Civil Society In Central Asia

Civil Society in Central Asia

Civil Society in Central Asia Edited by

M. Holt Ruffin Daniel C. Waugh

Center for Civil Society International The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Johns Hopkins University

in association with University of Washington Press Seattle and London

© 1999 the Center for Civil Printed in the United States of America

International

All reserved. No of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including nh,"ttn,"fir,,, n~COf(11ng, or any information or retrieval without from the putll1S11er. in Central Asia! edited M. Holt Daniel C. em. p. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-295-97795-7 1. Civil :-i"".'l'!tv._A Central. 2. Asia, Central--Politics and Govemment--1991 M. Holt II. Daniel Clarke. JQ1086.C58 1999 98~33178 30 1'.0958'09049--dc21 CIP Civil

The paper used in this meets the minimum of American National Standard for Information Sciences--Permanence ANSI Z39.48-1984. Printed

for

Contents Preface Maps of Central Asia

Introduction M. Holt Ruffin

vii viii, ix

3

Civil Society in Central Asia S. Frederick Starr

27

The Legal Regulation ofNGOs: Central Asia at a Crossroads Scott Horton and Alla Kazakina

34

Freedom ofAssociation and the Question ofIts Realization in Kazakhstan Evgeny A. Zhovtis

57

Government and Nonprofit Sector Relations in the Kyrgyz Republic Erkinbek Kasybekov

71

Environmental NOOs and the Development of Civil Society in Central Asia

85

Kate Watters

Kolkhoz and Civil Society in the Independent States ofCentral Asia Olivier Roy

109

Prospects for Development ofan Independent Media in Kazakhstan Oleg Katsiev

122

Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil SOCiety? Abdumannob PoIat

135

Civil Society and Identity in Uzbekistan: The Emergent Role ofIslam

158

ReueJHanks

Islam and Tajikistan 's Human and Ecological Crisis AzizNiyazi

180

Women's NGOs in Central Asia's Evolving Societies UIa lkramova and Kathryn McConnell

198

The Real Work: Sustaining NGO Growth in Central Asia Jay Cooper

214

Organizations Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

Online Resources E-mail Lists Web Sites Internet Access Centers in Central Asia

235 264 280 291 295

313 315 320

Appendices About the Authors

325

Glossary

330

Preface

T

he analytical essays in the first part of this book are in part the product of a two-day conference held in 1998 and by the Center for Civil International and the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the Nitze School of Advanced International Jobus ~LV'P_U"" in Wasbington, D.C. At that of issues and views were and debate was sometimes In the of free inquiry, we did not seek a authoritative POSiltlCm rf'"r",rt11tHT how to view Central Asia, particularly with respect to issues of civil The essays in the book reflect a wide range democratic tives, concerns, and and no essay should be taken to reprethe Central Asia-Caucasus Instlhlte, sent the views of the International. the inclusion of any in for Civil the section on nongovernmental organizations in Civil in Central Asia should not be interpreted as an endorsement by the publishers of that ",.«<>n"7" tion's purposes, or any other it may make about itself. Center for Civil !'inl""!v International ;ol1)Or:atl()fl of New York and the Earhart Foundation of Ann for generous which made possible both this book and the conference descnbed above, Important for that conference was also by The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the Nitze School of Advanced International Johns whose chairman is S. Frederick Starr. Additional funding for this hook was by the Central Asia Institute of Hozelnall, iVIUUI4U
Brent Roraback and Dana Tumenova contributed to various as did Maria Kozhevwho also translated the article by Zhovtis, Center for Civil International is alone responsible for any shortCOl:mIlgs to be found in Civil in Central Asia.

-The Editor.v vii

Data pI'OYIHd by ESIU Data ill Maps, 1m

Cortography by lennif
Russia

.SamaniI



o o

«Xl

800

500

I

1000 IVIes. 1200 Kikmete!s

Clina

l.Jn.rrqi •

Russia

Novokumetsk •

o

.;~

~

<:>

8 c

'fl.,"

8 "

~ c

!l

:c'" c

:l

3:

"

N

I

Civil Society in Central Asia

Introduction M Holt Ruffin

C

tvil in Central Asia addresses important problems of social, political, and economic change in the newly countries of Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. The area encompass has a rich culture and long history-for the most part little known or understood in the West-in which nomads on nOlCSel)aCK, centers and agricultural settlements around oasis cities established more than two millennia ago prominently. The so-called Silk Road---in China with the Roman fact a network of routes through the LOU'f'U". and it was not until the of sea routes around India that Central Asia's role as a major overland trade route began to decline. It is a historical paradox that Russian conquest and later Soviet ruie introduced many Westeru institutions to Central at the same time that they isolation from the West, from nearby neighbors, and, contributed to tbe in this century, from worldwide movements of national independence. Thus the de'vel1oprncl1t of new national identities, institutions, and diplomatic-economic elatiOlls.i1ios with the rest of the world is a challenge these new nations which to the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 had never known mdtep!end.cnl;e and statehood. Since Central Asia has drawn considerable attention in the West, for economic and reasons. As Western nations have established independent relations with each of the five new Central Asian (>rumtt;",,, an additional aspect of these relations, for better or for worse, has been programs intended to these new nations quickly emerge as economica By vibrant democracies of a Western Expectations wishful tllillKlltlg) have not always been matched by acute analysis and unlrierstandllI1g. Many programs have been to "transitions," but a look over the current and economic raises serious questions as to how effective or realistic they have been and what the future may hold. Perhaps one might ask whether the history of a nation such as the United States is really relevant for countries whose societies and traditions are so different. Even if one were to grant the the emergence of "civil Western models, is it reasonable to that such a trans" formation can occur in a matter when the institutions in question took "..."tif\1~~ to evolve in other societies? The answer to this is probably negative, but does this mean that in the are in vain'? Not hopes for democratization and economic 3

4

M. Holt Ruffin

necessarily. The sudden arrival of independence created a need in all Central Asian societies to find new social and cultural values to replace those of Homo sovieticus. The search for these new values has introduced some degree of fluidity and openness into previously closed political cultures, with many Central Asians seeking to revive ancient traditions of Islam, others seeking to introduce institutions of the advanced industrial democracies of Europe and America, and still others looking for some uniquely Central Asian hybrid of Islam, limited democratization and rule of law, and statist approaches to economic development While the response of governments in the region has been to try to "cap" all activities, secular or religious, that might pose serious political threats, a considerable amount of nonpolitical associational activity is now permitted in Central Asia that was never possible in Soviet times. This has given rise, in turn, to policies by the United States, members of the European Union, and private international donors to seek to strengthen the institutions of civil society in Central Asia through programs aimed at training, equipping. and directly financing selected nongovernmental organizations in the region. Underlying this policy is the view that if the governments of Central Asia's new nations are not ready for foreign assistance programs oriented to political or economic reform, opportunities exist for projects targeted directly at citizens of those societies. If such assistance can yield strong and independent citizen organizations, even those of a necessarily nonpolitical character, could this not translate eventually into the democratization of political institutions and hberalization of the economies in Central Asia? Indeed, in many respects, a focus on civil society has been the best option for U.S. foreign assistance when dealing with the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia. The United States has learned from long experience that governmentto-government foreign assistance programs directed to authoritarian regimes can experience large amounts of "leakage" due to corruption. In the worst cases, such assistance can strengthen a repressive apparatus without buying either a reliable ally or a commitment to democracy. By contrast, foreign assistance programs that focus on civil society can help create the preconditions for democracy in states which are not currently democratic. In strengthening grassroots citizen organizations, such programs strengthen principles of citizen participation and activism, of government accountability to citizen concerns, and of civil rights-including the basic right of citizens to organize in order to press for more rights. Also, when indigenous citizen organizations that provide human services or humanitarian relief receive support from abroad, real ties are built with the outside world which can endure political upheaval and changes of government leadership. In addition, these indigenous organizations achieve a certain prestige within their own society because of their international connections. Together all

Introduction

5

these factors affect a nation's political culture, help mitigate authoritarian. xenophobic, or insular attitudes that usually exist to some degree within any nation-Central Asian, European. or American-and diminish the constituencies of extremist leaders and movements.

The Conference That Preceded This Book For a combination of reasons, an emphasis on civil society strengthening programs has seemed a propitious focus of U.S. policy toward Central Asia at this particular time. But, to consider the question more deeply, to what degree can one speak of civil society in Central Asia? Is it a meaningful concept at this stage of development of these five specific countries? What parts of American experience have relevance to institutions of cultnres based on the steppe and the oasis, the khan and the imam? And if we can in fact "jump start" some institutions, laws, and customs--most of which took decades and centuries to evolve in our own society--are any particular efforts more likely to succeed than others, in the course of just three to five years in Central Asia? To investigate these questions more thoroughly, Center for Civil Society International and the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in 1997 sought support for a conference and a subsequent book on the theme of "Civil Society in Central Asia." The Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Earhart Foundation of Ann Arbor, Michigan, each made generous grants for the project, and in late March 1998 we convened the conference in Washington, D.C. It was a very lively two-day event. Attendance was considerably higher than anticipated and the quality of presentations and discussions that followed each presentation was outstanding. After the conference, and based in part on the discussions, the presenters reworked their papers and then submitted their final drafts. The result is Civil Society in Central Asia. This book, then. is an effort to provide some answers to difficult questions, with the understanding that its effect may be to pose more problems than it solves. In the balance of this introduction we provide a brief historical overview. to set the stage for the contemporary situation of Central Asia. Then we will deal with some of the conceptual issues which underlie the papers in the book and provide an overview of their substance and some additional material to supplement what they contain.

Historical Background The five nations of Central Asia constitute a region roughly half the size of the United States, not including Alaska. In area. Kazakhstan accounts for more than

6

M. Holt Ruffin

two-thirds of the region, but Uzbekistan, with more than 23 million inhabitants. has the largest population. The predominant languages of the region are related to Turkish, except in Tajikistan, where most citizens speak a form of Persian. Ethnic pluralism characterizes Central Asia, and no country is without significant minorities. Kazakhstan, for example, has nearly 17 million inhabitants

(1996 figures), of whom 46 percent are Kazak:h and 35 percent are ethnic Russians. Other minorities comprise the balance. Of Kyrgyzstan's 4.5 million people, 52 percent are Kyrgyz, 18 percent are Russian, and 13 percent are Uzbek. Tajikistan's 5.9 milliou people are 65 percent Tajik and 25 percent Uzbek. The most ethnically homogeneous countries are Uzbekistan, which is 80 percent Uzbek, and Turkmenistan, 77 percent of whose 4.2 million residents are Turkmen. (Uzbeks and Russians take a 9 and 7 percent share, respectively).' The overwhelming majority of inhabitants in Central Asia consider themselves Muslims. In 712, only eighty years after the prophet Muhammed's death, a force from the Umayyad Islamic empire based in Baghdad took most of what is now Uzbekistan and introduced Islam to Central Asia. Over the course of the next few centuries a number of great armies either swept into the region-e.g., under the Seljuk Turk Sultan Sanjar or Genghis Khan-or arose within it. Foremost among the latter was the army ofTimur (Tamerlane), who ruled in the latter part of the fourteenth century. For twelve centuries, however, until the Soviet period, Islam was a vital part of Central Asian life. Russia's first thrust into Central Asia, under Peter the Great, is remembered as a resounding defeat, when the czar's task force was anrlihilated at Khiva in 1717. Russia's expansion to the south and east was only beginning to gather force, however. and a century and half later, in 1873, General Konstantin Kaufmann, veteran of campaigns in the Caucasus. took Khiva and established permanent Russian control throughout Central Asia. Between the middle of the nineteenth century and 1917, several million Russian farmers (many of them freed serfs), artisans, and merchants emigrated to Central Asia,l The sequence of events that resulted in Central Asia's incotpOration into the USSR is a complicated one. Communist parties in the region harnessed nationalist sentiments to help the Bolsheviks prevail after the November revolution of 1917. But once the civil war was over, the nationalist elements had to be suppressed. A turning point in this effort was the murder in late 1921 ofEnver Pasha, a would-be leader of an independent ''Turkestan,'' who had been recruited by Lenin. In 1924 in order to weaken further any pan-Turkic aspirations, Stalin reversed Lenin's creation ofa single Central Asian Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Republic and began the policy of "national delimitatiou," to carve Central Asia into five smaller, and less powerful, political units. These corresponded in name to major ethnic groups in the region, but the borders Moscow drew did not always match their geographical distribution, whether by

Introduction

7

accident or design remains a matter of controversy. Between the early twenties and mid-thirties, the borders and status of the Central Asian republics cbanged-Kyrgyzia, for example, began as an "autonomous oblast," then became an "autonomous republic," then at last a "Soviet Socialist Republic." By 1936, however, the Soviet Socialist Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan had all been established with essentially those borders that they have today. It is an interesting fact-and one which may indicate how little Central Asia was a regional political force in the old Soviet Union-that no summit meetings took place among the leaders of Central Asia's republics during virtually the entire Soviet period, that is, until June 23, 1990, when the five met in Bishkek (then Frunze), on their own initiative and in the absence of Russia, and signed an Agreement on Economic, ScientificTechnical and Cultural Cooperation.3 During the Lenin-Stalin years numerous policies were implemented that would thoroughly "Sovieti7..e" Central Asia: Islamic schools, courts, and mosques (more than 98 percent of the latter) were closed or destroyed; Russian became compulsory in schools; and Cyrillic came to take the place of Arabic and Latin alphabets. While these policies were not entirely successful-several essays in this book indicate some of the ways in which Islam survived the sustained campaigns against it-they have been summarized accurately as follows: With regard to the Central Asian region they [the Soviets] took extreme measures to eradicate the cultural and political traditions that had evolved over the centuries. This meant the physical extermination of the intellectual elite and the arbitrary creation of national borders. Wherever ethnic groups considering themselves Muslims experienced a sense of their own unity, an ideological program of atheism was forcibly put into effect and panIslamism was marked for eradication, as synonymous with medieval backwardness and fanaticism. 4 Not only Islam, but virtually all institutions of civil society in Central Asia were suppressed in this period.5 With incorporation into the Soviet Union came aU the hallmarks of that system: rapid urbanization and industrialization, the system of collective farms, and mass education, to name a few. To appreciate the speed of urbanization, for example, consider Dushanbe. It had only 6,000 inhabitants in 1925, four years before Stalin sliced "Tajikistan" out of Uzbekistan, leaving the latter with the two ancient and predominantly Tajik cities of Samarkand and Bukbara. The new capital city of Dushanbe grew rapidly-much of the growth from immigration by Russians, but much of it also from misguided economic policies, explained in

8

M. Holt Ruffin

Aziz Niyazi's essay later in the book-so that by the early 1990s it had 600,000 inhabitants. This was urbanization over two generations by a factor of 100, and it has intensified in the years since independence. While many Russians have left Dushanbe, the civil war that broke out early in this decade added many more thousands of refugees to the city, further stressing its capacity and concentrating population in the capital. Along with urbanization came mass compulsory education and the development of universities and scientific-technical institutions throughout the region, perhaps the most positive legacy of Soviet rule. Decidedly negative, however, were the region's total isolation from all non-Soviet Bloc countries, the imposition of the Soviet economic system, and the great damage done over many years to the environment, e.g.• through the cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, based largely on water diverted from the Aral Sea, and years of heavy atmospheric nuclear testing in Kazakhstan. The effects of Soviet economic development policies on Central Asia is a topic for another book, but suffice it to say that Moscow's central planners-not comparative advantage, rates of economic return, global demand, or, least of all, the desires and values of Central Asia's popuiations-
Introduction

9

Central Asia since 1991-Old Wine in New Bottles? In important respects, Central Asia' s transition to independence has been a successful one. Tajikistan has suffered a costly civil war, but all the other countries have averted major post-independence conflicts based on ideological, ethnic, or regional differences-unlike India, Nigeria, or Yugoslavia, for example. Each state is truly sovereign today and has created its own political, economic, and security institutions. Each is successfully pursuing an independent foreign policy. Of great importance, Central Asia's isolation from the world community has largely ended, and trade, travel, and communication with the rest of the world are occurring on a scale that dwarfs the Soviet period. But beyond independence, how much has really changed in Central Asia? With respect to political institutions, the answer is decidedly mixed. When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991 some people hoped-highly unrealistically. we now see-that all of the fifteen former Soviet socialist republics would make a rapid transition to democracy and open societies. Reality has been different. As of 1998, only the Baltic states were classified as "free" in Freedom House's annual survey, Freedom in the World. Of the five post-Soviet nations classified as "not free," four were in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.8 Among the four there are significant differences, and it is important to note that limited freedoms of press and association exist in Kazakhstan, for example. A Russian analyst, S. Panarin, has classified the five Central Asian states differently: all are considered authoritarian, but some are accompanied by either real or "decorative" elements of democracy. Only Turkmenistan, according to Panarin, lacks even the decorative elements; it is characterized by "comprehensive police control over the population" without a division of power established "even at the constitutionallevel.,,9 Whether truly competitive elections will be held in any of the four not-free countries in the next decade is doubtful. Three are ruled by Soviet-era Communist Party First Secretaries who have staged Soviet-style elections or referenda since independence. (Only Kyrgyz Republic President Askar Akayev was never a member of the Communist Party.) Turkmenistan's SaparmuratNiyazov is in power until 2002 based on a referendum in which he won 99.9 percent of the vote. Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov, won 99.6 percent of the vote in his election and will be in office until at least the year 2000. Kazakhstan's first ''multi-party'' elections for parliament held in 1994 were characterized as "not meet[ing1 international standards" and "not free and fair" according to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, which sent observers. IO The following year, Kazakhstan President Nursultan

10

M Holt Ruffin

Nazarbaev was confinned in office by an uncontested "referendum" similar to those ofUzbeldstan and Turkmenistan. In Tajikistan, l.civil war broke out in mid-1992 that killed more than 20,000 people over four years and displaced more than 800,000. A postindependence coalition government failed, and a government headed by former Communist Party leader and collective farm manager Emomali Rakhmonov was elected in a 1994 election that observers said was marred by hud and intimidation. A U.N.-sponsored peace agreement was signed in September 1994 and another accord was signed in Moscow in June 1997 between the Rakhmonov government and the Islamist United Tajik Opposition (UTO). A U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT). made up of approximately 30 military observers and 170 civilian staff, will remain in the country until late 1999 in order to help implement this accord. A large Russian-led peacekeeping force has also been stationed in Tajikistan for several years. Ifnone of the governments in Central Asia can today be described as democratic, what about the economies? Has reform occurred there? One of the paradigms of political development, derived from the modem experience of countries such as Chile, South Korea. or Taiwan, holds that economic liberalization can coexist with authoritarian rule and produce sustained high rates of economic growth. These in turn help reduce social tensions over time and eventually allow a transition to democracy. Unfortunately, there is little reason for optimism that such a scenario might occur in Central Asia-for many reasons. None of the institutions of a market economy existed in Central Asia for more than seventy years prior to independence. Only in some countries and sectors of the economy have significant marlcet reforms or privatization occurred, and of the latter, most of it has been "nomenklatura privatization." This tends to change only the ownership of a business. not the way it is conducted. Kyrgyzstan, the country with one of the smallest populations and the least amount of natural resources. is the one making the most rapid transition to a market economy. Much slower, and much more uneven, have been the so-called transitions of the other, larger Central Asian economies. In addition, the geography of Central Asia and the very undeveloped transportation infrastructure (highways, rail lines, and pipelines) represent major constraints to the rapid growth of exports-the economic sector which fueled growth in Chile, Taiwan, etc. The common market that the five states once enjoyed with each other and with the rest of the Soviet Union was broken up b.y independence, and while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a treaty to create "a single economic space" in 1994, in practice it will probably be some years before the free exchange of goods and services that prevailed in the region during the Soviet period can return. Many old patterns of trade have been disrupted, and Russia and Ukraine, trade partners who could theoretically

Introduction

11

fuel sizable demand for Central Asian exports, have themselves been stagnant or in decline. A bright spot is China, which probably will become a major trading partner in coming years. But that is in the future and for now Central AsiaChina trade today is not significant. (Only 2.8 percent ofUzbekistan.'s and 7.4 percent of Kazakhstan's total exports went to China in 1996. 11) Finally, prices for the commodities which Central Asia produces and exports-oil, natural gas, gold, cotton-have fallen in the late nineties to levels which, in inflationadjusted terms, are the lowest in decades. This has cut severely into budgets for investments in infrastructure, made imports effectively more expensive, and presented additional important disincentives to foreign investment. In short, there is little reason to expect that high levels of investment or high rates of economic growth will be a feature of the Central Asia region for some years to come.

Can Modernization through Civil Sodety Transform Central Asia? But what about the society? Is it possible that changes are occurring at the social level that will ultimately have positive, modernizing effects on the political system and the economies of Central Asia? This is the question that each of the essays in this volume will address. Not all relevant issues and not all countries receive the treatment we would wish for them in the pages that follow-and it would perhaps be impossible to accomplish this in a single book. Turkmenistan, for example, gets insufficient attention. On the other hand, we have tried to include a range of points of view, so as to avoid any false uniformity of opinion or consensus. In the end, we hope that this volume's twelve essays on topics related to the theme of civil society in Central Asia can together serve as both a progress report on what has been accomplished and an agenda for tasks that still lie ahead The flI'St essay, by the chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, S. Frederick Starr, offers an overview of the idea of civil society, distinguishing its Lockean meaning, as a fundamental attribute of a society (i.e., the rule of law), from its narrower Hegelian one, which treats it in a more limited sense as that sector of society characterized by voluntary associations and civic organizations. Starr then details some of the most important factors boding either ill or well for the development of civil society in the region. At the heart of the idea of civil society is the notion that state and society are separate and that both citizens and the state are equal before the law. In most democracies the development of laws is influenced by the organized activity of citizens. Thus, without the strongest possible legal protection of the right of association, the very citizen activities which seek the legal reforms that expand a society's rights and freedoms become imperiled. This is the perspective

12

M. Holt Ruffin

Two Types of NOOs The term NGD ("nongovernmental organization") is often used synonymously NGD as the quintessential institution of participatory with civil derllo<:ra.;;y An NGD in this understanding the spirit of civic of of collective work for the common good. This is what vme celebrated in in America'" and it is the which characternational, and international nonprofit in the izes countless of these "classical" NGOa include reliUnited States and elsewhere. Rotary groups, groups, and OTIl[anizatioJI18 such as the Salvation are truly mdleplendent OQ5a:t1,IZllltl0!llS, eX!)re1.SlIU! the values of their members or "n"''''''...fi'"'' provide services which government either cannot provide "'..".'eI1lllllent RFPs for proposals). The late twentieth has seen the development of a different. of NGO--one in contracts with either a govenunent agency or a NGDs may foundation to carry out certain work. TIlese modem Tw(',vult>, important human services and engage in social and political ",h,,,,,·,,,,,, but do not have the same civic character as the classical NGO. and values of those in control of the fq1!res,enl:ati'ves of government or pu:Ua:llturor)v In most cases both of NGD benefit But it is the classical NGO which better embodies the idea of civil taking VOlUll\,

Introduction

13

throughout the essay of Scott Horton and Alla Kazakina, which offers a thorough analysis of the legal environment for public associations and nongovernmental organizations in Central Asia. They caU attention, for example, to Kazakhstan's article 337 orits Criminal Code, which provides stiff penalties for participation in the activities of any unregistered association. Another feature of Kazakhstan's law denies registration to any religious organization with fewer than 100 members. This results in a situation, for example, in which it is very difficult to start or build up a new religious organization, since any meetings held while the organization's membership is below 100 are illegal. Neither Kyrgyzstan nor Uzbekistan has a comparable provision in their criminal code. Another important deterrent to the formation of citizen organizations in Kazakhstan is that provision of their law which requires payment of a 10,000 tenge (USS150) registration fee-a stiff sum in the United States, let alone Central Asia. But Central Asia governments not only exercise control on associational activity in these ways, they also arrogate to themselves the right-entrusted to a board of directors in the U.S.-to insure an organization's compliance with its founding charter. As Horton and Kazakina point out, "this is far more sweeping than merely monitoring compliance with regulations or positive law; it creates an opportunity for government bureaucrats to substitute their judgment for that of the NGO's governing structures with respect to the entity's program of action.» In short, the Horton-Kazakina essay offers a clear point-by-point blueprint for additional measures needed to improve the laws governing associational activities in Central Asia. One of the important debates at the March 1998 conference was precipitated by Evgeny ZhovUs's presentation on "Freedom of Association and the Question onts Realization in Kazakhstan." Zhovtis's position, put simply. is that Soviet thinking, Soviet personalities, Soviet institutions, and Soviet "law" still largely persist in Central Asia. Any meaningful improvement in the laws first requires political reform. There are limits to how much the laws on public associations in Central Asia can improve in light of "a basic suspicion on the part of the state agencies with regard to the motives of nongovernmental public associations." The problem at root is one of "a fundamental lack of governmental accountability to society." To solve this problem. Zhovtis, leader of one of the more active and effective human rights organizations in the region, suggests the direct election oflocal administrators in Kazakhstan. (Interestingly, this is one of the ways in which the Chinese government today is incorporating into its society, in piecemeal and gradual fashion, some limited elements of democracy.) He concludes his essay by asking Western governments to abjure double standards of human rights advocacy, which allow them to castigate

14

M. Holt Ruffin

severely those countries which have little economic importance while remaining silent with respect to a country like Kazakhstan with its large oil reserves. The essay by Erkinbek Kasybekov of the Kyrgyz Republic on governmentNGO relations also addresses the theme of government distrust ofNGOs, but from a very different point of view. According to Kasybekov, lack of professionalism and unwillingness by NGOs to inform themselves about the government's social programs are major reasons for elements of distrust in relations between the two sectors-at least in Kyrgyzstan. The assumption is that NGOs' primary role is to help implement government programs, and they could do this, if they would first inform themselves better about the programs' provisions. He discusses several areas (including microcredits and assistance to the very poor) in which NGOs could significantly enhance the government's outreach and social services, and thereby enhance their standing with the government Besides this problem, says Kasybekov, "fiscal problems and the lack of fiscal responsibility have probably hurt the image ofNGOs more than any other factor." Since he has worked as a trainer ofNGOs as well as a consultant to the Kyrgyz government, Kasybekov understands both sides well. But his view of NGOs is primarily that of consulting organizations which contract to provide services for the government, acting almost as its extension agents. This is indeed one way in which NGOs operate, not only in Kyrgyzstan but also in the United States. But it is not their only function, and it is not a function that particularly strengthens the spirit of citizen participation, local democracy, government accountability, or other important attributes of civil society. Much closer to this spirit are those NGOs that make II. career of advocating changes in government policies, or those that carry on their activities independently of government. With this distinction between NGOs in mind, the essay by Kate Watters is of interest because it concerns the work of those NGOs in Central Asia that perhaps come closest to the "classical" type of voluntary, independent citizen organizations. These are NGOs in the environmental freld. Watters's essay relates some of the recent history of Central Asia, illuminating the important role that environmental organizations such as NevadaSemipalatinsk played in mobilizing large numbers of citizens against nuclear weapons testing. In 1991, thanks in good part to this powerful movement headed by a charismatic writer, the Semipalatinsk test gounds in Kazakhstan were closed permanently. Watters also documents the contributions grassroots environmental organizations have made in other areas: helping to stop poaching of endangered species in Turkmenistan, drafting elements of three new laws that will help protect nature in Kazakhstan (e.g., by requiring environmental impact statements in certain circumstances), introducing wind turbines as sources of energy, etc. Her essay suggests strongly that, in the environmental field at least,

Introduction

15

NGOs in Kazakhstan In a situation of crisis in which the government is increasingly unable to support its citizens. NGOs are both an alternative and a supplement to the public social welfare system. NGOs can playa unique role in developing solutions to social problems and in articulating the genuine needs of the citizens. Because NGOs are often connnunity-based, they have the potential more effectively to address the innnediate needs of their connnunity, such as homelessness and hunger. In some areas, NGOs are the only organizations addressing the needs of specific groups of people. In Kazakhstan, the third sector is in the beginning stages of its development. Many NGOs have little or no knowledge of themselves as a sector capable of effecting change. Their vision of themselves in the broader social context is still vague. The legislative aspects of their functioning also are unclear. The govemment currently does not view NGOs as authentic and potentially strong partners that are able and willing to assist them in their work. As a result, the energies and resources of many NGOs are spent on surviving and adapting to the rapidly changing socio-political situation in Kazakhstan. Despite many obstacles, the third sector in Kazakhstan is steadily making progress. Many organizations are strengthening and beginning to stabilize financially. They are recognizing the need to create a national representation for the sector, to network and share their knowledge, experiences and skills. and to develop strong partnerships with other local NGOs as well as regional and international NGOs.

-Gulmira Dzhamanova. Almaty organizations representing the public-spirited values that inform a vibrant civil society are growing. The continuation of their work appears to be likely in one form or another if governments will only give environmental groups the freedom to carry on their activities. If this does occur, it would seem to augur well for sustained work on what can only be described as the environmental crisis of Central Asia. Despite decades of industrialization and urbanization, the nations of Central Asia remain in varying degrees significantly rural and agriCUltural societies. As such, the fate of the Soviet-created lwlkhozes (large collective farms) becomes an important question for millions of residents of rural areas, the majority of whom had or still have livelihoods dependent on the kolkhoz. In analyzing this question, Olivier Roy, a scholar and consultant to the French foreign ministry, focuses on the social role of the kolkhoz in providing continued employment, a

16

M Holt Ruffin

rellltiolIlS, and perhaps a transition to a new His advice: go when it, the social structures of the kolkhoz. "Privatization is inevitable in the long run," notes Roy, "but, in my eyes, it should start from the kolkhoz it, because the kolkhoz is now part ofa 'real' civil and not

.,,"'j...... ,.. nrnrl" ... hn,., akin to

or not" At the March cOElierlence, The str()ng,est dlsagJ~eelneJtlt came from William u" ...._,~ business Volunteer Programs for the Citizens Network for Affairs. First, Witting disputed the identification of the collective farm with the clan. "The collective farm was by the Soviets on Central Asian ::;UI,;:n;;WICli. said Witting. "Even in instances where the membership of the collective farm cOlTes:pOl!1ds to the clan, the collective has served as an iIlStrument of central control of farmer activity, never of autonomous, consensual and !erilem::e n:nV,ltlzmg culture in former Soviet claimed that, this l\"t;''"''''', not love of the collective fann as an institultion, but Central Asian cr"'".. rnn,p,,t<: and rather fear oftlle alternatives. To Western aid donors have failed to create an attractive alternative model to tIle collective farm. Support for the of truly entrep!refJtewrial tannwtg has been meager and poorly "LI:;,..1'-""'",> farmers in Central Asia are stiU wonder that collective farmers are to their collective farm with its gu:arante:e-··bl)w,ev,~r threadbare at this point---ofheaIth care, e(lllCatIOll, and old age (and continue to vote since it is the to rebuild the collective fa.rm If the communists who farmers we members of collective farnls SeJe wager that will rush to join them. may well themselves into clan-based groups, but those groups will bear no resemblance to collective farms.

Introduction

17

The issue was a theme of another paper delivered at the conference, this one by Oleg Katsiev ofInternews in Almaty. His essay, which was updated significantly after the looks at efforts to create an independent electronic media in Kazakhstan. Against a background of substantial success by in broadcasting in Kazakhstan ill the immediately after independence, Katsiev shows how the authorities began in 1996 to take steps to bring br<>adclU.ting back under their control. Tne chief device was a "tender on radio and television " which was announced by President Nazamaev at the beginning of 1997. Through the and ecclnol:mcaUy unwarranted fees, this competition resulted in the immediate closure of twenty broadcasters in Kazakhstan. Some that this was the fmlt toward the eventual renationalization of the media in Kazakhstan But the government's was and more subtle. It closed some stations, threatened others with extended privileges to still others. Such a policy of divide-and-conquer in Katsiev's virtually assured the the "n"..-v,rl tnn"rt<>ntmedia outlets in the run-up to the 1999 election. Katsiev's essay is an object lesson in the need to look beneath the surface in order to understand how pressures against any would-be independent radio or TV station can exert themselves in Central Asia. "It is " concludes Hto see how little corporate or unity there is in the mass media" in Kazakhstan. Its absence a clear message to the authorities that could suppress opposition and extend control to the mass media." One lesmay be the son to draw from the Kazakhstan broadcast tender tance of media development program..<; which build a sense of institutional saHamong the so efforts at by government authorities encounter united responses which defend freedom, rather than a scramble for by individual broadcasters. But another lesson was drawn by Catherine executive director of the International who commented on Katsiev'g paper at the conference. in where USAID or any other agency of the U.S. government was when the in Kazakhstan launched a tender clearly or close down the nation's media. did the U.S. fund a host grams to democratization in Kazakhstan-~such as the the American Bar Association's Central and East European Law Initiative to rewrite the Kazakh Constitution-and then remain when the of Kazakhstan launched fundamental attacks on democratic such as the tender COlDPetl!10rl'! If an American oil company received unfair treatment from the the State Department would intervene diplomatically on behalf

18

M. Holt Ruffin

of the oil company with the authorities in AImaty, said Fitzpatrick. Should it not also remonstrate vigorously when millions of American taxpayers' dollars had been invested in projects such as that of Intemews, to strengthen the independent media in Central Asia-and that entire investment was on the verge of being destroyed by an attack from the authorities? The importance of an independent media is a major theme also of the essay by Abdumannob Polat, "Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?" His nuanced analysis includes two important suggestions for policy initiatives by the international democratic community. The first concerns the media: Of particular importance are activities aimed to promote freedom of information and media; publications independent of any political group; publications and activities which advocate religious, politica~ ethnic pluralism and tolerance; human rights monitoring and reporting; and di~ogue between different movements. Special emphasis should be placed on the development of a truly free. professional media which is independent from any political or religious group. But Polat puts forward another intriguing suggestion. Based on his view that an independent institution of Islam in Uzbekistan offers the best promise for instilling in the national culture the values of civil society, POlat calls on other govemments and international organizations to be more vocal in defending the principle of religious freedom when Uzbekistan's government moves to suppress Islamic clerics on the pretext that they are "fundamentalists" or support armed violence against the state. An Islam that is modest and tolerant of other religious views, an Islam that is independent of the state and does not seek political power, such an Islam is possible in Uzbekistan and it could provide one of the main ethical models and spiritual foundations of a still-to-be-developed civil society. A flfSt step which the West could take to support the emergence of such an independent, nonpolitical Islamic tradition in Uzbekistan would be to focus much more attention on the Karimov government's blatant and systematic attacks on religious freedom. It would be a novel tum of events, to say the least, if the United States were to begin defending persecuted Central Asian mullahs in the name of religious freedom as vigorously as we defended persecuted political dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov and Vaclav Havel a decade or so earlier. But ifPolat is right and the kind of Islam gaining strength in Uzbekistan is largely guided by principles of tolerance and pluralism, his advice is indeed compelling.

Introduction

19

Another point Polat makes is that "money talks" in Uzbekistan. American advocacy on behalf of democratization and human rights would have much more clout if the United States were also investing significant sums in support of Uzbekistan's social and economic development. If our foreign assistance to the country is essentially at a trivial level, no diplomatic demarches by us concerning democratization or civil society issues, no matter how important these may be, will be taken seriously by the authorities. But should the United States seek to buy influence with the Uzbek authorities-even influence on behalf of democratization and human rights-if the price of that influence is that we underwrite with millions of dollars some ill-considered official development project without a sound economic basis, which may even be designed to line private pockets? Polat seems to assume that any substantial increase in American economic assistance to Uzbekistan would be money well invested. A closer look at Islam, its revival. and its implications for civil society in two nations in particular, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, is offered by Reue! Hanks and Aziz Niyazi, respectively. Hanks documents the intensity of the Islamic revival in Uzbekistan, while also recognizing the variety of ways in which Islam survived the Soviet period: local soviets (councils) which were de facto mahallas, the existence of an Islamic samizdat in the seventies that paralleJed Christian samizdat in other parts of the Soviet Union, etc. If his view of Islam in Uzbekistan is as benign as Polat's, his assessment of the Karimov government's strength is more qualified. Hanks worries that a downward economic spiral is occurring in Uzbekistan and that U.S. policy will become too identified with a government that will be replaced in a not-too-distant future by precisely those variants ofIsIam-militant and anti-Westem-which presently do not characterize Uzbek society. Although the language of Tajikistan is closely related to Persian, the tradition of Islam that prevails there is not shia but sunni, as in Uzbekistan. In fact, Aziz Niyazi's essay on Islam and its relationship to the crisis in Tajikistan is not unlike a vivid Persian miniature pain~g. as he succeeds in illustrating so many of Islam's fascinating and sometimes paradoxical features. For example, while Niyazi believes that in Soviet Tajikistan, ''the 'struggle against the survival of religion' did not inflict serious damage on the Islamic tradition,n the isolation from the rest of the world did separate Islamic leaders and thinkers in Central Asia from important currents in Islamic social and political thought throughout most of the twentieth century. In particular, Nizyazi believes that Islam contains the values and spiritual orientation to counter many of the devastating social effects of Tajikistan's Soviet-period industrialization and environmental degradation.

20

M. Holt Ruffin

Tajikistan's President Seeks Improved Cooperation with "Unified" NGOs

By an order of Tajikistan President Emomall Rakbmonov...on 28 August 1997 a seminar was held, titled "Cooperation Between Government Agencies and Social Associations in Contemporary Conditions.» The goal of 1he seminar was to develop a unified approach in order to ensure the cooperation of government agencies (ministries, mayor's offices, local officials, etc.) with social associations. This seminar was the fourth in a national series organized by the Presidential Administration. The participants reviewed cooperative events that have occurred in the two months since the signing of the National Reconciliation Agreement between President Rakhmonov and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), Said Nuri. At present in Tajikistan, 356 NGOs have registered themselves, including 8 political parties, 6 popular movements, 64 foundations, 16 fraternal organizations, 23 trade unions. 11 children's organizations, 5 organizations for the disabled, 12 women's organizations, and 4 environmental organizations (16 environmental organizations remain unregistered). Recently, the government has begun to devote considerable new attention to NGOs, considering them to be a potentially important factor in the democratization of society and the strengthening of statehood of Tajikistan.... Seminar participants and government representatives noted that the insufficient level of development of the legal system in Tajikistan retarded development and contributed to the weak level of cooperation between the government and NGOs. Government representatives, in'their presentations, drew attention to the fact that in its policies for worlcing with NGOs. the state steered clear of the word "control," preferring instead "cooperation." Moreover, the government explained that it endeavors to create all necessary conditions for the unimpeded founding. registration, and operation ofNGOs. - Yuri Skochilov and Timur Idrisov of Youth EcoCenter, in Ecostan News, September 1997

The most cautionary view of the effects of the ongoing Central Asian Islamic revival will be found in the essay by Ikramova and McConnell on "Women's NGOs in Central Asia's Evolving Societies," This essay starts from the premise that the principle of equality between men and women was a feature of Soviet rule which, even jf limited in its application and only symbolic in some areas, at least was not in question. In today's Central Asia, by contrast,

Introduction

21

wholesale to restoring tradition have resulted in the exclusion of women from positions in the economy and that were once open to them. This is one of the Ikramova and McCmmeU argue, which \oAI"1411'" the high of women-led and women-dominated NGOs in Uzbekistan. Their essay documents the wide variety of activities in which these orI';anizatiolllS are not only in Uzbekistan but other countries of the 12 If their activism can sustain itself in the years to come, it will not be that women's organizations in Central Asia can recover unreasonable to lost since independence and a new between of gender relations with reasserted Islamic customs and modem beliefs ofthe The final essay in the book returns to the theme ofNGOs as institutions of civil and identifies the them at this moment in their development in Centra! Asia. Cooper has spent several years in the most liberal in the region with respect to policies toward programs aimed at and NGOs in the While that many of the successful NGOs in the perspective is that "extemal support is not Sometimes, communities have the resources to deal with the lack is leadership and or~~anization. describes the work of three different or~~anlzat1o:ns irnnuwf' primary and education in stan's rural areas; a consumer protection organization based in Bishkek but with branches in other and the Association of Social Workers of ,;r""'7<'t"n an first formed in 1997. does not underestimate the importance of the tolerant attitude toward the NGO But what is "the real work" of the title of his essay that remains to be done? Consistent with his view that the developmellt oithe NGO is 'arlent and democratic as well as to establish a broad base of constitu-

"The

in Central Asia," Gregory Gleason has was that it came "as had Soviet-style colonialism several decades before-it was MosCOW.,,13 This statement is correct in the sense that came suddenly to Central Asia and with its timing determined in Moscow more than Tashkent or Unlike the independence

22

M. Holt Ruffin

achieved in mid~century by African and Asian anti~olonial movements--which were generally able to agitate openly against governments much less repressive than the Soviet syste~independence for the 50 million inhabitants of Central Asia was preceded neither by a national liberation struggle nor by self-conscious efforts on the part of the metropolitan power to prepare the region for independence. The dissolution of the USSR in December 1991 created an almost frantic struggle for new institutions and identities in the new nations of Central Asia. It also created a considerable sense of hope within the international democratic community, not all of which was based on wishes alone. Scott Horton, in comments delivered at the March conference, reminded the audience of a remarkable speech delivered by Kazakhstan's President (then First Secretary) Nursultan Nazarbaev in Moscow in the closing months of 1991, in which he invoked with great power such liberal values as human rights, civil society. and the rule oflaw. As time bas passed, much of the change appears to have been in more symbolic areas, such as those of language, culture, and identity. Perhaps the least change has occurred with regard to political institutions and in this arena there are indeed sallent continuities that link the region to its Soviet pastcontinuities of leadership, of laws, of practices, of ways of thinking. Still, real change, amidst continuity. is occurring in Central Asia. The imposed isolation of Soviet rule has ended, and while the nations of the region are still far from being open societies, well integrated into the world community. there are many forces at work which suggest that trends will be in this direction, even for least-reformed Turkmenistan. Islam is clearly making a resurgence in the region and, while it is too early to tell how it will develop further, there appears to be a consensus among those who know the region that some kind of secular Islamic states are more likely to emerge than states controlled by Talibans or Khomeini-like leaders. Ethnicity and clan-based regionalism have been the source of strife and tension in the region-and these factors will remain important for a long time--but there are signs that the worst may be past. For one thing, significant numbers of Russians have emigrated, reducing tensions from this source. One can be guardedly optimistic with respect to the prospect for civil society in the region. If taken in both its Lockean and Hegelian meanings. as described by Frederick Starr, it seems fair to say that at least four of Central Asia's new nations have moved in the direction of civil society, albeit unevenly. That is, there are trends in each nation toward the development of societies under the rule of law in which citizens have meaningful rights. and toward societies with vibrant sectors of nonprofit organizations and voluntary associations independently providing important public services.

introduction

23

As documentation of the latter phenomenon, our twelve analy~ tical essays, the reader will frod in Civil in Central Asia some 75 pages that describe hundreds ofNGOs which are now active in Central with names and contact information for each of them. Some are "international" or~~anizahOlls whose home offices are in the United States or ('m,ntTv outside of Central Asia. are indigenous, and among these are many which have reasonable hopes of remaining in operation over the years to come. In as to their to the course" was one of the criteria used in selecting them (along with the other apl)arent eUiectllveltless. range with etc.) It is our if another edition ofthis book is done ill three or four number of the profiled in our NGO section will not years, a only still be in business but will have their activities. Whether this is the case or not, wm in on tbe evolution of civil ill its broader sense: that is, the of Jaws that the and association and, most a widespread freedoms of acc:eo1tanl~e of the principle of rule of law in itself. As Hillary Clinton said when she was in Samarkand in late I want you to know that in my country and in yours not individuals and include all on developing institutions that individuals from different on holding free and fair elections once, but time and not only on freedom ""h",u,n and freedom of association. But it depends ultimately on whether democratic values live in the hearts and minds of all citizens. 14

the democratic community both within and outside Asia. Many decades of Soviet rule have left a deep residue of not only detachment and passivity with regard to the vlast' on the of most but even of values which the antidemocratic behavior of the "state structures. The very terms that Russians (and Central use to refer to e.g., vlast', tend to connote forces or powers control rather than officials whose behavior is U"1JPn'Pi'I laws. In a survey commissioned by the United States Information Agency in September 1997, citizens of Kazakhstan were found to hold the following percent) described their pel:SOltlal economic situation as bad";

24

M. Holt Ruffin

even larger majorities gave "fairly bad" or "very bad" ratings to the government's performance in a number of areas; .. two-thirds of respondents expressed confidence in President Nazarbaev's leadership; • asked who should succeed the president nhe should not seek re-election, 81 percent could not offer a single name; .. more than half of all respondents expressed support for strong authoritarian government as opposed to the separation of powers and wide individual freedoms. How to instill "democratic values [thatJlive in the hearts and minds of all citizens"? The problem is that in some fundamental way such values must be self-generated and self-discovered. They cannot be imported or implanted. But democratic values are more ubiquitous than we, who are privileged to have been born and to live in democratic societies. sometimes think. In this regard, Civil SOCiety in Central Asia is more than a status report on the development in. postSoviet Central Asia of those values and institutions associated with the idea of civil society and democracy-i.e., the growth of voluntary associations, a free media, respect for the rights of women and minorities, etc. It is, in a sense, confirmation that the same struggles are taking place in Central Asia that have preceded the establishment of democracy and the rule oflaw in many other nations. When Uzbekistan passes a law that forbids "offending the honor and dignity of the President," we recognize this as an attempt to put not just a person, but the entire government, above the law. But not only do we in the West recognize this; most importantly, so do citizens of Uzbekistan and the other nations of Central Asia. They may not constitute majorities at the present time, but they are significant influences in their societies. They are the authors of some of the essays, or leaders of the organizations, contained in this book; and they are active within their societies. If working together they are able to establish even some limited civil rights within their presently authoritarian nations-especially the freedoms to associate and to organize-then. there are grounds for hoping that over time, civil rights will expand to political rights, and these will eventually undeIpin real democracy. To be sure, whatever forms Central Asia's institutions take in the future, they are unlikely to mimic the West and very likely to reflect the strong influences of Islam, as well as other factors and traditions indigenous to the region. This points to a final issue: the need for citizens of the United States and the West to develop a much better understanding of Islam and the Islamic world and to engage with the latter considerably more closely than we have to date. We have noted already our regrets about some lacunae that exist in this book, e.g" with respect to Turkmenistan. In a book as broad as this, of only one volume, some omissions or shortcomings are inevitable. But one subject to which we

Introduction

25

have tried seriously not to give short shrift has been Islam. We will feel satisfied if one conclusion readers take from Civil Society in Central Asia is the importance of understanding better this large and powerful religious tradition and, in particular, its social, civic, and democratic possibilities. For whatever form civil society takes in the region, it will reflect some synthesis oflong-establisbed Central Asian values, such as hurmat (meaning "deference" or "respect"),16 with classical Western values, such as that of equality before the law. In a recent essay titled "The Feeble Breath of Democracy," Anthony Hyman, an associate editor of Central Asia Survey, concluded: Some disillusioned observers have virtually written off Central Asia as a region where civil society concepts are too alien to make progress. Such judgments ignore that the almost total isolation of the Soviet era has been broken down, and the post-Soviet years have brought valuable exposure to ideas from the outside world. But it would be unrealistic to expect any rapid or straightforward transition. 17 Hyman's challenge to Western disillusionment with Central Asia is valid. So is his suggestion that whatever form the region's transition takes, it is likely to surprise us. Whether it is a pleasant surprise, as we are inclined to believe, or a less-appealing one, much will depertd on the themes analyzed and the organizations descnbed in the pages that follow.

Notes I. Central Intelligence Agency '97 World Factbook. 2. One estimate is that 3.5 million Russians emigrated to the region in just the period 19()()"1914. See Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence ofCentral Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London: Zed Books, 1994), p. S1. 3. Gregory Gleason, The Central Asia States: Discovering Independence, Westview Press, 1997, pp. 25 and 190. 4. A. K. Kazymzhanov and K. O. Tnbble, "The Political Tradition of the Steppe," Nationalities Papers, vol. 26, no. 3, 1998, p. 467. S. Tsarist rule was not particularly respectful ofIslam and Cen!ral Asian cultures, but it did not attempt to eradicate them. A characteristic of nineteenth·century Russian colonialism was the creation of two distinct and largely segregated societies, with little social interaction between the colonizers and the colonized, perhaps similar to the English pattem in India. 6. The fonnal dates of independence range from August 31, 1991, for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to December 16, 1991, for Kazakhstan. 7. As quoted in Gleason, p. 2. 8. Freedom in the World, 1997-98 (New York: Freedom House, 1998). See also Nations in Transit (New York: Freedom House, 1998), a comprehensive analysis of "countries in transition," which looks at !rends in the rule of law, economic freedom. corruption, and other issues in nations of the fonner Soviet Union, Eastern Europe. and

26

M. Holt RufJin

Mongolia. The other "not free" country was Belarus. The seven "partly free" were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. 9. Boris Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov. Central Asia: The Cluzlienges of Independence(AJTnonk,~:M.E.Sharpe, 1998),pp.45~.

10. Michael Ochs, "Kazakh Elections Criticized by Western Observers," Digest, March 1994, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Washington, D,C.), p. 3. About 100 foreign observers monitored the Kazakh elections, including a delegation from the Kyrgyz Republic. II. RumerandZhukov,pp. 213,188. 12. A recent article on Kyrgyzstan confirms the same trends there. "The dernocratization of Kyrgyz society has triggered the formation of new nongovernmental organiza.tions and the revival of participatory social movements. There are more than 500 nongovernmental organizations, among the strongest of which are those representing the interests of women. While women are most seriously affected by consequences of the transition, they are at the same time a major force in the transformation of society." Zairash Galieva, "Civil Society in the Kyrgyz Republic in Transition," Central Asia Monitor, no, 5, 1998, p. 7. B. Gleason, p. 15. 14. "Remarks by Hillary Rodbam Clinton, Novernber 15,1997," Central Asia Monitor, no. 6,1997, p. 8 15. "Suffering without Protest in Kazakhstan," findings of a survey as reported by Debra Javeline, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, Central Asia Monitor, no. 3,1998. 16. Gleason, p. 38. 17. Transitions, September 1998, p. 81.

Civil Society in Central Asia S. Frederick Starr

C

ivil Society:in Central Asia? Until very recently. few would have considered this to be a fruitful object of study, let alone a title for a book. Yet a combination of developments, most of them :indigenous to the region but others originating elsewhere, have thrust this topic to the fore. This bas occurred with breathtaking speed, even though the development of civil society :in Central Asia is still at a rudimentary stage. The intensity of this process can be discerned at many levels. Whether one is speaking of the evolv:ing theoretical debate, of national legislation, or of practical developments :in the region's cities, towns, and countryside, the theme of civil society :in Central Asia is no longer avoidable. Anyone seeking to gauge the overall development of public and social life :in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan must take notice of the state of civil society there. To be sure, the pace of change varies greatly from country to country. Yet for all the diversity, there is a common story here, for all of these countries have shared a common fate and are subject to similar influences. both :internal and external. Several of the authors of the follow:ing essays are themselves part of the picture, s:ince they have taken an active part :in the developments they describe. They are uniquely qualified to enlighten us on practical aspects of the issue. But before turn:ing to their analyses, it is well to pause to review how we reached this :interesting and, to many. unexpected po:int, and also to assess some of the fundamental questions that have been raised in the course of this process. Until fairly recently, the notion of "civil society" was something one encountered :in textbooks on political philosophy. The standard view :in the English speaking world was that civil society is a state or conditicn that exists when a people is ruled by law, when freedoms of speech and association prevail. when a multitude of voluntary groups work freely to foster civic ends, and when people consider themselves to be citizens rather than subjects. This definition, dating from the late seventeenth century :in England and Scotland, :infused the American Revolution and the system to which it gave rise. A quite different perspective was :introduced by the German philosopher Hegel :in the early n:ineteenth century, namely, that civil society is not the entire body politic but only that part of society that organizes itself voluntarily to promote the common good. Unlike John Locke and his British contemporaries, the Prussian philosopher Hegel juxtaposed state and society and confined the 27

28

S. Frederick Starr

"civic" element to the latter. Such an approach reflected and reinforced the tendency, widespread in authoritarian societies, to see social life as a struggle between "us" and "them." In this dialectic guise the idea of civil society entered Marxism and gained popularity also in Latin America and other places where n~cent civic impulses came up against entrenched bureaucracies of state. So matters stood down to the 1970s. In that decade a new generation of activists in Central Europe rediscovered old concepts of civil society and applied them to their own situation. The causes of this renaissance are not hard to flnd. Solid education, expanded communication with the West, and contact with older traditions in their own societies emboldened many young men and women in Poland and Czechoslovakia to challenge the inefficient and increasingly ineffective bureaucrats who ruled them. Equally important, Communist leaders in those countries were less willing than formerly to impose discipline on their societies by force. These conditions gave rise to the Charter 77 movement in Prague and Solidarity in Gdansk. Even though the tone of these movements was set mainly by artists (in Prague) and workers (in Poland), a solid core of intellectuals in both groups provided an underpinning of ideas. It was they who revived the old concept of civil society and placed it on the banner of powerful new movements for change. It is not surprising that their approach to civil society was closer to Hegel's than to Locke's. Unlike Britain in 1688, there had been no Glorious Revolution in Czechoslovakia or Poland. Down to the fall of the Berlin Wall, these embattled activists felt themselves to be engaged in a Manichean struggle of good against evil. Their fervor had a heroic quality and soon attracted admiring mends and supporters in the West. In such a mood the idea of civil society gained new currency in western Europe and North America. It took root flrst in the academic world and spread then to several large private foundations in America. By the late 19808 "civil society" had become the rallying cry for many thoughtful people who had experienced disillusionment after 1968 and had been searching for new, more moderate affirmations ever since. The Central European renaissance found a receptive climate in the Soviet Union as well. Its fmt Soviet champions were to be found outside Russia, however, mainly in the Baltic republics of Estonia and Lithuania. One of the first writers to espouse the idea of civil society within Russia itself was an ethnic Armenian, A. Migranian. Scarcely had the term attracted the interest of Moscow journalists than the reforming leader of the Soviet state took it up. By 1989 Gorbachev was using "civil society" interchangeably with "a law-governed state" or a "normal state." Perhaps this is not surprising. After an. Gorbachev was a graduate of Moscow State University's Faculty of Law. Even in the darkest days of Stalin's rule the syllabus there had included texts by Boris Chicherin and other pre~

Civil Society in Central Asia

29

Revolutionary Russian h"beral jurists, all of whom had expounded standard Central European views of civil society. Far more important than such intellectual links were the practical considerations driving Gorbachev into the civil society camp. By 1986 the Soviet state was nearly broke. The rate of investment had been slowing for a generation, productivity was falling. huge expenditures on the military were driving the budget into the red, and the war in Afghanistan had compounded the deficits. Gorbachev's own ill-advised temperance campaign destroyed the state's income from the alcohol monopoly, which had equaled nearly the entire military budget. By the late 1980s the Soviet state could no longer pay for the many social programs on which the Communist Party based its legitimacy. Gorbachev's first response was to try to shift the burden from Moscow to the republics and oblasts. But decentralization did not solve the problem since local govemments were also broke. He therefore conceived the idea of turning to "society," i.e., inviting normal citizens to take their well-being into their own hands. The spread of mass education, improved international communications, and the decline of fear left millions of Russians eager to accept the offer. But it bears repeating that official talk of civil society in the waning years of Soviet power was above all a means of addressing an irresolvable budgetary crisis. This, in telegraphic fonn, was the situation at the time of the Soviet collapse. The amalgam of ideas, social change, and brute fiscal realities that fueled thinking about civil society in Central Europe, the Baltic republics, and Russia was a major part of the bequest from the late Soviet period to the new states of Central Asia. These new sovereignties were bom at precisely the moment when thoughts of civil society were spreading like wildfue in the West and especially in the United States. What had begun as a somewhat arcane infatuation of a few academics had blossomed into a full-blown movement, affecting not only private foundations but also members of Congress and of the executive branch. Leaders of USAID, USIA, and other governmental funding bodies concluded that the most noble mission their agencies could pursue in the newly independent states was to foster the development of "civil society." A parallel tide spread through European governments and offices of the European Union. In quick order a host of well-funded programs appeared, aU designed to promote this goal. By the late 19908 tens of millions of dollars, pounds, marks, and francs had been spent on the development of "civil society" in Central Asia. Inevitably, those who were paying the bills have begun to ask what all this activity has accomplished. Skeptics point out that the C.entral Asian states, like Russia itself, are still ruled by authoritarian leaders. Freedoms of speech aud association are constantly under threat. Nongovemmental organizations struggle to survive, even when they enjoy a legaJ right to exist. And the public at large, preoccupied

30

S. Frederick Starr

with the demands of daily life in their impoverished lands, remains largely indif· ferent to the blessings of independent initiative and voluntarism. Suffice it to say that when the International Foundation for Electoral Systems polled citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, an overwhelming majority indicated that they were not prepared to toil for nongovernmental organizations unless they were paid for their efforts. It is easy to proceed directly from this enumeration to the conclusion that the five new states of Central Asia are not fertile soil for the implantation of voluntary associations nor for the growth of civil society in either the Lockean or Hegelian sense. In defense of this proposition the following six arguments are commonly broUght forward. First, the oasis societies that form the traditional urban core of Central Asia are what Karl Wittfogel termed "hydraulic cultures," i.e., the basis of their economic and social life is the mobilization of labor to build and maintain irrigation systems. Such cultures require collective effort and actively discourage the individualism (sense of "citizenship") that is the building block of civil society. Second, those same cultures were traditionally hierarchical, with power flowing down to subjects from above rather than upward from the citizenry. Arable land, not labor, was the scarce commodity. Whoever controlled the oasis therefore controlled life. Subjects had no choice but to make their peace with power. Such circumstances made voluntary associations at best irrelevant to survival. Third, among both the oasis dwellers and nomadic peoples the family and clan reigned as the most basic unit in society. This discourages the formation of voluntary associations among citizens who constitute the backbone of civil society. Fourth, far from abolishing these features of traditional society in Central Asia, the Soviet system reinforced them. The state's control of water resources became absolute; extended families took over collective farms; the expansion of cotton culture turned everyone connected with it into subjects rather than free citizens; and the Communist Party gained a degree of control over society that was beyond the dreams of emirs of yore. Fifth. post-Soviet practice in several countries, notably Uzbekistan, seems to have strengthened the hierarchical principle at the very moment one might have hoped it would be weakened. Thus, the universal neighborhood organizations ofIslamic society, the mahalia, have been revived and given new powers. A century ago these exercised a degree of self-government, but in modem Uzbekistan the state has co-opted their authority and governmentalized them. Voluntary initiatives at the local level are now subject to control by the mahalia, as well as to direct regulation by the state.

Civil Society in Central Asia

31

Sixth, even where more or less satisfactory new laws on voluntary associations have been instituted, as in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, they are not yet backed up by independent and effective courts of law. Absent these, voluntary associations of all sorts remain subject to the caprice of state officials, tax coUectors, etc., with little recourse. These arguments do not preclude the development of civil society in Central Asia, any more than feudalism or the village community in Western Europe a half miUennium ago precluded the eventual emergence of civil societies there. But they cannot be ignored, for they describe the base-line reality on which any realistic effort to foster civil society in Central Asia must build. Fortunately, they are also not the whole story. A number offactors in the lives of Central Asian peoples favor the emergence of civil society today. Some of these parallel developments in Central Europe and Russia are descn'bed above. Among these, none is more important than the high level of literacy and general education that is the legacy of Soviet rule. Whatever the expectations of Communist Party officials, education in Central Asia was and is empowering. Especially for women, it opens possibilities for independence and initiative that were inconceivable a few generations ago. It is no wonder that voluntarism in Central Asia today is dominated above all by a remarkable group of empowered and activist women. Scarcely less important is the integration of the region into international channels of communication. Old systems of hierarchy and social control are less sustainable when individual citizens have access to infonnation on how people live elsewhere. Such information, combined with modern proficiencies acquired through education, transfonns subjects into active citizens who expect to control directly their own lives and the life of their communities. Further, even as Central Asian societies open themselves to the world, they are turning with renewed interest to their own past. As they do so, they find a number of elements in their traditional way of life that directly support modem notions of civil society. Local rulers may have dominated the ancient oasis cities, but guilds and independent associations of artisans flourished everywhere until they were suppressed by Soviet rule. Mahallas provided a considerable sphere for the development of neighborhood-level leadership and initiative. And throughout the entire region there existed independent foundations (waqfs) that maintained shrines, schools, and public welfare agencies. Finally. the Muslim tradition of giving (zakat) may resemble more closely the Catholic practice of tithing than Protestant voluntarism, but it does create the expectation that a pious person must take responsibility for the well~being of others at the local level. Even though much of this was eclipsed during Soviet times, the nature of Moscow's imperial rule in Central Asia allowed ample scope for self-initiative

32

S. Frederick Starr

there. Working both within and outside the law, Central Asians became adept at identifying and exploiting small zones of independence and self~management. Little studied today, the actual practice of voluntarism and autonomy under Soviet rule provided the immediate seed-bed for the emergence of independent activity after independence, both in its positive and negative manifestations. These various considerations go far toward offsetting the obvious impediments to the development of civil society that exist in Central Asia today. Over time, their influence is likely to be decisive, for they are reinforced by many elements of modem life. But before succumbing completely to a rosy optimism, one must face the reality that civil society is possible only when large nwnbers of citizens possess some form of private property and when their right to that property is protected by law. Given the overwhelming extent of the state's ownership of property in Soviet times, and the complexity of the privatization process, it is no criticism of the new governments in Central Asia to note that this condition has yet to be fully instituted anywhere in the region. The privatization of state property has proceeded at very different paces in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Yet even in Kazakhstan, where most property is now in private hands, the unequal distribution of wealth is such that large segments of the population are as dependent as they were in Soviet times. It is feared that windfall profits from oil and gas might increase, rather than decrease, this polarization. In Uzbekistan privatization has advanced slowly, in the hope that social stability can be maintained during the transition. There and elsewhere in Central Asia the privatization of land has proven to be as vexing a problem as it is in Russia. Only in Kyrgyzstan does it appear that thoroughgoing privatization of land is likely in the near future. Until large numbers of people throughout the region have gained a modicum of private property, it is unlikely that they will look to themselves and to one another to meet the needs of society, rather than to the government No less important:. without the expansion of private property and its protection under law, it will be difficult:. ifnot impossible, for the independent sector in these countries to become self-sustaining. Fortunately, there is one force at work in all of the states (with the possible exception of Turkmenistan) that augurs well for the future. Recall that in both Central Europe and Soviet Russia in the decades before 1991, the states had assumed huge and costly responsibilities in virtually every area of social development. Over time the governments became unable to pay the bill for these services. As financial pressures grew, they had no choice but to decentralize and fmally to devolve responsibilities onto society itself. A similar dynamic is at work throughout Central Asia today. Governments are no longer able or willing to extract enough money from society to finance all the functions they had arrogated to themselves under Communism. As they

Civil Society in Central Asia

33

come to grips with this problem, they are gradually tuming to the citizenry for help, inviting them to take a role in areas previously monopolized by the state. The rapid growth of independent institutions of higher education is but one example of this process among many that could be cited. The great unresolved question is whether such entities will grow financially independent and self-sustaining over time or will continue their present dependence on support from foreign governments and foundations and from international funding agencies. It cannot be denied that many organizations existing on foreign and governmental support are performing valuable services, and with a fair degree of independence. But they remain fragile and, from the standpoint of civic education, fundamentally different in character from associations that raise most or all of their resources locally and privately. It is perhaps revealing that organizations existing on international grants and contracts are termed "nongovernmental organizations," i.e., they are deImed by what they are not rather than by what they are. All this does not imply that every Central Asian state will embrace the ideal of civil society, or that those doing so will espouse it with equal fervor. But for the foreseeable future, it means that the most powerful engine for change will foster rather than thwart the development of civil society.

The Legal Regulation of NGOs: Central Asia at a Crossroads Scott Horton and Alia Kazakina

P

roceeding at an uneven pace, the three nations of the Central Asian Union have now reached an important crossroads in their treatment of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Each nation inherited the late Gorbachev-era style law on public associations and has built on this base in the enactment of a Civil Code envisioning noncommercial corporate structures. In order to provide a sustainable platform for the development ofNGOs, however, another step is critical: the enactment of a comprehensive law governing noncommercial entities and according them appropriate tax exemptions. In this study, we briefly consider the development of the nonprofit sector in Central Asia, and discuss major features of the existing legal regime governing the activities of nonprofit organizations in the states of the Central Asian Union-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan. and Uzbekistan (collectively, the "CAU")where the most important progress in NGO activities has been achieved. Of course, what matters is not just what the laws on the books say, but how they are interpreted and applied by the government officials charged with their enforcement. With this in mind, we will also discuss some experiences "from the trenches" in addition to reviewing relevant laws and regulations.

The LegaJ Environment and NCO Sustainabillty The Central Asian republics have existed de jure as independent nations since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, and they have evolved out of the Moscow-centric legal orbit at varying paces over the past seven years. A great deal has been written and said about their evolution of market-economic structures, but the development of the nonprofit sector in these countries has attracted much less attention. It is difficult to describe the process on a regional basis, since genuinely independent NGOs appeared frrst and most vibrantly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and subsequently also in Uzbekistan. In Turkmenistan, the situation continues to be rather bleak. with the exception of a few brave environmental and public service organizations. Tajikistan has attracted enormous attention from foreign NGOs, many of which have been permitted to operate with great intermittent freedom, but the NGO environment there is more the result of a disabled state apparatus than a consequent regime of legal regulation or promotion. Taking these considerations into account, we will focus on 34

The Legal Regulation ofNGOs

35

the situation in the core CAU republics to the exclusion of that in the peripheral republics of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. In the CAU, we can trace the development of a small but increasingly selfsustaining and professional NGO community, which has embraced leamed professions, cultural and educational organizations, and public interest advocacy organizations. Of course, we should be frank in acknowledging that a good part of this community has come into being in order to take advantage of the sudden wealth of funding opportunities brought by the major multilateral and bilateral development programs. Whether much of this community will survive the inevitable withdrawal of USAID, TACIS, and similar funding organizations is an important question which must be considered with greater urgency as time passes. We frankly question whether the donor organizations have given enough weight to sustainability as an issue and criterion in their grant-making, especially in light of the fact that most grant-making in the region supports specific projects often crafted by development agencies, and little appears to have beeR granted in the form of core operating support. In any event, creating a positive legal environment may be an essential element in insuring sustainability of the most worthwhile of the NGOs brought into being by the great donor tsunami of 1994-96. A legal environment which will give domestic NGOs a fighting chance entails two critical elements: appropriate corporate vehicles for NGO activity, which can be registered and maintained with a minimum of bureaucratic runaround; and a system of tax exemptions and benefits that promotes a culture of private and corporate giving, domestically and from abroad, to support legitimate NGO activity, whether it be educational, religious, artistic. scientific. or public interest advocacy. At this point, the first objective seems within the grasp ofNGOs in the CAU, but the second still seems elusive. Moreover, a system of tax benefits will only work to promote NGO activities if the Central Asian republics can develop a culture of responsible taxpayers. At present, suffocating tax burdens in the region are spurring most businesses (probably excepting the significant foreign investors) to engage in broad-scale tax evasion. We must recognize that this is not only a problem for the state in its efforts to meet revenue objectives, it is also a long-term nightmare for the cause of philanthropy in the region. The domestic debate around NGO legislation currently revolves around several competing drafts presented by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), including variants drafted for the World Bank and the Open Society Institute by ICNL and the German Gesellschaft fUr technische Zusammen" arOOt (GTZ). These models in turn reflect Anglo-American as compared with continental European. perspectives on the regulation of not-for-profit organizations. We consider the ICNL models to be clearly superior from the perspective

36

S. /forton and A. Kazakina

of promoting the development of an NGO Either of these models, l'Io'.vl':'ver would appear to form a suitable basis for the development ofthe Whether these leg;uUluH'e onlectrves will be achieved depends in large they obtain from the Central Asian pre:sldeni:S, advisors and, in the case of Kyrgyz-stan, 'lNith its OPf.lOsltiOll-Ol'lented parhruneIlt, from The track record of the four years that aggressive support from donors and international financial institutions can also have important influence on the process.

The NOO Community "'nJ'''TV 1, 1998, app'roximately 700 nonoro1'lt olrgalnza,tiol:lS had been

vnrvz:stall; n,[lWleVer, only 300 organizations were viewed as active. l In 1996 was by the rapid growth of NGOs. ACCOr(UIllg to a report of the Ministry of Justice, 559 nongovernmental orR;anltZatious were reglste:red in Kazakhstan during the from September 1991 to December 1995. a year later of January 9, 1997), nongovernorg.ani:zatious had been in Kazakhstrut. to BakhytBelctw'!!1ll10va. S!)Cl()lOll;lSt"co'usIHtant of the J::,Cc~!Oglcal Kaza~J1s1:an, this quantity orgamean that of them will "survive,"z nizations does not I'..1""nnr."ht org~anizatiolllS in the CAU, despite their recent face serious difficulties of which financial sustainability is the most common. Many of these see a government role their own go'vernntent, as the basis for but the realiti.es of go,vernmlenlts largely uusble to meet their own direct social obligations, much less subsidies to charity. Most members still function almost on a volunhave had basis. When dealing with the government, to overcome bureaucratic red tape, the registration process. Whatever the attitude with lower level bureaucrats in the of Justice and other organs genethe favorite response cannot expect a favorable audience. From 1992 to to establish a voluntary organization was "we have one of " Sometimes obstacles arose because the applicant was viewed as by underpaid a threat, but more often these obstacles were put ill officials who wanted to supplement their income. Clear progress has been process the region, in Kazakhachieved in the The process is increasingly a nlinisstan and

an

The Legal Regulation ofNGOs

37

terial function" as it should be. Still, certain public interest advocacy organizations-such as the Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan and human rights organizations in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan-do have a serious struggle when it comes to registration. The contributions made by NGOs to the development of a civil society in the CAU are of critical importance. Nonprofits substitute for the decreasing role of government in all areas ofine by providing direct services. Many of the former mechanisms for providing social welfare to the population have been limited or abolished and the government is currently unable to meet the needs of the people. The role of nonprofit organizations is increasing in protecting the interests of women and children and of disabled, retired, homeless, and other needy people. NGOs have been able to fill many of the gaps that have resulted from the lessening of government involvement Nonprofit organizations have strengthened their influence in other areas as well, and they currently contribute in varying degrees to defending human rights, protecting the environment, educating youth, and promoting culture and the arts.

The Special Role of Human Rights Organizations Among this group. the human rights organizations merit special attention and support, since without them their effectiveness will be impaired and they will be vulnerable. According to the U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996, effective human rights advocacy organizations have been created throughout this region.3 In Kazakhstan, Helsinki Watch, the Kazakhstan-American Human Rights Association" and Legal Development of Kazakhstan are the most active of a small number of local human rights organizations. They cooperate on human rights and legal reform issues. Although in 1996 these groups operated largely without government interference, limited fmancial means hampered their ability to monitor and report human rights violations, and 1997 saw a clear deterioration in their working conditions and more menacing human rights violations. Some human rights observers complained that the government monitored their movements and telephone calls. A presidential commission on human rights was established in Kazakhstan in 1993. In February 1996, the Prosecutor General's Office established a Department for Supervising the Protection of Human and Civil Rights.4 However. in the beginning of 1997, this department was liquidated. In Kyrgyzstan" a number of human rights groups operate without governmental restriction" investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally responsive and sensitive to their views. S The country has faced serious human rights issues in the press area.

38

S. HQrton and A. Kazakina

particularly in connection with its criminal libel laws, which have been employed as a device to try to silence dissent Kyrgyzstan differs from its neighbors in that outcries over human rights abuses almost always seem to provoke a favorable government response mitigating the alleged abuse, even though sometimes many months pass in the process. In Uzbekistan, the government generally disapproves of the involvement of domestic nongovernmental organizations in human rights issues and restricts their operations. The Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU). an opposition-linked group formed in 1992, has been the chief independent domestic source of information on human rights abuses in Uzbekistan. In the past, it was denied registration, and its activities were subject to prolonged harassment, including physical violence. A governmental human rights commission, headed by a parliamentary ombudsman, was founded in 1995. It responds to complaints from citizens but has insufficiently trained staff to carry out in-depth investigations of human rights violations and does not vigorously pursue allegations against the police and security forces. The Uzbekistan government's response to human rights criticism has shifted over time as its strategy has fluctuated from denial to confrontation to co-option. President Karimov's call for journalistic responsibility, his tenuous support of the publication Hiiriyet, and the subsequent repression of that publication--these events offer an interesting study in the latent contradictions of this policy. There is certainly nothing objectionable about the government's formation of its own human rights organizations, but even in modem democratic societies such devices have often proved of only marginal effectiveness when compared with the work ofNGOs. It is therefore lamentable that the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent chose to validate the Uzbek response by providing financial support to the government's human rights operations in 1997.

Legal Framework for Nonprofit Organizations The legal infrastructure for nonprofit organizations in the CAU rests on the following sources: constitutions of the CAU states/ which guarantee the citizen's right to associate freely and to do so without government interference; civil codes which establish basic civil-law institutions and create two major categories of legal entities: commercial and noncommercial organizations; laws governing public associations; and ancillary legislative acts. As the purpose of this report is to provide a general overview of trends in the region, we will focus on the common elements of the systems in these states. As noted at the outset, each of the CAU republics are currently working on draft legislation regulating the activities of nonprofit organizations.

The Legal Regulation of NGDs

39

Kyrgyzstan. The original law of the Kyrgyz Republic "On Public Associations" was adopted on February 1, 1991 (hereinafter, the "Kyrgyz Associations Law") and the Civil Code (First Part) was adopted on May 8, 1996. The level of NGO involvement in the development of the new Kyrgyz law is quite impressive; indeed, it may be the only genuinely successful case of effective legislative lobbying by domestic NGOs in the region. Among the local NGOs participating in the process are the Foundation for International Legal Cooperation ("UKUK Foundation"), International Center Interbilim, the Fund for Legal Initiatives, the Fund for Legal Problems, and the Kyrgyz Bar Association. Currently, three draft Jaws governing nonprofit organizations exist in Kyrgyzstan. These drafts were submitted to the Jogorku Kenesh (the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic), following compliance review by the Ministry of Justice. However, the Legislative Assembly of the Parliament decided not to consider the three drafts on the same issue. Instead, the assembly authorized a prominent Uzbek deputy, Mr. Sabirov, to apply to the President's Consultative Council on Legal Reforms asking the council to develop a structure (conception) of the NGO legislation which would simplify the task. Sabirov has been a vocal supporter of the NGO effort, as has the Uzbek community based in southern Kyrgyzstan, which views NGOs as an important vehicle for promoting and protecting their cultural identity and values. UKUK Foundation (which recently merged with the Kyrgyz Bar Association) has taken the initiative to draft the Jaw governing charitable activities and organizations, and leadership in the process is being exercised by Mirgul Smanalieva, the president-elect of the bar association. In addition, a law on political parties was considered by the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan in January 1998. Both the laws on political parties and those on nonprofit organizations were expected to be adopted before 1999,7 and President Akayev has noted their importance in light of the country's upcoming local elections. Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan presents an interesting study in contradictions. The country has generally enjoyed a quite favorable reputation in the West with respect to laying the foundations for a civil society, but a study of its NGO legislation and of the implementation of such legislation would suggest this reputation is undeserved. Although Kazakhstan adopted a new "On Public Associations" law (hereinafter, the "Kazakh Associations Law") on May 31, 1996-much later than other Central Asian republics-it contains several provisions which are similar to the provisions in other old post-Soviet public associations laws. Religious organizations are still regulated under the same law as public associations. The Civil Code ofK.azakhstan (First Part). was adopted on December 27, 1994. The other laws regulating nonprofit organizations in Kazakhstan include the Law on Labor Unions (1993) and the Law on Political Parties (1996). Lamentably, Kazakh law contains some very severe provisions

40

S. Horton and A. Kazakina

designed to chill NGO development, particularly article 337 of the Criminal Code, which provides stem penalties for participation in an unregistered public association. Neither of.Kazakbstan's CAU neighbors has such a provision. The law on political parties also contains a noteworthy provision prolubiting and punishing those who seek to fonn a political party on the basis of religious beliefs. Although Kazakhstan has a number of well-run and sophisticated NGOs which have attempted to influence the situation. it does not appear they have been terribly effective. In 1995, a draft law "On the Right to Associate" was prepared by Interlegal, a Moscow-based consultancy on philanthropic laws. The draft law "On the Right to Associate" was forwarded to Ms. Sevryukova, a deputy of the Parliament of Kazakhstan who made several revisions and unsuccessfully tried to submit it to the Parliament. A draft law on nonprofit organizations has been developed and submitted to the Parliament 8 Uzbeldst4n. A leading lawmaker in Tashkent accurately descnbes Uzbekistan's attitude toward NOOs as "accepting, but cautious. " The law on its face is not bad, but its application has been uneven. The current law "On Public Associations" was adopted on February 15, 1991, as amended on July 3, 1992 (hereinafter, the "Uzbek Associations Law"), and the Civil Code (First Part) was adopted on December 21, 1995. A progressive step was made in 1996 when the new law "On Political Parties" was adopted. Religious organizations are now regulated by a separate law. "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations," adopted by the Parliament of Uzbekistan on May I, 1998. This law is directed at the Wahhabis. In Central Asian parlance, the term wahhabi is not used to refer to the Islamic sect by that name of the Arabian peninsula, but rather to any devout Muslim who rejects the state control of Islam through the official muftiate and state-controlled mosques. The Uzbek government perceives Wahhabis as the primary threat to state stability. According to a report issued by Human Rights Watch, the 1997-98 crackdown in the Fergana Valley appears to be a dramatic escalation of a sporadic six-year government campaign against free expression of religion, specifically nongovernmental Islam,S' The new law requires that all religious groups be registered with the Uzbek government and have at least 100 members (not just ten, as before). The law bans political parties based on religion and does not permit minors to take part in religious organizations and missionary activities. In addition, the new law permits the imposition of restrictions on religious organizations for national security reasons and for the protection of the life, health, and freedoms of other people. These restrictions must be viewed as substantive rather than procedural when considered in the overall context of the anti-Wahhabi campaign. While Uzbek NOO legislation is similar to NGO legislation in the other CAU republics, the NOO sector in Uzbekistan experiences more restrictive

The Legal Regulation ofNOOs

41

regulation by the government. The NGO sector cannot playa significant role in discussing draft NGO legislatio~ and there appears to be no adequate channel for domestic NGOs to present their concerns about such legislation. Foreign NGOs are, however, able to present their concerns and frequently get a friendly ear from officials in the Cabinet of Ministers. At the end of 1996, a draft NGO law was developed by a joint drafting group established by the UNDP with the assistance of an ICNL consultant, Jacek Kurczewski. The draft group included deputies of the Oli Majlis (the parliament of Uzbekistan), government officials, and NGO representatives. The Ministry of Social Maintenance chaired the work of the joint drafting group. However, the work on the draft law ceased in the spring of 1997. 11} The parliamentary working group now addressing the issue has identified the ICNL draft and a draft developed by OTZ as models likely to influence their forthcoming legislation.

Analysis of Public Associations laws-Positive Aspects The right to form associations in the CAU is regulated by the laws on public associations (collectively, the "Public Associations Laws"). Adoption of these laws has represented progress for the hundreds of public associations in the CAU: public associations now enjoy a level oflegal protection which they did not previously have. As a point of departure, the Public Associations Laws show the obvious influence of the Soviet Law on Public Associations of October 19, 1991, part of the progressive legacy of the Oorbachev period. 1l First and foremost, the Public Associations Laws assert that normative concepts in international agreements ratified by the CAU republics supersede domestic law in the event of conflict IZ This principle establishes an international safeguard against human rights abuses. Among CAU nations, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have ratified the major international human rights charters, including the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (each of December 16, 1966), whereas Kazakhstan has ratified only the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). The Public Associations Laws provide a detailed list of permitted activities for public associations, including: protection of civil, political, economic. social, and cultural rights and freedoms of citizens; • promotion of peace and prevention of conflicts; promotion of the moral and physical health of the population; • protection of the environment and animals; and • protection and maintenance of buildings and other objects ofhlstorical and cultural value.

42

S. Horton and A. Kazakina This list is not exhaustive. It contains a catch-all provision ''for other types

of activities not restricted or prohibited by law." For the first time the Public Associations Laws give the people the right to fonn any lcind of social organizations "except those that are prolubited:' For instance, the Public Associations Laws provide that the creation and work of public associations whose purpose is the violent overthrow or alteration of the constitutional structure, violation of the integrity of state territory, propaganda for war, violence or brutality, inflam.mation of social, national, or religious dissension or other criminally punishable acts, are forbidden. The creation of public militarized associations and armed formations is also prohibited. Therefore, the basic premise of the Public Associations Laws is that every type of association is permitted except those which are expressly and statutorily prolubited. Among the positive aspects of the Public Associations Laws is a provision according to which a citizen's participation in the activities of a registered public association may not serve as a basis for restricting hisJher rights, as a condition for employment in a state organization, or as a justification for the state to grant other privileges or advantages. Under the Public Associations Laws the right of public associations to judicial protection is guaranteed. A refusal to register the charter of a proposed public association may be appealed in each CAU republic's general jurisdiction COurt.13 We have no meaningful record of successful appeals at this point, however. Public Associations Laws provide the main principles of public associations' activities, such as voluntarism, equality of members, self-government, legality, and publicity.14 The Public Associations Laws also provide that foreign citizens can be members of public associations along with local citizens.

Shortcomings of the Public Associations laws The Public Associations Laws have some serious shortcomings which, taken collectively, may be viewed as impairing freedom of association in these countries. One of the most serious shortcomings is the concept of "prior approval"the necessity of prior registration and approvaJ of the charter of a public association or the public association itself(as in the case ofK.azakhstan) with the government. IS This concept opens the door for significant restrictions on the freedom of those associations that the government deems undesirable and for the persecution of start-up organizations. Pursuant to the Public Associations Laws, all public associations must register with the government. The founders of public associations convene a constitutional congress (conference) or general meeting at which the charter is adopted and officers are elected. Following such

The Legal Regulation ofNOOs

43

a conference, public associations must file all of their organizational documents including a list of founding members with the Ministry of Justice. The Public Associations Laws stipulate that if a public association does not adopt a charter or the charter is not registered, the public association cannot legally exist If a public association operates without registration, the Public Associations Laws provide for criminal (in Kazakhstan) or administrative and civil liability (in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) pursuant to the legislation of the CAU. 16 In addition to a complicated procedure involving the collection of various documents for registration, the Ministry of Justice, or, at its request, some other governmental departments, thoroughly review the purposes of the activities listed in the charter of a public association, especially if it is intended to be political in nature. The Ministry of Justice and its local departments often drag out the process of registration or use various bureaucratic methods to add new conditions to registration. According to an important Kazakh NGO, the Association for the Protection of the Rights of Prisoners and the Rights of Persons Released from Prison has not been able to register for more than one and a half years. Its organizers have presented different charters 'to the authorities, but because of the intractability of the Ministry of Internal Affairs they were not able to obtain permission to register their organization, even though they obtained statements of support from the Commission on Human Rights. This association was even forced to change its name to the Center Facilitating Criminal Justice Reform. Finally, at the end of 1996 the center was registered. This case demonstrates that applicants seeking to create an association with a mission critical to the government can be required to endure more scrutiny than the law on its face warrants and that there is a clearly subjective and political element to the registration process. Uzbekistan has been generous in permitting registration ofNGOs except when it views the conduct of such NGOs as hostile and political. The registration ordeal of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan is a useful example of the practice. Since 1992, the government has repeatedly frustrated the efforts of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, a local human. rights group with close ties to exiled opposition figures. to register officially. In the fall of 1996, President Islam Karimov invited the society's chairman, Abdummanob Polat, to visit the country after three and one-half years of exile. However. the Ministry of Justice rejected the society's application in January 1997, citing a number of technical problems in the submitted documentation, and a duly revised application met a final rejection in July 1997. The government, however, granted registration to another human rights group, the Committee for Protection ofIndividual Rights, a group fonned with government support. 17

44

S. Horton and A. Kazakina

According to the State Department's human rights reports, all human rights public organizations have been able to register in Kyrgyzstan, with the excep~ tion of a Uighur organization whose stated goal is the creation of an independent Uighur state in northwest China. 18 This organization was seen as threatening the territorial integrity of China, an important neighbor. and its rejection was justified on that basis:The decision of the Kyrgyz authorities to reject registration did in fact comply with the requirements of Kyrgyz law, which precluded the registration of an organization with a charter like the one proposed. Nonpolitical associations and social organizations usually do not encounter comparable difficulties in registering, although bureaucratic delays and official suspiciousness continue to plague the registration process for such groups. It should be emphasized that registration is not just a bureaucratic formality. Subsequent to the registration of the charter of a public association, the public association is recognized as a corporate body. The corporate status, which is the primary goal of registering the association, is needed to establish a bank account, to be eligible for preferential tax treatment, and for various corporate housekeeping matters. The procedure for registration of public associations is not only complicated but also expensive. Many public associations consider a required registration fee as a deterrent to registration. For instance, the registration fee in Kazakhstan is about 10,000 tenge (about US$150. or one and a halftimes the average monthly wage in Kazakhstan). The payment of snch a registration fee creates a great problem for citizens of Kazakhstan who want to form an association. The other serious shortcoming of the Public Associations Laws is their tendency to justifY inappropriate state intervention into the activities ofNGOs. Although each of the Public Associations Laws contains precatory language stating that the interference of state agencies in the activities of public associations is not permitted, the laws contemplate a number of ways in which the state can in fact interfere in the activities of public associations, and not all of these roles are consistent with the state's legitimate regulatory authority. For example, according to the Public Associations Laws, the charter of a public association should set forth not only the name and purpose of the association, its structure and its sources of funding, but also the conditions and procedures for admission to membership in the association and withdrawal from it, the rights and responsibilities of the members of the assocultion, and the competence of procedure for establishing the management. I9 Consequently, the Public Associations Laws require excessive mandatory details for inclusion in the charter of a public association. We believe that the state has a legitimate interest in identifying founders, officers. and directors, and in insuring fair standards for the process of including members, but some of these provisions seem to exceed these needs. In

The Legal Regulation ofNGOs

45

practice, these provisions appear som.etimes to be drawn upon to gain infonnation about members and to chill or complicate the process of attracting members-clearly inappropriate conduct for a state regulator. The requirement of the Public Associations Laws on the number of individuals needed to constitute a public association represents another display of interference of state agencies in the activity of public associations. The Public Associations Laws require that public associations be created on the initiative of no less than ten individuals. Furthermore, under the Public Associations Laws, foreigners are not generally allowed to be founders of public associations. 20 An exception is the somewhat more liberal Kyrgyz Associations Law. It requires that the number of founders be not less than ten individuals, but it permits foreigners to be founders of public associations along with citizens of Kyrgyzstan. As a matter of practice, foreigners in other countries appear to be allowed to be founders of public associations, but not to be founders of political parties and trade unions. The membership threshold in all Central Asia countries, however, seems unreasonably high and seems designed to force disclosure of a larger list of names than otherwise would be appropriate. Another set of provisions which may cloak or authorize inappropriate intervention by state agencies is found under the rubric of "control and supervision of public associations." Under the Public Associations Laws, the state authority which registers the charter of a public association exercises supervision of compliance with the provisions of the charter with respect to the activities of public associations. This is far more sweeping than merely monitoring compliance with regulations or positive law; it creates an opportunity for government bureaucrats to substitute their judgment for that of the NGOs' governing structures with respect to the entity's program of action. Furthermore, the organs of the procuracy (prokuratura) are authorized to conduct investigations at their own initiative to ascertain whether activities of public associations comply with the laws of the CAU.21 In theory, this means that procurators can interview staff and officers, seize and inspect records and take other potentially disruptive steps without notice or a subpoena or writ issued by a judge or magistrate. In both cases, the sweeping supervisory authority given government officers is inappropriate. It derives from socialist legal norms applied with respect to state property. The registering authority has the right to require management of a p~blic association to submit copies of decisions adopted, send its representatives to participate in activities conducted by the public association, and obtain explanations from members of the public associations and other citizens on questions relating to charter compliance. While there is a legitimate sense of public trust with respect to some NGO assets, it certainly does not rise to the highly paternalistic level envisioned in the Public Associations Laws. In enacting the Civil Code and Companies Laws throughout the region, these extra-

46

S, Horton and A. Kazakina

.....""l1m.,." powers of the procuracy and the branch ministries have cue;""",'.. , A is also appropriate with to NGOs. These Ylf'f'.vt"!lor'" taken the state ample authority to suppress and intimidate NGOs which come into their cross hairs. Nor are the fears identified in the foregoing paragraph purely academic, There is ample in the CAU of abuse of these provisions by state actors. ,,"',rel',na to a of the Kazakhstan-American Bureau on Human and the Rule of ofKazaknstan, the Association of Independent Trade Unions was sut~Jectea un~~xrlecltealY to a fmaneial audit by the local procurator and the local department of the Committee on National Security, even though these state bodies have no cOlmection with the tax 111s
The

47

Nonprofit Organizations under the Ovil

zations are \11v'IU"'",", n:mem~JST, as or~:an:iza1tiolls which exist fo.r purposes other than ,....,,,',,,n,n a fmm commercial op,eratlo.ns. also have the common teatures: income that is gellerate:d can be used only to. further the nonprofit's statutOJry goals. from any activities cannot be distributed among the P~1~,~~~coftheo.~,amunlon.

that they either "unite the and are formed as a result of citizens' V
48

S. Horton and A. Kazakina

Kazakhstan provides for the detailed regulation of religious organizations in a generally disconraging fashion. It states that religious administrations (or centers) shall have the right in accordance with their registered charters to found theological institutions, mosques. monasteries, and other religious associations acting on the basis of their charters. The creation of theological religious associations and institutions and the missionary activity of foreign citizens and stateless persons shall be permitted only after their accreditation in local agencies of power and on conditions of the conformity thereof to legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The Civil Code of Kyrgyzstan permits religious associations to receive financial and other material assistance from foreign religious centers and international missionary and philanthropic societies and foundations, unless the use thereof is contrary to other legislation. "Public foundation"17 is defined as a nonp:ofit organization without members which is founded by individnal citizens and/or legal entities on the basis of voluntary financial and property donations which are directed toward social, charitable, educational, or other socially beneficial goals. A foundation must publish a report annually about the "use of its resources."28 Civil Codes of the CAU remain silent with respect to the governing organs of public foundations, as well as the procedures for their formation and activity. The Civil Codes state that these questions shall be determined by the foundation's charter approved by its founders. A "nonprofit association oflegal entities" is a union of commercial organizations for the purpose of coordinating business activities and representing commercial interests. While the members of such an association retain complete legal independence, they may act in concert for specified purposes. A number of trade and business associations have been registered in the CAU in recent years under this rubric.29 "Consumer cooperatives" are voluntary associations of citizens based on membership for the purpose of satisfYing their material and other needs by means of combining the property share contributions of the members thereof.30 Under the CAU Civil Codes. the charter of a consumer cooperative must contain, besides the regular information specified in constitutive documents of legal entities, conditions concerning the amount of shares issued to members of the cooperative; the composition and procedure for the issuance of shares to members of the cooperative and their responsibility for a violation of the obligation relating to the contributing of the share; and the composition and competence of the management organs of the consumer cooperative and the procedure for collective decision-making. Note that the Civil Code of Kazakhstan (art. !OS) provides that rural consumer cooperatives may be created for the satisfaction of material and other requirements not only of their members, but also of other citizens residing in the rural locality. The Civil Code states that the legal regime

The Legal Regulation ofNGOs

49

of a rural consumer cooperative shall be determined in accordance with the legislation of Kazakhstan. It is important to note that the CAU Civil Codes do not restrict nonprofit organizations to these forms. The codes seem to contemplate the issuance of further general NGO legislation wbic~ may create additional vehicles.

Business Activity by Nonprofit Organizations For exempt organizations in the West, "related" commercial activity has emerged as an increasingly important source of revenue in the past two decades. The right ofNGOs to engage in activity with a commercial aspect is therefore important to their long-term viability. In general, under the Public Associations Laws and the CAU Civil Codes, a nonprofit organization has the right to carry out business activity only insofar as such activity furthers the purposes for which the nonprofit organization was created and corresponds to such purposes. The Civil Codes emphasize that (1) generation of profit may not be the primary purpose of a nonprofit organization, (2) its business activities must serve the purposes for which the organization was created.31 Therefore, prior to starting business activities, it is necessary for any nonprofit organization to verify whether such business activities correspond to its charter purposes. Kyrgyz Associations Law and Uzbek Associations Law provide that public associations may engage in business activities through commercial entities (selffinanced business organizations and enterprisesV1 However, it is not very clear from the language of these articles whether it is an option or a requirement for public associations to establish commercial entities to engage in business activities. In both countries, NGOs have in fact followed the accepted Western practice of creating commercial subsidiaries to carry on for-profit businesses. The Civil Codes lack provisions regulating the commercial activities of certain types of nonprofit organizations, such as charitable organizations. This is widely recognized as an oversight which requires redress. It is expected that these issues will be regulated by the new laws governing the nonprofit sector we described at the outset of this piece. Providing clear guidelines for charitable activity is as much in the interest ofNGOs as of the state, since the reputation of the NGO community in this region presently suffers from widely circulated stories surrounding dubious charitable organizations which appear to exist only for purposes of evading tax liability.

Property Rights of Nonprofit Organizations A registered nonprofit organization has the right of exclusive ownership and management of its own property. Nonprofit organizations must have an

50

S. Horton and A. Kazakina

independent statement of accounts and generally have the right to maintain bank accounts both in the country and offshore (except in the case of Uzbekistan). The Civil Codes do not include any special restrictions on the nonprofit's property. The property may include, inter alia, buildings, facilities, equipment, appliances, and monetary funds in local and foreign currency. These provisions are significant because they may be understood to supersede some of the overw sight vested in the procuracy under the Public Associations Laws. Nonprofits are eligible to receive contributions from founders and monetary or inwkind contributions (e.g., donations from the business community and local government, revenues from business activity, and foreign grants). In Uzbekistan, however, account transfer rules may burden and complicate this right Understandably, the solicitation of funds is subject to some oversight and accounting. The CAU Public Associations Laws and Civil Codes contain provisions that prohibit political parties, public associations, and public foundations with political aims from accepting funds from foreign legal entities and foreign citizens, as well as from foreign states and international organizations.33 Conceptually such restrictions are easy to justifY with respect to actual participants in the electoral process. We wonder, however, how ''political aims" may be construed in the region, where ''politics'' is taken to subsume many policy issues which have nothing to do with elective offices and institutions. We expect to see further refmement of the law governing solicitation in coming years, probably including registration, monitoring. and periodic reporting functions. Please note that unlike other forms of nonprofit organizations, institutions do not own property, but rather only manage property. Ownership rights are retained by the institution's founders, in many cases state entities. While the majority of institutions belong to the government or municipalities, it is possible for an individual or non-governmental organization (e.g., public or religious organizations) to be the founder of an institution. During the last several years, a number of nongovernmental educational institutions (schools and universities) have been established. The liability of a nonprofit organization is generally limited to its property. Participants (members) in nonprofit organizations (excluding such forms of nonprofit entities as institutions and associations or unions) are not liable for the obligations of nonprofit organizations and nonprofit organizations are not liable for the obligations of their participants (members). An exception to this general rule of limited liability, however, arises with respect to nonprofit organizations defmed as institutions and associations of legal entities. Institutions and associa· tions have secondary liability for debts of the nonprofit organizations. Such secondary liability arises only when the primary obligor, the nonprofit organization, cannot satisfy a debt or judgment. Further exceptions may arise with respect to certain types of tax and payroll obligations, as to which individuals in

The Legal Regulation ofNGOs

51

control may face personal liability in case they fail to oversee the performance by the NGO of its legal obligations. Upon the liquidation of a nonprofit organization, any remaining assets must be used for the purposes indicated in the nonprofit foundation's documents for the nonprofit's charitable goals-:-a rule akin to the Anglo-American legal doctrine of cy pres. Such distribution of assets for nonprofit organizations contrasts with the liquidation of the assets of commercial entities, which are distributed among the entities' founders. Consumer cooperatives and institutions, however, are exceptions to this general rule; the property of an institution remaining after the satisfaction of the creditors' claims shall be transferred to the institutional founders (except the property acquired by the institution itself, e.g., grants or profits received as a result of the permitted business activity). In the case of consumer cooperatives, the member has the right to receive the property of the cooperative in proportion to his/her share contribution. Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations

As noted above, the tax treatment ofNGOs remains unclear throughout this region, and a major push to produce fair and easily comprehensible rules governing the funding and activities of NOOs is now underway. Like all legal entities, nonprofit organizations are subject to tax inspection and must register with the State Tax Service. While many nations' tax laws distinguish between the commercial and nonprofit sectors, tax legislation in the CAU generally lacks separate laws regarding nonprofits and fails to ensure fundamental tax advantages to nonprofit organizations or to individual and institutional donors. Tax benefits have to date been granted on and ad hoc basis to NGO actors. Thus far, foreign grant-making organizations and foreign entities engaged in development assistance activities have been the quickest to seize such ad hoc benefits, and instances of domestic organizations securing benefits are far less frequent. Under tax legislation in the CAU, nonprofit organizations would appear to have to meet the following criteria to qualify for tax benefits: 1. An entity should be registered as a political party, mass movement, trade union, professional association, or religious, amateur sport, or other similar noncommercial entity. 2. A charter of the non-conunercial entity should contain a provision pursuant to which profits and assets cannot be distributed among its founders and members. 3. The activities of a non-commercial entity should be consistent with its charter PUtpOseB.:14 It is noteworthy that to date, the CAU authorities seem determined to approach tax benefits on the basis of personal statute-that is the status or char-

52

S. Horton and A. Kazakilla

acter of the enl:ltv-:ratliler does not seem wen conterrlPOI'ary NGO in which mr-tJrlJnt "ff1Tnm1'a.ltmeans of sut)SI(:hzmg seem somehow out of alignment with the newer Civil Codes provisions reguthe nonprofit sector. The Civil Codes provide for several additional forms of nonprofit institutions, foundations, associations of legal , added tax Ii levy the increase in value created in the process of manufacture and turnover of goods, works, or services. The rate of V AT in the CAU is 20 percent on aU and services Uzbekistan, the VAT is 10 n'>"(, P11t on certain foodstuffs and children's from the tax are available for services rendered by and educational org;anJizatl0l.1b,>,31 As a matter, NGOs have had exe~ffii:ltion. VAT is assessed at the of and vendors are unwilling to entertain about since are held accountable to the tax service under trust-like In pracfor a VAT refund. However, entities thmughtice, NGDs would have to too wen that the way to a tax audit know is to a refund, Properly Tax. The tax is based on aU assets reflected on an I"nirp ....w;c .. balance including fIXed and assets. Under Kazakh and Uzbek tax legislations, nonprofit organizations pay property tax only on property used in business activities, The tax is imposed at the rate of Yz of the value of the property in Kazakhstan and at the rate of 4 in Uzbekistan. 3s

The Legal Regulation ofNGOs

53

Tax Benefits to Companies and Individuals Making Donations to Nonprofits Tax legislation in the CAU generally provides a basis for a claim of deduction or credit against the taxable income of commercial entities and/or individuals on account of qualifying charitable contributions. Please note that Kyrgyz tax legislation extends this tax benefit only to individuals. By contrast, pursuant to Uzbek tax legislation, this tax benefit is applicable only to legal entities. Under Kazakh tax legislation, both legal entities and individuals are entitled to the above-mentioned tax benefit The total amount of contributions which can be deducted from the taxable income of commercial entities and individuals, however, should not exceed 2 percent of taxable income (in Uzbekistan 1 percent), and even these contributions must be given to specific nonprofit organizations for specific purposes (e.g., donations to charitable and ccologica.l organizations, public associations for the disabled, and religious organizations).39 For example, if a commercial entity in Kazakhstan bas taxable income of$10,OOO and makes a charitable contribution oUI,OOO, the company may deduct only $200 from its taxable income. These provisions are fairly new and the local tax authorities have developed sporadic enforcement standards and frequently seem skeptical about claims of charitable contributions. Contributions cannot be carried forward and tax deductions cannot be deferred to a subsequent year. Unlike most Western countries, the tax system of the CAU does not allow a carryover of any contributions, so that a tax deduction may not be deferred to a subsequent year (the same solution is taken by the tax legislation of the Russian Federation).4Q As applied in Kyrgyzstan, the system bas been even more drastic, with local tax inspectorates claiming that quarterly accounting without carry forward is required. In the United States, for instance, while a corporation is limited to charitable contributions of 10 percent of its taxable income, any contnbutions ineligible in a given year for deduction may be carried forward for up to five succeeding years, subject to certain limitations. While these corporate benefits are better than none, they are unlikely to stimulate more corporate giving. Few domestic commercial entities now claim charitable donatious because declaration of such contrIbutions only draws attention to their income and potentially subjects them to greater tax scrutiny. Grants Received by Nonprofit Organizations. Kyrgyz and Uzbek tax legislation lacks provisions governing domestic and foreign grants to nonprofit organizations. According to Kazakb tax legislation, no profit tax shall be levied on grants to nonprofit organizations.'" Kazakh tax legislation explicitly provides that grants received for charitable purposes and utilized for purposes other than

54

S. Horton and A. Kazakina

to taxation. In received from charities for their charitable purposes are i"xp'm.."t.~ri from profit tax. In the Cabinet of Ministers has are exempt, infomlal clarification to the effect that foreign-source at least pending more formal law-making on the lOU"J""", Conclusion and Recommendations

orgamz:abons in the their in the since face serious obstacles in Central Asia. We should re{;kon with the likelihood that a substantial number of local NGOs will fail fonowing donor assistance. Efforts in the interinl should be the withdrawal "''''''''.'''n"" a basis for sm;talnalnUty will play an important role in this process. The CAU nOj.JUVJ",-,,,, have taken some important toward a which nrtun."t,. the sector. much more needs to be done. Comand reJiOf!l;anlzatlolls need to be adopted in the immediate future. Although such must foHow in the of the Civil Codes, further guidance is needed with to the and reorganization their amnolmy to engage in commercial activities 'Wtl'fH)'l1' J';v~..:u,..u.IU14 status, and the tax treatment of nonprofits. Since current tax fails to encourage charitable giving, it is important to further enhance incentives for individual and corpowill not be taxed. It is as well as provide that also to provide for fundamental tax advantages for nonprofit zations and to ensure that bona fide receive the benefits of tax ex~:ml)tlll!ns. to Public Associations Laws, taken as a group, we recomWith elirninatulg the and of the mend: charter of a association note as the approach taken the Russian Federation, whose law "On Public Associations" eliminated the prior which for requirement), and state into activities of public
The Legal Regulation ofNGOs

55

Notes 1. Authors' telephone interview with Mirgul Smanalieva, Chainnan of the International Legal Cooperation Committee of the Kyrgyz Bar Association on March 18, 1998. 2. B. Bekturganova, Nongovernmental Organizations in the Republic ofKazakhstan. (Ecological information Agency, Almaty, 1997), p. 15. 3. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 1996 (1997).

4. [bid., p. 997. 5. [bid., p. 1004. 6. Constitution ofthe Kyrgyz Republic adopted on May 5, 1993, art 16; Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, adopted on Dec. 8, 1992, art. 58; Constitution of the Republic ofKazaldtstan adopted on Aug. 30, 1995, art. 23. 7. International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Current Legislation ofKyrgyzstan Governing Not-for-Profit Sector (1996). 8. International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Current Legislation. of Kazakhstan Governing Not-for-Profit Sector (Washington, D.C., 1996). 9. Human Rights Watch, Republic of Uzbekistan, Crackdown inlhe Farghona Valley; Arbitrary Arrests ami Religious Discrimination, Vol 10, No.4 (l998). to. International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Current Legislation of Uzbekistan Governing Not-for-Profit Sector (Wasbington, D.C., 1996). 11. See S. Horton, A. Kazakina and E. Ametistov, Between Ruler and Ruled: Freedom ofAssociation in the Russian Federation, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (1994), for a description of this law and its innovations. 12. The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic ''On Public Associations," adopted on Feb. 1, 1991, art 29 [hereinafter the "Kyrgyz Associations Law'1; the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan "On Public Associations," adopted on Feb. 15,1991, as amended, art 25 [hereinafter the "Uzbek Associations Law'1; the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On Public Associations," adopted on may 31, 1996, art. 3 [hereinafter the "KazaIdt Associations Law"]. 13. Kyrgyz Associations Law, art. 12; Uzbek AssOciations Law, art. 12; KazaIdt Associations Law art. 16. 14. Kyrgyz Associations Law, art. 4; Uzbek Associations Law, art. 4; Kazakh Associations Law art. 6. 15. The Russian Federation is the only country of the former Soviet Union whose law ''On Public Associations" (May 25, 1995) specifically addresses the issue ofregistration by stating that associations have the right to exist and conduct their activities without registration (art. 3). Therefore, the Law on Public Associations explicitly affirms the right of unregistered public associations to exist, as well as registered public associations. 16. Uzbek Associations Law, art. 21; Kyrgyz Associations Law, art. 22; and Kazakh Associations Law, art. 5. 17. Memorandum from Acacia Shields, Human Rights Watch, to Scott Horton, re: Freedom ofAssociations Concern in Central Asia (Mar. 4, 1998). 18. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996, p. 1003 (1997), 19. Kyrgyz Associations Law, art 10; Kazakh Associations Law, art. 12; Uzbek Associations Law, art. 10. 20. KazaIdt Associations Law, art. 10; Kyrgyz Associations Law, art. 8; Uzbek

56

S. Horton and A. KazakilUl

Associations Law, art. 8. 21. Uzbek Associations Law. art. 20; Kyrgyz Associations Law, art. 21. 22. Report of the Kazakhstan-American Bureau on Human Rights and the Rule of Law, The Human Rights Situation in Kazakhstan, January-October 1996, at 1.4 (1996). 23. Kazakh Associations Laws, art. 23; Kyrgyz Associations Law, art. 23. 24. Kyrgyz Associations Law, art. 24; and Kazakh Associations Law, art. 23. 25. Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, adopted on Dec. 27,1994, as amended, art. 105 [hereinafter the "Kazakh Civil Code"]; Civil Code of Uzbekistan, adopted on Dec. 21,1995, as amended, art. 76 [hereinafter the "Uzbek Civil Code'; Civil Code of Kyrgyzstan, adopted on May 8,1996, as amended, art. 163 [hereinafter the "Kyrgyz Civil Code',. 26. Kazakh Civil Code, art. 106; Uzbek Civil Code, art. 74; Kyrgyz Civil Code, art. 161.

... 27. Although the Kyrgyz Associations Law and Uzbek Associations Law mention a "foundation" as the form of a public association along with trade unions, political parties, etc., the later adopted Civil Codes of these countries consider a foundation as a separate form of a noncommercial entity. 28. Kazakh Civil Code, art. 162; Kyrgyz Civil Code. art. 162. 29. Kazakh Civil Code, art. 110; Kyrgyz Civil Code, art. 85; Uzbek Civil Code, art. 77. 30. KazaIcb Civil Code, art. 160; Kyrgyz Civil Code, art. 160; Uzbek Civil Code, art. 73. 31. Kazakh Civil Code, art. 34; Kyrgyz Civil Code, art. 85; Kyrgyz Civil Code, art. 85; Uzbek Civil Code, art. 40. 32. Kyrgyz Associations Law, art. 18; Uzbek Associations Law, art. 17. 33. Uzbek Associations Law, art. 18; Kyrgyz Associations Law, art. 17; Kyrgyz Civil Code, art. 16; KazaIcb Civil Code, arts. 106,107. 34. State Tax Service of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Instruction No. 37, adopted on June 26, 1995, as amended; Tax Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, adopted on Apr. 24,1997, as amended, arts. 28, 3J[hereinafter, the "Uzbek Tax Code'; Tax Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, adopted on Apr. 15, 1996, as amended, art. 9, ct. 27 [hereinafter, the "Kyrgyz Tax Code'135. Decree of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On Taxes and Other Compulsory Payments to the Budget (Tax Code)," adopted on Apr 24,1995, as amended, art. 30 [hereinafter, the "Kazakb Tax: Code"]; Uzbek Tax Code, art. 31; Kyrgyz Tax Code, arts. 106, 112. 36. Kyrgyz Tax Code, art. 119; Uzbek Tax Code, art. 73; Kazakb Tax Code, art. 66.

37. For instance, Kazakh tax legislation exempts from VAT services provided by nonprofit organizations if they are related to: (a) provision of medical treatment, (b) protection or welfare of children, the aged and disabled persons, (c) educational, cultural, physical training or sports services, and (d) the performance of religious rites and ceremonies by religious societies. Kazakh Tax Code, art. 6, cl. 1.5; Uzbek Tax Code, art. 92. 38. Kazakh Tax Code, art. 133; Uzbek Tax Code, art. 73. 39. Kazakh Tax Code, art. 34, cl. 6; Kyrgyz Tax Code, art. 88, cJ. 2; Uzbek Tax Code, art. 32. 40. Alia Kazakina and Mary Holland, "Tax and Legal Regime for Nonprofit Organizations," Eastern European Reporter, Issue 8 (Aug. 1997). 41. Kazakh Tax Code. art. 34, cl. 6.

Freedom of Association and the Question of Its Realization in Kazakhstan Evgeny A. Zhovtis Translated by Maria Kozhevnikova

K

azakhstan is a constitutional repUblic. According to the constitution ratified by the referendum of August 30, 1995, nearly all power in azakhstan is concentrated within the executive branch, specifically in the authority of the president The powers of the president as well as the activity of the government cannot be controlled by the society. The legislative and representative branches-the parliament and the local legislatures, or maslikhatsare deprived of any control functions. The Constitution of 1995 stipulates all the basic rights and freedoms of an individual. including freedom of religion, speech, press and mass media, movement and residence, peaceful assembly and association, etc. Along with these rigbts and freedoms, the constitution contains a number of clauses limiting individual rights and freedoms. These clauses concern the establishment and activities of voluntary organizations; the propagation of ideas leading to interethnic, social, racial, religious, clans and estate conflicts; and forceful efforts to change the constitutional order or infringe the territorial integrity and national security of the Republic of Kazakhstan.! Individual rights and freedoms are also limited in the clauses on social order and the observation of individual rights and freedoms of other peoples, constitutional order, and public morality. These limitations correspond with the norms and standards ofintemationallaw on the observation of human rights, but in Kazakhstan such standards are more open to interpretation and regulation by the executive power. Citizens have limited ability to appeal legislative acts which, in their opinion, contradict the individual rights and freedoms stipulated in the constitution, just as they are limited in their power to address grievances to a judicial system directly or indirectly controlled by the executive branch. The new constitution abolished the institution of the Constitutional Court and replaced it with a Constitutional Council, open to appeals only from the president, the prime minister, the chairmen of both houses of parliament (the Senate and the MajJis), and only one-fifth of parliament members. Generally speaking, citizens ofKazakbstan can exercise their right to freedom of speech, press, mass media, and religion only to a certain extent. Freedom of association is also limited to a certain degree--especially the right to 57

58

Evgeny Zhovtis

establish political parties, but also, significantly, the right to organize peaceful assemblies, meetings, demonstrations, processions, etc.2 In this article we will discuss the problem of realizing one of the fundamental freedoms-freedom of association-in K.azakbstan.

Historical Background to the Problem In order to present the political context in which citizens ofK.azakbstan must seek to realize their right to freedom of association, let us make a brief historical digre;ssion; The process of democratization in K.azakbstan has bad three stages. The first stage lasted from 1991, the year in which Kazakhstan became independent, until the end of 1994. During this period the post-comnnmist elite in Kazakhstan-the president of Kazakhstan is the former fIrSt secretary of the Communist Party ofKazakb.stan-.expressed its wish to enter the international community and present Kazakhstan as a country building a democratic state in the proCess of transition to a market economy. The former communist nomenklatura believed that the West would be consistent in its demands for democratization. observation of human rights, an open society, and reform of a political system in exchange for full membership in the world market and international trade. The economies of the post-Soviet republics were in a miserable state and they depended on the technical and financial assistance of the developed countries and international financial institutions. Between 1991 and 1994 there were signillcant developments in freedom of speech and media in Kazakhstan. A large number of relatively independent newspapers, magazines, and TV and radio stations appeared. This period was characterized by a certain permissiveness in regard to peaceful assembly, meetings, and demonstrations. The agenda of such meetings was often restoration of justice toward the participants in the December events of 1986, when a number of young Kazaks stood up against the imperial policies of Moscow . The participants, who bad been subjected to a number of punitive measures, organized several meetings in 1991-92 demanding democratization and political reform. At the same time a number of voluntary organizations, associations, and movements appeared, including the Public Zheltoksan Committee; the Almaty branch of the Memorial society; the Adilet (Justice) Society with an agenda of historical education; the Society for Protection of Rights of the Victims of Purges; the Helsinki Committee in Almaty; the Human Rights Democratic Committee; the International Human Rights Bureau in Almaty; Azat" a citizen movement which also bad characteristics of a political party; the interethnic movement Edinstvo (Unity); plus a number of ethnic cultural centers. Several political parties also appeared, some of them in opposition to the government:

Freedom ofAssociation in Kazakhstan

59

the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, the Communist Party of .Kazakhstan, the People's Congress ofK.azakhstan, the Social-Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, Azat (mentioned above), the Republican Party ofKazak:bstan, etc. The government approved several1aws on the realization of basic political rights and freedoms. Although those laws had all the features of authoritarian regulations, they still allowed for the creation of some institutions of civil society. The second stage began in late 1994, early 1995, when the Constitutional Court made the decision to dissolve the Supreme Soviet (the parliament) of Kazakhstan. This decision of the highest judicial body broke the evolutionary development of the political system in Kazakhstan and left the state and the people of the republic without legislative and representative power. Immediately after the so-called dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in March 1995, a referendum extended the president's powers until the year 2,000 (a move suggested by the administration of the new Assembly ofPeoptes of Kazakhstan). Another referendum on August 30, 1995, approved the new Constitution of Kazakhstan. What were the motives for these anti-democratic developments? On the one hand, by the beginning of 1995, the post-communist elite already felt comfortable in international politics. It became clear that Western countries, transnational corporations, and international financial institutions were mostly interested in satisfying their geopolitical, strategic, and economic interests in this territory. Thus, the superficial talk by Western governments about human rights and democracy did not necessarily result in any sanctions or pressure on the government of Kazakhstan in older to promote democratization in the country. The government simply had to be cautious and not allow open violation of political rights and civil freedotns-such as arrests of opposition leaders, breaking up of meetings and demonstrations, or bans on the opposition mass mediain order to avoid any significant problems in the world arena. Communist control mechanisms for public activities, the legal limitations of basic political rights and freedoms, and the work of national security and law-enforcement agencies assured the malleability and conformity of society, while the country still kept its image of a democratizing state. On the other hand, during the period 1991·95 a rotation of cadres took place in the top echelons of power, which led to replacement of some reform-oriented officials by hardliners with their orthodox management psychology and general unresponsiveness to problems of the society. This period ended in the beginning of 1997 when the continuous suppression of freedom of speech and mass media was followed by a TV and radio frequencies ''tender''-in effect, a demand by government that broadcasters purchase rights to use certain frequencies, but at prohibitively high prices. As a result of this tender the majority of independent media stations all over the republic ceased to exist. After the elections at the end of 1995. boycotted by the democratic opposition, the new two-house parliament

60

Zhavtis

was formed. The new constitution did not provide the with any meallS power and control over the executive branch. This parliament, as the institution in Kazakhstan, is loyal and to the executive power. Finally, the began to suppress peaceful assemmeetings, processions, demonstrations, etc., with mC,."""HlU determination. The of political stopped and they p,,nt""",.. groups or, discnssion clubs. New m(lepet14ieI!t pressure from the IU\'bfp.rnmp.nt n"">"~m" dc'velopjooents in the democratization process and suppresand freedoms became apparent by the midre}:lcalrea appeals ofNGOs to the international comto take llotice of these developments in Kazakhstan were not followed any response from the developed democratic cormtries. ,.",,,,n,,,·l·pn human rights declarations of or International, Human Rights Committee to Protect sallS and the Union of Conncils. None of the developed democratic countries ""or",""".",,,.. t.be of Kazakhstan. 1997-98 marked the ofa third de,le\(lpnlents in Kazakhstan, Severe social and economic crises led to a number of mass protest actions Kentau, Zhanatas, Ust Kamenogorsk, PavlomClUamg several marches, Since the of 1997 the direct aimed at the pruitlClpal11tS marches and unsanctioned un,,\OuI'K", of ten or fifteen days for oppo111tl1on, Arrests and detentions treqmmt. Among those arrested was peltlSl1om:r movement Pokoformer vice-Prime Minister oftbe government of Kazakhstan and co-chairman of the opposition movement leaders of the Workers' Madellsmailov and Yurl and others. In the ofUralsk two young spent six months injalI, indicted for l"""'''''_ on the walls and pavement. The were fonnd to the honor and of the of Kazakhstan and other officials. At the beg;mnmg

the deputy chairman of the Ka:mi>:ilSl:an, was sentenced to one year in jail preSH!ent of Kazakhstan. The L,ni,U1"~l), who demanded payment of several

Freedom ofAssociation in Kazakhstan

61

months wage arrears, were also subjected to various punitive measures. In June 1998 by the decision of Kentau City Court independent unions were banned in Kentau. This situation has fInally drawn some response from the international community and governments of the developed democratic countries. Nevertheless, the government's position towards opposition and dissidents is becoming more and more repressive. For these reasons, it is necessary that one should fll'St discuss the historical and political context in which citizens ofK.azakhstan seek to realize their right to freedom of association.

Problems of Realizing the Right to Freedom of Association in the Context of Current Legislation and Practices Paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan stipulates: "Citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall have the right to the freedom of forming associations. The activities of public associations shall be regulated by law." First of all, if one understands this provision literally. it means that citizens have the right to create some formal associations, which are called public associations. At the same time the expression "freedom of association," recognized allover the world. implies that an individual has the right to form associations with other individuals with or without forming a formal organization. Secondly, if the norms outlined in this article have a true meaning, then it is clear that in Kazakhstan freedom of association is recognized, but the activities of specifIc associations are to be regulated by law. But the meanings of the verbs "to regulate" and "to limit" are very different. When one reviews current legislation, it becomes obvious that freedom of association in Kazakhstan in practice is not regulated, but limited. In fact, freedom of association is regulated-and limited--by the Law on Public Associations/ signed into effect in rnid-1996, the Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan,4 and the Decree of the President of the Republic ofK.azakhstan on the Registration of Legal Entities.s This is typical of a post-totalitarian country, in which democratic principles and norms stipulated in a constitution can be abridged by authoritarian methods in second and third levels of enabling legislation. Thus, the right to freedom of association guaranteed by a constitution may be neither a right nor a freedom in fact. In democratic countries freedom of association is understood in the following ways. The state does not regulate, control. or limit the formation of public associations because voluntary associations of citizens are viewed as independent creations of the society. The state may regulate activities of public associations in the event that they want to enter into a specific relationship with it-in

62

Zhovtis

bCllcttts, and In this case the state certain but expects that such an association will fulfill certain obligations, The state has no to limit the constitutional of a group of citizens as compared to an individual. Any group of citizens, acting as initiators or active palrtlCl])a.ots of public bears the same responsibility before the law as a and is treated in principle no from an individual in cases of an infringement of the law, to receive the stams of a legal entity associations rellaUCmSJ:up with the state must be in accordance with law, Typically these are intended more to and inform the state than to seek from it Public associations which do not wish to and acquire the stams of a legal are ·not m.Jjl1~~iU to do so. Their activities are not considered simply because they do not have a certificate. A government has a monopoly on tnt,p'rnrf't.'f1IOxir:nately Consi,dermg the fact that the
Freedom ofAssociation in Kazakhstan

63

also visit any organizational meeting or gathering in order to observe or collect information. Thus, thorough control and registration may serve as a means to halt or stop the activities of an association when it does not comply with the goals and tasks specified in its charter, even if an activity does not contradict the Constitution and existing legislation. In a democratic state, a public association or a noncommercial organization which has certain tax privileges is controlled by tax agencies. Tax agencies have the right to take away the privileges in case the organization becomes involved in certain commercial transactions. However, a democratic state does not attempt to limit the public activities of such an organization as long as they do not contradict the constitution. In a post-totalitarian state the constitution may contain a clause guaranteeing the right to freedom of association in the fonn corresponding to international nonns, but the state immediately sets limits to this right, specifically in the sphere of public activities. In Kazakhstan there are no separate laws on public organizations (not to be confused with public associations), noncommercial organizations and charity foundations, although all these types of public entities are recognized in the Civil Code. According to existing legislation, in order to fonn a public association ten or more people have to take the initiative and call a constituent conference. approve the charter, and submit the application to the registering agency. There are also territorial boundaries to the activities of public associations. Associations are divided into local, regional. and republican. To register a regional association, it is required that the association have offices in more than one region of the republic. To register a republican association, it is required that the association cover more than half of the regions and have offices in the capital and another major city. Such gradation implies control over the geography ofan association's activities and opens the possibility of limiting an association's activities if it is registered in one city but wishes to expand its sphere of influence to another. The paperwork required for registration is complicated and local justice agencies closely watch the fonnulations of goals and tasks of a public association, particularly if those goals are political. Despite the fact that according to the law the registration agency has to issue approval or rejection within fifteen days, and the Civil Code prolubits the rejection of an application on the grounds of the inexpediency of creating an association, the registering agencies often invent various bureaucratic obstacles to prolong the approval process. A directive issued in the fall of 1997 by the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs became the next logical step of such "pseudo-democratic regulation." Some of the proposals outlined in this document directly affect the rights and freedoms of citizens. It is stated that "the leaders and activists of some public

64

Evgeny Zhovtis

associations violate the Constitution and existing legislation by conducting closed (secret) meetings and sessions, on the pretext of discussing current affairs of their organizations. The fact is that they gather to discuss the political. social and economic situation in the country and to plan protest actions not specified in their charters." By making such a statement, the Deputy Minister ofIntemaJ Affairs made the right of citizens to discuss the situation in the country and to organize civil actions contingent on the presence or absence of corresponding clauses in the charters of public associations.7 Thus, any meeting of the members and activists of public associations and organizations which takes place without the supervision of a justice agency official is labeled closed (secret) and-it seems logical to conclude-will be considered illegal. Frivolous interpretation of the clauses of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the laws regulating the activities of justice agencies and public associations allows this high-ranking bureaucrat to conclude that ..the law obliges. rather than permits, the justice agencies to be present at the meetings ... of public associations.» This means that total police control is being introduced in the country. It is clear that this directive primarily concerns opposition parties and associations; in effect the mechanism of political investigation and detection known from tsarist times as "slezhka" is being put to work, so that no public association is now safe. This is a de facto proclamation of the presumption of political guilt inasmuch as the directive states that the presence of representatives ofjustice agencies at the meetings of public associations is necessary "to prevent crime. reveal and investigate crimes, etc.,o It is obviously assumed that members of public associations make up criminal schemes and that justice agency representatives should participate in their meetings to prevent any infringements of law. Implementation of this directive limits the right of citizens to form associations, express their opinions. and seek. receive, and impart information. This has already led to situations in which the police make attempts to participate. or even to control. association meetings which they choose to attend. This is particularly relevant to opposition parties. political movements. and organizations. Attempts to confront the policemen lead to conflicts and disruptions of meetings. Further development of the ideas and principles outlined in the quoted document may lead to a situation in which police could receive the right to break into the private homes of members of public associations in case they decided to meet in a private home, or listen to their telephone conversations, or conflSCate documents from the political opponents of the ruling elite. Similar practices have been characteristic of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes and they have nothing to do with democracy. These practices cost millions of lives in the former Soviet Union and other countries where an attempt

Freedom ofAssociation in Kazakhstan

65

was made to exercise political control over the minds of citizens. The international community has rejected such methods of "order enforcement" and "fulfulment" of the rights and freedoms of citizens. Legal regulation of freedom of association is not limited to the legal act quoted above. The new Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan. brought into effect on January 1, 1998, increased legal accountability for the members and leaders of public associations in comparison with citizens who do not belong to any associations. Article 336 of the Criminal CodeS stipulates increased liability for "unlawful interference of public associations with the activities of state agencies." Furthermore, the punishment for the member of an association is either a fme or up to four months in jail, whereas the leader of the association could be sentenced for up to a year. One should note that there are no similar articles for ordinary citizens. Supposedly. if an ordinary citizen is accused of "unlawful interference," a different article pertaining to "hooliganism" would be applied to him. This is a remarkable fact. The post-totalitarian state singles out the members of public asSC?Ciations as some dangerous category of citizens, and thus reinforces its typically authoritarian treatment of such individuals. Article 334 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan stipulates liability for "creation or participation in activities of unregistered public associations" as well as for "creation or leadership of a religious party, or a political party, or a professional union, financed by foreign governments or individuals, and foreign or international organizations," resulting either in a fine or detention for up to four months or sentence for up to one year in jail. Finally, Article 337 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan stipulates liability for "cooperation with the political parties and professional unions of foreign states." The political discrimination contained in the articles quoted above is obvious. Unfortunately, such "legal regulation" of citizens' rights to belong to an association does not correspond well with democratic norms and principles. These practices do not encourage the creation and activity of public associations, which are the constituent blocks of civil society. but rather inhibit social activity of citizens and their ability to participate in reforms and to elect competent and responsible authorities.

Umitations to Activities and Influence of Public Associations and Organizations in Kazakhstan Although registered and active nongovernmental public organizations in Kazakhstan number upwards of 500, their influence to date is limited. 9 Here we will explore the reasons and offer some recommendations concerning improve-

66

Evgeny Zhovtis

ment in their effectiveness. First let us identifY the methods of direct and indirect influence which in theory they possess. Direct influence involves activity addressed specifically to the government in the hope of shaping its policies. Public organizations might develop alternative drafts of laws and lobby in the parliament In addition, there are various state institutions which deal with public associations and with which those associations might interact: the courts. the office of public prosecutor,lawenforcement agencies, administration at all levels, the Human Rights Committee at the Office of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, etc. In situations where additional pressure might be needed to achieve results, associations might organize public appearances, issue declarations, collect signatures for claims and petitions, and organize peaceful assemblies, picketing, and demonstrations. Indirect influence is aimed at broader segments of society. international organizations, and the media. Such activity might involve monitoring and study of problems and shaping public opinion with the help of foreign and local media. Contacts and cooperation with international human rights organizations and other foreign public organizations could place problems specific to Kazakhstan in a broader context and elicit outside support. Public associations might organize conferences or seminars and radio or television appearances. Public education also may involve distribution of literature and on-going campaigns to raise public awareness and concern over issues important to society. Even the organization of self-defense classes for citizens might be necessary in order to defend individual rights and freedoms and make the government respect them As we have seen already, political and legal circumstances in Kazakhstan have so far severely limited the freedom of association and thus the ability of public associations to function effectively. Let us now examine several of the areas of possible influence and activity of those associations to see what some of the specific limitations are and how they might be eliminated. Many of the fundamental problems derive from the Soviet legal legacy. which has a negative impact on any efforts to shape effective laws in parliament. The parliamentary elections themselves were far from free and fair. The result is a lack of professionalism in parliament and the legislators' tendency to give low priority to individual rights and freedoms. The government of Kazakhstan has reinforced this tendency by failing to ratifY or take a clear stand regarding basic intemational agreements on human rights. Further, the agencies of executive power in post-totalitarian countries such as Kazakhstan tend to obstruct any attempts to create legislation corresponding with international standards, especially in the sphere of civil and political rights and freedoms. On the part of public organizations, there is also a lack of legal "literacy" amongst both leaders and rank-and-file members. To compensate for this, it is necessary to hire professional lawyers to help with legislative drafts. Yet to do

Freedom ofAssociation in Kazakhstan

67

so requires ftmding that most of the public associations do not have, given their precarious financial position and dependence on grants from international organizations and foundations. The result then is a very limited ability to influence parliamentary legislation. International contacts and pressure are the key to solving this problem, with the goal ofultimateJy raising the level oflegal education and respect for the law and creating the institutional framework for self-sustaining progress. On the international and state level, members of the U.N. and OECD should exert pressure on the governments of some CIS countries in order to sign and ratify major international agreements in the sphere of human rights and make national legislation congruent with those agreements. To ensure that such legislation then be defended, it is necessary to educate a new generation of lawmakers at home and abroad, individuals well-versed in international law who can then gradually reform the legislative foundations of society. Model legislation for such a transformation can be developed by public organizations with the help oflawyers from developed democratic countries, with particular emphasis to be placed on realization and protection of basic human rights and freedoms such as freedom of speech, independence of the media, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, and the guarantee of free and fair elections. In all this, it is necessary. of course, to take into account the special problems of the transition period. Frequent contacts and exchanges between nongovernmental organizations of the CIS and developed democracies can improve the structure and professionallevel of the NGOs which are advocates for fundamental legal guarantees. The influence of such NGOs could be institutionalized, and their independence still maintained, if the parliamentary commissions and committees would consult with public groups consisting of representatives of nongovernmental public organizations and public leaders, with the goal of eliminating incongruities between existing legislation and international norms and adhering to principles of individual rights and freedoms. lust as efforts to influence parliamentary legislation so far have proved ineffective, public associations have had little impact in their appeals to other state institutions ostensibly charged with protection of human rights. The main reason for this is the conservatism of those institutions, which place state interest above public and have little respect for individual civil rights. There are no effective feedback mechanisms for the interchange between public organizations and the corresponding state institutions to insure that monitoring of human rights abuses will be able to haIt them. There is in fact no state office, such as that of an ombudsman, which can monitor such problems independently. Finally. the problem is compounded by a basic suspicion on the part of the state agencies with regard to the motives of nongovernmental public associations.

68

Evgeny Zhovtis

Such problems can be addressed both by institutional change and by programs of education. It would be important to establish an ombudsman's office with the authority and independence to prevent serious violations of human rights by the state. In addition, mechanisms such as public consultative organi. zations or "round tables" can be created to ensure dialogue between public organizations and the state. The example of the positive role of public organi. zations should be stressed by international organizations, in order that the government, its functionaries, and society can be made more aware of the way such organizations can help protect human rights. Such protection must come to be understood as fundamental to the interests of the state itself. Petitions, demonstrations, and the like have so far been of limited value in Kazakhstan because of a fundamental lack of governmental accountability to society. Often petitions are simply ignored, in a situation where heads of local administration are not elected by the local residents but rather are presidential appointees. The problem is compounded by the legal restrictions on the right of citizens and public organizations to assemble peacefully or undertake any demonstration that may be devoted to criticism of the government To-a degree society itself contnbutes to this situation, since it lacks any tradition of independent collective action and organization to protect human rights. Several obvious steps could change all this. For one, election of local administrators is necessary in order that they be held accountable to their constituents and be expected to develop an effective system of local government If public assembly is to become acceptable and effective. legal guarantees must be provided at the state level, which means bringing Kazakh law into accord with international standards. By itself, guaranteeing the right to assemble freely is not enough; it must be complemented by a broad program to educate the citizenry in the principles and mechanisms of a democratic civil society under the rule of law. In the sphere of indirect influence, appeals to public opinion at home and abroad could playa critical role. Yet the mass media in Kazakhstan are of little help in this, since they often serve as the mouthpiece for the government and exercise self-censorship to avoid adverse government intervention in their affairs. For their part, public organizations lack the funding necessary to deliver their messages to a broad audience. Where there is a common interest with international organizations that might help, there may be insufficient coordination to take advantage of the synergy and the possibilities for outside support. Alth.ough it is difficult to counter the impact of government influence on some of the mass media, foreign grants that could support publications on basic rights and the development of civil society would help. There should be some com~ bined effort on the part of nongovernmental public organizations to publish a news bulletin devoted to such issues.

Freedom ofAssociation in Kazakhstan

69

The potentially significant influence on the situation in Kazakhstan by international organizations has in fact been very limited. The failure of the government of Kazakhstan to ratify basic international agreements on human rights has meant that international intergovernmental organizations have no tools to influence the Kazakh government in its human rights policies. Public opinion in developed democratic countries often can influence governments to pressure for democratization and human rights elsewhere in the world. Yet too often such public opinion is shaped by official press and government opinions, which in fact conceal the facts regarding human rights within CIS countries. To a degree this situation reflects a double standard with regard to countries of the former Soviet Union, where in certain cases concern over protecting foreign investment and strategic interests overrides any genuine concern for democratization and human rights. Thus, it is important that the international community insist that Kazakhstan, as a member of the U.N. and OECD, sign and ratifY all the major documents of those organizations guaranteeing human rights. In addition, there should be a much more extensive exchange of information between local and international human rights organizations, as well as appropriate publicity regarding the results of their common effort at monitoring the situation in Kazakhstan. In this connection, if the public in democratic countries can be well enough informed regarding their governments' efforts to promote democracy abroad, pressure can be placed on those governments to move away from applying the "double standard" that allows human rights abuses to continue for economic or geopolitical reasons. In sum, we have demonstrated in this article the problems citizens of Kazakhstan face in trying to realize their right to freedom of association in order to create a democratic state and civil society under the rule of law. To date, the post-totalitarian politics of the country have blocked progress in achieving these goals and thus hindered prosperity and long-term social and political stability. It is clearly in the interests of the international community for Kazakhstan to achieve that prosperity and stability; thus the international community must more actively involve itself in the process of change in the former Soviet bloc. Given the handicaps they face at home, the nongovernmental organizations in Kazakhstan cannot achieve these goals without such assistance.

Notes 1. Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Collection of Intemational Agreements and Legislative Acts ofthe Republic of Kazakhstan on Human Rights), in two volumes, vol. 2 (part 2), Almaty, 1997, pp. 10-24.

10

Evgeny Zhovtis

2. Report of the Human Rights Bureau in Kazakhstan "Human Rights in Kazakh· stan: January-October 1996." 3. The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Public Associations, May 31, 1996. 4. The Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (General Part), December 27, 1994. 5. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. "On State Registration of Legal Bntities," April 17, 1995, as amended January 26,1996. 6. These indices are used by the state to calculate minimal wage, pension, fines. incomes, etc. 7. Bulletin, "Human Rights in Kazakhstan and the World," no. 10, October 1997. 8. The Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan. which went into effect on January I, 1998. 9. Directory ofNon-Commercial Organizations in Kazakhstan, Interlegal, Kazakhstan, 1998.

Government and Nonprofit Sector Relations in the Kyrgyz Republic Erkinbek Kasybekov

B

y many accounts, the Kyrgyz Republic is an example of democratic development in post-Soviet Central Asia. one where the institutions of "civil society" are growing rapidly. Testimony to this is to be seen in the development of the grassroots NGO community-between 1991 and 1996 more than 800 NGOs had been established. Yet their impact has been all too limited because of their failure to establish cooperative relations with the government. In the current situation, where economic transition is placing great pressure on Kyrgyz society and where government resources to deal with the difficulties are extremely limited, more extensive NGO-government cooperation would benefit all parties. This paper offers an analysis of the poverty·alleviation policies of the Kyrgyz government and the ways in which NGOs may assist in their implementation, from the perspective of one who has worlc:ed as an NGO trainer in the nonprofit sector. It is clear that obstacles to government and NGO cooperation must be overcome by both sides. Before turning to specific problems of poverty alleviation and NGO activity, we might consider briefly some of the obstacles to the creation ofNGOs in post-Soviet space. In the Soviet era both public understanding of civil society and the role ofNGOs were very limited. There were only a few extremely large but general public institutions, such as the Peace Fund, the Children's Fund, the Red Cross arid the Red Crescent Society, the Nature Protection Society. and a few others. The establishment of such societies was possible only with government or Communist Party authorization. The only method of fundraising, if indeed this term is appropriate, was through budget subsidies or the forcible sale of membership stamps to often involuntary "members" of the societies. Thousands of Soviet citizens were involved in such activities and subjected to the stamp campaigns. which occurred fortunately only once a year. Even secondary school students were forced to buy the stamps. It was not unusual for a person to become a member of several societies through such stamp sales yet know nothing about their activities. Usually the leaders of these large societies were very famous and popular people such as the flfSt woman astronaut, Valentina Tereshkova, or the world chess champion, Anatoly KaIpov. The structure and functioning of the societies were exactly the same in the Kyrgyz Republic as in Russia or any other part of the Soviet Union.

71

72

Erkinbek Kasybekov

These organizations continue to exist in our country and still receive support from the state budget. We call them QUANGOs or quasi~NGOs. The government treats the leaders of such organizations as high-ranking officials and bas an excellent mutual understanding with them. The same situation appears to prevail in Uzbekistan. As a facilitator of some sessions at a recent conference in Tashkent, I observed high Uzbek officials gathering with Uzbek NGOs to discuss possibilities of cooperation, but in fact it was only the quasi-NGOs which were represented. One reason such QUANGOs retain the support of the governments is that they openly pursue the government goals with regard to social policy and presumably are trusted not to promote alternative agendas. It is my argument here that the truly independent NGOs in the Kyrgyz Republic share many of the same goals the government advocates in the sphere of social policy and that therefore it would make sense for the NGO community and the government to cooperate in the same fashion that the old-line QUANGOs do. All parties--the NGOs, the government, and, most importantly, the Kyrgyz population-would benefit from such cooperation. Among the highest priorities of the Kyrgyz government is poverty alleviation. We can understand this need and the policies that have been enunciated to address it if we examine the economic situation that bas developed since independence in 1991. Many important changes have occurred or are underway, starting with the elimination of the system of centralized planning and the establishment of the basis for a market economy. Freeing of prices and wages bas occurred, with the initial effect of substantial inflation, but the inflation rate bas now been reduced to below 20 percent. While privatization and restructuring of large enterprises is still underway. a majority of small and medium-sized enterprises has been privatized, especially in the area of consumer services and agriculture. Conditions and stimuli for independent economic activity have developed, notably in the freeing of the labor market, resulting in the appearance of secondary employment and self-employment and its re-distribution toward the consumer. commercial, and financial sectors. Accompanying these economic changes have been important changes in social and cultural services. Nongovernmental, private educational, and health institutions have been created; Kyrgyzstan became the ftrst country in the NIS to introduce a targeted social assistance system. The social costs of the transition have been substantial, something that is easy to forget when looking at the economic growth figures for 1996-GDP growth of 5.6 percent, an increase of 3.6 percent in industrial output, and an increase of 13.1 percent in agricultural production. These gains come after catastrophic production declines in all sectors of the national economy. Between 1991 and 1995, GDP in Kyrgyzstan fell almost 75 percent, gross industrial

Government and Nonproftts in the Kyrgyz Republic

73

production 66 percent and gross agricultural production by a third. A significant percentage of the working part of the population bas suffered from the emergence of massive arrears in wages and an increase in underemployment. One of the main income-generating activities in the country is petty trade. Income inequality has increased against a background of mass impoverishment, and this in a country where even in the Soviet period per capita income was well below the marginal national norm. I Both international and domestic assessments confum that Kyrgyzstan has turned out to be poorer than the majority of transition economies of the former socialist bloc (only Albania, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, which have endured both economic and military-political shocks. are worse ofl)?World Bank calculations on the basis of purchasing power parity indicate that the average citizen of Kyrgyzstan earned about $800 in 1995. According to an official poverty survey conducted by the government in autumn 1996, the poverty level was 716 som per capita per month (18 som =: US$l). The proportion of households with incomes below that line was 62.1 percent 18.2 percent of households were below the "extreme poverty" line of221 som/month, estimated on the basis of income needed for a household to be able to purchase 10 percent of the consumption goods in the average basket of Kyrgyz consumers.) To help support the approximately 800,000 most needy citizens who are entitled to receive social benefits, the government pays some 350 million 80m/year. Apart from specific measures (to be discussed below) to encourage enterprise development and address such issues as unemployment, the government has recognized the seriousness of poverty in Kyrgyzstan by enunciating a national program with ambitious goals of poverty alleviation. Consultation among international experts and the staffs of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection led to the approval of the first draft of the program on December 30, 1997. Subsequently, a working group of the President's Office developed the "National Program to Overcome Poverty 'Araket' (1998-2oo5):"'which was then approved by Presidential Decree No. 34 of 11 February 1998. It provides the basic guidelines for all government officials in the republic and establishes the major strategic concerns and assumptions of the government regarding poverty alleviation.s The program acknowledges the connection between poverty and the crisis created by economic restructuring and recognizes that elimination of poverty is a long-tenn process. At the same time, the goal is to eliminate "extreme poverty" by the year 2000. The key to long~term success is complete economic recovery; particular attention needs to be devoted to the agricultural sector, whicb accounts for 47 pen::ent of national employment. It is worthwhile to enumerate some of the specific policies to be implemented by the program, since they connect directly with the goals and activities ofNGOs:

74 •

Erkinbek Kasybelwv

There is an emphasis on stimulating citizens' sense of responsibility for their own welfare • Support is to be provided for small businesses and farmers and self· employed labor activities • Incomes should become sufficient so that citizens can pay for major social services and benefits, the provision of which under market conditions becoming more commercialized • The creation of a strong middle class is envisaged, where an emphasis is to be placed on the development of entrepreneurship, especially by women • At the same time, it is recognized that a proactive social policy should invest in creating opportunities for vulnerable social groups, targeting social benefits for needy families, the disabled, and the elderly. Following the decree of February 11, the informational campaigns carried out in aU the regions of the country by President Akayev and his assistants emphasized the idea that charitable funds and NGOs should play an important part in the implementation of this program. The president established a National Commission on Poverty Alleviation for elaboration of policy and a National Fund on Poverty Alleviation as an implementing agency and delivery mechanism for funds. The Fund is to be supported only by nonbudgetary resources, which means that fundraising from a variety of sources must be undertaken. The regulations for the Commission and Fund envisage specifically that the Fund consider and award grants to NGOs. As has been pointed out by Colin Watson, a British Council consultant for the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, the new program is particularly important for the day-w..day activiti.es of that ministry. This means that NGOs should acquaint themselves thoroughly with the details of the government initiative. since it provides them with an opportunity to influence government sector officials and persuade them that closer collaboration can achieve common goals.' The ambitious goals of the new program build upon projects that have been underway. We will now examine the achievements and problems of such activity to date, with particular emphasis on programs aimed at alleviating unemployment, promoting business development, and supporting social services. While there has been significant accomplishment, this discussion will point up the limits so far in the involvement ofNGOs. One of the first efforts to combat unemploymene with the support of local NODs was undertaken by the Headquarters of Employment Services (HES) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection and the German Society for Technical Cooperation (OTZ). Together these two agencies have created so-caUed Employment Promotion Companies (EPCs) throughout the country. Funding for the EPCs came from the State Commission on Reorganization and Liquidation ofEntetprises, the Social Fund of the Kyrgyz Government, the Partner Fund of

Government and Nonproftts in the Kyrgyz Republic

75

the European Union, and the lalal-Abad and Mailuu-Suu state administrations. Eleven EPCs now exist, and they have undertaken a very broad range of programs: local infrastructure development. social assistance to vulnerable groups, support for public education, vocational training and programs aimed specifically at youth and women's employment, and efforts to assist recent migrants from rural areas into urban centers such as the capital Bishkek. While the EPCs are treated as juridical entities and are in theory to develop real independence from the government, they are experiencing significant problems in the areas of fund-raising and local controL The largest portion of their budgets (and thus the support for the core of their permanent staff) comes from HES. In 1997, EPCs received 3,775.300 som (USS210,OOO) from HES and 636,500 80m (USS36,OOO) from OTZ for six projects. A decline in the GTZ share of the budgets has been compensated for by a Mercy Corps International contribution of 593, 100 80m (USS33,OOO) for nine projects last year. The financial dependence of the EPCs on the ministry means that EPC staff act as though they are ministry employees. The ministry thus makes the key decisions regarding EPC programs. As part of my consulting work on behalf of the nongovernmental sector, I met with senior staff ofHES at the end of 1997, among them Aigul Ryskulova, the director. I suggested that they build their relationships with the EPCs on the basis of a division of policy-making and implementing functions. HES would monitor EPC activities and continue to play an important role in financial support and supervision, but would allow the EPCs much more independence to implement policy without excessive interference from the central administration. HES is still considering these recommendations. As is the case in many OECO countries, the largest share of resources administered by HES for a proactive labor market policy has been directed toward professional training and re-training programs, especially for adults. This is an area where the NGO sector has considerable experience that could help the government improve its programs. Much of the training funded by HES has been offered by vocational training schools but without adequate assessment as to its impact. The experience of OECO countries' employment training programs suggests that those offered in a formal classroom setting often are ineffective, unless targeted for specific labor market needs. In Kyrgyzstan one problem with the training through vocational schools is that the teachers nonnally deal with teenagers and thus have no experience in adult education techniques. As Dr. Manfred Kaiser, an international consultant for the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, has suggested, it is necessary to educate teachers in participatorY training techniques. The potential for contributions from the NGO sector can be seen in the activity of Counterpart Consortium, which in February 1995 began to introduce into Central Asia new

76

Erkinbek Kasybekov

methodology in adult-oriented training programs. In a context where in the former Soviet Union there never was any differentiation between teaching children and teenagers on the one hand and adults on the other, this has been a revolutionary innovation.S In cases where unemployed individuals are attempting to gain the skills to be self-employed, the record of accomplishment by Ministry of Labor and Social Protection programs to date has not been very encouraging either. Too many of those who received stipends for self-employment activities returned to the Ministry for funds once the initial grants expired. Few of their microbusinesses have proven to be sustainable. In response to these problems, the new Minister of Labor, Aylgul Abdurekhmenova, has adopted a new approach. In collaboration with experts from the BES, I designed a project named "Jumnsh" supported by the Bishkek UNDP office and integrated as a component of an ongoing UNDP-financed "Poverty Alleviation" project. In competitive bidding, Counterpart Consortium won the contract to train trainers from different NGOs-Center InterBilirn, the Club of Young Teachers, the Ecological Movement "Biom"-and representatives from Kyrgyz state agencies such as Kyrgyzgoskominvest, state employment services, local authorities, and other support organizations. There is great potential for further development of such initiatives. Apart from training programs to develop new skills relevant to a market economy, the provision of funding and credit tied specifically to the creation of new businesses is critical in an economy where banking and credit institutions are underdeveloped. Only one financial institution-Settlement Savings Company-has branches throughout the country; all other banks are concentrated in the few large cities such as Bishkek and Osh.9 In these circumstances. it is clear that NGOs can playa significant role as financial intermediaries. The experience of other countries suggests that microcredit programs for small businesses can produce employment gains. especially for men between ages 30 and 40 who have relatively high educational levels. The record of long-term survivability for such businesses is still in need of improvement, but the projected gains from successful small and medium enterprise development are impressive. One conservative estimate is that by the year 2015, about 221,000 jobs in such enterprises and the self-employment sector might be created, or about 11,000 new jobs a year. In a country that currently has an economically active population of 1.8 million, such an accomplishment would indeed be substantial. 10 Two government decrees (No.6 from January 6, 1995, and No. 330 from June 2, 1997) regulate its program of financial assistance for unemployed people seeking to start new businesses. These decrees encompass a number of important measures: lump sum unemployment benefits for a full calendar year, fund-

Government and Nonproftts in the Kyrgyz Republic

77

ing of training courses including stipend support for three to six month periods, reimbursement of legal and counseling fees in connection with registration of new businesses and reimbursement of th.e registration fees. employment subsidies for the creation ofup to ten new jobs for the unemployed, and support for creation of community credit groups and nonprofits to help unemployed citizens. The success of this last undertaking is notable. Discussions with Ms. Ismailova. a national UNDP consultant for the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, indicate that self-organizing by vulnerable able-bodied people has substantially facilitated their self-employment efforts. One of the best mechanisms to loan money is when it can be tied to a sense of mutual responsibility within a group. relying on the concept of "moral" or "group" collateral. According to RES statistics, the financial aid program for small business creation resulted in about 2,900 individuals starting their own businesses and creating an additional 4,800 jobs for the unemployed between January and August 1997. The prospect for cooperation between NGOs and the government in fmancial support for small business development has been improved by a constructive meeting called in November 1997 by the president's office and moderated by Kamila Kenenbayeva. who heads its division responsible for government social policy, The focus of the discussion was microcredit issues connected with women's NGOs. Experts were invited from various organizations experienced in microcredit programs: FINCA Kyrgyzstan, the pilot demonstration project "Kol-Kabysh," Mercy Corps, and others. Among the issues discussed were ways to monitor and assess the impact of selfemployment programs with the aim of improving them and developing new ideas for synergy between government-sponsored programs and those in the nongovernmental sector. One mechanism for assisting in the establishment of small and mediumsized enterprises is the "business incubator," for which NGOs might also provide essential training and services. Business incubators offer for a limited time to new start-ups various kinds of support-rental office and workshop space, advisory and bookkeeping services. communications, copying and computing services. The government has provided a legal framework for their establishment in Decree No. 325 from July 2, 1997, and is planning to establish pilot incubators in densely populated areas such as Osh and Ialal-Abad. The start-up cost of these centers is substantial, however. They need to be planned like any new enterprise and be based on a developed business plan. Both they and their clients need to be ensured access to loans or credits. The legislative basis for regulation of such matters still needs to be developed; advice ofNGOs could assist in the legislative process regarding matters where such specific expertise is essential.

78

Erkinbek Kasybekov

Given the substantial regional and structural variation throughout Kyrgyzstan in regard to unemployment and underemployment, proactive labor market tools alone cannot be expected to solve the problems. Among the regions are mountain areas with high unemployment and relatively low development potential. There are at least thirty-five "one firm towns." To address the problems in such pJaces, community-based economic development initiatives need to be encouraged. Government Decree No. 338 ofJune 6, 1997, recognized this and budgeted 25 million som to encourage such initiatives in communities with especially high rates of unemployment. It is envisaged that community initiatives may take various f01'1llS----partnerships, development projects, cooperatives, community-run businesses, family home-based enterprises, labor foundations. etc. Such ideas are quite new for the Kyrgyz Republic, having been introduced only recently by projects of international organizations such as UNDP and the World Bank. UNDP is funding the rehabilitation of water supply facilities and the roads and irrigation infrastructure. II A World Bank pilot demonstration project aims to promote community development by assisting women's groups in planning and implementing their programs. This project has provided general orientation and training for community representatives in techniques of mobilizing local resources. There have been specialized training modules on management, accounting. marketing. rehabilitation of infrastructure, and even sanitation and hygiene. 12 My experience in conducting several such training sessions in the Osh and Issyk-Kul regions revealed very clearly why such programs are essential. The majority of participants entered the training session feeling that receiving loans was the key to solving all their problems. Accordingly, we devoted time to analyzing what non-cash resources might be available in the community. since it was important to be able to make the case to donots that the community did have significant resources but that donor assistance might fill critical gaps rather than be expected simply to foot all the bills. It was encouraging to see bow by the end of such sessions, senior community leaders were able to articulate clearly the kind ofhigh-quality human capital the community did have to offer. Another issue raised in such discussions concerned the way in which community activity might best be organized. Participants initially could not appreciate that their community had any structure. with persons responsible for community activities; or, nit was necessary to create such a structure. elections of a core group of leaders could avoid the dangers of authoritarian leadetship. Discussions of these mattets emphasized the necessity for transparency of pr0ceedings, and in particular the development of transparent accounting systems for projects the community would. manage.

Government and Nonprofits in the Kyrgyz Republic

79

Such transparency is essential, given the fact that the government may soon designate funds that can be used specifically for community-based employment initiatives. The social insurance system in Kyrgyzstan includes several components-a Pension Fund. a Social Insurance Fund. a Medical Insurance Fund. and an Employment Fund. The revenues of the Employment Fund come from employer and employee contributions deducted as payroll taxes; in 1997 the Employment Fund had revenues of about 100 million som. A draft Employment Promotion Law for the country proposes allocating about 5 percent of Employment Fund revenues annually to support community-based initiatives. For communities to receive such funding, though, they will need to submit sound proposals with guarantees of fiscal accountability. To the degree that NGOs dealing with unemployment issues are involved in community-based initiatives, the NGOs thus may be in a position to obtain additional financial resources. Let us consider now the role that NGOs might play in another important area for the future well-being of Kyrgyz society. It is well known that social services, for better or worse, were supported by the state under the Soviet regime. Perhaps less appreciated by some in the international community is the fact that since 1991, in part due simply to very real fiscal constraints, state funding of social assistance agencies concerned with the most vulnerable groups in the population has declined. To date no NGO in the Kyrgyz Republic works directly with vulnerable clients in the way that, for example, the Salvation Army does in the United States. The government should be encouraging the participation of the private and nonprofit sectors in providing such services, because the cost of social care services is substantial and must be bome by the broadest possible range of organizations. The government is preparing a submission of a "National Program Outline on Social Care Services" to the European Union's TACIS program. The proposal does incorporate some collaboration with NGOs, which would seem to enhance the possibility that the proposal would receive funding. Several specific kinds of support for vulnerable groups are needed. The targeted groups include the elderly, disabled individuals, and orphans. Furthermore, there are problems of child neglect, juvenile delinquency, homelessness, and the rehabilitation of abused children of women. Not only is it necessary to find funding to expand the existing network of institutions, but if the private sector is to become actively involved, the state must develop standards and licensing procedures for social service providers. The cost of services for the elderly in residential houses is substantial. One way of meeting the needs at lower cost, whether or not the state is directly involved as the provider, is to expand services offered the elderly in their own homes. Low-income pensioners who live separately from their relatives will need in-kind help, especially free food. Analogously, in rural areas, mobUe care

80

Erkinbek Kasybekov

units may be the way to address the needs of a scattered population that could not be served by residential centers. Under current conditions, the problems of the disabled have sharply increased. Special support for them is needed with regard to employment, since the opportunities for employment of the disabled in specialized enterprises has generally declined. Measures are needed to restructure occupational and rehabilitation programs for the disabled and strengthen the programs offered by secondary and higher educational institutions for this group of the population. Finally, one notes that the ongoing economic difficulties have exacerbated problems involving families, women, and children. As many as two thirds of all the children in the country live in poverty. Thus, rates of mortality. disease, and disability continue to be very high. Many children are homeless, and juvenile delinquency is a serious problem. During the Soviet period, such sQCial problems tended to be denied on an official level; hence no adequate institutional structure was created to deal with them. This omission is now badly in need of rectification, but government resources alone are inadequate to do the job. In outlining the social and economic problems and the programs the government is developing to deal with them, we have seen how to a certain degree the government is encouraging NGO participation. However, it is stilI the case that public sector officials are reluctant to collaborate with NGOs, in part because they are seen as possible competitors or opponents, and in part because the NGOs themselves have too often provided evidence of weakness and unreliability. In the circumstances, it is clear why, as we suggested at the outset, the government has to date been more comfortable in dealing with the quasi-NGOs, which have a long and stable record of experience and responsibility in spending government funds. The NGOs then must address seriously the issue of how to "sell" their services to the government so that it will see them as reliable partners. There are several specific areas in which NGO organization and activity might be improved and thus provide the basis for greater trust and meaningful collaboration. One issue which needs to be addressed is the lack of clarity in the enabling legislation for NGOs. They still are regulated by the 1991 law "About Public Associations," which lumps them with trade unions, political parties, and religious organizations. Hence there is no clear sense of NGOs having distinct organizational or juridical status. An example is the ecological movement "Tabiyat," which attempts to address ecological problems and at the same time is very active in parliamentary electoral politics. This dual focus ofTabiyat's activity is confusing for those who may interpret its goal as being the same as that of a political party. Similarly, some NGOs engage in both commercial and nonprofit activity, a fact which can be harmful both for inexperienced small entrepreneurs and for the beneficiaries of the charitable activities. Such confu-

Government and Nonprofits in the Kyrgyz Republic

81

sion is an obstacle to the enactment of necessary tax exemption legislation for the support of nonprofit activity. To date the tax code's exemptions for commercial enterprises' support of charity are limited and do little to encourage such support from the business community. Fiscal problems and the lack of fiscal responsibility have probably hurt the image ofNGOs more than any other factor. although in their tum many of these problems reflect weaknesses in organization and management training. Only a few NGOs have boards of directors; hence policy and executive functions are not separate. In such circumstances, NGO leaders may have unrestricted power, and thus there is no mechanism to ensure their accountability in using funds. Much still needs to be done to develop skills in strategic planning, accounting. and self-evaluation. Democratic decision-making needs to be encouraged. There have been unfortunate examples ofNGO leaders collecting money from colleagues for personal purposes or defrauding donor agencies. Counterpart Consortium had to cut off funding for two or three NGOs because of such activity. A UNDP representative analyzed microcredit projects implemented by local NGDs, among them one of the few NGOs in Naryn region, the Soopker Charitable Society. The review determined the Soopker failed to get the benefits to the poor it targeted as its clients; in general the project was criticized for "poor financial performance, monitoring, and accounting."tl Another case illustrates vividly why the government might well distrust NGOs. When some NGOs funded by the President's Office were requested to show how their clients had benefited from the government funding, the representatives of the NGOs in question simply disappeared. Such instances may be the most serious obstacle to securing government trust. It is true, after all, that financial irresponsibility is one of the main reasons government officials are fired. To risk investing public money in an untested organization naturaUy may be seen as inadvisable. Apart from fISCal responsibility with respect to their funders, NGDs need to develop a clearer sense of the importance of networking, both among themselves and with state officials. Often the NGOs treat each other as competitors or insist on pushing their individual agendas, with the result that none of them may receive the support it deserves. An example occurred at a conference devoted to issues of institutional cooperation of government structures and NGOs in developing state policy with regard to human rights. The Ministry of Foreign affairs and Center InterBilim organized the conference and invited twelve local NGOs and four international ones. While for the most part the participants felt the conference was a very constructive step. Mr. Ramasan Dyryldaev, the bead of the Kyrgyz Human Rights' movement, used the forum mainly to criticize the government for human rights violations and then used email to teU the world about what he saw as a consciously biased policy on the

82

Erkinbek

part of tbe ministry in collaboration only from friendly NGOs. Conversations after the incident with Center Il1terBilim representatives revealed that had tried to collaborate with the Human Rights Movement in advance of the but were unsuccessful in from ex,lmlplepoints up the desirability ofNGOs to collaboration before iron out their differences and develop a basis for en~;agmg the in a that is intended to foster cOI:)pe:rative relations. we note the NGOs must face individually in de'veloDllDR me:an:ingfuI paJrtic:iP~lticln in their activities. In aU too few cases are NGO activists committed to such work as a " Most are forced to earn a living in full-time jobs wbich leaves only their "free time" for NGO actiThe stresses of the current economic situation mean that sucb time is in short supply, and there are often conflicts of interest and schedules that prevent NGO from receiving its due. Of course some of the most significant involvement in NGOs may come from public even if their only role is to serve on the NGO since in that position may be to mu'''''...... NGO programs. An can be found in the small town of Balykcbi near Lake KuL The head of the local NGO "Umut" invited the mayor and his to become board members. these officials do not have any direct means to the organization, their moral and public relations activity on its behalf have strengthened its in both the public and sector. Until were added to the board, it had been very difficult for Umut to obtain any support from the local administration. In we should stress that this is a moment opportunity V.v].,Ut/UIv to playa more role in adctre!;SlI1lg have been able to do so far. The connrutment gO\rernlment to attack strl~SS!!ng nmtactlVe socio-economic measures rather than I!o',rernrncent bandouts opens the door for meani:ngtul paItlrJcrship reS1POIlSlb'!e and skilled NGO and the of international or~~anizllltio'ns. turn, such has the active UNDP, the World Bank, and USAID are among the many major and international sources of support for NGOs. At the same time it is incumbent on the NGOs themselves to the highest standards and aJlDong betand between themselves and the governween themselves and the to ensure the viabiment. Since external carmot be lity ofthe NGO community, one of its greatest its roots ~

~~

~~

Government and Nonprojits in the Kyrgyz Republic

83

There is reason for optimism that the problems outlined in this essay have been recognized and that the dialogue has begun which can lay the basis for the desirable government-NGO collaboration, especially at the local level. On Marcb 19, 1998. round table talks on the topic "Collaboration between Rural NGOs and Local Government" were sponsored by a local NGO. the "Rural Child Rights Protection Bureau," in the Bazar-Korgon district of Jalal-Abad region. Among those present was the UNHCR Project Coordinator Aman Nusupov, the deputy hakims (local administrators) and deputy chairman of the Mogul Village Government, representatives from about ten NGDs. including Counterpart Consortium, Mercy Corps, and UNDP. The roundtable fmdings reported by Nusupov confirmed much ofwbat we have observed in this essay: NGOs lack information about each other; • NGOs are good resources to address social needs; • workshops involving local authorities are necessary; • NGOs have to be proactive and transparent to become partners; • ifNGOs are to work with local governments. they must be aware of the national Poverty Alleviation Program "Araket" precisely so that they will know what local authorities are planning in order to implement it That such discussions are already taking place is an encouraging sign that productive relations between NGOs and the government will now begin to serve the common national interest.

Notes 1. Vladimir Michalev et aI., "Analiz sistemy zasbchity naseleniia v Kyrgyzskoi respublike v usloviiakh perekhoda k rynku, "in Strategiia sotsial 'noi politild: zaniatost " rynok truda i sotsia/'naia zashchita naseleniia ["Social protection in the Kyrgyz republic under conditions of transition to the market" in Social Policy Strategy: Labor Market, Employment, and Social Assistance1. Bisbkek: Mig LID, 1998, pp. 5-24. 2. Asylgul Abdurekhmenova et aI., "0 sokrashchenii bednosti v Kyrgyzskoi respublike metodami politiki zaniatosti i sotsial'noi zaschity," in Strategiia sot.vial'nol politik;: zaniatost'. rynok truda i sotsial 'nata zashchita nose/entia, BishKek: Mig LTO, 1998, pp. 25-26. ["Poverty Alleviation in the Kyrgyz Republic Through Employment and Social Assistance Policies," in Social Policy Strategy: Labor Market. Employment, and Social ASSistance], Bishkek: Mig LID, 1998, pp. 25-67. 3. Kyrgyzstan Analysis Report: Living Standards and Measurement Survey (National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic and Research Triangle Institute. North Carolina, USA), Fall 1996, 216. 4. Kamila Kenenbayeva et aI., "Djakyrchylykty djoiunun uluttuk Araket programmasy (1998-2005)1 Natsionalnaia programma preodoleniaia bednosti Araket ["The National Program to Overcome Poverty"Araket" (I998-2oo5), in collection of documents and materials ofthe program (Bishkek, 1998), 7-611 85-142, in KyrgyzlRussianJ.

84

Erkinbek Kasybekov

5. Kyrgyz Respublikasy Prezidenti A. Akaevdin Cbui obJastynda djakyrchylykty djoyuu bouncha keneslunede suilogon sozunun tezisteri 1008 djyldyn 5 fevralynda zhana Osh obJasynda 1998 djyldyn 6 fevralynda (in Kyrgyz), Tezisy vystupleniia Prezidenta Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki A. Akaeva na soveshchanii po preodoleniiu bednosti v Cbuiskoi obl.asti 5 fevralia 1998 g. i v Oshskoi oblasti 6 fevralia 1998 g. (in Russian) [Theses of the addresses of the President of Kyrgyz Republic Askar Akayev to participants of Poverty Overcoming Conference in Cbui Oblast on the 5th of February 1998 and in Osh Oblast on 6th of February 1998 in Collection of documents and materials to National Program to Overcome Poverty "Araket" (Bishkek, 1998), 62-761143-150, in Kyrgyz! Russian). 6. Colin Watson, "Project Report by Senior Tecbmcal Consultant" (World Bank Kyrgyzstan Social Assistance, February 1998), p. 6. 7. The number of officially registered unemployed amounted to 77,200 (or an unemployment rate of 4.4 percent) at end of 1996 but decreased to 56,500 (3.2 percent) by August 1997. 8. Training Trainers/or Development: Conductinga Workshop on Participatory Training Techniques (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Development and Population Activities [CEDPA], 1993), p. 125. 9. Raylynn Oliver and Erkin Kasybekov, "Credit and Microcredit in the Kyrgyz Republic" (Working document, UNDP Country Office, 1997), p. 14. 10. Natalia Gudkova et al., uPrognoz chislennosti ekonornicheski aktivnogo naseleniia Kyrgyzskoi respubliki v svete novoi strategii zaniatosti naseleniia", in Strategiia SQtsial 'noi politiki: zaniatosl', rynok truda i sotsial 'naia zasheh;ta naseleniia, Bishkek: Mig LTD, 1998,87-108 ["Projections of the Economically Active Population in the Kyrgyz Republic under the New Employment Policy Strategy," in Social Policy Strategy: Labor Market, Employment, and Social Assistance (Bishkek: Mig LTD, 1998), pp.

87~I08].

II. Tilak Hewawasam, "Community Infrastructure Services Rehabilitation Program {CISRP)," Technical Report, Kyrgyz Peoples' Initiatives Fund, 1997, p. 31. 12. Alrnaz Djaparov and Erkinbek Kasybekov, "Survey of Community Development Projects in Kyrgyz Republic (Community Development, Community Infrastructure Rehabilitation)," Report. UNDP Country Office, 1997, p. 23. 13. Sharon Holt, "Kyrgyz People's IJritiative Fund: The Micro Finance Component" (Technical Report, UNDP Country Office, 1997), p. 25.

Environmental NGOs and the Development of Civil Society in Central Asia Kate Watters

E

nvironmental NGOs have played a significant role in the development of civil society in Central Asia. Within the NGO community, environmental groups are among the strongest organizations; they have the longest history and have made significant contributions, not only to improving the environment, but also to building a society in which citizen participation is becoming a reality. While democratic reform has yet to reach most Central Asian governments, the increasingly influential NGO sectors in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have created democratic mechanisms for addressing social, environmental, and other problems within their societies. Environmental NGOs have taken on challenging issues that governments have neither the ability nor interest to address and have focused attention on topics that do require government input but, for whatever reason, have not received it. In a movement that is less than ten years old, the progress made by environmental NGOs toward constructive dialogue and concrete activity within society is striking. However, the effects of repressive governments, economic hardship, and limited funding possibilities, not to mention the legacy of the Soviet system, continue to place serious limitations on the movement's influence. Additionally, the environmental movement continues to rely on outside sources for the lion's share of its funding; currently, without Western assistance the development of the sector would slow significantly. This essay will provide a brief history of the Central Asian environmental movement, including the efforts of U.S. and other international donor agencies. It will then look at the political situation for environmental NGOs, discussing some of the issues that have limited their ability to have broad-reaching social impact, and then focus on four broad areas which, in my opinion, demonstrate the impact that environmental NGOs have had on the development of civil society in Central Asia--and the obstacles they have faced in their efforts.

I wish to thank Megan Falvey, Michelle Kinman, Muazama Burkbanova, Yusup KamaJov, Sergei Kuratov, and Yuri Skocbitov for their valuable contributions to this paper. Additionally, I am grateful to Eliza Klose, for many discussions on the topic of NGO sustainability and support for NGOs in Central Asia, which contributed to many of the ideas expressed here. Any mistakes are my sole responsibility.

85

86

Kate Watters History of the Central Asian Environmental Movement

In the fust days of the glasnost period, in many regions of the then Soviet Union, environmental concerns provided a focal point for opposition to the communist regime. Because the green movement was one of the few areas of nongovernmental activity not directly controlled by the government, it attracted activists interested in social change as well as environmental protection. Since environmental activities were viewed by governments as less sensitive than other, overtly political issues, activists were able to gain momentum as the Soviet legacy of environmental degradation became more widely known to the general public. And, in the course of their work on environmental issues. Soviet activists increasingly realized the pressing need for political reform to guarantee certain basic human rights such as freedom of speech and the right to organize. Environmentalism in Central Asia followed a path similar to that of other regions of the former Soviet Union. The first grassroots environmental groups formed between 1988 and 1990, and, simultaneously, popular movements grew around massive environmental issues. In Ukraine, citizens rallied around Chernobyl, and in Kazakhstan, around the nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk. Those were heady days; a ground swell of popular support for championing such environmental issues led to the election of some leaders of these mass movements to the republican and national soviets. As People's Deputies, they spoke passionately to the USSR Supreme Soviet about the environmental catastrophes in Central Asia, drawing attention to such crises as the desiccation of the Aral Sea and the nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk. creating hope in the environmental community that their concerns would be addressed. 1 Environmentalism became Ii rallying cry that gave citizens the feeling that they could rise up against the old Soviet structure. In a stunning victory, the Semipalatinsk testing ground was closed in 1991,2 but the exalted rhetoric of government leaders failed to translate into a more inviting climate for grassroots NGOs, and the fall of the Soviet Union also did little to improve the political sitnation for NGOs in Central Asia. It remained difficult for NGOs to register. and outright harassment by the government diminished the size, strength, and effectiveness of the environmental movement. NGOs that had previously benefited from the anti-Moscow rhetoric of their republican leaders now found their environmental and political focus placing them at odds with their new national govemments.3 Conversely, Central Asian political leaders who had previously benefited from opposition to Moscoworiginated projects that degraded the environment, had little to gain from continued pressure by local greens. Governmental leaders could no longer make political gains from the mass protests undertaken by environmental leaders; in

Environmental NGOs

87

fact, they became the object of those actions as they were forced to assume responsibility for the problems that had previously been branded as Soviet disasters. Nevertheless, environmental grassroots activists who focused on specific issues in their own communities continued their work. A small group ofbiodiversity conservation activists and scientists, linked primarily through the SocioEcological Union (an environmental umbrella organization with a network throughout the former Soviet Union), shared information and contacts. However, most environmentalists, isolated by distance, poor communications infrastructure, and a lack of resources, had little opportunity to collaborate with their colleagues in other regions. The notion that others might be interested in their work, much less fund it, was beyond the imagination of most. The majority of environmental activists struggled in relative solitude; their problems received little, if any, attention from the world at large. In 1992, international assistance organizations began to tum their focus to Central Asia. With financing from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). a U.S. nonprofit named World Learning began funding the first rounds of cooperative grants between U.S. and FSU NGOs, including environmental organizations. One of the rust projects supported by World Learning that involved green NGOs in Central Asia was a project to develop an e-mail network among environmental NGOs throughout the FSU.4 U.S. activists and NGO representatives traveled throughout Central Asia (and other parts of the FSU) supplying computers, modems, and technical training to local activists. Using the simplest e-mail technology, the project brought e-mail capacity to over 170 environmental NGOs, which began to communicate across borders and regions, creating the beginnings of a vast FSU-wide e-mail network, and plugging into the international green cyberspace community. The bad phone lines in much of Central Asia made it difficult for groups to contact each other, and much of the e-mail sent out of Central Asia in those rust years had to be sent in the middle of the night (when phone traffic through Moscow was less dense). Nonetheless, committed environmental activists sitting at their computers in the wee hours of the morning were able to connect with one another via e-mail, and despite the poor phone lines and expensive long distance calls, a new mode of communication was born.

International Assistance and the Development of Environmental NGOs In 1993, the U.S. government, through USAID. began to support nongovernmental environmental organizations in Central Asia through small grants and technical assistance programs administered within the region; one of these efforts was that of ISARs A number of other international nonprofit and

88

Kate Watters

development organizations-supported by USAID and other funders-also began working with environmental NGOs and different types of organizations such as universities, hospitals, and government entities.Ii However, few of them focused exclusively on NGOs, and fewer still on environmental NGOs. Efforts to support the development of democratic processes tended to concentrate on rule of law and civil society building projects, while support for environmental improvement leaned toward large-scale technical assistance projects such as USAID's Environmental Policy and Technology Project, which attempted to tackle Central Asia's enormous water problems by building new facilities and bringing in engineers and other technical experts. Since 1993, U.S. government-funded NGO sector support to the green movement has focused largely on small grants programs, technical assistance, information dissemination, conferences and workshops, development ofNGO resource centers, and training of all kinds. Through its Seeds of Democracy small grants program, ISAR supported over 360 environmental projects over a recent five-year period with a total of approximately 5490,000 in all five Central Asian countries. Table 1 ISAR Grants to Central Asian Environmental NGOs, 1993-1991

250,000 225,000 .

Total Grant Amount: $489,162

200,000

...c

175,000

0

150,000

::I

~

~

125,000 100,000 75,000 50,000 25,000 0

. :~ , ; '0

I.

Using small amounts of money (the largest grant was U8$3,000) and laborintensive monitoring, computer and technical training, and frequent travel to regions outside the capital cities, ISAR' s Seeds of Democracy program supports grassroots environmental initiatives. The majority of grants have been given in the areas of environmental education (28 percent), public awareness and information outreach (24 percent), and biodiversity conservation (15 percent).

Environmental NGOs

89

Environmental education projects include a variety of children's education programs, as well as community outreach activities. Public awareness and information outreach projects include the creation of community information and resource centers and computer and e-mail training, while biodiversity conservation projects have provided support to specific conservation programs and cataloging projects.7 Other areas of project support include environmental journalism, technical support, environmental law and policy, environmental monitoring, and environmental health. (See Table 2 below for percentage breakdown of support.) After five years of U.S. government support to the environmental sector, the number ofNGOs has grown from just a handful of groups in 1993 to hundreds today. While the majority of organizations are located in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with over a hundred environmental NOOs in each of those two countries, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan each have twenty to forty environmental groups.s While these numbers may seem small to those not familiar with the region, the growth in the past few years is striking considering the lack ofNGO laws, repressive political systems, extremely limited funding sources, and, in the case of Tajikistan, a civil war. Table 1 ISAR Seed$ of Democracy Program

15%

S%

1------------------

90

Kate Watters Political and Economic Umits to the Impact of NOOs

Government Tolerance. Environmental NGOs continue to address a wide variety of issues in Central Asia. and the broader societal implications of their work vary from country to country and from community to community. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where governments do not perceive themselves as threatened by them, environmental NGOs are beginning to contribute to the buHding of civil society in substantial ways, some of which will be described below. However, they still face obstacles in working with their governments. According to one activist, these include widespread corruption, a growing level of incompetence and unprofessionalism among government workers, and a lower level of concern within state structures about observing the law than during Soviet times.9 In Kazakhstan, the Ministry of the Environment and Bioresources (MEB), which some specialists and the public have suggested should obtain special status due to the severe environmental problems facing the country, has no additional authority, which "reduces the effectiveness of the MEB's activities and permits influential ministries, departments, local authorities, and private businessmen to ignore its decisions and requirements to a significant degree."10 Thus, even when government officials do support the activities ofNGOs, or broad conservation efforts in which NGOs are involved, competing political and economic interests may prevent their actual implementation. Environmental NGOs, in Kazakhstan particularly, complain about a lack of transparency in government activity that impedes their ability to work effectively, as well as contributing to the general lack of access to information about environmental issues. Additionally, they point to the lack of resources that impedes the government's ability to do its job well. ''11le shortage of resources for environmental protection and restoration projects has greatly reduced the work capacity not only of the MEB, but also of other ministries."11 For example, due to a number of administrative reorganizations, specially protected wilderness areas now fall under the jurisdiction of the Forestry Committee, which is part of the Ministry of Agriculture, one of the "chief agricultural entities whose interests often collide with a policy of creating specially protected territories. "12 Such bureaucratic inconsistencies help to create an environment in which NGOs are likely to meet indifference at best, if not intolerance, from governmental bodies. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where governments are less tolerant of NGO activity, environmental groups focus primarily on noncontentious issues that help build NGO capacity. but do not directly cballenge state structures. They are unable to address the very dire environmental problems resulting from

Environmental NODs

91

severe water pollution caused by the state's decision to continue cotton production as a major agricultural product. As described below, environmental NGOs have been forced to sidestep some of the major environmental issues facing their communities because of economic decisions made by national governments. In an exception to that generalization, in 1993-94 Turkmen and Uzbek greens worked with international NGOs to stop organized (and governmentsanctioned) poaching of large game and endangered species on zapovednik (nature reserve) territory, particularly in Turkmenistan, The Turkmen government (and the governments of several of the Central Asian states) had either invited or turned a blind eye to invitations to bring international hunters into their zapovedniki to hunt endangered species. Such hunts brought in large amounts of hard currency, and zapovednik workers, whose job it was to protect the parks, were threatened with losing their jobs if they did not serve as guides to the foreign poachers. Additionally, fees to those who guided the poachers were huge in comparison to the scant official salaries zapovednik workers received. For those workers struggling to make ends meet, the temptation sometimes proved too much to resist Environmental activists, who got wind of this story, worked actively with their colleagues abroad to encourage the governments to stop this direct violation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). Spreading the story over the Internet to U.S. and other environmental groups who then published the story. Central Asian greens struggled to fight against their corrupt governments. Some Western NGOs served as gathering points for letters to Turkmen President Niyazov and other Central Asian leaders, and they received letters from citizens around the world. This international letter-writing campaign over e-mail brought international focus to poaching of endangered species not only in Thrkmenistan but throughout Central Asia, and resulted, finally, in the signing of CITES by Kazakhstan. U In Tajikistan, amid the economic, political, and social chaos caused by a civil war, NGOs, surprisingly, have been able to gain a solid and relatively influential foothold in society, According to one Tajilc NOO leader. during the war, the government did not have the time or energy to focus on monitoring or limiting the development of NOOs and because of the chaos, people feel as though they have nothing left to lose so they are less concerned with the possible risks of organizing or joining an NGO,I4 These two factors have enabled the movement there to flourish in ways not possible in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, where the governments perceive the NGO sector as a potential threat.

92

Kate Watters

White (llfd Black Gold-Off Limits to NGO Work As mentioned above, environmental NGO activities are severely limited by factors connected closely to the economic situation of the region. This is particularly evident in crisis zones such as the Ami Sea basin. Even as the health of basin communities continues to decline and the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers remain severely polluted by agricultural runoff, NGOs working on Aral Sea issues do not focus their activities on cotton production, one of the worst contributors to the Aral Sea problem. They do actively conduct public awareness campaigns. health education projects, and information dissemination about water quality. Yet, without overall reform of the cotton industry, the effect of their work will be limited to improving conditions within a situation that is controlled by forces outside the affected communities. While several Karakalpak NGOs successfuUy focus their activity on public education around Aral Sea issues, they cannot address the broader issues essential to the resolution of the AmI Sea problems, such as reducing cotton production, improving the quality of irrigation canals, and managing water resources, both up- and downstream. Uzbek and Turkmen NGOs are simply unable to address these issues as long as cotton production remains a major source of revenue for the state. Successful NGOs in both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan such as the Dashkhovuz Ecology Club, the Union to Save the Aral Sea and the Amu Darya River, and Perzent conduct environmental education campaigns for both children and adults, carry out water monitoring projects, and gather and disseminate information about the environmental health crises in their region. However, they are unable to address the root causes of the crises for a variety of political and economic reasons. Unfortunately, despite widespread international concern about the AmI Sea problem and millions of dollars worth of assistance, U.S. and international donors have not dramatically improved the situation for local NGOs or their communities. Frequently lacking in coordination, international projects have failed to result in broad-based reforms in the environmental arena, which might, for example, clean-up a community's water supply. Providing humanitarian assistance, building a reverse osmosis plant to improve the quality of drinking water, water monitoring. and public education campaigns are among the activities supported by foreign assistance. Yet none of these projects has resulted in dramatically improved conditions for the residents of the Aral Sea basin. Complex relationships between government and nongovernmental organizations, including a lack of trust, have limited the success of many Jarge~scale projects that often fail to incorporate local communities or NGOs adequately

Environmental HGOs

93

into their activities. Government authorities too often parade out quasi-NGO "representatives" to meet with multilateral funders. The lauer, often unfamiliar with the green movement and the corrupt practices of many government officials, too frequently are fooled, leaving independent local NGOs without representation in, or even understanding of, major intemational efforts until after the major decisions have been made. Additionally, many of the larger assistance projects take years to implement, meaning results are unknown for sometimes five to ten years after a project is announced. This leaves many locals skeptical at best of the benefits of international assistance to their communities. While small, individual community activities have had substantial, and quickly visible. results (some of which are described below), macro-level changes are not yet evident. In contrast to the activity around the Aml Sea issue, there is practically no environmental NGO activity in the communities around the Tengiz oil fields in northwestern Kazakhstan or on the shores of the Caspian Sea, where international companies have invested millions of dollars in order to extract and export oil. In Turkmenistan, environmental activists are among the most qualified oil and gas specialists in the country studying Caspian Sea oil extraction, but their NGO work, for the most part, avoids direct involvement in these issues. NGO leaders interested in gathering and disseminating information among their Central Asian and Azerbaijani NGO colleagues have begun to explore the possibilities of cooperation; however, that exploration is in the very preliminary stages. Given the amount of oil in the Tengiz and Caspian Sea reserves and the speed with which international companies are investing in the region, it seems likely that active NGO involvement may lead to tension around the inevitable pollution caused by extraction. The experience of local and international NGOs both in the Russian Far Bast and in Ukraine demonstrates that business as well as national governments and international agencies can perceive the environmental movement as a potential threat to development. 16 NGOs around the Caspian basin may come together in coalition to monitor the activities of their own ministries as well as international oil companies and lending institutions to ensure compliance with environmental standards. The potential for building strong alliances exists; however, this activity has yet to be initiated. While the circumstances driving the cotton and oil industries differ dramatically, they share an important strength: generating hard currency. Geopolitics and economics keep government control over these industries tight-and NGOs are not welcome to address the environmental issues associated with them. The ability of green groups to focus activity or direct campaigns involving major state revenue sources is limited by the broader social, political, and economic issues they raise. Until the political climate

I'

94

Kate Watters

changes to enable more open discussion around these volatile topics, NGOs will be unable to effect change in these areas.

Direct Persecution ofActivists The threat of harassment and persecution of activists by governments is a relatively rare, but very powerful limitation on the activity of environmental NGO activists in Central Asia. Whether for minor infractions, such as violation of registration or tax codes, or for direct challenges to authority, greens throughout Central Asia must consider the possible consequences of their environmental and political actions. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, many groups face a dilemma: try to register an NGO and run the gauntlet of complex, costly governmental bureaucracies, which usually involve some bribery. too; or risk harassment by the authorities for avoiding registration. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have more progressive registration laws, and Tajikistan is currently working on a new law on registration for NGOs,17 but banking and taxation procedures for NGOs remain problematic throughout Central Asia. Outright persecution ofNGO representatives is uncommon, but government crackdowns are severe when they do happen. On July 12, 1995, between 500 and 1,000 protesters rallied in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, demanding democratic presidential elections and speaking out against President Niyazov's government. According to one source, 60 people were arrested, and at least one protester died shortly following his arrest-of suicide, according to Turkmen government officials. IS However. another report claims as many as 200 people may have been detained for their involvement in the proteSt. 19 Just two weeks later, a group of 100 Turkmen women marched to the presidential palace in Ashgabat, protesting the worsening economic situation and authoritarian ru1e of the President. Military troops blocked the protest before they were able to reach the palace. 20 In an incident in 1992, three Uzbek activists attending an international human rights conference in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, were arrested and forcibly returned to Uzbekistan by Uzbek security forces. In 1994, this time in Kazakhstan, two Uzbek dissidents who were on their way to a human rights conference in Almaty, were arrested and returned to Uzbekistan. again by security police. 2' In both of these cases and in others like it, security forces have crossed borders, their activities either sanctioned or ignored by the authorities of the host country-a chilling constraint on all activists who may be perceived as threats to governments in the region. In 1995 in Uzbekistan, two women-one an environmental activist from Karakalpakstan, the other a relative of the former Uzbek ambassador to the United States--were arrested and imprisoned on trumped-up charges of illegally

Environmental NGOs

95

"'U'U~l';HU,~ cattle President Karimov was angry with the ambassador, who refused to return from the United States to Uzbekistan. In an attempt to force his return, Karimov ordered the arrest of the two women, both of whom were pregnant at the time. Uzbek law prohibits incarceration during pregnancy, so both women were forced to undergo abortions and imprisoned for six months. 22 While neither woman was arrested for her environmental work, such cruelty serves as a powerful deterrent to anybody whose activities might anger the President. to the Central Asia Monitor, in 1995 there were "at least 20 current, or released political and T\lrkInellista~ who are known to be non-political crimes."Z3 With conditions in these countries deteriorated since then, NGO activists have good reasons to their activities and avoid tackling the most difficult and contentious issues their communities.

Environmental NGO Contributions to Civil Society

the hairdShlI)s outlined above, the envirournental NGO community has el0pm.em of civil society through four areas of activity; developing community support; neltwC)r:kJlng and coalition building; working with and in and international contacts. NGOs involved in these of activities are evolving organizationaHy from ad hoc groups focused on a Spe:CltiC issue or to more professional organizations with long-term While small initiative groups can play an rnnClrt~l1t role in their own mature NGOs are more likely to ensure ongoing citizen input into social and political processes that can have a larger effect on the In addition, mature environmental NGOs serve as models of democratic communities in which non-hierarchical, inclusive structures provide an alternative to traditional, For instance, the number of women envirournentalleaders demonstrates that qualified women are able to obtain and thrive in positions and within a in many other sectors in Central Asia.

J.J
Developing Community Support

In contrast to the charismatic nature of Central Asian groups in the late 1980s aud environmental NGOs are now to the need to build local support for their work among the communities in which they work and their interests. As NGOs and make the transformation to more professional become more aware of the need to public concerns and community support. Many NGOs to understand that without such support, they cannot achieve aU are

96

Kate Watters

they wish to or gain the legitimacy necessary to give them real influence within the community and with local and regional governments. Public education campaigns, environmental education, and other broadbased projects are important first steps in bringing communities together to work for common goals. These communities are then much more likely to hold accountable their local and regional governments. They are also more willing to undertake their own projects instead of waiting for someone else to take care of their problems. For example, in Nubs, Karakalpakstan, a Jocal NGO called Perzent works with the community to educate women and dleir families about the important link between environmental issues and human health. Nukus is located in dle Aral Sea basin, which is bome to one of the worst environmental disasters on the planet. A casualty of Soviet cotton production, which overused the resources ofbodl the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers (the main feeders of the Aral) in order to irrigate cotton fields upstream, dle Aral Sea has shrunk to ahnost half of its original size and, in fact, bas split into two parts. Cities that once supported thriving fishing industries are now as much as seventy kilometers from the sea, their fishing boats abandoned on the sand.Z4 In addition to bearing the economic strain from the loss of fishing industry along the shores of dle dying sea, the region surrounding the sea is plagued with heavy salt deposits from the receding water and with chemical poJIution, carried downstream by the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, from the over-use of pesticides, fertilizers, and defoliants during Soviet times in an attempt to reach the increasingly impossible goals of Five Year Plans. The result of this environmental degradation is one of the highest infant and maternal mortality rates in the FSU,low standards of living, high incidence of disease-especially among women and children-and few resources with which to combat the massive problems facing the population.:IS Led by Oral Ataniyazova,. a gynecoiogist-obstetrician who was trained in Moscow before returning to her native Karakalpakstan. Perzent is a unique organization working to empower local citizens. It conducts public education campaigns on hygiene and reproductive healdl issues, directing their message toward rural women and their families. Perzent also conducts environmental education programs; conducts social security and income-generation programs for women and children; edits a monthly bulletin on women's issues, including family problems, women's rights, and healthcare; conducts drinking water quality monitoring programs; and conducts independent scientific analyses of the environmental situation and the population's health. Many residents of the region have not been educated about the dangers of their polluted water supplies, including the water in the irrigation canals, on which some communities are forced to rely for their drinking and cooking. Perzent bas studied the effect of environmental degradation on the health of women, including conducting a

Environmental NOOs

97

survey of local women, aged thirteen to twenty. interviewing local residents, and monitoring the local water supply. Using the results of this research to infonn their methods, Perzent offers education programs for women and children on health, reproduction, birth control, hygiene, and ecology through their own educational brochures, training seminars, television programs, and children's environmental education programs.26 Perzent has also been able to establish international contacts and work in partnership with foreign organizations. Together with the U.S. environmental NGO, ECOLOGIA. Perzent conducted a water monitoring project, providing independent data on air, water, and soil quality around the Aral Sea basin. The results of their monitoring are available on-line and accessible to both the national and international communities.27 Perzent has gained the trust of the local community by providing resources and information not only in Russian, but also in Karakalpak, thus including a frequently excluded, primarily rural. community in its work. The organization combines a mix of scientific expertise and community advocacy to gain trust. In Osh, Kyrgyzstan, in the fertile Fergana Valley, the NGO Tabiat has made enormous strides in transforming a project it undertook to clean up the Ak Bura River. The clean~up is now a community-based effort supported by the NGO and its volunteers, as well as by local government and residents living along the river. The river, polluted by agricultural and industrial waste, was also a dumping ground for people living along its banks, who threw all sorts of garbage directly into it. When Tabiat initially undertook its river clean-up project, it enlisted the help of fifteen to twenty volunteers-most of them university students-who walked along a seven-kilometer stretch of the river removing garbage. However, local citizens simply continued dumping their trash into the river, convincing the members ofTabiat that they needed to include the community more actively in their project. In order to spark the interest of the community and help them understand the benefits they had to gain from the project, Tabiat organized a series of community meetings to raise awareness about the need to keep the river clean, and then recruited individual communities to assist with cleaning up their portions of the river front. Tabiat was able to convince local businesses to stop dumping waste directly into the river and, by working with the local government, succeeded in enforcing the payment of fines for littering, as well as increasing fines for factories dumping into the river. With govemment assistance, Tabiat was also able to organize raids on local businesses that pollute the river and to lead efforts to control waste produced by the local bazaar. Finally, Tabiat has stepped up its own public education activities by publishing articles in the local press, printing an environmental bulletin for Osh residents and leading seminars on water quality.28

98

Kate Watters

While the project is not without obstacles (local government support is at times lukewarm and some residents remain apathetic), Tabiat overcame its major hurdle-lack of support from the local community-by simply involving them in the process and helping them understand the benefits of the river cleanup. While this may seem rudimentary, it is a major accomplishment for any grassroots organization and the first step to helping individual citizens understand their ability, and indeed responsibility. to be involved in community decision-making.

Coalition Building, Networking within the Movement In the past few years. environmental NGOs in aU five countries of Central Asia have worked together to build networks and coalitions of like-minded citizens and organizations. This phenomenon demonstrates significant development of the NGO sector. In earlier years, environmental NGOs were hesitant to cooperate, tending to be suspicious of each other and frequently unwilling to share scant resources and information. While some obstacles to cooperation remain, environmentalists have discovered that the likelihood of successfully addressing regional and international environmental problems is greater when the efforts of several organizations are combined. Water issues, information exchange. and biodiversity conservation are some of the issues that bring organizations together. NGOs in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have fonned a network along the Amu Darya River with the hope of working together more effectively to facilitate the exchange of information between upstream and downstream communities. By organizing the Association of Aral Sea Basin NGOs. these groups plan to influence the politics of water management in the region as a whole-a task they can tackle much more successfully in coalition than as individual NGOs. While the association has yet to take on a major activity, according to Yusup Kamalov, one of the group's founders. it is committed to "continue [its] efforts to create a workable and effective network along the Amu Darya River:':!? Similarly, environmental NGOs in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan have begun to discuss ways of sharing data and working together on joint projects dealing with oil extraction and other common environmental issues related to the Caspian Sea. In Kazakhstan, NGOs in and around Karaganda have been working together to maximize the effectiveness of their activities. EcoCenter, an NGO which works on a variety of topics including biodiversity conservation, assessing the impact of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, environmental education, NGO computer and e-mail support, and social problems in rural areas, is arguably the strongest Kazak: NGO outside of Almaty. The group has a dynamic leader-

Environmental NGOs

99

who has won two MacArthur Foundation grants-and a qualified staff, and has been generous in its support of other regioual organizations, providing them with information, consultation. and technical assistance. In addition EcoCenter works closely with several groups in the region sharing information. and coordinating public awareness activities on a regionallevel.30 EcoCenter members have worked with other local and regional NGOs to educate the public about the environmental hazards that continue to plague the population living around the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground. In the fall of 1994, the NGO Shyrak, produced a series of programs for regional TV entitled, "Polygon: A Senseless Tragedy;' which described the impact of nuclear testing on the local population. ("Polygon" was the name of the nuclear test site.) Members ofEcoCenter were f1lmed monitoring radiation levels on the grounds of the polygon and have continued to analyze the effects of testing on birds, fish, and other animals. In addition to its scientific work, EcoCenter has helped the local NGO community by operating as a resource center. Computer access, a library. and email resources are some of the services the NGO provides to colleagues in other organizations. The professionalism and commitment of this organization have raised the legitimacy and profile ofNGOs in the community, increasing the likelihood that government and international support will be available to the Karaganda green community. Environmental NGOs have also joined forces to address some of the more universal problems faced by all NGOs. Among them is the problem of e-mail and Internet access, which anyone who has spent time in Central Asia can appreciate. In 1995, the environmental NGO. Catena. based in Ashgabat, together with the U.S. nonprofit Sacred Earth Network, began working together to establish an Internet connection in Ashgabat. While current Turkmen government policy virtually prohibits the import of foreign magazines and newspapers, Turkmen NGOs can now access news and information, as well as communicate with colleagues, from all over the world at no charge through Catena's server. By providing the cheapest and most reliable Internet service to the business and international community in Turkmenistan. the Catena server has become selfsustainable: profits earned from business users pay for free access for Turkmen NGOs.3 ! The importance of e-mail and Internet access in Central Asia can scarcely be overestimated. Environmental NGOs throughout the region have used e-mail to manage campaigns drawing international attention to critical environmental issues. For example, during the Tajik civil war, Tajik and Russian environmental NGOs worked together to draw attention to bombing of the Tigrovaya Balka (Tiger Hollow) zapovednik. In 1994, the military was conducting exercises in the nature reserve. threatening protected habitat in this region along the Afghan

100

Kate Watters

border. The exercises also threatened in the reserve, who were unrest the country. an intemational e-mail camthe NGOs informed activists aroUlld the glohe of the bombing, which resulted in the military ceasing their operations on the territory of the zapovednik The intemational attention also encouraged the local Tajik NGO, Citizen on Sustainable Development and to continue u,,,,r1£;'-1<1 on the and with ISAR the group was able or~~an1Ze a series of roundtable discussions about the status Hollow. the zapovednik achieved status,32 by an international group of scientists.

Working with On the

Central Asian environmental NGOs have had limited success in when with NGD activities in "-',,",VU'LU. In recent years, there has been a movement of the NGDs maintain limited with government, pun"'''''J to see that NGOs can an t...,.... ""rt"'~t the life of tbe community, and NGDs seek to maximize their effectiveness. gO'vernrrlents have come to understand that NGOs can accomplisb - l 1 " " . : t H V at much less cost and with much quicker that the does not have the money or to NGO services to local include activities such as the development of environmental education materials for publishing "Red Books" (cataen
Environmental NOOs

101

fanners how to use the vermiculture reCjl1Illqu~~s and provide them with a "starter kit" OfWOrnlS. Additionally, Taza-Gul has marketed the biohnmus to dacha owners and others with the viable and its sustainability.33 While the ofNGO-government takes place at the local level, a few environmental NGOs are working with government at the national for a coalition of more than environmental level. In NGOs, caned the Citizens' Council on the has teamed up with the Minister advising him on national environmental issues. The group also lobbies the to support international acts and international conventions on the environment. Among their successes are the passage of a 1996 environmental education law and the increase in size of the Balka 54 have also lobbied the and the Council and an ('{\1nt-P'''PTlf',P ad,:lrel,SlIlg the International Convention on Desertififor the next session of the cation. Ratification of the Convention is Parliament. the in cooperation with the International Center for Not-for-Profit l.J1W reworked an alternative law on social org;amlZations and submitted it to the parliament for discussion, which will take at the [aU 1998 session ofparliarnent. 35 PpT'h",~" the most of environmental NGO-government collaboration involves the Almaty-based group, Green Salvation, which has been instrumental in the of three new nature protection laws in Kazakhstan. Green Salvation was invited by the to participate in WOlfKllltg groups that developed legislation, which resulted in the passage of the Assessments and the Law on Protected Law on Environmental ,",U,,'''''''Y pruttlC:lP,LtU1lg in the working group on a new draft law The reconunendations of the working group are passed on ""'rTi~i",'>nt as it reviews the draft that NGO opinion is heard at go'Velnlllelltt. 36

Establishing International Contacts The fmal element in successful environmental NGO contributions to civil is the of international contacts. While environmental NGOs tend to be most successful when the establishment of an international network is a tool ill for the concerns of a conununity. international networking frequently through discussion with locally-based international NGOs or and grows through e· as activists access infonnation resources not otllerwise available to them.

J02

Kate Watters collea.gm~s around the enables environmentaljsts to take "rt,...".-h",nti ..." outside of their immediate communities. Such con-

provides a network of colleagues for collaborative work, but also to new through 1:ellovvSflms and abroad programs. The opportunity to travel to other countries and witness fIrsthand-~and participate in-the envirollmental movements, and scientifIc communities provides environmental activists with invaluable It also enables them to educate their international vV'W~b~'~" about little understood Central Asian issues. of Central Asia's "tr'~'HJ, .."t environmental leaders have had just such international experience. travel to Russia and other parts ofthe as wen as to and the United environmental NGO leaders not only but skills orgi.miZa!tioxls and their communities when return home. The NGO cmUHl.QD, "-'....'in'.." , is comprised of leading Central Asian b10diconservationists who work to ensure Central Asian into international Biostan has in international !)m«ll,,'ers~lty conservation conferences, one on combating de~,ert.ll:l(;atl.on, members of the group attended the 1995 mCN conference in H>l"U",uau, ilitv with international donors that to demonstrate in their own countries. Because so have the few Western foundations are prepared to fund in Central Asia, it is extremely that activists from the have the opportunity to meet with those funders who are supporting, or considering supporting, PfO!lects in their countries. Another critical component of successful international networking is the opportunity for Central Asian environmental to work in pal1:rH~rsli1ip with international NGOs. in the envIronmental V;'lclV'.
Environmental NGOs

103

where communities around the globe are addressing similar problems, the benefit of partnership projects is great to all involved. Central Asian groups working on water monitoring, drafting environmental legislation, biodiversity conservation, environmental education, and development of improved communications systems for NGOs have an benefited from international partnerships (as have their partners). Successful partnership efforts require longterm commitments founded on solid trust between the partners and a project which has been developed and planned by both parties. The benefits of such projects are well worth the time and effort they require and can contribute greatly to the organizational and programmatic development of both organizations, as well as to fmding workable solutions to the problem at hand. For example, the partnership between ECOLOGIA and Perzent, descnbed above, has contributed to the overall understanding of the water quality in the Nukus region, and the effect it has on the local community. ECOLOGIA brought its technical expertise to the project, training local residents how to use HACH monitors to evaluate the water quality in their community, and Perzent, in addition to learning how to use the equipment, used its skills to bring the information to the local community in a positive and effective way. Unlike many other international projects in the Aral Sea region, this project utilized the expertise of both organizations, and included them in both the conception and implementation of the project In another example of successful international partnership, the Aralsk, Kazakhstan-based NGO, Ana-Umiti, worked in partnership with Yusup Kamalov, a wind engineer based in Nukus, Karakalpakstan, the UNDP, and ISAR to provide wind energy to a maternity hospital in Aratsk. The project provided a wind-powered turbine to the hospital, which has recently been without electricity OVer 50 percent of the time. Using the technical expertise of Kamalov and the knowledge of the local conditions of Ana-Umiti, UNDP and ISAR, with financial support from UNDP, the Turner Foundation, and USAID, purchased and set up the wind turbine to provide electricity to the hospital. The project also included a public participation component, which provided seminars to the local population and a bookIet, in Russian and Kazak, on climate change issues in Kazakhstan. This unusual partnership provided a necessary service to a needy community through the diverse expertise of the various partners. International NGO partnerships also playa key role in preparing Central Asian NGOs for the roles they can and must playas both watchdogs and partners with industry and government International NGOs, while not holding all the answers. have long experience in negotiating with business and government leaders who would often prefer to conduct their activities without NGOs at the table. International partnerships can ensure that this does not happen, particu-

104

Kate Watters

larly in cases where investors are bound by intemationallaws, which often stipulate citizen awareness of and involvement in projects with international financing. Finally. international contacts can provide a safety net for environmental NGOs. It is much more difficult for a repressive government to crack down on an environmental leader or the activities of a particular organization with the international community watching. The case of Aleksandr Nikitin in Russia is a good example of the kind of pressure the international community can place on a government. Nikitin, a retired Russian naval officer, was arrested in February 1996 by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and accused of espionage, a charge which carnes a sentence of ten to fifteen years in prison or death. Nikitin had been researching the extent of radiation leaks from Russian naval nuclear submarine fleets on the Kola Peninsula for the Norwegian NGO, Bellona. After spending ten months in pre~trial detention, Nikitin was released from prison and restricted to the St. Petersburg city limits in December 1996, thanks to national and international pressure on the Russian government. In 1997, Nikitin was a recipient of the internationally acclaimed Goldman prize, and although he was unable to leave Russia to accept the prize, his wife traveled to the United States to accept it for him. Throughout 1997 and most of 1998, environmentalists around the world watched his case and applied steady pressure to the Russian government to drop the charges against Nikitin. His case fmally went to trial in October 1998. with the Bellona Foundation providing a daily account of proceedings bye-mail around the world. In the event, charges against Nikitin were dismissed in a major defeat for the the government and victory for the rule of law in Russia.37

Condusion One of the questions posed to all authors who made contributions to this book was what conclusions can be drawn about supporting the third sector in Central Asia with international funding? Is it realistic to think that a viable, sustainable sector can be jump~started in three to five years? The answers to those questions are different in each of the countries of Central Asia, due not only to the state of the NGO sector but also to the broader political realities in each country. It is no secret that democratic reforms have taken much stronger hold in Kyrgyzstan than in Turkmenistan, and the level of democratization directly affects the size and influence of the NOO sector in each country. The simple answer is that we have not seen the development of a sustainable NOO sector in the five years that international funders have been working in Central Asia, but that does not mean it will not happen in the future. Ongoing efforts will be necessary to

Environmental NOOs

105

achieve a sustainable Third Sector-but given the relatively low cost they are wen worth it. Effective international assistance to NGOs requires a careful effort on the part of funders in order to ensure effective coordination of projects and adequate support to local NGOs. It requires working with new organizations, not only with those that are the most established and accomplished, in order to ensure the continued development of the sector. It also requires that donors listen carefully to the needs of the local communities and then use that information in the development of long-range pIans--even if it means adopting programs with a focus different from the original concept. Some environmental activists have been critical oru.s. foreign assistance to the region, claiming that donors are patronizing and lack a solid understanding of the communities they ostensibly want to help. According to Central Asian greens, maintaining transparent and democratic processes, listening to and working with local activists and utilizing a grassroots approach can improve the effectiveness of international programs.38 Effective assistance means obtaining citizen input on all kinds of projects, from development of rule of law to the building of water purification plants; for without an informed and interested citizenry that feels invested in the process of reform, international efforts will fail. The U.S. government has stated that it is committed to the development of a market economy and democratic reforms in Central Asia. Its assistance programs should continue to reflect that commitment. International economic interests in Central Asia may bring prosperity to local communities, but only if an informed citizenry participates in the decisions about where to place that new factory or how to determine the environmental impact of oil drilling. gold mining, and other natural resource extraction. As the United States and other countries develop markets in Central Asia using government monies, we have an ongoing responsibility to ensure that democratic reforms accompany the economic ventures. Just as market economies do not happen overnight, so, too, grassroots citizen involvement is slow to develop, but it is the essential ingredient of participatory democracy. the inclusion of which foreign assistance should ensure. While the governments of Central Asia are unlikely to undergo radical political reform in the near future, we should not turn our backs on the achievements of the region's Third Sector. Each NGO accomplishment is a sman step forward in the process of developing a civil society in which citizens take responsibility for, and have the ability to effect, change in their communities. In the environmental sector that means working for environmental improvements, preserving protected areas, and ensuring a better future for coming generations.

106

Kate Watters

Notes I. For detailed discussions of Central Asian deputy discussions on the Ami Sea and other environmental crises, see Kathleen Watters, "Central Asia and the Central Press: A Study in News Coverage," Journal a/Soviet Nationalities, Vol. 1, No.2, (Summer 1990): pp.99-121. 2. For a full account of the opposition to Semipalatinsk:, see D.J. Peterson, Troubled Lands: The Legacy o/Soviet Environmental Destruction, Westview Press, 1993, pp. 202-206. 3. For example, the Uzbek opposition party Birlik, which enjoyed relative freedom in the late 1980s, was outlawed and its leaders imprisoned or forced into exile in the . early 1990s. See Abdumannob Polat, "Pursuing Dissidents in Exile: mega{ Activities of Central Asian Security Forces," parts 1 and 2, Central Asian Monitor, nos. 2 and 3, 1995, for more information about persecution of Birlik members. 4. This project was a two-year joint effort of ISAR and the Socia-Ecological Union (SEU). In the years following this World Learning project, lSAR has continued to help environmental groups get on-line by providing computers and other equipment, as well as by providing on-site e-mail and Internet training to environmental NGOs. Other U.S. NGOs also began working with their FSU counterparts to improve computer and e-mail capacity. Sacred Earth Network, a Massachusetts-based environmental organization took the lead in providing e-mail training to NGOs throughout the FSU, and continues this work today through their Environmental Communications Project 5. ISAR: Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia was created in 1983, and has been working directly on the ground in the FSU since 1991. Based in Washington, D.C., and through its offices in Moscow, Vladivostok, Novosibirsk, Kiev, Almaty, and Baku, ISAR administers small grants programs, technical assistance and training to environmental and other NGOs throughout the FSU. ISAR-Almaty serves all of Central Asia, managing an e-mail program, a cooperative grants program for Central Asian and other FSU environmental NGOs, and several other programs for Central Asian greens. 6. Mercy Corps, NOI, 00, 8oros, HNOS, NOVIB, Milieu Kontakt, Eurasia Foundation, and later Counterpart Consortium, Sacred Earth Network, VOCA and others were among the international NGOs that began working in the region. 7. ISAR-Almaty Seeds of Democracy data base, March 1998. 8. ISAR, "A Brief Overview of the Environmental Movement in the Newly Independent States" (Paper prepared for the NGOlDonor Workshop in Szentendre, Hungary, 12-14 May 1997), pp.6-7. 9. Sergei Kuratov, correspondence with author, March 1998. 10. Sergei Kuratov, "The Economic and Social-Environmental Situation in Kazakhstan," Ecological Economics Bulletin, Vol 3, No.3: 20. 11. [bid, p. 20. 12. Ibid. 13. See £Coston News, Vol. I, No.2; Vol. I, No.3; Vol. 1, No.4; Vol. 2, No. I; Vol. 4, No.5; and Vol. 5, No.3 for detailed descriptions of those and other hunts on big game and endangered species in Central Asia. 14. Yuri Skochilov, "Tajik Activists Stress Coalition Building," Surviving Together (Fall 1996): 35, and interview with Megan Falvey. ISAR-Almaty, March 1998.

Environmental NGOs

107

15. This phenomenon is not limited to Central Asia. For a comprehensive study on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance to the FSU, see JNA Associates, Inc., Aid to the Former Soviet Union: When Less is More, March 1996. The project studied U.S. assistance to the FSU, analyzing what sorts of projects worked, and how assistance monies could be spent more effectively. Among their findings, was the conclusion that smaller projects-whether nonprofit or for-profit activities-were much more effective than larger ones. This was true for all types of projects. including environmental ones. 16. In both Sakhalin (in the Russian Far East) and Odessa (Ukraine), NGOs are working to ensure that environmental impact assessments and other legally required provisions are followed by corporate or state entities drilling for and/or exporting oil. Their efforts have brought them criticism for being anti-development. However, in two instances in these regions, the World Bank has sided with the NGOs and delayed project funding pending compliance with international standards. 17. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law has the most current legislation on not-for-profit organimtions in all five Central Asian countries. 18. "Protests in Turkmenistan," Ecostan News, Vol. 3, No.8, pp. 1-2. 19. "News Briefs, Turkmenistan," Central Asia Monitor No.5, 1995: 12-13, and "New Briefs, Turkmenistan," Central Asia Monitor No.4, 1995: 12-13. 20. "News Briefs, Turkmenistan," Central Asia Monitor, No.4, 1995: B. 21. Abdumannob Polat, "Pursuing Dissidents in Exile: Illegal Activities of Central Asian Security Forces,' Part I, Central Asian Monitor No.2, 1995: 31-36, and Polat, "Pursuing Dissidents in Exile, "Illegal Activities of Central Asian Security Forces, Conclusion," Central Asian Monitor, No.3, 1995: 31-36. 22. Yusup KamaIov, correspondence with the author, August 1998. 23. Central Asia Monitor, No.3, 1995: 33. 24. Peterson, Troubled Lands, p. 112. 25. Peterson, Troubled Lands, p. 115; Philip R. Pryde, Environmental Management in the Soviet Union, Cambridge University Press, 1991. p. 226; David R. Smith, "Kazakhstan," in Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet Republics, ed. Philip R. Pryde, Westview Press, 1995, p. 268. 26. For more information on Perzent, see Oral Ataniyazova, "NGO Helps Relieve Distress of Women's Reproductive Health in KarakaJpakstan," Surviving Together, Winter 1994: 37-38, and Women, Health and Environment Newsletter, 1+2, Autumn, 1997. 27. ISAR Cooperative and Seeds ofDernocracy Program grants reporting. 28. Pirjan Manasov, "NGO Works to Clean Up Kyrgyz River," Surviving Together, Winter 1996: 18-20. 29. Yusup Kamalov, e-mail interview with author, March 1998. 30. Andrew Vim, ISAR Grants Manager Report, November t 997. 31. {SAR Cooperative Grant files, and Gabriela Scbwan, "Turkmen NGOs: Off the Beaten Track," Surviving Together, Fall 1996: 4()..41. 32. Biospbere status is a United Nations designation, part of the UN's "Man and Biosphere" program. Achieving Biosphere status means that the zapovednik becomes a site on the UN's list of places deserving of international protection. 33. ISAR-Almaty Grant Manager Project Notes, 1997. 34. Yuri Skochilov, Wfajik Activists Stress Coalition Building," Surviving Together, Fall 1996: 36.

108

Kate Watters

35. Yuri Skochilov and Muazama Burkhanova in correspondence with the author, March 1998. 36. Sergei Kuratov in correspondence with the author, March 1998. 37. For more information on the Nikitin case, including copies ofNikitin's report on the radiation leaks. contact Bellona at http://www.grida.nolngolbellona. or the Sierra Club at http://www.sierraclub.orglhuman-rightslrussialhtml. 38. Sergei Kuratov and Sergei Solyanik, "The Glimmer and Glare ofC()operation," Ecostan. News, Vo!' 3, No. S, August 1995, and Oleg Tsaruk, "Equality for the Earth: Fostering Genuine Partnerships in the Environmental Movement," Surviving Together, Winter 1995: 5-7.

Kolkhoz and Civil Society in the Independent States of Central Asia Olivier Roy

C

entral Asian societies are still mainly rural; 60 percent of the Uzbek population, for instance, lives in rural areas, and the figure is higher if we consider only ethnic Uzbeks, because non-Muslim minorities tend to live in cities. The birth rate is higher in the countryside, and there is still no massive rural mi.gration: the rural population will thus keep its weight for a while. On the other hand, the few active democratic movements are urban· based, while the presidential power is largely supported, among other things, by a network of rural notables (usually on a regional basis). The consequence is that no process of democratization could bypass the rural areas. They are until now organized along the kolkhoz system, which is an administrative, economic, and sociological entity. The issue of the kolkhoz (collective farm) system is at the core of any approach to the building of a civil society. Maintaining, reshaping, or destroying the kolkhoz is also a practical issue as far as economic development is concerned. Is the kolkhoz just a legacy of a centralized and statist system or did it acquire some social and economic autonomy in the transition period after inde. pendence? Is the kolkhoz doomed to disappear in favor of privatization or does it retain a kind of social personality which makes it an actor not only of the transition but also in the emergence of a civil society? How to combine the social role of the kolkhoz with economic efficiency and rationality? The usual perception from economic experts (not just the IMF and World Bank, but also many NGOs engaged in building civil society) is that the kolkhoz is a negative factor and should be dismantled in favor of private farmers. Of course, the negative social aspects of dismantling the kolkhozian system are sometimes taken into consideration (mainly the rural migration that will follow), but they are seen as inevitable. Our aim here is not to plead in favor of the kolkhozian system, but to analyze its resilience and ambiguity. Privatization is inevitable in the long run, but, in my eyes, it should start from the kolkhoz and not fight against it, because the kolkhoz is part of "real" society, civil or not. In any case, the local actors are more clever (and have more time) than foreign experts to alter and recast imported schemes of privatization according to their own traditions, requirements ... and power struggles. One would save time in. starting from the existing social order instead of trying to impose an artificial change by Jaw, money, inducements, and good will. 109

110

Olivier Roy

The kolkhoz is in many ways a conservative institution inherited from the Soviet system and it is still a tool in the hands of apparatchiks who fear losing their grasp on society in the event of privatization. But, on the other hand, the kolkhoz has acquired in Central Asia a far larger social and even political role than was devoted to it by the Soviet system; it does represent collective identities that could be a basis for maintaining a civil society. It could also be an actor in the transition period, allowing peasants to tum into farmers while retaining social structures which protect them from both state encroachments and wild privatization. In fact we can observe a differentiation among ko1khozes. Some are simply a tool in the hands of fonner apparatchiks trying to retain a social basis for their political power; they do this with the consent and support of the new authoritarian states, which find a way to extract benefits from industrial crops (cotton) bought at fixed prices and sold at market prices. But some others are experiencing a kind of social and economic autonomy. which makes them closer to the "cooperatives" of Westem Europe. Here arises the question of what we mean by a "civil society," Two definitions are at stake: one, inherited from Hegel and Marx. means a society which has its own social stratification and economic mechanisms "outside" the state; the other implies a society made up of free individuals, able and willing to build political ties voluntarily in order to create a State of Law. In this latter sense, privatization is obviously a prerequisite for democratization. In the former sense, there is already a kind of "civil society" in Central Asia; in the second sense, it has to be built from scratch. Without entering a lengthy philosophical debate, a point must be made. Civil or not, there already is a society in Central Asia, with its culture, traditions, solidarity groups, patronage networks, etc., and this society is not just a byproduct of the Soviet system. It is a mistake to see Central Asian societies as deprived of any social fabric: there are sociological networks, even loosely established, based on extended families, clans, the mahalla (or neighborhood), and on kolkhozes, which include a set of different mahaJIa. The concept of civil society should not ignore a traditional (or in this case re-traditionalized) social fabric. To ignore or bypass existing social structures would lead to "window" refonns which might benefit only a handful of "private" entrepreneurs. Any systematic campaign of privatization means Imt the destruction of an existing society and not only of an obsolete economic system. The "private" entrepreneurs or farmers are not just individuals who are more modem, clever, or dynamic than the others. They are also a part of networks, extended families, and clans, and they playa role in a political game. both local and national, where power is more at stake than democracy_ In a word, the Fergana Valley as well as the Kazakh Plains are not the Middle West of the nineteenth century. a

Kolkhoz and Civil Society in Central Asia's Independent States

111

mistaken perception shared equally by the IMP. some NGOs, and the Soviet Gosplan during Nikita Khrushchev's "Virgin Lands» campaigns. Of course, there are also many differences among the republics of Central Asia. The kolkhozes have been established according to different historical backgrounds: forced sedentarization of tribal nomads in Kazakhstan, huge population displacements in many places of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, direct transformation of already settled tribes and clans with little changes in their territorial repartition in Turkmenistan. The enforcement of the monoculture of cotton in the lowlands has entailed a differentiation with highlands kolkhozes devoted to food crops or to herding-the latter are easier to privatize. Independence has aggravated these differences; laws in favor of privatization are very open in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but not in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan is a mixed case, with official support for privatization contrasting with the very slow pace at which it is being implemented. But in fact the social reality of the kolkhoz bypasses everywhere the economic and legal systems. Even when kolkhozes are not the simple translation of sets of extended families which lived on the spot before sovietization* they have acquired, as we shall see, a "nec-traditional" identity. with their sets ofmahalla and awlad (extended family), whatever kind of crops are growing there. This is what differentiates "European" and Central Asian kolkhozes. The former provides only an administrative entity and some social services. The kolkhozian identity does not go further (a kolkhozian settled in town ceases to be a kolkhozian). But the Central Asia kolkhoz produced new clans and tribes, as patronage networks and extended family ties woven inside the kolkhoz stretched and thrived outside the kolkhoz. Here we have the revenge of a traditional culture and society on an imported system. The discrepancies in the new nations' law-making have not yet been translated into sociological differences. Many privatizations in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are window-dressing and express the ambivalent domination of local notables, whose constituency is based on a traditional identity group, superficially reshaped by the Soviet system. Our fieldwork has been done in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, but I suspect that my analysis would fit with what is going on in the other countries. This paper intends to provide experts on privatization with some cultural and sociological insights on post-independence Central Asian rural societies, but it does not pretend to give an exhaustive analysis of legislation, economic statistics, or the present state of privatization. The Kolkhozian Collective Identity

The sovietization of Central Asia really began in 1921 with the first five-year plan and the attack on traditional society and Islam (hojjum). Collectivization

112

Olivier Roy

led to a territorialjzation of the usually preceded displacements of population, although such displacements went on until the 19508, and of the of Mastcha and sometimes the 19608 (forced valleys in Tajikistan). Nomads were forcibly settled in the kolkhl)Zllm structures. But the kolkhozes were usually established on the basis of local identity groups, whatever the anthropological nature of these groups in tribal areas, extended families and mahaUa in other areas, groups caned qawm, etc.). In the population had already a sense of collective proin the framework of the awlad or dans~-it was easier to proceed to collectivization these already 'For vA"tWf1!C, most of the Turkmenistan kolkhoze:. are the sheer translation of the traditional tribal structures (tribe and distributed along the networks of irrigation CnllmltelS). A kolkhoz is usually based on such a set groups; for C]lJ;l.IlljJII;:, Bertrand Bouchet showed how in the rural soviet of Kungur me:ru.stan), the Karl Marx kolkhoz is the expression of the Kara Kungur-Jagyp and the kolkhoz Bolshevik of the Ak Golok clan. l In other (south the kolkhozes were along ethnic lines. In the district of Kabadyan, the kolkhoz Pakhtakar is ethnically Uzbek, while the koltheir names indicate) khozes LilI-i Badakhshan and Nasir Khosraw are that is by Ismailis brought from Badak:hshan during the fifties. When the population was it was on a collective either to take their pristine identities somewhere or, when settled in a very different context, to new identities in reaction to an alien context-but traditional lines of extended families in a manalla, patronage ""t.,,,,,,.tr,, An case has been the displacement of the population of the Mastcha district to northern in the fifties. The kolpristirle vaney did to the awlad segmclltalands in the north, the new villages when displaced to newly were named after the former ones why there are two Mastchas in the republic). In some cases local and loose identities on:gmatulg from the Gharm and the Kulab valleys in for mstan.ce} took on a and deeper nature after a forced migration to an environment some identities have often been by antaseen as alien or even competition between kolkhozes for land and water. For example, the Kulabi and Gharmi kolkhozes in the Kurgan-teppe oblast in Tajikistan, established in the became rivals when scarcity of land and water took Ii more acute turn. The kolkhoz Turkmenistan in Vakhsh, became the stronghold of the Gharmis civil while the kolkhoz on the other side of the

Kolkhoz and Civil Society in Central Asia's Independent States

113

Vakhsh-Kolkhozabade road near Kurgan-Teppe, was populated mainly by Kulabis. The road became a military front line from June to October 1992, when the two kolkhozes fought each other. The competition for scarce resources under the control of state structures led to the politicization of group antagonisms. 3 Incidentally, both kolkhozes include a minority of the other group that was expelled during the fighting (and subsequently reinstated after the war, with an inferior status for the Moskwa kolkhoz and a new leadership status for the Turkmenistan kolkhoz), Both minority groups lived in specific mahalla (the Maskinabad mahalla for the Kulabis in the Turkmenistan kolkhoz). Although the general rule is that within one kolkhoz there is a sense of collective identity, these examples show that inside the kolkhoz there are traditional subdivisions which could become antagonistic, a fact to be taken into account in a privatization process. People wanting to leave the kolkhoz might have other motivations than a taste for a market-oriented economy. And they might frod in NGOs another kind of patronage dependence. The inner administrative structure of the kolkhoz has also reshaped and strengthened traditional identity groups. The brigade and the uchatska (groupings of houses) duplicate the qawm and mahalla segmentations and give them an almost administrative reality, which of course has never been expressed in official terms. Traditional endogamy (or marriage within the group) tended to strengthen this group identity, as well as the fact that, in the Soviet system, work was allotted on the basis of such groupings. Communist party structures also often duplicated the anthropological segmentation into identity groups-the Communist Party's local leaders used to come from the dominant group. After perestroika the flourishing of new mosques indicated less a sudden upsurge in religious practice than. the will for any mahalIa to have its own mosque and mullah in order to stress its specificity (nowadays, one of the best ways to identify ethnic groups in rural areas is to count the mosques). This does not mean that the dominant group in Soviet times was the same as in the pre-Soviet period. It could be the same (in Turkmenistan, for example), but, in many cases, the new dominant group came from lower status pre-Soviet groups (for example, in Fergana, from thefoqara against the khwaja). The important thing is that, whatever the sociological or historical basis of the dominant group, the patterns of domination, solidarity> and patronage are of the same type as before the USSR and have reshaped, from inside, the Soviet local apparatus. Even at the economic level, a symbiosis was found between the Soviet system and traditional patterns of collective tenure (according to a qawm system) and private plots. The concept of a collective land tenure based on an identity group coupled with private plots owned by a father and his sons (even married).

114

Olivier Roy

which bas been inherited from the past, bas been repeated within the kolkhoz system. (Houses of the sons are often built on the father's plot.) By eliminating the "Begs" and "Khans," the Soviet system paradoxically upheld the local "communities» against a process of social and economic differentiation. which. for example, bas unraveled neighboring Afghani.stan:~ This does not mean that social and cultural differentiation ceased to exist. The prestigious families (pir and ;shan, or religious leaders, and khwaja, a sort of aristocracy with religious legitimization) retained their prestige but generally lost their economic position-except the ones. like the ashrafofKhojent, who managed to enter, after the purges of 1937, the top levels of the local Soviet apparatus. In particular many religious families (affiliated to a Sufi brotherhood) retain their social status inside the kolkhoz system.' In a word, the kolkhoz system is "traditional," not only as a "Soviet" system but also as the expression of a Muslim segmented society superficially reshaped along Soviet administrative lines, whose main achievement was to create administrative and political stakes for this segmentation (power inside the Party's structures). Although the government directed and planned the kolkhoz's production, state control inside the kolkhoz amounted to almost nothing in terms of police and intelligence. The kolkhoz was dependent on the state in many respects: inputs (gas, fuel, seeds, fertilizer, etc.), marketing, accountability, etc. Accounting was done by the state banks, prices and production quotas were fixed by the state, etc. But the kolkhoz was rather autonomous in its domestic management. Generally, no security forces (militias and KGB) were based in the kolkhoz and sometimes even not in the surrounding "Soviet of villages.'06 The agent of the state was supposed to be the local party apparatus, but an party members were by definition kolkhoz members, bom and brought up in the place, with family links to all the would-be "enemies of the people," such as the mullahs. Although the kolkhoz had its own hierarchy and conflicts (because of the prevalence of some clans and families), it protected its members from outside encroachments. Religious practice was in fact alive inside the kolkhoz, and the mullah. known by everybody, was simply registered as a "brigadist" or tractof driver. This protection extends today outside the kolkhoz. Kolkhoz members who settle in cities benefit from the kolkhoz's protection. through a network of patronage inside the republican party structure. Does a kolkhoz member have a problem in finding ajob or getting out of the grip of the militia? Call the kolkhoz chairman, hoping that he might pull strings. In Central Asia, unlike in Russia, the basis of political power is always linked with regional networks of rural apparatchiks. Is there a threat in town, fOf any reason? Take asylum in the kolkhoz. This is how three generations of mullahs have been able to survive. On the other band, the apparatchiks who succeeded in town will help their fellow kolkhozians. Unlike in Russia, most of the present political leaders of Central

Kolkhoz and Civil Society in Central Asia's Independent States

115

Asia have a rural background and often a "home-kolkhoz." But of course this creates a lot of differences between well-connected kolkhozes and the others, which in both cases leads to a growing self-identity, for the best or the worst. Every child of a kolkhozian is a member of the community, even if he moves to town. Even in this case, be is entitled to get a kolkhozian private plot and house. This explains why, when asked about the number or"kolkhozians," kolkhoz leaders give two figures: the "population" of the kolkhoz and the "workers" of the kolkhoz, with usually a ratio often to one between the former and the latter. For example, the Lenin kolkhoz in Dushanbe bas 26,000 "inhabitants" and 1,400 "workers," and at the Rasbidov kolkhoz in Kasansoy (Uzbekistan), the ratio is 22,000 to 2,000. 7 Kolkhoz leaders are seen more as the new notables than as party apparatchiks. Leadership was usually held inside the same family. Kolkhoz chairmen have many ways to extract perks. They have the better houses and cars. But they behave more as traditional notables than as apparatchiks eager to live in a different society, as did their Russian counterparts. A Russian apparatchik likes indoor cozy restaurants, apart from the workplace, to enjoy private parties with friends. Central Asian notables look for conspicuous feasts and lavish banquets (my) with as much of their constituency as they can afford. Private events (a son's circumcision, children's weddings) are celebrated in public and are part of the legitimization of the notables. A part of their wealth used to be redistributed among kolkhozians. Independence bas probably accentuated this social role of the former apparatchiks, which runs against the logic of privatization, that is, of a society of individuals without groups and notables. s There was no turnover of kolkhoz leaders in Central Asia. The leading families were well-rooted in the local population (sometimes they had ties to an older leadership, tribal or religious; sometimes they were descended from the elites created by the Bolshevik Revolution). Abdulfatab Otanazarov came to Dushanbe from Fergana in 1931, founded the Lenin kolkhoz in Dushanbe in 1953 and headed it until the eighties. Still alive and well respected in 1993, he had fifty-eight descendants. among them the present chairman. This importance of the "dynasties" of kolkhoz leaders is expressed by the changing of names after independence-the Soviet name is often dropped in favor of that of the founding father or of the chairman who shaped the kolkhoz's identity during the post-Stalin era. In the village of Zilkha (Fergana) the Lenin kolkhoz thus became "Kinjabaiev"; in Kulab, kolkhoz Sbatalov (a Red Army commander) became Zarifov. Another pattern is the return to the old name of the village. Less frequently the Soviet name was retained, specifically when the kolkhoz was built on reclaimed lands that had no historical names (Rah-i Lenin near Khojent, Lenin Yolu in Kasansoy).

116

Olivier Roy

In sum., a kolkhoz should be seen, even during Soviet times, as almost a "tribal" unit, with a sense of a common identity based on solidarity and loyalty to its leaders, whose links with the state were supposed to benefit the whole community. This sense of a common identity went further than the usual social protection and paternalism given by any Soviet enterprise. How did it work after independence?

Autonomy in the Kolkhoz and the Households: The Ijam System The end of the Soviet system meant first the end of automatic state support. The predicaments of the kolkhoz are well known and have been worsening since perestroika and independence: lack of new lands and irrigation water, overcrowding, low productivity, no access to cash and foreign currency. Few people were eager to leave the kolkhoz for fear of becoming isolated and left without support. It is important to note that throughout Central Asia, politics in rural areas have little to do with democracy and human rights but more with networks of patronage. To be a member of an "identity group" is seen as the best protection against rival groups or state encroachments. Two logics are at work for the rural Central Asian: to keep the kolkhoz as an umbrella, as his own "tribe," and to promote inside the kolkhoz his own solidarity group, usually the awlad. The bulk of peasants endeavor to get more autonomy for their family inside the kolkhoz framework, but are reluctant to sever their ties with it. At the same time, many (but not all) kolkhoz leaders understood that in order to improve productivity, they had to give up the ''brigade system" and give more autonomy to the extended family. How to improve production and still maintain or even reinforce the traditional solidarity group? A system appeared in most of the republics, with common patterns even if expressed in different legal terms, because of the variety of national laws. That is the sharecropping system of ijara. Under the ijara, the kolkhoz remains the ultimate owner of the land, but plots are allocated to an extended family on a long-term basis (usually five to twenty years). The group makes a contract with the kolkhoz, which usually includes some of the state's requirements in terms of production quotas. The kolkhoz provides materials (tractors, seeds, fertilizers, water) and the crop is shared according to the input of the entire kolkhoz. Peasants can sell on the market their part of any surplus. Interestingly, this system is close to a traditional sharecropping system still in use in Afghanistan (the "fifth" system, whereby a sharecropping contract divides the crop in five supposedly equal parts corresponding to land, water, seeds. plow, and labor). Many other elements of this system are also reminiscent of the customary "Muslim" agriCUltural system ("mulk." private property; -amlak or miri, state lands

Kolkhoz and Civil Society in Central Asia's Independent States

117

allocated to individuals with a hereditary customary right of occupancy; -ihya, right of appropriation for redeemed land), even if not expressed as such. The ijara system is more in line with pre-Soviet customs of sharecropping than with modem forms oflease and cash payments. Although gara may stimulate productivity, it does not solve many of the kolkhoz's familiar problems (overpopulation, lack of cash, excessive dependence on the state for inputs, bottlenecks in transportation). Thus many kolkhoz chairmen are trying to develop other activities to employ the local manpower while strengthening the kolkhoz's autonomy. They usually try to engage in small agro-processing industries, which use local product and export it to cities or even abroad. They also try to make deals with external business partners and even foreign firms (for buying seeds, for example). The need for productivity and diversification pushes them toward business, entrepreneurial management, and small-scale industrialization. The consequence is that many local leaders, although apparatchiks, are looking for more autonomy toward the state-access to foreign currency, the right to go on the market, an end of the quota system, or the right to be paid at market prices. These nea-notables have more political weight and connections than private farmers. But they are no longer the emissaries of a central bureaucracy, because their interests are now divergent. They are surely politically conservative and linked to networks of patronage, but the interests of the urban ruling elites are more and more disconnected from those of the kolkhozian. The state wants to extract from the peasantry industrial crops (cotton), while farmers prefer food crops. In fact, the interests of the state and the kolkhozes are nowadays on a divergent path. As usual, the states are more concerned with industrialization and urban development (or at worst with corruption and perks made on foreign contracts, customs duties, and privatization) than with the welfare of the countryside. The state is looking first for cheap raw materials and is not ready to invest in the agricultural system. It imposes on the kolkhozes accountability requirements which are an obstacle to development and prevent the kolkhoz from going directly to the market. In political terms, the new state bureaucracy is less and less based on rural networks. During Soviet times the Communist parties of the Muslim republics did not have access to the "statist" means of power (army, security forces, custom duties); they were obliged to rely on rural networks of support, from whence they originated. Now that the inheritors of the apparat have access to these traditional state instruments, they need less support from the countryside. So while Central Asia's nations remain rural, their elites are becoming increasingly urban. What we see in many kolkhozes. but not in aU, is the emergence of a new kind of manager: the "apparatchik-farmer" who endeavors to modernize his

118

Olivier Roy

kolkhoz by diversifying its production, giving more flexibility and autonomy to the peasants, and going to the market as an autonomous economic actor. Such a kolkhoz tries to retain its sociological basis and to become an actor in a free economy. But they need to bypass the state and to find customers and counterparts elsewhere. The only ones they have sometimes found are small Western private enterprises. As far as I know no program sponsored by NGOs. the IMF, or the EuroPean Bank has taken a look at this process. But, even if these entrepreneurial chairmen are in a minority, their approach has merit because it does not have the drawbacks of straight privatization. How to Follow IMF Injunctions and Preserve the Social Fabric: WIndow Dressing Privatizations

Refotmist kolkhoz management runs into two oppositions: the political will of the state or some regional apparatchiks who want to keep the kolkhoz under administrative control, and the politics of liberalization launched by the IMP, which is based on individuals not solidarity groups. Reform policy can destroy the fabric of rural society, to the benefit not necessarily of a new class of private entrepreneurs but of local Mafia and the "nouveaux riches." States officially approve of IMF injunctions, but fear extensive privatization and usually turn a blind eye on the particular way a so-called privatization has been undertaken. In fact, the campaign of privatization in Central Asia, when it has been officially launched with state support (as in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan), has apparently regularly been diverted by the local structures. Let us take an example in Uzbekistan: officially the law encourages kolkhozians to leave the kolkhoz and to get land. They are classified asjermir (farmers) and given access to loans and private bank accounts. In fact, a review of the process in the Fergana district (May 1997), shows that most of these "private farmers" have contracts of the ijara type, and do not hold full title to the land. Around 95 percent of the "farmers" (who themselves account for some 6.5 percent ofkolkhoz families) in the district ofFergana are called ijaradagijermirler, farmers with a leasing contract. usually of twenty years, and they still retain their kolkhoz membership. Only a handful of farmers are totally independent (mustakil jermirler), but even they cannot sell the land. In some cases it seems that the kolkhoz itselfhas encouraged some of its members to apply for the status of "private farmers" in order to get access to credits which are not bestowed on kolkhozes. It is a frequent pattern to see some privatization being done according to the nature of the agricultural activities: herders tend to go private more often than cotton growers. One interpretation is that cotton growers are still under state constraints (for use of machinery; fertilizer. pesticides, and other inputs; quotas of production; and state fixed prices).

Kolkhoz and Civil Society in Central Asia's Independent States

119

But a closer examination shows that things are more complicated. It is true that herding kolkhozes are more often tribally organized than the others, but it is not a general law (cotton-growing kolkhozes might also be organized along a traditional segmentation as in Turkmenistan). It is also true that most peasants would like to get rid of compulsory cotton growing and are not eager to grow cotton on privately owned lands. But if we look more closely at the patterns of privatization. we obtain another explanation. Herders more easily go private because there is less irrigated land involved (that is, "real" land). For example, the Zarkent kolkhoz (in Marghelan, Fergana), which owns 5,000 hectares (half in cotton and wheat), is a very conservative one and as of 1997 was still organized into brigades. Notwithstanding that all the herders (that is thirteen families) went ''private,'' all are still ''members'' of the kolkhozes. The first reason is that together they used only 130 hectares, the privatization of which does not deprive the kolkhoz of any valuable lands. The other reason (not mentioned by the kolkhoz leaders) is that the "private herders" have access to loans in cash, which are not provided to the kolkhozes. Given the close ties between the "privatized ones" and the others, it seems that the loans are in fact collectively used. By the same token, the sixty families cultivating the orchards of this kolkhoz made an association of ''farmers'' under ijara. Thus the bulk of the land remains in kolkhoz bands, but this double-standard privatization nevertheless supports the government's statistics on privatization.imd allows the kolkhoz to use some of the facilities "given away" for privatization. In a word, privatization is accomplished in a way which does not alter the traditional patterns of the collective identity, and eventually is used to "divert" the incentives of privatization toward more collective needs. This is a typical case of "window dressing privatization." Of course, this does not mean that most of the privatizations follow this pattern. In other cases, people wanting to go private belong to suppressed or excluded segments, which explains their exit from the kolkhoz. In many other cases there is a discrepancy between the beneficiaries of the "official" privatization, that is a single household (or nuclear family), and the way people tend to recreate (or to revert to) traditional extended families, bound with solidarity ties. I do not have statistics to offer, because most of the available figures are prepared by actors with vested interests. However. I think the ambiguous ways that privatizations occur in the field is a matter worth exploring. On the other band, even the window dressing privatizations are part of a process of ''reappropriation" by the existing society, which is a positive fact, even if the result might be more the re-creation of new "Begs" than the birth of independent private farmers. To summarize, privatization in Central Asia. when implemented, does not mean at all the creation of a new class of individual actors, market-oriented and

120

Olivier Roy

supporting democracy and direct representation. In fact. almost everywhere it seems that so-called privatization has respected the traditional networks and solidarity groups. In Kazakhstan, the discrepancy in privatization figures between the different oblasts show that many of these privatizations are certainly window dressing. In Kyrgyzstan, there are stories that "privatized" land has many times been attributed to koJkhoz chairmen (which,. by the way, reminds one of the process of privatization in tribal areas at the time of French or British colonization, when the cadastrial survey attributed the common lands to tribal elders). Enforcing privatization is not necessarily leading to the emergence of a class of individual farmers. It might lead to the destruction of the rural social fabric at the expense of the bulk of the kolkhozians, who could be turned into tenant farmers or wage laborers. The kolkhoz maintains social safeguards and even a kind of "political protection" for its members. It is undoubtedly the basis of a civil society in rural areas. The problem is, of course, the ambivalent nature of such a kolkhoz, for it also promotes social and economic conservatism. A successful transition depends on the leadership of the kolkhoz, which could react to the transition in very different ways. But any real reform in rural areas should start from the existing society and not endeavor first to destroy it. A possible policy would be to encourage the kolkhozes, which are trying to modernize and diversify their structures, to become some kind of "cooperative" of autonomous farmers, with an elected leadership, like the cooperatives in Western Europe. which join in several activities (buying seeds and fertilizers. food processing, canning, marketing) and also have a separate legal existence (trademark, right to proceed in courts and to borrow money, etc.). Democratization should start from inside the kolkhoz. The kolkhoz, even under another name or in another guise, will remain for a while the expression of a "nco-traditional" social fabric in Central Asian rural areas. It should be reformed, but respected for what it is: a safeguard, a source of protection (social, economic, and political) from the state or other power (Mafia), but also as a way for autonomous farmers to be inserted into the new economic order.

Notes l. For an in-depth field study of modem kolkhozes in Turkmenistan. see Bertrand Bouchet, ''Tribus d'autrefois, kolkbozes d'aujourd'hui:' Des ethnies aux nations en Asie centrale, ed. O. Roy, Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Meditemmee, January 1992,

Aix en Provence.

Kolkhoz and Civil Society in Central Asia's Independent States

121

2. Valentin Bushkov, ''The Population of Northern TlYikistan between 1870 and 1990," in State, Religion and Society in Central Asia, ed. Vitaly NalJll'lkin, Ithaca Press, 1995. 3. For a more compJete analysis of the translation of solidarity groups see Olivier Roy, La Nouvelle Asie centrale ou la Fabrication des nations, Le Seuil, Paris, 1997 (to be published in English by Tauris). 4. Jon Anderson, ''There Are No Kh/ins Anymore," Middle East Journal, no. 32, 1978. 5. The Lenin kolkhoz in Dushanbe "owns" the shrine ofYaqub Charkhi, a Muslim "saint" who introduced Naqshbandism in the area in the fifteenth century. During the Soviet period, the shrine was officially changed into a museum and attended by caretakers, who were in fact from "holy" families, but were paid as local employees. As a rule, many people with Jlin, lshlin and zade in their names are members of such religious families. 6. Which means that for a population of sometimes 20,000, there was no representative of the police or security forces, a ratio largely superior to French rural areas, for example. 7. Any kolkhoz mentioned in this paper without footnote was studied during my fieldwork in Central Asia from 1990 to 1997. 8. This traditional redistribution of wealth in exchange for prestige and allegiance does not make sense in Russia. For the extension of the system after independence in Kazakhstan, see Cynthia Ann Werner, ''Marketing Gifts: Economic Change in a Kazakh Village," Central Asia Monitor, no. 6, 1997.

Prospects for Development of an Independent Media in Kazakhstan Oleg Katsiev

T

he history of independent media development in Kazakhstan reveals many of the obstacles to the emergence of civil in Central Asia, In the circumstances of transition from the Soviet system, where individuals' constitutional and freedoms are only gradually being established and there is still insufficient check on abuse of authority, th.c media can critical role. the has to the initial n"",... ""n_ ment of independent private media by increasing its control over infonnation and limiting the views and criticism of govemment officials and 'Illis essay reviews the history of media in Kazakhstan since its and focuses in on the tender process that was initiated for the licensing of broadcasting The slg:mtllCaJlce of the tender process has been ignored by those in the West who wish to see democratic development in Kazakhstan and by Kazakh citizens. This essay argues that the process has with a tool to enforce its control over the broadcast media, The implications of this for Kazakhstan and more It."""""~uy for Central Asia are very serious. When the Soviet Union each of the newly independent countries inherited an information structure that had both advantages and drawbacks, In summary, the features of this structure were as follows: centralization of information sources, fmanced the state budget and the Communist Party and then state institutions; controlled traditional style of Soviet and agitation reflecting the pnon1t!es of Communist ideology; [ec.nn()lOjglCal backwardness in equipment and the means of infomlation limited resources tor setHlnal1clng, in the absence of a developed market and due to 1T''''V1''\,'''''''",T\f''P in money mdl.epen,1elJltly of the state budget; lack of a framework regulating the information industries, Of· nrirn'~rv lfnnn,rt,,,,,·p has been the continuation for state-run radio and where the state's interests rather than citizens' pn~Iel~en.lces held sway, The state owns all the technical equipment-~ brc!aocru,tnI,g centers, satellite facilities, and the like. Since very few :arl,vprtt~lrn(J

122

Development ofan Independent Media in Kazakhstan

123

private enterprises could afford their own transmission facilities, to operate they would have to lease equipment from the government. Given budgetary constraints in a period of economic transition, though, government control and financing have not meant adequate funding for equipment upgrades or the purchasing or development of new programs. For private radio and television to have the fInancial means to innovate and maintain its independence is increasingly the exception. Another feature of the broadcasting scene in Central Asia since independence has been the continued access to television originating in Russia. This has both positive and negative effects. On the positive side, Russian television is at a higher technical and creative level than that originating in Central Asia. For local stations to compete for audience, they must either make shows better than the Russian ones--a difficult task for want of finances and qualified professionals-or develop completely different material based on local material and traditions. Since Kazakhstan has such a high percentage of ethnically Russian and Russian-speaking population compared with other Central Asian countries, the «Russian legacy" has been partly responsible for the more rapid development of the electronic media there than in the other Central Asian countries. Unfortunately, the response to the challenge of Russian broadcasting has more typically been to take advantage of its relative popularity and accessibility and make little effort to develop alternative programming. To the degree that other programming is offered by local stations it may involve largely the broadcast of pirated copies of foreign movies. Thus any "creative" effort is confIned to local advertising spots. While, as we shall see, the local authorities wish to take advantage of the Russian broadcasting for their own financial gain, at the same time increasingly the government and relatively broad segments of society have reacted negatively to the content of the Russian programming. Russian stations are not bound by the same political constraints (at least insofar as Central Asian politics are concerned) as the local Central Asian stations. Thus political commentary on the Russian channels may be unacceptable. Entertainment on those stations often caters to the worst of popular taste for violence and erotica; a broad spectrum of society-government officials, Muslim clergy, writers and public fIgures, and especially the older generation in the population at large-react very negatively to this. One response to these problems of the Russian broadcasts is to limit their distrIbution through state-controlled television. At the same time, given the signifIcant proportion of Russian population in Kazakhstan and the popularity of much of the programming, it is politically inexpedient for the government to consider seriously switching off the Russian signal. Rather, in 1998 the state supported creation of a local company, "ORT Kazakhstan,» which rebroadcasts

124

Oleg Katsiev

programs from the Russian ORT but sells its own ",i.,pril<;;;-'HY thus has the means to influence the mix of satellite transmission and through the the Internet will mean that authorities may lose control of the broadcast media, Until the elite is determined to control the mass media maint.ain:rng itself in power. Most importantly, this means television. To understand the current situation in Central Asia with to it is useful to look at unleashed mass Gorbachev's "p,erestr;[)ika' and then accelerated Newspapers were the flrst ofthc media to a private sector. In the beginning of the 1990s, new newspapers almost every mspired by the of freedom changing Russian press. in and criticism displayed by the Central Asia, the local papers were Wlable to maintain for long the same their Russian The attraction of criti~ kind of freedom the now discredited Soviet power and Communist for journalists to redirect and there was not enough courage or their criticism to local customs and authorities. An additional that to undermine a free press was. the difficulty in making it a able business. The cost of paper, which generally had to be imported, became as did the cost or printing equipment and delipapers through the or other means. Delivery of national newspapers !4v""uou'Y involves to a week. As a result of such problems, while newspapers still exist in financed some relatively business or are few and their circulation is small. ofUS$l00 (and Where average monthly salaries are no more than the freQUI~ntJty remain for few feel newspapers. Hnrth,F'r1'1r'1or'p the few that have snrvived are Wlder attack from the government because oftheir in its policies. In mid-l 998, this was the fate of the newspapers Dat, XXI Vek, and Yarmarka. As they laWlched criticism of President the government responded by n!',if'''';"'' the state-controlled printing presses to refuse to print the papers, or subjecting them to Wlusual on the part of "tax inspectors." The worst frepressi(m has been the by an "unknown terrorist" of the editorial offices of XXI Vek. Another for inconvenient media voices seems to be illustrated in the fate of the most popular newspaper in Karavan. The newspaper, with the KTK television channel, Radio Karavan, and the Franklin was owned Ii entrepreneur, Boris Giller. In June pn~sllJmably under pressure from the he sold all these enter-

Development ofan Independent Media in Kazakhstan

125

prises "to private structures that wished to remain incognito" and whose identity is still a secret. Not coincidentally, with the change in ownership these media ceased criticism of President Nazarbayev's policies. With the effective disappearance of independent newspapers, one might imagine that radio has some potential to become the most popular mass media. In the Soviet era. however, radio did not enjoy a good reputation, due to its lack of creativity. The majority of the radio audience was pensioners and homemakers, who would listen to cable radio in their kitchens, or people living in remote villages. This is not the audience which advertisers in the new economic conditions of the post-Soviet era would find very promising; without advertising revenue, radio cannot develop. A further problem is the cultural tradition that had developed in the late Soviet period in which families would watch television together. Radio simply could not compete with television's popularity. Nonetheless, since the beginning of the 1990s, radio has increased in popularity, as private stations began to appear and feature popular music and news about matters of genuine concern to people. The growing availability of inexpensive imported radios. combined with fresh programming, began to attract an audience of younger listeners to whom advertising might be addressed; the audience began also to include businessmen who might listen to car radios. Radio listeners thus began to include significant numbers of people with disposable income. So far this development of radio seems confined primarily to Kazakhstan, the economically most developed country in Central Asia, where there are now more than twenty radio stations. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan has only five. Private stations are being organized in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and have begun to obtain the equipment to begin broadcasting soon. In many of the Central Asian countries, where electricity is frequently interrupted, battery-powered radio receivers may become the most reliable means of obtaining information. At least in the first years following independence, privately run television also began to develop in Central Asia, despite the growing economic difficulties. Several factors explain this development. The weakening of the official economy and state control over the population had several consequences for state-run television. The official stations were unable to obtain adequate support for salaries and other aspects of their operation, with the result that private stations could easily hire their staff and rent facilities from them. Private stations could step into the void created by the collapse of an official ideology; to a degree, the government saw them as a means to calm or divert popular dissatisfaction with the slow pace of economic transformation. It is significant that even in Uzbekistan, where in 1997 the official line was that no private television exists, several private stations have been operating in provincial towns. In fact, regional centers seem to hold the best potential for development of private stations in countries

126

Katsiev

such as and where urban centers concentrate a. substantial portion of the audience 65 of the population) and can be reached even without the most powerful transmitters. The deterioration of state finances has also meant that many of the comforms of entertainment have disappeared. Theaters and concert halls have empty; the end to the Soviet of centralized either closed or are t'lll1r,~h"Q.ncr of mms bas undercut cinema. Rather than rent eXl:>eniSlv'e of films, the managers have found it more profitable simply to rent out their space for other ",nt'"..,.,•.,,,,,,,, somewhat paradoxically, the difficult conditions of economic transition have private television. Relatively television sets allowed numbers of families to obtain a broader range of channels than before. Data from a survey in ten cities of Kazakhstan in November t 997 indicate that 93 of the has at least one TV set and 29 "",y,p"tmore than one. Unlike with print media, one's electrical pr()grarntmlng for "free," The new stations very quickly different mix from the state-run stations, much videos of films or music programs. The effect of such pT()gnmllniIlg has been to stimulate demand, especially among younger viewers who are an attractive audience for advertising. In tum, sman businesses began to aplJre.::ialte the of television advertising. Some of the earliest ventures in private television broadcasting featured a disproportionate amount of adverFor three years I was employed as the program manager for the first private station in Almaty. that were in fact extended commercials would occupy as much as an hour and a half of prime the anchor of one such program became of a media star, since ordinary viewers were attracted the of the .."1',,,", ..,.:P. To run a 1990s did not major financial. re,sources. It was eaf)Y to rent state-owned transmission facilities and to home and a with three or four indicornptlter for typing commercials·-and a " and little effort was viduals. Most of the material broadcast was "rn,nnr',", one's own programs. Such conditions still in Uzbekistan and the enforcement of copyright law license from the """'JPT1""""",f and the new mean that private television requires considerable financial resources. It seems that is beginning to move in the direetion of the Kazakh eXlimole with regard to such matters. Finally, the lesson oftbe last Russian presidential elections has not been lost on the authorities in Kazakhstan: clearly television is understood to be a political weapon and a means to obtain "'''',,1..,,<1, and financial

Development ofan Independent Media in Kazakhstan

127

The first private television stations in Kazakhstan appeared in 1990-KTK in Almaty, "Em" in Astana (then still known as Tselinograd), and RIKA~TV in Aktyubinsk. Rapid expansion of private broadcasting occurred in the next two to three years, so that by the end of 1996, the number of private TV stations peaked at over flfty and radio stations at about twenty. In each case, Almaty had seven of them: it is the largest market to attract advertisers, and revenues from advertising have tended to be sufficient to allow for technical upgrades to advanced SVHA equipment and the development of new programming. The technical quality of broadcasting in other cities has tended to be substantially lower. Internews Network, the international nonproflt organization for which I now work, contnbuted substantially to improvements in the broadcasting by private stations. Internews offers seminars (more than thirty to date) to develop professional qualifications ofbroadcastjoumalists, provides business training with a particular focus on ways to increase advertising revenues, loans advanced equipment, and provides various kinds of free programming. in part by supporting independent producers. The organization sponsored the creation of an association of sixteen independent stations called "Sary-Arka," designed to provide various forms of mutual support. By the end of 1996, at least twenty-seven private stations were producing their own local newscasts. Even though the political circwustances mean that such local broadcasts must exercise considerable self-censorship, the fact that they are airing programs about issues ofreal concern to their audiences is a signiflcant step away from standardized state progrannning. Development of this kind of programming attracts an audience and that in turn attracts the advertising revenue that can keep such private stations functioning. Unfortunately. the successes achieved by independent broadcasters by late 1996 led the authorities to undertake steps which are now radically changing the television market in Kazakhstan. The chief device, which someone in the government invented, is what came to be called the "tender on radio and television frequencies." The tender competition was announced by President Nazarbayev at the beginning of 1997. Several statutory orders regulating the competition were signed by the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and implementation was put in the hands of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. The tender competition requires that private stations wishing to broadcast pay the state for a license, since air frequencies were now to be considered a national resource from which the state should legitimately gain a profit. In principle, such an idea is unobjectionable, since many countries regulate broadcast frequencies, and there is generally an excess of demand for them. Furthermore, it is not as though stations prior to this new requirement had been able to use broadcasting facilities free--they paid local state counnunications institutions for renting frequencies or transmission facilities, fees that supplemented

128

Oleg Katsiev

the diminishing state financing for those institutions and, undoubtedly, lined the pockets of some administrators. The difference under the new lUTangement now was to establish complete state control over broadcasting by a committee of the Council of Ministers, which was vested with the authority to decide who would receive a frequency. One stated goal of the new policy was to raise the quality of local broadcasting to state standards. Many local stations have been unable to afford modem quality equipment; to establish a requirement that they meet certain technical specifications to obtain a license made some sense. Had the state committee decided to enforce strictly these new requirements, only one or two of the private stations and only a few of the state ones would have been able to meet them. Had the goal of the new competition been merely to close down private broadcasting, that could have been done solely on the basis of technical standards. As that does not seem to have been the major goal, we need to look for other explanations regarding the process. The most serious concern for private stations was the cost of obtaining broadcasting rights under the new rules. On average, a license for three years would cost between USS80,OOO and US$120,OOO, depending on the power of the transmitter. For a developed country with an established advertising market, such sums might be realistic. although even in Western countries, payments for broadcasting rights are from a fifth to a tenth of the rates established for Kazakhstan. True, the government did scale the rates depending on the location of the transmitter. The full amounts were required in Almaty and the new capital of Astana; in regional centers they were to be multiplied by factors offrom 0.8 down to 0.1, depending on the size and administrative status of the city. This adjustment notwithstanding, in the provinces of Kazakhstan the rates bore no relationship to any fiscal reality. The following tables give the full rates as established by the competition: Table 1: Tender television fees (per channel)

Band UHF

Power (Watts) <1

1-10 10-100 100-1000

VHF

<1

1-10 10-100 100-1000 >1000

Annual Payment (USS) 714.29 2,857.14 5,714.29 11,428.57 1,428.58 4,285.71 11,428.58 12,857.14 17.142.86

Down Payment (USS) 714.29 14.285.70 57,142.90 114.285.70 1,428.58 8.571.42 22,857.16 64,285.70 171,428.60

Development ofan Independent Media in Kazakhstan

129

Table 2: Tender radio fees (per channel) Band (MHz)

Power (Watts)

60-74, 88-108

<50 50-100 100-1000 1000-4000 >4000

Annual Payment (USS) 385.71 1,542.86 6,171.43 12,342.86 18,514.29

Down Payment (USS) n1.42 4,628.58 30.857.15 61,714.30 92,571.45

Given the size of the fees, one might speculate that a goal of the competition was to raise money to help balance the state budget Yet such a suggestion has little merit, since taxes from a successful station, its employees, and suppliers presumably might produce more revenue than the license fees. Thus one needs to look for other explanations for the terms of the tender competition. The immediate result of the tender competition was to force at least twenty stations to close. In several cities of some size located in underpopulated regions, the impact on their media was substantial, since their only stations closed: Taraz lost all three of its stations, Kokshetau its only two, and the single broadcasters closed in Taldykorgan, Petropav!ovsk, Arkalyk, Zhezkazgan, Aktau, Kyzyl-Orda, and several other cities. The stations in Kostanai and Uralsk were forced to merge with the state regional companies as the only way to continue any professional activity, but this meant giving up their independence. When the first tender was held in Almaty in January 1997, its conditions were very rigid and inunediately came under criticism from various public organizations such as Intemews and the Human Rights Committee. Although after each competition the conditions would change and become less restrictive, clearly the competition was at the outset limited so as to favor government interests: • Only private stations bad to participate in the tender; government channels automatically would receive frequencies (this despite the constitutional guarantee that private and state property have equal rights) • Only decimeter frequencies were offered in the tender; the more accessible meter frequencies were reserved for state channels • Licenses were to be issued for only three years at prices prohibitive for most stations (see tables 1 and 2) • The state committee overseeing the competition included only government officials, and there were no representatives from public organizations. In the face of these rules. private stations attempted to organize a "resistance movement" In December 1996 a conference of the Association ofInde-

130

Oleg Katsiev

pendent Electronic Mass Media convened in Almaty. At it, the participants from Abnaty stations agreed orally to boycott the tender. The idea was that the boycott would force the authorities to change the competition rules and reduce the license cost to a reasonable level. The boycott never materialized, though; all the stations that had agreed to it ended up presenting their documents for the competition on the appointed day. A month later, the second competition took place in Almaty. From the standpoint of the organizers, these initial tender competitions were a success. Six television and seven radio frequencies were distributed, with the successful applicants approving the conditions of the tender and the license fees by virtue of their participation in the process. The frequencies used by two Almaty television channels came under new ownership (the former owners lost the tender); the same happened with three radio channels. The committee of the Council of Ministers approved none of the contenders for one television channel. There was no visible effect of the auction from the viewers' standpoint. The quantity of programming remained the same; hosts and shows for channels that closed switched to other channels that continued to broadcast. The channels which lost out in the auction ("TV-M," ''Totem,'' and "The Family Channel") tended to be the ones that were weak economically. although their directors insisted that their failure was due to the fact that they were too independent in airing critical opinion. The apparent success of the tender competition for Abnaty led to several additional competitions in 1997 and 1998 to distribute frequencies in regional centers, with results that have serious implications for the future of independent broadcasting in Kazakhstan. If the chief goal was to promote the interests of the state budget, these competitions would have to be considered a failure. In 1991, television stations in only five of eighteen cities obtained broadcasting rights (Astana, Aktyubinsk, Pavlodar, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Shymkent), and similarly only five radio stations succeeded (Astana, Aktyubinsk, Karaganda, Shymkent, Uralsk). The high fees discouraged applications, but even where some were submitted, that did not always guarantee that frequencies would be awarded. Only in a few cases where there were no competitors (Kostanai, Shymkent, and Aktau) were applications accepted even if it was not clear whether the [mancial requirements could be met. Furthermore, no explanations were given regarding why competitors were turned down. On April 21, 1997, the competition committee prohibited broadcasting in the meter range for any station that lacked a license. The majority of stations were operating in that range; they had either to cease broadcasting or devise some kind of accommodation with the authorities. Soon after, in July. at the time of the last tender for the year, the committee ordered the regional offices of the Department of Communications to cut off any stations which had failed to

Development ofan Independent Media in Kazakhstan

131

obtain a license. Thus it seemed that private broadcasting in Kazakhstan would cease except for six major cities, and would never develop in smaller towns. since there was no plan even to hold a tender auction for them. In fact, though, private television has continued, and there is no sign that it will be shut down. We can understand why if we examine who benefits from the tender. There are important lessons here for the mass media in other Central Asian countries. For one thing, allowing private broadcasting helps preserve the image of a democratic state and president. Maintaining at least the appearance of democracy is important for Kazakhstan's international affairs and for obtaining foreign financial support. The economic reforms to date explicitly forbid prohibition of private property in the mass media. Internally, the continuation of private broadcasting undercuts any potential for significant public protest against the regime. There is another pressing political reason to winnow the existing private TV and radio stations and to ensure that only the loyal ones remain on the air by the end of 1998. For whatever the precise reasons, in October 1998 parliament insisted that an out-of-turn presidential election should take place only three months hence, on January 10, 1999, instead of waiting for the regular election date in the year 2000. The Russian eJections showed how important television is to ensure victory in an election, especially if otherwise the incumbent's campaign is not well managed. Even given the support of state television, the president would have no guarantee of victory. if opposition candidates managed to turn in their favor the increasingly popular private television. As it happens, not only the state television network but also the only "private" companies with broadcast rights throughout Kazakhstan can now be expected to support President Nazarbayev's re-electi.on campaign. There are four major national networks, the state-run Kazakhstan-! and Kazakbstan-2, Khabar TV (and its affiJiated Radio-Khabar), NTK TV and KTK TV. Until summer 1998 when it became a closed joint stock company, the state information agency, Khabar, managed the Khabar stations under the directorship of the President's daughter, Dariga Nazabayeva. Although no details have been released, it seems safe to assume that ,the newly organized joint stock company is under the same management Even after becoming a "private" company, Khabar was not required to participate in the tender process and thus it pays nothing for the right to use frequencies throughout Kazakhstan. Dariga Nazarbayeva is also the de facto owner of the private company NTK. which likewise obtained the opportunity to broadcast in at least eighteen cities throughout the country without participating in the tender process. The justification for this decision by the Frequency Distribution Committee was the necessity to improve the distribution of information in distant regions of the country. Finally, we note that KTK

132

Oleg Katsiev

TV (and simultaneously Radio--NS) obtained such nationwide broadcast rights in August 1998, after its purchase by unnamed individuals, even though up to that point it had not been allowed to broadcast nationwide. Ostensibly, the reason for extending such rights to these stations was to dispel the impression that the committee favored the interests of a single influential person. However, the Kazakh Press was silent about what was in fact illegal assignment of frequencies by the committee. Clearly the committee's chairman, Mr. Sarsenbayev, who also heads the Ministry of Information and Public Accord, has no interest in publicizing the committee's action. By not paying the license fees, the four national TV networks together save an estimated $17 million; it is inconceivable that any of them will fail to support Nazarbayev's re-election. Nor will the situation with radio be any different As the above makes clear, Radio Khabar is in loyal hands. Another station which received pennission for nationwide broadcasting from the Ministry of Information is "Radio Europe Plus Kazakhstan," which just happens to be owned officially by Rakhat Aliyev, the husband of Dariga Nazarbayev and head of the Kazakhstan Tax Police. It is reasonable to assume that Radio Karavan, and the newspapers Karavan and Novae Pokolenie, owned by Rakhat Aliyev's commercial interests, are in the pockets of the governing authorities. Another reason why it was beneficial for the ruling elite to establish its control over the most powerful mass media either directly or indirectly is the lure of advertising revenue. As the above suggests, the few national broadcasters are run either directly or indirectly by the President's daughter or by individuals close to her. In early 1997, even the ability of Russian advertisers to compete in the national market ceased as Russian channels largely disappeared from the air. Later that year, a new company ORT-Kazakhstan was created by owners who remain anonymous; its function is to re-broadcast Russian ORT programs, but with the substitution of local advertising in the spots where the Russian advertising has been deleted. The potential advertising market for media in Kazakhstan is very great; those companies which have a nationwide market can charge the highest fees. Data compiled by BRIEF agency and its partner Gallup Media Asia indicates that the TV advertising market in 1998 alone may be as high as $S{), 70 million. Already the advertising presence of large network broadcasters is having an adverse effect on the ability of small regional broadcasters to obtain support of foreign and nationwide Kazakh advertisers. There is substantial discontent with the results of the tender competition, although not all of the criticism could have been predicted. Quite naturally, stations which lost their frequency or were forced into dependence on the state were unhappy. Advocates of democratic reform, public organizations, and many media professionals are unhappy at what they understand clearly to be imposi-

Development ofan Independent Media in Kazakhstan

133

tion of state control over the media. In regions where only the limited programming range of state television is now available, discontent has emerged not because of any knowledge concerning details of the tender or the ownership of the new so-called ''private'' national networks. The main concern is often simply the loss of favorite programs. In Kostanai, viewers took up a collection to belp their favorite channel, "Alan," pay the license fee. In Astana (formerly Akmola), when the local channel, "Efir." lost its tender bid, it began broadcasting only the sound of the popular TV shows via radio, so that people could at least hear their favorite soap operas. Less expected was the adverse reaction on the part of local authorities, who had become used to the idea that local broadcasters served to inform the population about reforms and the activities of their administrations, the akirnats. Thus, in Aktau, Semipalatinsk, Karaganda, Kostanai, and several other cities, the directors of the private local stations enlisted the support of the akirnats, who requested that the Ministry of Information allow them to become the official owners of the frequencies for their cities. The programming for what were now the city channels was then to be worked out in agreement with the private stations. This meant that the private broadcasters could use the meter range and broadcast without having to enter the competition and pay the license fee. It also meant further savings in not having to purchase new equipment suitable for decimeter range broadcasting. Of course, such arrangements are fragile and do not guarantee independence. The local stations operating under such circumstances must remain loyal to the akimats. At any time the latter can abrogate the agreements. Any conflict that might develop between the Ministry of Information and the local authorities could lead to loss of the frequency, since the permits in question were issued in violation of the rules established by the Council of Ministers. Even stations which obtained permits legally are not immune from intervention by the authorities. For example, in summer 1998, the chairman of the Frequency Distribution Committee insisted on recalling licenses from two Shymkent stations, OtyrarTV and Radio-UMAKS, citing as an explanation that they had failed to observe the law requiring that 50 percent of broadcasting must be in the Kazakh language. The real reason must have been some other question concerning the stations' loyalty, since none of the broadcasters, even the stations run by the President's daughter, can observe that legal requirement, for want of enough materials in Kazakh. Clearly a double standard is being applied where it so suits the committee. The Kazakh experience with the tender competition is a sobering lesson concerning the future of democratic reform and the development of civil society for all of Central Asia. It is especially disturbing to see how little corporate spirit or unity there is in the mass media. The separate broadcasters, especially in

Oleg Katsiev

134

seeme
at the

fail. Most

IV",",.,,,,,,,, and publishers media were There was little aplprC'CIation of the fact that administrative arbitrariness directed against the competition as readily turn against the survivors and that the desire to control the electronic media then extend to the media, There was some, U "''',£\1.,' among public Internews) that the Association of Inciep1eudellt Electronic Mass Media might coordinate an effective protest Tile absence of even any serious effort at gave iii clear message to the authorities that could suppress opposition and extend control to the ro..ass media. No criticism came from abroad and the events went unreported in the mass media th,ere. The result has been to establish ullcontested control by the o-mJPrnm" elite over the most effective media that could have any influence in UP'CO[IUIl,g presidential election. There is now no effective national forum for a the lucrative market is now in the hands of this same elite. While the word may stitl be u..qed with to in fact the of aU the media on the local and central authorities bas become obvious. While techcerlsoJrshjlp does not exist in K.a:zak:hsl:an, self-censorship in self-interest takes its place. After then, media in Kazakhstan has ,>Tr.,>""·",,,,,, ceased. Similar attacks on television are mounted in for the other countries in Central which have not y,niove'cI freedom of speech, one cannot be optimistic for the establishment of any indeperl
Can (Jzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society? Abdumannob Polat

T

he process of building civil society in Uzbekistan cannot be characterized in simple black or white. As in many other states, the situation is more complicated than that. The basis for creating civil society does not yet exist in Uzbekistan. The purpose of this essay is to explore the reasons why and to suggest ways by which the situation might be changed. The dilemma that the Central Asian region and the developed nations face regarding this state is that while some people praise the current stability in Uzbekistan, the democratic community has serious concerns about the political development of the country. Many experts believe that the country's existing regime needs a step-by-step liberalization in order to ensure stability internally and across Central Eurasia into the future. Political developments in many nondemocratic countries, including Iran in the 1960s and 19708 and the current situation in Algeria, demonstrate the importance of pursuing both stability and liberalization. The strategic importance and economic potential of Central Asia and the South Caucasus call for efforts by the major world powers to promote the construction of civil society in that region. Wise assistance programs that lead to the establishment of viable, open societies in the region, and most especially in Uzbekistan-which is located in the heart of Central Asia, are critical to longtenn stability and peace. The alternatives in the fonn of civil strife; religious, political, and ethnic radicalization; wars over scarce resources; and "corrective" intrusions by neighboring powers can be avoided much more easily, and less expensively. than they can be cured. As Sodyq Safaev, Uzbekistan's ambassador to the United States, has written, "an unstable, disunited Central Asia could create severe problems for an increasingly interdependent world. A passive policy toward Central Asia would be an unfortunate mistake, while an active, fully-engaged relationship would enable the West to obtain its own respective goals."·

Parts of this essay first appeared in the Central A.sia Monitor, no. 1, 1998. 135

136

Abdummanob Polat

Uzbekistan's Strategic Position Uzbekistan is located in the heart of Eurasia and is the most populous state in Central Asia with 24 million people, half of whom are under eighteen. It has a significant natural resource base, and its gold and uranium deposits are especially valuable. The country is also the world's fourth-largest cotton producer. Uzbekistan has a manufacturing sector in the textile, automotive, and aerospace industries, and it is the only Central Asian nation to manufacture ferrous metal products, cotton harvesters, cable products, and excavators. Today, Uzbekistan's strategic importance in the region is temporarily being overshadowed by oil-rich Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Most Western investors do not see business opportunities in this country where state control of the economy and business is still so strong and currency exchange policies are so restrictive. Together with the very high level of bureaucracy and corruption in the country, these factors contribute to the lack of any substantial interest in Uzbekistan by international economic and fmancial institutions and investors, and as a result, by the West in general.2 Levels of foreign investment have a strong impact on the level of current interest in a nation. But many experts recognize that Uzbekistan is in a strategically sensitive position at the crossroads of Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan.3 Before its incorporation into Russia in the 186Os, the predecessors of the modern Uzbeks were a dominant political and cultural force in Central Asia. and Uzbekistan's influence remains strong today among neighboring countries. For example, in Tajikistan's civil war in 1992-93, Uzbekistan joined Russia in backing the Kulabi warlords (and then the Hojandi clan), making it possible for the current government to be established.4 However, disagreements between Rakhmonov's government in Dushanbe, supported by Russia, and Tajikistan's regions sympathetic to Uzbekistan and President Karimov caused problems between the two countries. 5 Indeed, the failures ofUzbek policy toward Tajikistan and Afghanistan, whose northern provinces are Uzbekistan's natural allies but which are currently excluded from power within their own nations, have had a serious impact on the position of Uzbekistan. To a significant extent the conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan have an interethnic character, and the exclusion of significant ethnic minorities and important provinces from national power structures and from attempts to bring stability and peace to these countries creates the danger of new conflicts and tension in the region. A military rebellion reported in early November of 1998 in Tajikistan's Hojand province, supposedly promoted by many important representatives of a local clan, and-more important-allegations that the Uzbek government supported the rebels, may cause further escalation of

Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?

137

restrictive and suppressive policies toward Hojandis. The latest stage of the Tajik civil conflict has already worsened unfriendly relations between the two governments. But regardless of these temporary setbacks, the long-term importance of Uzbekistan as the key country at the crossroads of planned oil and gas pipelines and what could be a new Silk Road of robust Central Asian trade routes is not in doubt Furthermore, Uzbekistan's strategic importance includes the country's role as another important bridge (somewhat like Turkey) between the West and the Islamic world. As noted by Ambassador Safaev, "with its membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference and its influence in the Islamic world as a whole, Uzbekistan will cooperate with all countries in strengthening transcivilizational dialogue and promoting understanding between people of different faiths. Uzbekistan can play this important role because of its special position in the worlds of Islam and the West, and its unique potential for both creating secular democracy and influencing the further development of Islam:'"

The Political and Judicial Context Islam Karimov, head of Uzbekistan's State Economy Planning Committee in the 1980s and of Qashqadaryo province in the south of the republic in 1987-89, became the leader of the country in mid-1989. Later, after the collapse of the Sonet Union, he established his one-man rule. Today, all public, political, and religious life remains under the government's strong, if not complete, control.' The head of state controls the central government in Tashkent and local governments as well through the appointment of hokims (governors). Hokims head local "councils of peoples' representatives" (local councils or "parliaments") and thereby extend the president's power down to the very loca11evel. The head of state also controls the 250-memher Oli Majlis (Supreme Council), a Sonet-style "national parliament" that meets once every few months to "approve" (usually without serious or open discussion) laws prepared by the government. Eighty percent of the members of the Oli Majlis are hokims or other representatives of the nomenklatura. The Constitution of Uzbekistan approved in December 1992 by the Supreme Sonet, the prenous "parliament" of the Republic, calls for a 150member national parliament. At that time, it was planned as a professional parliament. but later Karimov changed his mind and decided to give the opportunity for more nomenklatura representatives to be honored as members ofa "legislative" body_ Now, only a small number of the Oli Majlis members are full-time parliamentarians. The five officially recognized political parties are the Peoples Democratic Party, the former Uzbekistan branch of the Soviet Union Communist Party

138

Abdummanob Po/at

(from which President Karimov sprang); the Adolat ("Justice") Social Democratic Party, created after parliamentary elections in December 1994; Vatan Taraqqiyoti ("Homeland Progress"), established as a "constructive" opposition in 1992; Milliy TikIanish ("National Rebirth'') Democratic Party, created in 1995; and FidoforIar ("Altruists") National Democratic Party, founded in December 1998 and most likely the current favorite ofKarimov.8 The government created all these parties; they in tum fully support the president and playa subordinate role to the government The often expressed view that the People's Democratic Party has been the ruling party or has played a role similar to the role of the Communist Party in Soviet-style countries has never been correct, even when the party was headed-as it was until June 1996-by President Karimov. As in all republics of the former Soviet Union, beginning in 1990 in Uzbekistan the real power center began to move from the Communist Party apparatus to the presidential and governmental structures. During that process, many officials in the Communist party apparatus received important positions in the new power structures. In late 1991, this process was completed. Currently in Uzbekistan, there are no political parties in the Western understanding of the term. As in several other ex-Soviet states, in Uzbekistan the judicial system has undergone no significant changes since independence and preserves the main principles of Soviet jurisprudence. According to the Uzbek Constitution and laws, the courts are independent of the executive and legislative branches and are supposed to follow only the dictates of law and justice. But the president appoints all the judges, and they can be removed at any time. The one exception is Supreme Court justices, whose removal must be approved by the "parliament." But this is also, of course, controlled by the president. A large majority of cases are heard in open court, presided over by a judge of professional standing and assisted (except for some serious cases at the Supreme Court) by two "citizen advisors" who have little knowledge of the law. As in many countries, court hearings that involve state (or military) secrets and the privacy of minors are closed. Uzbek law, however, does not specifY clearly the grounds necessary for closing hearings to the public. Consistent with Soviet tradition, some of the politically motivated trials against opposition activists may permit only restricted access to human rights monitors and foreign or independent journalists. Criminal offenses are investigated mainly by the procurator's office, the investigative structures of the Ministry ofIntema1 Affairs, and the National Security Service (NSS), the former Uzbekistan's division of the KGB. (The NSS is in charge of "serious" political and economic crimes), The procurator's office conducts a significant part of all criminal investigations and presents charges at court. Both the procurator's office and the court have the right to

Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?

139

authorize arrests or searches. Surveillance and prosecution of individuals suspected of having independent views or sympathy toward the opposition are carried out by the structures of both the Ministry oflntemal Affairs and the NSS. By law, police and security services may detain a suspect without authorization from the procurator's office for up to three days. In extreme situations when it is impossible to get that office involved in the case, detention may be up to thirty days. However, suspects are usually held without authorization for ten days. Additionally, pre-trial detention is the norm, and this can sometimes last for months. The rights of the defense lawyer and prosecutor before the court differ significantly, even by law. The procurator's office not only conducts many criminal investigations and supports all criminal charges before the court, but also has authority to monitor the observance of the law by all institutions, including courts. The related bodies must consider protests issued by the procurator's office and its recommendations must be implemented. This leads to a situation in which the procurator's protest against a court decision leads to reconsideration of the case, while the defense lawyer or defendant's protest may be fully ignored, and usually is. According to an unpublished study conducted by Uzbekistan's Union of Defense Lawyers, in recent years courts in the country have issued only sixty-five verdicts of ''not guilty," and sixty-four of them were changed to "guilty" after protests from the procurator's office. Giveu the nature of the judicial system, it is not surprising that accepted international standards of evidence often are violated. as are basic rights of defendants. The U.S. State Department and international monitoring organizations such as Human Rights Watch have amply documented such violations, with the latter organization even going so far as to conclude that "1998 was disastrous for human rights in Uzbekistan. ,>9 From a democratic standpoint, the current political system in Uzbekistan should not be considered legal or legitimate even by the country's own constitution and laws. Yet, the regime appears to retain some support within society based on local and national traditions. Many people consider it to be better than the instability and chaos of civil strife.lQ

Secular Opposition The main independent and pro-democratic parties and movements are the Bidik ("Unity") Peoples Movement, the associated Birlik Party, and the Erk ("Freedom") Democratic Party. The BirJik Party began as the Democratic Party of Uzbekistan in June 1990 and adopted its current name in October 1991. The Birlik movement and party promoted principles of independence, national rebirth, and democracy and, in the words of Gregory Gleason, "quickly dis-

140

Abdummanob Polat

covered broad popular in the brief liberal of 1989-91.\1 the BirHk movement was in November 1991 (the Birlik neither the movement nor the was "t>rTnlif",rl was never to have an official office in Tashkent or to its newspapers. Several activists left Birlik in of 1989 and, <::n""''''7prl by Karimov's government as the "constructive opposition," created the Erk in April 199Q. Although the authorities were at that point much more tolerant of Erk and and sometimes even many of its activionly in of 199 L Erk the was was elected to the republican parliament in of with support from the During elections held in the was December of 1991, he was allowed to run for that office. nAT'ln,lrr"ti to have an office and its newspaper at the state-owned the best printing house in Uzbekistan. In the In July of the to act more independently of the same year, afrer the party leader Solih res,igrled from and declared that his would switch to underground actiallowed Erk to continue to openly Still, for a time the newspaper. in mid-l with severe """'.~m,.",,, and arrests of the movement's leaders. In both Birnk and Erk were and Erk's activists began to be arrested also. A number of Birlik Since 1995, Erk and Erk leaders and activists were forced to leave the and BirIik have had little difference in their orientation and U""'~l\;" over and Birlik and Erk continue some actiand are able to distrihute some hoth from exile and from inside the pul)l:\c:at1c[}ns in the country. BirHk the newspapers Mustaqil .. w,,. ....,... Indleptmdent HI ~~lrl,,"\ and Birlik and the liarakat u. ..~"" . ." " pu'bli(~ati.on of the Erlc newspaper continues. Coo{clinlltlrlg Council of Uzbekistan. 's Democratic lVlC'VelmCJrnS, 1\111rS<11(10'V. former prime minister ofthe then Soviet was created. 'The council aims to estahlish r«t"",... rm)-dernlocratlc groups and activists in the After several him and his members (including heatincidents of harassment omnbl.ng, ao(tuc'tlOIIS), in March of 1998 Mirsaidov announced that he had and from the council. 12 Ibrohim the executive govemor of Navoi province in the late 19805 and a known OlllPOSltl(ln and pro~ derno<;ra,;y leader who was a in the 1980s and in mdepe:ndicnt Uz!bd;istan, f
rt'\l"" ..

Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?

141

dence of the state. Except for some reports of suspicious activities in 1994 by a few activists. which had no serious impact on the political stability of the country, and a couple of emotional statements during the same period, the democratic opposition has been nonviolent

Islam and the Wahhabis: A Threat to Stability? The government considers independent Islamic activists to be the main threat to the regime and stability in the country. Therefore, harassment of advocates and supporters of the independent Muslim clergy is much stronger than of Christian missionaries and other non-Muslim religious activities. According to human rights monitors in Namangan and Tashkent, at least 156 Muslim prisoners, mostly in the Fergana Valley, remain jailed on what are probably fabricated charges such as possession of narcotics and weapons and, in addition, five Islamic activists have disappeared.',l However, many Western people and institutions that are interested in the region are much more aware of governmental and societal intolerance in Uzbekistan toward foreign Christian missionaries than of the Uzbek government's harassment of the independent Islamic community. 14 Since December 1997, for the flt'st time in decades, the authorities have been blaming Islamic activists in Uzbekistan for killings and attempts to establish by force an Islamic state in the country. Masked men cut off the head of a senior policeman and stuck it on a fence in Namangan, the major stronghold of Islamic thought in Central Asia today. Earlier that year, several officials, including the deputy hokim of the province, were murdered. In the ensuing police crackdown, during which hundreds of people were detained, there was a shootout in which more police were killed. The authorities claimed that an armed Islamic cell ofWahhabis 's was responsible for killing the policeman. Reportedly. during arrests or searches police planted weapons and narcotics on the arrested people. '6 Human rights monitors claim that among the jailed Wahhabis, only Tolib Mamajonov (sentenced to the death penalty this summer), who reportedly had no affiliations with Islamic activists, could have had some association with the crimes that were committed in Namangan. But even regarding this snspect, many advocates strongly doubt his guilt. Within hours of the 16 February 1999 bombings in the center of Tashkent and without any investigation, President Karimov and beads of both his National Security Service and Ministry of Internal Affairs blamed Islamic extremists in Uzbekistan and their supporters from abroad. This serious terrorist action resulted in the death of at least fifteen people and the injury of dozens more. Because only information released by the Uzbek government about this event is available to the public, it is unlikely that the facts, especially regarding

142

Abdummanob Po/at

its organizers, will ever be known. It is also to be expected that the government's campaign against dissent will now intensifY. Today. there is no known Islamic leader in Uzbekistan, either official or independent, who feels free to express his views publicly. Plans by Islamic groups and leaders to create independent structures have been laid aside, while most lslamic community functions, including Islamic education. have reverted to the government's Soviet-style control. Yet extremist IsIam. and especially the Iranian (of the 19808) or Taliban models of radical political Islam. has very few supporters in Uzbekistan. 17 There is no known Islamic extremist leader. Most representatives of the independent Islamic community (setting aside unproven claims related to the December 1998 killings in Namangan) mainly have educational and peaceful priorities. During the Islamic revival in 1988-97, especially until 1995, the government tolerated, in general. the reemergence of religious life. II About five thousand mosques were restored or built during this period. However, at the same time, a split among Muslims in Central Asia was observed. Some people, socalled Wahhabis, expressed opposition to Islamic rituals that are followed by most Uzbeks and are based on the Imom A 'zom maz 'bab or Hani/it l9 interpretation-the interpretation officially permitted by the government for decades. This form ofIslam. in addition to promoting loyalty to the existing rulers, tolerated and to some extent incorporated several expensive ceremonies and rites, especially regarding funerals and weddings. In other words, Islam in Uzbekistan has acquired certain national and local features. Many among the so-called Wahhabis in Uzbekistan recognize Hanijit or Imom A 'zam maz 'hab as one of four legitimate interpretations ofIsIam. but they do not tolerate the local accretions that changed this interpretation over the centuries. Although most of the clergy and many lay Muslims called for the reduction of expenses related to funerals, so better to follow the tenets of the religion, supporters of the newly emergent movement went further and strongly urged the "cleansing" of all deviations from what they believed to be true Islamic practices. In their everyday life and religious practices they called Muslims to follow the Qu'ran (Koran) and Prophet Muhammad's Sunn~ only. Though they were labeled Wahhabis, they always denied any association with the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia. Several mosques in the Pergana Valley and Tashkent became centers of this new movement in Uzbekistan's religious life. Unfortunately, it has been a development that the government has succeeded in exploiting, to deepen a split between followers of the traditional and this more austere inter~ pretation of Islam and encourage intolerance of views and interpretations of Islam among some clergy activists on both sides. It is believed that this nontraditional Islam was not imported from abroad, even though missionaries and educational publications from Saudi Arabia, Tur-

Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?

143

key, Pakistan. and Iran promoted it. Rather, the new movement's roots are based in indigenous attempts to understand and study real Islam by focusing on its founding principles. Such attempts always existed, but they became much stronger during the period of relative openness and tolerance toward Islam in 1988~97, and especially in 1989·95. There are no established independent Islamic organizations in Uzbekistan. The Islamic Rebirth Party of Uzbekistan, founded in January 1991, bas been inactive since the party's emir, or chairman, Abdulla qorfl O'taev, disappeared in December 1992.:n According to his wife, he was arrested near his home, but the Uzbek authorities deny ever having arrested him. Adolat, an Islamic militia group (to be distinguished from the Adolat Social Democratic Party, one of the government-organized "national" parties described earlier). and the groups Tavba ("Repentance") and Islom Lashkarfl emerged in 1991 in Namangan province and have been banned since March 1992. Many of Islom Lasbkari's leaders were arrested, but its main leader, Tohir Yoldoshev, and his supporters left for Tajikistan and joined the Islamic opposition during the civil war there. Later they were based in Afghanistan. According to some reports, there are several hundred Uzbek fighters based in Afghanistan. There are also statements and reports that many of these Uzbek fighters now cooperate with the Taliban. Generally, the Uzbek government bas succeeded in reestablishing control over the official Islamic clergy. The well-known and respected leader, Mufti Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf, was forced to resign his position as the official head of Central Asia's Islamic community in 1993 and later bad to leave Uzbekistan to avoid charges of helping Tajikistan's Islamic movement during the Tajik civil war. Since 1993-95, several known leaders and activists of the Islamic communities in Namangan. Quoqon (Kokand), Andijon. and even Tashkent have either been removed from their positions or have simply disappeared.24 The government denies holding any of them in prison. While Uzbekistan's attempts to create and cultivate a national ideology have not succeeded yet, the government suppresses advocates of openness and democracy. For a time, the mosque became the only place where people could hear independent views and be outside of total state control. Islamic thought, including interpretations not provided by the authorities, began to fill the existing "ideological vacuum." Friday and holiday prayers at mosques. led by popular imams. such as Abduvali qori Mizrayev (who bas since disappeared) and Obidhon qori Nazarov, brought together tens of thousands of Muslims, so many, in fact, that people had to pray standing up. Educational tapes authored by these imams were sold and circulated in hundreds of thousands of copies. But the government and many ordinary citizens considered these popular Islamic leaders to be "Wabbabis."

144

Abdummanob Polat

Muslims are allowed to listen only to government-approved ""'..'....,,',''-'' at mosques and other public many Muslims say that go to mosque only on Fridays at noon, because Islam strongly recommends COIldUctUlg this prayer at public Among the given for in Uzbekistan nowadays are reported surthe much lower mosque y'V"u ..",,,,,,,,, identification checks by police of Muslims, especially young men and campaign the Islamic movement repression is aimed at eliminating independent views and ee~.~a(HlS!lUlg ::'iOVler-~stvlle fear of authorities, which was weakened during the limited liberal reform of 1988-92. The threat ofIslamic fundamentalism spreading to Uzbekistan from the south has been exaggerated by the Uzbek government in part to justify ml.uu··uanv democracy within the country. At the same time, that even though not so or huge as President Karimov states, "forces" the leaders of Central Asian nations to seek support, ''''''-''''UUL5 probable military from Russia. NATO and the United States are far from Central Asia, and aside from Caspian oil and gas, they are not very interested in the region. Are Economic

Political Uberalization Urgent Needs?

An independent, wealthy, secular, open, and democratic Uzbekistan would be important for the stability of all Central Eurasia and for nr"·v ..,,,tHlO the establishment of totalitarian or anti~ Western regimes in the region. But how is this to be achieved? Although Uzbekistan bas resources of gold, ura,nillm, and some other are not sufficient to he the main foundaofa. country with a population of24 million. Az(~rb'ma]l1. and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan will stin need investments to restructure and develop the national economy and find its own in the international economic system, even after the dreams of oil and gas pipelines and a new Silk Road come true. Additionally, a level of modem technology and communications and environment based on the rule oflaw can Uzbekistan "",,,~,,,"UH'M a for economic and social prosperity and hope to avoid future disaster. There is simply no other way for Uzbekistan to realize its dream of becoming a llew Asian Even if Uzbekistan were to discover huge resources under its land, the country would stin lleed serious reforms. MallY experts warn the prosperity of a and its that oil and gas wealth does not As S. Frederick Starr noted in a rccent article in C-erltral Eurasia "wise rather than the number of barrels of oil will be the key to success t!1r'Qugn.lut Central Asia and the Caucasus. rich is not enough. ,,25

Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?

145

In the summer of 1996, President Karimov, who had long been criticized by the international democratic community for serious human rights abuses, repeatedly stated his commitment to begin democratic reforms. He said that Uzbekistan needed a free media with "aggressive journalists" who criticize the government bureaucracy and corruption, NGOs that are really independent of the government, and a "constructive" opposition as well He stated that the country's economic transition had achieved important successes and the country was now able to begin democratization as the second phase of his reforms. The government at this point made some positive but limited changes in human rights policy. Several prisoners, who, according to the human rights community, were jailed for political reasous, were released. Suppression of dissent was softened to some degree. The government expressed more readiness for dialogue with the international democratic community on human rights issues in the country. In September 1996, a conference of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU) was permitted in Tashkent Seventy pro-democracy activists attended what was their first relatively free meeting in years. At a human rights seminar in Tashkent sponsored by the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). about twenty independent activists and opposition representatives were allowed to participate. Some of them, including representatives of the HRSU, the pro-democratic opposition, and even the independent Islamic community, were able to present views on human rights that were critical of government policy. After almost four years of exile, thanks to an invitation from President Karimov, I was able to visit my homeland for more than two months in 1996 without incident The purpose of the trip was to organize the HRSU's conference, prepare the Society's documents for registration, participate in the OSCE seminar and make presentations. Later, in 1991-98, I was allowed to make two more trips to Uzbekistan that lasted one month and two months, respectively. During these trips, I was able to meet with many people of different political views: members of the pro-democratic community, government officials, the academic and Islamic community, and business people. It should also be noted that in September and October of 1991, pro-democratic groups held two meetings in Tashkent. Although the authorities did not officially permit these meetings, they did not prevent gatherings in which dozens of activists reportedly participated. The frrst meeting was the founding conference of the independent human rights organization of Uzbekistan. created by several activists who left HRSU. The second was a meeting ofErk members. These and other limited steps to improve human rights in the country may encourage people to believe that Uzbekistan is fmding a proper balance between stability and democratization. But there are negative trends as well, and these trends unfortunately appear to be stronger than the positive ones.26 For example,

146

Abdummanob Polat

the new Law on Political Parties, enacted in January 1997. imposed even greater obstacles for political party registration and '~ustified" the government's continued full control over political life.27 Despite promises given by President Karlmov and his top officials, the HRSU continues to be denied official registration, without proper legal grounds. Additionally, the new law on religious organiza.tions that was enacted in May 1998 prohibits the activities of religious groups and communities with fewer than 100 members. The law also creates extremely restrictive regulations for the registration of religious organizations. It prohibits religious activities and education conducted outside officially established bodies, like the Spiritual Board of Muslims. Foreign missionaries are also banned. While the Uzbek constitution declares the existence of many "political freedoms and civil rights," it guarantees very little. In reality, there is no freedom of media and almost no freedom of speech. Freedom of association and assembly are extremely limited, and there is practically no right of peaceful political or public activity and there are numerous examples of human rights violations.28 At the same time, activists may create and operate nongovernmental organizations and work on some issues in relative safety (such as women, environment, health, etc.), but only if they do not touch politics, avoid criticizing the authorities, and do not involve undesirable dissidents in their activities. As the U.S. State Department reports, Uzbekistan today "is an authoritarian state," and there is little indication it is planning any serious efforts to build civil society. The democratic movement is not allowed to advocate ideas of pluralism and openness. The opposition and independent groups, both secular and Islamic, are not strong. Values of individual freedom, respect for other views, and tolerance do not have strong roots in Uzbek society. Cultivation of these values and the construction of civil society in Uzbekistan will probably require decades of efforts to frod a middle ground between the willingness of the government to tolerate a certain level of peaceful opposition and the willingness of the opposition to compromise with the government. For many Uzbek citizens, the struggle to survive in the current economic crisis is their primary concern, and they fear political and societal instability. However, the current level of stability in Uzbekistan is unlikely to be maintained without serious reforms in the direction of a market economy and an open, civil society.

Can the West Help Uzbekistan to Democratize? Can the West, through a combination of pressures and inducements, ''push and pull" Uzbekistan toward democracy and the liberalization of society? In fact, the developed democracies could encourage the acceptance of gradual steps in

Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?

147

the right direction and use assistance policies as leverage to promote liberalization. It is important to remember that, as in many other countries, government officials in Uzbekistan also have some differences in their ideas, education, and career backgrounds. Although they are generally not free to express their views and are obliged to follow President Karimov's orders, different interest groups lobby the president and influence his policies and the way they are implemented. Additionally, despite his image, Karimov probably has some understanding of the need for openness in the country and some intention to begin reforms. But it is obvious that his readiness to allow some openness is limited to the extent that any reforms appear to threaten his authority. Cooperation with more open-minded officials oriented toward market and liberal reforms is critical for democracy-building efforts in Uzbekistan. Those officials who would be most open to participation in an economic assistance program from the West are the same officials who would be most likely to support economic and political liberalization domestically. But no such "liberalization lobby" will form within the Uzbek government unless Western assistance reaches levels that can be taken seriously. Current projects aimed at promoting democratic institutions and market reform and extending technical and economic assistance to Uzbekistan are all too small to effect real changes or to be used as serious leverage on the Uzbek government As one high-ranking advisor to President Karimov told me in the spring of 1998, "Americans want us to begin real democratization, but they give only a few million dollars. However, to maintain stability and conduct hDeraIization simultaneously, we need billions of dollars. because every step toward openness will increase our social problems and the threat of instability."

Can the West Strengthen CIVIl Sotiety In Uzbekistan? If the West is prepared to increase substantially levels of economic assistance to the government of Uzbekistan-and "substantially" does not require billions of dollars, contrary to the opinion given above-it will then also be in a much better position to promote the growth of democracy in Uzbekistan through projects that target social development and in particular the strengthening of nongovernmental organizations. On the other hand, Western support, including programs to promote civil society in the country, should be extended to include authentic groups and activities directed to open society-building efforts. Western democracies already conduct some programs to promote democracy-building in Uzbekistan. Frequently. however, they are too easily satisfied by the readiness expressed by the Uzbek authorities to talk about human rights without really taking any serious steps to improve them. Although

148

Abdum11Ulnob Polat

publicly their commitment to pf{)m(ltUJtg in many projects carried out to promote a free too often work and democratization in the i115t,ll\'oIt;;:> or with and groups who claim to be independent but -----"J n:pn~sellt the anti-democratic views and actions of the go'vernnlen.t Such activities meet fewer from the authorities but the many to Uzbekistan values of pluralism, openness, !"'''I~r",~l'p and real efforts to freedom_ Of course, there is no reason to exclude government officials and Soviet"nongovernmental" activists from discussions and projects related to etTm1s to build civil too, should be educated and trained in the But the focus of such efforts should be on programs that democratic ind,eplmd.ent groups and activists who are nonviolent reforms in Uzbekistan. nnpolrtallce are activities aimed at promoting freedom of information and publications group; lications and activities that advocate political, ethnic pluralism, and human monitoring and reporting; and dialogue between different movements. Special should be placed on the of a prcltes,SlGnal media which is independent from any political or ,,,,,,;:',,JW, group. The most and easiest to promote freedom of information in Uzbekistan would be to strengthen Radio Liberty's Uzbek the main cOllIDlacrltal'Y on events in th.e country and ofRL's Uzbek service is more tban op:IDH)n) n ..",,,...,,.,..., of the Uzbek standards of pr<)fe:,si~)n2llism nor its irr....."",f".,t l.ffi1piemente:d in many activities of its Uzbek Service. Other important ways to advance freedom of information in Uzbekistan would be (I) to support truly independent prmt publications for residents of v"OJ...,,"",... ., publications that advocate values of freedom; and "A"l'i"'"'' toieranc1e; and pluralism, and (2) as accurate and balanced DOI5!utHe. with the main focus on events in the coun.try and eX1PeIlerlce of struggle for and transition to a more Oplm ......,.,,, .... ,,to would serious and opporn"{'Vl,rln1,'" tt;"lUU"'~'!> elcorlODllC. and assistance to Central the United States and other developed democracies must observe a proper to the establishment of open societies balance. Without serious and in the with a particular focus on Uzbekistan, long-term

Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?

l49

peace in the region cannot be achieved. As the experience of large assistance programs to Russia and some other former Soviet republics indicates, a significant part of projects to promote market and democratic reforms and to build civil society should work primarily and directly with the private sector and inde~ pendent activists and groups. However, most governments in Central Asia, including the Uzbek government, do not like such an approach. They prefer that assistance go only to state agencies, or at least to institutions under the strong control of authorities. Finding a proper balance between these two approaches is a difficult problem, especially in the case of Uzbekistan. In the last three years, the Uzbek government established several state and semi-state bodies, which are supposed to promote human rights. democracy, and freedom of information. They include the Parliament's Human Rights Commissioner and Ombudsman, the National Center for Human Rights, the Foundation to Support Freedom of the Media, and the National Center for Public Opinion Studies. However, these institutions have made very little effort to improve the situation, and have been active mainly in holding discussions about human rights and democracy with representatives of the international community. In June 1996,just before President Karimov's trip to Europe and the United States, the government registered as a nongovernmental organization the Committee to Protect Personal Rights. The Ministry of Justice registered this organization within four days. The leader of the committee claims that there are no political prisoners and state-sponsored human rights abuses in the country, and he considers most of the critical assessments of human rights practices of the government to be false or even libelous. In contrast, the same Ministry since 1992 has investigated five separate times, for two-~three-month periods each time, the petition to register made by the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU) and each time justified its refusal to register the society on the basis of deliberate legal misinterpretations. The Independent Human Rights Organization, founded in 1997 by several former members ofHRSU, was similarly denied registration. As already noted, the Uzbek government tolerates relatively independent NGOs if they clearly distance themselves from politics, do not criticize the authorities, and do not work closely with undesirable dissidents. Among these NGOs are ethnic cultural centers, associations working on women's, environmental, and health issues, aid societies for disabled people, unions of Mghan war veterans, and many others. Western assistance projects that strengthen these organizations genuinely contribute to a tradition of independent civic initiative in Uzbekistan and therefore can be building blocks of democracy. But it is important that Western donor agencies be able to discriminate between authentic social organizations and government-created ones. Traditional, Soviet-style professional associations and labor unions and societies that promote friendly

150

Abdummanob Polat

relations and cultural ties with foreign countries are under the s1rict control of the state and in reality are not independent from the government. Additionally, many legal public groups were created by the direct order or "advice" of the president and his government and playa very small role in the political and public life of the country. operating similarly to such Soviet institutions as the Komsomol, Sovetskie Profsoiuzi, and Obshchestvo Znaniye (Union of Young Communists, Trade Unions, and Knowledge Society), Some Western and local experts on civil society issues in Uzbekistan have focused on manallas-Iocal neighborhood councils in Uzbekistan. Mahallas have played an important role in community life, especially in conducting family affairs and events such as weddings and funerals, and ~1ving disputes between family members or neighbors. Because these institutions were so important, in the Soviet period they were put under the strict control of the local governments. During the relatively open period of 1988-92. mahaUas became more independent. Today, however, local governments fund some mahalla activities, including the salary of each mahalla's head. Despite this funding, which significantly decreased the mahaUas' independence, these institutions have deep roots in the society. They could be considered to be elements, albeit weak at present, of civil society. But their role can become significant only when the government begins to tolerate different views or becomes unable to continue its strict control over society. As was the case under Gorbachev's glasnost. these institutions could playa more serious and positive role in political and public life if some openness and freedom were allowed in Uzbekistan.

Is Now the Time for Democratization to Begin in Uzbekistan? In the long run, a clear basis for optimism is the new generation ofUzbekistanis who have had some opportunities to gain world experience in economics, finance, monetary policies, politics, education, health, environmental protection, democracy, independent media. and freedom. I have spoken to many of them. Among them there are young men and women, who are educated, patriotically oriented, and open-minded. They are ready to consider the experience of wealthy countries and accept what is applicable to Uzbekistan. But it is an older, "Sovietized" generation that is in power now and the challenge today is how to deal with it. As noted, for a period of time in 1996 President Karimov gave indications that he was prepared to take concrete steps toward the h'beralization ofUzbek society and government, but these did not materialize. Most likely, the major immediate reasons for the delay in democratic reforms were the dramatic deterioration of the economic situation since October 1996 and the dangerous developments in neighboring Afghanistan.

Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?

151

After some very limited improvements in the suunner of 1996, which created hopes for future positive changes. the economic situation deteriorated badly. The government severely restricted the conversion of businesses , earnings in som (Uzbekistan's currency) into bard currency, except for a small number of companies reportedly run by high-ranking officials and their close relatives. As a result, the country's government lost the confidence of many potential investors. Prices went up dramatically. many stores selling imported goods and related joint ventures closed, and shortages of goods began to appear. Concurrent with these economic problems. the government significantly increased support for Abdurashid Dostum. who ruled several northern provinces of Afghanistan, in order to enable him and his allies to oppose the Taliban's attempt to gain control of the region. The current fundamentalist regime in Kabul does in fact present a threat to Uzbekistan's stability and the stability of the region as a whole. During seventeen of the nineteen years of war in Afghanistan, its northern provinces remained relatively stable and untouched by the conflict. This has also been true for the five years in which General Dostum has been the dominant leader in the region. The final fall of the more moderate, secular leaders in northern Afghanistan would mean that Uzbekistan's only nonCIS border would be with a radical Islamic state, posing many problems, including a threat to the area's stability and the likelihood of thousands of refugees. Developments in Tajikistan, another southern neighbor. also have an impact on the situation in Uzbekistan. The two republics have close historical ties. The establishment of a coalition government in Tajikistan, in which leaders of the armed Islamic movement have strong positions, and speculations about the future creation of a religious state in this country have also contributed to the fears and concerns of the Uzbek government. Among those who helped the armed Islamic movement gain power in Tajikistan is Uzbek fighter Tohir Yoldoshev, considered to be a serious opponent of President Karimov. The center of Islam in Uzbekistan is also located in the Fergana Valley, which is currently divided into Uzbek, Tajik. and Kyrgyz zones. Despite extreme measures taken by Uzbek authorities to minimize contacts with Tajikistan, influence from this country will remain strong. There is another likely reason for Karimov's decision to delay political liberalization. It is probable that the head of state and his top associates too often have inaccurate, sometimes falsified. information on events in the country, government-opposition relations, activities of the opposition leaders, and the goals and interests of the developed countries. In more open societies, a relatively free media plays an important role by providing a broader spectrum of reports and views related to the country and abroad. By restricting its own

152

Abdummanob Polat

citizens from access to independent ideas and news. the government of Uzbekistan also deprives itself of important information. Clearly, it is much easier to begin democratization in a country where there are no serious economic, political, social, environmental, and public health problems. Uzbekistan has all these problems. However, a "successful" country without serious problems probably does not need significant reforms. Uzbekistan, like many other non-democratic states, most likely will not have optimum conditions for starting the creation of a more open society any time soon. But though the creation of such a society in Uzbekistan could be a long, painful, and controversial process, the country badly needs democratic reforms to begin now in order to maintain stability over the long term. The establishment of free and professional media, responsible to an open market and other institutions of the civil society, is a long-term process. But the example of many former communist states suggests that it may be possible to frud an acceptable balance between freedom of information and stability. Moderate, liberal reforms and greater respect for differing views by the government and by opposition political forces will encourage a peaceful environment for the creation of civil society and genuine democratic institutions. The government's adoption of this process is not easy or even probable, but it is possible. Developed democracies should recognize that only through such a process, coupled with a serious new plan to support and promote the building of civil society in the country, can long-term stability in Uzbekistan and the region be achieved. Toward that end, it is important to encourage even mOderate steps by the government to support the adoption of a definite process of liberalization and to promote educational activities that involve all major political groups and elements of the society, including both the ruling establishment and the opposition. In Uzbekistan, there seems to be a calculated policy to limit democratization to the creation of a "constructive" opposition taking the form of GONGOs ("Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations"), and of "free" media which is in fact subordinated to the almost total control of the authorities. For instance, at the OSCE's human rights seminar and the HRSU Conference in September of 1996, some dissidents strongly criticized the human rights record of the government. Later, one of the top officials of Uzbekistan told an OSCE representative, "The September seminar organizers gave a tribune to our enemies and they used it to attack us and we will not allow you to hold such forums again." The Uzbek government obviously still wants "freedom and democracy" devoid of public criticism of authorities.

Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?

153

Conclusion Some (though limited) elements and institutions of civil society existed even in the former Soviet Union during the period when it was considered to be a totalitarian state. In reality. neither the Soviet state nor any other regime has ever had total control over a society and its citizens. Similarly. authoritarian Uzbekistan also has some, although very limited, structures and elements of a civil society. It is important that they be strengthened. It is necessary, however, to keep in mind that together with the level of civil rights of citizens and the openness of a society, other factors have a strong impact on the development of pluralism, civic activism, and social participation. These include national. cultural, and religious customs and traditions. Because of deep-seated inherited cultural conditions, the Western model of freedom cannot be implemented in many countries either rapidly or funy. Uzbekistan is no exception to this rule. The Western theory of civil. society and democracy is extremely important and useful, but its application in Central Asia is only possible iflocal customs and traditions are thoroughly taken into account In Uzbekistan, as compared to the United States, there is considerably more respect for authority, and local communities and neighborhoods are stronger, as are commitments to family and tribal connections. Individual freedoms do not hold the value they do in the West. Any strategy for the development of civil society in Uzbekistan that aims simply to copy Western democracies will never succeed. All Muslim and other Asian countries which have achieved a certain degree of civil society and democracy (Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, South Korea, to name a few) have preserved all, or at least many, of their most important national, ethnic, religious, and cultural traditions. Even so, Central Asian nations strongly need to limit the authority of both the state as an institution and the government officials who serve in it. Additionallarge problems are those of corruption and extreme levels of bureaucracy. In a long-term perspective, the moral and intellectual frameworks of a future (and strong) civil society in Uzbekistan wiU likely be based on a combination of universal values developed in the West for many centuries and local traditions and culture-such as respect for the independent religious. and nonviolent, views of both the majority and minorities. Thus, one of the most important contnbutions and maybe preconditions for Uzbekistan's development in the right direction is related to the role of Islam in the country. The goal should be to achieve a role for it similar to the role of Christianity in the West. An Islam that is modest and tolerant of other religious views, an Islam that is independent of the state and does not seek political power is possible in Uzbekistan, and it

154

Abdummanob Polat

could provide one of the main ethical models and spiritual foundations of a stillto-be-developed civil society. A first step which the West could take to support the emergence of such an independent, nonpolitical Islamic tradition in Uzbekistan would be to focus much more attention on the Karimov government's blatant and systematic attacks on religious freedom. These are violations of principles contained in various international conventions to which Uzbekistan is a party. They are also violations of principles which aU Americans hold dear. A second point concerns the role ofNGOs. It is believed that, in general. the tolerance of independent social organizations and media over time will lead to tolerance of political opposition, then to pluralism. democracy, rule of law, etc., both in Uzbekistan and the surrounding region. While for the next few years such a positive sequence of changes is not highly probable in Uzbekistan, outside institutions can and should promote free access to information, an exchange of ideas, open discussions and dialogue, and the growth of independent social organizations, both in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the most repressive and closed countries in post-Soviet Central Asia. Many projects, including the promotion of the free flow of information and ideas and advocacy for political, religious, and ethnic pluralism and tolerance, cannot be funded locally. Monitoring, documenting, and reporting human rights conditions in Central Asia, even if done in ways that are as accurate and balanced as possible, are considered by the authorities as a threat to the government. Activists advocating these values and working on such projects, even • those who have the most balanced and open-minded position, are in danger of harassment This is true because balanced and accurate reporting of human rights conditions in a nondemocratic country cannot avoid criticizing or documenting a poor human rights record and abuses, and authorities do not like it when such abuses are documented and reported. But such activities are vital, for they provide, like a mirror, a correct reflection of the real situation in a country. This is essential in determining an accurate diagnosis. The wrong diagnosis can lead to the wrong means of treatment. Continued intolerance on the part of the government can only breed violence. It is essential for the international democratic community to support strongly the observance ofhurnan rights, defend the right of peaceful opposition groups to act openly, and encourage tolerance and cooperation among pro-democracy leaders. The third conclusion is that the West should take a great deal more care not to create more internationally funded organizations which have very weak roots in the society, cannot function independently, and sometimes are only independent by disguise. Too often these organizations'have in reality been GONGOs (government-organized NODs). whose real purpose is to replace more inde-

Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?

155

pendent, truly nongovernmental institutions and alternative sources of information. In the end, Uzbekistan and all its friends and supporters, inside and outside. will need to encourage more dialogue among people with different views in order to effect a more open and tolerant society. To prevent extremism of any kind, all the people of Uzbekistan need to begin a process of step-by-step democratic reforms. Without such reforms, the current high levels of poverty and unemployment in Uzbekistan, combined with unfair and improper suppression of the peaceful Islamic community, may cause radical and fanatic Islamic groups to gain strength. Notes 1. Central Eurasia Review, a publication of the U.S.-Uzbekistan Council, vol. I, no. I,p. 17. 2. See, for example, Steve leVine, "Economists Foresee a Stumble in Uzbekistan's Stride," The New fork Times, national ed., January 2,1999, p. A6. 3. See, e.g., S. Frederick Starr, ''Making Eurasia Stable," Foreign Affairs, voL 75, no. I (1996), pp. 80-92. 4. Ironically. the situation dramatically cbanged in late 1993. The Kulabi warlords did not agree to share power with other regional elites. Instead. they strictly lif1lited Hojandi participation in the Dushanbe government while at the same time establishing control over the local government in the northern region of the country. 5. On the other hand, the views expressed by some authors that during the Soviet period, Moscow appointed Tl\iikistan's leadership after consulting with Tashkent cannot be taken seriously. Uzbekistan's cultural and economic influence in the region, in addition to the traditional role ofUzbeks in Central Asia, was mainly based on strong links to Northern Tl\iikistan and Southern Kyrgyzstan (and to a lesser extent, to Southern Kazakhstan and some provinces of Turkmenistan). This influence, however. did not translate into significant political power. It was simply not possible during the Soviet period for Uzbekistan's leadership to influence political appointments in Tajikistan. Such decisions were the sole prerogative of the Politburo in Moscow, which did not, as a rule, seek consultation with or approval from other republics on such matters. 6. Central Eurasia Review, p. 17. 7. For a similar viewpoint, supported by a description of the Uzbekistan governmental structure, see, e.g., Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 118-22. 8. See, for exampJe, Felix Corley, "Uzbekistan: Islam Karimov's Everlasting First Term," TransitiOns, vol. 5, no. 10 (1998), p.62; Anthony Hyman, "The Feeble Birth of Democracy," Transitions, vol. S, no. 9 (1998), p. 79; see also author's comment "New Karimov-Organized Political party In Uzbekistan" at bttp:llwww.fsumonjtor.com (21 January 1999). 9. U.s. State Department, "1997 Human Rights Report: Uzbekistan" (http://www.state.gov/www/globallhuman_rightsl1997_hrp_reportluzbekist.htrnl); Human Rights Watch, "World Report 1999: Uzbekistan" (http://www.hrw.orglhrw/worldreport99/europeluzbekistan.htrnl).

156

Abdummanob Polat

10. See, e.g., citations of such support (as well as criticism) in Stephen Kinzer, "Along the Old Silk Road, a New Effort to Shine," The New York Times, national ed., October 19, 1997, p. 8. 11. Gleason, Central Asian States, p. 124; see also William Fiennan. "Political Development in Uzbekistan: Democratization?," in Conflict. Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the CaucQ.SUS, ed. Karen Dawisba and Bruce Parrott, vol. 4 in series, Democratization and Authoritarianism in Post-Communist Societies (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 12. On the treatment of Mirsaidov and his family, see U.S. State Department, "1997 Human Rights Report: Uzbekistan." 13. See report released on 20 January 1999 by the Union of Councils' Central Asian Human Rights Information Network and the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, at h«p;lIwww.fsumonitor.com. 14. See comments by Roger D. Kangas. "Three Faces of Islam in Uzbekistan," Transition, vol. 1, no. 24 (1995), pp. 17~2I; Bruce Pannier, "Cracking Down on Wabhabis," Transitions, vol. 5, no. 6 (1998). pp. 8-9. 15. The Wahhabis are an Islamic political movement founded in Saudi Arabia by Abdul Wabhab in the eighteeenth century, which adheres closely to the Qur'an (Koran). They advocate a "true" Islam such as existed during the life of the Prophet Muhammad. Since 1953, Wahhabism has been the official ideology of Saudi Arabia and has followers in many countries. The Uzbek government has claimed many times that a number of alleged Wabhabis received military and terrorist training in Pakistan. To date, however, authorities have not presented any credible evidence to support these accusations. 16. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, "World Report 1999: Uzbekistan." 17. Various specialists on Islam in the region support this view. See, e.g., M. Nazif Shahrani, "Islam and the Political Culture of 'Scientific Atheism' in Post·Soviet Central Asia: Future Predicaments," in The Politics ofReligion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Michael Bourdeaux (Armonk, N.Y., and London, 1995), pp. 285·86; with some qualifications, Kangas, ''Three Faces," esp. pp. 2~21. Cf. Abdujabar Abduvakhitov, "Independent Uzbekistan: A Muslim Community in Development," in Bourdeaux, The Politics ofReligion, pp. 293·305. 18. On the Islamic revival, in addition to the literature cited in note 17, see Abdujabar Abduvakhitov. "Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan," in Russia's Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis, ed. Dale F. EickeJman (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 79-97; and for recent indicators, the essay by Reuel Hanks in the present volume. 19. One of the four interpretations of Islam, generally recognized to be legitimate among Sunni Muslims (the main sect in Islam). Founded by Abu Hanifa ~Nu'mon ibn Sobit (imom A'zam) in the eighth century. It is considered to be the most liberal. modest, and convenient in rituals among other interpretations of Islam. Also, this form of Islam is the most tolerant of local traditions and customs, and even occasionally incorporates them. 20. Surma or Surmah ("custom, tradition") refers to interpretations and explana~ lions of the verses of the Qu'ran and supplementary talks by Propbet Muhammad. Also, the term can refer to the Prophet's expressions and behavior, described in canonized Hadises, collections of stories on Muhammad's life. These stories and related comments serve as the ethic and every..day life model for Muslims.

Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?

157

21. A qori is an individual who is able to recite the entire Qu'ran from memory. 22. The charter of the Islamic Rebirth Party has been translated as an appendix to Abduvakhitov, "Islamic Revivalism."pp. 96-97. 23. Isiom La$hkari or Lashkarl Islom (Troops of Islam) was the main movement in 1918-32 that fought against Russians and Bolsheviks (communists) in Central Asia in 1918-32. However, unlike the national-religious resistance of decades ago, the form that emerged in this early 19908 group was nonviolent. There has not been a single credible report about guns or military activities associated with this organization. 24. The examples include the popular and respected Sheikh Abduvali qori Mirzaev of Andijon, his assistants Ramazoo Matkarimov and Ne'matjon Parpiev, and Obdihon qori Nazarov of Tashkent. For details see the author's article in Central Asia Monitor, 1998, no. 1. Since that article was published, Obdihon qQri has disappeared. See also, Human Rights Watch, "World Report 1999: Uzbekistan." 25. Central Eurasia Review, p. 17. 26. The disappointment following the positive measures of t 996 that seemed to promise liberalization can be seen by comparing the opening lines of the U.S. State Department's 1996 and 1997 Human Rights Reports on Uzbekistan. The first reads: "Uzbekistan is a state with limited civil rights. It took several steps toward creating a less authoritarian society in 1996, the full effect ofwbicb is unclear." The 1997 report bluntly states: "Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with limited civil rights." (Cf. http://www.state.govlwwwlgloballbuman_rightsll996_hrpJeportluzbekist.htrnl, and h«p:llwww.state.gov/www/globallbuman_rigbtsll997_brpJeportluzbekist.html.) 27. For a summary of the law's provisions, see OMRI Daily Digest, 8 January 1997. Key provisions include: "Prospective parties must submit details of at least 5,000 members spread over eight provinces. Applications for registering a party are to be directed to the Justice Ministry and the Supreme Court has the right to suspend or ban them if they are found guilty of persistent legal violations." 28. Again, see U.S. State Department, "1997 Human Rights Report: Uzbekistan."

Civil Society and Identity in Uzbekistan: The Emergent Role of Islam Reuel Hanks

C

iviI societies" are to emerge when a shared sense of identity is manifest among members. This may be marked by It common of purpose, a shared and social nonns, and a unifonn of the Soviet substrate of collective identification. Prior to the these elements were partially supplied, at least Marxist-IJeillnist The wholesale jettisoning of this philosophy in Central Asia during no:st-~~O"'ler era has left many in the searching for an a1temative. long vilified and as "feudalistic" and " has resurfaced as a viable response to the sudden demise of Soviet social doctrine for many in the region. Here 1 will to four regarding Islam in Uzbekistan I will describe the and its relationship to the notion of "civil society" there. based on the history of the faith in Central nature of Islam in Asia. recent survey data, I will describe the state of Islamic of the Uzbek population-university students. I among a select shall then examine the between Islamic tradition and the establishment of the structure of civil followed by a discussion of the betand Islam, considered in the context a civil ween the l>'tate in Uzbekistan. At the however, a of how the term "civil will be to this discussion is necessary.

What Is

By "Civil Society?"

CThe term "civil is nsed in a wide for a of purposes, and no defmition exists. One student of civil autonomous, and social activihas held that it is the ties and initiatives undertaken outside structures and instituti.ons."! Others have linked the notion with state and governance structures and linrit "civil societies" to those which evince democratic institutions and The values ofeim are those of political state accounand of politics.... The institutions of civil society are rCJm::sCflta1tve a free press and social associaLV . . . ..,..,.

158

Civil Society and Identity in Uzbekistan

159

tions ....Civil society has ... been privileged by democratic theory as a vital precondition for the existence of democracy ....Civil society emerges as a property of democratic states and societies.2

In addition to using a higbly restrictive definition, the author appears uncer~ tain whether civil society arises from democracy, or vice versa. Using this definition, civil society is possible only where representative democracy is the established political order. Central Asian societies are involved in the process not only of establishing new social orders but also of creating identities, and therefore face a much more complicated task than many other parts of the former Soviet empire. In Lithuania, Ukraine, and Russia, a clear conception of national identity was in place prior to Soviet control, in some cases for centuries. These identities were anchored by territorial association with a past independent state and additionally secured by linguistic and religious factors, along with a firmly established "historical myth." Although the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and other Central Asians could be considered ethnies (to use Anthony D. Smith's term), notions of national identity were far less developed than among the aforementioned groups. Therefore, in Central Asia, civil society and national identity are developing simultaneously, a circumstance which complicates the evolution of both. For this reason, Western approaches to "civil society" may have limited application to the region. In Central Asia as elsewhere, the concepts of "nation" and civil society are inextricably linked, and mutually reinforcing. A nation is a group which shares a collective identity based on some combination of shared factors held in common: history, language. religion, and cultural tradition are the strongest of these and generally provide the basis for distinguishing "us" versus ''them.'' It is this distinction which engenders nationality and which ultimately leads to the "selfregulated social activities" mentioned in the initial definition of civil society given above. Edward Shils has argued that nation and nationality are, in fact, the fundamental underpinnings of civil society: The nation is necessary for civil society. It is one of its main supports. The crucial collectivity within the nation-state is the dominant nation. Nationality is a necessary ingredient, perhaps even precondition for civil society. It is the collective self-consciousness which sustains the civil society. Concern for one's nation reinforces the concern for the common good. l If the relationship between the "nation" and civil society is indeed this secure, then Islam must be included in any discussion of civil society in Uzbekistan. For the nascent states of Central Asia, countries which had no geographical

160

ReuelHanks

identity before the 19208, Islam along with linguistic distinctions function as the basis of national identification. Traditionally, Islam pervaded the lives of Central Asians at every level: from the rule of law {fiharla) to the most fundamental life rituals. Islam is much more than a religious creed, it is a complete way of life which provides a framework for national identity, what Michael Rywkin calls the "national-religious symbiosis:04 Islam provides a corporate identity that distinguishes the Central Asian from those lying outside his cultural experience. Rywkin's comments regarding the situation before 1991 remain valid: If one accepts the classical defmition that a nationality is "a state of mind corresponding to a political fact," then in Soviet Central Asia the state of mind of the Muslim population is cemented by feelings of Islamic community standing in opposition to the political fact of Western, European, Russian, Soviet (used interchangeably) domination.'

What Is the Nature of Islam In (Jzbekjstan? Islam in former Soviet Central Asia has a unique history. particularly in this century, which serves to set it apart from the remainder of the Islamic world. No Muslim region under colonial domination experienced a sustained, systematic effort to eradicate Islam as an ideology and to replace it with an imposed, alien, and hostile philosophy (Marxism-Leninism).' Not only did Soviet rule alter Islamic custom in the region, but it also strengthened the characteristic attitudes, practices, and expectations of Central Asian adherents regarding Islam, which historically set them apart from much of the remainder of the umma, or community of believers. Sufism, for example, has for centuries been stronger in Central Asia than in many other comers of the Islamic realm, and certain practices, perhaps pre-dating Islam, remain a feature of the region's cultural landscape. Among such practices are kalym, or the bride-price, and votive offerings left at sites associated with Islamic figures or objects.7 These are associated with Islam by many Muslims in Uzbekistan, although they are not Islamic per se. In some instances votive offerings are left at natural sites which are believed to hold spiritual power, such as springs, lakes, and rock formations, but which usually have little if any direct connection to Islam. The isolation from the remainder of the Islamic world imposed by the Soviet regime over seven decades served partially to intensifY these currents, and stimulated the evolution of a variant of Islam which is similar, but not identical, to those found elsewhere. Due to its unique experience this century, Islam in Uzbekistan and throughout the Central Asian realm is undergoing processes which are different from those transpiring in any other Islamic region. It is therefore erroneous to auto-

Civil Society and Identity in Uzbekistan

161

matically equate events and processes in Central Asia with apparently similar events and processes occurring elsewhere, or to assume that the goals and aspirations of Central Asian Muslims are identical to those of Muslims in the Middle East, South Asia, or even in other parts of the former USSR. Some commentators have equated the rise in Islamic religiosity in parts of Central Asia with "fundamentalism" or "Islamic radicalism," terms that have become synonymous with "terrorism" in the lexicon of many Western politicians, pundits, andjournalists.8 This has particularly been true with the emergence of Islamic political groups in the region, who are often linked to "fundamentalists" in Saudi Arabia, Iran. or other parts of the Islamic world.9 By linking the appearance of Islam as a political force in Central Asia to these regions, an essential point is missed: Islam is by its very nature a political phenomenon, which does not necessarily mean that it is antithetical to Western interests or values. Indeed, Islam may serve as an important stabilizing force in Central Asia: No one should ignore the potential ofIsIam to make itseIffelt positively in the future. "The Islamic crucible," believes the French political scientist Francois Burgast ... "can produce conditions for socio.-political balance." It is wrong to equate fundamentalism and Islamic extremism. ...Islamists represented in the parliaments of Jordan and Kuwait can hardly be placed among radicals, let alone extremists. 10 A second, fundamental error often made is to approach Islam in Central Asia as a monolithic, uniform phenomenon. which exercises the same cultural influence in all the nascent Central Asian states and societies. The character of Islamic belief and practice in Kazakhstan was quite different from that in Uzbekistan before the establishment ofRussianlSoviet cultural domination, and this remains the case today. The geography of Islam varies even within the new states of the region, and Islamic influence in Central Asia cannot be properly examined or understood without taking these spatial variations into account The historical development of Islamic tradition and practice varies widely across the region, with some groups having belonged to the Dar ai-Islam (abode of Islam) for over 1,000 years, while others were brought into the community of believers as recently as two hundred years ago. In general, those areas which were characterized by sedentary agricultural development. with a corresponding level of urbanization, came under Muslim influence as early as the eighth century. This included Turkic- and Persian-speaking communities located in the oases of the region the ancient Greeks called Transoxiana, who historically were collectively identified as Sarts. II

]62

ReuelHanks

Almost all Uzbeks are Sunnis of the Hanafi school, as are most of the other Muslim groups within UzbekistanY Before the advent of Soviet power, Islamic ritual and practice were nearly universal among Uzbeks. The cities of Samarkand and Bukhara and others had been renowned centers ofIslamic scholarship and training for the entire Muslim world for centuries. although their status had declined significantly by the time of the Russian conquest. The Pergana Vaney in eastern Uzbekistan was also marked by ubiquitous Islamic culture, with the cities ofNamangan, Margilan, and Andijan serving as regional centers for teaching and organization. It was in the last that Muslims mounted a serious challenge to Russian hegemony in the late nineteenth century, the "Andijan Rebellion,,,IJ and this region of Uzbekistan is generally viewed as the most religious section of the country today.14 At the tum of the century, the patterns of behavior among Central Asian Muslims were quite similar to those found in the remainder of the Muslim realm. Muslim women commonly appeared in public only in hijab (Islamic clothing), often wearing the parandzha. or full veil. Central Asian Islam, in fact, was perhaps among the most conservative in the Muslim world and, at the time of the Bolshevik revolution, was experiencing a strong internal refoon movement, led by the Jadidists lS Uadid-"new method"). The Jadidists sought to refoon Central Asian society through refoon of the educational system, which only a small percentage of the population could access. The Jadidist reform movement coincided with the Bolshevik takeover, and many Jadids eventually joined the ranks of the Communists, only to be eliminated in the subsequent purges of the 1930s. After the 1920s, Islam was consistently attacked physically and through propaganda organs, with only infrequent lulls during and after World War II (when ''Muslim Spiritual Boards" were created), the Khrushchev "thaw," 16 and fInally the era of glasnost. In spite of the antagonistic posture of the Soviet regime, Islam survived the Soviet era and was transmitted to the generations ofUzbeks and other Muslims who lived their entire lives under the Soviet system,I7 By the late 19808 what appeared to be a "revival" of Islamic belief was underway in Uzbekistan, as indicated by limited but revealing survey data. Surveys taken in Tashkent by the Institute for Scientific Atheism among students in educational institutions found that 60 percent of the students took part in Islamic rituals. 18 A sample of medical students in Uzbekistan indicated that more than a third favored the observance of "religious customs,,,19 and the director of the Institute for Scientific Atheism stated in 1987 that at least in some regions of the republic, 98 percent of the inhabitants were religious believers.20 Any "revival" may have begun before the relaxation of anti-religious efforts during the late 1980s. There is evidence to suggest that the effort to strengthen Islamic traditions in Uzbekistan began some time before the advent of glasnost

Civil Society and Identity in Uzbekistan

163

under Mikhail Gorbachev, and that such efforts may have been given momentum by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Abdujabar Abduvakhitov, an Uzbek specialist on Islam, has reported that efforts to revive Islam were spearheaded by an underground movement in the Fergana Valley of eastern Uzbekistan in the late 19708.21 Private schools were established for teaching the Arabic language and Islamic traditions and they attracted students who had lost faith in the future of the Soviet system. 22 Due to the illicit nature of this activity. exact figures indicating the number of both schools and students is not available, but the movement was sufficiently strong to support the clandestine printing and dissemination of Islamic literature.23 After achieving independence, the effort to reestablish the physical and moral presence of Islam in Uzbekistan continued apace. This movement is clearly reflected in figures showing an eruption of religious sites across the country's landscape in the early 199Os. By 1994, over 5,000 mosques had been opened in Uzhekistan,24 and approximately 380 medressehs (Islamic seminaries) were in operation-up from two during the Soviet period.IS As many as 5,000 students are receiving training at these institutions,26 and even in the state-run universities, Arabic-language courses have become popular. Attendance at Tashkent's Tocha Boi mosque has led to traffic entanglements on Fridays,21 and the number of Muslims from Uzbekistan making the haj has steadily increased since independence, rising from 500 in 1990 to a figure of 3,500 by 1993.28 Such numbers give strong credence to the notion of "Islamic revival" in postSoviet Uzbekistan.

What Is the Depth of Islamic Religiosity among Uzbe!< Youth? The era of Soviet control imposed a kind of intellectual blackout towards issues of Islamic religiosity, since data available regarding the nature and extent of Islamic belief were thin and usually ideologically slanted. Islam in general fared worse than other faiths in the Soviet Union, since it not only represented an "opiate" in Marxist parlance but, unlike Christianity, was also a non-Western ideology and thus was viewed vis-a-vis Marxism-Leninism as an alien and antagonistic influence in a dual sense. The mere presence of continued Islamic tradition and practice represented a failure of Soviet propaganda efforts and indicated the weakness of the imposed, "scientific" ideological paradigm. Surveys and studies claiming to reveal the depth of "residual" Islamic belief, particularly among youth, were therefore constrained to present a picture of consistent erosion of Islam, particularly among younger segments of the population, at least until the late 19808. Studies done since independence in Uzbekistan indicate that Islam has retained its place as a guide for morality and social behavior. Islamic morality

164

ReuelHanks

implies not only the rituals and dietary requirements of the faith, but also acceptable modes of dress (particularly for women2l). social conduct, specifically respect for elders. arranged marriages, and other standards. Whether this is a "revival" or simply a continuation of earlier trends is difficult to determine, given the paucity of accurate information from the Soviet era. What appears certain is that Uzbek youth, even those possessing high levels of education and falling within the upper socio-economic echelons ofUzbek society, find in Islam a moral and spiritual anchor. For the generation ofUzbek youth who are now coming of age, Islam appears to be a key element of personal and group identification. Vcry little data has been collected on Islamic religiosity in Uzbekistan since independence, but a small sample of students recently surveyed at a major university in Tashkent indicates that Islamic belief, if not Islamic practice, may be nearly universal among young Uzbeks of both genders. Other traditionally Islamic ethnic groups, such as Kazaklhs, Tatars, Karakalpaks, and Uighurs, also show similar levels ofreJigiosity. Among a surveyed group of 43 students, 23 were Uzbek, and an additional 9 belonged to other Islamic ethnic groups, for a total of 34 (see Table 1). All respondents were between the ages oflS and 21, with the largest group being the 21-year oids. Survey participants were from 16 towns and cities in Uzbekistan, with the largest group (14) being from Tashkent. In response to the question, "Do you consider yourself a Muslim?" all students in the traditionally Muslim groups responded in the affirmative. In response to the question, "Is Islam the main moral force in your life?" all students having a tr.:lditionally Muslim ethnic background again responded positively. Nearly everyone in this group had in their possession a Koran, a book reviled as "feudalistic" during the Soviet era. This pattern of response indicates that Islamic religiosity is deeply ingrained in "Islamic" youth in Uzbekistan, even among those seeking a higher education. The observance of the Islamic proscription of alcohol and consumption of pork is less dominant among "Islamic" youth in Uzbekistan. Almost two thirds of the Muslim respondents admitted to sometimes drinking alcoholic beverages (21/34), and a slight majority (18134) on occasion ate pork. While these figures would be seen as alarmingly high in the Middle East or South Asia, they should not be viewed as such in the Central Asian context. Slavic drinking and dietary customs are part of the cultural residue remaining from more than a century of Russian cultural domination and were strongly promoted during the last seventy years, when abstention was viewed as anti-social, anti-Soviet behavior. Indeed, from this perspective, the fact that more than a third of the Muslim group does not drink may be seen as evidence of the resilience of Islamic tradition, in spite of decades of official hostility and attempts at physical eradication.30 Observance of the five ''pillars'' of Islam among the surveyed group was quite sporadic and weak. When asked which of the traditions they observed

Civil

and IrloKfilf"in Uzbekistan

165

daily prayer, the of alms, and the haj), only two were observed by any the profession of faith (iiman) and the of alms to the poor (zalwt). A high of the respOlJlderits had made the profession of faith (24/34), and a smaller group observed zakot Not a student in daily prayer or kept the fast Ramadan, and none had made the pilgrimage to Mecca. The virtual olsaPIlearprayer, Ramadan,31 and the should come a.'l no ,mrnri"" ance that these traditions were outlawed during the Soviet period, and their ",."rhf'p would be to conceal for most Muslims, Those traditions which could be sustained in such as the of alms to poorer uellghboJfS and the individual of faith, survived the period of Communist administration because infrequent, individual action. The of Soviet policy may also be seen in the of attendance at mosque among young Muslims iu Uzbekistan, When asked how on average, attend prayers at a mosque day, every every responded that once a year, or never) the males (24) visited a mosque once every year. None of the females (10) went to mosque, due to a among Muslim women in Uzbekistan that are prohibited from a mosque. The Soviet regime dosed most of the mosques in Central to the th.at in the 19808 Western estimated that a few hundred remained functioning in the entire USSR. Yct in the last it was estimated that more than 26,000 mosques years of the Russian were in for a much smaller Muslim population. 32 physicaUy elimost mosques, Soviet policy succeeded in dramatically the ritual of habitual mosque and this behavior has yet to be markedly reestablished in the seven years since independence. attendance at mosque or other public belief in Uzbekistan may not accurately indicate the level among MusHms. This is evident in the case of women, who do not attend prayr"'''''''''·''''' late in life according to Soviet-era SOC:I01'O,;(lC!l1 ,.,.,c,,,,.·,hy of believers?' Additional data indicates that women become more or at least more openly so, after they reach the age of 40. A survey conducted in Turkmenistan lU1)ong 750 women found that none above 40 claimed to be and found a of believers that age. 34 Muslims in Uzbekistan appear to support the transmission of Islamic When questioned about whether Muslim values to the following nrin~linl!~;: should be in Uzbekistan's schools, a maJonty ofthe group supported such (27/34). This indicates that youth in Uzbekistan indeed view Islam as providing a moral substrate for Uzbek society and that the Western of separation of church and state has not taken

166

Reuel Ha.nks

root. The importance that young Uzbeks attach to Islamic morality is quite significant when viewed in the context of their own experience: all attended elementary school during the 19808, when the state-sponsored ideology was Marxism-Leninism. The results obtained in the survey cited above support those of an earlier study, performed in 1995 at a different university in Tashkent1S In that survey the study group was also small (36), and consisted of students in their early twenties. with males outnumbering females by a ratio of almost 3 to 1 (27 to 9), The ethnic composition of the group was much less diverse, with all of the respondents being Uzbek. except for one Uighur. All the students identified themselves as "Muslim," and nearly all (32134) owned a Koran. The rate of abstention from alcohol was higher. with only 9 of 36 admitting to occasional drinking. The surveys cited above, while being far from conclusive, offer some interesting data. While the sample size in both cases is quite small and both surveys focus on a single segment of the Uzhek population (university students), the consistency of the responses regarding Muslim self-identification, possession of the Koran. and the persistence of those Islamic rituals which could be observed in private all indicate that Islam is seen now by many, if not most, traditionally Muslim groups as the moral foundation ofUzbek society. How Is Islamic Tradition Contributing to the Development of Structures Associated with "Civil Society" in Uzbekistan?

The fundamental social unit in Uzbekistan is the mahalia, a word usually rendered into English as "neighborhood." The maballa has been a feature of Central Asian culture for centuries, and developed as a form of social organization from the extended family s1ructure common to the region's indigenous ethnic groups. In addition, there was an economic rationale for the existence of a tightly linked social network. particularly in rural districts--without such a collective framework. the complex and extensive irrigation works of the oasis areas, built up over millennia, could not be maintained or expanded. The role of the mahaUa in Central Asian society extends wen beyond purely economic functions. The maballa traditionally provided a social security net, played a key part in the education of youth, particularly religious instruction, and in general helped to establish and enforce social standards and mores. In short, the mahalla system represents the basis for civil society in Central Asia, combining the roles of civic clubs, youth and religious organizations. economic cooperatives, and some functions oflocal government in the West. Islamilistorically provided the basis for the mahalla, and the mahalla in tum played a vital role in the survival of Muslim tradition and belief during the era

Civil

and lUpnW'lI in Uzbekistan

167

of Soviet The Soviet Poliakov, who conducted an extensive if ideologically biased study of Islam in Central Asia over several de,;adies, has noted that religious and conducted in an under~ school or maktab, was a common element of the mahaUa or~:anizatiolrl. ..,,,:t1LUUU. according to Poliakov, would eventually assume a role rellQ:ll)US leaneI'Stup in the mahalla in " or to use Alexandre Beltllligse:n's term, "parallel" Islam. Poliakov receivreIll2.l c:ms education ill cOlmection with his mahana, the future mullah str'en~:tfll~ned his to local contact and the mahalia. After the widespread of medressehs the 1920::; and 1930s, the role of the maha11a in the preservation of Islamic custom and tradition became as the maKtalt), buried deeply within the social structure of the maltaUa, was exl:reTnelv difficult to eradicate. In where Islamic to be the distinction between mahana and mosque became blurred, and perhaps CilSamleaJred altogether. In Namangan, a city lying in the Valley of eastern Uzbekistan, manana sometimes doubled as mosques on the Soviet period, and in fact may have been established in locations previously occupied by structures. the mahaUas may have nnj~r"'tp('\ coroolcte,lv uJICie]peIltCieJllt Islamic alcohol and via audio 37 In efiect, the mahalla was an ecclesia.<;tical unit, providing Islam a How secure foothold at the most fundamental level of Central Asian milch of this function may have shifted to more traditional structures (mosques and medressehs) since the renaissance of Islam in the region is an open 'jU'C"'Ll:VH and awaits further It is that the mahalla retains rellgll:ms slgmtLcaJllce in Uzbek since it served such a purpose for centuries before the advent of Soviet power. The mahana was the basic social unit in both rural and urban communities in Central and modifications in the urban morphology did not act to destroy or displace the maltaUa's central role. The mahalla proved to be of Soviet efforts to urban space coUecreSI(lents, at least in the urban areas, into muttistoried apartment cOlmplex.cs. In many entire mahallas simply relocated to the their location but not (H~n'l1".t_ their social In this fashion the maltaHa was even as the face of the largest areas of Central Asia were transformed by Soviet at modernization. The structure of the manaUa is tllcrarlctu1cal, with an elected council forming the highest administrative tier. The aksakals, or elders of the

168

ReuelHanks

mahalla. often playa decisive role in determining the composition of the council. even if they do not occupy positions on it themselves. In some cases, the local mullah and the local woman responsible for the religious upbringing of girls, the otyncha, may be members of the council and thereby exercise considerable political power beyond their religious authority. The council has the authority to ostracize those who violate the established norms. and can prevent certain economic transactions which might impact the composition of the mabal1a.39 Not only did the mahalla survive the advent of the Soviet system, it was actively incorporated into it. Soviet authorities legalized the mahalla as an extension of the party governing apparatus, sometimes allowing it to operate as an elected "Soviet of People's Deputies.'..40 Since independence, the Uzbek administration has continued the Soviet practice of utilizing the mahalla as a quasi-arm of the govemment This is particularly true in efforts to combat the rising level of poverty in the country, as Uzbekistan struggles with the challenges of making the transition from a command economy to free market capitalism. In late 1994 the Uzbek government initiated a program whereby funds targeted for assistance to needy families were administered and distributed through the mahana system. At that time it was estimated that some 12,000 mahallas were in place in Uzbek society, serving approximately half a million poor families. 41 It is significant that the govemment in Uzbekistan is not only using the mahaIla network to allocate social security-net funds, but also to determine the recipients of those funds. Mahalia councils in the Fergana Valley generally appear to have 15-20 members, with the total population of the mahalia being 4,000-5,000 individuals. The size of the Mahallas allow for direct assessment of a family's economic situation by the mahalIa council, based on a variety of factors, including the number of dependents in the family, quality of housing, etc. By cbarging the mahalla with this crucial function, the Uzbek authorities clearly recognize the inherent value of the Mahalla system as a social network and have cbosen to utilize traditional structures, rather than attempt to construct an alternative framework. In addition to promoting the mahalia social structure, the Karimov administration has openly elevated some Islamic figures to national heroes, particularly certain Sufi saints. Among these are the founder of the Naqshbandi Sufi order, Baba aI-Din Naqshband, and the twelfth-century saint, Ahmed Yasawi.42 The Uzbek authorities see Sufism as a counterweight to "fundamentalism" in the country, particularly since the former has often been considered heretical by more extreme groups, including the Wahbabis. The support of SuflSIll is a central component of President Karimov's campaign for manaviyet, Of "spirituality. "

Civil Society and Identity in Uzbekistan

169

As a means of publicizing manaviyet, Karimov established the Public Center of Spirituality and Enlightenment in Tashkent in 1994. Supported at least partially by government funds, the center produces printed materials for public consumption which outline the necessary path to spiritual "perfection.'043 The government clearly envisions a key role for Sufism in the construction of Uzbek society and identity, with the stated goal of the center being the foundation of "a civil society founded on harmonic development of common human and national values.'044 In addition, the government is partially funding the reconstruction of Sufi mosques and medressehs across Uzbekistan, such as the Kboja Abrar mosque and medresseh in Samarkand, a famous Naqshbandi sbrine.4S Not all Islamic groups have fared as well as the Naqshbandi and other SufIs, however, particularly those which represent potential political rivals to the current regime.

What Is the Nature of the Dynamic between the State Apparatus and Islam and Islamic Organizations in Uzbekistan? The trappings of Islam have been employed across the entire political spectrum of both pre- and post-Soviet Uzbekistan, beginning in the latter part of the glasnost era. Glasnost and the political and social reform associated with the term did not take root in Central Asia until the late 1980s, when several alternative organizations arose to challenge the supremacy of the Uzbek Communist Party. The most prominent of these groups, Birlik and Erk, were led by members of the indigenous elite, who sought to garner support from the population by focusing on issues of language, the environment, and the recovery of Uzbekistan's spiritual heritage. While not "Islamic" organizations per se, both groups sought to integrate the republic's Islamic heritage into their agendas for reform. Birlik, for example, recognized the "great role of Islam in contemporary society.,,46 and Erk sponsored a series of lectures in early 1992 designed to explore the linkages between politics and Islam at its Center for Political Information in Tashkent47 By late 1989 Birlik had emerged as a bona fIde popular movement, by some estimates attracting as many as half a million members. The rising power of the organization was clear by the fall of that year, when Birlik-sponsored demonstrations in Tashkent brought tens of thousands into the streets for several days in support ofUzbek as the national language. The power of the organization was undermined by internal divisions, however, and this led to a faction leaving Birlik and forming Erk in the spring of 1990. At least one scholar of the region holds that this was "provoked or encouraged'04S by the government. Whatever the regime's role might have been, the split weakened the movement and eventually set the stage for an authoritarian crackdown against the leadership of both groups,49 which may have been at least partially motivated by the connections both had cultivated with burgeoning Islamic movements.

110

Political stan in the late

Reuel Hanks

linked directly to Islam to appear in Uzbekias part ofa revival of religious activity throughout formed Islamic groups found themselves competing antag()l}i~>tic Uzbek Communist but also with "official" by the Muslim Spiritual Board for Central headquartered in Tashkent. Some of the new Islamic organizations appear to have formed sP(Jtnta.ne()Uslvand while others survived until driven underr"",r""",i"", measures. As a the and influence of "unofficial" Islamic remain difficult to gauge. In the 1990s severallslamic coalesced in Uzbekistan. Some were while at least one showed the to attract Muslims from across An example ofthe first was AdaJat, a group centered in the ofNamangan, in eastern Uzbekistan. Adalat was decapitated when most of its leaders were arrested in March 1992 and imprisoned.50 The Islamic Renaissance Party had national appeal, and at one time may have had several thousand followers. The IRP was immediately attacked as a orj,l,ani.zation in when its leadership was jailed after its tOtmdm~ congress was broken up in of 1991. Driven underground, the ~""'''JL,'''' aOl:Jarlentlv still although most of its leaders remain 51 in Much of tile Uzbek gmrern,meJot's effort Islamic org:anizations has been in response to an Wabhabi movement, which is a'many tied to "fundamentalism.",2 The actual nature oftllis movement, as well as its characteristics remain quite murky, and considerable confusion surrounds the issue. For one writer who detail Wahhabism in Uzbekistan cites the Uzbek scholar Abduvakhitov in support of the presence of a Wahbabi movement. In Abduvakhitov this notion and traces repOlts of this movement in Central Asia to a single Soviet source from the mid1980s, when Islam was under vicious attack in the Soviet media. 53 the aborted to establish Islamic political parties in ~o'vernmlCnt took steps to insure that no group »,..fiti,.,,; alternative in the by which banned all fouudation. The law required all new political parties to and un.ml!JUC'U such groups from to "associations of author,,54 The Uzbek promulgated in late 1992, states 58) that and associations are from th.e state and are assobefore the law. The state does not interfere with the activities the same document (article claims for the govemment the ciations," consiright to disband and outlaw any group in the eveut of

Civil Society and Identity in Uzbekistan

171

derations." Article 12 of the Constitution states that no ideology may be established as a "state ideology." Given the intensity of the reclamation of the Islamic heritage in Uzbekistan. and the ideological and spiritual vacuum generated by the philosophical implosion ofMarxism~Leninism, attempts to establish a political presence for Islam are not only unsurprising, they should be expected. The present administration in Uzbekistan has sought to limit the popularity of these movements via harassment, repression, and physical intimidation.s5 Islom Karimov, Uzbekistan's pre· sident, moved swiftly and decisively against the Islamic Revival Party in the early 19908, although he allowed other associations, such as Birlik and Erk, to function for a longer period. This pattern clearly indicates that the Uzbek administration regarded the Islamic organizations as having the strongest potential for usurping the position of the erstwhile Communists, a position supported by contemporary events in neighboring Tajikistan. As socio-economic conditions worsen, Karimov will likely frod that it is increasingly difficult to contain the inchoate Islamic political movement in Uzbekistan. It is possible that repression may actually serve to reinforce the politicization of Islam in Central Asia, as a postscript to Soviet disintegration. As the transition to a market economy continues to sputter and alternative social and political agendas are forced into the background, many young Uzbeks will tum to their religious heritage for answers to personal and societal problems. It is unrealistic to suppose that this trend will not eventually frod expression as a political force. The strategy of denying Islam a place in the political arena may ultimately work to the disadvantage of the Uzbek regime. Regional identities and clan affiliations remain in place in Uzbek society. and one of the common factors for building an "Uzbek" national identity trom the array of social and ethnic elements in Uzbek societyS6 is Islam. By hindering the development of a politically moderate variant oflslam, the current Uzbek leadership may be breaking a vital cultural chain that joins many of Uzbekistan's ethnic groups. Since independence, the Uzbek ad:ministration has clearly recognized the role ofIslamic ritual in legitimizing political power and has readily made use of Islamic symbology where appropriate. During his inauguration ceremony in 1992, Karimov took his oath of office while holding the Koran. a move clearly aimed to gather the respect of Muslims and especially the "unofficial leadership" and, most importantly, to indicate a clear break with the Communist past. When speaking publicly, be commonly quotes passages from the Koran and sometimes concludes his message with an Islamic prayer-gestures obviously designed to anchor Islam in Uzbek identity, and vice-versa, as well as confound any criticism regarding the president's atheist past.

172

ReuelHanks

The official media in Uzbekistan also frequently employ the symbols of Islam to strengthen Uzbek national myth and identity and generally promote the recovery of the country's cultural past, including its Islamic heritage. This is a continuation of policy from the late glasnost era, when Islam began to be portrayed in a favorable light in the Central Asian media. A well-known example appeared in the literary journal Dialog, when a brief history of Islam, as well as Pushkin's tribute to the Koran, "Podrazbanie Koranu" (Tribute to the Koran)57 were presented. More recently. several letters by Tolstoy, expressing his favorable attitude toward Islam, were published in the leading paper in Tashkent58 This approach is complicated by the Uzbek administration's accompanying strategy vis-a-vis political Islam, one of magnifying the dangers of a "fundamentalist threat" In portraying himself as a bulwark against "fundamentalism" and the establishment of an Islamic theocratic state in Uzbekistan, Karimov bas found allies in both the Western and Russian press. The civil war in neighboring Tajikistan, the alleged strength of the Wahbabi sect in the Fergana Valley. and the rise of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan have all provided a ready rationale for destroying any attempt to link Islam and political power. Nevertheless, the regime continues simultaneously to construct and to contain an Uzbek identity with Islam at its core. The theme of "stability" bas flgUt'ed prominently in the rhetoric of the Uzbek regime since independence, representing a goal which transcends pluralization of the political environment In a work that is now required reading for university students in Uzbekistan, Karimov articulates his vision of the future Uzbek state: "The final objective is the construction of a strong democratic lawgovemed state and secular society with a stable socially-oriented market economy and open foreign policy.»59 The "rebirth" ofUzbek history is key to the building of such a state, including Islam's role in that history, although this is generally acknowledged in vague terms. The economic reform may succeed only on condition [that1 ... the spirit, customs, and traditions of our forefathers will be revived .... [The1spirituality of our nation, going back to ideas and aspirations of our great ancestors, serves as a solid and powerful foundation for our economic transformations. 60 "Spirituality" here must not be associated with any pol~tical aspirations, however, and those who attempt this linkage are swiftly isolated and removed. Such was the case in the city ofKokand in the spring of 1995. when the govemment closed the largest mosque due to alleged "fundamentalism," and impri-

Civil Society and Identity in Uzbekistan

173

soned many of its members. At least one member of the mosque claims that the membersbip was guilty of no more than public criticism ofKarimov's policies.51 Many questions remain unanswered regarding the possibility of the creation of an "Islamic state" in Uzbekistan, and whether such a state would necessarily be antithetical to the West. At least one student of the region reports that the religious leadership in Central Asia it8elfbelieves it "impossible" that an Islamic government will appear there for twenty to thirty years.62 Other writers point out that numerous barriers exist to the creation of such a regime, and what was termed in the past "the Islamic threat to the Soviet Union" does not necessarily translate into a similar threat to Western interests in the region.63 Those wbo subscribe to Huntington's "clasb of civilizations" thesis may see the politicization of Islam universally as a threat to Western interests, but the alternative of authoritarian, single-party states seems no more attractive. Western leadership bas shown a ready willingness to accept claims ofa "fundamentalist" threat in the region, and this may carry a price in the future. Uzbekistan is a state facing an impending demographic and, subsequently, social crisis. Figures from the Uzbek administration indicate that the labor force in the country will nearly double between 1990 and 2015. In addition, the country's GDP shrank steadily for the first half of the 19908 with concurrent declines in employment opportunities-for the nearly 50 percent of the population under the age of twenty-five, the future looks bleak.64 Unless the Uzbek government adopts a more aggressive policy for economic development, rates ofunempJoyment and poverty are certain to increase dramatically. Once the social crisis in Uzbekistan reaches critical mass, the opportunity for more radical elements. wbicb now enjoy limited popularity, to come to the fore of the political stage will increase. Thus, present approaches may ultimately lead to the very kind of political systems the West now seeks to circumvent: Over the long term, Western support of such regimes likely will have negative consequences on public opinion in Central Asia. Indeed, it could help legitimize fighting against an oppressive, now national regime, within the only other loose but truly indigenous framework available: Islam. Plainly, this would amount to the inadvertent encouragement of those "holy" agendas and processes that the West has been seeking to avoid.65 By focusing on the more sensational "threat" of Muslim extremism, Westem policy-makers have failed to properly assess the more serious and immediate economic, environmental, and social challenges facing Uzbekistan. The development of "civil society," as the term is understood in Western context, faces far greater obstacles than those presented by an alleged "fundamentalist" movement, and the tendency to concentrate on the chimera of Islamic political move-

Reuel Hanks

174

mcnts distracts attention from more serious Uzbekistan, and Central Asia as a whole. This could eventually open the path to that variant of Islam seen as most dangerous to Western interests: attempt to limit and control Islam in Central and particuto fundamentalism in the bud, without simultaneous dramatic attempts to reverse the economic and social decline of the ... seems to hasten the growth of more observed as the secular authorities demonstrate their own spiritual and material poverty.66 Islam and civil are not mutually exclusive in Uzbekistan and in fact serve to reinforce each other. Islam has been a cultural component ofthe for centuries and functions as a force in its traditional manifestations. it is unlikely that anything akin to civil society will develop and prosper in Uzbekistan without the cultural and moral framework provided by II resurgent Islam. The character of "civil in Uzbekistan is mextrlcaloly interwoven with the character of Islam, and the latter has and will playa central t;;1it;~OJl:>nlHg the former. As President Karimov has noted: ··1r!Cf{~S.m2 "1)1'U ...."U values have enabled us to take a new approach towards values the Jevaluation of concept and of social development, and [the] whole process of reformation and renewal:,01

Notes Political Culture and Civil I. Vladimir Tismaneanu, in Russia and the NY: M, E. p.4. New States Chan(lllo,ke, State and Civil in Political 2. Publications p, 9. Edward "Nation, nationalism and civil society," Nations and NatlOrla.lI.sm, vol. 1,no. I, 1995,p.1l6. 4. Michael Moscow's Muslim C'h,alltmge, revised edition NY: p.87. M.E. 5. 6. No other colonial power attempted to although there were instances where Islmn to political as in While the French administration to crush the mS1urgcnc;y there never was a for the wholesale elimination of Islam and its rf'nlfl",r>m,r>nrhy an alternative loeolo'gy. 7. One of votive witnessed is connected to the enormous Koran stand located within in Samarkand. Near the stand are several trees, in which are often tied on them, S. There are numerous examples, n~,t,c,,,lllriv a Wahhabi cm;.1ern Uztle~(Jstan. See Leon Aron, "The movement in Central Asia and, in Issue, Soviet Union's Soft Muslim Central

Civil Society and Identity in Uzbekistan

175

1990, pp. 43-46; Merhdad Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia (New York: Sf. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 92-95; I. Ermakovand D. Mikul'skii, Islam v rossii i srednei azii (Moscow: "Lotos," 1993), pp. 225-35. 9. An excellent refutation of the fundamentalist scenario may be found in Roger D. Kangas, "The Three Faces ofIslam in Uzbekistan," and Lowell Bezanis, "Exploiting the Fear of Militant Islam," both in TransiJion, vol. I, no. 24, (29 December 1995). 10. Alexei V. Malashenko. "Islam and Politics in the Southern Zone of the Fonner USSR," in Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Etlmicity and Conflict, ed. Vitaly V. Naumkin (Westport, Cf: Greenwood Press. 1994). p. 117. 11. For more on the origins of the term "Salt" and Central Asian history in general, see Elisabeth Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 17-18. and OIafCaroe, Soviet Empire (New York: St Martin's. 1967), p. 39. 12. Reports in 1989 that the Meshketian Turks, a Muslim minority living in the Fergana Valley, were mostly Shiite and that bloody clashes between them and the Uzbeks were the result of SunnilShia conflict were in error. The majority of Meshketians are Sunnt. A good discussion of the Meskhetians may be found in S. Enders Wimbush and Ronald Wixman, "The Meshketian Turks: A New Voice in Central Asia," Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol. 17, nos. 2 and 3,1975. 13. See Ann Sheehy, "The Andizban Uprising of 1898 and Soviet Historiography," Central Asian Review. vol. 14, no. 2,1966, pp. 139-50. 14. Daria Fane, "Ethnicity and Regionalism in Uzbekistan," in Ethnic Conflict itl the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis. ed. Leokadia Drobizheva, Rose GottemoelIer, Catherine McArdle Kelleher, and Lee Walker (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 279. IS. A general discussion of the Jadids may be found in Helene Carrere d'Encausse's chapter entitled "Social and Political Reform." in Central Asia: 120 Years ofRussian Rule. ed. Edward Allwortb. (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 1989). For a more detailed account of one of the leading Uzbek Jadids, see Christopher Murphy, "Abdullah Qadiriy and the Bolsheviks," in Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions ofIdentity and Change. ed. Jo-Ann Gco!!S (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 1992). 16. Of course, during the latter years of the Khrushchev period, there was a renewed crackdown on religion. 17. This is not to argue that some aspects of Islam were not affected by Soviet efforts at eradication. Data collected on religious fasting among women indicate a large generational gap, with most women born in the 1920s and 1930s observing the fast, while less than 20 percent of those born in the late 1960s do. See Magali Barbier, Alain Blum, Elena Dolkigh, and Amon Ergashev, "Nuptiality, Fertility, Use of Contraception, and Family Policies in Uzbekistan," Population Studies, vol. SO, no. 1,1996, p. 74. 18. I. A. Makatov, "Novyi podkhod neobkhodim," Nauka i reiigila, no. 8, 1988, p.43. 19. S. L. Nigai, "Razvitie sotsialisticheskoi obriadnosti kale faktora sovershenstvovaniia mezbnatsional'nykh otnoshenii v usloviiakh obnovleniia sotsializma," Obshchutvennye nauki v Uzbekistane, no. 2, 1990, p. 26. 20. V. Imlov, "Kuda vedetulitsa vedushchaia k khramu"" Sovetskaia Kirgiziia, December 1'6, 1987, p. 3. 21. Abdujabar Abduvakhitov. "Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan," In Russia's Muslim Frontiers: New Directians in Cross-Cultural Analysis. ed. Dale F. Eickelman (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 82-83.

176

Reuef Hanks 22. Ibid., p. 8t. 23. Ibid., p. 83. 24. L. Usmanov, "Opredelit Ii 'Islamskii faktor' budushchee strany?" Nezavisimaia

Gazeta, January 6, 1994, p. 3. 25. Mebrdad Hagbayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 96. 26. Ibid., p. 97. 27. Alexei MaIashenko, "Islam and Politics in the Southern Zone of the Former USSR." In Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict. ed. VitaIy V. Naumkin (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 1994), p. Ill. 28. Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics, p. 99. 29. One can often guess the ethnicity of a woman on the streets of Tashkent from her physical appearance. Jeans or a dress above the knee and discernable makeup will virtually always be the mark of Slavic, Korean, or Armenian women. The majority of Uzbek and other Muslim women typically wear ankIe~length dresses and little make~up in public. Some in the old city ofTasbkent and other more traditional locations appear only in hijab. 30. While teaching in Uzbekistan in 1995. I heard several accounts from students and colleagues of parents and/or grandparents being forced to drink or eat during Ramadan, of pressures to publicly consume alcohol during Communist Party or Komsomol functions. etc. 31. The figures collected tend to support some of the Soviet data gathered on the subject offasting. See T. S. Saidbaev. Islam i obshchestvo (Moscow: Nauka, 1978). p. 180. 32. Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims o/the Soviet Empire (Bloomington,IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 12 33. M. A. Tolmacheva, "The Muslim Woman in Soviet Central Asia," Central Asian Su~, vol. 12, no. 4. 1993, p. 534. 34. Ibid., p. 537. 35. I conducted this survey while teaching on a Fulbright lectureship in Tashkent in the faIl of 1995. 36. Sergei Poliakov, Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. 1992), p. 78. 37. Ibid" p. 111. 38. Ibid., p. 77. 39. Ibid., p. 78. Poliakov claims that private real estate transactions may be blocked by the mahana, thereby preventing those who might wish to leave the neighborhood from doing so. 40. Alexei V. MaIashenko, "Islam and Politics in the Southern Zone of the Former USSR," in Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict, ed. VitaIy V. Naumkin (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 110. 41. Keith Griffin. ed., Social Po/icy and Economic Trans/ormation in Uzbekistan (United Nations Development Programme; International Labour Office, 1996). p. 151. 42. Alan Godlas, "The Life and Teachings of the Uzbek-Herati Naqshbandi shaykh known as Sufi Islam: a Window into the history and worldviews of 19th Century Central Asia," The Journal a/Central Asian Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (SprioglSummer 1998). 43, Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. For this information I am indebted to Prof. Hurram Barakaev, the director of the Khoja Akrarfund. who gave me a tour of the complex in the summer of 1998.

Civil Society and Identity in Uzbekistan

177

46. This phrase is from the organization's charter. 47. ERK (published in Tashkent), July 17, 1992, p. 2. 48. Anatoly Khazanov, After the USSR: Ethnicit>', Nationalism. and Politics in the Commonwealth 0/Independent States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, J995), p.138. 49. Daria Fane, "Ethnicity and Regionalism in Uzbekistan," in Ethnic Conflict in the post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis. ed. Leokadia Drobizheva, Rose Gottemoener, Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Lee Walker (Armonk. NY: M. E. Sbarpe, 1996), pp. 282-83. 50. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 21,1992, p. 3. 51. Roger Kangas, "Recent Developments with Uzbek Political Parties," Central Asia Monitor, no. 4, 1992. 52. See James Critchlow, "Islam in Fergana Valley: The Wahhabi Threat," Report on the USSR, December 8, 1989, and Mebrdad Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 92-95. 53. See Mehrdad Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995),92-95, and Abdujabar Abduvakhitov, "Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan," in Ruma '1£ Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis, edited by Dale F. Eickelman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). 54. The full text of the law appeared in Pravda Vostolm, February 26, 1991. 55. In July of 1992, Abdurahim Pulatov, one of the leaders ofBirlik. an opposition group, was savagely beaten in Tashkent and forced to flee the country. This followed several other assaults on the group's leadership, apparently with the approval and perhaps participation of government security forces. 56. Although the Uzbeks make up approximately 70 percent of the population, there are over 100 ethnic groups living in Uzbekistan. 57. Dialog, Tashkent: no. 8, 1991. pp. 74-79. 58. Tashkentskaia Pravda, January 21, 1998,7. Although great effort bas been made to replace Russian place names and terms with Uzbek equivaJents in Uzbekistan, Russian literary figures appear to be exempt from this trend, perhaps out ofrespect for their genius. The only two metro stations to retain Russian names in Tashkent, for example, are Pushkin and Gorky stations. 59. Islom Karimov, Uzbekiston: Along the Road 0/Deepening Economic Reform (fashkent Uzbekiston, 1995), p. 9. 60. Ibid., p. 26. 61. One of the members who had escaped a jail term related this information to me while I was in the Fergana Valley in October of 1995. 62. Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Islamic Awakening," Current History, April 1994, p. 154. 63. L. A. Bezanis, "Menace, Myth or Self-Fulfilling Prophecy? Reflections on the Islamic Threat and Forces Opposed to Theocratic Rule in Former Soviet CentraJ Asia," unpublished manuscript, September 1993, pp. 35-47. 60. Jtogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naselenia 1989 goda. Chislenost' i razmesbchenie naselenia SSSR. Chast I. Published by East~View Publications, Inc. 1992. 65. Bezanis, "Menance, Myth. or Self-FuIfiUing Prophecy?" p. 52. 66. Olcott, "Central Asia's Islamic Awakening," p. 154. 67. Karimov, Uzbekistan: Along the Road o/Deepening Economic Reform, p. 225.

178

ReuelHanks

Bibliography Allworth, Edward. The Modern UzbeIrs: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined C..ommunities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. Chandhoke, Neera. State and Civil Society; Explorations in Political Theory. London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1995. Deweese, Devin. Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 1994. Gellner, Ernest. Encounters with Nationalism. Cambridge. MA: Blackwell, 1994. Gleason, Gregory. The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1997. Griffin, Keith, cd. Social Policy and Economic Transformation in Uzbekistan. United Nations Development Programme, International Labour Office, April, 1995. Fierman, William, ed. Soviet Central Asia; The Failed Trans/ormation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. Haghayeghi, Mehrdad. Islam and Politics in Central Asia. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. fsaacs, Harold R. Idols ofthe Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989. Kaiser, Robert J. The Geography ofNationalism in Russia and the USSR. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Karimov, Islom. Uzbekistan: Along the Road ofDeepening Economic Reform. Tashkent: "Uzbekiston," 1995. Khazanov, Anatoly M. After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth ofIndependent States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995. Kolstoe, Paul. Russians in the Former Soviet Republics. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995. Lewis, Bernard. The Political Language ofIslam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 198B.

Mehmet, Ozay.lslamic Identity and Development: Studies ofthe Islamic Periphery. New York: Routledge, 1990. Pehe, Jiri. "After the Soviet Empire: Civil Society in Democratizing States." Current, March 1996. Poliakov, Sergei P. Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia. Ed. Martha Brill Olcott; trans. Anthony Olcott. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992. Poznanski, Kazimierz Z., ed. Constructing Capitalism: The Reemergence ofCivil Society and Liberal Economy in the Post-Communist World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Royce, Anya Peterson. Ethnic Identity. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. Rywkin, Michael. Moscow's Muslim Chalknge. revised edition. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe,I990. Sagdeev, Roald, and Susan Eisenhower, eds. Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution, Change. Chevy Chase, MD: CPSS Press, 1995. Shlapentokh, Vladimir. Munir Sendich, and Emil Payin, eds. The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994. Shtls, Edward. "Nation, nationality, nationalism and civil society," Nations and

Civil Society and Identity in Uzbekistan NatiOTIfJ/ism, vol. I, no. 1, 1995. Smith, Anthony D. Theories OfNationalism. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. :=-_--::.--:-:---:-_. The Ethnic Origins ofNations. New Yark: Basil Blackwell, 1986. Tapper, Richard. cd. Islam in Modem Turkey: Religion. Politics and Literature in a Secular State. New York: I. B. Tauris, J994. Tismaneanu, Vladimir, ed. Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States ofEurasia. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.

179

Islam and Tajikistan's Human and Ecological Crisis Aziz

The material which lie in scientific and technical progress, with aU their ex~:epitlOnal U11lportance, will not solve the fate Scientific and teclmical progress will not bring happiness, if it is not supplemented by considerably in the social, moral and cultural life of humanity. The life the inner imJ:>eUl..'i of their activity are very difficult to predict, but this is oftbe human what in the end the wreck and upon.! civilization 1974

To the world at the catastrophic situation that has in Tajikistan is little understood. At the root of the strife which has dominated the news are serious While Islamic tradition in the counits nature and relationship to the current crisis are little appreciated. The of Western countries has been to model development on the values of industri.alized secular democracies. In traditional Islamic which are concerned with a balanced aPtlmllcl1 to human ae','el'oplneJlt and the conservation ofnatlIIal resources, may be the to stable long-term de'felc)prnerlt. This essay will review the naum:: of Islam in discuss the connection between the "Islamic revival" there and the crisis that in terms the way in which local tradition the and then propose in Inay hold the solution to of stable de'fe14lprneIlt.

Tradition [slam to the which is Tajikistan quite early on--in the second half of the seventh century. Toward the end of the The author is to the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for its kind This article is adapted from Aziz "Islam in Tradition and ModJU:lj,xwn, State ajournal ofttle Keston Institute (Oxford, England), Issue}, 1998. With of Keston Institute. Its translation from Russian is Geraldine and Lola sections is by Daniel Waugh.

180

Islam and Tajikistan's Human and Ecological Crisis

181

century the dynamic new religion of the Arabs was already becoming established among a significant proportion of the population in the area between the rivers Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya. In the tenth century Islam became the state religion of the Samanid empire, which Tajik historians generally regard as the flI'St formation of the Tajik people into a state. The entrance of the Tajiks into the young, lively Islamic world was accompanied by the advent of high culture, flourishing scholarship. and the growth of the economy. This Central Asian territory between two rivers on the periphery of the Islamic world saw the development of a unique Islamic sub-civilization that combined the monotheistic tradition of Abraham with elements of ancient beliefs primarily linked with a settled, agricultural way of life. Philosophical, social, and moral thought reached unprecedented heights in Central Asia between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. This intellectual ferment came about under the influence of Sufism. which to a certain extent had distanced itself from the strict orthodoxy of scribes and lawmakers. The Sufis brought a fresh wave of spirituality into the Islamic tradition. The moral and social values they formulated permeate the whole of classical Tajik-Persian literature, which can be rightly regarded as the quintessence of Central Asian Islam. Nowadays, the Tajik peasant, mullah, engineer, or academic tries as a rule when discussing belief to support his arguments with the poetry of Jami, Saadi, Khaftza, Rumi, Rudaki, and other sages who brought together in their work the elevated philosophy of the unity of the universe, the folk epic, and fundamental morality. The Quran and Sunna were undoubtedly their main inspiration. Modem Tajik proverbs, sayings, and parables are full of Quranic and early Islamic motifs handed down through medieval poetry.2 At the basis of Islamic moral ideals is the socio-poJitical doctrine of the Naqshbandi, which is widespread among Tajik Sufis. It is better known locally under the name Khojagon.$ Condemning the asceticism of earlier mystic brotherhoods, the Naqshbandi urged fellow Muslims not to turn their backs on worldly problems and called upon their spiritual leaders to move close to thrones and exert all their influence on the ruling powers to prevent despotic rule over merchants, manufacturers, and the peasantry. With this as their aim, Khojagon sheikhs became mentors to sovereigns, attempting to implant in their souls the seeds of kindness, nobility of spirit, and the fear of God. They sometimes put quite heavy pressure on those who were excessively tyrannical, willful, and harsh in their treatmen.t of their subjects. This doctrine was particularly clearly manifest in the activities of the Naqsh-

bandi Sheikh Khoji Akhror. who by means of conviction and heavy pressure on rulers great and small succeeded in easing the Jives of simple folk by preventing destructive raids and bloody civil wars. The achievement of justice

182

AzizNiyazi

within the state was associated first and foremost with the necessity of implementing the commands ofsharia law in the very system of power. In . the apt words of the Sufi poet and philosopher Sheikh Abdnrrakhman Jami, Khoji Akhror "made sharia law and beliefs a yoke for all snItans' necks ...... In the eyes of the Naqshbandi followers, who measured norms of social relations by the Khanfit mazkhab, truth and shatia law were not bard and fast dogmas. Sufi leaders, including Khoji Akhror. called upon those in power "1:0 use the shatia law in accordance with the spirit of the age.'" In this way a considerable range of possibilities for political reform and the regulation of economic relations was opened up. The principal aim of just rule was considered to be the maintenance of a quiet and peaceful life for the workers, most of whom were peasants. In the Naqshbandi tradition agricultural work is holy and the oppression of the peasantry is sacrilegious in that it undermines the basis of the state. Indeed, the entire history of this Central Asian river valley region testifies to the fact that when villages grow poor, towns empty and palaces fall into ruin. As long ago as in the fIfteenth century Jami, an indisputable authority of the Khodjagon, warned: The peasant labor is the basic work In winter and in summer it is hard But if the peasant sweat faIls not upon the soil The fate will bode us trouble and starvation/; In the ftfteenth century the Naqshbandi teachers placed greater value on protection of the unfortunate, promotion of the interests of the majority, and service of the people than on mystical practices. At that time the tradition of intervention in politics by the spiritual authorities fmalty became established under Khoji Akhror. A motto of his is well known: "In order to fulfIl one's spiritual life in the world, it is necessary to use political power." The spiritual leaders began to correct the actions of secular leaders, but stopped short of replacing their power with that of the clergy. This idiosyncrasy of the Central Asian religio-political tradition is important for the understanding of the Islamic movement in Tajikistan today, especially since the Tajik mullahs themselves emphasize the fact that the Islam of the region is predominantly of the Naqshbandi type. In Tajikistan today (population 5.5 million) no fewer than 95 percent of believers are Muslims. Like official Islam, so-called folk Islam is widespread within the local culture. For centuries Arabic Islamic tradition has been adapting

Islam and Tajikistan's Human and Ecological Crisis

183

itself to local beliefs, and it has absorbed the customs of the peoples of Central Asia. In all parts of Tajikistan pre-Islamic rites have been preserved; for example, worship of saints and sacred objects and a belief in magic and miracles.7 The ancient agricultural rites and festivals of the Zoroastrian and pre-Zoroastrian period are widespread among Sunnis and Ismaelis alike; these are primarily linked with the worship of nature and the cults of fertility, fire, water, and earth. The mythical figure of Grandfather Ploughman (Bobo-i Dekbkon or Khoja Dekbkon) is particularly revered everywhere: according to traditional Muslim genealogy the Ploughman line descends from Adam. Villagers carefully preserve risola-genealogicallists of the names of holy "Khodzha Dek.hk:ons."s Before Soviet rule was established in Tajikistan each town and village had its own sacred places-the burial-vaults of devout spiritual leaders, sacred stones, trees, reservoirs. Places where famous Sufis had stayed for a time were also considered holy. Tajiks called them kadamja- "places where the foot of a holy one has stepped." These could be picturesque groves, majestic waterfalls, striking cliffs, springs, or caves. From the mid-1920s onwards the inhabitants of tens of thousands of tiny villages were transferred to larger settlements and towns; but the people maintained their spiritual connection with their small homeland, with the holy sites of their ancestors. A reverent attitude toward holy mazars9 continues for another reason, too: some Muslims, in the Garm group of regions and in Darvaz, for example, observe the custom of consecrating the newborn in the burial-vault of a local saint, who according to folk belief then becomes the baby's invisible life-time protector,to For various ethnic and cultural groups in Tajikistan the most revered Sufi burial vaults have gradually become objects of special veneration. Kulyab Muslims regard Sheikh Amir Said Khamadoni (fourteenth century) as their guardian, and Muslims of the Leninabad oblast regard Sheikh Muslikhiddin (sixteenth to seventeenth century) as theirs. The inhabitants of the Gissar Valley revere the burial vault of Mavlono Yakubi Charkhi (fifteenth century). while those of the Yavan Valley revere that of Domullo Kilichali (eighteenth century). II As recently as sixty to seventy years ago particular family groups, and sometimes even whole settlements and regions, would regard themselves as murid (followers) of a particular ishan (a Sufi spiritual leader) or of a whole family of ishans. Ishans, otherwise known as pir (Pious elders), generally came from the revered families of Seiid or Khodzha, whose genealogies go back to the families of the prophet Muhammed, of his closest associates, or of renowned Sufis.12 Elders in Tajikistan say that up until the revolution it was rare to meet a person who did not have a pit; in the eyes of simple folk anyone who did not would be considered to have lapsed from the faith. It is noteworthy that when elderly people are recalling the names of tribes and ancestors in their family tree, they

184

Aziz Niyazi

often mention that they were murids of one or another family of ishans. The last few decades have of course fundamentally altered traditional relationships; but even today Muslims from the most varied social groups still observe customs of religious class subordination, although certainly not as strictly as before. One indicator of a particularly respectful attitude toward Sufi leaders is the fact that most of the Tajilc leadership since the start of perestroika has been chosen from renowned ishan families. 13 On the whole, the Naqshbandi Islam in Central Asia has reconciled sharia law with pre-Islamic beliefs and customs. This mixture oflearned and folk Islam is so moderate, so distant from radicalism, and so much in accord with the spiritual mood of the most varied sections of Islamic society that it has showed significant tenacity in the new conditions of harsh modernization of society. In Soviet Tajikistan the "struggle against the survival of religion" did not inflict serious damage on the Islamic tradition. Islamic customs were not observed at work. but they were foDowed at home. Officially religious schools did not exist, but in fact local experts on the Quran and Islamic customs often taught children the fundamentals of religion and traditional morals. Some children were taught by their fathers and grandfathers. Documents produced by atheist departments give the number of mosques as just a few dOzeD, whereas in fact there were hundreds. Believers gathered for religious conversation and prayer in one another's homes, tea-houses, clubs, and "red comers" (recreational rooms in Soviet factories), where prayers would often be said in front of portraits of the classical thinkers of Marxism-Leninism. The pearls of Sufi literature, works thoroughly permeated by religious philosophy, were published and republished for decades; with superb commentaries on Sufi symbolism by orientalists, they were inexhaustIble sources of wisdom. The "atheist struggle" usually consisted in attempts to eliminate the cult of saints, magic rituals, and lavish expenditure on Islamic festivals, the usual targets of local atheists. Qergy were generally criticized as greedy and semiliterate, but intellectual disputes on the teachings of the Quran were hardly ever organized. In the late 19808, for example, there were reports from atheist departments about amulets confiscated from Muslims which were meant to demonstrate the effectiveness of the struggle against religious relics. Paradoxical as it may seem, the activity of Central Asian atheists in many ways recalled that of puritanical foreign Muslims and of the few local groups which were in favor of purifying the faith and putting an end to eclectic folk Islam. "Learned" Islam was preserved by the local intelligentsia, particularly those in the humanities. They began to fulfill many of the functions of the traditional class of the ulama (highly-educated theologians). Within the walls of acadernic institutes of philosophy, history. literature, oriental studies and eastern manuscripts, medieval Islamic texts were collected and studied, and sound works on

Islam and Tajikistan's Human and Ecological Crisis

185

Islamic history and philosophy were produced. The obligatory atheistic formulae they contained did not affect the scientific significance of these works; they were a formality and were not taken seriously. Thorough research was carried out, mainly on SUfISm and Ismailism. Academic specialists frequently outshone mullahs and ishans in their knowledge of Arabic, medieval sources, and the classical Islamic sciences: some of them, indeed, were from respected ulama families themselves. It is significant that much of the social program of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan was worked out by academic scholars who had a head start in the intensive study of the works of contemporary Islamic socio-political thinkers and the experience of islamicization in Arab countries, Pakistan. and Iran. At the end of the 19808 it was these humanities institutes which concentrated intellectual study on the subject of the national renaissance, which naturally included the religious renaissance too. There was indeed a price to be paid for free thinking: the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Tajikistan Academy of Sciences was closed down. The official Islamic clergy, though small in numbers, received sound theological training at the Bukhara medresseh "Mir-I Arab,» at the Tashkent Islamic Institute, and at universities in the Arab countries. Highly educated members of the Islamic clergy would always have a few pupils. They were able to pass on the religious knowledge they had accumulated regardless of whether they were serving in official mosques or not. The so-called self-taught mullahs, who were hungry to perfect their knowledge, would travel to visit the famous religious leaders of Uzbekistan, mainly in the Fergana Valley, most often in Andijan, but also in Termez, where the outstanding educational traditions of the Deoband Dar-ul-ulurna (the most famous Muslim university in India) was maintained illegally by several members of the ularna from local SeUd families who had completed their religious training under renowned Deoband teachers at the beginning of the century. Toward the end of the 19808 there were more than 1,500 unofficial mullahs in Tajikistan. They did not constitute an organization, and most of them kept out of politics. They chiefly concentrated on preserving tradition, organizing and registering local communities, and collecting funds for building mosques. By 1988 there were 17 official mosques in the country but thousands of unofficial ones. It was natural that as soon as the authorities relaxed religious persecution there was a rapid renaissance ofIslamic institutions. By the end of 1991, 130 Friday mosques were already functioning in Tajikistan, as well as 2,800 smaller mosques and prayer houses and 150 Quranic schools. Of the 120 Islamic societies which had been registered, 50 were so-caned pure Islam societies which follow traditional religious practices with particular zeal. Most of the clergy in the new mosques (95 percent) are from the ranks of demoted former clergy.14 A natural religious renaissance has thus taken place; but Central Asian Islam

186

Aziz

has remained untouched hy the of currents estahlished elsewhere in the East The natural process of refonn which had heen at the start of the twentieth had heen interrupted. Furduring the years power there had heen a process of compulsory this was nonintellectual and was not the result of processes coming to fruition within Islam. Elsewhere--in Iran, India, and Pakistan-Islamic social had heen developing for decades, digesting the eXlneY'ierlce of both West and hut in Central Asia Muslims were .....'·~~'M' concerned with the hasic features of a tra.dltiollllU" rl,,'JPI.O,fi6·rj ous while the state took over wholesale concern for social U<;:lUU!!ClI to Caesar was to what was God's was given to God. Muslims were involved with and were removed from the confessional and national It is not that in the perestroika and years Central Asia did not produce any Islamic social thinkers such as Ahul Kalam lamaIuddin Ali Seiid Khussein Abul Ala Mandudi, and Said Akhmad Khan. As far as we know, not one serious theoretical work about the structure of an Islamic state was written in Central Asia at this time. Intellectual activity was proceeding in a different direction. In the early 19905 a numher of works on the and ethics and studies of the Quran and khadisi appeared in Most of their authors were philologists, historians. Islamic were more involved in sacred texts and handbooks on Islamic rituaL The process of the Islamic renaissance was reflected in the legalization of religions institutions, and in a interest in the Islamic spiritual ha¥';+~"~ and educational For a education was the main concern even among those Islamic nonconformists who today comprise the leadership of the opposition Islamic Renaissance !5 was in his own way to the Hfe. There have never been any disputes OIl theolorevival questions among these groups; schisms have occurred chiefly as a result of PUUUI:,U affiliation and Islamic thought has thus not formulated many clear ideas ahout a desired state structure and social order. The usual Islamic SO(:lO··nOllncal tendencies as hut this is not appli~ cable to the current Islamic movement in This methodological model works elsewhere in the Islamic world hut does not suit the Central Asian situation. Islamic tendencies in this including can be divided more readily into moderate traditionalist apolitical) and radical neotraditionaHst politicized). The fundamental question for spiritual leaders in the

Islam and Tajikistan ':; Human and Ecological Crisis

187

republic remains that of whether to become involved in politics.

The Industrial Onslaught-The Islamic Response The politicized Islamic movement in Tajikistan, which gathered strength at the end of the 1980s, was first and foremost the response of a traditional society to the rapid process of industrialization, which was devastating because it was accompanied by violence against the dominant peasant culture. 16 This violence was felt particularly by the inhabitants of the mountainous south-eastem regions of the country: from the 1920s onwards they were resettled en masse on the parched steppe in order to cultivate cotton. Subsequent decades sa.w increasing efforts to create a broad local proletarian class. The prevalent theory was that the development of small-scale peasant production in mountainous territories had no prospects. The industrialization of manufacturing and agriculture, with the priority of developing cotton production, destroyed economic structures that had lasted for centuries. Hundreds of thousands of peasants and craftsmen were forced to break with their accustomed way of life and adapt to another, more or less alien, cultural environment Many did not endure the harsh change in climate, the unfamiliar exhausting work, and the constant chemical poisoning of the cotton fields. Those who were unable to learn new skills, fmd work, or settle into the new pla'7S tried to return to their original homelands, but subsequent campaigns to resettle the mountain folk repeatedly thrust them back into the valleys. The state's migration policy. which had as i.ts aim the transformation of traditional peasants and craftsmen into an advanced industrial and agricultural proletariat, was ,conducted on an astounding scale. Until the mid-1920s, 70 percent of the native population lived in the mountains and foothills; by the early 19908, the figure was down to 30 percent. In this mountainous republic lowlands account for just seven percent of the territory, however. Population movements have thus posed a problem for the 19808 and 1990s. The policy of relocating populations in the Soviet Union was a symptom of gigantomania. Its aim was to increase the size of cities and large settlements and to merge small collective farms. Naturally, human pressure on the environment from cities and valley settlements grew rapidly as population density in the valleys began to exceed all norms. 17 Traditionally resistant to moving into cities, the population tried to avoid working in large concerns, with the partial exception of the textile and food industries. A huge class of unemployed workers grew up not only in the towns but also in rural areas. Moreover, an acute shortage of water resources was becoming evident by the late 1980s, a result of irrational and wasteful utilization. With the restriction on land resources came a reduction in the area of irri-

188

AzizNiyazi

gated ploughed land per inhabitant. In 1925 it was 0.5 hectares; by the early ) 990s it was 0.1 hectares. This reduction was a result not only of rapid rates of population growth but also of civil and industria1 construction in rural areas and the degradation of the land that had been taken over. As a result of irrational utilization and the destruction of agricultural technology, over half of the 57~,OOO hectares of cultivated land is in an unsatisfactory condition at the present time. For the past flfteen years the use of water has more than doubled, while the disposal of untreated industrial and commercial waste has also grown. The quality of drinking water has markedly deteriorated. Twice or three times the planned amount of water has been used on the vast cotton plantations. The proportion of agricultural land that is used for cotton has been increased to 50 percent. The expansion of cotton land at the expense of arable land has led to a monocnlture which is unstable both economically and agronomically. Cotton has replaced nonnaJ crop rotation in the flelds and has weakened the sound basis of traditional agriculture. Gigantomania in industrialization has also done enormous harm to the ecosystem. Without regard for the natural climatic particularities of Tajikistan the go-ahead was given in the 19608 for the development of huge metallurgical, chemical, and engineering works. These quickly began to pollute the air, water, and soil. The extreme hazard these plants posed to the particular environment of Tajikistan was not taken into account: this area is in fact the one with the lowest potential for atmospheric self-regeneration within the territory of the former Soviet Union, and its arid soils and small mountain rivers also have a low recovery capacity. The reorientation of the republic around huge, energy-gobbling industries went hand in hand with the introduction of huge hydroelectric power stations to serve them. In the flood zones thousands of hectares of scarce fertile land disappeared under the reservoirs of gigantic hydroelectric plants and large numbers of peasant families were resettled from mountain ravines to cotton-growing valleys. Meanwhile the population was increasing rapidly, by 3.5 percent a year on average, and in. certain regions by up to 4.2 percent. The pace of economic growth Jagged behind that of the population. As a result at the beginning of the 19908 Tajikistan was performing worse than any other Soviet republic according to basic socio-economic indicators. This sonlless revolutionary modernization made the life of the peasantry especially hard. The people's spiritual and economic lives, which had been in harmony with nature for centuries, were disrupted. Unique local sociaecological systems were endangered and seriously damaged. Simply by working, human beings were now violating the rules of interaction with their environment.

Islam and Tajikistan's Human and Ecological Crisis

189

Economic indicators show that on the eve of "independence" the process of rapid industrialization in Tajikistan had collapsed. Gigantic projects, planned but not completed, hovered like mirages. That "progress" which the industrially minded elite understood in their idiosyncratic way had run into a wall: the wall of "tradition" which has been reasserted in recent years. However much society was modernized, Islamic peasant-artisan culture preserved a significant niche in it During the years of Soviet power the main preserve of such culture remained the Garm region in the southeast of the country in the foothills of the Pamirs (Pripamir'ye). Until recently harmony between society, the individual human soul, and nature prevailed here. The destructive monoculture of cotton did not penetrate the region. Thanks to plentiful water and a mild climate, the population of mountain ravines and valleys have traditionally specialized in the cultivation of fruit, vegetables, and grain. Herds of cattle graze on wide pastures. Garm has provided a significant proportion of the agricultural produce of Tajikistan. High yields have meant that poverty is almost nonexistent. Trade in goods has flourished. The mullahs and ishans here have become renowned for their knowledge of Islamic sciences, and the population is notable for its piety. More than 95 percent of Garm Tajiks are peasants or craftsmen. Communal and patriarchal ties are strong. Traditional morals--adab--are honored. It was no accident that in the 19808 the crime rate in this region was the lowest in the republic. However, the advance of industrialization left its destructive trail even here. The construction of the largest hydroelectric power station in the republic began in this mountain district in the valley of Rogun on the River Vakhsh. IS More and more electricity was required to transport water to the cotton fields and for the new industrial concerns. Dozens of villages were located where the reservoir of the new power station would be. Toward the end of the 19808 it was decided to move the inhabitants to the steppe, which had been colonized by cotton, but there was stubborn resistance on the part of the peasants. They refused to abandon the land they had cherished for centuries and their revered mazars and holy places. The memory of the forced resettlement of thousands of their countrymen was still alive. A breeze of change was already blowing softly through the Soviet Union and people began to voice their protests openly. At the same time discontent with their living conditions was intensifying among the mukhajir. the mountain dwellers who had been transferred to the valleys. The protest of the rural masses was headed by young unofficial religious leaders, many of whom had suffered separation from their native region. The majority of them came from mukhajir families. The opposition movement of the Tajiks of the Pripamir'ye naturally and inevitably assumed religious overtones. In spring 1992, as government authorities continued to ignore the interests of a desperate peasantry, authoritative ishans from the southeast of the country rose

190

AzizNiyazi

to their defense. The Naqshbandi tradition of intervention on behalf of landworkers and craftsmen was reborn. Thousands of mnrids poured into opposition meetings in the capital in support of politicized Islamic nonconformists. Antigovernment demonstrations were coordinated by the leaders of the Tajik Islamic Revival Party (TIRP) and the republican Kaziate. On the revolutionary wave rolling from Moscow and in response to the harsh actions of the authorities they turned to force in order to resolve political problems and were thus drawn. into the fratricidal war between the regions. 19

In 1993 TIRP merged with the Tajik Islamic Revival Movement (TIRM). which is now the most serious force opposing the government in Dushanbe. TIRM's main assistance comes from radical Afghan and Arab nongovernmental organizations. As a result of their influence it is being increasingly ideologized. It should be emphasized that the radicalization of the Islamic opposition on the eve of civil war took place mainly as a result of the clumsy actions of the authorities in Dushanbe. The Islamic nonconformists have still not worked out a model Islamic state structure appropriate for Tajikistan. Their debates are basically about the necessity of maintaining a balance between individual and social interests in any proposed system. and the rejection of the classical models of Western capitalism and Soviet socialism. In principle they accept all the institutions of the present state government on condition that these reflect and defend the interests ofall regions of the republic equally. Before the start of the bloodshed. supporters of "pure Islam" in Tajikistan were a wholly moderate movement and in other circumstances they evidently might have worked fully with the secularized institutions that had been in place for decades. The views of the leaders of the Islamic opposition on possible linkages between Islamic norms and modem legal, political, and economic systems were notable for their common sense. Nevertheless, the political struggle of Islamic nonconformists was not conducted to establish the rule of the clergy, but in the first instance for a wider representation of the mountain-dwellers in the structures of power and against the violence being done by the industrially minded elite on traditional culture. Through thern ..tradition" has defined the borders of what is acceptable and unacceptable to them in the process of its modernization, but has not yet given an answer regarding an escape from the deep crisis which has seized all spheres of human life in Tajikistan.

Wider Implications: Traditional Society and Contemporary Problems of Stable Development The gloomy prognoses of the Rome Club regarding the socia-ecological catastrophes of the end of the twentieth century have begun to come true, not in

Islam and Tajikistan '$ Human and Ecological Crisis

191

the post-industrial West but rather in the so-called Third World, which now certainly includes the majority of the republics of the fonner USSR. At the beginning of the 19908 Tajikistan exploded from within. Exceeding the limits of technological risk precipitated processes of degradation in the biosphere, undermined traditional culture, and qualitatively altered social conduct, which was already wen on the road to self-destruction. The Tajik tragedy was an alarm ben, a warning to the developing countries. Similar misfortune struck the Shah's Iran, Algeria, Egypt, Chechnya, and Sudan. and threatened Kyrgyzstan and Dagestan. It is a universal phenomenon. This is an example of the systemic crisis of a "new generation"........rocial, ecological, economic, demographic, spiritual, cultural. inteUectual, political, etc. Moreover, such profound crises ripen in semi-industrialized, semi-traditional countries independently of their type of social and state system. Various "isms" here are inconsequential; what is important rather is the degree of enlightenment of those in power. In its essence, the civil strife among the Tajiks is a struggle of regions for survival brought forth by rapid demographic growth. forced migration, over· population of valleys, and catastrophic insufficiency of water, land, energy, and food-production resources. It is impossible to overcome such a crisis merely by introducing the political institutions and economic relationships patterned on contemporary Western models and applicable to developed post-industrial countries. Superimposed on the matrix of local, ingrained social relations and economic cultnre, they will not produce the desired effect, but at times wiD interfere with social development. Economic and political liberalism by themselves will not untangle the interconnected problems of Tajikistan. Their resolution must involve the simultaneous, multi-faceted resolution of problems of demography, of resettlement policies, of the economy and state system, and of ensuring the harmony ofnatnre and society. This multi-faceted approach assumes that, together with social, economic, and political relations, the environment has equal status as a force in society shaping a new order. The ecological crises and catastrophes in developing countries directly influence the social sphere, slow economic development, and destroy the general level of cultnre. They are both the background and one of the principal reasons for the opposition of various models of life, of technocracy and the bearers of a rationalistic, secular ideology on the one hand and traditional ideology, with its largely religious world view, on the other. In the conflict among Tajiks a powerful stratum of unchanging traditional culture emerged which must be taken into account when developing models for the stable development of the country. In particular, in order to achieve the goal of restoring and preserving socio-ecological systems, it is possible to take advantage of the traditional local peasant attitude toward husbanding water and land resources. Of particular importance are Muslim prescriptions regarding the

192

AzizNiyazi

limitation of needs, the moderation of consumption, the condemnation of acquisitiveness and egoism, and the preservation of strong family bonds and human health. A long-term strategic program of stable development directed at establishing harmony between the spiritual and material activities of mankind and its environment should take into account specific interests and problems, the potential of all regions of the republic, cultural and economic traditions, and the human psychology of all its inhabitants. In the process of the establishment of democracy in Tajikistan, the role of social organizations and local organs of self-government should be revived in the sphere of environmental protection.. In connection with this, while preserving strong presidential power, it would be beneficial to limit the power of provincial administrators and instead delegate greater authority to lower organs of power at the level of regions, large settlements, city districts, groups of villages, and traditional mahalla councils. The role of central departments, ministries, and provincial organs would be to design projects for the distribution and use of productive forces, but local authorities would have executive power. Reform of the system of territorial-administrative supervision in the direction of strengthening local authorities is dictated by centurles-old traditions of communal self-administration. It also is the logical consequence of weak national integration and the political activity of the structures of power at the level of provinces and regions of republic-level subordination which have fostered centrifugal forces. The introduction of an effective system of local selfadministration could weaken the manifestations of regionalism in politics and facilitate stable development. In contrast, a federal organization of Tajikistan, comprising distinct major regions, as proposed by various experts, would have the potential to exacerbate interregional conflicts at the current stage of evolving statehood. This is the more likely, because the unstable socia-economic situation is likely to persist in the foreseeable future. The role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is growing. Through them citizens can control technological development and the exploitation by the state and private companies of nonrenewable natural resources by ensuring their rational use. The authorities are required to provide information on ecological monitoring, on the use of harmful technologies, and on technological strategy. Decision-making remains the right and proper function of officials. However, it should follow only upon financially, politically, and organizationally independent assessment of risk, canvassing of public opinion, open discussion in the mass media by the adherents and opponents of innovations. and in special circumstances the conducting of referenda. Universal ecological, moral, and humanistic imperatives must be taken into account in adopting technical and economic decisions. Sociological expertise must be applied, and values and moral considerations assessed. One cannot

Islam and Tajikistan's Human and Ecological Crisis

193

ignore the opinion of the population, even if the fact of its being ill-informed may substantially increase the degree of risk. To ignore the opinion of society can give rise to political, socia,4 ethno-regional, and even interstate conflicts, which may at times be very destructive, prolonged, and intense. The overall losses from them-not only materia4 but also cultural, spiritual, intellectual, and moral-may substantially exceed the projected benefits from the exploitation of one or another project. The construction of the Rogun hydroelectric station in Tajikistan is an excellent example of this. The building of civil society in Central Asia undoubtedly has its own distinctive features and should be based on a synthesis of the traditions of the local society and universally accepted democratic institutions. At the same time it is necessary to take into account the ecological dangers which have arisen in recent decades. These dangers have given rise to an increased potential for conflict in the region and make all the more pressing the issue of social control over them. Although the question of the criteria for a civil society remains a matter of debate, theoretically, in the most general terms, it is an ideal where harmony of individual and social interests rules. In a civil society political goals, govemment institutions, economic relations, and law should guarantee a citizen and his family a peaceful, stable, and healthy life. While there are efforts to achieve that ideal, so far in no instance has it been fully realized. The ideals of an Islamic state concemingjustice, equality, and brotherhood in our opinion are completely compab.ble with the commonly accepted contemporary understanding of civil society. In support of such a view, one should remember that such a state dates its beginnings much earlier than its equivalent in Europe. The idea of a state ruled by Jaw took root in the East on the basis of the universally accepted sharia law, which in theory eliminated estate, racial, and class privileges for the observers of the law, thus making the rights of the rank-and-me Muslim and the ruler equal. The Law of God, spelled out in detail in the shariat, was invoked to express concern for the spiritual and physical health of man, his home and family, the balancing of the interests of society and individual, and the regulation of property and economic relations in the interests of the state and its citizens. Freedom was limited primarily in cases where there was danger of the degradation of society and person in the spiritual and physical sense. In this regard Islamic civilization in its development rests upon a solid foundation of intrinsically valuable legal and philosophical principles. A brief historical period in Tajikistan has seen the destruction of a derming principle of Islamic civilization-touhid-monotheism, understood to embody the unity of God, Mankind, and Nature. Violence has come to dominate both the environment and the divine essence of humans. The jihad oCthe sword is the result. War has produced nothing but destruction of the soul and matter. It has no future. Beyond the jihad lies creation and self-perfection, through the' uniting

194

AzizNiyazi

and enlightenment, and science with faith and the of all creation. Priority will be given to values other th.an those to which obeisance :is paid and tradition will play in this a not inconsiderable role.

Notes Sali:hlil'ov. Mir, progress, prava clleloveka: stat 'j i >yjctuf'le1l~lya 2.

P''''U'''"5'
"Islam, the state and ethnicity in Central Asia in historical voL 24, nos, 1996, pp. 95-96. Ml.l.kl'llrmrncC!kh,lJdzhaJrev, 1I:1.€tOlo'gly'a Nakshbandizma pp. J\t',fI!{lun.

State and

D3-63. 4. Abdl.lrrakhioni

manuscrtpt, Institute of ''''~C1''t'.... no. 146, p. Ml.ltkillunrnedlgnlphlcal isolation from industrial centers. Unofficial rel)[gi()us ''''''''<'1'''5 was more wkiesl)reltd here and more Muslims could read Arabic and understand

Islam and Tajikistan's Human and Ecological Crisis

195

the Quran. At the same time, all manifestations of folk Islam---belief in the spirits of ancestors, the miracles of ishans and sacred sites--were preserved in this mountainous region as elsewhere. The pre-Islamic cults of fire, water, and fertility were also widespread. Thus, there is no substantiation for allegations often encountered in the press, especially official Tajik publications. that the people of the Gann region follow the fundamentalist Wahhabite school of Islam. As is well-known, the Wahhabi consider all the aforementioned manifestations of folk Islam to be inadmissible heresy: prejudices contradicting the belief in one God. The Islamic nonconformists in Tajikistan began incorrectly to be termed Wahhabi by analogy with the puritan movement in Islam which arose in Arabia in the eighteenth century under the influence of the teachings of Abdul Wahhab. {The term began to be especially widely used after appearance of the article "Vakhkhobizm i islamskaya partiya" by the head of the government's Committee for Religious Affairs, Sunnatullo Ibragirnzoda, in the newspaper Todzhildstoni Sovet; (11 December 1990). Communities of pure Islam in Central Asia manifest only isolated feafures of the Wahhabite school, such as: strict morality in everyday life; condemnation of lUXury and extravagance; strict observance of the Quran's ritual commands on fasting, prayer, charity, and family relations; striving for an atmosphere of brotherhood and sincere mutual aid; and the electivity of inwms. However, adherents of the Central Asian renaissance movement, including the Tajik Islamic Renaissance Movement, belong to a more moderate and flexible school of religious law that is far more tolerant of innovations and Sufi traditions. A very tiny section of the pure Islam community in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan did actually start calling themselves Wahhabi in the late 19808 and early 199Os. This generally happened after their leaders came back from the haj. The socio-economic prosperity they had seen in Saudi Arabia. the richness of religious life there and the feeling of Muslim solidarity which became a reality to them during the time of pilgrimage were all connected with Wahhabism. In the Tajik press, there have been two extensive articles by experts on Islam on the specifics of the renaissance movement and Islamic trends in Tajikistan. These academic works excellently demonstrate the simiJarities and differences between Tajik religious political nonconformism and foreign analogues; they illustrate the fundamentalist charac~ teristics of the movement and at the same time its divergence from Wahhabism and other reforming trends in ''pure Islam." See Pulodi SuJtonzod, "Vakhkhobikho kistand1" (Who are the Wahhabi?), Adabiyet va sanaa!, 2 July 1992; Davlatkhoja Nazirov, "Mo khama parvardai yak shokhu bargyem" (We are all grafts on the same green branch), Jumkhuriyat, 23 October 1991. Nevertheless, the Islamic oppositionists often continue to be called Wahhabi, and among the common folk are often called by the derivative name "Vovchiks." 8. See I. Mukhiddinov, Reli/cty doislamskikh obychayev i obryadov u zemledel'tsev Zapadnogo Pamira (19- nachalo 20 veka) (Dushanbe, 1989). In the appendix to this book (pp. 91-95) is the text of one of the rlsolya of the farmers, and there is information about other translated and publisbed rlsolya from both peasants and craftsmen. 9. A mozar is a Muslim cemetery where the remains of local saints lie. There are mazars where only saints are buried. 10. Kislyakova and Pisarchik (eds.), Tadzhiki Karategina i Darvaza, third edition, pp.82-83. 11. See Jumkburiyat, 6 August 1994,11-12 February 1993.

196

Aziz Niyazi

12. B. Kb. Karmysheva, Ocher/ci etnicheskoi isloro yuzhnylch raionov Tadzhikistana i Uzbekistana (Moscow, 1976), pp. 148-52. 13. Thus Kboji Akbar Turajonmda, formerly kazi-kalon (supreme sharia judge) and now vice-president oftbe opposition Tajik Islamic Revival Movement, comes from a respected clan of isbans in the Kafirnigan region. His father, ishan Turajon, had about a thousand munds. In 1993 Kbojl Akbar Turajonzoda was replaced as the head of Muslims in the republic by Kbojl Fatkhullokbon Sharifzoda, who comes from a revered clan of ishans in Gissar and Surkhandar'ya. His father, ishan Sharif Rasullo, had many foHowers not only in Tajikistan but also in Uzbekistan. Fatkhullokhon Sharifzoda studied for a while under ishan Turajon. (See Charogi ruz., no. 1(90), 1996). 14. These data were provided by representatives of the Kaziate in NovemberDecember 1991. According to data from the Muftiate, at the beginning of January 1996 there were 183 Friday mosques, one higher madrassah and nine middle-level madrassahs in the republic. In 1995, 1,500 people went on pilgrimage to Mecca. The fall in religiosity that was observed in 1993-94 changed back to an increase. The leaders of the "pure Islam" communities were by no means opponents of Sufism. They did not persecute those who worshipped saints, but they condemned the practice whereby isbans and mullahs would enrich themselves by performing ceremonies at mazars. Thus in Kbovalingsky raum. Kulyabskaya oblast " followers of pure Islam expressed displeasure with the behavior of the sheikhs of the mazar, Kbazrati Sulton. Every summer when the pilgrimage to the tombs was in full swing dozens of sheikhs would collect huge gifts but would not share them with disadvantaged and needy local Muslims. 15. The leaders ofTIRM usually received their formative religious education within the family circle. Their level of knowledge ofIslamic sciences was very high. The chainnan ofTIRM, for example, Said Abduilo Nun, was taught by bis father, who for many years headed a large collective farm and on retirement handed in his party mem~ bership card and became the spiritual leader of the local community. Until the civil war Said Abdullo himself was employed as a translator of Quranic sayings into the Tajik language and he also wrote children's books on Islamic rites. The Islamic movement in Tajikistan included both a political agenda and an educational one. Up until the 1990s the latter was clearly the more important. Convinced of the impossibility of supporting the Islamic way of life without a change in the consciousness and level of education of Muslims themselves, the Islamic nonconformists concentrated their efforts during the 1980s on widening the net of illegal Quranic schools. These schools operated the three-tier system of education worked out by the "Muslim brothers." Groups of scholars aged between 10 and 30 consisted of between five and ten people, and the scholars at advanced levels taught the younger ones. For reasons of secrecy lessons were held in various different places. 16. For detailed information on political Islam in Tajikistan. see A. V. Kudryavtsyevand A. Sh. Niyazi, '«Politichesky islam': nachalo 90-kb" in V. V. Naumkin (ed.), Sovremenny islam: Ieu/'twa i polttika (Institut vostokovedeniya, RAN, Rossiisky tsentr strategicheskikh i mezhdunarodnykh issledovanii. Moscow, 1994). pp. 95-128; A. Sh. Niyazi,lslam v Tadzhikistane: Rossiya i musul'mansky mir: Byulleten' reforativno-analiticheskoi in/onnatsil, INION RAN, IV RAN, no. 10 (40), 1995, pp. 5156. The analysis of the social and ecological consequences of industrialization is based

Islam and Tajikistan's Human and Ecological Crisis

197

on unpublished material from the Soviet po izuckeniyuproizvoditel'nykh sil (SOPS or, in English, "Council for the Study of Productive Forces") at the Tajik Academy of Sciences, as well as on data in the following books: Sostoyanie prirodnoi sredy Tadzhikskoi SSR v 1989 godu: Doklad, (Goskomitet Tadjikskoi SSR po okhrane prirody, Dushanbe, 1990); R. K. Mirzoyev (ed.), Problemy razvitiya i razmeshcheniya proizvoditel'nykh sfl Tadzkikistana (SOPS AN Tadzh. SSR, 1988); K. D. Mityukova, Opyt gosudarstvennogo slroilel'slva Tadzhikskoi ASSR (J924-1929 gg.) (Dushanbe, 1988); A. K. Suchkov, Sotsialisticheskaya indusmalizatsiya Tadzhikskoi SSR (Dushanbe, 1965). See ;Uso Aziz Niyazi, Tqjikistan: Konfl/kt reg/onov na fane sotsialno-ecologitcheskogo krizisa, in M. Olcott and A. Malashenko (ed.), £C%giya, obshestvo i traditsiya: Sotsta!niye i polititckeskiye krizisi v SNG v kontelrste razrusheniya prirodnoy sredi (Tqjikistan i rossiyskiy Sever) (Nautchniye dokladi, Moskovskiy tsentr I
Women's NOOs in Central Asia's Evolving Societies VIa Ikramova and Kathryn McConnell

A

nongovernmental sector has emerged in each of the five former. Soviet Centl:al Asia nations. with organiiations (NGOs) managed by women or primarily serving women. and the family being among the strongest. Through NGDs, women are learning to balance an acknowledgment of their societies' religiously rooted traditions with an entrepreneurial drive to improve the social and economic status of women, and to build their nations for the next century. The post-Soviet economic n-ansition in Central Asia has had a harsh impact on women. The Soviet system brought women educational and professional opportunities, while independence from that system has seen a reemergence of traditional views that a woman's place in society is lower than a man's and that men deserve the best jobs. Despite official decrees supporting women, these views now limit women's opportunities for finding routes to improved standards of living. As a result, women in Centl:al Asia are more at risk for poverty than men, particularly if they have been divorced or widowed, are unmarried mothers, or have large families. The unemployment rate for women in the region is higher than that for men, and is higher in rural areas, where women have mostly been tl:ained for low-wage agricultural work. Women have little access to credit. Even environmental degradation, especially in areas surrounding the Aral Sea, has disproportionately affected women's health. The Nukns-based NGO, Perzent (meaning "infanf' in Karakalpak), reports that the mortality rate of women and children in the Karakalpakstan region of Uzbekistan is one of the highest in the newly independent states (NIS). The opportunities women do find come mostly from still growing NGOs. Organizations developed by women provide assistance in areas centl:al to women's economic development: employment discrimination, women's low self-confidence and "legal illiteracy," and women's needs for business and vocational tl:aining and for business development capital. Women-led NGOs have established programs for victims of domestic violence and other crimes, for women who have turned to or have been pressured into prostitution, for divorced women and single mothers. and for families with many children, the elderly, and people with disabilities. NGOs are addressing women's and children's health issues, including access to health care and the effects of the region's poor environmental conditions on health. Slow and painful economic 198

Women's NGOs in Central Asia's Evolving Societies

199

transition bas forced many women out of their previous careers and toward creating new opportunities for themselves to help meet their families' needs and ultimately to influence their societies. Not surprisingly, many women who have started and lead Central Asia's NGGs are former researchers, educators, attorneys, and other professionals. Many NOOs were created by small groups of women who united after losing their jobs. An example is the Almaty Women's Information Center, whose founders include attorney Gulsara TIenchieva, and Mira! Akkent, Karlygash Toktybaeva, Sara Nursapaeva, Elvira Pak, and Alma Bakineeva. A different case is that of Raushan B. Sarsembaeva, who saw many women who had lost jobs develop feelings that their professional and life experiences were "useless" and that society no longer needed them. She felt post-Soviet women had a choice: to wait an indefinite period of time for the "crisis" to pass, or to chart a new course for economic survival. Sarsembaeva became a cofounder of the Kazakhstan Business Association. In the early post-independence years of 1992 to 1995, these small gatherings of like-minded colleagues first learned the basics of how to work as an organization from groups like the American Legal Consortium and Counterpart Consortium. Thereafter they sought out training in fund raising, financial management, and strategic planning as their leaders became more aware of international donor organizations' civil society development programs. Other predecessors oftoday's women's NGGs were the national Soviet-era Women's Committees, which were reactivated by Central Asian governments in the early 19908 and initially charged with distributing international donations of humanitarian assistance. Together with the younger and more loosely structured women's groups that emerged in the early nineties, and thanks to new laws making NOO registration easier, they began to form an NOO infrastructure in Central Asia. Yet even today, NGOs in the region are far from being self-sustaining. Those that have received grants from international donor organizations have become the most viable. Those that have not been successful in getting outside project funding have ceased operations. Central Asia's start-up NGGs do not have a community base of cotporate or individual donor support to which to tum for support. To achieve their public service goals, these NGOs need continued support from internationalorganizations, whose programs have funded the basics of organizational development, such as training and communication tools, and now are supporting budding partoership agreements. NOO sector viability is also tied to the development of an independent media in Central Asia, to consistent implementation of clear legislation favorable to NGOs, and to community and family attitudes supportive ofNGOs' work. Financial support from local private sources is a longerterm goal that will depend on the development of a stronger business sector.

200

U. lkramova and K. McConnell

Today, women have proved they have the vision and dedication to help advance a women's agenda consistent with the region's economic development goals. Through the organizations they have created, women are influencing developments in every sector of their societies: social concerns--including human and legal rights-the environment, health. education, culture, small businesses, the family, and the community. Recent conferences in the region suggest how women will play an increasing role in the Central Asia of tomorrow. In November 1997. a "Central Asian International Women. in Politics" conference was held in Almaty, with First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton as the guest of honor. In May 1998, the Uzbekistan government's Center of Public Opinion held a meeting for representatives ofNGOs and international organizations to review that country's laws and agreements for protecting tbe status of women and families. The following month. the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) sponsored a regional conference in Tashkent to which ten women leaders from every Central Asian nation were invited to discuss "Women in Public Life." In August 1998, a conference on "Developing the Rights of Women in a Democratic Society" brought together Uzbek alumni of U.S. education and research exchange programs and representatives ofinternational donor organizations to examine the progress made and to be made in the area of women's rights. The collective impact of periodic conferences such as these is to disseminate valuable information to women's NGOs, increase public awareness of the work ofNGOs and of women's issues, and motivate women to become more involved as citizens in solving social problems. Development of Women's NOOs

In 1991, the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan began to allow women's groups that had fonnerly been de facto agencies of the government to reregister as nongovernmental, nonprofit organizations. The same year, the Business Women's Association of Uzbekistan, Tadbirkor Ayel, the first women's NGO in that country, was founded in response to President Islam Karimov's challenge to women to become involved in the nation's economic development. By 1993, with funding from international and local sources, Kyrgyz NGOs were bolding meetings to train women's right activists. Women's NGOs in Kazakhstan successfully petitioned their government to support a delegation to the UN International Conference on Women beld in 1995 in Beijing. By 1996 NOO development had spread to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan's first NGO-like group was the quasi-governmental Turkmen Information Consulting Center, located at the National Academy of Sciences. By 1998, there were twenty NGOs in Turkmenistan, including the quasigovernmental Women's Committee and legal consulting center, Ayel. Civil

Women's NOOs in Central Asia's Evolving Societies

201

disturbances and refugee movements slowed economic and social development in Tajikistan. Nevertheless, NGOs that focus on issues affecting women have formed in Dushanbe and Khojand. The initial slow pace ofNGO development in Central Asia can be linked to early misunderstandings of the role that nongovernmental groups play in civil society. I Throughout most of the 19908, many officials were skeptical of organizations that could affect groups of citizens but were outside of government control---a skepticism that has also inht"bited the development of a credt"ble, independent media. Yet, having had the chance to witness what nongovernmental organizations could accomplish, even with limited resources, former skeptics are now receiving NGOs as partners in helping communities meet social needs and nurture small businesses. The degree of public officials' understanding ofNGOs' role and appreciation of their activities varies from country to country. Recently, NGOs' strongest working relationships have been with the alcimiats (local government administrators) ofKazakbstan. There, for a time, government-organized NGOs enjoyed moral support and other privileges bestowed by government officials. However, in 1997-98, the governments ofKazakbstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan began to sever their financial support for groups they helped establish just a few years earlier. Women's Committees and Business Women's Associations are examples of groups that had once received some national government financial support but are now losing it. Most of the area's active, registered women's NGOs were establisbed between 1994 and 1997.2 Among the most active are the Association Diamond and the Women's Congress of Kyrgyzstan in K.yrgyzstan; the Women's Resource Center, Women's League of Initiatives, and the Bukhara and QuqandBusiness Women's Associations in Uzbekistan; the Feminist League of Almaty, K.azakhstan Women Entrepreneurs, and the Almaty Women's Information Center in Kazakhstan; AyeJ in Turkmenistan; and the National Association of UniversityEducated Women (Dusbanbe) and Business Women's Association of Khojand in Tajikistan. The strongest NGOs are located in the five capital cities, but NGOs are forming in rural areas, as well. In 1997, one NGO leader in Kyrgyzstan reported that in just one part of Osh oblast, forty nongovernmental organizations were working on social issues, and 90 percent of their members were women. By 1998. with an NGO framework established in Central Asia, more and more groups realized they needed to look at their organizations as businesses as well as social service providers. Leaders accordingly began to allocate more time and resources to developing projects that will help them achieve social. moral, and economic sustainability.

202

U. lkramova and K. McConnell

Women and Small Business and Entrepreneurial Development With Central Asian governments focusing on attracting foreign investment and developing major industries, women·led NGOs have concentrated on helping to develop support structures for jolrcreating small and medium-sized enteIprises. Through legislation and decrees, the governments of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan encourage women to create nonprofit organizations and small businesses, leaving it up to the organizations to identify specific tasks and tmd ways to fulfill them. Business women's associations (BWAs) have become leading voices for women owners and managers of small- and medium-sized enterprises and principal generators of new jobs and economic opportunities for women. They are helping women develop skills in management, marketing, accounting. strategic planning, and economic development. Branches of the business women's assa. ciation Tadbirkor Aye} in Uzbekistan have developed regular, regionally based, business and vocational training programs for rural women-whose economic status tends to be lower, and training needs higher, than urban women. While encouraging women entrepreneurs, business women's associations also let women know that starting a business is a long process requiring much planning and hard work, and that women must also overcome their traditional fear of competing with men. NGOs have also developed programs to assist women in agribusiness. They maintain contacts with business associations and NGOs throughout the newly independent states, help women obtain business develop. ment credit, and help attract foreign partners for joint projects. BWAs have given birth to newer NGOs that meet other needs in their areas. For example, the Bukhara branch of Tadbirkor Ayel in Uzbekistan is fonning a family crisis center. Business women's associations also provide a forum for more experienced businesswomen to share their experience with women in the early stages of a career or business venture. Mukararn Yusupova, a member of the Tadbirkor Ayel Fergana branch, runs the private firm Makhigul. She started the garment business with just one sewing machine, then slowly accumulated funds to expand the venture, buying a building and more equipment, training young women to sew, and securing orders for school uniforms, other clothing, curtains. and car covers. Through BWAs. women also work to remove obstacles to doing business in Central Asia. For example, Fergana's Yusupova speaks out about small businesses' tax burdens and women's difficulties obtaining credit. Dilbar Akhmedova. founder and director of the Bukhara Tadbirkor Ayel branch mentioned above,

Women's NGOs in Central Asia's Evolving Societies

203

stated publicly in 1998 that the greatest needs of women in small business in Uzbekistan were: 1. Better tax laws and implementation that do not overburden small start~up ventures; 2. Access to business development loans of less than $2,000; 3. Eliminating the cultural taboo against women being in private business; 4. Better attitudes of government officials who now believe small business leads to criminal conduct. A considerable amount of grant-making by international donor organizations has centered on Central Asian business women's associations. Between 1995 and 1998. Uzbekistan's Tadbirkor Ayelreceived several Eurasia Foundation grants for computer and business skills training for representatives of its head offices in Tashkent and Bukhara, Fergana, Navoi and Syr Darya affiliates. Under these grants the Quqand branch created a Training and Consulting Resource Center which offered business training seminars for up to 290 women entrepreneurs from eight regions of Fergana oblast, and the Tashkent office produced a monthly bulletin for rural women entrepreneurs. In 1998 the Bukhara branch initiated a micro-credit program for women owners of small businesses capitalized by approximately $150,000 in membership fees. (Organizational and individual members pay different membership fee amounts.) The program includes classes in credit/financial management for borrowers. NGOs in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are initiating similar small lending programs. With divisions in twelve oblasts. Tadbirkor Ayel has grown to more than 3,000 members, according to chairperson Dildora Alimbekova. With Bukbara, its branches in Quqand, Andijan. and Nukus are the most active. The association has also received assistance from other U.S. and European Community organizations, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Bank. On a smaller and more local scale in Uzbekistan, the Association of Young Women in Nukus. Karakalpakstan, has created a training program for women on how to develop a business plan and start a business. Area Peace Corps volunteers have also taught business plan development to women involved in ventures such as a candy factory, a farm that produces condensed milk, a pig farm, a bakery, and a project in which the blind sew korpachas (blankets). In Kazakhstan, the Women's Business Association holds training and s~ port sessions for unemployed women, helps inform women of their legal rights, and publishes information bulletins. Through its information center, the association links its fourteen afIiliates located in Almaty, Astana, Karaganda, KyzylOrda, Turgay, Pavlodar, and southern Kazakhstan oblasts. Several affiliate offices are now equipped with computers and e-mail access, and staffhave been trained to be trainers. The Society for the Promotion of Women's Initiatives also

204

U. Ikramova and K. McConnell

supports women's NGOs and small businesses in western Kazakhstan through training and networking opportunities. With funding from the Eurasia Foundation, it has created a library and database on women's NGOs and issues. In Kyrgyzstan, the Women's Support Center helps rural women "adapt to the new market economy on an equal basis with men to enhance their contribution to economic reforms and the building of a civilized, democratic society.» Founded in 1996, the center bas organized women's community groups, helps women learn the basics of running a successful home-based business, and publishes books in Kyrgyz and Russian. Based in Bishkek, the center bas branches in Naryn and Talas oblasts. In 1996, the Women's Congress of Kyrgyzstan created a business center in Bishkek to provide women entrepreneurs with seminars on starting and registering an enterprise, business planning, accounting. marketing, and taxation. The goal was to train 720 women from all six oblasts of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Bishkek Women's Assistance Center, with grant assistance from the Eurasia Foundation, is developing an agribusiness training program and materials for women. The goal is to equip women to compete in a modem market-oriented agnousiness environment. The Society for the Protection of Mother's and Children's Rights also operates a consulting center for women managing farming enterprises. In Tajikistan, the women's business association Women for Progress, which registered in 1996, focuses on supporting small enterprises, women's legal literacy, and education in family planning. sanitation, and childcare. It helps poverty risk groups such as refugee women, female heads of households, widows, and women with large families to develop home-based and cooperative income generating projects. and to attract funding for them. It works to eliminate violence against women, which increased after the start of the civil war, and to generate national media coverage of women's issues. In 1995 the Women's Association "Sirno" began to develop an employment database and series of seminars and lectures for women on employment issues. The following year, the Business Women's Association ofKhudjand started a business consulting center for women with seminars on the basics of entrepreneurship and on writing business plans. The result of all these activities is that more and more women each year are acquiring the skills necessary to have an active place in their nations' evolving economies. Whether this is translating into higher levels of employment for women, an increase in workforce participation by women, or higher incomes for employed women is not known. One weakness of the NGO sector as a whole is that there still is little overall hard data on program results and long-term impact.

Women's NGGs in Central Asia's Evolving Societies

205

Women and Society-Research, Publishing. Polley Advice Another area in which women's NGOs can make important contributions is by conducting research and policy-oriented studies related to gender issues. The first women's NGOs in Central Asia started out by researching and defining the problems their groups would eventually develop programs to address. With support from academia, women's groups now research and report on gender issues, violence, and women's rights. They analyze international papers on women's rights, study local reports on subjects relevant to women, and collect data from surveys and interviews. They look at economic indicators and comparative demographic data for women and men and pass their findings on to other women's NGOs and governmental women's committees. Uzbekistan's Women's Resource Center draws its members from the scientific and higher education communities. Co-founder Marfua Tokhtakhodjaeva, a former architect, has published the results of her research in several articles and two books, The Daughters ofthe Amazons: Central Asian Women Speak and Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws ofIslam. The center encourages women to be less passive about their role in society and in the family. It brings women together at roundtables and conferences and has developed a publication summarizing laws and regulations affecting social services, small business, NGOs-ail from the perspective of women's rights. In 1995, the Women's Resource Center conducted studies of the conditions of women with respect to a major national industry (textiles), as well as health care, criminal law, and ecology; it plans to update its lmding periodically. In 1997, it developed a 190-page Uzbek language textbook, Woman, Law, and Society in Uzbekistan, with sections on civic law, labor law, family and marriage Jaw, and an analysis of materials on judicial practices in violation of women's rights. Two thousand free copies of the textbook were distributed to higher educational institutions, secondary schools and colleges. women's committees under rayons' khokimiyats (district administrations) and mahallas (neighborhood communities) in Tashkent, as well as to public foundations and NGOs in Central Asia. The center has worked with Sapienca University in Rome on a European Union-funded project investigating the economic condition of women in rural areas of Uzbekistan. With funding from the Eurasia Foundation the center has produced "Women and Law: A Transition Period in Uzbekistan." including an analysis oflegislation pertaining to women's rights, investigated the topic of how women are contributing to the incomes of large families in Uzbekistan, and developed information bulletins published in Uzbek and Russian. With support from the Sisterhood Is Global Institute, the center and the UN Population Fund are coordinating another demographic survey of Uzbekistan, looking especially

206

U. lkramova and K. McConnell

at mahallas and their income-generating activities. The center also bas broadened its focus and is now establishing hbraries to archive the information it collects and to disseminate it through worldwide networks. Its plans include publishing a book on "Women of Central Asia," combining articles on topics such as women's rights, fundamentalism, women and violence, income generation, and ecology with information on upcoming conferences, projects, and donor organizations. Another Uzbek organization, the Women's League of Initiatives bas been active in drawing public attention to women's issues. In 1998, it produced a series of thirty nationally broadcast radio programs on women's rights, partnering with a local human rights group. In another partnership arrangement, the center is working with a district labor department to identify employment and traming opportunities for poor and disabled women and teenage girls. Founding an organization to serve women was a dream of executive director Mahbuba Ergasheva, who bas received training in the United States sponsored by Counterpart Consortium and the International Research and Exchange Association (JREX). Co-founders were Ga1ina Vinogradova, Gulnoza Khidoyatova, Tatyana Kocherga, Mukhabat Alimova, Tatyana Iskhakova, and Larissa Silchenko, who have successfully carried out a series of training programs and round-table discussions. Finally, among Uzbek policy-oriented women's NGOs, Tashkent-based Tadbirkor Ayel (descnbed above) developed a program that includes human rights and bas lobbied members of Uzbekistan's Oliy Majlis (parliament) for legislation protecting women from discrimination and "social and economic violence." In Ahnaty, the Women's Information Center promotes information exchanges between women in Kazakhstan and abroad. One of its fll'St projects was publishing a women's magazine. Within a year circulation grew from 300 to 2,000. The center's Entrepreneurial Training for Women with Low Capital Investment Business project offers training for women on how to run a small business. Working with international organizations in the country. the center's AIDS Information and Education Project for women in Kazakhstan offers information about safe sex and living with HIV. Also with support from U.S. donor organizations, the center helped organize conferences on topics such as: The Legal Status of Women in Kazakhstan, Women and Economic Policy, Feminism in Central Asia, Women's Rights: Law and Reality, Women for a Nuclear-Free World, Ecological Security, Problems of Women Entrepreneurs, Feminist Art in Kazakhstan, Women in the Mass Media, and Women and Narcotics. Over the long term, the center wants to expand information exchanges with women's groups domestically and worldwide, by joining international networks supporting women's rights and publishing articles in English, Germa'1, French, and

Women's NGOs in Central Asia's Evolving Societies

207

Turkish. Its members have participated in skill-building conferences in the United States, Great Britain, the Czech Republic. Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Slovenia. Also with international donor funding, another NGO, Women Entrepreneurs of Kazakhstan, bas created an information network linking Astana, Karaganda, Kyzyl-Orda., Turgay. Pavlodar, and southem Kazakhstan oblasts. The network publishes and disseminates 4,500 copies of information bulletins covering key women's issues and has compiled a database of Central Asian women's NGOs. The network's impact is to expand women's possibilities by increasing their access to information. The Women's Congress of Kyrgyzstan has significantly helped facilitate the participation of women in Kyrgyzstan's economic and democratic processes. In 1995 the Congress conducted a two-day seminar for 90 women on "Women in a Transitional Society." As a result of the seminar, several recommendations were made to the Kyrgyz government, which then were included in a national program for improving women's economic and social status. Leaders of the group also credit the seminar with helping to speed up the Kyrgyz parliament's ratification of certain international conventions on women's issues. In addition, this seminar led to the creation of a women's business education center in Bishkek, covering topics such as opening and registering an enterprise, business planning, tax related legislation, and marketing. By mid-1998, 270 women from all oblasts in Kyrgyzstan had been trained at the center and 20 of them bad opened their own small business. These accomplishments may seem small. but they are very important. Public service delivery systems-including the infrastructure for delivering services dealing with unemployment and employment issues for the genera] population-are still developing in all of Central Asia. The following year, the same group conducted a series of five two-day seminars on the topic ''The Role of Mass Media in Support of Women's Positive Contributions to the Development of Society.tt The audiences consisted of journalists, representatives of akimiats, and women's NGOs in Jalal-Abad, Bishkek, Talas, Karakol, and Naryn. The project also resulted in creation of a library for use by members of the media, akimiats. higher educational institutions, and

NGOs. All five Central Asian republics maintain governmental national and local women's committees charged with coordinating policies on welfare, and for developing programs on women's health care, employment, education, legal rights, child care, and housing. Because these committees function within bureaucracies, their work has been perceived by some in the NGO sector as being slow. In fact, as govemmental bodies the committees do not have the flexibility NGOs bave and their ability to establish contacts with foreign governmental and nongovemmental organizations is restricted.

208

U. Ikramova and K. McConnell

In concl!lding this survey of the role of women's NGOs in promoting research and policies that improve their welfare in Central Asia, mention must also be made of the Autonomous Region ofK.arakaJpakstan in Uzbekistan. In 1995 the govemment ofKarakaJpakstan adopted a program for improving women's conditions, with a series of objectives to be accomplished by the year 2000. The program's goals are tied to the platform adopted at the U.N. International Conference on Women in Beijing. Work is carried out with assistance from local Karakalpak NGOs such as Perzent, a leading organization focusing on women's rights, ecology, and public health. Perzent's president, Dr. Oral Ataniyazova, is a well-known expert on the severe health consequences of AlaI Sea pollution. In cooperation with the KarakaJpak Women's Committee. the local govemment administration, and international funders, Dr. Ataniyazova has expanded the group's activities to include basic training for teenage girls on the necessity of home water filtration and hygiene in order to decrease the number of hepatitis and other medical cases in the region. The group has produced useful small booklets with guidance on hygiene, drinking water, and sanitation in Karakalpakstan.

Women and Education The work of Central Asian women's NGOs in the field of education extends beyond projects aimed at teaching women business skills, described extensively earlier in this essay. The League of Feminists in Almaty, registered in 1994, strives to rid textbooks, the media, business, advertising, and literature of stereotypes of women as passive creatures. It also conducts research on gender issues, advocates for legislation favorable to women, publishes children's books and articles on women, produces and distributes video and audio informational materials, provides counseling, and organizes self-defense courses for women. Its initial published works have included: "Women-Hater? No, Indeed!" (an interview with former league president Svetlana Shakirova); "Philosophy and Feminist Thinking"; "Assertion of Self: The Nascent Women's Movement in Central Asia"; "Philosophy and Feminist Thought"; "Political Kitchen: Women Are Not Allowed?" and "Attention-Commission on the Discussion of the Constitutionof the Republic of Kazakhstan: What Does It Mean to Be a Feminist?" The articles received broad dissemination in the press and were widely discussed in workshops that prompted the public to think about society's gender issues. The Kazakhstan Women's League of Creative Initiatives, established in 1994, has also created a program to train women in journalism and desktop publishing. In 1995, with a Eurasia Foundation grant, it conducted a ten-month journalism and computer publishing training program for teachers and high

Women'$ NGOs in Central Asia '$

l".l;'·UlJmU

Societies

209

school and to publish a monthly independent newspaper for children. TIle impact of the newspaper was to help talented children and expose them to basic democratic principles and to issues. In in 1996, the Association of Women with University Education Education School for Women in Dushanbe to courses m basic law and advocacy, to coordinate meetings with leading women in ministries and NGOs and with members of Parliament, and to publish an information bulletin international news and international and local The Scholarly Women's a former publie in Uzbekistan that as an NGO in has outand the VaHey and reach centers in Samarkand, Na1ma1ng2LU '~";:","'Ui>. The association works to increase awareness of women's issues while women with education to become involved in to solve problems that affect women. The association has the role of women in the country's economic and how religion, traditional and current culture affect women's and girls' lives,

Women, Family, and Community Numerous women's issues arise in the context and the A 1997 survey the Republican Women's Committee in Uzbekistan--the CODtenlpcmuy incarnation of the old Soviet Women's to an irwv"'''''''"10 rate in crime committed by rural youth. Part of the reason, the comcOlt1cludje:d, was that children were not getting enough guidance from their particularly from their fathers. after long fathers said they had little interest in being involved in childrearing. Only 15 of the fathers said had the time or interest in with less involved in home matters, the burden of 1C/','".r.O' the home falls on women. But the same survey fOLlnd that on minutes a day to on herself! One can ..."".nu",pn women with infants or SCIIO<:Ii-llt2e children. In order to more voice to a woman's on family and other in 1998 the Women's the NGO "Public vp,uu,-,'u to create the tnlmgua! lie OD'ini.on. and socialeconomic issues. One colunm in each issue will be devoted to women's lives. Ide~ntJJYliUg problems that affect women and solutions involves both men and WOmen. Fathers as wen as mothers must know how to make parentmg decisions. But Central Asians are uncomfortable with frank discuspla~nning and As a result, a United that was to bell' women in Uzbekistan learn about

210

U. lkramova and K. McConnell

family planning was revised to focus instead on medical and legal assistance for victims of domestic violence. Presidential decrees and modest financial support from national governments have encouraged the formation of women's mahalIas in Uzbekistan and akkimmats in Kazakhstan. Governmental support basically covers salaries, but it barely touches office overhead and program development costs. Like the national womens' committees, the local women's community groups deal mostly with humanitarian assistance and welfare payments to poor families and single-woman households. Some also have been strengthened by assistance from international organizations. NGOs in Turkmenistan are working on developing e-mail information networks in the areas of education, health care, and ecology. Aye1 is a legal assistance center dealing with criminal cases. It assists women who are victims of domestic violence and discrimination within the family. In one example of how culture affects the pace ofNGO development in Turkmenistan, a representative of an international donor organization noted that in NGO meetings most of the Ashgabat speakers were men. The representative was told that some national traditions remain so strong that in rural and some urban areas men do not speak directly to women in family settings. The messenger between husband and wife is usually their son. Men do speak to women injob-related and other public settings as necessary. Gulrukhsor is a Khojand NGO that was born from a tragedy-the rapes of two female students. Shamed, one victim hung herself afterwards. In despair over this loss, a young man then killed himself. These stunning events led the man's sister, Gulbakhor Makonova, then vice president of the Business Women's Association, to establish an organization to confront the problems ofvinlence against women. Gulrukhsor now also offers a "Women and Entrepreneurship" training program. In 1996 , the "Women's Initiatives" center created an informationconsulting department in Dushanbe to serve as an e-mail access site for women's NGOs and to compile a database of Tajikistan women's NGOs . Women are bringing leadership to organizations dealing with environmental and health issues. <4Kridi," the Parents' Public Club for Disabled Children in Tashkent, was founded in 1995 and helps disabled children. Assisted by volunteer physicians and attorneys, the organization gives moral and physical support to children with disabilities ages six to eighteen and offers caregiver training for parents. It has provided some children with rehabilitation equipment and braces. Group leaders received their first NGO management training from Counterpart Consortium in 1995. The Tashkent Disabled Diabetic Children's Association, "Umid," founded in 1993, also works with children with diabetes. The group's ongoing challenge

Women's NGOs in Central Asia's Evolving Societies

211

is obtaining insulin and monitoring equipment and appropriate foods for its young clientele. The group has received project funding from Mercy Corps and Counterpart Consortium to train parents to administer insulin and to raise children with diabetes. It also helps mothers start home-based businesses in order to contribute to the family's finances and cover the costs of insulin.

Challenge and Change Women are organized and active in Central Asia through a variety ofNGOs that enhance their business skills, affect social attitudes and policies, and serve many related and important causes, from the environment to the disabled. But women in Central Asia face two sharply diverging and polarizing realities: those of the individuals who bad professional opportunities during Soviet times and those of tradition-bound women who did not have those opportunities. Many women are coming to realize that by working together they can overcome their problems and help improve the social status of aU women. Where there is strict adherence to old traditions, the "real" Central Asian culture, women cannot work outside the home without a husband's consent. When they do, it is usually in a labor-intensive farm or factory job. With a typical Central Asian family of five to eleven children and possibly an exhausting job, a rural woman has little time or energy for community activities or training. Rural women's domestic issues, in general, are dealt with by community mahaUas. Even for the category of women wbo have the freedom to participate in women's NGOs, there are other problems. Though all five Central Asian nations have laws permitting NGOs to exist and register, the registration process can be arduous. NGO leaders continually try to help local authorities understand what NGOs are. Some have reported having to work with several ministries and face expectations for bribes. Rural NGOs have complained they must travel to their nation's capital city to register. Few "political groups," such as those focusing on human rights, have been allowed to register and their registration processes generally bave been longer than for other groups. Unclear and changing tax laws affecting NGOs bave added to the frustration NGO leaders face. In addition. NGO leaders and researcbers need much more access to information on international funding sources to identify potential project partners and proposal competitors outside of Central Asia. Dr. Dilbar Kadirova. from the Institute of Biochemistry in Tashkent, for example, studies thyroid cancer. She had been developing better therapies for women and children in the Bukbara, Fergana, Iizak, and Karakalpak regions affected by genetic and environmentally related thyroid diseases. Sbe bas received grant-writing training, but her project does not fit into the program areas of any U.S. government-funded organizations

212

U. lkramova and K. McConnell

currently operating in Uzbekistan. Her hopes of successfully completing the project's other two stages are threatened by a lack of financial support from the Uzbekistan government and from her institnte. Yet she continues with her seven-year effort, covering the project's expenses with her own small salary and with volunteer hours, motivated by her knowledge of the need for improved treatment technology for a population suffering from a high incidence of thyroid cancer. It is women like this who represent so much hope for future generations of Central Asian citizens. The media has played a role in getting information about NGO competitions to the public. For example. the Eurasia Foundation relies on the media to inform the public about upcoming project competitions; and its press conferences in Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan. and Turkmenistan draw many local journalists and authorities, as well as would-be grant competitors. But a more independent media sector could help inform the public even better. This is only one among many reasons that an independent media is so critical to civil society. U.S. fmancial support for the development of civil society in Central Asia has been small and came much later than support for Central and Eastern Europe. Is this because there is still so little understanding about Central Asia and its potential? Or is it because the West is geographically, historically, and culturally closer to Central and Eastern Europe? Fortunately, U.S. fmancial support for civil society in Central Asia has been steady in recent years. 3 In evaluating the effectiveness of this assistance, progress toward social development goals should be considered alongside economic progress and in the context of every country's unique "personality"-its history, traditions, mentality, and current political realities. What is next for women's NGOs in Central Asia? One hopes it is to become stronger through the widening of gateways to information, training in how to manage and share information, building partnership ties. and cooperating when and wherever possible to make the world better! Change is occurring in Central Asia. Through NGOs, women are part of the ftre fueling the change-and their countries' entry into the next century.

Sources Eurasia Foundation. Central Asia Regional Office, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Counterpart Consortium. NGO Service Center, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Various interviews conducted in Central Asia and the U.S. between 1996 and 1998. Information Bulletins ofNGOs between 1995 and 1998. Materials of the Round-Table Meeting: Woman-Family-Law, Center of Public Opinion. Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Office of the First Lady. First Lady's Home Page-Speecbes, bttp:llwww.wbitebouse.govIWHIEOPlFirsCLadylbtmUCARU, Washington. D.C.

Women '$ NGOs in Central Asia '$ Evolving Societies

213

U.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1991, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. u.s. Department of State, 35th Report on Helsinki Final Act: The President's 35th OSCE Report to the Congress, http://www.state.gov/www/regionsleur Tokbtakhodjaeva, Marfua, Between Communism and the Laws ofIslam, Shirkat Gab Women's Resource Center, Pakistan, 1995. U.S. Agency for International Development, Home Page-Publications. bttp:!/www.info.usaid.gov/pubslcp99/eni/a-eninar.htm Women's Resource Center, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. U.s. Office of Management and Budget, Appendix: Budget ofthe United States Government, Fiscal Year 1999. U.S. Government Printing Office.

Notes I. Tax laws unfavorable to nonprofits and small for-profit enterprises have also made growth in these sister-sector areas difficult. 2. Registration is required in order to qualify for grants from some key international donors. 3. In 1996, the year when several key NGOs began to take root in the region, total U.S. government grants and credits to Central Asia were $126 million. Of that, Kazakhstan received $51 million; Kyrgyzstan $25 million; Tajikistan $20 million; Turkmenistan $19 million; and Uzbekistan, a disproportionate $5 million. (Uzbekistan's population is five times as large as either Kyrgyzstan's or Turkmenistan's, and 50 percent larger than Kazakhstan '5.) As Central Asia's third sector began to establish itself, U.S. support has continued. In 1997 the USAlD budget for Central Asia was $87.8 mimon. The following year it was $90.5 million. Approximately one-third of the 1998 amount was earmark.ed for projects categorized as "democratic transition" and "social stabilization." The FY99 USAID budget request for Central Asia was $149.8, ofa total NIS budget request 0($925 million. But actual NIS foreign assistance budget approved by Congress in October 1998 was ultimately only $801 million. If the approved authorization for Central Asia declined in the same proportion from the request as for the entire NIS, then the authorized assistance for Central Asia in FY99 was approximately SI30 million-still a substantial increase from 1998.

The Real Work: Sustaining NGO Growth in Central Asia Jay Cooper

T

he Kyrgyz Republic has proven during the years since independence in 1991 that it is a country willing to change and adapt in the process of transition to democracy and the development of a civil society. Among the marked changes that have taken place is the development of a substantial NGO community. There are some 1,000 registered NGOs in the nation. They have grown with little impedance from government. and now the community needs to build mechanisms of support to establish the third sector as a sustainable institution in the Kyrgyz Republic. The NGO sector in the Kyrgyz Republic has developed more rapidly than in the other countries of Central Asia for a number of reasons, including the level of outside SUpportl and the recognition by government that the NGO community is a useful resource. At this time, however. there are some questions to ask about the current and future state of Kyrgyz NODs. which have had a relatively healthy environment for their development. What are the chances of their continuing to exist or mounting new initiatives in the long term? Will they continue to mature and develop a broad basis of support from their communities? Will they learn to balance cooperative efforts with government and business while advocating the true needs and interests of the citizens of Kyrgyzstan? The real work for the NGO community in the Kyrgyz Republic. as weD as Central Asia. consists in developing further their constituencies and organizing their support. while continuing to work with government and business in their role of facilitating social partnerships. The history of the development of the NGO community in Central Asia after the breakup of the Soviet Union shows that support by international organizations combined with an attitude of acceptance (or at least tolerance) by local governments will foster the growth of a potentially vital NGO community. The interest of local citizens to make change exists throughout Central Asia but that interest can flourish only when the right combination of political and economic factors exists. One of the earliest documents to assess the NGO community in the Kyrgyz Republic was drafted in the latter part of 1992 by a World Bank team. "Kyrgyzstan. Social Protection in a Reforming Society" documented a total of 208 NODs registered with the Ministry of Justice at that time. These included sports clubs, political parties, and religious groups. The report estimated that about 30 percent of the NODs were concerned with social needs and 214

The Real Work: Sustaining NGO Growth in Central Asia

215

problems and descn"bed eight NGOs which had been governmental agencies during the Soviet period.2 One of the fU'St activities in support of the NGO conununity in the Kyrgyz Republic was funded by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in March 1994 when INTRAC of Great Britain conducted a survey and led a workshop. Many of the participants were leaders of former governmental public associations. In Almaty, in May 1994, back-to-back conferences were held for NGOs of Central Asia, one for environmental groups and the other for NGOs in general. The latter was titled "The third sector" and it was at this conference that the rot evidence of the new genre ofNGO leaders began to appear. In November 1994, a conference was held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in conjunction with UNDP that presented a mix ofNGO leaders, both new and old. A conference in the Kyrgyz Republic in late 1994 was organized for the NGO community by a local NGO support organization, "Center''. which displayed a new interest and energy for the nascent NGO community. International agencies began to show their interest during this time ('94·'95) initiating a number of programs supporting NGO activity. The numbers ofNGOs in the Kyrgyz Republic and other Central Asian republics are counted using several sources: the list ofNGOs registered with the Ministry of Justice, NGOs listed with a number of international agencies, and lists of local NOD support organizations. The law "On Public Organizations," which is basically the same throughout the Central Asian republics, groups all public organizations, political parties, trade unions, and religious groups together. Numbers from the Ministry of Justice require caution, since there is no mechanism for updating an organization's status once it has registered with the Ministry of Justice. Additionally, some NGOs remain unregistered, others close down periodically due to lack of funds or commitment, and still others, for example, register in a rural government office and not in the oblast or national government offices. Out of the 1,027 Kyrgyz NGOs in Counterpart Consortium's3 database, the largest number deal with women (13.5 percent), children and youth (13 percent). education (10.9 percent). health (9.7 percent), ecology (8.4 percent), and media (6.1 percent). However, the distinctions between different types ofNGOs are generally blurred. Most groups have missions that include more than one sector, for example, health education for youth. The number ofNGOs that are registered with the Ministry of Justice and listed in Counterpart's database is 446, of which 364 are considered active at this time.4 The law that regulates the NGO sector was adopted in 1991. The registration procedure it established is simple, with fees affordable for the majority of people in the Kyrgyz Republic (about $5). Practice shows that registration takes not more than one to two months, including the processing of all documents.

216

Jay Cooper

According to regulations. the Registration Division of the MitUstry of Justice should notifY an NGO of its approval or denial of registration within two weeks of application. After registration, the Ministry of Justice is responsible for the conformity of actual NGO operations with its bylaws. (Another ministry, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, bas responsibility for violations of the Criminal Code, which would be considered on the basis of formal complaints from citizens or institutions with cause.) There is also a legal basis to dissolve an NGO for political reasons if it promotes forced change of the existing political system, or if it promotes racism and interethnic hostilities. NGO representatives are allowed to operate freely within the law. There are examples of incidents that could be construed as harassment. These have taken place during registration and also in interactions with the tax authorities, which have the right to investigate legal. entities. There are local lawyers and representatives of judicial NGOs who are trained and familiar with NGO law. Most active among them are the Association of Lawyers of Kyrgyzstan, Fund of Legal Initiatives in Bishkek, Osh Center on Dissemination of Legal Knowledge and Order, and the Fund for Promotion of Legal and Economic Reforms in Osh. There is a need to develop these services in other regions of the country, since access to legal advisory services at the local level is limited or nonexistent There are no tax exemptions for NGOs except for limited provisions for some groups of disabled persons. According to new amendments of the tax code beginning in 1998, only individuals have a right to reduce taxable income by making charitable donations. This is limited to not more than 2 percent of total taxable income. Business activity does not qualify for deductions. NGOs do not have to pay taxes on grants except staff income taxes (up to 40 percent) and social contributions (39 percent). There is a growing awareness in the NGO community as to how a favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance NGO effectiveness and sustainability. Over the last several years attempts have been made to introduce new legislation for NGOs to the parliament. Currently three drafts of the law have been integrated into one draft, with the participation of all stakeholders. including NGO representatives and deputies. The Jorgoku Kenesh (Kyrgyz Republic legislative assembly) scheduled the proposed legislation for review in the fan of 1998, which if approved would be the most progressive NGO legislation in the newly independent states (NIS). In 1997 the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) conducted a survey of public opinion, which indicated some success in the consolidation of democratic attitudes in the Kyrgyz Republic. In five of seven oblasts in which surveys were conducted, over 90 percent of those polled said they would join an NGO. But results were mixed when people were asked ifNGOs were necessary: 34 percent of respondents in one oblast said yes, compared to 75 percent in another. When asked if they would donate time to an NGO. about half of

The Real Work: Sustaining NGO Growth in Central Asia

217

those who would join said they would also give some time. s It is interesting to note that the more remote regions or oblasts of the Kyrgyz Republic seem to show the most interest in the NGO community. By contrast, in the capital city of Bishkek, which has received the majority of financial support for programs, interest was lowest The majority ofNGOs have a clear, defined mission statement reflecting problems existing in the society. The leaders and representatives of a majority of NGOs have attended a number of training workshops where they have learned to formulate such mission statements. These are typically problem.driven but are also broad enough to allow them to fit donors' criteria. Existing management systems among NGOs reflect a high level of inexperience. When there is a clearly defined management structure within an NGO, it relates only to the executive level. The main tendency is for newly formed boards to have an advisory function rather than responsibility for making policy. Although there have been a number of programs in the country to encourage use of boards of directors and improved NGO management structures, progress in this area has been slow. There are few NGOs with functional boards of directors and open, transparent fmancial systems. One NGO that has a developed organizational structure and a model system of governance is a consumer protection agency, Aikyn.

Aikyn, Association for Consumer's Rights Protection An example of one of the more successful and respected NGOs in Kyrg}'7,stan is "Aikyn." Association for Consumer's Rights Protection. Aikyn is comprised of qualified specialists directly dealing with consumer rights issues. It w~ regis· tered with the Ministry of Justice in April 1996. The mission of Aikyn is to promote the rule of law in the Kyrgyz Republic, based on the observance of all human rights, including the rights of consumers. Aikyn considers its "General Assembly" of members as the steering body of the organization. The coordinating and administrative body of the association consists of the president, nine board members and a secretary. To deal with consumers' complaints, the organization contracts lawyers, doctors, tradesmen, and other specialists. More than 800 activists/volunteers nationwide support Aikyn. Aikyn includes in its activities: • informing citizens about the Kyrgyz law on "Protection of Consumer's Rights"; training programs which include how to use current legislation to defend • the rights of the consumer; • sponsoring and observing the annual consumer's rights day in the city;

218

Jay Cooper

•

encouraging citizens to organize voluntary Consumers' Societies that can defend their rights locally and directly. In 1996 Aikyn conducted more than fifty lectures for the general public, at which they distributed leaflets titled "The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Protection of Consumer's Rights." The center renders assistance to consumers through consultations on issues of registering infringements of consumers' rights, receiving compensation for flawed goods or services, public speaking, publishing articles on consumers' rights issues, as well as organizing major conferences. Aikyn, for example, organized the "Day of Consumers' Rights Protection" in March 1997. The association's activity is mostly focused on legal education of consumers and the related consumer laws. The group accomplishes this goal by providing training seminars. giving lectures in schools and universities, and publishing promotional brochures. It has also received twenty-eight hours of airtime from the TV and radio station "Almaz" to introduce citizens to the Kyrgyz law on the "Protection of Consumers' Rights." At a televised press conference the association exposed various fraudulent businesses which did not have appropriate government documents and certificates. Aikyn has taken 600 claims to court. 90 percent of which were satisfied. The average compensation has been 1,600 SoInS or about USS90. In March 1998, Aikyn and the Anti-Monopoly Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic co-organized a conference and invited a diverse group of participants from NGOs, media, and government, including deputies from parliament. Alevtina Pronyenka, deputy speaker of the Legislative Assembly, congratulated Aikyn for its contributions to tire new law that had been passed on consumer's rights. (Issues addressed in the new Jaw include water standards, health standards, including those for radiation levels, security markets, and communications, all important needs of citizens and civil soCiety.) Deputy Pronyenka stated that "people need to change their mentality. they need to stand up for their rights and responsibility, not to depend on government." At its end, the conference was addressed by the Forum ofNGOs of Kyrgyzstan. whose representative discussed the change in mentality from the FSU: just as people through organizations need to take responsibility for needs and rights, so state structures should not look at the NGOs as beggars but as partners who can implement programs and share responsibilities.

International Support for the NOO Community The majority of Kyrgyz NGOs are small groups of persons with a common interest. They do not have significant constituencies that could be tapped for fmancial or voluntary support. These nascent organizations work together often

The Real Work: Sustaining NGO Growth in Central Asia

219

as volunteers or with salaries from grants. Organizing communities and building support for issues identified by NGOs will be the next stage ofNGO evolution. The development of member-based programs and the recruitment of supporters win be a key to the sustained development of the NGO community and civil society in the Kyrgyz Republic. Unfortunately, in the course of providing support for the NGO community, cases of deception and misuse of funds have inevitably arisen. The availability of international support, whether in the form of technical assistance or funding, has certainly been a motivating factor for the formation ofNGOs. There are charismatic leaders in Central Asia who organize NGOs that are completely grant driven and grant fed, and although they may have creative and needed projects their intentions are to obtain equipment and receive salaries. The donors, in their haste to deliver funds and report successes, approve projects without appropriate methods of project monitoring or without a real understanding of the capacity of the NGO to complete the project or satisfy the contract. This has certainly been the case in Kyrgyzstan. Donor agencies often send inexperienced local representatives who unwittingly direct funds and grants to local family members, friends, or inappropriate organizations. Other donors make large grants to a limited number ofNGOs rather than work with the additional administration of small grants to a larger group of grantees. This can and has had negative results. In fact, one of the major challenges for the NGO community as it matures is to transcend the "low quality funding" that results from weak administration and inappropriate large-scale "capacity building" grants that are imposed by some players in the international donor agency community. Early efforts to support democracy and the third sector after the breakup of the Soviet Union focused on the few organizations that could be called NGOs, although they were former state organizations with ties remaining to the old system. The structure of these organizations resembled the state models much more than that of an NGO or nonprofit of the West. The model of the powerful, dictatorial director had been in place for many years, and it is still visible especially in the NGOs that have transitioned from State to non-State. The early grants provided to these organizations had a number of problems, resulting in a negative public image of the NGO community as wen as discouragement for the donor. Such an example was the Central Asia Development Program.

The Misconceived Central Asia Development Program The Central Asia Development Program was implemented between 1992 and 1995 with funds from USAlD and was designed to strengthen the organizational capacities of the Red Crescent organizations of Centra} Asia. Designed by the American Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red

220

Jay Cooper

Crescent Societies, the program sought to provide technical expertise and training to "facilitate the transfonnation of each organization from Soviet-type quasi-state agencies to independent, non-profit social service organizations, in line with the statutes, rules and missions of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent MovemenC,(i The CADP project brought the Swedish Red Cross and the Finnish Red Cross to Central Asia to implement two training modules, "Leadership and Management" and ''ResourcelFinancial Management," in which approximately 125 middle to senior managers were trained from the five countries of Central Asia. Since five evaluations of the program were conducted, this particular program has been one of the most visible in terms of evaluation in the history of the American Red Cross (ARC). The final evaluation by the ARC clarified some inconsistencies in the previous four evaluations. The training program had a number of problems, including workshops conducted through intetpreters and no attempts to train indigenous trainers. Additionally, training modules evidently did not clearly show how to implement concepts that were presented. From the beginning. however, the program ran into other problems, including a distinctly passive attitude on the part of its intended beneficiaries. In the end it was judged a ''rather dramatic failure to effect significant changes in institutional performance.,,7 Why was this? Part of the reason was the idea that short-term training events, reinforced through an exchange program, would be sufficient to help each national Red Crescent organization cope with the transition imposed by the breakup of the Soviet Union. But of equal importance was the incorrect assumption that each Central Asian Red Crescent Society was a "partner NGO." committed in principle to operating according to the standards of the International Federation of the Red Cross.s In truth, the Soviet-created network of Red Crescent Societies was in effect "an agency of the Ministry of Health, supported with revenue generated by the state, and allowed to perform very basic social services with almost no concern for cost, efficiency or the optimality of resource use.tt9 The collapse of the USSR and the subsequent termination of state support for Central Asia's Red Crescent Societies was in. effect a privatization of a nonprofit organization, but without any preparations for the event As the Baker analysis of the CADP fiasco put it, each national society in Central Asia "emerged simultaneously independent and wholly unprepared for independence.'·10 But precisely Decause the leaderships of these societies did not see themselves in any meaningfuJ way as part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. when changing economic circumstances should nonnally have impelled them to re-connect with their international colleagues and learn what they might about how other Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies survive

The Real Work: Sustaining NGO Growth in Central Asia

221

in a nonsubsidized world, they showed virtually no interest in such training. They passively accepted what programs and resources the CADP offered them-programs which were themselves of limited quality and duration, admittedly-but psychologically they continued to view themselves as members of the old state apparatus whose salaries would be restored once the problems of the transition were resolved. Attempts to encourage are-thinking of this decades.old paradigm fell on deaf ears. The problem was concisely put in a letter written in 1992 by the American Red Cross and the International Federation: <"the leaderships ... of some of the Central Asian Red Crescent Societies do not share our interpretation of their needs.,,11 Problems of Soviet-Style International Aid Programs

The CADP case shows that it is important to keep in mind the managerial culture and the political nature of "public associations" (in fact, governmental departments) that existed throughout the Soviet era. The power and authority enjoyed by the typical Soviet bureaucrat make concepts of transparency and democratic governance extremely difficult to introduce to a post-Soviet NGO. Transparency and democratic management become even more complicated to achieve when international programs often mirror the old Soviet model. Programs that are managed and/or funded by the large aid agencies, bilateral donors, and development banks often resemble closely the Soviet model of a powerful ruler with top down programs. Visits from international directors are similar to visits of heads of state, with tight schedules to see model programs. Later, these directors are honored at dinner parties. There is little capacitybuilding and no direct relationship with the clients. The images conveyed to the local public, especially the NGOs which are the grantees, are of high levels of funding and little, if any. input from the community. Programs are often designed for their visibility. For example, they may produce publications that are colorful and flashy, professionally done but expensive and impractical. Such programs also tend to bring in high-priced consultants for periods of time too short for them to understand the local development climate or culture. If programs are then launched without adequate introductions to local communities, the result is a lack of understanding by the targets of support. To their credit, many international programs have moved quickly to put local people in place as program representatives, but these irIdividuals often are not adequately trained or do not have the experience necessary for their responsibilities. Of course, the FSU had no programs for education in nonprofit administration or community organizing. and nonprofit or nongovernmental organizations did not exist.

222

Opportunities, New Leadership in the NOO Without clp.,."",,,. the truth IOreg()lnJi!. 11,""''''17'''' it can also be said that there are local citizellil in and Central Asia who for the last severai years have invested and trained themselves through the NGO They are now ready to take on leadership roles as the deveIUp.rUC1!U of civil continues to evolve. One area ill which these opportunities exist is the field of microcredits. There are a number of rnicrocredit programs with a rural focus cWTerltly V,",U"" ..",,,,u,uv strides in cOlnrrlWl:lty as a valid and resourceful H.'-VVLH1Y a conference initiated by OSCE to conduct round table discussions every three months that will of the Minis~ try Ministry of Internal and the to~:etIler with NGOs to discus.." issues President's Conunittee for Human related to human ....vi., .......". A conference held

The Real Work: Sustaining NGO Growth in Central Asia

223

in November 1997 for environmental NGOs included plans for the coordinated development of a National Action Plan for the Environment in the Kyrgyz Republic by NGOs and the Ministry of Environmental Protection. NGOs have been included in the recently developed plan for poverty alleviation (ARAKET). These are a few examples of the Kyrgyz government's efforts to cooperate with the NGO community. Cooperation is even more evident in the case of local administrations in outlying regions. There dialogue and cooperation are growing measurably. An example of such cooperation can be seen in the case ofEJIAD. EJIAD, Alternative Education for Rural Areas

The NGO EJlAD (Erkin Jash lshker Adamdarynyn Dostogu. meaning "Union of Young, Independent, Creative People") was established in 1992 in the southern region of the Kyrgyz Republic. Its original mission was to provide quality education to children and youth in rural regions of Kyrgyzstan through not-for-profit schools. The mission has expanded to support NGOs working in rural regions and to encourage small business development. EJIAD encourages the development of self-financing alternative schools (lyceums) in rural regions of the Kyrgyz Republic by introducing a new model for school support, including fund-raising activities to support talented youth in villages. EJIAD and the Ministry of Education in the Kyrgyz Republic cooperate closely; the latter allows EJIAD lyceums in many cases to operate within the public schools. EJIAD in turn provides funding for the lyceum, which develops a program for talented students. EJIAD considers four possible options for generating funds: • internal potential of the region (parents, children, local resources) • external potential (individuals with origins in the region) support by local governmental administration (office space or land) • international potential (donor organizations which support NGOs through grants, training activities, workshops. and information) At present this model is functioning in five regions of the country and established groups willingly share their experience with those who are attempting to create similar structures in their communities. EJIAD acts as an intermediary organization helping new groups to collect, review, and issue information in the form of a brochure to be further distributed among interested people. The EJIAD model was designed five years ago on the initiative of villagers who wanted to support gifted children, and since that time it has become firmly integrated in social life of some rural regions. The Nookat region is an interesting case study because of the activity of the NGO community and the level of

224

Jay

cOI)'oc:ration with local government. Jaw allows local administrations to support to which the case in Nookat The local aU1UWll;)~ tration has provided land, and other support to local NGOs. are the and in tum providing support to local schools and communities. Additionally, the Nookat officials have granted tax benefits to local which IS an option under law. EJIAD has had success in of the community and government in suptheir work because of the a as well as EJIAD' s to combine a broad base of financial and physical of EJIAD, Omorzak Mamayusupov, was elected to the JorThe Kenesh with the of members of the fund. The candidate ran his election as a member and advocate of the NGO community. As a deputy he has been efforts for the growth and ofNGOs in He has the of his and has been elected chairman of the Committee for Economic Reforms. Deputy Mamayusupov believes in the NGO movement and its importance in as shown letters he has written to local administrators in Kyrgyzstan in support of specific NGOs. The influence of such a deputy in the Kenesh can make a difference in between local and NGOs.

The Real Work: Next Steps in Development The of the third se.ctor in the ..... l' '" N~en:ubIlC and Central Asia shows that people are interested in ticJpating in the search for solutions to current of their cOllmmnities, as wen as in COlltribulinQ to their countries' de 1velloprnellt. The institutions of civil that are to support and cOlltinued encouragement. ofNGO have been a process of building con· undel~stllnding of nonprofit organizations and their activities. The Inc:re~I"lrw number ofNGOs in the Republic to an interest in the sector and in for the purpose solutions to problen1s at hand. But the number ofNGOs which exist does not indicate their level to manage or to the needs of their client'} and the community. Those NGOs that are active are often project-driven, working from to without a plan in place for Their potential for funds from individual donors is low since the income of the ""''''.''''·'hr of individuals is small. There are no incentives (and in some cases there are in to encourage donations and in Without the economic conditions or incentives for financial for the NGO what are the available to NGOs? The ,L",

The Real Work: Sustaining NGO Growth in Central Asia

225

choices are the international donors and development agencies as well as the governments in the countries in which they exist. The sphere ofNGO activity that seems to get the most attention is in the highly visible areas such as social needs and poverty alleviation (although environmental efforts do well, too). In many cases, the people forming and leading the NGOs in Central Asia that focus on these visible needs are wellintentioned, dynamic individuals, but they do not have the skills and/or the expertise to design and manage projects, let alone ron an organization. There are a number of programs designed to build managerial capacity in NGOs through a variety of mechanisms such as training workshops, grant programs, regional and international partnership development, development of resource centers, as well as individually designed support. One international effort has a training program that not only provides workshops for NGO leaders and staff but also is developing a cadre of participatory trainers in the countries of Central Asia. The Asian Development Bank is planning a project to build social infrastructure in southern Kyrgyzstan. working through community based organizations (CBOs) in the health and education sectors. The plan includes extensive training for the CBOs. The UNDP in cooperation with the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has contracted local people to train ministry consultants in NGO concepts, microcredit, and small enterprise development The World Bank provided a variety of support to NGOs through the "Pilot Demonstration Project" that took place in 1996-97. The Forum ofNGOs, a national association ofNGOs in the Kyrgyz Republic, has made significant progress over the past two years in its efforts to encourage increased cooperation among NGOs. The forum organizes an annual conference and has an elected board which meets regularly to guide the forum's activity.

Reaching Rural Populations An important trend in recent years has been to decentralize NGO development work away from capital cities and into provincial centers and rural areas. USAlD and UNHCR have established NGO support centers in areas with refugee populations and potential for NGO activity. The first centers were established in the cities of Jalal-Abad and Kara-Balta. The NGO support centers provided a model for a third center in Naryn, a poor and mountainous region, accessible by road from Bishkek in about six hours. The Naryn Support Center has been funded by a number of small grants, such as that from the Swiss agency Helvetas and the Pilot Demonstration Project of the World Bank through a Japanese grant. Currently funding continues through Helvetas and Countexpart's USAID project. The level of cooperation among donors has been effective and

226

Jay

has demonstrated to both NGOs and !!O,ren1m,e:nt the unpolrtallce and interest of the international community in supporting the third sector. the creation of The continual requests for support in these regions the NGO centers. As skills of the local staff develop and the NGO comgrows, the centers will become independent sources of support and service for the entire NGO community. The concept of the NGO Support to rural communiCenter has shown that once services and support are both the level and the of local NGO activity grows. This model is inllPlemc'ute:d in other countries and will result in the oel"",l,,,n. men! of similar centers in Central Asia. It should be stressed that contifrom the above mentioned for NGO and CBO initiatives nued is crucial to the continued development of the third sector and civil in the

But external is not always essential Sometimes communities have the resources to deal with the What lack is and of partnership between zation. The Association of Social Workers is an sectors of and donors which is out to an of As a result of international aid and technical the association has to assist significantly vulnerable groups as wen as their own members. As a case it shows that local-international coordinated especiaUy if local citizens have strong incentives and are efforts can work involved from the start in the process of organizational development. The As!l.ociaticm

Social Workers of

Kyrgyz f'~f.1UUlill.;

The Association of Social Workers was as an NGO in the faU of 1997. The process of developing an to represent social workers in the Republic resulted from an initiative of activist'S in the field during the implementation of a World of Labor and Social Protection

The mission of the association is to the str~~n~~til~m their status, and support the development of their professional skills. social workers in Kyrgyzstan, aU oftbem state who are and an increased workload while the number of vulnerable <'Trr"""nn The pay is low and turnover is result·

established in six oblasts schools. fees are the main method of sustaining the orj2~anizatiOltl. Membership is with the International Federation of Social Workers (Norway), but as the association is eager to provide to improve

The Real Work: Sustaining NGO Growth in Central Asia

227

professional skills through exchange and training programs, it has already organized several exchanges and workshops with the Danish Association of Social Workers and the Norwegian Union of Social Teachers and Social Workers. There has been cooperation as well with the Russian Association of Social Services. The association received ftmds from international donors to implement a project that trains a team of trainers. For five months, the association's trainers worked with groups of social workers involved in providing community services. As a result, twelve newly established public foundations and centers totaling 150 people joined the association. The association uses its experience to help NGOs from different parts of the republic with registration, charter development, project design, and other issues. The association assisted in establishing a foster family home in the Issyk-Kul oblast and an NGO, Sairagul, that provides fJfteen low-income families with hot lunches every day. By partnering with the Russian-European Foundation and Rehab Medical of Great Britain, the group arranged a visit of two specialists from Great Britain to Kyrgyzstan-an occupational therapist and the director of a company that produces equipment for the disabled. In May of 1998, the association held a conference on social protection for the disabled with leaders of the affiliated offices. heads ofNGOs, social workers, and representatives of orphanages and oblast social departments. After the conference, the Association of Social Workers and the Rehab Medical Firm made an agreement on further cooperation. They designed a partnership project, "Center for Social Rehabilitation of the Disabled in Bishkek," in cooperation with the city administration of Bishkek. Funds for this project were awarded in part by the British Know-How Fund. Conclusion

International support for the Kyrgyz Republic has been and will continue to be an important part of the growth of the third sector and the transition to democracy and civil society. Although the government's support is not overt, the level of development of the NGO community and civil society would not be possible if the government took a different stance. As the government of the Kyrgyz Republic redefines its role and responsibilities in society the NGO community is increasingly recognized as a potential partner in improving the quality of life of its citizens. One part of the NGO community that does not get much attention but deserves recognition and support includes professional associations, not-forprofit schools and educational services, hospitals, and business centers. Professional associations have good growth potential since they can be at least

228

Jay Cooper

partially funded through membership fees. Associations of this type are forming and developing with international support and consultation and show potential for long-term sustainability. Indeed, associations based on membership fees could anchor the NGO community while the economic transition continues and lhe growth of philanlhropy and developments in legislation take place. But this is a long-term process that continually needs support and input from donor agencies as well as partner organizations. Through training and exchange programs, use of specialized consultants and startup funding, international donors have made efforts to work with a number of associations in the Kyrgyz Republic including farmers, lawyers, stock brokers, homeowners, family physicians, pharmacists, and registrars. The associations and their members are just beginning to see the advantages of organizing and its potential impact on society. The development of schools and colleges. hospitals and other nongovernmental institutions, could provide models of community initiative and involvement, which in tum would build the public's awareness of civil society. The real work, the development of a vital NGO community, is the responsibility oflocal citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic and Central Asia and not the work of international consultants. [t must be these dedicated citizens who take the responsibility for the development of the NGO community. understanding the need to be transparent and democratic as well as'to establish a broad base of constituent support. The NGO community has expanded significantly due to lhe positive environment that exists in the Kyrgyz Republic, and this growth bodes well for the development of civil society in the nation. But it should be emphasized that continued support and capacity building is vital to the sustainability of the young NGO community. Civil society is inconceivable without a vibrant NGO community that empowers citizens to take responsibility and participate in defining their daily lives.

Notes 1. International NGOs and multilateral agencies have provided essential support for the NGO community in its early years in the Kyrgyz Republic. These include ISAR,. Eurasia Foundation, Mercy Corps International, National Endowment for Democracy, Action by Churches Together (ACT), Abt Associates, National Democratic Institute, Helvetas, Hivos, INTRAC, Soros Foundation, American Bar Association, ACTRIAccels, Citizen's Network for Foreign Affairs, Aid to Artisans, Counterpart International, the family of United Nations' agencies, USAID, and USIA. Most of the NGO development work in Central Asia has been funded by the United States government, the European Community, other governments, and ecumenical donors. 2. World Bank Country Study, Kyrgyzstan Social Protection in a Reforming Economy, The World Bank. 1993. 3. Counterpart Consortium is a partnership of U.S. based PVOS implementing the USAID funded program, "The NGO Support Initiative for Central Asia." The current

The Real Work: Sustaining NGO Growth in Central Asia

229

partners are Counterpart International. Aid to Artisans. and the International Center for Not~for Profit Law. Two previous partners were Goodwill International and Citizen's Network for Foreign Affairs. 4. Counterpart Consortium has developed a database and website for Central Asian NGOs. The database includes all NGOs except for social and sport clubs, religious organizations, and political parties. The database can be viewed on the Internet at www.cango.netkg 5. Craig Charney, "Public Opinion in The Kyrgyz Republic 1996 Regional Analysis," WES, 1997. 6. Thomas Baker, "Disincentives to Development: Lessons Learned from the Central Asian Development Program (CADP)," American Red Cross, March 1996, p. 4. 1. Baker, p. 5. 8. "Red Cross" refers to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. It has evolved over more than a century into a multipwpose relief and development network consisting of the Intemational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and 115 national Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations. Each national organization exists, according to the Federation, "as an auxiliary to its national government." Committed to seven "fundamental principles» of humanity: impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality, these 175 national societies-the membership of the federation-have as their strategic mission for the 1990s the task of "improving the situation of the most vulnerable." Bilker, p. 4. 9. Baker, p. 6. 10. Baker. p. 6. I 1. Baker. p. 4. 12. Luigi De Martino, Almaz Japarov, Brkin Kasybekov, Rural Finance in the Kyrgyz Republic, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 1991. 13. Micro-credit lenders sometimes look for applicants to present projects that meet criteria without looking at the capability of persons to complete a project or to complete their mission. There was a case of a seemingly energetic retired person who was organizing community activity in a region of the capital city of Bisbkek. He bad a plan to bring people together for meetings, develop a database for the purpose ofheJping the most needy, and produce infurmation through a community bulletin board and newsletter. His project design included a governing council to work democratically and then share its experiences with other regions of the city. Unfortunately, upon receiving the first installment of his micro-credit in cash, he used the money for vodka and forged receipts, severely damaging the project before it had a chance to begin. The council rebounded, however, and eventually put together a solid program of support for their community. 14. Baker, p. 15.

Jay

230

By Selected Donors to NGOs in the Kyrgyz Republic, 1995-98 Project,,.

Total, $ Average, $

1995 $95,096 99,143

$19,019

17

DRK

1

60,000

Eurasia Foundation

9

144,480

60,000 16,053

ISAR

21

36,312

24,000 1,729

Total,1995

54

459,031

8,501

8

176,224 229,191

22.028 4,244

American Legal Consortium (ALe) Counterpart Consortium

5

24,000

HfVOS

5,832

1996 Action by Churches Together in Central Asia Counterpart Consortium

54

Eurasia Foundation

11

130,331

11,848

HIVOS

4

209,250

Kumtor Operating Company

4

5,601

52,313 1,400

National Endowment for

4

Save the Children (UK)

4

91,385 2,700

4

28,452

13

54,358

UNDP, life UNDP, United Nations Poverty AKeviation

22,846 675 1,113 4,181

11

29,200

2,655

14

67,167

4,798

1

10,400

10,400

132

1,034,265

7,835

Action by Churches Together in Centra! Asia

13

Counterpart Consortium

34,574 4,626

HIVOS

28 8 8

449,466 129,537 126,349

Kumtor Operating Company

42

15,348

365

108

331.662 81.667

3.071

Women in Development USIS World Bank Resident Mission

Total,1996

1997

Eurasia Foundation

Mercy Corps. !ntematlonal National Endowment for Democracy

4

417,500

15,793 52,188

20,417 .

The Real Work: Sustaining NGO Growth in Central Asia

231

Save the Children (UK) Soros Foundation - Kyrgyzstan

5 86

9,290 186,756

1,858 2.172

TACIS

3 13

314,056

104,685

136,298

26

163,534

10.484 6,290

20

6

65,412 262,490

43,748

5 1

15,193 14,900

376

2,720.058

8

88,078

2 19

14,480

11,010 1,240

164.283

8,646 5,333

25

16.000 7,330

3

66,130

8

3,480 6,285

UNDP. Life UNDP, United Nations Poverty AllevIation Program UNDP, Women in Development UNHCR, Resident Department of the High Comissloner on Refugees USIS World Bank Resident Mission Total,1997

3,271

3,159 14.900 7,234

1998 (first 6 months) Action by Churches Together in Central Asia ADS, AsIan Development Bank Counterpart Consortium HIVOS Kumtor Operating Company National Endowment for Democracy Save the Children (UK) Soros Foundation - Kyrgyzstan

3

13

293 22,243 435 483 7,547

15,094 15,000

15,000

5

27,679

5,536

14 7

47,377 199,060

28,431

6 116

33,120

5,520

Total,1998 (first 6 months)

703,996

6,069

Total for 1995-98 (3 % yeare)

678

4.917,350

7,253

TACIS

2

UNDP, Life UNDP, United Nations Poverty Alleviation Program UNDP, Women in Development UNHCR, Resident Department of the High Comissioner of UN on Refugees USIS

3,384

Note: Eurasia Foundation did not have information available for 1998 at the time of collection. Soros Foundation could not provide information on grants for 1994-1996

Organizations

Kazakhstan Country Code:

7

Astana (3172) ACCELS Astana Saken Seifutlin Library ul. Revolutsionnaya 67 473000 Astana Tel; 26-27-26

See the profile for American Councils for International Education under Almaty. Adnet School of Law A,l::{wleT BbICmaJI IJ1KO.7Ia

npaaa

Green Cross/Green Crescent International Ecological Organization 9KO.7IOf'HtlecKHii:

HHTePHa.IJ.HOHaJI 3e.rreHoro Kpec-ra/3e.rreHoro IloJIYMecmt.a pro RespubUky 311,21 473000 Astana Tel; 26-22-43,75-l9-69 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Yury Rubezbansky Green Cross/Green Crescent seeks to improve environmental conditions and public health in and around Astana. It organizes ecological summer camps for school children, monitors water quality of the Nura River, and helps the children of nuclear radiation victims at School No. 23 in the village of AkBeit.

Astana Tel:

Living Sons NGO Association AccoIl',llaIJ;WI HeKOMMepqecKBX OpI'aHH~ "1'KHBble

15-63-94

See the profile for Adilet under Almaty.

CbIHOBhSt'

Consumer's Advocate Center

Dom Parlarnenta 413000 Astana Contact: Tatiana Silkina

06m.ecTBeHHb~eHTP ..~BOKaT Il0Tpe6H'1'eIDI"

Revoliutsionnaya Sf. 44. k.102 413000 Astana TeUFax: 32-61-21 Contact: GaUna Bykovets. Chairwoman

The association was formed in April, 1997 by the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Kazakhstan with a mission to protect soldiers' rights. The association's activities include gathering and publishing information on rights violations of those currently in active military service, helping soldiers to obtain legal counsel, and increasing public awareness of soldiers' rights.The group has declared its fundamental goal to be ..the protection of the lives. health. honour, and dignity of soldiers from the Republic of Kazakhstan through all stages of military service."

Counterpart Consortium Resource Center

f(eHTp Kay:a:TepilaPT KOHcopIl;HYMa

PecypcHblit

pro Bogenbaya 12, k.l Astana TeUFax: 26-26-24 E-mail: [email protected]

See the profile for Counterpart under Almaty.

235

236

Organizations

Aktyubinsk (3132) ACCELS Aktyubinsk prospekt Moldagulova 34 463019 Aktyubinsk Tel: 55-27..Q7 See the profiile for American Councils for International Education under Alrnaty.

"INKAR" Foundation of Social and Economic Development Abulkhair-khan Ave. 40, k. 407 Aktyubinsk TellFax: 57-48-03 E-mail: aksai@ak:parat.kz Contact: Abzal Alashbajev INKAR conducts research on the political, economic, social, and environmental aspects of the Caspian region. The foundation is developing a Caspian Informational and Analytical Agency to prepare analytical information about the region for use by NGOs. the govemment, and the private sector.

schools, and universities throughout Central Asia. Since 1997. it has published more than 70 books for NGOs, and currently publishes 9 NGO periodicals, including: • Human Rights in Kazakhstan and the World, edited by the Kazakhstan International Human Rights and Rule of Law Bureau • Sustainable Development, edited by the Fund in Support of Ecological Education • Equal Opportunity. edited by the Feminist League • What '$ Up Student, edited by the Cultural Legal Youth Center • Overview ofMass Media, edited by the Kazakhstan Press Club The foundation helped organize a forum for ecological NGOs in Almaty in 1997. It is also planning to establish a bureau of technical support for NGOs and a technical training school to provide instruction in computer skills, publishing, NGO-management, fundraising, and grant proposal writing.

ACDWOCA

Almaty (3272) 21st Century Foundation for the Technical Support of Central Asian NGOs 21 BeK (BnaroTBOPHTeJ1bBbtH
fillO

ll.eHTpaJIblloA A3m.l) pr. Zholtoksan 12 480021 Alrnaty Tel: 32-34-16 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Alexander Polyakov, President

The foundation was founded in 1996 to provide affordable publishing to NOOs,

Abai St. 157, k. 11-12 Almaty Tel: 41-16-95.41-17-98.41-17-87 Fax; 50-93-86, 50-93-87 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.acdivoca.org Contact: Chuck Maffett, Country Representative ACDIIVOCA is a U.S.-based private nonprofit development organization formed in 1997 from the merger of two companies, Agricultural Cooperative Development International (ACDI) and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (VOCA). Today, ACDII VOCA provides technical assistance to more than 30 countries, including those of the former Soviet Union.

Kazakhstan In Ka2:akhstan

231

• "Farmer to Farmer" Business assists in the formation and development

tural enlernn!<(-~"_ farmers' aSSoclatl(mS, institutions. It to set up joint ventures between Kazakh and U.S. Nunn,,",,',, and assists local companies to locate sources of financial assistance. In 1996, ACDINOCA

Loan Fund

with financial from USAID and the SOfOS Foundation. The small, loans from that aHow small businesses to buy their "Ul-"I""~" with cash and in bulk. As of July 1998, over 500 active borrowers and 75 groups were en!l'ail't~d in KCLF in the areas

and Nearly 80 of KeLF's clients are women, and it boasts a default rate of less than 1 In the group to establish a Business Development Services Unit to provide clients with and technical assistance. KeLF is based in Taldykorgan, Kazakhstan. The Ke:g!onal Coordinator is Saken Akchalov, tel: 71547. Other ACDIIVOCA in Kazakhstan include: • "Farmer to Farmer" Agricultural Finance short-term technical assistance to preneurs, educational msl:ltt!tJons, and other financial institutions in Central Asia in order to introduce international standards of bank management and mechanisms for Oleg Urazov, 41

~'~Clrlerlltn.'i'>!:

associations providing short-term technical assistance in management, bUSllnt~S-planming,

and lml'lT'OVlf1

production, as well as and marketing of agricultural products. Bulat Directof, tel.:

509386. facilitates contacts between local .,.nt"""",ri",~,, and U.s. firms interested

in 1""'''''''''''' ties, tr,,-nd"""ina tec11l'l1:}!OGY, technical assistance and trade and investment Murat ""''',,"U'.'''V Manager tel:

Action Center for Working youth of Almaty U,eHTp PaOOqeH MOnOp;eJKH AAMaTbI "Action" k.4J6

Almaty

Tel:

52-36-97

Contact: Gul'zhakhan Biboldiyova

on youth. It provides legal consultations for low-income young and them to buy or sen slnP,rlnlen-h, The group is to establish an information network on nOllslflg for in

Adilet Historical-Educational Society of Kazakhstan Ka3aXCTaHCKoeMCTC~~[K()­

npocBeTHTenbCKoe06:Dle~r'BO

"AAwIeT"

pro Abaya39 480013 Tel:

53-17-21 Contact: Saule Aitmambetova

Organizations

238

Adilet, meaning "justice," conducts research on the history of political repression in Kazakhstan and promotes human rights.

Adilet School of Law ~eT

BbIcmasr 1IIK000a

npaBa

pro Gagarina 135-A 480046 Almaty Tel: 46-02-90 Fax: 4646-ll E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Victor Malinovsky, Director; Gulsara T1enchieva, Professor The motto of this private, noncommerciallaw school is ''Towards a free and responsible individual through market economy, civil society and lawful state." To this end, the school offers an interdisciplinary approach to the study of law. combining legal education (constitutional, contract. civil, criminal, and business/financial law) with the social sciences (ethics, economic theory, Latin. history, political science, psychology, and computer skills). Courses focus on the comparison of Kazakhstan's legal system with those of other countries. Faculty consists of over 40 professors and instructors, several of whom bave worked abroad, and visiting lecturers from the United States. In addition to their regular coUrses, Adilet instructors conduct annual three-month preparation courses for applicants to humanitarian institutes. They also teach law to 150 upper-level students at Secondary School # 94. Adilet has a comprehensive library of modem legal literature and an electronic database of1egislation in Kazakhstan. It founded a publishing house, Adilet Press, which produces

books by well~known Kazakhstani scholars, compilations oflegislation. and minutes of seminars and conferences. The school also publishes two periodicals of essays by law professors and students; a joumal, Adilet ScientifIC Works, and a student newspaper, The Daily Lawyer (in English). Adilet helped found the Center of Legal Information of Kazakhstan in April 1996. in collaboration with the American Legal Consortium, the Institute of State and Law of the Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences, the Kazakhstan State Law University, and the Library ofthe Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences. Graduates of Adilet typically pursue careers in government, private enterprise, banking, consulting firms, courts and joint-ventures. The schoo! has branches in four other cities in Kazakhstan: Kokshetau, UstKamenogors~ Taraz, and Astana.

Aid to Artisans Shevchenko St. 100, etazh 6 480091 Almaty Tel: 62-1544

Fax;

~86H06,69-29-97

E-mail: [email protected]. [email protected]

ATA works to assist artisans and craftspeople around the world to sen their work locally and in the global marketplace. It provides training and consultation at aU stage of the craft trade, including product development, production. business training. market research, marketing, and sales. ATA also provides local artisans links to the New York Intemational Gift Fair, which attracts more than 50,000 buyers from aI] over the United States. The group runs a five to ten day training program at the gift fair for

Kazakhstan producers and exporters new to the U.s. market. ATA also offers craftmen access to its network of more than 35 member companies who are buyers of decorative arts, handcrafts, fashion. home furnishings, and textiles. These companies work directly with ATA clients to help them develop products that will sell and provide them with direct contacts in the marketplace. The group makes 3040 grants of $500$1,500 per year to emerging artisans and craft~based associations worldwide. ATA has been working in Central Asia since 1996 as part of the Counterpart Consortium to support nongovernmental organizations. Ak Bota League for the Guardianship of Disabled Children nlllI'a "Ax. GoTa" no oneKe AeTeId-JiIHBWlHf\OB

Almaty Tel: 5246-16

Almaty Helsinki Committee AllMaTHHcImA: XeJIbCHHCImA: KOMlilTeT

Mikroraion Koktem I, d. 29, k. 17 480070 A1maty TeIJFax: 29-41-05 Contact: Ninel' K. Fokina Almaty Women's Information Center AAMaTHHcImA: }KeHcImA: V1H<j;lopMaI1;HoHHbIlll{eHTP ul. Volodarskogo 15-15 Almaty

Tel: 67-84-26 Fax: 50-61-87 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Alfia Abikenova, Regional Coordinator; Gulnara Kusherbaeva

239

AWIC addresses issues of gender discrimination in Kazakhstan and works to promote equal rights through education and leadership training. It sponsors conferences and talks. works with the media, and publishes its own journal to disseminate information about violations of women's rights and the activities of women's organizations in countries around the world. AWIC also lobbies for legislation in protection of women's rights. One of the center's primary goals is to maintain an on-going informational exchange between women and women's organizations in Kazakhstan, the NIS, and other countries. AWIC sponsors monthly discussion groups and seminars on current women's issues. including one on Discrimination and Violence Toward Women, held in Almaty in September 1997. In November 1997, an AWIC-sponsored seminar on women's studies resulted in the creation of the first women's studies group in Kazakhstan. American Councils for International Education: ACTRIACCELS pro Seifullina 531, kom. 208 480083 Almaty Tel: 63-20-56, 63-30-06 E-mail: [email protected]. in U.S.: [email protected] Web: www.actr.org

American Councils used to be ACTRf ACCELS, or the American Council of Teachers of Russian and the American Council for Collaboration in Education and Language Study. It continues to operate as ACTR in Russia and as ACCELS in the remaining 11 countries of the new independent states. It is an "educational association and exchange organization devoted to

240

Organizations

improving education, professional training, and research within and about the Russian-speaking world, including the many scores of non-Russian cultures and populations in the regions of central and eastern Europe and Eurasia." Specifically. American Councils: • Administer more than 20 exchange programs, ranging from three months to two years in duration, with the countries of the former Soviet Union • Manage student advising centers in Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan • Administer standardized testing in the NIS for the Educational Testing Service • Publish textbooks and materials for the teaching of Russian and English as foreign languages ACTRIACCELS administers 13 educational advising centers in Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. The centers maintain libraries that make written, audio-visual, and CD-ROM resources, including ETS test preparation materials, available to visitors. The organization has 42 offices in 12 countries of the NIS, a staffin excess of2oo, and ongoing relationships with more than 500 U.s. and NIS schools, institutions ofbigher learning. and NGOs.

Art Therapy ApTTepanIlIllH

ul.Shevchenko,d.48,k.14 480091 Almaty

Tel: Fax:

69-96-25, 46-39-87 61-61-32 Contact: Oleg Pishchev, Irina Saparova

Art Therapy provides creative rehabil-

itative therapy to the mentally ill. The group hopes to increase public and

professional awareness in Kazakhstan about the uses of art therapy for social integration of the mentally disabled. The group plans to develop art therapy training sessions for mental health workers and publish a textbook on the topic.

Artists' Union Almaty Tel: 63-43-23 Contact: Andrei Visbnayakov, Secretary

"Arys" Foundation for the Study of the Heritage of the Repressed Intelligentsia ..APbIC"

00~

HaCJl~

:H3Y'Iemm penpeccHpOBaHHoA

IIIH~

ul. Zhandosova 60, k. 408-412 480033 Almaty Tel: 44-07-93 Contact: Zholdasbek Adaev

Association of Independent Electronic Mass Media of the Countries of Central Asia (ANESMI) AccoIl,lllaJ.l',H.f.l He3aBHCBMbIX 9JleKTOpoHHbIX Cpe;qCTB

M:accoBOA IIIHcJ?oPM:au,mI CTpaH I.l.eH-rpaJIbHoA A3HH (AHOCMl1.) pro Dostyk 85 480100 Almaty TellFax: 63-69-22 E-mail: rozlana@anesmi.•almaty.kz. [email protected] Contact: Rozlana Taukina, President ANESMI was formed in 1993 at a meeting often television and radio

stations in Bishkek. Kyrgyzstan. Today, it is an association of 83 broadcasting television and radio

Kazakhstan stations representing four of the five Central Asian Republics. The association seeks to develop television and radio business in Central Asia, foster good relations between the media and government, influence legls~ lation on regulation of the mass media, and enhance infonnation exchange among television and radio stations in Central Asia. It has advocated laws on author's rights and advertising, and issued challenges to the state on the criteria selected for the redistribution of television and radio channels. ANESMI plans to intensify their lobbying efforts by learning about methods used by the mass media in other countries to influenCe public policy. It has also organized periods of silence on radio and television to mark the deaths and persecution of prominent journalists and professionals in the media sphere. The association has branches in Dushanbe, Tajikistan; Qoqand, Uzbekistan; and Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Association of Kazakhstani Authors and Artists Acco~a.tJJiUl Ka3aXCTaHCImX

aBTOpoB H HCnOJIHHTeJ1eii

pro Dostyk 85 480021 Almaty Tel: 63~69-22 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Askar Nunnanov, President;

Balnur Kydyrbek, Vice-President The association serves the interests of writers. painters, composers, directors. playwrights, scientists, inventors, and other representatives of the cultural sphere. In September 1996, it prepared a draft law on the rights of professional artists and writers concerning trade~ mark and copyright practices. In autumn 1997. it worked with the

241

government on a proposal "for the spiritual development of Kazakhstan" through support of the cultural sphere. Association of Nonprofit NGOs Acco~a.tJJiUl HeKOl4MepQecKHX HenpaBHTeJlbCTBeHHbIX OpraHH3~

alya 104 (care ofCASD1N) 480004 Almaty

Tel:

33-86-10

E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Kuralai Karakulova

The goal of the association is to strengthen the third sector in Kazakhstan by uniting NGOs, facilitating informational exchanges, and encouraging dialogue between NGOs. government structures. and the business world. Currently, 73 nonprofit organizations are members of the association. The association operates resource centers in Semipalatinsk, Astana, and Karaganda which provide technical and organizational support to NGOs and help thern obtain information and equipment for their projects. Association of Single Mothers Acco~artW'l OADHOKHX

Ma-repeA Mikroraion Orbita-4, d. 18, k. 6 480043 Almaty

TeUFax:

2~O-lO,29-93-53

Contact: Lyazzat Iskanderovna,

Director The association locates resources to assist single parents suffering from economic difficulties. It offers free legal and psychological consultations for parents, as well as vocational training and English classes. It publishes a bi-monthly information bulletin, Moldir. with essays and data on conditions for women and children

Organizations

242

in Kazakstan and resources for single mothers.

Association of Young Leaders Accoll.Ha.u;HH IOHbIX ~epoB ul. Kurmangazy 175, k. 43 480009 Almaty Tel: 53-84-93 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Natalia Ivan.ovna Bakhmutova Association of Youth Support 55 Dzhandosova, k. 448 Kazakh State Academy of Management 480035 Almaty Tel: E-mail:

63-04-74,29-77-77,28-54-41

[email protected]

The association provides assistance to young adults in finding employment or starting their own businesses. It also helps youth Jocateopportunities for professional development or continuation of secondary education, and conducts workshops on leadership skills.

BRIF Center (Central Asian Center of Socia' Data) u1. Furmanova 220, #53 480100 Almaty Tel: 65-62-33, 65-68-23 Fax; 6l-61-32 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Slava Kozlov, Julia Firsova

BRlF was ~lisbed in 1996 as a center for gathering, archiving, and disseminating data from social surveys and public opinion polls conducted in Central Asia. It was conceived by the managers of the BRlF Agency, a separate commercial information agency. The center focuses on a wide range of social issues, including ecology, politics, ethnic conflict, emigration, immigration, and the media. It receives information primarily from government and independent research

organizations, news/information agencies, NOOs, and international organizations working in the region. In turn, BRlF's statistical reports are used by a wide audience, including these same research organizations and news agencies as well as students, journalists, and commercial entities. Data is distributed both electronically and through print sources such as books, articles, research reports, research manuals, census data and government statistics, computer databases, GIS data, videotapes, etc. BRlF also publishes a montbly bulletin, Opinion, which reports the findings of recently conducted public opinion polls and surveys, announces upcoming events, and lists valuable sources of social information. This bulletin is published in both English and Russian and is available in print or electronic format. Slava Koslov, the center's director, has worked at Radio Svoboda in Budapest and writes the English version of the Bulletin.

Business Womens' Association of Kazakhstan Accoll.Ha.u,m:r AeJIOBbIX JKeHI.ItHH Ka3axCTaHa

ul. Shevchenko 100 480072 Almaty Tel: 69-27-98 E-mail: kazwomen@kazmail.• .kz

The association unites women active in the spheres of government and politics, business and entrepreneurship. science. education, health care, culture, and art. It aims to improve the social status of women through conferences. education. and training programs. The association cooperates with NGOs, the media, and government to realize its goa)s.It has numerous branches throughout Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan

Center for Conflict Management ul. Timiryazev 57V, k. 23 480070 Almaty Tel: Fax:

3-74-17 47-94-49

E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Elena Sadovskaya

Contact:

CCM works to reduce social and ethnic contlict in Kazakhstan and to promote transition to a free market economy and democratic civil society. It conducts research and organizes seminars on contlict prevention and management. Among the Center's recent initiatives are: • Joint Kazakh-American Peace. building Workshop for school teachers and university professors in Alrnaty, September 1995 • Lectures on contlict resolution theory at the Kazakhstan State University and the Institute for Advanced Humanitarian Studies, 1995196 and 1996/97 academic years • Organization of debate training for students at Kazakhstan State Univeristy (in cooperation with the Soros Foundation), April 1997 • Publication of a human rights textbook in Kazakh for school children, containing the full text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. August 1997.

Centra. Asian Foundation for Management Development (CAMAN) ul. Dzharndosov 58, k, 5 480057 Almaty Tel: 44-05-00 Fax: 45-59-59 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Assylbeck Kozhakhmetov.

President; Zaituna Sarsernbayeva, Executive Director

243

CAMAN was founded in April 1994 by participants of the Conference on International Cooperation in Business Education. The group's primary objective is creation of a Central Asian management development network by fostering cooperation between governmental and entrepreneurial institutions. CAMAN collaborates and exchanges infonnation with well-established international managernent development organizations such as the International Management Development Network (INTERMAN), the European Foundation for Management Development (EFMD), the American Association of College Schools of Business (AACSB), and others. CAMAN has sponsored several seminars and conferences, including "How to Create and Finance a Business Schoo):' in November 1997, and the "International Conference on Modernization of Government structures on the Eve of the 21st Century," in April 1997. The group also publishes a quarterly journal, CAMAN News.

Central Asian Sustainable Development Information Network (CASDIN) HH4>oPMaIt.JlIOHHruI CeTb no YcTOf4tmBoMY Pa3BHTmO B U,eHTp8.JIbHoA A3HH alya 104 ul. A. Moldagulovoi 32, k. 249 480004 Alrnaty TellFax: 33-86-10 E-maIl: [email protected]. [email protected] Contact: Gulmira Dzharnanova, Coordinator

CASDIN was developed in 1994 by the Center in Support of Environmental Education, which identified the need for an NGO support network in Central

244

Organizations

Asia. The network was originally planned to be interregi.onal, with offices in each country of Central Asia. However, financial constraints and the presence of similar support organizations in other Central Asian countries led to the group's current focus on Kazakhstan. At present, CASDIN offers electronic and print information about hundreds of organizations representing a variety of interests. including ecology. women's issues, law and democracy, children! youth, and social welfare. The network publishes Sustainable Development. a bimonthly newsletter featuring articles by and about members of the local NGO community. Opinion pieces by NGO leaders on such topics as Westem nonprofit models and their applicability to Central Asia are also included. The newsletter also publicizes news and upcoming events (conferences, seminars, grant competitions) relevant to independent organizations throughout Central Asia. CASDIN assists NGOs with proposal writing and provides access to computer, fax, photocopying, and e-mail on a limited basis. It organizes seminars and workshops on NGO management, fundraising, and community involvement. CASDIN was responsible for organizing the first forum of Kazakh NGOs. held in October 1996.

Chance Independent Environmental TV Orbits 4, d. 5, k. 96 480043 Almaty TellFax: 29-28-81,67-03-60 E-Mail: [email protected] Contact: Alexander Komissarenko

Consumers' Union of Kazakhstan CoI03 llOTpe(}HTeJIe:A" Ka38KCTaHa

alya 54-a:: 480100 Almaty Tel: 40-07-91 Contact: Tokhtar Sultanbekov

Contrast Charitable Foundation alya 108 480096 Almaty TelJFax: 233-8610

The foundation promotes the civil rights of homosexuals and greater societal acceptance of sexual minorities. It also provides AIDS education for sexual minorities and youth. Contrast is lobbying for changes in Kazakhstan's cri.minal code regarding crimes connected to homosexuality. It also plans to publish a weekly newspaper and to hold a seminar on "Democracy and the Gay Rights Movement."

Counterpart Consortium Central Asia Headquarters Shevchenko St. 100, etazh 6 Almaty Tel: Fax: E-mail:

62-50-09,62-16-44,69-29-97 60-86-06

[email protected]. [email protected], [email protected] Web: http://www.counterpart.org! Contact: David Smith, Regional Director; Marat Aitrnagambetov, Deputy Country Director; James Gershin. CHAP Regional Director

The U.S.-based organization Counterpart International, Inc. heads a consortium of organizations awarded a USAID grant in 1994 to implement the NGO Support Initiative for Central

Kazakhstan Asia. The program's three COITIPl:mernts facilitating information among NGDs and with the international community, and program for op()ratillg a small Central Asian N(,JOs. The consortium provided 246 grants over $} ,000,000 for 220 NGOs of Central Asia between the beginning of 1995 and June 1997. In addItIon, 'H~rlr~h~'M on various ~m'~Q"~n were conducted this time frame. Highlights ofthe consortium's grants and programs include: • Radio the first

;~'~m'A mass media access. The station broadcasts NGO interviews. .. A Ka:rAlkh consumer group A~,,,~L~~&,A a program of product procedure to increase quality control on imported and domestic tlf(lducts. The Association of Accountants and Auditors of Uzbekistan is nlAriri.", with the ofthe Disabled to and job pl8lceJTIellt services for the disabled. .. Central Asian artisan associations have over for their members in domestic and international sales with Aid to Artisans. LJl
245

Humanitarian Assistance Program (CHAP) ,.",,_tll>, expanded to Central Asia to complement consortium activities. CHAP focuses primarily on Kazakhstan and assistance in food and medical equipment to at-risk pU1PUl,nllJUI5 ofthese countries. In CHAP conducted its first humanitarian relief activities in Uzbekistan.

Cultural-legal Youth Centre MOJIOAe1KHhm n;euTP Ill, Tole bi 201, k. 24

480049 Almaty Tel: 41.-1 40-76-89 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: V. Artemieva

Diabetic's Association of the Republic of Kazakhstan 19 Line St. 184 Almaty

Tel:

49·29A n

Contact: Natalia Director

rlll,al<~V!l!nHa

Dialogue-Express Employment Center M. Makataeva k.402 Tel: Contact:

33-36-52 V. Sova

"Ecolnform" Resource Information Center for Environmental Education

Ryskulbekov st. k. 316 480043 Tel: 20-18-44 Fax: 20-12-81 E-mail: Contact: Talaibek A. V/li,;nUII<;;'., Coordinator

246

Organizations

Ecological Union of Associations and Enterprises "Tabigaft 9KOJlof'HTlecKBA COI03

accou,Ha:I.\'HA B npe~BHTBtt Ka3aKCTaHa "'Ta6BI"aT" uL Panfilova 106, k. 318

480012 Almaty 63-86-51 Contact: Mielz Eleusizov, President Tel:

More than 40 public organizations in Almaty have joined the union "Tabigat" ("Nature'') to protest the damaging effects of oil drilling in the Caspian Sea. The union formed in response to the "crisis conditions" of the sea and its watershed brought about by both drilling and transport of drilling platfonns. Large populations of fish, birds, and other wildlife have been killed off and the sea bed has been damaged as a result of this activity. The union is striving to build an. international movement, For a Clean Caspian, to promote monitoring of drilling and measures to protect the sea's ecosystem and biodiversity.

Fax: 40-96-31 Contact: Larisa Papaya

The association has held a series of training seminars for NGOs on topics such as public relations and business support, including a 1998 program "Public Relations through the Prism of Practical Psychology."

Fauna Foundation Institute of Zoology, Academgorodok 480090 Almaty Tel: 48-O5-75,2()..05-26 Fax:

64-38-19

E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Chingiz Tarabaev

Feminist league tlleMJlllDlCTCKaH JlBI"a

a/ya 521 480083 Almaty Tel: 63-02-42. 42-18-24 Contact: Evgenia Kozyreva

Foundation for Nuclear and Radioactive Safety

¥>HA .s:J)~epHoH B Pap.HaI{HOHHOH Be3onaCHOCTH

The Eurasia Foundation Panfilova 151, k. 6 480064 Almaty Tel/Fax: 69-97-29 E-mail: [email protected]. [email protected], See the profile for the foundation's Central Asia Regional Office under Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Family Public Association 06m;ecTBeHHoe o61::.eABHeHBe "CeMbJI"

Mikroraion 8, dom 4, kv. 82 480035 Almaty Tel: 67-69-23, 25-29-07

Ploshad Republic 13 480013 Almaty Tel: 63-55-89 Fax: 63-33-56 E-mail:

[email protected]

ata.su

Generation Pensioners Movement ABWKeHBe fieHCBoHepoa "fiOKOJleHBe" ut Vinogradov 85. kv. 205 480012 Almaty Tel:

63-38-48

Generation advocates for social and legal protection of pensioners and provides assistance to the elderly. The

247

Kazakllstan information on social of other countries, and seeks international contacts for joint activities discrimination of the

environmental eGllcat1011, and human

~\"'T"""'"

Green Salvation Ecological Society 9KOnOI'MQecKoe ofill{e:
UJ.

CnaceHMe" kv.66

4800 l2 Almaty

Tel:

67-96-85

E-mail: Contact:

Since 1995, GS has contributed regularly to Ec()stan News, an Internet social and environmental issues of Central Asia. It maintains archives of official documents and laws concerning environas mental protection in wen as a and vld,eotapt~s used to document violations of environmental laws and bolster In!1,hv.,,<> efforts. GS has been active in a number of public to promote _r"M·t~r! Hlvl"'UWl;; the creation in 1996 of

a 165,000 hectare nature reserve in the mountains south

group also participates regularly in a group on environmental issues. GS has held summer ec()loJl;lc:al education camps for schoolchildren in the mountains of the Almaty area since 1995. Members also teach at a ofpuhlic and private institutions, and secondary schools and universities. In addition, the group sponsors environmental cducation for teachers and seminars on sustainable ac'.el,omnC'tlt for members

GS nro,duocs tions. L>VUU',Uf news and issues to the media and NGOs Kazakhstan on a nm,rl"dv basis. Ves/nile is a series of booklets that offer analysis on a broader range sustainable development,

Greenwomen Ecological News Agency Tel:

47-45-37

E-mail:

Contact: Lidia I"""""""', Greenwomen's mission is to a new environmental consciousness within Kazakh " To this the agency disseminates information on the situation in Kazakhstan and other countries of Central Asia through the mass media. Greenwomen was founded by a group of women journalist'> who helped newspaper in start the first Kazakhstan, in 1991. Although the newspaper had only a small it had a circulation of more than 20,000 readers. The government withdrew its financial support for Ecocourier in 1994. In 1995, ('rreenwomcn pubHshing its material in

248

Organizations

national and local newspapers, such as Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, Vecherny Almaty, Garizont, and lndustria/naya Karaganda. It maintains a database of environmental conditions in Central Asia, global environmental problems, educational programs on environment protection, alternative sources of energy, urban environmental problems and environmentally sound technologies and innovations. The agency cooperates with other environmental organizations, including the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement, and Ecological Center of Karaganda. It has affiliates in Karaganda, UstKamenogorsk, and Kyrgyzstan, and plans to open offices in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the future.

HIVOS International (Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries)

u1. Shevchenko 28 Alrnaty TelJFax: 62-69-30 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www/dds.nll-hivosl Contact: Inessa Frants, Director This Dutch organization works in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to support the NGO sector through grant projects. In particular, HIVOS focuses on the following sectors ofNGO activity: culture and art, women, sustainable development, human rights, and AIDS awareness.

Information and Research Center for Civic Education p/ya 19 480100 Almaty E-mail: [email protected] The center was created in November 1996 by a group of teachers seeking to introduce civic education courses to

Kazakhstan's educational systemfrom preschool to university levels. The center develops civics curricula and trains educators to effectively teach and develop people's understanding of the value ofa civil society and democracy. When sending an e-rnail message, type "Center for Civic Education" on the subject line.

Information Center of the Kazakhstan Press Club HH€)xlPMaIJ,lIOBllOA ~eBTp Ka3aKCTaHCltoA

npecc-KJIY6

Kurmancharyi 29, k. 320, 321 480100 Alrnaty Tel: 62-82-37 Fax: 62-88-67 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: AscI Karaulova, President The center has conducted over 100 press conferences, 20 seminars, and 6 training courses for journalists with support from USAID, USIS, and the UNOP. It also advocates health and childcare issues. has broadcast 1V programs and radio shows. and disseminates publications on issues of reproductive health and childcare.

Intergovernmental Association ofUlghurs Aksai 4, 57-SO 480127 Almaty Tel: 24-16-78 The association works to preserve and revive Uighur culture, traditions and language. It holds celebrations and festivals and provides education for young people in the Uighur tradition.

Interlegal Kazakhstan HHTepJleraJI Ka3axcTaH

ul. Dzhandosova 58, etazh 8 480057 Alrnaty

Kazakhstan Tel: Fax: E-maiJ: Contact:

45-74-77 44-28-73 [email protected] Sergei Z1otnikov, President

Interlegal's mission is "to assist in the development of civil society and the restructuring of legislation in Kazakhstan" through educational programs and professional and legal training. Initiated in 1993 as a branch office of the international organization Interlegal. the group was registered as an independent, Kazakh organization in 1995. It sponsors seminars and conferences, runs a Legal Information Center, and provides consultation for NGOs on a variety ofJegal issues, from registration to fundraising and taxation. Interlegal conducted an international conference in May of 1994 entitled Recognition of the Third Sector in Kazakhstan, attended by NGO leaders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. as wen as Kazakh government representatives. Following the conference, Interlegal published a book with the same title, presenting the conference's main themes and findings. The group has produced several other publications, including the book A Practical Text: The Legal Regulation ofActivities ofNon-Profit Institutions in Kazakhstan in 1996, and an annual directory of indigenous NGOs. The Legal Information Center publishes a monthly bulletin, The Third Sector of Central Asia. Interlegal also conducts political and legal research on the third sector and its relationship with government structures in Central Asia. It participates in the legislative process by preparing draft laws on the rights of citizens to organize and on nonprofit and philanthropical activity in Kazakhstan.

249

International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 100 Shevchenko St., 6th floor 480091 Almaty Tef: 62-16-44 Fax: 69-29-97 E-mail: [email protected] ICNL is a U.S.-based organization which works to "facilitate and support the development of civil society on a global basis by assisting the creation and improvement of laws and regulatory systems that permit. encourage, and regulate the not-for-profit sector in countries around the world." It offers technical assistance on the writing of laws and regulations to governments, legislators. and international and nongovernmental organizations. It also sponsors research and conferences around the world. ICNL has published a survey oflaws governing the not-for-profit sector in Central Europe and a comprehensive study of the current laws governing NGOs in Russia. In cooperation with the Open Society Institute, it developed a set of Guidelines for Laws Governing Civic Organizations (published in December 1997 and now available in Russian and Farsi in addition to English).

International Ecological Association of Women of the East MelKAYHapo,ll;HoJl 9KOJlOI'INecKoJl AccoIf,Han;HJtI JKeHIIq4H BocToKa ul. Karasai batira 85, k. 420 480012 Almaty Tel: 63-69-00 Fax: 63-38-02 Contact: Urkiz meva, President

250

Organizations

This is an association of anti-nuclear women activists. In August 1998, it was one of five Kazakh NOOs that participated in the Global Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs in Japan.

Intemationaler Hilfsfonds e. V. ul. Shevchenko, 28 480021 Almaty Tel: 69-63-60, 69-17-28 Fax: 69-66-96 This group, meaning "International Help Foundation," is based in Germany with branches throughout the world, including offices in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The foundation offers assistance to victims of natural disasters, nuclear testing, and political repression through provisions of fmancial. humanitarian, and medical aid. The foundation's office in Kazakhstan combines this material support with educational programs, professional training, and cultural exchanges. It works to foster public awareness of issues that impact citizens' health and living standards. In t 993, the foundation organized a group of Australian journalists to film a documentary about the environmental and health consequences of nuclear tests in Seroipalatinsk. The foundation is in the process of creating a treatment center for pregnant women whose health has been affected by nuclear tests in Semipalatinsk, and medical services to treat mothers and children with viral hepatitis. The group publishes the University Herald for AI-Farabi Kazakh State University, and the magazine of the Kazakh Academy of Medical Sciences Klinitsist. In its own monthly bulletin, the foundation publishes information about health care, education, science,

and environment in Kazakhstan. Proceeds from these donations have been directed to orphanages in Semipalatinsk and Almaty.

Intemews uJ. Shevchenko 13, pod. 2, etazh I 480100 Almaty Tel: 61-17-58,62-86-85, 50-39-07 Fax: 61-13-90 E-man: [email protected] Web: www.intemews.kzI Internews Network, Inc. was founded in 1982 to "support the independent broadcast media in the former Soviet Union and other parts of the world through training programs and equipment grants." The organization now has 13 affiliates in Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and Africa, each an independent NOO. Together they are known as Internews International.

IREXIAImaty ul. Furmanova 103, k. 505 480091 Almaty Tel: 63-88-31 Fax: 62-46-94 E-mail: [email protected] IREX was founded in 1968 by a consortium of U.S. colleges and universities to administer academic and research exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. IREX's activities have expanded both geographically and topically in the past 27 years. They now encompass not only scholarly exchanges, but also professional development, technical assistance, and policy programs dealing with the Newly Independent States, Central and Eastern Europe. and Mongolia. In 1995, IREX launched the Internet Access and Training Program (IATP).

Kazakhstan IATP has established public access Internet sites at more than 65 universities and libraries across the fonner Soviet Union, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Training in internet and e--maiI use has also been offered to more than 100 noncommercial organizations. ISAR-Central Asia u!. Shagabutdinova 128, k. 7 480004 Almaty Tel: 67-71-88 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Jennifer Gable

ISAR, the Institute for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia, established its Almaty office in 1993 to support the environmental movement in Central Asia and the development oflocal environmental NGOs. ISAR believes that "providing training to local activists and grassroots groups, and financial support to help them realize concrete projects is the most effective way to encourage citizen activism and public awareness of the region's environmental problems." Since 1993, ISAR Almaty has administered a small grants program through USAID that has awarded approximately $480,000 to over 360 NGO projects. It also offers information and technical support to NGOs, including individualized training in e--mail, desktop publishing, and other computer skills. In 1997, ISAR supplied dozens of computers and modems to NGOs in all five republics, and provides free e-mail accounts to environmentalists in Kazakhstan. ISAR Almaty and the Global Environmental Facility Small Grants Program, Kazakhstan. are currently working on a demonstration climate

251

change project in Aralsk, Kazakhstan. The Maternity and Obstetrics Hospital in Aralsk regularly loses power. The project was initiated to provide the hospital of Aralsk with wind-powered electricity. As part of the project, a local NGO, Ana Umiti, win conduct a public awareness campaign, including the distribution of Kazakh and Russianlanguage materials on simple measures people can adopt to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases and combat climate change. ISAR Almaty maintains a database of Central Asian environmental NGOs and disseminates information about funding opportunities to them. It also conducted a World Bank project in 1997 to organize public forums for NGOs, and a project supported by the Turner Foundation to conduct seminars on successful NGO projects that can be easily replicated. Junior Achievement Kazakhstan School #55 a/ya9 480096 Ahnaty Tel: 32-35-82 Fax: (327) 581-1437 (c/o Zamira Kanapianova) E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Tamara Ilyicheva, National Coordinator

Junior Achievement is a U.s.-based organization which seeks to "educate and inspire young people to value free enterprise, business and economics to improve the quality of their lives." In 1991 Junior Achievement established its first program in the fonner Soviet Union. Junior Achievement Kazakhstan, which was founded in 1992, has three programs:

Organizations

252

• Applied Economics is a full semester economics curriculum for high schools students. The course includes a project in which students start and maintain their own company. • Management and Economic Simulation Exercise (MESE) is a curriculum in which students run their own company in a computer~ simulated international business environment. Participants make strategic decisions which impact the bottom Hne of their businesses while learning to interpret balance sheets, income statements, industry reports, and economic data. The simulation was developed by Harvard Associates. • Hewlett Packard Global Business Challenge is another international business simulation game similar to MESE, with the added twist that schools compete with other schools from around the world. In 1998 the cha1Jenge involved 648 student teams from 39 countries. Junior Achievement Kazakhstan has a staff of six and an annual budget of $62,000.

Kazakhstan Association of Women Invalids with Children ul. Baizakov 109/116 Almaty Tel: 53~1~82 Contact: Bibigul lmangazina, President

Kazakhstan Business ASSOCiation 155 Tole bi, k. 303 48096

Almaty

Tel: 6840·16 Contact: Ludmila Kot~Oglu

The association offers professional training and legal education sessions

for unemployed women, and publishes information bulletins to inform women of support services and professional opportunities. It also sponsors fundraising events such as concerts, lunches and clothing drives to gamer assistance for low-income families, single mothers; and orphans. The group maintains a network of 14 regional affiliates in Astana, Karaganda, Kyzyl-Orda, Turgay, Pavlodar, and south.em Kazakhstan oblasts.

Kazakhstan Composers Association AccoIl,WUJ.H.Sl KOMIl03BTOPOB Ka3aXCTaHa ul. Kupaeva 83, k. 41 480091 Almaty Tel; 62-50-18 Fax: 63..fi9-22 Contact: Bamur Kydyrbek, President

Members of the association meet to listen to and critique one another's musical compositions. The group helps members locate financial support and learn to publicize their work on a professional level. The association also holds concerts showcasing Kazakh composers.

Kazakhstan International Bureau of Human Rights and Rule of Law Ka3axCTaHCKoe

MeJKAYHapoAHoe OIOPO no npaBaM tlen:OBeKa H coO.mo}l;emno 3aKOHBOCTH

ul. Masanchi 5730 k. 404-405 480012 Almaty Tel:

67~8-41

Fax:

62~8-11

E-mail:

[email protected]

Contact: Evgenii Zhovtis

Kazakhstan The bureau was created by a group of human rights defenders and members of the Union of Councils fot' Soviet Jews. Its activities encompass four spheres of human rights activity: monitoring and reporting rights vio~ations. lobbying, independent legal assIstance, and education. The group has consulted government commissions that draft legislation, and has published materials addressing issues of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the right to due process of law. Each year since 1993, the bureau has offered free legal consultations to approximately 1,000 people. It pr0duced a TV program. "You Have a Right!" broadcast in more than thirty I5-minute episodes. The bureau also produces a monthly information bulletin, issued a 24-page report on the human rights situation in Kazakhstan, and has conducted seven international conferences, some in conjunction with other NGOs. Conference titles have included: "Public Associations and the Authorities: Cooperation in a Democratic Society," "Fundamental Human Rights and Their Protection by Non-Governmental Organizations," and "Problems and Practice of the Death Penalty in Kazakhstan and Other CIS Countries." In 1997, the bureau sent an open public letter to President Nursultan Nazerbaev and the Kazakh. Parliament to promote freedom of the press and protest government restrictions on free assembly. It was one of three organizations to protest the registration requirement for NGOs, claiming that citizens should have the right to form an NGO without government approval. Kazakhstan Press Club 29 Kurmangazy St., k. 320-321

253

480100 Alrnaty Tel: 62-88-67,62-82-37 Fax: 62-88-67 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Asel KarauJova, President KPC was founded in 1994 to support a

free and democratic medla in Kazakhstan. It has over 100 members, primarily journalists. who participate in the center's press conferences, seminars, round tables, and training programs. KPC's activities include: • A media campaign on pension reform in Kazakhstan, supported by USAID • A campaign on reproductive health, funded by UNDPlPathfinder International • Training for journalists on topics such as privatization and securities market development, the capital market, pension reform, and reproductive health issues • Internet training for journalists • Distribution of press releases to regional and national media sources • Publication of a weekly news bulletin. Media Monitoring Report, summarizing topics of interest from more than 90 regional and national newspapers in Kazakhstan. Subscribers include international organizations, embassies, and private companies. MMR is available in hard copy and via e-rnail, To subscribe, contact: [email protected]. league of Feminists Internatsionalnaya St. 46, k. 5 Almaty

Tel: 32-25-46 Contact: Svetlana Shakhirova

Registered in 1994, the league works to eliminate discrimination based on race nationality, social status, religion. ' culture, age, or health. It researches

254

Organizations

gender issues, advocates for legislation favorable to women, and publishes articles and children's books. The league produces and distributes video and audio infonnational materials, provides counseling services. and organizes women's self--defense courses.

Legal Development of Kazakhstan (LOK) and Almaty Legal Corporatron ut Zenkov22

480100 Almaty Tel: 61-60-33,33-22-26 Fax: 61-60-33,53-16-18 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Vitaliy Voronov, CEO; Andrei Cbebotaryev

LDK was created in March 1994, through the collaboration of a group of deputies from the "Progress" political party and private citizens concerned about weak rule oflaw in Kazakhstan. LDK's activities include: • Drafting legislation to further democratization • Assisting in the implementation of legal reform • Raising the level oflegal knowledge among the population by publishing and distributing legal literature. providing legal advice. and organizing seminars. In February 1997, LDK members created the Almaty Legal Corporation (ALC), which aims to further the protection of human rights and expand public participation in law-making. In August 1997. ALC founded the studio Rights, which produces and broadcasts television programs on legal and human rights. LDK is currently working on a project, entitled Center-Periphery, to establish a nonprofit legal information

network in Kazakhstan. It also publishes the Legal Development bulletin, distributed to public and political organizations at home and abroad. The group is involved in several other publishing projects, including a reference book on the voluntary sector in Kazakhstan, a manual on legal issues for NOOs, and a manual on working with specific sectors of the population. LDK bas approximately 1,500 members, encompassing the fields of law. economics, and small business development. Branches have been established in seven oblasts of Kazakhstan.

Malvina Non..profit Publishing for Women and Girls HeKOMMepllecKoe H3AaTeJThCTBO

.wm lKeB1IJ,T4H H

AeBOlleK ul. Abaya 23, kv. 32 48009l Almaty Tel: 63-02-42, 32-25-46 Contact: Yurii Zaitsev

Mercy Corps International SeifuUin St. 72, k. 36 480012 Almaty TellFax: 67-78-47 E-mail: [email protected] Contact; Thomas Hensleigh, Regional Director Mercy Corps International is a U.s.based humanitarian organization that seeks to eliminate poverty and promote democracy in transitional or disadvantaged countries. The organization focuses primarily on providing emergency relief services in areas affected by natural disaster or war, and promoting community development and the growth of civil society. Mercy Corps currently operates programs in

Kazakhstan Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The group has disbursed over $7 million in development funds to Central Asia since 1992. In 1997, it received a USAID grant of 2,000 metric tons of butter oil to sell in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Sales aUowed for the realization of agriculture, business development, health care, and democracywbuilding projects in these countries. Mercy Corps has offices in Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan, and . Uzbekistan. Its headquarters are In Portland, Oregon.

Hationa' Association of Professionals in the Securities Market/HAM. HaJ.\HOHaJlbHruI AccolUlaJ.l.1iUl ilpocpecCUOHaJlbHbIX

YqaCTImKOB PbmKa L(eHHbIX

BYMar/HAMM Tole Bi, 7380 k. 313-316 48009 Almaty Tel/Fax: 69-16-05, 67-30-33

[email protected] www.narni.kz Contact: Gabit Tolkimbaev

E-mail: Web:

NAMI was established as a "legal resource center" by the Association of Investment Funds, It seeks to develop a Kazakh investment market and cultivate the "ethical behavior"of market participants. NAMI publishes the "Invest-Inform" newspaper, featuring information on Kazakhstan's economic situation, and operates offices in nine cities across the country.

Hevada-Semipalatinsk pro Lenina 85 480021 Almaty Fax:

63-12-07

255

Contact: Alina Nesterov8o Coordinator

NevadawSemipalatinsk was established in 1989 when 5.000 people fined the hall of the Writers' Union in Almaty to hear K.azakh poet O. Suleymenov denounce nuclear testing and call for a public meeting the next day. Since then the movement has contributed to the ;uspension of nuclear testing in the area, fostered links with international organizations that oppose nuclear testing, and launched an investigati.on into the level of radiation sickness In the area.

Public Health Center L(eHTp 06~ecTBeHHoro

3.qOPOBbH u1. Furmanova 103, k. 910 480091 Almaty Tel: 62-49-43, 63w67-93 Fax: 63-14-48 Contact: Alia Uval'zhanova

Red CrossiRed Crescent Society of Kazakhstan 06~ecTBO KpacHoro fionyvecmJ,a If KpacHoro KpecTa PecnytS.1IHKH Ka3aXCTaHa ul. Kunaeva 86 480100 Almaty Tel:

61-80-15,61w62-91

Fax: 61·81-12 Contact: Erkebek Argymbaev

The society provides aid to the needy, irrespective of nationality, religion, or social status. It has been active in Kazakhstan since March 1937, and runs five hospitals, a shelter for refugees, 39 social centers, 3 soup kitchens. and 8 "banks" of clothing, medicine, and food for the poor. The Society sponsors more than 300 charitable events and projects in Kazakhstan each year.

256

Organizations

Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan uL Furmanova, 117120 480091 Almaty Tel: 50-38-11,81-14..08 Fax: 50-38-14,81-14-08 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.soros.org Contact: George Zarubin, Executive Director George Soros established his first foundation in 1979 in New York and his first Eastern European foundation in Hungary in 1984. Today, his network of foundations-the great majority of which are named Open Society Institutes-spans 31 countries and continues to grow. Open Society Institutes operate in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. These foundations are dedicated to "building and maintaining the infrastructure and institutions of an open society." Each national institute or foundation operates independently with its own staff and board. The foundation began working in Kazakhstan in 1993 to supports a variety of programs in the areas of educational, social, and legal reform. The Soros Fouu.dation Web site lists all the Network programs and provides e-mail addresses for persons involved with each of them. It also gives the office addresses and telephone numbers for each ofthe national Soros foundations.

Special Olympics Kazakhstan

Cnenman 01IHYIIIt!KC Ka3aKCTaHa

pro Dostik 38, k. 713a 480 100 Almaty TeIIFax: 62-35-24

E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Olga Bakhareva

"Tay" Ecological Center 9KOJlONNecKd n,eHTp "Tay" uJ. Kabanbai batyira 206, k. 39 Almaty Tet: 68·96-05, 42-53-90 Fax: 44-22-33 Contact: Irina Balashova UN Gender In Development Bureau 29 Kurmangazy, k. 53 480021 Almaty TellFax: 60-17-83 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Galiya Khasanova, Bureau Chief The GID Bureau was initiated by the UN Development Project in 1996 to promote equal gender rights in Kazakhstan. It works with the Kazakh government. parliament, agencies of the UN, and NGOs to accomplish the following: • Identify specific gender issues in Kazakhstan; • Advocate the incorporation of this information in all government decision-making and policy implementation; • Establish gender-sensitive statistical databases; • Increase the proportion of women in policy-making positions; . • Ensure continuous monitoring of gender issues. To this end, the bureau holds training courses and round tables for the government and NGO community, and develops and implements a country action plan on improvement of women's status in Kazakhstan. It also publishes a Women in Kazakhstan Report. a regular bulletin on women's

Kazakhstan issues, and compiles and distributes international documents on women's issues,

Women's League of Creative Initiative JIBra lKeHIll;HH TBOpqecxoA H.lIHlJ;Hanma ul. Kurmangazy 59A, kv. 37 480091 Almaty Tel: 62..Q7~22, 32..Q5-28. 62-21-36 (Women's Clinic) Contact: Asiya Khairulina, President; Aiman Bekullova, Vice-President; Kuralai Akhmedieva, Coordinator of Women' Clinic WLCI was formed in 1994 to support creative endeavors of women in the Almaty area. It has organized several exhibitions oflocal artists' work. All profits from sales at these exhibitions are directed to participating artists. The league also conducted a campaign to provide clothing and food to orphanages, as wen as presents, including a children's book with illustrations drawn by local artists and published by the league. It produces a monthly informational bulletin on Almaty's art galleries. which is distributed to artists' unions, educational institutions, and newspapers. Under a UNDP-funded project, the league established a Women's Clinic in the Women's Pedagogical Institute in Almaty to provide medical exams and information on reproductive health and contraception to women students. With funding from the Eurasia Foundation. the group also conducted a ten-month journalism and computer publishing course for teachers and high school students, It also publishes a monthly independent newspaper for children with the goal of exposing them

257

to basic democratic principles and gender issues.

Youth and the Law Public Association 06JI(ecTBeBHoe 06rbeAHHeHlle MOJIOAe1Kb II npaBO ul. Abaya 50a, k. 624 480004 Almaty Tel: 42-91-75.33-54-14,25-40-34 Fax: 33-95-76 Contact: Kuanysh U. Meduov

Zhan Society for Support of Families with Disabled Children alya36 uf. Aimanova 212 480057 Almaty TeUFax: 45-14-64 E-malf: [email protected] Contact: Aibek E. Dumbaev

"Zhangyru" Kazakh Center for National Rebirth "2KaHI"bIpy" KasaxcKd l.\eHTp H8I/;HOBaJIbHOro B03poE,O;emm: ul. Vinogradova 85, k. 422 480012 Almaty Tel: 61-55-57,63-69-17 Contact: Damen Satybaldiev

Aralsk (3302) Kok~Zhlek-Soclety for

Aral Sea

Region Issues KOK-lKHeK-06mecTBO coAeii:CTBl'IIH pememm:

rrpo6JIe:u: npHapaJIhSl ul. Leningradskaya 2 46811 0 Aralsk Kyzyl-Orda Oblast Tel: 22-25-80, 22-24-51 Fax: 22-22-79 Contaot; Kurushbek Igmagambetov

258

Organizations

Kok-Zhiek addresses issues of ecological security and public health in the AmI Sea region. It is working to establish an informational network for local NGOs.

Baly;kshl (31222) Caspian Nature Kacn:mli Ta6m:'aT per. Chimkentskii 8a 466400 Balyikshi Atirauskaia pblast Tel: 3-69-52 Contact: GaUna Chernova,. Makharnbet Khakimov, Co-Chairs

Caspian Nature seeks to put an end to oil drilling in the Caspian Sea in order to protect the diverse flora and fauna of the sea and its watershed. The group advocates new legislation for environmental protection in the area,. and uses the media and public gatherings to demonstrate against the activity of oil companies. The group collected over 5,000 signatures in initiation of a "fax war against oil companies" in 1998.

Chimkent (3252) Counterpart Consortium Resource Center PecYPCHbnt Il',eHTp KayaTepnaPT KOHcopJ.l;lilYMa ul. Baitursinova 5, k. 97

Chimkent TaWax: 23-85-47 E-mail: [email protected] See the profile for Counterpart under

Almaty.

Karaganda (3212) Association for the Protection of Consumers' Rights ul. Erubaeva 37, k. 109 470061 Karaganda Tel: 41-12-52.74-32-13 Contact: Nazym E. Zhakupova

Charitable Foundation "Democracyt Education, Solidarity" BJIaroTBOPH'l"ellbHbnt ~HA "1::{eMoKpaTIUl. 06pa30BaHHe. C~apHocTb"

ul. Lobody. 3a,. k. 24 47006l Karaganda TellFax:: 58-02-25 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Sergei Vanner

Human Rights Defense Center of Karaganda ul. Yerubaeva,. 49-7 470060 Karaganda Tel: 58-22-38 Contact: Gennadii Martynovich Nam

The Defense Center conducts civic education programs for elementary and high school children, and seeks to raise public awareness of rule of law and civil rights.

Karaganda Regional Ecological Center 9Ko-Il.eHTp ul. Stepnoi 3, k. 249 470070 Karaganda Tel: 14-56-86 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Kaisha Atakhanova

The Ecocenter focuses its activity on environmental education. monitoring, biodiversity protection, and nuclear issues.

Kazakhstan Kokshetay (3162) Adilet School of Law AAw'IeT BblcmWl UIKona IIpaBa

uJ. Uritsky 106 Kokshetay Tel: 25~27·98. 25-04-08 See the profile for Adilet under Almaty.

Kostanai (3142) "Young Generation of Ecologists for a Safe and Stable Environment," Kostanal Environmental Education Center ul. Tarana,. d. 118 Kostanai State University 458000 Kostanai Tel: 54-25-89. 39-32-85 Contact: Ludmila Muzichko

259

medical assistance to needy families. and specialized day care for disabled children and helps mothers of disabled children to find employment. Other activities include: • "How to Start Your Own Business," a series of courses for mothers of disabled children on how to start a business at home (1996) • Cooperation with a local hotel to provide meals once a week for disabled orpbans (1997) • Training for 15 mothers of children with cerebral palsy on practical medical and therapeutic techniques

Pavlodar (3182) City Roerich Center alya2072 637000 Pavlodar

Tel: 32-55-11 Contact: Alexandr Yasinskiy

Ecology and Public Opinion Lennontovast. 107, k.12 637026 Pavlodar Tel: 32-55-11 Contact: NikoJay Savuhin

Novo-Kazalinsk (32438) Shapagat Aid Society for Disabled Children and their Mothers 06II:(ecTBO no OKa3aHmO nOMOIIl',H

~eTHY-~aM

H

me MaTepHY "illanaraT" ul. Shalantos-Baradur 20a 468210 Novo-Kazalinsk

Tel:

21-1-29.22-5-90

Contact: Shynara Zhensikbaeva.

Coordinator

League of Women-Muslims of Kazakhstan naBJIo.,~apcKoe OTAen:eHHe .JDII'H EeHlIf,llH-:u:ycYJIbMaHOK

Ka3axCTaHa u1. Pervomaiskaia 15 637032 Pavlodar Tel: 72-09-88, 73-08-40 Contact: Zara Kozhakhmetova

The Shapagat Society was formed in

1996 by a group of mothers concerned about the future of their disabled children in the face of weakened social welfare structures and lack of government assistance. Shapagat provides

Pavlodar Center for Consulting and Information alya2072 637001 Pavlodar or

260

uL

48, k. 67

637013 Pavlodar TEll: E-mail: Contact:

Kolesov The center was created in 1995 with financial. support fyom the American Consortium. It works to promote demmTdtic . foster the rule of Ii legal culture, and sup· the NGO movement in Pavlodar obiast information distribution groups. and consultation to The center maintains a human rights the bulk of which was donated the Constitutional and Institute in rt has also estaband National lished Ii Human LC1?;ISlamm program which offers .Hllmnv distribution of national and international human and a human bulletin.

Pavlodar Consumer Protection Society 428

637000 Pavlodar 32·57·21 Contact: Vladimir Chevnenko

Tel:

The

educates citizens on their in the marketplace. It circulates

''''5''''''''''"''' related to

32-07-78,32-07·40 Contact: Mikhail

Tel:

This promotes Ukrainian cuiture, and folk traditions in Kazakhstan through Ukrainian Sunday a schools for adults and Ukrainian language radio program, and support of civic initiatives in Kazakhtan's Ukrainian ,,"'.TlITIl ....itv The group is to open a school for Ukrainian students, start a lJkrainian newspaper, and establish branch offices in rural areas ofthe Pavloclar oblast.

Union of the Elderly st. k 30 637000 Pavlodar Contact: Ekaterina Dmitrieva T'l'7"rii,,,,,ICl"'''''

Petropavlovsk (3152) Entrepreneurs Association of the Northern Kazakhstan Oblasts npeAllPHHKMa~~eMCeael~­

Ka3aKCTaHCKOM o6nacTJIl ul. Lenina k. 13 642015 Tel: 46·83·59 Fax: 46·10-81 E-mail:

Contact: Vitalii Mikheenko

as consumers have been violated.

Pavlodar Fellowship of Ukrainian Culture TIaIUlogapcKoe TosapJIllIl.ecTBO

Pavlodar

Initiative Support Foundation
civic

Kazakhstan initiatives in the areas of democratization, small business development, and human rights. It also supports projects addressing the preservation of cultural history and the protection of national minorities. Activities of the foundation include: • Creation of a library for deaf children • Technical support (office machines, e-mail accounts) for the "Kopemik" Polish Cultural Center • A series of seminars on the basics of small business management • Creation of The Northern Kazakhstan Entrepreneur, an independent newspaper for the sman business community

Semipalatinsk (3222) Enlik Ecology Club KJIy6 "3H.rIHK:"

9:KonOI'HtIecKlft.i

490035 Semipalatinsk Tel: 44-37-71 contact: K. R. Rakhimova

Enlik works with the Union for Nuclear Test Victims to provide ecological education for students and teachers in the Semipalatinsk region.

261

Union for Nuclear Test Victims fiOCTp8AaBIIIlIIX OT HAepHbIX Hcm.ITamm CoI03

a/ya296 uJ. Lenina26-14 490050 Semipalatinsk Tel: 62-25-91 Fax: 62-34-11 E-mail: [email protected]. org, [email protected] contact: Marken Zh. Chaizhunusov, Galina Sumarokova. Gulsum Kakirnzhanova UNTV seeks to protect the rights and interests of citizens whose health has been affected by nuclear testing in Semipalatinsk. The group conducts medical and environmental research, provides medical assistance to radiation victims, distributes medicines and supplies donated by foreign govem~ ments, and sends children to France and Germany for medical treatment. In 1995. UNTV established an Ecologi.cal Resource Center to improve public understanding of environmental issues and to facilitate contact between local NGOs and international organizations.

Ta/dykorgan (3282) Konovalov and Co. SOCiological Center KOHOBa}lOB JII Ko. CoIl,llIOJIO['HqecKD L(eHTP

14 Mikroraion. d. 1, k. 2 490047 Semipalatinsk Tel: 45·2147 contact: Aleksei Konovalov

The center conducts public opinion surveys on such topics as education reform, relations between different national ethnic groups, and elections.

"Contaer' Taldykorgan Society for Protection of Consumer Rights TaJIAbIKOpraHCKoe roPO~CKoe 06m;ecTBO 3a.m;u:TbI rrpaB n0Tep6J1ITeJIeAb "KOHTaKT"

ul. Kazakhstanskaia 9611 02. k. 20 Taldykorgan Tel: 24-23-94, 25-52-54 Fax: 27-17-71,7-12-34 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: S. Kasabulatov. President; Z. 8ausakova

262 Founded in 1996, Contact offers consultation to citizens on their as consumers and thern in court. It also maintains an information center of consumer legllslaltnm

Taldykorgan Regional Women's Support Center 9611 02 Kazahkstan k. 20 488000

TeUFax: 24-23-94

jury reviewed hundreds of pictures submitted by children from and the United States and awarded diplomas and prizes to winners. After the contest, the exhibition of children's art toured San t'ra:l1CU,CO, Almaty,

and

D.C.

"Kiwanis" Business Club of Ozhambyl "K:~BaHMC" OOII\eCTI:leHHbIH OM3Hec--KJ1[YO }KaMObma

Tarnz (3262-2) (formerly Dzhambyl)

Adilet School of law BbICmaH IDKOJIa

ul. Aiteke 484039 Taraz Tel: 3~27~93 Fax: 4-95-23 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Gem Sernenovich Khon

Tel/Fax: 23-15-88 See

for Adile! under A!maty.

Green Movement Center Lenin st. 31-4 484039 Taraz

TelfFax: 3-27-93 E-mail: Contact: Alexander Z",,:rrit,,'lrIV Chairman Green Movement was established in 1989 as one of the first environmental NGOs in Kazakhstan. It !JUt,U","',,, Oasis, an environmental newspaper. Members afthe center "",.hr",.,,,t.'Il in the Global Forum on Brazil in Environmental Issues in 1992. the center received ISAR In for an international environmental children's art "The Planet You Leave for Us," held in cO()'pe!'ati{)l1 with the n'7iHlt'l1,hvi Children's Art Studio. An international

Temlltal (32135) "Greenspace" Ecological Organization rpMHC9HCofu~ec'T:ae:HH(~ gKOJIOf'ItfqecKOR opr'aHH3a~

pro MetaUurgov 7/41>-23 472300 Temirtai Tel: 2~26~22 Fax: 1-32-37 E·mail: Contact: L. Kurtavtseva, B. ..,"""" ••" E. Co-Editors Bulletin nrf~mmru~e !J'~V"'"''''"''' a mOnIIlIIY

environmental bulletin for the Kl'!lrl'!,!!':anClll region with support from iSAR.

Kazakhstan

Uralsk (3112-2) Naryn Anti-Nuclear Movement AHTH-5iAepnoe ]:tBIDKeHHe "HapbIH" u1. Dmitrieva 75, k:m. 28 417000 Uralsk Tel: 5-89-93, 2-28-24 Contact: Kaken Kubeisinov

Naryn is working to halt nudear testing in Western Kazakhstan and to raise public awareness of the impact of the military-industrial complex on the environment. In 1993, Naryn investigated the levels of radioactivity and heavy metals in Kapustin Yar, and began a research project on public health and environmental conditions in the same region in 1996. SOCiety for the Promotion of Women's Initiatives Microraion 4, d. 5, k. 6 417003 Uralsk Tel; 27-22-14,24-74-83

The society supports women's NGOs and small businesses in western Kazakhstan through training and networking opportunities. With funding from the Eurasia Foundation, it bas created a library and database on women's NGOs and issues. Women Entrepreneurs of Kazakhstan Zhdanova St. 7 417000 Ura]sk Contact: Gauhar Kairlieva

This organization has created an information network linking Astana, Karaganda, Kyzyl-Orda, Turgay, Pavlodar, and southern Kazakh oblasts. The network publishes and disseminates information bulletins on women's

263

issues. It has also compiled a database of women's NGOs in Central Asia.

Ust-Kamenogorsk (3232) ACCElS Ust-Kamenogorsk East Kazakhstan State University ul. 3o..i Gvardeiskoi Divizii 34 492025 Ust-Kamenogorsk Tel: 44-61-61

See the profile for American Councils for International Education under Almaty. Adllet School of law A,J:(mIeT BbICmaH llIKOJ1a IIpaBa

Ulitsa Chernov 118 Ust-Karnenogorsk Tel: 42-59-08 Fax: 42-38-76 See Adilet's profile under Almaty.

Green Future of the Rudny Altai 3en:enoe 6~ee Py)::(Horo MTaH

ul. P. Lumumby, d. 12 492034 Ust-Karnenogorsk Tel:

44-0646.27-1646

Fax:

66-64-75

E-mail: [email protected] [email protected]

Contact: Vitaly Kulik, Executive Director; S. Smimov, Chairman Green Future is an ecological information center that researches and distributes data on environmental issues in Kazakhstan. It also provides informational and technical support for regional NGOs and publishes a quarterly news bulletin.

Kyrgyzstan country Code:

996

E-mail: [email protected]. bishkek.su Contact: V. P. Chareshy The goal of the club is to increase awareness of ecological issues.

Advisory Center for Refugees

Bishkek (312) ACCELS Blshkek Freedom Support Act Secondary School Administrative OffIce ul. Frunze 475 k. 23 720000 Bishkek TellFax: 22-38-79 62-15-35 Fax: E-mail: [email protected]. [email protected]

a/ya 1881 pro Chui 96 720000 Bishkek Tel: 21-08-33 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Alent Hashimi The center works on behalf of the refugee population in Kyrgyzstan, which consists primarily of people from Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Founded in October 1997. the center serves around 20 refugees a month with legal and social counseling. It has distributed humanitarian aid to more than 760 refugee children and their families. In January 1998 the center began teaching English and Russian.

See profile for American Councils for International Education under Almaty, Kazakhstan.

ACCELS Global Office ul. Moskovskaya 16, k. 64 720000 Bishkek Tel: 2845-64, 62-15-30 Fax: 62-15-35 E-mail: [email protected]

Aleyne Ecological Movement of Kyrgyzstan Sovyetskaya.137-7 720021 Bishkek Tel: 25-53-66, 25-53-70 Fax: 28-04-23.22-65-12 E-Mail: [email protected], [email protected] Contact: Emil Sbukurov, Lydia Orolbaeva

ACDWOCA 125 Ivanitsyna, k. 6 Bishkek E-mail: [email protected] Web:

www.acdivoca.org

See the profile for ACDIIVOCA under Almaty, Kazakhstan.

One of the largest environmental NGOs in Kyrgyzstan, Aleyne lobbies for improved environmentallegisiation in the republic, promotes the work and development of environmental NGOs. and distributes information regarding the republic's environment. Aleyne members developed a National Plan for Environmental Protection that was approved by the Kyrgyz federal

AdatCrub Klub«Adat" ut. Intergel'no 2 720012 Bishkek Tel: 21-82-81

264

Kyrgyzstan government. It held a seminar for NGOs on public participation in environmental protection. The group conducts ecological monitoring and is actively promoting the development of a Biosphere Reserve in Kyrgyzstan. Association for Support of Women Artists and Art Critics of Kyrgyzstan Moldibaeva St. 20, k. 65 720055 Bishkek Tel: 21-45-85142-78-75 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Orosgan Mambeta1ieva

The association seeks to support. professional women artists, encourage the development of artistic talents among youth, and preserve traditional national art forms in Kyrgyzstan. The group bas held 23 exhibits for women artists since its founding in 1993. Association In Support of Women Entrepreneurs Pushkina St. 70 Bishkek Tel: 22-86-23. 24-87-78 Contact: Gulnara Baimambetova Association of Independent Ecologists of Kyrgyzstan alya 702 720017 Bishkek Tel: 28-35-28,29-62-41,43-76-51 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Paul Graber Association of Independent Scientists-Lawyers of the Kyrgyz Republic pro Chui 46, room 220 720065 Bishkek Tel: 29-18-43,22-23-05 Fax: 28-27-76,68-01-30

265

Contact: Leila Ch. Sydykova, Ph.D.,

President; Bo10t N. Malabaev. Ph.D., Lecturer The organization was founded in April 1996 to promote ''the formation of a democratic legal state and the development of the legal conscience of society" by drafting laws, offering independent expert advice. and introducing new technologies for the training oflawyers. The association uses five high schools to train and retrain lawyers for general practice. law enforcement and customs, as well as courtroom judges and prosecutors. The association is composed of 50 active members (NGOs, individuals, and legal entities). Connected to the association are two centers: Center of Independent Expertise (which deals with licensing and legal practice issues), and Human Rights Center. In May 1996 with support from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Germany. the association conducted a round table on. the topic, "Judicial Reforms in Kyrgyzstan," Together with the NGOs, Diamond and Behests of Manas 21, and with the support of the Dutch agency HIVOS, the association has carried out several projects aimed at improving the status and legal protection of women in Kyrgyz society. These included publishing a report on the "Status of Women in Kyrgyzstan." Association of Parents of Disabled Children E1ebaeva St. 7 Bishkek Tel: 28-99-27 Contact: ~.Dikamnbaeva Beagle environmental Club 153, Bokombaeva St. Bishkek

266

Organizations

Tel:

23-40-63 (home) [email protected] Contact: V. A. Abdrasilova E-mafl:

Beagle works to increase ecological consciousness among young people. It is active in ecotourism and organizes an environmental youth camp. Founded in 1993, Beagle now has 600 members.

810M Youth Ecological Movement B110M M01IO~eE.Hoe 9K01IO['HllecKoe ABltDKeHHe

Kok·lar 2-45 720082 Bishkek Tel: 25.08-85,43-51-78 (home), 21·90-41 (home) E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Natalia Kravtsova, Vladimir Korotenko Fonned in 1993 as a youth component of the Aleyne Ecological Movement (see above), BIOM encourages and supports high school and university students and young professionals to become engaged in resolving environ· mental problems in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia. It develops and publishes environmental education curricula and other educational materials, organizes training seminars and camps for young people, and conducts research. Specific programs include: • New Horizons, a training program for future le8ders of regional ecological organizations • Simple Truth. which informs students and the public about ecological. issues • Seedling Program, conducted in cooperation with the Tuulgan Zherim Association, which planted seedlings in and around Bisbkek and provided practical support to the Frunze Forest Service

• Youth ecological infonnation center

810M has compiled a database of environmentaJ/ecological professionals and organizations in Kyrgyzstan, as well as a library of brochures, buUetins, posters, booklets, films, broadcasts, and education.al computer programs. In addition, BIOM has conducted several research projects, including a study of the ecology of Bisbkek, a study of biodiversity in the Bishkek region, development of a database of diseases in the Kyrgyz Republic, and research on biotechnology and agriculture. BIOM has 110 members, 25 regular volunteers, and 5 regional branches. It is interested in international cooperation and partnerships.

Blshkek Center of Social Initiatives 125-10 Ivanitsina St. 7200 II Bisbkek Tel: 27-05-72126-10-82 Contact: Khalida Rakisheva "Carmel" Charitable Fund Bishkek E-mafl: [email protected]. bisbkek.su Contact: Ak-Bermet Ondokeeva Center of Young Researchers of Kyrgyzstan UeHTp MOJIOAbIX yqeHbIX KbIpf'bI3CTaHa

ul. Fatianova, 71. kv. 2 Bishkek Tel: 42-74-36,23-81-13 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Cholpon Nogoibaeva, Chairperson The center was organized by the initiative of young researchers from various regions of Kyrgyzstan in October 1996. The mission of the center is to distribute information and

267

Kyrgyzstan

Children's Fund has the in Bishkek since 1996. The shelter provides homeless children with medical care, and school to them in programs and foster homes or return them to their families whenever The fund also sponsors various programs that aid to handicapped children and the children One ofthe fund's current endeavors Information is the Social SPIN, which is vrOc"{17
The center's activities include: OrOAl117mo two round tables, a sessions on communication among young researchers in a "creative young residents of Bishkek UU"''''UlJ<; an information bulletin of Researchers and

"""tn,of..

The center works to establish social with state and commercial al!:enCHeS of the It has 100 members and offices in five of T'I"rmf'T"hin"

Children'S Fund of Kyrgyzstan nP'1V'U'UTK


PecnyoJIlii'KM uL Abdymomunova 276 720033 Bishkek Tel: 21-67-55 Fax: 21-35-97 E-mail: [email protected].

established in ] 988 as a branch of the Soviet Children's the Children's Fund continues its work '-'''5''''''''.1

tions could share information. Fund staff visited more than 200 NOOs in Kyrgyzstan, gathering information to create the SPIN database. SPIN also published a Humanitarian Assistance for use by international The directory nrrn",rlpc ti",~:c:ri'ntnl'" of NO Os in Kyrgyzstan, as wen as information on available resources and governmental institutions.

Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs 107 5th floor 72000 I Bishkek Tel:

fax: • To find new ways to ImltlrCIVe conditions for the children of Kyrgyzstan • To publish information on issues "A."·"'''''',''O children of children • To assure that the

are prcltec:ted • To work with g01{eDrlm:ent "~';W';I"'~

E-mail: Web:

61-02-61 61-00-21 [email protected] WW\v.enfa.com

CNFA is a U.s.-based NGO dedicated to economic and development in the world's ",,,,,,,,,,"nin,, economies. Its work in Eurasia has included supporting the of and and protechnical assistance to NGOs. In

268

Organizations

Kyrgyzstan, CNFA works with Counterpart (see below).

Counterpart Consortium Kievskaya St. 107, etazh 5 720001 Bishkek Tel: 61-00-22,61-01-35 Fax: 61-00-21 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Jay Cooper, Deputy Regional Director See the profile for Counterpart under Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Diamond Association AccoD,HaI.Qtm ):{RawOHA u\. Panfil ova 200-39 720001 Bishkek Tel: 222-428 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Bermeta Tugelbaeva. President; Anara Tabyshalieva, VicePresident The association was established in April 1994 by women scientists from Bishkek's universities and the Kyrgyz National Academy of Sciences to promote the physical, social, and political well being of women. The Diamond Association has published two books, Women ofKyrgyzstan: Traditiqns and New Reality and The Unreliability of Gender Protection, and organized two national conferences on the role of women in Kyrgyzstani society. In addition, the group has conducted sociological research on the issue of violence in society, and produced reports on the status of women in Kyrgyzstan for the United Nations Development Program and other international NGOs. Association members have actively participated in many international conferences on women's issues.

At present, the association is implementing a Gender Protection program comprised of six distinct componentslprojec1S: • Analyzing of gender equality in the legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic • Increasing the legal literacy of women in Kyrgyzstan • Improving women's health and supporting their reproductive rights • Creating crisis centers to protect women and children from physical and sexual abuse • Researching crimes against women • Raising public awareness of women's issues

Eco-Resource Corporation Geotogichesky per. 4. k. 53 720031 Bishkek Tel: 43-47-33

Fax:

28-63-19

[email protected] Web: xmir.eu.orglecoresl Contact: Oleg Kolodyazhny, President E-Mail:

Ecologists Club Klub "Ekolog" alya 1451 720040 Bishkek Tel:

Fax:

22-10-41 28-83-62

E-mail: [email protected]. bishkek.su Contact: Igor Kbodzhamberdiev

.The Ecologists Club was created in 1988 by a group of "activistsdissidents" and is associated with the Social-Ecological Union based in Moscow. The club conducts independent research on ecological issues impacting public health (such as levels of heavy metals or pesticides) and carries out public awareness campaigns and protests. In 1996, with the support ofISAR-CentraI Asia, the

Kyrgyzstan Ecologists Club prepared a series of articles on the issue of nuclear testing for publication in local press and radio.

The Eurasia Foundation 137 Kievskaya, k. 12 720001 Bishkek TeUFax: 21 33 82 E-mail: [email protected] See the profile for the foundation's Central Asia Regional Office under Tashkent. Uzbekistan.

Forum of Women's NGOs of Kyrgyzstan opJM lKeHCKHX HenpaBHTeJlbHHbIX OPI"~ KbIpf'bI3bICTaHa

ul. Isanova 147, kv. 1 720033 Bishkek Tel: 2145-85 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Nurgul Janaeva The Forum of Women's NGOs was created in 1995 following a conference of Central Asian women's organizations. Participants at the conference decided that regular meetings between women's organizations would facilitate information exchange and help groups cooperate. The Forum meets monthly and unites representatives from 15 different Kyrgyz women's organizations, including the Women's League of Creative Initiative of Kyrgyzstan. Current activities of the Forum include: publishing a women's informational bulletin "Joogazyn" (Tulip) in Russian and Kyrgyz, assisting group members in writing grant and project proposals, and sponsoring conferences and seminars on topics concerning women. At present, the forum is working to create a School of Women's Studies in Bishkek. In June 1997, the Forum hosted a conference of Central

269

Asian women's NGOs entitled "Women's Dialogue."

Foundation for International Legal Cooperation (UKUK) ul. Pervomayskaya 63 720040 Bishkek Tel: 22-54-02 TeUFax: 28-85-05 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Mirgul Smanalieva

Greenwomen Information Agency, Kyrgyzstan ul. Sovetskaia 208 120040 Bishkek Tel: 28-69-69, 41-53-69 Fax: 28-12-90 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Ludmila Sapozhnikova

See the profile for Greenwomen Ecological News Agency under Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Initiatives Support Center U,eH'I'p rIoPoAepJKKIII li1Hm.\HaTIm ul. Moskovskaya 73, kv. 63 120000 Bishkek Tel: 28-72-98 Fax: 62-15-35 E-mall;[email protected] Contact: Erkinbek Djamanbaev, Center Manager The Initiatives Support Center originally evolved out of the NET Alunmi Center (part of the NIS Exchanges and Training Project funded by USAID) to provide educational and material resources to organizations of NET alumni. Today, the center offers its services to all NGOs, as well as to commercial and governmental organizations.

270 The center It business resources, such as N""'1t\O Internet/c-rnail access, and conference rooms. It also holds tr"·i,,'~..,, sessions and offers consultations aimed at "mid-level" NGOs which may need additional to realize their nr",''''<'TC

InterBiUm ul. Push kina 78/2 720040 Bishkek

Tei: 26-36-67 TellFax: 22-85-77 E-mail:

h",>,,,. Director, Coordinator

'i,,,:vI<

InterBilim is an mdePlmdent that supports the NGO

orp'am!7Ht10n

education. Interbilim a newsietter of the same name to inform NGOs of opportunities and events of interest. The newsletter contains articles about NGOs in and other countries, and articles for Nf'.rOs to use as reference materials. The

newsletter is rmr,f1«lf,,·£1 in and

International NGO Training and Research Center (INTRAC) ~anasPr.

k.37

Bishkek Tel: 21-87-11 E-mail: in UK: mtlraC!~g:n.apc.Ol

Contact: Theresa Mellon, Project Mfi.nJ.t!trP"'· Anne and Central Asia lNTRAC is a UK·based UI~:'I1IlZ,UlUII fonned in 1991 "to improve the ol'l!caniizal:iol1tal effectiveness and program of international and indigenous NGOs." The center has been in Central Asia since when it was asked by UNDP to conduct an NGO mapping exercise and

program, Institutional of NGOs, in aU five countries of Central Asia under grants :from TAClS and UNDP. The program ",""",tl,,,,, to NGO coordination and resource centers, the ofNGOgovernment and human resource dC'II'ciopment ofNGO leaders. INTRAC's he~tdQltlariters are in Oxford, UK.

Intemews ul. 213c 720001 Bishkek

TeWax: 24-72-89 E-mail: Web:

See profile tor Interncws under Almaty, Kazakhstan.

IREXIBishkek

uL

k. 202, 204

720040 Bishkek TeliFax: 22-84-34 E-mail:

See for lREX under Kazakhstan.

Kyrgyzstan

Junior Achievement Kyrgyzstan 55-5, Boulevard Molodaya Guardia 7200 to Bishkek

25-76-29 25-16-47 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Nuria Omurbekova, Executive Director

271

Osh, Jala-Abaci, and Naryin, but communication among thern at present is very limited.

Tel;

Fax:

See the profile for Junior Achievement under Almaty. Kazakhstan.

Kyrgyz-American Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of Law 40 Manas Ave., Room 77 720001 Bishkek Tel: 21-18-74 Fax: 22-39-24 E-mail: [email protected] Contact; Natalia Ablova. Director The Kyrgyz-American Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of Law was created following an international conference tit1ed "Human Rights and the Fate of Nations in Central Asia," held in Bisbkek in'Decernber 1992. The main task of the Bureau is to monitor human rights violations and appeal on behalf of victims to Kyrgyz authorities or international buman rights organizations. The Bureau's investigations into specific human rights cases have revealed wbat they describe as "a complete ignorance by militiamen [police] in all subjects concerning human rights ... and this is also typical of the prokuratura and the courts, especially on the local level." Accordingly, the Bureau has launched a program of human rights education in the secondary schools and universities. Another major focus of the Bureau is to develop a regular exchange of information among Kyrgyz human rights groups using computer networks. There are local civil rights groups in

Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights ul. Kicvskaya 96-A, k. 713-714 720030 Bishkek Tel: 66-13-42 TellFax: 66-01-83,66-25·15 E-mail: [email protected]. [email protected] Contact: Rarnazan Dyryldaev

The Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights acts as an umlxeUa organization for various groups concerned with human rights protection in Kyrgyzstan. The committee was established in 1996 and currently has a membership of over 1,000. The committee is active in many spheres of human rights protection. Committee members defended journalists from the newspapers Res Publica, Svobodnye Gori. and Kriminal when they were accused of slandering the government, and sought legal aid for imprisoned political activists from the Erk opposition party. Additionally, the group bas helped several independent newspapers to register with government agencies as official publications. The committee is dedicated to protecting national minorities in Kyrgyzstan and bas worked to belp Tajik refugees. educating tbern on their legal rights and helping thern apply for refugee status.

Kyrgyz Medical Association Me~cKWI Accoll14a~

KhIpI'bI3CTaHa

uJ. Moskovskaia 73. k. 63 720000 Bishkek Tel: 28-72-98 Fax: 62-15-35

272

Organizations

E-mail: [email protected]. [email protected] Contact: Erkinbek Djamanbaev

training classes for unemployed youth, and plans to hold a seminar on "Tolerance of Ethnic Minorities."

When the Soviet Union dissolved, so did the union-wide medical societies that provided members with professional journals and facilitated the exchange ofinformation on new practices, medicines, etc. The Kyrgyz Medical Association aims to fill this gap by promoting information exchanges between medical professionals and health-oriented NGOs within Kyrgyzstan and abroad. Other goals of the association are: establishing ethical, educational, and clinical standards for the medical profession; protecting the professional rights of physicians; improving public health; and making health care more accessible in Kyrgyzstan.

Lop-Nor Antinuclear Movement of Kyrgyzstan

Lawyers of Kyrgyzstan Association ul. Razzakova 63, tab. 6 720040 Bishkek

Tel: Fax:

28-85-05, 22-54-02 28-85-05 E-mail: [email protected]

Lingua Center Mikroraion Asanbai 31, kv. 20 720000 Bishkek

Tel: Fax:

46-10-24.22-10-41 28-83,.(j2 E-mail: eleonpro@casia-freenet. bishkek.su Contact: Aburakhim Khapizov

The Lingua Center has two objectives: to encourage the development of multiculturalism in Kyrgyzstan by teaching the languages and cultural traditions of "smaIl Turkic groups"; and to provide aid to veterans, the unemployed, and the poor. It holds courses in Uighur language and culture. and computer

pro ChUl 265-a 720071 Bishkek TelJFax: 24-36-61,26-37·65 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Ivan VasHiev

Mercy Corps International MeBtAYHapoAIJ.bIit KOPnyc :wmocepAJU{ pro Chui 219, kom. 322 720396 Bishkek Tel: 21-95-44.21-91-24 Fax: 62-19-55 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Eric Brainich, Director The Mercy Corps program in Kyrgyzstan distributes food to orphanages, kindergartens, hospitals, and local agencies for the unemployed. In rural towns, the Corps provides food for laborers who work on community projects, extends credit to farmers, and helps to develop farmers' associations and other support networks. Mercy Corps also runs "microcredit" programs to encourage small business growth, especially for women-owned ventures. See the profile for Mercy Corps under Almaty, Kazak:hstan, for additional information.

Peace Research Center of Kyrgyzstan ll.euTp HCCJIeAOBaHHe :MI4pa KnIpI"hl3CTaHa

PO Box 1880 720000 Bishkek TellFax: 28-17-71 E-mail: [email protected]

Kyrgyzstan Contact: AnaraTabyshalieva, Atyrkul Alisheva Following the outburst of ethnic conflict in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan in 1990, the future leaders of the Peace Research Center of Kyrgyzstan decided that research needed to be done to investigate the precursors and solutions to such violent incidents in the volatile, culturally diverse regions of Central Asia. The center was officially registered in November of 1994. Today, the center focuses on two main types of activity: research on indicators of and solutions to ethnic and religious conflict in Central Asia, and civic education through seminars for school teachers and university students. The various civic education programs that the center conducts emphasize the principles of democracy, citizen involvement, and responsibility and an understanding of the crucial role each person plays in the development of a civil society. The center has developed curricula for schools and for training programs for civic education trainers. The organization sponsors Democracy Today, a discussion club of social leaders, activists, and experts, which addresses current problems of democratic development in Kyrgyzstan. Center staff have made recommendations on government policy, and in 1996 the group published a textbook on civic education titled Step by Step. The center has branch offices in Osh and Dzhalal-Abad. Red Crescent Society in Kyrgyzstan Hau;HOHaJIbHoe 06~ecTBO

KpacHoro nOJIYMecsm.a KbIpf'bI3CTaHa bul. Erkindik. to

273

720040 Bishkek Tel: 22-24-14,66-19-78 Fax: 66-21-81 E-mail: redcross@imfiko. bishkek.su Contact: Raisa Ibraimova, Chairperson; Sabira Baratbaeva, Head of the International Department The Red Cross Society of Kyrgyzstan was formed on October 1, 1926. Until t 991 the society was a constituent part of the Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent Society. After the coUapse of the USSR the society was renamed the Red Crescent Society by presidential decree. The society has 61 committees, 293 employees, and 2,930 volunteers. In November 1997 it was officially admitted as a member to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. For 70 years the society actively participated in the health care program of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. During the last two years the Society com~ preted the following projects: • A home for abandoned children in Kara-Balta, which it established as part of a joint project with the Dutch Red Cross Society • Refugee medical center in Bishkek • Medical and social help for the elderly, low·income families, refugees, and families with many children • Youth center with branches in all regions of Kyrgyzstan Currently the society provides medical and social help to the refugees. the handicapped, and victims of armed conflicts and natural disasters, and searches for missing individuals and reunites them with their families. The society works closely with a wide range of international aid organizations.

274

Soros Foundation-Kyrgyutan ut Abdumomunova 205 720301 Bishkek Tel:

22·18~94

62~I5-65

Executive Dilrootor; ", ... ,,,..,,,,,,,.,.,1"\\1 PTl'lrITftm Coordinator

Tabied Ecological Movement of Kyrgyzstan uL Erkindlk korn. 16 720481 Bishkek Te&; E·mail; Contact; Ternirbek Choduraev

Tree of Life has conducted a number prc~jects including: program for farmers on how to prevent brucellosis • wheel chairs to disabled with support from International • Evaluation and educational program on reproductive health for rural women Pnl,li"hi"",. a book on functional • Project on sexual awareness for children Tree of Life'g. future include establishing a Survival School to end poverty a~d for women.

UNESCO Media Resource Center

Tabiat 1S active in the fields ofenviron~ mental and

208 720040 Bishkek Tel: 28-72-90 fax: 28-72-90

"Tree of Life" Human Development Center

E-mail:

1963 (attn: K. Motdol:r;azieva 720000 Bishkek Tel:

Smlt~t~~IC!nm

Contact: Cholpon Manager MRC was founded in 1995 to

E·mail:

Contact: Kalia Mc~ld()gazjeva,

Nu",m,t",.

classes for local journalists,

as wen as courses in TV and radio 1ne "Tree ofUfe" Human ment Center was established in 1996 and describes its main as "a "",.'<>rh",....., of human development in harmony with the environment." The center carries out nrc"..,,'t~

broadc;asfing for students The center publlshes a InfoCenter, which is distributed to local media, international org:anllzatl0!1IS, ern.bru;sies. and NGOs. MRC cooperates with the Association of Independent Electronic Mass the Media of Central Asia Center of Women Journalists of Central Asia (WIMCA), the Association of Print Media of Central Asia (PMACA), and Internews.

Kyrgyzstan UN Women in Development Project u1. Pushkina 78 "Dom Druzhby," k. 101 Bishkek TeUFax: 26-22-55 E-mi¥I: [email protected] Contact: Damira Sartbaeva. Bureau Chief Founded by the UN Development Project in 1995, the bureau works to promote gender equality in Kyrgyzstan. Its specific goals include: • Integration of Kyrgyz women's organizations into the international women's movement and promoting the development ofwomen's NGOs • Fostering of cooperation between governmental and non-governmental actors • Increasing the role of women in public policy and private business The bureau offers training programs for women in computer technology, English language issues, and market economics. It publishes and distributes information on gender, including a directory of women's organizations in Central Asia in 1995-96.

Women and New Technologies Center Maldibaeva St. 5, k. 18 Bishkek Tel: 23-35-85,44-51-93 Contact: N. S. Amanova

Women Business Independent Public Newspaper Varshavskaya Sf. 40 (Pushkina St. 78) 720030 Bishkek Tel: 24-40-81,25·28·89 Contact: Tamara Sharomova

275

Women Entrepreneurs Support Association Pushkina St. 70 720000 Bishkek Tel: 22-86-23 Fax:: 26·22·55 E-mal.;[email protected] Women in MedIa of Central Asia Center Sovetskaya St. 208, k. 41 Bishkek Tel: 28-69-69 Contact: Nargiz Kulmirzaeva Women of Kyrgyzstan for a Non Nuclear World and Ecological Safety pro Chui 225 Bishkek Tel: 21-49-48 Contact: Chinara Sidikova Women's Congress pro Chui 164a. k. 207 720001 Bishkek TeUFax: 21-08-73, 46-19-08 E-maIl: zamira@congress.:freenet. bishkek.su Contact: Zamira Akbagysheva The Women's Congress was established on May 24,1993. Its goal is to unite the women's movement in Kyrgyzstan to achieve full gender equality. eliminate discrimination, and promote democracy. It works to promote hea1th care services for women, provide financial assistance to poor families, disabled veterans, and single mothers, and to restore Kyrgyzstan's national culture and language. In 1995 the congress conducted the seminar "Women in a Transitional Society," after which recommendations on women's issues were made to the Kyrgyz government. It credits the

276 seminar with up Parliament's ratification of international conventions on women. A business education center was also established in Bishkek after the """'''1''1<'''' which had served 270 people 20 of them have their own businesses. The congress has also conducted seminars on the role of lhe mass media in ~' ..m~"'~~ women.

The Women's Support Center was established in February 1996 to assist ''''IJ'''..... ,OlH y the and mothers with many children. The center states that "the discontinuation ofthe Soviet welfare programs has particularly affected women, who I>n'I>Mil>,."", incTcELSlrlg i.nn,c,v.·";.,ht'l'1"""t due to the

economic crisis." The

Women's League of Creative Initiative of Kyrgyzstan Jh!ra :lKeHIIl;mI TBOP1tIc(:KC'M l'IHH[(HaTlIIBbI

Dzhal 720038 Bishkek L-¥~.rn"A~

Tel:

21-45-85 E-mail:

Initiative was created in 1995 to support, and sustain the talent and activities of the artists and to cross-cultural art education between and the rest of the world. Speclilc the WLCI inclllde: ~ ...,_,,¥h•• ~

HODS in

for contemporary Ii database of cultural programs.

Women's Support Center pr. Mira Bishkek

kv. #14

Tel:

44-45-10,26-36-50,42-19-08

Fax:

62-18-75

E-mail: bishkek.su, r",,,.ttfl'i"'r1,","'" bishkek.su Contact: Rosa Aitmatova, President

of the Women's Center is to promote women's to provide women with information and ,<mn-rr",,,

their

and to encourage their selt~eml'lllo\rrn(~nt [n its first six months the center conducted Ii survey in Talas oblast and determined that the average "n,~"",,,ln',,.,.."'nt rate among women in the Talas oblast is 80 percent and reaches 95 in some remote rural areas. The center came up with a proposal to establish a Women's Bank, based on the programs implemented by the Grameen Bank and the U.S. Financial International ....".nl,'\V1'n""~t "nn"",'"mi1;",,,

women with small loans at a low interest rate to establish their own small businesses and """r".,.."';.,,,,, Loans win be available to 'lV'il'V7.,t
women on issues and maternal care by hi",,,,..,,, and distrii)Utlng UN brochures on nutrition for

Kyrgyzstan women, basic hygiene, and family support during pregnancy. Youth Human Rights Group MOJIOAelKHaJI Dpa.B03a.Il\HTHaJI

ppynna

a/ya 1893 720000 Bishkek Tel; 66-49~09 TellFax: 66-48-02

E-mail;[email protected] Contact: Maria Lissitsyna. Chair of the Coordinating Council YHRG was established in November 1995 by students in Bishkek with support from the Kyrgyz-American Bureau on Human Rights and the Danielle Mitterand Foundation. Since its founding, YHRG has monitored violations of children's rights and worked to repeal forced, unpaid work by students on community farms. In 1997 it began its educational program in schools. YHRG volunteers have taught lessons on human rights in ten schools in Bishkek and several more in Osh. It has developed a 17 lesson curriculum for fifth graders and plans to make a video for the course. Other projects by YHRG include: • A weekly radio program on a private station in Bishkek done in Ii live question-and-answer format • In June 1998, it started publishing a quarterly bulletin on children's rights, which includes reviews of local, national, and intemationallaw, advice for teachers, and other news. • A project on alternatives to military service • It monitors orphanages and other children's institutions. YHRG has 16 permanent workers and volunteers and regional correspondents.

277

Ba/ykchi (33944) UMYUT Center for NonGovernmental and NonCommerciar Organizations YMIOT I..{eHTp 06II{ecTBeHHhlX HenpamITeJIbCTBeHHhIX

~emm

ul. Olimpiiskaya 615 722300 Balykchi Issyk-Kulskaya Oblast Tel: 42-49-01 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Svetlana Bashtovenko, Director and Founder Since its registration in November of 1991 UMYUT has sponsored and administered a number of social assistance programs in the city of Balykchi. These programs have been primarily aimed at improving the social condition of women, children, and the elderly. UMYUT's overall goal is to educate the Jocal population and to help them to realize their full social, economic, cultural, and professional potential. UMYUT plans to expand its activities to include information distribution, computer training, English-language education. an ecology club. Ii communication club, and an arts and crafts club.

Kara-Balta (3313-3) Imls Snow Leopard Lover's Club 4O-Let Kyrgyzia S1. 2-33 722030 Kara-Balta E-mail: [email protected]. bishkek.su Contact: Oleg and Irina Loginov

!rbis is the first NGO in the former Soviet Union solely dedicated to the

278

Organizations

Irbis is the first NGO in the fonner Soviet Union solely dedicated to the preservation of snow leopards. The group's founders, Oleg and Irina Loginov. are biologists who worked for many years at the Almaty Zoo in Kazakhstan, where they became acquainted with the plight of the snow leopard. The Loginovs began writing a column in an Almaty newspaper, publicizing the threat that poaching and declining habitat posed to the snow leopard. From this column, Irbis was born in 1993. Irbis distributes a quarterly newsletter educating people about the need for snow leopard protection and organizes anti-poaching campaigns. In the spring of 1997, Irbis joined forces with Sacred Earth Network to work coUaboratively on the Eurasian Snow Leopard Project.

The movement's interests include educational and environmental activities for children and young adults.

Karakol (3392)

Foundation for the Support of Legal and Economic Reforms in Kyrgyzstan
Kork Women's Public Organization ~urmanskayaSt.

144 722360 Karakol Tel: 23-39-22,22-02-91 Contact: Gulnara Kadirmisheva

Peri Women's Organization 219 Dzetjinskaya St. Karakol Tel: 29-16-19 Contact: Fatima Tagaeva

Public Union of Unemployed Women

OSh(3322) "Abshyr" Ecological Movement Kulatov Village Kant Rayon Osh Tel: 22-517,22-552,22-519 Contact: Baltabai Abdurasutiv

ACDINOCA 323 Lenin Street, clazh 2 714000 Osh TelJFax: 27-324 Web: www.acdivoca.org See the profile for ACDIIVOCA under Almaty. Kazakhstan.

co~eiiCTBIIlH npaBOBblM H 3KOHOMl(qecKlDd: pe4>oPMaM

KbIpI"bI3CTaHa

ul. Jim 242 714000 Osh Tel: 342·22, 2-5248 E-mail: [email protected]. bishkek.su Contact: Rustam Akhmatakhunov

Mercy Corps International, Osh Branch 4 Kyrgyzstana St., 17

Osh Tel:

2344-50

38a Fuchika St., Hotel Isik-Kol

Contact: Steve Downing, Program

Karakol Tel: 52-95-73,52-34-15 Fax: 52-65-35 Contact: Shoi lmankozhoeva

Manager

Kyrgyzstan Osh Center for the Dissemination of legal Knowledge OmcKlDi ~eHTP no paCIIpOCTpaHeHmO npaOOBbIX

3HaHld: ul. Lenina 275, kab. 119 714000 Osh Tel: 27-81-97,21-58-24 Contact: Asylbek Asanov

"Tereza" Center for Protection of Mothers' and Chlldrens' Health 19-11 Bayalinova St. Osh Tel: 22~16·16. 22-60-53, 21-57-17 Contact: Dinara Mamazhusupova

279

ACCELS Global Office

will develop and test a curriculum that win "orient students to cultural pluralism and the foundations of civil society in traditional culture." . The curriculum win focus on: • Human diversity and human ideals • Individuality and responsibility to community. society. and the environment • Understanding cultural creativity and decline • Culture, innovation, and applied reason • Art and the human condition • The relationship between the oral and the written tradition When it is completed, the curriculum wiil be required for all undergraduates. The project is part of a larger initiative of the Aga Khan Deve10pment Network, which includes other components that focus on English language instruction and economics.

Strategic Research Institute Rudak 40, k. 301 734025 Dushanbe

All Somon Cultural and Intellectual Foundation

Tajikistan Country Code: 7

Dushanbe (3772) ACCELS Dushanbe State Library> 1sf floor Rudaki 36 734025 Dushanbe Tel: 27-45-31 TeUFax: 21-17-95 E-mail: [email protected]. [email protected] (for EIC)

See the profile for American Councils for International Education under Ahnaty, Kazakhstan.

Tel: 21..(}6-00.51-OO-95. 21-82-49,21-07-87 Fax: 21-05-18

TeUFax: 27-03-40

[email protected]. [email protected]

Contact: Abdulqodir KhoJiqzoda,

1311 Chehova St. Dushanbe

E-mail:

E-mail:

[email protected]

Ph.D., Director

The Aga Khan Humanities Project for Central Asia

The Ali Somon Cultural and Intellectual Foundation was founded in Dushanbe in 1994. The name derives from the period of Somani rule remembered as a golden era ofhigb culture, rule of law, and scientific accomplishment by Persian-speaking people. According to its literature, the foundation "attempts to build a bridge between yesterday's epoch and today's life in order to regenerate the ancient culture, to help strengthen the liberty and independence of the Tajik people, and found a civilized society."

5 Sechenova St. 734000 Dushanbe Tel:

24-58-23

E-mail:

[email protected]

Contact: Rafique Keshavjee, Director

The project was launched, with the approval of the Ministry of Education. in 1997 to strengthen the teaching of the humanities at the undergraduate level in universities in Central Asia. In partnership with several universities in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. the project 280

Tajikistan To accomplish this goal, the foundation offers scholarships to aspiring students in foreign languages, business, law, politics, and medicine. It plans to open a Free University with departments in each of these fields. ASIA-Plus Information Agency uL Bokhtar 35/1, 8th floor 734002 Dushanbe Tel: 21-78-63,21-72-20 Fax: 21-78-63,51-01-36 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.internews.ras.ru/asiaplus Contact: Umed Babakhan.ov, Director; Daler Nurhanov, Manager

Asia-Plus is an independent information and consulting agency. It publishes a bi-weekly English-language information bulletin that features the latest economic statistics, new legislative and regulatory acts of the government, and news on privatization. Additionally, ASIA-Plus prepares analytical reports on topics such as the business climate and state of the mass media in T~ik­ istan. It is a member of the Association of Independent Electronic Mass Media of Central Asia (Assotsiatsia Nezavisimikh Electronnikh Sl'eilstv Massoro; Informatsii Tsentralnoi Asti-ANESMI). Staff size is 15, of which 5 are volunteers. Association of Independent Judges Negmat Karabaev St., 46 Dushanbe Tel: 33-42-97,33-67-67, 24-30-40 (home) Contact: Vatan Abdurahmanov, President

The association was founded in 1992 to strengthen the court system and to establish its independence. It organizes

281

conferences and seminars and works to educate the public about legal issues. The association is funded primarily by dues from its 360 members. Association of Salzburg Seminar Alumni & Supporters of American Initiatives in Tajikistan AccoIl,Ha.Il,HH "I1HTOMI.J,b1

3a..rIbr(6ypreKOI'O ceMmIapa If CTOpoHl:lmGI AMepmtaHCKHX

VfHm.J;r4:aTHB B Ta,1VKHlmCTaHe" uJ. Chekova 13 734024 Dushanbe Tel: 21-55-25 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: El1a Ryazanova, Tatyana Abdusbukurova This group is comprised of alumni from the Salzburg Seminar, an annual program of American Studies for European scholars, business professionals, and leaders held in Salzburg. Austria. Thirty-six men and women from T~ikistan have participated in the seminar since the program began accepting applicants from Central Asia in 1993. The association was formed in 1995 with the goal of implementing concepts and initiatives learned in Salzburg to help the growth of civil society and democracy. The association sponsors training sessions for NOOs on such topics as fundraising and organizational development, and publishes a "Philanthropy Digest." The digest is oriented toward encouraging joint projects and cooperation among the governmental, commercial, and nonprofit sectors in Tajikistan. Association members were integral in establishing the first Rotary Club in Tajikistan.

282

Organizations

Association of Women with University Education Idjubova St. 11a Dushanbe Tel: 37-81-20 Contact: Ms. Sbomansurov

Citizen's Group on Sustainable Development and the Fight Against Desertification rp~aHCKaa I"pynna no

YCTOAtnmoMY pa3BHTIUO H 6op6e C onyCTbIHllBa.mleM ul. Mayakovskovo 28, kv. 18

734043 Dushanbe Tel: 21...69-91 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Svetlana Blagoveshenskaya

Counterpart Consortium 20 Kirov St.

Dushanbe Tel: 21-65-14.21-82...65 Fax; 21-75-59 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: John Barbee, Country Director See the profile for the consortium under

Almaty, Kazakhstan.

The Eurasia Foundation Prospect Rudaki, 18 734012 Dushanbe Tel: 21...69-86 E-mail: [email protected] See the profile for the foundation's Central Asia Regional Office under Tashkent. Uzbekistan.

Foundatton to Support Civic Initiatives o~

nOA,;qepJKKH

I"p~aHCKlIX

lU:lBI\HaTllB

Prospect Rudaki 18 7340 12 Dushanbe

Tel:

21-67-66,21-71-41

TellFax: 21-58-57 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.ecostan.org Contact: Muazama A. Burkhanova,

Chairman The foundation was formed in 1995 as an umbrella organization to support the development of an NGO sector in Tajikistan. Its major programs include: • The public information eenter Dastgirie serves the NGO community in Tajikistan. It has a library and database. offers fledgling groups informational and technical support. helps them find sources of financial assistance. and unites organizations with similar interests and goals for joint projects. • The alternative energy group researches and publicizes renewable and environmentally clean energy sources. It manufactures solar kitchens and has helped establish a small hydroelectric power station in Shirkent National Park. • The Agroaction Group works with farmers, offering training and information for ecologically sound methods of agricultural production. • The foundation publishes a regular newsletter which reports on the activities of a wide range ofTajik NGOs. Members of the group are active in environmental monitoring in Dushanbe. They have evaluated the quality of drinking water and conducted an assessment of food products from industrial areas. The foundation has an office in Khujand to serve the needs ofNGOs in the Leninabad region. It is a member of the Socia-Ecological Union, based in Moscow.

Tajikistan Kushlston International ul. Maykovskogo 28, 18 734043 Dushanbe Tel: 35-5347 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Daler Pachajanov, Svetlana Blagoveshchenskaya

Based in the U.S., Kushiston International was one of the first international organizations to establish an office in Tajikistan when it began work in 1991. Its first project was a three-year research and policy program which led to the establishment of the Shirkent Historical Natural Park, the first such park in Tajikistan. Working with the World Wildlife Federation, it has helped organize a council ofTajik scientists and environmentalists which is working to develop a biodiversity strategy. It has also launched a microcredit program for women entrepreneurs, with support from Save the Children. Internews Tajikistan ul. Rudaki 94, k. 24 734001 Dushanbe TeUFax: 24-54-83,2143-12

See profile for Internews under Almaty, Kazakhstan. Lingua Scholastic-Consurtative Center YQe6HO-KoHCYJIbTaIJ.HOHHoro

IJ.eHTpa ".J'lIm:raa" uJ. Chehova 13 734024 Dushanbe TeUFax: 21-55-25 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Elena Ryazanova

Lingua supports educational NGOs and alternative education projects in Tajikistan. The group offers consultations and informational support for

283

NOOs working in the area of education reform. and provides practical courses on topics such as preschool education and teacher re-iraining. The group publishes a newsletter, "Interdonish," that features listings of independent schools, articles on new teaching methodologies. and discussions of education reform in the NIS. Mercy Corps International Teheran St. 12, etazh 2 734000 Dushanbe Tel: 21-08-60,27-61-13 Fax: 21-08-64 E-mail: [email protected]. glas.apc.org Contact: Paul Heinzen, Country Director; Michael Allen. Deputy Director See profile for Mercy Corps under Almaty, Kazakhstan.

National Association of Small and Medium Businesses 9 Bofanda St.• 3rd floor Dushanbe Tel: 21-90-01,21-17-26 TellFax: 27-79-78 Contact: Matluba Uldjabaeva. Executive Director

The association was organized in 1993 to advocate with government agencies on behalf of business owners and to provide business training for its members. It has more than 200 members and regional branches in Kurgan-Tyube, Kulyab, and Khujand. National Center of Legal Education ul. Mayakovskogo 45/1, k. 27 Dushanbe Tel: 35-81-03, 35-80-03

284

Organizations

Odamiyat Association Acco~aqwI

''OAaJ4IUIT''

uL Tekhron 12 Dushanbe Tel: 21-65-82,24-77-17 E-mail: [email protected]

Contact: S. Kamalova The Odamiyat ("Humanity") Association assists the poor, disabled. and elderly in Dushanbe. with a particular focus on veterans. Odarniyat runs a medical clinic, food bank, and social club for veterans and helps find employment opportunities for elderly vets who need additional income to supplement their pensions.

munity development. The project has also supported efforts to monitor violations of human rights.

Pamir Eco-Center ul. Lakhuti 10, kv. 21 734013 Dushanbe Tel: 23-45-92 E-mail: [email protected].

org, [email protected] Contact: Ogonazar Aknazarov Founded in 1994, the Eco-Center conducts environmental education programs for youth. It is also setting up an infonnation center for NOOs.

Parastor Center

"Oko" Information Newspaper Giprozem Gorodok Bldg. 30/31 Dushanbe Tel:

27-49-10

Contact: Pulat Isaev, Editor Oko reports on the work of humanitarian and charity organizations in Tajikistan.

Open Society Institute of the Soros Foundation 33 Rudaki St., k. 4, 5 734001 Dushanbe TellFax: 31-99-34 Fax: 21-19-58 E-mail: [email protected]. [email protected] Web: www.soros.orgltajkstan.html Contact Zoom HaJimova

OSI's project in Tajikistan was established in 1993 in response to the country's brutal civil war. The project awarded over $1 million in grants in 1994, supporting programs that provided emergency aid to refugees and internally displaced persons, and assisted returning refugees through reconstruction of housing and com-

6 Amirshoeva Street Dushanbe Tel: 24-28-30 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Rano Rahmatova, Director

The center was established in 1996 at the initiative of residents of the October district of Dushanbe who wanted to help their poorer neighbors. In 1991 it distributed humanitarian aid from the Netherlands to 50 disabled individuals and solitary pensioners. Also in 1991, the center organized a Collection Week in which more than 200 people donated goods that were in turn distributed to more than 60 needy families. The center is currently developing a project to provide educational services to orphans and poor children who have suffered from the civil war.

Relief International 10 Rudaki St., #76, 4th floor Dushanbe TeUFax: 21-86-53 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Babruddin Sapirov. Program Officer

Tajikistan RI, based in Los Angeles, provides emergency relief, rehabilitation, and development assistance to victims of natural disasters and civil conflicts worldwide. Founded in 1990. RI has directly provided emergency, rehab~ ilitation, and development project services to affected populations in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Tajikistan, and Vietnam. • Humanitarian Health Assistance: Tajikistan has experienced ongoing civil strife since the break~up of the Soviet Union in 1991, severely impairing the national health care system. Since 1993, RI-Tajikistan has provided medical supplies and training to rural health facilities in the Karategin Valley and KbatJon oblast, and has maintained permanent field base offices and warehouses in both areas. RI has supported over 200 rural health facilities, trained over 600 healthcare staff, and delivered an average of $15,000 in essential drugs and medical supplies each month, covering a resident population of 350,000 in both regions. As part of the larger health program, over 5,000 children living in "Intemats," institutions for orphans and children with special needs, received humanitarian medical assistance from RI's health teams in Tajikistan. RI trains and provides essential pharmaceuticals and health supplements for the children. RI also provided [ntemats with livestock as a sustainable source of nutrients and to develop job skills in animal husbandry. In 1998 RI continued to provide assistance to the Intemats. supplying them with pharmaceuticals and medieal care. This effort operated in coHaboration with Odamiyat, a local

285

medical NGO that provides services for the elderly. disabled, and disadvantaged youth in Dushanbe. RI provides Odamiyat with material support for its clinic in Dushanbe Central Hospital and assists Odamiyat with various public health campaigns, such as a widespread Vitamin A campaign throughout Dushanbe's schools that reached an estimated 50,000 students. • Education: In 1995, RI, with support from UNHCR, engaged in rehabili~ tation education activities for vulnerable Afghan students living in .Tajikistan. RI provided modest stipends to select individuals pursuing their higher secondary education. RI also hosted English language courses, taught by an Mghan instructor, for which a total 000 university students from the Medical and Agricultural Institutes were chosen based on eligibility and level of interest. • Small Enterprise Development: RI has operated a small enterprise development (SED) program to increase the economic self· sufficiency among women head~of'" households in the Kbatlon oblast region. Since 1995 the program has trained more than 450 women in private business concepts and provided additional assistance to about two-thirds of these women who were developing businesses in livestock breeding, bread making, yam making, knitting, sewing. poultry breeding, and making shoes. • Restocking of Livestock: In 1996 RI embarked on a livestock credit project which provides short-term loans for the purchase oflivestock, focusing on the distribution of milk goats to vulnerable families, especially those headed by females.

Organizations

286

The project has successfully assisted about 50 families wbo have experienced a 20 percent net gain in livestock outputs to date. • PeacelTolerance Education: In 1998 Rl began an education initiative that included training and curriculum development to promote peace and tolerance among war-affected children in Tlljikistan. This initiative was based on a model developed by UNHCR in Kyrgyzstan and was implemented in collaboration with the Tajikistan Ministry of Education, UNHCR, various NGOs, and parent/teacber/academic associations.

Republican Board of Attorneys 12 Gorodskaya St. Dushanbe Tel: 21-24-03,27-84-77 Contact: Naim Amirbekov, Chairman. The board provides legal services to pensioners, veterans, refugees, citizens, and organizations. It was founded in January 1992. but not officially registered until March ofl995. The board has 140 members and its work is supported by the fees it receives for its services.

Scientiflc-Pedagogical Society of Ecologists

Haytmo-neAaronNecKoe OOm.ecTBO 3KOJlOI"'OB

ul. Chehova 13 734024 Dushanbe

Tel:

21-67-66.21-59-65

E-mail: karatag@ta
Chairman The society was created in 1994 to unite scientists and educators addressing environmental issues in Tajikistan. Members of the society have organized four environmental

education programs over the past two years, including a field ecology course for school children and a biodiversity course focusing on the disappearance oflocal walnut forests. In 1997, the society began a project to improve water quality in the region of the AmI Sea and Amu Darya River.

Scout Association of Tajikistan clo Union of Architects Behzodl Dushanbe Tel: 27-09-52 TellFax: 21-05-55 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Rustam Karimov, President

The organization was founded in late 1991 and now has approximately 2,500 members. Its funding comes from the world Scout movement, as well as from grants.

Sharq Informational-Analytical Center HHq,oPMaIJ,HOHHD-

AHamtTKQ:eclOid: UeuTP

"maps:" u1. Radzhabovykb 4/1. kv. 3 Dushanbe Tel: 23-48-40 Tel/Fax: 21-39-50 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Muzaffar Olimov, Director; Tatyana Abdushukurova, Coordinator The Sharq Center conducts research into many issues surrounding Tajikistan's social. political, and economic transition with the goal of supporting the growth of democracy and reform. Center staff have authored several articles and books concerning civil society, including a report for the UN Development Program on "Tajikistan and Independence:' and a book publisbed in 1996 analyzing civil

Tajikistan society in India. The Sharq Center also operates a civic education resource center and publishes a news bulletin, "Democracy and Elections."

"Simo" Women's Association 33 Rudaki St. Dushanbe Tel: 22-6243,21-44-50 contact; Shakhobova Simo conducts seminars for women on obtaining employment and has developed a database of employment opportunities. Socio-Ecological Union c/o Anvar Buzurukov ul. Klara Zetkin 34, kv. 41 Tel: 33-68-80 or clo Khurshed Dadabaev Shota Rustaveli 11, kv. 40 734000 Dushanbe Tel; 27-63-04 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Anvar Buzurukov, Khurshed Dadabaev Students for Development of Tajikistan 103/3 Putovsky St., k. 12 734067 Dushanbe Tel: 37-81-68 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Alikhodjaev Zafarkhon A. Union of Economists 43 Rudaki Dushanbe Tel: 21-16-90,21-12-84,23-07-26 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Nuriddin Kayumov, President

The union conducts seminars and round tables which examine the social and

287

economic transformation in Tajikistan. The union has 3,000 members. Youth Eco..center MonoAelKHbIH 9KoI.l.cHTP roPOA8 ):brmaHOO u1. Chekhova 13 734024 Dushanbe Tel: 21-67-66,27-09-63 Fax: 21-04-04 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Yuri Skochilov, Chairman

Youth-EcoCenter has been organizing environmental monitoring and research projects, implemented by local students, since the mid-1980s. It was formally established in 1994 and, until 1996, operated under the name School of Ecological Education. The center's activities are concentrated in three areas: • Collecting information on the environmental situation in Tajikistan • Developing teaching resources for ecological education for young people • Stimulating ecological consciousness among the local population Since 1991, Youth Eco-Center staff have held weekly classes in ecology and environmental issues for high school and university students that attract more than 30 attendees per session. It also runs an annual environmental summer camp for children. In 1995 the center began publishing an ecological bulletin, Tabiat (Nature). The bulletin, which is available in print and electronic form, is written and produced by teenagers and young adults. The center works to help develop the NGO sector in Tajikistan. It offers training programs and consultations in NGO development and fundraising. It

288

Organizations

is a member of the international SociaEcological Union. based in Moscow, and the Central Asian Sustainable Development Network, based in Almaty.

Youth Nature Protection Brigade Dushanbe E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Firuza Abdurakhimova Located within the Biology Department ofthe Tajikistan National University. the brigade is engaged in environmental education. In 1997. with funding from ISAR, the brigade established a resource center, where it conducts seminars for teachers and has compiled a library of environmental literature. It has also published environmental education booklets, including "United in Our Efforts," "Integrated Methods for Teaching Ecology," and "Light at the Summit."

ZleduUo Shahidi International Foundation 108 Karl Marx St. Dushanbe Tel:

Khorog (377910) Pamir Ecological Center 9KonoI'HqecKdI..{eH'rp "I1aMHp"

ul. Kboldorova 1 736002 Khorog Tel: 41-82,41-83 E-mail: [email protected]. ape.org. [email protected] Contact: Ogonazar Aknazarov The goal of the Pamir Ecological Center is to protect the environment of the Parmr region by providing an ecological education for school children and collecting and disseminating'infonnation to local NGOs. The organization worked with Sacred Earth Network to establish the first e-mail connection in the Parmr area.

Union of Journalists (GBAO) 46 Islmaelova St.

Kborog 24-73,68-59,61-59 Contact: Buribek Buribekov, Chairman

Tel:

The union defends the rights and interests of its 65 members.

24-32-42,27-08--66

Contact: Munira Sbahidi, Chairman The foundation works to imbue Tajikistan's young democracy with new forms of self-expression and cultural initiatives. It conducts seminars on Tajik music and poetry, and bas organized three exhibitions of works by young artists. The foundation was established in 1992 and now has more than 500 members.

Khujand (3792-2) Khujand Association of Business Women AccoJl.HaIJ..IDI AeT10BblX lKeHm.HH "XYAlKaHA" 52 Kbakim Str. 735000 Khujand Tel:

6-31-27. 6-58-46

E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Rakhim Melikbaev. Sanovbar Sbaripova Founded in 1994, the association helps women obtain training, advice and

Tajikistan

289

support for creating their own businesses. The association has several projects, including: • Women and Entrepreneurship, which offers assistance to unemployed women • Save the Women, a program that provides counseling and assistance to victims of violence or abuse • Educational Consulting Center for Women, which offers assistance and training to women who want to start their own business • A library focusing on women's issues

Founded in 1996, the focus of the association's activity is on small business development, women's literacy programs, and education in family planning and childcare. It also assists refugees, widows, female heads of households, and women with large families to develop home-based businesses and income generating projects. The association promotes national media coverage of women's issues.

Khujand EcoEducation Center 50 LetSSSR 4- Khujand E-mail: [email protected]. silk.org

ECOLOGIA 14 ul. Karl Marx Kolkhozabad TellFax: 21-2744 E-mail: [email protected]. glas.apc.org Web: www.ecologia.org Contact: Dr. Ikram Davronov

The center was established in October J997 by local scientists and other intellectuals to ··educate the younger generation about ecological selfawareness." It has published a series of brochures on ecology for local university students. The center has also developed an environmental education curriculum in a grammar school in Chalovsk for children afflicted with schizophrenia.

Students for Development of Tajikistan 80 Shuro St. 735001 Khujand Tel: 4-03-54 Fax: 6-06-30, 6-16-63 E-mail: [email protected] "Women for Progress" Business Association 45 Nabiev St., k. 240 735000 Khujand Tel: 26-67-15,21-60-14 Contact: Dilbar Saidzoda

Kolkhozabad (3772)

ECOLOGIA is a U.S. based nongovernmental organization which provides training, information, and support to environmental NGOs in Central Europe, the Baltic States, and Eurasia. ECOLOGIA began working in Central Asia in 1993, where it has concentrated on monitoring drinking water quality and hygiene promotion. In 1993 it donated a portable water quality monitoring laboratory to the Union for the Defense of the Aral Sea and Amu Darya in Nukus, Uzbekistan. In 1995 it helped the Perzent Center in Nukus start another citizens' monitoring project, which included Ii public education campaign to improve the safety of water. In 1996 ECOLOGIA opened an office in Tajikistan and launched a project in Khatlon oblast to install and

290

Organizations

maintain water and sanitation facilities and to promote hygiene education. It has published a resource book for teachers on hygiene in Tajik. Russian, and English and has conducted training workshops for 150 teachers.

Kurgan-Tyube (37744) ULady Leader" International· Intellectual Club for Business Women Me2K,lU'HapoWJbIii ImTeJIJIeKTYaJIbHbIili :s:.ny6 AeJIOBOH 1KeHIll.Hll. "n~

J'IH'Aep" ul. Khubaidulloeva 4-23 735l4O Kurgan-Tyube Tel/Fax: 2-76-60 Contact: Zukhra Azimova The club helps women to realize their talents and abilities in the sphere of business. It offers informal management training and free business consultations to women, and produces a radio program. "For Women and Families."

Pendjlkent Women of the East 27 Prospect Rudaki, k. 16 73500 Pendjikent Leninabad oblast Tel: 5-53-94,5-22-78,5-23-04 Contact: Fatima Sharipova The Tajikistan Branch of Women of the East was founded in 1996. It works on issues related to peace, ecology, human rights, cultural heritage, and the welfare of women and children. It participated in the anti-nuclear action, "Peace Wave," to close the nuclear facility in Lob Nor. It plans to open a Civic

Reception Center which will provide social and legal advice and support to women. the poor, and refugees. Women of the East has 57 active members and 137 volunteers.

E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Ludmila Petukhova

Turkmenistan

The center assists people with issues of physical violence against women, internal conflicts in the family, and discrimination in public and personal life.

Country Code: 993

Ashgabat (12)

Catena Ecological Club ul. Pavlova 7/2

ACCELS Ashgabat

FSAFlEX

744012 Ashgabat Tel: 35-35-16, 35·15·31, 44-10-16 (home) Fax: 35..Q2-57.44-1381 E-mail: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Web: www.ecostan.org Contact: Andrei Aranbaev, Vagif Zeynalov

Maktymguly 104, kv. 2 744000 Ashgabat Tel: 39-71-54 E-mail: [email protected] See profile for American Councils for International Education under Almaty, Kazakhstan.

ACCELS Educational Information Center

Catena was founded in February 1994 by eight local environmental activists. While its primary focus is "to find solutions to Turkmenistan's pressing environmental problems, the members appreciate that such solutions win only become realizable in a more democratic society." Catena's projects include: • Ecological and geochemical mon· itoring, in cooperation with several state and academic institutions • Developing and promoting recycling tecbnologies • Campaigns to halt the hunting of endangered species • Environmental education in local schools. Catena is working with the International Economics School to develop an environmental education curriculum. The organization focuses on issues of water pollution, chemistry, air, soil, environmental education, sustainable agriculture, and environmental impact assessment. With support from ISAR

pro TuTknnenbashi31 Turkmen State University Building 1, k. 40 744014 Ashgabat Tel/Fax: 39-89-89 E-mail: [email protected]

ACCELS Global Office ul. Gogol11, d. 12 744000 Asbgabat Tel: 35-02-23 Fax: 35..Q2-24 E-mail: [email protected]

Association of Family Practitioners Central Railway Hospital ul. Makhtumkuli Asngabat Contact: Kurban Seitnepesov

Ayel Legal Consulting Center Turkmenbashi sbayely.27 744007 Asngabat Tel: 35-35-16,35·15·31 291

292

Organizations

and Sacred Earth Network. Catena is establishing an e-mail server which will provide free e-mail for environmental organizations located outside of Ashgabat. Counterpart Consortium Academica Petrova St. 26 744006 Ashgabat Tel: 35-71-25,35-70..05 Fax: 35-71-20 E-mail: [email protected], [email protected] Web: www.cango.net.kg Contact: RoseHe Vasquez. Country Director

Counterpart's Turkmenistan office was opened in 1997 as part of a USAlDfunded project, Central Asian NGO Support Initiative: Counterpart organizes NGO training and "train-the trainer" programs. and manages a smaU grant program which focuses on civic education, ecology, and women. For more information, see the profile for Counterpart under Almaty, Kazakhstan. The Eurasia Foundation Komsomolskaya St., 20a 744000 Ashgabat Tel: 39-36-95 Fax: 39-06-13 E-mail: [email protected]

See the profile for the foundation's Central Asia Regional Office under Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Gardener's Society of Academy

of Science ul. Bitarap Turkmenistan 15 Asbgabat Contact: Mukhamed Kerimi

Information Consultative Center of Turkmenistan ul. Komsomolskaya 20a, kv. 28 744000 Asbgabat E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.icctm.org Contact: Dmitry V. Shevkun

ICC is a noncommercial organization founded with support from the Eurasia Foundation in 1995. It is active in promoting a market economy, democracy, and culture in Turkmenistan. The Center finds funding sources for NGO projects and provides information to grant makers about local organizations. Its ongoing projects include: • Compiling a database on various organizations in Turkmenistan, including NGOs and grantrnaking organizations that work in CIS countries • The creation and maintenance of an NGO Web site for and about local NGOs in Turkmenistan. This project includes educating organizations about the resources and possibilities available through the Internet and providing free access to e-mail for local and foreign organizations and private entities who work or reside in Turkmenistan. This network is available on a national level with node stations in such regional centers as Cbardjev. Nebit-Dag, and Mary • A training program about modern network computer technologies for administrators and webmasters of localNGOs Twelve Turkmen organizations have received funding for their projects through the activities of the ICC in its two years of operation. "Ynam" Club Turkmenbashi shayely, 27 744007 Asbgabat

Turkmenistan Tel:

35-35-16

[email protected] Contact: Olga Mamedova, Tamila Islamovs, Coordinating Board members E-mail:

Registered in September 1997, the Ynam Club is a public and volunteer organization uniting women in Turkmenistan. The club provides free psycnological and legal services to women who have suffered from physical violence or discrimination. The goal ofYnam is to achieve equality and social protection for women, and to eliminate aU forms of discrimination. It has created its own free consulting service for women, which is successfully operating in Turkmenistan. Ynam is a wholly independent group that survives through the work of its two organizers and with the help of area organizations. The organization shares office space with the Aye) Legal Consulting Center (see above).

Dashkhovuz (36022) Dashkhovuz Ecological Guardians c/o Andrei Zatoka (co-chair) Microregion Ts-l, dom 8, kv. 23 746301 Dashkhovuz

TeUFax: 5-66-83 E-mail: [email protected] or c/o Farid Tukhbatullin (eo-chair) Microregion Ts-l, dom 9, kv. 60 746301 Dasbkhovuz

Tel:

5-14--60

E-maIl:

[email protected] www.ecostan.org

Web:

DEG is a coalition of environmental activists founded in 1992. It operates

293

on the principles of individual initiative and mutual assistance. and has no administrative staff or membership dues. Over the years DEG bas organized a variety of projects. • With support from the National Endowment for Democracy and the Open Society Institute, DEG opened a Public Information Center in Dashkhovuz to encourage civic initiatives. The center and a network of public libraries collect publications and periodicals from throughout Eurasia and the rest of the world. • DEG's publishing program includes its Vitamin Y journal on democracy, reform, and law, which is in its third year of pubJication. One of its most successful publications was an ecology textbook for school teachers. It has also produced a number of documentaries which have been shown on national television. • It established an environmental youth club, Young Cheetahs, which currently includes more than 100 school children from several schools in Dashkhouvz. The children learn about ecology, participate in recycling and other projects, and publish the Green Shoot journal, which is distributed throughout Turkmenistan and other countries in the former Soviet Union. Other DEG activities, include sponsoring environmental competitions in schools. distributing seeds and seedlings of endangered plants, and organizing exhibitions. Members ofDEG have helped to establish environmental organizations in other cities of Turkmenistan. In 1995 DEG organized and hosted the Cheetah 95 Central Asian Biodiversity Conference, at which the first Central Asian-wide environmental advocacy

294

Organizations

professional association, BIOSTAN, wasfonned.

Union of Women "Kurban Solmn Edje," Dashkhovuz Branch Dashkbovuz Tel: 54-80-4,54-03-1 Contact: Ms. K. Bazarova This branch of the Union of Women received a grant from the Eurasia Foundation to establish a women's resource center in order to provide legal information and seminars to local women. Seminar and training topics include civil rights and women's participation in economic reform. Information bulletins on each seminar are published and distributed among other branches of the union in Turlanenistan. Branches are located in the fonowing regions: Ashgabat Tel: (I2) 35-21-32 Contact: Ms. T. Ataeva Akbalsky oblast Tel: (3632) 41-93-55 Contact: Ms. O. Shpak Balkansky oblast Tel: (43242) 49-07-7 Contact: Ms. O. Amanova Lebabsky oblast Tel: (37822) 23-42-2 Contact: Ms. E. Yusupova Maryisky oblast Tel: (37022)35-91-11

Uzbekistan Country Code: 998*

ACCELS Uzbek-American Alumni Center ul. Uzbekistan 80, etazh 2, k. 201 700027 Tashkent Tel: 45-82-77 E-maIl: [email protected] ACCELS Uzbek-American Initiative Support Center u1. Abdulla Avloniy 20-A, etuh 4, k. 54-55 100000 Tashkent Tel: 55-69-16,53-19-55 TeUFax: 55-77-29 E-4lIall: [email protected]

Tashkent (71) ACCELS American Educational Information Center u1. Uzbekistan 80, etazb 2, k. 2lO, 203 700027 Tashkent Tel: 45-80-56 E-4lIall: [email protected]

Association of Accountants and Auditors of Uzbekistan

See the profile for American Councils

for International Education under Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Acco~au;r.m: 6yxraJITepOB II

aYAJ!TOpoB Y36eKHCTaHa a/ya4230 u1. Niyazbek Iuli 6 700000 Tashkent

ACCELS FSAFLEX Office ul. Furkat I, etazh 1, k. 5 700027 Tashkent Tel: 45-42-71 TeUFax; 45-49-54 E-4lIaJl: [email protected]. ape.org

Tel: Fax:

34-90-24 Contact: Yuri Itkin, President This group promotes the professional development of auditors and accountants by offering business education classes and certification programs. The association also provides financialJbookkeeping workshops to NGDs. It is currently working on a TACIS-sponsored initiative to introduce "best world practices" and standards to fiduciary professionals in Uzbekistan.

ACCELS Global OffIce u1. Lakhuty 16-A, etazb 7, k. 714 700015 Tashkent Tel: Fax: E-4lIail:

34-01-87,35-72-51

56-35-41,54-93-02,39-16-82 4~6-12

[email protected]

ACCELS Tashkent u1. Lakhuty t6-A, etazb 7. k. 716 700015 Tashkent Tel: 55-12-71,56-55-47

Center for Women in Media in Central Asia Art. 325, Mautbotchilar Str. Tashkent Tel: 33-70-09 Contact: Ekaterina Hlopovskykb

Tel/Fax: 55-88-60 E-4lIaJI: [email protected]

• Uzbekistan is revising its telephone system. In future all local telephone numbers will have 7 digits. For the present, if the local number has 6 digits, add a 2 to the beginning; if it has 5 digits, add two 2s. 295

296 Center for Women leaders

cornptlter database of inforrnation on

lj. Vmm."""" Tashkent

PUI}llSneS a

Tel: Fax:

41-55-07 76-66-91

Contact: Gulno7Al Khidcfyaltova. The Tashkent Center for Women Leaders defines its mission as "the ! ml"r"veln"'~T of women's and socio-economic status in Uzbekistan." Since its in I the Center has held wnrK"nnY1S

newsletter. In the Center held a seminar (to:getlher with the Uzbek National and the Center for Human Tashkent Women's Committee) Are Human entitled "Women's of the seminar was to b1'""If"""~ on national and r""" ..tilTI<> women's nm,rfp,..lv

hw;m'~R<:

and monthly HalYtlfnomasi," information about the chamber's activities and private sector news. The chamber has offices in eleven districts of Tashkent

Chilanzar Chapter of the Fund for a Healthy Generation Masslv Chilanzar 9, k.12 700004 Tashkent

Tel/fax: 45-56-31 Contact: Mashkura Director Dr. Zakhidova is a ga!.tfo,ent,ero who teaches at the II Tashkent Medical Institute and has more than 60 articles in various fields of medicine. She is a member of the Doctors' Association of Uzbekistan and fundfounder, director and raiser oHne Chilanzar an devoted to improving health.

Counterpart Consortium Chamber of Commodity Producers and Entrepreneurs of Tashkent

Tashkent

HospItal Massiv 12 700015 Tashkent Tel: 36-33-31, 55-56-33 Fax: 55-15-57

Contact: Blair "n,~n{:laI'L Director

E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Shobakhrom Shayunusov, Vice-Chairrl1lm

Created in the chamber has 1,300 members renreSI>mI.the interests of small and sized businesses in Uzbekistan. It offers advice, business ,"V,""" ""i!:'>' and technical assistance to entrepreneurs, and the interests of small medium cnterto the It maintains a

Druzhba Naradov St.

etazh 7

Sec the for Counterpart under Almaty, Kazakhstan.

ECOlOO Association of Ecologists IlA·lO Gaydar Pro 7001 05 Tashkent Tel: 91-39-35 E·mall: Contact:

Uzbekistan ECOLOG was established at the end of 1987 as an environmental organization, and is affiliated with the SocialEcological Union, based in Moscow. and the Law and Environment Eurasia Partnership, headquartered in Weston, MA. It was formed to work on protection of the Aral Sea and to address the loss of biodiversity in Central Asia. It serves as an umbrella organization uniting several environmental organizations and activists. ECOLOG has organized several environmental camps for students. It also helped organize the Association of Independent Farmers in the Tashkent region, and two clubs for school children in Chirchik (near Tashkent). Its current projects include a program on sustainable development and a joint project with a German organization, Pro-Nuratau, which is working to create a biosphere reserve. Mr. Tsaruk is especially well informed about domestic and foreign NGOs working on Central Asian problems.

Eremurus Environmentalist Club 9KonoI"'H'tlecKHit

KJIY6

"9peMYPyc" 21 Kvartal C-2, k. 33 700000 Tashkent Tel:

3341-46

[email protected]. ape.org Contact: Elena Melnikova

E-mail:

Eremurus Environmentalist Club is an independent youth organi7..ation that was established in 1982. The group's activities are primarily focused on environmental education and protection efforts. Eremums operates a Sunday school and annual summer camp that educate children about the natural world and the ecological movement. It organizes activities for children, including cleaning up national parks and

297

planting endangered plants. Additionally, the club sponsors workshops for teachers on environmental education techniques and curricula. Eremurus publishes a bulletin. "Archa," for children. Erernurus has produced several short films on ecological themes. including "Protection of Biodiversity in the Western Tian-Shan." which won a state competition for independent films, and "The Causes of Desertification in the Western Tian-Shan."

The Eurasia Foundation Central Asia Regional Office

Mailing address: P.O. Box 2860 700013 Tashkent Street address: 21 Gertsen Street 700100 Tashkent Tel: 5341-57,53-53-21 TellFax: 1394103

E-maIl: [email protected]. [email protected] Web: www.eurasia.org

The Eurasia Foundation is a privately managed, grant-making organization "dedicated to funding programs that build democratic and free market institutions" in the former Sovi.et Union. The foundation began making grants in June 1993. Approximately 20 percent ofthe foundation's fundin&is from non-U.S. government sources. In fiscal 1997 alone, the foundation awarded 805 grants worth more than $15.6 miUion. bringing the foundation's total to $10 million awarded in 3,000 grants. Grants are awarded in the following eight priority areas: business development, business education and management training, economics education and research, electronic communications, media, NGO development, public administration and local government reform, and rule of]aw.

298

Organizations

The foundation has been awarding grants in all five countries of Central Asia since April 1995. Grant-making is carried out in the foundation's regional office in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and its AJmaty, Kazakhstan, branch. Addi~ tional branch offices are located in Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat. Headquarters are in Washington, D.C. Eurasia's Web site includes information about grants projects in each country as well as a searchable database of the foundation's gran~. Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan Chilanzaya 20a, d. 1, k. 70 700156 Tashkent Tel:

1~13-42

The society monitors Uzbekistan's human rights situation and publishes an information bul1etin with lists of political prisoners and restrictions on free association. Internews Uzbekistan u1. 11 A. Kadyri, k. 202, etazh 4 7000 11 Tashkent Tel: 44-24-43 Fax: 41-28-78,41-86-06 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.intemews.uzI

See the profile for Intemews under Almaty, Kazakhstan. IREX Office ul. Navoi 6, k. 2 Shaikhantakhur District 700011 Tashkent Tel: 41-42-13 TeUfax: 41-59-97 E-mail;[email protected]

See !REX profile under Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Junior Achievement Uzbekistan alya 133 700128 Tashkent Fax: 40-66-92,89-13-35 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Bakhodir Samadov, Executive Director

Junior Achievement Uzbekistan manages Junior Achievement's Applied Economics program for bigh school students in Uzbekistan. JAU has a staff of five and an annual budget of $33,000. For more information see the profile for Junior Achievement under Almaty. Kazakhstan. KRIDI Club for Parents of Disabled Children K.ny6 poAJilTeJIeA KMeIODl,lIIX

AeTeil JmBa.1lJiIAOB "KP~ 248 Buyuk Ipak Yuli 700143 Tashkent Tel: 65-72-06. 65-48-30 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Grenada Kurochkina, Chairwoman KRIDI was formed in 1995 by Grenada Kurochkina, the mother of a disabled child. The club acts as a support network for parents and helps them find financial, medical, and educational resources for their children. The club provides worksbops for parents on topics such as home schooling and how to integrate their child into society. KRIDI also sponsors activities and events for disabled children through their youth organization, "Fenix." KRIDI plans to open two branches in regions in the Tashkent area.

law and Environment Eurasia Partnership pro Gaidar lla/10 700105 Tashkent Tel! 91-29-25

Uzbekistan E-mail: [email protected]. [email protected] Contact: OIeg Tsaruk, Central Asia Director In the U.S. 219 North Avenue Weston, MA 02193 Tel: (617) 497-6558 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Eric Sievers

LEEP is a U.S. nonprofit organization formed under the auspices of six native Central Asian NGOs whose mission is to facilitate the efforts of private foundations to support Central Asia. It assists indigenous NGOs with grant proposals and bank transfers, issues a monthly newsletter, Ecostan News, tracks legislative and political developments in the region, and provides NGOs with consultation. The group also maintains a database of900 local NGOs.

Medecins Sans Frontiares a/ya333 700000 Tashkent Tel: 255·2619 TeUFax: 120-7072 E-mail: [email protected], [email protected] Web: www.msf.orglaralsea Contact: Vanessa Raymond, Information and Communication Department MSF is one of the world's largest nongovernmental medical emergency organizations, with over 2,000 international health professionals and 15,000 national staff working with populations in 83 countries of the world. For 26 years, the group has been providing medical assistance to populations in crisis situations, often when the very survival of citizens is threatened. MSF's work typically focuses on rapid interventions in areas

299

of conflicts, natural disasters, and refugee camps to improve people's health. Since 1997, a team of 10 international health professionals and 20 national MSF staffhas been working in the Aral Sea area of Uzbekistan, implementing a health program to address the major causes of morbidity and mortality in the region. In two of the most affected districts, Muynak and Kungrad, MSF has begun a program in close cooperation with the Ministry of Health, focusing on the surveillance and control of tuberculosis, anemia, diarrheal diseases. acute respiratory infections. and on epidemiological skills development MSF works with local NGOs such as Perzent and Udasa, and advocates for the development of local capacity-buiJding in Uzbekistan.

"Mehri" Women's Organization Tc-14, d. 19. k. 25 700011 Tashkent E-mail: [email protected], [email protected] Contact: NaUya Kholmukhamedova Mehri works to encourage women's participation in public life and the steady development of women.

Mercy Corps International 56-A Building 7 C-14 Tashkent Tel: 44-08-96, 44-23-68, ~22-68 Fax: 44-09·96 E-mail: [email protected], [email protected] Contact: Jill Jackson-Mandel See the profile for Mercy Corps under Almaty. Kazakhstan.

Open Society Institute of the Soros Foundation ul. Iv]eva 41 700000 Tashkent

300 Tel/Fax:

Director OS1 Uzbekistan was established in October 1996 to award grants in eilllCaltlOTl!U, ",,,,,,u'n. and social initiatives. In 1998, it a Information. OSI also abroad programs for students and t"""hf't·!': E,ngllSl1-langIJag;e programs, and programs in and education.

PERDCA: Project for Economic Reforms and Development in Central Asia I Furk'hat k.522 700027 Tashkent Tel: Tellfax: 45-54-97 E-mail: Web; Contact: Shuk'hrat

Director

PERDCA was founded in 1993 "to and technical Central Asia as they work occ:omiUl}!; a sustainable and 'h~,m .."., delnoc::rac:y " PERDC A's most active programs include: • NGO and de'/c!()pn:1ent. PERDCA in Uzbekistan come into contact with other Uzbek intermttional NGOs and and government It consultations on such issues as dc\relc'Pftlent and management, UTIIlrU'tl;lI'l:l and and has org:anrzl;u a series m(''l1t seminars. It also a -~-."." "Friends of Uzbekistan" me,etillig in which local and intern"f1()rl2!

or!mTI1Zatu)llS come

to discuss

of mutual concern.

• Telecommunications: In 1994 PERDCA created an e-mail ne1cwclrlc SilkNet, which now serves more than users in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. E-mail is free of to whose children are "M•••UUH',!; school in the United States, SilkNet "subnodes" in Tashkent, Kokand, Salma'rkanC1. Bukhara in Uzbekistan, Nukus in Karakalpakstan, and Dushanbe in T,,;;ilri,ot,," • Education reform: PERDCA materials distributes books and to schools, education ocganj2~ti(ms,andocg,anlzmlons

throughout Central Asia. Books and support for have come from The Eurasia FOlJn(!atlon, International Journal International, Foumiatilon, Seattle Sister r" ....m,ith'f' and the United States Information Service. The Uzbekistan Ministry of Education has donated warehouse space. PERDCA is with Northwest Medical Teams International, based in Portland, to teams to in teach at medical Uzbekistan and to local hospitals and clinics.

"Soholm Avlod Uchun" Charitable Foundation Akhunbabayeva St 700047 Tashkent 15

Soholom AvIod Uelmm the was founded Health of the in 1993 to ensure the health of future li!:elHmrtlcms. It has established Points" centers Tru,hk1ent, which distribute humanitarian assis~ tance and conduct health and other educational programs. The foundation has a nctwork

Uzbekistan through which it distributes donated medicines. It currently has projects in the areas of immunization, family planning, nutrition for mothers and infants, hygiene, and a program for talented children. Tadbirkor Ayol Republican Women's BUSiness Association Afrosiab St. 41 700015 Tashkent Tel: 5(j..65-78,56-24-51 Fax: 56-81-58 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Dildora Alimbekova, Chair; Tadjikhon D. Saydikramova, Director

Tadbirkor Ayol heJps women develop small businesses, particularly in the rural areas of Uzbekistan. It provides business, vocational, and computer training and assists women to access business development funds. In 1996 the association developed a program on human rights and planned to lobby members of the aUy Majlis (parliament) for legislati.on protecting women from discrimination and "social and economic violence." The association also provides a forum for experienced businesswomen to share their expertise with women entrepreneurs. It has received assistance from the Eurasia Foundation, other U.S. and European Community organizations, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Bank. With divisions in 12 oblast8, it had grown to over 3,000 members by 1997. Its branches in Bukhara. Qoqand, Andijan, and Nukus are the most active. Tashkent Board of Lawyers uL P01toratskogo-Kafanova 4, k. 66 700015 Tashkent Tel: 76-86...()2 Contact; Nozima Kama1ova, Head of Legal Advice

301

Tashkent Public Education Center TamKeHTCKHit u..eHTp 06I1l'.ecTBeHHoro np
ul. P. Ryzhevsky 1-52 700067 Tashkent Tel/Fax: 54-27-67 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Muborak Tashpulatova, Natalya Kulakova The Tashkent Public Education Center promotes civic education reform for Uzbekistan's educators and schools. The center develops civic education curricula and teaching strategies, publishes civics materials, and conducts training sessions for educators. Since 1995 more than 1,000 teachers. college students, and NGO leaders from all over Central Asia have taken part in TPEC's training workshops. TPEC has published two textbooks for use in Uzbek schools: The Constitution & Us, which presents the history of participatory democracy and explains the principles outlined in the ~t constitution of Uzbekistan; and The ARCs ofCitizenship, which describes the basic tenets of democracy. The group also publishes a newsletter, "Public Dialogue," distributed to more than 500 readers. The newsletter features civics lesson plans, information about textbooks and conferences for teachers, and analysis of the problems facing the third sector.

"Umld" Disabled Diabetic Children's Association , Tashkent Tel: 57~28-11 Contact: Dilbar Qurbanova

Founded in 1993. the association works to obtain insulin, monitoring equipment, and appropriate foods for diabetic children. It also helps mothers to start home-based businesses in order to

302

Organizations

cover the costs of insulin, The association has received funding from Mercy Corps and Counterpart Consortium, Uzbekistan Zoological Society Severo-Vostok 2, d. 43, k. 59 700124 Tashkent Tel: 63-51-00 E-Mail: bukbara@glas,apc.org Contact: Elena Mukbina

The society works to raise public awareness about conservation practices to protect endangered species. It conducts research on animal populations and ecosystems in Uzbekistan and publishes "The Red Data Book of Uzbekistan." Women's League of Initiatives 76 Bobur St., k 54 700025 Tashkent Tel: 41-55-07 Fax: 76-66-91 E-mail: [email protected]. [email protected] Contact: Mahbuba Ergasheva

The league publicizes information about women's issues and rights in the local press and on 30 local radio programs. It works to find employment and training opportunities for poor and disabled women and teenage girls, and helps women to develop professional skills. With support from Counterpart and in conjunction with Uzbek Film, the league developed and produced a documentary film to publicize the third sector and activities of local NGOs that address women's issues. It has pr0duced ten television talk shows on which women from various occupations discussed women's pT9blems. In March 1998, with support from the German charitable group Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung and other organizations, the league held a round table, "Traditions and Modem Life," on the

leading role of modem women in society. Women's Resource Center Abdulla Kodyri St. 11 100011 Tashkent Tel; 41-89-31 Fax: 35-48-78 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Marfua Tokbtakhodjaeva, Barno Valieva

The center conducts research on the position of women in Uzbek society, addressing such topics as gender issues, fundamentalism, women and violence, health, and income generation. It organizes round tables and conferences, and has published a compilation of laws and regulations related to women's rights. The center is comprised of representatives of the local scientific and higher education communities. Co-founder Marfua Tokbtakhodjaeva has published results of her research in several articles and two books, The Daughters ofthe Amazons: Central Asian Women Speak and Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam. In 1997, the center published a textbook, Woman, Law and Society in Uzbekistan. Two thousand free copies of the book were distributed to universities, schools. public foundations, and NGOs in Tashkent. Under an EU~funded project, the center investigated the economic condition of women in rural Uzbekistan, in collaboration with Sapienco University in Rome. With support from the Eurasia Foundation, the center analyzed legislation pertaining to women's rights through the project "Women and Law: A Transition Period in Uzbekistan," It also conducted a regional study of income-generating activities of large families in Central Asia and the contributions of women to family income. The center is working on a

Uzbekistan

303

demographic survey of Uzbekistan with support from the Sisterhood is Global Institute.

E-mail: [email protected]. silk.org Contact: Nadira D. Sharipova. Chairperson; Matluba Baybanova, Deputy Chair

Andijan (74)

The association was founded in 1991 by a group of 1J doctors in Bukhara committed to the following goals: • Improving child nutrition • Informing association members of the latest medical news and research • Increasing members' knowledge of traditional and nontraditional medicine and medical techniques • Supporting the education and development of young doctors • Improving the general health of the population and redUCing the region's mortality rate According to the association, 93 doctors have taken part in educational sessions on pediatric issues and problems since 1991. Fifty-six doctors have been provided up-to-date information about child cardiology. 115 have received information about intestinal diseases among children, and 56 have been informed about the advantages of breast feeding. Local committees of association doctors also educate young mothers about infant and child care. The group has published 59 medical articles and papers at home and abroad; 24 physjcians have achieved the status of "Senior Doctor" since joining the association. Partners and contacts of the association include the St. Petersburg Medical Academy of Pediatrics, the Samarkand Medical Institute, the Association of Business Women in Bukhara, Bukhara State Medical Institute, and the U.S.-based Counterpart Consortium.

Disabled Children's Parents' Club. Regional Branch ul. Rashidov. d. I Andijan Fax: 2-26-33 Contact: Makhsudakbon MatIchamova The club helps parents with their children's disabilities.

Tadbirkor Ayol Women's Business Association, Andljan Branch Gagann Street 149 Andijan Tel: 37..()6..19.38-49-74 Contact: Ms. lafarova. President See the profile for the association under Tashkent.

Bukhara (65) ACCELS EIC BUKHARA Bukhara Cultural and Information Center Art Museum Building ul. Nakshandi 13 705001 Bukhara TellFax: 4-22-46 E-mail: [email protected] See profile for American Councils for Intemational Education under Almaty, Kazakhstan.

"AVICENNA" Association of Pediatricians of Bukhara Pravda St. 9 705000 Bukhara TellFax: 224-3218

304

Tadbirkor Ayol Women's Business Association, Sukhara Branch pro Navol 5/1 705018 Bukhara TellFax: 23-60-21 E-mail: Contact: Dilbar Akhmedova See the profile for the association under Tashkent.

• Appraisal of the Needs ofR.ural Areas seminar for 20 rep,resematl'l'CS ofsocial org;anizations in Uzbekistan and Kw..akhstan

141 students

Information Center of Association of Business Women of fergana Region ul. Novoi, d. 26

Fergana (73)

Fax:

24-564'7

Contact: Elshod

"For An Environmental-Clean Fergana" Association ul. Ferganskaia 86 712022 Tel: 22-29-81 22-29-17 Fax:

E-maIl:

Founded in 1 the association works network of to create an environmental groups and activists for information and mutual It has a resource and condu.cts environmental education programs for children. It also disseminates information on the environment to the the mass media. R.ecent nr(,,,prt,, of the association include: • Memorials of Nature in which citizens to local flora and fauna • Nature of Children to foster respect and aPtlre<;iation for nature schoolchildren ~ Analysis and Water Pollution to gauge the of industrial on the environment "~r'9"l'!rla to discuss the local non-

The association created an information database in order to foster communication among the structures of the Association of Business Women, It also offers and works with the mass media,

Namangan (69) ACCELS Namangan ul. Mashrab 4, etazh 4 716000 Tel: 6-27-50 i'el/Fax: 6-19-19 E-mail: See the for American Councils for Intemational Education under Kazakhstan .

Tadbirkor Ayol Women's Business ASSOCiation, Namangan Branch Tel:

4-16-47

E·mail:

Contact: Mavluda Abdukhalimova of the association under

Uzbekistan

Navoi(79) Tadbirkor Ayol Businesswomen's Association, Navoi Branch ul. Khalldar Dustligi Yoshlik Hotel, d. 134, etazh 1, k. 105 Navol Tel: 4-41-76 Fax: 56-81-58 Contact: Larisa Yurikova See the profile for the association under Tashkent.

Nukus(61) Karakalpakstan ACCELS Nukus Karakalpakistan St. 3, 1st floor Nukus Karakalpakstan Tel: 4-28-61 TellFax: 7..09-68 E-mail: [email protected]. silk.glas.apc.org See profile for American Councils for International Education under Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Ara' Dialogue Association uL Shamubatova l04-A, kv. 30 742000 Nukus Karakalpakstan Tel: 7-42-39,4-16-41 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Vladimir Sergeev

Farmers' Center UeHTp epMepa ul. Sportivnaya 8 742000 Nukus Karakalpakstan Tel: 6-42-21 E-maIl: [email protected] Contact: Rustam Arzikhanov

305

The center provides assi.stance to local farmers and gardeners-professional and amateur-to develop more efficient use ofland and effective methods of farming. In the spring of 1998, the center held a seminar on this topic attended by farmers from twelve regions of Uzbekistan, agriculture students, amateur gardeners, and specialists from the Ministry of Agriculture. The center also helped children of a local orphanage set up a vegetable garden, wbich is now maintained by the orpbans themselves.

Fund of Social Defense of Karakalpakstan Women Doslik Guzary, 1, k. 4, etazh 2 Nukus Karakalpakstan Tel: 70-280 Contact: Ms. Pirnazarova

Infocenter on Questions of Afghan War Veterans' Rehabilitation ul. Tatibaeva, 11.1, k. 2 742000 Nukus E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Oleg O. SayfuUin

The center provides information and supports services for the social rehabilitation of Afghanistan war veterans.

Karakalpakstan Art Museum Prospect Doslyk, 127 142000 Nukus Karakalpakstan Tel: 2-24-56. 4-46-92, 4-50-37 E-mail: [email protected]. ape.org Contact: Marinika Bobonazarova The KarakaJpakstan Art Museum, founded in 1966, is home to a collection of ancient and modern art

306

Organizations

accumulated by Igor Savitsky during the 1960s and '70s. Savitsky was an artist from Moscow who spent years conducting ethnographic research in Kara.kalpakstan. His collection (comprising more than 80,000 objects) includes ancient art pieces from the third century B.C. and avant~garde Uzbek art from the 1930s. Karakalpakstan Society of the Disabled u1. Amira Temura 120, kom. 3-4 742000 Nukus Karakalpakstan Tel: 7-63-90, 7-70-46 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Dmitrii Kalachev

The society helps people with physical disabilities obtain employment, support themselves. and lead more independent lives. It conducts computer classes for disabled youth in their homes. Perzent-Karakalpak Center for Reproductive Health and Environment PO Box 27 ul. Sharafa Rashidova 39a 742012 Nukus Karakalpakstan Tel: 7-55-17 (Ataniyazova), 646-44 (Kuzmin) Fax: 7-68-13 E-maIl: [email protected] [email protected] Contact: Oral Ataniyazova, M.D., Director and Founder~ Artik Kuzmin, Deputy Director

"Perzent" means "progeny" in Karakalpak. Oral Ataniyazova is a gynecologist who also obtained a Ph.D. in medical science in Moscow. For her research, Dr. Ataniyazova studied around 5,000 reproductive-age women in Karakalpakstan. Her findings were so alarming that in 1992 she founded the first Karakalpak women's clinic for

reproductive health: the Marriage and Family Clinic. In 1997 the clinic, which rents out five rooms from the government hospital in Nukus, consulted and treated 1,300 patients with a variety of sexual and reproductive problems. The center has developed an environmental education program for 200 pupils ofNukus schools, published brochures and booklets on health and on the relationship between health (particularly reproductive health) and the environment, and maintains an environmental library open to the public. It created the Ecological Club "Shagala" to provide environmental education programs in rural areas. Together with the Save the Children Fund it started an environmental education program for 5-6-yearold children. Center Perzent publishes a monthly . newsletter in both Russian and Karakalpak and distributes it to all Central Asian republics. This newsletter features articles on local NOOa, educational programs, and legislation that affects women. The newsletter also contains translations of materials from various international organizations and a column that answers questions from readers on issues sucb as pensions, stipends. and labor laws. Perzent has carried out research on issues ofhealtb and the environment in cooperation with local and international institutes and NGOs. Examples include: • Public drinking water monitoring program with Ecologia (USA) • Toxicological research with Russian scientists • Anemia research with the Uzbekistan Institute ofHemaetology Center Perzent is currently engaged in developing environmental health indicators for the AmI Sea region together with the World Resource Institute (USA) and other health research with Dutch universities and

Uzbekistan

307

laboratories. The center provides medical consultations to women on reproductive system pathologies at an independent women's cllnic and is developing an STD laboratory with Mercy Corps International. Perzent has helped set up "health desks" in five towns and viUages of Karakalpakstan, where local specialists give information and advice on health and environmental problems to the local population. It has also distributed humanitarian assistance through this network. Recently, Perzent has helped set up a local demonstration farm of 20 hectares where organic vegetables and other produce will be grown (a) to supplement the meals of children and mothers of the district and (b) to test specific salt-resistant and soil-regenerating crops and investigate possibilities for local food processing and marketing. Perzent's international partners include Women in Europe for a Common Future, headquartered in Utrecht, the Netherlands, and Women's Environment Development Organization, based in New York. Perzent has 18 employees and more than 500 members.

democratic societies, and the need for civic participation. It also provides legal consultation to private farms in the area, and seeks to promote consumers' rights. It publishes and disseminates information through the mass media and consults local government offices on specific legislation affecting the NGO sector. The center established a consulting service for local NGOs and published a book, Non-governmental Organizations and Law: Directory ofLegal Acts of Uzbekistan. In 1997, the Center collaborated with the Counterpart Consortium to conduct a seminar "NGOs and the Mass Media,"and led its own seminar for NGOs, "Project Deve]opment." In 1998, it published a book. On the Rights ofCosumers. Other recent projects of the center include Legal Assistance to Farms of Karakalpakstan, Creation of a Legal Information Center for NGOs. and Consumers and Their Rights.

Public Research Center

TeiIFax: 2-58-58 Contact: Aukhan Saekeeva

Tadblrkor Ayol Women's Business Association. Nukus Branch ul. A.Shamuratova 86 742000 Nukus

KarakaJpakstan Doslik Guzarii 147 742000 Nukus Karakalpakstan Tel: TellFax: E-mail: Contact:

2-37-63 7-57-30

[email protected] Palmurza Hojabekov,

Director Founded in 1995, the center seeb to foster public participation in the process of democratization and market transition in Uzbekistan. To this end. it works to educate citizens on their rights, the role of nongovernmental organizations and the mass media in

See the profile for the association under Tashkent.

Union for the Defense of the Aral Sea and Amu Darya COI03 3~ThI Apana Irt ~apbI

ul. Berdakha 41 742000 Nukus Karakalpakstan TellFax: 7-72-29 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Yusup Kamalov. Chairman

308

Organizations

The Union seeks to restore water quality and environmental health in the Aral Sea basin. The group conducts environmental education classes for high school students and participated in a World Bank-sponsored project on monitoring water supplies in the Khorezm Oasis region.

See the profile for American Councils for International Education under Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Armenian Cultural Center "Luis" Amir Timur St. 90 Samarkand Tel:

24-29-87

Qoqand (37355)

Ayol Resource Center for Women and Family u!. Achunbabaev 66

Tadbirkor Ayol Women's Business Association, Qoqand Branch Mubiddin Hojaev St. 73 713000 Qoqand

703000 Samarkand Tel: 33-76-90,33-66-66,33-43-33 Fax: 33-09-89 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Victoria Ashirova

Tel: 32-582,41-109 E-maIl: [email protected] Contact: Ms. Sakhibakhon Irgasheva, Board Chairperson

Founded in 1991, the center encourages the participation of women and young people in public life and society's democratic transformation. The center provides information for women on citizen rights and the nongovernmental sector. It also offers seminars on such topics as reproducti~e health, sexual education, and family planning. The center's Leadership Club for youth sponsors debates and camps focusing on citizen activity. Ayol receives assistance from Counterpart. the Open Society Institute, and the Red Apple Program of The Futures Group International.

The Qoqand branch ofTadbirkor Ayol was founded in 1994, partly in response to a "request" from the regional department of the Fergana hakimiyat. Its leader, Ms. Irgasbeva, was a leader of the Komsomol and local Communist Party during Soviet times, but since then she has helped to organize 15 women's NGOs in the Qoqand region, including Nodir. a center for mothers and their children. Ms. Irgasbeva also sits on the board of the Open Society Institute-Uzbekistan. See additional information for Tadbirkor Ayol under Tashkent.

Samarlcand (66) ACCElS Samarkand 15 University Boulevard, Dept. of Quantum Phy.sics 703000 Samarkand

Tel: 35·67-80,35-75-02,35-14-98 E-mail: [email protected]. [email protected]

"Caravan" Business Association 53 Sharaf Rashidov St. 703005 Samarkand Tel: 33-02-11,22-55-48.33-14-11

Center of Cultural Development "Youth, Culture and Peace" Shota Rustaveli St. 34/6 Samarkand

Uzbekistan Tel: 24-43-48 Contaet: Artur Fuzailov

Center of Russian Culture Rashidov St. 33 703000 Samarkand Tel: 33-73-9 Contact: Valentina Duzinskaya

Iktisodchi Ayo' Association ul. A. Timur 1 Samarkand Fax: 31-11-49 E-mail: [email protected] Contaet: Gulsara Ganieva

The association provides consulting services to businesswomen.

International Museum of Peace and Solidarity a/ya 76 (postal address) u1. Mustaqillik 56 703000 Samarkand Tel: 33-17-53 E-mail: [email protected] Contact: Anatoly Ionesov, Director

The Museum was set up by the International Friendship Club "Esperanto" in December 1986 in honor of the International Year of Peace. The first such museum to be created in the former USS~ it promotes universal human values and peace through person-to-person contacts, culture, and the arts. It also strives to develop a sense of public awareness, concern, and personal responsibility for tOOay's global challenges. The museum runs a wide range of voluntary educational activities and international projectsincluding literature, artwork, memorabilia, etc.-from over 100 countries. Some of the museum's projects and exhibitions include: • International Artists for Peace Conference and Art Exhibition,

309

"Beauty Will Save the World." Celebrating the tenth anniversary of the museum, artists from different countries and ethnic backgrounds came together to display their work. The conference was a joint project of the museum and the Artists for Peace Association in Geneva. • The Peace Autograph: a collection of signed photographs, personal visions, and autographed works of men and women of achievement who have contributed to making the world a better place for individuals. Participants have included Mother Teresa, Desmond Tutu, Yehudi Menuhin, Jorge Amado, Thor HeyerdahJ, Arthur C. Clarke, Stanislaw Lem, and James Michener. • The World Through the Eyes of Children: presentations of children's art from allover the world. including France, South Korea, Australia, Egypt, Taiwan, the Philippines. and New Zealand. An exhibition of Uzbekistani children's art abroad is planned for the future. • Children's Disarmament Campaign: inspired by the mottoes "War is not a game. Why buy war toys?" and "If YOU believe in peace, why play at war'!" children exchange military toys for nonviolent ones. They then publicly throwaway their war toys and sign the International Children's Disarmament Treaty. • The Peace Post: the museum serves as an information service on the activities of national and international organizations in promotion of peace and solidarity, publishing interesting materials received by the museum in the local media. • Smiles Wanted: the museum maintains an intemational exhibition "The World of Smiles," featuring photographs and sketches of smiling

310

Organizations

faces from around the world. It welcomes new additions to this exhibit.

Sabr Crisis Center for Women and Teens KPH3HCBbn't I{eHTp AJl.H lKeHIJJ,1llH H nOAJXlCTKoB "Ca6p"

ul. Akhunbabaeva 68 703000 Samarkand Tel: 33-66--66, 33-76--90 E-mail: sabr@samunLorg Contact: Mavlyuda Shirinova, Director The Sabr Crisis Center offers psychological and medical help to women and children. Since its founding in 1996, the center has provided consultations (both in-person and via telephone) to more than 1,500 people. Sabr staff also conduct "mobile consultations" in communities throughout the Samarkand oblast.

Samarkand Information Consulting Center Samarkand State University Information Consulting Center University Boulevard 15 703004 Samarkand Tel: 35-14-98,31-06-66 E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] Contact: Ravshan Sabirov, Director; Laiia Kashaeva, Office Manager ICC was established in 1994 to provide information and consultations to NGOs and small/medium-sized businesses in Samarkand. It provides legal consultations for NGOs, and consultations regarding the establishment offoreign partnerships, funds, and small businesses. ICC maintains a database of U.S. and European foundations and other grant-making organizations. It publishes its own newspaper, In/ormation for Initiatives, which includes a supplement for NGOs called "Grassroots."

ICC has a public e-mail node. which is free of charge for teachers and research workers of Samarkand State University. NGOs can aIso access email but must pay half of the cost. ICC also has a public library of over 3000 books and periodicals.

Urgench (62) Association of Women with University Education Al Khorezmi St. 23, k. 206 Urgench Tel: 4-23-50. 6--73-55 Contact: Ms. Khasanova The association supports small business and entrepreneurship in Urgench and Khorezm obJasts.

Ziatdin (36640) "Green Wave" Children's Ecology Organization Istiklol St. 20 704114 Ziatdin Pakhtachi district, Sarnarkand region Tel: 3-10-67 Contact: Bahodir D. Khudaiberdiev

Online Resources

Online Resources E-mail Lists CenAsla People with projects in Central Asia, as well as those with a general interest in the region, win find the CenAsia list to be an excellent resource. CenAsia includes: announcements of meetings and job openings; news of organizations working in the region; leads to other Internet resources related to the region; and references to print materials, such as journals and dictionaries. CenAsia is also a political discussion list and, unlike some discussion lists on the Internet, is distinguished by the high quality of discussion and the background and expertise of its participants. Archives of CenAsia are available at: www.sorO$.orgItajiklcenaslallndex.html

List address:

[email protected]

To subscribe, send the message: to:

subscribe cenasla firstname lastname [email protected]

CentralAsia-L CentralAsia-L is an announcement-only list sponsored by the Harvard Forum for Central Asian Studies. The list is moderated and carries announcements about conferences, cultural events, calls for papers for journals, new books, jobs, and academic programs. Archives of list postings are available at: www.fas.harvard.edu/-casww/Subscribe_CA-L.html

List address:

[email protected]

To subscribe. send the message: to:

subscribe centralasla-l [email protected]

Central·Asia-Studies-L The Central Asia Studies Listserv was established by the research schools of Social Sciences and Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, to provide a worldwide communications vehicle and a central electronic archive for anyone working on or interested in the study of Central Asia's history, politics, sociology, demography, economics, languages, culture, philosophy, and religion, and to place these within the broader framework of the changing global order. Subscription to the listserv is open and the discussions are unmoderated.

List address:

[email protected]

To subscribe. send the message: to:

subscribe central-asla-studies-l [email protected]

Ecostan News An English-language monthly bulletin reporting on the environment and environmental movements in Central Asia. A good source of information on non-

313

Online Resources

314

governmental organizations in the region. Back issues are available at: www.ecostan.org. (Archives were previously located at: di-145c.mit.edulproJedal leep). To subscribe, send a message to Eric Sievers at: [email protected]. For the Russianlanguage edition, send a message to: [email protected] Ferghana-Valley The Fergnana-VaHey discussion list is meant to serve as a too] for addressing development issues in the Ferghana Valley. It is provides a forum for local NGOs, local governments, business, scholars, and international organizations. The list is associated with the United Nations Ferghana Valley Development Programme ([email protected]).though it is open to all who are interested in the welfare of the Valley. Messages are in English and Russian. List address:

[email protected]

To subscribe, send the message: to:

[email protected] firstname lastname [email protected]

Kyrgyz Business News Kyrgyz Business News publishes an e-mail newsletter reporting on general business news in Kyrgp.stan. KBN is an on-line educational project of students at the Kyrgyz-American School in Bishkek. The on-Hne version ofKBN is available at: freenet.bishkek.sulkbn/kbn.html To subscribe, send the message: to:

sub$crIbe [email protected]

Turkistan-NewsleUer Turkistan-Newsletter is an electronic newsletter whose purpose is to report on the "Land of the Turks." In addition to news. the publication also contains book reviews, commentaries, articles. and letters from readers. Archives of list postings (in HTML or e-mail form) are available at: www.euronet.nUusersisotaiturldstan.htm List address: [email protected] To subscribe, send the message: to:

SUBscribe Turldstan-N [email protected]

UrGHUR-L ListProc Page Uighur-L is an open, unmoderated mailing list dedicated to discussions on "Eastern Turkestan" (the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China), the Uighur people. and related topics. Archives of list postings are available at: www.taklamakan.org/ulghur..f!u_archlve.html List address:

[email protected]

To subscribe. send the message: to:

SUBscribe UIGHUR..t. ma;[email protected]

Online Resources

315

Web Sites Asia-Pius www.intemews.ru/ASIA-PLUS An independent news service in Tajikistan. A selection of back issues is available at the site, plus information on how to subscribe to the regular Asia-Plus e-mail news service. Asian Studies WWW Monitor coombs.anu.edu.auJasia-www-monitor.html Published twice a month. the Monitor tracks Internet resources related to the field of Asian Studies. All resources listed are rated by the editorial staff in terms of the scholarly/factual content and usefulness to Asian Studies. The content is also distributed via an e-mail list. To subscnbe, send the message: 'subscribe asia-www-monitor your-emailto:

address [email protected]

CANGO.NET www.cango.net.k.g The Central Asian Non-Governmental Organizations network is a Web site and email network for NOOs in the region, managed by Counterpart International with support from USAID. The Web site contains a large, searchable database ofNGOs in the region, including brief descriptions of the organizations and contact information (follow the link "Countries" to search the database). There is also a large and growing on-line library of resources for NOOs in a wide variety of fields.

Center for Political and Strategic Studies www.cpss.org The Center for Political and Strategic Studies is a nonprofit organization seeking to increase Western knowledge and understanding of complex international and domestic events. CPSS publishes the newsletter Perspectives on Central Asia, copies of which may be downloaded from the site. The site also contains links to other sites with infonnation on Central Asia. For more infonnation, contact CPSS at: mail@ep$S.org.

Central and Inner Asia Seminar, University of Toronto, Canada www.utoronto.caldeeds/ciasf.lIldex.html Focusing on the cultures and activities of ancient and modern nomadic peoples of Central Asia. CIAS sponsors annual seminars and publishes papers on related topics. The site contains infonnation on future seminars and links to CIAS publications.

316

Online Resources

Central Asian Studies World Wide www.fas.harvard.edu/-casww The Central Asian Studies World Wide site provides resources and tools for scholars of Central Asia. The site seeks to provide infonnation useful to both ''beginners'' and "experts," encompassing all fields of the social sciences and humanities. The Harvard Forum fur Central Asian Studies sponsors the site. For more infonnation, contact: [email protected]

Central Eurasia Resource Page www.soros.orgicentraLeurasia.html A project of the Open Society Institute, the Central Eurasia Resource Page contains detailed sections on states in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Within each section is an excellent collection of links to Web sites. on-line news sources, articles, and print publications. The site is wen designed and easy to navigate.

Choynona Weekly News cwnews.cjb.netl or 128.138.13.157:99/umid_templnewsl A weeJdy Web newspaper published by a student group in Uzbekistan.

Coyne Airways Kyrgyzstan Links www.coyne--aviation.co.uklhtmlllinkkyr.htm Coyne Airways, an air cargo service operating throughout ~tral Asia and the Caucasus, maintains this page of useful links to sites about Kyrgyzstan. The site also contains links to similar pages for other Central Asian states.

Cyber Uzbekistan www.cu-online.comt-k_aluzbekistan Cyber Uzbekistan contains infonnation on news, politics, business, travel, and culture. A message board on the site is divided into three sections: Makhalia (friends and pen pals), Silk Road (business messages), and Uzbekistan on Line (general messages). Links to other sites with infonnation on Uzbekistan and Central Asia, classified advertisements, and education are also included.

Eurasia Research Centre euraslanews.comlercJhomepage.htm The Eurasia Research Centre home page contains links to news and analysis of the nations of Central Asia and other regions of the world, as well as its publication. EurasiaNews. The EurasiaNews archives are searchable, and the site also contains links to other searchable international news archives. The ERC is associated with the "International Relations and Security Network-A Swiss Contribution to Partnership for Peace, Coordinated and Developed by the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research at the Em (Swiss Federal Institute ofTechno)ogy). Zurich."

Online Resources

317

Harvard Forum for Central Asian Studies www.fas.harvard.edul-centasia From this web site you can obtain information about Central Asian studies at Harvard University-md much more. The site contains archives oftbe CentralAsiaL Announcement List for Central Asian Studies (as well as the Central-AsiaHarvard-List. a similar announcement list covering only Harvard related matters). The site received a Five Star rating ("Essential") by the Asian Studies WWW Monitor (http://coombs.anu.edu.aulasia-www-monitor.htrnl), which called it "a well organized, rich, no-nonsense on-line research tooL" It contains literally hundreds of announcements of conferences, job opportunities, new publications, etc., making it perhaps the richest and most concentrated source for information on Central Asian studies worldwide. Human Rights tn Turkestan www.euronet.nVuserslturkfedlerk.html Human Rights in Turkestan contains information, articles, and analysis on the human rights situation throughout Central Asia. Information Consultative Centre of Ashgabat wwwoicctm.org ICCM was founded in 1996 to promote the development ofNGOs in Turkmenistan. The site contains an on-line database (go to "Active NGOs in Turkmenistan'') with contact information for many NGOs in Turkmenistan. But it does not appear to be kept up routinely. When we visited this page, the last indicated update was nearly nine months before. There is also a listing of Western organizations providing funding and assistance to NGOs in Eurasia. The site is sponsored by the Eurasia Foundation. Interactive Central Asia Resource Project www.rockbrldge.netipersonaVbichellwelcome.htp

The Interactive Central Asia Resource Project is a comprehensive index of Central Asian-related resources available on the Internet, with more than 500 separate links. For each link there is a brief but informative annotation which provides a sense of the resources available as well as background on the person maintaining the site and how frequently it is updated. For Central Asia as a whole, and for each country in the region, there is a page with annotated links divided into major categories, such as Culture and Language, Health and Environmental Issues, Politics and Economics, and General Information. There is also a list (including e-mail addresses) of people who have a professional interest in the region. International Center for Not-for-Profit Law wwwJcnl.org/nis.html Variations of a law on public associations adapted from the Soviet law are currently in effect in all Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have adopted new civil codes which contain provisions regulating noncommercial organizations. In all countries NGOs and/or governments are making efforts to develop and adopt other NGO draft laws, which would regulate

318

Online Resources

the NGO sector more comprehensively, The implementation of each country's Law on Public Associations is different from country to country; from the most NGOfriendly approach of Kyrgyzstan to the most restrictive and repressive of Turkmenistan. ICNL's complete catalog of related documents for the region can be found at this site.

International Takiamakan-lJighur Human Rights Association www.taldamakan.orgliooex.html International Taklamakan-Uighur Hurnan Rights Association site contains archived information, articles. and events related to the human rights situation in Taklamakan region. For further information. contact Mr. Abulajiang Layli Namen (Baret) at; [email protected]

Political Resources on the Net www.agora.stm.itlpoliticlasia.htm The Asia section of the Political Resources on the Net site contains sections on all the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. Within each section there are links to political parties and organizations, news agencies, articles, statistics, and other information.

Radio Free EuropelRadlo Liberty www.rferl.org RFEIRL was originally established by the U.S. government after WWII to serve as an alternative source for news about events in their own countries for the people of Eastern Europe and the USSR. RFEIRL has continued to broadcast news of the region with the support of regional leaders such as Vaclav Havel. RFE/RL's Web site is very large, with lots of news, including RealAudio files ofRFE/RL's broadcasts, an archive of its NewsUne daily news briefs. feature articles. special reports, and more. News reports are available in English and Russian.

Research Centre for Turkestan and Azerbaijan www.turldye.netlsota/sota.html The Research Centre for Turkestan and Azerbaijan (SOTA) was founded in 1991 and is dedicated to research and analysis of the Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union. The center is also concerned with the promotion of human rights. dernocratic governments. and peace throughout the Turkic World. The site contains information on publications; articles and analysis on politics, history, and culture; and links t9 other sites related to the region. Links are also available to SOTA·hosted sites dedicated to the Karaims and Tatars of the Crimea.

Russian and Eastern European Network Information Center reenic.utexas.edulreeniclreenic.html The Russian and Eastern European Network Information Center contains a collection ofImks to Web sites with information about East and Centra] Europe, Russia, and the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union. The site includes information organized by state or region, as wen as a listing of Web resources. listservs, databases, news, libraries, and archives. REENIC is supported

Online Resources

319

by the Univemty of Texas at Austin Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies and the College of Liberal Arts. Silk Road Foundation www.slfk-road.com Founded in 1996, the Silk Road Foundation is dedicated to preserving the art and culture ofInner Asia, as weI) as encouraging the study ofthis region. The site provides links to information on news, travel, art, culture, and other topics related to the region. For more information, contact: [email protected] South China Morning Post www.scmp.comlnewslchinaltopchina.idc Published in Hong Kong. the South China Morning PO$t site is a good source for news on the Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China, where a large Uighur population exists. Tajikistan Update www.angelfire.comlsdltajikistanupdate The Tajikistan Update contains sections on news (including archived news stories), culture, discussion and chat groups, analytical articles, and a message board. The site also contains a useful map directory. For more information, contact the host, David Straub at: davidstraubOgeocities.com Uzbekistan Subject Index www.columbia.eduiculsipaiREGIONAUHlluzbekisthtmi The Uzbekistan Subject Index contains a selection oflinks under the following headings; general information. business and economics, culture, environment, government agencies, human rights, law and legislation, news, and travel. The site is maintained by the Harriman Institute at Columbia Univemty in New Yark. World Uighur Network News www.uygur.com The World Uighur Network News reports on current political, cultural and economic developments in Eastern TurkistanlXinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and Uighur-related issues. It is published by the East Turkistan Information Center. Current and back issues are available from the English·:·language page at the Center's Web site. For further information, contact AbduljeJil Karkash at: [email protected]

320

Online Resources

Internet Access Centers The International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX) has administered Internet programs in the NIS since 1991 and began administration of the USIA-sponsored Internet Access and Training Program (IATP) in 1995. The IATP program is a broad one, with country coordinators being responsible for: • Developing training materials and cwricula, Internet resources, and local language on-line development; • Assisting local institutions to establish on-line presence, including Web sites, electronic publications, and listservs; • Training and supervising a staff that consists of trainers, web masters, systems administrators, and other program personnel; • Implementing program outreach and publicity to targeted audiences. including local alumni ofUSIAprogratris; • Administering open grants competitions; • Coordinating the work of "Internet Working Groups." lREX is administering IATP programs in the capitals of all the formerly Soviet Central Asian republics except Tajikistan. (Other cities with IREXIIATP programs are Yerevan, Baku, TbiHsi, Chisinau, Minsk. and Kyiv.) Through the IATP, IREX has established several public "Internet Access Sites" in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The number of these sites will expand as the IATP develops; visit the IREX Web site (www.irex.org. or specifically, www.irex.org/programs/iatp/iatpsites.htm) for the most current listing. The following Central Asian Internet Access Sites had been established as of early 1999. Almaty

Almaty Power Engineering Institute ul. Baitursynova, d. 126, kom. 228 TellFax: 3272-67-79-00 The National Library of Kazakhstan pro Abai, d. 14 Tel: 3272-69-65-86 Contact: Vladimir Shatskikh E-mail: [email protected] Kazakh State University ul. Timiriazeva, d. 70, kom. 22 Tel: 327247-19-70 Contact: Anna Parentieva E-mail: [email protected]

Kazakhstan Institute of Scientific and Technical Information (KasGozINTI) ul. Bogenbai Batyra, d. 221 Tel: 3272-42-33-02 Fax: 3272-42-80-59 Contact: Ualisber Tukaev E-mail: [email protected]

Online Resources Bishkek

The National Library of the Kyrgyz Republic uL Sovetskaia, d. 208 Tel: 3312~2647~39 Contact: Igor Lebedev [email protected] http://freenet.bishkek.sulmain.html Education Information Center ul. Tynystanova,257,kab.202 Tel: 3312-22-86-90 Contact: Eugene Dronov

321

Tel: 3323-1346-56 Contact: Zamir Raev E-mail: [email protected]

Osh Osh State University Tel: 3322-22-29-12 Contact: Victor Tsoy E-mail: [email protected]

E~mail:

[email protected]

Tashkent

Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University ul. Kievskaia, 44, kom. 1/113 (computer labs: kom. 210,317) Tel: 3312-22-16-77 Contact: Konstantin Arsienko E-mail: [email protected]

Academy of State and Socia] Construction Uzbekistanskaia, 45, 10th floor Tel: 371245-69-21 x 151 Contact: Tuligoon Nishenbaev E-mail: [email protected] http://www.assc.ac.uz

Kyrgyz-American School ul. Abdymamunova, 205 Tel: 3312-26-2342 Contact: Konstantin Arsienko E-mail: [email protected] Kyrgyz-Turk "Ala-Too" University J0 mikrorayon, ul. Kamskaya 10 Tel: 331242-76-96 Contact: Gokhan Ozgur E-mail: [email protected] Resource Center at InterBilim society ul. Razzakova, 16 Tel: 3312-66-04-25 Contact: Vladimir Folomeev E-mail: [email protected] Jalalabad

Jalalabad State University

Institute of Cybernetics Akadmicheski Gorodok Tel: 3712-45-87-04 Contact: Zilfira Adillova E-mail:[email protected] http://www.ic.ac.uz The Institute of Regional and Strategic Studies Khaklar Dustligi 4 Tel: 371245-14-52 Contact: Maxim Emm E-mail:[email protected] http://www.iss.ac.uz University of World Economy and Diplomacy Buyuk lpak Yuli 54. kor. B, kom. 34 Tel: 3712-67-83..Q3 Contact: Alex Vostrikov, Trainer E-mail: [email protected] http://www.uwed.ac.uz

Appendices

About the Authors Jay Cooper is Director of Counterpart International in Kyrgyzstan and training coordinator for the project, "NGO Support Initiative in Central Asia." He is a director and co-founder of Center InterBilim, an NGO support group registered in Bishkek in 1994. In 1996 he was a member of a World Bank pre-appraisal mission in Tajikistan, in connection with a Joan to the government of Tajikistan for the establishment of a Social Investment Fund. Previously he was directof'Of several Peace Corps projects in Africa. He has a B.A. degree from the University of Akron in Ohio.

Renel Hanks is Assistant Professor of geography at Oklahoma State University and editor of the Journal ofCentral Asian Studies. He received his B.A. degree from the University of Missouri and his Ph.D. from the University of Kansas. He has contributed a chapter on the Uzbeks to An Ethnohistoncal Dictionary a/the Russian and Soviet Empires (Greenwood. 1994); co-authored (with Eric Fournier) Geographic Perspectives: Culture, Environment and the Global Economy (Kendall Hunt, 1995); and has a forthcoming article in the Journal of Third World Studies titled, "Directions in the Ethnic Politics of Kazakhstan: Concession. Compromise, or Catastrophe?" Scott Horton is a partner with Patterson, Belknap, Webb and Tyler LLP, an intemationallaw firm with offices in New York and Moscow and affiliated offices in St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Kyiv, Tbilisi, Erevan, Baku, Tashkent, Bishkek, and Almaty. He founded the finn's practice in the CIS countries and today is responsible for its work throughout the Central Asian and Transcaucasus regions. Mr. Horton commenced his law studies at the Universities ofMainz and Munich in Germany and took a J.D. degree from the University of Texas in Austin in 1981. His current practice encompasses the representation of major philanthropies, advice to foreign heads of state (including at various times an five of the Central Asian republics) on legal reform issues, representation of multilateral development banks in secured finance and equity investment projects, and representation of Western natural resource companies in exploration and development projects. He is an adjunct professor at the Columbia University School of Law and the author of more than two hundred articles and monographs on legal developments in nations in transition. Mr. Horton has been a lifelong activist in the human rights area, having served as counsel to Andrei Sakharov, Elena Bonner, Sergei Kovalev, and other leaders of the Russian human rights and democracy movements for over twenty years and having worked with Human Rights Watch, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and the Intemational League for Human Rights, among other organizations. He is currently president Gfthe International League and a director of the Moscowbased Andrei Sakbarov Foundation. He is also a directGr of the Open Society Institute's Central Eurasia Project, the Intemational Center for Not-for-Profit Law, the CGuncil on Foreign Relation's Center for Preventive Action, and numerous other NGO organizations.

325

326

Appendices

Ulil Ikramova is Program Officer and Coordinator for the Eurasia Office in Tashkent. She manages a series of Fotmdation Central Asia COJrnpetltlO!1IS focused on nongovernmental She has worked with a diverse group of international the Union's T ACIS program, AEC Holland and the U.S. Peace Corps. Ms. Ikramova from the in Moscow and earned her Ph.D. in her master's of World in where she later served as dean of the Department. An alumna of the Musklc Fellowprogram, Ms. lkramova studied public administration at the of Nebraska-Omaha and internships with Winrock International, Voice of America's Central Asia and the Central Asia Institute at Johns j:.:J"",lr'n"

.Katsiev is Director of Internews Almaty in Kazakhstan. After more than ten years with Kazakh State TV, where he served as division chief and chief the formed the first television station in ""(Hlni",,, the first Internews journalism training seminars in Kazakhstan. Mr. Katsiev continues to teach at Internews seminars in Central Asia and joined the Internews Almaty staff in 1995. Erldnbek Kasybekov is a consultant to the of Labor and Social Credit program funded by Protection under the Social Sector 1995 and 1997 he worked with the World Bank. Between NGOs as an NGO trainer. He has also been part of a group attached to the President's Office to a "National to Overcome !'n·tJprlv___ Dr. obtained a in from Institute ofthe Siberian Departand a Ph.D. fmm the of Sciences in Novosibirsk. Between 1985 and 1996 ment of the Russian Academy of he was a senior researcher at the Institute of Biology of the Sciences.

Alia Kazakina is a Russian attorney who as a Ncw York She has been associated with Pa~tter'SOll. R.. l~""n LLP in New York since 1990 and has focused on CIS corpOl'ate transactions and On"fPT'T1rU10 NGOs. In with honors from InHu"r,,,hr In eight years of work !IS an attorney in St. Pel:ersbmrlZ she had a diverse civil labor, commereiallaw, and criminal law matters, and she matters in the district court, mtmi(cip.al court, and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Ms. Kazakina is a author on CIS issues. In she worked with Justice Ernest Ametistov ofthe Russian Constitutional Court on a ofthe Law on Public Associations in Russia, her articles are "Between Ruler and Ruled: Freedom of Association in the Russian Federation" (LawMarch Organizations in yen, Committee for Human with Tax and Other Issues" June 1997); "The Ncw Russia Russian Criminal Code Combats Economic Crimes" (Doing Business in Eastern

About the Authors

327

Europe, January 1997); "'New Russian Arbitration Rules Prompt Rethinking" (Doing Business in Eastern Europe, July 1995). Kathryn A. MeConneD is Creative Services Manager, Document Sales Division. U.s. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. In this position she develops and manages marketing strategies for a publishing operation with $81 million in annual sales and 12,000 titles in print. Ms. McConnell obtained a B.A. degree in journalism, Phi Beta Kappa, from the University of Minnesota and an M.B.A. from Marymount University in Virginia. She has served as a management consultant! trainer to Counterpart Foundation and as an advisor to the National Forum Foundation. Aziz Niyazi obtained a Ph.D. (Candidate of Historical Science) and is presently

Senior Research Worker at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also Deputy Director of the Institute ofIslamic Studies and Deputy Chief Editor of the bulletin Russia and the Muslim World. His academic interests include problems of ecology and stable development, Islam, and ethnic and regional conflicts. Abdummanob Polat is Chairman of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan and

Director of the Union of Councils' Central Asian Human Rights Information Network. He received a PhD. in mathematics from Lomonosov State University in Moscow, was an associate professor ofrnathernatics at Tashkent State University from 1979-93, and has authored 35 publications in the field of mathematics. He is also the author of about 60 articles on democracy, human rights, and political development in Uzbekistan (in Uzbek, English, and Russian). \ Olivier Roy is a senior researcher at Centre Nationale de Recherches SCientifiques (CNRS) in Paris and a consultant for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After

studies in Philosophy and Oriental Languages (persian), Roy obtained an "Agregation de Philosophie" and a Ph.D. in political science. Roy was a consultant for UNOCA (United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan) in 1988, and was Special Envoy for the OSCE (Office of Security and Cooperation in Europe) in Tajikistan (August-December 1993). then head ofOSCE's Mission for Tajikistan (February-November 1994). Dr. Roy's research fields include political Islam, the Middle East, and Central Asia. His main publications are Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 1990, translated from the French); The Failure ofPolitical Islam (Harvard University Press, 1994, translation of L 'Echec de l'Islam Politjque, Le Seuil, 1992); Genealogie de I'Islamisme (Hachette, 1995); and La Nouvelle Ask Centrale ou fa Fabrication des Nations (Le Seuil, 1997). M. Holt Ruffln is Executive Director of Center for Civil Society International. which he founded in 1992. The organization maintains a large Web site containing several thousand files related to civic initiatives in the nations of the former Soviet Union (http://www.friends-parmers.orgl.-..ccsil) and sends out an electronic bulletin daily. known as "CivlISoc," to approximately 1,400 subscribers worldwide. Mr.

328

Ruftin is co-editor of The Post-Soviet Handboo/;;: A Guide to Grassroots el"(J,'IlZ,CJlUlnS and Internet Resources in the NIS of Washington revised and Internet Resources for Economic Educators NaIlOTlllt Council for Economic Education and 1997). He holds a B.A. from Stanford and an M.P.A. from the Woodrow Wilson School at Pri.nceton S. Ji'rederick Starr is Chairman of the Central Asja~Caucasus lnstitute at Johns Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in D.C .. His which has resulted in 18 books and 180 l)UI)I.ls:tlea t".. "t ..,hf" and elements in modern and domestic po1icy, and the relation of to the Central Asia Dr. Starr was director of the Kennan Insitute for Advanced Russian Studies at The Wilson Center in for U years ofOberiin and of the Institutee He is a of four and a Fellow ofthe American " ~.an~,,,,,,,, of Arts and Sciences. He also serves on the Board of Advisors of Center InternationaL Eurasia Stable" He is work for a new to the Aga Khan and the government of Tajikistan. Kate Watters is Director of Programs at ISAR: Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia. As she is for programs working with includinllboth ISAR's DC~hased and field programs in West NIS, Central and the Caucasus. Ms. Watters worked at the Center on East-West as the director Investment and Communications at Duke and the editor of tile Journal Nationalities. She holds a B.A. in Russian and Literature from the University of Massaclmsetts at Amherst and an MeA. in Russian Area Studies from Daniel C. Waugb is Associate Professor of history and international studies at the fashingt()D \ •.,,,,,,,.,,,,,,,, where until recently he chaired the l'..~t;S;SIWI, ]:{"'rAn""" and Central Asian Studies in the Jackson School of International Studies. After a B.A. in from Yale, he went on to an M.A. in Re~iconaJ Studies and a Ph.D. in Russian at Harvard His research intercsts concern and he also is currently studying the British consuls in in the early 1920s. He nal1:icinated in a 111 1991, is ~"TT_tl" _~~"n.~~~ to teach a course on the "Silk " and has traveled in Central Asia---·in part to his interests as an active mountaineer. Professor is a member of the Board of Directors of Center for Civil International.

About the Authors

329

Evgeny Alexandrovieh Zhovtis founded the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights in 1993. with the assistance of the American organization Union of Councils. He has been its Executive Director since then. He graduated from Kazak Polytechnical University with two degrees, one in mining engineering, the other in economics. From 1977 to 1991 he worked in the Institute for Mining Research of the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan and authored more than 50 articles. From 1989 to 1992, he participated in the activities of the Almaty affiliate of the public organization "MemoriaL" From January 1992 to June 1996. he was vice~president of the Independent Trade Union Center of Kazakhstan, responsible for public information and consultations. Mr. Zhovtis is on the board of directors of the Almaty affiliate of the international foundation for legal and political research. Interlega1. He is also a member of the Expert Council attached to the Republican Commission on Human Rights under the president of Kazakhstan. He has published widely on problems of democratization, economic transformation. human rights, and the rule oflaw in Kazakhstan. He is a recipient of the U.S. and European Union Award for Democracy and Civil Society.

Glossary of Foreign Words and Special Terms Ail Okomoto

council in It consists elected by direct vote. The village council chairman is supposed to be elected hut it can that at the tjme of the election of the the arrives from the district Int>:rVt'oP" the election.

Klwkim

Mlmn!Q" akimat

Astana

The term in Kazakhstan for the local government administration. Also known as akimiat in as akimiat or in Uzbe~astan, and as in Turkmenistan. The new capital before that as Ts,:hnogt'oo.

until

Awlad

Extended

CAU

Central Asian Union·-the nations Uzhekistan

CiS

Commonwealth

and

or dan, and

Indlep,mdent States,

CiTES

Convention on International Trade in bndarlgeJred

FSU

Shorthand for the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Greens

A commonly used term for environmental activists.

Hectare or ka,

An area 100 meteJrS x 100 meteJrS square. Approximately 2,5 ac,es.

leNL

International Committee for Not-for-Profit Law

Imam

A Moslem cleric,

l~han

A Sufi

to Mecca-..one of tile five pillars of the Moslem faith.

.fnF"'.I""

Kenesh

leader.

The

Kolkhoz

Collective farm.

Mahalla Maktab

N .. i"~,hf1it'h,~,,rl or~~an:izal,torls

Medresseh Alurid

oflslamic societies.

An underf,,>Tound school where people would learn the tenets of Islam the Soviet Islamic senljmuy, A follower of an ishan,

NGO

Nomenklatura

stratum in Communist

made up of high

""c'.""'''''' in the party and government institutions.

Oblast

A sub-national unit that might the United States or departments in France.

330

to states in

Glossary

331

Ulama

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European institution that evolved from the Marshall Plan. Parliament of Uzbekistan. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europ&-an institution which has evolved out ofthe 1975 Helsinki Accords. A pious Sufi elder; can be synonymous with ishan. A Muslim cleric who is able to recite the entire Qu'ran from memory. The Koran. Districts, often within municipalities. A term used in the same way we would use "national" in the United States, as in the "President of Kazakhstan's Republican Commission on Socia] Security," or "Uzbekistan's Republican Fund Yodgorlik." Islamic law. Islamic courts. The unit of currency in Kyrgyzstan. Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth ofIndependent States, a program of the European Union which operates analogously to USAID. The unit of currency in Kazakhstan. Refers to that sector of society composed of associations, religious organizations, political parties, trade unions, charities, etc.-as distinct from the two other major sectors, business and govemment. An elite within Islam of highly educated theologians.

USAlD

United States Agency for International Development.

Wahhabi

Member of an Islamic"political movement founded in Saudi a Arabia by Abdul Wahhab in the eighteenth century, which adheres closely to the Qur'an (Koran). It advocates a return to the ''true'' Islam that existed during the life of the Prophet Muhammad. Since 1953, "Wabhabiism" has been the official ideology of Saudia Arabia. It has fonowers in many countries. Islamic foundations, controlled by clerics, which help maintain mosques, support schools, and provide general welfare support. The Moslem practice of giving alms to the poor, another of the five pillars of the faith. Nature preserve.

OECD Oli(y) Majlis OSCE

Pir Qori

Quran, Qu'ran Raton Republican

Sharia Shariat Sam TACIS

Tenge Third sector

Waqf Zakat, zakot

Zapovednik