Critical Theory Now
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Critical Theory Now
Edited by Philip Wexler
The Falmer Pr...
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Critical Theory Now
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Critical Theory Now
Edited by Philip Wexler
The Falmer Press (A member of the Taylor & Francis Group) London • New York • Philadelphia
UK The Falmer Press, 4 John St., London WC1N 2ET
USA The Falmer Press, Taylor & Francis Inc., 1900 Frost Road, Suite 101, Bristol, PA 19007
© Philip Wexler 1991
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without permission in writing from the Publisher.
First published 1991
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004.
British Library Cataloging in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data available on request
ISBN 0-203-21491-9 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-27137-8 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 1 85000 753-5 (Print Edition) ISBN 1 85000 754-3 pbk.
Contents
Preface 1 Touring Hyperreality: Critical Theory Confronts Informational Society Timothy W.Luke
vii
1
2 Critical Theory, Gramsci and Cultural Studies: From Structuralism to Poststructuralism Raymond A.Morrow
27
3 Playing with the Pieces: The Fragmentation of Social Theory David Ashley
70
4 The Uses and Abuses of French Discourse Theories for Feminist Politics Nancy Fraser
98
5 Theorizing the Decline of Discourse or the Decline of Theoretical Discourse? Ben Agger
117
6 How Mothers Quit Resisting and Managed to Love TV Serafina K.Bathrick
145
7 From Pathos to Panic: American Character Meets the Future Lauren Langman
165
8 Afterword. Collective/Self/Collective: A Short Chapter in the Professional Middle Class Story Philip Wexler
241
Notes on Contributors
250
Index
252
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Preface
The first wave of North American critical theory was at once both academic and political. Interest in the works of the early Frankfurt School may have belonged to a more general renaissance of academic social theory that occurred in North America during the late 1960s and early 1970s. But the passion for critical theory came out of a particular historical political moment of self- and collective transformation. Critical theory best gave voice to the New Left understanding of politics as psychological and cultural transformation, and as an unbridgeable difference and dissent from a European and American Marxism that seemed irrelevant to the historical experience of an emergent, socially critical new class. The subsequent defeat of the cultural revolution, and the social movements which fed it, predictably led not only to the formalization of social theory, but to an atrophy of a deep political and psychological passion for social theory. The ritualism of defeat expressed itself in an academicist interest in critical theory. Frankfurt School theory became respectable as an object of scholastic interpretation. In that sense, the academic success of critical theory was a sign of an apparent end to its political transformative project. The North American Restoration—not postmodernism—eviscerated the effort to politicize everyday life. For the new generation, it seemed that theoretical interest was either formal and scientistic, or at best, in a postmodern vein, of an aesthetic interest. Now, there are signs that we are exiting the long night of the Restoration. It is not that corporatism has ceased to flourish, or even that there is a new articulation of mass consciousness. Rather, the scholastic interest in critical theory has again become political, and the social theoretic ideology of the Interregnum, postmodernism, has proven that it can be a channel as well as a damper for the articulation of a critical theory of society. There is a new voice in critical the-
viii CRITICAL THEORY NOW
ory. It is a voice that comes through the historic political struggles of a student movement, of feminism, and of anti-racist and ecological social movements. It is a voice also schooled in a sensitivity to the theories of social disintegration or an ‘implosion’ that characterizes the post-modernist moment. The authors represented in this reader are neither scholastic nor dogmatic. They do not eschew postmodernism for hackneyed slogans, nor do they embrace theory as an aesthetic substitute for theory as a socially transformative practice. They are committed both to social theory and social practice, and it is this which unifies the papers which follow. The authors are a new generation of North American critical theorists who do not retreat to European humanism in the face of social, cultural and self transformation. Each one actively encounters and works through the social and theoretical changes that have occurred since Frankfurt-style critical theory. They offer social analyses of the information society (Luke), the character of public discourse (Agger), and changes in the relation between the family and mass media (Bathrick). They all refuse to simply dismiss postmodernism, poststructuralism or discourse theories on the grounds that they are ‘neo-conservative’ (Habermas, 1981). Morrow, for example, offers an historical account of how critical and cultural theories converge and can incorporate structuralism and poststructuralism. They work through, as Agger describes, a dialectic of postmodernism, and a politically interested critique of discourse theories, which as Fraser so aptly says, will lead to a ‘critique of essentialism without becoming postfeminist’. Ashley takes Baudrillard’s simulacra seriously as a criticism of Marxist ‘productionism’, but notes that Baudrillard ‘does tend to get carried away’. Ashley’s effort to reclaim totality as a critical vantage point, Agger’s postmodern, public intellectual, Bathrick’s mother as transformative mediator, and Morrow’s ‘disciplinary deconstructions’ all show how critical theorists can avoid new forms of sublimation in discourse by a clear social analytic interest, a ‘pragmatic’ interest as Fraser calls it, that is not based on a desire to retain a scholastic critical theory tradition, but instead encounters new forms of cultural expression. Luke offers a reformulation of the political possibilities of critical theory in conditions of ‘hyperreality’, and Langman explores the cultural and psychological conditions within which a contemporary emancipatory project is possible. The authors present different political interests, analytical dimensions and empirical examples. Despite Ashley’s Adornoesque caveat that there are ‘no theoretical solutions’ to contemporary aporias, this
PREFACE ix
new generation of critical theorists does not accept the postmodern, poststructural, discursive dissolution of a subject who can understand and act. Their qualifications to global action are in the service of a practical, theoretically knowledgeable politics. They are redeeming critical theory, but not naively, as the integration of social analysis and political practice, at a time when such a form of life is not easily nurtured. They are exemplifying how the agon of internalized contradictions among subjects of the professional middle class may be overcome in theory and in practice. I believe that readers will find in these essays a thread of continuity with Frankfurt School theory, a political reading of post-modernism, an engagement with contemporary social movements, and—what distinguishes ‘critical’ theory—a fresh effort to articulate a new critical social theory in a new historical moment.
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1 Touring Hyperreality: Critical Theory Confronts Informational Society* Timothy W.Luke
As the 1990s begin, it is clear that the frozen impasse of the Cold War has thawed, bringing new possibilities and problems for the capitalist world-system. Yet, some central points must be remembered. During the strategic deadlock of Soviet and American superpower over the past four decades of Cold War, the everyday commerce of transnational corporate capitalism has transformed significantly the established cultures, politics, and society of many nation-states by developing electronically-mediated consumption communities within and alongside their traditional ways of life.1 Indeed, the end of the Cold War marks the intrusion of these transformations even into the centrally planned economies of China, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. Conventional codes of power, ideology and resistance are changing in all of these still modernizing regions, but in ways that now are unclear, contradictory, and incomplete. Within such transnational consumption communities, the flow of goods, services, and signs generates densely encoded ‘hyperrealities’ or ‘mediascapes’, which form new regions and sites of shared cultural consciousness that continuously but cryptically display the workings of power and ideology. But whose power and whose ideology? The institutionalized forms of organized power are increasingly dominated by the networks of transnational corporate capital (based mainly in Japan, North America, and Western Europe), under the watchful vigilance of weak transnational zone-regimes (tied to either Soviet or American superpower), which reveal their biases most directly in the electronic imagery and technology underpinning the hyperreality of contemporary mass consumption and production. How can one best travel through these essentially contested,hyperreal terrains of the ‘post-industrial’, ‘information-based’, or ‘informational’ society as they have been forming with the globalization of advanced corporate capitalism since 1945? The distinctive features of 1
2 CRITICAL THEORY NOW
postindustrialism, such as the trends toward rising numbers of whitecollar workers, decreasing numbers of blue-collar workers, a greater emphasis on services or information goods rather than industrial manufacturing, the mobilization of science as a factor in production and management, and a consumer-oriented economy of affluence, have been talked about since the mid-1950s. Intense debates over what these changes mean, and how far they go toward actually constituting a new stage of development, continue today.2 Still, these economic and social developments have not led to the carefree utopia of cybernetic postindustrialism that fascinated early space age America in the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, new technical and economic forces are creating a more culturally impoverished and ecologically destructive world system, which is now based upon attaining the complete commodification of all aspects of human life. With the emergence of informationalization, one can see concomitant declines in several different but interrelated spheres—environmental quality, urban life, material living standards, cultural vitality, popular political effectiveness, and ordinary everyday community. Consequently, it should be useful here to outline some speculations— grounded in contemporary semiotic and critical theory—about the origins and operations of hyperreality by taking a brief tour through some corners of its mediascapes. In turn, these observations might disclose a few provisional traces of how power and politics seem to work in hyperreality, while setting the scene for some tentative conclusions about the project of critical theory today.
I Speculations: From Ontology to Hyperontology? What is real? How do we know it? Given what is real and how much we know of it, what can we do? Discussing ‘reality’, as such questions indicate, always seems slightly unreal. Questions, like ‘what is’ or ‘what is “is”’ once asked, are difficult to answer. To frame responses, as in this discussion, the metaphors of maps and terrain are inevitably invoked. ‘What is’ or ‘what is “real”’ are usually given the status of an unknown ground whose topography might then be revealed through some conceptual cartography, traced out in linguistic maps or representational grids. These instruments historically have been considered inadequate disclosures of what is ‘real’ inasmuch as no abstractconceptual representation can fully disclose or encapsulate that which is real. The pre-categorical always overwhelms the categorical as the given and the lived evade that which can be thought or spo-
TOURING HYPERREALITY 3
ken. Never completely coextensive, the metaphorical elements of ‘map’ and ‘terrain’ still have delimited the basic boundaries of ontological reflection, resting on the belief that the terrain always precedes and denominates the map as a constant invariable presence beneath its representational narratives. Yet, lately something seems to be changing. Like the survivors of the 1989 California earthquake, who could not describe the very solid reality of the earth shaking beneath their feet without reading their experience and its meaning through their past viewings of simulated earthquake disasters on TV or in old movies, everyday participants in informationalized societies regard what is real, and their knowledge of it, in similarly hyperreal terms. Increasingly, in the innermost individual consciousness, many ordinary judgments of reality, knowledge of the real or even how to act echo the ontology of the earthquake victims: what was it like? It was just like on TV! What did you think was happening? It was like an old sci-fi, disaster movie! Describing and interpreting this sort of ‘hyperreality’ seems more than slightly unreal. The means of information generating the symbolic basis of today’s global, transnational economy unhinge ordinary metaphorical relations between map and terrain inasmuch as the operative principles of this informational order are those of simulation. Abstract narratives can no longer function definitively as ‘the maps’, ‘the doubles’, ‘the mirrors’ or ‘the concepts’ of some ontological terrain metaphorically regarded as ‘the real’. Instead, what were once abstract frames of the real increasingly function in ordinary consciousness as simulations. The terrain is framed by television screens. Its topography is fluid not fixed, flowing in continuously shifting images. The maps are constantly under revision, changing with every new voiceover and scan of the images. The moving frames of all the viewing screens compose the pictures: without the images there is no terrain, and its features are only those drawn into the scan and pan of the camera. As Baudrillard asserts, ‘simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or a reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory—precession of simulacra—it is the map that engenders the territory…’.3 In this hyperspace, the ineluctable non-identity of map and terrain disappears. Therefore, it seems that some provisional hyperontology must now somehow define and describe what ‘is’. If such hyperrealities do exist broadly enough to have these effects, then one must look constantly for something else that is now only inconstantly there:
4 CRITICAL THEORY NOW
No more mirror of being and appearances, of the real and its concept. No more imaginary coextensity: rather, genetic miniaturization is the dimension of simulation. The real is produced from miniaturized units, from matrices, memory banks and command models—and with these it can be reproduced an infinite number of times. It no longer has to be rational, since it is no longer measured against some ideal or negative instance. It is nothing more than operational. In fact, since it is no longer enveloped by an imaginary, it is no longer real at all. It is a hyperreal, the product of an irradiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace without atmosphere.4 The simulation systems of hyperreality play off and on these dissolving differences between true and false, drifting in and out of real and representation. Again, like the California earthquake survivors, as they recounted their adventures to the TV cameras, confusing themselves in the real disaster of 17 October, 1989 with images of Clark Gable and Jeanette MacDonald in the distant past of San Francisco or Charlton Heston and Ava Gardner in the indistinct future of Earthquake, fact and fiction are interwoven in hyperreality to the point that electronic/cinematic fictions are cited commonly as the ultimate standard for judging material facts. Simulations rest upon absence and negation, eliminating the role of the real or the true in fabricating intersubjective experience. Actually, as Baudrillard suggests: age of simulation thus begins with a liquidation of all referentials—worse: by their artificial resurrection in systems of signs, a more ductile material than meaning in that it lends itself to all systems of equivalence, all binary oppositions, and all combinatory algebra. It is no longer a question of imitation, nor of reduplication, nor even of parody. It is rather a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself, that is, an operation to deter every real process by its operational double, a metastable, programmatic, perfect descriptive machine which provides all the signs of the real and shortcircuits all its vicissitudes..... A hyperreal, therefore, is sheltered from thereal and the imaginary, leaving room only for the orbital recurrence of models and the simulated generation of difference.5 While systems of representation may endeavor to appropriate simula-
TOURING HYPERREALITY 5
tion as false representation, the dynamics of simulation turn all representations into simulacra, reducing the sign to a valueless free radical capable of bonding virtually anywhere in any exchange. Specifically, When the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality; of second-hand truth, objectivity and authenticity. There is an escalation of the true, of the lived experience; a resurrection of the figurative when the object and substance have disappeared and there is a panicstricken production of the real and the referential, above and parallel to the panic of material production: this is how simulation appears in the phase that concerns us—a strategy of the real, neo-real and hyperreal whose universal double is a strategy of deterrence.6 The material means of generating hyperreality are mainly the electronic media. Traditional notions of causality, perspective and reasoning are undermined completely by the electronic means of information, which efface the differences between cause and effect, ends and means, subject and object, active and passive. ‘Rather,’ Baudrillard argues, ‘we must think of the media as if they were, in outer orbit, a sort of genetic code which controls the mutation of the real into the hyperreal, just as the other, micro-molecular code controls the passage of the signal from a representative sphere of meaning to the genetic sphere of the programmed signal’.7 Simulation goes beyond the distinctions of space and time, sender and receiver, medium and message, expression and content, as the media generate and maintain a new hyperspace with ‘no sense of place’. Difference vanishes, because ‘nothing separated one pole from the other, the initial from the terminal: there is just a sort of contraction into each other, a fantastic telescoping, a collapsing of the two traditional poles into another: an implosion—an absorption of the radiating model of causality, of the differential mode of determination, with its positive and negative electricity—an implosion of meaning. This is where simulation begins. Everywhere, in whatever political, biological, psychological, mediadomain, where the distinction between poles can no longer be maintained, one enters into simulation, and hence almost absolute manipulation—not passivity, but the non-distinction of active and passive’.8 In elaborating the practical logic of hyperreality, one must recognize how it also reflects the general operation of monopoly capital as
6 CRITICAL THEORY NOW
transnational corporate planning effaces the historical contradictions between capital and labor, production and consumption, supply and demand. Traditionally, ‘capital only had to produce goods; consumption ran by itself. Today it is necessary to produce consumers, to produce demand, and this production is infinitely more costly than that of goods’.9 As part of the production of demand, the forms and substance of society itself are manufactured to sustain consumption. Consequently, every dimension of social existence today is essentially a complex simulation of reality, designed specifically to sustain the fragile cycles of political, economic and cultural reproduction. Since individual desires are abstractly autonomized into pre-packaged needs that serve as productive forces, the social devolves into an aggregate of atomized individuals, whose role is to mediate the packaged meaning of their desires in the corporate marketplace. The traditional cultural forms of attaining both individuality and the social collapse under these conditions. Instead, particular individual subjects ‘are only episodic conductors of meaning, for in the main, and profoundly, we form a mass, living most of the time in panic or haphazardly, above and beyond any meaning’.10 At the same time, ‘the masses’ are neither a subject nor an object. These social forces bear little relation to any historical referent—a class, a nation, a folk or the proletariat. Rather, they are a demographic construct, a statistical entity whose only traces appear in the social survey or opinion poll. Their members and extent vary with the complex coding of the media and the marketplaces, which set and reset the outer boundaries of the mass, in that ‘it only exists at the point of convergence of all the media waves which depict it’.11 The masses can no longer act as traditional historical subjects in this social and political context. Nonetheless, they cast an immense shadow as the silent majorities that ground and channel or diffuse and deflect the circuits of corporate power and state authority in their personal activities. What is deterred by hyperreal strategies of deterrence? Essentially, everything that might be or become ‘real life’ totally separate and completely free from the planned imperatives of social programs and designer models of everyday life as set by corporate production agenda. In this vacuum of (in)significance, the proliferation of secondhand authenticity has plainly become the primary growth industry of thepresent era. Power and politics assume new forms in hyperreality as electronic mediations of experience and meaning substitute the imaginary for the real, simulations displace actuality, simulacra merge into the real. No longer duplicity or counterfeit, simulation acquires
TOURING HYPERREALITY 7
an almost total integrity, actually becoming what many regard as what is real. Signs of this process surface in many sites on the contemporary post-1945 political horizon, ranging from televisual democracy to nuclear deterrence to urban renewal. The sites of struggle are staked out here over generating and perhaps resisting hyperreal illusions of what is. By controlling what is considered real, the simulations weakly control human activity. Simulation as an organizing principle requires a continuous and purposeful substitution of the signs of the real for reality itself, but the deeper ties to the cycles of commodification clearly need not be broken. Hyperreality simply brings new forms of hyperreal commodification along with it. The entire ethos of national electoral politics in the United States, for example, largely rests upon the panic-stricken efforts to produce a real consensus, a national mandate, and a true representation of the electorate’s preferences from an increasingly divided, smaller, segmented and apathetic public that participates in a simulation rather than a real representative democracy. In democratic electoral politics, a simulated hyperreality of public life emerges from public opinion polls, whose mathematical indices are substituted in practice for ‘the public’ itself. The ever-changing outcomes of daily, weekly, and monthly surveys continually span the gap between the opinion leaders and opinion holders. The mathematical montages of satisfaction and dissatisfaction from such polls, in turn, increasingly constitute what the contemporary public accepts as its sense of itself. The whole process is one of hyperrealistically simulating a particular type of democratic reality in order to substitute it for the real workings of democracy.12 These artifacts are much more potent than traditional ideology as a mode of exercising power. Most historical forms of ideology entailed the betrayal or distortion of some actual reality with signs as ‘false consciousness’, but simulation entails the complete ‘short-circuit of reality’ and its ‘reduplication by signs’13 in ways that suspend truth and falsity almost entirely in the fabric of hyperreality itself. Much like daily television news programs which create false stylized narratives about contemporary political ‘reality’ with actors, sets and scripts to report ‘what is true’ about American politics by merging reality and representation in an electron haze, the hyperreal practices of democracy form in the changing coded conventions of its own continuous fabrication. At the level of global politics, nuclear deterrence is the epitome of simulation. The arsenals in nuclear arms races are the signs of hyperreality that neutralize the reality of actual nuclear war. Real nuclear war would annihilate the geopolitical stakes at issue in global power
8 CRITICAL THEORY NOW
struggles. Consequently, the superpowers devote their energies to the hyperreal simulations of preparing and rehearsing for such a war, which short-circuits that reality.14 However, this struggle reduplicates the conflict as a war of signs between the opposing superpowers. The balance of terror is the terror of balance’, as the simulations ensure that the real event of nuclear war will not disturb the equilibrium of the general system.15 This macrological system of deterrence also pervades the micrological dimensions of everyday life: ‘The same model of planned infallibility, of maximal security and deterrence, now governs the spread of the social’, throughout the networks of social control.16 Every effort is now being made, through constant simulations and resimulations of every conceivable eventuality in daily life, to guarantee that ‘nothing will be left to chance’. The accidents that do occur, like the Three Mile Island or Chernobyl nuclear disasters, are very exceptional. As rare incidents of purposive human error, they are regarded as inconceivable and therefore appear as totally unsimulated events. Once they happen, however, they become, like oil refinery disasters, civil defense drills, airliner crashes, or high-rise fires, a new modeling scenario for innumerable fresh simulations. Indeed, the relatively low loss of life and high degree of social cohesion after the 1989 California earthquake are, in large part, attributable to the Bay Area’s residents’ continuous simulation of coping with disaster in emergency services drills and practice runs. In the decaying core of today’s immense exurban/post-urban agglomerations, for example, expensive efforts at urban revitalization and renewal being made by the Rouse Company and other redevelopment corporations thrash out image-driven simulations of city life in urban dead zones where none has existed for decades. However, these redevelopment programs are typically pitched to the commuting sub-urban upscale gentry rather than ordinary citizens who are still in residence.17 By the late 1950s, the classic urban industrial core of most American cities was in complete decline for many reasons, ranging from suburbanization, maturing markets, and foreign competition, to regional population shifts, runaway shops, and building the interstate highway system. Racial conflict and economic hard times in the 1960s and 1970s virtually killed off what was left in most urban downtowns, turning what were once vibrant self-contained communities into nothing but ‘central business districts’. To recapture some sense of urban excitement and diversity, many consciously planned efforts have been made by alliances of corporate capital and various state agencies since the 1970s to renew, renovate or rebuild certain regions in such cities’ downtown cores via ‘redevel-
TOURING HYPERREALITY 9
opment’. What has been created, however, in such re-creations is not a revitalization of what once was alive. Rather, it is more often merely a gentrified simulation, trading off of memories about what is believed to once have been by presenting packaged fantasies that now will be accepted as true. Remaining essentially ultra-contemporary in both form and function, redevelopment is cleverly denominated, nonetheless, with as many symbols of the past as are necessary to sell the commodity of itself in the present. These simulations displace and surpass serious efforts at careful historical reconstruction by using just enough historic tokens to seem basically convincing to many people. Such commodification of urban spaces only takes on a disguise of close, face-to-face concern for neighborhood renovation, civic preservation, historic conservation. The acids of exchange continue splashing through their familiar transnational tubes behind the hyperreal renovated facades of local architectural and urban traditions. Corporate capital, here in the form of civic-minded urban development partnerships or just plain real estate speculation, aims at colonizing the hitherto and probably otherwise impenetrable preserves of urban decay with new outposts of commodification. Its continuing mission is to accumulate greater power and authority via exchange, but dress up the exchange in spectacle and illusion. These campaigns for expanding the controlled policing of space behind the valorized boundaries of development districts take place behind the screen of hyperreal illusion. Up to a point, at one time, significant questions about the nature of urban life could still be asked. Is it real or is it Memorex? Is this real life or a movie? Is this really happening or are we on television? Is this a live performance or an electronic mediation/ simulation? These are now much less meaningful questions. We all know the answer about life in such cities. Redeveloped or rehabbed urban life is an illusion. Yet, we all seem to like it that way. Hyper-reality absolutely requires the consent of the audiences accepting and incorporating its narratives into its representation of the real in order to close its codes. Commercial megastructures, like Georgetown Park or Union Station in Washington, Baltimore’s Inner Habor, Richmond’s Sixth Street Marketplace, St Louis’ Union Station, Underground Atlanta or The Cannery and Ghiradelli Square in San Francisco are each in their own ways nostalgic expressions of the troubled conscience inmediadriven informational society. Economic exchange and cultural enlightenment, because of the electronic media, computerization, telecommunications, and jet travel, can and do happen almost anywhere.
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What was once produced downtown in America is now shipped in from Taiwan, Mauritius, South Korea, Mexico or Thailand. Likewise, what was once learned, enjoyed or found entertaining up-town is now often accessible twenty-four hours a day on cable or satellite TV. Still, the memories of an urban excitement and civic community linger like an unfulfilled wish over the exurban sprawl stretching over hundreds of square miles around many major American cities. Artifacts or sites from America’s once vibrant industrial past, like railway stations, old factories, market buildings or abandoned warehouses sitting empty in decay, are recolonized with signs or resettled by design to generate hyperreal plays of rehabilitated urban life. Something like the activity and allure of old civic institutions are simulated in hyperreal reconstructions of what is believed to have been ‘urban life’ in the highly coded and commodified architectural spectacles of these new urban malls and megastructures. Lacking any other definitions of ‘city living’ in the exurban sprawl of interstate highway-structured cities, these hyperreal spaces become ‘the real’ significations of urban hustle in the promotion of today’s personal consumption. The effect is easily produced given the figurative richness of these sites’ former uses or historical functions. The architectural details and symbols of another era or earlier time are refunctioned as signs of the real substituted for the real itself in order to deter anything other than a nostalgia-driven consumerism. In a panicstricken search for what is real and meaningful, simulation mobilizes the most potent indicators of what was ‘urban’ to escalate consumption and guarantee compliance in the posturban/exurban realities of what is. Actually, however, few if any urban downtowns were ever so upscale, so elite, so stylishly correct as these rehab representations would suggest. The urban revitalizations, aiming to reproduce what was the real thing, only succeed at producing absolute fakes. Masked in the particularities of old train stations, industrial plants, warehouses or habor piers, these nostalgia centers are industrially massproduced to move the goods and services of today’s transnational capitalism to any willing buyer affluent enough to pony up the plastic for such purchases. Here, of course, the demographics of real estate amortization programs define who really is welcome in the rehab city. Affluent tourists, upscale professionals or the leisured classes populate these sites of civic simulation as security guards and the prices keep most locals and the downmarket types out on the streets or commuting to their own suburban commercial strips. Yet, this ‘buying public’, as it is identified by corporate marketing plans, accepts such
TOURING HYPERREALITY 11
weak simulations of urban community as meeting their needs for play, consumption, leisure, community, and work every time they enter these controlled spaces. There are few or no other alternatives. As more and more manufacturing moves offshore, the economic zones of existing industrial cities hollow out and collapse. Thus, the planned campaigns for building and operating these hyperreal simulations of urban life in the 1980s and 1990s are also sold by city halls or corporate developers as programs for job creation, crime control, urban beautification, and tourist generation. The illusory fiction of such hyperreal spectacle cities, then, becomes material reality as bricks and mortar refigure image in the hyperreal architecture of urban revitalization. Tied to the iconic demands of old photographs, paintings, newsreels or advertising images, the reality of what cities once were (or what they actually are on the pavements outside these centers) disappears into the hyperrealism of urban rehab. Moving from these media to the medium of architecture, ‘the real is volatilized; it becomes an allegory of death, but it is reinforced by its very destruction…. Realism had already begun this tendency…. The hyperreal represents a much more advanced phase, in the sense that even this contradiction between the real and the imaginary is effaced. The unreal is no longer that of dream or fantasy, or a beyond or a within, it is that of a hallucinatory resemblance of the real with itself’.18 Why are such illusory urban core areas created? The hunger for the figurative in the emptiness of corporate-coded hyperspaces or a nostalgia for signs of the real are part of it. However, these commercial megastructures are also coded to be seen by the transnational corporate consciousness as any city’s signs of prosperity and wealth beyond their narrow boundaries. Decaying cities that are still wealthy or decisive enough to build or recreate what never was as what once was real are taken as being business-minded, progressive and forwardthinking. Such development may keep in town what businesses still remain or provide the economic, cultural and logistical incentives to attract new investment from outside. To forsake the model may mean forsaking everything, including what little they may already have in the vast expanses of poverty and stagnation. Thus, bits and pieces of a nostalgic past become ‘the real for the real, fetish of the lost object— no longer object of representation, but ecstasy of denegation and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal’.19 Like the total environment of redeveloped urban malls, the deterrent engineering of existence ultimately guarantees an anticipatory control over any possible threat to this hyperreality: ‘Reality no longer has the time to take on the appearance of reality. It no longer
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even surpasses fiction: it captures every dream even before it takes on the appearance of a dream. The cool universe of digitality has absorbed the world of metaphor and metonymy’.20 While its larger connections to class contradictions or social conflicts are clearly questionable, this interpretive treatment of simulation presents a useful account for grasping some of the mechanisms behind the strategies of social control embedded in the cultural codes of informational society.
II Provisional Traces: Power and Politics in Hyperreality? Political power prior to the implosions of hyperreality was organized around institutional mediations with different structures of cultural space and time than that found in electronically-mediated hyperrealism.21 As Innis and McLuhan maintain, the metaphors perhaps most appropriate for understanding social ontologies in preinformational societies largely tie back into the bias in their print-driven media, which were the first mass-production industrial technologies for creating cheap, identical products.22 These media essentially create a linear, panoptical or typographical mode of space. The personal and social sense of place are fixed in grids of class, status, or geographical distance. This perspectival space evolves with a particular sense of social time, grounded in diachronous concepts of ‘development-intime’, such as evolution, progress, or maturation. Change is marked by incremental measures of linear change. The ‘new’ is the latest increment of diachronic development in time or space. The power exerted in linear, panoptical space presumes its own production by ‘power-ful’ agents at the top of society, outside of or from within the center of established institutions, which mediate the production and application of power on the ‘power-less’. A difference, in other words, between active and passive, subject and object, message and meaning is strongly apparent. Seen in this mode, preinformational power is clearly coercive, creating and policing its own subjects in the evolving procedures of civil institutions, social organizations, and parastatal discourses conducted in print and in writing across the grids of a perspectival space. Without its strong oversight, the leadership of these institutions assumes everyone would repudiate their directions in complete revolt. Hence individuals are often seen as potential rebels, ready to cast off heavy coercive controls. The state places a very high premium on obedience, loyalty or full integration into its structures of hegemony. Ideologies tend to be a totalistic discursive program for transforming everything
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in accord with a fixed theoretical map. Power works through a logic of coercive detainment and continuous indoctrination, which finds expression in elaborate, extended narratives. A shift in social position within the perspectival scope of such space also assumes that some concomitant gain or loss of control over the power production process is experienced. As McLuhan argues in The Gutenberg Galaxy, ‘print exists by virtue of the static separation of functions and fosters a mentality that gradually resists any but a separative and compartmentalizing or specialist outlook’.23 The sovereign agencies of the state—king, republican assembly, or bureaucracy—stand apart in these linear spaces as an author, who adopts and exercises a ‘fixed point of view’ in its narratives of discipline and domination. Within such typographic fields, the state can be seen as a scribe or draftsman, scrolling power across its subjects as objects through discourses of visually-anchored classification. Foucault’s ‘disciplines’ and ‘discourses of power’, for example, might be seen emerging within the interstices of such procedures. A particular kind of individual subjectivity, typically grounded upon a ‘possessive individualism’, is produced as part and parcel of such social realities. Throughout these dimensions of power, as McLuhan observes, ‘the homogenization of men and materials will become the great program of the Gutenberg era, the source of wealth and power unknown to any other time or technology’.24 From such panoptical perspectives, as Bentham proposed, powerful state agencies normalize individual and mass behavior among their subject populations through a continuous regulatory gaze exerted through the police, schools, bureaucracy, health care, and military. The spatiality of print, market exchange, and linear time sets out the expansive dimensions of the panoptical space in which those on top, outside, or at the center of society organize those at the bottom, inside, or margins of society. The analog clock perfectly exemplifies how these relations can be understood. The travel of its hands coterminously creates and regulates measures of time by moving continuously through an enclosed space from a central axis of representation, marking the twenty-four hours that represent one day on a calendar’s grid. To a certain extent, social time can be measured or conceptualized under this logic as the duration or pressures of this kind of power traveling in ‘real time’ through linear space from top to bottom. In turn, relatively clear relational-spatial distinctions of social status, cultural pre-eminence, and political authority develop in line with the print-bound, panoptical space in traditional industrial societies or industrializing agricultural societies.
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The ontological nets of hyperrealism, on the other hand, are framed by new structures of cultural space and time made possible by the bias in informational networks of transnational communication and exchange. Metaphors for interpreting it lock into images from telecommunication-based media, which can generate nonlinear, multiperspectival modes of space, containing innumerable hyperreal constructs of unique, nonidentical realities. The personal and social senses of place become more mobile, defined by fluid changing connections into networks of information. One’s ability to log on, call in, switch on, or tune in to cybernetic/electronic media overcomes many types of distance. Electronic transmissions allow for rapid shifts in focus from geographically and culturally unrelated places either in time-sequence or simultaneously through editing, directing, or split screening. If the average TV viewer, for example, is not pleased by the transmitted flow of images, then he or she can create his or her own ‘program’ of rapidly changing and varied images simply by flipping through the channels. Participants in the hyperreality of informational societies no longer live in tightly bounded ethnogeographic settings. They also inhabit a continuously changing mediascape of transnational scope and content with different regions organized around particular image-flows or signs. Television does not ‘bring the entire world into our homes’ as much as it moves everybody who is watching to the same place and into the same events—or into a hyperreality. Such ‘screenal’ space, likewise, builds a new sense of social time based upon synchronic concepts of ‘simultaneity’, including those incompletely expressed in surrealism, postmodernism or simulation. Change is marked by shifting permutations or passage between regions in the current constellation of signs, images, and appearances on synchronic screen displays. The ‘now’ is simply an ephemeral existing configuration of particular images in a shifting sign flux at this or that point, discontinuously differentiated from many other ‘thens’ in other sign fluxes. Power in hyperreality, as it is exercised in imploded, nonlinear, screenal space, however, appears more puzzling. It seems to require continuous coproduction by those with access to ‘behind the screens’ and those without access ‘before the screens’. Informational power is essentially seductive, motivating its subjects with images to collaborate in reproducing or completing the codes’ logic or sequence in hyperreality. Individuals recreate themselves continuously in the permissive coding of individual self-management. The institutional leadership of informational society recognizes that ‘rebelling’ within such screenal spaces is not necessarily a serious threat to the social order.
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Given the complexity and rigorous demands of the codes of control, all can, at least in part, style themselves as something of a rebel. It even can become a central theme in selling goods and services. The organization of power, then, forces all to behave as collaborators, who fulfill their needs and desires by completing the outlines of constrained personal choices left partially unfinished in the available codes of commodification. As a result, power rides along acceptable ranges of rebellion by putting an emphasis on containing the deeper roots of dissidence, resistance or opposition existing beneath the constraints of collaboration. Even open rebellion can be tolerated to the extent that police technologies work out their own changing subcodes of interaction with dissidents, rioters, or rebels, designed to contain or deter their activities within specific regions or rituals of interaction. An ideology, if this notion retains its meaning in such hyperreality, often appears as a partial, ad hoc routine pieced together from images or signs assigned to particular goods, behaviors, or styles in constantly changing codes. The final meaning of signs is never completely certain. They are never necessarily received as sent nor sent as received. Image production assumes their being continuously recoded or counter coded during their reception to complete the encoding of their transmission. Power in hyperreality, therefore, follows a logic of collaborative containment and constant deterrence, which exerts its influence through equivocal, ephemeral images. The state in the hyperreality of informational conditions is largely integrated into the loops of code circulation as a systems operator, that can range across and combine multiple points of view in an ‘interdisciplinary’ or ‘networked’ mix of different coding routines, options, and programs. Within these imploded regions, the state can be seen as a scheduler, director, and programmer, constructing contexts for collaboration by its subjects or conflict among them with the assistance of business and industry, which also act as codecoprocessors in the codings of various reified scripts and packages that basically channel, but never totally control, behavior. Political conflict centers around who directs and who is directed or what is coded where, when, and why. As Baudrillard asserts, under these conditions of power in ‘the ecstasy of communication’,25 audiences produce their own message displays and the message displays create their own audiences. Given these shifts, Poster argues that theoretical attention must now be paid to the ‘modes of information’ interoperating between the state and capital rather than the ‘modes of production’ in informational societies.26 Who has and who does not have access, as
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well as who is behind and who is before the screens, for the most part, varies with the shifting codes of control. To a large extent, hyperreality can be understood as a field of complete synchrony or as the simultaneous participation of diverse groups in coproducing their discrete networks of power. As McLuhan claims (following James Joyce), its reality (or hyperreality) is based upon ‘allat-once-ness’. In fact, hyperreality becomes culturally meaningful. Selfconscious, complex social groups can and do emerge transnationally around the signs and images of successive discrete ‘news’, like the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s, that differentiate themselves from each other by the reified insignia of their era’s peculiar commodities. Movies, television programs, popular music or the news serve as hyperreal means of imploding space, defining identity and forming group consciousness. Time can also be understood as being measured in the ‘machine time’ of instantaneous communication or computation, which becomes so pivotal in creating codes of consent and consenting to code-creation. As its metaphor, the digital clock suggests how these forces are apprehended. Time simply reads out statements of its passage in continuously changing screens of LCDs or LEDs; what surrounds or coexists with that reading is that now-ness marked in its digital identity. ‘Now’ is one digital display in the same place as ‘then’, which was only another digital configuration of identical signs. There is no spatial sense of time, as was true with analog clocks, traveling in an enclosed but carefully measured space, only a constantly recirculating set of signs dictating its display of simultaneous read outs. Overall, social control in the screenal spaces of these mediascapes boils down to organizing attractive conditions for collaboration and using different forms of seductive, but nevertheless imposed, selfmanagement in large social aggregates while aggressively containing those who challenge or fail to grasp the conditions of collaboration. Of course, elements of panoptic linear space remain operant at the global level of transnational firms, banks, and superpower states. In the bureaucratic structures of oversight, these modes of power are critical tools of management for those persons with the highest, broadest, deepest points of access to these institutions. Notwithstanding the prophets of postindustrialism, like Alvin Toffler or John Naisbitt, who see high-tech electronics creating new, more equitable, ‘hightouch’ global communities, advanced communications can also reinforce existing social barriers tied to language, class inequalities, education, or basic code competencies. The development of informational production does not totally destroy the power of industrial production as much as it simply subsumes it: literacy and typographic con-
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sciousness have not been obliterated. They function as axial subcodes of the larger codes of cultural reproduction. In times of crisis the state can always activate a ‘fixed point of view’ in the coercive powers of its bureaucratic, police, and military organs to scroll power directly across its subjects, forcing them to abide by direct bureaucratic dictates. The screens of power also act as a ‘screen’ in the sense of sheltering, protecting, or concealing those with complete access from the view of those with partial or limited access or none at all. Here, for example, hyperreality can hide many of the everyday routines of military or police containment operations in the ghetto, at the Iron Curtain, outside terrorist hide-outs, or along the borders with the Third World, even as they apparently depict them in action. Screenable images of power, then, are always partial or indistinct. Much like the swarming snow of pixels in television broadcasts, hyperreality forces viewers to project continuously their own gestalts of completion into indistinct images of how ‘they’, who have access to the networks of control, imperfectly steer the intertwined systems of collective choice. The basic expectations projected into the postlinear, multiperspectival, nonpanoptic spaces of the electronic mediascapes are assembled imperfectly and incompletely by individuals in the hyperreal sign systems of image-driven informational society. Those with less access listen to, read across, look through, and constantly watch these ‘screens’, taken now in another sense as the many diverse surfaces upon which signs, images or pictures are projected. From these circulating tokens with their partial, polyvalent meanings, diverse private codes with more total, univocal meanings enable individuals and groups to construct new personal and partial conventions of understanding for the mythologies of the spectacle. As Barthes maintains, the form and content of these projections are soaked with mythologies, which organize ‘a world without contradictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident’.27 A new politics of image, in which the authoritative allocation of values and sanctions spins out of the coding and decoding of widely circulating images by politicized ‘issue groups’, arises alongside and above the interest-group politics of industrial society. Contesting these mythologies can expose some of the contradictions and hidden dimensions of image-driven power. But, on the whole, the endless streams of mythological images in turn bring together the flow of elite control, mass acceptance, and individual consent in a new informational social formation—the ‘society of the spectacle’. In work and play, or in public and private, everyone decodes these signs, giving them an individual slant or group style, because most
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commodities ultimately have a ‘do-it-yourself dimension of fulfillment. Conventional culture and unconventional counterculture both rest on the same principles. Everyone’s own needs are interpolated into the screens’ partial, fuzzy images. Not all screens are as explicit as personalized junk mail that attempts to show addressees directly— referring to them by name how a certain commodity fits into their life, why they cannot live fully without the commodity, and how they are or must become what the customized commodity offers. Instead, the codes of commodification most often stipulate that each consumer/ client/citizen complete their own scripts to match the fantasies partially promised on the screens. As hyperreality unfolds, such rudimentary principles provide the shallow ideological tracks of contemporary ‘permissive individualism’. By these actions, individuals alternately can fuse and break their personal desires, at least in part, with the corporate goals of transnational capital and the state, coproducing power by creating their own unique styles of self-government in accord with the codes. On the other hand, ‘those in charge’, like the professional/technical experts, middle-level managers, or the critical intelligentsia, might have slightly greater freedom as code creators or sign managers within more restricted access subscreens of the screen. Yet, beyond the scope of such secured windows, which are defined by these individuals’ special code competence or bureaucratic clearances to access gates, ‘those in charge’ also remain among the code consumers and sign managed. The imperatives of government in hyperreality are those of ‘indirect rule’. Individuals ‘self-manage’ themselves through the mazes of constant commodification. To fuel the growth of transnationalized capitalism, more and more of the everyday lifeworld must be colonized by the corporate coding system reducing autonomous non-commodified behavior to scripted/packaged choices projected across hyperreality. Despite the apparent ‘freedom’ or ‘revolt’ projected by many new cultural styles, the tokens of transnational informational capitalism are still hooked into all the behavioral scripts and material packages flowing across the screens. Moreover, those possibilities that are not yet penetrated soon will be as the codes of exchange absorb new contextual forms to sustain the instrumental substance of exchange. Individual and group resistance constantly works at counter-coding or refunctioning these codes to suit each individual’s or group’s own immediate personal or social uses. Revolutionary changes in these hyperrealities, however, are often not abolitions of the existing regime. Instead, they frequently turn out to be limited affirmations of the regime’s power to expand or contract the degree of freedom in
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collective choice within these transnational means of informational reproduction. Hyperreality, then, offers new kinds of ‘liberation’ from the traditional drudgery of everyday life in agricultural or industrial society. Of course, the extent of, and opportunities for, such emancipation vary greatly across the world’s various societies in relation to the growth of corporate markets. The consumer has had only to accept his or her unique place as a permanent client/customer of global commerce to enjoy the rewards of collaboration. Yet, in the bargain, collaboration also enforces new modes of domination over each individual’s self-management through the ceaseless consumption of corporate capital’s codes, scripts and packages from hyperreality. Resistance or contestation is possible, but frequently it is difficult to organize and sustain beyond the threshold of weak, corrective forms of ‘artificial negativity’.28 Even rebellion and radicalism can become heavily encoded lifestyle choices lived out as conventionalized scripts of behavior in almost ritualized coexistence with government surveillance or police containment. Resistance is often very slow in coming, because individuals cocreate the power that dominates them on these shifting mediascapes as they ‘liberate’ themselves in a self-directed consumption montage of Utopian moments. The material goods and symbolic codes of hyperreality can be refunctioned, by individuals in their use and reception of them, but often only temporarily. The systemic utility and personal value of such commodified micro-utopias derives from individual consumers’ psychic management of their own consumption as a perpetual rerun of image bits personally scanned off the screens of power. The ‘utopia’ of the consumer’s countercoded personal ‘style’ in popular culture simultaneously affirms the ‘ideology’ of capital’s over-coded ‘rationality’ in collective choice. Transnational capital within each of its national markets, therefore, tries to provide individuals with the psychosocial means indirectly to rule himself or herself in hyperreal terms, while permitting it to expand the culture and commerce of its electronic world system elsewhere, confident that most of its current clients will basically leave it alone or that their weak resistance may actually strengthen the flexible codes of corporate commodification.
III Questions: What Must Not Be Done? In informational society, the community and solidarity of ‘the masses’
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are melting into hyperreality. Where unity or commonality can no longer exist organically, they are created via mobilization of images and illusions, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s with the Woodstock nation, extending through the 1980s with Band-Aid style solidarity, and continuing into the 1990s with George Bush’s (or Roger Ailes’) ‘kinder, gentler America’. Images now form group identity among the silent majorities, unifying together and exerting pressure as blocs of like-minded consumers willing to appear at the sites of consumption to make a statement simply by appearing to consume. By the same logic, exurban consumers shopping at a Banana Republic or Ralph Lauren store at Georgetown Park, Inner Harbor or Union Station believe their buyers’ choices are revitalizing Washington, Baltimore or St Louis as real cities. Here the silent majorities ironically may take on a voice and accept a vision in the hyperreal presentation of this sort of collective consciousness. Saying it or showing it to be so in this or that particular frame makes it so, and in making it so, makes it hyperreal. Power in hyperreality derives from controlling the means of simulation, dominating the codes of representation, and managing the signs of meaning that constitute what hyperreality is taken as being at any particular time. By setting the limits of what is hyperreal, and therefore at least temporarily ‘real’, the managers of media, movements, and displays can set agendas, determine loyalties, frame conflicts, and limit challenges to the prevailing organization of what is or is not taken as being real. In this terrain, then, what is to be done with critical theory today? While there are perhaps as many visions of critical theory as there are critical theorists, critical theory today, particularly given the views provided on this brief tour of hyperreality, must deal with several challenges to its understanding of informational societies. First, critical theory must be essentially reflective, reflexive and ironic rather than positive, objective and methodologically formalistic. In seeking a reflective, reflexive or ironic knowledge of social relations, critical theorizing should repudiate a positivistic mode of knowing tied uncritically to natural science models of investigation. Critical analysts must not follow set-piece research strategies, using formalistic methodologies intent upon grinding some preprocessed empirical data through an allegedly objective but still theory-laden mathematical model. The results of such productions almost always fail to resonate successfully with reality, or, more importantly, hyperreality. Critical theory, instead, is a way of seeing and a form of knowing that employs historical knowledge, reflexive reasoning, and ironic aware-
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ness to give people some tools to realize new potentials for the emancipation and enlightenment of ordinary individuals today.29 By adopting insights from semiotic thinking into critical theory, one also should not see semiotics as an all-powerful science of signs that will provide a special, correct consciousness of contemporary society. This danger resides in nearly every corner of modern semiotics. The rise of informational societies arguably places a high premium upon the professional study of codes and communication. Rather than developing semiotics as the open-ended, critical study of how meaning is produced and communicated, experts working in the discipline often seem to reduce it to nothing but a formalized science of signs or methodologies for systematizing signification. To the extent that informationalization travels upon formalized signification systems in the corporate and state rationalization of the economy and society, semiotics as a ‘science’ does perhaps increasingly serve as its ‘appropriate technology’ of both self-disclosure and self-mystification. Its partial deployments in the areas of artificial intelligence, public relations, cryptography, advertising, software engineering, product design, and cognitive science, all illustrate some of these trends. Culture, meaning, and values, however, are much more than merely modes of ‘communication’ or genres of ‘information’. And a critical semiotics can be engaged politically and culturally in disclosing the sources of mystification, power, and domination in the social production and consumption of meaning. When directed to these purposes, it also might broaden the analytical perspective of critical theory on the social context of generating and interpreting knowledge. Second, critical theory must adopt the goal of guiding human actions to realize greater emancipation and enlightenment in the lives of people today. By refining people’s thinking abilities and moral sensibilities, critical theorists should hope to equip individuals with a new consciousness of what must be done and how to do it. This consciousness might help them determine what their best interests should be besides gauging how far they must move away from currently held beliefs that embody elements of domination and exploitation. By helping people come to such realizations, critical theory could advance the process of human emancipation by lessening the victimization that people impose on themselves from within or that is forced upon them from without. Such domination prevents people from attaining their best interests through fully conscious, reasoned activity by blocking the conditions that would allow them to realize liberation. At the same time, however, critical theory must acknowledge the cultural and psychological groundings of the people it addresses.
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There are few general categories or universal classes that can be addressed with complete certainty. While transnational forces are clearly at work on a global scale, their impact on any particular individual, group, locality, or region always has unique peculiarities. Such variations must not be entirely explained away or ignored by abstract critical systems. On the contrary, these particularities in the diverse variations of everyday life must be faced locally in the agenda for change in each individual, group, or region. And third, critical theory also must advance a systematic radical critique of society, demystifying how power, position, and privilege relate to class, group and personal inequalities. By elaborating this ideally open-ended and changing critique with an interest in human enlightenment and emancipation, critical theorists can provide some guideposts for the actual resistance groups always forming at the margins of society. Radical critique aims at identifying in a particular society how ideologies and forms of domination might be overcome in this context and time to obtain greater liberation for more people. Yet its ironic outlook must also alert these resistance efforts to the always unexpected and unintended results of any human action as individuals and groups oppose the prevailing systems of power, position and privilege. More specifically, critical theory must not promote any millenarian fantasies of total redemption through political action. All human beings are entangled and enmeshed in a recalcitrant reality made of enduring cultural traditions, the demands of everyday existence, and often unyielding personal identities that no critical theorist can ever wholly unravel. Any critical theory that ignores these realities runs the risk of presuming too much as it allegedly traces out the ruses of reason into some Jacobin or Stalinist excuse for following an infallible road map to the irresistible future. This sense of irony should always remind us that the future is almost always resistible, and there are few reliable road maps to anywhere. Finally, in developing a critical theory for an informationalizing society, it is also essential to begin developing a post-Marxist critique of commodity production and exchange suitable for use in hyperreality. By retooling insights from many diverse discourses, like the studies in this collection, critical theory begins to stake out some preliminary benchmarks for many new post-Marxist critiques of the events and experiences unfolding on the mediascapes of contemporary informational society.
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Notes * Sections of this chapter are drawn from my Screens of Power: Ideology, Domination and Resistance in Informational Society, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1989. 1 For more detailed treatments of advanced corporate capitalism in its transnational forms of exchange, which is beyond the central focus of this analysis, see Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974; Richard J.Barnet and Ronald E.Mueller, Global Reach: The Power of Multinational Corporations, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974; Andre Gunder Frank, Crisis: in the World Economy, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980; James O’Connor, Accumulation Crisis, New York: Blackwell, 1984; and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 2 For a sample of these discussions, see Richard J.Barnet and Ronald E. Mueller, Global Reach: The Power of Multinational Corporations, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974; Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, New York: Basic Books, 1973; Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, New York: Basic Books, 1976; James R.Beninger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986; Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America, New York: Basic Books, 1982; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era, New York: Viking, 1970; Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959; Peter F. Drucker, The New Society: The Anatomy of Industrial Order, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950; Christopher Evans, The Micro Millenium, New York: Viking Press, 1979; John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 3d ed. rev., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976; Galbraith, The New Industrial State, 3d ed. rev., New York: New American Library, 1978; Alan Gartner and Frank Riessman, The Service Society and the Consumer Vanguard, New York: Harper and Row, 1974; Michael Hudson, Global Fracture: The New International Economic Order,New York: Harper and Row, 1977; Donald M.Lamberton, Ed., The Information Revolution’, Vol. 412, of Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1974; Fritz Machlup, The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962; Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism, London: Verso, 1978; Yoneji Masuda, The Information Society as Post-Industrial Society, Bethesda, MD: World Future Society, 1981; John Naisbitt, Megatrends, New York: Warner Books, 1982; Simon Nora and Alain Minc, The Computerization of Society: A Report to the President of France, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980, Marc Uri Porat, The Information Economy: Definition and Measurement, Washington: Office of Telecommunications, US Department of Commerce, 1977; Robert Reich, The Next American Frontier, New York: Times Books, 1985; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave, New York: William Morrow, 1980; Alain Touraine, The Post-Industrial Society, New York: Random House, 1971; and Frederick Williams, The Communications Revolution, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982. 3 See Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, New York: Semiotext(3), 1983, 2; and Jean Baudrillard, ‘The Structural Law of Value and the Order of Simulacra’, The Structural Allegory: Reconstructive Encounters With the New French Thought, (Ed.) with introduction by John Fekete, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984, 54-71. 4 Baudrillard, Simulations, 3. Baudrillard’s critical project only provisionally sums
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5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18
up the state of society as hyperreal simulacra put an end to traditional social reality. For Baudrillard, needs increasingly have no autonomous basis in an authentic conception of humanity outside of commodity exchange. They are, instead, grounded in the prepackaged expectations of cultural codes conveyed to individuals as part and parcel of their aestheticized duty to consume. Consumers serve as the vital productive force of monopoly capitalism, while the code enforces their productive potential through a free-floating flow of signifiers and signs. There are, of course, many considerable weaknesses as well as some strengths in Baudrillard’s system of analysis. Hyperreality often still seems overshadowed by the tenacity of reality in several spheres of everyday life. And, beyond some of the reservations expressed above, his lack of a consistent theory of the subject at both the individual and mass level makes it difficult to envision a way out of the political contradictions of hyperreality he describes. The ‘who’ and ‘whom’ of these power arrangements are never made concrete—institutional mechanisms, group relations, and political conflicts all still need to be defined much more closely. No moral criteria are elaborated for transforming the simulation regime into some more satisfying system of human organization. There is often no clear political direction or better sense of the ethical choices to be had from Baudrillard’s analyses. His work promotes a deep distrust of collective action, while providing new categories to refine one’s faculties of critique and analysis. Yet what must be (or, at least, might be) done to resist or contest the hyperreal web of simulation is largely left unanswered. The future ‘now’ will only be like the present ‘now’, reiterating an endless play of signs in a never-ending simulation of hyperreal models. For some additional critical discussion of Baudrillard’s project, see Kate Linker, ‘From Imitation, to the Copy, to Just Effect: On Reading Jean Baudrillard’, Art-forum, 22, no. 8, 1984:44–48; Andre Frankovits, (Ed.) Seduced and Abandoned: The Baudrillard Scene, Glebe, New South Wales: Stonemoss Services, 1984; John Miller, ‘Baudrillard and his Discontents’, Artscribe International, 63, May 1987:48–51; and, William Bogard, ‘Sociology in the Absence of the Social: The Significance of Baudrillard for Contemporary Thought’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 13, No. 3, 1987, 227– 242. Baudrillard, Simulations, 4. Ibid., 12–13. Ibid., 55. Ibid., 57–58. Jean Baudrillard, In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities…or the End of the Social, New York: Semiotext(3), 1983, 27. See also Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, St Louis: Telos Press, 1981, for the initial development of this position. Also see Arthur Kroker, ‘Baudrillard’s Marx’, Theory, Culture, and Society, 2, No. 3, 1985, 69– 84. Ibid., 11. Ibid., 30. See Tim Luke, ‘Televisual Democracy and the Politics of Charisma’, Telos, 70, Winter 1986–7, 59–79. Baudrillard, Simulations, 48. See Timothy W.Luke, ‘What’s Wrong with Deterrence?: A Semiotic Interpretation of National Security Policy’, Intertextual/International Relations: Postmodern and Poststructural Readings of World Politics, (Ed.) James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 1989, 207–29. Baudrillard, Simulations, 60. Ibid., 63. See, for example, Jeanne Schuler, ‘Back to Union Station’, Telos, 78, Winter 1988–9, 55–69. Baudrillard, Simulations, 142.
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19 Ibid. 20 Baudrillard, Simulations, 152. 21 Also see Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974; Michael Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process Under Monopoly Capitalism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; Ralf Darendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959; Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods, New York: New York University Press, 1982; David Landes, Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Europe From 1750 to the Present, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969; Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, New York: Basic Books, 1969; Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1934; and Max Weber, General Economic History, New York: Collier Books, 1961. 22 See Elizabeth L.Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change:Communications ana Cultural Transformations in Early Modern Europe, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979; Harold Innis, The Bias of Communication, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977; Harold Innis, Empire and Communications, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972; Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880–1918, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983; Donald M.Lowe, History of Bourgeois Perception, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962; Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, New York: Signet Books, 1964; Charles Newman, The Post-Modern Aura: The Act of Fiction in an Age of Inflation, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1985; and Walter J.Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, London: Methuen, 1982. 23 McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, 126. 24 Ibid., 127. 25 Jean Baudrillard, ‘The Ecstasy of Communication’, The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Post-Modern Culture, Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press, 1983, 126–34. 26 See Mark Poster, Foucault, Marxism and History: Mode of Production versus Mode of Information, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984, 146–69. 27 Roland Barthes, ‘Myth Today’, A Barthes Reader, (Ed.) Susan Sontag, New York: Hill and Wang, 1983, 132. This characterization of myth is echoed in Lefebvre’s critique of advertising publicity: ‘This image duplicates not only an object’s material, perceptible existence but desire and pleasure that it makes into fictions situating them in the land of believe, promising “happiness”—the happiness of being a consumer. Thus publicity that was intended to promote consumption is the first of consumer goods; it creates myths—or since it can create nothing, it borrows existing myths, canalizing signifiers to a dual purpose: to offer them as such for general consumption and to stimulate the consumption of a specific object’. See Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 105. 28 See Paul Piccone, ‘The Crisis of One-Dimensionality’, Telos, 35, Spring 1978:43– 54; and, Tim Luke, ‘Culture and Politics in the Age of Artifical Negativity’, Telos, 35, Spring 1978:55–72. 29 See, for some useful examples, Ben Agger, Fast Capitalism, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1989; Fred R. Dallmayr, Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Politics, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981; Dallmayr, Polis and Praxis: Exercises in Contemporary Political Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984; Kathy Ferguson, The Feminist Case against Bureaucracy, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984; David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, Berkeley: University of California
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Press, 1980; Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950, Boston: Little, Brown, 1973; John O’Neill, On Critical Theory, New York: Seabury, 1976; and Stephen K. White, The Recent Work of Jurgen Habermas: Reason, Justice, and Modernity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
2 Critical Theory, Gramsci and Cultural Studies: From Structuralism to Poststructuralism Raymond A.Morrow
I Introduction: The Crises of Critical Theory
The Argument The task of this essay is to contextualize historically contemporary critical social theory as a revitalized tradition which can be adequately understood and criticized only in terms of its continuous selftransformation in response to critics, emergent (and often opposing) theoretical movements, and societal change in advanced capitalism. In the process, it will be argued that critical theory broadly understood represents the consistently most productive strategy for learning from the crisis of Marxism, struggling against the co-optation of the human sciences by the welfare state, and coming to terms with the changing context of historical events. As Poster has put it: ‘…critical theory contains the best of what remains in the shambles of the Marxist and neoMarxist theoretical positions, the best of what is left of the Left’ 1989:3). Finally, the example of critical theory’s relation to cultural studies will be used as the basis for illustrating both these more general theses about critical theory and to develop more specific arguments about its continuing contributions to cultural studies.1 First, its resilience and openness as a theoretical tradition will be analyzed with respect to its reponse to three fundamental challenges: structuralist Marxist and related semiotic theories; the subsequent Gramscian turn in British cultural studies; and to various more recent currents associated with the concept of poststructuralism. Second, the outcome of these theoretical transformations will be considered as suggesting signs of, and the basis for, a broad convergence between critical theories and neo27
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Gramscian cultural Marxism in the domain of cultural studies. The central thesis will thus be that critical theory has incorporated—or is in the process of successfully incorporating—structuralist, neoGramscian and poststructuralist methods and theoretical constructs without abandoning either an initial commitment to critical theory as a tradition of inquiry or its self-understanding as a political project and form of institutional analysis which has not altogether lost its roots in theories of social and cultural reproduction.2 This is not to say, of course, that critical theory claims some kind of privileged knowledge as the basis for true science; indeed, it implies something rather different: acceptance of its potential fallibility, as well as awareness of its own precarious and contingent relation to social change and the inherent difficulties of any avowedly selfreflective mode of theorizing. As a consequence, critical theory has no need of canonizing its founders (e.g. the first generation Frankfurt School), any more than it needs to canonize Marx, Gramsci, Lukács or any other seminal contributor to social theory. The attitude of the younger generation of critical theorists is expressed by Honneth’s admission that: ‘Only with the awareness of all its deficiencies can one today productively continue the theoretical tradition originated by Max Horkheimer’ (1987:348; see also, Bonß and Honneth, 1982).
Cultural Theory and the Frankfurt School Tradition: Continuities and Discontinuities Critical theory and culture. The focus of this essay will be upon the ongoing re-interpretation of cultural theory in those forms of critical theory which retain some self-conscious identification with the Frankfurt tradition.3 That tradition included a critique of positivism derived from the materialist epistemology of Marx; a political economic analysis of post-liberal capitalism which recognized the primacy of the state as a new source of stability; social psychological research on the foundations of social order in personality structures; and a theoretical analysis of the role of mass culture in the construction of cultural domination. As Honneth concludes, it is in this domain of culture in particular that the original project of critical theory went awry: The theory of culture, the third component of the research project envisaged by Horkheimer, would have been the place to force open the closed functionalism of such an analysis of society. Here it could have been demonstrated that socialized
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subjects are not simply passively subjected to an anonymous steering process but, rather, actively participate with their own interpretative performances in the complex process of social integration. In fact, Horkheimer had, at the beginning, assigned a task to the analysis of culture that theoretically catered for this insight…. If Horkheimer had subsequently followed this line of research, then…that logically independent dimension of social action-orientations and value patterns, which cannot be viewed as a merely functional element in the reproduction of domination, would have become available to him…. In the institute, a type of cultural research was thus adopted in whose framework culture—as in the Marxist superstructural-basis doctrine—appears solely as a functional component of domination securement. (Honneth, 1987:355– 6) Needless to say, a concentration on critical theory as an approach to cultural studies runs the risk of pushing to the margins its simultaneous relationship to political economy and the state, on the one hand, and social psychology, on the other.4 This is of particular importance because one of the distinctive features of critical theory is precisely its attempt to theorize the interrelationship between all three of these forms of analysis. Four phases of cultural analysis. A central theme underlying the analysis of this essay is that the vitality of critical theory in the domain of cultural studies is most evident in its capacity to respond to historical transformations and critically appropriate emergent currents of thinking.5 Though the discussion will focus on the last phase of the process, critical theory generally—and more specifically in the present context its approach to culture—can be loosely periodized in terms of four phases.6 The first three are familiar and need not be reviewed here: (1) an interdisciplinary materialism which attempted to analyze the cultural bases of working-class consciousness in the Weimar Republic; (2) subsequent disillusionment culminating in theories of ‘total administration’ in a ‘one-dimensional society’ in which mass culture had undermined all potential for resistance; and (3) the emergence of an international New Left in the 1960s which drew upon critical theory as part of an effort to reaffirm the existential bases for radical cultural change in advanced capitalism. The fourth phase is of particular concern here because of the way it develops in response to three overlapping, but sequential, fundamental challenges: first, the emergence of structuralist Marxism and discourse theories in the late 1960s as a critique of the voluntarism and
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anti-positivism of the New Left; second, the Gramscian turn in British cultural studies in the late 1970s which sought to restore the structureagency dialectic in a theory of hegemony and resistance in popular culture; and, third, the recognition of the broader social theoretical significance of poststructuralism and deconstructionism in the 1980s.7 If the first three phases of critical theory struggled with the shift from the primacy of the economic to the political, this fourth phase can best be described as a fleshing out of the significance of the political significance of the cultural. The various receptions of Gramsci provide a very suggestive guide to the history of the relations between critical theory and cultural studies, as well as to broader issues in social theory and epistemology. In this context, three phases of the reception of Gramsci in cultural studies will be distinguished which broadly coincide with the three challenges to critical theory: first, the Gramsci invoked by the structuralist theory of ideological apparatuses; second, the Gramsci of critical theories of resistance and counterhegemony which characterize the initial Gramscian turn in British cultural studies and its effort to overcome the culturalist/structuralist split; and, third, the Gramsci of poststructuralist critiques of class theory and essentialism. In this respect, Gramsci becomes the absent presence, the shadow around which the transformation of critical theory has danced.
II Critical Theory and Cultural Reproduction: The Challenges of Structuralism and Semiotics
Introduction With the decline of student movements by the early 1970s, the subsiding and/or incorporation and commercialization of broader countercultural tendencies, the emergence of an international economic crisis, and the rise of Thatcherism and Reaganism, the cultural theories and the politics of the critical theory that influenced the New Left were called fundamentally into question. For many, especially in Britain and France, Althusser’s theory of cultural apparatuses, combined with semiotic theories of discourse, and his overall project of a scientific, structuralist Marxism, appeared the obvious alternative to the failures of humanist Marxism, especially the Hegelian Marxism of the Frankfurt tradition. More generally, a rediscovery of the political economic foundations of Marxism was called for in opposition to the idealistic
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and romantic humanism of critical theory.8 As we will see, the challenge of structuralism (and its conception of social reproduction and related semiotic theories of discourse) proved decisive for the revision and rethinking of the cultural theory of critical theory in the 1970s. Of decisive importance here was a reconsideration of the tasks of critical theory as a form of empirical research, as well as a rethinking of the nature of the relationship between culture, the state and social movements. The task of surveying the response of critical theory to structuralism and structuralist semiotics is complicated by the difficulties of differentiating the complex of tendencies represented by structuralism and poststructuralism, as well as the arbitrariness of separating off cultural analysis from other concerns of critical theory.9 There is an inevitable difficulty in separating out the response of critical theory to structuralism as opposed to poststructuralism, given that they share many assumptions and that their reception took place more or less simultaneously for many of those with access to the original French texts.10 The primary justification for such a separation, beyond the important theoretical shifts entailed, is that the focus of structuralist theories of society is the reproduction of culture, whereas the focus of poststructuralist theories is in part the impossibility, or at least difficulty, of any positive, representational theory of culture in the former sense. Giddens provides a useful characterization of these underlying continuities. Poststructuralist authors, such as Derrida and Foucault, were reacting against aspects of structuralist thought and yet were indebted to many of its diverse assumptions and arguments (e.g. the work of de Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, Lacan, early Barthes). Though handled distinctively in structuralist and post-structuralist writing, a number of shared themes can be identified: …the thesis that linguistics, or more accurately, certain aspects of particular versions of linguistics, are of key importance to philosophy and social theory as a whole; an emphasis on the relational nature of totalities, connected with the thesis of the arbitrary character of the sign, together with a stress upon the primacy of signifiers over what is signified; the decentring of the subject; a peculiar concern with the nature of writing, and therefore with textual materials; and an interest in the character of temporality as somehow constitutively involved with the nature of objects and events. There is not a single one of these themes which does not bear upon issues of importance to social theory today. Equally, however, there is
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not one in respect of which the views of any of the writers listed above could be said to be acceptable. (Giddens, 1987:196) The precise boundaries of the theory of culture are also notoriously difficult to define. Some focus on a more narrowly artistic notion of culture, others slip into a more generic and inclusive one. As Grossberg and Nelson note in their recent collection: …cultural theory is now as likely to study political categories (such as democracy), forms of political practice (such as alliances), and structures of domination (including otherness) and experience (such as subjectification) as it is to study art, history, philosophy, science, ethics, communicative codes or technology. Cultural theory is involved with reexamining the concepts of class, social identity, class struggles, and revolution; it is committed to studying questions of pleasure, space, and time; it aims to understand the fabric of social experience and everyday life, even the foundations of the production and organization of power itself. Consequently, it is all but impossible to define the terrain of cultural theory by pointing to a finite set of object-domains or to the search for a limited set of interpretive tools. (1988:6) As such a definition suggests, the contemporary boundaries between the topics of cultural studies and those of critical theory in general are fluid indeed. To that extent, the effort in the following section to focus on the response of critical theory to structuralism will be confronted not only with the difficulty of precisely differentiating structuralism and poststructuralism, but also isolating cultural research as distinct from the two other major substantive themes of critical theory: the theory of the state and social psychology.
The Structuralist Program Setting aside specifically epistemological and methodological issues, three aspects of the structuralist program were taken to demonstrate the inadequacies of the older form of cultural analysis (derisively characterized as ‘humanist’) associated with both the culturalist wing of British cultural studies and the Frankfurt tradition: (1) a structuralist as opposed to an expressivist conception of totality; (2) a conception
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of ideological apparatuses based on Gramsci; (3) a theory of ideology as material practices indebted to structuralist semiotics, as opposed to the essentialist theories of interpretation linked with hermeneutics. The strain of British cultural studies associated with Althusserian structuralism has been virulently critical of the Frankfurt tradition which is associated with all of the theoretical sins of ‘historicism’, ‘humanism’ and ‘essentialism’, as well as political impotence (see, e.g., Slater, 1977, and the response in Morrow, 1977). The structuralist program in its Althusserian and cultural studies form has been closely linked with a theory of society, even if the discursive dimensions of social reality are strongly emphasized. Broadly speaking, therefore, the issues of cultural studies overlap with the problematic of theories of social and cultural reproduction, i.e. an approach to cultural studies which is necessarily based on a specific model of cultural reproduction.11 With its thesis of economic determinism ‘in the last instance’, structuralist Marxism provided an ostensible alternative to economism, but at the price of a deterministic theory of cultural reproduction which transformed Gramsci’s theory of hegemony into a crude form of (structuralist) functionalism leaving no room for resistance, agency and the sources of cultural innovation required for fundamental transformation.12 Initially, then, in the British context the reception of Gramsci in cultural studies was filtered through the distorting lens of Althusserian interpretations. Though it is acknowledged that his epistemological position is flawed by ‘historicism’, class reductionism, and a relativization of criteria of theoretical validity, it is argued that this historicism ‘is in no sense a clear-cut issue’ given its ‘partial nature’ (Hall, et al., 1978:46). Such a less critical position, moreover, is held to converge with Althusser’s self-criticism which rejects ‘the generalized divorce between science and ideology as an epistemological position (1978:72). And despite these weaknesses, he does have an ‘unrivalled sense of the material forms and production of ideology and political struggle, the anti-psychologistic stricture that ideology is an epistemological and structural matter, and the lasting value of his own specific concepts…’ (Ibid.). As well, the structuralist intervention suggested the primacy of the theory of ideology (e.g., Hall, et al., 1978) and culminated in more or less reductionist semiotic theories of ideological discourse such as that developed by Michel Pêcheux in France (see Thompson, 1984:232– 54) and expressed in a rather different form in work such as that found in the ‘Screen’ tradition (Coward and Ellis, 1977).
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Responding to the Challenges of Structuralism The remarkable rise and rapid fall of structuralist Marxism in the 1970s has now been well-documented (see, for example, Benton, 1984; Morrow, 1986a). What has been noted less often is the salutary effect this transitory movement had upon revitalizing the critical theory of culture and cultural studies generally. Documenting this would require surveying the vast literature which has emerged in the various subfields of critical cultural research such as mass communications, sports, leisure, and popular culture, literature and the arts, education, law, religion and theology, and feminist theory. The following discussion will draw only very selectively on such research for purposes of illustration. The task of the present brief review is to demonstrate how the strategy of critical theory and related responses in cultural studies contributed significantly to the more enduring forms of analysis—despite some residual, unresolved difficulties—which escaped the extremes of either instrumentalism and economism (the heritage of nineteenth century vulgar Marxism), on the one hand, or a hyperstructuralism (the heritage of 1960s French theory) on the other. The most explicit version of this critical engagement with structuralism in critical theory can be found in the work of Giddens. Again, symptomatically, this initially takes place without any explicit reference to Gramsci or the theory of hegemony as such (e.g., Giddens, 1976; 1979; 1984; 1987). In the form of somewhat stylized simplifications, the general response of critical theories to structuralism—despite differences of emphasis and detail—can be described as follows: first, with respect to a theory of totality, a conception of society as a totality in which the theory of cultural reproduction does not collapse the distinction between the systemic and social action levels of analysis; second, a resulting conception of hegemony (or of domination, to use the conventional terminology of the Frankfurt tradition) which increasingly stresses its uneven and contradictory character, as well as its inherent connection with processes of counterhegemony and resistance; third, conceptions of discourse and ideology which preserve a sense of the autonomy of the cultural, as well as breaking down unnecessary, artificial distinctions between critical hermeneutic and social semiotic approaches to cultural analysis; and fourth, an active conception of the subject as agent, but one minus the naive voluntarism of existentialism and social phenomenology. Totality. Whatever the limitations of studies inspired by structuralist political economy, they served to address central empirical ques-
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tions in a way which had been initiated by but later neglected in the older Frankfurt School, e.g., its analysis of cultural industries. One of the consequences was a renewed sense of the importance of an ‘empirical turn’ in critical theory (Forester, 1985). Ironically, economism represented one of the original targets of critique within the Frankfurt tradition; on the other hand, its effort to draw upon the concept of totality following Lukács tended to culminate in functionalist type theory of cultural reproduction (e.g. Adorno’s ‘total administration’ and Marcuse’s ‘one-dimensional society’) which, despite different epistemological assumptions, anticipated Althusser’s theory of ideological apparatuses. Responding to both the limitations of this earlier Frankfurt approach, as well as to Althusserian structuralism, students of critical theory and cultural studies moved toward more open models of cultural reproduction, e.g., the cultural-reproductive model of Bourdieu and his associates, and hegemonic-state reproductive models indebted to a non-Althusserian version of Gramsci, and various types of resistance theories (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1985:74–109). Also in this context, Habermas’s (1987) bilevel model of society based on the distinction between systems and social integration could be viewed as a parallel move away from both the economic-reproductive models of structuralist Marxism and the base-superstructure model of early critical theory. Domination. Given that Frankfurt critical theory had long rejected economism, following the lead of Lukács’ conception of totality, it resisted Althusserian structuralism on substantive as well as epistemological grounds because it already had a well-developed theory of cultural reproduction (exemplified in the theory of cultural industries, etc.). The thesis of the decline of the public sphere (Habermas) provided an account of how the rise of the mass media cultural industries had eroded emergent potentials for democratization, but the resulting theory was not reductionist in the sense found in the work of Adorno’s theory of ‘total administration’ and Marcuse’s ‘onedimensional society’. Though the term hegemony as such figured infrequently in the writings of critical theorists, their theory of cultural industries and new social movements converged broadly with non-structuralist interpretations of Gramsci. Ideology. Third, structuralist semiotics and related theories of ideology were initially taken by many to render obsolete the earlier hermeneutically grounded theory of ideology of the type represented in the Habermas-Gadamer debate (see Warnke, 1987). Yet as a number of more recent studies have suggested, a fully social and pragmatic semiotics (e.g., Hodge and Kress, 1988) is not in principle
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incompatible with critical theories of ideology (e.g., Thompson, 1984), even though a number of theoretical and methodological issues remain to be worked out. The crucial point is that critical theory has not remained mired in the problematic of hermeneutics and has selectively appropriated useful aspects of semiotic structuralism and theories of discourse. The subject. Finally, critical theories have sought to restore the agency-structure dialectic, fully aware of the difficulties of voluntarism and overly centred conceptions of the subject. The object of critique here has been the notion of an ‘interpellated subject’ found in Althusser. A good example of the resulting response can be found in the work of Connell (1983) which begins with a critique of theories of cultural reproduction and how they need to be complemented by an historical depth psychology which can accommodate issues of embodiment, gender, class formation, and intellectual work. More generally, critical theories of education appropriated Gramscian themes in the name of a theory of resistance (Giroux, 1983). In sum, the challenge to critical theory and related tendencies in cultural studies posed by structuralist Marxism and related tendencies in cultural studies was fourfold: to regain a sense of the empirical importance of economic structures and state mediation, without relapsing into instrumentalist or structuralist reductionism; to develop a theory of cultural struggle which challenges static conceptions of hegemony and domination; to articulate a theory of cultural forms which could draw upon advances in semiotic theories of communication; and to provide an approach to the subject which preserved the agency-structure dialectic and incorporated a theory of resistance, and yet did not rely upon some of the more problematic assumptions of expressivist conceptions of totality and related understandings of ideology and subjectivity.
Cultural Theory and Critical Theory: Residual Problems Whatever the gains made by critical theory in its efforts to develop empirical research, as well as to deal with the challenge of structuralism and semiotics, several general weaknesses continued to hamper the revitalization of critical theory. First, several aspects of critical theory in the 1970s called into question its status as an orientation to theory and research: a lack of clear disciplinary identification and distinctive strategy for empirical research; an ambiguous relation to North American traditions of research and politics given its European
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origins; a continuing focus on high culture and an ambivalence toward popular culture inherited from the Fankfurt tradition, and the absence of any clear theoretical contribution to, or well-developed position with respect to, Third World issues.13 Second, it was also confronted with a political challenge on two fronts. On the one hand, critical theory’s abandonment of the theory of proletarian revolution left it without the traditional collective agent of historical change which, with reservations, was retained in neoMarxist political economy. On the other hand, the rise of neoconservatism further called into question its political relevance by suggesting that the theory of legitimation crisis (ostensibly an alternative to traditional class-based crisis theory) failed to provide the promised insights into strategies for a revitalization of the public sphere (Lawrence, 1989). In short, by the early 1980s the resurgence of critical theory seemed once again endangered because of criticism on its neo-Marxist left flank (Eurocommunism), as well as continuing hostility within the mainstream of the academic social sciences. With the decline of Eurocommunism and the collapse of East bloc Marxist ideology, however, the neo-Marxist political challenge has evaporated. As well, the emergence of two new theoretical challenges opened the way for a new phase of theoretical renewal. First, rapid theoretical and political disillusionment with structuralist Marxism elicited a crisis in British cultural studies which culminated in a Gramscian turn which broadly convergences with more recent development in critical cultural theory—the theme of the next section. Further, the gradual penetration in the 1980s of poststructuralist debates (initially confined to philosophy and literary theory) into social theory began to transform dramatically the presuppositional foundations of the confrontation between critical theory, neo-Gramscian theory, and empirical social science.
III The Challenge of The Neo-Gramscian Turn in British Cultural Studies
Cultural Studies and The Second Reception of Gramsci Historically, the use of the term ‘cultural studies’ has its origins in various attempts inspired by the work of Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, E.P.Thompson and Stuart Hall, with the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies as the initial institutional base.14 Though orig-
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inally split between its ‘culturalist’ (Williams, Thompson) and ‘structuralist’ wings (Althusserians), British cultural studies shared an emphasis on the discursive dimensions of cultural reproduction and a critique of economistic Marxism (Hall, 1980). Though eclectically influenced by the Frankfurt tradition, Gramsci, Althusserian structuralism, Lacanian psychoanalysis, Foucault and poststructuralism, etc., this tradition was never static and never developed a unified perspective or program (Johnson, 1983). Quite significantly, it attempted to be interdisciplinary and purposely tended to eschew any traditional disciplinary definitions, focusing instead on the ‘cultural’ as a distinctive object of inquiry. Nevertheless, there is a strong identification with the objectives of the social sciences, despite the appropriation of concepts and methods from the humanities and philosophy.
Neo-Gramscian Cultural Studies Beyond the culturalist/structuralist split. With the decline of Althusserianism by the late 1970s, the way was opened for overcoming the simple opposition of ‘structuralism’ and ‘culturalism’ which represented respectively the ‘imported’ and ‘home-grown’ varieties of cultural studies (Bennett, 1986a:xii). ‘In the perspective of structuralism, popular culture was often regarded as an “ideological machine” which dictated the thoughts of the people…with law-like regularity…. Culturalism, by contrast, was often uncritically romantic in its celebration of popular culture as expressing the authentic interests and values of subordinate social groups and classes’ (1986a:xii). Whereas structuralism dominated the study of film, television and popular writing, culturalism was more predominant in the study of sport and subcultures: ‘It was almost as if the cultural sphere were divided into two hermetically separate regions, each exhibiting a different logic’ (1986a: xiii). As Bennett concludes: ‘the only way out of this impasse, therefore, seemed to be to shift the debate on to a new terrain which would displace the structuralist-culturalist opposition, a project which inclined many working in the field at the time to draw increasingly on the writings of Antonio Gramsci, particularly those on the subject of hegemony’ (Ibid.). Redefining the popular. A crucial aspect of the Gramscian turn in cultural studies has been a move away from the abstract, functionalist theorizations of the theory of state ideological apparatuses toward a rethinking of popular culture. This does not reflect an abandonment of the importance of the analysis of dominant cultural institutions,
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but it does acknowledge that their functioning cannot be separated from their capacity to incorporate popular culture. On the one hand, this suggests abandoning a content-oriented definition of popular culture as reflecting some kind of relationship to the ‘people’ (i.e., working class). As Bennett suggests: By contrast, I shall argue in favour of an approach which keeps these terms definitionally empty—or at least relatively so —in the interest of filing them politically in varying ways as changing circumstances may require. According to such a view, popular culture can be defined only abstractly as a site— always changing and variable in its constitution and organization—which, since it provides one of the key terrains for the struggle over the political production of ‘the people’ and ‘the popular’, cannot be more precisely specified in terms of these concepts. (1986b:8) As Hall now argues, Gramsci represents a ‘veritable Copernican revolution in Marxist approaches to the state’ because, first, it acknowledges the productive, positive aspects of state power, not only the negative and repressive, and second because of its stress on the importance of culture, especially popular culture (1986:22). For Hall, in the British context that suggests studying the ways in which ‘the British state has always played a crucial role in conforming popular culture to the dominant culture’ (1986:23).
The Gramscian Legacy and Critical Theory The neglect of Gramsci. One of the anomalies of the development of critical theory as a general theoretical approach in sociology has been the virtual absence—until more recently—of any sustained, explicit dialogue between the Frankfurt tradition and the legacy of Antonio Gramsci.15 None of the major representatives of the West German tradition has made this a focus of concern. This tendency has been paralleled in Gramsci’s virtual absence in the writings of the major Anglo-American philosophical and sociological representatives of critical theory such as Giddens, Richard Bernstein, Alvin Gouldner, Norman Birnbaum, etc. Symptomatic here is Gramsci’s absence in John Thompson’s otherwise systematic and wide-ranging Studies in the Theory of Ideology (1984). The notable exceptions have been associated with specifie areas of the sociology of culture or the state or the
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Gramscian version of critical theory developed by Paul Piccone and promoted by Telos. Implicit convergence? With the waning of Althusserianism, however, the affinities between contemporary critical theory and cultural Marxism have become clearer, though rarely made explicit. One of the significant, unifying themes of the forms of cultural research influenced by critical theory in the late 1970s onward was the pervasive indirect influence of Gramsci, especially an interpretation at odds with the structuralist account of Althusser. Such ‘humanist’ interpretations stressed the affinities with Frankfurt critical theory. As a consequence, in the domain of cultural research one finds an association between critical theory and Gramscian tendencies which is not reflected in more general discussions of critical theory, most conspicuously among those influenced by Habermas and Claus Offe, though John Keane (1988b) is an exception here. Generally, the anti-structuralist retrieval of Gramsci was closely associated with approaches to cultural analysis which sought to combine a structural theory of society with phenomenologically sensitive analyses of lived-experience and the complexity of hegemonic relations. Within the cultural studies tradition, the work of Willis (1981) on working-class ‘lads’, or more generally work on popular culture (e. g., Bennett, et al., 1986; Gruneau, 1988) is exemplary here. Research in historical sociology with roots in the culturalist tradition, such as that of Corrigan and Sayer (1985) on state formation and culture in Britain, clearly transcends the culturalist/structuralist dichotomy, echoing as well influences from critical theory and Gramsci. As for those identifying with or more directly allied with critical theory, educational research is one of the most important sites of such inquiries (e. g., Apple, 1982; Giroux, 1983). In this educational context the latent tension also becomes evident between studies originating in the Weberian and critical theory problematic of legitimation (as in the work of Giroux) and those beginning with the Marxian-Gramscian problematic of hegemony.16 A number of studies in communications and advertising and elsewhere could also be cited in this context. For example, though mentioning Gramsci only in passing, Kellner finds it unproblematic to explain Horkheimer and Adorno’s theory with a Gramscian vocabulary: ‘In Gramsci’s terminology, the culture industries reproduce capitalist hegemony over the working class by engineering consent to the existing society, thereby establishing a sociopsychological basis for social integration’ (1989:131). But again, Kellner feels no need to justify these affinities—symptomatic of the silent and largely unreflected appropriation of Gramscian themes in con-
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temporary critical theory. Similarly, Hearn’s (1978) study of domination, legitimation and resistance in the incorporation of the nineteenth century English working class is based on the work of Marcuse and Habermas and makes no mention of Gramsci, despite obvious affinities. Obviously, this remains a rich area of exploration which requires further development. The crucial point, however, is that whether Gramsci is explicitly cited or not critical theory has converged with neo-Gramscian cultural studies in its stress upon the articulation between state policy and popular culture, completing this as well with a theory of consumption (see Kellner, 1989:146–66) which goes far beyond the weak social psychological foundations of cultural studies.
IV Where is Critical Theory Now? The Poststructuralist Challenge
Introduction The problematic. The forms of critical cultural research alluded to above continue to develop, gain more extensive footholds in disciplines, and exert a small, but significant influence in many areas of professional practice, policy research, and in social movements. Though it is now possible to have a sense of historical perspective with respect to the issues surrounding the reception and critique of structuralism, the same cannot be said of the challenge of poststructuralism. What is in question here are ongoing debates whose resolution or final direction remains to be determined. Further, the issues surrounding the concept of poststructuralism resist any unified characterization and, not surprisingly, the responses of those associated with critical theory have been diverse, and sometimes contradictory. With the rapid decline of structuralist Marxism, and general disillusionment with the possibilities of fundamental change, poststructuralist tendencies emerged in France—associated above all with Derrida’s deconstructionism and Foucault’s theory of power and discourse— and quickly became popular in literary criticism and philosophy, eventually spreading even to sociology in the late 1980s (Hoy, 1986; Norris, 1982). In the process, methods of cultural analysis dependent upon broadly genetic structuralist assumptions (i.e., the sociology of knowledge, as well as both critical theory and neo-Gramscian cultural studies) were called into question. Unlike more orthodox forms of Marxism, however, critical theory has proven resilient in its capacity
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to effectively appropriate aspects of poststructuralism without succumbing to either some of its conservative political implications or its tendency toward a pan-discursive reductionism. There are at least three important contexts in which the confrontation of critical theory and poststructuralism could be taken up in the context of cultural studies: (1) the systematic response of Habermas and those influenced by his example (see Dews, 1987); (2) specific disciplinary studies which identify with critical theory but have drawn extensively upon poststructuralist concepts and authors; and (3) the convergence of critical theory and poststructuralism in the context of neo-Gramscian cultural studies. The latter two contexts are of primary concern here.17 But first of all, it must asked, what are the issues at stake with the problematic of ‘poststructuralism’? In many respects these tendencies have provided an even more fundamental threat than structuralism to the Marxist tradition: …rejecting structuralism’s unreflective claims to scientificity, crediting the semiotic and political nature of its own theorizing, recognizing that a more radically problematized human subject did have a place in textual production—it began to confront the implications these positions had for its own critical practice. While cultural Marxists did accept the ideological bases of their own theoretical and political positions, and consequently had begun to recognize the problematic, contingent nature of its own interpretive activities, it was poststructuralism that gave Marxists the vocabulary with which to begin to theorizetheir own determination. (Grossberg and Nelson, 1988:7; emphasis added). Whatever misgivings neo-Marxists may have had toward critical theory, they were mild by comparison to the sense of the threat posed by poststructuralism. And as opposed to the revitalizing effects of the challenge of structuralism and semiotics, the consequences of poststructuralism for neo-Marxism were potentially catastrophic.18 Whereas the transition from instrumentalism to structuralism allowed maintaining, and even enhancing, the identity of Marxism as a scientific enterprise, poststructuralism called into question its very foundations as a form of knowledge. By contrast, critical theory had long confronted the specter of epistemological nihilism in relation to its own critique of positivism and Adorno’s later writings; and it has been suggested that ‘the closest approximation of deconstruction on
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the left is the work of Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin’ (Ryan, 1982: xiv). As well, from the outset critical theory—unlike cultural Marxism—had been aware of the problematic of its ‘own determination’. Though critical theory could not emerge unscathed, it could retain its (if increasingly decentered) identity and accommodate to an anti-foundationalist epistemology in a way which has been virtually impossible for conventional neo-Marxists who took the challenges of poststructuralism seriously. As will be argued in this section, critical theory has provided the framework for a broader theoretical critique of poststructuralism, as well as appropriated a number of useful concepts and methods which have been used effectively in recent research. The attitude of many critical theorists in this context is effectively captured by Giddens’ pronunciamento: Structuralism, and post-structurahsm also, are dead traditions of thought. Notwithstanding the promise they held in the fresh bloom of youth, they have ultimately failed to generate the revolution in philosophical understanding and social theory that was once their pledge…although they did not transform our intellectual universe in the manner so often claimed, they none the less drew to our attention some problems of considerable and durable significance. (1987:195) For purposes of exposition the response of critical theory to poststructuralism will be identified in relation to the three themes: Jacques Derrida’s deconstructionism and the challenge to theories of representation; Michel Foucault’s genealogical inquiries and theory of power; and the modernism/postmodernism debate. Obviously, such complex issues can only be treated superficially in the context of outlining the terrain of debate as an introduction to the final section where several representative examples of critical theory’s appropriation of these poststructuralist themes will be reviewed in two contexts: first, representative efforts to combine critical theory with poststructuralist techniques to deconstruct disciplinary traditions as discourses (e.g. mass communications, education, and sociology as a science); and second, poststructuralist appropriations of Gramsci for the purposes of a form of cultural studies which converges with and complements more conventional forms of contemporary critical theory. Some key issues. As a critique of metaphysics in all its forms, the impact of Derrida in the context of the Marxist tradition and social theory has been that of a challenge to the theories of representation and positive knowledge on which they are grounded. On the one
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hand, then, this theme converges with anti-foundationalist critiques of epistemology—a problem to which Habermas’s theory of communicative action attempts a constructive response. On the other hand, conceptions of deconstructive reading point to the possibilities of a form of discourse analysis which (in contrast to a conservative American literary adaptation of deconstructive theory) has been held to provide the basis for a deepened theory of political criticism (e.g., Ryan, 1982). As we shall see, both of these themes have influenced some recent discussions in critical theory. Broadly speaking, Foucault’s critical relation to the Marxist tradition, his anti-positivism, and critique of the instrumental rationality of the human sciences converges on many crucial points with the critical theory tradition. Not surprisingly, his work has produced a largely sympathetic dialogue with a number of critical theorists (e.g., Smart, 1983; Poster, 1984, 1989). At the same time, his theory of power has posed a fundamental challenge to the theory of emancipation and ideal speech which underlies Habermas’s theoretical program in particular, especially his insistence on the constructive aspects of power and the illusory aspects of any utopia which would abolish power relations (D’Amico, 1989; Dews, 1987; Miller, 1987). Though somewhat removed from the discussions that follow, the question of whether modernism has been in a significant way supplanted by a postmodern cultural epoch is also an ongoing source of debate (Featherstone, et al., 1988; Foster, 1983; Huyssen, 1986; Jameson, 1984; Lenz and Schell, 1986; Ross, 1988). On the one hand, Habermas (1987; see Bernstein, 1985) has challenged postmodernist theorists in speaking of modernity as an ‘incomplete project’ and in stressing the conservative and irrational aspects of postmodernism. Others, with affinities to critical theory (e.g. Jameson, Baudrillard, Lyotard), have suggested that postmodern tendencies require a fundamental revision of social theory. As Kellner (1988:266) has concluded that ‘the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School therefore has yet to develop a theory of postmodernism beyond its denunciations of postmodern social theory and culture’, this applies most specifically to Habermas.19 Indirectly, the studies to be reviewed below constructively engage these issues in various ways.
Critical Theory and Disciplinary Deconstructions Responses to discourse theory. The concepts of ‘discourse analysis’ and discourse theory generally have become among the more elusive
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in modern social theory. Such terms have been applied to such diverse activities as the seemingly directionless and apolitical technical analysis of certain ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts to theories of ideology critique. What such enterprises share, however, is a sense of the textual character and narrative structures of social reality; though not by themselves completely new to the human sciences, such approaches have added a remarkable arsenal of theoretical and methodological resources for the study of meaning and cultural processes generally. What critical theory has necessarily resisted, however, is the tendency of poststructuralist discourse theories to undercut the material dimensions of social explanation altogether. In other words, the analysis of discourse cannot be ultimately separated from socio-historical accounts of their genesis. Poststructuralist theories of discourse have the advantage of rejecting the reductionism of earlier structuralist theories of discourse within which the categories of ideology and economic determinism ‘in the last instance’ play a decisive role. Even if poststructuralism may tend toward a problematic ‘indeterminism in the last instance’, its anti-positivism has left space for a more open and eclectic appropriation by critical theorists. The present selection can only be exemplary, both with respect to the authors and topics; and most obviously, other strategic domains could also be reviewed in similar terms.20Yet each of the following studies clearly illustrates the general argument that fruitful encounters between critical theory and poststructuralist discourse theory have illuminated a number of disciplinary domains—without abandoning the original intentions of critical theory as a political project. Communications discourse. Marike Finlay’s Powermatics: A Discursive Critique of New Communications Technology (1987) is based on a comprehensive analysis of the international discourse on communications technologies as manifest in the range of debate: ‘theory, journalism, advertising, popularized scientific reporting as well as policy and mandate documents’ are utilized (1987:28). The outcome is a closely argued and rigorous analysis which reveals that the discursive practices of those who, in popular debate, are ‘for’ or ‘against’ new technologies are remarkably similar in their reliance upon presuppositions deriving from classical scientism and instrumental conceptions of rationality. Of particular interest here, however, is the method of discourse analysis employed which combines three distinctive elements: an account of the ‘discursive procedures’ through which the discourse on communications technology is constructed; a social and historical contextualization of these discursive social practices; and a constructive
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policy strategy for revitalizing the discourse on communications and reconceptualizing communications research. The basis of this approach is a carefully thought out, rigorous appropriation of the analysis of discourse as developed by Foucault, but largely within the framework of a theory of potential communicative competence indebted to Habermas and Bakhtin.21 Rather than stressing the tensions between Foucault and Habermas, she draws out their affinities: the notion of ideal speech in the domain of communications is taken to suggest a form of empowerment, not the abolition of power. From this perspective the realization of a community of ideal speech in relation to communications technology would entail offering rights such as the following to all members of society: ‘(1) equal rights to appropriate discourse; (2) equal rights to change the prepositional content of discourse; (3) equal rights to change the level of discourse, i.e. from object-level to meta-level where the rules of communicating are reevaluated; (4) equal rights to place into question and to reformulate the laws of communication followed at any particular time by a particular society of communicators’ (1987:278–9). Educational discourse. Philip Wexler’s somewhat misleadingly titled Social Analysis of Education: After the New Sociology (1987) is in most respects methodologically parallel to Finlay’s, but departs from a more pessimistic sense of the political conjuncture at hand: The cultural revolution that was expressed early in the student movement and that later appeared in paradigmatic critiques of academic social science has been contained’ (1987:3). To the extent that versions of critical theory penetrated educational discourse much earlier in the context of the ‘new sociology’ of education, there has been time to reflect upon the theoretical implications of its failure. Analogous to Finlay’s finding that the critics of communications shared many of the presuppositions of their opponents, it is argued that in neglecting its own historicity, the new sociology of education’s attack on liberalism remains (pace Foucault) within the same episteme and suffers from the ‘discursive blockage’ entailed in ‘occupying space allocated to negation and critique’ (1987:6). The way out of this discursive blockage is identified with the rather unfortunate term ‘social analysis’: ‘... sociology is being replaced by social analysis’, i.e. the theoretical analogue of a series of global transformations associated with theories of a ‘post-industrial society’, an ‘ecological society’ or, in the cultural sphere, semiotics and poststructuralism. ‘The transformation includes, then, postindustrialism in social life and post-structuralism in social analysis’ (1987:8). In short, such social analysis requires taking seriously the ‘historical movement
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that is redundantly announced in many analytical languages: poststructuralism, semiotics, anti-humanism, textualism, postindustrialism, the information society, the micro-electronic revolution, the video-age, anti-logocentrism, deconstruction, decentring’ (1987:11). In applying this approach to the educational left, Wexler seeks to replace the ‘contemporary combination of functionalist structuralism and romantic individualism (‘reproduction’ and ‘resistance’) with an approach which attempts to ‘show how a social reading of post-structuralism and a critical reading of postindustrialism can combine toward a historically appropriate theory and practice of education’ which culminates in ‘a new politics in which education is understood as a collective discursive practice’ (1987:16). Clearly—though it is obscured by the vague notion of ‘social analysis’22—this suggests a somewhat more radical appropriation of poststructuralist themes than that suggested by Finlay’s analysis of communications (which may reflect the somewhat more benign form of conservative restoration in Canada). What is at stake for Wexler is not only a discursive analysis of new cultural phenomena, but how these presage a new ‘semiotic society’ which renders obsolete previous left political strategies: ‘the meaning of critical theory is changing’ because ‘left professional middle-class institutional intellectuals became a socially residual remnant, rather than the institutional vanguard of an ascendant social class segment’ (1987:123). Crucial here was the way in which the new sociologies and old critical theory failed to grasp the significance of ‘textualism’ which was dismissed as ‘idealism’ (1987:124). Parallel with Finlay, however, Wexler insists such textualism not only reflects the emergent form of production, but also ‘helps recast symbolic and literary theories as a new type of critical social theory’ (1987:126). Though this does not entail completely displacing hermeneutic textualism, the poststructuralist and postmodernist themes found in Derrida, Barthes, Foucault, and Baudrillard are given priority. The outcome of this analysis, however, draws us away from disciplinary cultural studies analysis toward the new social psychology of ‘collective, though individualized, identities’ which is to be transformed in the context of education (1987:170ff.). Though an analysis and evaluation of Wexler’s specific strategic considerations go beyond the task here, his approach clearly demonstrates the capacity of critical theory to appropriate poststructuralist themes which parallel, but also radicalize, Finlay’s analysis by implicitly questioning the presuppositions of Habermas’s theory of ideal communication. Sociological discourse. In his Socio(onto)logy: A Disciplinary Read-
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ing (1989), Ben Agger turns the textual strategies of poststructuralist theory against the discipline of sociology and ‘mainstream Marxism’. Here we find a third strategy of appropriating poststructuralist themes which recombines a now familiar set of elements: an identification with critical theory, a methodological focus upon the strategic importance of a discursive analysis of disciplinary traditions, and an insistence upon the historical and contextual dimensions of social reality. Several features of Agger’s approach, however, diverge somewhat from the cases of Finlay and Wexler. Unlike Wexler, for whom Habermas is implicitly consigned to the dustbin of ‘old critical theory’, Agger sees an essential continuity between Habermas and socio-textual analysis, but seeks to further radicalize the issues: ‘I too contribute to the reformulation of Marxism as communication theory albeit in ways that more explicitly draw from poststructuralism and feminism’ (1989:22), as well as a theory of ‘fast capitalism’ (analogous to Wexler’s ‘semiotic society’) where texts obscure their own narrative nature. In so doing Agger explicitly acknowledges breaking ‘the strangely symptomatic silence between Derrideans and secondgeneration critical theorists like Habermas, who nonetheless converge on certain issues of substance’ (1989:28; but see Noms [1985] and Ryan [1982] for exceptions here). Agger (via Adorno’s influence) also sides with Derrida on an important issue relating to the nature of science as a form of writing. Whereas Habermas (1987:190ff.) challenges, for epistemological and other reasons, Derrida’s tendency to blur the distinctions between genres (e.g., philosophy, science, literature) by unjustifiably giving rhetoric priority over logic, Agger’s concern with demystifying the representational illusions of positive sociology leads him to remind us that ‘like any scientific literature, sociology embodies a subtext, methodology, enjoining imagination’ (1989:40). Here critical theory appropriates a deconstructionist theme in justifying itself as a literary mode of knowledge: ‘A different version of writing, call it critical theory, demonstrates the possibility of itself and thus of an open world not reproduced iteratively by a text that would end itself in a last paroxysm of cumulated data—text swallowing whole the world finally reduced to the tracelessness of number, signification failing to signify. Otherwise thought dissolves into the whir and hum of computers’ (1989:304). Though both Finlay and Wexler recognize the crucial contribution of poststructuralism to deepening the concept of reflexivity, they do not explicitly couple this in theory (or writing practice) with the ‘literary’ implications of critical theory as a form of communicative competence or its implications for ideal speech.
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Gramsci and Poststructuralist Cultural Studies Beyond Gramsci? As we have seen, the legacy of Adorno and Benjamin, along with the linguistic turn in Habermas, have made the dialogue between Frankfurt critical theory and poststructuralism both natural and constructive. Authors such as Finlay, Wexler and Agger clearly demonstrate the power of critical theory to appropriate aspects of poststructuralism without succumbing to its conservative, relativistic, and idealistic tendencies. On the other hand, the confrontation between neo-Gramscian cultural studies and poststructuralism would not seem initially to have such fruitful potential. Nothing might seem more incongruous than Gramsci and poststructuralism. Gramsci the resolute Marxist militant, theorist of praxis, and proponent of an existential strategy based on ‘pessimism of the intellect’ and ‘optimism of the will’, would apper at complete odds with critiques of representation and theories of the subject, let alone poststructuralist theories of power and postmodernity which back off from confronting the monoliths of hegemonic power and dominant ideologies. The sense of that incompatibility is certainly well-grounded, so what meaning could the confrontation of Gramsci and poststructuralism have? The question is whether a third—poststructuralist—reading of Gramsci is possible, one which moves beyond either the structuralist or humanist ones that informed the earlier oppositions within cultural studies.23 If so, then the continuity between the traditions of critical theory and Gramsci might be sustained. The point of departure here was Mouffe’s (1979) contention of a convergence between Gramsci and Foucault, a point which Smart (1983:42) perceptively anticipated. He implied that there is ‘a considerable departure within Gramsci’s work from the central tenets of Marxism’, and that this might ‘simultaneously serve as an indirect confirmation of the limits of the Marxist problematic’. As we shall note in a moment, this was precisely the theme elaborated in Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) subsequent work. To anticipate the argument to follow: as inheritors of a Marxist tradition in ruins (now dramatically symbolized in postmodern form by the celebration of mere ‘bourgeois’ freedoms atop a now liberated Berlin Wall), critical theories of society which aspire to a constructive political project appear to be confronted by two major options: the anti-foundationalist strategy of Habermas’s theory of communicative action or a poststructuralist neo-Gramscian theory of culture, ideology and social movements.24 It is the latter strategy which is of inter-
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est now, especially some of its contradictory manifestations: first, those who push the logic of a poststructuralist critique of Gramsci and Marxism to some of its more paradoxical conclusions, yet still attempt to remain within an avowedly leftist perspective; and those who have begun the constructive task of reconstituting a postGramscian critical theory. Pessimism of the intellect? Post-Marxism and panic postmodernism. Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralist reading of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony opens the floodgates within mainstream Marxism: Our principal conclusion is that behind the concept of ‘hegemony’ lies hidden something more than a type of political relation complementary to the basic categories of Marxist theory. In fact, it introduces a logic of the social which is incompatible with those categories…. As we shall argue… the expansion and determination of the social logic implicit in the concept of ‘hegemony’—in a direction that goes far beyond Gramsci— will provide us with an anchorage from which contemporary social struggles are thinkable in their specificity, as well as permitting us to outline a new politics for the Left based upon the project of radical democracy. (1985:3) The details of Laclau and Mouffe’s argument are not so important here as the strategic importance of a poststructuralist reading of Gramsci and the radical consequences for any politically interested conception of cultural studies. As they conclude, ‘the very possibility of a unified discourse of the Left is also erased…. Discursive discontinuity becomes primary and constitutive. The discourse of radical democracy is no longer the discourse of the universal…’ (1985:191). Such conclusions shake to the foundations the universalistic theoretical ambitions which even a poststructuralist critical theory still entertains, whether in the strong form represented by Habermas or the weaker forms suggested by Wexler, Agger and others. As well, the political implications of such an approach remain ambiguous. As Keane suggests, ‘Laclau and Mouffe do not specify the institutional mechanisms of hegemonic articulation’ which ‘leaves their interpretation of democracy wide open to traditional Left appropriations…. It remains unclear from their vague account who is to be “articulated”, for what purpose, by whom, and with which means’ (1988a:239). There is a sense in which the ‘panic’ postmodernist politics of Arthur Kroker and his associates (Kroker and Cook, 1986) could be identified as another plausible leftist reading of the post-Marxist theo-
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retical and political space opened up by Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis. Though Laclau and Mouffe soberly give lip-service to a new type of political project following from their position, they are not able to ward off the kind of frenzied postmodernist reading which reveals the political and cultural abyss on the ‘post’ side of a Marxist tradition in ruins. Yet there are a number of other variants of a poststructuralist neo-Gramscian theory of culture which attempt to sustain a stronger relation to either the Marxist tradition (e.g., Stuart Hall) or critical theory (e.g., Stanley Aronowitz and Henry Giroux on education or Cornell West on race and the Third World) which should be considered as plausible alternatives. Optimism of the will? The language of possibility. British cultural studies were initially sidetracked by importing a version of Gramsci filtered through Althusser’s structuralist epistemology. The second phase of British cultural studies was characterized by rescuing Gramsci from the straitjacket of Althusserian epistemology and functionalism. The developments in the more recent work of Stuart Hall are interesting in this context because of his clear move toward a poststructuralist version of Gramscian cultural studies, though he remains reluctant to link this back to redefining his relationship to critical theory. As Hall candidly recalls, his original assimilation of Althusser was offset by his relation to Gramsci: Gramsci is where I stopped in the head-on rush into structuralism and theoreticism. At a certain point I stumbled over Gramsci, and I said, ‘Here and no further!’ Gramsci represented a kind of test of historical concreteness for me against the overtheoretical claims of structuralism. (1988:69) As Hall now acknowledges, the crucial test case for cultural studies is explaining the rise of the New Right. For him the answer—presented in an analysis of Thatcherism—is to be found in Gramsci, a strategy which leads him away from his original flirtation with Althusser’s theory of ideology. While continuous with the neo-Gramscian turn in cultural studies, Hall’s current position also reflects a response to poststructuralist theories. Now he explicitly rejects the classical theory of false consciousness as presupposing some ‘empiricist relation of the subject knowledge’ which transforms ordinary people into ‘dupes’, whereas experts in theory ‘are somehow without a trace of illusion and can see, transitively right through into the truth, the essence of a situation’, thus obscuring the possibility ‘that they are themselves living in false consciousness’ (1988:44). Though this does
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not justify the deconstructionist tendency to dismiss social determination altogether, class and material factors no longer provide any guarantees of relations between ideological and positional factors: ‘What we know is that there is no unitary logic of inference or deduction from one to the other. The logics of different ideological formations remain poly vocal, or as Volosinov would say of all discourse, “multiaccentual”; not infinitely open-ended, but essentially plural in character’ (1988:45). This position leads Hall away from an overly functionalist Althusserian tendency to collapse the state/civil society distinction and the Lacanian effort to locate social integration primarily in early childhood and infancy. Instead he turns to Foucault’s treatment of discursive practices (though not his overall epistemological position), but couples this with Gramsci: ‘The problem with Foucault, to put it brusquely, is a conception of difference without a conception of articulation, that is, a conception of power without a conception of hegemony’ (1988:53). From the perspective of a theory of hegemony it becomes possible to conceptualize Thatcherism ‘in terms of the struggle to gain ascendancy over a whole social formation, to achieve positions of leadership in a number of different sites of social life at once, to achieve the commanding position on a broad strategic front…. The advantages of the concept of hegemony lay above all in the directness of its address (and not in a lopsided, false conscious way) to the central issue of popular consent.’ Finally, ‘another advantage is the critique of essentialism implicit in all of Gramsci’s formulations. Hegemony is constructed, through a complex series of processes of struggle. It is not given, either in the existing structure of society or in the given class structure of a mode of production…. This implies a conception of the process of social reproduction as continuous and contradictory—the very opposite of a functional achievement’ (1988:53– 4). Hall is less clear, however, about what such a rearticulated bloc of popular struggles might look like in the British context. For anyone who has observed the fate of critical theory—both in its specifically Frankfurt form and more generic sociological versions— over the past two decades, it is refreshing but often ironic to find—in the late 1980s—life-long self-proclaimed Marxists engaging in courageous expressions of self-doubt about categorical issues (e.g., about the primacy of class in relation to gender), encouragement of the proliferation of discourses within Marxism (as opposed to labeling them as ‘revisionist’), and calls for appropriating ‘bourgeois’ theories (rather than ignoring or dismissing them). In this context, it is curious
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to note Stuart Hall’s response to the question, ‘What, if anything, do you retain from Marx?’: It is the reductionist understanding of the importance of economic relations that I am opposed to, not the categories themselves…. My critiques of marxism attempt to dethrone its guarantees, because as an ideological system, it has tried to construct its own guarantees…. I think of marxism not as a framework for scientific analysis only but also as a way of helping you sleep well at night…. You can’t see how the economy determines, but just have faith, it does determine in the last instance! The first clause wakes you up and the second puts you to sleep…. I think these are very ideological guarantees. And as soon as you abandon that teleological structure under marxism, the whole classical edifice begins to rock. Now that isn’t any news theoretically these days. Almost everybody of any note is in the business of rocking the marxist foundations. My question is, should we now admit that, since the guaranteed philosophical and epistemological underpinnings of the theory do not stand up, it is finished as a problematic? I want to try to account theoretically for what is still there, what needs to be retained. Can one retheorize the theory in a nonreductionist way? I have tried to suggest some ways in which a modern, more discursive understanding of ideology, which mediates the link between ideas and social forces through language and representation, can accomplish that. That is the contemporary theoretical revolution: the notion that the arena or medium in which ideology functions is one of signification, representation, discursive practices. That is the intervening term that has changed the nature of the debate. I have tried to rethink some of the things that Marx was saying in that more discursive framework. My work, therefore, is in the very unfashionable mode of salvage work, of deconstruction/reconstruction—a dangerous enterprise in the age of deconstruction. (Hall, 1988:72–3) It is refreshing to hear that the shock of Thatcherism has finally shaken the rock of British Marxism much as did Hitlerism for Weimar Critical Theory—even if a little belatedly. The collaborative work of Stanley Aronowitz and Henry Giroux on education and cul-
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tural theory illustrates more explicitly the convergent tendencies between critical theory and poststructuralist neo-Gramscian cultural studies. On the one hand, unlike their British counterparts, they are able to sustain a strong (though independent) relation to the traditions of critical theory; on the other, they are able to confront headon the limits of Gramscian theory and the implications of poststructuralist critiques. Accordingly, they are willing to go a few, heretical steps further in drawing out the implications of poststructuralist theory for the Marxist tradition: ‘…the basis for generating a new critical and radical theory appropriate to the problems and lived experiences of the twentieth century demands a new discourse, one that is informed by the legacy of a critical Marxism but that, in the final analysis, has to break with its most fundamental assumptions and, as such, break with Marxism as the master discourse of any emancipatory project’ (1985:116; emphasis added). On the one hand, this master discourse has been linked with economic, class and historical reductionism; on the other, it has underestimated the importance of politics, ideology and culture as the basis of a theory of praxis. This leads Aronowitz and Giroux (here following Laclau and Mouffe) beyond classic Gramscian theory in suggesting that ‘the notion of hegemony is a much broader category than class as a unit of analysis suggests…the rise of new social movements around issues such as race, ecology, feminism, and sexual freedom refer to forms of hegemony that cannot be subsumed within the logic of class struggle’ (1985:125). Further, they combine ‘somewhat unevenly’ insights drawn from Bloch, Foucault, Benjamin and others to argue that the Marxian conception of social time is doubly flawed. First, the Marxian conception of the logic of historical necessity underplays the significance of the radical discontinuities suggested by otherwise apparently trivial aspects of institutional life. Second, the Marxian tradition works with a notion of the uniformity of time which denies ‘the multilayering of the past, present and future’ as ‘present in the sedimented histories and discourses that constitute various individuals and social groups’ (1985:126). Accordingly, they call for a theory of social movements guided by the notion of a ‘language of possibility’ which, following Foucault, acknowledges that ‘power is both a negative and a positive force’ and social control is viewed as ‘not just an instance of domination but also as a form of emancipatory practice’ (1985:155). The case of Cornell West (1988) presents another interesting exemplar of the increasingly heterogeneous (some might say eclectic) confluence of tendencies and openings characteristic of contemporary
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critical theory in the context of cultural studies. More explicitly than Hall—or even Aronowitz and Giroux—he proposes a reconciliation of Gramsci, critical theory and poststructuralism: The controversial issue of the relation between historical context and differential intertextuality, ideological closure and infinite dissemination serves as the major bone of contention between Marxists and poststructuralists. My neo-Gramscian viewpoint resists explanatory nihilism, that is, despite immense theoretical difficulties and practical obstacles it does not give up on explaining and transforming history and society. …Poststructuralisms rightly dismantle the logocentric and a priori aspects of Marxist theory, yet they wrongly textualize historical constraints and political praxis into mere endless chains of signifiers…. Gramsci’s metaphor of ‘historical bloc’ performs this function. If appropriately employed, it precludes the logocentric economism of pre-Gramscian Marxisms and the labyrinthine abyss of poststructuralisms. Furthermore, my neo-Gramscian viewpoint rejects the remnant of class reductionism in Gramsci’s work. In short, my neo-Gramscian perspective yields ideological yet differential disclosure— provisional structural constraints and engaged political praxis —but with no guarantees. (1988:24–5) His provocative if sketchy proposal may presage important potentials for, and characteristics of, emergent forms of critical theory in the coming decade. First, he does not define his approach as that of ‘critical theory’ as such; rather it is labeled neo-Gramscian, though the reasons for this are not altogether clear (given that in his notes (1988:28, f.n. 25) he identifies the need for the normative foundations of the type proposed by a communicative ethics); also his terminology may reflect the increasing pervasiveness and diffuse character of the influence of critical theory. Second, he reaches out to the Third World and race, topics traditionally absent in critical theory (except for the special case of anti-Semitism). Third, he incorporates feminist theory as a crucial dimension of analysis in a manner that implies their often neglected complementarity. Fourth, he preserves a relation to political economy and historical institutional analysis. Fifth, he draws upon methodological procedures from Foucault’s genealogical approach and Derrida’s deconstructionism. And finally, he postulates the necessity of normative foundations (as an antidote to poststructuralist skepticism) which
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are both rationally grounded as a communicative ethics and yet incorporate the theological moment of the principle of hope.
IV Conclusion: The Convergence of Cultural Studies and Critical Theory?
The Implications of Convergence The argument for the general convergence of poststructuralist cultural studies and the cultural analysis of critical theories turns on two themes: actual convergences of analysis, as well as complementary formulations. For example, it is ironic to note that the discovery of language in cultural studies (e.g., Hall) is seen, finally, to require a rethinking of historical materialism and Marx: regardless of all the residual and continuing differences with respect to how to treat language, that was, after all, the central claim of Habermas in Knowledge and Human Interests (1971) more than two decades ago with his categorical distinction between labor and communicative interaction. As well, the complementarity of the theory legitimation crisis and Hall’s poststructuralist Gramscian analysis of the New Right or West’s post-structuralist extension of Gramsci to race and Third World issues is striking: each tends to account for what the other leaves out. Whereas Habermas lays out the new positional relationships between the economy, the state and crisis possibilities, he has not adequately dealt with, empirically, the cultural dimensions of change as manifest in the discursive reconstitution of ideological forms. In contrast, Hall provides the basis for an analysis of the symbolic dimensions of the state’s displacement of crisis tendencies through the reorganization of a hegemonic historical bloc. West, on the other hand, points to some of the normative and cultural bases of alternative political cultures. Various exemplary disciplinary deconstructions (Finlay, Wexler, Agger) point to strategies for appropriating poststructuralist discourse theories in academic and policy contexts. In a word, the new convergences and continuing divergences between cultural studies and critical theories promise to guide the agenda of critical social theory in this last decade of our century. It would be presumptuous to prophesy the exact directions which the preceding analysis implies for the re-positioning of critical theory, poststructuralism, neo-Gramscian tendencies and cultural studies, let alone the possibilities for synthesis. Yet it is possible to point to some
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obvious areas of thematic continuity implied by the previous discussion: (1) the continuing movement of the issues of feminist theory toward the center of social theory, i.e., less ghettoization and greater dialogue and integration of critical and feminist theory (e.g., Benhabib and Cornell, 1987); (2) in contrast to some deconstructionist tendencies, greater stress will be placed upon the Utopian dimensions of the linguistic turn, especially its relation to a rehabilitation of aesthetic themes as in the notion of ‘poetic interaction’ as a complement to ‘communicative’, as in McCumber (1989) or Ingram’s (1987) interpretation of the aesthetic dimension of Habermas’s more recent work; (3) continuing expansion of the selective and critical re-appropriation of deconstructionist and poststructuralist methods and arguments in various domains of the human sciences.
Discursive Re-positioning The other side of convergence is its implications for the discursive repositioning of theoretical paradigms and ideological stances. If we also take into account the delegitimation of East bloc and Soviet Marxism, it is possible that we may be confronted with both the collapse of Marxism as a distinctive approach and the withering away of critical theory as a distinctive theoretical perspective. As Mannheim stressed, the dialogical relationship between various ideological positions has important implications for resulting mutual influence and transformation over time. More recently, this general conception of the strategic importance of theory competition has been reinforced by pragmatic and postempiricist theories of science, especially the theory of argumentation (see Morrow, 1990). What will be the fate of critical theory given the death-agonies of classical Marxism? The decline of Marxism and reconfiguration of ideologies. The elements of convergence between critical theory and poststructuralist cultural studies are closely linked with broader historical and discursive shifts of which two appear to be central: the reconfiguration of Western ideological discourse with the collapse of East bloc ‘dialectical materialism’ and the emergence of the crisis of the Third World as the most fundamental social issue of the twenty-first century. In this context, the tradition of critical theory will likely emerge as the primary discourse of critical reflection upon advanced capitalism, but its continuing neglect of Third World issues remains an anomaly and the primary domain where the Marxist tradition will remain an important intellectual and ideological force. On the other hand, given the
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continuing identification of most neo-Gramscian cultural studies with the Marxist tradition, these transformations promise to provoke a confrontation between the neo-Marxian and poststructuralist (and post-Marxist) appropriations of Gramsci (as in Wood, 1986). The withering away of critical theory? Does the collapse of East bloc Marxism, along with the convergences between critical theory and poststructuralist cultural studies, suggest that critical theory is in danger of losing its specific identity? Until now, there has been some justification for distinguishing between ‘critical theory’ as a specific metatheoretical and substantive approach to capitalism (and associated with its origins in the Frankfurt School tradition), on the one hand, and more general and inclusive references to ‘critical perspectives’, ‘critical social science’, or ‘critical sociology’ (Fay, 1987; Morrow, 1985), on the other. But for the purposes of an interrogation of ‘critical theory now’, and in the specific context of cultural studies, it is clearly imperative to expand the definition of critical theory beyond the confines of the Frankfurt school or its German context of origin to include parallel and complementary tendencies elsewhere—without slipping into any conflation of critical theory with neo-Marxism or just any perspective that wants to invoke the label ‘critical’. Why then persist with the term ‘critical theory’? There are two basic reasons. First, it does refer to a specific historical tradition which, despite historical discontinuities and national variations, has a recognizable identity as an approach to the theory of society as evident in its response to the three challenges documented in this essay; it also represents the first coherent and influential break with the Marxist tradition, one which anticipated a half-century ago the current ‘crisis of Marxism’ (Aronowitz, 1981). As a consequence of this break, the price for heresy has been to be excluded from the official camp of ‘Marxism’, an exclusion which most embraced without regret. Yet historically, critical theory’s oppositional strategy with respect to Marxism has been broadly vindicated given that the identity of the latter has collapsed: ‘One can no longer speak of Marxism in isolation from other intellectual and political positions, nor apart from the wider exigencies of history, for Marxism is no longer a single coherent discursive and political practice’ (Grossberg and Nelson, 1988:11; emphasis added). The second is that critical theory in this first historical sense exemplifies an approach to theorizing—a relationship to reconstructing historical materialism, critically appropriating the academic disciplines, responding to changing historical circumstances, and providing theoretical rationales for the practices of social movements—
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which has been increasingly taken up, consciously or not, by others working under other labels. Indeed, as Grossberg and Nelson note, ‘an ability to problematize Marx’s writings has been central to the whole renaissance in Marxist theory’ (1988:11). This is not to say that all more recent Marxist theory is critical theory, but it is to argue that much of what now goes under the heading of ‘Marxist’ could increasingly be labeled as critical theory. In the present essay, for example, much of the self-defined Marxist research that takes place under the heading of British cultural studies could be included within the framework of critical theory in this generic sense. But it is also important to remember that critical theory is defined more broadly as a distinct theory of society and its critique, whereas cultural studies is more narrowly defined as a sociology of culture with roots in a Gramscian interpretation of neo-Marxist theory. Only in the context of poststructuralist interpretations do cultural studies begin to loosen their link with the Marxist tradition as a ‘post-Marxist’ approach.
Ecological Crisis and the Third World: The Final Challenge? Finally, it is important to raise a question hinted at only in Cornell West’s essay: the problematic of a convergence between a critique of Eurocentrism, the crisis of the Third World, and the advance of critical social ecology as a theoretical and cultural force. Since these themes have not been directly addressed in the previous discussion, it is necessary to conclude with a brief elaboration. Historically, one of the most distinctive and striking features of critical theory, especially in contrast to the Marxist tradition as a whole, has been its focus on the specifie issues of the crisis of advanced capitalism. Cultural studies have had a similar bias to the extent that their focus has been upon the transformations in the cultural domain which have accompanied the transformations within advanced capitalism. But with occasional exceptions (primarily in the study of postcolonial literatures or in the context of liberation theologies) Third World issues have not been central to critical theory and cultural studies debates, though this will likely change in the future. Further, these elements of convergence should not obscure the broader program of critical theory, as opposed to cultural studies. Most importantly, its concerns with a critique of political economy and social psychology resulted in themes which are virtually absent in the discourse of cultural studies: a critique of technology and the
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foundations of an ecological critique of advanced societies (Jones, 1987; Leiss, 1976; Luke, 1987; Luke and White, 1985). Also in this context, the work of ‘anarchist’ mavericks such as Ivan Illich and Murray Bookchin, assumes a strategic significance, whatever the specific flaws or limitations of their work (Luke, 1987; Morrow and Torres, 1990). What such authors share is recognition of the cultural significance of the transformation of technological societies and its broader relation to the survival of the species—a question whose outcome will be closely linked with the models of ‘modernization’ followed in the Third World.
Notes 1 The present argument can be understood in part as a friendly polemical response to the otherwise exemplary introduction by Lawrence Grossberg and Cary Nelson to their reader on Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (1988). While they provide an insightful introductory analysis in noting that most recently an ‘almost forced dialogue of Marxism with other perspectives has had profound implications for Marxism itself, for the issues defining Marxism have come into question and have been reshaped as a result’ (1988:10), they fail to point out that it was critical theory—initially of Frankfurt inspiration—which has been historically the primary and original source of this dialogue. A consequence of their approach—reflected in the initial selection of participants—is a general neglect (presence by absence?) of the pioneering contributions of Frankfurt and sociological critical theory to cultural analysis in the postwar period. 2 The inspiration for this general line of argument can be traced back to my association as a graduate student in sociology with Ioan Davies at York University in the mid-1970s; in his work and teaching he has consistently defended the importance of reconciling critical theory and British cultural studies. Participation in the Toronto ‘Telos Circle’ during this period also reinforced a strategic sense of the relationship between Gramsci and critical theory. Finally, more recent critical comments by Ian Taylor on an earlier paper of mine (Morrow, 1985) called my attention to many of these outstanding issues by stressing the advantages of the Gramscian version of British cultural studies over my interpretation of critical theory. As well, I have been influenced by a tradition combining critical theory and a distinctive nationalist version of cultural studies in Quebec (e.g., Morrow, 1982; Nielsen, 1985; Rioux, 1978). 3 Paradoxically, many of the concepts and concerns of the older Frankfurt tradition have become so widely diffused that authors are unaware of their indebtedness; others may consciously avoid citations for polemical reasons or the particular academic politics of their publishing venues, issues which caution against any crude use of citation indexes. The present chapter will explore the subsequent fate of cultural analysis in contemporary critical theory which will be taken to refer to three interrelated modes of theoretical discourse: the Frankfurt tradition, especially as fundamentally revised in the work of Habermas and those directly influenced by his example (e.g. Thomas McCarthy, Richard Bernstein, etc.); critical sociological theories which, though influenced by the former (e.g. Norman Birnbaum, Anthony Giddens, Alvin Gouldner, John O’Neill, etc.), incorporate diverse elements as part of a more specifically disciplinary self-definition.
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4 For accounts of the social psychological aspects of critical theory, see Wexler (1983). On the relationship between critical theory, political economy, and the state, see Held (1980); and Keane (1984; 1988a; 1988b). 5 Obviously there are significant national variations with respect to these tendencies. The present discussion will focus, however, on British and North American examples. 6 With slight variations, these phases of transition could be applied as well, I think, to the other dimensions of the classical project of critical theory: metatheory, social psychology, political economy and theory of the state. For a good survey of the cultural debates in these first two phases, see Held (1980) and Lunn (1982). 7 One could also argue that the revival of neo-Marxist political economy also represented yet another challenge. I would reject this for two reasons. First, critical theory arose out of a debate with economistic political economy and has always been aware of its strengths and weaknesses. Second, critical theory has also accepted political economy as a useful research method, but rejected its generalization as a general theory of society. Thus the revival of political economy represented not so much a theoretical challenge as a reminder of the importance of an empirical question, i.e., a critical historical sociology. 8 The primary impact of more orthodox forms of political economy upon critical theory was to reinforce a sense of the importance of empirical research; otherwise, beyond its descriptive value as a form of economic determinism, most political economic research adhered to more or less orthodox assumptions—including effort at accommodating to traditional positivistic criteria of scientific method— which had been criticized from the beginning of the Frankfurt tradition. Not surprisingly, this contributed to a certain hostility between many representatives of critical theory and political economy respectively. 9 As well, there are other important structuralist influences which are separate from structuralist Marxism and tangential to the focus on cultural theory here. The most important uses of structuralist theory can be found in Habermas’s turn to developmental psychology (Piaget) and the reconstruction of evolutionary models drawing upon both developmental logic and structuralist concepts (Godelier). But except for the notion of the evolution of worldviews, this reception relates more to epistemological, social psychology and historical issues which lie outside the focus on cultural studies here. 10 For this reason Fredric Jameson falls outside the present schema of analysis which holds primarily within social theory and for those reliant on translations. The case of Jameson is complicated by the fact that even though his early work is in the tradition of humanist Marxism (Sartre) and the early Frankfurt tradition, he subsequently encounters literary structuralism on the way to an appropriation of both structuralism and poststructuralism as part of his own version of a ‘Marxist’ literary criticism culminating in his The Political Unconscious (1981). Indeed, his simultaneous appropriation of structuralist and poststructuralist tendencies, from a perspective informed by but not dogmatically attached to humanistic Marxism, renders his approach unclassifiable in any simple way. His work also violates the pattern of reception assumed by this essay, i.e., the succession of structuralist and poststructuralist influences. 11 This holds for systems and structural functionalist theories as well, though here the ‘function’ of cultural reproduction is the needs of society as a whole, rather than those of a dominant class and/or mode of production. These issues are discussed in more detail in Morrow and Torres (1988) which is the basis of a monograph in preparation. 12 For a thorountgh critique of Althusserianism, see Benton (1984); and for a critique of Althusserian cultural theory, Clarke, et al. (1980). These evaluations are
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13 14
15
16 17 18
19
20
21
not advanced from a specific critical theory position, though there are many points of overlap. Critical theory does have a longstanding concern with the analysis of Soviet Communism culminating in Marcuse and more recently, Arato (1982). It might also be possible to identify an American variant of critical cultural studies with close affinities to British cultural Marxism. As opposed to the sociological variants of critical theory (and analogues in political science and social science subfields), and to an extent the Birmingham tradition, this form of cultural Marxism is more institutionally and theoretically rooted in the humanities, especially literature (e.g. Fredric Jameson), history (Stuart Ewen, Mark Poster), and philosophy (e.g. Douglas Kellner) and communications studies (e.g. Lawrence Grossberg). This disciplinary context has contributed to a very marginal foothold in sociology and shapes both the forms of discourse (strongly influenced by the traditions of literary criticism) and the textual focus of cultural analysis. The present discussion will focus, however, on the British example. In the German context, this can in part be traced back to some initial problems of translation and the peculiarities of the Gramsci reception in the German context (see Morrow, 1975); see also Adamson (1985) and Kilminster (1979) generally. Though aspects of Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) approach has affinities with critical theory, they jump over the critical theory debates directly into a poststructuralist critique of Gramsci. The roots of this comparison need to be traced to the similarities and differences between Weber and Gramsci’s approaches; see Bocock, 1986:83–103; and Morrow and Torres, 1990. A comparison of the implications of Habermas’s work for the approaches to cultural studies noted here would go beyond the confines of this chapter. The agonies of Perry Anderson (1984) in attempting to preserve Marxism’s bedrock while conceding various positions to critical theory and poststructuralists are particularly exemplary. On the other hand, Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) version of the shift from a Gramscian Marxism to a post-Marxism illustrates some of the problematic consequences of a comprehensive rejection of ‘essentialist’ categories. Kellner (1989) extends this argument in a major re-interpretation of the Frankfurt tradition built around the theme of modernity. Since this study became available to me only at the last minute of revising this chapter, Kellner’s insights on certain issues could not be fully incorporated in my discussion. Though his book represents an important contribution which goes beyond historical exegesis by presenting the tradition ‘as providing methods a set of positions that are of relevance and importance for contemporary social theory and politics’ (Kellner, 1989:2), he virtually ignores the receptions of structuralism and poststructuralism within critical theory, as well as their relation to the neo-Gramscian problematic, which is the focus of the present discussion. Obviously a central theme in contemporary critical theory is the interplay between feminist theory and poststructuralism, a topic which could be a basis for a paper in its own right. Since feminist theory has tended to define itself independently, without specific reference to the tradition of critical theory (e.g. Diamond and Quinby, 1988), it is difficult to specify those relations. For important exceptions, however, see Benjamin (1988) and Benhabib and Cornell (1987) and Fraser (1989). The following discussion necessarily focuses on cultural studies, hence social psychological issues and the theory of the state are inevitably neglected. Given her specific focus on communications technology, as well as perhaps a reaction against her background in comparative literature, Finlay selfconsciously ignores reference to Derridean deconstructionism as well as the
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postmodernist debate. Both of these absences complement the Habermasian problematic within which her version of appropriating poststructuralism unfolds. 22 Agger’s (1989:8) off-hand use of the term ‘social-textual analysis’ is much more suggestive of what Wexler has in mind by reference to ‘social analysis’. 23 Such a reading would have certain parallels with, but be distinct from, one proceeding directly from critical theory as suggested, for example, by Keane that recent European debates raise ‘serious doubts about the adequacy of the Gramscian schema for contemporary political strategy’. Such a ‘post-Gramscian approach’ would have to take into account the changed conditions of Western Europe since Gramsci’s time, his questionable assumptions regarding the leading role of the Communist Party, and an opportunistic conception of civil society coupled with the dubious proposition of abolishing the state (Keane, 1988b: 24–5). 24 In saying this I am self-consciously excluding a third option of the type represented, for example, by Perry Anderson (1984; see the response in Morrow, 1986b). A comparison of these two options is obviously beyond the scope of the present chapter, but see Boggs (1984).
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– (1986b) ‘The Politics of the “Popular” and Popular Culture’, in BENNETT, T. , MERCER, C. and WOOLLACOT, J. (Eds) Popular Culture and Social Relations, pp. 6–21, Milton Keynes and Philadelphia: Open University Press. BENNETT, T., MERCER, C. and WOOLACOTT, J. (Eds) (1986) Popular Culture and Social Relations, Milton Keynes and Philadelphia: Open University Press. BENTON, T. (1984) The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism: Althusser and His Influence, London: Macmillan. BERNSTEIN, R.J. (1985) ‘Introduction’, in BERNSTEIN, R.J. (Ed.) Habermas and Modernity, pp. 1–32, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. BOCOCK, R. (1986) Hegemony, Chichester, London and New York: Horwood/ Tavistock. BOGGS, C. (1984) The Two Revolutions: Gramsci and the Dilemmas of Western Marxism, Boston, MA: South End Press. BONß, W. and HONNETH, A. (Eds) (1982) Sozialforschung als Kritik: Zum sozialwissenschaftlichen Potential der Kritischen Theorie, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. CLARKE, S., LOVELL, T., MCDONNELL, K., ROBINS, K. and SEIDLER, V.J. (Eds) (1980) One-Dimensional Marxism: Althusser and the Politics of Culture. London and New York: Allison and Busby. CONNELL, R.W. (1983) Which Way is Up? Essays on Sex, Class and Culture, Sydney, London and Boston: George Allen and Unwin. CORRIGAN, P. and SAYER, D. (1985) The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. COWARD, R. and ELLIS, J. (1977) Language and Materialism: Developments in Semiology and the Theory of the Subject, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul D’AMICO, R. (1989) Historicism and Knowledge, New York and London: Routledge. DEWS, P. (1987) Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory, London: Verso. DIAMOND, I. and QUINBY, L. (Eds) (1988) Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance, Boston: Northeastern University Press. FAY, B. (1987) Critical Social Science, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. FEATHERSTONE, M. et al. (1988) Special Issue on Postmodernism, Theory, Culture and Society, London: Sage. FINLAY, M. (1987) Powermatics: A Discursive Critique of New Technology, London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
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FORESTER, J. (Ed.) (1985) Critical Theory and Public Life, Cambridge, MA: MIT. FOSTER, H. (Ed.) (1983) The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press. FRASER, N. (1989) Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. GIDDENS, A. (1976) New Rules of Sociologial Method, London: Hutchinson. – (1979) Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. – (1984) The Constitution of Society, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. – (1987) ‘Structuralism, Post-structuralism and the Production of Culture’, in GIDDENS, A. and TURNER, J.H. (Eds) Social Theory Today, pp. 195–223, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. GIROUX, H. (1983) Theory and Resistance in Education: A Pedagogy for the Opposition, Amherst: Bergin and Garvey. GRAMSCI, A. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. HOARE, Q. and NOWELL SMITH, G., New York: International Publishers. GROSSBERG, L. and NELSON, C. (1988) ‘Introduction: The Territory of Marxism’, in GROSSBERG, L. and NELSON, C. (Eds) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, pp. 1–13, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. GRUNEAU, R. (1988) ‘Introduction: Notes on Popular Culture and Political Practices’, in GRUNEAU, R. (Ed.) Popular Culture and Political Practices, pp. 11–32, Toronto: Garamond Press. HABERMAS, J. (1971) Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. SHAPIRO, J.J., Boston: Beacon. – (1981) ‘Modernity versus postmodernity’, New German Critique, 22, Winter, pp. 3–14. – (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, trans. MCCARTHY, T., Boston: Beacon. – (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, trans. MCCARTHY, T., Boston: Beacon Press. HALL, S. (1980) ‘Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms’, Media, Culture and Society, 2:57–72. – (1986) ‘Popular Culture and the State’, in BENNETT, T., MER-
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CER, C. and WOOLLACOTT, J. (Eds) Popular Culture and Social Relations, pp. 22–49, Milton Keynes and Philadelphia: Open University Press. – (1988) ‘The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among the Theorists’, in GROSSBERG, L. and NELSON, C. (Eds) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, pp. 35–57, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. – LUMLEY, B. and MCLENNAN, G. (1978) ‘Politics and Ideology: Gramsci’, in SCHWARZ, B. et al. (Eds) On Ideology, pp. 45–76, London: Hutchinson. HEARN, F. (1978) Domination, Legitimation, and Resistance, Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press. HELD, D. (1980) Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. HODGE, R. and KRESS, G. (1988) Social Semiotics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. HONNETH, A. (1987) ‘Critical Theory’, in GIDDENS, A. and TURNER, J.H. (Eds), Social Theory Today, pp. 347–82, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. HOY, D.C. (Ed.) (1986) Foucault: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. HUYSSEN, A. (1986) ‘Mapping the Postmodern’, in LENZ, G.L. and SHELL, K.L. (Eds) The Crisis of Modernity, pp. 253–99, Frankfurt am Main and Boulder, CO: Campus Westview Press. INGRAM, D. (1987) Habermas and the Dialetic of Reason, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. JAMESON, F. (1981) The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. – (1984) ‘Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’, New Left Review, 146:53–92. JOHNSON, R. (1983) ‘What is Cultural Studies, Anyway?’, Anglistica, 25: 7–81. JONES, A. (1987) ‘The Violence of Materialism in Advanced Industrial Society: An Eco-Sociological Approach’, The Sociological Review, 35:19–47. KEANE, J. (1984) Public Life and Late Capitalism: Towards a Socialist Theory of Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. – (1988a) Democracy and Civil Society, London and New York: Verso. –(1988b) (Ed.) Civil Society and the State, London and New York: Verso.
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KELLNER, D. (1988) ‘Postmodernism as Social Theory: Some Challenges and Problems’, Theory Culture and Society, 5:239–69. – (1989) Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. KILMINSTER, R. (1979) Praxis and Method: A Sociological Dialogue with Lukacs, Gramsci and the Early Frankfurt School, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. KROKER, A. and COOK, D. (1986) The Postmodern Scene: Excremental Culture and Hyper-Aesthetics, Montreal: New World Perspectives. LACLAU, E. and MOUFFE, C. (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, trans. MOORE, W. and CAMMACK, P., London: Verso. LAWRENCE, P.K. (1989) ‘The State and Legitimation: The Work of Jürgen Habermas’, in DUNCAN, G. (Ed.) Democracy and the Capitalist State, pp. 133–158, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. LEISS, W. (1976) The Limits to Satisfaction, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. LENZ, G.H. and SHELL, K.L. (Eds) (1986) The Crisis of Modernity: Recent Critical Theories of Culture and Society in the United States and West Germany, Frankfurt am Main/Boulder: Campus Verlag/ Westview Press. LUKE, T.W. (1987) ‘Social Ecology as Critical Political Economy’, The Social Science Journal , 24:303–15. – and WHITE, S.K. (1985) ‘Critical Theory, the Information Revolution, and an Ecological Path to Modernity’, in FORESTER, J. (Ed.) Critical Theory and Public Life, pp. 23–53, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. LUNN, E. (1982) Marxism and Modernism: An Historical Study of Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press. MCCUMBER, J. (1989) Poetic Interaction: Language, Freedom, Reason, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. MILLER, P. (1987) Domination and Power, London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. MORROW, R.A. (1975) ‘Gramsci in Germany’. Telos, 32:193–216. – (1977) ‘Amnesia Critique: The “Marxist” Appropriation of the Frankfurt School’, Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 1:105–16. – (1982) ‘Deux pays pour vivre: Critical Sociology and the New Canadian Political Economy’, Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 6: 61–105.
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– (1985) ‘Critical Theory and Critical Sociology’, Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 22:710–47. – (1986a) ‘The Cul-de-sac of Structuralist Marxism’, Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 10:46–51. – (1986b) ‘Review, Perry Anderson. In the Tracks of Historical Materialism. London: Verso, 1983’, Canadian Journal of Sociology, 11:469–73. – (1990) ‘Toward a Critical Theory of Methodology: Habermas and the Theory of Argumentation’, Current Perspectives in Social Theory (forthcoming). – and TORRES, C.A. (1988) ‘Social theory, social reproduction, and education’s everyday life: A framework for analysis’, paper presented at the Canadian Western Association of Sociology and Anthropology Annual Meetings. Edmonton, Alberta, 18–20 February, 1988. – and TORRES, C.A. (1990) ‘Theories of hegemony versus legitimation: Implications for political sociology and education’, paper presented at the World Congress of Sociology, Madrid, Spain, 9–13 July, 1990. – and TORRES, C.A. (1990) The Deschooling Thesis: A Reassessment of Illich’s Proposals Two Decades After’, New Education, 12:3–17. MOUFFE, C. (1979) ‘Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci’, in MOUFFE, C. (Ed.) Gramsci and Marxist Theory, pp. 168–204, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. NELSON, C. and GROSSBERG, L. (Eds) (1988) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. NIELSEN, G.M. (1985) ‘Communication et esthétique culturelle dans deux sociologies critiques: J.Habermas et M.Rioux’, Sociologie et Sociétés, 17:13–26. NORRIS, C. (1982) Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, London and New York: Routledge. – (1985) Contest of Faculties: Philosophy and Theory After Deconstruction, London and New York: Methuen. POSTER, M. (1984) Foucault, Marxism and History: Modes of Production versus Mode of Information, Cambridge/Oxford: Polity Press/Basil Blackwell. – (1989) Critical Theory and Post Structuralism, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Rioux, M. (1978) Essai de Sociologie Critique, Montréal: Hurtubise HMH.
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Ross, A. (Ed.) (1989) Universal Abandon? The Politics of Postmodernism, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. RYAN, M. (1982) Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. SLATER, P. (1977) Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. SMART, B. (1983) Foucault, Marxism and Critique, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. THOMPSON, J.B. (1984) Studies in the Theory of Ideology, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. WARNKE, G. (1987) Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason, Cambridge: Polity Press. WEST, C. (1988) ‘Marxist Theory and the Specificity of AfroAmerican Oppression’, in GROSSBERG, L. and NELSON, C. (Eds) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, pp. 17–29, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. WEXLER, P. (1983) Critical Social Psychology, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. – (1987) Social Analysis of Education: After the New Sociology, London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. WILLIS, P. (1981) Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs, Morningside Edition, New York: Columbia University Press. WOOD, E.M. (1986) The Retreat from Class, London: Verso.
3 Playing with the Pieces: The Fragmentation of Social Theory David Ashley
They will no longer savagely uproot you from your life in order to deliver you to the machine—they integrate you in your infancy, with your quirks, your human relations and unconscious drives, even with your refusal to work. They will find a place for you somewhere, a personalized job, or in default a share of unemployment calculated according to your own equation. In any event, they will never abandon you, for what is essential is that everybody is the terminal of the entire network, a lowly terminal, but a term/end (terme) nevertheless—above all not of an inarticulate cry, but a term of language, in terms of the sole structural network of language…. Labor-power is no longer bought or sold brutally, it designates itself, it markets itself as merchandise—production rejoins the system of the signs of consumption. Jean Baudrillard (1989:9–10)
The End of Production In the last part of the twentieth century, in an era—as Jay (1988) has put it—of ‘fin de siècle socialism’, a strange, unkind, fate has overtaken Marxism. As the residual reservoirs and slivers of shattered lifeworlds are colonized by the ‘system imperatives’ of money and power (Habermas, 1987a:301–73), the Marxist critique of modernity, perversely in step with these developments, seems to have become progressively less relevant. In the late-twentieth century the commodity form has not turned out to be less total or less abstract than expected, nor have Western ‘liberal democracies’ managed to avoid new levels of triviality, vacuity and imbecility that would have befu70
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dled even Marx. Capitalism today is hardly less rapacious or dehumanizing than it was in 1917. Yet as commodity relations complete their penetration and dissolution of non-Western cultures, as global economic relations become even more rationalized, and as inequalities within this world system increase, Marxism—at least in its more ‘orthodox’ Marxist-Leninist form (Lukács, 1971:1–24)—has been steadily marginalized. In the process, what used to be the definitive internal critique of a social form called capitalism—the idea of socialist transformation—has become increasingly unbelievable or has been progressively softened and diluted. A starting point for the analysis of this ironic state of affairs should be the examination of changes in the relationship of capital to its dialectically or internally produced oppositions and critical antitheses. Theorists of postmodernism perhaps have made the most significant contribution to this kind of investigation (see, for instance, Baudrillard, 1975, 1981:112–84, 1983a:1–77, 1983b, 1987a:9–64, 1989; Harvey, 1989; Jameson, 1984, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1989; Lyotard, 1973a, 1973b, 1974, 1984, 1987, 1988b:45–76; Rorty, 1985a, 1989). Jean Baudrillard has probably taken the analysis of the internal relationship between capitalist development and the fate of Marxist critique further than any other post-Marxist critic. This essay will therefore pay particular attention to his work. I would like to suggest that, as a mode of critical selfunderstanding, Marxism remains a master discourse as long as commodity production, with its alibi of use-value (Baudrillard, 1975:30), is the primary means of social formation. Perhaps, though, the end of the classical or modernist dialectic is not merely a matter of a shift in the mode of production. Maybe, as Jean Baudrillard (1989) has suggested, when an industrial emphasis on the rationalization of labor gives way to the commodification of the image and the need for ‘hyperreality’, it is no longer necessary to produce (and alienate) what used to be defined as ‘species-being’. If so, then Marxism has now been turned against itself because, as a modernist and not a universal discourse, it is—and in fact always was—parasitically attached to a mode of reality production that in a ‘postmodern’ era can no longer be sustained. According to Baudrillard (1987b:64–6), ‘modernity’ involved ‘individualistic and modern rationalist thought’, ‘the modern, centralized and democratic, bourgeois State’, ‘urban concentration, and the gigantic development of the means of communication and information’, a ‘way of life articulated on change and innovation’, ‘anxiety, instability, continued mobilization, shifting subjectivity, tension, crisis’, the
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‘integrated hierarchy of personal relations’, etc. Above all, however, Baudrillard emphasizes that ‘modernity’ meant ‘the prodigious expansion of science and technique, the rational and systematic development of the means of production, their management and organization’. These latter developments mark ‘modernity as the era of productivity: an intensification of human labor and of human domination over labor, both reduced to the status of productive forces and to the schemas of efficacy and maximal output. This is the common denominator of all modern nations’ emphasis supplied. It is only in the postmodern era: that we can conceive of a new peripetia of power—a catastrophic one this time—where power no longer succeeds in producing the real, in reproducing itself as real, or in opening new spaces to the reality principle, and where it falls into the hyperreal and vanishes: this is the end of power, the end of the strategy of the real. (Baudrillard, 1987a:33) Once, capital respected the reality principle. For Baudrillard (see Poster, 1988:180), however, capital has now liquidated this principle ‘in the extermination of every use value, or every real equivalence’. Thus, in the postmodern era what has sealed Marxism’s fate has been capitalism’s new-found ability to subsume and absorb those antagonistic and irreconcilable forces and oppositions that it once produced.
Fateful Dialectics In order to trace the shift from the modern to the so-called ‘postmodern’ it is helpful to chart the changing function of the sign, the ‘precession of simulacra’ (Baudrillard, 1983a) from representation to pure simulation and from reality-production to the implosion of meaning. Figure 3.1 illustrates five distinct operations of the sign.1 (I do not assume that these options are exhaustive). With the first three operations it is possible to talk about the production of the real because all these operations posit or assume a referent. The latter two operations, however, do not posit or assume a referent; they can be classified as ‘postmodern’. ‘Fetishism’ refers to a type of operation that can be holistic (e.g., the kind of orientation described by Lévi-Strauss in The Savage Mind), or partial (e.g., ‘commodity fetishism’, described by Marx in Das Kapital). Holistic fetishism presents a totalistic, reified concep-
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Figure 3.1 The Sign and the Production of the Real
tion of the universe, but a partial fetishism could conceivably be taken up and dropped again, as in the early stages of capitalism, when individuals caught between tradition and abstract value moved uneasily between two worlds of meaning. The essence of fetishistic thinking is that it does not distinguish between observation and interpretation, thus—so it appears—signs carry their meaning with them (LéviStrauss, 1966:223). In a similar fashion, commodity fetishism configures social relations as necessary and objectively real relations among things—thereby ensuring that such relations cannot be discursively redeemed. For Baudrillard (1983a:84), fetishism traditionally has produced a ‘strong’, ‘cruel’ symbolic order. In feudal, caste societies, for instance, ‘each sign functions with its full value as interdiction, each is a reciprocal obligation between castes, clans or persons’. Such interdiction ‘protects the sign’ and eliminates the possibility of a counterfeit presentation. The only kind of (meaningful) social deviance that would be possible in such a symbolic order would be ‘sacrilege’ or ‘black magic’. Baudrillard (1983a:83–5) suggests that ‘Counterfeit (and fashion at the same time) is born with the renaissance, with the destructuring of the feudal order by the bourgeois order and the emergence of open competition on the level of the distinctive sign’. This is the beginning of a ‘disenchanted universe’ containing arbitrary signs which ‘instead of linking two persons in an unbreakable reciprocity…[refer] back to
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the disenchanted universe of the signified, common denominator of the real world toward which no one has any obligation’. The sign is thus used cynically or opportunistically in impression-management. Rennaissance drama—including, for instance, the works of Shakespeare—is often almost obsessed with the desire to explore the effects and consequences of the proliferation of the ‘counterfeit’ that occurred during this era.2 As a third possibility, the sign can mask or screen reality. Here we are within the domain not of simulation but dissimulation. To simulate is to feign what is not, and to dissimulate is to hide or conceal what is. While level-3 dissimulation masks or screens the real, it still invokes the existence of a referent, albeit one that is hidden. Dissimulation can operate through religious or aesthetic imagery, where what is concealed or hidden is portrayed as sublime or as beyond representation. It also explains the panic of the iconoclast who fears that the boundary between level-3 and level-4 dissimulation is being erased. The iconoclast is threatened by images of God because such simulacra represent not merely the divine but also the terrible possibility that what is depicted does not exist. A more serene attitude is maintained by more sophisticated theodicies. Buddhism, for example, cautions us not to take human simulations at face value but to see through the ‘masks of eternity’ to understand what is ultimate and complete in itself, an impossible task in this world. In attempting to locate what was being screened or masked within modernity the two great critical theories of that epoch—Marxism and psychoanalysis—helped instantiate the realities that determined them. The dialectic of modernity they analyzed involved the exploration of the oppositions posited within (1) level-3 dissimulations (e.g. commodity fetishism, screen memories) which, (2) understood as distorted simulations of the real, would explain observable, empirical manifestations (of class domination or perceived irrationality). What neither Marx nor Freud could sweep into the domain of their analysis, however,was the connection between such demystification and determination, i.e., the collusion between (1) the critique of what assuredly are no more than partial or one-sided conceptions of reality (Vernunft), and (2) the attempt to discover what is being masked through such dissimulation.3 Such a procedure is destined to result in conceptual puzzlement. As Baudrillard (1983a:1) observes: ultimately, ‘the simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth—it is the truth that conceals that there is none’ (emphasis added). For Marx, what commodity relations masked was the hidden source of value; for Freud, what was screened were the workings of
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the unconscious. Given the collusive relationship between Das Kapital and the mode of domination it successfully penetrated it is not surprising that Marx’s critical examination of the commodity revealed that, while use-value could not be reduced to exchange-value, it becomes its accomplice: In other words, the system of political economy does not produce only the individual as labor power that is sold and exchanged: it produces the very conception of labor power as the fundamental human potential…. And in this Marxism assists the cunning of capital. It convinces men that they are alienated by the sale of their labor power, thus censoring the much more radical hypothesis that they might be alienated as labor power, as the ‘inalienable’ power of creating value by their labor. (Baudrillard, 1975:30, emphasis removed) In a similar fashion, Freud’s radical critique of the unconscious as a producer—of dreams, slips of the tongue, repetition, etc.—convinces modern individuals that their individuality is a personal and a difficult compromise between archaic natural and upstart cultural forces. They therefore accept that character must be brutally forged on the anvil of repression. A more radical hypothesis would suggest that the unconscious is a mythological territory in terms of which modern subjects can learn (in depth) how to understand—and thereby produce— themselves. The unconsious is not, therefore, a producer; it is a language of desire that must first be forced into hiding before its discovery can be made possible. When the sign operates to mask the absence of a reality, or is its own pure simulacrum, we are, according to Baudrillard, beyond production and have put an end to the reality principle. At levels 4 and 5 in Figure 3.1 simulation does not posit a referent. A politics that has grasped that the sign masks the absence of a reality is one of ‘panic’ (Kroker, Kroker and Cook, 1989) or ‘deterrence’ (Baudrillard, 1983a:25). A politics of deterrence works vainly to try to save the reality principle, which, under the conditions of capitalism, is predicated on the supposition that the value of commodities must be determined by the conditions of their production. Thus in Marx’s (1970:42–3) terminology, while exchange-value merely enabled everything to be related to everything else, use-value was a touchstone: it is ‘independent of all forms of society…[and] an external natureimposed necessity without which there can be no material exchange between man and Nature, and therefore no life’. While the labor the-
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ory of value was foundational both for Marx and for bourgeois political economy, in a postmodern society it has little relevance. When Marx was alive the ‘cunning’ of capitalism was merely ‘to veil itself continually in the evidence of content…and to produce itself in the obviousness of [exchange] value’ (Baudrillard, 1981:145). In his critique of bourgeois domination Marx thus was able to demonstrate successfully that bourgeois political economy was the concealed code of domination institutionalized within civil society: a form of representation that was invisible and unrecognizable because it was lived. Demystifying (unmasking) the code in terms of which this lived experience was produced, Marx showed that commodity fetishism was an illusion that nevertheless masked the ‘real’, the true source of value: expropriated, material, productive labor. For Marx, then, the political economy of capitalism and the ultimate significance of the commodity was founded on the bedrock provided by the productive power of social labor. While the value of the commodity could be obscured or screened, it could never, according to Marx, simply cease to exist. Marx declared that individual workers recycled value as the usevalue of their labor power was commodified, turned into exchangevalue, used to produce surplus-value, and finally reproduced, as laborers purchased those commodity objects that kept them working. Although alienating, this process was at least rational. Today, consumption tends not to be rooted in use-value; often it is not even disciplined by the need to exchange labor-as-commodity for the objectas-commodity. In a postmodern world, consumers are no longer penny-counting wage slaves who consume and recycle rationally. They are more likely to be restless, empty vessels dominated by a resurgent id and by infantile cravings. Unlike the ego, the id cannot be rationalized. Given that postmodern culture de-differentiates (the opposite of rationalization) and de-individualizes, what becomes infrastructural are the fantasies of the consumer, not the means by which surplus-value is extracted. Under postmodernity, commodities possess mostly ‘sign-value’ signifying difference. The commodity connotes meaning that cannot be explained in terms of the real or objective world of material production. Signs respond only to the indeterminacy of a code that is constantly in flux; they are tied to a structural play of value that manifests itself through advertising, marketing or subcultural reworkings of the code. This code is one of pure simulation in that signs ‘exchange among themselves [as commodities]…without interacting with the real’ (Poster, 1988:125). The Coca-Cola Company spent
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over a million dollars scientifically demonstrating that consumers preferred the taste of ‘new’ to ‘old’ (now ‘Classic’) Coke. At the end of the day what they learned was that the value of Coca-Cola could not be reduced either to its taste or to its cost of production. In the early stages of capitalism money made money (m` c` m′) within a cycle of production containing labor exploitation, the extraction of surplus-value, and reinvestment. For the arbitragers and finance capitalists of the 1980s money was magically made out of money without having to have recourse to the messy and brutal world of production. At least two levels of abstraction were involved. First is the abstraction of commodity relations from social relations, the process of mystification analyzed so definitively by Marx. But second is a hyperabstraction that departs from the already abstracted domain of commodification. The enormous profits made by speculators and by junk-bond salesmen during the Reagan era were completely disconnected from the real world of commodity production. Of course, this is not to say that there are no earthly limits to such activity. Clearly, however, in the last decade capitalism has managed, at least in part, to detach itself institutionally from the ‘infrastructural’ mode of production analyzed by Marx.4 A politics of deterrence must persuade us of the rationality of our economy and society, (and, the ‘end of production’ notwithstanding, must also hide the fact that America still manages to produce crime, despair and irrationality quite successfully). In a larger sense, however, deterrence must work to conceal the fact that celebrations of ‘democracy’ and ‘the American Way’ mask the absence of any institutionalized procedures that might guarantee substantive justice. For Baudrillard (1983a;1988b), America has become a giant ‘deterrence machine’ that functions to conceal the absence that it masks. Politics is hyperreal: not disciplined or constrained by any referent or by the recognition of any finality outside simulation. Because a public sphere of accountability no longer exists, ‘Watergate’ and ‘Irancontragate’ conceal the fact that political scandals can no longer occur. Hysteria about the significance of bruises on toddlers’ thighs and the number of horses being sacrificed in the nation’s day-care centers deters consideration of legions of brain-damaged, poverty-stricken, malnourished, and drug-ridden infants. America’s bizarre ‘War on Drugs’ (which cannot even be taken seriously by an image-sodden media) serves to mask the fact that individuals can no longer understand, let alone control, the forces and substances that have penetrated and dispersed their bodies. It also attempts to signify that the strong state will do something to prevent the lawlessness it must produce.
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The sign always has been its own pure simulacrum; when this is understood it finally can be acknowledged that the secret of power is that it does not exist. This is not to say that there are not, or have not been, victims and oppressors—the dominated and those who dominate. However, the institution of power, like the institution of spatial perspective versus “real” space in the Renaissance, is only a simulation of perspective’ (Baudrillard, 1987a:41). This is something that Foucault never grasped. While his genealogies of power brilliantly showed how power was produced through ‘discrimination…the violent founding act of Reason’ (ibid.: 37), according to Baudrillard (ibid.: 40), ‘Foucault…does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power itself’. In the final analysis, power is limited and inferior to seduction because power has to be produced, and, therefore, unlike seduction, must be self-limiting. The dialectic of modernity described above (i.e., the oppositions between the critique of dissimulation and the attempt to discover what really is being masked) is limited, death-ridden and ultimately fated to be seduced by the reversibility which haunts it. Seduction is stronger than power because it is [i.e., knows itself to be] a reversible and mortal process, while power wants to be irreversible like value, as well as cumulative and immortal, like value. Power shares all the illusions of the real and of production; it wants to belong to the order of the real and so falls over into the imaginary and into selfsuperstition…. Seduction, however, does not partake of the real order. (Baudrillard, 1987a:45) Seduction is not opposed to production; it seduces it. It is not concerned with ‘mastering the universe of meaning’ but of ‘mastering the reign of appearances’, it is ‘simply that which lets appearance circulate and move as a secret’ (Baudrillard, 1988a:57–63; see, also, Baudrillard, 1979:19ff.). It is stronger than power because it ‘envelops the whole real process of power, as well as the whole real order of production, with this never-ending reversibility and disaccumulation— without which neither power nor production would even exist’ (Baudrillard, 1987a:45). Seduction knows that there is nothing beyond simulation and acknowledges that meaning cannot be anchored by reference points or finalities outside the simulacrum. Subjects can move only on the inside of the discourses that constitute them; there are no longer any dualisms between the name and its referent. According to Baudrillard (1988a:59): ‘Seduction is the world’s elementary
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dynamic’. It is the fundamental truth that governs the operation of the sign.
Disappearance of the Narrative of Modernity Once upon a time human subjects located themselves in terms of the philosophico-political referents of the ‘grand narratives’ or ‘metanarratives’ of post-Enlightenment modernity (Lyotard, 1973b; 1974; 1984:31–7). These included themes like the dialectic of the Spirit that supposedly came to know itself as it struggled blindly against the barriers it had erected against its own self-understanding. For Lyotard (1984:21–3), narratives transmit pragmatic rules that constitute the social bond. They require no other authorization than themselves: they ‘define what has the right to be said and done in the culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of that culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do’. The most powerful metanarrative of the modern era was a story of the progressive mastery of productive forces as the proletariat struggled toward the light. It affected many diverse facets of modern aestheticism. For instance, in his crusade for ‘a new spirit’ that could reconcile technology with democracy, le Corbusier’s dream was to represent this heroic narrative architecturally. Walter Gropius’s Bauhaus of 1923 (‘the cathedral of the future’), the International Style, the futurists, all represented another kind of heroic, modernist narrative (Jencks, 1986:31–2). In terms of this narrative, a universal subject would initially be forged on the anvil of material production, a process that would create a first-order discursive practice that would undergo a sudden reversal during a period of revolutionary upheaval. ‘If man is shaped by his material environment’, said Marx in ‘The Holy Family’, ‘this environment must be made human’. As a universal subject, humankind one day would be the measure of all things. This narrative has now been cast into doubt by those trends consolidated by Baudrillard under the slogan ‘the end of production’. As we have seen, these include panic, deterrence and the exuberant explosion of sign-value. While signs are still exchanged as commodities they now tend to represent little more than the endless play of difference. As market value loses significance, the ‘discipline of the market’, which compels producers to respect its referents, is replaced by a system in which what will always be in short supply are not workers or products but sign-value and meaningful relations of consumption. In terms of this ‘structural law of value’ (Baudrillard, 1989:5–6; Poster,
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1988:180), exchange-value and use-value are no longer anchored by the referential labor theory of value; rather, value expands endlessly and horizontally. With sign-value, the medium is always the message; thus value is merely the constituent and exclusive part of media that circulates meaning, usually in the form of desire. In the nineteenth century, for the most part, capitalism had only to produce goods and services, consumption took care of itself. In the late-twentieth century the structural law of value has begun to erase the referential dimension of value. In line with these developments, today ‘labor is no longer a force, it has become one sign among many…. Neither more nor less “alienated”, it is no more the locus of a singular historical “praxis” engendering singular social relations’ (Baudrillard, 1989:6). Indeed, the structural law of value puts an end to the ‘brutal’ buying and selling of labor-power: This is why the end of primitive accumulation marks a decisive turning point in political economy, the passage to the preponderance of dead labor, to a social relation crystallized and incarnated in dead labor weighing on the whole society like the code of domination itself. It was Marx’s fantastic error to have innocently believed, in spite of machines, techniques and science, that all of this could become living social labor after the liquidation of the system of capital, when it is precisely there that it founded itself, (ibid.: 11) Of course it still might be argued that the Marxist critique should be as central to the subject’s critical self-understanding as ever because, even under the conditions of postmodernity, commodity relations (i. e., the exchange of the sign as commodity) remain ‘the purest form of social domination’ (Baudrillard, 1989:5). Baudrillard, however, maintains that such domination is now ‘unreadable’: it can be reproduced ‘without references to a dominant class or a relation of forces, [it is] without violence, entirely absorbed without a trace of blood in the signs that envelop us’ (ibid.: 5–6). Similarly, Lyotard has argued that Marxism’s vitality as a narrative of emancipation has withered in the face of the dissolution and dispersal of that subject to which such a narrative supposedly is addressed and which, alone, could ground it as a form of practice. Thus two of the leading theorists of postmodernism—Baudrillard and Lyotard—have both concluded not that Marxism is ‘wrong’ or ‘untrue’ in some sense but that, as a rhetoric of enlightenment, it can no longer help us address the real.
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The purpose of theory, said Marx, is to abolish itself. If Baudrillard (1975:21–51; 1981:130–42), for one, is right in pointing to the collusion in modern society that linked the order of production to that of representation it becomes easier to understand how this principle might apply to Marxism. The modern subject was interpellated both by the classical form of capital and, simultaneously, by the Marxist narrative of emancipation. Because of the interpenetration of bourgeois, democratic-liberal ideology and Marxist criticism, the end of the possibility of institutionalizing the ‘progressive’ worldview of the latter is not, however, the philosophical or ideological triumph of the former but the marker of its irrelevance and ultimate disappearance. Modernity (and thus Marxism) placed the potentially universal selfreflective subject at the center of the universe. Today, the selfobjectification of this once tragical and now farcical figure has become progressively more untenable.
The End of History In our era, the oppositions of the Cold War have been replaced by ‘cool communicational obscenity’ (Baudrillard, 1988a:24): a seamless, network of information and sign-value that eliminates traditional epistemologies of dualism and referentiality and the distinction between the interior and exterior of discourse. In the ideal-typical postmodern world we are either inside the simulator or outside a meaningful universe. There are no longer any barriers to the total hyperrealization of this universe; all references to finalities or ontologies become superfluous. According to Baudrillard (1988a:20ff.), postmodernism entails the disappearance of the difference between private and public spaces, together with the ability of the subject to see itself reflected in the objectively real. Postmodern subjects can no longer produce themselves in a mirror, i.e., self-reflectively, but only as ‘a pure screen, a pure absorption and reabsorption surface of the influent networks’ (Baudrillard, 1988a:27). By way of contrast, while early capitalism’s forced differentiation between the ‘private’ and residual sphere of subjective will-formation and the objectifying tendencies of commodity rationalization was alienating, it at least contained the symbolic benefit of alienation (the fact that the other exists) and that otherness can be played out for better or for worse…. Obscenity begins when there is no more specta-
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cle, no more stage, no more theatre, no more illusion, when everything becomes immediately transparent, visible, exposed in the raw and inexorable light of information and communication. (Baudrillard, 1988a:21) The major cause of such obscenity—and the reason for the concomitant marginalization of Marxism—is thus the progressive universalization and abstraction of the sign, this ultimately facilitated by the development of new technologies of communication.5 As noted above, in its most advanced form, capitalism must now be described not primarily as a mode of commodity production but as the globalization of a system that is predominantly concerned with signs and images. The allure and the fascination of these disembodied media images are now impossible to resist, and the once-familiar ideological interpellations of the Cold War now convey merely a feeling of nostalgia for something that has disappeared. Today, the ruined remnants of ‘actually existing socialism’ whimsically invoke other modernist disasters like Ronan Point in London or the Pruit-Igoe public housing complex in St Louis blown up in 1972. Even the Berlin Wall, which (among other things) heroically and futilely attempted to protect social capital and block the enticements of consumerism and the seduction of the sign, has now been swept aside in an orgy of celebration—a great modern spectacle—that played on Western TV screens like the finale from Les Misérables. The attempt to represent shopping expeditions in heroic modernist terms has been too much, though, even for some élite intellectuals. As Goerge A.Carver, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, explained to The New York Times, the desire of many East Germans ‘to decamp for the West’ was not an ideological victory; rather ‘the bulk of the population set their standards by what they see on their TV screens…it’s not so much the news stories but the commercials that get to them’.6 Once upon a time the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe were at the forefront of a war against those who tried to resist commodification. MTV would have been more seductive. Carver has not been the only élite intellectual to sense, lately, that the triumph of Western capitalism may turn out to be something of a Pyrrhic victory. In a now notorious thesis that was first published in National Interest, a periodical that expresses the views of establishment ideologues who helped prepare the agenda for the Reagan and Bush administrations, Fukuyama, a deputy director of the State Department, recently created a maelstrom of controversy by suggest-
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ing that ‘history’ has ‘come to an end’.7 According to Fukuyama (1989:3), ‘the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism’, together with ‘the ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture in such diverse contexts as the peasants’ markets and color televisions now omnipresent throughout China’, or the rock music ‘enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and Tehran’, signifies the apotheosis of a culture that, as Weber put it, had ‘universal culture and significance’. Fukuyama argues that it is now impossible to envision the emergence of any oppositional force or power that could impede the rationalizing and totalizing system of global consumer capitalism. He concedes, of course, that most human beings will continue to eke out a marginal existence on the periphery of the world system, away from where the action is, but, given the ‘exhaustion’ of Marxism-Leninism as a revolutionary creed, they now lack the ability to have any purchase on something that has, in any case, ceased to exist, i.e., on ‘history’. Indeed, Fukuyama suggests that if history were to be jump-started one day the impetus would come not from the wretched of the earth but from the boredom of yuppies suffering from aleatory exhaustion. Fukuyama thus can smugly conclude that, for the time being at least, the ‘triumph of the West’ will keep the world safe for banality. The ‘universalization of Western, liberal democracy’ will be ‘the final form of human government’ because we now have reached ‘the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’. Even so (like Baudrillard), Fukuyama cannot purge himself of a residual nostalgia: The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history. (1989:3)
Strategies of Resistance Baudrillard has successfully managed to analyze some of the characteristics of ‘postmodernism’, nevertheless he does tend to get carried away. As Best (1989:48) has pointed out, he ‘confuses tendencies of
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contemporary society with a finalized state of affairs’. This is a serious error. In order to ascertain whether strategies of resistance are still possible within the hypercapitalist core it is first necessary to identify whether ‘postmodernism’ means the end of modernity or merely its exhaustion. As we have seen, Baudrillard concludes that as the masses can no longer be passed through the ‘mirror stage’ of class consciousness they can no longer be alienated. In a postmodern society the only weapon available to the silent majorities is silence. The power of the masses now becomes merely the ability to remain indifferent, the power to soak up meaning and absorb it utterly, leaving no trace behind. ‘Who can say which is winning today: the simulation power performs on the masses, or the inverse simulation held out by the masses for power to be swallowed up in’ (Baudrillard, 1983a:29–30). For all his undoubted brilliance, Baudrillard cannot—or will not— (how could he?) attain the kind of critical vantage point that would enable him to determine whether, or to what extent, the postmodernity he describes represents a complete rupture from the past. Thus, labeling Baudrillard ‘a neo-aristocratic sign fetishist’, Kellner (1989c:199) has suggested that Baudrillard finds himself torn…between fascination and melancholy in the face of the disappearance of deep signs, the big signs of modernity like the real or art, and the advent of ‘obscene’ signs (flat, onedimensional, fully explicit) in the society of simulations. This helps explain why Baudrillard vacillates between giddiness and nostalgia (unlike Fukuyama who vacillates between boredom and nostalgia). While there is a strategy of ‘resistance’ implicit in Baudrillard’s analysis—one of withdrawal and ‘hyperconformity’ (see, Baudrillard, 1983b)—the strategy is itself (to use a term that Baudrillard favors) ‘imploded’. As it is unable to get beyond the domination it describes but can only seduce it from within, this strategy lacks any kind of independent perspective. Thus Baudrillard’s plan of ‘resistance’ is indeed ‘fatal’: it cannot escape the orbital pull of that which it surveys, and it cannot even find a reason for trying. It would, therefore, be impossible to try to pretend that Baudrillard has defined a meaningful politics of resistance. Of course, this might be because such a strategy is no longer possible. However, as Baudrillard’s text passes across the glassy surface of contemporary life it takes no interest even in searching for the ‘privileged’ vantage point that Habermas (1987b:126–7) has indicated must be located if
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theorists are to avoid merely being a part of that which they survey. Baudrillard’s fatalism results from a dogmatic metaphysical insistence that to struggle against what seeks to be productive is merely to select how one is already determined. His necrophilia—the obsession with death and with the end of everything—is an inevitable consequence of this fatalism. There is only waste, excretion and morbidity because there is nothing beyond what already exists and no other place to go. Marxist theorists, including Frankfurt Schoolers, were able to reject such a sad dogma because of their commitment to Aufhebung, the idea that criticism can overcome and transcend—as well as address, incorporate and preserve—its oppositions. Yet if such a critical strategy is to be made to work the idea of totality must be preserved. This means that analysis must identify a system wherein partial entities and relations can be shown to be determined and structured by a set of rules or principles that permit critical understanding of how such a ‘system’ was produced in the first place. Marx’s genius was to identify how the system of modernity would universalize itself and colonize the lifeworld according to a code of commodity exchange based on industrialized and bureaucratized production. As we have seen, though, there is reason to believe that—to some extent at least—the rationalizing system that Marx identified is breaking down. Nevertheless, even when describing the ‘end of production’, Baudrillard can still invoke the idea of ‘system’: e.g., ‘the masses… know there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic’ (1983b:46). Baudrillard believes that the logic of hypercapitalism is beyond a rational recall, i.e., it is beyond the understanding of self-reflective individuals (who, in any case, supposedly have ceased to exist). The ‘system’ of hypercapitalism contains subjects who are no longer capable of taking a revolutionary stance. According to Baudrillard, the only way in which postmodern culture can be ruptured is by taking its internal logic to the limits. Thus, exuberant paranoia and the frenetic excretion of garbage becomes the apogée of political will-formation. For Marx, Freud, and for the members of the Frankfurt School, the function of the critic was to identify and help excise pathology. Yet, as Hebdige (1988:209) has pointed out, for Baudrillard The critic-as-surgeon cutting out and analyzing diseased or damaged tissue is replaced by the critic-as-homeopath ‘shadowing’ and paralleling the signs of sickness by prescribing natural poisons which produce in the patient’s body a simulation of the original symptoms.
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Presumably Baudrillard exempts himself from his own analysis. Granted he has spent a fair amount of time driving around America in rented automobiles soaking up its ‘inspired banality’, taking photographs and engaging in wasteful excess (see, for instance, Baudrillard, 1988b). But he has also gone to great pains to simulate the kind of élitist (partial) thinking that one would expect to find coming from a bona fide member of the French intelligentsia. Overall, Baudrillard is not at all interested in pursuing the critical possibilities of his sociology, his remarks about a ‘hyperlogic’ of resistance notwithstanding. This does not invalidate his clever description of hypercapitalism, but it does, I think, jeopardize his chances of making a lasting or definitive impact on theory. Certainly Baudrillard is vulnerable to the charges of ‘neoconservatism’ that Habermas (1981) has leveled against postmodernists. In the final analysis, his strategy of hyper conformity, while posing as radical, not only helps reproduce consumerism (albeit ironically) but also buries deeper the subject that might be expected to have provided some kind of input. In this regard, Baudrillard’s postmodernism seems inferior, for instance, to Georg Simmel’s analysis of aesthetic modernism. Although Simmel anticipated many of the hyperreal forms of consumerism described by Baudrillard and other postmodernists, he never lost sight of the dialectical relationship that invariably obtains between subjects and their objects of production or simulation. Similarly, in describing the fragmentation and increased abstraction of experience in late modernity, Simmel anticipated the progressive disappearance of those reference points that once might have been capable of anchoring the endless flux of life. Although Simmel believed that both the individual and the social whole were striving toward unities of self-expression that were logically incompatible he did not conclude that a sense of individuation or individuality would simply disappear. I think that this is because, unlike Baudrillard, Simmel was never consumed by nostalgic yearning. Also, Baudrillard’s image of the lost social is derived from nowunfashionable structuralist thinking. Simmel did not suffer from such a handicap. While postmodernism has a dark side, it also has a liberating potential, albeit one that tends to be unfocused.8 No one can doubt that in the last two or three decades there have been profound changes in the textual experience of many individuals living in Western societies. The critique of language and of rigid, totalizing modes of experience— an integral part of postmodernism—is to be welcomed, not condemned. Nevertheless, the weakening and possible disappearance of
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modernist narratives of emancipation in Western societies is certainly a potentially catastrophic development, especially when these narratives are replaced by forms of cultural expression that tend merely to insert the commodification of the sign into every partial and disconnected life sphere. Unlike Baudrillard, Lyotard (1988a; see, also, Lyotard and Thébaud, 1985) does attempt to describe how a non-foundationalist theory of critical judgment could be institutionalized within the condition of postmodernity. Lyotard does not appeal to non-existent static, transcendental, or totalistic rules of discourse, nor—unlike Habermas —does he invoke transcendental principles of communicative rationality to which competent subjects must be bound. Indeed, Lyotard (1984:xxv) insists that Habermas’s commitment to a rationalization of communicative action must be rejected because of the ‘violence’ it would do ‘to the heterogeneity of language games’. According to Lyotard (1984:41), we do not have to allow ourselves to be dominated by ‘pessimism’ about the contemporary heterogenous splintering of language-games. For Lyotard, the history of the humanities was a sequence of limited police-actions that were supposed to demarcate and protect the proper boundaries of the subject. Now, philosophy and the humanities can relinquish their ‘legitimation duties’ with a sigh of relief; the ‘mourning process has been completed’. Lyotard would thus both understand and enjoy the panic experienced by contemporary intellectuals like Fukuyama. Similarly, he has little patience for stiff ‘old Europeans’ (as Habermas likes to think of himself) who cannot disavow the now discredited grand narratives of a lost past. Disavowing his earlier belief that the choice facing humanity is socialisme ou barbarie,9 Lyotard (1984:41) suggests: ‘Most people have lost the nostalgia for the lost narrative. It in no way follows that they are reduced to barbarity’. Today, ‘legitimation’ can be based only ‘on performativity. That is what the postmodern world is all about’. While Lyotard’s ‘performative principle’ cheerfully suggests that postmodernism has unleashed new creative possibilities that will permit the subject to ‘wage a war on totality’, ‘activate the differences and save the honor of the name’ (Lyotard 1984:82), the immediate prospects for such revolutionary action appear quite remote. Furthermore, Lyotard’s (1984:60ff.) peculiar insistence that science is consistent with postmodernism because at root it is based upon ‘paralogy’ (i. e., on deliberately contradictory reasoning) is highly problematic, indeed implausible, as several commentators have pointed out. It is difficult to believe that, because it will concern itself mostly with
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‘undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by incomplete information, ‘fracta’, catastrophes and pragmatic paradoxes …’ (ibid.: 60), a ‘postmodern science’ will be a liberating influence, as Lyotard argues. Such a suggestion seems merely fanciful. According to Lyotard (ibid.: 66), we must ‘arrive at an idea and a practice of justice that is not linked to that of consensus’. This theory of justice is further explored in The Differend (1988a). But the description of difference, plurality and indeterminacy endemic to language described in this work does not enable Lyotard to identify critical judgment as resting on anything other than respect for the alterity of the other. For Lyotard, the issue of justice cannot be understood, let alone resolved, in narrow moralistic or cognitive terms. He does assert suggestively that justice cannot be separated from the problem of representation—including the problem of encapsulating feeling— because this is mandated by respect for alterity. However, he cannot, of course, suggest a program or a formula that would enable subjects to generate critical self-judgment mechanistically. (Consistently, he also refuses to give a definitive or universal account of postmodernity.) For Lyotard, ‘justice’ will show itself in a thousand points of light. These disembodied points will twinkle arbitrarily. Any relationship among them will be fortuitous.10
Concluding Remarks In the 1980s, theorists of postmodernism, like Baudrillard and Lyotard, have helped radically to transform social theory. As I have tried to show, this was not merely an academic or theoretical achievement; these transformations are of one piece with profound changes in the substance of human experience in Western cultures since the early 1960s. What is of unquestionable significance in the writings of Baudrillard and Lyotard is the analysis of the displacement of production by simulation, the collapse of conventional modes of reality production, the weakening hold of classical theories of modernity (like those of Marx and Freud) and the increasing irrelevance of the ‘grand narratives’ that have had such a grip on the Western mind since the so-called ‘Enlightenment’. We are now beyond the point where the postmodernist tendencies of ‘advanced’ Western societies can be ignored. At the same time, we cannot afford merely to survey the damage. As Jameson (1988b:111) has pointed out: ‘The point is that we are within the culture of postmodernism to the point where its facile repudiation is as impossible as
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any equally facile celebration of it is complacent and corrupt’. One of the major tasks now facing theory must therefore be the attempt to locate that critical and privileged vantage point that would enable the writer to be more than a bubble on the surface of contemporary life. A starting point here should be a reformulation of the idea of totality. I have suggested above that neither Lyotard nor Baudrillard can entirely dispense with this concept. For instance, Baudrillard does not expunge the notion of ‘system’ from his work; indeed, if he were to do so it would be difficult to comprehend how he could say anything at all about the contours of postmodernism. Certainly, for instance, his discussion of a ‘politics of deterrence’ implicitly affirms that it is still necessary to conceal the fact that there is nothing, that political leaders still have to concern themselves with the problem of movement across an absent political domain. Baudrillard is surprisingly mute about the significance of this problem, perhaps because its existence suggests that contemporary politicians have not yet completely managed to replace dissimulation with hyperreality. Hence, perhaps, to some extent, there is still the chance that they might be held accountable. In trying to reconstruct the idea of totality under the conditions of postmodernity a starting point should be the ongoing relationship between capitalism and the ‘postmodern’ cultural tendencies described above. Clearly there are totalizing tendencies in postmodernism, as well as obvious fragmentation and pluralism. Since the nineteenth century, capital has progressively assimilated first labor then culture; finally it has attempted to commodify all signs, images and events. This has led Best (1989:24) to point out that, although the ‘commodification of reality’ has been an undeniable trend, the ‘reality of commodification has not come to an end’. Similarly, while acknowledging that ‘we need to rethink the problematics of radical politics, of socialism or even radical social transformation or emancipation’, Kellner (1989b:19) argues that ‘the hegemony of capital is still the fundamental principle of social organization…’. Yet the transition from the commodity as sign to the sign as commodity has marked a definitive break between two qualitatively different kinds of capitalism. Whereas early market capitalism produces a cultural form of ‘realism’ based on production and use-value, ‘postindustrial’ or ‘multinational’ capitalism sustains and reproduces the condition of ‘postmodernism’ (Jameson, 1984:78), i.e., nihilism and implosion. The major impediment to developing a critique of the totalizing effects of the structural law of value remains the difficulties associated with the concomitant disappearance of the relatively indepen-
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dent, self-reflective and critical subject. Unfortunately, by definition, the disappearance or marginalization of such a subject must of necessity be a part of such totalization. Jameson (1989) is sanguine about a reconciliation between Marxism and postmodernism, declaring that there is no necessary incompatability between them. He claims (1989:386–7), we are now in a ‘transitional period between two stages of capitalism’, the earlier stage having had to deal with the oppositions it had helped produce, viz., ‘labor movements and insurgencies, mass socialist parties, even socialist states…’, the latter being a period in which capital will enjoy ‘greater elbow-room and space for maneuver’ than ever before. Still, Jameson is optimistic about the future: ‘That a new international proletariat (taking forms we cannot yet imagine) will reemerge from this convulsive upheaval it needs no prophet to predict…’. An important issue raised by Jameson and by others is the possible impact of Third World rebels on the culture of core capitalist societies. Like Fukuyama, Baudrillard is quite willing to relegate the majority of the world’s population to a state of utter oblivion and invisibility. Doubtless Jameson is correct in suggesting that there will be unforeseeable explosions among the ranks of the utterly deprived. It is perhaps significant that as state socialism was rolled up in Germany of the people of El Salvador fought back against the barbarism inflicted on them by the United States with a degree of courage and organization that caught the governing élite in this country completely off balance. However, Jameson is unable to locate a new rhetoric or narrative of struggle that would unite a dislocated and fragmented international proletariat. The question here must be whether commodity penetration in ‘traditional’ societies will effectively neutralize the opportunities radical elements will have to organize resistance against Western and Asian capital. It is extremely difficult to build a revolutionary society behind closed boundaries, but, as the Sandinistas discovered, it is also almost impossible to chart an independent revolutionary course in a society that is daily subject to economic and ideological penetration. Because the commodification of the sign has increasingly come under centralized control, in the foreseeable future any resistance to capital per se will probably continue to be concentrated in the core societies. Attempts to preserve a recognizably Marxist narrative of emancipation will prevail only to the extent that this narrative will interpellate subjects still capable of resisting commodification and who —in the midst of indeterminacy—can manage to ground the reality of their critical practice. As I have already suggested, the production of
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such actors is now inherently problematic. While I do not reject out of hand the possibility of identifying vantage points that permit a privileged or critical perspective, I do not believe it likely that such a perspective could easily be universalized. It must therefore be acknowledged that, as a total narrative of emancipation, Marxism today has run its course. Critical theory must now help subjects to discover the internally imposed limits of their practices or language games. Only within this context can Marxism still have relevance. These developments, however, need not be fatal. As Rorty (1989:189) has observed, even if we can no longer believe in ‘core selves’ (souls), or history, and even if we can no longer place our trust in traditional or modern institutions, ‘belief can still regulate action, can still be thought worth dying for, among people who are quite aware that this belief is caused by nothing deeper than contingent historical circumstance’. The end of a universalistic narrative of emancipation does not mean the end of unitary discourses constructing very specifie subjects. In fact, it might even be the case that the ‘category of the subject remains highly viable in large part because it has never been so hotly contested’ (Collins, 1987:24). Over half a century ago, Adorno (1973:325) acknowledged that modernity had required us to ‘renounce the illusion with which philosophical systems formerly began: that it is possible to grasp the totality of thought through the power of thought’. There are no theoretical solutions either to the problems of modernity or to the aporias of postmodernity. If we can no longer believe in the likelihood of a total critique of society we can perhaps take comfort in the thought that total mechanisms of cooptation are probably equally unlikely. Lyotard has suggested that the end of modernist reification opens up at least the possibility of new performatives, the outcome of which cannot be determined in advance. Even Baudrillard (1987a:71)— somewhat inconsistently and paradoxically—has suggested that the nihilism of postmodernism opens up ‘a more exciting world’: ‘Not a more reassuring world, but certainly more thrilling, a world where the name of the game remains secret. A world ruled by reversibility and indetermination…’.
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Notes 1 Figure 1 is partially adapted from Baudrillard (1983a:11–12, 83–7). 2 To use the sign cynically is to produce a certain effect. This effect is produced as part of simulation. Yet, as Erving Goffman liked to point out, whether or not an observer is aware that something is being simulated is not of ultimate importance in determining whether the real is being produced. The fundamental question Goffman (1974:2) asked was ‘Under what conditions are things real in their effect on us?’. As he demonstrated repeatedly, as far as counterfeiting is concerned, an awareness on the part of an observer that something is being simulated will not in and of itself affect the reality or unreality of an experience. Brahms’ violin concerto played by a synthesizer can still produce the same emotional effects as the almost identical sounds made by a violin player and an orchestra. 3 I should point out here that I am not trying to make dogmatic metaphysical statements. I do not wish—or need—to address the issue of whether there is anything outside simulation or beyond the simulacrum. (I do not know whether there is or is not; more to the point, I do not know how this question could ever be resolved satisfactorily). I am merely pointing out that it is useless to try to persuade oneself that one has located some timeless truth by pointing to the existence of finalities already produced in discourse. Instead, I think the ‘real’ is best explained by identifying the conditions under which the referent is produced. Thus I endorse Rorty’s (1985a) post-Wittgensteinian argument that much of modern (post-Cartesian) philosophy has been an irrelevant ‘sideshow’ and that most of the classical epistemological problems with which ‘an isolated order of priests’ have devoted themselves over the last few hundred years can be retired. 4 As Terry Eagleton (1986:134) has suggested, the interpenetration of hyperreality and hypercapitalism helps illustrate the embeddedness of poststructuralism and postmodernism in contemporary experience:
It is not difficult…to see a relation between the philosophy of J.L.Austin and IBM, or between the various neoNietzscheans of a poststructuralist epoch and Standard Oil. It is not surprising that classical models of truth and cognition are increasingly out of favor in a society where what matters is whether you deliver the commercial or rhetorical goods. Whether among discourse theorists or the Institute of Directors, the goal is no longer truth but performativity, not reason but power. The CBI are in this sense spontaneous poststructuralists to a man, utterly disenchanted (did they but know it) with epistemological realism and the correspondence theory of truth. 5 Postmodern developments have transformed what is now meant by ‘science’ or ‘knowledge’. As Lyotard (1984:3–4) has pointed out, it explains why
for the last forty years the ‘leading’ sciences and technolo-
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gies have had to do with language: phonology and theories of linguistics, problems of communication and cybernetics, modern theories of algebra and informatics, computers and their languages, problems of translation and the search for areas of compatibility among computer languages, problems of information storage and data banks, telematics and the perfection of intelligent terminals, paradoxology. 6 The New York Times, 8 November, 1989. 7 Fukuyama’s essay has been introduced to the world as an insightful work of genius. National Interest initially published it with accompanying commentary from Senator Patrick Daniel Moynihan, Irving Kristol, Allan Bloom, and other leading thinkers, thus drawing attention to its importance, centrality, and originality. It has even been given extensive coverage by the mass media (see, for instance, ‘Has History Come to an End?’, Time, 4 September 1989:57). Admittedly, as a work of description, rather than analysis, ‘The End of History’ does have a certain dogged plausibility. And Fukuyama’s discomfort as he contemplates the disappearance of the ground on which he would like to place his feet does give the essay a certain poignancy. In a dim sort of way Fukuyama understands for whom the bell is tolling. Unlike Baudrillard, though, he lacks a sense of irony. Like Weber, whom he quotes fulsomely, Fukuyama tends to portray Western rationalism as an inscrutable excrescence that is now unredeemable. Yet, unlike Weber, Fukuyama cannot even try to locate the beginning of the end of history in history. 8 For a good discussion of postmodernist culture as a positive, creative influence, see Hebdige (1988). 9 Like Baudrillard, Lyotard is a lapsed Marxist. From 1954–64 he was part of an independent Marxist group, Socialisme ou Barberie, which also included Claude Lefort and Cornelius Castoriadis. 10 As Rorty (1985b) has pointed out, the problem with Lyotard is that he tends to posit a false dichotomy: representation must either be totalitarian or anarchistic. Rorty claims that a middle ground between these two extremes does exist, the example here (besides himself) being the work of the American pragmatists, including William James, Charles Peirce and William Dewey. Honneth (1985:155) has shown how Lyotard’s ‘aversion against the universal’ has created avoidable aporias:
For [Lyotard] every universal is the false, outright: each universalism, every assertion of universal conditions or rules of collective human rights bears on its brow the mark of the will to suppress cultural differences…. However, because he is not at all able to ignore the problem of the universal without remainder, Lyotard must in the end become ensnared in the premises of his own thought; the antipathy to universalism forbids a solution to the very
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problem which he came up against with his demand for an unforced pluralism of social language-games. For, if recourse to universal norms is on principle blocked in the interests of a critique of ideology, then a meaningful argument in support of the equal right to coexistence of all everyday cultures cannot be constructed.
References ADORNO, T.W. (1973) [1931] ‘Die Aktualitát der Philosophie’, Gesammelte Schriften, 1. ASHLEY, D. (1990a) ‘Postmodernism and the “End of the Individual”: From Repressive Self-Mastery to Ecstatic Communication’, in WILSON, J. (Ed.) Current Perspectives in Social Theory, Vol. X, pp. 195–221, Greenwich, Connecticut: Jai Press. – (1990b) ‘Postmodernism and Anti-Foundationalism’, in DICKENS, D.R. and FONTANA, A. (Eds) Postmodernism and Social Inquiry, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. BAUDRILLARD, J. (1975) [1973] The Mirror of Production, translated by POSTER, M., St Louis: Telos Press. – (1979) De la Seduction, Paris: Denoel-Gonthier. – (1981) [1972] For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, translated by LEVIN, C., St Louis: Telos Press. – (1982) ‘Fatality or Reversible Imminence: Beyond the Uncertainty Principle’, translated by PARK, P., Social Research, 49:272–93. – (1983a) Simulations, translated by Foss, P., PATTON, P. and BEITCHMAN, P., New York: Semiotext(e), Foreign Agent Press. – (1983b) In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, translated by Foss, P., PATTON, P. and JOHNSTON, J., New York: Semiotext(e), Foreign Agent Press. – (1987a) [1977] Forget Foucault, New York: Semiotext(e), Foreign Agent Press. – (1987b) ‘Modernity’, translated by JAMES, D., Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 11:63–72. – (1987c) The Evil Demon of Images, translated by PATTON, P. and Foss, P., Sydney: Power Institute Publications. – (1988a) The Ecstasy of Communication, edited by LOTRINGER, S., translated by SCHUTZE, B. and C., New York: Semiotext(e), Foreign Agent Press.
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– (1988b) America, translated by TURNER, C., London: Verso. – (1988c) ‘Hunting Nazis and Losing Reality’, New Statesman, 115:15–17. – (1989) ‘The End of Production’, translated by JULIAN, A., Polygraph 2/3: 5–29. BEST, S. (1989) ‘The Commodification of Reality and the Reality of Commodification’, in WILSON, J. (Ed.) Current Perspectives in Social Theory, Vol. IX, pp. 23–51, Greenwich, Connecticut: Jai Press. COLONS, J. (1987) ‘Postmodernism and Cultural Practice’, Screen, 28:11–26. DEWS, P. (1987) Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory, London: Verso. EAGLETON, T. (Ed.) (1986) ‘Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism’, in Against the Grain: Essays 1975–1985, pp. 131–48, London: Verso. FOUCAULT, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–77, edited by GORDON, C., New York: Pantheon. – (1989) Foucault Live (Interviews, 1966–84), translated by JOHNSTONE, J., edited by LOTRINGER, S., New York: Semiotext(e), Foreign Agent Press. FUKUYAMA, F. (1989) ‘The End of History’, National Interest, 16:3–18. GOFFMAN, E. (1974) Frame Analysis, New York: Harper. HABERMAS, J. (1981) ‘Modernity versus Postmodernity’, New German Critique, 22:3–14. – (1984) [1981] The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, translated by MCCARTHY, T., Boston: Beacon Press. – (1987a) [1981] The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, translated by MCCARTHY, T., Boston: Beacon Press. – (1987b) The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, translated by LAWRENCE, F., Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. HARVEY, D. (1989) The Condition of Postmodernity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. HEBDIGE, D. (1988) Hiding in the Light. On Images and Things, London: Routledge. HONNETH, A. (1985) ‘An Aversion Against the Universal. A Commentary on Lyotard’s Postmodern Condition’, Theory, Culture, and Society, 2:147–56.
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JAMESON, F. (1984) ‘Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’, New Left Review, 146: 53–92. – (1988a) ‘Postmodernism and Consumer Society’, in KAPLAN, E.A. (Ed.) Postmodernism and its Discontents, pp. 13–29, London: Verso. – (1988b) [1984] ‘The Politics of Theory. Ideological Positions in the Post-modern Debate’, in The Ideologies of Theory. Essays 1971– 1986, Vol. II, pp. 103–13, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. – (1988c) [1984] ‘Periodizing the 60s’, in The Ideologies of Theory, op. cit. pp. 178–208. – (1989) ‘Afterword—Marxism and Postmodernism’, in KELLNER, D. (Ed.) Postmodernism, Jameson, Critique, pp. 369–87, Washington, DC: Maisonneuve Press. JAY, M. (1984) Marxism and Totality. The Adventures of a Concept from Lukàcs to Habermas, Berkeley: University of California Press. – (1988) Fin-de-Siècle Socialism and Other Essays, London: Routledge. JENCKS, C. (1986) What is Post-Modernism? New York: St Martin’s Press. KAPLAN, E.A. (Ed.) (1988) Postmodernism and Its Discontents, London: Verso. KELLNER, D. (Ed.) (1989a) Postmodernism, Jameson, Critique, Washington, DC: Maisonneuve Press. – (1989b) ‘Boundaries and Borderlines: Reflections on Jean Baudrillard and Critical Theory’, in WILSON, J. (Ed.) Current Perspectives in Social Theory, Vol. IX, pp. 23–51, Greenwich, Connecticut: Jai Press. – (1989c) Jean Baudrillard. From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond, CA: Stanford University Press. KROKER, A. and COOK, D. (1986) The Postmodern Scene: Excremental Culture and Hyper-Aesthetics, New York: St Martin’s Press. KROKER, A., KROKER, M. and COOK, D. (1989) Panic Encyclopedia. The Definitive Guide to the Postmodern Scene, New York: St Martin’s Press. LÉVI-STRAUSS, C. (1966) The Savage Mind, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. LUKÁCS, G. (1971) [1923] History and Class Consciousness. Studies in Marxist Dialectics, translated by LIVINGSTONE, R., Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. LYOTARD, J.-F. (1973a) Des dispositifs pulsionnels, Paris: Union générale d’editions.
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– (1973b) Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud, Paris: Union générale d’editions. – (1974) Economie libidinale, Paris: Minuit. – (1984) [1979] The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, translated by BENNINGTON, G. and MASSUMI, B., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. – (1985) ‘Missive sur l’Histoire’, Critique, 41:456–78. – (1987) ‘Rules and Paradoxes and Svelte Appendix’, Cultural Critique, 5:209–19. – (1988a) [1983] The Differend. Phrases in Dispute, translated by VAN DEN ABBEELE, G., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. – (1988b) Peregrinations. Law, Form, Event, New York: Columbia University Press. LYOTARD, J.-F. and THÉBAUD, J.L. (1985) [1979] Just Gaming, translated by GODZICH, W., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. MARX, K. (1970) [1867] Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I, New York: International Publishers. POSTER, M. (Ed.) (1988) Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, Cambridge, England: Polity Press. VAN REIJEN, W. and VEERMAN, D. (1988) ‘An Interview with Jean-Francois Lyotard’, Theory, Culture and Society, 5:277–310. RODERICK, R. (1989) ‘Beyond a Boundary: Baudrillard and New Critical Theory’, in WILSON, J. (Ed.) Current Perspectives in Social Theory, Vol. IX, pp. 3–4, Greenwich, Connecticut: Jai Press. RORTY, R. (1985a) ‘Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity’, in BERNSTEIN, R.J. (Ed.) Habermas and Modernity, pp. 161–75, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. – (1985b) ‘Le Cosmopolitisme sans émancipation: en réponse à JeanFrancois Lyotard’, Critique, 41:570–83. – (1989) Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DE SAUSSURE, F. (1959) [1916] Course in General Linguistics, edited by BALLY, C. and SECHEHAYE, A., translated by BASKIN, W., New York: Philosophical Library. SIMMEL, G. (1968) ‘The Concept and Tragedy of Culture’, in ETZKORN, P.K. (trans. and Ed.) The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays, pp. 27–46, New York: Teachers College Press. –(1978) [1907] The Philosophy of Money, trans. by BOTTOMORE, T. and FRISBY, D., London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
4 The Uses and Abuses of French Discourse Theories for Feminist Politics1 Nancy Fraser
This essay grows out of an experience of severe puzzlement. For several years now I have been watching with growing incomprehension as increasing numbers of feminist scholars have been trying to use or adapt the theory of Jacques Lacan for feminist purposes. I myself have felt a deep disaffinity with Lacan, a disaffinity as much intellectual as political. So while many of my fellow feminists have been using Lacanian ideas to theorize the discursive construction of subjectivity in film and literature, I have been relying on alternative models of language to develop a feminist social theory. Until now, I have avoided any explicit, metatheoretical discussion of these matters. I have explained neither to myself nor to my colleagues why it is that the footnotes in my recent papers contain some positive or quasipositive references to Foucault, Bourdieu, Bakhtin, Habermas, and Gramsci but not positive references to Lacan, Kristeva, Saussure, and Derrida.2 In this essay, I want to begin to provide such an explanation. I will try to explain why I think feminists should have no truck with Lacan and why we should have only the most minimal truck with Julia Kristeva. I will also try to identify some places where I think we can find more satisfactory alternatives.
What do Feminists want in a Discourse Theory? Let me begin by posing the questions: what might a theory of discourse contribute to feminism and what, therefore, do feminists want in a discourse theory? I suggest that a theory of discourse can help us understand at least four things, all of which are interrelated. First, it can help us understand how people’s social identities are fashioned and altered over time. Second, it can help us understand how, under conditions of inequality, social groups in the sense of collective agents 98
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are formed and unformed. Third, a theory of discourse can illuminate how the cultural hegemony of dominant groups in society is secured and contested. Fourth, it can shed light on the prospects for emancipatory social change and political practice. Let me elaborate. First, consider the uses of a theory of discourse for understanding social identities. The basic idea here is that people’s social identities are complexes of meanings, networks of interpretation. To have a social identity, to be a woman or a man, for example, just is to live and to act under a set of descriptions. These descriptions, of course, are not simply secreted by people’s bodies, still less are they exuded by people’s psyches. Rather, they are drawn from the fund of interpretive possibilities available to agents in specific societies. It follows that in order to understand anyone’s feminine or masculine gender identity, it does not suffice to study biology or psychology. Instead, one must study the historically specific social practices through which cultural-descriptions of gender are produced and circulated.3 Moreover, social identities are exceedingly complex. They are knit from a plurality of different descriptions arising from a plurality of different signifying practices. Thus, no one is simply a woman; one is rather, for example, a white, Jewish, middle-class woman, a philosopher, a lesbian, a socialist, and a mother.4 Moreover, since everyone acts in a plurality of social contexts, the different descriptions comprising any individual’s social identity fade in and out of focus. Thus, one is not always a woman in the same degree; in some contexts, one’s womanhood figures centrally in the set of descriptions under which one acts; in others, it is peripheral or latent.5 Finally, it is not the case that people’s social identities are constructed once and for all and definitively fixed. Rather, they alter over time, shifting with shifts in agents’ practices and affiliations. Thus, even the way in which one is a woman will shift, as it does, to take a dramatic example, when one becomes a feminist. In short, social identities are discursively constructed in historically specific social contexts; they are complex and plural; and they shift over time. One use of a theory of discourse for feminist politics, then, is in understanding social identities in their full socio-cultural complexity, thus in demystifying static, single variable, essentialist views of gender identity. A second use of a theory of discourse for feminist politics is in understanding the formation of social groups. How does it happen, under conditions of inequality, that people come together, arrange themselves under the banner of collective identities, and constitute themselves as collective social agents? How do class formation and, by analogy, gender formation, occur?