitions can be ordered according to their stability (in the above sense), then only most stable coalitions can result. Generically, the most stable coalition is unique. In such cases, i ’s bargaining power may appear to be independent of the number of stable coalitions and of the number of stable coalitions that i is a member of. This impression would be wrong, as all alternatives imply power with respect to the agenda bargaining.
6. Application to Power Indices We considered a model of coalitional bargaining where the formateur communicates with the other parties to learn about the coalition contracts that they would accept. Based on the responses, he forms (proposes) a coalition. We assumed that the game would be static, rather than dynamic, and that the parties’ responses would be aspiration levels, i.e. lists of contracts that are compatible with an aspiration level rather than unrestricted lists of acceptable coalition contracts. Both assumptions are not critical with respect to the topic that we want to discuss next: the construction of power indices. In particular, alterations of these assumptions would not render the parties’ preferences irrelevant. We also assumed that the players would be completely informed, which appears to be a feasible approximation of most instances of political bargaining. This framework allowed us to provide general characterizations of equilibrium outcomes and specific predictions for selected valuation structures. Our results underline the relevance of the valuations for the sustainability of specific outcomes in equilibrium. We also saw that comparably minor variations in the valuation structure can have significant impacts upon the set of equilibrium outcomes (while, on the other hand, even major variations may be without any consequences, e.g. when the formateur’s most preferred choice would result in any case). This has implications for conducting power analyses, even if the power measure is to be abstract of the valuation structure (see e.g. Garrett and Tsebelis 1999a,b ; Steunenberg et al. 1999). Namely, the estimated power would generally depend on whether we ignore valuations (and strategies) altogether or take the expected power in non–cooperative games for some distribution of valuation structures. The latter approach would also allow to differentiate the power with respect to the political positioning of the respective party. We follow Napel and Widgrén (2004), who argue strongly in favor of the second (non–cooperative) approach. They also define a general framework
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to conduct power analyses. As the measure of power in non–cooperative games, they (mainly) propose the sensitivity of the equilibrium outcome to infinitesimal changes in the strategies (the marginal impact of a player upon the solution). Applied to our model, players outside a given equilibrium coalition do not have any power in this sense. For, the outcome would not be affected when they increase their aspirations, and infinitesimal aspiration reductions would have no impact because of the discreteness of our model (apart from that, aspiration reductions would not reflect power in the sense of Napel and Widgrén). We have seen above (Prop. 5.2) that the equilibrium coalition is unique in a significant number of cases, and also that the presence of parties outside the equilibrium coalition does affect the set of equilibrium outcomes. Hence, we conclude that these parties have power, while their marginal impact does not capture it (in our model). An alternative measure would be the impact implied by the presence of a party. This relates to the proposal of Napel and Widgrén (2004: 529) to consider the maximal impact that a party could have on the outcome through changing its strategy. In our context, the equilibrium outcome appears to be affected most when the party would not take part in the bargaining process, and a slight generalization of the bargaining game would allow us to define this within the framework of Napel and Widgrén (2004).The required generalization concerns the introduction of a first stage where the parties signal whether they would take part in the second stage, and being informed of who takes part, the parties announce their aspirations in the second stage. There appear two significant obstacles to this approach of defining power. On one hand, the definition of valuations for games with several equilibria is generally difficult. In these cases, the ex ante power would depend on the assumed equilibrium selection concept, and thus be generally open for debate. Depending on the game form, it is possible to obtain unique predictions without equilibrium selection (see, for instance, Breitmoser 2006), but a consensus on the definition of the game would be required still. On the other hand, the ex ante power would depend on the assumed distribution of valuations. One might try to solve this obstacle through endogenizing the preferences. The preferences reflect the political platforms of the parties, and the platforms are strategically chosen to attract votes in elections. In this sense, the evaluation of the power characteristics of given institutions would best be assessed in models of complete election cycles (e.g. following Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Diermeier et al. 2003) with certain constraints to reflect the characteristics of the investigated electorate. But in such a general model a new obstacle may appear, tractability. It is a matter of further research to show whether such a general model would allow closed form solutions or at least numerical approximations.
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References Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J. (1988) Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes, American Political Science Review 82: 405–422. Ausubel, L. M. and Milgrom, P. R. (2002) Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding, Frontiers of Theoretical Economics 1: 1–42. Baron, D. and Ferejohn, J. (1989) Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review, 83: 1181–1206. Baron, D. P. (1991) A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems, American Political Science Review 85: 137–64. Bernheim, D. and Whinston, M. (1986) Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101: 1–31. Bloch, F. (1996) Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division, Games and Economic Behavior 14: 90–123. Bolle, F. (1995) Team Selection: Factor Pricing with Discrete and Inhomogeneous Factors, Mathematical Social Sciences 29: 131–150. Breitmoser, Y. (2006) A Theory of Coalitional Bargaining in Democratic Institutions, Europa Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder, mimeo. Browne, E. C. and Franklin, M. N. (1973) Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies, American Political Science Review 67: 453–469. Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., and Merlo, A. (2002) Coalition Governments and Comparative Constitutional Design, European Economic Review 46: 893–907. Diermeier, D., Eraslan, H., and Merlo, A. (2003) A Structural Model of Government Formation, Econometrica 71: 27–70. Eraslan, H. (2002) Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron– Ferejohn Model, Journal of Economic Theory 103: 11–30. Gamson, W. A. (1961). A Theory of Coalition Formation, American Sociological Review 26: 373–382. Garrett, G. and Tsebelis, G. (1999a) More Reasons to Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the EU, Journal of Theoretical Politics 11: 331–338. Garrett, G. and Tsebelis, G. (1999b). Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the EU, Journal of Theoretical Politics 11: 291–308. Holler, M. and Illing, G. (1996) Einführung in die Spieltheorie, Springer. Holler, M. and Owen, G. (2001) Power Indices and Coalition Formation, Kluwer. Jackson, M. O. and Moselle, B. (2002) Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game, Journal of Economic Theory 103: 49–87. Kats, A. and Nitzan, S. (1977) More on Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes, British Journal of Political Science 7: 419–422. Merlo, A. (1997) Bargaining Over Governments in a Stochastic Environment, Journal of Political Economy 105: 101–131. Napel, S. and Widgrén, M. (2004) Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis, Journal of Theoretical Politics 16: 517–38. Ray, D. and Vohra, R. (1999) A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures, Games and Economic Behavior 26: 286–336. Schofield, N. and Laver, M. (1985) Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945–83 British Journal of Political Science 15: 143–164. Steunenberg, B., Schmidtchen, D., and Koboldt, C. (1999) Strategic Power in the
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European Union: Evaluating the Distribution of Power in Policy Games, Journal of Theoretical Politics 11: 339–366. Warwick, P. V. and Druckman, J. N. (2001) Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments, British Journal of Political Science 31: 627– 649.
11. Democratic Defences and (De-)Stabilisations Werner Güth Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany
Hartmut Kliemt Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Frankfurt, Germany
Stefan Napel Department of Economics, University of Bayreuth, Germany
1. Introduction 1 Once the invention of the state is made, the question of controlling it arises. 2 Taking recourse to controllers the ancient problem of controlling those who are in control emerges: ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ (who will guard the guardians?). As far as this is concerned democratic self-rule has been and is often still regarded as a way out: self-control seems to eliminate the need for control and thereby the need for controllers. But taking a closer look most of us will agree with John Stuart Mill (On Liberty, chap. 1): The ‘people’ who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the ‘self-government’ spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the 1 One referee pointed out that a discussion of the Barbera-Jackson (2004) study ‘Choosing how to Choose’ was conspicuously missing in the first version of our paper. We are most grateful to the referee since we were indeed shamefully unaware of this important item of the relevant literature. But we should like to remind our fellow economists, too, that in constitutional theory an economic approach – as more traditionally conceived – is not the only game in town. Our paper is an effort to bridge the gap between traditions at least to some extent. When digging a tunnel, starting from both sides is a good strategy provided that the efforts meet. The question of how constitutional preferences are endogenously created by the constitutional process and how they feedback on it by supporting or eroding the constitutional framework should be approached from different sides. Our analysis is clearly one-sided, too, but hopefully on its way to the other side. 2 For an overview see Gordon (1999).
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majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. This view of things, recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those important classes in European society to whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had no difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations ‘the tyranny of the majority’ is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.
The general acceptance of a democratic ‘rule of submission’ (de Jasay 1997) which amounts to the general opinion that acceptance by a majority carries a moral claim to legitimacy independently of substantive normative content makes the problem of arbitrary democratic power even more pressing. Backed by the opinion of its natural legitimacy majority rule may possibly overrun all constitutional checks and balances by means of voting. But participation in majority voting and having a share in the exercise of power may (psychologically) induce the foes of constitutional democracy to endorse the system and its basic rule of recognition. 3 Higher order rules constraining voting processes by requiring higher majorities may form an important stabilizing element. 4 But constitutional rules that constitute and constrain constitutional powers cannot be picked from the shelf so to say. They must be brought into existence endogenously within the very social process they regulate. A complex rule of recognition conferring powers to relevant authorities – including voting bodies – must be applied and sustained within the social process (voting criteria are just one element of that rule system). Rendering within rule choices of the rules too difficult to accomplish may lead to an erosion of the belief in the legitimacy of the system and thereby enhance the risk of abandoning the constitution as a whole by extra-constitutional measures. 5 Relying on the simple majority rule and letting diverse groups participate in power may psychologically induce the greatest extra-constitutional support for the constitutional rules but at the same time erosion of the constitutional constraints by within rule choices. In sum: on the one hand, a Constitution may be changed by abolishing it altogether and putting a new one in its place. Such an act of rule substitution does not arise within the Constitution but rather in ways external to it. Whether this may happen or not entirely depends on the
3
See, of course, Hart (1961) and with respect to political stability Garzon-Valdes (1994). See Buchanan (1962) and for a discussion of central formal aspects, Barbera and Jackson (2004). 5 On the maximization of total commitment power of a constitution see Lutz (1994). 4
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sufficient or insufficient acceptance of a complex rule of recognition embedded in a complex social practice. On the other hand, a Constitution may be changed by within rule choices. For instance, the simple majority rule might be changed according to the majority rule itself or some rule that requires higher majority parameters than simple majority. 6 Even though the basic rules of rule change of the system may be very complex in a constitutional democracy simple majority rule will remain fundamental. It is such a basic rule and there is nowadays such a fundamental and deeply entrenched prejudice in favor of it that no constitutional democracy could survive for long unless it would decide most matters including those of rule change according to simple majority rule. Therefore as far as the acceptance of the system as a whole and the belief in its legitimacy are concerned we cannot but grant a central role to simple majority. But it is not only the rule that matters. Any Constitution claiming to be a democratic one would lose out to its critics if it kept larger groups of society out of the game of majority formation within the Constitution even though it would be entirely constitutional. Vice versa, if there are groups in society which have adverse or at least skeptical attitudes towards the Constitution letting or actively making them participate in the majoritarian game may – and we think will indeed – be an effective method of instilling a preference for constitutional democracy in the members of those groups. The risk that the foes of constitutional democracy might use the simple majority rule to abolish that rule must be incurred if granting them a real share in power is the only way to induce them to accept democracy. 7 In studying the problem of the effects and the requirements of democratic constitutionalism we will adopt a philosophy of law perspective first (section 2). Then we will approach the same class of problems in a somewhat more specific and more formal vein and illustrate by ways of simplified examples how a cartel of otherwise competing democratic parties might deal with what we shall call ‘dogmatic’ parties (section 3). After having illustrated what philosophy of law and game theoretic analyses can in principle contribute to our understanding of democratic defenses and destabilizations we add somewhat speculative extensions (section 4) and conclude with final observations (section 5).
6 There may be changes of the rules of the game by other authorized actors like for instance the courts. 7 This is similar but different from Donald Lutz’s problem of maximizing commitment power by balancing the risk that a constitution may be too rigid and therefore abolished altogether and that it may be too lenient and impose no constraint or only insufficient constraints at all.
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2. On Limiting the Power to Enact 2.1 The ‘Logical’ Problem That the Pope could not tie his own hands was a commonly accepted insight of medieval political theory. As the ‘canonists’ observed – already noted in Ockham (1992) – the Pope could not ‘today’ enact a command that would commit him to do something ‘tomorrow’. For, being the highest authority in church matters, the Pope could revoke today’s command tomorrow. Therefore he could not by a present command commit himself to a future action. A revocation of present enactments of norms would follow automatically under the rule that later norms enacted by the Pope would supersede norms enacted before. In fact, this power to create norms that are ‘automatically’ regarded as valid according to the basic ‘rule of recognition’ 8 of the internal rules of the church characterizes more than anything else what it means to be the Pope. But then, how could the Pope conceivably commit himself in church matters? To put it slightly otherwise, due to the preceding characterization of the Pope there seem to be no sub-game perfect ways of self-commitment for him. According to the same logic, it seems to follow more generally that a supreme rule-giver in any system of rules cannot commit. Like a rational actor who is defined such that he cannot give up his own rationality or a Bodinian sovereign 9 who cannot restrict his own sovereignty any supreme law-giver seems unable to restrict his own capacity to enact law by law. 10 Therefore, is it conceivable that the rules of rule enactment could limit themselves? Is it meaningful to enact a constitutional clause like Article 88 Danish Constitution or Article 79 (3) Grundgesetz (GG, German Constitution or German Basic Law) which both stipulate that certain other norms cannot be altered legally in the future? 11 It is unclear whether articles such as 88 Danish Constitution or 79(3) GG could be changed constitutionally. 12 It all depends on how we interpret the rules of the social games we play. If we accept, as we should, that the semantics of rules are such that they cannot be changed in ordered and intentional ways unless there are secondary rules allowing for such changes then a system of rules without a rule of rule enactment cannot be changed inten-
8
On this see, of course, Hart (1961). On this and for additional literature see Garzon-Valdes (1983). 10 Being the highest authority in the church, the Pope could not find means within his rule enactment power to solve any ‘political weakness of the will problem’ he might face. See Ainslee (2002), Ainslee (1992), and Spitzley (2005). 11 Of course, the rules can always be abolished by simply not obeying them. But this is different from being able or unable to abolish rules within the system according to its own rules of legitimate rule change. 12 See Ross (1969), Raz (1972), and Hoerster (1972). 9
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tionally according to rules. 13 But if that is so then introducing a rule of rule change that explicitly names the exceptions to the fall-back rule of no change is possible. The semantics of interpreting rules are such that all intentional alterations of norms of the basic system of rules by enacting new rules are ruled out unless such alterations are explicitly allowed. According to this interpretation the German Constitution by introducing 79 (3) GG explicitly allows ‘e contrario’ to change all articles except for 79 (3) GG. The latter remains unalterable in explicitly stating that articles 1 and 20 may not be altered. In this reading article 79 (3) GG is just an extreme form of a list of exceptions to the rule that the basic rules are unalterable unless the alteration – in the case at hand for all articles except 1 and 20 GG – is explicitly admitted. There does not seem to be a principal ‘logical’ problem with the preceding solution of the constitutional commitment problem (Kliemt 1993). We construe a game of rule enactment in which we start from a set of unalterable norms including one unalterable rule which explicitly lists the rules that can be altered. All others remain beyond the reach of the rule of rule enactment since rules in the sense that we use the term are ‘unalterable by rules’-entities unless the possibility of alteration is explicitly introduced by a secondary rule. As long as the consistency of the system of rules is enforced the rule of non-alteration will restrict the enactment of new rules (Kliemt 1978). In short, constitutionalism may work if an appropriate ‘rule of recognition’ is in place. Applying this rule we can tell valid from invalid law and impose substantive constraints on what can be validly enacted according to the rules themselves. There is no logical problem involved in absolutely limiting the constitution by means of the constitution. As long as sufficiently many sufficiently influential individuals 14 adopt an internal point of view to its basic rule of recognition the system will be changed only according to the rules of rule change implemented in it. But within the modern democratic mindset as opposed for instance to that of the medieval Church 15 any form of commitment must pay due respect to the requirements of democratic rule. This ‘psychological’ rather than logical problem renders the absolute commitments discussed before impossible. As far as within rule choices are concerned sets of voting rules that 13
Of course, people can start to act differently and thereby change the established rules or conventions but this is not of interest in a context in which we consider games in which the rules are changed only according to the rules of those games. To games in which there are other ways of rule change obviously other considerations would apply. 14 This, of course, alludes to a famous phrase from the ‘defensor pacis’ of Marsilius of Padua in which he characterizes conditions for the existence of constitutional frames in general. 15 Even though, for instance according to Russell’s fine discussion of the conciliary movement in the medieval church, there was a strong democratic element even among the reformist precursors of the much less democratic Lutheran reformation. See Russell (1975).
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may be ‘self-stable’ in that they will not lead to their own abolishment – in some kind of equilibrium – become of particular importance as means of constitutional commitment. The analysis of Barbera and Jackson (2004) is in this regard very instructive. However, it should be noted that the analysis presupposes that rules do manage to exist at all. For that to be the case they must be brought into existence by the application of the rule of recognition from an internal point of view. And, this in turn, will happen only if an appropriate belief system prevails.
2.2 The Paper Wall Problem and Democracy Critics of constitutionalism have objected always that it is impossible to constrain real powers in a society by writing something ‘on paper’. What matters according to this argument is ‘real’ power (guns and money so to say) 16 not words in a legal document and opinions about the legitimacy thereof. However, in the last resort hardly anything but opinion does matter. As the British Moralists were fond to say ‘it is on opinion only that government is founded’ (Hume 1985. I,iv ). 17 The opinion that the words written on paper (or in case of unwritten constitutions established in practices) go along with a legitimate claim to obedience or at least, as Hume insists, with the belief that no alternative system can be established with acceptable transition costs (including transition risks) render the constitution ‘stable’. The belief is at the same time limiting and is constitutive for power. 18 Who is powerful is determined by rules. The powerful are powerful because certain individuals accept a ‘rule of recognition’ such that those thereby empowered are ‘recognized’ as those whose orders are to be obeyed; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular. The soldan of EGYPT, or the emperor of ROME, might drive his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclination: But he must, at least, have led his mamalukes, or praetorian bands, like men, by their opinion (Hume 1985: iv).
Some two hundred years later Hayek makes roughly the same point: There is thus no logical necessity that an ultimate power must be omnipotent. In fact, what everywhere is the ultimate power, namely that opinion which produces allegiance, will be a limited power, although it in turn limits the power of all legislators. This ultimate power is thus a negative power, but as a power of withholding al16 We do not deny that the fact that Swiss constitutional democracy has been a rather stable one may be related to the fact that Switzerland always had a militia system of defence and no standing army. 17 Hobbes already said ‘... the power of the mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people…’ (Hobbes 1682/1990: 16). 18 On how power is constituted by secondary rules see Barry (1981).
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legiance it limits all positive power. And in a free society in which all power rests on opinion, this ultimate power will be a power which determines nothing directly yet controls all positive power by tolerating only certain kinds of exercise of that power (Hayek 1973-79: I, 93).
Much depends on what is meant by the term ‘free society’ in this context. If we assume that we are talking of a non-despotic system in which secure individual rights and rule of law prevail then, clearly, it should be true that power is quite effectively constrained in a ‘free society’. The power of the mighty is constrained by the people’s unwillingness to follow too extreme orders of those who are – by the very willingness to follow their guidance – made powerful. But if we assume that a free society on top of being subject to rule of law is characterized by democratic rules of law enactment then things may be different. The claim to legitimacy that majority vote as such seems to command may be so strong that it can undermine any restrictions that may have been imposed. Therefore the fundamental problem of making constitutionalism work in practice – to make the constitution an effective factual restraint on majority rule rather than a mere paper wall – applies with particular force with respect to constitutional democracies or democratic games and their sub-games. The risk that the constitutional system may be eroded by the rule of simple majority applies to all forms of democratic rule. 19 But in democracies in which democratic rule is not yet firmly established as a guiding principle it is a minor one as compared to the risk that the legitimacy of the system at large is not accepted. In particular after the initial phase in which a new constitutional democracy is established there is a risky time in which those who are sceptical about the new political order must be induced to think more favourably of it. Clearly, citizens may be won over by such factors as economic success as established within the new legal framework (as the German experience after World War II shows). But another factor crucial for creating a general opinion of legitimacy seems to be participation in the democratic political process. Even a democracy that is not ‘self-stabilizing’ in the aforementioned sense may be ‘self-establishing’ as far as the belief in its legitimacy is concerned. Participation in the exertion of democratic power might induce a gradual change of mind even in the foes of constitutional democracy. If, as we tend to believe, such a mechanism of endogenous preference change is in fact operative this psychological mechanism suggests that Democrats should consider to grant the non-democratic a share in democratic power. Doing so they will incur the risk of losing out to the foes of democracy altogether. But chances are that the foes may be induced to become friends of constitutional democracy (or, so to say, be tamed). This might render 19
For this problem see, again, Barbera and Jackson (2004).
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constitutional democracy much safer against constitution substitution – by external or revolutionary means. 20
3. Sharing Democratic Power Imagine you are in the position of a counsellor to democratic parties. Assume that the parties supporting democracy confront minority parties that are critical of democracy itself. The minority groups intend to compete within the rules of the democratic game for a majority. Their agenda is to gain a majority to abolish democracy eventually. Or, to put it slightly differently, they intend to use the majoritarian rule or rule change to rule out its future use. If the anti-democratic parties – to whom we will refer rather euphemistically as ‘dogmatic’ also – should succeed to abolish constitutional democracy democratically this would have devastating consequences from the point of view of adherents of constitutional democracy. However, as long as the parties with non-democratic aims comply with the rules of constitutional democracy it seems very problematic from a democratic point of view not to admit them as players or competitors in general elections. The more seriously democratic parties take their own basic democratic convictions the more difficult it is for them to erect barriers to entry to the ‘political market’. In their dealings with dogmatic parties democratic ones will therefore tend to seek remedies for the problem of dealing with constitutional democracy’s foes that avoid to disenfranchise these groups of the populace. For this reason and since experience indicates that letting the enemies of democracy play along with its supporters and to let them compete within the system can be rather subversive for the original anti-democratic impetus of the dogmatic parties, democratic parties may tend towards ‘power sharing’. As far as participation in democratic life leads to accepting democracy one could speak of an addiction hypothesis of democratic participation. Such a view would be very naïve if it would assume that being exposed to democracy would always and almost automatically induce a preference for democratic procedures and constitutional democracy. But this notwithstanding the self-educational aspect of democratic participation should not be disregarded out of hand. In transitional societies, especially when the winners and the losers of fundamental changes can hardly be predicted (except for a few certain losers), many might tentatively be willing to accept democratic elections (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). But to take hold the tentative view presupposes that all groups not only participate in voting but also in the exertion of the powers thereby conferred on government and other (e.g. judicial) authorities. So prevalent groups of individuals who all 20
On other aspects of what makes democracy work see, of course, Putnam (1994).
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endorse constitutional democracy will face the need to share governmental powers with others who possibly will remain enemies of constitutional democracy. Taking such a bet is in line with the democratic principles of the majority. It takes into account the democrats’ resentment against disenfranchising any group of voters (and here not only as far as the right to vote is concerned but also the actual exercise of the powers conferred on governments). Moreover, since it is based on quite plausible assumptions of political psychology democrats may often hope that integrating democracy’s enemies into the democratic process succeeds. This prospect seems worth taking some risk. Still, it will not justify exposing democracy to arbitrary risks. Since we need some kind of instrument to assess such risks in somewhat more precise terms let us turn to some very simple such models as a first step into such a direction.
3.1 A Model of a Democratic Majority Cartel in a Democracy To be more specific, assume that proven democratic parties compete according to the rules of the game of democracy but form a cartel as far as admission of non-democratic parties to a share in democratic power is concerned. Members of the cartel believe that there can be two types of adversaries of democracy. One type is so dangerous that the risk of dealing with it is relatively high, while for the other that risk is somewhat lower. We refer to the latter as the low-danger or F-type, and to the former as the high-danger or 1 F -type. The parameters F 0, 21 and 1 F can be interpreted as the probability of an abolishment of democracy if the democratic parties handed over all power to their non-democratic adversary. 21 The probability that co-operation with the anti-democratic party leads to an end for democracy itself will depend on the share of power c ¢ 0,1 conceded (the concession made) by democratic parties to the anti-democratic ones. Though the concession of size c is made with the aim to assimilate the dogmatic parties into the democratic system this effort may fail. The actual probability of failure of the ‘appeasement policy’ for given power share c is assumed to be R cM when the true type of the non-democratic party is M \F,1 F^ . Assume that, when offering the share c in power, the democratic parties cannot discriminate between the two types. But the democratic parties have beliefs about the non-democratic party’s type. More specifically, we assume the democratic majorities to expect the low-danger F-type with probability p 0,1 and the high-danger 1 F -type with complementary probability 1 p. 21 Somewhat more generally, one could introduce separate parameters FH , FL 0,1
with FH FL for the two types; but the implicit restriction FH 1 FL implies no essential loss.
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Let us assume we assess the value of successfully integrating the originally anti-democratic minority into the democratic process to be
u(c ) B (1 M)c for some B [0,1) . The process will eventually succeed and the benefits U (c ) will actually be reaped with type-dependent success probability of (1-R). The payoff of having admitted the dogmatic minority to a share c of power in case of failure is assumed to be 0. This payoff will apply with type-dependent complementary probability R. Note that if the inclusion strategy succeeds, its value will be higher for the F-type than the 1 F -type since for M F we get B (1 F)c which in view of F 0, 21 is larger than B Fc . This reflects that during the time when transformation into a fully democratic party – the aim of the process – has not yet succeeded, it can be very plausibly assumed that from the point of view of the democratic parties the co-operation in democratic government is the more fruitful the less antidemocratic the party admitted to power sharing is. Either the process ends in success and the party becomes fully democratic or manages to abolish democracy. 22 The kind of counsel that a counselor should give a cartel of democratic parties depends, of course, on the expected benefits perceived for different policies. As far as that is concerned the crucial policy variable is c. According to the assumptions made here, c can be fixed by the cartel of democratic majority parties as seems fit. Inviting the anti-democratic party in or not can be decided for alternative values of c by the majority. 23 For given values of F and p, an optimal c can be determined by considering the expected value (or utility) U (c ) p(1 Fc )< B (1 F)c > (1 p )<1 (1 F)c > ¢B 1 (1 F) c ¯±
where 1 R L (1 Fc ) and 1 R H <1 (1 F)c > indicate the probability that the process of power sharing at parameter c does not fail – to keep matters simple the payoff is assumed to be 0 if it fails (the generalization is obvious) – in case of the low and the high-danger anti-democratic party, respectively. The c * (0,1) which maximizes U (c ) can be found by forming the first derivative (the second-order condition for an interior optimum U aa(c ) 2F(1 F) 0 is satisfied),
22
The two types of an originally dogmatic party may not imply equal payoffs for the democratic parties since they may have lost all chances of democratically gaining power in case of the high danger type. 23 It should also be noted that in a constitutional democracy c need not coincide with anything like the number of ministers in the cabinet or any such simple measure.
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U a(c ) \p F < B (1 F)c > p(1 Fc )<(1 F)>^
\<(1 p )(1 F)> (1 p )<1 (1 F)c >F^ and setting it to zero. Solving for c yields p <1 (1 B)F > (1 p )(F(1 B) B) 2F(1 F) B (1 2F)(1 B) 1 p. 2(1 F) 2F 2F(1 F)
c*
Therefore, whenever a value c * (0,1) with U a(c * ) 0 can be found, the optimal policy advice is: the enemies of democracy should be admitted in to have the positive share c * 0 of democratic power. 24 If, however, there is no c * (0,1) with U a(c * ) 0 then the best policy is to keep the dogmatic party out at c * 0 . The latter case is rather likely when, as opposed to our simplification, failure of inducing the dogmatic party to develop a belief in the legitimacy of constitutional democracy and a proclivity to play by its rules, leads to dramatically negative payoffs for the democratic parties. Looking at the effect of a variation of B, i.e., the baseline value of no integration (c 0), one can check that B l 0 implies that c * converges to lim c * Bl0
F (1 2F)p 0. 2F(1 F)
Moreover, the marginal change of c * after a marginal increase of B is dc * (1 2F)p (1 F) dB 2F(1 F)
which is negative for every p 1. So, the larger the baseline value of no integration, the smaller is the optimal power share given to the non-democratic party by the democratic cartel. If B is sufficiently large, c * 0 will in fact become optimal. More generally, the requirement c * 0 can be expressed as the requirement that p exceeds some lower bound: p p :
B F(1 B) (1 2F)(1 B)
It may be useful to consider ‘type’ convergence, too. If the types would converge with F l 21 this implies
24
The smaller p, the smaller is the optimal inclusion level c * which the democratic cartel will offer to the non-democratic party (recall F 0, 21 and B [0,1) ). This would naturally be expected since p is the probability of the less dangerous dogmatic type.
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p ¯ 1 p lim1 c * 2 ¡ (1 B) (1 B)° (1 B) ¡ °± 2 Fl ¢2 2
according to which an interior solution for c *(0,1) requires B (0,1) . Finally, for p 12 we get c*
1 (1 B)F F(1 B) F 1 B . 4F(1 F) 4F(1 F)
The preceding considerations are applicable only if the democratic parties in a democracy would face their adversaries as a unitary actor. As long as democratic parties manage to act as a kind of ‘power cartel’ they should be able to implement the optimal strategy choice c * . They will not unwisely incur the risk of admitting non-democratic parties to a share in power if that does not maximize their expectations. If, however, competition among democratic parties becomes a factor it may well be that the democratic cartel, desirable as it may be otherwise, breaks down. The following model captures some of the effects of competition among the democratic parties and corroborates in more precise terms some of the intuitive views on the potentially harmful effects of competition among democratic parties in a setting in which a dogmatic party is present.
3.2 Democratic Competition for Dogmatic Parties Assume that there are two democratic parties and a single dogmatic one. The democratic parties could share power which in total amounts to c 1 . None of them has a majority on its own but the two together could form a majority that jointly would command power c 1. Let c 1 (0,1) be the power that democratic party 1 is offering to concede to its preferred coalition partner, democratic party 2, and let c 2 (0,1) be the concession that party 2 is willing to make to democratic party 1. Accordingly, democratic party 1 demands the share (1 c 1 ) (0,1) while democratic party 2 demands (1 c 2 ) (0,1). If in the bargaining process among the two democratic parties the demands are incompatible in the sense of (1 c 1 ) (1 c 2 ) 1 then insufficient concessions to the other democratic party, respectively, have been made since 1 c 1 c 2 . 25 Assume that in this case the one non-democratic party 3 approaches a democratic party, possibly the one which was willing to make the larger concession c max \c 1 , c 2 ^ to the intended democratic partner. We assume 26 that the (by intention) 25
On bargaining see Holler (1992). Openly discriminating a suspicious party but inviting it nevertheless to participate in government may as such exclude making it truly democratic (the coalition agreement between Christian Democrats and Communists in Italy did, for instance, avoid any obvious discrimination). 26
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non-democratic party expects the same concession as was offered to the democratic competitor. To make the same such demand is plausible since the dogmatic party claims to be democratic. To concede it may be wise in view of the aim of ‘seducing’ the foes of democracy since that would be hardly possible if the latter were discriminated. If the party i \1,2^ with c i max \c 1 , c 2 ^ evaluates sharing power with the dogmatic party at U i (c i ) while a democratic party that is not sharing in power at all evaluates the result at 0 then the party approached should in principle be willing to share power if U i (c i ) p(1 Fc i ) (1 p )<1 (1 F)c i >< B (1 (1 F))c i > 0.
When, after insufficient concessions, a purely democratic coalition ceases to be an option, then the coalition may be formed even if the expectation is not maximal from the point of view of the democratic parties. Had they been able to form a cartel they would have been better off at least potentially. But the competition among democrats drives them towards a more risky course. The preceding comparison of U i (c i ) with the 0-payoff assumes, of course, that the democratic competitors 1 and 2 cannot agree on sharing power (after insufficient concessions in the sense of c 1 c 2 1 ). But even in case of insufficient concessions a party i \1,2^ may approach its democratic counterpart and try to avoid the impasse by a further concession c i 1 c j with j v i . Assume that the payoff from conceding c i 1 c j to one’s democratic competitor is U i (c i ) 1 c i c j . Then we only have to expect a democratic party to co-operate with the non-democratic party if p(1 Fc i )< B (1 F)c i > (1 p )<1 (1 F)c i > c j
(*)
holds for at least one party and i 1,2 and j v i . Otherwise, one could expect the two democratic competitors to reach an agreement in spite of their initial impasse. If, however, U i (c i ) is larger than c j for at least one party i 1,2, chances are that the dogmatic party will be admitted into government. The crucial condition depends on insufficient concessions c i c j 1 of the two democratic parties. In slightly more precise terms one could imagine the following elementary procedure, among two democratic parties 1, 2 and a dogmatic party, 3: Stage 1 Both democratic parties 1 and 2 choose a concession of c 1 , c 2 < 0,1> respectively. If c 1 c 2 p 1 the game ends with a coalition of the two democratic parties \1, 2^ and payoffs 1c i for i 1,2 and c 1 c 2 2 2 c 1 c 2 1 U 1 U 2 for c 1 c 2 2. 2 Ui
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If c 1 c 2 1 the process proceeds to the next stage. Stage 2 Democratic party i \1,2^ with c i c j (if c 1 c 2 , equal probability is assumed) decides between conceding c i 1 c j , thereby ending the game with coalition \1, 2^ receiving payoffs U i c j ,U j 1 c j ; or forming a coalition \i ,3^ with dogmatic party, 3, leading to payoff U i (c i ) p(1 Fc i )< B (1 F)c i > (1 p )<1 (1 F)c i >.
In sum the initial concessions are crucial along three dimensions: x the power shares of the democratic parties in case of feasibility c1 c 2 p1 , x the role of becoming the natural target of undemocratic dogmatism (in the sense that party i with c i c j will be approached since party 3 finds it more likely that this one offers a higher power share), x the effect on the crucial condition (*).
4. Extensions Assume that the above condition (*) for expecting that a democratic party could be willing to co-operate with the non-democratic party applies. The result may be a coalition with a comparatively high power share c i c j for the non-democratic party even though an operational cartel of the democratic parties would optimally choose only a low involvement of the non-democrats or none at all (see section 3.1). One might object to this finding that we considered a fairly inflexible bargaining protocol (essentially simultaneous concessions), but there are good practical and theoretical reasons to expect significant mis-co-ordination even under more sophisticated bargaining procedures. 27 The public-good character of democracy implies that competition between democratic parties – no matter which precise form it takes – can produce a sub-optimal level of inclusion of dogmatic parties (which in fact may prove ‘lethal’ for democracy itself). Democratic competition fares worse in that regard than a cartel of democratic parties entirely focused on (and restricted to) democracy’s preservation as well as on democratizing dogmatism. Inefficiency in fulfilling democratic values is the result of democratic agents’ efforts to maximize individual party-oriented payoffs rather than being first of all interested in preserving democracy. Suppose that the two democratic parties independently choose levels c 1 and c 2 which jointly determine the degree of acknowledgement or legitimacy bestowed on the non-democratic party. The non-democratic party’s total share of power, c, which results from individual choices c 1 and c 2 could be determined in various ways depending on the institutional structure. In terms of our simple model this structure may lead to different conditions of power sharing with the non-democratic party. 27
See, for example, the general impossibility result in Myerson (1983).
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For example, c w H(c 1 c 2 ) for H (0,1) would reflect that both democratic parties’ acknowledgements are perfect substitutes regarding the nondemocratic party’s overall role in society and potentially harmful access to power. Alternatively, c w H ¸ c 1 ¸ c 2 would formalize that more acknowledgement by one of the democratic parties can compensate for less acknowledgement by the other but with an increasing rate of substitution and, more critically, both democratic parties can veto any positive power share for the non-democrats since if either party chooses c i 0 then total power c is zero. The same is true if for instance c w H ¸ min \c 1 , c 2 ^ (capturing a very high degree of complementarity between c 1 and c 2 over their full range). Here, for the time being, we do not specify how c is linked to c 1 and c 2 . Of course, whether in fact there will be institutional arrangements corresponding to the preceding examples of functional forms is an empirical issue. Likewise it depends on factual preferences of the decision making entities which kinds of decision they would reach under alternative institutional arrangements. Assume for instance that the democratic parties are concerned with, first, the common expected utility U (c ) considered in Section 3.1 but also, second, a private utility component U i (c i ) which only depends on the acknowledgement c i that they themselves bestow on the dogmatic party. This term may increase or decrease in c i depending on whether it primarily reflects costs of acknowledging the non-democrats or (private) benefits from doing so. The former may result, e.g., from the need to wield internal support for the implied gamble amongst risk-averse party members or because acknowledgement of an extreme leftist/rightist party diminishes the moderate leftist/rightist party’s voter base. Private benefits might take the form of an expected ‘preferential treatment’ in case the nondemocrats successfully acquire dictatorial power or could account for diminished electoral chances of the democratic competitor (reminiscent of implicit endorsement of the Ross Perot or Ralph Nader candidacies in US presidential elections by Democrats and Republicans, respectively, which, of course, did not threaten US democracy but potentially the established twoparty system). Independently of whether U i (c i ) increases or decreases in c i , party i will choose c i to maximise the sum of expected net social benefits of inclusion, U (c ), and net private benefits U i (c i ) . Except for special cases, whatever the expected c j and the connection between c, c 1 , and c 2 may be, 28 the maximum of U (c ) U i (c i ) is achieved at a different level c i* than the maximum of U (c ). That is, individual decisions c 1* and c 2* will typically fail to result in the optimal level of inclusion c * (as identified in section 3.1). The right level of comparison may actually no longer be c * since private 28
Even, for instance, c w c i could be justified either by false consensus (party i thinks that party j will reason in the same way so that c c i c j ) or by dictatorial illusion (party i thinks that her choice c i will determine c j ).
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costs or benefits to the democratic parties, U i (c i ), were not considered in section 3.1. But even if one looks at the level c ** which maximizes U (c ) U 1(c 1 ) U 2(c 2 ) , e.g. when assuming c w (c 1 c 2 ) 2, the equilibrium (c 1* c 2* ) produced by strategic interaction of the democratic parties will typically fail to be socially optimal. The reason is that both democratic parties impose an externality on each other (via U (c ) ) which is ignored in their particular optimization problems. The result could be too little integration of the non-democratic party, namely if private costs dominate: both parties try to free-ride, i.e., enjoy the expected net benefits from successful integration but bear a less than equal share of its up-front costs. It seems more likely though that there will be too much integration in analogy to the analysis of section 3.2. This is the case if private benefits are considerable: both parties try to feather their own nest and spoil the other’s, but fail to fully account for the shared consequences of unsuccessful integration. The intermediate case in which positive and negative externalities cancel out is a theoretical possibility (then both parties’ interests would be fully aligned with the common goal of preserving democracy), but it can be expected to arise only by great coincidence. To admit party competition sub-optimal choices (c 1* c 2* ) may well be a price worth paying. In particular, the gap between the socially optimal level c * and the one resulting from (c 1* c 2* ) can be tolerably small. This would be the case if the term U (c ) is of considerably greater magnitude and variation than the corresponding private terms. Both democratic parties would then value democracy per se higher than winning a particular election or pursuing other private goals such as increasing their party’s membership. Production of the ‘ideal level’ of inclusion of the dogmatic party by competition among democratic parties can be expected to be a rare event, though. Still, the more all democrats are committed to democracy, the less likely a fatal deviation from the ideal level becomes. This is how it should be.
5. Conclusions Without allowing quite unrestrained democratic voting and open competition for power the legitimacy of democracy will be undermined. In particular in young or transitional democratic legal orders supporters of democracy may deem it advantageous not to side-line democracy’s foes. This will apply in particular if they endorse the quite plausible empirical claim that participation in democratic practices and having a real share in power will tend to induce a preference for constitutional democracy itself. Taking the risk of letting the foes of democracy participate in earnest will be good policy only if the ‘enemy’ is not ‘too dangerous’. As long as democratic parties can form a cartel which keeps out the more dangerous dogmatic foes of democracy one might basically trust that the risk will be taken only if it is worthwhile. But since competition among democratic parties
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may induce them to admit their dogmatic competitors to a positive share in power when it is unwise (from the point of view of the common weal of the parties), trust in the good behaviour of democratic parties in dealing with non-democratic ones may not be warranted. One might want to resort here to constitutional rules that simply prevent non-democrats from competing. But keeping competition open for all competitors is such a basic ingredient of the process in which democratic legitimacy is built up that it may not be a particularly good policy to erect barriers to entry. Such a policy may be unwise because under official prohibition the forbidden parties may engage in all sorts of conspiracies and clandestine operations. It may be much better to ‘have them in the open’ or to admit them to the democratic power game as legitimate competitors. But then the exclusion of parties from true participation in the game of power may become more conspicuous and in the end even more harmful. Nevertheless, in particular in a transitional state of affairs in which constitutional democracy has not taken hold it may be relatively best to control the democratic game by certain constitutional rules of a non-democratic character. In this vein, one could imagine that a constitution would allow for a ‘path dependent’ cartel formation rule among democratic parties of the following kind: any of the established democratic parties that form the cartel has a veto against the formation of any coalition that contains one of the non-democratic parties. Such a measure would fall short of a full fledged prohibition of dogmatic parties. They would be allowed to compete for a majority of votes while the rule might prevent the race to the bottom. If under such circumstances the adversaries of democracy would fail to win votes it would be helpful. Should they, however, win great shares of the vote it would be hard to imagine that constitutional democracy could persist. Still, letting the foes of constitutional democracy participate in government such as to induce them ‘to develop a taste’ for constitutional democracy though a rather desperate strategy in the first place may nevertheless be the best option within the realm of the feasible.
Acknolwdgements We thank two anonymous referees for their challenging and constructive comments and participants at the conference on ‘Power: Conceptual, Formal, and Applied Dimensions’, 17–20 August 2006, Hamburg, Germany.
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12. The Instability of Power Sharing Steven J. Brams Department of Politics, New York University, USA
D. Marc Kilgour Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada
1. Introduction When two f