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L First: Edit:ion
Professor o f Public International La'H/;, L.Tniversity o f Bristol
1?R.E S ~r------------------
I
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i I t (.
____". __~~...__. . _. .
OXFORD
OUTLINE CONTENTS
UNIVERSITY PRESS
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford oX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kqng Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Sao Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Editorial material and arrangement Malcolm D. Evans 2003
INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN PRACTICE REFLECTIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
3
HE Judge Rosalyn Higgins, DBE, QC THE PINOCHET CASE-SOME PERSONAL REFLECTIONS
7
The Rt Han The Lord Millett THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW -FROM THE BAR
11
Ian Brownlie, CBE, QC
© Individual chapters-the several contributors 2003
The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published2003 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics-rights organizations. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above
REFLECTIONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
15
Campbell McLachlan A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
21
Ralph Zacklin, Assistant Secretary-General, United Nations THE PERSPECTIVE OF A FOREIGN MINISTRY LEGAL ADVISER
25
Michael Wood
You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on anyacquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available ISBN 0-19-925114-2
PART I THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
Typeset in Adobe Minion by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk Printed in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall
A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
31
Stephen C Neff 2 SOME COMMON HERESIES ABOUT INTERNATIONAL LAW: SUNDRY THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
59
lain Scobbie 3 WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR?
89
Martti Koskenniemi
PART II THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION 4 THE SOVRCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Hugh Thirlway
117
vi, .
OUTLINE CONTENTS
5 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 'RELATIVE NORMATIVITY'
OUTLINE CONTENTS
145
Dinah Shelton
15 ISSUES OF ADMISSIBILITY AND THE LAW ON INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
vii
473
Phoebe Okowa 6 THE PRACTICAL WORKING OF THE LAW OF TREATIES
173
Malgosia Fitzmaurice
PART VI RESPONDING TO BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
PART III THE SUBJECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
16 COUNTERMEASURES AND SANCTIONS
505
ND White and A Abass 7 STATES AND RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
205
Colin Warbrick
17 THE MEANING OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
529
John Merrills 8 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
269
DapoAkande
18 THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
9 THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
299
559
Hugh Thirlway
Robert McCorquodale 19 THE USE OF FORCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
589
Christine Gray
PART IV 'THE SCOPE OF SOVEREIGNTY 10 JURISDICTION
329
PART VII THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Vaughan Lowe 20 THE LAW OF THE SEA JURISDICTION BY NATIONAL COURTS OF STATES
623
Malcolm D Evans
11 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RESTRAINTS ON THE EXERCISE OF
357
Hazel Fox
21 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
657
Catherine Redgwell 12 IMMUNITIES ENJOYED BY OFFICIALS OF STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
387
23 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
13 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW
22 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
689
Gerhard Loibl
. Chanaka Wickremasinghe
415
721
Antonio Cassese
Eileen Denza 24 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Henry J Steiner 25 THE LAW OF WAR (INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW)
PART V RESPONSIBILITY 14 THE NATURE AND FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
James Crawford and Simon Olleson
Christopher Greenwood 445
757
789
CONTENTS
v
CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 'BY THE EDITOR NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS ABBREVIATIONS TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL CASES TABLE OF STATUTES BY COUNTRY TABLE OF DOMESTIC CASE LAW BY COUNTRY
xxvi xxviii xxxiii xxxix xlvi xlix 1
3
7
The Rt Hon The Lord Millett THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE BAR
The Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries (1919-
50
A
50 52
The Inter-war Period After 1945
56
References
56
Further Reading
58
Summary
59
I
Introduction: Theory Matters
60
II
What is a
61
III
The Legal Structure of the Cold War: Liberal Democracy Versus Marxist-Leninism
67
A
The New Haven School
68
B C
Soviet Theory New Haven and Soviet Approaches Compared
76
15 IV 21
Ralph Zacklin, Assistant Secretary-General United Nations 25
59
lain Scobbie
11
Campbell McLachlan
THE PERSPECTIVE OF A FOREIGN MINISTRY LEGAL ADVISER
41 46 47
The Positivist Tradition Natural-law Remnants The Historicist (or
VII Conclusion
REFLECTIONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
A B 'C
B
Ian Brownlie, CBE, QC
LITIGATION
41
SUNDRY THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
HE Judge Rosalyn Higgins, DBE, QC THE PINOCHET CASE-SOME PERSONAL REFLECTIONS
The Nineteenth Century (1815-1919)
2 SOME COMMON HERESIES ABOUT INTERNATIONAL LAW:
INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN PRACTICE REFLECTIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
VI
ix
V
72
New Order For a New World?
78
And in the End
82
References
83
Further Reading
86
Michael Wood 3 WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR?
89
Martti Koskenniemi PART I
THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Summary The Paradox of Objectives
89
II
Converging Interests?
91
31
Stephen C Neff
89
Summary
31
III
The Significance of Statehoo,d
94
I
Introduction
31
IV
Into Pragmatism?
97
II
Ancient Worlds
32
V
A Tradition of Anti-Formalism
100
III
The Middle Ages: The Natural Law Era
34
VI
IV
The Classical Age (1600-1815)
37
Instrumentalism, Formalism, and the Production of an International Political Community
103
x
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
xi
105
B
Hierarchy Among Treaties Governing the Same Topic
163
VIII Between Hegemony and Fragmentation: A Mini-history
108
C
Hierarchy Among Regimes
164
IX
110
IV
'Soft Law'
166
112
V
Conclusion
17l
VII Beyond Instrumentalism and Formalism
Legal Formalism and International Justice
References
PART II
THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION
4 THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
117
Hugh Thirlway
References
171
Further Reading
172
6 THE PRACTICAL WORKING OF THE LAW OF TREATIES Malgosia Fitzmaurice
173
Summary
173
Summary
117
I
Introduction
173
I
Introduction: What are Sources of Law?
117
II
Basic Concepts and Structures
174
II
The Enumeration of the Traditional Sources of International Law: Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
120
A
Treaties and Conventions in Force
121
B
Custom
124
A
The Making of Treaties
177
C
The General Principles of Law
130
B
Authority to Conclude Treaties
177
D
Subsidiary Sources: Judicial Decisions and Teachings
132
C
Expression of Consent to be Bound
178
III
IV
V
III
174
The Vienna Conventions
175
The Anatomy of a Treaty
177
134
D
Invalidity of Treaties
180
A
Relationship Between Treaty and Custom
134
E
Amendment and Modification
181
B
The Hierarchy of Sources
136
F
Termination and Suspension of the Operation of Treaties
182
Is the Enumeration of Article 38 Exhaustive? Possible New or Additional Sources
IV 138
A
How Can New Sources Come into Existence?
138
B
Some Additional Sources or Quasi-Sources That Have Been Suggested
139
Conclusion
Further Reading
143
5 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 'RELATIVE NORMATIVITY'
V
142 143
145
Dinah Shelton Summary·
III
What is a Treaty?
B
The Relationship Between the Sources of International Law
References
II
A
145
Introduction: The Concept of Relative Normativity
145
The Assertion of Peremptory Norms
150
Hierarchy Among Conflicting Norms and Procedures
159
A
160
Hierarchy Within a Single Treaty
VI
The Scope of Legal Obligations
183
A
The Principle Pacta Sunt Servanda .
183
B
Treaties and Third States
184
General Principles of Interpretation
185
A
General Issues
185
B
Practice
186
C
.Travaux Preparatoires
188
D
The Object and Purpose of a Treaty
189
E
The Principle of Effectiveness
189
F
Plurilingual Treaties
190
Reservations to Treaties A B C D
The Genocide Convention Case The Regime of the 1969 Vienna Convention The Problem of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties Interpretative Declarations
191 191 192 194 195
xii
CONTENTS
VII Problems Concerning the Grounds for Termination
CONTENTS
196
A
Material Breach
196
B
Supervening Impossibility of Performance Fundamental Change of Circumstances
198 198
C
8 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DapoAkande
xiii 269
Summary
269
I
269
Introduction
VIII Conclusion
200
A
History and Role of International Organizations
270
References
200
B
Definition, Distinctions, and Differences
270
Further Reading
201
C
Is there a Common Law of International Organizations?
271
II
Legal Personality A
PART III
THE SUBJECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
7 STATES AND RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW Colin Warbrick
205
Summary
205
I
206
States
III
IV
270
B
Objective Legal Personality and Relations with Non-member States
275
C
Personality in Domestic Law
276
Interpretation of Constituent Instruments
278
A
Who is Empowered to Interpret?
278
B
What are the Relevant Principles of Interpretation to be Applied?
280
Powers of International Organizations
282
A
Introduction
206
B
History
210
A
Implied Powers
282
Decision-making Powers
283
Ultra Vires Decisions of International Organizations
285
C
Self-determination
213
B
D
Personality-What it means to be a Legal Person
217
C
E
Statehood as Personality-What it takes to be a State
220
F
The Rights and Duties of States-What it means to be a State
231
A
Sources of Privileges and Immunities
286
G
The (Juridical' State Conclusion .
232
B
Scope of Privileges and Immunities
287
H II
III
Personality in International Law
272
Recognition
236 236
A
Introduction
236
B
The Tinoco Arbitration
238
C
Legal Nature, Legal Consequences of the Recognition Decision
238
D
Recognizing, Not Recognizing, Non-recognition
241
E
Recognition of Governments
242
F
International and Domestic Legal Consequences
247
G
The Declaratory/Constitutive Debate
248
H
International Organizations-Membership and Credentials
250
Practice-the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia After 1989
254
Constituting States-State-building
259
V
VI
Privileges and Immunities
The United Nations System
286
291
A
The Structure of the United Nations
291
B
Principal Organs of the United Nations
293
VII Conclusion
295
References
296
Further Reading
297
9 THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM Robert McCorquodale Summary
299 299 299
261
Introduction
References
262
A
The Individual
300
Further Reading
266
B
Individuals in the International Legal System
300
Conclusion
xiv
CONTENTS
II
III
IV
V
International Rights and Responsibilities
CONTENTS
304
IV
Individual Rights
304
References
354
B
Individual Responsibility
306
Further Reading
354
International Claims
307
A
Bringing International Claims
307
B
International Human Rights Law
309
C
International Economic Law
311
D
Immunities
314
Creation, Development, and Enforcement of International Law
314
11 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RESTRAINTS ON THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION BY NATIONAL COURTS OF STATES
357
Hazel Fox. Summary
357
I
Introduction
357
II
State Immunity
359
A
Right of Self-Determination
315
B
Indigenous Peoples
316
A
Origins of the Plea of State Immunity
359
B
Development of the Common Law Relating to State Immunity
359
C
Non-governmental Organizations
317
D
Jurists
320
Conclusions
321 322
Further Reading
325
III PART IV
THE SCOPE o.F SOVEREIGNTY
10 JURISDICTION Vaughan Lowe
329
C
Development in Civil Courts and the USA
361
D
Present Day Sources of the International Law of State Immunity
362
E
The Elements Constituting the Plea of State Immunity
363
F
Definition of the Foreign State for the Purpose of State Immunity
366
G
Exceptions to Adjudication Jurisdiction
366
H
Immunity from Execution
371
The Other Two Avoidance Techniques
376
A
Act of State
376
B
Non-justiciability
377
IV
The Three Avoidance Techniques Compared
378
329
V
The Arguments For and Against the Use of Avoidance Techniques
380
Introduction
329
VI
Challenges to Immunity and Judicial Restraint
381
A
The Meaning of <Jurisdiction'
329
VII Conclusion
B
The Significance of the Principles of Jurisdiction
330
'C
The Doctrinal Analysis of Jurisdiction
331
Summary
Prescriptive Jurisdiction A
III
353
A
References
II
Conclusion
XV
333
The Territorial Principle
336
B
The National Principle
'339
C
The Protective Principle
342
D
The Universal Principle
343
E
Treaty-Based Extensions of Jurisdiction
383
References
384
Further Reading
384
12 IMMUNITIES ENJOYED BY OFFICIALS OF STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
387
Chanaka Wickremasinghe Summary
387
343
I
388
II
Introduction
F
Controversial Bases of Prescriptive Jurisdiction
345
Diplomatic Relations
391
G
Inadequacies of the Traditional Approach
347
A
The Scheme of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
392
351
B
Jurisdictional Immunities
395
The Fundamental Principle Governing Enforcement Jurisdiction
XVI
CONTENTS
C
Remedies in Cases of Abuse
III
Consular Relations
IV
Heads of State, Heads of Government, and Ministers for Foreign Affairs
V VI
CONTENTS
396
E
Can a Treaty Prevail Over a National Constitutional Norm?
434
397
F
Should the Executive Direct or Guide the National Court?
434
G
Should a National Court Apply a Foreign Law which Conflicts with International Law?
436
H
Are there Questions of International Law which National Courts should Decline to Answer?
437
398
A
Heads of State
398
B
Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs
400
Special Missions
401
The Immunities of Other State Officials
403
VII Officials of International Organizations
404
VIII The Scope of Irnmunities-Immunity and Impunity Distinguished
406
IX
411
Conclusions
References Further Reading 13 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW
411 ·413
VI
Further Reading
441
PART V
Introduction
415
II
The Approach of International Courts and Tribunals
416
IV
V
A
Where National Law Causes Breach of International Law
417
B
International Law Looks Mainly to the Result
419
The Approach of National Parliaments and National Courts The Spectrum of Constitutional Rules
RESPONSIBILITY
14 THE NATURE AND FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
445
James Crawford and Simon Olleson The Scope of International Responsibility: Introduction and Overview
415
4.15
439 440
Summary
I
III
Conclusion: Elements of a Happy Relationship
References
Eileen Denza Summary
xvii
II
III
420 422
State Responsibility: Issues of Classification and Characterization
445 446 449
A
Responsibility under International or National Law?
449
B
The Typology of State Responsibility
450
The Elements of State Responsibility
453
A
Attribution of Conduct to the State
454
B
Breach of an International Obligation of the State
458
C
Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness: Defences or Excuses for Breaches of International Law
462
A
The Netherlands
422
B
Germany
423
C
France
424
D
Russia
424
E
The United States
425
F
The United Kingdom
426
References
471
428
Further Reading
471
Some Problems Which Arise in National Courts A
IV
The Content of International Responsibility
465
V
Invocation of Responsibility: Responses by the Injured State and Other States
468
VI
Conclusion: Further Development of the Law of International Responsibility?
470
Does a Rule of Customary International Law Prevail Over Conflicting National Law?
428
What is the Meaning of an International Law Rule in the Context of Domestic Law?
429
Phoebe Okowa
C
Is the International Rule Directly Applicable and Directly Effective?
430
Summary
473
D
Does a Treaty Prevail Over Inconsistent National Law?
432
I
474
B
15 ISSUES OF ADMISSIBILITY AND THE LAW ON INTERNAT,IONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Introduction
473
xviii II
III
IV
V
VI
CONTENTS
Legal Interest as a Pre-requisite to Admissibility of Claims
CONTENTS
D
474
A
Rationale of International Law Rules on Locus Standi
475
III
B
Modalities of Establishing of Legal Interest
476
IV
Economic Coercion
518
Sanctions
522
477
A
Definition of Sanctions
522
A
B
Limitations upon Sanctions
524
V
Nationality as the Basis of Legal Interest in Indirect Claims
B
Establishing Nationality for Purposes of Diplomatic Protection
477 479
C
The Nationality of Corporations
483
References
527
D
Applying the Nationality Rule
485
Further Reading
528
Admissibility in Cases Concerning Obligations Owed to a Plurality of States
488
A
Introduction
488
B
Treaty Instruments Protecting Collective Interests
490
C
Litigation in the Public Interest and the Enforcement of Erga Omnes Obligations
490
Admissibility of Claims and the Rule on Exhaustion of Local Remedies A B
The Content of the Rule
C
The Application of the Rule in the Context of Mixed Claims
D
Nature of the Rule
495 497
E
Which View Represents the Law?
498
F
The Exclusion of the Local Remedies Rule
Introduction
Conclusion
Conclusion
17 THE MEANS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT John Merrills I
Introduction
529
II
Diplomatic Methods
531
493
A
Negotiation
531
493 494
B
Mediation
533
C
Inquiry
535
D
Conciliation
537
III
Legal Methods
499
Arbitration The International Court of Justice
539 541
500
C
Other Courts and Tribunals
543
D
The Place of Legal Methods
544
501 IV
International Organizations and Dispute Settlement A B C D
505 505
Introduction: Self-help in International Law
505
Countermeasures
508
A
Definition of Countermeasures
B
Reprisals and Retorsion
508 510
C
Limitations upon Countermeasures and other Non-forcible Measures taken by States
539
A B
502
Summary
528 529
Further Reading
16 COUNTERMEASURES AND SANCTIONS ND White and A Abass
526
Summary
PART VI RESPONDING TO BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
L
514
The Bases of Diplomatic Protection
References
II
Countermeasures and Third States
xix
512
V
Regional Organizations The United Nations The Charter System in Practice The Value and Limitations of Organizations
Conclusion
547 547 548 550 552 553
References
554
Further Reading
557
18 THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE Hugh Thirlway
559
Summary
559
I
Introduction
559
II
History
560
xx
CONTENTS
III
CONTENTS
XXI
Structure and Composition
562
N
Procedure
564
V
The Court's Jurisdiction
566
A
Measures Under Article 41
608
A
Jurisdiction: Structural Limitations
566
B
The Use of Force Under Chapter VII UN Charter
608
B
Jurisdiction in Particular Cases
568
C
Implied Authorization of Force?
610
C
Jurisdiction and its Exercise
571
D
Verification of Jurisdiction and Admissibility: Preliminary Objections
572
VI
V
VI
The Role of the Security Council
The Use of Force Under Chapter VII UN Charter
UN Peacekeeping
610
The Inception of Peacekeeping
610
Peacekeeping After the End of the Cold War
611
574
C
The Transformation of Peacekeeping: Yugoslavia and Somalia 1991-95
612
Parties: Joinder of Cases; Intervention by Third States
576
D
Peacekeeping in Africa
613
Interpretation and Revision of Judgments
579
E
Peacekeeping After the Brahimi Report
614
VII Regional Action Under Chapter VIII UN Charter
614
A
Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures
B C
VIII Advisory Proceedings
582
The Court Past and Present: An Assessment
Further Reading
19 THE USE OF FORCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER Christine Gray
A Greater Role for Regional Organizations
B
Controversy as to the Interpretation of Chapter VIII
615
587
C
The OECS Intervention in Grenada (1983)
616
D
Regional Peacekeeping After the Cold War
616
589
VIII Conclusion
618 618 619
Summary
589
I
Introduction
589
Further Reading
A
590
The UN Charter Scheme
615
A
585
References
The Prohibition of the Use of Force in Article 2(4) UN Charter
591
A
The Use of Force in 'International Relations'
592
B
The Meaning of 'Threat or Use of Force'
592
C
The Use of Force 'Against the Territorial Integrity and Political Independence of Any State,- or in Any Other Manner Inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations'
593
Humanitarian Intervention
595
D
608
A
574
579
II
606
B
Other Incidental Proceedings
VII Effect of the Decisions of the Court
IX
G
PART VII
THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
20 THE LAW OF THE SEA Malcolm D Evans
Summary Introduction
623 623 623
Constructing Baselines
626
III
Intervention, Civil Wars, and Invitation
598
A
Introduction: The Normal Rule
626
IV
Self-defence
599
B
Straight Baselines
626
A
600
C
Bays
627
Anticipatory or Pre-emptive Self-defence
601
D
Archipelagoes
628
B
The Scope of Self-defence: Necessity and Proportionality
II
C
The Meaning of 'Armed Attack'
602
The Internal Waters, Territorial Sea, and Contiguous Zone
629
D
The Use of Force in Protection of Nationals
602
A
629
E
Self-defence Against Terrorism
603
B
Jurisdiction of the Coastal State
630
F
Collective Self-defence
605
C
Navigation in the Territorial Sea
632
III
Introduction
xxii
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
IV
V
VI
The High Seas
637
E
Conservation of Nature
677
A
The Freedoms of the Seas
637
F
Conservation of Marine Living Resources
683
B
The Exceptions to Flag State Jurisdiction
638
VIII Conclusion
685
C
Conclusion
641
References
685
Further Reading
687
Resource Jurisdiction
642
A
The Continental Shelf
642
B
The Exclusive Fishing Zone
644
(r22)INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
\....../ Gerhard Loibl
/"l ..
C
The Exclusive Economic Zone
644.
The Deep Sea Bed
646
Summary
689
Delimitation of Maritime Zones between Opposite or Adjacent States
647
I
Introduction
689
A
Equidistance or Equitable Principles?
648
II
International Finance Law
691
B
Factors Affecting Delimitation
649
A
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
691
650
B
The World Bank Group
695
C
Regional Development Banks
699
D
Concluding Remarks
699
International Trade Law
700
A B
The Basic Scheme of Regulation Managing Fisheries
650 651
VIII Conclusion
654
References
654
Further Reading
657
TIl
2~'NTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
657
C
International Commodity Agreements
708
Introduction
710
B
Definition of Investment
711
C
Bilateral Investment Treaties
712
D
Is there a Need for a Multilateral Investment Agreement?
714
E
Investment Insurance Schemes at the National Level
714
F
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
714
G
Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
716
II
Defining 'The Environment'
659
III
The Development of International Environmental Law
659
IV
Key Environmental Actors
662
V
Sources of International Environmental Law
663
A
Customary International Law
664
B
TreatyLaw
664 665 667
Protection of the Marine Environment
667
B
Protection of the Atmosphere
670
C
Nuclear Risks
674
D
Other Hazardous Substances and Activities
674
A
700
A
657
VII Substantive International Environmental Law
The World Trade Organization
657
Introduction: What is International Environmental Law?
Enforcement of International Environmental Law
B
710
I
VI
700
International Investment Law
IV
Catherine Redgwell
Summary
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)
A
.7'0--' ~
689
D
VII Fisheries
(
xxiii
V
Regional Economic Integration Arrangements
717
VI
Concluding Remarks
717
References
718
Further Reading
720
~'hNTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
L/
721
Antonio Cassese
Summary
721
xxiv
II
CONTENTS
Introduction: The Notion of International Criminal Law
721
General Features of International Criminal Law
722
The Reach of Human Rights Duties within States: Non-State (Private) Actors
776
D E
The Progressive Realization of Civil and Political Rights The State's Duty to Promote and Transform: Cultural Obstacles
777 780
722
B
The Relationship With International Human Rights and National Criminal Law
723
IV
724
References
786
726
Further Reading
786
The Relationship With Public International Law
The Establishment of International Criminal Tribunals Post-Cold War 'New World Order' and the Development of Ad Hoc Tribunals (1993-94)
726
B
The International Criminal Court
730
C
The Establishment of so-called Internationalized or Mixed Criminal Courts or Tribunals
734
Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law
735
V
Categories of International Crimes
738
A B C D
War Crimes Crimes Against Humanity Genocide Other International Crimes (Aggression, Torture, Terrorism)
Conclusion
References Further Reading
739 740 742 754 755 756
757
Henry J Steiner Summary
757
I
Introduction
757
II
The Kinds of Protection Provided by International Organizations
759
A
Why Create International Organizations?
759 762
BIGOs and NGOs C Interaction among Institutions and Systems in Exerting Pressure on Delinquent States
770
Characteristics of International Human Rights Relevant to the Nature of Protection
772
A B
Human Rights Violations Generally Occur within and Affect only People Within a Single State Human Rights Violations Often have a Systemic Character and Reflect Deep Aspects of a State's Political Structure
773 774
784
789
Christopher Greenwood Summary
789
Introduction
789
II
When Does the Law of War Apply?
791
III
Who Is Entitled to Take Part in Hostilities?
794
IV
What Is a Lawful Target and How May it Be Attacked?
797
V
What Are the Limitations on the Weapons with Which States May Conduct Hostilities?
802
A
806
744
/-\ V,NTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Conclusion: Perspectives and Voices
@THE LAW OF WAR (INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW)
IV
III
C
Recent Origins
A
VI
xxv
A
C III
CONTENTS
VI
Nuclear Weapons
What Protection Does the Law Afford the Victims of Hostilities? A B
C
Prisoners of War The Wounded and Sick Civilians
809 809 811
812
VII How Much If Any of this Law Applies in Civil War?
814
VIII How Can the Law Be Enforced?
817
References
822
. Further Reading
Index
823 825
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION International law is a rich and varied subject, bearing upon most of the great issues facing individuals and communities. This work aims to capture something of that breadth and diversity by drawing on the knowledge and experience of a broad range of contributors who are intimately engaged in its teaching and practice. It is designed to present the essential elements of the international legal system in a clear and accessible fashion, but seeks to go further, addressing a number of key questions which challenge many of the assumptions upon which the international legal system is founded. It also seeks to provide a succinct introduction to a range of topics that are subject to increasingly detailed international regulation. The work opens with a series of shorter contributions offering personal reflections upon the role and function of international law by some its leading exponents and from a variety of perspectives. Parts I-VI then consider the key building blocks of the subject whilst Part VII provides a series of introductory overviews of particular areas of contemporary interest. The structure, coverage, and level of the book are intended to reflect the requirements of undergraduate courses in public international law, although it will also be of use on general courses at the masters levels as well as being of interests to academics and practitioners. Although structured to form a coherent presentation of international law, each chapter can be read as a self-contained unit, balancing exposition with argument and reflecting the distinct perspective of its author(s). No attempt has been made to harmonize the views expressed or to produce a single 'voice'. Even if this had been possible, it would have been undesirable. As any teacher-as any lawyer-knows, opinions are best formed through exposure to competing argument. The chapters in this volume combine to address international law from a variety of perspectives: rather than one voice there is a range of voices and a range of opinions. It is to be hoped that this will be a source of stimulation, since the work as a whole aims to be more than just a compendium of knowledge. It aims to be a resource of value to all those interested in probing and testing the international legal enterprise. On a personal note, I am of course greatly indebted to all those who so readily agreed to contribute chapters to this work. I am even more indebted to them for the manner in which they fulfilled their tasks, both in terms of substance and of time. The pressures of production have borne heavily on all involved and I cannot sufficiently express my gratitude to those at the Oxford University Press for their role in nurturing this project through to completion. Indeed, its origins lie in a suggestion made to me by Michaela Coulthard, and I am immensely grateful to her for her support and encouragement in getting the project onto and off the starting blocks. That baton was then assumed by Christina White who guided me towards the last lap. Finally, Claire Brewer and Helen Adams have coaxed and carried me towards the finishing line. Many others have supported me on the way, and particularly my colleagues in the
xxvii
School of Law at Bristol University, past and present, Pat Capps, Phoebe Okowa and Chanaka Wickremasinghe. Likewise, I have been greatly helped by my secretary, Mis Pat Hammond, who was able to maintain a grip on reality when mine had deserted me. I would also like to express my special thanks to Dr Wei Su and Dr Yusuf Aksar who provided me with invaluable assistance in the process of editing, willingly and at short notice. Last, but certainly not least, I should like to thank my wife, Alison, and children, Olivia, Isobel, and Amelia, for their endurance during almost a year's worth of my near total immersion in the editorial role. Malcolm D Evans Easter 2003. The substance of the chapters was laid to rest well before the outbreak of hostilities against Iraq in March 2003 and it has not been possible to take account of that conflict and its consequences in this volume. It is to be hoped that a need to produce future editions of this work will provide occasions on which to do so.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS Ademola Abass, LLB, LLM, PhD, Barrister and Solicitor, is a Lecturer in Public International Law, Law of Armed Conflict and Use of Force, Collective Security Law, and Law of Trusts at the University of the West of England, Bristol. He recently completed a PhD degree at the University of Nottingham. He has authored and co-authored several articles. His specialization includes United Nations Law and International Economic Law. Dapo Akande is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Durham. He is a member of the International Law Association's Committee on Accountability of International Organizations and has been a Visiting Professor at the University of Miami School of Law. He has published articles on international organizations and international tribunals in leading journals such as the British Yearbook of International Law, the European Journal of International Law and the International and Comparative Law Quarterly. He has also advised and assisted counsel in a wide variety of international law cases before national and international courts. Ian Brownlie, QC, CBE, FBA, Member of the English Bar. Ian Brownlie is a member of Blackstone Chambers, Temple. He practises in international tribunals, including the International Court, the European Court of Human Rights, and courts of arbitration. He is a member of International Law Commission (1997), and of the Institut de Droit International (1977). Antonio Cassese is Professor of International Law at the University of Florence. He is a member of the Institut de droit international, and has been awarded Law Doctorates honoris causa by the Universities of Rotterdam, Paris X and Geneva. In 2002 he was awarded the Annual Prize of the Academie Universelle des Cultures (Paris) for 'the exceptional importance of his contribution to the promotion of human rights in Europe and in the world'. James Crawford, SC, FBA is Whewell Professor ofInternational Law and Chairman of the Faculty Board of Law, University of Cambridge. He was a member of the International Law Commission from 1992-2001, and in that capacity directed the ILC work on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (1994) and as its Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility (1997-2001). He is a member of Matrix Chambers and has an extensive practice before international courts and tribunals. Eileen Denza was formerly Assistant Lecturer in Law, Bristol University, a Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Counsel to the EC Committee of the House of Lords. Now recycled as Visiting Professor of Law at University College London, she is author of Diplomatic Law (2nd edn 1998) and of The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (2002).
xxix
Malcolm D Evans, MA, DPhil, is Professor of Public International Law at the University of Bristol. His areas of special interest are the law of the sea and the international protection of human rights, and in particular the freedom of religion and the prevention of torture. His principal publications include 'Religion and International Law in Europe' (1997) arid (with Professor Rod Morgan) 'Preventing Torture (1998) andCombating.Torture in Europe (2001). Professor Malgosia Fitzmaurice holds a chair of public international law at the Department of Law, Queen Mary, University of London. Her main interests include international environmental law and the law of treaties, and she has published widely on both subjects. She is the secretary of the International Water Resources Committee of the International Law Association. In 2001 she delivered The Hague Academy of International Law lecture on the topic of international environmental law. Hazel Fox QC (Lady), Editor of the International and Comparative Law Quarterly, formerly Director of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, member of the Institut de droit international. She was formerly Fellow and Law Tutor and now is a Hon Fellow of Somerville College, University of Oxford, Bencher of Lincoln's and in practice 4-5 Grays Inn Square, Grays Inn, WCIR 5JP. Christine Gray, MA, PhD, is Reader in International Law at the University of Cambridge. She is author of International Law and the Use of Force and of Judicial Remedies in International Law as well as of many articles on the use of force. Christopher Greenwood, CMG, QC, is Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and a member of Essex Court Chambers practicing in the area of public international law. He is the author of numerous articles on the laws of war and other aspects of international law. Court appearances include the Lockerbie, Nuclear Weapons and Kosovo cases in the International Court ofJustice, the Bankovic case in the European Court of Human Rights, and the Pinochet case in the House of Lords. HE Judge Rosalyn Higgins, DBE, QC. Judge of the International Court of Justice (1995- ). Bencher of the Inner Temple. Formerly Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics 1981-1995; and Member of the Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1985-1995. Martti Koskenniemi, Professor of International Law, University of Helsinki, Global Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Member, International Law Commission. Principal publications: From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Company, Helsinki, 1989), The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge University Press, 2002). Gerhard Loibl, Dr iur, LLB, Chair of International and European Law at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and Associate Professor at the University of Vienna. He has
xxxi
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
published widely on subjects of public international and European law, in particular in the area of international environmental and economic law, has participated in numerous international negotiations on behalf of Austria, and is Chairman of the Water Resources Committee of the International Law Association.
graduate research student at Trinity College, Cambridge, and a Research Associate of the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge.
xxx
Vaughan Lowe is Chichele Professor of Public International Law and a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University. He practices as a Barrister, from Essex Court Chambers, London. Robert McCorquodale is Professor of International Law and Human Rights at Nottingham University. He is co-author of one of the leading texts in international law, Cases and Materials on International Law (4th edn, 2003, OUP) and is on the editorial board of a number of respected academic journals. He also edited Self-Determination in International Law (Ashgate, 2000) and Human Rights (Ashgate, 2003). Campbell McLachlan, Professor of Law, Victoria University of Wellington Law School, New Zealand; LLB(Hons); PhD(Lond); Diploma cum laude (Hague Academy of International Law); Barrister (New Zealand). 1992-2003: Partner, Herbert Smith (Solicitors), London, heading Public International Law Group; Chair, International Bar Association Committee on International Litigation; Co-Chair International Law Association Study Group on Practice and Procedure of International Courts and Tribunals. John G Merrills, BCL, MA, is Professor of International Law at the University of Sheffield and currently Dean of the Faculty of Law. He is the author of International Dispute Settlement, Human Rights in Europe, Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and the Discipline of International Law and several other books, as well as numerous articles in law reviews. Lord Millett is a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. As such he is a member of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, which is the final Court of Appeal for the United Kingdom and sits on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which is the final Court of Appeal for a number of Commonwealth jurisdictions, including New Zealand, Mauritius, and the Caribbean territories. Stephen C Neff is a Senior Lecturer in International Law at the University of Edinburgh, specializing in the history of international law. His publications include Friends But No Allies: Economic Liberalism and the Law of Nations (1990) .and The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History (2000). Phoebe N Okowa is Senior Lecturer in Law at Queen Mary, University of London. She is the co-editor of Foundations of Public International Law (OUP) and the author of State Responsibility for Transboundary Air Pollution in International Law (OUP 2000). Simon Olleson, BA(Hons) (Cantab); LLM (NYU); Barrister. Simon Olleson is a
Catherine Redgwell, BA(Hons), LLB, MSc. Catherine is a Reader in Public International Law at the University of Oxford, and Yamani Fellow and Senior Tutor in Law at St Peter's College. She has published extensively in the international law field within the areas of environmental law, energy law and treaty law. Dr lain Scobbie LLB(Hons) (Edin), LLB(Cantab), GDIL(ANU), PhD(Cantab), Reader in International Law, University of Glasgow. He is the author of numerous articles which examine diverse matters such as the jurisprudence and practice of the International Court and various aspects of the law of armed conflict, as well as the theory of international law. Dinah Shelton is Professor of International Law and director of the doctoral program in international and comparative human rights law at the University of Notre Dame Law SchooL She is the author of Remedies in International Human Rights Law as well as several other books and numerous articles on international law. Henry J Steiner, Jeremiah Smith, Jr Professor of Law at Harvard University, is founder and director of the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program, and member and former chair of the University Committee on Human Rights Studies. He has published articles on a broad range of human rights topics and is co-author of a leading coursebook, International Human Rights in Context (2d edn 2000, OUP). Steiner has lectured on human rights subjects in over twenty countries. Hugh Thirlway is at present Principal Legal Secretary of the International Court of Justice, a post he previously held but resigned in 1994,when he was appointed Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. On retiring from academic teaching, he was invited to resume his former post with the Court. He is the author of two books and numerous articles on various aspects of international law. Colin Warbrick, MA, LLB, LLM is Professor of Law in the Law Department, Durham University. His ~nterests are in International Law generally, European Human Rights and International Criminal Law. He is the co-author (with David Harris and Michael O'Boyle) of The Law of the European Convention on Human Rights and the co-editor (with Vaughan Lowe) of The United Nations and the Principles of International Law. Nigel White is Professor of International Organizations and currently Head of the Law School at the University of Nottingham. He is author of The United Nations System: Toward International Justice; Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security; and The Law of International Organisations. He is Co-Editor of the Journal of Conflict and Security Law. Chan aka Wickremasinghe studied law as both an undergraduate and a post-graduate at the LSE, and qualified as a solicitor. He is currently a Legal Researcher at the Foreign
xxxii
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
and Commonwealth Office. Before this was a lecturer in law at Bristol University, and prior to that Senior Research Officer at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law.
ABBREVIATIONS
Michael Wood, MA, LLB. Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He is co-author of The Legal Status of Berlin and has published various articles on international law topics. Ralph Zacklin, LLB, LLM, Dr des Sciences Politiques is Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs of the United Nations. He has published a number of books and articles on issues of public international law and the law of international institutions. He has also lectured at the Hague Academy of International Law and several universities and institutes in Europe, Africa, and the Americas.
AALCC AFP AIA
AJIL ASCOBANS ASEAN ATCA AU BITs BYIL CBD CCAMLR CEDAW CERD CESCR CFC CFCs CIS CITES CLC CMLR COP CRC CSC CSCE DEA DRC DSB DSU EAC
African Asian Legal Consultative Committee Australian Federal Police Advanced Informed Agreement American Journal of International Law Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas Association of Southeast Asian Nations Alien Tort Claim Act (USA) African Union Bilateral Investment Treaties British Yearbook of International Law Conservation of Biological Diversity Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Convention on Fisheries and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas chlorofluorocarbons Confederation of Independent States Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species . Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Common Market Law Review Conference of the Parties Convention on the Rights of the Child Continental Shelf Convention Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Drugs Enforcement Agency Democratic Republic of the Congo Dispute Settlement Body Dispute Settlement Understanding East African Community
xxxiv EBRD· ECE ECHR ECJ ECOMOG ECOSOC ECOWAS ECSI ECtHR EEC EEZ EFZ EHRR EJIL ENMOD EUROFIMA FAO FATF FCCC FCN FCO FGM FRY FSIA GA GAB
GATS GATT GEF HCHR HIPC HRC HRLJ HSC IACHR IAEA IBRD ICAO ICC ICCPR
ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (United Nations) Economic Commission for Europe European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Justice Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group Economic and Social Council Economic Community of West African States European Convention on State Immunity European Court of Human Rights European Economic Community Exclusive Economic Zone Exclusive Fishing Zone European Human Rights Review European Journal of International Law Environmental Modification Treaty European Company for the Financing of Railroad Rolling Stock Food and Agriculture Organization Financial Action Task Force Framework Convention on Climate Change Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (Treaties) Foreign and Commonwealth Office female genital mutilation Former Republic of Yugoslavia Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act General Assembly General Agreements to Borrow General Agreement on Trade in Services General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Global Environmental Facility High Commissioner for Human Rights Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Human Rights Commission Human Rights Law Journal High Seas Convention Inter-American Commission on Human Rights International Atomic Energy Authority International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) International Civil Aviation Organization International Criminal Court International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR ICJ ICLQ ICOMOS ICBP ICRC ICSID ICTR ICTY IDA IFAD IFC IGAD IGO IHRR ILA ILC ILM ILO ILR IMF IMO INGOs IPCC Iran-USCTR ISA ITC ITLOS ITO ITU IUCN IWRB LMOs LNTS LOSC LRTAP MAl MARPOL
xxxv
International Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights International Court of Justice International and Comparative Law Quarterly International Council on Monuments and Sites International Council for Bird Preservation International Committee of the Red Cross International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Development Organization International Fund for Agricultural Development International Finance Corporation Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development Inter-Governmental Organization International Human Rights Review International Law Association International Law Commission International Legal Materials International Labour Organization International Law Reports International Monetary Fund International Maritime Organization International Non-Governmental Organizations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports International Seabed Authority International Tin Council International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea International Trade Organization International Telecommunications Union International Union for the Conservation of Nature International Waterfowl and Wetlands Research Bureau Living Modified Organisms League of Nations Treaty Series Law of the Sea Convention Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Multilateral Agreement on Investment International-Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
xxxvi MIGA MSC NAB
NAFO NAFTA NATO NGOs NYBIL OAPEC OAS OASTS OAU ODIL OECD OECS OEEC ONUC ONUCA OPEC OSCE OSPAR
PCU PFLP PLO POPs POW Recueil des Cours RFOs RGDIP
.RIAA SADC SBDC SC SDR SIA SPS SSA SSC
ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals New Arrangements to Borrow North Atlantic Fisheries Organization North American ~ree Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Organizations Netherlands Yearbook of International Law Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries Organization of American States Organization of American States Treaty Series Organization of African Unity Ocean Development and International Law Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization of East Caribbean States Organization for European Economic Cooperation United Nations Operation in the Congo United Nations Observer Group in Central America Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic Permanent Court of International Justice Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Palestine Liberation Organization Persistent Organic Pollutants Prisoner of War Recueil des cours de l'Academie de droit international Regional Fisheries Organizations Revue General de Droit International Public Reports of International Arbitral Awards South African Development Community Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber Security Council Special Drawing Rights State Immunity Act Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Straddling Stocks Agreement Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling
SWAPO TAC TPRM TRAFFIC TRIMs TRIPS TSC UAE UDHR UEMO UKMIL UKTS UNAMIR UNAMSIL UNAT UNCAT UNCC UNCITRAL UNCLOS UNCTAD UNDP UNEF UNEP UNESCO UNGA UNICEF UNIDO UNHCR UNITA UNMIK UNOSOM UNPROFOR UNTAET UNTS
xxxvii
Fishstocks and Highly Migratory Species (Straddling Stocks Convention) South West Africa Peoples' Organization Total allowable catch Trade Policy Review Mechanism Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce Trade-Related Investment Measures Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention United Arab Emirates Unilateral Declaration on Human Rights Union Economique de Monetaire Ouest-Africaine United Kingdom Materials on International Law United Kingdom Treaty Series United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone United Nations Administrative Tribunal United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment United Nations Compensation Commission United Nations Commission on International Trade Law United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Development Programme United Nations Emergency Force United Nations Environment Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations General Assembly United Nations International Children's Economic Foundation United Nations Industrial Development Organization United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola United Nations Mission in Kosovo United Nations Operation in Somalia United Nations Protection Force United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor United Nations Treaty Series
xxxviii UNYB UPU USFSlA VCCR VCDR VCLT WHC WIPO
WMO WTO WWF YBILC YIHL
ABBREVIATIONS
United Nations Yearbook Universal Postal Union United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties World Heritage Convention World Intellectual Property Organization World Meteorological Organization World Trade Organization World Wildlife Fund . Yearbook of the International Law Commission Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law
TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights ... 160,161-2 Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities ... 710 Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Art.3 ... 284 Agreement on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species. .. 653 Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) . .. 704-5 American Convention on Human Rights ... 160,162,169,310 ArtA(4) ... 193 Art.27 ... 160 Antarctic Treaty (1959) ... 169 Protocol on Environmental Protection ... 658,667 Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism. .. 751 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution ... 668 Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal ... 663,675 Biological Diversity Convention see Convention on Biological Diversity Bonn Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals ... 169,317,681-2 Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules concerning the Immunities of Government Vessels ... 361 Chemical Weapons Convention 1993 ... 805 Cobden-Chevalier Treaty (1860) ... 45 Convention against Torture ... 317,364,419 Art.l(1) ... 749 Convention Concerning Employment of Women During the Night (1919) ... 187 Art.I-Art.3 187 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage ... 659,679-80 Convention for the Protection of the
Environment of the North-East Atlantic ... 665 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Environmental DecisionMaking, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. .. 660 Convention on Biological Diversity. .. 538, 658, 659,660,661,662,663,665,666,682-3 Art.22 ... 166 Biosafety Protocol ... 164 Cartagena Protocol on Living Modified Organisms ... 666,676-7 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous for the Environment. .. 659 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage ... 669 Convention on Conventional Weapons 1981 ... 805 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency ... 674 Convention on Environmental Assessment in a Transboundary Context. .. 660 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (CFC) ... 652 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species ... 164,680-1 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution ... 659,660,664-5,671 Convention on Nuclear Safety ... 674 Convention on Special Missions. .. 388, 402-3 Art.2 ... 402 Art.3 ... 402 Art.l2 ... 402 Art.20(1)(e) ... 402 Art.21 ... 403 ArtAI ... 402 ArtA7 ... 402 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources ... 661,684 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals ... 169,317, 681-2
xl
TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. .. 669 Convention on the Law of the Sea. .. 26, 63, 164,284,533,538,540,543,625-54,659, 662,667-8 Art.2(2) ... 630 Art.3 ... 630 Art.5 .,. 626 Art.6 ... 648 Art.7 .. , 627 Art.7(1) ... 627 Art.7(4) .. , 627 Art.7(5) ... 627 Art.8(2) ... 630 Art.lO ... 627 Art10(6) ... 628 Art.14 ... 626 Art.15 ... 648 Art.18 ... 633 Art.19(l) ... 633 Art.19(2) ... 633,634,635 Art.21 .. , 634 Art21(2) ... 634 Art24(1) ... 634 Art.25(3) ... 634 Art.27 ... 634 Art27(l) ... 631 Art.27(2) ... 631 Art.28 ... 632 Art.30 ... 632 Art.33 .. , 632 Art.35(c) ... 636 Art.36 ... 636 Art.38(l) ... 636 Art.39 ... 637 Art.42(l) ... 637 Art.45 ... 636 Art.47 ... 629 Art.52 ... 637 Art.53 ... 637 Art.56 ... 645 Art.56(3) ... 645 Art.57 ... 645 Art.59 ... 645 Art.61(l) .. , 651 Art.61(2) ... 651 Art.61(3) ... 651 Art.62(1) .. , 651 Art.62(2) . ~. 651
Art.62(3) ... 651 Art.63 ... 651,653 Art.63(4) .,. 645 Art.64 ... 651,653 Art.65 ... 651 Art.66 ... 651 Art.67 ... 651 Art69 .. , 651 Art.70 ... 651 Art.73 ... 646 Art.74 ... 140 Art76 ... 643 Art.76(8) ... 643 Art.77(4) ... 642 Art.82 ... 643 Art.83 ... 140 Art.87 ... 637 Art.94(1) .. , 638 Art.99 ... 641 Art.l01(l) .. , 639 Art.107 ... 638 Art.l08 ... 641 Art.l09 .. , 640 Art.IIO ... 641 Art1l0(l) ... 638 ArtllO(5) ... 638 Art.lIl . .. 639 Art.1l6(b) ... 651 Art.1l8 ... 651 Art.1l9 ... 651 Art.12l(3) ... 626 Art.192 .. , 658 Art.31I ... 166 Convention on the Prevention and punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons. .. 26, 388 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) ... 91, 163,191-2,447,742-4 Art.5 ... 420 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. .. 665, 668, 669 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies. .. 287, 388 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1946) ... 287,388, 405,582 Art2(2) . .. 288 Art.5(18)(a) .. , 405 Art.5(19) ... 405
TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Art.6(20) ... 405 Art.6(22) ... 405 Art.29 ... 290 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea (Helsinki 1992) . " 182 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-east Atlantic ... 668 Convention on the Rights of the Child. .. 317 Art.45 ... 319 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel. .. 792 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. .. 163 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Convention) ... 661, 662,678-9 Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties ... 670 Covenant of the League of Nations Art.14 ... 560 Declaration of Paris (1856) ... 44 Declaration of St Petersburg (1868) ... 44,803 Environmental Modification Treaty. .. 805 European Convention on Human Rights. " 99, 160,194,310,439-40,462,772,790 Art.10(1)-(2) ... 98 Art.12 ... 161 Art.l5 ... 160 Art.38 ... 534 Art.64 ... 194 First Additional Protocol. .. 432 European Convention on State Immunity ... 361,362,368,370 Art.4 ... 367 Art.ll ... 370 European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International NGOs ... 319 European Social Charter ... 162 European Union Treaty. .. 423, 434 Art.6 ... 310 Art.234 . .. 313 Framework Convention on Climate Change ... 660,661,662,663,665,666,672-3 Art.3{l) ... 665 Kyoto Protocol. .. 666, 673
xli
General Act of the Brussels Conference. .. 43 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ... 164,700,701-3 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) ... 704 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (1958) ... 123,126,135 Art.6 ... 135 Geneva Conventions on humanitarian law ... 122,160-1,163,317-18,728,790,792-802, 806,809-21 Additional Protocol I ... 790,795,808,811, 817,820 Art.1(4) ... 793,796 Art.5 ... 820 Art.44 ... 795 Art.44(3) ... 795-6 Art.51(2) ... 797 Art.51(5){a) '" 804 Art.52(2) ... 797-8 Art.52(3) ... 798 Art.53 ... 801 Art.55 ... 801 Art.56 ... 801-2 Art.57 ... 800 Art.58 ... 801 Art.90 ... 821 Additional Protocol II ... 750,815 Art.1(l) ... 815 Art.l(2) ... 815 Art.2 ... 792 Art.3 ... 814-15 Art.3(2) ... 815 First ... 811 Fourth ... 811,812-13 Art.33(l) ... 750 Gas Protocol 1925 . " 805, 806 POW Convention. .. 809-11 Art.4 . .. 794, 795 Art.118 ... 810 Second ... 811 Third ... 791,819 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea ... 624 Hague Convention (1899) ... 535,554,790, 804 Hague Convention (1907) ... 536,790,794, 804 Hague Conventions (1907) ... 813-14 Helsinki Final Act (1975) . .. 175
xlii
TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights see American Convention on Human Rights International Cocoa Agreement. " 709 International Coffee Agreement. .. 708, 709 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979) ... 344 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil . " 660 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. .. 684 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism . '. 750-1 Internatiomil Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) Art.20 ... 193 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) ... 160, 161, 195,215,294, 767,772,779,783 Art.1 ... 315 Art.2 ... 780 ArtA ... 160
Art.12 ... 432 Art.18(3) ... 161 Art.28 ... 767 ArtAO ... 767,785 ArtAO(l) ... 779 Optional Protocol ... 768 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) ... 162,215 Art.1 ... 315 Art.2 ... 779 International Labour Organization Constitution Art.19(6) ... 284 International Labour Organization Convention No 29 ... 156 International Labour Organization Declaration of Fundamental Rights of Workers ... 162 International Tin Agreement. .. 709 International Tropical Timber Agreement ... 661, 709 Jay Treaty (1794) ... 45,539 Law of the Sea Convention see Convention on the Law of the Sea London (Dumping) Convention. .. 659, 660, 668 Manila Declaration. .. 541 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. .. 530-1
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States Art.l . .. 220-1 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation Art.1 . .. 343-4 Nordic Environmental Protection Convention Art.3 ... 667 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) .'. 165,461 Art. 104 ... 165 Art.2005A . .. 165 Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Convention. .. 670 Oslo Dumping Convention. .. 668 Ottawa Convention (1998) ... 790,805 Pact of Paris (1928) ... 28,50-1 Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources ... 668 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy ... 674 Peace of Utrecht ... 48 Peace of Westphalia (1648) ... 38,48,90, 138, 210,359 Porter Convention ... 47 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance ... 661,662,678-9 Rome Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. .. 639 Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent (1988) ... 169,663,676 Statute of the International Court of Justice ... 146,147,541,566 Art.17 ... 562 Art.24 ... 562 Art.35 ... 567 Art.35(l)-(2) ... 567 Art.36 ... 569,57l Art.36(2) ... 541,569,570 Art.36(6) ... 541, 57l, 572 Art.38 ... 62,119,120-34,136,143,314,560, 566,567,648 Art.38(1) ... 542 Art.38(l)(c) ... 73,491
TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Art.38(l)(d) ... 132, 133,320 Art.38(2) . '. 542, 569 Art.38(5) . " 569 ArtAl ... 574,575 ArtA6 ... 565
Art.59 ... 120,579,580,581 Art.60 . .. 579, 580 Art.61 ... 579 Art.62 ... 577,578 Art.63 ... 577 Art.65 ... 541,583 Art.68 ... 584 Art.75 ... 309 Statute of the International Criminal Court ... 363,407-8,731 Art.5(1) ... 731 Art.5(2) ... 732 Art.6 ... 744 Art.9 ... 739 Art.12(2) ... 732 Art.13 ... 733 Art.15 ... 733 Art.16 ... 733 Art.17 ... 732 Art.25 ... 736 Art.27(1) ... 737-8 Art.27(2)(b) ... 736 Art.28 ... 737 Statute of the Permanent International Court of Justice. .. 136, 569 Art.36(2) ... 561 Art.38 ... 138 Art.38(l)(c) ... 213 Stockholm Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration. .. 540 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants ... 676 UNESCO Constitution ArtA(4) ... 284 Art.8 ... 284 United Nations Charter. .. 6, 22, 28, 52-3, 54,152,162,163,169,214,252,309,449, 462,506,515,554,566,590-1,727,760, 762-3 Art.1 ... 89,291,548,590,660 Art.2 ... 14 Art.2(l) ... 232 Art.2(3) ... 530,549,592
xliii
Art.2(4) ... 64,78,99,507,520,589,590, 591-7,599,618,746 Art.2(6) ... 152,591 Art.2(7) ... 97,294,305,521,596,607 ArtA( 1) . .. 251 ArtA(2) ... 251 Art.7 ... 291 Art.7(l) ... 291 Art.7(2) ... 291 Art.9 ... 293 Art.1O ... 283,294 Art.ll ... 283 Art.12 ... 283,294,550 Art.13 ... 283 Art. 14 ... 283,549 Art.18 ... 294 Art.20 ... 293 Art.23 ... 294 Art.24 ... 294,607,611 Art.25 ... 97,283,294,518,525 Art.27 ... 607 Art.27(3) ... 137 Art.33 ... 530 Art.33(l) ... 549 Art.34 ... 549 Art.36 (1 ) . .. 549 Art.36(3) ... 551 Art.39 . .. 523, 607, 608 ArtAO . .. 607, 608 ArtAl ... 507,518,523,524,607,608,615, 763 ArtA2 . .. 99,607,608,763 ArtA3 . .. 608, 763 ArtA8 ... 97
Art.51 ... 22,97,99,589,599-606,618 Art.52(2) ... 547,549 Art.53 ... 518,614,615,616,617 Art.53(1) ... 507 Art.55 ... 660 Art.57 ... 292 Art.62 ... 294 Art.63 ... 292 Art.68 ... 764 Art.77 ... 295 Art.92 ... 560 Art.93(2) . '. 567 Art.94(l) ... 567,568 Art.94(2) . '. 568 Art.96(l) ... 582
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TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Art.96(2) ... 582-3 Art.98 . .. 550, 551 Art.99 . .. 550, 551 Art.lOO : .. 295 Art.103 ... 164,407,518,524,525 Art104 ... 273 Art.105 ... 286 Universal Declaration of Human Rights ... 169, 662 Versailles Treaty (1919) ... 50,736 Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ... 641 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer ... 671-2 Montreal Protocol ... 164,538,666,667,672 Art.2 ... 97 Vienna Convention on a Uniform Law for the Sale of Goods ... 15 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage ... 674 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ... 388,397-8 Art.5 ... 397 Art36 . " 418,431,432,466 ArtA1 '" 398 ArtA3 ... 398
Art.73. " 398 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations ... 135,388,391-6 Art.2 ... 392 Art.3 ... 392 Art.7 ... 392 Art.9 ... 393 Art.l0 ... 392 Art.22 ... 393 Art.22(2) ... 393 Art.22(3) ... 373 Art.24 ... 394 Art.27 ... 394 Art.29 ... 395 Art.31 '" 395 Art.31(1) ... 399 Art.32 ... 396 Art.32(1) ... 396 Art.33(2) . .. 396 Art.33(4) ... 396 Art.37(1) ... 395 Art.37(2) ... 396
Art.37(3) Art.38(1) Art.39(2) ArtAI (1)
... ... ... . ..
396 396 396,399 394 ArtAl(2) ... 395 ArtAl(3) ... 395 ArtA2 ... 395
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (1978) ... 175-6 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) ... 122,123,135,137,150,153,157,161, 163,174,175,176,178,182,194,200,451, 538 Art.l .. , 176 Art.2(I)(a) ... 176 Art.2(1)(b) ... 179 Art.2(2) ... 174 Art.2(d) ... 191 Art.3(b) ... 176 Art.3(c) ... 176 Art.4 ... 176 Art.5 ... 280 Art.7 ... 177,454 Art.7(1) ... 177 Art.7(2) ... 177 Art.8 ... 177,178 Art.ll ... 178 Art.12 ... 178 Art. 14 ... 179 Art.14(2) ... 180 Art.15 ... 179 Art.18 ... 178 Art.19 ... 192 Art.19(c) ... 192, 195 Art.20(4) ... 192 Art.20(5) . .. 192 Art.24( 4) . .. 178 Art.25 ... 178 Art.26 ... 122, 183 Art.27 ... 417 Art.30 ... 183 Art.31 ... 186,187,189,280 Art.31(l) ... 186 Art.31(2) ... 186 Art.31(3) ... 187 Art.31(3)(b) . " 281 Art.32 ... 188,280 Art.33 ... 190
TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Art.34 ... Art.35 ... Art.36 ... Art.37 ... Art.38 ... Art.39 ... ArtAO ... ArtA1 ... ArtA3 ... ArtA6 ... ArtA7 ... ArtA8 ... ArtA9 ...
Art.50 ... Art.51 ... Art.52 ... Art.53 ... Art.54 ... Art.57 ...
122, 184 184 184 184 176,184 181 181 137, 181, 182 176 180,417 178,180 180 181 181 181 181 146, 150, 153 182 182
xlv
Art.58 ... 182 Art.59 ... 182, 183 Art.60 ... 196,197,451,490,509-10 Art.61 ... 198 Art.62 ... 198, 199 Art.63 ... 142 Art.64 ... 137, 151 Art.69(2) ... 469 Art.69(4) ... 180 Art.71 ... 181 Art.73 ... 176 Art. 746 . .. 454 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations (1986) ... 153, 175 World Health Organization Constitution Art.22 ... 283 World Trade Organization Agreement ... 532, 700
TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL CASES
TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL CASES Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, Ie} Reports 1978 p3 ... 532 Aerial Incident of ... 3 July 1988, Orderof22 February 1996, ICJ Reports 1996 p9 ... 532 Ahlstrom Osakyhtio v CommIssion [1988] ECR 5193 ... 339 Air Services Agreement case (1978) 54 ILR 303 ... 507,508,519 Akayesu case. .. 744 Al-Adsani v UK, Judgment 21 November 2001 ECtHR; 34 EHRR 11 . .. 382, 383 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of8 April 1993, ICJ Reports 1993 p3 . .. 607 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium), Preliminary Objections and Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002 p3 ... 133, 154,362,371,383,400,408, 410,448 Asylum, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1950, p266 ... 129 Baccus SRL v Servicio Nacional del Trigo [1957] 1 QB 438; 28 ILR 160 . .. 260 Bananas case. .. 706 Bankovic v Belgium and others (2001) 123 ILR 94 ... 790 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970 p3 ... 130-1,140,149,340,469,476,477-8,481, 483-4,486-7,489,491,516 Beef Hormones case ... 706-7 Bering Fur Seals Fisheries Arbitration (Great Britain v US) (1893) Moore's International Arbitrations 755 ... 677, 683 Brazilian Loans, Judgment No 15 (1929) PCl] Ser A No 21 ... 416,438 Brunner v European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR57 ... 423 Caire (1929) 5 RIAA 516 ... 459 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1962 p151 ... 278,282, 283,285,611 Certain Norwegian Loans, Judgment, Ie} Reports 1957 p9 .. , 498, 570 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Ie} Reports 1992 p240 ... 577
Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership of the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion (1948) ICJ Reports 1947-1948 p45 ... 251 Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949 p4 ... 459--60,468,594,633,635--6 Costa v ENEL Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585 ... 419 Cumaraswamy case. .. 406, 446-7 East Timor Case (Portugal v Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995 p90 . .. 308, 492, 517 Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1954 p47 ... 292 Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI), Judgment, Ie} Reports 1989 p15 ... 458,487,496,499 Elmi v Australia, UN Committee Against Torture (2000) 7 IHRR 603 ... 300 Empire ofIran case 45 ILR 57 . .. 366, 369 Enigster case 18 ILR 542 ... 741-2 Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion (1925) PCl] Ser B No 10 ... 417 Factory at Chorz6w, Jurisdiction, Judgment No 8 (1927) PCIJ Ser A No 9 ... 466,467,498 Fisheries, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1951 p116 ... 129-30,626-7,628 Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v Iceland), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1973 p3 ... 181,198-9,577,630 Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v Iceland), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974 p3 ... 625,644 Flegenheimer Claim (1958) 25 ILR 148-150 ... 481 Fogarty v UK, Judgment 21 November 2001 ECtHR; 34 EHRR 12 . .. 382 Franco-Canadian Fisheries Arbitration (1986) 90 RGDIP 713 ... 646 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali), Judgment, Ie} Reports 1986 p554 ... 215, 585 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/ Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1977 p7 ... 176,183-4,196-7,198,199,451,464,512,542, 666
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Merits, Judgment No 7 (1926) PCIJ Ser A No 7 ... 498 Gulf of Maine case (1984) ... 585 Haya de la Torre case. .. 129 Heathrow Airport case (1992-1993) 102 ILR 216 ... 540 I Congreso del Partido [1983]1 AC 244; [1981] 2 All ER 1064 (HL); 64 ILR 307 ... 361,368,369 Interhandel, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1959 p6 ... 494,495--6 International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention, Advisory Opinion, OC-14/94 Ser A No 14; 116 ILR 320 ... 417-18 International Tin Council cases ... 8,12,274-5, 289,427 Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 Concerning Employment of Women During the Night, Advisory Opinion (1932) PCIJ Ser NB No 50 p365 . .. 187, 188 Island of Palmas case (1928) 2 RIAA 829 ... 539 Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appeals Body (1 November 1996) DSR 1996: I p108 ... 94 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion (1928) PCIJ Ser B No 15 p17-18 ... 304 Kahan v Pakistan Federation [1951] 2 KB 1003; 18 ILR 210 ... 360 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, Ie} Reports 1999 p1045 ... 176, 187--8 Krstic case . .. 744 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [1995] 3 All ER 694 (HL); 103 ILR 340 ... 368,379 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 439 ... 377,379--80,381 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 439; [2002] UKHL 19 ... 437 La Bretagne case (1986) 90 RGDIP 713 ... 540 LaGrand (Germany v USA), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001 ... 418,466,574,586 Land, Island and Maritime Boundary Dispute (EI Salvador/Honduras), Application to Intervene, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1990 p92 ... 578,579,628 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Application to Intervene, Order of21 October 1999, ICJ Reports 1999 p1029 . " 578,649
xlvii
Lauder v Czech Republic. .. 18,20 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971 p16 ... 137,281, 316,584 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Ie} Reports 1996 p226 ... 95,104,126,127,130,463,591,593,600 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Request by WHO), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996 p66 . .. 280, 284, 292 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v Belgium), Provisional Measures, Order of2 June 1999, ICJ Reports 1999 p124 ... 27,595 Letelier and Moffat (Chile/United States) 88 ILR . " 727; (1992) 31 ILM 1 ... 536 Lockerbie cases ... 27,344,525,577,607 Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Judgment 23 March 1995, Ser A, No 310 ... 194,462 'Lotus' Judgment No 9 (1927) pcn Ser A No 10 pI8-19 ... 334-5,338,346 McElhinney v Ireland and UK, Judgment 21 November 2001 ECtHR; 34 EHRR 13 ... 382 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reports 1995, p6 ... 19, 188-9,649 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judgment, Ie} Reports 1993 p316 ... 649 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No 2, (1924) PCn Ser A No 2 p19 ... 190,477 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986 p14 ... 109,127, 134,141,151,154-5,156,179,456,457,475, 565,591,593,594,596,598,600,601,602, 605--6,747 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, Judgment, IC] Reports 1954 p19 ... 492,572, 581 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, Ie} Reports 1969 p3 ... 123, 125, 126, 135,222, 532,577,585,625,642,643 Nottebohm case, Second Phase, Judgment, IC] Reports 1955 p4 ... 341,416-17,476,480-1, 481-2,484,487 Nuclear Tests (Australia v France), Judgment, IC] Reports 1974, p253 ... 139-40,175,577,578, 666
xlviii
TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL CASES
Nuremberg Judgment (1948) ... 307 Passage through the Great Belt, Provisional Measures, Order of ... 29 July 1991, ICJ Reports 1991 p12 ... 576,634 Philippine Admiral, The [1977] AC 373; [1976] 1 All ER 78; 64 ILR 90 . .. 360 Prosecutor v Anto Furundiija ... 748,749 Prosecutor v Delalic and others . .. 749 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic ... 109,456-7,728, 739,816 Prosecutor v Kunarac ... 749 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, Provisional Measures, Orders of 14 April 1993, ICJ Reports 1992 p3 ... 344
Santa Elena v Costa Rica, ICSID Final Award 17 February 2000 . .. 312 Serbian Loans, Judgment No 14 (1929) PCIJ Ser A No 20 ... 416,438 Shearson Lehman Bros v Maclaine Watson & Co (1987) 77 ILR 107 ... 289 Sokolovic case . .. 748 South West Africa cases ... 474,491,516-17, 577,585 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Application to Intervene, Judgment of23 October 2001, ICJ Reports 2001 . .. 578 Taba case (1988) 80 ILR 224 ... 539-40 Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1962 p6 ... 180-1 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Chad), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994 p6 ... 186-7 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co v Libyan Arab Republic (1977) 53 ILR 389 ... 312 Tinoco Arbitration (1923) 1 RIAA 369 . .. 238, 539 Trail Smelter Arbitration (1939) 33 AJIL 82; (1941) 35 AJIL 684; 3 RIAA 1905 ... 539,658, 666,670
Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (New Zealand v France) (1990) 82 ILR 499; (1986) 74 ILR 256 ... 319,450-1,454,540 Rawle Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago, Comm No 845/1999, Decision 2 November 1999, UN Doc N55/40 Vol II Annexe XI A ... 195 Red Crusader case. .. 536 Red Sea Islands case (2001) 40 ILM 900 ... 12, 540 Reparation for Injuries, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949 p179 ... 272-3,274,276,281, 282,301,302,303,312,446,488,660 Republic of the Philippines v Marcos and others 806 F.2d 344 (1986); 81 ILR 581 ... 436 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1951 pIS ... 91,93, 191-2,744 Restrictions to the Death Penalty, Advisory Opinion, Inter-American Court of Human Rights AO OC-3/83, 8 September 1983, (1984) 23 ILM 320 ... 193 Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1960 p6 ... 129, 131
Van Gend en Loos ECJ (1963) 1 CMLR 82 ... 313
Saiga case (St Vmcent and the Grenadines v Guinea) ... 19,640,645 St Pierre and Miquelon case (1992) 95 ILR 645 ... 540
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975 p12 ... 315,551,584 Woodpulp cases 89/85, Ahlstrom Osakyhtio v Commission [1988] ECR 5193 ... 339
US CASES
US v The Palestine Liberation Organization and others AILC 2nd Series vol 12 p386; 695 ESupp 1456; 82 ILR 282 ... 433 US Diplomatic and Consular staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980 p3 . .. 393-4, 456,459,461 US-French Air Services Arbitration (1978) 54 ILR 303 ... 509
TABLE OF STATUTES BY COUNTRY UK LEGISLATION
US LEGISLATION
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 s.47 ... 345 s.51 ... 345
Alien Tort Statute 1789 . .. 430
Criminal Justice Act 1988 . .. 8, 9
D'Amato Act ... 350
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 ... 394,435
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 ... 362, 366,370,373,375,452 s.1603(d) ... 367 s.1605(2)(a) ... 367 s.161O(2) ... 375
European Communities Act 1972 ... 434 Extradition Act . .. 8
Constitution ... 425-6, 432
Human Rights Act 1998 ... 439 Helms-Burton Act ... 350 Immigration Act 1971 ... 812 International Organizations Act 1968 . .. 277 Patents Act 1949 ... 430 Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 ... 349 Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act 1964 . .. 349 State Immunity Act 1978 ... 361,368,371,435 Part I. .. 399 s.3 ... 368 s.3(3)(a)-(b) ... 368 s.4 ... 368 s.5 ... 370 s.7-s.8 ... 368 s.9 ... 365 s.13(1)-(2) ... 372 s.13(3)-(4) ... 374 s.14(2) ... 366,379 s.14(5) ... 366 s.20 ... 399
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 1986 ... 342 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and AntiTerrorism Act 1986 ... 345 Prohibition Law. .. 348
OTHER COUNTRIES
French Constitution. .. 424 German Constitution. .. 423, 434 Netherlands Constitution ... 422,434 Russian Constitution. .. 424-5 Russian Federal Law on International Treaties ... 424 Swiss Constitution. .. 157
TABLE OF DOMESTIC CASE LAW BY COUNTRY
OTHER COUNTRIES
TABLE OF DOMESTIC CASE LAW BY COUNTRY UK CASES
Al-Fin Corporation's Patent, Re [1970] Ch 160 ... 430 Alcorn v Republic of Colombia and others [1984] 2 All ER 6 ... 433, 435 Attorney-General for the Isle of Man v Poyiadjis ... 17 Bennett v Horseferry Magistrates' Court [1993] 3 All ER 138 ... 431-2 Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer [1982] AC 888; 3 All ER 616 ... 377-8,438 DPP v Doot [1973] AC 807; [1973] 1 All ER 940 (HL) ... 338 DPP v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55; [1977] 2 All ER 909 (HL) . .. 338 Jazayeri, Re . .. 16 Liangsiriprasert v Government of the USA [1991]1 AC 225; [1990] 2 All ER 866 (PC) ... 338 Liby~n Arab Foreign Bank v Manufacturers' Hanover Trust Co [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep 608 ... 16 Luthor v Sagor [1921] 3 KB 532 ... 376
Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] lAllER434(HL) ... 339 Saloman v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1967] 2 QB 116 ... 433 Trendtex v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 QB 529; [1977] 1 All ER 881; 64 ILR 111. .. 361, 429 Westland Helicopters Ltd v Arab Organization for Industrialization 108 ILR 565; [1995] 2 All ER387 ... 278
US CASES
Air France and British Airways v Port Authority of New York and New Jersey ... 435 Breard cases ... 19,431,432,439 Bush v Gore 121 S Ct 525 (2000) ... 245 Clayco Petroleum Corporation v Occidental Petroleum Corporation and others 712 F.2d 404 (1983); 81 ILR 522 ... 436 Cutting case. .. 335, 346 Filartiga v Pefia-Irala 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir 1980) ... 157,430
Mox Plant case ... 18 Greifelt ·and others ... 742 Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] AC 249; [1975]1 All ER 538 ... 376-7 Parlement BeIge, The (1879-1890) 5 Prob Div 197 (CA) ... 360 Propend Finance v Sing III ILR 611 ... 403 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International Intervening) (No 3) [2000] AC 151; [1999] 2 All ER 97 ... 8-10, 12, 16, 18, 19, 133, 156-7,364,381,399,403,408,409-10,435, 438,439 R v Charrington . .. 641 R v Mills. .. 640 Rayner (JH) (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1989] 3 WLR 969 ... 277
Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California 113 S Ct 2891 (1993) ... 350 Mondev International Ltd v USA (Case No ARB(AF)/99/2) ... 461 Schooner Exchange v McFaddon (1812) Cranch 116 (US) . .. 359-60 Underhill v Hernandez 168 US 250 (1897) ... 376,436 US v Aluminium Co of America 148 F.2d 416 (1945) ... 338 US v Alvarez-Machain [1992] 112 S Ct 2188, USSC ... 431,439 US v Gonzalez 776 F.2d 931- (1985) ... 342
Banca Carige SpA v Banco Nacional de Cuba & Anor [2001] 1 WLR 2039 ... 16 Concerning Certain Normative Acts of the City of Moscow and Some Other Regions VKS 1966 No 2 ... 432 Eichmann case ... 352-3,743-4 Hoess case ... 742 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1974] 2 CMLR 540 ... 434
Ii
Philippine Embassy Bank Account Case, German Federal Constitutional Court 13 December 1977 46 BverfGE 342; 65 ILR 146 ... 372,373, 374 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 25 SCR 217 ... 216 SOS Attentat and Castelnau d'Esnault v Qadaffi, Head of the State of Libya, France Court of Cassation criminal chamber 13 March 2000 No 1414 ... 133,408 Suresh case. .. 751 Tabatabai case 80 ILR 388 ... 401
REFLECTIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COURT HE Judge Rosalyn Higgins
I have been asked to offer a short prefatory reflection on the role and responsibility of a Judge of the International Court of Justice in the contemporary international legal system. There are aspects that seem to me both broad and narrow. To take the broader issues first: I am sympathetic to the current trend of thinking that no international actors are immune from scrutiny. It is only natural there should be public interest in their independence from national or other pressures, and in the absence of any possible conflict of interest. The maintenance of these standards, which both the legal profession and the informed public are entitled to expect, requires the active support of the presidents of international courts and tribunals. The maintenance of these standards within a court, and the visible manifestation of this commitment, is part of the job-description of judicial leadership. That being said, I do not believe that a Judge of the International Court is in any more narrow sense 'responsible to' any other organ or international actor. The International Court is a main organ of the United Nations. Each year it presents a written report to the United Nations on its work. And in recent years the practice has grown whereby the President addresses the General Assembly and its Sixth Committee (and perhaps even the Security Council). But the Court is not 'responsible to' any of those bodies in the sense· that its role is to please or 'satisfy' them. The Court is not 'answerable' to them if its legal decision is not the pronouncement that they might have hoped for on any particular occasion. And indeed, that is well understood by all concerned. The General Assembly is interested in, and generally appreciative of, the work that the Court reports to it. But members of that body-and certainly the Assembly as such-carefully refrain from observations on th~ Court's findings in particular cases. Certainly the international judge is not 'responsible to' the particular States appearing before him/her. It is totally inappropriate for a State to assume, still less to say, that a particular Judge's vote in a case was due to his or her nationality (or race, or religion). Only those present in the Deliberation Chamber can know what views were
ROSALYN HIGGINS
REFLECTIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
held, by whom, and on what grounds. In fact, the dynamics of the legal exchanges between the Judges of the International Court in no way reflect tired stereotypes. Assumptions based on such ideas would be surprisingly wide of the mark. Even if a Judge of the International Court is not 'responsible to' any particular organ of the United Nations, or any government, the very fact of being elected to this high office does carry with it enormous responsibilities. What does this mean in practical terms? It means the responsibility to work at maximum capacity, to continue systematically to read the literature in the field, to study the pleadings meticulously, to make every effort to see arguments from all points of view, and to make up one's mind only after reading everything, listening to everything, and considering the viewpoints of others. In my view, this generalized responsibility of the Judge also puts an emphasis on collegiality. I do not believe that Court Judgments are 'weakened' by separate or dissenting opinions. A Judgment is as good or as bad as the reasoning it relies on. A poor Judgment will be no more persuasive by virtue of unanimity. That being said, the first task of the Judge is to contribute to the common enterprise of the Court. Ideas should be shared, suggestions made in timely fashion. The main priority is to contribute to an impressive and authoritative Judgment. There is necessarily some measure of give and take required. But in a successful Court this is in no way synonymous with Judgments that are merely the lowest common denominator of the views of the various Judges. A judge is not an academic and judicial opinions should not be academic articles. They should, in my view, be resorted to only exceptionally, in respect of points of real importance for the particular case at hand; and should not go beyond that either as regards frequency or as regards the subject matter traversed. Of course, the Courts as such, and not only the Judges who comprise them, bear this generalized responsibility to the international community too. This requires that all Judgments are fully reasoned and that all arguments of the parties that could affect the outcome are properly addressed or answered. There are sometimes grounds for judicial economy but this concept cannot excuse an absence of reasoning nor can it provide grounds for avoiding issues simply because they are hard to resolve. (And no more can solace in the face of difficulty be sought in invocation of a 'non liquet!). A Court's job is precisely to decide difficult, and often sensitive, points oflaw. Courts must also constantly strive to maintain that difficult line between the maintenance of the highest quality judgments and the achievement of an efficient throughput of work. This has been a high priority for the International Court of .Justice. The last fifteen years have seen an enormous growth in its docket. Mindful of the need to be responsive to the trust placed in it by States engaged in litigation, the Court now has its work methods under more or less constant review. The heavy docket means there is no longer the luxury periodically to review, at leisure, the entirety of the Rules of Procedure, simply as an exercise that should be engaged in from time-to-time. Instead, the Court has moved to a practice of entrusting its Rules Committee with a 'watching brief' on particular Rules that are proving problematic
in the practice of the Court, and making proposals for their amendment. Revisions of Rules 79-80 are resulting examples. Other Rules are under review. Other changes in the Court's methods of work have also been reported to the General Assembly. They include no longer generally having recourse to Judges' Notes in Preliminary Objection cases and the introduction of Practice Directions. The International Court of Justice is the Court of the entire United Nations. While the Judges are elected in their personal capacities, they must through their work serve the entire international community, and not anyone particular region or legal system. It follows that the work-model within the Court must be collegial, involving everyone, and not delegated to particular Juges-Rapporteurs. This involvement of the entire Bench in every phase of all Court Judgments is, of course, time consuming. Even though judicial efficiency is of great importance, it is perhaps of even greater importance for States to be confident that all Judges have listened to and thought about their arguments, and have fully participated in the Judgment ultimately rendered. A not inconsiderable side-benefit is that Judgments are normally very detailed and thorough, with the points in issue fully canvassed. How one regards the role and significance of international law today can be answered either at the level of philosophy or pragmatic observation. In this very brief prefatory comment I can dono more than offer a personal outline-sketch. I have elaborated elsewhere why I regard international law as a special and stylized system of decision-making, rather than as a purportedly mechanistic application of 'rules'. This particular perception of international law has the virtue that it makes clear where these so-called 'rules' (or applicable norms) come from, who is purporting to apply them, and in what factual context. It also makes it explicit that international law is a vehicle for the attainment of certain values-which values in turn must be open to scrutiny and debate. I find it hugely pleasing that legal theory is no longer unfashionable. In the last twenty years there has been a tremendous debate about the nature of international law, engaged in by protagonists whose work challenges us intellectually at every turn. There is no longer a rigid division between 'the theoreticians' and 'the practitioners'. Indeed, some of the leading theoreticians have had distinguished careers as practitioners. I find it equally pleasing that national Courts everywhere now routinely engage in issues of international law. They, too, have come to recognize that it is not an arcane and mysterious subject, upon which only 'others' should pronounce, but is simply part of the law of the land. Without minimizing the difficulties that flow from the diverse ways in which treaty law is received into national law, this new phenomenon of engagement by domestic Courts is visible everywhere. The impact upon our daily lives of the decisions of international organizations, the renewed importance of the United Nations, and the open embrace of the values of human rights, have all contributed to this welcome trend. Whether one regards international law as 'rules that restrain', or as 'a common language', or as a 'normative guidance in the making of decisions', it is clear that it
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has a significant role to play in today's contemporary problems. That being said, there are several points to be made. First, the judicial element in that role should not be exaggerated. There has been an explosion of international litigation and arbitrationbut this is a reflection of an improved international climate, and not the cause of it. Secondly, the invocation and use of law has its place in diplomatic discourse and negotiation, both procedurally and substantively: it is not reserved to litigation. Thirdly, the role that international law can play in the resolution of the fearful problems of the day does depend, to a degree, on how one views this creature 'international law'. A disembodied set of rules may be functionally ill-suited to respond to the problems of applying 'law' to entirely novel circumstances. The function of international law is to find that fine balance between legal expectations generated by the experiences of the past and the solving of problems as they present themselves today. We should not underestimate the difficulties. They have been particularly evident as we struggle with notions of self-defence, reprisals, terrorism, non-State actors and all the new realities of our troubled world. The Charter is a living instrument: but where is the end of creative interpretation and where is the beginning of illegality? Is the legal stairway from Article 43 of the Charter to (peacekeeping' to (peace enforcement'to (coalitions of the willing' an infinitely extending staircase? Does the answer to that question lie in process and form (that is, in knowing that there has been a .binding decision of the Security Council) or in substance? And who is to articulate that substantive answer? There are many comparable conundrums to wrestle with. What is the reach of exceptions to the normal requirements of (the rule of law'? What, indeed, is meant by (the rule oflaw'? Is the contemporary interest in ethics an intrusion into legal rules or simply the articulation of a value inevitably present in international law as legal process? It is useful to step back from analysing today's legal problems (on which there has been a profusion of interesting and useful writing) to think about these fundamental, over-arching questions. We should not pretend that on these profound dilemmas there are clear answers-(correct rules' which simply wait to be impartially applied. There are not clear answers. There is a process by which optimal answers can be arrived at, with leading guidance given by those decision-makers entrusted by the international community with that task. This is the contemporary challenge in international law, and the particular responsibility of the international judge.
THE PINOCHET CASE-SOME PERSONAL REFLECTIONS The Rt Hon The Lord Millett
It is fifty years since I studied public international law at Cambridge. (Studied' rather
overstates the case; prospective barristers like me knew that we would be unlikely to need the subject in the Hendon Magistrates Court or the Southend County Court where we expected to spend our early years in practice. So we did not pursue our studies with as much diligence as we should have done. But we were assiduous in attending the lectures, which were given by the great Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, the most venerated international lawyer of the day. He was a marvellous lecturer and an inspiring teacher who conveyed his own enthusiasm to his students. The Nuremburg trials were then of recent memory and the Cold War was in its early stages. We were still optimistic that Nazi criminals remaining at large would be brought to trial, that the international community would take on board the lessons of the holocaust, and that in future crimes against humanity would be punished. No longer, we hoped, would the way in which a sovereign State treated its own nationals be regarded with indifference by the rest of the world. But it was not to be. The Cold War lasted for a further forty years. With the notable exception of Eichmann, the major Nazi criminals were not brought to justice. They were too useful to be locked up or hanged. Former neutral and even Allied countries offered them refuge and competed for their services. Not until the Cold War was over did the world turn its attention once again to unfinished business. And by then a new generation of monstrous tyrants had appeared. The international criminal court, which Lauterpacht had advocated with such passion fifty years ago, has finally been established, albeit in a different millennium. In the years between I had little or nothing to do with public international law. As a barrister practising at the Chancery Bar, first as a Junior and later as Queen's Counsel, my time was almost exclusively spent on domestic English legal problems. Occasionally they had a foreign element, so private international law issues occasionally reached my consciousness. But public international law, like criminal law, was a distant memory. It recalled undergraduate days, along with punting on the Cam and May Balls, but that is all.
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THE PINOCHET CASE-SOME PERSONAL REFLECTIONS
In 1986 I was appointed to the Chancery Bench, and one of my first cases was the International Tin Council case. The question was whether the English Court had jurisdiction under the Companies Act to wind up an international organization. It involved issues of company law and both private and public international law. Twenty-two counsel, if I remember correctly, appeared before me in a packed court. They included Rosalyn Higgins, now a judge of the International Court of Justice at the Hague, but then a junior counsel appearing for the International Tin Council, and Eli Lauterpacht, Hersch's son, who was appearing as junior counsel for the creditors. He delivered an academic lecture rather than a legal argument. I well remember the moment when, referring to a decision of the House of Lords, he mentioned in passing that it was generally regarded by international lawyers as wrongly decided. Since a mere High Court judge like myself is not allowed even to entertain such a thought, I hurriedly made a mental note not to mention the case at all in my judgment. I have only one regret about the International Tin Council case. Before it began my wife presented me with a model of the Tin Man in the Wizard of Oz and suggested that I place it on the Bench in front of me, but I never had the courage to do so. By 1998 I was a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and a member of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. Within a few months I had the great privilege of being a member of the seven-man panel which sat to hear the Pinochetcase, arguably the most important public international law case in my professional lifetime. The story of the case is well known. In September 1973 General Pinochet, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean army, seized power in Chile and installed himself as Head of State. He retained power until 1990, when he stepped down in favour of a democratically elected government. It was alleged that he had maintained himself in power by the systematic and institutionalized use of torture as an instrument of State policy. In October 1998 he visited the United Kingdom in a private capacity. Contrary to some press reports at the time, he was not travelling on a diplomatic passport. He was arrested by the Metropolitan Police on an international warrant issued by a Spanish examining magistrate. The Crown Prosecution Service, acting on behalf of the Kingdom of Spain, applied for his extradition to Spain. General Pinochet opposed the application and applied for a warrant of habeas corpus. General Pinochet put forward two arguments. First, he claimed that the English courts had no jurisdiction over offences committed by a foreigner.abroad~ The Criminal Justice Act 1988, which conferred extraterritorial juri$diction on the court, was not retrospective. Secondly even if there was jurisdiction, he claimed State immunity as a former Head of State for acts committed in the exercise of his official functions. The case was heard by the Divisional Court-three judges presided over by the Lord Chief Justice. It was tried with great urgency. The hearing lasted only two days, and unreserved judgment was given on the following day. General Pinochet's submissions on jurisdiction were rejected. The 1988 Act was not retrospective, so we could not bring a prosecution ourselves. But the Extradition Act was retrospective. We could extradite a defendant for an offence in respect of which the English Court had
jurisdiction at the date of the warrant. But the General's claim to State immunity was upheld. The Crown's appeal to the House of Lords was originally heard by a panel of five Law Lords. General Pinochet did not challenge the ruling that the Extradition Act was retrospective, so the appeal was confined to the question of immunity. Once again there was something of a rush to judgment. The hearing lasted six days, and judgment was given with unusual speed only two weeks later. By a majority of three to two the Appellate Committee ruled that extradition could go ahead. The immunity of a former Head of State was confined to acts performed in the legitimate exercise of his official functions, and these did not include torturing his political opponents. As is well known, the decision was later set aside because of Lord Hoffmann's presence on the panel which heard the case. This was an example of pure bad luck. The case was obviously politically sensitive, and the senior Law Lord, Lord BrowneWilkinson, who is responsible for selecting the particular Law Lords to sit on a case, was concerned that whatever the outcome the losing side would accuse him of having packed the Committee. So he simply selected the five most senior Law Lords to sit. These did not include Lord Hoffmann. Unfortunately Lord Browne-Wilkinson then found that he himself was unable to sit, and at the last moment the sixth senior Law Lord took his place. This was Lord Hoffmann. Judgments of the House of Lords are delivered in the Chamber, and take the form of a formal debate whether the appeal should be allowed or dismissed. Each member of the Committee who sat on the case rises in order of seniority and briefly states his opinion. Lord Hoffmann, being the most junior, spoke last. When he rose the voting was 2-2, and there was intense excitement in the Chamber. It was shaping up to be a penalty shoot-out. Lord Hoffmann has often been described since as having had the swing-or even the casting-vote. But in truth his vote was no more decisive than those of the other two in the majority. I was sitting over a coffee in the Bois de Boulogne when I received a call on my mobile to invite me to sit on the seven-man panel to re-hear the case. This time there was no rush to judgment. The case was much more fully argued. The Republic of Chile appeared for the first time to press the claim for State immunity. The hearing took twelve days, and we took six weeks to consider our decision. General Pinochet successfully argued that the Extradition Act was not retrospective. Our decision on this point was unanimous. We can only extradite where we can prosecute. Like the previous panel, we rejected General Pinochet's claim to immunity, this time by a majority of six to one. On the question of jurisdiction, five of the six ruled that there was no jurisdiction over offences committed by foreigners abroad before the Criminal Justice Act 1988 conferred extraterritorial jurisdiction on the English courts. I disagreed. At first sight, the difference between us appears to be a technical one: We all agreed that torture by public officials carried out as an instrument of State policy was already an international crime of universal jurisdiction by 1973. The majority considered that this meant that, as a matter of international law, the United Kingdom was free to assume extraterritorial jurisdiction, which it eventually did in 1988.
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I considered that it meant that, as a: matter of customary international law, which is part of the common law, the United Kingdom already possessed extraterritorial jurisdiction. But the difference really goes far deeper than that. The majority considered that torture by foreigners abroad was not a crime at all under English law before the 1988 Act made it one. I could not accept that. In my opinion torture has always been a crime under every civilized system of law. It is just that, until 1988, our courts had no jurisdiction over it if it was committed abroad. There was no question of retrospective criminalization of conduct which was lawful when committed. Torture was already a crime under both English and Chilean law. A similar point was made by the Nuremburg Trial and by the Supreme Court of Israel in the Eichmann case. On the same day that we delivered our judgment, NATO forces began to bomb the sovereign state of Serbia in an attempt to stop the atrocities its government was committing against its own citizens in Kosovo. Two events on a single day showed how far we had come from the classical doctrines of international law as we had learned them fifty years ago. No longer is international law a matter which concerns sovereign States alone. It marches with human rights law to protect individuals from State action. The world community has finally decided that the way a sovereign State treats its own nationals is not a purely internal matter. International intervention is justified to prevent a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population by its own government. The justification for intervention is that such an attack, conducted on a large scale and as a matter of State policy, is an attack on the legal order itself and threatens the peace and security of the world. As with the Pinochet case, the moral justification is that some crimes are so great that they are not just crimes against . domestic law and order but crimes against humanity itself. Those who commit them do not merely offend against their own domestic law, but are (enemies of all mankind'.
THE PER·SPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE BAR Ian Brownlie, CBB, QC
The literature often addresses the question of the (relevance' of international law and, at the outset of studying the subject, such discussions are useful. It is a particular characteristic of international law that it is not easy for the observer or student to develop the necessary empathy. The problem of perception is increased by the distance between ordinary experience and the wavelength of international affairs. Experience of legal practice reveals the impressive diversity of contexts in which reference to international law is necessary. The following list is illustrative and by no means exhaustive but it does address the issue of relevance. The focus of the classification is upon the legal function and context in each case. (1) Advice to government delegations involved in negotiations with other
governments, for example, concerning maritime delimitation or the creation of the mechanism for the peaceful settlement of a dispute. (2) The drafting of written pleadings in relation to cases in front of courts of arbitration or the International Court of Justice, together with the preparation of oral arguments. (3) Assistance to government delegations involved in procedures of mediation or
conciliation in order to settle, or to ameliorate, disputes between States. (4) Advice to the armed forces of a State relating to the application to the humanitarian law of war in an armed conflict, including civil strife, and the drafting of the rules of engagement to be observed in the military operations envisaged.
(5) The provision of legal advice to national liberation movements, to organized minority groups within States, and to political parties. (6) Assistance to non-governmental international and national organizations,
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such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace International. Such organizations may be involved as parties in international dispute mechanisms, and as parties, or interveners, in cases in national courts. (7) The giving of evidence and, or, advice to the committees of parliamentary assemblies involved in the investigation of particular incidents or crises. (8) Assistance to temporary administrations set up with the authority of the organs of the United Nations, as in the case of East Timor. (9) Advice to private corporations on questions of international law, for example, in relation to the protection of investments, concession agreements, access to natural resources, and questions of human rights. (10) Acting as Counsel and Advocate in proceedings before international tribunals and specialized bodies, such as the United Nations Compensation Commis-, sion and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The international tribunals include the ad hoc courts of arbitration, such as the Arbitration Tribunal created to determine issues of sovereignty and maritime delimitation in the Red Sea Islands case, or the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, established pursuant to an agreement dated 12 December 2000. (11) Acting as Counsel in municipal court proceedings involving matters of public international law, such as the appeals and other proceedings concerning the International Tin Counci~ and the two appeals in the Pinochet case. The above list of types of work provides a simple but effective indication of the responsibilities of a member of the Bar specializing in matters of international law. However, the picture needs to be rounded out by reference to the not inconsiderable number of constituencies involving specialized areas of public international law, including human rights, the legal protection of the environment, international criminal law, petroleum law, trade law, refugee law, and monetary law. In the field of arbitration the applicable law in bilateral investment treaties will involve a multiple reference to municipal law, public international law, the treaty provisions themselves, and perhaps other elements. Members of the Bar will, in the setting of national courts, and in providing episodic advice, normally work as individuals or in small groups. In the practice of international law the clients are normally States, organizations and corporations. The milieu calls for working in groups and, perhaps, in a series of overlapping groups. States are not infrequently concerned to establish a: degree of internal accountability and the team working on a problem, or preparing litigation, may thus consist of three elements: the in-house government lawyers (of the Foreign Ministry, the Attorney-General's Office, or some other relevant ministry), the external lawyers, and a nationally based monitoring group, which will include persons representing local and regional interests. It is necessary to point out that, in the International Court and before other international tribunals, it is not necessary to belong to the Bar of any State, or to be
THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE BAR
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otherwise a member of the legal profession. Locus standi depends upon the authority to appear conferred by the client concerned. It is quite normal for States to be represented by distinguished academic lawyers or other legal specialists who have no professional qualifications. Moreover, it is a pleasant and necessary characteristic of practice that other professions are directly involved. Thus teams may encompass economists, petroleum engineers, members of the armed forces, hydrographers, surveyors, geographers, and social anthropologists. These specialists will often have the role of expert witnesses, subject to cross-examination, but the State involved in litigation must make its election. Provided their names are formally indicated on the delegation list presented to the tribunal, such specialists may address the tribunal in the role of advocates, but will not then, of course, appear as expert witnesses. Tribunals may, and sometimes do, make practice directions which impose certain duties on Counsel. More often the only source of professional discipline will be the governing bodies of the legal profession (or two professions in some common law jurisdictions) of the State of origin of the individual concerned. Thus, the English Bar, of which the writer is a member, prohibits the practice of touting for work and, in addition, the English barrister is not permitted to select the clients (this injunction is known familiarly as the 'Cab Rank' principle). Beyond the formal and institutional imposition of rules of conduct, the standards of conduct applying to international law practice tend to reflect the fact that the clients are often States and organizations. Such clients value confidentiality. For this and other reasons, it is tempting fate to publish material about litigation one has been concerned with, even when all appears to be said and done. New issues may arise and the discussion of a case in a journal may, in retrospect, be discovered to contain hostages to fortune. It is important' to appreciate the idiosyncratic aspects of a practice which involves acting for States and working within the context of governmental action and diplomacy. In the preparation of written and oral arguments before international tribunals the freelance pleaders are working exclusively as representatives of the State concerned and not as unauthorized experts or amici curiae. Consequently, all material presented to the tribunal must have the authorization of the government-appointed head of the team, the head of the delegation, usually designated as 'the Agent'. In this context Counsel cannot be permitted' to answer questions of substance addressed to him or her by the Tribunal except with the permission of the head of delegation. In cases before the International Court and in inter-State arbitrations the practice is for questions to be addressed to the parties at the end of the first round of the oral hearings, these questions to be answered in the course of the second round speeches or within a period, usually two or three weeks, after the close of the session. There is a special culture of speech preparation with its own difficulties and points of protocol. Time-keeping is of the essence. It is often the case that the association with a State engaged in a major boundary dispute or resource-related maritime delimitation will last for thre.e or four years, commencing with the giving of general advice on the merits and the often difficult
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question of establishing an appropriate forum for peaceful settlement of the dispute. However, the freelance adviser retains, and should retain, the independence of approach which is characteristic of the professional lawyer. Confidential advice to the client must involve frankness and objectivity, otherwise it is worthless, and probably harmful. Working in a milieu in which the clients are States presents problems of a special sort, relatively unknown in a single jurisdiction practice. Within the United Kingdom the Bar would consider appearance against the government and its agencies as perfectly normal and a necessary concomitant of the Rule of Law. But should this principle apply to disputes between States, in which Counsel will appear against his own government? The principle must surely remain applicable, if the Rule of Law is to be maintained. And does the principle apply in a situation in which the client is a State which is, or is likely to be, in a state of armed conflict with Counsel's State of nationality? No doubt there is a clear prima facie constraint here. But, once more, the ultimate source of guidance is the Rule of Law and, in the present context, which is, the practice of public international law, the principles of general international law, and the principles enshrined in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter. The general principle applicable to practice at the English Bar is that the barrister does not select his or her clients, and this principle of objectivity applies to the nature of the causes which a client may espouse and the type of conduct with which the client is allegedly associated. Without such a principle the Rule of Law would be set at naught and in criminal trials defendants would lack representation. In some circles the claim is made by certain lawyers that they will only work for good causes. Apparently, such good causes do not include the giving of practical reality to the Rule of Law. It is surely of the essence of the principle of legality that the law should be available to all. In conclusion it is worth emphasizing that, at least in the tradition of the English Bar, the legal adviser or advocate represents the client, but retains a significant degree of independence and aloofness. If the barrister simply identifies with the client in all respects, his value will diminish. The purpose of advocacy is to establish a link with the court and, if a client ignorant of or indifferent to the judicial context imposes inappropriate instructions the desired link with the court will be weakened or broken. Pleasing the client is one thing, winning a case is another, although if one is fortunate, both outcomes may be achieved.
REFLECTIONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL ·LITI·GATION Campbell McLachlan
My first experience of International Law in practice came from the less conventional direction of Private International Law. At a relatively young age, I was asked by the then director of the Legal Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat, Jeremy Pope, to attend as Commonwealth Observer the Working Sessions of the Hague Conference on Private International Law on the Taking of Evidence Abroad and Choice of Law in International Sale of Goods. These were diplomatic conferences concerned with respectively the review of an existing convention of great practical importance in International Commercial Litigation and the attempt (ultimately still-born) to conclude a new convention on choice of law to complement and fill the gaps left by the great Vienna Convention on a Uniform Law for the Sale of Goods. As such, they carried the trappings of international treaty-making by State representatives. But, given the (at least then) less politicized character of Private International Law, and the very special character of the Hague Conference, a constructive informality prevailed in which even a junior observer's views could be heard. This introduction to international law-making instilled into me three insights which I have carried with me into practice. The first is the degree of inte~connection between Private and Public International Law. Although there are many oft-cited differences between the two disciplines, in my opinion the distinctions tend to be over-stated. The resulting lack of interplay between those working in each field has impoverished both subjects and in particular obscured examination of the interface between them. The importance of this interface could be seen even in the discussions at the Hague Conference on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, which had become a flash-point for differing conceptions of permissible assertions of jurisdiction and the extent to which cross-border process could be engaged for the public law claims of foreign States. In my view, Private International Law (despite its comparative diversity) was not to be seen as merely another domestic law subject, akin to contract
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or tort, but rather as a legal response to inherently international problems. In this way, it shared much with Public International Law. The second insight which I gained from that early observation of international law-making is that International Law is not to be seen merely as an abstract body of rules. It is, importantly, a means of resolving actual disputes as they arise on the international plane. As such, an understanding of how the rules will operate in practice as part of a process of dispute resolution can also help in the formulation of new international law. The third point is that International Law is not to be regarded as a static code. It must be capable of creative change in response to new international realities. Amongst other things, this includes a growing diversity of the contexts and fora in which international law falls to be applied. Of particular importance then, and even more so in practice today, was the development of mixed arbitration between corporations and states in the field of foreign investment law, where the governing law was often Public International Law (or a hybrid of international law and a given national law). Upon entering private practice in 1988, I was fortunate to be able to pursue these interests in the conduct oflive cases. I joined a practice group at Herbert Smith, which was (and is) pre-eminent in handling cases on the interface between Public and Private International Law. Founded by Dr FA Mann (who was active in the firm until his death in 1991), and then headed by Lawrence Collins (editor of Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws), the group exemplified an approach which married the academic and the practical without compromise to either. The first case in which I was involved in practice was one of the cases on the effect of President Reagan's Libyan assets freeze on bank deposits held in London (Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Manufacturers' Hanover Trust Co [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep 608). It involved issues of the extraterritoriality of laws and International Monetary Law, approached, as one might expect of an English court, within the framework of a conflict of laws analysis. Since then I have been privileged to act on numerous matters involving the interests of sovereign States in international litigation. Sometimes, as in Ex parte Pinochet (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147, in which we acted for the Republic of Chile, the cases involve matters of the greatest possible international moment. More often, the cases, while of no less importance to the client, arise out of the regular 'conduct of international commerce. Recent examples include: an attempt by a foreign creditor of Cuba to enforce its debt over the assets of the Central Bank of Cuba, raising issues of State immunity and jurisdiction (Banca Carige SpA v Banco Nacional de Cuba & anor [2001] 1 WLR 2039); parallel proceedings pursued by the International Fund for Agricultural Development in connection with corruption in the procurement of consultancy contracts in the International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal in Geneva and the English courts (Re Jazayeri); an international arbitral claim intimated by a Western European investor against an African State concerning the latter's alleged failure to protect the investor's right to operate an exclusive state
REFLECTIONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
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lottery; acting for the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in the recovery in the Isle of Man of the largest-ever sum alleged to be the proceeds of insider trading secured outside the United States (Attorney-General for the Isle of Man v Poyiadjis); and representing the Republic of South Africa in proceedings to recover Clive of India's Gold, believed to have been taken from South African territorial waters, and displayed for auction in London. These cases have all involved a mix of Public and Private International Law issues. We have also found in practice that Public International Law has moved into the mainstream of the concerns of commercial clients. Perhaps the most notable aspect of this has been the development of foreign investment protection through bilateral investment treaties. These treaties typically give investors direct rights of action against host States through arbitration, in the event that the fundamental rights protected by International Law (including the protection from expropriation and the right to full protection and security) are infringed. There has been a huge rise in the number of such cases pursued in recent years, particularly before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Cases in which we are currently acting have concerned investments as diverse as a water utility in Bolivia; a telecommunications business in West Africa; and oil and gas exploitation in a CIS State. Even disputes which arise purely at the inter-State level, such as maritime boundary disputes, often involve commercial interests as well, particularly as the impetus for delimitation often comes from the need for certainty in natural resource allocation. Thus oil companies in particular take a keen interest in the resolution of such matters. They also seek advice on Public International Law generally as a means of providing some protection from the vagaries of national legal systems and as a self-contained solution for trans-boundary projects (such as pipelines). From my experience of International Law in the context of disputes, I would advance five short propositions about the changing nature of International Litigation, especially as it affects sovereign States: 1. International litigation is increasing in frequency and scope
It has become almost a truism in recent years to observe that the volume of international litigation is increasing. We have moved in the space of little more than a decade from a situation in which the absence of any comprehensive judicial system was the first observation made by any undergraduate student of Public International Law, to an unprecedented proliferation of tribunals and rising case-loads. Not only does the International Court of Justice have a longer docket than ever in its history, but there are also many more specialist courts and tribunals. Of course, there have been many examples in the past of tribunals created to address particular disputes, or batches of disputes. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal and the United Nations Compensation Commission were innovative in many respects. But they nevertheless still take their place in a history of specialist claims commissions. What is new is the number of institutionalized tribunals with broad competence
18
CAMPBELL McLACHLAN
REFLECTIONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
and standing submission to jurisdiction by States: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization, and, most recently, the International Criminal Court. These institutions have a standing remit to apply international law within their particular area. Perhaps less remarked upon, but of no lesser significance to States, has been the increasing incidence of litigation involving sovereign States in national courts. Often this involves States as defendants, as States' increasing activities in the international commercial arena, and the reducing scope of State immunity, subject more and more States to foreign litigation. However, some States have also become willing to use foreign court processes to pursue their own remedies (as some of the examples which I gave above illustrate).
decisive tactical victory was obtained in the Qatar v Bahrain dispute, when Bahrain called for and inspected documents relied upon by Qatar in support of its historical arguments, and established them to be forgeries. In the Yugoslav Genocide case, the parties had at one stage signalled an intention to call over a thousand witnesses of fact. A court adjudicating upon any modern boundary dispute must generally consider a welter of expert and factual evidence in reaching its determination. In the Saiga litigation before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, very effective use was made of the power to cross-examine the Master and crew of the vessel.
2. The polycentric nature of modern disputes The second point, itself a development from the first, is that many disputes are now pursued simultaneously or consecutively in multiple fora. In Pinochet, there were parallel proceedings in the United Kingdom and Spain; diplomatic representations made by Chile to both the other States; and applications for interventions by third interested States, including Belgium. Further, had Senator Pinochet himself not been returned to Chile, the Republic of Chile had publicly announced its intention to refer its dispute with Spain over the latter's assertion of jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice. This has led rapidly to the surfacing of a problem long encountered in Private International Law, but until recently a rarity in Public International Law, namely the potential for conflicting decisions. A recent dispute between the well-known American entrepreneur Ron Lauder cind the Czech Republic over Mr Lauder's investment in a Czech television channel led to the commencement of two parallel arbitrations: one brought by Mr Lauder personally under the US/Czech BIT; and one brought by his investment company under the Dutch/Czech BIT. Although both tribunals considered identical facts and construed identical treaty language, they arrived, within the space of ten days at diametrically opposed decisions on whether the actions of the Czech Republic could constitute expropriation. The absence of any developed rules of litispendence or res judicata in international arbitration means that this situation is likely to continue. Indeed, in a recent decision, the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea decided that parallel proceedings under no less than four treaties could continue in a dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom in relation to the operation of a nuclear reprocessing plant at Sellafield (the Mox Plant case). 3. Modern international litigation is fact intensive
A third trait of mod~rn international litigation is that it is increasingly fact intensive. Although the procedure of some international courts, including the International Court of Justice, may not be well attuned to the assessment of contested facts, the cases which come before the courts ,increasingly call for such procedures. Thus, a
19
4. Modern international litigation is urgent Fourthly, much modern international litigation is dominated by the use of provisional measures and other urgent pre-emptive remedies. The use of the provisional measures jurisdiction in the International Court of Justice is starkly illustrated by the application made by Paraguay in Breard to attempt to prevent (ultimately unsuccessfully as a result of the contrary decision of the United States Supreme Court) the execution of one of its nationals who had been sentenced to death in the United States. More prosaically, more than half of the cases which have so far come before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea have concerned applications for prompt release of vessels. In contrast with the lengthy timetable which can obtain in litigation on the merits, applications for provisional measures typically arise and are determined in a matter of a few short weeks. Yet, of their nature, decisions on provisional measures often have a dramatic tactical effect on the ultimate outcome of the case. 5. Modern international litigation is unpredictable
Finally, many modern cases cannot be predicted by the States concerned. This element of unpredictability has (at least) two aspects. The first is unpredictability of commencement. In the classic case of an inter-State arbitration, for example over a boundary dispute, the case itself will have been preceded by months, if not years, of negotiation, and then by the conclusion of a compromis pursuant to which the States concerned agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration. All the actors involved would thus have plenty of time to consider the parameters of the dispute and the implications of its submission to arbitration. However, many modern forms of international dispute resolution are characterized by the State's standing consent to arbitration by treaty which can thus be invoked at the election of the claimant without prior warning. Bilateral Investment Treaties, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Energy Charter Treaty all provide examples of this trend. The second aspect of unpredictability is as to result. It might be said that this is a perennial aspect of any kind of litigation. But the results may be more acute where States are involved. Pinochet provides a stark illustration of this, with the first decision of a Judicial Committee of the House of Lords decided 3-2 against any form of immunity for Senator Pinochet; and the second decision, by a differently constituted Judicial Committee, deciding 4-1 in favour of the survival of a partial immunity.
20
CAMPBELL McLACHLAN
The Lauder v Czech Republic arbitrations provide another apposite example of unpredictability. What implications may be drawn from these trends for the development of International Law more generally? The welter of new cases coming out of the renewed enthusiasm of States for litigation will undoubtedly enrich the study of International Law as a living code, by providing opportunities to test many previously unsettled issues. At the same time, care must be taken to ensure that the proliferation of international tribunals does not lead to fragmentation of the subject, as each tribunal goes its own way in developing its jurisprudence. That problem will become all the greater as International Law is taken up and applied by a wide range of advocates and judges, both at national and international levels. There is a danger (already evident in the decisions of some national courts and arbitral tribunals) that a
A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW Ralph Zacklin
In the early 1960s, while a doctoral student at the Graduate Institute ofInternational Studies in Geneva, I was recruited to work as a research assistant by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The project on which I worked for the next three years was the Manual of Public International Law edited by Max S0rensen, Professor of International and Constitutional Law at Aarhus University in Denmark, and published by Macmillan in London and St Martin's Press in New York in· 1968. The development of international law had been a major objective and concern of the Carnegie Endowment when established in 1911, reflecting a turn of the century conviction that the rule of law is as basic to a peaceful international community as it is to a peaceful national society. This was the period between the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the outbreak of war in 1914. The decision to underwrite the publication of the Manual in 1963 coincided with one of those cyclical upturns in interest in international law which recur from time to time. The Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment, even though the development of international law was a stated objective of their trust, were themselves not immune from these cyclical trends. The 1960s seemed to be the ideal time to return to the development of international law and the Carnegie Endowment believed that it had a particular niche to fill. The Cold War seemed to be waning, or at least there were signs of a thaw in relations between East and West, and the decolonization of Africa and Asia had resulted in large numbers of new member States in the United Nations whose presumed attachment to international law and international institutions was seen as ushering in a new era of international law. The idea underlying the S0rensen Manual was to capitalize on this perceived new era by preparing and publishing a treatise on public international law written from an international rather than a national perspective. The authors were to be from different regions and different legal systems, representative of the new dispensation of the community of nations: East-West, North-South .. While each contributor would be assigned individual topics, the final edited text would represent the collective views of
RALPH ZACKLIN
A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
the group as a whole. The Manual was successfully completed and published in 1968. It was made available in a paperback edition for students world-wide. Within five years the Carnegie Endowment changed course and abandoned its interest in international law and international institutions, surrendering its pre-eminent place among foundations and NGOs in the field, and eventually moving its headquarters from New York to Washington DC. This recollection demonstrates both the strength and weakness of international law. On the one hand there is its enduring appeal which draws governments, international institutions, foundations, civil society, academies, and individuals time and again to the notion of an international community under the rule of law; on the other hand there is the widely held view among many segments of society that international law is honoured more in its breach than its observance and especially when major national interests are at stake. I have been privileged to work for almost thirty years as an international lawyer in the United Nations and from this vantage point international law is neither the omnipotent solution to the world's problems nor is it an illusion that only die-hard pacifists cling to. It is, in fact, for the practitioner a very real and pragmatic discipline. That it may be uncertain, incomplete, and difficult to enforce does not lessen the need for the rule of law on the international plane nor does it mean that the efforts to codify the law and develop its institutions should cease or be diminished. At the core of contemporary international law is the Charter of the United Nations. It is a tribute to its drafters in the San Francisco Conference that this instrument has retained its essential validity as a set of fundamental principles which have guided the community of States for more than fifty years. It is the basis for the development of much of international law as we know it today in such key areas as human rights, the environment, and the law of the sea and outer space, not to mention the vast array of multilateral treaties in numerous technical, economic, and scientific areas. International law provides a common legal vocabulary within which States and other actors operate. It provides a framework for conceptions of what is 'legal' or 'right'. For the author personally, the most striking lesson of the last thirty years is not the quantitative qualitative development of international law which has been substantial but the degree to which States have come to accept the existence of international law as a standard that must be observed or by which their actions must be justified. The debate taking place at the present time regarding the content of the rule of selfdefence as enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter is not, to my mind, a demonstration of the irrelevance of the Charter. Rather, it is a demonstration that even the most powerful state feels the need to justify its actions in law in order to secure international legitimacy. There is another dimension to international law which is sometimes overlooked in an era of globalization. International law, however inchoate it may be, represents the expectations and claims of substantial segments of humanity. It cannot be dismissed merely because of its perceived weakness. This dimension is of particular relevance to
the member States of the United Nations, the overwhelming majority of whom rely on international law-making processes in international forums to weave together the fabric of the rule oflaw. This accounts for the persistence of the United Nations in the holding of major conferences or summits-much derided in some quarters-which have produced soft law Declarations on the environment, human rights, advancement of women and a panoply of economic and social rights. These fora move from agenda-setting gradually towards normative outcomes and have undeniably altered the international legal landscape over the past twenty-five years. Law, whether domestic or international, is by nature a conservative discipline. Its evolution is slow, even laborious. International law is not, nor should it be, viewed as an ideal state in which harmony prevails. Like any other system of law, its rules and institutions mature over time. When one compares the international law of today with that of a mere three decades ago, one cannot but marvel at the advances that have been made both normatively and institutionally. The path of advancement is by no means uneventful but it continues. I have been fortunate in my own career to have had the opportunity to contribute to significant developments in international law, such as the establishment of ad hoc criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as, more recently, the Special 'Court in Sierra Leone. Over the years I have provided legal advice which has helped to ~ape much of the contemporary law of UN peace-keeping and, like many of my colleagues, have rejoiced in the completion of UN mandates which have resulted in the independence of countries such as Namibia and Timor-Leste. There have also been tragic failures in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia. At the outset of my career I was motivated like many young people of the time by an idealistic determination to make the world a safer and a better place. Over the years my idealism has certainly been tested, but I believe that the role and impact of international law has grown, and it continues to grow. The present work to which I have been asked to contribute this short prefatory reflection bears testimony to my conviction. In many ways it completes a professional and intellectual circle that is as harmonious for me personally as is the ultimate aspiration of international law itself.
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23
I ..-1
THE PERSPECTIVE OF A FOREIGN MINISTRY LEGAL ADVISER Michael Wood
To spend nearly thirty-three years as a Legal Adviser in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office may sound unadventurous. Yet the work is infinitely varied, often exciting, and --.::i'nost of the time-enjoyable. The first thing to' make clear is that the law of concern to a Foreign Ministry is by no means exclusively public international law. Questions of domestic law, including constitutional law, arise constantly, and not only over the domestic implementation of treaty and other international obligations. In the case of the United Kingdom, domestic law includes the law of the United Kingdom's overseas territories. European Union law is a field of the highest importance, as is the law of the European Convention on Human Rights. Both are now largely incorporated into UK domestic law, but have their origins in public international law. A second important point is that, in areas in which they specialize-especially in general questions of public international law-FCO Legal Advisers tend to give advice and assistance to the whole of Government. This is an important aspect of the wider 'service' which the FCO offers to other Government Departments. A third point is that, despite our title, FCO Legal Advisers are not confined to giving advice. Much of our time is spent in negotiating, and most of that is done abroad-at the United Nations in New York and Geneva, in Brussels, Strasbourg, and elsewhere. I used to regard at least one trip to Paris a year as a given. I never tire of visiting new places, whether it be a few days travelling around Svalbard (something of a highlight), or three weeks incarcerated at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio. A particularly agreeable part of the job is the number of good friends one makes from all over the world: the Governmental 'regulars' on the international legal network are a relatively small and close-knit group, who meet frequently in different locations to resolve (or at least seek to resolve) a great variety of issues. A fourth and most important point is the role of a Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser.
· 26
MICHAEL WOOD
This is a subject which has been much discussed. For the present writer, Frank Berman expressed it best: What then is the role of the governmental legal adviser? In the writer's view the main role of the Governmental legal adviser is to 'make' his Government comply with international law. One must of course put the word 'make' in mental inverted commas. It would be a rare case indeed if a Governmental legal adviser were in a position to compel the Government he serves to act in one way or another. But it cannot by the same token be the limit of the function of even someone whose role is that of 'adviser' simply to ascertain what the law is, to explain it to the best of his ability to his client, and leave it at that. Of course, when it comes to action the final decision may not be his. It is a truism to say that the question whether or not to comply with what international law requires is always a question of policy. But even the meanest definition of the role of the international law adviser in government cannot treat that policy question as if it were an entirely neutral one. It must be assumed to be a necessary part of the role that the international law adviser should be expected to use his gifts of exposition and persuasion to bring those with whom the power of decision lies to use this power to the right result (Berman, 2000, p 3). Looking back these thirty-three years, what highlights do I see? A very selective list would include the following: - negotiating a number of terrorism conventions in the 1970s, including the Internationally Protected Persons Convention (and its accompanying General Assembly resolution) in the Sixth Committee, which was a tough introduction to the legal politics of the United Nations at the time; and the 1978 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, which sought, without complete success, to circumvent the political offence exception to extradition; - negotiating over many years the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, especially its Part Xl on the Deep Sea Bed, an even more acute exposure to UN legal politics in the era of the so-called 'New International Economic Order', and involvement in setting up the International Seabed Authority in Kingston, Jamaica; involvement in the Rhodesia settlement, both at Lancaster House and with Governor Soames in Salisbury (now Harare), when questions of public international law were for the large part in the background but nevertheless of considerable underlying importance; acting as Agent before the European Court of Human Rights over a five-year period, including in cases such as Soering, close involvement in the Cambodia peace negotiations; the Two-plus-Four and One-plus-Three negotiations on the reunification of Germany; the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia; and the failed negotiations at Rambouillet fora corresponding Kosovo peace settlement; - involvement, as Legal Adviser to the United Kingdom's Mission in New York, in the drafting of the hundreds of resolutions and Presidential Statements adopted
THE PERSPECTIVE OF A FOREIGN MINISTRY LEGAL ADVISER
27
by the Security Council during the period 1991-4, including a number which involved innovation and considerable subtlety, eg those concerning Lockerbie, the former Yugoslavia, the Republic of Macedonia's admission to the United Nations, the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda; acting as Agent in cases before the International Court of Justice (Lockerbie; Legality of Use of Force) and in inter-State arbitrations (the OSPAR and UNCLOS arbitrations over Sellafield); advising on questions concerning the use of force, including Kosovo in 1998, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2002-3; handling longer-term developments in international law, including the work of the International Law Commission and the Sixth Committee on matters such as State responsibility and State immunity. Most of the above issues come to mind because they involved a great deal of work, over an extended period. Other important issues may have to be dealt with very quickly, or appear essentially as critical points in greater developments. Recent examples include aspects of the International Criminal Court (the negotiations leading to the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002), questions concerning Article 98(2) agreements, the election of the judges). And much that has to be done may be seen as 'damage limitation': sitting firmly on silly ideas or, as it was termed in New York, giving a 'decent burial' to items on the Sixth Committee's agenda that were going nowhere. My main impression, looking back over thirty-three years, is of the huge increase in the quantity and complexity of public international law issues that have to be dealt with by Government, and their increasing political and public interest. Over the last five years alone, we have seen the British media covering international law issues, day after day for weeks on end, such as the immunity of a former Head of State (Pinochet), the rights and wrongs of the United States' position on the International Criminal Court (during the evolution of Security Council Resolution 1422 in JuneJuly 2002), and-as I write-the legal necessity or not of a 'second' resolution before force may be used to disarm Saddam Hussein. The number of lawyers in the FCO has scarcely increased over this period, with the result that they are under far greater pressure than in 1970 when I first joined the Office. One result of this pressure, which I personally greatly regret, is that it becomes increasingly difficult to find the time to write articles or books. In earlier times, FCO Legal Advisers appeared to have the time to contribute far more to academic debate than they do now, at least in writing. This is unfortunate, since the publication of books and articles often adds to the personal satisfaction that one derives from the job; moreover, those involved in negotiations, and involved in the practical day-to-day application of public international law, are well placed to shed a special light on developments.
28
MICHAEL WOOD
'International law is what other countries break'. So say the cynics. It may be thought that the 'invisible college of international lawyers' is largely composed of. idealists, not cynics. But for my money, what is really needed is an underlying idealism combined with a very healthy dose of realism .. Perhaps the two greatest achievements. ()f international law over the last century are, first, the restrictions on the use of forc~ embodied in the Pact of Paris and then in the United Nations Charter; and, secondly, the development of human rights and humanitarian law and their enforcement. Both these developments are currently under severe challenge. It is, indeed, the best of times and the worst of times to be a Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser. Whatever else it is, life is not dull.
PART I
THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
REFERENCE BERMAN, SIR FRANKLIN (2000), 'The Role of the International Lawyer in the Making of Foreign Policy' in Wickremasinghe, C
(ed.), The International Lawyer as Practitioner (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law), p 3.
1 A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Stephen C Neff
SUMMARY This history will emphasize broad trends in international law, in both the conceptual sphere and in State practice. The discussion will move chronologically, beginning with a cursory look at the ancient world, followed by a rather fuller discussion ofthe great age of natural law in the European Middle Ages. The classical period (1600-1815) witnessed the emergence of a dualistic view of international law, with the law of nature and the law of nations co-existing (more or less peacefully). For the nineteenth century, the least known part of international law, the existence of three distinct traditions will be notedbut with one of them (the positivist one) so dominant as nearly to efface the other two. Regarding the inter-war period, developments both inside and outside the League of Nations will be considered. Since the post-1945 period will occupy most ofthe remainder of this book, this discussion will confine itself to a few historically-oriented comments on some of its most general features.
I. INTRODUCTION No area of international law has been so little explored by scholars as the history of the subject. This is a remarkable state of affairs, probably without parallel in any other discipline (including other branches of law). This intellectual scandal, as it well deserves to be called, has only recently begun to be remedied. As we are still only in the earliest stages of the serious study of international legal history, many blank spots exist, some of which will be identified in passing in the discussion below. This short history-inevitably very short history-can give no more than a flavour of the major periods of development of international law. Nor will it be possible to give more than the most token attention to developments outside the Western
STEPHEN C NEFF
A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
mainstream. Both ideas and practice will be covered. The ideas chiefly concern what international law was thought to consist of in past times. State practice is concerned with what states actually did. It was the two in combination-if not always in close harmony-that made international law what it became.
most evidence for a nascent international law in the three areas of ancient Eurasia that were characterized by dense networks of small, independent States sharing a more or less common religious and cultural value system: Mesopotamia (by, say, the fourth or third millennium BC), northern India (in the Vedic period after about 1600 BC), and classical Greece. From each of these three State systems, characterized by a blend of political fragmentation and cultural unity, a number of fairly standard practices emerged, which helped to place inter-State relations on at least a somewhat stable and predictable footing. This was true in three areas especially: diplomatic relations, treaty-making, and the conduct of war. l A major additional contribution of the Greek city-States was the practice of arbitration of disputes, of which there came to be a very impressive body of practice (Ager, 1996). Nor was it inordinately difficult for some of these practices to extend across deeper cultural lines as well. One of the earliest surviving treaty texts is between Egypt and the Hittite Empire; from the thirteenth century BC, which concerned an imperial division of spheres of influence, but which also dealt with extradition of fugitives. The problem of good faith and binding force was ensured by enlisting the gods of both nations (two thousand strong in all) to act as guardians (Bederman, 2001, pp 147-150). With the advent of the great universal religions, far more broadly-based systems of world order became possible. One outstanding example was the Islamic empire of the seventh century AD and afterwards. Significantly, the body of law on relations between States within the Muslim world (the Dar aI-Islam, or 'House ofIslam') was much richer than that regarding relations with the outside world (the Dar al-Harb, or 'House of war'). But even with infidel States and nationals, a number of pragmatic devices evolved to permit relations to occur in predictable ways-such as 'temporary' truces (in lieu of treaties) or safe-conducts issued to individuals (sometimes on a very large scale).2 In Western history, the supreme exemplar of the multinational empire was Rome. But the Roman Empire was, in its formative period, a somewhat tentative and ramshackle affair, without an over-arching ethical or religious basis comparable to the Islamic religion in the later Arab empire. That began to change, however, when certain philosophical concepts were imported from Greece (from about the second century BC). The most important of these was the idea of a set of universal principles of justice: the belief -that, amidst the welter of varying laws of different States, certain substantive rules of conduct were present in all human societies. This idea first surfaced in the writings of Aristotle (Rhetoric, p 1370). But it was taken much further by the philosophers of the Stoic school, who envisaged the entire world as a single 'world city-State' (or kosmopolis) governed by the law of nature. Cicero, writing under Stoic influence, characterized this law of nature as being 'spread through the whole human community, unchanging and eternal' (Cicero, Republic, pp68--69).
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II. ANCIENT WORLDS For a vivid indication of how persons from even the most diverse cultures can relate to one another in a peaceful, predictable, and mutually beneficial fashion, it is difficult to top Herodotus's description of 'silent trading' between the Carthaginians and an unnamed North African tribe in about the sixth century Be. When the Carthaginians arrived in the tribe's area by ship, they would unload a pile of goods from their vessels, leave them on the beach and then return to their boats and send a smoke signal. The natives would then come and inspect the goods on their own, leave a pile of gold, and retire. Then the Carthaginians would return; and, if satisfied that the gold represented a fair price, they would take it and depart. If not satisfied, they would again retire to their ships; and the natives would return to leave more gold. The process would continue until both sides were satisfied, at which the point the Carthaginians would sail away with their gold, without a word exchanged between the two groups. 'There is perfect honesty on both sides', Herotodus assures us, with no problems of theft or conflict (Herodotus, Histories, p 336). This silent trading arrangement may have been successful in its way, but a process of interaction so inflexibly ritualistic and so narrow in subject matter could hardly suffice for political interactions between States, even in ancient times. Most people probably have the feeling that something rather more elaborate is required to merit the grand name of 'international law'. Indeed, the ambiguity of the term 'international law' leads to various different answers to the question of when international law 'began'. If by 'international law' is meant merely the ensemble of methods or devices which give an element of predictability to international relations (as in the silent-trading illustration), then the origin may be placed virtually as far back as recorded history itself. Ifby 'international law' is meant a more or less comprehensive substantive code of conduct applying to nations, then the late classical period and Middle Ages was the time of its birth. If 'international law' is taken to mean a set of substantive principles applying uniquely to States as such, then the seventeenth century would be the starting time. If 'international law' is defined as the integration of the world at large into something like a single community under a rule oflaw, then the nineteenth century would be the earliest date (perhaps a trifle optimistically). If 'international law' is understood to mean the enactments and judicial decisions of a world government, then its birth lies (if at all) somewhere in the future-and, in all likelihood, the distant future at that. If we take the most restricted of these definitions, then we could expect to find the
33
I On the Middle Eastern and Greek practice, see generally Bederman, 2001. On ancient India, see Bhatia, 1977. 2 On Islamic views of international law, see generally Khadduri, 1955.
STEPHEN C NEFF
A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
This concept of a universal and eternal natural law was later adopted by two other groups, the Roman lawyers and the Christian Church, and then bequeathed by them to medieval Europe. The lawyers in particular made a distinction that would have a very long life ahead of it: between a jus naturale (or natural law properly speaking) and a jus gentium (or law of peoples). The two were distinct, but at the same time so closely interconnected that the differences between them were often very easily ignored. Natural law was the broader concept. It was something like what we would now call a body of scientific laws, applicable not just to human beings but to the whole animal kingdom as well. The jus gentium was the human component, or sub-category, of it. Just as the law of nature was universal in the natural world, so was the jus gentium universal in the human world.
universe could be derived (although not until long after the Middle Ages would serious attempts actually be made to achieve this feat). Medieval natural law was also broadly teleological in nature, particularly so with the growth in influence of the Aristotelian outlook after the twelfth century. By this is meant that the universe-comprising both the social and the natur,al worlds-was held to be organized according to a (literally) universal grand plan. And that plan and purpose infused and animated the entire universe, both natural and social. Law, as an integral part of this grand master plan, had a purpose: to move society ever further in the direction indicated by reason and the law of nature. In short, medieval manindeed, the whole medieval universe-was imbued with a strong sense of mission. I There continued to be, as in the ancient period, a distinction between the jus naturale and the jus gentium, still without any very sharp line between the two. The jus gentium was very much the lesser of the two, being seen largely as an application of the natural law to human government. These jus gentium rules were sometimes referred to as (secondary' natural-law rules. It must be stressed that this original jus gentium did not consist entirely, or even primarily, of what would now be called rules of international law. Instead, it was a collection of laws common to all nations, affecting individuals of all stations, from the highest to the lowest and dealing with all walks of life-contract, property, crime, and the like. It was more in the nature of what we would now call an ethical system, setting out general norms of conduct, than of a legal code, listing prohibitions and punishments. In the grander scheme of natural law, there was no strong tendency to think that any body of law existed that was applicable uniquely to international relations as such. This point was most apparent in the development of one of the most notable products of medieval natural-law thought: ideas about the lawful resort to force (or about (just wars', in the common medieval expressioII). Just-war ideas first emerged in debates over an issue of personal conduct-whether practising Christians could lawfully perform military service, which involved violence and killing, contrary (apparently) to the express commands of scripture. It was held that such service was permissible, so long as it arose from noble and disinterested motives: from the desire to protect the community against oppressors, rather than for personal glory or gain or (worst of all) for love of violence for its own sake. This basic idea was then extrapolated, with very little change, to the inter-State level, so that States, like private persons, were permitted lawfully to wage war for such purposes as the punishment of wickedness or, generally, for the enforcement of the law-but not for vainglory or conquest or oppression. 5 The description of medieval natural law as rationalist in character is, in some ways,· all too accurate. It was much more the subject of debate amongst educated theorists, in a theological milieu, than it was a living law in the everyday world. As a result, many of the more practical issues-especially those relating to war-were treated by secular writers rather than by theologians. For example, Bartolo of Sassoferrato, the famous
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III. THE MIDDLE AGES: THE NATURAL LAW ERA The European Middle Ages became the great age of natural-law thought. During this period, natural-law ideas developed under the umbrella of the Catholic Church. But it must be remembered that natural law was not specifically Christian in its inception, but rather was a legacy of the classical Stoic and Roman legal traditions. It is true that there was a line of medieval (and, later, Protestant) thought known as (voluntarism', which held natural law to be a pronouncement or command by God, with the contents discoverable by humans by way of revelation. But the dominant school of thought-represented outstandingly by Thomas Aquinas-was the rationalist (sometimes called the intellectualist) one, which held the content of the natural law to be susceptible of discovery and application by means of human reason rather than revelation. 3 Natural law is one of the many parts of international law that has never received the systematic study that it merits. Moreover, many of its ideas were deeply foreign to our present ways of thinking. In the present context, only a few of the most salient points can be noted. 4 Perhaps the single most outstanding feature of medieval natural law was its all-embracing character. It encompassed and regulated the natural and social life of the universe in all its infinite variety-from the movements of the stars in their courses to the gurgling of the four humours through the veins and arteries of the human body, from the thoughts and deeds of all of the creatures of land, sea, and air, to those of human beings and the angels in the heavens. At the same time, however, amidst this kaleidoscopic variety, natural law was, ultimately and fundamentally, monistic in character, in that it was based on a single grand coherent plan for the universe at large. Moreover, it was seen to be deductive in nature-ie, based on a very small number of basic principles froIl:?- which, in theory, all the infinite detail of the 3
On the voluntarist and rationalist traditions in natural-law thought, see Schneewind, 1998, pp 17-36.
4 For a good short account of medieval natural-law theory, see generally Gierke, 1937.
5
For an outstanding exposition of medieval just-war theory, see Russell, 1975.
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Italian lawyer of the fourteenth century, wrote a treatise on reprisals, a subject of practical importance to merchants suffering injuries at the hands of foreign States. At about the same time, rules on the conduct of war ('the law of arms', as it was known) were expounded by John of Legnano and later by a monk named Honore de Bonet (or Bouvet), whose book entitled The Tree of Battles, of the 1380s, became very influential. 6 Accounts of medieval warfare led to grave doubts, however, whether even these practical rules exerted much real influence. Only in the late Middle Ages did international law begin to be applied regularly to immediate political and military issues. Rules on the acquisition of territory became highly relevant with the European explorations of Africa and, particularly, the New World from the fourteenth century onward.· In the sixteenth century, the Spanish conquest of the Indian kingdoms in the New World sparked vigorous debates (if only after the fact). The Dominican scholar Francisco de Vitoria, in a series of lectures at the University of Salamanca, concluded that the Spanish conquest was justified, on the ground that the Indians had unlawfully attempted to exclude Spanish traders from their kingdoms, contrary to natural-law rules. But he also confessed that his blood froze in his veins at the thought of the terrible atrocities committed by the Spanish in the process. 7 At the end of the century, the Italian writer Alberico Gentili, who was a practising lawyer as well as a university scholar, produced the first truly systematic study of the law of war, bringing classical just-war thought to bear on a broad range of concrete questions arising from the actual practice of war. 8 Much of the State practice in the Middle Ages consisted of traditional ways inherited from ancient times. The area of diplomatic relations is an example, with diplomats increasingly being accorded a broad (but not absolute) degree of immunity from judicial process in host States. Law was also being used to facilitate a different sort of 'commerce' between peoples: foreign trade by private merchants, often with the Muslim States, which were more advanced economically for much of this period than the European States were. Many of the financial practices associated with international trading, such as bills of exchange (which were probably of Muslim origin) found a wide use within the peripatetic medieval merchant community. Beginning in about the eleventh century, European (chiefly Italian) States began to conclude bilateral treaties that spelled out various reciprocal guarantees of fair treatment. These agreements, sometimes concluded with Muslim States, granted a range of privileges to the foreign merchants based in the contracting States, such as the right to use their own law and courts when dealing with one another. The same process was at work in the sphere of maritime trading. The seafaring community made use of the laws of Oleron (which were actually a series of court decisions from the small island of that name in the Bay of Biscay), and also of a code of rules called the Consolato del Mare,
compiled in about the thirteenth century for the maritime community of Barcelona. These codes governed the broad range of maritime activities, including the earliest rules on the rights of neutral traders in wartime. In short, medieval international law was a jumble of different beliefs and practices-from the rarefied conceptions of the law of nature, to the more serviceable rules by which various communities conducted their actual day-to-day business, from warfare and diplomacy, to buying and selling.
On medieval law on the conduct of war, see Keen, 1965. 7 Vitoria, 'On the American Indians', in Political Writings, pp 231-292; Letter to Miguel de Arcos, ibid, pp 331-333. 8 On Gentili, see generally Van der Molen, 1968. 6
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IV. THE CLASSICAL AGE (1600-1815) In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a new spirit entered into doctrinal thought on international law. Its principal harbinger was the Dutch writer Hugo Grotius, whose major work On the Law of War and Peace was published in Paris in 162S-a work so dense and rich that one could easily spend a lifetime studying it (as a number of scholars have).9 Grotius has often been credited with the 'secularization' of natural-law thought, partly on the basis of the celebrated statement in the prologue of his book, that the law of nature would be the same even if God did not exist. In reality, this was merely an announcement of his adherence to the rationalist (or intellectualist) tradition of natural law, inherited from medieval Catholic thought, as distinct from the voluntarist philosophy, which had become the dominant view of Protestantism. Nor was Grotius very modern in his style. He carefully avoided references to current or recent political events wherever possible, thereby sharply limiting the practical utility of his book. Instead, he risked burying his hapless readers beneath an avalanche of illustrative examples, promiscuously culled from classical and Biblical writings. The most crucial contribution of Grotius was his emphasis on the law of nations (the jus gentium) as a body of law distinct from the law of nature properly speaking, and not merely as a component or sub-set of it, as had been previously the case. Furthermore, this body of law was no longer seen, as in the Middle Ages, as the application of natural law to human affairs. Instead, the practice of States was now seen as a distinct source oflaw in its own right. The law of nations, in Grotius's words, was the 'law which has received its obligatory force from the will of all nations, or of many nations' (Grotius, War and Peace, p 44). This human-made law of nations later came to be commonly labelled the 'voluntary' law of nations (a term that will be used henceforth in this discussion).lo One of the most distinctive features of this voluntary law, to Grotius, was that it only purported to regulate the external conduct of rulers 9 Much of the study of Grotius has been by political scientists rather than specifically by international lawyers. Remarkably, there is no comprehensive and accessible survey of his international legal thought and influence in English. For an older work that is still of value, see Knight, 1925. For a brief overview of his legal thought, see Tuck, 1999, pp 78-108. For a more thorough study, see Haggenmacher, 1983. 10 Gottfried von Leibnitz may have been the first to use this particular expression.
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and States. It did not concern itself, as the natural law did, with inward dispositions or states of mind. Other forces were at work in this period, helping to create a law of nations in the full sense of the word. It was only now that nation-States were coming to be seen as permanently existing, corporate entities in their own right, separate from the rulers who governed them at any given time. The most concrete sign of this development was the fact that it became commonly accepted in this period that treaties were binding on the State as such, not merely on the particular rulers who concluded them. During this period, too, States began to build up permanent government bureaucracies, whose task was to regulate and monitor the activities of the nation as a whole, in the general national interest. There was even, in Germany, an academic science of statecraft, known as 'cameralism'. Parallel with this emergence of States as distinct and permanent entities with their own legal 'personality' (as lawyers put it) was the idea that these entities should be governed by a distinct set of laws uniquely suited to them alone-in short, by a law of nations, which would be distinct from the general ethical principles laid down by the classical natural law. This law of nations-in this newer sense of the term-would consist of a set of rules governing the relations between nation-States as such. In the late eighteenth century, it would even receive the new label of 'international law' at the hands of Jeremy Bentham (Nussbaum, 1947, pp 135-136). Since the subject matter of this law would be the relations between States, it necessarily left States free to determine internal matters for themselves. In other words, there now emerged a distinction, which gradually became sharper over time, between international matters and domestic matters. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648, ending the Thirty Years War, illustrated this new outlook in action, by expressly placing religious matters in the sphere of domestic activities. It should not be thought, however, that natural law was discarded in anything like an abrupt fashion in this period. In fact, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the great age of systematic jurisprudence, in which natural law was re-housed (it might be said) in grand logical edifices of a hypothetico-deductive nature, modelled on that most magnificent of all intellectual constructions, mathematics. The names of Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, and Gottfried von Leibnitz come readily to mind in this regard. (Grotius himself had advanced this ideal of organizing natural law into a mathematical-style deductive order, but he made no real progress in that direction.) Amongst the most prominent in this rationalist tradition was the German writer Samuel Pufendorf, whose major work on The Law of Nature an.d Nations was written in 1672. (Pufendorf, incidentally, held one of the first academic chairs in 'the law of nature and nations' at the University of Heidelberg in the 1660s.)11 The culmination of this systematic natural-law movement came in the mid-eighteenth century, at the hands of the German philosopher Christian Wolff, who fittingly had been trained as a mathematician. Wolff's massive eight-volume encyclopaedia of natural law contained
detailed discussions of practically everything under the sun and beyond (including a discourse on the characteristics of inhabitants of other planets)-while paying virtually no heed to State practice. It holds an honourable place on the list of the world's great unreadable and unread masterpieces. 12 These two kinds of law-the law of nature (properly speaking) and the law nations-coexisted in a complex, and somewhat untidy, way. From their interplay arose a modern law of nations that was rooted in State practice as well as in grand theory. In principle, the law of nature was recognized as superior to the voluntary law. Only where the law of nature was unable, for one reason or another, to provide an effective guide to State conduct could the voluntary law of nations be brought in to fill the gap. The voluntary law, in other words, was seen as interstitial in nature rather than comprehensive, as the natural law supposedly was. The dualistic character of the law in this period-and the increasing role of the voluntary component of it-was nowhere more evident than in the writing of the Swiss diplomat Emmerich de Vattel. His famous exposition of The Law of Nations, published in London in 1758, was to international law what the near-contemporary Commentaries of Blackstone were to English law. The first systematic internationallaw treatise of the modern kind, it would not look drastically out of place on a twenty-first-century bookshelf, as the works of Grotius or Wolff certainly would. Instead of setting out a grand philosophical scheme, the book was designed as a sort of handbook for lawyers and statesmen, full of practical applications of the law as well as illustrations from recent practice. Moreover, its graceful style ensured it a wider usage by lawyers, judges, and lay persons than any other international writing had previously had. It can make a good claim to being the greatest international-law textbook ever written. With it, we stand at the threshold of modern international law. In a number of ways, Vattel's treatise was a popularization of Wolff's ideas, but it was really written in a very different spirit. 13 Where Wolff had been disdainful of the voluntary law, Vattel fully embraced it, cheerfully and candidly expounding it alongside the natural law whenever appropriate. He has been accused of inconsistency-of constantly being on both sides of issues-but that charge is unfair. The fact is that he had two bodies of law to expound, which sometimes provided differing solutions to practical problems. He was generally very forthright about which law he was expounding at any given time. It is we who tend to misunderstand the nature of his task because the dualistic approach of that era is so foreign to us. The best example of the dualistic 'method' in practice concerned war. The natural law on just wars allowed a State to resort to force in self-help to vindicate a legal right that had actually been violated (or was threatened with violation) -so that, in a given conflict, one side would be fighting justly, and the other one not. The voluntary law, however, was not concerned over which party had the stronger legal claim to use force
II
On Pufendorf, see Dufour, 1991 and Tuck, 1999, pp 140-165.
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12 On Wolff's cosmological views, see Wolff, Cosmologia. Only the final volume of the main work on natural law concerned international law. For an English translation of that final volume, see Wolff, Law of Nations Treated According to a Scientific Method. 13 For Vattel's full presentation of the views of Wolff, see Vattel, Questions.
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(ie, it did not deal with the jus ad bellum, in legal terminology). Instead, it simply treated each side as if it had lawfully resorted to war. It then contented itself with regulating the conduct of wars, fixing rules for both parties to apply, on an evenhanded basis, in their contention against one another (the jus in bello, in the common legal parlance). In effect, then, the natural law saw war in terms of law enforcement and as a sanction for wrongdoing. The voluntary law, in contrast, saw war more in terms of a duel. In other areas, the two bodies oflaw reinforced one another. A good illustration was the sphere of economic relations. In the natural law, there had been support for a general principle of freedom of trade. But in the seventeenth century, European States began to give substance to that principle by building up an increasingly dense network of bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation ('FCN treaties', in common legal shorthand). Although there were inevitable variations in detail, there was also a high degree of standardization. Typically, the treaties would guarantee nondiscriminatory treatment of merchants from each State settling in the other. Also, in the event of war between the two States ('which God forbid!' in the common phrase), a period of grace would be given to the merchants to sort out their affairs before departing. These treaties also laid the ground of the law of neutrality by specifying the rights and duties that neutral merchants would have during war. Because of the ever-growing importance of the voluntary law, it is well to say a bit more about it. It had, in general, a practical and utilitarian character, even if it involved some neglect of the eternal verities championed by the strict natural lawyers. The voluntary-law outlook also gave to international law, for the first time, a dynamic flavour, in the form of a concern with the making of new law, rather than of simply determining what the natural law-in its eternal but static majesty-was. Finally, it should be noted that this voluntary law was made in two different ways. One was by means of treaties. The other was by way of custom, or 'usage' as it was often called. Both of these, however, posed certain conceptual difficulties. Consider treaty law first (or 'conventional international law' in the rather awkward, but common, phrase). That treaties were binding on parties in the ordinary case no one doubted. There was doubt, however, whether treaties could be said to be binding in extreme situations in which a State's most vital interests (such as survival) would be threatened by adherence. Pufendorf thought not. To Pufendorf (as well as to Wolff and Vattel), a State's highest obligation was its natural-law 'duty to itself' (in the common phrase of the time)-ie, the duty of self-preservation. This overriding doctrine of necessity (as it came to be known later) would inevitably introduce a certain inherent instability into treaty relations. The conceptual problem with custom was somewhat greater-and cannot be said to have been resolved even today. In the Middle Ages, some (like Aquinas) saw custom as a form of legislation-of legislation by and for the whole community at large, brought about through day-to-day practice. Others, however, preferred to see custom as a sort of private agreement, or wide-ranging contract, amongst ordinary people. This 'contractual' view of custom tended to dominate international law in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A custom was seen as a 'tacit treaty', so that a customary practice would have the force of law for those States which habitually followed it (ie, which were parties to the tacit agreement) but not for other States. These, and other, uncertainties at the heart of customary law have continued to plague-or to enrich - international law to the present day.14
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v. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1815-1919) The nineteenth century, extraordinarily, is the least explored area of the history of international law. It might be said that three rival traditions co-existed uneasily in that period. For lack of any standard or accepted terminology in this area, we may label them the positivist tradition, the natural-law remnant, and the historicist (or p.erhaps romantic) tendency. The dominant tradition of these three, by a very wide margin, was the positivist one, which :will therefore claim the greater part of our attention. The historicist strand has been the least explored.. A. THE POSITIVIST TRADITION
By 'positivism' is meant such a wealth of things that it may be best to avoid using the term altogether. As originally coined in the 1830s by the French social philosopher Auguste Comte, it meant something like 'scientific' or 'objective' or 'empirical', in contrast to speculative or religious or hypothetico-deductive modes of thought. Comte posited that the human race had gone through three great historical stages: the theological, the metaphysical, and (now) the 'positive'. In the theological stage, religious ideas had been dominant. In the metaphysical stage, legalistic and jurisprudential ideas had prevailed-meaning, in essence, natural law. But the 'positive' era now dawning promised to bring the true and final liberation of the human mind from the superstitions and dogmas of the past. This positivist age would be a scientific one, based on rigorous, disinterested study of objective, ascertainable facts. These would be harnessed for the planned and systematic improvement of the lot of the human species. The old ecclesiastical, feudal, military, and legal elites would be displaced, in favour of a new ruling class of engineers, financiers, inventors, and social planners. Positivism, in this original Comtean sense, became a strange amalgam of technocracy and evangelism. Indeed, positivism actually did become a religion, with the most influence, as it happens, in Brazil (whose national flag is emblazoned with the positivist motto 'Order and Progress'). In the more mundane legal sphere, perhaps the principal manifestation of positivism was the belief that law is entirely a human institution. In the realm of 14
See Ch 4 below.
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international law specifically, this meant that positivism was the clear heir to the voluntary law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In recognition of this fact, legal scholars in the nineteenth century conferred onto Grotius the retrospective title of 'father of international law' (with some assiduous, and patriotic, lobbying from Dutch lawyers in particular). But there was a clear difference in spirit between the earlier voluntary law and this new positivism. The voluntary law had been applied faute de mieux, hesitantly, almost apologetically, in cases in which, for various reasons, the natural law could not readily be applied. Nineteenth-century positivism was much more doctrinaire. It applied the voluntary law as a point of high principle rather than merely as an expedient, to the point that the voluntary law came to be regarded as the only true source oflaw. As the World Court would later put it, '[t]he rules of law binding upon States ... emanate from their own free will'. IS From this outlook emerged the common saying, that international law was a law between States, rather than a law above States (as in the natural-law vision). Certain other aspects of the positivist outlook should be noted. One was the insistence on the independent nation-State as the fundamental unit of international law. This inevitably gave to positivism a strongly pluralistic cast. Each nation-State possessed its own distinctive set of national interests, which it was striving to achieve in an inherently competitive, even hostile, environment. Each State was sovereign within its territory, so that each State's law could reflect that State's own particular history, values, aspirations, traditions, and so forth. It was in this period that the principle of 'the sovereign equality of States' became the fundamental cornerstoneor even the central dogma-of international law, along with the concomitant rule of non-intervention of States into the internal affairs of one another. This naturally pluralistic outlook of positivism was greatly reinforced by the huge influx of new States into the international community during the nineteenth century, most conspicuously from Latin America and Eastern Europe but also from the Far East (Bull and Watson, 1984). This pluralistic mentality in turn meant the abandonment of the monistic and teleological view of medieval natural law, which was now replaced by an instrumentalist outlook. That is to say, the law was no longer seen as having any innate goal of its own, any intrinsic master plan. Instead, the law was now seen, in technocratic terms, as a tool for the attainment of goals which were decided on by political processes. Law, in short, was now a servant and not a master. With this technocratic and instrumentalist outlook, international lawyers in the nineteenth century became increasingly reluctant to trespass into areas of political controversy, in marked contrast to their natural-law forbears, who had proudly worn the mantle of social critics. International lawyers began to see themselves instead as the juridical counterparts of Comte's engineers. This positivist ethos brought a new sense of precision, a businesslike character to the study and practice oflaw that was a welcome contrast to some of the cloudier musings of natural lawyers. No longer was there concern, as with Wolff,
over the characteristics of beings on other planets. There was much work to be done here on Earth. The instrumentalist approach gave to positivism a certain moral ambivalence. If the law was a servant, then it could serve evil masters as readily as benevolent ones. The law could be put to work, for example, in the elimination of slavery and slave trading, as in the General Act of the Brussels Conference of 1890, which established an International Maritime Office (at Zanzibar) to act against slave trading. But the law could also be enlisted to fix the 'rules of the game' for the imperial partitioning of Africa, as at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. (Contrary to the belief of some, that conference did not actually allocate any territories; it established the criteria by which the powers would recognize one another's claims.) Another effect of the technocratic cast of positivism was that questions of high politics were off limits to lawyers, in principle as well as in practice. In particular, it came to be widely agreed that fundamental national-security interests were in the realm of politics and not of law. This meant, in turn, that the rights and wrongs of a State's decision to resort to war (the jus ad bellum) were not a subject for lawyers to deal with. Instead, war was now seen as an inevitable and permanent feature of the inter-State system, in the way that friction was an inevitable and permanent feature of a mechanical system. What international lawyers lost as moral critics in the nineteenth century, they gained as solid professionals, as international law became, for the first time, an established profession. The two major professional bodies, the International Law Association and the Institut de Droit International, were both founded in the 1870s. Characteristically for this period, and reflecting the increasingly technical outlook of lawyers, these associations rigorously eschewed political issues. International law also became a subject of university studies on a large scale for the first time during the nineteenth century, so that there could now be a steady supply of trained personnel to deal with international legal issues as they arose. The nineteenth century was also the period in which major systematic treatises began to be written in the various European languages. Where Vattel had led, many followed. In 1785, Georg Friedrich de Martens wrote an important early treatise, which departed from earlier writing in being largely based on State practice rather than on natural-law doctrine. Originally penned in Latin, it was soon translated into French and English and was later greatly enlarged (Martens, Primae lineae). Martens also compiled an important collection of treaty texts. In English, the most notable early exposition was by Henry Wheaton, an American diplomat and legal scholar, whose Elements of International Law was published in 1836. Its popularity is indicated by the fact that it was translated into French, Spanish, and Italian, with new editions produced for fully a century after the first one. Wheaton was followed in Britain by Robert Phillimore, whose treatise of 1854-61 ran to four volumes (with two further editions). The first major German-language treatise was by Auguste Wilhelm Heffter in 1844 (which ran to eight editions by 1888). The French were slightly later in the field, with a Precis du droit des gens, by Theophile Funck-Brentano and Albert Sorel
15
'Lotus', Judgment No 9, 1927, PClJ, Ser A, No 10.
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in 1877. More influential was the Manuel de droit international public by Henry Bonfils in 1894 (which ran to eight editions by the 1920s). One of the most popular texts was that of the Swiss writer Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, whose exposition in 1870 (in French) took the form of a systematic 'code'. A pronounced difference of style, if not of substance, emerged between the Anglo-American writers and their continental European counterparts, with the English-language writers concentrating more heavily on State practice, court decisions, and the like, and the Europeans more on logical exposition. This intellectual division of labour (so to speak) between the pragmatic and the doctrinal is evident to the present day. There was much, admittedly, that was unattractive about nineteenth-century positivism, particularly to modern eyes-its doctrinaire quality, its narrow horizons, its lack of high ideals, the aura of superficiality raised to the pitch of dogma, its narrowly technocratic character, its ready subservience to power. But it would be wrong to judge it on these points alone because its solid achievements were many. If it lacked the breadth and idealism of natural-law thought, it also discarded the vagueness and unreality that often characterized natural-law thought at its worst. In many ways, positivism was a breath (or even a blast) of fresh air, countering the speculative excesses of natural-law thought. Even if it sometimes went too far in the opposite direction, we should nonetheless appreciate the valuable services that it performed in its time. It is clear from even a cursory survey of the nineteenth century that, when the wills of States were coordinated, the results could be impressive. The positivist era was the period in which we first see the international community 'legislating' by way of multilateral treaties, for the most part in areas relating to armed conflict. The first major example of this was the Declaration of Paris of 1856, concluded as a kind of side effort to the peace treaty ending the Crimean War. It restricted the capture of private property at sea, by providing that 'free ships make free goods' (ie, that enemy private property could not be captured on a neutral ship). It also announced the abolition of privateering. Within five years, it attracted over forty ratifications. In 1868, the Declaration of St Petersburg contained a ban on exploding bullets. It also denounced total-war practices, by stating that the only permissible objective of war is the defeat of the enemy's armed forces. The culmination of nineteenth-century international legislation-and the arrival of parliamentary-style diplomacy and treaty-drafting-came with the two Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The first Conference drafted two major conventions: one on the laws of war and one on the establishment of a Permanent Court of Arbitration (which was actually a roster of experts prepared to act as judges on an ad hoc basis, and not a standing court). The Second Hague Peace Conference, in 1907, was a much larger gathering than the earlier one (and hence less Europe-dominated). It produced thirteen conventions on various topics, mostly on aspects of war and neutrality. 16
One of the major achievements of the nineteenth century was in the area of the peaceful settlement of disputes. Although it was widely agreed that fundamental security issues were not justiciable, the nineteenth century marked a great step forward in the practice of inter-State arbitration. The trend began with the Jay Treaty of 1794, in which the United States and Britain agreed to set up two arbitration commissions (comprising nationals of each country) to resolve a range of neutrality and property-seizure issues that had arisen in the preceding years. These were followed by a number of ad hoc inter-State arbitrations in the nineteenth century, of which the most famous, again between Britain and the United States, took place in 1871-72, for the settlement of a host of neutrality-related issues arising from the American Civil War. I7 As befitted a scientific and materialistic (ie, 'positive') age, the universalist outlook of the Middle Ages was transmuted into a programme for the economic and material betterment of the human race. This re-formulation was pioneered by the French physiocrats of the eighteenth century, who argued for freedom of trade in foodstuffs. In the nineteenth century, the Comte de St-Simon and his followers envisaged a technocratic programme for global economic development and public works. I8 (Comte's early career had been spent as the Comte de St-Simon's secretary.) At the hands of the British and French liberal political economists, the programme was re-cast into one of global freedom of economic intercourse on a liberal capitalist basis-the kind of regime to which the label 'globalization' would later be attached. Politicians and economists negotiated an ever wider network of FCN treaties, as well as bilateral agreements for tariff reductions (of which the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860 between France and Britain was the most famous). Other important elements of the campaign included widespread freedom of migration (passports were unnecessary for much of international travel in the nineteenth century) and the linking of currencies through the gold standard. Lawyers had a role to play in this grand programme-fittingly, in a technical and non-political capacity. They helped to provide the necessary legal infrastructure for improvements in international communication and transportation: from the international river commissions that were set up to ensure freedom of navigation on the Rhine and Danube Rivers (which had been commercial backwaters since the Middle Ages), to special arrangements for the Suez and Panama Canals, to the founding of the International Telegraphic and Universal Postal Unions (1865 and 1874 respectively). The results were impressive. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the world was economically more integrated than it would be for many decades thereafter (and in some ways more so than today). (See Neff, 1990, pp38-71.)
44
17 16
For an informative and lively account of these conferences, see Tuchman, 1966, pp 265-338.
18
For a detailed and informative account, see Crook, 1975. On St-Simonism, see Manuel, 1956.
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B. NATURAL-LAW REMNANTS
In one outstanding-but highly conspicuous-area, natural-law ideas survived in the nineteenth century. This was the use of force-not the law relating to war as such, but rather the law relating to 'measures short gf war' (in the somewhat euphemistic expression). War properly speaking (as noted above) was seen as a matter of State security policy, the business of politicians and not of lawyers. But measures short of war were different. They were law-enforcement actions, albeit of a self-help character-the direct heirs of the old medieval just war. As yet, this phenomenon has not been the subject of serious historical study. The most important category of measures short of war were forcible reprisalsarmed action taken against States that were alleged to have committed some kind of breach of law. Reprisals therefore were not exercises of State policy, as wars were, but rather were law-enforcement operations. Nor were such actions rare. Indeed, the nineteenth century was a golden age (if that is the right word for it) of armed reprisals. The most common cause of such actions was injury to nationals that was unredressed by the target country. A famous example was Britain's action against Greece in the 'Don Pacifico' incident of 1850, in which Britain blockaded Greek ports to compel Greece to pay compensation for mob injury inflicted against one of its subjects. One of the grandest operations was a blockade of Venezuelan ports in 1902-03 by a coalition of major powers, to compel Venezuela to pay various debts that were owing to their nationals. Reprisals sometimes also included occupations of territory and even bombardments of civilian areas. Other forms of forcible self-help in the nineteenth century induded actions under the heading of necessity-meaning acts taken not to punish a wrongdoer (as in the case of reprisals) but to protect the State from some actual or impending harm. The most obvious example was .self-defence action. The leading incident in this area occurred in 1837, when the British government pursued Canadian insurgents into the United States, which they were using as a safe haven, capturing the miscreants and, in the process, killing several persons and destroying a boat named the Caroline. Britain justified its action as self-defence. And the correspondence between the two countries on this subject became famous as the classic exposition of the principle of selfdefence: action in the face of a crisis that is 'instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation' .19 Measures short of war could take a variety of other forms, such as punitive expeditions. Notable examples included the British expedition against the Mahdi and his followers in the Sudan in 1898 (for the killing of General Gordon in Khartoum in 1885) and the American pursuit of Pancho Villa in Mexico in 1916 in the wake of a terrorist attack on an American town. Another avatar of necessity was the rescue of imperilled nationals. The best known example was the use of a multinational armed force to rescue the diplomatic quarter in Peking in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900.
A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In these situations, there was certainly scope for abuses. Some actions, such as the British intervention in the Sudan in 1898, blossomed from punitive operations into annexations. Nor did it escape general attention that armed reprisal actions were almost exclusively waged by the major powers against what would now be called developing countries. Not surprisingly, these measures of armed self-help sparked a high degree of outrage among developing States. In the wake of the Venezuelan incident of 1902-03, the Foreign Minister of Argentina, Luis Drago, proposed an outright ban against the use of force in cases of contract debts. The most that could be agreed in this direction was a milder restriction, set out in the Porter Convention of 1907 (named for the American diplomat who was its chief sponsor), adopted by the Second Hague Peace Conference. This convention merely required certain procedural steps to be taken before armed reprisals could be resorted to in debt-default cases. It is one of history's great ironies that the natural-law tradition, which had once been so grand an expression of idealism and world brotherhood, should come to such an ignominiously blood-spattered end. A philosophy that had once insisted so strongly on the protection of the weak against the strong was now used as a weapon of the strong against the weak. It is, of course, unfair to condemn a whole system of justice on the basis of abuses. But the abuses were many, and the power relations too naked and too ugly for the tastes of many from the developing world. Along with imperialism itself, forcible self-help actions left a long-lasting stain on relations between the developed and the developing worlds.
C. THE HISTORICIST (OR 'ROMANTIC') TRADITION
The historicist (or 'romantic') strand of nineteenth-century thought represents, to some extent, an evolved version of natural law-but evolved to the point of being transformed nearly out of recognition. It was natural law decked out in a historicist garb, whose principal philosophical tailor was Georg Friedrich HegePO Hegel agreed with the positivists that the fundamental unit of study was the nation-State. If anything, he was more dogmatic on that subject than the ·most doctrinaire positivist ever was-seeing the State primarily as the political vehicle for the cultural and psychological aspirations of peoples. This historicist and romantic mentality played a major role in nineteenth-century thought and politics generally, but only a minor one in international law. It attracted only two major international-law writers to its banner: James Lorimer from Scotland and Pasquale Mancini from Italy.21 And it has largely been forgotten since, at least by lawyers. This is a pity, because State practice in the area offered a number of interesting lessons that might have been (and might yet be) useful in our own time.
See generally Hegel, Lectures. For Lorimer, see generally, Lorimer, Institutes. For Mancini, see Mancini, Della Nazionalita. Mancini is very little known in the English-speaking world, since he wrote almost entirely in Italian. For an extremely brief account of his views in English, see Sereni, 1943, pp 162-164. 20 21
19
29 British and Foreign State Papers 1137-38.
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A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Never did a legal school of thought span the political spectrum so comprehensively as this historicist one. On the left, it readily embraced liberal nationalism and the selfdetermination of peoples. Mancini, for example, saw international law chiefly as a law of peoples or of nations in the sense of historical, linguistic, and cultural units. It was the destiny of these cultural 'nations' to play their allotted role in. world history by acquiring the trappings of statehood. But the historicist outlook also accommodated itself readily (far too readily for modern sensibilities) to ideas about 'progressive' and 'atavistic' States. This outlook in turn led to imperialist, Social Darwinist, and even racialist ideas associated largely with the political right. A crucial aspect of the historicist outlook was the thesis that the direction of history on its march was susceptible of comprehension and even of judicious guidance. This idea gave the historicist strand of thought a teleological component, reminiscent of older natural-law thought. In practical, everyday terms, this guidance was in the hands of the four major powers which had triumphed over the armies of revolutionary and Napoleonic France (Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria). At the Congress of Vienna in ISI4-1S, they consciously set about reversing the revolutionary disruptions to the extent possible, crafting a continent-wide set of political arrangements that would (they hoped) keep the scourge of revolution from breaking out again. The four victors also formed themselves into a Quadruple Alliance (later to become a Quintuple one when a 'reformed' France was admitted to its ranks), which would oversee the longerterm preservation of the Vienna settlement. An important aspect of this informal policing of Europe by the major powers was a readiness to intervene militarily where necessary-though in the interest of general European peace and security, rather than of the parochial interests of the individual powers. (But the line between the two sets of interests was, to put it mildly, not easily drawn.) From the legal standpoint, certain features of this settlement of ISIS are particularly worth noting. There had been major European peace settlements before-most notably, the Peace of Westphalia in 164S and the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. But this one was different, in that it was to be rooted fundamentally in law-in a body of principles that became known as the 'public law of Europe', an idea grandly announced by Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna. This 'public law of Europe' would be based on faithful adherence to treaty commitments, as well as on respect for established laws and legitimate governments and property rights within the States of Europe. It should not be supposed that this Vienna settlement was wholly reactionary in character. It included a duty on the part of rulers to 'earn' their legitimacy by providing orderly and efficient government to their peoples and by cooperating with movements for orderly and peaceful change. It was a programme calling for the cool dispassion of the manager in place of the warm ardour of the revolutionary. This 'public law of Europe' was to be vigilantly overseen by the Quintuple Alliance. The resemblance to the later United Nations is unmistakable, with its plan for major-power oversight of the post-194S world. But there were important differences between this system of world order and the later one. The most obvious one was that
this post-ISIS system had none of the organizational trappings that modern lawyers are accustomed to. There were no annual assemblies of States, no resolutions, no secretariats, no standing courts. Instead, the organization was decentralized and ad hoc. (There were regular congresses of the powers for a few years after ISIS, but they were soon discontinued.) For this reason, it has proved almost impossible for modern lawyers to see this aspect of their own heritage. In the event, this post-ISIS system of great-power oversight worked much less tightly than originally planned (or hoped), largely because the national interests of the five powers began to diverge. The three most conservative States-Russia, Prussia, and Austria-formed themselves into a so-called 'Holy Alliance', which was distinctly more concerned to suppress revolution than to advance orderly change. Britain, on the other extreme, was generally opposed to an active intervention policy. As a result, the oversight by the major powers took a looser form known as the 'Concert of Europe', which intervened in crises only on an ad hoc, sporadic basis. A few of these interventions may be noted briefly. The first ones were in the cause of 'legitimacy' in the IS20s, when there were military interventions to subdue revolutions in Naples and Sardinia (by Austria) and in Spain (by France). Some of the actions of the Concert of Europe were in the nature of what would later be called peacekeeping. A notable case occurred in the late IS20s, when Britain, France, and Russia cooperated to stop the bloodshed in the Greek independence struggle-in the process ensuring outright independence for the Kingdom of Greece. There was also great-power involvement in the Belgian independence crisis of the IS30s. The powers even considered themselves entitled to intervene in peace settlements after wars, if the terms imposed on the losing side looked to be too destabilizing for the continent as a whole. The most notable instance of this occurred in IS7S, when the major powers stepped in to prevent Russia from exacting too harsh a peace against Turkey after a victorious war. 22 Humanitarian considerations were a factor in some of the interventions, such as the Greek and Belgian ones. The same was true of an intervention chiefly by France in a communal-violence crisis in the Mount Lebanon area in IS60. The most notable of these great-power humanitarian actions was probably the one in Crete in IS97, when the powers stepped in to stop atrocities and counter-atrocities between Greeks and Turks. In virtually none of these cases was there a pure humanitarian motive, untouched by any other consideration. But some (arguable) precedents were established for later advocates of the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention. In the event-and here too, foreshadowing the later United Nations-the divergent interests of the major powers meant that the guidance of the Concert of Europe worked only fitfully at best. Most notably, the Concert of Europe was not able to prevent the outbreak of the Great War of 1914-1S-an episode so overpowering and tragic that it gave rise to new forms of world organization.
22
For one of the few legal texts to treat this subject, see Dupuis, Principe d'equilibre, 1909.
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A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
VI. THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES (1919- ) Since much of this book will cover twentieth-century developments, no attempt will be made at comprehensive coverage, particularly of the post-1945 period. But certain aspects of both the inter-war and the post-1945 periods which have received comparatively little attention so far will be emphasized..
A. THE INTER-WAR PERIOD
The carnage of the Great War of 1914-18 led many to hold that neither the positivist 'rules of the game' approach to world order, nor the practice of ad hoc interventions by the Concert of Europe, was adequate any longer. The solution was the establishment of the League of Nations, whose Covenant was set out in the Versailles Treaty of 1919. This new system of public order would be of an open, parliamentary, democratic character, in contrast to the discreet great-power dealings of the Concert of Europe. The League was a complex combination of conservatism and boldness. On the side of conservatism was the decision to make no fundamental change in the sovereign prerogatives of nation-States as these had developed up to that time. No attempt was made to establish the League as a world government, with sovereign powers over its member States. Nor did the Covenant of the League prohibit war. Instead, the resort to war was hedged about with procedural requirements-specifically that either a judicial or political dispute-settlement process must be exhausted before there could be war between League member States. On the side of boldness was the Covenant's provision for automatic enforcement action against any League member State resorting to war without observing the peaceful-settlement rules. This enforcement took the form of economic sanctions by all other League member States, a tactic inspired by the Allied blockade of Germany during the Great War. There was, however, no provision for military action against delinquent States. The general history of the League has been adequately treated in other sources (Walters, 1952; Northedge, 1986), so only a few points of special interest to lawyers need be noted here. One problem that immediately arose from the restriction on war was the need to distinguish war properly speaking from measures short of war, such as reprisals. The importance of this distinction lay in the fact that the League's automatic sanctions were only triggered by a resort to .':war', not by a measure short of war, This issue first arose in 1923, in the context of ~ Italian bombardment and occupation of Corfu - which Italy insisted was a reprisal action against Greece and not an act of war (a position which the League effectively accepted). In due course, two major initiatives supplemented the League's efforts to maintain peace. In 1928, the Pact of Paris was concluded, in which the States parties forswore
\
'I' I
51
any resort to war as a means of national policy. The practical effects of this initiative, however, were not impressive. For one thing, no sanctions were provided. It was also carefully understood by the signatories that self-defence action would be permitteda potentially large loophole. The second initiative was the Stimson Doctrine of 1932, announced by the United States (and named for its Secretary of State at the time) in the wake ofJapan's occupation of Manchuria. It held that any situation brought about by aggression would not be accorded legal recognition by the United States. Here too, the immediate material impact was not great; but it perhaps had some precedential value, since the UN General Assembly endorsed it as a general principle in 1970. Only on one occasion was the sanctions provision of the Covenant invoked: against Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia in 1935-36. The sanctions failed to save Ethiopia, since the conquest was completed before they could have any serious effect. This failure led to a period of profound soul-searching amongst international lawyers as to what their role in the world should be. 23 It similarly led States into desperate searches for alternative sources of security to the League Covenant. A number of countries, such as Switzerland, Belgium, and the Scandinavian States, sought safety in reverting to traditional neutrality policies. But there were also a number of imaginative proposals for informal, but coordinated, action by States against aggressors (eg, Cohn, 1939; Jessup, 1936). There was even a sort of return to ad hoc great-power management, in the form of a collective and coordinated non-intervention policy organized by the major powers at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. Unfortunately, this effort, too, was largely unsuccessful because of inadequate implementation and great-power rivalry (see Watters, 1970). Although the League failed as a protector against aggressors, it would be far wrong to suppose that the inter-war period was a sterile time in international law generally. Precisely the opposite was the case. It was a time of ferment, experiment, and excitement unprecedented in the history of the discipline. A World Court (known formally, if optimistically, as the Permanent Court of International Justice) was established as a standing body, with its seat at the Hague in the Netherlands. It did not have compulsory jurisdiction over all disputes. But it decided several dozen cases, building up, for the first time, a substantial body of international judicial practice. These cases ~ere supplemented by a large number of claims commissions and arbitrations, whose outpourings gave international lawyers a volume of case law far richer than anything that had ever existed before. The codification of international law was one of the ambitious projects of the period. A codification conference, convened by the League of Nations in 1930, produced only modest results (chiefly on certain issues on nationality). But there were further initiatives by the American States in a variety of fields. These included a convention on the rights and duties of States in 1933, which included what many lawyers regard as the canonical definition of a 'State' for legal purposes. 24 The American 23
24
See, notably, Niemeyer, 1940. See Ch 7 below.
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States also concluded conventions on maritime neutrality, civil wars, asylum, and extradition. The inter-war period also witnessed the first multilateral initiatives on human rights. A number of bilateral conventions for the protection of minorities were concluded between various newly created States and the League of Nations. In the event, these proved not to be very effective; but they set the stage for later efforts to protect minority rights after 1945. The principle of trusteeship of dependent territories was embodied in the mandates system, in which the ex-colonies of the defeated States were to be administered by various League member States as 'a sacred trust of civilization', with oversight by the League. Finally, the League performed heroic labours for the relief of refugees, in the face of very great obstacles-in the process virtually creating what would become one of the most important components of the law of human rights. In short, the inter-war period did not bring an end to war or aggression. But it was the most vibrant and exciting era in the history of the discipline up to that time (and perhaps since). B. AFTER 1945
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, international law entered upon a period of unprecedented confidence and prestige, for which 'euphoria' might not be too strong a word. International lawyers even found themselves in the (unaccustomed) role of heroic crusaders, with the dramatic prosecutions of German and Japanese leaders for crimes under international law at Nuremberg and Tokyo in the late 1940s. Plans even began to be laid for the creation of a permanent international criminal court. The founding of the United Nations in 1945, to replace the defunct League of Nations, was a critical step in the creation of a new world order. With the UN came a new World Court (th~ International Court of Justice, or ICn, though still without compulsory jurisdi~tion over States. The heart of the organization was the Security Council, where (it was hoped) the victorious powers from the Second World War would continue their wartime alliance in perpetuity as a collective bulwark against future aggressors. (It may be noted that 'United Nations' had been the official name for the wartime alliance.) The UN therefore marked something of a return to the post-1815 system of great-power dominance. The special status of the five major powers (the principal victors in the Second World War, of course) was formally reflected by their 'possession of permanent seats on the Security Council, together with the power of veto over all its decisions. The UN Charter went further than the League Covenant in restricting violence, by containing an outright prohibition not only against war as such, but also against 'the use of force' in general-thereby encompassing both war properly speaking and measures short of war, such as armed reprisals. An express exception was made for self-defence. Regarding action against aggressors, the UN was both bolder and more
A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
53
timid than the League had been. It was bolder in that the Charter provided not only for economic sanctions but also for armed action against aggressors. There was even provision for a standing rapid-action military capacity, although that did not bear fruit. The UN Charter was more timid than the League, however, in that. sanctions (whether economic or military) were not mandatory and automatic, as in the League Covenant. The Security Council-dominated by the major powers-was to decide on an ad hoc basis when, or whether, to impose sanctions. The result was to make the UN a more openly political body than the League had been. Parallel to this security programme was another one for the promotion of global economic prosperity. The economic-integration effort of the nineteenth century, shattered by the Great War and by the Great Depression of the 1930s, was to be restructured and given institutional embodiments. The International Monetary Fund was founded to ensure currency stability, and the World Bank to protect and promote foreign investment and (in due course) economic development. Trade liberalization would be overseen by a body to be called the International Trade Organization (ITO). The euphoric atmosphere proved, alas, to be very short-lived. Enthusiasm for further international criminal prosecutions waned after the Nuremberg trials, as did interest in establishing a permanent international criminal court. Scarcely had the UN begun to function than it became paralysed by Cold-War rivalry between the major power blocs-with the notable exception of the action in Korea in 1950-53 (only made possible by an ill:-advised Soviet boycott of the Security Council at the relevant time). Nor did the new World Court find much effective use in its early decades. The ITO never came into being (because of a loss of interest by the United States). The UN Charter's general ban against force also appeared to have little effect beyond a cruelly ironic one: of propelling self-defence from a comparative legal backwater into . the very forefront of international legal consciousness. Since self-defence was now the only clearly lawful category of unilateral use of force, the UN era became littered witb self-defence claims of varying degrees of credibility, from the obvious to the risible. In particular, actions that previously would have been unashamedly presented as reprisals now tended to be deftly re-Iabelled as self-defence. 25 All was not gloom, though, by any stretch of the imagination. In non-political spheres, lawyers fared a great deal better, very much in the technocratic spirit of nineteenth-century positivism. The post-1945 period witnessed a veritably explosive increase in international law-making. The codification of international law, for example, made some major strides, in large part from the activity of a UN body of technical experts called the International Law Commission., The principal areas of law that received a high degree of codification included the law of the sea (with four related conventions on the subject in 1958, replaced in 1982 by a single, much larger convention), diplomatic and consular relations (in the early 1960s), human rights (with two international covenants in 1966), and the law of treaties (in 1969). 25
See Ch 19 below.
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A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
There was also a huge increase in the number of areas in which international cooperation was seen to be important. There scarcely seemed any walk of life that was not being energetically 'internationalized' after 1945-from monetary policy to civil aviation, from human rights to environmental protection, from atomic energy to economic development, from deep sea-bed mining to the exploration of outer space, from democracy and governance to transnational crime-fighting. Accompanying this expansion of subject areas was a mushrooming in the number of international organizations after 1945, with an ever-proliferating parade of resolutions, programmes of action, assemblies of States, secretariats, conventions, protocols, and the like. 26 The cumulative effect was to weld the States of the world in general-and international lawyers in particular-into a tighter global community than ever before. All this was a very far cry indeed from Herodotus and his silent traders. It is easy to understand that, amidst all this hub-bub of accomplishment, a certain triumphalist spirit could pervade the ranks of international lawyers. At the same time, though, it was not so clear that the fundamentals of the subject had changed very much. The basic positivist outlook, inherited from the nineteenth century, continued to have great staying power. The cornerstone principle of the sovereign equality of States remained in force-even finding expression in the UN Charter as one of the basic principles of the organization. In addition, international law continued to be regarded, at least in largest part, in positivist terms as an emanation of the free wills of the States themselves. And those wills continued to find expression through the two familiar channels: treaties and custom. It might be noted that some of the most important political and intellectual upheavals of the twentieth century left strangely little mark on international law. Socialism, for example, far from being a major challenge to lawyers, was actually a conservative force. Socialist theorists tended to write more dogmatically in the positivist vein than their Western counterparts did. Nor did the massive influx of developing States onto the world scene bring about any fundamental conceptual upheaval. For the most part, the developing countries readily accepted established ways, although they also made some concrete contributions in specific areas. One was the establishment of self-determination as a fundamental, collective human right. Another was in the area of succession to treaties by newly independent States, with the States being given an option of choosing which colonial treaties to retain. It is not that there were not new ideas in the air. There were. 27 But they seemed to have little impact on the actual practice of international lawyers. Around the 1980s, a certain change of atmosphere in international law became evident, as something like the idealism of the early post-war years began, very cautiously, to return. There were a number of signs of this. One was a sharp upturn in the judicial business of the World Court. This included a number of cases of high political profile, from American policy in Central America to the Tehran hostages crisis to the
Yugoslavian conflicts of the 1990s.28 In the 1990s, the ITO project was revived, this time with success, in the form of the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which gave a significant impetus to what soon became widely, if controversially, known as 'globalization' .29 Human rights began to assume a higher profile, as a result of several factors, such as the global campaign against South African apartheid and the huge increase in activity of non-governmental organizations. The end of the Cold War led to tangible hopes that the original vision of the UN as an effective collectivesecurity agency might, at last, be realized. The expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 lent strong support to this hope. Perhaps most remarkable of all was the rebirth of 'plans for an international criminal court, after a half-century of dormancy. A statute for a permanent International Criminal Court was drafted in 1998, entering into force in 2002. 30 In this second round of optimism, there was less in the way of euphoria than there had been in the first one, and more of a feeling that international law might be entering an age of new-and dangerous-challenge. International lawyers were now promising, or threatening, to bring international norms to bear upon States in an increasingly intrusive manner. A striking demonstration of this occurred in 1994, when the UN Security Council authorized the use of force to overthrow an unconstitutional government in Haiti. In 1999, the UN Security Council acquiesced in (although it did not actually authorize) a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo by a coalition of Western powers. It was far from clear how the world would respond to this new-found activism. The end of the Cold War may have been welcome. But it was by no means clear whether the world would really be content to entrust its security, in perpetuity, to a Concert-of-Europe style directorate of major powers. International legal claims were being asserted on a wide range of other fronts as well, and frequently in controversial ways. For example, lawyers who pressed for self-determination rights for various minority groups and indigenous peoples were accused of encouraging secession movements. Some human-rights lawyers were loudly demanding changes in the traditional practices of non-Western peoples. And concern over democracy, governance, and corruption posed, potentially, a large threat to governments all over the world. Some environmental lawyers were insisting that, in the interest of protecting a fragile planet, the world should deliberately curb its economic growth. Economic globalization also became intensely controversial, as the IMF's policy of 'surveillance' ~ somewhat ominous term to some) became increasingly detailed and intrusive am:i-..as 'structural adjustment' was seen to have potentially far-reaching consequences in volatile societies. Fears were increasingly voiced that the globalization process would bring an increase in economic inequality.
54
28 26 27
See Ch 8 below. See, eg Ch 2.
29 30
See Ch 18 below. See Ch 22 below. See Ch 23 below.
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VII. CONCLUSION How well these new challenges will be met remains to be seen. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is hard to see the UN 'failing' in the way that the League of Nations did and being completely wound up. No one foresees a reversion to the rudimentary ways of Herodotus's silent traders. But it is not impossible to foresee a nationalist or populist backlash against what is seen to be excessive international activism and against the elitist, technocratic culture of international law and organization. If there is one lesson that the history of international law teaches, it is that the world at large-the 'outside world' if you will-has done far more to mould international law than vice versa. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, international lawyers were changing the world to a greater extent than they ever had before. But it is (or should be) sobering to think that the great forces of history-religious, economic, political, psychological, scientific-have never before been successfully 'managed' or tamed. And only a rash gambler would wager that success was now at hand. Perhaps the most interesting chapters of our history remain to be written.
REFERENCES AGER, SL (1996), Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337-90 B.G. (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press). ARISTOTLE, 'Rhetoric', in The Basic Works of Aristotle (McKeon, R (ed.) 1941), (New York: Random House), pp 1325-145l. BEDERMAN, DJ (2001), International Law in Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). BHATIA, HS (ed.) (1977), International Law and Practice in Ancient India (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications). BLUNTSCHLI, JC (1870), Le droit international codifie (Lardy, MC (trans.» (Paris: Guillaumin). BONET, H (1949), The Tree of Battles (Coopland, GW (trans.» (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press). BONFILS, H (1894), Manuel de droit international public (Paris: A. Rousseau). BULL, H and WATSON, A (eds) (1984), The
of International Society Expansion (Oxford: Clarendon Press). CICERO, MT (1998), Republic (Rudd, N (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press). COHN, G (1939), Neo-neutrality (Kellar, AS and Jensen, E (trans.» (New York: Columbia University Press). CROOK, A (1975), The Alabama Claims: American Politics and Anglo-American Relations, 1805-1872 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). DE MARTENS, GF (1785), Primae lineae iuris gentium Europaearum practici in usum auditorum adumbratae (Gottingen: Johann Christian Dieterich). DE VATTEL, E (1916), The Law of Nations (Fenwick, CG (trans.» (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington). _.- (1762), Questions de droit naturel, et observations sur Ie traite du droit de la nature de M. Ie Baron de Wolf (Berne: Societe typographique).
A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
DE VITORIA, F (1991), Political Writings (Pagden, A and Lawrance, J (eds» (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). DUFOUR, A (1991), 'Pufendorf, in The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700 (Burns, JH and Goldie, M (eds) ) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), PP 561-588. DUPUIS, C (1909), Le principe d'equilibre et Ie concert europeen de la Paix de Westphalie a l'Acte d'Algesiras (Paris: Perrin). GENTILI, A (1933), On the Law of War (Rolfe, JC (trans.» (Oxford: Clarendon Press). GIERKE, 0 (1938), Political Theories of the Middle Age (Maitland, FW (trans.» (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). GROTIUS, H (1925), The Law of War and Peace (Kelsey, FW (trans.» (Oxford: Clarendon Press). HAGGENMACHER, P (1983), Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France). HEFFTER, AW (1844), Das europiiische VoIkerrecht der Gegenwart, auf den bisherigen Grundlagen (Berlin: EH Schroeder). HEGEL, GF (1975), Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (Nisbet, HB (trans.» (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). HERODOTUS (1954), Histories (De Selincourt) A (trans.» (Harmondsworth: Penguin). JESSUP, PC (1936), Today and Tomorrow, vol 4 of Jessup, PC and Deak, F, Neutrality: Its History, Economics and Law (4 vols, 193537) (New York: Columbia University Press). JOHN OF LEGNANO (1917), Tractatus de Bello, de Represaliis et de Duello (Holland, TE (ed.), Brierly, JL (trans.» (Oxford: Oxford University Press). KADDURI, M (1955), War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press).
57
KEEN, M (1965), The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul). KNIGHT, WSM (1925), Life and Works of Hugo Grotius (London: Sweet & Maxwell). KOSKENNIEMI, M (2001), The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). LORIMER, J (1883-84), The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities, 2 vols (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood). MANCINI, PS (1851), Della Nazionalita come fondamento del diritto delle genti (Turin: Eredi Botta). MANUEL, FE (1956), The New World of Henri St-Simon (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press). NEFF, SC (1990), Friends But No Allies: Economic Liberalism and the Law of Nations (New York: Columbia University Press). NIEMEYER, G (1940), Law Without Force: The Function of Politics in International Law (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publications). NORTHEDGE, FS (1986), The League of Nations: Its Life and Times 1920-1946 (Leicester: Leicester University Press). NUSSBAUM, A (1947), A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan). PHILLIMORE, R (1854--61), Commentaries upon International Law, 4 vols (London: WG Benning). PUFENDORF, S (1934), On the Law of Nature and Nations (Oldfather, CH and Oldfather, WA (trans.» (Oxford: Clarendon Press). RUSSELL, FH (1975), The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
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SCHNEEWIND, JB (1998), The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modem Moral Philosophy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). SERENI, AP (1943), The Italian Conception of International Law (New York: Columbia University Press). TUCHMAN, B (1966), The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Ballantine).
WALTERS, FP (1952), History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press). WATTERS, WE (1970), An International Affair: Non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War (New York: Simon and Schuster). WHEATON, H (1866), Elements of International Law, 8th edn (Dana, RH (ed.) 1936) (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
TUCK, R (1999), The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
WOLFF, C (1737), Cosmologia Generalis, 2nd edn (Frankfurt: Officini Libraria Rengeriana) .
VAN DER MOLEN, G (1968), Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law (Leiden: Sijhoff).
- - (1934), The Law of Nations Treated According to a Scientific Method (Drake, JH (trans.)) (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
FURTHER READING BEDERMAN, DJ (2001), International Law in Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), very ably covers the ancient Near East, together with classical Greece and Rome. GREWE, WG (2000), The Epochs of International Law (Byers, M (trans.)) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter), is another general historical survey of international law, focusing on State practice and having a generally political slant. KOSKENNIEMI, M (2001), The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) contains a vast wealth of information on continental European (particularly French and German) thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. NUSSBAUM, A (1947), A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan) is a very broad-brush general historical survey of international law, concentrating largely on doctrine.
TUCK, R (1999), The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press), examines international law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but is confined to doctrines of the major thinkers and does not cover State practice.
.2 SOME COMMON HERESIES ABOUT INTERNATIONAL LAW: SUNDRY THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES lain Scobbie
Legal theory is always more or less closely connected with philosophical thinking, political conditions, and ideological currents. Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact (1971), p 27 {T}heories of law . .. are one of the principal causes of low morale among students of international law. Ian Brownlie, International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (1995), p 22
The following works trace the history of certain topics:
SUMMARY
FREY, LS and FREY, ML (1999), The History of Diplomatic Immunity (Columbus: Ohio University Press).
International law does not exist in an intellectual vacuum. Our understanding of the nature of international law-of what it is and what it can and should do-is ultimately dependent
NEFF, STEPHEN C (1990), Friends But No Allies: Economic Liberalism and the Law of Nations (New York: Columbia University Press).
(2000), The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History (Manchester: Manchester University Press). RALSTON, JH (1929), International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno (London: Oxford University Press).
on theoretical assumptions and presuppositions. These can be latent and unexamined, in which case they are likely to foster only an acritical complacency. As all law has a political dimension, because law attempts to provide authoritative models of how people should behave, it is not surprising that theoretical models of international law encode specific views of the world and of relations between States. These assumptions and presuppositions influence the analysis of substantive issues, thus theory is an issue which should neither be ignored nor be simply left behind in the academy. This chapter attempts to demonstrate this by exposing the premisses and methodology of two dominant schools of international legal thought that are now principally associated with the Cold War-the New Haven School and Marxist-Leninist theory. These are, howeve~ instrumental approaches to international law that do not exhaust the scope of theoretical writing. The chapter ends by giving
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an account of a fundamental contemporary critique of the international system- Philip Allott's Eunomia-which denigrates the world of States, and argues for a reconstruction of international affairs that focuses on the individual.
as 'international law', as something distinct from other disciplines, particularly politics. s We must start somewhere, and from a less radical position than one which disavows the very subject of this chapter. Otherwise I could simply rest content with stating that international law isn't, even although that might have to be stated at some considerable length. Accordingly, I propose to offer if not a rough account of what 'international law' might be, at least perspectives on this question; but any such relatively abstract exposition must amount to a 'theory' of law. So what is a 'theory', and what it is for?
60
I. INTRODUCTION: THEORY MATTERS An understanding of legal theory is crucial to the legal enterprise and to the practical application of law. Doubtless this would b~ denied by some; for instance Professor Brownlie has claimed that '[t]here is no doubt room for a whole treatise on the harm caused to the business of legal investigation by theory' (Brownlie, 1983, p 627).1 On the other hand, this disavowal of theory could simply be seen as a conservative commitment to a hidden or latent theory that rests content with the status quo and seeks neither to question nor justify either the substance or practice of international law (Warbrick, 1991, pp 69-70).2 If so, this disinterest simply amounts to a conscious refusal to think about what one is doing. It constitutes an intellectual self-censorship which suppresses analysis and critical evaluation at least as much as an external authoritarian enforcement of conformity to some 'official' or received model of the nature and function of international law. It is perhaps worth noting that although in some instances the official model might be that prescribed by the State-such as the Soviet theory of international law-theoretical trends or schools can themselves attempt to impose an intellectual hegemony and decry or denigrate dissent, for instance by designating critics and doubters as 'decadent' (Carty, 1997, pp 188-189). Despite, in some quarters, a lingering attachment to the classical Austinian positivist claim that, because there is no determinate sovereign superior to promulgate and enforce commands, international law is not law but merely amounts to positive morality,3 this view is no longer generally accepted. As Professor Franck (1995, p 6) affirms: international law has entered its post-ontological era. Its lawyers need no longer defend the very existence of international law. Thus emancipated from the constraints of defensive ontology, international lawyers are now free to undertake a critical assessment of its content. 4 Some contemporary theorists, however, on grounds far divorced from the crudities of Austinian analysis, deny the very existence of a discipline we can identify For Brownlie's antipathy to theory, see also Brownlie, 1981 at pp 5-8, and Brownlie, 1995, p 22ff. See also Warbrick, 2000, p 621 passim, but especially at pp 633-636; and Lasswell and McDougal, 1943, p 207. This was their first co-authored work, and is reprinted as an appendix in Lasswell and McDougal, 1992, vol II at p 1265. 3 See Austin, 1832 (1995), Lecture V, pp 123-125. 4 On the ontological argument of whether international law is really law, see, for instancej Arend, 1999, ch 1, especially at p 28ff, and Franck, 1990, ch 2. 1
2
II. WHAT IS A (THEORY' AND WHAT IS IT FOR? Again, for present purposes, we need only adopt some definition that gives us a place to start. A useful orientation to the notion of a theory is provided by Kant. Kant (1793 (1970), p 61) defined a theory as: A collection of r~s, even of practical rules, is termed a theory if the rules concerned are envisaged as principles of a fairly general nature, and if they are abstracted from numerous conditions which, nonetheless, necessarily influence their practical application. Conversely, not all activities are called practice, but only those realisations of a particular purpose which are considered to comply with certain generally conceived principles of procedure. But what does this mean? It means that the function of a theory is to formulate or guide practice; to- provide a relatively abstract framework for the understanding and determination of action. Kant cautions, however, that a theory is not enough. The abstract knowledge provided by a theory 'must be supplemented by an act of judgement whereby the practitioner distinguishes instances where the rule applies from those where it does not'. There are those who understand a field but can never apply it practically precisely because they lack judgement, such as 'doctors or lawyers who did well during their schooling but who do not know how to act when asked to give advice' (ibid). Nevertheless, a theory is necessary because it provides us with the intellectual blueprint necessary to understand the world, or some specific aspect of human affairs (p 62): no-one can pretend to be practically versed in a branch of knowledge and yet treat theory with scorn, without exposing the fact that he is an ignoramus in his subject. He no doubt imagines that he can get further than he could through theory if he gropes around in experiments and experiences, without collecting certain principles (which in fact amount to what we term theory) and without relating his activities to an integral whole (which, if treated methodically, is what we call a system).
5
For instance, Kratochwil, 1989; Koskenniemi, 1989. For a commentary on both, see Scobbie, 1990.
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Kant's notion of a system, which comprises an integrated body of knowledge rather than simply a collection of essentially unrelated general rules, underlines the constitutive function of theory. Theory makes data comprehensible by providing a structure for the organization of a given discipline or body of knowledge. Contrast this with Hart's analysis of international law. He argued that it formed a set, but not a system, as the rules of international law were 'not unified by or deriv[ ed] theirvalidity from any more basic rule' (Hart, 1994, p 234). Rather he claimed (p 214) that:
counts as international law-is a question of theory in the sense just indicated.ll The identification of sources is the determination of general principles which classify phenomena such as documents, the statements and behaviour of international actors and so on, as relevant or irrelevant to the enterprise of international law. On this question of sources, Judge Higgins (1994, p 17) has commented: \
international law not only lacks the secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide for legislature and courts, but also a unifying rule of recognition specifying 'sources' of law and providing general criteria for the identification of its rules. This view was wrong when Hart first expressed it in 1961. Despite criticism, whether on grounds of inadequacy or inept drafting, 6 it is generally accepted that Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides at least a starting place for the enumeration of the sources of international law and thus functions as a 'rule of recognition' for the international legal system, should one wish to adopt a Hartian analysis. Hart defines the rule of recognition as 'a public, common standard of correct judicial decision' (Hart, 1994, p 116).7 Article 38 falls squarely within this notion, particularly as one of the criticisms made of it is that it was constructed precisely to specify the sources which the judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and subsequently the International Court, should apply in their decision-making, rather than specify sources for the non-judicial identification and application of international law. 8 Indeed, much contemporary theoretical analysis of international law is precisely concerned with the investigation of the sources of international law-the identification of what counts, or should count, as international law which is exemplified in the contemporary debate about relative normativity for instance9 -as opposed to the conceptual exegesis of distinct substantive themes or fields. The latter type of analysis, however, is not lacking, finding expression in works such as Professor Franck's account of the emergence of individualism as a core concept in international law (Franck, 1999), in the numerous applications of New Haven analysis to such diverse topics as the law of the sea, human rights, and armed conflict,lO or in Nathaniel Berman's critical analysis of international responses to domestic conflict (Berman, 1994). Ultimately, however, all conceptual issues of sources-the identification of what
. 6. For instance, see Carty, 1986, P 13if; Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000, P 67if; Jennings, 1982, p 9; Hlggms, 1994, pp 18-19; Tunkin, 1974, pp 118, 123-124. 7 For a commentary on the rule of recognition, see MacCormick, 1981, p lO8ff. 8 For this criticism, see, eg Higgins, 1994, p 18. 9 For instance, see Weil, 1983; Tassioulis, 1996; Beckett, 2001; and Roberts 200l. 10 ' McDougal and Burke, 1962; McDougal, Lasswell, -and Chen, 1969 and 1980; and McDougal and Feliciano, 1994.
As international lawyers, we have perhaps ceased to notice how very strange it is that we spend so much time talking about the provenance of the norms that bind the participants in'-· the international legal system. In domestic legal systems the sources of legal obligation are treated in a much more matter-of-fact way ... But we have become so preoccupied with jurisprudential debate about the sources of international law that we have, I think, lost sight of the fact that it is an admission of an uncertainty at the heart of the international legal system. I do not mean that there are uncertainties about what particular norms provide (which there may be), but about how we identify norms. These uncertainties should not be overstated. There is a general consensus on core sources doctrine, with doctrinal disagreement attaching to specific, but nonetheless important, issues-such as the very existence and potential effects of the doctrine of persistent objection to the formation ofcustomary international law. 12 Doctrinal divergences and disagreements are inevitable because all theoretical positions are, to some degree, $ubjective inasmuch as they reflect the author's own predispositions and concerns, some of which can be quite transient. Consider, for instance, the discussion of persistent objection in the mid-1980s by Charney and Stein. To an extent, this was informed or influenced by the then-recent conclusion of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and its initial repudiation by various developed States which objected to the regime it created for deep seabed mining. 13 Charney and Stein took diametrically opposed views on whether non-signatory States could or should be bound by any customary regime on deep seabed mining that the Convention might generate, despite their protests. This specific issue masked more deeply held views about the nature of international law, and in particular the roles of sovereignty and State consent in the formation of customary international law. Charney saw the doctrine as one that held only a temporary or strategic utility, which a State could employ 'to force an accommodation of interests in the international community with respect to the evolution of new rules oflaw' (Charney, 1985, p 23). He stressed consensus and a contextual approach which downplayed the need for State consent to individual rules. Stein (1985, pp 458-459), on the other hand, emphasized State sovereignty and 'the central premise of international law theory', namely:
For an express affirmation of this view see, eg Higgins, 1994, p 267. See Norwegian Fisheries, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1951, p 116 at p 131, and North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p 3, paras 29-33: The principal doctrinal commentaries-which adopt opposed views-are Charney, 1985; Stein, 1985. 13 Both use deep seabed mining to illustrate possible persistent objection claims-see Charney, 1985, p 4, n 12, and Stein, 1985, pp 462, 474-475. 11
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that the international legal order lacks a hierarchically superior sovereign authorized to prescribe rules for the subjects of the order. In the absence of such a sovereign, law must result from the concurrent wills of states and, at the very least, cannot bind a state that has manifestly and continuously refused to accept it.
every threat or use of force is evaluated on its own merits based upon the context in which it occurs ... the operational code is contextual. Moreover, the categories in which uses of force are sometimes considered appropriate evolve ... Ultimately ... extra-Charter uses of force will fall outside the operational code if they fail to advance shared world order values. 15
Accordingly, because writers start from different, and often inarticulate, premisses about the nature and function of international law, it is not surprising that adhesion to different theoretical presuppositions results in different conclusions about what counts as international law in the first place (Lauterpacht, 1933, p 57). Having said that, as Thirlway (1972, p 33) notes:
The application of the theoretical presuppositions of the New Haven School to determine the legality of the use of force is controversial, and yet this forms the core of influential doctrine on an emerging topic. Presuppositions such as these are, however, frequently inarticulate, if not invisible, in works of substantive exposition, and yet they mould tacit understandings of and approaches to the rules of international law and their content. Identifying authorial dispositions is crucial to evaluating the weight to be given to an argument. Indeed, identifying the very author of a text can be decisive in law, in a way alien to other disciplines. For instance, in the field of literature, Foucault endorses the notion of the death of the author, the idea that the identity and personality of the author of a work of fiction is irrelevant to the authority and interpretation of the text. As Foucault (1998, p 222) acknowledges:
it is highly unlikely that any modem jurist will ever be able to exert such an influence on his own or subsequent ages as did the 'founding fathers' of international law, so as to be cited in the same breath as Grotius, Vattel, Bynkershoek, Pufendorf and Suarez. The age of doctrine is past, perhaps never to return. This view of the diminishing importance of doctrine is probably correct insofar as it concerns the diminishing importance of a single author in terms of the elaboration of the corpus of substantive law. It cannot, however, be denied that some authors may exert an important influence on the understanding or development of a given issue or area oflaw. For instance, Schmitt's views on computer network attacks and information warfare undoubtedly inform, if not structure, the current legal appreciation of these issues. 14 Nevertheless, encoded within expositions of substantive international law-within general textbooks, specialized monographs, and articles in scholarly journals-are preconceptions and expectations about the nature and function of international law. Schmitt, to take an example, does this quite overtly. In discussing the interpretation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and the extent to which this prohibits the unilateral use of force in international affairs, he notes that the dominant interpretation is 'positivist'. It starts from the premiss that the text of the Cha.rter must authorize a use of force for it to be lawful, rather than 'from the postulate that force is permissible unless a specific Charter prohibition thereon applies' (Schmitt, 1999a, p 901). He comments (p 902): Although textually sound, the positivist approach fails to reflect the realities underlying uses of force. It evidences misguided fidelity to the failed constitutive endeavour to establish a Charter security schema that would generally dispense with the need for unilateral uses of force ... strict adherence to the plain text meaning of Article 2(4) can actually operate as a counterpoise to the Charter's world order aspirations. In contrast, Schmitt argues that the tenets of the New Haven School, as exemplified in the writings of Michael Reisman, should be applied to this question. Reisman emphasizes the context in which force is used, and the values this seeks to advance or protect. Accordingly, Schmitt argues (p 903):
14
See, eg, Schmitt, 1998; 1999a; 1999b; and 2002.
I seem to call for a form of culture in which fiction would not be limited by the figure of the author ... All discourses, whatever their status, form, value, and whatever the treatment to which they will be subjected, would then develop in the anonymity of a murmur. We would no longer hear the questions that ha':;:e been rehashed for so long: Who really spoke? Is it really he and not someone else? With what authenticity or originality? And what part of his deepest self did he express in his discourse ... [W]e would hear hardly anything but the stirring of an indifference: What difference does it make who is speaking? Foucault claims that the ascription of an author to a text entails that it 'is not ordinary everyday speech that merely comes and goes ... On the contrary, it is a speech that must be received in a certain mode and that, in a given culture, must receive a certain status' (p 211). The identity of the person or body promulgating some types oflegal texts has precisely this function. A document's legal significance can depend on its author; because its author is a judge; because its author is a legislature; because its author is a foreign ministry and so on. Legal texts, and their authors, only make sense within the context of the system that gives them authority and meaning. Literary, artistic, even philosophical texts, on the other hand, can be a great deal more autonomous. At the extreme, as in the case of the fictitious Australian poet Ern Malley whose works were fabricated to satirize modernist poetry but yet now form part of the Australian literary canon, the 'author' need not exist. 16 Or consider the ascription of Lectures on Jurisprudence to Adam Smith, despite the fact that these were notes taken at his lectures by students, unrevised and unseen by Smith before their ultimate publication long after his death in 1896 and 1978.17 Even, given their 15 Schmitt relies on Reisman, 1985. The principal arguments of the New Haven School are considered below. 16 For details of this literary hoax, see http://jacketmagazine.com/17/index.html. 17 The authoritative modern edition of both sets of lecture notes was only published in the Glasgow edition of Smith's works in 1978.
\
..
~
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propensity for jokes and badinage, would it make a difference to our reading of Foucault if we discovered that he was really a long-lost Marx brother, as opposed to merely being influenced by Marx and thus, we could surmise, intent on doing to philosophy what his brother Harpo generally intended to do to the nearest available blonde? Or would his writings still be taken seriously, just as those of 'Ern Malley' are in literature?
is perceived to require regulation, and the contours of its legal analysis are determined by recourse to broadly political values. An early example is Vitoria's De Indis (On the American Indians) (1537) which applied Scholastic natural law reasoning to undermine the legitimacy of Spanish claims to sovereignty over its American possessions:
In some circumstances, authorial dispositions and concerns are important to gain a full understanding of a text, or to locate it within a framework where it might be properly understood. Thus, in exploring David Kennedy's views on the international human rights system, Hilary Charlesworth claimed that the 'most intriguing aspect' of the article in question 'is the self-portrait of its author' (Charlesworth, 2002, p 127 in response to Kennedy, 2002). Some would argue that all readings of a text are partial, and that a search for authorial intent, even in law, cannot generate a 'correct' interpretation (eg Balkin, 1986, p 772). There is a degree of truth in this, but it is equally true that legal texts, unlike literary texts, form part of an inter-locking system of meaning and are not free radicals that bear the meaning anyone chooses to put upon them. There is a difference between a legal text such as Article 51 of the UN Charter, whose interpretation is admittedly contested in regard to matters such as whether it would allow a kinetic (bullets, bombs, and things that go bang) response in selfdefence to a non-kinetic (computer network) attack, and a literary text which can bear any meaning one chooses, such as the opening lines of Gertrude Stein's poem Susie Azado:
Vito ria' s writings on power and the rights of conquest effectively set the agenda for most subsequent discussions on those subjects in Catholic Europe until the late seventeenth century ... [A]lthough it is clearly false to speak of Vitoria as the father of anything so generalized and modern as 'International Law', it is the case that his writings became an integral part of later attempts to introduce some regulative principle into international relations.zo
Sweet sweet sweet sweet sweet tea. . Susie Azado. Sweet sweet sweet sweet sweet tea. Susie Azado. Susie Azado which is a told tray sure. A lea:q. on the shoe this means slips slips hers. When the ancient light grey is clean it is yellow, it is a silver seller. This is a please this is a please there are the saids to jelly.18
To illustrate the formative power of theory, it is useful to contrast two very different but articulate accounts of international law, namely the New Haven School which was elaborated principally by Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell in Yale Law School, and the Soviet theory of international law propounded by GI Tunkin. Products of the Cold War, these were distinctive theories of international law which set out to bolster and justify the external projection of the political values of the United States and Soviet Union. As such they embody profoundly different political aims and objectives: this is abundantly clear in their approach to sources and methodology. It could be argued that the chasm between the two theories runs deeper, that there is an architectonic difference between the two, as the New Hayen School sees law ·as facilitative whereas Soviet theory amounts to a constitutive theory. Posner (1990, P 94) explains the facilitative approach as claiming that law provides:
Although it can be fun to play with Stein's language, probably not even she knew what she was writing or what it 'really' meant, if it really 'means' anything. It is a poem: it does not need to mean anything. Legal texts, on the other hand, do need to have an identifiable meaning, or range of acceptable meanings, because law is an instrumental activity aimed at practical outcomes. Accordingly, the more overtly a writer uncovers his or her theoretical assumptions, perhaps more honest the writing, as his or her model of international law is exposed on the page for all to see. Law and legal theory do not exist in a value-free vacuum but are inevitably concerned with political concerns and conditions. 19 It is often the case that an issue emerges that 18 Stein, 1998 (1903-32), p 362. 19 For instance, for an overview of the political context of the development of jurisprudential ideas, see Olivecrona, 1971, ch 1; and also Tuck, 1999.
Or, to take a more contemporary example, should non-kinetic hostile acts attributable to a State and directed against another be held to breach Article 2(4) of the UN Charter?
III. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE COLD WAR: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY VERSUS MARXIST- LENINISM
a service to lay communities in the achievement of those communities' self-chosen ends rather than as a norm imposed on those communities in the service of a higher end. This notion of facilitative law can be associated with various jurisprudential strands in the United States, perhaps principally with the process of private ordering elaborated by Henry Hart and Albert Sachs. As Duxbury (1995, p 256) comments, their notion of: 20
Vitoria, 1991, p xxviii: De Indis is at p 231£1'. See also Tuck, 1999, pp 72-75.
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private ordering-the use of 'self-applying regulation' by private individuals in the government of their own activities-is the principal method of social control in a democratic society.21
lawful (p 209), the law school curriculum should aim towards the implementation of 'clearly defined democratic values in all the areas of social life where lawyers have or can assert responsibility' (p 207). Policy and value permeate law, therefore there are no autonomous or neutral theories of law which can ignore the policy consequences of rules. 24 Therefore (p 212):
The New Haven goal of clarifying and implementing a world order of human digmty could be seen as falling squarely within this notion. In a celebrated article, McDougal and Lasswell (1981, p 24)22 define 'human dignity' as 'a social process in which values are widely and not narrowly shared, and in which private choice, rather than coercion, is emphasized as the predominant modality of power'. New Haven is not, however, a facilitative theory. Its raison d'etre is the pursuit of an imposed 'higher norm', the defence and maintenance of (American) liberal democracy as a bulwark against the spread of communism. As Falk (1995, p 2004) observes, New Haven analysis is constructed around an: ideological bipolarity of a world order that pits totalitarian versus free societies as the essential struggle of our time, a view that anchors the McDougal and Lasswell jurisprudence in the history of the Cold War era.
A. THE NEW HAVEN SCHOOL
The genesis of New Haven lay in the Second World War and the emergence of communism as an international political force. McDougal and Lasswell argued that, when US law schools reopened after the war, they should be 'a place where people who have risked their lives can wisely risk their minds' (Lasswell and McDougal, 1943, p 292). They perceived the war as (p 211): a propitious moment to retool our system oflegal education. America's huge plants for the fabrication of lawyers are practically closed for the duration ... In the rush of conversion from war to peace the archaic conventions and confusions of the past may win out over the vital needs of our civilization ... War is the time to retool our educational processes in the hope of making them fit instruments for their future job. This future job, the aim of legal education according to McDougal and Lasswell (p 206),23 was to provide systematic training for policy-makers attuned to 'the needs of a free and productive commonwealth': The proper function of our law schools is, in short, to contribute to the training of policymakers for the ever more complete achievement of the democratic values that constitute the professed ends of American polity. These values should be so reinforced that the student applies them automatically to 'every conceivable practical and theoretical situation' (p 244). As lawyers influence or create policy when indicating whether a proposed course of action is or is not
In a democratic society it should not, of course, be an aim of legal education to impose a single standard of morals upon every student. But a legitimate aim of education is to seek to promote the major values of a democratic society and to reduce the number of moral mavericks who do not share democratic preferences. The student may be allowed to reject the morals of democracy and embrace those of despotism; but his education should be such that, if he does so, he does it by deliberate choice, with awareness of the consequences for himself and others, and not by sluggish self-deception. Despotism breeds societal instability given the climate of fear and uncertainty in which totalitarian leaders emerge and in which they must survive (McDougall and Lasswell, 1981, pp 17-18). For McDougal and Lasswell the choice was one between nuclear annihilation and the global promotion of US democratic values (Falk, 1995, P 2002; Duxbury, 1995, pp 195-198). They, in an act of 'ideological partisanship' (Falk, 1995, P 2003), chose the latter. Although McDougal and Lasswell initially (1943, passim) envisioned the comprehensive application of their theory to reform the entire law school curriculum, it rapidly became focused specifically on international law (Duxbury, 1995, p 191). The practical aim of the New Haven School is to advance 'a universal world order of human dignity' which secures the widespread enjoyment of values by individuals. Human dignity, however, is not foundational: We postulate this goal, deliberately leaving everyone free to justify it in terms of his preferred theological or philosophical tradition. 25 This goal reflects the New Haven School's basis in, and intended refinement of, the American Legal Realist school of jurisprudence and its inter-twining of law and the social sciences, especially economics. 26 Realism rejected formalist accounts of law which claimed to be value neutral and relied on the logical exegesis of legal principle to explain the operation of the courts and legal system. One of the principal strands of realism-rule scepticism-argued that uncertainty lay in the very formulation of rules, and thus judicial decisions could not lay claim to be simply the inexorable application of the law to the issue in question. This is reflected in Lasswell and McDougal's admonition (1943, p 213) that:
McDougal and Reisman, 1983, p 122. McDougal and Lasswell, 1981, p 24: compare Lasswell and McDougal, 1943, p 213 on the nonderivational clarification of specific values to be pursued. 26 On American Legal Realism, see Duxbury, 1995, chs 1 and 2: more elementary accounts of this school may be found in standard textbooks on jurisprudence, such as Freeman, 2001, ch 9. 24 25
21
22 23
For a critical account of Hart and Sachs' notion oflegal process, see Duxbury 1995, p 251ff. This article was first published in (1959) 53 AIIL l. See also FaIk, 1995, P 1993.
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From any relatively specific statements of social goal (necessarily described in a statement of low-level abstraction) can be elaborated an infinite series of normative propositions of ever increasing generality; conversely, normative statements of high-level abstraction can be manipulated to support any specific social goal. Realism, contrary to formalism, laid stress on the social consequences of the law which should be taken into account in judicial decisions, and thus emphasized empiricism. This aimed at determining the real factors involved in judgments beyond the formal appeal to rules, and also at demonstrating the social impact that alternative judicial choices might have. Law was seen as a form of social engineering that could be used as a tool to attain desired societal goals. The New Haven School built on this tradition in American jurisprudence by rejecting the notion that law is merely a system of rules, by trying to achieve a more empirical account of the operation of law in society, and by postulating the instrumental aim of achieving human dignity. 27 The New Haven School displaces the conception of law as a system of rules in favour of one where law is a normative social system which revolves around trends of authoritative decisions taken by authorized decision-makers including, but not restricted to, judges. There is, after all, more to law than what happens in court rooms- 'If a legal system works well, then disputes are in large part avoided' (Higgins, 1994, p 1 (emphasis in original». International lawyers, giving legal advice that moulds policy and action, are more likely to be in foreign ministries than appearing before the International Court of Justice. Law is a continuing process of decisions involving choices aimed at realizing the common value of human dignity. As McDougal and Lasswell (1981, p 19) assert: the major systems of public order are in many fundamental respects rhetorically unified. All systems proclaim the dignity of the human individual and the ideal of a worldwide public order in which this ideal is authoritatively pursued and effectively approximated. They differ in many details of the institutionalized patterns of practice by which they seek to achieve such goals in specific areas and in the world as a whole. The New Haven process of decisions has been likened to the Heraclitan aphorism that one never steps into the same river twice, because the river moves on. For New Haven adherents, because the social context of decisions change, and because the trends and implications of past decisions can be unclear, the quest for human dignity necessitates the rejection of a model of law that comprises simply the neutral or impartial application of rules. Rules are: inconsistent, ambiguous, and full of omissions. It was Mr. Justice Cardozo who aptly remarked that legal principles have, unfortunately, the habit of travelling in pairs of opposites. A judge who must choose between such principles can only offer as justification for his choice a proliferation of other such principles in infinite regress or else arbitrarily take a 27 For an exposition and defence of New Haven as an empirical theory of law, see Morison, 1982, pp 178-188.
SOME COMMON HERESIES ABOUT INTERNATIONAL LAW
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stand and state his preference; and what he prefers or what he regards as 'authoritative' is likely to be a product of his whole biography.28 Rules are only 'shorthand expressions of community expectations' and thus, like any shorthand, are inadequate as a method of communication (Duxbury, 1995, p 194). Rules simply cannot be applied automatically to reach a decision because that decision involves a policy choice: Reference to 'the correct legal view' or 'rules' can never avoid the element of choice (though it can seek to disguise it), nor can it provide guidance to the preferable decision. In making this choice one must inevitably have consideration for the humanitarian, moral, and social purposes of the law.29 The realization of preferred values is not, however, the sole factor in decisionmaking: law does constrain. Recourse must be made to trends of past decisions, and how these relate to the goals the decision-maker wishes to achieve- 'the task is to think creatively about how to alter, deter, or accelerate probable trends in order to shape the future closer to his desire' (Lasswell and McDougal, 1943, p 214). Further, these goals can only be achieved if the decision taken is both authoritative and controlling: Authority is the structure of expectation concerning who, with what qualifications and mode of selection, is competent to make which decisions by what criteria and what procedures. By control we refer to an effective voice in decision, whether authorized or not. The conjunction of common expectations concerning authority with a high degree of corroboration in actual operation is what we understand by law. 3D More succinctly, Higgins (1994, p 5) describes law as 'the interlocking of authority with power'.31 Thus the New Haven School aims at providing a framework of values and matrix of effective and authoritative decision-making in pursuit of the democratic ideal it favours: Every phase in the processes of authoritative decision is affected both by past and present distributions of values and by the perspectives (demands, identifications, and expectations) of community members about future distribution. The outcomes of processes of authoritative decision also, of course, directly affect any future distribution of values among community members and, in total impact and in the long run, determine and secure the larger community's public order. 32
28 Lasswell and McDougal, 1943, p 236. This, in itself, appears to be a New Haven refinement of realism. Hutcheson had argued that, in hard cases, the judge does not decide by an abstract application of the relevant rules, but decides intuitively which way the decision should go before searching for a legal category into which the decision will fit-'No reasoning applied to practical matters is ever really effective unless motivated by some impulse' (Hutcheson, 1928-29, p 285). 29 Higgins, 1994, p 5. 3D McDougal and Lasswell, 1981, p 22. 31 See also Arend, 1999, pp 77-79. 32 McDougal and Reisman, 1983, p 118.
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In the classic version of the theory expounded by McDougal and Lasswell, a value is simply 'a preferred event' or, in other words, whatever an individual or decisionmaker desires. A full enumeration of values is impossible- 'if we were to begin to list all the specific items of food and drink, of dress, of housing, and of other enjoyments, we should quickly recognize the unwieldiness of the task'. McDougal and Lasswell claim that any given value will fall within one or more of the categories that they identify as enlightenment, respect, power, well-being, wealth, skill, affection, and rectitude. 33 Higgins (1994, p 5) argues this articulation of relevant policy factors, and their systematic assessment in decision-making, precludes the decision-maker unconsciously giving preference to a desired policy objective under the guise of it being 'the correct legal rule'.
eradicated as these are the products of class division, although there would still be rules of conduct. 35 Until then, international law was 'immortalize[d] ... as an instrument of struggle between states belonging to opposed social systems' (Damrosch and Miillerson, 1995, p 4) in which the most that could be achieved was peaceful co-existence between capitalist and socialist States. Soviet theory is structurally a much more traditional theory than New Haven. It is firmly rooted in Marxist-Leninist theory to the extent that, at times, it seems simply to amount to taking the dogma for a walk. Perhaps paradoxically, Soviet theory appears to be much more conservative than New Haven, placing its emphasis on rules and State consent to rules, rather th~ the New Haven realization of values by authorized decision-makers:
B. SOVIET THEORY
The other principal Cold War doctrine- the theory of international law sponsored by the Soviet Union, rooted in Marxism-Leninism, and reaching its apogee in the works ofTunkin-was a diametrical opposite to the New Haven School, both in its professed structure and envisaged political outcome. This orthodoxy, enforced by the Soviet bloc, relied not on the values encompassed in human dignity to explain international law, but on the objective rules of societal development and the historical inevitability of socialism. Thus Tunkin (1974, p 277) explained: The foreign policy and diplomacy of socialist states is armed with the theory of MarxismLeninism and a knowledge of the laws of societal development. Proceeding on the basis of a new and higher social system replacing capitalism, they adduce and defend progressive international legal principles which correspond to the laws of societal development and which are aimed at ensuring peace and friendly cooperation between states and the free development of peoples. 34 Accordingly (Tunkin, 1974, P 251): The regulating influence of contemporary general international law is such because it was formed and is developing further under the decisive influence of the socialist states, the developing countries, and the other forces of peace and socialism, and as a whole is aimed at ensuring peace and peaceful coexistence, at the freedom and independence of peoples, against colonialism in all of its manifestations, and at the development of peaceful international cooperation in the interests of all peoples. Contemporary international law promotes the progress of human society, and this progress inevitably is linked to socialism, leads to socialism, and facilitates the struggle for socialism. Soviet writers argued that socialism was the inevitable outcome of social processes and, with its triumph, the State and law (including international law) would be
both the Soviet government and Soviet doctrine consistently treated the existing corpus of international law as a system of sufficiently determinate principles and norms which all states are obliged to observe in their mutual relations, in contrast to some Western scholars who find international law to be more or less adaptable and argue that law should fit behaviour rather than the other way ar9und. The Soviet preference for a relatively rigid rulebound approach was not merely an outgrowth of traditional jurisprudential conventions, but also served political and polemical functions. 36 Soviet theory is based in the class struggle, and the Marxist-Leninist tenet that the mode of production within a society (the economic base) is the principal influence on the will of the ruling class, and thus on the social institutions (the superstructure) of that society. Only with the emergence of private property and social classes does the State emerge 'as an organ of the economically dominant class', along with law which constitutes the will of this ruling class in defence of its interests. 37 Capitalist and socialist States have different interests, and thus wills, given the difference in their socio-economic organization - 'the influence of the economic structure of society and its societal laws affects the process of creating norms of international law through the will of a state, since the content of this will basically is determined by the economic conditions of the existence of the ruling class in a given state' (Tunkin, 1974, p 237). While the dominant economic class determines the will of a capitalist State, in a socialist State, this comprises 'the will of the entire Soviet people led by the working class' (p 249 and, eg p 36). One clear consequence of this divergence in interest is Soviet theory's rejection of 'general principles of law recognised by civilised nations' (Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice) as an independent source of international law. Tunkin (1974, p 199) argued: Eg Tunkin, 1974, pp 42, 238: see p 232ff generally. Damrosch and Mallerson, 1995, p 9 (footnotes omitted). 37 Kartashkin, 1983, p 81, see pp 79-83 generally; and also Tunkin, 1974, pp 27, 36, 232ff. Kartashkin (1983, p 81) notes that according to Marxist-Leninist theory, there are five socio-economic formations of society-primitive communal, slave, feudal, capitalist, and communist. Compare Smith's notion of the four stages of society found, for instance, in Smith (1978, p 4ff) 'in these severall ages of society, the laws and regulations with regard to property must be very different' (p 16). 35 36
33 McDougal and Lasswell, 1981, p 20: see also Lasswell and McDougal, 1943, pp 217-232; McDougal and Reisman, 1983, p 118; Arend, 1999, p 72; and Duxbury, 1995, p 178. 34 For an overview of Marxist theory of law, see Freeman, 2001, ch 12: a clear, succinct, and critical introduction is Collins, 1984. For an account of the early formation of Soviet concepts of international law, see Macdonald, 1998.
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the question arises whether in contemporary conditions of the existence of states not only with different but also with opposed socioeconomic systems there can exist normative principles common to socialist law and to bourgeois law. One must say very definitely that normative principles which would be common to the two opposed systems of law, socialist and bourgeois, do not exist. The principles of these legal systems, even in those instances when externally they appear to be identical, are fundamentally distinct by virtue of their class nature, role in society, and purposes.
principles of general international law, when applied in relations among socialist countries, expand their shape and acquire new socialist content. They go beyond general principles of international law. For example, the general principle of international law-the equality of states--':"'acquires a new content when applied in relations among socialist states. Parallel to the respect for legal equality, its implementation presupposes the achievement of factual equality of all socialist states and the equalization of their economic level. The principles of socialist internationalism are used by socialist states to strengthen their relations, to protect them from anti-socialist forces, and to ensure the construction of socialism. Thus, in relations among socialist states two types of norms function-the socialist and general principles and the norms of international law.
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A common ideology, however, is unnecessary for the development of international law, bilt the existence of two opposed social systems places limits on the content of the norms of international law. Because these must be agreed by States on the basis of equality-(only those international legal norms which embrace the agreement of all states are norms of contemporary general international law' -they can be neither socialist nor capitalist (pp 250-251).38 Consent between States, albeit reflecting the interests of their ruling classes (pp 36, 291), to specific rules is the keystone of Soviet theory which, furthermore, recognizes only treaties and custom as sources of international law. There is no room for some authoritative decision-maker to determine or influence the content of international law-for instance, (The [International] Court does not create international law; it applies it' (p 191). Norm creation necessarily requires State consent, whether express or tacit (p 124 and Chapter 4, passim). Accordingly (p 128): the majority of states in international relations cannot create norms binding upon other states and do not have the right to attempt to impose given norms on other states. This proposition is especially important for contemporary international law, which regulates relations of states belonging to different and even opposed social systems.39 One consequence of this strict requirement of consent is that Soviet theory endorses the doctrine of persistent objection to the formation of customary international law (p l30). Tunkin stresses that international law, as it exists between socialist and capitalist States, rests on democratic principles of peaceful co-existence which include the principles of the sovereign equality of States and non-interference in their domestic affairs (pp 29 and 251). The application and implications of these principles, however, differ in the international relations between States from opposed socio-economic systems and the relations between socialist States inter se. Relations between socialist States are not predicated on the notion of peaceful co-existence but on the principle of socialist or proletarian internationalism (p 47).40 Thus Kartashkin (1983, pp 82-83) maintains that:
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The principle of proletarian internationalism is that of (fraternal friendship, close cooperation, and mutual assistance of the working class of various countries in the struggle for their liberation' (Tunkin, 1974, p 4).41 This manifests itself in principles of socialist legality which, in the relations between socialist States, are lex specialis to the norms of general international law (pp 445-456).42 These principles are, (first and foremost' , those of (fraternal friendship, close cooperation, and comradely mutual assistance' (pp 434-435).43 Their implementation requires that (p 430): Socialist states carry out close cooperation in the field of foreign policy and defence measures for the purposes of defending the gains of socialism from possible feeble imperialist swoops. At its most stark, this aim was expressed in the Brezhnev doctrine, the claim that socialist States could, if necessary, use force to ensure that a socialist State did not divert from socialism and revert to capitalism. This doctrine asserted that a threat to socialism in one State was 'a threat to the security of the socialist community as a whole'44 and thus a common problem. It therefore constituted 'the joint defense of the socialist system from any attempts of forces of the old world to destroy or subvert any socialist state of this system' (Tunkin, 1974, p 434). Although the Brezhnev doctrine was promulgated following the forcible suppression of moves towards democratization in Czechoslovakia in 1968,45 this principle of socialist internationalism was employed to justify the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 195646 and its 1980 invasion of MghanistanY
41 See also Butler, 1971, pp 796-797; cfHazard, 1971. 42
See also Osakwe, 1972, p 597.
43 See also Butler, 1971, p 797; Osakwe, 1972, p 598. 44 Brezhnev doctrine as quoted in Schwebel, 1972, pp 816-817; see also Franck, 1970, pp 832-833. Franck See also TunIcin, 1974, ch 2, passim; Kartashkin, 1983, p 96ff. See also Tunkin, 1974, P 210 and the claim that natural law theorists of international law undermine its consensual basis 'thereby creating greater possibilities for an international legal justification of the imperialist policy of diktat, coercion, and military adventurism'. 40 The theory of socialist internationalism is expounded at length at p 427ff. 38
39
argues that the United States foreshadowed the Brezhnev doctrine in its policy towards the Americas-see ibid, pp 833-835, and pp 822-835 generally. 45 For instance, Butler, 1971, p 797; Franck, 1970, p 833; and Schwebel, 1972, p 816. 46 TunIcin, 1974, pp 435-436. 47 See Brezhnev, 1980, pp 6-9.
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C. NEW HAVEN AND SOVIET APPROACHES COMPARED
Accordingly, just as New Haven has the teleological aim of achieving human dignity (and thus the external projection of democratic liberal values), so Soviet theory has the aim of realizing proletarian internationalism. While New Haven rejects any foundational basis for human dignity- 'everyone [is] free to justify it in terms of his preferred theological or philosophical tradition' (McDougal and Lasswell, 1981, p 24), Soviet theory maintains that, by way of objective rules of societal development, the goal of proletarian internationalism is historically inevitable. In the meantime, according to Tunkin (1974, p 48) common ground must be sought in which competing social systems may peacefully co-exist: For thousands of years jurists have debated about definitions of law, but notwithstanding this law has existed. States, politicians, and jurists of different countries can hold various theories relating to the nature of international law, but this difference of opinion does not create insuperable obstacles to achieving agreements relating to the acceptance of specific rules of conduct as international legal norms. For instance, the absence of a common ideology is apparent in the international regulation of human rights. As Kartashkin (1983, p 95) notes: Marxist-Leninist theory proceeds from the premise that human rights and freedoms are not inherent in the nature of man and do not constitute some sort of natural attributes. Rights and freedoms of individuals in any state are materially stipulated and depend on socio-economic, political and other conditions of the development of society, its achievements and progress. Their fundamental source is the material conditions of society's life. McDougal and Lasswell would undoubtedly see this as an example where 'allegedly universal doctrines' such as sovereignty, domestic jurisdiction, and non-intervention are used 'to resist the institutional reconstructions which are indispensable to security'. In this case, the Soviet claim is that the content of internationally agreed human rights fall within the domestic jurisdiction of the implementing State (Tunkin, 1974, pp 82-83). McDougal and Lasswell (1981, p 18) resist such 'false conceptions of the universality of international law': The discrediting of claims to universality which are in fact false is ... a first necessary step toward clarifying the common goals, interpretations, and procedures essential to achieving an effective international order. Indeed, Soviet confidence that it was 'master in its own house' in human rights matters led the Politburo, against the advice of the KGB, to conclude the 1975 Helsinki Accords. This has been seen as a 'strategic mistake' by the USSR precisely because it opened it up to human rights condemnation, granting succour to its dissidents, and thus contributing to its own dissolution. 48
SOME COMMON HERESIES ABOUT INTERNATIONAL LAW
On the other hand, the policy science approach of New Haven was an anathema to Soviet thinking. Tunkin (1974, p 297) argued: Even though states may use international law as a support for foreign policy, this does not mean that international law is merged with policy. Mixing international law with policy inevitably leads to a denial of the normative character of international law, that is to say, to a denial of international law, which becomes buried in policy and vanishes as law. Professor McDougal's concept of the policy approach to international law is an example of this kind of mixing or blending of foreign policy arid international law. . .. McDougal, while not denying the importance of international law in so many words and sometimes also stressing it, in fact drowns international law in policy. In consequence thereof, international law in McDougal's concept is devoid of independent significance as a means of regulating international relations; it disappears into policy and, moreover, is transformed in to a means of justifying policies which violate international law. This criticism that New Haven analysis results in the eradication of international law is commonplace,49 but is perhaps equally applicable to Soviet theory despite its reliance on 'norms'. Falk (1995, P 2001) notes that, although not inevitable, the outcome of the application of New Haven analysis to a given issue 'had an uncomfortable tendency to coincide with the outlook of the US government and to seem more polemically driven than scientifically demonstrated'. 50 It cannot be doubted that the same was true of Soviet international law. As Damrosch and Mullerson (1995, pp 8-9) comment: The political climate of the Cold War undoubtedly contributed to the sense that the international legal order was far from approaching an optimal or perhaps even minimal level of determinacy. Especially in highly politicized areas such as the use of force or intervention, as well as in many aspects of human rights law, the content and clarity of principles and norms suffered from the fact that states proceeded from opposed interests; while they wanted to delineate parameters for the behaviour of the other side, they were wary of tying their own hands. The positions of the two sides were not only different but often irreconcilable; yet those positions were sometimes dictated more by ideological considerations than by real national interests. The New Haven tendency to make law malleable in its pursuit of human dignity, McDougal and Lasswell's 'penchant for applyin'g their theory in justification of U.S. foreign policy' (Falk, 1995, P 1997), undoubtedly gives an impression of normative indeterminacy. Could it be argued, however, that this mistakes the anomaly for the paradigm? One of the criticisms of formalism made by realist scholars was that it focused on the judgments of appellate courts which concentrate on contestable points oflaw (Duxbury, 1995, pp 57,135-137). Is this not also true of the common impression gained of the New Haven School (and equally of Soviet theory for that matter)? As Higgins (1994, pp 6-7) notes, New Haven does not require: 49 See, eg, Arend, 1996, p 290; Bull, 2002, pp 153-154; and Kratochwil, 1989, pp 193-200.
48 Andrew and Mitrokhin, 1999, p 420, and Chapter 20 passim.
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50
See also Faik, 1995, P 2001, see also p 1997.
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one to find every means possible if the end is desirable. Trends of past decisions still have an important role to play in the choices to be made, notwithstanding the importance of both context and desired outcome. Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the policy-directed choice can properly be made.
New Stream or New Approaches in International Law school fall squarely within this tendency. Indeed for some, it appears to amount to a manifesto: 51
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students of international law should reformulate their sense of cause and effect in international affairs: rejecting reliance upon visions both of State interests that we too often take to propel doctrine and of the law that we take to restrain statesmen.
The application of most international law is not problematic: standardized rules are applied to standardized situations otherwise, as Franck (1990, p 20) points out, 'for example, no mail wo~d go from one state to another, no currency or commercial transactions could take place ... [V]iolence, fortunately, is a one-in-a-rnillion deviance from the pacific norm'. Higgins' point appears to be that if ambiguity exists, then the decision-maker can make a choice which implements or is justified by existing legal material. Choice is inevitable in legal decision-making because rules are not fully determined - for instance, is or is not a computer network attack a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter? In these circumstances, Higgins (1994, p 5) thinks it:
This tendency towards detachment, the perceived disinclination to making clear commitments to anything but being 'critical' has caused adverse comment. For instance, Higgins (1994, p 9) argues that this approach: leads to the pessimistic conclusion that what international law can do is to point out the problems but not assist in the achievement of goalS.52 The leading UK 'non-instrumental' theorist of international law is Philip Allott whose work is avowedly iconoclastic. Unlike New Stream scholars, however, Allott is imbued with a regenerative idealism. He argues for the rejection of the State as the primary unit of authority, and thus for the reconstruction of world affairs. At the heart of Allott's project lies an elemental conviction in the power of ideas both to structure and to change-to restructure-the world (2001, p xxvii):
desirable that the policy factors are dealt with systematically and openly. Dealing with them systematically means that all factors are properly considered and weighed, instead of the decision-maker unconsciously narrowing or selecting what he will take int9 account in order to reach a decision that he has instinctively predetermined is desirable. Dealing with policy factors openly means that the decision-maker himself is subjected to the discipline of facing them squarely.
We make the human world, including human institutions, through the power of the human mind. What we have made by thinking we can make new by new thinking. Allott (2001, P 243, para 13.105) argues that the adoption of the Vattellian concept of international relations, with its emphasis on the centrality of the State, was at least a mistake, if not a tragedy:
While one can disagree with the policy factors Higgins thinks relevant, at least this approach has the virtue of making these factors candid. Analysis and evaluation are easier because one knows what factors are in play. Despite their differences, the New Haven and Soviet schools share a common approach: both are instrumental theories of law, aimed at guiding and informing practice. Not all legal philosophy has this focus, despite the fact that this might cause disappointment. As Gardner (2001, p 204) observes:
The eventually dominant Vattel tradition is not merely a tradition of international law. It implies a pure theory of the whole nature of international society and hence of the whole nature of the human social condition; and it generates practical theories which rule the lives of all societies, of the whole human race. It is nothing but mere words, mere ideas, mere theory, mere values-and yet war and peace, human happiness and human misery, human wealth and human want, human lives and human life have depended on them for two centuries and more.
Lawyers and law teachers ... think (rightly) that legal practice is a practical business, and they expect the philosophy of law to be the backroom activity of telling front-line practitioners how to do it well, with their heads held high. When a philosopher of law asserts a proposition that neither endorses nor criticises what they do, lawyers and law teachers are often frustrated ... They cannot accept that legal philosophy is not wholly (or even mainly) the backroom activity of identifying what is good or bad about legal practice, and hence of laying on practical proposals for its improvement (or failing that, abandonment).
This tradition has generated a wrong consciousness, a fundamental misconception about what matters: for Allott, what matters is humanity rather than a collection of States, the pursuit of whose interests has all too often harmed humans. The edifice of the State does not have its agenda set by the people of the society it encompasses, but, Allot argues, (p 243, para 13.105(1) ), rather by the much narrower class of politicians and officials: The state (public realm under the authority of a government) having developed as a way of internally organizing a certain sort of society ... came to be conceived also as the external
IV. NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD? Much contemporary theory of international law is more detached from practice or doctrinal justification than New Haven or the Soviet school. Some strands of the
:\
51 Kennedy, 1985, p 381; see also Kennedy, 1999 and 2000. Good overviews of New Stream work are Cass, 1996; Paulus, 2001; and Purvis, 1991. 52 This is precisely the criticism m~de of Kennedy in Charlesworth, 2002. An early, and extreme, denunciation of critical scholars as engendering legal nihilism is Carrington, 1984.
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manifestation of the given societies. The state was turned inside. out, like a glove. The governments of the statally organizing societies recognize in each other that which is state, not that which is society. Just as the State is not co-extensive with society, international unsociety (to use Allott's term), where States dominate, is markedly less representative of humanity. This was an inevitable outcome of the reception of Vattellian thought in international affairs (pp 248-249, para 13.106): It is a reality which was welcome to the ruling classes of western Europe, the classes who still
had most control over social reality-forming, including the self-conceiving of society in theory and including reality forming far beyond the territorial limits of western Europe. It was most welcome of all to the political and administrative sections of those ruling classes, who could speak to each other and compete with each other and conflict with each other across frontiers, safe in the fastnesses of their self-contained internal-external statesystems.
Eunomia is an idealist edict. Allott seeks a (revolution, not in the streets but in the mind' (p 257, para 14.9) in order to achieve (a social international society [where] the ideal of all ideals is eunomia, the good order of a self-ordering society' (p 404, para 18.77). This is predicated on Allott's fundamental belief (p 180, para 12.5) that: international society has the ultimate capacity to enable all societies to promote the everincreasing well-being of themselves and their members, the ultimate responsibility to prevent societies from doing harm to themselves and to other societies. It is in international society that humanity's capacity to harm itself can achieve its most spectacular effects. And it is in international society that the ever-increasing well-being of the whole human race can, must, and will be promoted. Allott places his faith in the power of the human mind to reform the future by imagining what that future should be, and then use reason to implement this idea(Societies live within the theories they make. A society generates a theory-filled reality which shapes its willed action which, in turn, shapes its actual everyday living' (p 38, para 2.64). Human consciousness thus provides the template for human action and human reality. The adoption of sovereignty as the structural premiss of international affairs, explains (the theoretical incoherence and the practical impotence of international law' (p 302,para 16.14). Sovereignty is the preserve of States, and projects (an authoritybased view of society' (p 199, para 12.53) which:
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consciousness of the State is impoverished, concentrating on State rather than human interests. At least in some States, however, the notion of sovereignty has been surpassed by that of democracy which relocates power in society rather than in the simple fiat of authority. This introduces a profound shift in social consciousness as democracy (seeks to make the individual society-member seek well-being in seeking the well-being of society. Democracy seeks to make society seek well-being in seeking the well-being of each individual society-member' (p 217, para 13.31). International society, on the other hand, has chosen (to regard itself as the state externalized, undemocratized, and unsocialized' (p 240, para 13.98). This has given rise to the perception (p 244, para 13.105(6)) that domestic and international affairs are (intrinsically and radically separate' as citizens can only participate in international affairs through the mediation of their governments. Further (p 247, para 13.105(13)): The purposes of the interstatal unsociety are simply the aggregated purposes conceived within the government-controlled public realms of the state-societies, purposes related to the survival and prospering of each of those state-societies rather than the survival and prospering of an international society of the whole human race. This exacerbates the division between the domestic and international spheres, and entails the consequence that morality is discontinuous between the two. Accordingly (p 248, para 13.105(16)), (governments, and the human beings who compose them, are able to will and act internationally in ways that they would be morally restrained from willing and acting internally, murdering human beings by the million in wars, tolerating oppression and starvation and disease and poverty, human cruelty and suffering, human misery and human indignity'. What we are left with is (p 249, para 13.109): a world fit for governments. It is an unsociety ruled by a collective of ,self-conceived sovereigns whose authority is derived neither from the totality of international society nor from the people but from the inter-mediating state-systems. The result (p 296, para 16.1) is that (international law is left speaking to governments the words that governments want to hear' and (p 297, para 16.3) remains marginal in the international system: (International law has been neither very threatening nor very useful to the politicians and the diplomats'. International law Cpp 298-299, para 16.8) is:
tend[s] to make all society seem to be essentially a system of authority, and ... to make societies incorporating systems of authority seem to be the most significant forms of society, at the expense of all other forms of society, including non-patriarchal families, at one extreme, and international society, at the other.
a mystery to international society. The people of the world do not know themselves as participants in its making, only as participants in its effects. It seems to be the business of a foreign realm, another world, in which they play no personal part.
Thus the notion of the State, organized as sovereign authority over specified territory, trumps membership of other possible societies which are not as exclusive, and whose consciousness and ideals may differ from those of the State. Moreover, the
International law, accordingly, cannot be integrated into the social process of humanity and is (doomed to be what it has been-marginal, residual, and intermittent' (p 304, para 16.17). As things stand, international law cannot play its proper part in the realisation of eunomia.
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When Eunomia first appeared, Allott's vision was criticized as utopian. It assumes that a fully socialized international society will be benevolent and eschew conflict, as these arise from the competing interests of States. Allott (p xxxii) denies that the criticism of utopianism has any force:
you do write as you have heard it said then you have to change it'.53 This is precisely the point of Allott' s Eunomia. Having looked at the world and found it sadly wanting, Eunomia provides a blueprint for making it better. Its idealism is not about thinking the unthinkable, it is about thinking the unthought, and then grasping the challenge to put these thoughts into practice. And thinking, after all, is what theory is all about.
In response to this criticism, it is surely only necessary to say that our experience of the revolutionary transformation of national societies has been that the past conditions the future but that it does not finally and inescapably determine it. We have shown that we can think ourselves out of the social jungle.
It is equally true that we can think ourselves into that jungle: the 1917 Russian revolution, and resultant terror, is only one case in point. Allott's presupposition that humanity would develop a more just, loving, and peaceful consciousness-and choose to implement this in its social reality were it allowed to do so-is difficult to accept without hesitation. His argument is predicated on the belief that bad or wicked choices have been made which have caused human misery. It might be that Allott does not believe in the possibility of 'pure' evil, of wicked acts done in and for themselves. For Allott, human evil might simply be a contingent possibility, the product of a perverted consciousness arising, for instance, from the asocial conduct of international affairs. Accordingly, for Allott, evil might not be a necessary part of the human condition and may be banished through the transformation of human consciousness in the strive for eunomia. This belief, nevertheless, appears to be more an act of faith than a demonstrable proposition. On the other hand, one consequence of Allott's vision must surely be that of taking responsibility for international society and thus for international law. If Allott's inclusive international society were to be realized, international law would become a matter directly within individual consciousness. Accordingly, individuals (ultimately) -rather than the State would determine and thus be responsible for the substantive content of international law. With that responsibility, Allott's hope is that morality would no longer be discontinuous between domestic and international society.
v.
REFERENCES ALLOTT, PJ (2001), Eunomia: New Order For a New World (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (first printed in 1990, reprinted 2001 with an extensive new preface). ANDREW, C and MITROKHIN, V (1999), The Mitrokhin Archive: the KGB in Europe and the West (London: Allen Lane). AREND, AC (1996), 'Toward an Understanding of International Legal Rules", in Beck, RJ, Arend, AC, and Lugt, RDV (eds), International Rules: Approaches From International Law and International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press), p 289. - - (1999), Legal Rules and International Society (New York: Oxford University Press). AUSTIN, J (1832), The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Rumble, WE ed. (1995)) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
AND IN THE END
BALKIN, JM (1986), 'Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory', 96 Yale LJ743.
Eunomia presents a fundamental critique of the contemporary conduct of international affairs. It is, at the very least, a useful and profound corrective to the notion that international law is ultimately about States, whether liberal democratic or socialist in orientation. States are neither conscious nor sentient. States neither bleed nor starve nor are forced to flee for their lives. This might seem to be simply a self-evident and perhaps mundane corrective, but Allott exposes the intellectual foundations of the centrality accorded to States and proposes a reformative alternative. The realist, allegedly, tells us as it is, but as Gertrude Stein-this time intelligibly-cautions us, 'If
BECKETT, J (2001), 'Behind Relative Normativity: Rules and Process as Prerequisites of Law', 12 EJIL 627. BERMAN, N (1994), 'Between "Alliance" and "Localization": Nationalism and the New Oscillationalism', 26 NYU JILP 449. 53
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Stein, 1936 (1998), P 411.
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BREZHNEV, L (1980), On Events in Afghanistan: Leonid Brezhnev's Replies to a Pravda Correspondent (Moscow: Novosti Press). BROWNLIE, I (1981), 'The Reality and Efficacy of International Law', _ 52 BYIL l. - - (1983), 'Recognition in Theory and Practice', in Macdonald and Johnston (eds), p 627. - - (1995), 'International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations: General Course on Public International Law', 255 Recueil des Cours 9. BULL, H (2002), The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave). BUTLER, WE (1971), '''Socialist International Law" or "Socialist Principles of International Relations"?', 65 AJIL 796. CARRINGTON, PD (1984), 'Of Law and the River', 34 J of Legal Education 222. CARTY, A (1986), The Decay of International Law? A Reappraisal of the Limits of Legal Imagination in International Affairs (Manchester: Manchester University Press). - - (1997), 'Theory oflor Theory Instead of/International Law', 8 EJIL 181. CASS, D (1996), 'Navigating the Newstream:
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Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law', 65 Nordic JIL 341.
Society in the Age of Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
CHARLESWORTH, H (2002), 'Author! Author!: a Response to David Kennedy', 15 Harvard HRJ 127.
FREEMAN, MDA (2001), Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence, 7th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell).
- - and CHINKIN, C (2000), The Boundaries of International Law: a Feminist Analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
GARDNER, J (2001), 'Legal Positivism: 5% Myths', 46 American J of Jurisprudence 199.
CHARNEY, J (1985), 'The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law', 56 BYIL 1. . COLLINS, H (1984), Marxism and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press). DAMROSCH, LF and MULLERSON, R (1995), 'The Role of International Law in the Contemporary World', in Damrosch, LF, Danilenko, GM, and Miillerson, R (eds), Beyond Confrontation: International Law for the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press), p 1. DE VITO RIA, F (1991), Political Writings, Pagden, A and Lawrance, J (eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). DUXBURY, N (1995), Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press). FALK, RA (1995), 'Casting the Spell: the New Haven School of International Law', 104 Yale LJ 1991. FOUCAULT, M (1998), 'What is an Author?', in Faubian, JD (ed.), Essential Works 1954-84, vol 2, Aesthetics (New York: New Press), p203. FRANCK, TM (1970), 'Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States', 64 AJIL 809. - - (1990), The Power ofLegitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press). - - (1995), Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press). - - (1999), The Empowered Self: Law and
HART, HLA (1994), The Concept of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
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KOSKENNIEMI, M (1989), From Apology to Utopia: the Structure ofInternational Legal Argument (Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Co). KRATOCHWIL, FV (1989), Rules, Norms and Decisions: on the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
HAZARD, J (1971), 'Renewed Emphasis Upon a Socialist International Law', 65 AJIL 142.
LASSWELL, HD and McDOUGAL, MS (1943), 'Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest', 52 Yale LJ 203.
HIGGINS, R (1994), Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford:- CI~endon Press).
- - and - - (1992), Jurisprudence For a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff).
HUTCHESON, JC (1928-29), 'The Judgment Intuitive: the Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision', 14 Cornell LQ 274.
LAUTERPACHT, H (1933), The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press). MACCORMICK, N (1981), HLA Hart (London: Edward Arnold).
JENNINGS, RY (1982), 'The Identification of International Law', in Cheng, B (ed.), International Law: Teaching and Practice (London: Stevens), p 3. KANT, I (1793), 'On the Common Saying: "This May be True in Theory, But it Does Not Apply in Practice"', in Reiss, H (ed.) (1970), Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p 61. KARTASHKIN, V (1983), 'The MarxistLeninist Approach: the Theory of Class . Struggle and Contemporary International Law', in Macdonald and Johnston (eds), p 79. KENNEDY, D (1985), 'International Legal Education', 26 Harvard ILJ 361. - - (1999), 'The Disciplines of International Law and Policy', 12 LJIL 9.
MACDONALD, RStJ (1998), 'Rummaging in the Ruins. Soviet International Law and Policy in the Early Years: is Anything Left?', in Wellens, K (ed.), International Law: Theory and Practice. Essays in Honour of Eric Suy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), p 61. - - and JOHNSTON, DM (eds) (1983), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy Doctrine and Theory (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff). McDOUGAL, MS and BURKE, WT (1962), The Public Order of the Oceans: a Contemporary International Law of the Sea (Yale: Yale University Press).
- - (2000), 'When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box', 32 NYU JILP 335.
- - and FELICIANO, FP (1994), The International Law of War: Transnational Coercion and World Public Order (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff).
- - (2002), 'The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?', 15 Harvard HRJ 101.
- - and LASSWELL, HD (1981), 'The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order', in McDougal,
MS and Reisman, WM, International Law Essays (Mineola, NY: Foundation Press), pIS. - - , - - , and CHEN, LC (1969), 'Human Rights and World Public Order: a Framework for Policy-oriented Inquiry', 63 AJIL237. - - , - - , and - - (1980), Human Rights and World Public Order: the Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press). - - and REISMAN, WM (1983), 'International Law in Policy-oriented Perspective', in Macdonald and Johnston (eds), p 103. MORISON, WL (1982), John Austin (London: Edward Arnold). OLIVECRONA, K (1971), Law as Fact, 2nd edn (London: Stevens). OSAKWE, C (1972), 'Socialist International Law Revisited', 66 AJIL 596. PAULUS, AL (2001), 'International Law After Postmodernism: Towards Renewal or Decline of International Law?', 14 Leiden JIL 727. POSNER, RA (1990), Cardozo: a Study in Reputation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). PURVIS, N (1991), 'Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law', 32 Harvard JIL 81. REISMAN, WM (1985), 'Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law', 10 Yale JIL 279. ROBERTS, AE (2001), 'Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: a Reconciliation', 95 AJIL 757. SCHMITT, MN (1998), 'Bellum Americanum: the US View of Twenty-first Century War and its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict', 19 MichiganJIL 1051.
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SCHMITT, MN (1999a), 'Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework', 3i ColumbiaJ of Transnat'l L 885. - - (1999b), 'The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare', 2 Yale Human Rights and Development LJ 143. - - (2002), Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello, 84/846 International Review of the Red Cross 365. SCHWEBEL, SM (1972), 'The Brezhnev Doctrine Repealed and Peaceful Co-existence Enacted', 66 AJIL 816. SCOBBIE, I (1990), 'Towards the Elimination of International Law: Some Radical Scepticism about Sceptical Radicalism', 61 BYIL 339. SMITH, A (1978), 'Lectures on Jurisprudence', in Meek, RL, Raphael, DD, and Stein, P (eds), the Glasgow edition of The Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, vol 5 (Oxford: Clarendon Press). STEIN, G (1998), Gertrude Stein: Writings 1903-1932 . (New York: Library of America). - - (1936), 'The Geographical History of America or The Relation of Human Nature to the Human Mind', in Stein, G
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(1998), Gertrude Stein: Writings 19321946 (New York: Library of America), p 365.
STEIN, T (1985), 'The Approach of a Different Drummer: the Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law', 26 Harvard ILJ 457. TAssIOuLIs, J (1996), 'In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case', 16 OxJLS 84. THIRLWAY, HWA (1972), International Customary Law and Codification (Leiden: Sijthoff). TUCK, R (1999), The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press). TUNKIN, GI (1974), Theory of International Law (Butler, WE (trans.») (London: Allen & Unwin). WARBRICK, C (1991), 'The Theory ofInternational Law: is there an English contribution?', in Allott, P et al., Theory and International Law: an Introduction (London: BIICL), p 49. - - (2000), 'Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law: an Assessment', 11 EJIL 62l. WElL, P (1983), 'Towards Normativity?', 77 AJIL 413.
Relative
FURTHER READING In addition to the works cited in the bibliography, the following are useful in providing a variety of theoretical perspectives on international law, although this is an enormous and expanding field.
Relations (New York: Oxford University Press) is an excellent introductory collection of readings and commentary which covers the principal contemporary schools of international legal thought.
BECK, RJ, AREND, AC, and LUGT, RD (eds) (1996), International Rules: Approaches From International Law and International
BYERS, M (ed.) (2000), The Role of International Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press) is a collection of essays by distinguished authors which examines the interface between international law and politics. This is for a more advanced audience than Beck although it remains fairly accessible. DALLMEYER, DG (ed.) (1993), Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law (Washington DC: American Society of International Law) is a fairly early and important group of essays on feminist approaches to international law. The leading monograph on this issue is Charlesworth, H and Chinkin, C (2000), The Boundaries of International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
KOSKENNIEMI, M (2001), The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: the Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) is an extensive scholarly analysis of the intellectual history of modern international law. RUBIN, AP (1997), Ethics and Authority in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) is a readable and slightly idiosyncratic account of the influence of the naturalist and positivist schools of legal theory on our understanding of international law. TES6N, FR (1998), A Philosophy of International Law (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press) expounds an essentially Kantian notion of international law.
Finally, the European Journal of International Law frequently publishes articles that discuss diverse aspects of the theory of international law, and periodically symposia on specific figures such as Kelsen (vol 9, 1998), Lauterpacht (vol 8, 1997), and Franck (vol 13, 2002).
3 WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR? Martti Koskenniemi
SUMMARY The objectives of international law appear differently depending on one's standpoint. International law certainly seeks to realize the political values, interests, and preferences of various international actors. But it also appears as a standard of criticism and means.of controlling those in powerful positions. Instrumentalism and formalism connote two opposite sensibilities of what it means to be an international lawye~ and two cultures of professional practice, the stereotypes of \the advisor' to a powerful actor with many policy-alternatives and \the judge' scrutinizing the legality of a particular international behaviour. Beyond pointing to the oscillation between instrumentalism and formalism as styles of legal thought and practice, howeve~ the question \what is international law for?' also invokes popular aspirations about peace, justice, and human rights, and thus acts as a platform for an international political community. Whatever its shortcomings, international law also exists as a promise of justice, and thus as encouragement for political transformation.
I. THE PARADOX OF OBJECTIVES Attempting to answer the question in the tide one meets with a familiar paradox. On the one hand, it seems indisputable that international law 'has a general function to fulfil, namely to safeguard international peace, security and justice in relations between states' (Tomuschat, 1999, p 23). Or as Article 1 of the UN Charter puts it, the organization has the purpose to 'be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of ... common ends' such as international peace and security, friendly relations among nations, and international cooperation. Such objectives seem selfevident and have never been seriously challenged. On the other hand, it is hard to see how or why they could be challenged-or indeed why one should be enthusiastic
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about. them-because they exist at such high level of abstraction as to fail to indicate concrete preferences for action. What do 'peace', 'security', or 'justice' really mean? As soon as such words are defined more closely, disagreement emerges. To say that international law aims at peace between States is perhaps already to have narrowed down its scope unacceptably. Surely it must also seek to advance 'human rights as well as the rule of law domestically inside States for the benefit of human beings ... ' (Tomuschat, 1999, p 23). But what if advancing human rights would call for the destruction of an unjust peace? In the end, very little seems to depend on any general response to the question 'what is international law for?' The real problem seems always to be less about whether international law should aim for 'peace', 'security', or 'human rights' than about how to resolve interpretative controversies over or conflicts between such notions that emerge when defending or attacking particular policies. There is no disagreement about the objective of peace in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinian people. But if asked what 'peace' might mean for them, the protagonists would immediately give mutually exclusive answers. Nor is the 'Asian values' debate about being 'for' or 'against' human rights but about what might such rights be and how they should be translated into social practices in the relevant societies. To enquire about the objectives of international law is to study the political preferences of int~r national actors-what it is that they wish to attain by international law. And because those preferences differ, the answer to the question in the title can only either remain controversial or be formulated in such broad terms as to contain the controversy within itself-in which case it is hard to see how it could be used to resolve it. lt would therefore be wrong to think of the paradox of objectives as a technical problem that could be disposed of by reflecting more closely on the meaning of words such as 'peace', 'security', or 'justice' or by carrying out more sophisticated social or economic analyses about the way the international world is. Such notions provide an acceptable response to the question 'what is international law for?' precisely because of their ability to gloss over existing disagreement about political choices and distributional priorities. If they did not work in this way, and instead permanently preferred some choices over other choices, they would no longer be able to do the service we expect of them. In accordance with the founding myth of the system, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 lay the basis for an agnostic, procedural international law whose merit consisted in its refraining from imposing any external normative ideal on the international society. The objectives of that society would now arise from itself: there were no religious or other transcendental notions of the good that international law should realize. If there is an 'international community', it is not a teleological but a practical association, a system not designed to realize ultimate ends but to coordinate practical action to further the objectives of existing communities.} Sovereign equality builds on this: because ¢.ere are no natural ends, every member of the } This is why it is so easy to discuss it in terms of the ethics of Immanuel Kant, an ethics of universalizable principles of right action rather than as instrumental guidelines for attaining the Good. Cf, eg, O'Neill, 2000.
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international society is free to decide on its own ends, and to that extent, they are all equal. The law that governs them is not natural but artificial, created by the sovereigns through the processes that are acceptable because neutral (cf, eg, Nardin, 1983). To say that international law is for 'peace', 'security', and 'justice' is to say that it is for peace, security, and justice as agreed and understood between the members of the system. 2 What this means for international legal argument can be gleaned, for instance, from the opinion of the International Court of Justice in th~951). Here the Court was called upon to examine the admissibility of reservations to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Court first outlined what seemed a natural consequence of the principles of neutrality and sovereignty, namely that no reservation should be effective against a State that has not agreed to it. To stay with this understanding, however, might have undermined the Convention by creating a system in which some reservations were in force in regard to some States (namely those accepting them) but not against others, while each nonaccepting State would be free to regard the reservation-making State as not a party to the Convention at all. This would have gone against the universal nature of the Convention. Thus, the Court continued, a State having made a reservation that has been objected to by some of the parties, may still be held a party to the Convention if the reservation is compatible with the 'object and purpose' of the Convention. At this point, then, the Court moved to think of the law expressly in terms of its objectives. However, there were no objectives to the Convention that were independent from the objectives of the parties to the Convention. Thus, it was up to each party to make the determination 'individually and from its own standpoint'.3 Such an argument defines the objectives of international law in terms of the objectives of the (sovereign) members of the international society-in this case the society formed by the parties to the Genocide Convention-bringing to the fore two types of problems: what will happen in cases where States disagree about the objectives? And why would only State objectives count?
II. CONVERGING INTERESTS? If no antecedent order establishes a firm priority between what States want, then any <;:ontroversy either will have to remain open or we shall have to assume that the procedure in which the disagreement is revealed will somehow be able to dispose of it
2 Henkin writes that instead of 'human values', the system is centred upon 'State values' (Henkin, 1989, p 109). This polemical contrast undermines the degree to which States-including principles of sovereignty and non-interference-find their moral justification in late eighteenth century liberal individualism and the ideal of national self-rule: 'State values' persist because they channel 'human values' within a political community. See also Paulus, 2001, pp 69-97. 3 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, IC! Reports 1951, p 15 at p 26.
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to the satisfaction of all. The latter suggestion embodies the idea of the (harmony of interests', the presence of an underlying convergence between apparently conflicting State interests. Under this view, any actual dispute would always be only superficial. At a deeper level, State interests would coalesce and the objective of international law would then be to lead from the former level to the latter. 4 It has been difficult to defend this view against realist criticisms. Why would harmony, instead of conflict, be the true nature of international politics? What evidence is there that, rightly understood, the interests of States are compatible? Might the harmony not rather seem a form of wishful thinking that prevents people from clearly seeing where their interests lie, and' acting accordingly? Hans Morgenthau, one of the fathers of realist thought, attacked the inter-war legalism precisely for having made this mistake. To believe in harmony under the League of Nations had left the world unprepared for Hitler's aggression in 1939 (Morgenthau, 1940, pp 261-284). EH Carr, another powerful realist thinker, described the' harmony as an ideological smokescreen: (Biologically and economically, the doctrine of the harmony of interests was tenable only if you left out of account the interest of the weak who must be driven to the wall, or called in the next world to redress the balance of the present' (Carr, 1946, p 50).
jurisprudential techniques that often emerge into each other. Even the hardest 'realism' reveals itself as a moral position (for example by highlighting the priority of the national interest) inasmuch as, 'philosophically speaking, realism is unthinkable without the background of a prior idealistic position deeply committed to the universalism of the Enlightenment and democratic political theory' (Guzzini, 1998, p 16). On the other hand, any serious idealism is able to point to aspects of international reality that support it, and needs such reference in order to seem professionally credible. Much of the controversy is about political preference, including the question of what element of a many-faceted 'reality' should be chosen as the starting point of one's analysis. Disciplinary progress has occurred by recurrent cycles oflawyers rejecting the previous generation as either 'utopian' (typically because excessively idealist) or as 'apologist' (typically because too impressed by sovereignty) and the corresponding critiques are as available today as they were a century ago. Care must be taken not to associate any legal position or doctrine permanently with either: idealism and realism are best understood as forms of critique and channels for institutional reform in accordance with particular political agendas, disciplinary manoeuvring rather than qualities of an independent international world. 6 This is not to say that international law would not often be helpful for the limited resolution of conflicts, resulting in temporary accommodations or even settlement. This is, after all, why the S:ieneral Assembly posed its question to the ICJ in the Reservations case in the first place. The Court was not asked to rule on the admissi'bility of particular reservations but to indicate how to go about implementing the Convention so as to minimize any distorting effect that controversial reservations 'might have. , Many lawyers make a more ambitious defence of international law in terms of such practical effects. However neutral in regard to political principles, they would say, the structure is not devoid of normative direction. In their view, international law is accompanied by a cunning logic that slowly socializes initially egoistic States into the law's internationalist spirit.? It is possible (though not necessary) to picture this ethic as the (inner morality of law' that accompanies any serious commitment to work in a legal system. 8 An alternative but parallel approach would be to characterize the system in terms of a 'culture of civility' shared by its administrators and excluding certain types of secrecy, dishonesty, fraud, or manipulation. Such an explanation resonates with international law's emergence in the late nineteenth century as an aspect of optimistic evolutionism among the liberal elites of Europe and North America. To view international law as a process of education is to assume that, by entering into
International lawyers have responded to such criticisms in two ways. Many have accepted the marginal scope that power leaves for law and defined the legal regimes as variables dependent on a central power (Schmitt, 1988; Grewe, 2001), or developed purely instrumental accounts of the use of law in the defence of particular interests or preferences (McDougal, 1953, pp 137-259). Others have sought to articulate the harmony under a more elaborate interdependence or globalization theory. 'International trade and commerce, international finance, international communicationall are essential to the survival of States, and all require an international legal system to provide a stable framework within which they may function' (Watts, 2000, p 7). Institutional, procedural, and even linguistic theories have been used to argue that even the articulation of State interests is based on an internalization of legal notions such as 'sovereignty', 'treaty', and 'binding force' that delimit and define what may count as State interests or even State identity in the first place. 5 But the opposition between 'realism' and 'idealism' is only of limited heuristic usefulness. The labels invoke contrasting political sensibilities and different 4 This argument, always implicit in moral objectivism and theories of natural law, was made in a dramatic way by Hersch Lauterpacht, speaking at Chatham House in 1941, as bombs were falling over Coventry and his family was being destroyed by the Nazis in Poland: 'The disunity of the modern world is a fact; but so, in a truer sense, is its unity. Th[e] essential and manifold solidarity, coupled with the necessity of securing the rule of law and the elimination of war, constitutes a harmony of interests which has a basis more real and tangible than the illusions of the sentimentalist or the hypocrisy of those satisfied with the existing status quo. The ultimate harmony of interests which within the State finds expression in the elimination of private violence is not a misleading invention of nineteenth century liberalism' (Lauterpacht, 1975, p 26). 5 This is the 'constructivist' explanation of international law's impact on States, much used today in international relations studies. See, eg, Finnemore, 1996. For a discussion, see Brunnee and Toope, 2000, pp 19-74; Kratochwil, 2000, pp 55-59.
93
This is one of the central arguments in Koskenniemi, 1989. A defence of the view that law socializes States not by constraint but by 'compliance strategies [that] seek to remove obstacles, clarify issues, and convince parties to change their behavior', as well as by 'various manifestations of disapproval: exposure, shaming, and diffuse impacts on the reputations and international relationships of a resisting party', is found in Chayes and Chayes, 1995, pp 109, 110. 8 The point about law necessarily containing certain 'aspirations of excellence' without which an order would not be recognized as 'law' in the first place, is made, of course, in Fuller, 1969, especially pp 41-94. 6 ?
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the processes it provides, States come to define not only their objectives but perhaps even their identity by principles offered by international law (Koskenniemi, 2001a).
This outlook was reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Opinion in 1996. In response to the question about the lawfulness of the threat or use of such weapons, the Court concluded that whatever the consequences, "It could not exclude that such use would be lawful 'in an extreme circumstance of 'self-defence, when the very survival of a State would be at stake'. 10 State objectives and State survival remain the highest objectives of the system. Likewise, bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights or the UN Human Rights Committee recognize that the treaties they administer function in a State-centred world: the margin of appreciation ~d the wide scope of derogations allow for national security reasons if 'necessary in a democratic society' to operate with notions of 'security' and 'democracy' that are embedded in a world of States. 11 But the defence of international law's state-centredness is thoroughly practical. 'Stated quite simply', James Brierly once wrote, 'what [international law] tries to do is to define or delimit the respective spheres within which each of the ... States into which the world is divided for political purposes is entitled to exercise its authority' (Brierly, 1944, p 3). Little of this justification has changed. A form and a process is needed that channels interpretative conflicts into peaceful avenues. This is not to say that non-State values such as 'human rights', 'efficient economies', 'clean environment' , or 'justice' would be unworthy objectives of political action. Disagreement about them provides the life and blood of political community. The defenders of the State-system would only note that such values conflict and that 'States alone have provided the structures of authority needed to cope with the incessant claims of competing social groups and to provide public justice essential to social order and responsibility' (Schachter, 1997, p 22). States may be set aside, of course, by consent or revolution but there are dangers in such transformations, some of which are well known, and something about those dangers results from their teleological nature. On the other hand, there is no doubt that international politics is far from the Westphalian ideal. The informal networks and epistemic communities that influence international developments beyond the rigid forms of sovereign equality are populated by experts from the developed West. It is hard to justify the attention given and the resources allocated to the 'fight against terrorism' in the aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001 in which nearly 3,000 people lost their lives, while simultaneously six million children under five years old die annually of malnutrition by causes that could be prevented by existing
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STATEHOOD But the Westphalian myth leaves also unexplained why only State objectives count. At least since Immanuel Kant published his essay on the Perpetual Peace (1795), philosophers, political theorists, and lawyers have routinely challenged the Statecentrism of the international system, arguing that whatever instrumental value States may have for the coordination of affairs of particular communities, the 'ultimate' members of those communities are individuals and that many other human groups apart from States ('peoples', 'nations', 'minorities', 'international organizations', 'corporations') also play important roles (Westlake, 1910, p 16). Globalization and the crisis of sovereignty have intensified the criticisms of the nature of international law as State law from sociological, functional, and ethical standpoints. These critiques have often sought to project a material value or an idea of social justice outside of statehood that they suggest should be enforced by international law (Koskenniemi, 1994, pp 22-29). The universalizing vocabularies of human rights, liberalism, economic, and ecological interdependence have no doubt complicated inter-sovereign law by the insertion of public law notions such as jus cogens and 'obligations owed to the international community as a whole' and by 'fragmenting' the international system through the fluid dynamics of globalization (cf Section VIII below). But it has not been replaced by something recognizeably non-Westphalian. None of the normative directions-human rights, economic or environmental values, religious ideals-has been able to establish itself in a dominating position. On the contrary, what these values may mean and how conflicts between them should be resolved is decided largely through 'Westphalian' institutions. This is not to say that new institutions would not enjoy a degree of autonomy from the policies of States. Human rights and many economic and environmental regimes provide examples of such. The European Union has developed into an autonomous system that functions largely outside the frame of international law. How far these other regimes are from that of the EU can, however, be gleaned from the recent characterization of the WTO system by the Appeals Body in the Alcoholic Beverages case (1996): The WTO Agreement is a treaty-the international equivalent of a contract. It is self-evident that in an exercise of their sovereignty,· and in pursuit of their own respective national interests, the Members of the WTO have made a bargain. In exchange for the benefits they expect to derive as members of the WTO they have .agreed to exercise their sovereignty according to commitments they have made in the WTO Agreement. 9 9
lapan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appeals Body (AB-1996-2) DSR 1996: I p lOS.
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10 Legality of the Threat or Use ~f Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, leI Reports 1996, p 226, paras 96, 101(E). 11 Or in other words, these mechanisms are only subsidiary: 'The [European Convention on Human Rights] leaves to each contracting State ... the task of securing the rights and freedoms it enshrines', Handysidev UK, Judgment of7 December 1976, Ser A, No 24, (1979) 1 EHRR 737, para 4S. As Susan Marks points out, liberal reformers conceive of 'democratization' in terms of reform of domestic (and not international) institutions (Marks, 2000, pp 76-100).
WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR?
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economic and technical resources. 12 What becomes a (crisis' in the world and will involve the political energy and resources of the international system is determined in a thoroughly Western-do.r;ninated process (Charlesworth, 2002). It is widely believed that the informal and fluid economic, technological, and cultural processes termed (globalization' strengthen the political position of the most powerful actors-transnational networks, large corporations, Western developed States-and marginalize public international law (eg Hurrell and Woods, 1999). Weak States despair over their inability to hold on to achieved positions and privileges by the antiquated rhetoric of sovereignty. But the latter's awkward defence of the conservative system of sovereign equality undermines the extent to which globalization may also open avenues for contestatory transgovernmental action within international civil society, or by what Hardt and Negri call the (multitude' (Hardt and Negri, 1999, pp 393-413). There is room for conflict and consensus both within and beyond the Westphalian system and little political worth lies in d~ciding a priori in favour of either. Formal rules as well as anti-formal objectives and standards may each be used for progressive or conservative causes. 13 The choice of technique must reflect a historically informed assessment of the effect of particular institutional alternatives. . In the following sections I will try respond to the question (what is international law fort by describing its role in a world that is not one of pre-established harmony or struggle but of both cooperation and conflict. I will argue that international law operates-and should operate-as a relatively autonomous formal technique as well as an instrument for advancing particular claims and agendas in the context of political struggle. If international law as a system seeks the assent of States by claiming rigorous impartiality, as a profession and a sensibility it has been unabashedly partial in favour of urIiversal objectives beyond the State. Such objectives can be advanced only by two means: imposition or inclusion. There is no third alternative. Much instrumental thinking about international law today adopts the point of view of the decision-maker in a relatively prosperous State or transnational network, in possession of resources and policy-options and seeking guidance on how to fit their objectives with international legality. Clearly, international law exists (for' such decision-makers. But it should not exist exclusively for them. In this chapter I shall try to explain why there is often a reason to adopt a (formalist' view on international law that refuses to engage with the question of its objectives precisely in order to constrain those in powerful positions. But I shall also argue that the question (what is international law for?' needs to be removed from the context of legal routines to the political arenas in which it might be used to articulate claims by those who are sidelined from formal diplomacy and informal networks and feel that something about the routines of both is responsible for the deprivations they suffer.
'The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2002', www.fao.orgiDOCREP/005!Y7352e!Y7352eOO.HTM (last visited 24 October 2002). 13 For the varying use of the rule/principle opposition in self-determination arguments about change, participation, and community, see Knop, 2002, pp 29-49. 12
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IV. INTO PRAGMATISM?
I
\ i
The paradox of objectives shows that the formal law of Westphalia cannot be replaced by social objectives or ethical principles without invoking controversies that exist in regard to the latter. (Whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat', Carl Schmitt once wrote (Schmitt, 1996, p 54), citing the nineteenth century French socialist Pierre Joseph Proudhon and making a useful point about the use of abstract humanitarianism to label one's political adversary as an enemy of humanity so as to justify extreme measures against him-a point that applied in today's context (lacks neither lucidity nor relevance' (Kervegan, 1999, p 61). One need not think only of the extreme case of the (war against terrorism' to canvass the slippery slope from anti-formal reasoning to human rights violation. Quite everyday legal argument assumes the analytical priority of the reasons for the law over the form of the law in a fashion that underwrites Stanley Fish's perceptive dictum: (once you start down the anti-formalist road, there is no place to stop' (Fish, 1989, p 2). For example, the right of self-defence urIder Article 51 of the Charter is formally conditioned by the presence of an (armed attack'. But what about the case of a threat -~f attack by mass destruction weapons? Here we are tempted to look for guidance ·from the objective of Article 51. The rationale for allowing self-defence lies, presumably, in the objective of protecting the State. Surely we cannot expect a State to wait for an attack if this would bring about precisely the consequence-the destruction of the State-that the rule was intended to prevent. Because the rule itself is no more valuable than the reason for its existence, we erase the condition of prior armed attack and entitle the State to act in an anticipatory wayY Or the other way around: surely formal sovereignty should not be a bar for humanitarian intervention against a tyrannical regime; in oppressing its own population, the State undermines its sovereignty. We honour (sovereignty' as an expression of a people's self-rule. If instead of self-rule there is oppression, then it would seem nonsensical to allow formal sovereignty to constitute a bar to intervention in support of the people. is In other words, we do not honour the law because of the sacred aura of its text or origin but because it enables us to reach valuable human purposes. We follow the emission reduction schedule of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in Article 2 of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on the Protection of the Ozone Layer because we assume that it will reduce the depletion of the ozone layer and the incidence of skin cancer. We honour the domestic jurisdiction clause in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter because we assume ·it upholds the ability of self-determining communities to lead the kinds oflife they choose. But what if it were shown that ozone depletion or skin cancer bears no 14 This is the argument for the 'Bush doctrine' of pre-emptive self-defence, as made in the United States security strategy, published on 20 September 2002. Cf the text in, eg, Financial Times, 21 September 2002,
p4. IS This position is often combined with the argument for pro-democratic intervention. For useful analysis, see Chesterman, 2001, pp 88-111.
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relationship to the emissions of CFCs, or that domestic jurisdiction merely shields the arbitrary reign of tyrants? In such cases we would immediately look for an equitable exception or a counter-rule so as to avoid the-now unnecessary-costs that would be incurred by bowing to the empty form of the original rule. Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides for freedom of speech. If applying the right would enable the distribution of fascist propaganda, it is always possible to interfere and prohibit it by the counter-rule in Article 10(2) that enables the 'prevention of disorder or crime' and to ensure 'the protection of morals', with a margin of appreciation lying with State authorities. Enabling those authorities to protect 'national security' is indispensable if they are to secure the liberal rightsregime. Yet, because setting the 'balance' between security and rights lies with the authorities against whom the rights-regime was established, the door to abuse remains open (see Cameron, 2000, pp 62-68). We often allow the reason for the rule to override the rule. We do this because we believe the rule itself has no intrinsic worth. If it fails to support the purpose for which it was enacted-or worse, prevents its attainment-why should it be honoured? In domestic society, abstract law-obedience can be defended in view of the routine nature of the cases that arise, and the dangers attached to entitling citizens to think for themselves. Such arguments are weak in the international realm where situations of law-application are few, and disadvantages of obedience often significant. Few States that were economically or politically dependent on Iraq fully implemented the sanctions set up in 1990. Though they were in formal breach of Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter, the UN preferred to look the other way. The European Union is not going to give up the prohibition of importation of hormone meat merely because a WTO dispute settlement organ may have decided it should do so. The importance of the interest in living peacefully with a powerful neighbour and of deciding on national health standards vastly outweighs any consideration about the importance of abstract law-obedience (see Koskenniemi, 2001b). And yet, as the argument by Schmitt shows, there is a dark side to such antiformalism. A legal technique that reaches directly to law's purposes is either compelled to think that it can access the right purpose in some politics-independent fashion-in which case it would stand to defend its implicit moral naturalism-or it transforms itself to a licence for those powers in position to realise their own purposes to do precisely that. Instrumentalism inculcates a heroic mindset: we can do it! It is the mindset of well-placed, powerful actors, confident in their possessing the 'right' purpose, the mindset that drove Stalin to collectivization, or Israel to destroy the Osiraq nuclear power plant in 1981. Instrumental action mayor may not be acceptable in view of the circumstances. But the instrumentalist mindset creates a consistent bias in favour of dominant actors with many policy-alternatives from which to choose and sufficient resources to carry out their objectives. 16 To always look for reasons, instead of rules, liberates public authorities to follow their reasoning, and 16 For a description of instrumentalism as a culture, see Binder, 1988, pp 906-909.
WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR?
99
their purposes-hence their frequent aversion against rules in the first place: the International Criminal Court, disarmament or human rights treaties, environmental or law of the sea regimes, and so on (see Byers and Nolte, 2003). The difficulty with the instrumentalist mindset is that there never are simple, well-identified objectives behind formal rules. Rules are legislative compromises, open-ended and bound in clusters expressing conflicting considerations. To refer to objectives is to tell the law-applier: 'please choose'. There is no doubt that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter aims towards 'peace'. Yet it is equally certain that 'peace' cannot quite mean what it seems to say. It cannot mean, for instance, that nobody can ever .take up arms. 'Perhaps the most serious problem with outlawing force is that sometimes it is both necessary and desirable' (Watts, 2000, p 10). J\rticles 42 and 51 of 'the UN Charter expressly allow for the use of military force under the authority of the ~ecurity Council or in pursuance of the inherent right of self-defence. The positive law of the Charter is both pacifist and militarist-and receives its acceptability by such schizophrenia. The European Convention on Human. Rights seeks to protect individuals' rights to both freedom and security. But one person's freedom conflicts with another's security. Whether or nof authorities should be entitled to censor prisoners' letters or prohibit the publication of obscene materials, for instance, cannot be reached through instrumental reasoning that would be independent from a political choice (see Koskenniemi, 2000, pp 99-106). The will of the drafters is the language of the instrument. Beyond that, there is only speculation about what might be a good (acceptable, workable, realistic, or fair) way to apply it. Practitioners usually understand international law as being more about routine application of standard solutions, ad hoc accommodation, and compromise than discourse about large objectives. Providing advice to a non-governmental organization or drafting judgments at the International Court of Justice are usually held to require pragmatic reconciliation of conflicting considerations, balancing between 'equitable principles', conflicting rights, or other prima facie relevant aspects of the case at hand. Dispute-resolution during the dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s was understood to involve conflicting considerations about stability of frontiers and expectations of justice on the part of the different protagonists. This required the management of the uti possidetis principle as against the provision of minority rights for populations left on the wrong side of the boundary.17 The balance struck between these considerations did not come from any anterior directive but from the negotiators' pragmatic assessment of what might work (Lam, 2000, pp 141-151). At the European Court of Human Rights, individual freedoms are constantly weighted against the need for interference by public authorities. In regard to the pacific enjoyment of possession or protection of private life, it is established case-law that 'an interference must achieve a "fair balance" between the demands of the general interests of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's 17 Cf Opinions 2 and 3 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (1992) 31 ILM 1497-1500.
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fundamental rights'. 18 In a like manner, the law concerning the delimitation of frontier areas or the sharing of natural resources resolves itself into a more or less flexible cluster of considerations about distributive justice-sometimes described in an altogether open-ended fashion in terms of 'equitable principles' or 'equitable use' -that enables the decision-maker to arrive at a pragmatically acceptable end19 result. Even decision-making concerning the use of force involves setting a balance between restraint and the need for action, while hard cases in this field invariably turn into a contextual assessment of what number of non-combatant casualties might still be within the limits of proportionality by reference to the military objective. Few international lawyers think of their craft as the application of pre-existing formal rules or great objectives. What rules are applied, and how, which interpretative principles are used and whether to invoke the rule or the exception-including many other techniques-all point to pragmatic weighing of conflicting considerations in particular cases (Corten, 1997). What is sought is something practical, perhaps the 'fairness' of the outcome, as Thomas M Franck has suggested. Under this image, law is not about peace or justice, freedom or security, stability or change, but always about both one and the other simultaneously. 'The tension between stability and change, if not managed, can disorder the system. Fairness is the rubric under which the tension is discursively managed' (Franck, 1995, p 7). The lawyer's task is now seen in terms of contextual 'wisdom', or 'prudence', rather than the employment of formal techniques or instrumental calculations.20 In a fluid, fragmented world, everything hinges on the sensitivity of the practising lawyer to the pull of contextually relevant considerations.
policy-oriented in favour of the West or in a more social-democratic way highlighting the needs of international cooperation (see Kennedy, 2000, pp 380-387). Legal realism always had its Hawks and its Doves but for both, it seemed useful to criticize old law for its 'formalism' in order to support 'dynamic' political change. Interdisciplinary studies in the 1990s highlighted the extent to which the formal validity of a standard was independent from its compliance pull (see, eg, Shelton, 2000). As the law was seen instrumentally, its formality seemed to bear no particular merit: 'hard law' was just one choice among other possible regulative techniques, including soft standards or the absence of any standards at all in cases where the imposition of one's preference seemed within the limits of the possible and preferable given that it might 'minimise transaction and sovereignty costs'. 21 In such debates formal law has nobody speaking in its favour and is indicted as a utopianism supporting conservative causes. Anti-formalism is always a call for transformation: to overrule existing law either because it does not really exist at all, or if it does, because it should not. The debate on soft law and jus cogens in the 1980s and 1990s manifested both of these criticisms and Prosper Weil's famous analysis of the pathological problems (the 'dilution' and 'graduation' of normativity) introduced in international law by such notions were unpersuasive to anti-formalist critics who wanted to realize the good society now and had no doubt that they knew how to go about this (see Weil, 1983; Tasioulas, 1996). Avant-garde instrumentalism at the end of the century reads like German public law conservatism at its beginning: over every international rule hangs the sword of clausula rebus sic stantibus (see Kaufmann, 1911). What makes the formalism/anti-formalism debate suspect is the extent to which anything may be and has been attacked as 'formalism' (see Kennedy, 2001). The following views, at least, have been so targeted:
v.
A TRADITION OF ANTI-FORMALISM
The movement towards pragmatism has been accompanied by a series of criticisms of international law's alleged 'formalism'. The first generation of professional international lawyers in the last third of the nineteenth century used a flexible notion of 'civilization' and a historically oriented political jurisprudence to expand its horizon beyond diplomatic protocol and outdated natural law. The inter-war generation attacked the formalism of sovereignty that it saw in pre-war doctrines and advocated tradition and interdependenc~ as bases for a more solid international law. After the next war, reformist lawyers especially in the United States indicted the formalism of the League and based their 'realism' on Cold War themes, either expressly 18 Fredin v Sweden, Judgment of 18 February 1991, Ser A, No 192, (1991) 13 EHRR 784, para 51; Lopez Ostra v Spain, Judgment of9 December 1994, Ser A, No 303-C, (1995) 20 EHRR 277, para 5l. 19 Cf, eg, Separate Opinion of Judge Jimenez de Arechaga, Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1982, p 18, pp 103-108 (paras 11-31) and, eg, the International Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, A/RES151/229 (8 July 1997). I have ana-
lysed this 'turn to equity' in, among other places, Koskenniemi, 1999b, pp 27-50. 20 For a celebration of judicial creativity in this regard, see Lauterpacht, 1958.
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(a) rationalistic natural-law theories; (b) views emphasizing the importance of (formal) sovereignty; (c) views limiting international law's scope to treaties or other (formal) expressions of consent; (d) views highlighting the importance of international institutions; (e) views emphasizing 'rigour' in law-application; (f) views stressing the significance of formal dispute-settlement; (g) views insisting on a clear boundary between law and politics. The list is by no means exhaustive. In fact, anything' can be labelled 'formalism' because the term is purely relational. When a speaker advocates something (a norm, 21 An interdisciplinary research on the recent 'move to law' uses a method of assessing 'legalization' by reference to the standards' obligatory nature, precision, and the presence of a centralized authority. The project examines 'legalization' instrumentally, by concentrating on the conditions under which it constitutes a rational choice. See, eg, Abbott and Snidal, 2001, pp 37-72. Such instrumentalism is not neutral: to assess law from the perspective of rational choice is to occupy the perspective of a small number of actors that actually may choose their options by agendas they set. It celebrates the managerial culture of Western experts at work to advance Western interests.
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a practice) by its material fullness, the opposite view will inevitably appear to be holding fast to the dead weight of some 'form'. The almost uniformly pejorative use of the term 'formalism' in international law reflects the predominance of the instrumentalist mindset in diplomacy and international politics. The way the legal idiom constructs and upholds the structures of diplomacy and politics is left invisible. The contrast between instrumentalism and formalism is quite fundamental when seeking to answer the question 'what is international law for?' From the instrumental perspective, international law exists to realise objectives of some dominant part of the community; from the formalist perspective, it provides a platform to evaluate behaviour, including the behaviour of those in dominant positions. The instrumental perspective highlights the role of law as social engineering, formalism views it as an interpretative scheme. The instrumental perspective is typically that of an active and powerful actor in possession of alternative choices; formalism is often the perspective of the weak actor relying on law for protection. If instrumentalism today needs no particular defence, it may be useful to highlight the twin virtues of formalism. First, it is indispensable. Every standard is always formal and substantive at the same time. The very ideas of treaty and codification make sense only if one assumes that at some point there emerges an agreement, an understanding, a standard that is separate from its legislative background. When States enter an agreement, or when some behaviour is understood to turn from habit into custom, the assumption is that something that was loose and disputed crystallizes into something that is fixed and ascertainable. The point of law is to give rise to standards that are no longer merely 'proposed' or 'useful' or 'good', and which therefore can be deviated from if one happens to share a deviating notion of what in fact is useful or good. Instead, they are assumed to possess 'validity'. To accept that positive law enjoys that property is not to say anything about how it is recognized in individual rules or standards, nor indeed of whether any actual standard so recognized would possess any particular meaning as against some other putative meaning. Validity indicates a formal property that leaves the norm so characterized a 'flat, substanceless surface' - but a surface without which no 'law' could exist at all. Secondly, the fact that the legal form is a 'flat substanceless surface' expresses the universalist principle of inclusion at the outset and makes possible the regulative ideal of a pluralistic international world. '[O]nly a regime of noninstrumental rules, understood to be authoritative independent of particular beliefs or purposes is compatible with the freedom of its subjects to be different' (Nardin, 1998, p 31). Between the form of the law and a decision to project on it meaning 'x' instead of 'y', is a professional technique that excludes no interpretation a priori, that enables stakeholders to articulate their grievances as legal claims on conditions of equality, including them in the normative universe as subjects of rights and duties or carriers of distinct identities. The form of law constructs political adversaries as equals, entitled to express their subjectively felt injustices in terms of breaches of the rules of the community to which they belong no less than their adversaries-:-thus affirming both that inclusion and the principle that the conditions applying to the treatment of any
one member of the community must apply to every other member as well. In the end, competent lawyers may disagree about what this means in practice. But the legal idiom itself reaffirms the political pluralism that underlies the Rule of Law, however inefficiently it has been put into effect. There is a constant push and pull in the international world between a culture of instrumentalism and a culture of formalism. It would be wrong to associate this dialectic with fixed positions representing particular interests or preferences. Instrumental action is a necessary part of the search for good rules or institutions beyond the status quo. And any present rules are always also mechanisms to support particular interests and privileges. 'Power' and 'law' are entangled in such complex ways that it is difficult to interpret particular events as manifesting either one or the other: power works through 'formal rules' -just like instead of 'naked power', we see everywhere power defined, delimited, and directed by rules. But the two cultures do play distinct political roles in particular historical situations. As the debates around the fluid dynamism of globalization have demonstrated, formal standards and institutions may now offer some protection for the weak actors, and pose demands on the powerful ones?2 There is no magic about formalism, however. It does not automatically produce protection but may also buttress privilege. Hence my reference to instrumentalism and formalism as 'cultures', sensibilities and biases, traditions and frameworks, sets of rituals and self-understandings among institutional actors. As pointed out above, whereas instrumentalism possesses a 'heroic' mindset, formalism, with its associated tropes about the rule of law, rights, and constitutionalIsm, associates with impartiality and pluralism less in terms of definite institutional models than as regulative ideals for a profession without which no community could rule itself by standards it recognizes as its own (instead of those of some influential faction). For this purpose, the community needs servants that administer those standards (instead of trying to invent them)-the class of lawyers-whose traditions and practices are defined by their closeness to the 'flat, substanceless surface' of the law.
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VI. INSTRUMENTALISM, FORMALISM, AND THE PRODUCTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNITY Modern international law puts the international lawyer at the heart of the legal system. It is possible to represent that position schematically by reference to the two types oflogic at play in the international rule oflaw. Here is the international relations theorist Hedley Bull:
22
Out of a burgeoning literature, see, eg, Tsagourias, 2000.
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The special interests of the dominant elements in a society are reflected in the way in which the rules are defined. Thus the particular kinds of limitations that are imposed on resort to violence, the kinds of agreements whose binding character is upheld, or the kinds of right to property that are enforced, will have the stamp of those dominant elements. But that there should be limits of some kind to violence, and an expectation in general that agreements should be carried out, and rules or property of some kind, is not a special interest of some members of a society but a general interest of all of them. (Bull, 1977, P 55.)
sufficient elements to enable it to decide with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would be necessarily at variance with the principles and rules applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance'.23 I have defended elsewhere the Court's silence inasmuch as it protected the need for a sustained political condemnation of the killing of the innocent, lifting it from the banal instrumentalism and formalism of modern law (Koskenniemi, 1999a). Irrespect~ve of that position, however, the case illustrates the indeterminacy of both of the two types of logic behind the Rule of Law, as outlined by Bull above. Neither instrumental calculation nor a purely formal analysis could grasp the status of such weapons: a decision was needed that was irreducible to the two logics. Here the decision was silence. In other cases, the Court may have recourse to literalism, balancing, contextualization, and bilateralization, among a host of other techniques, to complete the instrumental and formal structures within which it works (Koskenniemi, 1989, pp 410-421). Each of such techniques is, again, indeterminate. None of them explain why this argument was held relevant, why that interpretation was chosen. The decision always comes about, as the political theorist Ernesto Laclau has put it, as a kind of 'regulated madness', undetermined by any structure outside it (Laclau, i996, p 58). A court's decision or a lawyer's opinion is always a genuinely political act, a choice between alternatives not fully dictated by external criteria. It is even a hegemonic act in the precise sense that though it is partial and subjective, it claims to be universal and objective. But it is this very partiality and political nature of the decision that ensures that it is an aspect of, or even a creative moment of, a political community. Here finally, is the significance of the under-determination of the two logics behind the Rule of Law. The society upheld by international law is not an effect of instrumental reason, nor even of (some conception) of formal reason tout court. It is an effect of decisions, made under conditions of uncertainty and conflict and amenable for immediate criticism from alternative standpoints. That international law is not a passive reproduction of deductions from some globalizing logic or other (economic, environmental, humanitarian) structure beyond itself, institutes the international society it governs as a political community that seeks to decide for itself what rules govern it. It is, as Bull noted, a union of 'dominant elements' and 'general interest'. Not reducible to either one or the other, international law is the terrain in which the never-ending struggle between the two is being waged.
So described, law unites an instrumentalist logic, one that looks for the realization of objectives through law, with a formalist logic, one that establishes standards of behaviour. Now it is obvious that neither logic is fully constraining. The instrumental logic is indeterminate as the objectives always . leave a number of possible choices: what does 'peace and security' mean and how should it be realized in the Middle East, for example? Nor is the formalist logic ever fully formal, but always in practice somehow partial and biased. However general the rules of law are, their equal application may appear unjust because the reality to which they are applied is profoundly unequal: should large and small States, democracies, and dictatorships really be treated alike? The form of law is realized in particular rules or decisions that are no longer formal but that always institute a bias in favour of some substantive politics. In the Nuclear Weapons case (1996), the ICJ was requested by the UN General Assembly to give an advisory opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons. From the perspective of the instrumentalist logic, the relevant regulation (human rights law, environmental law, humanitarian law, and the law concerning the use of force) sought to accomplish several types of objectives: above all protection of human life and the environment, as well as the survival of States. These objectives proved indeterminate, however, and both opponents and supporters of nuclear weapons argued by reference to them: are people better protected with or without nuclear weapons? The instrumental logic did set some limits to what the Court could say, but it did not-indeed could not-fully constrain it. A decision by the Court was needed to supplement the instrumental logic-a decision that would, then, leave that logic under-determined. The formalist logic was equally under-determined. To decide that nuclear weapons were illegal would have created a consistent material bias in favour of States in possession of conventional weapons or in de facto possession of undisclosed nuclear weapons. To require the dismantling of disclosed nuclear arsenals would have revolutionized the existing military-political relationships in unforeseen ways. But to decide that nuclear weapons were lawful would have maintained the systemic bias in security policy in favour of the Great Powers and gone against the deep-rooted popular sense that the existence of such weapons constitutes a permanent hostagetaking by nuclear weapons States of most of the world's population. Neither illegality nor legality could remain fully within the formalist logic. Both broke through pure form and created one or another type of material bias. Indeed, it was impossible to decide either way without the decision seeming 'political'. And because the political choice in this case seemed too important for the Court to take, it chose the path of recognizing the insufficiency of both logics: 'the Court considers it does not have
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VII. BEYOND INSTRUMENTALISM AND FORMALISM And yet this cannot be the whole story. Although notions such as 'peace', 'justice', or 'human rights' do not fit well within the techniques of legal formalism, and are quite disappointing as behavioural directives, they give voice to individuals and 23
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p 226, para 95.
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groups struggling for spiritual or material well-being, fighting against oppression, and seeking to express their claims in the language of something greater than merely their personal interests. Law-including international law-has a 'utopian, aspirational face' (Cotterell, 1995, p 17) expressed in large notions such as 'peace', 'justice', or 'human rights' that in countless international law texts appeal to solidarity within community. They do this in three distinct, but related ways. First, they redescribe individuals and groups as claimants of rights or beneficiaries of entitlements and in so doing provide them with an identity that they may assert against the homogenizing pull of formal law. As Karen Knop has recently pointed out, the treatment of claims of self-determination by marginalized groups such as indigenous peoples in legal institutions has sometimes enabled those groups to be represented by an identity 'that might resonate with those represented' and thus to 'equalize cultures in international law' (Knop, 2002, p 210). Secondly, such principles give an international voice to communities by allowing them to read their particular grievances as claims of universal entitlement, at the same level as claims made by other members of the community. To be able to say that some act is an 'aggression' or that the deprivation of a benefit is a 'human rights violation' is to lift a private grievance to the level of a public law violation, of concern not only to the victim but to the community. Such notions-and the whole debate about the objectives of international law-act in the political realm to challenge what Norman Geras has termed the 'contract of mutual indifference' -the tendency to regard violations as a private matter between the victim and the perpetrator, and therefore not of concern to others (Geras, 1998). They challenge the way claims are blocked in the international realm as matters of 'domestic jurisdiction' or 'private law', thus helping to express cosmopolitan ideas about a genuinely political international public realm. And thirdly, to make those claims as legal claims (instead of moral aspirations or political programmes) is to imagine-and thus to create-the international world as a set of public institutions within which public authorities should use their power in roughly predictable ways and with public accountability. The fact that public law notions such as jus cogens or of obligations erga omnes tend to be formulated in such large terms as to restate the 'paradox of objectives' has made them seem quite useless from an instrumental perspective. But, we may now assume, their role may be precisely to counteract the ideological effects of instrumentalism. Again, the form of those ideas-of an 'international legal community' -is important in allowing their use for the articulation of the most varied types of claims, and thus providing a surface for the inclusion of the claimants as members of a pluralistic community. 'Self-determination', typically, may be constructed analytically to mean anything one wants it to mean, and many studies have invoked its extreme flexibility. Examined in the light of history, however, it has given form and strength to claims for national liberation and self-rule from the French Revolution to decolonization in 1960s, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the political
tranSItions that have passed from Latin America through Eastern Europe and South Africa. 'Peace', too may be an empty notion, perfectly capable of coexisting with economic deprivation and suppression of human rights. On the other hand, peace movements have been an invaluable aspect of political contestation inasmuch as they 'mobilise support and highlight the inconsistencies in international concepts of peace and security' (Charlesworth and Chinkin, 2000, P 272). Even if 'justice' does lie in the eye of the beholder, without a language of justice, the international struggles for resources, recognition, democracy or, for instance, 'ending the culture of impunity' would have seemed like so many meaningless games played by diplomats. In other words, though the question 'what is international law for?' is seldom useful as an aspect of the deliberations over particular problems among international lawyers, it is absolutely crucial as a focus for international law's emancipatory potential. While the culture of formalism is a necessary though often misunderstood aspect of the legal craft, as a historical matter, it has often provided a recipe for indifference and needs to be accompanied by a live sense of its political justification. To lift the debate about objectives from diplomatic instruments or academic treatises to the level of political struggles is a necessary counterweight to the bureaucratic spirit often associated with formalism. This would also enable the reconstruction of international law as a political project. As modern international la~ arose in the last decades of the Nineteenth Century, it did so as a part of the elitist politics of European liberal internationalism that expected public opinion and democracy to pave the way for a rationally administered world (see Koskenniemi, 2001a; Pemberton, 2001). The last articulations of that spirit date from the first decade following the Second World War (see, eg, Lauterpacht, 1946). Since then, a gap has been created between the utopian and the pragmatic parts of international law, the former becoming a rather grandiose justification over the latter. But when formalism loses political direction, formalism itself is lost.24 Hence the turn to pragmatism as surveyed above. The question 'what is international law for ?' needs to be resuscitated from the paralysis that it is infected with because of the indeterminacy of the responses given to it. But this necessitates a reformulation of the relationship of international law to politics, in either of its two guises, as principles and doctrines on the one hand, and as institutional practices on the other. Both political realism and institutional pragmatism arose as reactions to failed expectations about international law's autonomy: realists rejected legal institutions as a sham and told politicians to aim directly at their objectives. Institutionalists were wary of such objectives and instead relied on techniques of adjustment and compromise.
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24 For a useful reconstruction of Hans Kelsen's formalism in terms of the political project that inspired it, see von Bernstorff, 2001.
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VIII. BETWEEN HEGEMONY AND FRAGMENTATION: A MINI-HISTORY These reaction formations are intellectually disappointing and politically dubious. Neither provides space for anything but a most formal debate about 'what is international law for?' and no space at all for responding to that question by reference to popular aspirations about peace, order, and justice. A first step in trying to account for such aspirations is to accept that these notions are subject to political struggle and that even as they are formulated in universal terms, they are constantly appropriated by particular agents and interests so as to support their agendas and causes. To say that one's actions embody those of an 'international community' is one such technique (see Klein, 2001). They are aspects of hegemonic struggle, that is to say, struggle in which a particular claims to represent that which is universal (see Mouffe and Laclau, 2001). That the question 'what is international law for?' is a terrain of ~truggle is a na:ural aspect of a pluralistic society and a precondition for conceiving Its government m democratic terms. . The hegemonic nature of the debate about international law's objectives may be illustrated in terms of its history. When Spain and Portugal at the end of the fifteenth c~ntu~ divided ~e non-European world between themselves by reference to a Papal dIrectIve, they claImed to be speaking as Christian powers on behalf of humankind as a whole. When the Spanish theologians Vitoria or Las Casas later were claiming that God had given the Indians a soul just as He had given it to the Spanish, a particular form of Christian scholasticism-Dominican theology-came to speak in terms of universal principles, equally constraining on the Princes and the Indians. And when Hugo Grotius in 1608 challenged the Iberian claims, he was redefining the objectives of international law within a hegemonic struggle that opposed a Reformationinspired commercial universalism against the ancien regime of (Catholic) Christianity. The. narrative of international law from those days to the Nineteenth Century may be depIct~d as a succession of natural law arguments that were united by their always emergmg from some European intelligentsia that claimed it was speaking on behalf of the world as a whole. When de Emmerich Vattel in 1758 formulated his 'necessary law of nations' in terms of the co:r:nmands of natural reason, and found that it consecrated a balance of power between European sovereigns, he already filled the category of the 'universal' with a profoundly particular understanding that was a part of the (European) Enlightenment. . Since the ~rst appearance of the (modern) international law profession in Europe m the late nmeteenth century, that profession imagined itself as, in the words of the Statute of the Institut de droit international (1873), the 'juridical conscience of the civilised world'. This understanding, too, was born in a cultural environment that imagined its own experience-which it labelled (civilization' -as universal and postulated it as the end-result of the development of societies everywhere. The civilizing mission enthusiastically propagated by late nineteenth-century inter-
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national lawyers was a hegemonic technique, embedded in an understanding of the law as not simply a technical craft or a set of formal instruments and institutions. It was a spontaneous aspect of 'civilization' which had the natural tendency to become universal. If the First World War destroyed whatever was left of the civilizing mission, it also gave rise to a series of efforts to articulate anew the universal basis of international law, sometimes in terms of a law-like movement of societies to ever more complex forms of division of labour and interdependence (eg, Huber, 1910), sometimes through a reinstatement of the hierarchical principles that were a natural part of legal systems (eg, Verdross, 1923). Most of the reconstructive scholarship of the inter-war period, however, simply generalized the legal experience of European societies into the international level, bringing into existence a universal international law through private law analogies, conceiving the Covenant of the League of Nations as a constitution of the world and by allocating to the juristic class the function of 'filling the gaps' in an otherwise primitive-looking legal system (see Lauterpacht, 1933; Koskenniemi, 1997). The particular European experience with the Rule of Law became the placeholder for the aspirations of peace and justice that lawyers saw were demanded by populations struggling with industrialism and social conflict. In the more recent post-war er,a, much of that kind oflanguage-like the political liberalism with which it was associated-has lost credibility. When somebody today claims to be acting on behalf on the 'international community', we immediately recognize the hegemonic technique at work (see Klein, 2001; Feher, 2000). As against the pragmatic spirit of to day's public international law, new specializations carry ideals of universalism and progress. Recently, this has occasioned a lively debate about the 'fragmentation of international law' - the emergence and consolidation of special regimes and technical sub-disciplines: human rights law, environmental law, trade law, the use of force, and so on (see Barnhoorn and Wellens, 1995). In each of such realms, particular interests and standards are projected as universal ones, resulting in normative and jurisdictional conflicts. In its Tadic Judgment of 1999,.the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) expressly deviated from the practice of the International Court of Justice, as laid out in its !"icaragua case in 1986 concerning the attribution of conduct by military irregulars to a State. To move from a standard of 'effective control' to one of 'overall control' significantly. enhanced the accountability of foreign States indirectly involved in internal conflicts, constituting a shift of normative preference with respect to one set of international problems.25 The continuing debate about the relevance of environmental, human rights, or labour standards within the WTO system reflects a search for the relative priority of political objectives within WTO institutions as those priorities have not been set at the level of the relevant agreements themselves. The autonomy invoked by human rights regimes constitutes a subtle manoeuvre by human rights
25 The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Judgment, Case No IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber (15 July 1999), p 57, para 137.
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implementation organs to universalize their jurisdiction. 'Dynamic' arguments and the object and purpose test allow the creation of a systemic bias in favour of the protected individuals that could be difficult to justify under traditional law. Now 'fragmentation' is not. a technical problem resulting from lack of coordination: the normative preferences of environmental and trade bodies differ, as do preferences of human rights lawyers and international law 'generalists' (Koskenniemi and Leino, 2002). Such differences are like differences between States: what is at issue is a hegemonic struggle where each institution, though partial, tries to occupy the space of the whole. Far from being a problem to resolve, the proliferation of autonomous or semi-autonomous normative regimes is an unavoidable reflection of a 'postmodern' social condition and a beneficial prologue to a pluralistic community in which the degrees of homogeneity and fragmentation reflect shifts of political preference and the fluctuating successes of hegemonic pursuits (Stark, 2002).
political community among social agents-States, other communities, individualswho disagree about social purposes but do this within a structure that invites them to argue in terms of an assumed universality. But there is a fourth response as well: international law exists as a promise of justice. The agnosticism of political modernity has made the articulation of this last teleological principle extremely difficult. For the justice towards which international law points cannot be enumerated in substantive values, interests, or objectives. All such languages express inadequate and reified images, (partial) points of view. A return to morality-in contrast to 'moralization' -is not available (Koskenniemi, 2002). As a promise of justice, international law describes the international world as a political community in which questions of just distribution and entitlement are constantly on the agenda. Such a self-image supports an administrative culture in which the acts of public officials are constantly assessed by a language of community standards. The instrumentalist mindset understands the law only as a technique of domination, a coercive order to make 'nations behave'. Its underlying image is the Hobbesian view of law as a melancholy technique to prevent human groups from self-destruction. The image oflaw as. a pointer towards justice challenges this self-view and encourages support for transformation: a world of-for lack of better wordspeace, equality, and freedom. Iflaw is used to compel (as it is), it is so used to because the violations cannot coexist with such aspirations. They are singular until the law lifts them from the purely subjective into public illegality:
IX. LEGAL FORMALISM AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE Let me close by four responses to the question 'what is international law for?'. Two are rather straight-forward. First, international law exists to advance the repertory of substantive values, preferences, and practices that those in dominant positions seek to realize in the world. Secondly, it also gives voice to those who have been excluded from decision-making positions and are regularly treated as the objects of other peoples' policies; it provides a platform on which claims about violence, injustice, and social deprivation may be made even against the dominant elements. To bring these two aspects of international law together means that there is no fixed set of objectives, purposes, or principles that would exist somewhere 'outside' or beyond international law itself, that they are always the objectives of particular actors involved in hegemonic pursuits. The law is instrumental, but what it is an instrument for cannot be fixed outside the political process of which it is an inextricable part. This is why, thirdly, international law's objective is always also international law itself For as I have tried to argue above, it is international law's formalism that. brings political antagonists together as they invoke contrasting instrumental understandings of its rules and institutions. In the absence of agreement over, or knowledge of the 'true' objectives of political community-that is to say, in an agnostic worldthe pure form of international law provides the shared surface-the only such surface-on which political adversaries recognize each other as such and pursue their adversity in terms of something shared, instead of seeking to attain full exclusion'outlawry' -of the other. Its value and its misery lie in its being the fragile surface of
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Law is the name of the semblance of order-the assembling, the ordering, the establishing of commonality-that is made of our otherwise (subjective) differences when we take, or interpret them to be a world that can be judged, rather than mere subjective experiences (Constable, 2000, p 95). But the justice that animates political community is not one that may be fully attained. Not only is law never justice itself, the two cannot exist side by side. If there is justice, then no law is needed -and if there is law, then there is only a (more or less well-founded) expectation of justice. Here is the truth in Instrumentalism about positive law being a pointer beyond itself. There is a Messianic structure to international law, the announcement of something that remains eternally postponed. It is this 'to-come' that enables the criticism of the law's own violence, its biases and exclusions. No doubt, law and justice are linked in the activity of lawyers, paradigmatically in the legal judgment. This is the wisdom grasped by legal pragmatism. But the judgment is always insufficiently grounded in law, just like positive law is always insufficiently expressive of justice. In the gap between positive law and justice lies the necessary (and impossible) realm of the politics oflaw. Without it, law becomes pure positivity, its violence a mere fact of power.
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KOSKENNIEMI, M (1989), From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Co). - - (1994), 'The Wonderful Artificiality of States', 88 ASIL Proc 22-29. - - (1997), 'Lauterpacht, The VictQrian Tradition in International Law', 8 EJIL 215-263. - - (1999a), 'The Silence of Lawl The Voice of Justice', in Boisson de Chazournes, L and Sands, P, International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp 488-510. - - (1999b) 'The Limits of International Law: Are There Such?" XXVIII Thesaurus Acroasiarum: Might and Right in International Relations, pp 27-50. - - (2000), 'The Effect of Rights on Political Culture', in Alston, P, The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp 99-116. - - (2001a), The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). - - (200lb), 'Solidarity Measures: State Responsibility as a New International Order?' 72 BYIL 339-356. - - (2002), 'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much. Kosovo, and the Tum to Ethics in International Law', 65 MLR 159-175. - - and LEINO, P (2002), 'The Fragmentation of International Law: Postmodern Anxieties', 16 LJIL 533-579. KRATOCHWIL, F (2000), 'How Do Norms Matter?', in Byers (ed.), pp 35-68. LACLAU, E (1996), 'Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony', in Mouffe, C (ed.), Deconstruction and Pragmatism (London: Verso).
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LAM, MC (2000), At the Edge of the State: Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational).
PEMBERTON, J-A (2001), Global Metaphors. Modernity and the Quest for One World (London: Pluto Press).
LAUTERPACHT, H (1933), The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
SCHACHTER, 0 (1997), 'The Decli.lle of the Nation-state and its Implications for International Law', Col J of Transnafl L 7-23.
- - (1946), 'The Grotian Tradition in International Law', 23 BYIL 1-53. - - (1958), The Development of International Law by the International Court (London: Stevens). - - (1975), 'The Reality of the Law of Nations', in International Law, being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, vol 2, pp 22-5I. McDoUGAL, MS (1953), 'International Law, Power and Policy. A Contemporary Conception', 82 Recueil des Cours 137-259. MARKS, S (2000), The Riddle ofAll Constitutions. International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology (Oxford: Oxford University Press). MORGENTHAU, H (1940), 'Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law', 34 AJIL 261-284. MOUFFE, C and LACLAU, E (2001), Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 2nd edn (London: Verso). NARDIN, T (1983), Law, Morality and the Relations between States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). - - (1998), 'Legal Positivism as a Theory of International Society', in Mapel, DR and Nardin, T, International Society. Diverse Ethical Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp 17-35. O'NEILL, 0 (2000), Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). PAULUS, A (2001), Die internatinale Gemeinschaft im Volkerrecht. Eine Untersuchung zur Entwicklung des Volkerrechts im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (Munich: Beck).
SCHMITT, C (1988), Der Nomos der Brde im Volkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum, 3rd edn (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot). - - (1996), The Concept of the Political trans and intr by Schwab, G, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). SHELTON, D (ed.) (2000), Commitment and Compliance. The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press). STARK, B (2002), 'After/Word(s): Violation of Human Dignity and Postmodernism in Law', 27 YaleJIL 336-347. TASIOULAS, J (1996), 'In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case', 16 OJLS 85-128. TOMUSCHAT, C (1999), 'International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of New Century', 23 Recueil des Cours 1-28 I. TSAGOURIAS, N (2000), 'Globalization, Order and the Rule of Law', XI FYBIL 247-264. VON BERNSTORFF, J (2001), Der Glaube an das Universale Recht. Zur Volkerrechstheorie Hans Kelsens und seiner Schuler (Baden-Baden: Nomos). VERDROSS, A (1923), Die Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes (Tiibingen: Mohr). WATTS, SIR A (2000), 'The Importance of International Law' , in Byers (ed.), pp 5-16. WElL, P (1983), 'Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?', 77 AJIL 413-442. WESTLAKE, J (1910), International Law, 2nd edn, vol 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
PART II
THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION
4 THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Hugh Thirlway
SUMMARY A rule of international law must derive from one of the recognized sources, namely: (l) treaties and conventions; (2) international custom; (3' general principles of law; and (4) the \subsidiary sources' of judicial decisions and legal teachings. Treaties are binding only on the parties to them; custom (which pre-supposes an established practice and a psychological element known as the opinio juris) is in principle binding on all States, unless it is a \special' or \Iocal' custom, and save for the exceptional case of the \persistent objector'. The general principles of law (as evidenced by national legal systems) may be appealed to if a point is not settled either by treaty or custom. Other sources, or alternative conceptions of how law comes into being, have from time to time been suggested, but the traditional analysis continues to be used in practice, in particular by the International Court.
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT ARE SOURCES OF LAW? The essence of every legal system is a body of principles and rules that lay down the rights and obligations of the subjects of that system. I These may for convenience be called the 'primary rules' of the system. However, each system also contains rules which can be applied to determine what are the primary rules, how they come into existence and how they can be changed; these we may term 'secondary rules'.2 In
I The question whether international law is solely a set of principles and rules is controversial, but no-one denies that such principles and rules are comprised in it, and for present purposes it will be sufficient to limit our attention to those principles and rules. 2 The terminology is that employed by Hart, 1994 in the context of municipal systems; it is less commonly used in international law, but makes for clarity.
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municipal legal systems, ie the legal systems applicable within individual States, the presence of these secondary rules is easy to overlook in the actual practice of the law. The landowner surng his neighbour for trespass, or the prosecution in a criminal case, normally do not need to stop and ask themselves, 'Why.does encroachment on someone else's land invite legal consequences?', or 'Why is it an offence to do what the defendant has done?' - the law so provides, and that is all. The primary legal rules being applied in these cases did not however spring up from nowhere: they exist because Parliament passed particular legislation, or because a long line of judicial decisions has established that the common law is to this or that effect. Thus there exist secondary rules, to the effect that legislation passed by Parliament, <3.p.d the S2!!E!lon law as expressed in judicial precedents, constitutes the law of the land-the body of primary rules. In international law, there exist similar secondary rules, but they are less clearly defined, for a number of reasons. There is, for example, at the international level neither a universal legislative body corresponding to a national Parliament, nor a system of universal judicial jurisdiction which has built up a wide-ranging body of precedent. At the municipal level, legal disputes are usually over the precise applicatIon or interpretation of rules, the existence of which is generally recognized: do the circumstances of the case fall within the rule enunciated by the judges in a particular line of cases, or within the purview of a particular statute, as correctly interpreted? At the international level, disputes may just as often turn on whether the legal rule relied on by one State exists at all as a legal rule, since there are controversial aspects of the workings of the secondary rules. There may be recognition of a rule, but dispute whether it is a rule binding on one or the other party to the dispute (since, as we shall see, not all rules of international law are binding on all States). These secondary rules are referred to in international law as the sources of international law. This terminology highlights the idea that a rule must come from somewhere, as well as the idea that there is a flow, a process, which may take time: a rule may exist conceptually, as a proposal or a draft, and later come to be accepted as binding. The problem may then be to determine at what moment the rule acquired the status of a rule of existing, binding, law. Prior to that moment, it forms part of what is called lex ferenda (law which ought to be made, ie, developing or embryonic law); thereafter it is part of the lex lata (law which has' been made, positive law). It is traditional to distinguish between what are called the material sources of international law, and the formal sources. In relation to a particular rule which is alleged to' be a rule of international law, the material source is simply the placenormally a document of some kind-in which the terms of the rule are set out. This may be a treaty, a resolution of the UN General Assembly, a proposal of the UN International Law Commission, a judicial decision, a 'restatement' by a learned body, or even a statement in a textbook. In identifying a material source, no account need be taken of the legal authority of the textual instrument: for example, a treaty which has never come into force at all, and is thus not binding on anyone as a treaty, may
still be the material source for a rule which has acquired the force of binding law by another route. 3 The question of the authority for the rule as a rule of law, binding on States, is determined by the for-mal source of the rule. The generally recognized formal sources are identified in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, to be examined in more detail below, but the two most important sources in practice are treaties and international custom. If a rule is laid down in a treaty, then it is binding on the States parties to that treaty, and the treaty is at once the material source and the formal source of the rule. The rule may however be taken over and applied in the practice of other States, not parties to the treaty, in such a way, and to such an extent, that it takes on the character of a customary rule. For'these States, the material source of the rule will still be the original treaty, but the formaJ. source will be international custom. -If the secondary rule defining the recognized sources of international law operates to make it possible to determine what are the primary rules, governing the actual conauct of States, what rule-presumably a tertiary rule-determines the identification of the secondary rules? If the question is asked, 'Why should I comply with this primary rule?', the answer may be, 'Because it is a rule of treaty-law, laid down in 'a treaty to which you are a party'; but what then is the answer to the question, 'Why must I comply with treaty-Iawt The classic answer is that there is a principle pacta sunt servanda, that what has been agreed to must be respected; this is an eXj!mple of a secondary rule, one which defines treaties and agreements as formal sources of international law. Theoretically one may then ask, 'But why should I respect the principle pacta sunt servanda? Is there a higher principle still requiring me to respect it?' Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, already referred to, provides that the Court, in deciding disputes in accordance with international law, is to apply international treaties and conventions in force; but that is no more than a recognition of treaties as one of the formal sources of primary rules. The Statute is in fact a material source of the secondary rule that treaties make law, but not a formal source of that rule. Much legal ingenuity has been deployed to discuss this problem, to avoid an infinite regression of se'~ondary, tertiary, quaternary, etc. rules, by establishing, for example, a 'fundamental norm' on which all international law is based. None of the theories advanced commands universal assent; but nor are any of them actually essential to international legal relations in practice. The issue is fortunately one of purely academic interest. The realistic answer to the conundrum can probably only be that this is ~he way international society operates, and has operated for centuries, and probably the only way in which anything that can claim to be a society or community could possibly operate.
3 For example, the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States is regularly referred to as containing a convenient legal definition of a 'State', and of the conditions which must be met for that status to be acquired, despite the fact that for want of ratifications it never came into force as a treaty.
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The doctrine of sources has attracted enormous amounts of discussion and criticism among international lawyers, and various proposals h~ve been made for re-thinking the subject, or for getting rid of the idea of (sources' altogether. While the traditional view presents some anomalie~ and difficulties, it has so far proved the most workable method of analysing the way in which rules and principles develop that States in practice accept as governing their actions. The reasoning in the decisions of the International Court of Justice has consistently used the traditional terminology and structure of source-based law, and it seems unlikely that any other system will be able to replace it.
II. THE ENUMERATION OF THE TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ARTICLE 38 OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE When the Permanent Court of International Justice was to be established in 1922, a Commission of Jurists was appointed to draw up its Statute, the legal instrument to govern its workings. The Permanent Court was to be the first standing international tribunal to decide disputes between States; if States were to be willing to accept it, one of the matters that had to be defined in advance was the nature of the law that the Court would apply. There was' at the time an established tradition of referring interState disputes to binding arbitration, on an ad hoc basis, or of submitting groups of related disputes to a temporary standing body, usually called a Claims Commission; but the terms of reference of arbitral bodies or claims commissions were almost always defined in the international agreement (known as the compromis) by which they were established. The text which was adopted as Article 38 of the Permanent Court Statute was re-· adopted after the Second World War, when the Permanent Court was wound up and replaced by the International Court of Justice, with one change in the wording. The present text is as follows:
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the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et
bono, if the parties agree thereto. The clause in the first paragraph (whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it' was added in 1946; its effect is to emphasize that, by applying what is mentioned in sub-paragraphs a to d, the Court will be applying international law, ie, that the sources mentioned in those subparagraphs constitute recognized sources of international law, and (presumably) the sole sources of that law. That this was already the intention of the text is clear from the records of its drafting; but it also follows from the inclusion of paragraph 2. To .decide a case ex aequo et bono is by definition to decide otherwise than in accordance with the applicable law: to decide simply what seems to the judge or arbitrator the fairest solution in the circumstances. 5 Since the Court only possesses the power to decide in this way when the parties agree to it, all other decisions must be in accordance with law-and law as derived from the sources mentioned in paragraph l. Article 38 has been much criticized as a definition' of the sources of international law, and it has often been suggested that it is inadequate, out of date, or ill-adapted to the conditions of modern international intercourse. As already noted, there have been suggestions that the whole concept of (sources' should be thrown overboard, to be . replaced by, for example, the (recognized manifestations of international law'; it has also been suggested that the existence of additional sources should be accepted. Some of these latter suggestions will be addressed in section IV below; but the fact is that no new approach has acquired any endorsement in the practice of States, or in the language of their claims against each other; and the International Court has in its decisions consistently analysed international law in the terms of Article 38. It may of course be objected ,that this is not necessarily significant, because whether or not Article 38 is obsolete as a general statement, the Court remains bound by it; but if there had really been a substantive change in international legal thinking' on the question of sources, the Court might have been expected at the least to have taken note of it, while drawing attention to its o~n inability to go beyond the terms of its own Statute.
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
A. TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS IN FORCE
a.
mternational conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b.
inte.r:national custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
The principle pacta sunt servanda has already been mentioned as the basis for the binding nature of treaties. The whole point of making a binding agreement is that each of the parties should be able to rely on performance of the treaty by the
c.
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d.
subject to the provisions of Article 59,4 judicial decisions and the teachings of
4 Article 59 provides that 'The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case'.
5 The Court has never been asked by the parties to a dispute to decide it in this way; but it has been suggested (by Judge Oda) that maritime delimitation cases, in view of the difficulty of basing any specified delimitation line on a framework of logically compelling legal argument, have in fact been decided on an unavowed ex aequo et bono basis, with the tacit consent of the, parties.
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THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
other party or parties, even when such performance may have become onerous or unwelcome to such other party or parties. Thus a treaty is one of the most evident ways in which rules binding on two or more States may come into existence, and thus an evident formal source oflaw. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties6 , which is to a very large extent the codification of pre-existing general law on the subject, states the principle in Article 26, under the heading 'Pacta sunt servanda': 'Every treaty is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith'. It has been argued that a treaty is better understood as a source of obligation, and that the only rule of law in the matter is the bas,ic principle that treaties must be observed (Fitzmaurice, 1958). Certainly the content of, let us say, a bilateral customs treaty, setting rates of duties and tariffs on various goods, does not look much like 'law'. At the other extreme, there are more and more examples in modern law of socalled 'law-making' treaties: multilateral conventions that lay down for the parties to them a whole regime, as for example the Geneva Conventions in the field of humanitarian law, or the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties itself. The principle in each case is however the same: that the States parties accept a commitment to certain behaviour that would not be legally required of them in the absence of the treaty. They may indeed by treaty vary or set aside the rules that general international law imposes on all States, though such variation or exclusion is only effective between the parties; and this power is subject to the limits imposed by jus cogens. 7 The traditional doctrine that treaties are sources of law is therefore recommended by logic and convenience. If it is axiomatic that a party to a treaty is committed to what has been agreed in the treaty, it is equally axiomatic that a State which is not a party to a treaty is under no such oblig<j.tion. The principle res inter alios acta nee noeet nee prodest (a transaction between others effects neither disadvantage nor benefit) is as valid as pacta sunt servanda and can in fact be regarded as a corollary of that principle. As the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 34) expresses the point: 'A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent'. The Vienna Convention being itself a treaty, its codifying provisions are thus themselves only applicable as treaty-law to the States which have ratified it. There are two apparent exceptions to this principle-but they are only apparent. First, the situation in which an obligation stated in a treaty is or becomes an
obligation of general customary law (a process to be examined below), in which case the non-party State may be bound by the same substantive obligation, but as a matter of customary law, and not by the effect of the treaty. This is in fact the case of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties itself; its provisions have frequently been applied by the International Court in cases in which one or both of the parties was not a party to the Convention, on the basis that such provisions stated rules which apply to all States as customary law. Secondly, it is possible for a State not a party to a treaty to accept an obligation stated in the treaty, or to derive a benefit from the treaty, if all States concerned-the parties to the treaty and the outsider State-are so agreed. In effect a new treaty is concluded e~ending the scope of the original treaty to the third State. 8 ' The normal way in which a State becomes bound by the obligations provided for in a treaty is by becoming a party to it, through the processes to be described in Chapter 5. Where the treaty is a multilateral convention of the 'law-making' type, it is possible that a State could, simply by conduct, indicate its acceptance of the regime of the convention as applicable to itself. In the North Sea Continental Shelf case before the International Court, it was argued by Denmark and the Netherlands that the Federal Republic of Germany, which had. signed but not ratified the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, had 'by conduct, by public statements and proclamations, and in other ways, ... unilaterally assumed the obligations of the Convention; or ... manifested its acceptance of the conventional regime.'9 The Court rejected this contention on the facts of the case, but did not, absolutely rule out any possibility of such process; it did however make it clear, first that 'only a very definite, very consistent course of conduct on the part of [the] State' could have the ~ect suggested, and secondly that there could be no question of a State being permitted to claim rights or benefits under a treaty 'on the basis of a declared willingness to be bound by it, or of conduct evincing acceptance of the conventional regime'. 10 Article 38 of the ICT Statute refers to 'treaties and conventions in force', thus excluding treaties which have not, or not yet, come into force, or which have ceased to be binding on the parties. 11 The question whether a particular treaty is 'in force'
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6 A multilateral convention adopted in 1969, on the basis of a draft prepared by the UN International Law Commission, and accepted by a large number of States. It codifies practically the whole of the law of treaties (see further Ch 6 below). '. 7 This concept will be dealt with more fully in Chapter 5: briefly:internationallaw is regarded as divided into jus dispositivum, the rules of law from which States may freely contract out, by treaty; and jus cogens, a category composed of a limited number of norms which, because of their importance in and to the international community, remain binding notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary (see Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). The concept is generally accepted, but there remains considerable controversy as to its application, as to how rules of jus cogens acquire that status, and which rules have in fact acquired it.
123
a
8
See Articles 35 and 36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
'Article 35: An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third State accepts that obligation in writing. Article 36(1): A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a group of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated, unless the treaty otherwise provides.' 9 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p 3, para 27. 10 Ibid, para 28. Underlying the distinction is of course the question of the consent of the original parties: they may be presumed to have no objection to other States accepting the obligations of the Convention, but if other States are to enjoy benefits under it there must be positive consent of the original parties, as indeed the Vienna Convention requires. This point was made by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, ibid, para 28. 11 The question whether neglected treaties cease to be binding through 'desuetude' was raised, but not answered, before the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests and Aegean Sea Continental Shelf cases; it remains controversial.
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THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
between a particular pair of States is however not an absolute one, to be answered simply by checking that each of them has ratified it. A new State may be bound by certain treaties concluded by its predecessor, without a formal act of accession thereto. A further complication is due to the possibility of reserVations made by parties when signing or ratifying the treaty: in the case of a complex multilateral treaty, there may in effect be a number of parallel regimes operating between different pairs of States, depending on the extent to which a State may have excluded certain provisions of the treaty by reservation, and the extent to which the reservation has been accepted (or more precisely, not objected to) by other States parties. The operation of the rules as to reservations will be explained more fully in Chapter 6.
one dispute, may find it needs to invoke the same rule in its favour tomorrow in a different dispute. 12
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B. CUSTOM
1. Introduction It is probably a universal characteristic of human SOCIeties that many practices which have grown up to regulate day-to-day relationships imperceptibly acquire a status of inexorability: the way things have always been done becomes the way things must be done. In treating custom as a source of legal rules, international law does not deviate from the pattern discernible in municipal legal systems. Historically, at the international level, once the authority of natural law, in the sense of what was given by God or imposed by the nature of an international society made up of independent princes, had weakened, it was natural to derive legal obligations from the legitimate expectations created in others by conduct. The precise nature and operation of the process has, however, always presented obscurities. One approach is to regard all custom as a form of tacit agreement: States behave to each other in given circumstances in certain ways, which are found acceptable, and thus tacitly assented to, first as a guide to future co