CRITICAL THEORY AND WORLD POLITICS
CRITICAL THEORY AND WORLD POLITICS EDITED BY
RICHARD WYN JONES
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CRITICAL THEORY AND WORLD POLITICS
CRITICAL THEORY AND WORLD POLITICS EDITED BY
RICHARD WYN JONES
b o u l d e r l o n d o n
Published in the United States of America in 2001 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2001 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Critical theory and world politics / edited by Richard Wyn Jones. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-802-4 1. International relations—Philosophy. 2. Critical theory. I. Wyn Jones, Richard. JZ1305.C75 2001 327.1'01—dc21 00-062564 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America
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The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5
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Contents
Preface Acknowledgments
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vii xi
Introduction: Locating Critical International Relations Theory Richard Wyn Jones
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Part One: The Contours of Critical International Relations Theory 2
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The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory Andrew Linklater
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The Way Ahead: Toward a New Ontology of World Order Robert W. Cox
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Critical Theory and the Democratic Impulse: Understanding a Century-Old Tradition Craig N. Murphy
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Part Two: Critique in Critical International Relations Theory 5
The Nature of Critique in Critical International Relations Theory Kimberly Hutchings
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Contents
Negative Dialectic? The Two Modes of Critical Theory in World Politics N. J. Rengger
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Global Realism: Unmasking Power in the International Political Economy Jeffrey Harrod
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What’s Critical About Critical International Relations Theory? Mark Neufeld
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Part Three: The Practice and Praxis of Critical International Relations Theory 9
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The Practice, and Praxis, of Feminist Research in International Relations Sandra Whitworth
149
Deliberative Politics, the Public Sphere, and Global Democracy Kenneth Baynes
161
Creating Cosmopolitan Power: International Mediation as Communicative Action Deiniol Lloyd Jones
171
Part Four: Commentaries 12
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“Our Side”? Critical Theory and International Relations Chris Brown
191
What Is International Relations For? Notes Toward a Postcritical View Alexander Wendt
205
References The Contributors Index About the Book
225 249 253 259
Preface
Critical Theory and World Politics is a book about the dialectical engagement of critical theory and the study of world politics. It also represents a moment—one hopes a significant one—in that engagement. A critical theory–inspired strand of thinking has been apparent within international relations since the early 1980s. It has formed a key part of a wider tendency—now known under the rubric of postpositivism—that has sought to challenge the metatheoretical assumptions of traditional international relations thinking and attempted to articulate and operationalize other principles and precepts in their place. But despite its many links, both intellectual and disciplinary, to other postpositivist strands of international relations thought such as poststructuralism and constructivism, critical international relations theory is seen by both proponents and opponents as representing a distinct and distinctive set of views and concerns. Simultaneously, and strikingly mirroring developments within international relations, critical theorists working within their more traditional domains of social theory and sociology have become increasingly aware of and engaged with the sphere of the international. This direction, in turn, has led to a significant break with the state-bound, and almost invariably Eurocentric, patterns of thought associated with traditional critical theory— a break whose radical implications are still being worked through. This book represents the first attempt to bring together key figures in these parallel moves to discuss the implications of their work both for the study of world politics and for critical theory. That this is the first such attempt despite almost twenty years of intellectual activity is a somewhat curious anomaly. Nevertheless, it remains the case that proponents of critical theory seem to be better at engaging with those who hold to very different intellectual viewpoints than with those with whom they share, ostensibly at least, common ground. This noninteraction, in turn, may well reflect the intractability of both inter- and intradisciplinary boundaries, even vii
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among those who are intellectually committed to their supersession. Whatever the explanation, the relative lack of dialogue among critical theorists has most certainly hampered the development of critical international relations theory. Critical Theory and World Politics is an attempt to kick-start just such a dialogue concerning the evolution and future direction of critical international relations (IR) theory. It was organized to encourage the greatest possible degree of engagement among the contributors. Initially, all were invited to present draft versions of their chapters at a conference held at the Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth. The chapters were subsequently reworked in light of the specific reaction they engendered from the other participants in the project and the themes brought out by more general discussion. The elements of interaction—and reflexivity—were further strengthened by an invitation to two figures prominent in the discipline of international relations, but not identified with critical theory, to comment on the arguments in the other chapters and on critical IR theory more generally. Because of the pioneering nature of this venture, it was felt important not to impose a preordained set of questions or issues on the participants. As far as possible, therefore, the themes as well as the structure of the book have emerged organically from the concerns of the contributors and from the interactions among them. That said, the decision of whom to invite to participate in the project clearly affected the shape of the final outcome and in turn reflected certain editorial concerns and preconceptions about what critical IR theory is and yet might become. It is important to make these premises explicit at the outset. The relationship between critical theory and other schools of thought in international relations has already been extensively discussed, and that discussion, of course, continues in this volume. However, the distinctiveness of the various strands within critical theory—and the possible implications of these differences for the coherence of critical IR theory—has not yet been sufficiently recognized or explored (at least within international relations). These issues are brought into focus in this book by ensuring that the main strands are all given a voice. The aim has been to represent critical IR theory in its diversity. It is, of course, a matter for the contributors—as well as the reader—to judge how significant these differences in intellectual inspiration and orientation prove to be. Another central concern in the design of the project is the extent to which critical theory–inspired themes can illuminate both the analysis and practice of world politics. Whereas metatheoretical questions are undoubtedly important, this volume is predicated on the view that they are only part of the story and only part of the possible contribution of critical interna-
Preface
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tional relations theory. Thus several of the chapters focus on more praxisoriented issues. Following an introductory chapter wherein I seek to locate critical IR theory within broader trends in social theory and international relations, the book has been organized into four parts. In Part One, three of the figures most prominently associated with the critical theory intervention in international relations, Andrew Linklater, Robert W. Cox, and Craig N. Murphy, trace the contours of critical IR theory. All three chapters not only reflect in different ways on the development of contemporary critical IR theory but also set out agendas for its future development. In Part Two, Kimberly Hutchings, N. J. Rengger, Jeffrey Harrod, and Mark Neufeld discuss the various forms of critique in critical IR theory. The discussion ranges from immanent critique to negative dialectic, from Kant to Marx, and serves to underline the diversity of approaches and opinions prevalent among contemporary critical theorists. In Part Three, “The Practice and Praxis of Critical International Relations Theory,” Sandra Whitworth, Kenneth Baynes, and Deiniol Lloyd Jones illustrate the potential payoffs—and problems—associated with thinking about world politics from perspectives informed by critical theory. In the fourth and final part, “Commentaries,” Chris Brown and Alexander Wendt provide penetrating discussions of the preceding chapters and offer their own views on some of the central concerns of critical IR theory. The focus in each of the four parts is not mutually exclusive of the others. Rather, by the very nature of their subject matter, the discussions in the chapters inevitably tend to overlap to some extent. Taken together, they testify to the intellectual vibrancy of critical international relations theory. The primary purpose of this collection is not, however, simply to demonstrate that interesting work is being generated under the rubric of critical IR theory. Rather it is to encourage critical dialogue and interaction with and within this work. It is this aim that has underpinned the organization of Critical Theory and World Politics from the outset. The ultimate success of the project will thus be measured by its ability to inspire or incite further responses. —Richard Wyn Jones
Acknowledgments
This project was made possible by the Cadogan Research Initiative of the Higher Education Council for Wales. Its financial support allowed those involved to be brought together for an initial conference at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. The initiative subsequently supported the production of the manuscript. I would like to offer my sincere thanks to the trustees of the fund for their vision and generosity. Steve Smith was the main catalyst for the project and has remained centrally involved throughout. He has been unstinting in his support and sagacious in his advice. I am very grateful to him. Two other people have played key roles in the project. Eurwen Booth provided invaluable editorial assistance. Eli Stamnes gave selflessly of her time and expertise in order to help the manuscript take its final shape. I am grateful to them both. This volume was originally to have been edited jointly by Roger Tooze and myself. Sadly, however, Roger was forced to withdraw from involvement as a result of illness. I would like to thank him for his contribution to the overall success of the project. I would also like to thank Paul Williams, who produced the index, and all at Lynne Rienner Publishers for their usual good-humored efficiency. —R. W. J.
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1 INTRODUCTION: LOCATING CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY Richard Wyn Jones
When as an undergraduate student I attended my first international relations lecture, the professor commenced by announcing baldly that there were two kinds of theory, positive theory and normative theory. The former was concerned with facts and certainties and was the proper business of scholars of international relations (IR). The latter dealt with values, opinions, and aspirations and should be left to philosophers, theologians, and other “moralizers.” Since then, however, the subject of international relations, and indeed the object of its study, world politics, have been transformed. It is certainly hard to credit that the current head of any intellectually respectable department of international relations could introduce students to the discipline in quite the same way as I encountered it in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the professor’s introduction did capture one of the central elements in the discipline’s self-image from at least the mid-1960s onward, if not before. During this period international relations was almost completely in thrall to the attempt to develop and formulate a theory of world politics along positivist, scientific-objectivist lines (see Smith 1992). True, as highlighted in Craig Murphy’s rendering of an alternative history of the discipline in this volume, there were always other voices; true, as Murphy also reminds us, the commitment to the rigors of positive science was often more notional than actual, and indeed, the tools of positivism could be turned against the mainstream to some effect. But those who dissembled from the dominant approach were always a marginalized minority. There was no doubt where the center of gravity lay. In retrospect, however, it appears that the publication of the book that marked the high point of the endeavor to develop international relations as 1
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Introduction
a positive science, Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979), also marked the point at which the dominant approach began its decline. G.W.F. Hegel, for one, would not have been surprised by this turn of events. For since then the hegemonic understanding of international relations has come under sustained assault from a variety of alternative approaches. The cumulative effect has been to cast doubt on many of the verities so confidently—and complacently—propounded over so many years in so many lecture theaters and conference halls by members of the IR community. This is not to say that the scientific-objectivist, or positivist, epistemology that underpinned my erstwhile professor’s remarks has been cast aside completely. Far from it. Many, indeed almost certainly the majority of those actively engaged in the study of world politics through the discipline, continue to adhere to the supposed tenets of positive social science. But undeniably, doubt has been introduced. Those who remain faithful to those metatheoretical ideals are increasingly forced to argue for them rather than simply assert their “obvious” superiority. Thus although the dominant approach may still be dominant in simple numerical terms, its dominance has been denaturalized. The center of gravity has perceptively shifted. One of the approaches that has helped bring about this shift is critical theory, the subject of this book.
On Contribution and Confusion Since its arrival was heralded in 1981 by the publication of Robert W. Cox’s seminal essay “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” critical theory has not only contributed to the critique of the mainstream but has also made substantive contributions of its own to the study of world politics (see Linklater 1996b). These span the subfields of international political economy (Murphy and Tooze 1991 provides a good introduction), so-called normative theory (Linklater 1998 represents a landmark in this regard), and security studies (see Wyn Jones 1999). Moreover, as Andrew Linklater argues in this volume, the critical theory move within international relations runs parallel to and is wholly complementary with the development largely beyond the discipline of a wider literature “on the prospects for new modes of human governance and new forms of political community” (an overview of which is provided by Baynes in Chapter 10 of this volume). But despite this contribution, it is undeniably the case that critical theory remains the source of deep confusion in international relations circles. How and where does it fit in? Can critical theory be defined as, say, embodying a particular set of epistemological claims or a particular onto-
Introduction
3
logical standpoint? Can we even speak of a critical theory approach in the singular, or are there two or even more distinct approaches laboring under the label “critical theory” active in international relations? And if so, what if anything binds them together? Furthermore, how does critical theory relate to the alternative approaches such as poststructuralism and postmodernism or the new, and already seemingly ubiquitous, kid-on-the-block constructivism? Where are the points of overlap and areas of distinctiveness? The degree of confusion that critical theory engenders, and the degree of misunderstanding to which it is subjected, are apparent in some of the more recent and influential state-of-the-discipline surveys. To cite one well-known example, over a decade ago Robert Keohane distinguished between two approaches to international relations, the rationalist and the reflectivist (Keohane 1988). The former utilizes the principles and precepts of positive social science; into the latter category he lumped all their theoretical opponents, including critical theorists. It is clear that the reader is meant to infer from the labeling of the two approaches that members of the reflectivist camp are somehow hostile to rationality—or at a minimum, less committed to reason and rationality in scholarship and in human life in general. But as far as critical theory is concerned, nothing could be further from the truth. Keohane seems unaware of the fact that in recent years, Jürgen Habermas has been the most vocal and persistent defender of the Enlightenment commitment to reason in the polemics that have surrounded postmodernism (see, for example, Habermas 1987). The critical theory objection to the kind of positivist social science that Keohane advocates is not its commitment to rationality per se but rather that its conception of rationality is too narrow, indeed atrophied (see Wyn Jones 1999: chs. 1–3). Similarly, confusion reigns in Ted Hopf’s survey of what alternative approaches “bring to an understanding of world politics” (Hopf 1998: 172). Hopf distinguishes between mainstream critical theory and its constructivist critics, but he also further distinguishes between the two types of constructivism, conventional and critical. There is no need to elaborate further on these categories here. What is relevant for our purposes is that in illustrating them, Hopf seemingly manages to locate the Habermasian critical theorist Mark Hoffman within the “conventional constructivist” camp, whereas Linklater, equally heavily influenced by Habermas, is placed among the “critical constructivists” (Hopf 1998: 183, 185). A close reading of their work may well uncover some subtle differences between the critical theory of Hoffman and Linklater, but we can be less than sanguine that Hopf’s categorization of their work is based on such attentiveness to detail. This lack is underlined when he also seems to argue that one of the characteristics of critical constructivism—a category that includes postmodernist scholars—is an unequivocal commitment to human emanci-
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Introduction
pation (Hopf 1998: 185) when this emancipation is precisely one of the central points at issue between critical theorists and postmodernists (see below). But should critical theorists be concerned by these and other examples of confusion and misinterpretation? It is tempting, perhaps, to conclude not. After all, critical theory can hardly claim to have been singled out for special treatment in this regard: All the alternative approaches have suffered the same fate (for what Checkel [1998: 339f.] has described as a particularly “egregious piece of caricaturing” see Mearsheimer 1994–1995; the treatment of postmodernism in Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998 represents another low point). Indeed, in a discipline where the creation of typologies is so often a substitute for rather than a prelude to real analysis and engagement, it may be that the apparent ability of critical theory to escape easy categorization should be considered a positive advantage. N. J. Rengger (in this volume) suggests that the lack of any real response from the mainstream to Linklater’s criticisms of neorealism reflects the difficulties that the keepers of the positivist flame have had in pigeonholing his standpoint. And after all, it was Theodor Adorno, one of the founding fathers of Frankfurt School critical theory, who attempted to write in such a way as to avoid easy categorization (Jameson 1990). But it would be foolish to draw too much comfort from these observations. Adorno notwithstanding, confusion, let alone caricature, is clearly a barrier to understanding and intellectual development. Furthermore, I would argue that it would also be a mistake to conclude that all misunderstanding and misrepresentation is somehow part of a deliberate strategy to blunt the challenge of alternate approaches (a view implicit in Weber 1994a; cf. Neufeld in Ch. 8, this volume). In the case of critical theory at least, my contention is that there is already enough scope for confusion inherent both in the wider (extradisciplinary) tradition itself and in the specific ways it has developed within international relations. Reflecting on these somewhat tangled roots is necessary not only to understand how we have come to the present stage of development but also to allow the critical theory approach to grow and mature further into the future. In the first part of this introductory chapter, I seek to locate critical theory–inspired writing on international relations—critical IR theory—in relation to the critical theory tradition more broadly drawn. The reading offered suggests that rather than understand critical theory as a particular approach, it is more appropriate to view it as a constellation of rather distinctive approaches, all seeking to illuminate a central theme, that of emancipation. Working from this basis, I then explore the relationship between critical theory and two alternative approaches, namely poststructuralism and constructivism. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the distinctive con-
Introduction
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tributions that critical IR theory makes—and can make—to the study of world politics.
Locating Critical International Relations Theory in Social Theory Broadly speaking, there are two main sets of influences acting upon critical international relations theory. The first is Frankfurt School critical theory, whose leading lights include Habermas, Adorno, and Max Horkheimer. They are surrounded by an extraordinarily talented supporting cast composed of such luminaries as Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, Eric Fromm, and, more recently, Albrecht Wellmer, Karl-Otto Apel, and Axel Honneth (for good overviews see Wiggershaus 1994, Bronner 1994, and Hohendahl 1991). The second is the work, perhaps more correctly the life and work, of Antonio Gramsci. But if Gramsci and the Frankfurt School are both influences on critical IR theory in general, an important point is that they do not, on the whole, influence the same scholars. That is, some critical theorists working in international relations draw on Gramsci, others on the Frankfurt School, but very few draw on both. To take some of the authors in this book as examples, Cox and Harrod are clearly influenced by Gramsci and Gramscian concepts and modes of analysis, but not apparently by the ideas of the Frankfurt School (Cox’s brief intellectual autobiography [1996a: 18–38] certainly makes no mention of any Frankfurt School influence). Linklater, Jones, and Baynes draw explicitly on the intellectual resources of the Frankfurt School but have little or no debt to acknowledge to Gramsci. Moreover, the division between these scholars is not only one of influences but also tends to be one of intellectual orientation: The Gramscian-influenced scholars are primarily concerned with political economy; those influenced by the Frankfurt School are interested primarily in political and normative theory. Of course, this distinction can be overdrawn. Linklater, to give but one example, engages with political economy in his 1990 book Beyond Marxism and Realism: Critical Theory and International Relations. And even if the distinction exists, the question remains, How significant is it? After all, it is clear that the Gramscian and the Frankfurt School approaches share a common ancestry both in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition and, as Kimberly Hutchings stresses in Chapter 5 of this volume, in the broader Kantian tradition of critical philosophy. One could even argue, utilizing the now venerable but still powerful base-superstructure model of society, that the difference in focus should be regarded as a strength. For if the
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Gramscians concentrate on understanding the economic base and the Frankfurtians concern themselves with the superstructure, is not the end result a more rounded analysis of the whole? In this sense Gramsci and the Frankfurt School might be construed as two sides of the same coin. But whereas such an argument might have a superficially pleasing plausibility as well as a certain symmetry, to accept it would be to undersell and oversimplify both elements. Gramsci was much more than a theorist of the economic base. He was among the first in the mainstream Marxist tradition to recognize the relative autonomy of the superstructure and to (re)emphasize the dialectical nature of the base-superstructure relationship. He was also interested in issues of culture and identity. Moreover, through his development of concepts such as hegemony and historic bloc, his legacy is a series of powerful analytical tools through which social orders and social transformations may be understood (Augelli and Murphy 1988 and Rupert 1995 are powerful exemplars of how concepts derived from Gramsci’s work can illuminate concrete issues and problems). Gramsci’s was an incredibly broad-ranging intellectual project and should not be confined or consigned to one side of any theoretical coin. When we turn to the Frankfurt School, the problem we encounter is that the very name implies far more coherence and consistency than is actually the case. Apart from a common intellectual heritage, personal relationships (which were often difficult), and a tenuous relationship to Frankfurt itself, little unites the members of this particular “school” (Wiggershaus 1994). Indeed, the differences in intellectual standpoints are fundamental and exist both among different members and even within the work of individual members across time (Wyn Jones 1999, chs. 1–3). To trace the various twists and turns in the intellectual biography of the Frankfurt School is an enormously complex task and clearly beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is necessary to gain some sense of the various strands that make up the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory if we are to understand the relationships among the various elements that make up critical IR theory. This understanding is also a prerequisite for any attempt to gain a clearer picture of the relationship between the critical theory approach to international relations and alternative approaches to the subject. To these ends, it is useful to differentiate between three distinct strands. The first is the original conception of critical theory as a critical social theory—as a broad framework within which the insights of the traditional social science disciplines can be integrated with and through Marxian theory to produce an analysis of society that aims, eventually, to facilitate and support a process of emancipatory social transformation. Horkheimer’s essay “Traditional and Critical Theory,” first published in 1937, is the key statement of this view (Horkheimer 1972).
Introduction
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The second strand of critical theory is concerned to trace why the possibilities for emancipatory transformation had (apparently) been extinguished. Its main elements were first elaborated in the now classic study Dialectic of Enlightenment, published in 1944 (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944/1979). This work reformulated critical theory as a critique of instrumental rationality and argued that the civilizational process itself had created a “hermetic society” suffused with a domination and terror from which escape—in any social sense—was impossible. The third, and almost certainly the most influential version of critical theory, has attempted to develop a critical theory of society within the context of a theory of communicative action (Habermas 1984, 1989a). Much more obviously post-Marxist than the other two strands, this approach claims to transcend the Marxian focus on productive relations and their immanent problems and to highlight instead the emancipatory potential inherent in communication. As a shorthand the three strands will be identified with three thinkers, namely Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas, respectively. This shorthand is not entirely accurate inasmuch as Horkheimer collaborated in the development of Adornian critical theory through his coauthorship of Dialectic of Enlightenment, but it is nevertheless a reasonably fair reflection of where the intellectual center of gravity has lain for each of the three strands. Given the major differences among these three strands in critical theory, the question arises, What, then, is the unifying thread that allows us to talk of a school at all? This issue is explored in Stephen Eric Bronner’s marvelous study of the Frankfurt School tradition, Of Critical Theory and Its Theorists (1994). His argument is that in the final analysis, the only thing common to all critical theorists, and fundamental to all critical theories, is a concern to explore the barriers to and possibilities for human emancipation—hence Bronner’s definition of critical theory as “a cluster of themes inspired by an emancipatory intent” (Bronner 1994: 3). Where does this leave our discussion of critical IR theory? The first point is that the same threefold distinction can also be usefully applied to the work of those seeking to utilize the insights of Frankfurt School critical theory in the field of international relations. Whereas the majority of those theorists are best understood as Habermasians, some are much closer to both the letter and spirit of Horkheimer’s model of critical social theory. (As will be discussed in the next section, Adorno’s critique of instrumental rationality also resonates in contemporary international theory, but in the work of poststructuralists.) Again, using some of the authors in this book as examples, Linklater, Baynes, and Jones are Habermasian critical theorists. To their number we can also add another influential proponent of critical IR theory, Mark Hoffman (1987, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995). Neufeld’s work is arguably much more Horkheimerian in spirit. This is also the case for some of those writers working in the field of critical security studies. Ken
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Booth’s discussion of “utopian realism,” for example, contains many striking overlaps with Horkheimerian critical theory, even though Booth did not at that stage draw on the work of the Frankfurt School (Booth 1991b). More recently, I (1999) write explicitly within the problematique established by Horkheimer’s “Traditional and Critical Theory” (1972). But again, it would be wrong to overdraw these distinctions. Linklater has certainly used the work of Horkheimer and the early Frankfurt School, although less so in his more recent work (cf. Linklater 1990b and 1998), and indeed is now noticeably more radical than the increasingly liberal Habermas. Similarly, Neufeld has drawn on Habermas (for example, in this volume), whereas none of the contemporary Horkheimerians share the expectations of the revolutionary proletariat that underpinned “Traditional and Critical Theory.” Nevertheless, the categorizations do capture important differences in orientation and outlook. Habermas, after all, views his own work as representing a fundamental break with that of Horkheimer and Adorno (see Habermas 1984: 366–399; 1987: 106–130). It is not surprising, therefore, that this break is also manifested in critical IR theory. So, for example, in his chapter in this volume, Rengger utilizes some of the core ideas developed in Adorno’s critique of instrumental rationality to outline far-reaching objections to Linklater’s Habermas-inspired project. Once we view Frankfurt School critical IR theory not as a unified whole but as a series of different and indeed contradictory strands, it is then possible to clarify its relationship(s) with Gramscian critical theory. The fundamental point here is that Gramscian critical theory is much closer to one Frankfurt School strand than the others. Specifically, the differences between Gramsci’s work, especially in the way it has been interpreted in international relations, and Horkheimer’s critical social theory are small. True, the latter abjures the former’s concern with political economy to concentrate almost exclusively on superstructural phenomena. Nevertheless, both approaches are rooted in the same Marxian productivist paradigm, and both seek to develop a social theory orientated toward social transformation. They are recognizably variations on a theme rather than different in any fundamental way. (More work remains to be done on the commonalities and differences between the work of Gramsci and that of the Frankfurt School; in the interim see Holub 1992.) It might be added, parenthetically, that it is this convergence between the Horkheimer of “Traditional and Critical Theory” and Gramscian critical IR theory—as if to emphasize the point, Cox (1981) makes an almost analogous distinction between problem solving and critical theory—that initially made critical IR theory (as a whole) appear to many observers to be more unified and coherent than has actually proven to be the case. The distance between Gramscian critical theory and work conducted in the Adornian or Habermasian veins is much greater. Gramsci and Adorno
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are separated by a vast gulf. Through the critique of instrumental rationality, Adorno “rephilosophized” critical theory (Dubiel 1985). He effectively abandoned all hope in the possibility of developing a critical social theory and instead posited that the purpose of critical theory is to interpret the capacity of avant garde art to mimetically transmit those echoes of humanity’s emancipatory impulses that have now completely fled the social realm (Wellmer 1983; Zuidervaart 1991; Bronner 1994). Even if Gramsci was a drama critic of some distinction, this is not a formulation with which he could ever have sympathized! In the case of Habermasian critical theory, the situation is more complex, but in the final analysis, Gramsci and Gramscians are working in a paradigm fundamentally different from that of Habermas and the Habermasians. Even if Gramsci was concerned with linguistics, communication, and the construction of intersubjective understanding (hegemony)— all familiar Habermasian themes—his concern was situated within the context of a social theory that regarded productive relations as (ultimately) determinant and that viewed humanity’s emancipatory capacity as being immanent within the productive sphere rather than in language. The communicative turn in critical theory pioneered by Habermas represents as fundamental a break from the ideas of Gramsci as it does from those of Horkheimer. Given differences and distinctions among the different strands of critical IR theory that have been identified here, we are left with the same fundamental question raised earlier in the context of the Frankfurt School. What, if anything, unites or links these strands? The answer is substantially the same as in the former case. Those developing critical IR theory clearly share in, and partake of, the same broad intellectual heritage of Hegelian or Western Marxism (Anderson 1979). Beyond that, however, as has already been made clear, little positively unites them. Whereas critical IR theorists may largely agree with each other in terms of their critique of the mainstream, there is little agreement among them as to what should take its place. Critical IR theory is not characterized by a commitment to a particular epistemology (contra S. Smith 1996) or to a specific ontology. Neither do its proponents subscribe to a common political program. Ultimately rather, as in the case of Frankfurt School critical theory, the ties that bind are a shared commitment to exploring and elucidating the theme of human emancipation as it is highlighted in the study of world politics. Critical IR theory is thus best understood as a constellation of different approaches, all seeking to illuminate the question of emancipation in world politics. The constellation metaphor first developed by Adorno and Benjamin, and later utilized to great effect by Martin Jay (1984a) as an organizational device for his short introduction to the ideas of Adorno, is particularly apposite (see also Bernstein 1991). Its usage—then as now—
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seeks to facilitate the thinking through of relationships between various “elements” that “resist reduction to a common denominator, essential core, or generative first principle” but that are, nonetheless, linked in significant ways (Jay 1984a: 15). Critical IR theory certainly resists reduction to a particular set of principles and precepts, but the shared concern with and commitment to emancipation does allow its proponents to identify—and to be identified—with the same broad intellectual project.
Locating Critical IR Theory Among the Alternative Approaches Having argued that critical IR theory should be viewed as a constellation of approaches rather than as an approach, I seek in this section to utilize this understanding to briefly explore the relationship between it and some of the alternative approaches to international relations. I will focus on two different approaches in particular, poststructuralism and constructivism. Poststructuralism Habermas, as has already been mentioned, has been at the center of recent debates concerning the poststructuralist move in social theory. These debates, which have often been decidedly polemical in tone, have pitted critical theory as the defender of the modernist tradition against its postmodern detractors. To many, including perhaps a number of those involved in the exchanges, critical theory and poststructuralism have appeared as implacable foes. These conflicts and disagreements in social theory have been replicated to some extent in international relations. The debate between Hoffman and Rengger, which is discussed by Rengger in Chapter 6, highlighted many of the differences, and these have been further and forcibly underlined by Chris Brown (1994a; also Ch. 12 in this volume). Neufeld (in Ch. 8) has also attempted to clarify the distinctions between poststructuralism and critical IR theory, as well as their implications. Another view of the critical theory–poststructuralist relationship is in evidence. Linklater (1990a: postscript; also Ch. 2 in this volume) has focused on the commonalities—on the points of intersection—between critical theory and poststructuralism (his attitude has not, however, always been reciprocated by the poststructuralist camp; see Walker 1999). In Chapter 5 in this volume, Hutchings calls for a halt in the ultimately futile “wars of reason” between critical theorists and poststucturalists and seeks to move the debate from the level of metatheory to that of political analysis, where both may well find that more unites than divides them. Implicit
Introduction
11
in Murphy’s (Ch. 4 in this volume) alternative history of international relations is the view that critical theory and poststructuralist international relations theory are both manifestations of the same radical sensibility—what he describes as the “democratic impulse” in international relations. How are we to understand these two apparently contradictory views of the relationship? Are those who stress differences to be dismissed as sectarian dogmatics, or are those who focus on commonalities simply engaged in a more or less sinister exercise in co-option? I would argue that to pose the question in this way is to succumb to a form of binary thinking that in this case, as in most others, is distinctly unhelpful. Rather, when critical IR theory is understood in terms of a constellation, it is clear that both views of the relationship are, in a sense, correct. Some elements in the constellation of critical IR theory do have a great deal in common with some of those in the constellation of poststructuralism (poststructuralist thought is no more unified than critical theory and is also best understood in these terms). So, for example, when the poststructuralist R.B.J. Walker writes that “it is important to recognize that ideas, consciousness, culture, and ideology are bound up with more immediately visible kinds of political, military and economic power,” in this case at least, his thinking is in complete harmony with Gramscian critical theory (Walker 1984: 3). The congruence between key elements of Adorno’s critique of instrumental rationality and Foucault’s genealogies of domination are even more striking and were remarked upon by Foucault himself (see Foucault 1991: 115–129). Indeed, it is plausible to argue that writings on international relations in a Foucauldian vein are the closest we have at present to an Adornian critical IR theory. There is also substantial convergence between some poststructuralists and Habermasians. As Linklater persuasively argues, for example, little of substance separates the Habermasians’ normative stress on “unconstrained communication” and Lyotard’s support for “equal rights of participation in a universal speech community” (see Ch. 2 in this volume). Of course, there are also differences in influences, in focus, and in orientation. Most fundamentally perhaps, poststructuralist writing in international relations remains deeply suspicious of the critical IR theory stress on emancipation (see Wyn Jones forthcoming). But when we understand critical IR theory and poststructuralism in terms of constellations, it remains a moot point whether the differences between them are any greater than the differences within them. Moreover, it must be remembered that it is only a very attenuated version of modernism that has been defended by any of the strands within the critical theory tradition, and that version has become more attenuated over time. When one also considers Jacques Derrida’s refusal to “renounce the great classi-
12
Introduction
cal discourse of emancipation” (Derrida 1996: 82) and recognizes further the existence of a general ethical turn within poststructuralist social theory (Honneth 1995a), it may well be that over time, the differences among other elements within these constellations will become increasingly imperceptible. Constructivism Since constructivism’s emergence onto the international relations stage in the late 1980s (Kratochwil 1989 and Onuf 1989 remain important basic statements), there is no denying its very substantial impact. One of the points at issue in the overviews of the constructivist literature that have begun to appear (e.g., Checkel 1998; Hopf 1998; Price and Reus-Smit 1998; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998; Zehfuss 1997) has been the relationship between the “constructivist turn” and the other alternative approaches, including critical theory. As yet at least, no consensus has appeared. Hopf, for example, argues that constructivism has “its origins in critical theory” (1998: 181), a category into which he conflates both critical theory and postmodernism with his focus firmly on the latter (his confusion concerning the former has already been noted). Jeffrey Checkel, in contrast, argues that one of the benefits of the constructivist intervention in international relations is that “constructivists have rescued the exploration of identity from postmodernists” (1998: 325)—and, one suspects by extension, from critical theorists. A more nuanced and more interesting analysis is proffered by Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit. Their core argument is that constructivism is best understood as the empirical or applied wing of postpositivist international relations theory. That is, it represents an attempt to move beyond the metatheoretical concerns of critical IR theory (which, in their usage, is a spectrum encompassing the work of both modernists and postmodernists) to apply the “ontological propositions, conceptual frameworks, and methods” of postpositivism to a substantive analysis of world politics proper rather than simply to the discourse of international relations itself (1998: 264). They go on to differentiate between modernist and postmodernist forms of constructivism (267–270). The former category, which presumably (though the links are not spelled out) is the closest to the critical theory strand within postpositivist theorizing, is further subdivided between “systematic constructivism,” a category that apparently contains only one person, namely Alexander Wendt, and “holistic constructivism,” two of whose leading proponents are Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie (268–269). But these distinctions notwithstanding, the authors seem to claim that all constructivism is consistent with critical theory in the sense used in this book:
Introduction
13
Constructivism problematizes both agents and structures, it explores the dynamics of change as well as the rhythms of stasis, and it calls into question established understandings of world politics, it is analytically open not closed. For these reasons, it is necessarily “critical” in the sense meant by Habermas and Cox. (288)
They, however, also concede that constructivists have had comparatively little to say about the “normative orientation” of their work and that “constructivism contains no philosophy of the good life or the ideal political order per se” (287, 288). As a result, they strongly imply that the role of critical theory in the “new phase” that they claim constructivism represents is to supply the normative orientation toward which constructivists, because of their “underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions,” are predisposed but are apparently unable to generate themselves (288). Given their approving comments about the normative framework developed in Linklater’s work, it is perhaps not too fanciful to suggest that, in this regard at least, it is with one of the strands of critical IR theory already discussed in this chapter—namely the Habermasian—that Price and ReusSmit wish to bring constructivism into dialogue (284–288). When these comments are taken in conjunction with Wendt’s explicit commitment to emancipation (Ch. 13 in this volume), and bearing in mind also that Price and Reus-Smit strongly imply that Wendt is among the least radical of the constructivists, a very interesting picture emerges. Granted, the constructivism label encompasses a variety of disparate scholars and many different and indeed contradictory viewpoints on matters epistemological, ontological, and methodological. But the fact remains that a group of scholars who are usually identified as constructivists in international relations are apparently seeking to identify themselves with key aspects— the key aspect?—of critical IR theory. What are we to make of this? Are they somehow wrong? Are they not really critical theorists, despite what they seem to think? Or rather, do we need to redraw our disciplinary maps and reassess our ideas as to who or what constitutes critical IR theory? In an important sense, it may well be too early to attempt to come to any definitive conclusions. The discipline of international relations, as has already been noted, is in a considerable state of flux, and constructivism is a relatively recent intervention. It is also undoubtedly the case that the mainstream exerts a strong gravitational pull on many constructivists, and this pull may yet serve to blunt the force of many of the more heretical notions to which they currently adhere. Nevertheless, utilizing the model of critical IR theory developed here, we can begin making some tentative suggestions as to the points of commonality and difference between constructivism and critical theory, as well as their implications. Elements in the constellation of critical IR theory clearly overlap with elements in the constructivist constellation. Price and Reus-Smit claim a
14
Introduction
fundamental convergence between their project and both that of Cox and of Habermas, but it is with the latter rather than the former that common ground can most easily be identified. Cox, as has been noted, remains fundamentally rooted in a productivist paradigm, and most constructivists would almost certainly demur from the historical materialist premises of his work even if they might agree with aspects of his critique of the mainstream. The same is arguably the case for Horkheimerian critical theory. When we turn to Habermasian critical theory, commonalities become much more apparent. Thinkers such as Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf are recognizably ploughing the same furrow as Habermas (Kratochwil 1989, Onuf 1989; see also Zehfuss 1997). They too are concerned with speech acts, communicative action, and, in the case of Kratochwil, communicative rationality (1989: 15–16). Of course, that they use the same literature as Habermas, and Kratochwil, at least, quotes Habermas’s work approvingly, does not necessarily mean that these authors—or other constructivists who share their intellectual concerns—are Habermasians (see Kratochwil 1987: 304). Nevertheless, it does make it difficult to draw any hard and fast lines between them and other critical theorists who have followed Habermas’s communicative turn. Moreover, if the argument is accepted that the only common theme among the disparate strands of critical IR theory is a concern with emancipation—and I readily acknowledge that this is a big if and that others, including contributors to this volume, will almost certainly wish to set more exclusive or demanding criteria for entry into the critical camp—then it is hard to see how Wendt, for example, might be excluded if (another big if!) he chose to identify himself as a critical theorist. True, his description of his project as involving a commitment to “emancipation and science” will certainly grate with almost all self-identified contemporary critical theorists to the extent that science is still conceived of in traditional mainstream terms. But Wendt is surely correct to argue that his formulation is roughly analogous to that employed by the Frankfurt School (Bonß 1993 provides a most insightful discussion; see also Dubiel 1985). And at any rate, Wendt, like the many of his constructivist colleagues (see Price and Reus-Smit 1998), is apparently well aware of the arguments of contemporary critical theorists—and other postpositivists—that theory as well as practice (of the early Frankfurt School, among many others) suggests that when normative concerns are simply bolted on to analysis conducted according to the principles and precepts of positive social science, the presumptions as to what constitutes knowledge underpinning the latter will eventually undermine the former. The question that both critical IR theory and constructivism have to face is how to move beyond this insight. Again, as Rengger’s discussion of Adorno suggests (Ch. 6 in this volume), there is no consensus among critical theorists as to how to answer that question.
Introduction
15
But to the extent that contemporary critical theorists eschew the Adornian “great refusal,” the kind of discussion that ensues is exemplified by Sandra Whitworth’s thought-provoking meditation (in Ch. 9) on fieldwork. This is also an issue where proponents of critical IR theory can benefit from the work of the constructivists, even if the claims by Price and Reus-Smit (1998) that critical theorists have failed to “produce the goods” in terms of empirical work are overstated (cf. Linklater 1996b). Thus there are clearly overlaps—and striking ones at that—between the key elements in the constellation of critical IR theory and the equally central elements of constructivism. Moreover, to the extent that some constructivists seek to illuminate the question of emancipation in and through the study of world politics, it is valid to consider their work as part of the broad constellation of critical IR theory. As Wendt’s insightful discussion of emancipation (in Ch. 13) indicates, they have much to contribute to the enterprise.
What Is Critical International Relations Theory For? This chapter has stressed the heterogeneous nature of critical IR theory by identifying distinctive and, indeed, contradictory strands within it and has posited an apparently minimalist definition of what unites these strands, namely, a concern with the question of emancipation. It has gone on to underline the commonalities between elements in the constellation of critical IR theory and elements in the constellations of poststructuralism and constructivism. Given this, it is legitimate to ask what purpose critical IR theory serves in the study of world politics. Would anything be lost if critical IR theory simply dissolved with elements being absorbed into other constellations? Habermasians, for example, might like to consider a future that provides some normative backbone for constructivist IR relations theory. All this is rendered especially piquant not so much for the essentially trivial reason that international relations has more than its fair share of competing paradigms and approaches but because the study of international political economy is increasingly being constituted as a discipline separate from international relations. If this trend continues—and given that increased specialization (and atomization) is one if the most baneful manifestations of the domination of positivism in the social sciences, this seems likely—Gramscian critical theory may well become progressively more detached from the other strands of critical theory. To reiterate, would anything of value be lost should this occur and the constellation of critical IR theory disintegrate? My answer is most definitely yes, and this for at least two reasons: The first relates to what critical IR theory already contributes, namely a focus on emancipation; the second to what it can potentially con-
16
Introduction
tribute in the future, that is, a forum in which attempts can be made to bridge the gap between the productivist and communicative paradigms. To elaborate, this discussion has highlighted that although concern with emancipation may well be compatible with forms of constructivism and is almost certainly implicit in poststructuralism, it is foregrounded by neither. Even such stalwart defenders as Price and Reus-Smit are forced to concede that constructivism has provided little in the way of normative direction, and poststructuralist IR theory has, generally speaking, failed to move beyond denaturalization and deconstruction to the kind of reconstructive politics that a concern with emancipation eventually requires. By relentlessly focusing on the question of emancipation and by questioning what this might mean in terms of the theory and practice of world politics, critical IR relations theorists are playing a currently irreplaceable role. It is also important to recognize that by focusing on emancipation, critical theorists (of all strands) are setting themselves extraordinarily demanding targets. Implicit in the orientation toward emancipation—in the recognition, after Marx, that the point is not only to understand the world but to change it—is that it is “in the crucible of practice that critical theories meet the ultimate test of vitality” (Fraser 1989a: 2). For critical theorists, therefore, the ultimate criteria by which the adequacy of a theory is measured is extradisciplinary. Thus it is all too easy for the concern with emancipation to fall by the wayside, especially given that the disciplinary mainstream is quick to measure alternative approaches by its own standards of adequacy (as evidenced in Checkel 1998, among many others), and some alternative thinkers are apparently more than willing to adapt to the criteria set out for them (witness, for example, the extraordinarily conciliatory way in which Price and Reus-Smit [1998: 282–283] respond to the demands that Checkel seeks to place on constructivism). To orientate theorizing toward emancipation is, necessarily, to raise a series of difficult and intractable questions concerning audiences and agency. The question is not just, after Wendt, What is international relations for? but also, Who is it for? and, How can a process of dialogue with that audience be initiated? Craig Murphy (Ch. 4 in this volume) is almost certainly correct in arguing that critical IR theory has supplied less convincing answers to these questions than previous manifestations of the democratic impulse in the study of world politics. In all honesty, proponents of critical IR theory have barely begun to ask them (for an attempt to think through some of the issues involved, see Wyn Jones 1999: ch. 6). Nevertheless, it is only the orientation toward emancipation that renders these questions worth asking in the first place, and it is precisely that orientation that critical theory can and does bring to a consideration of world politics. The argument for the continuing importance of critical IR theory as a broad project also spans metatheory and matters of more immediate practi-
Introduction
17
cal and political import and concerns the potential of critical IR theory to act as a site in which the insights of the paradigms of communication and production can be better integrated. Nancy Fraser (1995) has argued lucidly that contemporary political struggles are conducted along two main axes, redistribution and recognition. Redistributionary struggles are concerned primarily with issues of economic welfare. They form the arena of “class struggle” (a phrase whose very quaintness is eloquent testimony to the success of the theory and practice of neoliberalism since the early 1980s). Struggles for recognition involve attempts by members of various groups—identified by sex, sexuality, race, national identity, language, and so on—to gain justice as members of those groups. These latter types of struggle are often considered to be a more recent phenomenon than old-fashioned redistribution politics—there are regular references in the literature to the rise of identity politics. Those of us who, for example, inhabit the Celtic periphery of the British Isles might beg to differ from this analysis. Be that as it may, the point I want to emphasize here is that there is a tendency in critical theory (and, I think, social theory more generally) to analyze and understand these two different types of political struggle through two different metatheoretical paradigms. Work conducted through the paradigm of production—that is, the paradigm that underpins the Gramscian and Horkheimerian strands of critical IR theory—tends to focus on redistributory struggles. Work based on the paradigm of communication—Habermasian critical IR theory, for example—is concerned with questions of identity and community. The fundamental problem is that neither paradigm is adequate for the task of understanding the problematique of the other. The arguments as to why identity cannot simply be reduced to questions of productive relations have been well rehearsed by feminists and many others. Very few would now argue that patriarchy, racism, and the domination of one nation or linguistic group by another are simply the epiphenomena of particular sets of productive relations that would somehow disappear should those relations be swept away or fundamentally reconfigured. Neither, by extension, can these phenomena be understood solely through focus on relations of production and political economy more generally. (This is not, however, to suggest that such an analysis could not shed important light on these issues—merely an argument that they reveal nothing like the whole story.) Arguments as to why work conducted through the communicative paradigm (as it is presently understood) is inadequate to the task of understanding redistributionary struggles—and the emancipatory impulses that are undoubtedly a key element within them—have been heard less frequently (but see Honneth 1982, 1994, 1995b; Postone and Brick 1993; Calhoun [1995] even questions the usefulness of Habermasian theory for
18
Introduction
understanding particular manifestations of the politics of identity). They are, however, no less compelling. Briefly, Habermas in his “reconstruction of historical materialism” has distinguished between work and interaction and argued that the locus of humanity’s emancipatory potential lies in the latter and not (as Marxists have understood) in the former (a sphere that Habermas regards as being dominated by instrumental rationality). Thus Habermas and his followers have tended to bracket questions relating to work (political economy) and have concentrated instead on exploring interaction through the development of the theory of communicative action. However, to view relationships of work solely in terms of instrumentality seems unwarranted reductionism (Wyn Jones 1999: 62–63). Moreover, even on Habermas’s own terms, it is apparent that economic structures have major distorting effects on the process of communication. Yet the social theory that Habermas has attempted to develop on the basis of his theory of communicative action has no way of analyzing the causes of these distortions or any concrete suggestions as to how they might be overcome beyond a commitment to the continuation of the welfare state in the West (global inequalities are something of a closed book). It is striking in this regard that democratic theory developed in the Habermasian vein has abandoned all hope of fulfilling the old left project of extending democracy into the economic realm. Cognizance of the need to bridge the gap between both paradigms abounds. Linklater, for example, stresses the need to yoke the “defense of dialogue” to a critique of asymmetries of wealth and power, and Cox recognizes the need to move beyond a focus on class-based identities (in Chs. 2 and 3, respectively). The question remains, however, How, theoretically speaking, is this to be accomplished? Some critical theorists working in the field of social theory have begun to work on this problem. Axel Honneth, working from the basis of the communicative paradigm, is attempting to refocus critical theory onto the intuitive expectations that human beings have in any social encounter that “they receive recognition as moral beings and for their social achievements” (1994: 262). His work, and in particular his Struggle for Recognition (1995b), involves a self-conscious attempt to bridge the work-interaction divide. Moishe Postone (1993), working from a productivist standpoint, has attempted to recast the Marxist concept of labor (in a way he regards as more faithful to the meaning deployed in Marx’s own work) so that it moves beyond a focus on instrumentality to include also those features that Habermas has separated out under the heading of interaction. These developments are welcome, and they should surely continue. My own hope is that they can be echoed within the constellation of critical IR theory. Indeed, for both theoretical and pragmatic reasons, it seems to me that critical IR theory forms an ideal site for an attempt to begin a dialogue
Introduction
19
between those working in both paradigms. Both “sides” recognize the need for such a dialogue and, crucially, recognize themselves to be part of the same intellectual project. Moreover, one of the most pleasing aspects of the critical move in international relations has been its open, undogmatic quality, and as such the dialogue will almost certainly prove to be fruitful. But even more fundamentally, the most striking feature in contemporary world politics is the rapid increase in global inequality. For the poor and defenseless the results are nothing less that cataclysmic. And yet despite this, those forces that resonate to the progressive democratic impulse are apparently catatonic. With very few exceptions, the left has little to offer. It has no credible alternative to an inhuman and environmentally catastrophic global economic order, no way beyond the most transient of linking different particularized struggles concerning issues of identity, and no conception of how to link or synthesize elements on the axes of recognition and redistribution to facilitate the development of a broader progressive politics. Although bridging the gap between the paradigms of production and communication can play only a very small part in answering some of the very difficult questions that those committed to emancipatory politics currently face, it is an important and necessary task, and proponents of critical IR theory have the opportunity to make a significant contribution. Critical IR theory may well have already helped to disrupt some of the complacency of professors of international relations, but that achievement, such as it is, pales into absolute insignificance beside the challenges that it—that we— face in the real world of world politics.
Notes I would like to thank Ken Booth, Tim Dunne, Eli Stamnes, and Michael Williams for their perceptive comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. My thanks also to Maja Zefuss for her advice. All the usual disclaimers apply.
PART ONE THE CONTOURS OF CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
2 THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY Andrew Linklater
When Frankfurt School critical theory first made its mark on the study of international relations (IR) in the early 1980s, the terms of the debate were narrower than they are today. At that time, the advocates of critical theory were mainly concerned to refute the principal arguments of neorealism. Drawing on Marxian themes, critical perspectives offered an account of the nature of social inquiry with explicitly normative goals; they proposed modes of sociological inquiry oriented toward enlightenment about, and emancipation from, unnecessary constraints. Unsurprisingly, given the intellectual debt to Marxism, much of the analysis criticized global inequalities of economic and political power. Critical theory started from the paradigm of production and, in so doing, reflected the influence of the broad problematic, but not the detailed argument, of the neo-Marxian analyses of global dominance and dependence, which enjoyed their greatest influence in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A robust alternative to the neorealist analysis of immutable geopolitical imperatives was built on these theoretical foundations (Ashley 1981; Cox 1981). Critical theory has not stood still in the intervening years, but the nature of its foundations has been keenly debated since the mid- to late 1980s. As a result, Frankfurt School critical theory no longer represents the main challenge to orthodoxy within the field. It is important to recall that members of the first generation of the Frankfurt School criticized the paradigm of production over a half-century earlier and that Adorno, in particular, foreshadowed some of the more recent moves to the paradigm of identity and difference (see Coles 1995). However, the parameters of the debate have shifted even more dramatically in the past decade. Postmodern critical theory, which has taken the initiative in developing the paradigm of identity 23
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The Contours of Critical IR Theory
and difference, does not try to reconstruct historical materialism or to complete the emancipatory project as defined by Western Marxism, although it is worth noting Derrida’s observation that strategies of deconstruction proceed in the spirit of Marxism (Derrida 1994). But far from championing that project, postmodernism is generally thought to challenge or problematize the conceptions of enlightenment and emancipation favored by those who belong, however loosely, to the Marxist tradition (Devetak 1996a, George 1994). Above all else, disputes surrounding the project of modernity or the project of the Enlightenment have transformed the disciplinary debate (Devetak 1995). A great deal has been written in the wake of Foucault’s writings about the extent to which modernity contributes to the progress of human autonomy or simply reconfigures social confinements and constraints; and much has been written about how far the language of critical social theory—universality, rationality, autonomy, progress, enlightenment, and emancipation—actively empowers the marginalized or sows the seeds of new structures of social power and political domination. Postmodern responses to these questions strike at the heart of many of the aspirations of critical theory within the broadly Marxian tradition, although they also aim to uncover and criticize the dark side of modernity. Most of the key issues in these debates have been thrashed out in a series of encounters between Habermas and his critics. These debates continue, but as Foucault argued early on, it would be erroneous to assume that one must be either for or against the project of the Enlightenment (Rabinow 1986). The more Marxian of contemporary writers do not dispute this point. Habermas is reported to defend an “enlightened suspicion of the Enlightenment” in which partial redemption from the dark side of modernity remains possible, but all notions of historical finality and completion are abandoned (Roderick 1986: 134). There are some parallels here with Foucault’s project, which defended local rather than globalizing critical projects and was ever mindful that everything may not be bad, but everything is potentially dangerous (Rabinow 1986: 343). Those shifts within radical thinking indicate that the classic pretensions of Marxian critical theory, including the belief in irreversible and unilinear progress toward the fully autonomous society, have been cast aside. An awareness of the ambiguities of modernity, which has its origins in Hegel’s reflections on the modern state and revolutionary terror and in Marx’s writings on industrial capitalism, is pronounced across the critical spectrum. From that premise, the goal of critical theory is to release the progressive side of modernity from stifling constraints. But the critical project forgoes the assumption that practices of liberation are innocent or unambiguous and guaranteed to remove rather than reconstitute the forms of power; it dispenses with the
The Changing Contours
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perfectionist supposition that the project of modernity or the Enlightenment could ever be finalized or brought to completion. Different forms of critique occupy some common ground; arguably, they have more in common with each other than with the perspectives they oppose. Even so, one of the major achievements of postmodernism is to invite all perspectives to reconsider their standpoint from the ground up. Accepting that invitation, the following argument considers the legacy of critical theory that reflects Frankfurt School concerns and borrows from the ethical and cultural forms of Western Marxism rather than from Marxist political economy. Following previous discussions about the nature of the approach, the aim is to consider the normative, sociological, and praxeological dimensions of the critical-theoretical enterprise (Linklater 1992a, 1998). A comment about each of these domains is in order before proceeding further. The normative realm refers to the nonarbitrary principles that can be used to criticize existing social practices and to imagine improved forms of life; the sociological realm refers to the analysis of the historical development of these principles in past intersocietal systems and in the contemporary society of states; the praxeological realm considers the moral capital that has accumulated in the modern era and that can be exploited to create new forms of political community. The argument seeks to explain how critical theory continues to evolve beyond the paradigm of production to a commitment to dialogic communities that are deeply sensitive about all forms of inclusion and exclusion—domestic, transnational, and international. A post-Marxist critical theory of this kind can build upon the normative, sociological, and praxeological dimensions of classical Marxism without perpetuating its theoretical fallacies or generating its political consequences and dangers.
The Normative Domain The observation that there are no disembodied cognitive subjects who can acquire objective knowledge of external reality is a crucial theme running through all critical standpoints, and the related contention that knowledge invariably has a political purpose has acquired considerable prominence in recent years. The critique of neorealism, whether critical-theoretical, postmodern, or feminist, attacks its assumption that theory can provide objective knowledge of an immutable reality to which rational subjects should resign themselves. The immutability thesis, it has been argued, imputes properties to anarchy that truly belong to its constitutive parts, the more powerful of which have sufficient power to modify the dominant patterns of political interaction and principles of association, should they so wish
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The Contours of Critical IR Theory
(Wendt 1992; Linklater 1995a). One consequence of this weakness is that international relations theory contributes to the reproduction of asymmetries of power, wealth, and opportunity. Put differently, notions of immutability conspire against those who have already lodged serious complaints about the injustices and deficiencies of the prevailing world order. All branches of critical theory have been keen to stress this important theme. A high level of self-consciousness about the nature of the relationship between the subject and the object, accompanied by the ambition to overcome the limitations inherent in problem-solving approaches to allegedly unmovable structures, is one thread uniting the different critical standpoints. Where to go from here is the intriguing question, and critical theory has been internally divided about the appropriate response. The early stages in the development of critical international relations theory reflected the influence of Marx’s vision of the whole of humanity associated in a universal society of free and equal producers. Whether that vision assumed that the main tendencies of modernity were universalizing and homogenizing need not detain us here. Suffice it to add that although Marx was notoriously vague about the place of the nation in the future socialist world order, he clearly believed that socialism represented the beginning rather than the end of history. This was the point at which greater individual creativity would distinguish the emancipated society from all previous forms of life. Objections to this conception of history and progress are far from new. Various nineteenth-century writers, including Mikhail Bakunin, argued that deeply exclusionary properties resided at the heart of Marx’s project of universal emancipation. Their main objection was that romantic images of the industrial proletariat already contained the possibility of new forms of state domination of marginal groups, a criticism that Marx and Lenin’s disparaging view of the peasantry did nothing to dispel. More recent radical perspectives, including postmodernism and feminism, renew this assault on projects of universal emancipation, noting how various conceptions of abstract universalism have contributed to the subjugation of non-Western peoples and the long exclusion of women from the public realm. Whether any notion of ethical universality and project of universal emancipation survives these criticisms is a point to return to in a moment. What has been clearly established in the critical literature is that some, but not necessarily all, forms of ethical and political universalism may be just as exclusionary as the arrangements they criticize. Recent critiques of universality are intimately linked with the greater awareness of unjust exclusion that shapes the politics of all contemporary societies. Many current political struggles contest the ways in which the development and reproduction of social bonds rest on and require systems of unjust exclusion. Much contemporary critical theory endeavors to
The Changing Contours
27
answer the question of how systems of exclusion should be legitimated. Far from attempting to reconstruct ethical universalism from some Archimedean point (a project that has been almost universally abandoned), critical theory reflects on the tests to which all modes of exclusion— domestic, transnational, and international—should be subject. At the forefront of these discussions is the normative commitment to create more openly dialogic social arrangements. An important shift beyond Marxist critical theory is evident in this development. It is well known that Marx and Marxism were preoccupied with the critique of class-based exclusion anchored in the unequal distribution of ownership of the means of production. Post-Marxist critical theory has enlarged the scope of the inquiry to include all known forms of unjust exclusion. It has been concerned not only with the plight of subordinate classes but with the overlapping forms of exclusion experienced by women, minority nations, and the racially and culturally different, including indigenous peoples. Invariably, critique proceeds by challenging hierarchies of class, culture, ethnicity, gender, sexual identity, or race that have been granted a natural status. It emphasizes that it is society or at least its most powerful groups that impute this power to nature and alienates social power and agency to natural processes. A central feature of critical theory is this assault on efforts to naturalize all modes of social exclusion that disempower members of subjugated groups. The critical project aims to demonstrate that some of the differences among human beings do not have the moral relevance that they have been assumed to possess, and often by the disempowered as well as by hegemonic groups. A primary moral goal is lifting “scope restrictions,” in which morally irrelevant distinctions based on class, gender, race, or ethnicity are used to deny groups access to the rights the privileged already enjoy (Bernstein 1995: 193). Whether reliant on genealogical techniques or the method of immanent critique, different forms of critical theory aim to deprive these systems of legitimation of their traditional authority and sacrosanct status (Hoy and McCarthy 1994). Efforts to make morally irrelevant differences between human beings central to social life might have failed had those whose interests were harmed in consequence been in a position to contest these suppositions in unconstrained dialogue, and systems of unjust exclusion will be that much harder to introduce in the future if the legitimacy of social practices is decided in open tribunal. Many different schools of critical theory imply at the very least that decisions about morally relevant differences among persons cannot be decided by those who stand to benefit most from them. The upshot is that all modes of exclusion have to be tested in dialogue that is open to the included and excluded alike. Habermas’s account of undistorted communication is the most frequently discussed example of this perspective. His approach endorses the view that all conceptions of ethics that
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assume the existence or possibility of an Archimedean point from which it is possible to derive some substantive and universalizable conception of the good life have dissolved into thin air. What survives the critique of substantive visions of the good life, according to Habermas (1990a, 1993), is a rational normative commitment to the universal procedures of the ideal speech community. Many who take this standpoint subscribe to a conception of dialogue that is in principle open to all human beings, that accepts the prima facie equal legitimacy of all claims, and that proceeds on the assumption that in true dialogue, no one can be sure of who will learn from whom—these being central elements of Habermas’s discourse theory of morality. But what many reject is the supposition that these normative commitments can be grounded in some universal conception of communicative action or linked with the belief that the unity of the whole species was already anticipated by the first speech act. Habermas has often been criticized for positing the ideal of a fully transparent and homogeneous society, but many of his formulations defend modes of communication that affirm the right to radical otherness and argue that the first test of universalism is the seriousness of its commitment to deep diversity as a normative ideal (Habermas 1992a: 240). There is much to be said, in consequence, for Richard Rorty’s observation that “merely philosophical differences” separate the foundationalists from the postfoundationalists (Rorty 1989: 67). It is arguable, without trivializing the importance of these differences, that the different strands of contemporary critical theory share similar conceptions of the virtues of dialogic communities and the preconditions of their successful existence. The belief that the legitimacy of systems of exclusion ought to be decided in open dialogue is the common ground. Allegiance to this ethical goal is apparent in certain forms of feminism that reveal a Habermasian influence, as Seyla Benhabib’s defense of “post-conventional contextualism” or “interactive universalism” reveals (Benhabib and Cornell 1987: ch. 4; Benhabib 1993: 151, 163–164). It is just as evident in the feminist commitment to a dialogic communitarianism that affirms the solidarities and sentiments that bind social groups together while denying that tradition and convention can be immune to the scrutiny of open dialogue (Frazer and Lacey 1993). Though far removed from Habermas’s defense of ethical universalism, Jean-François Lyotard’s support for equal rights of participation in a universal speech community strikes a remarkably similar chord to the Habermasian conception of undistorted communication (Lyotard 1993). Similar trends are evident in, or compatible with, Foucault’s claim that he was not for consensus but “anti anti-consensus” (Rabinow 1986), as well as in postmodern writing influenced by the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (Der Derian 1994). There are also similarities with Hans-Georg Gadamer’s
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philosophical hermeneutics, which celebrate conversation as the means by which the radically different can enter into one another’s worldviews and fuse cognitive horizons without merging identities or assimilating otherness within dominant perspectives (Shapcott 1994). Minor philosophical differences aside, these approaches share a broadly similar conception of the dialogic ideal. In authentic dialogue, as Lyotard has argued, one speaks only inasmuch as one listens, and in a related passage, he suggests that dialectical discourse in the Platonic sense may not escape the operation of power (Haber 1994: 42; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985: 4). The crucial question, Rorty has suggested, is what it would mean to take part in unconstrained communication (Rorty 1991: 634). Habermas raises similar concerns by admitting that his earlier notion of ideal speech is misleading because it suggests that unconstrained dialogue could exist in practice (Habermas 1994a: 102, 112–113). The relevant conclusion is that authentic dialogue can never be anything other than an ideal to be aimed for, a goal that can be approximated, because there may always be forms of exclusion that human beings have still to discover. They could never be sure they had reached the end of history and that all systems of unjust exclusion or constraints on human autonomy had been identified and removed. One of the more important implications of these comments about authentic dialogue is that it is insufficient simply to remove scope restrictions on participation in dialogic arrangements. Removing indefensible restrictions grants additional parties an equal right to participate in the speech community, but it may not secure equal respect for all the positions brought before the tribunal of open dialogue. As the sociologist Benjamin Nelson, put it, authentic dialogue requires the radical expansion of permissible expressions and disagreements (Nelson 1973). Increasing access to participation involves the eradication of systems of exclusion based on morally irrelevant differences among human beings; but this is not the same as concluding that the differences between them do not matter at all. The essential point, which various writers on gender, ethnicity, and indigenous peoples have advanced with considerable sophistication, is that often those who belong to systematically excluded groups have no desire to be included in the political community on exactly the same terms as everyone else (Kymlicka 1989, 1995; Phillips 1993). Demands for group-specific citizenship rights and local autonomy often express this point particularly well, since they show that the drive to universalize certain rights may represent significant progress for some groups but fail to address the concerns of those for whom securing the public recognition of their cultural differences is the primary concern. From the latter perspective, progress toward universality by conferring the same legal and political rights on all members of society constitutes limited progress beyond unjust exclusion. Still more
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radical measures require advances in the public recognition of cultural diversity that may take the form of the devolution of political power or the creation of group-specific rights. The commitment to dialogue therefore requires communities that are more universalistic and more respectful of human differences than they have been in the past: It requires the development of societies that regard the differences between human beings as less important than their shared experience of pain and suffering (Rorty 1989: ch. 9). No less important is the need to ensure that these communities do not efface human differences in the search for agreement and understanding (Habermas 1994a: 120). Support for this dual process of development spans the different branches of contemporary critical theory that affirm the dialogic ideal. Interestingly, and conceivably in response to the postmodern defense of diversity, Habermas has suggested a preference for understanding as opposed to emancipation, which is best reserved for describing personal biographical developments (Habermas 1994a: 104). Limiting the concept of emancipation to the personal domain may not be the best move to make, and in a more compelling formulation, Karl-Otto Apel has described the project of emancipation as “the progressive implementation of the standard of ideal communication and nonrepressive deliberation” (Apel 1979: 98–99). As previously noted, progress in this direction involves the lifting of scope restrictions and greater sensitivity to radically different worldviews. But it also requires collective efforts to create a more equal distribution of power and influence; otherwise, greater access to the speech community simply grants individuals and their associations formal rather than substantive rights. For this reason, the thin morality that substitutes the defense of open dialogue for classical efforts to define a universalizable conception of the good life is, in Michael Walzer’s words, already “pretty thick” and laced with substantive content (Walzer 1994: 12). An account of the ethical procedures specific to the dialogic community does not extend very far unless it links up with the neo-Marxist critique of asymmetries of wealth and power (Apel 1980: 283; Cohen 1990). The defense of dialogue that is so pronounced across the critical spectrum is incomplete without this emancipatory component in which the basic ethical aspirations of the Marxist tradition are reaffirmed (see also Derrida 1994). Critical theory in the Marxian mode has been opposed because its project of universal emancipation is host to totalizing potentials. Efforts to reconstruct that position have culminated in the case for a procedural ethic that abandons the quest for some global conception of the good life, but universalistic commitments in the form of lifting restrictions on access to the speech community remain central to the critical project. In response to postmodern and feminist critiques, the normative focus of contemporary critical theory reveals a greater sensitivity to radical differences, realizing,
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perhaps belatedly, that this is one key to an improved universality. Retaining the Marxian critique of the asymmetries of power and wealth is the remaining side of the triangle. The normative aim of critical IR theory can therefore be summed up in this way: It is to increase the spheres of social interaction that are governed by dialogue and consent rather than power and force; to expand the number of human beings who have access to a speech community that has the potential to become universal; and to create the socioeconomic preconditions of effective, as opposed to nominal, involvement for all members of that community.
The Sociological Domain The discussion thus far is a reminder of the extent to which the recent history of the discipline has been shaped by complex philosophical discussions, but not every member of the profession welcomes these developments with enthusiasm. Some responses to the critical turn lament the level of abstraction, even obfuscation, and invite critical scholars to produce useful social analysis (Wallace 1996; see also Halliday 1996: 325; Mann 1996: 221). From the time Robert Keohane introduced the distinction between reflectivist and rationalist approaches to the subject, postmodern writers have borne the brunt of this criticism (Keohane 1988). Complex questions about what counts as a strong empirical research agenda arise at this point, but they must be passed over here (Walker 1989). Nor is this the appropriate moment to compile an inventory of the postpositivist contribution to recent sociological analysis. Perhaps it is sufficient to add that a complete inventory would doubtless include the studies of the “doors to otherness,” in Taylor’s felicitous phrase, which have been closed because of the assumed moral relevance of racial, ethnic, gender, or civilizational differences (see Taylor 1985). Related to this, a substantial literature has appeared about how the West forged its “civilized” identity through a series of negative contrasts with non-Western peoples and about how national identity has been created and national purposes sustained through similar exclusionary practices (Dalby 1990; Campbell 1992, 1993). Writers within the Marxian tradition, particularly the neo-Gramscian school, have brought a sophisticated political economy to bear on the analysis of world order and global hegemony (Cox 1996a). The many different tendencies that constitute the postpositivist turn are also evident in the project of reworking security studies from the ground up (Krause and Williams 1997). Others have enumerated many of these empirical developments in some detail, and there is no reason to retrace their steps here (see George 1994; Devetak 1996a, 1996b). The main point is that even a brief analysis of the evolution of the empirical research agenda over the past fif-
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teen years reveals that contemporary critical theorists have no reason to apologize to the allegedly more empirically minded for any failure to deliver concrete analysis. As noted earlier, postpositivist empirical research agendas do not purport to offer objective accounts of an external reality, but they have an explicitly normative and critical purpose. The question then arises of what kind of sociology should flow from the normative aspirations set out in the preceding section. It was noted there that the normative content of critical theory supports removal of the barriers to the equal enjoyment of rights, greater respect for radical differences of worldview, and efforts to reduce material inequalities. The point of these measures is to create new forms of community that increase access to dialogic arrangements and encourage what Fraser calls “parity of participation” for all members (see Cochran 1996). Whether modernity has the resources with which to make substantial progress in this direction is a question that can be deferred until the next section. What can be stated with some confidence at this stage is that visions of a universal speech community have not existed in all societies; they are the outcome of complex patterns of social development that have frequently been spurred on by political resistance and violent social conflict. What is equally clear is that the project of developing a sociology that traces these developments has barely begun and that it raises questions that go beyond conventional sociological analysis. As Anthony Giddens has argued in a different context, mainstream sociology was committed to an unfolding conception of social change in which little or no attention was paid to exogenous forces or to their complex interplay with endogenous factors (Giddens 1985). Frankfurt School social theory has not been immune to these traits, as Habermas’s schematic overview of the course of social evolution reveals. The “empirical philosophy of history with an emancipatory intent” that Habermas defends scarcely mentions international relations and their part in promoting or delaying progress toward a universal communication community (Linklater 1990a: postscript). A sociology that corresponds with the normative commitments set out earlier must therefore move from the idea of society to intersocietal systems (without committing the neorealist error of abstracting the latter from their constituent parts). These systems include, inter alia, relations among groups that have been forced together within imperial modes of domination, intercivilizational relations, and international societies of states. Recent sociology contains important resources with which to take this neglected project further. Michael Mann’s account of the early empires of domination explains how they dismantled scope restrictions by permitting the elite members of subjugated societies to enter the dominant political class. But far from affirming radical otherness, the early empires simply
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tolerated cultural difference, not least because they generally lacked the social reach or “intensive power” to assimilate entire subordinate cultures within the prevailing order (Mann 1986). Any vision of equal dialogue with the alien other would have been anathema to the members of the ruling strata, as would the ethical commitment to reducing material inequalities in order to create social arrangements in closer harmony with the ideal of a universal speech community. Similar themes appear in Nelson’s sociology of civilizational structures and intercivilizational relations (Nelson 1973). Breaking down some of the invidious differences between insiders and outsiders within their boundaries was one of the great achievements of the major world civilizations, in Nelson’s view. But non-Western civilizations, he argued, hardly developed dialogic potentials internally or in their relations with the rest of the human race. With their deep-seated assumptions about the moral significance of the differences between insiders and outsiders, those civilizations were committed to hegemonial conceptions of international society (see also Bull and Watson 1984). Societies of states provide an interesting point of contrast not least because a dialogic element is intrinsic to their nature. Hellenic international society, for example, possessed the institution of diplomacy, though not the idea of dialogue between equals, until quite late in its history (Wight 1977: 2–3). Modern visions of a speech community with the potential to become universal would have seemed an absurd proposition to the vast majority of the inhabitants of ancient Greece. Whereas conceptions of moral and political universalism emerged, they invariably assumed the superiority of Hellenic culture and the ideal incorporation of the alien other within its supposedly more rational worldview (Kristeva 1991: 59). Relations with Persia revealed the tension between the egocentrism of Hellenic culture and the pragmatic requirement to enlarge the diplomatic dialogue so that Persia was recognized as a different but equal member of international society (Wight 1977: ch. 3). What is more, the Greek city-states system, along with the intersocietal systems that predated it, did not develop an ethic of transferring power and wealth to subordinate groups to ensure parity of participation in a widening dialogic community (Resnick 1992). It is tempting to draw the conclusion that support for lifting restrictions on the equal enjoyment of political rights, for respecting the radically different and redistributing wealth and power to the members of systematically excluded groups, is greater in the modern era than in any past intersocietal system. This is a proposition that can be advanced only with serious qualification. Support for these principles has not always been matched by radical changes in practice, and, needless to say, it varies enormously within and between societies. Greater support has not occurred because modern societies are more clever than their predecessors but because in many respects they are as, if not more, oppressive and have engendered powerful
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opposition to their negative properties and tendencies as a result. The seemingly unique qualities of modernity are evident in the achievements of modern citizenship, around which struggles to universalize rights, respect differences, and reduce inequalities continue to revolve. Modernity’s qualities are also evident in the recent development of the international society of states. Scope restrictions that prevented non-Europeans from gaining admission to European society have been lifted, at least for those groups with the power to constitute themselves as separate states. Advances in respect for cultural differences and progress in reducing material inequalities within many nation states have failed to stir collective action to reduce international inequalities, but it would be foolish to conclude that there had been no progress at all on these fronts. Arguably, the commitment to pacify the society of states without converting it into empire is a more pronounced theme in the modern society of states than it was in ancient Greece or China. Still more radical changes in the structure of international society are made possible by these normative commitments. These are conjectural statements that further research will either confirm or disconfirm. Whatever their long-term fate, some observations about the condition of modernity can be safely made. As previously noted, the progressive side of modernity is not the outcome of the unassisted development of reason but the product of political struggle against terrible forces. The main influences on Frankfurt School critical theory knew as much. Immanuel Kant’s observation that war had taught human beings by experience what the use of reason could have foretold, namely that their primary political goal ought to be association within a cosmopolitical association dedicated to promoting permanent peace, conveyed the essential point (Kant 1970). Hegel’s account of the dialectical interplay between the development of reason and the struggle for freedom in the face of arbitrary state power and the destructive effects of industrial capitalism reworked the crucial theme (Avineri 1972). Marx’s claim that the fate of human freedom depended entirely on the outcome of the struggle against capitalist exploitation was the version that defined critical theory for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many of the most insightful trends within social and political theory continue this tradition by providing critical theory with a more profound understanding of the strange ambiguities of modernity (see Smart 1985). Again, this is one point where the different paths of Frankfurt School critical theory, postmodernism, and feminism intersect. Current efforts to reconstruct the sociology of the ambiguities of modernity include the literature on the unprecedented territorial concentrations of power that have emerged over the past 200 years. The relationship between this phenomenon and the struggle to acquire legal rights against the state and rights of representation and participation has been one of its central concerns, as has the analysis of the impact of warfare on the evolu-
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tion of state power and on subsequent demands for citizenship rights (Giddens 1985). Accounts of the dialectics of capitalism in which new structures of social control and patterns of inequality compete with demands for welfare rights have enriched the sociology of modernity and its ambiguities (Giddens 1985, 1993). Inquiries into the relationship between state building, war and capitalism and the formation of, and resistance to, modern patriarchal relations and the dominant conceptions of sexual identity have transformed the analysis. The same may be said of explorations of the homogenizing effects of state building and capitalism and the parallel ethnic revolt and struggle for recognition by indigenous peoples. No inventory of the ambiguous qualities of modernity would be complete unless it included the relationship between industrialization and the various social movements committed to reconstituting dominant approaches to the natural environment and to nonhuman species. Those formulations emphasize the deeply ambiguous character of Western modernity: They reveal that unprecedented territorial concentrations of power, unparalleled violence against subordinate groups and alien outsiders, and more insidious forms of social control compete with unusual levels of social mobilization to resist multiple forms of political domination and social exclusion. Critical social theory stands at the intersection of these contrasting forces, which form the conditions of modernity’s existence. Its opposition to the dark side of modernity draws on the moral and political resources that constitute the progressive side of modernity and reveal that improved forms of political community may yet evolve. The thesis that postmodernity does not represent a break with modernity but rather a vital intensification of its radical, democratic potentials reinforces the point (Keane 1990: 91–92). Different strands of critical social theory have highlighted the multiple strands of exclusion that run through the structure of modern societies and their international relations; they have analyzed the variety of counterhegemonic forces that resist forms of domination and exclusion within the modern world system; in so doing, they have turned the dialogic elements and further potentials of modernity against its dark and oppressive forces. Some critics of the “new scholasticism” lament the paucity of concrete social analysis in contemporary critical theory (Wallace 1996), but the charge misfires. In a relatively short period, there has been considerable progress in rewriting the sociology of modernity to show how the seeds of alternative social and political arrangements are evident within existing forms of life. Right at the heart of this enterprise is the analysis of the dialectic of dialogue, difference, and exclusion. Those analyses of the properties of modernity need to be placed in a wider historical context that allows informed assessments about the extent to which different intersocietal systems developed conceptions of universal
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dialogue that are sensitive to cultural differences and economic inequalities. The historical evidence suggests that different forms of world political organization exhibit different properties in this regard (Linklater 1998: ch. 4). To summarize, the first empires promoted selective advances in universality but remained deeply exclusionary and inegalitarian. Lifting restrictions on access to elite positions enabled egocentric cultures to administer sprawling empires, but hierarchical worldviews prevented any major breakthrough in the shape of egalitarian commitments to universal dialogue. Similar worldviews are evident in the relations among the major empires or civilizations. Imagining their association within a universal communication community that overcame the deepest forms of social exclusion rarely emerged as an ethical ideal. Movement to new structures of consciousness is evident in societies of states with their commitment to dialogue among their constitutive parts. Hellenic international society broke through the limitations of early empires, but hegemonic conceptions of international relations hampered the evolution of modern conceptions of the equality of states and clashed with the Kantian notion of a universal kingdom of ends. Ethnocentrism prevented the radical extension of dialogic commitments in relations with non-Hellenic societies, although some movement toward more universalistic structures of consciousness was evident in the gradual expansion of international society to include Persia. A preliminary survey of the historical evidence suggests that the vision of forms of political community that are more universalistic than their predecessors and more sensitive to cultural differences and material inequalities is a uniquely modern idea and an expression of the progressive side of modernity.1 It is not entirely fortuitous that this vision has emerged in a civilization that may be unique in attaching deep moral significance to differences of race; that has been as, if not more, assimilationist than past intersocietal systems; and that has been the site for the development of seemingly unprecedented inequalities of wealth and power. But modernity is not reducible simply to this dark side; whether it can create political arrangements that represent its progressive side is the crucial question.
The Praxeological Domain The complaint that the critical turn has forsaken concrete social analysis for indecipherable reflections about the foundations of human inquiry was noted earlier; the related lament is that postpositivism is annoyingly detached from vital questions of public policy and governance (Wallace 1996). Invitations to deepen the connections between postpositivist inquiry and current policy and practice are welcome—all the more so if they take up complex questions surrounding the relationship between theory and
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practice, which have always been central to those working within the Marxist tradition. One recent critique of postpositivism fails to mention, even in passing, Cox’s important and influential distinction between problem solving and critical approaches to international relations (Wallace 1996). This distinction is an important reminder that sophisticated policyrelevant research must confront the question of which interests are privileged and which are conveniently ignored by the urge to address issues of current practice (Cox 1981; Booth 1997). Critical theories of all descriptions are especially alert to these considerations, which are at the forefront of a range of inquiries into policy matters, political structures, and alternative forms of human governance. Critical theory in the revolutionary Marxist tradition was concerned with large questions about current political structures and alternative modes of social organization rather than with incrementalist policy recommendations associated with revisionist solutions to the problems of modern capitalist society. But in more recent times, few would deny the importance of shuttling between long-range questions about the prospects for alternative forms of political community and shorter-term policy debates that determine whether societies evolve in the normatively preferred direction. The commitment to the discourse theory of morality, for example, necessarily combines grand visions of more dialogic cultures and human subjects with support for concrete measures (such as freedom of information) that will contribute to the realization of that goal. Approaches to current policy have to be linked, then, with longer-term normative objectives that link critical theory with classical political philosophy and its reflections on the good society and the good life. This is the specific domain of critical praxeology. Raymond Aron introduced the term praxeology in the course of his reflections on the antinomies of statecraft (Aron 1966: 577–579). He maintained that the tension between Machiavellian calculations of opportunity and the Kantian problem of acting ethically and securing progress toward universal peace is at the heart of foreign policy. Aron’s writings highlighted the allegedly unending struggle between the realist conviction that the purpose of foreign policy is to enhance national power and prestige and the idealist commitment that the function of foreign policy is to promote cosmopolitan goals. In so doing, he stressed the recurrent tension between the ethics of conviction and responsibility that Weber analyzed in the final sections of “Politics as a Vocation” (Weber 1948). These realist approaches to praxeology are at odds with the Kantian alternative in “Perpetual Peace,” which informs the argument of the present section. In “Perpetual Peace,” Kant recognized that the struggle for power and security could not be eradicated overnight but might be eliminated gradually in a process of international political change lasting several centuries (Kant 1970). Kant believed that the bitter experience of war had taught human beings the need to bring
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civility to international relations. Greater economic interdependence also encouraged the widening of humanity’s moral horizons so that the concern for human dignity and human rights had begun to unite the whole world. In Kant’s writings, praxeology was concerned with the prospects for releasing the progressive side of modernity from superfluous constraints. The static representation of the tension between power and ethics that typifies classical realism gave way to a more complex analysis of the dynamic qualities of world politics. Kant’s critical approach to praxeology focused on the pressures that had compelled human beings to humanize their international relations and on the specific measures they could take in the future to make world politics comply with their highest ethical ideals. Central to the approach is how the tension between the different sides of modernity can be resolved by the gradual accumulation of just international norms. The moral capital that accumulates in the struggle against unnecessary constraints checks the recovery of the politics of power and force, but it also creates the possibility of further advances in the politics of dialogue and consent. Compliance with these norms is essential for the reproduction of society, and serious violations of these norms create considerable public alarm and provoke significant political opposition. The integrity of these norms also requires the restructuring of social arrangements when they are found to clash with important ethical commitments. Important aspects of this process have already been discussed. Lifting scope restrictions so that the members of subordinate classes could enjoy the legal and political rights monopolized by dominant groups was part of a larger process in which systematically excluded groups contested the moral relevance of their differences from full-fledged citizens. Efforts to universalize legal and political rights triggered political discontent when dominant groups failed to deal with profound economic inequalities. Such measures have been regarded as deficient by groups that do not wish to have exactly the same rights as all other citizens but desire special rights and entitlements that recognize their cultural distinctiveness. The accumulation of norms therefore serves the dual purpose of preventing the recovery of pernicious systems of exclusion and enabling further development and movement. In modern societies, the concept of citizenship performs this dual role. The moral capital invested in citizenship is the product of resistance to territorial concentrations of power, to national-assimilationist policies designed to curb national minorities and secessionist tendencies, and to the social inequalities resulting from the transition to the industrial era. The struggle for citizenship has focused on lifting barriers to the enjoyment of equal legal and political rights, but it has also sought advances in welfare rights and the establishment of group-specific rights in response to the politics of cultural recognition. Citizenship rights provide a barrier against the
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reemergence of past forms of unjust exclusion, and they are a vital element in the collective memory of earlier struggles to remove them. These rights are a key moral resource that progressive social forces continue to exploit in contemporary efforts to reconfigure political community. They ensure that a culture of sensitivity to unjust exclusion remains important to a significant proportion of the citizenry of modern societies. Whereas a realist account of praxeology stresses the tension between these normative commitments and the logic of power, a critical approach focuses on the higher possibilities that they build into the structure of modern societies. From the latter point of view, the moral capital invested in citizenship is not in a state of permanent tension with the logic of anarchy but confirms the Kantian theme that these societies possess the moral resources for narrowing the sphere of social interaction that has been ceded to the dominion of force and power. Universalizing suffrage by dismantling scope restrictions has been an intriguing feature of modern societies, all the more so because of the coexistence of deeply embedded particularistic norms that deny aliens representation and voice. Most societies have assumed that the distinction between insiders and outsiders has obvious moral relevance, at least as far as the right of democratic participation is concerned. Increased opportunities for and incidences of cross-boundary harm pose the question of whether the differences between insiders and outsiders are any more morally relevant than the distinctions of gender, class, ethnicity, and race. A profound moral contradiction arises for democracies that cause harm to outsiders by polluting their environment and endangering their health. The logic of their moral beliefs requires them to widen the boundaries of democratic government so that insiders and outsiders come together as associates in joint rule. Proponents of cosmopolitan democracy have offered a cogent defense of this argument, and the growth of regional organizations and the emergence of a global civil society encourage the belief that the history of democratic governance is entering a new phase of development (Archibugi and Held 1995; Held 1995; Archibugi, Held, and Kohler 1998). It is abundantly clear that national commitments to citizenship have already generated powerful arguments for creating a transnational democracy in Europe. Interestingly, these visions of expanded democracy often stress the need to devolve power to domestic regions and local communities. Most of them do not predict the end of the nation state, but they anticipate new forms of political community in which significant national powers are shared with substate and transnational institutions, and national loyalties exist alongside stronger subnational and transnational allegiances (Camilleri and Falk 1992; Meehan 1993; Beiner 1995; Turner 1993). Thus the moral capital that has been accumulated in the struggle against unjust exclusion is more than a way of preserving past achieve-
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ments; it can also be used as a resource for creating new forms of political community and citizenship that institutionalize the dialogic ideal in a more complex ensemble of democratic public spheres. Praxeology in the Kantian tradition considers the implications of normative analyses of the highest ethical ideals and sociological explorations of the ambiguities of modernity for matters of current policy and practice. Significantly, praxeological inquiry considers large-scale questions about the possibility of new forms of human governance and reflects on the more important developments that can help realize this ideal. Visions of the modes of governance that ought to appeal to societies with deep moral commitments to citizenship are combined with critical reflections on the concrete measures that deserve support. The latter include the right of individual appeal against the state not only in national but in European courts; the international protection of minority rights; the devolution of power to domestic regions; and the development of richer conceptions of European citizenship that embrace legal, political, and welfare rights (Linklater 1996a). The recent critical or postpositivist turn has not attempted to shift the study of international relations away from issues of current policy and practice toward the higher reaches of detached philosophical analysis. One of its central ambitions has been to recapture something of the ethical spirit that existed when the field first came into existence, and to do so without repeating the mistakes of early idealism. Very complex issues attend this process, and it is unsurprising that much of the recent literature has addressed them in their own terms and for their own sake in relative isolation from questions of current practice. Those who have taken these philosophical issues seriously have often abandoned the familiar territory of conventional international relations for the less familiar world of social and political theory, a necessary step if the field was to advance quickly. No serious understanding of the complexity of the issues involved could conclude that the theoretical retreat had gone far enough and was in danger of imbalancing the subject. A more profound assessment of the meaning of the critical turn would note how far it runs parallel with the wider literature on the prospects for new modes of human governance and new forms of political community. It is not possible to undertake a detailed examination of these parallel lines of investigation here, but for present purposes, it may suffice to comment briefly on some recent writings that envisage forms of political community that break the nexus between sovereignty, territoriality, nationality, and citizenship. In The Other Heading, Derrida defends a European polity that avoids the monopolization of power and its dispersal to the representatives of exclusive particularisms (Derrida 1992: 41). In The Past as Future, Habermas supports moves to transnationalize democracy and to invest authority in substate and transnational authorities in a more democratic
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Europe (Habermas 1994a). In the study of international relations, a related strand of thought defends the rights of national groups to preserve their differences but not necessarily to constitute themselves as exclusive, sovereign entities (Elshtain 1994). A parallel development notes the connections between Hedley Bull’s heavily qualified support for a neomedieval Europe and the critical-theoretical defense of forms of political community that are more universalistic and more sensitive to cultural differences than most states have been in the past (Linklater 1996a). Numerous parallels exist with a range of recent commentaries on the future of the nation-state in Europe (MacCormack 1996, Wallace 1994). Here the philosophical defense of societies that embody higher levels of universality without effacing human differences is reflected in praxeological reflections on new forms of community and citizenship that reveal the potentials of modernity. These reflections about governance, which deal with the possibility of postnational or postsovereign societies in Europe, inevitably raise complex questions about how Europe should conduct its relations with the rest of the world. Fears that a postsovereign Europe might turn in on itself and purchase its own welfare and autonomy by imposing hardship on others have been emphasized in these discussions (see Derrida 1992: 9). The important point is that efforts to release the progressive side of modernity within Europe may generate, and even require, injustice for the members of nonEuropean societies. For this reason, the ambiguities of modernity may be only partially overcome. But as already noted, the culture of sensitivity to unjust exclusion is a major dimension of modernity, and all efforts to consolidate the achievements of national citizenship by creating a transnational citizenship in Europe provoke the concern that they may clash with cosmopolitan ideas. Recurrent attempts to give meaning to world or cosmopolitan citizenship reveal that the dark side of modernity has never succeeded in eradicating a powerful moral sense that national communities are answerable to the rest of humankind (Linklater 1998: ch. 6). The Kantian ideal that commitments to dialogue, publicity, and consent can gradually contract the dominion of power and force in international relations is as important now as it was 200 years ago. Apel’s defense of “the progressive implementation of the standard of ideal communication and nonrepressive deliberation” (Apel 1979: 98–99) restates the Kantian ideal, as does the notion of the universal speech community defended by Habermas and Lyotard. The more important formulations of this normative project maintain that political subjects should endeavor to make their actions compatible with what might be agreed upon within an imagined universal communication community, and they should support all measures that will help bring such a community into existence (Bohler 1990: 133). Pressures on the current frameworks of communication in international relations offer more concrete guidance to those who support this ideal. The
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diplomatic dialogue in modern international history was long confined to states and concerned with preserving political order among the most powerful. These dimensions of world politics are undiminished in importance, although there are important moves to open that dialogue to nonstate actors, including the range of nongovernmental organizations, and to extend it to embrace issues of global governance including the rights of individuals and minorities, international social justice, and greater concern for the natural environment and for nonhuman species. Reflections on the current state of the diplomatic dialogue are one way of monitoring the extent to which international society is making progress toward or falling short of the ideal of a universal speech community from which no voice is excluded and from which no dissenting perspective goes unheard because of political weakness or the absence of respect. Such reflections on the current state of the dialogue can hardly lead to confusion about the most desirable trajectories of development and patterns of change, although it would be foolish to expect that they will either settle the most profound disputes about the best means of promoting change or solve complex disputes about who has most responsibility for initiating political action. Critical praxeology should aim to highlight the moral deficits of international society and to stress immanent possibilities and desirable directions. From there, it can begin to explore the relatively uncharted waters of critical foreign policy analysis.2
Conclusion Few efforts to develop connections among social theory, moral and political philosophy, and the study of international relations existed even by the early 1980s. Resistance to exploring these connections was commonplace, not least because of realist arguments that the violent conflicts of the century had crushed the project of the Enlightenment. Dissenting voices were heard from various liberal or socialist standpoints that retained their faith in the idea of international progress. They prepared the way for the more systematic assault on realist and neorealist thought that has taken place since the mid-1980s. In the early stages, critical approaches reflected the influence of Marxist conceptions of society and politics. These approaches questioned many of the classical Marxian assumptions about the demise of nationalism, the epiphenomenal character of the state, and the nature and possibility of world socialism. But they were not exposed at that time to the radical challenges of postmodernism and feminism. They were equally critical of the conventional theory and practice of international relations, but they were deeply troubled by perceived similarities between realism and its
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critical opponents. The totalitarian potentials residing within universal histories and global projects of emancipation were among the chief concerns. The intriguing question is where this leaves the tradition of critical theory with its Marxian commitment to creating an overarching perpective that unites normative, sociological, and praxeological modes of inquiry. Many have doubted the wisdom or possibility of recovering a project of modernity that holds on to these convictions. Perhaps they are right to do so, although this is not the conclusion drawn here. What has been proposed instead is an approach to critical IR theory that remains universalistic while recognizing that some forms of universalism have wished to submerge or extinguish the difference of the other. Here it is essential to stress that various accounts of the universal speech community are explicitly concerned not only with tolerating difference but with enlarging human diversity. They have a normative commitment to dialogic relations in which human beings can explore the possibility of forms of life simultaneously more universalistic and more diverse than preceding arrangements at the domestic and international levels. They invite further sociological studies that consider the condition of modernity with all its tensions and ambiguities in the broadest historical perspective, and they call for additional praxeological inquiries that reflect on how the progressive side of modernity can be embodied in new forms of political community that continue the struggle against all forms of unjust exclusion. Historical awareness is a central feature of critical theory, which recognizes that all categories and perspectives have to be amended, even abandoned entirely, as societies change. Contemporary critical IR theory in the Marxian tradition has not lost sight of this basic truth. Its changing contours are evident in its attempt to rebuild the project of modernity around the themes of dialogue, difference, and exclusion.
Notes 1. It is important to note some similarities here with the English School, which stressed the tensions between the dialogic element in systems of states and their exclusionary practices (see especially Bull 1977, 1983; Bull and Watson 1984; Wight 1977). For the purpose of exploring these issues in more detail, the English School is a convenient point of departure. 2. Critical foreign policy analysis can reflect on existing policy decisions and alternative possibilities in the light of the normative commitments and sociological observations discussed in this chapter. The latter would need considerable refinement in any detailed commentary on specific policy options.
3 THE WAY AHEAD: TOWARD A NEW ONTOLOGY OF WORLD ORDER Robert W. Cox
One recurrent criticism of critical theory in international studies is that it has yet to deliver a substantive research agenda. Working from the general to the particular, the criticism goes in its broadest sense to the question of ontology. How do we describe the sphere of reality within which our study seeks to focus on the important issues? My initial proposition is that international relations (IR) is an inadequate and misleading way of describing the object of our search for knowledge. The institutionalization of a discipline in university departments, academic posts, and funding is one thing. There is no harm in this endeavor so long as we keep an open mind about what the term international relations may cover. My point is that the term gives a distorted impression of what should be included. What’s in a name? A rose by any other name . . . But let us focus on the rose without, at least for the time being, trying to rename it—and thereby raising all the issues of material subsistence and institutional rigidity that will come in their time. There are two meanings of ontology. The primary meaning is an affirmation of the ultimate reality of the universe—what we can call Universality I. This meaning probably has its roots in monotheistic religion and was taken over in secular form by the European Enlightenment. Human beings invent the idea of God as the all-powerful creator; from that they reverse the process of invention to assume the human mind to be Godlike, that is, to have the potential for understanding the truth of the universe.1 Universality I can take the form of affirmation of the kind of truth embodied in religious revelation or in the certainties of Enlightenment philosophy. It can also, in a spurious form, apply to affirmations of universality that are manifestly products of a particular historical situation but not recognized to be such for lack of critical self-appraisal. Neorealism is a good example. 45
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The other meaning of ontology—which we can call Universality II—is the attempt to identify the basic constitutive factors that help toward understanding and acting upon a particular historical conjuncture. We could say the task is one of perceiving the historical structures that characterize an epoch. These structures, which are mental constructions, summarize the cumulative result of collective human action over time. The purpose of defining them is to construct a base point for considering the problems of maintenance or transformation of a particular historical order. Universality II is universal in a transitory way, the snapshot of a world in perpetual motion, the synchronic picture of something that is diachronically changing. A synchronic picture cannot be a mere list of factors. To qualify as ontology, it has to show the interactive properties of a system—albeit an open system in which the homeostatic mechanisms that maintain closure can be disrupted by forces that open the way for change. Neorealism has an explicit ontology—a perverse form of Universality I—in which states, balance of power, Hobbesian power-seeking man, and the contractual basis of polity are presumed to be eternal interrelated components of world order. Critical theory has relativized neorealism so as to perceive it as an ideology of the Cold War. In a more positive sense, critical theory has envisaged a shift in ontology toward a more adequate depiction of the “real world” of the twenty-first century; so far this alternative ontology is only a work in progress. My aim here is to try to grasp the directions of ontological reconstruction that will give a proper weight to factors ignored by neorealism but that are relevant to understanding power relations affecting conflict, cooperation, and prospects of human survival. Because ontological shift both reflects and anticipates structural change, it is also important that the effort focus on the forces of agency that are capable of reshaping structures consolidated from the past. This inquiry into structure and agency is undertaken in a spirit of realism. Realism is concerned with power; but the questions, Where does power lie? and How is it exercised? should be asked without any prior assumptions about the answers. Neorealism starts with the assumptions previously mentioned. Its ontology forecloses a broader search. The realism of E. H. Carr, who initiated the modern study of international relations at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, had a much broader and more open understanding of power in world affairs. He was sensitive to economic and social structures and to culture and ideology. He saw states not as a series of like entities (the state) but as historically differentiated forms. Returning to Carr’s realism is a first step toward escaping from the ahistorical confines of neorealism. Unfortunately, however, Carr’s reputation as a realist among students of international relations has come to rest mainly on his Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (1946). His essay Nationalism and After
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(1945) better illustrates his broad understanding of economic, social, and ideological transformation shaping the nature of states and of world order. Much of the rest of his work, The Romantic Exiles (1949), for instance, and his studies of Marx, Bakunin, and Dostoyevsky as well as his essay What Is History? (1964) and his multivolumed history of the Soviet Union, demonstrate the breadth of his approach. There has already been a good deal of work toward expanding neorealism by adding markets to states in the conventional ontology. But even this is not a sufficient answer to the problem of where power lies in the early twenty-first century. A Marxist might justifiably argue that states and markets are just two forms of alienation. The first displaces human responsibility to an artificial construction, the state. The second displaces human relations to relations among things in the market. Underlying each of these constructs are social relations, the human substance that is active in these two spheres. Really existing social power relations are the fundamental object of inquiry. We may therefore begin by examining the way social relations are being reshaped on a global scale by tendencies in the global political economy, especially since the world economic crisis of the mid1970s. I see four interrelated configurations that define the “real world” of the early twenty-first century: (1) the social structure of the world as it is being reshaped by economic globalization; (2) the pattern of change in states and the state system; (3) humanity in the biosphere; and (4) the subjective (or better, intersubjective) aspect of world order, or the different understandings that different categories of people have about the nature of world order.
The Changing Social Structure of the World The term globalization is so widely and diversely used that some clarification of my use of it here is called for. In my usage, globalization has an economic connotation. Bernadette Madeuf and Charles-Albert Michalet (1978) drew a distinction between the international economy (understood in classical economic theory as flows of goods, payments, and investments across borders) and an emerging form of economy in which production was being organized on an integrated basis among entities located in a number of countries. The English translation of their article, which was written in French, referred to the latter as a “world economy,” just as the common French term for the process generating this emerging economy was mondialisation. The more common English-language term for this process has been globalization. Hence, I am using global economy to denote this emergent phenomenon. Of course, much of the world’s economic activity still
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goes on outside this global economy, albeit increasingly constrained by and subordinated to it. I reserve the term world economy for the totality of economic activities of which the global economy is the dominant part. The policy impetus behind the formation of the global economy is neoliberal globalization; I have called its ideology hyperliberalism. The global economy was initially perceived in the sphere of production associated with transnational corporations (TNCs), but the deregulation of financial operations quickly followed and led to the globalization of finance, which, as in the Asian financial crisis of 1998, has manifested a destructive potential in relation to production and employment. The impact of the globalization process on power relations in societies, among states and social forces, and in the formation of institutions designed to entrench the global economy or to stimulate resistance to it is the realm of global political economy. The globalization of production is producing a three-part social hierarchy that is worldwide, cutting across state boundaries. The proportions of the three levels in society vary from one territorial unit to another, but the tendency is uniform throughout. The top level comprises those people who are integrated into the global economy. This stratum runs from the global economy managers in public and private sectors to relatively privileged workers who serve global production and finance in reasonably stable employment. The second level includes those who serve the global economy in a subordinate and more precarious way. They are the potentially disposable labor force, the realm of “flexibility,” “restructuring,” “downsizing,” and “outsourcing.” This level is a consequence of the phenomenon known as post-Fordism, the organization of production on the basis of a relatively permanent core of people concerned with planning, technology, marketing, and finance, and a peripheral group whose employment depends on the level of demand and production decisions made by the core group. Employment of this kind is expanding in the industrialized countries as the proportion of stable employment in industry declines, and it characterizes most industrial jobs in poor countries. The bottom level comprises those who are excluded from the global economy. Here are the permanently unemployed, superfluous labor, the underemployed, and many of the people living in what one former commissioner of the European Union, Claude Cheysson, called the “useless” countries (cited by Cheru 1997: 213, 221), that is, those countries that have little prospect of making a go of the global economy. The top level is doing quite well in material terms, although it is only a small proportion of humanity. The second level is the one that is expanding most rapidly with the geographical extension of globalization and with the growing penetration of the social structure of globalization into the economically leading countries. Its members are placed in an ambiguous posi-
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tion toward the social order: They are supportive in their concern to find and keep a job but potentially hostile when insecurity strikes. The excluded pose a potential threat to the globalization order. But certain conditions may diffuse that threat: the fact that excluded people’s energies are directed to personal and family survival rather than protest and the proclivity of rejected people often to direct their violence against their excluded neighbors rather than against the established society. Nevertheless, the potential for challenge to the globalization order exists among both the excluded and the precarious segments. There are also contradictions among the integrated, many of these generated by ecological concerns that affect jobs in forestry, fisheries, and energy industries. The challenge to globalization, if it is to become activated, would require the formation of a common will, a vision of an alternative future, and the transcendence of the manifold divisions of ethnicity, religion, gender, and geography that cut across the three-level social hierarchy being created by globalization. This restructuring of world society brought about by globalization challenges the primacy of state-oriented identities as people become aware that transnational economic organizations determine their livelihood and populations become increasingly heterogeneous from migration. It also challenges the Marxist schema of the primacy of class-oriented identities. The nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century concepts of class have been muddied by the emerging social structure. The working class as it is conventionally thought of is now divided among the three levels of the social hierarchy, and these three components can be shown to have very divergent interests. Where the sense of class remains strong today, it may be more a cultural matter than defined by a property relationship. Yet the concept of class retains vigor and calls for reformulation in early-twenty-first-century conditions as a means to the formation of a common front of resistance toward an alternative to the future that is being prepared by globalization. Class would have to embrace comprehensively the various identities—ethnic, religious, gender, and so on—manifested by those groups that have initiated pockets of resistance.
States and the State System Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, interstate relations have tended to become more concerned with adapting state structures, policies, and practices to the requirements of a global economy conceived on neoliberal lines rather than toward the alliance building of the Cold War period. The dominant theme proclaimed by the United States and widely acquiesced to by the other major countries has been “democracy and market reform.” The slogan has
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been applied specifically to countries of the former Soviet sphere and also to countries in what was formerly called the third world. The primary emphasis of dominant power has been on the market reform aspect, which in practice has been held to mean deregulation and privatization accompanied by measures to combat inflation and to achieve and maintain currency stability. The practical consequences have been the gutting of public services, increased unemployment, and rampant corruption. The democracy aspect has meant an emphasis on elections in the hope that they will legitimate market reform and on human rights in the sense of individual rather than collective rights. The cumulative consequence of these pressures has been to propagate the idea that the primary function of states is to adjust domestic economic practices to the functional requirements of the neoliberal global economy. I have called this process the internationalizing of the state (Cox 1987: 253– 265). It contrasts with the post–World War II concept of the state as mediator between the international economy (understood as flows across national boundaries) and domestic concerns about economic growth and employment. According to the newly dominant doctrine, domestic interests are best served by allowing free rein to the global economy, and new efforts at regulation, such as those embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), are designed to limit the capacity of states to interfere with the working of the neoliberal global economic order. In terms of social relations, the global economy is led by and benefits mainly the top segment of the world social hierarchy just discussed. This segment, the integrated, is both inside and outside the state. It is outside the state insofar as it is embodied in agencies like the Group of Seven (G7, or now G8 with the inclusion of Russia) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WTO, or even in such unofficial conclaves as the Trilateral Commission and the World Economic Forum, which meets annually in Davos, Switzerland. It is inside the state insofar as the interests that are represented in these bodies are present within different countries and can put pressure on states at the national level. At the interstate level, two main functions are performed: First is the propagation and legitimization of neoliberal global economic practice by international institutions, mainly the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO but now increasingly the UN itself. The UN used to be differentiated from these international economic agencies, which have operated clearly within a neoliberal logic, being seen as more open to the expression of heterodox views about world economy, particularly in the interest of less-developed countries. However, the success of the United States in securing the election of Kofi Annan as Secretary-General after excluding Boutros BoutrosGhali from reelection indicates a shift in the UN toward alignment with the
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IMF and WTO policy orientation. The new Secretary-General seems to be moving toward centralizing budgetary control, which the United States has always sought, and giving fuller access to multinational corporate interests in the formation of UN policy. The second function at the interstate level is the neutralization of potential disruptions of the global economy that could arise from explosions among the bottom (excluded) segment of the world social hierarchy. Global poverty relief and riot control now tops UN priorities, displacing development assistance, which had the top spot during the 1950s and 1960s. Poverty relief takes the form of humanitarian assistance in the wake of famine and internal warfare, much of which can be seen as consequences of globalization. Riot control takes the form of military interventions where local governmental authority has broken down.
The Biosphere Alongside social restructuring, environmental degradation is an accompaniment to economic globalization. The conventional study of international relations has heretofore recognized only human actors, but in recent years some nonhuman forces have appeared, threatening to constrict the realm of human action: global warming, the hole in the ozone layer, deforestation and soil erosion, the loss of biodiversity, and the collapse of fish stocks, among others. These forces express the response of nature to the cumulative consequences of human activities. They are new phenomena that signal dangers to the physical environment in which human activities take place. They can lead to conflict, for example, over scarce vital resources such as water, and they challenge accepted modes of understanding humanity’s place in the world. Monotheistic religions with their notion of a transcendent deity encouraged a separation of human beings, the image of the divine, from nature, created by God for the use and enjoyment of humans. Scientific modernism inherited this idea in conceiving nature as something to be dominated, tamed, and shaped by human beings. The irruption of forces of nature into human affairs, not as the occasional flood or earthquake but as a deterioration of the planet’s life-support system, now suggests the need to revise this notion by seeing humanity as one component of the natural world, interacting with other forms of life and life-sustaining substances. The biosphere is this larger interactive realm, an envelope circling the earth and stretching from the seabeds to the higher atmosphere. In the modernist tradition, economics reduced nature to land and considered land a commodity (what Karl Polanyi [1944] called a false commodity, since land is not produced for sale on the market). Nature has been subordinated to economic logic, to the market mentality, which is based on
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the proposition that everything is for sale. The basic problem for market logic is getting the prices right. Nature, however, has a logic of its own that is not comprehended by economics and that functions independently of economics. The basic problem for nature’s logic is equilibrium among the different forms of life and life-supporting substances. So long as there is enough slack in nature, market logic is tolerated by nature; but when the effect of economic logic is to strain nature to the limit, nature responds with its veto (Harries-Jones, Rotstein, and Timmerman 1992, 1998). The problem here is to rethink economics within a science of nature so that economic prescriptions are attentive to signals from nonhuman nature. This rethinking implies a departure from the modernist epistemology that separates human capacity for knowledge from the world of nature and conceives nature as a manipulable object. The dilemma for humans now is to think through the consequences of understanding ourselves as part of nature rather than as dominant over nature. One implication of this understanding is a fundamental contradiction in economic globalization and perhaps also in movements of democratization. The dynamic of globalization is consumer demand. The consumption model of North America and Western Europe—consumerism—is what the other peoples of the world have aspired to. To extend this model universally would likely have catastrophic consequences for the biosphere, but to suggest that relatively poor societies should drop this aspiration incurs the charge of imperialism. It seems obvious that those societies that have pioneered the quest of consumerism would have to show the way toward an alternative model that would be consistent with biosphere maintenance. This is where the challenge to democracy arises. Former U.S. president George Bush anticipated it when, in preparing for the Earth Summit at Rio in 1992, he was reported as saying: “Our lifestyle is not open to negotiation.” He was implicitly acknowledging that change of lifestyle is necessary to biospheric survival and at the same time recognizing that political survival in modern democracies makes change highly risky for politicians to advocate. If such a basic change in people’s aspirations and behavior cannot be changed by political leadership, let alone by exhortations at international conferences, the change must come from within civil society. The issue then becomes whether the reconstruction of people’s understanding of their place in nature and of what is necessary to maintain the biosphere can outpace and reverse the progress of ecological degradation.
Intersubjectivity: Civilizations and Forms of Political Economy The problem of the biosphere brings out the relationship between objective material conditions (ecological degradation) and subjective, or, more accu-
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rately, intersubjective, understandings and values of people (consumerism versus ecologically responsible behavior). By intersubjectivity, I mean the prevailing sense of the nature of the world, or the common sense of reality shared among a population. Intersubjectivity can be understood as the knowledge produced in the cumulative collective response by people to their conditions of existence, to what Marx called the conditions not chosen by themselves within which people make history. Thus intersubjectivity is a creation of history, not something innate to the human soul, although in its unquestioned state it may appear among contemporaries to be an innate awareness of the natural order of the world. It is in the realm of intersubjectivity that civilizations become significant for world politics. The materialist connotation of the term civilization signifies an urban-centered aggregation of a large number of people such as came into existence circa 2500 B.C. in the Nile valley, the Fertile Crescent, and the environs of Mohenjo Daro (cf. Childe 1942). This material, technological, economically organized, and class-structured entity called civilization was unified in the realm of consciousness or subjectivity by religion. It is common nowadays to call civilizations by the names of religions— Judeo-Christian, Confucian, Islamic, and so forth. Religion enabled people within a civilization to develop a shared consciousness and symbols through which they could communicate meaningfully with one another. Myth, religion, and language were coterminous until language became secularized and rationalized. The material world provided a common ground of experience; religion provided a common realm of intersubjectivity. So a working definition of civilization could be a fit between material conditions of existence and intersubjective meanings (Cox 1996b). This definition does not imply a base-superstructure relationship in the sense that common material conditions generate similar ideological superstructures in a “vulgar Marxist” manner. One can attribute more autonomy to the realm of intersubjectivity while positing a necessary correspondence, or what Max Weber called “elective affinity,” between thought and material conditions of existence. The challenge of material conditions may be confronted in different ways in different forms of consciousness expressive of different values. The material limits of the possible are constraining, but there is always some scope for ethical choice. Feminist scholarship has been particularly fruitful in developing this notion of the social construction of reality. Feminists use it as a means of revealing the historical genesis of patriachy and specific categorizations or stereotypes of gender, but the insight has other applications as well. In the world of the early twenty-first century, civilizational differences are expressed through different forms of economic and social organization. This fact has been obscured both by dogmatic forms of Marxism and by dogmatic neoliberalism, both of which cling to an economic determinist philosophy, an oversimplified reductionist view of capitalism as a mono-
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lithic global force. In one sense capitalism is, of course, a global force: Big corporate organizations based in different parts of the world compete for shares in a world market, and finance flows freely across territorial boundaries. But people in different places are organized in somewhat different ways, not only mainly to participate in this global capitalism but also sometimes to exist outside of it. These differences are important for the people who live within different coexisting forms of capitalism. Thus we can speak in one sense of global capitalism as the dynamic force of globalization; but at the same time, it must be recognized that capitalism, the competitive drive for profits and expansion, takes different social forms shaped by different civilizational imperatives, some of which place limits on unconstrained profit seeking. Concepts of society and organization can express different notions as to what is natural and proper in human relations. These differences cannot be reduced just to a matter of ideology. Ideologies are conscious constructions with specific programs. Intersubjectivities are less conscious and more deeply rooted, the common sense of a people as to what is right and proper in collective life. Karl Polanyi’s concept of substantive economies is a way of seizing these differences within the more abstract notion of global capitalism. Polanyi was concerned with the ways in which economies were embedded within societies (Polanyi 1944; Polanyi et al. 1957). He rejected the notion that the economy can be abstracted from society in such a way as to make society subservient to the economy. Where this is attempted—he spoke of the nineteenth-century attempt to impose the rule of a self-regulating market as a utopian project—it provokes a reaction from society that is usually expressed through political action. In Europe, the reaction began with labor legislation and ultimately led to the welfare state. Utopian projects are still current; the most obvious is the hyperliberal attempt to construct a deregulated global market. But other distinctive forms of economic-social organization also exist, and rival forms contest the terrain on which hyperliberalism has claimed predominance (see, for example, Albert 1991). Three salient existing forms of political economy are (1) the AngloAmerican individualistic-competitive form, (2) the European social market form, and (3) the East Asian mercantilist form (Fallows 1994; Tsuru 1993). Each of these has generated ideologized representations. Hyperliberalism is the ideology of the Anglo-American form, envisaging an untrammeled global movement of goods and money. The social market is the characteristic European form, ideologically derived from Christian democracy and social democracy. Asian capitalism has been constructed, often with attribution to Confucianism, as an ideology supportive of authoritarian politics or bureaucratized paternalism. Yet the forms are more deeply rooted than these ideologies; they can be seen as constructions that find a more or less
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congenial base in different human attitudes and values—different intersubjectivities. There is scope for other potential forms of political economy to emerge. What will happen in Russia? The consequence of shock therapy has been erosion of public services, mass unemployment, frequent nonpayment of workers, and an economy controlled by the mafia. Russia’s tragedy has been its people’s subjection to a sequence of alien-inspired radical reforms, first by Peter the Great, then by the Bolsheviks, and now by Harvard economists. Is there a possibility that even so patient a people as the Russians may ultimately reject foreign models and attempt to build their economy based on their own practices of social relations? In China, a new form of political economy is emerging, rather confusedly described as both communist and capitalist yet gradually revealing its own characteristics (Ling 1996). Is it conceivable that Islam will evolve practices that reconcile its principles of human relations with economic activity in an evolving vision of the world? Another force lies in the Green movement, which has given rise to many small, locally based economies with cooperative forms of production and their own currencies (Helleiner 1996). These social experiments may perhaps be seen as an indicator of the search for economic practices that are consistent with biosphere maintenance. These different forms of political economy that express civilizational differences coexist within the world economy and in some cases become rivals. They challenge the notion of a single hegemonic, homogenizing global economy. Lionel Jospin, when the French Socialist Party emerged as victor from the French legislative elections in June 1997, characterized this electoral verdict as “un choix de civilisation” (Le Monde, June 7, 1997). He was stressing a break with the tendency toward dominance of the AngloAmerican form in Europe and the resurgence of the social market form of political economy. The use of the term civilization was appropriate in that context. The victory of Tony Blair’s New Labour Party in British elections several weeks earlier was celebrated not as a rupture with previous tendencies but rather as a change within continuity, heralding what might be called Thatcherism with a human face. The issue between rival concepts of civilization in Europe remains clouded.
Agency in Structural Transformation The distinction between agency and structure is an analytical distinction rather than a distinction of kind. Structures are ways of representing the world as it is. Agency focuses attention on the forces that change structures. Agency, in the sense in which I use the term here, represents cumulative
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actions—not just a single event—that have as consequences either the maintenance or the transformation of structures. We can divide the forces at work into those that operate from the top down, which tend to maintain the trajectory of existing power relations, and those that operate from the bottom up, which may challenge existing power relations. There are also contending forces within the top, and rival and divergent forces at the bottom. Hegemony consists in the formation of a coalition of top-down forces activated by a common consciousness in which those at the bottom are able to participate. Counterhegemony arises when bottom-up forces achieve a common consciousness that is clearly distinct from that of hegemonic power. So a strategy of structural transformation may be seen as a project for the formation of counterhegemony. There is no need to attempt a full inventory of the top-down forces that maintain existing power positions and power relations. I shall mention three sets of forces that I think call for fuller study. The first is the mode of concertation of the dominant world-economy forces. This process takes place through some formal official organizations and conferences (e.g., the G7 meetings, the IMF, the Basel meetings of central bankers) and some less formal conclaves (e.g., the Trilateral Commission, the Davos World Economic Forum), although the important thing is not to identify an organization or an organizational complex but to understand the process through which collective policy guidelines are reached. Because this process is only vaguely delineated, I have called it a nébuleuse (Cox 1996c: 301–302; 1996d: 27).2 A second area that merits much fuller study is the private power that is effective in world financial markets. The bond-rating agencies are a good example of actors that effectively determine the conditions on which governments and corporations can borrow and thus what activities they can undertake and what they must forgo (Sinclair 1994, 1997). A third set of forces have the cumulative consequence of sustaining existing power and can be loosely described as involved in political corruption and clandestine activities. I would group these under the heading “the covert world” and examine particularly the interrelationships of the various kinds of agents in the group. It includes intelligence agencies, organized crime and the drug trade, money-laundering banks, the arms trade, and terrorist organizations. It may seem strange to include terrorist organizations committed to destroying the existing order among a set of forces that have the consequence of maintaining the status quo, but they work in the same field as these other agents and at times interact in cooperation as well as in conflict with them. Although there have been studies of some of these components of the covert world individually, for example, of organized crime and of particular intelligence agencies (the CIA or the KGB), the pattern of interactions among such agencies and their consequences for political sys-
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tems have not received much attention. Yet this realm of political activity has great implications for popular control. A weak civil society leaves a wide political space for occult influences. Probably the best way to enhance democratic accountability is to narrow the space open to the covert world through the development of an active civil society. Struggles shaping different forms of capitalism illustrate the divergent and conflicting tendencies among top-down forces: differences between the United States and Japan over economic practices; the conflict over social policy in Europe, epitomized once as Margaret Thatcher versus Jacques Delors; conflicts over who has the right to harvest depleted fish stocks. These conflicts are indicators of the problematic nature of global capitalist hegemony and of the potential for the emergence of a world of not one capitalism but several. I am not here referring to economic blocs or the socalled triad of rivals: Europe, America, and Japan. I am referring rather to different basic concepts of social economy and the ethics of how production and distribution should be organized. Such different concepts have historical-geographical bases but are not necessarily unified or coherent entities engaged in a trade war. The bottom-up forces are many and various but have rarely achieved a degree of coherence that could plausibly be considered a basis for counterhegemony. The prospect for counterhegemony is, however, the focal issue for the study of structural transformation. The French strikes of December 1996 were notable not only in rallying workers despite the weakening over recent decades of the labor movement but also in gaining the sympathy and support of a public that was willing to put up with a shutdown of public transport in a big city in the cause of combating an economic policy perceived as sacrificing ordinary people in favor of dominant global-economy interests. A comparable effort at mobilizing opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was initiated by labor movements in the United States, Canada, and Mexico with the support of women’s and environmentalist organizations. This effort failed but did demonstrate a degree of political efficacy. Increasingly, new social movements have become the vehicles of protest and means of prospecting for alternative forms of social economy. They have only partially been directed toward the state and have rarely operated through formal electoral channels. They express more a will to reconstitute civil society, and in some cases to construct what Yoshikazu Sakamoto has characterized as a “civic state” on the basis of a strengthened civil society—a state that would be more fully responsive to the bottom-up forces of civil society. This would be the direction in which one could envisage a society that could reestablish harmony within the biosphere. It must be recognized that this aspiration remains utopian. One intriguing model is presented by the Zapatista rebellion in the Mexican state of
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Chiapas, which is seeking to transform itself from a military-political rebel movement into a broader-based movement in civil society that is directed toward the democratization of the Mexican state while building transnational links of support (Najman 1997). Other movements of resistance, very widespread in Africa, have sought survival of excluded groups through organization outside the political system and the formal economy. This form of resistance has been called the “silent revolution” in Africa (Cheru 1989). The collapse of the kleptocratic state in the former Zaire was effected by organized military rebellion, but the way was made easier by the widespread development of local self-help and the informal economy, which deprived the corrupt Mobutu regime of any popular support (Braeckman 1997). The study of social movements has thus become basic to an understanding of the potential for structural transformation. Three levels or stages apply: (1) the level of conditions propitious for awareness of being in a common situation, a sense of opposition toward dominant powers; (2) the level of a social movement, that is, a condition of aroused and motivated collective consciousness; and (3) the level of organization that poses the questions of alliance and cohesion among groups, of doctrine and ideology, and of leadership. It should not be assumed that all social movements are supportive of democratic methods and open comprehensiveness. The contemporary world is rife with racism and right-wing populism; the possibility of a fascist revival is probably stronger now than at any time since the 1930s. Such undemocratic organizations are as much popular movements as those usually classified as new social movements. Civil society is a terrain of struggle between exclusionary and nonexclusionary forces. The context in which this struggle is taking place seems to leave the outcome indeterminate. If modernism in political terms can be defined à la Max Weber as consisting of states that define the national identities and loyalties of people, hierarchical rational bureaucratic administrations, and classes and status groups that give people their social identities, this modernist social structure has become weaker in all parts of the world (although more weak in some parts than others). State authority has been fragmented by ethnic, linguistic, and local identities and by macroregional institutions like the European Union and NAFTA. Bureaucracies have been experienced as alienating by those who have to deal with them. Class identities have been eroded by the growing salience of ethnic, cultural, and gender identities and by the fragmenting of classes in the new social structuring produced by globalization. People have become depoliticized by awareness that politicians are incapable of dealing or unwilling to deal with the consequences of economic globalization as it affects their lives through decaying public services
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and unemployment, and by evidence of political corruption that flows from the high cost of election campaigns and the importance of political decisions for corporate interests. The postmodern political condition is one of weakened and fragmented authority at the top and fragmentation of protest and resistance at the bottom. Occasionally, the latter may be overcome by a (usually unsustained) explosion of “people power.” Eric Hobsbawm summed this up when he wrote in his Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991: “The world at the end of the Short Twentieth Century is in a state of social breakdown rather than revolutionary crisis” (Hobsbawm 1994: 459). What is to be done? The only way effectively to confront the salient issues of the early twenty-first century—biospheric collapse, extreme social polarization, exclusionary politics—is to reconstitute political authorities at local, national, and global levels that are firmly based in public support. Only strong public authorities will be capable of dealing with these problems. Such a movement would have to come from the bottom, from a reconstitution of civil society as a support for political authorities attentive to people’s needs (whereas much of the movement in civil society recently has been toward withdrawal from alienating government and corporate powers). The movement presupposes the rediscovery of social solidarity and of confidence in a potential for sustained collective creativity, inspired by a commitment to social equity, to reciprocal recognition of cultural and civilizational differences, to biospheric survival, and to nonviolent methods of dealing with conflict. The supreme challenge is to build a counterhegemonic formation that would embody these principles; and this task implies as a first step the working out of an ontology that focuses attention on the key elements in this struggle.
Notes 1. Giambattista Vico, a philologist working in Naples in the early eighteenth century, may be regarded as the first countermodernist (neither a premodernist nor a postmodernist). It was very clear to him that the human mind was not adapted to understanding the truth of the universe. It was, however, he thought, well adapted to understanding the processes of historical change (Vico 1970). 2. I have sought to avoid imputing clandestine power to this partially visible, or transparent, complex: “The visible form is a photo opportunity accompanied by an anodyne press communiqué. Far from being a sinister occult power, the nébuleuse may turn out to be a Wizard of Oz. Perhaps no one, or no coherent structure, is really in control” (Cox 1996d: 27).
4 CRITICAL THEORY AND THE DEMOCRATIC IMPULSE: UNDERSTANDING A CENTURY-OLD TRADITION Craig N. Murphy
Contemporary critical theory in English-language international relations (IR) may best be understood as today’s manifestation of a long-standing democratic impulse in the academic study of international affairs. The impact of this impulse can account for scientifically progressive breakpoints within the discipline, the moments of transformation that are part of almost every conventional account of the field’s history—for example, the transition from idealism to realism in the period between World Wars I and II. Understanding critical theory in this way lets us compare today’s scholarship to that of earlier democratically inspired schools within the discipline; it allows us to ask whether today’s theorists have been as successful as their predecessors. Along most relevant dimensions of comparison, today’s critical theory is just as progressive as its three predecessors—the work of John A. Hobson and his colleagues in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the interwar studies of realists on the left such as E. H. Carr and Reinhold Niebuhr, and the critical scientific peace research of the early 1960s. Nonetheless, along one significant dimension, contemporary critical theory may be less progressive than its predecessors. Unlike early scholars with similar political motivations and similar epistemological concerns, contemporary critical theorists have offered little programmatic input into the political practice of egalitarian social movements. In the final section of the chapter I speculate as to why. Before doing so I make the case that the history of the field can be understood through the lens of this hypothesized democratic impulse and then link earlier manifestations of this impulse to some defining intellectual practices of contemporary critical theory. 61
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Egalitarian Concerns in International Relations When social science disciplines recount their own histories, it is almost invariably with the aim of explaining why some current disciplinary trend continues a line of scientific progress that has marked the field since its beginning. Within a field these accounts most often differ simply because there are different ways of defining the central concerns of science and therefore different criteria for assessing its progress. One of the most consistent stories that IR scholars can tell about their own field is that it has at its core a view of social science as a meliorative endeavor subject to a consensus theory of truth. In this story, scientific progress occurs along five relatively orthogonal dimensions. Thus, a progressive social science regularly produces explanations that 1. Account for more phenomena, 2. Are more consistent within themselves and with other scientific accounts of other phenomena, 3. Would be consented to more widely by all free men and women (men and women whose views are unconstrained by relations of domination or exploitation), 4. Empower the weak or otherwise ameliorate their condition, and 5. Are more concise, parsimonious, or elegant than other explanations. Although progress can take place along any one of these dimensions, they are listed in an order of relative importance that would be consistent with a meliorative, consensus-oriented epistemology (Tooze and Murphy 1996). Of course, there would be many who would argue with both the ordering of these dimensions of scientific progress and the inclusion of some, in particular the third and the fourth. Here I ask readers to accept only that these are five dimensions along which a consistent, academically credible account of social scientific progress might be made. In fact, they are the dimensions along which critical theorists following Jürgen Habermas are likely to judge scientific progress. They emphasize that the practical, meliorative dimension is as essential in social science as it is in medicine and that unconstrained consensus is an indicator of truth that is particularly significant to the social world (Habermas 1971: 75–90; McCarthy 1978: 303–307). Periodically there have been prominent schools of IR scholars who have judged the progress of their own scientific work along this set of dimensions. I contend that these successive schools reflect a democratic impulse operating within the field simply because the epistemological views of these schools can be distinguished most readily from those of their contemporaries by considering the two democratic dimensions, 3 and 4.
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Many other schools of scholars, let’s call them uncritical scholars or problem-solving scholars (to follow Robert W. Cox), separate any meliorative concerns they may have as citizens, religious devotees, and so on from judgments about the success of their work in what they conceive of as a value-neutral realm of social science. Many of the same scholars also see little reason to judge their work on the democratic basis of the breadth of the unconstrained consensus that it might enjoy. Quite the contrary, many understand the history of more mature sciences as evidence that true scientific progress may lead to a progressive narrowing of the intellectual caste that is capable of understanding the new truths as they are revealed. Despite the fact that an uncritical view of science often has been the one accepted by mainstream IR scholars, it is significant that the major progressive disciplinary changes that are recognized by almost all accounts of international relations were not wrought by these uncritical, problem-solving schools, no matter how much more conventional their view of scientific progress may be. The key changes were wrought by men and women who both wanted the discipline to speak to an ever wider audience and were certain that the field had a socially progressive, meliorative function. Between those moments of critical innovation, the academic discipline usually deteriorated along dimensions 3 and 4 even though more parsimonious, more consistent, and (to a lesser extent) more encompassing work was produced from year to year by the increasingly uncritical mainstream.
Origins of the Academic Field A century ago international relations first entered the English-speaking academy on both sides of the Atlantic as the child of an anti-imperialist social movement. The academy was one of a number of places in which citizens of increasingly democratic nations found the space to talk with other citizens about the politics of princes. The field’s key founders in both Great Britain and the United States were activist scholars such as John A. Hobson, an early leader of the Union of Democratic Control of Foreign Policy, and Emily Greene Balch, the Wellesley College economist who chaired the union’s sister organization in the United States. In Britain, Hobson’s books and lectures fueled public outrage over the human and financial costs of the Boer War. He treated British actions as ruthless aggression in defense of the narrow interests of the mining companies newly operating throughout southern Africa in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The political object of this Christian socialist economist’s critique included the various organizations and publications through which Cecil Rhodes had created a movement supporting his mining interests (on Hobson, see Long 1996; for Balch, see Randall 1964, Palmieri 1995).
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Hobson’s attempts to explain the international politics of his day were preferable on all five dimensions to the alternative explanations offered at the time, both the realist arguments of the generals and diplomats who disapproved of the new level of public discussion of matters of state and the liberal imperialist arguments promulgated by the more democratic voices that were sponsored by Rhodes and other captains of industry. Hobson and his colleagues could explain underemployment as well as imperialism; free citizens as well as statecrafters were treated as competent enough to support their views—and those views certainly won in the court of public opinion; the scholars of the new field promulgated meliorative policies of full employment, nonintervention, and support for democratization when it occurred overseas. Moreover, their views did not suffer from the contradiction of the “scientific” racism that was central to the liberal imperialist account. In his classic study Imperialism, Hobson maintained that the simultaneous extensions of the British, French, German, Belgian, and U.S. empires in the last decades of the nineteenth century reflected the capture of diplomatic and military policy by self-interested political minorities (Hobson 1965). There was, Hobson agreed, a real economic problem to which the overseas investment associated with imperialism was a response: Industrial capitalist economies produce more than can easily be consumed or invested at home without diminishing the relative power of the capitalists. But imperialism was neither the only nor the best solution. A better alternative, one that would serve the interests of the vast majority, would be to allow the wages of the vast majority of poorly paid workers at home to rise. The fact that governments of industrialized societies did not choose this alternative reflected the capture of foreign policy by a tiny minority (Hobson 1965; Long 1996: 72–96). A political solution, to make foreign policy subject to democratic control, followed directly. The popularity of that conclusion increased between the end of the Boer War, in 1902, and the end of World War I, in 1919. Others added to Hobson’s arguments. Norman Angell, another leader of the Union of Democratic Control, affirmed that it was not capitalist interests per se that led to belligerence and violence. To the contrary, the larger profit that could come to capitalists through peacetime trade ensured that if all modern states could be made subject to the general interest of profit-making firms (as distinct from the particularistic interests of a specific sector) they would be peaceful (J.B.D. Miller 1995). Angell would later be derided by realists who deliberately misunderstood him as having proclaimed the logical impossibility of war among capitalist powers just months before the outbreak of World War I, but in his own day he was treated as a prophet. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in the early years when it was still occasionally given for the same purpose as all the others endowed by the
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Swedish industrialist, to spur invention and science in the designated field, in this case, the new field of public discourse about international affairs. Nonetheless, the choice of Angell rather than other British IR innovators was hardly apolitical. Whereas Hobson’s sort of argument tended to appeal to a working-class and, as yet, not particularly powerful audience, Angell’s kind of argument spoke to more powerful commercial and industrial leaders, one of whom endowed the first professorial chair of international politics at what is now the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. The benefactor named the chair for Woodrow Wilson, the hero of the moment, whose well-intentioned but somewhat incoherent diplomacy throughout the war had been legitimated with the democratic foreign policy slogan, “open agreements, openly arrived at” (Porter 1995). Back in the United States the more intellectually consistent arguments in favor of democratic foreign policy came not from Wilson’s political supporters and apologists but from many of the men and women, like Emily Greene Balch, who founded the discipline of international relations. Although Balch supported many of Wilson’s ideas about a postwar League of Nations, she was an ardent critic of his 1915 intervention in Haiti and of U.S. imperialism in general. Balch, like Hobson, also worked to help define and articulate the demands of industrial labor, focusing especially on the interests of women and immigrants, who made up the majority of the U.S. working class at the turn of the twentieth century (Palmieri 1995: 130, 170–171; Balch 1910, 1918, 1927). Balch’s political leanings led to her 1918 dismissal from the conservative New England college where she taught. Although she later became reconciled with the academic world when the college joined in nominating her for her 1946 Nobel Peace Prize, other, often more conservative—more Wilsonian—scholars ended up filling the space she had helped create in the U.S. academy for the field of international relations. Many in the interwar generation of IR scholars on both sides of the Atlantic maintained faith in the pacific influence of public opinion over foreign policy as well as in Angell’s conclusions about the ultimately benign interests of capitalist enterprise. Many of the interwar scholars worked tirelessly to support and maintain the international institutional framework in which the pacific interests of business in free trade and intergovernmental cooperation might come to the fore. Scholars became some of the most visible and ardent critics of U.S. isolationism and some of the most impassioned advocates of the League of Nations. By the early 1930s, when most League agencies began to experience chronic financial crises, some scholars were willing to move to Geneva and work with little or no pay to staff the beleaguered institutions (anticipating a practice that has been typical within the UN since the mid-1980s, when the United States stopped paying its full assessments). Others stayed in the academy, work-
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ing to design new, more effective systems of international government and to convince the next generation of elites to accept their legitimacy (Murphy 1994: 183–184).
Interwar Realism as Democratic Critique Few living IR scholars have a very clear conception of the preoccupations and motivations of the first generation of scholars within our field, but most of us remember E. H. Carr’s devastating portrayal of the naive idealism affecting both policymakers and scholars in the interwar decades when war was “abolished” by international agreement and true believers turned a blind eye to the League’s obvious failures in Ethiopia and Manchuria. We may be less likely to remember what some think of as unpleasant truths about Carr: that his realism initially led him to support appeasement, that he opposed the kind of liberal internationalism that is now so often portrayed as the only road to prosperity and peace, and that he and other early realists such as Reinhold Niebuhr stood far to the political left of most of the “idealists” they critiqued (Carr 1946: chs. 1–2; Brown 1992; Merkeley 1975; Kegley and Bretall 19561). Carr, Niebuhr, and the recently more accurately remembered Karl Polanyi—whose Great Transformation was a contemporary work that is similar to the major studies of the canonical realists 2 —all provided accounts of international affairs that were superior to those of their academic contemporaries, whom Carr caricatured as utopians. The utopians—the more Wilsonian successors of the more democratic founders of the field such as Hobson and Balch—had consistent ways to account for the failure of the League. The realists could not only explain that failure; their theories also explained the economic failure of the liberal fundamentalist economic policies (endorsed by the victors in World War I as the best policy for the vanquished and then adopted by Republicans in the 1920s), the rise of fascism (as a political response to long-term contradictions of liberal economics and shorter-term issues that ensured the failure of the Weimar Republic’s alternative), and the reasons for the failure of well-meaning liberals (Wilsonians) in their attempt to establish a social order that supported the common woman and man (Murphy 1994: 163–177). The early realists also wrote for a “democratic” audience that extended beyond the academy both to citizens—for example, the industrial labor movements to which the prewar Niebuhr remained closely linked—and to government officials. The meliorative aspects of the early realists’ work included not only relatively clear-eyed proposals about the fascist threat but also proposals for more democratic societies to copy aspects of the thensuccessful systems of state involvement in the economy by the fascists and
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the Soviets, proposals that were echoed in the interwar studies of some critical liberal internationalists, such as David Mitrany and Mary Parker Follett, who, significantly, were never labeled as idealists or utopians by the early canonical realists (Murphy 1998). Finally, the early realist views suffered from neither of the sets of contradictions that typified many of their academic or policy-making contemporaries. As Jawaharlal Nehru argued in his brilliant contemporary analysis of World War II, a key part of the political background both of the actual appeasement policy of Britain’s conservative government and of the failure to use the League to counter earlier fascist moves was the continuing sympathy that many reactionary policymakers had for the racist ideology underlying fascism (Nehru 1985: 418, 481–482). But no dewy-eyed, antiscientific Anglo-Saxonism clouded the early realists’ analysis. Nor, of course, did the realists suffer from what we now might call the psychological denial that affected the interwar liberals whose own Wilsonian vision had proven so flawed. Of course, today, realism is rarely remembered as the international theory of the left. In the Cold War United States the theory became attached to the name George Kennan, the formative intellectual of the postwar U.S. world empire, and to such aging progressives as Niebuhr and Walter Lippmann, who turned their backs on the socialist ideals that had guided them throughout their most politically active years. By the late 1950s one version of realism had become, in part, a justification for shielding foreign policy makers from public scrutiny; it was the so-called realism of the national-security experts—along with their special, publicly inaccessible knowledge—that made it best to let them make all those vital decisions about the nuclear arms race, the NATO buildup, and land wars in poorly understood parts of Asia.
Behaviorist Peace Research as Democratic Challenge Almost as soon as this uncritical form of realism gained ascendancy within the journalistic and policy communities in the English-speaking world, it was challenged from inside the academy. The challenge came in part from scholars who are, often somewhat strangely, not considered part of the canonical tradition of international relations. Most notable in this group are the revisionist historians of U.S. foreign policy (see, for example, Williams 1959, LeFeber 1963, McCormick 1967). The challenge also came from some, such as linguist Noam Chomsky and socialist activist Michael Harrington, whose exclusion from the canon is more easily understood. Chomsky and Harrington never based their critiques of uncritical realism
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on their academic expertise but asked simply that they be treated as the observations of informed citizens within a democracy (Chomsky 1969; Harrington 1977). Nonetheless, there was one group within the academy that is still treated as part of the IR canon and that did link its critique to its academic expertise: the early generation of behaviorist peace researchers. Elise Boulding recalls the intellectual hothouse of the early years of “scientific” peace research, especially at the University of Michigan, where she and Kenneth Boulding crossed paths with J. David Singer, Anatol Rapoport, Johan Galtung, and many others who shared a commitment to scientific method and distrust of Cold War policymakers and their incoherent, superstition-laden, war-promoting observations about the world (Boulding 1997). She reports that in the still unquestionably sexist academic world of the day, it fell to her—the woman with “free” time—to comb through the scrap baskets and put together the newsletter that began to link the Ann Arbor group to like-minded groups—Robert North’s astonishingly productive group of students at Stanford; Karl Deutsch, Bruce Russett, and Hayward Alker at Yale; and others. This was the beginning of the International Peace Research Association, the Peace Science Society, and the research sections on foreign policy, peace studies, and the scientific study of international processes within the International Studies Association. That these groups began with an essentially meliorative aim is hardly questioned within the standard histories of the field. That their epistemological concerns were essentially democratic may surprise some in the current generation of critical theorists, but consider Ole Holsti’s paradigmatic study of John Foster Dulles’s beliefs (Holsti 1962). Holsti hoped with his research to help explain why Cold War foreign policy experts failed to live up to their promise. The study shows that Dulles, far from being realistic, was a rigid ideologue, someone incapable of having his core beliefs about the Soviet Union moved by any change in Soviet behavior. Holsti demonstrates his conclusion by referring to information and forms of analysis accessible to any citizen; to public documents, not secret insider knowledge; and to easily replicable systems of counting and readily calculated correlations. With Holsti and the other behaviorist peace researchers, as with Habermas, truth is largely that which is judged to be true by the largest possible consensus of free women and men. Science, rather than the much less accountable policy expertise, is the road to truth about international affairs, in large part simply because science is democratic. The story of another wonderful article, from the waning years of the Vietnam War, makes the point even more pointedly. J. David Singer and Melvin Small used the generalizations about international affairs contained in the presidential state-of-the-world messages to evaluate the theories
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espoused by the quintessential (uncritical) realists of the day, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. Using the publicly available, readily replicable Correlates of War data, simple two-by-two tables, and clearly explained statistical measures, they demonstrated that Nixon frequently affirmed sweeping generalizations that were not supported by the historical record, as well as many, of course, that were. The article’s lessons are made even more dramatic by the authors’ account of the initial reception of their research. They initially wrote their report for Foreign Affairs, the elite journal in which foreign policy experts speak to each other and to corporate leaders and top journalists. Foreign Affairs rejected the article. The democratic epistemology that its authors affirmed did not mesh with the belief in the value of irreproducible expertise, which was widely shared by the journal’s elite readers (Singer and Small 1975). Thus much of early behaviorist IR shared the same democratic impulse that animated both the first wave of anti-imperialist scholars and the interwar realists on the left. In addition, the work begun in Ann Arbor, Stanford, and Oslo was superior to the contemporary uncritical realism along all dimensions. Singer and Small, or any of those who provided competing behaviorist accounts of war that were not simply codifications of realism, could indeed explain more cases than Kissinger or any other realist luminary (Vasquez and Henehan 1992). The behaviorists had a consistent view of knowledge, its sources, and its role in policymaking that was in sharp contrast to the inconsistent views of the traditional scholars and policymakers of their day. The behaviorists’ epistemology urged them to place their ideas before as wide an audience as possible, and their concerns about the way they built their science meshed with a meliorative agenda that linked them to forms of democratic social action, to movements for peace and justice that helped ensure that their societies survived the Cold War. Of course, many scholars trained on both sides of the Atlantic in years after the Vietnam War never experienced behaviorist peace research as a democratic, critical tradition. Many IR scholars today are apt to see demands for science as only one part of the gate-keeping activities performed by relatively conservative, most often U.S., and most often white and male scholars against the critical voices of scholars whose specific egalitarian concerns have only recently gained a tenuous foothold within the field. There is a great deal of truth to that observation, although it is one that may make us forget an important part of the history of the field. It is, perhaps, useful to remember that before Kenneth Waltz or Robert O. Keohane were self-consciously writing about the values of social science, when they were still writing in the mode of traditional scholars, Elise Boulding and Cynthia Enloe were self-conscious positivists, creating a social science whose truths were open to all as part of the critical challenge
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to an undemocratic cult of international relations expertise (consider, for example, Boulding 1976; Enloe 1980).
The Rise of Contemporary Critical Theory The current wave of democratically inspired theory in IR grew up, in part, as a challenge to the uncritical positivism of the field’s mainstream, especially as it was consolidated in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet it is important to recognize that the response to positivism was not the whole story. Looked at through the lens of the longer history of citizens talking to citizens about the politics of princes, the self-consciously critical theory of the 1990s came as part of a wave of democratically inspired global theory that began in the waning years of the Vietnam War. The primary aim of that movement has been to make a wide range of previously excluded voices heard within the central academic and public dialogues about international affairs. Whereas Hobson and Balch’s generation spoke about the imperialized world, primarily with the aim of promoting the interests of working people within the colonizing powers, worldsystems theory, subaltern studies, and much of Gramscian IR sought to amplify the voices of the imperialized world, to rewrite international relations from the point of view of the interests and aspirations of the impoverished South. Whereas every earlier generation of critical theorists of international relations included women who often saw parallels between the emancipation struggles of women and movements for peace and decolonization, the feminist IR of the previous decade has placed gender inequality at the center of what needs to be understood in order to understand international affairs. Whereas earlier generations of critical scholars recognized the importance of protracted social conflicts rooted in histories of injustice to the vast majority of the world’s less powerful, members of the new generation of critical scholars whose research led them to form conflict-resolution workshops linking perpetrators and victims actually empowered the victims by taking the task of explaining those conflicts away from external experts and demanding, instead, that the discipline accept the mutually agreed upon explanations of the conflicts that arose from those workshops as the most plausible explanation (Rouhana and Kelman 1994). The article in which Robert Cox makes his often-cited distinction between critical and problem-solving theory includes a strong acknowledgment of the key link between democratic inclusiveness and the critical enterprise (Cox 1981). Theory is always for someone. Critical theory is the kind that allows us to understand how social structures come into being and how they may be changed. It is, in that sense, the kind of theory that is for those who are concerned with the transformation of society as it is, largely
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including those whose interests and aspirations are not served by global structures as they are—the excluded, the powerless, the hitherto unheard. When contemporary IR critical theory is understood in this larger way—as a movement concerned with vastly increasing the number of voices, the number of standpoints, reflected within the field—the movement, too, can be seen as producing scientific progress within the discipline. Almost invariably, today’s critical theory accounts for more than uncritical positivist studies of the same phenomena, if only because the critical theorist includes a wider range of people as objects to explain and as sources of explanation. Liberal feminist Mona Harrington, for example, often can explain much more than canonical liberal institutionalists, including her mentor, Stanley Hoffmann, simply because she demands that her theories account for the actions of women as well as they account for the actions of men (cf. Harrington 1981 with Hoffmann 1968). Similarly, the internal logic of much of today’s critical theory is quite a bit more coherent than that of much uncritical IR positivism simply because uncritical work often must rely on loosely connected ad hoc arguments to explain away its failure to include the entire universe of cases under its “universal” generalizations.3 And, of course, the inclusion of a wider range of people within critical theory’s understanding of global politics mirrors its epistemological commitment to wide, unconstrained consensus as a primary gauge of truth.
The Impossibility of a Detached Social Science So far, then, I have made the case that IR critical theory really does do little more than update Hobson, if that is taken to mean that it carries out the byno-means-simple task of reflecting the democratic impulse that has resulted in the major breakpoints of scientific progress within the field. Here I want to take the argument further and claim that some of what is often seen as the distinctive contributions of today’s critical theory was also anticipated within the schools that reflected the same democratic impulse at an earlier time. Much of what is distinctive about today’s critical theory comes from its critique of international relations positivism, so my claim here is simply that parts of that critique have been present in each of the earlier critical schools. Steve Smith writes of today’s critical theorists that one of their great strengths is treating the silences of mainstream research as meaningful, asking why those silences exist, positing plausible explanations for them, and using those explanations to uncover aspects of the way in which international action is constituted (Smith 1995: 1–2). For example, within the subfield of international organization and international law, Peter Vale has followed the silences of realist and liberal discussions about the new world
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order to identify quite clearly whom the order is not for, who is bound to be peripheralized no matter which side wins the hegemonic debate over the near-term global future (Vale 1995). And within international political economy, Roger Tooze has written about the “unwritten prefaces” to neorealist and neoliberal classics, their authors’ silences about the quite restricted, often inherently undemocratic cultures in which they believe reliable knowledge must be constituted (Tooze 1988). Vale’s contribution is like many of those made by earlier IR critical theorists when they followed the silences in the uncritical mainstream of their day. The earliest academic IR scholars followed silences about imperialism that made it possible for policymakers to ignore the issue of undercompensated labor at home. The interwar realists saw Wilsonian denial about the failure of the League and the rosy-eyed view of Adolf Hitler as a sort of closet liberal internationalist as a useful mask for the unpleasant reality that there were real alternatives to free-market liberalism on both the left and the right. Cold War peace researchers uncovered the Western interests in maintaining the system of antagonistic blocs that lay behind the mainstream’s unwillingness to examine evidence of changing Soviet motivations. Anatol Rapoport, for example, wrote that it was foolish to look to empirical peace research to provide expertise to end the bipolar conflict simply because the problem was not that scholars knew too little about the conflict but that the bipolar powers did not want to end the conflict. The role of peace research was, instead, to undermine the legitimacy of the war system via “critical enlightenment” in “areas where obsolete thinking and habits and vested interests perpetuate superstitions that stand in the way of removing a very real threat to civilization” (Rapoport 1988). Each group of critical scholars also included those who, like Tooze, examined the knowledge-constituting culture that generated the silences of their day. The early anti-imperialists and the Cold War–era peace researchers emphasized the way in which traditions of expertise led to the denial of public scrutiny and, from there, to blindness to questions about the systemic sources of competitive imperialism and superpower rivalry. The interwar realists also explored the impact of a knowledge-constituting culture that afforded scholars and policymakers an intellectual basis on which to deny the evidence of the failure of the League and of the liberal fundamentalist economic policies that had been imposed on weaker nations. This culture is not dissimilar, as the distinguished Mexican economist Victor Urquidi argues, from the knowledge-constituting culture of today’s neoliberal economics and neoliberal international political economy (Urquidi 1992). Early generations of critical IR theorists also reflected on the epistemological problem of disinterested objectivity in the social sciences. Hobson and Carr both wrote that the key distinction between the natural and social
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sciences arose from the fact that doing social science was itself social action that was bound to influence the things the (positivist) scientist merely wished to observe. The insight did not lead them to discard traditional scholarly methods of question generation, evidence gathering, and verification, but it did lead them to caution themselves and their colleagues about the potential, often unpredictable, impact of their own words, which could become self-fulfilling prophecies or (perhaps more usefully) one of those strange kinds of social myth that become a reality if they are believed—for example, the myth of the collective power of the working class to transform capitalism by the withdrawal of its labor power (Augelli and Murphy 1998). Peace researchers Rapoport and Adam Curle took a similar set of issues even further by noting that there are significant sets of real-world conflicts that are unresolvable in the form of strategic games: asymmetric conflicts (conflicts involving distributional inequalities) and ideological conflicts, including conflicts of identity. Both are resolvable only in the nonstrategic mode that Rapoport called debate, but social scientists cannot explain (or predict) the successful outcome of debates. If we could, if we could point to a specific sequence of actions that would invariably result in one party convincing another party of the first’s way of seeing an issue of identity or justice, actors would be able to use that pattern in a deceitful way, as a strategy to win compliance, thus turning the debate back into a strategic game in which the conflict is unresolvable. As a result, Rapoport argued, we social scientists really cannot produce any positive theory relevant to the general problem of making peace in most of the conflicts that plague the world, but we can say something about the ethics of debate, about the type of discourse situation that must be maintained if we want to have any hope that a conflict involving questions of injustice or identity can be resolved (Rapoport 1962: 1–28; Curle 1971: 183–189). Mark Hoffman, one of the leading figures in the new generation of IR critical theory, has taken that conclusion to heart in his actions and research as a third-party facilitator within protracted social conflicts. Conflict workshops create the possibility of Rapoport-style debate that may allow conflicts of injustice or identity to be resolved by the parties involved (Hoffman 1992). This type of debate is, in fact, one significant way in which contemporary critical theory has had programmatic impact on the practice of some egalitarian social movements, specifically those that have become explicit parties in protracted conflicts in which violence has been one of a number of strategies used to promote the interests and aspirations of the least advantaged. I believe it is also significant that this important input into egalitarian practice simply continues and replicates one of the inputs of the previous generation of scholars whose work reflected the democratic impulse within the field.
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Contemporary Critical Theory and Egalitarian Practice Earlier generations of critical scholars made contributions to egalitarian practice in two other ways: (1) by suggesting designs for social institutions that would regularly reproduce more egalitarian outcomes, and (2) by suggesting strategies that movements of the disadvantaged might follow in order to defeat their opponents. Perhaps our generation of critical scholars has been less likely to offer this second type of input simply because, consciously or unconsciously, we have learned the lesson understood by Rapoport and also promulgated quite explicitly (in different ways) by Gandhi and by some recent poststructuralist commentaries on egalitarian political practice: Ultimately conflicts between oppressors and oppressed must be resolved through the transformation of the perceptions and attitudes of the oppressors (and, likely, those of the oppressed) via open debate, a process in which strategic concerns are irrelevant (Rapoport 1972: 84; see also, in a different context, Brent 1996). My own hunch is that this idea is not true. Even if we had learned this lesson, we would probably have learned along with it Adam Curle’s related lesson that the dominant parties in asymmetric conflicts enter such debates only after they have become convinced of the material and moral power of the weaker party, and getting to that stage is, most certainly, a matter of strategy and gamesmanship, as Gandhi’s life work so clearly demonstrates (Curle 1971: 183–189). Similarly, even if we had learned Rapoport’s lesson, we would still have reason to work on the first issue: designing more egalitarian institutions that might be agreed upon at the end of the transformative debates that can resolve asymmetric conflicts. It may be easier to understand why these sort of forward-looking plans are as rare for our generation as they were for the interwar critical realists. Unlike Hobson’s generation or the generation of the early positivist peace researchers, we live at a time that is not very hopeful for those with egalitarian aspirations and with interests in substantive democracy. As the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other intergovernmental agencies keep repeating year after year, global inequality—material inequality among regions of the world and among social classes everywhere—has grown more in the past twenty-five or thirty years than in the entire period of the rapid growth of inequality that began with the British Industrial Revolution (UNDP 1999). At the same time, in the past fifteen to twenty years, almost all of the grand egalitarian visionary projects of the twentieth century have been discredited: communism, decolonization, the welfare state. Perhaps our positive theory has failed to let us see any alternatives to these older grand visions. Perhaps we do not understand enough about the
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global political economy to create a relevant grand egalitarian vision for the early twenty-first century or even politically relevant visions of lessencompassing policy changes. If that is the case, it may very well be that today’s critical theorists would do well to follow Susan Strange’s unwelcome advice and “get on with it” by doing empirical research either to find the relevant levers of power for the disadvantaged or to persuasively conclude that no such levers exist (the phrase did not survive into the published version, but see Strange 1995). Perhaps we find Strange’s admonition troubling in part because within academic international relations it is actually quite comfortable for critical scholars to be politically detached from the social movements that are working to thwart the global forces they see as creating ever greater inequality. One of the leading historians of U.S. IR has argued that in terms at least of democratic input into foreign policy, the recent (post–World War II) legitimation and professionalization of the field has been a very mixed blessing. It has meant that now, during their college days, U.S. elites are likely to learn a bit about the world at large, some of it even from relatively critical scholars. That is probably a good thing for the lives of the many people around the world who are subject to U.S. supremacy. It has also meant, however, that as critical scholars have found more opportunities within the academy, the need to serve as intellectuals of popular social movements has faded (McCaughey 1984). On a grander stage Gramsci writes of the hegemonic strategy of “decapitating” the popular masses by enticing their intellectuals into the priesthood, the universities, and the state-run schools (Augelli and Murphy 1988: 125–126). Similarly, Emily Greene Balch’s recent biographer writes that her dismissal from Wellesley was, in the long run, a personal liberation that allowed her to focus her intellect entirely on the issues that the college’s governors found so disreputable (Palmieri 1995: 117–118, 242–244). No critical theorist would hope for a similar closing of the space for critical IR within today’s academy. Nonetheless, we may need to guard against the political tameness and complacency that would help to keep that space open.
Notes 1. In terms of the history of postwar IR, it is interesting that the Kegley and Bretall volume was edited by the father of positivist foreign policy, analyst Charles W. Kegley Jr., whose recent work has come out of a critical peace research tradition and emphasizes liberal-internationalist “democratic peace” arguments that are more typical of Hobson or Balch. See Kegley and Raymond 1994. 2. This link is recognized by a number of those who admire Robert W. Cox’s work and is, perhaps, reflected in his choice of a designation for the eclectic combination of insights from Gramsci, Polanyi, and others (Cox 1997).
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3. Some of the most telling critiques of the tendency of IR positivism to ignore large numbers of relevant cases have come from scholars employing more traditional methods. Robert H. Jackson, for example, has demonstrated that scores of the “fundamental units” of rationalist neoliberal and neorealist models simply do not have the independence that those models assume. Hence, the resulting theories can, at best, apply to only a limited part of the world (see Jackson 1993).
PART TWO CRITIQUE IN CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
5 THE NATURE OF CRITIQUE IN CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY Kimberly Hutchings
In this chapter the aim is to focus attention on the nature of critique in the kind of international relations theory that refers to itself as critical. I begin by drawing attention to the fact that there are different forms of critical international relations theory. What is sometimes identified as critical theory proper tends to rely heavily on Marxist or Frankfurt School sources. In contrast, postmodernist and feminist IR theory, which also sees itself as critical, draws on a range of post-Marxist inspirations. In spite of this diversity of theoretical grounding, however, I argue that it is possible to identify a common element that helps to identify all these theoretical approaches as critical. It is my contention that this common element reflects a logic that can be traced back to the origins of the idea of critique in the work of Kant. I then go on to suggest that, as with Kantian critique, there are both dangers and possibilities inherent in the kind of critical theoretical turn in international relations (IR) that is the subject of this book. The dangers can be summed up as those of lapsing back into the wars of reason between realist and idealist perspectives, which critical theory in international relations is actually supposed to have transcended. These dangers, I argue, are largely responsible for the tendency of critical IR theory to remain trapped within unsolvable theoretical debates rather than turning attention toward redirecting empirical research and specific explanation. The possibilities of critical IR theory relate to the ways in which it opens up our understanding of the scope and potential of developments in international politics. There are two dimensions to critical theory’s contribution here: On the one hand, by challenging the traditional limitations on explanation, critical theory extends the capacity of social scientists to account for particular phenomena; on the other hand, by never taking the limitations and conditions of possibility of 79
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contemporary world politics as given, critical theorists elucidate the possibilities and probabilities of change. There are at least four general positions that can claim to be examples of critical theory in the international relations context. First, there is neoGramscian work on global political economy and international politics, most notably exemplified by the work of Robert W. Cox (see, for example, 1996a). Second, there is explanatory and normative theory, such as that of Andrew Linklater (Linklater 1990a, 1990b, 1998), which draws on the work of the Frankfurt School and of Jürgen Habermas in particular. Third, there is postmodernist work—such as that of Richard Ashley (1988), R.B.J. Walker (1993, Ashley and Walker 1990), James Der Derian (1987, Der Derian and Shapiro 1989), and Jens Bartelson (1995)—that draws on a range of poststructuralist and postmodernist philosophers, of which Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida are the most significant (on Foucault, see Hutchings 1997). Fourth, there is feminist work, such as that of Jean Elshtain (1987), Cynthia Enloe (1989), Christine Sylvester (1994), V. Spike Peterson (1992a), Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland (1991), and Ann Tickner (1992), which draws on a very wide range of traditions (including Marxism, the Frankfurt School, and postmodernism) but always insofar as those traditions have been mediated by the insights of the diversity of theoretical traditions peculiar to feminism (see also Hutchings 1994). In none of these four categories is there an exact consensus about what that particular version of critical theory should look like. This means that it is no easy matter to pin down what being critical means or to work out whether there is anything in common among the perspectives that all see themselves as critical. I suggest, however, that there is a certain common logic at work in these different critical positions. This is not an argument that all these different perspectives are saying the same thing but simply that insofar as they involve a critical aspect, they share certain formal characteristics that have particular theoretical and practical consequences. The best way of summing up what all the previously mentioned critical theories have in common, I would suggest, is to say that they are all engaged in tracing and challenging given limits, most obviously the limits given in the dominant neorealist perspectives on the explanation and judgment of international politics but also, particularly in the case of some postmodernist and feminist work, those inherent in more liberal, idealist approaches. There are two interrelated ways in which critical theories accomplish this. One is by focusing on the ways in which the object of investigation in international relations fails to fit within the limits prescribed for it by more orthodox approaches. This approach involves a challenge to the ontological assumptions that have governed prevalent thinking about what constitutes and accounts for international relations (in realism’s case a particular conception of the state and the interstate system operating
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in terms of realpolitik) as opposed to domestic or transnational politics and global economics. The second is by challenging the necessity of the conditions of possibility of judgment (explanatory and normative) that are relied on by more orthodox approaches. This involves an epistemological challenge to orthodox modes of analysis and investigation in international relations (which rest on specific conceptions of the notions of state, interest, and power as well as on positivist methodological assumptions) but also a challenge to the apparent exclusion of normative values from explanation in mainstream thinking. In addition, it brings into question the distinction between morality and politics; it is through this distinction that the nature of international politics has been defined by both realism and idealism. Critical theorists tend not to accept the characterization of politics in terms of realpolitik and the banishment of morality from the realms of politics. Similarly, they reject the characterization of morality as a matter of ahistorical, transcendental principles by which political reality will always be condemned. In the context of this chapter it is impossible to do full justice to the different versions of critical theory; what follows is a very brief consideration of how each of the critical approaches carries out the dual challenge I have identified. Cox’s work is well known for its eclectic use of a variety of theoretical traditions, although his most prominent theoretical debts are to the Marxist historicist tradition in social science (Cox 1996a: 124–173). Cox’s historicism is the key to the way he traces and challenges the limits of realism in both senses mentioned previously. In terms of the ontological aspect of his critical work, Cox criticizes realism’s characterization of its object of analysis for its ahistorical perspective, in which the limits of a particular present are treated not as historical constructions, which come about through a complex interaction between states and substate and transstate forces, but as unquestionable eternal verities. In making this critique of classical IR thinking, Cox is drawing attention to a range of conditions of possibility for international politics, including economic, cultural, and ideological factors. His claim is that if the theorist does not see the object of study as including these conditions of possibility but deals with interstate relations in isolation, then the work only reproduces and reinforces the common sense of the age. In terms of the epistemological aspect of his critical work, Cox also identifies modes of social scientific investigation as part of the historical development that delivers a particular articulation of the pattern of state power, productive forces, and world order. In other words, positivism is not a neutral and guaranteed route to the truth but a methodological approach that itself reflects a series of assumptions about politics, power, human nature, and knowledge; it is itself historically conditioned. Cox’s arguments about history and knowledge establish a strong link between the explanatory and the normative in social science. Certain
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kinds of explanation are seen to derive from the norms embedded in either hegemonic or counterhegemonic discourses. This observation directly challenges the line drawn by traditional international relations theory between facts and values. In addition, the identification of norms as within history rather than located in the conscience of the historian undermines the assumption common to both realism and idealism that the spheres of politics and morality are inherently distinct. For Cox, moral ends are a potential of his object of investigation and are open to being recognized and encouraged by the critical theorist but are not invented by him or her. Linklater’s work has much in common with Cox’s. In Beyond Realism and Marxism, Linklater also argues that analysis in international relations that is restricted to interstate relations fails to recognize the role of sub- and transstate political and economic forces in conditioning the possibilities of international politics (Linklater 1990b: 1–7). As with Cox’s work, Linklater’s argument is not designed to dismiss the insights of realism but to identify their partiality and examine the role of what has been excluded in order to enhance explanation and understanding in the field. Like Cox again, Linklater seeks to bring history into the ahistorical assumptions of traditional international relations theory and to challenge the claim to neutrality in its theoretical and methodological framework. In Linklater’s case, however, there is a specific variant of the challenge to the fact/value and politics/morality distinctions that are constitutive of classical realism and idealism. Whereas Cox works with the notion of hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourses, Linklater draws on Habermas’s discourse ethics and theory of historical development to identify the potential of modern states to transcend the logic of the state system reflected by realism (Linklater 1990b: 163–164; see also 1992b: 35–36). Among the conditions of possibility that realism takes as eternally given (i.e., the state) is a notion of right that points beyond particular interest. Over time, a pattern of collective learning oriented by the logic of communication itself may enable the transcendence of the “anarchy problematique.” Thus the presumptions of realist analysis have to be rethought not only in terms of the ways they have been historically produced or constructed but also in terms of their capacity for self-transcendence, conceptually and in practice. Postmodernist approaches to international relations depart from the work of Cox and Linklater insofar as postmodernists are suspicious of any reference to or reliance on notions of progress in history, whether of a Marxist or Habermasian kind. In addition, postmodernist work focuses less on the specification of what international politics is than on the ways it has been discursively constructed by the discipline of international relations itself—largely because postmodernists insist on the impossibility of disentangling questions of what is from discourses about what Is. This conviction is evident in the work of Der Derian on diplomacy and Bartelson on
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sovereignty; both theorists draw attention to the discursive construction of what has come to be identified in more mainstream analysis as independently existing objects of investigation (Der Derian 1987; Bartelson 1995). Ashley and Walker (1990) likewise have drawn attention to the intimate connection between academic IR’s vision of world politics and the politics of academic international relations itself. Nevertheless, the ways in which postmodernists trace and challenge the limits of more orthodox approaches to understanding world politics clearly echo aspects of Cox’s and Linklater’s arguments. Like Cox and Linklater, postmodernists question the boundary between the domestic and the international and argue that the conditions of possibility of interstate relations include sub- and transstate forces. Similarly, postmodernists challenge the epistemological presumptions of positivism, the distinction between fact and value, and the conceptual armory of realism, in particular realism’s reliance on a particular understanding of the concepts of state, sovereignty, and power. When it comes to challenging the morality/politics distinction, however, postmodernists see themselves as being more radically critical than Cox and Linklater. As was already discussed, Cox and Linklater challenge the distinction realism draws between morality and politics both by pointing to the normative agendas implicit in the study of international relations nurtured by hegemonic interests and by arguing for an alternative mode of theorizing oriented by alternative normative values. Both Cox and Linklater identify critical theory with a project of emancipation and with the capacity to discriminate between the workings of power and the workings of freedom. In contrast, postmodernists are reluctant to suggest that there are any stable criteria by which one version of the international can be judged better than another. They argue that using the notion of emancipation as a ground for criticizing the theoretical and practical status quo is itself authoritative and exclusionary, an argument that problematizes the idea of a clear distinction between power and freedom. For this reason postmodernists accuse critical theorists such as Cox and Linklater of relying on uncritical assumptions about criteria of judgment that collapse critical theory back into Marxist or liberal idealism. Nevertheless, in spite of this rejection of the idea of a substantive vision of emancipation, postmodernists still claim that their theorizing is in a “register of freedom” (Ashley and Walker 1990). This register of freedom is identified with the Foucauldian notion of an imperative to constantly transgress the boundaries of given limitation (in theory and practice) rather than with any substantive ideal of a world without oppression (Hutchings 1997). Feminist international relations theory is an even more recent development within the discipline than the perspectives already mentioned and is in some ways more difficult to characterize because there are feminist positions that would classify themselves as critical in the Cox and Linklater
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sense or as postmodernist and that therefore reflect many of the characteristics of the positions previously noted (Hutchings 1995: 169–185). Feminists, like other critical theorists, question the existing ontological and epistemological assumptions of international relations theory. In particular they draw attention to the consequences for those assumptions of considering gender as one of the crucial conditions of possibility both for contemporary interstate relations and for the realist worldview. The work of critics such as Elshtain and Enloe has drawn attention to the fact that gendered divisions of labor and constructions of femininity and masculinity underlie many practices in contexts—from diplomacy to the military—that are central to the realist perception of international politics. The work of Tickner and Peterson has challenged the positivist claim to neutrality by pointing out the gendered assumptions that help to construct the building blocks of positivist analysis and methodology (Tickner 1991; Peterson 1992b). Once more it is argued that the assertion of a fact/value split and of a morality/politics distinction collapses in the face of investigation of how that distinction is produced and sustained within theory. With regard to the morality/politics split, one of the most significant strands in feminist thinking about war has been a set of claims about the normative standard inherent in the caring work most commonly carried out by women and its potential both to maintain and to subvert the possibility of war as an acceptable last resort in international politics (Ruddick 1990). The previous brief overview has served to illustrate my initial claim that at least one significant feature is shared by the different theoretical approaches to international politics that see themselves as critical: They all trace and challenge the ontological and epistemological limits given in traditional realist analysis. However, a certain tension has become evident between the critical perspectives that might be seen as in the mainstream of critical theory and the postmodernist approach. This tension has its ground in the different answers the alternative critical theories would give to the question of how their own critique is possible—the question, in other words, of the conditions of possibility of the critical theorists’ challenge to the conditions of possibility of realism. It is fairly clear from the previous account that Cox and Linklater suggest a dual answer in accounting for their own critique: First, they both operate with a concept of emancipation that functions as a principle for judgment of the contemporary world order; second, they both argue that this normative principle of critique is immanent, even if by no means necessarily realizable, within history. This dual ground, which each would account for differently by reference to the theoretical sources on which they draw, enables a more definite account of better-worse judgments and outcomes than is offered by postmodernist theorists. The way postmodernist theorists answer the question of how their critique is possible involves no such reference to values immanent within
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history. Instead, postmodernists locate the possibility of critique within the necessary unsustainability of any secure ground for judgment. Thus, for postmodernists, better-worse claims are always inherently problematic. Once the question of how critical theory is grounded or validated becomes a focus of attention, it is all too easy for the tension described to take on the form of a fixed opposition in which different schools of critical theory condemn (and caricature) each other. For critical theorists of the Cox-Linklater orientation, the postmodernist position is condemned as ultimately unintelligible as a critical theory because in the end, it has no reference point in relation to which its own account of international politics is better in the sense of being more progressive or emancipatory than realism or idealism. For postmodernists, neo-Gramscian and Habermasian critical theory is condemned as ultimately unintelligible as a critical theory because, they claim, it relies on assertions about normative values and progress in history. A similar standoff is reproduced in feminist critique. In this context, the analogous position to that of Cox and Linklater is provided by feminist theorists who ground their critique in a particular account of what the oppression or emancipation of woman means and use this as a measure for better-worse. Postmodernist feminists respond by pointing to the ways in which specific characterizations of woman, oppression, and emancipation are themselves open to challenge and argue that critique is better understood as the refusal of all given conditions for judgment. Their opponents reply that this view renders critique as nothing other than a commitment to the pluralization of voices and thereby deprives it of moral authority and political effectiveness (Hutchings 1994, 1995: 169–185). To sum up, it appears as if one kind of critique is seen as disabling itself through uncritical reliance on given, ungrounded, and ungroundable assumptions; the other kind of critique is seen as disabling itself through its collapse into a skepticism about the possibility of any meaningful judgment at all. Ironically, this debate has clear echoes of the argument between realism and idealism or its contemporary liberal heirs, an argument that all kinds of critical theory saw themselves as superseding. Here also it was always the case that one side condemned the other for cynicism and skepticism on the one hand or for dogmatic reliance on ideal and unsubstantiable standards on the other. This focus on what differentiates alternative critical perspectives from one another diverts attention from what they share. This diversion in turn means that as an influence on the theory and practice of the discipline of international relations, both kinds of critical theory risk marginalizing themselves by becoming preoccupied with this inward-looking battle between what is characterized as skepticism on the one hand and dogmatism on the other. It is at this point, I would argue, that a consideration of the ways critical IR theory in its various guises is developing may be illuminated by an
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examination of Kantian critical philosophy. Not only does the logic of Kantian critique provide an excellent clarification of the patterns of thinking in critical IR theory, but it also highlights the danger of self-marginalization and suggests how that danger might be addressed and the positive potential of critical theory be realized. At the beginning of my discussion, I characterized critical IR theory in terms of its preoccupation with the tracing and challenging of the conditioning ontological and epistemological limits of more orthodox approaches. In this sense, critical IR theory is a classically Kantian enterprise. Kantian critique sets out to trace the conditions of possibility of claims to knowledge, taking its starting point from the untenability of skepticism, exemplified by Humean empiricism, and dogmatism, exemplified by Wolffian rationalism. Kant is concerned with what conditions the appearance of the object of knowledge (the analogous question might be, How does international politics come to appear as it appears?) and with what conditions the ways in which the object of knowledge is known (analogously, the conceptual framework and methodological techniques of realism). The paradox of Kantian critique, however, is that even as it refuses the classical empiricist and rationalist alternatives, it constantly comes back to them when it attempts to account for its own ground or authority. Whereas the purpose of critique is to trace the limitations of reason in order to engage in critique, reason (in the form of the work of the critic) takes on powers that appear to transcend that limitation, which the critic needs to account for. In the struggle to make this accounting, the Kantian critic is always in danger of either asserting a dogmatic authority over judgment or problematizing the authority of critical judgment to such an extent that its very possibility becomes open to question. I have discussed the nature of what I term the politics of Kantian critique at some length elsewhere (Hutchings 1995: 11–57); what is important here is the apparent difficulty Kant’s critique has in sustaining itself as critical. If the critic succeeds in grounding the authority of critique, critique lapses into the dogmatic assertion of set standards of judgment. If the critic fails to provide a ground for critique, critique lapses into skepticism. It appears, then, as if critique depends on refusing to either succeed or fail in the task of establishing the ground of its authority. In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes the clash between skepticism and dogmatism in terms of the wars of reason (Kant 1929: 601–608; Hutchings 1995: 150–166). In contrast, he presents critique as initiating a peacemaking process that mediates between and transcends the two precritical alternatives. As I have suggested, this mediation and transcendence is not a stable resolution of antinomic moments but a problematic interplay of dogmatic and skeptical elements that are always held in tension. When called to account for the authority of critique, the critic’s response is and must be equivocal and unsatisfactory (Hutchings 1995: 186–191). I have
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suggested that critical theory of international relations, like Kantian critique, is an attempt to transcend the wars of reason in which realist analysis is countered by idealism and vice versa. In accounting for its own authority, however, critique in international relations also follows Kant in threatening to fight the battles of reason all over again. Characterizing the critical other as a modernist dogmatist or a postmodernist skeptic merely returns theory to a tedious and unwinnable war. At the same time it encourages critics to identify their own critical practice as having overcome the difficulties of critique rather than as preserving and acknowledging its tensions, thus rendering critique uncritical once again. The problems critique encounters when it attempts to ground its own authority represent the dangerous road that is all too easy for critical IR theory to take, whether it goes in a skeptical or dogmatic direction. For the critical theorist, it is impossible either to ground critique securely or to abandon the notion of critical authority. The mark of critique is precisely a fundamental insecurity about its conditions of possibility. This insecurity is best summed up as a capacity for constant theoretical self-reflection in which the vulnerability of the conditions of possibility of critique is acknowledged even as its claim to authoritative judgment is made. The preoccupation with the ground of critique is dangerous because it forces critical work into a philosophical argument that, as Kant shows, is both violent and unresolvable. Thus the energies of critique get caught up in a backward-looking theoretical debate rather than being pushed outward into the exploration of how critical insights may be used to strengthen understanding and explanation in the realm of international politics. This regressive debate occurs in critical IR theory when the tension between different ways of grounding critique becomes the focus of attention. If no ultimate accounting for the authority of the judgments of critical theory is possible, the only way critical theory can prove itself is through more modest and pragmatic means. These means amount, I suggest, to a critique of orthodox theoretical frameworks and methodologies on the one hand and on the other to a clear indication of the explanatory benefits and costs of moving beyond those frameworks and methodologies in specific contexts. In the previous brief discussions of the different forms of critical IR theory, I focused principally on the critique of orthodoxy, which is characteristic of critical theory. Essentially, this critique demonstrates that realism’s account of its own assumptions is open to question and that those assumptions may be better accounted for by a rethinking of the conditions of possibility of realist work. How can this rethinking be carried out? One way would be to seek to demonstrate that the validity of the judgment of the critical theorist can be proved by its being traced back to ground superior to that on which the realist rests his or her case, a move that involves the critical theorist demonstrating his or her epistemological and ethical
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authority. As I have already suggested, I think this is a dangerous road to take and presents the critic with an impossible task. The other road is a phenomenological or immanent critique in which specific examples of realist analysis are shown to rely implicitly on what they exclude explicitly and are unable to account for. This kind of work does not need to rely on largescale claims to truth or goodness but simply on a commitment to examining the conceptual and practical conditions of possibility of that which is taken for granted in the dominant form of explanation. This work has in fact been crucial to all forms of critical theory and is perhaps most evident in the ways critical theorists draw attention to the historical, social, economic, and normative conditions of modern state sovereignty. The argument works in two directions: First, in relying on the notion of state sovereignty, it is argued, realism is bracketing off its reliance on a nexus of structures and forces by which states and sovereignty are constituted and sustained; second, the exclusion of these structures and forces from explanation, it is argued, limits realism’s ability to grasp the interplay between interstate behavior and historical, social, economic, and normative conditions and therefore limits its explanatory and predictive power. I suggested that there are two directions in which critical theory can develop. First, it can move in a more negative direction in which attention is focused on the partial and distorting nature of realist analysis. So far most critical theoretical work not caught up in the backward-looking wars of reason has been of this nature. The second direction, which is only in its infancy within critical IR theory, is one in which the positive implications of the rethinking implied by the immanent critique of realism are thought through. Here, it seems to me, critical theory has great potential as long as it maintains a scrupulous attention to its own limitations and the theoretical and methodological assumptions it is making. This kind of work is likely to be of three kinds. The first would be work that involves developing new conceptual frameworks and methodological techniques through which international politics can be explained and understood. The shift from the term international relations to the term international politics to describe the object of investigation provides one very simple example. The term international relations, according to the realist tradition, encapsulates the fundamentally apolitical and ahistorical logic of the state system. The use of international politics immediately prevents from being taken for granted the idea that different kinds of possibilities pertain to the international as opposed to the domestic political sphere. The second kind of work would offer alternative explanations for phenomena—from war to interstate cooperation—that realism is concerned to account for. Here critical theory is obliged to demonstrate empirically how the historical, social, economic, and normative conditions of the modern state system account for specific international developments.
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The third kind of work would focus on phenomena that realism tended to exclude or see as marginal to mainstream explanation of interstate behavior, such as transnational organizations, new social movements, nationalism, and democracy. Here critical theory is likely to find much in common with contemporary work in development studies, global political economy, sociology, and political science, which all testify to the difficulty of operating on the presumption of the state as the crucial constitutive limit on the analysis of economic and social order or normative political agendas. For many critical theorists of international relations it would seem as if the previous discussion misses one very important dimension of critical theory: I have focused on what critical explanatory work in international relations might look like but have not mentioned the normative element that is common to this sort of critique. Critical theory’s quarrel with realism has never been a purely social scientific one; it has also always been about values and their importance not just as phenomena that are part of international politics but as something that acts as a focus or orientation for social scientific work and the kinds of policy priorities that may follow from it. Above all, critical theorists of all persuasions, including postmodernists, have stressed that critique is necessarily bound up with freedom (Hutchings 1995: 158–165). In what sense does the kind of work I have mentioned incorporate this dimension? Here, once again, it is tempting to see historicist and Habermasian critics as lined up against postmodernists, with the former claiming a grasp of at least some of the determinate conditions of freedom (emancipation) and the latter arguing that freedom can be understood only negatively, in terms of resistance to determination (transgression). According to these responses, the link between critique and freedom would be realized in terms of condemnation or prescription depending on whether a particular analysis did or did not fulfill either emancipatory or transgressive criteria. This answer to the question of the normative dimension of critical theory returns us to the wars of reason, since it reopens the unresolvable debate about the grounds of critique, this time in terms of rival accounts of freedom. However, there is a more minimal normative sense in which historicist, Habermasian, postmodernist, and feminist critical theorists can all claim that their theoretical work is grounded in and oriented toward freedom. This sense derives from the commitment of all critical theorists to always consider the question of the conditions of possibility of both the theory and practice of international politics. This question has infinite implications, it can never be definitively answered, and it rests on the assumption that no conditions are simply given but all are produced and constructed. By stressing this claim as a universal presumption of critique, critical theorists are also committed to the revisability in principle of any given theoretical posi-
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tion or state of affairs. When critical theorists move beyond this claim to the specific prescription of one path rather than another or the condemnation of what is in terms of what might or ought to be, they are building on a deeper insight that is fundamental to all critique. What cannot be revised is the assumption of the revisability of conditions itself. I would argue, therefore, that it is possible for IR theory to be critical without being specifically prescriptive as long as it involves the exposure of conditions of possibility in the sense already discussed. Specifically, prescriptive critical theory is certainly not ruled out, but as long as it remains critical it must continue to make explicit the fundamental assumption on which it rests. Thus prescriptive critical theorists need to be cautious and to articulate as clearly as possible their own (revisable) basis for the claims they are making. Moreover, prescriptive critical theorists must always acknowledge that no normative position is nonexclusive or unchallengeable. Perhaps most important, all critical theorists should be clear that the possibility of revision of things as they are is purely theoretical unless and until revision either is or becomes the burden of actual economic, social, or political movements and forces. The actual effects of critical theorizing are not guaranteed and cannot be known in advance. The irony of the previous discussion, of course, is that it is theoretical and may therefore be seen as falling foul of the common complaint about critical theory, that is, that it has failed significantly to further the explanation and understanding of an increasingly complex and obscure world of international politics. What I have tried to argue in this chapter is that this charge can be made reasonably against critical theory only insofar as it allows itself to be distracted by philosophical debates about the ground of critique, debates that actually rest on a fundamental misconception of what critique means. Critique is premised on the impossibility of a definitive answer to the conditions of its own possibility and can only content itself with the acknowledgment of the revisability of any grounds on which its specific claims are based. The positive potential of critical theory lies in its widening the range of phenomena relevant to the explanation of international politics and a range of questions that a realist agenda rules out in advance. The significance of critical theory will be demonstrated in two ways in the future: first, in the empirical work that is being and will be carried out in the wake of its theoretical challenge; second, in the extent to which critical theory’s constant reminder that the world need not be as it is chimes in with world historical, social, economic, and political forces— forces that are way beyond the control of the critical theorist.
6 NEGATIVE DIALECTIC? THE TWO MODES OF CRITICAL THEORY IN WORLD POLITICS N. J. Rengger
Almost coterminous with the birth of the modern states system has been the development of the many attempts to transcend it. At its conceptual inception in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there were many who bitterly opposed it, seeing it as little better than a law of the jungle and a denial of everything they felt Christian Europe stood for. Perhaps the most eloquent, and still among the most interesting, of these figures is Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Riley 1992, 1996; see also Nardin, Brown, and Rengger 1998). However, Leibniz’s affection for the medieval conception of the Respublica Christiana was not the route that disaffection with the states system was increasingly to take in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, even though, significantly, it is perhaps increasingly relevant today. For those who felt that the order created by the states system most strongly resembled the order of the grave, the procession of attempts, begun by the Abbe de St. Pierre, to find a way of converting the system into one of perpetual peace is perhaps the best-known attempt to transcend the states system. Commented on at the end of his long life by Leibniz and throughout the eighteenth century by writers such as Rousseau, perhaps the most famous version of this attempt today is Kant’s justly celebrated essay “Perpetual Peace,” first published in 1795 (in Reiss 1970). Kant sketched a program for the gradual transcendence of the states system in all but name and its replacement by a system of cosmopolitan law. Kant, of course, is usually—and often rightly—seen as a liberal. However, there is in Kant’s thinking a radicality that many liberals shy away from. It is perhaps most clearly displayed in his writings on international relations; it was, after all, Kant who famously referred to his predecessors in the field—Grotians and realists alike—as “sorry comforters” 91
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(those specifically mentioned included Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and Emmerich von Vattel). In his “Perpetual Peace” essay, Kant spoke firmly in the accents of the European Enlightenment, of which he was perhaps the greatest philosophical representative. It is worth remembering, in this context, his famous description of Enlightenment in one of his other essays: “An Answer to the Question ‘What Is Enlightenment?’” Enlightenment, he writes, is the emergence of man from his “self incurred immaturity” (1991: 59). In other words, for Kant and for the Enlightenment as a whole, the key to our emancipation is to recognize that it is we who hold ourselves back. In international relations (IR) theory, Kant was famously referred to by Martin Wight as a revolutionist, and it is his hostility to the states system that makes him genuinely revolutionary in that sense if not in others. He has, however, been joined in that hostility by a good many thinkers and traditions, especially in the twentieth century, even where they have shared almost nothing else with him. In the nineteenth century, it was the liberal Enlightenment that dominated, and such hopes were largely forgotten save for a few little-known—at the time—radicals like Karl Marx. In the twentieth century, however, such hopes of systemic transcendence, what Richard Falk refers to as “system transforming” hopes, became much greater, especially over the last few years, when all sorts of possible agents were fingered as the agent who would put the final nail in the coffin of the states system: technology, globalization, the world economy—the list goes on and on. This revolutionism that would seek to transcend the states system had two great advocates in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Kant and Marx. Andrew Linklater has described them as “the two great exponents of moral and political universalism within the tradition of philosophical history” (Linklater 1990a: 205). They were also the two greatest exponents of emancipation—though they did not entirely agree either on what was to do the emancipating or on what humans were being emancipated from. In the context of international relations, however, the tradition in which they stand is unambiguous. The order of the current international system is no true order at all, for it has no place for justice and little for humans as humans rather than humans as members of discrete communities. The problem of order can therefore be solved only when it is effectively transcended. This tradition is rightly seen as a cosmopolitan tradition—though it is not, of course, the only available cosmopolitanism; it is also seen, again often rightly, as a universalist one (on the relationship between cosmopolitanism and universalism, see Rengger 1999: epilogue). Most important, it is seen as an emancipatory project.
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Emancipation and Critical Theory in International Relations There are a number of approaches that seek to develop this line of reasoning, and not all of them are directly related to (academic) international relations theory. For example, it would be central to a good deal of liberation theology (and some continental political theology, such as that of Jürgen Moltmann and Johann Baptist Metz); to more general dependencia analysis (André Gunder Frank, Samir Amin) and world-systems analysis (Immanuel Wallerstein, Christopher Chase-Dunn); and to some still more heterodox work such as the critical pedagogy of Paulo Friere, the critical legal theory of, among others, Roberto Managebeira Unger, and the literary and political writings of Edward Said and a number of other postcolonial literary theorists. (Leonard 1994 provides an interesting overview. See also Moltmann 1967; Metz 1969; Frank 1967; Wallerstein 1974, 1979, 1980, 1989; Chase-Dunn 1989; Arrighi 1994; Friere 1983; Said 1994; Unger 1987.) However, the body of work that makes this the centerpiece of their argument in contemporary IR theory is usually called critical theory. Critical theory is, however, often used in international relations in an unhelpfully general way—to name but five examples, international relations theory influenced by poststructuralism; feminist IR theory; Gramscian concerns, especially in international political economy; some interpretive constructivisms such as that of Kratochwil (1989); and Marxisant analysts such as Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg (Halliday 1994; Rosenberg 1994a; see also Rengger 1996) are all often referred to as critical theory, as is the work of those thinkers, most obviously Andrew Linklater, who draw sustenance from the tradition of critical theory properly so called, that is to say, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School.1 I want to emphasize that in this chapter I am concerned to discuss only those critical theories of international relations that make emancipation central to their analysis and operation. This focus effectively rules out poststructural international theory and a good deal of constructivist theory. Although it is possible to argue, as for example, Andrew Linklater has, that all forms of critical theory have something to bring to the emancipatory project, many poststructuralists and constructivists would, I suspect, be very skeptical about this. In any event, the central set of arguments I am concerned with here are derived from or related to Frankfurt School critical theory. In my view, it is the Frankfurt School–influenced critical IR theorists who have provided the most general orientation for critical theory in international studies as far as emancipation is concerned, and it is this orientation that essentially drives the critical project in international relations.
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Thus in this chapter I want to offer a general argument connecting certain key Frankfurt School themes with the use to which they have been put in critical international relations theory. I will return in my concluding remarks to what this general argument might imply for other critical literatures in contemporary international theory.
The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory The general story of the Frankfurt School is well enough known and has been sufficiently well told by others (see Jay 1973; Wiggershaus 1994; Held 1980). However, I do want to make a couple of prefatory points, since I will come back to them later on. As is well known, the powerful mix of different intellectual currents that became known in the 1930s as critical theory was originally developed by thinkers as different as Karl Korsch, Georg Lukács, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Eric Fromm, Leo Lowenthal, and Herbert Marcuse and covered fields as diverse as history, political science, social theory, aesthetics, political economy, psychology, and economic history. This critical theory was powerfully influenced by Marx and by Sigmund Freud (see, for example, Jay 1973) and, rather less obviously but perhaps more powerfully still, by Hegel. However, it is also significant that it developed in the context of the stresses and tensions of the Weimar Republic. Virtually all the original members of the Frankfurt School were both Jewish and Marxist—at least in general orientation—and all were, in the Weimar context, Vernunftrepublikaner (Gay 1974), that is to say grudging, rationally led supporters of Weimar, which they saw as a liberal bourgeois republic. It was Horkheimer, of course, who first referred to the theory he and his colleagues were developing as critical theory, and as is well known, he did so to distinguish it from what he termed traditional theory (Horkheimer 1972). This was theory seen as separate from that which is theorized about, as in traditional pictures of the natural sciences and, though Horkheimer hardly had this in mind when he was writing, as the dominant post–World War II traditions of social science have predominantly seen themselves. Critical theory, by contrast, saw itself as irretrievably situated and thus related to social and political life. Thus critical theory, but not traditional theory, can investigate the function of theory itself—who and what it serves and why and how. This capacity is put in service of the task of theory as conceived by the Frankfurt School—as Horkheimer and his colleagues became known on their return to Frankfurt after the war—which is to investigate the historical and social evolution of society, tracing contradictions that might open up in it and offer the possibility of transcending it.
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However, the thinking of the Frankfurt School on this point oscillated wildly. The early, largely prewar, writing was broadly optimistic, seeing the possibility for successful political action to help bring about change. Much critical theory indeed remained optimistic even after the war. The work of Marcuse, for example, remained wedded to the idea of effective political action into the 1960s—hence his adoption by the students in the United States during that period as a leading exemplar of radical politics (Marcuse 1972b; Bronner 1994: chs. 10–11; Bokina and Lukes 1995). Similar points could be made of a number of other former Frankfurt School adherents, for example, Erich Fromm (Bronner 1994: ch. 10). However, the central duo of the Frankfurt School, Adorno and Horkheimer, displayed a very different trajectory. Their writing during World War II, and Adorno’s at least thereafter, was much more pessimistic. Indeed, it is difficult to resist the sense that, at least from their joint authorship of Dialectic of Enlightenment during the 1940s, the intellectual relationship between the two altered to the extent that whereas prior to the war Horkheimer was the senior partner, as it were, after the war Adorno was elevated to that position. The key text was, indeed, Dialectic of Enlightenment, and in it they presented a deeply pessimistic view of the Enlightenment as a whole and of the possibilities for transformation in the contemporary context (Adorno and Horkheimer 1944/1979). Unquestionably, the experience of the rise of Nazism in Germany and the revelations about the Holocaust played their part in this pessimism, but other reasons lay deeper still. Adorno, in particular, came to believe that the exploitative and oppressive aspects of modern society were now so embedded, and so protean, that they were continuing to gobble up even those aspects of life that had previously remained potentially independent, such as Adorno’s beloved “culture”—hence, of course, his mordant and bitter delineation of the emerging “culture industry,” or the commodification of creativity. His writings were, he came to believe, a message in a bottle for some future generation that might, if it was lucky, live in a totally transfigured time. He remained the great Hegelian, still alive to the possibilities of dialectical contradictions to the end, but his overview was always pessimistic. I shall come back to this point in a moment. In this chapter I examine the parameters of critical thinking in international relations, which seeks to solve the problem of order by, so to speak, abolishing it; it seeks to transform the states system—and perforce much else as well. The point is that critical theory hardly speaks with one mind on this: It has, so to speak, two modes or faces, optimistic and pessimistic, each of which is locked in dialogue with the other. The optimistic view is now most persuasively put by the most significant contemporary representative of the Frankfurt School—significantly also, its most Kantian—to wit, Jürgen Habermas (see, for example,
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Outhwaite 1994; Held 1980). Habermas’s influence on contemporary critical theory in all of its variants is almost impossible to overstate. Both in his native Germany and elsewhere, especially in the United States, Habermas has become a major influence.2 Most especially in the current context, he has been far and away the most influential critical theorist as far as critical theory in international relations is concerned. With rather more qualifications and hesitations, such optimism is shared by the éminence grise of critical IR theory—and by the most influential Gramscian, Robert Cox, as well as by some of his friends and followers, such as Stephen Gill. It is also the view of some of the most robust feminist scholars of international relations, for example, Ann Tickner (Tickner 1992); and it is shared with various emendations of content or temper by many working in what is now called critical security studies, for example, and especially, Ken Booth (Booth 1991a, 1991b, 1995). And though this is less relevant here, it is a common assumption of virtually all the related critical theories I have referred to. Mark Hoffman, in his essay on the trajectory of critical theory in international studies—“Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate”—has called this optimistic impulse utopian and, notwithstanding the extremely bad press this term has had in twentieth-century international relations, I suggest that he is right to do so (Hoffman 1987).3 It is utopian in the sense that all the best emancipatory theory is utopian, and as the early Frankfurt School was, following the sense of utopia made famous in the work of Adorno’s friend Ernst Bloch’s magnificent The Principle of Hope (Bloch 1986; also useful is Geoghan 1995). I want to suggest, in fact, that the emancipatory project of critical theory in IR—as opposed to, for example, its value as a salutary discourse— depends on this optimism. Indeed, I want to suggest that notwithstanding all their differences, all those committed to an emancipatory project in contemporary world politics share this optimistic impulse. Thus, however much they might differ from Frankfurt School critical theory in emphasis and orientation, they will perforce share the belief that the progressive transformation of society is possible. They must.4 However, I suggest that there are problems inherent in this view, that the project of emancipation in critical theory at one and the same time develops what we might call a dark side. It is this dark side that was the source of Adorno’s pessimism and it is this side, I suggest, that critical theory in international relations must confront if it is to make good on its emancipatory project.
The Achievements of Critical Theory First, I need to offer an overview interpretation of how the optimistic strand of critical theory manifests itself in Frankfurt School–influenced critical IR
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theory. I shall do so first through the work of the foremost critical theorist of international relations, Andrew Linklater. Linklater is, without doubt, the most penetrating critical IR theorist writing in the tradition of the Frankfurt School. Inasmuch as the future of critical theory lies with critical international relations theory, a view subscribed to by a number of “noninternational” critical theorists as well as—as you might expect—by a number of international critical theorists, it seems certain that Linklater’s influence will grow.5 Linklater has recently provided a useful and powerful interpretation of what he considers to have been the achievements of critical theory, and he has amplified this interpretation in his most recent book (Linklater 1996b, 1998). He thinks, in brief, that critical theory has four main achievements. First, it has taken issue with positivism by arguing that knowledge always reflects preexisting social purposes and interests. In the context of IR theory this argument has led to powerful criticisms of rationalist theory and what Linklater calls a “gradual recovery of a project of enlightenment and emancipation reworked to escape the familiar pitfalls of idealism.” Second, critical theory stands opposed to claims that the existing structures of the social world are immutable and “examines the prospects for greater freedom immanent within existing social relations.” Third, critical theory learns from and overcomes the weaknesses inherent in Marxism, emphasizing forms of social learning, drawing very heavily on Habermas’s reconstruction of historical materialism, and opening up new possibilities for constructing a “historical sociology with an emancipatory purpose.” Fourth, critical theory judges social arrangements by their capacity to embrace open dialogue with all others and envisages new forms of political community which break with unjustified exclusion. . . . Critical theory . . . envisages the use of unconstrained discourse to determine the moral significance of national boundaries and to examine the possibility of postsovereign forms of political life. (Linklater 1996b: 279–280)
Linklater also suggests that various forms of postpositivist theory in international relations can all agree that “reaching an understanding [which may not culminate in a moral consensus] captures the most important respect in which critical theory, post-modernism, feminism and also philosophical hermeneutics are involved in a common project” (Linklater 1996b: 293). He implies that it is through this process, very much tied in his view to a Habermasian discourse ethics, that the states system can be transcended and human beings emancipated, since it is through this possibility that we can begin to articulate what it might mean to live in “post-sovereign” communities, and thus transcend the “sovereign” communities of the states system. There are two points I want to draw attention to here. The first is the
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extent to which, as Linklater presents it, critical theory has a project—the emancipatory project—that comprises a fourfold set of developments, each of which build on each other and reinforce each other, thus opening the way to still further “achievements” in which critical theory will “maintain its faith in the Enlightenment project and defend universalism in its ideal of open dialogue not only between fellow citizens but, more radically, between all members of the human species” (Linklater 1996b: 296). The second is the extent to which this view of critical theory subsumes a good deal of the substantive agenda of international society theory and constructivism and liberalism without necessarily accepting the methodologies of any. As the article makes clear, and as recent work in critical IR theory demonstrates, the plausibility of this position turns on whether discourse ethics provides for genuinely emancipatory theory. For critical IR theory, as Richard Devetak has recently noted, “emancipation can be understood as the establishment of a community which allows and protects the development of universal autonomy. . . . The question [thus] arises as to how . . . to reconstruct world politics so as to extend to the entire species a rational, just and democratic organization of politics” (Devetak 1996b: 169). The answer that the leading critical IR theorists give is drawn, very largely, from Habermas’s attempt to develop a discourse ethics that recognizes the necessity of universalist principles while not doing violence to the fact of diversity. Discourse ethics, of course, depends on Habermas’s general theory of communicative action (Habermas 1984, 1989a; see also Outhwaite 1994: 68–120; Bernstein 1995: 35–57, 88–135), which emphasizes the centrality of consent to intelligible communication. As Devetak puts it, Communicating subjects [need] to rationalize or account for their beliefs and actions in terms which are intelligible to others and which they can then accept or contest. Similarly, social norms and institutions must also be submitted to scrutiny and argumentation if they are to maintain legitimacy. At such moments when a principle, social norm or institution loses legitimacy or when consensus breaks down, discourse ethics enters the fray as a means of consensually deciding upon new principles or institutional arrangements. . . . Newly arrived at political principles, norms or institutional arrangements can only be said to be valid if they can meet with the approval of all those who would be affected by them. (Devetak 1996b: 171)
He goes on to point out three things about discourse ethics: It is universalistic, it is democratic, and it is a form of moral, practical reasoning that is “not simply guided by utilitarian calculations or expediency, nor is it guided by an imposed concept of the good life. Rather, it is guided by justice” (169).
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The implications of this view for world politics have been developed in differing ways by different critical theorists. However, in general terms, as Devetak says, three broad implications stand out. The first is concerned with the evolution of more generally democratic forms of global governance and is predicated on an explicit critique of the state as simply inadequate, both practically and ethically, for contemporary decisionmaking. As David Held, the critical theorist who has perhaps done most to develop this line of argument, notes, “Whose consent is necessary and whose participation is justified in decisions concerning, for instance, AIDS, or acid rain, or the use of non-renewable resources? What is the relevant constituency, national, regional or international?” (cited by Devetak 1996b: 171; see also Held 1992, 1995). Second, and perhaps potentially most immediately fruitful, discourse ethics offers a way of thinking about and regulating conflict. The critical theorist who has developed this line of argument most thoroughly and interestingly is Mark Hoffman (Hoffman 1992). Again, discourse ethics offers a way of being inclusive without denying difference. Third, Devetak suggests that discourse ethics “offers a means of criticising and justifying the principles by which the species organizes itself politically, that is it reflects on the principles of inclusion and exclusion” (Devetak 1996b: 172). Since in principle no one should be excluded from any process that affects them, actually or potentially, this becomes a very clear cosmopolitan universalism that suggests that the “problem of order” can openly be overcome through the progressive evolution of what Linklater calls the “social bond of all with all” (Linklater 1993: 119). Critical IR theory is thus committed, I think, to a version of institutional as well as moral cosmopolitanism, to use Charles Beitz’s well-known terms (Beitz 1993). 6 Indeed, Linklater, toward the end of both Beyond Realism and Marxism and The Transformation of Political Community, has made explicit that in his view the future of critical theory depends on its ability to develop analyses and institutions that actually help to restructure world politics along the lines suggested by this analysis.
Negative Dialectic? The question arises, however, How can critical theory, even on its own terms, be emancipatory in the required sense? I suggest that in fact critical theory has a profound ambiguity about the question of emancipation, that critical theory is engaged, in a sense, in a negative dialectic with itself on this question. This ambiguity can be most clearly seen in the work of Adorno, and so I shall turn to him before assessing the implications of this reading for critical IR theory. It would obviously be impossible to offer even a sketch of a thinker as
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complex and nuanced (and as committed to the claim, as he often insisted, that “true philosophy resists paraphrase” [Jay 1984a: 11]) as Adorno in the space I have available. All I want to do is illustrate why I think Adorno’s thought is problematic for the emancipatory project—on which, I have suggested, the versions of critical theory (both general and international) that I previously discussed depend (on Adorno, see Bernstein 1995; Rose 1978, 1992; Honneth 1985, 1992a). To do this, I first want to develop Jay Bernstein’s recent reformulation of critical theory along Adornoesque, rather than Habermasian lines. He argues first that critical theory is not a theory of society or a wholly homogenous school of thinkers or a method. Critical theory, rather, is a tradition of social thought that, at least in part, takes its cue from its opposition to the wrongs and ills of modern societies on the one hand, and the forms of theorizing that simply go along with or seek to legitimate those societies on the other hand. (Bernstein 1995: 11)
The three basic criteria of this tradition are a noninstrumental conception of reason and cognition, a nonfunctionalist conception of culture, and the harmonization of both (Bernstein 1995: 28). However, the central root of critical theory for Bernstein is the recognition—originally laid out by Adorno—that the dilemmas of modernity have a common root, directly or indirectly, in the abstractive achievements (and they are achievements) of instrumental reason, which produces two things. First, it produces “domination” in the sense of what he calls the domination of “exchange value over use value,” seen as the result of the “universal development of the exchange system,” part of a continuous rationalization process within modern societies that leads to the domination of institutions over people. Second, it produces “nihilism” in that this “rationalization process” possesses “three logically discriminable features; proceduralism (formalism or methodologism as applied to social sanctions), substitutablity and end-indifference,” which lead to a continuous devaluation of the highest values. These questions become the problem of justice and the problem of reason for Adorno, and, taken together, Bernstein suggests they represent, respectively, the Weberian and the Nietzschean departure points for contemporary theory. These issues have, however, tended to be analyzed apart from each other. As Bernstein puts it, Traditional Marxism [and one might add most contemporary analytic moral and political theory] tends to focus on the question of injustice . . . making its trajectory at one with the most advanced moments of liberal political theory. Conversely, the tradition of existentialism and phenome-
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nology [and one must add here most contemporary poststructural thinking as well] . . . directs itself to the problem of nihilism. . . . Adorno’s original insight . . . was the identification of the common root . . . and hence the deman