Muslim-Christian Relations in Central Asia (Central Asian Studies)

Muslim–Christian Relations in Central Asia

This book explores issues of cultural tension that affect Muslim and Christian interaction within the Central Asian context. It looks at the ways that Christians have interacted with Central Asian Muslims in the past, and discusses what might need to be done to improve Muslim–Christian relations in the region in the present and future. Since the time that Nestorian Christian missionaries traveled eastward from Asia Minor along the Silk Road, and Islamic cultures came to the region in the seventh century, Christians and Muslims have shared a unique relationship in a fascinating cultural milieu. Under the reigns of various conquerors, czars, Soviets, and modern nationalist strongmen, the everchanging political and economic situation of these former Soviet Republics has dramatically affected the ways that Muslims and Christians have practiced their faith. Today, as Muslims and Christians work to stabilize their interactions, they face new challenges because of the activities of Protestant Christian and Islamist missionaries who are flooding into Central Asia as never before. The book corrects common misunderstandings of Central Asia as a cultural backwater, and is a valuable introduction to Muslim and Christian interactions in one of the most quickly changing regions of the globe. It will appeal to readers interested in Muslim–Christian interaction, and for researchers in the field of world religions, Central Asian studies, and intercultural studies. A. Christian van Gorder is Associate Professor of Religion at Baylor University in Waco, Texas. He has also taught at Messiah College in Pennsylvania and the Yunnan University in Kunming, China. He is the author of No God but God: A Path to Muslim–Christian Dialogue on God’s Nature and co-author of Three-Fifth’s Theology: Challenging Racism in American Christianity.

Central Asian studies series

Mongolia Today Science, culture, environment and development Edited by Dendevin Badarch and Raymond A. Zilinskas Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire Daniel Brower Church of the East A concise history Wilhelm Baum and Dietmar W. Winkler Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia Communal commitment and political order in change Paul Georg Geiss Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924 Seymour Becker Russian Culture in Uzbekistan One language in the middle of nowhere David MacFadyen Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia Maria Elisabeth Louw Kazakhstan Ethnicity, language and power Bhavna Dave Ethno-Nationalism, Islam, and the State in the Caucasus Post-Soviet disorder Edited by Moshe Gammer Humanitarian Aid in Post-Soviet Countries An anthropological perspective Laëtitia Atlani-Duault Muslim–Christian Relations in Central Asia A. Christian van Gorder

Muslim–Christian Relations in Central Asia

A. Christian van Gorder

First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2008 A. Christian van Gorder All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprihnted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Muslim–Christian relations in central Asia / [edited by] A. Christian van Gorder. p. cm. – (Central Asian studies series) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Islam–Asia, Central–History. 2. Christianity–Asia, Central–History. 3. Islam–Relations–Christianity. 4. Christianity and other religions–Islam. I. Van Gorder, A. Christian. BP63.A34M86 2008 261.2’70958–dc22 2007047629 ISBN 0-203-92680-3 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 10: 0-415-77608-2 (hbk) ISBN 10: 0-203-92680-3 (ebk) ISBN 13: 978-0-415-77608-0 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-203-92680-2 (ebk)

Do not think this is a fortress; it is a lofty mountain well beyond the reach of a person’s imagination. Its height reaches so far out to such extremes that the hands of imagination are too short for it. Bukharan Chronicle, 16th century The aim of a book may be to instruct, yet you can use it as a pillow; although the purpose is to give knowledge, direction, and profit. Jalaludin Rumi

Contents

Preface Acknowledgments Map

ix xi xiii

1 The steppe is cruel and heaven is far

1

2 Central Asia: A great sea of land

6

3 Central Asia’s ethnic mosaic: An interreligious perspective

10

4 A history of triumphs and disasters

38

5 The history of Christianity in Central Asia

49

6 Russians and Central Asian Muslims: Eagle and sickle against the crescent

61

7 Islamic missionaries and the Islamicization of Central Asian society

73

8 Post-Soviet Protestant missionary efforts in Central Asia

91

9 Central Asia and the new geopolitical Great Game 10 Central Asia tomorrow: Earthquakes of transition

112 124

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Contents

Epilogue: The future of Central Asia’s Muslim– Christian relations

134

Appendices: A partial list of resources for the study of religion in Central Asia Glossary Notes Bibliography Index

142 144 156 191 199

Preface

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union the attention of scholars has remained steadily focused on Russia, with a plethora of exemplary works dealing with political, economic, and geostrategic developments in that country. The perception for good reasons was, and to some degree this perception is still with us, that the most strategically important country in the whole of the enormous Eurasian landmass is Russia and the processes unfolding there invariably resonate in its near abroad, the political sphere in its most immediate neighborhood, and one better study Russia if one is to understand Central Asia. Although true to some degree, this line of thinking has had unforgivable adverse effects on the field of scholarship dealing with the political and historical developments in such regions as the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia, especially Central Asia. It appears that beside the usual interest by Western intelligence services, the US State Department, and occasional travelers, there is not much interest to be found anywhere else. Even when vast human rights abuses transpire in any or all of these republics (such as the mass killing of protesters in Andijon, Uzbekistan), journalists usually good at painting a general picture, albeit sometimes with the broadest of strokes, are at a loss to explain to their readers the historical and political background of the developments in the region, and the reader is left to wonder whether these processes are born out of a vacuum or perhaps on some level they are a result of the new Great Game. The terrorist attacks of September 11 occasioned a change, but change has been slow in coming. With the United States heavily involved in oil and gas projects in the region as well as continuing its war effort in the neighborhood, the world’s attention, it seemed for a while, focused on the Central Asian republics, raising hopes of speedy democratic changes from authoritarian forms of government that have replicated themselves and are continuing as it were in perpetuity to democracy. The deployment of US military personnel to bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan of the former Soviet Union to support the war effort in Afghanistan was one sign of the

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changing mood. Another was the changing political context in the region that seeks to blast out of the orbit of traditional Russian influence. Things have gone downhill since. By any account, the region has now become a field of intense religious, political, and economic competition that needs systematic scholarly treatment in the hopes of understanding the region and avoiding the tragic fate that befell their neighbors to the south. The field is amass with equally determined competitors bent on commanding the support of their either coreligionists, ethnic kin, or political sympathizers for advancing a political agenda favorable to them. The United States, a resurgent and ever more assertive Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan are all engaged for the “soul” and the economic resources of the Central Asian states. Central Asia and the people who inhabit there comprise a vast mosaic of multicultural, multiethnic, and multireligious influences. Trends unfolding in one place, be they cultural or political, inevitably influence trends unfolding elsewhere in the region. It is a beautiful crisscrossing of multiple cultures and religions and customs that seems to have gone wholly unnoticed only if by people who have had the good fortune to travel there. Also gone unnoticed is the dynamic of the interactions between these countries’ Muslim and Christian populations. Christian van Gorder’s book is a great introduction to the topic. He has put all of us in his debt by writing a highly relevant introduction to the region and its post-Soviet realities. Artyom H. Tonoyan Baylor University

Acknowledgments

If a gem falls into dirt it is still valuable; if dust ascends to Heaven it remains valueless. Saadi of Shiraz On the day of battle it is the slender horse, not the lumbering ox that will be of use. Saadi of Shiraz

My first visit to Central Asia began in the quiet Cotswold home of Dr Kenneth Cragg, author, scholar, and Anglican Bishop. The April morning, before a long series of flights to Tashkent, began with the fresh scent of spring wildflowers and a recent rain. Tomorrow, the miracle of air travel will transport us into another world of splashing colors, the sounds of laughter and bartering, and pungent and fragrant smells—an Uzbek market filled with flowers, fruits, vegetables, and meat swarming with flies. Today, the gentle shadows of morning are taking their time moving across the kitchen. Along with my traveling companion, Greg Webb, we sit with Bishop Cragg drinking tea and munching on biscuits while talking about Central Asia and the Bishop’s hopes for future, positive Muslim and Christian interrelationships. Time with the Bishop reminds me of a Japanese proverb: When an ordinary person gains knowledge, they ask to be called a “sage,” but when a sage increases in knowledge they ask to be called common. I am a common fellow student with a debt of gratitude to so many who have served as “sages” for me in the last 15 years of writing this book. I must begin with D. Alan Hall and David Jones of Open Doors International, UK and Ireland, who first introduced me to the fascinating questions of Central Asia’s Muslim and Christian interactions. I have appreciated the assistance of many friends and colleagues at Baylor University, including David Nydegger, Jason Whitt, and, especially, William Bellinger and Ralph Wood. At Routledge, I am grateful for the patient encouragement provided

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by Ms. Dorothea Schaefter, Associate Editor for Asian Studies. I have also benefited from the helpful suggestions provided by three anonymous readers. For any and all errors I am completely responsible. I have benefited from the editorial assistance of colleagues Artyom Tonoyan, Jonathan Warner, Muhammad Barhumdun, and my mentor in the study of the interrelationships between Muslim and Christians, my beloved Doktor Vader, A. H. Mathias Zahniser to whom I owe a debt of gratitude beyond measure. Thanks also to my sons, Patrick Xavier, Brendan Daniel Christian, and Sean Michael Theodore and to my sweet daughter Keegan Evangeline Joy. As this book is completed, another angel is joining our family, baby Tatijana Erika Ezeife. These five people are the joy of my life, and this book was begun in the same year that Brendan came into this world in Donaghadee by the Sea. Thanks to my sister Gretchen for her assistance and to my friend Gregory Edward Webb for his help in this project, which is close to his heart. He is a fellow warrior, and pilgrim in pain and hope. Words fail to express the appreciation for the support I have received from my beloved wife Vivian Ezeife van Gorder and to our parents in Lagos, Papa Stanley and Mama Charity, for all their prayers throughout this project. Efumenya Obioma! My namesake Andrew Curtis Van Gorder passed away this past year as this book was being finished. I learned that my father had cancer as I was finishing this book. As father and son we often struggled but continued to forgive each other’s failings and tried to encourage each other’s virtues. Dad studied at the University of Pittsburgh and loved his hometown. He could never understand my interests in places like Bukhara, Samarkand, Dushanbe, Irkutsk, Urumqi, or Ulaan Bator. Life has a way of repeating itself and now my father’s firstborn grandchild is also rooted in Pittsburgh, where he is studying Political Sciences at the same university. Being a father is the greatest blessing of my life and it is my hope to continue to learn from the lessons of the past, positive and negative, from my own father. I hope each of them can forgive me as they will surely need one day to be forgiven by their children. Patrick, stay steady. The Tamil proverb is correct, son, that “consistency of action is the measure of greatness.” In my father’s memory I dedicate this book to Patrick Xavier Webb van Gorder. Someday, Patrick, you’ll be a father and when that time comes I know you will flourish. As Churchill said, “Success is seldom final, failure is seldom fatal; courage is all that matters!” September 11, 2007

The Caucasus and Central Asia

1

The steppe is cruel and heaven is far

You will know at harvest that laziness is not planting. Saadi of Shiraz

“Ahh, the steppe is cruel, and heaven is far,” sighed a weary Kyrgyz horseman, recounting a timeworn proverb that described the bitter challenges of his life. The history and modern legacies of Central Asia are marked by centuries of wearying challenges as well as magnificent flashes of blinding brilliance. This book will take the multivalent threads of history, contemporary social and political concerns, and the religious and cultural dynamics between Muslims and Christians, and weave together an introduction to the story of Central Asia. My intention is to offer you, the reader, a thought-provoking and engaging introduction to Central Asia, with particular attention to the region’s Muslim and Christian relations across the epochs of history and into an undivinable future. There are countless scholars more adept in both Muslim and Christian relations and in Central Asian studies than myself, but I felt obligated to write this book because this story needed to be told in fresh articulation. I beg the patience of learned colleagues far more capable than me as I offer this contribution to the study of the various religions and cultures of the Central Asian steppe. Such an introduction is intended to provide a “big-picture” focus, which can help readers gain a generalized interpretive framework as they continue in their own specific areas of interest. My own point of orientation is that of a North American professor interested in the past and present interactions between Muslims and Christians in Central Asia and throughout our world. I hope that this book will not only advance intercultural and interreligious respect, but will also prove helpful for those from other faith communities or those without any particular religious affiliation. Central Asia is not a particularly specific geographic term. It evokes a host of varying, exotic images and is a designation that was not used outside

2

The steppe is cruel and heaven is far

of the region until it appeared in travel narratives during the first half of the nineteenth century.1 Before then, Central Asia was normally known as Bactria or Turkestan (obviously failing to appreciate the widespread influence of Persian civilization). Central Asia is a contestable term for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that it assumes there is also an outer Asia. Contemporary scholars are just now beginning to reflect on the ways such appellations are historically rooted within the framework of misleading orientalist assumptions. One such observer admitted, “Central Asia can be as broad as ‘Inner Asia’ or even as ‘Central Eurasia’…or it can be as narrow as the oases of the three Turkestans, Russian, Chinese and Afghan.”2 In spite of these Gordian knots, I will use the term Central Asia throughout the book because it is the most widely accepted term. My principal concern about using the term Central Asia is that readers might fall into the quicksand of thinking of the various cultures and nations of the area in overly generalized ways. Because you are reading an introduction to the region, I am hopeful that you will keep this fact in mind as you work to draw your own conclusions and continue your own research. It is my intention, however, that this introduction can point you toward the direction you hope to pursue. It is also true that, in spite of the breadth of the region, the term is workable because the five Central Asian republics that are the focus of this book share many common denominators, including prospects both for positive growth and negative developments. As orphans from the former Soviet Union, Central Asia’s five republics have been forged in the same furnace. Legacies of the Soviet era include these republics being governed by autocratic elites, inheriting a crumbling infrastructure, a high rate of literacy, and many of the same problems in questions of economic and political development. Importantly, for my perspective, these five Central Asian nations share a common story in their relation to intercultural and interfaith interactions. Terminology also becomes a problem when it comes to the question of the transliteration of non-English terms. This book will refer to Russian, Arabic, Turkic, Persian, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, Chinese, and a host of other terms, which all have variant spellings through time and geography. When these variants are significant, I have tried to provide both consistency and some notation to alert the reader. In all decisions of transliteration, I have sought to keep things as simple as possible. Writing about Central Asia also presents a Pandora’s Box of historigraphic problems. A number of early literary, historical, and religious sources present a host of blanket assertions. Numbers are often conflated and must be looked at with suspicion. Many of the chronicles, of women or cultural minorities for example, remain unwritten. In addition, each of these cultures and religions tend to describe themselves in the most glowing of

The steppe is cruel and heaven is far

3

terms imaginable while castigating others who are different than themselves in an ungenerous light. Another dimension of this context is how fluid the cultural changes, religious beliefs, and political powers are in Central Asian history and how much interplay there existed between the various traditions. In the area of religions for example, Christianity or Islam in thirteenth-century Central Asia look very different as traditions than when they are expressed in the modern milieu. This book is confined to the geographic parameters of the five former Central Asian Soviet Republics of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Central Asia encompasses a vast area about the size of Continental Europe west of Russia. I have had to be selective when questions have arisen, which flow across those political boundaries. In the area of Muslim and Christian relations, it is regrettable that I am not able to describe the fascinating interplay among the various people groups of Xinjiang in western China. This is also true of the political and social cauldron that is modern-day Afghanistan. The region’s ethnic groups travel freely across such boundaries into the neighboring countries of China, Azerbaijan, Iran, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Mongolia, and Russia. The geographic centrality of Central Asia means that it must constantly deal with issues originating beyond the confines of its own political boundaries. This was of even greater consequence in the past when cultural or religious identities were much more cherished than any specific sense of national identity. The nomadic citizens of these ancient cultures moved freely across political frontiers without any recognition of their importance. A major objective of this book is to explore a number of different reasons that contribute to intercultural and interreligious tensions in Central Asia. The area faces a host of social justice issues as governments try to steer their nations through this time of transition. Questions will be asked about the ways that Central Asian ethnic and religious communities can remain faithful to their specific distinctiveness in the midst of dramatic social transformation and cultural instability. While much of this focus will be on Muslims and Christians, these same inquiries can be asked of those Jews, Buddhists, and people of other religions who remain in Central Asia. There is much progress that needs to take place, and those from various faith traditions who live outside the region must work to positively contribute to the strengthening of social networks that promote social justice and intercultural harmony. Religion has played a major role throughout the history of Central Asia. This region was probably, at one time, the most religiously diverse place on the planet. There have been centuries when Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Mongolian shamanism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all sent missionaries into the region and had large faith communities existing in constant interaction with the other religious communities of the region.

4

The steppe is cruel and heaven is far

Because of these experiences, Central Asia is a fascinating context for the study of the ways that various religious groups have interacted with each other and framed their ideas in specific cultural contexts. In the modern setting, where Islam predominates but there is still a very small but significant Christian representation among the population, these questions continue to merit consideration. Their examination may also hold the promise for helping Muslims and Christians in other parts of the world learn to interact with each other in more constructive ways. The social justice, human rights, and environmental justice issues of Central Asia are not only problems for the individuals within that region but for all of us who share space in this increasingly shrinking world. The area has the potential to explode along a number of intercultural and interreligious fault lines and the recent events of this last century remind us all too well that what happens in one corner of the world affects everyone everywhere. The two major religious communities, Muslims and (a shrinking number of) native Christians, often receive input into their development in both positive and negative ways from the outside world. As Central Asia navigates unchartered waters, extraversionary influences should contribute to solutions instead of compounding difficulties. This conviction explains why two chapters in this book are dedicated to the work of Muslim and Christian missionaries and external religious funding and influence in Central Asia. The forces of modernization and political developments can develop in dangerous ways without the rest of the world paying close attention and making a helpful contribution. It is as true now, as it has always been that “justice is always the prerequisite for true peace.”3 While some non-Central Asians, often ideological and religious missionaries, become more active in the region, others have given this area of the world scant attention. Many Europeans and North Americans seem to regard Central Asia as a quaint cultural backwater meandering throughout history as though it were one vast and lazy camel caravan route. For centuries, Central Asia was only a place of otherness and difference. Typifying this attitude, James Elroy Flecker wrote, “For lust of knowing what should be known, we take the golden road to Samarkand.”4 Romanticized notions rooted in 200 years of dramatic European (often missionary) travel adventure narratives have left behind this inheritance of misunderstanding.5 While these accounts succeed in presenting a plethora of fascinating cameos describing the dizzying color of Central Asian market towns, they are often portrayed through the eyes of wandering wealthy vagabonds, gambling mercenaries, nomadic businessmen, and zealous missionaries. Few of these embroidered perceptions have much in common with the dusty, stark reality of present-day life in modern Central Asia. Another consideration is that, for

The steppe is cruel and heaven is far

5

reasons we will detail later, Central Asia is often evaluated from a decidedly Russian point of reference. While Russian–Central Asian relations are intriguing, they form only one piece of the larger puzzle. This book seeks to introduce the region and also provide the reader with a better understanding of the ways that different cultures and religions have interacted with each other. Particular attention will be given to the ways that Muslims and Christians have encountered each other and how they are progressing in their present interactions. A number of important interfaith questions will be considered: What are the issues emerging in Muslim and Christian interactions in Central Asia, and what background information will be helpful for making these projects as beneficial as possible? How can Western and Asian Christians or Muslims better appreciate the various challenges facing Central Asian Christians or Muslims? How might non-Central Asians positively contribute to the stability of the Christian or Muslim communities living among Central Asia’s historically Turkic and Persian Islamic cultures?6 Non-Muslims or Christians may also find these questions insightful to their own hopes of constructing regional networks, which foster intercultural stability, interfaith tolerance, and mutual respect.

2

Central Asia: A great sea of land

When I see the poor dervish without food, my own food is pain and poison to me. Deep in the sea are riches beyond compare. But if you seek safety, it is on the shore. I fear that you will not reach Mecca, O Nomad! For the road which you are following leads to Turkestan. Saadi of Shiraz

The Kyrgyz call her talaa, a vastness of unfathomable emptiness.1 The talaa, or steppe, is mother of all Central Asian civilization and is a sweeping sea of grasslands and mountains.2 Central Asia straddles the two great continents of Europe and Asia, but for much of the world, it seems to be a blank space at the center of the map. Central Asian intercultural and interfaith interactions have often only gained the attention of historians in relation to the expansion of Russian colonialism. Few scholars of sociology, history, religion, or missiology have explored the various ways in which, for example, Central Asian Christians or Muslims have interacted with their neighbors of the opposite faith while also examining the ways non-Central Asian Christians or Muslims have positively or negatively been involved in the intercultural, interreligious dynamics of the region. Central Asia is just now beginning to assert its own unique cultural identity without external interference. The area has never been culturally homogenous or religiously monolithic in its character—a fact expressed in emerging civil societies, which are rooted in a cherished Islamic heritage and also committed to the preservation of cultural diversity. These goals run headlong into Central Asia’s increasing interaction with the political and cultural actualities of an increasingly globalized world. Central Asian Christians are in the middle of this cauldron, but they are also often connected with their Russian, Ukrainian, and German cultural and linguistic heritages. Many Christians in the region are descendants of those who were living in the area only because of the oppressive historical legacies of Soviet imperialism.

Central Asia: A great sea of land

7

The engagement of Central Asian Christians with their Muslim neighbors has also been affected by external pressures from Russian Orthodox, Catholic, or Protestant missionaries who have exerted their influence and resources without much attention to the needs of the local church. Missionaries, motivated by passion, declared sentiments echoing those of Henry Martyn: “What a wretched life I shall lead if I do not exert myself from morning till night in a place where, through whole territories, I seem to be the only light.”3 Their passion (either consciously or unconsciously) completely ignored the fact that their fellow Christians have been present in Central Asia from almost the inception of Church history. Most Christians in history also automatically assumed, to use Martyn’s words, that there was no “light” at all to be found among the Muslims, Shamanists, Jews, Zoroastrian, Buddhist, or others living in Central Asia. What does the term Central Asia refer to? Where does the region begin? Perhaps the Caspian Sea can be considered as a natural point of geographical demarcation between Transcaucasia and Central Asia.4 For the purposes of this book, Central Asia refers to the five political states of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.5 These nations were created in the 1920s and 1930s by the former Soviet Union, and their creation did not spring from any specific geographic or ethnic divisions. The densely populated Ferghana Valley, for example, runs through parts of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Even the names of the countries, generally intended to reflect ethnic groupings that predominate in the region, are somewhat arbitrary since, for example, Uzbeks or Kazakhs have always lived in regions beyond Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. Central Asia is made up of a vast landlocked realm of mountains and deserts that spans almost a quarter of the globe from Europe’s Black Sea in the west almost as far as the Gobi Desert of Mongolia and the Siberian taiga to the north, and from the foothills of the Pamir, Tien Shan, and Elbruz Mountains to the south and beyond to China’s Yellow River and the ricefields of the east. These five former Soviet Republics cover an area over four million square kilometers (twice the size of Iran).6 It is geography of contrasts: lakes and deserts, mountains and flatlands. Much of the soil is fertile but, suffering from a continental climate, does not hold enough moisture for most crops, and thus it is largely used by nomadic pastoralists for grazing animals. This climate, without the moderating influence of the ocean, tends to be harsh with temperatures often ranging from over 120 degrees (Fahrenheit) in the summer to −40 and below in the winter. The two largest deserts of Central Asia are the Kyzlkum, the red-sand desert, and the Kara Kum, or black-sand desert, where dunes sometimes rise as high as 300 feet.

8

Central Asia: A great sea of land

While there is some geographic diversity in the area, the vast majority of Central Asia’s 4,000,000 square miles consists of featureless steppe. Central Asian history provides an extraordinary narrative of turmoil and transition. The tide of years has risen against the people, driving them into a relative cultural isolation, often hidden in the long shadows of Russian and Chinese civilizations. Political, religious, and social insularity was aided by both geography and circumstance to create within Central Asia a unique set of cultural expressions that fossilized over time. These long eras of isolation were preceded by a lengthy period of time when the region, mainly through commerce, was abuzz with new ideas and invigorating cultural and religious interactions. Long-distance trade promoted a dynamic cross-pollination of new ideas and cultures. Central Asia was in a constant state of struggle, which limited its cultural advances compared with those enjoyed by other nations able to establish more stable communities. This unending state of conflict against oppression, both external and internal, has had a dramatic effect on the people who lived there. Perhaps, it can be argued, that these circumstances have made them tougher and more fatalistic in their character. This may explain to some degree why the religions that have emerged in Central Asia often seem to have a mystical or escapist quality. Notions of an unexplained and hidden world have often provided adherents with the opportunity to encounter a better spiritual world while also lifting them beyond the harsh glare of present realities. Sufi Islamic mystical devotion or countless folk Islamic practices for example, are often characterized by believers seeking spiritual aid with unceasing petitions for divine intervention. The mystical evocations of these traditions are poetic sources, each of which expresses the unique cosmology of their localities. Unlike some fatalistic Muslims, the poet Nuzami7 wrote, “man is turbid and limpid by nature and a touchstone, and gold and a goldsmith…we have come into the world to toil, and not for idle talk have we come.”8 Such statements underscore the difficulty of daily life for many Central Asians. Decades of Soviet-era propaganda attacked Sufi mysticism, folktraditions, and Muslim and Christian rituals, and challenged the spiritual underpinnings of the various people groups of Central Asia. Partly in reaction to the extremes of previous Soviet anti-religious efforts, emerging national governments have tried to create political forms (hybrid autocratic democracies) that also honor in some way the Islamic heritage of their constituencies. Centuries of turmoil, imperialism, relative isolation, and poverty have not destroyed the spirituality of the people, whose devotion has probably been made even stronger. The religions of Central Asia often tell you more about a person’s ethnicity than about his beliefs. Very few ethnically Russian people in the region are Muslim and very few Tajiks would ever consider becoming

Central Asia: A great sea of land

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Russian Orthodox Christians. While religion is a significant factor in better appreciating Central Asian history, it is probably not the most important one in past decades. This is why it is important to examine other factors such as political, economic, and intercultural concerns, which will be introduced in this text in order to show how these factors affect interfaith interactions. Little about the past can be garnered from European and North American writings about Central Asia in the last three centuries. Most travel narratives about Central Asia published in the nineteenth century emphasized characters and events that were bizarre and unexplainable. Dreamy adventure stories filled with eccentric portrayals of opulent fiefdoms and gypsy nomads say much more about an inconsequential, empty land of the author’s imagination than they do about the realities of daily life in Central Asia. To these poets, preachers, pedants, and political spies, Central Asia was nothing more than a theatrical set whose only importance was as a perilous and mysterious Silk Road passageway between European, Chinese, Persian, Turkish, and Indian civilizations.

3

Central Asia’s ethnic mosaic: An interreligious perspective

A beggar went to a door asking for something to be given to him. The owner answered and said, I am sorry but there is nobody in. I don’t want anybody, said the beggar, I want food! Hakim Jami When we are dead, seek not our tomb in the earth; find it in the hearts of men. Jalal al-din Rumi

This chapter will focus on five major ethnic groups and the ways that Muslims and Christians have interacted among these communities. When walking through the pulsating, vibrating bazaars of any one of the major cities in Central Asia one becomes rapidly aware of the dynamic interplay of the melting pot of cultures. Indeed, contemporary Central Asia is the result of a “genuine merging and crossing marked by widespread bilingualism and cultural hybridization.”1 Persians, Turks, Russians, Germans, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Kazakhs meet together in a splashing mixture of color, smell, and sound that includes young and old, modern and ancient, religious and secular, and nomadic and urban. In terms of demographics, Central Asia is comprised of a mottled mosaic of different people groups consisting of well over 100 million people. At least 40 distinct cultural groupings have been identified by anthropologists. These communities may exist either in tightly clustered groups or scattered across wide, empty spaces. The population density of Central Asia varies widely, from two people per square kilometer (in parts of Tajikistan) to over 200 people per square kilometer in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan. Central Asia has some of the highest birthrates in the world, leading to an average age of the overall population that is under 18 years of age. Many Central Asians still speak Russian (a residual trace of empire), and most also speak one of the various languages sharing a linguistic heritage with Turkish.

Central Asia’s ethnic mosaic

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Many of these Turkic languages, though distinct, can be partially understood by those speaking a different dialect. Central Asia has been characterized as a “cultural reactor [because]…few parts of the world can provide such a great diversity of languages, religions, local ethnic differentiation, and political systems.”2 Traditionally, European and North American scholars have spoken in general terms about large, amorphous cultural categories such as the Turkic-Mongolians. Orientalist generalities easily morph into a series of exotic details that underscore the backward and primitive natures of these various Central Asian cultures. The British writer Francis Younghusband, for example, wrote that Central Asians are “the essence of imperturbable mediocrity.”3 Intercultural harmony, in history, has not always been promoted as a desirable end among Central Asian political and religious leaders. The years of Soviet rule saw the intentional implementation of policies that served to divide and conquer local populations in order to keep them subjected to Soviet political domination. Stalin drew up the boundaries of the five Soviet republics with this very objective in mind. In addition, governmental propaganda accentuated ethnic differences and allowed the Soviet state to offer themselves as the solution for cultural unity in place of religion or a shared history and experience. The Soviet Union acted out of a fear that pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic movements might gain too much sway in Central Asia and become a competing force for the loyalty of their citizens. Although Central Asia is host to countless ethnic groups, this chapter will focus specifically on the five major Muslim ethnic groups who speak, with the exception of the Tajiks, Turkic languages. Thinking of ethnic groups in terms of “who was here first” is not helpful because of widespread migration and because of the religious, linguistic, social, and political intermixing, which has taken place within Central Asia. Uigyurs, for example, are to be found today on both sides of the Kyrgyz–Chinese border as are Iranians in Tajikistan. Germans, Poles, Chinese, Iranians, Arabs, Tatars, Ukrainians, Gypsies, and Russians have peppered their own unique pockets of culture in Central Asia, creating an ever-changing mosaic of values, perspectives, assumptions, and intercultural understandings. After reading this chapter, I hope you have a greater appreciation for that which is distinctive about the various ways these communities have interacted both with the political, historical, and social issues discussed in earlier chapters and also with the way the major ethnic groups from Central Asia have historically interacted with both Islam and Christianity.

Uzbekistan The primordial cradle of the Uzbek people is a dry, sunbaked realm of desert and marshland spread over 1.5 million acres. Twice as large as

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Great Britain and about the size of California (or Spain), the landlocked Republic of Uzbekistan has about 27 million people, two-thirds of whom live in rural villages.4 Uzbeks comprise the most significant ethnic group in Central Asia and are also the largest Turkic-language based people group in the world, with the exception of Anatolian Turks. The term Uzbek was applied generally to Turkic nomads of Central Asia and is a relatively recent invention. Previously, those who lived in the area were referred to primarily in terms of their proximity to either the emirate of Samarkand or Bukhara. Because of the artificiality of this label, Bennigsen states that Uzbekistan is “the most artificial of all Central Asian nations.”5 Reasons for this include the fact that within the boundaries of Uzbekistan are some of the most important cultural, religious, and historic centers in Central Asia as well as some of the best universities and scientific institutions. Uzbeks share a fascinating ethnic history with their first ancestors being “descendants of Turkic tribes of the Golden Horde who began settling in Central Asia in the 15th century mixing with native peoples.”6 The TurcoMongol conqueror Timur was responsible for the building of Samarkand and led what Uzbeks today call their “golden heritage” (oltin meros). The halcyon era for modern-day Uzbekistan came with the development of the four cities of Khiva, Khokand, Samarkand, and Bukhara between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, when noted intellectuals, scholars, and poets pioneered new pathways of intellectual insight. Bukhara the Noble was the center of this renaissance and was a city brimming with noteworthy masjids and madrassas.7 Algebraic mathematician Musa Khwarezmi, astronomer Prince Ulugh Beg, and philosopher Ibn Sina are just a few of the many thinkers who lived in the city during the Golden (or Classical) Age of Islamic civilization. One can still hear Uzbeks speak with pride about “the ways of the Fathers” and about the great men of the past who left behind cherished legacies. After centuries of stagnation, Russian armies of the Czar conquered modern-day Uzbekistan at the end of the nineteenth century. Their arrival did nothing to alleviate epochs of political nepotism and economic sluggishness. The Soviet Union established the Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan in 1924, but many of the retrogressive forces that had previously ruled were allowed to continue unabated. Little happened of international newsworthiness in Central Asia until, suddenly, on April 26, 1966, a devastating earthquake put Tashkent on the front page of every newspaper in the world. Despite the harsh natural conditions and dramatic geological shifts, the death and destruction in Tashkent forced the Soviet Union to undertake a massive rebuilding project that dramatically improved the infrastructure of Uzbekistan’s capital by providing new rail and air links to other nations.

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These construction projects were successful and, today, Tashkent is a center for air and land travel between India, Russia, and China. Modern Uzbekistan has been described as one of the “world’s most selfdestructively repressive regimes.”8 Intercultural tensions lead the list of internal problems the country faces because bitter histories between various groups have often simmered into serious social disharmony. In the Fall of 1990, scores of Kyrgyz were killed by Uzbeks in the city of Osh. Violent conflict also raged between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities in Bishkek (or Frunze), Kyrgyzstan. Another horrid series of events transpired in 1989 when brutal clashes between Uzbeks and Meshketian Turks forced many people to leave their homes, fleeing for their lives. People were rounded up, killed, and mutilated for no other reason than being a Meshketian Turk. Hyman refers to these volcanic incidents as a “virtual pogrom…that left more than 200 Turks murdered with appalling savagery and many more wounded with the authorities forced to airlift about 15,000 of the remaining Meshketian Turks out of the Republic.”9 The horrific scars of this time continue to seethe deeply within the heart of Uzbekistan. Lingering expressions of ethnic division between the various Uzbek and Tajik communities of southern Uzbekistan are also apparent. Uzbek chauvinism is a major concern, reflected in the fact that Uzbekistan continues to have simmering border disputes with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. It seems that Uzbekistan feels it should be the dominant power in the region and this arrogance is irksome to its neighbors. Burghart writes that Kazakhstan “openly resents their treatment as country cousins.”10 Many of the populations of Uzbekistan’s neighbors move freely across the nations’ borders and, because of this interplay, Uzbekistan’s President, Islom Karimov, has warned that ethnic rivalries could explode again at any time and throw the country into chaos: “The situation is so dangerous that it would only need a match and the whole place could blow up.”11 It is clear, however, that President Karimov is seeking to benefit from these intercultural tensions and the perception of potential dangers for his own political advantage. In addition to ethnic tensions, Uzbekistan faces a plethora of unresolved issues. Regarding gender justice, the women of the country are effectively treated as second-class citizens, one result of which is the alarmingly high rate of suicides (by immolation) among Uzbek women.12 The social cost for the treatment of drug- and alcohol-related problems are skyrocketing. Uzbekistan suffers from its location as a main transit route for narcotics from Afghanistan and Kazakhstan into Russia because many drugs and criminals have come into the country. Nepotism and bribery are rampant, which has contributed to an extensive network of organized crime. There is an Uzbek proverb that in order to understand the Uzbek you have to visit their graveyards and shop in their markets. Today, Uzbek markets are

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bustling as never before but the economic sector is also facing major hazards as it seeks to modernize its economic infrastructure in the hopes of attracting more international investment. The telephone system, for example, was antiquated, and its improvement was a major initial priority. Uzbek politicians sought to chart a course of market socialism that garnered few tangible results until about 1996, when some improvements became apparent.13 Government fiscal planners launched a host of measures to try to gain control over the rate of inflation and the value of the currency, but these were met with widespread frustration. Because the pace of change has been so slow, the population has become increasingly restive. It is apparent to anyone that levels of economic inequality are precipitously high. In 2005, close to 30 percent of Uzbekistan’s residents lived below the poverty line and were considered underemployed.14 Cotton has, for decades, been one of the country’s foremost products for international export. Uzbekistan remains the world’s second-largest exporter of white gold. One dilemma, however, has been that the means of production is not in the hands of the growers. They only deal with the raw materials and, thus, benefit in a small way. These cotton-growers are placed in particular economic distress when the value of the cotton crop dips on the world market. An additional concern is that the cotton industry in Uzbekistan has long been blighted by its relationship with organized crime. Embezzlement of resources has run rampant in this sector of the economy. Further, because of the size of this industry there is a strong connection in Uzbekistan between the stability of society and what is going on in cotton production. This was obvious when one of the last acts of the Soviet Union in Central Asia was to arrest one of Uzbekistan’s leading cotton tycoons. The nation erupted in rage. When people heard about how widespread the corruption was in the cotton industry, Uzbek students took to the streets of Tashkent in bitter protests, resulting in the deaths of six protesting students being shot by Uzbekistan’s riot police. Another systemic economic problem that Uzbekistan is addressing is the development of the industrial sector. Industrialization has been tepid, and those manufacturing facilities remaining from the era of Soviet rule produce woefully toxic pollution levels. Environmental problems abound in the country. The once vast Aral Sea is quickly shrinking and rampant desertification is increasing as farmers overuse agrochemicals, speeding up the rate of the depletion of water supplies. These environmental issues have also led to a number of serious health disorders related to soil and water contamination from buried processed nuclear wastes. Politically, Uzbekistan is without any democratic framework and is ruled by authoritarian strongman: President Islom Abduganievich Karimov. Beginning in 1992, Karimov has ruled the country and has made no

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arrangements for his successor. Karimov has tried to link his own success to the progress of the nation and the motto “Uzbekistan, the Great State of the Future” (O’zbekiston, kelajagi buyuk davlat) is predominantly displayed throughout the country. Karimov, the former Soviet apparatchik, controls all sections of the government. While Karimov, “lauded the 1992 constitution as enshrining most principles of the International Declaration of Human Rights, in practice these principles remain unrealized.”15 It has not been unusual for Karimov to institute a law and then flaunt its enforcement with blatant violations. For example, the government instituted a mandate from the President stating that it would be illegal to erect any statues or monuments to anyone who was still living while, at the same time, allowing statues of himself to be erected. Although the country is adamant that the judicial and legal systems continue to be gradually liberalized, Uzbekistan still lacks an independent judicial system.16 Karimov, in the tradition of Stalinist authoritarians, has not made room for political opposition. A few rival political parties are allowed to be registered but none of these hold any power in the government. Some of these groups include a few political associations that are decidedly Islamist in their religio-political rhetoric and stated objectives. Karimov, completely dedicated to a secular state, tolerates the existence of such organizations but will not allow them to gain any actual power as long as he is in office. When Karimov ran unopposed for office in 1991, he assumed the title Turkmenbashi (Chief of the Turkmen, a title that was also used by Niyazov in Turkmenistan) in what may have been a veiled reference to the powerful Turkish nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.17 Another motive in using such a title would be to frame the cult of personality through the invocation of traditional historic–ethnic terms. Because of conflicts resulting from competition for scarcity of jobs, land and water resources, and cultural differences, Uzbekistan is a nation that has faced a number of intercultural tensions with their political neighbors. Adding to the pressures are the facts that Uzbekistan has become the most militarized society in Central Asia with the most advanced army. Hope remains that democratic principles will eventually win the day over political heavy-handedness, but international organizations (such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) are not optimistic that rampant human rights abuses will be alleviated in the near future. What is the religious situation in the country? Uzbekistan is a religious nation, and about 88 percent of the population is Sunni Muslims. Islam empowers people with hope and pride and ties their identity to a fabled past in a completely harmonious Islamic world. These are some of the reasons that Islam plays a large role in nearly every facet of their society, and Uzbeks

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have been described by some as the “most religious of all Central Asian Muslims.”18 It is also the case that many of the imams and leading muftis of other Central Asian republics are Uzbek and their religious authority and influence can be seen throughout the region.19 One cannot talk in Uzbekistan about unambiguous boundaries between faith and political ambitions. This is because the cherished faith of Islam comprehensively touches every area of a believer’s life and unmistakably affects every aspect of Uzbek culture. Because Islam is so highly esteemed in Uzbekistan it has recently been used by opponents of the government to press their case. Some Uzbeks have been drawn into supporting militant Islamist political organizations, which have challenged Karimov’s rule on the basis of its unwillingness to support the initiation of Islamic shariah law. The political expressions of Islam in Uzbekistan are more visible than in any other Central Asian nation, with the exception of Tajikistan. Missionary work and Islamic influences from outside of the region have been the major reason these movements have grown. For example, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, one of the muftis (an honorific title for a clerical leader) of Tashkent, Mohammad Sidiqi Mohammad Yusuf, went for further religious training in Libya, and other Muslim religious leaders have similarly received religious training in centers of intense Islamist radicalism. Probably the most active and belligerent Islamist area in Uzbekistan is the Fergana Valley, where years of strident Soviet propaganda aimed at the people of the valley that was framed in Islamist rhetoric served to strengthen their passionate Islamic resolve. In terms of traditional Sunni Islam, the Tashkent Islamic Institute is the largest Muslim educational academy in Central Asia. It is directed by a group of mullahs who oversee all of the (Hanafi) Sunni Islamic communities across Central Asia. Muslim education in Uzbekistan has sought to normalize and deepen the dedication of believers, but it has faced difficulties in doing this. One force working against widespread commitment to traditional Islamic practices is that devout rural Uzbeks often participate in local folk and mystical Sufi practices. At the same time, most traditional Muslim festivals are celebrated. Rural Islam in Uzbekistan is a complicated mix of Sunni ideas with pre-Islamic, seemingly incompatible, animistic shamanism. These patterns of mixing various religious cultural themes have been tolerated by Uzbek Muslims for centuries. Interfaith relations between Muslims and Christians in Uzbekistan focus on the nation’s urban areas. Muslims have had little interaction with Christians outside of the major cities where most Christian churches are to be found. The largest Christian denomination in Uzbekistan is the Russian Orthodox Church, which consists of about 9 percent of the population. Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant Christians, while not experiencing the same degree of problems Christians have encountered in other Central Asian

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countries, have complained that potential converts to Christianity are facing strong religious persecution. Uzbeks of Muslim ancestry who convert to Christianity experience severe cultural and relational isolation as a result of their decision. These interfaith tensions have resulted in many ethnic Uzbek Christians deciding to leave the country and move to European enclaves of security. Both Muslims and Christians outside of Central Asia must encourage their own governments to keep a watchful eye on the policies that the Uzbek government develops regarding the religious freedom of their nonMuslim citizens and the promotion of increased intercultural harmony. Uzbek issues of interfaith tensions have been heightened by the recent activities of Protestant missionaries from Europe and North America and because of Muslim missionaries from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Uzbekistan government enacted a series of legal ordinances in 1991 and 1992, which sought to limit external religious proselytization. Laws were also put in place to protect those who were vulnerable to outside pressures to become socially displaced from their native Islamic community. The government mandated that all children in the country should receive some Sunni Islamic religious education as a way to counteract the efforts of Protestant and Islamist missionaries. Additional laws about religion were passed in May 1998, which restricted unauthorized Christian or Islamist activities with particular attention to efforts at proselytization. Sadly some of Uzbekistan’s political leaders have tried to advance their careers by stirring up hatred against Islamist and Protestant missionaries. Specific legal standards have been developed and implemented, which favor the status of Hanafi Sunni Islam in Uzbekistan.20 Other rulings have been authorized, which prohibit the distribution of non-Islamic religious literature. Christian churches are required to register with local government authorities, and there are instances where the government has removed registrations for some churches that have clear links with missionaries from outside the region.21 Some Christians have been forced to pay fines, have lost jobs, have been interrogated by the police, and even been beaten because of these extraversionary connections. Reports, which are harder to confirm, claim that some Protestant services have been raided and closed , and religious literature has been confiscated.22 In spite of these prohibitions, Protestant missionaries from Europe and North America have continued to be active in Uzbekistan. Many Europeans and North Americans, such as the Swedish Pentecostal Ulf Eckman, have organized churches and sent missionaries into Uzbekistan to promote messages such as Eckman’s call that people can become healthy and prosperous by embracing his teachings about Christianity. Protestants from Europe and America have also developed radio programs and printed evangelical literature in the Uzbek language. In 2006, the Uzbek Bible Society (funded by

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Protestants outside the region) completed the translation of the Uzbek Bible.23 The Bible Society claimed that this new edition was needed because almost 75 percent of the population speaks Uzbek.24 Since the fall of the Soviet Union a number of other nontraditional new religious movements have been active in proselytization efforts in Central Asia. One can find Hare Krishna in Tashkent (since 1987) as well as various Mormon denominations, the Baha’i, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and members of other groups, such as the Family of Love (Children of God). Many times these new religious movements are represented at first by people who come as English teachers or businesspeople but whose real concern is the advance of their religious message. Protestant missionaries often follow the same strategy for gaining a foothold in the country. Missionary efforts by both new religious movements and Protestants among the Uzbeks, however, are not only confined to Uzbekistan. There are six million Uzbeks outside of Uzbekistan. Most of these are in neighboring republics, but according to the General Secretary of the Central Asian Association in New York, there are between 5,000 and 7,000 Uzbeks in New York. Other Uzbek communities exist in Australia, West Germany, and France. Thrower states that there are “well over 1 million Uzbeks living in Afghanistan and about 200,000 in the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China.”25

Kazakhstan Kazakhstan is an evocative world of vast steppe lands. It is a nation rich in oil, natural gas, coal, iron ore, and many other natural resources. The northernmost reaches of the country are on the same latitude as Moscow, making it a cold region that can be shrouded in snow and ice for months at a time. In contrast, 800 miles to the south along the Chinese border, Kazakhstan is at the same latitude as Madrid. In these warm climes one will find verdant apple orchards blooming as early as March. A huge nation (about the size of Argentina and one-third the size of the United States), Kazakhstan, spans 1,200 miles from east to west. The country has tremendous diversity and topographical transition where the harsh rigid tundra of Siberia meets the parched deserts and rocky uplands of Central Asia. Mudslides threaten Almaty, blizzards lash the country in unforgiving winters, and sandstorms sweep across the land in broiling summers. The often unpredictable nature of this land has produced a hardy stock of individuals. During the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, this toughness was exemplified in the armies of Kazakh warriors who fought with fierce determination. When the Mongol warriors of Genghis Khan came to the region, his rugged Mongol tribesmen bred with the locals to forge a new

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culture; thus the Kazakhs came to be known as warrior-horsemen and conquerors of some of the most forbidding lands in the world. In about 500 BCE, Persian Parathians passed through the area and established caravan stations along the Silk Road between Greece and China. Almaty was one of the early important oasis cities along this route. Invasions by scores of armies followed one after the other until the Mongols established three hordes (ordias), which allowed the local people to have a degree of sovereignty over their own land. After the Mongols left, Uzbek warriors came and ruled until the sixteenth century when local Kazakh warriors were able to regain control of their own territory. In the eighteenth century, Russian conquests of the vast steppe began in earnest. Some of the earliest missionaries sent to the region from Russia were not Orthodox but actually Tatar Muslims who had been commissioned by the Czarina to move to frontier trading posts and transform these truculent border nomads into civilized imperial subjects who followed Islam.26 Later, the first Russian Orthodox missionaries arrived and did not approach the Kazakhs so much as Muslims but as shamanists who resorted to “spirits, sorcerers and fortune-tellers.”27 Aleksei Levshin wrote (in 1832) that when he asked Kazakhs what their religion was they uniformly told them that they did not know if they were “Mohammedans, Manicheans, or pagans.”28 Indeed, their migratory lifestyle kept Kazakhs from building masjids and madrassas. Kazakhstan became a Soviet republic in 1936, and Soviet collectivization led to the forcible settlement of these nomadic people—a devastating disruption for the social cohesion of the local culture. The Soviets dissolved Kazakh leadership structures, broke up migratory routes, and eliminated historical tribal identities. Proud Kazakhs were forced to settle and become landless peasants. The results of these traumatic changes were horrific. Hyman writes: The decline in the Kazakh population in the 1920s and 1930s was particularly striking. This was the result of deliberate massacres, famine and a mass exodus of the population which ensued from the forced collectivization of a nomadic culture. Since some Kazakh sources claim that fully half of the Kazakh population died in this period, it is hardly surprising that it has been compared to genocide.29 Kazakhstan lived in a state of perpetual crisis beginning with the famines of 1921 and 1922 and lasting throughout the period of the Second World War. During the years of famine at least one million Kazakhs slowly starved to death as the direct result of failed government economic policies and social chaos. The unsteady nature of this time was routinized into a continual

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downward spiral, which saw one man-made disaster after another. In 1926, there were about four million Kazakhs, and that number dropped to under three million by 1939. Kazakhstan has had seemingly perpetual cycle of crisis that did not ease until the Second World War, when national survival became more pressing than draconian social engineering efforts. Another residual effect of the war was that Stalin sent wave after wave of German-speaking Russians to live in Kazakhstan because he feared they would become sympathizers of the encroaching Nazi war effort. Most of these poor German farmers had no choice but to stay and became the backbone of such efforts as the Virgin Land Program of the 1950s and 1960s. During this campaign, the Soviet government sent a large number of impoverished agrarian Russians to the northern pasturelands to build a new life for their families in distant Kazakhstan. Politically, Kazakhstan is quite stable. President Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, a ruler content to serve as manager, has been leading the country since its inception in 1991. Legal systems are in place that combine legacies of Soviet rule with historic Kazakh traditional legal frameworks (adapt). Nazarbayev has worked to develop pragmatic solutions to economic problems and has attempted to build an ethnic consensus between Russians and Kazakhs. On this last front he is walking a tightrope that he realizes could have a negative impact on the future of the country if it is not properly controlled. Elections at the end of 2005 gave Nazarbayev 87 percent of the vote and an overwhelming mandate to rule for the next seven years. In the next round of elections, on August 18, 2007, Nazarbayev’s political apparatus, the Nur Otan party captured 100 percent of all 98 seats in the lower house of parliament (Mazhilis). International suspicions of widespread voting fraud in this election went unnoticed by Nazarbayev’s authoritarian realm.30 His dictatorship, however, provides stability and a way to avoid further political trouble, possible tensions with Russia to the north, and social unrest about the economic chaos in the country. Nazarbayev has established a state where he alone is able to initiate changes in the constitution. The leader, however, seems to enjoy a large degree of support from the population because, generally, they seem to welcome policies that promote relative political and economic stability. In recent years the Kazakh government has aggressively privatized a significant portion of the society, which has benefited the economy. Good harvests, foreign investments, and particularly the booming energy sector have resulted in Kazakhstan enjoying the healthiest economy in Central Asia. The 2001 opening of the Caspian Consortium pipeline from the Tengiz oilfields to the Black Sea will also help the economy in the future. Leaders also recognize, however, the future cannot be built solely upon an unhealthy overdependence on the oil sector.

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By the end of Soviet rule in 1992, 40 percent of the citizens of Kazakhstan were Kazakh, while 38 percent of the population was of Russian descent.31 In 2006, those numbers had changed with approximately 54 percent of Kazakhstan’s 15 million people being ethnic Kazakhs.32 A “World Kazakh Congress” held in Almaty in October 1992 sought to show the world that there are Kazakh communities throughout the world. Sixteen different countries were represented in the conference program. Over 100,000 Kazakhs live in neighboring Turkmenistan and over one million more Kazakhs live as a large minority Muslim community among the majority Uigyur people of Xinjiang in the People’s Republic of China.33 The term Kazakh probably comes from a Turkish word meaning wanderer, or man of independence.34 This refers to the daily life that nomads experienced in that part of the world. It has traditionally been essential for every Kazakh man to be an able horseman while every Kazakh woman was expected to handle tough manual labor without complaint. Kazakhstan is still a harsh place where great travelers embark on epic journeys. It is here that Russia’s space programs at the Baikanour Cosmodrome launch men and women to wander through the distant stars of night. Years of Russian influence may have corroded some widespread sense of a unique Kazakh culture, but families of herdsmen (chabany) still live in simple yurts (a circular, domed tent) and sing the epic poems of timeworn years as Kazakhs have for generations.35 While some rural Kazakhs still hunt or work as falconers, most Kazakhs today survive in drab urban conglomerates such as Almaty or Chimkent. Almaty, a city whose population is probably only a quarter ethnically Kazakh, spreads a dozen miles in all directions. Traditional society has been undermined by this process of urbanization. Tribal clans (hordes), which once were led by a ruler and migrated seasonally, have been replaced by work units and smaller nuclear families. The Sunni Islam practiced by most Kazakhs is distinct in its lack of assertive devotion, and the riders of the steppe are often considered “the least Islamicized of all the Central Asian Turks.”36 Thrower notes, “It was in fact the Russians who encouraged the Kazakhs to become Muslims, believing—mistakenly as it turned out—that if the Kazakhs were Islamicized they would be much easier to civilize and control.”37 Islam vies with a widespread appreciation for a host of traditional shamanistic practices, which closely parallel the beliefs of their Mongol ancestors, especially in the country’s rural areas where life is an ongoing struggle between local demons and gods in a foreboding spirit world. Very few Kazakhs speak a word of Arabic and even the words of the shahadah are often replaced by the Kazakh phrase: Al-hamdulillah musilmanmin (Praise God, I am a Muslim).38

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Kazakhs did not become predominantly Muslim until the nineteenth century, and this relatively recent embrace of the faith may account for Islam’s generally apolitical expression among Kazakhs. When Islam did reach Kazakhstan, it was spread by Sufi mystics. In fact, the present regime in Kazakhstan has pushed to turn the Sufi shrine of Ahmet Yesevi (founder of the Yesevi order) into a major tourist site. Other Central Asians criticize Kazakhs for their flexibility of belief and laxity of Islamic practice. Technically, however, the Muslims of the country are Hanafi School Sunni Muslims, and the Islamic seminaries and schools in the region support a conservative and traditional form of Islam. Central Asia’s strongest Christian communities are in Kazakhstan. Protestantism is growing at a rapid rate, with approximately 6,000 new Kazakh-speaking Pentecostal and Baptist Protestants resident within the country by 2005. Sometimes, to avoid trouble, young Kazakh Protestant converts choose to call themselves Followers of the Messiah instead of the term Christian. Other forms of Protestantism have been shrinking in the region. There were 960,000 German-speaking Lutherans in Kazakhstan in 1992 but emigration to Russia and Europe radically reduced that number to 350,000 by 1997.39 This decline has continued further since that time. Kazakhstan’s Roman Catholic community has experienced steady growth since the fall of the Soviet Union. The World Youth Day in Cologne, Germany, was visited by 270 Kazakh Catholic youth who danced in their national costumes and sang folk songs. Most young converts to Catholicism are native German speakers from the predominantly German and Catholic parish of St. Teresa in and around the city of Pavlodar.40 The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Kazakhstan even publishes a monthly journal for Catholics called Credo. Catholics first came to the region when Stalin forced their ancestors to flee from the Volga and the Ukraine. Many priests were also banished from their homes for their political views and found their way to Kazakhstan. When Pope John Paul II met with the Bishops of Central Asia he told them that “even though the Catholic Church here is only a little plant, she is full of hope because her trust is in the power of divine grace.”41 The Russian Orthodox Church remains the strongest Christian presence in Kazakhstan. The Orthodox Church confines its efforts mostly to Kazakhstan’s Russian- or Ukrainian-speaking population. Both the Kazakh government and the local Russian Orthodox Church have worked hard to protect a number of beautiful and ancient churches, including one church in Almaty held together without a single nail. The Russian Orthodox Church has done little recently in terms of proselytism among Muslim communities.42 Since their earliest encounters, Russian missionaries in the country have, according to their letters and diaries, communicated extremely

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negative views of the Kazakh people and their culture. Robert Geraci notes that the Orthodox mission among the Kazakh “was fairly short lived,”43 beginning in the early 1880s and ending at the time of the Russian revolution. Before the Russian Bible Society was shut down by Czar Alexander in 1824, it had also been active in translating the Bible into Kazakh. Translators chose to write the Kazakh language in a Cyrillic alphabet as a way to distinguish Christians from their Muslim neighbors.44 Kazakhstan has an uneven record on supporting human rights for religious communities. Laws mandating that religious organizations register with the government have been enacted (1997) along with other controls about the production and distribution of religious literature. Churches and other religious organizations have been fined or even closed if they refused to register with the government agencies that were overseeing this process. Because of their unwillingness to cooperate with this initiative on the grounds of conscience, Jehovah’s Witnesses claim in 2002 that they had experienced “waves of repression because of the perception that they are not supportive of the government.”45 Russian, North American, and European Protestant missionaries are presently active in Kazakhstan. Local Baptists have sponsored courses on missions and evangelism and have established printing presses for the publication of Kazakh evangelistic literature. German Baptists have also begun to identify and contact Kazakh immigrants living in Germany. American and European mission organizations have relied upon a number of methods to get their message out to the people of Kazakhstan. Some missionaries have established business education and cultural exchange programs sponsored by their organizations. Many summer outreach programs throughout the summer are geared around holding church camps or vacation Bible school programs. Twenty American southern Baptist missionaries are attempting to plant churches in remote rural areas. Many of these Protestant missionaries are not afraid to seek recruits among Russian Orthodox or Mennonite Christians who are still in the country. Other Protestants have focused more on social justice initiatives than evangelistic efforts. The United Methodist Board of Global Ministries has launched a medical mission for the rural poor in the country. Presbyterian missionaries have established a hospice ministry for terminally ill patients due to a strong commitment to what they call “servant ministry.” American Presbyterian missionaries have inaugurated a “Christian cultural center” in Almaty, complete with a choir and seminars on church music. They have also launched a network of 37 churches involved in what is known as the Christian Business Fellowship.46 Interfaith and intercultural issues are less of a concern in Kazakhstan than they are in Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. Other pressing problems are of far

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greater significance. As is true for all Central Asians, Kazakhs live in a period of tremendous social, economic, and political transition. Thousands of years of cultural values and cherished traditions are under attack. Urbanization has fostered a host of social problems, including crime, alcoholism, and an increased rate of divorce. Kazakhstan is beautiful but years of neglect in promoting healthy environmental policies have taxed the pristine nature of the country. The unique topography of Almaty, a city surrounded by mountains, along with spiraling pollution, have worked together to form something of a poison bowl of exhaust fumes. Problems of this nature, as well as political considerations, overpopulation, and its geographic location, are why the capital was moved to Akmola from Almaty in 1998 (with the process beginning in 1993).47 Radioactive and toxic chemical sites associated with the former industries related to the military are another problem. Industrial pollution is severe in terms of soil, air, and water pollution. Although Kazakhs pride themselves on being self-sufficient and independent, the problems that they face will be greatly eased when other nations provide vital assistance. New challenges demand new solutions, capital, and modern technology.48 Kazakhstan is searching for a cohesive national identity and the proper development of its vast potential. When a foreign missionary asked a Kazakh how he would reach the world beyond, the Kazakh replied, “On horseback!” Those who come from outside of Kazakhstan should be willing to listen and learn from their Kazakh friends over warm glasses of kumyss and perhaps while listening to ancient folk tunes strummed on a dombra. The future of Kazakhstan will probably be robed in Kazakh attire and not in Western or Arabic garb.

Tajikistan Tajikistan is a small country with artificially contrived borders, which never coincided with its ethnographic realities. Soviet authorities designed the country’s frontiers in order to erode the power of the historical intercultural balance that long existed between the region’s Persian and Turkic peoples. Tajikistan has large, fierce neighbors, including Afghanistan to the south and China to the east and it is just 20 miles away from Pakistan (separated by a narrow corridor of Afghanistan). From the mountains surrounding Dushanbe one can look into Afghanistan. This nation is the poorest and remotest of all the Central Asian nations but is rich with a legacy of poets, philosophers, and writers.49 The Tajiks consider themselves proud guardians of a heritage of wisdom and intellectual insight. The term Tajik was first used by Russians and others to generally refer to settled people and was also used as a synonym for Arab to describe the

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distinctive pastoralist nature of these people. Thrower conjectures that “their name is derived from the name of an Arab tribe, the ‘Taiy’, under whom they sought protection during the Arab invasion of the region in the 7th and 8th centuries.”50 Tajiks were also referred to as Sarts, and are of Persian ancestry with a language very similar to the Dari spoken in Iran. Seven million people live in the country while another five million Tajiks live outside the republic.51 The Tajik population has increased dramatically (45 percent) since national independence in 1992. This surging growth rate is one of the highest in Central Asia. The population of Tajikistan is increasingly young, with almost 40 percent of them under the age of 14 and less than 5 percent over the age of 65.52 The median age in the country is under 20 years.53 Geographically, Tajikistan is about as large as Greece or Scotland. About 90 percent of this nation is mountainous. More than half of the land is situated in the Pamir Mountains, at an altitude above 10,000 feet. Their elevation dwarfs North America’s Rocky Mountains or the Swiss Alps. Under the reign of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan was able to boast of having the tallest mountains in the entire country.54 This mountainous terrain and network of rushing rivers also make it susceptible to both earthquakes and extensive flash flooding. Tajikistan faces a host of issues relating to its mix of urban and rural communities. Most Tajiks live in countless small rural villages (67 percent of the population) spread out across its 143,000 square kilometers. These villages, along rivers or in the high mountain ranges, often consist of between 200 and 500 single family homes. Tajik villages (unlike Kazakh or Kyrgyz settlements) are inhabited by farmers who cultivate wheat and other crops such as melons, apricots, cherries, apples, grapes, plums, or figs. There are some sheepherders, but, similar to neighboring Uzbekistan, the soil and climate are ideal for growing cotton. Because of Tajikistan’s mountainous terrain, however, less than 6 percent of all of the land in the country is arable. Even by Central Asian standards, Tajiks are extremely poor. More than 60 percent of the population lives in abject poverty. Many residents of Tajikistan have no alternative but to rely on international food aid. Increased international economic assistance has begun to flow into Tajikistan because organizations have become more aware of problems while responding to the problems of neighboring Afghanistan during three decades of civil war and strife. Tajikistan is seeking membership in the World Trade Organization, while at the same time trying to effect needed structural reforms and restructure its huge foreign debt. Some of the recent economic growth has been because of high commodity prices but there has been some progress. The international community has also begun to address the extensive environmental challenges brought on by inadequate sanitation facilities, excessive use of pesticides, and industrial pollution, which has ruined soil and water in much of the otherwise pristine country.

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Religiously the Tajiks, in spite of their many cultural and linguistic links with Persian culture, are predominantly Sunni (85 percent) with only about 5 percent of the population being Shi’ite Muslims. Given the cultural links, however, Iran has tried to promote strong ties between the two countries since its independence and hopes that the Islamic Republic of Tajikistan will increasingly look to Iran for guidance and support. Tajikistan’s hard-won peace is at risk. President Emomali Rakhmonov’s People’s Democratic Party holds an absolute majority in the country with only two genuine opposition representatives in government—both from the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT). Any appearance of political pluralism is only window-dressing. Rakhmonov’s inner circle is increasingly dominated by close allies and friends from his home region. This corruption added to the power of the warlords make the situation quite precarious. In certain regions of the country local warlords hold sway. The United Tajik Opposition and the Popular Front of Tajikistan, for example, control large regions of the eastern Rasht Valley and in the Pamir Mountains. Tajikistan’s neighbors are watching the fragility of Tajikistan’s political situation with great interest. Since 1992, Iran has provided economic and humanitarian assistance to Tajikistan. They have also sought to develop stronger political and cultural connections. Iranian money has been visible in helping to build mosques and provide religious education for meritorious students in the country. In economic terms, however, Iran’s relationship with Tajikistan is far less substantial (annually only about 8 percent of Tajikistan’s export business is with Iran). Christianity came to the Tajik people early with the presence of Nestorian Christian missionaries in their midst as early as the fifth century. Today, only a scattered handful of Christian communities remain in the country because many Tajik Christians have left the country to go to Europe or Russia. I saw this transition firsthand. Two years before my visit to the Dushanbe Baptist Church the pastor related that there had been over 800 members in attendance but fears about an increasingly Islamic context had dwindled that number down to only about 200 congregants.55 It is ironic that, while these Christians endured decades of Soviet persecution without wavering, these most recent fears had brought about such a dramatic demographic shift. One reason why there are fewer Christians in Tajikistan springs from the fact that it was one of the least Russified of the Central Asian republics. Russian rule did not arrive in the region until the 1860s, and the country was not fully incorporated into the Soviet Union until 1925. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the number of citizens of Tajikistan who spoke Russian probably numbered at only about 1 percent of the population. Those Russian and German Christian churches that do exist are primarily either in

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the capital city of Dushanbe or along the border. Ethnocentric attitudes from both Tajik Muslims and these Russian and German Christians have meant that interaction has been kept to a minimum. Protestants from North America and Europe have been active in Tajikistan. Missionaries from Operation Mobilization, Youth with a Mission, Campus Crusade for Christ, and other Protestant groups have been active in a number of ways, including creating radio programming in the Tajik language, showing the “Jesus Film,” and doing dramatic and musical programs. Christian service organizations have relied on the promotion of medical, agricultural, and technical skills. Some mission organizations have distributed Christian evangelistic materials in the Tajik language. Bible translation was also carried out with the first translation of a Tajik New Testament being completed in 1983. Christian human rights monitoring organizations such as Open Doors International and The Voice of the Martyrs have cited Tajikistan’s government for being repressive to members of the country’s fledgling Christian minority. One pressure exerted on Christians is requiring that local church communities register with the government and then putting roadblocks, assigning fines, or even refusing to accept an application for registration altogether. One pastor of an evangelical Christian church in northern Tajikistan complained that local authorities have refused to allow her congregation to meet in her home.56 A number of Christian social service organizations are active in Tajikistan. One organization, Christian Aid, has been working there since 1997 and sponsors at least 15 different partnership programs to assist vulnerable women and children. One of their major projects is the Ghamkhori’s Women’s Center in southern Tajikistan, which provides medical, psychological, legal, and financial support for poor women in need. Another initiative, Zan Va Zamin (“Women and Land”), monitors the country’s land reform process and assists women farmers in meeting their needs. Christian Aid also launched a partnership program between an organization in Kosovo (the former Yugoslavia) called the Center for the Protection of Women in Kosovo and an organization in Tajikistan that was trying to establish a number of microcredit economic initiatives in order to benefit primarily rural and impoverished women in need.57 Tajikistan’s political situation is complicated by the might of China and Russia and the volatility of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Relations with China and Uzbekistan have been particularly tense. In 2003, Tajikistan and China finally reached an agreement over their contested border, but at the time of this writing, these lines of demarcation were still not finalized. Tajikistan’s borders with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan continue to be disputed and the Uzbekistan government has laid down an extensive series of

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minefields between the two countries, causing significant animosity. Another problem that Tajikistan has with its neighbors is that drugs are being transported across Tajikistan from Afghanistan en route to Russia and Europe, resulting both in an increase in organized crime and social problems related with widespread drug use. Religion and politics have had an uneasy relationship in Tajikistan since the fall of the Soviet Union. Religion is an especially potent force in the country because the Tajiks are perhaps the most conservative and devout Muslims in the entire region, potentially making it ripe for those who preach a message of Islamist political assertiveness. Shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, the fledgling government in Dushanbe was temporarily overthrown (in May 1992) by a cabal of militant Islamist clerics and politicians who sought to establish a government favorable to Afghanistan’s president at the time, Sheikh Massaud. The first five years of the new republic saw a bitter civil war, but there have been no major flare-ups from this time or security incidents in recent years. The Tajik civil war, however, continues to have a lingering effect because problems set in motion at that time severely damaged the economic infrastructure and disrupted agricultural production. Since 1994, Emomali Rahmonov (of the dominating Political Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the PDPT) has been the chief of state based in Dushanbe while holding a number of different titles.58 Tajikistan held another election for president in 2006. One issue that was prominent in that election was the way that the country relates to its neighbors. Some are calling for Tajikistan to join the NATO Partnership for Peace program, which offers significant economic benefits as well as stronger links with the West while others are calling for closer ties with various Islamic nations. While the situation seems to become more stable as time goes on, the social and political future of Tajikistan is anything but certain.

Kyrgyzstan The Kyrgyz Republic is a beautiful country that has been described as an Asian Patagonia because of its enormous glaciers and lofty mountains. It is about as large as Syria and Lebanon combined and has a population of almost five million people, most of whom are pastoralists.59 Kyrgyzstan (sometimes also known as Kyrgyzia) has for centuries been a strategic land for a host of competing political powers seeking hegemony in Central Asia. Whenever possible, the Kyrgyz tried to avoid these conflicts by retreating into the mountainous refuges of the Tien Shan. Without access to the fertile farmlands of the valleys (controlled by invaders), the Kyrgyz became nomadic shepherds who lived in the harsh mountains, developing, over the

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centuries, a collective memory that is rooted in a strong “fortress mentality” for self-preservation. In rural valleys, far from the din of a more urbanized Bishkek (also known as Frunze, the capital city), most Kyrgyz make their own homes.60 The term Kyrgyz first appears in Muslim sources dating from the tenth century and is used in reference to a tribal group that conquered southern Kazakhstan.61 Earliest historical records sometimes fail to make a distinction between the Kyrgyz and the Kazakhs.62 This might have been the case when the term was used by Chinese warriors in the seventh and eighth centuries when they staged raids in the fertile farmlands of modern-day Uzbekistan. This Chinese incursion was decisively turned back by a Muslim army at the battle of Talas (751 CE). An army of Uighur Western Chinese attempted another incursion into the area but they were defeated by local warriors in 840 CE. This cemented the rule of the Kyrgyz in all of the lands between the Yenisei and Orkhon Rivers. During the era of Mongol rule, Islam was greatly weakened and the people of modern-day Kyrgyzstan had no choice but to submit to the authority of their Mongol conquerors. This led to many of the local people coming to embrace many of the cultural and shamanistic religious practices of the invading Mongols. Of course, the Kyrgyz also shared many common cultural characteristics with the Mongols such as a strongly patriarchal family structure and the practice of nomadic, seasonal migrations for the maintenance of their animals. Some Kyrgyz even use the Mongol practice of hunting for gazelles using eagles.63 Like the Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz were some of the last Central Asians to convert to Islam (around the middle of the seventeenth century).64 Russia began to annex the region in 1864 and by 1876 had gained complete control. The Russian presence, however, did not drastically affect the nomadic traditions of the local population. In 1916, the last year Russia was active in the First World War, the Czar imposed a forced migration (mfecane) on the Kyrgyz. This event has come to be known as the flight (urkun), in which deported, “punished people”65 were forced to leave their homes and settle in the worst of conditions. Further dramatic social changes took place with the rise of the Soviet Union. Shortly after Stalin came to power, the dictator launched a series of iron-handed policies that were intended to de-nomadize and collectivize the Kyrgyz. The results were disastrous. Famine was so widespread that local inhabitants slaughtered their livestock in order to survive. In addition, a relative degree of local cultural hegemony was thrown into disarray by Stalin’s aggressive course of action. He imported unwanted criminals from Russia (both to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) and, during the Second World War, brought truckloads of German settlers into the territory because they were perceived to be a

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possible threat to the Soviet war effort. Many of these displaced Germans chose to remain and settled in Bishkek at the conclusion of the war. Beginning in 1990, President Askar Akayev (a former academician) took control of the government of Kyrgyzstan. Akayev, however, was forced to flee after widespread protests in March 2005. He was replaced by the former Prime Minister Krumanbek Bakiyev in an election held in June of that year. While anxieties continued to mount, Akayev tried to form a national congress (or kurultay) in January 2004, as an attempt to unite the nation’s various ethnic groups. This move was seen as threatening to those who wanted to maintain the benefits of a fractured social status quo. Kyrgyzstan seems to lurch from crisis to crisis. There has been worsening political violence, prison revolts, a rise in crime, and a host of economic problems that have led to labor strikes.66 In addition to internal struggles, the country faces deep intercultural problems because of the wide range of differing cultures that live within its borders. Intercultural tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities are particularly acute. There are also problems between Muslims both Kyrgyz and Uzbek and those ethnic Germans and Russians who have chosen to stay in the country. Akayev was criticized by both his nationalist and Islamist political opponents for being too lenient and responsive to the requests of these local German and Russian communities whom these militant forces were hoping would eventually respond to the pressure that they were imposing on them to leave the country altogether. This argument was instrumental in Akayev’s eventual ouster from power. The goal of the nationalists who eventually gained control was a more homogenous national population.67 These criticisms belie a long history of conflict that ethnic Kyrgyz have had with non-Kyrgyz neighbors in their midst. This attitude explains why at the outset of the new Kyrgyz Republic a huge exodus of emigrants fled the country and, in the process, brought major dislocation to the medical and industrial sectors of the national economy.68 Social tensions, however, were only one of the significant factors that contributed to Akayev’s ouster. Another important reason was Kyrgyzstan’s deepening economic problems. Rural youth, unable to find meaningful employment, often led the social criticisms of the government. Poverty remains rampant even though Kyrgyzstan has been active in trying to affect a broad range of market and land reforms. Land reforms, in particular, have been chaotic and many of the farms designated for redistribution were eventually occupied by squatters.69 Bakiyev, Akayev’s successor, promised to expand democratic government and to increase the privatization of unproductive state-owned businesses. Bakiyev also sought to draw attention to interethnic hostilities as well as the fact that Kyrgyzstan in the past has been a staging ground for rebel terrorists seeking independence for Xinjiang

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(in China). Today, the support of Bakiyev’s authoritarianism is relatively shallow among the population. There is a pronounced risk the Kyrgyz government will loose control of the country and it will fall into a state of permanent low-level violence, criminality, poverty, and corruption unless dramatic political changes are made to address these lingering problems. Kyrgyzstan is of strategic geographic importance because of its location between Russia and China and also because of its abundant raw materials. In addition to China to the east, Kyrgyzstan borders Uzbekistan to the west, Kazakhstan to the north, and Tajikistan to the south. Over 85 percent of its area (76,000 square miles; about the size of Syria) is over 5,000 feet above sea level. Except for the temperate northern foothill zone and the subtropical Fergana Valley of the southwest, much of Kyrgyzstan is perpetually covered in frigid conditions. In terms of natural resources, the country’s rivers are a tremendous source of hydroelectric power and its hills are rich with minerals.70 High mountain valleys are thick with dense forests of Tien Shan white spruce. Even though Kyrgyzstan is a pristine nation of glacial peaks and high-altitude lakes, it has not escaped the environmental problems that have plagued other Central Asian nations. Many Kyrgyz have no alternative but to secure their drinking water from contaminated streams and wells, and waterborne diseases are widespread. Like their forefathers, the ethnically proud Kyrgyz share a passionate devotion for a life of independence and nomadic freedom. The traditions of the migratory Kyrgyz culture have emphasized an aversion for imposed authoritative social structures. Each man ruled his own domain and referred to himself and other men as the kaisak or the “brave ones.” For centuries, men have worn the khalpak, a turban of white felt, the elechek, turban for the married man, or the tebbetey, the fur-trimmed hat, while working the steppe as roaming shepherds. Many values and customs have remained unchanged in this part of the world. A man can still be put to death in the countryside by his neighbors, for example, if he is caught being deceptive in business or in stealing animals.71 Epic poetry and other forms of folk stories are deeply esteemed in Kyrgyz culture. Traditionally, the Kyrgyz loved to recite elaborate epics that have been passed on by oral tradition from one generation to another. Probably the proudest achievement of Kyrgyz civilization is a 250,000 line epic, the Manas. This national heritage treasure was composed and sung entirely in an oral form passed on throughout the centuries.72 Recently, artists such as the short-story writer Chingiz Ayitmatov and the poet Aly Tokombaev have carried on this laudable tradition in literature and have won an international audience for their books. The Kyrgyz speak a Turkic language that is almost identical to Kazakh.73 This correlation has led some to conclude mistakenly that the Kyrgyz are

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basically Kazakhs. There are over 5.1 million Kyrgyz, with 3.3 million of these in Kyrgyzstan. The remaining number of Kyrgyz in the world live mostly in either China or Kazakhstan. The population is young, with over 30 percent under 14 years of age; the median age is 23.6 years.74 The origin of the term Kyrgyz is uncertain. It might come from the stems of two Turkish words, gigh and giz, which mean “forty maidens,” which would have been a description of their ancestors. In the Visyur language, Kyrgyz means “a tencolored face.” Russian anthropologists conjectured that the Kyrgyz came from people of the Upper Yensei River in the Siberian steppe. Religion has been an influential factor in the world of the Kyrgyz. Long before Islam, shamanism, with clear traces to Siberian animist practices, flourished in the area. These shamanistic rituals provided ceremonies for contacting demonic powers or departed ancestors who might be able to assist people in their present circumstances or in the afterlife.75 Adherents of shamanism lived in a world brimming with supernatural powers and departed souls and found in these beliefs, along with their Islam, ways to help them grapple with their stressful daily lives. Islam did not take deep root among the Kyrgyz people until the eighteenth century. This may explain why the Islam of Kyrgyzstan seems less of a cultural factor in the country than in any other of the Central Asian republics (possibly excepting Kazakhstan). Contributing to this was the fact that decades of antireligious Soviet propaganda flooded the Kyrgyz educational system during the era of Soviet rule. Local Soviet village leaders were mandated to establish “special anti-religious motor clubs which held theatres, operas, and ballets.”76 The political rationale for these Soviet efforts was to create a secure secular buffer zone between the rebel-prone Muslims of Xinjiang, China, and the rest of the Muslim populations of Soviet Central Asia. Today, most Kyrgyz would claim that Islam is the lens through which they understand the world, and one can clearly see a revival of Islamic practice and belief since the fall of the Soviet Union. Islamic life-cycle rituals such as child circumcision and wedding and funeral rites are, once again, widespread among the Kyrgyz.77 New masjids are being constructed, and the Qur’an is becoming widely available for the first time in a Kyrgyz translation. Young people are attending the masjids in record numbers. Islamic education has grown in order to guard against the “Kyrgyz people only keeping the traditions of Islam without understanding the truths of the faith.”78 Traces of the Islamist militant political organization, the Hizb-utTahrir, have also surfaced, but Islamist fundamentalist ideas seem to be less of a threat to Kyrgyzstan than these movements are in other Central Asian countries. Christianity has a long history among the Kyrgyz, with the Nestorians being the first Christians that the Kyrgyz encountered. A gravestone near

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Bishkek with Nestorian markings dates to the seventh century. Christians flooded into the region again during Stalin’s rule and in the Second World War when the tyrant exiled thousands of poor Russians, and later Germans. Many of these Russians were Orthodox, Ukrainians were Catholic, and Germans were Lutherans but among their number were also a host of smaller groups such as Baptists, Pentecostals, and Mennonites. Many of these transplanted Germans and Russians became uneasy about living in Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union because they feared that they would be forced to become Muslims or would be treated with discrimination by their Muslim neighbors. These fears resulted in a large number of Russian, Ukrainian, and German Christians emigrating to Russia and the West. Those who remained (in 2006 about 123,500 or 2.4 percent of the population) have not experienced any major difficulties with their neighbors. Kyrgyzstan’s law on religion contains no provisions that are aimed at discriminating against any particular religious group. Christians in Kyrgyzstan are not required to register their churches with the government and few have complained about any significant problems. One exception was the Pentecostal Church of Jesus Christ, which was threatened with closure and a substantial fine in 2004. This church claims around 10,000 members and is the best-attended Protestant church in Kyrgyzstan.79 The church has 30 satellite churches, only 10 of which are presently registered with the government. Concerns have been raised by the government about their proselytization efforts and some of their political activities. Other than the Church of Jesus Christ, only members of various Jehovah’s Witness Kingdom Halls have faced significant difficulties in the country. The Catholic Church is relatively strong in Kyrgyzstan, with a national cathedral in Bishkek and about 40 small parishes scattered throughout the country. Protestant missionaries have come to Kyrgyzstan from Europe and North America, trying to encourage local Russian and German Christians to resist the temptation to leave as well as assisting them in their church growth and pastoral care efforts. One example of a partnership between local Baptists and a mission organization is the work of the “Ray of Hope Mission.” The Ray of Hope, based in Bishkek, has established mission efforts in other locations, including one only 35 miles from the Chinese border in the village of Marion. This outreach began in 1978 in the living room of a Baptist pastor who was involved in relief aid after a major earthquake struck Kyrgyzstan. Other Protestant missionaries have printed the Bible in the Kyrgyz language and have developed radio programs that are distributed as cassette tapes by missionaries in their evangelization efforts to Muslims. Russian Orthodox Christians continue to build new churches and Protestant missionaries remain active. Interfaith issues are becoming particularly visible in Kyrgyzstan because the nation is becoming increasingly

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culturally stratified. The southern half of the country is more strongly Islamic while the Christians in the north are gaining increasing political and economic control. This trend has gained the attention of Islamic political movements, who are clamoring for a greater degree of Islamization.

Turkmenistan Turkmenistan has been labeled as one of Central Asia’s most socially backward nations and accused of being “more of a tribal confederation than a modern nation.”80 The nation (about twice the size of the United Kingdom) has a devoted core of Islamic believers. Turkmen are “the most homogenous of all Turkic people living in Central Asia.”81 They are sometimes referred to as the “Kuwaitis” of Central Asia because of their industrious work ethic as entrepreneurs and for their work in the construction industry in a number of nations such as Iran and Pakistan. You can also find Turkmen in Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia working as rug makers and carpet salesmen. Turkmen today find themselves at a social and political crossroads with the elders of their community (yashuli) being called upon to make key decisions about how to respond to a host of political and economic factors in a changing world. In one significant decision that will affect the future, the government of Turkmenistan looked to neighboring Turkey, and away from Russia, when it decided to change its alphabet from the Cyrillic to the Latin script. The Turkmen are historically descendants of the Oghuz tribal nomads of Mongolia.82 These nomads began arriving in the region and displacing Persian-speaking residents as early as the fifth and sixth centuries CE but the greatest influx of these people came in the tenth century. These Mongols gradually began to be known as Turkmen and converted in large numbers to the Sunni Islamic faith. Safavid Persians held political power over the southernmost portion of the region from the fifteenth century until they were decisively routed by the Emir of Bukhara, Ma’sum, in the eighteenth century. Turkmenistan was incorporated into the expanding Russian empire with Russia’s victory in 1881 at the battle of Gok Tepe. The country officially became a Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924 and Soviet rule lasted until the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Although the entire region (with the possible exception of Kyrgyzstan) has been slow to embrace democratic political values, Turkmenistan has been the slowest. At least other nations have often sought to add a little democratic “window-dressing,” such as allowing weak opposition groups to participate as registered parties in political campaigns. This has not been the case in Turkmenistan, which has shown no regard for ideals such as the freedom of expression or a free press and has been unapologetically oppressive.83

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In 2007, Turkmenistan saw President Gurbanguly Berdymukhhammedov come to power after the long rule of Saparmurat Niyazov who died in that same year. The firm political apparatus that Niyazov built, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, retains absolute control over the government (modeled after a tribal assembly or shura) and has no tolerance for any political dissent.84 It is true that, after coming to power, President Berdymukhammedov pardoned a number of religious and political prisoners (including the former chief Mufti Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah) and this has given observers some cause for hope. It remains the case, however, that formal opposition parties are outlawed. This does not mean, however, that fragile and tiny underground groups do not exist but most of these operate as political organizations in exile. Any voice raised in opposition is attacked as treasonous against the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan. During Niyazov’s 15-year totalitarian rule there were no elections. Freedom of speech or religious freedoms were denied. Like Karimov in Uzbekistan (and following the pattern of Stalin), Niyazov promoted a cult of personality rooted in traditional nomenclature and relying on cultural symbols and legends to reinforce his mystique. Niyazov tried to root state authority in cultural terms instead of relying on the role of Islam to bolster his authority. Turkmenistan borders the Caspian Sea between Iran and Kazakhstan and is located on the same latitudinal lines as the Mediterranean Sea. It shares borders with both Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The country is slightly larger than the state of California. The baking-hot Garagum (Kara-Kum) desert makes up over 80 percent of the country’s landmass with mountains to the south and to the west. The Garagum is central to Turkmen life, with storytellers “crouched around fires to ward off the chill of desert nights”85 retelling the legend of how God created Turkmenistan. Turkmen say that God loved Turkmenistan so much that he blessed it with more sunshine than any other place on the earth and that is why it is so arid and why so much of the country became a desert. While God left the Turkmen with a dry country, the fierce Turkmen applied their tenacity to this reality by building a 900-mile canal to Ashkhabad (Ashgabat), the nation’s capital. Turkmenistan has a sparse population, just over five million people.86 There are perhaps another two million Turkmen throughout the world, including some who live in Afghanistan and Iran. Most of the Turkmen who live in Turkmenistan (55–70 percent) reside in rural areas and are involved in intensive agriculture centered in small irrigated oases. One half of all irrigated land is planted with cotton, but poor harvests have led to a dramatic decline in cotton production. The authoritarian regime has taken a cautious approach to economic and market-oriented reforms and has tried to install some state-controlled capitalist programs that have led to an increasing gap

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between the rich and the poor. Turkmenistan has relied on natural gas, crude oil, and cotton sales to sustain its inefficient economy. Poverty is widespread, and Turkmenistan is burdened with a huge amount of foreign debt. One of the legacies of this poverty is that Turkmenistan is a major transit center for Afghan narcotics bound for Russia and Europe and is a transit point for heroin precursor chemicals bound for Afghanistan. Another challenge Turkmenistan faces is a host of environmental problems related to the contamination of the soil and the groundwater due to decades of the overuse of agricultural chemicals and pesticides. Increasing desertification has resulted in increased political bickering with neighboring Uzbekistan over questions about how to share the resources of the Amu Darya River and, with Azerbaijan, the Aral Sea. With only about 10 percent of inhabitants speaking either Uzbek or Russian, the vast majority of citizens speak Turkmen. Sunni Islam is the predominant religion in Turkmenistan (79 percent), but included within this umbrella are a number of people who participate in folk Islamic practices and Sufi orders by visiting various shrines to holy Sufi mystics. These centers of Sufi devotion are some of the most frequented religious sites in all of Central Asia. Sufism and folk Islam mix amulets, magic, and curses with the purity of normative Sunni Islam. Here as elsewhere, religion, national politics, and ethnic self-concepts, all merge into a jumbled Islamic worldview that continues to change and adapt. Christianity first came to the Turkmen with the efforts of Nestorian missionaries. Since their arrival very few organized mission efforts focused on Turkmenistan. Ethnic Russians, about 10 percent of the population, attend Russian Orthodox services. In 2005, the country had only a handful of Protestant churches with only a few hundred members remaining in each congregation. Protestant missionaries have turned to radio programming and literature publication in the promotion of their faith. Some missionaries have come to Turkmenistan either working in business or as foreign language teachers as a way to secure their residence visas. This is also done to appear less threatening to Turkmen citizens who might not otherwise understand why a European or North American would chose to live in their country. There are also missionaries working on the translation of the Bible into Turkmen because, as of yet, an updated and completed Bible in the Turkmen language does not exist. Christians in Turkmenistan of all denominations have faced a host of problems since the fall of the Soviet Union. It may have the harshest religious policy in Central Asia today. All religious organizations have to be registered with the government, but only the applications of Muslims and Russian Orthodox churches have been granted. This situation obligates Protestant churches to operate illegally and face closure, as was the case at

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the Turkmenabad Baptist Church. The Ashkhabad Baptist Church, which had registered under the former Soviet Union, lost its legal status in 1997.87 One Baptist pastor was arrested by government authorities and held in prison for four years because he was viewed to be a threat to the national security of the country. Members of other churches have been threatened with imprisonment and the closure of their worship facilities. The only Seventh-Day Adventist church in Ashkhabad was destroyed in November 1999, reportedly at the direct order of then President Niyazov.88 Believers from the Jehovah’s Witnesses have also undergone tremendous persecution in the country. Members of this group have been forcibly evicted from their homes, harassed, arrested, and imprisoned. Islamic masjids not seen as being favorable to the government have also been demolished.89 Human rights observers continually note that hostile policies of the government aggressively attack Christian communities within the country.

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A history of triumphs and disasters

Whose game was empires And whose stakes were thrones Whose table earth and whose dice were human bones Lord Byron in “The Age of Bronze”

Central Asian history is replete with accounts of cruel invasions, dramatic catastrophes, and the rising and falling of legions of empires, such as those of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and Tamurlane. Countless warriors, merchants, and missionaries have claimed the region as their own in endless waves of bloody conquest. Vast armies of Sogdians, Turks, Arabs, Persians, Uzbeks, Mongols, Uighurs, Chinese, Tibetans, Tatars, Russians, and many others have left traces of their religious and cultural values on Central Asia. At times, the exotic accounts of Central Asian history seem more appropriate as stories to be read beside a glowing fire in an Uzbek or Kazakh yurt or while sitting at a teahouse (chaykhana) in Bukhara surrounded by mulberry trees or while resting in the middle of the Jayma bazaar in Osh leisurely savoring a steaming cup of tea. British and North American historical narratives of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries often parade, one after another, a circus menagerie of blurred generalizations and bold assertions. In the final analysis, it may not be possible today to know much of what actually transpired in the past because much of Central Asia’s history remains clouded in uncertainty. Central Asia, however, has always been a contested prize sought by strong neighbors and ruthless enemies. From King Xerxes,1 the master of Persia five centuries before Christ, to the Russian Czars beginning with General Chernayayev’s soldiers and through the Soviet rule of Lenin and Stalin, a parade of powerful despots has conquered the caravan cities along the Great Silk Road. Some Orthodox Central Asian Christians claim the Genesis narratives of the four rivers that make up the boundaries of the Garden of Eden were

A history of triumphs and disasters 39 tributaries that flowed through Central Asia. Civilizations have risen and fallen along the banks of the Oxus River (now known as the Amu Darya) for more than 5,000 years of documented history. This river descends from the Tien Shan and Pamir Mountains and plays a similar sustaining role in Central Asia that the Nile plays in the scenes of Egyptian history. Archeologists observe evidence of particularly advanced communities existing along the Oxus River at about the same time as the Babylonian empire of Nebuchadnezzar (605–562 BCE). These recent findings are reorienting the ways that contemporary historians are coming to understand the region’s development. Archeological excavations in the Amu Valley in southern Uzbekistan reveal extensive cultural links between Central Asians and the people of India in earliest times. The name for this area in Indian literature was Jambudvipa (Sanskrit for “Rose Apple Island”)2 and was one of the seven concentric islands in their world geographical configuration, with one of the primary waterways in the region (the Oxus) being known in ancient Vedic cartography as the Vamskhu River.3 Some archeologists have argued that burial sites uncovered in Dashly (in northern Afghanistan) and elsewhere point to Indian influences.4 Probably the greatest Indian contributions in Central Asia’s development came from merchants who have long traversed the area en route to larger market towns.5 Around 300 BCE, the battalions of Alexander the Great entered the land the Greeks called Bactria or Sogdiana. The crown jewel city of this area was Samarkand (known by the ancient Greeks as Marakanda, capital of Sogdiana).6 Alexander the Great marched his massive force into Persia and finally conquered Marakanda shortly before his ignominious death in 323 BCE. It is claimed that upon his arrival in the city of Markanda, Alexander declared that it far exceeded the praise that he had heard about the city and proclaimed that it was a crown in his empire—beautiful beyond imagination. Although Alexander established martial law, the encroaching presence of Chinese merchants led to increasing attention from Chinese politicians. Chinese historical and literary sources describing the region also may add to the ways that contemporary scholars look at the role of China in Central Asia. Chinese military representatives came to Central Asia in search of the famed warhorses sired in the Fergana Valley. About 126 BCE, the Chinese soldier-chieftain Zhang Qian traveled to the “western lands” in search of these horses.7 They were prized for their ability to give an army a tactical advantage because of their toughness and endurance in the midst of battle.8 Zhang’s intelligence mission for the Han Emperor lasted for at least 13 years and led him all the way to India. Military commanders were followed by religious authorities. During the Kushan Dynasty (105–250 CE), Buddhism was introduced for the first time into Central Asia although some argue that Buddhist missionaries may have

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been in the area during the reign of Emperor Ashoka, India’s Maurya dynasty (268–239 BCE).9 For a time, around the middle of the second century CE, Buddhism even briefly gained the status of being the official religion in those parts of Central Asia under Chinese control. There is ample archeological evidence to support the idea that Buddhist shrines were built throughout western Central Asia during the Kushan dynasty with Kushan-era coins bearing images of a variety of deities (Iranian, Indic, and Buddhist), which seems to imply a tolerant attitude toward all religions. Foltz states that a third century Chinese Buddhist source claims that the Kushan lands were one of the main centers for the entire Buddhist world at that time.10 Buddhist monks and missionaries from China also often traveled through Central Asia on their way to pilgrimage and training sites in India. Buddhism took hold among Sogdians living in Bactria (in what is now Afghanistan) and spread from this base into Central Asia along trade routes since Sogdian was the primary language spoken throughout much of the Silk Road for centuries.11 Chinese influence was never thorough and this fact eventually resulted in an increase of Persian military and political activity. Persians (Sassanids) eventually entered Central Asia with little opposition. Because Buddhism was considered a polytheistic religion (and Buddhists were considered to be idol worshippers) by Muslims when they arrived in Central Asia, they were persecuted to such a degree that most Sogdian-speaking Buddhists became Muslims.12 Persia was home to many new religious movements that came to Central Asia especially Zoroastrianism and a philosophy called Manichaeism. The Prophet Mani was born in 216 CE and was raised as an ascetic who studied both Christian and Jewish ideas. He taught that dualism characterized the world and that all souls would transmigrate from one form to another. Zealous missionaries wearing white robes, eating a vegetarian diet, and preaching abstinence were effective in their work by adapting the Manichean message to the local gods and beliefs of the various Persians and Central Asians they encountered. A place was found for Buddha, Zoroaster, Ahriman, Ormazd, and especially Jesus, in the list of Manichean prophets with Mani being seen as the final prophet. Manichean teachers were also respected for their skills in teaching the physical sciences, particularly astronomy. Manichaeism thrived from the third through the ninth centuries throughout the religious “melting pot” of Western Asia and was seen as a threat to the other religions that first encountered its message.13 Today, it is a religion that is sometimes described as Gnosticism. It has long had many critics and, indeed, were it not for the scorn of its enemies (such as St. Augustine—a former Manichean) little would be known about Manichaeism.14 It has not been until very recently that European archeologists have unearthed actual writings written by Manicheans in Central Asia, Xinjiang, and even Egypt.15

A history of triumphs and disasters 41 Zoroastrianism also became a powerful cultural force in Central Asia. This religion, founded by Zoroaster (or Zardusht, Zarathustra, or Zardust), in the sixth century BCE, centers around a collection of sacred hymns called the Avesta (first written in an old Iranian dialect that is close to Vedic Sanskrit), which opposes worshipping leaders of tribes and calls for an awareness of the polar realities of good and evil. Zoroaster was one of the world’s first monotheists (along with his contemporary Moses) and preached that the world was filled with both good and evil.16 It is not certain exactly when or where the prophet was born. Masani suggests that a probable date is the seventh century BCE while others have dated his birth from between 1200 and 600 BCE.17 His birthplace is also blurred by the “dark regions of myth and history” and has been variously located as being “placed as far west as Azerbaijan and as far east as Mongolia.”18 Even the meaning and origin of the name Zarathustra is uncertain since the prophet’s ancestral name was Spitama (named after the warring clan in Iran from which he hailed).19 Central Asia plays an important role in the ancient writings of Zoroastrianism. One of the heroes of the Avesta is from a city near Samarkand called Afrosiab. Another important Zoroastrian site in Central Asia is in Bukhara. Zoroastrians revere a Persian hero named Siyavush (fifteenth century CE) who traveled to Bukhara where he led a fire-ordeal ritual on a hillside now considered holy by Zoroastrians. According to their sacred texts, the prince passed through a wall of fire after being falsely accused of seducing his own stepmother. The oldest building in Bukhara is the Arg (or Ark) fortress, which dates to the supposed time of this legendary saint who initiated these practices and, according to legend, was buried inside the eastern gate of the fortress. Near modern-day Tashkent there was also a center for Zoroastrian worship at a temple called Chilazar Ak-Tepa. Commerce grew along with an influx of Turkic people who continued eastward in a steady stream. They brought with them a bevy of gods and religious practices and the area was anything but religiously homogeneous. Some followed a wine-cult and others followed a moon-cult that taught that all of creation sprung from the moon called gao chithra (which literally means “having bull semen”).20 Turkic immigrants often worshipped the skygod Tangri who was a “male-principle” who was balanced by the femaleearth. The Turks left not only a religious legacy but also a significant linguistic heritage that had a lingering effect on the formation of Altaic cultures. This heritage was expressed in the various Turkic languages as well as in the willingness to blend their own unique shamanistic religious practices with native mysticism, Persian Zoroastrianism, and later, with Islam. One of the most renowned military champions of Central Asia was the fierce Attila the Hun, who was born in 406 CE. Attila was the last and most feral of the Huns who built an empire that stretched from the Baltic Sea to

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the Danube River and from Central Europe to the Black Sea. Attila the Hun was able to march as far as Orleans in France and, because of this accomplishment, gained eternal disdain in the imagination of European historians. Attila was a tyrannical general who led a series of lethal military campaigns which were infamous for leaving pyramids of skulls and mountains of corpses outside of ransacked cities later burned to the ground. From the time of his death in 453 CE until the advent of Islam, Central Asia saw armies of Chinese, Persians, and Mongolians pass through seeking to gain control of needed agricultural wealth. There was even a brief period of time (from about 655–692 CE) that a Tibetan empire gained control over Silk Road oasis towns in the Tarim Basin. Central Asia has long promoted an Islamic culture and has a long Islamic heritage. The imploring declaration “God is very great!” has echoed for over 12 centuries through the faithful hearts of Central Asia’s Muslims. Islamic armies came to Central Asia (then known as Khurasan) shortly after the revelation of the Qur’an and the life of Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century CE.21 In 651, Arab warriors captured the city of Merv (known as the modern-day city of Mary in Turkmenistan) after defeating and absorbing the entire Sasanian empire (in the 640s). Of course, since Muslims do not believe Islam began with the Prophet Muhammad but with Adam at the beginning of time, one famous Muslim document written in a Turkish dialect known as the Fir-daws ul-Iqbal (The Paradise of Fame) boldly asserts that Central Asia has been Islamic since the time of creation.22 Central Asia’s Muslim communities and personalities are some of the most important in all of Islamic history. During the “Golden (or Classical) Age” of Islamic civilization a number of great intellectuals were of Central Asian origin. The role of Hadith literature in worldwide Islam, for example, cannot be overstated and two of the most authoritative of the six compilations of Hadith were compiled by Muslims who had originally come from Central Asia: Imam Abu Isma’il al-Bukhari (810–870) and Abu Isa Muhammad al-Tirmidhi (825–892). Great jurists like Abu Mansur Muhammad al-Maturdi (died 1197), scientists such as Abu Nasr al-Muhammad al Farabi (died 950), and probably the greatest Muslim philosopher of all, Ibn Sina (or “Avicenna,” 980–1037), all came from Central Asia.23 As Islam spread in Central Asia it began to take on an increasingly Persian character. At the time of Islam’s entrance in the region, the Islam of Persia was Sunni Hanafi Islam (Shi’a Islam did not predominate in Iran until the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries). Foltz writes, “To a large extent, Islamic law, philosophy, literature, art, and mysticism all developed in the Persian cultural sphere. It was therefore a very Persianized form of Islam that penetrated and transformed Central Asia over the next several centuries.”24 One can vividly see traces of this Persian influence on Central Asia’s Islamic heritage

A history of triumphs and disasters 43 in the amazing artistic monuments of grace and architectural beauty that were built by rulers throughout the breadth of the region. When Arab Muslims first arrived they found themselves in a locality brimming with a host of divergent religious traditions. The first traces of Arab Islamic influences in modern-day Uzbekistan came with Muslim jihadists who arrived in Bukhara as early as 673. Arab and Persian Muslims tried to work through the disaffections and rivalries that come when two distinct cultures unite in a common religious tradition.25 It is not surprising that rebel movements in eastern Iran tried to overthrow Umayyad power. These tensions eventually fed into the emerging split between those who felt the Muslim world should be led by a direct descendant of the Prophet (Shi’ia Islam) and those who called for that leader to be chosen by a consensus from among the community.26 The Abbasid revolution from 749 to 751 led to the demise of Umayyad rule. A new government was set up following the pattern of the Sasanian Imperial empire and many of the new functionaries in the government were overwhelmingly Iranian (including many recent converts from Zoroastrianism and Christianity). Baghdad (from the Persian “gift of God”) became the new capital when it was inaugurated by Caliph Mansur in 762. By the beginning of the eighth century, Muslim Persians gained power as the political sway of China gradually faded away in Central Asia.27 Many Central Asians began to convert to Islam for political and economic benefit as well as for spiritual enlightenment.28 Both Persian and Arabic-speaking soldiers established Central Asia’s Islamic rule and many Arabs settled among the local Persian-speaking populations around the garrison city of Merv (Marw or Mary). Arab businessmen and generals gave a written alphabet to the people, as well as a new religion, but Arabic never took root as the lingua franca of the region.29 In fact, Arabic played a much smaller role in the intellectual and religious development of Central Asia than even the local Turkic languages.30 A significant turning point occurred in Central Asia when one aristocratic Persian Muslim, Ismai’l Samai, chartered a Muslim state in Bukhara. The Samanid dynasty was born. The Samanid dynasties (from the ninth to thirteenth centuries) inspired a golden age for Bukhara and made the city a rival to Baghdad for its architectural splendor, religious learning, and cultural progress. During this era, Bukhara earned the title as one of the “pillars” of early Islamic civilization. The city became a magnet for artisans, musicians, philosophers, and business leaders and was the seat of a Persian renaissance where some of the world’s greatest scholars and poets resided. Central Asia’s most noted personage of this time was the physician, mathematician, and philosopher Abu Al-Hussain Ibn Abdullah Ibn Sina (Avicenna) who was born at Asfana near Bukhara.31 Ibn Sina was proficient

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in Qur’anic studies by the age of 10 (learning at the feet of Abu Abdullah Natili) and, at age 17, was credited for bringing a dramatic medical recovery to the Emir of Bukhara, Nuh Ibn Mansur. After leaving Bukhara when his father died, Ibn Sina went to Baghdad where he wrote an encyclopedia of medicine that became the basis of health sciences in Europe for centuries. Ibn Sina is also honored in Europe for being an important source for the recovery of Aristotle’s writings, which had previously been lost to the West. When Islam went across Persia and arrived in Central Asia another religion that was widespread in the area was Judaism. Judaism has had a long history of interaction with Persian cultures dating back to the times of the Bible (II Kings 18:11 is the earliest reference). This interaction probably affected both Persian and Jewish cultures in significant ways. One possibility is that Jewish relations with Persians may be the foundation for such ideas as a blissful paradise and the notion that the world would come to an end with a great day of judgment where the righteous would ascend to paradise through a bodily resurrection while the wicked would burn in an eternal lake of fire. All of these theological ideas predate early Judaism and were present in ancient Persian religious writings.32 A Persian army under King Cyrus the Great conquered Babylon and freed captured Jewish slaves. The Bible states that Jewish people moved into the furthest regions of the Persian empire, which would mean modern-day Central Asia (Esther 3:6; 8:5; 9:20), and Jewish names have been found on pottery fragments dating back to the first through the third centuries have been uncovered near Merv (Marw or Mary) in modern-day Turkmenistan.33 During the Samanid dynasties the two cities of Bukhara and Samarkand were home to a significant Jewish community, and it was their presence that helped distribute the ideas of Ibn Sina. Blady writes “Jews have been living in Central Asia since remote antiquity,”34 and it is not possible to determine when the first Jewish community was established. When Muslims arrived in the seventh century they recorded that Jews were there and that, as their new rulers, they entered into a contract of dhimmi (protected ones) status with the “People of the Book”—Jewish and Christian. Jewish traders in oasis cities sometimes included members of a peculiar Jewish group known by historians as the “Radanites” (from the Arabic al-Radiniyya or the Persian rah-dan meaning “one who knows the way”).35 The economic success of the Jewish community ensured their survival, but also meant that Jews living under Muslim rule (either by choice or obligation) gathered in specified living areas and only married among fellow Jews. At times, certain restrictions were applied to Jews in Central Asia, but it is difficult to verify contestations that indignities were enforced by law (such as the claim that Jews had to ride only donkeys and dismount when passing a Muslim). If such prohibitions were in place in certain locales they were mild and not

A history of triumphs and disasters 45 surprising, given the challenging nature of intercultural and interreligious relationships. In addition to Muslim sources, later Russian travelers and ethnographic researchers wrote extensively about three large Jewish communities in the region and gave special attention to the large Bukharan Jewish presence. From the seventeenth to twentieth centuries some Jews who had been living in Russia and had faced pogroms and prejudices relocated to Bukhara. This migration later turned out to be fortunate for those Jews who were able to stay alive in Central Asia while Hitler’s Nazi armies swept across parts of Russia that were occupied during the Second World War. Jewish settlements in Central Asia were not touched by the war. Currently, Jews have been emigrating from Bukhara and relocating to Russia, Israel, and North America in increasing numbers.36 A dwindling community of about 20,000 Bukharan Jews remains.37 In the thirteenth century, a chilling rumble shook the world from Mongolia when Genghis Khan (Temujin) shattered the bulwarks of the Muslim world with his armies. Mongol tribes had unified under the banner of the Great Khan (meaning Universal Lord). Temujin had been a local chieftain from the shores of Lake Baikal who had built an army with vastly superior military skills and tactics than his opponents. The Mongols were adept horsemen and had developed a strategy of fearsome warfare combining mobility with ruthless coldheartedness. As Stephen Neill states, Central Asia prepared to “spill forth upon the world some of its apparently inexhaustible treasure of human lives.”38 One cannot be certain of exactly how many actually died, but astronomical claims cite as many as 1.3 million people being slaughtered at Merv with another 1.5 million citizens being murdered at Herat.39 While those numbers seem implausible, what is certain is that the atrocities of this era were extensive and horrific. At first some Central Asian villages resisted the Mongol advance. This led to disaster. After watching city after city have its entire population massacred and then beheaded for the purposes of building pyramids of skulls, these towns soon opened their gates wide to welcome the Mongols. One narrative explained that after these invasions, “no eye remained open to weep for the dead.”40 The Mongols, in fact, had no other method of control except through brute oppression. Again, numbers of casualties are problematic but between 3 and 18 million Central Asians were killed in the 12 years of Mongol conquest. These devastating Mongol campaigns created the largest land empire in the history of the world for Genghis Khan and his descendants.41 Mongol armies proceeded to advance through Hungary and had intended to conquer the wealthy farmlands of Europe. They might well have been successful except that, while on the march, domestic politics intervened when the Great Khan died suddenly and the news of his death forced the Mongol armies to

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retreat back to Mongolia to appoint a new leader. Even after the Mongols left Russia, their legacy remained branded deeply into the consciousness of the Russian people. Not only did they conquer Russia in the winter, which no other invading army has ever been able to accomplish, but they also caused so much damage that it was assumed their successes on the battlefield were divinely authorized by an angry god. One Russian chronicle lamented: For our sins, unknown tribes came. No one knows who they are or from whence they came, nor what their language is, nor of what race they are, nor of what is their faith. God alone knows who they are and from whence they came.42 The Mongol armies never tried to impose their religious values (a mix of shamanism with worship of Tangri, their sky-god) on their defeated enemies. Their practical religion was made up of rituals and prayers that served the soldiers and leaders of the Mongols to help them in their battles and hunts. Because the Mongols were open to any sort of religious rituals that were effective to these ends they allowed other religions to make their case and a form of tolerance to different religions took root. Unlike Muslim invaders they did not build worship centers across the breadth of their newly acquired lands. Mongol forces usually obliterated Muslim shrines for fear that they might harbor rebellion but they were not so concerned about the actual practice of Islam.43 They had come to Central Asia to exploit the wealth of the Silk Road and not to promote their religion. Because the Mongols used locally recruited Turks for their armies and their administration a large number of these soldiers and administrators were already Muslims.44 Mongol rule in Central Asia was weakened dramatically when, in 1227, Genghis Khan fell from his horse and died. His death led to panoply of inner-tribal feuds. The Mongol empire was eventually torn apart into four major jurisdictions (one for each of his sons) and a patchwork of tribal and regional fiefdoms.45 Over time, a powerful branch of the army known as the “Golden Horde”46 became ensconced on the northwest reaches of the Silk Road.47 The Mongols who remained in Central Asia gradually assimilated into the Muslim practices of their neighbors. Political stability under Mongol rule made Central Asia the economic center of trade between Europe and Asia. Caravans moved across this transAsian trade route carrying spices, fabrics, carpets, weapons, slaves, technology, and both exotic and common goods.48 The Silk Road linked the Mediterranean with East Asia in a series of stages from one oasis town to the next.49 Businessmen did not carry their wares across the entire length of this route but only in stages, passing along their valuables in a relay stretching for thousands of miles. In Central Asia, virtually the only way to travel safely was

A history of triumphs and disasters 47 to join a caravan. There was safety in numbers and generally, the larger the caravan, the safer the travel. Foltz writes, “Travel was exceedingly expensive and dangerous, especially the farther one got from areas of dense population.”50 Nothing, of course, was able to protect caravan travelers from sudden snowstorms or blinding sandstorms. These often led to vast numbers of travelers dying of starvation in the mountains or of dehydration in the desert. It was during this time that Marco Polo, who traveled the Silk Road from Italy to China, made his caravan journeys across these lands famous for his European readers.51 Because of the many risks along the Silk Road, the vast majority of travelers were hopeful businessmen but some diplomats, dedicated pilgrims, or missionaries also joined caravans traveling across these regions. Caravans passed freely through areas controlled by the Mongols who found supplying travelers an ideal source of income. Over time, Mongol people gradually lost their distinct culture, became more agrarian and less nomadic. This affected their religious status as well. After years of interaction with Muslim missionaries and traders, and under the reign of Uzbeg (or Uzbek, 1312–1341), the Mongols of Central Asia embraced Islam as the official state religion.52 One of the effects of this mandate was that Christian communities throughout Central Asia began to experience waves of persecution and were forced to pay a high tribute for their protection. The newly devoted Muslim convert, Uzbeg Khan, attacked all expressions of Shamanism and imprisoned shamanic priests. His idea was not only to strengthen Islam, but because the shamans were considered to be too powerful and to function as outlets for rebellion, to ensure his own sovereignty. Those who were effectively forced to become Muslims mixed their newfound faith with their historic reliance on mystical rituals and folk practices. With abundant wealth and without political opposition, Uzbeg Khan began to build the magnificent cities that hosted an influx of renowned Islamic scholars and poets, including the famed historian Ibn Battuta, the medieval poet Saifi Sarai, and Sayyid Jallal al-Din (among others).53 Uzbeg Khan was an efficient administrator known for his “fair-doings and love of the Muslim faith, which he restored in the whole of the Mongol domain.”54 Uzbeg Khan’s death led to further political divisions and a time of social instability, coinciding with the ravishing effects of the “Black Death” (bubonic plague), which depopulated Eurasia beginning in 1346 and lasting until around 1396.55 The next military sirocco to sweep across the Central Asian steppe was Timur-i-Lang, “Conqueror of the World”—known in Europe as “barbarous and bloody Tamburlaine, bloody and insatiable Tamburlaine.”56 Timur, who lived from 1333 until 1405, referred to himself as the “scourge of God” and “Lord of all the Earth,” but also held a passionate and evangelistic allegiance to Islam. Wherever he found Christian churches or monasteries he destroyed them. While he enslaved other groups of people who were

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vanquished, he butchered Christian refugees. If such savagery can be gauged, he is considered “the most cruel and destructive of all medieval conquerors.”57 His skills on the battlefield, however, did not translate into administrative powers and much of the extent of his rule was divided into a number of separate Khanates (kingdoms) at the time of his death. Timur sought to build an enduring legacy in stone: the city of Samarkand, which he referred to as Gokkand, the “city of blue” and the “mirror of the world.” Timur named Gokkand his capital in 1369 and returned to it whenever his military campaigns were finished. It became the meeting point for Persians, Chinese, Turks, Tatars, and Armenians to share their business and cultures. When Timur first came to Gokkand it was a quaint, half-ruined village of mud and brick. Under his kindly patronage and protection, and with armies of slave labor, Gokkand emerged as a blue-tiled realm of exotic treasures. Timur’s architects built high towers, massive palaces, strong city gates, masjids, and schools and covered many of them in mosaic majolica tiles.58 The central architectural feature of the city was the Registan, a square in the city center, massive in its grandeur and beauty.59 Before his death, Timur arranged to have his body buried under a massive block of solid green jade and directed that a warning be inscribed on his tombstone: “Whoever opens my grave will be attacked by an enemy fiercer than I.”60 After Timur died, the capital city flourished under the auspices of his grandson, Ulugh Beg.61 Ulugh Beg is best known to history for his love of astronomy and the construction of a series of buildings designed to promote the study of the stars. In the fifteenth century, nomadic Uzbeks, descendants of Siberian Turks, established a new domain based in Bukhara. Further to the south, another of Timur’s grandsons, Babur, led a small group of soldiers into India and founded the Islamic Mughal (the Persian word for Mongol) dynasty. Another of Timur’s relatives, Shah Jahan, carried on the family tradition for architectural grandeur by building the Taj Mahal in Agra, Rajasthan.62 The Mughals of India left an amazing legacy of art, architecture, and works in the sciences, which still exist within the proud weave of Indian history. In the sixteenth century, the discovery of new trade routes between Asia and the Mediterranean by the Portuguese explorer Vasco de Gama (and others) made overland travel along the Silk Road more expensive and longer than the much easier sea routes. A period of stagnation ensued as Central Asia lost its economic importance as a bridge between China, India, and Europe. Things did not change for centuries until the region became the focus of what British diplomats called the Great Game between Russia and England. The end of the Silk Road as a major economic pathway also opened up the door for increasing Russian involvement in Central Asia.

5

The history of Christianity in Central Asia

The snow covered heights of the Altai range made heavy demands on the missionary; pathless ridges with an average height from 8,000 to 10,000 feet, valleys with dark lakes and marshy morasses, hot summers and exceedingly cold winters, made even traveling from place to place a torment. J. Glazik in Die Russiche-Orthodoxe Heidenmission, 1954

Christian churches have existed within Central Asia for over 1,500 years. Even earlier, Central Asians and Christians would have interacted with each other as travelers since trade routes passed through various regions where Christian communities were already in place. The New Testament records the birth of Jesus being celebrated by Magi or wise men who came originally from the East, which was probably Persia (Matthew 2:1–12). In the book of Acts the writer reports the feast of Pentecost in Jerusalem saw people from many far-flung nationalities, including Parthians, Medes, and Elamites (Acts 2:5–11) who would have been Jews who originally came from Iran but also possibly as far away as modern-day Turkmenistan.1 An early account of Christianity in Central Asia dates to 196 (“Nor do our sisters among the Gilanians and Bactrians have any intercourse with strangers”).2 Early mission activity in Central Asia probably began when Nestorian Christians who lived in Syria began moving into Persia.3 Arab historian al-Biruni writes that Christian preachers (without providing any details as to their identity) were active in the city of Merv as early as 200 CE and throughout Persia even before that date.4 Christians were fairly numerous in Persian-speaking lands with as many as 20 bishoprics in the region by 225 CE.5 Some served in the army and one Christian general even led a Sasanian army into battle against the Byzantines. Many of these Christians were persecuted once Zoroastrianism became the state-sponsored religion of the Sasanian empire. One reason for this was that Christians were suspected of being disloyal to local authorities since the Byzantine world was entirely Christian.

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A Syrian Bishop Nestorius was named the Patriarch of Constantinople in 428. A number of Christians followed him when a controversy exploded about how the Virgin Mary should be described (either as the Bearer of Christ, the term Nestorius preferred, or the Mother of God). His views on the subject were condemned as heretical by the Council of Ephesus in 431.6 Nestorius’ eventual banishment to Egypt led his followers, many of who were living in Syria, to become quite active in missions. Church historian Kenneth Scott Latourette argued that Nestorian Christians were probably “the most missionary church that the world has ever seen.”7 Nestorian evangelists traveled to Central Asia (and as far as China), as members in a host of monastic orders, while other Christians traveled into the area because they were merchants looking for markets for their wares along the fabled Silk Road. Nestorian Christians did not always receive a welcome reception and were sometimes regarded as a threat because they taught a different religion and had unusual customs and ideas.8 While Nestorians faced some persecution in Asia, they experienced exactly the same treatment when they lived among other Christians. So widespread was the assumption that this religious group was heretical that other Christians at the time of the Crusades and the Middle Ages used to attack each other’s character by saying that a person was as immoral or as ignorant as a Nestorian. One writer in the Middle Ages, the Franciscan William of Rubruck, explained dismissively that Europeans did not understand Christianity outside of Europe and, as a result, “contemptuously designated the Mongol congregants of the Assyrian Church as Nestorians.”9 Without any extensive organization or administration, however, Nestorian Christians were amazingly determined in their proselytizing efforts so that their message of Christian zeal reached as far eastward as China by the year 832 CE (where they called the Bible “sutras” and the saints of the church were referred to as “Buddha’s”).10 Nestorianism in China became known as “the brilliant religion” (ching chao) and Nestorians were highly sought after as erudite teachers. Modern-day western China and Central Asia have a number of archeological sites where ancient stele have been unearthed, which reveal the Nestorian symbol of a Christian cross emerging from the base of a lotus flower, a common Asian symbol for beauty borne from difficulties.11 After launching work in Persia, Nestorian missionaries turned toward the vast and unchallenged lands of the north and east and eventually established as many as ten different Nestorian Churches within the boundaries of Turkestan.12 Nestorian Christians established strong communities able to support a residing bishop in the cities of Samarkand, Merv, and Heart as early as the sixth century. The Syrian Chronicle (c. 570 CE) mentions that

The history of Christianity in Central Asia 51 Uigyur nomadic tribal people who lived in the Tarim Basin were Nestorians. These Uigyur Nestorians centered much of their missionary activity on the city of Karakorum. Stewart claims that there is a document, recovered from the eighth century (c. 762), which describes a group of Christians who were most probably members of a Nestorian community: “These Christian Turks are true believers and fear God.”13 For a host of reasons, but primarily because of their proximity to the emerging Islamic communities of Arabia, Persia, and Central Asia, Nestorian Christians were highly regarded by the intellectual elite of the Muslim world. Merv (Mary) had been a major Nestorian center until it was attacked and overwhelmed in 1211 by the armies of the “Golden Horde.” Accounts claim that over one million Nestorians were killed in these decades of plunder, although this number seems unfeasible.14 One notable massacre took place in Samarkand where all Christians were massacred after they were first assembled in one of their churches. In spite of such grizzly narratives, the Mongols tended to be relatively tolerant of religious difference when they did not feel it was a threat to their military and political goals. The Mongols tended to be tolerant of religious differences and even requested that representatives from various religions present their arguments to the Mongol rulers.15 Genghis Khan also exempted Christian priests and scholars from paying any taxes.16 Over time, Islam gained the upper hand in Central Asia and persecutions became increasingly harsh. One edict issued by the Muslim Amir Nawruz, who led a large Mongol army stated that “Churches shall be uprooted and the altars overturned.”17 Invading armies led by Timur, claiming descent from Genghis Khan, finally destroyed the last remnants of any large Nestorian communities by around 1380.18 The Mongols also interacted with Catholic monks such as William of Rubruck, John of Plano Carpini, John of Montecorvino, and others who came to this region both as missionaries and as politicians. The political dimension was the hope by some in Europe that a Mongol–Christian alliance could emerge to recapture the Holy Land.19 One Armenian King Hethum even went so far as to offer troops to the Khan (1254) in exchange for the Khan’s promise to protect all of Anatolia’s Christian community. Another hopeful sign for many was the fact that the Mongols spared all Christians during the murderous sack of Baghdad in 1258.20 John of Plano Caprini left Europe in 1245 and arrived at the Khan’s court in time to see the coronation of Guyuk as the Great Khan in 1246. Guyuk, who had a very short-lived reign, was sympathetic to Nestorian Christians in his realm and even gave John a letter to the Pope, which scolded His Holiness for holding to an arrogant view that theirs was the only true

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expression of Christianity. William of Rubruck followed John’s visit and was at the Khan’s court from 1253 to 1255 during the reign of Mongke Khan who was Guyuk’s successor.21 William’s writings tell of how Mongke Khan relished establishing debates between resident scholars who were Muslims, Nestorians, and Armenian Orthodox as represented by a feuding Armenian monk named Sargis (Sergius).22 John of Montecorvino was sent as an emissary by the Pope to the Mongol court at Khanbaliq (Beijing) arriving there between 1290 and 1294. John lived for the rest of his life at the court, almost 40 years, until he died in 1328. He worked alone except for the moderate support of Andrew of Perugia who was a Franciscan monk sent by Rome to confirm on John the title of Bishop. John preached, not only to the Mongol court, but to the many Christian slaves and residents of the capitol, including quite a few Armenian Christians. One of the greatest hindrances that he experienced in his ministry was the rivalry that he shared with a group of Nestorian priests who saw John as a competitor to their interests. Eight years after the death of John of Montecorvino, the Vatican sent John of Marignolli to Khanbaliq where he stayed for only three years.23 Christianity faded from public record at the end of the fourteenth century. After the Mongols, there remained a few scattered traces of Nestorian Christian communities. The rise of Islam and the Nestorian lack of involvement in local commerce were important factors. Groups of these Christians continued to worship in small pockets around the city of Turfan (in modernday Xinjiang, China).24 Some Nestorian churches remained among Monophysite communities who were often treated better under Muslim rule than other Christian groups.25 Historical clues suggest that there were remnants of Nestorians during the Middle Ages among Persian and Turkic Christians, because Nestorian scholars in Syria and in the Middle East continued to translate and publish editions of the Nestorian hymnal for the benefit of those Christians who spoke Turkic and Persian languages.26 Centuries later during the Middle Ages, Crusade-bound European warriors sang songs and told stories credited to a Greek historian named Philoxenus who spoke of a distant but powerful Christian King named Prester John. This King, resident in the Eastern Mountains, would provide needed support at just the right time for the cause of the Crusaders against the Muslims, and would arrive with an army of at least 200,000 converted and baptized Christian warriors.27 Some scholars have tried, without success, to find links between Prester John and various Christian communities.28 Mythology about the devout Prester John and his magical army added further touches of exotic embellishment to the Crusaders’ own wearisome and gruesome campaigns of war. Some incidences of pseudo-history have been retold with such regularity that they have assumed a life of their own. One instance is the tale, retold by

The history of Christianity in Central Asia 53 Marco Polo, of the Mongol Kublai Khan requesting the visiting Italian traders in his court to return to Europe and ask the Pope to send a contingent of 100 faithful missionary priests who would lead his empire into the Christian faith. One version of this story, published in 1929 by the Protestant missionary Mildred Cable, relates that the Great Khan promises: “And so I shall be baptized… and then there will be more Christians here than in your region.”29 Kublai Khan was, according to Cable, not just looking for any variety of Christians, but those who were “so devoted to the Christian faith that they could prove to the learned of his domain by just and fair argument that the faith professed by Christians is superior and founded on more evident truth than any other.”30 Cable concludes by relating to her audience that the response in Europe to this plea was almost nonexistent; only two priests responded to Pope Nicholas’s plea, and both of those missionaries died en route to Central Asia. This failure, Cable explains, is the reason why Central Asia remains almost entirely untouched by the Christian message and completely under the control of Islamic ideas. European travelers who visited the capital might have had some interactions with one of the Khan’s wives or a family member who might have had some knowledge or familiarity with Christianity. Another English missionary narrative written by John Stewart explains: The grandson of the Great Khan known as Mango was known as a follower and defender of the religion of Jesus. Bar Hebraeus reports that another Mongol leader named Guyuk was also a devout Christian.31 The only possible confirmation that any of this may have happened is the claim that, in the year 1925, a copy of a letter from some Central Asian with the name Guyuk was placed on display for a period of time in the Vatican describing the arrival at the Court of the Great Khan of “Father John of Plano Caprini.”32 Only circumstantial and unverifiable evidence tells of any Christian presence at all in Central Asia between the thirteenth and the seventeenth centuries. One narrative describes an incident where a group of Franciscan monks donned Mongol attire in the year 1335 and proceeded to follow a caravan of Mongol traders. As they traveled with this group they were reported to bear portable altars on wagons while preaching to the merchants of the Silk Road. Cable suggests that there was a Nestorian presence in Samarkand in the form of a bishop as late as 1350. In the words of Cable, “As far as Christian missions were concerned, this vast region ceased to exist.”33 Czar Ivan the Terrible, beginning in 1552, was the first Russian leader to begin the conquest of the Muslim lands along Russia’s eastern borders. His approach to local populations was cautious (because as Czar he was also

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considered the leader of the church) and respectful. This contrasts with later Russian rulers (with the exception of Catherine the Great) who did not follow Ivan’s more tolerant position in relation to Russia’s Muslim citizens. In a letter to the Orthodox Bishop in Kazan, Ivan asked Russians to avoid all brutality in dealing with Muslims and, while advising that Muslims should convert to Christianity, that “Christian evangelism must be conducted with love and sympathy and never by force.”34 Ivan’s policy (including forbidding forced conversions) may have had something to do with the fact that his father-in-law was a Muslim and his second wife Maria Temrukovna was born a Muslim (named Altynjan, or Golden Soul) before she converted to the Russian Orthodox faith. What is certain is that Czar Ivan’s consistent policy of allowing Muslims to practice their faith without any fear of persecution stands in bold contrast to history’s standard characterization of Czar Ivan as a bloodthirsty tyrant.35 Ivan’s policy of treating Muslims as equals ended abruptly with his death in 1584. This is why it is “difficult to recognize any sort of common thread running through Czarist Russia’s treatment of the Muslim problem.”36 Czar Fyodor, Ivan’s son, demanded that Islamic masjids and madrassas be closed and that religious endowments be confiscated, while also launching “intense Christian missionary activities,” leading many Muslims to flee into the mountainous regions of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.37 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Russian Orthodox Christians began to slowly form a host of opinions about Islam from their interactions with Tatar and Central Asian Muslims. Many, led by the Kazakh scholar Chokan Valikhanov, claimed the Russian state had erred in promoting Islam among people who previously had little understanding of Islam.38 Others called on the state to actively promote the conversion of the Kazakhs to Christianity. While many dismissed Muhammad as a charlatan and “seducer of virgins, who turned sons against fathers,” many also admitted that he had been responsible for the end of paganism and idolatry among the Arabs.39 Other Orthodox Russians were even more sympathetic. When Maksim Nevzorov visited a masjid in early nineteenth-century Kazan, he wrote that Muslims prayed with extraordinary reverence, and watching their prayers he felt “the palpable presence of God above them” even if he did not feel “God’s Love in Jesus.”40 The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the beginning of dedicated missionary activity and the construction of a series of Russian Orthodox monasteries in areas where the majority of the population was historically from, at least a nominal, Muslim background. In 1866, one Russian Governor General, Nikolai Kryzhanovskii called for the state to enforce the dominion of the Church by aggressive persuasion and enlightenment.41 These efforts to proseltyze were often accompanied by violence.42 Russian national policy varied widely during these centuries but one constant was the desire to protect resident Russian Orthodox Christians.

The history of Christianity in Central Asia 55 Orthodox missionary proselytism among the Muslims of Central Asia was not actively supported by the Russian state until the reign of Czar Alexander II (1865–1881) who rejected the Catherinian proposition that the Russian empire could use Islam to advance its own power. Increasingly, Islam came to be seen as a threat that had to be confronted and Russian Orthodox missionaries were directly financed by the government. Existing Orthodox monasteries in Central Asia provided support to these newer missionary efforts. Over time, Orthodox Christians came to embrace the idea that as Russians they were involved in a godly struggle to convert the backward Asian barbarians who were in desperate need of Russian culture and the blessings of Christian civilization. One can see in this attitude the groundwork being laid for attitudes that continued in the Soviet era. Russians felt their presence in Central Asia was part of a divine calling because “Russian Orthodox Christianity had inherited the universal Christian mission of the fallen Byzantine Empire…The Principality of Moscow, which now laid claim to be the third and final Rome, was God’s chosen instrument for the fulfillment of that mission.”43 It was the duty of Russian Orthodoxy to advance Christianity, as well as Russian culture, in Central Asia. In contrast, the Muslim citizens in the region felt that the Russians were uncivilized and, more importantly, dangerously prone to plunder. Their northern neighbors, the Rus, were described as, “wild and primitive natives, purveyors of rare blond slaves and such precious raw materials as fur and ivory.”44 Russian Orthodox missionaries struggled and often died proclaiming the true and ancient faith “beyond the border (zu grantisu)”45 of their beloved homeland. Many of these efforts took place among the Kazakh people, but the extent of their work was often “superficial and relied primarily on either force or material incentives.”46 As was the case with British and American missionary efforts in Africa and Asia, the efforts of the Orthodox missionaries in Central Asia were closely interrelated with the political and social transformations that the invaders were seeking to impose. Russian missionary V. Grigoryev wrote: The first means for Russification of the inorodsy (ethnically nonRussians) is our religion. After that, the second most powerful device for Russification is an instillation into the non-Russian mind of the concept of the moral superiority of the Russian nation.47 The widespread conviction held by the Russian invaders that they were more moral and advanced than those Central Asians who lived undoubtedly alienated among those whom they were trying to reach. Central Asians

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saw that Russian attempts at political and social reform were often cruel and corresponded with the low morals of many of the Russian settlers in their midst. While one might assume that Orthodox missionaries would seek to convert Muslims with Christian “love and affection,” another method was to sponsor large feasts and festivals where ample alcoholic beverages were available, even though Muslims were forbidden to drink in their religion. Muslims who converted to Christianity often did so in order to enjoy temporal economic and social advantage rather than to gain spiritual blessings. The Russian government imposed taxes upon Muslims in Kazan (modernday Russia) who did not agree to convert to Christianity. Some Tatar Muslims had their lands taken and redistributed to Christian Russians. Muslims who did convert were encouraged to change their language, clothing, names, and even the foods they ate. In becoming Christians they were expected to identify increasingly with all aspects of Russian culture. Between 1826 and 1831 the Russian Orthodox Church launched the Altai Mission, which was directed by Father Eugenius Kasantseff.48 This extensive missionary effort, which lasted until the 1917 Soviet revolution, was responsible for the translation of portions of the New Testament into the Kazakh languages for purposes of evangelization. One of the most noted of the Altai Mission workers, Father N. P. Pstourmov, lived in Tashkent for a number of years before the revolution and was beloved among the Russians in that city. Russian Orthodox missionaries felt that they were in an elemental confessional struggle with Islam. Efforts were made to increase the devotion of those non-Russians who had converted to Christianity but might now be wavering. Mission efforts were also directed toward Russian citizens in the region who had begun to stray from the faith in alarming numbers. Apostasy became a problem to both non-Russian Christians and to Russians in some Muslim areas because cultural and social pressures were often intense for them to become Muslim. The Czarist state passed laws that supported Russian Orthodox mission work. Such laws led to a group of Turgai Kazakhs revolting against local authorities after one political leader boasted that converting the Kazakhs would be “as easy for him as putting his cap on his head.”49 Czar Nicholas I imposed an imperial law that obligated local political authorities to guard Russian Christians from converting to Islam. Those who rejected the faith would face invasive police measures designed to confront such religious crimes.50 Laws were passed in 1889 to prohibit non-Christians from serving on juries, act as attorneys at law, or adopt Christian children.51 Muslims were, in some places, not permitted to do business on Christian holidays.

The history of Christianity in Central Asia 57 When the Soviet revolution erupted, the era of Russian Orthodox missions among Muslims ended. During a century of sporadic proselytization efforts among Muslims in Central Asia, Russian Orthodox missionaries had met with only limited success. Orthodox missionaries found an easier audience among the waves of Russian frontiersmen who came to Central Asia with their families. Kenneth Scott Latourette notes that “by the beginning of the twentieth century, Orthodox mission efforts among Muslims were much less effective than parallel outreaches among other non-Christian communities in Siberia where over 25,000 conversions were reported.”52 The fact that fewer Central Asians than Siberians converted to Christianity primarily originates from the fact that Siberians had much greater economic and social motives to convert to Christianity than did Central Asians. Shortly before the Russian Revolution, a number of non-Russian missionaries worked in Central Asia. Most of these English and North American Protestants carried out episodic adventures, which were not ultimately effective in establishing Christian churches in the area. The role of British and American missionaries as emissaries of Protestantism was further complicated by political interests that Britain had in Central Asia. These tensions may explain why European and North American Protestant missionaries had little interaction with Russian Orthodox Christians. While the stories that these English and North American Protestant missionaries have related about their adventures in Central Asia may be viewed as dramatic, these efforts resulted in little lasting impact on the region. However, exceptions can be found. Two Swedish missionaries named Hermanson and Ahlbert were active in translating the New Testament into the Uzbek language shortly before the Russian Revolution. The English Protestant missionary nurse Jenny de Mayor wrote about her journey across Central Asia in 1913 to her mission station in modern-day Xinjiang. Her spellbinding account of the conversion of an Uzbek (who was reportedly known as Fasl Begh) was typical of a number of conversion accounts portraying lost Muslims redeemed by Protestant missionaries.53 De Mayor writes that this convert was subsequently martyred: “When he did make his decision, Fasl gave strong witness to his neighbors and soon a mob of villagers approached his house, clamored for his Bible and killed him.”54 Another English evangelical missionary, J. W. Sweetman, related how this same convert’s martyrdom was influential in the conversion of an onlooker who, in Sweetman’s narrative, explained: “Fasl Begh looked at me, but not with anger. He looked at me but it was with compassion and a countenance of forgiveness…When he bowed his head to take the fatal stroke it was as if all Bukhara exclaimed, ‘What new thing is this?’ ”55 One can observe from such accounts how Christians in Europe and North America came to understand how their fellow Christians in Central Asia

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faced a host of dire and threatening circumstances, including the threat of martyrdom. North American and English Protestant missionaries wrote a number of books about their lives and efforts among the various cultural communities of Central Asia. Some of these narratives tell of missionary journeys that began in India, Persia, and Afghanistan in the nineteenth century that saw Protestant missionaries facing a series of daunting challenges. One of the consequences of this missionary literature was political inflammation. In these accounts, determining where Christian mission ends and British political enthusiasm begins is not always easy. A number of missionary narratives raised interest in England especially about the Great Game or the Pamir Question between England and Russia over the social and political destiny of Central Asia. Some of these accounts addressed the issue of slavery among the Muslims of Central Asia. English Protestants clamored that the Bukharan slave markets should be discussed in Parliament and that redress be given to this social injustice. The British government sent two ill-fated agents to Central Asia, Henry Stoddart and Colonel Arthur Connolly of the Bengal Light Horse, who were eventually apprehended by the Bukharan Emir and then publicly executed much to the shock of the British public. The English press glowingly described Colonel Stoddart as a “touchy, fiery soldier with an exaggerated sense of what was due to an Englishman’s honor.”56 When Connolly was told, according to English evangelical sources, that his life would be spared if he would convert to Islam it was said that he replied fiercely: “There is no better way to live than to die for Christ.”57 In response to the execution in Bukhara of Stoddart and Connolly, an eccentric, middle-aged, German-born, British clergyman named Joseph Wolff (1795–1862) traveled to the Bukharan Caliphate in 1844. Wolff, originally a Jew converted to Catholicism before finally deciding to become an Anglican priest, felt that he was a “latter-day Paul” who needed to bring the gospel to the lost tribes of Israel. Because Bukhara had a long history of attracting eccentric dervishes and holy men from all over Central Asia and because Wolff greeted the Jewish community of Bukhara in English, his initial reception in front of the gates of the Arg (Ark or fort) of Bukhara was probably viewed by the citizens with amusement and curiosity.58 His narrative describes this encounter at Bukhara: The people crowded in masses around me demanding to know what the book was that was in my hand. I replied that it was the Towrat-e-Moosa (laws of Moses) the Saboor-e-Dawood (Psalms of David) and the Anjeel-e-Esau (Gospel of Jesus). Devotedly did these poor unenlightened souls touch the book.59

The history of Christianity in Central Asia 59 Wolff was then asked by the Emir of Bukhara “to tell the story of Mohammad as it is known in England.”60 The evangelist writes about himself in the third person and states the Emir invited Wolff to continue his preaching: Let this preaching be transcribed and kept among the library of the great Mosque. It is remarkable with what prudence Joseph Wolff has contrived to state his sentiments without giving offence, and at the same time deliver, with the sincerity of wise Christians with regard to our prophet.60 Missionary narratives such as Wolff’s increased English and North American interest in Central Asia, and others, followed these pioneering adventurers. The Reverend George Hunter of the China Inland Mission lived in Chinese Turkistan (modern-day Xinjiang) but also traveled among the Kazakh and Kyrgyz-speaking people of eastern Central Asia. While most non-Russian missionaries left the area with the advent of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, a number of Russian Orthodox missionaries continued to work in Central Asia until they were silenced during Stalin’s 1928 antireligious campaigns. Even then, a few Russian missionaries remained to continue their pastoral work among those Russian, Ukrainian, and German transplants consigned to Central Asia. The story of Christianity’s presence in Central Asia is primarily a narrative describing early missionaries trying to establish churches and reach converts until the nineteenth century, when the Russian Orthodox mission movement joined its forces with the larger political interests of the Russian state. In spite of this change, what remains compelling about the story of Christians among the Muslims of Central Asia are the amazing accounts of dedicated individuals—Nestorian, Russian, European, and North American—who shared their faith with Central Asians for centuries. Dedicated Christians lived and died among local populations. Even though their efforts did not result in a legacy of many Christian churches and converts, their failures provide lessons both for Central Asians and for people around the world. One of these failures was that Christians in Central Asia were consistently hostile to Islam; they preached to their Muslim audiences that the Islamic faith was deficient and that it led to a backwardness, which these Christians said, made Central Asians mere slaves to Islam. Perhaps it was because these foreign missionaries did not proclaim reconciliation, love, and grace, which led to their preaching being ineffective among the people of Central Asia. Perhaps it was their foreign ways, aggressive attitudes, and their condescending methods that resulted in their rejection. The facts are that very few Central Asians became Christians because of these missionary efforts. This, however, did not dissuade the missionaries who

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continued to press ahead with their efforts while choosing to understand their failures in theological terms. One Irish Anglican missionary wrote fatalistically about his lack of success in converting Central Asians: “I am not reaping the harvest. I can scarcely claim to be sowing the seed; but I am gathering out the stones.”61

6

Russians and Central Asian Muslims: Eagle and sickle against the crescent

A man cannot be too careful in the choice of his enemies. “Lord Henry Walton” in The Picture of Dorian Grey, by Oscar Wilde

When the first brushstrokes of dawn touched the fading canvas of night, at sunrise on June 15, 1865, the commanders of the Imperial Russian army gave the order for their troops to begin the advance toward Tashkent. General Mikhail G. Cherniaev’s soldiers surged forward with hurly-burly of confidence and easily overwhelmed the disorganized and poorly equipped Uzbek and Turkish defenders.1 Holding high a huge golden crucifix, Chaplain Andrei Y. Malov of the Fourth Orensburg line battalion led the warriors in shouting “Ura! For God and Holy Russia!” as they passed through the broken down Kamalan gate and into the ancient fortress city of Tashkent.2 The Russian empire was built across several decades without regard for cultural, linguistic, or religious difference. Russia advanced with the conviction that they were the center for the civilization of all things. In exchange for colonial enslavement, the Russian empire provided an end to internecine wars, the abolition of slavery, and a generally improved economy.3 Vanquished nations were expected to adapt to Russian ways and language.4 Religion was less of a concern for the Czars than economic progress and political influence. The advance of Russian control over Central Asia was gradual but persistent and followed the routes of commerce more than that of missionary fervor. While Russian rule began to master the Kazakh steppes around 1820, the Russian conquest of Central Asia was not complete until the Eastern Pamirs finally came under the rule of the Russian empire in 1900. Although a Russian proverb states, “The quieter you travel, the farther you get,”5 the history of Russian–Central Asian interactions in the last 100 years was anything but peaceful. In fact, for centuries relations between Russia and Central Asia have been tense and marked with misunderstanding and

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lack of effort from both sides in appreciating each other’s cultural and religious perspectives. Today, many Central Asians think about their relationship with Russians in terms of their long history of being exploited by Russia, while Russians who remain in Central Asia see themselves as being vulnerable to Muslim control over their lives. Many of the Russians living in Central Asia today describe themselves as outsiders who live within their own countries. This chapter will introduce some of the major historical reasons for these past and present tensions. The Russian empire was becoming increasingly stronger as a world power in the sixteenth century. With Ivan’s conquest of the Tatar Kingdom of Kazan in 1552, the Russian empire proceeded to expand southward and westward, moving into Muslim-dominated lands in the process. When Russians first encountered Islam, they viewed it as a primitive religion developed by Muhammad—a “cursed charmer… the diabolical son of a Jewish mother.”6 Muslims, for their part, wondered if the long-foretold end time (okhir zamon) had arrived as the world was now filled with those Nazarenes who love “liquor, wine, home-brew,” and gambling instead of “justice, humanity, honor, and religious learning.”7 The first Central Asians who pledged loyalty to the Russian czars were three Kazakh tribal confederations in the 1730s.8 Both Empress Anna (who reigned from 1730 to 1740) and Empress Elizabeth (1741–1761) imposed regulations against all non-Christians (basurman) throughout their realm. Muslims were forbidden to build masjids, and Russian rulers actively supported proselytization efforts.9 These policies were reversed with the rule of Czarina Catherine the Great (1729–1796), who ruled the Russian empire for 34 years beginning from 1762, when her husband, Peter III, was deposed. Catherine the Great transformed Russia with a broad vision of a strong multiethnic nation. Because the nation was so vast, Catherine realized that the depth of Russian rule from faraway St. Petersburg would be shallow and, thus, mandates a policy of toleration toward cultural differences. She “viewed Islam through the lens of imperial expansion” and did not demand that Muslims within the realm should change their religion.10 She demanded that Russian Orthodox bishops should cease their efforts at proselytization.11 In fact, Catherine accorded Islam as the status of an accepted religion and, in so doing, “transformed the imperial regime into a patron of Islam.”12 She commissioned Tatar Muslim missionaries to go to Central Asia (primarily modern-day Kazakhstan) and teach their faith.13 Catherine even paid for the printing and distribution of copies of the Qur’an to her Kazakh citizens without demanding a charge.14 This was because she felt that Islam would be a civilizing force among Central Asia’s Kazakh barbarians. Ever a voracious learner, Catherine seems to have expressed a personal interest in Islam and said that Islam was a “reasonable religion, better fitted

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to civilize the wild Asian populations than Orthodox Christianity.”15 This posture of acceptance greatly enhanced the fledgling relationships being forged between Central Asia and Russia.16 Czarina Catherine’s position on Islam is noteworthy because the Russian Orthodox hierarchy shared no such warm sentiments toward Mohammedanism (Magometantsvo). Many clerics felt that their own Christian ideals were synonymous with the Russian state and that only Orthodoxy could build a godly society.17 Theology, of course, was often jettisoned along the long and muddy roads between the great cathedrals of Moscow and the vast steppes of Central Asia. As has been the case throughout the Christian history, pragmatic concerns (such as gaining economic wealth and political power) seemed much more important to Russian decision-makers than the eternal destinies of Central Asia’s Muslims. For most Russian colonizers, the only reason why Islam was tolerated at all was that it was too deeply entrenched within local Central Asian communities to confront and was, in any event, of little consequence in their desire to gain greater control over the region economically and politically. Most Russians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries assumed that they alone had embraced the only true religion: Russian Orthodoxy. In contrast to this gift of secure faith, Russians regarded Central Asians as incompetent barbarians whose fate was to be ruled by those more enlightened. Although the mission history of the Orthodox Church in Central Asia is fascinating, most Russian clergy and citizenry showed little interest in preaching to Muslims in hopes of their conversion to the Mother Church. Or, to think of it in another way, Bukharaev notes, “theological arguments within Russian Orthodoxy itself never influenced the ardent task that church and state set for themselves in the conquered Islamic lands: the complete Christianization of the subdued Muslim population.”18 Especially after the reign of Czarina Catherine the Great, the primary goals of Russian political policy as related to Central Asia were political and economic. This explains why the Czar established a chain of muftis who would represent their political ambitions among Muslims.19 Forced conversions did occur, especially when Central Asians were seeking to avoid ethnic cleansing at the hands of the interlopers. Many Russian clerics in northern Kazakhstan encouraged a host of stratagems to purify their dominions from Islamic influences. This project was often carried out by strenuous forced expulsions accompanied by torture and slaughter. Given this reality, a forced conversion from Islam to Christianity may seem like a more humane way to address the interfaith tensions between Russians and Central Asians at the outset of the twentieth century.20 Czar Peter the Great (ruling from 1689 to 1725) commissioned a Russian translation of the Qur’an as he marched his troops toward Astrakhan and the

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Caspian Sea.21 The Russian military conquests of Astrakhan brought Russia into an alliance with the Shia Savafi state in Iran against their common foe, the Ottomans. This alliance had a tremendous impact on the Muslims of Central Asia because, in Thrower’s words, it “had the effect of bisecting the Turkish Muslim world in two to such an extent that contact between the Western and Eastern Turks would not be fully re-established until after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.”22 Russians brought a new language, culture, religion, and a host of new ideas about social governance. The traditional societies of Central Asia had governments with a very minimal impact on the daily life of the average citizen. The past rulers of Central Asia concentrated mainly on defense, a few public works, and a modest system of criminal law. The Russian czars, in contrast, had more ambitious goals from the outset. They intended to import their religion and language into Central Asia and, by these means, to transform and subdue the nations under their control. Russia sought to domesticate its Muslim citizens and turn them from any alternative or competing allegiances Czarist policies often changed toward their Muslim citizens. On one hand, Peter the Great made conversion to Christianity a prerequisite for being among the landowning elite, but on the other hand, Catherine the Great reversed this policy.23 After the reign of Czarina Catherine the Great (who recognized Muslims as having special status in the empire), Muslims were asked to take a vow to affirm their loyalty to Russian rule.24 Russia was interested in Central Asia both to secure its political borders against the threat of Chinese and Persian military intrusions, and also to benefit from exploiting the area’s natural resources and economic potential. Russian rule followed after Russian settlers as they pushed further into the region, “jumping from one river network to another”25 in pursuit of a more secured future. Russian authority faced little opposition as it progressively annexed more lands from local Muslim nawabs and emirs, whose influence had been dramatically weakened. Religion played an unpleasant role in these developments, with Russians destroying masjids and even, at times, forcing people to convert to Christianity.26 Under Czar Nicholas I, in 1854 (the same time as the Crimean War), a military fort was established in Verny27 on the frontier with China. The first major Russian military victory occurred in 1865 when the city of Tashkent fell to troops serving Alexander II. In 1868, General Kaufman took both Bukhara and Samarkand. At this same time, emissaries of Czar Alexander and representatives from the Chinese government established a set of territorial agreements that allowed for increased Russian control in Central Asia in exchange for an agreement not to threaten Chinese territory.

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During the last years of the nineteenth century, Central Asia became characterized by illiteracy, poor health, widespread crime, and, in terms of religious movements, the growth of mystical Islamic Sufi sects and the popularity of Islamic folk practices. Bukharaev notes that while “fatalism may appear beautiful in poetry… taken as a state ideology it can only lead to disaster.”28 This is what happened during the period of social chaos that the Russian colonizers first encountered in Central Asia. Local populations initiated rebellions against the Russians, which failed because of lack of organization and leadership.29 Some of these uprisings were probably financed, or at least encouraged, by British and other foreign interests trying to gain an increasingly strong foothold in Central Asia and, at the same time, weaken Russian control. In spite of the presence of military outposts and the presence of large numbers of Russian immigrants following the train-lines into the region, the Russian state authority remained weak in Central Asia. The question of the control of Afghanistan and Central Asia between Britain and Russia was called the Great Game, The Pamir Question, or the Tournament of Shadows by enthusiastic journalists of that time. British foreign officers participated in countless intelligence missions into the wild lands north of India with the aim of trying to secure their political interests inside India. The price for this espionage was high, with thousands of British soldiers dying in the effort, including some who were horribly tortured.30 Another consequence of this intrigue was the solidification of Iran, which was facing total disintegration at that time before receiving the support of both Russia and the Britain, who saw Iran as a sort of necessary buffer zone.31 The people of Central Asia were of no importance in the Great Game— simply pawns in the Anglo-Russian bid for control of the region. When a treaty was finally signed between Russia and Britain in 1895, the Pamir Question was resolved in favor of Russia. Russia consolidated its control by building extensive railways, adding military fortifications, inviting Russian settlers, and relocating unwanted criminals into the wildness of Central Asia. The railways reduced the two-month journey from Moscow to Tashkent to just four days. It was an unruly era in which vendetta killings and vigilante justice went on without control. It was not uncommon for Russian (often peasant) interlopers to simply arrive at the farm of some Kazakh or Kyrgyz person, shoot them, and capture their land. In 1913, Russia celebrated the three-hundredth anniversary of the Romanov dynasty with a number of official ceremonies, which included many Muslim officials voicing their loyalty to the Czar. By this point in time, the Russian empire had largely succeeded in ruling over a vast land of Muslims, who believed that “devotion to the throne and love for the motherland are ordered by God himself and his prophet Muhammad.”32 One of the ways that the Russian empire had consolidated its power was to follow

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the example of Britain in India and assigning rule to local emirs, who, in turn, were expected to serve the Czar as puppet rulers. Russians effectively were able to manipulate local authorities because they were more committed to clan loyalty and immediate personal gain than to any sense of devotion to the land, allowing Russian settlers to take land relatively easily. Step by step, Czarist Russia consolidated its control and exploited the region’s wealth and citizenry for its own imperial advantage. The Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 markedly altered the nature of Eurasian–Russian relations. It also changed the way that Islam would be transmitted in Central Asia. The years of Soviet rule (1917–1991) were marked by a time of frontal attack against the worldview and cultural values of the various Central Asian Islamic civilizations. Muslims in Central Asia were taught that their religion and culture and even their languages were backward and needed change. The Islamic culture of the region was frozen in time. Central Asia will take a long time to fully recover from the effects of the Soviet Union’s political and religious colonization. Shortly after 1917, the impact of the revolution on the hinterlands was initially negligible and largely symbolic. At first, the Soviets made only slight changes in the official names of the existing Czarist administrative and legal scaffolding that maintained public order.33 Many Central Asians looked to the future with optimism because some of the “vague slogans of the new regime” offered “some affinities with Islam.”34 Perhaps, Muslims also assumed that they could remake state institutions as their own as they had done under the Czarist era.35 Progressively, however, as the Soviets gained increasing control, they began to turn the administrative ship of state toward gaining a clearer direction on atheistic education and secularist policies about the role of religion in political society. One of the first threatening actions enacted was the Soviet ban on the usage of the Arabic language, because it was seen to be a “reactionary, clerical language constituting an obstacle to progress and modernization.”36 In 1928 (the same year as this same thing happened in Turkey), all Turkic languages were recast with a Latin alphabet. Russian was, of course, given pride of place, and government business was designated to be carried out in Russian. Those Central Asians who did not speak Russian were often passed over for advancement opportunities. In the agrarian sector, local farmers were collectivized, while Soviet propagandists aggressively debunked Islamic traditions and ideals. In the name of progress, Muslim peoples were called upon to forsake improbable dreams of a distant paradise for the immanent goal of a socialist paradise on earth. In the 1920s, many Muslims initially welcomed the end of Czarist rule (as it had been repressive to them in recent years) and the Soviet revolution’s generalized promises of bread, peace, and justice. Intellectuals, such as the

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writer Munawwar Qari (1880–1933), who became the first Commissar for National Education in Uzbekistan, and other members of the various influential literary societies, such as the Chagatay Society, saw hopeful changes for their region. Mahmud Khoja (Behbudy) (1874–1919) and Rizaeddin Fahreddin (1859–1936) were involved in a number of “daring experiments that had an effect on the Muslim consciousness in Central Asia.”37 These leaders were instrumental in the formation (in 1924–1925) of five Soviet Central Asian republics configured around ethnic national lines. Muslim intellectuals ignored the atheist underpinnings of the Soviet revolution and embraced Lenin’s promise to Muslims under the new Soviet rule: “All of you, whose mosques have been destroyed, whose customs have been trampled under foot by the Czars, the oppressors of Russia; your beliefs, customs, and your national and cultural constitutions are now free and safe.”38 These promises for a bright future soon became taunting refrains in a grim and unending nightmare. Josef Stalin launched a massive assault against the opiate of the toiling masses of Islam beginning in 1927–1928 (shortly after the inauguration of an anti-Christian campaign of a few years earlier). Stalin was dedicated to the cause of smashing traditional Islamic society. He felt that the deconstruction of what he understood to be static cultural identities was necessary before a new Soviet man would be able to emerge from the rubble of the old. The avowed goal of the Soviets was the creation of a unified society of equals, but what it succeeded in uniting was a group of Muslims who became sworn enemies of the Soviet Union. Central Asia’s Muslims tried at first to revolt against the Soviet atheists (mulhidun). Guerilla movements such as the Bashmachis39 (bandits, also known in Russian as basmachestvo) were crushed soon after they arose by the fierce wrath of the Soviet state. Stalin set in place what he called the second revolution (or the revolution from above),40 which established scores of policies that brought complete social chaos to Central Asia. Because masjids were the spiritual and symbolic center of traditional Islamic cultures, they received particular attention. Masjids were closed, and Muslim clerics were stripped of all rights and labeled parasites. The Qur’an was vilified as being superstitious. Religious ceremonies such as baptism, marriage, divorce, and religious funerals were forbidden. Laws were even written that confronted the clothing and food of Central Asian Muslims.41 All that provided cohesion to the society were refashioned. Stalin’s policies were a crushing attack against both Islam and Central Asian cultural traditions. Because Stalin’s anti-Islamic campaign focused on reeducating Muslim youth, religious education was a particular target. Any religious training for a child under the age of 18 was strictly forbidden. Madrassas were

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systematically closed, and secular atheistic education was seen as the primary tool to bring the needed Soviet changes to Central Asia. Many of these madrassas were either leveled or turned into factories or offices. A few of these schools were saved as architectural monuments but the entire framework of private Islamic education came to a halt. The leaders of that network of religious leadership, the ulama, were mercilessly persecuted. This meant that Muslims during this time were only able to gain the most rudimentary of understandings of Islamic beliefs and of Central Asia’s Islamic heritage. Women’s issues were another major focus in early Soviet efforts in reconstructing Central Asia in its own image. Central Asian Muslim women were given the right to marry whomever they chose and to be protected from being beaten by their husbands. Campaigns stressed that Islam was an imported religion brought by invading Arabs to subdue women through the use of the veil (paranja or hijab) and early marriage and to sanctify the strong authority of the elite. In 1927, an attack (hujum) was launched by the Communist party, which banned the widespread use of the Islamic headscarf by the women in Central Asia. This led to many women being able to join the workforce (particularly in the cotton industry). Many women were unveiled by police and local authorities when they went out in public with head coverings in defiance of the law. Central Asian Islam was caricaturized by the Soviets as being a force for social and familial divisions undergirded by primitive rituals such as circumcision, polygamy, and fasting. Muslim clergy were publicly derided for their ignorance, immorality, and corruption. Some clerics were registered and allowed to continue to serve their constituencies as long as they were “compliant instruments of the Soviet regime.”42 Soviet teachers glorified the wisdom and benefits of atheism and stressed that the more an individual was educated, the less likely they would be superstitious (religious).43 Stalin’s most destructive efforts, however, came through the restructuring of Central Asia’s society and the role of Islam in the region through a score of major economic changes that he initiated. Stalin felt that Central Asia would always be backward as long as it was Islamic and that the social structure Islam provided kept people from uniting under the socialist banner. As a result, beginning in 1924 and throughout the 1930s (the same time that Ataturk pursued a similar policy in Turkey), Stalin launched an aggressive agricultural collectivization process attacking the nomadic soul of the people and causing more displacement than any invader since Genghis Khan. The ummah of the Islamic masjid was replaced by the collective of the Soviet Union. Even in this dark time, however, Central Asian Muslims found innovative ways to maintain their faith far from the distant tyrannical powers of Moscow. As the Muslims could not participate in the hajj, they

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organized local festivals (to’y) where boys were circumcised (forbidden by the Soviets) and Muslim weddings were performed incognito.44 Collective farms had masjids, which were officially designated as storage rooms or community halls, and every imam received a salary even if he was listed on the books as working as a tractor driver or mechanic.45 Stalin also concluded that Central Asia’s vast space was an ideal place to imprison his many enemies, as Central Asia was functionally as remote as the moon. Stalin exiled swarms of Ukrainians, Germans, Poles, Koreans, and other political outcasts into the area. In one notable incident beginning in 1944, Stalin deported between 100,000 and 200,000 Meskhetian Turks from southern Georgia to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.46 At least 50,000 Meskhetians died of cold and hunger in transport.47 For Stalin, modernization was to be won at any price. That price in Central Asia was incalculable. With the advent of the Second World War, Stalin took a brief respite from his draconian war against the persistent menace of Islam and conscripted over 1.5 million of the Soviet Union’s Islamic ummah into the Red Army to fight the invading Nazis.48 Propaganda efforts at this time were dramatically curtailed, and Muslims were even allowed increased freedoms of worship. When Stalin died, Khrushchev returned with vigor to the task of religious and political repression. From 1959 to1964, countless masjids and madrassas were closed and Muslim leaders arrested. Like Stalin before him, Khrushchev sought to divide and conquer Central Asia by breaking down the social, cultural, and linguistic bridges time had built between the various ethnic groups. Soviet policy stressed differences instead of similarities to hinder the emergence of a pan-Turkish movement.49 The disconcerting political legacy of the Stalin and Khrushchev years was that the new leaders of the Soviet state cherished a great desire for social and economic stability. In religious matters, this meant allowing official Islam to be recognized while continuing to seek to restrict the activities of parallel Islamic communities, be they Sufi mystics, folk practices, or Islamist militants. The teaching of atheism was eased in Central Asia’s schools. Imams and Muftis were once again licensed and registered by the state and had to return the favor by supporting the activities of the Soviets. These Muftis, in fact, became a key link in Soviet efforts to control Central Asia’s populations. Of course, no Central Asian Mufti ever admitted that they were being controlled by the Soviet state. Leonid Brezhnev and subsequent leaders, including Yuri Andropov (1982–1984) and Mikhail Gorbachev (1984–1992), struck a more conciliatory tone with the Muslims of the Central Asian republics because they were committed to social and economic stability. The Soviets enacted a policy called nativization (korenizatsiia) where power was placed in the

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hands of local party functionaries. The almost two decades of Brezhnev’s rule coincided with the lengthy rule of Kazakhstan’s Dinmuhamed Kunaev and Uzbekistan’s Sharaf Rashidov. Both Central Asian politicians represented the Soviet strategy of allowing local party elites to run their local republics almost as if they were independent fiefdoms. In return, the Central Asian dictators would provide unwavering support for government economic policies as well as carrying out the unpopular task of recruiting Central Asian Muslims to fight for the Soviet Union during the war in Afghanistan. One economic motivation for the Soviets to be more flexible toward the nations of Central Asia related to a major development project undertaken by Brezhnev called the Virgin Lands Campaign (a way to describe the fecundity of the regions’ agricultural potential) in Kazakhstan.50 This grandiose economic plan helped Kazakhstan escape the cotton monoculture that eventually crippled other Central Asian republics. Another reason for allowing the Central Asian republics so much autonomy was for the Soviets to curry favor with geopolitical allies in the Muslim Middle East who began to wield increasing political power with the American oil embargo of the 1970s. The Soviet Union made sure that the city of Tashkent became a mecca for international Arab and Muslim students as well as a show-case city for the USSR to show its toleration to the Muslim world. Most Soviet efforts at rapprochement with Islamic communities in Central Asia, however, were largely superficial. By 1980, only 200 masjids had been opened across the area—a mere fraction of the more than 20,000 masjids that had been in operation before the Soviet revolution.51 Gorbachev’s brief time in office did see attempts to effect reforms in Central Asia like the ones undertaken in other parts of the Soviet Union. One of his major programs was the confrontation of corruption. Local realities, however, made many of these efforts ineffectual. Gorbachev’s program of glastnost (openness) and perestroika (reconstruction), while having wide-ranging consequences for Central Asia’s Muslims, were not always implemented consistently. Throughout the Gorbachev era, there were a series of laws that were enacted and did ease the restrictions against the practice of Islam and other religions in Central Asia. Religious organizations were once again able to hold property and carry out their religious activities in freedom. In some instances, religious groups were even given tax-free status. Gorbachev’s concerns about “the failing moral standards in the Soviet Union”52 actually resulted in the government seeking to enlist the assistance of Muslim and Christian clerics. Reform initiatives such as the 1987 economic mandate for cost accounting (khozraschet) that were enforced in other regions under Soviet rule were not enforced in the Central Asian economy.

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The abrupt ending of the Soviet era in 1992 meant that Muslims in Central Asia, cut off from the larger dar-al Islam for decades, were stunted and underdeveloped in the depth and breadth of their Islamic development. Rashid says that, “ideologically speaking Central Asians were still back in the 1920s.”53 The Muslims of Central Asia emerged from Soviet rule as if having come from the end of a war. For seven decades, the Soviet Union had sponsored a relentless war against Islam. Shahrani writes, “The Soviets considered it essential to undermine and destroy all forms of traditional Islamic social and cultural identities, loyalties, and institutions in Muslim Central Asia and to replace them with new Soviet (Russian) ones.”54 Government authorities went so far as to reconfigure the geographic borders of the various Central Asian countries to ensure the maximal amount of social fragmentation so that the social fabric of religious identities would be further weakened. The defamation of Islamic beliefs was a standard social practice under Soviet rule. Memories surrounding decades of Soviet rule will not easily be erased. Stalin butchered an entire generation and deported whole villages in his quest for collectivization.55 Under Brezhnev, the two years of required military service in the Soviet Army were seen as a major tool for the Sovietization of young Muslim men.56 Considering all of this aggression, the local populations often felt that they had no alternative but to acquiesce. Very few terrorist campaigns were launched by Central Asians against Soviet rule. Any attempts made by small terrorist groups in the name of Islam to oppose the Soviet government were crushed with fierce severity as a warning to other religious zealots who might also try to oppose the will of the government. During Soviet rule, Central Asia was the “most backward region of USSR.”57 Soviet rulers, not surprisingly, did nothing to promote a political culture of tolerance and democratic freedom in the region, and, as a result, the legacy of Soviet rule left behind only the most fragile of roots for a healthy civil society. A handful of Central Asians—those who rose to political and social influence—benefited from despotic and nepotistic Soviet control because it meant economic progress and tangible improvements in their daily lives. Indeed, communism found its greatest support among Central Asians when it set aside its ideological agenda and focused on improving the daily life of the average citizen. There were tangible improvements in the post-Khrushchev era. Needed roads and train lines were built. Electrification eased the lives of millions of Central Asians. Literacy and public health improved greatly at this time. Before Soviet rule, for example, the estimated literacy rate in Uzbekistan hovered at around 2 percent, but by the end of Soviet rule (1991–1992), it was claimed to stand at over 98 percent.

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Also, prior to Moscow’s domination, the life expectancy of a Turkmen would have been around 40 years, but by 1992, citizens of Turkmenistan could expect to live close to 70 years of age. Gorbachev and others frequently reminded Central Asians that these statistics were significantly better than those in neighboring Islamic Pakistan, where health services were far less extensive.58 Progress in irrigation and advances in farming methods were also noticeable. By the end of Soviet rule, Central Asia was considered the third most productive cotton region in the world behind China and the United States.59 Regarding Islam, many devout Muslims concluded that Soviet rule was the will of Allah and, perhaps, chastisement for past negligence in holy devotion. Islamic practices in Central Asia were opposed by the Soviet government in a consistent and systematic way, including not only propaganda campaigns, but the actual murdering of Islamic scholars and leaders and the devastation of Islamic texts and mosques. The assault was ferocious. A number of programs initiated through educational structures were put in place to discredit Islam and show its evils to the population. History shows that seven decades of Soviet efforts to destroy Islam in Central Asia failed. Central Asian Islam actually became stronger in the face of Soviet opposition. Damage was inflicted that affected the character and depth of Islamic identity, but, inversely, Islam also adapted and created a new, assertive Islamic identity in the face of suffocating and degrading colonialist oppression. Anti-Islamic propaganda campaigns ultimately did nothing but strengthen the resolve and extent of Islam in Central Asia. Under Stalin, and later Nikita Khrushchev, Sufi missionary orders were established and spread widely across Central Asian society. Islam became the sole unifying factor for the traumatized, beaten down, and exploited. Islam instantly became the rallying cry for the people of Central Asia when they were able to secure their freedom. Very few Central Asians shed tears of regret at the passing of seven decades of atheistic and anti-Islamic Russian socialism.

7

Islamic missionaries and the Islamicization of Central Asian society

(Jyglgan ooganga kulot)—The one who has fallen laughs at the one who is about to fall. Kyrgyz Proverb Do you know what a man of earth may be, Khayyam? A lantern of imaginings, and inside a lamp. Omar Khayyam

Strong spring winds rushed fiercely through bending the willow trees while I was visiting Dushanbe, Tajikistan in April 1992. A driving rain lashed the city. Thunder and lightning filled the darkness. The weather hid a full moon behind a cover of fog. But throughout the first night in the city, I heard the bold declaration, “Allahu Akbar!” echoing over and over again through the storm as it cascaded out across the rooftops of the city. The next day, in the city center, I listened to a missionary, originally from Iran, preaching boldly in front of the Tajik National Government offices. He was calling for the immediate implementation of shariah code as the law of the land. I remember a committed follower falling at the feet of this speaker to kiss the edges of his flowing robe. The missionary responded appreciatively before leading the crowd in a series of impassioned chants: “Death to infidel America! Death to infidel Russia! God is great!” This chapter will introduce Islam in Central Asia and look at the ways that Islamist missionaries have been active in the region since the fall of the Soviet Union. Islam is once again resurgent throughout the Central Asian society with over 90 million Muslims resident in these five republics. A gradual series of transformations are slowly unfolding in the region. Critics argue that Muslims in Central Asia hold to a superficial brand of Islam because it is unlike any other expression of Islam in the world. Many Muslims who live outside the region look at Central Asian Muslim practice with wonder because it seems so paradoxical to their own experiences as

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Muslims. One Muslim missionary to Central Asia that I talked to told me about visiting a masjid in Uzbekistan, where immediately after the Friday prayer, the imam proceeded to bring out a bottle of vodka and pass out cups for the men who waited around for this seemingly regular ritual.1 Most Central Asians are Sunni Muslims, with the exception of some two million Shi’a in Tajikistan and other Shi’a, who live on the western lands bordering Azerbaijan. When Shi’ite communities exist in Central Asia, they are assumed to be ethnically Persian and they are now confined to a few specific cities such as Samarkand, Bukhara, and Tashkent, though some Shi’a Muslims are present in Turkmenistan. A significantly large Shi’ite community also remains in Bukhara, Uzbekistan.2 Central Asian Sunnis are of the conservative Hanafi School (madhab) but they also have no problem in often adding various Sufi or folk Islamic practices to the experience of their faith.3 Sufi pirs and Sunni imams historically have worked harmoniously in countless Central Asian villages, and Sufi pilgrimage sites are widely visited by all Muslims. Central Asian Hanafi scholars taught that “belief in Islam is more important than adhering to practices” and “is more concerned with practical devotion rather than strict adherence to practice.”4 Most of the religious tensions that Muslims have historically had in Central Asia have been between the various interpretations ( fiqh) of Islam held by Shi’a, Ismai’li, and Sunni. Recently, however, tensions have surfaced with the introduction of right-wing Islamist missionaries and ideas that have been critical of centuries of Islamic traditional practice, be it Sunni or Sufi, in the region. Islam has always been a missionistic (dawah) religion committed to the worldwide expansion of the faith for the glory of God. Missionaries, merchants, and warriors brought Islam to Central Asia. The religion of Islam came into the region as an external power but it was able to give strength and identity to people who were constantly assaulted by external powers. Geographically, Central Asia has been described as the frontier of a Muslim world bordering Russia, China, and India. But what role exactly did Islamic missionaries play in the cultural and intellectual development of contemporary Central Asia? What kind of Islam will emerge to dominate the Islamic ethnic identity of the region? How are Islamist missionaries affecting the region today? Because many of these missionaries preach a militant message, one observer warns that Central Asia is becoming part of an area of Islamist threat and that, “Geopolitically, the black hole of Central Asia now constitutes an expanded part of the new Middle East.”5 Some have dismissed the Islam practiced by Central Asians at present as being “a largely uncivilized, crude version of Islam.”6 This kind of

Islamicization of Central Asian society 75 assessment has sometimes been a motivation for other Muslims to support missionaries to come to Central Asia. What such a conclusion fails to take into consideration is the important fact that almost everyone in Central Asia considers themselves to be Muslims. This self-awareness is intrinsic in the same way that familial, ethnic, or linguistic identities are held. In some sense, it simply means that they are not Christians. What is most important about Islam in Central Asia is that the religion provides common social and communal reference points as shared values and historic identities. Islam has provided Central Asians with a shared cultural identity-marker more than providing a normative Islamic philosophical worldview or normative devotional practice. The tensions between the need for social continuity and adaptation that sweep across modern Central Asia dramatically affect religious life in the region. Islamic missionaries, merchants, and warriors came to the oasis cities of Central Asia, early in the advance of the faith, and Islamic social institutions soon became central to the development of local societies. The work of these missionaries and merchants took root in the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara and helped these principalities experience two centuries of tremendous progress (i.e., from eleventh to twelfth century). Because of trade and other cultural links, Bukhara and Samarkand were able to maintain close contact with the social movements and intellectual developments in the Muslim world. Most of the Central Asia’s early Muslims numbered among the intellectual and political elite. In contrast, Islam took longer to become established in harsh and remote mountainous regions. As Central Asian mountain communities gradually became Muslim, they developed their own unique Islamic folk rituals that easily mixed old shamanistic traditions with the Sunni beliefs and practices of their newfound faith. Sunni Islam spread in Central Asia in many of the same ways that it advanced in other areas of conquest. Islamic economic social traditions such as waqf 7 (the legal process that ensures the protection of land and personal property) became visible in Central Asia as early as the beginning of the twelfth century. Property was endowed and funds were provided through this system of patronage, which ensured the ongoing vitality of the community of faith. These funds, according to Khalid, also “created a large and influential group of scholars (ulama) as the authoritative interpreters of norms of Islam, as it was locally understood.”8 Increasingly, Muslims began to set aside funds to do dawah, to construct religious schools and public buildings, to support the poor and travelers, and to protect the stray and sick animals. In a number of legislative and social ways, Islam became woven into the fabric of Central Asia’s daily life. Laws were formed in Central Asia on the basis of the conservative Hanafi (or Nu’mani) legal

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school for judicial administration with these legal codes being implemented by the noted shayks of Bukhara and Balkh.9 Islamic cultural reform was advocated at the end of the Czarist era by a movement led by Central Asian intellectuals called Jadidism.10 With missionary zeal, Jadids tirelessly advocated the teaching of Arabic through the method of using a phonetic alphabet (usul-i jadid). This was the first time that Arabic was introduced into Central Asia since the era when the first Arab soldiers arrived. As a modernist missionary reformist movement, the Jadids challenged the Central Asians to turn to modern knowledge and technology in matters of daily lives but to return to the foundational teachings of the Qur’an and Hadith in their spiritual lives. One Jadid missionary, Mahmud Xo’ja Behbudiy, called for Muslims (in 1913) to educate the youth to become “Judges, lawyers, engineers, teachers, the supporters of the nation,” so that they would “work for the true faith of Islam.”11 While advocating progress, the Jadids challenged the Islamic community in Central Asia away from its long established cultural roots with its idiosyncratic folk practices. Faint echoes of the Jadidist missionary movement can still be heard in Central Asia today whenever moderate reformist Muslim groups advocate for both pride in national identity, a return to foundational Islam, and in the critique of traditional folk Islam and Sufi Islamic practices.12 Another Muslim group, the Isma’ilis, is also present in Central Asia. About 400,000 Isma’ili Muslims live concentrated in the Pamir Mountain regions of southeastern Tajikistan. These Isma’ilis first came into this region because of persecution in Iran and commitment to their zealous missionary activities. Sometimes Isma’ili Muslims are also referred to Seveners because they believe in the eventual return of the Seventh Imam, and for these ideas (and others), they are dismissed as heretics by both Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims. Isma’ilis have often been persecuted by the majority cultures for holding to such fabricated beliefs (nihal). In fact, Ismai’ili practice, which is generally less strict, is the primary point of difference between Sunni and Isma’ili Muslims. Their organizational structures are quite secretive as a way to protect their number and their leadership comes internationally through the Agha Khan. All forms of Central Asian Islam, hope to offer stability and answers for the questions people are confronting. In the midst of upheaval, Islam is often recognized by people as one of the main stabilizing factors in the area. After the collapse of Communism and the throwing aside of its socialist values, Islam offered the people a message and a pattern of life that was able to fill the moral and ethical void. The fall of the Soviet Union gave space for Central Asian Islam, which had been deeply battered by decades of religious persecution. This transition also had a significant impact on the role of Central Asia’s (highly literate and economically equal) women, who went

Islamicization of Central Asian society 77 from one set of expectations under Soviet rule to a very different model in more traditional Central Asian Muslim societies. After seven decades of Soviet rule, there are various degrees of adherence to Muslim ordinances among the local populations of Central Asia. There was widespread decay (al-inhitat) among Central Asia’s Muslim believers. Even those in the region who describe themselves as theologically agnostic or atheistic may still describe themselves, at least culturally, as Muslim. Almost the entire population of a given community will usually participate in the widespread celebration of traditional Islamic festivals and also use Islamic rituals for such significant events as birth, marriage, and death. These rituals are being administered by a new generation of mullahs, who are being trained locally in newly constructed madrassas (religious colleges) that will, over time, provide greater cohesion and continuity for the practice of normative Sunni Islam in Central Asia. Sufi Islam also spread throughout Central Asia because of the work of Sufi missionaries. Today, Sufi orders are widespread, and Sunni communities are home to a number of different groupings of devotional Sufi communities.13 These tariqa (orders) usually are led by one teacher (great khoja or khwaja) who lead the community in mystical devotional practices. Although there are many different orders, many of their practices have blended together over time. Orders are often centered on historic shrines and holy places, often tombs (mazar) of special teachers and saints who are both mythical and historic. These tombs often become places for pilgrimage and provide for some adherents an acceptable alternative for their required once-in-a-lifetime hajj to the holy city of Mecca.14 Sufi shrines are centers for devotional practices (zikr), including ecstatic states of worship, as well as places for mutual fellowship and encouragement. Sufi practices have always included chanting, dancing, and singing.15 Perhaps, the Sufi missionaries, who came to Central Asia, first gained an audience with Central Asia’s nomads through the evocative power of their music and the intensity of their dancing and chanting. Such practices are often lumped together under the broad category of Sufism, a term that was not introduced among Muslims until about the ninth century.16 What are the main ideas of Sufism? Most of Sufi practice is Islamic but, in addition to Sunni doctrine and ritual, these spiritual masters also call for tariqat (order), where members accept with complete obedience the spiritual insight of their teachers. Strict asceticism, dedicated abstinence, and prolonged contemplation characterize most Sufis. The doorway to truth comes through obedience to one’s spiritual mentor because it allows members of an order to enter into a trance-like spiritual state known as marifa, where a member abandons reason and begins to hear the guidance of God inside the heart. In this way, step by step, a member of a Sufi order internalizes

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and fully expresses khaqiqa (truth)—understanding reality, as it actually is and attaining complete oneness with the divine will. In this manner, a Sufi is finally free from false misconceptions about the world, and no longer has any pedestrian anxieties. Academics and social observers may like to draw a distinction between Sunni Muslims, Sufi Islam, and popular or everyday Islam, but in actual fact such lines are often blurred in Central Asia. At certain times, the same Muslim who prays to a local saint will, in another instance, elicit the assistance of the imam at the local masjid. Expressions of mystical folk Islam remain strongest in the Central Asian countryside and whenever people go on pilgrimages (ziyarat) to countless shrines (mazars). Although some shrines are the graves of famous powerful holy men, and it is also the case that some people make their way to holy caves, springs, and trees that are said to have curative powers, provide material blessings, or endow protection from an array of evil spiritual ghosts and goblins. Tabyshalieva writes that the most popular shrines in Kyrgyzstan are “hot medicinal springs,” where pilgrims go to “obtain a blessing, fulfill a vow, cure a sick child, or seek a remedy for infertility.”17 Unlike Sufism, there may be no ritual to such journeys, and these folk practices probably predate the advent of Islam. Sunni Islamic dogma mixes with intense passion, and is often expressed in ancient shamanistic rituals and stories passed down through the centuries from Mongols and Turks. Some of these folk practices include the use of trance-induced divination to foretell the outcome of a hunt (or some other event), and most importantly, ceremonies to dispel evil spirits and to contact dead relatives. Bands of traveling missionary mystics, known as Uwaysi, who contact the dead through telepathic powers, were widely hailed in Central Asian literature, although it is not certain that such groups actually ever existed.18 Over 75 percent of all of the Soviet Union’s Muslims lived in Central Asia at the time of the fall of the Soviet Union.19 There are more than 100 distinct ethnic groups that live within the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia.20 Among the Muslims of Central Asia, there are a number of minority Muslim populations, such as the Karakalpaks, that total about a half a million and are concentrated in Uzbekistan (along the lower reaches of the Amu River). Their name, Karakalpak means “black cap” and relates to their distinctive head gear,” which is first mentioned in Russian histories dating to the twelfth century.21 Another group of Muslim peoples who make up a small minority of the Muslim population in the region are Turkic Uighurs, one of the oldest and most distinctive, ethnic Muslim communities. The Uighurs overthrew the “Eastern Turkish Khaganate in 744 and established themselves on the banks of the Orkhon with a capital at Ordu-Baligh.”22 Thrower notes that the

Islamicization of Central Asian society 79 group adopted Manichaeism as their official state religion in 762. Within 100 years, the Uighurs abandoned the faith of Manichaeism and became Buddhists and in the thirteenth century decided en masse to leave Buddhism and finally embrace Islam. Today, most Uighurs resides in China, but there are large Uighur communities in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan’s Uighurs came as refugees after problems simmered in China during the 1880s and again in the 1950s.23 Large Muslim communities border Central Asia to the west. In the region of Dagestan or land of the mountains, most of the Muslims hold to a mixture of Sunnism and Sufism. Dagestan is an area roughly the size of Scotland and consisting of over 40 distinct language groups and cultures.24 Sufi missionary activity is widespread in Dagestan, where the countryside is filled with Sufi shrines, tombs, and other pilgrimage sites. Bordering Central Asia to the west are the Azeri-Turks of Azerbaijan, who numbered about 15 million (in 2005).25 Half of all Azeri live within the borders of Azerbaijan, but numerous other communities can be found in Turkey, Iran, Russia, Europe, and North America. Most Azeri who live in Azerbaijan (perhaps as many as 70 percent) are Shi’ite Muslims, but there is not much tension between these Muslims and their Sunni neighbors who make up the balance of the population. Sufism is a major factor that serves to link these two Azeri communities together. These same mystical orders spill over with their practices and their preaching into neighboring Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan flourished economically under the Soviet Union because of the development of the vast oil and natural gas fields in Baku as well as its significant cotton industry. At one time, the Baku oil fields were the largest in the world; Nazi attacks against them in the Second World War seized international headlines. The world once again focused on Azerbaijan when bitter tensions with Armenia resulted in horrific tragedies affecting villages of both noncombatant Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Unfortunately, the media promulgated a simplistic portrayal of the conflict, presenting it as a skirmish between Christian Armenians and Muslim Azeri. Each of these Muslim cultural groups across the former Soviet Union felt more connected to their ethnicity than to their Islamic faith after 70 years of Soviet rule. During these years, no Islamic missionary activity was tolerated anywhere in the Soviet Union, and those who tried to spread the faith were severely persecuted. Missionaries from outside the country were not able to come into the Soviet Union. These years had, in effect, been an all-out war against Islam because Moscow felt that any local sense of an Islamic identity was antithetical to the goals of the Soviet state. Soviet control stifled religious education throughout Central Asia, and Moscow only permitted two Islamic training centers for imams to remain

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in operation. None of these schools had any connection with missionaries from the outside Muslim world. A few students were carefully selected by the local authorities to determine whether they could go to these schools and had all of their expenses paid by a salary provided by the state apparatus.26 In contrast, since the demise of the Soviet Union, a host of Islamic educational facilities have been inaugurated. Most of these have missionary connections and many of these madrassas have been directly funded by Arab Islamist communities from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, from Iran. These missionary enterprises working through education are gradually changing the way Islam is practiced. Many of the clergy who are trained at the Mir-Arab madrassa of Bukhara, for example, are said to be preaching a more puritanical and militantly active Islam. One example of this is the al-Bukhari Muslim Institute, which opened in Tashkent, and since the fall of the Soviet Union, has committed its curriculum to educate Muslims about the aberrant practices of mystical Islamic movements in Central Asia. Local Muslims have never seen this as a problem. PanIslamism (and other political ideas with a long history in the Muslim world but not in Central Asia) also circulates from missionary preaching in such religious training centers. Islam has survived for decades in Central Asia without any missionary influences being able to enter the region. The years of Soviet rule among Central Asian Muslims resulted in most Muslims knowing less about the basic ideas and doctrines of Islamic teaching. Even in the middle of statesponsored persecution against Islam, however, a confessional fraternity emerged, which allowed Islamic worldview assumptions, beliefs, and rituals to be taught. In this way, Islam came to be understood within most people’s minds as the primary way their ethnic identity was to be understood. Persecution created an Islam that was increasingly militant in its political character, as well as assertive of its distinctive cultural identity. Rooted in local heritage and identity, Central Asian Islam has become more assertive in the weave of the social fabric. This trend is evident in every republic and across all age-groups but is not necessarily a result of extraversionary Islamist missionary activity. Religious observance is becoming increasingly evident. At many Central Asian universities, an increasing number of students are fasting during the month of Ramadan, and more women are choosing to wear a hijab (head covering). Hyman observes, “Numbers of young women in the cities have taken to wearing white head scarves to cover their hair. Is this the straightforward observance of Islamic dress rules, or instead, as some claim, more a fashion, a style rather than an alternative lifestyle?”27 All of the former Soviet Central Asian republics are Muslim societies with the lines between nationality and religion becoming progressively

Islamicization of Central Asian society 81 more blurred. After the fall of the Soviet Union, there were questions about how Islamic this region actually was, but “these discussions have declined, and Central Asia is now considered a legitimate part of the Muslim World.”28 Islam seeks to insert itself into the ideology of every political, economic, and social aspect of Central Asian life. Through Islam, past rulers embodied their political aspirations, and present officials have asserted their Islamic credentials to their citizens. Uzbek strongman President Islom Karimov officially sponsors all pilgrims making the hajj, and he himself traveled to Mecca.29 Central Asian political leaders today are sworn into their various offices while holding their hand above a copy of the Qur’an.30 Historically, Islamic schools (makhtabs) run by local clergy and madrassas led by teachers chosen in the community were the primary ways by which many Central Asians received education. This changed dramatically during the Soviet era when, according to Panarin, “Muslim education and Koranic knowledge were strictly localized with the circle of those who were officially allowed to conduct religious services greatly narrowed.”31 This is not the case today with new masjids and schools that are being opened with dizzying speed. Missionary activity has been behind much of this growth. Malasheko writes that “Islamic foreign organizations are financing the construction of masjids, the setting up of madrassas and institutions, and sending out teachers and preachers.”32 Festivals are celebrated once again, and the mullah at the masjid is once again looked upon to provide Civic leadership. Islam is in resurgence. In 1990, there were only 18 masjids open throughout Tajikistan, but by 2005, there were over 2,500 masjids in operation.33 Abandoned masjids and schools are being repaired and reopened. Thousands of Central Asian Muslims can once again be seen at Arabia’s pilgrim sites (an interesting thread for further research might be how these Central Asians change their understanding and practice of Islam upon their return to the region). Private religious education is flourishing once again. Islamic books and other religious commodities are increasingly visible in Central Asian markets.34 Although many of these books are printed in the region, scores of other books are being printed by Muslim influences from outside of Central Asia. All of these changes in the expression of contemporary Central Asian Islam illustrate both the widespread impact of the fall of the Soviet Union as well as the rapid advances that Islamic ideology is making in penetrating the fabric of society. As Central Asians begin to identify themselves primarily as Muslims (instead of simply as Central Asians), those who come from other faith communities feel increasingly marginalized and less welcomed within their own villages. The increasing Islamization in relation to cultural identity parallels a similar effort in neighboring Russia to establish “Orthodox Christianity as a specific component of a specific Russian identity.”35

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But is this Islamic resurgence a threat? Will Islamist missionary influences make Central Asian Muslims more likely to link their faith with their political ambitions? Historically, Central Asian Islam was not a significant factor in political change. The faith of Islam aided people in passing down traditions and maintaining cultural identities but it had little impact on political facts. This may explain why, today, most Muslims in Central Asia remain politically apathetic, essentially tolerant, and usually only concerned about making ends meet. This legacy is also the primary cause for hope in the question of how militant the region might become in the future. Michael Rykwin asserts that religion is a defense mechanism for the weaker against the stronger.36 This was certainly the case under Soviet rule in Central Asia. Islam is now allowed to flourish in post-Soviet Central Asia, and Muslims are no longer powerless. The masjid, however, continues to serve as the meeting place for those in the new order who are disenfranchised and frustrated by the pace of change or the lack of success in their own until they are finally given the power they sought. In some sense, the masjid has become a battlefield, where traditional Islamic practices are increasingly coming into confrontation with an externalized missionary vision of Islam as a universal force. For the first time in Central Asian history, religion-based political opposition parties have emerged, offering attractive solutions of the past to deal with the anarchic realities of the present. Muslim clergy who have been influenced by Islamic missionaries have become increasingly involved in the local political process and often criticize their own governmental leaders for being too secularist in their political orientation. Will the Muslims of Central Asia embrace militant Islamist movements? Will Islamist missionary influences change the character of Islam in Central Asia? Islamism in the region is a result of missionary activities and has to be seen in the context of the larger global movement, and what happens outside the region has a direct effect on the growth of Islamism within Central Asia. After the Soviet and American invasions of Afghanistan, for example, these movements gained popularity in Central Asia. On the one hand, some Islamist missionaries entered the region (in small numbers) for the first time from Pakistan and Afghanistan. On the other hand, many Central Asians, commissioned to fight for the Soviets in Afghanistan, quickly became impressed with the level of Islamic dedication that young mujahadeen who had come from all over the Muslim world brought to their confrontation. The civil war that gripped Tajikistan for five years (1992–1997) was framed as a war between Muslim fundamentalists influenced by missionaries from outside the region and post-Soviet neo-Communist secularists.

Islamicization of Central Asian society 83 There was ample extraversionary missionary influence during this time in Central Asia. One fruit of this may have even been the dramatic explosion of six bombs at government offices in Tashkent on February 16, 1999, that resulted in wounding hundreds of citizens and the killing of 16 people. Traditional Islam was probably not responsible for such an aggressive action. Armed Islamic bands have repeatedly crossed a number of borders in the region. Hostage taking and political assassinations have taken place. The question is not whether such terrorist movements are taking place but to what extent and how much of a threat are they to the fabric of civic society. Islamist missionary radicals preach that the salvation of the Muslim world is dependent on the community of faith returning to a purer, more zealous Islam. The degree that a good Muslim should assimilate with Western ideas and adopt progressive ways of thinking has long been a point for discussion among Muslims. Radical Muslims influenced by Islamism from outside the region provide a clear call for an uncompromising position on such questions. Some demand that their nations exile all infidels (non-Muslims) from their midst and that governments impose shariah law. Other radicals have attacked women, for example, who walk about the streets of Central Asia without headscarves as being prostitutes who need to be arrested.37 They are driven by a “worldview that seeks to establish its own order.”38 Although critics dismiss Islamic fundamentalists (a problematic term) as lacking “intellectual coherence and being morally blind and socially perverse,” their views have been warmly welcomed among frustrated Central Asians.39 Because the political cauldron of Central Asia simmers with social misery, corruption, and authoritarian governments, these ideas about Islam from outside the region are becoming increasingly attractive. It is not hard for common people to realize that many of their governments are doing very little to change their grim plight. Many rural Central Asians are poorly educated, or even illiterate (‘awamm), but are very devoted to the faith. Radicals will take advantage of this and have gained strength among the poor by seeming to offer concrete hope and specific and practical solutions. With missionary fervor, voices of dissatisfaction have gained a wide audience throughout the area.40 Islamist radicalism is expressed in many complicated ways. Depending on one’s point of view, these advocates for change are either thugs and bandits or simply a disenfranchised minority, whose real importance is that they serve as social indicators of wider communal discontent with the corrupt status quo. Many Muslims feel that an alien and inherently violent type of radicalism that is coming from Islamist missionaries is completely antithetical to their own heritage. Islam, as a political ideology (or Islamism) in Central Asia, has been referred to with the elastic term Wahhabism since the 1950s.41 It is interesting

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to note that leaders of governments continued to use this misnomer even while collecting money and enlisting support from Saudi Arabia. Namecalling predominates when tensions rise. It is not uncommon today for Islamists to attack all government officials as communists, and these government officials dismiss all Islamists as being Wahhabists. Islamist movements originating from outside Central Asia challenge the political and religious status quo and claim to have direct authority from the Qur’an and Hadith. They often rely heavily on symbolic resources to promote their assertive convictions. The collapse of the Soviet Union has been a crisis for Central Asia, and Islamist missionaries have seen an opportunity to grow in this context. This is because in a crisis, one writer suggests, “people see no real prospects for themselves in this earthly life; they fear the present and even more the future. The only way out is in idealizing the past. A turn towards bygone days is prompted by despair.”42 Islamist missionary movements have been active with their politicized message in many Central Asian republics and especially among the rural poor. Although there are many different Islamist organizations, three large groups merit particular consideration. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a relatively small group of militant rebels and was originally formed in the 1990s by an activist who used the assumed name, Juma Namangani. First, the IMU began as a missionary organization that was based in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban because of its militant struggle against Uzbekistan’s government. It has also been active in other countries (particularly in Kyrgyzstan) and supported the IRP in the Tajik civil war. The IMU is also sometimes known as the Islamic Democratic Party.43 This group had links with al-Qaeda and a host of other Islamic terrorist organizations that had been training recruits in Afghanistan, during the Taliban era. The IMU is primarily constituted of impoverished farmers in the Fergana Valley. For many years, they were active in carrying out bomb attacks, political assassinations, and highprofile kidnappings. The IMU was often active in local drug trafficking as a way to finance their organization. In recent years, only pockets of the organization have continued as their leadership structure was widely disturbed by the death of their leader, during the United States bombing raids in northern Afghanistan in November 2001. The Party of the Islamic Renaissance (or the Islamic Rebirth Party) or IRP is another important political Islamic group, which is active in missionary activities. They preach a bold message that is critical of moderate Muslims who have allowed social injustices to flourish. They often call for the establishment of Islamic schools and are convinced that only Islam has the answers to the problems that the region is facing. Many of their ideological assertions parallel the strident conclusions of people like Imam

Islamicization of Central Asian society 85 Khomeini in Iran or Abu A’la al-Mawdudi of Pakistan. There is no place in an Islamic society, the IRP suggests, for democracy. One incendiary article written in 1991 in their newspaper al-Wahdat “carried a verbose article under the meaningful heading, ‘Democracy for democrats, Islam for Muslims’.”44 The IRP has subdivided into branches in each Central Asian nation. The Tajik IRP was a significant protagonist in Tajikistan’s civil war and largely funded their political activities with lucrative narcotics trafficking originating from the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan. A large reason for the IRP’s ability to gain effective control over a large portion of the country outside of the capitol has been the inability of a weak Tajik central government to maintain order. The eradication of this group, infused with Taliban ideology, will be difficult because it has bases in Afghanistan as well as in Tajikistan and missionaries travel back and forth across the border. The IRP has gained increasing grassroots support among the people because they present the only viable alternative to the Communist party political operatives (apparatchiks). The Tajik peace agreement of 1997 gave official recognition to the IRP, and they have tried to work through the political process but with very little success to date. Third , the Pan-Islamic Party of Liberation (or Freedom) or Hizb ul-Tahrir (HT) is gaining increased support in Central Asia. The HT is another missionary movement that was founded in Jordan and Palestine in 1953. It often employs “extremely radical language to assert that there can be nothing in common between Western values and those of the Islamic world.”45 The Hizb ul-Tahrir is an internationalist missionary movement that operates in at least 40 countries, including a strong following in Egypt, Turkey, North Africa, the Sudan, and Pakistan as well as all of Central Asia, but especially in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.46 The HT has recruited many of its numbers from educated, urban youth, who then helped to spread the message among the poor and rural populations. They use literature and the internet to expand their missionary efforts. The HT preaches a message that calls for the radical redistribution of wealth and the elimination of political and economic corruption. Another of its stated goals is the establishment of an Islamic state (or Caliphate) where all Muslims will exist as brothers. The HT claims this goal will only take place through nonviolent means. Their literature, however, is filled with rhetorical violence against the Jews and the West. Although the HT is probably not directly affiliated with any other militant Islamic political missionary group in Central Asia, it does share similarities with many of these organizations. The HT is highly secretive and well organized into small five-member cell groups called daira and shares many of the intolerant Islamic fundamentalist worldviews held by militant Islamic

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groups such as al-Qaeda. The HT is not only anti-Jewish and anti-Western, but it also rails against Shi’ism, threatening the significant Shi’ite communities of southern Uzbekistan and eastern Tajikistan. It opposes all expressions of mystical Islamic orders, many of which have long promoted tolerance in both Central Asia and in Persia. In one diversion from al-Qaeda, the HT website is critical of Osama bin-Laden for launching his war against the West prematurely, and thus bringing undue harm to all who hope for a united Islam.47 From the perspective of the repressive leaders of Central Asia, the HT is a group of bandits. This might not tell the entire story. Most members are ethnic Uzbeks and thousands of their numbers now languish in Uzbek jails at the behest of President Karimov, who insists that they share the radical message of the militant Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Unlike the villagers of the IMU, many of their number are taken from the intelligentsia and from the ranks of students. As of yet, they have not encouraged actions such as suicide bombings or other terrorist tactics. They claim to be idealists who call for a peaceful Jihad. The Asian Times wrote that, “The HT, whose (international) underground headquarters is now probably in Jordan, has defined itself in a communiqué on its website as a political party that does not undertake material actions…It is above all a giant proselytizing machine that has not resorted to guerilla warfare—at least not yet.”48 It is a modern missionary organization relying on the internet and digital technology to advance its message of the need for a one-nation shariah-law Islamic state. Missionaries from Islamic universities and institutions abroad have preached an Islamist message that had been forbidden during Soviet times and have met with a positive response. Missionaries poured into the region from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union. Most of their activities were confined to distributing Qur’ans and talking to people about Islam but there were some who became involved in political and military struggles. This led authorities to become suspicious of their activities. Mission activity mixing with militant politics was especially noticeable in the Ferghana Valley between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The message of the missionaries caught on in this region because most people had not seen any noticeable improvement in their material and social living standards.49 The Tabligh Jamaat claims to be a nonpolitical missionary movement, and it is growing in Central Asia. It was founded in India in 1926 by Muhammad Ilyas. Since their founding, they have been organized into groups ( jamaats) of ten missionaries who often go into small villages with their message of revival. Most of the Tabligh Jamaat missionaries in Central

Islamicization of Central Asian society 87 Asia today hail from Iran, Pakistan, India, or Afghanistan. They are quite strong in Tajikistan. Missionaries are easily recognizable because of their small beards and Pakistani robes. Their focus is on instructing men in how to lead their families in devotional Islamic practices. The growing success of these missionaries and their high visibility, however, has gained the attention of governments in the region, which have tried to crack down on their missionary efforts. Some claim that Tabligh Jamaat opens the door for more militant messages to come along because it fundamentally attacks the status quo and is rooted in dissatisfaction. The Times of London wrote of their growth in England that “the continuing role of powerful mass-proselytizing groups like the cultish Tabligh Jamaat remains deeply problematic.”50 Indeed, the organization sometimes involves itself in political issues. Others argue that this mission organization actually provides an alternative to the extremism of other Islamist missionary organizations and should not be curtailed. The Tabligh Jamaat claims to be completely apolitical and has no room for violence. In spite of this claim, and without any evidence, the government of Uzbekistan claimed that these missionaries were behind a string of bombings in March and April 2004 that killed over 40 people. Although they are no longer allowed in Uzbekistan, they operate freely in Kyrgyzstan. One missionary organization that is active in Turkmenistan is the Nurcu movement (ceemat) led by Fethullah Gulen of Turkey.51 The main focus of Gulen-sponsored missionaries in Turkmenistan is in the development of educational programs, such as sponsoring the construction of student dormitories and the organization of training programs for professionals and laity. Links began when Nurcu delegations visited Turkmenistan and then invited Turkmen officials to come and visit Turkey to learn about their educational programs. Most of the Gulen workers in service (hizmet insani) are Turks, who are involved in education. They advocate programs that focus on scientific and modern methodologies. There is no religious component at all in the teaching programs, even though the group is Islamic and committed to the advance of its movement in Central Asia. Missionaries are not allowed to even mention Gulen or Nurcu, or distribute (at least openly) Nurcu literature. Gulen teaches that mission work should be extended by teaching (tebligh) and noble living (temsil). The movement has overseen the establishment of a large number of high schools and even one university in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Educational programs sponsored by the Nurcu in Uzbekistan were banned in September 2000. Some have compared their methodologies to those of the Jesuits. They will refer to themselves as a Turkish school instead of as a Fethullaci school. When asked suspiciously why they are so active in

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Central Asia, the Gulen movement always provides the same answer, “We are here to help the sister republics of Turkey.”52 Because Turkmenistan was the least Europeanized of the previous Soviet Republics, it is not surprising that it remains very conservatively Islamic and resistant to external missionary activities. In his lifetime, President Niyazov promoted an aggressive Islamification project as a way to control Islam and to guard against the more fundamentalist Islamist teachings from his neighbors to the south: Iran and Afghanistan. Niyazov’s goal was to promote a traditional Sunni Islamic vision rooted in the ancient history of his country. Likewise, Uzbekistan, while supporting Islamification mandates that all religious activities within the country must first gain the approval of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (formerly the SADUM of the Soviet Union). In this way, missionary efforts of Muslims from outside the region are more easily controlled. This same instrumentality of Islam for political motivations is also a major factor in Tajikistan. Outsiders should not confuse such movements as reflecting the same kinds of Islamic militant ideas that are seeking to take root in other parts of the world. Every Central Asian republic is wary of missionary movements with connections from outside the region, and some nations, such as Uzbekistan, are trying to keep these movements on a very tight leash. During the United States Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations briefings on Central Asia, S. Fredrick Starr reminded his audience that “Thanks to Soviet rule, Central Asia boasts one of the most literate and numerate Muslim populations anywhere, and is ruled by secular governments.”53 This quotation is only one illustration of the many ways that Eurasian Muslims must be understood to be very different from their Muslim brothers and sisters in neighboring countries to the south such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. The Islamic quality of life in Central Asia has a clear effect on fraternal relations with other Muslim countries. Pragmatism, however, continues to be the primary determinant in these dynamics. Islam, if anything, will continue to grow in importance both internationally and in domestic issues of Central Asian cultures. As frustrations with modernism increase, hopes and promises fade, and as poverty continues to take root, the wishful world of dreams will continue to offer a warm haven from the harsh winds of reality. Islam can be a force for unity and has been that historically in Central Asia. Missionary movements can promote a moderate Islam that focuses on faith (which will then create positive opportunities for social change) or become increasingly fundamentalist and threaten to tear communities apart. Radicalized forms of Islam may be able to gain headlines around the world, but most Muslims in Central Asia embrace a much more deeply

Islamicization of Central Asian society 89 rooted Islam of profound faith and deep cultural heritage. Militant Islamist missionaries offer some appeal, but the heavily weighted political agenda of its advocates will not gain a wide appeal among millions who find in their faith assuring consistency instead of angry assertiveness. Central Asia’s Muslims have been sustained over the centuries by inspirational encouragement and ritual practice that have provided consistent support in any and every situation. Although all Muslims are commanded to struggle against the abuses of a despot (taghiya), Sunni Islam has long advocated that this be done without violence.54 Perhaps, most importantly, missionaries from outside the region are dramatically changing the character of Central Asian Islam. Because many of these movements promote a specific brand of right-wing Islam, they are often intolerant of the diversity of traditional Islamic practice in the region. Saudi missionaries from a Wahhabist background are determining the direction of Islam in the region by their insistence on certain claims and their reductionistic solutions. Central Asia has a diverse Islamic identity, and many missionary efforts are geared to eradicating what is unique about Sufi Islam in the region. Wahhabist missionaries, for example, have condemned the practice of celebrating Norooz, the Persian New Year (celebrated at the Vernal Equinox) because it is dismissed as being a pagan practice with no Islamic heritage. Kyrgyz faith healers have also been targets of attack. Many Saudi missionaries attack what is unfamiliar and culturally different and hope to replace it with their true Islam. In spite of waves of external influences, Central Asia has preserved unique expressions of the historic Islamic experience. Much of the resurgence of Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia, in fact, is as much about the reassertion of cultural identity as it is about the revival of Islam. Ancient Islamic values are once again being promoted as pathways to stronger civil societies during this era of transition. Each externalized manifestation of missions that promotes resurgent Islamism in Central Asia must be examined in its own right. Many of these will only have a temporary effect. Perhaps missionaries will return to their Muslim contexts changed as well. The worldwide dar al-Islam will benefit from the continuing preservation of the unique heritage of Central Asian Islam. Central Asia has historically made a major contribution to the worldwide community of faith. That legacy can continue if it is not destroyed by radical missionaries or authoritarian dictators. Islam is important in Central Asia today but it is not usually the defining factor. Central Asia’s republics are not as secular as their European or North American counterparts. There is a clear mixing of secularism, nationalism, and “the use of Islam” to promote “quasi-theocratic authoritarianism.”55 Modern challenges face the Muslim communities of Central Asia. Perhaps,

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the deeply rooted Islamic heritage of Central Asia will not only overcome retrogressive politicized missionary movements but, in so doing, extend hope to other Islamic communities encountering similar transitional challenges. The resistance Central Asian Islam offers militant Islamist missionaries may be a valuable resource for both Muslims and those who hope that Islam does not become increasingly hijacked by advocates of extremist discontent.

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Post-Soviet Protestant missionary efforts in Central Asia

East is east and west is west/and never the twain shall meet Till earth and heaven stand presently/before God’s great Judgment Seat. Rudyard Kipling, The Ballad of East and West Let our Western brothers who come to us remember that we are not green grass. Pastor Nedelchev, Bulgaria Many removed their coats as they entered the warmth of the church… and though they became less bulky, they still looked shapeless, worn-out, used, but not broken… These were peasants, known as kreshanan, virtually the same word as the Russian word for Christian. Geoffrey Moorhouse, Apples in the Snow

On October 6, 2006, the local Justice ministry in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, placed the Missionaries of Charity, originally founded by Mother Theresa in Calcutta, under state control. The investigation into the activities of this Catholic mission, universally praised for its help for the poor, came as part of a larger crackdown on other foreign missionaries and NGOs who might be bearers of potentially corrosive Western ideas. The focus of the investigation was on their activities, and not on their legal status, because the Missionaries of Charity have been registered in Uzbekistan since 1995, and the organization was reregistered in March 2004. This action by the Uzbek government is part of a larger trend in Central Asia to not only control every aspect of society but also to regulate what influences come to the people of Central Asia. A major focus of these concerns has to do with European and North American Protestant mission organizations. For the most part Russian Orthodox Christians and Catholic Christians are not very active in seeking to proselytize Central Asian Muslims. Both Orthodox and Catholic communions have sent missionaries

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to Central Asia in the past two decades but their work has been almost entirely focused on either pastoral care for adherents of their own communities or for humanitarian efforts such as those done by the Missionaries of Charity. The same is not true of many of the Protestant denominations, which typically share some degree of affiliation with the churches in North America or Europe. Mennonites, Pentecostals, a range of Baptists, Mormons, and Seventh-Day Adventists are all present in Central Asia. Their activities will be the primary focus of this chapter. Conservative Protestant missionaries often claim that their activities in Central Asia are based on the biblical commands to be “witnesses” to nonChristians (Matthew 28:16–20) and to support their fellow Christians in discipleship (Colossians 1:27–29; Galatians 6:4). They follow the example of the first Christians, who preached across lines of cultural and religious difference (Acts 14:17; 17, 22, 31; Romans 1:2, Gen. 14:18–20). Christ himself preached his message on obscure and dusty streets clothed in the common garb of his peasant community. Because the life of the Nazarene was woven into the fabric of his culture, he would probably have worn a prayer cap and flowing robes and would have spoken Kazakh or Tajik or Uzbek had he lived in Central Asia. Christians make the bold claim that God chose a Galilean peasant to reveal eternal truths to humanity (John 12: 44–45; 14:9). Elizondo writes that God cannot be known for Christians apart from the “historical and cultural situation of his people. Jesus was not simply a Jew, he was a Galilean Jew.”1 Further, it is important that Christ himself lived a life of constant cultural interaction: His genealogy reminds us that he hailed from an interethnic AfroAsiatic ancestry. At birth, Jesus was greeted by Persian Magi and then fled the Roman Empire as a refugee into Africa. In his preaching, Jesus spoke to Romans, Syrians, Arameans, Samaritans, and Canaanites. In each case Christ modified his approach. Contrast, for example, His dealings with Nicodemus (John 3:1–21) with the interactions with the woman of Samaria (John 4:7–26). Christianity holds that Christ’s life and death are applicable to every culture.2 Although many of these evangelical Christians describe their gospel as Good News, it is often presented to the Central Asians as very bad news—as an alien and threatening challenge to the stability of Central Asian culture. Both Christians and Muslims should unite to work in Central Asia as positive agents for changes that are desired (such as in social injustice). Such an approach may be less glamorous and will demand a long-term commitment to involvement in Central Asia. New paradigms need to be adopted by both Muslims and Christians to improve interfaith relations. These must be

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based on the hard realties that are being experienced instead of hoped-for and unrealizable fantasies. The evangelical missiologist David Hesselgrave writes that while the future may provide daunting challenges it will also “certainly present tremendous opportunities to demonstrate the truth and power of Christ.”3 Although many of the remnants of Protestants in Central Asia speak with a decidedly Ukrainian or German accent, Central Asian Christianity, in its modern expression, is largely Russian Orthodox Christianity, and even that which is not Russian Orthodox has been dramatically defined by the Russian presence. This would explain why Russian evangelicals and Pentecostals are so interested in Central Asia, including many who used to live in the region before immigrating to Russia. Michael Rykwin says that Russians in Central Asia have always connected their concerns about their faith with their concern for Central Asia: “The Russians have always been missionary people. Whether advocating Russian Orthodoxy or Marxism, they seem to hold a deep belief in their own righteousness combined with an inability to compromise.”4 These same Christians, however, seldom express any desire to positively connect with Central Asia’s Muslims at the level of interfaith engagement. This general lack of desiring to relate with Muslims on the basis of faith is augmented by the valid fear that many Christians in the region are facing social challenges that they fear might erupt into persecution. Foreign Christians have difficulty being able to fully grasp what it means to be a Christian living in Central Asia today, where very few of their neighbors share their Christian faith. In spite of this, non-Central Asian Christians have the potential to be able to assist and encourage Central Asian Christians, if they come in a posture of mutual respect. Throughout any process of engagement, however, questions of motives must be addressed. Central Asia is not some phantasmal backdrop for outsiders to experience; it is a real world that merits more accurate understanding and more sensitive engagement than it now enjoys. A number of European and North American Protestant mission organizations are active in Central Asia. These groups need to examine not only their methods, but also their motives as they relate to their interaction with local communities be they Christian or Muslim. The priorities and the perspectives of Central Asian Christians or Muslims have not always seemed to come first in these unequal relationships. Sometimes foreigners have come with an attitude of arrogance and seem to have forgotten that their own countries might also be in need of some dimension of spiritual renewal while, at the same time, viewing Central Asia only through the lens of a perceived spiritual need. This mindset contributes to paternalism. Missionaries in Central Asia should remember that they are there as guests at the good graces of all Central Asians (not just the Christians) and that

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their experiences as visitors provide them with a wealth of personal benefit in terms of life experiences. One question that provides an ideal starting point for considering the status of Protestant missions in Central Asia would be the ways that these foreigners relate to the predominantly Russian and German Christians, who have lived in the region throughout their lives. Some Europeans and North American Protestants seem to harbor preconceptions that Russian Orthodox or Russian Catholicism is deficient in contrast to the European or North American versions of the faith that they are seeking to import. A number of denominational North American and European mission organizations have not felt it necessary to establish working relationships with local Christians, particularly with Russian Orthodox Christians. This sends a fundamentally disrespectful message. The problem goes the other way as well. Some Russian and German Christians opt for the safety of insularity as it relates to the foreigners in their midst who often seem completely out of touch with what they need to do to be more successful in their new environment. This may be a conditioned response given a long history of problematized relationships with outsiders. Self-sufficiency provides its own benefits as well as difficulties for a church that has been embattled and still feels under siege within its present realities. Protestant missionaries and service workers should sympathetically work toward diffusing possible suspicions. In fact, it is this very cautious reaction on the part of Russian and German Central Asian Christians that has allowed the church to be sustained through difficult decades of tremendous opposition and even physical persecution. A French proverb explains that a good cause needs help and, indeed, both Christians and Muslims in Central Asia can benefit from external assistance, but only that aid which comes in the spirit of mutuality instead of brusque assertive arrogance. The influx of confident but naive Western Protestants may make things much more difficult for these established Christians. Interfaith partnerships expressed with mutual respect will be sensitive to the local context and will not impose alien forms and expectations. On many occasions, condescension instead of cooperation has defined interfaith and intercultural relations. Northrop writes generally that: “The Central Asian East was seen as unenlightened and primitive, thus practically begging for the introduction of civilization and progress by a more advanced West” and this same mindset can be at work as missionaries from outside the region relate with Central Asians.5 One-dimensional observations such as that expressed by the British cleric Henry Landsell that “the people of the Kazakh steppe are an excellent example of how people lived at the time of the Old Testament…having a primeval character”—do nothing but harm.5

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Protestant missionaries would have a better chance of being welcomed as guests instead of being seen as a threat if their actions consistently showed a willingness to participate alongside those Central Asians, who are already working to realize their own dreams for a positive future. One example of such a partnership exists between Southern Baptist missionaries and a student fellowship in Almaty, Kazakhstan, called the Church of the True Way. These missionaries and local Christians, because they are a tiny minority among numerous primarily Muslim cultural groups, are very careful not to entrench themselves in an insular mentality but seek to foster an attitude of acceptance to cultural expressions. These Kazakh Christians, for example, pray in a manner similar to their neighbors and wash their hands when finished.6 Although broad generalizations about cultural concepts such as Asian values are malleable to the point of being factious, they should be addressed because they are still widely used by both Central Asians and others. Westerners may greatly appreciate the ways that Central Asians think of their faith and moral values more in terms of its communal, as opposed to its individualized expression. More attention could be given to respecting the intrinsic authority of elders and placing an emphasis on courtesy over a slavish devotion to the schedule and the clock. Of course, these are values not only found only in Central Asia. Another Central Asian cultural value that is cherished is that of a high priority given to hospitality. Central Asians are proud of the fact that they extend gracious openness to their visitors even if they speak a different language or hold to a differing religious point of view. Foreign missionaries and service workers have often been slow to embrace a disposition that links their dedication with a patient humility to recognize mistakes in the past and adapt methods and leadership structures. It has sometimes been the case that Protestant missionary organizations have been afraid to address pragmatic considerations in fear of compromising their commitment to biblical principles. The two should not be seen as mutually exclusive. An openness to change will protect missionaries from making unnecessary intercultural mistakes. The Lausanne Committee for World Evangelism (LCWE) is an ecumenical and evangelical Protestant organization, which has developed a six-point strategy for intercultural cooperation between Christians in Central Asia and those from other parts of the world. First, the LCWE suggests that all intercultural partnerships should exist primarily for the benefit of the local congregations and not for the para-church or international religious organizations. The first question that should be asked is: How will missionary efforts impact local Christians? Second, the LCWE challenges that nonresident missionaries and service workers should model intergroup

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cooperation by actively participating in such partnerships. Too often, mission and service organizations function as detached organizational entities instead of working in partnerships with local Christians. Those who are outside the Christian community learn volumes from the example of Christians from different cultures that are able to cooperate with each other in mutual respect. Creative partnerships need to emerge where missionaries see themselves as learners and beneficiaries and not simply as those who are coming to give and direct. Third, mission and service activities should be directed to the point of greatest need as defined by local residents. External priorities imposed by Westerners should not carry more weight in decision-making than the views of those who live in Central Asia. Fourth, programs should be long-term, and not temporary, tokenistic gestures that are not able to be sustained. It is rather easy to sense when people are involved in a project that is only temporary for their own self-interests. Fifth, all intercultural and interfaith initiatives must be rooted in the specific cultural context of the region. Cultural sensitivity will be the foundation for effective partnerships, which progress with ease. Escobar describes postimperial missiology as that which clarifies “the degree to which missionary ideas and practices from which the missionaries came.”7 Class attitudes and cultural idiosyncrasies often frame the presentation of cultural and religious values without the presenter even being aware that this is taking place. Finally, the LCWE reminds Christian missionaries and service workers that all interchurch partnerships must be vigilant to conduct their dealings with complete ethical and financial integrity. As a Turkish proverb reminds us, “Vigilance and precaution are safety.” Examples, regrettably, can be cited of missionaries or service workers who have sown the seeds of division among the local Central Asian communities. Countless problems have arisen when Westerners have insisted that their way of doing things is the best way to proceed, often undergirding their arrogant assertions with theological arguments. Cultural, religious, or organizational differences need not be glossed over, but they also must not capsize the rafts of partnerships. To avoid potential problems, foreign missionaries and service workers should resist claims of programmatic leadership for given initiatives. Educational plans, which can either be led by locals directly or by Christians who can more easily relate to the interreligious and intercultural challenges that define ministry in Central Asia, should be encouraged. It might be the case, for example, that Iranian, Turkish, Gagauzi from Georgia, or Pakistani Christians would be more effective working in Central Asia than someone originating from Sussex or Texas. Wealthy Westerners could sponsor Christians from poorer nations (maybe those with sizeable Muslim communities) instead of sending people from their own countries who will face

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the additional hurdles of cultural understanding and language differences. Financial support might also be focused on educational opportunities for Central Asian Christians who hope to return at some point in time but would benefit from training that would make them more effective in their long-term service. Medical programs are helpful in Central Asia because local health care facilities are desperately understaffed and undersupplied. The focus of one British mission organization has been on “those in need of healing” (Luke 9:11), which has led them to regularly sponsor a group of visiting medical specialists and students who come to Central Asia every year to provide basic medical assistance.8 The mission organization Frontiers is involved in eye-clinics, and pediatric and dental projects in Central Asia. Global Health Ministries, affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, provide short- and long-term service opportunities in Central Asia. Mental health problems, a growing concern in Central Asia (reflected by such indicators as an increasing suicide rate), are another area of concern in this era of social dislocation. Mental health care is imperative in Central Asia given the extent of the problem and the shortage of sufficiently trained mental health personnel, advanced medical technologies, and appropriate mental health facilities. Likewise, eye clinics and provisions for the treatment of those with physical disabilities or gerentological problems are needed because of the paucity of existing supplies, facilities, and personnel. Central Asia would also benefit from a host of nutritional and feeding programs for new mothers and their children. Central Asia faces a number of pressing ecological problems that merit assistance from external sources such as resources provided by Christian and Muslim service organizations. Facing these problems might provide an ideal context for interfaith partnerships. Ecologists and irrigation specialists are needed to develop programs to deal with the fact that many of the region’s lakes and rivers are drying up, causing dramatic irrigation problems. Some might question how addressing environmental issues relates to interfaith tensions in Central Asia, but a pressing need for progressive ecological justice is needed after decades of socialist centralized and ideological policies that rarely considered environmental concerns. Christians and Muslims can choose to remain on the sidelines or to engage actively in the development of a stable environmental, social, or economic climate. In the area of economics, a positive climate of progress will benefit all Central Asians as long as these developments are not predatory and opportunistic, but function in reference to that which is best for the local communities. Unfortunately, Christians have often engaged negatively (especially in China and Africa) in a marriage of what African missionary

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David Livingstone called “commerce and Christ.”9 Integrity is requisite, and hidden agendas cannot be tolerated. Increasing global economic interdependence is creating a new business context within the Central Asian bazaar. Technological advancement in communications and information services needs tremendous attention (though some nations in the region, Uzbekistan for example, have been more effective than others in utilizing and marketing their respective resources). Kazakhstan has worked extensively with a number of large multinational oil companies (such as Chevron) to develop the enormous Tengiz oil fields. A number of Protestant missionary organizations in North America and the United Kingdom are involved in job-placement programs for missionaries who will move to Central Asia with the purpose of evangelism.10 Economic realities in Central Asia provide unique ethical challenges for Christians and Muslims working in the business sector. Questions include concerns about responding to requests for bribes or incentives promised for special favors being rendered as a precondition for granting a contract. The Christian or Muslim business person will need to respond to a number of situations where economic blackmail remains a threat. They will be forced to deal with questions about the ways that they will work to ensure that legal codes and business regulations fall in line with international standards. Many economic problems, such as bureaucratic corruption and nepotism, are deeply rooted in Central Asia. A pressing need exists for business-related educators who will assist the Central Asians in transforming their economic infrastructure. Related to this are opportunities for people to teach English, the international language of business. In Uzbekistan, for example, one of the first acts of the newly constituted republic was to pass a resolution (SR197) calling for the widespread teaching of English. Education for the Central Asian Christians is another focus of mission organizations. The International Service Corps (ISC) of the Southern Baptist Church began in 1990 to place Southern Baptists in two-year assignments in Central Asia. The Southern Baptist mission Journeyman program was designed to promote educational formats that were sensitive and appropriate to the local situation given the fact that educational structures invariably have political implications. Some groups, such as Open Doors International, have organized training seminars focused on the nature and history of the Muslim–Christian interaction. Others have organized shortterm educational programs (S.T.E.P. seminars) focusing on such themes as leadership training, Biblical or Qur’anic studies, and theological education for parishioners. An organization known as Bible Mission International sponsors a Missionaries in Training (MIT) Program, which enables the Central Asians to establish their own mission organizations to other Central Asian republics.

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Missionaries have also formed schools both for their own children and for local communities. The Association of Christian Schools in Central Asia (ACSA) has opened elementary and primary schools, educational summer camps, education clubs, and after-school programs along with children’s homes and orphanages. The major concentration of their efforts is in northern Kyrgyzstan, but they are active throughout the country as well as in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.11 An American organization called Teach Overseas.org works in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to provide conversational English language teachers and uses the English language as a “starting point for deeper conversations about life and faith.”12 Media outlets have been used to promote religion in Central Asia. Christian television programming is broadcast into the region via satellite. In October 2002, the organization International Religious Radio and Television (IRR/TV) set up a number of programs in conjunction with the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association in Russia and Campus Crusade for Christ to launch a regional Christian Radio and Television Association in Central Asia. A media mission conference was even held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, by IRR/TV, which had over 80 missionaries from across Central Asia in attendance.13 Other Central Asians have been sent to Moscow for further training in the promotion of media in evangelism. Radio has long been popular among missionaries because, in many parts of Central Asia, a “voice across the skies” provides local Christians with encouragement and also the chance to promote evangelism among Central Asia’s Muslims.14 These radio programs are costly because day-to-day expenses for transmission are significant to reach a high standard of technical quality. The argument to support these efforts are that many Central Asians might never stop to read a book written by a Christian or attend a Christian service, but they might listen to a radio program while at work or in their homes. Religious organizations report that they receive many letters asking for follow-up literature. These inquiries are then forwarded for a response by local Christians living within Central Asia.15 Some missionaries have shown the Jesus Film, and other religious movies, which are primarily evangelistic, have been translated into the major languages of Central Asia.16 Movies are popular because local television stations commonly suffer from a shortage of programming in a given language. Any materials, even if they are religious, are welcome as long as they are seen to be complimentary to, and not in opposition with, local cultural values. Television stations within Central Asia have been, at times, benefited from technical assistance provided by expatriate Christians. Certain churches have established video libraries as a way to help encourage their congregants. Pastors have distributed portable cassette tapes and video cassettes for training.

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Christian literature is not abundantly available in the various languages of Central Asia. The distribution of this material, when it is available, is not always done in a systematic way. For example, 10,000 copies of a Tajik translation of the Bible were printed, but only handfuls were distributed. Some evangelical groups organize programs in Central Asia in which individuals, often in response to radio programs, come to churches or neutral sites to participate in simple evangelistic Bible studies.17 Bibles may still not be available to every Central Asian Christian in their own language. The availability of scriptures is difficult to measure accurately and continues to change. Organizations like Open Doors International remain active in distributing Bibles and other Christian materials in Central Asia. Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, a host of Central Asian countries shifted away from using the Cyrillic alphabet for their languages, and these changes have affected the way that the Bible and other religious literature is read. Some specific dialects remain, to this day, without their own alphabet. This is the reason why some Bible translation organizations have remained active in Central Asia.18 A long tradition of Bible translation characterizes Christian mission efforts within the region. Uzbeks gained access to translation of the Bible in their own language in 1913, but it was in an Arabic script that was not used under the Soviet rule. A recent translation of the Bible into Tajik improves on an earlier version, while revisions to translations of the Bible continue in both the major and minor languages of Turkmenistan19 and in the various languages of Kazakhstan.20 Some universities and other educational programs within Central Asia are designed to host visitors who are learning various Central Asian languages. Missionaries have been instrumental in either organizing or participating in a host of linguistic study centers designed for the study of the local languages. The training and logistics for the support of these missionaries are complicated and include addressing issues such as finances, housing, legal requirements relating to immigration and visas, and the education of children. A major issue of Protestant missionary extraversion (a term used to describe external influence) in Central Asia is the myriad host of short-term visits that countless organizations in North America and Europe organize. Southern Baptists organize a number of trips every summer to introduce North American Baptists to Central Asia. One group that works exclusively in Central Asia, People International, describes these short-term programs as being either evangelistic or service projects.21 People International emphasizes that these short-term missionaries should stress language learning as a way to reach “over 200 million unreached Muslim peoples,” who live in “one of the spiritually darkest areas in the world today.”22 The length of these short-term mission trips often vary in length anywhere from one

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week to two years. Many of these initiatives do not keep the LCWE mandate of linking their efforts with long-term local programs and objectives. Invasionary-type task forces fly into Central Asia, take pictures, do their damage, make promises, and are never heard from again. Many meet local Christians and ask them, often on a moment’s notice, to function as glorified tour guides. Although many Christians in Central Asia are often happy to serve as gracious hosts in assisting others in gaining a better appreciation of their situation, they probably have more pressing demands than making countless arrangements for the transportation, lodging, food, and even sightseeing needs for visiting Europeans or North Americans. Central Asian Christians should not be obligated to function as travel agents for missionary tourists. Short-term missionary efforts or cultural educational programs that support long-term objectives may have their place. Criticizing the methods of others and casting stones with sneering scorn is not productive. In this era of convenient international air travel and evangelistic imperialism, some organizations have even coined a new term to describe those who live in one place but work in another region: “the nonresident missionary.”23 This category may hold some validity in instances where permanent residency is not possible because of governmental restrictions. Where residency is simply inconvenient, the role of nonresident missionaries is dubious at best. The less grandiose but more accurate term visitor should be used for even the most dedicated of Christian tourists who, often at tremendous expense and effort, are involved in episodic programs for education or pastoral care. Peter Kuzmic of the World Evangelism Fellowship Theology Commission has noted that Western Christians must “recognize the differences between religious tourists and servants of Christ.”24 Some short-term ventures barge into the situation offering their own culturally appropriate answers instead of humbly listening and asking questions. Other groups distribute money, physical goods, and resources in a way that is indiscriminate and inappropriate. A number of published and televised descriptions of evangelistic activities from Central Asia are designed primarily for a North American audience to portray North Americans as being dizzyingly successful in their proselytizing efforts. Such accounts, in fact, often simplify and sensationalize complex problems to motivate their funding-base constituency. A host of nontraditional and even non-Christian religious groups, including Baha’i, Hare Krishna, Mormons, the Family, and Jehovah’s Witnesses are presently active throughout Central Asia. This is to be expected given the dramatic social changes taking place in the region. The Baha’i have been particularly active in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan. This city was targeted by Baha’i because, before the Soviet era (all Baha’i were expelled from Ashkhabad in 1938), it had been a significant center for their community.25

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A vast number of short-term Protestant missionary and service organizations have become active in Central Asia. One news account reported that between 1991 and 1992 the number of short-term North American missionaries or temporary service workers in Central Asia went from below 200 to over 900 workers.26 This article claims that Southern Baptists have budgeted 12 million dollars for mission effort in the former Soviet republics. North American Southern Baptists have maintained a high level of commitment to this region in the past two decades. It is their conviction in the words of one American evangelical organization that “Central Asia is the largest unevangelized area in the world,” and requires “Christians to share their faith in short-term opportunities for in-country language and culture study and openings for longer service in fields from agriculture to zoology.”27 These include efforts that are innocuously caricaturized as cultural-exchange festivals where, in fact, the drama and musical teams have come to evangelize Muslims and even Russian Orthodox and Russian Catholic Christians. The breadth of this influx may relate to the fact that many other nations with a predominantly Islamic population are far less easily accessible to their proselytization efforts. Further, Central Asians, starved for finances, attention, and spiritual resources after decades of the Soviet rule, seem uniquely welcoming to those who surreptitiously claim to serve as educators or businesspeople but who are in fact working in the region with evangelistic missionary intent. Some Protestant mission organizations even seem to be competing with other groups by replicating each other’s programs and disregarding each other’s activities. An example of waste can be cited in the instance of one evangelical mission organization that spent thousands of dollars on the translation of a hymnal, only later to discover that the same hymnal had already been translated years before. Certainly, mistakes will happen, and many good reports and efforts often go unnoticed. Nonetheless, Christian mission efforts would do well to consider the sage observation of a farmer who mirthfully noted that, “Some people are like manure that does a world of good when they are spread around but can make a terrible stink if they are all piled together in one place!” Infighting between different groups of Christians only brings further tensions to the already daunting challenges of the Muslim–Christian interaction. In fact, division and factionalism is one of the most common Muslim stereotypes of Christians. Ibn Hazm’s attacks against Christianity often cite the propensity of Christian groups to contradict each other.28 Within the historical development of Islam, one of the primary motivations for establishing a normative Qur’an and laying out guidelines for normative Islamic practice was such that Muslims might be able to more easily avoid the factionalism that seemed to be symptomatic of the argumentative faith communities that Muslims encountered wherever they interacted with Christians.

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Protestant mission efforts in the past two decades have been both the focus of persecution or have been granted a tolerant welcome. The experience of these missionaries has varied widely from country to country. Kyrgyzstan, for example, has constitutional laws, which provide strong assurances that individual religious practices will be protected. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, in contrast, make it difficult for Christians to be involved in any form of proselytization at the local level. In May 2006, the government of Uzbekistan closed down two Protestant churches in Samarkand because they had received funding from outside the region. A Seventh-Day Adventist church and an interdenominational fellowship run by a Korean pastor were also cited for efforts in illegal proselytizing. Other groups such as the American group “Central Asia Free Exchange” and “Global Involvement through Education” were also fined for “attempts to convert locals to a religion of Protestant character.”29 Muslims who convert to Christianity are considered apostates and could experience significant attacks that might be overlooked by local legal authorities. In some countries, cosmetic legal protections, however, do not always translate into local realities, and sometimes these statements are for the benefit of international political observers who are calling for respect for human rights. On a positive note, some Central Asian governments are increasingly active in arranging meetings with representatives from a wide range of religious and cultural communities and organizations to allow for their input in the development of such laws. Progress is slow, but it seems that, more and more, those who are concerned about violations against freedom of religion are becoming increasingly able to express their anxieties. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are making efforts to look more open in their acceptance of various religious perspectives, while Tajikistan seems to be becoming more restrictive. All Central Asian governments adamantly agree that they will not tolerate any religious views that are destructive to the wellbeing of a progressive civil society. Two religious postures are universally agreed to fall into this category: Marxist atheism and Islamic fundamentalism. Most Central Asian nations expressly forbid the teaching of atheism in the public schools as a direct response to the past legacy of the Soviet rule. Political extremism in the guise of Islam is also suppressed with aggression. But where does Christianity, particularly the efforts of expatriate evangelical missionaries, fit into this categorization of religious views that are seen to be socially destructive? Some Christians feel pressure to reign in any activities that might help their churches to grow either amongst themselves or through proselytization. They cite the fact that local officials employ a number of stratagems seemingly designed to make their lives more difficult. Strict and labyrinthine registration procedures, for example, and other legal procedures force Christians to become very much aware of their dependence on the good

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graces of the administrative structures that determine their destinies. Christians in Kyrgyzstan, for example, are confronted with a host of cumbersome registration procedures that have resulted in some applications being temporarily rejected and with certain groups being asked to reregister. Eventually, most Christian groups seeking to register with the government in Kyrgyzstan do seem to succeed in meeting these requirements, although some smaller congregations have experienced more delays and problems than larger Christian churches and organizations in the country. The tensions between the Central Asian Christians and their Muslim neighbors have often resulted in deep chasms of suspicion and even hatred. Notable and positive exceptions can be found, but many Christians, even though they have lived their entire lives among Muslims, are becoming increasingly isolated as they begin to equate interfaith interactions with issues of political and cultural security. This response is understandable, with recent political changes serving to compound these anxieties. Some Russian and German Christians, fearing the same kind of ethnic conflicts that engulfed Rwanda or Bosnia, characterize the diminishing of a Russian military presence in the region as the removal of a protective shield around their faith communities. Among other factors, these apprehensions have resulted in a large number of Christians choosing to leave Central Asia. What decades of Soviet antireligious propaganda failed to accomplish, a few years of relative freedom has achieved. The number of Christians as a percentage of the population in every Central Asian state has continued to decline. Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, the entire communities of the Russian and German Christians chose to migrate from a precarious “Sodom and Gomorrah” to what they hoped would be more secure places to raise their families (such as Russia, Europe, and North America). Many Christians decided to leave though they still had the opportunity because they felt that Central Asia was becoming increasingly Islamic in character. Many Christians felt this trend would eventually result in diminished religious freedoms. One can easily appreciate how such a large demographic transition fosters a sense of being embattled within those Christians who remain. On one hand, this situation also makes their Muslim neighbors look on them in a different light, often viewing them as too poor or too timid to leave. On the other hand, the decision of some Christians to stay can be viewed by their Muslim neighbors as meritorious because of their faithfulness and their full identification with Central Asia. Beginning in 1992, and still in existence, a series of incentives offered by the Federal Republic of Germany offered German speakers favorable conditions for immigrating to Germany, contributing to a large emigration of German Christians from Central Asia. A visit at that time to a German

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Mennonite, Lutheran, or Baptist congregation would allow any visitor to meet people who were considering moving to Germany or who had family members and friends already departed. It was not unusual to visit a German congregation only to find that the keys had been turned over to Russianspeaking Christians.30 Those churches that did remain open were often lacking in pastoral leadership. German-speaking congregations often lack recent hymnals and other educational resources in their native language. German church leaders in these congregations are worried about the ability of the remaining youth to maintain a strong identity with their German heritage, particularly their German language skills.31 Rapid demographic changes have made it difficult to accurately understand the strength of a particular denomination in a given region of Central Asia. While some congregations have actually grown in size in recent years, some of this growth has been due as much to consolidation as it has been because of evangelistic proselytization efforts. Baptist churches claim that while losing members and congregations, their losses have been less dramatic than others because they have been fortunate enough to receive more foreign financial assistance than other denominations. Many local Central Asian government officials, however, recognize that the increased emigration of Christians has impacted the community beyond the religious sphere. Émigrés were often some of the community’s most highly educated, and had held key technical and professional positions, which were important economically to the larger society. Their level of expertise, at the same time, made these émigrés increasingly attractive to potential employers outside Central Asia. As intercultural and interfaith problems continue to make Central Asia more unstable, those best prepared to strengthen the economy as well as provide religious and cultural diversity are leaving. Perhaps, missionaries could organize educational forums that focus on intercultural or interfaith issues. Evangelical research organizations have initiated programs from time to time that help both Central Asians and those outside of the region to face a host of ministerial challenges.32 Seminars on the Islamic–Christian relations may be constructive if those who are teaching them keep in mind that their cultures often have a host of issues (e.g., racism or negative attitudes about immigrants) that make them as guilty as any Christian Islamophobe who lives within the Central Asian cauldron. Educational initiatives should be organized free of any paternalistic condescension where foreigners see the “speck in the eyes” of their sisters and brothers but fail to recognize the “logs” (Matthew 7:3–5) in their own intercultural perspectives. Central Asian Christians can benefit from the input of foreigners who can speak with them about the nature of the Muslim–Christian interactions from

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a host of different perspectives (theological, historical, or missiological). The situation of Central Asia is unique, but that does not preclude the possibility that Christians learning about the Muslim–Christian interactions in Indonesia or Africa, for example, might be able to garner significant lessons for their own context. This might be particularly beneficial in assisting Central Asian Christians to grapple with questions relating to the incorporation of Muslim converts into Christian communities while, at the same time, helping them maintain good relations with their friends and families. Issues of how Central Asian Muslim communities deal with apostasy will become especially prescient in these circumstances. Although Christians often experience tensions with Muslim acquaintances, this is not the entire picture. Some have Muslim neighbors who are less hostile to their presence and who recognize their Qur’anic status as People of the Book (Surah 3:64–80; 4:47, etc.), giving them a more positive experience of interfaith interactions. Some Central Asian Christians have actively participated with their Muslim neighbors in mutual worship activities, civic improvement projects, and social justice activities. Members of one German-language mission organization, Licht im Osten (Light of the East), have made the Muslim–Christian interactions an area of particular focus in their missionary efforts. An organization, Ray of Hope, based in Frunze, Kyrgyzstan, as well as the missionary activities of a large church from Riga, Latvia (known as the Church of the Cross) are also active in Muslim and Christian dialogue from an evangelical perspective. Some of these groups in Central Asia have launched innovative programs such as encouraging Christians to join their Muslim neighbors to fast and pray in special worship services during the month of Ramadan. The presence of all forms of religion, Muslim or Christian, should positively contribute to the aesthetic life of the region. Art, music, literature, poetry, folk crafts, architecture, and dance are all vehicles to express the “grace of God at work in all of the small parts of life.”33 The folk art of Kazakhstan is one example of a local form which is distinct. Another would be the architecture of Central Asia’s masjids and madrassas. These provide a sensual overload of devotional imagination. Stalactite columns, arabesque doorways, peaceful verdant courtyards, and sky blue domes covered in glazed tile conspire to capture the heart. In gently flowing rivers of calligraphy and with the singsong magic of music of prayer, God’s word is proclaimed. Cultural observers can learn significant lessons by noting whom a given culture chooses to designate as meritorious enough to receive a monument or a memorial. It is not unusual to see, in many of the major cities of Central Asia, that some of the most notable statues are erected in honor of poets and writers. In Tajikistan, for example, the Samanid poet Abdul Hassan Rudkai

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is memorialized. Historical figures and events that are remembered either in sculptures or in literature also reveal clues about what a culture values as important. Literature is highly regarded in Central Asia, and there may be no more accessible path to gain insight into the mind of a given culture than to study literary works. Most Uzbeks, for example, speak reverently of the writings of Khamza Niazi, Kazakhs hail the poetry of Abay Kunakaev, and the Kyrgyz speak with pride of the writings of Chingiz Aimatov. Although the writings of most Central Asian authors are not readily available in an English translation, one can at least discuss with those they meet why they find resonance with a particular author. Effective communication in a given intercultural and interfaith context is best expressed through the nuance of form as well as content. This means Western and Asian Christians or Muslims in Central Asia will be committed to the task of multifaceted language study, which includes ancient proverbs and etymologies. Although English is spoken in selected urban areas, and Russian is more widely used (especially in Kazakhstan), these languages should not be learned as quickly because of the ways that these languages have been used in colonial and political contexts of oppression. Expatriates who take the time to learn local languages are paying a compliment of respect to those with whom they are interacting. Central Asian Christianity or Islam is best expressed, not in lofty European hymns or Arabic treatises, but when sung in the folksy and romantic dastans, the melodic renderings of folktales. When one relates the stories of Hoja Nasariddin, the wise fool unafraid to confront even the fierce Shah, one is participating in the celebration of a shared cultural heritage. Anecdotes, proverbs, and folk stories faithfully pass on the legends from father and mother to son and daughter, while the patriotic manas literature of Kyrgyzstan clothes any message they convey with motifs that have long been cherished. An ongoing legacy of values conveyed through such modes has been instrumental in helping Central Asians maintain some semblance of traditional perspectives in spite of a rapidly changing world. Other cultural factors merit consideration. Food and drink play a celebrated role in all Central Asian cultures. Business and friendships are advanced by sipping green tea or sharing a plate of nan (bread) while sitting on the carpeted daises of the chayakhansm or teahouses. Outsiders need to appreciate the significance of why certain countries have holidays and festivals and what those commemorations affirm within the life of a given community. Islam, Judaism, and Christianity are committed to the cause of advancing peace. Christianity teaches that Christ inaugurates the “gospel of peace” (Romans 10:15) by breaking down the walls of division and difference (Ephesians 2:14–15). Christians need hold no animosity to those who call

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themselves Muslims and should approach Muslims with a sustainable, intellectual confidence (Philippians 4:7) that is not threatened or intimidated by otherness. Christians engaged in interaction with Muslims are called to “pursue the things that make for peace” (Romans 14:19) in devotion to the “God of peace” (Romans 15:33; see also I Thessalonians 5:23 and II Corinthians 1:3). Among Muslims, Christians need not defend their own agendas but simply proclaim “Christ and Him as crucified” (I Corinthians 2:1–2). For Christians, Christ models his participation with humanity in his death, which means that Christians also are called to “share in the pathos of God toward all scattered things which are held together in the glory of the crucified Lord.”34 Unfortunately, many Muslims interacting with Christians do not feel that the Christian message that they hear has any “engagement with the real issues of life.”35 Judaism, Christianity, and Islam describe shalom or salaam of God as a comprehensive term that includes well-being, joy, and social and individual prosperity. God created a world of salaam out of chaos (as described in Genesis 1:2). The Bible speaks of a Messiah who becomes active in the midst of humanity to restore the creation to that initial sense of shalom (Isaiah 2:2–5). This salaam described is not merely a theoretical ideal expressed in vague platitudes but is the promised result of God’s presence expressed through God’s people (Hebrews 12:14; I Peter 3:11). Followers of Moses, Muhammad’s message, or Jesus Christ are called to be peacemakers among the various cultures of Central Asia. As one Christian writer said, “In Christ our peace we see that shalom is both the goal of our journey and the way we are called to walk.”36 An important consideration in interfaith interactions is the fact that this same goal is often the hope of many Islamic activists who recognize the extent to which injustices are now tearing at the heart of social cohesion. Central Asian Christians, Jews, and Muslims committed to peacemaking should not be surprised if their efforts are viewed by the powerful as a prophetic threat to their authority to rule (I John 3:13). Although some Central Asian governments talk about democratic reforms, their actions communicate what they are in actuality: “democracies of imitation, however insincere.”37 Unfortunately, political and social questions are often placed outside the realm of interfaith concern. Many Protestant evangelicals, for example, have concluded that the mandate of proclaiming the Christian gospel does not include confronting social inequalities. This approach is particularly problematic in the context of an Islamic or Jewish community that cannot understand any notion that faith is not to be directly applied to the living, daily challenges faced by the believer. The work of shalom-building is demanding and these faith traditions call their followers to wield the assertive sword of dedicated struggle (an allusion

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to Matthew 10:34) against injustice. Christians, Jews, and Muslims must “pull down strongholds” with a prophetic militancy (Psalms 20:7; II Corinthians 10:4) even in the face of those who oppose justice with their clubs and swords of intimidation (alluding to John 18:3). Although the messages of the Bible and the Qur’an are calls for both faith proclamation and for social justice, some suggest that the only priority for people of faith in a given society is to present a purely spiritual or religious message that deals only with eternal issues. Those foreigners who have criticized Central Asians for turning to Islamist militancy should appreciate that the attraction to their message springs from its perceived relevance to pressing social concerns and not a sense of remote detachment from the lived world of human suffering. Protestant missionaries who rail against Islam or Muslims who attack Christianity do nothing but promote suspicions and only add tensions to local faith communities. Jesus lived in a multireligious environment but chose not to focus on the failings of other religions (e.g., the Jupiter worshippers of Caesarea Philippi or the faith of the Samaritans). Instead, Christ offered a positive message of hope in the healing mercies of God. Christians in Central Asia need to share bread together with Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, and Kazakh Muslims at a table of mutual friendship. Instead of raising doubts about the veracity of the Muslim faith, Protestant missionaries should consider alternative approaches in their presentations. Attacks against other religions do not characterize the ministry of St. Paul, the first Apostles, or the message of Jesus. The same is true of the Prophet Muhammad, who believed that God alone was the judge on the final day and that followers of God must bow in humility instead of rant in bold castigating assertions against those of other faith communities and cultures. The Qur’anic command to “stand firmly for justice (adala)” is highly regarded in both Christianity and Islam. In both the religions, the glory of God can only be expressed once social justice is able to flourish. El Fadl notes that “The Qur’an persistently commands Muslims enjoin the “good” (ma’ruf ).38 When Muslims and Christians interact with kindness (ihsan, which literally means to beautify and improve), the entire society will benefit and tensions will lessen. Standing up for social justice may even mean that individuals will oppose their own self-interests but this kind of sincerity of action will generate all kinds of potential for improving interrelationships. When Muslims and Christians rise to that level of moral conscientiousness then normal contentiousness will fall to the wayside. Chains of fossilized social, cultural, and religious discrimination and resignation to injustice (munkar) will be broken when Christians and Muslims apply this imperative for social justice. For Christians, the message of salvation comes from Christ who came both to “preach the good news to the poor and to set at liberty those who

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were oppressed” (Luke 4:19). As Christians give to “the least of these,” they fulfill the command to serve Christ Himself (Matthew 25:40). Muslims are also obligated to care for the least in their midst as a way to show their devotion to God. The pillar of faith, zakah, reminds every Muslim or their duty to give to those in need. A number of Muslim social service organizations are active in Central Asia. A host of Christian organizations in Central Asia are also involved in humanitarian efforts. Numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are funded and staffed by Christians committed to the alleviation of human suffering. Initiatives range from education for agricultural concerns to helping organize greater civil services within Central Asia.39 Some Christians have looked at the problems related to potable water from rural wells and how contamination of this water has led to intestinal health problems. Other Christian organizations are working toward improving the quality of education, tackling issues of economic injustice, enhancing medical programs, and addressing social issues such as sexist attitudes toward women.40 Still other groups are providing care for orphans and assisting local adoption agencies in being more effective. Europeans and North Americans should be sensitive not only to Russian or Ukrainian Orthodox Christians but also to a number of local indigenous Pentecostal Christians in Central Asia. For some Christians, the Pentecostal emphasis on dreams, prophecies, and the miraculous is hard to fathom, but for others it is an ideal point of mutual understanding (an instance of commonality would be the shamanistic infrastructure of Turkic spirituality). Pentecostals take to heart Paul’s words to the Ephesian church that the “battle” of faith against demonic forces must be fought in “spiritual armor” (Ephesians 6:12–14) to pull down strongholds of evil (II Corinthians 10:4). They cite the ministry of Jesus who frequently confronted demonic powers (e.g., Mark 16:17). In his book, Christianity with Power, Charles Kraft notes that the story of Elijah challenging the prophets of Baal is the way that many Pentecostals understand interfaith confrontations where supernatural power encounters become the primary way to reach non-Christians. One such example is cited in the Issachar Bulletin for Frontier Mission Research, which relates the account of a Muslim Imam’s wife, who was healed when she went to a local Christian pastor and requested prayer. This Muslim leader openly proclaimed that his wife had been healed by the power of Jesus.41 Pentecostals believe that miracles are the best form of evangelism because, “in the Muslim world traditional mission approaches will not work. What the governments allow, the Islamic infrastructure will resist.”42 A number of Protestant mission organizations working in Central Asia are active in linking together different congregations in what they call sister-church relations between Central Asian churches and with a church in

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either Europe or North America. The massive First Baptist Church of Woodway in Waco, Texas, has developed prayer groups within its congregation, which not only pray for Central Asian Christians, but have also organized repeated visits to the region with some members even moving to Central Asia and living there for years at a time.43 Concern will always find a way to be meaningfully expressed and communicated, and the development of these networks of interrelation will greatly benefit both Christians within Central Asia and those outside its boundaries. Christians in Central Asia continue to adapt to a changing social context. In spite of difficulties and a significant number of émigrés, Christianity remains a visible presence within contemporary Central Asia. As Christians become increasingly adept at relating to the questions their Muslim neighbors have about their presence in society, they will become better able, not only to maintain, but also to increase their level of influence in Central Asia’s future. Toward this goal, Christians from around the world can offer encouragement without imposing their own critical expectations on Central Asians of all faiths.

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Fanatics have their dreams Wherewith they weave A paradise for a sect… Keats, “The Hall of Hyperion, I.1–2” Those who don’t learn from life will never learn anything from any teacher. Abdul Husayn Rudkai

The geostrategic importance of Central Asia has changed dramatically in recent years. Cultural, economic, political, and social stability is fragile and elusive in Central Asia. The implosion of the former Soviet Union in 1992 threw the nations of the area into a period of uncertainty and transition continuing into the present. Historically, Central Asia was often described as the battleground for a Great Game of political intrigue between nations, and this dynamic of intrigue has returned again with Russia, China, Iran, and the United States involved in efforts to gain increasing influence at these crossroads between Europe and Asia. Rashid writes that it is “almost certain to become a new global battleground.”1 Although progress is desirable, even more important to the world powers of today is that Central Asia does not destabilize any further and become a chaotic breeding ground for terrorist zealotry and despotic aggressors. Since independence, the five Central Asian republics have been forced to respond to a host of competing geopolitical interests because the breakup of the Soviet Union changed the Cold War duality inherent in the world’s political climate. Independence came to the Central Asian republics at a time when they were facing extensive social challenges while also having to address their citizens’ long-standing dreams for national independence and cultural recognition. From the outset of their independence, these governments have been called upon to address fears about the eruption of nationalism and deep ethnic conflicts as well as handle larger security concerns from outside

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their borders. The new Great Game, as was true historically, saw distant foreign nations vying for political influence in Central Asia purely to advance their own strategic objectives. In addition to Russia, China, Iran, and the United States, a number of other countries have tried to extend their influence in Central Asia. These include Pakistan, India, Turkey, and the nations of the Middle East. After decades of relative stability thanks to Soviet domination, the political currents of Central Asia are once again a boiling cauldron of chaos, confusion, and possibility. The shadow of Iran across the area is particularly alarming to Russian and North American observers as they seek to gain influence in the region. The Iranian revolution of 1979 was unambiguous in its assertion that it would export its revolutionary ideas throughout the region.2 This objective was strengthened by increasing Iranian military might. Central Asia offers Iran a fertile field for the expansion of its religious, political, and economic influence because many Farsi-speaking Uzbeks and Tajiks already look to Persian civilization for affirmation of their own cultural and historical foundations. The domination of “Iranian peoples over Central Asia began in the 2nd century CE, while the area was fully incorporated into the Persian Empire of the Achamenids (330–559 CE), and lasted until the 6th Century CE.”3 Foltz writes, “From ancient times the principal inhabitants of Transoxiana were an Iranian stock known as Sogdians.”4 One might ask why such ancient history has any importance today. More than in most other places on the globe, the past seems to dominate the present as Central Asia races toward an uncertain future. Russians and North Americans are worried that Iran will continue to export its own unique mixture of religion and politics into Central Asia (particularly into Tajikistan) and Turkmenistan. Iran, for its part, wants to be active in Central Asia to avoid strengthening the hand of the United States and, to a lesser extent, Russia. At the August 2007 meeting of the Shanghai Group in Bishkek, the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadenijab stated that American influence in Central Asia is a key concern for Iranian national security.5 One observer stated that Iran feels “encircled and extremely threatened. It is only natural they would seek to gain influence with the new states to the north.”6 The Iranian economy can potentially benefit from any economic progress that might take root in Central Asia because these five republics offer Iran a new source for needed raw materials and affordable labor as well as promising new markets for their own manufactured and agricultural goods, technology, and services. Although trade agreements and efforts to increase business between Iran and Central Asia have been vital, the primary vehicles to extend Iranian influence have been the efforts of both the government and the private sources to fund the power of the voices of Islamic

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zeal. Some of these efforts have been opposed by Sunni clerics who are suspicious of Iranian missionary efforts. Although most of the Central Asian Muslims are Sunni, there are sizeable pockets of Shi’ites in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, who look to their Iranian brothers for spiritual inspiration, guidance, and training. This is where the Iranian government has invested money for the construction of new masjids and religious schools. Both Iranian government and private sources of funding continue to provide means for hundreds of Central Asian men to come to Iran to continue their education in Islamic studies, history, and theology. Religious radio programming originating in Iran has flourished in Tajikistan. Trade agreements have also increased. Even though Saudi Arabia has been another nation active in the promotion of religious education and missionary activity in Central Asia, it is not yet a “major player in the region.”7 Saudi Arabian sources of funding are increasingly involved in supporting religious organizations by “sending literature and religious advisers to help with the revitalization of what we might, faute de mieux, call ‘Islamic consciousnesses.’ ”8 Rumer writes, “The rustle of Arab petro-dollars is becoming ever more audible in Central Asia.”9 The initiatives launched may have a direct relation to the activities of other nations in the area (particularly Iranian activity in Tajikistan). Saudi missionaries organized a movement in the Ferghana Valley in the early 1990s called Adolat ( justice), which not only taught Islam but challenged local governments who had not promoted social justice. In March 1992, the movement was banned by Uzbek authorities. The leaders of the movement fled into Tajikistan, where they became active in Tajikistan’s civil war. Saudi religious organizations have also underwritten Islamic educators and missionaries who have worked in Central Asia and financial support for the airlifting of large quantities of the Qur’an (and other religious books) in Uzbek and Tajik translation. Some Central Asians have been sent to Saudi Arabia on religious scholarships, and others have been given funding to undertake the hajj. Modern-day Pakistan traces its cultural contacts with Central Asia back to prehistoric times. Imran Hasan, a Pakistani historian, claims the IndoAryan people of the subcontinent first lived in Central Asia.10 Recent social changes are welcomed in Pakistan because when Central Asia was under the Soviet rule the situation was charged with tension due to Pakistan’s close political ties with the United States. Shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, Pakistan was one of the first nations to initiate a series of cultural agreements with the new republics. In a meeting with a number of Central Asian leaders in 1994, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto advocated for a block of Islamic and Arab States uniting to oppose both Western and Russian interests.11

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Pakistan faces formidable obstacles in attempting to develop increased ties with Central Asia for a host of reasons, not the least of which are the gigantic internal and external problems they face, which make thinking beyond the borders of Pakistan somewhat quixotic. One problem is that the logistical challenges of transportation between Pakistan and Central Asia are demanding. The development of any direct access to the area will need to go through the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan, and instability in that country makes this even more difficult. On a more promising note, Pakistan has opened direct air travel between Karachi and a number of large Central Asian cities. Economically, Pakistan also shares with a number of countries (particularly with Uzbekistan) a strong interest in the further development of the cotton industry. Turkey has eagerly trumpeted its desire to increase relationships with the emerging nations of Central Asia. Idris Bal states, “the first and most important reason includes cultural issues such as ethnicity, religion, history and language.”12 Early Greeks visiting Central Asia described in their narratives a Turkish funeral ceremony, where mourners lashed their faces and a number of stone pillars have been found with Turkic inscriptions.13 One of the basic links between Turkey and Central Asia is the common roots of the Turkish language with various Eurasian languages such as Kazakh and Uzbek. However, these historic and linguistic connections have been challenged by a number of scholars as being much less important than some would suggest. Turks consider the Central Asian languages as Turkic “dialects of one another; European academics consider them as independent languages.”14 Turkish interest has been reciprocated by a number of Central Asian political leaders, who see in Turkey a promising political model for their own future because the country has both maintained its Islamic heritage and also developed a relatively progressive modern society. This conveniently dovetails with the fact that a large number of Central Asians trace their own cultural heritage back to Turkey. For almost a century, a movement has been afoot among Turkish people around the world to form a unified political entity. This vision called miraism (from mira, the Turkish word for heritage) has inspired those of Turkic ancestry within Central Asia to look with esteem toward older brother Turkey, a fact celebrated by Turkish politicians. On a visit to Kazakhstan, Turkish President Turgut Ozal proclaimed, “Anatolia is the motherland for us while Kazakhstan is the land of our ancestors.”15 The miraist movement encourages Central Asians to think of themselves, not as Uzbek or as Kazakh, but as Turks. However, such ideas have been challenged for being impractical and unduly idealistic. In 1994, for example, Turkish President Suleiman Demirel advocated a more moderate approach: “In Central Asia we are the emissaries of Europe. We are the

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Europeans who are taking European values to Central Asia. … Pan-Turkism; the goal of uniting all Turkic speaking nations is utopia.”16 As is often the case, attempts, such as the Pan-Turkish movement, to revive cultural identity are often set to work for more mundane political advantage. President Demirel’s warnings echo the many voices in Turkey calling pan-Turkic aspirations fantastical and, thus, detrimental to addressing Turkey’s pressing national problems. These voices are numerous, but primarily result from internal political tensions between Muslims and secularists. The country has encountered a number of international slights against their national dignity. Turkey has faced, for a number of reasons, significant opposition within Europe to their request to officially become part of Europe through membership in the European Union. Many Turks complain that their nation is not fully appreciated by NATO, even though it has the second largest army within that organization.17 Some Turks lament that Turkish service in the First Gulf War was not reciprocated by their NATO allies, who failed to support Turkey in “key issues such as Kurdish separatism, disputes with Greece, questions about the Cyprus problem [political divisions between northern and southern Cyprus], and water disputes in the Middle East.”18 Turkish and Armenian tensions are another major reason for Turkish interest in Central Asian politics, with efforts at direct intervention from pro-Azerbaijani citizens within Turkey making these questions increasingly complicated.19 To the approximately 60 percent of Central Asians who claim some sort of Turkish ethnic and linguistic heritage, the Republic of Turkey remains a focus of admiration. This attitude is most welcome within Turkey. One Turkish government officially conceded, “We Turks are delighted to find ourselves being admired.”20 The Turkish government hopes to continue to channel these positive connections to increase their own military, economic, and political influence within Central Asia. Turkey has long been concerned about Russian foreign policy, including fears of Russian military and geographic expansion one day toward the Bosphurus Straits as well as within Turkey’s eastern provinces. Although such scenarios are easily dismissed as remote, fears of Russia remain strong in Turkey. President Suleiman Demirel wrote: “Will Russia re-create the Russian Empire?”21 This paranoia regarding Russia explains, in part, the reason why Turkey was so active in signing with most Central Asian republics a flurry of economic and cultural pacts so rapidly after the demise of the Soviet Union. Turkish embassies were some of the first to be established within the new republics. This rush of initial support did not go unnoticed within Central Asia, and may have had something to do with the effusive nature of comments like the ones made by Uzbek President Islom Karimov who declared, “I announce that my country will go forward by the Turkish route.”22

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Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev actively sought to woo economic assistance from Turkey as his nation tried to establish a free-market economy after decades of Soviet planned economic control. However, economic partnerships between Turkey and Central Asia were slow in development, and the earliest efforts centered on initiatives in light industry (especially textiles), tourism, the construction of a number of hotels, and a number of infrastructure programs. Turkey hopes to remain active in Central Asian economics as long as they see “an irresistible political opportunity to bolster its international standing [in the hopes of] …enhancing Ankara’s standing vis-à-vis its Western partners.”23 Although efforts at economic partnerships are significant, perhaps the most important long-term programs Turkey has launched in Central Asia focus on educational and cultural initiatives. Funds have been given to build schools within Central Asia. In addition, the Turkish government has supported a host of university scholarships with almost 13,000 Central Asians and Azerbaijanis studying in Turkey.24 It is hoped that when students finish their education they will return to Central Asia with a deep feeling of gratitude and a sense of connection to Turkey. Russia remains the primary political, economic, and military concern for the five republics of Central Asia. Russian economic realities have a major impact on Central Asia, even though “past Russian dominance is being steadily diluted by the agreements the Eurasian states have signed with new economic partners.”25 The voice of Russia carries weighty authority when speaking to the nations of Central Asia. When Russia dissolved the Soviet Union, it forced the Central Asian governments to find their own way to independence.26 The trauma of this history continues to affect the Russian– Central Asian interaction, which is often marked by gyrating indecision. Tensions can be seen in the way Russia under Putin has responded to attempts by NATO to expand progressively eastward into the former Soviet Bloc (e.g., Poland and the Ukraine). Because Russia is still able to impose its political and economic will to such a degree, the Central Asian–Russian relations seem to be drifting steadily toward a modified version of the Monroe Doctrine, where Russia will claim the right to command the future. The defense potential of Central Asia, for example, remains entirely dependent on Russia.27 Russia’s relation with Central Asia, of course, is “highly volatile and permeated by deep, mutual distrust.”28 Russia has tried to build a coalition with China and the other nations of the six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization.29 Meetings were held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in August 2007, and joint military exercises between Russia and China followed the conclusion of the conference.30 Several visiting heads of state attended this program as observers including the leaders of Afghanistan and Iran. One of the main goals of this week-long summit

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was to build an alliance to weaken the influence of the United States in Central Asia. Promises were also made about fighting the rise of drug trafficking in the region. Much of the drugs are transited through the region from southwest Asia. A significant amount of cannabis, however, is grown in Kazakhstan for the CIS market as well as the cultivation of opium poppies and ephedra (for the drug ephedrine). At this conference, the Russian President Vladimir Putin promised the Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakieyev over 2 billion dollars in new investments into his country. Russian economic relations with the area have been declining due to a “fall in production and investment activity and also because of the reorientation of resources toward domestic markets.”31 However, Russian companies retain the most active international economic interest in the region, and meeting Russian technicians and administrators scattered across the breadth of Central Asia’s business and industrial infrastructure is not uncommon. High energy prices on the world market have allowed Russia to become more active in the region. Central Asia is once again serving as an economic link between Russia and China and 2007 saw this joint trade reach a level of 40 billion dollars.32 However, business interests from other nations are also seeking to gain a foothold. Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Pakistani, and Israeli business ambassadors are a few of the nations representing multinational corporations on trade missions to explore Central Asia’s economic potential for joint ventures or other partnerships. Japanese investors have conducted managerial seminars, and European investors have held programs teaching the importance of protecting property rights and addressing outdated accounting practices.33 Economic progress is slow, but a number of indicators provide hope for increased prosperity. New hotels have been built, large infrastructure projects have been funded, new technologies have been introduced, and natural resources continue to be marketed for international trade. Business interests from Europe, Australasia, and North America have been active in Central Asia. Since 1992, the major mistake that European countries have made has been focusing on region-wide projects instead of more specific initiatives. Until now, “EU assistance to the region has largely taken the form of technical assistance implemented through the program (TACIS) that was designed in 1991 to support transition to market economies and reinforce democracy and the rule of law in the post-Soviet space.”34 This approach is now being reconsidered because local governments have not been able to work together. European nations such as Switzerland have been investing millions of dollars in social projects aimed at alleviating economic oppression and widespread poverty.35 President George H.W. Bush oversaw a program entitled Operation Hope, which helped Central Asia in the first year of political independence with tons of food and medicine.36

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American industry, however, has tended to focus on more pragmatic programs, especially the purchase of Central Asia’s significant energy resources. North American oil business efforts have enjoyed the enthusiastic support of United States governmental officials beginning with a visit from James Baker, the former Secretary of State under Ronald Reagan, in 1992. A veritable parade of North American leaders, including Vice Presidents and Presidents, has visited, and continues to visit, the area. Economic aid programs are careful to confront human rights abuses in the region but very little actually changes because of such pronouncements. A Niagara of human rights abuses have been perpetrated by Central Asian governments against their own citizens. North America’s public silence to such problems stems from ignorance and indifference and also because of the goal of military expediency in the United States’ war on terror against Islamic fundamentalist movements. While the neoconservative commentator Daniel Pipes is correct that, “activity alone does not guarantee influence,”37 the United States carries enormous political weight in the area. Washington has initiated militarybase sharing agreements with some nations and has already been able to station troops within the borders of Central Asia. The United States military base remains in Manas, Kyrgyzstan (about 100 miles north of Bishkek), while the airbase at Karshi-Khanabad in southern Uzbekistan was closed by President Karimov in 2006. Germany continues to lease a military base in the country. France has an arrangement where about 200 troops are stationed at the Dushanbe airport, and many other European nations have refueling arrangements with various Central Asian republics. The stationing of forces from the United States and its allies in military installations once occupied by Soviet forces is the brashest legacy of the victory of the United States and Europe in the cold war. American and European military personnel have also been involved in joint military activities with the Central Asian troops.38 Kazakhstan is the only of the five Central Asian republics that shares a border with Russia. This border is roughly as large as the border between the United States and Canada.39 It is no surprise then that Kazakhstan has remained the most loyal to Russia, while Tajikistan and, to a lesser degree, Uzbekistan, have had the most involvement with the United States. Political relations have been fostered carefully by the United States, but a host of missteps have been made along the way. North American interest stems from a desire to curtail the influence of Russia and gain access to energy resources. The United States also has a long-term goal of increasingly diversifying its support among Muslim nations near Iraq and Afghanistan and becoming less reliant on Pakistan, where little public enthusiasm is shown

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for pro-American policies.40 This agenda is also in line with the Central Asian states who have seen Afghanistan repeatedly used as a “training camp for the Central Asian Islamic militant groups.”41 Various expressions of international Islamic terrorism remain a major source for alarm, and, from an American perspective, Central Asia is an obvious potential breeding ground for such movements. Another concern is the fact that the region still has nuclear weapons and nuclear capability. Many of these former Soviet Central Asian governments know that it is in their interests to emphasize to countries like the United States, Britain, and Russia the grave nature of the threat from Islamist terrorism that they are facing. Financial and military rewards have flowed into the region since September 11, 2001. Fear of Islamist terror is also a gloss applied to any and all opponents in Central Asia. Governments use the instrument of Islamist fundamentalism to further their own agendas. They animate political enemies with supposed links to militant groups and pacify local opposition parties in the name of quelling terrorism. The grateful citizens of the country are told they should be grateful for having been spared chaos and danger. Even more importantly for these Central Asian autocracies, their authoritarian rule has not been uniformly challenged by Europe, Russia, and America, who prefer dictatorial stability without human rights over nations led by Muslim extremists such as the Taliban. The People’s Republic of China, since the mid-1980s, has become increasingly active economically and politically within Central Asia. This is another concern for Russia and the United States. The opening of the Pakistan-to-China Highway (the Karakoum Highway) in 1986 and the Trans-Eurasian Railway in 1991 were first steps toward increased economic interaction (along with direct air travel between China and a number of Central Asian cities). China is involved in the promotion of a new Silk Road, which is based on shared economic interests. Chinese Premier Li Peng visited four of the five Central Asian states in 1994 (excepting Tajikistan) and revisited Kazakhstan two years later to sign an agreement promising Chinese oil companies exclusive rights in the Ozen Oil Field (one of the largest in Central Asia).42 While Russia continues to dominate the existing gas and oil pipelines in the region, recent visits to Central Asia by the Chinese President Hu Jintao have focused on promoting new initiatives in this sector. The increased demand for oil in China combined with declining expectations about China’s own energy resources in the Tarim Basin gives this economic initiative a high profile. China has a long history of involvement in Central Asia. As recently as the nineteenth century, a major portion of the Central Asian territory belonged to the Chinese empire.43 China has an extensive border with Central Asia, and the Chinese province today known as Xinjiang (in Chinese

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a term that means new dominion) was sometimes considered part of Central Asia before it came under the rule of the Qing Dynasty in 1759. Today, a significant number of Central Asian tourists undertake shopping trips into Xinjiang and return loaded down with goods they intend to resell in their small village markets. Increased exports, technical assistance, and joint cooperative efforts between Xinjiang and the Central Asian republics continue to grow at a steady rate.44 Although economic interrelationships are welcome, both sides of these borders are worried that militants and religious advocates for political change will use the increasingly porous nature of the borders as staging grounds for their political activities. A number of economic joint ventures have been inaugurated between China and Kazakhstan. Even though Kazakhstan is made up of 6,000 miles of land that border other nations, only the small border between China and Kazakhstan is monitored with a military presence. However, the two nations are coming closer together as never before. China is “now the second most important economic partner for Kazakhstan (after Russia).”45 One of the most important of these ventures was the Chinese decision to purchase one of Kazakhstan’s major oil producing companies. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was forged in 1996, with China joining Russia and four Central Asian states to ensure economic security.46 The most important enduring legacy of Chinese interaction with Central Asia has nothing to do with China at all but with the fact that most of the Central Asian republics are hoping to model their forms of political governance after the Chinese model of economic liberalization combined with harsh authoritarian control. This is a logical continuation for many Central Asian nations given their Soviet autocratic past. Unlike the United States and Russia, China has no military presence in Central Asia. According to Fyodor Lukyanov, “China is quietly expanding through economic means. They make no drama but are persistent.”47 One can see Chinese imports overflowing in nearly every Central Asian market. In 2006 alone, trade turnover reached over 2.8 billion dollars, and these numbers continued to rise throughout 2007. China also has been taking advantage of the negative attitudes throughout the region toward many American foreign policy initiatives. A major factor in all of Central Asia’s neighbors is the role that trade plays in affecting the cultural distinctives of a given community. The relationship between religion and trade is a major factor in Central Asia’s development.48 Central Asia’s political and economic future could develop in a number of different directions. On the one hand, Iran or Saudi Arabia could provide economic models supporting the development of a distinctly Islamic political state, including the institution of shari’ah law. Such developments would be

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welcomed widely by the poorest strata of the society. On the other hand, these five Central Asian nations have the potential to develop along the lines of Turkey or Pakistan, which, while maintaining a strong Islamic identity, have also tried to create secular governments that are supportive of the policies of the United States and Europe. A mixture of these two models might be forged that takes its inspiration from China. All models, however, seem to share a common theme: the desire to provide economic freedom and progress but also to maintain strict political and military control. European or North American models of democracy seem unlikely to take root anytime soon. Before the fall of the Soviet Union, the nations of Central Asia were primarily interested in religious and social freedom and not (it would seem) political independence. The political structures that emerged in the area followed the predictable patterns of historic authoritarianism. The political climate of Central Asia remains grim for the prospects of a European or North American style movement for democracy. There is no legacy for such a movement on which to build, but most importantly, autocracy provides social and cultural security. Across Central Asia (with the exception of Kyrgyzstan) elite leaders are busy consolidating their power. These autocracies follow familiar patterns learned in the Soviet era that are marked with economic corruptions such as bribery, embezzlement, and political nepotism. Mostly, human rights abuses remain widespread and unchallenged. Central Asian dictators have cultivated the “politics of antifundamentalism,” where they present themselves to the world as champions against militancy. In the most extreme cases, such as in Uzbekistan, political opposition of any kind is systematically smashed and caricaturized as being “Wahhabist.” Karimov banned the use of loudspeakers at masjids because their use is not one of the “fundamentals of Islam” and he warned on a live radio broadcast in 1998 that “Such people (speaking of ‘Wahhabists’) must be shot in the head. If necessary, I’ll shoot them myself.”49 The potential for a free press that challenges powerful forces in the region is being systematically crushed. The void of an independent media means that little information can emerge from the country. At one point, a leading Uzbek official even referred to foreign and domestic journalists as “hyenas and jackals searching for carrion.”50 Autocracy maintains a level of popular support apart from the media by using propaganda to claim that they are providing social stability. Central Asians, often racked by decades of chaos, find these promises reassuring. Leaders warn of impending disaster because of ethnic and cultural tensions, which they threaten could devolve at any moment into a “veritable caldron of boiling hatreds.”51 Those who question such scenarios have no place to raise their objections. Oppression and injustice continue unchallenged.

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Complicitous in this vicious cycle are richer, democratic countries, such as those of Europe and North America, who may see these trends but choose to remain silent in the interests of political, economic, or military advantage. The advocacy of justice must not be slighted by those who have influence but choose not to use it. Instead of policies toward Central Asia that might foster positive social change, all too many foreign policy initiatives are mired in the expediencies of shortsighted financial gain. Long-term mutual interests are ignored. Patterns of myopic exploitation have taken root instead of meaningful international partnerships on the basis of mutual respect. Many warn of a potential meltdown of civil society in Central Asia.52 Is there hope? Yes. Education from both inside and outside of Central Asia can change the present situation from despair to justice. Fear-mongering threats warning of an impending tsunami of Islamist radicalism should be considered in light of the fact that an oppressive and zealous social framework is already in place and, in fact, may well foster public support for militant solutions to profound social problems. Fear-mongers criticize militant Islamism for being political and admonish their local Muslim citizenry to be apolitical. Threats are co-opted for the sake of control. Instead of fearing an inevitable cultural and political meltdown, perhaps another approach should be considered. Is it possible that nations of Europe and North America could actively promote educational and cultural programs that foster self-esteem, possibility, and capability instead of continuing the methods of the status quo? Challenges are daunting, but there is no reason why Central Asians cannot enjoy the same quality of life that people in other parts of the world experience. This will not come about without determination on the part of both Central Asians and friends of the area who are willing to set aside their own short-term interests for the greater good. Central Asia faces a host of uphill challenges on every front, but as one Russian proverb states, “while nightmares may be dreadful, God can be merciful.”53

10 Central Asia tomorrow: Earthquakes of transition

… Nothing beside remains/and round the remains of that colossal wreck, Boundless and bare/The love and level sands stretched far away … Shelley, Ozymandius I have never seen a man lost on a straight path. Saadi of Shiraz

Central Asia’s republics are emerging from a turbulent history and face an uncertain future cluttered with a pressing litany of social challenges. The previous chapter explored external pressures, while this one introduces the region’s many homegrown threats. These include poor living conditions, a marked increase in organized crime, progressively worsening environmental conditions, serious water shortages, widespread unemployment, religious extremism, heavy-handed political control, drugs, border disputes, and significant ethnic and cultural tensions. Central Asia is being redefined in a number of ways. This is literally the case in an area where the spelling (or choice) of place-names has changed a number of times—sometimes because of Central Asia’s linguistic plurality and sometimes to reflect a political change. Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, a number of principalities were rechristened: Leninabad became Khadzhent (Tajikistan) and Frunze is once again known as Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan).1 These are only two notable examples. In addition, government buildings, memorials, halls, and offices often needed to be hastily renamed to honor local citizens instead of the Soviet-era heroes or values. Political changes have even resulted in entire languages in the region being reinvented and given increased educational attention. The use of Russian language has been steadily declining, as nationalist forces have discouraged both the use of Russian and the use of a Cyrillic alphabet to express the local Central Asian languages.2 Neighboring Iran has encouraged Tajikistan to reintroduce the Farsi script for their alphabet, while Kazakhstan, with

Central Asia tomorrow 125 continued close ties to Russia and a large Russian population, has chosen to continue using the Russian alphabet (while exploring a gradual shift to a Latinized alphabet for Kazakh on the basis of the Turkish model). A grim portrait emerges of increasing social, political, economic, and cultural instability. Instances of dramatic tension seem to explode with dramatic force from time to time. For example, on May 13, 2005, Uzbek government forces clashed in the eastern city of Andijon with protestors, who were later accused of being funded by the United States. The government claims that 187 unarmed protestors were killed, while human rights groups put the number at closer to 700.3 Hundreds more fled for their lives into neighboring Kyrgyzstan in the following military crackdown. The European Union imposed limited sanctions after this massacre but the situation has not changed. Refugees from Uzbekistan continue to leave the region and those who stay have faced hefty fines, ostracism, and even imprisonment. Political opposition organizations such as the Sunshine Uzbekistan Coalition (led by Nodira G. Khidoyatova) have been repeatedly fined and harassed.4 Every government in Central Asia guarantees all basic human rights such as freedom of religion and the freedom of the press in their respective constitutions.5 Each state is also a signatory to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and also the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The actual facts on the ground are very different. These nations are ruled by autocratic pragmatists who have gained and maintained their power through any means necessary. Not one nation in the region enjoys an independent judiciary or a free political system. Dissidents have no rights to speak of because they are viewed as enemies of the state. Press freedoms are dramatically curtailed in Central Asia and may actually be worse today than under the Soviet rule. International aid in the region should focus on supporting journalists in such countries because they often face tremendous dangers in reporting free from governmental controls. The International Crisis Group claims that “the countries of Central Asia are some of the world’s least open societies typified by increasingly authoritarian political systems, limited freedom of the press and of expression, human rights abuses and widespread corruption.6 Moreover, growing poverty…could contribute to instability in the longer term.”7 Many NGOs have called on the United Nations to provide technical assistance to elections, when they are held in the region to promote their fairness and accuracy. Lawyers and judges need to be trained in such a way as to promote both human rights and the rule of law. Every human rights violation imaginable seems to be exacerbating an already difficult situation. But one Uzbek scholar, B. A. Abdurazakov, asks for understanding instead

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of judgment: “It would hardly be reasonable to approach the democratic process in our country with the yardstick of the American reality or the modern European criteria.”8 Less than a century ago, most of the Central Asians were simple nomads, who lived in flat, portable yurts. These pastoralists raised horses, sheep, goats, and camels while following time-honored rituals. Russian orientalist V. V. Bartold characterized rural and urban communities in Central Asia existing in a symbiotic relationship between the “Steppe and the sown.” 9 Today, yurts have been replaced by villages of sun-dried brick and clusters of apartment high-rises around factories. Ancient societies have been dragged into a new world, where old customs no longer seem to apply. Technology, politics, and an influx of foreigners have also contributed to a changing Central Asia. The old kinship system where direct male descendants inherited what the father earned was shattered under the Soviet rule. Only in a few rural areas has it been possible to hold on to strong cultural, religious, and social links with the world before the Russian rule. Women’s rights in Central Asia are receiving considerable attention after millennia of indifference. This focus began under the Soviet Union, which laid tremendous stress on the ways women were oppressed by the Central Asian Islam. Anderson and Pomfret write, “The status of women in the U.S.S.R. was a matter of (contested) interpretation.…In Central Asia the starting point was low.”10 Soviet propaganda preached that Marxism liberated women from the “primitive, dirty, and oppressive” habits of Central Asian sexism.11 The Soviets attacked this issue with zeal. In Tashkent (beginning on Women’s Day, 1926), a hujun, or an assault, was carried out by the government against what the authorities called the “moldy old ways of female seclusion and inequality.”12 Soviet critics claimed Islamic dress for women was oppressive and destroyed the dignity of Central Asia’s women. Propaganda films showed liberated women giving up their black veil along with their fated status as second-class citizens to become fully entitled Soviet comrades. Soviet films caricaturized all of Central Asia as being represented by a dishonored Muslim woman, who was “alluring and sensual, yet simultaneously a primitive and oppressed victim of patriarchal (Islamic) despotism.”13 Muslims, of course, challenge this view. In fact, the practice of veiling was never universally practiced at any time in Central Asia. The status of women, it could be argued, was only marginally better under the Soviet rule than prior to the Russian revolution of 1917. The Soviet Union created a legal framework, which codified and protected the rights of women, and these laws remain largely in place. Instead of legal issues, the major problems that Central Asian women face today are health concerns, widespread domestic violence, and even some instances of the alarming cultural practice of self-immolation, which has reappeared in

Central Asia tomorrow 127 Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.14 Some women have fallen into prostitution, sponsored by organized crime-rings, as a way to deal with their economic distress.15 Central Asian women are increasingly returning to Islamic ways of living their daily lives. It is true in Central Asia, as in much of the world that religious traditions are primarily passed on by mothers to their children. Conservative practices such as wearing the veil are increasing, though it is not certain if this is the result of women choosing to adopt these practices or if it is in response to social pressures being placed on them by local religious authorities or their husbands and family. A bevy of new literature is being distributed that encourage women to stay at home and attend to their families.16 The rights of women remain under attack by those who would seek to relegate them to a position of subservience under the protection of men. While the role of women in the region has only slowly come to the foreground, it is essential to understanding the “various expressions of religious syncretism which continuously emerge from within the cosmopolitan and multicultural societies of the Silk Road.”17 Another problem Central Asia faces is rampant population growth. Larger families are increasing, the average age for marriage is going down, life expectancy is rising, and infant mortality is decreasing. These trends have been consistently identifiable for at least the past four decades. They probably began between 1960 and 1970, when the population of Muslim nationalities in the Soviet Union grew rapidly by between 45 and 50 percent.18 It is not unusual today to visit a Central Asian Muslim family with five or six children. If present population trends continue, by 2010, over half of all children born between Beijing and Berlin will be given Muslim names and raised in a Muslim family. It is one of the fastest growing demographic areas in the world with the capability of tripling its population within the next century.19 Education has changed dramatically in structure and content since the fall of the Soviet Union. Historically, superior education in Central Asia was limited primarily to the wealthy elite, while common people only strove to become literate enough to begin reading the Qur’an. This situation improved significantly under the Soviet Union when literacy became widespread. At the same time, the Soviet Union used education as the primary vehicle to instill pro-Marxist and anti-Islamic attitudes in its Central Asian citizens. Soviet education initially attacked or ignored Islam but under Gorbachev began to eschew aggressive rhetoric in the hopes that “traditional educational networks (e.g., Islam) would atrophy over time.”20 School systems throughout Central Asia remain “absolutely secular with no religious instruction whatsoever in any country.”21 Religion is not taught in schools but is usually transmitted by women (otins), who are invited into people’s homes to communicate the values of Islam.

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Religion now plays an ever-increasing role in Central Asian education. Countless educational institutions have been opened across Central Asia with a clear religious emphasis. Although Central Asian education is able to function as a force for social cohesion, Heyneman writes that it has also increasingly served to advance “local ethnic and religious groups, sometimes hostile to traditional authorities, who use the school system as their communal instrument to take revenge for previous perceived injustices.”22 Cotton is prevalent across the large sections of Central Asia’s farmland. Stalin’s agricultural planning strategies determined that most of Central Asia’s agro-business be directed toward the cultivation of what they called white gold. The Soviets, as had the Russian czars before them, provided loans of money and tools to be repaid in future cotton crops. Moscow viewed cotton as a strategic resource and an ideal source for earning income for the state. However, the legacy of the cotton monoculture that developed was a shortage of basic food staples needed by the local populations and a decrease of revenue whenever the world price of cotton dropped. Another reason that cotton from the region did not sell well on the international market was it was of a relatively poor quality, and the methods for packaging and delivering the cotton to the world’s markets were not ideal.23 Further, the water resources of the cotton region, the Syrdaria and the Amurdaria Rivers, were practically dried up by the demands that the cotton industry had for irrigation. Central Asia needs to diversify its economies with special attention being given to the further development of light industries. The strength of the economies of Central Asia is that many of these nations are quite rich in terms of natural resources, metals, and natural gases.24 One of the problems the agricultural economies face is a significant shortage of water. Water issues are a major concern throughout the developing world, and Central Asia is no exception. As the amount of available water continues to diminish, this area faces increased pressure regarding the task of sustaining populations, which are increasing exponentially. Although Central Asia’s contemporary challenges with the allocation and distribution of water resources relates to long-standing decisions made by the former Soviet Union, bold actions need to be taken in the present while opportunities to avoid even deeper problems remain.25 Drought has significantly exacerbated an already fragile social situation. A worst-case scenario, becoming increasingly possible, is that widespread famine could result if the extent of the present drought continues for a few more years. Fortunately, Central Asia “is well-endowed with underground waters,” which are being utilized to an increasing degree.26 This is of paramount economic importance because the general availability of water resources both for economic and agricultural development and for the

Central Asia tomorrow 129 domestic needs of the population is closely tied to a host of other social issues such as poverty and corruption. Water resources have generally been poorly managed, and environmental concerns have been forced to take a backseat to economic demands. One of the biggest environmental problems is water salinity; the waters of Central Asia are some of the most saline in the world. From the Aral Sea to the Pamirs, the rivers and water resources are becomingly increasingly polluted without the prospect for a dramatically improved situation on the horizon. Because so many environmental problems have gone unattended for so long, a tremendous amount of economic capital will be required to address the issues at hand. The environmental standards of industries of Central Asia are either not enough or nonexistent. The little industrialization that has occurred in the past decades has gone forward with little or no regard to serious environmental dangers. One of the most visible environmental issues to the world’s press is how Kazakhstan continues to wrestle with the task of disposing of mountains of used-up nuclear waste and the grim aftereffects of years of atomic energy testing near Semipalatinsk. Since 1949, more than 500,000 Kazakhs have been exposed to dangerously high levels of radiation because of decades of nuclear weapons testing at the site. This fact has resulted in the doubling of the rate of respiratory deaths in the country and an abnormally high number of leukemia cases in the area surrounding Semipalatinsk when compared with other regions of similar size and population. When medical problems related to environmental degradation arise, few medical resources exist to assist local communities. Medical problems related to the environment, however, are just one of many problems taxing Central Asia to the extreme. For example, infant mortality rates are much higher in Central Asia than in Russia or in any other part of the former Soviet Union. Rumer speculates that this disparity may relate to a number of factors, including “the quality of health services during pregnancy…[and] low quality of doctors and gynecologists,”27 the relatively poor hygienic quality of food preparation and distribution, and the scarcity of water, which negatively affects the sanitation standards of hospitals and medical care. A report presented by the World Bank (2000) states that “diseases such as tuberculosis that had been largely controlled are now staging resurgence along with the explosion in sexually transmitted diseases…Less widely recognized— but with potentially serious implications for child development—are signs of emerging nutritional deficiencies.”28 Central Asia’s economic problems are often politicized. Countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are almost entirely dependent on neighboring Uzbekistan for their energy and transportation needs. One thing is certain throughout the region: people cannot easily provide for their families or

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create jobs for themselves. Living standards are declining while unemployment is rising. Although thinking in regional terms provides some general impressions, it is more instructive to look at specific economic issues on a country-by-country basis because the economic opportunities and the managing of available resources are widely varied. Unwisely, the former Soviet Union often tried to govern the region in interchangeable terms. What all the countries in the region share in common since the fall of the Soviet Union is that they have had no alternative but to deal with major economic traumas as they slowly move from central planning toward increasingly free markets while dealing with massive economic decline, disorganization, and mammoth hyperinflation.29 While some of the economic legacies of Central Asia’s links with the Soviet Union developed over decades and could be predicted, the new nations also received an economic shock, when the Central Bank of the Russian Federation announced, on July 24, 1993, without warning, that it was removing all pre-1993 ruble bank notes from circulation within Russia. This left the five Central Asian countries not only with huge reserves of worthless retired rubles but also no strategic plan to work toward a resolution of the chaos. Overnight, both businesspeople and citizens needed hard currencies that were in very short supply. Inflation spiraled to unimaginable numbers as four of the five republics scrambled in 1993 to introduce their own currencies and to make their citizens feel confidence in their worth as more than just pieces of paper. Tajikistan, in such political chaos at that time, had no choice but to wait to introduce its own currency until May 1995. All five of these nations became virtually bankrupt overnight and were unable to receive favorable terms of credit from other nations. Money that was borrowed came with strings attached, including extensive promises to modify the region’s banking system to be more consistent with the realities of a modern economic context. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan were able to deal with this period of economic crisis by mobilizing international business attention toward the utilization of their vast natural and mineral resources such as gold, silver, oil, and gas. These nations began to export these nonrenewable natural resources intensively as a way to avoid a complete meltdown of their economies. The proven oil reserves of the Tengiz fields of Kazakhstan, for example, are said to contain about twice the amount of oil that is on Alaska’s North Slope.30 Turkmenistan is particularly rich in gas and oil resources, while having a very poor record for the production of steel. Even with the dramatic potential for profit that these resources offered Western companies, reticence remained to enter Central Asia with full enthusiasm because of the generally unstable political and social climate of the region.

Central Asia tomorrow 131 Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, with little of the natural resources of these other nations to offer to the West, were consigned to increasing poverty. Because so many Central Asians live at the edges of dire poverty, they are exposed to a host of social problems, often exacerbated by the fact that many impoverished people watch opulent businessmen, successful foreigners, and government officials becoming richer, while they themselves suffer myriad misfortunes. Social cohesion has been disintegrating as support networks such as the health care and educational systems are progressively strained. The economic challenges facing Central Asia are “extraordinarily complex”31 because economies are set in a “clan-based tribal conscious Muslim context” where job-creation and opportunities for creative economic reforms have been suffocated by rampant political corruption and nepotism.32 Although Central Asians talk glowingly about a new modern Silk Road between Europe and Asia, the facts are that these same political leaders are usually choosing their own short-term needs over the greater long-term needs of their citizenry. The United States has lobbied for the World Trade Organization membership for all Central Asian republics. This may do little to change their economic situations. Kyrgyzstan (which joined in 1998), the only Central Asian republic already in the WTO as of 2007, has not benefited economically from this status. When tangible needs such as efforts to improve communication and infrastructure networks are glossed over by politicians making magical promises for a brighter day, it should not be surprising that citizens become increasingly bitter. Bribery and theft are often supported by law enforcement agencies, and government officials look the other way in the face of widespread racketeering and gangster activities. Banking and lending practices are antiquated and need attention. Local businessmen have no choice but to adapt to these grim economic realities. Corrupt businesspeople function as mafioso bosses, who take whatever they want from companies and falsify business records. This was a widespread problem under the Soviet Union, particularly in the cotton industry, but these same practices continue into the present. These thieves often deliver raw materials (such as cotton) that are already accounted for in the company’s ledger books to an unofficial black market. Today, across Central Asia, a persistent and pervasive shadow economy exists where, in the words of Rumer, the entire accepted economic system consists of “vertical structures of authority entangled in illegal activity [where] people came to believe that the theft of state property or its use for private profit was not amoral or contrary to generally accepted norms.”33 The promise of easy and large amounts of money from allowing the West to exploit the area’s natural raw materials is a Faustian bargain. Money

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gained in this process must be directed toward strengthening the region’s marketing base. Reliance on natural resources already means that Central Asia has no choice but to be dependent on the volatility of international markets. Fiscal discipline, never a hallmark of the region’s governments, has never been more essential. Instead, the vicious cycle of borrowing with no thought to the future has mortgaged that future for a relatively easier present situation. Even economic progress has generated new sets of problems. Nations such as Kazakhstan have identified their economic problems and sought solutions from the West in hopes of becoming increasingly privatized and more efficient in their business structures. While these are essential, even these solutions generate new problems such as increased unemployment of unskilled workers, who seem to be unable to adapt. Once again, these problems have their roots in the era of Soviet control. By 1990, most of Central Asia’s state-run factories were not only archaic and pollution generating but also only running at about 60 percent of their employment capacity. They were amazingly inefficient, with too many workers and not enough modernized machinery to compete on the international economic markets. Workers who understood these problems had no choice but to avoid dealing with them so as to maintain their own job security. Unemployment in Central Asia is more than seven times higher in rural regions than in urban centers.34 Problems in the countryside were at the heart of the riots that began in Uzbekistan in 1992, immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, when villagers, desperate to receive their portion of some donated aid, went on a rampage and killed a number of authorities. Many workers were not paid for long periods of time. Food assistance programs from organizations such as the United Nations were only able to meet a few of the urgent requests for assistance.35 One group often neglected is pensioners as there is not enough money available to provide for them as promised. The growing gap between the rich and the poor pours fuel on the fire of social unrest and provides a fertile soil for the simple, dramatic solutions of militarist Islamist fundamentalist organizations offering the uneducated, devout, and hopeless young men an opportunity for lavish, sensual rewards in the afterlife in exchange for the sacrifice of their lives in this world of sorrow. One can find hope in the fact that the region has the historical model of bazaars filled with private traders negotiating in a free market with marketbased pricing as well as a strong regional history of supporting private property. How do such quaint ideas, however, relate to the pressing challenges of modernization and international and interregional trading initiatives? Speaking of Central Asia, one economist, Chan Yong Bang, warned, “We do

Central Asia tomorrow 133 not have a lot of time. Within a few years there will be stagnation and increasing social unrest unless positive, radical economic changes can be set in motion.”36 Although Central Asia’s economic present remains paralyzed by rampant problems such as corruption and an impossibly archaic social infrastructure, there are a few glimmers of progress such as instances where infrastructure initiatives have helped everyone and where new trading partnerships have developed. Central Asia’s workforce has a much higher level of education than in other parts of the Muslim world. Antigovernment forces will continue to work toward increased consolidation to become more effective. This will mean that dictatorships will have to spend an increasing amount of time and money to maintain their dictatorial controls. They will have to expend more money in maintaining localized patronage networks. Moderate voices who call for power sharing in such a context will not be heard and extremism will advance. Brutal crackdowns and human rights abuses will continue as long as the best interests of local citizens are not the number one concern of those who are leading these nations. Central Asia is ripe for the message of Islamist militancy as populations grow and increasingly simmer with dissatisfaction over the poverty and ethnic divisions that mar their lives. Some argue that Islamist militancy in the region will never succeed because “it is not suited to the temper of Central Asians.”37 Daunting problems must be addressed, and until they are, Central Asia will continue to shake in response to a seemingly endless series of economic, cultural, religious, and social earthquakes rocking the region.38 World leaders need to develop a long-term perspective on Central Asia’s problems. European and North American nations must stop taking the inflammatory rhetoric and the vain promises of Central Asian dictatorships at face value. The failed piecemeal political and economic policies of the past decade need to be abandoned for fresh initiatives with clear consequences when changes are not implemented. European and North American nations and international organizations such as the United Nations should increasingly link their economic and military assistance with progress in building societies built on the rule of law. Genuine opposition groups, independent elections, and a free press must be cultivated. Past abuses should be carefully investigated. Scholarships should be initiated for Central Asian students to study abroad. Rosy predictions about the future seem to be based more on wishful thinking than on the dry, dusty soil of present, sobering realities. The potential for continued bloody civil conflicts is very real. If it is true that “the degree of a nation’s civilization is marked by its disregard for the necessities of existence,” then Central Asia is receding instead of progressing.39

Epilogue: The future of Central Asia’s Muslim–Christian relations

The sanctuary is in front of me, the thief is behind: if I enter I will be safe; if I sleep I will die. Saadi of Shiraz Some Israelites reviled Jesus one day walking through their town. He answered by repeating prayers in their name. Someone said to him, you prayed for these men, did you not feel incensed against them? He answered: I could only spend of what was in my purse. Attar of Nishapur Now I am called the shepherd of the desert gazelles, now a Christian monk, now a Zoroastrian, the Beloved in three, and yet One: Just as the three are in reality one. Ibn al-Arabi

Few places in the world have more cultural diversity than Central Asia. I have tried to remind the reader throughout this book that, while we speak about Central Asia, we are actually talking about a host of widely different cultural, economic, political, and religious contexts. Central Asia’s open lands are the common meeting ground of Persians, Turkic people, and Slavic Russians. It is a stage on which the religions of Islam, Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, and Shamanistic beliefs interact to a surprising degree. The historical narrative of this interplay of faiths is filled with twists and turns. While it is generally true that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are more multireligious, Muslim and Christian interactions are also more tolerant there than in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, where both legal and cultural challenges are significant. Another consideration is that the northern tier of Central Asia has large communities of Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Christians, while Christians in the southernmost regions of Central Asia are more scattered and, by necessity, more integrated into the larger Islamic cultures. Islam plays a larger role in national

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identity in southern regions and it is increasingly difficult to “distinguish between the development of ethnic identity and the growth of aggressive nationalism.”1 In each case, the line between culture and religion is becoming increasingly indistinguishable. One of the greatest concerns of Central Asian Christians are how their communities will relate to Muslims and Islamic values. Muslim–Christian interactions have often more resembled contested battlegrounds than forums for respectful interaction. Some of these tensions, however, have been fanned from faint embers into roaring flames by external influences such as abrasive Islamist missionaries from outside the region and insensitive North American and European Protestant missionaries. The first fact in examining the problems facing Muslim and Christian interaction in Central Asia is mutual ignorance. Muslims in Central Asia make little effort to study the nature of the Christian communities in their midst, and Christians are also woefully ignorant of the theological or religious values of Central Asian Muslims. Many Muslim scholars content themselves to dismiss Christianity and rely on centuries old criticisms like those offered by Ibn Hazm.2 Christian apologists against Islam use sweeping generalizations and rely on outmoded assertions that are presented with little nuance. European and North American academic scholarship about Central Asian Islam is scant and often focused on sensational issues of either the shamanistic qualities of Islam in the region or the threat of Islamist movements. In light of this, an important step would be for European and North American nations to actively promote the teaching and study of Central Asian languages, history, and cultures. Russian sources must also be examined with a cautious eye because of the ways in which both Christianity and Islam in the region have been dramatically affected by Russian ideological colonialization. Many of the challenges facing the region today have their roots in problems initiated by colonialists and those with a paternalistic mindset, be they Russian, North American, or European. These are some of many factors that make the interfaith dynamics of Central Asia complicated and resistant to simplistic evaluations. The basic nature of Muslim and Christian interaction in Central Asia must also not be overlooked by clouds of obfuscation. Christians in relation to Muslim minorities are consigned to a dhimmi, or protected status. This has been true, to a greater or lesser degree, in Central Asia. Laws and taxes have characterized dhimmitude throughout the history of Muslim and Christian relationships but it is fundamentally designed for non-Muslims to recognize their submissive status in relation to the Muslim community.3 It has been argued by Muslims that dhimmitude was a way to protect Christian communities, but the historical narrative is clear that many Christians in

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Central Asia (and elsewhere), tired of being second-class citizens in this two-tiered system, found it easier to embrace Islam. This book has attempted to help Christians and Muslims (and others) explore a broad panoply of issues in Central Asia with the hope of providing a more nuanced understanding of the region. Related to this is the hope that Central Asia becomes increasingly appreciated as a region in the world that is not simply a background for larger political or religious histories or civilizations. One could, in fact, argue that the exact opposite is the case: China was under the control of two Central Asian powers for centuries (the Mongols and the Manchus), India was invaded and unified by a Central Asian power (the Moguls), and Russian history is dramatically different because of Russian–Central Asian interaction. Muslims and Christians in Central Asia (and on behalf of Central Asia) need to be actively involved in partnerships for social justice in the region as social fragmentation increasingly threatens the fabric of societies. Dramatic changes are going on as dusty camel caravan trails are replaced by express highways, runways, and even rocket launching pads. Political and economic pressures continue to burn, with hungry neighbors lusting after the land and natural resources of the region. Political and economic forces such as capitalism, democracy, and autocracy are also dramatically shaping the changing experiences of modern Central Asia. As a Christian, I am reminded that Christ eschewed labels in his interactions with those he sought to encourage. When Christ touched the life of Matthew the tax collector he did so because, in the words of Matthew’s own narrative, “Jesus saw a man named Matthew” (Matthew 9:9–13) instead of simply as a despised and marginalized “tax collector” (known as “dogs”) as he was described in the other Gospel narratives (Mark 2:14–17; Luke 5:27–32). Jesus challenged the hostile cultural and religious clash that was going on in his lifetime between the Jews and the Samaritans (Luke 10:30–37; Luke 17:11–19; John 8:48) and I imagine he would do the same thing today between Muslims and Christians. It is almost as if Christ is an “agent provocateur ” in a number of instances where he intentionally sought out Samaritans. Further, these interactions, unlike those of his contemporaries, were devoid of any trace of judgmental bombast. When his followers asked God to destroy the Samaritans with fire and brimstone, Jesus rebukes them for their arrogance (Luke 9:51). The Gospel of John recounts that when an entire village of Samaritans decided to repent, it was not because of Christ’s preaching alone but because they were able to experience for themselves the power of grace: “We no longer believe just because of what you said, now we have heard for ourselves, and we know that this man really is the Savior of the World” (John 4: 42). God alone, according to both Muslims and Christians, is the judge on the Final Day. Our task is obedience to God (Ta’a). Those who speculate on

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the eternal destinies of others, and indeed entire religious communities, are justifiably accused of overreaching. Christians would do well to remember Father Abraham’s prophetic reassurance that the “judge of all the earth” will do what is appropriate (Genesis 18:25). Christians blinded by myopic religio-centrism, veiled usually as theological rectitude, are in danger of becoming opponents of the greater work of divine grace expressed throughout God’s creation. Jesus, in contrast, was ever about “the Father’s business” (John 5:19) of “seeking and saving those who are lost” (Luke 19:10) whatever their cultural “label” or religious category. Jesus challenged the insularity of those who worship a regional or tribal god bound to their own expectations instead of the God who “shows no favoritism” (Acts 10:35) toward any of His creation. Christian theology teaches that God comes seeking all of creation through the miracle of the incarnation of Christ. Christ for Christians is the express image of God as active and participant within the creation. Genesis relates that God actively sought out Adam in Eden after his rebellion and the Christian message explains that God is still seeking out the modern-day “Adams” of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, England, and North America. One must always remember that Islam in Central Asia is as much about “social cohesion” (asabayah) as it is about religious conviction.4 In his address to the Catholic Bishops of Central Asia, Pope John Paul II encouraged these leaders to be more deferential to their Muslim neighbors and to think in terms of relationships instead of in terms of theological categories: “Respect and dialogue should be fostered in relation to the Muslim community, with those who belong to the other religions. May everyone be able to appreciate the gift of your faith, lived in charity and may they open their hearts to the most profound dimensions of life.”5 The challenge is for Christians among Muslims to be active participants as “salt and light” (Matthew 5:13–16) instead of threatening interlopers. Christians who interact in dialogue with Muslims must recognize that the community of faith is multivalent with a host of competing Islams being expressed in Central Asia. Islamic fundamentalism, for example, is not as the name would suggest a return to an ancient form of Islam but is actually a contemporary response that serves as a “reaction against states that are oppressive, inefficient and corrupt, and which can be presented as unduly reliant on external powers.”6 Rampant Islamophobia that sees Islam only as a threat creates barriers of tension. A major factor in the future of Muslim and Christian relations in Central Asia is the question of how Muslims will interpret the dhimmi or protected status that is assigned to Christians and Jews.7 Toleration implies at least a willingness to recognize a degree of pluralism and coexistence. The title was not relevant during centuries of Russian and Soviet rule and it is clear

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that the secular autocracies of the region want nothing to do with such designations. Nonetheless, Christians in Central Asia must wonder if this status in the future will become a source of threat. While Christians in Central Asia have lived the status of being protected (dhimmi) during centuries of Muslim hegemony, one can view this status as either paternalistic diminishment or, alternatively, an expression of a contractual covenantal partnership. Christians fear in the worst case that such a status could lead to significant persecution of their freedoms of religion and increased economic burdens as has been the case in other parts of the Muslim world.8 Globalization is an important factor to consider when discussing Muslim and Christian interactions in Central Asia. The rapid development in communications has meant that Central Asians are linked to the outside world as never before. When people in Bradford, England, fight over how to respond to Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses, Islamist all over the world became involved. In addition, right-wing Islamist and Christian missionistic forces of extraversion have further problematized interreligious dialogue. Polarization has been a consequence of extraversion in the region where people do not look any longer at each other as neighbors but as competitors or even enemies. While it is far too simplistic to speak of a “clash of civilizations” between Christians and Muslims, it is sobering how such rhetoric has been increasing in recent years.9 Christians and Muslims have to forge a new path where respectful and patient conversations about similarities and differences characterize interactions instead of harangues and disparagements that often lead to direct confrontations. Many of the confrontations between Muslims and Christians in Central Asia have been promoted by external forces—either those who have come as Christian “crusaders” or Islamist “jihadists”—intent on imposing their ideological visions of purity. Christians must come to terms with Muslims who feel marginalized or persecuted even when they maintain a majority within their own political or cultural context.10 Non-Central Asians should not be surprised when controversial or new ideas that they introduce into Central Asia are met with fear or skepticism. Alien ideas cannot be related by strangers (often speaking foreign languages) who wrap their ideas in unrelatable forms and expect a positive response. Before Central Asians will consider being baptized into Christian faith, the message of Christ must first be baptized into the dynamic river of Central Asian culture free of the cultural embodiments of Western Christianity. Elizondo writes that “every concrete Christian community has the privilege and obligation to reflect on the meaning of faith…and has no excuse but to work out its own expression of who Christ is and what he is doing in their midst.”11 Contextual conversion precedes spiritual conversion. One can cite without too much difficulty a host of instances where

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Muslims and Christians from outside the region have entered and served as positive forces for growth in the two communities. The importance of intercultural sensitivity might be accurately summarized by the axiom, “People do not care what you know until they know that you care.” The impact of Protestant missionaries may also be a factor in the increasing number of instances where Christians have faced persecution. Gunn wrote (in 2003), “The number of religious-related prisoners is not known, but it is commonly assumed to be more than 2,000. Non-traditional religions, particularly Christian evangelical religions, are harassed and their leaders have been incarcerated on what appears to be contrived allegations.”12 They are seen as an alien threat and are connected with the hegemonic ambitions of Western nations. A host of legal codes have been enacted, which have intentionally sought to curtail the free expression of religious liberties for Christians and other minority religious groups. The Kazakh constitution (1992) guarantees religious liberty, but a number of legal codes enacted in 1998 created stricter regulations about the process of who was and who was not eligible for registration as a religious organization. In 2002, a Baptist pastor in eastern Kazakhstan was arrested for refusing to register his church.13 Non-Central Asians need to speak with one voice consistently on human rights abuses in the region whether they be religious or political. These issues must be kept to the foreground. Trade talks, for example, should not continue until meaningful human rights progress has been forthcoming. Restrictive laws may have come as a result of the extensive amount of conversions due to widespread mission activity. The Association for the Religious Organizations of Kazakhstan claims that in 2002 there were 50,000 Protestants in that country with about 6,000 of these being ethnic Kazakhs, and this number is a dramatic increase from the past.14 Kyrgyzstan, like neighboring Kazakhstan, has seen a notable response to Protestant mission activities where numbers are quite high.15 The capital city of Bishkek has five Bible schools.16 These two nations have been more tolerant of Christianity than the other Central Asian republics. Even difficulties and opposition, however, can provide a positive context for the growth of Christianity. During one season of extensive persecution in the Roman empire, Paul wrote to his friends that in his life “great doors” of opportunity for effectiveness in service had opened to him while, at the same time, the church was dealing with “many who oppose us” (I Corinthians 16:9). When Christians do experience persecution at the hands of Muslims the appropriate response is love and forgiveness. In spite of the religious minimalism of many Central Asian Muslims, Muslims need to be reminded that theirs is also a religion that emphasizes the tender mercies of God (see Surah 6:54) even toward non-Muslims. The Islamic word for mercy (rahma)

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is in the words of Mernissi, “A rich concept with multiple facets: sensitiveness (al-riqa), tenderness (al-ta’attuf ), and also forgiveness (al-maghfira). It is everything that is sweet and tender, nourishing and safe, like a womb.”17 Muslims need to be challenged to flow in merciful sympathy toward their Christian brothers and actively oppose their persecution (Surah 11:113). The intrinsic pluralism of the Islamic revelation counters all attempts to persecute Christians in Central Asia, and the Muslims of Central Asia must be called to account for this discrepancy.18 One of the challenges facing Christians in Central Asia is the strong temptation to emigrate. The most powerful form of evangelism imaginable will not be the decision to use words but the decision to remain among people with a willingness to “step into the lives of one’s dialogue partners.”19 Temptations to immigrate to areas more economically or socially advantageous abound. Expatriate Christians need to come alongside local communities and “arise and strengthen that which remains” (Revelations 3:2). Central Asian Christians are not mysterious “problems to be solved” who fit into neat categories of understanding but are to be respected as real men and women who are facing specific, daunting challenges.20 Dr Martin Luther King Jr. wrote about legions of haunting self-doubts, which assailed his work for justice. It was from his own context that he challenged others to be less fearful: “If not now, when? If not us, who?”21 Islam teaches that Christianity is a religion revealed by God (milal ). Christians and Muslims in Central Asia can come to see their differences about the nature of our shared revelation in a positive light. Instead, confrontational postures built on mountainous rubble of misunderstandings often caricaturize Muslim and Christian interactions around the world. Can it be that Muslims and Christians can not only coexist but actually enrich and enhance each other? It is a difficult, but rewarding work, to build bridges over chasms of misunderstanding instead of barricades that keep Muslims and Christians separated. Are Muslims and Christians capable of forging creative partnerships? Muslims can ask if Christians are called by God to remain in their faith. Christians can ask if one can “follow Christ within Islam.”22 Early Muslims and the first Christians seem to be far less intractable than Muslims and Christians today. New ways of thinking need to replace stale, confrontative assertions. Orientalist rhetoric about the backwardness and stagnation of another faith tradition are too narrow and should be abandoned.23 A Muslim proverb reminds us that “what only comes from the lips only reaches the ears but what comes from the heart will reach the heart.”24 Christians and Muslims have much to learn from each other if the work of listening with a positive attitude can be promoted. Fears and negative stereotypes will only promote suspicion and fantastical conjecture. Dedication need not be expressed as

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an argumentative and passionate confrontation. Those who feel the most threatened are those who are the most assertive. In such a downward spiral the calm perspective of the quiet is often overlooked and the bold set the “agenda.” A story in John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress describes how negative perceptions can paralyze understanding. The protagonist “Christian” is wearily traveling through some high mountains in the murky shadows at sunset. This pilgrim comes to a sharp curve in a mountain pass only to discover that he is facing a fierce lion blocking his path. The pilgrim freezes in fear and backs away, spending the rest of the night huddled against the cold wall of the mountain pass while listening to the fierce roars of the lion. With the advent of dawn, the pilgrim discovers that the lion he has feared had all along been firmly chained to the mountain wall. There was no danger—the lion could be easily circumvented. Christians and Muslims engaged in interfaith dialogue should take this lesson to heart. Instead of focusing on the roaring difficulties between us, we should stop and examine the positive potential that constructive interfaith interactions might provide. One final word: A legend from Tajikistan tells of a famous warrior who ruled the Steppe. Part of his fame came from the long-sheathed sword that he carried with him because it was elaborately studded with precious jewels. These silver and the diamonds glimmered brightly in the sunlight. When war began, however, this beautiful weapon was useless because its blade was dull from lack of use. Christian and Muslim interaction in Central Asia, in the same way, will best progress, not with effusive rhetoric, but with a mutual willingness to share life together. Both Islam and Christianity teach that each of us can model in our lives the convictions of our faith in humble service to a God who chose to create this world brimming with surprises and irregularities of cultural and religious diversity. Because there is only one God and only one humanity, this is a pilgrimage that both Muslims and Christians must become willing to undertake. May God’s embracing love sustain us.

Appendices: A partial list of resources for the study of religion in Central Asia

A. Selected periodicals for Christianity in Central Asia and for Central Asian studies 1. Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research, Box 2321, Amherst, MD 01004 (Academic Journal) 2. Central Asian Survey, 6 Elmbrook Gardens, London, SW13 ONT, England 3. Society of Central Asian News, 30 Bucknell Avenue, Lancaster, PA 17603 4. Religion in Communist Lands, Keston College/USA, Box 1310, Framingham, MA 01701 5. World Christian News, Prins Hendrikkade, 50, 1012 A C Amsterdam, the Netherlands 6. RFE/RL Research Report, 1175 Broadway, NY 10019 7. Central Eurasian Daily Report, Foreign Broadcast Information Service P.O. Box, Washington, DC 20013 8. Current Digest of the Russian Press, 3857 N. High St., Columbus, OH 63214 9. Issachar Frontier Mission Strategies, Box 6788, Lynwood, WA 98036

B. Selected North American universities or Central Asian study programs 1. Ball State University (History), Muncie, IN 47306 2. Colorado State University (History—Ottoman empire), Fort Collins, CO 80523 3. Emory University (History—Central Asia), Atlanta, GA 30322 4. University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (History—Persian empire), 309 Gregory Hall, 810 Wright St., Urbana, IL 61801

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5. Kenyon College (History—Ottoman and Islamic empires), Gambier, OH 43022 6. University of Massachusetts, Amherst (History—Soviet Union), 612 Herter Hall, Amherst, MA 01003 7. University of Minnesota (History—Islamic and Russian empires), Minneapolis, MN 55455 8. University of New Mexico (Political Science), Albuquerque, NM 81751 9. City College of New York (History—Russian), 138th St., New York, NY 10031 10. University of Oregon (Asian-Pacific Studies), Eugene, OR 97403 11. Institut Québécois de Recherche sur la Culture (History—Central Asia), 290 Place D, Yorkville, Montreal, Quebec, Canada 12. Rutgers University (History—Turkic and Central Asia), Cenkin Hall, 175 University Ave., Newark, NJ 07102 13. Washington University at St. Louis (History—Central Asia), St. Louis, MO 63130 14. University of Washington, Seattle (International Studies/Politics), Thomson Hall, Seattle, WA 98195 15. University of Wisconsin (Slavic and several Central Asian Language Programs, History), 720 Van Itise, Madison, WI 53706 16. University of Wyoming (Anthropology, Uzbek, History), PO Box 3431 University Station, Laramie, WY 82071

Glossary

Abbasids Descendants of Prophet Muhammad’s uncle, Al-Abbas ibn-Add al-Mutalib. The Arab Abbasid dynasty came to power after the collapse of the Umayyad dynasty (661–750 CE) and reigned over the Islamic empire from 750 to 1258 CE. ‘Abd Al-Wahhab, Muhammad Ibn (1703–1792) ‘Abd al-Wahhab studied theology with his father and then traveled widely in Arabia, Iran, and Iraq before going to Medina to study Islamic law and theology. He became active in the fight against British colonial rule in Egypt and became the founder of the movement known as Wahhabism. Abu Bakr (573–634) First of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and father of ‘Aisha, the favorite wife of Muhammad. Abu Bakr One of the earliest converts to Islam. Prophet Muhammad’s close companion and the first Caliph of Islam (r. 632–639). Abu Hanifah, Al-Num’Man Ibn Thabit (c. 700–767) Great Sunni jurist and founder of the Hanafi school of law, the largest of four orthodox schools and the dominant school in the Ottoman empire (1281–1924). He was born in Kufah and died in prison in Baghdad because he refused to serve as a judge (qadhi), or more likely, because he was a supporter of a revolt. Adl (Arabic) Equity, fairness, justice, balance, and equilibrium. In Islam, it is often interpreted as justice, an attempt to give everyone his due and the hallmark of a devout Muslim. It is the fundamental value governing all social behavior and forming the basis of all social dealings and Islamic legal frameworks. Ahmadis An offshoot of Sunni Islam that was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1837–1908), who was born in a village in the Indian Punjab called Qadian. Thus, Ahmadis are also called Quadianis. Other Muslims view them as having moved beyond the pale of Islam because of some of their beliefs.

Glossary 145 Al-Dunya (Arabic) Literally, this world; life in this world as opposed to life in al-akhira (hereafter or next world). Al-Razi, Abu Bakr (865–925) Persian physician, philosopher, and universal thinker from present-day Iran. Al-Razi was known in Medieval Europe as Rhazes. He published works on various diseases and their symptoms, which were translated into Latin, Greek, and other European languages. His first medical book, dedicated to the Samanid Prince al-Mansur (kitab al-mansuri), established him as a medical authority. Alexander, Czar (1777–1825) Czar of Russia (1801–1825) whose plans to liberalize his country’s government were forestalled by wars with Napoleon I. Alexander the Great King of Macedonia (336–323 BCE) and conquerer of Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, Babylonia, and Persia. His reign marked the beginning of the Hellenistic Age. Allahu Akbar! (Arabic) Literally, God is great; many Muslims interpret it as God is Most Great or God is the Greatest. Ansar (Arabic) Plural of nasir, which means helper or supporter. In Islamic history the ansar were residents of Medina who gave asylum to Prophet Muhammad and actively supported him when he emigrated from Mecca in 622. Apparatchik (Russian) A member of a Communist apparat; or an unquestioningly loyal subordinate, especially of a political leader or organization. Attila the Hun King of the Huns (433?–453) and the most successful of the barbarian invaders of the Roman empire. Bactria An ancient country of southwest Asia. It was an eastern province of the Persian empire before its conquest by the Greeks in 328 BCE. The kingdom was destroyed c. 130 BCE by nomadic tribes. Baha’ism Around 1863, a leading disciple of the B’ab, Mirza Husain Ali Nuri, known as Bahaullah (1817–1892) or splendor of God proclaimed himself the Messiah (savior) in Persia. Bahaullah recognized the B’ab as Prophet Muhammad’s successor while also claiming that was the promised Messiah foretold by the B’ab. The Bahaullah’s persuasive skills won over the majority of Babis, who came to be known as Baha’is, the adherents of Baha’ism. Bazaar (Persian) Market or marketplace. Bedouin Nomadic Arabs who originally inhabited desert areas of the Middle East. Less than 2 percent of the Arab World today is inhabited by Bedouins (most of whom are Muslim). BCE Abbreviation for Before the Common Era. Some Christians refers to it as Before the Christian Era.

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Bid’ ah (Arabic) Literally, innovation; some Islamists consider any innovation in the purity of Islamic beliefs and practices of the aslaf as bid’ ah or an unworthy innovation, and thus reprehensible. Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906–1982) Soviet leader. He served as the chairman of the Presidium (now the Politburo) and secretary of the Communist Party before becoming president of the USSR in 1977. Burqa (Arabic) Veil worn by conservative Muslim women in traditional Muslim societies. The burqa is a voluminous head cover, with a mesh grid over the eyes. Caliph The anglicized term for khalifah or the religious leader of the ummah who assumed power after the Prophet Muhammad’s death. Caliphate The anglicized term for khilafat (caliphate) or rule by a khalifah (caliph). Catherine the Great (1729–1796) Empress of Russia (1762–1796) after her husband, Peter III (1728–1762), was deposed by a group led by her lover. She vastly increased the territory of the empire through conquest and three partitions of Poland. CE Abbreviation for Common Era. Cheykhena (Uzbek) Uzbek term for teahouse; a common meeting place in Uzbek culture. Ching Chao (Chinese) Chinese term meaning the brilliant religion. Used to describe Nestorian Christianity when they first arrived in China. Crusades The two-centuries-long (1099–1291 CE) military encounters between Latin Christians from Central and Western Europe and Muslims in the Holy Land of Palestine in the eastern Mediterranean coastal strip. Dar al-Islam (Arabic) Literally, abode of Islam; refers to a land where Muslim authorities govern and where, ideally, Islamic laws are practiced and Islamic institutions are free to exist. Da’wah (Arabic) The call, invitation, or summons to acknowledge religious truth and join a religious community, missionary movement, or religious organization; it can also mean missionary activity or the propagation of Islam. Dhimmis (Arabic) Derives from the Arabic term dhimma (an agreement of protection); often applied to free non-Muslims (especially people of the Book, namely, Christians and Jews) who lived in Muslim countries and were guaranteed freedom of worship and government protection. Dhimmis paid no zakat, but paid a tax called jizya for the state protection guaranteed them and for not bearing the responsibility of defending the dar al-Islam in times of war. Dombra (Kazakh) A long-necked stringed instrument possessing a wooden resonating chamber, somewhat similar to a banjo or a lute, and especially popular in the Central Asian nations.

Glossary 147 Fatwa (Arabic) A formal and authoritative Islamic legal decree on a civil or religious issue that is often formulated and promulgated by a mufti or a qualified and respected Islamic theologian–jurist. It is based on the Qur’an, Hadith, Shariah, and Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). Fethulla Gulen (born on April 27, 1941) A former Islamic preacher, writer, and leader of the eponymous group alternatively known as Gülen’s movement. His critics accuse him of undermining the secular roots of the Republic of Turkey by advocating Islamization, while his supporters hail him as an open-minded Islamic scholar who has been subject to a long-lasting hate campaign. Fiqh (Arabic) Islamic jurisprudence, which covers all aspects of religious, political, economic, and social life. While a fiqh is not as comprehensive and immutable as Shariah, each legal community within the House of Islam has its own fiqh. Fundamentalism A term initially used by nineteenth century American Protestants who emphasized the literal interpretation and absolute inerrancy of the Bible as fundamental to Christianity. In the second half of the twentieth century, the Western mass media and scholarly community popularized the term fundamentalism to signify a religio-political movement of any religious group that is traditionalist, orthodox, conservative, radical, revolutionary, or zealous in its orientation. Fundamentalist The term has been popularized in the West to imply a member belonging to any religion who believes in the literal interpretation of his/her infallible or inerrant scriptures. A fundamentalist believes that his faith is God-given, pure, and right. Thus, those who share his dogmatic, doctrinaire, and often narrow-minded beliefs are favored by God or Supreme Being and destined to a better life after death, while those who do not share his religious convictions are wrong, misled, and destined to a miserable life in the hereafter. Genghis Khan (1162?–1227) Mongol conqueror who united the Mongol tribes and forged an empire stretching from China to the Danube River and into Persia. In 1206, he took the name Genghis Khan (supreme conqueror). Glasnost (Russian) Literally means opening. An official policy of the former Soviet government emphasizing candor with regard to discussion of social problems and shortcomings. Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich (born on 1931) Soviet politician who was the General Secretary of the Communist party from 1985–1991 and president of the USSR from 1989–1991, ushering in an era of unprecedented glasnost and perestroika. He won the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize. Great Game A term been used to describe the rivalry and strategic conflict between the British empire and the Russian empire for supremacy in Central Asia.

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Hadith (Arabic) Prophet Muhammad’s recorded saying(s) or statement(s) that were memorized and written down by members of his extended family and close companions, and later compiled into various collections. The most popular of these compilations are the Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim. Hajj (Arabic) Literally, pilgrimage. Adult Muslims of sound mind and body have been enjoined to undertake the hajj, the spiritual journey to Mecca, once in their lifetime, if they can afford it. Hajj is the fifth pillar of Islam and it is formally undertaken between the seventh and tenth days of Dhul-Hajj, the last month in the Islamic calendar. Hajji (Arabic) A pilgrim to Mecca who has performed the hajj during the annual season; also a title assumed by someone who has successfully completed the pilgrimage. Hijab (Arabic) The veil or headscarf worn by Muslim women when they are in public. The basic reason for the hijab is Islam’s emphasis on modesty in dress. Ibn Khaldun, ‘Abd Al Rahman Ibn Muhammad (1332–1406) Arab philosopher of history. He was born in Tunis, where he worked as a secretary. In Fez, he was the chief judge. In Oran, he wrote the famous Muqaddima (Prolegomena), the introduction to his book on the origins of the Arabs, Berbers, and Persians. Ibn Tamiyyah, Taqui Al-Din (1263–1328) A Syrian-born theologian– jurist who spent his life elaborating upon Hanbalite teachings in puritanical writings and sermons. He rejected taqlid (legal conformity) an ijma (consensus), insisting upon the literal interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah. Ijma (Arabic) Agreement, unanimity, or consensus; considered to be the third source of Islamic law. The consensus can be that of the first generation of Muslims, the great theologian–jurist of medieval era of Islam, the ummah scattered all over the world, or even an entire nation. Ijtihad (Arabic) The word ijtihad derives from the same Arabic root as jihad and literally means to exert oneself. Technically, ijtihad implies a Muslim jurist exercising his personal, independent reasoning, knowledge, and judgment to give his opinion on a legal issue where there is no specific order in the Qur’an. The term now commonly implies the independent interpretation or reinterpretation of Islamic laws. Imam (Arabic) A prayer leader or officiating cleric in a mosque or a learned and competent teacher. In the Shi’a sect, the title of Imam is also used for the divinely guided and rightful successors of Muhammad starting with Imam Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law.

Glossary 149 Islam (Arabic) Derived form the Arabic root “s, l, m” and literally means submission or surrender. Those who believe in Islam are called Muslims. For Muslims, Islam is the final and perfect religion of God. Islamism It can be viewed as the ideologization of Islam, whereby Islam becomes a comprehensive political ideology, the generic term for the phenomenon of Islamic revivals occurring around the world. Islamist A term used generically in the literature on Islamic revivalism to refer to any participant in an Islamic revival. However, it is more specifically used for prominent Islamic revivalists who make a significant contribution to bringing about an Islamic revival. In propagating their perception of the true Islam, all Islamic revivalists frequently, but not necessarily, promote the creation of an Islamic state by teaching, preaching, or writing or on rare occasions even by the force of arms. Isma’ilis A branch of Shi’ism which follows the leadership of Isma’il, a son of Ja’far al-Sadiq, and his descendants. The two largest Ismai’li branches in existence are the Dawoodi Bohra and the Agha Khan sects. Jama’at-I Islami Name of a Pakistani political organization founded by Maulana Abu’l-“ala Maududi (1903–1979) in 1941 that advocates the establishment of an Islamic state patterned after the early Islamic community. It is pan-Islamic and looks at the Muslim community as one nation (ummah) and rejects nationalism as contrary to Islam. Jihad (Arabic) Literally, to strive or struggle; it means to struggle in the way of God. A jihad, when used in the military sense, is to be fought against aggressors and tyrants. It also regards to the spiritual struggle waged against one’s own baser instincts. Kafir (Arabic) The term was first applied to unbelieving Meccans who rejected Muhammad’s message and denounced him. The term has also been used for non-Muslim enemies of Islam and Muslims as well as for apostates, polytheist, infidels, hypocrites and wayward or nonpracticing Muslims. Kaisak (Kyrgyz) A Kyrgyz term for the brave ones, used to describe older men. Kalam (Arabic) Literally, speech, or dialectic; it is applied to Islamic theology, which is the study of God’s words, the subject that attempts to give rational proofs for religious beliefs, deals with the problems of God’s oneness, His attributes and human free will and self-determination, among other philosophical issues. Karimov, Islom Abdug’aniyevich (born on January 30, 1938) has served as the President of Uzbekistan since 1991. Khan A medieval ruler of a Mongol, Tartar, or Turkish tribe. Kharijites (Khawardij) Originally followers of Caliph ‘Ali, who deserted him when he agreed to arbitration with the caliph over a dispute

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with Mu’awiyah at Adhruh. These rebels turned against ‘Ali and became a source of rebellions during the Umayyad and early ‘Abbasid periods. The Kharijites (pl. Khawarij, self-designation the People of Paradise) found their supporters primarily among the newly converted as well as among Arab nomadic tribes that did not benefit from the early conquest. Madrassah (Arabic) A school, college, seminary, or academy where primary emphasis is on a broad spectrum of classical Islamic disciplines. Students also learn subjects such as Arabic, astronomy, mathematics, medicine, literature, philosophy, and metaphysics. Mahdi (Arabic) Literally, the divinely guided one, the expected deliverer, the redeemer, or the savior. The doctrine of the Mahdi probably first originated in the Shi’a sect with their belief in the hidden twelfth Imam who will be sent by God to establish the true Islam. Manas (Kyrgyz) A traditional epic poem of the Kyrgyz people. Manas is the name of the epic’s hero. Manichaeism A Gnostic religion named after its messenger Mani (216–277 CE) that emerged in Mesopotamia and quickly spread to North Africa and East Asia. It was to replace all religions before the end of the world. Mani proclaimed the dualism of lightness and darkness, and body and spirit. Marco Polo (1254–1324) Venetian traveler who explored Asia from 1271 to 1295. His Travels of Marco Polo was the only account of the Far East available to Europeans until the seventeenth century. Masjid (Arabic) Derived from the word sajdah, meaning to prostrate oneself. It is the place for (ritual) prostration or a Muslim house of worship, also called a mosque. Moghuls The longest ruling Muslim dynasty in the Indian subcontinent (1526–1857) that created a sophisticated civilization. It was established by Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur (ruled 1526–1530), a Muslim warrior and descendant of Tamerlane. Its last emperor was Bahadur Shah II (1837–1857) who was exiled by the British to Rangoon after the beginning of the Indian Mutiny (1856). The term Moghul is simply Mongol in a phonetic form adapted to the Persian language and the Arabic script. Mongol Invasion The Mongol invaders of the Islamic world caused terror and wreaked destruction from which it took centuries to recover. According to some sources, the Abbasid caliph sought the help of Genghis Khan against a neighboring state and for a short time Baghdad was safe. But after the death of Genghis in 1241, his grandson Huylegu moved West. In 1258, he captured Baghdad and established a dynasty, which ruled much of the Middle East from 1256 to 1353.

Glossary 151 Mufti (Arabic) A learned and respected expert on Islamic theology and jurisprudence; a mufti might also claim the authority to not only interpret Islamic law but also to issue a fatwah. Mutazilities A school of Islamic theologians and jurists advocating rationalism and free will. It was founded by Wasil ibn Attah, who separated from the conservative and literalist school of Hasan al-Basri around 732. The school’s reasoned arguments are a criticism of those Muslims who read the Qur’an literally. The Mutazilities influenced the intellectual environment in the eighth and ninth centuries. Nawab A governor in India under the Mogul empire. Also called nabob; a person of wealth and prominence. Nazarbayev, Nursultan (born on July 6, 1940, in Chemolgan, Kazakh SSR, Soviet Union) has served as the President of Kazakhstan since the fall of the Soviet Union and the nation’s independence in 1991. Nestorianism Of or relating to the theological doctrine, declared heretical in 431, that within Jesus are two distinct persons, divine and human, rather than a single divine person. Nicholas, Czar (1796–1855) Czar of Russia (1825–1855) who suppressed the Decembrist movement and led Russia into the Crimean War (1853–1856). Nomads A member of a group of people who have no fixed home and move according to the seasons from place to place in search of food, water, and grazing land. Orientalists Non-Muslim Western scholars who have studied, researched, interpreted, and written about the Orient (the East), and non-Western cultures in general in an ethnocentric, patronizing, and/or disparaging manner. Islamists believe that Orientalists have undermined the Qur’an’s integrity, Muhammad’s personal character, and the authenticity of the Hadith. Islamists also believe that Orientalists have distorted the concept of jihad to mean only aggressive holy war; have over-emphasized Islam’s conditional permission of polygamy, the veiling and segregation of women, and the second-class status of women in the Muslim world; exaggerated the medievalism and barbarity of shariah (Islamic law) punishments; overstated the schism, heresies, and fanaticism in Islamdom; and denigrated the backwardness of Islamic culture. Ottoman The name given to a member of the Turkish ruling dynasty, descended from Uthman (d. 1324) that ruled over a multinational empire from the fourteenth century. At its height (the early sixteenth century), the Ottoman empire ruled much of the Middle East, the Balkan Peninsula, and a large part of Caucasus region. Pan-Islamism The concept of political unification of the Islamic world to gain strength for defense against European imperialism. The ideas were

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propounded by Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani and Muhammad Abdu in the late nineteenth century. They advocated reforming the Islamic world by selectively borrowing Western technology and administration. Perestroika (Russian) The restructuring of the Soviet economy and bureaucracy that began in the mid-1980s. Persia The name given to Iran by the ancient Greeks. Iran was called Persia until 1935, when the name was changed by Reza Khan (r. 1921–1941). Pir (Persian) A spiritual leader, guide and teacher; in South Asia, it refers to Sufi or a religious or political leader of a tribe. Putin, Vladimir (born on October 7, 1952) He became acting President of the Russian Federation on December 31, 1999, succeeding Boris Yeltsin, and was sworn in as President following the elections on May 7, 2000. In 2004, he was reelected for a second term, which expires in 2008. Qur’an (Arabic) Literally, recitation; according to Muslims the Qur’an is the collection of revelations sent by God to Muhammad through the agency of the Archangel Gabriel (who recited them to Muhammad in Arabic). Muhammad, in turn, recited these revelations to his companions, who wrote them down and recited them to others. The name Qur’an was later given to the holy book containing these revelations. According to Muslims the Qur’an is the last of all holy books. Ramadan (Arabic) The ninth month of Islamic calendar. The name Ramadan is derived from ramz, which means to burn. Therefore, fasting from dawn to dusk during the month of Ramadan is said to burn away one’s sins. It was in the month of Ramadan that God revealed the Qur’an to Muhammad. Revolutionary Islamists Muslims who are often revolutionary and puritanical in their religious and political orientation. They usually believe in ijtihad and are extremely critical of taqlid and Western ideas. They often have a passionate desire to establish an Islamic state based on the comprehensive and rigorous application of the shariah. Rumi, Jalal ad-Din Muhammad (September 30, 1207 to December 17, 1273) was a thirteenth century Persian (Ta-jı-k) Muslim poet, jurist, and theologian. His name literally means Majesty of Religion; Jalal means majesty and Din means religion. Rumyss (Kazakh) Kazakh term for a traditional drink made of fermented mare’s milk, popular among Kazakh herdsmen. Sadaqah (Arabic) The voluntary charitable contribution of money or food for the sake of acquiring merit with Allah. It is often criticized by Sunni fundamentalists.

Glossary 153 Samanid Dynasty (819–1005) A dynasty, named after its founder Saman, which reached its greatest extent under Nasr II ibn Ahmad (913–943) and included eastern Iran, Tranoxania, and present-day Afghanistan. Virtually independent of the ‘Abbasid caliphs, the Samanids defeated the Saffarids and captured ‘Amr ibn Layth (d. 901). They established their capital at Bukhara, one of the greater centers of Islamic civilization. Secularism A government that promotes secularism clearly separates the Church/Masjid from the State, refuses to act as the promoter and defender of a particular faith, and rejects religious ideas as the basis of its political legitimacy. Secularists Those who believe that religion should not enter into the conduct of government affairs or those who promote secularization. Shakykh (Arabic) Literally, an elder, or wise man. It is often used for tribal chieftains, members of the educated elite, Sufi teachers in brotherhoods, and generally for men enjoying positions of authority in a Muslim society; also written as sheikh. Shamanism The animistic religion of certain peoples of northern Asia in which mediation between the visible and spirit worlds is effected by shamans. Shi’a (Arabic) Members of this minority sect are partisans or followers of Ali ibn-i-Abu Talib and believe that God and Muhammad wanted Ali to be Islam’s first caliph. They, like the Sunnis, believe in the fundamentals of Islam, the Qur’an, the five pillars, Muhammad’s Hadith, and Sirah. Stalin, Joseph Soviet politician. The successor of Lenin, he was general secretary of the Communist Party (1922–1953) and premier (1941– 1953) of the USSR. His rule was marked by the exile of Trotsky (1929), a purge of the government and military, the forced collectivization of agriculture, a policy of industrialization, and a victorious but devastating role for the Soviets in the Second World War. Steppe A vast semiarid grass-covered plain, as found in southeast Europe, Siberia, and central North America. Sufis The term Sufi has been derived from early Muslim ascetics and pious mystics who wore simple clothes made out of suf (coarse wool). Sufis became lax in their observance of the shariah and devoted their lives to meditation and proselytization. They emphasize the spirit rather than the literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Sufism The body of Islamic beliefs and practices that tends to promote the spiritual union between self and God through religious discipline and mystical experience.

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Sunnah (Arabic) In Islam it is understood as Muhammad’s trodden path, way, custom, or tradition. The Sunnah comprising Muhammad’s sayings and deeds complements the Qur’an as the major source of Islamic faith and practice. Sunni (Arabic) refers to the majority Islamic sect (approximately 80 percent of the Muslim world) as well as to the members of that sect. Sunnis follow the Sunnah or the way, the path, or the road shown by Muhammad. However, Shi’as follow the Sunnah too. Tawhid (Arabic) It signifies the unity and oneness of God and His sovereignty. This is the most important tenet of Islam. Timur-Lang (Tamerlane, 1336–1405) The Lame Timur was a military genius and the last of the great nomadic conquerors. He was born of humble origin in Kesh, a town near Samarkand in present-day Uzbekistan. He claimed descent from the family of Genghis Khan, but his real link to the family was his marriage to a Mongol noble woman. He carried a number of titles, but only in 1388, did he call himself sultan. He was called the Lame Timur because he was disabled on the right hand and foot. An infirmity he suffered in war, according to some sources, while stealing sheep. Turkestan A historical region of west-central Asia extending east from the Caspian Sea into western China and south from the Aral Sea into Afghanistan. It has long been a crossroad for trade and conquest between East and West. Ulama (Arabic) Learned scholars of Islamic theology and jurisprudence. Ulugh Beg (c. 1393 or 1394 in Persia—October 27, 1449) He was a Timurid ruler as well as an astronomer, mathematician, and sultan. Ummah (Arabic) refers to the Muslim nation or brotherhood of believers (Muslims). Umayyad Descendants of Umayyah within the Quraish tribe. They were one of the most influential families at the time of Muhammad and established the first hereditary caliphate in 661. Wahhabis Followers of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab (1703–1792). They belong to the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence and are concentrated in contemporary Saudi Arabia and Qatar, where royal families in both Kingdoms have adopted and propagated Wahhabism. Wahhabis initially disliked the term assigned to them by Westerners, claiming the term Wahhabi, implied that they venerated Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab; in actuality though they venerated no one but God. They prefer to be known as al-Muwahhidun, which literally means monotheists or Unitarians.

Glossary 155 Waqf (Arabic-pl. Auqaf ) An Arabic term for an Islamic endowment (usually of landed property) established for pious charitable purposes. Xerxes King of Persia (486–465 BCE) who organized a vast army that defeated the Greeks at Thermopylae and destroyed Athens (480 BCE). After the defeat of his navy at Salamis (480 BCE) and of his army at Plataea (479 BCE), he retreated to Persia, where he was later assassinated. Yurt (Mongolian) A circular, domed, portable tent used by nomadic peoples of Central Asia. Zakah (Arabic) The fourth pillar in which Muslims are enjoined by their faith to donate 2.5 percent of their wealth to the poor for charitable causes and institutions. Zarathustra Also, Zoraster (sixth century BCE); Persian prophet who founded Zoroastrianism.

Notes

1 The steppe is cruel and heaven is far 1. The term Central Asia was probably first used in the 1820s, certainly in the 1830s, when it appeared on maps produced by Arrowsmith in conjunction with the travels of Alexander Burnes. The term generally referred to the lands between the River Indus and the Caspian Sea. Central Asia was also often called Tartary, although this designation also usually included the northern reaches of the Russian and Chinese empires extending to the Pacific Ocean. The northern part of Tartary came to be incorporated into the Russian empire and became known as Siberia from the eighteenth century onwards. The area west of the Oxus River became more often aligned with the Persian empire and Afghanistan. The term Tartary was usually used to refer to the lands of Turkic-Mongol people, while the term Central Asia was first introduced in Great Britain as a political term that related to the British empire’s strategic concerns in their relations with Russia as it advanced steadily toward India. Yapp notes, “Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Western Powers confirmed their division of the world, for the present regions owe their origin and popularity to the perceptions of West Europeans and Americans. Others are obliged to tolerate these divisions in order to be able to conduct some intelligible discourse that they are not necessarily the ones which appear appropriate to them.” Malcolm Yapp “Tradition and Change in Central Asia,” in Shirin Akiner, editor, Political and Economic Trends in Central Asia, London: British Academic Press, 1994, pp. 3–4. 2. S. A. Adsead, Central Asia in World History, New York: St. Martins Press, 1993, p. 3. 3. Harold Wells, “Theology for Reconciliation,” in Gregory Baum and Harold Wells, editors, The Reconciliation of Peoples: Challenge to the Churches, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1997, p. 4. 4. Geoffrey Moorhouse, Apples in the Snow, London: Scepter, 1991, quoting Hassan, 1913. 5. Notable accounts were written by Albert von le Coq, Aurel Stein, Paul Pelliot, and the indomitable Langdon Warner of Harvard University who was reputed to be the model for Stephen Spielberg’s character Indiana Jones. Stein was instrumental in helping scholars learn more about Manichaeism and this work was carried on by von le Coq who took beautiful Manichean frescoes to Berlin. Many of these were destroyed by bombs in the Second World War. 6. Turkic groups in Central Asia include the following languages and cultures: Karachai, Balkar, Nogai, Koumyk, Azerbaijanian, Tatar, Bashkir, Uzbek,

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Karakalpak, Kyrgyz, and Kazakh languages. Iranian or Persian languages would include Tajik, Yagnob, Shugnan, and other Pamirs languages. From an article by Sergei A. Panarin, “The Ethno-historical Dynamics of Muslim Societies within Russia and the CIS,” in Mohiaddin Mesbahi, editor, Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics, Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1994, p. 24. 2 Central Asia: A great sea of land 1. The term kipchak is also used to describe the early nomads of the steppe or the language they spoke, according to Gordon Bowles in The People of Asia, London: Wilmer Brothers, 1977, p. 268. Terms vary because they are often written differently in primary and secondary sources written in Russian, Chinese, Turkic languages, Arabic, and English. These sources transliterate names and places in a number of different ways. There is often little consistency, but this book will try to use widely agreed upon spellings for various terms. For Chinese names I have relied on the Pinyin system of Chinese transliteration into the English alphabet instead of the older Wade–Giles system designed to aid foreigners in more accurately grasping actual sounds. With all transliterations I have tried to avoid diacritics. 2. Technically, Kyrgyzstan is not a steppe, but actually two valleys separated by a mountain range. 3. Jesse Page, Henry Martyn of India and Persia. Greenville, South Carolina: Ambassador-Emarald International, 2003, p. 85. 4. Roy Allison, editor, Challenges for the Former Soviet South, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London), 1996, p. 2. 5. Sometimes Kazakhstan is distinguished from the other Central Asian states because of its large Russian populations and its unique Altaic culture, distinct from the Persian influences seen in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan is also sometimes included in the definition of Central Asia because of its Muslim populations. Afghanistan and Xinjiang in China might also be considered part of Central Asia. 6. Yuriy Kulchik, Andrey Fadin, and Victor Sergeev, Central Asia after the Empire. London: Pluto Press, 1996, p. 1. 7. Nisami or Abu Muhammad Ilias Yusuf ibn Zaqi Muayyad was born in Gyanj, Turkmenistan, in 1140 CE. 8. Nisami, Miniature Illuminations of Nisami’s “Hamsah,” Moscow: Uzbek Academy of Sciences, 1985. 3 Central Asia’s ethnic mosaic: An interreligious perspective 1. Imart, p. 21. 2. Thierry Dodin, “Central Asia at ECAI—Propositions and Prospects for a Central Asia Group,” found on the website http://pnclink.org/annual2000. The Central Asia Caucasus Institute was founded in 1996 at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University (Washington, DC). 3. Yapp, p. 3. 4. According to the CIA World Fact Book there were 26,851,195 people in July 2005. Thirty-three percent of these were younger than 14, while only 4.8 percent

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5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20.

Notes were older than 65. The median age was 22 years, with a life expectancy of 60.8 years for males and 67.7 years for females. The population growth rate was about 1.67 percent. Emigration out of the country exceeded the birthrate by a wide margin. Eighty percent of the population was Uzbek, 5.5 percent were Russian, 5 percent Tajik, and 3 percent Kazakh. Eighty-eight percent of the population was Muslim and 9 percent Eastern Orthodox Christian. The land area was 447,400 square kilometers. Along with Liechtenstein, it was the most landlocked country in the world. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ print/uz.html Bennigsen and Broxup, p. 139. James P. Nichol, “Uzbekistan: Basic Facts,” in A. J. Armanini, editor, Politics and Economics of Central Asia, New York: Novinka Books, 2002, p. 34. According to Khalid, at the turn of the twentieth century there were 300 madrassas and 365 masjids in the city of Bukhara, one for each day of the year. Khalid continues, “The actual numbers were much smaller (lectures were given in 22 madrasas in those years), but the city attracted students from all over Central Asia and beyond.” Khalid, p. 136. Chris Patten, “Saving Central Asia from Uzbekistan,” The International Herald Tribune, March 22, 2006. Anthony Hyman, “Nationalism and the Coming of Independence,” in Roy Allison, editor, Challenges for the Former Soviet South, chapter 2, p. 12. Daniel Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Heif, editors. In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s Path to the 21st Century. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2004, p. 12. BBC Television documentary, “Assignment” that aired in the United Kingdom on March 17, 1992. In 1982, Pravda reported that 290 young women had been burned in that year. An example of this is that in 1995 the inflation rate was at 204 percent but in 1996 it had fallen markedly to 26 percent. James P. Nichol, “Uzbekistan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests,” in A. J. Armanini, editor, Politics and Economics of Central Asia, New York: Novinka Books, 2002, p. 49. As of July 2005 and according to the website http://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/factbook/print/uz/html Nichol, p. 37. A press release from the Press Office of the Embassy of Uzbekistan to the United States dated May 5, 2006, unequivocally states: “Justice in Uzbekistan is carried out by the courts. The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan proclaims the independence of judicial authority. Being an independent branch of the power, judicial bodies carry out the function to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens.” The Caspian port town of Krasnovodsk was renamed Turkmenbashi in honor of this title assumed by Niyazov. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquesay. Islam in the Soviet Union, London: Pall Mall Press, 1969, p. 62. Roy writes that in 2000 the three muftis of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan where either Uzbeks or came from regions that were “very Uzbekised.” Roy in Gunn, p. 399. World Christian News. February 1992, p. 11. Warnings like the one cited that Islam is seeking to place legal strictures against Christians should be “complexified.” David C. Lewis, in a collection of over 200 interviews cited in

Notes

21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

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his book (After Atheism: Religion and Ethnicity in Russia and Central Asia (Caucasus World), London: Saint Martin’s Press) feels that interfaith issues in the region should focus more on worldview perspectives than on the kinds of legal and governmental tensions that are often the focus of non-Central Asian Christians. On May 25, 2002, in the autonomous Republic of Karakapakstan, Uzbekistan authorities raided the Mir (Peace) Church and arrested Pastor Khym-Moon Kim for conducting unlawful services. International protests resulted in a lenient court ruling: http://www.worthynews.com/news-features-3/uzbekistan-pastorlenient-ruling.html Open Doors Website: http://sb.od.org/index.php?supp_page=uzbekistan&supp_ lang=en A poor translation was completed in 1913. The International Bible Translators of Stockholm, Sweden, published a revised version in 1992. 74.3 percent speak Uzbek and 14.2 percent speak Russian and 4.4 percent speak Tajik according to the CIA World Fact book. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/print/uz.html Thrower, pp. 24–25. Crews, p. 200. One of the most attractive features of Islam, according to Levshin, was the practice of polygamy. Crews, p. 207. Crews, p. 206. Hyman, p. 10. The leader of election monitors for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Canadian senator Consiglio Di Niro said that flaws were found in more than 40 percent of all polling places they visited. David L. Stern, “Kazakhstan: Leader Savors Sweep,” The New York Times, August 21, 2007. The European Union issued a statement critical of the elections and a spokesman for the United States State Department, Gonzalo Gallegos, said that while the election clearly fell short of international standards, there were also signs of progress toward democratic reform. The leader of the Ak Zhul opposition party in the country, Alikhan Baymenov, refused to recognize the results of the election. Newsweek, February 3, 1992. The World Factbook-Kazakhstan reports that in July 2005, it was estimated that there were 15,185,844 Kazakhs, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ print/kz.html. Twenty-four percent of the people of the nation were under 14 years of age and the life expectancy was 61 years for males and 72 years for females. Thirty percent of the people were Russian and 4 percent Ukrainian, and 3 percent each were Tajik and German. There were also many Kazakhs in Siberia, western China, and in the Altai Mountains of western Mongolia. Hyman, p. 29. Another etymology attributes the term Kazakh to the Turkish synonym Kaz (goose) and ak (white)—a flock of white geese is sometimes used as a symbol for the free-spirited, wandering people of the land. A Yurt is a circular tent of felt or animal skins set on a framework of wooden poles and able to be assembled in a matter of hours. Yurts are common across Mongolia and among the Buryats of Siberia. Richard V. Weeks, editor, Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978, p. 210. Thrower, p. 27.

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38. Khalid, p. 151. 39. Tobin Perry, “Central Asia’s Great Awakening,” Christianity Today, July 10, 2000. 40. The Federation of Asian Bishops Conferences. Website: http://www.fabc.org/ 41. http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/pope0264ur.htm 42. The China Inland Mission efforts of George Hunter focused specifically on the Kazakhs. 43. Geraci, p. 275. 44. Geraci, p. 277. 45. Norwegian Forum 18 website: http://www/forum18.org/Archivephp?article_ id=2449 46. Presbyterian Frontier Fellowship website: http://www.pff.net/Projects/ projcentralasia.htm 47. An official plan was announced in September 1993 but the idea had been discussed prior to that time. The capital was to be relocated to Akmola in the northeast and the primary rationale was that Almaty was in an earthquake zone. An unstated reason was that, since Almaty was located in the southeastern corner of the country, it was not able to serve as it should the interests of European and Russian settlers who lived in the northern and western oblasts. The expensive nature of this project greatly slowed the progress of governmental offices shifting from one city to the other. 48. Johannes Reimer mentions that one Central Asian group, the Avers, who traditionally raised cattle in the mountains, has been traumatized by modernization and a deterioration of traditional family structures. 49. Ibn Sienna (Avicenna) is also claimed by Uzbeks because he was born in Khorezm in modern-day Uzbekistan. Ibn Sienna wrote in both Persian and Arabic. 50. Thrower, p. 30. 51. Of the 5 million Tajiks who live outside Tajikistan, 1.5 million live in Uzbekistan, and most of the rest live in Iran and Afghanistan. Tajiks divide themselves into two groups, lowland Tajiks who are similar to Uzbeks and mountain Tajiks who more closely parallel the people of Afghanistan. Tajiks often call themselves farsiman. 52. Based on estimates from July 2006, 37.9 percent of the population is under 14 years of age, 57.4 percent of the population is between the ages of 15 and 64, and only 4.8 percent of the population is over 65 years of age. This was based on the July 2006 estimated population of 7,320,815 people. 53. The average life expectancy is 61.6 years for men and 67.6 years for women. One bright spot is that HIV or AIDS is very minimal in the country with only about 200 cases in the entire country. All statistics are from July 2005 and are from the United States government: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/print/ti.html 54. The mountain is now known as Qullai Ismoili in the southeast of the Pamir Mountains, but it had been known during the Soviet Union era as Communist Peak. 55. My translator to help communicate with the Russian Pastor of this Germanspeaking Baptist Church was a Nigerian medical doctor. He explained that he felt God was calling him to stay in Dushanbe and be a witness for Christ to his Muslim patients. When I spoke with the Pastor of the Dushanbe Baptist Church of how the pastoral leadership of the church was planning to respond to this dramatic exodus of members he explained to me that I should direct my questions to his associate because he and his family were about to move, later that same week, to Sacramento, California.

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56. Voice of the Martyrs website: http://www.persecution.com.au/news/article. asp?artID={BFCFD 57. Christian Aid website: http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/world/where/meeca/ tajikisp.htm 58. The Political Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) won 74 percent of the vote and the CPT (Communist Party of Tajikistan) received 13 percent, with the Islamic Revival Party receiving 8 percent in the elections last held in February and March of 2000. From an article on the website, http://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/factbook/print/ti.html 59. The United States Department of State website says that Kyrgyzstan has a total area of 67,741 miles and a population estimated at 4.7 million people. In 2001, 61.2 percent of the populations were ethnic Kyrgyz while 14.9 percent Russian, 14.4 percent ethnic Uzbek, 1.1 percent Tatar, and 0.3 percent German, with 8.1 percent consisting of other ethnic minorities. Eighty percent of the Kyrgyz were Muslims and 17 percent were Russian Orthodox worshipping in more than 200 churches. A small Jewish congregation was said to exist in Bishkek. From the International Religious Freedom Report released on October 26, 2001, by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor: Kyrgyzstan, http://www.state. gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/5998.htm 60. Probably less than a quarter of the people of Kyrgyzstan live in an urban setting. 61. Foltz, p. 141. 62. The Kyrgyz are also referred to at this time as the Qara-Qyrgyz. 63. When an eagle was trained to assist the hunter of the gazelle, he was first introduced to the head of a freshly killed sheep, which was stuck upon a post with its eye sockets stuffed with red meat. This caused the bird to learn to go for the eyes first during the hunt. From Geoffrey Moorhouse, p. 40. 64. As of 1582, one Muslim source states that the Kazakhs were “neither infidels nor Muslims.” A source from the next century states they worshipped idols and were not true Muslims. Another stated that the “Kyrgyz are the originators of all the revolts in Moghulstan.” Foltz, p. 141. 65. Guy G. Imart, “Past Western Imperial Crisis: A lesson for Forthcoming Eastern Ones?,” in Shirin Akiner, editor, Political and Economic Trends in Central Asia, p. 19. 66. One notable example of labor unrest occurred at the Karakeche coal mines in Naryn province. A major prison riot occurred in October 2005, which resulted in the murder of Parliamentarian Tynchbek Akmatbayev. 67. On January 31, 1994, a striking 93 percent of those who voted on the referendum on this plan voted in support of President Akayev’s proposals. This may, however, speak more to the overwhelming power of incumbents than to anything else. Landslide elections are the norm across the region. 68. A particularly public instance of emigration took place in July 1993 when the former vice president of the republic, E. Kuznetsov, accepted a senior political position in Moscow. 69. Critics of the government have accused the Bakiyev family of seizing lands for their own benefit. Problematic land reform initiatives have also led to thousands of peasants from the countryside moving to Bishkek. 70. These include mercury, tin, marble, limestone, gypsum, and some natural gas and petroleum oil. 71. In one account, not only would a coward or thief be killed, but also, their fathers (if living). From Empire of the Western Turks. Undated travel account, p. 189.

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72. An English translation of the Manas is reported to be available through The Silk Road Foundation, PO Box 2275, Saratoga, CA, 95070. This organization claims it exists to provide “cultural bridges between East and West.” 73. Probably 98 percent of the Kyrgyz language is the same as Kazakh. 74. Based on the July 2006 estimate of 5,213,898 people, 30.9 percent of the population was under 14 years, 62.9 percent between 15 and 64 years, and 6.2 percent over 65 years of age. 75. A shaman in modern parlance is a priest of religion. 76. Bennigsen, p. 83. 77. One Mullah in Kyrgyzstan said, “They may pretend to be an atheist here, but yet like everybody else you will finish in a Muslim cemetery.” Quoted in Bennigsen, 1980, p. 82. 78. Society of Central Asian News, Fall, 1991, p. 1. 79. Norwegian Forum 18 website: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_ id=222 80. Hyman, p. 17. 81. Thrower, p. 28. 82. Tribal groups that remain today among the Turkmen are the Tekke, Ersary, Yomund, Goklen, Salor, Saryk, and Chowdor tribal groupings. The language of most Turkmen is closer to Turkish or Azeri than it is to Uzbek or Kazakh. The main dialect that is understood by most Turkmen is the Tekke dialect. 83. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., “Ten Years After the Soviet Breakup: Disillusionment in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” Journal of Democracy, volume 12, issue 4, 2001, pp. 49–56. Fairbanks notes that Turkmenistan is the only nation in the region that does not have multiple political parties, p. 49. Fairbanks also notes that the Turkmen ruler has allowed for no power sharing and is not afraid to resort to violence and repression in order to maintain control. He states that “hortatory slogans reminiscent of the Khrushchev Era pervade the land, as does the personality cult of President Sapurmarad Niazov…To be a Turkmen is to give up all freedom, but to belong to a state capable of furnishing order and protection,” p. 52. Fairbanks notes, in an attempt to evoke sympathy, that the nation is functioning in what he calls “…conditions that resemble the Great Depression or worse,” p. 50. 84. The shura, formed by Niyazov, is a consultative body of 60 members from all the country’s districts that is to work in cooperation with Turkmenistan’s Parliament known as the Mejlis. The idea of a consultative body to the President is to provide stability. This is an example of an ancient tradition joining with a modern form of rule. 85. National Geographic, February 1976. 86. As of the July 2006 estimate there were 5,042,920 people living in Turkmenistan. Of these 35 percent were under the age of 14 and only 4.1 percent were over the age of 65. The median age was 21.8 years for Turkmenistan. 87. http://www/persecution.com.au/news/article.asp?artID=%7BEB1874FF. This same source also states that Turkmenistan’s President Saparmurat Niyazov has published a book entitled the Rukhname, which is a collection of ethical and morals statements intended to answer life’s questions. 88. http://news.adventist.org/data/2001/10/1005150490/index.html.en 89. Norwegian Forum 18, website: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_ id=501

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4 A history of triumphs and disasters 1. Xerxes of Persia dreamed of conquering Greece. He devastated Attica and Athens before being defeated at Sakmis (480 BCE). Xerxes returned to Persia where he indulged in “such debauchery that his subjects were disgusted and his guards murdered him in a palace intrigue.” From the article, “Xerxes,” in The Encyclopedia Americana, volume 29, 1988, p. 597. 2. “According to Puranic cosmography from India, the Earth is divided into seven concentric Island continents. Continent Jambudvipa (Rose Apple Island) also known as Sudarshandivipa forms the innermost concentric island in the above scheme of Puranic divipas or continents… Uttara-Kuru varsa is the region north of the Pamirs upward. It probably includes northwestern parts of Xinjiang Province of China, the Tien Shan region and most parts of Kyrgyzstan… Ketumala vars is said to… correspond with Western Turkmenistan.” http:// en.org/wiki/Jambudvipa. The specific points of identification are all found within Jambudvipa. This region borders the next concentric continent, which begins in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Sakadvipa). 3. “Ancient India and Central Asia,” from http://en.org/wiki/Ancient_India_and_ Central_Asia (Accessed on November 1, 2007.) 4. Foltz, p. 25. The author states: “Burial sites also show evidence of animal sacrifice, especially horses, but also dogs and oxen. The graves often have wooden covers held up by posts, just as described in the Rig Veda. Scriptures of the ancient Indo-European migrants to India, peoples often referred to as Indo-Aryans.” The idea of sacrificing horses to the sun-god was to “offer the swiftest animal to the swiftest of the gods.” 5. Scott Levi, The Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and its Trade, 1550–1900, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 2000, p. 1. 6. Also known as Transoxiana. Sogdinia, along with Khorezm, were the principal slave-owning states of the fourth century BCE. 7. In Pinyin his name was Chang-ch’en. An additional reason for the journey sometimes dated as early as 139 BCE was to forge an alliance with the local people against the predecessors of the Huns (known as the Zung-nu in China). Even though the Great Wall was in place at this time it was not effective against these invaders. 8. These horses were known as “heavenly horses” and were described as “sweating blood” because of skin parasites. They were from the Ferghana Valley in modern-day Uzbekistan. Demand quickly outgrew the supply. Foltz, p. 3. 9. One of the arguments for this case is that Ashoka’s empire was so vast, Foltz, p. 38. 10. Foltz, p. 46. Foltz writes “The Silk Road city of Marv (Greek Margiana), situated in the eastern part of the Parthian Empire, became a major Buddhist Center by the middle of the Second Century of the common era.” 11. Sogdian merchants were, for centuries, the most successful in Central Asia and were active in spreading philosophical and religious ideas from the East to the West. Sogdians were first Buddhists in Bactria and then later converted to Manichaeism and Nestorian Christianity. Foltz writes “With their internal connections Sogdians knew foreign languages and many of them were literate. They were often engaged as interpreters and translators. It was Sogdian scribes who translated most of the religious texts of Buddhism, Manichaeism, and Christianity into the various languages of the Silk Road from the Indian Prakrits

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12. 13. 14.

15.

16.

17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22.

Notes (vernacular dialects), Aramaic, or Parthian into Bactrian, Tokharian, Khotanese, Turkish or Chinese either via Sogdian or directly.” Foltz, p. 13. One Buddhist monastery near Balkh was known as Naw Bahar (or new spring in Persian) and was the center of a network of Buddhist temples in Iran. These were controlled by the Barmak family who converted to Islam. Manichaeism often easily mixed in with these traditions so that writings can be found, which are both Buddhist, Zoroastrian, or Jewish and Manichean. As the Manichean movement traveled it also changed its name at times as a way to respond to repression. In the Europe of the Middle Ages their major ideas survived through the Cathar movement in Provence and among the Bogomils in the Balkans. Manichaeism, however, mostly thrived in Persia, Central Asia, and China. It was even the official state religion of a Uighur Turkish Kingdom in Xinjiang lasting from 763 to 840 CE. Manichean priests had great power in Uighur lands and found protection among the Uighurs even after it was no longer the state religion. The most important documents were found in Xinjiang, western China, where a Uyghur community was led in the ninth and tenth centuries by a Manichean official. The Manicheans found protection among the new Uighur capital city of Qocho after the Uighurs were defeated in the Tarim Basin in 840 CE. On the question of Zoroastrianism being a monotheistic religion instead of being dualistic, Masani writes “Owing, however, to a confusion of ideas and a misconception of the counteraction of good and evil in the system of the speculative philosophy of the Bactrian sage, and owing mainly to the want of correct texts, Zoroastrianism was, until recently, often described by European writers as a dualistic religion. Such a concept avoided the rudiments of Avestan theology. The fault, however, lay not so much with those writers as with Zoroastrians of a later era, who themselves lost sight of the original teachings of their prophet, confounded his philosophy with his theology, and gave rise to a belief in the existence of an evil spirit co-equal with Ahura Mazda.” Rustom Masani, Zoroastrianism: The Religion of the Good Life. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1969, p. 34. Masani, p. 24. Foltz, p. 27. Masani, p. 25. Masani elaborates on the same page: “Some have suggested that Zarathustra meant ‘possessor of old or yellow colored camels’, others that it meant the ‘high priest’. It was probably the appellation by which he was known after he proclaimed his religion, and which has been rendered into English as ‘He of the Golden Light’, just as Prince Siddhartha came to be as the Buddha and Jesus as the Christ.” Foltz, p. 29. Khurasan was the name for the frontier province of the Abbasid Caliphate and includes parts of Afghanistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. This chronicle was compiled in Khiva in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It asserted that the people of Khorezem, “as descendents of Japheth, the son of Noah, had been Muslim since creation. Along the way, various generations had lapsed into infidelity, but they had been brought back to the path of Islam by divinely guided ancestors, the last of which was Oghuz Khan (a mythical figure).” Adeeb Khalid, “Islam in Contemporary Central Asia,” in R. Michael Feener, editor, Islam and World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives, Santa Barbara, California: ABC Clio, 2004, p. 136.

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23. Another influential jurist of Central Asian origin from the Classical (or Golden) Age of Islamic civilization was Burhan al-Din Abu’l Hasan al-Marghinani (died, 1197 CE). The scientist al-Farabi was known as “the second teacher” after the philosopher Aristotle. 24. Foltz, p. 15. 25. Foltz writes “For many Iranians, being captured by the Arabs, a people they had always considered barbaric, was and remains the greatest single trauma in the history of their nation. The Iranian national epic, the Shah-nama (‘Book of Kings’), though compiled in the tenth century by a Muslim poet for a Muslim patron, portrays the Arab conquest of Iran as a sort of final and ultimate tragedy.” Foltz, p. 94. 26. Shi’a Muslims claim that the early Islamic community erred when they chose Abu Bahr since, according to them, the Prophet had designated that Ali ibn Abi Talib, his relative, should serve as his direct successor. The last sermon that the Prophet delivered at Ghadir Khumm is where he instructed his believers to follow Ali. 27. Bennigsen and Broxup provide the following chronology of events: “Arab armies advanced into Central Asia…in 673 they crossed the Amu Darya, conquered Bukhara in 676 and, in 751, on the banks of the River Talas, they routed a Chinese army sent by the Tang Emperor to buttress his distant Central Asian vassals. Between 706 and 716 they took the entire sedentary territory south of Syr Darya and finally in the 10th century Islam became the religion of Central Asia with just a small group of Bukharan Jews resisting the onslaught.” Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983, p. 2. 28. Political rulers often converted to Islam because they had no other option, but some businessmen converted in order to impress their patrons. Muslims dominated commercial activity, and becoming a Muslim would allow a person to benefit from a series of Islamic laws concerning commerce and finance that benefited Muslims. 29. For example, a resistance movement sprung up in Sogdiana in 777 CE that was led by a Prophet by the name of Magana (the veiled one). He claimed to be able to shape-shift because he was the Lord of all the Worlds. Those who doubted would end up in hell. Once, he used mirrors reflecting the sun to an angry crowd who asked him to reveal his brilliance. He commanded his followers to wear white robes and they were widely popular in the villages. After nine years, Muslim armies reached him and when cornered he told his disciples he would ascend to heaven to get helpers for them before he threw himself into a fire. The most successful religious rebellion in Central Asia against the Muslims was raised between 816 and 837 by a prophetic person named Babar and his group known as the Hurrah-din or happy religion. The name of this movement is also referred to as Dadaism and practiced an early form of communism with both the sharing of property and wives. Prophet Babar was publicly executed. 30. Foltz writes “An early twelfth-century Bukharan translator into Persian of an Arabic work on local history explains in his preface that ‘Since most people do not show a desire to read an Arabic book, friends of mine requested me to translate the book into Persian. Similarly, among the Steppe nomads Islam was learned not so much from Arabic texts as through the often highly personalized teachings of charismatic individuals who preached in local languages such as Turkish.’ ” Foltz, pp. 16–17.

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31. Ibn Sienna was able to rise to a position of authority in the Sultan’s palace after he miraculously cured an illness of the Sultan. In gratitude he was given access to the Royal Library where he continued his studies. His writings were translated into Latin and used in European academies and hospitals until the seventeenth century. 32. Foltz notes: “The concept of a heavenly paradise (old Persian paira daeza) and a hell of punishment for the wicked are also seen in ancient Iranian religion, but not in Israelite sources prior to the Babylonian period. The Iranian spirit Angra Mainyu or Ahriman evolves into the Christian and Muslim devil, who first appears in the book of Job as “ha-satan” (the accuser). The concept of angels and demons likewise seems to derive from Iranian beliefs.” Foltz, p. 32. 33. Foltz, p. 31. 34. Ken Blady, Jewish Communities in Exotic Places, Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson, 2000, p. 177. Blady writes that some thought that the Jews of Central Asia were connected to the ten lost tribes taken into captivity by Shalmanessar, King of Assyria, in 722 BCE. It is more probable that the suppression of the Jewish religion in Persia during the reigns of the Sasanian Kings Yazdegerd and Firuz in the fifth century CE is the reason for a mass migration of Jews to Central Asia. They may have followed Jewish merchants who might have already settled in the region. 35. Foltz claims that the original home of the Radanites was Roman Gaul, near Arles or Marseilles, where they were slave-traders and led a center in Verdun adept in turning slaves into eunuchs. Foltz, p. 101. 36. In 1992, I was able to visit the ramshackle streets and ancient synagogue at the heart of Samarkand’s fledgling Jewish ghetto. I had read about the synagogue before arriving in the country but was not sure if it would still be open because of all the political and social changes and extensive emigration that had been going on in the last few years. The synagogue was an old but warm building draped in blue cloths and wooden plaques with scriptures written in Hebrew. One gentleman tapped me on the shoulder and sought to engage me in conversation: “Pazhalasta, shtoh vy radnoi gorod?/Ya Amerikanskaya./Ahh! Amerikanitz! Amerika-very goodArnold Schwarzenegger-Terminator 2!” The old man then gave an enthusiastic “thumbs up” sign and made the rapid-fire sound of his idea of what a machine gun sounded like. This hissing sprayed the air around the synagogue with a hail of imaginary bullets. 37. This number comes from the News Release of the Jewish Museum in June 20, 1999, which hosted a collection of rare Jewish objects from Central Asia/the Caucasus. There are probably far fewer Jews than this number implies. It may, however, include all Jews throughout Central Asia and not just Bukhara, which would make it more feasible. Source:http://www.thejewishmuseum.org/site/pages/ content/about/press_release_archive/facingwe… 38. Stephen Neill, the History of Christian Missions. London: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 118. 39. John Aldridge, “Central Asia-Center or Periphery?,” 1998, from http?:www. passages.org.uk/essays/centralasia. Aldridge writes: “The Mongols had a specific grudge against the people of Nishapor, a place obliterated from the map in 1221 where having methodically slaughtered the population, all animals were killed, crops ploughed up, trees burnt and the city razed to the ground. In absolutist finale, the river was diverted to ensure the city never recovered. It never did. In the wake of the Great Khan, Central Asia entered period of security sometimes

Notes

40. 41. 42. 43.

44.

45. 46.

47.

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known as the ‘Pax Mongolica’. The Mongol Empire was divided by heirs and eventually fell to further conquerors.” Mildred Cable, The Challenge of Central Asia, London: World Dominion Press, 1929, p. 12. A less familiar spelling of Genghis Khan’s name is Dzhingis. His original name was Temuchin but renamed himself when he began his campaign to extend his rule over “all who dwelt in felt tents.” Neill, p. 118. One notable exception to this was the Mongols did not allow Muslims to slaughter meat in a hallal way and forbade the Muslim practice of only bathing in running water because these were seen to be contradictory to their own practices, and thus, an indirect form of Muslim condescension against Mongol culture. Mongol armies were never larger than 150,000. They were masters of strategy and military skills aimed to confuse opponents. Mongol horsemen were deadly marksmen who could fire arrows from 200 to 300 yards with accuracy. They marched enemy prisoners in front of their advance in order to take the first impact of any enemy’s counterattack. Mongol armies moved with tremendous speed. In 1221, Genghis Khan’s army covered 130 miles in just two days. In the same year it was reported that General Suhadi covered 180 miles in three days through deep snow. Speed was also a key to their administration. The Mongols developed a courier system of relaying messages by horsemen who would ride for a set distance from one station to another. As they approached the next village they would ring a bell and a fresh horse would be prepared. The Mongols also considered water to be sacred and so they never bathed! One description of them is most vivid: “Their eyes were so narrow that they might have bored a hole in a brazen vessel. Their stench was more horrible than their color. Their heads were set on their bodies as if they had no neck and their cheeks resembled leather bottles full of wrinkles and knots … Their nostrils resembled rotting graves and from them hair descended as far as their lips … Their chests were covered with lice which looked like sesame growing on a bad soil. Their bodies, indeed, were covered with these insects, and their skins were as rough grained as Shagreen leather fit only to be converted into shoes.”—quoted from a Persian source in Apples in the Snow, by Geoffrey Moorhouse, London: Scepter, 1991, p. 87. Genghis Khan died in China. When his body was carried to Kharakorum, the capital of the Mongols, tradition states that the Mongols killed every human being that they had to pass along the way. “The name Golden is believed to have come from the steppe-color direction system: black-north, blue-east, red-south, white-west and yellow (or god)-center. According to another version, the name was derived from a magnificent golden tent that Batu Khan established to mark a place of his future capital on the Volga… Earlier documents refer to this polity as Ulus of Jochi. Some scholars prefer to use an alternative name—Kipchak (or Qibchaq) Khanate—because various derivatives of Kipchak were also applied to this state in medieval documents.” Although there are various versions it is widely held that Ferdinand von Richthofen first coined the term Silk Road to emphasize the exotic nature of the route. Richard C. Foltz, Religions of the Silk Road: Overland Trade and Cultural Exchange for Antiquity to the Fifteenth Century, London: MacMillan Press, 1999, p. 2.

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48. Paper-making was one of the technologies that went from China across Central Asia to Europe along this route in the tenth century. The slave trade was also quite lucrative. Since Muslims were not allowed to enslave other Muslims, the poor of Central Asia became ideal candidates for slavery. Central Asian rulers would sell their criminals and debtors as slaves to the businessmen of the Silk Road. Many of these ended up in the Turkish Seljuk Army or among the wealthy families of Baghdad. 49. Notable Central Asian oasis towns included Marv (Merv), Balkh, Bukhara, Samarkand (Samarqand), and in Xinjiang (which is modern China) the cities of Kashgar, Turfan, Khotan, and many others. These way stations provided an opportunity for travelers to stock up on their supplies and rest for a few days before traveling onward. Animals were also rested or bought and sold in these cities. Bactrian camels were used in the colder and higher elevations of inner Asia while dromedaries were used in Southwestern Asia. Camels, cows, and yaks were also used. These animals all proceeded at a very slow pace, perhaps only about four miles an hour on average, meaning that a caravan might only cover 30 or 40 miles in a day. 50. Foltz, p. 9. 51. Marco Polo traveled with his two brothers Niccolo and Maffeo. Their account was not believed at first because it was thought to be inconceivable. Trade flourished during the Pax Mongolica, lasting over 100 years. 52. Some Central Asians converted to Islam because they found it a way to connect with the outside world. Foltz writes, “This is a phenomenon that historical Jeremy Bentley has aptly characterized as ‘conversion by voluntary association.’ According to this interpretation local community, especially in remote areas would tend to see foreign traders as being their link to the outside world, a world that wasn’t hard to imagine as being far more advanced and civilized than the isolated settlements one lived in.” Foltz, p. 12. 53. It was the poet Saifi Sarai (probably born about 1321 on the banks of the Volga River near modern-day city of Volgograd, formerly Stalingrad) who, some 140 years before Nicholas Copernicus, wrote a line of a poem that described “the earth circling around the sun.” This may have been more than an incidental metaphor, given the advanced astronomical knowledge among the noted scientists (such as Ibn Haldun and Ibn Taimiyya) of the Muslim Renaissance (an era immediately preceding the Italian Renaissance). Saifi Sarai was a fascinating individual who died in Egypt in 1396 and is best known for his version of Saadi’s Gyulstan. In Ravil Bukharev, Islam in Russia: The Four Seasons. Richmond, Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 2000, p. 156. 54. Bukharev, p. 147. 55. Bukharev, p. 159. 56. This quote is from Christopher Marlowe’s play Tamburlaine. Ibn Khaldun, the renowned Arab historian credits Timur’s military genius with his flexibility in adopting battle plans and his consistent capitalization on the weaknesses of his enemies. He refined his strategic prowess by unceasingly playing chess with his troops. 57. Neill, p. 113. 58. Of the city of Samarkand the English playwright Christopher Marlowe wrote that Tamerlane’s “shining turrets distressed heaven” and the minarets of the city were “towers to hell.”

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59. The Registan is at the center of the city and is surrounded by a public square described by Lord Curzon as an “extravaganza of massive simplicity and grandeur, balance, space and time.” Even after centuries, and in its ruin, the Registan is opulent. 60. The tomb of Timur remained sealed and untroubled until it was finally opened by Soviet archeologists on June 21, 1941. Without warning, on June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. 61. When Timur died he had no son to become heir. He was buried under a single piece of green jade in Samarkand. On this stone was inscribed the message: “whoever disturbs this stone will be met by an attacker fiercer than me.” On June 21, 1941, Soviet archeologists opened the tomb. The next day in a surprise attack, Hitler’s panzer tanks began their blitzkrieg into the Soviet Union. 62. The Taj Mahal, in Agra, was built by Shah Jahan to honor his favorite wife, the young Mumtaz Mahal. 5 The history of Christianity in Central Asia 1. The Medes may have been from eastern Turkey and forerunners of the Kurds. 2. Foltz, p. 65. Foltz also notes that “The apocryphal book of Thomas, written around the same time, mentions the land of the Kushans (baith kaishan).” 3. LaTourette states that the term Nestorian has been loosely applied to any and every form of Christianity in the East in early church historical accounts. 4. Thrower, p. 86. 5. Foltz, p. 65. 6. While Nestorius was liked by the Byzantine Emperor Theodosius II, he came under attack from the sister of the Emperor named Pulcheria. St. Cyril led the attack against Nestorius and when he was appointed to preside over the Council of Ephesus, which was called to decide what was the appropriate term to use for the Virgin Mary, it was no surprise what the eventual outcome of the trial would be and this is why Nestorius refused to even participate in this trial. The Emperor had no choice but to banish Nestorius. 7. Kenneth Scott LaTourette, The History of the Expansion of Christianity. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1961, p. 63. 8. Nestorius: The Bazaar of Heracleides, translated, with an introduction by G. A. Driver and Leonard Hodgson, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925. In the introduction to this book, the translators provide an extensive explanation of Nestorius’ main views about the relationship between Christ’s divine and human natures, xxxii–xxxv. 9. http://www.registan.net/?p=5226 10. Foltz, p. 72. One major problem Foltz states they experienced was when they transliterated the name of Jesus from the Syriac Yeshu to the Chinese it became Yishu, which sounds in the pronunciation of the period something like the Chinese term meaning “a rat on the move.” Most Nestorians in China were foreigners as was the case with Jews. This is why Nestorian or Jewish religious buildings also served as cultural centers in China. 11. Gladney, p. 442. 12. Bruce Shelley, Church History in Plain Language, Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1995, p. 113. 13. John Stewart, Nestorian Missionary Enterprise, Edinburg: T&T Clark, 1928 (reprinted, New York: AMS Press, 1980, p. 142).

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14. Stewart, p. 143. 15. The Mongols may have even had some Christians in Mongolia before they began their wars. The Kerait and Ongot Turkic tribes converted to Christianity in the eleventh century and Christian names are to be found within Mongolian Merkits. A rumor existed that even some members of the Khan’s royal family were Christians. Foltz speculates, however, that “The Christian accounts were wishful thinking and propaganda aimed at a remote Christian audience.” Foltz, p. 116. 16. Foltz, p. 114. 17. Foltz, p. 129. General Nawruz ordered the destruction of churches in Tabriz and Hamadan. 18. Shelley, p. 113. 19. This hope was fueled by the fact that, in 1260, a Mongol king named Kitbuqa captured Aleppo and Damascus. 20. The leader of the Mongol Horde conquering Baghdad was Hulegu who ruled Mongol Persian domains. Hulegu even “gave over the royal palace to the Nestorian Catholicus Mar Makikha and had a new cathedral built for him.” Foltz, p. 123. 21. William of Rubruck was probably the first European Christian to write about Buddhism. His writings held to the idea that Buddhists were simply wayward Christians. 22. Sargis was especially noted for his frequent attacks against Islam. William Rubrick said that the Khan declared: “Here you are Christians, Saracens, and tuins (Buddhist priests) and each of you claims that his religion is superior and that his writings or books contain more truth.” Quoted in Foltz, p. 122. 23. When he returned to Avignon in 1353 after a long sea voyage he presented the Pope with a letter from the Khan. Foltz, p. 133. 24. This is in reference to the remote and minor Ongot Kingdom in Northern China. 25. Hodgson suggests “The Monophysites may have favored the viewpoint of the Monophysites on particular issues—notably the relative repugnance to be found among Monophysites to religious statues and to figural art, which perhaps sprang partly from their more general hostility to the richer churches who could better afford such attractions.” Marshall G. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, volume 1—The Classical Age in Islam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974 (1961), p. 306. 26. Stewart, p. 165. 27. Marco Polo also mentions Prester John in The Adventures of Marco Polo. 28. Mar Apem, Nestorian Christians. Kerala, India: Mar Narsai Press, 1976, p. 86. 29. Cable, p. 16. 30. Cable, p. 16. 31. Stewart, p. 159. 32. This letter, dated 1247 CE, was sent to Pope Innocent IV. Father John was followed by William of Rubrick. In a letter dated 1253, William of Rubrick stated that he had met many slaves who were Christians in the Mongol court. 33. Cable, p. 28. Cable writes that in 1606 CE Jesuits traveled through the region en route to China. Russian Orthodox missionaries also went through Kazakhstan en route to Alaska in the 1700s. Most Russian Orthodox missionary activity before 1800, however, was in the Urals and the Caucasus mountains. 34. Thrower, p. 166.

Notes 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

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Bennigsen and Broxup, p. 11. Bennigsen and Broxup, p. 23. Thrower, p. 167. Chotan Varlikhanov was the son of a noble Kazakh who became a Russian military cadet and wrote ethnographic studies about the Kazakhs in the 1860s. Varlikhanov maintained that Islam was an alien and marginalized force among his people and Islam should no longer be promoted there by the Russian government. Dostoyevsky claimed Varlikhanov was “the first Kazakh with a fully European education.” Crews, p. 211. Crews, p. 49 Crews, p. 48. Kryzhanovskii was the Governor-General of Orenburg Province. He did not view this as being in conflict with the mandate to enforce social toleration since “Mohammedanism and the schism (within the church) take the form of propaganda, at the manifest detriment of the predominant faith…The main doctrines of the Mohammedan religion preaches hatred toward Christians.… To force Russian police to affirm and spread the shari’a in Russia, to drive people into mosques and to invited parishioners to monetary payments in support of fanaticism (izuverstvo) may, in truth, be taken as a mockery of the Russian authorities.” Crews, pp. 295–296. In the year 1743, Russian state officials and churchmen were responsible for destroying as many as 418 of the 536 masjids in the town and district of Kazan. Crews, p. 38. Thrower, pp. 163–164. Bennigsen and Broxup, p. 5. Robert P. Geraci, “Going Abroad or Going to Russia? Orthodox Missionaries in the Kazakh Steppe, 1881–1917,” in Robert P. Geraci and Michael Khodarkovsky, editors, Of Religion and Empire: Mission, Conversion and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 274. Geraci, p. 276. Bukharev, p. 291. Kasantseff was the Archbishop of Tablosk. The Governor-General who made this boast was N. A. Kryzhanovskii. Crews, p. 339. Crews, p. 93. Crews, p. 332. LaTourette, pp. 432–433. It is not clear if his actual name was Fasl Begh. De Mayor states that he was from a village near Andijan and was converted in September 1913. Cable, p. 17. J. W. Sweetman, The Bible in Islam. London: British and Foreign Bible Society, 1953, p. 25. Philip Glazerbrook, Journey to Khiva: A Writer’s Search for Central Asia, New York: Kodansha International, 1994, p. 77. Joseph Wolff, Narrative of a Mission to Bukhara, New York: Harper and Brothers Publishing, 1845, p. 187. According to Wolff this was actually his second journey to Bukhara, with his first being between 1830 and 1832. Wolff, p. 187. Following are “Wolff ’s Evangelical Apologetics” in his message to Muslims: (1) Jesus was prophesied for centuries; (2) He was distinguished by

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a life of miracles; (3) His miraculous birth spoke of His calling from God; (4) the prophecies that he spoke, such as the destruction of Jerusalem, were proof of his authority; (5) the effect of the Christian message produces in adherents a desire to be servants of love even to enemies; and (6) the personal testimonies in faith of various Christians. From Wolff, 1848, pp. 445–446. 60. Wolff, p. 220. 61. Neill, p. 367. 6 Russians and Central Asian Muslims: Eagle and sickle against the crescent 1. A Muslim eyewitness Muhammad Salih wrote, “The Nazarenes appeared suddenly from the North, unleashing fire on the city walls and causing panic among the people… The elders, religious scholars and well-born notables gathered at the mosque and other public places to decide how to respond to the unexpected arrival of the Christian sources.” Robert D. Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2006, p. 241. 2. Crews, p. 242. 3. Alexei Vasiliev, “Russia’s Destinies and Islam,” in The Christian-Muslim Frontier: Chaos, Clash or Dialogue? Edited by Jorgen S. Nielsen, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1998, p. 26. 4. One ramification of this was that Muslim terms and the names of religious personages of Central Asia are often transliterated in a number of different ways. For example one important Tatar cleric is usually referred to as Muhammadjan bin al-Husayn while becoming Mukhamedzhan Khusainov in Russian versions. I have tried to follow standard transliterations for Russian (the so-called Library of Congress system) and inform the reader when variances occur. The transliteration of Arabic terms will be based on transliteration charts provided by the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. My goal throughout this process is consistency in usage of terms. 5. Wolfgang Meider, editor, The Prentice-Hall Encyclopedia of World Proverbs: A Treasury of Wit and Wisdom through the Ages, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1986, p. 491. 6. Crews, p. 36. The quotation is from the Russian scholar Andrei Lysol and dates to the writing of his book Scythian History written in 1692. Lyzlov stated that the origin of Islam sprang from “Muhammad’s charm and his devious imagination.” 7. This quote is from the acerbic poetry of Muhammad Amin Ho’qondiy who wrote in Kazakh. Crews, p. 255. 8. Crews, p. 193. 9. Empress Elizabeth forbade the building of masjids in any village where there were Orthodox Christian inhabitants and stipulated that 200 Muslim males were required in a village before a masjid could be built. Riots among the Bashkirs in 1755 brought these issues to a head which had an impact on how Catherine viewed these problems. 10. Crews, p. 33. 11. In the Volga and Kama River and Ural regions of Russia, Catherine closed the offices of the most aggressive Orthodox Christians seeking converts among Muslims in 1763.

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12. Crews, p. 32. 13. Chotan Valikhanov says of the Tatar mullahs in Kazakhstan hated the local Kazakhs and were “swindlers without exception… They reject poetry, history, mathematics, philosophy, and all natural sciences.” Crews, p. 218. The ethnographer Shakhimardan Miriasovich (Ivan Ivanovich) Ibragimov “depicted itinerant mullahs from Kazan, as well as those from neighboring Khanates, as exploiters of the credulous Kazakhs.” Crews, p. 224. 14. In 1789 Catherine ordered a printing of the Qur’an in St. Petersburg for distribution among the Kazaks. By the end of that century that same press had printed at least another 3,600 Qur’ans for sale to Muslims. Crews, p. 52. 15. Bennigsen and Broxup, p. 18. 16. Catherine’s policies also came at the same time as the Russo-Turkish war of 1768–1774 which only came to a conclusion (with the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774) because of the need to quell the rebellion led by Emeralian Pugachev, a Cossack who was able to gain some support among Orthodox dissenters and disheartened Muslims. Because of this link the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church called Pugachev, “The disciple of the anti-Christ Mahomet.” Crews, p. 357. 17. Prince Mikhail Shcherbatov warned that all Muslims were “born enemies of the Christian.” Crews, p. 45. 18. Catherine the Great’s declaration would have also positively affected Russian relations with the Ottoman Sultan and this may well have played a role in its formulation. Ravil Bukharaev, p. 281. 19. The first was Mufti Mukhamedzhan Khusainov appointed by Czar Catherine and the Ministry of Interior Affairs in 1788 and died in 1825 and was replaced by Gabdessaliam Gabdrakhimov who was in office from 1825 until 1840. The third Mufti was Gabdulvakhid Suleimanov who was in office between 1840 and 1862. The fourth Mufti was Salimgarei Tevkelev (1865–1885) and the last was Mukhamed’iar Sultanov (1886–1915). These Muslim religious leaders all invoked God’s blessings on the Russian czars and taught that Muslims who were not patriotic angered God. They called that “warm prayers to God” be offered for the czars and for “all of Russia.” Crews, p. 92. 20. Forced expulsions were particularly enforced to the western Cherkess tribes of Abkhazia but also to Crimean Tartars. Noted massacres against Turkmen tribes were carried out by General Skobelev and others including a massacre of Teke tribesmen in Gok-Tepe in 1881. Often, however, Russian authorities sought to destroy a given community by cutting it off from the resources of the larger society. This tactic called dying out (vymiranie) was used widely in the Kazakh Steppes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. From Bennigsen and Broxup, 1983, p. 24. 21. The translation into Russian was based on a French edition. It appeared in 1716 as The al-Koran on Muhammad, or the Turkish Creed. Because the Russians learned most about Islam from the Ottomans the adjectives Turkish and Mohammedan were used interchangeably in the Russian writings of this era. 22. James Thrower, The Religious History of Central Asia from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004, p. 165. 23. Under Peter the Great, “Tatar nobles who refused to abandon Islam found themselves demoted to the ranks of the peasantry or laborers for the Admiralty.” Crews, p. 37.

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24. The oath of 1809 stated: “We, the below-named, promise and vow before Almighty God and the Great Prophet Muhammad on four of his most just books, the Gospels, the Torah, Psalms of David and the Qur’an that we… must serve as loyal subjects of his imperial majesty… In concluding this our oath we kiss the Qur’an of our Prophet Muhammad. Amen.” Crews, introduction. 25. Fred W. Bergholz, The Partition of the Steppe: The Struggle of Russians, Manchus and the Zungar Mongols for Empire in Central Asia, 1619–1758—A Study in Power Politics, New York: Peter Lang, 1993, p. 27. 26. For example, in Kazakhstan in 1565 CE. One exception to this pattern was the reign of Catherine II who had the highest regard for Islam and actually sent Muslim missionaries into Tartar regions to strengthen their faltering faith. 27. Verny means reliable in Russian. It was here that the Czar sent his most trustworthy soldiers. This uttermost boundary of the empire is now known by its new name, Alma-Ata. 28. Bukharaev, p. 279. 29. The major rebellion among the Central Asian Muslims between the time of the Russian seizure of Tashkent and the onset of Soviet rule was the rebellion in Andizhan (Andijan) in 1898. 30. Captain Arthur Connolly, a Protestant zealot from Dublin was sent to the Emir of Bukhara to see about the fate of the queen’s envoy, Captain Charles Stoddart. Stoddart was tortured by the Emir Nasrullah in his prison (called the sia chat). For six months, Stoddard shared a hole with rats, scorpions, lice and sheep ticks until he renounced his faith and became a Muslim. When Connolly arrived, Stoddart renounced Islam and both of them were beheaded before a crowd in the square in front of the Arg (or fort) on the morning of June 17, 1842. 31. Karsh notes that the Qajar tribe, led by Agha Muhammad in the eighteenth century was instrumental in affecting the Anglo-Russian competition in Central Asia. Efraim Karsh, Islamic Imperialism: A History. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2007, p. 119. 32. Crews, p. 351. 33. Bennigsen and Broxup write: “The General Government of the Steppes changed its name to that of the Republic of Kazakhstan without any modification of its border, whilst the former General Government of Turkestan became within its former frontiers the Autonomous Republic of Turkestan. The two protected states—the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva—were merged to become the People’s Republics of Bukhara and Khorezm. This preservation of the czarist administrative picture of Central Asia corresponds not only to the wishes of the pre-revolutionary ‘bourgeois nationalists’ of pan-Turkic persuasion, but also to those of the first Central Asian Bolsheviks, whose leaders, the Kazakh Turar Ryskulov and the Uzbek Fayzullah Khojaev believed that sooner or later all Central Asia would be unified into one state, Soviet Turkestan and would form one nation, the Turkestani.” In Bennigsen and Broxup, 1983, pp. 41–42. 34. Crews, p. 365. 35. Crews, p. 365. 36. This effort began in the North Caucasus and spread throughout the region. Bennigsen and Broxup, p. 41. 37. Thrower, p. 188. 38. Moorhouse, p. 121.

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39. The Basmati guerilla fighters were in Turkestan from 1918 to 1928 but some were active as late as 1936. During this transition from czarist to socialist rule a half million Uzbeks migrated to northern Afghanistan. When the Kyrgyz revolted against the Russians beginning in 1916 vast atrocities were committed against entire communities. Over 100,000 Kyrgyz fled into China. 40. Thrower, p. 196. 41. Akbar S. Ahmed, Islam Today: A Short Introduction to the Muslim World. London: I.B. Tauris Publishing, 1999, p. 186. 42. Thrower, p. 197. 43. On the topic of atheism in Russia, I am reminded of Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s quote in The Idiot where I recall him stating (but I am not sure where): “It is easier for a Russian to become an atheist than for anyone else in the world.” 44. Khalid notes that these to’y were also often opportunities to drink tremendous amounts of alcohol. 45. Khalid, p. 141. 46. Kriwaczek writes: “Stalin, who had once studied for the priesthood had remembered his Bible lessons well. The best way to make a nation like the Crimean Tatars or the Tribes of Israel disappear, he had learned from the ancient Assyrian despots, was to carry them off to faraway places, where the would eventually disappear into the general population.” Paul Kriwaczek, In Search of Zarathustra: Across Iran and Central Asia to Find the World’s First Prophet. New York: Random House, 2002, p. 6. 47. The remnant of these people and their ancestors are renowned in Central Asia for their ongoing passionate devotion to Islam and to their Turkish identity. In 1970, for example, they applied en masse at the Turkish Embassy in Moscow requesting emigration to Turkey. They were denied. Bennigsen and Broxup, p. 29. 48. As many as 800,000 of these soldiers deserted to the Nazis at the first opportunity. Most conscripts were used away from the battle to dig trenches and other logistical tasks. 49. This quest for a unified nation of Turkic peoples is also referred to as a Pan-Turanian movement. 50. This was an effort to expand the amount of arable land by building canals from the Aral Sea and by redirecting rivers to enhance cultivation. The long-term ecological effects of this program, however, have been disastrous. 51. Bennigsen and Broxup, p. 17. 52. Thrower, p. 200. 53. Ahmed Rashid quoted on p. 390 in “Shaping an Islamic Identity: Religion, Islamism and the State in Central Asia,” by T. Jeremy Gunn, Sociology of Religion, volume 64, number 3, Autumn 2003, pp. 389–410. 54. M. Nazif Shahrani, “Muslim Central Asia: Soviet Development Legacies and Future Challenges” in Central Asia and the Caucuses, Mohiaddin Mesbahi, editor, p. 63. 55. One estimate stated that as much as a quarter of the entire population of the Kazakhs was physically eliminated through two decades of collectivization— Henri Carrere d’Encousse, Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt, New York: Newsweek Books, 1980, p. 66. 56. While these recruits were away from Central Asia, Soviet officers often forced them to eat pork and were consistently obliged to listen to lectures extolling scientific atheism.

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57. Boris Z. Rumer, Soviet Central Asia: “A Tragic Experiment” Boston: Unwin Hyman Publishers, 1989, p. 131. 58. During the reign of the Soviet Union propagandists made much of the fact that there were many more doctors per capita in Central Asia then there were in neighboring Pakistan. 59. US News and World Report, May 14, 1979, p. 37. Cotton production, however, while providing income and a ready market took prime farmland out of food production. 7 Islamic missionaries and the islamicization of Central Asian society 1. When my Muslim friend asked with shock how Muslims could even consider doing such a thing given the clear commands of the Qur’an and the Hadith about mixing alcohol with prayer, the Imam explained that the text literally said not to come to the salat drunk and as the salat was finished, they were now free to proceed with their intoxicants. 2. This community has historic ties with Iranian Khorasan and the merchants from that community. This particular Shiite community is Twelver Islam (Ithna Ash’ara) and is situated in a compact area in Bukhara known as the Juybar. Another Shiite group lives in the Pamir Mountains bordering China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and belongs to the majority Ismaili sect (known as Khojas in India). There are also Ismaili communities in Samarkand and Bukhara as well as Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The Ismaili’s of Tajikistan staunchly promote Persian and Tajik languages and literature and cultural expressions. From the article, “The Emerging Central Asia: Ethnic and Religious Factions,” by Eden Naby in Mohiaddin Meshbahi, editor, Central Asia and the Caucasus, pp. 43–45. 3. The Hanafi School is widespread throughout the Middle East but has a particularly strong following in Central Asia, Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan. The four principle schools of fiqh within Sunni Islam are Hanafi, Shafi’I, Hanbali, and Maliki. Many of the greatest Hanbalite scholars in Islamic history wrote in Persian (or Farsi). 4. T. Jeremy Gunn, p. 396. Gunn explains that one example of a greater interest in devotion than strict adherence to practice would mean that Muslims in Central Asia would be allowed to read the Qur’an in their local languages instead of forcing them to read it only in Arabic. Further, the legal code is more tolerant than others and is more accepting of women. Diversity of opinion is accepted as inevitable and not an affront to the Islamic community. 5. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “The Emerging “Muslim” States of Central Asia and the Caucasus,” in Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics,” 1994, p. 2. 6. Kulchik, Fadin, and Sergeev, p. 5. 7. In a narrow legal sense, the term waqf means the voluntary relinquishing of properties or funds for the benefit of the community. This is also called simply a charitable gift (sadaqah) to use a nonlegal term. The practice of waqf is important in early Islam and is first seen when the Muslim Mukhayriq was killed shortly after the hijrah and willed all of his wealth to the Prophet Muhammad. 8. Khalid, p. 136. 9. The Hanafi School is named after Abu Hanifah al-Nu’man (d. 767) and that is why either name is used interchangeably. Abu Hanifah was interpreted by two

Notes

10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

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students who came after him, Abu Yusuf (d. 808) and al-Shaybani (d. 805). Compilations of these sources are widespread in Central Asia beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The reference to the “sheikhs of Bukhara and the sheikhs of Balkh” refers to the legal scholars who lived in these two cities in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. R.D. McChesney, Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480–1889, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 5. Some scholars have argued whether the movement began in Central Asia or came from outside the region. Khalid, p. 138. Early Sufis had both “A relative disinterest in material and political concerns. This did not necessarily involve a withdrawal from the world; however, Arab-Islamic sources indicate that early or proto-Sufis participated in jihad against the Byzantine Empire. But it did entail a commitment to a life of spirituality and self-denial (zuhd) rather than one of indulgence and material comfort.” Matthew S. Gordon, The Rise of Islam. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2005, p. 76. The largest Sunni groupings are the Hanafi and Shafii schools (mazhaabs) and the Sufi paths (or tariqats) of Naqshbandiah and Qadyriah. The tomb of Naqshband is generally considered to be one of the holiest of such tombs by Central Asians. Crews, pp. 130–131, writes about the introduction of the loud singing of prayers among Muslims under Czarist rule. Baldick suggests that although the term probably dates to no earlier than the ninth century, the practice and ideas of Sufism may actually come from Christianity. Baldick writes, “It is really not until the 10th century that a coherent body of doctrine was put together to form a new discipline. From the 11th century, the institution of the lodge (ribat) was developed to shelter and feed travelers and the poor. Sufis would meet there and could be permanent residents. In the 13th century, brotherhoods (literally paths as opposed to the single Path, tariq, Sufism itself) began to be founded with recognized leaders and their deputies teaching disciples in distinctive programmes of instruction,” op. cit., pp. 5–6. A. Tabyshalieva, 2000, quoted in Gunn, p. 398. The name Uwaysi comes from a legendary contemporary of the Prophet Muhammad, who was said to communicate with the Prophet through telepathy. This Yemeni Muslim was supposedly called Uways Qarani with the name Uways means wolf in Arabic and the Surname Qarani a supposed designation of his tribe. The most famous figure in the development of this tradition is the Iranian Sufi named Kharaqani (d. 1033 CE) so-called after the name of the place of his birth in northeastern modern-day Iran. The group developed a new significance in the fourteenth century with the formation of the Naqshbandi brotherhood named after Baha al-din Naqshband, who was a student of his master named Kulal (d. 1371 CE). These Sufi orders claim to have a line of masters that pass on the teachings. Around 1600, a book of these traditions and the men who held them was written by Ahmad of Uzgen (modern-day Kyrgyzstan) entitled the History of the Uwaysis, where the travels and exploits of this group are celebrated in “a series of biographies, usually of people who never existed. It is a kind of imaginary history of Islam, which mirrors the religions spread and development, and is also intended to teach the reader to become an Uwaysi himself.” Julian Baldick, Imaginary

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19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41.

42.

Notes Muslims: The Uwaysi Sufis of Central Asia, New York: New York University Press, 1993, p. 1. This according to an article entitled Muslims in USSR published in Saudi Aramco World, January/February, 1990, volume 41, number 1, p. 37. Dru C. Gladney in John L. Esposito, editor, The Oxford History of Islam, p. 471. Thrower, p. 30. Thrower, p. 43. Thrower, p. 31. There are dozens of valleys each with their own distinct linguistic characteristics in both countries. This term Azeri is considered archaic by some but remains widely used in Europe and North America. H.B. Paksoy, “Thoughts on Religious Fundamentalism—Identity in Central Asia” in the Journal of Turkish Weekly, Online edition, February 21, 2002, http://www.turkishweekly.net/articles.php?1d=85 Roy Hyman, “Post-Soviet Central Asia” in Roy Allison, editor, The Challenges for the Former Soviet South, p. 23. Alexei Malashenko, “Islam in Central Asia” in Roy Allison and Lena Johnson, editors, Central Asian Security: The New International Context, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2001. Khalid, p. 148. Malashenko, p. 58. Sergei A. Panarin, “The Ethnohistoric Dynamics of Muslim Societies within Russia and the CIS,” in Mohiaddin Mesbahi, editor, Central Asia and the Caucasus, p. 23. Malashenko, p. 64. Newsweek, February 3, 1992, p. 17. Religious commodities would include such items as bumper-stickers, banners, shirts, plaques, and calendars with Islamic themes. Malashenko, p. 58. Michael Rykwin, Moscow’s Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia, Armonk, New York: Sharpe, 1982, p. 85. Crews, p. 329. Ahmad S. Moussali, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism and Human Rights. Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 2001, p. 20. These terms, cited as coming from the French scholar Oliver Roy are in Noorani. He also writes: “Militant groups have been especially active in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, whose governments have been the most repressive.” A. G. Noorani, Islam and Jihad: Prejudice versus Reality. London: Zed Books, 2002, p. 125. The Jadid Movement was active in Central Asia before it was crushed by the Soviet revolution. Stalin massacred Jadidis and their efforts were forced underground. The term Wahhabism was introduced by Muslim clerics in the region and it is widely used. It is not as much a specific reference to Wahhabism as in the case of Saudi Arabian Puritanism but has a more generic meaning to include all groups that are preaching an aggressive Islam that criticizes the authority of local Muslims. Crews, p. 367. Kulchik, Fadin, and Sergeev, p. 7.

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43. Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 2002, p. 160. 44. Alexei Malashenko in Nielsen, editor, p. 63. The gist of the article is that European democracy is incompatible with the traditions and practices of the Muslim world. At the time of Malashenko’s article, one of the leaders of the IRP was Geidar Jamal, who also served as chairman of the “Tawhid Islamic Center.” Jamal completely rejected any form of democracy in a European interpretation because Islam already promotes a pure democracy rooted in the revelation of the Qur’an. 45. This article states that the group began in London but other accounts describe the movement beginning in either Saudi Arabia or in Jordan by Palestinian Diaspora intellectuals led by Sheikh Taquiddin an-Nabhani, once a student at the al-Azhar University in Cairo. Certainly, his writings remain very influential in the movement. Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan–Pakistan Connection, translated by John King, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 10. 46. Gulnoza Saidazimova suggests that there are as many as 10,000 HUT members in Kyrgyzstan as of 2007. Gulnoza Saidazimova, “Central Asia: Banned Islamic Group Hizb ut-Tahir Continues to Gain Members.” Eurasia Insight, August 14, 2007. The HUT distributes a newspaper in the Uzbek Language called Ong—al Waie (Awareness). This newspaper is distributed free to those who are interested but must be purchased by members. All members are expected to contribute at least 10 percent of their income to the organization. The newspaper is highly critical of the West, especially the United States. Many other articles in this paper focus on religious observance themes. 47. According to Thomas Friedman, this is also what Hezbollah did when it kidnapped a number of Israeli soldiers in 2006, The New York Times, July 19, 2006. 48. Asian Times website, Part Six of the Series, “Central Asia: Peaceful Jihad,” November 25, 2003, http://www.aitimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/EK25Ag01. html. This same article is intent on emphasizing that the HUT is not interested in militancy but in a peaceful Jihad. There is an obvious tension in this view because the article also notes that the movement was, in its formative stages, quite influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the first movements to call for a militant struggle against European and Western colonial domination. 49. Malashenko, p. 56. 50. Zoya Pylenko, “Central Asia’s New Missionaries,” ISN/ETH (International Security Network), Zurich, Switzerland, May 11, 2005. 51. The Nurcu Movement was founded by Said Nurcu (1873–1960) but was carried on after his death by Fethullah Gulen, who was born in Eruzum in eastern Turkey in 1938. His branch of the Nurcu movement is the largest and most influential, and it is also sometimes designated as the Fethullahci movement. Gulen is known by his followers as Hocaefendi or the Respected Lord. 52. Bayram Balci, “Central Asia: Fetullah Gulen’s Missionary Schools” in the ISIM Newsletter, number 9, 2002. 53. S. Fredrick Starr, “The War Against Terrorism and U.S. Bilateral Relations with the Nations of Central Asia” December 13, 2001, available at http://www. cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Testimony.htm.

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54. Qadi Ashmawi, an Egyptian religious authority, wrote: “Seeking justice through violent subversion removes the essential element from the scene—the masses and their will.” Fatima Mernissi, Islam and Democracy: The Fear of the Modern World. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus Books, 1992, p. 29. 55. Aleksei Malashenko in Jorgen Nielsen, editor, p. 61. 8 Post-Soviet Protestant missionary efforts in Central Asia 1. Virgilio Elizondo, Galilean Journey: The Mexican-American Promise, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1983, p. 49. 2. A. Christian van Gorder, No God But God: A Path to Muslim–Christian Dialogue on God’s Nature, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2002, p. 19. 3. Stan Guthrie, Missions in the Third Millennium, Harrisonburg, Virginia: Paternoster Press, 2000, p. 194. 4. Rykwin, p. 106. 5. Northrop, p. 35. 6. Further details are available at the Central Asia website of the southern Baptist International Mission Board. This website has a number of accounts of Central Asians who converted to Christianity. 7. Samuel Escobar, “Evangelical Missiology: Peering into the Future at the Turn of the Century” in William D. Taylor, editor, Global Missiology for the Twenty-First Century—The Iguassu Dialogue. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic Books, 2000, p. 108. 8. Christian Medical Fellowship: http://www.cmf.org.uk/literature/content.asp? context=article&id=271 9. J. Herbert Kane, A Global View of Christian Missions: From Pentecost to the Present, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 1971, p. 388. 10. Such Evangelical Protestant job placement organizations would include Frontiers, Canada (6240 London Road, Richmond, British Columbia, V7E354), People International (PO Box 26, Turnbridge Wells, England) and Interserve (12 Elm Avenue, Lenzie, Glasgow, Scotland, G66 YH3). 11. http://www.acsa.narod.ru/indextext.htm 12. http://www.teachoverseas.org/locations/kazakhstan.html 13. http://www.irrtv.org/training.html 14. Evangelical radio programmers active in Central Asia include the Far Eastern Broadcasting Company (FEBA Radio, Box 1975, Limmisol, Cyprus), Evangelical Rundfunk/TransWorld Radio (Box 1444, 6330 Wetzlar, Germany), and HCJB World Radio (1605 Elizabeth Street, Pasadena, California, 91104). 15. TransWorld Radio states that the organization has three AM stations and one shortwave radio station in the region. The three AM stations vary in size from the smallest of 50,000 Watts to the largest of 1 million Watts. This organization provides Christian programming “from several locations throughout Central Asia” and in Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, Uighur, Uzbek, and ‘Central Asian Russian (CAR).’ Radio programs include children’s evangelistic programs, programs for prisoners and ‘MemCare by Radio,’ which are programs aimed to “encourage missionaries and expatriate believers living in Central Asia.” Other information and listener testimonials can be found at http://www.twr.org/index.php?option=content&task=view &id=59&Itemid=77

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16. Information about the Jesus Film is available by contacting Campus Crusade for Christ (4700 Arrowhead Springs, San Bernadino, California, 92414) or by contacting Gospel Recordings International. 17. More information is available on the Bible League at http://www.bibleleague. org/persecuted/asiapers.php 18. Evangelical Bible Translation organizations that are active in Central Asia include The Slaviska Mission (PO Box 15037, 161-15 Bromma, Sweden), People International (PO Box 26, Turnbridge Wells, TN2 5AZ, England), The International Bible Society (PO Box 20100, 10460 Stockholm, Sweden) and the Wycliffe Bible Translators (with offices in Huntington Beach, California and Dallas, Texas, USA). 19. An Arabic script Gospel of Matthew was published in 1884. 20. The four gospels were published in the Cyrillic script in 1901. 21. Notable Evangelical groups leading short-term travel programs in Central Asia include “Operation Friendship” through Open Doors International (PO Box 6, Witney, Oxon. OX8 7SP, England), Youth With a Mission (c/o Prins Hendrikkade 50, 1012 AC Amsterdam, The Netherlands), and International Teams (97 High Road, Beeston, Nottingham N99 2LH, England). 22. http://www.gopeople.org/faqs.php 23. Thomas Hale, On Being a Missionary, William Carey Library: Pasadena, CA, 1995, pp. 293–295. The term is used widely and this is only one example. To Hale’s credit he is describing this trend as much as endorsing it and begins his discussion by admitting, “At first hearing, ‘nonresidential missionary’ sounds like a contradiction in terms” and goes on to clarify specific situations where such a term is more appropriate than it would be elsewhere, p. 294. 24. New Network International, January 17, 1992. 25. The first Baha’i began arriving in Ashkhabad in 1880 shortly after it had been founded by the Russian empire to be the capital city of the new Province of Transcaspia. In 1888, the dramatic murder of Hajji Mohammad Reza Isfahani in the market during broad daylight was very important because seven Shi’a Iranian citizens were convicted for the murder, making it the first time in the movement’s history that the law had rallied to the defense of the oft-maligned group. A large number of émigrés came to the city after this victory, and there was a thriving school and as many as 4,000 Baha’i in Ashkhabad by the start of the First World War, most Baha’i in the city were shopkeepers, traders, and merchants but they developed a highly organized social and cultural support group in the city. One of the most important Baha’i writers, Abd al-Baha’i taught in the city from 1905 until his death there in 1924. Baha’i stopped coming to Ashkhabad with the first religious persecution of their adherents by the Soviets in 1928. The leading scholar on this topic is probably M. Momen and his article “The Baha’i Community in Ashkhabad” is in the book Cultural Change and Continuity in Central Asia. Shirin Akinar, editor. London: Kegan and Paul, 1991, pp. 278–305. 26. The Pittsburgh Press, “Spreading the Word,” section B, pp. 1, 4, February 16, 1992. 27. Website of Interserve Canada at http://www.hardplaces.ca/where_we_serve/ central_asia.html 28. For an extensive discussion of this argument look at my book, No God But God: Muslim and Christian Discussions about the Nature of God. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2003.

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29. Article, “Samarkand Churches Closed by Uzbekistan Government,” The Associated Press, May 21, 2006. 30. In 1989, there were 460 Lutheran churches in Central Asia, but by 1992 there were only 60 Lutheran churches. 31. Gerald Stricher,“German Congregations in Central Asia Lands,” by Gerald Stricher in Religion in Communist Lands (RCL) volume 17, number 1, Spring 1989. 32. Evangelical missiological research organizations that have either studied or have worked in Central Asia include The Zwemer Institute for Muslim Studies (at the William Carey University in Pasadena, California), the Issachar Frontier Missions Strategies (PO Box 6788, Lynwood, Washington, 98036) and Operation Mobilization (PO Box 660, Forest Hill, London, SE23 3ST, England). 33. Cheryl Forbes, Imagination: Embracing a Theology of Wonder, Portland, OR: Multnomah Press, 1986, p. 73. 34. Kosuke Koyama, Water Buffalo Theology, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1974 (1999), p. 170. 35. Samuel Escobar, The New Global Mission: The Gospel from Everywhere to Everyone. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2003, p. 103. 36. Gayle Boss-Koopman, S. D. Hoogerwert, and Robert A. White, editors, Christ is Our Peace: Biblical Foundations for Peacemaking, Lansing, Illinois: Reformed Church Press, 1982, p. 5. 37. Fairbanks, Jr., p. 56. 38. Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Place of Tolerance in Islam. Boston: Beacon Press, 2002, p. 14. 39. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/pp091804.shtml 40. The Qur’anic passages on male/female relations include Surah 2:282; 4:1; 4:34; 3:195; 4:124; 9:71–72; 66:11–12. 41. Issachar Journal of Frontier Mission Research, May 1985. 42. Steve Hawthorne, World Christian Magazine, volume 9, 1982, p. 7. 43. Erich Bridges, “Pioneering Path for Others—Church Sends Nucleus to Central Asia” in the Baptist Press News, October 13, 2005. Available on the website: http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=21847 9 Central Asia and the new geopolitical Great Game 1. T. Jeremy Gunn, p. 392. 2. Widespread riots erupted in November 1979 and February 1980 in Shi’ite towns in the oil-rich Saudi Arabian empire as the protestors railed against their Sunni “oppressors.” After the bloody war with Iraq, Iran then began to put its focus on Central Asia and the Tran caucuses according to Karsh, p. 223. 3. Peimani, p. 24. 4. Foltz, p. 13. He continues: “A sedentary Indo-European people related to their nomadic neighbors the Sakas, or Scythians, they spoke an Iranian language, Sogdian, which survives today, as Yaghnobi in remote areas of Tajikistan.” 5. Hooman Peimani, Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey and Russia, London: Praeger Books, 1998, p. 4. Peimani defines a security complex as a shared and “mutually felt high level of threat or rarely friendship among two or more states,” p. 16. 6. Shareen Hunter, “The Great Game,” Newsweek, February 3, 1992, p. 22.

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7. Malashenko, p. 63. 8. Thrower, p. 250. 9. Boris Rumer, “Disintegration and Reintegration in Central Asia: Dynamics and Prospects” in Central Asia in Transition: Dilemmas of Political and Economic Development, edited by Boris Rumer, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996, p. 5. 10. Imran Hasan, “Central Asia Speaks: Pakistan—Tracing Back Ties with Central Asia” and available on the website http://www.newscentralasia.com/modules. php?name=News&file=article&sid=1247 11. Boris Rumer, 1996, p. 2. 12. Idris Bal, Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Model, Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishers, 2000, p. 43. 13. Foltz, p. 26. These inscriptions found on the banks of the Orkhon River (in modern Mongolia) date from the seventh century and refer to a sky-god named Tangri and to a sacred mountain referred to as Otukan. This is one of the sources that confirm that Tangri comes to be identified as the Supreme Being worshipped by Altaic peoples. The name is still, according to Foltz, used in modern Turkey as a synonym for Allah. 14. Bal, p. 44. 15. Bal, p. 44. 16. Bal, p. 52. 17. Bal, p. 45. 18. Bal, p. 46. 19. Turgut Ozal in a visit to the new republics in 1993 declared, “What can the Armenians do if shots happen to be fired? March into Turkey?” Meanwhile Prime Minister Suleiman Demirel who was President Ozal’s chief rival at the same time explained, “We shall not attack Armenia. If we attack, others on the other side will also attack…” Demirel also stated, “We are being pushed and we are under pressure from the pro-Azerbaijani public opinion. People say we should intervene. Actually we can intervene but that won’t be the end of the problem. Maybe the problem will start once you intervene.” He warned against a conflict between Muslims and Christians that will last for years. From Idris Bal, p. 52. 20. Hunter, p. 24. 21. Bal, p. 45. 22. Hunter, p. 25. 23. Rumer, p. 3. 24. Hyman, p. 42. 25. Hyman, p. 7. 26. On December 8, 1991, President Gorbachev became the first President of Russia in the newly formed CIS, Commonwealth of Independent States, formed between Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia. Eight more states, including the five Central Asian republics joined the CIS later in December 1991. 27. Rumer, 1996, p. 43: “Central Asia is dependent on Russia for the simple reason that their armies (with the exception of Uzbekistan) are still in an embryonic stage of development. The officer corps is composed primarily of Russians, who remained there after the liquidation of the Central Asian and Turkistan military districts. Weapons are still obtained from Russia, if in a sharply reduced volume…Russian troops still predominate in defending the border of the former USSR, including the Tajik–Afghan border.”

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28. Rumer, p. 24. 29. The six nations are Russia, China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan, cherishing a posture of neutrality, chose not to participate at its inception. A number of countries might consider joining the SCO including India, Pakistan, Iran, Mongolia, and Turkmenistan. The 2008 conference will be held in Dushanbe. 30. About 6,000 troops and dozens of aircraft and armored vehicles held exercises in Russia’s Ural Mountains. The first joint military exercises between the two countries were in August 2005 and were held in northern China. 31. Rumer, p. 33. 32. Itar-Tass News Agency, August 16, 2007. 33. S. Fredrick Starr in “The Investment Climate in Central Asia and the Caucasus” at http://www.cacianalyst.org. In terms of investments in the Tengiz Oil Fields, the amount that Starr says was invested by Tengizchevroil was over 800 million dollars. Starr feels that transportation systems and power grids are the major blocks to further economic growth in the region. He notes the electrical power infrastructure is particularly acute in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Tax reform is another issue of major importance to foreign investors and new tax codes are being put in place. Most Central Asian republics are also following Kazakhstan’s lead and forging a two-tiered banking system that has a state-owned National Bank supervising the entire banking sector. 34. Executive Summary and Recommendations, “Central Asia: What Role for the European Union?,” Asia Report, number 113, April 10, 2006. 35. “In 2002 the SDC (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation) and Seco (the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs) invested more than 40 million US Dollars in Central Asia and projected to spend similar amounts of money every year in the region until 2006.” Article in “Swiss Info,” entitled “Switzerland has mixed Record in Central Asia,” December 26, 2003, website: http://www.swissinfo.org/sen/swissinfo.html?siteSect=2156&sid=4574256&c Key=107244 36. Operation Hope consisted of huge shipments of MRE (ready-made meals) left over from the 1992 Gulf War that included pork products and third generation antibiotics, which were inappropriate for the medical needs of the local population. Shipment included a number of hundred pound boxes of “Skittles” candy: not exactly a vital ration. 37. Daniel Pipes, “What Leverage in Central Asia?,” the Christian Science Monitor, April 8, 1993. In this article, Pipes points out those nations like Turkey would like to be more active but are severely limited by their own problems. In September 1992, Turkey established the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) and pledged 1.2 billion dollars in credits and aid to Central Asia but was only able to deliver 700 million dollars of that amount. Pipes cites William Ward Maggs in this article who says that Turkey “cannot do much more than ship typewriters and television programs” to Central Asia. 38. Adam Federman, “The US Footprint in Central Asia” in Counterpunch, December 4, 2003 and available on the web at http://www.counterpunch.org/ federman12042003. Federman reports that as early as 1997 some 500 soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division (Fort Bragg, North Carolina) parachuted into Kazakhstan in one such joint military exercise. Students from the region are also being sponsored in American military schools as well as in training programs for counter-narcotics programs. Federman describes the K-2 base as

Notes

39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

44.

45. 46.

47. 48. 49.

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being “equipped with air-conditioned tents laid out on a grid with streets named after New York’s major thoroughfares (Fifth Avenue, the Long Island Expressway, Wall Street, etc.).” American transport planes were also allowed to stage through three former Soviet airbases in Tajikistan during the early phases of the war in Afghanistan. The United States military base in Bishkek Kyrgyzstan, originally named Manas when it was a Soviet base, was renamed “Ganci Airbase” in honor of Chief Peter J. Ganci Jr., chief of the New York City Fire Department, who lost his life on November 9, 2001. Soviet-era sources often referred to the region as “Central Asia and Kazakhstan” because of this affinity. When the country’s borders were designed by Stalin in the 1930s, there was a deliberate effort to include a large part of land that had formerly been part of Russia as a way of building loyalty and support among its citizenry. Swante E. Cornell and Regine A. Spector, “Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists,” Washington Quarterly, volume 25, number 1, Winter 2002, p. 193. Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War and the Future of the Region. New York: Palgrave Press, 2002, p. 191. Dru C. Gladney, “Central Asia and China: Transnationalization, Islamization and Ethnicization” in The Oxford History of lslam, edited by John L. Esposito, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 433. Rumer states that “Beijing—according to some scholars—still considers the fertile Fergana Valley to be Chinese territory: [Although] Beijing has been careful to avoid public mention of these territorial controversies, it has not forgotten the Chinese past of these Central Asian territories, and it sees the breakup of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to expand China’s Central Asian leadership.” From an article by Rumer, 1996, p. 8. A 1997 study on the growing interdependence of the region noted that by 1996 the amount of trade between Xinjiang and the five Central Asian republics had reached at least 775 million dollars. Article by Dru C. Gladney in Esposito, editor, The Oxford History of Islam, p. 468. Rumer, p. 8. Turkmenistan was the only Central Asian republic that decided not to join this grouping. American military activity has increased in the region since the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. Kyrgyzstan leased out its Manas base to the United States for 50 million dollars and Uzbekistan received 120 million dollars in annual aid packages, which allowed American troops to be stationed at the Karshi-Hhanbaad (K-2) airbase. When the Uzbek revolts of May 2004 caused the deaths of hundreds of civilians, the United States Senate voted to freeze economic assistance to Tashkent including lease charges for the K-2 military base. Both Russia and China welcome the rollback of American military presence in this region. Article, “Power Play in Central Asia,” by Tayyab Siddiqui in Opinion, October 14, 2005, and located at http://www.dawn. com/2005/10/14/op.htm Quoted in Sebastian Smith, “Great Powers Cast Bids for Strategic Central Asia,” Agence France Presse, August 11, 2007. Foltz, p. 6. Khalid, p. 154. The edict about the loudspeakers was outlawed by the Muslim Directorate (which in the Soviet era was known as The Spiritual Directorate of Muslims in the Asian Regions, SADUM). The Muslim Directorate in Uzbekistan

186

50. 51.

52. 53.

Notes licenses imams and even controls what religious literature is allowed in the country. A person found with unauthorized literature is subject to a fine or imprisonment. Khalid notes that restrictions are even in place about “the kind of beard” a person might wear (p. 154). Andrew Stroehlein, “Uzbekistan: A Lifeboat for the Media,” Transitions Online, March 22, 2006. The International Herald Tribune, February 27, 1992, p. 2. Ethnic violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which was the time of transition from the Soviet rule to independent states included events in Alma-Ata in 1986, Samarkand in 1988, Tashkent in 1989, and in February 1992 in Kazakhstan. In this last event, three Kazaks were killed by Russians at the Baikanour Cosmodrome. Chris Patten, “Saving Central Asia from Uzbekistan,” The International Herald Tribune, March 22, 2006. Wolfgang Meider, editor Encyclopedia of World Proverbs, NY: Prentice-Hall, 1986, p. 126. The actual proverb translated states, “Dreams are dreadful but God is merciful.”

10 Central Asia tomorrow: Earthquakes of transition 1. Time Magazine, January 27, 1992, p. 34. 2. In 1980, 19 percent of the Kyrgyz, 16 percent of the Tajiks, 14 percent of the Turkmen, 13 percent of all Uzbeks spoke any Russian at all. Bennigsen, p. 173. In spite of this, Russian is still the most widely spoken language and will remain the lingua franca of the region for the foreseeable future. 3. Andrew Stroehlein, “We Must Prepare for the Coming Crisis in Uzbekistan,” Financial Times, May 12, 2006. 4. C.J. Chivers, “Uzbek Dissident Could Face Hefty Sentence on Tax Charges,” New York Times, December 21, 2005. 5. The constitution of Kazakhstan written in 1995 guarantees these rights in Articles 1, 5, 8, 14, 20, and 22. The constitution of Kyrgyzstan written in 1996 guarantees these rights in Articles 8, 15, and 16. The constitution of Tajikistan written in 1994 guarantees these rights in Articles 1, 8, 26, and 100. The constitution of Turkmenistan written in 1992 guarantees these rights in Articles 11, 17, and 28. The constitution of Uzbekistan guarantees these rights in Articles 13, 18, 57, and 61. Rights guaranteed include the prohibition of discrimination or any hostility in the name of religion. All five Central Asian Republics declare themselves to separate the state and religion in governance. Tajikistan is the only nation among these five that allows religious parties to be in the government. 6. The International Crisis Group is a nonprofit organization, which monitors Central Asia from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and Dushanbe, Tajikistan. For more information check their website at http://www.crisisgroup.org 7. “Central Asia: Unrest and Instability” on the website of the International Crisis Group (a human rights advocacy organization), http://www.crisisgroup.org/ home/index.cfm?id=3450&1=1 8. B. A. Abdurazakov quoted in Jorgen Nielsen, p. 55. 9. Foltz, p. 23. Foltz goes on to say, “According to this model. Central Asia history is defined largely by the dynamics of nomadic–sedentary relations, often hostile, even violent, but always mutually interdependent.”

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10. Kathryn H. Anderson and Richard Pomfret, Consequences of Creating A Market Economy: Evidence from Household Surveys in Central Asia, Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar, 2003, p. 9. 11. Douglas Northrop, Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 34. 12. Northrop, p. 12. 13. Northrop, p. 41. 14. Shirin Akiner, “Between Tradition and Modernity: The Dilemma Facing Contemporary Central Asian Women” in Mary Buckley editor, Post-Soviet Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 282: “There were a series of horrifying and baffling incidences of suicide by self-immolation. According to official sources in Uzbekistan in one year alone (1986–1987), 270 girls and young women killed themselves in this way…the method of death, by the girl dousing herself with oil then setting it alight was excruciatingly painful and the very few who survived were dreadfully disfigured. Yet this did not seem to act as a deterrent but rather as a goad to others to take more care with the preparations. Visitors to areas where there had been recent instances of self-immolation described an atmosphere of contagious, almost physically palpable hysteria.” 15. Shirin Akiner, p. 289: “Female (and to a lesser extent, male) prostitution is on the rise in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; for students it is sometimes the only way of financing their studies. In Kyrgyzstan, questions have been raised in parliament about the desirability of licensing brothels in order to limit the risk of spreading sexually transmitted diseases. The majority of those who are involved in prostitution are Slavs and members of other immigrant groups, but there are also quite a few Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. In other Central Asian states it is uncommon for women to work as prostitutes.” 16. This kind of message coincides with the fact that there are far fewer jobs available for men in the new economy after the dislocations from the Soviet rule. 17. Foltz, p. 19. 18. Schopflin, May 1972, p. 25. 19. Kulchik, Fadin, and Sergeev, p. 1. 20. Mark S. Johnson, “The Legacy of Russian and Soviet Education and the Shaping of Ethnic, Religious and National Identities in Central Asia” in Stephen P. Heyneman and Alan J. De Young, editors, The Challenges of Education in Central Asia, Greenwich, Connecticut: Information Age Publishing, 2004, p. 26. 21. Khalid, p. 152. 22. Stephen P. Heyneman, “One Step Back, Two Steps Forward: The First Stage of the Transition for Education in Central Asia” in Stephen P. Heyneman and Alan J. De Young, p. 4. 23. Kulchik, Fadin, and Sergeev, p. 12. 24. The primary minerals being mined in Central Asia are iodine, bromine, potash, lead, zinc, and copper. 25. Stuart Horsman, “Water in Central Asia: Regional Cooperation or Conflict?” in Roy Allison and Lena Johnson, editors, Central Asian Security, p. 70. 26. Rumer, p. 47. 27. Rumer, p. 140. 28. Report of the International Bank for Reconstruction/The World Bank, Making Transition Work for Everyone: Poverty and Inequality in Europe and Central Asia, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000, p. 8.

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29. The annual increase in the consumer price index for example in Kazakhstan in 1991 was 79 percent and rose by 1,381 percent by the end of 1992. Prices usually increased by more than 50 percent per month in all five countries, Anderson and Pomfret, p. 11. 30. Martha Brill Olcott, “The New Nations of Central Asia” in John W. Blaney, editor, The Successor States to the USSR, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1995, p. 213. 31. Rumer, p. 147. 32. Rumer, p. 149. Rumer also states “outsiders find it exceedingly difficult to penetrate this local structure.” Was Islam a factor in this corruption? Rumer suggests the view that the region was ruled by a host of tyrants such as Akhmadzhan Adylov who ruled in Uzbekistan until he was arrested at the end of the Brezhnev era in 1984. One critic wrote: “Adylov would cast opponents into prison and torture them with red-hot irons and beat pregnant women with a whip before the eyes of their husbands. And the population tolerated all this! Old men bowed and scraped whenever they passed him, exclaiming Allah is great!” p. 152. 33. Rumer, p. 144. 34. Newsweek, February 2, 1992, p. 17. 35. David Hoffman, “US Airlift” in the International Herald Tribune, February 11, 1992, p. 1. 36. The International Herald Tribune, January 28, 1992, p. 2. 37. Khalid, p. 152. 38. The earthquake that struck Tashkent at dawn on April 26, 1966 may have killed over 250,000 people. 39. “Thornton Clay” in the play Our Betters, Act I. Epilogue: The future of Central Asia’s Muslim–Christian relations 1. Fatimakhon Ahmedova, “National Identity in Modern Central Asia: Islamic and Christian Influences,” from http://depts.washington.edu/reecas/events/ conf2001/abstr01/ahmedova.htm (Retrieved on November 1, 2007.) 2. Abu Muhammad Ali Ibn Hazm (994–1064 CE) wrote of Christianity: “Human superstition need never excite our astonishment. The most numerous and civilized nations are thralls to it…So great is the multitude of Christians that God alone can number them and they can boast of sagacious princes and illustrious philosophers. Nevertheless, they believe that one is three and three are one; that one of the three is the Father, the other is the Son and the third is the Spirit; that the Father is not the Son and is the Son; that a man is God and is not God; that the Messiah existed from all eternity and yet was created.” Richard C. Martin, “Political Growth of the Islamic Empire,” in David Bender, Bruno Leone, Bonnie Szumski, and Clarice Swisher, editors, The Spread of Islam. San Diego, California: Greenhaven Press, 1999, p. 94. 3. Betty Jean Bailey and J. Martin Bailey, Who Are the Christians in the Middle East? Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Press, 2003, pp. 138–139. 4. Ahmed notes that Ibn Khaldun made “social cohesion” (asabayah) a major theme in his writings. Ahmed, p. 186. 5. http://www.cathollic-forum.com/saints/poppe0264ur.htm 6. Yuriy Kulchik, Andrey Fadin, and Victor Sergeev, editors. From the Foreword written by Fred Halliday, page ix.

Notes

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7. Dhimmitude was also extended, over time, to include a number of other non-Muslim groups. 8. Karsh writes of the laws that were first set in place at the outset of Umar’s reign. While the way dhimmitude has been implemented varies widely throughout history its first expression is often sought to be replicated. Karsh writes: “The religious activities of dhimmi were curtailed, the ringing of bells was forbidden, the construction of new church buildings was prohibited and the proselytizing of Muslims was made a capital offense punishable by death. Jews and Christians had to wear distinctive clothes to distinguish them from their Muslim lords, could ride only donkeys, not horses, could not marry Muslim women, and had to vacate their seats whenever Muslims wanted to sit, were excluded from positions of power and so on and so forth.” Karsh, p. 28. 9. Karsh writes: “Even the millenarian confrontation between the worlds of Islam and Christianity has essentially been a clash of imperialisms rather than a clash of civilizations. This was manifested in the crystallization of a symbiotic relationship between East and West, comprising extensive trade and pragmatic political cooperation. Even during the age of the Crusades, the height of supposed civilizational antagonism, all Christian and Muslim rulers freely collaborated across the religious divide, often finding themselves aligned with members of the rival religion against their coreligionists. The legendary Saladin himself spent far more time fighting Muslim rivals than the infidel crusaders; while he was busy eradicating the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem he was closely aligned with the Byzantine Empire, the foremost representative of Christendom’s claim to universalism.” Karsh, pp. 238–239. 10. Ahmed talks about what he calls the Andalus Syndrome, where Muslims around the world feel a sense of historical loss or injustice in the cruelty of the world against the Islamic community. He tells of a South Asian Muslim character in an Urdu novel who explains to his friend: “The bearded man tried hard to recollect; after a while he said, ‘all I can remember is that I was leaving Granada.’/ ‘Granada!’ The rest looked up at the bearded man with a start…And the poor old bearded man, already shocked at their mocking disbelief, felt utterly distraught at their laughter. …I’ve been uprooted he remarked dolefully and that is what matters. What difference does it make now for me to remember whether it’s Granada that I have been thrown out of, or Bait-al-Muqaddis (Jerusalem), or Jahanabad, or Kashmir?” Ahmed, p. 229. 11. Elizondo, Virgilio. Galilean Journey: The Mexican-American Promise. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2000 (1983), p. 3. 12. Gunn, T. Jeremy, “Shaping an Islamic idendity: Religion, Islamis, and the state in Central Asia.” Sociology of Religion, volume 64, number 3, pp. 389–410. 13. Stan Guthrie writes in Christianity Today: “In December (2001), Kazakh authorities fined Baptist pastor Pavel Leonov for refusing to register his church in Ayaguz, eastern Kazakhstan. In October, Kazakh authorities beat and threatened to cut out the tongue of a former Muslim, Asylbek Nurdanav, in an attempt to force him to recant his faith in Christ. Nurdanov was held in a psychiatric hospital for six days in November.” 14. Stan Guthrie, “Christians Fear Decade of Freedom is Over,” Christianity Today, March 25, 2002. 15. An unverifiable and undocumented source dating from 2002 claimed that there were about 1,000 Protestant Christians in Uzbekistan and about 600 in Tajikistan while other estimates are much larger.

190

Notes

16. Stan Guthrie. Also available on the web at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ ct/2002/003/25.30.html 17. Mernissi, p. 88. 18. Farid Esack, Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity Against Oppression. Oxford: OneWorld, 1992 (2002), p. 237. 19. C.S. Song, Tell Us Our Names: Story Theology from an Asian Perspective, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1987, p. 141. 20. Elizondo, p. 2. 21. Dr King is also quoted in expressing this idea of activism: “No social advance rolls on the wheels of inevitability, Each and every step toward the goal of justice requires sacrifice, suffering and struggle; the tireless exertions and passionate concern of dedicated individuals.” Lewis T. Tait, Jr. and A. Christian van Gorder, Three-Fifth’s Theology: Challenging Racism in American Christianity, Africa World Press: Trenton, New Jersey, 2002, p. 151. 22. This question is answered in the affirmative in a recent book by Paul-Gordon Chandler, Pilgrims of Christ on the Muslim Road. London: Cowley Publications (Rowan and Littlefield), 2007. 23. Crews, p. 326. 24. Quoted in Ahmed, p. 237.

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Index

Afghanistan ix, 3, 13, 18, 24–5, 27–8, 35–6, 39–40, 58, 65, 70, 82, 84–8, 115, 117, 119–20, 153–4, 156–7, 160, 164, 175–6, 179, 185, 193, 196 agriculture 35, 102, 153 Alexander I, Czar 23, 145 Alexander the Great 38–9, 145 Almaty 18–9, 21–24, 95, 99, 160 Armenia 48, 51–2, 79, 116, 183, 195 Attila the Hun 41–2, 143 Azerbaijan 3, 36, 41, 74, 79, 116–7, 156–7, 183, 195 Azeri 79, 162, 178

Dushanbe xii, 24, 26–8, 73, 119, 160, 176, 184, 186

Bactria 2, 39–40, 49, 145, 163–4, 168 Baha’i 18, 101, 145, 181 Baptists 22–3, 26, 33, 37, 92, 95, 98, 100, 102, 105, 111, 139, 160, 180, 182, 189 Bishkek 13, 29–30, 33, 113, 117, 119, 124, 139, 161, 185, 186 Brezhnev, L. 69–71, 146, 188 Buddhism 3, 39–40, 79, 134, 163, 170, 197 Bukhara xii, 12, 34, 38, 41, 43–5, 48, 57–9, 63–5, 74–6, 80, 153, 158, 165–6, 168, 171, 173–4, 176–7, 193, 198

Family of Love 18 Ferghana Valley 7, 86, 114, 163, 195 folk Islam 8, 36, 74, 76, 78 Frunze 13, 29, 106, 124

Catherine the Great 54, 62–4, 146, 172–4 demography 10, 26, 104–5, 127 Dostoyevsky, F. 171, 175 drought 128

economy 14, 20, 30, 36, 61, 70, 105, 113, 117, 131, 152, 187, 191 education 16–7, 23, 26, 32, 66–8, 72, 79–81, 87, 96–101, 103, 105, 110, 114, 117, 123–4, 127–8, 131, 133, 171, 187, 194, 197 England 48, 58–9, 87, 137–8, 142, 168, 180–2, 187, 191–2 environment 4, 14, 25, 31, 36, 97, 124, 129 evangelicals 93, 108

Genghis Khan 18, 38, 45–6, 51, 68, 147, 150, 154, 167 Germany 18, 22–3, 104–5, 119, 169, 180 Gorbachev, M. S. 69–70, 72, 127, 147, 183, 197 Great Game ix, 48, 58, 65, 112–23, 147, 182 Gülen, F. 87–8, 147, 179 gypsies 11 Ibn Sina (Avicenna) 12, 42–4 India 3, 9, 13, 39–40, 48, 58, 65–6, 74, 86–7, 113, 118, 136, 144, 150–1, 156–7, 163, 170, 176, 184, 195

200

Index

industrialization 14, 24–5, 30, 34, 68, 79, 115, 117–19, 128–9, 131, 153 Isma’ili 74, 76, 149, 176 Ivan the Terrible, Czar 53–4, 62 Jews/Judaism 3, 7, 39–40, 44–5, 49, 58, 62, 85–6, 92, 107–9, 134, 136–7, 141, 146, 161, 164–6, 169, 189, 192, 195, 197 Kara Kum 7, 35 Karimov, I. 13–16, 35, 81, 86, 116, 119, 122, 149, 194 Lausanne Committee for World Evangelism (LCWE) 95–6, 101 Lutherans 22, 33, 97, 105, 182 Manichaeism 3, 40, 79, 150, 156, 163, 164 Marco Polo 47, 53, 150, 168, 170 medicine 23, 27, 30, 44, 78, 97, 110, 118, 129, 145, 150, 160, 180, 184 Mennonites 23, 33, 92, 105 Merv 42–5, 49–51, 168 mineral resources 31, 130, 187 Mongolia 3, 7, 11, 34, 41–2, 45–6, 155, 159, 170, 183–4, 192 Moscow 18, 55, 63, 65, 68, 72, 79, 99, 128, 157, 161, 175, 178, 194, 197 natural resources 18, 31, 64, 118, 128, 130–2, 136 Nazarbayev, N. A. 20, 117, 151 Nestorians 26, 32–3, 36, 49–53, 59, 146, 151, 163, 169, 170, 191, 197 Nicholas 1, Czar 56, 64, 151 Niyazov, S. 15, 35, 37, 88, 158, 162 North America/North Americans 1, 4, 9, 11, 17, 23, 25, 27, 33, 36, 38, 45, 57–9, 79, 89, 91–4, 98, 100–2, 104, 110–11, 113, 118–19, 122–3, 133, 135, 137, 142, 153, 178 Pakistan x, 3, 17, 24, 27, 34, 72, 80, 82, 85–8, 96, 113–15, 119, 120, 122, 149, 176, 179, 183–4, 194, 198 Pamir 7, 25–6, 39, 58, 61, 65, 76, 129, 157, 160, 163, 176 Pentecostals 17, 22, 33, 92–3, 110 poverty 8, 14, 25, 30–1, 36, 88, 118, 125, 129, 131, 133, 187, 197

Presbyterians 23, 160 Putin, V. 117–18, 152 Roman Catholicism 7, 16, 22, 33, 51, 58, 91, 94, 102, 134, 137, 160 Rumi, J. M. 10, 152 Russian Orthodoxy 7, 9, 16, 19, 22–3, 33, 36, 54–7, 59, 62–3, 91, 93–4, 102, 161, 170 Samarkand xii, 4, 12, 39, 41, 44, 48, 50–1, 53, 64, 74–5, 103, 154, 166, 168–9, 176, 182, 186, 195 Saudi Arabia 17, 34, 80, 84, 86, 114, 121, 154, 178–9, 182 Shamanism 3, 16, 32, 46–7, 153 Shi’a 26, 42–3, 74, 76, 79, 86, 114, 148–50, 153–4, 165, 181–2 Silk Road 9, 19, 38, 40, 42, 46–8, 50, 53, 120, 127, 131, 162–3, 167–8 Stalin, J. 11, 15, 20, 22, 29, 33, 35, 38, 59, 67–9, 71–2, 128, 153, 175, 178, 185 Sufism 8, 16, 22, 36, 65, 69, 72, 74, 76–9, 89, 152–3, 177–8, 192 Sunni 15–17, 21–2, 26, 34, 36, 42, 74–9, 88–9, 114, 144, 152–4, 176–7, 182 Syria 28, 31, 49, 50, 52, 92, 145, 148, 166, 169 Tibet 38, 42, 192 Tien Shan 7, 28, 31, 39, 163 Timur 12, 47–8, 51, 154, 168–9 Turkey 10, 48, 80, 82, 93, 99, 101–2, 127, 129–31, 136, 161, 183, 189, 193, 196–8, 206, 208 Ukraine 6, 10–11, 22, 33, 59, 69, 93, 110, 117, 134, 159, 183 Wahhabism 83–4, 89, 122, 144, 154, 178 women 2, 13, 21, 27, 68, 76, 80, 83, 110, 126–7, 140, 146, 148, 151, 158, 160, 176, 187–9, 191, 195 Xinjiang 3, 18, 21, 30, 32, 40, 52, 57, 59, 120–1, 157, 163–4, 168, 185 Zoroastrianism 3, 7, 40–1, 43, 49, 134, 155, 164, 194–5