CONTENTS Preface ..
.
.
......
.
... ......
.
... ... ...
... ..
.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
PlATO.. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
...... ..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..... .. ...
... XIX
1
8 Ion 10 from, Republic ........... . ......................... 16 from, Phaedrus .................................... �6 from, Sophist ...................................... �8 from, Philebus .................. . ............ . .... 40 from, Cratylus ..................................... 41 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.. .
.
.
... ...
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
ARISTOTLE .... . .......
........ .. . .. .. .. from, Physics ...................................... from, Metaphysics .................................. Poetics ......................................... from, Rhetoric..................................... .
.
.
.
.
MARCUS TULUUS CICERO ........... . . . .. ...
48
49 51 52 69
74 from, Brutus ...................................... 75
QUINTUS HORATIUS FLACCUS (HORACE) Art of Poetry .
STRABO
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
...
.
.
.
.
....
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .... .
. .
.
.
.
78 . 79
.
..... . .. . ... .. . . .... . 86 from, Geography................................... 87 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
PUBUUS CORNEUUS TACITUS..
.
.
.
.... . . .. ... . . 90 from, Dialogue on Oratory .......................... 91 .
.
vi <>
CONTENTS
PSEUDO-LONGINUS' . .
On the Sublime
PLUTARCH
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
. . ... ... .
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
.. . ... 94 95
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .. . . .. . . 119 from How The Young Man Should Study Poetry........ 120 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
FLAVIUS PHILOSTRATUS
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .. . . .. from Lives ofthe Sophists .................... . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
' .
.
.
.
.
. .
124 125
PLOTINUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. 127 .
from Enneads ................................... 128 .
SAINT AUGUSTINE
.. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 140 from On Christian Doctrine ........................ 141 .
.
ANICUS MANUUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS
. 147 from The Consolation of Philosophy ................. 148
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS.
.
D ANTE AUGHIERI ..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.. . . .. 149 from Summa Theologica ........................... 150 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .. . . ... 153 from The Banquet ................................ 154 from Letter to Can Grande Della Scala ............... 154 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
GIOVANNI BOCCACCIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. 157 .
from Life of Dante ................................ 158 from Genealogy ofthe Gentile Gods . . .. 160 .
JUUUS CAESAR SCALIGER from Poetics
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
. .
.
LODOVICO CASTELVETRO.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .. . ..
. .
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
. .
.
.
. .
.
. 168 169
.
.
.
. .. . ....... ' 176 from The Poetics of Aristotle Translated and Explained 177 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
CONTENTS
SIR PHIUP SIDNEY
. 185 An Apology for Poetry............................ 186 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
GIORDANO BRUNO .......................... 207 from Concerning the Cause, the Principle, and the One . 208
GIACOPO MAZZONI .. .... ..... ..... ... .... ... 215 from On the Defense ofthe Comedy of Dante ......... 216
TORQUATO TASSO........................... 226 from Discourses on the Heroic Poem................. 227
SIR FRANCIS BACON.......................... 234 from The Advancement of Learning ..... .. . . 235 Preface to the Wisdom ofthe Ancients .... . . 236 from The New Organon ........................... 238 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
PIERRE CORNEILLE .......................... 244 Ofthe Three Unities of Action, Time, and Place
JOHN DRIDEN
. . . 245
.
.
.
253 An Essay of Dramatic Poesy ....................... 254 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
JOHN LOCKE· ... .... .......... .... ..... ..... 281 .
from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding ..... 282
ALEXANDER POPE ........................... 297 An Essay on Criticism ........
JOSEPH ADDISON .
.
.
...
.
.
. .. ... ... 298
.
.
.
.
........ .... ... ..... .... 307 On the Pleasures of the Imagination ................ 308 .
.
.
GIAMBATTISTA VICO ......................... 313 from The New Science............................. 314
<>
vii
viii
<>
CONTENTS
DAVID HUME
.. . Ofthe Standard of Taste .
.
.
.
EDMUND BURKE .
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
. .
. .
.
. .
. .
.
.
.
.
.. . . g22 .......... g2g
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.. .. . 3g2 from A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Origin of Our . 3g3 Ideas ofthe Sublime and Beautiful .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
EDWARDIDUNG
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . from Conjectures on Original Composition .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
SAMUEL JOHNSON
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
' ...... M7 M8
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .. . . .. Rambler, Number 4: On Fiction .................... from Rasselas from Preface to Shakespeare ......................... .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
g57 358 360 361
g69 from Elements of Criticism: Introduction 370 Chapter XXV .................................. 372 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING ............... 378 . from Laocoon ................................... 379 .
DENIS DIDEROT ..
.
.
.
.
.
from The Paradox of Acting
g8g . .................... 384
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS .. ..... ..... .. ........ 393 .
from Discourses on Art ............................ 394
IMMANUEL KANT
. ... ... . from Critique ofJudgment ....................... " .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFf .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.. . from A Vindication of the Rights of Woman .
.
.
.
.
.
. .
. .
.
.
.. . . .
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
416 419
441 442
CONTENTS
WILLIAM BLAKE .......... ........... ... .. 447 .
.
.
from The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.. 448 from Letter to Thomas Butts ........................ 448 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
from Annotations to Reynolds' Discourses.............
.
,
448
from A Descriptive Catalogue ....................... 458 from A Vision ofthe LastJudgment ............ ..... 458 .
FRIEDRICH SCHILLER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 460 from Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man . ..... 461 .
FRIEDRICH SCHLEGEL .......... ............ 473 .
from Critical Fragments (Lyceum Fragments) ......... 474 from Athenaeum Fragments ........................ 477 from On Incomprehensibility....................... 480
WILLIAM WORDSWORTH ................ .... 481 .
Preface to the Second Edition of Lyrical Ballads...... , 482
SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE ................. 493 Shakespeare'sJudgment Equal to His Genius . ..... , 494 from On the Principles of Genial Criticism ............ 497 from Biographia Literaria . ........................ 501 .
.
.
from Essays on the Principles of Method .............. 508
from The Statesman's Manual .............. . ..... 519 .
.
from On the Constitution of Church and State ....... .
.
519
WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT ... .............. 523 .
from Collected Works ............ .... ........... 524 .
.
JOHN KEATS ..........................
.
..... 534
.
from Letter to Benjamin Bailey...................... 535 from Letter to George and Thomas Keats . ... .. .... 536 .
.
.
from Letter toJohn Taylor ......................... 536 from Letter to Richard Woodhouse .................. 536
<>
ix
x
<>
CONTENTS
PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY ... . ... ... ........ ... 5�7 A Defense of Poetry..................... :........ 5�8
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL.......... 552 .from The Philosophy of Fine Art .................... 55� .from The Phenomenology of Mind .................. 561
RAL PH WALDO EMERSON ..............:..... 566 .from The American Scholar ... .. . ....... ......... 567 .
.
The Poet ................... .................... 570
EDGARAllAN POE ......... . . . .. ... . .. . 580 .from The Poetic Principle .......................... 581
MATIHEW ARNOLD .... ... .............. . . 586 .
The Function of Criticism at the Present Time ........ 587 .from The Study of Poetry ............. .. ...... . 599 .
.
.
.
CHARLES BAUDELAIRE .......... ....... . . .. .
604
.from The Salon of 1859............................ 604
FRIEDRICH ENGELS........... 607 Manifesto ofthe Communist Party.. . .... . .. . . . . . ... 608 .from The German Ideology ........................ 614 .from A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy ............................. 615
KARL MARX and
WALTER PATER ................ .... ... ...... 617 .
.from Studies in the History ofthe Renaissance ......... 618
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION: THE MODERN ERA 621
HIPPOLYfE ADOLPHE TAINE
.
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE .
.
. 639 from History of English Literature ................. :. 640 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. On a New List of Categories (1868) ..... .. . .... from Lessons from the History of Philosophy .. . . . The First Rule of Reason ........................ " from Training in Reasoning ... . .......... .. from What Pragmatism Is (1905) .. . .... . .. ... .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
WALT WHITMAN
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . . from Democratic Vistas (1871) ........... .. ...... .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
. .
652 655 661 666 667 668 673 674
. 686
.
from The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music ..... 687
Truth and Falsity in an Ultramoral Sense ...
.
. ..... 692
.
.
EMILE ZOLA . .. . . . ..... ... .. . . . . ... .. ..... .. 698 .
from The Experimental Novel
OSCAR WILDE
.
.
.
.
.
.
The Decay of Lying ...
. .
.
.
.
...
.
.
.
....
.
. .
.
. ... .. .. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
.
STEPHANE MALLARME .. ...
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . ....
.
.
.
. .
.
. 699
.
711 . .. 712 .
.
.
.
.
.
. The Evolution of Literature ............ . ... ... The Book: A Spiritual Instrument . ... ... ...... Mystery in Literature ... ..... . . . .... .. " .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
I
GOTTLOB FREGE
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
726 727 729 731
. . 734 On Sense and Meaning ........................... 735 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
<.) xi
xii <>
CONTENTS
SIGMUND FREUD ...... . . . ... . .... . ...... .746 from Letter to Wilhelm Fleiss, October 15, 1897. ...... 747 from Thirteenth Lecture: Archaic and Infantile , Features in Dreams ......... .. .. ...... ... 748 from Lecture Twenty-One: Development ofthe Libido and Sexual Organization ...................... " 752 .
.
.
LEO TOLSTOY .......................... :.... 757 What Is Art? ............ ......... .......... . 758 .
.
.
EDMUND HUSSERL . . ...... . .. .......... . . 770 .
Investigation I: Expression and Meaning.......
.
.. "
.
773
FERDINAND de SAUSSURE ..... . ...... . .... 786 .
from Course in General Linguistics .......... ....... 787 .
VIKTOR SHKLOVSKY . . ... ... .... ... . ... . .. 796 Art as Technique ........ ..... ... ........... . 797 .
.
T.S .ELIOT .................................. 806 Tradition and the Individual Talent................. 807
BERTRAND RUSSELL ......................... 811 Descriptions . ..................... ............. 812 PAUL VA.LERY ... .. . . ....... . . . ............ 818 Leonardo and the Philosophers .. ... ......... . " 819 .
.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN . ..... . ... ......... 823 from Tractatus Logio-Philosophicus ................. 825 from Philosophical Investigations.................... 836
CONTENTS
I.A. RICHARDS .. ......... ..... ... . .. .... . . 856 from Principles of Literary Criticism ... ... . ....... . . . 857 .
.
.
from Science and Poetry ........................... 860 from Practical Criticism . ........................... 863
BORIS EICHENBAUM ..... .. ... . . ...... .... 867 .
.
.
The Theory ofthe "Formal Method"................ 868
VIRGINIA WOOLF . ... .. .. .. ....... .
... 885 A Room of One's Own............................ 886 .
.
.
.
.
.
...... . ....... .... 894 from Seven Types of Ambiguity ....... . ........... .. 895
WILLIAM
EMPSON ..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
MIKHAIL M.BAKHTIN ............. . ......... 912 .
from Epic and Novel: Toward a Methodology for the Study ofthe Novel .......................... 913
VALENTIN N.VOLOSINOV .................... 926 Verbal Interaction ... . ........... . . ... . . .... . 926 .
.
.
.
ANTONIO GRAMSCI .. ............. ... .
.
.
.
... 936 .
from Prison Notebooks ............................ 937
JOHN CROWE RANSOM . . .
...... ... .. 953 Poetry: A Note in Ontology........................ 954 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
R.P.BLACKMUR ....... . . .. ...... ... 964 A Critic'sJob of Work ..... . . . ... . ... . ... . . . .... 965 .
RUDOLPH CARNAP .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . ..... .. ..... .... 978 The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language ........................... 980 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
xiii
xiv
¢
CONTENTS
JACQUES LACAN .. ...... . ...... . .... . .. .
.
.
_
.
The Mirror Stage as Formative ofthe Function ofthe I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience
WALTER BENJAMIN ..... .. ..... .. Theses on the Philosophy of History . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
. ..
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
990
.
991
.
. 995
.
.
996
WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS .............'.... 1001 Against the Weather
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1002
KENNETH BURKE ........................... 1011 Literature as Equipment for Living . 1012 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
ERNST CASSIRER ..... . ...................... 1016 from An Essay on Man . . . 1018 .
.
.
.
.
W.K. WIMSATT and MONROE C.BEARDSLEY The Intentional Fallacy .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
. .
.
, 1026 1027 .
CLEANTH BROOKS .............. . ........... 1085 The Heresy of Paraphrase Irony as a Principle of Structure .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1086 1048
MARTIN HEIDEGGER ........................ 1051 from Letter on Humanism
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
, 1058
R.S. CRANE ................................. 1071 The Critical Monism of Cleanth Brooks . , 1072 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
M. H.ABRAMS . .............................. 1087 from Orientation of Critical Theories
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1087
CONTENTS
THEODOR W.ADORNO ....
.. .. . ... . . 1101 Cultural Criticism and Society .. . ...... . . ... . . 1102 from Negative Dialectics .... . . .. . .... .. . .. .. 1110 "
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS . . . ... ..... .. . 1119 The Structural Study of Myth . ... . . .. . . .. . .. . 1120 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
ROMAN jAKOBSON ........ ......
.
NORTHROP FRYE.
.
.......... 1132 The Metaphoric and Metonymic Poles .... ;......... 1132 .
. .. 1136 from Anatomy of Criticism ........................ 1138 .
.
.
.
.
.
•
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
•
. NOAM CHOMSKY............................ 1166 from A Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior........ 1167
JEAN PAUL SARTRE . .. ........ . .... .... .. ... 1175 .
I. Marxism and Existentialism ..................... 1176
FRANTZ FANON ............................. 1187 On National Culture
10
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
IO
•
•
•
•
•
•
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
,,
·
1187
JACQUES DERRIDA .......................... 1203 Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences........................... 1206 Meaning and Representation . ....... ... . .. ...... 1215 .. . ... . . . . . . 1220 from Of Grammatology ... .... ..
HANS ROBERT jAUSS ........................ 1237 from Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory
1238
ROLAND BARTHES .......................... 1255 The Death ofthe Author ......................... 1256
<>
xv
xvi
<>
CONTENTS
MICHEL FOUCAULT What Is an Author? Truth and Power
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
from Postscript-1969
.
.
.
. .
. .
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
1259 . 1260 . 1269
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
THOMAS S.KUHN ..
.
..
.
.
.
. .
.
. .
LOUIS ALTHUSSER .....................:
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
. .
. 1297 .
1298
from Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses
PAUL de MAN . . .
.
.
.
.
.
Criticism and Crisis The Resistance to Theory .
.
CLIFFORD GEERTZ .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.... 1309 . 1310 .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
MARY LOUISE PRATT
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1280 1282
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1317
. 1328 .
1329
. 1343
from Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse.................................... 1344 from Chapter Three: The Linguistics of Use 1349 .
RAYMOND WILLIAMS
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
from Marxism and Literature, Part III
1356 1357
1369 from Orientalism ................................ 1370
EDWARD W. SAID
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. ... .
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.. . . 1384 from Dancing Through the Minefield: Some Observations on the Theory, Practice, and Politics of a Feminist Literary Criticism.................. 1385
ANNETTE KOLODNY . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
CONTENTS
STANLEY FISH ............................... 1395 Is There a Text in This Class? .................... . 1396 PIERRE BOURDIEU .......................... 1403 from Language and Symbolic Power ............... . 1404 J EAN FRANC OIS LY OTARD .................... 1417 Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?.... 1418
BENEDICT ANDERSON ....................... 1424 The Origins of National Consciousness ............ . 1424 JURGEN HABERMAS ....................
1429
Excursus on Leveling the Genre Distinction Between Philosophy and Literature ..................... . 1430
G ILLES DELEUZE and FE LIX GUATTARl ........ 1442 1. Introduction: Rhizome ....................... . 1443 RICHARD RORTY ............................ 1457 The Contingency of Language ... ...... ...... ..... 1458 EVE K OSOFSKY SEDGWICK ................... 1469 from Epistemology of the Closet . .... .. ...... ....... 1470 STEPHEN J.GREENBLATT .................. .. 1476 Resonance and Wonder .. ........................ 1477
JUDITH BUTLER ............................ 1489 Imitation and Gender Insubordination ........... .. 1490
<>
xvii
xviii
0
CONTENTS
JOHN GUILLORY ........................... 1500 .
from Literature after Theory........ ............... 1500
GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTYSPNAK . .
Teaching for the Times ...
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
. .
. .
.
. 1509 .. 1510
.
.
.
. 1525 Subject of Politics, Politics ofthe Subject............ 1526
ERNESTO I.ACI.AU
Index
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1535
Preface
Since the publication of the first edition in 1971, the field of critical theory has expanded dramatically, particularly after the 1960s. This edition, accordingly, �as been reshaped throughout, not only to reflect recent work but also to provide a more substantial histor ical background for it. This third edition of Critical Theory Since Plato follows the ba
sic plan of previous editions in offering a general introduction (Plus a supplementary in troduction to modern criticism-see page 621), with selections prefaced by headnotes and brief bibliographic information, all presented in chronological order. We have avoided the use of thematic or other rubrics that group texts by approach or subject, since each individual selection reflects substantive individual work, by older as well as more recent writers, that may connect with other authors and historical periods in multi
ple ways. The aim is to present in a single volume, of moderate size, materials for a course of resentative readings in the history of critical theory in Western culture, with out privileging any particular scheme of associations.
The special problems of representing contemporary criticism since 1965 are al ready familiar to scholars, teachers, and students. The issue is not merely the sheer growth of the field itself, in the.. number of universities that now offer (and in many cases, require) courses in criticism and theory, together with a dramatic increase in pro fessional publications on theoretical subjects in literary and cultural study. Even more important, we believe, are changes in the conception of the field that can be evaluated only by patient historical and philosophical reflection. Some of these problems we ad
dressed in Critical Theory Since 1965 (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1986), but in this volume our approach has been more comprehensive.
As critical theory has become more diverse, it has also become increasingly diver gent in the sense that the special problems of particular areas of study demand separate and extensive treatment that cannot reasonably be satisfied by a general and historical anthology such as this one. Fortunately, very good resources for more extended work on such areas are now readily available. W hat is required, we believe, is a selection of es sential and substantive materials to facilitate a rethinking of the historical shape and tra
jectory of the expanded field as a whole. Thus, readers will find in this edition amplified resources to examine the rhetorical and pedagogical function of the literary in the an cient world, with sometimes surprising pertinence to contemporary studies of discursive practices, just as they will find throughout a greater diversity of philosophical selections, ancient and modern, and a broad representation of work addressing contemporary themes pertaining to the role of theory and the place of literature in collective cultural life.
In particular, we have been concerned in this edition to take full advantage of his
torical reflection as a way to put contemporary practices and concerns in an expansive framework. This pertains not only to the addition, for example, of selections from the
xx
0
PREFACE
dialogues of Plato that formerly were not seen as pertinent to the literary, but the repre sentation of other philosophical perspectives from the last one or two centuries where, conversely, the problems usually associated exclusively with the literary have been found to be fundamental for all organized thinking. We have, in this spirit, included new selections by such philosophers and theorists as Charles Sanders Peirce, Edmund Husserl, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolph Carnap, Valentin N. Volosinov, Jean Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger, Frantz Fanon, Jacques Der rida, Edward W. Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Judith Butler, and Ernesto Laclau, among others, that together make clear the shortsightedness of insular and exclusive re liance on only certain traditions of thinking on fundamental topics. Additional material extending the scope of this edition is available on-line at www.textchoice.com. Two general observations concerning the selections in this anthology bear special mention. The first is that we have been guided in our editorial choices by the conviction that the intellectual problems of the literary, and more generally, the imaginative, are
fundamental and not topical. The sense of crisis and controversy that has marked recent criticism is, in this light, partly the result of the discovery that many of our dominant philosophical presuppositions are vulnerable precisely because they have been unable
to accommodate the vigorous and dynamic quality of imaginative thinking. The second is that imaginative thinking, so considered, remains one of the greatest practical re
sources upon which we can draw, as a continuing source of the ongoing discourse of justice that has been particularly prominent in contemporary critical theory. Finally, we wish to thank our students and colleagues, especially the late Ernst Behler, Robert L. Montgomery, Henry Staten, Raimonda Modiano, Nicholas Halmi, and Gary Handwerk, whose generous conversations and suggestions have been most ap preciated.
HazardAdmns Leroy Searle
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
I This third edition is a thorough revision of the second. Our choice of selections re flects an effort to represent the main themes in the history of literary criticism and the ory in Western culture from Plato to the present and to recognize that this history forms an important part of the comparative history of ideas and cannot be more than partially separated from certain other disciplines. Thus some texts not directly concerned with lit erature have been included; in a few cases these texts imply hostility to literature. They are important because they helped to generate an apologetic and defensive reaction ammig critics and poets. An example in the twentieth century is the work of the logical positivists, of Rudolph Camap and Bertrand Russell, and their relation, for example, to the critical writings of I. A. Richards and, in tum, his curious relation to the American New Critics. But more important is Plato himself; the ambivalence he exhibited toward poetry gave rise to numerous defenses over centuries, some actually citing Plato, even as attackers cited him in their own support. Indeed, much of the long history of the defense of poetry has been expressed in, and captured by, the terms set forth by its attackers, the first and foremost being Plato, whose search for justice in Republic led his Socrates to advocate the banishment of poets. The defense of poetry has long sought to overcome the Socratic attack, but too often within the language put in his mouth by Plato. The his tory of literary criticism and theory has always been intertwined with that of philosophy, sometimes vexing it, sometimes being vexed by it. Although our principal effort has been to reflect the main intellectual paths, we have sought to make an eclectic selection without succumbing to fashions that seem to us not a particularly important part of the history of literary thought. Further, we have tried to make sense of the developments that have given late-twentieth-century criticism the appearance of disorder. It must be added for clarity's sake that this book's title is meant to refer to literary criticism and theory and what has influenced or paralleled it. We do not use the term "critical theory" specifically to designate the social thought of the Frankfurt School of critical theory founded in the 1930s, with which were associated such names as Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, though these thinkers contribute to our history. It must be added, too, that we recognize that some late-twentieth-century theorists called in question the notion of literature itself, seeking to break down distinctions between modes of linguistic utterance tacitly accepted for centuries and explicitly argued for ear lier in the century. In our view there is a literary art that criticism and theory tradition ally addressed. Our concern is to study how that art has been and continues to be thought about, even when the immediate effect has been to call it into question.
2 <>
GENEllAL INTllODUCTION
We have found ourselves compelled to enlarge significantly not only the selec tions from Plato and Aristotle to reflect the variety of their views and influences but also
the selection of other classical texts, in part to show the relation of rhetorical theory to
poetics. Thus Cicero, Strabo, Tacitus, and Plutarch appear here for the first time, as do selections from Plato's Phaedrus, Sophist, and Philebus and Aristotle's Metaphysics and Rhetoric. These additions have in turn encouraged us to enlarge the selections from the Renaissance with the addition of Scaliger, as well as additional writings by Mazzoni and Bacon. A reading of these texts enriches significantly one's sense of the movement of
literary thought and its considerable range; and it indicates that certain issues recur in different dress.
As in the two previous editions, we have chosen to print the selections roughly in
chronological order, resisting organizing them by an allegedly dominant theme. There are many different ways to classify these texts, and to locate them by theme or example
of school or movement would tend to make their arguments appear simpler, neater, and less multidimensional than they usually are. An argument can be made that the greatest
critics resist classification anyway and even contain in their work irresolvable contra
dictions that in the end may be the most interesting things about them. In any case, we
assume that teachers and students will select texts and make comparisons for themselves and not simply absorb imposed categories. We offer deliberately more than any sane course can or ought to cover. Any syllabus will have to be selective. As a result of our view, discussion of themes, traditions, and fundamental concepts are here restricted to the headnotes, footnotes, an introduction to the modem era, and what follows immedi ately and briefly below.
II One way to consider the work of a critic is to note the words that carry most weight in that person's discourse, making sure to recognize that often words change
their meanings radically over time and from one critic to another and even within a
critic's own career. Indeed, one can often see that a critical quarrel is over who is to es tablish a word's definition and claim, so to speak, its ownership. One may be reminded here that Kenneth Burke wrote of a "stealing back and forth of symbols" that occurs in many disciplines and cultural situations. The history of Western criticism as we know it begins with such a quarrel-over the word "imitation" (mimesis). Plato used it in one sense, Aristotle in quite another, and Horace in still another. It can be said that each
claimed the prestige of the word for his way of looking at literature.
Certainly the word was prestigious. It dominated, in one or another of its various
senses, literary thought for over two thousand years. Even after that it had brief periods of revival. Its prestige waned when philosophical speculation turned, roughly in the sev enteenth century, from ontological concerns, inquiry into the nature of Being, to episte mological ones, that is, inquiry into how we know.
Indeed, if we recognize the radical simplification inevitable in any such effort, we
can divide the history of philosophy and of literary thought into four major phases of
general emphasis. The first three phases have been the ontological, the epistemological,
and the linguistic. The first and by far the longest phase, the ontological, addressing !he
II nature of Being, can be seen at once in Plato's location of Being in the eternal ideas or forms. Aristotle's shifting of the location of Being and his redefinition of ideas also re defined imitation. It comes as no surprise that the ontological interest raised over and over the issue of the status of literary fictions. The question of Being dominated philos ophy, and that of verisimilitude dominated literary thought through the Middle Ages and well into the Renaissance. Then, however, the emphasis shifted to what had come to be regarded as a prior question. One began no longer with the problem of Being but instead that of knowing, the assumption being that it was necessarily the prior question. The classic expressions of the epistemological problem were those of Rene Descartes and John Locke in the seventeenth century. Descartes's rationalism began with an attempted deduction of the human subject's indubitable knowledge, arriving at what is known as the Cartesian cog
ito: "I think; therefore I am" seemed the fundamental ground. Descartes proceeded from
this to deduce further knowledge. Locke's empiricism, following on the experimental ism of Francis Bacon, divided experience into secondary (subjective) qualities and pri
mary (objective) qualities of experience, privileging all that was primary, that is, all that
he regarded ascertainable as real through measurement. Knowledge became identical with the results of scientific method. The epistemological age threatened to separate the
literary from reality in a new way, or rather reserved the real world for science and tended to drive literature into subjectivity and thence into a kind of solipsism. We place Walter Pater's conclusion to his Studies in the History of the Renaissance, notorious in
its time, at the end of the first part of this book. It is there because it radically represents
the movement into subjectivity generated ultimately by epistemology. A variety of movements had tacitly or explicitly, as in Pater's case, accepted poetic subjectivity, ei ther to exploit it by identifying poetry with the expression of irrational, personal experi ence or feeling or to overcome it to some extent by at least a partial recapture of objec tivity, either of taste (David Hume) , of morality (Samuel Johnson), or, later, of experimental method itself (Emile Zola). At the same time, the epistemological phase focused much attention on the mind of the subject. But the mind was also beginning to be objectified and systematically studied, or at least so it began to be hoped. Poetry once again found itself embattled. The epistemological phase, nevertheless, greatly enlivened critical discourse, rescuing it from a vocabulary, grown up around the word imitation, that had fairly well exhausted itself. However, until literature could find a theory that would .overcome its relegation to subjectivity, it would suffer denigration of its value. Even today it suffers from the popularity of the object-subject opposition. The rise of aesthetics was, it turned out, one form of defense, particularly Im manuel Kant's effort to establish what he called "subjective universality" in aesthetic response to the beautiful and the sublime. But as is so often the case in philosophy as well as in literary theory, the problem was not so much solved as shelved in favor of a new and fresher one. As the ontological question had given way to the epistemological one, so the epistemological question gave way to the linguistic one. To ask about Being led eventually and perhaps inevitably to ask about how and what we can know. But other questions came to seem even prior to that: Can what we call knowing occur apart from language or other systems of symbols like mathematics? To what extent does lan guage inform us? To what extent are we enclosed within it? For a very long time, with some important exceptions, philosophers considered language a way of expressing and
<>
3
4
<>
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
communicating prior experiences and ideas, which it represented (copied, imitated) in words. But as the epistemological phase developed it seemed that the matter was much more complicated, that language, not merely perception, played a constitutive role in the way reality appeared to us. The idea of language as representing or imitating some prior entity now had to vie with the idea'that language made these entities or at least es tablished the limits within which these entitles existed for us. The querying of language had begun at least as early as Plato's Cratylus, but the great surge of interest occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and has never died out, though it has taken a variety of forms that could produce a large and in teresting anthology of its own. T here were historical (including !iearch for origins), philological, semantic, and semiotic interests, roughly in that historical order.. Locke found it necessary in 1690 to devote a part of his Essay Concerning Human Under standing to the problem of language, though he clung for the most part to a traditional ist and rather naive view. Giambattista Vico in The New Science (1725), ahead of his time, though in some ways a reactionary, proposed a way of considering language that related its source and fundamental nature to what he called a "poetic logic." The origin of language became a popular topic on which many, including Jean Jacques Rousseau, wrote; but eventually the approach died out as it began to appear that the origin of lan guage was as mysterious as the origin of humanity. Indeed, the two things came to be considered a sort of twin birth (one might add myth to this family), man being charac
terized as a linguistic or symbol-making animal. Views of this sort, set forth by Wtlhelm von Humboldt early in the nineteenth century, and carried into the twentieth by Ernst Cassirer, were echoed in various ideological contexts in the twentieth. It has always been recognized, of course, that literature is composed of language. From the earliest times poets have been obsessed with language as a medium of their art. The elaborate development of the discipline of rhetoric in the ancient world attests to an interest in the ways language can be employed to specific effects. The Renaissance produced numerous treatises on linguistic devices, especially tropes and prosody. But the new linguistic phase saw language as fundamental to human nature, not just as a hu man tool. The more recent excursion into language theory known as semiotics or the theory of signs was, however, less interested in these anthropological matters than in an
alyzing language as if it had a life of its own or was itself a system. The source of this
interest was mainly structuralist linguistics, grounded in the work of Ferdinand de Saus sure, the terminology of which flooded later twentieth-century theory in America by way of Europe, where structuralist linguistics displayed a relation to Russian Formalist literary theory. In England and in America it met other forces that had emphasized lan
guage. I. A. Richards's semantically oriented views had led to his characterization of a
poem as a ''piece of language," and his student William Empson had studied poems as
texts in which linguistic ambiguities abounded. T. S. Eliot had emphasized the objectiv ity of the poem as a linguistic artifact, although Eliot did not foresee the lengths to which later theorists would take his notions. Richards and Eliot strongly, and in quite
different ways, influenced the American New Criticism, sponsored principally by John Crowe Ransom and carried out in theory and practice by such critics as Cleanth Brooks, R. P. Blackmur, Allen Tate, Robert PelUl Warren, W. K. WlDlsatt, and Monroe C. Beard sley. The New Critics, however, knew virtually nothing of Eastern European literary the
ory until the arrival and subsequent activity of Ren6 Wellek in the United States, and
-
II
even his views took on their coloring. The terminology of the New Criticism remained derived from the English critics known to it, mainly Samuel Taylor Coleridge and, when it became more philosophical, Kant. Until sometime in the mid-1960s the New Criticism's academic followers domi nated literary study as it was professed in the United States and to some extent in Eng land. The first major and most articulate response to the New Criticism was that by the Canadian critic Northrop Frye in his Anatomy of Criticism (1957), perhaps the most im pressive single work of criticism in the century, certainly the wittiest, and a very ambi tious effort to provide a general theory that would encompass systematically most past literary thought. Frye provided his own phasal history of both literature and criticism, absorbed the New Criticism into one phase, and offered a paradox that identified criti cism with both art and science, suggesting that the venerable distinction between the two had to be rethought. Frye's work had some affinities with Structuralism, but with out any of its terminology and with strong links to the tradition of English criticism. Mainly, however, it was grounded in Frye's vision of William Blake's notion of art.
.,
Structuralism first came to America principally through Saussure's Course in General Linguistics, the writings of Roland Barthes, and Claude Uvi-Strauss's anthro pology. Jt had a very short life in its pure form, for in 1966 at a conference at Johns Hopkins University the French philosopher Jacques Derrida delivered his now famous paper "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences." Thus was born Deconstruction, a critique of the structuralist position as grounded in the work of Saussure and Levi-Strauss. Derrida pointed out inconsistencies in Structuralism having to do with the notion of nature in Levi-Strauss and origins or centers of meaning in Saussure. A new terminology flooded literary theory. By this time, rather than the world containing language, language seemed to con tain the world. The critic Edward W. Said, desiring to restore the primacy of what he called "worldliness" for a politically and morally active criticism, characterized both Structuralism and Deconstruction as presuming "wall-to-wall language." Barthes had carried the notion of linguistic structure into a variety of areas, so that aspects of the world-myth, sport, fashion, and so forth-seemed to copy the structure of language. It seemed that if there was anything left of imitation, its direction had been reversed. The world as we can know it copied the structure of language. Structuralism dissolved substance into sets of pure relations. Rather than things, Structuralism was concerned with the relations among things. It was the relation of or, in structuralist terminology, the "difference" between things, that became real, not the things themselves. The model was Saussure's language seen as a system of differences, each lin guistic unit definable in terms of its difference from all the other units in the system, pot in terms of its relation to an object beyond it. Derrida pointed out that such systems had no center, grounding point, or first word, and that meaning never came to rest in any ori gin. The search for meaning was allegedly involved in an infinite regress, and interpreta tion as it had traditionally been understood and practiced was a philosophically impossi ble activity. Rigorously pursued, it produced irresolvable contradictions or aporias. Deconstruction evolved, in spite of Derrida's deliberate resistance to calling it a method, a critical technique that threatened to dominate the American academy as had the New Criticism, though it was much less popular in Derrida's France. In contrast to the New Criticism, to which it later appeared to have some similarity, Deconstruction
<>
5
6 <>
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
emerged not out of previous criticism but out of Derrida's discussions of philosophical texts. It is possible to consider Deconstruction the culmination in theory of the linguis tic phase. Later movements, in spite of a continued interest in language, sought to free themselves from what came to be called the "prison house of language." Reservations about the New Criticism, when it replaced the old philology, literary history, and Marxism then dominant in the academy, had been mainly political, accus ing it either of political reaction or of isolation from life in a new form of aestheticism. This accusation was later made against Deconstruction, though, unlike many of the New Critics, Derrida himself could certainly not be identified as a political reactionary or conservative. Still, Deconstruction's emphasis on the final elusiveness of centers or grounds and its theory of difference was anathema to any explicitly ideological or mate rialistically grounded position. But Deconstruction was not the only linguistically based philosophical theory or, in the eyes of many, even the dominant one. Indeed, in English and American philosophy the continental tradition back to Hegel and through Phenome nology and Deconstruction was either ignored or denigrated. It was especially the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein that influenced philosophers who came to concentrate almost exclusively on the analysis of language. Wittgenstein's influence was quite different from that of Saussure and had its own special history, since Wittgenstein changed his views radically between his first book, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1918), and Philosophical Investigations (1958). The latter work proved more interesting to literary critics because it moved beyond the antipoetical logical positivism of its predecessor.
III Although we are now discussing matters to which we give more detailed attention in our introduction to the modern era (below, page 621), it is worthwhile here to com plete the brief phasal history on which we embarked. It is fair to say that in the wake of Deconstruction and political events since the 1960s a new phase was reached that might be called the phase of political moralism or, if one objects to the term "moralism," the phase of political and cultural critique. As the twentieth century ended there was still in some quarters a Marxist-derived social criticism. There were the critiques of colonial ism and racism. There was the feminist movement, which had taken a variety of turns, generated quarrels within itself, and was often now subs�med under the critique of what is called gender. All of these developments were grounded on a certain set of moral prin ciples connected with theories of power and were activist in the desire to bring about social change. With respect to theories of power the work of Michel Foucault stood out as most influential. It is an interesting and somewhat depressing fact that as the century moved along most criticism and almost all theoretical literary discourse came to be located in univer sities and written by people who were not themselves poets, novelists, or dramatists. This was in stark contrast to all earlier centuries, including the earliest part of the twen tieth. This development had many causes and some results that changed the scene dras tically. Only one of the latter we shall mention here. It was the tendency among many academics to spend less time discussing what at least used to be called "literary" texts and more time debating theories. In earlier ages poets like Dante, Sidney, and
-
III
W.ordsw.orth wr.ote erudite defenses .of their .own P.oetic practices that were .of general the.oretical interest. Many .of the earliest New Critics were poets .or n.ovelists wh.o ended up teaching in universities. It sh.ould be n.o surprise that programs in creative writing be gan t.o fl.ourish at this time, f.or the New Criticism was in s.ome imp.ortant respects .ori ented t.o a writerly perspective. T.oday's the.orist, th.ough inhabiting English .or f.oreign language departments, may be m.ore interested in, and read m.ore, psych.oanalytic .or P.o litical writing and perhaps even publish m.ore ab.out phil.oS.ophical .or anthr.oP.ological disc.ourses than literature in the traditi.onal sense. One might .observe alS.o that the phases we have discussed ab.ove have bec.ome pr.ogressively sh.orter. The peri.od .of the d.omi nance .of imitati.on was at least tW.o th.ousand years l.ong, .of epistem.ol.ogy maybe three hundred, .of linguistics tW.o hundred at m.ost. The huge increase .of academic activity t.o day eats up theory alm.ost as fast as it is pr.oduced. This is all the m.ore reas.on f.or at tempting t.o view it in a hist.orical perspective. The late twentieth century was, t.o shift Said's phrase, an age .of wall-t.o-wall the
.ory in whatever it is that literary study became. In his essay "Mixed Genres" (1980) the anthr.oP.ol.ogist Cliff.ord Geertz discussed this situati.on as ubiquit.oUS in the "human sci
ences." The risks .of superficiality and perhaps ide.ol.ogical d.ogmatism became greater, but there was alS.o a new set .of interests that stretched fr.om discipline t.o discipline. It appeared, however, that a new defense .of P.oetry and perhaps .of literary criticism itself might have t.o be m.ounted in part t.o resP.ond t.o the tendency .of the phase .of P.olitical m.oralism t.o treat literary texts alm.ost exclusively as documents f.or social analysis. This came about in a lively th.ough C.onfusing ferment .of soci.opolitical acti.ons and ideas vir
tually w.orldwide. It left literary study in apparent cha.os and even fr.om .one P.oint .of view seemed t.o be a return t.o earlier hist.orical interests. The present situati.on has im
pelled us t.o write a sec.ond introducti.on, specifically t.o the m.odem era. We h.ope it will help t.o make sense .of and give s.ome .order t.o the peri.od fr.om about 1870 t.o the present by suggesting in part that these devel.opments may .open the way f.or interesting new c.onfigurati.ons in literary th.ought.
<>
7
Plato c. 427-c. 347 B. C.
Student of Socrates and founder of the Academy in Athens, Plato is regarded as the first major figure in the history of Western philosophy. Among writers whose works are extant he is the earliest to discuss poetry at any length. Further, he is, as author of dia logues, an accomplished literary figure; and here is a paradox, given the criticism of po ets that he puts into the mouth of the fictionalized Socrates in Republic. The paradox may be extended, for in numerous places Socrates himself quotes the poets, professes his love for Homer, asserts that true poets are divinely inspired, and tells stories, to which he frequently has recourse when the dialectic stalls itself. Even further, Plato himself writes in a dramatic form, the same form that his Socrates criticizes as imita tion. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine Plato if there had not been the poets who pre ceded him, for he owes so much to them in approach. There is, therefore, a deep irony in Socrates's dismissal of the poets from his ideal commonwealth. It is Plato who bequeaths to the tradition of literary criticism the concept of imita tion or mimesis, dominant in literary criticism well into the eighteenth century. Even af ter that, imitation had periods of revival. In R£public, imitation is given two meanings, a broadly philosophical one involving Plato's ontology and epistemology and one pertain ing to literary technique, though the two are closely related. Plato has Socrates locate reality in what are called ideas or forms rather than in the world of appearances or phe nomena experienced through the senses. He regards objects that we perceive as mere copies of their ideas. It is only our rational power exercised in dialectical search that can advance us toward truth. Nevertheless, Socrates declares in Phaedrus that there are var
ious types of divine madness or possession, one of which is that of the true poet. On the other hand, it is difficult if not impossible to determine whether this madness is truly di vinely inspired or demonic; and the poet and all artists are imitators, making copies of appearances, thus twice removed from reality. This removal is alleged also to be charac teristic of the utterances of sophists and rhetoricians, who are more sinister than poets because they often deliberately delude and gain illicit power over their listeners. In Re
public, Socrates speaks of acceptable and unacceptable stories and banishes the poets, except those who limit their compositions to hymns or praises of the state; but he allows for the possibility of their return if they can successfully defend themselves either in
verse or in prose, thereby setting the stage and the terms for numerous defenses to come.
The second meaning of imitation is the technical one. Socrates speaks in Republic of pure imitative form (as in the drama), where the poet has others speak, pure narra tive, where the poet speaks always in his own voice, and a mixture of the two (as in epic). In his view, imitation is the most deceptive of these because the author never speaks in his own voice. There is a huge irony here because in no dialogue does Plato ever speak for himself. In Sophist, the second form of imitation is described as of two
types: icastic and phantastic, the former being imitation with the aim of making a like ness, the latter imitation of imagined things or the making of mere appearances.
Plato 0 9 Plato's, or at least the fictive Socrates's, view of critics (or the closest thing in Plato to them) appears in Ion, where Socrates converses with the successful though obtuse rhapsode Ion, a professional reciter of and commentator on epic poetry, specifically Homer. Socrates would demolish Ion's claim that as a rhapsode he is an expert on Homer's work by asking him whether he is an expert on everything or even anything mentioned in Homer's epics and driving him toward one final absurd claim. Socrates concludes that Ion's powers as a rhapsode must be irrationally inspired. For Socrates (at least in this dialogue), a poem is only the sum of its subject matter or content; he ig nores its existence as something in itself, a formal structure. This emphasis and the ar gument in Republic give good reason to regard Plato as the founder of moralistic and didactic criticism, the separation of content from form, and the consequent privileging of the former. Later Platonists maintained a similar theory of ideas, but many, including Plotinus (below, page 127), sought to defend poetry and fine art as an avenue to a grasp of intel lectual beauty. Some found in Plato's own tendency to myth-making the establishment of a tradition of allegorical interpretation in which many works were read as arcane ex pressions of Platonic ideas. Even a criticism that regards poetry as antirational, as found in certain nineteenth-century critics, often claims support in Socrates's treatment of po etic madness in Phaedrus. Even when the critic is avowedly anti-Platonic, as for exam ple John Crowe Ransom (below, page 953), or simply anti-poetic as in Stephen Gosson's Schoole ofAbuse, which gave rise to a somewhat Platonic answer by Sir Philip Sidney (below, page 185), Plato's influence is present. More recently Plato's treatment of lan guage in Cratylus and Philebus has caught the attention of poststructuralist theorists. Among the numerous translations of Plato's works, a standard edition is that of Benjamin Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato (first edition, 1871, fourth edition, 1953, edited by others). The twelve-volume (1914-1930) Loeb Classical Library edition has Greek and English facing texts. A more recent collection of translations by many hands is The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (second printing with corrections, 1963). All standard histories of philosophy, aesthet ics, and criticism devote substantial space to Plato. See J. W. H. Atkins, Literary Criti cism in Antiquity, 2 vols. (1934); G. M. A. Grube, Plato 's Thought (1935); Rupert C. Lodge, Plato 's Theory of Art (1953); G. M. A. Grube, The Greek and Roman Critics (1965); Rosemary Harriott, Poetry and Criticism Before Plato (1969); Gregory Vlastos, ed., Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, 2 vols. (1971); 1. Moravczik and P. Temko, eds., Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts (1982); Julius A. Elias, Plato's Defense of Poetry (1984); Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, lronist and Moral Philosopher (1991); D. Thomas Benediktson, Literature and the Visual Arts in Ancient Greece and Rome (2000); Julia Annas and Christopher Rowe, eds., New Perspectives on Plato, Modem and Ancient (2002); Ruby Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato 's Dialogues (2002); Gregory Nagy, Plato's Rhapsody and Homer 's Music: The Aesthetics of the Panhellenic Festival in Classical Athens (2002).
10
<>
PLATO
Ion
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
Socrates, Ion
Socrates
Welcome, Ion. Are you from your native
city of Ephesus? Ion No, Socrates; but from Epidaurus, where I at
tended the festival of Asclepius. 1
Socrates
And do the Epidaurians have contests of
should like to ask you a question: Does your art extend to Hesiod and Archilochus4 or to Homer only?
Ion To Homer only; he is in himself quite enough. Socrates Are there any things about which Homer
and Hesiod agree?
Ion Yes; in my opinion there are a good many. Socrates And can you interpret better what Homer
says, or what Hesiod says, about these matters in which they agree ?
Ion
I can interpret them equally well, Socrates,
rbapsodes at the festival?
where they agree.
did you succeed?
agree?-for example, about divination, of which both ' Homer and Hesiod have something to say,-
Ion 0 yes; and of all sorts of musical performers. Socrates And were you one of the competitors-and
Ion I obtained the first prize of all, Socrates. Socrates Well done; and I hope that you will do the
same for us at the Panathenaea.
Ion And I will, please heaven. Socrates I often envy the profession of a rbapsode,
Ion; for you have always to wear fine clothes, and to look as
beautiful as you can is a part of your art. Then, again, you are obliged to be continually in the company of many good po ets; and especially of Homer,2 who is the best and most di
vine of them; and to understand him, and not merely learn
his words by rote, is a thing greatly to be envied. And no man can be a rhapsode who does not understand the meaning of the poet. For the rbapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hearers, but how can he interpret him well unless he knows what he means? All this is greatly to be envied.
Ion
Very true, Socrates; interpretation has certainly
been the most laborious part of my art; and I believe myself able to speak about Homer better than any man; and that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus of Tha sos, nor Glaucon, nor any one else who ever was, had as good ideas about Homer as I have, or as many.
Socrates
I am glad to hear you say so, Ion; I see that
you will not refuse to acquaint me with them.
Ion
Certainly, Socrates; and you really ought to hear
how exquisitely I render Homer. I think that the Homeridae should give me a golden crown.3
Socrates
I shall take an opportunity of hearing your
embellishments of him at some other time. But just now I Plato's Dialogues: These selections from Plato are reprinted from Benjamin Jowett, tr., The Dialogues of Plato, third edition (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1892). Ion is regarded as an early dialogue, circa 390 B.C. Sophist,
Philebus, and Crary/us are thought to belong to Plato's middle period. Re public was composed in about 373 B.C.
I Greek god of healing.
2 The works attributed to Homer were probably written between 1200 and 800 B.C. 3poets who composed in the style of Homer.
Socrates
But what about matters in which they do not
Ion Very true: Socrates Would you or a good prophet be a better in
terpreter of what these two poets say about divination, not only when they agree, but when they disagree?
Ion A prophet. Socrates And if you were a prophet,
would you be
able to interpret them when they disagree as well as when they agree?
Ion Clearly. Socrates But
how did you come to have this skill
about Homer only and not about Hesiod or the other poets?
Does not Homer speak the same themes which all other p0-
ets handle? Is not war his great argument? And does he not speak of human society and of intercourse of men, good and bad, skilled and unskilled, and of the good conversing with one another and with mankind, and about what happens in heaven and in the world below, and the generations of gods
and heroes? Are not these the themes of which Homer sings?
Ion Very true, Socrates. Socrates And do not the other poets sing of the same? Ion Yes, Socrates; but not in the same way as Homer. Socrates What, in a worse way? Ion Yes, in a far worse. Socrates And Homer in a better way? Ion He is incomparably better. Socrates And yet surely, my dear friend Ion, in a dis
cussion about arithmetic, where many people are speaking,
and one speaks better than the rest, there is somebody who
can judge which of them is the good speaker?
Socrates
And he who judges of the good will be the
same as he who judges of the bad speakers?
Ion The same. Socrates And he will be the arithmetician? Ion Yes. 4Archilochus (ft. 7 14-676 b.c.), one of the earliest known Ionian
poets.
Greek
Ion 0 Socrates
Well, and in discussions about the whole
someness of food, when many persons are speaking, and
11
said-a thing which any man might say: that when a man
has acquired a knowledge of a whole art, the enquiry into
one speaks better than the rest, will he who recognizes the
good and bad is one and the same. Let us consider this mat
better speaker be a different person from him who recog
ter; is not the art of painting a whole?
nizes the worse, or the same?
Ion Clearly the same. Socrates And who is he, and what is his name? Ion The physician. Socrates And speaking generally, in all discussions
in which the subject is the same and many men are speak ing, will not he who knows the good know the bad speaker also? For if he does not know the bad, neither will he know
the good when the same topic is being discussed.
Ion True. Socrates Is not the same person skilful in both? Ion Yes. Socrates And you say that Homer and the other po
Ion Yes. Socrates
And there are and have been many painters
good and bad.
Ion Yes. Socrates
And did you ever know any one who was
skilful in pointing out the excellences and defects of Poly gnotus the son of Aglaophon but incapable of criticizing other painters; and when the work of any other painter was produced, went to sleep and was at a loss and had no ideas;
but when he had to give his opinion about Polygnotus, or whoever the painter might be, and about him only, woke up and was attentive and had plenty to say?
ets, such as Hesiod and Archilochus, speak of the same
Ion No indeed, I have never known such a.person. Socrates Or did you ever know of any one in sculp
things; although not in the same way; but the one speaks
ture, who was skilful in expounding the merits of Daedalus the son of Metion, or of Epeius the son of Panopeus, or of
well and the other not so well?
Ion Yes; and I am right in saying so. Socrates And if you knew the good
Theodorus the Samian, or of any individual sculptor; but speaker, you
would also know the inferior speakers to be inferior?
Ion That is true. Socrates Then, my dear friend, can I be mistaken in
when the works of sculptors in general were produced, was at a loss and went to sleep and had nothing to say?
Ion No indeed; no more than the other. Socrates And if I am not mistaken, you
never met
saying that Ion is equally skilled in Homer and in other po
with any one among flute-players or harp-players or singers
ets, since he himself acknowledges that the same person
to the harp or rhapsodes who was able to discourse of
will be a good judge of all those who speak of the same
Olympus or Thamyras or Orpheus, or Phemius the rhapsode
things; and that almost all poets do speak of the same
of Ithaca, but was at a loss when he came to speak of Ion of
things?
Ephesus, and had no notion of his merit or defects?
Ion
Why then, Socrates, do I lose attention and go to
sleep and have absolutely no ideas of the least value, when
Ion
I cannot deny what you say, Socrates. Neverthe
less I am conscious in my own self, and the world agrees
any one speaks of any other poet; but when Homer is men
with me in thinking that I do speak better and have more to
tioned, I wake up at once and am all attention and have
say about Homer than any other man. But I do not speak.
plenty to say?
equally well about others-tell me the reason of this.
Socrates
The reason, my friend, is obvious. No one
Socrates
I perceive, Ion; and I will proceed to explain
�. can fail to see that you speak of Homer without any art or
to you what I imagine to be the reason of this. The gift
you would have been able to speak of all other poets; for po
not an art, but, as I was just saying, an inspiration; there is a
knowledge. If you were able to spe� of him by rules of art,
etry is a whole.
Ion Yes. Socrates
which you possess of speaking excellently about Homer is.
divinity moving you, like that contained in the stone which
Euripides calls a magnet, but which is commonly known as And when any one acquires any other art as
the stone of Heraclea. This stone not only attracts iron rings,
a whole, the same may be said of them. Would you like me
but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting other
to explain my meaning, Ion?
rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of
Ion
Yes, indeed, Socrates; I very much wish that you
would for I love to hear you wise men talk.
Socrates
0 that we were wise, Ion, and that you
could truly call us so; but you rhapsodes and actors, and the
iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain: and all of them derive their power of sus pension from the original stone. In like manner the Muse first of all inspires men herself; and from these inspired per
poets whose verses you sing, are wise; whereas I am a com
sons a chain of other persons is suspended, who take the in
mon man, who only speaks the truth. For consider what a
spiration. For all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose
very commonplace and trivial thing is this which I have
their beautiful poems not by art, but because they are
12
0
PLATO
inspired and possessed. And as the Corybantians revellers when they dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric po ets are not in their right mind when they are composing their beautiful strains: but when falling under the power of music and metre they are inspired and possessed; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers when they are under the influence of Dionysus6 but not when they are in their right mind. And the soul of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves say; for they tell us that they bring songs from honeyed fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dells of the Muses;7 they, like the bees, winging their way from Bower to Bower. And this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no in vention in hiin until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: when he has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles. Many are the noble words in which poets speak concerning the actions of men; but like yourself when speaking about Homer, they do not speak of them by any rules of art: they are simply inspired to utter that to which the Muse impels them, and that only; and when inspired, one of them will make dithyrambs,8 another hymns of praise, another choral strains, another epic or iambic verses-and he who is good at one is not good at any other kind of verse: for not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine. Had he learned by rules of art, he would have known how to speak not of one theme only, but of all; and therefore God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers, as he also uses diviners and holy prophets, in or der that we who hear them may know them to be speaking not of themselves who utter these priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that God himself is the speaker, and that through them he is conversing with us. And Tynnichus the Chalcidian affords a striking instance of what I am say
vine and the work of God; and that the poets are only the in terpreters of the Gods by whom they are severally pos sessed. Was not this the lesson which the God intended to teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the
best of songs? Am I not right, Ion? Ion Yes, indeed, Socrates, I feel that you are; for your
words touch my soul, and I am persuaded that good poets by a divine inspiration interpret the things of the Gods to us. Socrates And you rhapsodists are the interpreters of the poets?
Ion There again you are right. Socrates Then you are the
interpreters of inter�
preters?
Ion . Precisely. Socrates I wish you would frankly tell me, Ion, what I am going to ask of you: When you produce the greatest ef fect upon the audience in the recitation of some striking pas sage, such as the apparition of Odysseus leaping forth on the Boor, recognized by the suitors and casting his arrows at his feet, or the description of Achilles rushing at Hector, or the sorrows of Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam,-are you in your right mind? Are you not carried out of yourself, and does not
your soul in an ecstasy seem to be among the persons or places of which you are speaking, whether they are in Ithaca or in Troy or whatever may be the scene of the poem?
Ion That proof strikes home to me, Socrates. For I must frankly confess that at the tale of pity my eyes are filled with tears, and when I speak of horrors, my hair stands on end and my heart throbs. Socrates Well, Ion, and what are we to say of !lo man who at a sacrifice or festival, when he i s dressed in holiday
attire, and has golden crowns upon his head, of which no body has robbed him, appears weeping or panic-stricken in the presence of more than twenty thousand friendly faces,
ing: he wrote nothing that any one would care to remember but the famous paean which is in every one's mouth, one of the finest poems ever written, simply an invention of the
when there is no one despoiling or wronging him;-is he in
Muses, as he himself says. For in this way the God would seem to indicate to us and not allow us to doubt that these beautiful poems are not human, or the work of man, but di-
speaking, he is not in his right mind. Socrates And are you aware that you produce similar effects on most spectators? Ion Only too well; for I look down upon them from
'The Corybantes were mystic divinities often associated with the mothergoddes ses Rhea and Demeter and worshipped in enthusiastic rituals. 6(]reek god of wine and natural passions, called Bacchus by the Romans. He is often contrasted with Apollo, who represents intellect and rationality. "Apollonian" and "Dionysiac" were employed by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy (below, page 687) to describe two major forces in Greek tragedy. Aphrodite and Eros were respectively goddess and god of love. 7The Muses were earliest the goddesses of song and later came to preside over the different types of poetry, the arts, and the sciences. IDionysiac choral hymns.
his right mind or is he not? Ion No indeed, Socrates, I must say that, strictly
the stage, and behold the various emotions of pity, wonder, sternness, stamped upon their countenances when I am speaking: and I am obliged to give my very best attention to . them; for if I make them cry I myself shall laugh, and if I make them laugh I myself shall cry when the time of pay ment arrives. Socrates Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings which, as I am saying, receive the power of the orig
inal magnet from one another? The rhapsooe like yourself
Ion � 1 3 and the actor are intermediate links, and the poet himself is
the first of them. Through all these the
God sways the souls
of men in any direction which he pleases, and makes one man
Ion
'Bend gently,' he says, 'in the polished chariot to
the left of them, and urge the horse on the right hand with
whip and voice; and slacken the rein. And when you are at
hang down from another. Thus there is a vast chain of dancers
the goal, let the left horse dmw near, yet so that the nave of
pended, as if from the stone, at the side of the rings which
tremity, and avoid catching the stone.' 10
and masters and undermasters of choruses, who are sus
hang down from the Muse. And every poet has some Muse
from whom he is suspended, and by whom he is said to be
possessed, which is nearly the same thing; for he is taken hold
of. And from these first rings, which are the poets, depend others, some deriving their inspiration from Orpheus, others
from Musaeus;9 but the greater number are possessed and held by Homer. Ofwhom, Ion, you are one, and are possessed
the well-wrought wheel may not even seem to touch the ex
Socrates
Enough. Now, Ion, will the charioteer or the
physician be the better judge of the propriety of these lines?
Ion The charioteer, clearly. Socrates And will the reason be that this is his art, or
will there be any other reason?
Ion No, that will be the reason. Socrates And every art is appointed by God to have
by Homer; and when any one repeats the words of another
knowledge of a certain work; for that which we know by the
one recites a strain of Homer you wake up in a moment, and
Ion Certainly not. Socrates Nor do we know by the art of the carpenter
poet you go to sleep, and know not what to say; but when any
your soul leaps within you, and you have plenty to say; for
not by art or knowledge about Homer do you say what you
say, but by divine inspiration and by possession; just as the
Corybantian revellers too have a quick perception of that strain only which is appropriated to the God by whom they
are possessed, and have plenty of dances and words for that,
but take no heed of any other. And you, Ion, when the name
of Homer is mentioned have plenty to say, and have nothing
to say of others. You ask, 'Why is this?' The answer is that
you praise Homer not by art but by divine inspiration.
Ion
That is good, Socrates; and yet I doubt whether
you will ever have eloquence enough to persuade me that I
praise Homer only when I am mad and possessed; and if
art of the pilot we do not know by the art of medicine?
that which we know by the art of medicine?
Ion Certainly not. Socrates And this is true of all the arts;-that which
we know with one art we do not know with the other? But
let me ask a prior question: You admit that there are differ ences of arts?
Ion Yes. Socrates
You would argue, as I should, that when one
art is of one kind of knowledge and another of another, they are different?
Ion Yes. Socrates
Yes, surely; for if the subject of knowledge
you could bear me speak of him I am sure you would never
were the same, there would be no meaning in saying that the
I should like very much to hear you, but not
For example, I know that here are five fingers, and you
think this to be the case.
Socrates
arts were different-if they both gave the same knowledge.
until you have answered a question which I have to ask. On
know the same. And if I were to ask whether I and you be
every part. .
arithmetic, you would acknowledge that we did.
what part of Homer do you speak well ?-not surely about
Ion
There is no part, Socrates, about which I do not
�. speak well: of that I can assure you.
Socrates
Surely not about things in Homer of which '
you have no knowledge?
Ion
And what is there in Homer of which I have no
knowledge?
Socrates
Why, does not Homer speak in many pas
sages about arts? For example, about driving; if I can only remember the lines I will repeat them.
Ion I remember, and will repeat them. Socrates Tell me then, what Nestor
came acquainted with this fact by the help of the same art of
Ion Yes. Socrates
Tell me, then, what I was intending to ask
you-whether this holds universally? Must the same art
have the same subject of knowledge, and different arts other subjects of knowledge?
Ion That is my opinion, Socrates. Socrates Then he who has no knowledge of a partic
ular art will have no right judgment of the sayings and do ings of that art?
says to An
tilochus, his son, where he bids him be careful of the turn at
Ion Very true. Socrates Then
which will be a better judge of the
lines which you were reciting from Homer, you or the
the horse-mce in honour of Patroclus.
charioteer?
9 Ancient legendary Greek poets .
10 [Jowett] Iliad XXIII, 335.
14
<>
Ion
PLATO
The charioteer.
Socrates not a charioteer.
Ion Yes. Socrates
Why, yes, because you are a rhapsode and
And the art of the rhapsode is different from
that of the charioteer?
Ion Yes. Socrates
And if a different knowledge, then a knowl
edge of different matters? Ion
True.
Socrates
You know the passage in which Hecamede,
the concubine of Nestor, is described as giving to the
wounded Machaon a posset, as he says,
'Made with Pramnian wine; and she grated
cheese of goat's milk with a grater of bronze, and at his side placed an onion which gives a relish to drink.' l 1
Now would you say that the art o f the rhapsode o r the art of
medicine was better able to judge of the propriety of these
lines?
Ion The art of medicine. Socrates And when Homer says, 'And she descended into the deep like a
leaden plummet, which, set in the hom of ox that ranges in the fields, rushes along carrying death among the ravenous fishes ,' _12
will the art of the fisherman or of the rhapsode be better able
to judge whether these lines are rightly expressed or not?
Ion Clearly, Socrates, the art of the fisherman. Socrates Come now, suppose that you were to say to
me: 'Since you, Socrates, are able to assign different pas
sages in Homer to their corresponding arts, I wish that you
would tell me what are the passages of which the excellence
ought to be judged by the prophet and prophetic art' ; and
you will see how readily and truly I shall answer you. For there are many such passages, particularly in the Odyssey;
as, for example, the passage in which Theoclymenus the
prophet of the house of Melampus says to the suitors:'Wretched men! what is happening to you?
Your heads and your faces and your limbs under
neath are shrouded in night; and the voice of
lamentation bursts forth, and your cheeks are wet
II [Jowett) Iliad XI. 630. 63S. 12 [Jowett) Iliad XXIV. SO.
with tears. And the vestibule is full, and the court
is full. of ghosts descending into the darkness of
Erebus, and the sun has perished out of heaven, and an evil mist is spread abroad.' 13
And there are many such passages in the Iliad also; as
for example in the description of the battle near the rampart, where he says:-
'As they were eager to pass the ditch, there
came to them an omen: a soaring eagle, holding
back the people on the left, bore a huge bloody
dragon in his talons, still living and panting; nor had
he yet resigned the strife, for he bent back and smote '
the bird which carried him on the breast by the neck,
and he in pain let him faIl from him to the ground into the midst of the multitude. And the eagle, with a cry, was borne afar on the wings of the wind.' 14
These are the sort of things which I should say that the
prophet ought to consider and determine.
Ion And you are quite right, Socrates, in saying so. Socrates Yes, Ion, and you are right also. And as I
have selected from the Iliad and Odyssey for you passages which describe the office of the prophet and the physician
and the fisherman, do you, who know Homer so much bet
ter than I do, Ion, select for me passages which relate to the
rhapsode and the rhapsode's art, and which the rhapsode ought to examine and judge of better than other men.
Ion All passages, I should say, Socrates.l� ; Socrates Not all, Ion, surely. Have you already for .
gotten what you were saying? A rhapsode ought to have a
better memory.
Ion Why, what am I forgetting? Socrates Do you not remember
that you declared
the art of the rhapsode to be different from the art of the
charioteer?
Ion Yes, I remember. Socrates And you admitted that being different they
would have different subjects of knowledge?
Ion Yes. Socrates
Then upon your own showing the rhapsode.
and the art of the rhapsode, will not know everything?
Ion I should exclude certain things, Socrates. Socrates You mean to say that you would exclude
pretty much the subjects of the other arts. As he does not
know all of them, which of them will he know?
1 3 [Jowett) Odyssey XX. 35l. 14 [Jowett) lliad XII. 200. lSHad Ion answered. "The poems as itself a thing." be�ould have fared better.
Ion Ion
He will know what a man and what a woman
[)ught to say and what a freeman and what a slave ought to
15
Ion Certainly, Socrates. Socrates And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode?
say, and what a ruler and what a subject.
Socrates
<:>
Do you mean that a rhapsode will know bet
ter than the pilot what the ruler of a sea-tossed vessel ought to say?
Ion No; I do not say that. Socrates But you do say that he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general.
Ion No; the pilot will know best. Socrates Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the ruler of a sick man ought to say?
Ion He will not. Socrates But he will know what a slave ought to say? Ion Yes. Socrates Suppose the slave to be a cowherd; the
Ion Certainly. Socrates And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes? Ion Far the best, Socrates. Socrates And are you the best general, Ion? Ion To be sure, Socrates; and Homer was my master. Socrates But then, Ion, what in the name of goodness can be the reason why you, who are the best of generals as
rhapsode will know better than the cowhe�d what he ought
well as the best of rhapsodes in all Hellas, go about as a
to say in order to soothe the infuriated cows?
rhapsode when you might be a general? Do you think that
Ion No, he will not. Socrates But he will know what a spinning-woman At anY rate he will know what a general
ought to say when exhorting his soldiers?
Ion
Yes, that is the sort of thing which the rhapsode Well, but is the
art of the rbapsode the art of
the general?
Ion
I am sure that I should know what a general
and do not need a general; and you and Sparta are not likely to have me, for you think that you have enough generals of your own. My good Ion, did you never hear of Apol
lodorus of Cyzicus?
Ion Who may he be? Socrates One who, though
a foreigner, has often
been chosen their general by the Athenians,: and there is
ought to say.
Socrates
Why, Socrates, the reason is, that my country
men, the Ephesians, are the servants and soldiers of Athens,
Socrates
will be sure to know.
Socrates
not want a general?
Ion
ought to say about the working of wool?
Ion No. Socrates
the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown, and do
Why, yes, Ion, because you may possibly
Phanosthenes of Andros and Heraclides of Clazomenae,
have a knowledge of the art of the general as well as of the
whom they have also appointed to the command of their
rhapsode; and you may also have a knowledge of horse
armies and to other offices, although aliens, after they had
manship as well as of the lyre: and then you would know
shown their merit. And will they not choose Ion the Eph
when horses were well or ill managed. But suppose I were
esian to be their general, and honour him, if he prove him
to ask you: By the help of which art, Ion, do you know
self worthy? Were not the Ephesians originally Athenians,
whether horses are well managed, by your skill as a horse
and Ephesus is no mean city? But, indeed, Ion, if you are
man, or as a performer on the lyre-what would you
correct in saying that by art and knowled�e you are able to praise Homer, you do not deal fairly with me, and after all
answer? �
,
Ion I should reply, by my skill as a horseman. Socrates And if you judged of performers
your professions of knowing many glorious things about on the
Homer, and promises that you would exhibit them, you are
lyre, you would admit that you judged of them as a per
only a deceiver, and so far from exhibiting the art of which
former on the lyre, and not as a horseman?
you are a master, will not, even after my repeated entreaties,
Ion Yes. Socrates
And in judging of the general's art, do you
judge of it as a general or a rhapsode?
Ion
To me there appears to be no difference between
them;
forms as Proteus;16 and now you go all manner of ways, . twisting and turning, and, like Proteus, become all manner of people at once, and at last slip away from me in the dis guise of a general, in order that you may escape exhibiting
Socrates that the
explain to me the nature of it. You have literally as many
What do you mean? Do you mean to say
art of the rhapsode and of the general is the same?
Ion Yes, one and the same. Socrates Then he who is a good rhapsode good general?
your Homeric lore. And if you have art, then, as I was say ing, in falsifying your promise that you would exhibit
is also a "Greek sea god who could change his shape at wilL
16
<>
PLATO
Homer, you are not dealing fairly with me. But if, as I be lieve, you have no art, but speak: all these beautiful words
And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we
begin with the false?
about Homer unconsciously under his inspiring influence,
I do not understand your meaning, he said.
then I acquit you of dishonesty, and shall only say that you
You know, I said, that we begin by telling children sto
are inspired. Which do you prefer to be thought, dishonest
ries which though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are told them when they
or inspired?
Ion
There is a great difference, Socrates, between the
two alternatives; and inspiration is by far the nobler.
Socrates
Then, Ion, I shall assume the nobler alterna
tive; and attribute to you in your praises of Homer inspira
are not of an age to learn gymnastics. Very true. That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics. Quite right, he said.
tion, and not art.
You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work, especially in the case of a young and tCn�
Republic from Book II
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
Socrates, Adeimantus
der thing; for that is the time at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more readily taken. Quite true. And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very op posite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown up?
Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling, and our story shall be the education of our heroes. By all means. And what shall be their education? Can we find a bet ter than the traditional sort?-and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and music! for the soul. True. Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards? By all means. And when you speak: of music, do you include literature or not? I do. And literature may be either true or false?2 Yes.
We cannot. Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire
mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorised ones
only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most of those which are now in use must be discarded. Of what tales are you speaking? he said.
; You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I
said; for they are necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of them. Very likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term the greater. Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hes iod, and the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind.
1 Republic begins as a discussion ofjustice, set in motion by lbrasymachus' s argument that justice is what is to the advantage of the powerful. The argu
ment is opposed by Socrates, who rai.ses the question of the relation of jus tice to the good and proceeds to develop his notion of the ideal state and the education of those who are to be its guardians. Music, for Socrates, inCludes poetry principally because by tradition poetry was spoken to music, usually of the lyre. 2 This discussion dealing with the truth or falsity of poetry and a similar discussion in Sophist (below, page 38) begin a tradition in criticism. Defenders of poetry developed various arguments explaining why poetry could contain truth from Plotinus (below, page 1 27), through Sidney's argument for allegorical truth (below, page 1 9 1 ), to Mazzoni's distinction (page 220), borrowed directly from Sophist, between icastic and phantastic imitation, and finally to some modem theories suggesting that poetry provides a special kind of knowledge.
But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with them?
A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, what is more, a bad lie.3 But when is this fault committed? Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes,-as when a painter paints a por trait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original.
3 Elsewhere in Republic, Socrates says that lies on behalf of the preservation of the state are acceptable. Presumably these are not"bad" lies.
Republic Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blame lble; but what are the stories which you mean? First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies, in
<>
17
whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal, anything that he receives into his mind at that
ugh places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which
age is likely to becoine indelible and unalterable; and there
was a bad lie too,-I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus
fore it is mosti mportant that the tales which the young first
lid, and how Cronus retaliated on him.4 The doings of
hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.
::::ronus, and the sufferings which in tum his son inflicted
There you are right, he replied; but if any one asks
lpon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be
where are such models to be found and of what tales are you
ightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible,
speaking-how shall we answer him?
hey had better be buried in silence. But if there is an ab
I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment
solute necessity for their mention, a chosen few nlright hear
are not poets, but founders of a State: now the founders of a
them in a mystery,s and they should sacrifice not a common
State ought to know the general forms in which poets should
[Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim;
cast their tales and the linlrits which must be observed by
and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed.
them, but to make the tales is not their business.
objectionable.
which you mean?
Why, yes, said he, those stories are extremely
Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State;
the young man should not be told that in comnlrit
ling the ,worse of crimes he is far from doing anything out rageous; and that even if he chastises his father when he does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following the example of the first and greatest among the gods.6 I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite unfit to be repeated. Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling among themselves as of all things the
basest, should any word be said to them of the wars in heaven,
Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology Something of this kind, I replied:-God is always to be represented as he truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which the representation is given. Right. And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such? Certainly. And no good thing is hurtful? No, indeed. And that which is not hurtful hw:ts not? Certainly not.
and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another,
And that which hurts not does no evil?
for they are not true. No, we shall never mention the battles of
No.
the giants, or let them be embroidered on garments; and we
And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?
shall be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods
Impossible.
believe us we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and
Yes.
and heroes with their friends and relatives. If they would only
that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between
citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by
llin8 children; and when they grow up, the poets also should
te
be·told to compose for them in a sinlrilar spirit. But the narra tive of Hephaestus binding Hera his �other,7 or how on an
And the good is advantageous? And therefore the cause of well-being? Yes. It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only? Assuredly.
other occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when
Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things,
she was being beaten,8 and all the battles of the gods in
as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only,
Homer-these tales must not be admitted into our State,
4Uranus confined his children, whom he hated, in Tartarus. He was castrated
and dethroned by the Titan Cronus, who later lost his throne to Zeus. This story is told by Hesiod (seventh century B.C.) in his Theogony (154, 459). , A religious ritual. 6Zeus. 7Kept ignorant of his parentage, Hephaestus, son of Zeus and Hera, trapped Hera in a chair until she told him wbo his parents were. IWben Hephaestus took Hera's part in an argument with Zeus, Zeus hurled him from Olympus down to the island of Lemnos. Some writers attribute his lameness to this fall.
and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him. That appears to me to be most true, he said. Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks 'Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil lots,'
18
(>
PLATO
and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two
That will do, he said. And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I
'Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;' but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill, 'Him wild hunger drives o'er the beauteous earth.' And again'Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to US.'9 And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was really the work of Pandarus,lO was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our young men to hear the words ofAeschylus, that 'God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house.' And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe-the subject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur-or of the
house of Pelops, or of the Trojan war or on any similar theme, either we must not pennit him to say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must devise
some explanation of them such as we are seeking; he must say that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished: but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their misery the poet is not to be pennitted to say; though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author of evil to any one is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or heard in verse or prose by any one whether old or young in any well-ordered commonwealth. Such a fiction is suici dal, ruinous, impious.
I agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my
assent to the law. Let this then be one of our rules and principles con cerning the gods, to which our poets and reciters will be ex pected to conform-that God is not the author of all things, but of good only.
ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to ap pear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms, sometimes deceiving us with the resemblance of such trans formations; or is he one and the same inmutably fixed in his own proper image? I cannot answer you, he said, without more thought. Well, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be effected either by the thing itself, or by some other things. Most certainly. And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or discomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant which is in the fullest vigour also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sUD or any similar causes. Of course. And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least con fused or deranged by any external influence? True. And the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite things-furniture, houses, garments: when good and well made, they are least altered by time and circumstances. Very true.
Then everything which is good, whether made by art or
nature, or both, is least liable to suffer change from wi1;hout? True. But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect? Of course they are. Then he can hardly be compelled by external infiuence to take many shapes? He cannot. But may he not change and transform himself? Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all. And will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the worse and more unsightly?
If he change at all he can only change for the worse, for
we cannot suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty. Very true, Adeimantus; but then, would any one, whether God or man, desire to make himself worse? Impossible.
9[]owettj Iliad XXIV. 527. IO[]owett) Iliad II. 69.
Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change; being, as is supposed, the fairest and best that is
Republic 0 conceivable, every God remains absolutely and for ever in his own form. That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment. Then, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that 'The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and down cities in all sorts of forms; ll and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis,12 neither let any one, either in tragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Hera disguised in the likeness of a priestess asking an alms 'For the life-giving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos;' -let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their chil dren With a bad version of these myths-telling how certain gods, as they say, '.Go about by night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms:' but let them take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the same time speak blasphemy against the gods. Heaven forbid, he said. But although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft and deception they may make us think that they appear in various forms? Perhaps, he replied. Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in word or deed, or to put forth a phantom of himself? I cannot say, he replied. Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an ex pression may be allowed, is hated of gods and men? , What do you mean? he said. I mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which . is the truest and highest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters; there. above aU. he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him. Still. he said. I do not comprehend you. The reason is. I replied. that you attribute some pro found meaning to my words: but I am only saying that de ception. or being deceived or uninformed about the highest realities in the highest part of themselves. which is the soul. and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie. is what mankind least like;-that, I say. is what they utterly detest. II [Jowett] Odyssf!)I XVII. 485. 12Thetis was the wife of Peleus. by whom she became the mother of Achilles.
19
There is nothing more hateful to them. And. as I was just now remarking. this ignorance in the soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy im age of a previous affection 13 of the soul, not pure unadulter ated falsehood. Am I not right? Perfectly right. The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men? Yes. Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not harmful; in dealing with enemies-that would be an in stance; or again, when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive; also in the tales of mythology, of which we were just now speaking because we do not know the truth about ancient times, we make falsehood as much like truth as we can. and to turn it to account. Very true, he said. But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has re course to invention? That would be ridiculous, he said. Then the lying poet has no place in our idea of God? I should say not. Or perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies? That is inconceivable. But he may have friends who are senseless or mad? But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God. Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie? None whatever. Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely inca pable of falsehood? Yes . Then is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed; he changes not; he deceives not, either by sign or word. by dream or waking vision. Your thoughts, he said, are the reflection of my own. You agree with me then, I said, that this is the second type or form in which we should write and speak about divine things. The gods are not magicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in any way. I grant that. Then, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not admire the lying dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon; I3State of being.
20
<>
PLATO
neither will we praise the verses of Aeschylus in which Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials 'Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long, and to know no sick ness. And when he had spoken of my lot as in all things blessed of heaven he raised a note of tri umph and cheered my soul. And 1 thought that the word of Phoebus,14 being divine and full of prophecy, would not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he who was present at the banquet, and who said this-he it is who has slain my son.'IS These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our anger; and he who utters them shall be re fused a chorus; neither shall we allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young, meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true wor shipperS of the gods and like them. 1 entirely agree, he said, in these principles, and promise to make them my laws.
Then we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales as well as over the others, and beg them not simply to revile, but rather to commend the world below, intimating to them that their descriptions are untrue, and will do harm to our future warriors. That will be our duty, he said. Then, I said, we shall have to obliterate many obnox ious passages, beginning with the verses, 'I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man that rule over all the dead who have come to nought.' 1
We must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared, 'Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should be seen both of mortals and immortalS.'2 And again:'0 heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form but no mind at all!'3
from
Book III PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
Socrates, Adeimantus, Glaucon
Such then, 1 said, are our principles of theology-some tales are to be told, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth upwards, if we mean them to honour the gods and their parents, and to value friendship with one an other. Yes; and 1 think that our principles are right, he said. But if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons besides these, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of death? Can any man be coura geous who has the fear of death in him? Certainly not, he said. And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real and terrible? Impossible.
14 Apollo as sun god. " This play of Aeschylus (525-456 B.C.) is lost.
Again of Trresias:' [To him even after death did Persephone4 grant mind,] that he alone should be wise; but the other souls are fitting shades.'s Again:'The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamenting her fate, leaving manhood and youth.'6 Again:'And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the earth.'7
'[Jowett) odyssey IX. 489. 2[Jowett) Iliad XX. 64. 3[Jowett) Iliad XXIII. 103. 'Goddess of the underworld. '[Jowett) Odyssey X, 495. "[Jowett) Iliad XVI. 856. '[Jowett) Iliad XXIII . 100.
Republic <> 21 And,-
And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort 'As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, when
ever any of them has dropped out of the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and cling to one another, so did they with shrilling cry hold to gether as they moved.'8
which may befall him.
Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than
another. Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamenta tions of famous men, and making them over to women (and not even to women who are good for anything), or to men of
And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike out these and similar passages, not because they
are unpoetical, or unattractive to the popular ear, but be
cause the greater the poetical charm of them, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are meant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death. Undoubtedly.
Also we shall have to reject all the terrible and ap palling names which describe the world below-Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under the earth, and sapless shades, and any similar words of which the very mention causes a shud der to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind; but there is a danger that the nerves of our guardians9 may be rendered too excitable and effeminate by
a baser sort, that those who are being educated by us to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the like. That will be very right. Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other
poets not to depict Achilles, 10 who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on his back, and then on his face;
then starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the barren sea; now taking the sooty ashes in both his hands II and pouring them over his head, or weeping and wailing in the various modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe Priam the kinsman of the gods as praying and beseeching, 'Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name.'12
them. .There is a real danger, he said.
Still more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to
Then we must have no more of them.
introduce the gods lamenting and saying,
True. Another and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us.
'Alas ! my misery ! Alas ! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow.' 13
Clearly. And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and
But if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so completely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods,
wailings of famous men? They will go with the rest.
as to make him say-
But shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is that the good man will not consider death terrible to any other good man who is his comrade.
'0 heavens! with my eyes verily
I behold a
dear friend of mine chased round and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful.' 14
Yes; that is our principle. And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed
friend as though he had suffered anything terrible? He will not.
Or again:-
Such an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for
'Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon,
himself and his own happiness, and therefore is least in need
dearest of men to me, subdued at the hands of Pa
of other men.
troclus the son of Menoctius.' 15
True, he said.
And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of fortune, is to him 'of all men least terrible. Assuredly.
8[JoweUj Odyssey XXIV, 6. 9'J'hey who are trained to become guardians of the
state.
lorJowett] Iliad XXIV, 10. ll [Jowett] lliad xvrn, 23. 12[JoweUj lliad XXII, 414. ll[Jowettj lliad xvrn, 54. 14[JoweUj Iliad XXII, 168. lS[JoweUj lliad XVI, 433.
22
<>
PLATO
For if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to
ing about the ship and the rest of the crew, and how things
such unworthy representations of the gods, instead of laugh
are going with himself or his fellow sailors.
ing at them as they ought, hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being but a man, can be dishonoured by similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination which may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And instead of hav ing any shame or self-control, he will be always whining and lamenting on slight occasions. Yes, he said, that is most true. Yes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not to be, as the argument has just proved to us; and by that proof we must abide until it is disproved by a better. It ought not to be. Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess al most always produces a violent reaction. So I believe. Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods be allowed. Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied.
Most true, he said.
If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying
in the State,
'Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physi
cian or carpenter,' 18
he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and destructive of ship or State. ' Most certainly, he said, if our idea of the State is ever carried out. In the next place our youth must be temperate? Certainly. Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience to commanders and self-control in sen sual pleasures? True. Then we shall approve such language as that of Diomede in Homer,
Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used
'Friend, sit still and obey my word,' 19
about the gods as that of Homer when he describes how 'Inextinguishable laughter arose among the
and the verses which follow,
blessed gods, when they saw Hephaestus bustling
'The Greeks marched breathing prowess, 2O
about the mansion.' 16
. . . . in silent awe of their leaders.'21
On your views, we must not admit them. On my views, if you like to father them on me; 17 that we must not admit them is certain. Again, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is useless to the gods, and useful only as a med icine to men, then the use of such medicines should be re stricted to physicians; private individuals have no business
and other sentiments of the same kind. We shall. What of this line,
'0 heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a stag,'22
with them. Clearly not, he said.
and of the words which follow? Would you say that these,
Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying,
or any similar impertinences which private individuals are
the rulers of the State should be the persons; and they, in
supposed to address to their rulers, whether in verse or
their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens,
prose, are well or
may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind; and although the rulers have this privilege, for a private man to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the pa tient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth
ill spoken?
They are ill spoken.
They may very possibly afford some amusement, but
they do not conduce to temperance. And therefore they are
likely to do harm to our young men-you would agree with
me there?
about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain what is happen-
16[1owettj Iliad 1. 599. 17''1'0 call me the author of them."
1 80dyssey xvn. 383. 19[1owettj lliad IV. 412. 2O[Jowettj Odyssey m. 8. 21 [1owettj Odyssey IV. 431. 22[lowettj Odyssey I . 225.
Republic <> 23 Yes.
Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or
And then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his opinion is more glorious than
deemed to have given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist them,29 but that without a gift he should not lay aside his
'When the tables are full of bread and meat,
anger. Neither will we believe or acknowledge Achilles
and the cup-bearer carries round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the CUpS; '23
himself to have been such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon 's gifts, or that when he had received payment he restored the dead body of Hector, but that without pay
is it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such words? Or the verse 'The saddest of fates is to di.e and meet destiny from hunger' ?24
ment he was unwilling to do so. 30
Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which
can be approved. Loving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say that in at tributing these feelings to Achilles, or in believing that they are truly attributed to him, he is guilty of downright impiety.
What would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and men were asleep and he the only person awake, lay devising plans, but forgot them all in a moment through his lust, and was so completely overcome at the sight pf Hera that he would not even go into the hut, but wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had
As little can I believe the narrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says, 'Thou hast wronged me, 0 far-darter,3 1 most
abominable of deities. Verily I would be even with thee, if I had only the power; ' 32
never been in such· a state of rapture before, even when they first met one another
or his insubordination to the river-god,33 on whose divinity he is ready to lay hands; or his offering to the dead Patroclus
'Without the knowledge of their parents; '25
of his own hair,34 which had been previously dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius, and that he actually per
or that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar go ings on, cast a chain around Ares and Aphrodite?26 Indeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that sort of thing. But any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men, these they ought to see and hear; as, for exam ple, what is said in the verses, 'He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart, Endure, my heart; far wor�e hast thou endured!' 27 Certainly, he said. In the next place, we must not let them be receivers of
formed this vow; or that he dragged Hector round the tomb of Patroclus,35 and slaughtered the captives at the pyre;36 of all this I cannot believe that he was guilty, any more than I can allow our citizens to believe that he, the wise Cheiron's pupil, the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gen tlest of men and third in descent from Zeus, was so disor dered in his wits as to be at one time the slave of two seem ingly inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by avarice, combined with overweening contempt of gods and men. You are quite right, he replied. And let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be re peated, the tale of Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Pirithous
gifts or lovers of money.
son of Zeus, going forth as they did to perpetrate a horrid
Certainly not.
rape,37 or of any other hero or son of a god daring to do such
Neither must we sing to them of
'Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings.' 28
2l[Jowen] Odyssey IX. 8. 2oI[Jowen] Odyssey XII, 342. "[Jowett] Iliad XN, 281. 26[Jowenj Odyssey vm, 266. 27[Jowenj Odyssey XX, 17. 21[Jowenj Quoted by Suidas as attributed to Hesiod.
29[Jowettj lliad IX, 515. 3O[Jowettj lliad XXN, 175. 31''Par-dar!er'' refers to Apollo, skilled as an archer. 32[Jowettj lliad XXII, 15sq. 33[Jowenj Iliad XXI, 130, 223sq. 34[Jowenj lliad XXIII, 151. 3'[Jowettj lliad XXII, 394. 36[Jowenj Iliad XXm, 175. 37Pirithous aided Theseus in carrying off Helen, then a child, to Aphidnae. Theseus then aided Pirithous in an attempt to carry off Persephone from the underworld.
24 <>
PLATO
impious and dreadful things as they falsely ascribe to them
in our day: and let us further compel the poets to declare ei
ther that these acts were not done by them, or that they were
not the sons of gods;-both in the same breath they shall not
be permitted to affirm. We will not have them, trying to per
suade our youth that the gods are the authors of evil, and that heroes are no better than men-sentiments which, as
we were saying, are neither pious nor true, for we have al
ready proved that evil cannot come from the gods. Assuredly not.
And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those
who hear them; for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are al
ways being perpetrated by-
'The kindred of the gods, the relatives of
Zeus, whose ancestral altar, the altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida,'
and who have 'the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins.'38 And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they en gender laxity of morals among the young. By all means, he replied.
But now that we are determining what classes of sub
But if you admit that I am right in this, then I shall
maintain that you have implied the principle for which we
have been all along contending.
I grant the truth of your inference.
That such things are or are not to be said about men is
a question which we cannot determine until we have discov
ered what justice is, and how naturally advantageous to the
possessor, whether he seems to be just or not. Most true, he said.
Enough of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of
the style; and when this ,has been considered, both matter
and manner will have been completely treated.
I do not understand what you mean, said Adeimantus.
Then I must make you understand; and perhaps I may
be more intelligible if I put the matter in this way. You are aware, I suppose, that all mythology and poetry is a narra
tion of events, either past, present, or to come? Certainly, he replied.
And narration may be either simple narration, or imita
tion, or a union of the twO?39
That again, he said, I do not quite understand.
I fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so
much difficulty in making myself apprehended. Like a bad speaker, therefore, I will not take the whole of the subject,
but will break a piece off in illustration of my meaning. You
know the first lines of the Iliad. in which the poet says that Chryses prayed Agamemnon to release his daughter, and
jects are or are not to be spoken of, let us see whether any
that Agamemnon flew into a passion with him; whereupon
demigods and heroes and the world below should be treated
against the Achaeans. Now as far as these lines,
have been omitted by us. The manner in which gods and
Chryses, failing of his object, invoked the anger of the God
has been already laid down. Very true.
And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the
remaining portion of our subject. Clearly so.
But we are not in a condition to answer this question at
present, my friend. Why not?
Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that
about men poets and story-tellers are guilty of making the
gravest misstatements when they tell us that wicked men are
often happy, and the good miserable; and that injustice is
profitable when undetected, but that justice is a man's own loss and another's gain-these things we shall forbid them
'And he prayed all the Greeks, but especially
the two sons of Atreus, the chiefs of the people.'
the poet is speaking in his o1fn person; he never leads us to suppose that he is any one else. But in what follows he takes
the person of Chryses, and then he does all that he can to
make us believe that the speaker is not Homer, but the aged
priest himself. And in this double form he has cast the entire
narrative of the events which occurred at Troy and in Ithaca and throughout the Odyssey. Yes.
And a narrative it remains both in the speeches which
the poet recites from time to time and in the intermediate
to utter, and command them to sing and say the opposite.
passages?
38[Jowettj From the Niobe of Aeschylus.
39f!ere Socrates employs "imitation" not in the sense of copying copies of the ideas but to distinguish from straight narration the poet's putting words in the mouth of a character, as in a play.
To be sure we shall, he replied.
Quite true.
.
Republic But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may
we not say that he assimilates his style to that of the person
who, as he informs you, is going to speak? Certainly.
And this assimilation of himself to another, either by
the use of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person
whose character he assumes? Of course.
Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said
to proceed by way of imitation?
Very true.
Or, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals
himself, then again the imitation is dropped, and his poetry
becomes simple narration. However, in order that 1 may
make my meaning quite clear, and that you may no more
'I don't understand,' 1 will show how the change might be effected. If Homer had said, 'The priest came, having his
<)
25
You have conceived my meaning perfectly; and if 1
mistake not, what you failed to apprehend before is now
made clear to you, that poetry and mythology are, in some
cases, wholly imiJative-instances of this are supplied by
tragedy and comedy; there is likewise the opposite style, in which the poet is the only speaker-of this the dithyramb
affords the best example; and the combination of both is
found in epic, and in several other styles of poetry. Do 1 take
you with me?
Yes, he said; 1 see now what you meant.
1 will ask you to remember also what 1 began by say
ing, that we had done with the subject and might proceed to
the style.
Yes, 1 remember.
In saying this, 1 intended to imply that we must come
say,
to an understanding about the mimetic art,-whether the po
daughter's ransom in his hands, supplicating the Achaeans,
tate, and if so, whether in whole or in part, and if the latter,
and· above all the kings;' and then if instead of speaking in
the person of Chryses, he had continued in his own person,
ets, in narrating their stories, are to be allowed by us to imi in what parts; or should all imitation be prohibited?
You mean, 1 suspect, to ask whether tragedy and com
the words would have been, not imitation, but simple narra
edy shall be admitted into our State?
and therefore 1 drop the metre), 'The priest came and prayed
r really do not know as yet, but whither the argument may
tion. The passage would have run as follows
(I am no poet,
the gods on behalf of the Greeks that they might capture
Troy and return safely home, but begged that they would
give him back his daughter, and take the ransom which he
Yes, 1 said; but there may be more than this in question:
blow, thither we go.
And go we will, he said.
Then, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our
brought, and respect the God . Thus he spoke, and the other
guardians ought to be imitators; or rather, has not this ques
was wroth, and bade him depart and not come again, lest the
man can only do one thing well, and not many; and that if
Greeks revered the priest and assented. But Agamemnon staff and chaplets40 of the God should be of no avail to
him-the daughter of Chryses should not be released, he
tion been decided by the rule already laid down that one
he attempt many, he will altogether fail of gaining much
reputation in any? Certainly.
said-she should grow old with him in Argos. And then he
told him to go away and not to provoke him, if he intended to get home unscathed. And the old man went away in fear and silence, and, when he had left the camp, he called upon
APollo by his many names, reminding him of everything
- ·which he had done pleasing to him, whether in building his
And this is equally true of imitation; no one man can
imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one?
He cannot.
Then the same person will hardly be able to play a se
temples, or in offering sacrifice, and praying that his good
rious part in life, and at the same time to be an imitator and
might expiate his tears by the arrows of the god,' -and so
of imitation are nearly allied, the same persons cannot suc
deeds might be returned to him: and that the Achaeans
on. In this way the whole becomes simple narrative. 1 understand, he said.
Or you may suppose the opposite case-that the inter
imitate many other parts as well; for even when two species
ceed in both, as, for example, the writers of tragedy and
comedy-did you not just now call them imitations?
Yes, 1 did: and you are right in thinking that the same
mediate passages are omitted, and the dialogue only left.
persons cannot succeed in both.
ple, as in tragedy.
once?
That also, he said, 1 understand; you mean, for exam
Any more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at
True.
Neither are comic and tragic actors the same; yet all
�reaths or garlands for the head.
these things are but imitations. They are so.
26
<> PLATO
And human nature, Adeimantus, appears to have been coined into yet smaller pieces, and to be as incapable of im itating many things well, as of performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies. Quite true, he replied. If then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our guardians, setting aside every other business, are to dedicate themselves wholly to the maintenance of freedom in the State, making this their craft, and engaging in no work which does not bear on this end, they ought not to practise or imitate anything else; if they imitate at all, they should imitate from youth upward only those characters which are suitable to their profession-the courageous, tem perate, holy, free, and the like; but they should not depict or be skilful at imitating any kind of illiberality or baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be what they imitate. Did you never observe how imitations, beginning in early youth and continuing far into life, at length grow into habits and become a second nature, affecting body, voice, and mind? Yes, certainly, he said. Then, I said, we will not allow those for whom we pro fess a care and of whom we say that they ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, whether young or old, quarrelling with her husband, or striving and vaunting against the gods in conceit of her happiness, or when she is in affliction, or sorrow, or weeping; and certainly not one who is in sick ness, love, or labour. Very right, he said. Neither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the offices of slaves? They must not. And surely not bad men, whether cowards or any oth ers, who do the reverse of what we have just been prescrib ing, who scold or mock or revile one another in drink or out of drink, or who in any other manner sin against them selves and their neighbours in word or deed, as the manner of such is. Neither should they be trained to imitate the ac tion or speech of men or women who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice, is to be known but not to be practised or imitated. Very true, he replied. Neither may they imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or boatswains, or the like? How can they, he said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds to the callings of any of these? Nor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bel lowing of bulls, the murmur of rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of thing? Nay, he said, if madness be forbidden, neither may they copy the behaviour of madmen.
You mean, I said, if I understand you aright, that there is one sort of narrative style which may be employed by a truly good man when he has anything 'to say, and that an other sort will be used by a man of an opposite character and education. And which are these two sorts? he asked. Suppose, I answered, that a just and good man in the course of a narration comes on some saying or action of an other good man,-I should imagine that he will like to per sonate him, and will not be ashamed of this sort of imita tion: he will be most ready to play the part of the good man when he is acting firmly and wisely; in a less degree when, he is overtaken by illness or love or drink, or has met with any other disaster. But when he comes to a character which is Unworthy of him, he will not make a study of that; he will disdain such a person, and will assume his likeness, if at all, for a moment only when he is performing some good ac tion; at other times he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practised, nor will he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser models; he feels the employment of such an art, unless in jest, to be beneath him, and his mind revolts at it. So I should expect, he replied. Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of Homer, that is to say, his style will be both imitative and narrative: but there will be very little of the former, and a great deal of the latter. Do you agree? Certainly, he said; that is the model which such a speaker must necessarily take. But there is another sort of character who will naqate anything, and, the worse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be too bad for him: and he will be ready to imitate anything, not as a joke, but in right good earnest, and before a large company. As I was just now say ing, he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and hail, or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes, pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments: he will bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, or crow like a cock; his entire art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture, and there will be very little narration. That, he said, will be his mode of speaking. These, then, are the two kinds of style? Yes. And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has but slight changes; and if the har mony and mythm are also chosen for their simplicity, the re sult is that the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is always pretty much the same in style, and he will keep within the limits of a single harmony (for the changes are not great), and in like manner he will make use of nearly the samemythm?
Republic 0
27
That is quite true, he said.
considered to be finished; for the matter and manner have
Whereas the other requires all sorts of hannonies and
both been discussed.
all sorts of rhythms, if the music and the style are to corre spond, because the style has all sorts of changes. That is also perfectly true, he replied. And do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all poetry, . and every form of expression in words? No one can say anything except in one or other of them or in both together. They include all, he said.
I think so too, he said. Next in order will follow melody and song. That is obvious. Every one can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to be consistent with ourselves. I fear, said Glaucon, laughing, that the word 'every one' hardly includes me, for I cannot at the moment say what they should be; though I may guess.
And shall we receive into our State all the three styles,
At any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three
or one only of the two unmixed styles? or would you in
parts-the words, the melody, and the rhythm; that degree
clude the mixed?
of knowledge may presuppose?
I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue.
Yes, he said; so much as that you may. And as for the words, there .will surely be no difference
Yes, I said, Adeimantus; but the mixed style is also
between words which are and which are not set to music;
very charming: and indeed the pantomimic, which is the op
both will conform to the same laws, and these have been al
posite of the one chosen by you, is the most popular style
ready determined by us?
with clPldren and their attendants, and with the world in
Yes.
general.
And the melody and rhythm will depend upon the
I do not deny ii. But I suppose you would argue that such a style is un suitable to our State, in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one part only?
words? Certainly. We were saying, when we spoke of the subject-matter, that we had no need of lamentations and strains of sorrow?
Yes; quite unsuitable.
True.
And this is the reason why in our State, and in our State
And which are the hannonies expressive of sorrow?
only, we shall find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a husbandman to be a husbandman and not a dicast41 also, and a soldier a soldier and not a trader also, and the same throughout?
You are musical, and can tell me. The hannonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the full-toned or bass Lydian, and such like. These then, I said, must be banished; even to women
True, he said.
who have a character to maintain they are of no use, and
And therefore when any one of these pantomimic gen
much less to men.
tlemen, who are so clever that they can imitate anything,
comes to us, and makes a proposal to exhibit himself and his
poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and
Certainly. In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly unbecoming the character of our guardians.
holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that
Utterly unbecoming.
will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him
The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian; they are termed
-in our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to employ for our souls' health the rougher and severer poet or story
teller, who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will fOllow those models which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our soldiers.
. We certainly will, he said, if we have the power.
Then now, my friend, I said, that part of music or liter ary education which relates to the story or myth may be
4lJuror.
And which are the soft or drinking hannonies? 'relaxed.' Well, and are these of any military use? Quite the reverse, he replied; and if so the Dorian and the Phrygian are the only ones which you have left.
I answered: Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want
to have one warlike, to sound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stem resolve, or when his
cause is failing, and he is going to wounds or death or is over
taken by some other evil, and at every such crisis meets the blows of fortune with firm step and a determination to endure; and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of action, when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is
28
0
PLATO
seeking to persuade God by prayer, or man by instruction and
admonition, or on the other hand, when he is expressing his
willingness to yield to persuasion or entreaty or admonition,
and which represents him when by prudent conduct he has at tained his end, not carried away by his success, but acting moderately and wisely under the circumstances, and acqui
But, indeed, he replied, I cannot .tell you. I only know that there are some three principles of rhythm out of which
metrical systems are framed, just as in sounds there are four notes43 out of which all the harmonies are composed; that is
an observation which I have made. But of what sort of lives they are severally the imitations I am unable to say.
escing in the event. These two harmonies I ask you to leave;
Then, I said, we must take Damon44 into our counsels;
the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom, the strain of
and he will tell us what rhythms are expressive of meanness,
the unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate, the strain of courage, and the strain of temperance; these, I say, leave.
or insolence, or fury, or other unworthiness, and what are to be reserved for the expression of opposite feelings. And I
And these, he replied, are the Dorian and Phrygian har
think that I have an indistinct recollection of his mentioning
Then, I said, if these and these only are to be used in
arranged them in some manner which I do not quite under
monies of which I was just now speaking.
a complex Cretic rhythm ; also a dactylic or heroic, and he
our songs and melodies, we shall not want multiplicity of
stand, making the rhythms equal in the rise and fall o{ the
notes or a panharmonic scal�?
foot, long and short alternating; and, unless I am mistaken,
I suppose not. Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with
three comers and complex scales, or the makers of any other
many-stringed curiously-harmonised instruments? Certainly not.
But what do you say to flute-makers and flute-players?
he spoke of an iambic as well as of a trochaic rhythm, and assigned to them short and long quantities.45 Also in some cases he appeared to praise or censure the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm; or perhaps a combination of the two; for I am not certain what he meant. These mat ters, however, as I was saying, had better be referred to Da
Would you admit them into our State when you reflect that
mon himself, for the analysis of the subject would be diffi
in this composite use of harmony the flute is worse than all
cult, you know?
the stringed instruments put together; even the panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute? Clearly not. There remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and the shepherds may have a pipe in the country. That is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument.
The preferring of Apollo and his instruments to
Marsyas and his instruments is not at all strange, I said.42 Not at all, he replied. And so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been uncon sciously purging the State, which not long ago we termed luxurious. And we have done wisely, he replied. Then let us now finish the purgation, I said. Next in or
Rather so, I should say. But there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the ab
sence of grace is an effect of good or bad dtythm. None at all.
And also that good and bad dtythm naturally assimilate to a good and bad style; and that harmony and discord in like manner follow style; for our principle is that
rhythm
and harmony are regulated by the words, and not the words by them. Just so, he said, they should follow the words. And will not the words and the character of the style depend on the temper of the soul? Yes. And everything else on the style? Yes.
der to harmonies, rhythms will naturally follow, and they
Then beauty of style and harmony and grace and good
should be subject to the same rules, for we ought not to seek
rhythm depend on simplicity,-I mean the true simplicity of
out complex systems of metre, or metres of every kind, but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of a
a rightly and nobly ordered mind and character, not that
other simplicity which is only an euphemism for folly?46
courageous and harmonious life; and when we have found
them, we shall adapt the foot and the melody to words hav ing a like spirit, not the words to the foot and melody. To say what these rhythms are will be your duty-you must teach me them, as you have already taught me the harmonies. .ZIn a contest with Apollo, which Marsyas lost, Marsyas played the flute, Apollo the lyre.
43[Jowett] The four notes of the tetrachord. "A celebrated musician and sophist.
"[Jowett] Socrates expresses himself carelessly in accordance with his assumed ignorance of the details of the subject. In the first part of the sentence he appears to be speaking of paeonic rbythms which are in the ratio of Ill; in the second part, of dactylic and anapestic rbythms, which are in the ratio of I/Z or 211. 46Socrates tends to identify beauty or the beautiful with mathematical proportion.
Republic Very true, he replied. And if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these graces and harmonies their perpetual aim? They must.
<>
29
Yes, he said, I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should be trained in music and on the grounds which you mention. Just as in learning to read, I said, we were satisfied
And surely the art of the painter and every other cre
when we knew the letters of the alphabet, which are very
ative and constructive art are full of them,-weaving, em
few, in all their recurring sizes and combinations; not slight
broidery, architecture, and every kind of manufacture; also
ing them as unimportant whether they occupy a space large
nature, animal and vegetable,-in all of them there is grace
or small, but everywhere eager to make them out; and not
or the absence of grace. And ugliness and discord and inhar
thinking ourselves perfect in the art of reading until we
monious motion
recognise them wherever they
are nearly allied to ill words and ill nature,
as grace and harmony are the twin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness.
are found:
True-
Or, as we recognise the reflection of letters
in the water,
That is quite true, he said,.
or in a mirror, only when we know the letters themselves; the
But shall our superintendence go no further, and are
same art and study giving us the knowledge of both:
the poets only to be required by us to express the image of
Exactly-
the good in their works, on pain, if they do anything else, of
Even so, as I maintain, neither we nor our guardians,
expulsion from our State? Or is the same control to be ex
whom we have to educate, can ever become musical until
tended to other artists, and are they also to be prohibited
we and they know the essential forms, in all their combina
from ,exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemper
tions, and can recognise them and their images wherever
ance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building
they are found, not slighting them either in small things or
and the other creative arts; and is he who cannot conform to
great, but believing them all to be within the sphere of one
this rule of ours to be prevented from practising his art in
art and study.
our State, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him?
Most assuredly.
We would not have our guardians grow up amid images of
And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful
moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a festering
form, and the two
are
cast in one mOUld, that will be the
fairest of sights to him who has an eye to see it? The fairest indeed.
mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our youth dwell in a land of
from Book X
health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul from earliest
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
Socrates, Glaucon
years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason. , There can be no nobler training than that, he replied. And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent instrument
than any other, because rhythm and
harmony find their way into the inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making
Of the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, there is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about poetry. To what do you refer?
the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of him
To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly
who is ill-educated ungraceful; and also because he who has
ought not to be received; as I see far more clearly now that
received this true education of the inner being will most
the parts of the soul have been distinguished.
shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and
What do you mean?
with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and re
Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have
ceives into his soul the good, and becomes noble and good,
my words repeated to the tragedians and the rest of the imi
he will justly blame and hate the bad, now in the days of his
tative tribe-but I do not mind saying to you, that all poeti
youth, even before he is able to know the reason why; and
cal iInitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hear
when reason comes he will recognise and salute the friend
ers, and that the knowledge of their true nature is the only
with whom his education has made him long familiar.
antidote to them.
30
<>
PLATO
Explain the purport of your remark. Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my
Oh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker or creator, or that in one sense there
earliest youth had an awe and love of Homer, which even
might be a maker of all these things but in another not? Do
now makes the words falter on my lips, for he is the great
you see that there is a way in which you could make them
captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic
all yourself?
company; but a man is not to be reverenced more than the truth, and therefore I will speak out.
What way? An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in
Very good, he said.
which the feat might be quickly and easily accomplished,
Listen to me then, or rather, answer me.
none quicker than that of turning a mirror round and
Put your question.
round-you would soon enough make the sun and the heav
Can you tell me what imitation! is? for I really do not
ens, and the earth and Jourself, and other animals and
know. A likely thing, then, that I should know. Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the keener. Very true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any faint notion, l could not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire- yourself?
plants, and all the other things of which we were just now speaking, in the mirror. Yes, he said; but they would be appearances only. Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter too is, as I conceive, just such another-a creator of appearances, is he not? Of course.
Well then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual man
But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is
ner: Whenever a number of individuals have a common
untrue. And yet there is a sense in which the painter also
name, we assume them to have also a corresponding idea or
creates a bed?
form:-do you understand me? I do. Let us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the world-plenty of them, are there not?
Yes, he said, but not a real bed. And what of the maker of the bed? were you not say ing that he too makes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, but only a particular bed?
Yes.
Yes, I did.
But there are only two ideas or forms of the�ne the
Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot
idea of a bed, the other of a table. True. And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in accordance with the idea-that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances-but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how could he? Impossible. And there is another artist,-I should like to know what you would say of him. Who is he? One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen. What an extraordinary man! Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is he who is able to make not only ves
make true existence, but only some semblance of existence; and if any one were to say that the work of.the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence, he c
If you please.
Well then, here are three beds : one existing in nature, which is made by God, as I think that we may say-for no one else can be the maker?
sels of every kind, but plants and animals, himself and all
No.
other things-the earth and heaven, and the things which
There is another which is the work of the carpenter?
are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also. He must be a wizard and no mistake.
Yes. And the work of the painter is a third? Yes.
ISocrates speaks of imitative poets, meaning dramatists and those others who do not speak in their own voices. However, in the larger sense of imitation to be developed here, alI poets and other kinds of artists are imitators.
Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter?
Republic
<>
31
Yes, there are three of them.
Of appearance.
God whether from choice or from necessity, made one
Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth,
,
bed in nature and one only; two or more such ideal beds nei
ther ever have been nor ever will be made by God
.
Why is that?
Because even if He had made but two, a third would still
and can do all things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image. For example: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts ; and, if he is a good artist, he
appear behind them which both of them would have for their
may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows
idea, and that would be the ideal bed and not the two others.
them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they
Very true, he said.
God knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of
a real bed, not a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed which is essentially and by na ture one only. So we believe. Shall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed? Yes, he replied: inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is the author of this and of all other things. And what shall we say of the carpenter-is not he also the maker of the bed? Yes.
will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter. Certainly. And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing with a higher degree of accu racy than any other man-whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought all-knowing. because he him
self was unable to analyse the nature of knowledge and ig norance and imitation. Most true. And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedi
But would you call the painter a creator and maker?
ans, and Homer, who is at their head, know all the arts and
Certainly not.
all things human, virtue as well as vice, and divine things
Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?
too, that the good poet cannot compose well unless . he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge
I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that which the others make. Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the de scent from nature an imitator? Certainly, he said.
can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw their works that these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth,
And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all
and could easily be made without any knowledge of the
other imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from
truth, because they are appearances only and not realities?
the truth?
Or, after all, they may be in the right, and poets do really
That appears to be so.
know the things about which they seem to the many to
Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about
speak so well?
the 'painter?-I would like to know whether he may be - thought to imitate that which originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?
The question, he said, should by all means be considered. Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make
The latter.
the original as well as the image, he would seriously devote
As they are or as they appear? You have still to deter
himself to the image-making branch? Would he allow imita
mine this. What do you mean? I mean, that you may look at a bed from different
tion to be the ruling principle of his life. as if he had nothing higher in him? I should say not
points of view, obliquely or directly or from any other point
The real artist, who knew what he was imitating. would
of view, and the bed will appear different, but there is no dif
be interested in realities and not in imitations; and would
ference in reality. And the same of all things.
desire to leave as memorials of himself works many and
Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent.
fair; and, instead of being the author of encomiums, he
Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art
would prefer to be the theme of them.
of painting designed to be-an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear-of appearance or of reality?
Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honour and profit.
32
<>
PLATO
Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not going to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like Asclepius, or left be hind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second-hand; but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. 'Friend Homer,' then we say to him, 'if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third-not an image maker or imitator-and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small have been similarly benefited by others; but who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about you?' Is there any city which he might name? I think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids them selves pretend that he was a legislator. Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive? There is not. Or is there any invention of his, applicable to the arts or to human life, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other ingenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him? There is absolutely nothing of the kind. But, if Homer never did any public service, was he pri vately a guide or teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate with him, and who handed down to posterity an Homeric way of life, such as was es tablished by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite cele brated for the order which was named after him? Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose narile always makes us laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as is said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was alive? Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imag ine, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind-if he had possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator--can you imagine, I say, that he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and
loved by them? Protagoras ofAbdera, and Prqdicus of Ceos, and a host of others, have only to whisper to their contem poraries; 'You will never be able to manage either-your own house or your own State until you appoint us to be your ministers of education' -and this ingenious device of theirs has such an effect in making men love them that their com panions all but carry them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at home with them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough? Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true. Then must we not infer that all these poetical individu als, beginning with Homer, are only imitators; they copy im ages of virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as we have already observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he does, and judge only by colours and figures. Quite so. In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on the colours of the several arts, himself under standing their natqre only enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmon - and rhythm, he speaks very well-such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor appear ance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colours which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose. Yes, he said. They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming, and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them? Exactly. Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the im age knows nothing of true existence; he knows appearances only. Am I not right? Yes. Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be sat isfied with half an explanation. Proceed. Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?
y
Republic Yes. And the worker in leather and brass will make them?
<>
33
And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore
Certainly.
to imitate only that which appears to be good to the ignorant
But does the painter know the right form of the bit and
multitude?
reins? Nay, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman who knows how to use tbem-he knows their right form.
Just so. Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imita tor has no knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates.
Most true.
lmitati,on is only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic po
And may we not say the same of all things?
ets, whether they write in Iambic or in Heroic verse, are im
What?
itators in the highest degree?
That there are three arts which are concerned with all things : one which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them? Yes. And the excellence or beauty or truth of every struc
ture, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended them. True.
Then the user of them must have the greatest experi ence of them, and he must indicate to the maker the good or
Very true. And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice re moved from the truth? Certainly. And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed? What do you mean? I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when seen at a distance? True.
bad qualities which develop themselves in use; for example,
And the same object appears straight when looked at
the flute-player will tell the flute-maker which of his flutes
out of the water, and crooked when in the water; and the
is satisfactory to the performer; we will tell him how
concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about
he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his
colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of con
instructions?
fusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the
Of course.
human mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving
The one knows and therefore speaks with authority
by light and shadow and other ingenious devices imposes,
about the goodness and badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is told by him? True. The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or
having an effect upon us like magic. True. And the arts of measuring and numbering and weigh ing come to the rescue of the human understanding-there
badness of it the maker will only attain to a correct belief;
is the beauty of them-and the apparent greater or less, or
and this he will gain from him who knows, by talking to him
more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but
and being compelled to hear what he has to say, whereas the
give way before calculation and measure and weight?
user will have knowledge? True. But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his drawing is cortect or beautiful? or will
Most true. And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in the soul? To be sure.
he have right opinion from being compelled to associate
And when this principle measures and certifies that
with another who knows and gives him instructions about
some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than
what he should draw?
others, there occurs an apparent contradiction?
Neither.
True.
Then he will no more have true opinion than he
But were we not saying that such a contradiction is im
will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his
possible-the same faculty cannot have contrary opinions at
imitations?
the same time about the same thing?
I suppose not.
Very true.
The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelli
Then that part of the soul which has an opinion con
gence about his own creations? Nay, very much the reverse.
trary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?
34
0
PLATO
The latter, he said, is the truer statement.
True.
Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out
And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation?
against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he
Certainly.
is alone? It will make a great difference whether he is seen or
And that which is opposed to them is one of the infe rior principles of the soul?
not. When he is by himself he will not mind saying or do
No doubt. This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to ar rive when I said that painting or drawing, and imitation in
ing many things which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do?
general, when doing their own proper work, are far removed
True.
from truth, and the companions and friends and associates
There is a principle of law and reason in him which
of a principle within us which is equally removed from rea
bids him resist, as well as a feeling of his misfortune which
son, and that they have no true or healthy aim.
is forcing him to indulge his sorrow?
Exactly.
True.
The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior offspring.
But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to
and from the same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily im plies two distinct principles in him?
Very true. And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry? Probably the same would be true of poetry.
Certainly. One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law? How do you mean?
Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the
The law would say that to be patient under suffering is
analogy of painting; but let us examine further and see
best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there
whether the faculty with which poetical imitation is con
is no knowing whether such things are good or evil; and
cerned is good or bad.
nothing is gained by impatience; also, because no human
By all means.
thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way
We may state the question thus:-Imitation imitates
of that which at the moment is most required.
the actions of men, whether voluntary or involuntary, on
What is most required? he asked.
which, as they imagine, a good or bad result has ensued, and
That we should take counsel about what has happened,
they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there anything more?
and when the dice have been thrown ord�r our affairs in the
But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at
way which reason deems best; not, like children who have ' had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time
unity with himself-or rather, as in the instance of sight
in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul forth
No, there is nothing else.
there was confusion and opposition in his opinions about
with to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and
the same things, so here also is there not strife and inconsis
fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing art.
tency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question again, for I remember that all this has been already admit ted; and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar' oppositions occurring at the same moment?
Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of reason? Clearly. And the other principle, which inclines us to recollec
And we were right, he said. Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an
tion of our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call irrational, useless, and
omission which must now be supplied.
cowardly?
What was the omission? Were we not saying that a good
Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune.
man,
who has the mis
Indeed, we may.
fortune to lose his son or anything else which is most dear
And does not the latter-I mean the rebellious princi
to him, will bear the loss with more equanimity than
ple-furnish a great variety of materials for imitation?
another?
Whereas the wise and calm temperament, being always
Yes.
nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when
But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that
imitated, especially at a public festival when a promiscuous
although he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate his
crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented is one to which they are strangers.
sorrow?
Republic <>
by the poets ;-the better nature in each of us, not having
Certainly.
Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is
not by nature made, nor is his art intended, to please or to
affect the rational principle in the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated? Clearly.
And now we may fairly take him and place him by the
side of the painter, for he is like him in two ways: first, inas
been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sym
pathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is an
other's; and the spectator fancies that there can be no dis
grace to himself in praising and pitying any one who comes
telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why
should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too?
much as his creations have an inferior degree of truth-in
Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the
concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and therefore we
themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gath
this, I say, he is like him; and he is also like him in being
shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens
the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city when the
evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out
evil of other men something of evil is communicated to
ered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own. How very true!
And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous?
of the way, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imita
There are jests which you would be ashamed to make your
rational nature which has no discernment of greater and
you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and are not
other small-he is a manufacturer of images and is very far
repeated;-there is a principle in human nature which is dis
tive poet implants an evil constitution, for he indulges the ir
less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at an
removed from the truth. Exactly.
But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count
in our accusation:--the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and there are very few who
is surely an awful thing?
are not harmed),
Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.
Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we
listen to a passage of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in
which he represents some pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping, and smiting his
breast-the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to
sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most. Yes, of course I know.
, But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then
_
35
you may observe that we pride ourselves on the opposite
quality-we would fain be quiet and patient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the recita
tion is now deemed to be the part of a woman. Very true, he said.
Now can we be right in praising and admiring another
who is doing that which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?
No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.
Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view. What point of view?
If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel
a natural hunger and desire to relieve . our sorrow by weep
ing and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept un
der control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted
self, and yet on the comic stage, or indeed in private, when
at all disgusted at their unseernliness;-the case of pity is
posed to raise a laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you were afraid of being thought a buf
foon, is now let out again; and having stimulated the risible
faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed unconsciously to
yourself into playing the comic poet at home. Quite true, he said.
And the same may be said of lust and anger and all
the other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which
are held to be inseparable from every action-in all of
them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of dry
ing them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness
and virtue.
I cannot deny it
Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with
any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education
and for the ordering of human things, and that you should
take him up again and again and get to know him and regu late your whole life according to
him, we may love and ho
nour those who say these tbings--they are excellent people,
as far as their lights extend; and we are ready to acknowl
edge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy
writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that
hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you
go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either
in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind,
which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but
pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State. That is most true, he said.
36
<>
PLATO
And now since we have reverted to the subject of po etry, let this our defence serve to show the reasonableness of our fonner judgment in sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have described; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harsh ness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an an cient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of 'the yelping hound howling at her lord,' or of one 'mighty in the vain talk of fools,' and 'the mob of sages circumventing Zeus,' and the 'subtle thinkers who are beggars after all ' ; and there are in numerable other signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her-we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer? Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed. Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only-that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some other metre? Certainly. And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers-I mean, if there is a use in po etry as well as a delight� Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers. If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too are in spired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we lis ten to her strains; that we may not fall away into the child ish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware that poetry being "Such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth: and he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law. Yes, he said, I quite agree with you.
Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be profited if under the influ ence of honour or money or power, aye, or under the excite ment of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue? Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any one else would have been.
from
Phaedrus PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
Socrates, Phaedrus The third kind is the madness! of those who are possessed by the Muses: which taking hold of a delicate and virgin soul, and there inspiring frenzy, awakens lyrical and all other numbers: with these adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for the instruction of posterity. But he who, having no touch of the Muses' madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art-he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted: the sane man disappears and is nowhere when he enters into ri valry with the madman. Socrates And of madness there were two kinds; one produced by human infirmity, the other was a divine release of the soul from yoke of custom and convention.2 Phaedrus ' True. Socrates The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds, prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four gods presiding over them; the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that of Aphrodite and Eros. In the descrip tion of the last kind of madness, which was also said to be the best, we spoke of the affection of love in a figure, into which we introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true though partly erring myth, which was also a hymn in hon our of Love, who is your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guardian of fair children, and to him we sung the hymn in measured and solemn strain. Phaedrus I know that I had great pleasure in listen ing to you.
IThe types of madness, of which the poetic is the third, are mentioned in the excerpt below. lDiscussed earlier in the dialogue.
Phaedrus Socrates
Let us take this instance and note how the
37
is called the Ibis is sacred to him, and he was the inventor of
transition was made from blame to praise.
many arts such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry
mostly playful. Yet in these chance fancies of the hour were
Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt; and he
hBve a clearer description if art could give us one.
call Egyptian Thebes, and the god himself is called by them
Phaedrus What do you mean? Socrates I mean to say that the composition was
involved two principles of which we should be too glad to
Phaedrus What are they? Socrates First, the comprehension of scattered partic
,
and astronomy and draughts and dice, but his great discov
ery was the use of letters. Now in those days the god dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes
Ammon. To him came Theuth and showed his inventions,
desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have
ulars in one idea; as in our definition of love, which whether
the benefit of them; he enumerated them, and Thamus en
discourse, the speaker should define his several notions and
and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them.
true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the
so
make his meaning clear.
Phaedrus What is the other principle, Socrates? Socrates The second principle is that of division into
species according to the natural formation, where the joint
is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might. Just as our
quired about their several uses, and praised some of them
It would take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said to
Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts But when they .
came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians
wiser and give them better memories; it is a specific both for the memory and for the wit. Thamus replied: 0 most inge
two discourses, alike assumed, first of all, a single form of
nious Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art is not always
comes double and may be divided into a left side and right
to the users of them. And in this instance, you who are the
ter this manner the speaker proceeded to divide the parts of
have. been led to attribute to them a quality which they can
unreason; and then, as the body which from being one be
side, each having parts right and left of the same name>-af
the left side and did not desist until he found in them an evil or left-handed love which he justly reviled; and the other
the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions
father of letters, from a paternal love of your own children not have; for this discovery of yours will create forgetful ness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their
discourse leading us to the madness which lay on the right
memories; they will trust to the external written characters
vine, which the speaker held up before us and applauded
have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to reminis
side, found another love, also having the same name, but di and affirmed to be the author of the greatest benefits.
Phaedrus Most true. Socrates I am myself a great lover of these processes
of division and generalization; they help me to speak and to
and not remember of themselves. The specific which you
cence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and
will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome com
think . And if I find any man who is able to see ' a One and Many' in nature,3 him I follow, and 'walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.' And those who have this art, I have hith
pany, having the show of wisdom without the reality.5
knows whether the name is right or not. And I should like to
Dodona that oaks first gave prophetic utterances. The men
erto been in the habit of calling dialecticians; but God
_
0
�ow what name you would give to your or to Lysias '4 dis
Phaedrus
Yes, Socrates, you can easily invent tales
Socrates
There was a tradition in the temple of
of Egypt, or of any other country.
of old, unlike in their simplicity to young philosophy,
ciples, and whether this may not be that famous art of
deemed that if they heard tire truth even from 'oak or rock:
Skilful speakers they are, and impart their skill to any who
whether a thing is or is not true, but who the speaker is and
rhetoric which Thrasymachus and others teach and practise?
is willing to make kings of them and to bring gifts to them.
Socrates
At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was
a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which
it was enough for them; whereas you seem to consider not
from what country the tale comes.
, Phaedrus
I acknowledge the justice of your rebuke;
and I think that the Theban is right in his view about letters.
Socrates
He would be a very simple person, and
quite a stranger to the oracles of Thamus or Ammon, who 3Qn "one and many" see the excerpt from Philebus (below, page 40). 'This dialogue begins with Phaedrus reading aloud to Socrates Lysias's oration on love, in which he argues that one should accept someone who is not in love with one rather than a lover. Socrates ironically praises the speech, but only as a piece of rhetoric. In connection with this see Sophist (below, page 39).
should leave in writing or receive in writing any art under
snte story of Theuth and Thamus is interesting in the light of modem lingis. tics, which tends also to privilege speech over writing and Jacques Derrida' s (below page 1221ff.) poststructura!ist criticism of this.
38
<>
PLATO
the idea that the written word would be intelligible or cer tain; or who deemed that writing was at all better than knowledge and recollection of the same matters? Plwedrus That is most true.
Socrates
I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing
is unfortunately like painting; for the creations of the painter have the attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence. And the same may be said of speeches. You would imagine that they had intelligence, but if you want to know anything and put a question to one of them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And when they have been once written down they are tumbled about anywhere among those who may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply, to whom not: and, if they are maltreated or abused, they have no parent to protect them; and they cannot protect or defend themselves. P1wedrus That again is most true. Socrates Is there not another kind of word or speech far better than this, and having far greater power-a son of the same family, but lawfully begotten? P1wedrus Whom do you mean, and what is his origin? Socrates I mean an intelligent word graven iQ the soul of the learner, which can defend itself, and knows when to speak and when to be silent. Plwedrus You mean the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image? Socrates Yes, of course that is what I mean.
Sophist
pear to be all-wise? Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger But they are not; for that was shown to be impossible. .
�
Theaetetus Impossible, of course. Stranger Then the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things, which is not the truth?
Theaetetus
Exactly; no better description of him
could be given.
Stranger Let us now take an illustration, which will still more clearly explain his nature. Theaetetus What is it? Stranger I will tell you, and you shall answer me, giving your very closest attention. Suppose that a person were to profess, not that he could speak or dispute, but that he knew how to make and do all things, by a single art.
Theaetetus All things? Stranger I see that you do not understand the first
you and me, and all creatures. Theaetetus What would he mean by 'making'? He
Theaetetus, Strangsr Stranger
How do the Sophists make young men be lieve in their supreme and universal wisdom? For if they neither disputed nor were thought to dispute rightly, or be ing thought to do so were deemed no wiser for their contro versial skill, then, to quote your own observation, no one would give them money or be willing to learn their art. 1 Theaetetus They certainly would not. IUp to this point the dialogue has been concerned with the attempt to make clear what a sophist is, and the sophist has proved difficult to pin down
be
sophists are
identified with rhetoricians, of whom the Stranger (and elsewhere Socrates) is deeply suspicious.
Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger And they dispute about all things? Theaetetus True. Stranger And therefore, to their disciples, they ap
also animals and trees. Theaetetus What do you mean? Stranger Suppose a person to say that he will make
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
in the dialogues
that they are supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute?
word that I utter, for you do not understand the meaning of 'all.' Theaetetus No, I do not. Stranger Under all things, I include you and me, and
from
cause he appears in many guises. Generally,
Stranger But they are willing. Theaetetus Yes, they are. Stranger Yes, and the reason, as I should imagine, is
cannot be a husbandman;-for you said that he is a maker of animals. Stranger Yes; and I say that he is also the maker of the sea, and the earth, and the heavens, and the gods, and of all other things; and, further, that he can make them in no time, and sell them for a few pence. Theaetetus That must be a jest. Stranger And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that a jest?
Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger And is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than imitation?
£4
Sophist <> Certainly not; and imitation is a very
Theaetetus
comprehensive term, which includes under one class the
Stranger
39
Then, clearly, we ought as soon as possible
to divide the image-making art, and go down into the net,
most diverse sorts of things.
and, if the Sophist does not run away from us, to seize him
by one art to make all things is really a painter, and by the
the lord of the hunt, and proclaim the capture of him; and if
Stranger We know, of course, that he who professes
painter's art makes resemblances of real things which have the same name with them; and he can deceive the less intel
according to orders and deliver him over to reason, who is
he creeps into the recesses of the imitative art, and secretes
himself in one of them, to divide again and follow him up
ligent sort of young children, to whom he shows his pictures
until in some sub-section of imitation he is caught. For our
of making whatever he likes.
any other creature will ever escape in triumph.
at a distance, into the belief that he has the absolute power
Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger And may there not be supposed to be an im
itative art of reasoning? Is it not possible to enchant the hearts of young men by words poured through their ears,
method of tackling each and all is one which neither he nor
Theaetetus Well said; and let us do as you propose. Stranger Well, then, pursuing the same analytic
method as before, I think that I can discern two divisions of
the imitative art, but I am not as yet able to see in which of
when they are still at a distance from the truth of facts, by
them the desired form is to be found.2
think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest of
visions of which you are speaking?
exhibiting to them fictitious arguments, and making them
men in all things?
. '{heaetetus such art?
Stranger
Yes; why should there not be another
But as time goes on, and their hearers ad
vance in years, and come into closer contact with realities,
and have learnt by sad experience to see and feel the truth of
things, are not the greater part of them compelled to change
Theaetetus Will you tell me first what are the two di
Stranger
One is the art of likeness-making;-gener
ally a likeness of anything is made by producing a copy which is executed according to the proportions of the origi
nal, similar in length and breadth and depth, each thing re
ceiving also its appropriate colour.
Theaetetus Is not this always the aim of imitation? Stranger Not always; in works either of sculpture or
many opinions which they formerly entertained, so that the
of painting, which are of any magnitude, there is a certain
their dreamy speculations are overturned by the facts of
portions of their fair works, the upper part, which is farther
That is my view, as far as I can judge, al
with the lower, which is nearer; and so they give up the truth
great appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all life?
Theaetetus
though, at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance only.
Stranger
And the wish of all of us, who are your
friends, is and always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can without the sad reality. And now I should
like you to tell me, whether the Sophist is not visibly a ma gician and imitator of true being; or are we still disposed to
- think that he may have a true knowledge of the various mat ters about which he disputes?
Theaetetus
But how can he, Stranger? Is there any
doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in
one of the divisions of children's play?
degree of deception; for if artists were to give the true pro off, would appear to be out of proportion in comparison
in their images and make only the proportions which appear
to be beautiful, disregarding the real ones.
Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger And that which being other is also like, may
we not fairly call a likeness or image?
Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And may we not, as I did just now, call that
part of the imitative art which is concerned with making such images the art of likeness-making?
Theaetetus Let that be the name. Stranger And what shall we call those resemblances
of the beautiful, which appear such owing to the un
Stranger Then we must place him in the class of ma
favourable position of the spectator, whereas if a person had
Theaetetus Certainly we must. Stranger And now our business is not to let the ani
tude, they would appear not even like that to which they
Theaetetus What is that? Stranger The inference that he is a juggler. Theaetetus Precisely my own opinion of him.
2Here the Stranger makes an influential distinction between "icastic" and "phantastic" forms of imitation, the first likeness-making and the second the making of things that dol not exist. See Sidney (below, page 199); Mazzoni (below, page 220).
gicians and mimics.
mal out, for we have got him in a sort of dialectical net, and . there is one thing which he decidedly will not escape.
the power of getting a correct view of works of such magni
40
<>
PLATO
profess to be like? May we not call these 'appearances,'
from
since they appear only and are not really like?
Philebus
Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger There is a great deal of this kind of thing in
painting, and in all imitation.
Theaetetus Stranger
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
Of course.
And may we not fairly call the sort of art,
which produces an appearance and not an image, phantastic art?
Theaetetus Most fairly. Stranger These then are
the two kinds of image
art of making appearances?
was doubtful before in which of them I
I even now able to see
clearly; verily he is a wonderful and inscrutable creature.
And now in the cleverest manner he has got into an impos sible place.
Theaetetus Yes, he has. Stranger Do you speak advisedly,
stances which we were giving, for in those cases, and when
unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as I was saying, a
universal consent that no refutation is needed; but when the -
one, or the good one, then the interest which attaches to
these and similar unities and the attempt which is made to
divide them gives birth to a controversy. 1
Protarchus Of what nature? Socrates In the first place, as to whether these unities
have a real existence; and then how each individual unity, or are you carried
away at the moment by the habit of assenting into giving a
Theaetetus Stranger
When, my boy, the one does not belong to
assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or be�uty
True.
should place the Sophist, nor am
hasty answer?
Socrates
the class of things that are born and perish, as in the in
making-tbe art of making likenesses, and phantastic or the
Theaetetus Stranger I
Protarchus, Philelms, Socrates
May I ask to what you are referring?
being always the same, and incapable either of generation or
of destruction, but retaining a permanent individuality, can
be conceived either as dispersed and multiplied in the infin
ity of the world of generation, or as still entire and yet di
My dear friend, we are engaged in a very
vided from itself, which latter would seem to be the greatest
how a thing can appear and seem, and not be, or how a
at the same time in one and in many things? These,
difficult speculation-there can be no doubt of that; for
impossibility of all, for how can one and the same thing be
man can say a thing which is not true, has always been and
Protarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is the one and
or think that falsehood really exists, and avoid being
plexity if ill decided, and the right determination of them is ; very helpful.
still remains a very perplexing question. Can any one say
caught in a contradiction? Indeed, Theaetetus, the task is a
difficult one.
Theaetetus Why? Stranger He who
many to which they relate ; they are the source of great per
Protarchus
Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing
up these questions. says that falsehood exists has the
audacity to assert the being of not-being; for this is implied in the possibility of falsehood. But, my boy, in the days
when I was a boy, the great Parmenides protested against
Socrates That is what I shOUld wish. Protarchus And I am sure that all my
other friends
will be glad to hear them discussed; Philebus, fortunately
for us, is not disposed to move, and we had better not stir
this doctrine, and to the end of his life he continued to incul
him up with questions.
out of verse:
and multifarious battle, in which such various points are at
cate the same lesson-always repeating both in verse and
'Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show that not-being is.'3
Socrates
Good; and where shall we begin this great
issue? Shall we begin thus?
Protarchus How? Socrates We say that the one and many become iden
tified by thought, and that now, as in time past, they run
about together, in and out of every word which is uttered,
and that this union of them will never cease, and is not now
3Parmenides (b.c. 515 B.C.), Greek philosopher. Both fonns of imitation make things that do not, according to the Stranger, have being. This leads to a discussion of "being" and "not-being" and the puzzle that these words create.
beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of ISocrates has been discussing whether knowledge is one thing or many things and the general question of the one and the many, or oneness and manyness .
..
Cratylus thought itself, which never grows 01d.2 Any young man, when be first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure of wisdom; in the first enthusi asm of his joy he leaves no stone, or rather no thought un turned, now rolling up the many into the one, and kneading them together, now unfolding and dividing them; he puzzles himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbours, whether they are older or younger, or of his own age--that makes no difference; neither father nor mother does he spare; no human being who has ears is safe from him hardly even his dog, and a barbarian would have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could only be found. ,
from
Cratylus PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
Socrates, Hermogenes, Cratylus
-
Socrates Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing:-bas this propoSition been sufficiently proven?1 Cratylus Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite true. Socrates Names, then, are given in order to instruct? Cratylus Certainly. Socrates And naming is an art, and has artificers? Cratylus Yes. Socrates And who are they? Cratylus The legislators,2 of whom you spoke at first. Socrates And does this art grow up among men like other arts ? Let me explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse? Cratylus Yes. Socrates The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures, better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders also, the better sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse. 2S0me translations mention sentences or language rather than thought here. expJicitly identifying the problem as one of language. ITbe dialogue has begun with a discussion between Herrnogenes and Socrates of names and their appropriateness to what they denote. Socrates has speculated that there were original. primary. or "first" names, from which later "secondary" names were derived. 2Early in the dialogue, Socrates and Herrnogenes have agreed that the legislator is the giver of names. Shelley uses "legislator" in this sense in a muchqu<>!ed passage at the end of his Defense of Poetry (below, page 551).
<> 41
Cratylus Socrates
True. And among legislators, there are some who do their work better and some worse? Cratylus No; there I do not agree with you. Socrates Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse? Cratylus No, indeed.Socrates Or that one name is better than another? Cratylus Certainly not. Socrates Then all names are rightly imposed? Cratylus Yes, if they are names at all. Socrates Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was mentioned before:-assum ing that he has nothing of the nature of Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at all?3 Cratylus I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who has the nature which corre sponds to it. Socrates And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes, if he is not. Cratylus What do you mean? Socrates Are you maintaining that falsehood is im possible? For if this is your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in all ages. Cratylus Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?-say something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which is not? Socrates Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that falsehood may be spoken but not said? Cratylus Neither spoken nor said. Socrates Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting you in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: 'Hail, Athenian stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion'-these words, whether spoken, said, ut tered, or addressed, would have no application to you but only to our friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all? Cratylus In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking nonsense. Socrates Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and partly false:-which is all that I want to know. .
�Early in the dialogue there has been a discussion of what we call proper names.
42
<>
PLATO
Cratylus
Cratylus Certainly. Socrates And may I not go to him again, and say,
I should say that he would be putting him
self in motion to no purpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of hammering at a brazen
'This is your name' ?-for the name, like the picture, is an
pot.
imitation. May I not say to him-'This is your name' ? and
Socrates
But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot
may I not then bring to his sense of hearing the imitation of
find a meeting-point, for you would admit that the name is
himself, when I say, 'This is a man;' or of a female of the
not the same with the thing named?
Cratylus I should. Socrates And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of the thing?
Cratylus Certainly. Socrates And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, but in another way?
human species, when I say, 'This is a woman,' as the case may be? Is not all that quite possible?
Cratylus
I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and
therefore I say, Granted.
Socrates
That is very good of you, if I am right,
which need hardly be disputed at present. But if I can assigp names as well as pictures to objects, the right assignment of
Cratylus Yes. Socrates I believe you may be right, but I do not
falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of
rightly understand you! Please to say, then, whether both
names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assign
them we may call truth, and the wrong assignment of them
sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures or words) are not
ment of verbs; and if of names and verbs then of the
equally attributable and applicable to the things of which
sentences, which are made up of them. What do you say,
they are the imitation.
Cratylus?
Cratylus They are Socrates First look at the matter thus: you may at .
tribute the likeness of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on?
Cratylus Certainly. Socrates And conversely you may attribute the like ness of the man to the woman, and of the woman to the man?
Cratylus Very true. Socrates And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first?
Cratylus Only the first. Socrates That is to say, the mode of assignment
Cratylus
I agree; and think that what you say is very
Socrates
And further, primitive nouns may be com
true. pared to pictures, and in pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and figures, or you may not give them all-some may be wanting; or there may be too many or too much of them-may there not?
Cratylus Very true. Socrates And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and he who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one.
Cratylus Yes. Socrates In like manner, he who by syllables and let
which attributes to each that which belongs to them and is
ters imitates the nature of things, if he gives all that is appro
like them?
priate will produce a good image, or in other words a name;
Cratylus That is my view. Socrates Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a good understanding about the argu ment, let me state my view to you: the first mode of assign ment, whether applied to figures or to names, I call right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right; and the other mode of giving and assigning the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in the case of names, false as well That may be true, Socrates, in the case of
pictures; they may be wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names-they must be always right.
Socrates
image but not a good one; whence I infer that some names are well and others ill made.
Cratylus Socrates
That is true. Then the artist of names may be sometimes
good, or he may be bad?
Cratylus Yes. Socrates And this artist of names is called the legislator?
as wrong.
Cratylus
but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he will make an
Why, what is the difference? May I not go
to a man and say to him, 'This is your picture,' showing him
Cratylus Yes. Socrates Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good?
Cratylus
Very true, Socrates; but the case of lan
his own likeness, or perhaps the likeness of a woman; and
guage, you see, is different; for when by the help of gram
when I say 'show,' I mean bring before the sense of sight.
mar we assign the letters
a
or 13, or any othedetters to a cer-
�
Cratylus <> tain name, then, if we add, or subtract, or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not only written wrongly, but
not written at all; and in any of these cases becomes other
than a name.
Socrates
and myself in the particular instance of the names of the
letters.
Yes, I remember.
Cratylus Socrates
Good; and when the general character is
But I doubt whether your view is altogether
preserved, even if some of the proper letters are wanting,
How so?
not well, when only a few of them are given. I think that we
correct, Cratylus.
Cratylus Socrates
43
I believe that what you say may be true
about numbers, which must be just what they are, or not be
at all; for example, the number ten at once becomes other
still the thing is signified;-well, if all the letters are given;
had better admit this, lest we be punished like travellers in
JEgina who wander about the street late at night: and be
likewise told by truth herself that we have arrived too late;
than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any
or if not, you must find out some new notion of correctness
itative or to anything which is represented under an image.
sion of a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you
other number: but this does not apply to that which is qual
of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the expres
I should say rather that the image, if expressing in every
will be inconsistent with yourself.
us suppose the existence of two objects: one of them shall
say to be very reasonable.
will suppose, further, that some God makes not only a rep
ourselves whether a name rightly imposed ought not to have
point the entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let
be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus; and we resentation such as a painter would make of your outward form and colour, but also creates an inward organization
like yours, having the same warmth and softness; and into
this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have,
and in a word copies all your qualities, and places them
by you in another form; would you say that this was
I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you
Cratylus
Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask
Socrates
the proper letters.
Yes.
Cratylus Socrates
And the proper letters are those which are
like the things?
Yes.
Cratylus Socrates
Enough then of names which are rightly
Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two
given. And in names which are incorrectly given, the greater
I should say that there were two Cratyluses.
letters, or there would be no likeness; but there will be like
Cratyluses?
Cratylus Socrates
Then you see, my friend, that we must find
part may be supposed to be made up of proper and similar wise a part which is improper and spoils the beauty and for
some other principle of truth in images, and also in names:
mation of the word: you would admit that?
something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive that
quarrelling with you, since I cannot be satisfied that a name
and not insist that an image is no longer an image when images are very far from having qualities which are the ex
act counterpart of the realities which they represent?
Cratylus , Socrates
Yes, I see.
But then how ridiculous would be the effect
of names on things, if they were exactly the same with
- them! For they would be the doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names and
which were the realities.
Cratylus Socrates
Quite true.
Then fear not, but have the courage to admit
There would be no use, Socrates, in my
Cratylus
which is incorrectly given is a name at all.
Do you admit a name to be the representa
Socrates tion of a thing?
Cratylus Socrates
.
Yes, I do.
But do you not allow that some nouns are
primitive, and some derived?
Cratylus Socrates
Yes, I do.
Then if you admit that primitive or first
nouns are representations of things, is there any better way of
framing representations than by assimilating them to the ob
that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly
jects as much as you can; or do you prefer the notion of Her
same with the thing; but allow the occasional substitution of
tional, and have a meaning to those who have agreed about
given: and do not insist that the name shall be exactly the a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a sentence,
and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence which is not appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing
may be named, and described, so long as the general char
acter of the thing which you are describing is retained; and
this, as you will remember, was remarked by Hermogenes
mogenes and of many others, who say that names are conven them, and who have previous knowledge of the things in
tended by them, and that convention is the only principle; and
whether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and opposite one, according to which you call small great and
great small� they would say, makes no difference, if you
are only agreed. Which of these two notions do you prefer?
<>
44
PLATO
Cratylus
Representation by likeness, Socrates, is in
finitely better than representation by any chance sign.
Socrates
Very good: but if the name is to be like the
thing, the letters out of which the first names are composed must also be like things. Returning to the image of the pic
Socrates And what is custom but convention?4 I utter
a sound which I understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: this is what you are saying?
Cratylus Yes. Socrates And if when I speak you know my mean
ture, I would ask, How could any one ever compose a
ing, there is an indication given by me to you?
picture which would be like anything at all, if there were not
Cratylus Yes. Socrates This indication ofmy meaning may proceed from unlike as well as from like, for example in the A of axA1)p6TTJc;. But if this is true, then you have made a con
pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated, and out of which the picture is composed?
Cratylus Socrates
Impossible. No more could names ever resemble any ac
vention with yourself" and the correctness of a name turns
�-:
tually existing thing, unless the original elements of which
out to be convention, since letters which are unlike are
they are compounded bore some degree of resemblance to
dicative equally with those which are like, if they are sanc
the objects of which the names are the imitation: And the
tioned by custom and convention. And even supposing that
original elements are letters?
Cratylus Yes. Socrates Let me now invite you to consider what
you distinguish custom from convention ever so much, still you must say that the signification of words is given by cus tom and not by likeness, for custom may indicate by the un
Hermogenes and I were saying about sounds. Do you agree
like as well as by the like. But as we are agreed thus far,
with me that the letter
Cratylus (for I shall assume that your silence gives consent),
is expressive of rapidity, motion,
and hardness? Were we right or wrong in saying so?
Cratylus I should say that you were right. Socrates And that A was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the like?
then custom and convention must be supposed to contribute to the indication of our thoughts; for suppose we take the in stance of number, how can you ever imagine, my good friend, that you will find names resembling every individual
Cratylus There again you were right. Socrates And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us aXA1)poTTJC;, is by the Eretrians called UXA1)p6TTJp· Cratylus Very true. Socrates But are the letters p and ('j equivalents; and is there the same significance to them in the termination p,
far as possible resemble things; but I fear that this dragging
which there is t o u s in
could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are
a,
or i s there no significance to one
of us?
Cratylus of us.
Socrates are unlike?
ness of names? I quite agree with you that words should as in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a shabby thing, which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of con vention with a view to correctness; for I believe that if we perfectly appropriate, this would be the most perfect state of
Nay, surely there is a significance to both
In as far as they are like, or in as far as they
Cratylus In as far as they are like. Socrates Are they altogether alike? Cratylus Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion. Socrates And what do you say of the insertion of the
A? for that is expressive not of hardness but of softness.
Cratylus
number, unless you allow that which you term convention and agreement to have authority in determining the correct
Why, perhaps the letter
A
is wrongly in
language; as the opposite is the most imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what is the use of them?
Cratylus
The use of names, Socrates, as I should
imagine, is to inform; the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things which are expressed by them.
Socrates
I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as
the name is, so also is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the other, because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same art or science; and therefore
serted, Socrates, and should be altered into p, as you were
you would say that he who knows names will also know
saying to Hermogenes and in my opinion rightly, when you
things.
spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon occasion.
Socrates
Good. But still the word is intelligible to
both of us; when I say
aXA1)pOC; (hard),
you know what I
Crarylus Socrates
That is precisely what I mean. But let us consider what is the nature of this
information about things which, according to you, is given
mean.
Cratylus that is custom.
Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of
�e discussion here may be compared with Saussure· s discussion of signi· fien (below. page 787).
'4
Cratylus us by names. Is it the best sort of information? or is there any other? What do you say?
Cratylus
I believe that to be both the only and the
best sort of information about them; there can be no other.
<)
45
them; and therefore we should leave the beginning as at present, and not reject the
B, but make an insertion of an L B (not 1I'LU�Jl.TJ, but 811'LLUT1'jJl.TJ). Take an other example: l3el3aLov (sure) is clearly the expression of
instead of an
But do you believe that in the discovery of
station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word
them, he who discovers the names discovers also the things;
taTOpCa (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (tcrrwaL) of the stream; and the word 1I'W'TOV (faithful) cer tainly indicates cessation of motion; then, again, j.l.v1'jj.l.TJ
Socrates
or is this only the method of instruction, and is there some other method of enquiry and discovery.
Cratylus I certainly believe that the methods of en quiry and discovery are of the same nature as instruction. Socrates Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great danger of being deceived?
Cratylus How so? Socrates Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his conception of the things which they signifi�d he not?
Cratylus True. SQcrates And if his conception was erroneous, and
(memory), as any one may see, expresses rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as
&jJ.apTta and CTUj.l.CPOpa, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of their etymologies will be the same as aWBULC; and 811'L�j.l.TJ and other words which have a good sense (cp. oJl.apTBlv, O'UVLBvaL, f:1I'Bu9aL, CTUJl.
he gave names according to his conception, in what position
those which have the best. And any one I believe who would
shall we who are his followers find ourselves? Shall we not
take the trouble might find many other examples in which
be deceived by him?
Cratylus
But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that
he must surely have known; or else, as I was saying, his
the giver of names indicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that they are at rest; which is the opposite of motion. Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater num
names would not be names at all? And you have a clear
Cratylus
proof that he has not missed the truth, and the proof is-that
ber express motion.
he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that all the words which you utter have a . common character and purpose?
Socrates
But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For
Socrates
What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count
them like votes? and is correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of whichever sort there are most, those are the true ones?
into agreement with the original error and with himself;
Cratylus No; that is not reasonable. Socrates Certainly not. But let us have done with this
there would be nothing strange in this, any more than in
question and proceed to another, about which I should like
geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight and invisi
to know whether you think with me. Were we not lately ac
ble flaw in the first part of the process, and are consistently
knowledging that the first givers of names in states, both
if he did begin in error, he may have forced the remainder
mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is -the reason why every man should expend his chief thought and attention on the consideration of his first principles: are they or are they not rightly laid GOwn? and when he has
Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and that the art which gave names was the art of the legislator?
Cratylus Quite true. Socrates Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who
duly sifted them, all the rest will follow. Now I should be as
were the givers of the first names, know or not know the
tonished to find that names are really consistent. And here
things which they named?
let us revert to our former discussion: Were we not saying that all things are in motion and progress and flux, and that this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do you not con ceive that to be the meaning of them?
Cratylus
Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the
true meaning.
Socrates Let us revert to E1I'I.CJ'�Jl.TJ (knowledge), and observe how ambiguous this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than going round with
Cratylus They must have known, Socrates. Socrates Why, yes, fr;i.end Cratylus, they could hardly have been ignorant.
Cratylus I should say not. Socrates Let us return to the point from which we di gressed. You were saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things which he named; are you still of that opinion?
Cratylus
I am.
46
0
PLATO
Socrates
And would you say that the giver of the first
names had also a knowledge of the things which he named?
Cratylus I should. Socrates But how could he have learned or discov
ered things from names if the primitive names were not yet
given? For, if we are correct in our view, the only way of
learning and discovering things, is either to discover names for ourselves or to learn them from others.
Cratylus say, Socrates.
Socrates
I think that there is a good deal in what you But if things are only to be known through
names, how can we suppose that the givers of names had
knowledge, or were legislators before there were names at
all, and therefore before they could have known them?5
Cratylus
I believe, Socrates, the true account of the
matter to be, that a power more than human gave things
their first names, and that the names which are thus given
are necessarily their true names.
Socrates
Then how came the giver of the names, if he
was an inspired being or God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now that he made some names ex
pressive of rest and others of motion? Were we mistaken?
Cratylus names at all.
Socrates
But I suppose one of the two not to be
And which, then , did he make, my good
friend; those which are expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a point which, as I said before,
cannot be determined by counting them.
Cratylus What you are saying is, I think, true. Socrates Well, but reflect; have we not several times
acknowledged that names rightly given are the likenesses
and images of the things which they name?
Cratylus Socrates
Yes.
Let us suppose that to any extent you please
you can learn things through the medium of names, and sup
pose also that you can learn them from the things them selves-�hich is likely to be the nobler and clearer way; to
learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of which
the image is the expression have been rightly conceived, or to learn of the truth whether the truth and the image,of it have been duly executed?
Cratylus I should say that we must learn of the truth. Socrates How real existence is to be studied or dis
covered is, I suspect, beyond you and me. But we may ad
mit so much, that the knowledge of things is not to be de
rived from names. No; they must be studied and investigated in themselves.
Cratylus Clearly, Socrates. Socrates There is another point. I should not like us
to be imposed upon by the appearance of such a multitude
of names, all tending in the same direction. I myself do not deny that the givers of names did really give them under the
idea that all things were in motion and flux; which was their
sincere but, I think, mistaken opinion. And having fallen
Cratylus No; not in that way, Socrates. Socrates But if this is a battle of names, some of
into a kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried round,
they are, how or by what criterion are we to decide be
your opinion: Tell me, whether there is or is not any ab
them asserting that they are like the truth, others contending that
is other and different from them must signify something
other and different from them.
tween them? For there are no other names to which appeal
can be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another standard which, without employing names, will make clear
which of the two are right; and this must be a standard which shows the truth of things.
Cratylus I agree. Socrates But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose
that things may be known without names?
Cratylus Clearly. Socrates But how would you expect to know them?
What other way can there be of knowing them, except the
true and natural way, through their affinities, when they are akin to each other, and through themselves? For that which
�e discussion here verges on the question of origin and suggests infinite regress. See Derrida (below, page 1208ff.), who implies the impossibility of source or origin in his treatment of Claude Uvi-Strauss's anthropology. Derrida finds the same problem in Saussure' s concept of a closed linguistic structure.
and want to drag us in after them. There is a matter, master Cratylus, about which I often dream, and should like'to ask
solute beauty or good, or any other absolute existence?
Cratylus CertainIy, Socrates, I think so. Socrates Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking
whether a face is fair, or anything of that sort, for all such
things appear to be in a flux; but let us ask whether the true
beauty is not always beautiful.
Cratylus Certainly. Socrates And can we rightly speak of a beauty which
is always passing away, and is first this and then that; must
not the same thing be born and retire and vanish while the
word is in our mouths?
Cratylus Socrates
Undoubtedly.
Then how can that be a real thing which is
never in the same state? for obviously things which are the same cannot change while they remain the same; and if they
are always the same and in the same state, and never depart from their original form, they can never change or be moved.
Cratylus
CertainIy they cannot.
Cratylus
0
47
Nor yet can they be known by any one; for
education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he
at the moment that the observer approaches, then they be
so far trust names or the givers of names as to be confident
Socrates
come other and of another nature, so that you cannot get any
in any knowledge which condemns himself and other exis
further in knowing their nature or state, for you cannot know
tences to an unhealthy state of unreality: he will not believe
that which has no state.
that all.things leak like a pot, or imagine that the world is a
Cratylus True. Socrates Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that
Ius, but is also very likely to be untrue; and therefore I
there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a state of transi
would not have you be too easily persuaded of it. Reflect
tion and there is nothing abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowl
man
who has a running at the nose. This may be true, Craty
well and like a man, and do not easily accept such a doc
trine: for you are young and of an age to learn. And when you have found the truth, come and tell me.
Cratylus
I will do as you say, though I can assure
edge; and if the transition is always going on, there will al
you, Socrates, that I have been considering the matter al
ways be no knowledge, and, according to this view, there
ready, and the result of a great deal of trouble and consider
will be no one to know and nothing to be known: but if that
ation is that I incline to Heracleitus.
which knows and that which is known exist ever, and the
Socrates
Then, another day, my friend, when you
beautiful and the good and every other thing also exist, then
come back, you shall give me a lesson; but at present, go
were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal na
shall set you on your way.
I do not think that they can resemble a process or flux, as we ture in things, or whether the truth is what Heracleitus6 and his followers and my others say, is a question hard to de termine; and no man of sense will like to put himself or the
6Heraclitus held that all things are in flux.
into the country, as you are intending, and Hermogenes
Cratylus
Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that
you will continue to think about these things yourself.?
'The dialogue ends in uncertainty and ambivalence about what it has accom plished with respect to understanding language.
Aristotle 384-322 B.C.
The first extant and probably the most influential treatise on poetry in the Western world is Aristotle's Poetics. Earlier works by him, for example Physics and Meta
physics, contain important statements about art and nature that bear on literature; and Rhetoric, written after Poetics, distinguishes rhetoric as a practical art involving "do ing" from productive arts, including poetic, that involve "making." Aristotle's Rhetoric has had a strong influence on criticism, for many later writers have blurred or obliter ated the distinction even to the extent that in some cases poetic seems to have become a branch of rhetoric (or the art of persuasion). That Poetics was lost to European thought for many centuries may have contributed to the importance of rhetoric over poetic until the rediscovery of Poetics in the Renaissance. From that time, commentaries on Poetics abound, the most important of the earliest being Castelvetro's (below, page 177). Aristotle was a student of Plato, though he came to disagree with his teacher par ticularly with respect to Plato's doctrine of ideas or forms. In Poetics, he approaches literature to some extent as if he were a classical biologist. He intends to classify and categorize systematically the kinds of literary art, beginning with epic and tragic drama. Unfortunately, not all of Poetics has survived, and it breaks off before the discussion of comedy. Nevertheless, our sense of Aristotle's method is established. He is the first critic to attempt a systematic discussion of literary genres. It appears that Aristotle means to answer directly Plato's criticism of the poet as merely an imitator of appearances (phenomena). He disagrees with Plato about where to locate reality. He does not believe that the world of appearances is merely an ephemeral copy of changeless ideas (forms), Indeed, he denies the being of ideas (in Plato's sense) apart from things. He believes that change is a fundamental reality, a process of nature, which is a creative force with a teleological direction. In this respect, the argument of Poetics serves an important purpose in Aristotle's philosophy as a whole, since it provides a critical example in which form can be linked to telos or pur pose directly, providing support for a teleological interpretation of nature. Reality is the process in which a form is manifested from matter by nature. The poet's imitation is an analogy of this process; the poet takes a form from nature and reshapes it in a different matter or medium. This medium, which the form does not inhabit in nature, is the source of each work's inward principle of order and consequently its independence from slav ish copying. The poet is thus an imitator and a maker, and imitation is, in fact, a kind of making. In imitation the poet discovers the ultimate form of an action. This is why, for Aristotle, the plot of a tragedy is of prime importance-over char . acter, thought, diction, song, and spectacle, though these are all elements of tragic drama. The poet makes the meaning of events by making their structure as plot; he does this in a medium, which is principally words. Literary art, along with the fine arts (all the productive arts), is thus an improvement on nature in that the poet has brought to completion what nature, operating with its own principles, is still developing.
..
Physics
0
49
These ideas have heavily influenced criticism from the Renaissance to this day. Re naissance critics often sought to blend Aristotle with the dominant Platonism, especially where defense of poetry was the aim, but the two philosophers' disagreement about the location of the ideas always seemed to intervene. Then neoclassical critics, following Castelvetro, extended to extremes what appeared to them to be Aristotle's fixed rules about the so-called unities. Other followers of Aristotle emphasized either his theory of imitation or the analytic procedures exhibited in his discussion of tragedy. Aristotle's attention to the poem as an object that can be discussed in terms of its formal nature is probably his greatest contribution to literary theory, though his treat ment of tragedy as bringing about a catharsis or purgation of pity and fear has been of great interest and much debated. The standard, complete translation of Aristotle's works is that edited by J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross, The Works ofAristotle,
11
vols.
(1908-1931).
Translations of Poetics
together with commentaries abound: for example, S. H. Butcher, Aristotle 's Theory of
Poetry and Fine Art (1 894); G. F. Else, Aristotle 's Poetics: The Argument (1957); G. M. A. Grube, Aristotle on Poetry and Style
(1958); L. Golden and O. B. Hardison, Aristo tle 's Poetics: A Translation and Commentary for Students of Literature. See also C. S.
Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic
(1924); W. R. Roberts, Greek Rhetoric and Liter
ary Theory (1928); F. L. Lucas, Tragedy in Relation to Aristotle 's Poetics (1928); J. W. H. Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity, 2 vols.
(1 934);
Richard McKeon, "Literary
Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity" in R. S . Crane, ed., Critics and
Criticism (1952); Humphry House, Aristotle 's Poetics (1956); G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (1963); Elder Olson, ed., Aristotle 's Poetics and English Litera ture (1965); Harvey Goldstein, "Mimesis and Catharsis Reexamined," Journal of Aes thetics and Art Criticism, XXIV ( 1 966); Teddy Brunius, Imagination and Katharsis (1 966); K. V. Erickson, ed., Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric ( 1 974); S . Halliwell, Aristotle 's Poetics (1986); Eugene Garver, Aristotle 's Rhetoric: A n Art of Character (1 994); D. J. Parley and A. Nehemas, eds., Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophi cal Essays (1994).
from
ers ascribe things to this cause, arguing that since the hot and
Physics
the cold, &c., are of such and such a kind, therefore certain
(Book 2, Chapter 8) 8
We must explain then
(1) that Nature belongs to the
class of causes which act for the sake of something; (2) about the necessary and its place in physical problems, for all writ-
things
necessarily are and come to be-and if they mention
any other cause (onel his 'friendship and strife', another2 his " 'mind '), it is only to touch on it, and then g,oodbye to it.
A difficulty presents itself: why should not nature
work, not for the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just as the skY rains, not in order to make the com grow, but of necessity ? What is drawn up must cool, and what has been cooled must become water and descend, the result of this being that the com grows. Similarly if a man's
Aristotle's Physics was probably an early work, written before Poetics and Rhetoric. The text is from the translation by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye in w. D. Ross, ed., The Works of Aristotle, Vol. II (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1930).
I [Hardie and Gaye] Empedocles [Greek philosopher, fifth century B.C.] ' [Hardie and Gaye] Anaxagoras [Greek philosopher, 500?-428 B.C.]
50
<>
ARISTOTLE
crop is spoiled on the threshing-floor, the rain did not fall
This is most obvious in the animals other than
for the sake of this-in order that the crop might be
they make things neither by art nor after inquiry or delil
rna
spoiled-but that result just followed. Why then should it
eration. Wherefore people discuss whether it is by intell
not be the same with the parts in nature, e. g. that our teeth
gence or by some other faculty that these creatures work,
should come up
spiders, ants, and the like. By gradual advance in th
of necessity-the front teeth sharp, fitted for
tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down the
direction we come to see clearly that in plants too that :
food-since they did not arise for this end, but it was merely
produced which is conducive to the end-leaves, e. g. gr01
a coincident result; and so with all other parts in which we
�o provide shade for the fruit. If then it is both by nature an ' r for an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider il
suppose that there is purpose? Wherever then all the parts came about just what they would have been if they had
web, and plants grow leaves for the sake of the fruit au
come to be for an end, such things survived, being orga
send their roots dowp (not up) for the sake of nourishmenl
hi
nized spontaneously in a fitting way; whereas those which
it is plain that this kind of cause is operative in things w cl
grew otherwise perished and continue to perish, as Empedo
come to be and
cles says his ' man-faced ox-progeny' did . .
things, the matter and the form, of which the latter is th�
are
by nature. And since 'nature' means tw�
Such are the arguments (and others of the kind) which
end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the forn
may cause diffi culty on this point. Yet it is impossible that
must be the cause in the sense of 'that. for the sake 0:
this should be the true view. For teeth and all other natural
which' .
things either invariably or normally come about in a given
Now mistakes come to pass even in the operations oj
way: but of not one of the results of chance or spontaneity is
art: the grammarian makes a mistake in writing and the doc·
this true. We do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence
tor pours out the wrong dose. Hence clearly mistakes are
the frequency of rain in winter, but fre uent rain in summer
possible in the operations of nature also. If then in art there
q
we do; nor heat in the dog-days, but only if we have it in
are cases in which what is rightly produced serves a pur
winter. If then, it is agreed that things are either the result of
pose, and if where mistakes occur there was a purpose in
coincidence or for an end, and these cannot be the result of
what was attempted, only it was not attained, so must it be
coincidence or spontaneity, it follows that they must be for
also in natural products, and monstrosities will be failures
an end; and that such things are all due to nature even the
in the purposive effort. Thus in the original combinations
champions of the theory which is before us would agree.
the 'ox-progeny' if they failed to reach a determinate end
Therefore action for an end is present in things which come
must have arisen through the corruption of some principle
to be and are by nature.
corresponding to what is now the seed. ·
Further, where a series has a completion, all the pre
Further, seed must have come into being first, �d not
ceding steps are for the sake of that. Now surely as in intel
straightway the animals: the words 'whole-natured first . .
ligent action, so in nature; and as in nature, so it is in each
must have meant seed.
:5
action, if nothing interferes. Now intelligent action is for
Again, in plants too we find the relation of means to
the sake of an end; therefore the nature of things also is so.
end, though the degree of organization is less. Were there
Thus if a house, e. g., had been a thing made by nature , it
then in plants also 'olive-headed vine-progeny ', like the
would have been made in the same way as it is now by art3;
'man-headed ox-progeny' , or not? An absurd suggestion ;
and if things made by nature were made also by art, they
yet there must have been, if there were such things among
would come to be in the same way as by nature. Each step
animals.
then in the series is for the sake of the next; and generally
Moreover, among the seeds anything must have come
art partly completes what nature cannot bring to a finish,4
to be at random. But the person who asserts this entirely
and partly imitates her. If, therefore, artificial products are
does away with 'nature' and what exists 'by nature' . For
for the sake of an end, so clearly also are natural products.
those things are natural which, by a continuous movement
The relation of the later to the earlier terms of the series is
originated from an internal principle, arrive at some comple
the same in both.
tion: the same completion is not reached from every princi ple; nor any chance completion, but always the tendency in each is towards the same end, if there is no impediment.
3Sy '"an" Aristotle does not mean just the fine ans and literature, but also the deliberate making of things by human beings-for example, houses, furni ture, tools, laws. In Rhetoric, Aristotle distinguishes rhetoric as a practical an from poetic as a productive an. 'See Wilde (below, page 7 1 2).
5 [Hardie
and Gaye] Empedocles, Fragment 62.4.
Metaphysics The end and the means towards it may come about by
<>
51
memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for
chance. We say, for instance, that a stranger has come by
a