Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia (Central Asian Studies)

Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia During the last two decades, Central Asian states have witnessed an intense ...

Author: Mariya Y. Omelicheva

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Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia

During the last two decades, Central Asian states have witnessed an intense revival of Islamic faith. Along with its moderate and traditional forms, radical and militant Islam has inﬁltrated communities of Muslims in Central Asia. Alarmed by the border incursions, sporadic terrorist violence, and religious anti-governmental campaigns, the leadership of all Central Asian states adopted extensive measures against radical Islam and intensiﬁed counterterrorism policies. This book examines the dangerous tendency of counterterrorism policies of the Central Asian states to grow more alike amid propensities for divergence and attributes this trend to the impact of the social context in which these states operate. It underscores the importance of international setting that shapes governments’ perceptions of terrorism and their counterterrorism policies. Applying a comprehensive theoretical framework, which integrates different mechanisms of international inﬂuences on state behavior, the author explains the Central Asian states’ perceptions of terrorist threat and their counterterrorism responses. The book analyses the counterterrorism policies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the two Central Asian states that have been least affected by terrorist violence and Islamism but chose to combat those threats vigorously. Using materials derived from a wide range of sources, including legal documents, ofﬁcials’ memoirs, and ﬁeldwork, this research will contribute to studies in Asian politics, national security, and international relations. Mariya Y. Omelicheva is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas, USA, where she teaches and conducts research on Eurasian security, counterterrorism and human rights, and Russian foreign policy. She has published in leading journals and contributed her research to edited volumes.

Central Asian Studies Series

1 Mongolia Today Science, Culture, Environment and Development Edited by Dendevin Badarch and Raymond A. Zilinskas 2 Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire Daniel Brower 3 Church of the East A Concise History Wilhelm Baum and Dietmar W. Winkler 4 Pre-tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia Communal Commitment and Political Order in Change Paul Georg Geiss 5 Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924 Seymour Becker 6 Russian Culture in Uzbekistan One Language in the Middle of Nowhere David MacFadyen 7 Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia Maria Elisabeth Louw

8 Kazakhstan Ethnicity, Language and Power Bhavna Dave 9 Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus Post-Soviet Disorder Edited by Moshe Gammer 10 Humanitarian Aid in Post-Soviet Countries An Anthropological Perspective Laëtitia Atlani-Duault 11 Muslim-Christian Relations in Central Asia A. Christian van Gorder 12 The Northwest Caucasus Past, Present, Future Walter Richmond 13 Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy Positive Neutrality and the Consolidation of the Turkmen Regime Luca Anceschi 14 Conﬂict Transformation in Central Asia Irrigation Disputes in the Ferghana Valley Christine Bichsel

15 Socialist Revolutions in Asia The Social History of Mongolia in the 20th Century Irina Y. Morozova 16 Post-Conﬂict Tajikistan The Politics of Peacebuilding and the Emergence of a Legitimate Order John Heathershaw 17 The Politics of Transition in Central Asia and the Caucasus Enduring Legacies and Emerging Challenges Edited by Amanda E. Wooden and Christoph H. Stefes 18 Islamic Education in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States Edited by Michael Kemper, Raoul Motika and Stefan Reichmuth 19 The Military and the State in Central Asia From Red Army to Independence Edited by Erica Marat

20 Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan Wojciech Ostrowski 21 Political Islam in Central Asia The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir Emmanuel Karagiannis 22 Caspian Energy Politics Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Edited by Indra Øverland, Heidi Kjærnet and Andrea Kendall-Taylor 23 Securing the Indian Frontier in Central Asia Confrontation and Negotiation, 1865–1895 Martin Ewans 24 Ethnicity, Authority and Power in Central Asia New Games Great and Small Edited by Robert L. Canﬁeld and Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek 25 Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia Mariya Y. Omelicheva

Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia

Mariya Y. Omelicheva

First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2011 Mariya Y. Omelicheva All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Omelicheva, Mariya Y. Counterterrorism policies in Central Asia / Mariya Y. Omelicheva. p. cm. – (Central Asian studies series ; 25) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Terrorism–Prevention–Asia, Central. 2. Terrorism–Government policy–Asia, Central. I. Title. HV6433.A783O44 2010 363.325’160958–dc22 2010007447 ISBN 0-203-84494-7 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 978-0-415-77981-4 (hbk) ISBN 978-0-203-84494-6 (ebk)

Contents

List of tables Acknowledgments List of abbreviations Introduction

ix x xii 1

Central Asia combating terrorism: why are states’ responses converging? 2 Dimensions of counterterrorism policy 5 Alternative explanations of states’ counterterrorism policies 7 Overview of the book 10 1

A reference group perspective on state behavior

12

Introducing reference group theory 12 Types of social inﬂuence and reference groups 14 Factors affecting the choice of reference groups 17 Communicating groups’ norms, perspectives, and knowledge; transmitting feedback from the reference groups 20 Framework for empirical analysis 22 Establishing states’ reference groups 23 Identifying reference groups’ perspectives on terrorism and counterterrorism policies 24 Assessing the impact of reference groups on states’ responses to terrorism 24 2

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy Kyrgyzstan’s reference groups 29 Kyrgyzstan after independence: troubles of the newly independent state 29 States that Kyrgyzstan relied on 32 Kyrgyzstan’s partnership with Russia: pragmatic choice or value-based community? 35

26

viii Contents Russia as Kyrgyzstan’s normative reference group 38 Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors: induced cooperation 41 Kyrgyzstan and the West: drifting apart 44 Counterterrorism policies of Kyrgyzstan’s reference groups 48 Counterterrorism in the Russian Federation 48 Counterterrorism policies of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors 54 US counterterrorism policy 62 Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism responses: examining the impact of reference groups 67 Kyrgyzstan’s views on terrorism 67 Institutional and legislative frameworks for combating terrorism in the Kyrgyz Republic 71 Human rights in the context of counterterrorism in Kyrgyzstan 78 3

Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism policy

82

Kazakhstan’s reference groups 86 Kazakhstan’s national interests 86 Social groups assisting Kazakhstan in achieving its national goals 92 Russia as Kazakhstan’s reference group 99 United States as Kazakhstan’s reference group 105 The inﬂuence of China and other Central Asian states on Kazakhstan 107 Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism responses: assessing the inﬂuence of its reference groups 110 How assessment of terrorist threat has changed from “moderate” to “real” 114 Counterterrorism measures: expanding in scope 118 Human rights and counterterrorism: adjustments in “style” 126 4

Conclusion

133

Notes Bibliography Index

150 155 175

List of tables

1.1 2.1 3.1 3.2

Reference groups, types, and mechanisms of their inﬂuence Counterterrorism policies of the Central Asian states Summary of counterterrorism policies of Kazakhstan’s reference groups Kazakhstan’s participation in joint exercises and training with CIS, CSTO, and SCO

15 55 112 123

Acknowledgments

I owe a debt of gratitude to a number of individuals who provided their time, encouragement, inspiration, and invaluable advice for this book. I am also indebted to several institutions whose material and administrative resources were indispensable to the success of this project. This research undertaking began many years ago during my tenure as a PhD student in the Department of Political Science at Purdue University in Indiana, and was shaped by the committee that advised my original dissertation. Sincere thanks go to the chair of my dissertation committee, Dr. Aaron M. Hoffman, who saw the potential in my research and facilitated my efforts toward its completion in every possible way. I am grateful to my dissertation committee members, Dr. Ann M. Clark, Dr. James A. McCann, and Dr. Keith L. Shimko, for their support throughout my work. I also beneﬁted from the insightful comments and encouraging remarks of the participants of the Public Policy Workshops and “brown bags” held at the Department of Political Science, Purdue University, particularly, Dr. L.S. Raymond and Dr. L.S. Weldon. A special thanks goes to David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, whose work provided an important intellectual stimulus for conceptualizing the human rights dimension of counterterrorism policies and also helped to direct my efforts at data collection on human rights violations committed in the post-Soviet territory under the guise of combating terrorism. I would like to thank the Purdue University Graduate School and Department of Political Science for generous ﬁnancial support that was instrumental for carrying out parts of my ﬁeld research and for completion of the original dissertation. My research was also supported in part by the Ludwig Kruhe Fellowship and the Purdue Research Foundation Grant, which is administered by the Graduate School. The manuscript was substantially expanded and rewritten after my arrival at the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas. I beneﬁted tremendously from discussions of my work with my colleagues in and outside of the department and from my participation in the workshops conducted at the Hall Center for Humanities. Most of my data gathering efforts and ﬁeld research were funded through the New Faculty Research Fund and through awards from the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Kansas. Many other people have contributed to this work in one way or another, and, unfortunately, only a small number of them can be acknowledged here. Several

Acknowledgments xi journal articles on the topic of states’ counterterrorism policies preceded the publication of this book. Additional help came from people who gave me feedback on those publications, as well as the invaluable comments of the anonymous referees, all of which found their way into the ﬁnal version of this book. I am thankful to my friends and colleagues at the International Studies Association who saw prospects for my research project to be turned into a book, who put me into contact with the publisher, and who reviewed my work. This book would not have been possible without the generosity of the many people I interacted with or interviewed in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and Astana, Kazakhstan. Special thanks to those government ofﬁcials, human rights activists, and political and security analysts who took time out of their busy schedules to meet with me and discuss political and security situations in their countries. Lastly, this project would not have been accomplished without the emotional, spiritual, and intellectual support of my friends in Kansas City and Lawrence, KS, and, of course, my mother and sister. I dedicate this book to them.

List of abbreviations

AI ATA ATC CIS CSTO DCK ETIM EU EUR EurAsEc FATF FSB GTD HRW ICG IRP IMF IMET IMU KGB KNB MIPT NAK NATO NCTC OCAC PfP RFE/RL ROTC SCO START UN USAID USSR

Amnesty International Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program Anti-Terrorism Center of the CIS Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Security Treaty Organization Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan East Turkestan Islamic Movement European Union Eurasian Group Eurasian Economic Community Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation Global Terrorism Database Human Rights Watch International Crisis Group Islamic Renaissance Party International Monetary Fund International Military Equipment and Training Program Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Committee for State Security of the USSR Kazakh National Security Committee National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism National Counterterrorism Committee North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Counterterrorism Center Organization of Central Asian Cooperation NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism United Nations United States Agency for International Development The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Introduction

Central Asia is a vast landmass of diverse topography, culture, and ethnicity that stretches from the Caspian Sea to the heartland of China, and extends between southern Russia and the north of India. Its history has been intimately connected to the Silk Road, the world’s oldest and most historically important trade route connecting the West and China. Its political landscape still bears the stamp of the reign of legendary warriors and emperors such as Genghiz Khan and Tamerlane. Two hundred years ago, these vast swaths of steppe territory were a bone of contention between the Russian Tsars and the British Queen before being incorporated into the Russian Empire, which was seeking to secure its trade routes to and from the Far East and to expand its real estate. In the twentieth century, these territories moved from Russian Imperial domination to Soviet control, becoming administrative units of the Soviet Union. During the Soviet era, they served as the source of supply of raw materials, and a destination of exile for political opponents of the Soviet rule. Today, Central Asia is commonly associated with the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.1 These countries, which received their independence in 1991, are still awakening from centuries of rule by the powerful political entities that surround them. The cultures and political systems of these states, until recently, have been little known to outsiders. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were the only Central Asian republics that received heightened attention (bordering on pressure) from abroad. The reason is obvious: the two states are a repository of untapped natural resources, particularly, deposits of gas and oil. Their political choices with regard to participation in multilateral energy projects channeling Caspian fuel to Europe will determine which major power—the United States, Russia, or China—will gain geostrategic control over Eurasia. Because of the rapidly expanding presence of Russian, American, Chinese, and European business interests in these states, and due to the ﬁerce competition over inﬂuence in the energy sphere in Central Asia, this region has been likened to California at the dawn of the Gold Rush. Recently, however, the region has been in the limelight of world attention for yet another reason. The rise of radical Islamic movements and terrorism has been viewed as the most alarming development in the Central Asian states.

2

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed a ﬂood of religious activity in the republics of Central Asia, where the majority of believers identify with the Sunni branch of Islam. The Muslim communities of the Central Asian states have witnessed an intense revival of Islamic faith. Along with its moderate and traditional forms, radical and militant Islam re-emerged in parts of Central Asia. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil and the ensuing military operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan’s territory exposed the strategic importance of Central Asian countries for regional and global security. The sheer proximity of the region to the “Islamic arc of instability” renders it vulnerable to external sources of inﬂuence that are encouraging religious extremism and terrorism in Central Asian states. Conversely, the political and security situation in the region is directly and closely related to the success of counterterrorism and counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s conﬂict zones. The failure of any Central Asian state might turn it into a source of regional instability, terrorism, and trafﬁcking and transborder crime.

Central Asia combating terrorism: why are states’ responses converging? The problem of religious extremism and terrorism in Central Asia has been associated with activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-Tahrir, and a number of lesser known radical Islamic movements, such as Akramiya, Hizb an-Nusra, and Tablighi Jamaat among others. The IMU is a terrorist organization infamous for a series of terrorist attacks and raids in the Central Asian states, and ostensibly tied to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda networks. It was established with the aim of toppling President Karimov’s secular regime in Uzbekistan, but later expanded its goals in an attempt to create a region-wide Islamic caliphate in Central Asia (Naumkin 2003). Ideologically speaking, the IMU is a jihadist movement that is not truly Islamist (Omelicheva 2010). Its followers have no interest in the transformation of society or converting people to their beliefs. The organization has no political program beyond the conquest of power and the subsequent imposition of their vision of Islam upon other communities and states (Khalid 2007: 16). The overthrow of the Taliban regime and the destruction of Al-Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan severely weakened the IMU. The remnants of this militant organization created a number of splinter groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Turkistan and the Islamic Jihad Union, afﬁliated with, but not controlled by, the IMU. The former IMU ﬁghters continue to recruit and train volunteers in parts of Central Asia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, but the numbers of militant Islamists are likely much smaller than ﬁgures given by the governments of Central Asian states. Another group that has been increasingly active in Central Asia is the Hizb utTahrir al-Islami (The Party of Islamic Liberation). It pursues the same goals as the IMU, but ofﬁcially eschews violence. The ﬁrst records of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activities in Uzbekistan appeared in the mid-1990s. By 1999, the movement attracted

Introduction 3 between 6,500 and 7,000 followers, and the membership increased to 15,000 by 2003, according to the estimate of a well-informed Tashkent scholar (ICG 2003b: 17). In Kyrgyzstan, where the group appeared in 1997, the membership was between 1,000 and 2,000 in the early 2000s, and reached as many as 7,000 to 8,000 members by 2009 (ICG 2009). In Tajikistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir recruited more than 1,000 members in the early 2000s (ICG 2003b: 18). Around this time, a number of reports alluded to the emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir in southern Kazakhstan, where observers estimated the movement’s membership in the low hundreds. Yet, the recent reports of the Kazakh security service allege unprecedented growth in the activities of other radical Islamic groups. In 2003, Kazakh police seized over 1,000 leaﬂets with radical Islamic propaganda. By 2004, the number of seized pamphlets increased to 11,000. In that same year, a cell of the Jamaat Mujahedin of Central Asia, with alleged ties to Al-Qaeda, was dismantled in Kazakhstan (Omelicheva 2009a, 2010; Shpekbaev 2005). All Central Asian states outlawed the IMU, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and a number of other radical Islamic organizations. The harsh persecution of Muslims suspected of collaboration with Islamists drove radical Islamic groups underground, making their membership numbers and popularity difﬁcult to estimate. The authoritarian nature of Central Asian governments, which often strategically manipulate the discourse on Islamic radicalization, also complicates scholars’ efforts at data collection. Although some studies, news articles, and governmental reports assert that radical Islam has made a forceful comeback in the last decade in Central Asia, and that its threat to regional security is growing, the reality is more complex. Central Asian states are bastions of moderate and traditional Islam, and the rise of its radical and militant forms have been exaggerated by both governments and Islamists. Concerns about radical Islamic movements persist, however, for a reason, as a number of reputable analyses recorded some growth in the rank-and-ﬁle members of radical Islamic groups (see, for example, reports of the International Crisis Group (ICG), a leading non-partisan organization with an established presence in Central Asia (ICG 2003a,b; Omelicheva 2010). Central Asian governments have been alarmed by instances of border incursions, low-scale Islamic insurgency, and sporadic terrorist violence. The antigovernmental religious campaign has been perceived as a challenge to governing regimes. Threatened with the growing popularity of radical Islamic movements, all Central Asian states adopted restrictive religious policies and measures in an attempt to control and manipulate Islam. The governments of the Central Asian republics enacted new laws on combating terrorism and religious extremism, and established counterterrorism institutions with almost identical functions and authority (Omelicheva 2007). Despite the states’ similarities in institutional and legislative frameworks, their leaders had previously differed in their assessment of terrorist and extremist threat and in their subsequent counter-terrorist and counter-extremist responses. The governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, for example, used to estimate the level of terrorist and extremist threat as moderate or low. In contrast, the public ofﬁcials in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan had promulgated a view stressing the dangers of radical Islam. Subsequently, repression and

4

Introduction

violent crackdown had been systematically applied to Islamists in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, whereas, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had exhibited a more lenient and conciliatory approach. Recently, however, the views on the threats of terrorism and religious extremism and approaches to combating them across all Central Asian states began to converge. In its increasingly aggressive stance against radical Islam, Kyrgyzstan has come closer to its more ﬁerce neighbors. The Kyrgyz authorities began treating all forms of political and social activity within Islam as manifestations of extremism and terrorism and clamped down on both moderate and radical believers. The Kazakh leadership adjusted its assessment of security risks in Kazakhstan to a position promoted in the bordering nations. Kazakhstan’s authorities declared that the threat of terrorism and religious extremism in the republic is real and growing. The security services of Kazakhstan have cracked down heavily on radical Islamic groups and the number of detentions of alleged Islamists continues to grow (Omelicheva 2009a). What explains a rising tendency of counterterrorism policies in Central Asia to become more alike amid propensities for divergence? This book engages with this question. It examines the dangerous tendency of convergence in the counterterrorism practices of the Central Asian states on a model that displays little regard for human rights and that prioritizes forceful, military-style responses and punitive measures over a more balanced counterterrorism approach. I argue that the magnitude of Islamist violence and the volume of support for radical Islamic groups are insufﬁcient for explaining the Central Asian governments’ perspectives on security threats and their counterterrorism responses. This point of views stands out against a widely accepted position treating the observed levels of security threats as the decisive factors in shaping the countries’ counterterrorism responses. In contrast to other approaches to counterterrorism that emphasize domestic determinants of states’ measures aimed at combating the terrorist threat, this study underscores the importance of an international setting that shapes governments’ perceptions of terrorism and their counterterrorism policies. In this analysis, I treat states and governments as social actors and argue that the social environment in which states operate inﬂuences their understanding of security threats and affects their policy choices. I develop a reference group theory, a type of social theory that explains how various groups of states with which other states identify or to which they belong affect their understanding of security threats, as well as their views on the legitimacy and effectiveness of solutions to security problems. The reference group approach puts forth a framework for explaining states’ responses to terrorism that not only systematizes the mechanisms of international and domestic inﬂuence but also integrates instrumental, expressive, and psychological motives of policy-making. The book applies the reference group perspective for an in-depth analysis of counterterrorism policies in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the two Central Asian states that have been least affected by terrorist violence and Islamism but still chose to combat those threats vigorously. It also explores the counterterrorism policies of neighboring states and other strategic players in the region—Russia,

Introduction 5 Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, and the United States, as well as the counterterrorism measures adopted by regional organizations—the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). By charting out the social environments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, I demonstrate how the social groups to which these states belong have inﬂuenced their views and perspectives on terrorism and affected the content and “style” of their counterterrorism responses.

Dimensions of counterterrorism policy Broadly deﬁned, counterterrorism can be thought of as a mix of public and foreign policies designed to limit the actions of terrorist groups and individuals associated with terrorist organizations in an attempt to protect the general public from terrorist violence. As a type of policy, counterterrorism encompasses a range of actions (e.g., freezing ﬁnancial assets of terrorist organizations), speciﬁc decisions (e.g., a decision to join a counterterrorism treaty), general guidelines (such as provisions that allow the use of military forces on the territory of other states), observable behaviors of states (e.g., police raids on supposed terrorist sites), and verbal pronouncements of policy-makers (e.g., promises of military and economic aid to other states struggling with terrorism). In its broadest and fullest sense, counterterrorism spans a variety of policy areas. It is carried out by almost every governmental agency, not only those authorized with law-enforcement and defense functions. Counterterrorism measures do not stop at states’ borders. As the threat of terrorism blurs the boundaries between internal and international security, counterterrorism blurs the distinction between foreign and domestic policy (Omelicheva forthcoming). Traditionally, counterterrorism has been associated with a range of offensive, proactive, and aggressive actions. Anti-terrorism has been employed for describing defensive measures, focusing on the collection and dissemination of information about terrorist threats, and reduction of the vulnerability of people, security forces, and property to terrorism (Celmer 1987; NATO 2002; Raymond 2003). The criteria offered for categorization of anti- and counterterrorism responses do not lend themselves to a systematic and easy classiﬁcation of states’ actions. Counterterrorism policies of an increasing number of states combine both offensive as well as defensive measures to combat and prevent terrorism. Consequently, this study does not differentiate between counterterrorism and anti-terrorism strategies and operations. In order to compare the counterterrorism policies of Central Asian states and to evaluate the impact of reference groups of states on the practices and responses of their members, I have singled out three dimensions of counterterrorism policies, namely, the governments’ perceptions of terrorist threat along with the scope and brutality of states’ responses to terrorism. These three analytical dimensions embrace commonly used typologies of counterterrorism responses, incorporate the perceptual side of policy-making, and reﬂect a wide range of measures that can be adopted by states and international organizations

6

Introduction

to preempt, disrupt, or eliminate terrorists and their support networks. The scope and brutality of counterterrorism reﬂect a concern with the impact of counterterrorism policies on human rights. Determining the factors affecting the scope and brutality of counterterrorism responses can assist in resolving the problem of a balance between the effectiveness and acceptability of counterterrorism measures. The concept of the scope of counterterrorism denotes the breadth of a counterterrorism program or the degree to which a state’s responses to terrorism are spread across different areas of public and foreign policy and across a range of institutional, preventive, punitive, and other measures. The scope of counterterrorism policies of the Central Asian republics and their reference groups will be compared by looking at: (1) the content of states’ counterterrorism policies (which programs, laws, criminal legislation, executive directives, and international agreements form the legislative basis for responses to terrorism); (2) the organizational framework (which institutions are established to carry out, administer, and enforce counterterrorism policies); and (3) the policy “style” denoting the types of counterterrorism responses (such as, use of force, preventive measures, international cooperation, and others) that prevail in the states’ counterterrorism program. The brutality of counterterrorism refers to the degree to which a state is willing to sacriﬁce fundamental human rights and liberties under the pretext of combating terrorism. To examine the brutality of counterterrorism responses comparatively, I evaluate (1) the ideas and ideology underlying counterterrorism responses. What are the perspectives on terrorism and terrorists espoused by a state and its reference groups? Does the legislation of the state and its reference groups provide for the possibility of circumventing certain individual rights in the name of state security? (2) Human rights practices in the context of counterterrorism. Do the state and its reference groups practice unlawful detentions, inhuman, and degrading treatment, or unfair trials of the suspects of terrorism, or engage in other types of violations of individuals’ political and religious rights? How systematic and widespread are these practices? After the collapse of the USSR, political elites of the Central Asian republics instituted openly non-democratic regimes variously labeled as “authoritarian presidentialism,” “neopatrimonial” regimes, or “personal dictatorships.” Despite many socio-economic and political similarities shared by these states, their positions on the magnitude of terrorist threat differed. As it was mentioned above but will be discussed in a greater detail in the rest of the book, the counterterrorism policies of Central Asian republics used to vary in scope and in the extent of repression committed by these non-democratic states (Omelicheva 2007). Traditionally, the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have exhibited a less brutal approach toward radical Islam, whereas Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have championed more vigorous counterterrorism responses. However, with the recent convergence of approaches to terrorism and religious extremism across all Central Asia states, we must ask about the source of this convergence. Below, I review alternative explanations of states’ counterterrorism responses and introduce a theory of reference

Introduction 7 groups that will guide my investigation into the counterterrorism policies adopted by Central Asian states.

Alternative explanations of states’ counterterrorism policies Academic interest in counterterrorism has exploded recently, triggered by terrorist attacks in New York, Moscow, Madrid, and London, as well as ongoing instability in the Middle East and other parts of the world. Most existing analyses of counterterrorism policies have been descriptive and exploratory in character, and single case studies of established democracies continue to dominate the ﬁeld (Boulden and Weiss 2004; Freedman 2002; Lugna 2006; Schmid and Crelinsten 1993; Sidel 2004; Van Leeuwen 2003; Von Hippel 2005; Yonah 2002, 2006). While scholarship of this type has provided invaluable knowledge about individual governments’ experiences with terrorism, and has advanced our understanding of factors affecting counterterrorism policies, there have been few systematic attempts to account for differences and similarities in states’ responses to terrorism. The magnitude of terrorist threat has been widely regarded as a decisive factor affecting counterterrorism measures (Sidel 2004: 145). There have been, however, few attempts to explain or test the extent of this impact, and even less to account for the variation in counterterrorism responses of those states that have been affected by the scourge of terrorism (Trumbore and Woodhead 2005). A number of studies of states’ counterterrorism policies have underscored particular determinants of national security policies such as the historical and cultural–institutional context of policy-making and the constructed identity of states (Hocking 2004; Hoffman 1999; Johnston 1995; Miyaoka 1998; Pedahzur and Ranstorp 2001; Rees and Aldrich 2005). These explanations, however, are limited to individual cases under investigation due to the lack of a general theory that explains how and why policy-makers look at security issues through the lens of cultural and social norms when they respond to security problems. A number of theoretical reviews have suggested that explanations for states’ behavior fall into one of two competing analytical paradigms, namely Rationalism and Constructivism (Fearon and Wendt 2002; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1999). In the context of international relations, Rationalism has become associated with the “positivist” tradition of explaining policy choices by reference to goalseeking behavior (Fearon and Wendt 2002: 54). In a narrower sense, Rationalism explains behavior of states in functional terms as a product of utility maximization—the actor performs an action if the costs associated with enacting it do not exceed the expected beneﬁts from the action (Bueno de Mesquita 2003; Fearon and Wendt 2002). According to this axiom, the magnitude of terrorist violence and national capabilities determine the scope and brutality of states’ counterterrorism policies. A variant of the Rationalist framework, Realism, explains states’ counterterrorism responses in utilitarian terms as a pursuance of exogenously deﬁned self-interest in security under anarchical conditions. States do what is believed in their best interest given the availability and accessibility of resources and the

8

Introduction

information they have about the strategic environment. It is in the state’s interest to minimize, if not eliminate, the threat of terrorism. Terrorists challenge the authority of governing elites. Politically motivated violence undermines a government’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force and questions the regime’s ability to retain power. Terrorist acts generate public fear, distress, and disappointment with a government that is incapable of protecting its populace from violent attacks (Chalk 1994, 1998; Crelinsten 1989). The goal of counterterrorism policies, then, is to limit actions of terrorist groups and individuals associated with terrorist organizations in an attempt to protect the general public from terrorist attacks. The availability of military, security, and police forces, ﬁnancial resources and physical infrastructure through which states’ actions can be performed will limit the range of states’ policy options. Therefore, in the Rationalist framework, states’ counterterrorism policies are decisively shaped by the magnitude of terrorist attacks and states’ material capabilities to strike back. Constructivist theories of international relations focus on the social construction of world politics (Adler 2002). Whereas in rationalist explanations state actors behave autonomously, driven by their egoistic deﬁnition of state interest, in constructivist accounts of world politics, states act as social actors whose interests and identities are shaped by commonly held (“intersubjective”) ideas (norms, knowledge, and culture) (Checkel 1998a; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). Constructivist scholars have offered a host of reasons for why states abide by norms and other intersubjective ideational structures (Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner 2001; Checkel 1998b; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). International norms can serve as conduct-guiding decision shortcuts; they provide decisionmakers with simple organizational and decision-making rules (Shannon 2000). Norm-compliance also promotes positive social reinforcement and legitimacy. Some states aspire to maintain or enhance their reputation as norm-compliant members of international society, while others seek international legitimation (Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner 2001; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). There may be strategic and instrumental reasons for following international norms, when, for example, the provision of foreign aid or the lifting of economic sanctions depend on the degree of states’ norm-compliance (Omelicheva 2009b). Counterterrorism scholarship has also spawned perception-based explanations of states’ counterterrorism measures according to which states’ choices of counterterrorism policies are shaped by the governments’ perceptions of terrorism (Crelinsten 1989; Oliverio 1998). By perceiving terrorism as a type of criminal offence, the state conﬁnes its counterterrorism responses to the prescribed rules of law and the prerogatives of due process. By perceiving terrorist attacks as acts of war, the state relies on the institutions, rules, strategies, and tactics used in the wartime (Crelinsten 1989). The rationalist, constructivist, and perception-based approaches to states’ counterterrorism responses taken in isolation are limited in providing a comprehensive account of states’ choices of counterterrorism measures. None of these approaches, taken in isolation, can adequately account for policy choices or conclusions about appropriate responses to the problem of terrorism that are

Introduction 9 adopted by states’ decision-makers. The interest-based explanations tend to sacriﬁce a nuanced understanding of the nature of terrorist threat and of appropriate responses to it in favor of parsimonious accounts of how states respond to objective levels of terrorist violence. In other words, Rationalism assumes that states respond to threats by using the most cost-effective means but it does not explain why the assessment of similar levels of threat associated with terrorism varies across nations. Neither does it explain how governments form an understanding of the “menu” of all available responses to terrorism. Many constructivist accounts lack a description of mechanisms and scope conditions explaining how and why policy-makers look at security issues through the lens of an intersubjective ideational context. Norm-based accounts provide no more than an indeﬁnite answer as to what make some norms, ideas, and perspectives on terrorism more inﬂuential and attractive than others in these types of situations. The problem with perception-based explanations, on the other hand, is that the micro-foundations of the processes of perception formation described by these approaches are never made explicit, and they do not enumerate conditions that account for differences in governments’ perceptions of terrorism. Furthermore, counterterrorism scholarship has traditionally ascribed considerable autonomy and initiative in policy-making to domestic forces at the neglect of international inﬂuences that also shape states’ perceptions of terrorist threat and their counterterrorism policies. It has traditionally privileged either methodological individualism or the social context as sources of state action (Omelicheva 2009b). In this study, I develop an integrative theoretical framework for explaining states’ responses to terrorism that combines international and domestic determinants of counterterrorism and systematizes instrumental, expressive, and psychological sources of policy-making. It is my contention that our understanding of how states form their views on terrorist threats and devise their counterterrorism policies can be considerably improved by nesting domestic processes within a larger international setting and studying the interplay of strategic behavior with non-instrumental goals of policy-making. To explain the perceptions of Central Asian governments concerning the nature of terrorist threats, and the scope and brutality of their counterterrorism responses, this book adopts a reference group perspective, which integrates an explicitly social element into the models of state behavior, explains how a given government may emulate the counterterrorism policies of some states, but not of others, and how cross-pressures arising from membership in different groups of states can be resolved. Originating from social psychology, the reference group perspective is concerned with how groups’ membership and the salience of group identity affect the views and cognitions of their members. While the use of social psychological research to inform theories of international politics is growing, no speciﬁc study has used psychology to understand the impact of social groups on counterterrorism policies of individual states. The reference group approach developed in this study postulates that a given state’s counterterrorism responses are strongly inﬂuenced by the social groups in which a state aspires to gain or maintain membership, or by those states whose material resources or information are necessary for the

10

Introduction

given state to achieve its political, economic, expressive, and other goals. Broadly deﬁned, reference groups are states or groups of states whose perspectives policymakers use for interpreting and responding to various situations encountered in the realms of domestic and international politics. They set and enforce standards of behavior for other states and serve as comparison points for making judgments about the legitimacy and adequacy of policies. Whether a state adopts extensive and/or severe measures to cope with terrorism will depend on the endorsement of these types of responses by the state’s reference groups. Reference group theory offers a stronger explanatory account of Central Asian republics’ counterterrorism policies than the two competing analytical paradigms, namely Rationalism and Constructivism. It is also superior to the perceptionbased explanations of states’ counterterrorism responses. Contrary to the rationalist accounts that portray world politics as a series of purposeful acts performed by autonomous actors with sets of preferences, the reference group approach explains world affairs through a social lens, where the social groups of states determine much of behavior of other actors. In this, the reference group approach comes close to constructivism and international socialization approaches that also stress the importance of social context in the analysis of state behavior. While constructivist and socialization accounts focus in general on “peer-pressure” cumulative effects of other states and non-state actors, reference group theory explains that different conceptual groups of states may have differing impacts on the cognitions and actions of other states. It enumerates factors that make the perspectives of some states more attractive than the policies of others.

Overview of the book This project aims to describe and evaluate the propositions of reference group theory, as regards the impact of social environment on states’ perceptions of the nature of terrorist threat and the scope and brutality of their counterterrorism responses. Chapter 1 lays out the key premises of reference group theory. The ﬁrst section of the chapter identiﬁes three types of reference groups—utilitarian, normative, and comparison reference groups—and explains the basis of their social inﬂuence. Next, it describe factors affecting the choice of reference groups, and discusses ways in which reference groups communicate their norms, values, and perspectives, and transmit their feedback to the groups’ members. The last section provides a methodological framework for qualitative analysis designed to establish reference groups of states and to assess their impact on governments’ perspectives on terrorism, as well as to test their inﬂuence on the member-states’ counterterrorism policies. In the following two chapters, I apply the proposed theoretical framework to case studies of counterterrorism measures adopted by Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, as well as counterterrorism policies of the reference groups of these Central Asian republics. Chapter two surveys the evolution of Kyrgyzstan’s views on terrorist threats and its counterterrorism polices and aims to explain why the Kyrgyz government continues to intensify its counterterrorism measures in the absence of

Introduction 11 evidence of a growing terrorist threat to the state, and why an increasing number of human rights abuses are committed under the guise of combating terrorism. The chapter begins by establishing Kyrgyzstan’s reference groups independently of the primary task of exploring the groups’ impact on the republic’s counterterrorism policies. The analysis draws on historical narratives, written and verbal communications, and behavioral evidence to discern Kyrgyzstan’s national interests, and identify groups of states, which, according to the Kyrgyz political elites, can satisfy Kyrgyzstan’s needs best. The second section provides an overview of counterterrorism policies of Kyrgyzstan’s primary reference groups—Russia, Russian-led regional organizations, China, the United States, and other Central Asian states. The ﬁnal section of the chapter traces the republic’s counterterrorism policies to those of its reference groups. Chapter 3 aims to explain changes in Kazakhstan’s assessment of terrorist threat and intensiﬁcation in the republic’s counterterrorism policies. It is structurally similar to chapter two and begins with the analysis of historical records, written and verbal communications, and behavioral acts of Kazakhstan’s political elites in order to establish the republic’s normative, utilitarian, and comparison reference groups. Next, it employs the reference group premises for examining how Kazakhstan’s membership in various reference groups has affected its responses to terrorism. It assesses new legislative, institutional, and security measures adopted by the Kazakh authorities and investigates why human rights violations of the alleged Islamists continue to be on the rise. The book’s conclusion contains an overview of ﬁndings, including a discussion of similarities and differences in the experiences of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. It reiterates the growing importance of an international environment in the shaping of perceptions of security issues and in the responses to security threats by individual states. It demonstrates that the outcomes of adopting measures favored by other states can be damaging to a country’s security. The conclusion also suggests means of steering governments to counterterrorism practices and responses that would not perpetuate terrorism.

1 A reference group perspective on state behavior

Introducing reference group theory It has long been noted that policy-making is “an extraordinary imitative art” (Leichter 1977: 588) displaying a natural tendency of individuals and nations to borrow and adopt structures, administrative arrangements, institutions, and ideas from other societies and states (Bennett 1991: 220; Siegel and Weinberg 1977: 79). The work of social psychologists has done much to substantiate the human predisposition toward emulation. Particularly, the reference group perspective is based on the principle that individuals take the standards and values of other individuals and groups for making judgments, self-appraisals, and behavioral choices (Hyman 1968; Kelley 1952; Shibutani 1955). The concept of reference groups has been used to explain and predict the patterns of individual behavior across a wide array of social and political contexts, such as, for example, juvenile delinquency, marketing, and consumer choices. The impact of social groups has been further generalized across different cultures and states (Mehta, Lalwani, and Ping 2001; Yu and Liska 1993). In political science, the concept of reference groups appeared in studies of public opinion and political behavior (Conover 1988; Lau 1983). Recently, it has surfaced in analyses of the behavior of states and political elites (Bermeo 1992; Rivera 2004). Agyeman-Duah and Olatunde (1991), for example, applied the reference group perspective to examining the impact of a particular reference group, institutionalized as the Economic Community of West African States, on the behavior of its members. Price (1971) explored the development of positive reference group identiﬁcation among Ghana’s military elites and the ofﬁcer corps of its former colonizer, Britain, and the ensuing impact of the reference group on policies of the military regime in Ghana. A common conviction of these and similar studies is that like other individuals, political elites tend to use information, knowledge, and experience learned from others and to apply it to their political work. State leaders often refer to external models in their policy-making at home and borrow ideas and practices from abroad (Agyeman-Duah and Olatunde 1991; Price 1971; Rivera 2004). The similarity of human social behavior at different levels of aggregation opens up a possibility for inferring state conduct from individuals’ actions. Since it is through their human agents that states interact, form relationships, and interpret the behavior of other

A reference group perspective on state behavior 13 states (Cronin 1999; Wendt 1999), it can be surmised that states, like individuals, have reference groups. A reference group refers to a state or a group of states that sets and enforces standards of behavior for other countries and/or is accepted by political elites of other states as an appropriate source of information for making judgments about the legitimacy and adequacy of their own decisions and actions. With respect to counterterrorism and human rights, a reference group is a state or a group of states that guides and orients other states’ responses to terrorism by (1) endorsing and enforcing principles of counterterrorism policies and guiding concrete counterterrorism responses; and (2) providing information about the legitimacy and effectiveness of counterterrorism policies. Although the public also has reference groups and those groups may be different from the external models selected by political leaders, the focus of this book is on elite-driven emulation. Political elites are the critical agents in the development of political attitudes and behavior of the people they lead (Campbell et al. 1960; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Zaller 1992). State leaders contemplate effective ways of addressing a policy problem, sort out various policy choices, and choose from a broad spectrum of alternative policies. They are the “receiving ends” of external political pressure, and ﬁnal decision-makers about the content of policies they emulate from abroad. Since it is the foreign policy-makers who maintain relations with other states and outline directions of the foreign policies of their state, it is legitimate to make inferences concerning the actions and viewpoints of states from the attitudes and decisions of their political elites. Typically, a state’s reference group is an organization of which the state is a member or in which it aspires to acquire membership. However, the reference group does not have to be a membership-based international organization. Neither do states that make up the reference group have to engage in dense interactions and form complex interdependencies. The reference group is a perception-based social category that does not require face-to-face contact between political elites of different states or regular political, economic, and social interactions between states. What matters is that the leadership of two or more countries perceives their states to be members of the same social category, for example, being a European state. There are two distinct perspectives on what makes a group. One postulates that a group is a collection of individuals interacting with each other face-to-face to achieve some common purpose (Cartwright and Zander 1968: 46). Another meaning for group is that of a social category: individuals form a group when they share a common deﬁnition of themselves and a perception that they belong to the same social category of, say, blue-collar workers, generation X, or war veterans (Lau 1989: 220). There are two different conceptions of group inﬂuence that spring from these conceptions of group (Lau 1989). The social interdependence approach that relies on the conception of a group as a collection of members considers group inﬂuence as a function of interaction among group’s members aimed at the achievement of some common goal (Conover 1988; Lau 1989). The social identiﬁcation approach treats group inﬂuence as an “outgrowth of cognitive and affective identiﬁcation with the group” (Conover 1988: 54; Price 1971: 403). In this second perspective, a

14 A reference group perspective on state behavior group can exert inﬂuence on its members even in the absence of a sense of shared self-interest. The reference group framework adopted in this book draws largely on the social identiﬁcation approach (Conover 1988: 53). A state typically has more than one reference group and emulates their policies for different reasons. The section that follows identiﬁes three types of reference groups, describes the mechanisms of their social inﬂuence, and explains the theoretical and practical importance of differentiating among several types of reference groups. Next, I consider factors inﬂuencing political leaders’ subscription to policies and perspectives on terrorism and counterterrorism of particular reference groups, and discuss ways in which reference groups communicate their norms, values, and perspectives, and transmit their feedback to the groups’ members. A framework for empirical analysis of the reference group’s social impact on states’ counterterrorism policies concludes this chapter. Types of social inﬂuence and reference groups The behavior of any social actor is always purposeful, i.e., it attempts to meet various goals and needs. States’ policies may be driven by value-expressive motives, which refer to a state’s need to enhance or maintain its positive image (Herek 1986: 106; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 903).1 Alternatively, states may adopt policies for instrumental reasons in order to avoid punishments or secure beneﬁts and rewards mediated by other states. The governments are also interested in having complete and accurate information about different aspects of their environment and the effectiveness of their policy choices. In other words, states seek to satisfy value-expressive, utilitarian, and informational needs. A valueexpressive goal refers to a state’s need to deﬁne itself through the expression of important values and alignment with other social groups of states (Herek 1986: 106). Utilitarian needs are a means for fulﬁlling other goals (Wilensky 1978). For instance, gaining membership in an international organization, such as NATO, may be a utilitarian need, which satisfaction is believed to be important for accomplishing various security goals of a candidate state. Finally, informational goals are directed toward acquiring information about different aspects of the environment in which states operate. These goals form the basis of the social inﬂuence of reference groups (Table 1.1). Reference group theory distinguishes among normative, utilitarian, and comparison reference groups that perform normative, utilitarian, and informational functions for states (Burnkrant and Cousineau 1975; Clark and Wilson 1961; Deutsch and Gerard 1955; Mehta, Lalwani, and Ping 2001). When a state is motivated to enhance and maintain its positive image, it will seek identiﬁcation with a group in which membership is beneﬁcial to the state’s self-concept. This group is the normative or value-expressive reference group (Hyman 1968; Kelley 1952). To promote its acceptance, the state brings its policies and behavior into conformance with what is perceived as a group’s values and norms. Through conformity to the perspectives and standards of behavior of the normative reference group, a state can gain a symbolic sense of acceptance by the group. This outcome can

A reference group perspective on state behavior 15 Table 1.1 Reference groups, types, and mechanisms of their inﬂuence Types of goals

Types of reference group

Mechanisms Outcomes of inﬂuence of inﬂuence

Utilitarian

Utilitarian

Rewards and Compliance with punishments or deﬁance to the group’s interests Acceptance Conformance or rejection (or deﬁance) to the group’s norms, values, and perspectives

Value-expressive Normative (positive image) (positive or negative)

Informational

Comparison

Factors conditioning impact of reference groups

Economic and political resources Afﬁnity to the group Perceived similarity Status of the group Beneﬁts from being a part of the group Acceptance by the group Geographic proximity Perceived expertise Providing or Changes in withholding policies in light and experience of the of information group important Perceived similarity knowledge, about more Geographic proximity experience, efﬁcient or and expertise legitimate ways of achieving a policy goal

heighten the state’s self-image and esteem (Blanton and Christie 2003: 123). In the area of counterterrorism, a state will follow norms and principles of counterterrorism policies established by the normative reference group and adopt the group’s perspectives on different aspects of the terrorist problem in order to maintain or gain its membership in the group. When a state is driven by instrumental reasons, it will succumb to the inﬂuence of other states in order to secure important beneﬁts or avoid losses mediated by the governments of these countries. The utilitarian reference group is a group of states that is believed to wield signiﬁcant power that can be used for providing tangible awards or incurring material losses on other states. The government will comply with the utilitarian reference group’s expectations about counterterrorism responses in order to secure material beneﬁts, such as military assistance, preferential treatment in trade relations, and the like, or to avoid sanctions that can be imposed by the group. Finally, when a state lacks complete and accurate information about different aspects of its environment, it will rely on the knowledge provided by other states for making and justifying its policy decisions. The comparison reference group is a group of states that supplies information, which can be used for facilitating states’ judgments about the legitimacy and adequacy of their actions. States compare their past policies and prospective programs against those of the comparison reference group because the knowledge that others are doing the same things

16 A reference group perspective on state behavior (or abstaining from doing them) can legitimate behavior (Kemper 1968: 32). Comparison reference groups can also serve as role-models. If legitimization is concerned with whether a state has chosen an appropriate course of action, the role-models inform states on how to excel in the selected course of action. Comparing its policies against those of the reference group, the government can learn about different aspects of state programs responsible for success. States may belong to the same reference group, but for different reasons, and the same reference group may serve all or some purposes for states. It is important to differentiate between the types of reference groups because the underlying mechanisms of their social inﬂuence differ, affecting the consistency with which states follow the groups’ norms and policies and the difﬁculty with which states’ behavior can be changed. For example, as a reference group, the EU maintains guidelines concerning states’ human rights practices, by which all of the EU members (or those states aspiring to become a part of the EU) must abide. The Union’s ability to bring a state into compliance with its human rights policies will depend on the type of inﬂuence that the EU exercises over the state. For those governments that identify with the EU as a normative reference group, any deviation from the EU human rights principles should create a meaningful threat to their identity as democratic states founded on the principles of the rule of law and respect for human rights. Even when the disclosure of human rights violations is unlikely, the state will follow the normative expectations of its reference group because through the process of identiﬁcation with the normative reference group, the state internalizes the group’s norms and values. For those states that do not view the EU as a normative reference group, human rights violations would not translate into a meaningful identity threat. These states have fewer barriers to human rights abuses. If the EU is a utilitarian reference group for a state, then the government of this state may consider the possibility of sanctions or withdrawal of signiﬁcant rewards as an obstacle to human rights violations. In the absence of sanctions, or when the expected beneﬁts from human rights violations exceed the incurred losses, the state will defy the EU human rights considerations. It may be very difﬁcult to change the behavior of a member of the normative reference group by using mechanisms that lie outside of the group. A state would have to be convinced that alternative values and norms would be more beneﬁcial to its underlying values and self-concept. It is easier to change the behavior of a member of the utilitarian reference group, although it may cost more. The state needs only to be convinced that some alternative utilitarian reference group would bring more beneﬁts for compliance (or incur more costs for non-compliance) with the group’s expectations. This change will only be temporary, lasting until the group is capable of satisfying the state’s utilitarian needs. Thus, different types of reference groups have different logics that underlie their inﬂuence on state behavior, in general, and states’ responses to terrorism, in particular. The differences in the mechanisms of social inﬂuence, will, in turn, affect predictions of states’ behavior and ensuing policy recommendations.

A reference group perspective on state behavior 17 Factors affecting the choice of reference groups A state, typically, belongs to multiple social groups among which it has the freedom to choose its reference groups. There are situations in which values and perspectives of one reference group conﬂict with values and perspectives of another group. It is important, therefore, to establish how states choose their reference groups and how they solve cross-pressures arising from membership in several reference groups. The primary factor that determines the “attractiveness” of the normative reference group is affect (Lau 1989: 221). In other words, the more states’ political elites sympathize with or like the reference group, the stronger their identiﬁcation with the group will be. There are a number of individual factors associated with affect or “liking” for the normative reference group. The most important one is “social psychological proximity” developed on the basis of historical, institutional, and value similarities (Brown 2000: 186; Rose 1993: 105; Weil 1993: 198). The perceived similarity of important attributes increases afﬁnity among states. Groups of states sharing social, political, and institutional characteristics, such as regime, religion, or ethnicity that are salient to the members of these groups, are more likely to be perceived as appropriate positive referents. Other factors that strengthen the appeal of the normative reference groups are listed below. •

•

•

•

Status of the reference group: a favorable image of the reference group increases its attractiveness to the group’s members (Majone 1991; Weil 1993: 198; Weyland 2004: 11). Political and economic power or cultural appeal determine the status of a reference group of states vis-à-vis other groups. Beneﬁts from being a part of the reference group: the groups that offer rewards, provide moral support against internal and external subversion and bestow exclusive rights and privileges, or provide an ability to meet their members’ individual goals, such as enhanced global acceptability and respectability, are liked more (Agyeman-Duah and Olatunde 1991: 299; Hyman and Singer 1968). Geographical proximity: the cognition and affect of state policy-makers is often biased toward what is closest to them, particularly when political elites in the neighboring states are similar to them in some important ways (Mooney 2001; Walker 1969). Acceptance by the group: the strength of state identiﬁcation with the reference group of states depends on whether other group’s members ﬁnd the state attractive and express this, and whether those outside of the reference group treat the state as a part of the reference group.

Thus, a state is likely to adopt norms and perspectives of a normative reference group that is perceived as similar to the state in some important ways, having a positive image and that is beneﬁcial to and accepting of the state. When this normative group is also geographically close, the state will be further inclined to identify with the group (Bermeo 1992: 284; Rivera 2004).

18 A reference group perspective on state behavior States adopt norms and perspectives of the utilitarian reference group of states for instrumental reasons. The impact of the utilitarian reference group will be determined by the intensity of the need related to a particular goal of the state. The group can hamper or help in the attainment of this goal by mediating material rewards and sanctions. For instance, the two main pillars of the Uzbek president’s political strategy are the protection of Uzbekistan’s sovereignty and preservation of political stability. The indiscriminate crackdown on religious dissent and the heavy-handed counterterrorism tactics employed by the Karimov government since 1999 to eliminate security threats have been strongly reprimanded by the EU. This was particularly true in the aftermath of the Andijan massacre in May 2005, which the government has effectively linked to its combat against terrorism, and following which the EU imposed targeted sanctions on the republic. The lifting of sanctions was conditional on the improvement of human rights practices in Uzbekistan. According to experts, these sanctions had little impact on the extent of human rights violations by the Uzbek security forces (ICG 2006b). Karimov’s cabinet did not change its counterterrorism practices because it perceived the West as incapable of weakening the regime or inﬂuencing political stability in the country. Uzbekistan’s neighbor, Kyrgyzstan, one the other hand, has been more dependent on the political and economic support provided by the West. It knuckled down under the political pressure of European institutions and declined Uzbekistan’s request to repatriate some of the Uzbek refugees who had ﬂed Andijan. Thus, to be able to exert inﬂuence on a state’s counterterrorism policies, the utilitarian reference group has to wield signiﬁcant authority and resources relevant to a state’s immediate interest (which may or may not be related to combating terrorism). The outcome of inﬂuence for both normative and utilitarian reference groups is the adoption of the group’s perspectives and norms. Although, in the case of normative reference groups, the adoption occurs at a much deeper level: a state internalizes the group’s norms. In the case of utilitarian reference groups, the adoption signiﬁes mere behavioral adaptation or public acceptance. If a state accepts the policies and perspectives of its normative reference group, it is very unlikely that the state will change its position even when the reference group exerts no pressure to induce compliance with its policy preferences or recommendations. When a state modiﬁes its counterterrorism measures in light of its utilitarian group’s expectations, it will continue to pursue the group’s policies and support its perspectives as long as the utilitarian group’s inﬂuence persists and the government remains under the actual or perceived watch of the reference group. A state may circumvent the norms of the utilitarian group when its rewards or punishment are perceived as too small to continue to follow its expectations. A state may also defy the norms of the normative reference group when the latter is viewed as a negative normative referent. The negative referent is a group that a state does not wish to be considered a part of and thus is motivated to disassociate from the group. The negative normative group generates behavior that goes contrary to the norms and values promulgated by the group’s members (Kemper 1968: 32).

A reference group perspective on state behavior 19 Both normative and utilitarian reference groups use a system of rewards and punishments for encouraging behavior consistent with expectations of the group. An important difference is in the nature of those incentives and disincentives. The normative reference groups use mostly intangible rewards and penalties, which have no concrete monetary value or cannot be easily translated into material incentives and disincentives (Clark and Wilson 1961: 134). Among those rewards are certain rights and privileges associated with membership in the group, a sense of distinctiveness, the status resulting from membership in the group, an ability to socialize with political elites from other state-members of the group, and so on (Clark and Wilson 1961: 134). For the normative reference groups, rewards and punishments are not the only factors that determine attractiveness of these groups to states. For the utilitarian reference group, material incentives and disincentives that have substantial monetary value or can be translated into tangible rewards are the primary means of affecting the behavior of other nations. Finally, those states that are interested in acquiring knowledge and information for ﬁnding or optimizing solutions to problems will turn to comparison reference groups. A group that is believed to have expertise and sufﬁcient experience in a speciﬁed issue area will likely be a role-model for other states. What also matters is a perceived similarity of the comparison group and a borrowing state. Similar states are not only liked and emulated more but also can provide more accurate appraisals of a state’s handling of a particular problem. Geographical proximity has also been recognized as an important dimension of comparison (Buzan 1991; Lake and Morgan 1997; Rivera 2004). Shared borders facilitate the ﬂows of information, communications, and interactions, thus, providing ample data on practices and experience of adjacent states. Regional problems can set off the process of policy transfer as governments work together to resolve common concerns (Hoberg 1991). Thus, states that are perceived to have expertise and experience in countering the threat of terrorism will likely become comparison reference groups. The likelihood of a group’s informational inﬂuence on counterterrorism responses in a particular state will increase with geographical proximity and a perceived similarity in the nature of threats, capabilities, and goals of the comparison reference groups and the state. Typically, normative, utilitarian, and comparison reference groups coincide in the same group of states. There are, however, many instances when normative, utilitarian, and informational functions are divided among several groups. It is in these situations of splits in the locus of reference groups that conﬂicts of inﬂuence often arise. The factors affecting the choice of a reference group of states will also determine the salience of this group. The latter refers to the prominence of the reference group, or its ability to capture the attention of political elites, and induce their conformity to the group’s norms. The more a state is motivated to enhance its positive image, obtain a material reward and avoid a punishment, or acquire information and expertise necessary for resolving a pending problem, and the better a reference group serves the state’s need, the more salient this reference group will be for the state (Kelley 1952; Turner 1991). Such factors as similarity, a group’s status, economic and political weight, a group’s incentives, expertise, and

20 A reference group perspective on state behavior geographic proximity will determine the group’s potential to serve a state’s needs and the group’s attractiveness to the state. Reference groups’ inﬂuence is not ubiquitous. Experimental and correlational studies, for example, have demonstrated that the members of subordinate social groups—minorities or immigrants—whose social mobility is blocked, and who have high contact with in-group members and low contact with out-group members have been malleable to their reference groups’ impact (Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980). Similarly, states with a low international status (for instance, weak, transitional, and third-world states) will tend to yield pressures from their social groups more than states with high international standing. As will be shown in the following chapters, Kyrgyzstan, for example, due to its landlocked position, low strategic importance, and higher dependence on policies of the neighboring states, has been more vulnerable to the inﬂuence of its social environment, than Kazakhstan. Ishenbay Abdurazakov, a political analyst and the former State Secretary of Kyrgyzstan, summarized this observation in reference to the Kyrgyz republic in the following way, “a small state has small advantages” (Institute for Public Policy 2008a). Kazakhstan’s possession of valuable strategic resources—oil and gas, a stronger economic standing, and more diversiﬁed international contacts—has awarded it greater latitude in making its choices about foreign and domestic policies. It does not mean, however, that powerful states are not motivated to maintain their positive image, or that reference groups are inept in the face of great powers in the world. Dominant states also have their reference groups. However, the members of dominant groups will be more likely to deﬁne themselves by unique, distinct features, and derive their identity to a large extent from outside the group (Lorenzi-Cioldi and Clémence 2001). What also matters is how issues are framed for states. Governments have to cope with an array of issues. Some reference groups of states may not have norms, regulations, or information pertinent to the problem at hand. In such a situation, a reference group will not be able to provide a state with necessary guidance. With regard to the areas of reference groups’ inﬂuence, all issues can be thought of as varying along the continuum from the strong group issues that invoke speciﬁc groups to the weak and non-group issues in which group cues are latent or not present (Conover 1988: 60). When the issue of counterterrorism is framed, for example, as the global “war on terrorism” led by the United States and a coalition of the Western states, it brings to mind speciﬁed reference groups. When an international treaty addresses the issue of terrorism, those who read, discuss and debate the treaty will likely establish a link between the issue and a group they closely identify with or a group that invokes a strong affective reaction. For governments of the Central Asian states, for instance, terrorism evokes association with radical Islamic groups operating in the region. Thus, the issue will prompt other Central Asian states as a reference group. Communicating groups’ norms, perspectives, and knowledge; transmitting feedback from the reference groups There are a variety of channels that reference groups utilize for making their norms, values, and perspectives available and known to others. First, there are

A reference group perspective on state behavior 21 written records. The norms and principles of reference groups of states are often codiﬁed in statutory documents: treaties, conventions, and domestic legislation that the individual member-states enact in accordance with provisions of international agreements. The CIS, for example, as a reference group spearheaded by the Kremlin, adopted almost 1,500 documents by the beginning of 2005. Although, only a small percentage of those have been enforced or implemented in full, cumulatively, these documents communicate the CIS/Russian vision about directions of its members’ economic, trade, custom, security, and other policies. They also convey the CIS’s other expectations and norms. The documents and resolutions adopted during the meetings of member-states of the reference group not only reiterate norms from the founding treaties but also transmit a group’s position on various problems at hand. The meetings of the group’s members also make salient their group identiﬁcation, while their voting records during the meetings of larger social groups express their views on the international situation. The voting records of the SCO members in the UN General Assembly, for example, or votes that Russia and China cast on the Security Council’s resolutions can communicate a speciﬁc position embraced by the SCO. The reference group may provide new or potential members with written instructions about how to bring their domestic practices and legislation in accordance with norms, principles, and practices espoused by the group. The reference group’s values—both attributed to the group itself as well as to other groups of states—are typically contained in the rhetoric of the group’s members (Rokeach 1970: 160). In their public announcements, addresses, speeches, and public and private responses to events, states’ leaders send unequivocal messages about their attitudes toward a state, or a group of states, a policy, or an incident. Additionally, political elites rely on a variety of interpersonal tactics to make values and preferences of the reference group known to others. These include direct orders and requests, manipulation, negotiations, and other forms of persuasion (Forsyth 2006). A famous Latin saying, facta non verba, purports that actions speak louder than words. The observable practices of the reference group’s members express states’ adherence to certain principles and norms. A state can also learn about what is considered as the reference group’s best practices through participation in training, exercises, workshops, and other activities organized by the members of the reference group. Feedback provides another avenue for inferring groups’ norms and perspectives. A reference group’s rewards and punishments are the most manifest feedback that a state can get. As positive feedback, the group can bestow recognition or membership on a state, or enhance its status within the group. Suspension of the state’s membership, isolation, expulsion, exclusion from group’s activities, acting against or failing to act on the state’s recommendations and advice are all examples of the group’s disapproval of actions and policies of this state (Leonard, Beauvais, and Scholl 1999). Feedback can also be conveyed through verbal and written communication—praising or complementing the competency of a state’s leadership in dealing with the terrorism problem, for example, or reprimanding and criticizing the state authorities for inﬂicting unnecessary civilian losses or

22 A reference group perspective on state behavior damaging property during a military raid against a terrorist cell. Importantly, the reference group does not have to aim at providing feedback for the state receiving it to interpret this response as feedback provided by the reference group (Leonard, Beauvais, and Scholl 1999). In summary, states belong to multiple social groups that perform various functions for them. Those groups that serve a state’s value-expressive, utilitarian, and informational needs become the state’s normative, utilitarian, and comparison reference groups. Any reference group has an explicit or implicit set of norms and values that are communicated to the group’s members via different channels. In the area of counterterrorism, normative reference groups of states establish standards for counterterrorism policies that the states are expected to follow to ensure acceptance by the group. Utilitarian reference groups also promote certain approaches to counterterrorism that states follow to secure material rewards or to escape punishment mediated by the groups. Comparison reference groups serve as points of comparison against which states judge acceptability and effectiveness of their counterterrorism responses. States’ responses to terrorism will resemble policies of their normative, utilitarian, and comparison reference groups. A state is more likely to develop and implement extensive counterterrorism measures that span different areas of public and foreign policy if the scope of counterterrorism policy in the state’s reference groups is very broad. A state is more likely to respect its human rights commitments in the context of combating terrorism if the state’s reference groups emphasize adherence to the human rights principles in their counterterrorism programs. When multiple reference groups advance conﬂicting expectations of state’ responses to terrorism, a state will be likely to emulate counterterrorism policies of those groups that serve its vital interests best.

Framework for empirical analysis Empirical evaluation of reference group theory requires the establishment of reference groups, assessment of their counterterrorism policies, and demonstration of the conscious borrowing and emulation of the reference groups’ perspectives on terrorism and counterterrorism among the groups’ members. Therefore, this investigation of the impact of the reference groups’ counterterrorism policies on the counterterrorism responses of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan will proceed through three stages. The goal of the ﬁrst analytical stage is to identify which states serve as normative, utilitarian, and comparison reference groups for Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Analysis of the reference groups’ views and perspectives on terrorism and counterterrorism, and review of the groups’ counterterrorism policies will follow. The ﬁnal step is to evaluate the similarity of the counterterrorism policies of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan and their reference groups, and to examine whether the Kyrgyz and Kazakh governments rely on their reference groups for devising and implementing counterterrorism programs.

A reference group perspective on state behavior 23 Establishing states’ reference groups A reference group is a perception-based social category created by political elites. What matters in the reference group analysis is not the “raw facts” about, for example, the prestige of the reference group, or the amount of aid it provides to a state, but the perceptions of the state’s political elites about how beneﬁcial the group is to the state image, or how important the group’s monetary assistance is for the achievement of the state’s goals. As a perception-based category, a reference group has to be explored at the social psychological level of analysis inquiring into motivations, perceptions, and views of the individuals vested with the key tasks of state policy-making. These perceptions can be inferred from a variety of perceptual and behavioral data such as speech acts (remarks, public statements and announcements, lectures, and speeches), written communications (letters, notes of protest, and communiqués), behavioral reactions (leaving a meeting, canceling a trip, or paying a visit), and artifacts of interactions of the states’ political elites. Reference group theory’s propositions about the factors affecting a state’s choice of its referents should serve as a guide to discerning the state’s reference groups. The impact of reference groups is contingent upon their ability to satisfy states’ needs. Subsequently, the inquiry into the state’s goals and the detection of those groups of states, which, according to political elites, serve the needs of their state best should be the starting point in the process of establishing reference groups of the state. State goals can be deduced from a state’s declarations and doctrines examined through the lens of the state’s history, and through analysis of the background of the state’s security and economic relations. In order to establish the existence of a normative reference group, it will be necessary to demonstrate that: (1) the state’s political leadership identiﬁes with the group; states’ authorities perceive a commonality between the state’s values, culture, and history and those of the group; (2) the government views its relations with the reference group as beneﬁcial to the state image; and (3) state leaders believe that the group, itself, grants inclusion and acceptance of the state. The utilitarian reference group can be identiﬁed on the basis of expressed and inferred state interest in obtaining rewards or avoiding punishment mediated by the group. The comparison reference group can be ascertained through explicit and implicit references to the experiences and expertise of the group as the basis for policy emulation. The similarity of a state’s values, perspectives, and policies to those of the state’s reference groups will be an indication of the reference’ groups social inﬂuence. To reiterate, the state’s policies and perspectives need to be considered in the context of elites’ discourse and actions undertaken toward the state’s reference groups. It does not sufﬁce to simply demonstrate the similarity of the state’s and the group’s policies that may arise for non-comparative reasons. It is important to examine political elites’ speeches and statements accompanying their political decisions to demonstrate conscious policy borrowing for normative, instrumental, or informational reasons.

24 A reference group perspective on state behavior Identifying reference groups’ perspectives on terrorism and counterterrorism policies The next step after establishing the reference groups of a state, independently of the primary task of exploring the groups’ impact on states’ counterterrorism policies, is to examine the reference groups’ views on terrorism and their counterterrorism programs. Broadly deﬁned, counterterrorism is a mix of public and foreign policies designed to limit the actions of terrorist groups and individuals associated with terrorist organizations in an attempt to protect the general public from terrorist violence. To make a wide range of counterterrorism measures amenable to systematic examination, I singled out three dimensions for comparing counterterrorism policies of individual states and regional organizations. The ﬁrst dimension encompasses the governments’ views on the nature and magnitude of terrorist threats. The second dimension is that of the scope of counterterrorism policy. This denotes the breadth of counterterrorism measures or the degree to which a state’s responses to terrorism are spread across different areas of public and foreign policy and across a range of institutional, preventive, punitive, and other measures. The scope of counterterrorism policies can be determined by looking at the content of counterterrorism policies (what programs, laws, criminal legislation, executive directives, and international agreements form the legislative basis for responses to terrorism); the organizational framework (what institutions are established to carry out, administer, and enforce counterterrorism policies); and policy “style,” meaning the types of counterterrorism responses (such as, the use of force, preventive measures, international cooperation, and others) that prevail in the states’ counterterrorism program. Finally, the third dimension is that of human rights in the context of counterterrorism. This dimension examines the degree to which a state is willing to sacriﬁce fundamental human rights and freedoms under the pretext of combating terrorism.

Assessing the impact of reference groups on states’ responses to terrorism The third step in the analysis of the social inﬂuence of the reference group of states is to compare their counterterrorism policies to those of their members. This comparison needs to be accompanied by an assessment of evidence surrounding decision-making processes concerning the formulation, implementation, and modiﬁcation of states’ counterterrorism policies. The last one is important for demonstrating the awareness of political elites to policy borrowing and emulation as well as conscious adoption of norms and emulation of practices of their reference groups. An indication of an impact of the reference group on state’s responses to terrorism will be a similar to the reference group’s understanding of terrorism and appropriate responses to it reﬂected in the vocabulary used for articulation of counterterrorism policies as well as in concrete policy responses (Kuhn 1964: 6). The two empirical chapters examining counterterrorism policies of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan will have a three-section structure corresponding to the three stages of the reference group analysis. The ﬁrst section establishes a state’s reference

A reference group perspective on state behavior 25 groups drawing on the theoretical propositions about the factors determining the state’s choices of its normative, utilitarian, and comparison reference groups. The second section examines the reference groups’ perspectives on the nature of terrorist threat and their counterterrorism policies. The last section compares the state’s counterterrorism policies to measures and responses adopted by its primary reference groups. Since leadership of individual states is crucial to the conception of reference groups, they can be viewed as an object and a product of the politicians’ “cold” (perceptions) and “hot” (motivations) cognition. However, not every public ofﬁcial plays an equally important role in deﬁning the state’s reference groups. It is the foreign policy-makers who maintain relations with other states, and outline directions of the state foreign policy. Therefore, the focus of empirical analysis will be on examining verbal and written communications of the key foreign policy players in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Additionally, I will explore communiqués of the states’ security and defense actors insofar as their perspectives affect the shaping of the contours of the states’ security and defense policies. After independence, both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan established hyperpresidential systems in which the head of state wields exceptional powers. In both states, foreign policy is decisively shaped by the president in tandem with a small circle of elites in foreign ministry and a presidential apparatus that is tightly controlled by the regime (Wood 2006). The Constitutions of both republics stipulate that presidents make decisions on major issues of foreign policy. In 1999, the Kyrgyz president endorsed the primacy of the Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry in conducting foreign policy, and Kyrgyzstan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs was once cited blurting out, “everyone keep silent, we will make decisions”, where “we” stands for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Institute for Public Policy 2005). Despite these endorsements, the presidential domination of Kyrgyzstan’s international relations remains (Institute for Public Policy 2008a). Until recently, the parliaments of both states have been largely sidetracked in their foreign policy power. I will use presidents’ statements and documents issued by the foreign ministries as the primary sources of data. The communiqués, reports, and declarations of the “power ministers,” which refer to the ministers of defense, internal affairs, and security, will be analyzed to establish the governments’ perspectives on different aspects of the states’ policies to combat terrorism. Although, in both states expert communities are rarely engaged in the process of decision-making, just like civil society is completely excluded from participation in these processes, security experts and political analysts can partake in crafting justiﬁcations of policy-related decisions. Therefore, I also consult statements and analytical materials of the established political experts and security specialists in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

2

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy

The Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan) is the second smallest state of the Central Asian region. Geographically, it is squeezed between two giants (Kazakhstan to its north and China to its south-east) and shares a southern border with Tajikistan and a western border with Uzbekistan. Politically, it has become the scene of geopolitical competition between Russia and the United States, a subject of rapidly increasing Chinese inﬂuence, and a casualty of regional rivalry for leadership in Central Asia between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyz ethnos, whose history dates back to the second century BC, has been formed by the nomadic tribes traversing the northern part of Central Asia and coming into contact with other peoples in the region. The ﬁrst Kyrgyz state, created in the sixth century, lasted until the Mongolian conquest in the thirteenth century. During that time, Islam, the religion of the majority of modern Kyrgyz, spread into the land of the Kyrgyz nomads.1 Adopting this new faith, the Kyrgyz tribes adjusted the basic tenets of the Sunni tradition of Islam, with the pre-eminence of its mystic Suﬁ form, to their ancient Turkic beliefs and earlier religious systems. This resulted in a peculiar place for Islam in the life of the nomads. Islamic precepts, Turkic religious ideas, and indigenous worldviews informed by the cultures of nomadic tribes were blended to create a unique philosophical, ideological, and ethical system (Allsen 1997; Chotaeva 2003). In the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, the Kyrgyz saw a subsequent takeover by the Kalmyks, the Manchus, and the Uzbek rulers. In the late nineteenth century, Russia routed the Uzbek Khanate and the Kyrgyz became a part of the Russian Empire. The Bolshevik revolution established Soviet rule in the Kyrgyz territory, whose status was upgraded to that of Soviet Republic in the USSR in 1936. The central Moscow government turned Kyrgyzstan into a raw materialsproducing agrarian appendage of the Soviet Union dependent on the center’s subsidies. Russians dominated the Kyrgyz political scene until the 1960s. The accession of the native Kyrgyz to the ranks of the Kyrgyz political elite rekindled a centuries-old rivalry between the northern and southern clans that resulted in the establishment of a system of local patronage, a vestige from feudal times. In 1990, on the wave of perestroika, the north took charge of the republic and named Askar Akaev, a progressive academic, as its leader (Makarkin 2005). Askar Akaev

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 27 became the ﬁrst president of Kyrgyzstan, which gained independence from the Soviet Union in August 1991. With independence, Kyrgyzstan inherited a host of economic problems and domestic security concerns. Rampant crime, a pervasive drug industry, weapons smuggling, and human trafﬁcking thrived in a rapidly changing social, political, and economic environment. Political instability in the republic’s vicinity exacerbated these security problems. Caught amidst intense political conﬂicts—post-civil war inﬁghting in Tajikistan, the Taliban’s resistance in Afghanistan, and Islamists’ insurgency in Uzbekistan—Kyrgyzstan, itself, has been a target of incursions by Islamic ﬁghters. The largest incursions took place in August 1999, when armed militants of the IMU crossed into Kyrgyzstan, taking a number of hostages, including foreign citizens (US Department of State: The Ofﬁce of the Secretary of State 2000). Since then, a series of terrorist acts and hostage-taking incidents have occurred in Kyrgyzstan (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database 2006). All these attacks have been blamed on the IMU and the East Turkistan Liberation Organization. The latter group unites ethnic Uighurs, the Muslims of Turkic descent, who reside in the north-western region of China and are seeking to establish an independent state. On several occasions during 1999–2000, the Kyrgyz military forces clashed with the IMU insurgents who were attempting to penetrate the Kyrgyz territory and take hostages from among the Kyrgyz population (Neshkumai 2000). After these raids, the Kyrgyz government declared international terrorism as a threat to Kyrgyzstan’s national security and began hardening its responses toward terrorism and religious extremism. The government concentrated its intelligence and counterterrorism efforts on the IMU and its military and political allies, both inside and outside of the county (UN Security Council 2006). The Kyrgyz authorities also intensiﬁed persecution of members of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (The Party of Islamic Liberation), a radical Islamic movement, which advocates for the re-creation of the historical Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia. In contrast to the IMU, Hizb ut-Tahrir is a non-militant Islamist movement. According to an ofﬁcial statement of the mission and method of the group, it neither directly advocates nor engages in violence for accomplishing its goals (ICG 2003a; Karagiannis 2005). The Kyrgyz government, however, alleges that Hizb ut-Tahrir has ties with the IMU. The toppling of the Taliban regime and the destruction of Al-Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan severely weakened the IMU. The remnants of this militant organization created a number of splinter groups, which continue to recruit and train volunteers in parts of Central Asia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Despite the presence of militant Islamists in the Central Asian republics, their numbers in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere in Central Asia are much smaller than the ofﬁcial ﬁgures published by the governments of these states. After the IMU suffered severe losses of the rank-and-ﬁle members and the rupture of organizational ties, the Kyrgyz authorities, for a short while, acknowledged that the terrorist threat had declined. Soon after, however, they began speaking out about the dangerous resurgence of radical Islam in Central Asia, and Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism responses

28

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy

intensiﬁed once again. The government has shifted its attention to nonmilitant Islamic groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, whose public support, according to public ofﬁcials, has been rapidly growing across the region. Some recent studies, news articles, and governmental reports assert that the threat of radical Islamic groups to regional security is growing. The reality, however, is more complex in Kyrgyzstan. Central Asian states, particularly Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are bastions of moderate and traditional Islam. For the majority of Kyrgyz Muslims, Islam is not merely a religion. It is a sociocultural system, a cultural heritage, a facet of ethnic identity, and a way of life (Chotaeva 2003). For this reason, Kyrgyzstan’s believers are often considered as “nominal” Muslims practicing “popular Islam,” deﬁned by adherence to traditions and customs rather than strict observance of Islamic rituals.2 Radical ideas concerning the establishment of an Islamic state have been alien to the majority of Kyrgyz. Many people in Central Asia, even in the traditional centers of Islamic piety, have developed distrust and hostility toward radical Islamic groups because Islamism and religious fundamentalism have become associated with the threat of civil war and instability. This is not to say that the risks of terrorism, religious extremism, and Islamists’ incursions do not exist in Central Asia. These threats, however, have been consistently exaggerated by both the governments and the Islamists. Recent ﬁeld research suggests that terrorists and Islamists have limited capabilities in Kyrgyzstan and the broader region (Bartuzi, Zasada, and Zygala 2002; Berdikeeva 2005). In spite of this, the Kyrgyz authorities have alleged that the IMU and radical Islamic groups still pose the gravest security threat. Not long ago, the government of Kyrgyzstan declared “gazavat” (war) against Islamists (Karimov 2006). The Kyrgyz leaders’ interpretations and reactions to terrorist threat do not correspond to the objective levels of violence in the republic or the Central Asian region. What, then, explains Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy? Why does the Kyrgyz government continue to intensify counterterrorism measures in the absence of evidence of a growing terrorist threat? Why does it commit an increasing number of human rights violations under the pretext of ﬁghting international terrorism? A central premise of this book is that the international environment in which states operate strongly inﬂuences their views on the nature of terrorist threat and appropriate counterterrorism responses. It is my contention that Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy can best be understood in light of the counterterrorism measures and practices adopted by Kyrgyzstan’s social groups. To assess the inﬂuence of Kyrgyzstan’s social environment on the state’s counterterrorism responses, this chapter begins by establishing its utilitarian, normative, and comparison reference groups. In doing so, it relies on historical narratives, written and verbal communications, and behavioral evidence to discern Kyrgyzstan’s national interests and identify groups of states, which, according to Kyrgyz political elites, can best satisfy Kyrgyzstan’s needs.3 Next, it examines the nature, content, and “style” of the reference groups’ counterterrorism policies as well as their human rights practices in the context of ﬁghting the terrorist threat. The last section reviews Kyrgyzstan’s

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 29 counterterrorism responses, and traces the republic’s counterterrorism policies to those of its reference groups.

Kyrgyzstan’s reference groups Kyrgyzstan is a small, landlocked country with a slowly developing economy, low per capita income, and a shortage of natural resources. As such, it has been highly dependent on neighboring states for access to the outside world and for the supply of energy resources. To stay ﬁnancially aﬂoat, Kyrgyzstan has relied on the remittances of labor migrants temporarily residing in Kazakhstan and Russia as well as the burgeoning trade with Beijing. Under these conditions, the republic’s freedom in independent foreign policy-making has been severely restrained. There is a broad consensus among analysts of Central Asia that due to Kyrgyzstan’s subordinate position, foreign powers have always exerted signiﬁcant inﬂuence on its domestic politics and foreign policy. The circumstances in which Kyrgyzstan exists have dominated the deﬁnition of its national goals.4 Askar Akaev, former Kyrgyz president and a renowned physicist, once compared Kyrgyzstan’s geopolitical environment to an “equation of motion” describing the behavior of a system of three bodies (namely, Russia, China, and the United States) and discreet local elements (other Central Asian states). The goal of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy has been to navigate geopolitical interests and create a balance between the global and regional players in Central Asia. According to ofﬁcial Bishkek, Russia, China, and the United States constitute the primary global vectors of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy, whereas its Central Asian neighbors are deﬁned as a regional vector. Akaev once likened his multi-vector approach to foreign policy with the search for the equation’s optimal solution, which would satisfy the interests of all parts of the system. Although equations of motion contain multiple possible solutions, the Kyrgyz government has adopted the one in favor of a strategic alliance with Russia and Russian-led regional organizations (Akaev 2003a,b, 2004c). Below, I explore how Russia and other global and regional players have entered Kyrgyzstan’s “equation of motion” and the role they have played in Kyrgyzstan’s politics and foreign policy using the reference group theory as an analytical lens. Kyrgyzstan after independence: troubles of the newly independent state The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought an economic disaster to Kyrgyzstan. During the Soviet era, the Kyrgyz economy was narrowly specialized in the production of cotton and agriculture. The natural resources mined in Kyrgyzstan were exported to other regions, while its own industry was run on imported raw materials. The republic’s economy was largely oriented on the Soviet Union’s military–industrial complex and Moscow’s subsidies determined the subsistence level in Kyrgyzstan. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan lost easy access to the major market for its export commodities, and the Russian government stripped the republic of most of its ﬁnancial aid. The Kyrgyz republic

30

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy

experienced serious challenges as it transited from its command economy to the market-based economic system. The republic lacked many instruments of governance for effective running of the independent state. Kyrgyzstan’s authorities had very limited knowledge of the rules of the market, and had inadequate training and the dearth of professional and managerial expertise. With meager executive experience, the leadership of the republic had to look for foreign assistance and guidance in establishing new institutions, devising economic policies, and building political, economic, and other relations with foreign governments and non-governmental entities abroad. In an effort to overhaul its plummeting economy, the Kyrgyz government agreed to a series of liberalization reforms supervised by the agencies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which provided Kyrgyzstan with ﬁnancial support for countering inﬂationary pressures and closing its balance of payments. The macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment efforts of the IMF, the World Bank, and a number of bilateral and multilateral donors did not bear much fruit in Kyrgyzstan. The country’s economy continued to slide downhill, hitting the bottom in 1995. Foreign investments in Kyrgyzstan, which had never been generous, became sparser in the mid-1990s. Many joint ventures with foreign investors did not bring expected beneﬁts, and revenues from the sales of Kyrgyz businesses were insigniﬁcant as well. The economic situation in Kyrgyzstan had improved at the century’s turn, but the growing debt and repayments on international loans became a heavy burden for the national budget. The exponential growth of arrears has sunk people’s living standards and fueled unemployment rates. In recent years, the global ﬁnancial crisis has ravaged local businesses, causing a signiﬁcant recession in several sectors of Kyrgyzstan’s economy. Production output in the country has decreased by almost 20 percent, while its inﬂation rate has been the highest in the post-Soviet territory. Against the backdrop of bleak economic conditions, Kyrgyzstan’s security situation and its capacity to tackle its security problems deteriorated as well. Kyrgyzstan’s government faced an alarming rate of organized crime and growth in trafﬁcking of people, narcotics, and weapons. According to experts’ assessment, Kyrgyzstan has been under a high risk of becoming a staging post for the transportation of drugs from Afghanistan to Europe and the United States. In the 1990s, civil war in neighboring Tajikistan was the major reason for the government’s apprehension about the surrounding security situation. Today, the Kyrgyz government is alarmed with security implications of the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan and the Islamist threat in Central Asia. Political instability in the neighboring states begot an inﬂux of refugees to the densely populated regions of Kyrgyzstan, worsening their already dreary socio-economic and political situations. The republic’s economic, demographic, and military potential has been incommensurable to the aforementioned security concerns. The Kyrgyz army and security services cannot provide a symmetrical response in order to ensure the country’s protection. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan has derived its security from participation in military arrangements with other CIS states and guarantees of protection stemming from collective security agreements.

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 31 Security problems and deep economic crisis rekindled the longstanding clannish inﬁghting that threatened to destabilize the republic’s political scene. President Askar Akaev, who enjoyed the status of Central Asia’s Thomas Jefferson in the early 1990s, fell into disrepute at home and abroad for the increasingly authoritarian policies, corruption, and nepotism of his administration. In April 2005, Akaev’s opposition staged a revolt, using the 2005 electoral fraud scandal as a pretext for ousting the president. Akaev found asylum in Russia, and representatives of the southern clans, as well as some of Akaev’s opponents from the north ascended to the top power posts in Kyrgyzstan. First elected to the post of president in August 2005, Kurmanbek Bakiev pledged to stage a ﬁght against corruption and launch comprehensive democratic reforms. Quickly, however, he became embroiled in a heated confrontation over the distribution of power with former allies and a strong but unruly parliament. In a series of political maneuvers over the following years, the new president split the opposition camp and implemented electoral reform in advance of the parliamentary elections. Thanks to the changes in electoral laws and access to administrative resources during the pre-election period, a newly created pro-presidential political movement, Ak Zhol, won a decisive victory in the 2007 elections to Jogorku Kenesh, Kyrgyzstan’s unicameral parliament. Kurmanbek Bakiev succeeded in the creation of a functional one-party state ruled by his family and a tight circle of the president’s conﬁdants. His presidential future, however, was not guaranteed, particularly ahead of the 2009 presidential elections. The failure of the Bakiev administration to solve the food and energy crisis during some of the harshest winters in Kyrgyzstan disgruntled the country’s population. The Kyrgyz president had legitimate fears that he would be voted out for breaking his promises about improving the country’s political, economic, and social situation. As the former president Akaev before him, Kurmanbek Bakiev had to look for external political guarantees to his regime in case of civil war or political breakdown (ICG 2006a). Bakiev was re-elected for the second term as Kyrgyzstan’s president. His win, however, neither resolved nor improved the country’s political, economic, or social conditions. For the second time in a ﬁveyear period, Kyrgyzstan descended into a severe political crisis following a popular unheaval and mass clashes between opposition protesters and law enforcement forces in April 2010. In the aftermath of riots leaving dozens of people dead, the Kyrgyz parliament was disbanded, President Bakiev ﬂed the capital and, later, the country, and a new interim government was formed. The opposition that rose to power is plagued by internal rivalries and lack of competence. Today, as before, the Kyrgyz ruling elite needs external support to pull the country out of endemic crisis, to consolidate their power, and ensure their political survival. Aside from the economic and security problems, Kyrgyzstan’s government has been concerned with its low international standing. Owing to the remoteness of the country and minimal strategic importance, Kyrgyzstan has been little known to the outside world. Akaev and his ministers had to traverse the globe in order to establish relations with other countries and ﬁnd partners abroad. By the mid-1990s, Kyrgyzstan was recognized by 120 nations and had established diplomatic relations with just about 60 of them (Curtis 1997). Kyrgyzstan’s massive liberalization

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and democratization reforms accorded the country the image of a Central Asian beacon of democracy in the early 1990s. Yet this representation quickly faded as Akaev’s democratic government turned into an autocratic one (Sadji 2001). The Bakiev cabinet, too, has abjured the liberal democratic model of governance in favor of the limited or managed democracy ruled by a strong president. Western states and international organizations have harshly criticized the corruptive practices of Kyrgyzstan’s administration, its marginalization of the opposition, and electoral fraud. Subsequently, the Bakiev government had sought opportunities to add luster to its international standing and to enhance Kyrgyzstan’s image abroad. States that Kyrgyzstan relied on Owing to its lack of natural resources, narrowly specialized economy, and small and isolated internal market, Kyrgyzstan’s economic performance has been contingent on economic policies of other states and the developmental assistance of international donors. Kyrgyzstan’s economic indicators, for example, have been largely affected by the extent of ﬁnancial aid from Moscow as well as the economic climate in the Russian state. The energy and trade policies of other Central Asian republics have had important implications for the health of the Bishkek economy, which also beneﬁted from growing trade and foreign investments from Beijing. After independence, Kyrgyzstan remained in the Russian rouble zone, and the Kyrgyz and Russian markets were tightly intertwined. Although Kyrgyzstan introduced its own currency, som, in 1993, by that time it had accumulated considerable debt to Russia. The growth of payment arrears on Russia’s energy imports and outstanding amounts associated with inter-governmental trade expanded the Kyrgyz portfolio of external liabilities to Russia. Servicing this debt only became possible due to a number of short-term debt rollover granted by Moscow. In the 1990s, for example, Kyrgyzstan rescheduled repayments of parts of its debt owed to Russia ﬁve times (Odling-Smee and Linn 2001). During the early 1990s, Russia simply vacated the Central Asian region, zeroing in on building its own economic and political ties with the United States and Europe. The vacuum left behind in Kyrgyzstan was quickly ﬁlled with the growing presence of Western institutions, ﬁrms, and other foreign donors. Either directly or through international monetary funds and banks, Europe and the United States provided Kyrgyzstan with millions of dollars in assistance in order to goad the Kyrgyz leadership into democratization and liberal reforms (Huskey 1997: 242). The volume of ﬁnancial aid was still meager compared to the gravity of the republic’s economic problems. Despite the largesse of developmental assistance provided by the West, Kyrgyzstan remained economically dependent on Russia, and the Kyrgyz government has sought economic and trade beneﬁts from Moscow to keep the weak Kyrgyz economy aﬂoat (Bakshi 1999). According to the Kyrgyz leadership, deeper economic and trade integration with Russia have always been in the interests of Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz government has repeatedly stated that strengthening every aspect of relations with Moscow is one of the key long-term priorities of Kyrgyzstan (Akaev 2003a,b; Bakiev 2007; Weinstein 2005).

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 33 The ebbs and ﬂows of Russia’s economy along with Moscow’s reluctance to shoulder aid burden to Kyrgyzstan have prompted the Kyrgyz government to diversify its economic ties. China was a much-welcomed alternative to both Western and Russian assistance. In recent years, developing strategic partnership with China has become one of the top priorities for Kyrgyzstan. The rapidly expanding Chinese economy, the growing weight of Beijing in international and regional affairs, the considerable demographic and economic potential of the Chinese, as well as their geographic proximity to Central Asia, have made China an attractive regional partner for Kyrgyzstan (Bakiev 2007). Similar to the Kyrgyz economy, Kyrgyzstan’s national security has largely depended on the security policies and assistance of other states. In the early 1990s, Russia’s military forces safeguarded the security interests of Kyrgyzstan. The Russian border guards used to patrol Kyrgyz borders (Curtis 1997). Kyrgyzstan’s servicemen received education and training in Russian military schools and Moscow supplied Kyrgyzstan with military equipment and gear. The economic crisis that hit the Russian Federation in 1998 severely limited Moscow’s capacity for increasing its presence in Central Asia. The launch of the second military operation in Chechnya in 1999 prevented the Russian leadership from delivering military assistance to Kyrgyzstan.5 Despite the Kremlin’s own economic and military hardships, there has been no other state willing or able to assume Russia’s security role in Central Asia or Kyrgyzstan. The United States and NATO have sustained military ties with the Central Asian republics since the early 1990s and have expanded their military presence in the region following the commencement of the military campaign in Afghanistan. In the opinion of the Kyrgyz administration, neither the American government nor the leadership of the Northern Alliance has so far demonstrated readiness to shoulder responsibility for the security of Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan (Akaev 2003a,b). The Kyrgyz military participated in the Central Asian peacekeeping battalion under the aegis of the Central Asian Economic Union, and continues to take part in small military projects within the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP). Despite these initiatives, the republic’s authorities believe that Kyrgyzstan’s security is contingent on Russia. On different occasions, Askar Akaev stated that only Russia can guarantee stability and security in Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan (Semenov 2003). Many in the Kyrgyz administration feel that Russia, more so than the United States or any other state of the world, is willing and able to provide the desired level of security, political support, and economic assistance to their country (Shablovskiy 2003). The Kyrgyz government supposes that it is by strengthening bilateral security ties with the Russian Federation and actively participating in the regional security institutions championed by the Russian state that Kyrgyzstan will succeed in ﬁghting organized crime, trafﬁcking in weapons and narcotics, Islamic insurgency, and terrorism. This will promote security in the region as a whole and ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan. Russia has also shouldered responsibility for the inviolability of the governing regimes and the safety of the Central Asian ruling elites. The Kremlin has been very supportive of the governments in Central Asia, and deaf and dumb in relations with the opposition in these states. Russia, for example, took President Karimov’s

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side after his troops ﬁred at peaceful protesters in Andijan, Uzbekistan, despite harsh criticisms of the Karimov regime in the West and the isolation of his country. The Kremlin provided safe haven for the former Kyrgyz president, Askar Akaev, who ﬂed the republic after a series of events known as the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan. Russia’s ﬁnancial assistance and political backing was instrumental for preserving the powers of the Kyrgyz president, Kurmanbek Bakiev. Moscow awarded Bakiev with a lavish ﬁnancial package consisting of US$150 million in aid and US$2.3 billion in state loans to pay for the closure of the American military base. The Russian money helped the Bakiev team to run a successful election campaign and launch a new construction project—a hydropower plant—that ﬁgured strongly in Bakiev’s election platform in 2009. Some of the Russian funds were channeled to the public sector of the republic for increasing payments to various social programs. Russia also wrote off US$180 million of the Kyrgyz foreign debt in exchange for 48 percent of shares in Kyrgyzstan’s strategic industries (Blank 2009; Yusupova 2009). There has been more to Russia’s inﬂuence in Kyrgyzstan than serving the republic’s economic and security needs. Many observers presume that there have been more subtle bonds tying the former Soviet republic with Moscow: notably, culture, ideology, and language (Eshanova 2002a). Askar Akaev, himself, reinforced this belief by noting that centuries of back-to-back existence in Eurasia and the similarity of national characters, histories, and aspirations, laid down a solid foundation for the union of Russia and Kyrgyzstan (Surovtsev 2001). Kyrgyzstan’s ofﬁcials have characterized the republic’s relations with Russia as the most advanced in the post-Soviet territory, referencing not only security, military, economic, and trade relations, but also scientiﬁc and cultural ties (Akaev 2004a,b). With Russia’s rising image shored up by the profusion of oil and gas dollars, political, economic, and cultural partnerships with Moscow have become attractive to many states. Earlier, it was noted that the Kyrgyz government, whose international reputation was tarnished following electoral fraud and the circumvention of political freedoms, sought for alternative ways to enhance its public standing and the country’s image abroad. For the Kyrgyz government, the country’s integration with Russia appears to be the optimal solution for elevating the republic’s regional and domestic standing because Kyrgyzstan does not stand a chance of developing into a Western-style participatory democracy anytime soon (Olcott 2006). Some Kyrgyz politicians have voiced the opinion that Kyrgyzstan’s participation in Russian-led projects is a sensible choice because it serves as an entry ticket to the political elites’ club.6 China’s rapidly developing economy freed an abundance of capital available for investments abroad. It also bestowed China with new prestige and growing weight in international affairs. The Kyrgyz government highly values Chinese investments and China’s political support in resolving Kyrgyzstan’s economic and political issues. Both the Chinese model of development and Russia’s relative prosperity have been looked to as models for Kyrgyzstan’s struggling economy. In summary, there have been several groups of states whose policies have affected the realization of Kyrgyzstan’s economic, security, and other goals.

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 35 According to the Kyrgyz government, Kyrgyzstan’s economic and political stability, security, and international standing hinges upon Russia, China, and, to a lesser extent, the West, particularly, the United States. Central Asian states, too, shape the security environment in the region and control Kyrgyzstan’s access to outside markets and energy resources. The foreign policy doctrine developed by president Akaev denounced the “either–or” principle of foreign policy, and proposed, instead, building “and–and” relations with the outside world. This foreign policy principle allowed Kyrgyzstan to pursue its national interests by establishing contact with other states without threatening the interests or violating responsibilities that emanate from Kyrgyzstan’s membership in Russian-led organizations and treaties (Akaev 2003b). Kyrgyzstan’s partnership with Russia: pragmatic choice or value-based community? According to reference group theory, the locus of states’ inﬂuence, that is, their capacity to direct or modify the behavior of other states, lies in their ability to satisfy instrumental, value-expressive, and informational goals of states. A state can yield to the inﬂuence of a group of states for utilitarian reasons, in order to secure important beneﬁts or avoid losses mediated by the group. A state can bring its policies in conformance with what is perceived as the group’s norms and perspectives for value-expressive reasons, in order to become accepted by the group in which membership is beneﬁcial to the state’s self-image. Finally, a state can modify its policies in light of the information, knowledge, and expertise provided by other states. The Kyrgyz government has never denied Russia’s inﬂuence on the country or the Central Asian region as a whole. Askar Akaev, the former Kyrgyz president, asserted that Russia would always play an important role in Central Asia and any attempt aimed at expelling Russia from the region would be doomed (Akaev 2004a). Akaev’s political foresight had been manifested in the Russian-oriented foreign policy of the government of President Kurmanbek Bakiev (Institute for Public Policy 2006b; Olcott 2006). Kyrgyzstan depends on Russia’s economic favors, political support, and security assistance. Such dependency leaves Kyrgyzstan with no other option but to take into consideration Moscow’s preferences and opinions in making its decisions regarding both international and domestic affairs. In fact, Kyrgyzstan’s public and foreign policy have generally dovetailed with Moscow’s interests. The Kyrgyz government has granted the Russian language the status of a second state language. Kyrgyzstan and Russia have signed a dual citizenship agreement that facilitated the movement of Kyrgyz and Russian nationals across the borders of their states. In 2003, Kyrgyzstan let Russia open its air base in Kant, which now serves as a stronghold of Moscow’s political and security interests in Central Asia. Following president Bakiev’s volte-face on the American military base at Manas (to Russia’s dismay, the Kyrgyz government transformed the air base into a freight transit center instead of closing it), the Kyrgyz government agreed to the deployment of a second Russian military base housing CSTO forces in the town of Osh, in southern Kyrgyzstan.

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This decision was made despite the disapproval of Uzbekistan and latent concerns of other CSTO members. Kyrgyzstan has been a stalwart supporter of regional organizations spearheaded by Russia. Moscow’s controversial activities abroad and at home never invoked ofﬁcial condemnation or criticism from Bishkek. When the West was castigating the Kremlin for a politically motivated trial of the chairman of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Kyrgyz government did not say a word against the arrest and prosecution of the Russian tycoon. Reportedly, although there was no public approval or disapproval of Russia’s military engagement in Georgia and South Ossetia in August 2008, the Kyrgyz government supported Moscow in bilateral talks held behind closed doors. The Kyrgyz leaders expressed understanding of Russian foreign policy toward the South Caucasus, while the Kremlin’s military operation in Georgia was assessed as legitimate and justiﬁed (Grozin 2008). The Kyrgyz government has not voiced any concerns with Russia’s recognition of the independence of Georgia’s breakaway territories. The pro-Russian moves of the Kyrgyz government have been largely driven by Kyrgyzstan’s increasingly pragmatic approach to its foreign policy. The Kyrgyz government plays up to Russian interests because it believes that Moscow can provide important security guarantees and economic protection to Kyrgyzstan. Recently, for example, the Kyrgyz government agreed to a transfer of 30 percent of its fuel market to the command of Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled natural gas monopoly. This Russian largest energy corporation purchased almost 100 gas stations in Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 2006. In 2008, Gazprom acquired licenses for geological prospecting and exploration of potential oil and gas ﬁelds in the south of Kyrgyzstan, and a year later it was set to acquire a majority stake in Kyrgyzstan’s national gas company KyrgyzGaz. The Kyrgyz government has negotiated two hydropower plant projects with the Russian electrical company United Energy System. The Russian Navy leases plots of land in the Issyk Kul area of Kyrgyzstan. The Russian investments in the hydroelectric projects, in the agricultural sector, and in the cotton industry have been viewed as crucial for the revival of the Kyrgyz economy. As of early 2009, Kyrgyzstan’s principal debt to Russia was over US$193 million. The restructuring of Kyrgyzstan’s multi-million dollar debt to Russia has been a top priority of the government of Kyrgyzstan. Since much of Russia’s inﬂuence on Kyrgyzstan has been based on the mediation of tangible rewards and punishments, Russia has primarily played an important utilitarian function for Kyrgyzstan. Alexander Kulinsky, a renowned political analyst in Kyrgyzstan, acknowledged that Kyrgyzstan’s drift toward Russia was a pragmatic choice for the Kyrgyz government. “Whoever puts in the most capital— that will be the country’s orientation,” asserted the analyst (Saralaeva 2005). On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan’s support of Russian policies has also been fostered by sympathy toward Russia emanating from a perception of shared cultures, ideologies, and values, as well as historical and geographical ties. The Kyrgyz government believes that both Kyrgyzstan and Russia belong to the same Eurasian civilization, a geopolitical, economic, cultural, spiritual, and linguistic space that was formed, according to the Kyrgyz leadership, around Russia (Abdulatipov 2001;

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 37 Akaev 2003a). The perceived commonality of national characters and widespread sympathetic feelings for Russia are stimulated by Russian TV, Russian music, Russian news media, Russian fashion, and the Russian language that are still prevalent in Kyrgyzstan. The former president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev, for example, has never veiled his personal afﬁnity for Russia. Akaev considered Russia as his second motherland. The former Kyrgyz leader spent 17 years in St. Petersburg, a time that he has characterized as “the best period of [his] life” (Abdulatipov 2001; Akaev 2003a). The majority of public and political elite share this fondness of Russia. In a survey conducted by the InterMedia Survey Institute (Washington, DC) on a random sample of 1,000 Kyrgyzstan citizens, almost 92 percent of respondents expressed a positive attitude toward Russia. Only young people in Kyrgyzstan have been increasingly oriented toward the West (Bondarets 2005). The results of this survey were largely conﬁrmed in another poll conducted by one of the social services of Kyrgyzstan in 2005. The poll revealed that, on average, 80 percent of the Kyrgyz people consider Russia to be the main ally of the country and many of them expressed aspiration to integrate with Russia.7 A number of analysts studying public opinion in Kyrgyzstan dubbed the attitudes of the Kyrgyz toward the former Russian President Vladimir Putin as “worshipping” and “idolatrous respect” (Motosmonov 2009). The Kyrgyz public perceives Russian presidents favorably and even the legitimacy of the Kyrgyz president is often contingent on his attitudes toward Russia and his personal relations with the Russian head of state (Mambetaliev 2008). There are many public ofﬁcials, particularly those in the security circles and the Kyrgyz intelligentsia clustered around the Kyrgyz– Russian Slavic University, who sympathize with Russia (Makarkin 2005). Some of the political opponents also consider Russia’s inﬂuence in the country as “very good for Kyrgyzstan” (Economist 2009). The Kyrgyz government shares more common goals with its Russian counterpart than it does with any other state of the world (Weinstein 2005). Both states have been interested in developing their own “special” types of democracy, and both have been wary and critical of democratic institution-building projects promoted by the West. In his book A Memorable Decade published in Russia under the title, A Hard Road toward Democracy, Akaev wrote, “There is no [sic] and cannot be a universal type of democracy applicable in all times, to all countries, and peoples. Every society developed its own approach to democracy taking into account special circumstances of its development” (quoted in Abdulatipov 2001). In an interview to the Russian radio station Mayak, Askar Akaev stated that democratic principles have been endemic to the nomadic culture of the Kyrgyz. The nomadic tribes have always valued the freedoms of thought, expression, and movement that constitute “a peculiar [Asian] type of democracy” (Semenov 2003). President Bakiev, too, abandoned the aspiration to develop the country into a Western-style liberal democracy opting, instead, for a model of democracy adopted by the Russian state. Echoing the president, many Central Asian political scientists have rightly observed the growing popularity of the idea of a special “Asian way” to democratize, and the inability of the former communist

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republics to embrace Western democratic values (Tolipov 2007). Russian leaders and political pundits have declaimed before the Western states about Russia’s own democratic path, dubbed “sovereign democracy,” and it has never been a Russian intent to transpose its model of democracy on other states. Neither democracy, nor progress has been declared by Russia as its foreign policy aims in the postSoviet world. Instead, stabilization has been the quintessence of its power games in Central Asia. International observers have repeatedly declared that political processes unfolding in Russia and Kyrgyzstan have failed to meet Western democratic standards. The governments of both states have shared a sense of annoyance and discontent with having been reprimanded by the US and European states for moving down an authoritarian path. The leadership of each country has chastised Western nations’ attempts to meddle in their domestic affairs. The geographical proximity of Russia and the remoteness of the West have also played an important role in the development of Kyrgyz–Russian ties. Even the most ardent Westernizers in Kyrgyzstan recognize that Kyrgyzstan’s integration into Europe is out of the question due to the geographic location of the country, the mentality of the Kyrgyz, and the country’s level of economic and political development. Therefore, the Kyrgyz authorities have expressed strong preference for more direct forms of integration with Russia, and the creation of supra-national organizations in the territory of the former Soviet Union (Wood 2006). In fact, the Kyrgyz government has always hoped for more attention, support, and integration with the Russian state than the Russian cabinet has been willing or able to provide. Russia has become not only Kyrgyzstan’s primary utilitarian group, but also its only normative reference group, whose inﬂuence stemmed from a sense of afﬁnity toward Russia shared by many Kyrgyz, perceived similarity of goals and values, historical ties, and belonging to the same Eurasian geopolitical space. The Kyrgyz leadership believes that, through Russia, the Central Asian cultures became known to the world, and European culture reached Central Asia. Russia has been viewed as an important bearer and transmitter of the European values to the Kyrgyz land. For Kyrgyzstan, the West has been associated with Russia (Wood 2006). This, as well as Russia’s relative economic and military might and international standing, added to the attractiveness of Russia for Kyrgyzstan. Russia as Kyrgyzstan’s normative reference group By deﬁnition, a normative reference group is a state or a group of states with which other states seek identiﬁcation and integration. To promote this integration and acceptance, states bring their policies and behavior in conformance with what is perceived as the group’s values and norms. Kyrgyzstan has been one of a few newly independent states sharing Russia’s views on the CIS. Like the Russian leadership, the Kyrgyz public ofﬁcials believe that the CIS established at the end of 1991 had vindicated itself as an institution. It ensured peaceful transformation from the union of Soviet republics to a system of sovereign states, and preservation of a common educational, cultural, and informational space. Akaev opined that the CIS was a springboard for developing inter-state relations of the

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 39 post-Soviet republics and stated his government’s interest in strengthening the existing institutional mechanisms developed within the CIS (Bakiev 2007). Kyrgyzstan does not dissociate from its Soviet past. The foreign policy concept of Kyrgyzstan characterizes it as a post-communist state located at a historical juncture of the communist past and democratic future (Bakiev 2007). Contrary to other republics’ deprecation of Russia’s colonial rule, the Kyrgyz leadership shares Moscow’s perspective on the positive role of Imperial and Soviet Russia in the history of Kyrgyzstan (Akaev 2003b). The Kyrgyz position is best captured in Chingiz Aitmatov’s (1995: 2) words, “the Soviet past, with all its difﬁculties and suffering, prepared [the Kyrgyz] for the surprising opportunity to suddenly receive as a small nation the status of a state and world recognition.” The Soviet government united the majority of ethnic Kyrgyz in a single political unit, the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic, established in 1936. The creation of the Kyrgyz republic provided the Kyrgyz with national symbols, rituals, and practices, and prepared the republic for independent statehood. Tsarist and Soviet Russia fostered the Kyrgyz intelligentsia and political elite. According to Akaev, the Soviet epoch was “a renaissance in healthcare, culture, education, and science” in Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan (Aitmatov 1995: 2). Kyrgyz leaders chastised the anti-Russian policies of the former Soviet republics. Particularly, with regard to Georgia, Askar Akaev expressed a bitter reminder that Georgia joined the Russian Empire voluntarily in accordance with the 1783 treaty, and if the Russian Tsar had not protected the beleaguered Georgians, a political map of Eurasia in the early twentieth century would have had no Caucasian republics (Tretjakov 2004). Akaev wrote that the newly independent states, such as Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, would not have existed without Imperial and Soviet rule, which were the necessary precursors of modern states and nations. The Kyrgyz leaders’ critical assessment of a stream of “velvet” and “rose” revolutions mimics that of their Russian counterparts. President Akaev declared: … the revolution in Georgia … deﬁed the young state formed on the postsoviet space. I, personally, interpreted it as a challenge … I think that the further dissemination of “velvet revolution” technologies based on the concept of a limited state sovereignty, leads to the weakening of our Commonwealth … (Akaev 2004a: 76) The Kyrgyz leaders view events in Georgia and Ukraine as state coups initiated and funded from abroad (Tretjakov 2004). Both Akaev and his successor have been highly critical of Washington’s pressures, perceived as an unwanted interference in Kyrgyzstan’s internal affairs. Russia’s positions have been very inﬂuential not only in deﬁning the contours of Kyrgyzstan’s domestic politics and foreign policy, but also in molding the geopolitical culture of the Kyrgyz, particularly ethnic Russians, who even consider the republic a territory within the CSTO and SCO (Mambetaliev 2008: 11). The negative image of the United States and the West has been engrafted into the Kyrgyz public by the Russian broadcasting channels and press that dominate

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Kyrgyz informational space. Naturally, similar to Russia, Kyrgyzstan has evinced a strengthening attitude of anti-Westernism. There is another reason for why Bishkek has had its eyes glued on Moscow. The old political leadership of Kyrgyzstan as well as the new political leaders that replaced Akaev’s and Bakiev’s political protégés were members of the Soviet political elite (Olcott 2005, 3). Kyrgyzstan’s army was created on the basis of units stationed at the Soviet-era Central Asian Military district, and the latter’s organizational and personnel structure has been largely retained (Knyazev 2008). All of the senior ofﬁcer corps in Kyrgyzstan served in the Soviet Army, and, according to military analysts, the command of the Kyrgyz military forces has been affected by “Soviet thinking” (McDermott 2004). The new generation of the Kyrgyz servicemen continues to rely on Russia as a source of their military education and training. The Kyrgyz national security agencies were also created on the basis of the republic’s branch of the Soviet KGB. The former Soviet-era security professionals working in the security establishments of Kyrgyzstan maintain close ties with their Russian counterparts. This inﬂuences Kyrgyzstan’s security operations, the working style of Kyrgyz security specialists and their vision of security problems. What prevented Russia from securing a ﬁrm foothold in Kyrgyzstan is Moscow’s own foreign policy, which has combined instruments of power politics, nearly complete disinterest in the region, and a condescending (at times, humiliating) attitude toward Russia’s smaller neighbors. Following the dismemberment of the USSR, Moscow’s foreign policy exhibited a strong pro-Western tilt, and a mélange of domestic problems kept the Russian government’s focus and funds away from the former Soviet republics (Bakshi 1999; Beshimov 2006). The interest in Russia’s “near abroad” grew stronger in 1993–4 on the background of growing nationalist sentiment and disillusionment with the West (Bakshi 1996). Russia declared a desire to preserve and strengthen its military presence and economic predominance in the former Soviet states, including the republics of Central Asia, a policy that provoked mounting fears of Moscow’s neo-imperial aims (Bakich 1997; Dorian, Rossi, and Indriyanto 1994). It was not until the late 1990s, however, that the Kremlin began increasing its military, strategic, cultural, and economic presence in Central Asia because Russia’s own economic, political, and military weaknesses got in the way of realization of Moscow’s ambitious aims. By that time the United States had substantially expanded its presence in what Russian leaders branded as the “soft underbelly” of Russia threatening to undermine the Kremlin’s centuries-old inﬂuence in the Central Asian states (Freedman 1996–7). Moscow reoriented its foreign policy course toward Central Asia because of its oil and gas projects that promised to turn the Russian state into the major supplier of energy resources to feed the growing economies of Asian giants—India and China. The Kyrgyz political turmoil also revealed the precariousness of balance of domestic political forces in Central Asian states and threatened to increase Russia’s costs for maintaining security and stability in these nations (Freedman 1996–7). Subsequently, the restoration of Russian inﬂuence throughout the postSoviet region had become a motto of Putin’s regime. The growth of world energy

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 41 prices signiﬁcantly increased Russia’s revenues and boosted the country’s ﬁnancial standing. It allowed the Russian government to put Putin’s plan into action and increase Russia’s presence and inﬂuence in Central Asian states and elsewhere in the post-Soviet region. It is not a mere coincidence, for example, that toward the end of his second term as president, Putin decreed the creation of a new state body, the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs, which has been dubbed the “Russian USAID.” The Central Asian foreign policy of the new Russian President Dmitri Medvedev continues in the same vein. The ﬁrst visits of the newly elected state leader were to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia. This conveyed a clear message about Russia’s foreign policy priorities and reafﬁrmed that a special kind of relations are enjoyed by these states with the Kremlin. In this rapprochement with Central Asian republics, Russia appears to be primarily interested in receiving strategic and economic beneﬁts for itself. Attempts to restore Russia’s global inﬂuence (for declared geopolitical reasons and due to Moscow’s imperial tradition) and the sidestepping of Kyrgyz interests hamper the development of a genuine Russia–Kyrgyzstan partnership grounded on principles of friendship and equality (Bondarets 2005; Yasmann 2006). Moscow’s foreign policy continues to serve as an obstacle to promoting Kyrgyzstan’s strong normative identiﬁcation with the Russian state. Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors: induced cooperation Devoid of energy resources, Kyrgyzstan relies on its oil and gas-rich neighbors for the sale of fuels. A landlocked state, Kyrgyzstan depends on Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan for access to the outside world. All aircraft leaving and arriving at the Kyrgyz airports in Osh and Jalal-Abad have to go through Uzbekistan’s airspace. Several southern regions in Kyrgyzstan used to have no direct ground transportation links with the Kyrgyz capital, and the overland trafﬁc from Kyrgyzstan’s south had to traverse Uzbekistan’s territory. Around 20 percent of Kyrgyz imports go to other Central Asian republics, whereas the total share of intra-regional exports to Kyrgyzstan constitutes around a quarter of its trade (Asian Development Bank 2006). Kyrgyzstan’s dismal economic condition undermined its ability to pay for the imported energy resources on time, and the debt to Uzbekistan for gas amounted to US$23 million in 2009 (RFE/RL 2009a). On several occasions in the past, Uzbekistan halted its exports of gas to Kyrgyzstan, souring relations with the neighbor. To avoid interruptions in the fuel supply and in the transit of air and ground vehicles, Kyrgyzstan needs to make concessions to the Uzbek government. Uzbekistan has been exploiting, free of charge, its industrial sites, power lines, and gas pipes located in Kyrgyzstan. Tashkent has enjoyed the exclusive use of water reservoirs that were built in Kyrgyzstan during the Soviet period for hydration of Uzbek cotton plantations. Kyrgyzstan’s plans to construct a hydropower plant have been perceived as a challenge to national security in Uzbekistan and president Karimov has repeatedly sabotaged the prospects for regional collaboration on economic and political issues during the summits of various regional organizations. The Uzbek government has not been compensating Kyrgyzstan

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for environmental and economic damages caused by ﬂooding. Challenging the Tashkent authorities is out of question in Kyrgyzstan: the country may suffer new cuts in gas supplies or, even, a forceful takeover of the reservoirs in the case of deﬁance (Grebenshchikov 2000). Both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have used “sticks” and “carrots” with Kyrgyzstan as a way of putting political pressure on Bishkek. The Uzbek government has used its energy monopoly in Kyrgyzstan as political leverage for gaining political concessions from Kyrgyz policy-makers (Saidazimova 2005a). Kazakhstan has applied its political and economic weight to inﬂuence Kyrgyzstan on various dimensions of domestic politics and foreign relations. One US diplomat stated, “As the economic and political situation deteriorated in Kyrgyzstan, Akaev listened more and more to Nazarbaev, who told him, ‘Tell the Americans what they want to hear, and then do it the way you think it should be done’”(quoted in Spence 2005). The Bakiev government needed Kazakhstan on its side, and president Bakiev was personally indebted to president Nazarbaev for political backing. To return the political and economic support of Kazakhstan, President Bakiev pushed a number of important decisions favoring the neighboring republic through the country’s pliable parliament. The Kyrgyz unicameral legislature approved a contentious border agreement signed in 2001 and ratiﬁed by the Parliament of Kazakhstan in 2003. According to the agreement, Kyrgyzstan consents to the border delimitation line, which annexes to the republic a larger territory, but recognizes the sovereign right of Kazakhstan over strategically important lands that contain some infrastructure and possible gold deposits. The parliament also recognized Kazakhstan’s right to several resort areas on picturesque Lake Issyk Kul and began working on legislation that will remove any barriers to the economic expansion of Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan, where the Kazakh investments constitute about 60 percent of foreign investment in the Kyrgyz economy (Kim 2008). Although Central Asian states share many institutional, political, economic, and cultural similarities conducive to deeper integration in the region, there have been many obstacles to developing intraregional cooperation and closer identiﬁcation with the neighboring states. Central Asia does not constitute a viable and cohesive economic unit because its member states’ economies lack diversiﬁcation. There are no sufﬁcient incentives for intraregional trade, economic coordination, and cross-border investments into regional projects. Unresolved disputes over the apportionment of water consumption and Turkmenistan’s policy of “positive neutrality” have thwarted regional integration projects as well (Curtis 1997; Olcott 2005: 8–9). Regional elites have perceived integration as a form of constraint and, potentially, a challenge to their power to monitor and distribute national resources. Low levels of trust between the Central Asian governments have also impeded the development of cooperative ties between their states. Unilateral moves by the government of Uzbekistan—air-raids in the wake of the IMU attack in 1999, sealing the Uzbek border, and bullying—have placed a signiﬁcant strain not only on the relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, but also between Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states. The countries of the region have been concerned

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 43 with the overweening and untoward policies of Uzbekistan, suggesting that the country harbors some hegemonic aspirations. For these reasons, Central Asian leaders have never been eager to promote regional identities in their states. The ongoing rivalry for regional leadership and international preeminence between the Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, and Nursultan Nazarbaev, the leader of Kazakhstan, which has been reignited by varying degrees of the US political attention and assistance, has further undermined a sense of unity in the Central Asian region. With this intraregional rivalry and competition, it is hardly surprising that regional and sub-regional efforts to coordinate economic, defense, or security policy through mechanisms of multilateral cooperation have made little progress. As a result, the Kyrgyz government has never aspired to identify with the Central Asian republics. Kyrgyzstan’s cooperation with other Central Asian states has been driven by instrumental considerations. The republic has been playing up to the interests of more powerful neighbors because its economic and political stability has always been affected by developments in other Central Asian states (Turgunbekov 1999). Kyrgyzstan’s strategic partnership with China has also been premised on pragmatism. Cultural dissimilarities, geopolitical differences, and language barriers are important obstacles for integration with China or the emulation of policies promoted by Beijing. The relationship between China and Kyrgyzstan has suffered from lingering mistrust, the prevalence of the “myths” about Chinese expansion, and apprehension of Chinese intentions triggered by images of a dragon on Kyrgyzstan’s doorsteps. The Chinese government, itself, has shown no interest in spreading its cultural and political ideas and institutions in the Kyrgyz republic. On the contrary, the Beijing authorities have supported the Kyrgyz leadership’s efforts at maintaining national independence and sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek has repeatedly expressed appreciation for the Chinese government’s respect of the social and political rule established in the republic (Chinese Information Internet Center 2004). Both the “Tulip” revolution of 2005 and the public revolt of April 2010 in Kyrgyzstan came as big surprises to Beijing. The Chinese government has become more vigilant and less trusting of the new governments due to continuing instability in the republic, discontinuities in politics of the old and new Kyrgyz cabinets, the teetering political course of the Bakiev team, and fragmentation on all political fronts. Many ofﬁcials in the Kyrgyz administration do not consider China as a potential aggressor with aims of annexing parts of the Kyrgyz land. However, there is still a degree of anxiety over Chinese economic expansion and labor migration, which is disseminated in political circles, among the Kyrgyz public, and in the republican press. The rise to power of some Sino-phobic political leaders has further undermined China’s trust of the Kyrgyz political elites.8 Despite these important obstacles to full-ﬂedged cooperation between Bishkek and Beijing, both China and Kyrgyzstan share important economic and security goals, and the Chinese presence in Kyrgyzstan continues to grow, particularly in the economic realm. Chinese workers are visible in Kyrgyz enterprises, and Chinesemanufactured goods inundate street markets and ﬁll shelves in Kyrgyzstan’s stores. Chinese leaders aspire to create a safe regional environment conducive to

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the economic growth of their country, and hold a vested interest in expanding the Chinese market to other Central Asian republics. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, has been interested in attracting more Chinese investments and acquiring continued Chinese political support (Blank 2005). To secure China’s economic assistance and avoid a political row with Beijing, Kyrgyzstan has made important concessions to its powerful neighbor. The Kyrgyz government agreed to cede China about 125,000 hectares (about 367 square miles) of its northern mountainous territory in an attempt to settle a long-running border dispute (Daly 2005; Khamidov 2001). Kyrgyzstan was the ﬁrst post-Soviet state to recognize the market status of the Chinese economy in June of 2004. The Kyrgyz government granted China access to Kyrgyz electricity, iron, tungsten, and tin sectors in exchange for US$900 million in investments for building a new hydropower station, two smelting plants, and other business ventures in Kyrgyzstan (Daly 2005). The Kyrgyz republic has ﬁrmly adhered to the principle of “One China” and steadily supported the Chinese government on various issues including Taiwan, Tibet, and the ﬁght against East Turkistan’s pro-independence (Uighur) movement. The ﬁrmness of the new Kyrgyz administration’s position on these and other questions (such as Kyrgyzstan/China agreements signed under the Akaev and Bakiev regime) will strongly inﬂuence the extent of Beijing’s political trust in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan and the West: drifting apart After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Central Asia was of little relevance to both the United States and Europe. Kyrgyzstan did not appear on the political radar of the European states, and was a low priority for the US administration. Although, the EU has launched a series of well-received programs and has delivered considerable ﬁnancial aid to Central Asian states, its activities in the region have been poorly planned, uncoordinated, and tainted with moralism (Cornell 2007). Until recently, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed by Kyrgyzstan in 1995 was the only platform for political dialogue with Europe. The dialogue took place in the format of annual meetings at the ministerial level, and the goals have never been clearly deﬁned. Neither has the process of socialization into the European democratic culture been included into various schemes of cooperation between Bishkek and Brussels (Warkotsch 2008: 64). All in all, the EU failed to reciprocate Kyrgyzstan’s initial eagerness to move toward greater cooperation with Europe, and Kyrgyz leaders eventually became repelled by senior European bureaucrats’ lack of engagement in talks with Kyrgyz ofﬁcials that would lead to greater cooperation between the Union and Kyrgyzstan (Norling 2007). The United States has provided the republic with substantial ﬁnancial assistance, with a priority placed on the goals of democracy-building and liberal economic reforms. In this foreign policy model, various civil society organizations have been seen as key instruments for promoting democratization. Therefore, a bulk of ﬁnancial aid was channeled toward the activities of civil society groups and to support political pluralism (Makarkin 2005; Olcott 2005: 2). The US administration applied pressure on the Kyrgyz government to facilitate

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 45 the development of independent Kyrgyz media. Non-governmental organizations have been given much attention and ﬁnancial support. The Kyrgyz opposition received overt monetary and technical assistance from nonpartisan American organizations as well as from the US embassy abroad (Knyazev 2008). All this has increased a perception of foreign meddling and has even led to resistance to Western inﬂuence on the political processes of Kyrgyzstan. In July 2006, the Kyrgyz government expelled two American diplomats from the country for “gross interference with the republic’s internal affairs,” a gesture unprecedented in the history of the post-Soviet states (Dmitrieva 2006). Western interests in the Kyrgyz republic and foreign monetary support spiked with the commencement of the US-led military operation in Afghanistan. The US government’s assistance to Kyrgyzstan increased twofold in ﬁnancial year 2002 from US$41.72 million to US$94.22 million in response to the republic’s approval of the United States’ request to use Kyrgyzstan’s airspace for its military campaign in Afghanistan. The amount of assistance was rolled back the following year to US$54.56 million and continued to shrink in ﬁnancial years 2006 and 2007. This was explained by the republic’s decreasing strategic value for the success of the Afghan operation (Olcott 2005: 175). Indeed, the country has limited military, economic, and demographic potential and does not share a common border with Afghanistan. The Kyrgyz administration became disillusioned regarding the West’s sincerity and ability to assist the republic in coping with mounting economic and security problems, and the utilitarian inﬂuence of the West on Kyrgyzstan has signiﬁcantly declined. Notwithstanding this disappointment, the American presence is still advantageous to the Kyrgyz republic. The government of Kyrgyzstan has always acknowledged the beneﬁts arising from the US–Kyrgyz ties, and has been opportunistic in playing up American interests in the country. According to a fact sheet released by the US Air Force, the Manas airbase that the United States leased from the Kyrgyz republic contributed more than US$64 million to its economy in ﬁnancial year 2008 (US Air Force 2009). In addition, over 500 Kyrgyz citizens have been employed at the airbase and their earnings have amounted to over US$2.6 million. In 2007, Kyrgyzstan was approved for the American program “Millennium Challenge Account,” a bilateral development fund created in 2004. In addition to annual foreign assistance from the United States, it received a US$16 million grant from the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a US agency established to manage the developmental assistance to foreign states. In comparison, Georgia has received more than US$270 million and Armenia has received US$236 million from the Millennium Challenge fund.9 The Kyrgyz government agreed to renew the Manas airbase lease to the United States though in a new capacity, as a transit center, in exchange for a threefold increase in yearly rent payments (from US$17.4 million to US$60 million per year). The United States pledged to invest over US$66 million in infrastructure improvement and air trafﬁc control system upgrades at the Manas airport. The Obama administration requested US$20 million for economic development in Kyrgyzstan, US$21 million for anti-drug efforts, and US$10 million for counterterrorism for ﬁnancial year

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2010 in addition to the assistance from the Defense and Energy Department and Millennium Challenge Funds (Nichol 2009). The United States has been one of Kyrgyzstan’s utilitarian reference groups, but neither Europe nor the United States has become the republic’s normative or comparison reference group. For all their invocations of democracy, the Kyrgyz political elite share few values with leaders of the United States or the EU. In their speeches and statements, Kyrgyzstan’s representatives rarely reference the West, and their discussions of the rule of law and human rights are almost never associated with the United States or Europe. Because of its political culture, its socio-economic challenges, and its geographical location, Kyrgyzstan has very remote chances of developing into a Western-type democracy. For these same reasons, the Kyrgyz republic will never be accepted as part of the European space (Makarkin 2005; Olcott 2006). Socio-cultural idiosyncrasies of the Central Asian states also serve as an important obstacle to becoming a Western-type modern state and democracy, and are an impediment to cooperation between Kyrgyzstan, Europe, and the United States. Kyrgyzstan knows no liberal democratic traditions and is still a neo-patrimonial state, in which legal–rational and patrimonial institutions are tightly interwoven. There are numerous informal rules and institutions that constitute a state within the state, or a two-level political culture: one is formal and legal, while another is based on the principles of traditionalism and the practices of factionalism and clientism. There is no rigid separation between public and private in the republic, and its public servants continue using their ofﬁcial positions for their own beneﬁt or for the beneﬁt of their kin groups, such as clans. The Kyrgyz leadership depends on a system of patron–client networks through which it distributes material incentives and other beneﬁts to ensure its voters’ support. Within such a pattern of relations between formal and informal rules, institutions, and networks, formal state structures cannot realize their purpose of providing protection and public welfare for people. While accepted as part of the socio-political order by natives, for the majority of Western observers, these practices are tantamount to graft (Ilkhamov 2007: Warkotsch 2008: 64). Patrimonial–authoritarian features are also embodied in the clan-based structure of a formally nomadic society, where one’s belonging to a clan can inﬂuence social status and access to various opportunities. The informal norms and practices underlying clan networks often override the formal rule of state institutions. No true political contestation is possible in a clan system, which is based on a relationship of reciprocal dependency: clan elites rely on the support of their networks to gain and maintain their posts, whereas the non-elites can count on the clan for helping them to improve their social status and wellbeing (Warkotsch 2008: 64). In this way, clans undermine the democratic process, particularly, free and fair elections. Clans can also weaken the constitutional system by undermining the separation of powers, depriving the people of true public oversight, and sheltering public ofﬁcials from any prosecution for abuses of authority. Kyrgyz politicians and scholars have long deliberated over the unique context of the republic’s political development. It has been argued that the distinctive aspects of the Kyrgyz history, culture, socio-economic processes, and the

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 47 mentality of the population moved the republic away from a general democratic evolution and toward a national democracy model. Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy documents emphasize the importance of strengthening the integration processes in Central Asia and the CIS, and do not mention the republic’s pro-Western orientation. Kyrgyz leaders have occasionally announced that the orientation toward Western democratic values is an indispensable component of Kyrgyzstan’s strategy of development. These statements, however, typically serve the goal of legitimizing the government and the ruling elite, and, as Askar Akaev put it, “this in no way contradicts or detracts from our primary orientation toward democratic Russia, from which we receive reciprocal responses and support” (Surovtsev 2001). The dissimilarity between Western and Kyrgyz values and goals and the remoteness of Kyrgyzstan from the West make the latter a poor role model for Kyrgyz elites to emulate. Even the United States, which former President Akaev once referred to as “a neighbor of all countries on all continents” (Akaev 2003b) has not become Kyrgyzstan’s comparison reference group. The Kyrgyz leadership has been wary of the American administration’s attempts to transpose a Western model of democracy on “failed states,” a term coined by the US government and denounced by the Kyrgyz elite. Askar Akaev, known for his liberal and, at times, idealistic outlook on the world, has been highly critical of the realist foundations of US foreign policy. In 2003, Akaev wrote, Reading through treatises of such luminaries as Henry Kissinger, Zbignev Bzezhinski, or through articles of other American political scientists, I came to believe that only the US has an unquestionable right to have national interests and moral values, whereas all other states should be almost like carriers (executors) of their overseas plans or designs. (Akaev 2003b: 93) The EU has become more visible in the Central Asian region post 9/11 mainly because of its members’ involvement in the military campaign in Afghanistan as well as due to its interests in gaining access to energy resources in Central Asia. The Kyrgyz leadership, however, has been wary of EU activities in Kyrgyzstan. Along with political pragmatists, a group of vocal human rights activists and likeminded politicians entered the geopolitical scene in Central Asia. They have been critical of European engagement with Central Asia states, blaming the Union for giving support to their corruptive practices and human rights violations, pushing for isolation of the Central Asian governments, and imposing sanctions on the authoritarian regimes. Therefore, the development of closer relations with Europe has carried substantial political risks recognized by the Kyrgyz government, as well as authorities of other Central Asian states. Moscow, and to a lesser degree Beijing, have taken advantage of Central Asia’s dislike for normative and ideological bases of the Western approach to Central Asia. Russia has attempted to steer the region away from the EU and the United States by planting the seeds of anti-Westernism in Central Asia (Mambetaliev

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2008). In recent years, the number of Kyrgyz citizens sympathizing with the United States dropped from 65 percent to 47 percent, according to a poll conducted by InterMedia (Schmidle 2006). Polls from the Russian Institution of Eurasian Studies have revealed that of all states and international organizations, integration with the EU is least desired in Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, more than 70 percent of the Kyrgyz respondents support integration with Russia (Mambetaliev 2008: 9). Disillusionment with the Western models of democracy, mistrust of the international donors whose activities have been perceived as stufﬁng the pockets of corrupted elites, and resentment toward the inﬂuence of dissolute Western sub-culture have all contributed to the development of anti-Western attitudes in Kyrgyzstan. American military presence is very conspicuous in the country; however, the people have little exposure to other Western ideas, values, and worldviews. The shelves in the kiosks, bookstores, and newsstands are satiated with Russianlanguage publications; Russian news channels known for their anti-American views dominate broadcasts. American reality shows, movies, and programs are a rare occurrence on the TV programs. Thus, in spite of the signiﬁcant potential that the West had for inﬂuencing developments in Kyrgyzstan, it did not use its full will and resources to bring the Kyrgyz republic into its fold. Today, the opportunities that American and European policy-makers have for exercising inﬂuence in Kyrgyzstan are becoming increasingly circumscribed as the Kyrgyz government develops ﬁrmer ties with Russia, China, and the governments of the Central Asian republics.

Counterterrorism policies of Kyrgyzstan’s reference groups In order to assess the impact of Kyrgyzstan’s social environment on the republic’s counterterrorism responses, it is necessary to examine the counterterrorism policies of Kyrgyzstan’s reference groups. An overview of Russian counterterrorism policy will be provided ﬁrst, followed by the assessment of counterterrorism measures adopted by other Central Asian nations. Finally, aspects of Chinese and American counterterrorism programs that relate to their global war on terrorism and their engagement with the Central Asian republics will be explored. Counterterrorism in the Russian Federation The last years of the Soviet Union were marked by a series of destructive processes conducive to the rise of violence and organized crime. Terrorist and extremist acts, which were infrequent under totalitarian rule, also intensiﬁed posing a threat to the security of the newly independent nation. In Russia, the threat of terrorism has been concomitant with the protracted insurgency in Chechnya and the broader North Caucasus region. The country has experienced a multitude of terrorist and militant attacks, and the turn of the century was marked by a series of high-proﬁle terrorist incidents involving a large number of civilian casualties. The development of Russia’s counterterrorism policy has been impacted by its experiences with ﬁghting the Chechen resistance and coping with the threat of terrorism in

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 49 the North Caucasus region. It is no coincidence, for example, that the crime of terrorism was added to Russia’s ﬁrst criminal code (inherited from the Soviet past) in 1994, a date which marked the beginning of the ﬁrst war in Chechnya (Jonson 2004: 123). But it was not until the adoption of the federal law of 25 July 1998 On Combating Terrorism that Russian legislators attempted to deﬁne terrorist activity and establish an institutional framework and principles for responding to the threat of terrorism.10 For the next eight years, the 1998 act On Combating Terrorism had become the principal legal pillar of Russian counterterrorism efforts. It sketched out the legal regime of counterterrorist operations and deﬁned the organizational basis of counterterrorism, placing Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Ministry of Interior (MVD) at the top of the list of agencies responsible for combating terrorism.11 The FSB’s anti-terrorism ofﬁce became a direct successor of the KGB’s department for the ﬁght against terrorism. In 1995, following the hostagetaking crisis in Budennovsk, the FSB’s director ordered the creation of the AntiTerrorism Center in place of the anti-terrorism ofﬁce. The Anti-Terrorism Center was transformed into the Interdepartmental Counterterrorism Commission in 1997, which was renamed as the Federal Counterterrorism Commission in 1998 (Rossiskaya Sistema Predotvrascheniya Teractov: Spustya God Posle Beslana 2005). The Commission was headed by the Russian prime minister and united a dozen ofﬁcials from the various Russian power ministries (Perovic 2006). The FSB played a primary role in combating terrorism in Russia until 2003, when the MVD expanded its authority over the management of counterterrorist operations in the North Caucasus and created its own anti-terrorism center. A special interdepartmental unit was established in the North Caucasus to address the problem of coordination and intelligence sharing between the FSB and MVD, whose counterterrorism agencies duplicated each other’s functions. Yet, this coordinating unit had neither the authority nor the means to perform its information sharing and coordination functions and was unable to resolve the issue of interagency cooperation. The ongoing interagency feud and the lack of coordination between the FSB and MVD have been the major obstacles to the success of counterterrorist operations in Russia (Forster 2006; Plater-Zyberk 2004). Until recently, there had been no functioning coordinating body that could facilitate the exchange of information between the main counterterrorism agencies in Russia. In February 2006, President Putin decreed the creation of the National Counterterrorism Committee (NAK). It is composed of the representatives of 17 federal agencies, including the FSB, MVD, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and others. NAK has been tasked with the coordination of all federal-level counterterrorism policies and operations. The committee replaced the Federal Antiterrorist Commission, which lacked a permanent secretariat, viable mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing its decisions, and effective tools for coordinating the day-to-day counterterrorism activities of the federal-level executive bodies. The regional counterterrorism commissions led by the regional administration chiefs perform the NAK’s functions in the Russian regions.

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Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy

In 1999, Russia entered the second Chechen military campaign, and a new wave of terrorist violence and insurgency engulfed the country in the early 2000s. These and other developments on the domestic scene, coupled with intensiﬁed terrorist activity in the international arena, compelled the Russian government to reassess the terrorist threat and reconsider the tactics and methods of its counteraction. The Russian counterterrorism legislation had been subjected to frequent changes reﬂecting experiences attained in the ﬁeld and acquired through Russia’s cooperation with other states and international organizations. Russia’s entry into international counterterrorism conventions necessitated further modiﬁcations to the normative framework governing Russia’s efforts in the area of combating terrorism. After the hostage crisis at a local school in Beslan in September 2004, president Putin pledged to overhaul the system of Russia’s security services and develop procedures for coordinating the activities of the counterterrorism agencies. To streamline these changes, the Russian government adopted a new federal law, On Counteraction to Terrorism, on 6 March 2006. The new act replaced the 1998 version. The 2006 law demonstrates an attempt by the Russian government to reﬁne the legal deﬁnition of terrorism, legalize the practice of using military forces for the purpose of combating terrorism, and provide a detailed regulation for the conduct of a counterterrorism operation. The 2006 act On Counteraction to Terrorism was envisioned as a comprehensive piece of legislation encompassing a wide range of preventive measures and policies aimed at protecting people and infrastructures against terrorist attacks. An explanatory note accompanying the 2006 act points out that “counteraction” has a broader meaning than “combat.” It encompasses responses of special services and law-enforcement bodies, as well as activities of various state and local agencies, organizations, and individuals in preventing terrorism, among other things (Petrushov 2006). The priority of preventive measures is stated as one of the main principles of counteraction to terrorism in the new law, which also calls for a systematic approach including political, informational, socio-economic, legal, and other responses to the threat of terrorism. According to the legal commentators, in the broadest sense, prevention should include the analysis of risks and trends of terrorism, the identiﬁcation of factors contributing to the recruitment of terrorists or radicalization of movements, as well as the detection and counteraction of the methods, propaganda and conditions through which individuals are drawn into terrorism. Regrettably, the Russian counterterrorism legislation is silent about speciﬁc preventive or prophylactic measures of counteraction to terrorism. Despite the detailed regulation of counterterrorist operation, lawmakers have sidestepped the development of measures aimed at protecting the rights, property, and lives of the people that happened to come under the purview of this regime. The law does not ascribe liability for a failure to act or for a negligence of counterterrorist responsibilities, for abuse of authority or for human rights violations (Truntsevcki 2005). It does not provide for effective internal and external oversight mechanisms guarding against such neglect and abuse. In practice, these legislative omissions have contributed to substantial property damage and casualties in the civilian population when military and security services have utilized force as a means of combating terrorism.

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 51 An effective system of prevention of terrorist attacks in Russia is in rudimentary shape. Neither the law enforcement agencies nor the secret services have a wellestablished practice of systematic examination of their counterterrorism experiences for preparing recommendations regarding the improvements of the methods and tactics of counteraction to terrorism. For a long time in Russia, terrorism had been deﬁned as a sum of discrete criminal acts, and the law enforcement and security agencies were tasked with the struggle against individual manifestations of terrorism. The analysis of the causes and conditions giving rise to the terrorist problem fell largely outside of their jurisdictional scope (Gorbunov 2008: 168–9). Detection and suppression of terrorist acts and mitigation of the destructive consequences of terrorism are the only methods of counteraction that received detailed explanation in the Russian counterterrorism legislation. The Kremlin authorities also place considerable emphasis on punitive measures, the use of force, and the role of the armed forces in combating terrorism. The Russian counterterrorism policy appears to reﬂect a long tradition of favoring military-style operations carried out by the army troops or small secretive liquidation squads. The Russian military took an active part in suppressing the Chechen resistance during the ﬁrst Chechen war, and the military was also used for the purpose of combating terrorism in the context of the second Chechen military campaign, framed as a counterterrorism operation. The Combined Group of Forces in the North Caucasus was created by a presidential decree in 1999 to carry out counterterrorism and mop-up activities in Chechnya. It consisted of the troops from the Defense Ministry, interior troops, forces from the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and units from the FSB and Border Service. To assist the military battalions in carrying out counterterrorism tasks, the FSB, the MVD, and the Main Intelligence Service of Russia created special task teams for liquidating terrorists and militants. For instance, the FSB uses the so-called “combined special groups” and ofﬁcers of the territorial sub-divisions of “Alpha” for the liquidation of alleged terrorists and insurgents. The Ministry of Interior relies on the so-called combined “mobile teams” of ofﬁcers sent from the central regions for elimination of small bands of terrorists and militants (Issledovatel’skii Tsentr Agentura.ru 2005). Recently, Moscow began replacing its regular army units with these special task teams composed of contract servicemen. Their goal has been to tighten the control over the internal borders between the republics of the North Caucuses, as well as over Russia’s international borders to the south (Perovic 2006). Before 2006, the practice of using Russia’s armed forces in counterterrorism operations had been neither properly sanctioned nor regulated. The 2006 law On Counteraction to Terrorism expands the goals of the Russian army beyond that of defending the country against aggression. The act legalizes the participation of Russian military forces in the combat against terrorism at home and abroad. The law deﬁnes the regime of counterterrorist operation, which allows for active combat and military responses, accompanied by the use of military equipment, armaments, and special facilities for containing and disrupting an act of terrorism and reducing its detrimental impact.

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Besides direct participation in counterterrorist operations, the military can be used for preventing terrorist attacks involving hijacking, as well as for suppressing acts of terrorism in Russian inner waters and its territorial seas. Russian legislators included a provision that allows the military to destroy a hijacked aircraft (or sea vessel) that poses an imminent danger to either vital targets or sites with a high concentration of people. The law does not specify the national registration of the carrier; therefore, these measures can be applied to both Russian and foreign airplanes. Military force can also be used for targeting terrorists and their bases abroad, and for suppressing international terrorist activity outside of Russian territory. Under contemporary legislation, the president of Russia has the authority to make personal decisions concerning the use of armed forces from Russian territory against terrorists and their bases overseas. The president’s decision to use Russia’s armed forces for conducing counterterrorism operations abroad requires the approval of the Federation Council, an upper chamber of the Russian Parliament. However, an amendment to the 2006 act gives the president full discretion in using FSB security forces abroad. No permission from the Federation Council is needed in this situation. Russian legislation has traditionally placed respect for human rights among the top priorities of its security and counterterrorism policy. This principle, however, has never been carried out in Moscow’s practice of counterterrorism. In Russia’s Chechnya, military responses have been applied in full force and the extent of human rights violations has reached an all-time high. The Russian security agencies used summary executions, torture, and abductions during counterterrorism operations, and this practice has recently spilled over into the regions bordering Chechnya and other parts of the Russian Federation. The normative provisions of the counterterrorism legislation also fail to embody the principle of protection of human rights in the context of the ﬁght against terrorism. The Russian legislation allows for the suspension of certain individual liberties in the zone of a counterterrorist operation. The regime warrants ID checks, screening of all types of communications, restrictions on movement, unhindered access to private homes and premises of organizations, various checks and searches, and other restrictions for the purpose of combating terrorism. According to the Russian Constitution of 1993, certain rights and liberties can be circumvented in a state of emergency and in accordance with the federal constitutional law. The regime of counterterrorism operation has not been deﬁned in a federal constitutional law. It does not require the declaration of a state of emergency but imposes the same restrictions. Whereas the latter requires a clear delineation of its temporal and territorial boundaries and is subject to a fairly complicated procedure to extend its duration or geographical domain, the regime of a counterterrorist operation is not limited in either time or space, and the chief of the counterterrorist operation has ultimate discretion in determining the area and duration of the operation. The regime of a counterterrorist operation does not require international accountability or parliamentary oversight but grants enormous surveillance powers to security forces, thus opening up possibilities for infringing on people’s basic rights.

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 53 Aside from provisions of counterterrorism legislation that strip individuals of many of their basic rights and judicial protection, the Russian law On Counteraction to Terrorism contains a number of loopholes surrounding the deﬁnition of terrorism. Terrorist activity, according to the Russian law, includes, among other things “informational or other types of assistance” at various stages of terrorism, as well as the “propaganda of terrorist ideas, dissemination of materials or information, which urge terrorist activity, substantiate and justify the need for such activity.” The liability for “informational assistance” threatens to become a major deterrent to the circulation of unofﬁcial information about terrorist attacks by broadcasting organizations (Levinson 2007: 2). Liability for the “justiﬁcation of terrorism,” which was established by an amendment to Russia’s Criminal Code in July 2007, has already had a chilling effect on the freedom of speech and open debate concerning terrorism. There are considerable risks of a politically motivated enforcement of these legislative provisions. The federal law on mass media has been amended with a new restriction that prohibits public justiﬁcations of terrorism by mass media sources. Given that terrorism has always been a politically charged term, it is very difﬁcult to separate terrorism from other manifestations of politically motivated violence. The imposition of the ban on the vaguely deﬁned justiﬁcations of terrorism can promote editorial self-censorship and restrictions on the freedom of expression. It may stiﬂe investigative journalism and promote censorship of news media articles on contentious topics related to terrorism (Levinson 2007). All in all, Russia’s counterterrorism policy has traditionally placed a greater emphasis on forceful military responses and shown little regard for human rights. It has been adopted in a “catch-up” mode dovetailing the military and counterterrorist measures in Chechnya and responses to committed acts of terrorism. Subsequently, the Russian counterterrorism, counter-insurgency, and military combat operations have become tightly intertwined. The brutal, protracted war has become a counterterrorist operation, the government war strategy has transmogriﬁed into Russia’s counterterrorism strategy, and the tools of conventional warfare and other coercive means for ﬁghting insurgency have become the tactics of combating terrorism (Baev 2004). Since both the war and counterterrorism operations have been led by the same people, funded from the same sources, and aimed at the same enemy, no effort has been made at distinguishing between terrorism and other forms of politically motivated violence, such as guerrilla warfare. Although the two are essentially different modes of operation, they have been approached using similar methods of counteraction. Today, as before, the Russian government appears to be conﬁdent in the effectiveness of repressive methods, military-style responses, and punitive measures aimed at suppressing terrorism. Russia’s legislative and institutional frameworks fortify a system of counterterrorism that prioritizes the “stick” over a more balanced approach to terrorism counteraction. The “stick” is Russian armed forces that shell houses and apartments on the suspicion that terrorists are harbored there, and the special units of the security service that wipe out villages and brutalize the population. The country is still lacking a long-term counterterrorism strategy that encompasses socio-economic approaches and an effective system of prevention

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and protection from terrorist attacks along with punitive and consequencemanagement dimensions. Safeguards against human rights abuses are missing in Russia’s counterterrorism legislation as are the mechanisms of public accountability and legal responsibility for the abuse and misuse of authority in the context of counterterrorism. The foreign dimension of Russia’s counterterrorism policy also places a high premium on forceful measures and the application of military force. Cooperation with the Central Asian states, for example, has taken on an increasingly military character manifested in steady military support, regular joint military maneuvers and training, and expanding Russia’s military presence in the region. Counterterrorism policies of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors Since the dissolution of the USSR, risks associated with the spread of radical Islam in the region have been among the main concerns of the Central Asian states, particularly, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Alarmed by the rise of religious extremism and terrorism in the region, the Central Asian governments supported the CIS Treaty on Cooperation between the CIS Members on Combating Terrorism of June 1999. All Central Asian states developed somewhat similar national plans in realization of interstate treaties and programs of joint measures to combat terrorism. The Central Asian authorities established counterterrorism institutions with almost identical functions, criminalized terrorist activity and terrorism-related acts, and deﬁned terrorism in similar terms (Table 2.1). The counterterrorism policies of Uzbekistan are formalized in the Program of Measures to Strengthen Efforts to Combat Reactionary Extremism and Terrorism, adopted in July 2000, and in the act of 15 December 2000 On Combating Terrorism.12 In 2004, the Uzbek government enacted a law, On Combating the Legalization of Income Derived from Criminal Activity and Financing of Terrorism. The program and the laws describe terrorism as one of the most severe criminal offenses and place it in the category of crimes against peace and security of mankind. The Criminal Code of Uzbekistan deﬁnes terrorism in very broad terms, making it possible to try individuals and groups for criminal offenses when they are participating in other activities of either a criminal or non-criminal nature. Article 155 of the Criminal Code states that terrorism refers to: violence, the use of force or other actions creating a danger to persons or property, or the threat of such actions, undertaken with a view to forcing a State body, an international organization or their senior ofﬁcials, individuals or legal entities to carry out, or to refrain from carrying out, any activity, with the aim of complicating international relations, violating sovereignty and territorial integrity, undermining State security, provoking war or armed conﬂict, destabilizing the social and political situation or alarming the population, and also activities in support of the existence, functioning or ﬁnancing of a terrorist organization, the preparation and commission of terrorist acts, as well as the direct or indirect provision or collection of any funds, resources or other services for terrorist organizations by any person who assists or participates in terrorist activities.

Source: Omelicheva (2007).

Program of measures to strengthen efforts to combat reactionary extremism and terrorism (2000); Act on combating terrorism (2000) Act on combating the legalization of income derived from criminal activity and ﬁnancing of terrorism (2004) Main Institutions National Security responsible for Service; Ministries counterterrorism of Internal Affairs, Defense and Emergency Situations; and committees on the protection of state border and customs Court penalties 20–25 years of for terrorism and imprisonment or death related acts penalty; 10–25 years for less serious acts Counterterrorism Repressive and policy ‘style’ aggressive. Unfair trials, systematic torture and ill-treatment of suspects

Legislative framework

Uzbekistan

Turkmenistan

5 years to life imprisonment

5–25 years of imprisonment or death penalty; 1–18 years for less serious crimes Less repressive than in Uzbekistan. Intense surveillance and control. Use of excessive force

Stern political control. Widespread repression following assassination attempt in 2002

Ministries of National Security, Internal Affairs and Defense; Security Service of the President; and State Border and Customs Services

Ministries of Security, Internal Affairs, Defense and Emergencies; Committees on the protection of state border; and presidential guard

Program for intensifying Act On Combating efforts to combat terrorism Terrorism (2003) for the period 1998–2000 (1997); Act on combating terrorism (1999) Program to combat terrorism and other manifestations of extremism for the period 2006–2010 (2006) Counterterrorist concept (2006)

Tajikistan

Table 2.1 Counterterrorism policies of the Central Asian states Kyrgyzstan

Act on combating terrorism (1999); State program for combating terrorism and other forms of extremism and separatism (2000); Law on counteraction to terrorism (2006); Law on counteracting terrorist ﬁnancing and legalization (money laundering) of proceeds from crime (2006) National Security National Security Committee; Ministries Service; Security of Internal Affairs and Council; Ministries of Defense; and Security Internal Affairs and Service of the President Defense; Customs and Border Services; and Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor-General 4–18 years of 10–25 years in prison or imprisonment; 2–5 years death penalty; a ﬁne or for less up to 8 years in prison for serious acts less serious acts More balanced approach Lenient and tolerant combining coercion and policy in the1990s. cooption, control and Repression of radical assimilation Islamists since 1999 Act on measures to combat terrorism (1999); Program for combating terrorism and other forms of extremism and separatism (2000); law on counteracting legalization (laundering) of illegal proceeds and terrorist ﬁnancing (2009)

Kazakhstan

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Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy

The punishment for terrorism in Uzbekistan is 20 years in prison or, as an exceptional measure, the death penalty. Less serious acts, such as the creation of banned organizations or the dissemination of materials and publications intended to undermine the state or public order are also considered as criminal offenses and severely punished in Uzbekistan. Individuals convicted of being members of a banned group or those found guilty of distributing anti-government leaﬂets have been sentenced to long prison terms of 10–25 years. In Kyrgyzstan, for the same charges they used to receive a maximum of ﬁve years in jail, but in most cases were only ﬁned (Eshanova 2002b). The government of Uzbekistan has long been determined to eradicate threats to the republic’s security posed by the activities of the IMU militants. Under the pretext of ﬁghting with Islamic insurgents, Uzbekistani authorities launched violent crackdowns on political and religious dissent allegedly related to terrorism. The ﬁrst wave of repression of independent Muslims practicing their faith outside of state-endorsed religious institutions began in the late 1990s in response to the December 1997 murder of several policemen and the beheading of a local government ofﬁcial in Namangan province. A marked rise in the prosecution of “evil-doers” that began in 1998 contributed to the patterns of arrests and unfair trials that took place in 1999 following a series of bombings in Tashkent. State repression recurred in 2004, in the aftermath of the suicide blasts and attacks against the US and Israeli embassies and other targets in the spring and summer of 2004. Since the ﬁrst wave of state terror in 1998, state authorities have imprisoned thousands of independent Muslims that governmental ofﬁcials began branding as “terrorists.” Under the guise of combating terrorism, the government has exploited war-like means to chase, crackdown on, and eradicate Islamic militants. Scores of civilians have perished as a result of excessive force used by the Uzbek security forces during counterterrorism operations. After the IMU suffered major losses from the assault by the allied forces in Afghanistan, the brunt of repression shifted onto the alleged members and supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an international Islamic movement with some presence in Central Asia. The cells of Hizb ut-Tahrir operating in the Central Asian states pursue the goal of restoration a supranational Islamic Caliphate in the region. Unfair trials, systematic torture and abuse of detainees have become a routine in Uzbekistan. Religious and political prisoners suffer particularly harsh treatment. Reported disappearances, death sentences and executions of alleged Islamists have been a major concern of international human rights organizations. Gradually, the government’s repression has spread to moderate Islamic believers and groups (ICG 2003a: 10). Uzbek courts have handed down harsh punishments for terrorism-related acts as well as for less serious activities, such as the dissemination of materials intended to undermine public order. The courts’ rulings have been based on the ﬂimsiest of evidence of the defendants’ guilt in the alleged crimes (Eshanova 2002b). Uzbekistan’s foreign policy toward other Central Asian states has also been buttressed by force or the threat of the use of force. Uzbek president Islam Karimov has repeatedly accused neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan of providing safe haven for

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 57 terrorist and extremist groups. Uzbekistan’s borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain mined as a result of the Uzbek government’s policy to deter intrusions by Uzbek armed groups based outside the country. On one occasion in the past, Tashkent used bomb attacks against bordering states under the pretext of targeting terrorist hide-outs (Aslam 2001). Following the attacks of unknown militants on the Uzbek law enforcement facilities located in the areas adjacent to Kyrgyzstan, the Uzbek government adopted a unilateral decision to dig ditches and erect walls in several borderline regions to strengthen security on the Kyrgyz–Uzbek border in 2009. The government of Tajikistan has also been known for harsh prosecution of Islamic militants. In 1997, the Tajik government enacted a state counterterrorism program for the period 1998–2000, which was superseded by a new plan to Combat Terrorism and Other Manifestations of Extremism for the Period 2006–10 and a counterterrorist concept developed by the Tajik Ministry of Security. Tajikistan’s parliament adopted a law On Combating Terrorism in 1999 in pursuance of the provisions of counterterrorism programs.13 Terrorism is deﬁned as a particularly grave crime in Tajikistan and placed in the category of criminal offenses against public security. Criminal legislation of the republic deﬁnes terrorism as: explosion, arson, shooting with a ﬁrearm, or other actions that may cause the loss of persons’ lives, signiﬁcant damage, or entail other socially dangerous circumstances, if these actions are carried out with the aim to violate public safety, threaten people or affect the decision making by state authorities, as well as a threat of commission of any of these actions for the same purposes. According to the Criminal Code of Tajikistan adopted in May 1998, a crime of terrorism without incriminatory circumstances is punishable by 5–10 years in prison, or 10–20 years of imprisonment when a terrorist act is committed against a public ﬁgure or when terrorist actions cause the inadvertent death of a person. A defendant can also be subjected to life sentence. There are a number of other terrorism-related offenses, such as the organization of a terrorist organization, recruitment to terrorist groups, training and use of terrorist groups, and willful ﬁnancing of terrorism that are deﬁned as terrorist activity in Tajikistan’s legislation. Some of the provisions of the Criminal Code (for instance, the article on money laundering) contain very broad deﬁnitions of the elements of crimes unrelated to terrorism and could be applied to various illegal activities regardless of the type or nature of the criminal act committed. The ﬁve-year civil war that started in 1992 and left over 50,000 people dead devastated the state. The peace agreement signed in 1997 between the government of Tajikistan and the Islamic opposition brought ﬁghting to an end; yet, intermittent skirmishes with remnants of ﬁghters from the civil war era have been a destabilizing factor in the republic. For the Tajik authorities, Islamists who fought against governmental forces in the war have been the principle security threat and challenge to the governing regime, and the government of Tajikistan has subjected the former militants to the harshest prosecution. Tajik ofﬁcials launched criminal investigations against former ﬁghters on the grounds of various grave crimes, including terrorist acts allegedly committed during the civil war.

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The human rights groups and representatives of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), which fought on the side of the opposition in the war, maintain that trials and sentencing are politically motivated to discredit this political organization (Najibullah 2003; US Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2005). After 9/11, Tajikistan declared itself a stalwart supporter of the international coalition for the ﬁght against terrorism, but lack of resources has been an insurmountable obstacle to the success of its counterterrorism efforts. Tajikistan is the poorest state of the former Soviet republics. Its governmental agencies are understaffed and their employees lack proper training, equipment, and funds to effectively implement counterterrorism responses. Porous borders and endemic corruption in law-enforcement institutions further undermine the security situation in the republic and broader region. To compensate for the lack of preventive and law-enforcement components in its counterterrorism program, the Tajik government has resorted to violent practices and forceful responses to counteract the threat of religious extremism and terrorism. Some international observers contend that Tajikistan’s leadership has taken advantage of the context of the war on terrorism in order to settle scores with former civil war opponents. Although Tajikistan is the only Central Asian country to ofﬁcially register an Islamic political movement—the Islamic Renaissance Party—the IRP’s activities have been hampered by the government’s persecution. Members of other Islamic groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, have also been subjected to intense surveillance and prosecution by the state. Local monitors and journalists allege that criminal defendants charged with participation in or support of the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir (which is banned in Tajikistan) had unfair trials and were abused or tortured in detention to extort confessions for crimes they never committed (AI 2005; HRW 2001). Until recently, Turkmenistan lacked a distinct counterterrorism policy. Sweeping national security measures and stern political control established by the government of Turkmenistan compensated for the paucity of speciﬁc counterterrorism responses. The late Turkmen president, Saparmurad Niyazov, personiﬁed the state, state power, state unity and national legitimacy. Consequently, the national security of the republic was tantamount to the personal security of the president. To keep presidential powers intact, Niyazov’s regime blatantly subdued political and religious opponents and placed bans on political pluralism, religious diversity or alternative expression (Cummings and Ochs 2002). The Ministry of National Security of Turkmenistan, a successor of the Soviet-era Turkmen KGB, has had unlimited discretion to use any means to ensure the safety of the governing regime. The atmosphere of stern political control, repression and persecution left no opportunities for the formation of organizations either directly or indirectly linked to terrorism. In the vacuum of pending political threats, the adoption of full-ﬂedged counterterrorism policies seemed needless. However, after an alleged assassination attempt on the president in November 2002, which Niyazov survived untouched, the government adopted counterterrorism legislation and created the State Commission on Fighting Terrorism and the Department for Counterterrorism

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 59 and Organized Crime of the Ministry of Internal Affair. Along with legislative and institutional changes, state authorities intensiﬁed oppressive measures and prosecution of the Turkmen (AI 2004b; HRW 2004). By accounts of international human rights groups, the criminal police arrested about 100 people in relation to the attack. Among those prosecuted were relatives of the exiled political opposition. Hundreds were rounded up for questioning and about 60 individuals were convicted for alleged participation in the attack. All of the procedural components of trials were rushed and closed to public and international observers. The hearings were carried out without consideration of due process, including the violation of the presumption of innocence. Defendants lacked adequate legal counsel and were denied basic procedural rights. Amnesty International reported that it received information about the torture and harassment of detainees and threats against their relatives. All the alleged partakers in the attempt on the president’s life were pronounced traitors to their fatherland and sentenced to lengthy prison terms or forceful resettlement. In addition to the prosecution of Turkmen, the government of Turkmenistan implied that the Uzbek authorities assisted the organizers of the November 1998 attack. In a blatant violation of international obligations, Turkmenistan security forces searched the Uzbek ambassador’s residence in his absence causing deterioration in Turkmen–Uzbek relations. The government of Turkmenistan declared the Uzbek ambassador persona non grata and gave him 24 hours to leave the country. Turkmenistan’s international counterterrorism cooperation has also been tenuous, at best. Turkmenistan was the only post-Soviet government that recognized Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and maintained diplomatic ties with the Talibs. Because of its avowed policy of neutrality and friendly relations with the Taliban, Turkmenistan did not extend full-ﬂedged support to the US-led military campaign in Asia. After Russia’s decision to support the American war against terrorism and military operations in Afghanistan, the late Turkmen president, Saparmurad Niyazov, consented to granting some overﬂight and refueling privileges to the coalitional forces. Despite this assurance of support, there have been reports that the Turkmen authorities have blocked NATO overﬂights to Afghanistan and obstructed the delivery of humanitarian aid to the country in recent years. Saparmurad Niyazov died unexpectedly of a heart attack in December 2006, and his Deputy Prime Minister Kurbanguly Berdymukhamedov won presidential elections two months later. Many expected some relaxation of repressive measures during Berdymukhamedov’s tenure as president. Yet the new Turkmen government continued to keep a lid on the exercise of various political freedoms and strictly control all aspects of societal life, making it unlikely that the country could ever be used as a terrorist safe- haven (US Department of State: The Ofﬁce of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2009). In 2008, the US Department of State annual report on terrorism mentioned a gun battle that took place in the Khitrova district of Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. The incident forced the Turkmen government “to reevaluate its counterterrorism program, training partners, and readiness.” President Berdymukhamedov required the government to introduce

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Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy

new counterterrorism measures and step up cooperation with foreign states and international organizations in counterterrorism training. The Turkmen authorities have bolstered their efforts at preventing the ﬁnancing of terrorism and have disseminated lists of individuals and organizations suspected in terrorist activities to banking institutions. Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism policy will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. Here, it is depicted in very broad strokes. Similar to other Central Asian states, the government of Kazakhstan declared religious extremism as one of the threats to its national security but chose a more balanced approach to staving off Islamic fundamentalism. It has combined coercion and subjugation of political freedoms with policies of cooption, control and assimilation of the Islamic forces and appeasement of the general public. Following the lead of other Central Asian states and in fulﬁllment of its obligations stemming from the CIS conventions and agreements on ﬁghting terrorism, Kazakhstan adopted the act On Measures to Combat Terrorism on 13 July 1999 and the State Program for Combating Terrorism and Other Forms of Extremism and Separatism in the Republic of Kazakhstan (2000–3), which was approved in November 2000.14 The same year, the National Security Council (the KNB) created a commission to develop policies to combat religious extremism. The commission developed proposals for toughening national religious laws. After 9/11, Kazakhstan amended and supplemented counterterrorism legislation by introducing new categories of offenses into the Criminal Code. In February 2002, the government of Kazakhstan established increased liability and sanctions for advocacy of terrorism and public incitement to commit an act of terrorism as well as the establishment or leadership of a terrorist group and participation in its activities. Suicide bombings in the capital of Uzbekistan in July of 2004 raised security concerns in Kazakhstan. Following the general crackdown on Islam in the region, Kazakh authorities beefed up prosecution of religious extremist groups. The Kazakh leadership adjusted its assessment of security risks in Kazakhstan to that in the bordering states and declared that the threat of terrorism and religious extremism in the republic was real and growing. In October of 2004, the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan issued a ruling in which it recognized Al-Qaeda, the East Turkistan Islamic Party, the Kurdish People’s Congress and the IMU as terrorist organizations and prohibited them from any activity in the state. Six months later, another Kazakh court banned activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir, pronouncing this group as an extremist organization. Even before the ban of Hisb ut-Tahrir, its members had been arrested and tried for participation in the activities of an illegal organization. In recent years, the Parliament of Kazakhstan toughened national religious legislation by adopting new provisions envisaging severe punishment for extremist activities and for providing ﬁnancial help to extremist and terrorist groups. Under the pretext of preventing terrorism and religious extremism, law enforcement has conducted inspections of religious organizations throughout the country and suspended a number of religious groups. The security services of Kazakhstan have cracked down heavily on radical Islamic groups and the number of detentions of the alleged Islamists continues to grow.

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 61 Home-grown terrorist groups have been one of the recurrent security concerns of the Central Asian states’ eastern neighbor, China. Recently, terrorist attacks on Chinese people and their commercial interests abroad have intensiﬁed in various parts of the world. China’s rise as a major regional player and a great power at the global level has been accompanied by increasing terrorist risks to its overseas property and people residing abroad. The last decade has seen attacks on Chinese nationals and enterprises in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and Central Asia where the Chinese government has sought access to energy resources, and where Chinese companies have spread their commercial activities (Smith 2009). Domestically, the threat of terrorism has emanated from restive Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, also referred to as East Turkestan. This ethnically mixed area with a high concentration of ethnic Uighurs, Muslims of Turkic descent, has been a home to the East Turkistan independence movement calling for independent, self-governing Xinjiang. Ethnic Uighurs have resisted the Beijing control over the practice of their religion, forced assimilation, migration of ethnic Chinese into Xingjian, and other types of constraints under the strict communist rule. The Chinese government responded to their dissent with mass executions and a public campaign of persecution and sentencing rallies (Kan 2008). Following a series of bombings and other violent incidents in Xinjiang during the 1990s, the Beijing authorities named East Turkistan groups as terrorist organizations. The Chinese government has also accused the Uighurs of staging terrorist incidents abroad. After 9/11, China incriminated the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an organization of highest concern to Beijing, in ties with the Al-Qaeda network, and sought US designation of the ETIM as a terrorist group (Kan 2008). The Bush administration registered ETIM on its list of terrorist organizations in 2002, and two years later included the group in its “Terrorism Exclusion List,” which prohibits the entry of certain foreign nationals to the United States (Kan 2008). The UN, too, classiﬁed ETIM as a terrorist organization. Despite the growing terrorist threat to its international interests that have been disquieting for Beijing, China’s counterterrorism efforts have centered on uprooting the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism associated with unrest in Xingjian. Under the pretext of ﬁghting terrorism, Beijing forces have ruthlessly suppressed ethnic Uighurs. The Chinese counterterrorism agenda has included vigorous persecution of Uighurs, crackdowns on their Islamic practices, massive violations of their human rights, arbitrary arrests, and summary trials resulting in long prison sentences and capital punishment (HRW 2005a; The Times of Central Asia 2006a). All Central Asian states have substantial Uighur minorities. Cross-border trade and migration between Xinjiang and the neighboring states have brought even more ethnic Uighurs to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. China has been a strong advocate of a counterterrorism agenda under the SCO umbrella and an ardent supporter of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism signed at the SCO inaugural meeting in 2001. The government of China has used the SCO to leverage its inﬂuence in Central Asian states, particularly on the question of Uighur separatism and terrorism. The signatory parties

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to the SCO counterterrorism convention committed themselves to prosecuting the perpetrators of terrorist acts, a provision that has been frequently invoked by Beijing to force extraditions of Uighurs by the governments of the Central Asian republics. On China’s appeal and despite the protests of international human rights organizations, Central Asian states have effectively silenced Uighur associations that are active in their territories, extradited ethnic Uighurs to China, and prosecuted individual activists ﬁghting for Uighurs’ rights (HRW 2005a). Similar to Russia and the United States, Beijing has been sympathetic to the military counterterrorism model stressing vigorous counterterrorism measures at home, including the deployment of military force to curb dissent, and counterterrorism exercises with other SCO states. In 2006, the Chinese government conducted a joint military drill with Tajikistan that had counterterrorism goals as its primary focus. A year later, the SCO member states held a multilateral joint staff military exercise, whose scenario involved a counterterrorism operation in China’s Xinjiang province and Russia’s Eastern city Chelyabinsk. The latter exercise began a tradition of joint counterterrorism drills that helped the Chinese authorities to acquire extensive experience in using military force for suppressing low-insurgency conﬂict, terrorism, and other unconventional threats. US counterterrorism policy After the tragedy of 9/11, the United States government adopted a series of comprehensive legislative, institutional, law-enforcement, intelligence, border security, civil aviation safety, and other measures aimed at protecting the public from terrorist violence and prosecuting those responsible for terrorism. A fair assessment of the individual aspects of this multi-faceted counterterrorism strategy can only be done in a separate volume on American counterterrorism policy, a task that falls outside of the scope of this book.15 The purpose of this section is to outline a context for understanding the directions and principles of US counterterrorism policy, to sketch its institutional and legislative framework for combating terrorism, and to bring to light an international dimension of the American counterterrorism program insofar as it relates to the struggle with terrorism in the Central Asian states. Throughout its twentieth century history, the United States had seen sporadic outbreaks of terrorism mounted by both domestic and foreign groups. The magnitude and frequency of violence was perceived as too insigniﬁcant for deﬁning terrorism as a major national security problem. The country lacked a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy or general consensus concerning the deﬁnition and nature of terrorism (Yonah 2008). The American states have used a wide range of deﬁnitions of the crime of terrorism, while the federal level executive agencies disagreed in their positions on the meanings of the term or the magnitude of actual threat (Yonah 2008). The subject of terrorism began to appear on the presidential agenda more frequently in the 1970s, after the 1972 Munich massacre of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists during the Olympic games hosted by Germany and,

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 63 particularly, during the 1980s, after a series of spectacular bombings against US targets abroad. The US government established new counterterrorism institutions and began developing a more coherent and proactive strategy aimed at suppressing terrorism. These developments had been facilitated by increasingly more frequent and devastating attacks against US armed forces, US citizens, and US interests abroad. Over the past decades, the US government and American citizens have borne the brunt of nearly one-quarter of terrorist attacks committed in the world. Still, the US administration continued viewing these attacks as discrete incidents without a strategic dimension or political pattern (Yonah 2006; 2008: xxxv). There was a lack of political will to run a vigorous and sustained counterterrorism campaign at home or abroad (Hoffman 2002). The feeling of invulnerability was prevalent in the minds of political elites and the general American population. The deﬁciencies and breaches in the country’s counterterrorism capabilities were sidestepped or all together ignored. The fallout of this piecemeal approach and this attitude of invincibility to terrorism became obvious on the morning of September 11, 2001. The collective trauma and pain incurred by the brutal attacks on the American homeland immediately changed the national outlook on the threat of terrorism and strengthened the country’s determination to ﬁght it globally, relentlessly, and without remorse. This change in American perceptions over the nature of terrorism could already be observed during the years preceding 9/11. The emergence of Al-Qaeda (the “Base”), a complex multi-national network of Sunni terrorist groups inspired and led by Osama bin Laden and his accomplices, drastically changed American interests abroad. Already in the 1990s, this terrorist organization had declared Jihad (Holy War) against the United States and had issued a fatwa (religious ruling) calling on Muslims around the world to kill the American people. The belligerent disposition of Al-Qaeda coupled with the 9/11 attacks on American soil strongly affected American perceptions and caused a change from the treatment of terrorism as an ordinary crime to its characterization as a new type of warfare (Yonah 2006: 15). After 9/11, the Bush administration launched the most extensive counterterrorism undertaking not only in the history of the United States, but also in the history of the world. Immediately, in the wake of the attacks, president George W. Bush declared war against Al-Qaeda; this evolved into a global war on terrorism in the next months. He further rallied international support for a military operation in Afghanistan targeting Al-Qaeda bases and the Taliban government, which provided a safe haven for bin Laden’s terrorist infrastructure. At home, the US government initiated extensive counterterrorism measures, most of which were codiﬁed in the USA Patriot Act, 16 which integrates a number of legislative initiatives put forth in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and enacted in October 2001. Envisioned as a comprehensive piece of legislation augmenting US counterterrorism capabilities, the USA Patriot Act enumerates a wide range of traditional and “outside-of-the-box” responses. The former category includes enhanced aviation security measures, policies to strengthen bio and nuclear security and public

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health, activities aimed at improving intelligence capabilities and information sharing, stricter immigration laws and border control requirements, emergency funding and other ﬁnancial support, among many other things. Its extraordinary measures, severely criticized at home and abroad, encompass, for example, various elements of enhanced surveillance powers and data-sharing procedures, the introduction of the power of detention without trial, revised military orders related to the detention, treatment, and trial of non-US citizens arrested on charges of terrorism, disclosure of educational records and access to other types of personal information, and changes in attorney–client relations. Initially, American lawmakers attached sunset stipulations to many of the most controversial provisions, requiring Congress to reauthorize them within four years. In March of 2006, after months of debate, Congress reafﬁrmed the bill, making 14 of the 16 provisions of the USA Patriot Act permanent, which were otherwise scheduled to expire in March 2006. The remaining two sections were announced to expire in December 2009. The second major development in the post-9/11 counterterrorism program was the establishment of a new Department of Homeland Security in July 2003, and the introduction of structural changes to governmental agencies responsible for combating terrorism in the United States. The Department of Homeland Security, whose primary missions are to keep the American homeland safe from the many threats it faces and to respond to natural disasters, integrated 22 previously independent governmental agencies. It consists of several divisions, such as Border and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and Responses, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures, and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, and employs more than 225,000 people. Besides the Department of Homeland Security, the US counterterrorism team includes different bureaus in the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Treasury, Department of Justice, CIA, FBI, and National Security Council (NSC). The NSC hosts the Ofﬁce of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, which is responsible for coordinating and supporting the development and implementation of US counterterrorism policies overseas. It integrates the efforts of individual agencies directed at either combating terrorism or coordinating crisis management at home. In 2004, the US president, taking into consideration recommendations of a commission set up to investigate the circumstances of the 9/11 attacks, decreed the establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The primary task of the NCTC is integration and examination of all intelligence concerning US counterterrorism efforts as well as interagency information sharing. The NCTC has served as a knowledge data bank on known and suspected terrorists and their organizations, and an analytical tool providing the US government and other counterterrorism agencies with important intelligence reports and other information on terrorism. US counterterrorism efforts have not been limited to domestic measures that serve to limit the actions of terrorist groups and individuals associated with terrorist organizations on the territory of the United States. The international dimension has been an integral and growing aspect of the US counterterrorism program. One of the lessons that the US government learned from its experiences of ﬁghting

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 65 terrorism is that the interruption of international terrorist networks would be unfeasible without robust international cooperation (Cressey 2000). Today, international cooperation is one of the basic and enduring policy principles guiding US policy aimed at combating terrorism at home and abroad (Kraft 2008; US Department of State: The Ofﬁce of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2005). The US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism approved in 2006 emphasizes the international dimension of the US counterterrorism program. The document maintains that the success of the global war on terrorism hinges on the ability of the United States ( jointly with other nations) to deny terrorists the support, sponsorship, and sanctuary of rogue states. It requires cooperation in deterring terrorists from taking control over any nation that could be used as a base and launching pad for terrorist acts. It calls for mutual efforts in rectifying the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, such as political instability and social vulnerabilities, as well as security breaches in the countries at risk. It also proposes the advancement of democracy as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2006). US efforts to build and lead an international counterterrorism coalition include many issues. The US government has been fostering regional stability and security of individual states that work with the US by bolstering their counterterrorism capabilities through foreign assistance, military and law enforcement cooperation and training, and economic cooperation (where needed). The AntiTerrorism Assistance Program (ATA), for example, administered by the Ofﬁce of the Coordinator for Terrorism, has been used to provide American partners with anti-terrorism training and equipment to protect their national borders and critical infrastructure, to respond to terrorist incidents, to mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks, and to prosecute those responsible for terrorism. The US administration has also provided billions of dollars in assistance through the Shared Security Partnership program aimed at enhancing the ability of American partners to improve their own security in order to work with the US toward the common goal of suppressing terrorism worldwide. The US government has pushed for international cooperation using both bilateral means and multilateral forums, such as the UN, the group of G8 countries, and other international groups, organizations, and specialized agencies. The American administration sponsored important Security Council resolutions requiring member states to step up their efforts at curbing terrorism and terrorist ﬁnancing, and sharpening sanctions against state-sponsors of terrorism. It has been assisting in the development and enactment of international conventions dealing with different aspects of the global struggle against terrorism and has championed efforts focusing on disruption of terrorist ﬁnancing. The US government has also been identifying and publicizing lists of terrorists and terrorist organizations, termed “designations.” These lists impose certain obligations on American citizens and businesses worldwide, or anyone residing and doing business in the United States. They must abstain from engaging in any kind of activities, ﬁnancial or otherwise, with individuals and groups on the foreign terrorist organizations list and other such lists.

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All in all, the United States has developed and enacted a comprehensive and fairly balanced counterterrorism policy encompassing broad preventive responses, measures aimed at the suppression of terrorism, and activities for mitigating the consequences of terrorist attacks and bringing the culprits to justice, particularly, in the realm of the homeland security. In its international dimension, however, it has shown a greater inclination toward forceful responses and reliance on the employment of military abroad. It has been argued that American strategic culture, shaped by beliefs in American exceptionalism, the superiority of its moral values, and its position of leadership in the world, has predisposed the country toward the privileging of military responses. American national goals have been perceived by its leaders as symbolic of broader international goals, and its actions employed in the interests of all humankind. The United States government, driven by a sense of a global mission, has been willing to use the American military forces and its technological might for accomplishing its national and international goals (Dunn 2003; Thorne 1992). The employment of armed forces against terrorism, even more impressive than using diplomatic and economic means to combat terrorism, did not begin after the 9/11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon. The use or potential use of military might as an appropriate tool for ﬁghting terrorism has always been part of the US counterterrorism strategy. Before 9/11, both the Reagan and Clinton administrations had selectively utilized military strikes against terrorist groups and states supporting them (Yonah 2008: xxxvii). But it was after 9/11 that the United States accorded the greatest priority to the military aspect of its strategy for ﬁghting the terrorist menace worldwide. The Bush administration adopted a policy of pre-emptive strike allowing the American government to use its military force against states accused of harboring terrorists or posing a range of other threats to American security (Rees and Aldrich 2005: 909). The use of military force gives the United States a global reach and guarantees that no target remains beyond its scope. The US position on the use of military force is different from that of the EU. Although the Union does not reject the employment of the military in international relations, it only endorses the multilateral use of military force and underscores the importance of adhering to the rule of international law, particularly to Article 51 of the UN Charter on self-defense. Contrary to the Union’s stance, the American approach permits unilateral employment of force even when broad international consensus (embodied in the UN or other international organizations) for the use of force is lacking (Rees and Aldrich 2005: 915). Aside from the military campaign in Afghanistan and the war against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, the United States has selectively used its military power against tactical terrorist targets in other countries. The US government has also substantially increased defense spending relative to other states, and this has further heightened the military aspect of its counterterrorism program. Finally, an important observation has been made about the amount of attention accorded to the issue of human rights in the US counterterrorism campaign. In American policy documents, the position on human rights has been reduced to general statements of respect and commitment to human rights and reafﬁrmation

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 67 that US counterterrorism activities and military operations will conform to international human rights standards and humanitarian law. In practice, the United States has been regarded as an enfant terrible for circumventing a number of freedoms at home and violating the rights of detainees abroad. For many around the world, the United States has become the epitome of the radical transformation from the land of the free and a champion of human rights to a security state, a military occupant, and a malignant hegemonic force. The US administration has been severely criticized for compromising its standards on human rights in the name of security and counterterrorism, failing to openly and unambiguously condemn inhuman and derogative practices in other states combating terrorism and striking security deals with authoritarian regimes.

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism responses: examining the impact of reference groups This section explores counterterrorism measures adopted by the Kyrgyz government and assesses the impact of Kyrgyzstan’s reference groups on the state’s counterterrorism responses. It starts with the survey of views on terrorism shared by public ofﬁcials in Kyrgyzstan and examines how the leaders’ understanding of the nature of terrorism has evolved through interaction with the republic’s neighbors. Next, I will look into the legislative and institutional frameworks for combating terrorism in Kyrgyzstan and discuss how the country’s engagement in joint counterterrorism efforts with Russia, China, the United States, and other Central Asian states has affected the scope of counterterrorism responses adopted by its government. The last section of this chapter will illustrate how Kyrgyzstan’s reference groups have inﬂuenced the republic’s human rights practices in the context of war on terrorism. Kyrgyzstan’s views on terrorism The threat of terrorism in Central Asia has traditionally been associated with activities of Islamist movements in the region. As discussed above, radical Islamic groups have been a major challenge to the secular rule of the Uzbek President Islam Karimov since Uzbekistan’s independence. In Tajikistan, too, Islamists have been viewed as one of the principle security threats to the governing regime. The governments of both states have blamed radical Islamic groups for all incidents of political violence in their countries. In contrast, during the 1990s, the public authorities in Kyrgyzstan believed that their state, where Islam has traditionally had a less profound inﬂuence on social and political life, provided poor soil for Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. In an interview with a Russian newspaper, the ﬁrst Kyrgyz president, Askar Akaev, plainly stated, “If I don’t have a real problem of religious extremism, why would I create an artiﬁcial one?” (Rotar 1999). Following the February 1999 bombings that targeted key government buildings in the center of Uzbekistan’s capital, President Islam Karimov assailed radical

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Islamic groups for what the authorities called “terrorist” attacks. Since then, the label of terrorism has been routinely used in connection with any activity within unofﬁcial Islam in Uzbekistan. The Tajik leadership also appropriated terrorist terminology in reference to the remnants of the Islamic military underground. Around the same time, Russia became embroiled in the second Chechen war. The Russian leadership, coping with the loss of its country’s former international inﬂuence, also embraced a gloomier worldview, stressing the growing threat of terrorism. Some analysts argue that Russia has stirred up the fears of religions extremism and terrorism in Central Asia to revitalize the CIS collective security system and to bolster its military ties with the Central Asian states (Hunter 2004: 334). The speeches and statements of Russian leaders and the documents adopted within the framework of Russian-led organizations have stressed the danger arising from activities of Islamists in the Central Asian states. Particularly, in recent years, Russian security services have been pouring out warnings about the imminence of terrorist threat and Islamist insurgency in Central Asia. Anti-Islamic sentiments ﬁnd a great deal of support in mainland China. The Chinese ofﬁcials have been keen to bolster the view equating terrorism with activities of Islamist movements, particularly the ETIM formed by ethnic Uighurs, in Central Asia. The Kyrgyz security establishments have always had to work closely with their Uzbek, Tajik, and Russian counterparts in bilateral and multilateral formats (Sidorov 2002). Through their interaction with the neighbors’ security forces, they learned and adopted terrorism terminology in reference to the activities of Islamist groups. Uzbekistan, for example, has been the foremost exponent of a position stressing the dangers of radical Islam and has been a champion of vigorous counterterrorism responses. Following the 1999 raids of the IMU militants, the Uzbek authorities were particularly disgruntled with the Kyrgyz government’s playing down of the Islamist threat, while Uzbekistan’s security forces harshly criticized their Kyrgyz counterparts for passivity in coping with the crisis (Jonson 2003). Recently, the Karimov government redirected its efforts toward curbing religious activities of other Islamist groups whose practices deviate from the ofﬁcial position. Hizb ut-Tahrir has become the primary target of the secret service in Uzbekistan. In the Kyrgyz republic, where the movement ﬁrst appeared in 1997 and quickly garnered the support of several thousands of Muslims in Kyrgyzstan’s south, the public ofﬁcial exhibited little fervor in persecuting the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Some local authorities used to turn a blind eye to the activities of this Islamist organization as long as Hizb ut-Tahrir maintained a low proﬁle (Pannier 2008). In recent years the situation has changed. President Karimov has been exercising pressure on the government of Kyrgyzstan, forcing its authorities to recognize the growing Islamist threat and to adopt stricter counterterrorism measures. Assailed with threats and exhortations, Kyrgyzstan ﬁrst accused Hizb ut-Tahrir of “ideological extremism” and declared it as a threat to the republic’s national security. In 2003, Kyrgyzstan’s court banned the group and the government began clamping down on the activities of human rights organizations that speak out against the persecution of members and supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir (Taktogulov 2004).

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 69 The Bakiev administration appeared to be interested in intensifying counterterrorism cooperation with Uzbekistan. In 2006, the Kyrgyz and Uzbek presidents and security ofﬁcials held talks in which they decided to join forces in ﬁghting terrorism and extremism. A new wave of reports about IMU activity and the growing threat of Islamic radicalism in the country appeared at the time of a thaw in the relations between the two Central Asian republics. The Bakiev cabinet also signaled its intent to carry out a vigorous campaign aimed at stamping out the outlawed Islamist groups, including Hizb ut-Tahrir. Another sign of Uzbek inﬂuence on Kyrgyzstan’s views of the terrorist problem is the tendency of Kyrgyz ofﬁcials to conﬂate Hizb ut-Tahrir, a radical Islamic group that has not been implicated in violence in the region, with the IMU, a terrorist organization with ties to Al-Qaeda (Kimmage 2006b). After the 9/11 attacks and the inception of the US-led counterterrorism operation, the sentiments about the growth of Islamism in Russia, Central Asia, and elsewhere in the world has been accompanied by the rhetoric of threat and danger. Soon after the commencement of the global war on terrorism, Kyrgyzstan declared international terrorism and religious extremist as the primary threats to national, regional, and international security. The Kyrgyz authorities began treating all forms of political and social activity within Islam as manifestations of fundamentalism and a prelude to religious and political conﬂict. The designation of the IMU as a terrorist organization and a branch of Al-Qaeda by the US Department of State reinforced the determination of all Central Asian leaders in apprehending and liquidating the members and supporters of this militant group (US Department of State: The Ofﬁce of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2001). The conclusions of the recent reports on terrorism around the world published by the State Department, which largely concur with the Russian assessment of the security situation in Central Asia, strengthened the governments’ beliefs in the growing threat of terrorism and Islamic extremism in their states (US Department of State: The Ofﬁce of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2009). The premonitions of powerful nations with better military intelligence capabilities and greater experience at combating terrorism have inﬂuenced the perceptions of the Kyrgyz government. Kyrgyzstan’s administration has been keen to demonstrate its awareness of the growing threat of Islamic militant groups, its support of global anti-terrorism efforts, and its ability to cope with the new danger. The government of Kyrgyzstan has always recognized the transnational character of its security concerns and its own limited national capabilities to cope with threats to security. Thus, it has sought active collaboration with regional organizations set up to address those security problems. Kyrgyzstan’s participation in regional security arrangements required harmonization of its views on regional security threats. The Anti-Terrorism Center (established in 2000 under the auspices of the CIS) requested the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik authorities to submit courts’ decisions recognizing the IMU, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and other Islamist groups as terrorist or extremist organizations. These court decisions were used for preparing a single roster of terrorist and extremist groups operating in the CIS. In 2003,

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the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic issued a ban on several Islamic groups on the list, including the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir. In 2007, the SCO created a uniﬁed anti-terrorism database containing information about terrorist organizations, individual terrorists, and terrorist acts shared among the SCO members through the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (ROTC). The ATC CIS has also been compiling its own integrated databank of terrorist and extremist organizations, their leaders and rank-and-ﬁle members, terrorist and extremist activities in the CIS and other states, and non-governmental organizations and people implicated in supporting terrorism. These rosters of terrorist organizations and individuals persecuted for crimes of terrorism, extremism, and separatism have served to promote information exchange between state security bodies as well as to synchronize views of counterterrorism agencies about the nature and content of terrorist threat in the postSoviet territory. The SCO has also contributed to a locally bounded understanding of terrorism. The SCO member states do not view terrorism as a distinct abstract phenomenon with global relevance. Instead, for the SCO terrorism is “locally deﬁned by the ruling elite and left to sovereign states to combat by any means they see ﬁt” (Kimmage 2006a). The governments of the SCO member states accept each others’ understandings of security concerns. For the Central Asian states, it is religious extremism and terrorism, for Russia, Chechen separatism, and for China, the Uighur secessionist movement. All SCO members are expected to support the struggle of individual states with a perceived threat to their national security. It is this responsibility to assist in counterterrorism efforts of the fellow SCO member states that instigated the Kyrgyz government to launch a massive crackdown on individuals and groups suspected of posing a threat to regional security. Undeniably, the IMU raids in 1999 and sporadic attacks by Islamic militants have destroyed a sense of security in Kyrgyzstan. The growing popularity of radical Islamic groups, particularly, Hizb ut-Tahrir, has been unsettling for public ofﬁcials. Recently published ofﬁcial reports assert that radical Islam has made a forceful comeback in Kyrgyzstan and its threat to regional and national security is growing. The reality, however, is more complex. Kyrgyzstan has been a bastion of moderate and traditional Islam, and the rise of its radical and militant forms has been exaggerated by the Kyrgyz authorities. The governments of all Central Asian republics have been notorious for manipulating the discourse on radical Islam and taking advantage of the context of the war on terrorism for their own interests: to stiﬂe domestic opposition and fortify the power of the governing regimes. Islamist incursions similar to those that took place in 1999 have never recurred in the Kyrgyz republic. The IMU strongholds were severely weakened during the course of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The threat of terrorism, religious extremism, and low-scale insurgency continues to persist in Central Asia, but there has been a disparity between the Kyrgyz leaders’ representations of these threats and the objective levels of violence in the republic and the broader region. Kyrgyzstan’s

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 71 neighbors have always exerted a strong impact on the republic’s policies and conduct, while Kyrgyzstan’s interactions with Russia and other Central Asian states have strongly inﬂuenced its views on the terrorist problem. Institutional and legislative frameworks for combating terrorism in the Kyrgyz Republic In the 1990s, ﬁghting terrorism was a low priority for the Kyrgyz government. No counterterrorism legislation was adopted in Kyrgyzstan until 1999. The 1997 Penal Code of the Kyrgyz republic criminalized terrorism and a number of illegal activities that could lead to the perpetration of terrorist attacks, such as the organization of an armed or criminal association and participation in it. The deﬁnition of terrorism contained in Kyrgyzstan’s penal code repeated the language of the crime of terrorism provided in the Model Criminal Code approved by the CIS InterParliamentary Assembly in 1996 and the Criminal Code of Russia adopted the same year. In 1999, the Kyrgyz Parliament passed a law On Combating Terrorism followed by a national plan of counterterrorism measures adopted in realization of the CIS interstate program of joint measures to combat international terrorism and extremism.17 Both documents contained a broad outline of Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy, listed the governmental agencies responsible for ﬁghting terrorism, and deﬁned their mandate. The primary responsibility for combating terrorism in Kyrgyzstan lies with the Kyrgyz National Security Service, a successor of Soviet Kirgizia’s KGB. In preparing and carrying out counterterrorism operations, the National Security Service cooperates with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Security Council of Kyrgyzstan, the Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor General, and the Border Service. During the 1990s, the national security agencies of Kyrgyzstan lacked specialists with expertise in counterterrorism, were underfunded, and required extensive technical, ﬁnancial, and informational assistance. When the IMU ﬁghters raided the southern territory of Kyrgyzstan in 1999, the Kyrgyz interior forces were in a woeful shape to conduct a protracted military campaign in the mountains (Curtis 1997). Racked by low morale and poor discipline, the Kyrgyz servicemen also lacked crucial gear needed for everyday security operations. The Kyrgyz borders were poorly protected against the trafﬁc of illegal materials, weapons, drugs, and nationals of other states crossing the Kyrgyz border without proper documentation. The identiﬁcation papers issued by the Kyrgyz government had minimal level of protection, and the problem of corruption plagued every level of the state security and law-enforcement hierarchy. In recent years, the Kyrgyz government has improved the preparedness of its military and special task forces, increased security of the Kyrgyz border, and strengthened control of illegal trafﬁcking in arms and narcotics. Notwithstanding these improvements, the national security services are still inept at facing and redressing security threats in the republic or the broader region. Top Kyrgyz security ofﬁcials admit the vulnerability of Kyrgyzstan’s security system and lament the lack of preparedness to fend off internal and external security threats (Muzalevsky

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2009). With limited experience in carrying out an effective counterterrorism policy and scarce national resources, Kyrgyzstan has sought international assistance and active collaboration with other states and international organizations, particularly, with Russia and Russian-led CIS, CSTO, and the SCO. Kyrgyzstan’s legislative counterterrorism measures have followed the treaties and other documents related to the implementation of joint measures to combat international terrorism and organized crime approved under the CIS. Among those documents were the 1999 Treaty on Cooperation between the CIS Members in Combating Terrorism, and the Program of CIS Member States to Combat International Terrorism and Other Forms of Extremism up to the Year 2003 (UN Security Council 2002, 2003b,c). In 2004, the CIS member states developed the concept of the Program to Combat International Terrorism and Other Forms of Extremism for 2005–7 (Council of the Heads of State of the CIS 2005) and adopted the Program of Joint Measures to Combat International Crime for 2005–7 (Council of the Heads of State of the CIS 2004). The Kyrgyz Republic endorsed national plans for the implementation of the treaty and programs (UN Security Council 2006). Kyrgyzstan also ratiﬁed the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism approved by the SCO in 2001. By joining the CIS and SCO counterterrorism conventions and signing bilateral and regional agreements with Russia, China, and Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan transposed counterterrorism provisions contained in the treaties into its own domestic laws. According to Kyrgyzstan’s Constitution of 1993, international treaties and agreements adopted by the Kyrgyz government in accordance with established procedures become a part of Kyrgyzstan’s legislation. Zhogorku Kenesh (the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan) amended the existing legislative instruments related to the ﬁght against terrorism and adopted new counterterrorism laws to bring its domestic legislation in line with the ratiﬁed international agreements. The Kyrgyz lawmakers increased penalties for certain types of crimes related to terrorism and criminalized terrorism-related activities with the view of harmonizing Kyrgyz legislation with legislative acts of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors and in compliance with international agreements acceded to by Kyrgyzstan (Zhusupaliev 2005). In 2006, Kyrgyzstan enacted a new law On Counteraction to Terrorism following the approval of a new version of the model law with a similar title by the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS in 2004. Similar to the Russian act On Counteraction to Terrorism of 2006, and the CIS model law, Kyrgyzstan expanded the purview of the new counterterrorism legislation to include more detailed deﬁnitions of terrorist acts and terrorist activity, parameters of the regime of counterterrorism operations, and the use of military force. Paralleling the Russian and CIS laws on counteraction to terrorism, the Kyrgyz act was envisioned as a comprehensive piece of legislation encompassing a wide range of preventive measures, as well as responses aimed at suppressing the terrorist threat and liquidating its negative consequences. However, the law provides only scant description of prophylactic measures and is lacking a systematic approach including political, informational, socio-economic, legal, and other types of responses to the threat of terrorism.

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 73 One more piece of legislation enacted in 2006 in Kyrgyzstan was the Law on Counteracting Terrorist Financing and Legalization of Proceeds from Crime (Money Laundering). The Kyrgyz parliament approved the act in fulﬁllment of the republic’s international responsibility to prevent the ﬁnancing of terrorism. The law established a new Financial Intelligence Unit charged with collecting and analyzing information pertinent to ﬁnancial transactions. It is also tasked with the development of measures aimed at preventing and detecting suspicious ﬁnancial transactions and reporting those cases to the ofﬁce of the public prosecutor. In preparing this law, the Kyrgyz government relied on the assistance of specialists from the World Bank, the IMF, and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) as well as experts from the Eurasian Group (EAG), a regional FATF-style body on combating money laundering and ﬁnancing of terrorism that unites the ﬁve CIS states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) and China. The regional and bilateral agreements signed by Kyrgyzstan laid the ground for its participation in various counterterrorism initiatives under the aegis of the CIS, CSTO, and SCO. In the summer of 2000, the CIS member states, at Russia’s initiative, decided to establish a CIS Anti-Terrorist Center with headquarters in Moscow. Ofﬁcially, the ATC operates under the aegis of the CIS. In practice, however, it is subordinate to the Russian security service. The headquarters of ATC is located next to the main ofﬁce of the FSB, and the latter’s deputy director heads the center. A number of structural sub-units within the ATC are tasked with coordination of counterterrorism activities in the CIS member states, the preparation of counterterrorism exercises and training, the monitoring of terrorist trends on the territory of the CIS states, and the identiﬁcation of directions of future cooperation in the area of counterterrorism. A year after the creation of ATC, the CIS Heads of States supported Putin’s idea of a Central Asian branch of the CIS ATC. In January 2002, a structural subdivision of the ATC was opened in Bishkek. A Russian colonel of the FSB, Sergei Reva, was placed in charge of the Central Asian branch of the CIS ATC. It is also in Bishkek that the Russian president chose to locate the headquarters of the CIS rapid-deployment forces created within the framework of the CSTO and uniting several battalions from Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. On several occasions, the Kyrgyz authorities have commended the CSTO rapiddeployment troops as an important instrument for combating international terrorism, drug trafﬁcking, and coping with other threats to the CSTO members. According to the Kyrgyz leadership, the CIS rapid-deployment force is a sign of the growing importance of collective security measures in the area of combating terrorism. An opinion shared in Kyrgyzstan’s security circles is that in 1999-2000 Kyrgyzstan had to ﬁght off the raids of Islamists alone. With the creation of the CIS rapid-deployment force, it is expected that Islamic militants or other destabilizing forces will be repelled through a collective CIS response (Akaev 2001). The meetings of the CSTO top decision-makers in 2008-9 resolved to give a boost to the rapid-deployment forces and transform them into operational response ones. According to the Russian president, Dmitri Medvedev, the change is not merely

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emblematic and limited to the alternation in the title of troops. Instead, it is meant to beef up the CIS collective security forces and expand their task from focusing exclusively on the low-intensity conﬂict to the conduct of full-ﬂedged conventional war. It is envisioned that the operational response forces would incorporate security service, special task and emergency situation units, and interior ministry troops totaling up to 20,000 service people. Russia’s standards would be used in the development of a collective doctrine, selection of armaments, munitions, and uniform (Felgenhauer 2009; Socor 2009). In recent years, Kyrgyzstan’s military and internal forces have intensiﬁed their cooperation with regional partners and increased their efforts at improving their counterterrorism capabilities. Kyrgyzstan’s army relies on military equipment produced in the Soviet Union or Russian Federation, and, therefore, is bound to purchasing hardware and gear from the Russian state sold at a discounted rate. This, in turn, increases the interoperability of the Russian and Central Asian forces. Military cooperation has also been reinforced by Russian-oriented military education and similarities in approaches to military training. The Kyrgyz cadets are trained free of charge in the Russian military schools, whereas the ofﬁcers have to pay only around 30 percent of all expenses for their education in the Russian Federation. Most of the generals in Kyrgyzstan’s army graduated from the Russian Academy of the General Staff (Institute for Public Policy 2006b). The factors facilitating military cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Russia also encourage joint exercises and training under the aegis of the CIS, CSTO, and SCO. The Kyrgyz law enforcement and military personnel took part in numerous CIS-staged operations, such as “Arsenal,” “Border,” “Anti-Terrorism Vortex,” “Passenger,” “Trafﬁc,” “Alien,” and other operations aimed at preventing and suppressing terrorist attacks and the activities of transnational criminal groups. Kyrgyz army units have participated in the CIS ATC joint command-post exercises: “Commonwealth-2000 Southern Shield;” “South, Anti-terror-2002;” “Azov, Anti-terror-2003;” and many others. In 2004, Kyrgyzstan hosted the CSTO rapiddeployment forces exercise “Rubezh 2004,” and sent its troops for participation in similar exercises in 2005 and 2006. With the establishment of the SCO, contact between the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Russia, China, and the Central Asian states intensiﬁed. Kyrgyz security representatives have been holding regular meetings with their counterparts from neighboring republics. Delegates from the Supreme Courts of the SCO member states have been engaged in ongoing judicial dialogue over the ways to streamline legal practices in various areas of state cooperation, including extradition, criminal investigation, and conﬁscation of property, as well as concerning trials on charges of extremism, terrorism, and separatism. Since 2007, Kyrgyzstan has taken part in a number of SCO-sponsored counterterrorism drills, such as the Issyk-Kul Anti-terror-2007 and Norak-Anti-terror-2009 exercises, which involved special forces units and law enforcement agencies from the SCO member states. The above analysis of Kyrgyzstan’s legislative and institutional responses to the threat of terrorism reveals that the republic’s counterterrorism policy as well as concrete measures aimed at combating terrorism bear a clear sign of inﬂuence

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 75 by Russia, China, Central Asian states, and regional organizations with a signiﬁcant Russian clout. The former Kyrgyz president, Askar Akaev, acknowledged that practical steps undertaken within the CIS and SCO constitute a model of effective counterterrorism responses (Akaev 2004a). Both the SCO and CSTO have been looked at as models in dealings with terrorism, extremism, and separatism. The administration of president Bakiev was also hopeful of counterterrorism cooperation under the aegis of the CSTO, CIS, and SCO. Kyrgyz counterterrorism legislation mimics Russia’s counterterrorism laws and model legislation adopted within the CIS and SCO frameworks. The structure and authority of the Kyrgyz counterterrorism agencies resembles its neighbors’ counterterrorism institutions. Security forces in Kyrgyzstan play a major role in combating terrorism. The punitive and military aspects of the ﬁght against terrorism constitute the core of Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism program, as they do in the counterterrorism policies of the neighboring states. The Central Asian states’ counterterrorism practices, particularly those adopted in Uzbekistan, have also been looked at for legitimizing the responses adopted by the government of Kyrgyzstan. It would be remiss not to note that NATO, the OSCE, the UN, and other organizations and individual states have assisted Kyrgyzstan in strengthening its counterterrorism capabilities. Through their monetary, technical, consultative, and informational support, Western states and institutions have inﬂuenced the scope of Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy. Kyrgyzstan has been cooperating with NATO within the PfP framework acceded to by the republic in 1994. As recently as 2007, this framework was complemented with the PfP Planning and Review Process. The latter instrument aims to increase the interoperability of NATO and Kyrgyz military forces and assist the Kyrgyz government in developing army reform plans and other defense initiatives. Kyrgyzstan’s infantry units, National Guard counterterrorism team, and border guards participated in NATO-led training exercises. The Northern Alliance has also supported various educational activities pertinent to security and defense issues in addition to the sponsorship of seminars on civil emergency planning in Kyrgyzstan (NATO 2009). The Kyrgyz government took advantage of its membership in international organizations to secure the Kyrgyz border and strengthen control of illegal trafﬁcking in arms and narcotics. In order to modernize the Kyrgyz passport system and bring it in line with international standards, the Kyrgyz government cooperated with the International Organization for Migration and a number of other international organizations. With the ﬁnancial support of the United States, the Kyrgyz government constructed several modern border point facilities furnished with radiation detection equipment. The American administration has provided funds for training Kyrgyz military service personnel, and helped with modernization of some defense facilities (US Department of State: The Ofﬁce of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2009). It also supplied equipment, uniforms, and personnel gear to the Kyrgyz Ministry of Defense, Border Troops, Ministry of Emergency Situations, National Guard, and Ministry of Interior Forces. Sponsored by the US, the Kyrgyz National Guard opened a counterterrorism training facility. In this way, technical, ﬁnancial, and other kinds of support from the United States,

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NATO, and other international organizations and individual states have helped to build Kyrgyzstan’s capacity in terms of its capabilities to detect, prevent, and respond to the terrorist threat. Cooperation with other states and international organizations is in the interest of the Kyrgyz government because neither Russia nor Russian-led regional institutions are capable of rectifying every weak spot of Kyrgyzstan’s security and defense complex. The foreign agencies’ counterterrorism initiatives typically do not interfere with counterterrorism projects that Russia, China, and other Central Asian states implement in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, international counterterrorism assistance is typically dispensed for small-scale projects. The amount of funds allotted for Kyrgyzstan’s security sector by foreign organizations and individual states is too insigniﬁcant to absolve the Kyrgyz government from its dependence on Russia. From 1994 to 2002, only 52 Kyrgyz servicemen had participated in the International Military Equipment and Training (IMET) courses sponsored by the United States. A very small fraction of the Kyrgyz ofﬁcer corps has been trained in the United States or other NATO partners’ military schools (Olcott 2005: 190). The EU has acknowledged the persistence of the Islamist threat in Central Asia. The Union, however, has not followed through in its intent to support Central Asian states in countering it. Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian republics have long realized that Europe’s wide-ranging assistance for improving the capabilities of their security forces will not be forthcoming (Norling 2007). Kyrgyzstan had hoped to boost its ties with the United States by demonstrating strong political will to support the United States in its war against terrorism. Russia’s enthusiastic backing of global anti-terrorist efforts and Moscow’s endorsement of the US-led operation in Afghanistan were politically important decisions. The Kyrgyz authorities, too, felt unconstrained in various forms of practical assistance to the United States and coalitional forces (Ponsard 2005). The government of the United States, for example, requested Kyrgyzstan’s permission to use its airspace for American forces participating in the military campaign in Afghanistan. After consultations with the CSTO leaders, Kyrgyzstan granted permission and agreed to host coalitional troops and aircraft at Ganci airbase, located at Manas International Airport in Bishkek. The latter decision was also approved during behind-the-scenes meetings with the leaders of Russia, China, and other Central Asian states (Knyazev 2008). In acknowledgment of Kyrgyzstan’s support, the US government sharply increased aid to the republic in 2002, but US foreign assistance dropped away the following year. In ﬁscal year 2002, Kyrgyzstan received US$95 million from all US Government agencies. In ﬁscal year 2003, only US$56.6 million was budgeted for Kyrgyzstan and the amount of aid continued to decline in subsequent years (US Department of State: The Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 2004). Of all Central Asian republics (with the exception of Turkmenistan), Kyrgyzstan received the smallest amount of US foreign assistance. Another setback in Kyrgyz–American relations was caused by the US decision to open an alternative military base in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan’s long-standing foe. The decision was “a bitter pill” for the Kyrgyz government to swallow because it signaled the unwillingness of the Bush administration to build an exclusive relationship

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 77 with Kyrgyzstan, which had been hoped for (Olcott 2005: 130). Soon after the opening of Uzbekistan’s Karshi-Khanabad airbase, known as K2,18 the Kyrgyz government began complaining about the ways the Americans operated the Ganci (Manas) airbase and declared that the functioning of the base was damaging to Kyrgyzstan’s national interests. The Kyrgyz authorities claimed that the air base caused an environmental hazard, and its rent was very low. Furthermore, the government expressed disappointment that the air base command would refuse to employ the locals for daily maintenance operations at the base (Pannier 2006). The relationship offered by the United States to Kyrgyzstan was perceived as too limited by the republic’s leaders, who reached out to Moscow and Beijing and concentrated their efforts on developing regional security and economic cooperation. Deputy Minister of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic, Kubanychbek Oruzbaev, cogently stated during a roundtable in 2006, “Are their any more effective alternatives for military security in Kyrgyzstan [to those supplied by Russia]? I think not” (Institute for Public Policy 2006b). In September 2003, a Russian airbase was opened near the village of Kant, approximately 30 miles away from the Manas airbase. The Kant base was constructed to support security and counterterrorism efforts of the CSTO members: Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz government stressed the permanent status of the Russian air base contrary to the Manas base, whose terms were limited by the time-frame of the US-led military operation in Afghanistan. To avoid disagreements with its CSTO and SCO partners, Kyrgyzstan turned down American requests to carry out reconnaissance ﬂights over the Kyrgyz– Chinese border in 2004 (Knyazev 2008). The next year, following the passage of the SCO declaration, which called on the United States to set a timeline for the withdrawal of its military forces from the region, the Kyrgyz government threatened to close down the Manas air base and demanded a 100 percent increase in rent for the facilities at the base (Peuch 2006). Although, the Kyrgyz prime minister claimed that the air base dispute had “no political undertone,” he made it explicit that the future of the US facilities in Kyrgyzstan would depend on the consent of the CSTO members, particularly, Russia (Peuch 2006). The question about the expediency of the US military presence in Kyrgyzstan was a subject of hearings in the Kyrgyz parliament in 2006–7. The Kyrgyz government deliberated over the issue of closing the Manas airbase on several occasions during those same years (Knyazev 2008). In February 2009, the Bakiev administration announced its determination to evict the US military from the Manas airport, ostensibly goaded toward this decision by Russia. By the summer, however, Bakiev changed his mind and acquiesced to an American request to transform the military base into a cargo transit center with increased lease payments from Washington. Questions remain about the Kremlin’s approval of Bakiev’s change of mind (Marat 2009). Some analysts argue that Kyrgyzstan’s leadership acted unilaterally in response to an ofﬁcial letter from the American president, in which Obama appealed directly to Bakiev to support international counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s president Hamid Karzai also requested the Kyrgyz leader to continue providing support to the coalitional forces. Given Kyrgyzstan’s

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recurrent threats to evict the US from the republic, there is little guarantee that the Kyrgyz leadership’s pledge to cooperate with the US will last. Clearly, Moscow has not exhausted its political clout in this state because already in July 2009 an ofﬁcial announcement was made regarding the deployment of a second Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan. The Russian and Kyrgyz presidents signed an agreement on 1 August 2009. This would allow Moscow to signiﬁcantly boost its military presence in the country through the establishment of another Russian military base in the town of Osh. Ofﬁcially placed under the guidance of the CSTO, the Russian forces will be tasked with deterring and suppressing attacks by terrorist groups and protecting Kyrgyzstan’s sovereignty (RFE/RL 2009a). Human rights in the context of counterterrorism in Kyrgyzstan In the late 1990s, a softer and more tolerant response toward radical Islamic groups set Kyrgyzstan apart from its more ﬁerce neighbors. Caught for the ﬁrst time, a Hizb ut-Tahrir member received a police warning and a ﬁne of up to US$100. Subsequent detentions could result in short terms of imprisonment. Most Islamists’ offenses were prosecuted under Article 299 of the Kyrgyz Penal Code, which prohibits instigation of religious and ethnic strife (ICG 2003a). In comparison, in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, members of radical Islamic groups received up to 15 years of imprisonment for distribution and possession of anti-government materials and attempts to topple the governments in these states (Mukhametrakhimova 2006a). A spokesperson for the Interior Ministry of Kyrgyzstan, Joldoshbek Busurmankulov, once explained the difference in the republics’ strategies: I don’t think that we will live 20 years without any Hizb ut-Tahrir, if we give them [members of Hizb ut-Tahrir] 30 or 40 years of imprisonment or arrest all of them. It will not happen. I think we may ﬁght by alternative ways, different methods. We should prove their destructiveness. We should ﬁght for the hearts and minds of the people. (Eshanova 2002b) The following example illustrates differences in the ways the Central Asian governments responded to security threats. At different times, the presidents of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were targets of assassination attempts. In Turkmenistan, the government responded with a widespread repression of alleged partakers of the November 2002 attack. The government of Uzbekistan claimed that the bombings that exploded in Tashkent in February 1999 were an assassination attempt on president Karimov. A surge of arrests and trials followed the bombings. The decision of Kyrgyz president Askar Akaev to pardon six people convicted of plotting to kill him in 1999 appeared as a remarkable contrast to reprisals of the Uzbek and Turkmen presidents. Askaev’s offenders were initially sentenced to 14 to 16 years in prison on charges of preparation for a terrorist attack on the president and with an attempt to overthrow the country’s constitutional system. First, a city court reduced the terms to four and six years on the defenders’ appeal; and a year later, all culprits were pardoned by the Kyrgyz president (Omelicheva 2007).

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 79 The government of Uzbekistan has been the foremost exponent of vigorous counterterrorism responses. It prosecuted and convicted hundreds of people on charges of religious fundamentalism and terrorism. Uzbekistan’s security services and law-enforcement ofﬁcials operate under no constraints in their methods of ﬁghting against terrorism, and are immune to prosecution for the excessive use of force. The government of Tajikistan has also been known for harsh prosecution of Islamists. Struggling against terrorist threats, the governments of both states typically fail to differentiate between those who advocate violent means for accomplishing their divinely instituted mission and goals, and those who peacefully express their religious beliefs. The leadership of both republics does not distinguish between those who advocate radical Islamic ideas and those who practice their faith outside of religious institutions supported by the states. Following the lead of neighboring republics, Kyrgyzstan, too, hardened its policies toward terrorism and religious extremism. The number of cases of detention of Hizb utTahrir members has been on the rise, and the Kyrgyz courts began handing down harsher sentences to Islamists (Saidazimova 2007). There have been numerous complaints about violations of detainees’ rights, falsiﬁcation of charges, and torture of prisoners (ICG 2003a; Saidazimova 2007). Uzbekistan has always criticized Kyrgyzstan’s lenient approach to radical Islamic groups. President Karimov fretted over the ineptness of Kyrgyz troops to halt the advance of the IMU militants in 1999, and the Uzbek air forces bombed Kyrgyz and Tajik villages while supposedly searching for the IMU targets. Following the Islamists’ incursions, Uzbekistan’s security forces mined the Uzbek–Kyrgyz border, a virulent policy that resulted in numerous civilian casualties (ICG 2001). In 2002, the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on joint actions to ﬁght terrorism and religious extremism. This agreement laid juridical grounds to demand that the Kyrgyz government take decisive steps for preventing the recruitment of individuals for terrorist activities in other nations. President Karimov, for example, has taken advantage of legal agreements with Kyrgyzstan to pressurize his Kyrgyz counterpart to detain and forcefully return to Uzbekistan its citizens who had ﬂed from the prosecution for the alleged ties with Islamists. The Uzbek government exploited its position as an important provider of gas to Kyrgyzstan to exert further concessions from the Kyrgyz government. Following the republic’s refusal to send Andijan refugees back to Uzbekistan (a decision made under international pressure), the Uzbek authorities cut off some of their gas shipments to Kyrgyzstan. Notwithstanding the refusal to extradite all Uzbek refugees back to their homeland, the Kyrgyz government joined other SCO states in supporting Uzbekistan’s ofﬁcial position on the circumstances and consequences of clashes between the protesters and Uzbek Interior Ministry forces. According to the Karimov administration, the IMU organized the Andijan unrest, while the demonstrators were Hizb ut-Tahrir’s members. By the government’s estimates, only 187 people were killed by ﬁre from interior troops. Many international critics maintain that the Islamist threat was only a pretext for clamping down on the opposition and maintaining a repressive state. Despite these alternative reports, the SCO member states

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sided with the ofﬁcial position of the Karimov regime and praised the Uzbek troops for suppressing terrorist and other criminal activities in the Andijan region. The SCO resolutions, some of which were directed to Kyrgyzstan’s government and its treatment of the Uzbek refugees, required the member states to deny asylum to any individual charged with terrorism or extremism by a neighboring nation (The Times of Central Asia 2006b). Under pressure from the Uzbek authorities, Kyrgyz military units joined the security forces of Uzbekistan in raids on suspected bands of terrorists and carried out a number of independent terrorist groups’ liquidations. In recent years, the Kyrgyz interior troops and secret service conducted more counterterrorism sweeps, particularly in the south of the country, killing some people and arresting dozens of alleged Islamists. The witnesses of raids claim that the Kyrgyz security services planted extremist literature, arms, or drugs in the homes of pious Muslims and, then, used this “evidence” as grounds for arrests (Firdavsi 2006). The Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies have persecuted several Uzbek imams on the grounds of their involvement in radical Islamic groups, and have tolerated occasional abductions and forced repatriation of Islamic activists by the Uzbek secret service. In the fall of 2006, following the government’s killing of a prominent ethnic Uzbek religious leader, Raﬁg Qori Kamuluddin, implicated in ties with the IMU, the security services of Kyrgyzstan developed a special plan for strengthening the control of the republic’s Islamic clergy. The plan envisages, among other things, extensive monitoring of the Kyrgyz citizens of Uzbek and Uighur origin who have lived in the south of the republic, and those individuals who have arrived from Uzbekistan since the early 1990s (Djuraev 2006). In addition to stricter controls over religious practices of Kyrgyzstan’s Muslims, the law enforcement agencies of the republic have undertaken active steps to halt the spread of religious literature by Islamic groups and organizations (Saidazimova 2005c). If Uzbekistan has pressurized Kyrgyzstan to tighten control over religious activities of ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz, the government of China has exerted strong inﬂuence over the Kyrgyz authorities in dealing with ethnic Uighur Muslims. For years, the Chinese authorities have been battling with the Uighur separatists, but only recently has Beijing equated the Uighur strife with terrorism. The Chinese government used the SCO counterterrorism framework as a platform for gathering international support and recognition of the dissent in Xinjiang as a manifestation of international Islamic terrorism (The Times of Central Asia 2006a). In a series of agreements between Kyrgyzstan and China, the two states pledged to cooperate on different aspects of counterterrorism policy and vowed to join their efforts in the ﬁght against ethnic Uighur Muslims as part of their counterterrorism agenda (The Times of Central Asia 2006a). Bowing to pressure from China, the government of Kyrgyzstan suppressed any support to the Uighurs. It effectively silenced Uighur organizations and forcibly returned Uighur refugees wanted by Beijing. The ﬁrst law signed by Bakiev as president was an act on counteracting extremist activity. According to experts, the Chinese authorities put pressure on the Kyrgyz government to adopt this anti-extremist law (Zhusupaliev 2005). The expanded deﬁnition of extremism

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy 81 provided in the law allows prosecuting Uighur activists, supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir, and members of other Islamist groups operating in the country (Zhusupaliev 2005). In a series of trials, which observers labeled as politically motivated, the Kyrgyz courts sentenced Uighur defendants for terrorist bombings and attempts to set up a branch of the Uighur separatist movement in Kyrgyzstan (Usaeva 2001). Kyrgyzstan’s vigorous campaign against the Uighurs has come to resemble the ruthless ﬁght against the so-called “three evils” of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism conducted by the Chinese government, the government of Russia and authorities of other Central Asian states. There is little doubt that all Central Asian governments have taken advantage of the novel context of the war on terrorism for strengthening their power and limiting political opposition. Joanne Mariner, Terrorism and Counterterrorism Program director at the HRW, asserted that “some SCO countries have conﬂated domestic dissent with terrorism, and used abusive means in combating it” (HRW 2006). In much of this, the international community has been passively complicit. Neither Russian, Chinese, nor American assistance to Kyrgyzstan has been conditioned by progress in the area of human rights. In the opinion of representatives of human rights groups, constructive regional security cooperation could be critical in defeating terrorism in Central Asia. There is, however, every reason to be concerned that the SCO and CSTO championed by Russia and China will simply reinforce the worst human rights practices in their member-states (HRW 2006). All SCO republics have been notorious in their serious human rights violations under the pretext of ﬁghting terrorism. Their deplorable records include unlawful extraditions, extraordinary renditions, procedural rights violations, mistreatment of suspects in the police custody, extrajudicial executions, and clampdowns on religious and ethnic dissent. These human rights breaches can be exploited for justifying governmental abuse and repression in Kyrgyzstan and other states. Until recently, the United States, with its sullied human rights records, had also served as a very poor model for human rights practices in the region. Many observers believe that the US administration failed to fully utilize its leverage over the Central Asian governments to inﬂuence human rights practices in their republics. Both the United States and the EU have been called on to underscore the human rights dimension in their security-related and other initiatives in the Central Asian states. The Obama administration, however, has already announced that it will avoid public condemnation of human rights practices and democratization processes in Central Asia. Instead, a new approach espoused by the Obama team is based on the idea of teaching by example: the United States should become a role model, a positive example for other countries to emulate without imposing American values and principles on other nations. Only international human rights organizations put forward scathing criticism of the Central Asian governments’ increasingly authoritarian styles. The governing elites have exploited the fear of Islamic extremism to intensify their counterterrorism policies and stiﬂe dissent without much concern about international condemnation (Peimani 2002).

3

Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism policy

Kazakhstan is the largest landlocked state in the world and territorially the second largest republic of the former Soviet Union. It stretches across an area of approximately 2.7 million square kilometers, larger than the size of Western Europe. Countries that border Kazakhstan are Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (clockwise beginning from the north), and the Western border of the republic has a signiﬁcant shoreline on the Caspian Sea. Since time immemorial, this vast territory with diverse climate and topography was populated by ethnic Kazakhs leading a nomadic way of life and adhering to a system of clan and tribal grouping. The area became a part of tsarist Russia in the eighteenth century after the Kazakh hordes—political formations of the Kazakh tribes—suffered devastating attacks from the Kalmyks and sought protection from the Russian crown. With the incorporation of hordes into the Russian empire, the contact between the Russians and Kazakhs intensiﬁed through rapidly expanding immigration of Slavs into the steppe territory, conquest, and other aspects of colonial rule (Akiner 2000; Cummings 2005; Olcott 2002: 59–60). In the early twentieth century, Soviet rule replaced the reign of the Russian tsars and the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established in 1925 as a result of the Bolsheviks’ national delimitation of Central Asia. In 1936, the status of Kazakhstan in the Soviet Union was upgraded to that of Soviet Socialist Republic. Parallel with other republics of the USSR, Kazakhstan underwent economic industrialization, urbanization, and integration into the Soviet Union’s command economy and military–industrial complex. It also experienced an intensive Russian acculturation and development of the Soviet mindset during that same time period. In the waning days of Soviet rule, the USSR witnessed what has been described as the “parade of sovereignties” and the Kazakh republic was one of the 41 constituent units of the Soviet Union that claimed sovereignty in 1990. Following the abortive putsch in Moscow in August 1991 that triggered the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan declared independence in December 1991. With independence, Kazakhstan gained control over a substantial, albeit somewhat outdated, industrial sector. Unlike many other republics, it contained considerable natural wealth that quickly magnetized global attention. Signiﬁcant reserves of oil, gas, and minerals combined with the Kazakh government’s intelligent economic reforms contributed

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to the republic’s economic recovery and subsequent economic growth (Cummings 2005: 3). Under the leadership of Nursultan Nazarbaev, who came to power in Kazakhstan in 1989 as the head of the republican branch of the Communist Party and became its ﬁrst president in 1991, Kazakhstan implemented comprehensive market reforms and integrated the country into the global economy. Not only has the Nazarbaev administration succeeded in harnessing the republic’s copious energy resources and relinquishing its nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet period, but it has also avoided the political instability that has plagued other nations in transition. A multi-ethnic and poly-confessional state, Kazakhstan has fancied itself as a model of spiritual tolerance, inter-faith dialogue, and a meeting place of various religions, cultures, and civilizations. Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian republic that does not recognize Muslim holidays or mention Islam in its constitution, and Nazarbaev is the only Central Asian leader who has avoided drawing express association between his republic and Islam (Olcott 2002: 32). Unlike other Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which became the epicenters of the resurfaced Islamic tradition, Islam has made a less vigorous comeback in Kazakhstan (Ro’i 2000: 460). The urge to open and register mosques in Kazakhstan, for example, was much less than in the historically sedentary areas populated by Uzbeks and Tajiks (Ro’i 2000: 185). There were 6,000 mosques built in Uzbekistan in 1993, compared to 300 in 1989 (Yerekesheva 2004: 584). In Tajikistan, 2,000 new mosques were opened during 1989–91. In Kazakhstan, there were 1,402 mosques built toward the late 1990s (Yerekesheva 2004: 585). The less developed religious infrastructure, the lack of inﬂuential clergy, as well as intellectual environment were less conducive to the emergence of radical Islam in Kazakhstan than in other Central Asian republics. No terrorist attack blamed on the Islamists has ever been carried out successfully in Kazakhstan. Neither has the republic experienced raids by Islamic militants. Some attribute civil peace in Kazakhstan to governmental inter-religious policy and efforts of security forces, while others place greater emphasis on the republic’s ethnic and religious composition as well as on the orthodoxy and praxis of Islam in Kazakhstan. Although the majority of Kazakh population associates with Islam, there are several other confessions that attract substantial religious followings. Owing to the high percentage of Russians in the republic, for example, the Russian Christian Orthodox Church is the second largest denomination in the republic. In 1994, some 47 percent of the population of Kazakhstan was Muslim, 44 percent was Russian Orthodox and 2 percent was Protestant.1 According to the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Kazakhstan, in 2001 there were over 6,000 religious communities and 59 confessions in Kazakhstan of which 5,000 were Muslim. During the last decade, Kazakhstan witnessed religious growth and, by different accounts, today 52 to 65 percent of all believers in the republic are Muslims, about 23–30 percent are Christian Orthodox, 2–4 percent are Catholics, and less than 1 percent are Protestants (Telebaev 2003; Troﬁmov 2001).

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The relatively insigniﬁcant (compared to other Central Asia republics) Muslim population provides an insufﬁcient social basis for mobilization by Islamic groups. Furthermore, ethnic Kazakhs have been known as nominal Muslims for they have never observed Islamic prohibitions and laws very closely. Although most of the Kazakh tribes were converted to the Sunni branch of Islam by the end of the nineteenth century (Sagdeev 2000: 8), Islam has never had such a prevalent inﬂuence among the Kazakh nomads as among the Uzbeks and Tajiks. The Islamic practices of the nomadic societies have been largely conﬁned to the spheres of family life and cultural rites and were intertwined with pre-Islamic pagan traditions and Adat, a common law prevalent in the steppe. One survey conducted in 2002 in Kazakhstan found that only 2.3 percent of respondents go to mosque every day, 4.8 percent visit mosques 3–5 times a week, and 10.3 percent go 3–5 times a month. A total of 65.9 percent of the survey respondents, the so-called “nominal believers,” go to mosque 1 to 5 times a year (Telebaev 2003). There is another important difference between Islam in Kazakhstan and in other Central Asian states. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the return to Islam took a somewhat different form in this country that had been subjected to intense Russiﬁcation as a consequence of the inﬂux of Russians. Public authorities and ordinary people have been ready to embrace Islam as a part of the greater ethnic idea, and to assert a local identity against the Russians who had long overshadowed local cultural life (Khalid 2007: 119; Telebaev 2003). Because of Kazakhstan’s ethnic and religious diversity, the relatively mild levels of religiosity among the majority of Muslims, and improved socio-economic conditions, it was common for people to stress the country’s immunity to religious extremism and terrorism during the ﬁrst decade after its independence. This attitude was conveyed in the speeches of Kazakh ofﬁcials and statements of the delegations participating in summits of the CIS. It was at the turn of the century that Kazakhstan’s leadership began embracing the rhetoric of Islamic radicalism and fundamentalism. Both politicians and security experts began deﬁning these phenomena as serious threats to national security and destabilizing factors in the broader Central Asian region. This attitude toward the problem of radical Islam made quick inroads into security and military circles and spread among the governing elite and political analysts. The Kazakh leadership has become increasingly insecure about the republic’s burgeoning religious sector. Various humanitarian and missionary groups have been suspected as cover-ups for Islamic groups seeking to intensify their activities in the republic. Particularly, in the wake of the events of 9/11, it has become common to hear a viewpoint that in Kazakhstan, too, there are certain conditions and factors that might become the precursors for the emergence of terrorism and extremism (Kurganskaia 2002). In his 2005 Presidential address to the people of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nasarbaev named terrorism, political instability, and religious extremism as the gravest threats of the twenty-ﬁrst century and serious obstacles to the economic, social, and political modernization of the country (Nazarbaev 2005). The following year, the president called on the Kazakh National Security Committee (KNB), an agency in charge of counterterrorism, to do its utmost to protect the security of

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the nation. Spurred by this appeal, the KNB published a series of interviews and reports discussing what the agency branded as the “burning” question of terrorism and religious extremism in Kazakhstan. The agency also publicized its timely reaction to threats emanating from terrorist and extremist organizations. In 2006, the KNB announced a successful joint operation conducted by the secret service and Interior Ministry troops that prevented a major terrorist attack and shut down an organization established for terrorist activities (Yermukanov 2006). The Kazakh military has also been convinced that religious extremism and terrorism present a real and serious threat to Kazakhstan. The military leadership has opined that the Kazakh army should increase its preparedness to defend the country from unconventional risks to security in case those threats materialize. The religious leaders and Kazakh security experts have been divided in their assessment of the magnitude of the threat of religious extremism and terrorism in Kazakhstan. Some theologians contend that Kazakhstan provides poor soil for terrorism and extremism because the Kazakhs have never been religious zealots, while other portend that Islamism has taken root in the republic and poses a novel and grave threat (Kurganskaia 2002). The lack of consensus on this issue also characterizes the opinions of analysts. Some believe that due to its historical and socio-cultural bases, radical Islam is inimical to Kazakh Muslims. Others are inclined to think that there is a real danger of religious fanaticism and extremism in Kazakhstan. The position of the latter group has been cogently expressed in a statement of the former KNB agent, a political activist and expert, MajorGeneral Tursun Aizhulov. “Terrorism is not simply knocking on the window; it is already at our doorstep. We must oppose this evil with our vigilance. We should consolidate the powers of state, society, and businesses for ﬁghting terrorism and extremism,” asserted Aizhulov (Sokolov 2007). Following the change in the perception of risks associated with radical Islam, Kazakhstan’s government invigorated a national counterterrorism policy. The role of the special services dedicated to protecting the republic’s national security has intensiﬁed. The Kazakh leadership set up new counterterrorism institutions for coordination and leadership over activities of different agencies participating in combating terrorism. The KNB initiated the creation of counterterrorism ﬁghting units and the establishment of operation headquarters in Astana and regional centers for implementing timely and comprehensive measures for suppressing manifestations of terrorism. The Kazakh government has been an ardent supporter of the anti-Taliban coalition and its anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. Kazakhstan has increased its participation in international joint command post training and exercises, and began holding regular inter-departmental counterterrorism drills aimed at honing the tactics of hostage release, negotiations with hostage-takers, and discovery, persecution, disarmament, and liquidation of terrorist groups in localities with different characteristics. The Kazakh courts banned a number of religious organizations. Security services have stepped up their counterterrorism operations alone or with their counterparts from neighboring states. There has been a substantial increase in searches of religious organizations. The seizures of prohibited literature, print equipment, arms, and other illegal materials

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have been on the rise. The state has also increased criminal and administrative responsibility for certain types of activities associated with extremism and terrorism and strengthened religious regulations. What explains changes in Kazakhstan’s views on the problem of terrorism and intensiﬁcation of its counterterrorism responses? What factors account for growing religious intolerance, infringements on religious freedoms, and violations of human rights committed in the name of combating terrorism? It is my contention that Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism policy can be best understood in light of the views and practices adopted by Kazakhstan’s social groups; these groups inﬂuence the counterterrorism policies of their members. To assess the inﬂuence of Kazakhstan’s social environment on the republic’s counterterrorism policy, this chapter begins by establishing Kazakhstan’s utilitarian, normative, and comparison reference groups.2 Next, it brieﬂy reviews the scope and brutality of the counterterrorism policies of Kazakhstan’s references group (the content and style of counterterrorism approaches adopted by Russia, China, United States, and other Central Asian states are described in greater detail in chapter two). The last section of this chapter examines Kazakhstan’s responses to terrorism and traces the republic’s counterterrorism policies to those of its reference groups.

Kazakhstan’s reference groups According to the reference group theory, governments turn to external models, experiences, and ideas for instrumental, value-expressive, or informational reasons. The better a social group of states is able to satisfy these needs the greater its social inﬂuence on its members will be. Knowledge of a state’s goals can guide investigation into the kinds of social groups which, according to the state’s political elite, best serve the state’s interests in achieving a desired state of affairs. As such, I begin this chapter with a brief historical inquiry into Kazakhstan’s chief national goals since the country’s independence. Kazakhstan’s national interests The break-up of the Soviet Union dealt a harsh economic blow to all newly independent states. In the years following its disintegration, Kazakhstan, like other post-Soviet republics, faced a gamut of serious economic, social, and environmental problems. During the Soviet period, Kazakhstan’s economy was an integral part of the Soviet Union’s economic system, based on hierarchical principles of command and control. The Moscow government held sweeping authority over important economic decisions about the structure of the Soviet economy, the rates of production and consumption in the constituent republics, as well as the distribution of income among them. Kazakhstan’s responsibilities in this centrally planned system were narrowly specialized. It played the role of the supplier of agricultural products, raw materials, and some manufactured goods. From Russia, Kazakhstan received a steady supply of manufactured products, equipment, and, most importantly, reﬁned petroleum products, gas and oil.

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The termination of centralized planning caused a sharp decline in output for Kazakhstan. The republic’s economy suffered from reduced demand on the key articles of its exports and also suffered from broken economic ties. Russia, for example, was Kazakhstan’s sole consumer of products related to mineral extraction, and many of the republic’s processing and manufacturing plans as well as agricultural farms were interdependent with reﬁning, processing, and manufacturing facilities in Russia (Olcott 2002: 131–2). While Kazakhstan initially relied on the ruble as its primary currency, the stringent conditions of the currency union imposed by Russian authorities forced it to leave the ruble zone and introduce its own national currency, the tenge, in the fall of 1993. The demise of the ruble zone had a crippling effect on the republic’s enterprises. It hampered cross-border trade and caused a severe recession in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s gross domestic product (GDP) fell sharply throughout the early 1990s, hitting rock bottom at just over 40 percent of its 1990 level by 1995. According to the Kazakh authorities, this economic decline surpassed the losses experienced during the American Great Depression of the 1930s. Runaway inﬂation peaked at the annual rate of 2,169 percent in 1993 and 1,876 percent in 1994, causing an astronomical rise in consumer prices (Akbarzadeh 2004). Living standards in the republic deteriorated, and a vast number of people plunged into poverty. Naturally, the primary goal of the Kazakh authorities during the early years of the republic’s independence was to manage its transition from a centralized command economy to a market-oriented economic system. The government’s immediate task was to pull the country out of the economic crisis and bridle the destructive consequences of the demise of its political and economic institutions that had been associated with central planning and communism. In spite of the economic hardships accompanying its transition, Kazakhstan fared better than many other post-Soviet states. The republic possessed enormous economic potential owing to its extensive mineral and energy wealth. Kazakhstan holds vast deposits of iron, copper, zinc, coal, uranium, and gold. Its energy resources are the largest among the countries in the Caspian Sea basin. The republic has been ranked among the top twenty countries in terms of gas reserves. The reserves of the Kashagan oil ﬁeld, the largest offshore oil ﬁeld in Kazakhstan, have been estimated as the ﬁfth largest in the world (Saprykin 2004). Still, in the early 1990s, Kazakhstan could not fully capitalize on the boon of its natural wealth. The rupture of economic ties with Russia left the republic without a stable consumer base, while the low world prices for crude oil limited revenues from the sales of hydrocarbons. A landlocked geographic position hindered its access to the markets of foreign consumers, and the lack of professional staff with proper managerial and administrative skills hampered the conduct of world trade. Kazakhstan’s economy began stabilizing in the late 1990s thanks to the inﬂux of petroleum dollars, the Kazakh government’s efﬁcient policies and structural reforms, and various forms of assistance from international institutions. The state-funded “Bolashak” program has further contributed to the republic’s economic recovery and growth. By sending its nationals to study abroad at various

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degree programs in American, European, and Russian universities, Kazakhstan’s leadership began nurturing the country’s own professional elite. The discovery of new oil and gas ﬁelds altered the oil exploration potential for Kazakhstan and attracted substantial amount of foreign investments (particularly, the Kashagan ﬁeld that was regarded as the largest oil ﬁeld discovery in the last 30 years). These foreign investments enabled economic growth in the country that pulled Kazakhstan’s economy far ahead of other Central Asian states. To sustain its economic development, Kazakhstan’s pipeline infrastructure had to be modernized for increasing its throughput. The old pipelines were approaching their exploration limit and were unable to cope with the increased energy load. The resource development required considerable initial ﬁnancial input due to the geological characteristics of the oil and gas deposits, such as the geological formation of the resource basins and the high content of chemically aggressive crude oil admixtures. Kazakhstan’s government and corporations continued to seek foreign capital for diversiﬁcation of its energy transportation networks. Throughout the 2000s, Kazakhstan’s economy has remained poorly diversiﬁed and oil production has accounted for more than half of Kazakhstan’s industrial output. Oil reserves in Kazakhstan are concentrated in 15 major ﬁelds with Tangiz and Kashagan oil ﬁelds accounting for more than half of Kazakhstan’s oil resources. Many other Kazakh industries are dependent on the production of oil and gas. While a valuable asset to Kazakhstan’s economic development, the excessive reliance on the export of these resources threatens to degenerate into a “Dutch Disease.” The Kazakh government has shown awareness of the problem and announced the goal of turning the export of hydrocarbons into a tool for developing a diversiﬁed, modern, high-tech, and globally integrated economy in Kazakhstan. This objective was formalized in the National Strategy adopted in 1998 that was extended throughout 2030 and in the State Industrialization and Innovation Program for 2003–15 (Bakin 2009). The government of Kazakhstan has always recognized that the accomplishment of its economic goals hinges on political stability at home and security in neighboring states (Nazarbaev 1997; Panﬁlova 2004). Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, has repeatedly asserted that a stable and secure political environment in Kazakhstan is a prerequisite for the steady ﬂow of foreign investments into the country (Nazarbaev 1998: 2; Panﬁlova 2004). According to the Kazakh authorities, the inter-ethnic and inter-religious accord is one of the key factors for political stability and civil peace in their country. Kazakhstan managed to escape political turmoil that has roiled many other transitional states. Nonetheless, it also has had to cope with numerous problems endemic to multiethnic and multi-confessional nations. There are over 6 million Russians residing in the country, constituting over 40 percent of the total population of Kazakhstan. With a substantial Russian minority, plying the interests of the two main ethnic groups has been a difﬁcult task for the government of Kazakhstan (Cummings 2005: 1). The state leadership has to play up to Kazakh nationalists without offending the Russians. The latter ethnic group has always been an important constituency for President Nazarbaev (an ethnic Kazakh), who has been hopeful

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of the Russians’ unwavering political support. The Nazarbaev government has been a target of political inﬂuence emanating from Russia, which has assumed the role of protector of all Russian minorities residing in the “New Abroad” (Olcott 2002: 58). Therefore, one of the biggest challenges for the Nazarbaev cabinet has been ﬁnding the balance in safeguarding the republic’s sovereignty and devising its policies in a manner that is respectful, yet, independent of Russia. The republic’s immediate environment has been another security concern for Kazakhstan. Since the mid-1990s, the country has been caught amidst intense political conﬂicts in the region—the civil war and post-war political scufﬂe in Tajikistan, the Taliban’s resistance in Afghanistan, and Islamists’ insurgency in Central Asia. In his 2005 Presidential Address to the People of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev forewarned about the possibility that the novel threats of terrorism and religious extremism would turn into signiﬁcant obstacles to further economic, social and political development of Kazakhstan. National and global security and stability in the Central Asian region have been among the key national goals in the republic (Nazarbaev 2005). Throughout the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s military and security service establishments were ill-positioned for performing their role of protecting national security and defending the state. Kazakhstan inherited a derisory military force from Soviet times. The military was in a woeful shape for safeguarding state sovereignty and defending the country’s national security. The army was staffed with poorly trained and demoralized service personnel. It suffered from inadequate funding, an antiquated technical base, and a shortage of ofﬁcer corps. Only after the economic situation in the republic stabilized did the defense and security service receive a boost in funds. The military budget increased to about 1 percent of the GDP in 2001, and has been slowly growing since then (McDermot 2009: 3). Despite this substantial increase in military funding, the Kazakh government has not been spending enough money for increasing the professionalization of the army, and implementing successful, comprehensive military reform. In 2003, President Nazarbaev issued a decree calling for the major overhaul of the Kazakh military forces. The directive also assigned the main priority in defense against terrorism to the military troops (McDermot 2009: 6–7). To be able to promote and maintain national and regional security, Kazakhstan needs to bolster its defense capabilities as well as reform and reshape its military force. The long-term goals of the Kazakh military reform include technological modernization of Kazakhstan’s armed forces, the acquisition of new military technologies, training, and reconstruction of key military infrastructure. As mentioned above, Kazakhstan has largely avoided the political turmoil that has inﬂuenced the political scene of the neighboring states. Notwithstanding the civil peace, the country’s founding president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, and his cabinet have had to cope with a range of political insecurities accompanying the country’s transition. Soon after independence, the ruling elite began demonstrating signs of factionalism, leading to frequent rotations in the cabinet’s leadership. Changes in the government’s composition, clannish allegiances, and unbridled nepotism have had a negative impact on the consistency of state policies, the commitment to liberalization, and the overall legitimacy of the ruling elite.

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Kazakhstan’s abundant hydrocarbon reserves have nourished another threat to the governing regime, emanating from the secular business opposition. The 1990s saw a massive privatization of previously state-owned businesses in Kazakhstan, but many proﬁtable enterprises went to the members of Nazarbaev’s inner circle. The president’s political opponents and an emergent business elite have vied for access to the country’s natural wealth as well as control over strategic sectors of Kazakhstan’s economy. In the fall of 2002, prominent business leaders and some former government ofﬁcials united in a new opposition movement, the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) that was poised to offer a viable challenge to governing political circles.3 To solidify his rule, President Nazarbaev adopted a series of quasiconstitutional reforms and enlisted the support of the country’s security forces (Oliker 2007). In 2002, the government arrested the DCK leaders, and in 2005 the movement was liquidated by a ruling of the court on the grounds that it was engaged in “political extremism” and posed a threat to Kazakhstan’s national security (HRW 2005b). The Nazarbaev government resorted to extreme measures aimed at eliminating key economic and ideological competitors from the system through new restrictions on opposition parties, retaliatory campaigns against independent media, and legal barriers on associational freedoms. For this, the Nazarbaev regime was accused of a political crackdown in advance of the 2006 presidential elections in Kazakhstan. International disapproval of the policies of Nazarbaev’s cabinet resounded on the backdrop of a wave of “color” revolutions that rippled across the post-Soviet territory in 2003–5. Public upheaval in the former Soviet republics clearly inspired the Kazakh opposition, which formed a united coalition movement to contest the presidential election in 2005. The toppling of presidents in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan made Nazarbaev understandably nervous, and shattered his trust in the inviolability of his regime. To avoid the fate of Eduard Shevardnadze, Leonid Kuchma, and Askar Akaev, Kazakhstan’s president undertook some strenuous efforts to forestall instability at home and began to look for external support of his rule. Nazarbaev won a decisive victory in the 2006 presidential elections and, over the following years, managed to strengthen his power grip in Kazakhstan. Today, the president and his immediate family circle, along with some permanent members of the National Security Council, wield almost unlimited and unchecked power in Kazakhstan. The pliable parliament approved a legislative provision that effectively eliminated any restrictions for the founding president to run for this post again.4 Nazarbaev’s supporters have been zealously advocating for a proposal that would name the Kazakh leader a “president-for-life” to honor his visionary prowess, which has allowed the country to achieve its success. In 2009, Nazarbaev celebrated his sixty-ninth birthday and twentieth anniversary as Kazakhstan’s leader. Many in political circles who have become concerned with the president’s age wonder about what comes next for the country after the founding president is gone. The sudden death of president Saparmurat Niyazov in neighboring Turkmenistan was a vivid reminder of the importance of grooming a presidential successor for achieving a smooth “change of guard” in Kazakhstan and avoiding the struggles accompanying succession.

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Besides the economic and security problems and fears of internal political discord, the Kazakh authorities have been concerned with the regional and global standing of their republic (Nazarbaev 1998). President Nazarbaev has sought to position himself as a pivotal ﬁgure for regional political and economic integration, and his state, as a crucial element for maintaining stability in the broader Central Asian region. The longing for international recognition of Kazakhstan’s role in the region and the strengthening of its position abroad has stemmed from the unique self-image of the republic as a bridge between the East and the West, a regional leader, and an intermediary between the western nations and other Central Asian states. Kazakhstan’s desire to position itself as a leading country in Central Asia has also been driven by a historical competition for regional leadership with Uzbekistan, and the growing interest in attracting investments from foreign nations. The image of the republic visibly tarnished in 2002–5 following the exposure of several major cases of ofﬁcial corruption, serious electoral fraud, and crackdowns on opposition forces. The government of Kazakhstan attempted to repair its international standing and regain respect from its counterparts in the West. In 2003, the Kazakh authorities announced their plans to apply for the OSCE chairmanship that has become regarded as a national prestige project for the country. OSCE is the world’s largest regional intergovernmental organization with a broad mandate including security issues, democratization, and political reforms. The organization and its worldwide activities have been viewed as a manifestation of high human rights standards, fair elections, freedom of the press, and a symbol of the spread of democratic values throughout the OSCE community. Kazakhstan would have become the ﬁrst post-Soviet country outside of Europe and the ﬁrst predominantly Muslim state to be passed the reigns of leadership in the OSCE. To succeed in its controversial intent, Kazakhstan has sought support of likeminded states. Astana lost its initial bid for the 2009 chairmanship because of its poor human rights and political freedoms record, but eventually succeeded in securing the 2010 leadership of the OSCE. The Kazakh authorities made unprecedented pledges to organization: Astana assured the OSCE member-states that it would implement a “grand-scale political modernization” to bring its legislation and practices in line with the rigorous standards of the OSCE (Lillis 2009). Many human rights groups, civil society activists, and politicians from Western democracies insist that Astana has not passed the litmus test: democratic transformation and creation of a more pluralistic political and media environment. Kazakhstan’s government, however, has been trying to persuade the world that Astana has met all of its OSCE commitments. To recapitulate, since independence, Kazakhstan has endeavored to meet three national priorities in the areas of economics, security, and the country’s image abroad. Kazakhstan’s steady economic growth, the development of its hydrocarbon complex, the maintenance of an open market economy with high levels of foreign investments and internal savings, and diversiﬁcation of national production have always been among the top priorities for the Kazakh government. Today, the country’s leadership strives for further integration of Kazakhstan’s market into

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the global economy and hopes to transform the republic into one of the 50 most competitive countries and the world’s largest producer of “black gold” with customers in both Europe and Asia (ICG 2007; Kassenova 2005; Laumulin 2007a: 84). Security-wise, Astana has strived to maintain internal stability, national unity and civil peace. President Nazarbaev and his small inner circle of political conﬁdants have sought to consolidate their rule in Kazakhstan, and fend off domestic and international threats to the governing regime. The country has also aspired to present itself as a regional leader, a bridge between the West and the East, in order to earn a favorable international reputation. Social groups assisting Kazakhstan in achieving its national goals Kazakhstan’s economic, political, and security problems have been incommensurable to those experienced by Kyrgyzstan, or other post-Soviet states. Nevertheless, the success of the republic’s socio-economic programs and fulﬁllment of its national tasks have been contingent on foreign support and international cooperation. Kazakhstan’s economy, for instance, has been interdependent with national economies of the post-Soviet states. Therefore, the pace and outcomes of the country’s economic transition have been inﬂuenced by the economic policies and processes in the neighboring nations. Kazakhstan’s economic recovery has been bolstered by generous Western assistance. The republic has also beneﬁted from Chinese investments and trade with Beijing. The section that follows discusses the role of various states in Kazakhstan’s security, economic, and political affairs. As discussed in Chapter 2, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia deserted Central Asia. Moscow’s foreign policy exhibited a strong pro-Western tilt, and the disastrous consequences of its fast economic transition kept Russia’s money and focus away from the newly independent states. Russia’s interest in the post-Soviet countries grew stronger in the mid-1990s, when the Russian government endeavored to extend its military presence in the “Near Abroad” and to restore its economic inﬂuence in the neighboring nations. In September 1995, the Russian president Boris Yeltsin formalized this change in a presidential degree, which declared the integration of the post-Soviet space around Russia as the main foreign policy priority of Moscow. Notwithstanding the stated foreign policy change, the Kremlin’s own economic, political, and military problems stymied the realization of Russian ambitions. Despite the weaknesses of its transitional period, Russia had many economic trumps in its hand in relations with Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet states. Kazakhstan’s economic growth pivots on revenues from sales of its primary export commodities—gas and oil. By different estimates, about 70–80 percent of the hydrocarbon resources sold by the republic are transported through Russian territory (Polyannikov 2007; Tomberg 2007). In the early 1990s the transit of oil and gas across Russia was the only route open to the Central Asian fuel-producing states. Since the Kremlin wielded control over the energy export pipelines out of Central Asia, it also held the prerogative over assessments of the pipelines throughput and signiﬁcant authority over decisions about the costs for energy

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transportation (ICG 2007: 9). The European ﬁrms bidding for exploration rights in Kazakhstan quickly discovered that the republic’s oil, gas, and mineral wealth could not be exploited and exported without the cooperation with Russia. The landlocked position of Kazakhstan made Astana dependent on the Russian state. Partnership and teamwork with the Russian Federation was and continues to be one of the republic’s primary aims. Economic cooperation with other post-Soviet countries has also been in the interests of Kazakhstan. Throughout its entire history as a sovereign state, but particularly during the early years of the republic’s independence, Kazakhstan has sought deeper integration with other post-Soviet countries through the CIS and other regional organizations. Relatively high social integration and common problems associated with transition laid a ﬁrm basis for cooperation with the post-Soviet states. The maintenance of transportation and electricity networks and the resolution of cross-border issues demanded multilateral management (Libman 2007: 405; Robinson 2004). The CIS, which was created at the dissolution of the Soviet Union by 12 newly independent states,5 was established with the hope of performing these tasks. It was thought of as a platform for gradual opening of the members’ noncompetitive economies to the global market and a temporary, if imperfect, solution to numerous political and economic concerns unleashed by the disintegration of the centralized Soviet state. Numerous treaties signed under the auspices of the CIS envisage the creation of a common market and economic union, a free trade zone, and a space for free movement of people and capital across the CIS territory. The majority of these agreements remains largely on paper, while the sectoral agencies and statuary institutions established for implementing them lack credibility and tools for enforcement of their decisions. Still, the CIS has been beneﬁcial to many states in the post-Soviet territory, including Kazakhstan. It has provided a useful framework for regulating questions of standardization, customs, and trade. It has offered a platform for negotiations on a wide range of other issues. The CIS has assisted its members in the ﬁght against organized crime, terrorism, and other threats. It has also provided an interstate community of belonging important for its member states, since many of them have been neither expected nor welcomed in the West or Europe. Russia’s exit from Central Asia in the early 1990s created a vacuum that was gradually ﬁlled by other states, international organizations, and donors. The Kazakh government willingly embraced ﬁnancial aid and support from the IMF and the World Bank, which applied their standard development measures in the republic. These institutions’ technical support and expert advice were used for improving Kazakhstan’s management and planning, for the implementation of macroeconomic changes, and for a number of structural reforms. The loans from these organizations helped to stabilize Kazakhstan’s balance of payments, while their professional staff assisted in mobilizing the external donors’ support (Jandosov 2002). During the second half of the 1990s, Kazakhstan attracted US$6,783 million in foreign direct investment, or 77.1 percent of all investments that went into the Central Asian region during 1994–9 (Zhaksybaev 2000). This high enthusiasm of

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foreign investors was triggered by the discovery of new energy reserves in Central Asia and the ensuing expectation of growth in energy production in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh authorities have shown their readiness to do business with foreign partners in accordance with rules and principles governing the functioning of the global market. The republic’s commitment to transporting its energy resources to Europe has further encouraged investors’ interest in Kazakhstan. The injections of foreign capital in the lucrative gas, oil, and mineral extraction industries had a cushioning effect on Kazakhstan’s economy and were among important factors in the economic recovery of the republic by the end of the 1990s. The rate of foreign investments, however, was rather low in comparative terms, particularly in light of the amount of foreign direct assistance provided to countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Kazakhstan, with the highest record of foreign money ﬂows, received US$564 per capita during the ﬁrst decade since its independence. In comparison, Croatia attracted US$214 per capita in 2002 alone (Akbarzadeh 2004: 696). In the early 1990s, American businesses, for example, had few commercial ventures in Central Asia, while the American government zeroed in on Kazakhstan’s nuclear arsenal inherited from the USSR. Washington even privately recognized Russia’s geopolitical interests in the region, and accepted the Kremlin’s responsibility for security and stability in the Central Asian states (Laumulin 2007b). It was only after the discovery of Caspian hydrocarbon reserves in the late 1990s that the government of the United States declared Central Asia a zone of vital interest (at that time, the American leadership became engrossed in the search for energy transportation routes that would detour Iran and Russia). Financial assistance to Kazakhstan and Central Asia from the United States, Europe, and international ﬁnancial institutions increased in the wake of the war with the Taliban. The consequences of this ﬁnancial boost are still, however, unclear. In the 2000s, Kazakhstan’s government continued to seek foreign capital and modern technologies for reinvigorating its rapidly depreciating energy infrastructure. It has also been looking for alternative routes for energy transportation and new customers for its gas and oil. Naturally, the republic welcomed the entry of China into the Central Asian energy market. China, with its vibrant economy, growing demand for raw materials, and free-ﬂoating capital, has been viewed as a much needed partner in Kazakhstan (Guang 2007; Syroezhkin 2007). The government of the republic welcomed the idea of building an oil pipeline from western Kazakhstan to China. The initial proposal surfaced in 1997, and over the following years Kazakhstan enthusiastically pushed for this plan. Central Asian oil began ﬂowing eastward through the 1,300 kilometer Atasu–Alashankou pipeline in 2005 and one year later the pipeline was operating to its full capacity. At the launching ceremony, President Nazarbaev stressed the importance of the pipeline in bolstering economic development in his nation and the broader Central Asian region (Guang 2007). Soon after the commencement of the operation of the Atasu–Alashankou pipeline, the Kazakh and Chinese partners reached an agreement about extending this petrol route for linking Chinese customers directly to Caspian ﬁelds on Kazakhstan’s side (Marketos 2009: 7).

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The Russian government interpreted the growing presence of Western interests in Central Asia and the penetration of the regional market by Chinese ﬁrms as a sign of Russia’s weakening position in the Central Asian region. Moscow was gradually losing its grip over the Central Asian states. The restoration of Russia’s inﬂuence in the region has become a motto of Moscow’s foreign policy since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s ﬁrst term as president of the Russian Federation. The global economic situation at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century was favorable to Russia’s accomplishment of this aim. A spike in world crude oil prices ﬁlled Russian coffers with much needed cash, and Russia’s economic recovery encouraged more assertive foreign policy conduct. The Putin government signiﬁcantly expanded its economic cooperation with the Central Asian republics through bilateral contracts as well as multilateral ties. The Russian leadership acquired resources for funding and implementing large-scale industrial projects in Central Asia, and Russia began participating in the prospecting, production, and transportation of Central Asian gas and oil. By 2006, the Russian share in foreign trade in the region increased to 17 percent (compared to China’s share of about 12 percent). The trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Russia constituted almost 19 percent of Kazakhstan’s foreign trade, which placed the Russian Federation at the top of the list of the republic’s trade partners (Kniazev 2007). The economic interdependence of Astana and Moscow as well as the dependence of Kazakhstan on Russia (in some aspects of their economic relations) became a source of unequal vulnerability that gave Russia a special leverage over this Central Asian state. The current administration of president Medvedev continues to underscore the importance of the Central Asian region in Russia’s foreign policy. It is emblematic that the ﬁrst foreign visit of the new Russian president was to Kazakhstan, which Dmitri Medvedev visited again on several occasions during his ﬁrst year in ofﬁce. The volume of trade between Russia and Kazakhstan continues to grow (Chufrin 2008: 8–9). The number of joint Russian–Kazakh ventures has also increased. The bordering regions of Russia and Kazakhstan have ratiﬁed over 200 agreements on cooperation on a wide range of questions, including cross-border trade, exploitation of natural resources, environmental issues, and prevention and management of natural disasters, among other things. In recent years, the Central Asian vector of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has increased in importance as well. Kazakhstan has held a leadership position in Central Asia on different dimensions and aspired to consolidate this role by fostering and strengthening economic cooperation with neighboring states. Kazakhstan supported the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in 2001 (Nygren 2007: 37). It was designed as a tight economic association uniting energy producers (Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan), transit countries (Belarus and Ukraine) and afﬁliates. In 2005, the EurAsEc merged with another Central Asian grouping, the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC) created by the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan’s production output has outgrown domestic levels of consumption, and the republic’s administration has been looking for external

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markets for its business interests. The Nazarbaev government has been interested in supporting an open economic environment and a stable political situation in the neighboring nations, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, for advancing its commercial goals. As described in the previous section, after independence Kazakhstan’s own army was small and weak, and the government had limited funding for raising a potent armed force. In an effort to boost its military power and train the Kazakh troops, Kazakhstan’s leadership resorted to military cooperation with other countries. Although the republic received multiple forms of security and defense assistance from international organizations and beneﬁted from collaboration with different states, there has been no realistic alternative or serious competitor to the role of Russia in Kazakhstan’s security and defense situation. There are several reasons for Astana’s reliance on bilateral security cooperation with Moscow and Kazakhstan’s support of the regional security initiatives spearheaded by the Russian state. Kazakhstan’s army inherited Soviet-era equipment and ammunitions, and Russia continues supplying spare parts for weapons to Kazakhstan. Russia is also a major supplier of new weapons systems and gear compatible with the knowledge and military devices already in use in Kazakhstan. Those new armaments are sold to the republic at a discounted price. Russia and Kazakhstan closely cooperate in military training and education, and Kazakhstan’s government sends its service persons to the Russian military establishments on preferential terms. Kazakhstan’s military has a large percentage of ethnic Russians, particularly in the ofﬁcer corps, and their obedience and subordination to the command of the ethnic Kazakhs has been a nagging concern (Olcott 2002: 74). Besides a long history of military ties, border security is another reason for military cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia. The two countries share a 4,000-mile common frontier, which calls for the establishment and management of a full-ﬂedged border regime along one of the longest land borders in the world. Trans-border security problems including illegal migration and social tensions in the ethnically mixed border regions have also necessitated security cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan. Finally, Kazakhstan’s security cooperation with Russia has also been fostered as a result of revitalization of regional security ties. Russia was able to solidify its security posture in Central Asia in response to the threat of Islamic extremism. A series of explosions in Tashkent in 1997, Islamic insurgency in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000, and terrorist bombings in Uzbekistan in 2004 drew Central Asian states closer to Moscow, which demonstrated resolve in dispatching its troops for the purpose of quelling unrest and suppressing the Islamist threat. To coordinate states’ efforts in the ﬁght against terrorism, the Russian authorities initiated the CIS Anti-Terrorist Center, which was established in Moscow with a structural subdivision of the ATC in Central Asia located in Bishkek. Military and security cooperation with Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states was institutionalized in the Collective Security Treaty Organization that was created in place of the collective security treaty in 2003. Regular military exercises, conferences, and training held under the auspices of the CSTO have been designed with the goal of boosting security in the region and

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increasing preparedness of the member states to respond to both traditional and novel security threats. Shanghai Cooperation Organization is another security grouping where Russia has signiﬁcant clout. The SCO began as an organization for security cooperation, but has largely outgrown its original mandate of border demarcation and military limitation issues. Today, the SCO’s activities extend from anti-terrorism and joint military exercises to cooperation in education, economy, ﬁnance, and trade. In October 2007, the SCO signed a memorandum with the CSTO on broadening security cooperation in the region through coordinated and joint activities to combat terrorism, drug trafﬁcking, and organized crime. When it comes to security assistance and cooperation, the United States was a latecomer to Central Asian states. In Kazakhstan, for example, initial security assistance from the US was limited to the area of non-proliferation. The American administration provided support for the dismantlement of the nuclear arsenal that Kazakhstan inherited from the Soviet Union and the transfer of certain weapons system to Russia. American political backing, security assurances, and ﬁnancial aid were instrumental for persuading the Kazakh government to make and enact a decision renouncing the nuclear status of Kazakhstan. Over the following years, direct military support from the United States to Kazakhstan was reduced. Some military aid continued to ﬂow into the republic through NATO under the provisions of the PfP program. That program laid the basis for early seminars and symposia on economic, defense, scientiﬁc, and other issues between representatives of the republic and NATO, and later deepened into assistance in planning for national defense, training, and formation of Kazakhstan’s armed forces (McDermott 2009). The war on terrorism has intensiﬁed, diversiﬁed, and deepened the lines of cooperation between Kazakhstan, NATO, and the United States. A 5-year military cooperation agreement signed between the US Department of Defense and Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense provided for several forms of assistance from Washington to Astana. According to the plan, the US government launched a Foreign Military Financing program and IMET program in Kazakhstan. The former was intended for the provision of funds for the development of military infrastructure and military capabilities in Kazakhstan, particularly in the Caspian Sea region. The latter ﬁnanced education and training of Kazakhstan’s service persons for developing NATO’s interoperable peace support force (McDermott 2009; Shaimergenov 2005). In addition to bilateral forms of assistance, the US administration supported Kazakhstan via multilateral security initiatives. Washington, for example, took part in the coordination and implementation of a security assistance agreement between Kazakhstan and Turkey. Together with Germany and the United Kingdom, it made its funds available for modernizing the system of air defense in Kazakhstan. Another event that contributed to the strengthening of the military ties between Kazakhstan and the United States was the international isolation of Uzbekistan, the most militarily advanced and strategically important Central Asian nation. Following the Andijan unrest in May 2005 in Uzbekistan, during which the

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National Security troops shot dead hundreds of unarmed protesters, Uzbekistan severed its ties with the West. Kazakhstan emerged as a key Central Asian partner for the United States and NATO. The Northern Alliance has poured extra resources into the republic for achieving greater compatibility of the Kazakh and NATO forces and improving their preparedness for combating terrorism (Allison 2008: 29). In 2008, the Kazakh government approved a new 5-year military cooperation agreement with the United States, which envisaged more than 80 bilateral events in both states and substantially expanded the areas of security cooperation between the two states (McDermott 2009). Despite the intensiﬁed ties with the United States, Euro-Atlantic security institutions, and other Western states, the government of Kazakhstan continues to believe that an effective solution to security problems in Central Asia is inconceivable without the participation of Russia (Arunova 2001). First, many of the original goals of the military security cooperation plans agreed to by the United States, Kazakhstan, and NATO remain unachieved (McDermott 2009). Many Kazakh service persons who receive education and training in Western military establishments quit military service for various reasons upon their return home, but largely because they become disillusioned with the state of military affairs in Kazakhstan (McDermott 2009: 18). Second, a certain degree of mistrust of US intentions in Central Asia has tainted security cooperation between Kazakhstan and the United States. Astana became wary of American contributions to the transfer of power during the course of the “color” revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. It was displeased with the US less than favorable assessment of Kazakhstan’s parliamentary elections, and of Nazarbaev’s landslide victory for the third presidential term. Suspicious of the hidden agenda of the Bush administration in the Central Asian region, Kazakhstan reevaluated its economic and security priorities and needs (Blank 2005). Moscow denounced America’s meddling in the politics of individual nations and pledged its support to the governing regimes. It also promised to shelter the governments of the Central Asian nations from growing international criticism. The Kremlin’s assurances of military and political backing were soothing to the Nazarbaev regime, which noticeably increased the Russian vector in Kazakhstan’s international relations. Boosting its international image and furthering its reputation as a regional leader and liaison between the West and the East has been another goal that Kazakhstan has actively pursued. The Kazakh government has zealously promoted the country’s international reputation and searched for international recognition of its image abroad. A decision to abandon nuclear weapons in the early 1990s, for example, not only fostered more contact between Kazakhstan and the United States, but also brought the republic into the international limelight and raised its international proﬁle. The deepening of lines of cooperation with the Northern Alliance has earned the country the reputation of the regional security leader and NATO’s “anchor” in Central Asia. By signing the ﬁve-year military cooperation plans with the United States, the Kazakh authorities hoped to raise the country’s prestige, since Kazakhstan became the only post-Soviet republic that has adopted these agreements with the government of the United States (Nurgaliev 2007).

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By 2006, the top US ofﬁcials ﬁnally acknowledged Kazakhstan’s potential to emerge as a regional model of economic and political development and a regional leader for multifaceted reforms in Central Asia (Laumulin 2007b). This change in the attitudes and rhetoric of the American administration was very beneﬁcial for the image of Kazakhstan. Russia has also been supportive of Kazakhstan’s international posture. The latter solicited Moscow’s support as well as the backing of other post-Soviet nations in pushing through its controversial bid for the chairmanship of the OSCE. Negative assessments of the conduct of elections and the status of political freedoms in Kazakhstan damaged reputation of the country. The government of Kazakhstan was grateful for the praises of the SCO, which certiﬁed elections as legitimate and fair, thus undercutting international criticisms and boosting Kazakhstan’s self-esteem. The preceding analysis identiﬁed several groups of states which played an important role in Kazakhstan’s domestic and foreign affairs. These states, which have been identiﬁed as the most important vectors of Kazakhstan’s multi-vectored foreign policy, are Russia, China, the United States, and other Central Asian states. Kazakhstan’s authorities have always promoted an image of the country portraying it as the “Eurasian Bridge” connecting Europe with Asia, and embracing both continents from the standpoint of civilizational processes, history, geography, and culture. This concept gave rise to the principle of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector diplomacy that continues to guide the republic’s foreign policy in directions important to Kazakhstan (Laumulin 2007a: 242). Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, explained in his memoirs, “Our country, situated as it is between Europe and Asia, lies between several inﬂuential geopolitical blocs: China, Russia, and the Muslim world, in which I also include the countries within the Central Asian union. This has greatly determined the content of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, and will continue to do so” (Nazarbaev 1998: 177). Has Astana succeeded in its multi-vectored approach to foreign relations, or has its diplomacy favored one foreign policy vector over others? In the parlance of reference group theory, has any state or group of states been more salient for Kazakhstan? The next part of this chapter examines the nature and potency of the reference groups’ impact by evaluating changes that Astana has introduced to its foreign policy and domestic politics under the inﬂuence of its social groups. It also analyzes motives for conforming to and complying with the social groups’ expectations or emulating policies exhibited by the reference groups. Russia as Kazakhstan’s reference group Reference groups serve as “reference points” for the governments’ decisions about directions and contents of their public policies as well as foreign policy choices. There is an observable correspondence between the goals and strategies of reference groups and policies of the groups’ members. For Kazakhstan, Russia has always been an important reference group. For Russia, Kazakhstan has been the most reliable foreign partner. President Nazarbaev has repeatedly stated that the Russian vector in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is the republic’s main priority (RIA

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Novosti 2006b), and this attitude toward its big neighbor is unlikely to change. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has placed relations with Moscow at the top of its diplomatic list (Panﬁlova 2004). Kassym-Jomart Tokaev, the republic’s foreign minister, once admitted that, from his country’s standpoint, the future of Kazakhstan and Russia cannot be separated (Tokaev 1997: 45–7). In 2006, in response to foreign press inquiries about the main foci of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, the republic’s Deputy Prime Minister Karim Massimov reafﬁrmed that Russia was Kazakhstan’s number one partner. China was listed in second place, whereas the United States was placed in third (Panﬁlova 2004; Vlasov 2006). Kazakhstan’s elites continue to perceive Russia as the single most important external inﬂuence on the republic and the broader Central Asian region (Cummings 2005).6 Kazakhstan has generally been sympathetic to Moscow’s foreign policy decisions and goals. President Nursultan Nazarbaev, for example, has supported Russia’s efforts at preserving and expanding the CIS role in the post-Soviet territory and backed the Kremlin in implementing other regional and sub-regional projects spearheaded by the Russian state. During the ﬁrst major row between Russia and Georgia in 2003–4, when president Putin threatened Tbilisi with the unilateral use of force, Astana expressed understanding of Moscow’s right to employ a preemptive strike doctrine in its foreign relations (Patrikeyeva 2004). A few years later, Kazakhstan sided with Russia in its policy of non-recognition of Kosovo, and joined Moscow and other SCO member-states in their demands for a reduction of Western strategic presence in Central Asia. Although Astana did not follow the Kremlin’s lead in recognizing the sovereignty of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, neither has it ofﬁcially rebuked the Russian policy toward Georgia’s breakaway regions, or admonished the Russians about the consequences of their actions in the self-proclaimed independent states. The Nazarbaev administration appealed to the principles of consistency and avoidance of double standards in its foreign policy in an ofﬁcial explanation of its decision to deny recognition to the breakaway regions. Following Russia, Kazakhstan had already denied recognition to Prishnina, and it chose to hold on to this position on self-determination in relations with other states. The government of Kazakhstan alluded to Russian and Chinese experiences with domestic secessionist movements and cautioned about the consequences that the recognition of restive territories would have on political stability in these states. Astana, however, acknowledged that those nations, whose very existence has come under threat, should have a right to be safe and must be awarded a degree of independence. It also admitted the inevitability of conﬂict between the right to self-determination and the territorial integrity of individual states.7 Overall, Astana has shared Moscow’s views on the position of Russia in the world and its importance in regional and international politics. Kazakhstan’s president forewarned the West against using a strategy that aims at supplanting Russia from global processes. Nursultan Nazarbaev maintained that the anti-Russian approach is futile and downright incorrect. The Kazakh leader acknowledged that Russia is a big state that should always play an active role in world affairs (Shaimergenov 2005).

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In domestic politics, too, Kazakhstan’s government has tried to avoid disappointing and agitating Russia. The ﬁrst constitution of independent Kazakhstan declared the Kazakh language as the only state language, while Russian was deﬁned as a language of inter-ethnic communication. The current constitution of 1995 elevated the Russian language to the status of ofﬁcial language to satisfy the linguistic claims of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan and other Russophone groups’ demands. Up until now the Kazakh government has not replaced the Cyrillic alphabet with the Latin alphabet, and Russian continues to be taught as a compulsory subject in the Kazakh schools from grade one. Kazakhstan has a wide circulation of Russian newspapers and journals, and most of the Russian television channels are broadcasted in Kazakhstan. Economically, Russian companies have acquired control over the majority of Kazakhstan’s oil exports8 and have a substantial share in the development of oil and gas ﬁelds. In 2007, Kazakhstan consented to a long-term trade contract with the Russian gas monopoly, Gazprom, where the Russian government holds a controlling stake. According to the agreement, Kazakhstan commits to selling its energy resources to Gazprom and exporting its gas through the Russian networks. This is notwithstanding the fact that this trade format will beneﬁt Russia more than Kazakhstan or any other Central Asian state. The venture enables Russia to purchase considerably cheaper gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and use it for domestic consumption, while freeing the Russian gas for sales to the European states at a higher market price. Kazakhstan has also backed the Russian initiative at forming an intergovernmental gas cartel that will further consolidate Moscow’s position as a leading gas exporter and increase its control over European gas supplies (Marketos 2009). Kazakhstan has always strived to avoid antagonizing Moscow while cultivating ties with other states. Despite the numerous attempts of the Russian competitors to sway Astana toward alternative energy projects, Kazakhstan, until now, has not acceded to business schemes that would allow the European companies to get access to Caspian energy resources without Russian participation (Saprykin 2004). The Kazakh authorities have underscored a positive dimension of the mixed cooperative–competitive energy relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, and have regularly assured the Russian energy ﬁrms that they would be able to take part in multinational ventures operating in their republic (Marketos 2009). In no other area has Russian inﬂuence felt stronger than in the realm of defense. Kazakhstan has given consistent support to Moscow’s security and defense policy, and the Russian authorities have deemed Astana the most reliable security ally in the post-Soviet territory. The military strategy of Kazakhstan adopted in 2007 reafﬁrms the close defense ties between Russia and Kazakhstan that have been cemented in numerous bilateral treaties and regional institutions such as the CSTO and SCO (McDermott 2009: 56). The new military doctrine also discusses the emerging partnership between Kazakhstan and the West, particularly, bilateral military cooperation with the US. Despite this emerging dimension of Kazakhstan’s military strategy, the doctrine places considerable emphasis on “common military-political interests” of Astana and Moscow and deep strategic partnership between Russia and Kazakhstan.

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Kazakhstan has committed itself to purchasing new weapons systems and military equipment from Russia, and utilizing the Russian innovations for modernizing its military arsenal. The majority of Kazakhstan’s ofﬁcers and cadets who are scheduled to train in the military establishments abroad receive their education in Russia. In fact, there are more Kazakh service persons who study in the Russian military institutions than there are ofﬁcers and cadets from any other post-Soviet state. A plan that recently resurfaced in Astana’s political circles envisages the placement of Kazakhstan’s defense attaches for short-term courses in Russia’s Frunze Military Academy in Moscow, suggesting that Astana is open to “Russifying” its defense attaches prior to posting abroad (McDermott 2009: 48). In the republic itself, the national military education is largely modeled on the curriculum and structure of military education in Russia, and Russian military instructors continue to teach in Kazakhstan. Astana provides important military facilities for Moscow, leasing more than 11 million hectares of the republic’s land for this aim. Most of the Russian space shuttles and other cosmic expeditions are launched from Kazakhstan’s Baikonur Cosmodrome that Russia has leased from Kazakhstan until 2050. The republic has also granted Russia extensive military weapons testing rights, and Moscow has been conducting air force and naval aviation trials of new missiles and ammunitions in various parts of Kazakhstan (McDermott 2009: 49). There is no doubt that practical considerations continue to underlie Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia. Astana’s concessions to Moscow have always served the republic’s instrumental aims. The Kazakh leadership needs the goodwill of Russia in the areas of energy transportation, security, trade, and on other dimensions of the two countries’ bilateral relations. Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia for transporting its energy resources made the republic vulnerable to the Kremlin’s demands. The country’s reliance on Moscow’s support for maintaining its military forces has called for closer ties in the area of defense. As Kazakhstan Minister of Defense, Mukhtar Altynbayev explained in 2003, Kazakhstan’s army carries weapons and arms made in the USSR or Russia. This makes the republic dependent on Moscow for servicing its military hardware and modernizing its military arsenal (as cited in McDermott 2009: 41). A large Russian population is, yet, another deterrent to breaking away from the Russian power grip. The Kazakh authorities avoid irritating Russia because a row with Moscow will alienate Kazakhstan’s Russians and threaten the loss of support from predominantly Russian-populated parts of Kazakhstan. There are, however, other reasons for close relations between Astana and Moscow. The two states and their vernacular populations have had over a centurylong interaction resulting in intense economic, social, and cultural Russiﬁcation of Kazakhstan. A kind of social psychological proximity and even fondness for Russia rooted in historical, linguistic, and cultural ties with this state is an important source of the Russian inﬂuence in Kazakhstan. The Russian press has been cultivating a positive image of the Russian Federation in Kazakhstan’s informational space, dominated by the Russian language and Russian culture. Russian news media channels broadcast a great deal of news in Kazakhstan, shaping perceptions

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of the Kazakh people about Russia and the world. The Russian internet providers that dominate in Kazakhstan’s cyberspace indoctrinate the users with Russian viewpoints on international situations. Russia has been more than a utilitarian reference group for Kazakhstan. It has also been the only normative reference group, whose inﬂuence is based on the perceived commonality of the Russian and Kazakh history and culture, belonging to the same civilizational space, and the ensuing positive assessment of Kazakhstan’s association with Russia. Many post-Soviet states have tried to substantially rewrite the histories of their nations in order to separate their historical paths from both the Tsarist and Soviet past. They have disparaged the period of Russian colonization and represented the Soviet era in an uncritically negative light. In contrast, Kazakhstan’s political leaders do not reconstruct or renounce the Soviet era. They do not reprimand the “post-Soviet” or “post-communist” identiﬁers when those are used in reference to Kazakhstan. The history of the republic as represented through museums’ exhibitions and historical artifacts embraces the epoch of tsars and the Soviet past, and, according to views of some public ofﬁcials, the chronology of modern Kazakhstan did not begin with the dissolution of the USSR (Nazarbaev 1998; Tokaev 1997: 45). In 2000, President Nazarbaev supported the construction of a majestic building of the Presidential Center of Culture in Astana to familiarize the public and international visitors with Kazakhstan’s historical heritage and its achievements in the world of art and culture. Kazakhstan’s Presidential Center of Culture stands in drastic contrast to Georgia’s Museum of the Soviet Occupation established in 2006 in Tbilisi to commemorate the victims of repression during the Soviet rule. The themes of “occupation” and “conquer” are conspicuously absent from the exhibits of a history museum that is an integral part of the Presidential Center in Astana. The compositions and headings over displays of historical facts do not scream out the suffering of the Kazakhs under the tsarist and Soviet oppression. This also comes as a marked difference to Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia. The Kiev administration has criticized the Soviet-era policies in Ukraine and sought to promote a vision of the Soviet era “genocide” by famine that occurred in the republic in 1932–3. In contrast, the Kazakh government has placed a much greater emphasis on the positive aspects of historical relations between Kazakhstan and Russia, and their common history has been narrated in a more constructive light. Similar to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan credits Russia with the gestation and birth of the modern state and nation (Tokaev 1997). According to some politicians, under Soviet rule, ethnic Kazakhs were given a territory with political boundaries that took on their eponymous name. As a Soviet Republic in the USSR, Kazakhstan acquired the attributes of statehood, including state symbols and institutions of governance. The Kazakh republic received opportunities for fostering vernacular language, spreading mass education, and raising its national elite (Cummings 2005: 21). Progressive Russian thought inﬂuenced the development of the Kazakh intelligentsia and the national democratic liberation movements. Kazakhstan reveres Abay Ibrahim Qunanbayuli, the “Great Abay,” a recognized founder of Kazakh written literature and language, and one of the greatest poets,

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composers, and philosopher of the nineteenth century. Many among the Kazakh elite and ordinary people hold sacred his wisdoms and sayings. The Great Abay once said that the Russian culture and science was the key to world depository of political, cultural, and scientiﬁc thought, and advised the Kazakh to receive a Russian education (Tokaev 1997: 47). Particularly, during the Soviet time, Kazakhstan’s elite highly valued Russian educational institutions and considered it very important for Kazakh children and youth to study in Russian schools (Nazarbaev 1998: 1). Today, Russian schooling is valued to a lesser extent and many of those who study abroad go to American and European universities. In spite of the falling status of Russian education, the ability to speak Russian is still highly valued in Kazakhstan. In his memoirs, President Nazarbaev admits that the Kazakhs themselves have no interest in suppressing the Russian language because the knowledge of Russian has given them much more than mere access to Russian education and culture. According to the president, the knowledge of Russian has opened a window into the world of science, Western culture, and Western political thought for Kazakhs (Nazarbaev 1998; Tokaev 1997: 45). The Kazakh government has also looked at the Kremlin as a comparison reference group, and emulated its policies for informational reasons. Emulation denotes a voluntary goal-oriented effort of a state to borrow and adopt overseas policy approaches, tools or institutions, and is typically driven by the lack of knowledge about effective ways of addressing a policy problem. Using other states’ policies and practices as institutional and legislative archetypes helps the decision-makers to cope with ambiguities concerning the success of their policy choices (Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén 2004). It also assists in sorting out various policy options since the spectrum of alternatives can be too large for rationally bounded decision-makers to weigh each of them (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The perceived similarity of Russia and Kazakhstan—the shared social, political, cultural, and institutional characteristics – and their geographical proximity made the Russian policies a viable model for emulation in Kazakhstan. The continuity of the post-Soviet elites in Kazakhstan is another reason for Russia’s emulation. Unlike many other post-Soviet states, there has been no post-Soviet transition of executive power in Kazakhstan. The republic features high retention of Soviet staff across its public institutions. The most prominent apparatchiks— members of the Kazakh communist party—came to occupy inﬂuential positions in the presidential administration, government and parliament, particularly during the early years of the independence of Kazakhstan (Cummings 2005: 46). Even today, a bulk of the Kazakh political elite built their professional careers under the Communist party or the Soviet government. Despite the inﬂux of a new generation of young politicians who have taken advantage of the Bolashak state program to receive education abroad, the Nazarbaev regime remains a Soviet holdover in its mentality and methods of administration. It is essentially ruled and held together by the old Soviet elite for whom Russia remains the model for institutional change and emulation. The key posts in Kazakhstan continued to be staffed with the people who had worked closely with Russia in the Soviet time or under the Yeltsin and Putin administrations. The situation is particularly emblematic in defense.

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According to McDermott (2009: 40), for every Kazakh ofﬁcer who happened to be open and receptive, if not enthusiastic, to Western military methods and ideas, there were nine more ofﬁcers skeptical of these programs and wanting to maintain the “Russian outlook.” What has prevented Russia from gaining a stronger footing in Kazakhstan in terms of its ability to inﬂuence and shape its policies, politics, and reforms is Moscow’s condescending attitude and unwillingness to engage in real partnership with Kazakhstan on equal terms. Kazakhstan is interested in integration with Russia without the subordination of its sovereignty. Russia wants subordination of other nations and strategic and economic gains for itself. For Russia, Kazakhstan is the closest and most reliable but, nevertheless, junior partner. Russia’s geopolitical preoccupations and neglect of the interests of other Central Asian states has long hampered regional cooperation and integration (Bondarets 2005; Nygren 2007: 25). It is not surprising, therefore, to notice some ambiguity in the Kazakh elite’s attitudes toward the Russian state. Kazakhstan continues to depend on Russia and has sympathies with its culture, politics, and foreign policy projects. At the same time, it has occasionally sought differentiation from Moscow, which has also been perceived as a potential threat. United States as Kazakhstan’s reference group The United States has also been an important reference group for Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, but its impact has been less stark than that of the Russian Federation. Even in the area of energy production and transportation, the United States has had little success in cajoling the Kazakh authorities into alternative ventures. Kazakhstan has, so far, been committed to energy projects orchestrated by Moscow. In the realm of politics, the American impact has also been weak. Kazakhstan has committed itself to democratization and a broad range of political reforms under pressure from American diplomats, activists, and civil society groups. American specialists and advisors have been invited to draft and assess changes in the country’s practices, institutions, and legislation. The 2010 OSCE chairmanship compelled Kazakh leaders to embark on further liberalization of laws and practices in the areas of media, party politics, and elections. Notwithstanding the promises of democratization, Kazakhstan has not met the expectations of the West and failed to bring its political practices, institutions, and legislation in full accordance with the OSCE principles and democratic values. In the assessment of scholars, politicians, and experts from the West, Kazakhstan’s political reform has amounted to a series of insufﬁcient half-steps, piecemeal measures, and superﬁcial and half-hearted changes. Westernism and democracy have been a guise for upholding and fostering the global and regional image of Kazakhstan and sustaining political and economic support from Western nations. If anywhere, the American presence in Kazakhstan has been mostly felt in the area of security, particularly in the period following the 9/11 attacks. The United States had played an important role in convincing the Kazakh leadership to abandon its nuclear arsenal that had fallen into the country’s possession after the

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demise of the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1990s, the United States continued working with Kazakhstan’s security and military forces in a bilateral format as well as within the framework of NATO’s PfP program. After the United States and NATO dispatched their forces to Afghanistan in 2001, Kazakhstan was showered with Western military aid. Military assistance has naturally deepened Astana’s cooperation with the Northern Alliance and other Western nations, and strengthened its defense ties with the United States. Kazakhstan agreed to take part in a number of NATO-led exercises and made the controversial decision to send a battalion of its military engineers to Iraq to assist in demining efforts there. Soon after, Kazakhstan agreed to implementation of the long-term defense cooperation plans signed with the US Department of Defense. The impact of the United States and NATO on Kazakhstan’s defense and security affairs has grown as a consequence of intensiﬁed cooperation with these groups of states during the course of the war on terrorism. The partnership between Kazakhstan, the United States and NATO in the area of defense, similarly to cooperation with the United States in other realms, has been driven by pragmatic and symbolic aims. Kazakhstan has taken advantage of the military assistance from the Western states to bolster its military and defense posture. Kazakhstan’s participation in the training and programs led by NATO and the United States has enhanced its image as a regional leader and boosted its military stature abroad. It is also possible that Astana has used its maturing partnership with the West as leverage in its relations with Moscow and for attaining concessions and further support from the Kremlin (Allison 2008: 29). Contrary to the Baltic States or other countries of Eastern Europe and Georgia, Kazakhstan’s cooperation with the United States and NATO has not been driven by its aspiration of joining the Alliance. In the parlance of the reference group approach, neither the United States nor NATO have become the republic’s normative reference groups. Therefore, their political, defense, and economic impact has been limited in scope. The declared achievements of military and security cooperation between Kazakhstan, the United States and NATO have not been matched by equivalent results, especially when compared with the accomplishments of the United States and NATO in the countries of Eastern Europe. The large distance separating the United States and Europe from Central Asia and their relatively recent appearance in the politics and geopolitics of the Central Asian states have planted seeds of mistrust and doubts about the durability of the American and European presence in the region. The lack of a tradition of Western-style democracy and political institutions in the Central Asian republics has been a major obstacle to a better understanding of the politics of these states and the creation of an expressive bond with Western nations. Some contradictions within the American foreign policy approach (exhibiting both ideological inclinations as well as rationalism and pragmatism) have further dampened American prospects for gaining a stronger footing in the region. American commitment to democratic principles and human rights has been an irritant for many Kazakh politicians. In 2003, for example, the American congress dubbed Central Asian states “dictatorships” and “tyrannies,” a shameful exposé that marred the

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self-image of Kazakhstan (Laumulin 2007b). Kazakh political ﬁgures, including President Nazarbaev, have chafed at the harsh criticism of Kazakhstan’s progress in democratization by the American parliament and administration (Nazarbaev 1998: 2). The alleged participation of the American administration in staging a series of “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet states has deepened mistrust and tensions in the relations between Kazakhstan and the United States. In 2005, the Bush administration made public its intentions to carry out a new “charge for democracy” in the Central Asian states. President Nazarbaev felt threatened with the possibility that an exported “color” revolution would replace his regime with a Western-leaning administration. The Kazakh government has also been jittery and distressed about American support of the government opposition in Kazakhstan (Laumulin 2007b). Following Kazakhstan’s presidential elections of 2005, in which the incumbent President Nazarbaev emerged as an indisputable leader, Washington shifted the accent of its foreign policy approach to Kazakhstan. Rhetoric appealing to the “change of elites” in Kazakhstan has almost disappeared from American political conversations. Excessive destabilization of the Kyrgyz political scene following the regime change in Kyrgyzstan, and the prospects of military interference by Russia have clearly had an impact on the attitudinal change in the United States. The American government has softened its critique of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states, and has since been repeatedly stressing the importance of Kazakhstan’s leadership for the region. The interest in enlisting Kazakhstan for Western-backed energy export schemes supplanted Washington’s concerns about Astana’s lagging democratization. Mistrust and ambivalent attitudes toward the United States continue to persist in Kazakhstan. Today, the United States has two faces in the republic. On the one hand, it is perceived as a country of bountiful opportunities that Kazakhs want to visit. On the other hand, there is a politicized face of the United States, which has a negative image informed by external policies of the United States—meddling in domestic politics of the post-Soviet states, support of the Kazakh political opposition, and its foreign military operations (Karataeva 2008: 179). The inﬂuence of China and other Central Asian states on Kazakhstan Just like Kazakhstan–US relations have been buttressed by utilitarian considerations, Astana’s relations with Beijing have been largely based on pragmatism. Kazakhstan’s partnership with China has been beneﬁcial to both Asian nations. In order to secure and expand beneﬁts from cooperation with Beijing, Astana has had to acquiesce to some of the geopolitical interests and preferences of China. The locus of Chinese inﬂuence over the republic rests in its ability to meet the country’s needs, particularly, requirements for foreign investments and diversiﬁcation of routes for energy transportation. Of all Central Asian states, only Kazakhstan has signed a declaration about strategic partnership with China. The governments of the two states also signed an agreement describing directions and priorities of the future economic cooperation between Astana and Beijing (Syroezhkin 2008: 38).

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To invite into country more Chinese investments, Kazakhstan’s government agreed to a number of energy projects with Beijing, including two new oil pipelines—the Kenkiyak–Atyrau and the Atasu–Alashankou projects. The Chinese energy companies were granted access to the energy market in Kazakhstan, and Chinese corporations acquired large shares in major oil companies in the republic. The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation, for example, purchased substantial stock in the new natural gas ﬁelds in western Kazakhstan. Other Chinese oil ﬁrms have made substantial investments in various unilateral and multilateral projects in the republic’s energy sector. Today, Chinese corporations operate a number of oil ﬁelds in Kazakhstan and exercise control over important petroleum companies, including Petrokazakhstan, a leading Kazakh energy ﬁrm (Marketos 2009). Astana has made many other concessions to China to sustain and broaden the gains from cooperation with Beijing. The long common border between Kazakhstan and China, for example, had several contested territories. During the process of delimitation of the disputed stretches of land, Kazakhstan conceded parts of its territory to China. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has stressed its adherence to the vision of “One China,” and Astana has supported Beijing in its drive against separatism. In its relations with foreign nations, China has followed the principle of noninterference in other countries’ domestic and foreign affairs. The Chinese government has also vowed to build foreign partnerships based on the principles of trust, respect, and mutual gains. Beijing’s foreign policy pillars have been appealing to Kazakhstan’s government and public authorities of other Central Asian nations, which continue to fear encroachment on their sovereignty, independence, and political freedom. Nevertheless, there have been important obstacles to cooperation between Kazakhstan and China, resulting in only limited inﬂuence of Beijing on this Central Asian state. For China, neither Kazakhstan nor other Central Asian republics have been pre-eminent foreign policy vectors. China has rather narrow commercial and security interests in partnership with Kazakhstan. The Beijing government has been keenly aware of multiple constraints on the full realization of its economic aspirations in Central Asia due to the instability of world prices for crude oil, lack of managerial experience in the Central Asian nations, and some haphazardness and spontaneity in implementing trade contracts with governments and companies in the Central Asian states. Chinese companies lack adequate knowledge of the peculiarities of the Central Asian market and business environment in Kazakhstan, which still suffers from underdeveloped infrastructure, a lack of consulting services and inadequate exchange of information. Deﬁciencies of the banking system and hiccups in the system of electronic payments and exchange have slowed down cooperation between the Kazakh and foreign corporations (Syaoyan 2008: 22). Kazakhstan, itself, has apprehensions about the intentions of Beijing. Concerns have been expressed about the country’s market being inundated with cheap Chinese merchandise and products that undermine the industrial and agricultural base in Kazakhstan, particularly in those regions located in the territories bordering China. Studies of public opinion in Kazakhstan have demonstrated that its citizens

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have limited knowledge of Chinese culture, its domestic political situation, and its geopolitical aims. This lack of awareness has been conducive to sustaining distrust between the peoples of two nations. Many in Kazakhstan are still inﬂuenced by myths and stereotypes about Beijing, which cultivate fears of China’s military conquest and the demographic expansionism of Beijing (Karataeva 2008: 179). Kazakhstan’s Central Asian neighbors have been another social group, whose inﬂuence, albeit very limited, is important for consideration. This inﬂuence stems from interdependency of the Central Asian states that arises from similarities in their development practices, historic economic ties, and presence of common infrastructure. The Central Asian republics have signiﬁcant overlapping populations and common problems in the economic, political, and security realms. In recent years, the Central Asian region has ascended in Kazakhstan’s priorities, and the republic’s foreign policy has shifted toward deepening lines of cooperation with other Central Asian states. According to Kazakhstan’s leadership, domestic political stability in the republic cannot be ensured if the broader region is unstable. Both the Kazakh government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been encouraging more active diplomatic ties with other Central Asian states (Yermukanov 2007). Kazakhstan has taken on a leadership role in promoting regional cooperation, but has accomplished only limited success. Despite objective conditions conducive to regional integration, the region is still lacking a sense of community, mutual sympathy, shared values, and collectively held norms. There is a low level of trust between the ruling elites who often perceive integration as a form of constraint (Robinson 2004: 180). Regionalism is deemed as a threat to the power bases of semi-authoritarian regimes. It is hardly surprising, then, that regional and sub-regional efforts to coordinate economic, defense, or security policy through mechanisms for multi-lateral cooperation have made little progress in the Central Asian region. The special attention given to Russia, the United States/NATO, China, and Central Asian republics in this part of the book is not meant to suggest that no other state or group of states has been important in Kazakhstan’s politics and foreign policy. In comparative terms, however, the scale and intensity of impact of other states and international organizations on Kazakhstan’s economics, political and security affairs, and international standing has been rather low. The European Union, for example, and individual European states have been almost absent from the regional geopolitical scene. It is true that some EU projects, such as the TACIS (technical assistance to CIS countries) program, which has been in effect since 1991, delivered close to US$1.5 million to the region. The impact of this and other European initiatives is, however, uncertain (Kassenova 2007).9 Hedi Wegener, Chairperson of the German–Central Asian Group in the Bundestag, depicted EU policy toward the Central Asian states as “rather aimless, unplanned and uncoordinated” (Wegener 2007: 16). Until recently, the EU had had no comprehensive strategy toward Central Asia. The numerous difﬁculties with integration and enlargement processes within the EU kept its focus and resources away from the Central Asian states. There has also been a widespread, albeit uninformed, opinion

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portraying Central Asia republics as the most backward and underdeveloped nations in the post-Soviet territory not yet ready to fully embrace the goals and initiatives of the EU. The European Union has had a quite different assessment from the United States in regards to the strategic signiﬁcance of Central Asia. Despite its awareness about the problems of trafﬁcking in persons, arms, and narcotics faced by the Central Asian states, Brussels has opted for building its relations with Russia and other East European nations (Kassenova 2007). In 2007, during Germany’s chairmanship of the EU, the Union enacted the European Community Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007–13. Concerns about energy security in Europe and the search for alternative sources of energy to cater to the needs of the growing customer base in the European states compelled Brussels to take a closer look at the Central Asian states. Although the new strategy, which ties together questions of security and development, is a big step forward in this direction, its outcomes are yet to be seen. Ideological differences and value-confrontations between Central Asian republics and the European Union may become the major obstacles to realization of the Union’s plans in Central Asia (Kassenova 2007).

Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism responses: assessing the inﬂuence of its reference groups Throughout the modern history of Kazakhstan, Russia, China, Central Asian states, and the United States have served as the republic’s reference groups affecting Astana’s politics and foreign policy. Kazakhstan’s compliance with policies and perspectives of these reference groups has been driven by instrumental reasons: all of the identiﬁed states served as the utilitarian reference groups for this Central Asian state. The Kazakh authorities have played up to the interests of Russia, China, Uzbekistan, and the United Staes in order to secure important beneﬁts or avoid losses mediated by the republic’s neighbors. The Russian Federation, whose impact has waxed and waned since the time of Kazakhstan’s independence, has also served as Astana’s normative reference group, whose inﬂuence stemmed from a sympathy or “psychological” proximity between Kazakhstan and Russia. Recently, the American administration expanded its military, ﬁnancial, and political support to the Nazarbaev regime and, as a result, its inﬂuence over the republic has grown. It can be expected, then, that Kazakhstan’s views on the problem of terrorism and its counterterrorism responses will be affected by the Russian, Chinese, and American perspectives on terrorism and counterterrorism, and speciﬁc measures prevailing in the reference groups’ counterterrorism policies. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan feature the same reference groups of states. Therefore, here I only brieﬂy summarize the main legislative, institutional, and operational aspects of the Russian, Chinese, American, and the Central Asian states’ counterterrorism programs, which were discussed at a greater length in chapter two. Next, this part of the book will examine Kazakhstan’s measures aimed at combating terrorism and assess the impact of its reference groups on the republic’s counterterrorism

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policy. The assessment will start with a survey of views on terrorism shared by Kazakhstan’s authorities and, then, proceed to the analysis of Kazakhstan’s legislative and institutional frameworks for combating terrorism. The last section of the chapter will illustrate how Kazakhstan’s social environment has inﬂuenced its human rights practices in the context of war on terrorism. For all reference groups of Kazakhstan, the problem of terrorism has become tightly associated with activities of radical Islamic movements (Table 3.1). Religious terrorism has been perceived as a serious threat to global and national security in all of the identiﬁed states. In Russia, Chechnya and the neighboring territories have been the areas with the highest concentration of terrorist attacks, while the Chechen guerilla ﬁghters have been implicated in the vast majority of terrorist acts in the country. Naturally, the Russian government has equated the threat of terrorism and activities of Islamists in Chechnya and the broader North Caucasus region. In other Central Asian states, terrorism has also been identiﬁed with the spread of radical Islam. China has recently experienced a rise in terrorist attacks on its foreign interests and nationals residing overseas. Despite the growing threat of international terrorism to Beijing, the Chinese government has focused its counterterrorism measures on uprooting the homegrown terrorist groups associated with activities of ethnic Uighur Muslims residing in Xingjian. Although the United Stated has had experience of ﬁghting homegrown left-wing, right-wing, and special interest terrorist organizations, religious terrorism has become the number one concern for the United States. Over the last two decades the American administration has concentrated its efforts on ﬁghting against a complex network of Sunni terrorist groups inspired and led by Osama bin Laden and his collaborators, waging the Holy War against the United States. The evolution of counterterrorism strategy and concomitant legislative efforts in Russia and Central Asian states have followed their governments’ experiences with the threat of radical and militant Islam in these nations. The counterterrorism policies of these republics have been adopted in reaction to committed acts of terrorism or in response to the pending threat of terrorism. Essentially, the governments of Russia and the Central Asian states have codiﬁed the practices of military and security forces in the realm of counterterrorism into proper legislative and institutional formats. Moscow has championed many of the counterterrorism projects in the post-Soviet territory, and the CIS conventions and programs aimed at combating terrorism reﬂect the Kremlin’s position. The CIS member states have traditionally looked at CIS model laws for preparing their domestic legislation. Therefore, there is a great degree of resemblance of laws on combating terrorism, as well as in the structure and mandates of agencies tasked with the ﬁght against terrorism in post-Soviet nations. Another commonality of the Russian and Central Asian states’ counterterrorism program is that it lacks a balanced approach to the problem of terrorism. In their counterterrorism responses, the Russian and Central Asian governments have traditionally employed repressive methods and punitive means to suppress the threat of terrorism. The legislative and institutional frameworks of these states fortify a system of counterterrorism that prioritizes force. The troops of the interior ministry

Brutality of counterterrorism responses

Scope of counterterrorism policy

Views on terrorism

Pays little heed to the protection of human rights in counterterrorism legislation. Exhibits low regard for human rights in the practice of counterterrorism. There is no public oversight

Religious terrorism is perceived as the most dangerous type of terrorism Terrorism is associated with Islamist insurgency in Chechnya and broader North Caucasus region Narrow. Counterterrorism measures are unbalanced in favor of punitive and military responses. Counterterrorism, counter-insurgency, and military combat operations have become tightly intertwined.

Russia

Very comprehensive, particularly, on the domestic dimension of counterterrorism policy. In international relations, greater emphasis is placed on military cooperation and developing states’ military and security capabilities to combat terrorism Recognizes human rights principles in documents and policies. Domestically, the United States has been criticized for a series of extraordinary, controversial measures. In relations with other states, human rights considerations have been placed on the backburner Narrow. Place a high premium on forceful measures and application of military force. There is a lack of a long-term strategy that encompasses socio-economic approaches and an effective system of prevention and protection from terrorist attacks Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have been implicated in various kinds of human rights abuses in the name of combating terrorism. Kyrgyzstan, until recently, had relied on a more lenient and conciliatory approach Narrow. Excessive reliance on military force for curbing domestic dissent. Emphasis on military and security agencies’ cooperation within the SCO framework

Notorious for violations of human rights: summary executions and clampdowns on the rights of Uighurs. It has put pressure on other states to forcefully return Uighur activists back to China

Religious terrorism is perceived as the most dangerous type of terrorism Terrorist threat is associated with activities of Al- Qaeda and afﬁliated Sunni terrorist groups

Terrorism is equated with the activities of radical Islamic groups (in some states, moderate Islamic groups practicing their faith outside of state controls are viewed as terrorist)

Terrorism is associated with activities of the Uighur activists ﬁghting for independence of Xingjian

United States/NATO

Central Asian states

China

Table 3.1 Summary of counterterrorism policies of Kazakhstan’s reference groups

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and security agencies’ special task teams have been excessively used in chasing, containing, and liquidating alleged terrorists. These countries still lack a longterm counterterrorism strategy embracing an effective system of prevention along with the protection of people, property, and critical infrastructures from terrorist attacks. Similar to Russia and other Central Asian states, China has adopted a “war model” in its counterterrorism approach stressing vigorous counterterrorism measures undergirded by the use of military force to curb domestic dissent. In its international relations, Beijing has also relied on joint counterterrorism exercises under the auspices of the SCO to master responses to low-insurgency conﬂict, terrorism, and other unconventional threats. The counterterrorism legislation of these states allows for the suspension of individual liberties and certain political freedoms in the name of combating terrorism, and all of them have been notorious for taking advantage of these legislative provisions. Safeguards against human rights abuses are missing in the counterterrorism legislative and institutional frameworks of Russia, China, and the Central Asian states, as are the mechanisms of public oversight and legal responsibility for the abuse and misuse of authority in the context of counterterrorism operations. Contrary to Russia, China, and Central Asian republics, the United States has adopted a comprehensive and balanced approach combining preventive responses (measures aimed at enhancing bio, nuclear, and aviation security, intelligence capabilities and border control), extraordinary and punitive responses (enhanced surveillance powers, data-sharing procedures, disclosure of educational records and access to other types of personal information, and changes in attorney–client relations among other things), and activities aimed at mitigating the detrimental consequences of terrorist attacks. In the international dimension of its counterterrorism policy, the United States, like other reference groups of Kazakhstan, has been sympathetic to forceful responses, including the use of military force. Under the leadership of president Bush, the US government enacted a pre-emptive strike doctrine legalizing the use of the American military force against states providing safe havens to terrorists and their organizations, and against other threats to homeland security. It is noteworthy that the doctrine allows for the unilateral use of force even in the absence of the UN Security Council’s resolution authorizing military deployment. NATO’s Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism also legalizes preemptive strikes by authorizing the North Atlantic Council to make decisions regarding the deployment of the Alliance’s military forces against terrorist bases and sanctuaries of terrorists (NATO 2002). The Concept differentiates between anti-terrorism and counterterrorism military operations. The former encompasses various defensive measures designed to reduce the vulnerability of allies’ forces, people, and property to terrorism; whereas, the latter includes offensive military operations designed to reduce terrorists’ capabilities. It is noteworthy that offensive counterterrorism measures have been given primary attention in NATO’s practices and policies. The goal of US foreign initiatives with partners of the counterterrorism coalition has been to bolster their counterterrorism capabilities through foreign assistance and military and law enforcement cooperation and training. The American IMET

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programs abroad have aimed at the creation and training of NATO-interoperable rapid-deployment forces specializing in anti-terrorist operations and combat with illegal armed groups. The American government has also subsidized the transfer of necessary military gear, various kinds of equipment for protecting national borders and critical infrastructure, and other technological devices to military, security, and other agencies of individual states. The training programs administered by the United States and NATO tend to underscore the military aspect of the ﬁght against terrorism, and prioritize the establishment of professional armed forces operating in accordance with NATO interoperability principles. The issues of human rights and democratic reforms have been sidelined in the US/NATO negotiations and cooperation with other states. International human rights groups have rebuked the American administration for slighting its human rights principles in the name of security and counterterrorism and turning a blind eye to inhumane and derogatory practices in other states combating terrorism. How assessment of terrorist threat has changed from “moderate” to “real” Kazakhstan has barely seen any terrorist activity in the country and has never been targeted by Islamic militants. The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, an online database of terrorist incidents and terrorist organizations sponsored by the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) reported three minor explosions that took place in 2002 and 2004 in Kazakhstan, resulting in one death and one injury.10 In April 2002, Kazakh security forces detonated a bomb hidden on the side of a road used by President Nazarbaev, thus preventing the only terrorist attack deemed to have targeted the government. Astana’s ofﬁcials downplayed these incidents. Another open-source database of terrorist events, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), reports 10 incidents of a different nature— assaults, hijacking, assassinations, and explosions—that took place from 1992 to 2000 in Kazakhstan. A total of 10 people were killed in those attacked, according to the GTD.11 The ofﬁcial assessments of terrorist activity in the country have been inconsistent. On the one hand, the majority of ofﬁcial reports state that no terrorist attack has been carried out successfully in Kazakhstan. On the other hand, Kazakhstan’s authorities maintain that they have exposed and prevented terrorist activities. All in all, in the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s leadership did not regard Islamic militancy and terrorism as the principle threat to their state. These phenomena, however, have always been considered as one of the destabilizing factors in the region. These attitudes to the problem of terrorism have been shared in the Kazakh population. According to a survey conducted in 2007, more than half of the respondents do not fear becoming a victim of terrorist attack, and only 2 percent deem terrorism the most important problem in the country (Karataeva 2008: 183). In the 2000s, the discourse over dangers posed by Islamists and radical Islamic groups has noticeably changed in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh government has

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assumed a frame similar to the one adopted by Uzbekistan, Russia, and Tajikistan that associates terrorism with radical Islam. The Kazakh authorities declared terrorism and radical Islam as the real threats to the security of Kazakhstan. There have been a growing number of reports and announcements about the recruitment of Kazakh citizens in terrorist and extremist groups and their participation in terrorist attacks at home and in foreign countries.12 Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee and the Ministry of Interior have expressed alarm over the attempts of international terrorist organizations to set up training camps and ﬁnd safe haven from prosecution in Kazakhstan. A state that initially welcomed Islamic renaissance and embraced religious diversity as part of the process of democratization has become increasingly insecure about the growth of Islam. The ofﬁcial position on Islam has been further reﬂected in the views of the religious institutions representing the major religious denominations in Kazakhstan, which have also expressed concerns about destructive activities of the mushrooming religious organizations (Yermukanov 2006). Indeed, there has been a noticeable growth in the religious consciousness of Kazakhstan’s Muslims, and the number of Islamic groups and organizations has substantially increased in Kazakhstan. There are, however, many regional specialists, human rights activists, and scholars who posit that the threat of radical Islam in Kazakhstan has been grossly exaggerated. Constraints on using Islam are still much stronger in Kazakhstan than in any other Central Asian state. Only 47 percent of the republic’s population is Muslim, whereas the second largest religious denomination, Russian Orthodoxy, accounts for 44 percent of believers in Kazakhstan (CIA 2009). The relatively small Muslim constituency renders insufﬁcient social basis for mobilization by Islamic groups. Furthermore, the majority of those identifying with Islam are non-strict observers of Islamic laws and prohibitions. Although Islam spread in the lands of nomadic tribes in the ninth and tenth centuries, it has never had such a prevailing inﬂuence among the Kazakh nomads as among the Uzbeks and Tajiks.13 The question then becomes, why has the government of Kazakhstan modiﬁed its views on the nature and magnitude of terrorist threat in the country despite the lack of objective reasons for causing a change in perceptions of risks associated with terrorism and radical Islam? The key premise of this chapter is that Kazakhstan’s reference groups have inﬂuenced its understandings about the nature and levels of terrorist threat. Kazakhstan’s outlook on the problem of terrorism has largely followed the assessments of terrorist threats that have been promulgated by Russia, the United States, China, and other Central Asian states. Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism measures have also been affected by policies prevalent in its social environment. The ﬁrst warnings about the imminent threat of terrorism and religious extremism in Central Asia and calls for joint counterterrorism measures appeared in the late 1990s when both Uzbekistan and Russia intensiﬁed their struggle against radical Islam. In December 1998, the CIS adopted one of the ﬁrst resolutions calling for a series of joint activities in the area of cooperation in combating extremist crimes committed on religious grounds. It was also around that time

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that an international conference of the OSCE, held in Istanbul in 1999, declared international terrorism a novel threat to global and regional stability. This historic OSCE meeting resulted in the adoption of a Charter for European Security that listed international terrorism, violent extremism, and organized crime among the growing challenges to international security (OSCE 1999). The OSCE summit issued a declaration calling for joint efforts in counteracting international terrorism. In light of this decision, the CIS states passed a series of acts dedicated to the problem of combating terrorism. The year of 1999 saw the passage of the resolution On Combating Terrorism on the Territory of CIS Member States and the appeal to Heads of State and Heads of Government of the CIS countries. The ﬁrst document envisioned the creation of the anti-terrorism center for coordinating activities aimed at combating terrorism in the territories of the CIS member states. The second document called on the leadership of the CIS countries to make the struggle with international terrorism their primary goal. The year 2000 in the CIS was dedicated to the development of anti-terrorism measures and the strengthening of counterterrorism cooperation between the CIS member states. The CIS adopted two programs: one for combating international terrorism and other manifestations of extremism, and another for joint measures of ﬁghting international crime. The CIS also established an Anti-Terrorist Center. The programs enacted by the CIS member states provided the basis for carrying out various interagency operation-preventive activities and special operations against terrorism and extremism. The 9/11 attacks on the United States and the ensuing military and rhetorical war on terrorism created an atmosphere where state security and safety of people from terrorist attacks with religious undertones were all but impossible. The discourse accompanying the military onslaught on the Al-Qaeda terrorist network worldwide, and the Taliban in Afghanistan helped to construct an image of imminent terrorist danger. The reporting system and the mechanisms of accountability established within regional and global institutions, particularly, the reporting system administered by the UN Counterterrorism Committee created in 2001, compelled the governments to demonstrate the effectiveness of their counterterrorism policies, thus indirectly encouraging the perceptions of terrorist threat. In October 2001, following the recent September 11 attacks on American soil, the parties to the Collective Security Treaty agreement, including Kazakhstan, adopted a new anti-terrorism plan. Combating terrorism was declared the main priority of the members of the Collective Security Treaty. The Kazakh government has been keen to demonstrate its support of global anti-terrorism efforts and its ability to cope with the Islamist threat. By acknowledging the threat and taking an active part in suppressing it, Kazakhstan has tried to reinforce its positive image as a competent member of the global coalition against terrorism. It has also assisted in burnishing the reputation of Kazakhstan’s security agents as reliable partners of global and regional anti-terrorist institutions. Reports of the US Department of State on terrorism and counterterrorism around the world have further conﬁrmed the presence and persistence of terrorist threat in Central Asia. In an annual report on terrorism in 2008, for example,

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the State Department conﬁrmed that terrorist groups were still operating in the Central Asian republics. This analytical document afﬁrmed that terrorist threat has been growing in the region and the greatest danger has stemmed from activities of Islamists in the Ferghana valley, the most populous and tumultuous area divided between several Central Asian states (Kucera 2009). Since 9/11, Kazakhstan has stepped up cooperation with regional institutions, international organizations, and individual states in the realm of counterterrorism. The intensiﬁcation of contact with Russia, China, and other Central Asian republics encouraged harmonization of their understanding of the nature of terrorism and levels of terrorist activity in the region. For instance, all of the members of the CSTO and SCO developed similar understandings of those religious groups that pose a terrorist threat. They also adopted uniform rosters of terrorist and extremist organizations. In the early 2000s, Russia, China, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan declared ofﬁcial bans on Al-Qaeda, the East Turkistan Islamic Party, the Kurdish People’s Congress, the IMU, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and a number of less known groups. In 2004, Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court also issued a ruling in which it recognized these organizations as terrorist groups, prohibiting their activities and any kinds of support to these organizations in the country. Six months later, another Kazakh court outlawed activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, pronouncing this group as an extremist organization. A representative of Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor-General’s Ofﬁce explained, “It does not mean that all these organizations are active in Kazakhstan […] The decision to ban them is a preventive measure. These organizations are considered as terrorist [sic] in the Russian Federation, the United States, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan” (Saidazimova 2005b). There has also been mounting peer pressure on the republic to recognize terrorism as a primary security threat in Kazakhstan. According to some observers, Kazakhstani ofﬁcials have changed their assessment of security risks associated with Hizb ut-Tahrir under political pressure arising from Tashkent (Saidazimova 2005b). On several occasions, the Uzbek authorities chastised their counterparts in Kazakhstan for providing a safe haven for militants’ camps, where some suicide bombers for terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan’s capital were allegedly trained. Although ofﬁcially Astana denied these accusations as downright incorrect, it, nonetheless, took a harsher stance in its counterterrorism measures. Hizb-ut-Tahrir was outlawed as an extremist group, and terrorist threat has been given more serious consideration and sterner assessment. In 2009, the Russian security service sent out new alerts about the rise of terrorism, Islamist insurgency, and political instability in the Central Asian region. Following these warnings, both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan saw their border posts attacked by armed Islamists, and a suicide bombing took place in Uzbekistan’s Andijan province (Norling 2009: 3). Russia’s premonitions seemed to have received a conﬁrmation in a renewed Islamist onslaught. In Russia, concerns with the growing threat of terrorism were formalized in the newly adopted National Security doctrine of 2009, which names CSTO as the main tool for fending off conventional and unconventional security threats and carrying out military operations in the territory of the CSTO member nations. The fact that the Russian

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government has been ﬁrmly committed to reinforcing its military presence in Central Asian states underscores how serious and earnest Russia has been in its assessment of the magnitude of terrorist threat in Central Asia (Norling 2009: 3–4). For a short while, the Kazakh government had tried to escape the grip of Russian-led security institutions and strengthen cooperation with NATO and the United States (Baev 2006). These attitudes, however, changed after a wave of revolutionary transformations engulfed the post-Soviet territory. Moscow assured extensive support in suppressing the opposition, a strategy presented under the guise of counterterrorism. The Nazarbaev government was compelled to re-evaluate its security partners and change its discourse on terrorism to ﬁt the Kremlin’s assessments and interpretations (Omelicheva 2009a). Today, Russia’s views on the nature and levels of terrorist threat have become shared by all Central Asian states. Counterterrorism measures: expanding in scope Until the late 1990s, Kazakhstan had lacked both legal pillars and practical measures aimed at counteracting terrorism. The ﬁrst legislative act in this area was adopted in 1999, when Kazakhstan’s parliament enacted the law On Measures to Combat Terrorism. This act was followed by a Presidential Decree on measures to counteract terrorism and extremism and the State Program for Combating Terrorism and Other Forms of Extremism and Separatism in the Republic of Kazakhstan (2000–3), approved in 2000 (UN Security Council 2001). The 1999 act On Measures to Combat Terrorism largely replicated the Russian Law on Combating Terrorism adopted a year earlier. Both pieces of legislation feature similar deﬁnitions of terrorist activity, of the principles for responding to the threat of terrorism as well as of the structure of institutions responsible for combating terrorism. The 1997 Criminal Code of Kazakhstan that criminalizes terrorism repeats the corpus delicti of terrorist crime contained in the 1996 Russian criminal code. Both the Russian and Kazakh codes deﬁne terrorism by enumerating different methods of inﬂicting violence on individuals or organizations and causing damage to property with a view of intimidating the population, violating public safety, and inﬂuencing governmental decisions.14 Both establish a list of offenses considered as terrorist crimes. Hostage-taking, attacks on a person or organization enjoying international protection, recruitment, training, funding or other support of a mercenary, and other terrorist offenses carry sanctions ranging from 4 to 15 years of imprisonment for crimes without aggravating circumstances, or 15 to 20 years of imprisonment or a life sentence for the crime of terrorism with incriminating circumstances.15 It is very common for Russian legislation and CIS model codes and laws (adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS where Russia has a signiﬁcant political clout) to form the basis for parallel legislation among CIS members.16 The CIS model law On Combating Terrorism adopted in 1998 has served as an exemplar for the development of a repertoire of legislative, institutional, and additional measures in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian nations. Decisions of

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the Council of the Heads of State, the Council of the Heads of Government, and other CIS Charter bodies have encouraged its members to translate the model legislation into their domestic laws. In 1996, for instance, the Council of the CIS Heads of State approved a program for suppressing international terrorism and extremism to the year 2000, and later to 2003 that all member states were supposed to follow. Numerous resolutions and statements adopted under the auspices of CIS appealed to the member-states’ obligation to carry out a broad spectrum of individual and collective measures for countering the threat of terrorism. It is in response to these legislative initiatives and statements enacted under the auspices of the CIS that Kazakhstan’s leadership adopted its counterterrorism legislation. Because of many similarities in Russian and Kazakhstan counterterrorism legislation, their institutional frameworks for combating terrorism also coincide. Kazakhstan’s act On Measures to Combat Terrorism thrusts the responsibility for ﬁghting terrorism on the KNB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and a number of other state bodies. In practice, however, the republic’s security service and agencies at the Ministry of Internal Affairs play the primary role in combating terrorism in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s KNB is a successor of the Soviet era Kazakh branch of the KGB. It is not surprising that organizational and operational principles of the Soviet secret service have strongly affected the structure and principles of operation of the modern KNB. During the ﬁrst decade of Kazakhstan’s independence, many Russians were purged from the KNB and replaced with ethnic Kazakhs. As a consequence, the effectiveness and level of professionalism of the Kazakh secret service suffered because Russian and Ukrainian ofﬁcers constituted the most educated, experienced, and well-trained security service personnel in many post-Soviet states. Ethnic Russians began returning to the Kazakh secret service after a disgraced former son-in-law of the Kazakh president, who served as the KNB deputy chief, departed from Kazakhstan’s security service. Despite the removal of ethnic Russians from the leading posts in the main security agency, they continued to form the core of counterterrorism ﬁghting units, such as Arystan, particularly during the 1990s. A special unit, Arystan, was established from the remains of the regional corps of the Soviet unit Alpha, the famous “A” group that was formed in 1974 for reconnaissance, surveillance, surgical raids, hostage rescue, and other operations. Staffed with the best KGB troops, it became the main organization carrying out tactical counterterrorism operations in the Soviet Union (Podrazdelenije Antiterrora “Al’fa” 2006). After the collapse of the USSR, Kazakhstan’s unit of the Alpha group was transformed into Arystan and placed under the command of the KNB. There are also several other special operations groups in Kazakhstan, such as Synkar and Berkyt, overseen by the republic’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. Until the events of 9/11, Kazakhstan’s special operations units were modeled after Russian counterterrorism and special purpose units. Synkar, for example, mimicked the Russian elite special purpose military unit Vympel, while Berkyt was an analog of the Russian special police units, or riot squads, known as OMON.

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Kazakhstan’s special operations troops took an active part in joint exercises and training with militaries and special purpose forces of other CIS states. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) played an important role in training Kazakhstan’s special operations ofﬁcers, many of whom were sent to the FSB Special Operations Center for strengthening a wide range of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and counter-sabotage skills. After 9/11, Kazakhstan’s special counterterrorism units began receiving training and education from American military advisers. Today, Kazakhstan’s special operations personnel is sent for training to the elite centers of security services in Russia, the United States, Israel, the Great Britain, and Germany. The 9/11 catastrophe and the ensuing war on terrorism signiﬁcantly changed US perceptions of its strategic interests in Central Asia and encouraged greater military and security involvement in the Central Asian states. Russia, too, stepped up its cooperation with the Central Asian republics and increased its military presence in the region under the pretext of combating terrorism. All this marked a new stage in Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism efforts. On September 28 2001, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1373, sponsored by the United States. The resolution outlined extensive criminal, ﬁnancial, and administrative counterterrorism measures that are binding on states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It also established a reporting system headed by the Counterterrorism Committee that was tasked with monitoring states’ compliance with international counterterrorism conventions and the resolutions of the Security Council. In the years following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1373 and subsequent counterterrorism resolutions, the Kazakh authorities amended and supplemented the country’s counterterrorism legislation, introduced new categories of offenses into the Criminal Code of Kazakhstan, and tightened responsibility for extremist and terrorist activities. In 2002, the government established a criminal liability for the advocacy of terrorism and public incitement to commit an act of terrorism as well as the establishment or leadership of a terrorist group and participation in its activities (UN Security Council 2003a). In 2005, the Criminal Code was amended with another article that criminalized ﬁnancing of extremism and terrorism. Kazakhstan’s government was compelled to add the latter amendment to the Criminal Code and adopt legislation prohibiting money laundering and ﬁnancing of terrorism because of pressure from its reference groups. Already in December 2001, the OSCE and the UN Ofﬁce for Drug Control and Crime Prevention organized an international conference on security in Central Asia, hosted by Kyrgyzstan. The adoption of national anti-money laundering legislation and the creation of corresponding institutions were listed as the primary goals of the Program of Action agreed upon by the conference’s participants (OSCE 2001). The conference and its action plan fostered comprehensive security and counterterrorism efforts of the participating countries and laid the ground for the ensuing workshops on ﬁghting money laundering and the ﬁnancing of terrorism in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Despite these efforts and commitments to ﬁghting the ﬁnancing of terrorism, Kazakhstan, until recently, lacked appropriate legislative and institutional bases

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for counteracting money laundering and prosecuting those responsible for various forms of ﬁnancial assistance to terrorist organizations. In 2005, the director of the SCO regional anti-terrorism unit publicly accused Kazakhstan of supporting terrorism because the Kazakh government allowed a Saudi construction company with links to Osama Bin Laden to operate in the country (Yermukanov 2005). The Kazakh authorities ﬂatly denied all accusations of sponsoring international terrorism but, nonetheless, accelerated their work on the draft of the law against money laundering. The Kazakh government also reinforced its efforts at ﬁghting illegal ﬁnancing practices in Kazakhstan. The experts from the Eurasian Group on combating money laundering and the ﬁnancing of terrorism (EAG), uniting Russia, China, Belarus, and Central Asian republics, have been assisting Kazakhstan’s authorities in creating appropriate legislative and institutional mechanisms for combating money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing in line with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). The new law on Counteracting Legalization (Laundering) of Illegal Proceeds and Terrorist Financing was adopted by Kazakhstan’s parliament in August 2009 and went into force the following month. EUR experts as well as specialists of the World Bank and the UN Ofﬁce for Drug Control and Prevention assisted Kazakhstan in drafting and passing this law. Since 9/11, Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism legislation has been subjected to many other changes reﬂecting the country’s cooperation with other states and international organizations. Kazakhstan’s entry into international and regional counterterrorism conventions necessitated further modiﬁcations to the normative framework governing its efforts in the area of combating terrorism. To streamline these changes, Kazakhstan’s government began working on a draft of a new law on counteracting terrorism, which will replace the outdated 1999 act On Measures to Combat Terrorism. The new law is supposed to reﬁne the legal deﬁnition of terrorism in line with the description of terrorism contained in a new version of the model law On Combating Terrorism adopted by the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly in 2006. Like the new Russian law, On Counteraction to Terrorism, adopted by the Russian parliament in 2006, Kazakhstan’s draft law uses “counteraction” in its title. “Counteraction” implies a broader meaning than “combat” and encompasses responses of special services and law-enforcement bodies, as well as activities of various state and local agencies, organizations, and individuals in preventing terrorism. Kazakhstan has also seen many changes in the structure and activities of its institutions tasked with counteracting terrorism. A new counterterrorism agency, the Anti-Terrorism Center, was established within the framework of Kazakhstan’s KNB in 2004. The Center’s primary responsibility is coordination of counterterrorist and counter-extremist activities of various state bodies. The Center also serves as a liaison between Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism agencies and similar structures abroad. After the Kazakh government enacted the second Program for Combating Terrorism, Extremism and Separatism (2004–6), the Center engaged in the realization of measures and activities envisioned in this plan. The Center organized and administered multiple counterterrorism training exercises,

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conferences and symposia in different regions of the republic. It engaged in education and public outreach projects that involved such activities as, for example, regular broadcasting about state counterterrorism efforts and publishing materials about different measures aimed at combating terrorism (Center for Anti-Terrorist Programs 2008). In 2005, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of the Interior launched its own training center for combating terrorism and extremism. It works with both the staff of the agencies under the Ministry of the Interior and with the police, and instructs them on new methods of counterterrorism and legal aspects of prosecution for the crime of terrorism. In recent years, Kazakhstan has redoubled its input into joint security measures developed within the regional security structures uniting Russia and Central Asian states. Contact between state leaders and representatives of security and military agencies of these nations have noticeably matured. Chinese security and military ofﬁcials occasionally join in the meetings of Russia and Central Asian states. The staff members of security establishments from both Russia and Central Asian republics hold regular meetings on different aspects of security and counter terrorism cooperation. The special services of these states have been involved in the ongoing exchange of information on terrorist suspects, organizations, and counterterrorism operations. Law enforcement agencies from these states methodically carry out requests for extradition of individuals from neighboring republics that are suspected of terrorist activities (UN Security Council 2004). Judiciaries of the republics are engaged in the exchange of expertise and dialogue over the questions of administration of justice, including legal practice in the areas of counteraction to terrorism, extremism, and separatism. Kazakhstan has also intensiﬁed its participation in joint operations and training carried out under the aegis of CIS, CSTO, and SCO, as can be evidenced from examples of the joint exercises in Table 3.2. In addition to multilateral exercises listed in Table 3.2 and carried out under the umbrella of CIS, CSTO, and SCO, Kazakhstan engaged in bilateral training and exercises with Russia and other nations. In 2008, Kazakhstan initiated an international anti-terrorist drill “Atom-Anti-terror-2008” that was held within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in Almaty.17 During the exercise, participants rehearsed security forces’ responses to attempted nuclear terrorism. The drill was attended by representatives from more than 30 nations. On the whole, Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism measures have been clearly inﬂuenced by the counterterrorism policies of Russia, China, and regional organizations spearheaded by the Kremlin and Beijing. Kazakhstan’s legislative responses mimic Russian laws on combating terrorism as well as CIS model counterterrorism legislation. The structure and authority of Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism organs resemble the functions and make-up of counterterrorism institutions in Russia as well as those in neighboring states. As in Russia and other Central Asian republics, the balance of punitive and preventive aspects of Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism program leans toward military and security service efforts. It is true that the Kazakh government has pioneered an inter-faith dialogue through the initiative of

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Table 3.2 Kazakhstan’s participation in joint exercises and training with CIS, CSTO, and SCO (2004–8) Year

International counterterrorism exercises

Location

2004

Assembly of counterterrorism divisions of the security and special service agencies of the CIS member states and the joint command headquarters training, “Zapad-Antiterror2004” under the aegis of the CIS ATC. “Caspii-Antiterror-2005” training of counterterrorism subdivisions of the security and special service agencies of the CIS states in tactical response to terrorist acts against the oil and energy complex. The exercises were organized by the CIS ATC. “Tian-Shan-1-2006” anti-terror drill conducted with China under the aegis of the SCO. The maneuvers pursued the goal of enhancing collaboration on joint counterterrorism measures, the exchange of data, the synchronization of rapid response, and the coordination of the activities of various counterterrorism subdivisions. “Rubezh-2006” joint command and staff exercises in tactical maneuvers in response to a major terrorist attack or attack by a state against one of the members of the CSTO. The training was organized by the CSTO and held simultaneously with “Tian-Shan-1-2006” in the Caspian Sea area of Kazakhstan. The exercise involved some 2,500 troops from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and included all branches of the CSTO armed forces. “Atom-Antiterror-2006” joint staff and command exercise practicing neutralization of terrorists at a nuclear power station and the release of hostages. The drill was organized by the CIS ATC jointly with the CSTO. Special forces from Armenia, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine took part in the exercise. “Peace Mission-2007” joint anti-terror military exercises held by the six SCO member states. “Baikonur-Antiterror-2007” operational strategic command staff exercises held under the aegis of the CIS. Security agencies and special services of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia took part in exercises involving the release of hostages and responses to an attack on critical infrastructure, in particular, cosmodromes. “Issyk-Kul-Antiterror-2007” joint staff and command exercise conducted under the aegis of the SCO and aimed at simulating a multinational, cross-border counterterrorism operation. The drill involved special forces units and law enforcement agencies of the six SCO members. “Volgograd-Antiterror-2008” joint staff and command exercises conducted under the umbrella of the SCO and aimed at simulating a special operation to neutralize “terrorists” and free “hostages” on an oil tanker. The drill involved special services from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia as well as representatives of regional anti-terrorist organizations.

Chisinau, Moldova

2005

2006

2007

2008

Aktau, Kazakhstan

Almaty, Kazakhstan/ Xingjian, China

Aktau, Kazakhstan

Yerevan, Armenia

Chelyabinsk, Russia Baikonur, Kazakhstan

Lake Issyk Kul, Kyrgyzstan

Volgograd, Russia

(Continued)

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Table 3.2 Kazakhstan’s participation in joint exercises and training with CIS, CSTO, and SCO (2004–8) (Continued) Year

International counterterrorism exercises

Location

“Bastion-Antiterror-2008” joint command post exercises conducted under the auspices of the CIS ATC with the goal of drilling complex measures for identifying and suppressing terrorist groups operating in the territories of several CIS member nations.

Minsk, Belarus

the International Conference on Peace and Harmony, intended to foster peace and stability and to prevent religious extremism and terrorism. Kazakhstan, however, has yet to establish legal and organizational bases for a variety of preventive and protective activities aimed at defending the people and infrastructure against the threat of terrorism. The bulk of security responses enacted by the Kazakh authorities has been aimed at terrorism suppression. Kazakhstan’s security forces have played a primary role in the republic’s efforts to combat terrorism. By emphasizing forceful, punitive, and military-style responses, Kazakhstan, like Russia and other Central Asian nations, has inadvertently been shaping a counterterrorism strategy that prioritizes the “stick” over a more balanced approach to terrorism counteraction. In other words, Kazakhstan, similarly to its reference groups, prefers to concentrate on military capabilities in combating terrorism. This is at the expense of prioritizing and funding counterterrorism efforts of law-enforcement agencies and investigative bodies, strengthening infrastructure and securing state borders, and encouraging mass education and religious dialogue. Like Russia and other Central Asian nations, Kazakhstan has lacked strong forecasting, intelligence analysis, criminal investigation capabilities, and disruption-based approaches to counteracting terrorism (McDermott 2009: 7). Russia, China, and Central Asian states are not Kazakhstan’s only reference groups; other states and international organizations have inﬂuenced the republic’s counterterrorism policy, albeit to a much lesser extent. The United States, NATO, and partners from the Northern Alliance have assisted the Kazakh government in strengthening the preventive aspects of the country’s counterterrorism program. Kazakhstan took advantage of multilateral assistance for securing borders and strengthening control of the trafﬁcking in drugs and arms. Representatives of the Kazakh defense agencies and border service took part in seminars organized within the framework of NATO’s PfP program, while the US government organized the training of customs ofﬁcials and personnel from other governmental agencies in Kazakhstan. US ﬁnancial assistance to Kazakhstan has doubled in the ﬁve years since September 11th, compared to the amount of aid that Kazakhstan received in the preceding ﬁve-year time-frame (Center for Defense Information 2007). The US government has provided Kazakhstan with several sources of counterterrorism funding, and the average appropriations for the IMET program and Foreign Military Financing program have doubled since ﬁscal year 2002 (USAID 2007).

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In exchange, the government of Kazakhstan has shown wide-ranging support to the US-led war against terrorism. US forces have been using Kazakhstan’s major airport in Almaty as a reserve airﬁeld for aircraft participating in the Afghani military operation. The Nazarbaev administration granted coalitional forces overﬂight rights and granted transit rights to German troops in support of NATOled International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The government of Kazakhstan also signed memorandums of understanding with individual states participating in the counterterrorism coalition that allowed them to use the Shymkent international airport as an emergency airﬁeld. Kazakh security forces intensiﬁed their efforts at protecting American public facilities and oil enterprises with the US private interests throughout the country. Kazakhstan’s government has committed itself to freezing ﬁnancial assets of individuals and groups designated as terrorist by the US Department of State. As mentioned above, after the commencement of war against Saddam Hussein’s regime, and reportedly responding to an appeal from the US administration, Kazakhstan made a controversial decision to dispatch its battalion of engineers (KAZBAT) to perform a peacekeeping mission in Iraq. Kazakhstan became the only Central Asian state to provide its military for an international coalition force in the Middle East. Kazakhstan has followed through on its pledges of assistance to the international anti-terrorism coalition, thus receiving many statements of praise from the United States and earning international prestige. In 2004, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage referred to Kazakhstan as a “guiding light” in Central Asia, the South Caucasus and beyond, and a “key player” in the war against terrorism (Nichol 2004: 1). A year later, President George W. Bush labeled Kazakhstan a “strategic partner of the United States in Central Asia” and commended Nazarbaev for his vision as well as policies responsible for much of the republic’s economic and political progress (Socor 2005). Through active engagement with regional and global organizations on security matters, Kazakhstan has supplanted Uzbekistan as the favored partner in Central Asia for both Russia and the United States. There has been little disagreement concerning the counterterrorism measures promoted by NATO and the United States, on the one hand, and Russia, China, and Central Asian states, on the other. Although, preventive measures are very prominent in the US homeland security responses, they have taken a back seat in American counterterrorism policies abroad. The foreign policy and security assistance programs of the United States as well as the counterterrorism policies of Russia and China have all but neglected a wide range of prophylactic activities and socio-economic measures. Methods for strengthening Kazakhstan’s ability to forecast security threats, as well as to collect and examine intelligence information have been sidestepped in counterterrorism programs promoted by Kazakhstan’s reference groups. Because of this consistency of perspectives on counterterrorism exhibited by Russia, China, and the United States, Kazakhstan has avoided major dilemmas with translating their expectations about counterterrorism responses into its own counterterrorism program, despite the geopolitical competition characterizing foreign relations between these states.

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The Kremlin has been anxious of the increased US presence in Central Asia. Nonetheless, it has grudgingly supported Kazakhstan’s teamwork with NATO and the US. Moscow understands that counterterrorism projects supported by the Western states and international organizations in Central Asia have rarely interfered with counterterrorism initiatives promoted by Russia. Western security assistance, for example, has been dispensed for relatively minor undertakings, which have not obstructed the counterterrorism efforts of the CSTO, SCO, or CIS. Western security planners lack the informed outlook on the region necessary for tackling its multifarious problems. Some Central Asian experts have even afﬁrmed that despite the increased and deepened cooperation of Kazakhstan with the West in the sphere of terrorism counteraction, the United States continues to be the only global player that is missing in this teamwork (Kucera 2009). The amount of funds allocated by the US to Kazakhstan’s security and military sectors has been insigniﬁcant considering the scale of the republic’s security needs, and it has been channeled through a dozen of poorly coordinated security programs. Washington’s security assistance has been devoid of a time-phased approach and has been allocated to procuring new military equipment instead of to creating substantive reform of the key elements of the Kazakh military and security service. Therefore, most American initiatives have not reached intended aims. NATO’s PfP program has also failed in bringing about real change in the structure and performance of Kazakhstan’s military. NATO’s success in the republic has been hampered by insufﬁcient resources, while the very generic character of its assistance projects have impeded the outcomes of its security and military efforts in Kazakhstan (McDermott 2009: 17). Because of the limitations of Western security assistance programs in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, the Kazakh leadership has concentrated its efforts on the development of regional security ties with Russia, China, and regional organizations. SCO, for example, has been considered a bulwark against militant Islam in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The government of Kazakhstan has conceded that practical steps undertaken within the SCO security frameworks constitute a viable solution to stabilization of the volatile Central Asian region. According to the republic’s key policy-makers and experts, Russia remains its key defense partner and “a guarantor of national security for Kazakhstan.”18 Kazakhstan’s military elite have praised the intensiﬁed military cooperation with Russia and extolled the Russian military as “the main strategic ally of the Kazakh armed forces.”19 Human rights and counterterrorism: adjustments in “style” Throughout the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s government utilized a fairly balanced approach toward Islamist groups and toward the religious activities of those individuals whose practices, beliefs, and afﬁliations were not recognized by the state-controlled Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh authorities mixed religious restrictions with policies of cooptation of pliable religious ﬁgures who did not challenge the secular leadership in Kazakhstan, and attempted to assimilate various Islamic groups and communities into the

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mainstream (ofﬁcial) Islam.20 They also combined state control over Muslim groups with measures of promoting Islamic identity in the general population. Following changes in regional and global discourses over the dangers of radical Islam, the government of Kazakhstan also began branding non-traditional Muslim groups “extremist” and “terrorist.” The Kazakh authorities embraced a position shared by Russia and other Central Asian states, which equated the activities of Islamist groups with terrorism and extremism. In recent years, Kazakhstan has tightened control over religious groups and imposed restrictions on their operations. Kazakhstan’s government has publicly vowed to wage a no-holds-barred war against terrorism, and the republican parliament enacted new laws allowing for the circumvention of certain freedoms in the name of combating terrorism. Kazakhstan’s reference groups have long encouraged its leadership to embrace a more resolute stance on Islam. Russia, China, and Uzbekistan have warmly welcomed these changes in the republic’s counterterrorism approach. First, following the lead of other former Soviet states, Kazakhstan began narrowing the space for religious freedom by toughening national religious laws. It also endorsed more severe criminal liability for a vaguely deﬁned crime of extremism and ﬁnancial help to extremist and terrorist organizations. In 2005, the Kazakh government pushed through several legislative initiatives on the grounds of enhancing national security. Those initiatives included a new law On Counteraction to Extremism and amendments to the existing legislation regulating religious practices. The former piece of legislation contains a broad and loose deﬁnition of extremism that can potentially be employed against any religious association that is viewed unfavorably by the state.21 It also gives state authorities the power to designate religious or other groups as extremist and outlaw their activities in the state. Other amendments to religious legislation required the registration of missionary activities in Kazakhstan and placed a ban on operations of unregistered religious groups.22 Unregistered missionary work became illegal in Kazakhstan and unregistered religious activities, including worship, were turned into administrative offenses (HRW 2008). The provisions of these laws provided legal grounds for the growing number of arrests of Islamic missionaries in Kazakhstan and the deportation of alien Muslims for illegal missionary work (Interfax 2007; Kazorina 2008). The law On Counteraction to Extremism was used to designate Hizb ut-Tahrir as an extremist religious group and to delegitimize all of its activities as well as membership in the organization. Kazakhstan became the last Central Asian state that outlawed this religious movement. Kazakhstan continued moving toward stricter regulation of religious organizations in 2007 and 2008. In 2007, the government of Kazakhstan put forth a new set of amendments to the legislation on religion, which envisioned the establishment of what could have become a licensing regime for religious groups. The amendments would have imposed a stringent registration procedure for the majority of religious organizations and severely restricted rights of small, unregistered religious communities. The registered religious groups would have come under the watchful eye of the state and local administrations, which would have been given full discretion in determining the speciﬁc circumstances and places

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for legitimate distribution of religious materials, and would have been charged with monitoring other activities of the religious groups (HRW 2008). The draft law was harshly criticized by human rights activists at home and abroad as well as by representatives of regional and international organizations. The government withdrew the draft law from the parliament a few months prior to the OSCE meeting that was scheduled to deliberate over Kazakhstan’s application for the chairmanship of the OSCE. The passage of the controversial law would have seriously jeopardized Kazakhstan’s chances at assuming leadership in the organization. After Astana secured its right to the chairmanship of the OSCE for 2010, the notorious bill resurfaced in Kazakhstan. In 2008, the draft law successfully passed through both chambers of the Kazakh parliament. It was a decision of Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Council declaring the restrictive provisions of the law unconstitutional that prevented this piece of legislation from entering into force (Bayram 2009). Kazakhstan’s resolve in the ﬁght against terrorism and religious extremism has been evidenced not only in harsher laws, but also in the growth of counterterrorism activities conducted by the Kazakh law enforcement and secret service forces, jointly with special purpose units from neighboring states. The volume of detentions and arrests of alleged terrorists and extremists has increased, and the clampdown on missionary work and activities of unrecognized Islamic groups has intensiﬁed.23 As in neighboring states, some of the harshest measures of the Kazakh authorities have been reserved for the members and supporters of Hizb utTahrir. Until the adoption of the law On Counteraction to Extremism, Kazakhstan lacked a legal basis for declaring Hizb ut-Tahrir an illegal organization and prosecuting its members. Despite these legal gaps, those afﬁliated with Hizb ut-Tahrir had been systematically detained for distribution of leaﬂets and other religious materials and charged with inciting social, religious, or other discord. The penalties were rather mild, compared with sanctions established by the courts of other Central Asian states, and limited to ﬁnes and short prison terms (HRW 2003; US Department of State: The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2004). Since 2005, the number of trials on charges of extremism and terrorism has been on the rise in Kazakhstan, and courts have been handing down severe sentences to the members of radical Islamic organizations (Saidazimova 2007). According to reports released by the press service of KNB, Kazakhstan’s secret service carried out investigations in 41criminal cases involving terrorism and extremism in 2008 (Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2009). The three largest trials of Hizb at-Tahrir activists that took place in 2008 involved 154 people, all of whom were sentenced to long prison terms (Mavloni 2009). According to estimates of human rights defenders, from 2007 to 2009, Kazakhstan’s government prosecuted and imprisoned about 700 individuals for their religious beliefs (Akkulyuly 2009). Human rights groups have been alarmed with the practices of Kazakhstan’s courts. The courts have routinely charged religious defendants with more and more severe crimes, ranging from terrorism and illegal possession of arms to

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participation in banned extremist or terrorist organizations (Interfax 2008). If earlier, the rank-and-ﬁle members of Islamist groups charged with organization of terrorist acts were sentenced to short prison terms (usually, 1 to 3 years in prison), recent court rulings signiﬁcantly increased the penalty for similar crimes.24 There have been cases of trials on charges of planning a terrorist act where defendants were sentenced to 19.5 years in prison. The majority of sentences for preparation of terrorist attacks have recently fallen within 9 to 12 years of imprisonment. Human rights defenders who monitor religious cases during their preliminary investigations and trials have called for increased international attention to procedural violations and other human rights breaches they have observed.25 According to activists of these human rights groups, trials of Muslims often lack any meaningful investigation. The accusations are typically based on fabricated evidence of membership in a terrorist group. Secret service and law enforcement agents are notorious for planting explosives, narcotics, religious literature, ammunition, and forged documents that they later conﬁscate, and using those “facts” as evidence in investigation and trials (HRW 2008). While in detention, terrorist suspects are often subjected to intimidation and physical abuse, and their court hearings are frequently held behind close doors (Mavloni 2009).26 Neither the public, the media, nor relatives of the defendants are allowed access to the trials. Therefore, Kazakhstan’s courts have often been immune to public oversight; this ampliﬁes the likelihood of passing unfair and politically motivated judgments. Even the 2005 decision of Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court has never been made public; it designated 11 international organizations as “terrorist” and banned their activities in the republic. The grounds for delegitimizing these religious groups and branding them “terrorist” remain unknown.27 Aside from numerous human rights violations committed during investigations and trials, Kazakhstan’s authorities have recently began engaging in the corrupt practice of prolonging the incarceration of imprisoned Muslims. To extend the prison terms, law enforcement ofﬁcials charge the felons with the persistent deﬁance of orders from the administration of a penitentiary institution.28 Some human rights activists maintain that this method has spread to Kazakhstan from neighboring Uzbekistan. This neighboring republic has employed this tactic for the continued incarceration of those Muslims who refuse to recant their religious practices and radical Islamic beliefs. Kazakhstan’s responses to the threat of terrorism and religious extremism have dovetailed the vigorous policies and measures espoused by Moscow, Tashkent, and Beijing. In Central Asia, Uzbekistan has been a champion of unprecedented counterterrorism measures aimed at suppressing radical Islam and terrorism. Tashkent launched its ﬁrst counterterrorism campaign in the wake of a series of bombings that shattered the Uzbek capital in 1999. Following the crackdown on religious activities by the Tashkent authorities in Uzbekistan, the Kazakh press published some reports containing alerts about the communities of Muslims of the Salaﬁ persuasion residing in the western Kazakh province on the border with Uzbekistan. Analysts link this discovery of Salaﬁsts by Kazakhstan’s secret service to the large-scale anti-religious and anti-extremist campaign launched

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by Uzbekistan (Ponomarev 2007). According to materials of Memorial, the most reputable regional NGO focusing on the violations of human rights in the territory of the former USSR,29 Kazakhstan’s authorities began persecuting Salaﬁsts in the fall of 1999, and subsequent years have seen several cases of illegal detention, harassment, and physical abuse of the members of this Salaﬁ group. The campaign against Islamists, whom the government dubbed “Wahhabists,” continues to this day (Ponomarev 2007). The Uzbek leadership has never exercised signiﬁcant inﬂuence over Kazakhstan, particularly in comparison to the amount of leverage that Tashkent has wielded over neighboring Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, even the Nazarbaev government has not been immune to Uzbekistan’s perilous impact. Uzbek security forces have been notorious for derisive comments about the incompetence of their Central Asian counterparts. Kazakhstan’s security forces have been compelled to expand security measures to demonstrate their preparedness in suppressing the trans-border Islamists’ movement in the territories adjoining the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. President Karimov has shot accusations at Kazakhstan calling the country a safe haven for extremists and a terrorist training ground. These allegation induced Kazakhstan into cooperation with Russia, China, and Central Asian neighbors in identifying and liquidating the alleged terrorist campgrounds. Following a series of explosions, suicide bombings, and attacks on police checkpoints in Uzbekistan in 2004, Kazakhstan provided wide-raging operational and investigative assistance to the Uzbek national security service and the Ministry of Interior in locating and prosecuting the alleged terrorists (UN Security Council 2004). In the fall of 2004, Kazakhstan’s KNB announced the arrest of several ethnic Kazakhs and Uzbeks from the Shymkent oblast of Kazakhstan, in connection with the Tashkent suicide bombings. After the discovery of Kazakh nationals implicated in suicide attacks in Tashkent, Kazakhstan’s authorities strengthened measures against radical Islamic groups and tightened control over religious practices, particularly in the republic’s south. Beginning in 2004, all imams in the South of Kazakhstan have been compelled to pass a compulsory re-attestation (Rotar 2005a). In the wake of the public announcement concerning the results of the investigation into the Tashkent bombings, all Uzbek imams in southern Kazakhstan came under renewed pressure of subordination to the state-backed Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan (Ponomarev and Jukeyeva 2002). In January 2005, hundreds of Muslims staged an unauthorized demonstration in Almaty in response to the measures of the Kazakh administration and to express discontent with the government’s religious policies. Following this event, the Kazakh security forces carried out a stream of arrests of the supposed members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which was accused of staging the unauthorized demonstration. Kazakh authorities began closely monitoring the Uzbek-populated areas of Kazakhstan (Omelicheva 2010). Arrests of members of banned organizations and the seizure of Islamists’ literature have become more pronounced in the south of the republic (Mukhametrakhimova 2006b). Uzbekistan’s counterterrorist approach has inﬂuenced Kazakhstan’s perspectives on terrorism and counterterrorism responses in other ways as well.

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Kazakhstan’s leadership, for example, following the example of Russia, China, and other members of the SCO, endorsed Uzbekistan’s representation of the unrest in Andijan in 2005. Not only did the Nazarbaev government attribute the incitement of unrest to radial Islamic groups recognized as terrorist organizations in Uzbekistan, but it also acknowledged the legitimacy and efﬁcacy of actions by the Uzbek security forces that quelled the uprising (RIA Novosti 2006a). During his visit to Tashkent, President Nazarbaev cordially praised his Uzbek counterpart for maintaining regional stability and protecting the peace of Uzbeks. Uzbekistan has been a stalwart supporter of regional initiatives to criminalize religious extremism. The government of President Karimov impelled other Central Asian states to pass counter-extremist laws for streamlining the process of Islamists’ extradition. In the past, calls for the extradition of people suspected of ties with extremist groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, caused many concerns in the neighboring states, including Kazakhstan, which lacked a legal basis for making decisions about the transfer of Islamists from one jurisdiction to another. The passage of counter-extremist legislation and the ban of radical Islamic groups removed legal barriers for Islamists’ extradition. In recent years, the Kazakh authorities have carried out requests from Russia, China, Uzbekistan, and other states to identify, arrest, and hand over to the respective nations wanted individuals on the grounds of their involvement in terrorist and extremist groups. Some Muslims were detained and extradited to neighboring nations despite their refugee status and other international protections (Saidazimova 2006). Human rights groups have publicized instances of abductions and forceful transfer of the alleged terrorists by Kazakh security forces to neighboring states. At the request of Beijing, Astana’s authorities have prosecuted Uighurs residing in Kazakhstan. The Islamic Party of East Turkestan has been designated as a terrorist organization, and all activities of this group have been banned in Kazakhstan. Ethnic Uighurs have been denied any access to the national asylum process, while representatives of this group have been under persistent risk of detention and deportation to China as illegal immigrants (AI 2004a). To conclude this section of the book, the counterterrorism policies of Uzbekistan, Russia, and China have inﬂuenced the Kazakh government’s views on appropriate methods of tackling the problem of radical Islam and terrorism at home and in the broader region. Uzbekistan’s authorities have applied persuasion and pressure on Kazakhstan to promote a counterterrorism strategy with punitive and forceful measures at its core; Russian and Chinese ofﬁcials have reinforced this position. Unfortunately, the United States has not used its leverage over Kazakhstan for promoting human rights practices in the republic. US legislation contains stipulations about the conditionality of American aid upon economic and political progress and adherence to human rights in the recipient states. Despite these legislative provisions, the listed requirements have not been stringently applied to Kazakhstan. US involvement in Central Asia has been propelled by its energy interests and security considerations. After the Uzbek leadership expelled American forces from their military base in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan has become the premier Central Asian partner of the US in its

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global war on terrorism. Already in 2004, the Bush administration certiﬁed that Kazakhstan had made signiﬁcant progress in the area of human rights and had met all human rights standards for American military assistance and other forms of assistance (HRW 2005c). As stated earlier, until recently, the United States, with its sullied human rights records, had served as a poor model for human rights practices in Kazakhstan. The European Union, an advocate and defender of the best human rights practices in Europe, has not become an external anchor for democratic processes in this republic. Despite recent changes in the depth and intensity of political dialogue between Central Asian states and Europe, the EU has not yet pursued a dialogue on human rights in its bilateral relations with Kazakhstan (Warkotsch 2008: 67). The 2010 chairmanship of the OSCE, the most prestigious post ever held by the post-Soviet nation, conferred on Kazakhstan certain obligations of conformance with democratic standards and principles of human rights. Before it assumed the 2010 leadership of OSCE, the Kazakh government vowed to cure its record of human rights violations. Regretfully, the country’s leadership has not met the OSCE’s expectations. Many fundamental rights, including the freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press are still circumscribed in Kazakhstan. The intensiﬁed counterterrorism campaign has been taking place in an atmosphere of increased hostility toward religious freedoms. In 2009, conﬁscations of religious materials, censorship of religious literature, and other forms of interference and restrictions of religious activities have been on the rise (HRW 2008). The government’s targeting of religion has culminated in a ban on using certain religious texts from the Quran. In July 2009, a Kazakh court declared some of its verses “extremist,” based on some unidentiﬁed mysterious expertise of the text. This decision was published on the website of the Ministry of Interior of Kazakhstan in September 2009. Kazakhstan has become the ﬁrst country with a predominantly Muslim population that outlawed the Holy Quran.

4

Conclusion

The collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed a ﬂood of religious activity in parts of Central Asia. Along with its moderate and traditional forms, radical and militant Islam has inﬁltrated communities of Muslims in the Central Asian states. During the past decade, religious extremism, including its extreme manifestations in the form of terrorist attacks and low-scale Islamic insurgency, has jeopardized the stability of several countries in the region. The governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have been determined to eliminate the threat of terrorism, which became associated with activities of radical Islamic groups in the region. The Karimov administration in Uzbekistan has taken the toughest stance on radical Islam, and has been notorious for markedly forceful counterterrorism responses and disregard for personal, religious, and political rights under the guise of counterterrorism. Similarly, the Tajik authorities have ratiﬁed a wide range of repressive measures aimed at deterring Islamists and suppressing the threat of terrorism in their republic. In Turkmenistan, the Ashgabat government has kept a tight grip over all religious and political activities, but its counterterrorism policy has recently intensiﬁed as well. Traditionally, the Kyrgyz and Kazakh governments exhibited a softer, more lenient approach toward radical Islam and evaluated the level of terrorist threat as moderate or low. In recent years, however, these states began sinking into an authoritarian zone and into the realm of repressive politics. Their counterterrorism responses have come to resemble the politics of neighboring states. Today, a concurrence of views on the nature of terrorist threats deﬁnes the position of Central Asian nations. Radical Islam and religious extremism are among the top security threats in these states. Terrorism is perceived as a serious long-term security risk in all countries of the Central Asian region. The US-led military campaign in Afghanistan that toppled the Taliban regime and destroyed Al-Qaeda strongholds also struck a serious blow to militant groups in the Central Asian states. In all Central Asian countries, militant Islam has been on the retreat. In spite of this, Central Asian public ofﬁcials, particularly authorities in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, have always insisted on the imminent danger of Islamist insurgency in their countries and in the broader region. The governments of these states have contended that the number of believers embracing the ideas of radical and militant Islam has been steadily rising in the Central Asian states.

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The threat of resurgence of the militant movements and further radicalization of Muslims in Central Asia continues to exist. There are, however, good reasons corroborated by ﬁeld research to assume that radical Islamic groups have limited capabilities in the region. According to a number of regional security experts, the threat of terrorism, religious extremism and Islamic insurgency in Central Asia is far less critical than ofﬁcially proclaimed. There are many factors that suggest that the majority of Central Asian Muslims have been inimical to radical ideas, and some parts of Central Asia, particularly Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, have been much less receptive to Islamism. Despite the unique characteristics of Islam in Central Asia and indicators of only low or moderate threats of terrorism, all Central Asian governments have been intensifying their security responses and stomping on a wide range of religious and political freedoms under the pretext of ﬁghting terrorism. What explains counterterrorism policies in Central Asia? Why have responses of Central Asian states grown more alike? How do we account for the convergence of the counterterrorism measures of the Central Asian nations and their policies targeting radical Islam? The goals of this study were to explain the counterterrorism policies of Central Asian states and to account for an observable tendency of their counterterrorism measures to grow more alike amid propensities for divergence. A better understanding of the factors that broaden the spectrum of governments’ responses to terrorism at the domestic and international levels is important because the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts depends on the range of counterterrorism policies adopted by the governments of individual states. It is also imperative to search for the causes of excessive and unlawful counterterrorism measures remiss in the area of human rights because the brutality with which governments respond to terrorism is itself an important predictor of future terrorist attacks (Koufa 2001). Examining the factors responsible for states’ choices of counterterrorism responses has far-reaching implications not only for our efforts at limiting the spread of the activities of terrorist organizations but also for our advances in stopping human rights violations committed under the guise of combating terrorism. Political science is replete with approaches that can be used for explaining countries’ behaviors, including governments’ activities in the area of counterterrorism, and even more theoretical models can be drawn from adjacent disciplines. A common assumption favored in academic, political, and media circles is that states’ responses to terrorism match the intensity of terrorist attacks and the material capabilities of states. This explanation derives from the Rationalist framework, a dominant approach within the discipline of international relations. I contend, however, that the magnitude of terrorist violence and states’ material capabilities provide insufﬁcient explanations for the counterterrorism policies of the Central Asian states. According to ofﬁcial accounts, neither Turkmenistan nor Kazakhstan has suffered from deadly terrorist incidents; yet, the governments of both states have endorsed vigorous counterterrorism measures. Throughout the 1990s, Tajikistan had taken the brunt of terrorist violence. Kyrgyzstan, too, has suffered from Islamic incursions. However, it

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is Uzbekistan that has systematically applied the most appalling methods of combating terrorism (from a human rights standpoint and in terms of the reliance on excessive use of force). The counterterrorism responses of the richest states of the region, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and those of the poorest nations, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, differ as well. A principle weakness of rationalist accounts of states’ counterterrorism policies is that they neglect the wider context of inter-state relations in which governments interpret the extent of terrorist threat and assess the effectiveness and acceptability of various counterterrorism measures. Constructivist theoretical frameworks that have become popular in the ﬁeld of international relations accentuate the impact of social forces and recognize the normative and socializing inﬂuence exerted by other states. Many constructivist approaches, however, fall short in enumerating the factors that make the counterterrorism positions of some states more attractive than the policies and responses of others (Omelicheva 2009b). Internationally, states operate in a number of social settings. Each international institution and global or regional power can be more or less actively involved in socializing other states into the behavioral modes of which it approves. Constructivist approaches have grappled with general explanations of differences in the pace and depth of the international socialization of target states (Checkel 2005).1 Contrary to other approaches that emphasize domestic determinants of states’ counterterrorism measures, this study developed a comprehensive theoretical framework in order to illuminate the impact of the international setting on governments’ perceptions of terrorism and their counterterrorism policies. Instead of assuming the primacy of states’ security needs, I interrogated and disaggregated states’ interests and goals, and examined them through the prism of history, existing political and geopolitical arrangements, and the socio-cultural milieu. As a reﬁnement to socialization approaches, this work systematized the mechanisms and scope conditions under which different types of social inﬂuence occur. The reference group theory presented in this book explicates how various groups of states and organizations to which states belong affect their understandings of security threats as well as their views on the legitimacy and effectiveness of solutions to security problems. Studies examining how and why states adopt new behavioral modes and roles typically privilege either a rational choice or socialization approach, and catalogue multifarious processes—bargaining, persuasion, teaching or learning—through which international socialization can take place (Zürn and Checkel 2005). The reference group perspective provides an integrative framework of normative, strategic and psychological sources of international inﬂuence. This is done on the assumption that it is by studying the interplay of strategic behavior with social and psychological forces that our understanding of how states transform their views and policies can be considerably improved. In a nutshell, the reference group approach postulates that states’ counterterrorism policies are strongly inﬂuenced by their social groups. The reference group is a perception-based social category describing a state or group of states, which

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policies, norms, and orientations serve as benchmarks for other states’ policy choices. Governments bring their policies in line with perspectives promoted by their social groups for value-expressive, utilitarian, and informational reasons. In the area of counterterrorism, for example, a state can choose to conform to counterterrorism policies and views on terrorism promoted by its reference group because of the perceived similarity of this state and its reference group on a number of important indicators and the ensuing liking of the group that motivates the state to identify with the group and be or become part of the group. The social group of state, which membership other states aspire to gain or maintain, is known as the normative reference group. A state can also modify its counterterrorism measures following its reference group in order to obtain material incentives (for instance, foreign policy and security assistance), or avoid sanctions (such as international criticism or isolation) mediated by the group. The group of states that is believed to have signiﬁcant resources that can be used for providing tangible awards or incurring material losses on other states to inﬂuence their counterterrorism policies is the utilitarian reference group. Finally, a state can emulate counterterrorism responses of its social groups when it has insufﬁcient information, experience, and expertise for devising and implementing effective counterterrorism policies. Alternatively, the government can look to the counterterrorism policy of its reference group for legitimating its own counterterrorism responses. The social group that possesses information that can be used by other states in drafting, enacting, and assessing their counterterrorism policies is known as the comparison reference group. A state can belong to several social groups of states, and the same group can perform different functions for its members. The reference group approach explains variations in the degree of impact of different reference groups on a state by looking at the nature and strength of its motivations and the ability of social groups to satisfy the state’s most salient needs. The book applied the reference group perspective for an in-depth analysis of counterterrorism policies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the two Central Asian states that have been least affected by terrorist violence and Islamism but chose to combat those threats vigorously.2 In each of the case studies, I identiﬁed the states’ reference groups, reviewed the groups’ counterterrorism policies, and assessed how counterterrorism measures adopted by reference groups affected Kyrgyzstan’s and Kazakhstan’s perspectives on terrorism and their counterterrorism responses. The study also examined the counterterrorism policies of neighboring states— Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Russia, and China, reviewed the US approach to homeland and global security, and explored counterterrorism measures of regional organizations, such as CIS, CSTO, and SCO. The social environment of Central Asian republics has been the major source of inﬂuence on their responses to threats of terrorism and religious extremism. The book attributed the convergence of the counterterrorism policies of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan with those of other Central Asian states to the growing salience of the same reference groups—Russia, China, Uzbekistan, and, to a lesser extent, the United States—in the politics of the Central Asian republics. The salience of these groups of states stemmed from their aptitude in responding to goals and needs of the ruling elites in Central Asia.

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Kyrgyzstan’s dependency on Russia, China, and other Central Asian states made it susceptible to the political inﬂuence of their administrations. A small, landlocked country with a narrowly specialized economy, Kyrgyzstan has been compelled to embrace the perspectives and policies promoted by these states. In Kyrgyzstan, the achievement of economic, political, and security goals has been conditioned by economic, political, and security assistance from Russia, as well as by cooperation with China and Central Asian states. To secure the beneﬁts arising from these multilateral and bilateral contacts, Kyrgyzstan adopted what its government perceived as these states’ perspective on terrorism and counterterrorism for manifestly utilitarian reasons. Throughout the brief history of Kyrgyzstan’s independence, Russia has also played normative and informational functions for the Kyrgyz elite. Kyrgyzstan’s susceptibility to the Kremlin’s inﬂuence stemmed from a “liking” for Russia developed on the basis of perceived historical, institutional, and value similarities and the rising image of Russia abroad. Moscow’s provision of moral support, political backing, and other privileges to Kyrgyzstan’s leadership has furthered the development of an expressive bond. The Kyrgyz government has deemed cooperation with Russia as beneﬁcial to the republic’s international standing. The country’s self-image has also improved through its participation in counterterrorism exercises and meetings of the Kremlin-led regional security groups. The Kyrgyz authorities have had a high opinion about the measures adopted within the CSTO and SCO frameworks, and these organizations have been viewed as the pioneers of security cooperation in the Central Asian region. Another reason for Kyrgyzstan’s emulation of the counterterrorism policies of its Central Asian neighbours and Russia was because these nations were the closest groups of states geographically. They have experienced common political, economic, and security problems as states in transition and have shared numerous aspects of political strategies, peoples’ mentality, and leadership styles inherited from the Soviet past. According to the reference group perspective, when a government is lacking complete and accurate information about effective means to combat the terrorist problem, it will likely resort to the knowledge provided by other states perceived as experienced in countering the threat of terrorism. The geographical proximity and a perceived similarity in the nature of threat, capabilities, and goals will strengthen the informational inﬂuence on the borrowing state. Kyrgyzstan’s political leadership experienced many uncertainties evaluating the risks of religious terrorism and extremism. It had very limited knowledge regarding the most effective ways to tackle the terrorist problem. It was not surprising to ﬁnd that the Kyrgyz authorities have looked at positions and practices of the states with better intelligence capabilities and experience in this area. Geographic proximity and a perceived similarity between Kyrgyzstan, Russia and other Central Asian nations made their counterterrorism policies a viable model for the Kyrgyz government to emulate. All in all, my analysis concluded that Russia, China, and Central Asian republics have exerted signiﬁcant impact on Kyrgyzstan’s position on terrorist threats as well as the republics’ responses aimed at combating terrorism. Under mounting

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pressure from the government of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan began treating all manifestations of unofﬁcial Islam as security threats associated with religious extremism and terrorism. Russian and Chinese ofﬁcials have only reinforced this position. Despite the limited evidence of the imminent threat of Islamic insurgency or terrorism in Kyrgyzstan, the republic’s authorities have been convinced that religious extremism and terrorism constitute the primary threats to state security. All counterterrorism efforts of Kyrgyzstan’s security forces have been directed toward the elimination of Islamists and suppression of activities of the radical Islamic groups in the state and in the broader region. Since Kyrgyzstan’s security has been intertwined with political stability and security in the broader Central Asian region, the Kyrgyz authorities have always been eager to take part in joint security initiatives with other Central Asian states. The Kyrgyz security forces have participated in joint exercises and training conducted under the auspices of regional security organizations. Kyrgyzstan’s representatives from the power ministries have played a part in regular meetings with representatives of security and military elites from Russia, China, and other Central Asian states. These interactions have also contributed to the convergence of views on the nature of risks to security in the Central Asian republics and to the harmonization of measures aimed at containing these risks. Through its membership in the CIS, CSTO, SCO, and other regional security arrangements, Kyrgyzstan translated measures underscored by Moscow, Beijing, and Tashkent into its domestic practices and laws. Various security agreements signed between Kyrgyzstan, Russia, China, and Central Asian states laid juridical grounds to demand that Bishkek take decisive steps to suppress the terrorist threat. Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism legislation has come to resemble provisions of Russia’s counterterrorism laws and the model legislation adopted within the CIS framework. The structure and mandates of Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism institutions have grown more similar to the functions of agencies established in Russia and other Central Asian states. Kyrgyzstan’s military and security services have been ascribed the primary role in counteracting the threat of religious extremism and combating terrorism. The counterterrorism operations, clampdowns on Islamist groups, and liquidations of terrorist cells have also been carried out parallel to similar actions enacted by Russia, China, and other Central Asian states. The punitive and military aspects of the struggle against terrorism have been brought to the fore of Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism program, as has been the case with the counterterrorism policies of neighbouring republics. The counterterrorism practices of Kyrgyzstan’s reference groups reinforced the republic’s belief in the application of force as the most effective approach to protecting the country’s security. The government of the Kyrgyz republic has looked to repressive measures employed by the Kremlin, Beijing, and Tashkent for legitimizing its own increasingly violent stance on counterterrorism. Kyrgyzstan’s authorities have been largely immune to sanctions from their reference groups for encroaching on human rights in the name of combating terror. The perceived vindication of Kyrgyzstan’s leadership for violations of individuals’ freedoms has been another factor in the intensiﬁcation of counterterrorism measures in this state.

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Moscow’s inﬂuence over Bishkek has waxed and waned, dying down during the Yeltsin era and waxing steadily since Putin took power into his hands. Yet, Russia’s bearing on the Kyrgyz republic has never been commensurate to, for example, the EU’s and NATO’s impact on the countries of East and Central Europe. Russia’s own foreign policy has prevented the Kremlin from gaining a stronger footing in this Central Asian state. On the one hand, the Russian leadership has always been more interested in pursuing Moscow’s own interests in the Central Asian region than promoting regional goals or addressing concerns of its individual states. On the other hand, the activities of other world players in the region—the United States, NATO, and China among others—counteracted Russia’s inﬂuence in Central Asia. Security cooperation with the United States, NATO, and other states and international organizations has been very beneﬁcial for the Kyrgyz republic. The Kyrgyz government has taken advantage of various forms of security assistance from the West to secure its borders, to boost its military capabilities, to strengthen control of illegal trafﬁcking in arms, drugs, and persons, and for other aims. Counterterrorism assistance from international donors has been dispensed for a limited number of small-scale projects. Therefore, it has also been insufﬁcient for strengthening prophylactic measures and developing the preventive aspects of a counterterrorism program in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, the counterterrorism initiatives of the United States and NATO in the Central Asian region not only, at times, complemented the counterterrorism projects implemented by Russia, but also reinforced a position accentuating forceful responses in combating terrorism. After 9/11, US counterterrorism policy, particularly its foreign policy dimension, has become increasingly military in nature. The war model has assumed a central and permanent place in counterterrorism rhetoric and in the practices of the United States (Crelinsten and Schmid 2006: 261). The US administration has placed a high premium on military force in uprooting the international terrorist network; military training, procurement of equipment, and other forms of security aid have been brought to the forefront of counterterrorism cooperation with foreign states. Similarly, China has embraced the military model of terrorism counteraction, manifested in joint counterterrorism exercises and military drills with other SCO states and reliance on the use of force in suppressing the threat of terrorism at home. The positions of Russia, China, and Central Asian states on terrorism and counterterrorism have also inﬂuenced the Kazakh government’s views on the terrorist problem and ways of tackling it. Similarly to Kyrgyzstan’s authorities, Kazakhstan’s leadership has been clearly oriented to Moscow. Close political, economic, and security ties with the Russian state have been an essential dimension of Kazakhstan’s strategic doctrine. The Nazarbaev administration enacted political and security strategies similar to those adopted in Moscow out of pragmatic considerations. The country’s dependence on Russia for transportation of primary export commodities—oil and gas—to European consumers exposed it to Russia’s power games. Although Kazakhstan has been better connected with the global market than any other Central Asian neighbor, Russia continues to occupy

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an important position in Kazakhstan’s economic relations and foreign trade. Russia has also served as the only guarantor of Kazakhstan’s security and the stability of its ruling elite. The study also found that Kazakhstan and Russia have been tied by much more than bilateral trade and pipelines. Kazakhstan has been more integrated with Russia than any other post-Soviet country, based on cultural and linguistic factors and perceptions of belonging to the same Eurasian space. Kazakh elites share an expressive bond with Moscow, and Russia has served as the republic’s normative reference group. In addition, the contiguous and interacting economies of Kazakhstan and Central Asian neighbors, shared infrastructure systems that must be maintained jointly, and common security threats compelled the Kazakh administration to coordinate its policies with those of other republics in the region. As discussed in chapter three of the book, for nearly two decades, Kazakhstan has been untouched by terrorist violence, according to statements of its public ofﬁcials, who throughout the 1990s had shrugged off the problem of terrorism in their state. Neither has the republic suffered from Islamists’ incursions.3 The views of Kazakhstan’s public have coincided with the ofﬁcial assessment of terrorist risks, and only a very small percentage of the Kazakh population regard terrorism as a national threat. The present analysis found that it was not until Russia, China, and Uzbekistan brought the issue of terrorism to the fore of their security policies that the Kazakh administration began tackling the threat of terrorism. The post-9/11 counterterrorism responses of the United States and NATO have reinforced the position of Kazakhstan’s neighbors. Kazakhstan’s stance toward terrorism and religious extremism has begun corresponding to attitudes exhibited by these nations. Through intensiﬁed multilateral and bilateral contact and participation in regional security arrangements, Kazakhstan translated into its domestic legislation and practices counterterrorism measures promoted by its reference groups. Similarly to counterterrorism practices of Russia, China, and neighboring states, Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism policy has become unbalanced in favor of punitive responses at the expense of prophylactic measures and the systematic analysis of risks. Kazakhstan’s authorities, who used to be known for a milder and more conciliatory approach to the extremist problem, began prioritizing forceful methods in the struggle against terrorism and religious extremism. The recent predisposition of the Kazakh administration toward military tactics has been largely consistent with the priorities of American security programs abroad. Under the pressure of Uzbekistan and China, the Kazakh government intensiﬁed prosecution of Islamists and became implicated in an increasing number of human rights violations in the name of the ﬁght against terrorism. Since human rights considerations were a rather low priority in counterterrorism policies among all of Kazakhstan’s reference groups, the Kazakh authorities have been devoid of any stimulus for meeting human rights obligations in the context of a war against terrorism. Both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have belonged to the same reference groups for similar reasons. For both states, Russia, China, other Central Asian neighbors, as well as the United States and NATO, have served as utilitarian, normative,

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and comparison reference groups, whose inﬂuence stemmed from their ability to satisfy the states’ instrumental, expressive, and informational goals. The salience of those reference groups, or their ability to inﬂuence foreign policy and domestic politics in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, have somewhat differed. In both states, Russia has exerted the strongest utilitarian impact. In the instance of Kazakhstan, however, Moscow has wielded less of a sway over Astana than Bishkek. Kazakhstan has been less economically dependent on Moscow and better connected to the outside world than Bishkek. This, in turn, has given the republic more room to maneuver between Moscow, Beijing, and Washington. Russia has also been the only normative reference group for Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Political elites of both states have always strongly identiﬁed with Russia because of the perceived similarity of a number of important attributes that increased afﬁnity between the states, along with the expressed acceptance of the republics as belonging to the same “social circle” by public authorities in Moscow. Because the normative, utilitarian, and comparison reference groups of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan coincided in Russia, it was rather unproblematic for the leadership of these states to translate and internalize norms, values, perspectives, and policies promoted by Russia and the Russian-led regional organizations into their foreign and domestic policies and programs. Particularly, in the area of security, where the Kremlin has held the prerogative over all other major players in the region, the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have followed their primary reference group’s counterterrorism policies and adopted its views on the nature and levels of terrorist threat. Adopting a reference group’s policy for value-expressive reasons translates into the internalization of the group’s norms. A state will continue to conform to the reference group’s normative and policy guidelines even in the absence of sanctions for non-compliance with the group’s norms. Conformance with the group’s expectations stems naturally from the state’s self-concept, as created through its interactions with the social world. Both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have brought their policies and behavior in line with what they perceived as the expectations of Russia because identiﬁcation with Moscow was consistent with and beneﬁcial to their self-concepts. Because the adoption of Russian counterterrorism policies has occurred for not only pragmatic, but also value-expressive reasons, it can be expected that both states’ counterterrorism measures will continue to bear a strong mark of Moscow’s responses to combating the terrorist threat. Both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan will continue contributing to Russia’s security efforts in Central Asia and will remain active participants of Russian-led counterterrorism campaigns. It will be difﬁcult to bring about changes in Kyrgyzstan’s and Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism policies because they have a strong foundation not only in Moscow’s security assistance and political support, but also in historical ties, shared values, similar mentalities, and institutional arrangements. This is not, however, to suggest that Kyrgyzstan’s and Kazakhstan’s approaches to the terrorist problem are unamenable to change. Since at the present moment Russia has signiﬁcant clout in the politics of both nations, Kyrgyzstan’s and Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism policies can be modiﬁed by stimulating changes

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in the counterterrorism policy of the Russian Federation. Central Asian states’ commitment to human rights and freedoms can be induced through their primary reference group. Instead of isolating the regional security organizations championed by Russia, both the United States and NATO should expand cooperation with Moscow and the Kremlin-led CSTO. Instead of treating the SCO as an emerging threat to American power abroad, the world community should seek to engage this group. The Northern Alliance can sign a common security strategy with Russia and formalize its relations with the CSTO. Not only will this set a viable foundation for future cooperation on security matters between NATO and Russia, it will also create an opportunity for the US to obtain an observer status in the SCO. Greater engagement with the United Staes and NATO will lead to modernization of Russian-led security organizations. Russia’s fears of being supplanted as a major player in the Central Asia states can also be dispelled through joint undertakings with the United States and NATO. To change human rights practices in the context of counterterrorism operations in Russia and other Central Asian states, both the United States and NATO will have to place human rights principles at the core of their counterterrorism programs. Although Russia has been the only normative reference group for Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, these republics have expressed discontent with the lack of genuine equality and partnership in their relations with Moscow. Fears of the hegemonic aspirations of the Kremlin have further attenuated the commitments of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to Russia as a normative reference group. Russia is still the most important player in the Central Asian geopolitical arena, but it is not the only one. Moscow’s authority among the regional elites is not sacrosanct, and its relations with some Central Asian states are increasingly built on pragmatism, rather than ideological and expressive bases. The weakness of expressive bonds between Russia and Central Asian nations and the splitting of utilitarian inﬂuence between Moscow, Washington, and Beijing explains some of the inconsistencies in Kyrgyzstan’s and Kazakhstan’s following of Russian expectations in the area of counterterrorism policies as well as other policy realms. Kazakhstan, for example, has long been pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy orientation, contriving ways of taking advantage from cooperation with Russia, China, the US, and other states. Kyrgyzstan continues to host a US air base at the Manas airport, which was renamed into a cargo transit center, despite the protestations of Moscow against the American presence in Central Asian states. Therefore, another approach to altering the counterterrorism policies of Astana and Bishkek is to convince the leadership of these Central Asian states that an alternative to the Russian reference group would bring them more beneﬁts for compliance (or incur more costs for non-compliance). An efﬁcacy of this approach could be evidenced in the circumstances of Kazakhstan’s application for chairmanship of the OSCE. In recent years, both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have demonstrated a strong predisposition toward forceful counterterrorism policies and low regard for meeting their commitments to human rights in the context of ﬁghting terrorism. However, the Kazakh government acceded to some of the Western states’ expectations concerning human rights (if only for a short period of time), when it was

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eager to secure the leadership position in a prestigious international organization. Chairmanship of the OSCE was viewed as an important national project by the Kazakh administration and people. It would have elevated the republic’s international standing and satisﬁed its need for enhanced international status and respect. To accomplish this goal, the Kazakh authorities rescinded national legislation what would have impinged on religious freedoms and moderated some practices in the realm of counterterrorism. All this was done for expressly utilitarian reasons: to secure the leadership of the OSCE for 2009 (and, later, for 2010). As soon as the threat of sanctions (rejection of the chairmanship’s application) dissipated, Kazakhstan began moving away from its promises of democratic changes and avowed commitments to human rights. Returning to the argument delivered above, a greater attention to human rights and individual freedoms can be induced in the Central Asian republics through more signiﬁcant “punishments” and “rewards” than those delivered by Russia. At present, however, no other state or group of states has the same vested interests in Central Asia as Russia, and has the motivation and capacity to serve as a guarantor of security and stability in the Central Asian states. If the Obama administration signiﬁcantly increases funds to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and the European Union proceeds with deeper engagement in Central Asia, Russian utilitarian inﬂuence over the governments of these states may decrease, opening up a window of opportunity for introducing changes in their approaches to the terrorist problem. Both the Brussels leadership and the US administration should use this opportunity for inﬂuencing the human rights practices in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Aggressive democratization was one of the foreign policy pillars of the Clinton and Bush administrations. US ofﬁcials put pressure on Central Asian states, particularly the Akaev and Nazarbaev regimes, to cultivate civil society and foster political pluralism. The leadership of these nations was expected to show steady support for political and media freedoms (Institute for Public Policy 2008b). US attempts at promoting democracy abroad were shored up by the policy of “carrots” and “sticks.” The US administration also relied on bargaining strategies (negotiations of beneﬁts and costs) for bringing about the desired behavioral changes. This coercive approach toward the projection of democratic norms abroad quickly went wrong. Inducing political changes through various forms of assistance to local civil society groups or funding activities of the regimes’ opposition incited local resistance. The ruling elites became anxious over American intrusions perceived as precursors to staging revolts that would bring into power new pro-Western administrations. In response to American meddling in the internal affairs of Central Asian states, their political leadership coalesced around the Kremlin. The Russian authorities vowed to help these regimes to survive challenges posed by local opposition. They also assured the states that Russia would stay by their side in order to defy Western pressures for democratization and liberalization. Human rights and democratic reforms had never been stricken off the foreign policy agenda of the Bush administration. For president Bush, the lack of political freedoms and the frailty of democratic institutions and norms were the root causes of terrorism and other security problems. In practice, this ideological slant

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in foreign policy of the US administration had resulted in foreign policy tensions: the US government had to balance competing priorities of ﬁghting the war on terrorism with pursuing democratization. Over time the American government’s position on promoting democracy abroad has changed from one expecting swift outcomes based on quick institutional reform to recognition that a democratic transition is a complex process demanding a long-term commitment and substantial ﬁnancial investments. Furthermore, the focus of the American administration’s foreign policy began shifting from liberalization and political reforms to energy, security, and economic cooperation (Laumulin 2007b). The foreign and security policy of the Obama administration has so far differed from the approach of president George W. Bush not only in its attempt to dissipate the Islamophobia inadvertently created by the previous administration, but also in its novel approach to the problems of human rights and the democratization of states in the Central Asian region (Kucera 2009). “The gist of these new approaches,” explained Richard Norland, the US ambassador to Uzbekistan, “lies in the fact that it is counter-productive to impose values on other nations. It is crucial to be a good example for others to follow while defending democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech and religion as a set of values important to all” (Golovnina 2009). What follows from these observations is that changes in nations’ behavior based on strategic calculation are almost never enduring and deep. The directions and content of states’ policies will change once the system of incentives is changed (when the threat of punishments fades away, and rewards get paid). This is an important explanation for why the mere conditionality of steadfast commitment to democratic reforms and human freedoms for the receipt of foreign assistance will be incapable of bringing about a viable solution to authoritarian problems in Central Asian states if it is employed in isolation from other methods for altering politics and behavior of the republics in the Central Asian region. Complex learning,4 teaching by example and persuasion concerning the legitimacy and appropriateness of the advocated norms are deemed to be superior approaches for stimulating long-lasting and sustainable changes in states’ behavior (Warkotsch 2008). In practical terms, for example, for any positive changes in human rights practices to occur in the context of counterterrorism, signiﬁcantly more attention should be dedicated to teaching foreign soldiers how to succeed in counterterrorism operations without compromising the principles of human rights in the American IMET programs. Teaching and learning approaches and persuasion methods, however, should be buttressed by a deeper awareness of institutional weaknesses characterizing states of Central Asia and the peculiarities of neo-patrimonialism. Central Asian republics are not “modern” states in the Weberian sense of the term, denoting legal–rational entities with well-functioning bureaucracies, a system of formal rules, and a clear dividing line between public and private realms (Weber 1964).5 The countries of Central Asia are so-called “neo-patrimonial” states in which legal–rational and traditional institutions are tightly intertwined (Eisenstadt 1973; Ilkhamov 2007). Although the authority in these states is still

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exercised through informal networks of clannish, tribal, and regional interests, the Western approach to Central Asia has been informed by an implicit assumption that they are dealing with modern states. The policies of Washington and Brussels have almost exclusively focused on advocating for free and fair elections, building civil society, and nurturing independent media, while political and social realities in the Central Asian republics have been largely overlooked. The West has failed to take into account the fact that modern political institutions are either weak or non-existent across Central Asia and that professional staff is either altogether missing or insufﬁciently trained and underpaid. The democratic opposition is absolutely absent in Turkmenistan and is in the process of formation in Uzbekistan. It is in the midst of a deep political conﬂict in Tajikistan, and too weak and fragmented in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. More efforts, therefore, should be expended on building modern political institutions, particularly, parliaments in these states, and developing their modern bureaucracies and professional staff in the newly created institutions. Knowledge of the socio-political foundations of order in the region should inform any foreign policy approach to Central Asia. For any socialization method to work, particularly if it centers on the persuasion process, it must resonate with the preexisting beliefs and worldviews of the Central Asian nations. The reference group perspective concedes that the deep and enduring impact of normative reference groups depends on affect, while the likeness of reference groups is determined by perceived similarities of important political and social characteristics of the group and its members. The afﬁnity of the reference group will increase its trustworthiness for the members of the group, and trustworthiness, in turn, will enhance the effectiveness of transposition of the reference group’s norms and ideas. Therefore, the successful socialization of Central Asian republics into desirable modes of behavior through persuasion and political dialogue will depend on how the advocated ideas tally with the existing collective understandings in these states. A better “ﬁt” can be attained by introducing some changes in the presentation and framing of the projected norms and ideas. It has been noted, for example, that, historically, the legal tradition and principles of administrative accountability have been a part of the socio-political order of the Inner Asian Khanates. A persuasion tactic that utilizes this historical link and emphasizes governmental accountability instead of the loaded notion of democracy or the separation of powers (which are alien concepts to Central Asian peoples) will likely be perceived as more legitimate and, therefore, respected. The credibility of Western initiatives in the Central Asian states will also increase if they avoid advocating for processes that threaten the political survival of governing regimes (Warkotsch 2008: 69). A persuasive, yet unthreatening message should be delivered consistently and over a reasonably long period of time. The policy of socialization through persuasion will necessitate a long-term commitment, a large amount of work, and possibly require a change of generations in Central Asian nations since the modern day ruling elite carry deeply ingrained beliefs that are incompatible with the policies promoted through socialization.

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This study has illuminated a number of other important conclusions and areas for future research. Scholarly interest in the question of how and why polities adopt policies and develop new patterns of behavior has never waned resulting in a thriving literature on policy transfer, diffusion, and convergence. Most of this research, however, has focused on analyses of the export of “good” norms, the adoption of successful policies, and the spread of innovations. This book concurs with these earlier works in stressing the inﬂuence of an international environment on policies and politics of individual nations. What makes this analysis different from previous lines of research is its attribution of the ﬂaws and deﬁciencies of states’ counterterrorism policies not only to their domestic circumstances, but also to international impact on these nations. A central theme of this book is that decisively non-progressive and forceful counterterrorism policies can converge, and the outcomes of adopting perspectives and practices favored by other nations can be damaging to the countries’ security situation. The study, for example, demonstrated how a wave of global Islamophobia has engulfed the Central Asian states, resulting in a hypertrophied assessment of extremist and terrorist danger. This is despite the fact that the face of Islam is unique in the Central Asian states and deﬁned by moderate Islamic beliefs connected to social practices, rituals, and traditions. The threat of terrorism and religious extremism persists in Central Asian states, but the magnitude of this threat has been exaggerated through discourse and interactions of these states among themselves as well as with other nations. As a result, all Central Asian governments, even the leadership of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, began equating moderate Islamic believers and extremists, as well as Islamist beliefs and activities of radical Islamic groups. The blank association of Islamism with extremism and terrorism makes it difﬁcult to tackle this complex problem in a sensible manner. It perpetuates a heavy-handed approach that is unbalanced and favors punitive counterterrorism responses and policies fraught with the excessive use of force. Human rights activists and international organizations have indicated that the context of the war on terrorism can provide a golden opportunity for undemocratic regimes to curb political opposition. The book made available several illustrative examples that are largely supportive of the human rights agencies’ claim. Repeatedly, Central Asian republics have stuck the “terrorist” tag on Muslim associations regarded as dangerous by their governments or by the governments in neighboring states. The work of the SCO and CIS on common lists of terrorist groups and individuals implicated in ties with terrorist organizations has devolved into a kind of “political trade.” Public authorities of the individual CIS and SCO countries engage into bargaining over who should be labeled as “terrorist” and “extremist” as a way to bring back to their countries political opponents in exchange for having the terrorist label attached to dissidents sought by other states (Borogan 2007). Both the Kazakh and Kyrgyz governments have taken advantage of the rhetoric of the growing threat of terrorism and religious extremism for their own interests: to put increasing pressure on democratic and religious opposition and to fortify the power of the ruling elites.

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To reiterate, this is not to suggest that Islamist danger and terrorist threat are non-existent in the Central Asian region. The risks of terrorism and extremism in the Central Asian states remain. Furthermore, these risks are becoming increasingly difﬁcult to tackle and hard to detect due to changes in the structure of global terrorist networks. In Western states that are also experiencing the terrorist problem, there is a robust civil society, which exercises public oversight on the activities of public administrations. A system of checks and balances and other democratic institutions can prevent the abuse of authority by governments of democratic states. None of this exists in the political infrastructure of Central Asian republics. That is why there is always a danger that the authoritarian governments in Central Asia are exploiting the context of the war on terrorism for strengthening their authority and stiﬂing political pluralism. And yet, state repression is often counterproductive in restraining terror. It has been shown, for example, that those states where practices conform to principles enshrined in the UN Charter are least likely to be affected by terrorism (Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 2001). Although preemptive and targeted state repression may reduce political violence and diminish the level of popular support for Islamist groups, the disproportionate measures employed by governments contending against Islamist movements can cause a backlash among moderate Islamic groups. As the level of violence employed by the state escalates to the point that it becomes indiscriminate and reactive, violent dissent by radical Islamic groups will increase. Blanket repression will serve as a catalyst for increased public support of the Islamist opposition (Hafez 2003). Outbreaks of violence in the Central Asian region suggest that the excessively forceful counterterrorism strategy employed by the governments of these states has been ineffective in curbing the spread of radical ideas or reducing the threat of terrorism. The governments’ repression against the alleged terrorists might have served as a temporal deterrent that drove some Islamists underground. Yet, over time, vigorous region-wide crackdowns on radical Islam have resulted in more militancy. The spread of repressive measures on Muslims practicing their faith outside of religious conﬁnes established by Central Asian states generated widespread sympathy for the oppressed in the broader population (Omelicheva 2010). Instead of addressing the root causes of terrorism and Islamic radicalization, such as poverty, unemployment and endemic corruption, the governments of the Central Asian states resorted to heavy-handed methods, thus raising the risk of pushing more moderate Muslims toward violence and radicalism (ICG 2009). To neutralize the threat of radical Islam, the Central Asian governments need to explore alternative paths. Socio-economic and political reforms that will improve people’s lives are necessary conditions for the achievement of social harmony in the Central Asian republics. The governments of the Central Asian states should develop and enact measures that will assist the ruling elites in gaining support of moderate Islamic groups and those Islamists who are open to a dialogue with state ofﬁcials.

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People often become members of radical Islamic groupings in order to gain a sense of identity and belonging and to ﬁnd solutions for day-to-day problems of the state and society they live in. To thwart radical groups’ attempts at gaining large-scale support among moderate Muslims, governments have to turn to addressing the root causes of extremism and terrorism that can be found in commonplace failings caused by corruption, low standards of living, lack of opportunities, and authoritarianism. Counterterrorism policies should be based on a more systematic approach, including political, informational, socio-economic, legal, and other responses to the threat of terrorism. Preventive and prophylactic measures of counteraction to the terrorist problem should be given a priority in the counterterrorism program. Repressive tactics against communities of moderate Muslims are counterproductive and should be avoided at all cost. The use of counterterrorist and counter-extremist operations as a pretext for suppressing dissent or strengthening the power of the governing regimes is an unacceptable move that will stir up hostility toward the ruling elites rather than lay the foundation for stability in the region (Omelicheva 2010). State-imposed religious controls and strictures on media freedom are encouraging a turn to Islamism, which continues to ﬁll in the informational and ideological vacuum created following the Soviet demise. New legislative measures adopted by each of the Central Asian states with the aim of combating terrorism and religious extremism repel local and national media from any serious discussion or in-depth coverage of religious topics. Instead of stiﬂing religious freedom and limiting discussion of issues related to faith, the Central Asian governments need to promote extensive religious and spiritual education, encourage dialogue within Islam, and support the expansion of critical coverage of religious issues by broadcasting organizations. One of the most effective strategies for coping with the growth of radical Islamic movements and the politicization of Islam is through enlisting the assistance of competent theologians at the local and national levels. For this to happen, the ofﬁcial Islamic clergy should expand its educational, ideological, and informational work with the population to improve its reputation, increase trust, and foster people’s beliefs that it possesses sufﬁcient religious knowledge (Omelicheva 2010). In terms of theoretical implications, there are multiple avenues for developing the reference group theory further, extending its empirical reach outside of the Central Asian space, and applying the framework to other areas of states’ policies and behavior. In the instances of Kyrgyzstan’s and Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism policies, the locus of normative, utilitarian, and informational inﬂuence coincided in the same groups of states. The counterterrorism measures of Russia, China, other Central Asian republics, and, to a certain extent, of the United States, have been complementary in nature. Therefore, it has been largely unproblematic for the Kyrgyz and Kazakh authorities to implement counterterrorism legislation, establish necessary institutions, and adopt other measures promoted by these groups of states in the realm of counterterrorism. A greater empirical challenge would be to study those cases where the seat of the normative and utilitarian inﬂuence is split among several groups of states, and where different social

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groups put forth conﬂicting expectations on their members’ behavior. Another direction for future research is to further investigate the mechanisms and scope conditions under which a shift takes place from behavioral compliance based on a cost–beneﬁt calculation to normative conformance based on the internalization of groups’ norms. The logical range of possible internationalization of norms and subsequent changes in states’ identities also needs more elaboration and investigation (Omelicheva 2009b).

Notes

Introduction 1 From a cultural standpoint, the boundaries of Central Asia are often extended to encompass the northwestern parts of Pakistan, the western territory of China concomitant with the autonomous region of Xinjiang, and Afghanistan. Historically, Central Asia had been known under different names used in the Soviet Union, such as “Middle Asia” or “Inner Asia,” and Kazakhstan used to be excluded from “Central Asia” (Kangas 2004). 1

A reference group perspective on state behavior 1 According to research of social psychologists and ﬁndings of experimental studies, individuals have a natural need for high self-esteem, and this need translates into the realm of states (Curley 2009: 651).

2

Kyrgyzstan’s counterterrorism policy

1 Most of the Kyrgyz were converted to the Sunni branch of Islam by the end of the nineteenth century. 2 A recent survey of youth in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, found that more than 75 percent of respondents never or rarely attend a mosque, and more than half of the survey participants never recite Namaz (Malikov 2008: 6). 3 Data for the case study come from a great variety of print and electronic sources (in English and Russian); these sources monitor political and security trends and events in Central Asia, as well as broadcast speeches and statements of Central Asian political elites and world leaders. I also examined the 1991–98 print editions of Slovo Kirgizstana during archival work at the National Library of Russia (St. Petersburg, Russia). Since its establishment in 1925, this national newspaper has been publishing edicts of the republic’s presidents, government resolutions, laws, and articles on politics, economic, culture, and social affairs. Additionally, I carried out a series of unstructured interviews with security experts and representatives of human rights organizations in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in summer 2008. 4 These are the views expressed by political experts and governmental representatives who participated in a roundtable discussion of topical issues of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy held on December 21 2005 at the Institute of Public Policy, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (Institute for Public Policy 2005). 5 For instance, when Islamists took hostages in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan’s Osh oblast in 1999, the Kyrgyz government requested Russia’s military support. The Moscow government was unable to provide assistance at the time since the Russian military troops were in the midst of the military campaign in Chechnya.

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6 A statement of Jeenbek Kulubaev, Deputy Executive Secretary of the SCO, expressed during the roundtable on cooperation between China and Kyrgyzstan after the republic’s “Tulip Revolution” held on May 25 2006 at the Institute of Public Policy, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (Institute of Public Policy 2006a). 7 Results of the survey were presented by Muratbek Imanaliev, President of the Institute for Public Policy, during a roundtable discussion on the topic of cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Russia held on June 9 2006 at the Institute for Public Policy, Bishkek (Institute for Public Policy 2006b). 8 See the discussion of Kyrgyz/Chinese relations during the roundtable on cooperation between China and Kyrgyzstan held on May 25 2006 in Bishkek (Institute for Public Policy 2006a). 9 Estimates of Kuban Omuraliev, independent expert, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, delivered during the roundtable discussion on the main results of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy held on December 24 2008 in Bishkek (Institute for Public Policy 2008b). 10 In some English translations, this law is also known as the act On the Fight Against Terrorism and the act On Fighting Terrorism. It should be noted that the earliest version of the law On Combating Terrorism in Russia appeared in 1993. It was largely envisioned as an instrument for suppressing hijacking incidents. After the beginning of the ﬁrst war in Chechnya, Russian legislators extended their work on the counterterrorism law. 11 Among other agencies that take part in the ﬁght against terrorism in Russia are the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Federal Protection Service, the Defense Ministry, and the Federal Border Service, among others. 12 Uzbekistan’s reports on counterterrorism policies S/2002/4 (January 2 2002), S/2002/974 (August 27 2002) and S/2003/4 (August 25 2003) submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Available at www.un.org/sc/ctc/countryreports/Creports.shtml (accessed December 21 2009). 13 Tajikistan’s reports on counterterrorism policies S/2002/358 (April 2 2002) and S/2003/147 (February 4 2003) submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Available at www.un.org/ sc/ctc/countryreports/Creports.shtml (accessed December 21 2009). 14 Kazakhstan’s reports on counterterrorism policies S/2001/1307 (December 26 2001), S/2002/1087 (September 17 2002), S/2003/862 (September 5 2003) and S/2005/658 (August 4 2004) submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Available at www. un.org/sc/ctc/countryreports/Creports.shtml (accessed December 21 2009). 15 For more information on US counterterrorism policy see, for example, Yonah and Kraft (2008). 16 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001. 17 Kyrgyzstan’s reports on counterterrorism policies S/2002/204 (March 4 2002), S/2003/776 (July 22 2003) and S/2004/660 (August 10 2004) submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Available at www.un.org/sc/ctc/countryreports/Creports.shtml (accessed December 21 2009). 18 The Uzbek government evicted the US forces from its military based in 2005 following the row between the United States and Uzbekistan over the consequences of the Andijan massacre of 2005. 3

Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism policy 1 There are important regional differences in the religious make-up of Kazakhstan. For historical reasons, Islam is more widespread in the southern and western regions of

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Notes

Kazakhstan. In the north and east of the country, fewer people identify with the religion of Islam. Data for the case study comes from a variety of primary and secondary, print and electronic sources (in English and Russian) that monitor political and security trends and events in Central Asia. I systematically examined all available periodicals, newspapers, and magazines available through the East View database pertinent to the topic of foreign and security policies of Kazakhstan. The East View database is the largest provider of credible, in-depth information on China, Russia and the former USSR and encompasses thousands of current journals, newspapers, governmental publications, military and security periodicals, social sciences and humanities journals, and news wire reports from the region. Additionally, I carried out a series of unstructured interviews with representatives of Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Presidential Administration, and Parliament, and activists from human rights organizations and religious groups in Astana, Kazakhstan, in summer 2009. Despite an avowed commitment to democratic principles and the rule of law, most of the DCK members’ participation in politics has been driven by economic interests. Nazarbaev’s Nur Otan party won every elected seat in the 2007 parliamentary elections, giving what had already been a compliant legislature the appearance of a rubberstamp body. All but three former Soviet Union republics initially joined the CIS. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania opted out of membership in this regional organization. This conclusion was reached in all of the interviews that the author conducted with Kazakhstan’s public ofﬁcials. From the interview with Mr. Bulat Sultanov, President of the Kazakh Institute of Strategic Studies, March 2 2009. Today Russia controls 87 percent of the Kazakh oil transported through the Russian pipeline system (Tomberg 2007). The EU has also tried to reach out to Central Asia indirectly through NATO and OSCE (Laumulin 2007a: 150). MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database. A Comprehensive Databank of Global Terrorist Incidents and Organizations. The database was available at www.tkb.org/Home.jsp. The Terrorism Knowledge Database ceased operations on March 31 2008. The differences in estimates of terrorist attacks between the MIPT and GTD are due to the employment of different deﬁnitions of terrorism. The GTD is available at www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=Kazakhstan&sa.x=43&sa.y=1 (accessed September 3 2009). Kazakhstan’s informational space became infused with the statements about terrorism and radical Islam around the time when Kazakhstan’s security service arrested and deported several IMU members to Uzbekistan. They were suspected of the attempted murder of the president of Uzbekistan. Shortly after, one of the perpetrators of the terrorist act in Buynaksk in Dagestan was arrested by KNB and deported to Russia. A group of Uighur separatists was liquidated in the course of a special operation in Almaty. Finally, according to the Kazakh press, two citizens of Kazakhstan were arrested in the course of the counterterrorist operation in Afghanistan and transferred to the Guantanamo prison around that time. The role of Islam in Kazakh society intensiﬁed somewhat in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, Kazakh nomads never observed Islamic prohibitions and laws very closely. Their Islamic practices were largely conﬁned to the spheres of family life; cultural rites were intertwined with pre-Islamic pagan traditions and

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Adat, a common law prevalent in the steppe (Klyashtornyi and Sultano 1992: 150–1; Zhusupov 2001). See Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Federal Law No.64-FZ adopted 13 June 1996, available at www.uk-rf.com/ [in Russian] (accessed December 3 2009)) and Article 233 of the Criminal Code of Kazakhstan (Law No. 167–7 adopted June 16 1997, available at www.pavlodar.com/zakon/?dok=00087&uro=08239 [in Russian] (accessed December 3 2009)). Until the abolition of the death penalty in 2007, Kazakhstan’s Criminal code allowed for the use of the death penalty as the most severe punishment for terrorism. In January 2004, President Nazarbaev ordered a moratorium on the death penalty, and the Kazakh parliament annulled capital punishment in 2007. By 2009, Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS approved over 200 models acts, codes and laws, and over 100 recommendations and other documents for CIS members. CIS legislation is available at www.iacis.ru/html/?id=22&str=list&nid=1 (accessed December 27 2009). The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was ﬁrst put forth by the presidents of Russia and the United States with the goal of establishing a multi-tiered system of defense against nuclear terrorism and strengthening international cooperation in thwarting terrorist groups attempting to gain access to nuclear weapons. Today, the Global Initiative unites more than 70 states. Statement of Bulat Sultanov, Director of Kazakhstan’s Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan, in February 2008 (as cited in McDermott 2009: 45). Kazakhstan’s defense minister, Daniyal Akhmetov, boasted about the depth of strategic partnership between Kazakhstan and Russia in May 2008 (as cited in McDermott 2009: 45). There has long been a latent rivalry among the Central Asian ethnos regarding their “Muslimness” (Lubin and Rubin 1999). The settled Uzbeks believe that they are better Muslims than Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, whereas Tajiks contend that they are the “real Muslims” of Central Asia, as opposed to peoples of the Turkic origin (Ahmedova and Leitich 2001). This competition around the degree of religiosity of different ethnic groups gave rise to a widespread practice of constructing ethnically separate mosques and religious schools for Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, and other Muslims (Omelicheva 2010). According to Article 1 of Kazakhstan’s law On Counteraction to Extremism, extremist activity is deﬁned as all actions pursuing extremist goals, including public calls for extremist activities, propaganda, agitation, and public use of the symbols of extremist organizations. Extremist goals are deﬁned by listing a range of motives for extremist activity, such as forceful changes of the constitutional structure of Kazakhstan, violation of the republic’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, leadership and participation in illegal armed units, fomenting racial and religious discord, and others (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 31 On Counteraction to Terrorism, February 18 2005. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. February 26 2005 No. 45–46). For the overview of amendments to religious legislation premised on the need to cope with the threat of religious extremism in Kazakhstan see Rotar (2005b). The government of Kazakhstan has been targeting pious Muslims who are distinguished by greater religiosity as manifested by stricter interpretation of the Quran, the study of Arabic, and beliefs in the merits of restoring Islamic laws in the country. These believers often pray at home instead of in mosques afﬁliated with the Religious

154

24 25

26 27 28

29

4

Notes

Administration of Kazakhstan’s Muslims, and wear untrimmed beards and religious attire (Memorial Human Rights Center 2007). See interview with a prominent human rights activist and Chair of Almaty Helsinki Committee, Nikel Fokina, as reported in Akkulyuly (2009). See, for example, HRW interview with Anara Ibraeva, Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law, Astana, July 28 2008, as reported in HRW (2008). This also follows from my own analysis of all publicly available reports on trials of alleged terrorists and extremists in Kazakhstan. From my interviews with representatives of human rights groups in Kazakhstan. Interviews with Vitali Ponomarev, Chair of the Central Asian program of Memorial and expert in Islamic movements, and Roslana Taukina, editor-in-chief of a newspaper Obschestvennaya Pozitsiya [Public Position] and human rights fund Zhurnalisty v Bede [Journalists at Risk], as reported in Akkulyuly (2009). Memorial unites dozens of organizations in different regions of the former Soviet Union and several specialized research, human rights, and educational centers. Memorial’s reports about human rights violations in the post-Soviet sphere are highly valued by international human rights organizations, such as AI and HRW, as well as by international organizations—the UN, the OSCE, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Conclusion

1 Additionally, the literature on socialization favors an assumption of international organizations as triggers of socialization that push for the induction of states into their community of values and norms. In practice, however, individual states, themselves, may eagerly seek identiﬁcation and social integration based on the deﬁnition of what constitutes their national goals and needs. 2 Although Kyrgyzstan has been a target of Islamic militants, most of the Islamists’ raids resulted in minimal or no human casualties. Until recently, it had been assumed that Kyrgyzstan provided a poor ground for planting the seeds of Islamism and spreading radical Islamic ideas. 3 The country’s security services have asserted that they have successfully thwarted a number of terrorist attempts. 4 In international relations, complex learning is usually contrasted with “simple learning or “behavioral adaption.” Whereas simple learning, which is typically induced from outside, results in mere adjustment of means without altering any deeper states’ goals or interests, complex learning is understood as more profound and radical changes based on reﬂection, questioning, and redeﬁnition of underlying states’ values and ultimate purposes. The change in behavior and views occurs at a much deeper level of states’ identities and interests. They internalize new positions, perspectives, and norms (Jönsson 1995: 218). 5 The modern states are legal in the sense that rules of public authority and ownership are clearly formalized and rational in that the compact between state and society serves the interest of both parties.

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Index

Abkhazia 100 adat 84, 153 Afghanistan 30, 45, 77, 150: al-Qaeda in 2, 27; Taliban 2, 27, 59, 116; see also United States: military operation in Afghanistan Akaev, A. 26, 29, 31, 33–40, 47, 67, 75, 78 al-Qaeda 2–3, 60, 63, 69, 116–17 Andijan massacre 18, 34, 79, 97, 131, 151 Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program 65; see also United States: international cooperation Anti-Terrorism Center 69–70, 73, 96, 116: joint command-post exercises 74, 123–4 Atasu-Alashankou pipeline 94, 108 Beijing see China Bakiev, K. 31–2, 34–6, 42–4, 69, 75, 77, 80 Berdymukhamedov, K. 59 Bishkek see Kyrgyzstan Bolashak program 87, 104 Brussels see European Union Bush, G. 63, 113, 125, 143–4 Caspian See: hydrocarbon reserves 1, 94, 101; see also Kazakhstan: energy Central Asia: authoritarianism 3, 6; convergence of counterterrorism 4, 134–6; obstacles to integration 42–3, 109; region of 1, 150; regional cooperation 33, 54, 95, 109; regional security 2, 28, 133–4, 146 China: counterterrorism policy 61–2, 112–13; as reference group of Kazakhstan 94–5, 107–9, 131; as reference group of Kyrgyzstan 33–4, 43–4, 80, 137–9; terrorism against 61, 70 (see also Uighurs) clans 46, 145 Clinton administration 66, 143

Committee for State Security of the USSR 40, 49, 71, 119 Commonwealth of Independent States 38–9, 93: CIS model laws and decisions of statutory bodies 54, 60, 71–2; collective security 30, 68, 73–4; as reference group 21, 75, 111, 116–17, 119; see also Collective Security Treaty Organization complex learning 144, 154 Collective Security Treaty Organization 35, 96, 75, 116–17, 137: joint exercises 74, 96–7, 123; rapid-deployment forces 73; see also Kant air base constructivism 7–10, 135 counterterrorism policy: brutality of 6, 24; deﬁnition of 5, 24; dimensions of 5–6, 24; explanations of 7–10 (see also rationalism, constructivism); scope of 6, 24; war model of 113, 139 Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan 90 Department of Homeland Security 64; see also United States: counterterrorism policy Department of State 64, 69, 117, 125: annual reports on terrorism 59, 69, 116 East Turkestan Islamic Movement 61, 68 Eurasia 34, 36, 38, 140 Eurasian Group 73, 121 Eurasian Economic Community 95 Europe 33, 38, 44, 93–4; see also European Union European Union: in Central Asia 47, 76, 106, 109; as reference group of Kazakhstan 132; as reference group of Kyrgyzstan 18, 44, 46; sanctions on Uzbekistan 18; TACIS 109

176

Index

Ferghana valley 117 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering 73, 121 Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation 49, 51–2, 73, 120; see also Russia: counterterrorism policy Ganci air base see Manas air base Gazprom 36, 101; see also Russia: energy Georgia 39, 45: August 2008 war 36; “Rose” revolution 90, 98; Museum of Soviet Occupation 103; see also Abkhazia, South Ossetia Global Terrorism Database 114 Hizb ut-Tahrir l, 2–3, 27, 56; see also Islam: radical Human rights 5–6, 11, 16, 24, 134, 142–3, 144; see also counterterrorism policy: brutality Islam: Islamic revival in Central Asia 2; moderate 146; radical 1, 3, 54; 133–4; see also Sunni Islamic Renaissance Party 58 International Monetary Fund 30 International Military Equipment and Training Program 76, 97, 113, 124, 144 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 2, 27; incursions in Kyrgyzstan 27, 68, 71 islamophobia 144, 146 Kant air base 35, 77 Karimov, I. 2, 41, 43, 56, 68, 78–9, 130–1 Karzai, H. 77 Kashagan oil ﬁeld 87–8 Kazakhstan: ban on the Holy Quran 132; chairmanship of OSCE 91, 99, 105, 128, 132, 143; counterterrorism legislation of 55, 60, 118–21, 127–8, 153; counterterrorism policy of 55, 60, 85–6, 133, 140; economy of 82–3, 86–8, 92, 94; energy 87–8, 90, 92, 94, 101–2, 108; extraditions 122, 131; foreign assistance to 97, 126; foreign policy of 25, 96, 99–100, 109, 142; history of 82, 103; Hizb ut-Tahrir in 117, 127–8, 131; human rights violations by 91, 126–9, 131–2, 140; image of 91, 98–9, 105, 116; investments in 88, 93–4, 108; Islam in 3, 83–5, 115, 151–2; military of 89, 96–8, 101–2, 106, 126, 138; national interests of 91–92;

nuclear arsenal of 94, 97–8; reference groups of 99, 110, 139–40; Russians in 83, 84, 88, 96, 101, 119; Russiﬁcation of 84; views on terrorism in 85, 114–5, 139; Uighurs in 131 Kazakh National Security Committee 60, 84–5, 119, 121 Kenkiyak-Atyrau project 108 Kremlin see Russia Kyrgyzstan: anti-Westernism in 40, 47; clans in 26, 31, 46; counterterrorism legislation of 55, 60, 73, 138; counterterrorism policy of 28, 55, 133; debt of 30, 32, 34, 36, 41; democracy in 32, 37, 46–7; economy of 29–30, 32, 42, 137; extraditions by 62, 79; foreign assistance to 30, 32, 36, 45, 65, 76 137, 139; foreign policy of 25, 29, 35–6, 39, 47; history of 26, 39, 46; Hizb ut-Tahrir in 27, 58, 60, 68–70, 78–9, human rights violations by 29, 78, 81, 138; IMU in 69–71; international standing of 31–2, 34; investments in 30, 34, 36, 42, 44; Islam in 4, 26–8, 70; military of 30, 33, 40, 74–5; national interests of 29–32, 35; political instability in 31, 45; reference groups of 35, 137–9; views on terrorism of 67–8; Uighurs in 61, 80–1 Manas air base 35, 45, 77 Medvedev, D. 41, 95 Moscow see Russia Nazarbaev, N. 42, 83, 88–91, 99–100, 104, 107, 125 neo-patrimonialism 46, 144; see also clans Niyazov, S. 58–9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization: in Kazakhstan 97–8, 106, 124, 126; in Kyrgyzstan 75–6, 139; Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism 113; Partnership for Peace Program 33, 75, 97 Northern Alliance see NATO Organization of Central Asian Cooperation 65 OSCE: Charter for European Security 116; see also Kazakhstan: chairmanship of OSCE Obama: administration 45, 77, 81, 143–4 Osama bin Laden 63, 111, 121; see also al-Qaeda

Index Putin, V. 37, 40–1, 95, 100, 139 rationalism 7, 9; see also counterterrorism policy: explanations realism 7; see also Rationalism reference groups: channels of communication with members 20–22; comparison 15, 19; deﬁnition of 10, 13; factors affecting the choice of 17–19; mechanisms of social inﬂuence 15–16, 86; normative 14–15, 17; social identiﬁcation approach to 10; theory of 4, 9–10, 135–6; types of 14–15, 136; utilitarian 15, 18 Russia: Chechnya 48–9, 51–2, 111; counterterrorism legislation of 49–50, 53; counterterrorism policy of 113; economy of 33; energy policy of 36, 40, 92, 95, 101; foreign policy of 32, 40–1, 54, 92, 95; human rights violations by 50, 52–4, 81; as reference group of Kazakhstan 99–100, 102–4, 139–40; as reference group of Kyrgyzstan 34–5, 37, 137–8; regime of counterterrorist operation 51–2; security role in Central Asia 33, 68, 96 (see also Collective Security Treaty Organization); sovereign democracy in 38; terrorism in 49–50 Russian Christian Orthodox Church 83, 115 salaﬁsts 129–30; see also Kazakhstan: Islam Shanghai Cooperation Organization 97: Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism 61–2, 72; counterterrorism exercises under the aegis of 62, 74, 113, 123; Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of 70 socialization (approach) 10, 135, 145, 154; see also constructivism South Ossetia 36, 100 Sunni 2, 26, 63, 84, 111 Tajikistan: Civil War in 30, 57; counterterrorism policy of 55, 57–8; Hizb-ut-Tahrir in 3; repression by 3–4, 57–8, 79

177

Tangiz oil ﬁeld 88 Taliban see Afghanistan Tashkent see Uzbekistan Terrorism: scholarship on 7 Tulip Revolution 34, 43; see also Kyrgyzstan: political instability Turkmenistan: assassination attempt on the president 58, 78; counterterrorism policy of 55, 58–9; policy of “positive neutrality” 42; repression in 58–9, 133 Uighurs, 27, 61, 80; see also Xinjiang Ukraine 39, 90, 98, 103 United States: 9/11 2, 62–3, 66, 116; counterterrorism policy of 63–6, 112–3; democracy promotion by 44–5, 47, 143–4; human rights 66–7, 81, 114; international cooperation of 64, 114; military operation in Afghanistan 2, 33, 45, 47, 56, 59, 63, 70, 76, 85, 106, 133; as reference group of Kazakhstan 97–99, 105–6; as reference group of Kyrgyzstan 44–5; terrorist attacks against 56, 62–3; use of military abroad by 66, 139 United Nations 61, 65–6, 75; Counterterrorism Committee of 116; Ofﬁce for Drug Control and Crime Prevention of 120–1; Security Council’s resolutions 113, 120 USA Patriot Act 63–4, 151; see also United States, counterterrorism policy Uzbekistan: Andijan 34, 117; counterterrorism policy of 18, 54–6; Hizb ut-Tahrir in 2–3, 117; IMU in 42, 56, 79, 117, 131; as reference group of Kyrgyzstan 41–2; repression by 4, 18, 56; 78–9, 129–30, 133; terrorist attacks in 78, 117 West 18, 34–5, 37–8, 45–8, 91, 98, 100, 106, 126, 145; see also European Union, United States World Bank 30, 73, 93, 121 Washington see United States Xinjiang 61, 80, 150