Non-State Actors and International Law
The Library of Essays in International Law Series Editor: Robert McCorquodale
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Non-State Actors and International Law
The Library of Essays in International Law Series Editor: Robert McCorquodale
Titles in the Series: International Law of Human Rights Michael K. Addo
Sources of International Law Martti Koskenniemi
International Law and Indigenous Peoples S. James Anaya
International Refugee Law He'l2ne Lambert
International Law and Islamic Law Mashood A. Baderin
Space Law Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen
The International Criminal Court Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer
Self-Determination in International Law Robert McCorquodale
Non-State Actors and International Law Andrea Bianchi
International Dispute Settlement Mary Ellen 0 'Connell
Democracy and International Law Richard Burchill
International Crimes Nikos Passas
Law of the Sea Hugo Caminos
International Environmental Law Volumes 1and I1 Paula M. Pevato
The Law of Treaties Scott Davidson Humanitarian Law Judith Gardam International Legal Personality Fleur Johns International Economic Regulation Jane Kelsey International Organizations Jan Klabbers International Peacekeeping Boris Kondoch
State Responsibility in International Law Rene' Provost Jurisdiction in International Law Michael Reisman Title to Territory Malcolm N. Shaw The Nature of International Law Gerry Simpson Collective Security Law Nigel D. White
Non-State Actors and International Law
Edited by
Andrea Bianchi Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva
ASHGATE
O Andrea Bianchi 2009. For copyright of individual articles please refer to the Acknowledgements. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Wherever possible, these reprints are made from a copy of the original printing, but these can themselves be of very variable quality. Whilst the publisher has made every effort to ensure the quality of the reprint, some variability may inevitably remain. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Wey Court East Union Road Farnharn Surrey GU9 7PT England Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA Ashgate website: http:/lwww.ashgate.com
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Non-state actors and international law. - (The Library of essays in international law) 1. Non-state actors (International relations) 2. Non-governmental organisations - Law and legislation 3. Persons (International law) 4. Liability (Law) I. Bianchi, Andrea 34 1.2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Non-state actors and international law 1 edited by Andrea Bianchi. p. cm. -- (The library of essays in international law) Includes index. ISBN 978-0-7546-2833-0 (alk. paper) 1. Non-governmental organizations. 2. Persons (International law) 3. International law. I. Bianchi, Andrea. 524841.N6567 2009 341.2--dc22 2008030729 ISBN: 978-0-7546-2833-0
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Contents Acknowledgements Series Preface Introduction: Relativizing the Subjects or Subjectivizing the Actors: Is That the Question.; PART 1 NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 Hersch Lauterpacht (1970), 'The Subjects of International Law', in E. Lauterpacht (ed.), International Law. Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, Volume I: The General Works, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 136-50. 2 A. Claire Cutler (2001), 'Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy', Review of International Studies, 27, pp. 133-50. 3 Jan Klabbers (2003), '(I Can't Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Actors', in Jarna Petman and Jan Klabbers (eds), Nordic Cosmopolitanism. Essays in International Law for Martti Koskenniemi, LeidedBoston: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 35 1 4 9 . 4 Daniel Thiirer (1999), 'The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and Transnational Enterprises in International Law and the Changing Role of the State', in Rainer H o h a n n (ed.), Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, pp. 37-58. 5 Janne E. Nijman (2007), 'Paul Ricoeur and International Law: Beyond "The End of the Subject". Towards a Reconceptualization of International Legal Personality', Leiden Journal of International Law, 20, pp. 25-64.
PART I1 THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH: SELECTED NON-STATE ACTORS 6 Robert McCorquodale (2006), 'The Individual and the lnternational Legal System', in Malcolm Evans (ed.), International Law (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 307-32. 7 Steve Charnovitz (2006), 'Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law', American Journal of lnternational Law, 100, pp. 348-72. 8 Oscar Schachter (l977), 'The Invisible College of International Lawyers', Northwestern University School of Law Review, 72, pp. 21 7-26.
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PART 111 PARTICIPATION BY NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES Law-Making 9 Michael J. Struett (2004), 'NGOs, the International Criminal Court, and the Politics of Writing International Law', in I.F. Dekker and W.G Werner, Governance and International Legal Theory, LeidenJBoston: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 321-53. 10 Kenneth Anderson (2000), 'The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society', European Journal of International Law, 11, pp. 91-120.
22 1
Law Adjudication 11 Lance Bartholomeusz (2005), 'The Amicus Curiae before International Courts and Tribunals', Non-State Actors and International Law, 5, pp. 209-86.
253
187
Law Enforcement 12 Alix Gowlland Gualtieri (2002), 'The Environmental Accountability of the World Bank to Non-State Actors: Insights from the Inspection Panel', British Yearbook of 333 International Law, 72, pp. 2 13-53. 13 Andrea Bianchi (1997), 'Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors', in G. Teubner (ed.), Global Law without a State, Aldershot: Dartmouth, pp. 179-212. 375 PART IV NON-STATE ACTORS' ACCOUNTABILITY: THE QUEST FOR NEW PARADIGMS 14 August Reinisch (2005), 'The Changing International Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors', in P. Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 37-89. 41 1 15 William A. Schabas (2002-2003), 'Punishment of Non-State Actors in NonInternational Armed Conflict', Fordham International Law Journal, 26, pp. 907-33. 465 16 Jill Marshall (2005), 'Torture Committed by Non-State Actors: The Developing Jurisprudence from the Ad Hoc Tribunals', Non-State Actors and International Law, 5, pp. 171-82. 493 17 Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons (2007), 'Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law', Modern Law Review, 70, pp. 599426. 505 18 Erik B. Bluemel(2005), 'Overcoming NGO Accountability Concerns in International Governance', Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 31, pp. 139-206. 533
Index
60 1
Acknowledgements My heartfelt thanks to Lorenzo Gradoni, Melanie Samson and Fouad Zarbiev for their assistance in the preparation of this edited volume. Thanks also to Katherine Del Mar for her editing work on the Introduction. The editor and publishers also wish to thank the following for permission to use copyright material. Brill Academic Publishers for the essays: Jan Klabbers (2003), '(I Can't Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Actors', in Jarna Petrnan and Jan Klabbers (eds), Nordic Cosmopolitanism. Essays in International Law for Martti Koskenniemi, Leideni Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 35 1 4 9 . Copyright O 2003 Brill Academic Publishers; Michael J. Struett (2004), 'NGOs, the International Criminal Court, and the Politics of Writing International Law', in I.F. Dekker and W.G. Werner, Governance and International Legal Theory, LeidentBoston: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 321-53. Copyright O 2004 Brill Academic Publishers; Lance Bartholomeusz (2005), 'The Amicus Curiae before International Courts and Tribunals', Non-State Actors and International Law, 5, pp. 209-86. Copyright O 2005 Brill Academic Publishers; Jill Marshall (2005), 'Torture Committed by Non-State Actors: The Developing Jurisprudence from the Ad Hoc Tribunals', Non-State Actors and International Law, 5, pp. 171-82. Copyright O 2005 Brill Academic Publishers. Brooklyn Journal of lnternational Law for the essay: Erik B. Bluemel (2005), 'Overcoming NGOAccountability Concerns in International Governance', BrooklynJournal oflnternational Law, 31, pp. 139-206. Copyright O 2005 Brooklyn Journal of lnternational Law. Cambridge University Press for the essays: A. Claire Cutler (2001), 'Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy', Review of International Studies, 27, pp. 133-50. Copyright 0 2001 British lnternational Studies Association; Janne E. Nijman (2007), 'Paul Ricoeur and International Law: Beyond "The End of the Subject7'. Towards a Reconceptualization of lnternational Legal Personality', Leiden Journal of lnternational Law, 20, pp. 2 5 4 4 . Copyright 02007 British International Studies Association. Copyright Clearance Center for the essay: Steve Charnovitz (2006), 'Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law', American Journal of International Law, 100, pp. 34872. Duncker and Humblot GmbH for the essay: Daniel Thiirer (1999), 'The Emergence of NonGovernmental Organizations and Transnational Enterprises in International Law and the Changing Role of the State', in Rainer Hofmann (ed.), Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, pp. 37-58.
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Lauterpacht Center for the essay: Hersch Lauterpacht (l970), 'The Subjects of lnternational Law', in E. Lauterpacht (ed.), International Law. Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, Volume I: The General Works, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 136-50. Copyright O 1970 Lauterpacht Center. Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons (2007), 'Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law', Modern Law Review, 70, pp. 599426. Copyright O 2007 Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons. Oxford University Press for the essays: Robert McCorquodale (2006), 'The Individual and the International Legal System', in Malcolm Evans (ed.), International Law (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 307-32. Copyright O 2006 Oxford University Press; Kenneth Anderson (2000), 'The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society', European Journal of International Law, 11, pp. 91-120. Copyright O 2000 Oxford University Press; Alix Gowlland Gualtieri (2002), 'The Environmental Accountability of the World Bank to Non-State Actors: Insights from the Inspection Panel', British Yearbook of International Law, 72, pp. 213-53. Copyright O 2002 Oxford University Press; August Reinisch (2005), 'The Changing International Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors', in P. Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 37-89. Copyright O 2005 Oxford University Press. William A. Schabas for the essay: William A. Schabas (2002-2003), 'Punishment of NonState Actors in Non-International Armed Conflict', Fordham International Law Journal, 26, pp. 907-33. Copyright O 2002-2003 William A. Schabas, published by Fordham University School of Law. Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the first opportunity.
Series Preface Open a newspaper, listen to the radio or watch television any day of the week and you will read or hear of some matter concerning international law. The range of matters include the extent to which issues of trade and human rights should be linked, concerns about refugees and labour conditions, negotiations of treaties and the settlement of disputes, and decisions by the United Nations Security Council concerning actions to ensure compliance with international law. International legal issues have impact on governments, corporations, organisations and people around the world and the process of globalisation has increased this impact. In the global legal environment, knowledge of international law is an indispensable tool for all scholars, legal practitioners, decision-makers and citizens of the 2 1st century. The Library of Essays in International Law is designed to provide the essential elements for the development of this knowledge. Each volume contains essays of central importance in the development of international law in a subject area. The proliferation of legal and other specialist journals, the increase in international materials and the use of the internet has meant that it is increasingly difficult for legal scholars to have access to all the relevant articles on international law and many valuable older articles are now unable to be obtained readily. These problems are addressed by this series, which makes available an extensive range of materials in a manner that is of immeasurable value for both teaching and research at all levels. Each volume is written by a leading authority in the subject area who selects the articles and provides an informative introduction, which analyses the context of the articles and comments on their significance within the developments in that area. The volumes complement each other to give a clear view of the burgeoning area of international law. It is not an easy task to select, order and place in context essays from the enormous quantity of academic legal writing published in journals - in many languages -throughout the world. This task requires professional scholarly judgment and difficult choices. The editors in this series have done an excellent job, for which I thank and congratulate them. It has been a pleasure working with them. ROBERT McCORQUODALE General Series Editor School of Law University of Nottingham
Introduction Relativizing the Subjects or Subjectivizing the Actors: Is That the
Question? Context
The Library of Essays in International Law is a valuable series of books. Among other things, it is an attempt to restore doctrine to its ancient role of collecting relevant legal materials and providing guidance to scholars as well as practitioners. In the early days, doctrine carried out this function by assembling primary sources, which were difficult to retrieve. Its role was prominent in finding the instances of state practice, and thereby systematizing and making available to the interested public - which would include other scholars, state officials and courts -the fundamental elements on the basis of which legal decisions were to be taken and the law was to be found. Certainly, this process was not a neutral one. The way in which the relevant materials were chosen, assembled and presented depended heavily on the way in which doctrine perceived of the international legal system and its proper functioning. Acting as a broker between raw legal materials and its users, doctrine shaped international law to its own liking. The task was somewhat facilitated by arelative convergence ofviews about what international law was about and which purposes it was meant to serve. The most highly qualified publicists of the time, to borrow the term used in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice,' provided evidence of the rules of international law. Whether in so doing they also created such rules is a question that goes beyond the purpose of these introductory remarks. Be that as it may, scholars had control over the way in which the law was made and applied. The pioneering effort by Arnold McNair and Hersch Lauterpacht in the early 1920s to launch the Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases ( 1 9 19-32) (later Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases (1 933-49) and subsequently renamed International Law Reports), which brought together judicial decisions, including those by national courts, at the core of international practice, attests to this active role of doctrine, including its intermediary function as regards primary sources (Jennings, 1998). At this point, one might think that the historical reminiscing about the early last century doctrine has carried the author away, or, at least, has led him astray. In fact, a similar intermediary role could be aptly performed nowadays by doctrine for completely different reasons. Certainly, in a world where there is no want of information, where most legal materials have become accessible at real time, where databases are as numerous and rich as to satisfy
' See Art. 38 (d) of the International Court of Justice Statute listing 'the judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law', applicable by the Court to disputes submitted to it.
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even the most eager law journal reader, the role of doctrine may no longer consist of disclosing hidden materials and unravelling instances of practice which would go otherwise unnoticed by the unskilled researcher. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, doctrine may still mediate, no longer between primary sources and their potential users but, rather, between secondary sources and interested readers. The proliferation of publications and the ensuing panoply of writings, the scant quality control of many existing publications, the redundant stratification of well-known arguments in endless law review essays, the lengthy compilations of a-critical commentaries and a certain inclination (by some segments of the academic corporation) to conceive of scientific writing as an industrial production process, all are elements that contribute to make international legal scholarship a discipline in disarray. Against this backdrop, some selectivity is indeed warranted. In this respect, to sift out the most important contributions on any given area of international law is an exercise worth the effort. To take up the responsibility of providing interested readers with some of the writings that have better contributed to the understanding of the state of the law in a certain area of international regulation appeared to me a valuable service to the scientific community. This is why I accepted with pleasure the invitation to edit a volume of essays on the topic 'Non-state Actors and International Law'. I thought that the exercise would be a good opportunity to revise the extant literature, to find pieces I had never read before or to retrieve from my memory recollections of readings done long ago, which had struck me at the time as particularly interesting or thought-provoking. Much to my dismay, the search has been difficult and has brought about some sense of frustration. In particular, I would have expected to find myriad contributions of a theoretical character, which would shed light on the concept of 'actor' in international legal processes, to be contrasted with the more traditional notion of 'subject'. Having set out to lay down the theoretical framework for a theory of actors in international law - what luck not to have to do it yourself, but rather rely on colleagues who have already done it for you! - I soon found myself incapable of tracing the plethora of writings I expected to find. Several explanations may lie at the heart of the above-mentioned difficulties. The simplest one is that I have not researched well enough and that what I was looking for is actually out there, in some law journal, monographic study or edited volume which I have overlooked. This could reasonably account for my failure, one not particularly flattering for my ego as a researcher, but certainly comforting to the discipline: what you need is there if only you can find it. However, the many colleagues and collaborators whom I had asked to draw to my attention interesting writings on the topic had no more success than I did, which probably means that the difficulties are real. Second, I thought that the outcome of a research depends heavily on the queries one submits and the premises one starts from. Perhaps I was wrong to search for studies on the actors of international law, simply because there is no such thing in the general theory of international law. Mainstream scholarship still thinks in terms of 'subjects' and international legal personality. The term 'actor' comes from the language of political science. This may attest to an ever-increasing cross-fertilization between the two disciplines. Or, perhaps, it is simply evidence that once the border of interdisciplinarity is crossed, what lies ahead is a barren plain with no landmarks or other distinctive signposts. Against this background, what makes a piece of scholarly writing eligible for inclusion in this volume of essays is debatable. Should one select only those essays that have been written by international lawyers proper - that is, members of the 'scientific field' (Bourdieu,
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1981) who are socially recognized as laying a legitimate claim to scientific authority and competence in international law? But then one may wonder whether those who are clearly not readily identifiable with the discipline of international law and yet have published their work in international law journals or books edited by international lawyers may likewise lay such a legitimate claim. Is publication in international law books and journals the determinant factor? Or should one reach out to scholarly contributions that, although admittedly belonging to other disciplines, may shed light on some aspects of the functioning of the international legal system and inspire from outside hrther thinking within the discipline? These questions are clearly reminiscent of Hart's distinction between the internal and external point of view on the law (Hart, 196 1, pp. 86-88).2 A contemporary and contextual reappraisal of the dichotomy would arguably presuppose that clarity be made at the outset about what is meant by internal and external as well as the usefulness and propriety of placing oneself strictly within the internal perspective. If the above-mentioned distinction appeared as relatively clear-cut and straightforward at the time when the positivist theory of law provided a unitary and selfsufficient framework of analysis, in the present time to distinguish between internal and external perspectives requires a prior definition of what are the boundaries that connote the 'legal' and make it distinct from other aspects andlor dimensions of social life. The difficulty of providing sound answers to the above queries may be one of the reasons why international legal scholarship has carefully avoided dealing with the issue of non-state actors in a systematic way. It is extraordinary to realize how little attention the theoretical discourse about non-state actors has drawn. Yet this reluctance is understandable. In fact the issue lies at the interface of theory and practice, law and policy, and the stance you take about it is likely to have repercussions on such other systemic issues as law-making and law enforcement. To use Jan Klabbers' words (from Chapter 3), 'subjects doctrine forms the clearing house between sources and substance: it is through subjects doctrine that the international allocation of values takes place, and as any political scientist knows, the authoritative allocation of values is one of the main political functions' (p. 55). The subjects1 actors discourse, therefore, takes place in a variety of contexts on a small scale. Most of the time the narrative describes how different actors participate in legal process in any given area, such as international human rights law, environmental law and international economic law. Whether the same actors play a role in other areas is often of little interest, and the extreme fragmentation of relevant studies makes one think that the concept of 'regime' has also been successfully imported from political science. At this point, I suppose I have made a strong enough case to argue that my task was not an easy one and that what is proposed to the reader in this volume did not come naturally from the state of the literature. Nor have I demonstrated a capacity or inclination to assemble the scattered pieces of the mosaic back into a coherent pattern where figures and objects can be clearly seen. I suspect that to entrust the preparation of this book to someone who clearly subscribes to one of the methodslschools that characterize international legal scholarship in the present time would have been much more beneficial to the overall coherence of the volume. A positivist would have had plenty of choice among traditional writings on the subjects of international law. Suffice to look at most manuals and treaties that are currently As is known, Hart's distinction remains controversial. For a recent reappraisal, see Perry (1995).
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used in European universities to realize that the prevailing discourse is still one concerning the subjects of international law. Alongside a solid study of the doctrine of subjects, there would have been some critical voices about the diminished importance of the state and an essay restating the fundamental role that states will continue to play. Then, the discussion would have shifted to the personality of international organizations, against the background of international case law, particularly the International Court of Justice's and, if the editor were a 'progressive' scholar, he or she would have included a selection of contributions making the case for individuals having partial or relative personality. By the same token, if a New Haven School representative were to indulge in the exercise, she would hardly have mentioned the doctrine of subjects, but rather would have concentrated on the decision-making process and its many participants. She would have made clear that the way in which participants operate depends heavily on context and the values that they want to foster. I doubt that there would have been a reference to the case law of the International Court of Justice. Perhaps there should be as many volumes as there are methods and schools to provide everybody with the comforting view that even the language of the subjects can be spoken in their own dialect?
Non-State Actors in the Theory of International Law (Or dowsing for theory: the divining rod does not vibrate) Conceptual thinking about non-state actors poses numerous challenges. As regards terminology, one may wonder whether the term, which has come to be part of the common parlance of international lawyers, has merely a descriptive connotation, used to encompass those actors that are not states, or whether it refers, in a prescriptive fashion, to a particular status, recognized by the international legal order, to which specific legal connotations are attached. One would expect theory to have tackled this issue and have provided satisfactory responses to such a fundamental question. In fact, despite the increasing use of 'non-state actors' as a term of art, no systematization seems to have been made in the literature which could satisfactorily account, from the theoretical perspective, for the role played by non-state actors in contemporary international law. Traditional doctrine provided a neat framework of analysis. The international legal system recognized only a limited number of entities, primarily states, which could bear rights and duties under international law. The concept of international legal personality was meant to cover those entities which 'the legal system has cast to appear on the stage of the law' (Cheng, 1991, p. 24). As the etymology of the words suggests, only those personae that played a direct role in the legal system could appear on stage, regardless of the other entities that might participate in the production of the play. The latter would be of interest to sociologists and political scientists but were irrelevant to legal analysis. The question 'Who is the subject?' found an obvious answer in a strongly state-centred system, where states had the monopoly of law-making, law adjudication and law enforcement processes (Weil, 1992, p. 122). In a somewhat tautological fashion, 'indices' of the legal personality of entities at international law were traced to the capacity of certain entities to perform such functions as to exchange diplomatic missions or to conclude treaties, which were all typical states' prerogatives (Cheng, 1991, p. 38). Anomalies could always be accommodated and their marginal character posed no systemic threat (Arangio-Ruiz, 1996). Over time, legal personality reached out to international organizations, in many ways a direct emanation of states, and the International
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Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Reparation for Injuries case paved the way for relativizing the doctrine of subjects and adjusting it to the new demands of the international ~ommunity.~ Ever since, the doctrine of subjects has resisted any attempt at revision and still stands as a cornerstone of positivistic legal analysis. Most textbooks and treaties still have a section on the subjects of international law, and the unity of the system is being preserved by denying the existence of new scientific paradigms and schools of thought that, in the meantime, have done away with traditional theory and have proposed frameworks of analysis based on entirely different tenets. The merit of sociological approaches to international law and, particularly, the introduction of policy analysis by the New Haven School is to have highlighted that the social fabric and structure of the international legal system, on the one hand, and its subjects1 actors, on the other, are 'mutually-constitutive'. Constructivist theories, elaborated in the field of international relations, have shown that the interaction among different actors constitutes the structure of the system and the latter shapes the identity, interests and expectations of the actors in a mutual process of influence (Arend, 1998, p. 129; Mertus, 1999-2000). When and how the terminology of actors andor participants made its way into international law may be subject to controversy. Certainly, Rosalyn Higgins' critique of the old theory of the subjects (1994) and its advocacy of the notion of participants in international decisionmaking processes has greatly contributed to giving legitimacy to such a new terminology. The argument that, by construing the reality of international law in terms of 'subjects' and 'objects', '[wle have erected an intellectual prison of our own choosing and then declared it to be an unalterable constraint' (Higgins, 1994, pp. 49-50) carries much force, particularly because the distinction does not seem to serve any particular functional purpose. This, however, is unlikely to convince the positivist who would rebut, not without reason, that the doctrine of sovereign equality and the doctrine of subjects are constitutive fictions 'that require acceptance if the whole edifice of the international legal system is not to be called into question' (Dupuy, 2003, p. 179). The point is well taken, insofar as it highlights that the way in which one conceives of international law inevitably reflects on the way in which such fundamental questions as to 'who makes the law' and 'who is the subject of the law' are answered. In fact, to conceive of international law as a body of rules in a community of states or as a legal process in a community where 'there are a variety of participants, making claims across state lines, with the object of maximizing various values' (Higgins, 1994, p. 50) is not the same thing, and the use of a different terminology hardly hides a fundamental difference in thinking of the international legal system. The situation of disarray in which the doctrine of subjects/actors seems to be is further attested by the attempt to put together such different visions with a view to reconciling them. In a recent book, the relevance of the proliferation of actors to treatymaking has been assessed by Roben (2005) who has taken for granted the variety of actors that contribute to making international law. Dupuy's comment on the paper, and his tremendous difficulty in accommodating such a way of thinking in relation to the traditional doctrine of subjects, is evidence of a certain malaise within the profession to abandon the old scheme and 'The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the international community. Throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life' (1949 ICJ Reports, p. 178).
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embrace new ones. Dupuy's fictitious joke, reporting a hypothetical conversation with Jean Combacau, who would not understand the expression 'non-state actors' as such a term would fall 'outside the scope of legal analysis', is too ostentatious to be an exercise in self-irony. In fact, the foundational character of the doctrine of subjects to positivist thinking does not allow its adherents to relinquish it lightheartedly. Even if they are ready to concede that the doctrine is no longer capable of explaining the complexities of contemporary international law-making, the lack of an intellectually systematic alternative would nevertheless cause them to cling to the old framework. The inadequacy of the doctrine of subjects has been underscored by numerous authors. Indeed, in one of the earliest statements, Hersch Lauterpacht, writing on 'The Subjects of International Law' (Chapter 1) contends that 'the individual human being is the ultimate unit and end of all law' (p. 16). Key to any such critique is the acknowledgment that the changing social structure of the international community must be adequately accounted for and that new conceptual tools are required. The solipsistic vision of state sovereignty as the quintessential element of the international community of states must give way to a contemporary assessment of the social forces that structure a wider community whose members have 'values, identities and roles distinct from the geographic limitations of states' (McCorquodale, 2006, p. 149). In her essay on 'Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy' (Chapter 2), Claire Cutler notes that '[tlhe logic of the liberal representative state and consent-based notions of international law' (p. 36) do not allow reconsideration of the state as the only subject of the international legal system, thus causing a 'disjunction between theory and practice'which is conducive to a 'crisis of legitimacy' (pp. 33 ff). As is well known, despite Franck's effort (1999) to introduce legitimacy into the vocabulary of international law, the term makes positivist lawyers diffident by their incapacity to attach to it sufficiently precise legal connotations. In this context, however, its meaning is self-evident. As Cutler shows, if the participants in international legal processes fail to see their social practices reflected in the law, the law's claim to authority will be undermined. Attempts to reduce the gap between theory and practice and to address the issue of subjects1 actors in a comprehensive way have not been numerous. Jan Klabbers does it in Chapter 3, '(I Can't Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Actors', as discussed earlier. In addition, a new approach to the theory of international legal personality has been put forward, with a view to introducing a rebuttable presumption of normative responsibilities of de facto p o w e h l actors. According to Nowrot, the influential position of some non-state actors would create the presumption that international legal obligations concerning 'the promotion of community interests such as the protection of human rights, the environment and core labour and social standards' are applicable to them (2005, p. 13). Such an approach would ensure that international law fulfils its mission of 'comprehensively civilizing international relations' (ibid.). As to the objection that the concept of 'influential actor' would be too indeterminate to attach to it a particular status, the proponent of the theory submits that the influence of any given actor can be objectively measured on the basis of such criteria as direct or indirect participation in international law processes, as well as its capacity to contribute to promoting common interests and protecting global public goods. A constitutional perspective, such as the one adopted by Daniel Thiirer in Chapter 4, 'The Emergence ofNon-Governmental Organizations and Transnational Enterprises in International Law and the Changing Role of the State', is also likely to cast the debate in a new light. By
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acknowledging the changing structure of international law and the impact of globalization on world affairs, Thurer advocates the adoption of a constitutional approach that focuses on the basic components of the legal system, thus doing away with the doctrine of subjects. In Thurer's enlarged notion of 'international community' there would be no room for formalistic doctrines of legal personality and 'the new actors in our globalizing world might more easily be moulded into the system of international law if we try to conceive of them as factors and forces of a broader constitutional order' (p. 74). To agree with this characterization of international law actors implies, for Thurer, an endorsement of the underlying constitutional perspective which puts forward a vision of international law gradually drifting towards a form of world federalism where states are no more than mediators or 'bridges' between communities on the local, regional and global plane. Whether or not this is the way in which international law is going, the attempt to move away from formalistic constructions is self-evident. Yet another way to depart from the doctrine of subjects is to focus directly on the scope of application of international norms and to identify their addressees without drawing any conclusion in terms of subjectivity, properly so-called. In other words, what matters is to determine whether any specific obligation is applicable to any given non-state actor. The answer to this question is not predetermined by the subjectivity (or lack thereof) of the non-state actor but by a number of factors ranging from international practice to policy considerations. Furthermore, the ultimate purpose of any such query is not to determine whether the entity is a subject of international law, but more simply whether a certain intemational legal obligation is applicable to it. This approach, which inspires many works, has been recently used by Andrew Clapham (2006a, 2006b) in his work on the human rights obligations of non-state actors. Its merit lies primarily in de-emphasizing the importance of the notion of 'subject', to focus more pragmatically on the actual scope of application of international obligations. A strong policy consideration for adopting this approach is the need to promote the implementation of rules and their underlying values. lf the prohibition of torture is perceived to be a fundamental value by the international community, its respect should be owed by all actors, regardless of whether they are a state or a non-state. But to impose obligations directly on non-state actors presents the obvious disadvantage of divesting states of their responsibility to ensure compliance with international law obligations (Vazquez, 2004-2005). Unless such a direct imposition of obligations on non-state actors is coupled with effective enforcement mechanisms, it may be ill-advised to rely on this normative strategy to the detriment of more traditional and, arguably, more effective state-centred paradigms of intemational obligations (ibid.). By and large the most engaging and intriguing attempt to revisit the notion of international legal personality at international law is the work of Janne Elisabeth Nijman, in particular her monographic study on The Concept of International Legal Personality (2004). In an attempt to revive the naturalist tradition of international law, founded on considerations of ethics and morality, Nijman puts forward a theory of international legal personality whereby individuals - the primary legal persons in international law - possess 'a natural right to political participation . .. the right to have rights, [which] includes the right to live in a world governed by just institutions' (ibid., p. 472). As a corollary to such a natural right, the individual (the Self) also has 'the duty to take moral and political responsibility' (ibid., p. 473) to respect the Other and, as Nijman states in Chapter 5, 'to fight against exclusion and misrecognition on the global scale' (p. 115). The fiction of the state's international legal personality (the mask) as shaped by classical international law is doomed to subside and give way to a new concept
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of international legal personality (the vocal chords) which, by linking law to justice, refers to the capacity to speak and act, and, in a broader sense, 'the capacity to be a political participant, with a natural right to such participation' (Nijman, 2004, p. 469). In a later essay, 'Paul Ricoeur and International Law: Beyond "The End of the Subject7" (Chapter 5), Nijman, who thrives on the works of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, particularly his hermeneutics of the Self, further elaborates on the notion of international legal personality as 'life in global institutions7(p. 115). The quest for a new cosmopolitan ethics requires 'the participation of the whole of humanity through different associations and institutions' (p. 117). The reconstitution of every individual and collective Self in relation to others is constitutive of a social order of mutual recognition and respect. This idea of international legal personality as 'moral identity constituted in the dialectic relation of Self and Other(nes)s' (p. 118) is an admirable attempt at changing the language of international law by reconceptualizing some of its foundational tenets. Although, admittedly, Nijman refuses to engage in the analysis of international practice, some of her findings obviously bear on practice. For instance, she advocates the attribution of personality to non-state actors in an inclusive fashion and she denies personality to those states who are no longer capable of expressing and protecting the personality of their citizens (Nijman, 2004, p. 469). Unlike Allott, who would do away with the traditional category of subjects and allow for the recognition of the countless participants in international legal relations 'as the needs of international society demand' (1990, p. 372), Nijman confers to the concept of international legal personality a fundamental role in ordering international society and shaping the contours of a new and more just international order. Interestingly enough, Nijman's fundamental tenet may be thought to rejoin Hersch Lauterpacht's contention in Chapter 1 that 'the individual human being is the ultimate unit and end of all law' (p. 16). What to make of such convergence of views among scholars, who have written at dramatically different times and from so divergent theoretical standpoints, is no easy task. If one were to venture into some synthesis of sorts, it would be reasonable to speculate that a common feature of their respective theories is the centrality of the human being in law. Law, however, is a political project which different people conceive of in an entirely different way. To Lauterpacht, to acknowledge the central role of the individual and to look at it as subject of all law was 'an essential stage in the progression of the international community towards the goal of federal integration' (p. 16; my emphasis). To Nijman, to recognize that the individual is 'the legal personality par excellence of international law' (Nijman, 2004, p. 473) is instrumental to putting forward her main thesis that '[International Legal Personality] forms the cords between the individual human being and the universal human society' (ibid., p. 473). The task of international law and of the international community would then be to 'guarantee the rights to have rights, the right to political participation, i.e. the right to speak out and raise one's voice' (ibid., p. 473). Against this background, international legal personality takes up an entirely new function within a brand new project of international society made of just institutions. International legal personality stands somewhere in between morals and politics and is part and parcel of a more ambitious project to refound international law on an ethical basis. Incidentally, the call for laying down a moral foundation for international law is not isolated and goes hand in hand with other intellectual projects, apparently inspired by entirely different considerations (Franck, 1999; Buchanan, 2007; Koskenniemi, 2007).
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This vision, characterized by some commentators as 'utopian idealism' (Masciulli, 2006), is unlikely to appeal to the positivist who would typically look at it as an exercise in 'sociopolitical history' deprived of practical legal relevance (Kolb, 2007). However, the proliferation of studies that attempt to put forward dramatically different conceptual perspectives should not be taken lightheartedly as they attest, at the very least, to the unsatisfactory character of traditional international law frameworks as regards their capacity to explain the reality of contemporary international law and, most of all, to direct its future development.
The Empirical Approach: Selected Non-State Actors To account for the whole range of entities that could qualify as non-state actors is not the purpose of this edited volume. Given the controversial character of the topic and the dissonant voices in international legal scholarship, it would have been simply pretentious to lay claim to an exhaustive presentation of non-state subjects/actors. This limitation appears all the more compelling when one realizes that nowadays the range of non-state actors can be stretched almost ad libitum to include all sorts of actors, including 'scientists, technicians, auxiliary staff, and engineers in the academic, industrial research and life science communities', at least as regards the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Prescott, 2007, p. 41). The task is rather that of bringing forward a few, selected contributions which may help think about the topic in a stimulating way. The first essay in Part 11 is Robert McCorquodale's 'The Individual and the International Legal System' (Chapter 6). By thoroughly reviewing the role of individuals, including groups of individual^,^ in the different areas of international law, McCorquodale concludes that the individual is an independent participant in the international legal system, even though the degree of participation may vary depending on the changing needs of international law. The fact that nowadays many, but certainly not all, international law scholars would admit that individuals are subjects or legitimate actors of international law should not be a cause to overlook the long and painful process that eventually led to the recognition of the role of individuals in international law. In many ways, this is a paradigmatic example, as it shows how sensitive an issue the inclusion/exclusion of any given entity as subjectlactor of the system can be (McCorquodale, 2004, pp. 481 ff). Given their increasing role in international law-making, law adjudication and law enforcement processes, particular consideration is given in this section to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In fact, it would be simplistic to think that NGOs have only recently made their appearance on the international scene (Martens, 2003). Steve Charnovitz's essay in the Michigan Journal of International Law (1996-97) provides a detailed account of the different historical phases of NGO involvement in international affairs. The book-length and readily available character of the piece advised against its inclusion in this volume of essays. Another essay by Charnovitz, 'Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law', is included as Chapter 7 in this volume, and in this he gives a more succinct and yet effective account of the role of NGOs in contemporary international law. Charnovitz concludes by striking a note of optimism when he says that NGOs will continue to inject into the debate
For additional insights on the rights of peoples, see also Tomuschat (1986) and Korkeakivi (1993).
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'competing facts and sentiments', thus paving the way for a 'more englobing international law in the twenty-first century' (p. 171). How this is to be done remains an open question. Finally, an explanation may be owed for including Oscar Schachter's seminal work on the 'Invisible College of International Lawyers' (Chapter 8). Since the essay was written, the college and its influence have become more visible, with international lawyers playing an ever-increasing role in shaping the discipline and its practice. If they have failed in preserving the unity of the discipline, as Schachter had wished, their acting under the different guise of scholars, counsel, international judges and legal advisers make them a powerful actor on the scene. Their actual influence on the development of international law cannot be underestimated. An astounding example of such influence is given by the manner in which international lawyers have moulded the normative category of jus cogens and exploited its evocative power as a collective belief. As I have written elsewhere, by invoking its magical power and administering its rites, the magician-international lawyer has 'succeeded in making jus cogens a part and parcel of the fabric of the international law discourse' (Bianchi, 2008, p. 494). Participation by Non-State Actors in International Legal Processes
Law-Making An apt illustration of the way in which civil society and NGOs may participate in the international law-making process is given by the adoption of two treaties, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Ottawa Convention on the ban of landmines. Certainly, these are not the only instances in which the formal interstate law-making mechanisms have been strongly influenced by NGOs. Other occurrences can be traced to recent practice that further attest to this phenomenon (Breen, 2003,2005). And yet the ICC Statute and the Ottawa Convention are prominent examples of this trend for the overt and highly publicized role that NGOs have played in their creation. This should hardly come as a surprise. As Michael Struett shows in Chapter 9, 'NGOs, the International Criminal Court, and the Politics of Writing International Law', NGOs have become more sophisticated in their lobbying strategies and the level of their expertise has remarkably improved. Indeed, the capacity to accompany their 'discursive claims' with 'expert knowledge' (p. 203; see also Kamminga, 2005, p. 110) has, in all likelihood, been crucial in enhancing their practical impact on international treaty-making. The fact that many legal experts drawn from NGOs were integrated into states' delegations in Rome is quite telling of the potential effects that their specific expertise may bring about. It may very well be that NGOs used to work in the interstices of the international system and that their whispers from the basement were barely audible upstairs to state representatives negotiating treaties. It can hardly be denied, however, that nowadays their conspicuous presence can be physically detected in the corridors of state diplomacy and their voice can be distinctly heard by any bystander. Two caveats to the above considerations seem to be in order. First, it would be misleading to think, as Kenneth Anderson aptly warns in his essay on the Ottawa Convention banning landmines (Chapter 1O), that such instances of law-making are evidence of a democratization
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of international law, some sort of springing of the law from below as opposed to the traditional interstate law-making. Quite the contrary, such a process only attests to the ever-increasing role of powerful transnational elites, and democratic legitimacy should not be conhsed with the ability to operate as pressure groups and mobilize certain segments of civil society (p. 248). Nor are NGOs necessarily to be identified with the good side as opposed to states being on the evil side, although some commentators maintain that 'irresponsible' states more than 'irresponsible' NGOs are the main problem (Kamminga, 2005, p. 11 1). Second, however thorough and systematic is the intervention of NGOs in the law-making process, the process still remains within the firm grasp of states (Martens, 2003). Once again, one is left with the choice of focusing on the formal aspects of law-making, in respect of which nothing seems to have dramatically changed, or of stressing the practical impact of unconventional actors in the formal processes. In domestic legal systems as well, laws are often adopted under pressure from lobby groups and yet the latter are not characterized as part of the law-making process. Similarly, at international law the substantial impact of NGOs on normative outcomes does not make them the formal law-maker. The tension between the 'politics of form' and the 'forms of politics' becomes palpable again and the identification of the subject proves to be, more and more, a struggle for determining who may legitimately and authoritatively allocate communal values, as Klabbers suggests in Chapter 3 (p. 55). Law Adjudication
Another relevant aspect is participation of non-state actors in international law adjudication processes. This expression can be taken to mean different things. First, it may refer to the possibility that non-state actors may be a party to international judicial proceedings. For instance, until recently the individual's lack of standing before international tribunals had been used as an argument to refuse the individual's subjectivity under international law. Nowadays, the developments that have occurred, primarily in the area of human rights, have deprived the argument of much of its force. Individuals have direct access to a number of international tribunals and may directly enforce their claims. A sketchy overview of the position of non-state actors before international jurisdictions is given by Orrego-Vicuiia (200 I), whose contribution has the merit of not limiting the analysis to the field of human rights. By and large, however, the most significant and widely discussed phenomenon in respect of participation in law adjudication processes is the submission by non-state actors, particularly NGOs, of amicus curiae briefs before international courts. Although already in the early 1990s participation of non-governmental organizations in international judicial proceedings had attracted scholarly attention (Shelton, 1994), the issue has gathered momentum particularly in recent years through the increasing practice of submitting amicus curiae briefs. Chapter 11 by Lance Bartholomeusz is the most comprehensive recent account of such practice and its inclusion in this volume of essays is justified both by its thorough treatment of the topic and by its attempt to draw some general inferences from this widely accepted practice. In fact, it is difficult to make generalizations because the issue ought to be broached on a 'tribunal by tribunal' basis as suggested by Watts (2001). International courts enjoy a great deal of discretion about whether or not to allow amicus curiae submissions, and in exercising such discretion they are obviously limited by the rules of procedure that govern their respective judicial body.
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Overall, the status and juridical nature of the amicus curiae remains uncertain. It is not the same as an expert or a witness, although it may occasionally overlap with these other categories. As regards its functions, they can be varied. Amici can provide legal expertise or factual information; provide assistance to persons and entities that may be affected by a decision in accessing the court; or act on the basis of public interest considerations as some sort of 'trustees' for the protection of communal interests. It may aptly be wondered whether this relatively new practice effectively contributes to the legitimacy and transparency of international jurisdictions. The answer must be anuanced one. Despite some scattered reference in arbitral awards to the ~ontrary,~ participation in judicial proceedings and transparency of the latter seem to be two distinct issue^.^ As regards the issue of legitimacy, the argument is double-edged. On the one hand, amici's participation to protect community interests can be perceived by the public at large as a means to ensure greater legitimacy to judicial proceedings which most ofthe time remain firmly within the grasp of power-wielding entities (Stern, 2006). On the other hand, in certain particular contexts, the increasing involvement of civil society groups and professional associations can be perceived by the 'users' of judicial mechanisms as an undue interference and, potentially, a disruptive element in the complex process of interest-accommodation that third party settlement inevitably entails. Law Enforcement Non-state actors may also effectively participate in law enforcement processes. Once again, this may occur in a variety of forms. Arelatively simple example is provided by Astrid Epiney's work (2006) on the role of NGOs in ensuring compliance with multilateral environmental agreements. By complementing the states in relevant compliance or enforcement mechanisms, NGOs could effectively contribute to enhancing the overall effectiveness of multilateral environmental agreements. Indeed, environmental protection and human rights represent the two areas in which the potential role for non-state actors in implementing international law standards is most evident. Given the well-known reluctance of states to complain publicly about their fellow states in cases of violations of international law,7 it is often NGOs that draw attention to such violations. More generally, NGOs participate in monitoring activities, either directly or indirectly, and may trigger mechanisms of compliance or enforcement. Their capacity to gather information, provide expertise and mobilize public opinion makes
See, among others, the NAFTA tribunal decision in Methanex Corp. v. United States. Decision on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as 'Amici Curiae', 15 January 2001, para. 49, and the ICSID tribunal decision in Aguas Argentinas S.A. and Others v. Argentina. Order in response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 19 May 2005, para. 22. See the declarations of Canada ($$ 71-72) Turkey ($ 80) and Argentina ($ 93) at the WTO General Council Meeting of 2 November 2000 (WT/GC/M/60,23 January 2001). It is of note that states hardly ever take advantage of interstate claims mechanisms under human rights treaties such as Article 41 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 11 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination or Article 21 of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Article 33 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning interstate claims has also been rarely applied.
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NGOs powerful actors in the implementation of international law, even in situations of armed conflict. A particularly interesting example of the way in which non-state actors have come to play a major role in checking the conduct of state actors is the Inspection Panel of the World Bank. The insights provided by Alix Gowlland Gualtieri's essay on the environmental accountability of the World Bank to non-state actors (Chapter 12) are particularly useful in appreciating this innovative form of control over the World Bank's projects and their consistency with environmental and social policies which the institution has pledged to respect. Participatory requirements stipulate that non-state actors, such as individuals, interest groups and local communities, be legally protected against the loan development operations of the World Bank. Regardless of any other consideration concerning the technical arrangements and actual practices of the Inspection Panel, the accountability mechanism set up within the World Bank further attests to the multiplicity of ways in which non-state actors can effectively contribute to implementing international law and international policies. As I attempt to show in my essay on 'Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Nonstate Actors' (Chapter 13), the end result of these multifarious processes is that non-state actors generally, and NGOs more particularly, can create transnational solidarities and gather consensus over certain values, sometimes regardless of whether they are embodied in formal rules. In other words, they tend to create communication processes on the transnational level whereby the conduct of states is not necessarily evaluated in terms of its compliance with legally binding rules, but rather by a much less formal code, according to which the legality of their action largely depends on its being consistent with certain values, the respect of which is perceived to be mandated by law. The relevance of this process cannot be underestimated, as it casts a new light not only on the way in which non-state actors operate internationally, but also and, perhaps, most importantly, on the changing modes by which the distinction legal1 illegal is perceived and applied by relevant actors in contemporary international society.
Non-State Actors' Accountability: The Quest for New Paradigms (Or yet another slip of the international lawyer's tongue) The heterogeneity of non-state actors makes the issue of their accountability complex. Although the notion of accountability is far from being neatly defined, let alone in the legal field, the core of its meaning in this context can be intuitively grasped. Accountability is taken to refer to any form of control that can be used to hold any given actor accountable for its conduct. The standards against which such an evaluation must be performed are various and not all of them are amenable within the purview of the law, properly so-called. In this respect, recourse to what August Reinisch, in Chapter 14, 'The Changing International Legal Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors', calls a 'legal framework' may be of some utility. Approaching pragmatically the issue ofhow to deal with non-state actors in human rights law (even though his remarks lend themselves to a certain degree of generalization), Reinisch identifies a number of elements which constitute the proposed concept of 'legal framework', ranging from behavioural standards and the procedures used to discuss, supervise and enforce them to the institutions and networks within which the procedures are implemented. Against this backdrop, issues of accountability become somewhat more immanent and intelligible if not expressed in positivistic legal terms.
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Yet one should not think that accountability stands in contradistinction to legal responsibility, properly so-called. As far as individuals are concerned, for instance, mechanisms of legal accountability have steadily developed since Nuremberg. The principle of individual criminal liability for at least some core international law crimes is widely recognized as a matter of customary international law, and individual criminal liability is also attached to a number of conducts proscribed by specific treaties. If the principle of individual criminal liability is no longer seriously called into question, major flaws still hamper its effective implementation. Until recently international criminal jurisdictions have been scant and the International Criminal Court is still in its infancy. Domestic jurisdictions, which, according to the principle will bear the main burden for adjudicating international crimes, have not of c~mplementarity,~ been too active on the enforcement side (Ratner and Abrams, 2001, pp. 160 ff), mostly due to the carelessness of national legislators in failing to provide them with the necessary enabling legislation to apply international criminal law standards. Rather than focusing on well-known doctrines, the choice of materials as regards individual responsibility is directed towards considering the expansion of international criminal law: in particular, the punishment of nonstate actors for international crimes in non-international armed conflicts and the ancillary issue of the prosecution, by the ad hoc criminal tribunals, of acts of torture committed by nonstate actor^.^ This is clarified in William Schabas' essay on 'Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-International Armed Conflict' (Chapter 15) and Jill Marshall's essay on 'Torture Committed by Non-State Actors: The Developing Jurisprudence from the Ad Hoc Tribunals' (Chapter 16). Indeed, these developments seem to lend support to the theories that consider that the scope of application of certain international law norms must not be predetermined on the basis of any abstract notion of legal personality, but must be geared towards the realization of the norm's underlying values, particularly as they relate to human rights or humanitarian concerns. Entirely different considerations apply to the accountability of transnational corporations. The most impressive account of a theory of the legal responsibility of corporations for human rights abuses is Steven Ratner's book-length Yale Law Journal essay (2001-2002). Ratner develops an international law-based theory of corporate responsibility, whereby international obligations can be deemed to address corporate entities insofar as the latter cooperate with states and commit violations of the human dignity 'of those with whom they have special ties' (ibid., p. 449). An array of tools for the implementation of the theory is also put forward, ranging from corporate-initiated codes of conduct, NGO scrutiny and national legal regimes to soft international law and treaties. The merit of Ratner's theory lies in its comprehensive character and in its foundation in international law rather than the domestic law of any particular state. Given that a large part of domestic litigation involving the human rights abuses of corporate entities has taken place in the US on the basis of the Alien Tort Claims Act and that most of the literature relies on this strand of domestic case law to account for the responsibility of corporate entities (Joseph, 2004), such a wider focus is indeed welcome. Article 17 of the International Criminal Court Statute provides for the inadmissibility of cases that are being investigated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over them, unless that state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or the prosecution, thus creating a primacy of national jurisdictions over the ICC. On the role of the ICC in ensuring punishment of individual non-state actors, see Zellweger and Koller (2007).
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Furthermore, Ratner (200 1-2002, p. 545) emphasizes the importance of other elements, not necessarily of a legal character, which may prompt the accountability of corporate entities. Corporate social responsibility as well as market incentives to comply with international standards in certain areas may well provide additional tools for a comprehensive system of corporate accountability. In an essay on state responsibility for extraterritorial violations of human rights by corporations (Chapter 17), Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons advocate another
approach to the issue of corporate responsibility for human rights abuses, namely an expansive reading and use of the rules on state responsibility. By focusing on the applicability of human rights obligations incumbent on the home state to the extraterritorial acts of the national corporate entity, the authors apply the relevant rules of state responsibility to the conduct of home states with a view to holding them accountable for the acts of their corporate entities.I0 This approach has the merit of fostering solutions that are clearly available within the system - the rules on state responsibility - and provide states with an incentive to act diligently if they want to avoid international responsibility. To argue that states should be responsible for the acts of national corporate entities abroad makes sense, particularly as one realizes that home states attempt to impose their laws and regulations on foreign subsidiaries of corporate nationals in a number of areas, ranging from export controls to antitrust regulation. The argument that the same states should be accountable for the acts of the same entities when these violate human rights standards could reasonably follow. Criteria of attribution for the purpose of state responsibility, such as the exercise of elements of governmental authority or the direction or control by the state of the relevant activities, could well provide adequate tools for the implementation of such normative strategy. Two considerations, however, might stand in the way. The first is the acknowledgment that states do not seem inclined to accept such an expansive reading of their obligations under international law, and international practice does not seem to develop in that direction. The second remark stems from an assessment of the judicial policy of the International Court of Justice on matters of attribution. It will be recalled that in one of the few instances of conflicting jurisprudence among international jurisdictions, the ICJ made use of the criterion of 'effective control' to attribute the conduct of groups of individuals to a state," whereas the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) later adopted ' ~ the recent Genocide case,I3 the ICJ has a much softer criterion, that of 'overall c o n t r ~ l ' . In reiterated its previous jurisprudence and made clear, not without some institutional acrimony,I4 that general international law requires 'effective control' for conduct carried out by an In
For an earlier approach along similar lines, see Fatouros (1983). More generally, on the applicability of the rules of state responsibility to the conduct of individuals or groups of individuals, see Roucounas (2005) and Wolfrum (2005). See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States ofAmerica), ICJ Reports 1986, pp. 6445, para. 115. l2 See Prosecutor v. Dusko TadiE, ICTY, N0IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, paras 11545. See Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime ofCenocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ Reports 2007, paras 396407. IJ Ibid., para. 403.
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individual or a group of individuals to be attributed to a state. Besides the institutional aspects of the dispute between the two tribunals, it is reasonable to speculate that the ICJ, whose selfperception as the guardian of the international legal system is traditionally strong, when opting for the much more stringent criterion of 'effective control', must have had in mind not only the circumstances of the case, but also the potential application of the criterion to other areas, including state responsibility for terrorist acts and state responsibility for the extraterritorial acts of corporate entities. The discussion boils down to determining whether, for the purpose of assuring the accountability of non-state actors, to have recourse to traditional mechanisms of state responsibility is a good normative strategy to ensure greater effectiveness. At the very least, this can be doubted. As regards the accountability of NGOs, Erik Bluemel's essay on 'Overcoming NGO Accountability Concerns in International Governance' (Chapter 18) is evidence of how tenuous the border between international law and other social sciences has become. Bluemel's approach is interesting insofar as his work attempts to move the debate about accountability from the actor to the function performed. In so doing, he puts forward a composite theory of NGO accountability in international governance, which does away with many of the traditional dividing lines peculiar to the field of law, such as internationaVdomestic and publiclprivate. To speak in terms of international governance rather than in terms of international legal order may be more an issue of disciplinary allegiance than a real difference of conceptual categories. To dismiss as 'non-law' social practices that constitute the fabric of day-to-day international life and are increasingly perceived by the relevant actors as demanding respect as a matter of law may be an attitude that fosters certain vested professional interests, but it is unlikely to advance the cause of international law and enhance its credibility (Krisch and Kingsbury, 2006). In this respect, interdisciplinary dialogue may well produce interesting outcomes and, for once, may be instrumental in providing a better understanding of societal dynamics. Conclusions
There is no definitive answer to the query posed in the title of this introduction. Whether the solution lies in relativizing the subjects or, rather, in subjectivizing the actors remains open to doubt. The constant swing of the pendulum from the normative to the descriptive mesmerizes the observer and makes him wonder whether the observed reality can provide the answers he is looking for. Ultimately, this will depend on the kind of questions that are asked. A draconian way to look at things would be to maintain that the very title of this edited volume is somewhat of an oxymoron. International law as a normative and political project is indissolubly linked to states, and non-state entities may not legitimately lay claim to forming part of the system. Such a drastic way of thinking would have the merit of reducing the complexity of the debate, although it would probably lead to a greater marginalization of international law. On the other hand, if we acknowledge that international law has changed dramatically in the past few decades, the need to reformulate some of its foundational tenets seems an obvious solution. The contemporary international community, which provides the terrain in which the game of international law is played, is no longer perceived as consisting solely of states and, inevitably, the inclusion/exclusion mode with which the traditional theory of subjects has been set and used in a restrictive fashion to preserve the integrity of the system needs to be reconsidered. An alternative conceptual framework has not been created and the
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language of other disciplines has been borrowed to provide a temporary accommodation. That the participants need 'legitimacy' and must be made 'accountable' is an expression that would mean little to many positivist lawyers and yet seems to have become part and parcel of the fabric of international law. International law, however, remains a 'pragmatic project', which tends to accommodate societal and normative developments in a pragmatic fashion. The functional purpose of qualifying certain entities participating in international law processes as subjects or actors may not make such a big difference in practice. Transnational corporations are unlikely to be the addressees of the rules of maritime delimitation but they might be called upon to respect certain fundamental international human rights norms. NGOs are not going to be recognized as having any formal treaty-making power, and yet they will continue to play an important role in international law-making. However, as Alston rightly noted, the 'negative and euphemistic term' of non-state actors may not 'stem from any language inadequacies' but may have been adopted 'to reinforce the assumption that the state is not only the central actor, but also the indispensable and pivotal one around which all other entities revolve' (2005, p. 3). In fact, the disjunction between theory and practice and the strain between the different ways of looking at the same reality are a symptom of a more general disease affecting international law. The 'politics of forms' has long exhausted its ordering function and has been supplanted by a panoply of other narratives which tell different stories about the same reality. The challenge is to inquire afresh about the 'Subject', not so much in the narrow context of this edited volume, but in the much broader framework of inquiry of 'who or what it is that thinks or produces law' (Schlag, 1991, p. 1629; Caudill, 1993, p. 7 10). Until a satisfactory account of the 'Subject' is given, to reason in terms of 'subjects', 'actors', 'participants' or whatever else will be either a matter of preference or a struggle for power to legitimize or exclude some of the players. What needs to be understood, however, is the game. References
Allott, Philip (1990), Eunomia: New Order for a New World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Alston, Philip (2005), 'The "Not-a-Cat" Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?', in Philip Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-36. Arangio-Ruiz, Gaetano (1996), 'On the Nature of the International Personality of the Holy See', Revue belge de droit international, 29, pp. 35449. Arend, Anthony C. (1998), 'Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics', VirginiaJournal of International Law, 38, pp. 107-53. Bianchi,Andrea (2008), 'Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens', European Journal oflnternational Law, 19, pp. 491-508. Bourdieu, Pierre (1981), 'The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of Reason', in Charles C. Lemert (ed.), French Sociology: Rupture and Renewal Since 1968, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 257-92. Breen, Claire (2003), 'The Role of NGOs in the Formulation of and Compliance with the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict', Human Rights Quarterly, 25, pp. 453-81.
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Breen, Claire (2005), 'Rationalising the Work of UN Human Rights Bodies or Reducing the Input of NGOs? The Changing Role of Human Rights NGOs at the United Nations', Non-State Actors and International Law, 5, pp. 101-26. Buchanan, Allen E. (2007), Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Caudill, David S. (1993), 'Pierre Schlag's "The Problem of the Subject": Law's Need for an Analyst'. Cardozo Law Review, 15, pp. 707-32. Charnovitz, Steve (1996-97), 'Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance'. Michigan Journal of International Law, 18, pp. 183-286. Cheng, Bin (1991), 'Introduction to Subjects of International Law', in M. Bedjaoui (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Prospects, Paris and Dordrecht: UNESCO and Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 2 3 4 0 . Clapham, Andrew (2006a), 'Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations', International Review of the Red Cross, 88, pp. 491-523. Clapham, Andrew (2006b), Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dupuy, Pierre-Marie (2003), 'Comments on Chapters 4 and 5', in Michael Byers and George Nolte (eds), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 176-96. Dupuy, Pierre-Marie (2005), 'Proliferation ofActors: Comment', in Riidiger Wolfrum and Volker Roben (eds), Developments of International Law in Treaty Making, Berlin: Springer, pp. 53742. Epiney, Astrid (2006), 'The Role of NGOs in the Process of Ensuring Compliance with MEAs', in Ulrich Beyerlin, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Riidiger Wolfrum (eds), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Dialogue between Practitioners and Academia, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 319-52. Fatouros, Arghyrios A. (1983), 'Transnational Enterprise in the Law of State Responsibility', in Richard B. Lillich (ed.), International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, pp. 371403. Franck, Thomas M. (1990), The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, New York: Oxford University Press. Franck, Thomas M. (1999), The Empowered SeK Law and Society in the Age of Individualism, New York: Oxford University Press. Hart, Herbert L.A. (1961), The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Higgins, Rosalyn (1994), Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Jennings, Robert Y. (1998), 'The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of International Law', in Collected Writings of Sir Robert Jennings, The Hague: Kluwer, vol. 11, pp. 796-812. Joseph, Sarah (2004), Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation, Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart. Kamminga, Menno T. (2005), 'The Evolving Status of NGOs under International Law: A Threat to the Inter-State System?', in Philip Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 93-1 11. Kolb, Robert (2007), review of Janne Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality: An Inquiry into the History and Theory of International Law, in European Journal of International Law, 18, pp. 775-76. Korkeakivi, Antti (1993), 'People's Rights -An Overview', Finnish Yearbook of International Law, vol. IV, pp. 281-325. Koskenniemi, Martti (2007), 'The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics', Modern Law Review, 70, pp. 1-30.
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Krisch, Nico and Kingsbury, Benedict (2006), 'Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the lnternational Legal Order', European Journal oflnternational Law, 17, pp. 1 3 4 5 . McCorquodale, Robert (2004), 'An Inclusive Legal System', Leiden Journal oflnternational Law, 17, pp. 477-504. McCorquodale, Robert (2006), 'Beyond State Sovereignty: The International Legal System and NonState participants'. Revista colomhiana de derecho internacional, 8, pp. 103-59. Martens, Kerstin (2003), 'Examining the (Non-)Status of NGOs in International Law', Indiana Journal ofGloba1 Studies, 10, pp. 1-24. Masciulli, Joseph (2006), review of Janne Nijman, The Concept of lnternational Legal Personality: An Inquiry into the History and Theory of lnternational Law, in Law & Politics Book Review, 16, pp. 34245. Mertus, Julie (1999-2000), 'Considering Non-State Actors in the New Millennium: Toward Expanded Participation in Norm Generation and Norm Application', New York University Journal of lnternational Law and Politics, 32, pp. 5 3 7 4 6 . Nijman, Janne E. (2004), The Concept oflnternational Legal Personality: An Inquiry into the History and Theory of lnternational Law, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. Nowrot, Karsten (2005), 'New Approaches to the International Legal Personality of Multinational Corporations: Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative Responsibility', Paper delivered at the 2005 Geneva Research Forum on International Law, organized by the European Society of pp. 1-26). lnternational Law (published online at http:/lwww.esil-sedi.eu/english/pdflNowrot.PDF Orrego-Vicuiia, Francisco (2001 ), 'Individuals and Non-State Entities before lnternational Courts and Tribunals', Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 5, pp. 5 3 4 6 . Perry, Stephen R. (1995), 'Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory', in Andrei Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 97-135. Prescott, Elizabeth M. (2007), 'UNSCR 1540 and the Scientific Community as a Non-State Actor', in Olivia Bosch and Peter Van Ham (eds), Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540, The Hague: Clingendael Institute, pp. 41-53. Ratner, Steven R. (2001-2002), 'Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility', Yale Law Journal. 111, pp. 443-545. Ratner, Steven R. and Abrams, Jason S. (2001), Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Roben, Volker (2005), 'Proliferation of Actors', in Riidiger Wolfrum and Volker Roben (eds), Developments of lnternational Law in Treaty Making, Berlin: Springer, pp. 51G36. Roucounas, Emmanuel (2005), 'Non-State Actors: Areas of International Responsibility in Need of Further Exploration', in Maurizio Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory ofOscar Schachter, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 391404. Schlag, Pierre (1991), 'The Problem of the Subject', Texas Law Review, 69, pp. 1627-1743. Shelton, Dinah (1994), 'The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings', American Journal of International Law, 88, pp. 61 1-42, Stern, Brigitte (2006), 'The Emergence of Non-State Actors in International Commercial Disputes Through WTO Appellate Body Case-Law', in Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes (eds), The WTO at Ten: The Contribution ofthe Dispute Settlement System, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 372-85. Tomuschat, Christian (1986), 'Rights of Peoples: Some Preliminary Observations', in Yvo Hangartner and Stefan Trechsel (eds), Volkerrecht im Dienste des Menschen, Bern and Stuttgart: Verlag Paul Haupt, pp. 337-54. Vazquez, Carlos M. (2004-2005), 'Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations under International Law', Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 43, pp. 927-59.
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Watts, Arthur (2001), 'Enhancing the Effectiveness of Procedures of International Dispute Settlement', Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 5, pp. 21-39. Weil, Prosper (1992), 'Le droit international en qu&tede son identitC: cours gCnCral de droit international public', Recueil des cours, 237N1, pp. 9-370. Wolfmm, Rudiger (2005), 'State Responsibility for Private Actors: An Old Problem of Renewed Relevance', in Maurizio Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 423-34. Zellweger, Valentin and Koller, David (2007), 'Non-State Actors, International Criminal Law and the Role of the International Criminal Court', in Stephen Breitenmoser, Bernhard Ehrenzeller and Marco Sassoli (eds), Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Liber Amicorum Luzius Wildhaber, Ziirich: Dike, pp. 1619-34.
Part I Non-state Actors in the Theory of International Law
T H E SUBJECTS OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L LAW Hersch Lauterpacht
47. The dejnition of subjects of international law As in any other legal system, so also in the international sphere the subjects of law are the persons, national and juridical, upon whom the law confers rights and imposes duties. I n international law these persons are normally States; but they are not so exclusively. Organizations of States, having a different juridical personality from the States composing them, may and have become subjects of international law. This is hardly startling seeing that it is difficult to deny to States acting in association the unchallenged legal personality which they possess when acting in isolation. Individuals possess in a limited sphere international legal personality, not always accompanied by corresponding procedural capacity, accorded to them expressly or by implication. For these reasons the relevant part of the definition of international law given above1 speaks of international law as a body of rules 'which confer rights and impose obligations primarily, though not exclusively, upon sovereign States'. However, the view that entities other than States can be subjects of international law has been denied by many; and although opposition to it has receded under the impact of modern developments it cannot, as yet, be said that it has been generally accepted. Its effects linger, in some ways, in existing international law.
48. The traditional view According to what may be described as the traditional view in the matter, States only and exclusively are the subjects of international law. In particular, on that view, individuals are not the subjects of international law; they are its objects in the sense that by customary and conventional law States may be bound to observe certain rules of conduct in relation to individuals. Thus, while they may be bound to accord privileged treatment to foreign diplomatic representatives, the latter are not on that account subjects of international law; the right to privileged treatment is the right of their own State. See above, p. 9.
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Similarly, although aliens residing in the territory of a foreign State are entitled to be treated by it in conformity with rules of international law, according to the traditional view the resulting rights are not the rights of the alien but of his State.1 Although in concessionary or similar contracts made with a foreign State the individual alien may agree not to have recourse to protection by his own State until he has exhausted the local remedies available to him, he cannot effectively renounce the protection of his own State if the rights recognized for his benefit by international law have been violated; for these are not his rights but those of his State. Further, it would seem to follow from the view stated above that a treaty cannot directly confer rights upon individuals and, generally, that international law cannot do so unless these rights are incorporated as part of municipal law. The rigid exclusion of bodies other than States and of individuals from exercising any procedural capacity before international tribunals would appear to be yet another consequence of the traditional doctrine. As will be shown in this chapter, there are other equally far-reaching consequences of that view as here outlined. In its main aspects the doctrine stated above gives an accurate picture of the existing position in international law. However, it is important to qualify it; to note the numerous exceptions to its operation; and, above all, to bear in mind that the range of subjects of international law is not rigidly and immutably circumscribed by any definition of the nature of international law but is capable of modification and development in accordance with the will of States and the requirements of international intercourse. These propositions will now be considered in relation: ( a ) to collective bodies other than States; (b) to individuals.
49. Collectiue bodies other than States International practice has recognized that bodies other than States may on occasions be endowed by international law with rights and made subject to its duties. This may occur, for instance, in the case of persons engaged in hostilities against their lawful Government For a n authoritative statement of this principle see the following passage of the Judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of the Serbian Loam: 'reference should be made to what the Court has said on several occasions, and in particular in Judgments No. 2 and 13, namely, that by taking up a case on behalf of its nationals before an international tribunal, a State is asserting its own right-that is to say, its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international (ibid. no. 1 7, law' (Series A, nos. 20121, p. I 7). See also the Chorrdw Factory cme (Merits) P P 27, 28).
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and recognized as belligerents by other States. Such belligerents, without having been recognized as a State, become entitled to exercise as against neutrals certain rights of war. They also become subject to the obligations of the law of war. The same, on a more limited scale, applies to persons recognized as insurgents, In a different sphere, political units not as yet endowed with full statehood have been treated as subjects of international law. This was the case of the Holy See between its extinction as a State in 1870 and the restoration of its temporal sovereignty in the Lateran Treaty of 1929 in the international sphere. I n the intervening period the Holy See, although not a State in international law, concluded treaties and sent and received diplomatic representatives-it was a subject of international law. The British Dominions, prior to their achieving full statehood in the sphere of international relations, acted and were treated for various purposes-for instance, in the matter of conclusion of treaties and diplomatic intercourse--as fully sovereign States. Moreover, it is now generally recognized, in a variety of treaties and otherwise, that international public bodies composed of States possess an international personality and as such are subjects of international law. This applies, in particular, to the so-called specialized agencies of the United Nations such as the International Labour Organisation, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational and Cultural Organization, and others. The constitutions of these bodies provide for a measure of separate personality in respect of each of them. Thus the constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization lays down that 'the Organization shall have the capacity of a legal person to perform any legal act appropriate to its purpose which is not beyond the powers granted to it by this Constit~tion'.~ The Treaty of 1952 constituting the European Coal and Steel Community provides not only generally that the Community shall have juridical personality but also specifically that in its international relationships the Community shall enjoy the juridical capacity necessary for the exercise of its functions and the attainment of its ends.2 The capacity of public international organizations to conclude treaties is recognized in their constitutions Article xv(1) of the Constitution. The constitutions of other specialized agencies and other international organizations confine themselves to laying down that the organization shall enjoy in the temtory of each of its members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its objectives. a Article 6 of the Treaty: AJ. 46 (rg52), Suppl. p. 109.
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and frequently acted upon in practice. They have concluded agreements with one another, with the United Nations, and with individual States, and these have been registered like 'every treaty and every international agreement' under Article 102 of the Charter. Thus, for instance, the International Labour Organisation concluded, in 1946, an agreement with Switzerland concerning the priviIeges and immunities of the Organisation in that c0untry.l The Treaty of 1957 establishing the European Atomic Energy Community provides expressly that, within the limits of the powers conferred upon it, the Community may enter into agreements or conventions with an outside State or an international organization.2 The specialized agencies possess a degree of procedural capacity before the International Court of Justice as a result of having been granted, in Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations, the right to ask, subject to authorization by the General Assembly, for an Advisory Opinion of the Court. That authorization has invariably been granted in general terms3 and has been used.4 Previously the international personality of public international organizations had been recognized in various ways by decisions of various court^.^ The international personality of numerous other bodies-such as the Reparation Commis~ion,~ the international river commissions or the Cape Spartel Lighthouse Commission7-has often been asserted, probably with justificati~n.~ U.N.T.S. 15, 378. Article I O I of the Treaty: A.3. 51 (1957)~ Suppl. p. 984. For details see Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1950)~p. 16. See also the same in Grotiw Society, 32 (1g46), 1-41. 4 See Advisory Opinion of 23 October 1956, in the case of the Judgments of the .4dministmtiue Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon Complaints made against UNESCO (I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 77). In 1931 the Italian Court of Cassation held in the case of International Institute of Agriculture v. Profili (Annual Digest, 5 (1g29-30), Case no. 254) that the International Institute of Agriculture was an 'international person . . free . . . from interference by the sovereign power of the States composing the Union [i.e., the Institute of Agriculture] '. The Court overruled the Court of Appeal of Rome which had held that the Institute was not a subject of international law seeing that it did not exercise sovereignty over a fixed territory and a population. See also Godman v. Winterton, decided in 1940 by the English Court of Appeal (Annual Digest, I I (1g19-42), Case no. I I I), where it was held that the members of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees were entitled to jurisdictional immunity seeing that it was a Committee of sovereign States-a line of reasoning which may be regarded as in accordance with the view, suggested in the text above, that the international personality of public international bodies and their quality as subjects of international rights and duties follows from the fact that they are associations of States of which each is a subject of law. See also International Refugee Organisation v. Republic S.S. Corp. decided by the United States Court of Appeals (Z.L.R. 18 ( r g g ~ ) , Case no. 140). See Fischer Williams in B.2: 13 (1g32), 33-5, and in A.3. 24 (1930), 665. 7 For a bibliography on the international personality of these bodies see Jenks in B.1: 22 (1945)~ 267 n. I . See also Morelli in Hague Renreil, 89 (1956) (i), 557-84, and in 3
.
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The question of the position of the League of Nations as a subject of international law was widely discussed but never judicially determined. On the other hand, in the Advisory Opinion in the case concerning Reparation for Injuries Sufeered in the Service of the United Nations the International Court of Justice rejected the view that only States can be subjects of international law and affirmed the international personality of the United Nations as being indispensable to the fulfilment of the purposes for which it was created. The Court pointed out, with regard to the more general question of subjects of international law, that 'throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life' and that 'the progressive increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of action upon the international plane by certain entities which are not States'.l 'Such new subjects of international law', the Court explained, 'need not necessarily be States or possess the rights and obligations of statehood.' For 'the subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community'.2 As already stated, the question of the international legal personality Rivista, 40 (1957), 3-25; Zemanek in 0.2.o.R. 7 (1956), 335-72. AS to the contractual capacity of international unions see Capotorti in Comunicazioni e Studi, 7 (1g55), 145-98. From public international organizations-which are organizations composed of States-there must be distinguished international organizations of individuals and private associations, of which there is a very considerable number. A French tribunal has held that a Committee of debenture holders of the Danube-Adriatic Railway Company, a Committee empowered by the Treaty of Trianon of 1919 to represent the interests of the holders, was 'necessarily and validly endowed. . with legal personality in international law' which enabled it to sue in French courts: see Vigoureux v. Comiti des Obligataires Danube-Save-Adriatique (I.L.R. 18 (1951),Case no. I ) . On the consultative status of private international organizations by virtue of Article 71 of the Charter authorizing the Economic and Social Council to make 'suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence' as well as by virtue of the constitutions of the various specialized agencies see Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1950), pp. 23-6. Also, as to the access of non-governmental organizations to the Headquarters of the United Nations for 434-50. consultative purposes, see Liang in A.3 . 48 (1954)~ I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 174. a Ibid. a t p. 178. As international personality is not limited to States, the latter are bound to fulfil international duties-i.e. duties prescribed by general international law -not only in relation to other States but, in proper cases, to international persons generally. This explains why in the Reparation for Injuries case the International Court of Justice held that the United Nations was entitled to bring a claim even against a nonmember State, although in the same case the Court held that the basis of the claim by the United Nations was a breach of a duty to it. For, once the Court found that the United Nations was endowed by the Charter with international personality not only in relation to its Members but erga omnes (ibid. at p. 185), it followed that all States-whether Members of the United Nations or not-owed it duties as prescribed by general international law. Sed quaere. See Fitzmaurice in B. Y.29 ( Ig52), 2 1.
.
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of an association of States each of which is indisputably a subject of international law ought not to give rise to difficulty. However, that Advisory Opinion must be regarded as one of the most important pronouncements of the Court inasmuch as it provided a much-needed qualification of the doctrine that only sovereign States are the subjects of international law. I t may also be noted that international practice recognizes in the contractual field a measure of international personality of territorial units, such as colonies and dependencies, which are not States but which nevertheless are admitted to participation in their own name in public organizations of States such as the Universal Postal Union or the World Health Organization. 50. The individual as a subject of international law As a matter of moral principle, individuals have no independent position in international law and any rights which they may possess and any duties to which they may be subject in consequence of international law are rights and duties prescribed by the municipal law of the State. However, that principle is not absolute, and it is necessary to bear in mind the numerous exceptions which the practice of States has already engrafted upon it. These exceptions cover both rights and duties created by international custom and treaty. With regard to duties, the most important example of direct subjection of individuals to international law is the operation of the law of war. It is an established principle that individual members of the armed forces of a belligerent are bound as such by the law of war and that the belligerent into whose hands they may fall is entitled to punish them for violations of that law-even if, at least in the case of ruthless and inhuman crimes against the law of war, they acted in obedience to superior orders. It was by reference mainly to violations of the law of war that the International Tribunal for the Trial of Major War Criminals rejected, in 1946, the view that, as States only are subjects of international Iaw, there could be no individual responsibility for the violation of the laws of war. I t is often contended, without apparent exaggeration, that piracy jure gentium is no mere formula and that it constitutes a direct imposition upon individuals of the duty, under international law, not to commit piracy-although there is room for the view that States exercise jurisdiction over aliens in the matter of piracy by virtue of a customary rule according to which States concede to each other the right to exercise jurisdiction over their subjects for the com-
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mission of piracy rendered criminal by municipal law. Moreover, the municipal law of many States penalizes in other spheres what are termed violations of the law of nations, for instance, offences against foreign diplomatic representatives. In an early case, Respublica v. De Longchamps, decided in 1784 by a Pennsylvania Court, the accused-who had insulted the French ambassador-was found guilty of a 'violation of the law of nations'.= I n a distinct sense, in countries in which international law is, by legislation or ~therwise,~ incorporated as part of the law of the land, it may be considered that the duties-as well as rights--of international law are directly operative in relation to individuals; this is so although such direct effect of international law is due to a general act of incorporation. The constitutions of some countries provide expressly that international law directly creates rights and duties for the inhabitants of the State.3 Moreover, treaties may impose duties directly upon individuals. This is probably the effect of the Convention of 1948 for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Similarly, both customary and conventional international law may confer rights directly upon individuals. I n the Advisory Opinion concerning the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, the Permanent Court held that although in principle a treaty cannot, as such, create direct rights and obligations for private individuals, 'the very object of a n international agreement, according to the intention of the contracting parties, may be the adoption by the parties of some definite rules creating individual rights and obligations and enforceable by national c o ~ r t s ' .The ~ Court rejected the view that as the provisions of a treaty adopted in favour of Danzig railway officials had not been incorporated in Polish law, those officials had no enforceable right of action. As will be indicated presently, the contracting States may agree to create in favour of individuals rights enforceable directly not only before national but also before international tribunals. T o the extent to which the Charter of the United Nations established the legal obligation of its members to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms (though there are See below, p. 154. I Dallas Reports I I I . See, e.g., Article 25 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949. Series B, no. 15, p. 17. In the Advisory Opinion, given in 1950, on the International Status of South- West Africa, the International Court ofJustice assumed, without elaborating the point, that as the result of certain resolutions adopted in 1923 by the Council of the League of Nations in the matter of petitions from the inhabitants of mandated territories, these inhabitants acquired a corresponding right-a right under international law -and that right was subsequently maintained by Article 80 of the Charter of the United Nations: 1.C.j. Reports 1950, p. 133.
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many who deny the provisions in question the character of a legal obligation), it conferred upon individuals a corresponding right not dependent for its international validity upon national legislation, and even though unaccompanied by effective provisions for its enforcement. To that extent the Charter constituted the individual a subject of international law. Similarly, though more indirectly, this is also the effect, in one important respect, of the Agreement of 8 August 1945 between the four Principal Powers establishing an International Military Tribunal for the Punishment of the Major War Criminals. That Agreement provided, inter alia, for the punishment of crimes against-humanity. These were acts deemed to be violative of the sanctity of human personality to such a degree as to make it irrelevant whether or not they were committed in obedience to the law of the State. The inclusion of crimes against humanity in an international instrument reflected the acknowledgement of fundamental human rights of the individual recognized by international law and grounded in considerations superior to the law of the State. To that extent, again, the instrument in question recognized the individual as a subject of a fundamental international right.l 51. The procedural capacity of individuals in the international sphere The significance of the status of individuals as direct beneficiaries of rights conferred by treaty or customary international law-and, in consequence thereof, as subjects of international law-has been somewhat obscured by the fact that, in the present state of the law, their procedural capacity is severely limited. I n particular, apart from exceptional cases they have no right to appear as parties before international tribunals. Article 34 of the Statute of the International Court, the drafting of which was influenced by the predominant view of the exclusiveness of States as subjects of international law, lays down expressly that 'Only States may be parties in cases before the CourtY.2Various treaties providing for the settlement of claims arising out of injuries to individuals clearly provide that the claims shall be presented by Governments; that agents and counsel shall be appointed by government^;^ and that 1 See Lauterpacht, Zntrmatwnal L a w and Human Rights (1950)~ pp. 35-8, and Schwelb in B.Y.23 (1946), 17&226. See Oppenheim, 11, 54. And see, as to the position of individuals in connection with the advisory jurisdiction of the Court, Gross in 4.3.52 (rg58), 16-40. 8 See, e.g., the provisions of the Treaty of 8 September 1923 between the United States of America and Mexico, setting up a General Claims Commission. For the text of the Convention see Feller, The Mexican C l a i m Commission, 1923-1934 (1935), p. 321. And see ibid. pp. 83-90, for an account of the position of the individual claimants before the Commission.
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the latter shall retain decisive control over the claim and its prosec~tion.~ However, although this is, in general, the existing legal position, some qualifying considerations must be kept in mind. I n the first instance, a person or organization may be a subject of international law-i.e. directly endowed by international law with rights and charged with duties-without at the same time enjoying full procedural capacity by way of being able to claim before international tribunals and agencies any rights thus granted. Thus if the Charter of the United Nations were to impose unequivocally upon its Members the legal obligation to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms,$ and if the faculty to invoke these obligations were confined to the United Nations as such or its Member States, without conferring upon the individual an independent status before the organs of the United Nations for that purpose, the individual could still properly be considered a subject of international law in that sphere. I n the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, provision was made not only for securing human rights as there defined but also for the implementation of those provisions by the action both of the signatory States and, as soon as a requisite number of States have agreed thereto, by private individuals themselves. The resulting rights are vested in the individual inhabitants of the States concerned, independently of whether they have been made part of the law of the signatory States. Individuals are subjects of the rights in question by virtue of the provisions of the Convention even before their right to petition the Commission has been recognized. There are treaties which contain clauses providing For an emphatic instance of the affirmation of the full control of the State over 2: F. Assets Realization Corporaclaims adjudicated before an international tribunal see tion et Al. v. Hull, Secretary of State, et Al. (Annual Digest, lo (1941-2), Case no. I 34). See, however, for some qualifications of this rule American-Mexican Claim Bureau v. Morgenthau (ibid. g (1938-40), Case no. 106);Adminirtratiue Debion No. I in the Tripartite Claims Commission, 1927 (ibid. 4 (1gr7-8), Case no. 172); William A. Parker case, decided by the Mexican-United States General Claims Commission (ibid. 3 (1925-6), Case no. 178) and, by the same Commission, the North American Dredging Company case (ibid. Case no. 179). On the other hand, as laying down the principle that in concluding treaties the Crown d o e not act as trustee of the subject and that therefore the latter has no legal right to any compensation provided for in a treaty, see Ciuilian War Claimants' Association Ltd. v. The King [ ~ g p A.C. ] 14; 46 T.L.R. 581; 47 T.L.R. 102; Administrator of German Property v. Knoop [1g33] Ch. 439; Gschwind v. Swiss Confeederation, decided by the Swiss Federal Court in 1932 (Annual Digest,6 ( I93 I-2), Case no. I 20) ; Receiver in Bankruptcy of the N. V. ' <eilschip Nest' v. The State of the Netherlands, decided by the Hague Court of Appeal on 14January 1937 (ibid. 8 (1935-7), Case no. I 17). And see B.2: 13 (1g32), 163, 164. As stated above, p. 142, it is controversial whether the provisions of the Charter in the matter amount to a clear legal obligation on the part of the Members of the United Nations.
<.
I44
I1
12
Non-State Actors and International Law
SUBJECTS OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L LAW
for the treatment of individuals who possess no nationality and whose rights cannot therefore be protected by a State of which they are nationals; those rights can only be protected by the various States signatories of the treaty. The Minorities Treaties as well as the treaty provisions in the matter of mandated and trust territories make it possible for the parties thereto to invoke the jurisdiction of the International Court concerning the interpretation and application of these provisions with regard to the interests both of their nationals and of persons who are not their nationals. The rule as to the 'nationality of claims' cannot be invoked in cases such as these. The treaties in question offer examples of rights which are created by international law and whose international existence-and the attribution to the individual of the quality of a subject of international law resulting from them-is independent either of any incorporation of such rights into the municipal law of any State or of the formal procedural capacity of individuals to assert the rights in question in their own name. Secondly, there are instances in which such procedural capacity has been created, wholly or in part, in favour of individuals. I n the Statute of the proposed-and eventually unratified-International Prize Court adopted at the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, private claimants were given the right to appeal to that Court against judgments of national prize c0urts.l I n the Treaty which, in 1907, established the Central American Court of Justice between the five Central American Republics, individuals were given the right of direct access to the C ~ u r t .In ~ the Treaty of Versailles the nationals of the Allied Powers were accorded the right to advance against Germany claims in their own name and, if so desired, without the assistance of agents appointed by their Governments.3 The Upper Silesian Convention of 1922 between See Oppenheim, 11,485. "or an account of the case of D i a r v. Guatemala, brought under that Treaty and involving a claim for false arrest, imprisonment and expulsion, see Hudson, The Permanent Court of Inkrnational Justice, ~ g z o - ~ g(1943), p p. 54. a But see Anzilotti, p. 136, for a different view. See also, generally, as to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, Bliihdorn in Hague Recueil, 41 (1932) (iii), I 74-6. And see generally on the access of individuals to international tribunals: Fleury, Un nouueauprogrh & lajurtice inkmationale: L'acch des particuliers aux Tribunaux inkrnationa~m (1932); SchulC, Le droit d'acc2s des particuliers aux juridictiom inkmationales (1934) ; Annuaire, 33 (1927) (ii), 601-26; Rundstein in R.I. 3rd ser. 10 (1929), 431-53; 763-83; Borchard in A.J. 24 (1930), 359-65; TtnCkidts in R.Z. 3rd ser. 13 (1932)~89-1 I r ; Baumgarten, ibid. pp. 742-99; StfQiadts in Hague Recueil, 51 (1935) (i), 5-120; Kaufmann, ibid. 54 (1935) (iv), 420-7; Idelson in Grotiuc Society, 30 (1g44), 5 e 6 6 . As to the access of individuals to international authorities by way of petition see Richard, k droit de pitition (1932); and Feinberg in Hague Recueil, 40 (1932) (ii), 529-640. 1
10
745
LIL
Non-State Actors and International Law INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE
GENERAL PART
Germany and Poland not only established a tribunal open to the nationals of both parties; it also gave it jurisdiction to entertain actions brought by nationals of either party against their own State, notwithstanding the contention of Poland that under international law an individual cannot invoke the aid of an international authority against his own State.l In the same case the Tribunal held that a national of a third State, which was not a party to the treaty in question, could exercise rights enforceable before the Tribunal.= I n fact, apart from the somewhat unreal emanations of the doctrine that only States-as the exclusive subjects of international law-possess procedural capacity in the international sphere, there is no true obstacle to further developments in that direction. Undoubtedly, so long as the principle of obligatory jurisdiction of international tribunals as between States has not been adopted, it would be premature to urge that individuals should be in the position to bring Governments against their will before an international jurisdiction. However, there is no reason why international tribunals should not, with the agreement of Governments, adjudicate with regard to claims advanced by and made against individuals, including those in the sphere of criminal responsibility. International practice contains instances of proceedings of this n a t ~ r eAs . ~ stated, no such power to entertain claims advanced by private bodies or individuals, or even public bodies other than States," is vested in the International Court of Justice; Article 36 of its Statute limits its jurisdiction to disputes between state^.^ There is no intrinsic See Steiner and Gross v. Polish State: Annual Digest, 4 (1927--8),Case no. 188. a
Zbid. Case no. 287.
As to criminal responsibility see above, p. 133. For an example of a special arbitral tribunal created by agreement between a ~overnmentand a private and deciding on the basis not of municipal law but of international law or general principles of law, see above, p. 77. This situation may appear somewhat anomalous in view of the Advisory Opinion given by the Court in 1949in the Reparation for Injuries case, where it held that the United Nations has the capacity for certain purposes to bring a n international claim (see above, p. 140). This means, presumably, a claim before an international tribunal-but not, a t present, before the international tribunal which is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. A possible line of development in this sphere might consist in enlarging the present scope of Article 36 so as to give the Court jurisdiction not only in disputes between States but also in disputes between States and private or public bodies or private individuals in cases in which States have consented, in advance or by special agreement, to appear as defendants before the Court. An extended jurisdiction of this nature, if invoked with some frequency, might necessitate consequential changes in the Statute or the Rules of the Court, for instance, by enabling the Court to sit in divisions. The existing Statute authorizes the Court to create special chambers. I t will be noted that, in effect, the vast majority of cases decided by the Court have involved claims arising from actual or alleged injuries to private persons.
Non-State Actors and International Law
14
S U B J E C T S OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L LAW
necessity, in the light of the definition presented earlier,l to confine international law-and its adjudicatory agencies-to relations between States. International law can properly be comprehended as regulating the rights and duties of States in the international sphere and, as the result of international custom and agreement, also in relation to entities other than States. It must also be noted that international practice recognizes a distinct measure of procedural capacity of individuals before international organs. That has included, in varying degrees, the right of petition before such bodies as the Mandates Commission, the Minorities Commission, the Trusteeship Council and the European Commission of Human Rights. The quality of a subject of international law-i.e. the capacity of being a subject of rights created or recognized by international law-does not, as already stated, depend upon the capacity to claim or enforce such rights in the beneficiary's own name. Nor does it depend upon whether the persons or body concerned are a contracting party in relation to the instrument creating such rights. It is sufficient if such rights are created in their favour and are effectively vested in them.2 Moreover, although the contractual capacity of individuals in relation to States and with effect in the sphere of international law is not as yet recognized in international practice-with the effect, for instance, that such agreements are not capable of registration as 'international treaties and agreements' under Article 102 of the Charter-it is not certain that they cannot be so recognized at all. International law is not exclusively a law governing the relations between sovereign States. I t is wide enough, especially having regard to the applicability of general principles of law as one of its sources, to include agreements made by States with persons other than States and not expressly or by implication made subject to the municipal law of such States. 52. The rights and duties of States as rights and duties of man I t has been shown that although the question as to who are the subjects of international law is to some extent of a doctrinal character, See above, p. 9. For a different view see the valuable contribution by Sperduti, 'L'individu et le droit international', in Hague Remil, go (1956) (ii), 824, who suggests that as individuals are not persons in relation to whom States undertake direct contractual engagements, they are not, for that reason, invested by international law with subjective legal rights proper. However, he admits that individuals possess in international law the legal powers for putting into effect the engagements contracted for their benefit and that therefore they are ' titulaires d'inttrets internationaux lkgitimes' (ibid.). a
Non-State Actors and International Law INTERNATZONAL LAW-THE
GENERAL P A R T
it has important practical implications. The answer to that question has influenced considerably the existing law relating to access of individuals-and, generally, of bodies other than States-to international tribunals and agencies. However, its importance goes
much further and explains the occasional emphasis of the discussion with which it has been surrounded. This is so in particular in the field of duties imposed by international law. Individuals are subjects of international law in the sense that-in Westlake's phrasel-the duties and rights of States are the duties and rights of men who comprise them. The composite personality of the State is not a sufficient reason for disregarding the fact either that the State is not an irresponsible instrumentality of power but primarily an expression of the legal order operating within a defined territory or that its conduct is imputable to the individual persons acting on its behalf and, in a wider sense, to the individuals comprising the State. Thus viewed, individuals are the subjects of international law. Unless the obligations of international law are directed to individual human beings, they are directed to no one. It is in that sense that the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, in rejecting, in 1946, the submission that violations of international law could not be attributed to individuals, said: ' Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.'2 The realization that, in the matter of observance of the obligations of international law, individuals are the true subjects of international law must entail two main results of practical significance. First, it must tend to limit the consequences of the personification of the State inasmuch as these tend to foster the assertion of two standards of morality-one to be observed by the individual and the other by the personified State. While the ethical shortcomings of the international conduct of States have often been exaggerated, there is no doubt that the notion of the personified State as the only and true subject of international law, distinct from the individuals who compose it and act on its behalf, has not been without influence. Secondly, as appears from the passage in the Nuremberg Judgment just quoted, the effectiveness of international law is bound to suffer unless the notion gains ground that the true subjects of the duties Pafirs, p. 78. See also to the same effect Krabbe, The Modern Idea of the State (English tranl. 1922), p. 240; Duguit, Trait4 de droit constitutionnel (1927), I, 560; Kelsen, Dm Problem der Souveranitat ( ~ g r o )pp. , 130-4, 162-7. Annual Digest, 13 (1g46), at p. 221.
15
I6
Non-State Actors and International Law S U B J E C T S OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W
imposed by international law are not the metaphysical entities of the State but individual human beings. Further, the principle that the rights and duties of States are but the rights and duties of man is of importance inasmuch as it lends emphasis to the idea-with which is bound up the progress of international law-that the individual human being is the ultimate unit and end of all law, national and international, and that the effective recognition and protection of 'the dignity and worth of the human person' and the development of human personality is the final object of law. I n a different sphere, the recognition of the inalienable rights of the individual in relation to the State signifies the recognition of a legal authority, however impersonal, superior to the State itself-a notion which is congenial to the view that international law as a legal system can be understood only by reference to the principle that the State is subordinated to the international legal order. I t signifies the establishment of a direct relationship between the individual and international law similar to the manner in which within a Federation the individual benefits directly from and is subject to federal law. T o that extent it constitutes an essential stage in the progression of the international community towards the goal of federal integration. Finally, such recognition of the individual as a subject of international law-a recognition based on the assumption of some fundamental and inalienable rights of man-in turn sets a limit, both legal and moral, to any omnipotence of the organized international community destructive of the freedom alike of the individual and of the national State. The notion of the subject of international law thus conceived, of which the essence is the denial of any basic difference between the subjects of international and municipal law, gains strength from the fact that in a large and growing number of States international law has been recognized, by judicial practice or express enactment, as forming an integral part of the law of the State. This is the essence of what may be described as the doctrine of incorporation, an account of which is given in the next chapter.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY O N SUBJECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The following is a selection of the vast literature on the question of subjects of international law: Kaufmann, Die Rechtskraft des internationales Rechts (1899); Westlake, Papers, p. 78; Kelsen, Das Problem der Souueranitat
Non-State Actors and International Law INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE
GENERAL P A R T
und die Theorie des Volkerrechts ( I 920), pp. 1 24-34 ;t h e same i n Hague Recueil, 42 ( 1 9 3 2 ) ( i v ) , 141-72, and Principles of International Law ( ~ g y )pp. , 94-147; Krabbe, The Modern Idea of the State (English transl. 192I ) , pp. 240-5 ; Duguit, Traiti de droit constitutionnel ( I g23), i , 55 1-60; Politis, Les nouuelles tendances du droit international (1927), pp. 59-93; Lauterpacht, Analog;es, pp. 73-82; the s a m e in Hague Recueil, 62 ( 1 ~ 3 7(;v), ) 207-43, i n L.Q.R. 6 3 (1947), 438-60, and 6 4 ( 1 9 4 8 ) ,97-1 19, and International Law and Human Rights ( 1 g 5 0 ) ,pp. 3-72; K n u b b e n , Die Subjekte des Volkerrechts ( I 928) ; Spiropoulos, L'individu en droit international ( I 928) ; Segal, L'individu en droit international ( 1 9 2 8 ); TCn&kid&s, L'individu en droit international (1928); Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations ( 1 9 4 8 ) , pp. 15-42; Sperduti, L'individuo nel diritto interna
17
Critical reflections on the Westphalian assumptions of international law and
organization: a crisis of legitimacy A. CLAIRE CUTLER
Abstract: This article argues that the fields of international law and organization are experiencing a legitimacy crisis relating to fundamental reconfigurations of global power and authority. Traditional Westphalian-inspired assumptions about power and authority are incapable of providing contemporary understanding, producing a growing disjunction between the theory and the practice of the global system. The actors, structures, and processes identified and theorized as determinative by the dominant approaches to the study of international law and organization have ceased to be of singular importance. Westphalianinspired notions of state-centricity, positivist international law, and 'public' definitions of authority are incapable of capturing the significance of non-state actors, informal normative structures, and private, economic power in the global political economy.
Introduction
This article posits that the fields of international law and organization are experiencing a legitimacy crisis relating to fundamental reconfigurations of global power and authority. It argues that traditional Westphalian-inspired assumptions about power and authority are incapable of providing contemporary understanding and identifies a growing disjunction between the theory and the practice of the Westphalian system. This disjunction suggests that these fields are experiencing a crisis in that they are incapable of theorizing contemporary developments that do not fit within the Westphalian paradigm of authority and rule. Indeed, a critical analysis of the Westphalian model of rule illustrates that it has never adequately captured international practice. However, the article argues that the lack of fit or asymmetry between theory and practice is becoming more acute, portending a crisis of legitimacy. The actors, structures, and processes identified and theorized as determinative by the dominant approaches to the study of international law and organization have ceased to be of singular importance. Westphalian-inspired notions of state-centricity, positivist international law, and 'public' definitions of authority are incapable of capturing the significance of non-state actors, like transnational corporations and individuals, informal normative structures, and private, economic power in the global political economy. Moreover, liberal mythology makes the content of the private sphere disappear by defining it out of existence as a political domain. In so doing, liberalism effectively insulates private activity from social and political controls. As a result, as part of the private sphere, neither transnational corporations nor individuals are regarded as authoritative legally or politically. Both are 'invisible' as agents of political and legal change. This produces some rather bizarre and alarming results. The legal 'invisibility' of corporations enhances their
Non-State Actors and International Law
20
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A. Claire Cutler
significance, facilitating forces of globalization, privatization, and deregulation, which are expanding corporate influence in the wor1d.l Simultaneously, the legal 'invisibility' of individuals seriously inhibits individual challenges to the expansion of corporate power and constrains efforts to hold corporations acco~ntable.~ The article will first consider the inability of Westphalian assumptions of power and authority to capture the activities of corporations as 'subjects' of the law. It will then examine notions of public and private authority in the context of the legal personality of transnational corporations. The article will conclude with a discussion of the conditions of political legitimacy and evaluate the existence of, or prospects for, a severe legitimacy crisis of theoretical, empirical, and normative proportions.
The problem of the 'subject' While much divides theorists of domestic and international politics, many are united in the treatment of their subject-matter as a constitutional order.%s theorists of international society have shown, the domain of international relations is characterized by principles and rules that provide a normative framework for action." This framework is in turn traced in origin to the Peace of Westphalia which brought an end to the Thirty Years' War and is generally regarded as providing the constitutional foundations for the emerging state system. Indeed, it is almost an article of faith amongst international lawyers that the origins of their discipline can be traced to the Peace of Westphalia as a founding, original m ~ m e n t David .~ Kennedy comments on this story of origins:
2
For a collection of papers that explores the dimensions of private, corporate power and authority in the global political economy, see A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler. and Tony Porter (eds.), Private Authority and International Affairs (New York: SUNY Press, 1999). While more will be said later on the international legal status of the individual, a full analysis is beyond the scope of this article and must await another time. However, for good statements of the problem of the individual under international law, see Rosalyn Higgins, 'Conceptual Thinking about the Individual under International Law', in Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Saul Mendolvitz (eds.), International Law: A Contemporary Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985) and M. W. Janis, 'Individuals as Subjects of International Law', Cornell International Law Journal, 17 (1 984), pp. 61-78. For limitations to the use of the domestic analogy, see IIidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). For the view that international society is a constitutional order characterized by norms and rules, see A. Claire Cutler, 'The "Grotian" Tradition in International Relations', Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 4 1 4 5 and the references cited therein relating to the English school and the works of Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, and Sir Hirsch Lauterpacht. And see Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On zhe Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Kratochwil, 'Politics, Norms and Peaceful Change', Review of International Studies, (1998), pp. 193-218. In the United States this view has been associated with the study of international regimes as constituted orders. See for example, Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) and International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); and Oran Young, 'International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions', World Politics, 39 (1986), pp. 104-22. For a classic statement of this position see Leo Gross, 'The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948,' American Journal of International Law, 42 (1948), pp. 20-41. For more contemporary texts that date the history of modern international law to the Peace of Westphalia see Richard Falk, 'The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order', in Falk, Kratochwil, and Mendolvitz (eds.), Inlernational Law, and Peter Malanczuk (ed.), Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th revised edn. (London: Routledge. 1997).
21
Non-State Actors and International Law Westphalian assumptions and their legitimacy
135
International legal scholars are particularly insistent that their discipline began in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia closing the Thirty Years' War. The originality of 1648 is important to the discipline, for it situates public international law as a rational philosophy, handmaiden of statehood, the cultural heir to religious principle. As part of the effort to sustain this image, public international law historians have consistently treated earlier work as immature and incomplete-significant only as a precursor for what followed. Before 1648 were facts, politics, religion, in some tellings a 'chaotic void' slowly filled by sovereign states. Thereafter, after the establishment of peace, after the 'rise of states,' after the collapse of 'religious universalism', after the chaos of war, came law-as philosophy, as idea, as word.G As Kennedy notes, law came as philosophy into a void. There it established state sovereignty as the fundamental ordering principle of the states system, placing the . ~ a story of origins, it state at the centre as the unambiguous locus of a ~ t h o r i t yAs marks the birth of modern international law, anticipating the move from natural t o positive law conceptions more in keeping with notions of sovereign c ~ n s e n t The .~ entire edifice of modern international law thus came t o be crafted on the foundation of positive acts of sovereign consent, evidenced explicitly in treaty law and implicitly in customary international law. Treaty and customary law came to be regarded as the primary sources of law, while states became its 'subjects'. The doctrine of international legal personality determines what entities are regarded as 'possessing rights and duties enforceable at law'.9 Citing Sir Hirsch Lauterpacht, Shaw observes that 'the orthodox positivist doctrine has been explicit in the affirmation that only states are subjects of international law'.Io Indeed, for most of the history of modern international law, states have been regarded as the sole legitimate subjects. While there has been a slow recognition of the legal personality of other corporate bodies, like international organizations, the general orientation of the law has been statecentred. However, there are problems with this story of origins. To begin, historically, other non-state entities like the Holy See, chartered companies, and belligerents have been treated as having some legal capacities." As Stephen Krasner notes, Westphalia did not provide a n unambiguous determination of the state as the sole or exclusive locus of authority. The view that the Westphalian system implies that sovereignty has a taken-for-granted quality is wrong. The actual content of sovereignty, the scope of authority that states can exercise, has always been contested. The basic organizing principle of sovereignty-exclusive control
'A New Stream of International Law Scholarship', Wisconsin International Law Journal, 7 (1988), p. 14. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Sludy of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan,
' 1977) * Kennedy, 'A New Stream', p. 22 notes that '[Tlhe traditional intellectual story of international law's
evolution from 1648 to 1918 is familiar. Begun as a series of disassociated doctrines about navigation, war and relations with aboriginals within a "natural law" philosophy, international law slowly matured as a comprehensivedoctrinal fabric rendered coherent by a set of "general principles" and authoritative by its "positivist" link to sovereign consent. The shift from fragmentation to coherence is accompanied, then, by a shift from "natural law" to a combination of "principles" and
"positivism"'.
lo
M. N. Shaw, International Law, 3rd edn. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1994),p. 135. Shaw, International Law, p. 137 cites a 1975 volume of Lauterpacht's Int~rnationalLaw; Collected
I'
Shaw, Int~rnationalLaw,p. 137.
Papers, vol 11, p. 489.
22
Non-State Actors and International Law
I36
A. Claire Cutler
over territory-has been persistently challenged by the creation of new institutional forms that better meet specific material needs.'* But the problem goes still deeper than ambiguity over the exclusivity of state claims to authority and relates to the status of the state as the 'subject' of law and politics. This is referred to as the 'problem of the subject' and runs something as follows.13The problem of the subject involves the tendency to 'avoid confronting the question of who or what thinks or produces law'.I4 Schlag notes that it can be stated in different ways: 'Just who or what is it that thinks about or produces law?' or 'What must be true or potentially true about the character of the agents that construct the law, in order for the law to be a legitimate or a viable enterprise?' or 'What conception of subject-object relations is implicit in the rhetorical and social forces that are constructing us?'15 In international law, the problem of the subject appears in the designation of states as 'subjects' of the law while individuals and corporations are regarded as 'objects' of the law. While more will be said of this in the next section, as 'objects', whatever rights or duties individuals and corporations have are derivative of, and enforceable only by, states who, as 'subjects', conferred these rights and duties upon them. Conceptualizing the state as the subject thus performs a valuable function. Schlag notes that the subject is a 'concierge' and as 'the keeper of artifacts is a kind of bailee' whose role it is to conserve and avoid change.16 But the subject is more than conservative of the existing order, for the concierge also functions as a gatekeeper. In international law, the state functions to keep out antistatist tendencies and personalities. This is achieved through a process of differentiating between subject and object, associating the former with states and the latter with individuals and corporations and then objectifying this condition by allowing the subject to drop out of sight. This enables the law to stand alone as the embodiment of sovereign will, authority, and legitimacy. Under positive international law the law became the embodiment of the sovereign will; it was abstracted, objectified and related to the state as thought relates to action or as legal theory relates to state practice. Most importantly, the state was both reified as a 'subject' and deified through objectification of the law.I7 As Kennedy notes, '[l]ronically, at the very moment of religion's disappearance, international law appears as a universalist ideology of its own-temporally freed from its origins and c o n t e ~ t ' . 'Moreover, ~ law, like 'Westphalia and All That', in Judith Goldstein and Robert 0. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy (Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 235. l' Pierre Schlag, 'The Problem of the Subject', Texas Law Review, 69 (1991), p. 1627, formulates the problem of the subject in the context of the objectification and sublimation of the subject as a formalistic move to give law the appearance of neutrality and objectivity, and hence to render law stable and legitimate. l4 Schlag, 'The Problem of the Subject', p. 1640, notes that '[Tlhe sublimation of the subject into the order of the object and the resulting fetishism is a move that is replayed endlessly in American legal thought. This self-effacement of the subject to the order of the object is precisely what enables legal thinkers to keep believing in their objectified thought structures as off the shelf, stand-alone, selfsufficient, self-sustaining systems, completely independent of the activity of the subjects. This sublimation of the subject is precisely the kind of process targeted by the reification critique of liberal legal thought offered by cls [critical legal studies].' l5 Schlag, 'The Problem of the Subject', p. 1629, note 6. l 6 Schlag, 'The Problem of the Subject', p. 1726. Kennedy, 'A New Stream', p. 25 observes that '[Dloctrinally, the development of a territorial jurisdiction, so crucial to the image of a disembodied state, was first and foremost a religious n o t i o n replacing and instantiating a disembodied deity as state.' l8 Ibid., p. 22. l2
23
Non-State Actors and International Law Westphalian assumptions and their legitimacy
137
religion before, came to operate as a 'mechanism of exclusion', excluding and suppressing 'actual social difference'.19 As Kennedy observes '. . . we would find in the origins of international law not a moment of tolerant generality, of liberality, but a well articulated practice of social intolerance. For it was the law of peoples
which worked to exclude the Jew, the homosexual, the heretic, and perhaps most
crucially, worked to suppress the exuberance of spiritual fervour, displacing it with bureaucracy. The suppression of witchcraft, sorcery, but also of ecstatic millenarianism, and their replacement by the logic of state orthodoxy, was a collaborative practice of religious inter-sovereign action'.20 The subjective identity of business corporations, which are regarded as analogous to individuals, was suppressed along with that of individuals and excluded as part of the reification and deification of the state. Moreover, the law came to operate in a dialectical fashion with the state. The law both constituted the state as 'subject' and mirrored the state through laws governing sources and personality. But, the law also stood outside the state and, through the process of objectification described above, policed and measured state action. Kennedy describes this as a dialectical or double movement: The move is paradoxical. We need to read it very slowly. On the one hand, international law is a matter of ideas, born in the move from state to law, instantiating law to facilitate the state. On the other, maturity is achieved at each stage through a double reversal of this order-first by a movement from thought to action, and second, exactly at the moment of law's movement from principle toward practice, law is set up against the state, separated from the sovereign it facilitates and mirror^.^' The implications of treating corporations, like individuals, as objects and not as subjects are deeply troubling empirically and normatively. When one reviews the activities of business corporations it becomes clear that while they may be objects at law (de jure), they are, in fact, operating as subjects (de facto). Indeed, the problem of the subject is becoming increasingly more acute in the context of contemporary developments that are reconfiguring state-society relations, in some cases causing a contraction of state authority and an expansion of private, corporate authority in the world. Susan Strange has posed the problem of the subject in the context of 'Who or what is responsible for change?' and 'Who, or what, exercises authoritythe power to alter outcomes and redefine options for others-in the world economy or world society?'22 She calls it Pinocchio's problem, for, like Pinocchio upon his transformation from a puppet into a boy with no strings to guide him, it involves making choices over 'allegiance, loyalty, and identity' in 'a world of multiple, diffused authority'. The problem of the subject is a problem of the growing disjunction between law and politics or between theory and practice. However, this disjunction is obscured by state-centric definitions of law and politics and public notions of authority that render private authority invisible, matters to which we will now turn.
'9
20 21
"
Ibid., p. 25. Ibid.. o. 25. 1bid.i 23. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 184.
b.
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A. Claire Cutler
Public and private authority: states, markets, corporations and legal personality The distinction between public and private authority is central to legal and political theory, both domestically and internati~nally.~~ The association of authority with the state, government, and the 'public' sphere and its consequent disassociation with the 'private' sphere of individuals and their market activities is essential to liberal political and legal analyses. As Michael Walzer notes, these associations are fundamental to the 'liberal art of separation', where 'political community is separated from the sphere of economic competition and free e n t e r p r i ~ e ' .Indeed, ~~ these associations derive from the prior more fundamental distinction between politics and economics.25They developed as powerful associations over the course of the emergence of the European state system and modern capitalism. They formed the foundation for the Westphalian order and continue to inform contemporary liberal political and legal discourse. First, the state was identified as the locus of political and legal authority, although as we noted above this association was not uncontested. Later, the nineteenth-century identification of the self-regulating market as a defining institution of the private sphere provided a crucial element for dominant notions of political authority. It perfected the association of 'political' and legal authority with the public sphere of governments and the association of 'apolitical' economic relations with the private sphere of individuals and marketsz6 Henceforth, governments came to be the legitimate wielders of 'public' and political activity, whilst markets were the legitimate arbiters of private and economic activity. The authority of the market in ordering private relations was grounded in legal theory and liberal political economy, which provided the rationale for the private and 'nonauthoritative' regulation of individual and corporate activities. Morton Horowitz notes that 'Vlust as nineteenth-century political economy elevated markets to the status of the paramount institution for distributing rewards on a supposedly neutral and apolitical basis, so too private law came to be understood as a neutral system for facilitating voluntary market transactions and vindicating injuries to private rights'.27 Liberalism facilitated these developments by providing private ordering as a grund norm or a founding myth for this constitutional order. The private ordering of individual and corporate economic activities was posited by liberalism to provide the most natural, neutral, consensual, and efficient means for
23
24 25
26
''
See generally, A. Claire Cutler, 'Locating "Authority" in the Global Political Economy', International Studies Quarterly, 43 (1999), pp. 59-81 and Cutler, 'Private Authority and International Trade Relations: The Case of Maritime Transport', in Cutler, Haufler, and Porter (eds.), Privaze Authority and International Affairs, pp. 283-329. 'Liberalism and the Art of Separation,' Political Theory, 12:3 (1984), pp. 315-30. See A. Claire Cutler, 'Global Capitalism and Liberal Myths: Dispute Settlement in Private International Trade Relations', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 24:3 (1995), pp. 377-97, and Susan Strange, 'Political Economy and International Relations', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). For a classic account of the origin of the separation of public and private authority in terms of disembedding the self-regulatingmarket from its social and political context, see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Times (Boston, MA: Beawn Press, 1944). 'The History of the PublidPrivate Distinction', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 130 (1982), pp. 1425-6.
Non-State Actors and International Law Westphafian assumptions and their legitimacy
25 139
regulating commercial activities and for achieving justice in international economic affairs.28 In international political theory, the free market continues to be regarded as an integral component of liberal theorizing. Although contemporary liberals have long recognized important imperfections in market operations, they continue to regard market actlvity as an Integral part of mternat~onalrelations.z9 However, there is a great degree of controversy over the nature of the relationship between the market and the state; between economics and politics; between the private and public spheres. The extent to which states control markets or, conversely, are driven by them forms a central debate in international political economy today. Part of this controversy stems from the near axiomatic nature of the associations of states with political activity and of markets with economic activity and with what appear to be rather visible departures from these associations. Increasingly, states are functioning as market participants and economic actors, like transnational corporations, are influencing political outcomes.30 However, another part of the controversy stems from a less visible debate between liberal and Marxist analysts over the priority to be assigned to economics or to politics. Attributing authority and, hence, political significance to economic actors sits uneasily with liberal democratic theory and with the representative foundations of this constitutional order. Indeed, international law forms the foundation for a representative order in which state authority and state consent constitute the litmus tests of law and society. The recognition of the 'political' nature of private or non-state authority threatens to undermine these constitutional foundations, while attributing political functions to economic actors and processes threatens to elide into M a r x i ~ m . ~The l 'liberal art' of separating politics and governments from economics and markets is thus a crucial element of the founding mythology. International legal theory reproduces these liberal separations in the doctrine governing international legal personality and in the distinctions between public and private international law.32 The law governing international legal personality
'* 29
30
)'
32
Cutler, 'Global Capitalism and Liberal Myths'. For the significance of the market to international political economy, see generally Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of Internatioml Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter, 1988); Herman M. Schwartz, States Versus Markets: Historj Geography, and the Development of the International Political Economy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies (Baltimore. MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988). Susan Strange was probably one of the strongest proponents of this view. See States and Markets, The Retreat of the State, and 'Political Economy and International Relations', and with John Stopford, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competitionfor World Market Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). See Ellen Meiksins Wood, 'The Seaaration of the Economic and Political in Cavitalism'. New Left Review, 127 (1981), pp. 6 6 9 5 repr;duced in her Democracy Against ~a~ita1ism:~Renewing ~istorkal Materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) for discussion of the distinction between economics and politics. And see A. Claire Cutler. 'Historical Materialism, Globalization, and Law: Competing Conceptions of Property', forthcoming in Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith (eds.), The Point is to Change the World: Social~smthrough Globalization? (Routledge, forthcoming) for the view that Marxist analysis reproduces the liberal distinction between economics and politics and thus also neglects the authority of private relations. For the liberal foundations of international law, see M. W. Janis 'Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of 'International Law', American Journal of International Law, 78 (1984), pp. 405-18, and for a critical analysis of the distinction between public and private international law, see A. Claire Cutler, 'Artifice, Ideology, and Paradox: The PublidPrivate Distinction in International Law', Review of International Political Economy, 4 (1997), pp. 261-85.
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26
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A. Claire Cutler
identifies the proper 'subjects' of the law. It determines who possesses 'rights and duties enforceable at law. .. . Legal personality is crucial. Without it institutions and groups cannot operate for they need to maintain and enforce claims.'33 In identifying the state as the proper subject of the law, the doctrine formed the foundation for establishing the dominant authority structure as that of the territorial state and the state system and eliminated any potentially rival claims to identity and authority coming from individuals or from corporate entities. As Mark Janis notes, '[nlineteenth century positivists promoted the notion that the individual was not a proper subject of international law ... public international law went to matters affecting states, while private international law concerned matters between individuals' .34 The identification of states as the proper 'subjects' of international law is generally associated with legal positivism, which attributes the binding force of international law to states and state consent. Legal positivism developed as a reaction to natural law theories,35 whose assumption of a universal transcendent moral order was increasingly difficult to reconcile with the growing power of states.36 Legal positivists, historically, provided the equivalent of the statist political theories advanced by Jean Bodin and Thomas hob be^.^^ Today, the modern doctrine of international legal personality continues to run parallel to territoriallstatist conceptions of international relations. Only states are recognized as full members of the United Nations and the degree of legal personality possessed by international organizations is determined by and derived from their member states.38Only states may bring contentious proceedings before the lnternational Court of Ju~tice.~"nly states are entitled to claim the right of territorial integrity, a basic right recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties explicitly limits the application of the Convention to treaties between states, although increasingly non-state entities are entering into treaties40 Only states may acquire territory, appoint ambassadors, or declare war.41 Importantly, as mentioned earlier, the international legal status of transnational corporations, probably the most visible private global actors today, is analogous with that of the individual. They are 'objects' and not 'subjects' of the law. As Rosalyn Higgins notes, leading legal positivists regard individuals as 'objects' of international law.42According to this view, '[ulnder a legal system there exist only objects and subjects. In international law "subjects" is the term used to describe
"
34
35
36
'' 38 39 40
4' 42
Shaw, International Law, p. 135. An international person is defined as 'capable of possessing international rights and duties ... and [having the] capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims' by the International Court of Justice in the Reparations case (Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 International Court of Justice Reports), p. 178. 'Individuals as Subjects under International Law'. p. 62. See Kobert J. Beck, Anthony C. Arend and Robert D. Vander Lugt (eds.), International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), chs. 2 and 3 for good reviews of natural and positive law theories of international law, respectively. See Cutler, 'The "Grotian Tradition" in International Relations'. Shaw, International Law. p. 25. Reparations case, p. 180. Article 34 (I), Statute of the International Court of Justice. See the discussion of bilateral investment treaties accompanying note 62. Malannuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, p. 100. 'Conceptual Thinking About the Individual in International Law'.
Non-State Actors and International Law Westphalian assumptions and their legitimacy
141
those elements bearing, without the need for municipal intervention, rights and responsibilities. Under the existing rules of international law there is no evidence that individuals are permitted to be the bearers of duties and responsibilities. They must, therefore, be objects: that is to say, they are like "boundaries" or "rivers" or "territory" or any of the other chapter headings found in the traditional textbooks.' 43
As objects, individuals have no original rights or liabilities under international law.44The only rights or liabilities they possess are derivative of states under the The situation is basically principles governing nationality and state re~ponsibility.~~ the same for corporations, with the narrow exception of those that are constituted by states as international 'subjects' by international treaties creating them.46Thus, as one legal theorist notes, '[tlhe law recognizes as "international corporations" only those entities which are constructed by international law, that is by treaty. ... This format is not available to the private commercial enterprise which must content itself with stringing together corporations created by the laws of different state^.'^' For private business enterprises operating transnationally, legal personality is conferred under national and municipal laws, and corporate rights, duties, and remedies remain a function of national law. The transnational corporation thus lacks 'concrete presence in international law ... it is an apparition ... its actuality sifted through the grid of state sovereignty into an assortment of secondary rights and contingent liabilitie~'.~~ Like individuals, transnational corporations are treated as
" 'Conceptual Thinking About the Individual in International Law',
p. 478.
" It is important to note that while the formal legal status of the individual remains that of an 'object,'
45
46
47
48
there are growing indications that the international legal status of the individual is undergoing a practical transformation. A number of forums now entertain the human rights claims of individuals, although legal theory and the official position of many states, including the former Soviet states, many developing states, and the United States, remain stubbornly opposed to the extension of international legal personality to individuals. The most notable instances of this accretion of legal personality occur in the contexts of the European Commission on Human Rights; the European Court of Justice; the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the War Crimes Tribunals for Nuremberg. Tokyo, former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda; the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The United Nations Trusteeship Council and the yet to be established International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea entertain individual claims in areas outside the human rights context. See generally the references cited above in note 2 and Donna E. Arzt and Igor I. Lukashuk, 'Participants in International Legal Relations,' in International Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings, edited by Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 155-76. This trend does not appear to be occurring in areas involving individual claims of economic loss from wrongful or negligent international activities. While the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, which was set up to hear claims flowing from the Gulf War, is open to individual claims, it has largely ignored the claims of individuals as Arzt and Lukashuk note at p. 168. Typically. individuals seeking to make a claim under international law must work through the state of which they are a national. However, there is no obligation on states to represent their nationals diplomatically or in international judicial proceedings. Such representation is purely discretionary and may be withheld. See William R. Slomanson, Fundamenla1 Perspectives on International Law, 2nd edn. (MinneapolidSaint Paul, MI: West Publishing Company, 1995), ch. 4. Examples of corporate enterprises exhibiting various elements of international legal personality include Eurofima, Intelsat, Eurochemic, the Mont Blanc Tunnel Company, and the Mozelle Canal Company. Detlev F. Vagts, 'The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law', Harvard Law Review, 83 (1970), p. 740. Fleur Johns, 'The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and Theory', Melbourne University Law Review, 19 (1994), p. 893.
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28
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A. Claire Cutler
nationals of the state in which they are i n ~ o r p o r a t e d .And ~ ~ as in the case of individuals, the state is under no obligation to pursue a corporation's claims diplomatically or under international law. Indeed, states may be reluctant to do so in cases where the nationality of the corporation is ambiguous and difficult to determine.50 More importantly, however, the lack of legal personality renders corporations unaccountable under international law. Once again their responsibility, like their identity, is filtered through the lens of state authority. According to the doctrine of state responsibility, states are responsible for acts or omissions that breach international law and cause injury to another state.51However, the injuries must be caused by a state, its officials or others whose behaviour is imputable or attributable to the state.52 The actions of private corporate entities will thus not engage state responsibility and injured parties are left to their remedies under local law.53 The ability to hold a corporation responsible for wrongful or negligent conduct will thus turn on the provisions of national law. Unfortunately, establishing corporate responsibility is particularly difficult when domestic legal doctrines, like shareholder limited liability and entity theory, shield parent corporations from domestic liability for the actions of their foreign s u b s i d i a r i e ~ .This ~ ~ implies significantly compromised state control over corporations and their affiliates. As one legal analyst observes: TNCs benefit from their international nonstatus. Nonstatus immunizes them from direct accountability to international legal norms and permits them to use sympathetic national governments to parry outside efforts to mold their behavior. TNCs also enjoy some immunity from third world derision at the UN General Assembly and other multinational forums 49
The traditional Anglo-American approach to determining the nationality of a corporation is the place of incorporation (domicile) and for unincorporated businesses, the state in which the governing body meets or is located. In contrast, European states tend to use the state where the corporation's home office is located or where its principal business is carried on. See Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law, 7th edn. (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. 1996). See too Ian Brownlie. Princi~leso f Public International Law. 4th edn. (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1990), pp. 4214. In the famous legal case Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co., 1970 International Court of Justice Reports (Second Phase), 3 (1970). the company Barcelona traction was incorporated and held its registered office in Canada although 88 per cent of its shareholders were nationals of Belgium, and some lived in Canada and the US. Barcelona Traction operated a power company in Spain which was declared bankrupt by Spanish courts, who ordered its assets seized. Belgium, Canada, and the US tried to assist Barcelona Traction resist the seizure because they felt the Spanish authorities were acting prematurely and improperly in instituting the bankruptcy proceedings. Canada was unwilling to pursue the claims of the shareholders living in Canada, and Belgium pursued the claim against Spain in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, the ICJ disallowed Belgium's claim, finding that the proper country to initiate the claim was Canada. Given that Canada was unwilling to proceed with the claim, the shareholders were left with no remedies under international law. State responsibility comes in a number of forms including injuries to a state or aliens (foreign citizens) and ranging from human rights violations to injury to property interests See Shaw, International Law, ch. 13. Shaw, International Law, p. 488. That is unless the state fails to provide local remedies to redress the wrong. Von Glahn, Law Among Nations, p. 201. See Philip I. Blumberg. The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law: The Search for a New Corporate Personality (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) for the doctrine of limited liability and entity theory. See Notes, 'Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages', Harvard Law Review, 99 (1986), p 991 for the view that 'limited liability encourages corporations to place high-risk activities in the hands of poorly capitalized subsidiary corporations. The incentive for corporations to use subsidiaries as a shield against liability is particularly great in the hazardous waste disposal field because the costs of waste disposal activities may be readily shifted onto involuntary creditors'.
.
5L
52
53
"
<
29
Non-State Actors and International Law Westphalian assumptions and their legitimacy
143
because national governments are willing to insulate them from these and other international pressures. Broad international legal personality would destroy these defences.55 Understandably, transnational corporations are not lobbying for the recognition of general international legal personal it^.^^ Rather, they are content to arrange more
specific recognition of legal personality for limited purposes so as to enable them to pursue their legal claims more directly without exposing them to more general international legal responsibility. This is precisely what they are doing in efforts ranging from their increased participation in international negotiations to the enhanced recognition of their right to make a legal claim directly against another corporation or a state in international tribunals under international law without the representation of a state. Concerning international negotiations, the general rule is that only states are the formal participants in international negotiations. However, there has been considerable expansion of corporate r e p r e s e n t a t i ~ n .In ~ ~the International Labour Organization, representatives of business and labour participate and vote independently of government representative^.^^ In the United Nations system in general, transnational corporations, like individuals, are most often limited to observer and/or consultative statuss9 However, their participation in international organizations and negotiations has increased dramatically and their influence on the outcomes of negotiations can be substantiaL60 In terms of direct access for corporations to forums for dispute settlement, there has been a notable expansion of corporate powers. Corporations have legal standing in the European Economic Community and the European Coal and Steel Comm ~ n i t y . ~The ' International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) has created an international tribunal, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), that hears investment disputes between states and foreign corporations. Indeed, there has been a proliferation of bilateral investment treaties that provide access to ICSlD for dispute settlement and expand corporate rights by prescribing standards of treatment of corporations, protecting them from expropriation without compensation, and granting corporations the right to take legal actions against states.62 Corporations and individuals have legal '5
'h
57
58
s9
61
62
See Jonathan I. Charney, 'Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International Law', Duke Law Journal (1983), p. 767. Charney, 'Transnational Corporations', p. 766 notes that in international negotiations, 'TNCs have not overtly sought broad international legal personality' and were unenthusiastic about developing mechanisms for international incorporation. Charney, "liansnational Corporations'. Ibid., p. 750-1. Ibid., p. 751, n. 4 notes that in the United Nations Commission on International Trade and Development (UNCWD) business interests could only participate through representations to the Secretariat and to national delegations. In comparison, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) enters into formal consultation with business and labour groups. He also notes that there were extensive consultations with business during the Tokyo Round GATT negotiations. See Charney, 'Transnational Corporations', pp. 75&5. Arzt and Lukashuk, 'Participants in International Legal Relations'. p. 167. A bilateral investment treaty is 'a legally binding international agreement between two states, whereby each state promises, on a reciprocal basis, to observe the standards of treatment laid down in the treaty in its dealings within investors from other contracting states'. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, p. 617. They are designed to protect the investor and when used in combination with an agreement to submit disputes to ICSID accord corporations much scope in enforcing their rights against host states.
30
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A. Claire Cutler
standing in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, set up to settle disputes arising from the Gulf War.63The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration has amended its rules to attract more business by offering to hear claims of non-state parties.@ The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) provides for binding dispute settlement for corporation^.^^ The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides similar access for private parties.66 It is noteworthy that access for private parties is also provided for under the failed OECD initiative to create a Multilateral lnvestment Agreement (MAI).67 Finally, the widespread preference for private arbitration over adjudication in national courts is revolutionizing the dispute settlement world by removing private international commercial relations from the purview of states and their public policy concerns. This is effecting a major expansion of corporate authority and autonomy.68The provision of direct access for corporations to dispute settlement panels and the expansion of private dispute settlement constitute significant accretions of international legal personality and corporate authority. This review illustrates that transnational corporations are increasingly functioning as participants in the direct creation, application, and enforcement of international law. Moreover, governments are participating in the expansion of corporate rights and powers. Changes in national business culture and ideology consistent with the removal of barriers to corporate activity are enhancing corporate authority. As Jan Scholte notes: 'states have played an indispensable enabling role in the globalization of capital ... governments have facilitated global firms' operations and profits with suitably constructed property guarantees, currency regulations, tax regimes, labour laws and police p r o t e ~ t i o n ' .Corporations ~~ are gaining rights through novel uses of domestic human rights d o c u r n e n t ~ The . ~ ~ resulting expansion of corporate rights under domestic constitutional laws is generally consistent with a notable decline in the corporate control function of states. As states adopt more permissive rule structures facilitating the expansion of corporate investment and financial activities, they have moved away from the 'corporate control' model that characterized previous approaches to regulating T N C S . ~ ~ International legal theory appears to be slow to react to the expansion of which is contributing to a reconfiguration of state-society corporate
@
65
66 67
69 70
7'
Malannuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, p. 101. Ibid., p. 294. J. -G. Castel, 'The Settlement of Disputes under the 1988 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement', American Journal of International Law 83 (1989), pp. 118-28; Lorraine Eden, 'The Emerging North American Investment Regime', Transnational Corporations 5:3 (December 1996), pp. 61-98; Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, p. 101. See Eden, 'The emerging North American investment regime'. Frans Engering, 'The Multilateral lnvestment Agreement', Transnational Corporations (December 1996), pp. 156-7. See Cutler, 'Global Capitalism and Liberal Myths', and Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitrarion and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 'Global Capitalism and the State', International Aflairs 73:3 (1997), pp. 442-3. Carl J. Mayer, 'Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights', The Hastings Law Journal, 41 (March 1990), pp. 577-667 and Chris Tollefson, 'Corporate Constitutional Rights and the Supreme Court of Canada', Queen's Law Journal, 19 (1993). pp. 309-49. Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995). pp. 9-1 1.
31
Non-State Actors and International Law Westphalian assumptions and their legitimacy
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relations.72Noting that the concept of corporate legal personality may be 'ripe for a revival' and in need of analytical and sociological re-examination in the 'global context', one legal analyst notes scant development in the past forty years.73Indeed, when considered in light of the 'global context', such analysis becomes even more urgent. Stephen Gill analyses similar developments in the context of 'disciplinary neoliberalism' and a 'new constitut~onalism'that 'confers prlvlleged rights of citizenship and representation on corporate capital, whilst constraining the democratization process that has involved struggles for representation for hundreds of years'.74 This development is affecting a shift in authority structures, recasting state and corporate authority and control. In some cases the political authority of states is being challenged and modified in a manner that enhances corporate power. This is evident in the broadly permissive nature of the principles that are being articulated as the grund norms for commercial law and in the unprecedented expansion of private international commercial a r b i t r a t i ~ n In . ~ ~other cases, national courts are participating in the insulation of nationally-based corporations from liability. For example, the working relationship between national courts and corporations that do business or have subsidiaries abroad is evident in their efforts to limit the rights of foreign litigants, seeking to take advantage of liberal American products liability laws, to litigate in the United States.76The implications for holding corporations liable for environmental disasters, personal injuries from defective goods and a host of other wrongful or negligent actions are deeply problematic in this general climate. The development of novel corporate arrangements render transnational corporations more difficult to locate nationally. This further compounds the problem of corporate accountability. As Susan Strange observes, the proliferation of inter-firm relationships, like 'partnerships, production-sharing arrangements, collaborative research and networking . .. have begun to blur the identity and indirectly undermine the authority of the state' making the attribution of corporate nationality and responsibility very diffic~lt.'~ She notes that when 'partners in the network operate and are registered in several countries, it is impossible even to guess the In contrast, students of international political economy seem to be more aware of the growing practical significance of TNCs. For Lorraine Eden, 'Bringing the Firm Back In: Multinationals in International Political Economy', in Lorraine Eden and Evan H. Potter (eds.), Multinationals in the Global Political Economy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994): p. 26, the crucial issue in the global political economy today 'is the tension between states and multinationals, not states and markets'. Susan Strange too notes the increasing 'political' significance of firms as changes in the global political economy enhance the significance of markets. See also Strange, The Retreat of the State, p. 4. However, there is still a dominant tendency to regard corporate power as ultimately linked to and conditioned by state power. See Stephen Krasner, 'Power Politics, Institutions, and Transnational Relations', in Bringing Transnationals Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions. Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 279. " William Twining, 'Globalization and Legal Theory: Some Local Implications', Current Legal Problems, 49 ( 1 996), p. 6. 74 'Globalisation, market civilization, and disciplinary neoliberalism', Millennium; Journal of International Studies, 24 (1995), p. 413. 75 See UNIDROIT'S Principles of International Commercial Contracts (Rome: UNIDROIT, 1994) and Cutler, 'Global Capitalism and Liberal Myths'. 76 See Hilmy Ismail, 'Forum Non Conveniens: United States Multinational Corporations', and 'Personal Injuries in the Third World: Your Place or Mine?, Boston College Third World Law Journal, 1 1 (1991), pp. 249 76. " Strange, 'Global Government and Global Opposition', in Politics in an Interdependent World: Essays Presented to Ghita Ionescu, Cheltenham, U K and Brookefield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1994), p. 26. 72
32
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"nationality" of the whole network. Yet much media comment and much academic analysis still assume that each transnational corporation has a national identity and that governments can identify and then support their own national champion.'78 While there appears to be a great deal of recognition of the enhanced power of transnational corporations, it is unaccompanied by effective efforts to regulate them. In many matters, international law is silent. There is no binding and general international commercial code governing the practices of transnational corporations. Most matters are dealt with under national systems of corporate and private international law principles, which even corporate lawyers agree are i n a d e q ~ a t e . ~ ~ The efforts of international and regional organizations and private business and industry associations have produced a number of instruments that attempt to regulate corporate behaviour, but they tend to be of a predominantly 'soft law' nature.80 The Draft Code of Conduct produced by the Commission on Transnational Corporations8' was hoped to make a major contribution to the development of an international regulatory framework, but the efforts failed to produce a consensus. Other failed efforts 'affirm rather than challenge the assumption that it is a state's prerogative to deal with TNCs [transnational corporations] through its national legal systems'.82 This creates a problem of ensuring corporate accountability. As noted above, there is no guarantee that a state will assume responsibility for the actions of corporations holding its nationality. Often the place of nationality is only remotely connected to corporate operations. As the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations observes: '[a] number of factors .. . conspire to make purely national control systems variously evadable, inefficient, incomplete, unenforceable, exploitable, or negotiable . . . with respect to transnational corporat i o n ~ ' One . ~ ~ solution is the recognition of the transnational corporation as a legal subject, bearing rights and responsibilities directly under international law. However, this faces major problems in states' unwillingness to 'relinquish their traditionally dominant position in international law, or to acknowledge the effectiveness of law in the absence of a s ~ v e r e i g n ' .Moreover, ~~ the emphasis on the legal aspects of corporate personality risks a formalism that mistakes the legal form for the actual conduct and practices of corporations and of states. It is here that we return to the 'problem of the subject.' The 'problem of the subject' must be framed today in the context of broader and deeper forces operating in the global political economy. The contemporary 'subject' is being reconfigured and reconstituted through a globalizing corporate ideology and business culture. A global mercatocracy unites local and global political economies through the law merchant, lex mercatoria, a body of commercial law and practice that has regulated merchant activities for over a
78 79
80 81
82
83 84
Strange, 'Global Government and Global Opposition', p. 26. Notes o f Cases, 'The Multinational and the Antiquities o f Company Law', The Modern Law Review, 47 (1984),pp. 87-92. Johns, 'The Invisibility o f the Transnational Corporation', 897, notes 21 and 22. The Commission was created in 1974 by ECOSOC and given the mandate to prepare a code o f conduct for governments and T N C s Drafts were produced in 1978, 1983, 1988, and 1990. Consensus over the draft was never achieved and in 1992 the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Secretariat to the Commission, was dismantled and its functions were transferred to a new Transnational Corporations Management Division within ECOSOC. Johns, 'The Invisibility o f the Transnational Corporation', p. 899. Quoted in Johns, 'The Invisibility o f the Transnational Corporation', p. 896. Ibid., p. 900.
33
Non-State Actors and international Law Westphalian assumptions and their legitimacy
147
m i l l e n n i ~ m The . ~ ~ modern law merchant is a central mechanism for the globalization of disciplinary neoliberal norms. These norms, in turn, constitutionalize private ordering as the dominant regulatory ethos, thus conferring legitimate authority on private business enterprises. Paradoxically, while corporations are central players in this restructuring process, linking global and local political economies, they remain invisible as 'subjects'. The de jure insignificance of corporations in the face of their de facto significance reflects a disjunction between theory and practice. In the context of the problem of the 'subject,' it marks a disjunction between law and state, for the law has ceased to constitute, mirror and, in some cases, to discipline its 'subject,' the state and state practice. The 'subject' has in fact, been reconfigured in the legally 'invisible' form of the transnational corporation. This portends a legitimacy crisis for both law and state.
The disjunction between theory and practice: a crisis of legitimacy All constitutional orders require some degree of fit between their principles and practices. Whether one focuses upon the symmetry between law and practice ' ~ ~the 'convergent expectations' of the participant^,^' through 'rules of r e c o g n i t i ~ n or the legitimacy of a constitutional order is associated with some measure of conformance of the actual practices of participants with its founding legall constitutional theory and principles. A disjunction between constitutional theory and the practices of participants, more often than not, portends a crisis of l e g i t i m a ~ yWhen . ~ ~ the participants fail to recognize the legitimacy of law through their practices, the law's claim to authority is challenged and potentially undermined. In international law, state practice is regarded as one of the main sources of law, another source being international treatiesn9 Traditionally, state practice constituted the state as the 'subject' of the constitutional order. However, we have argued that increasingly state practice is reconstituting the de facto 'subject' in the form of the transnational corporation. However, legal theory has not kept in step with this changing practice. The resulting disjunction between legal theory and state practice is part of a larger disjunction associated with globalization more generally. As Philip Cerny observes: ... globalization leads to a growing disjunction between the democratic, constitutional, and social aspirations of people-which continue to be shaped by and understood through the framework of the territorial state--and increasingly problematic potential for collective action through state political processes. Certain possibilities for collective action through multilateral regimes may increase, but these operate at least one remove from democratic accountability. Indeed, the study of international regimes is expanding beyond intergovernmental institutions or public entities per se toward 'private regimes' as critical
86
87 88 8y
See Cutler, 'Global Capitalism and Liberal Myths'. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of l a w , 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1983). A good example of a legitimacy crisis could be found in the former Soviet Union in the context of constitutionally protected human rights that were in practice quite meaningless. Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
34
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A. Claire Cutler
regulatory mechanisms. New nodes of private quasi-public economic power are crystallizing that, in their own partial domains, are in effect more sovereign than the state.90 The disjunction between law and practice is not lost on corporate actors. Indeed, a transnational corporate elite is pushing hard for the establishment of a global business regulatory order.91 But it is an order of a particular sort-one consistent with a renewed emphasis on neoliberal values concerning the superiority of the private ordering of global corporate relation^.^' Global corporate actors are not trying to discipline corporate activities. They resist developing methods for the international incorporation of companies, and the ancillary reporting requirem e n t ~ . ' The ~ MA1 was not intended as a mechanism for enhancing corporate responsibility, but as a means for limiting the restrictions that national governments could place on foreign ~orporations.9~ Indeed, together corporations and states are reworking the nature of the relationship between states and business enterprises as part of the reconfiguration of the 'welfare state' as the 'competition state'.95 This reconfiguration is in part a response to intensified global competition brought about by forces of economic globalization and competitive deregulation and liberalization. Increasingly states are functioning as market participants, blurring the separation between private and public authority and agency. In corporate law, this trend is evident in the competitive deregulation of corporate activities. Robert Cox argues that '[nleoliberalism is transforming states from being buffers between external economic forces and the domestic economy into agencies for adapting domestic economies to the exigencies of the global economy'.96 The enhanced authority of transnational corporations is a significant element of this transformation, for they mediate between local and global political economies, facilitating the mobility and accumulation of capital. In so doing, they function as crucial bearers of neoliberal discipline, enhancing the power of private capital. However, the enhanced power of private capital is rendered 'invisible' by liberal theories of international law and organization. This portends a legitimacy crisis that is empirical, theoretical, and normative. From an empirical point of view, the law governing international legal personality tells us very little about the nature of the corporate world, the authority wielded by corporations, or their complex relationships with states, both national and foreign. Theoretically, international law is unable 'Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action', International Organization, 49:4 (Autumn 1995), p. 618. See Johns, 'The Invisibility of Transnational Corporations', p. 896; Detlev Vagts, 'The Multinational Enterprise', p. 764. This is evident in the terms of the MAI, which restrict the regulatory ambit of states over foreign investment activities and in the shift in corporate legal preferences for 'soft law' agreements over 'hard law' ones. See A. Claire Cutler, 'Public Meets Private: The International Unification and Harmonization of Private International Trade Law', Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations, 13:l (January 1999), pp. 2 5 4 8 on the appeal of soft law norms governing international commercial contracting. See above, note 56. For a review of the provisions of the MAI, see Frans Engering, 'The Multilateral Investment Agreement', Transnational Corporations, 5:3 (December 1996), pp. 147-61. Philip Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency and the Future of the State (London: Sage Publications, 1990), p. 230 and 'Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization', Government and Opposition. 32:2 (Spring 1997). p. 273. 'Critical Political Economy', in International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder, edited by Bjorn Hettne (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, and London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1995), p. 39.
Non-State Actors and International Law Westphalian assumptions and their legitimacy
35 149
to theorize about its 'subject' in any but the most formalistic and artificial ways. The corporation is under-theorized, while the state is over-theorized. Finally, and probably most importantly, the normative implications of the problem of the 'subject' are obscured by the same moves suppressing the corporate subject. The problem of corporate accountability is concealed by avoiding the questions of 'who or what produces law?', 'what are the political conditions for legitimate agency in the creation and enforcement of law?', and 'who legitimately determines outcomes in the global political economy?' The very same doctrine that constructs the transnational corporation as an 'invisible subject' blocks the abilities of individual citizens to challenge corporate behaviour because such challenge must run through the agency of the state. In 'guaranteeing the economic res puhlic for capitalism', states are causing shifts in power relations within and between states.97Robert Cox refers to a 'decomposition of civil society,' in terms of 'a fragmentation of social forces and a growing gap between the base of society and political l e a d e r ~ h i p ' He . ~ ~identifies the alienation of people from their political institutions and a loss of confidence in the abilities of politicians to deal with contemporary problems as contradictions generated by globalization. To Cox, 'globalization has undermined the authority of conventional political structures and accentuated the fragmentation of s ~ c i e t i e s ' . ~ ~ Stephen Gill reminds us that 'the question of globalization raises the issue of globalization for whom and for what purposes'.i00 Echoing Cox's view that theory always serves some purpose, Gill notes increasing social polarization, 'a sense of political indifference, government incompetence, and a decay of public and private responsibility and accountability', as aspects of the contemporary crisis.10iThe basic contradiction between globalization and democratization portend a legitimacy crisis wherein 'the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer "leading" but only "dominant" ... The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born.'Io2 The 'problem of the subject' is so deeply embedded in international thought that it creates a blind spot of changes in practices resulting from changing material conditions. Moreover, neoliberal ideology compounds the problem by reasserting the values of enhanced private authority and the continuing significance of the distinction between the public and private spheres. Liberal thinking works against recognizing the authority of private corporations. The liberal faith in free economic markets and in representative democracy presents barriers to conceiving private relations or entities as politically authoritative or representative. Recognition of the transnational corporation as 'subject' is thus 'inconsistent with the liberal belief that the processes of democratically-elected government ought to be the only legitimate means of curtailing individual liberty'.lo3 Liberalism and public notions of authority thus preclude the recognition of corporate legal personality. They are incapable of conceptualizing de jacto corporate authority and A
A
Leo Panitch, 'Rethinking the Role of the State', in James A. Mittelman (ed.), Globalization: Critical Reflections (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1996). p. 86. 98 'A Perspective on Globalization', in Mittelman (ed.), Globnlizcrtion,p. 27. 99 Ibid., p. 27. loo 'Globalization, Democratization, and the Politics of Indifference', in Mittelman (ed.), Globalization, n. 205. ihid., p. 206. IUZ Antonio Gramsci, Sclcctionrfrom the Prison Notebooks, edited by Q. Hoare and G. Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), pp. 275 6. Io3 Johns, 'The Invisibility of Transnational Corporations', p. 913. 97
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A. Claire Cutler
control, for this would upset the logic of the liberal representative state and consentbased notions of international law. Moreover, such recognition would threaten the state as the 'subject' of international law and, hence, challenge law's claims to objectivity, neutrality and legitimacy. In a word, the recognition of corporate personality comes up against the problem of the 'subject'. Moreover, disciplinary neoliberalism reinscribes the problem of the subject as a seemingly objective and, ultimately, legitimate state of affairs that is removed from individual challenge. This suggests that for international law there is only one story and one problem. 'The story is the story of formalism and the problem is the problem of the subject. The story of formalism is that it never deals with the problem of the subject. The problem of the subject is that it's never been part of the story.'lo4
'"
Schlag, 'The Problem of the Subject', p. 1628.
(I Can't Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Actors Jan Klabbers*
Introduction In the great scheme of international legal thmgs, a most prornincnt place is reserved fox subjects docuine: subjects, one might say, fonn the clearing-house between sources and substance. The actual rights and obligations emanating from treaties, custom or other sources (in short: which result from somc form of political agreement) are distributed through notions concerning participation in the international legal system. At least in the greater scheme of things.' Yet, its importance in principle notwithstanding, subjects doctrine comes with remarkable uncertainties, perhaps due to the fact that subjects doctrine only arose once it became clear that there was a need for it: in a world of only sovereign states, there was fairly little that subjects doctrine could possibly occupy itself with: except
of International Law, University of Helsinki. In a similar vein, if more broadly discussing process doctrines, David Kennedy, Intematiod J2gd Srtuctxm (Nornos: Baden-Badm, 1987). 2 There is little on subjects, e.g., in the works of 19th century scholar. Westlake; see John Wesdake, Tbe CofbctedPapm oflohn IEc'd~tIbkson Pnbh IntcmdionafLaw (Lassa Oppenheim ed., Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1914), except for a brief statement that subjectivity is granted by states (at 2). Van Eysinga, for his pact, approached the European river commissions not through a subjects prism, but simply as treaties concaking substantive rules. See W.J.M. van Eysinga, Ontwtfa*&lingM i n h d dcr Na&rLndrcbc trmtaten re& 1813 (hfardnus Nijhoffi The Hague, 1916) esp. at 6. It is only after the creation of the League of Nations that subjects doctrine comes up @owever hesitanrly) in a form AAlpeinc Lchn wn recognizable to today's lawyers: see, e.g., Rolf Knubben, Dia St&ekr ks Vifkrmch~: dcr voiht xnd b~zchrii~~ktct~ Rrchfs- mid Hm&ngrfdh@dt (Kohlhammer: Stutyart, 1928); see also John kscher Wdliarns, 'The Status of the League of Nations in International Law', in his Cbqbten prr C u m d ItttemationalLnv und thc Lnv OfhTations (I~ngmans,Green & Co: London, 1929) 477-500. ' Professor 1
38
Non-State Actors and International Law
for discussing the notion of the state and a handful of oddities such as the Holy See or thc Maltese Order.' Nowadays, however, there is little agreement among international lawyers about the identity of international law's subjects. While most will agree that states arc subjects of intemational law, it is not entirely dear what exactly a state is: there are problematic entities such as Taiwan or Palestine, and then there are so-called failed states which may nonetheless remain states, or territories under international adminisuation whosc prccise status is debated.4 By the same token, most international lawyers will agree that international organizations ate subjects of international law, but again there is less agreement on what constitutes an international organization: does the European Union qualify despite, as is often said, lacking legal personality? Does the OSCE qualify, despite being kept, ostensibly at any rate, outside the realm of intemational law?5 Does the European Community still qualify, or is it reaHy, as often contended, a sui generis entity? Moreover, beyond these basics, agreement rapidly dissipates: there is widespread and loud disagreement as to whcthcr companies, or belligcrmts, or indigenous peoples, or non-governmental organizations, can or should be regarded as subjects of international law, or to what extent they should be so regarded. Indeed, it is not even clear whether individuals should be so regarded, although there seems to be a growing tendency to do so." There is also remarkable little agreement on what being a subject of international law entails. Therc is thc more or less descriptive denomination according to which a subject is capable of bearing rights or obligations directly under international law? but whether all bearers of internauonal legal rights can also be regarded as subjects, or Yice versa, is debatable.
Note how I'erzijl would still trat thc 1,ea~wcof Nations and the UN as 'exceptional and unique ~ ~ c r s ~ n son " , 3 pw with rllc popc, bdligcrcnts atid inrcrnadonalizrd territories. Sec J.II.\V. \'crzijl, I11t2n1afiorralLawiu Ili~?oriia/Persprrtive (I0 vols, Sijthoff: L.eidm, 1969) vol. 11: Inrernaaonal Persons, at 3
303-305. Gormat~cein Post-Co@icf On the latter, scr gcncrallp Ouri Korhonen & Jutta Gras, Infemufior~u~ Sitnutiom (I:& Cast& Insdtutc: Iielsinki, 2001). j Sec generally Jan Nablxrs, 'Institutional .lmbivalcncc by Dcsigm: Soft Organizations in Inrcrna~ional I .aw', 70 Xor&]ormaL ofIt~terr~~cfio~ru/ Lau/ (2001) 403-471. O SCC,c.g.. Pcter hldanc.duk, .tkehur~~t:rModrnr Ir~tmt(r,ctiot~ to lntem~ntiona/h* (7th cd., Komlcdgc: London, 1997) ch. 6. ' So already Knubhn, Subjkte~t,mpra note 2, at 2. See also Bin Cheng, 'Introduction to Subjects of Intcrn3rional Law', in Mohammed Bcdjaoui (cd.), Ir~fcn~a~ior~uf Law: Achievmrertcs rmd Pmqecti (hiartinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, 1991) 23-40, at 33.
Non-State Actors and International Law
(? Can't Get N o ) Recognition: SuLjecx~Doctrine
39
353
'She aim of thls paper is to have a closer look at subjects d~ctrinc,inspired mainly by the events of 11 September 2001. These, after all, provoked the awkward question as to how international law relates to terrorism in general and non-state terrorists in particular. What I will hope to illusuate below is that subjects doctrine is riddled with ambivalences, so much so that it may be doubted whether the law is capable of accommodating entities other than states in a convincing mannaR
Non-State Actors in International Law The events of September 11, 2001, have spawned a veritable cottage industry of international legal activities. Many a journal has invited scholars to write on assorted legal questions; many a law school has organized conferences to discuss those same questions, and newcomers to the discipline invariably end up asking those same questions from their professors. Did the attacks constitute an armed attack withn the scope of Article 51 of thecharter? Do they, perhaps, constitute a crime against humanity? Is the US respo&e'in Afghanistan a lawful exercise of self-defence, or is it best regarded as armed reprisal? And is Afghanistan the proper target to begin with? Should terrorists be granted the protection of international humanitarian law or even of human rights law? Those are, to be sure, important questions, yet somehow it would seem that perhaps the main point of September 11 gets lost amidst all the detail. That main point seems to be the point that September 11 demonstrates just how outdated the system of international law has become, and has allowed itself to become. It is not just a matter of September 11 forung a new regime on peace and war, as has been suggested9 (although this too is of importance), or of forcing us to rely more on general principles of international law as has also been suggested.10 Instead, there is something far more fundamental at play, and that is t h e very structure of the international legal order.11 Many of our international legal concepts, so September 11 suggests, are no longer able to deal with present-day developments, and the main B A critique of a different nature, focussing on the concept of personality through an exercise in legal history, is David J. Bedesman, The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the lighthouse at Cape Sparte)', 36 ViqmaJonmalofIn~ah'ona/Larv(1996) 275-377. 9 FrMCric M e t , "War"? Legal Semantics and the Move to Wolence', 13 Evmj~arrJonrnaf of ht6r)lodonafh(2002) 361-399. '0 See Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of Internarional Law', 12 European Journal ofIntemational Lmv (2001) 993-1001. This is a theme not often touched upon A rare exception is Florian Hoffmann, Watershed or Phoenix from the Ashes? - Speculations on the Future of International Law after the September 1 1 Artacks', 2 Gcnnan Lm, Jownaf (October 2001), at <www.gexmadawjournal.com~ (visited 23 July 2002).
40
Non-State Actors and InternafionulLaw
Jan Klabbers
cause is that international law has failed to seriously incorporate non-state actors into its framework. September 11, of course, is not the first illustration of how international law can only problematically be applied to activities involving actors other than states. The emergence of international organizations was accompanied by great debates about whether organizations could conclude treaties12 and whether they could bear responsibility under international law.13 Lengthy debates have raged on how agreements concluded between states and companies could best be classified,'4 with some arguing vehemently that such agreements could not be treaties for only sovereign states can conclude treaties.15 The same question, incidentally (and many of the same answers) keqis recurring whenever a liberation movement or a belligerent faction concludes some sort of agreement1" And as recent as 1994, a New York District Court dismissed a case against Radovan Karadzic on the ground that Karadzic's Bosnian Serbs did not constitute a state and therewith remained outside the scope of international law." Although this was overturned on appeal, the appellate decision demonstrates simiIar classification problems by treating the activities of the Bosnian Serbs in part as simply individual activities, and in part as activities of a state (albeit an unrecognized one) and possibly done in collusion with another state: the leftovers of the former Yugoslavia.'B Either way, what emerges is a picture of conceptual helplessness: confronted with nasty behaviour from entities that are not generally to be considered states, the law runs into problems. It is one thing to create rights for non-state actors, and doing so requires no special justificati~n.~g Yet, to impose obltgations directly on
'2 See, e.g., Catherine Brolmann, 'A Flat Earth? International Orbmnizations in the System of (2001) 319-340. InternationalLaw', 70 NordicJo~m~~J./In&n~&onafLaP, 13 Something which as late as the 1950s was still inconceivable. See, eg., Clyde Eagleton, 'International Orbanhation and the Law of Rcsponsibility', 76 RccnciJo'es Courr (1950/1) 319-425. 14 See pmxally Esa Pawivirta, Participafiorr ofStutts in Intenrational Covtracfs (Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Company: I.lelsinki. 1990). 13 Solc arbitcr 11.-J. Dupuy in Tesam v. L'&nn Arab Itep~~blic ((mcrirr), 53 LtentafiotralLIW Rtpottr 472, xt 473-474, para. 66. 16 See, c.g., Paola Gaeta, 'The Dayton Agreements and International Law', 7 European Jottnd o/ lnternationallmv (1996) 147-163. 1' &ILL, v. Kurud
Non-Stare Actors and International Law (ICan't Get ATo)Recognition: S~bjetsDoctrine
41
355
non-state actors, to submit them to the authority of international law, is quite another thing, and docs require a justification of sorts, if only for the sake of legitimacy. The same conceptual confusion emerges from the events of September 11.
Indeed, many of the questions listed above are complicated only because of the circumstance that the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were the work of a terrorist organization. Had September 11 been the work of a state, then dearly the attack would have qualified as an armed attack under the Charter, clearly triggering the right to self-defence,m and clearly activating international humanitarian law. It is the absence of an obvious state connection which causes our ir~tellectualproblems, not so much those activities themselves.
A State-Centric System It is a truism to say that international law has been, and is, a stare-centric system. Modem intemationd law, so often said to be a 'product of the 1648 Westphalia Peace, arose in conjunction with the modern state, and has been characterized ever since as a system regulating relations between states, by states, and for the benefit of states. While there has been a recurring but inconclusive debate on whether the real subject of international law is the individual, at the end of the day it is nonetheless clear that international law is a state-centric system.21 There are, most likely, some sound functional reasons for this state of affairs. The political scientist Hendrik Spruyt has plausibly argued that it is no coincidence that the state arose out of the middle ages as the dominant mode of social organization, rather than a Hansa-type league, or city-states.u One of those reasons, so Spruyt argued, was that by its exclusive control over territory, the state was in a unique position to guatantee that the promises it made could actually be lived up to. This suggests, in turn, an organic bond between the state and international law, a
NormGeneration and Norm-Application', 32 NN York U k m 3JowrnrJ ofZnkm@bnrrllav & PorFticr (2000) 537-566. m At least it is a different matter whether self-defence can still be exercised a few weeks after the attack occurred without stretching the notion of self-defence beyond its breaking point 2' Without addressing the international legal orderpr re, Bartelson observes that 'the emergence of the international mum be understood as lodcally linked to the emergence of the concept of the modem sovereign state'. See JensBanelson, A G ~ l l ~ f oofSopcn& gv (Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 209. For a brief conceptual history of the state, see Quentin Skinner, The State' in Terence Ball, James Faa: and Russell L. Hanson (eds.), Political Innovatior and Conr*plwal Cbmgr (Cambridge University Press,
1989) 90-131.
" See Hendrik Spruyt, Tk Sowmgn St& and ltr Co"Ipetiton (Princeton University Press, 1994).
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Non-State Actors and International Law ]an
fibbers
symbiosis perhaps: the existence of the state facilitates international law, whereas the very structure of international law facilitates statehood.23 It is no wonder then that states have done their best to secure for themselves a privileged position within that system of international law. International law is filled with small but telling illustrations thereof. Take, for example, the curious circumstance that when it comes to a document purporting to regulate treatymaking with international organizations,24 signature or ratification by those organizations has no relevance with respect to the document's entry into force. Or take the somewhat childish admonition that international organizations cannot ratify treaties but can only engage in acts of confirmation, on the theory that ratification is the prerogative of sovereigns,= or the equally Kindergarten-like daLn that the United Nations can not issue passports beca'use only states can; at best, the United Nations can issue a so-called kxis.se~-pmer.26 The state-centric nature of international law is also taken for granted in much writing about international law, even - and this is somewhat surprising - in some of the more futuristic, de kPgefCm& attempts to conswct or ground a different international legal order. Thus, Jonathan Charney's attempt to come to a 'universal' international law is, nonetheless, sdll a universal law between states: his main aim is upon states without their consent; to show why international law would be bin* not why it would be binding on entities other than states. Indeed, these are not even discussed." Mutatis mutaridis, similar considerations apply to the German 'school' focussing on the community interest: this community is still envisaged, by and large, as a community of stateseaAnd much the same applies to Anne-Marie Slaughter's
" Essentially thc sarnc point ir made .by Wolfgang Friedmann, Thc Changing Sttnctrrn ofIntcn~utio~u~nallmv. (Columbia University Press: New York, 1964) at 213, holding that states will remain the main subjccts of international law bccausc 'states are the repositodcs of lepjtimatcd authoricy over peoples and 2.' The 1986 \'ienna Convention on thc Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Orpnkations (Vienna, 21 March 1986, not yet in force) .\rtide 85, paragraph 1. I'hc tcxt is rcproduccd in 75 Itrtet'11a/iotraIL~uI:'Moterir1r5(1986) 543. 5 I b d , Articlc 14, paragraph 2 26 l'hc examplcs herc are gleaned from Jan Klnbbers, A n lntmriurtiou to It~tcmufoualIt~~tit~~tionul Low (Cambridge Univcrsity Prcss, 2002). 3 Scc Jonathan I. Chamcy, 'Univcrsal lnternational Law', 87 h ~ r i t u Jo~~rnal n of I~temutiondLcnv (1993) 529-551. 2 Sec, c.g., Christian 'l'omuschiir, 'Obhgations Arising for States Wthout or Against 'l'hcu Will', 241 Rerid der Co;m (1993/[\') 195-374;Jochcn :tbr. Frcwein, ‘Reactions by Not Directly Affected Statcs to Breaches of Public International Law', 248 Rrwkl das Cowrs (1994/I\') 345-438, and also Bruno Simma, 'From Bilateralism to Community Intcrest in International Law', 250 Renleil dv Coxr~ (1994/\'1) 211 -384. -1p d (and not overly satisfactory) exception is Bardo Fassbcndcr who, whiic continuing the mdition, devotcs one-and-a half pages of his lengthy essay to non-state actors. These
Non-State Actors and lnternational Law
43
(ICa~r't Get ATo)&cognition: SuLjects Doctrine blueprint of a liberal world: hcr world ton is world o f states in which othcr cntitics arc nor p e n a systematic place2"
An Illustration: Humanitarian Law .\s soon as othcr entities cntcr the picturc, international law starts to haw problems. Pcrhaps thc clearest illustrations hereof can be drawn from international humanitarian law. Humanitarian law wavers constantly betwecn mating thosc who fight for an entity other than a fully recognized statc as either lawful combatants or as common criminal^.^ This applies across the board, whethcr it concerns guerrillas, unorgmizcd hands, or rcrrorists: bccausc it is always possiblc to usc violcncc in thc scrvice of a good political cause, thc law cannot make up its mind as to whether those using violence are to be treated as lawful combatants or as criminals. Moreover, we generally have an ambivalent attitude towards politics: while we appreciate a certain degree of participation in politics, we seriously disWae it if people act 'for political reasons'. Perhaps Ed Morgan put it most succinctly when addressing terrorism: terrorism 'is both crime and politics, and is culpable o n both account~'.3~ O f course, this classification problem is by no means a novel problem, nor is the question of the origin of the binding force of humanitarian law upon non-state actors a novel issue: in a slightly different gmse they both caused serious headaches to those drafting the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protoc0ls.3~ are bound by the UN Chartcr because, well, the Charter is constitutional. See Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Consutuuon of the International Comunity', 36 Columlia Jountal of TratlsnorionalLnv(1998) 529-619, at 609-610. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'International Law in a Wodd of Liberal States', 6 European Jownaf of Z t t t ~ o n (1d995) ~ 503-538. 30 See Jan Klabben, 'Rebel with a Cause? Terrorists and Humaniwan Law', 14 E ~ m p a n Journal of Intemationa/Lm,(forthcoming 2003). See also Jama Petman's conmbution to this volume. 31 See Ed Morgan, 'International Law's Literature of Tenor', 15 CunadianJowrnul o f b and]wiprudcnn (2002) 317-324, at 324. Convention for the -4xnelioration of the Condition of thc ~ o u n d c dand Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75 United Natiom T W Seriu 31; Convention for the Amdoration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sca, 75 Uti:ttdNationr T n q S h s 85; Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 Unitrd nation^ Treaty Srricr 135; Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UnitrdXafioonsT n q SericJ 287, all done in Geneva, on 12 August 1949, in force 21 October 1950. Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of \'ictims of International Armed Connicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, in force 7 December 1978, UN Doc. h/32/144 (15 August 1977); and Protocol r\dditional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
"
"
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Non-State Actors and International Law
Jan fibbers
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides, as is well known, for the application of ce&n minimum standards of conduct during noninternational conflict. This provokes at least two important questions: How does common Anide 3 come to bind non-state entities? And, does it in any way affect the status of those entities? Common Article 3 aims to protect all parties to a domestic c o n h a and purports to be binding on all parties to a conflict; yet, it fails to specify how those provisions acquire their binding force on non-state entities. Non-state entities are not even supposed to express their consent to be bound, for this is only open to states. Instead, so the main argument seems to go, non-state entities become bound by virtue of the circumstance that their states are bound: the convediions become the law of the land upon ratification." This is open to two lines of critique. One is technical: conventions do not become law of the land everywhere; they only do so in domestic systems allowing for this to happen, somedung we usually refer to as monism." In more dualist oriented states, however, some act of transformation is required, which would mean that the conventions become bindmg upon non-state entities only by means of national law. But if this is so, then the entire purpose of common Article 3 is defeated, for it was precisely to offer protection beyond the whims of national authorities that Article 3 was devised.35 The problem, as the Commentary to the First Convention makes abundantly dear, was that governments would tend to consider their adversaries in domestic strife as common criminals, 'vu~aim mininek';M for this reason, the application of humanitarian standards should be taken -away from those national authorities.
Relating to the Protection of Vicdmr of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, 8 June 1977, in forcc 7 Dccembcr 1978.1125 United lvalions Tnaly Srnk 60. 33 See Jean Pictet (cd.), Commet~tyto the Secord Gewa Conventtor (ICRC: Geneva, 1960) at 31. While realizing that the explanation may not be completely satisfactoty, the Commentary adds, in an overly black-and-white tonc, that if an insurgent movcmcnt docs not apply humanitarian law, 'it will prove that those who regard its actions as mere acts of anarchy or brigandage are right.' 3.1 Whether the monist-dualist dichotomy makes much sense to begin with is a different matter. For an extensive critique, see \'eijo Heiskanen, I n t m d o r ~ / L e g dTopics (Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Company: Helsinki, 1992) 1-299. See also Jnn Klabbcrs, 'Inwrnational Law in Community I.aw: Thc IAW and Politics of 1)irccr t
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The second critique of the representation argument is morc structural: to arguc that non-state entities are by definition represented by their governments is implausible where the very raisan 8th of those non-state entities is to deny the representative nature of their governmenk. Surely, it is awkward to claim that the Kurds are represented internationally by Turkey or Iraq; surely, it is awkward to claim that the Kosovars are represented internationally by Yugoslavia; that the Chechens are represented by Russia, or that a movement like Unita is bound by humanitarian law for the simple reason that the Angolan p v c r m e n t may at some point have signed up to the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, it stops short when it comes to networks such as Al-Qaida, which have a presence across borders and whose leader, Osarna bin Laden, is most likely stateless. There is a second way in which common h i d e 3 of the Geneva Conventions has an impact on non-state entities. The final sentence of common hrticlc 3 is the result of an intensely political move: it provides that the application of common Article 3 'shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict7.This was, according to the Commentq, 'ej.renn'ef/e7:without this final sentence, no common Article 3 wouid have come into existence27 The point of the final sentence of common Article 3 is pretty much the opposite of the point of common Article 3 itself: where Article 3 is intended to ensure that insurgents shall have some special status?E the W sentence makes it h.ghly possible to do away with this special status. Indeed, the Comrnentaire, with obstinate ncxivetk, underlines that the final sentence makes dear that common Article 3 does not touch on the internal affairs of states, and does not in any way limit a state's right to repress a rebellion by all possible means including the use bf force. Indeed, so the Comentaite concludes, it does not at aU affect the right of the state to prosecute, adjudge and condemn its adversaries for their crimes, in accordance with its own law.39 The same problems re-appear with the two Additional Protocols of 1977. When it comes to the creation of obligations, Artide 96, patagraph 3 of the First Protocol offers non-state actors the possibility to express their consent to be bound in unilateral fashion. That looks like a feasible solution, but the unilateral declaration appears more attractive in theory than in practice.
And does indeed ensure this: designation of a dispute as an armed conflict 'confers a curious sort of ighrs in tbe Privae Spbm (Clarcndon recognition' on the actors involved. See Andrew Clapham, H m m R Press: Oxford, 1993) at 112. 39 See Pictet (ed.), Comm~nkaiirI, wpm note 36, at 65: V ne limite en aucune manike son droit de r+rimer m e rtbellion par tous les moyens - usage des armes compris - que sa propre loi lui fournit; il n'affecte en rien son droit de poursuivre, de juger et de condvnner ses adversaires, conformCment & sa pcopre loi, pow leuss uimes.' 38
46
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Jan fibber3
The main reason for this may well be that the non-state entity is only allowed to make such a formal declaration of acceptance on condition that the state with which it is in conflict is a party to the Protocol: the state thus still gets to determine the possibilities for the non-state actor to act, and whether eventually the Protocol will apply to the conflict. While this may be of little practical relevance (as quite a few states are parties to the Protocol, and nothing hinders the non-state entity from making a unilateral commitment), its sjmbolic value is significant: for the effects envisaged to become operative, prior state consent is necessary, even with regard to national liberal movements. Moreover, or consequently perhaps, not all that many declarations have been issued.40 Surprisingly perhaps, given the circumstance that Protocol I1 aims in part to regulate the activities of non-state entities, it does not spedfically include a possibility for those non-state entities to somehow express their consent or commitment. Joining the regime created by Protocol I1 is only open for states; there is no provision comparable to Article 96 of the First Additional Protocol. Of course, non-state entities may make unilateral declarations even in the absence of a specific provision to that effect, and following general international law, it may very well be that by rnakulg unilateral declarations those entities bind themselves on the international level.4' But the important thing is that no provision is made for n~n-stateentitics to in any way express their consent to be bound: in the state-centric system of international law, they are very much considered as secondrate entities. And on the point of recognition, Article 4 of Protocol I confrnns that application of the First Protocol 'shall not affcct the legal status of the Parties to the confict.' While apparently mcant predominantly to cover international conflictsp2 nonetheless it risks doing what common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions 'does to
Recent information is difficult to come by: typically perhaps, the website of the International (:omnuttcc of thc Red Cnws (<www.icrc.org>, visited 30 Octobcr 2002) lists the states parries and signatory states, but docs not list any non-statc entides that may have dcdared to abide by ~ldditional Protocol I. As of June 1983, no liberation movement had used the facility, although sevcrd had instead filed unilateral declarations with the ICKC and, apparently, livcd up to clle promise. See Julio .I. Barbcris, 'Xouvellcs quesdons concernant la pcrsonnalitt? juridiiuc internationale', 179 Renrcil &r Coz~ti (198311) 1-15-30-1,esp. at 256-258. 4 .\s much foUo\vs from in pamculsr rlic Sr11./rur'I'mcaws (.\ustrah v. Francc, and New Zcaland v. l:rminccj, ICJ Kcports ( I F $ at 153 and 157. But scc the Cad iaair,.~~i~g h Frot~~id~' Dijpnie (Burk~ii~ Fmo/Rrptb/ic ofMob), ICJ Reports (1986) 554, in which the Court hcld that unilateral dcclamrions may not automatically bc presumed to create binding commitmmts if thcrc was a more obvious way to create such commitrncnts, for instancc through a negotiating process. See Yvcs Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmennann (eds.), Cornrnc~tpon thr Mtioonal Prvtocolr of8 J I 1977 ~ to the Geneva Co~wrrcion~ of12 .;4wgzr 1919 (ICRC: Geneva, 1987) at 72-73. 40
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(ICan't G e t ATo) Recognition. Subjects D o c t r i n e
47 36 1
intcrnally tighting cnatics: it aims to dcpoliticizc the political. by somchow withholding formal recoption.43
Accommodating Non-State Entities? How then to overcome the state-centric naturc of international law and have an international law that adapts to the circurnstanccs of the day? 'l'he most popular solution in practice is to clcvate pretty much every non-state actor to thc status of subjcct of international law without thinking twice: broadening the circle of subjccts.4 While no one knows precisely what this means, at lcast it secms to snEcst that non-state cntitics arc takcn seriously: instead of excluding them altogether, they are embraced but, as noted, with a large measure of ambiguity: nonstate entities may be subjects of international law, but they are dcrivativc subjects at best, and have to remain content with second-class status. More importantly perhaps, h s reliance on the absorbing capacities of subjects doctxine hides from view the circumstance that the philosophicai niceties have yet to be worked out. Why, for example, is it that individuals can be under direct obligations in international law? To answer that this finds its explanation in the international legal subjectivity is merely to duck the issue: it did not satisfy the accused at Nutemberg, and it does not seem to satisfy Slobodan Milosevic either.45 Why is it that international law can claim authority over individuals, or over national liberation movements, or over multinational enterprises, or even over international organizations? In a domestic setting, the question of political obhgation is usually answered by reference to some form of social contract theory.46 Citizens banded together in order to protect themselves against evil from the outside, or so as to create a minimal workmg order guaranteeing their freedom, or so as to optimize their 43 The Second Additional Protocol does not contain a sitnilat &we, but is nonetheless based on the understanding that implementation of the Protocol 'does not coristitute recognition of belhgerency wen implicitly nor does it change the legal nature of the relations between the parries engaged in the conflict' See zbid, at 1344. See also Antonio Cassese, T h e Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts', 30 Infmatibnai @ Compm& Law @at-@$ (1981) 316-339. The more sophisticated contributions include Barbeds, Nouuehs questions, supra note 40, and [Iemann Mosler, 'Die Emeiterung des Kreises der VoUrerrechtssubjektc', 22 Zn'tsch$Jir a~sh~liiichcs bfc1rtk'cbe~Recht md V i k m c b t (1962) 1-48. 45 It is precisely this problem of political obhgation that Milosevic taps into when disputing the legibacy of the ICTY. a A usefd overview of contending theories is John Horton, Pofiiurl Obhgak'oon (lMachfillan: London, 1992).
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general welfare. Either way, they formed the state, they benefit from the state, and therefore they owe allegiance to the state. Whichever theory happens to be preferred, the main point is that at least there is something of a theory, more or less convincing perhaps, something of an explanation for the allegiance citizens owe to the states in which they live and for their duties to obey the law, at least in normal circumstances. International law, by contrast, has no such theory. No one has hitherto been able to explain why individuals owe allegiance to the international legal systernp7 and to the extent that explanations have been put forward, they invariably arrive at the conclusion that we owe allegiance to international law because our states have signed up to certain internati~naldocuments (the UN Chatter for some, the ICC Statute for others), and our states represent us at the international level. By the same token, it remains unclear why, for example, national liberation movements are supposed to adhere to international law generally. As with humanitarian law, often thc reprcscntation argument is made: liberation movements are bound if and when their states are bound. But this, as noted, ignores the rather crucial circumstance that the very point of a national liberation movement is to contest the legitimacy of that state. And then there are practical problems with simply extending the circle of subjects. For one thing, it may be next to impossible to figure out who is a certain people or minority, or who belongs to a liberation movement, and where to draw the line. It may be next to impossible, as the US response to September 11 seems to suggest, to draw any firm conclusions with respect to individual culpability. Indicative is that the net of sanctions has been cast extremely wide. Thus, cven if it could be argued, by way of example, that Unita is under internaaonal legal obligations,~through whatever mechanism, it still r&s to be scen how those obligations ought to be implemented, by whom they ought to bc implemented, and how they could possibly be enforced.43 In the absence of visible links between the group and individuals comprising the group, those questions may d e 5 easy an~wcrs.5~)
Indeed, few have tried: most often the question is simply not addressed. Sce, eg., Lyal Sunga, Inrliuidwd R e p n ~ i b i l i p in I~~fcrno~onaf LAW j r S m a u ~ffwrnan Rrgh~ Violafion~ @lassinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, 1992). M u c h thc s m c applies to Clapham, Phufe Sphm, supra note 38. 4X L1nita,of coursc, has bccn on the rccciving end of UN sanctions sincc Resolution 864 (1993). 49 Leaving aside whether groups can be moral agents to begin with. On this, see Marlies Galenkamp, Indui&&zn vznw CoUrdiv~m:TThc Conqbf ofColIrcriYc &;4hf1 (Erasmus Universitcit: Rotterdam, 1993). 50 And this docs not cven begin to address the vexed issue of group responsibility. On this, see c.g. Lany May, Sharing Rc~ponribi@ (University of Chicago Press, 1992). 47
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Even with international organizations, presumably the most uncontroversial subiects of international law other than states, variations on those same questions keep coming back. 'I'hus, the collapse of the International T i Counul provoked a number of lengthy studies on the responsibility of international organizations and their member states under international law:' and it should not come as a surprise that the answers varied widely. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the topic has made it to the agenda of the International Iaw Commission. More generally, as Rrolmann has concluded in a string of fine articles, there is a structural problem: organizations simply do not fit in rhe framework of state-cenmc international law without some awkward pushing and shoving.52 In this hght, not too much ought to be expectcd from recent pleas to recognize for instance non-governmmtal organizations as subjects of international law.5Wot only do no specific rights or obligations follow from subjectivity (instead, it is the existence of those nghts or obligations themselves which determines whether an entity can meaningfully be addressed as a subject of the law), but, of more practical importance, a designation as subjects will not guarantee a nice fit into the international legal system. . W the broaden& of the circle of subjects constitutes doctrine's most popular response to the emergence and increasmg relevance of non-state entities, at least one other attempt to come to terms with non-state actors can be identified: the Traction case, of the concept of the eqa omne launch, in the 1970 BUTCC~M obligation." This too did not work. While the ICJ aimed to cast elementary moral concerns into a form recognizable by the law in order to overcome traditional concerns of state-centrism and consensualism, it found a year later, applying its
51 Sce, eg., Rornana Sadunka & Christine Chinkin, The Collapse of the International T i Council: A Case of State Responsibility?', 30 V i @ n i a ] o d ofln&matioorrol Lmv (1990) 845-890; Matthias Hartwig, Die Hafirrng Ifcr Mitgic&trratmfirintanariorralc O ~ a t i o n n (Springer: r Berlin, 1991); Moshe Hirsch, Thr Repnsibi(i~of Znteniatiod O p p i ~ a t i otowmd ~ ~ Third Punks: Some Basic Print+ (Kluwer: Dordrecht, s nh i t 1995); Pierce Klein,b renrponsaMk'dcr o@rrhorrr intemuionaJes dmrz b ordnsjmdiq~esi ~ m t c et rkrgms (smylane Brussels, 1998), and Rick Lawson, Hct EVRM Enmpc G m G r m m c h p p(Kluwer: m Deventer, 1999). See Cathedne M. BrBlmann, The 1986 V i a Convention on the Law of Treaties: The History of Draft Article 36bis', in Jan Klabbas & Re& Lefeber (eds.), Essqs on tbc Lav of Tdrs: A CoUedon of Essqs in Honour ofBert V i g (Martinus Nijhoffi The Hague, 1998) 121-140; Catherine M.Brolmann, The Legal Nature of International Organisarions and the Law of Treaties', 4 h h n Reuim of Zn~r~rtior~land Empan Lav (1999),85-125; see also Brohnann, 'A Flat Earth', srgbra note 12. "3 For a fine and useful survey, see h - K a r i n Lindblom, The Legal Status of Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law', doctoral thesis; Uppsah Univenitet (2001). Case mncctning tbe Bmnlona Traaion,Light d Power Conpay Linitd (Bclgiun v. S@n) (Srrnd Pharr), ICJ Repom (1970) 3, at paras 33-34.
50
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Jan Kkabbws
concept in the Namibia opinion, that really the concept was unworkable:55 while the Court used the q a omnes obligation to justify the imposition of an obligation on non-UN-members, it could only do so at the cost of the strength of the rule violated% Still, the concept of the eqa omnes obligation was an audacious attempt to come to tenns with the expansion of relevant actors in international law: it is no coincidence that the concept was launched in a case which centered around the question of the status of companies. During what were, in retrospect, the heydays of subjects doctrine, the Court must have had.a lulgering sentiment that at some point in time it would have to address the question of how to incorporate non-state actors: Bmccl'ona Traction, given its problernatique, seemed a nice testing ground for the launch of a concept aspiring to bring basic moral considerations into international law.57
Between Necessity and Recognition Why, one may ask, does it prove to be so difficult, even controversial, to incorporate non-state entities into the framework of international law? The main intellectual problem bedeviling subjects doctrine is that is his to serve two masters at the same time. On the one hand, it must, like the more specialist doctrines concerning recognition of states, do justice to practical political concerns. It seems obvious that the Palestinian problem, for instance, can only be solved (if at all) with the participation of the PI,O, so somc room must be fo'md in'the intixnational legal system to accommodate the PLO and recognize its acts. By the same tokcn, practical transboundary problems mostly demand international cooperative efforts, implying that entities working on those problems may need to find a place in the international legal system. And war crimes, as the International Military Tribunal at
bga/ Cot~~cquet~ns for S#ej of the Corrtind Pmvnce of Sontb Africa in .Y'mnibia (South Vest @rica) Sot~yith~~tandilg Smirip C o u ~ Rz~vhttior~ d ,776 (1970), .\dvisor). Opinion, 1CJ Repons (197 1) 16. 1;or more Jetads, see Jan Klabbers, T h e Scope of International 1aw:Erga O ~ I CObligations I and the Turn to Morality' in Matti l'uparndci (ed.), fiber A m i t o m Btng Bmms (Finnish IL4 Branch: Helsinki, 1999) 149-179. '5 It is no coinadencc that most work on crga omnu obligations seizes upon the moral character of candidate norms, with some suggesting that there is no real distinction between law and morality. See, e.g., Maurizio Ragami, Tbe Cotlcrp/ offtrtematiotmf'Obk~arionsEga Omncs (CIarendon Press: Oxford, 1997).
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Yuremberg famously held, are committed by ind~lduals,not by abstract entities3 In short, thcre is an incentiw to accornmodatc non-state cntitics, in order to do justice to considerations of necessity, real or pcrceivcd.j~ On the other hand, the pte-keepers of the system have every reason not to elevate newcomers to their own level. States have every possible incentive to treat non-state entities as, somehow, of lesser rank, otherwise, states would lose thc prerogatives they have. Moreover, there are entities whose subjectivity docs not sccm to dcpcnd on considerations o f ncccssity: the Holy See is a possible example, the Maltcsc Order another. More generally, necessity is itself of course far from uncontested. It is no surprise then, that with some entities the explanation comes to rest not with necessity, but with recognition or acceptaxe.'*' It could hardly be otherwise, precisely due to the political nature of the type of situation which may g v e rise to a nccessiq--argument to begin with: surely, so !srael rmght argue, the problems in the middle east could easily havc been solved if it wasn't for the existence of the PLO. Thus, to elevatc the PLO to the status of subject of international law only aggravated the situation; therefore, the PLO's subjectivity should ncvcr havc been rccognizcd. As the example suggests, the two seemingly opposing arguments cnd up lapsing into one another. A necessity argument can be countered by an argument based on (lack of) recognition, and thus needs to incorporate recognition in order to survive; an argument based on mere recognition, on the other hand, is always vulnerable to the argument that even if an entity has been recognized as a subject, such was never really necessary to begin with or, more importantly perhaps, to the consideration that even non-recognized entities do play a role, and sometimes an important one.61 With respect to unrecognized states, Okeke sums it up neatly, if 58 See the Juq'grnent offbe I~~ternll~lonal M i l f a g Tribrnaljr #be Trial of Genna?~Major War Criminalr, Cmd. 6964, at 41; available at ~www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judn.hm>(visited 1 December
1002). Necessity underlies much of the argument in C.N.Okeke, Controvrniol Su&ects oflltttentahad LaPr (Rotterdam University Press, 1974). See also Friedmann, Changing Stnuhm, s q r a note 33, at 218: denying subjectivity to international organizations 'would be to freeze international law at a level corresponding to a past phase of international society, to deny it the capacity for growth . . . to a complex pattern of modern international relations, in which the need for co-operation in certain senices plays an ever increasing part'. 60 Okeke's discussion of the subjectivity of liberation movements, cg.,focusses almost exclusively on recognition. Okeke, Conhowniaf Su&& mpra note 59, ch. 6. Note also thar Nlugenva's discussion of subjects slips into a lengthy discussion of recognition. See Nkambo Mug-, 'Subjects of International Law', in Max Sorensen (ed.), M a n d ofPgbLc InternaftonuiLnv (MacMiUan: London, 1968) 247-310. See generally also Stefan Talmon, Ramgnidon ofGommentr in I n t e n d ' o d b w with PalalamlorRCfCmncc t o Govementr in Ewik (Chrendon Press: Oxford, 1998). 39
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bluntly: 'The conclusion should be that unrecognized states are states and that consequently they have the capacity to conclude treaties, in short they have international legal personality.''12 The International Court of Justice too has been wavering on the issue. In its classic R@mationfor I#mts opinion, it started its analysis of the international legal personality of the UN (which it seemed to treat as synonymous to subjectivity) by proclaiming that '[tlhe subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their aghts, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community.53 Here, then, the Court clearly stressed necessity-consideratiom. However, the subsequent analysis moved away from necessity pure and simple, and instead focussed more on other concerns. The Court highlighted that the UN had been created and had been given certain functions or powers by its member states, and was aaing in ways which only made sense on the basis of a presumed international personality." This then was no longer necessity as such, but necessity as shaped by the intents and desires of the member states, and as accepted by them and even, as the Court suggested in a different passage, by the world community at large.65 Sirnilat problems arise even with respect to the seemingly dearcut issue of individual criminal responsibility: it may be true that wa? crimes are committed not by abstract entities but by individuals, but nonetheless those individuals often act as of and on behalf df a group. While there is a need to come to t-s with individual @t, it may also have to be conceded that individual evil may merely be, as Hannah Arendt famously put it, 'banal',a.with the real-culprits being either governmental policies, or conspiracies, or super& officers, or a combination of the Okekc, Confmwrsiaf Su@ect~,swpra note 59, at 104. likewise, Bot concludes that substantively, recognition map 'dwindle to a neglidblc factor'. I lowever, on the procedural (or symbolic, perhaps) Icvcl, recogmidon is still important. Scc H.H. Bot, ATort~c~tirior a d Tmap Rch~iotu(Sijthoff: Ixidcn, 1968) at 246. 0.' Rcparatiottfor lyUrie>. S@end iu thc Stmice oftbe United Natiorrr, Advisory Opinion, ICJ lllcports (1949) 174, at 175. Ibid, at 179. 65 'fl]Bc Court's opinion is that fifty States, representing the vast majority of the members ofOle international communir)., had thc power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objecave international personaliry, and not muely personality r e c o p r e d by rhcm alone', ibin., at 185. Note that the Court does not speciFy whence objective personality springs; see Jan Klabbers, Tresumptivc Personality: The European Union in Inremarional Law' in Nami Koskenniemi (cd.), I~~fen~utionul Larv AJ~CCIJ. oftbe E ~ m p c a tUnion ~ (Kluwer Law Internaaonal: The IIabwe, 1998) 231253. 66 Sec Hamah k n d t , Eirhman~ritl Jemafcm: A h p o r f otr fbe h a & of Evil (first published 1963) (Penpin: London, 199-1). 62
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above. Individual responsibility lapses into group responsibility, or into command rcsponsibility.~~ 'l'he only way out, it would scem, is to turn the debatc on thc incidcncc of subjcctivity into one on the merits of subjectivity. Where a discussion on whether entity X qualifies as a subject of international is inconclusive, the next best thing is to start to argue that subjectivity as such does not entail any automatic rights or obligations anyway, and indeed this argument inevitably comes up in subjects discoursc.(fi 'The International Court of Justicc hcrc too made its mark. in the abovementioned REpararation nfor injr/rics opinion, after having observed that the UN was to be regarded as a subject of international law, the Court confirmed that as such, this may not mean all that much. The Court was clear in suggesting that personality did not mean that the UN was a state, much less a super-state.@Instead, while states possess 'the totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law, the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must depend on its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice'.70 Perhaps as a result, the literature demonstrates a markedly inductive approach, approaching subjects docuine by looking at the rights or obligations of various entities. If taken seriously, this can only mean that there is no particular legal advantage to be gained from being regarded as a subject of international law. If subjectivity says nothing at all about rights or obligations, then why insist on subjectivity? If one need not be a subject of the law in order to perform legally valid acts; if, instead, the very performance of those acts indicates subjectivity, as is often suggested, then what is the point? The only conceivable point, then, if no rights or obhgations flow from subjectivity per se, is that being regarded as a subject of international law is a shorthand way of describii that an entity has found recognition from within the international legal system.71 Subjectivity entails that a degree of legitimacy is
67 For a further exploration of these issues, see Jan Klabbers, "fie Spectre of Intemational C& Justice: Third States and the ICC' in Andreas Zknmtrmann (ed.), In&ma/iond CriminaI LAW a d #be Gmat Dmkpmmt ofPnbhIntrrmrdonrJLav (Dundrer & Humblot: Bulin, 2003) 49-73. 68 See, cg.,Okeke, Contnmm'JSniycctr, szpa note 59, at 73: 'wherever there are nghts and obhgations, there is a person or subject of such rights and oblqptions'. 69 Rrpadonfirr I + i e s , snpra note 63, at 179. lbid, at 180. AS Bartelson puts it with respect to states: 'A sovereign state acquires part of its identity from being recognized sovereign by other states: a state without nplttclfio is not a state in the eyes of other states, and hence not qualified to be a political subject' See B d s o n , A Grncolog, mpra note 21, at 165 (emphasis in original).
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Jan fibbers
bestowed upon entities; it recognizes that their existence is somehow considered useful, desirable, or simply opportune; given this circumstance, it is only logical that considerations of utility, necessity or opportunism enter the picture. And given this circumstance, it is only natural that subjectivity is seen not just as the result of rights and obligations, but also as constitutive of those rights and obligations: you can only have rights and obhgations whcn you are a subject of international law, and you can only be a subject of international law when you have rights and obligations under international law. Subjectivity is, in terms borrowed from recognition discourse, both declarative and constit~tive.~~
Concluding Remarks With the above in mind, it seems hardly coincidental that we keep on struggling about the proper place of NGOs in the international legal order, or of individuals, or of behgerents, or companies. On one level, they are increasingly incorporated, and the usual means of incorporation are to create obligations for non-state actors or (more regularly) rights under international law. Thus, individuals enjoy human rights, and may have to answer to international criminal law; companies may, on occasion, use international tribunals (the EC Court, the ICSID, arbitration), but are expected, somehow, to respect human rights, either voluntarily or involuntarily; international organizations and some others (belligerents, liberation movements) can even. conclude treaties if and when circumstances so require; and NGOs are increasingly granted access to negotiating tables. Yet, creating rights and dbligations left, right 'and centre, however useful perhaps in itself, does not add up to the sort of paradigm shift that international law might nccd in ordcr to truly accommodate mtities other than states. Indeed, it may even backfire, in that without a clear grounding, those non-state entities may always rcject the authority international law holds or claims to hold over them. It remains unclear why Unita would havc to rcspect UN-ordained sanctions; it remains unclear why hfiloscvic would havc to pay rrepcct to thc ICTY. And as long as this remains unclear, we should not be overly surprised that war crimes keep being cornrnined, that rebels hold entire thcatres hostage, and that terrorists keep twrorizing. A legal system which treats actors as second-rank citizens should not bc surprised that thosc sccond-rate citizens d m to upgrade their status, and the shortest rourc to And those also l a p into onc another, as Koskenniemi has o b s e n d some rime ago. See X l d Koskenniemi, Fmm Apology to Utopia: The Stmctun of I~~tcrnational Lrgal Argrcme~~t (Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Company: Helsinki, 1989) 236-245. . '2
Non-State Actors and Iizternational Law (ICan't Get No) Recognition: S~~bjeccts Doctrine
55 369
being hcard and being taken scrictusly is through violmcc. Perhaps Skurbaty put it most forcefully when dscussing terrorism: T h e crucial difference betwecn state and non-state terrorism lies in the available repertoire of tactics and the degree of control of the propaganda and enforccrnent machinery. Whereas State terrorists havc a wide range of policy options, wield power, control and authority - and can control. for example, the intclhgence scnicc, thc a r m y , the policc, thc sccrct police, ctc.- and can rvcn formally legitimize its [sic] tcrror, non-statc actors usually use acts of terror as their last and only rcson73
In short, subjects doctrine displays highly political characteristics, which rcndcrs it unlikely that subjects docmnc will come to accommodate nun-state entities without further ado. This should comc as no surprise: as notcd culicr, subjccts doctrine forms the clearing house betwccn sources and substance: it is through subjects doctrine that the international allocation of values takcs place, and as any political scientist knows, the authoritative allocation of values is one of the main political functions.
3 See Zeiim Skurbaty, Rr I f Pcopks Mutbmd (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 2000) at 145 (emphasis omitted).
The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations
and Transnational Enterprises in International Law and the Changing Role of the State Daniel Thiirer' In recent years, the international system and, as a consequence, the system of international law has changed considerably due to the emergence and activities of various non-state actors such as non governmental organizations (NGOs) and transnational enterprises . These new global and transnational entities may not yet have reached the stage of being fully fledged subjects of international law, but they certainly contribute to creating a "social milieu" or"arnbiancen (Dietrich Schindler sen.)' in international life out of which new legal structures and entities may grow. The international system has therefore been given new functions with which it has to deal. With the changing nature of the international legal order, the rore of states has been transformed and is still being transformed. Has it declined under the pressure of events? Or have states, in this whole process of evolution, rather gained in weight and profile as the "trustees" of those tasks which are inherent in the concept of statehood under modem intemational law? These are the questions I would like to deal with in this essay. Given the sweeping nature of our theme I have chosen to divide our subject up into the following three parts. First, it would be useful to define the concept of the state in modem international law in order to set a frame of reference against which its supposedly "changing role" can be measured. Second, we shall deal with the emergence of new transnational or global legal entities - i. e., NGOs and transnational enterprises which, it is submitted, represent the main factors and forces which are leading to the changing nature of states. Thirdly, an attempt is made to evaluate this new situation from the perspective of present intemational law and to inquire if and in what manner the international legal order needs to be reconceived, redefined or reshaped in light of the abovementioned developments.
* Professor of Law, University of Zurich, Switzerland. I thank Ms Marie-Ursula Kind, lichr., LL.M. (Cambridge), Attorney-at-Law, for her very valuable assistance. 'DietrichSchindlersen., Verfassungsrechtund soziale Struktur, 5th. ed., 1970,92 et seq.
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A. The Notion and Shape of Statehood in Modern International Law We shall start our considerations with the question as to what sovereign statehood means in public international law. In approaching this problem I shall make some remarks concerning the nature and notion of the sovereign state as a concept of modem international law and then add some observations concerning two basic changes of or inroads into the traditional inter-state system of international law. I shall then try, in the light of this evaluation, to restate our problem.
I. The Changing Notion of Sovereign Statehood What is meant - as the basic concept on which my following analysis is based sovereign statehood? Traditionally, sovereignty has been stated as meaning the special quality a state has as the highest authority under international law within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. However, this purely formal qualification of statehood does not satisfy the inspirations, tendencies and conceptions of modem international law. Considering the evolution and integration of the international legal order, sovereignty cannot just mean the final, superior decision-making power ("Hochstmachtigkeit" or "letzte Entscheidungsgewalt") under international law. It also implies, as convincingly put by Jorg Paul Mulle?, the idea that a state is a political community which is invested with the effective power to grant, to realize and to implement certain basic values inherent in the principle of the "rule of law" understood in a substantive sense. In support of this thesis is the opinion of Max Huber, who stated already in 1928 in his arbitral award in the Palmas Case: Territorial sovereignty cannot limit itselfto its negative side, i. e., to excluding the activities of other states; for it serves to divide between nations the space upon which human activities are employed, in order to assure them at all points the minimum protccrion of which international law is the guardian.3 - by
'Jorg Paul Muller, Wandel des Souveranitritsbegriffs im Lichte der Grundrechte - dargestellt am Beispiel von Entwicklungendes internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes auf dis schweizerische Rechtsordnung, in: Rene'RhinowlStephanBreitenrnoserlBernhard Ehrenzellev (eds.), Fragen des internationalen und nationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes (Bibliothek zur Zeitschrift fir Schweizerisches RechtIBeiheft 25), 1997,45,61 et seq. ' Quoted by Muller, id., 62. As a general perspective see also Josf Delbriick, Die Konstitution des Friedens als Rechtsordnung, '1996, 192 et seq., 275 et seq., 3 19 et seq.; Stcphan Hobe, Statehood at the End of the 20th Century - The Model of the "Open State": The German Perspective, Austrian Review of International and European Law, 1997, 127 et seq.
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Thus, the basic idea which provides the foundation for our analysis and evaluation of the globalizing evolution of the international system is that due to its purpose and because of its very nature state sovereignty represents a value-laden notion. It does in fact, as a concept of present-day international law imply the capacity to realize human rights and other basic values recognized by the internarional cornrn~nity.~
11. The Changing "Shape7' of Sovereign Statehood
Two further observations of a rather theoretical character should be added, before coming to grips with the question if and to what degree the role of states has been transfonned under the impact of new non-state actors such as NGOs and transnational enterprises. It is not the normative substance of the concept of states which is concerned here but rather the function as well as the extent of the power which states exercise in a rapidly changing - i. e., integrating and at the same time shrinking - public international system. The first consideration may be labeled the "federalizing trend" of international law, while the second refers to a shift of power from the system of public order to the realm of private actors and is generally dealt with under the heading of "globalization". By the 'Ifederalizing tendency" or '>paradigm ",which has been so well described by Christoph Schreue9, I am referring to a move within the international order towards a greater diversity of participants. Nowadays international law is to a diminishing extent state-centered. Power within the international system becomes ?ore and more diffused into two directions. On the one hand a number of state constitutions concede limited authority to sub-state entities to regulate certain matters with other states or subdivisions of states across national boundaries6; on the other hand, international institutions are becoming, to an ever growing extent, actors in their own right, exercising a certain measure of authority, and must, in so far, be seen as highly relevant members of the international community. Both trends are confined to the sphere of public authority and are, within this domain, opening up the state monopoly of public power in order to include additional In this sense Miiller, id.
'ChristophSchreuer, The Warning of the Sovereign State: Towards aNew Paradigm for International Law, EJIL, 1993, 447 et seq. See, e. g., Daniel Thiirer, FBderalismus und Regionalismus in der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik: Zum VerhSiltnis von Bundeskompetenzen und kantonalen Kompetenzen unter veriinderten Umstwden, Schweizerisches Zentralblatt fir Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht, 1992,49 et seq.
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groups of subjects of intemational law within a "vertical" structure. They are thus conducive to a diversification and pluralization of the international legal system. On the "horizontal" plane theparadigm of "globalization" has emerged which has been described by Jost Delbruck7 and Alfred C. Aman8 as well as Stephan Hobe9 in a most illuminating way. According to this trend, the state system has been gradually transformed in the sense that states - in accordance with EC-law, WTOIGATT-law and other international regimes, or on the basis of unilateral arrangements of national law -have gradually delegated or relinquished parts of their hnctions to private, societal actors. I am referring here to large-scale measures of de-regulation which have been taking place in a most dramatic fashion not only within former communist states but also within western-type liberal democracies. A consequence of this has been the rapid growth of an internationally highly integrated private economic sector: amovement driven and shaped mostly by powerful multinational enterprises. "Federalization" has thus been followed by "globalization7' as a second inroad into the traditional inter-state system and new paradigm of intemational order.
111. Problem Restated
Thus, the question to be dealt with in this essay, in examining the changes brought about by new global and transnational actors, has a double character: - In conceiving the state as a normative concept, namely as a legal entity designed to realize basic values of justice and the "rule of law" (i. e., as a "communautC de d r ~ i t " ' ~we ) , should inquire in what sense and to what degree do non-state actors in fact enhance, strengthen and enable states to realize their proper function in the face of pressure from opposing forces, or the failing will of state authorities to fulfil their proper tasks as legitimizing agencies within the overall international system.
'Jost Delbriick, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets - Implications for Domestic Law: A European Perspective, IJGLS 1993,9 et seq.; id., The Role of the United Nations in Dealing With Global Problems, IJGLS, 1997, 277 et seq. "&ed C. Aman Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the PublicIPrivate Distinction, Federalism and Democracy (Manuscript). ' See Stephan Hobe 's contribution in this volume. 'I' This term coined by the European Court of Justice in order to characterize the European Community might well be used to define the concept of State sovereignty in modem international law (Case 294183, Les Verts (Parti Ccologiste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament), judgment of 23 April 1986, [I9861 ECR 1365).
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- Does and to what degree does the international community have to step into the vacuum of the "rule of law" and of "public order" which has been created both by the processes of privatization and by the fact that some individual states are incapable of exercising public control because of a fragmentation or collapse of their internal order?
B. Emergence of New Transnational or Global Entities Having defined sovereign statehood as the frame of reference for our considerations, we now turn to the question whether the emergence of new transnational (global) entities lead to a decline or otherwise affect the role of states. In dealing with these new challenges I shall concentrate on two types of actors: NGOs and transnational enterprises. I am quite aware that they do not cover the whole spectrum of the relevant phenomena which emanate from the "grey zone" between international and domestic law. However, I think that their selection enables us to obtain a more or less representative picture of the broader questions raised concerning law, facts and values.
I. Non-Governmental Organizations 1. General development
NGOs are an important feature of modem international life. With a wide diversity of purpose and structure they perform their activities in fields such as human rights, humanitarian action, environmental protection, women's rights or consumer protection and thus give color and shape to issues of international relations. Historically, NGOs are atypical product of Western civilization, often displaying a somewhat missionary character. One of the frrst examples of what we nowadays regard as NGOs were the associations set up in the 17th and 18th centuries to promote the abolition of the slave trade and eventually of slavery itself." The year 1863 then saw the establishment.of the Red Cross Movement which developed out of the "Sociktk d'utilitk publique" in the protestant city of Geneva. Since then amultitude of NGOs have emerged, some of which are still flourishing today. ' I In this sense see the especially valuable analysis of Peter Macalister-Smith, NonGovernmental Organizations, Humanitarian Action and Human Rights, in: Ulrich Beyerlin/Michael BotheIRainer Hofmann/Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung - Festschrift fir Rudo[fBernhardt, 1995,483.
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However, it is only in recent times that NGOs have appeared as a salient phenomenon in world-wide policy-making and execution. Three factors and stages might, according to the pertinent analysis of Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss", be distinguished in this process of growth: - First, the political environment during the Cold War should be mentioned as being a powerful factor in shaping and facilitating the rise and influence of NGOs. Within range of the powerful Soviet empire they emerged as the conscience and visible manifestations of an awakening "civil society" claiming its rights for political, cultural and economic freedom. In this context NGOs played their role initially behind the diplomatic scenes dominated by states and the United Nations. But undohbtedly they were a most effective force in paving the way for glasnost, perestroika and finally for the break-down of the communist regime. After its collapse and dismantlement, they also effectively contributed to the building up of democratic and free-market institutions. - A second factor conditioning the growing influence of NGOs was a gradual shift in post Cold War international relations from "high politics" to "low politics". As long as matters such as security, particularly over nuclear issues, preoccupied the international actors, NGOs were at a comparative disadvantage. But as soon as issues such as human rights, environmental protection or women's rights began to dominate the international agenda, NGOs active in these fields gradually succeeded in gaining direct access to policy makers and making their voices heard. - Finally, developments in informationtechnology should be put forward as being a possibly general, but a very powerful explanation for the increasing prominence of NGOs in international life. Throughout history governments have frequently succeeded in monopolizing information or in effectively preventing transborder communication but this capacity of state power is nowadays being gradually eroded. The flow of information through Internet and fax comrnunications cannot be inhibited and NGOs enjoy full freedom to interact and network without state control. This newly emerging scene of world public opinion-making has been well described in the following words by Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss: "Electronic means", they observe, "have literally made it possible to ignore borders and to create the kinds of communities based on common values and objectives that were once almost the exclusive prerogative of nationalism.
Leon GordenkerlThomas G. Weiss, Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions, in: Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker (eds.), NGOs the UN, and Global Governance, 1997,24 et seq.
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Modern communications technology is independent of territory. 'By providing institutional homes in the same way that states have accommodated nationalism', one author suggests, 'NGOs are the inevitable beneficiaries of the emergence of the new global communities'. 'Consequently', as another study claims, 'global social change organizations may represent aunique social invention ofthe postmodern, postindustrial, information-rich and service-focused, globally-linked world ~ystem'."'~
2. Dejnition a n d PhenomenologicaI Description NGOs encompass a wide diversity of organizations, social movements and pressure groups which are active in fields of public concern. They can be classified according to different criteria such as size, aims, statutes, structure, membership, geographical reach of activity or methods and means of action. l 4 Legally they have according to the definition of Peter Macalister-Smith - the following three elements in common:
1. They are, as their name indicates, not established by a government nor by an intergovernmental agreement; 2. they are typically private institutions: associations, foundations, federations or other unions founded on the basis and under the regime of the private law of a state; 3. the concerns, purposes and objects of NGOs are, in contrast to their origins, of a public nature.15 Some NGOs act on the international plane while others limit their actions to the internal domain of a state. As far as the international NGOs are concerned, they are not, unlike international organizations, generally recognised as subjects of (note 12), 25. See the phenomenological survey of Henv J. Steiner, Diverse Partners - Non Governmental Organizations in the Human Rights Movement, 1991; Yves Beigbeder, Le r61e international des organizations non-gouvemementales, 1992; Elmar AltvaterlAchirn BrunnengraberlMarkus HaakelHeike Walk (eds.), Vemetzt .und Verstrickt - Nicht-Regierungs-Organisationen als gesellschaftliche Produktivkraft, 1997; Florian T. Furtak, Nichtstaatliche Akteure in den intemationalen Beziehungen, 1997; Theo C. van BovedCees FlinterrnardFred GrunfeldRita Hut (eds.), The Legitimacy of United Nations: Towards an Enhanced Legal Status ofNon-StateActors;Jackie Smith1 Ron Pagnuccol George A. Lopez, Globalizing Human Rights: The Work of Transnational Human Rights NGOs in the 1990s, HRQ, vol. 20, 379 et seq. Among the large number of publications concerning specific fields of action see e. g., Oran R. YounglGeorge J. Demko/Kilaparti Ramakrishna (ed.), Global Environmental Change and International Governance, 1996. In this sense Macalister-Smith, op.cit., 477, 480 f.; Jiirgen Schramm (ed.), The role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the new European Order, 1995. " Gordenker/Weiss l4
''
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intemational law. Therefore, as a general rule, NGOs and their personnel do not benefit from the special privileges, standing, facilities or immunities under intemational law which may be accorded to intergovernmental organization^.'^ However, such special treatment may be granted to NGOs as parties or beneficiaries of specific intemational instruments." The broadest acknowledgment of the existence and formal standing of the non-governmental sector as a whole was included in Article 71 of the UN-Charter which enables the Economic and Social Council to consult with NGOs which are concerned with matters within its competence." NGOs serve different functions. They may:
-
collect information on the spot, i. e., bring to light facts and material concerning disputed, cokoversial dr desperate situations which would otherwise be neglected or forgotten by public opinion; - report to bodies within intergovernmental mechanisms for consultation and or supervision; - plead and advocate, lobby and monitor, mobilize or educate public opinion; - aim at holding states accountable to honor commitments they have accepted under intemational law; - undertake field activities and render services, for instance in the course of the implementation of aid programs; l 6 A special status is recognized, under international law, to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).This institution forms part of the Red Cross Movement which also embraces, as further components, the National Red Cross Societies, the Federation of National Red Cross Societies and the International Red Cross Conference. The Red Cross Movement thus represents in our international system a somewhat old-fashioned,but at the same time (post-)modern, framework and instrument of states and forces of international civil society for humanitarian action. Among the different components of the Red Cross Movement only the ICRC is recognized as a subject of international law. For further details see Denise Bindschedler-Robert, Red Cross, in: RudolfBernhardt (ed.),EPIL, vol. 5 (1983), 148 et seq.; Frarz~oisBugnion, Le ComitC international de la Croix-Rouge et la protzction des victimes de la guerre, 1994; Christian Dominick, La PersonnalitC juridique internationale du CICR, in: Christophe Swinarski (ed.),Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en I'honneur de Jean Pictet, 1984,663 et seq.; Paul Reuter, La personnalitt juridique internationale du Comitt International de la Croix-Rouge, op.cit., 783 et seq. See Macalister-Smith, opcit., 487188. '"ee, as an elaborationof Article 71 of the UN-Charter, Resolution 1996131 concerning "consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations", adopted by the Economic and Social Council at its 49th plenary meeting on 25 July 1996 (replacesResolution 1296144 adopted by the Economic and Social Council on 23 May 1968).
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on-~ovemrnental Organizations
45
promote the development and elaboration of standards and principles in various fields of social behavior. The modus operandi adopted by NGOs may be characterized by "activist"
methods used when appealing to the public at large through the mass media ("mobilization of shame") or by a more cautious approach in the form of confidential dialogues with the responsible authorities.
3. Evaluation
If we now try in a few words to evaluate the impact of international NGOs on international life, we easily see that they exceed by far the informal status accorded to them in international instruments. Undoubtedly, the most prominent NGOs represent a driving and shaping force of progress in today's international political life:
- by influencing the agendas of intemational organs and World Conferences, as
-
-
was powerfully demonstrated at the Rio Conference on Global Environment (1992), the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993), the Habitat Conference in Cairo (1994), the Social Summit in Copenhagen (1995) and the World Women's Conference in Beijing (1995); by devising new intemational instruments such as, most recently, the Convention on the Prohibition ofthe Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonal Mines and on their destru~tion'~, or the Statute of the International Criminal Courtz0; by providing expert knowledge, e. g., in the human rights field2'; by monitoring the implementation of international lawzzand guiding political principles; and by realizing a great variety of projects "in the field".
l9 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personal Mines and on their destruction of 18 September 1997, ILM, vol. 36 (1997), 1507. 20 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998, UN AICONF. 18319. E. g., inducing 1503- and 1235-proceduresbefore the UN-Human Rights Commission. See Karl Wolji.am, Stille Diplomatie oder Publizittit? - ~berlegungenzum effektiven Schutz der Menschenrechte, in: Eckart Klein (ed.),Stille Diplomatie oder PublizitZit?, 1996, 40 et seq.; Dinah Shelton, The Participation ofNon-Governmental Organizations in Intemational Judicial Proceedings, N I L , vol. 88 (1994), 61 1 et seq. 22 See e. g., Agenda 21, adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development on 13 June 1992.
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From asubstantiative perspective, the efforts ofNGOs in transferring democratic principles from the domain of state constitutional law to the field of international politics are of fundamental importance. The former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali rightly observed that NGOs have become "a basic form of popular participation and representation in the present-day world." 23 Of course, NGOs themselves are not necessarily democraticallyorganized, since elections are infrequent within NGOs. However, on the whole and given the variety of philosophies and policies which they reflect and shape, they seem, although perhaps not always accurately, to be highly representative of world public opinion in political life. As "grass-roots" or "bare feet" movements they help to bring the values of civil society and the voice of the citizen to bear. As non-state entities, NGOs introduce an independent stance into the intemational arena. And, by reminding states to fulfil their obligations entered into under intemational law, NGOs could often be said to express the juridicial conscience of the international community. Thus, NGOs strengthen states by enhancing the "rule of law" and democracy (described at the outset as being elements inherent in the notion of the state in international law) in situations where state organs or agencies fail to fulfil their essential functions and, in exceptional situations, even by acting as the surrogates of state officials where state institutions have broken down.24 Thus, as a general rule, NGOs support states in carrying out those tasks which are inherent in the concept of statehood under modem international law, namely, to be the guardians of the values and principles of humanity as a whole (such as human rights and democracy) and thereby to promote the public interests of those living and kting within their jurisdiction.
11. Transnational Enterprises
In a similar way to NGOs, transnational enterprises are institutions founded under the domestic law of a state. They also share with intemational NGOs the characteristic of planning and acting across state borders. Transnational enterprises differ from NGOs in that they are not designed, or at least not principally designed, to fulfil a public purpose, but rather aim at making a profit which can be distributed
Boutros Boutros-Ghdi, Foreword in GordenkedWeiss (note 12), 7. Obvious examples are the "Failed States" such as Somalia, Liberia, or countries otherwise caught up in civil war or internal strife. For further evaluation see Daniel ThuredMatthias HerdegedGerhard Hohloch, Der Wegfall effektiver Staatsgewalt: ''The Failed State", BDGVR, vol. 34 (1996). 2'
24
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to the shareholders or re-invested in the corporation. Contrary to NGOs, their intrinsic purpose is not to encourage or support state authorities to fulfill their functions under international law. Instead, they tend to escape from the control of -home or host - states and in fact often rival with state powers. This raises the question whether, according to the principle of the "rule of law", existing rules and institutions should be strengthened and new mechanisms should be set up in order to control their activities in a fairer, more reliable and effective way. In a book carrying the telling title "Global Shift", a British professor of intemational economy states that much of the changing shape of the global economic system is sculptured by transnational enterprises investing in particular geographical locations. The same author points out that the significance of the transnational enterprise, especially the very large global corporations, is due to three basic characteristics: 1. Its control of economic activities in more than one country; 2. its ability to take advantage of geographical differences between countries and regions in factor endowments (including government policies); 3. its geographical flexibility, that is, its ability to shift its resources and operations between locations on a global scale.25 What seems to be significant from a legal point of view is that transnational enterprises are -to put it simply - constituted according to the law of a particular country. As a general rule, they are governed by that law and the relevant rules of conflict of laws. However, although they are embedded in the system of law and the political culture of their home as well as their host state26,they are to a large extent in their practical operations liberated from state control. This is so because, on the one hand, by entering into binding international treaties or unilateral policyPeter Dicken, Global Shift, 1992. 47. See Paul N. Doremus/William W. Keller/Louis W. Pauly/Simon Reich, The Myth of the Global Corporation, 1998. Interestingly enough, these authors underline that striking 2'
26
differences in corporate strategy remain in the most fundamental areas. They write: "The empirical evidence ... suggests that distinctive national histories have left legacies that continue to affect the behavior of leading MNCs. The scope for corporate interdependencies across national markets has unquestionably expanded in recent decades." (9) The authors further explain: " We see corporations internalizingboth the basic political institutions and underlying ideological frameworks within which they remain most firmly embedded. And unlike other scholars who acknowledge such effects but assume that they will inevitably recede over time, we see them as 'hard-wired' into core corporate structures." (15) They conclude: "But states - especially home states - remain decisive. They do notjust matter. In analytical terms, our approach remains open to the possibility that states retain their priority with respect to other factors influencingthe operating environment of the modem corporation." (1 5)
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Daniel Thiirer making, states have in many fields denationalized their economies, especially as far as processes of transborder financing, production and distribution are concemed. On the other hand, transnational enterprises are, by the very nature of their operations, not easily controllable by any one political ~ystern.~' As C. WiIfredJenks put it: (T)he relationship of their operations to the law is one of the largest questions to be resolved to create an effective world rule of law. But they are not the creation of any one legal system and are not, and cannot be, effectively controlled in the public interest by any existing legal system or combinationof legal systems.They are a triumph ofeconomic power and legal ingenuity operating on a scale which transcends and at times dwarfs the authority of individual states, and for which the existing legal order makes no appropriate provision. It is inevitable that in such a situation so much economic power and so much legal ingenuity should sometimes be tempted to take advantage of the complexity of political and legal systems to create a world of their own which must accommodate itself in the conduct of its operations to many legal systems but is not in any real sense subject to any of themz8 W e are thus confronted with a gulf between two "worlds" or two types o f systems: the highly fragmented political world of states with their parliaments, governments, courts, public debates and political decisions and the partially unified, integrated world of global economies.29This latter is characterized as an "anti~-
~
-
-
27 Efforts to change this situation have been made by the UN. With Resolution 1997111 of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the preparation of a background document on the relationship of the enjoyment of human rights and the working methods and activities of transnational corporations has been induced. C. Wilfred Jenkr, Multinational Entities in the Law of Nations, ,in: Wolfgang Friedmann, Louis HenkidOliver Lissitzzn (eds.), Transnational Law in a Changing Society Essays in Honor of Philip C. Jessup, 1972,72173. 2' See Martin Carnoy/Manue[ Castells/Stephen S. CohedFernando Henrique Cardoso, The New Global Economy in the Information Age, 1993, 112: " ... the 'informatization' of the world economy changes the conditions and possibilities for national policies. It means the informatizationofsocieties and politics. Economic globalization means the globalization of local social movements. Local becomes global, and global becomes local." However, these authors also stress the influence of the home bases on strategies of Multinational Enterprises (MNE): "We are convinced that MNEs are a product of their national origins and still depend on their home bases for economic strength. We are also convinced that there is a wide range of nation-state activity enhancing local economic development that goes beyond developing human resources for international distribution." (3) And they go on: "The nation-state's policies have a profound influence on the capacity of its MNEs to expand, for two reasons: 1) for most MNEs the home market is still crucial to the overall capital-accumulation process - national macroeconomic policies are important for homemarket development; and 2) most MNEs' research-and-development capacity is linked to home-base, nation-state R&D policies, high-skill human capital development policies, and telecommunications policies." ( 9)
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political world" by some observers or as a "political subsystem" by others in that strategies decided on behind closed doors in Transnational Enterprise headquarters are aimed primarily at safeguarding and strengthening shareholder (and, at times, stakeholder) values. In the bygone times of national economies, economic processes were to a large extent contained within the borders of states, and public authorities were able to regulate the economy and to effectively supervise key economic actors such as banks, insurance companies and other business institutions. Nowadays, in the "noman's-land" of global economies, we are witnessing a lack of adequate control, transparency, and responsibility. Can we today -the citizens of political comrnunities - be compared, as the French author Viviane Forrester put it, to a theater audience, watching closely the drama and admiring the actors on the stage without noticing that the real actors deserted the stage long ago, taking with them the script and leaving only their shadow^...?^' Are we thus living in a time characterized by a worldwide, fundamental shift of power from the public to the private domain? The scenario so painted might be exaggerated considering the fact that there are and always will be business leaders with the capacity and potential to display enlightened vision and responsibility in a much broader, future-oriented sense than that offered by many public authorities. In fact, a code of ethics for business behavior, anchored in a sense of collective responsibility for future generations and for disadvantaged peoples or segments of society in our present world, might, if faithfully respected by entrepreneurs, be an important key to the evolution of world public ~ r d e r .In ~ 'addition, individuals considering themselves to be "consumer-citizens", "producer-citizens" or "trader-citizens" certainly have a great potential to play a much more powerful and influential role in shaping a hture public economic system. Finally, the means and devices of private law, such as product liability, have been developed in the public interest in order to assist individuals to control and contain economic power on the horizontal level. On the whole, however, the fears are not unfounded which consider that the global economy, following its own inner imperatives, tends to evade the rules con-
'' Viviane Forrester, L'horreur tconomique, 1996, 3 1. See Bruno FritschStephan Schmidheiny/Wafter Seifritz, Towards an ecologically sustainable growth society: physical foundations, economic transitions and political constraints, 1994; Debora L. Spar, The Spotlight and the Bottom Line - How Multinationals Export Human Rights, Foreign Affairs, 199812, 7 et seq. 3'
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cerning social justice and environmental protection3' which have usually been created a s a result o f hard political struggles within the framework of traditional nation states. It is disturbing that according to the "principle of comparative advantage" first developed by David Ricardo, international social and economic standards a r e put under pressure and that, in reality, in the so-called "laissez-faire" economic system of the free market guided b y Adam Smith's "invisible hand", true competition between economic actors does not actually exist because there is t o o m u c h interdependence between them.33 Tax evasion and tax dumping are a l s o logical consequences of the present order characterized by competition between political systemsP4
We should therefore not 'ignore the warning voices of eminent o b s e k e r s , such as Michael Walzer who recently wrote: Multinational corporations. . . need to be constrained, much like states with imperial arnbitions; and the best constraint probably lies in collective security, that is, in alliances with other states that give economic regulation some international effect. The same mechanism may turn out to be useful to the new environmental groups. In the first case, the state pressures the corporation: in the second it responds to environmentalist pressure. The two cases suggest, again, that civil society requires political agency. And the state is an indispensable agent - even ifthe associational networks also, always, resist the organizing impulses of state bureaucrat^.^^
32 Long-term, deep and impressive visions of ecology are developed by Alexander Gillespie, International Environmental Law - Policy and Ethics, 1997, Hans Jonas, Erkenntnis und Verantwortung, 1991, who reminded us to take into account the"Fernf0lgen" as integral part of responsible action (1 14), and Ernst U. von Weizsacker, Erdpolitik Okologische Realpolitik an der Schwelle zum Jahrhundert der Umwelt, 2nd ed., 1990 who wrote: "Gegen (den) okologischen Kollaps hilfi die 'Unsichtbare Hand' nicht." (7) And it is hrther stated: "Wir treten, ob wires wollen oder nicht, in ein Jahrhundert der Umwelt ein. In diesem wird jeder, der sich Realist nennen mbchte, gezwungen, seine Handlungsweise als Beitrag zum Erhalt der Umwelt zu rechtfertigen. Die kurzfristige wirtschafiliche Optimierung bleibt natiirlich als Ziel erhalten, aber wenn sie sich den okologischen Notwendigkeiten nicht unterordnet, wird ihre Glaubwurdigkeit nicht hoher sein als die der heutigen Konfessionsstreiter in Nordirland oder die von luxemburgischen Nationalisten." (9110) 33 It has bcen estimated that 40 percent of international transactions in goods and capital take place within the framework of some globally active transnational enterprises; see PL?!P~ lilrich, Integrative Wirtschaftsethik - Grundlagen einer lebensdienlichen Okonornie, 2nd ed., 1997, 380. See also, in this context, Thomas MaaW York Lunau (eds.). Weltwirtschaftsethik - Globalisierung auf dem Priifstand der Lebensdienlichkeit, 1998. 34 Hans-Peter MartidHarald Schumann, Die Globalisierungsfalle - Der Angriff auf Demokratie und Wohlstand, 1996, 269 et seq. 'j
Michael Walzer, Towards a Global Civil Society, 1995, 23/24
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Ulrich Beck advises us that: Der Politik der Deregulierung der transnationalen Organisationen w&e die Forderung einer Reregulierung, der Wiedereinfuhrung sozialer und Gkologischer Standards entgegenzusetzen.36("By way of opposition to the politics of deregulation of transnational organization there should be the postulate of a re-regulation, a re-establishment of social and ecological standards.") Or as C. WiIfredJenks already observed years ago about economic power: Every legal system as it develops must grapple with the problem of placing an effective restraint upon power and insuring responsibility; this is the essenceofthe whole concept of due process of law."
C. Evaluation a n d Need f o r Reconception of t h e International Legal O r d e r I. Plea for a "Constitutional" Approach
Up to now, we have been dealing with the picture of the modem state which is, on the one hand, being orchestrated by the various activities of NGOs as voices and exponents of a modem and volatile international civil society. And yet on the other it is being challenged by transnational enterprises as power centers and forces of an international economic system which, in a legal sense, is not adequately regulated and might, by its very own logic, have long-term adverse consequences for the common interests ofmankind. Both situations stem from and are manifestations of a global shift in politics, economics and law and have been, as we have noticed, created, shaped and facilitated by explosive developments in the field of cornmunication technology. Against this background we shall now evaluate the newly emerging situation from the perspective of the present international legal order and investigate if and in what manner international law needs to be reconceived, redefined or reshaped in order to better reflect and to cope with the needs of modem intemational society. In trying to find a new frame of reference for the evolving international legal order, the phrase coined in the thirties by the German constitutional lawyer Herrnann Heller "Juristische Denknotwendigkeit besitzt der Staat, nicht aber das Volker-
UIrich Beck, Was ist Globalisierung?, 1997, 263. 37 J e n h (note 28), 71. 3G
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recht" ("Logically necessary is the state and not public international law")", can certainly no longer be our guide. Instead, as indicated at the beginning of this essay, the principle of the "international rule of law" should rather be placed at the center of our efforts to conceptualize the new situation. However, neither the classical defmition of international law offered by the British international lawyer Lassa Oppenheim whereby the law of nations is a "law between states only and exclusively" (1905), nor the one of the American intemational lawyer John Westlake, for whom international law is a legal order where states are the "immediate" but men the "ultimate" members (19 14)39,correspond to our needs. They embrace too minimal a concept to be useful as a paradigm of modem international law in its actual form and even more it does not contain any potential for future development. In the light of the processes of transformation which we have just described, I would like to suggest that a new dimension within the international legal order should be considered. We should conceive of intemational law "vertically7' as a (hierarchical) legal system with a constitutional bask4' The idea of a constitutional foundation of international law is, of course, not new. It was, if I am well informed, the Austrian international lawyer Aped Verdross4'who, as far back as in the twenties, coined the expression "volkerrechtliches Verfassungsrecht". Eminent German international lawyers, such as Hermann Mosler, Christian Tomuschat, Jochen Abr. Frowein or Bruno Simma, took up this concept in their well-known Hague Lectures and in other ~ritings.~' Their elaborations were made against the background of such intemational practice as the United Nations resolutions in the General Assembly and the Security Council or the decisions and opinions made in 38 Hermann Hellel; Die Souver2nitat - Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Staats- und Viilkerrechts, in: Christoph Miiller (ed.), Gesammelte Schrifien, 2nd ed., 1992, 140. 3%oth autors quoted by Jenks (note 28), 70171. 40 In German one could speak ofthe "Tiefendimension der Rechtsordnung". -If we consider in this article that vertical international law should be conceived of as a legal system with a constitutional basis, we do also suggest that on the horizontal dimension, so to speak, the reach of international law should be extended so that it includes a fully-fledged law of economic transactions as well. There is, regrettably, no opportunity in this context to further consider rules and institutions designed or to be developed to cope with the aspects of thc growing power of globalization. " A y e d Verclmss, Die Verfassung der Volkerrechtsgemeinschaft, 1926. " See Her-mannMosler, The International Society as a Legal Community, RdC 1974/IV, 17 et seq.; Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, RdC 1993/1V, 216 ef seq.; Jochen Abr. Frowein, Reactions by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of Public International Law, RdC 1994/IV, 355 et seq.; Bruno Simma, ~rom Bilateralism to Community Interest inhtemational Law, RdC 1994N1, 256 et seq.
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the International Court of Justice. But, above all, they deduced the doctrine from key concepts such as ius cogens, which represents a category of core principles in international law, the erga omnes-effect of certain basic principles of international law and the category recently recognized by international law of "international
crime^".^' The attraction of a "constitutional" approach to international law seems to me to be especially compelling when placed against the background of the globalizing tendencies which we have just been describing. Of course, in the given intemational law context, we do not have in mind a "statist" model ("vision etatiste") of a constitutional order, but a much more modest, rudimentary concept. Perhaps, therefore, we should rather refer to "constitutionalism"or "a constitutional theory" or "a constitutional method" of conceiving, shaping and interpreting international law. Or perhaps it would be better to compare it with the constitutional practices and conventions developed within the British Commonwealth of Nations rather than with the logically coherent construction of the constitutional order of a state.
11. Elements of a "Constitutional" Approach Whatever terms we might use, it is a fascinating adventure to try to discern and to identify, within the complex body of intemational law, those principles and rules which form the basis, the imminent goals, the framework and the core structure of this system of law as a whole. I shall try now to explain the relevance of a "constitutional approach" to international law in the context of the basic theme of this essay by looking at the following six topics: 1. One important advantage of a (coherent) constitutional theory is that it enables us to better identifjr the basic components.of the legal system. Considered from a constitutional perspective it would seem to provide us with an easier way of escaping from the rigidly defined circle of traditional subjects of intemational law. Thereby we can avoid the intensely debated but largely sterile question as to whether or not NGOs or transnational enterprises have emerged as new subjects within the international legal order. Instead - using a constitutional or functional approach -these new entities can be elegantly integrated into a broader concept of "international community". To illustrate my point with a similar example fiom 43 See, as an endea~ourof elaboration of this concept Daniel Thurer, Internationales "Rule of Law" - innerstaatliche Demokratie, SZIERRSDIE, 1995, 455 et seq.; id., Bundesverfassung und Viilkerrecht, in: Komrnentar zur Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschafivom 29. Mai 1874 (Einleitung), 1996.
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domestic (German) law: the fact that the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) is endowed with legal personality, but the SPD (Social Democratic Party) not, might have significant consequences under German private law, but it is largely irrelevant from a constitutional point of view. In a similar way, the new actors in our globalizing world might more easily be moulded into the system of international law if we try to conceive of them as factors and forces of a broader constitutional order. 2. One of the main functions of constitutionalism is to identify the basic rules of legitimacy of the relevant legal system. Perhaps the most prominent rule of legitimacy of state constitutional law is the "consent of the people" or "popular sovereignty". Similarly does not our present study reveal a strong tendency of the NGO community to make the desires and wishes, the public opinion and public conscience of a cosmopolitan civil society heard in international relations? This revolutionary effort, not to confine democracy to inner-state systems but - as argued by W. Michael Reismad4 and Thomas M. Franck4' -to consistently extend it to the global level might be better recognized and valued for its inner right, weight and novelty, if we consider this aspect of globalization from a constitutional perspective. Of course, by its very nature, democracy cannot have the same place and be given the same role in international law as within the differently structured domestic legal systems. The national model as such is not transferable to the (more fluid) global scene. In international law, democracy seems to be a goal rather than a legally binding principle rooted in a set of individual rights. However, as I tried to demonstrate in a recent article46we-may question, whether the concept of "citizenship" might be taken out of the simple national law setting which is its "natural home" and be extended to a novel form of "Union citizenship" provided for at the European Union level in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. Out of these a development might be further made up to the global level, where a concept of "cosmopolitan" citizenship might ultimately be achieved containing vaguer and more abstract elements4' 44 W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, AJIL, vol. 84 (1990), 866 et seq.; Thomas hf Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, AJIL. vol. 86 (1992), 46 el seq. Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, 1990. 46 Daniel Thiirer, "Citizenship" und Demokratieprinzip:''F6derativeW Ausgestaltungen
''
im innerstaatlichen, europlischen und globalen Rechtskreis (forthcoming). 47 See, in this context, David Held, Democracy and the Global Order, Cambridge 1995, especially the last chapter on "Cosmopolitan Democracy and theNew International Order" on 167 et seq.
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3. The notion of human rights in its traditional, liberal and political sense is even more firmly recognized than democracy as a core component of modem international legitimacy. In connection with the establishment and the functioning of NGOs would it not be logical to see guarantees of political fieedom such as the peedom of association and opinion being set? These rights are expressly secured under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights48,the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights49and in other international instruments, and represent, as basic components of international law, a "constitutional basis" for the core NGO activitie~.~~ 4. Constitutional legitimacy also means that nopower shouldremain unchecked. Considered in our context, it has been recently put in this way: "A metaphor" - suggested Marc Nerfin - provides a starting point for locating NGOs in the political realm; the prince represents governmental power and the maintenance of order; the merchant symbolizes economic power and the production of goods and services; and the citizen stands for people's power. As such, the growth ofNGOs arises from demands by citizens for accountability from the prince and themerchant. In this perspective, NGOs compete and cooperate with the prince and the merchant for guidance in aspects of social life. They function to 'serve undeserved or neglected populations, to expand the freedom of or to empower people, to engage in advocacy for social change, and to provide service^'.^' May - we ask in this connection - the thesis be developed that, fiom the viewpoint of legitimacy of the international order and, especially, of a rudimentary system of "checks and balances", movements such as Greenpeace, WWF (World Wide Fund ofNature), International Commission of Jurists or Amnesty International with their actions against the abuse of power by the "merchant" and the "prince" should be conceived of as sort of "countervailingforces ". Perhaps in the interest of the world community they should be welcomed and unrecoverable costs caused by their resistance action would have to be anticipated as a normal part of the budget of the relevant transnational enterprises or other actors concerned. To be sure, such actions are highly problematic due to an obvious lack of adequate civil liability. But are protests and challenges of this kind not, on the whole, desirable faute de mieux? In other words they emerge due to a lack of adequate legal mechanisms to safe-guard public interests on the international plane. In this sense, the "con~tit~ltional'~ perspective of"checks and balances" certainly has some relevance for our discussion.
48
49
kt. 19 and 20. kt. 19 and 21/22.
Macalister-Smith(note 1 1), 486. Gordenker/Weiss (note 12), 19.
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5 . The present-day scene of world economy seems to make clear that a "total market" (Peter Ulrich)" cannot be an aimperse of the international society. In the production and distribution of goods and services, market mechanisms should only be valued as instruments designed for the fulfilment of values of human life, pmpose and culture of a higher order. This limited place of "economic efficiency" seems to be generally accepted within the "order of ideas" of traditional state constitutions. But does not the present state of world economy with its inherent dangers for socialjustice, solidarity5' and - ultimately - peace demonstrate in an especially persuasive way the potential of the idea to think abcut world order relations within a constitutional conception? 6 . Finally let me mention a very general perspective which comes to light if a constitutional approach to international law is taken. In some State constitutions it is laid down that the state has a federal structure or that it is based on afederal principle of legitimacy. Would it not be much easier to identify those tasks which have to be, totally or partially, dealt with on a central level of governance if we regard this global process of distribution, balancing and sharing of power from a constitutional-federalistic perspective? Generally experiences in domestic laws4have demonstrated above all that three types of powers or responsibilities are located at the central level of government: - The protection of basic (common) values such as human rights. These basic common bonds of a legal community should be rendered more visible in international law by being integrated into a constitutional core. - Tasks which, from their very nature, are of an embracing character. For instance in the international scene many aspects of environmental protection such as climatic change or protection of the ozone layer fit into this category as does terrorism, trade in arms or narcotics etc.
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' j
The same author also speaks about "market methaphysies".
'' See John Kenneth Galbraith, Die solidarische Gesel1schaft.-
Pliidoyer fur cine moderne soziale Marktwirtschaft, 1998, 126 et seq. 54 See, e. g., Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism - A View From the States, 2nd ed., 1972; Max Frenkel, Fbderalismus und Bundesstaat, vol. 2 (1 984-1 986); Daniel Thiirer, Bund und Gemeinden - Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zu den unmittelbaren Bzziehungen zwischen Bund und Gemeindcn in der Bundzsrepublik Deutschland. den Vcreinigten Staaten von Amerika und der Schweiz, 1986; id., Switzerland: The Model in Need of Adaption? In: Joachim J. HesseNincent Wright (eds.), Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems, 1996,219 et seq.; Hartwig BulckPeter Lerche, Fbderalismus als nationales und internationales Ordnungsprinzip, VVDStRL, no. 2 1, 1964.
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Matters which, because of their spill-over effect, have to be regulated on the central level. In international law those areas might be included where public common goods suffer as a result of competition between political systems.
As Peter PernthaleJS has so convincingly described, federalisticthinking might also help us to adequately perceive the role of states within the international system. In the architecture of domestic federal systems, Cantons, Lander or states are usually given a double function. Firstly within the frontiers of their territory and within the "political space" designated to them by the federal constitution, they constitute their own political order based on their specific perception of needs and collective identities. They have, in this respect, an authority which might be called "exclusive". But they are also component parts of the overarching federal system: they participate in its central decision-making process and implement law made by central organs. This process is not limited in reach to the territory of the composing unit and it has an "inclusive" character. In this sense, Cantons, Lander or states are "bridges" between the regional population and the central authorities. Might not, under the finality of federal thinking, sovereign states also be conceived as middle parts, as mediators or "bridges" between communities on the local and regional level on the one side and on the global plane, on the other? These "bridges" are, of course, in the international sense, not empty, abstract, lifeless constructions, but rather, as Peter Saladid6 put it, a sort of Ponte Vecchio crowded with shops, houses and peoples.
Conclusion Let me end my essay by returning to the question raised at the outset. Do NGOs, transnational enterprises and other actors of globalization strengthen or lead to a decline of the role of states? I think,' we should answer this question in a differentiated way. If we consider the globalizing processes just described as a catalyzer permitting us to conceive international law as a legal system embedded in a nascent constitutional order, we easily come to the conclusion that states as "Trustees" of values recognized by the international legal order have been reenforced, reaffirmed, revitalized and even empowered by the forces of globalization. The vigilance ofNGO-activities continual-
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"Peter Pernthaler, Globalisierung als Herausforderung an eine modeme Staatslehre, in: Heinz Schoffer/Walter BerkdHarald Stolzlechner/Josef Werndl (eds.), Staat - Verfassung - Venvaltung: Festschrift f i r Friedrich Koja, 1998,69 et seq.
''Peter Saladin, Wozu noch Staaten?, 1995, 2481249.
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ly remind states about the essence of their role and responsibility and stimulate them to live up to their true function under the rule of modem international law. Therefore, I wonder if these new evolving new concepts under international law do in fact actually assist states, at least partially, in fulfilling their proper functions in a more adequate, meaningful, and promising way. As far as challenges by powerful transnational entities are concerned, it can be seen that there is a need for the reach of law to be extended. No accumulation of power should remain unchecked under a system of "rule of law". States should cooperate together and create new rules and institutions in order to effectively regulate and domesticate economic power. This is a requirement dictated by the raison du syst2me international as opposed to the raison d'ktat dominating the traditional world of international law. Sovereigntyhere is not so much endangered in its traditional "exclusive" sense, but it is no doubt challenged in its "inclusive", non-territorial participative dimension and cooperation is demanded in order to strengthen the international system. By way of conclusion, it should however not be forgotten that, as a general rule, states are and remain the indispensable centers of authority and power in the world of international relations and in international law. They are, after all, the units which hold the monopoly of force and which provide the basic infrastructure in the present world public order which still has a largely non-centralized character. However we are also living in a time of transition. Globalization has created new forces. One outstanding new feature is the emergence of new non-territorial actors whose influence partially de-territorializesthe notion of state sovereignty. Globalization brings a concept no longer limited to territorial control, but which extends to participating functions in an overriding, non territory-based system. Traditional institutions like the state are certainly here to stay but - in a process characterized by new, often ambiguous concepts and notions and by the tentative, partly soft-law effects of new regulations -their appearance and function are to a certain extent been changed in the present times. In the place of the crumbling "walls" of the old "state fortresses" new ivory networks are rapidly spreading and are covering up the old towers, bestowing on them a new and exciting appearance.
Paul Ricoeur and International Law: Beyond 'The End of the Subject'. Towards a Reconceptualization of International Legal Personality
Abstract The enquiry into international legal personality in the following article is both descriptive and prescriptive in nature. On the one hand, the phenomenon of the (legal) subject is described ;nd explained, in order to offer a better reflection on, and analysis of, its existence. This holds for both the individual and the (so central to international law) collective subject. On the other hand, our attempt at reconceptualization has a clear normative aspect. Reconstructing (international)legal personality on the basis of anthropology and ethics as an inextricable part of the identity of a person results in a conception of (international) law as justice. And this means that international legal personality reconceptualized along the lines suggested in this paper functions to develop just international institutions and just international law.
Kev words cosmopolis; ethics; hermeneutics; Hobbes; international institutions; international legal personality; justice; legal theory; natural law; phenomenology: postmodemism; recognition I.
INTRODUCTION
'If modern law is law without God, then postmodern law is law without Man.'' But can law do without Man? It cannot, and yet this is the situation we face here. It is among the urgent challenges of today: is man indeed nothing more than a scattered locus where contingency rules, an atopos subjected to all kinds of forces which determine who he is, rather than that man constitutes himself and the world he lives in? The philosophical attack on man - best known as 'la fin de l'homme' in the version of Foucault - cannot remain without response, including from the discipline of international law. The problematic of the subject underlies legal personality as well as legal (and ethical) responsibility. Traditionally, the legal subject presupposes
*
I.
Assistant Professor, Department of International Law, School of Law, Universiteit van Amsterdam. This article is part of the research programme T h e International Constitutional Order' of the Amsterdam Centre for International Law, Universiteit van Amsterdam. Many thanks to Catherine Brolmann and Anthony Carty for their comments on an earlier draft. The first drah of this article was written while the author was a Visiting Fellow at Queen Mary,University of London (summer 2006).I would like to express my gratitude to Queen Mary School of Law for their pleasant and efficient assistance and in particular to Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Michael Lobban for their stimulating conversations. A. Carty, Post-Modern Law: Enligktcnment, Revolution, and theDeath ofMan (1990).
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the human subject in the modernist conception - that is a single, coherent, unitary and autonomous entity, which does not really change with time so that its promises have validity in the future, which can thus be the addressee of law and which can be held responsible for its actions.' With this subject being so fundamental to law, it is impossible not to respond to the proclamation of 'la fin de l'homme' and to the replacement of the modern identity of the subject by the notion of the fragmented Selfwithout essence.How can such an unstable Self act? How canit change the world through actions? Where does it leave (the bearer of) responsibility? If these are pertinent questions with regard to the individual human subject, they are even more so with regard to collective entities such as, notably, the sovereign subject we call state. The attacks on both the individual and the collective (e.g. the state) Self are (philosophically) intertwined. This is self-evident as the individualist, subjectivist perspective has marked the deep structure of international law. Moreover, this individualist and subjectivist understanding of international law draws on one particular conception of the modem subject. It is the Hobbesian perception of man that has been transferred to the international level, and with that transfer factors of ethics and morality have been excluded from the intemational society and its legal order.3 With the transposition of the Hobbesian understanding of man as an egoistic being and of 'the state of nature' as a situation of war of all against all, the conception of the international society as anarchy due to self-interested state conduct has come to ground our discipline's thought. The Hobbesian vision of the amorality of the state and of international anarchy has pushed alternative perspectives that sought for representation of morality and justice at the international level to the margin or beyond. To be sure, Foucault's announcement of the 'End of the Subject' includes an attack of precisely the idea of the state person and its identity as the sovereign and amorally operating Leviathan. But this has affected our discipline perhaps even more. Foucault's rejection of the traditional theory of power and his (related) attack on Leviathan does not end the Hobbesian state of war but, on the contrary, moves it to an even more fundamental level: namely at the basis of society, between its members, and even to the inside of the fragmented Self. Foucault's resentment towards Leviathan is understandable, yet the means he proposes to eliminate the Sovereign monster and to reconceive power without a wielder is not acceptable
2.
.
The human subject may act individually as well as collectively.When it acts collectively aseparate autonomous subject may be formed which can be an addressee of law in its own right. Again, the existence or constitution of this (new) subject is understood as quite unproblematic, merely an issue of how the will of the new subject is formed by the collective of human subjects. This is not to say that Hobbes's comprehensive philosophy does not include both political and moral philosophy, but merely that his concept of the natural condition of mankind - the state of nature in which men live in war as no absolute authority exists -became the model for thinking about the intemational society, i.e. a society which has not entered into asocial contract and which lacks a supreme power to enforce moral-juridical action. Inother words, according toHobbes, for moralaction to exist, man must haveescaped from the state of nature and have given up his natural right of self-preservation. Otherwise, the fear of a violent death - without a government or sovereign power to protect him and to enforce order - justifies the right to self-defence. For morality and law to exist, a sovereign power is required. In the state of nature a moral action may be too high a risk since it may be abused rather than met in a mutual way.
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Non-State Actors and International Law PAUL R I C O E U R A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W
either. As much as I agree with the rejection of the Hobbesian conception of the state in its 'state of nature', I do not accept the consequences of Foucault's theory of power either. In the following, I shall instead draw on Hegelian-inspired thought in
order to reintroduce morality as part of the 'state of nature' and - proceeding from this model - as part of the international society and its legal order. Just as law cannot do without justice it also cannot do without man. Both propositions will be defended here. Clearly the postmodern critique of the modem subject has substance and value. It seems fair that the fiction of the legal person as a subject (both individual and collective) coherent and monadic, and thus capable of acting upon one unitary will with univocal (speech) acts, is under siege. But if, as in the postmodernist view, the (human) subject loses its existence, the legal subject, too, loses its significance. The rejoinder in this paper aims to find a way out of the deadlock which the 'end of the subject' creates for international law. In particular, it means to offer a first attempt for reconstruction of the notion of the (legal) subject. Such a reconstruction is necessary because, it is submitted, (i) (international) law ultimately requires a connection between the legal subject and the (human) subject, who is capable of acting and can be held responsible, and who is also capable of participating in the creation of law, as without this capacity democracy and the Rechtsstaatcannotexist. (ii) While taking account of the insights offered by postmodernist critique, this paper thus makes an attempt to transcend the deconstructive philosophies of the subject and to save the viable subject. The reconstruction of 'subjectivity' or 'personality' in the way suggested here reflects the subject's deep and inherent relationship with others and allows for ethics to ground law. (iii) The current inquiry into international legal personality is both descriptive and prescriptive in nature. On the one hand, the phenomenon of the (legal) subject is described and explained, so as to offer a better reflection on, and analysis of, its existence. This holds for both the individual and the (so central to international law) collective subject. On the other hand, our attempt at reconceptualization has a clear normative aspect. Reconstructing (international) legal personality on the basis of anthropology and ethics as an inextricable part of the identity of a person results in a conception of (international) law as justice. And this means that international legal personality reconceptualized along the lines suggested in this paper functions to develop just international institutions and just international law. First, the critique of the subject will be summarized in the variant of Foucault. Subsequently, I shall introduce the philosophical defence of the human subject as formulated by the recently deceased French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. Coming from phenomenology and hermeneutics, Ricoeur is able to save the capable and responsible subject and to defend it against its total fragmentati~n.~ His project- the 'hermeneutics of the Self -is about theunderstanding and explanation ofthe human
4.
Paul Ricoeur is hard to pin down in terms of philosophical traditions or schools. He moved in areas such as psychoanalysis, political theory, theology, existential phenomenology, philosophy of language, moral philosophy, and ethics. His ideas on the human subject as explored in this paper draw on philosophy of language (semantics and pragmatics), analytical philosophy, hermeneutics, and ethics.
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subject or Self, and in this process of inquiry the Self makes its (re)appearance.s It is a worthy response to Foucault's proposition that man is merely a construction of impersonal forces, as it recognizes that man is constituted in relation to the world outside but not fully by this outside world. The 'hermeneutics of the Self captures how the Self constitutes itself by narration and interpretation in pursuit of the Good Life. From the premise of the 'hermeneutics of the Self we instantly discern the ethical-moral dimension of this philosophical defence of the subject: 'the selfhood of oneselfimplies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the other, as we might say in Hegelian term^'.^ Man constitutes itself in relation to others. Ricoeur places the Other, not only (i) in the face of the other person, the otheniess inherent in intersubjective relations, but (ii) also in the experience of one's own body as an encounter with Otherness. Finally, (iii) otherness is implied in 'the most deeply hidden' relation of the Self to itself - which is conscience. Conscience is conceptualized as an Other voice in one's mind which manifests itself as 'attestation'- the key word of Oneselfas Another and a central concept of the 'hermeneutics of the Self as developed in that book. In brief, the self appears in optimaforma when it attests to its convictions. It then answers ethical questions, and its appearance provides a new kind of certainty'here I am'; as such, it has epistemic and ontological value as well. Ultimately, this is also the Self which constitutes itself by recognizing its responsibility and by seeking recognition by others. Ricoeur thus moves towards a Hegelian understanding of reciprocity as the constitution of selfhood and transcends the original asymmetry that characterizes the relation to others. With this move he also adopts Hegel's response to Hobbes's conception of man and the state of nature and facilitates the reappearance of morality in the state of nature and the order built upon it. Law is one of the institutional orders which mediate and organize this struggle for recognition at the impersonal level. Law mediates the self's impersonal relations - that is, the relations between the Self and 'distant others'. In these relations the Self also attests to its convictions by acting upon its desire to live in 'just institutions1.7In Ricoeur's own words, the just 'is first an object of desire, of a lack, of a wish. It begins as a In other words, man's quest for happiness marks wish before it is an imperati~e'.~ his relations with others both at a face-to-face and at an impersonal level. Part of the purpose of human life is to aim at living well also with, and for, impersonal others, hence, to live well even at a global level. Thus justice is not the virtue of the intersubjective relation (that would be friendship) but the virtue of the impersonal or institutional relation with faceless others. Institutions facilitate the transition 5. 6. 7.
8.
P. Ricoeur, OneselfasAnother(rgg2), translation of Soi-rnhnecommeun autre(1g90). References hereinafter are to OneselfasAnother. Ricoeur, supra note 5 , 3 . With the notion of institution, Ricoeur refers to structures which mediate the relation of distance from the other, the other of impersonal relations.This is 'the other for justice': institutions should mediate the virtue of justice in relation to the distant other - the other for justice is 'anyone' or 'each'. Among these orders of institutional mediation, these social institutions, is the juridical form of institutional otherness or the legal order: law as an order structures interaction and binds the agent to others. But the institutional condition is not a merely legal one; without social institutions and the political institution we would not associate with distant otherness. The juridical system mediates association with others: without it we cannot aim for the good life. Our sense of justice makes us aim for just institutions, i.e. distributing to each his due. P. Ricoeur, TheJust, trans. David Pellauer (looo), xv.
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from the interpersonal to the societal plane (from the virtue of friendship to the virtue of justice) and so the ethical aim arrives at its fullest scope : h chacun son droit. Thanks to international institutions -including international law -I live in relations with faceless other members of humanity. Justice as an imperative is aimed at peace: justice so conceived thus demands that international institutions and law serve peace and not war or revenge. For instance, the beginning of justice done to victims of human rights violations is recognition of the facts; and thanks to the many truth and reconciliation commissions this is also now part of the institutional structure of the international community.9 This perspective of just institutions may thus also serve tocontaincriticismsofcurrent institutionalrealities, which are predominantly power structures and which fail to recognize that justice should rule also in relation to the less powerful entities. Justice has an ethical content: the requirement of equality. Justice is distributive to the extent that it demands that social institutions promote the good of those who are part of them (the members of society); this includes the poorest and those who suffer most, even on a distant continent. Justice is served when institutions are transformed such as to create just situations - that is, situations in which the capabilities that people choose and value - such as those of being fed,of bodily health, ofbeing educated, ofexercising practical reason, of taking part in the life of the community, or of expressing oneself freely - are fully recognized. Justicethusis a substantivenotion,itis an intrinsic part of ethical intentionality. The demand for justice includes a demand for institutions which recognize and organize human responsibility, for ourselves as well as for others. In international law, the right to (internal and external) self-determination of (indigenous) peoples or ethnic minorities is one example of a concept that accommodates difference or otherness in the international legal system. Cultural (collective)rights or the recognition of selfdetermination often have to be fought for, since access to justice and its institutional structures is often difficult. Reflection on state sovereignty from the perspective suggested here includes the responsibility of states; after all, the inherent purpose of power is the good of the whole community (national and global), which includes both bodily and moral well-being. The doctrine of the responsibility to protect as it emerged within the United Nations concurs with this perspective.IOJustice as
However, Ricoeur does not argue in favour of amnesty, which does not 'proceed from the juridical realm'. If not part of the realm of justice, yet created as a political solution, amnesty creates a situation in which 'to the prevention of any pursuit of criminals, is added a prohibition even to refer to the facts themselves in terms of their criminal aspects. Therefore it is a question of veritable institutional amnesia that invites us to act as though something never happened'. Traumatic events have to be recognized by the perpetrators, victims have to be recognized, and a state should not allow misrecognition of this kind to be part of its history and identity. Amnesty denies memory, 'pardon gives memory a future'. Pardon can only be carried out by the victim; it is not aimed at forgetting but at 'the end of mourning'. Amnesty is 'the pseudo-juridical attempt to wipe out the facts'. Pardon comes within the realm of justice. Ricoeur, supra note 8, at 143-4. Justice demands institutions -includingsuch institutions as truth and reconciliation commissions - to take account of memories and the actual healing of the victims in order for genuine reconciliation and peace to be possible. 10. Sates, like other institutions, have to act responsibly too, which may come down to an obligation to protect with force the humanity of human beings threatened by gross human rights violations outside the state's own territory. Such humanitarian intervention, however, requires careful consideration of la soufrance des victimcs on the one hand and la violence de I'intmention on the other. There is un impe'ratifcate'gonque, le devoir d'assistance, but a de'chainement de la violence is prohibited too.
9.
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a virtue of institutional relations, including cosmopolitan relations, facilitates a critique of international law and institutions for their shortcomings with respect to justice: just institutions further the recognition of each actor by the other as a participant of the same international community." The recognition of otherness as an inclusion in the international (legal) order is given legal significance as a struggle for self-determination. Justiceas avirtue of global institutions challenges the international community to recognize humanity's universality as well as plurality and to confront misrecognition and misrepresentation of human plurality within institutional structures (as in the composition of the UN Security Council). Justice includes distributive justice and demands that the world take responsibility for its poorest members. The idea of a right to basic capabilities is formulated (below) with a view to implementing the standard of social justice. This conception of justice may come to serve as a basis for a critique of current international institutions international law and organizations - aimed at directing international institutions towards justice- that is, for the good of human beings and the distribution of certain basic capabilities, to be employed individually as well as collectively. Considering the current state of international society and the problems it faces, it is no luxury to reflect on a new ethos to contribute to our political imagination, to inspire global institutional reform, and to support and sustain the development of international law." The onset of the reconceptualization of the international legal personality
'C'est dans cette juste distance entre les partenaires affront&, trop prhs dans le conflit et trop CloignCs l'un de l'autre dans l'ignorance, la haine ou le mkpris, qui resume assez bien, je crois, les deux aspects de l'acte de juger: d'un cBt6 trancher, mettre fin l'incertitude, stparer les parties; de l'autre, faire reconnaitre par chacun la partque l'autre prend i la meme sociCt6 que lui,envertude quoi, le gagnant et le perdant du procks seraient rCputes avoir chacun leur juste part B ce scheme de coop6ration qu'est la sociCtC.' P. Ricoeur, Le Juste (1995)~at192. Ricoeur was asked in an interview, 'Est-ce que cela veut dire qu'il faut constituer un gouvernement international, ce qui pounait aider B resoudre beaucoup de problemes? Paul Ricoeur explained: 'Non, je ne pense pas. Notre problkme est sans pric&dent,car nous n'avons comme des sujets de droit et de force que de pays nationaux. Notre tdche n'est donc pas de creer une entit6 internationale qui serait l'Etat-Nation de la force " X . Maintenant nous avons une realit6 tout B fait nouvelle qui devrait former quelquechose comme un "concert desnations".'Question: 'C'est ce que j'ai voulu dire en pensant B la HdCration envisagee par Camus.' Ricoeur: 'Moi, je pense que de ce point de vue c'est Kant qui a vu les choses au plus clair dam son projet de la paix Cternelle comme consequence du ius gentium, des droits humains. Je pense qu'il nous faut aller par ce chemin, car il est beaucoup plus difficile d'amver B un concert des nations qu'au pouvoir d'une nation. Maintenant nous sommes mis en danger aussi bien par le morcellement des nations que par la suprematie d'une seule force, c'est dire par le chaos mondial et la monocratie americaine. D'ailleurs les am6ricains eux-msmes ont difficult6 se situer, car les autres pays les obligent 3 jouer les gendarmes du monde, souvent meme contre leur propre volont6.. . Ce que je veux dire, c'est que nous disposons de l'expirience historique du compromis et des nkgociations. Dans les activites publiques on se heurte tout le temps aux nCgociations entre chefs et conseils administratifs etc. Les dCmocratiesqui fonctionnent aujourd'hui plus ou moins bien, sont itablies sur des compromis comme les droits des minorit&, le contrBle constitutionnel de la majorit6 dirigeante etc. C'est prCcis6ment cette experience historique du compromis qu'il faut 4largir. Magnifier le differend, c'est voir la realit6 telle qu'elle est, mais cela ne veut pas dire du tout qu'il a une existence obligatoire, c'est juste un fait. Dire qu'il ait le mot dernier, ga serait une capitulation. Aufait le differend n'est qu'une partie du probl&me.'Diplomacy, as the opportunity for dialogue and compromise and the further development of international law, has to aim for the transformation of the international order into an order of respect and mutual recognition. Interview by Yvaka B. Raynova, 'Quo Vadis?. (2000) 2 (winter) Labyrinth, See also A. Carty, 'New also available at http~/phaidon.philo.at/-iaVlabyrinth/~ooo/ricoe.htmlnftn~. Philosophical Foundations for International Law: From an Order of Fear to One of Respect'. (2006) 19(2) CambridgeReview ofIntcmationalAffairs311,See for a plea for diplomacy ibid., at 314: 'The process of critique reveals a new dimension of the person, that of understanding another world than one's own, comparable to learning another language or understanding one's own language as one among others. Translation and the
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developed here is normative or evaluative as well as descriptive - descriptive in the sense that as a reconceptualization leaning on phenomenology it is better suited to the (human and institutional) reality. This ethical-moral dimension of the'hermeneutics of the Self is not only decisive for Ricoeur's project to save the humansubject,itis also suited to be the philosophical basis on which a new theory of international legal personality can be grounded. In the final part of this article, I shall argue that (international) legal personality should be conceived of as part of the ethical-juridical identity of the Self (individual and collective) in impersonal relations on a cosmopolitan scale.As such, the contours of a reconceptualization will centre on an anthropological grounding: legal personality is a mode of identity (i.e. the ethical-moral identity of the self) at a particular scale: in relations with a third person or Other mediated by cosmopolitan institutions. The (international) legal identity of the individual or collective Self is conceived as part of a broader concept of personal or collective identity. Both the identity of, for example, a historic community (people, nation) as organized in a state and also a personal identity are part of this quest for legal personality,while both the individual and the collective self have the power to act (the power-in-common is the capacity of the members of the historical community) and the desire to live together in just institutions. (International) legal personality, then, is no longer a formal fiction which shields the internal reality from the external international plane and whose meaning is construed by international law, as best symbolized by the mask; it is a concept which links law to justice. The reconceptualization of legal personality proposed here is thus inextricably linked to a theory of law as justice. It recognizes that law has its origins in the moral and ethical realm and that in the pursuit of happiness, man seeks (social) justice which means that at community level, he desires to live with justinstitutions. Hence the following will also confront the denial of the (philosophical) possibility of a just international order. The aim of this paper - to build philosophical foundations for international legal personality - therefore does not sit easily with contemporary international law scholarship: it needs to defy mainstream positivist critique as well as postmodernist theorists. The early twentieth-century breach with nineteenth-century reified and sanctified conceptions of personality in international law has surely been a significant and valuable one. It aimed at the liberation of international law from natural law and at its separation from morality. This is a controversial yet cherished separation. We only have to remember Kelsen's redefinition of legal personality. He replaced the contemporary substantive concept - a 'hypostatization of ethico-political postulates' - with a functional and formal concept: legal personality as a point of attribution of the legal order and as a heuristic tool. He did so, however, for
capacity for compromise, as amutualrecognition ofsituations of conflict, are always liable to be denounced as appeasement, particularly in the Hobbesian context where the person is not considered to have any moral dimension. However, for Ricoeur a capacity for compromiseispart of the capacity of the person to recognize himself as a figure of passage from one regime to another, without accusations of relativist disillusionment or superficiality (Ricoeur 2004 [La recourse de reconnaissance], 307)'.
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substantive and, I would submit, even moral-political reasons.'3 Kelsen renounced any natural law or sociological grounding of international legal personality or international law for their potential threat to peace and stability. After all, such grounding would bring foreign (social, political, moral, etc.) elements to law and legal science and with these elements include uncertainty. Law and morality cannot be linked; any natural law approach would bring along ideology and metaphysics. Sein or Being has to remain fully separate from Sollen or Ought. This is also at the root of Kelsen's critique of legal fictions; he valued fictions as long as they were not falsifying the world by claiming to be 'natural' reflections - like, indeed, the reified state of his days. Kelsen rejected the ontological distinction between law and the state; in his view, there could not be a state person as a meta-juridical reality since it would be a political and moral threat to democracy and peace.'4 This rejection of reified personifying notions was a response to the nineteenth-century substantiation of the state person as a divine entity above the law. In order to bring the state under the (international) law again, Kelsen redefined the state person as the legal order to which the international legal order is superior and all-comprising. Ontological dualism (law and state) is replaced by a monistic - purely, formal legal construction within which international law is the juncture between the international and national legal order. The (state) person is the legal order, not an entity separate from its order. The legal order grounded in the Grundnom was fully detached from morality or social reality. Legal personality was purified from moral, mythical, or glorifying interpretations and reduced to a fiction helpful in understanding the legal systern.'s But this fiction and its formalist definition depend fully on a conscious, wilful, and capable subject. Law presupposes the existence of the subject -individual as well as collective - as capable of deliberation and decision-making. Action is human action, not action of power or language practices. Law and legal personality (as 'bearing' rights and duties) rest on the idea of subject as 'centre of agency'. Man is the only 'place' where a shift from the factual to the normative can take place: we wonder what to do, come to some conclusion, and act. This shift may occur within the individual as well as the collective. It is a prerequisite for legal notions such as attribution and responsibility. Even though Kelsen's redefinition of legal personality as the starting point of relationships is detached from the physical being of man - the legal person is not the human individual, merely the personification of (part of) a legal order which configures at the point of attribution-it is not detached fromwill, intention, and human action.16 But we must bear in mind that behind Kelsen's formalist approach to (international) law was the modernist drive to establish a universal and objective identity of international law. At the time, his formalism was indeed ethically motivated. 13. See for an extensive account of Kelsen's theory of legal personality, 1. E. Nijman, The Concept oflntemational LegalPersona1ity:AnInquiy into the History and Theory oflntemational Law (2004, ch. 3. It is argued there that in redefining law and legal personality Kelsen also defended democracy and fought to liberate individual freedom and responsibility. 14. See, for a substantiation of this claim, ibid. 15. See, for Kelsen's critique of legal fictions, ibid., ch. 3. 16. After all, the essence of the exercisingof a legal right is the expression of a will, and, in the case of political rights, this means 'the power to influence the formation of the will of the state'. Ibid., at 187.
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Kelsen's definition of (international) legal personality as the subject or point of attribution for legal relationships involving rights and duties prescribed by positive law became a classic one. Many variations have since been formulated, but within mainstream positive international law the established concept of international legal personality is indeed the formal description of 'subject of rights and duties under international law', that is, positive law purified from moral grounding. International legal personality can only be granted by sovereign states (i.e. the full international legal persons of international law) that create positive international law. In common legal use international legal personality is a formal concept which distinguishes the legal from the political and the moral, thus sustaining the circular because not anthropologically grounded - identity of positive international law. The contours of a new theory of international legal personality suggested here may indeed be placed in a natural-law tradition, as it conceives of law as justice. However, contrary to premodern and modem perspectives it does not conceive of natural law as a set of divine or universalistic dictates. Instead, grounded on the 'hermeneutics of the Self, this post-postmodern perspective on international legal personality and international law recognizes law as justice and builds on the idea of law as an order of recognition. Law is a social system which organizes our relations with others (part of which is the recognition of each other's otherness) and so mediates institutionally our pursuit of the good life at the impersonal level. International legal personality is conceived as the ethical-moral identity of the Self, with at its core the relation of Self and Otherness, on a global scale which thus links ethics to (international) law and incorporates the recognition of human plurality. On a global scale as well, the claims of respect for the dignity and identity both of individual human beings and of (cultural) collectivities challenge us to find a way ethical and juridical - to deal with plurality, to deal with otherness. Within the realm of international law, this requires a theory of personality that facilitates recognition in multiple ways: recognition of one's ownresponsibility,mutual recognition of each other's differences, both individually and collectively,on multiple scales (domestic as well as global). In this globalized world we do share a common universal destiny. To confront the problems which threaten the future of humanity, we need a global order which facilitates and stimulates the recognition of responsibilities. Like all other disciplines, international law scholarship did not escape the (postmodern) influence of ideas such as the marginalization of universal modem values; the disqualification of the general, universal approach; and the negative conception of law and legal language." Even if it has indeed become less obvious that power 17.
I note elsewhere that Foucault's influence on the intellectual conventions of our time can hardly be overestimated considering how it has moulded contemporary international law scholarship in general, notably regarding (partly related) concepts of state sovereignty and international legal personality in particular. The identification of law as the repressive and therefore negative form of power is largely to blame for that. Of course, there is this defining dimension of international law that law springs from sovereign power, but it has always coexisted with this other international law (historic) imprint, i.e., international law as a (morally driven) critique and limit of power. Foucault's reduction of law and legal concepts to the negative language of power only may have prompted many international studies to turn away from the general and universal. Ibid,, at 351.
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is countered with universal values, and even if it is true that plurality is the human condition, it remains our discipline's intellectual task and responsibility to continue reflecting on how to contain power through international law. One way to do this is through conceptual rethinking. International legal personality is a crucial concept of international law. Here I shall draw on, and expand my quest for leads for, a new theory of international legal personality which was started elsewhere.18 Such a theory cannot leave aside a response to the critical perspective, as Anthony Carty has pointed out.I9 I will take up that challenge and develop my argument on Ricoeur and international law - thus responding to what to my mind is often a sceptical if not nihilistic view on international law. Alongside the 'death of the subject' theme, classical notions such as sovereignty and personality have been deconstructed and the indeterminacy of international law has been laid bare. However, reconstruction still has to begin. The Foucaldian suspicion of subjectivity in general and the critique of the modem subject by critical legal scholarship in particular is extremely important, in that we have been forced to be more realistic about the world, to experience it more fully and recognize its darker sides. Now we have to come back with an answer which prevents us from tumbling into nihilism. Critical intemational law scholars such as Carty and Koskenniemi indeed agree that after a stage of deconstructive scholarship we now need to search modestly for seeds for a new theory of international legal personality.'' 2.
THEEND OF THE SUBJECT: THE POSTMODERNIST CHALLENGE
The idea of the human subject is at the heart of modernity, it is the point of departure for both epistemological andmoralmodernthought.It hasits originsin the Cartesian subject: the conscious Self exists because it thinks; man is defined by its ratio. In the Grotian version, 'man is rational and social by nature'. The modem subject is solid, stable, and coherent; it is rational, independent, and cognizable. Man is able to know and understand himself and the world, to judge it, and thus to act rationally and reasonably within this world. The modernist Self creates and re-creates itself, the world, and the meaning ofboth.Through this accumulated knowledge, he has found universal truths. Generally, thanks to human reason, his actions are (perceived as) teleologically driven towards order and justice. This is a not unattractive line of thought, and yet it is attacked forcefully. The 'end of the (human) subject' or 'death of man' theme is indeed one -if not the Although by now amuch quoted and popular only -core theme of postrnoderni~m.~' 18. 19. 20.
21.
Ibid. A. Carty, 'International Legal Personality and the End of the Subject:Natural Law and Phenomenological Responses to New Approaches to International Law', (2005) 6 MelboumeJoumal oflntemational Law 534. See,e.g.,A. Carty,'CriticalInternational Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law', (1991)2 EJlL 66, at 81-2; M. Koskenniemi,From Apology to Utopia (zoos), 500.
Postmodernism completely rejects the alleged 'terror of reason' (in the sense of the absolute and timeless certainty that modernism (supposedly) conceived reason to be), because reason taken to extremes excludes everything that is different. Consequently, a certain hostility vis-i-vis the Enlightenment ideals of social progress, the emancipation and liberationof the individual,the existence of universal values, the possibility of absolute knowledge, and the supremacy of pure logical rationality (which were also all key principles
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statement,it refers to a complicatedbody ofthought oftenmisunderstood. Obviously the counterintuitive label of this debate is partly to blame. Most scholars, especially those within the international law discipline focused on improving human rights situations around the worid, intuitively repudiate it either for its factual inaccuracy or for its relativist andnihilist connotations. Apart from the simple reality that man is
living all over the globe and in many instances is suffering and in need of protection, there is also a legal motive. Without the (legal)existence of the human subject there is no entity to which to tie human rights - something which would cause an entire legal field to implode - or, there would be no entity to which to impute an action to or to hold accountable. But 'the end of the subject' debate is referring of course to a philosophical debate which has found its way into our discipline. The image of'the death of the subject' symbolizes a shift from the creating-subject(of language, power, or culture) to the idea of the constructed-subject (by language, power, or cult~re).~' As such, it is pivotal to contemporary debate in epistemology, ethics, and social and political philosophy, and in legal theory. We will meet the critique of the subject in the version of Foucault, who based his attack on an analysis of power operating discursively in s0ciety.~3 of modernism) can be felt in every discipline that has come under postmodern influences. It is in its revolt against modern reason that postmodemismis bothanepistemologicalandapoliticalmovement. Itscriticism of liberal political theory is a distinct feature of the postmodern view which we will also touch upon below. The 'death of the subjectlauthor' challenged Foucault also to respond to the question of the end of the subject in relation to language. In 'What is an Author? (1969) he argues that the author came into being and to the forefront of the discourse only as part of the juridification of the appearance of texts (who should be prosecuted for this insult?). M. Foucault, 'What is an Author?, in Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, PracticcSelectedEssaysandlntewiews. ed. and introd. D. F. Bouchard, trans. D.E Bouchard and S. Simon (1977). Foucault's question is not 'who is the author?' but 'what is the author? His concept of the 'author function' does not refer to the individual who wrote the text, but rather to the author as a function of discourse. The author having come into being only recently in human history, Foucault joined in now that the author is dead. Here, too, Foucault's argument on the disappearance of the subject raises questions in relation to notions of intention and attribution of and responsibility for (literary or linguistic) actions. Rather than an identification of a 'who' Foucault's author is indeed again a locus of discursive practices. The author as a function of discourse, what we make out to be the author of a text, cannot fully be identified with the actual person of the writer. The actually identity of the author is not what matters, only the narrator that emerges as part of or as a result of discourse. As we shall see below. Ricoeur uses the notion of narrator too. The narrator who tells his life's story is, however, a 'who'. Ricoeur agreed to the methodological considerations of the death of the author in relation to reading and understanding texts in literary theory. Fragmented (incomplete) knowledge of the author may distort our understanding of a text, and in that respect it is better not to knowanything.But he didnot extendthe deathoftheauthorto the philosophical realm and thesubject of humanism. Reading is a different kind of communication from speaking with someone; the later model of communication is the basis of Ricoeur's dialogical ethics. Ricoeur meets Foucault when he agrees to the image of the subject or the self as a locus of practices or forces, but it is not a full agreement. While Foucault gives up the question of'who?, Ricoeur does not stop at the conclusion of the self as a void where forces rule: the self as narrator - the narrative self - exists only in relation to the other who gives him the opportunity to address and unify both its permanent identity and its responsive and dynamic identity. The dialectic relation between the permanent and the changing self, accommodated by the narrator, enables Ricoeur to save the human subject even though man has fallen from its throne. Ricoeur's response to Foucault's understanding of the author is implicitly addressed in this article. The subject may be ruled by discursive forces, forces of power or knowledge, but the self is capable of taking control and is not merely a product of language. The human subject may not be sovereign - i t . independent and autonomous - but it is not a fiction either. For the purpose of this article, two of Foucault's works in particular have been taken into consideration Power/Knowledge:Selectedlntewiews6~OtherWn'tings 197~-1977(198o),and Thc0rderofThings:AnArchaeology of the Human Sciences (1970). translation of Lcs Mots et Les Choses (1966). At a later stage, this project, on the problematic of the (legal)subject,will develop an analysisofboth Ricoeurand Foucault which also takes into account Foucault's later work Histoire de la SewualitC(whichincludes 'Le souci de so?). However, the present article focuses directly on Foucault's work on power. Therefore some of the most profoundly philosophical
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'La fin de l'homme' should first and foremost be understood epistemologically in relation to the human sciences.'4 Foucault argued for a change of focus: away from the human subject as the object of study, and towards all processes and mechanisms that constitute man. In his view 'man is a recent invention. . . [whose] appearance.. .was the efect of a change in the fundamental arrangements of kno~ledge'.~5 These fundamental arrangements of knowledge were formed by modern thought at the end of the eighteenth ~entury.'~ However, man's being and actions are actually largely (perhaps fully) determined by language and power. Therefore, 'Ought we not to admit that man will return to that serene non-existence in which he was formerly maintained by the imperious unity of Discourse?' This is the epistemological critique in a nutshell; Foucault poetically described the possibility of man 'erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea'.'7 Consequently, to many the modern subject is no longer acceptable as the basis for bringing us truth; new - postmodern - methods to gather knowledge, to find the available fragments of truth, and to account for the phenomenon of man are needed. Foucault's redirection has profoundly marked political science and (international) legal theory. His argument that man is constituted by power manifests a rejection of the traditional (legal) conception of power in terms of sovereignty and legitimacy - a conception which he substitutes with a new concept of power couched in terms of knowledge and truth. This is not the place to elaborate on Foucault's theory of power or on the methodology of genealogy suggested to analyse power;28a few remarks will have to suffice. Legal and political theory, Foucault argues, have traditionally either advocated or attacked the power of the sovereign. But he rejects in the clearest terms the idea that the juridical edifice of state sovereignty is the correct explanatory model. In his view, power cannot stem from a mythico-juridical event like the social contract. For too long political analysis has been dominated by legal conceptions in general, and has been 'obsessed with' the notion of the sovereign person in particular.
or perhaps religious questions - the meaning of human life, whether and how the self can answer to existential questions of man's contingency, and the incomprehensiveness of humanexistence - for now are left unaddressed. 24. What Foucault meant to say is that the human subject as the object of modern thought, the subject which is the foundation and source of the human sciences, the cognizable self that has brought us a scaffolding of thought based upon itself, the subject involved in collecting knowledge and making meaning, that subject is fading away. His anti-humanist perspective is evidenced in his attempt to explain the existence of the humansciences and the fact that 'they are not sciences at all'; they merely serve the collectionof knowledge. Hence Foucault's anti-humanismis anti-subjectivismin thesense that it wishes to account fordevelopments, phenomena, for history -let us say - without reference to the human subject, also in order to account for the constitution of the human subject itself. Foucault, Order $Things, supra note 2 3 , at 366. 2 5 . Ibid., at 386-7. 26. Thus, viewed from a cultural - historical perspective, at the end of the eighteenth century the emphasis shifted from God (or his representative on earth: the king) to the human subject as the basis of knowledge and truth, and this new man gained the divine perspective of looking at himself as an object of study. Ever since, modem thinking has defined man by his relation with God or king, and for this reason the death of God has to involve 'the disappearance of man'. 27. Foucault, Order of Things, supra note 23, at 386-7 (emphasis added). 28. See, for more extensive analysis of Foucault's theory of power and his rejection of the traditional liberal or juridical theory of power, Nijman, supra note13, at 370 et seq.
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What we need, however,is a political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the King's head 1i.e.the locus of sovereignty]:in political theory that has still to be d0ne.~9 Having thus beheaded the king in order to 'escape from the limited field of juridical Foucault consequently turns his investigation sovereignty and state instit~tions',3~ to power outside the juridical schema of sovereignty and on to the micro-level of society, where the effects of power are most noticeable. By the beheading of the king (or the killing of the unifying sovereign spirit that constitutes Leviathan) Foucault deprives political and legal theory of its unifying concept, the possibility of singularity. In his view, 'rather than worry about the problem of the central spirit,. . .we must attempt to study the myriad of bodies which are constituted as peripheral subjects as a result of the effects of power'.jl In other words, Foucault renounces sovereignty and personality as adequate concepts, and he refutes our preoccupation with the transformation of the individual will into the will of the state person and with oppressive (sovereign) power as an attribute of the state personality. He thereby intends to liberate power (and the study of power) from its modernist legal box and to lay bare that the human subject is constituted by power/knowledge regimes. The human subject, then, does not pre-exist in relation to these powerlknowledge regimes. Rather, it is through power mechanisms within discourses of truth and knowledge that the subject emerges. Mechanisms of power function through 'the production of effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge,. . .power, when it is exercised through these subtle mechanisms, cannot but evolve, organize and put into circulation a knowledge, or rather apparatus of knowledge'.j2 In brief, power is a relational phenomenon of domination and subjugation that operates on the most local and concrete level of society, and within knowledge or truth discourses. Truth legitimizes power or, put differently, power is in the hands of those who define truth. Texts and discursive practices are thus powerful tools. Politics has become a discourse of truth in which numerous opinions operate, rather than just those of the few appointed members of the legislature. Who among the participants in this discourse are marginalized? or, whom does the discourse serve? In other words, 'the political question.. .is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology; it is truth itself.33 It is the question ofhow power works at the most local and concrete level; not so much at the legal level, but there
29. 30.
Foucault, Power/Knowledge, supra note 23, at I 21. Ibid., at 1 0 2 , 187. 3 I. Ibid., at97-8:'[It]wouldbetheexact opposite ofHobbes'projectinLeviathan,andofthat,Ibelieve,ofalljurists for whom the problem is the distillation of a single will - or rather, the constitution of a unitary, singular body animated by the spirit of sovereignty -from the particular wills of a multiplicity of individuals.Think of the schema of Leviathan: insofar as he is a fabricated man, Leviathan is no other than the amalgamation of a certain number of separate individualities, who find themselves reunited by the complex of elements that go to compose the State, but at the heart of the State, or rather, at its head, there exists somethingwhich constitutes it as such, and this is sovereignty, which Hobbes says is precisely the spirit of Leviathan.' 32. Ibid., at 101-2 (emphasis added). 33. Ibid., at 133 (emphasis added).
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where the state connects with the existing cluster of relations, where power is also 'productive' and 'hold[s]good'. Thanks to this productive nature of power, Foucault is able to explain how man comes about, how powerlknowledge regimes constitute subjects through subjection at themost concrete andactual level: 'how it is thatsubjectsaregradually,progressively, really and materially constitutedthrougha multiplicity of organisms, forces,energies, materials, desires, thoughts e t ~ . ' 3With ~ the proposition that the human subject is a product of power, Foucault identifies the individual subject as the locus of a fragmentary, incoherent self, constituted by the forces of power. The individual is no longer the prime mover: the constructed self has replaced the constituted subject. Evidently, this paradigm shift has radical implications. It means the 'end of the subject' in its modem identity of creator (of meaning and the finder of truth). In rejecting the subject-dependent concept of power, Foucault envisions politics without an identifiable subject to direct the political process: between action and reaction, politics develops discursively and the only direction it takes is from the objective it is intended to serve. However, faced with the practical political side of his end-of-the-subjectargument, Foucault recognized that 'Flere you can't escape the question of the subject, or rather the subjects, certainly, and this is what is preoccupying me'.35 Foucault shaped a hypothesis starting from the following question: if power is not sovereign power, who then participates in the struggle for it? He suggested that the struggle for power was a struggle of 'all against all'. In his view, there are no 'immediately given subjects of the struggle', for example the proletariat on the one hand and the bourgeoisie on the other.'We allfighteachother.Andthereisalways withineachofus somethingthat fights something el~e.'3~ Ultimately, the individual is a fragmented unit composed of 'sub-individuals', which is radically different from the coherent subject envisaged by modernism. In short, Foucault considered the human body to be 'the locus of a dissociated Self, which 'adopts the illusion of a substantial unity'.j7 In addition, we are all destined to fight each other and ourselves. And so, without the constituent subject, the world is ready to come apart. As such, the loss of human subjectivity is indeed the end of humanism, both It is the loss of the self as a stable epistemologically and morally - p0liticall~.3~ and coherent entity. Man's incoherence is applauded, rather than responded to by a philosophy that would enable man to re-establish a sense of wholeness by determining or finding 'meaning'. Contrary to the modernist project, which aimed to allay (but not deny) human anxiety, postmodernism celebrates the uncertainties and contingencies of life. 34. Ibid, at 97-8 (emphasis added). Ibid., at 207 (emphasis added). 36. Ibid., at 208 (emphasis added). 37. Foucault, Orderof Things, supranote 23, at 366. 38. It opposes, for example, the subject idea of existentialism, which considered the individual human subject the only entity capable of willing, of bearing responsibility,and creating meaning. It also considered it to be the only possible foundation in our quest for knowledge and in the moulding of history and building of progress.However, it is also true that Same through his brand of humanism ended up supporting Stalin and defending the Gulags. 35.
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But serious questions naturally emerge:if an individual is an effect of power, does this mean that we are never powerful andable to act?There is debate among scholars as to whether Foucault's rejection of subject was indeedarejection of agency. The two are related, but not identical, concepts. However, if the subject is merely a function of relational structures of power/knowledge, as a general consequence it must be that all agency is determined by its context, and no autonomous subject and agency can exist. For those concerned with ethical and legal questions, this is inconceivable. But how can we retain the human subject as an agent capable of evaluation and of ethical andlegitimate choices, notwithstanding this influential theoretical context? Who or what should bear responsibility in the postmodern world where man has ceased to exist -power relations or linguistic structures? Or, put differently,ifwe live in an age without a human subject, what implications does this have for individual and collective responsibility? It is with the questions of capacity and responsibility that we turn to Ricoeur's alternative.39
3. MEETING THE POSTMODERNIST CHALLENGE: PAULRICOEUR'S 'HERMENEUTICS OF THE SELF' With his 'hermeneutics of the Self, Paul Ricoeur engages with Foucault's critique of the subject and in particular with his attack on man's coherent identity. Ricoeur's objective - to defend and save the subject as the self-constituting Self is ambitious. That the individual is at least partly constructed by society, or social structures (language and power regimes), seems undeniable. And yet, even though man cannot constitute her- or himself independently from social regimes, according to Ricoeur there are moments or events in which man manifests his or her autonomy and coherence as a subject with agency. Ricoeur meets Foucault's contention concerning the subject with a combination of epistemological respect and normative di~agreement.4~ For some time, it was fashionable to consider Ricoeur as 'just another' philosophy professor, but today scholars increasingly value his work differently?' Nonetheless, the writings of Paul Ricoeur are unknown territory for 39. See,for anothersignificant defence of the notion of the subject in response to Foucault's theory of power and theendofman.].Habermas.'AnAlternativeWay out of the Philosophy ofthesubject Communicative versus at 589-616 Subject-Centred Reason'(1987). rn L Cahoone (ed.). From Modernism ro Posrmodrrn~sm(aoo~). 40. Ricoeur clearly distinguishes between structuralism as a method of text analysis and structuralism as a philosophy. Structuralism in the first sense perceives text autonomously: the text is taken as an objective thing. '[it] escapes its author and signifies for itself. Ricoeur accepts the structural analysis as a 'stage' in his reasoning, but rejects the philosophical conclusion subsequently drawn on the basis of this practice, i.e. that 'the subject is eliminated from its position as the author of discourse'. Foucault's 'idea that man is a recent invention seems to [Ricoeur]sheer invention'. P. Ricoeur, Critiqueand Conviction (1998), 77-9. 41. His has indeed been a 'reconnaissance tardive', since recognition of his theory took well into the 1980s to become firmly established. EMartel.'Levoyage philosophique de PaulRicoeuf. (1997) 357 Magazinelittiraire. The philosopher Charles Taylor has confirmed the importance of Ricoeur's contribution to the debate. C. Taylor, 'Une philosophie sans frontikres', (2000) 390 Magazine LittCraire, Dossier: Paul Ricoeur, morale, histoire, religion: une philosophie de l'existence, at 3-1. Ricoeur acknowledges the strong influence Taylor has had on his own work on ethics. Ricoeur, supra note 8, at xiv. It is suggested that Ricoeufs Protestantism is partly to blame for the fact that recognition came to him relatively late, although he has always 'insisted on a strrct separation between philosophy and farth' There IS no doubt that t h ~ rehgious s orientatron 1s a srenificant Dart of the exolanation for the lone ~ e n o dof neglect of hrs work In France' G Guttrne, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century zoo^), 364-5.
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most international law scholars. Meanwhile, his phenomenology of the capable self offers us a much needed way of engaging with the critique of the subject and, ultimately, of saving the (individual and collective) Self as an agent - as a capable and responsible subject. As such it may serve as an anthropological grounding for the new theory of the legal subject proposed below. Ricoeur's 'hermeneutics of the Self offers an alternative -andintuitively it seems a more accurate - understanding of the subject. He distinguishes two basic attitudes towards the problematic of the Self: one of 'overevaluation' and one of 'underevaluation' of the Self. He refers to the first as 'the exalted cogito' as first presented by Descartes and to the second as'the shatteredcogito'ofNietzsche42-or, in theversion of Foucault: the fragmented, contingent Self. Ricoeur's 'hermeneutics of the Self is a philosophy of the subject that neither 'exalts'not 'humiliates' the subject, but which discerns the 'acting and suffering' subject and trusts the reliability of its 'attestation' beyond suspicion.43 It is true that man's inner world is as much an interpretation as the outer world, yet rather than seeing Nietzsche's anti-cogito as the inverse of the Cartesian cogito, and accepting its prevalence, Ricoeur regarded the anti-cogito as a sign of 'the destruction of the very question to which the cogito was held to give an absolute answer.'44 The real question which the Self is held to answer is the question of the good life, and not the question of the ultimate foundation of knowledge. Indeed, it is in living a good life that the Self constitutes itself in relations with others. In Oneselfas Another, the Self is posited indirectly as it appears in four modes or dimensions of identity, as (i) a speaker who uttered a remark; as (ii) the agent on whom an action depends and who thus manifests his power-to-do; as (iii) the narrator who recounts his life; and as (iv) the self who is imputable and responsible. This manifestation occurs through self-identificationwhen the Self is called on to answer to the question of 'who? which Ricoeur poses in four different ways; in answering, the Self attests to its capacities and recognizes itself reflexively. Let me be more concrete. Ricoeur recognizes that the Self is dependent on its social context and grounds the capable subject on reflexivity and otherness. He demonstrates that 'The selfis implied reflexively in the operations (e.g. speaking or acting), the analysis of which precedes the return towards this ~elf.'~5 In other words, the Self manifests itself when speaking and acting, because the act of speech and the act of acting refer to the Self reflexively as the speaker or actor. To make this self-identification apparent, Ricoeur uses the 'detour' of four questions of 'who?: who is speaking? who is acting? who is The first Cartesian cogito refers to the modem tradition in philosophy that tries to find in the subject an absolute foundation of knowledge. With the image of the shattered cogito, Ricoeur characterized the tradition which turned against this positioning of the 'I' as a valid foundation for knowledge, because this view ignored the fact that in order to be able to doubt, think, and self-reflect the cogito needs the mediation of language. Since the use of language is not something literal, non-figurative, neutral, or truthful in itself, there is no language that is completely free ofdeceit, nolanguage that is not somehow suspect, and therefore any foundational claim of the cogito to certainty has to be rejected. Ricoeur, supra note 5, at 4 et seq. 43. Ibid., at 18-22. 44. Ibid., at 14. '[Tlhe three major features of the hermeneutics of the Self [are]. . . the detour of reflection by way of analysis, the dialectic of selfhood and sameness, and finally the dialectic of selfhood and otherness'. Ibid. at 16. 45. Ibid., at 18 (emphasis added). 42.
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narrating her or his life story? and, finally,who takes responsibility for these actions or events?46Each question asks for identification. With every answer - 'I am1- selfidentification and self-assertion occur. Every assertion, 'I am speaking', 'I can make something happen (intentionally)', 'I am narrating myself', 'I am holding myself accountable', constitutes a true foundation through identifi,cation by selfdesignation, always in relation to others. I speak to someone, someone ascribes an action to me as an agent,47 I talk narratively about myself with someone. By answering these questions,not only do we identify ourselves,we also attest to our capacities-we can speak, act, narrate, hold ourselves responsible for a bad or prohibited action, and in other words we can determine action as good and obligatory. I will come later to the social form of human capacities (i.e. the capacities as claimed by coIlectivities and submitted to public evaluation and approval - action in common, or agency), in particular to the capacity of narrating and taking responsibility, and concentrate here on human capacities in their individual form. In answer to the first two questions - who is speaking? and who is acting? - the Self identifies itself and attests to its capacity to speak and its power to act. 'I am' thus confirms the human subject as capable of speaking and acting. The self designates himself as agent by actions and speech acts. The subject is thus posited in an indirect manner through detours of analysis (by way of analytic philosophy and philosophy of action and of language) which bring out the way in which the Self is implied reflexively in these operations. Here, we concentrate on the stage beyond self-identification (as self-designation) when our personal identity appears. Ricoeur describes our personal identity as an identity which may be constituted from contingent elements (remember Foucault), yet these elements are united or 'emplotted' in the narrative of our lives. The narrative identity of the Self then becomes manifest in the capacity to narrate one's life story or to recount events experienced in relation to the world.48Ricoeur explains how we attest to this capacity when we answer to the third of the questions identified above: 'who is narrating? The subsequent identification of the Self by selfdesignation attests to the human capacity to recount and interpret life - its events, encounters, and its coherence which exist in spite of its contingency. It clearly brings to light the hermeneutic character of the Self. In the narrative identity of the Self, Ricoeur reconciles our identity-idem(our sameness of body and character, our stability illustrated by our genetic code) and our identity-ipse(selfhood,the adjustable part of our personality):49 Through our narrative identity our personal identity, 'which In the nine studies in OneselfasAnother, Ricoeur examines all four questions extensively. The first two studies are exercises in the philosophy of language (semantics and pragmatics) and deal with the question, 'who is speaking? As speaking is actually the performance of the act of speech, the subsequent two studies in action theory on the question'who is acting? are also closely re1ated:'by implication speakers are themselves actors'. Ibid., at 17. 47. Ascription or attribution to a person is part of the meaning of intentional action. See P. Ricoeur, The Course ofRecognition, trans. D. Pellauer (~oos),at 98. 48. Ricoeur, supra note 5, at 147-8. 49. Identity-idem and identity-ipse accord with one another dialectically. The first cannot be thought through without considering thesecond,but they may over1ap.Ricoeurintroducesthe notion of'acquiredident$cations by which the other enters into the composition of the same. To a large extent, in fact, the identity of a person or a community is made up of these identifications with values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes, in which the person or the community recognizes itself. Recognizing oneself in contributes to recognizing oneself by.
46.
41
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IANNE E. N I l M A N
can be articulated only in the temporal dimension of human existence',so endures throughout our lives; it accommodates both the permanence and the change of personal identity. It 'mediates' between selfhood as sameness in time and space (as 'uninterrupted continuity' or 'permanence in time') and selfhood as 'discontinuity and instability' enables the Self to discover something new and to change. In other words, the Self of our narrative is not the same as the character of the identity-idem, but it emerges from the interaction of the identity-idemwith the world, and from the way in which we recount that interaction. Personal identity is lost if selfhood is no longer upheld by sameness - that is, if selfhood loses its 'corporeal anchoring in the world'. The narrative identity gives a locus to both the permanent and the changing identity in this dialectic of the Self (ipseity). The character of these narratives,5' the narrative Self, evaluates its life and reflects on those events and actions that invite a favourable or unfavourable judgement. Narrating counts on a listening ear. It occurs mostly in dialogue with others as well as with oneself as another. The narrative identity of the Self attests to the capacity to describe and evaluate one's actions and life events and account for them to others. In other words, it implies in its structure mediation between description and prescription: 'there is no ethically neutral narrative'.S2 Ethical and moral reflection leads us naturally to the next mode of the identity of the subject. This fourth mode of identity - the ethical and moral identity of the Self - thus has narrative identity as a prerequisite. Like our other identities, our ethical-moral identity manifests itself in relations with ourselves, with the more intimate Other (the 'you' of the interpersonal), and with the third person or distant Other. This last relation, of the Self with the distant Other, requires mediation by institutions and occurs on different scales, for example, nationally but also internationally53 The fourth question in the quest for the capable human subject - 'who takes responsibility for these actions and accepts moral imputation? -enables the Self to identify itself as an ethical and moral being. It has the capacity to take responsibility for its past actions, to repair a bad or illegal act, and to take responsibility for action which is needed in The identification with heroic figures clearly displays this otherness as one's own, but thisis already latent in the identification with values which make us place a'cause" above our own survival'. Ibid., at I 21 (emphasis in original). 50. Ricoeur, supra note 5, at I 14. 51. The character of a narrative or life story is the character of what Ricoeur terms 'emplotment'. With this notion, he engages with the (postmodern) theme of the total contingency of life and the Self, the absence of any kind of unity and the resulting loss of meaning. In Ricoeur's view, the discontinuity and instability of selfhood does not mean that contingency is all there is. By the notion of emplotment he offers a narrative conception of the connectedness of life. By the Self's emplotment, i.e. by the configuration of events into a narrative, an event is transformed into a meaningful part of the narrative. The actions in the plot and its characters are necessarily related in the narrative, as predicates and actions are attributed to persons and 'the contingency of an event contributes to the necessity, retroactive so to speak, of the history of a life, to which is equated the identity of the character'. Ibid., at 142-7. 52. Ibid., at 1x5. 53. See supra note 7. An 'institution' is the structure that mediates living together associated with others in a (historical) community, such as a people or a nation or a region even, and which constitutes the social bond. We mentioned law as such a mediating structure and the political institution which constitutes the social bond of the polis is the most encompassing of social institutions as it creates the space in which all other institutions (such as economic, religious, and juridical institutions) can operate.Through the political institution called date citizens exercise their capacities in concert as 'power-in-common'. R'icoeur, supra note 5. at 196-7.
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the future. Hence the identification of the subject as the 'Self of responsibility' is the constitution of the subject capable of pursuing good (ethics) and respecting obligation (morality). The identification of the subject of imputation and responsibility by stating 'Here I am!' in a testimony attests most clearly to the Self. This is the Self that springs into action from a position of befuddlement over the multiplicity of practical possibilities induced by the modern anxiety of 'everything is possible, but what am I to do? into self-attestation: 'here is where I stand.' It is in response to the Other who counts on the Self, that the Self becomes one. In responding, ethically or morally, to the world one attests to oneself:Often this response holds a promise to be there or to act when necessary in the future. By its capacity to make and keep promises the Self (ipseity) distinguishes itself from its identity as sameness (idem). In other words, promise-making lays bare 'self-~onstancy':5~ I promised you, you can count on me, 'well, here I am'. Promising to be there for someone is paradigmatic of being oneself even when time has passed, it is a paradigmatic example of ipseity, and the other is essential for this event. The capacity to recognize one's responsibility as discerned in Oneselfas Another gets a more explicit role in The Course ofRecognition, in which Ricoeur develops the shift from imputability to responsibility. Here, the relationship with otherness evolves from a negative to positive one. In the scheme of Ricoeur, imputability refers to a negative relationship with the Other - that is, one has wronged the other and can be imputed in terms of this misrecognition of the other. Responsibility, on the other hand, refers to a positive relationship - that is, one feels responsible for the well-being of others. As such, this phenomenological shift from imputability to responsibility 'opens new horizons'beyond the reduction in the sphere of otherness to include responsibilities beyond the knowable or foreseeable effects of an action towards a more ethical and moral notion of recognizing one's responsibility for other persons:55 As a result of this change in emphasis, the idea of vulnerable others tends to replace that of damage done as the object of responsibility.. . . It is for the other who is in my charge that I am responsible.This expansion makes what is vulnerable or fragile,as an entity assigned to the agent's care, the ultimate object of his re~ponsibility.5~ Of course, our responsibility is not unlimited -if only because that would lead to indifference. Logically, the scope of our responsibility is determined by the extent of our power to do good and right. Likewise our capacity to do harm (and thus For the attestation of the ethical identity of the Self, the notion of 'self-constancy' is important. It gives permanence in time, independent of sameness and in spite of diversity and change. How can other people depend on us if we are not stable, coherent subjects? How can we trust the value of a contract if the subject changes? Ricoeur did not see the sameness of the body and character as the only expression of the continued self.He also identified'keeping one's word' as an expression of this permanence in time, and yet this does not overlap with the self's sameness. Keeping one's word challenges time and as such it has permanence in time, even though it is independent of the permanence of character. It involves the selfhood of the Self as a 'polar opposite' 6 the permanence of character, since it is not inscribed in the Self as sameness, but simply relates to the 'who? who has given his word. T o keep one's word'expresses 'self-constancy'by 'the faithfulness to a word' and indicates the ethical attitude of being accountable to the Other to whom the promise was given; it signifies honouring the trust that the Other has placed in your faithfulness. 55. Ricoeur, supra note 45. at 108. 56. Ibid.
54.
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our responsibility) is limited by spatial and temporal proximity57 In brief, being there for someone, as well as taking a stand on an issue in the face of multiple ethical alternatives, is the answer to the problem of the Self: the personal testimony (thoignage) of justice,s8 of aiming for the good life (part of which is the will to live with just institutions, as will be argued below). In answer to Foucault's fragmented, contingent Self, Ricoeur posits the Self as an atopos where nonetheless unity becomes evident once it is confronted with the Other - especially in situations of uncertainty, danger, or conflict which challenge the Self, who then acts upon his desire to do good. The expressions of the good and the just present a coherent and firm image of the Self: 'this is me' - 'here I am'. The Self which posits ethical and moral identity transcends the narrated (or constructed) Self. It is here that the self-identification of the capable subject findsits strongest case, according to Ricoeur: 'The autonomy of the self will appear then to be tightly bound up with solicitude for one's neighbor and with justice for each individuaL'59 Justice is to the life of the subject in social and political institutions what friendship or solicitude is to the subject's relations at the interpersonal level; they both represent the desire for the good life. The Self that is attested to in this way is not an ultimate foundation. But neither is it in a state of disintegration to the extent that no trace of certainty or unity remains. The unity that emerges from Ricoeur's studies is the thematic unity of human action - thus the certainty offered by the 'hermeneutics of the Self is not ab~olute.~" However, unlike the perspective of the anti-cogito, the prismlstarting point of attestation or 'testimony' at least provides the 'certainty' of trust. It saves the Self by placing 'trust' in the 'reliabi[lity]' of the attestation to the Self. Ricoeur thus arrives at a definition of attestation as 'the assurance of being oneself acting and s~fiering'.~'By the notion of attestation Ricoeur offers an alternative to the contemporary negation of man's future by pointing to the power of trust, or 'trust in the power to say [and] do', and hence in the power to act well and justly.62 We may say that the hermeneutic certainty of attestation is the 'ultimate recourse' in the face of announcements on the disappearing Self. While Foucault depicts the human subject as a product of historical and social influences and as the mere locus of these inter- and counteracting (power) forces, Ricoeur defends a subject that may, true to say, at times be divided and oscillating dialectically or lacking a centre, but that nevertheless attests to its coherence by narrating its own life story and, above all, by acting ethically, morally, and politically. Unfolding the modes or levels of identity of the subject, Ricoeur locates the
Ibid., at log. Which is - according to Ricoeur - the answer to the real question of the Self. See supra, text subsequent to note 43. Ricoeur, supra note 5, at 18 (emphasis in original). Oneselfas Anotheris set up as a series of studies of the problematic of the Self which make different analytical philosophical detours; the unity of these studies is their focus on human action: the ability to act is defining of man's humanity, and human action is treated as 'a fundamental mode of being'. When we ask, what sort of being is the Self? Ricoeur answers in terms of being as act and potentiality. Ricoeur, supra note 5, at 2 2 (emphasis in original). Ibid., at 22-3.
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ethical-moral dimension of the self and - as we shall see below - offers us a point of departure for the contours of a reconceptualization of (international) legal personality.
4. FROMTHE 'HERMENEUTICS OF THE SELF'TO THE SUBJECT OF JUSTICE OR LEGAL PERSONALITY Contrary to our discipline's customary approach, in this paper reflection on international legal personality does not take as a starting point the visibility of the actor in the eyes of the law - that is, where the law designates entities as legal subjects. In contrast, it starts at the base (as Foucault in a way suggested) in order to understand and explain how (international) legal personality emerges at a specific level of identity construction in the dialogical relation between the Self and the distant Other mediated by social institutions such as law. In other words, (international) legal personality can be reconceptualized as man's ethical -moral identity in relation to institutional otherness on a national as well as cosmopolitan scale. By taking ethical-moral account of one's actions in relation to third persons, one recognizes life in a political society and its legal system. We constitute our legal personality when we constitute our ethical-moral identity specifically in relation to 'distant' third persons (i.e. not in relation to ourselves or in inter-person relations) throughone of the mediating social institutions- in casulaw. It follows that legal personality or subjectivity is a continuation of, and inseparable from, the Self's ethical and moral identity. Hence the concept of the subject of ethico-juridical imputation and responsibility builds on the idea or reality of the capable human being.63 But what does it mean to act ethically and morally - hence, in conformity with what is 'good' and 'obligatory' - in relation to people outside one's personal sphere? Evidently,what this means depends on the relationship in which the Self is involved: with oneself (as another), with the near Other, or with the distant Other, that is one's fellow citizens.64 Each of these relations has a teleological and a deontological a~pect.~s Ricoeur defines the desire to live a 'good' life for all three relationships: 63.
'[Tlhere is a bond of mutual implication between self-esteem and the ethical evaluation of those of our actions that aim at the "good life" (in Aristotle's sense), just as there is a bond between self-respect and the moral evaluation of these actions, submitted to the test of the universalization of our maxlms of action (in the Kantian sense). Taken together, self-esteem and self-respect define the ethical and moral dimension of selfhood, to the extent that they characterize human beings as subjects of ethico-juridical imputation.' Ricoeur, supra note 8, at 4. 64. The following chart emerges: from left to right we have oneself, near other, and distant other, and from bottom to top the good, the obligatory and the practically wise. At the lowest level of the cha#, ethics have primacy over morality; from this Ricoeur derives 'the necessity for the ethical aim to pass through the sieve of the norm', and 'the legitimacy of recourse by the norm to the aim whenever the norm leads to impasses in practice'. 65. Ricoeur distinguishes between ethics which is teleologically oriented (actions which aim for the good life) -and morality - which is deontologically oriented, i.e. the realm of moral norms which are more universal and which may restrain human action. Ethics and morality are distinguished - human action as aiming for the good life or as focused on conforming to moral obligations. Like Aristotle, Ricoeur holds that human action is always aimed at something good and ultimately at the Good (Telos).But aiming for the good is not enough; human action should be submitted to morality - to norms which claim universality. Ricoeur proposes to establish '(I) the primacy of ethics over morality, (2) the necessity for the ethical aim to pass through thesieve of the norm, and(3) the legitimacy ofrecourse by the norm to the aim whenever the norm
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for the first the desire is for personal fulfilment; for the relationship with the 'near Other' the desire is for reciprocity in friendship; and with the 'distant Other' the desire is a fulfilled life in and with others in justinstitutions. We should not 'forget', Ricoeur underscores, that all in all the desire 'to live well with and for others in just institutions' is the foundation of moral and legal duties, rather than the fiction of the social contract.66In other words, just like the appearance of subjectivity in a general sense, the emergence of legal subjectivity requires otherness, that is 'institutional otherness'. The transition from the capable subject to thelegal subject (or the 'subject of real rights') requires the relation to the third person: Only therelation to the third,situatedinthebackgroundoftherelationto the you,gives us a basis for the institutional mediation reauired bv the constitution of a real subiect of rights - in other words, of a citizen. This double necessity - that of the mediation by otherness in general and that of the distinction between the other as a 'you' and the other as a third party - can be established on the plane of fundamental anthropology to which we appealed in order to elaborate the notion of capable Thus it is i n its relationship with 'the institutional other' that the Self appears as a legal person. Institutional otherness contributes to the construction of legal personality, and legal personality, i n turn, preserves the relationship between 'what is good' and 'what is just'. The good is prevented from being cut off from the legal; a purely procedural foundation for justice is forestalled as the teleological roots of justice are secured. The political order encompasses all other institutions of society. Citizenship as conceived here -the subject of law - is thus (re)constituted by the social bond by which the subject has rights but also 'the intrinsic obligation to participate in the burdens related to perfecting the social bond'.68 Citizenship -being a subject of law as justic