Broadening the Horizon of Linguistic Politeness
Pragmatics & Beyond New Series Editor Andreas H. Jucker University of Zurich, English Department Plattenstrasse 47, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland e-mail:
[email protected]
Associate Editors Jacob L. Mey University of Southern Denmark
Herman Parret Belgian National Science Foundation, Universities of Louvain and Antwerp
Jef Verschueren Belgian National Science Foundation, University of Antwerp
Editorial Board Shoshana Blum-Kulka
Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
University of Lyon 2
Jean Caron
Claudia de Lemos
Université de Poitiers
University of Campinas, Brazil
Robyn Carston
Marina Sbisà
University College London
University of Trieste
Bruce Fraser
Emanuel Schegloff
Boston University
University of California at Los Angeles
Thorstein Fretheim
Deborah Schiffrin
University of Trondheim
Georgetown University
John Heritage University of California at Los Angeles
Paul O. Takahara Sandra Thompson
Susan Herring
University of California at Santa Barbara
University of Texas at Arlington
Teun A. Van Dijk
Masako K. Hiraga
Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona
St.Paul’s (Rikkyo) University
Richard J. Watts
David Holdcroft
University of Berne
University of Leeds
Sachiko Ide Japan Women’s University
Volume 139 Broadening the Horizon of Linguistic Politeness Edited by Robin T. Lakoff and Sachiko Ide
Broadening the Horizon of Linguistic Politeness Edited by
Robin T. Lakoff University of California, Berkeley
Sachiko Ide Japan Women’s University
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam/Philadelphia
8
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The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Broadening the Horizon of Linguistic Politeness / edited by Robin T. Lakoff and Sachiko Ide. p. cm. (Pragmatics & Beyond, New Series, issn 0922-842X ; v. 139) Includes bibliographical references and indexes. 1. Grammar, Comparative and general--Honorific. 2. Politeness (Linguistics) I. Lakoff, Robin Tolmach. II. Ide, Sachiko, 1939- III. Pragmatics & beyond ; new ser., 139. P299.H66.B767 2005 306.44--dc22 isbn 90 272 5382 X (Hb; alk. paper)
2005048400
© 2005 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa
Table of contents
Acknowledgments
ix
Foreword Jacob L. Mey
xi
Introduction: Broadening the horizon of linguistic politeness Robin Tolmach Lakoff and Sachiko Ide
1
Part I. General overviews: The plenary papers Civility and its discontents: Or, getting in your face Robin Tolmach Lakoff How and why honorifics can signify dignity and elegance: The indexicality and reflexivity of linguistic rituals Sachiko Ide Whither politeness Bruce Fraser
23
45 65
Part II. The theoretical perspective Yoroshiku onegaishimasu: Routine practice of the routine formula in Japanese Makiko Takekuro
87
An argument for a frame-based approach to politeness: Evidence from the use of the imperative in Cypriot Greek Marina Terkourafi
99
The significance of ‘face’ and politeness in social interaction as revealed through Thai ‘face’ idioms Margaret Ukosakul
117
Table of contents
Part III. The descriptive perspective Face threatening acts, primary face threatening acts, and the management of discourse: Australian English and speakers of Asian Englishes Christopher J. Conlan
129
Politeness in Thai computer-mediated communication Krisadawan Hongladarom and Soraj Hongladarom
145
Polite diminutives in Spanish: A matter of size? Martha Mendoza
163
Indirectness as a politeness strategy of Thai speakers Deeyu Srinarawat
175
Part IV. The comparative perspective Japanese honorifics as a marker of sociocultural identity: A view from non-Western perspective Megumi Yoshida and Chikako Sakurai
197
Directness as a source of misunderstanding: The case of requests and suggestions Alexandra Kallia
217
Forms of address in Irish and Swedish Anders Ahlqvist
235
Women, men and polite requests: English and Greek Ekaterini Kouletaki
245
Privacy: An intercultural perspective Mark Lê
275
Selection of linguistic forms for requests and offers: Comparison between English and Chinese Masako Tsuzuki, Kazuhiro Takahashi, Cynthia Patschke and Qin Zhang
283
Table of contents
Part V. The historical perspective Japanese pronouns of address: Their behavior and maintenance over time Andrew Barke and Satoshi Uehara
301
An aspect of the origins and development of linguistic politeness in Thai Wilaiwan Khanittanan
315
Author index
337
Subject index
341
Acknowledgments
An enterprise of this kind would not have been possible without the generous and sincere dedication of a great many people. This collection was first planned after the International Symposium on Linguistic Politeness was held in 1999 at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand. Our gratitude goes to those who organized this uniquely productive conference. After the papers were selected for the collection, there were a number of difficulties to overcome. One of the difficulties was the result of the fact that the majority of the manuscripts were written by non-native speakers of English. The manuscripts had to be checked and rechecked by native English experts. Acknowledgment must be made to the work done by Dr. Krisadawan Hongladarom, who served as the key person responsible not only for having the manuscripts edited when needed, and checking all the manuscripts for their adherence to the style sheet, but also for contacting individual contributors and the copy editor of the publishing house. Dr. Soraj Hongladarom assisted her in getting the manuscripts into publishable form. Ms. Pananda Lerlertyutitham and Ms. Rachanin Pongudom at Chulalongkorn University faithfully served as assistants to Professor Krisadawan Hongladarom. Thanks also go to Ms. Makiko Takekuro, who served as an efficient assistant, when the two editors met at Berkeley in the summer of 2002. Our acknowledgment also goes to the two anonymous reviewers of this collection, who carefully read the manuscripts and provided us with insightful suggestions and comments. Their comments led us to choose the title “Broadening the Horizons of Linguistic Politeness”. Since the topic of linguistic politeness has its ‘raison d’étre’ in aiding successful communication throughout the world, we have to geographically balance the world-wide linguistic phenomena from which research results are brought to light. It is our hope that this collection illustrates the potential for broadening the horizons of linguistic politeness. The editors acknowledge gratefully the work of all those who share this goal and joined our enterprise. The Editors
Foreword
The Ancient Greeks had a particular notion, that of the akme (lit. ‘summit, top’) to capture a person’s reaching his (or her?) intellectual and moral zenith, a kind of holistic coming of age. In our hectic times, we both live longer and mature quicker, and it is no longer unusual to see people in their thirties assuming positions of great political and social importance. The field of politeness studies turns 30 this year. And similarly, we can say that it certainly has ripened over the three decades of its existence. The present collection celebrates, in a most fitting way, this coming of age. Most fitting, in particular, because two of the persons who have been at the forefront of the research on politeness during all of those 30 years, are now the editors of this not just commemorative, but truly new ground-breaking collection of articles. Robin Lakoff set the tone for a whole series of studies by her seminal 1973 paper ‘Minding your p’s and q’s’, in which she introduced an entire new vocabulary to talk about polite behavior and language use. And Sachiko Ide is best known for her successful efforts (as early as 1982) to break the Western dominance in the study of politeness and (in the true spirit of Lakoffian camaraderie) to suggest that we also look at aspects such as ‘discernment’ (the Japanese wakimae) that are often overlooked by researchers who are not familiar with other than Western norms and categorizations. This collection of 19 articles comes out of the 1999 International Symposium of Linguistic Politeness, held in Bangkok, Thailand. The contributions span a wide geographical and linguistic array, ranging all the way from Ireland and England over Sweden to China and Japan, from Australia over Thailand to Greece and Spain. Also, the languages represented are quite untypical for studies in this field: more than half of the contributions (even if not counting the three plenaries) stem from people working in such fields as Chinese, Japanese or Thai. Especially the studies of the latter language are most welcome, as Thai is a relative newcomer to the field, and most Western researchers have had little experience of, or exposure to, how Thai society is organizing itself around notions and practices such as politeness. Topic-wise, one finds not only ‘classical’ themes discussed (such as social class, gender, face, (in)directness and so
Foreword
on); newer approaches, too, are highlighted in various articles: first of all the notion of ‘discernment’, mentioned above, but also discourse analysis-related, computer-mediated, and other innovative approaches are found. Apart from the more individual language-oriented approaches, one finds a healthy dose of generalist, and more socially oriented views. Especially given the current trend towards interculturally oriented studies (as in the new, 2004, International Journal of Intercultural Pragmatics), one can safely predict that this volume will meet with enthusiastic response among a great variety of researchers in the diverse, directly or indirectly related, fields of sociolinguistics, anthropological linguistics, discourse analysis, media and other studies. The editors have done the international community a great service in compiling and intelligently editing this volume. They should not just be thanked for their efforts but rather, rewarded, by receiving our thanks in the form of targeted and stimulating feedback on their collection. I don’t think I’m sticking my neck out when I say that such a reaction will not be long in coming. Jacob L. Mey University of Southern Denmark & Universidade de Brasília, D.F., Brazil
References Ide, Sachiko (1982). Japanese sociolinguistics: politeness and women’s language. Lingua, 57, 357–385. Kecskés, István et al. (2004 & foll.). International Journal of Intercultural Pragmatics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Lakoff, Robin Tolmach (1973). The logic of politeness: or, Minding your p’s and q’s. In C. Corum, T. C. Smith-Stark, & A. Weiser (Eds.), Papers from the Ninth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society (pp. 345–356). Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
Introduction Broadening the horizon of linguistic politeness
.
Linguistic politeness?
Politeness, introduced into linguistics more than thirty years ago,1 since then has emerged as a vital and rapidly developing area of study. As it has grown, it has encountered questions about its appropriate concerns and potential that – as is typical in a rapidly growing field – have been tabled while basic issues were being examined. But at thirty, a field, like a person, is expected to have achieved some degree of maturity, and it therefore must confront issues that in its youth it could ignore. It is time to ask where the study of politeness is today and where it is going, and to try to reconcile the paradoxes and contradictions that arise from the consideration of larger and more vexing issues: universality and inclusiveness. The International Symposium on Linguistic Politeness (ISLP), where these papers were presented, was convened at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok in December, 1999, to celebrate the field’s coming of age and to offer an opportunity to assess its current status and future potential. Of over forty papers that were presented, we have selected for this volume some of the strongest demonstrations of the maturity of the field.2 When we speak of the recent emergence of the field of linguistic politeness, we mean just that. Of course examinations of politeness, systematic and anecdotal, have been a part of many scholarly and artistic fields. One could cite as ancestors a set of personages as various and eminent as Jane Austen, Sigmund Freud, and Margaret Mead. One could probably trace origins and connections as far back as the travelers’ tales of writers like Marco Polo, and as different in function from modern social science writings as the cautionary tales brought back to the west by Christian missionaries. During the early twentieth century, anthropologists began to objectively examine the differences in interpersonal behavior among diverse cultures, noting that what one group considered polite or proper, another might find bizarre or rude. While all cultures seem to pos-
Introduction
sess notions of what was appropriate or polite in specific contexts, there was no universal agreement about which behaviors fell under that rubric. One important contribution that should be mentioned here as vital to today’s research is the anthropologist/sociologist Erving Goffman’s (1967) Interaction Ritual, which introduced the invaluable concept of face. So explorations in older fields set the stage for the study of politeness within the newer field of linguistics, and the still newer ones of sociolinguistics and linguistic pragmatics. But this fact raises a question: if politeness can be and has been studied within many traditional fields, what is the contribution of linguistics? Is linguistics equipped to study interactive, not strictly language-related, behavior? What is the scope of the linguistic grammar? The organizers of ISLP, and the editors of this volume, see the study of politeness as necessarily interdisciplinary. The very fact that its provenance is impossible to pin down, that it resists assignment to any single field, means that a particular kind of mindset is needed to study it: from a theoretical perspective, one that is not overly concerned with turf and disciplinary boundaries; and, from the perspective of the data upon which the theory must be based, a deep understanding of more than one culture and a willingness to transcend the blinders that one’s own culture imposes. Consider the most important words in the title of this volume: “Linguistic Politeness.” From some viewpoints it might seem tautologous; from others, self-contradictory. We naturally feel otherwise. But people will make their judgments based on what they understand “linguistic” to mean. On the one hand, “linguistic” means “having to do with language.” Using this definition, some might feel that the term “linguistic politeness” was tautologous, since most of the behavior considered “polite” is accomplished through language. In that sense, there is very little “politeness” that is not “linguistic.” On the other, the word has also been taken to mean, “having to do with the field of linguistics, governed by the rules and laws of that field.” Since many regard the boundaries of “linguistics” as delimited by the so-called “core” areas of phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax and – grudgingly – a narrow version of semantics, in that case no study of politeness can be “linguistic,” since any examination of politeness must reach beyond the core for explanation and analysis. (In other words, we could study indirectness, or honorifics, within syntax or morphology; but to connect the two as aspects of human socialization – that is, to see them as “polite” – would be to transcend the limits of linguistics. From this perspective, then, the title is self-contradictory: there can be no such thing as “linguistic politeness.”)
Introduction
The organizers of ISLP and the editors of this volume subscribe to neither theory. We have chosen the terminology “linguistic politeness” in order to express a couple of relevant beliefs: –
–
that politeness is largely, but by no means exclusively, linguistic behavior. There is linguistic (language-based) politeness, and extra-linguistic politeness. As linguists, we stress the former in our work, but it has to be understood as part of a larger whole. Language and non-language behaviors are in all likelihood parts of a single system, to which similar theories and methods of analysis must be applied. Hence, theories that insist on the distinctness of linguistic and non-linguistic behavior, or organization in the mind or brain, are vitiated by the existence of politeness, since it includes both. that linguistics cannot remain the study exclusively of “core” language phenomena. The complete grammar that, perhaps, eventually linguists will be able to construct for the languages of the world will have to incorporate pragmatic and sociolinguistic knowledge; and pragmatics may well turn out to be the “core” of the core, the explanatory basis for much of the rest. Why, for example, do languages have syntactically different ways of expressing similar ideas? Consider these sets: Would you mind opening the window? Open the window. The window is closed, dammit! I broke the dish. The dish got broken.
It seems to us a poor theory of syntax that ignores the relationships among the members of each set above: their formal differences as well as their functional similarities. Autonomous syntax theories are said to produce “simpler” or more economical grammars – but this illusion, however tempting, is deceptive, because it ignores the fact that language is engaged in for the purpose of communication. Since the late 1950s, linguists have been forced to choose between the ultimate irrelevance of autonomous formal “core” approaches, and the immense complexity and indeterminacy of multisystematic perspectives.3 The complete understanding of politeness as a unifying force bringing together a theory of language and theories of human motivation, behavior, and culture rests on our willingness to accept indeterminacy and to deal with it as rigorously as we can – and never to insist on formalism for its own sake.
Introduction
. Linguistic politeness? But agreement that politeness is a valid topic for linguistic study begs perhaps another question: what is “politeness”? Does the English term “politeness” coincide perfectly with apparent synonyms used in other languages? A perfect match would be extraordinary: anyone who has tried to translate from one language into another knows that true synonymy across language boundaries is rare.4 It is rare enough within language boundaries. In English there are several words in common use that cover the area under discussion: polite, courteous, civil, mannerly, and genteel are all offered as synonyms on page 1401 of the 1990 edition of the American Heritage Dictionary. Mannerly seems to have become uncommon in current American English; genteel (at least in California in 2005) is seldom used except with ironic intent. Let us consider the other three. Polite . . . impl[ies] consideration for others and the adherence to conventional standards expected of a well-bred person. . .. Civil suggests only the barest observance of accepted social images; it often means neither polite nor rude. . . . Courteous implies courtliness and dignity. . ..
The existence of these choices hints at the complexity of the topic addressed here. Politeness itself is twofold: it involves both “consideration for others,” that is, adherence to the rules, whether a culture frames them in terms of face and FTA-avoidance or as something else, i.e., wakimae; and the “adherence to conventional standards,” i.e., the expectation that the rules will be followed, that all parties to a discourse are “well-bred” persons – that is, knowledge of the rules. Polite behavior per se avoids confrontation and conflict (that is, face threat); but at the same time, the fact that you and I are polite to each other signifies to each of us that we are well-bred members of the same culture (wakimae, or “discernment”: Ide 1989). To our knowledge, no previous discussions of western FTA-based politeness make use of or even comment explicitly on this duality, the workings of which can be summarized as follows. Suppose two people engage in an interchange in which both follow the rules of politeness. Not only do they thus avoid conflict (FTA-avoidance), but by operating in this way they implicitly signify to each other: (1) that they are members of the same group, a we, who are connected by their acknowledgment of the same system; (2) that they are both good (virtuous and proper) members of that group: they are both “well-bred.”We could call this understanding of understandings
Introduction
“metapoliteness,” contrasted with the simple politeness of FTA-avoidance. Or we could borrow Ide’s term wakimae for the latter case.
The American Heritage Dictionary’s contrast between politeness and civility in English brings up still another distinction. Normally we see acts of politeness as positive choices. Those expressions of willingness, however conventional, signify our acceptance of one another as persons whose feelings and responses we care about. Civility, on the other hand, seems to imply some level of duress or at least non-genuineness: it is neutral where politeness is positive and rudeness negative. To be civil is to do the bare minimum to avoid conflict and bad feelings, but often in a way that indicates that one would just as soon not be doing so. Thus we say, reprovingly, “You might at least be civil about it,” or “keep a civil tongue in your head.” Politeness is the quality achieved by education or polish in the social arts: it goes beyond the bare minimum required to keep a society cohesive, and is seen as an adornment to a person’s behavior. Civility etymologically is behaving like a citizen, acting in a political rather than a social role, one in which keeping order is the goal, not achieving friendly intercourse. Courtesy goes beyond mere politeness in positive associations, suggesting warmth and interest in the other person’s welfare. Etymologically, courtesy is behavior learned at, and suited for, the royal court: not just anyone can use it or merits it, but only those of noble birth. It is not merely the lowest common denominator required in civil society, nor is it the superficial polish of politeness. Thus courtesy is less apt to be conventionalized than politeness, and civility is largely conventional – what is required, not what is felt.5 So finding an all-encompassing definition of politeness is no easy task. Even if scholars agree that this behavior is rule-governed like other aspects of language, the rules in any culture must be highly complex and context-based; and the problem of making connections across cultures and across linguistic grammars will be daunting.
. Politeness comes into linguistics: The role of generative semantics If we agree that politeness is an appropriate concern of linguistics, another question arises: how did politeness become part of linguistics? To understand that, it is useful to recall some history. For generations linguists have set up an impermeable barrier between the universal grammarians who believe that the interesting things about language are the properties that all languages share, a commonality based on the sim-
Introduction
ilarities among all human minds, which shape and recognize the processes humans use to communicate with one another; and the contrastive or comparative grammarians, who feel that the most interesting aspect of language is its diversity, the fact that the same ideas are expressed in different languages in very different forms. The latter position was first articulated in modern linguistics by the American Structuralists led by Leonard Bloomfield (especially in Language, 1933). The former position is that of Noam Chomsky (e.g., 1964). Linguists who entered the field via the social sciences were apt to embrace the contrastivist position; those whose interests centered in mathematics or philosophy, the universalist. That argument, though the amount of attention given it waxes and wanes, has never really subsided nor has it been resolved to anyone’s satisfaction. As so often when dealing with the human mind and its products, both sides are right: we must agree to disagree, or agree that languages share many universal components, but also differ in surprising and unpredictable ways. A full analysis of any phenomenon must go both deep and wide. That is equally true of politeness studies. Scholars have noticed that all cultures recognize a set of behaviors and attitudes as “polite”; and yet that the particular sorts of behavior so identified may differ from culture to culture; different manifestations of polite behavior are expected by members of different cultures under similar circumstances; and in general, when, how, and to whom to be polite may differ considerably from one culture to another. (Anyone who has spent time in more than one society has experienced these differences, often with embarrassment and confusion.) So politeness can profitably be studied from both universalist and contrastivist perspectives, and indeed has been studied in both ways. Either universalists or comparativists had reasons to bring politeness into linguistics. But it was Generative Semantics, an offspring of transformational grammar, a universalizing theory, that had the need to do so, and therefore developed the means. Generative Semantics developed at M.I.T. within the Chomskyan transformationalist community in the mid-1960s, although at first its proponents merely thought of their work as deepening and strengthening the Chomskyan syntactic base, or Deep Structure.6 While many differences emerged between Standard (and Extended Standard) Theory and Generative Semantics in their views of language, the form and function of the grammar, the relation among the components of grammar, the extent of universality, and much more, one recurrent dispute concerned the role of extra-linguistic material in the linguistic (syntactic) grammar. In general, GSists wanted to be able to incorporate such material – for instance, psychological and social information available
Introduction
to speakers and having linguistic corrrelates (whether formally grammaticalized or not) – and ESTists didn’t. GS wanted to incorporate assumptions and presuppositions – for instance, speakers’ positive or negative attitudes toward propositions, represented in the choice of some versus any; or the recognition that the existence of a choice among: Go home! Would you mind going home? Isn’t that your mother calling you?
meant that syntactic form depended at least in part on speakers’ judgments about the interpersonal context in which their utterances were located. This information, according to GS, was present at the deepest level of syntactic analysis (the Underlying Structure, GS’s replacement for the Standard Theory’s Deep Structure). ESTists fought this argument vociferously on several grounds, for example: if “anything” that might enter a speaker’s awareness required Underlying Structure representation, US’s would be immensely complex, numerous, and infinite – that is, unable to function as part of a formal generative grammar. Even if such structures could be listed in a finite way, those lists would be vague and very long. Generative Semanticists agreed that these problems were serious but not deadly. True, the incorporation of this material into the grammar entailed a much more complex syntactic component than EST envisaged. But the pluses outweighed the minuses: the insight gained into the relationship between language and mind, and the eventual simplification of the grammar as a whole, were worth the apparent complications. And it might well be possible to devise a rigorous and predictive way of incorporating these new insights, so that they would function in a way parallel to the rest of the transformational grammar. One path toward a solution was offered by the theories and analyses of ordinary language philosophers, in particular J. L. Austin (1962) and H. P. Grice (1975). Their aim was to provide a rigorous (if informal) treatment of “ordinary” (that is, non-logical) language: to show that, even though on the surface utterances seemed to lack cohesion or clarity, with the use of a few assumptions (the Performative Hypothesis; Illocutionary Force; Conversational Implicature), a clear, succinct and informative intention could be discovered. Ordinary language philosophy, like EST and GS, is universalizing: it assumes that the structures it hypothesizes exist in all languages because they represent the working of all human minds. In this respect, they dovetail neatly with Chomskyan Deep Structure and even better with GS Underlying Structure.
Introduction
The incorporation of these theories into GS gave linguistics a way to relate form, meaning, and function (creating what GS eventually called pragmantax: the interface between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics). It also allowed the positing of connections between linguistic form and social or interactional functions – that is, the intersection with sociolinguistics (not yet a fully-developed field): we may choose indirectness, for instance, in order to avoid offense; we may use passive forms in order to deny responsibility for the propositions we are uttering (“the dishes got broken,” rather than, “I broke the dishes”). To ignore these options, GS argued, was to abandon the possibility of explanatory adequacy in any theory of syntax. Surely “explanation” had to include not only an accounting for the order of lexical items in a sentence, but also the reasons for choosing a syntactically more complex construction rather than a simpler one. Explanation for linguistic form required an excursus into psychological and social functions and systems. Linguistics had to become truly interdisciplinary, borrowing from other disciplines (not only philosophy, but also anthropology, psychology, and sociology). Standard transformational grammar embraced interdisciplinarity, as long as their version of linguistics colonized other fields and not vice versa. GS was (marginally) more open to true interpenetration and collaboration. From this theoretical disputation arose the notion of politeness as a topic amenable to incorporation within linguistics. If the Gricean Cooperative Principle accounts (in a more or less predictive way) for our ability to understand one another’s superficially illogical productions, it can explain or predict our use of many kinds of indirect forms (that is, those interpretable via Implicature) in a conventionalized and systematic way. Politeness might be a good test case for the utility of the Cooperative Principle. Unlike other functions of Conversational Implicature, it involves rigorously predictable (and often even grammaticalized) relationships.7 It seems to occur in somewhat similar fashion across languages and cultures, and yet to work differently across linguistic and societal boundaries (and when faux pas occurred in cross-cultural conversations, they could be explained as violations of rules or principles, which could then be learned like other linguistic rules). Interestingly, while Grice’s system seems (at least on some readings8 ) to view utterances based directly on the Maxims as unmarked, with Implicatures marked and requiring explanation, in many types of discourse politeness-based implicature supersedes clarity-based Maxim-adherence. That is, in daily intercourse, when faced with a choice between clarity and politeness, people normally opt in favor of the latter. That suggests that politeness is not just a superficial addition to a grammar in which directness (i.e., non-politeness) is basic.
Introduction
Rather, the behavior that a culture calls “polite” is an intrinsic and sometimes unmarked part of a communicative system. The choice of polite forms then plays a significant role in linguistic behavior, at least if there is a rough equivalence between “language” and “communication.” And the fact that speakers can tell intuitively whether an utterance is polite, rude, or something in between suggests (by the same logic Chomsky used to argue for transformational rules) that the system is rule-governed. Therefore, it is the business of linguists to determine the systematics of politeness. So, by the early 1970s, the GS project involved a strong commitment to extending the sphere of linguistic influence. As suggested in Lakoff (1989), the Generative Semanticists were still more loyal Chomskyans than either group thought: they still believed that these extra-linguistic behaviors had to be incorporated into the syntactic base of the grammar, while today many of the survivors might still insist on a connection, but see the basis of the linguistic grammar as interactional or psychological (or perhaps, ultimately, neurological), with social and pragmatic considerations motivating the syntax rather than vice versa. The notion of interconnectedness among levels and psychosocial systems is crucial, and over the years since then it has been the inspiration for the work presented here. The system proposed in Lakoff (1973) was an attempt to incorporate politeness into the core grammar, not to provide a complete and universal systematics of politeness cross-culturally, or a means of computing the explicit form an utterance might take under different contextual conditions. It was a first demonstration of the interfaces between language, psychology and society – that is, syntax, sociolinguistics, and pragmatics; and an examination of the role of the individual in creating and using a grammar (pragmatics) and the role of the social context in which individuals are necessarily situated (sociolinguistics). Borrowing from pragmatics, politeness theory makes use of ideas such as: – – – – –
systematic rules or principles; speech acts (or utterances) as basic to language; speech as world-changing; indirectness as intentional and interpretable; the multiplicity of ways to express the same idea.
From sociolinguistics, politeness theory incorporates: –
the universality of the phenomena of politeness across languages and cultures;
Introduction
– –
the typological differences in the realizations of “politeness” in different cultures; the different forms and functions of politeness across social contexts and discourse genres within a culture.
And these connections lead to other questions: can we frame a universal theory of politeness? Or should we understand the politeness of different cultures in different terms?
. Theories of politeness across the East/West divide: FTA-avoidance vs. wakimae We have spoken above at some length of the major competing theories of politeness: Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson’s9 (1987) concept of face, face-threats, and face-threat avoidance; and Sachiko Ide’s (1989) discussion of the importance of wakimae in explaining politeness in Japanese and other Asian cultures. The two views may be synopsized in the following table:10
Locus Function Context Relationship
FTA-avoidance
wakimae
West (overtly, covertly in Japan and other Asian cultures) conflict avoidance (or denial) individuals by themselves I vs. you
Japan (and perhaps Asia generally) appropriateness to situation group (ba) we
It is true that Brown and Levinson’s system makes use of contextualizing devices in their equation: Wx = D(S, H) + P(H, S) + Rx, but only as an adjunct to the larger system, rather than the central focus of it. So perhaps the distinction that needs to be made between east and west is not that they utilize completely different systems, but that each system places different amounts of emphasis on one FTA-avoidance or wakimae. But as much as all of us would like to see, and devise, a system of universal politeness, there are real obstacles in our path. None of us is free of our culture and its rules. Linguists (like other social scientists) strive for an objective and culture-free perspective; but striving is not achieving. Westerners, and
Introduction
particularly Americans, as the culturally dominant group in the world today, find it virtually impossible not to see behavior through the veil imposed by our own society and the rules we unconsciously assimilated as children. As social scientists, we are (we hope) beyond the “weird foreigners” or “inscrutable Asians” stereotypes, but as sophisticated as we feel, we still wear blinders: our ways still seem the “normal” ones, and those of others require explanation. Or – another way cultural imperialism insinuates itself – we adopt the Cinderella’s slipper approach: we attempt to fit all other systems into an explanatory model that appears to work well for our own, since our own languages and cultures are, almost invariably, the ones upon which “universal” theories (like Gricean conversational logic, or FTA-avoidant politeness) are based. Unquestionably there are universals of language and universals of culture. So a claim that a system proposed for and first tested on English is equally applicable to the world’s other 6,000 languages is not inherently ridiculous. But such a claim must be subjected to meticulous testing, and that testing cannot be done by cultural outsiders (as Brown and Levinson, for all their expertise in non-Indo European languages, are for Tzeltal, Tamil, and the other languages they cite as exemplary of the workings of their system). Until native participants are in a position to construct their own systematicities without pressure from Euro-based models, every allegedly universal system is open to suspicion. The writers of this Introduction are native participants in two very diverse languages and cultures; and while each of us can probably speak with some confidence about the workings of her own culture’s politeness system, it is not yet apparent to either of us that we are reliably able to construct or critique a supersystem that would encompass both of them, much less any that purports to be truly universal. Early transformational theorists were overconfident about universality: we were prone to observations to the effect that a syntactic phenomenon that was observed in English and German must be universal. We have learned to be much more cautious about syntactic universals; we must be equally so for pragmatic and sociolinguistic ones. So the question remains very much alive for the future: can a single system be devised that incorporates the intuitions of both FTA-avoidance and wakimae, and is applicable to all cultures? Or is an attempt to find a single explanation for politeness itself an error, an indication of our failure to appreciate the full range of human behavior?
Introduction
. Beyond linguistics: The importance of being polite, or at least understanding politeness We have spoken above of the importance of politeness in theories of pragmatics, sociolinguistics, and even core linguistics (and could extend the discussion to include the social sciences generally, and no doubt the humanities as well). But as with much of the subject matter of sociolinguistics and pragmatics, our theories have repercussions beyond academia, in the outside world. As the world grows increasingly global, better communication across national and societal boundaries becomes increasingly essential. Where once dominant groups could see the communicative strategies of others as silly or irrelevant, now even the strongest powers are coming to realize that survival entails understanding their politically weaker interlocutors. The point was first made forcefully in the area of gender. As we began to realize in the early 1970s, men and women spoke “different languages” – or more accurately, used the same linguistic forms with different intents and understandings. Until the dawn of the modern women’s movement during that period, men had been pretty well able to ignore what women meant by their communicative strategies; and when the latter were studied at all, generally by men, it was almost always in derogatory tones. Once women achieved social and economic positions in which they could say no (and other rude things) to men, men had to make efforts to bridge the communication gap – as signified by the tremendous popular success of Tannen (1991). Communication across national and linguistic boundaries today has a status similar to that of cross-gender communication in the early 1970s. Because other nations are rising in political and economic power, and the formerly impregnable (economically and otherwise) USA is being forced to see itself as a partner rather than a hegemonic boss, the next logical step will be the recognition that we all have to understand each other better if we are all to survive and flourish together. Politeness (or courtesy, or civility) is essential in this enterprise, and a general understanding, by Americans as well as others, of how to be respectful and friendly to others is intrinsic to the world’s continued health. Politeness studies are poised to break out of their academic enclave: the present volume is offered as a first step in that direction: an overview, however academic, of the state of the field at the opening of the new millennium and the new world order.
Introduction
. Overview of the volume The Bangkok conference included 40 papers (and three invited plenary addresses). From those 40 presentations we have selected the fifteen that represent the most interesting and innovative explorations of politeness theory and application. In keeping with the title of this volume, Broadening the Horizon of Linguistic Politeness, we have assigned each paper to one of four perspectives: The Theoretical Perspective, The Descriptive Perspective, The Comparative Perspective, and The Historical Perspective – often a difficult decision, since many of the papers could be assigned to more than one section. The first section, “General Overviews,” contains the plenary lectures.
Part I. General overviews: The plenary papers The first paper in this section is “Civility and its discontents; Or, getting in your face” by Robin Lakoff. Lakoff discusses “the role politeness expectations play at the level of discourse and social structure.” Why is politeness more important for some societies than others? For example, contemporary American culture has recently been criticized by pundits as becoming less “civil” or more “agonistic” – colloquially, getting in your face. Lakoff argues that while Americans may be becoming less concerned with traditional modes of civility, as demonstrated in the public discourse of the media, this may not be a bad thing: it may be an indication that new groups with new rules and old grievances are achieving a public voice – even if that voice is sometimes a raspy one. She reflects as well on the events set in motion on September 11, 2001: is there a larger or deeper problem with American discourse on an international scale than mere incivility, a problem whose repercussions might include the horrific events of that day? In her paper, “How and why honorifics can signify dignity or elegance: The indexicality and reflexivity of linguistic rituals,” Sachiko Ide discusses the honorific systems found in Asian languages (such as Japanese and Thai) and how they are understood. She notes that these phenomena “have not been well dealt with in the frameworks of the linguistic and pragmatic traditions of Western oriented scholarship,” and offers a corrective proposal. Westerners, if they understand honorifics at all, often see them as an excrescence on the languages that have them – something that can be removed without changing the effective nature of the language or the culture it represents. Ide shows that this is a gross misunderstanding: the honorific system is intrinsic and essential to the working of Japanese society, and to the self-image of speakers of Japanese. Japanese
Introduction
and other high-context cultures require explicit information about the relative status and connectedness of interlocutors, in order for communication to succeed between them. Bruce Fraser’s paper, “Whither politeness,” reexamines the most important of the bases of politeness theory, the work of Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson, and offers trenchant critique and some suggestions for changes in their model. The importance of face, the FTA, and power relations may not be the same across cultures (as Ide’s paper and her other work have suggested in the case of Japanese). Fraser offers some possibilities for extensions and revisions of the theory.
Part II. The theoretical perspective This section includes papers that explicitly or otherwise force a reexamination of current politeness theory, or bring new analytical techniques to its study. For example, the first paper in this section, “Yoroshiku onegaishimasu: Routine practice of the routine formula in Japanese,” by Makiko Takekuro. In this paper, Takekuro examines a complex lexical item and shows that, in order to predict its range of occurrence, it is necessary to understand the complete social relationship that exists between speaker and addressee. What earlier theorists might have dismissed as a mere formulaic phrase is shown to encapsulate a microcosm of Japanese language and society: without an understanding of the latter, it is impossible to use the expression correctly. Hence any attempt (à la Brown and Levinson) to segregate linguistic from extra-linguistic aspects of language usage will founder on this word. In the next paper, “An argument for a frame-based approach to politeness: Evidence from the use of the imperative in Cypriot Greek,” Marina Terkourafi, using data from a modern Greek dialect, proposes that we view politeness not as adherence to a set of grammatical rules, but as speakers’ making judgments of the expectations or norms in a conversation. Speakers recognize that they are participating in a specific frame and tailor their contributions so as to have unmarked status within that frame. So politeness, rather than (as in conventional theories) imposing an additional layer of meaning, in fact simplifies the task of meaning-making for interlocutors. The final paper in this section is by Margaret Ukosakul, “The significance of ‘face’ and politeness in social interaction as revealed through Thai ‘face’ idioms.” While “face” has been a basic aspect of politeness theory, some caution is necessary since the concept was imported into Western social science discourse from the usage of Asian cultures by an outsider to those cultures
Introduction
(Goffman 1967) – a process, as we have remarked above, fraught with the dangers of oversimplification and misunderstanding. Recognition of those dangers should suggest the appropriateness of a return to the source of the concept, by native participants in the cultures within which it originated. This paper demonstrates one way to reach an understanding of what “face” means in those cultures: a close examination of Thai idioms that use the word.
Part III. The descriptive perspective The papers in this section, while they make useful contributions to the theory of politeness, stress the detailed examination of politeness-based behavior in a particular language, viewed through the perspective of extant theories. Thus the first paper in this section, by Christopher J. Conlan, “Face threatening acts, primary face threatening acts, and the management of discourse: Australian English and speakers of Asian Englishes,” “seeks to develop a perspective on linguistic politeness as it relates specifically to discourse organization.” Conlan introduces the concept of the Primary FTA: a speech act “by means of which pragmatic goals are ultimately attempted but which depend for their success on being adequately framed by focussed discourse-specific and context-specific FTAs.” Conlan suggests that problems that occur between speakers of different forms of English could be the result of different expectations on the part of each in terms of the production and understanding of PFTAs. The next paper, “Politeness in Thai computer-mediated communication,” by Krisadawan Hongladarom and Soraj Hongladarom, examines the development and negotiation of politeness in a new discourse genre, the transactions of participants in virtual communities on the Internet, specifically Thai speakers. They reflect on the influence of such communities on the culture as a whole, suggesting that computer mediated communication is currently effecting change in Thai culture, perhaps most noticeably in politeness behavior. Politeness is often thought of as necessitated by face-to-face interaction with known others: what happens when communication is virtual and interlocutors anonymous? Martha Mendoza’s paper, “Polite diminutives in Spanish: A matter of size?” investigates a category of Spanish lexical items that has become grammaticalized. Originally the use of a diminutive made reference to the small size of the referent alone. Over time diminutives have acquired more abstract and complex meanings, including a polite usage, which can be interpreted as negative politeness. The paper examines the development and usage of diminutives in this function.
Introduction
The final paper in this section is by Deeyu Srinarawat, “Indirectness as a politeness strategy of Thai speakers.” The author examines the forms and functions of Thai indirect speech acts in conversations, and finds that indirectness in Thai is most common in interrogative speech acts, followed by declaratives and then imperatives. In Thai indirectness is mainly used for the sake of irony. An important conclusion is the fact that while indirect forms exist in all languages, their range of use and intended function may differ across linguistic boundaries.
Part IV. The comparative perspective Because politeness transcends language and culture, scholars have always been interested in the ways politeness may differ cross-culturally and crosslinguistically: in form, in function, in appropriate contextualization. The location of this conference in Bangkok did a great deal to encourage crossfertilization, the coming together of researchers from all over the world to compare politeness in their respective societies. In this sense all the papers presented here have a multicultural perspective, but the papers assigned to this section have it as an explicit and principal focus. This is variously accomplished: by using data from two or more different linguistic sources; or by contrasting the perspective of analysts from within the same culture as the data, to the views of outside observers. An example of the second approach is found in the first paper in this group, by Megumi Yoshida and Chikako Sakurai, “Japanese honorifics as a marker of sociocultural identity: A view from non-Western perspective.” This paper examines the Japanese honorific system using data from spontaneous conversations. The authors suggest that honorific usage and choice of honorifics can be explained only by taking into account psychological and social information about the interlocutors: their sense of their individual identities, the roles they play relative to each other, and the real-world situation in which they are speaking. The information to which a Japanese speaker must be privy in order to speak and understand appropriately is in this way different from, and more complex than, what must be available to speakers of western languages, at least in terms of computing their explicit utterances. In the next paper, “Directness as a source of misunderstanding: The case of requests and suggestions,” Alexandra Kallia examines the use of such speech acts in the conversations of English, Greek, and German speakers. The author notes that the two types of speech acts are used under different conditions in each culture, and discovers in her data significant misunderstandings in cross-
Introduction
linguistic communications on this basis. While speakers of all three languages use suggestions, each uses them in somewhat different forms, so that speakers of one language intending to be polite may be heard by speakers of another language as rude. The paper by Anders Ahlqvist, “Forms of address in Irish and Swedish,” examines a remarkable feature shared by both but uncommon elsewhere European languages: the existence of a single second person pronoun in the singular, and another in the plural. Although the two languages share this trait, in each language it developed differently and at different times. In Irish, the situation developed naturally and has been the case for a long time; in Swedish, it results from the political reforms of the 1960s, and was introduced from above. Ekaterini Kouletaki’s paper, “Women, men and polite requests: English and Greek,” as the title suggests involves a complex four-way comparison of both culture and gender. Using a questionnaire, the author found that men and women within the same culture had different ideas about what was polite under different conditions; and that members of the same gender but different cultures did too. Greek men are much more direct than English men, and Greek women more direct than English women, but the latter are less direct than the former. Greeks of both genders tend to use humor and other inclusive strategies for the sake of politeness more than the English do. As a result, the English tend to see Greeks as rude, although the Greeks’ intention is to be polite. Mark Lê, in “Privacy: An intercultural perspective,” considers behavior that can, if misunderstood, create really serious problems in communicating across boundaries. What members of one group consider friendly interest, members of another may interpret as rudely intrusive. How important is “privacy” in a culture, and how is the need for it negotiated? Finally, “Selection of linguistic forms for requests and offers: Comparison between English and Chinese,” by Masako Tsuzuki, Kazuhiro Takahashi, Cynthia Patschke, and Qin Zhang, illustrates first of all the advantages of having a cross-cultural group of investigators. It looks at the relative politeness of imperative forms vs. questions in requests beneficial to the addressee (i.e., suggestions), in English and Chinese. While with close friends the simple imperative is more common in both languages, otherwise in both a question form is preferred. But the languages differ for suggestions (what the authors call “beneficial requests”) in close and equal relationships: imperatives are much more common in Chinese than in English in such cases. These findings suggest that Chinese is more positive-politeness oriented than English.
Introduction
Part V. The historical perspective The final two papers in this volume look at historical change in the politeness systems of two languages, Japanese and Thai. Historical pragmatics is an area that is difficult to study and consequently has received comparatively little attention, so we are especially happy to have received papers that focus on that theme. How do politeness systems develop? What aspects of them change over time? The first of these papers is by Andrew Barke and Satoshi Uehara, “Japanese pronouns of address: Their behavior and maintenance over time.” Based on a survey of second person singular pronouns in older and contemporary Japanese, the authors find new strategies have developed in several areas: indirect or locative nouns, polite nominal prefixes and suffixes, and the use of Chinese-based titles of respect in which politeness is part of the word’s morphology. The investigators find that women play a major role in these changes. “An aspect of the origins and development of linguistic politeness in Thai,” by Wilaiwan Khanittanan, explores analogous phenomena in Thai. The author shows that the development of Thai politeness systems was instigated by the plurality of cultures that became modern Thailand. The various cultures jockeyed for linguistic and other forms of preeminence over time, resulting in a highly complex politeness system. In recent times, pressure for modernization has also had effects on the system. It is our hope that this volume will be a useful contribution to the understanding of politeness across disciplines, cultures, languages, and time. As we have said, this moment is especially propitious: in academia, we are developing and testing new theories and perspectives for the fuller understanding of interactional behavior, of which politeness is one aspect. In the larger world, we have recently been made acutely aware of our need to understand both the universality of politeness in all cultures, and the different ways in which the desire to be polite can be manifested in each. Robin Tolmach Lakoff Sachiko Ide
Notes . The first such publication was probably Lakoff (1973). . Additional testimony to the maturity and development of this field is the publication of Eelen (2001).
Introduction . One of the first and still most profound discussions of this controversy is in Labov (1972). . Ide et al. (1992) compares the concept of politeness with its Japanese equivalent, “teineina.” The authors find (based on questionnaires administered to American and Japanese students) that while the English words “polite” and “friendly” are categorized similarly as “good,” the Japanese “teineina” and “shitashigena” are organized along different dimensions: the former as “good,” the latter as “friendly.” . Possibly the distinction between civility and courtesy is seen in a familiar passage from Macbeth, in which the king is gloomily reflecting on what he has to look forward to for the rest of his life: And that which should accompany old age, As honour, love, obedience, troops of friends, I must not look to have; but, in their stead, Curses, not loud but deep, mouth-honour, breath, Which the poor heart would fain deny but dare not. (Act V, Scene III, ll. 24–28) As king, Macbeth would normally expect courtesy; but having forfeited that through bad behavior, since he is king he can still expect civility (“mouth-honour, breath. . ..”) – a poor second choice. . For discussion of Deep Structure, see Chomsky (1964); for a discussion of the quarrel between Generative Semantics and Extended Standard Theory, see Lakoff (1989). . Leech (1983) treats politeness not as one reason for CI, but as a subcase of the Maxim of Manner. This seems not the best way to incorporate politeness into Conversational Logic, since polite utterances – like Implicatures generally – requires some computation and often special knowledge to be interpreted, whereas Maxim-obedient utterances are by definition intelligible on their face. . For instance Matsumoto (1989). . Perhaps here is as good a time as any to mention that readers may be puzzled that Brown and Levinson, very much recognized as major influences in the development of politeness theory, are not contributors to this volume. For the record, they were invited to attend the conference and contribute, but declined. . The two systems have generally been viewed not as competitive but as parallel, one explaining the practices of the east, the other of the west. But another way to understand the duality is that a rapprochement may be possible: a universal theory of politeness might require both (or aspects of both) to be applicable in some or all cultures. In any case, the bifurcated model below represents current understanding.
References Austin, J. L. (1962). How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon. Bloomfield, Leonard (1933). Language. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
Introduction
Brown, Penelope & Levinson, Stephen C. (1987). Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chomsky, Noam A. (1964). Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press. Eelen, Gino (2001). A Critique of Politeness Theories. Encounters, Vol. 1. Manchester, UK: St. Jerome Publishing. Fillmore, Charles (1981). “Pragmatics and the description of discourse”. In Peter Cole (Ed.), Radical Pragmatics (pp. 143–166). New York: Academic Press. Goffman, Erving (1967). Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Interaction. Garden City, New York: Doubleday. Grice, H. P. (1975). “Logic and conversation”. In Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts (pp. 41–58). New York: Academic Press. Ide, Sachiko (1989). “Formal forms and discernment: Two neglected aspects of linguistic politeness”. Multilingua, 8 (2/3), 223–248. Ide, Sachiko et al. (1992). “The concept of politeness: An empirical study of American English and Japanese”. In Richard Watts, Sachiko Ide, & Konrad Ehlich (Eds.), Politeness in language: Studies in its history, theory, and practice (pp. 281–297). New York and Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Labov, William (1972). “The study of language in its social context”. In Sociolinguistic Patterns (pp. 183–259). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Lakoff, Robin (1973). “The logic of politeness; Or, minding your p’s and q’s.” In Papers from the Ninth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society (pp. 292–305). Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. Lakoff, Robin T. (1989). “The way we were; or, the real actual truth about Generative Semantics: A memoir”. Journal of Pragmatics, 13, 939–988. Leech, Geoffrey (1983). Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman. Levinson, Stephen C. (1995). “Three levels of meaning”. In Frank R. Palmer (Ed.), Grammar and Meaning: Essays in Honour of Sir John Lyons (pp. 90–115). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Matsumoto, Yoshiko (1989). “Politeness and conversational universals – observations from Japanese”. Multilingua, 8 (2/3), 207–222. Tannen, Deborah (1979). “What’s in a frame? Surface evidence for underlying expectations”. In Roy O. Freedle (Ed.), New Directions in Discourse Processing, Vol. 2 (pp. 137–182). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Tannen, Deborah (1991). You Just Don’t Understand. New York: William Morrow.
P I
General overviews The plenary papers
Civility and its discontents* Or, getting in your face Robin Tolmach Lakoff Although linguists have been studying politeness for some 30 years, some questions have not yet been explored. For instance, not much attention has been focused on the role politeness expectations play at the level of discourse and social structure. This paper focuses on some of these larger questions: why is the issue of politeness more salient in some societies than others? Why and how do the expected forms of politeness change over time? And how do members of a society express their concerns in times when the politeness rules are undergoing rapid flux, as is the case in America at this time? What is the role of the media in this shift? And, finally, what does our current state of agonism mean? Keywords: Politeness; civility; style; agonism; discourse
.
Introduction: Politeness in linguistics
Linguists have been studying politeness for over thirty years now. In the course of that time we have made a great deal of progress in understanding and analyzing the phenomena to which societies give that name. We have created taxonomic schemas – distance, deference and camaraderie politeness (Lakoff 1973); positive and negative politeness (Brown & Levinson 1987); maxims of politeness (Leech 1980). We have examined cross-cultural differences in the way these systems manifest (Black 1973; Ide 1982, 1989; Matsumoto 1989; Rhodes 1989). We have used pragmatic theory (Austin 1962; Grice 1975) as an approach to the understanding of politeness; we have examined the conditions on the usage of speech act verbs with politeness consequences, e.g., apologize and request, both within societies and across cultures (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984). We have looked at the relationships between Gricean conversational implicature and politeness, again both across and within cultures (Keenan 1976).
Robin Tolmach Lakoff
We have definitely made a lot of progress in the understanding of politeness as a rule-governed system including but also transcending language. But there is still a lot that is not well understood, questions that have not yet been answered, or perhaps even asked. In this paper, I want to look at a few of these. Linguistic analysis progressed during the twentieth century from smaller to larger units, from concrete to abstract systems. Before the 1960s and the rise of transformational grammar, at least in the U.S., interest was focused on sound (phonetics and phonology). After the rise of mentalist argumentation in the 1960s, syntax became a fruitful area for research. The development of linguistic pragmatics and sociolinguistics in the late 1960s and early 1970s allowed us to incorporate structures above the sentence level and beyond autonomous language into our linguistic analyses. The same direction of movement has occurred in related fields, over a more compact time-frame: for example in the area of gender and language. Studies of politeness at first concentrated on the levels of word and sentence. But with the advances that have been made in discourse and conversation analysis over the last two decades, we have begun to incorporate into our understanding of what politeness is and how it works some investigations at the level of discourse and its societal functions. We have a reasonable understanding of how politeness works. Now we can begin to explore why it works as it does, that is, what politeness means – to the individuals who use it, and to the society that prescribes it.
. Changes in the perception of politeness Most of my examples are taken from the English of contemporary American society. Similar and equally valid cases can undoubtedly be found elsewhere. But my own culture is the only one I feel confident to discuss. Some of the questions I want to address in this paper are:
Why is politeness more salient at some times than at others? In some societies, more than others? For instance, in the United States during the last decade of the twentieth century, a wide range of conflicts around “politeness” or “civility” were very much a part of public discourse, regular topics of harangue and jeremiad in all the public media. But this was not the case during the 1960s, although during that period a lot of very rude things were being said and done. Since September 11, 2001, interest in the topics I discuss here seems to have dropped off markedly.1 In countries like England and Japan, issues of politeness seem frequently to be under discussion and contestation.2 In France, one
Civility and its discontents
gets the impression that these topics are not seen as nearly so problematic – the French may be proverbially rude, but they don’t seem to worry about it.3 Similarly, anecdotes abound from some points in the past about bad behavior in high places and low: in first-century B.C. Rome, in Athens during the Peloponnesian War, in the U.S. at the end of the eighteenth and in the first half of the nineteenth century.4 But at other, more comfortable, times, civility is apparently the rule, or at least bad behavior goes unremarked upon by contemporaries.
How do normal people understand politeness? What do non-linguists, or nonsocial scientists, mean by terms like “politeness,” “civility,” or “courtesy”? What can we learn from looking at popular usage? Dictionaries may be of help. For example, the American Heritage Dictionary (1996: 1401) provides a note differentiating among several of these terms, cited in part below: Polite and mannerly imply consideration for others and the adherence to conventional social standards expected of a well-bred person. “The English are busy; they don’t have time to be polite” (Montesquieu); “It costs nothing to be polite” (Winston S. Churchill). Civil suggests only the barest observance of accepted social usages; it often means neither polite nor rude. “‘Always be civil to the girls; you never know who they will marry’ is an aphorism which has saved many an English spinster from being treated like an Indian widow” (Nancy Mitford).
The dictionary’s discussion suggests a distinction between “civility” and “politeness”: they are not synonymous. We could fold the former into the latter, considering civility as behavior at the far negative end of politeness. But I think the differences between the two are sharper than that. If politeness (whether positive or negative) is an offering of good intentions, civility is a withholding of bad ones, a decision not to do something negative that one might have otherwise done. We say, “Can’t you at least be civil?” meaning that that is the least that might be expected of a proper human being. And when we say, “She was very civil,” that is perceived as a grudging compliment at best, quite differently from, “She was very polite.” Attributing civility to someone implies the avoidance of any show of felt hostility, or of exuberant unconcern for someone else’s comfort. Incivility is therefore most likely to be manifested by the powerful to the powerless, because they can get away with it. So in the Mitford quotation above, the advice to be civil is not given
Robin Tolmach Lakoff
because civility would be nice, or make the “girls” feel good; one had better be civil to them just in case power relations are reversed in the future. So public worries of “incivility” in a culture suggest a general fear that society is fragmenting: the old taboos are no longer strong enough to thwart or discourage the childish acting-out of egocentric desires. Impoliteness from this perspective could be seen as implying merely a personal and individual choice to violate boundaries.When we speak of incivility, there is the extension of this boorishness across the culture at large, with even minimal expectations of good treatment becoming questionable. There is no constraint that can be counted on any more to keep the peace. Sachiko Ide has suggested to me that civility is the Western equivalent of Japanese wakimae which, as she has shown, corresponds only partially to the Western ideal of politeness. Her suggestion strikes me as itself partially right. Both civility and wakimae share a component of meaning: acting according to general societal tenets of appropriateness. But wakimae, as I understand it (or rather, if I do), defines participants’ behavior as expressing shared acculturation and thus increasing social cohesion – positive aims – while civility stresses the negative aim of not creating disruption, often between individuals who see themselves as having little in common and with no likelihood of creating a shared future relationship – not likely therefore to participate in the kinds of behaviors we label “polite.” Wakimae, like politeness, is seen within its cultural context as positive, civility as negative, not quite “nice.”
What happens when politeness systems change or shift, when behaviors formerly considered “polite” or “rude” become neutral? I have discussed (Lakoff 1979) historical changes in politeness systems, the effects of a shift in European cultures from camaraderie in the middle ages to distance in the Renaissance, and back to camaraderie again, starting in California in the early 1970s, spreading eastward in the course of that decade. But what happens to people caught in the crunch? How do they understand changes in a system that is not merely a set of neutral rules, but perceived as a marker (as the dictionary definition above suggests) of “good breeding” and decency, and that quintessential American trait, niceness?5
. The American preoccupation with politeness: Nine cases While all of these questions are important and interesting, I will concentrate here on the first. Why have Americans been preoccupied with manners, civility,
Civility and its discontents
and politeness? What kinds of behavior are commentators referring to in their repeated obsessive worrying about “rudeness,” “incivility” and other kindred terms? And finally, who is doing the worrying, and why? Public worries about incivility take many forms. Let us consider nine major examples below:
Sexual coarseness in public contexts: e.g., the use of terms like “penis,” and more recently (and even more shockingly), “vagina” on network television; sexual innuendo, and more blatant reference, in movies and on TV situation comedies; explicit discussion of presidential proclivities during the impeachment crisis a year ago; a recent candidate for the presidency endorsing Viagra on television not long after the election. Until the 1990s, mention of almost any sexual topic, especially by its proper name, was a rarity in the American mass media. Older people recall that, in the mid-1950s, when the star of the wildly popular TV situation comedy “I Love Lucy” was pregnant (both her character and her real self), she was “expecting”; they were “having a baby.” She was never “pregnant.” Probably the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings in 19916 initiated the change. While Hill was castigated in conservative quarters for uttering the word “penis” in the august halls of Congress, once she uttered it, media commentators had to use it again (and again) to comment on her utterance. The Lorena Bobbitt affair7 a couple of years later again forced the media to utter the word every day, many times a day for a month, on every news and magazine program. The lawsuits by Paula Corbin Jones8 et al. kept analogous topics in the public ear; and matters were brought to a head during the impeachment debâcle in which, for almost a year, “penis” was the mildest of the terms the media found it impossible to avoid. Public discourse was exploiting the new freedom in extra-political venues as well. Thus, for instance, the headline of an article in the New York Times (Elliott 1998) cites a “Vivid-Livid Divide: Madison Ave.’s New Explicitness is Open to Debate.” The article comments, “‘Are you getting enough?’ an ad for cottage cheese coyly asks, referring to calcium. ‘Zit happens’ is a line in an ad for acne medication....And it has become impossible to count all the variations on such lines as ‘Size matters’ and ‘...or are you just glad to see me?”’9 This may not be a purely American phenomenon. Another New York Times article (Tanikawa 1995), “Japan’s Young Couples Discover the Public Kiss,” notes that Japanese youth are breaching an ancient taboo against the public display of affection, shocking their elders. “It’s nothing to be embarrassed about,” says one such young man. “I kiss my girlfriend when I feel lonely.”10 But a sixty-
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six year old man wrote in to the newspaper Mainichi Shinbun, “I simply cannot stand it. Some may say that it is a natural expression of feeling. But what separates us from the rest of living creatures is that we...are capable of exercising self-restraint.”
Violence in the media. It is only recently that Americans have begun to find frank and “gratuitous” violence offensive. “The key assumption in everyone’s conception of violence in America today,” says Louis Menand (1994) in the New Yorker, “is that it is epidemic.” Menand drops the names of Tonya Harding, Polly Klaas, Snoop Doggy Dogg, Lorena Bobbitt, Lyle and Erik Menendez, Beavis and Butthead, and Colin Ferguson11 as examples of the out-of-control violence Americans worry about. We seem, Menand suggests, increasingly to view violence as “normal,” and perpetrators of crimes like those he alludes to as just extreme versions of normality. “The criminal is only doing what the rest of us secretly desire to do.” Menand finally suggests that the purportedly endemic violence of American society is a “war of group against group,” an offshoot of “identity politics.” He has a point, though not necessarily the one he thinks he has. One thing that has raised Americans’ consciousness about violence is that increasingly it is being committed by those who, stereotypically, are the ones least expected to do so. The prototypical violent criminal in the white mind is black and male, even though statistically whites still commit most crimes. So when white women commit violent crimes – well, that’s news: recall the media’s obsessions with both Lorena Bobbitt and Tonya Harding. In that sense violence, whether real or fictional, becomes construed as a sign of increasing incivility, of people whose deferential politeness could once be counted on no longer knowing how to behave, saving face turning into in-your-face. Agonism: the unwillingness to acknowledge a middle ground in debate – what Tannen (1998: 3–4) calls The Argument Culture. “The argument culture,” she says, urges us to approach the world – and the people in it – in an adversarial frame of mind. It rests on the assumption that opposition is the best way to get anything done: The best way to discuss an idea is to set up a debate; the best way to cover news is to find spokespeople who express the most extreme, polarized views and present them as ‘both sides’; the best way to settle disputes is litigation that pits one party against the other; the best way to show you’re really thinking is to criticize.
Civility and its discontents
Writing in the New Yorker, Michael Kinsley (1995) attributes much of the agonism to populism: Populism, in its latest manifestation, celebrates ignorant opinion and undifferentiated rage. As long as you’re mad as hell and aren’t going to take it anymore, no one will inquire very closely into what, exactly, ‘it’ is and whether you really ought to feel that way.
Outside of politics, agonism is often blamed on the American system of adversarial justice, which has come under increasing criticism lately. It is attacked as part of the “culture of victimization” (often called the “blame game”) and the failure to take responsibility (as in the infamous “McDonald’s Coffee” case in which a litigant was awarded a multimillion dollar payment by a trial court because she spilled boiling coffee on herself). It is seen as a system in which the side more willing to push the limits, play shamelessly on fear or other emotions, intimidate the judge or the opposing counsel, will win (the O. J. Simpson case did nothing to dispel this perception). Increasingly lawyers are seen not as courtly Clarence Darrows or Atticus Finches, but as loudmouthed Marcia Clarks and Johnnie Cochrans,12 setting a bad example for all of us about how to present oneself in public. “Attorneys seem to be losing their manners,” according to an article in the San Francisco Chronicle (Sinton 1994). The article offers as an example a Texas attorney who claimed at a deposition that his opponent could “gag a maggot off a meat wagon.” As a result, the Association of Business Trial Lawyer of Northern California has adopted a Guide to Professional Practice including a set of rules of professional etiquette. “Do not engage in derogatory or prohibited conduct on the basis of race, religion, gender or sexual orientation” is one; “Do not be offensive even when your client so desires” is another. Tannen (1998) advocates the abandonment of adversarial justice altogether. It’s not clear, though, what would replace it.
Uncontrolled displays of hostility: e.g. “road rage” and “air rage.”13 In a traditional distance or negative-politeness culture, venting unmediated emotion in the presence of strangers is worse than uncouth. It is a sign that the venter is not fully acculturated, perhaps not fully human: an “ape,” or a “yahoo.” But as camaraderie supersedes distance as our cultural ideal, the open expression of emotions, even the most distasteful, is viewed less harshly. There is still disapproval, to be sure, but what is missing is any sense that such acts place their perpetrator beyond the pale of sanity or humanity, an assumption that would
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cause the immediate gratification of the behavior to be outweighed by fear of humiliation. The media, especially television news and magazine shows, have spent a remarkable amount of time on both these phenomena. Some of the attention no doubt springs from our own natural impulses to act similarly (and, too, Schadenfreude, since the subjects have given in to what viewers have presumably suppressed), impulses encouraged by the crowded and dehumanizing conditions of highway and air travel. But in the past there were pirates, Indians, and highwaymen ready to waylay the traveler, and elegant manners were probably uncommon in the steerage compartments of the ships that brought the ancestors of most Americans to America. It is our new fascination with the topic, our belief that this behavior is novel, that requires explanation.
Negative political advertising. The smear has always been a part of American political campaigning. But a great deal of negative attention was devoted to it recently, for instance in an article by John Tierney in the New York Times Magazine (Tierney 1996), “Why Negative Ads are Good For Democracy.” Tierney acknowledges that there has been a boom in negative campaign advertising. He agrees that such ads create voter cynicism and probably contribute to low voter turnout. But at least they present the issues, in however distorted a form. Interesting here is that the existence, and probable continuance, of negative advertising is presupposed: it has become so normal a part of the process that the only question is whether it is as bad as it is believed to be. In opinion polls subjects express unanimous disapproval of negative ads. Yet after a negative ad has been shown, the candidate whose ad it was rises in the polls at the expense of the target of the ads. The polls’ subjects are apparently responding indignantly to the idea that they might be the kind of people who enjoy hearing dirt about other people – vicious gossips. But when they are actually exposed to the smears they deplore, voters treat them as valid sources of information. As so often, we disapprove “rudeness” of this kind when it is presented as a theoretical possibility, but when we encounter real examples we treat them with respect. Cursing and other bad language (including non-“politically correct” talk).14 Once upon a time the use of certain kinds of language in front of “ladies” or others with delicate sensibilities was forbidden – and ladies weren’t even supposed to know those words, let alone what they meant. But now, it seems, anyone can swear in front of anyone.
Civility and its discontents
Bad language in currant parlance does not stop with sexual and excretory references, but also includes the non-politically correct racial and genderrelated slurs, or “fighting words.” Bad language has always existed in the public sphere – for instance in graffiti on the walls of Pompeii. But the range of its use appears to have widened recently, turning up where it was formerly banned: in movies and late-night non-network television (and you can even hear the occasional “ass” in prime time).15 This extension of bad language distresses many conservative commentators, particularly because new constituencies (women and children) have started to use it. That may be what is really shocking: not the badness of the language itself, but the fact that bad language has been appropriated by those who used to have to be “protected” from it. Their no longer needing linguistic protection is a sign of their increasing power and autonomy. The use of ethnic and sexual slurs is a different issue. Unlike four-letter words, slurs generally are aimed directly at members of a non-dominant group the speaker holds in contempt. So it isn’t simple vulgarity that makes this kind of language controversial: it’s what these words communicate about the power relationship between users and targets, and everyone’s place in society at large. In that respect, four-letter words are in many ways the antithesis of slurs, democratizing rather than exclusionary. Not surprisingly, then, many of the conservatives who most loudly decry the extension of traditional swearing are also the most vociferous critics of “political correctness.” But both of these categories fall into a non-polite, non-civil level of discourse and the concern over them is a manifestation that something is shifting in American society: language change as a manifestation of social change. An article in the New York Times (Goldberg 1995) explores the fondness of New Yorkers for cusswords. “Linguists and experts on American dialects generally agree that New York, among its many claims to excess, appears to be the most foul-mouthed city in the nation,” the article comments, rather proudly, “rivaling only prison and the armed forces in its penchant for profanity.” The latter institutions have historically been strongly male, probably a reason for their association with profanity. But New York? “Life in New York is so much trouble that we need some expletive to fill the need,” suggests Leonard R. N. Ashley, an English professor at Brooklyn College. Then, too, “the anonymity [of life in big cities like New York] allows you to curse without fear of retribution,” according to Timothy Jay, author of Cursing in America. Outlying regions are not so comfortable with these changes. Raritan, New Jersey, according to the San Francisco Chronicle (Banisky 1995) has imposed a ban on “foul language.” “We’re just asking you to be polite,” says its mayor.
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The article does not provide the wording of the law, which from the examples given seems remarkably broad: call someone “Fatso” and you’re subject to a $500 fine. Similarly there was a wave of national attention to the case of a young man in Michigan who was arrested for shouting obscenities when his boat capsized on a river, because he was within the earshot of “women and children.” An old law, not enforced in years, was abruptly revived.
“Flaming” on the internet. As we develop new communicative channels, uncertainties arise about how to behave on them. Not only was this true of the telephone, but it is certainly true today of the internet. Because the net combines the immediacy of talk and the distance of traditional writing with the anonymity of chatrooms, bad behavior flourishes online. Of particular concern is “flaming,” the use of immoderate and insulting language under the cloak of anonymity provided by the net. Immediacy, distance, and anonymity encourage violations of politeness. Distant and anonymous violators are unlikely to be caught. And as Konrad Lorenz (1966) argued, physical proximity is an inhibitor of aggression: it’s easier to kill unseen people with a bomb than to stab someone at arm’s length. The same may be true of verbal aggression. And since a major function of politeness systems is to permit people to operate in close contiguity without dangerous consequences by erecting symbolic boundaries, we feel less necessity for politeness under these conditions. The loss of polite conventions (“please,” “thank you,” “how are you?” and the like). There are two contradictory stereotypes about Americans. On the one hand, Americans are seen (by themselves and others) as simple, no-frills, direct folks who do not make much use of ceremony. On the other, it is often stated16 that Americans rely on conventional expressions of politeness more than do members of many other cultures. Perhaps Americans overuse conventional expressions to camouflage their tendency to be curt and businesslike – to get “down to brass tacks” immediately – in business transactions, rather than even conventionally showing interest in the interlocutor as a human being. “Please” and “thank you” allow Americans to be impersonal yet civil. Therefore they are apt to feel threatened by any attrition in the uses of these forms. An article (Rubenstein 1994) in the San Francisco Chronicle notes that San Francisco’s telephone company, Pacific Bell, has required directory assistance operators to drop the use of “please.” In the past, the operator’s greeting was, “Hi, this is Mary. What city, please?” Now the two permissible greetings are:
Civility and its discontents
“Hi, this is Mary, what city?” and “Hi, I’m Mary, what city?”17 Why has the short and innocuous “please” been eliminated? By lopping it off, Pac Bell estimates that it saves .5 second per call. Over the large volume of directory assistance calls fielded by Pac Bell operators, that adds up. But it certainly makes it clear where the phone company’s priorities lie – and not on the side of conventional politeness. Interestingly, of the two politeness-marking monosyllables in the original Pac Bell greeting, it is “please” that has been deleted while “hi” is kept. Since “please” is most easily interpreted as a marker of negative politeness, “hi” of positive, this is just another indication of the victory of the latter in America. Predictably, traditional etiquette authorities, and others, are scandalized. “‘Oh, good Lord,’ said newspaper columnist Judith Martin, known as Miss Manners. ‘Just what we need, more abrasive brusqueness in the world. It hardly seems necessary to mandate that people be rude unless the object is to strip all possible courtesy out of life.”’ Noteworthy is Miss Manners’s assumption that if you eschew “courtesy” you must be “rude” – there is no neutral ground. But neutrality is possible, and the new form is just that – neutral, impersonal, shorn of conventional distance politeness. Especially interesting is Pac Bell’s willingness to delete “please” even as it mandates the use of a form that arguably conveys even less information and takes more time, the (bogus) name. Here is a clear instance of camaraderie outflanking formal distance politeness. The casualness with which the Pac Bell employee acknowledges the bogosity (if that’s the word) of the first name is itself striking, approaching hypocrisy (that is, going beyond the conventional system that is politeness). The use of a first name is, at least by convention, an opening to intimacy and an expression of personal connection between addressor and addressee. If you don’t use a first name, or any name, that’s neutral. But a fake first name – that both promises intimacy and makes a mockery of the idea. Somehow that appears to bother the etiquette authorities a lot less than the shearing off of “please.” Letitia Baldrige, another etiquette professional, is equally distraught. She calls the new policy “terrible, just terrible.” “‘Clearly the decision was made by someone who was not taught any manners by his or her mother. We need more “pleases” in the world, not fewer.”’ One way in which conventional politeness is communicated is by taking a bit of extra time, saying that additional syllable or two that conveys that getting down to business is not the most important thing – that attending to the human needs of the interlocutor comes first. But in America, we say, “Time
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is money.” The removal of “please” merely instantiates that belief in a newly explicit way. There are attempts to maintain the standard. Rudy Giuliani, the former mayor of New York City, attempted a campaign to make New York taxi drivers, and others who deal with the public, more polite. The city put out instructional material, in pamphlets and on signs in public transportation facilities, enjoining readers to say Please and Thank you. The hope was to make New York a more polite place (a little like trying to make Hell a more cold place). America’s second president, John Adams, got it right about New York over 200 years ago (he was from Boston, always a more gracious and slow-moving city): “They [New Yorkers] all talk very fast, very loud and altogether without paying any attention to each other.... Nobody has any manners here.” (And New Yorkers probably rejoined, then as now, “Wassamatta? You gotta problem widdat?”)
Invasions of privacy, and the rise of conventional anti-formality. A number of the situations described above are related to the difference between public and private self-presentation, and the traditional understanding that people behave differently in different contexts, so that politeness works differently in each. If the line between public and private is being erased in contemporary U.S. culture, then our very definition of politeness will have to be renegotiated. As the Pacific Bell example suggests, America is becoming an increasingly conventionalized-camaraderie society. In a culture using conventional distance (such as the U.S. used to be), it was important to show non- intrusiveness: a speaker needed to present directives as mitigated requests, even when the illocutionary force of the speech act was an offer – to give the caller needed information. Hence “please” needed to be tacked on as the signifier of the request, to distinguish it clearly from an order. It was generally if implicitly acknowledged that the courtesy was not intended literally. But it was the use of the form that counted: it showed the speaker’s good intentions.
. Politeness: Convention vs. (apparent) spontaneity Camaraderie,18 being relatively new to Americans, at first seemed literal, a breath of fresh air, the spontaneous expression of true feelings replacing stuffy old meaningless formalities. But politeness by nature must become conventional, so that it can be unambiguously recognized as such. The Pac Bell bogus first name is one sign of conventionalized camaraderie. It’s the putative friendliness of proffering a first name that counts, rather than the insincerity of offer-
Civility and its discontents
ing a name that is false. People (aside from the etiquette experts) feel less need for the distancing or deference implied in “please,” than for the friendliness implied in using the first name.
. The battle between public and private Another pervasive tendency then becomes intelligible: erosion of the line between public and private life. The move to camaraderie erodes the distinction. Camaraderie would have us say, whether or not we mean it, “Here I am, my true self.” If camaraderie is becoming our preferred mode of selfrepresentation, it is not surprising that the public/private dichotomy, a crucial part of Western life at least since the Greeks, is increasingly irrelevant. Let me offer two pieces of evidence for this claim:
Public engulfs private. Recent years have seen the invasion of the telemarketers (who often addressing the callee by first name) into the home and family time par excellence, the dinner hour. Once upon a time your home was your castle, surrounded by a moat. The moat has shrunk to a pitiful mud puddle. Privacy has become secondary to commerce (a public concern). Private engulfs public. Bill Clinton (or rather, Just Plain Bill). It was not just his own use of the nickname (after all, Jimmy Carter went even further, to the diminutive – it’s apparently a Southern thing). But a New York Times story (Purdom 1995) tells of Mr. Clinton going about his business on a golf course, when “a middle-aged man a few yards behind him suddenly shouted, ‘Hey, Bill, over here!”’ The normal address to the President of the United States, even by his closest aides, has traditionally been “Mr. President.” And this was not some kid, but a middle-aged man, explicitly so identified. Perhaps President Bill brought it on himself (and us) in the famous MTV interview in 1992 when he answered, on television, the question all America was dying to know: was his underwear briefs or boxers? The fact that the question was even askable, by a young woman, on national TV, to the President of the world’s only remaining superpower, made it clear that something had shifted: the default relationship was now informal and private – camaraderie.
Robin Tolmach Lakoff
. Why things are changing Having looked at some of the changes taking place in American manners, I return to a question posed at the outset: Why have Americans been obsessed with these changes? Why do we find them so distressing? What do we mean when we say, as so many commentators currently do, that Americans have become impolite or uncivil? I think that a number of different factors have converged, and everyone is likely to be upset about at least one. Deep and large-scale changes are occurring in power relations among different groups in society. Especially for those who have always maintained implicit control over meaning and social conventions, whose own behavioral choices and standards determined what could be done and what was right, those changes are threatening. But it is frightening to confront these physical and political realities head-on, and criticizing the groups whose increasing influence is motivating the changes is itself impolite: it looks like sexism and racism (because it is). As was observed during the Ebonics19 debate of 1996-6, it is safer to criticize people’s language than to criticize their behavior. Fear of change can be framed as an aesthetic issue – as the “incivility” debate permits participants to do. These are just a few of the changes that are leading Americans to agonize over a putative loss of civility. 1. America’s increasing diversity. Americans have always been multicultural. But until very recently, those who were not white, male, and middle-class and above had no access to public discourse, no way to compete for the right to make their own standards of meaning and language. Since the 1960s,20 more and more formerly disenfranchised groups have demanded, and to some degree received, the right to make language, make interpretations, and make meaning for themselves. The sharing of the right to make meaning turns America truly multi-cultural – and pretty scary for the formerly “in,” now moving toward the periphery. As a result the politeness rules of the former in-group are now only one of several options, as other styles of interaction become acceptable in public discourse. Speakers from these formerly silenced groups can no longer be ignored on the grounds that they don’t know how to behave. But often their behavior does not coincide with traditional cultural understandings of what is “polite.” It is easy to criticize the way people talk as a convenient and cheap substitute for the harder job of criticizing what they’re saying. So feminists are attacked as “strident” or “shrill” – words that substitute their putative way of talking for what is really troublesome, what they are saying. In
Civility and its discontents
saying that “they” are uncivil or impolite, critics may be articulating their fears that what “they” are saying is scary or otherwise unpalatable – offensive, less because politeness has been breached than because their very appearance in the public arena requires severe readjustments in our mores. But the new groups can be obstreperous. When you have been kept out of the conversation for hundreds or thousands of years, you can get impatient. So some of the alleged “incivility” arises because the new participants have grown tired of waiting to be heard, and being ignored. Now that it’s possible to get in the old boys’ faces, they are getting in them with a vengeance. To the old order, this behavior is doubly obnoxious: rude on its face (a violation of the rules of politeness), and a harsh (therefore rude) reminder that the newcomers have co-opted the power they unilaterally held. 2. A new communicative channel: The internet. About 100 years ago, as the telephone became a fixture in American homes, there arose a genre of popular literature – fiction as well as journalism – revolving around the dangers of the telephone. It would make us too private (keep us from face-to-face encounters), or it would steal our privacy (cf. the dinner-table telemarketer’s call). It would invade our homes, seduce our women (Brooks 1976; de Sola Pool 1977; Marvin 1988). Behind the scare stories was the real fear of a new popular channel of communication, the first in 2500 years (Socrates had had similar kinds of dark worries about the last one, general literacy). The fears each of these new channels engendered are remarkably similar, suggesting that it isn’t the nature of the channel, but its novelty, that we fear. Since new channels present new communicative challenges which favor the younger generation against the older, the internet is as frightening to the middle-aged and older among us as the telephone was to our ancestors. A lot of our fears about the internet have a real basis.21 But some of our worries are simply the expression of fears of entering a new age for which we are not ready. (Cf. Markoff 2000 for discussion of some of these fears.) 3. Media competition for ratings and audience. Over the last decade, the media clamoring for our attention have increased exponentially: both the proliferation of cable channels on television, the growth of a great many specialized (“niche”) magazines, and the rise of often irresponsible (because anonymous) internet journalism. To get our attention, all have to shout louder, behave worse: get in our faces, be blatant, intrude on both viewers/readers and the subjects of their stories (e.g. politicians and celebrities). So the loss of “civility” is in part the result of commercial necessity: the
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media have to be more oppositional, more controversial, more directly provocative, to attract consumers. 4. The rise of camaraderie politeness. If we were still a distance/negative politeness culture, many of the changes perceived as “incivility” would have had a harder time taking hold. But over the last generation or two presuppositions have shifted about the appropriate public presentation of self. The good American has always been direct, informal, and irreverent; increasingly that person is one who is able to talk to anyone about anything, with nothing left unmentionable – because that would suggest a lack of trust, a dissimilarity between speaker and addressee. The sense of symbolic difference that permits the use of distance and deference politeness may be becoming too threatening in a society that is, in fact, increasingly diverse.
. Conclusions There are many reasons why Americans now perceive themselves as threatened by incivility. Some of the perceptions are correct, in that old versions of “civility” and “politeness” are receding because new styles are more appropriate to current political and interpersonal discourse preferences. Other changes are in progress because the right to participate in public discourse has been opened to new people who will not or cannot play by the old proprieties. In still other cases, it is the means by which communication is effected that cause a perception of impropriety. America is in for some trying times as we try to get along in a very new millennium. For we must have rules we can trust one another to abide by. Most commentators have seen the loss of these shared expectations as negative, frightening, and divisive. But it need not be so – at least not for long. Life may be difficult for a while. We won’t know how to understand one another’s intentions as well as we used to think we did, so there will be more open argumentation and abrasiveness in our public discourse. But societies have gotten through changes even more cataclysmic and thrived. Americans historically have been able to accommodate to novelty. But while we readily adjust to most kinds of linguistic change, this one may be trickier, because politeness is political: we use it to determine and measure our status. When the rules shift, how can we assess our standing relative to everyone else? For instance, in the university, students are generally polite to professors, but alas! the reverse is not necessarily the case. We’re neutral to our colleagues of equal rank. And when we need something from the dean, we’re polite indeed. We
Civility and its discontents
behave this way not merely because we have to, but also because it’s a way to mark our position in the pecking order. Members of dominant groups use their traditional right to define politeness to control other groups, keep them obedient and silent. When the implicit assumptions behind this system break down, there can be, in those formerly dominant groups, a sense of loss of control, chaos, and unpredictability. Trying as these changes are, they are not deadly. While living through change is unquestionably nerve-wracking, once we understand the reasons why politeness is changing, we may find the new system preferable to the old.
Afterword. At the time I originally wrote and delivered this paper (late 1999), the issue of intra-American discord seemed to me, from the ample media evidence, to be highly salient. September 11 changed all that. The expressions of concern over incivility discussed above seem to have vanished in the wake of a much more compelling fear. Before, Americans’ principal concern might be broadly summarized as: How are we behaving toward each other? Now, Topic A is more like, How can they act like that toward us? How are we presenting ourselves to them? We have closed ranks and are looking outward – the war in Iraq being one manifestation of this new attitude. One shocker arising out of 9/11 was the realization that, in many parts of the world, we are not loved. This comes about, in part at least, because of our discourse toward others in the world, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union made America unequivocally Number One and therefore not needing to be nice to anyone any more. One message conveyed, less by the events of 9/11 themselves (which go beyond issues of politeness or civility), than by the response to them in many parts of the world: we need to learn a new way of talking to the rest of the world. Just as we need to learn to speak to and listen to one another in civil ways, despite our diversity, the same is true of discourse between the Number One Superpower and everyone else. Unfortunately, America’s behavior toward the rest of the world since 9/11 could be seen as a flagrant disregard for the comforts of others, a disdain for niceness – the individual understanding of incivility writ large, on a global scale. But America might remember that even a superpower that need not fear retaliation nor worry about being unlovable has a reason to be civil: you never know who may be useful to you, or dangerous to you, in the future.
Robin Tolmach Lakoff
Notes * I would like to thank the faculty of Chulalongkorn University for their hospitality and for organizing the conference that brought this paper into being, and Sachiko Ide for her insightful comments. . The interest in politeness has not totally abated, however, although it seems to concentrate less on groups than on artifacts. In the San Francisco Chronicle of September 18, 2002, there were two articles on the same page complaining about etiquette in cell phone usage. . For example, I am told by Sachiko Ide that the Japanese government has convened a committee to consider whether the use of honorifcs is still appropriate in a changing society. The idea of anything analogous happening in America is unthinkable. . Many examples, from an American perspective, are to be found in Adam Gopnik’s Paris to the Moon (New York: Random House, 2000). . All of these were periods of social and/or political upheaval. For instance, in Founding Brothers (New York: Vintage, 2000), Joseph Ellis discusses the astonishingly vituperative political discourse of the new American republic during the decade after its founding. . A PBS special aired in 1999 on Jackie Kennedy suggested that she made an indelible impression on all not merely because of her beauty but even more because of her niceness. . Clarence Thomas had been nominated for a Supreme Court position. A former subordinate of his, Anita Hill, charged that he had sexually harassed her. The Senate held several days of televised hearings to examine Hill’s charges, in the course of which names of sexual organs and other obscenities received continual attention. . In 1993, Lorena Bobbitt amputated her husband’s penis while he was asleep, tin retaliation for raping her. . She threatened to prove that she was telling the truth about Bill Clinton’s having exposed himself to her by testifying at trial to his observed “anatomical irregularities.” . Madison Avenue is historically New York’s advertising district. The (understood) direct object of “getting enough” is normally “sex.” “Zit happens” is a pun on a common phrase, “Shit happens.” “Size matters” normally refers to penile size. The last quotation is a reference to a well-known Mae West double entendre: “Is that a pistol in your pocket or are you just glad to see me?” . Although the discussion sounds as if the Japanese are adopting American attitudes toward kissing, actually this quote would sound bizarre on the lips of an American. Kissing is what you do when you feel horny, not lonely. . Tonya Harding is the Olympic skater whose boyfriend hit rival Nancy Kerrigan in the knee prior to the 1994 Winter Olympics; Polly Klaas is the twelve year old girl kidnapped and murdered in Petaluma, California, in 1994; Snoop Doggy Dogg is a rap musician who has been arrested on charges of assault; for Lorena Bobbitt, see Note 1; Lyle and Erik Menendez killed their parents; Beavis and Butthead are television cartoon characters noted for their oafishness; and Colin Ferguson opened fire on a Long Island (New York) railroad car, injuring and killing several people.
Civility and its discontents . Clarence Darrow was an illustrious American defense attorney of the early twentieth century, Atticus Finch an equally illustrious though fictional counterpart (the protagonist of Harper Lee’s novel, To Kill a Mockingbird. Johnnie Cochran and Marcia Clark were respectively the lead defense and prosecution attorneys in the trial of O. J. Simpson. . These have become frequent topics of critique in the popular media. “Road rage” refers to automobile drivers venting their anger on other drivers: cutting them off, shooting them, etc.; “air rage” to frustrated air travelers’ bad behavior (defecating on flight attendants’ carts; breaking into the cockpit and fighting with the pilots, etc.). Since September 11 – one of its few blessings – instances of the latter have declined precipitously, no doubt because criminal penalites against it are being vigorously enforced. . For discussion of the history and use of this term see Lakoff (2000). . An episode of PBS’ investigative program Frontline devoted to an examination of the gritty police drama (on a commercial network) Homicide offers clips of producers and network censors arguing over the permissibility of the word “shit” on the program. . For example by John Gumperz, interviewed in the video “Multi-Racial Britain: ‘Crosstalk’ ” (1980, National Centre for Industrial Language Training, Commission for Racial Equality). . “Mary” is a pseudonym. “We like names that are short, simple, and easy to understand,” says an operator manager. “It doesn’t matter if it’s the operator’s real name or not.” . I introduced this term (in Lakoff 1973) as one of three politeness options (the others were distance and deference) societies and individuals within them could choose. Although Brown and Levinson’s distinction between positive and negative politeness is more usual, I am returning to my system because I think camaraderie better captures what is happening in the cases under discussion than its otherwise close counterpart, positive politeness. Brown and Levinson’s positive politeness covers a range of expectations and behavior not covered by camaraderie, and vice versa. Positive politeness encompasses the use of forms like “I’d like it if. . .” and “It would help me for you to. . .,” which are not especially characteristic of camaraderie. The latter is the avoidance of conflict through the pretense that interlocutors are so intimate and similar that there could be no conflict between them. So conventional camaraderie uses first names and eschews polite formulas like “please.” It stresses the presentation of self (apparently) “warts and all” – as an avowal of trust and trustworthiness. . In late 1996, the Oakland (California) School Board (a majority black group representing a majority black community) offered a resolution declaring Ebonics (what sociolinguists call African American Vernacular English or AAVE) to be a language in its own right and equivalent in its propriety and range of use to Standard American English. A virulent debate promptly broke out in the public media, lasting over a month. For more discussion, see Lakoff 2000. . In the late 1960s civil rights leaders advocated a change from Negro to Black, the historically first instance of reclamation. . For instance, concerns about identity theft; the floods of pornographic material and spam.
Robin Tolmach Lakoff
References Austin, J. L. (1962). How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Banisky, Sandy (1995, February 7). “Town quite happy, thank you, with ban on foul language”. The New York Times, p. A10. Black, Mary B. (1973). “Ojibwa questioning etiquette and use of ambiguity”. Studies in Linguistics, 23, 13–19. Blum-Kulka, Shoshana & Olshtain, Elite (1984). “Requests and apologies: A cross-cultural study of speech act realization patterns (CCSARP)”. Applied Linguistics, 5 (3), 196–212. Brooks, John (1976). Telephone: The First 100 Years. New York: Harper and Row. Brown, Penelope & Levinson, Stephen C. (1987). Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. de Sola Pool, Ithiel (1977). The Social Impact of the Telephone. Cambridge: MIT Press. Elliott, Stuart (1998, June 19). “A vivid-livid divide: Madison Ave.’s new explicitness is open to debate”. The New York Times, p. B1. Goldberg, Carey (1995, June 19). “Welcome to New York, curse capital”. The New York Times, p. B12. Grice, H. P. (1975). “Logic and conversation”. In Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts (pp. 41–58). New York: Academic Press. Ide, Sachiko (1982). “Japanese sociolinguistics: Politeness and women’s language”. Lingua, 57 (2–4), 357–386. Ide, Sachiko (1989). “Formal forms and discernment: Two neglected aspects of linguistic politeness”. Multilingua, 8 (2/3), 223–248. Keenan, Elinor Ochs (1976). “The universality of conversational implicature”. Language in Society, 5, 67–80. Kinsley, Michael (1995, February 6). “The intellectual free lunch”. The New Yorker, pp. 4–5. Lakoff, Robin T. (1979). “Stylistic strategies within a grammar of style”. In Judith Orasanu, Marian Slater, & Leona Adler (Eds.), Language, Sex, and Gender (pp. 53–80). Annals of the New York Academy of Science 327. Lakoff, Robin (1973). “The logic of politeness; Or, minding your p’s and q’s.” In Papers from the Ninth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society (pp. 292–305). Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. Leech, Geoffrey (1980). Language and Tact. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Lorenz, Konrad (1966). On Aggression, tr. Marjorie Kerr Wilson. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World. Markoff, John (2000, February 16). “A newer, lonelier crowd emerges in internet study”. The New York Times, p. 1. Marvin, Carolyn (1988). When Old Technologies Were New. New York: Oxford University Press. Matsumoto, Yoshiko (1989). “Politeness and conversational universals – observations from Japanese”. Multilingua, 8 (2/3), 207–222. Menand, Louis (1994, March 14). “The war of all against all”. The New Yorker, pp. 74–85. Purdom, Todd (1995, August 27). “Call ‘em “Prez.” It’s fine by them”. The New York Times Week in Review, p. 4.
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Rhodes, Richard (1989). “‘We are going to go there’: Positive politeness in Ojibwa”. Multilingua, 8 (2/3), 249–258. Rubenstein, Steve (1994, October 29). “Operators must hold the “please”: Pac Bell revises greeting to save time”. The San Francisco Chronicle, p. 1. Sinton, Peter (1994, September 20). “Taming Rambo-style lawyers”. The San Francisco Chronicle, p. D1. Tanikawa, Miki (1995, May 29). “Japan’s young couples discover the public kiss”. The New York Times, p. 11. Tannen, Deborah (1998). The Argument Culture. New York: Random House. Tierney, John (1996, November 3). “Why negative ads are good for democracy”. The New York Times Magazine, pp. 52–56.
How and why honorifics can signify dignity and elegance The indexicality and reflexivity of linguistic rituals Sachiko Ide Honorifics are known as politeness markers in the languages that have them. However, the descriptions in the Western literature on the functions of honorifics were not felt by speakers of languages that employ honorifics to be satisfactory, either for academic or for general understanding. The goal of this paper is to try to make sense of the use and function of honorifics as fully as possible so as to explain how and why they can signify not only politeness but also the speaker’s dignity and/or elegance. It is claimed that the indexing and reflexive functions of honorifics according to wakimae use have to be understood in a high context culture where the speaker’s viewpoint and the organization of speaking is different from what has been generally assumed in the discipline to date. Keywords: Honorifics; indexicality; wakimae; speaker’s viewpoint
.
Can honorifics be abolished?
This article focuses on the use of linguistic forms characteristic of East Asian languages. It seems that the Thai language has a rich system of lexical varieties to show respect and humility. There are also complex varieties of person reference terms, which vary depending on the speaker’s relationship to the hearer or the other people in the context of speaking. In contrast to English, these features show great similarity with the Japanese language. Thus, it appears to make sense to talk of East Asian languages, and to point to some things which have not been well dealt with in the frameworks of the linguistic and pragmatic traditions of Western oriented scholarship.
Sachiko Ide
An incident which might illustrate the huge gap between the Western mind and the Eastern one occurred in 1997 when an economic crisis started in Thailand, and spread to all the East Asian countries including Korea. Japan was no exception. People all over the world watched to see how the Asians would cope with this economic crisis, as there was a possibility that it might trigger a worldwide economic collapse. One day, a journalist from The Financial Times, who had a Ph.D. in sociology from Cambridge University, came to my office for an interview. She felt that, if the honorific system were abolished from the Japanese language, this messy economical confusion could be resolved. She believed that language supports the infrastructure of a society. She presumed that the point of the system of honorifics was to ensure distance between interactants and it is also a system geared toward making information ambiguous and complicating its transmission. Therefore, if the system of honorifics were to be abolished from the society, it would make it easier for the Japanese to transmit information. This in turn would solve the complicated societal problems and economic crisis. Japanese colleagues and students all laughed when told of this suggestion. While none knew how to explain what it was that this journalist had not understood, all knew that honorifics are essential. Language is not a tool like a pen, a typewriter, or a computer. The very way East Asians think and express and relate to others is tied to a system of language in which honorifics play an indispensable role. Therefore, East Asians cannot think of abolishing honorifics from their systems of language. Honorifics were brought up by this journalist as the key hindrance for democratization of the society and efficient economic functioning. Behind this logic lies equating modernization and globalization with Westernization. To the extent East Asians become Westernized, they could have a better system, a better society and a better world. In the face of such a proposition, it is necessary to stop and think whether language is really such a system that can or must be changed so that East Asian societies can operate in the Western way. Is it better for the world to Westernize, and does that mean sacrificing all of the varieties? There are quite a number of linguistic or pragmatic features around the world that cannot be accounted for if only Western theories of linguistics and pragmatics are followed. It seems indisputable that the Western way of looking at language is basically somewhat different from the East Asian way. It seems that the Western way of looking at language is as something linear, which can be processed one piece after another in an alphabetic item-and-process approach. The way Western languages and Chinese are written highlights this difference, since Western
How and why honorifics can signify dignity and elegance
languages are all written from left to right, and as an oversimplification it can be described such that each alphabet letter contributes to a whole, which could be said to have a space before and a space after each word. Chinese, in contrast, features characters, which work as a whole lexical unit, though they may relate to others in a variety of ways. It is easy to understand the alphabetic brain-frame as a mindset that lends itself to simple conceptualization, but some aspects of language cannot be explained within the framework of this kind of linear understanding of language. Some languages seem to require a sociolinguistic system of complex conceptualization.
. Difference in speaking: The East and the West This problem has been central for about a decade, ever since my article, “Formal forms and discernment: Two neglected aspects of linguistic politeness” appeared in Multilingua in 1989. The conclusion reached after all this time is that there are at least two essential aspects that must be incorporated if a fair account of the universals of linguistic politeness is to be given. The first is the difference in what it means to speak in the West and in the East. The second is that the organization of speaking must be considered in terms of hierarchical structures. This first difference, that of what it means to speak in the West and in East Asia, is fundamental. This diversity is illustrated by a pioneering work by Linda Young called CrossTalk and Culture in Sino-American Communication (1994). Young realized that there are important differences in the way Americans speak English and the way Chinese speak English. What appears inscrutable to Westerners are Chinese discourse patterns that Chinese speakers use in English in crosstalk settings of business negotiations. For example, a summary statement of the main argument is delayed until the end, which is the reverse of an English discourse convention. She maintains that this is simply a consequence of the Chinese principle of pragmatics. She argued that such discourse phenomena could only be understood from the viewpoint of the Chinese cultural ideology of interpersonal interaction and the workings of the society. This difference in the role of discourse in the East and the West can be highlighted by the popular saying in the West: “A man is as good as his word” and a Chinese philosopher’s words that the “‘Dao’ (that is ‘the ethical way’) that can be spoken is not constant Dao,” i.e. the ethical way cannot be expressed by speaking. This simple but contrasting cultural understanding of speaking gives
Sachiko Ide
a glimpse of the depth of the differences between what it means to speak in the West and the East. However, it has been the trend up to now to base scholarship on the established assumptions of Western science, where the conviction that science is based on rationality emerged at the beginning of the 16th century, and sets a universal norm for accessing the value of cultural activity everywhere on the planet. The distinction of concern today is the outcome of the philosophical development in the civilizations in question, which can be traced back to their respective origins. The essential concepts in Western intellectual tradition, concepts such as “absoluteness,” “transcendence” or “subjectivity,” played no part whatsoever in the development of Asian cultures (Hall & Ames 1995). While in the West there is an absolute being which is supposed to have created individual beings, Asians do not assume such an entity or such an origin. The East Asian worldview goes back as far as the 10th century BC. The value system of yin and yang, which encompasses all objects and abstract concepts in the universe, has consistently endured despite changes in religion and philosophies over the 3,000 years of Chinese recorded history, spreading across neighboring countries, including Korea, Japan, Thailand, and others. According to this value system, every thing exists in relation to the other things. This differs greatly from the Western value of the individual as the central unit of society. In the Eastern world view, things exist in relation to others, for example, man and woman, parent and child, black and white, and so on. Herein lies a fundamental difference in the concept of “being,” that is to exist, from the West, though it is assumed to be one of the foundations of cultural ideology both in the West and in the East. As a medium of thinking, we have Buddhism and Christianity. While Buddhism views human beings as small, as nothing, Western political philosophy assumes that people were created by God. While in Buddhism, the world continues to exist, Christianity thinks of the world with limits. This contrastive worldview of the East and the West, mediated by religion, gave rise to contrastive thinking prototypes by such people as the geologist Hideo Suzuki (1978), who characterized the Eastern prototype as “thinking in the forest.” Such “thinking in the forest” means that the human viewpoint is that of a tree, surrounded by other trees, with no view to a horizon or vast expanses, but focused on the trees in the immediate vicinity. Such a perspective leads understandably to humility and caution in all things. An academic with the tree-in-the-forest perspective will hardly develop a theory of broad scope, but will rather focus on the precise technical discussion of the matter under investigation. The Western viewpoint can be characterized as that of the eagle
How and why honorifics can signify dignity and elegance
soaring in the sky, alone, unfettered by its surroundings, with a perspective that spans all that is beneath it. The ultimate individual, the Western scholar, can pronounce sweeping and decisive judgments on problems surveyed from such heights. In the Western way of thinking, there is nothing to obscure your perspective. In contrast, the way you conceive of the world in the East is as if your vision were hemmed in, as it is in the deep forest. The only things you can see are the things right in front of you. Therefore, in the East, you are very concerned with your relationship with whatever is around you. It is the tree-in-the-forest grasp of speech events.
. Features of some East Asian languages: How can the complexity of person reference terms be explained? When compared with English, Thai and Japanese share a number of characteristics with other East Asian languages. According to the International Encyclopedia of Linguistics (Bright 1992), Thai is said to lack inflectional endings for number, person, and tense in the verb stems, but has extensive derivational compounding, the use of numerical classifiers, sentence final particles, principal elder brother
father
- kocho sensei watakushi
niisan
ojisan otosan
boku
boku colleague
anata kimi
boku
self
oji
n
sense i omae name
younger brother
ae om e m na
pupil
omae name
isa
mae - an o e otos nam
isa
ni
ore
wife
n kimi boya neighbor’s son name + chan
son
Figure 1. Rules for self and addressee reference terms (Suzuki 1987: 43)
Sachiko Ide
wide spread zero anaphora, and in addition, sociolinguistic factors are explicitly marked. Person reference terms are highly complex. That is, multi selfreference and addressee-reference terms are marked for the sex of the speaker, and the relationship of the speaker and the hearer. Stylistic registers are lexically differentiated. Thus, there are various forms for the verb. Several variant forms, which are sociolinguistically chosen, are features of Thai, and the same can be said of Japanese. Figure 1 illustrates the Japanese case of self-reference and addressee-reference terms. The personal pronoun for the first person reference is “I” in the Western languages, whoever you are, and whomever you are talking to. But in Japanese, and in Thai, the person reference terms are changed in many varieties of ways depending on the context. Varieties of lexical forms constitute sociolinguistic structures: the speaker’s sex, age, role or social ranking is one dimension, the formality of the context the other dimension. The latter is determined depending on the relationship between the speaker and the hearer, as well as the formality of the situation. Table 1 shows the sociolinguistic structure of self and addressee reference terms. Honorifics are another example of this kind of linguistic and pragmatic phenomena. How can these linguistic and pragmatic phenomena be explained? Where can a framework to explain this difference be found? Why is it that East Asian languages have so many varieties of address terms? The richness in honorific forms is not unrelated to varieties of address terms. The discussion of Table 1. Sociolinguistic structure of self and addressee reference terms (Ide & Yoshida 1999: 471) Speaker
Adult
Young child
Person
Style
Male
Female
Male
Female
First person pronoun
Formal
watakusi, watasi watasi, atasi None
None
watasi
Normal Deprecatory
watakusi, watasi boku ore
boku ore
FN**+ tyan None
Formal Normal
anata* kimi
anata* anata
Deprecatory
omae
None
(kimi)*** FN + kun FN + tyan omae
(anata) FN + kun FN + tyan None
Second person pronoun
* not applicable in addressing superiors ** FN represents first name *** ( ) begins to appear around the age of five
How and why honorifics can signify dignity and elegance
these topics has as its goal the challenging of the Western perspective, which so clearly fails to give a fair account of the linguistic and pragmatic phenomenon prevalent in East Asian societies. In order to give an appropriate account of the sociolinguistic variables seen in the person referent terms in Thai and in Japanese, it is important to stop and think where the scholarship, or the science on which so much scholarship is based, actually came from. A great debt is owed to the scholarship that originated in the West. The academic disciplines created there naturally look at the phenomenon in question within their visible context. In the case of the study of language and language use, the frameworks to deal with such phenomena were established based on the worldview of Western people. Therefore, when an appropriate account of that which is unfamiliar in the Western context is to be given, there is simply no framework that encompasses such linguistic and pragmatic phenomena. When the journalist from The Financial Times suggested abolishing honorific use, it is obvious that this suggestion came from the perspective of Western society and Western languages. This paper attempts to show that what has been missing in the Western frameworks can be provided by independent thinking based on philosophical and historical developments in East Asia. This, it seems, may be a step towards a true understanding of the nature of human language and human interaction.
. Two types of agreement By returning to the differences in perspective between the East and the West, the deep forest view versus the bird’s eye perspective, it is possible to gain a further understanding of the differences in what constitutes speaking in the East and the West. Figure 2 illustrates the differences in the speaker’s positions. When speaking in English, the speaker talks about the speech event, as it were, from a seat in the audience. As a consequence, speakers must observe themselves in the speech event as objective actors on the stage, distancing “me” on the stage and the speaking self as shown in Figure 2. Therefore, a speaker has to describe the speech event objectively and say, “Mary gave me this book” in a full sentence. In contrast, in the speech event in Japanese, the speaker is on the stage with the audience, who are sitting on the same level as and under the stage light with the speaker, as shown in Figure 2. Therefore, the speaker shares the information with the hearer on the stage, and thus does not have to state what is obvious in the context. Thus, “Kono hon kure ta no yo (kono ‘this’ hon ‘book’ kure ‘be given’ ta ‘PAST’ no ‘nominalizer particle’ yo ‘FINAL
Sachiko Ide Mary gave me this book.
Mary
(Mary ga watashi ni) kono hon (wo) kurenta no yo.
me Mary
the speaker watashi
the speaker
English
Japanese
Figure 2. The speaker’s position in speech event
PARTICLE’)” where there is no indication of the subject “Mary ga” (ga ‘SUBJECT MARKER’) nor an indirect object “watashi ni” (watashi ‘I’ ni ‘DATIVE MARKER’), since both these items of information are obvious to the hearer, who is in the context of speaking. On the other hand, in Japanese there are two particles at the end of the utterance. One is “no,” a particle to nominalize. This particle indexes the speaker’s identity as a sweet female. Another sentence final particle “yo” at the end of the utterance asserts the speaker’s attitude toward the information. If the equivalent utterance to English “Mary ga kono hon wo watashi ni kure ta (wo ‘OBJECT MARKER’)” were uttered, this would be considered pragmatically incorrect. It might be useful to look at this in more detail. In speaking Japanese, the speaker is an element of the context on the stage, as illustrated in Figure 2. Therefore, the speaker shares the contextual information and the other factors relevant to the context with the hearer. Speakers carry on a complex analysis of a variety of factors while speaking: while thinking about the content of what to say, they also must recognize what kind of position or role they have, and index their identity. Next, they must recognize their relationship with the addressee, and index it by the choice of linguistic forms. Then, speakers must evaluate the extent to which the hearer shares the contextual information, because shared information does not need to be mentioned, as it is contained in the context. It is important for speakers to “agree” on the other contextual factors. For speak-
How and why honorifics can signify dignity and elegance
ers of Japanese to express or to index such positions in the context is essential. This agreement is shown by appropriate modal expressions. In the West, on the other hand, there is a tendency for speakers to situate their viewpoint in the audience and speak about what is going on on the stage from a seemingly objective perspective. This is not to say that they disregard the context completely, as such features as the T/V distinction show, but speakers do not show the multifaceted agreement with the context that speakers of Japanese so consistently do. This illustrates a fundamental difference in linguistic and pragmatic phenomena in the East and the West. Although this and many other features are similar among languages in the East, and the points where they contrast are similar among many languages in the West, further illustrations will be drawn from Japanese and English as examples of the respective types of languages in the East and the West. After gaining some insight into the importance of the difference in the speaker’s position relevant to speaking itself, it seems probable that the difference in “agreement” may also have to do with the different levels at which the “agreement” takes place. In Japanese, it is the context of situation, meaning the speaker and the addressee as well as the formality of the setting, which determines the predicate forms, and this can be termed pragmatic modality. Agreement takes place in terms of wakimae, in terms of showing one’s sense of self and relation to others, and takes place at the pragmatic level. In English, on the other hand, agreement occurs at the grammatical level, inasmuch as the subject determines the form of the predicate by establishing number, person and gender. Such pragmatic level agreement as does exist in English is more a matter of lexical choice than of the language system, as incompatible choices are regarded as situationally inappropriate rather than as linguistically incorrect.
. The organization of speaking What has been discussed up to now about the differences between Eastern and Western speaking brings to mind the idea of Edward Hall (1966) on high context and low context cultures. Since Japanese undoubtedly reflects the concept of a high context culture, speakers of Japanese have to be more sensitive to context than people who speak in English. Therefore, the organization of speaking can be thought of as shown in Figure 3. When you speak in a high contextual culture, you must take the context into account as part of the in-
Sachiko Ide
(1) Say/Not to say I Meta Communication
Say/
Not to say
Non Verbal Silence (2) Who/When/Where
II Meta Pragmatics (3) How (Pragmatic Modality) Propositional Level
Who/When/Where (Turn change, Topic Control)
How Situational Level
Interaction Contest Territory of Information, etc.
III Propositional (4) What Communication (Proposition)
Discourse Level Discourse Management
What
Figure 3. The organization of speaking
formation of an utterance. Most of the analytic frameworks Western minds produced reflect a low context culture. As soon as this basic difference is clear, it is obvious that speakers from high context cultures will feel that “something is missing.” It follows that a framework is needed that can take into account features essential when speaking in a high context culture. In Figure 3, “The organization of speaking,” there are three levels of communication. The first one is meta-communication, the second level is meta-pragmatics and the third level is communication of propositions. First, when you want to say something, you have to decide whether you should even say it or not. Every culture has rules about speaking and not speaking. In certain contexts, you evaluate your position and that of the person you are considering saying something to and decide that it would be better if you did not say it after all. For example, in Japanese, at a seminar in graduate school, students sit and listen to the professor or the fellow student’s presentations, and they do not speak, even if they feel they have something they want to say. That is because it does not agree with the contextual norm, that is, with wakimae, as it applies in the seminar. So, not saying anything is a way of showing that the
How and why honorifics can signify dignity and elegance
speaker’s (or rather the non-speaker’s) politeness conforms to the norm. One can, of course, show one’s intention by a number of non-verbal behaviors, such as nodding to show that one agrees, or tilting one’s head to show one’s doubt. At the next level of speaking are the considerations of who is to speak, when to speak, and where to speak. Contextual information regarding the age, status, role, who has most knowledge, and many others are the factors that determine who speaks to whom, when, and where. Another consideration involves the question of sequencing. How turntaking is arranged means a lot. One can, of course, take one’s turn, but it should be done within the shared knowledge of sense of place i.e. wakimae of the sequencing rules. If one breaks these rules, it gives a marked meaning, so it is always important to know when the appropriate time for one to speak has come. There are also rules regarding when and where one can interrupt or give back-channels, and who is to lead in topic selection. These and many other elements of a conversation are calculated with regard to the various contextual factors, factors that are shared among participants of the conversation in the speech event where the speaker and the hearer share the same context. In a high context culture, the questions of speaking or not speaking, of who may say what to whom and when and where are all a part of the information exchanged as a meta-communication. One can give a meta-communicative message because there is shared knowledge of the context. When one follows this rule, it means that one has the appropriate reading of the contextual information and that is also the information one is expressing. And if one does not follow these rules, this intended deviation gives a special message beyond what is verbally communicated. This kind of communication reflecting the context of speaking plays a major role in communication and is absolutely essential in high context cultures. The next stage of speaking is the meta-pragmatic level. It is not the proposition alone that determines what to say, for there are a variety of ways to say the same thing, and therefore, how to say what one has to say is a question that is crucial in speaking in a high context culture. It turns out that there are three sub-levels of pragmatic modality: the propositional sub-level, the situational sub-level, and the discourse sub-level. First look at the propositional sub-level. In saying the same thing, in a high context culture, one has to distinguish whether the information one is talking about is closer to oneself or the closer to the addressee (Kamio 1997). Depending on one’s judgment of this distinction, one can express the difference by means of modal expressions of evidentials. This is pragmatically obligatory.
Sachiko Ide
The next level is the situational sub-level. Depending on the relationship of the speaker and the hearer and the formality of the situation, appropriate modal expressions must be selected. Essential modal expressions used for this sub-level are honorifics, person referent terms and sentence final particles. This agreement to fit the context is just as obligatory as saying things grammatically correctly. If one fails to choose such modal expressions as honorifics appropriately, one may be criticized for the way one speaks. Matsumoto (1989: 208–209) claims that there is no neutral predicate form in Japanese for the proposition sentence “Today is Saturday.” One has to make obligatory choices for the predicate forms among plain, polite or super-polite honorific forms according to context of speaking. In a high context culture, where the speaker is supposed to exercise the tree-in-the-forest perspective by paying attention to the immediate contextual matters, and to express the appropriate positions according to the expected norms of the society, i.e. wakimae, a person who fails to do so will be an awkward speaker, just as those who ignores grammatical rules in English do. The next sub-level is the discourse. Appropriate devices such as constant back-channeling while listening make the conversation go smoothly. It is almost obligatory, as the lack of it would be regarded as the sign of disinterest or anger at the speaker. There are varieties of mitigating expressions or formula to make the discourse pragmatically appropriate. Finally, on the fourth level, having made decisions regarding all the other questions, one says what one wants to say, and that is the propositional content. The organization of speaking as represented in Figure 3 shows the way to capture speaking in a high context culture. But scholarship up to now has focused primarily on level (4), the level of propositional content. Language use is bound to the context in a variety of ways from (1) to (3) levels. The rules for language use that have been discussed in terms of the speaker’s intention are those we are familiar with such as the Grician Maxims, Speech Act Theory, and Linguistic Politeness Theories. However, little has been discussed regarding rules for linguistic form agreement with the context. It is essential and very often obligatory in a high context culture such as the Japanese culture to make appropriate choices of linguistic forms as are required by the context. It is often said among Japanese “what that person says is right but the way the person says it is not acceptable.” This saying reflects the importance of meta-pragmatic level of speaking.
How and why honorifics can signify dignity and elegance
. Politeness and pragmatic agreement Honorifics have been mentioned as one of the linguistic forms that contribute to pragmatic modality in the organization of speaking. The use of honorifics makes the speech polite because of the linguistic role it plays. It seems that only some of the aspects of honorifics have ever been discussed in academic works. For example, the brilliant work “Ideologies of honorific language” by Judith Irvine (1998: 62), for all its insight, still seems to fail to explain the essence of honorific use. She seems to claim, “grammatical honorifics accompany linguistic ideologies that specify that flattened affect, conventionality, and avoidance of engagement with the concrete or the sensory as appropriate ways to express respect for others.” Her interpretation of the use of honorifics does not explain how they work as “dignity or elegance” markers for the speakers of languages that employ them. No Japanese could imagine that our language could get along without honorifics. Even a simple propositional sentence requires the choice between honorific or non-honorific predicate forms. Honorifics work as linguistic politeness only when they are used in keeping with the context. In other words, the use of high honorific forms itself could be interpreted differently depending on the context of speaking. Thus, if a high honorific form is chosen inappropriately, that is in a context where a less polite honorific form is expected, it could imply “irony,” “alienation,” or any number of other meanings. If honorifics are not used in a context where it is expected, it means that the speaker has ignored or neglected politeness and appropriate behavior. Thus, just as grammatical agreement in Western languages requires the agreement of the subject and the predicate form, it is the context of speaking that defines what constitutes agreement of the modal forms, and people in high context cultures have a highly complex communicative competence regarding the structure of varieties of linguistic forms. It is this agreement that is at the heart of the concept called wakimae, an aspect of linguistic politeness that is totally unrelated to those with which analytical frameworks of linguistic politeness are already familiar. This concept differs rather strikingly from the linguistic politeness frameworks of Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) or Leech (1983), which posit that speakers find their strategies in order to produce utterances in such a way as to save face of the interactants. Perhaps explaining this from a different angle will aid in its clarification. Prevalent Western terms such as “common knowledge,” “frames,” “schema” or “script” all point to shared expectations in communication. Wakimae is the conceptual frame the members of the speech community share, and it is very
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often culturally defined. This kind of speaking is just like greetings or speech formulas in everyday language life that are used as rituals. It is the ritual aspect that makes certain types of speech behavior polite. On first seeing somebody in the morning, one says a greeting like “Good morning.” It is a ritualistic phrase intended to be uttered in the context of a first meeting early in the day. It is the situated practice to say “Good morning” in English speaking cultures, and “Ohayoo” in Japanese culture. It is a conventional practice. Everybody does it. Everybody knows that “Good morning” or “Ohayoo” are just a way of observing a ritualistic verbal exchange and indicating that the channels of communication are open. One could also say “Good morning” to one’s daughter when she wakes up at 5 o’clock in the afternoon. In that case, it could ironically mean “you are a sleepy head,” or “how in the world can you still be in bed when the sun is setting?” In this case, “Good morning” has a different meaning from “Good morning” uttered in the morning. It is not the exception, but the rule that linguistic forms and contexts have a matching relationship. In other words, linguistic forms do not stand by themselves. The forms and the situational context are in the relationship of co-occurrence. Speakers of a language where all belong to the same culture share the knowledge of the rules that match the linguistic forms and contextual situations in order to get along in the society. The system of “matching” between forms and context is not a one-toone correlation made by calculations, rather it is a system whereby one form out of a number of options is matched in a complex way. It operates according to the dynamic super-system as the matching of the form and context are made dynamically so that new meaning is created from one moment to the next. It might be useful to look at the way in which Japanese people acquire the appropriate use of honorifics. Up until they graduate from high school or college, they briefly learn how to use honorifics in the family, at school, or in the peer group. However, all they acquire is a rather superficial understanding of the forms and their uses. Once they become employed in a corporation, one of the first things they are trained in at many of corporations is the use of honorifics. They learn how to use honorifics to customers, or to other people they meet in business. In order to interact with people appropriately in the work place, they learn which linguistic forms to use in certain situational contexts. What they are learning is appropriate ritualistic behavior, because certain forms and certain situational practices are correlated, and the learning of this is the initiation ceremony for those newly employed in order to fit in in the society they will be working in. Therefore, the use of honorifics in Japanese society is not just an exercise in training people to respect certain other people in a certain way, or maintaining distance with certain people. It is first and
How and why honorifics can signify dignity and elegance
foremost a way of learning the rules so that you can get along with language in the society to which you belong. It is not like leaning the rules to get a driver’s license in a society where you have to drive a car. We learn the social rules by learning the rules concerning the use of linguistic forms, the core of which are honorific use.
. Why is the use of honorifics polite? Why is it that it is polite to use honorifics and formula? In other words, how does the pragmatics of ritualistic forms contribute to politeness? Ethologists have found that the basic wants of human beings are negative wants and positive wants. All human beings have the basic wants of negative face and positive face to be saved. Negative face has to do with the wants of a person not to be imposed on or hindered by others. On the other hand, positive wants have to do with the wants of every person that they want be desirable to others. A way to achieve the satisfaction of negative wants is to do things indirectly. In order for the positive face wants to be satisfied, it is good to claim that the speaker’s wants are the same as the hearer’s wants. The use of formal forms such as honorifics and formula can be viewed from this perspective. The use of formal forms according to the expected situational context is firstly accommodating to the positive face of the speaker and the hearer, because saying “Good morning” in the appropriate context, that is, in the morning, is an interactional behavior to establish common ground. Since it is uttered according to expected social behavior, it gives pleasure to both the speaker and the hearer by satisfying their positive face wants, giving both parties a sense of sharing. At the same time, since the speaker makes use of firmly established formula, it does not have a personal touch, and thus is a way of expressing things indirectly, which makes clear that it is a way to satisfy negative wants. Therefore, the use of rituals can be interpreted as the way to fulfill linguistic politeness with regard to both negative and positive face wants. In Brown and Levinson’s framework (1978, 1987), honorifics are treated under strategy No. 5, negative politeness. It means that the honorifics can be used as a strategy according to the speaker’s intention using the speaker’s rationality. It does not explain the most crucial aspect of this ritualistic use of honorifics. It is not the calculation of the speaker’s intention that the honorific form is chosen to be appropriate to the context, but rather it is the employment of the set pattern of language use. People say “Good morning” in the morning, it just comes automatically in the context. This is an aspect of language use in
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high context cultures, where there are many varieties of modal expressions including honorifics for saying the same thing. By now it should be obvious that it is highly “economical” to achieve linguistic politeness by linguistic rituals. Unlike Brown and Levinson’s framework of politeness strategies, one does not have to calculate options, and one need only follow the rules for automatically matching the ritualistic forms and the context. Honorifics are just one of a number of modal expressions. In Japanese, there is no grammatical agreement, like number, person, gender, or tense, but there is a pragmatic agreement between modal expressions and agreement with the context of the situation. While grammatical agreement is a strict kind with one to one agreement, pragmatic agreement is flexible. Several options of linguistic forms are often acceptable for one context. But there is a borderline of unacceptability such as that between uchi (in-group) and soto (out-group) that determines the use or non-use of formal forms. While Brown and Levinson’s (1978, 1987) framework of linguistic politeness, and Leech’s (1983) principle of politeness did not adequately cover the use of honorifics in the societies where they are used, Robin Lakoff ’s Rule of Politeness, published back in 1973, provided a foundation for the understanding and ultimately the incorporation of honorifics and all that they imply into pragmatic theory. Thirty years after its publication, it is now time to focus on Rule 1 of Robin Lakoff ’s linguistic politeness rules. It is this Rule 1 “Formality,” which has not been touched upon in detail until today. Lakoff ’s outstanding insight into pragmatics led her to pinpoint the aspect of politeness that is made by the use of formal forms. In some societies, the choice of formal forms, formulaic expressions, and honorifics are the primary focus of linguistic politeness. How can a universal principle of linguistic politeness be posited if, as Brown and Levinson did, this very important aspect of linguistic politeness in high context societies is excluded? In order for linguistic politeness to be truly universal and balanced, it seems indicated that a universal principle of linguistic politeness should be proposed that incorporates this aspect of ritualistic language use, which can be called wakimae.
. How honorifics express dignity and elegance How and why can honorifics signify dignity and/or elegance? It has been shown that honorifics are formal linguistic forms that cannot be used independent of the context. They are basically ritualistic linguistic forms chosen to fit to the particular situational context. The use of honorifics functions as linguistic
How and why honorifics can signify dignity and elegance
politeness because the fitting of the proper linguistic forms to the contextual factors makes the interactants feel secure in the interaction and the situation. What does using honorifics accomplish? The use of honorifics expresses, or more precisely indexes, the appropriate relationship between the speaker and the hearer. It also indexes the formality of the situation. But honorifics do more than that. Honorifics can index the speaker’s attributes. While honorific use for the interactants is geared to politeness for others, their usage to index the speaker’s attributes is quite different in nature. It indexes the speaker’s identity. People are judged as to what kind of person they are by the linguistic forms they choose. If honorifics are used appropriately according to the social norm, i.e. wakimae, a person is likely to be judged as a nice person. What is the mechanism of the function of this language use? It is observed that female executives use more elaborate honorific forms than do women of lower status in the same corporation. This contradicts the popular belief that honorifics are supposed to be used by a person of lower status towards a person of higher status to show respect. What is the reason for this result that contradicts what people have always presumed? The findings show that women of higher status signify their dignity or elegance by using more elaborate, higher honorific forms than those used by lower status women (Ide & Inoue 1992). How can this reality be accounted for? Even though, in a democratic society, talking about varieties of language in terms of social class is somewhat taboo, it is a fact that there are dialects that differ on the basis of categories of social roles and status. Female executives are one case in point, since they are indexing their high status by the use of more elaborate honorifics. Regional or geographical dialects are a familiar occurrence the world over. Osaka can serve as an example. People in Osaka, the second biggest city in Japan, speak in what is called the Osaka dialect. Listening to somebody speaking in Osaka dialect, one understands the referential meaning, but also that the speaker is from the Osaka area. Parallel to this, people tend to have different dialects according to their social roles and status. The higher the social status of the speaker, the more elaborate the linguistic forms they are likely to use. Regardless of an individual’s ability to employ the more elaborate honorifics, people in a speech community share at least passive communicative competence concerning their use. Just as people from the Osaka area are identified by their accent, hearers are able to categorize the social roles and status of speakers by the speech forms they use. There are varieties of language that differ on the basis of geographical, social, gender, and generational differences in a society. To the extent that a society is complex, the same propositional content can be expressed in con-
Sachiko Ide
junction with varieties of linguistic forms that index social differences of the speaker. Since these linguistic forms cannot be omitted, some linguistic form must be chosen. And it is by this choice that speakers index their own attributes according to the social context. If one uses forms that signal the Osaka dialect, women’s dialect, middle class dialect, and young people’s dialect, one indexes with great precision where one belongs in the society. The reading of the attributes of the speaker is possible only and if hearers share the sociolinguistic passive competence of varieties in the community. To the extent shared context is high, the reading of the speaker’s attribute may be elaborated. People from Tokyo who do not share high context with the Osaka area, for example, find it difficult to distinguish between Osaka dialect and Kobe dialect, the dialect of the neighboring city. It is very often the case that high status people, such as executives in big corporations, use honorifics appropriately, not hypercorrecting, and with a relaxed tone. That variety of speech can be recognized as that of people of that social category. In this way, in the mind of the members of a speech community, the correlation between the type of speech and the type of person is widely recognized. The elaborate use of high honorifics indexes the features of the category of high status persons. Since speakers who choose to use high linguistic forms are very often those who hold high positions and whose behavior exhibits dignity and elegance, this information is attached to the speaker of such speech. The speech itself does not have dignity or elegance, but the features of the people who make habitual use of that speech are reflected through their speech, offering metalinguistic meaning of dignity or elegance. This becomes possible owing to the reflexive capacity of language (Lucy 1993, 1999). In this way, speakers are able to index their identity as persons of dignity and elegance.
. Implication for linguistic relativity: Concluding remarks As has been emphasized, linguistic forms and contextual factors are closely connected in high context cultures, where the speaker’s vantage point is that of a tree-in-the-forest or on the stage as seen in Figure 3 and thus limited to that which is in the immediate area. High context cultures therefore require that speakers obligatorily pay attention to the contextual factors in the speech event in order to make the linguistic forms to be chosen agree with the relevant context. The above statement does not entail that low context cultures do not require appropriate linguistic choices according to situational context. For ex-
How and why honorifics can signify dignity and elegance
ample, in English, when you want to leave, you say “May I please be excused?” to a person with authority over you, “I’ve got to be off now” to an equal, but perhaps “I’m out of here” to a close friend. The last option, said to a boss, could be grounds for disciplinary action or firing, because it is inappropriate for the situation. The levels discussed do exist in Western languages and cultures, too. These features have just been ignored, because they have to do with situations, and linguists have confined themselves to words, not people and situations. The choice of linguistic forms appropriate to situational contexts is a universal phenomenon. However, it has not been systematically investigated in the Western languages. One goal of investigating honorifics and some other linguistic phenomena in East Asian languages is to highlight these phenomena and shed light on what has been neglected in other languages, above all the Western languages. What are the implications of this argument for the theory of linguistic relativity? It was stated above that the appropriate language use according to context can be found in English and many other languages, and therefore is universal. However, the focus should be made on the obligatory nature of systematic pragmatic agreement. The appropriate choice of predicate forms according to context for “Today is Saturday,” for example, is automatic, just as the third person singular subject in English automatically takes “-s” morpheme. Slobin (1996: 74–75) comments on Turkish narrative examples that have obligatory grammatical markings of evidentials, “We (English speakers) do have available optional lexical meaning for expressing notions that lie outside of the set of obligatory grammatical distinctions in a language.” He further posits the aspect of “thinking for speaking” as the medium of language and thought, and says, “A ‘verbalized event’ is constructed on-line, in the process of speaking. Von Humboldt and Whorf and Boas were right in suggesting that the obligatory grammatical categories of a language play a role in this construction.” What have been discussed so far are pragmatic, not grammatical phenomena. But, as long as pragmatic constraints are obligatory, it can be claimed that honorifics and other modal expressions play distinct roles in the process of speaking. Having observed how linguistic forms are context saturated and pragmatic agreement is often obligatory, it becomes clear that language does not stand by itself but it is embedded in our everyday lives.
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References Bright, W. (Ed.). (1992). International Encyclopedia of Linguistics. New York: Oxford University Press. Brown, P. & Levinson, S. (1978). “Universals in language usage: Politeness phenomena”. In E. N. Goody (Ed.), Questions and Politeness: Strategies in Social Interaction (pp. 56–289). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, P. & Levinson, S. (1987). Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hall, E. (1966). The Hidden Dimension. New York: Fawcett. Hall, D. & Ames, R. (1995). Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture. New York: State University of New York Press. Ide, S. (1989). “Formal forms and discernment: Two neglected aspects of linguistic politeness”. Multilingua, 8, 223–248. Ide, S. (1998). “Bunka to communication koudou: Nihongo wa ikani Nihon bunka to kakawaru ka [Culture and communicative action: How the Japanese language is interrelated to Japanese culture]”. Nihongogaku, 17, 62–77. Ide, S. & Inoue, V. (1992). “Onna kotoba ni miru aidentiti [Identity in women’s language]”. Gekkan Gengo, 11, 46–48. Ide, S. & Yoshida, M. (1999). “Sociolinguistics: Honorifics and gender differences”. In N. Tsujimura (Ed.), The Handbook of Japanese Linguistics (pp. 444–478). Oxford: Blackwell. Irvine, J. (1998). “Ideologies of honorific language”. In B. Schieffelin, K. Woolard, & P. Kroskrity (Eds.), Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory (pp. 51–67). New York: Oxford University Press. Kamio, A. (1997). Territory of Information. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Lakoff, R. (1973). “The logic of politeness; Or, Minding your P’s and Q’s”. In Papers from the 9th Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society (pp. 292–305). Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. Leech, G. (1983). Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman. Lucy, J. (Ed.). (1993). Reflexive Language: Reported Speech and Metapragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lucy, J. (1999). “Reflexivity”. In A. Duranti (Ed.), Language Matters in Anthropology: A Lexicon for the Millennium. Journal of Linguistic Anthropology, 9 (1–2). Matsumoto, Y. (1989). “Politeness and conversational universals: Observations from Japanese”. Multilingua, 2 (2–3), 207–221. Slobin, D. (1996). “From ‘thought and language’ to ‘thinking for speaking”’. In J. Gumperz & S. Levinson (Eds.), Rethinking Linguistic Relativity (pp. 70–96). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Suzuki, H. (1978). Shinrin no Shikou, Sabaku no Shikou [Thinking in the Forest, Thinking in the Desert]. Tokyo: NHK Books. Suzuki, T. (1987). Reflections on Japanese Language and Culture. Tokyo: The Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, Keio University. Young, L. (1994). Crosstalk and Culture in Sino-American Communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Whither politeness Bruce Fraser The paper addresses a number of questions raised by Brown and Levinson model of politeness, questions such as Is politeness communicated? What is the status of a politeness principle? What is the relationship between deference and politeness? Should a theory of politeness be extended to impoliteness? What is the status of politeness strategies? Is the notion of face universal? What is the status of Wx? These raise but a few of the important questions to be asked in pursuit of an understanding of what linguistic politeness is, how it is used, what factors influence a speaker’s choice to be heard as polite and what sort of a model is maximally useful. Optimists take the position that if we continue to work on the problem, we can expect to arrive at a serious theory of politeness, necessarily somewhat different from the existing model. Pessimists, on the other hand, take the position that while we all know polite behavior when we see it, we will never be able to speak definitively about it. I am an optimist. Keywords: Politeness; challenges; status; future
.
Introduction1
The initial publication of Politeness: Some Universals of Language Usage (Brown & Levinson 1978, 1987)2 some 25 years ago provided focus to the area of linguistic politeness and subsequently gave rise to an extraordinarily large number of articles and several books on politeness. Indeed, a bibliography edited by DuFon et al. which appeared in the Journal of Pragmatics, Volume 21 in 1994 listed more than 900 articles and books, most of them after 1978 (DuFon et al. 1994), and in the past five years the number has increased by several hundred. Yet, as we might expect, all is not settled in the domain of linguistic politeness. Several alternate models have been suggested, and the original model, not altered in the second edition (Brown & Levinson 1987), has been challenged on almost every aspect. It is my purpose in this paper to identify some of the
Bruce Fraser
challenges which have been made of Brown and Levinson’s model and thereby suggest areas where the field of linguistic politeness might be heading in the 21st century.
. Challenges to the Brown and Levinson model The model proposed by Brown and Levinson, claimed by the authors to be a universal model, has been challenged in a number of ways. In fact, Meier (1995b: 388), one of the most pessimistic, writes, “Politeness can be said to be universal only in the sense that every society has some sort of norms for appropriate behavior although these norms will vary, thereby accounting for societies in which the individual’s position within a group or those where the individual takes precedence”. As we shall see, there are a number of researchers who agree with him that the universality of politeness and the all-encompassing claims for the model are simply overstated. . The underlying assumptions There are challenges to the assumptions underlying the model. For example, both Fraser (1990) and Jary (1998) questioned if politeness is in fact a message, specifically an implicated message along the lines of Grice’s implicature, as Brown and Levinson had claimed (emphasis added): Linguistic politeness is therefore implication in the classical way [. . .] politeness has to be communicated and the absence of communicated politeness may, ceteris paribus, be taken as absence of the polite attitude. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 5) Politeness is implicated by the semantic structure of the whole utterance (not sentence), not communicated by ‘markers’ or ‘mitigators’ in a simple signaling fashion which can be quantified. (22) Politeness is then a major source of deviation from such rational efficiency, and is communicated precisely by that deviation. (95)
It follows from this view of Brown and Levinson that there is no politeness associated with bald on-record strategies – it is not a politeness strategy, and that whenever politeness strategies are used, an additional message is being conveyed: “I’m being polite here because I’m sensitive to your face needs”. In fact, this view is counterintuitive, since politeness is normally anticipated, it is the
Whither politeness
norm, and it is the breach of this norm of polite communication that is signaled and thus noted by the hearer as being impolite. As Kasper (1990: 193) wrote: Competent adult members comment on absence of politeness where it is expected, and its presence where it is not expected.
and, as Jary (1998: 2) has written, if this observation is accepted, then it is hard to see how the claim that the use of these forms/strategies always communicates politeness can be maintained.
If Brown and Levinson’s position is adopted, there are the following questions which need to be answered: What is communicated when politeness is communicated? What is the content of the message? Is politeness always communicated or is it communicated only in certain circumstances? If so, how can these cases be identified? . The status of the politeness principles Brown and Levinson fail to state what the status of politeness is within linguistic pragmatics, except to strongly object to placing a Politeness Principle (PP) on a par with the Cooperative Principle (CP) as did Leech (1983). Assuming that the PP would have a set of maxims, as suggested by Leech, they write: Now if politeness principles had maxim-like status, we should expect the same robustness [as the Cooperative Principle]: it should, as a matter of fact, be hard to be impolite. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 5)
Whereas there is little argument for making the PP parallel to the CP, there is certainly an argument for making a single Politeness Maxim (PM) under the CP, as Burt (1999) and earlier Fukada (1998, quoted in Burt’s paper) have done.3 They suggest that politeness should be another maxim under the CP, analogous to the maxims of Quality, Quantity, Relation, and Manner, and argue that it is better to have the PM follow from the CP, rather than some superordinate principle, which would be the case if it were placed parallel with the CP. They see the PM reflecting a rational behavioral manifestation, as do the other maxims, stating that “attention to communicative goals relevant to politeness is an aspect of rational behavior, not a departure from it, thus no clash between politeness and CP” (Burt 1999: 2). Furthermore, they claim that it is reasonable for the CP to enter into the calculation of politeness, that clashes can occur between the PM and other maxims, that one can opt out of the PM similar to the other maxims, and finally that a speaker can flout the PM. If, in-
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deed, politeness is the rational way of behaving, analogous to speaking clearly, to the point, being relevant, reflected in the other maxims, then a strong case can be made for maxim status. . The conflation of deference with politeness The concept of politeness and the more narrow concept of deference are often not separated by Brown and Levinson. Ide (1989) writes of “indexing” terms and terms of “discernment”, Watts (1992) writes of “politic behavior”, and Matsumoto (1988) writes of “honorifics”: honorifics, all convey rank differences. It is not negative politeness, the acknowledgement of the addressee’s freedom from imposition that is conveyed by these forms, but a reflection of rank-ordering. (Matsumoto 1988: 414)
Honorific terms, for example sensei in Japanese, Usted in Spanish, and Sie in German, are, as Goffman (1971: 56) commented, “that component of activity which functions as a symbolic means by which appreciation is regularly conveyed.” All of the terms reflect the socio-cultural relationship that exists between the interactants prior to the utterance, a relationship that is fixed, usually not negotiable, is not subject to the content of what is said, and thus are not strategies for us to consider as there is for politeness purposes.4 When used properly, they are not noticed. Of course, as Matsumoto (1988) claims, unexpected social markings can give rise to implicatures. Thus, for example, the utterance, “Sir, would you please pass me the butter,” spoken by a wife to her husband, implies anger. Hwang (1990) argues for the separation of the concepts of politeness and deference in Korean, arguing that one can be deferential without being polite or non-deferential while being polite: To sum up, the availability of various linguistic and pragmatic means of encoding polite intention outside the dimensions of deference not only enable the speaker of Korean to show – or not to show – their modesty and politeness while still having the status relationship properly encoded by levels of deference [. . .]. (48)
Whereas in some languages, like Japanese and Korean, nearly every sentence is marked for this social indexing, in English it is absent in most sentences. Sir, in English, is a deference marker and its presence signifies, by convention, that the speaker is showing (or giving) deference to the addressee. But this is deference, not politeness.
Whither politeness
Green (1989) captures this notion of deference when she writes of euphemisms that as with many politeness techniques, the speaker is really only going through the motion of offering options, of showing respect [deference; B.F.] for the addressee’s feelings. The offer may be a facade, the option nonviable, and the respect a sham. It is the fact that an effort was made to go through the motions at all that makes the act an act of politeness. (Green 1989: 147)
Deference is required by situation, not utterance. Moreover, politeness and deference are related in the following way: A Politeness B
C
Deference D
In the chart below, the English examples illustrate that deference and politeness are independent factors. Case
Pol.
Def.
English Examples
C B D A
+ + – –
+ – + –
“Sir, may I help you?” said by waiter to patron “Scapel, right now.” said by doctor to assistant “Sir would you mind shutting up?” said by waiter to patron “Shut up!” said by waiter to patron
. The limitation on the concept of politeness Other researchers have suggested that the Brown and Levinson notion of politeness is too limited, that politeness phenomena includes rudeness phenomena as well. Lakoff (1989: 102) identifies three kinds of politeness: (1) polite behavior, when participants adhere to politeness, expected or not; (2) nonpolite behavior, when participants are not conforming with politeness rules where conformity is not expected; (3) rude behavior, where politeness is not conveyed even though it is expected. The first two are in accordance with ‘politic’ behavior, i.e. socially sanctioned norms of interaction, with polite behavior serving the explicit function of ensuring comity, social harmony, and counterbalancing
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potential conflict. Rudeness, by contrast, is constituted by deviation from whatever counts as polite in a given social context, is inherently confrontational and disruptive to social equilibrium. Politic behavior normally goes unnoticed [. . .]. (Kasper 1990: 208)
Kasper (1990) herself distinguishes motivated from unmotivated rudeness, where unmotivated rudeness refers to the violation of the norms of politic behavior due to ignorance (e.g., by children, second language learners, people unfamiliar with the expectations of the situation) and distinguishes three types of motivated rudeness (Kasper 1990: 208): (1) Due to lack of affect control; (2) Strategic rudeness, e.g., courtroom behavior; and (3) Ironic rudeness, e.g., “DO help yourself,” (cf. strategic rudeness, à la Jary 1998). It is precisely the aggravated rude force that distinguishes sarcastic utterances from ironic ones, where the speaker rationally tries to not address face, and thus tries to be impolite. Brown and Levinson basically ignore the obverse of politeness: impoliteness/rudeness/aggravation. Turner (1996) writes that “there are exchanges in which the speaker not only declines the attempt to preserve the addressee’s face, as he or she might if s/he were speaking with Gricean rationality, but actively and intentionally seeks to damage it”, thereby suggesting a fourth type of rudeness. There are numerous questions about impoliteness. Where is rudeness/impoliteness to be situated? Is there a continuum with politeness at one end, impoliteness at the other, and degrees of (im)politeness along the way? Nearly every utterance can be construed as polite or impolite, depending on the circumstances: is it possible for the Wx formula be extended to account for impoliteness? Lachenicht (1980), in fact, went so far as to extend the Brown and Levinson strategies to include aggravation, where he adds bald on-record type of negative aggravation, defined as that which willfully impedes the addressee’s own actions, and positive aggravation, defined as that which willfully conveys to the addressee that he or she is not liked or respected. He writes: It is important to study not only the socially positive, but also the socially negative. Just as we cannot attain an adequate appreciation of value without an understanding of rubbish [. . .] so we cannot attain an appreciation of the positive uses of language without an understanding of invective. The one complements the other. (Lachenicht 1980: 680)
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. The status of politeness strategies There are a number of issues concerning the hierarchy of politeness strategies. Meier (1995b), concerned about whether a speech act serves as a FTA or a politeness strategy and, if the latter, is a negative or positive strategy, writes: Apologies, [. . .] classified by Brown and Levinson as negative politeness strategies, could be viewed as requests for exoneration (e.g., please forgive me, please excuse me) and as requests, would be threats to H’s face which would bring their status as politeness strategies into question. Furthermore, although request are considered to be FTAs, one could well imagine a context in which they could be a sign of solidarity [. . .] this would then qualify them for positive politeness status. (Meier 1995b: 385)
He later raises a different issue when he writes, “Politeness is not simply a secondary act piggy-backed to another, as in Brown and Levinson’s framework. An apology may itself constitute the primary act” (Meier 1995b: 387). In fact, the bald on-record strategy isn’t really a politeness strategy at all in the Brown and Levinson model, since it lacks any linguistic form which could implicate politeness. Yet it clearly is a polite way of communicating, given the proper circumstances. Turner (1996) echoes this problem when he points out that in addition to the allegation of the non-universality of face, there are many politeness strategies which address more than one face want at the same time. He suggests that the request, “Could you look after the baby for half an hour?,” is customarily taken to threaten the addressee’s negative face in that it serves to constrain future actions and may also undermine the speaker’s positive face because it implies that he/she is not able to act without assistance. He continues, But, and this is what is not so often remarked, the utterance may also be said to anoint the addressee’s positive face because the speaker is selecting the addressee as a reliable and responsible person to undertake this particular important task. [. . .] It is not too hard to see that positive politeness may put constraints on the addressee such that it doubles as negative politeness. For example, the positive polite ‘You’re good with children’ may implicate a threat to the addressee’s negative face such as ‘Perhaps you’d like to offer to look after mine for half an hour’ which itself implicates anointing of the addressee’s positive face such as ‘I regard you as a reliable and responsible person’. (Turner 1996: 4f.)
The Brown and Levinson hierarchy of strategies from bald on-record to offrecord (indirect) appears to be a continuum, although we are not told the relative placements of the two intermediary strategies: on-record with positive
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politeness and on-record with negative politeness. Blum-Kulka (1987) found it necessary to distinguish between conventional indirection (e.g., “Can you pass the salt?”) and non-conventional indirection (e.g., “I probably need some more salt for this.”), and concludes that politeness is routinely found associated with the former but only sometimes with the latter, in part because of the difficulty and time associated with working out the indirect message. This suggests, minimally, that there needs to be a distinction with off-record strategies. Scollon and Scollon (1981) suggest that positive and negative politeness are sufficiently different kinds of things that their placement on the same hierarchy is conceptually awkward, if not incoherent, and claim that “while positive politeness is directed more to the general nature of the relationship between interactants, negative politeness is direct to the specific act of imposition” (Scollon & Scollon 1981: 174). Strecker (1988) takes another approach when he argues that positive politeness, negative politeness, and off-record politeness are not independent and discrete domains. Although dealing with Hamar, spoken in Southern Ethiopia, his comments apply widely: [. . .] off-record speech abounds in the strategies of positive and negative politeness [. . .] on-record strategies are often combined with off-record strategies. These exist switches from positive politeness to negative politeness and vice versa. In fact, these switches can be seen to follow logical and/or temporal sequences which constitute a type of super-strategy. (Strecker 1988: 155)
In response, Brown and Levinson state that present evidence is too equivocal to entail the abandonment of our original scheme. But we do concede that the possibility that the off-record strategy is independent of, and co-occurrent with, the other two super-strategies is something which definitely requires closer investigation. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 21)
But then they add, that politeness is not the only motivation for using these strategies; they may for example be used to put on a social ‘brake’ or ‘accelerator’ in the development of social relationships, or an off-record utterance may be used to avoid responsibility for actions unrelated to face concerns. (22)
This quote is a summary of comments in the text of the book that “positive politeness techniques are usable not only for FTA redress, but in general as a kind of social accelerator, where S, in using them, indicates that he wants to ‘come closer’ to H” (103) and still later on that
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the wants outlined [. . .] are not the only motivations a speaker may have for using the linguistic realizations characteristic of negative politeness. The outputs are all forms useful in general for social ‘distancing’ [. . .] they are therefore likely to be used whenever a speaker wants to put a social brake on to the course of his interaction. (130)
Thus, it is not clear whether there are, in some cases, politeness strategies or just indirect strategies for sending a message which, perhaps incidentally, are useful in the course of addressing face. What about intercultural variation? Brown and Levinson write: We have argued in this section that indirect speech acts have as their prime raison d’etre the politeness functions they perform. We went on to argue that their internal structure is best accounted for as conforming with the demands of particular politeness strategies. And finally we took pains to establish that indirect speech acts are universal and for the most part are probably constructed in essentially similar ways in all languages. We may suggest, then, that the universality of indirect speech acts follows from the basic service they perform with respect to universal strategies of politeness. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 142)
But this is surely too narrow a view, since there are many counterexamples of a strategy having one purpose in one language, another purpose in another.5 For example, Escandell-Vidal (1996: 631) reports that whereas “Can you pass the salt?” is taken as a conventional (standardized) indirect request in English and Spanish, in Poland the same utterance is taken only as a genuine question while in Thailand the inference is taken that there is a doubt about the hearer’s ability. Clancy (1986: 221) suggests whereas the indirect form in US is seen as mitigating negative face threat, in Japan it emphasizes empathy between the participants, symbolizing a high degree of experience that would render a more explicit request unnecessary but even disrupt social bonds, while Blum-Kulka (1987) finds that indirectness is assessed as less polite than both conversational indirectness and direct requestive strategy by Israelis, since the noncommitting character of indirect request is viewed as lacking speaker sincerity and imposes in inferential burden on the hearer that runs counter to cultural values (cf. Kasper 1990: 200). Escandell-Vidal (1996: 631) writes: These striking differences, which affect both the conditions of use of a formula and the interpretation associated with it, clearly indicate that posing a question about a precondition of an action is not a universal means of requesting [. . .] if the interpretation of indirect illocutions is based on gen-
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eral, universal inference mechanisms, as claimed, then this would be a rather unexpected result.
. The universal notion of face As viewed by Brown and Levinson (1987), the notion of face is taken to be universal. Repeating, the concepts of face are the following: Negative Face: “the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, right to nondistraction – i.e., to freedom of action and freedom from imposition” (61) “[. . .] the want of every competent adult member that his action be unimpeded by others” (62). Positive Face: “the positive consistent self-image or ‘personality’ (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants” (61) “[. . .] the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others” (62).
But their view has come under fire an being far too ‘Western-oriented’, primarily by researchers writing from an Asian or African perspective. Matsumoto (1988), for example, concludes that the Japanese concepts of face are qualitatively different from those defined as universals by Brown and Levinson. The notion of individuals and their rights plays a dominant role in European and American culture, but cannot be considered basic to the Japanese culture and society: What is of paramount concern to a Japanese is not his/her own territory, but the position in relation to the others in the group and his/her acceptance by those others. Loss of face is associated with the perception by others that one has not comprehended and acknowledged the structure and hierarchy of the group. The Japanese concepts of face, thus, are qualitatively different from those defined as universals by Brown and Levinson. The difference transcends the variability of cultural elaboration acknowledged in Brown and Levinson’s theory (e.g. what kinds of acts threaten face, what sorts of persons have special rights to face-protection, etc.) and call into question the universality of a core concept; the notion of face as consisting of the desire for approval of wants and the desire for the preservation of one’s territory. (Matsumoto 1988: 405)
He goes on to say that what is most alien to Japanese culture in the notion of face is the concept of negative face wants as the desire to be unimpeded in one’s action. This assumption presupposes that the individual is the basic unit of Japanese society where in fact it is the relationship to a group or society, and who must acknowledge dependence on the other. In short, the concept
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of face for a Japanese is different from that of European and Americans, and Matsumoto concludes that the constituents of face are culturally dependent. In fact, Ide (1989) suggests that discernment, rather than face, is the motivation force behind Japanese politeness. She says that “people in a culture choose strategies of politeness according to the cultural expectation and requirement” (230).6 In contrast to a universal notion of face, Matsumoto posits a general notion of face, or “socially given self-image,” the desire to maintain face as the dynamic of the politeness system, but has the framework include also a certain spectrum of styles that can be chosen, according to the culture and the situation, to effect face-preserving ends. But in giving up the universality of face, and accepting some cultural styles, he is making politeness relative. Nwoye (1992) discusses politeness in the Igbo society as a form of social contract existing between the group, as a whole, and individual members of the group. The individual is expected to behave properly, i.e., be polite, as defined by the group, in return for which (s)he is entitled to reciprocal behavior from the other members of the group [. . .]. Brown and Levinson’s view of politeness, especially their notion of negative face and the need to avoid imposition, does not seem to apply to the egalitarian Igbo society, in which concern for group interests rather than atomistic individualism is the expected norm of behavior. (Nwoye 1992: 310)
He characterizes the society as egalitarian, where through socialization, each member of society acquires this pattern of behavior, thus entering, as it were, into a type of social contract with other member of the society to do his/her best to keep social contact friction-free. [. . .] The difference between this type of society and Western society is that while the latter can be said to be individual-oriented, the former is group-oriented. (313)
He then suggests that the notion of face, while useful as a heuristic device, should be further sub-classified into “individual face”, the individual’s desire to attend to his/her personal needs and to place his/her public-self image above those of others, and “group face”, the individual’s desire to behave in conformity with culturally expected norms of behavior that are institutionalized and sanctioned by society. But, here again, we have thrown away face as anything but a general notion without teeth. Brown and Levinson (1987: 24) state that “some acts are intrinsically threatening to face and thus require ‘softening.”’ But this ignores the fact that
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the social position, distance, and the circumstances may radically change the ‘politeness’ of an utterance. What is impolite in one set of circumstances (e.g, between a son and his father) may be quite polite in another (e.g., between military officers). Similarly, Nwoye states that requests, offers, thanks, and criticism in Igbo are carried out in the context of the stated attention to the dictates of the group within which the individual finds his/her own place and it will be shown that in many contexts, these acts are not face-threatening at all, even when performed in the most bald on-record manner. (Nwoye 1992: 317)
Gu (1990), writing about Chinese, concludes that Brown and Levinson (1987) is not suitable to account for Chinese for two reasons. First, the notion of negative face seems to differ; for example, offering, inviting, and promising in Chinese, under ordinary circumstances, will not be considered as threatening the hearer’s negative face. “Rather, it [negative face] is threatened when self cannot live up to what s/he has claimed, or when what self has done is likely to incur ill fame or reputation” (Gu 1990: 242). And second, because of the social norm view, which emphasizes the group rather than individual first, “[I]n the Chinese context, politeness exercises its normative function in constraining individual speech acts as well as the sequence of talk exchanges” (242). Kong (1999) extends this to the domain of service encounters. The difference in face needs underlies the Western view that the Chinese are rude, relative to Western service encounters. However, these encounters are usually interpreted as an “outgroup” (Scollon & Scollon 1981) rather than an “ingroup” relationship and thus facework is not required of either of the participants. This topic-response pattern (without the preliminary call-answer sequence) contrasts strongly with the Western practice. In Asia in an outside relationship the positions of the parties are tightly fixed with a service role relationship; one is a teller, the other a customer; one is a waitress, the other a customer. Before the encounter begins, the possible moves are limited within a narrow range. [. . .] Because this is an outside relationship Asians regard it as impossible for any other topics to be introduced or for any other relationship to develop; therefore, no facework is required, no preliminaries are necessary to establish who you are or why you are there. The topic can (and, in fact, must) be introduced directly. (118)
The upshot of these three cases – from Japanese, Igbo, and Chinese – is to cast serious doubt on the universality of face. To reduce face to a general notion with specific styles or sub-components reduces it to a figurehead, with each language constructing its conversation contract according to cultural and societal
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pressures, only some of which may overlap. We may then have to abandon the notion of cross-cultural research, at least insofar as it applies to politeness. But this wouldn’t be surprising to anyone who has looked seriously at any but the most trivial of cross-cultural issues. They are invariably treated emically, and when it comes to comparison, they are incommensurate. Ide (1989: 241) sums it up when she writes: In a Western society where individualism is assumed to be the basis of all interactions, it is easy to regard face as the key to interaction. On the other hand, in a society where group membership is regarded as the basis for interaction, the role or status defined in a particular situation rather than face is the basis of interaction.
. The correctness of Wx formula There are a number of different issues raised about the Wx formula which supposedly captures the amount of face work required. Wx is presented as equal to D(S,A)+P(A,S)+Rx, where D is the social distance between the speaker and addressee, P is the relative power of the addressee over the speaker, and Rx is the imposition (inherent risk) of the speech act, sensitive to cultural and contextual variables, and where Wx is the overall weight of the particular FTA in the estimation of this specific speaker. Glick (1996), is among the most strident critics, writing that the central theoretical notion of ‘inherent risk’ [value of Rx – B.F.] was never clearly operationalized so that different utterances could be universally compared in its terms. How these various influences on linguistic use are reduced to a unilinear and unidimensional scaling can not be justified by appeal to their abstract theoretical definitions. [. . .] Unable to move from empirical data to theoretical definitions in an internally-consistent way, we are left with only the abstract rational and logical model that the authors propose as a universalizing explanation for linguistic use. (156)
He goes on to point out that the independent variable of prediction, Wx, cannot be shown to have any predictive ability from either direction and the universal classes of strategic use have not been demonstrated to be regular classes at all (cf. 157). Brown and Levinson assume that each of these values can be “measured on a scale of 1 to n, where n is some small number and [. . .] the function that assigns a value to Wx on the basis of the three social parameters does so on a simple summative basis” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 76). But what is
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the meaning of the value of Wx which will determine the degree of politeness (face-saving) that the speaker concludes is required for the communication of the speech act, X? Asserted but untested is their claim that a Wx value of 5, for example, has the same significance for determining the strategy to be used, independent of what values of D, P, and R were summed to arrive at this value. How are the factors P and D to be defined? Brown and Levinson don’t tell us and, as Spencer-Oatey (1996: 5) points out: The precise meaning of many of the terms that the authors use often remains unclear, even when glosses or alternative wordings are given. For example, distance/closeness and familiarity could potentially refer to one or more of the following: frequency of contact, length of acquaintance, amount of selfdisclosure, and amount and type of affect. Yet very few of the authors discuss exactly how they interpret the terms.
Brown and Levinson do write that: We assume that each of these values can be measured on a scale of 1 to n, where n is some small number [. . .] and assume that the function that assigns a value to Wx on the basis of the three social parameters does so on a simply summative basis. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 76)
but they never give a precise definition of a variable or even how you would go about determining its value. On the next page, they write, P is an asymmetric social dimension of relative power. [. . .] That is, P(H,S) is the degree to which H can impose his own plans and his own self-evaluation (face) at the expense of S’s plans and self-evaluation. (77)
So far so good. They then go on to discuss three methods of assigning a value for P in a given case, concluding that the roles played by the individuals coupled with other situational sources of power might contribute, “so the values assessed hold only for S and H in a particular context, and for a particular FTA” (79). Thus we are left with no idea of how to assign a number to P although we are told that it is relative to contextual factors.7 Are these three variables sufficient? Slugowski and Turnbull (1988) suggest that the role of affect must be added to the lists of necessary factors. They write [the] tendency for subjects to perceive a positive relationship between perceived and reciprocal liking means that it may be practically impossible to manipulate perceived like without influencing people’s expectations about the social distance between the participants. (117)
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To what extent are the variables not independent of each other? Watts, Ide and Ehlich (1992) have commented on this, suggesting that the degree to which a social act is considered to be an imposition [Rx value] [. . .] depends crucially on P and D. So in order for the model person to be able to assess the value for R, s/he has to be able to calculate values for D and P first. [. . .] Similarly knowledge of the value of P may rely crucially on knowing the value of D. (Watts, Ide, & Ehlich 1992: 9)
Is the formula correct, both in its symmetry and in its additive nature? This question is impossible to prove or disprove, since the quantification of any variable is highly suspect. Holtgraves and Yang (1992) write that when any of the three interpersonal variables reaches a particularly high level, the effects of the remaining variables lessen or drop out completely. For example, if an interactant has committee an extremely offensive act or intends to ask for an extremely large favor, he or she will be polite regardless of the closeness of the relationship with the other person. (Holtgraves & Yang 1992: 252)
Also, if social distance increases because of a slight, politeness goes by the boards, and impoliteness may be called for. The imprecision of the Brown and Levinson model not only infects the determination of Wx, but once this number is determined, it is unclear how it should be applied to the hierarchy of politeness strategies and what the relationship of the main class of strategies is to each other. . Design flaw in hierarchy There is a design flaw in this hierarchy. There is no reason (and no evidence) to expect that the quantum of politeness between Strategy No. 3, on record with negative redress, and Strategy No. 4, off-record, is equal to the quantum between Strategy No. 4, and Strategy No. 5, don’t do the FTA. It might be, but there is no logical reason to support this implicit claim. In fact, under some circumstances, say when you have been directed to criticize another’s work, saying nothing is clearly less polite than criticizing off-record. Scollon and Scollon (1981) point out another difficulty in the hierarchy, namely that while “positive politeness is directed more to the general nature of the relationship between interactants, negative politeness is directed to the specific act of impositions” (174). Brown and Levinson responded with skepticism to these and other criticism, stating that “present evidence is too equivocal to entail the abandonment of our original scheme. But we do concede that
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the possibility that the off-record strategy is independent of, and co-occurrent with, the other two super-strategies is something which definite requires close investigation.” Blum-Kulka (1987) found that indirectness must be separated into two separate types, conventional indirectness (e.g., Would you turn up the heat?) always has politeness associated with it, while non-conventional indirectness (e.g., It’s cold in here) need not always, especially if the indirection were so great that the utterance itself created an imposition. Strecker (1988) wrote that the positive politeness, negative politeness, and off-record politeness are not in fact independent of each other, and pointed out that, off-record speech abounds in the strategies of positive and negative politeness . . . What is more, on-record strategies are often combined with off-record strategies. There exist switches from positive politeness to negative politeness and vice-versa. In fact, these switches can be seen to follow logical and/or temporal sequences which constitute a type of super-strategy. Brown and Levinson have not dealt with such sequential switches and yet these switches abound in practice. (155)
. Conclusion In the foregoing, I have provided a few of the many criticism levied at the Brown and Levinson model of politeness. For example, Is politeness communicated by an implicature or is it the norm, with only impoliteness being signaled? What is the status of a politeness principle? Is it a maxim, parallel to the Quantity Maxim, or does it have some other status? If so, what? Given that they are distinguishable, what is the relationship between deference and politeness? Should politeness be relegated to only attempts at maintaining harmony among the interactants, or should it be extended to impoliteness? What is the status of politeness strategies, both their relative distances from each other within the hierarchy and their internal structure? Is the notion of face universal or will there have to be cultural-relative definitions? Finally, what is the status of Wx, both in terms of its form and the definition of the component parts? These raise but a few of the important questions to be asked in pursuit of an understanding of what linguistic politeness is, how it is used, what factors influence a speaker’s choice to be heard as polite and what sort of a model is maximally useful. It is clear that considerable work on the Brown and Levinson model is necessary in the immedicate future if it is not be to relegated to the rag bin of rejected theories. Optimists take the position that if we continue to
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work on the problem, we can expect to arrive at a serious theory of politeness, necessarily somewhat different than the existing model, where concepts of face and the principles for interpretation are carefully articulated and well understood. Pessimists, on the other hand, take the position that while we all know polite behavior when we see it, we will never be able to speak definitively about it. I am an optimist.
Notes . A fuller, more complete version of the present paper was presented as one of the three plenary addresses in 1999 at the First Annual Conference on Politeness, Bangkok, Thailand. My thanks to Ken Turner for comments on an earlier draft. . The second edition of their book was published in 1987. While the main text remained unchanged, they did write a 50 page preface clarifying certain issues which had been raised over the preceding 9 years. . Grice made the same suggestion in his initial work on conversational implication but never followed it up. . Recall that politeness markers do not exist. . I am not considering here the case of a strategy being used differently because of cultural differences, for example, in Israel a request for a cigarette might be rendered in Hebrew as, Give me a cigarette, whereas in the U.S. under the same circumstances, the speaker would probably say, Could you give me a cigarette, please? Similarly, in the U.S. one normally thanks a waiter for bringing your food whereas in China this is seldom done. . Again, Ide and others conflate politeness and deference into one topic. . The factors of distance and power are constantly renegotiable and, not surprisingly have different loadings in different languages, therefore different strategies for the same Rx. Scollon and Scollon (1991) write of two types of relationship: inside (nei) – intimate regular contacts, outside (wai) – temporary contacts in service encounters; don’t require redressing, while Hwang (1987) describes three types of relationship: expressive (family), mixed (friends) instrumental (stranger, short-term) and Yang (1992) also describes three types: (sheng) outside; (shu) inside; (jia) family.
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Brown, P. & Levinson, S. (1978). “Universals in language usage: Politeness phenomena”. In E. Goody (Ed.), Questions and Politeness: Strategies in Social Interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, P. & Levinson, S. (1987). Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Burt, S. (1999). “Maxim confluence”. Paper presented at Pragma 99, Tel Aviv, Israel. Clancy (1986). “The acquisition of communicative style in Japanese”. In B. Schieffelin & E. Ochs (Eds.), Language socialization across cultures (pp. 213–249). New York: Cambridge University Press. DuFon, M. A., Kasper, G., & Takahashi, S. et al. (1994). “Bibliography on linguistic politeness”. Journal of Pragmatics, 21, 527–578. Escandell-Vidal, V. (1996). “Towards a cognitive approach to politeness”. In K. Jaszczolt & K. Turner (Eds.), Contrastive Semantics and Pragmatics (pp. 629–650). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fraser, B. (1975). “The concept of politeness”. Paper presented at the 1985 NWAVE Meeting, Georgetown University. Fraser, B. (1990). “Perspective on politeness”. Journal of Pragmatics, 14 (2), 219–236. Fraser, B. & Nolen, W. (1981). “The association of deference with linguistic form”. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 27, 93–109. Fukada, A. (1998). “A gricean theory of politeness”. Paper read at the 12th Annual International Conference on Pragmatics and Language Learning. Glick, D. J. (1996). “A reappraisal of Brown and Levinson’s politeness: Some universals in language usage, eighteen years later”. Review Article. Semiotica, 109 (1/2), 141–171. Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction Ritual: Essays on the Face-to-Face Behaviour. New York: Anchor Books. Goffman, E. (1971). Relations in Public. New York: Basic Books. Green, G. M. (1989). Pragmatics and Natural Language Understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Associates. Grice, H. P. (1975). “Logic and conversation”. In P. Cole & J. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts (pp. 41–58). New York: Academic Press. Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gu, Y. (1990). “Politeness phenomena in modern Chinese”. Journal of Pragmatics, 14 (2), 237–257. Held, G. (1992). “Politeness in linguistic research”. In Watts, Ide, & Ehlich (Eds.), 131–153. Held, G. (1999). “Submission strategies as an expression of the ideology of politeness: Reflections on the verbalization of social power relations”. Pragmatics, 9 (1), 5–20. Holtgraves, T. & Yang, J. N. (1992). “Interpersonal underpinnings of request strategies: General principles and difference due to culture and gender”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 246–256. Hwang, J. R. (1990). “‘Deference’ versus ‘politeness’ in Korean speech”. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 82, 41–55. Ide, S. (1989). “Formal forms and discernment: Two neglected aspects of universal of linguistic politeness”. Multilingua, 8, 223–248. Janney, R. & Arndt, H. (1993). “Universality and relativity in cross-cultural politeness research: A historical perspective”. Multilingua, 12, 13–50.
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Jary, M. (1998). “Relevance theory and the communication of politeness”. Journal of Pragmatics, 30 (1), 1–19. Jucker, A. (1988). “The relevance of politeness”. Multilingua, 7 (4), 375–384. Kasher, A. (1986). “Politeness and rationality”. In J. Johansen & H. Sonne (Eds.), Pragmatics and Linguistics: Festschrift for Jacob L. Mey on his 60th Birthday, 30 October 1986. Odense, Denmark. Kasper, G. (1990). “Linguistic politeness: Current research issues”. Journal of Pragmatics, 14 (2), 193–218. Kong, K. (1998). “Politeness of service encounters in Hong Kong”. Pragmatics, 8 (4), 555– 576. Lachenicht, L. (1980). “Aggravating language: A study of abusive and insulting language”. Papers in Linguistics, 13, 607–687. Leech, G. (1983). Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman. Matsumoto, Y. (1988). “Reexamination of the universality of face: Politeness phenomena in Japanese”. Journal of Pragmatics, 12 (4), 403–426. Meier, A. J. (1995a). “Defining politeness: Universality in appropriateness”. Language Sciences, 17 (4), 345–356. Meier, A. J. (1995b). “Passages of politeness”. Journal of Pragmatics, 24 (4), 381–392. Nwoye, O. (1992). “Linguistic politeness and socio-cultural variation of the notion of face”. Journal of Pragmatics, 18 (4), 309–328. Scollon, R. & Scollon, S. (1981). Narrative, Literacy and Face in Interethnic Communication. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Scollon, R. & Scollon, S. (1994). Intercultural Communication: A Discourse Approach. Oxford: Blackwell. Slugowski, B. & Turnbull, W. (1988). “Cruel to be kind and kind to be cruel: Sarcasm, banter and social relations”. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 7, 101–121. Spencer-Oatey, H. (1996). “Reconsidering power and distance”. Journal of Pragmatics, 26 (1), 1–24. Strecker (1988). The Social Practice of Symbolism: An Anthropological Analysis. London: Athlone Press. Turner, K. (1996). “The principal principles of pragmatic inference: Politeness”. Language Teaching, 29, 1–13. Watts, R. J. (1989). “Relevance and relational work: Linguistic politeness as politic behavior”. Multilingua, 8, 131–166. Watts, R. J. (1992). “Linguistics politeness and political verbal behaviour: Reconsidering claims for universality”. In Watts, Ide, & Ehlich (Eds.), 43–69. Watts, R. J., Ide, S., & Ehlich, K. (Eds.). (1992). Politeness in Language. Studies in its History, Theory and Practice. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
P II
The theoretical perspective
Yoroshiku onegaishimasu Routine practice of the routine formula in Japanese Makiko Takekuro Yoroshiku onegaishimasu is a Japanese routine formula, covering a wide range of meanings from greeting, relation-acknowledging, thanking to leave-taking, depending on context. My focus in this paper is on the significance of routinized communicative practice that effectuates the use of yoroshiku onegaishimasu as a routine formula in Japanese discourse. By examining the actual use of yoroshiku onegaishimasu in social context, I explore reciprocity and indispensability of yoroshiku onegaishimasu at two levels of discourse: semantic-pragmatic and metapragmatic. At the semantic-pragmatic level, the formula conveys request, imposition, deference, greetings, gratitude, and relation-acknowledgement, while at the metapragmatic level it demonstrates the speaker’s engagement in proper interactional routines and brings a sense of completion to social interaction. The paper also discusses that the formula gives shape to social relations and their meanings only through its situated use. Keywords: Yoroshiku onegaishimasu; practice; linguistic politeness; Japanese
.
Introduction
Ever since Brown and Levinson ([1978]1987) presented the study on some universals of linguistic politeness, researchers who analyze language use in Japanese have been striving to argue for two paradigms of language use and linguistic politeness. Here I label the two paradigms as “speaker’s strategic paradigm” and “social norm paradigm.” Studies under the former paradigm claim that linguistic politeness in Japanese is non-strategic and intentionless, because the main principle regulating linguistic politeness in Japanese is conformity to social norms (Hill et al. 1986; Ide 1989). Studies under the latter paradigm claim that linguistic politeness in Japanese is strategic (Okamoto
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1997, 2002; Pizziconi 2003). However, both of the paradigms posit problems. Studies based on actual discourse data reveal that speakers do not always follow regularity or the “normative” rules of language use, thereby questioning the very existence of norms in language use (Okamoto 1997, 2002; Miyazaki 2002). The former paradigm can only explain the guidelines and motivations for certain ways of language use; they cannot describe what actual interactants do under real conditions. To overcome the problem of the former paradigm and explain diverse uses of language in actual context, some studies attempt to account for the use of language from an individual speaker’s angle (Okamoto 1997, 2002). What they do, as similar to what Brown and Levinson did in their framework, is to reduce the use of language to individual speakers’ psychology. Linguistic forms indicate “the speakers’ linguistic ideology, or beliefs and attitudes concerning language use” (Okamoto 1997: 809) or “an individual’s underlying ideology, attutides, or disposition, even ideas of self ” (Pizziconi 2003: 1499). Nevertheless, viewing the immediate use of linguistic forms from an individual speaker’s angle also obscures the fact that the speaker is only a part in social relations. In this paper, I do not argue for either of the two available paradigms. Instead, using Bourdieu’s theory of practice ([1972]1977), I take a practicebased approach to the analysis of yoroshiku onegaishimasu, a routine formula in Japanese discourse. By “practice-based approach,” I mean the location of language use in situated processes of communication. From the outset, I consider Goffman’s (1981) “participation frames” (e.g. speaker, addressee, overhearer, and audience) as part of the organization of communicative practice. My main thesis is that the formula yoroshiku onegaishimasu comes to define social relations and its use through the situatedness of communicative practice. In this paper, I first examine the actual use of yoroshiku onegaishimasu in interactive contexts. Second, by exploring reciprocity and indispensability of yoroshiku onegaishimasu in Japanese discourse, this paper demonstrates two levels of discourse that operate in the use of the formula: semantic-pragmatic and metapragmatic (as a social act of positioning oneself in the immediate context) levels. At the semantic-pragmatic level, yoroshiku onegaishimasu conveys request, imposition, deference, greetings, and gratitude. At the metapragmatic level, yoroshiku onegaishimasu demonstrates interactants’ engagement in social relations and brings a sense of completion to interaction. The formula’s socially significant meanings arise at the intersection of these two levels of discourse. At the interaction of the two levels, interactants who use the formula enter into relations together with others and define themselves and their use
Routine practice of yoroshiku onegaishimasu
of yoroshiku onegaishimasu altogether. Lastly, I argue that the routinized and recurrent practice further creates the basis for the routine use of the formula.
. The routine formula yoroshiku onegaishimasu The routine formula yoroshiku onegaishimasu consists of the adjective yoroshiku and the performative utterance onegaishimasu. Yoroshiku is an adverbial form of the adjective yoroshii (‘good’). In today’s Japanese, yoroshiku itself is a relation-acknowledging phrase that is used to promote interpersonal relations between the speaker and the addressee or the referent (e.g. ‘Please say yoroshiku (‘hi’) to your family’). O-negai-shi-masu consists of the honorific prefix o- for the verb stem negau (‘to wish’ or ‘to request’) inflected for the adverbial form negai- in order to attach to the adverbial form of the verb ‘do’ shi- and the addressee honorific masu. Originally used as a wish to god, onegaishimasu means that the speaker makes a request or asks a favor. Derived from the semantics of requesting, onegaishimasu comes to be used in various situations where the inherent semantics of negai (‘request’) is not explicitly meant. For instance, onegaishimasu can function as an attention-getter in visiting a shop and asking for service. Yoroshiku onegaishimasu, the object of analysis in this paper, has a very high frequency of use in Japanese.1 As it is difficult to give literal translations of yoroshiku and onegaishimasu respectively, it is impossible to translate yoroshiku onegaishimasu into a single phrase in English. Literal translations of the formula include ‘I will rely on your help’ and ‘I ask you to treat me well.’ In social interaction, depending on context, yoroshiku onegaishimasu covers a wide range of meanings from greeting, relation-acknowledging, and thanking to leave-taking. The wide array of usage reveals the significance of this particular formula that gives shape to social relationships and their meanings in communicative practice in Japanese. In the light of Brown and Levinson’s model of linguistic politeness, Matsumoto provided detailed explanations on yoroshiku onegaishimasu as a ‘relation-acknowledging device’ (1988: 409–412). Yoroshiku onegaishimasu is formally an imposition, since it includes the speech act verb of request, negai. This formula also expresses the speaker’s deference to the addressee or the referent. By uttering this formula, the speaker humbly places oneself in a lower position and asks for the dependence and the need to be taken care of and treated well by the addressee or referent. The formula conveys both deference and an imposition on the addressee’s freedom of action (ibid.: 410). In
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Brown and Levinson’s model of linguistic politeness, giving deference is the negative politeness strategy that minimizes the imposition on the addressee to respect ‘negative face’, which is the desire for non-imposition based on individual rights. In short, deference and imposition are mutually exclusive in their model. How can we account for “deferential impositions” that yoroshiku onegaishimasu conveys? Matsumoto explains that in the society where the acknowledgement of interdependence is encouraged, it is respectful for juniors to acknowledge their dependence on seniors. For seniors, it is an honor to have the responsibility to take care of the juniors as an indication of their holding a higher position. Yoroshiku onegaishimasu implies honorable responsibility placed on the addressee for the speaker. Deference and imposition are not contradictory. The speaker can enhance the good self-image of the addressee (as positive politeness) through the use of yoroshiku onegaishimasu that indicates the addressee’s higher social ranking by requesting favorable action on behalf of the speaker. If the speaker is higher in social ranking than the addressee, the addressee tends to prevent loss of face, by denying the implied reversal of social ranking and repeating the same formula. In doing so, the addressee can also indicate understanding of their relative social position and maintain the position in the world. Thus, considering yoroshiku onegaishimasu in terms of the binary opposition of positive and negative politeness is problematic, because the formula is neither positive nor negative politeness. Rather, the formula is indicative and constitutive of interlocutor’s perception and acceptance of interpersonal relationships to acknowledge each other’s position and affirm social bonds among the interlocutors. My focus in this paper is on the socially significant meaning that arises out of using the routine formula in Japanese dicourse. My analysis aims to provide an additional account of yoroshiku onegaishimasu as an embodiment of linguistic politeness, by embedding the formula in the social world in which interactants co-construct to define their relationships.
. Data analysis The present study examines the use of yoroshiku onegaishimasu in the standard Tokyo dialect of spoken and written data. The spoken data set includes conversations among friends, families, between professors and students, and between bosses and subordinates. The written data set includes letters among friends, between professors and students, between bosses and subordinates, and between customers and companies. In the following sections, I illustrate
Routine practice of yoroshiku onegaishimasu
reciprocity and indispensability of yoroshiku onegaishimasu at two levels of discourse: semantic-pragmatic and metapragmatic. My analysis demonstrates that it is the situatedness of routinized communicative practice that brings both semantic-pragmatic and metapragmatic meanings to discourse and social relations among interactants. . Yoroshiku onegaishimasu as a reciprocal formula The use of yoroshiku onegaishimasu is a reciprocal verbal exchange among any interlocutors. Although people in lower ranking (e.g. students, juniors, subordinates, or companies) frequently use yoroshiku onegaishimasu to people in higher ranking (e.g. professors, seniors, bosses, or customers), people in higher ranking also use yoroshiku onegaishimasu to people in lower ranking, as in examples (1) and (2). (1) A professor (P) asks her research assistant (A) to prepare for a series of lectures. P: suimasen iroiroto yoroshiku onegaishimasu. sorry variously yoroshiku onegaishimasu ‘I’m sorry (to ask you) a lot, but yoroshiku onegaishimasu.’ S: aa ie kochira koso yoroshiku onegaishimasu. oh no this side also yoroshiku onegaishimasu ‘Oh, no, me, too, yoroshiku onegaishimasu.’
In this interaction, the professor’s use of yoroshiku onegaishimasu in line 1 could be seen as a deferential way of encoding a request, because the professor actually requests the student to work for her. However, regarding yoroshiku onegaishimasu simply as a deferential imposition may dismiss the social meaning generated through the use of the formula. For instance, the professor could have made a more direct request without using yoroshiku onegaishimasu, such as korekara mo tsuzukete issho ni hataraite kudasai (‘Please continue to work together from now on, too’). In reality, it is very unlikely that any professor would say so. The use of yoroshiku onegaishimasu has less to do with the deferential reduction of the potential offence of imposition on the addressee and has more to do with closing and settling the interaction. Saying this exact formula itself carries the significant meaning at the metapragmatic level of discourse that allows the speaker to enter into more meaningful social relations with other interactants. As an illustration of such metapragmatic meanings, consider example (2). In (2), a general manager uses the formula to end his phone conversation with his subordinate.
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(2) A general manager (M) talks to his subordinate (S) on the phone. S: shachou no goannai yoroshiku onegaishimasu2 president gen honp-guide yoroshiku onegaishimasu ‘Yoroshiku onegaishimasu for guiding (our company’s) president.’ shinbunsha ni wa watashi ga renraku tori newspaper company loc top I sub contact take masu kara add.hon so ‘I will contact with the newspaper company, so,’ M: hai jaa maa souiu koto de yoroshiku onegaishimasu hai yes then well such thing and yoroshiku onegaishimasu yes doumo. please ‘Yes, then, well, so, yoroshiku onegaishimasu.’
In (2), as the general manager uses yoroshiku onegaishimasu regardless of his higher social ranking than the addressee, the formula cannot be treated as a marker of unilateral or hierarchical relationships among interactants. In fact, yoroshiku onegaishimasu is a reciprocal verbal routine among any interactant engaged in social interaction. As the use of the formula increases feelings of connections among interactants, the manager adapts himself to the mode of interacting with his subordinate by this reciprocal use of yoroshiku onegaishimasu. The socially significant meaning of using the formula only arises in the situated context in which interactants wish to develop more solid and meaningful relationships. . Yoroshiku onegaishimasu as redefining social relations In this section, by examining the irreplaceable nature of yoroshiku onegaishimasu, I claim that recurrent and frequent practice creates a belief for the routinized use of the formula. Yoroshiku onegaishimasu is often impossible to delete and irreplaceable. It appears in most writings, such as New Year’s greetings, a notice of marriage, product instructions, and letters to teachers, professors, bosses, and customers. The most prominent case is New Year’s greeting. In Japan, it is a custom to exchange New Year’s cards among those who have and who do not have close relations with, including friends, relatives, teachers, colleagues, bosses, acquaintances, and clients. Example (3) shows typical expressions on a Japanese New Year’s card.
Routine practice of yoroshiku onegaishimasu
(3) On a New Year’s greeting card: akemashite omedetou gozaimasu /kingashinnen open congratulations cop.add.hon /humble-happy-new-year /geishun /welcome spring, ‘(I wish you a) Happy New Year.’ honnen mo yoroshiku onegaishimasu this year too yoroshiku onegaishimasu ‘Yoroshiku onegaishimasu for this year, too.’
Although variations exit, lines 1 and 2 almost always appear in New Year’s greetings. In the case of New Year’s cards, everybody writes sentences that include yoroshiku onegaishimasu, while they also know that New Year’s cards received from others have the same sentences. One generally adds a few more sentences, but it is very common to receive and send a card only with the two sentences in (3). On the other hand, it is very uncommon to find a card without yoroshiku onegaishimasu even among a few hundreds of New Year’s cards. Those who have no close contact for years except for the New Year’s card exchange still use yoroshiku onegaishimasu. The use of yoroshiku onegaishimasu is a deletion-impossible formula. Yoroshiku onegaishimasu is also irreplaceable. In product instructions or advertisement of a store, yoroshiku onegaishimasu serves the semanticpragmatic function of a closing expression, as in (4). (4) In product instructions and the advertisement of a supermarket/store: kongo tomo go-aigan no hodo yoroshiku onegaimoushiagemasu future also honp-love gen about yoroshiku onegaishimasu.hum ‘Yoroshiku onegaishimasu for your continued support.’
Yoroshiku onegaishimasu is very frequently used as a closing statement in business letters, as in (5). (5) At the end of a letter to a professor or a boss, a student or a subordinate writes: kongo tomo go-shidou /go-bentatsu no hodo yoroshiku future too honp-advice /honp-support gen about yoroshiku onegaiitashimasu onegaishimasu.hum ‘Yoroshiku onegaishimasu for your continued advice/encouragement.’
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Yoroshiku onegaishimasu semantically conveys the need of support from the reader who is supposed to possess rich knowledge and experience. Metapragmatically, the use of the formula suggests that they engage in and develop social relationships together. The deletion-impossible and irreplaceable nature of the formula becomes clear, when we replace yoroshiku onegaishimasu in (4) and (5) by other phrases, as in (6) and (7). Examples (6) and (7) would no longer carry the same metapragmatic meanings that yoroshiku onegaishimasu can yield. (6) In product instructions and the advertisement of a supermarket/store: ?kongo
tomo waga-sha no seihin o go-kounyuu future also my-company textscgen product O honp-purchase kudasai please ‘Please purchase our products from now on, too.’ (7) At the end of a letter to a professor/boss, a student/subordinate writes: ?kongo
tomo go-shidou /go-bentatsu kudasai future too honp-advice /honp-encouragement please ‘Please give me your continued advice/encouragement.’
However, if ‘-masu-you yoroshiku onegaishimasu (ADD.HON-like yoroshiku onegaishimasu)’ is added to the end of each sentence in (6) and (7), the examples would sound natural and effectual. This suggests that the very use of the formula enacts metapragmatic meanings to signify interactants’ engagement in meaningful social interaction. In this section, I have looked at the reciprocity and indispensability of using the formula. My analysis demonstrates that yoroshiku onegaishimasu accomplishes several things at two levels of discourse that are simultaneously in play in any given instance of the formula. At the semantic-pragmatic level of discourse, yoroshiku onegaishimasu expresses request, imposition, deference, greetings, gratitude, and acknowledgement of mutual relationships among interlocutors. At the metapragmatic level of discourse, yoroshiku onegaishimasu defines social relations among interactants and comes to define its use through practice. The social meanings of the formula arise at the intersection of these two levels of discourse only at the moment of the use in situated interactive contexts. In the next section, I will discuss the routine use of the formula in light of language use and linguistic politeness.
Routine practice of yoroshiku onegaishimasu
. Routine use of the formula and routine practice My analysis in the previous section has shown that interactants always negotiate and develop to make new relations in the on-going process of communication. Any given token of yoroshiku onegaishimasu is not meaningful outside communicative practice. Yoroshiku onegaishimasu is intelligible only in relation to the situated context. In this section, I argue that the significance of yoroshiku onegaishimasu is not inherent to any instance of use, but derives from the way such uses are interpreted and repeated within routines of communicative practice in Japanese. I would like to reexamine the deletion-impossible and irreplaceable nature of the formula from the two available paradigms mentioned in the beginning. Researchers advocating either of the two paradigms may formulate their arguments on the use of yoroshiku onegaishimasu in the following ways. According to the “social norm paradigm,” the conventionalized aspect of using the formula would show that the use is based on social norms that dictate how to behave and speak appropriately to social context. According to the “speakerstrategic paradigm,” it would be that speakers have an ultimate choice of using or not using yoroshiku onegaishimasu. Since the use of the formula is so conventionalized in discourse, speakers are no longer conscious of their strategic language use. Both of the paradigms posit a question as to how to distinguish empirically the state of being purely intentionless from the state of being strategic without conscious intention. Instead of trying to answer the question here, I suggest that habitual and recurrent practice of yoroshiku onegaishimasu (and the phenomena of linguistic politeness) is an essential element that forms the basis of our dispositions and behavioral routines in communication (cf. Bourdieu [1972]1977). It is not an individual speaker or a superimposed social norm that functions as a driving force for the use of the formula. I would argue that recurrent, frequent, and routinized practice creates a belief that using yoroshiku onegaishimasu is a social norm. However, it is not a social norm that comes first and enters into routinized practice. It is routinized practice that enters into language use and makes using the formula look as if it were the only and automatic option.
. Conclusion This paper has presented that the use of yoroshiku onegaishimasu has recurrent appearance in Japanese discourse. I suggested that the formula enters into and
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defines social relations among interactants and comes to define its use in the on-going process of interaction. Each time the formula is used, conditions for the use do not depend on the pre-established social norms or the speaker’s psychology that is independent of social context. But conditions for the use of the formula are within communicative practice and emerge from on-going social relations. In this study, I attempted to look at the routine practice of the routine formula as a habitual action embedded in social contexts. More detailed studies that treat linguistic politeness as a form of action fully embedded in the social world are necessary, in order to gain a deeper understanding of what actors do and accomplish with language in societies.
Notes . Depending on the formality of the speech situation, the degree of imposition that the speaker makes in requesting, and the level of interpersonal relationships among participants, yoroshiku onegaishimasu can have longer (humbler and more formal) variants such as yoroshiku o-negai-itashi-masu (HONP-request-do.HUM-ADD.HON) or yoroshiku o-negaimoushiage-masu (HONP-request-say.HUM-ADD.HON) or shorter (casual and more informal) ones such as yoroshiku, yoroshiku-ne (SFP), o-negai (HONP-request) or o-negaine/yo/dayo (HONP-request-SFP), and so on. The differences are in the use of addressee honorifics, referent honorifics, and sentence-final particles. Although there are many variants depending on context, in this paper, I use yoroshiku onegaishimasu to mean any variant of the formula in general. . Transcription conventions are as follows: ADD.HON = addressee honorific; COP = copula; GEN = genitive; HONP = honorific prefix; HUM = humble form of referent honorific; LOC = locative; SFP = sentence-final particle; SUB = subject; TOP = topic.
References Bourdieu, Pierre ([1972]1977). Outline of the Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, Penelope & Stephen C. Levinson ([1978]1987). Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goffman, Erving (1981). Forms of talk. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Hill, Beverly, Ide Sachiko, Shoko Ikuta, Akiko Kawasaki, & Tsunao Ogino (1986). “Universals of linguistic politeness: Quantitative evidence from Japanese and American English”. Journal of Pragmatics, 10, 347–371. Ide, Sachiko (1989). “Formal forms and discernment: Two neglected aspects of linguistic politeness”. Multilingua, 8 (2/3), 223–248.
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Matsumoto, Yoshiko (1988). “Reexamination of the universality of face: Politeness phenomena in Japanese”. Journal of Pragmatics, 12, 403–426. Miyazaki, Ayumi (2002). “Relational shift: Japanese girls’ nontraditional first person pronouns”. In S. Benor, M. Rose, D. Sharma, J. Sweetland, & Q. Zhang (Eds.), Gendered Practices in Language (pp. 335–374). Stanford: CSLI Publications. Okamoto, Shigeko (1997). “Social context, linguistic ideology, and indexical expressions in Japanese”. Journal of Pragmatics, 28, 795–817. Okamoto, Shigeko (2002). “Ideology and social meanings: Rethinking the relationship between language, politeness, and gender”. In S. Benor, M. Rose, D. Sharma, J. Sweetland, & Q. Zhang (Eds.), Gendered Practices in Language (pp. 91–113). Stanford: CSLI Publications. Pizziconi, Barbara (2003). “Re-examining politeness, face and the Japanese language”. Journal of Pragmatics, 35, 1471–1506.
An argument for a frame-based approach to politeness Evidence from the use of the imperative in Cypriot Greek Marina Terkourafi To investigate regularities of usage in the distribution of politeness devices across contexts, the realisation of selected speech acts in Cypriot Greek was researched into. Focussing on requests using verb forms denoting nonverbal acts in the imperative / 2sg., this paper examines their situational distribution in relation to extra-linguistic variables such as interlocutors’ sex, age and social class, the relationship between them, the setting of the conversation, and the sequential placement of the speech act in the flow of the conversation. Analysis of the data suggests that only collective reference to all the extra-linguistic variables studied can adequately account for the situational distribution of this politeness device, while at the same time shedding doubt on the claim that such collective reference can be subsumed under the definition of some over-arching variable such as Power and/or Distance. In other words, considerations of qualitative, rather than simply quantitative, appropriateness appear to drive the distribution of politeness devices in the data collected. Consequently, a more fine-grained analysis is proposed drawing on the notion of a frame, in which immediately observable, indispensable extra-linguistic information about a situation is summarised together with information about the appropriate linguistic politeness marker(s). It is argued that, in making no a priori theoretical claims about the politeness potential of specific linguistic devices (by classifying them, for example, under specific over-arching strategies, in the fashion of Brown & Levinson 1987), frames provide basis for a truly universalising approach which does justice to the cultural diversity empirically attested in the area of politeness phenomena. Keywords: Frames; societal rationality; generalised conversational implicatures; Cypriot Greek
Marina Terkourafi
‘Unmarking’ politeness In the recent literature on linguistic politeness, speaking politely is increasingly viewed as the unmarked way of speaking within a community (Kasper 1990: 193; Fraser 1990: 233; Jary 1998: 1–2). This view stems from the observation that politeness most often passes unnoticed, while what is commented on is impoliteness: in normal circumstances, when two people enter an exchange, they expect each other to be polite. Why should interlocutors harbour expectations of politeness? What are the empirical consequences of harbouring such expectations? Finally, how might expectations of politeness be incorporated into our theorising, and what are the consequences of such a move? In scrutinising interlocutors’ motivations for being polite, the first thing to note is that interlocutors are endowed with rationality not only as individuals, but also as members of a community of speakers. Placing politeness at the interface between individual and societal rationality foregrounds the importance of abiding by prevailing norms of behaviour, since such norms provide the stable background against which all behaviour is (automatically) evaluated as polite (or not). While this may seem like a reasonable point of departure – for, indeed, normative instructions figure largely in parents’ teaching of politeness to their children (Snow et al. 1993) – critics have pointed to the theoretical and empirical difficulties of delimiting cultural or societal ‘norms’ to argue against the theoretical usefulness of this notion (e.g., Eelen 2001: 169ff.). Justifiable as this objection may be, it may be more usefully recast as a methodological one: rather than rejecting norms altogether, the onus of proof is now shifted to empirically pinning down such norms. This paper takes up this task with reference to a corpus of conversational data from Cypriot Greek. The guiding principle is provided by the view that the uncontested use of an expression in context is evidence of its adequacy with respect to this context. Relying on the observation of real usage (addressees’ reception of, and responses to, actual utterances; cf. Gumperz & Tannen 1979: 306–307; Gumperz 1982: 5– 6), our aim is then to identify those features in the context of utterance which regularly co-occur with the expression in question, and with which use of this expression must, in virtue of this regularity, be associated. This exercise reveals situationally conditioned preferences for particular expressions, which can nevertheless not be subsumed under older proposals, e.g., Brown & Levinson’s 1978/1987 formula Wx = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + Rx .1 Difficulties in operationalising the proposed sociological variables lead to the proposal of a frame-based approach to politeness, in which immediately perceivable features of a situation are associated with particular expressions with
A frame-based approach to politeness
which they regularly co-occur. Borrowed from the fields of AI and psychology, the notion of a frame allows us to retain generality in what concerns the theoretical machinery of our theory, while at the same time modelling communityspecific, and therefore potentially diverging, norms of polite behaviour. This theoretical stance shares many insights with approaches which distinguish ‘strategic’ politeness, understood as volitional individual action, from politeness as a default, that is, behaviour which is expected – qua socially conditioned – all else being equal (e.g., Ide 1989; Fraser 1990; Escandell-Vidal 1998; Arundale 1999). Indeed, the observation that politeness most often passes unnoticed, quoted at the outset, can only apply to the latter type of behaviour, and it is this type of polite behaviour which constitutes the focus of this paper. At the same time, the current approach goes further, in suggesting ways to account for the difference between strategic and default politeness by using standard pragmatic tools operating at the level of the individual speaker/addressee, such as implicatures and speakers’ intentions, in consonance with frames operating at the level of the community.2 It also remains distinct in firmly grounding these theoretical proposals in the quantitative analysis of a large corpus of naturally occurring data. This analysis furnishes justification for the claim that politeness most often passes unnoticed, by revealing the routine nature of the vast majority of our (polite) exchanges: against this backdrop, strategic (or indeed, creative) investing into politeness shows up (quantitavely, as well as cognitively) as the exception rather than the rule. Teasing apart the intricacies of this ‘rule’ is another task this paper aims to fulfil by sifting through the empirical data, taking to heart Glick’s (1996: 167) injunction that “we need to turn to a more explicit investigation of the actual empirical facts associated with politeness in order to discover the empirical bases for universalising schemes of and for regularities of usage.”
A (fresh) look at some (obvious) facts Short description of the project The empirical data motivating the ensuing theoretical discussion consist in approximately one hundred hours of spontaneous conversations between adult native Cypriot Greek speakers, recorded in the four major urban centres of the Republic of Cyprus between October and December 1998. A variety of settings, distinguished into: at home/informal social gatherings, at work (mainly offices and shops), and at formal discussions/on radio/TV provided the scene for a
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total of ninety one sessions, in which six hundred and seventy two subjects participated. Combining speech-act theoretic and conversation-analytic considerations, utterance-sequences realising offers or requests were subsequently identified, and distinguished based on the desirability of the predicated act (i.e. whether this was desirable to the speaker or the addressee respectively). Finally, a process of semi-phonological transcription yielded a database of 2,189 observations, each of which is characterised for a number of linguistic and extra-linguistic variables. Linguistic variables include features of the main-clause verb, such as lexicosemantic properties (whether this is personal or impersonal, expresses obligation or volition, etc.), the subjective modality, and the combination of number/person for which it is marked. Extra-linguistic variables include the sex, age and social class of the speaker and of the addressee, the relationship between them, the setting of the exchange, the type of speech act performed, and finally its sequential placement in the flow of the conversation.
Delimiting the scope of the discussion From this extensive source-material, current limitations of space dictate a careful delimitation of an area of interest.3 In this paper, I focus on one of the linguistic variables studied, the subjective modality (henceforth SM) of the main-clause verb. Distinguishing objective from subjective modality, Lyons (1995: 328ff.) associates the former with speakers’ “reporting, as neutral observers, the existence of this or that state of affairs”, reserving the latter for speakers’ “expressing their own beliefs and attitudes or their own will and authority” (ibid.: 330). The potential to express subjectivity makes devices realising modality in natural languages prime candidates for expressing politeness. Such devices include verbal mood (ibid.: 255) and (some uses of) tense (ibid.: 319), as well as prosodic structure (ibid.: 185–186), and negation (ibid.: 175–176). Consequently, in what follows, I note, alongside the three moods traditionally recognised in Modern Greek, i.e. the indicative, the subjunctive, and the imperative (Holton et al. 1997: 203ff.), also occurrences of the future, the past, and the conditional (realised as (θα) + imperfective past). To ensure the comparability of examples, the type of speech act performed, as well as its sequential placement in the flow of the conversation, is kept constant, encompassing all and only requests performed for the first time (as opposed to later repetitions of requests for the same act). Focussing on the subjective modality of the main-clause verb, I further distinguish main-
A frame-based approach to politeness
clause verbs based on the propositional content which they express. Instances in which the verb expressing the act to be performed is in the main-clause are kept distinct from those in which the verb expressing the act to be performed is subordinated to a main-clause verb, which may in turn express, e.g., obligation (such as impersonal prepi ‘it must’), or volition (such as personal θelo ‘I want’). Only the former, i.e. main-clause verbs expressing the act to be performed, are dealt with at present. These are distinguished further depending on the kind of act expressed: when this is not linguistic, as with ‘to give’, ‘to help’, and ‘to write’, the verb is classified as an Action Verb (AV), while when this is linguistic, as with ‘to tell’, ‘to answer’, and ‘to explain’, the verb counts as a Speech Act Verb (SAV). Before attempting to account for the distribution of various SMs in the data using the formula Wx = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + Rx (Brown & Levinson 1987: 76), note that, by looking at requests performed for the first time, where the predicated act is expressed by an AV/SAV in the main clause of the utterance, we are in fact controlling for the variable of Ranking of the imposition. Rx is generally held constant at low values throughout the data, given that subjects were always aware of being recorded, which avowedly led them to avoid acts of high R. This puts the onus of accounting for the results of the analysis on the other two variables, the Distance between the speaker and the hearer, and the Power of the hearer over the speaker. Finally, in this paper, I prioritise requests performed in work settings, as the greater range of relationships between interlocutors in these settings engenders greater potential for variability in the values of Power and Distance. Looking at the frequency of occurrence of various SMs in the total of requests performed at work for the first time using an AV/SAV, we find a noticeable preference for the imperative mood (57% vs. 14.82% for the next runner-up, the subjunctive). And this is despite the fact that the imperative – contrary to other SMs – may only co-occur with the 2nd person, singular or plural. From now on, to avoid potential variability in politeness assessments due to variation between T and V, investigation will be limited to AVs/SAVs occurring in the imperative/ 2sg. (hence T-imperative). In particular, we shall seek to establish whether varying the context-dependent values of D and P affects this preference.
What are P(ower) and D(istance) made of? Having limited our discussion to requests performed for the first time in work settings using an AV or SAV in the T-imperative, we are now ready to exam-
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ine the data in more detail. Looking at the percentage of such requests out of the total of requests by relationship, we find that roughly as many, in fact more requests are addressed in the T-imperative by salespersons to customers (64.58%) than vice versa (61.97%). Explaining this result with reference to the variable of Power of the hearer over the speaker, defined as “the degree to which [the] H[earer] can impose his own plans and his own self-evaluation . . . at the expense of [the] S[peaker]’s plans and self-evaluation” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 77), would lead to the counter-intuitive claim that, in a work setting, salespersons have as much, if not greater Power over customers than vice versa. On the other hand, breaking down this result according to the degree of familiarity between customer and salesperson does not help either, since, contrary to Brown and Levinson’s prediction, an increase in the social Distance between interlocutors is accompanied by an increase in the percentage of requests performed in the T-imperative (80% from customer to salesperson and 75% from salesperson to customer when they are not previously acquainted, vs. 58.62% and 64.1% respectively when they are acquainted). Could we be dealing here with a phenomenon akin to Wolfson’s (1989) “bulge” phenomenon?4 In the above case, interpreting D as degree of familiarity is problematic, since, contrary to what is predicted by the formula Wx = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + Rx , D turns out to be inversely analogous to the degree of indirectness (Wx ) opted for. We may, then, be justified in trying an alternative interpretation of P and D to that of Brown and Levinson, who construe these variables as context-dependent, defined each time according to the relationship in which the Speaker and the Hearer stand for the purposes of the predicated act (1987: 78–80). That is we may appeal to more stable attributes of interlocutors, such as their sex, age, and social class. If Cypriot Greek speakers indeed calculate Power and Distance based on the latter, variation in these attributes should have an impact on the relative frequency of occurrence of the T-imperative in first-time requests performed at the workplace. At first sight, an examination of the relative social classes of speaker and addressee appears to confirm this hypothesis: working-class speakers do indeed receive more T-imperative from middle-class speakers (61.9%) than they utter in return (56.75%). On the other hand, the greater preference for the T-imperative in exchanges between working-class interlocutors (79.59%), as opposed to middle-class interlocutors (67.92%), confirms Brown and Levinson’s prediction that “there are higher D values in higher strata” (1987: 246). However, recall here that these authors define social Distance as “a social dimension of degree of similarity/difference” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 76–77; emphasis added). Accordingly, relationships between interlocu-
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tors from different socio-economic backgrounds should be characterised by high D values. It follows that, in requests addressed from middle-class speakers to working-class addressees, P is low and D is high, whereas in requests exchanged between middle-class interlocutors, P is low and D is high again, only for different reasons. So, in both these cases, W values should be approximately similar. But then, the greater frequency of T-imperatives exchanged between middle-class interlocutors (67.92%) compared to those addressed by middleclass speakers to working-class addressees (61.9%) remains unaccounted for. Perhaps, in this case, the considerations that lead to the assessment of Power and Distance, such as interlocutors’ social class, are represented in the final W values more directly than Brown and Levinson seem prepared to concede (1987: 78, 81). An investigation of the respective sexes of speaker and addressee leads to a similar conclusion. For, if same-sex relationships are characterised by low D (greater similarity), why do women interlocutors exchange fewer requests in the T-imperative (62.6%) than their male counterparts (70%)? One may venture that Power is the decisive factor here: female addressees have greater Power over their same-sex interlocutors than do their male counterparts. However, this high P of women over their same-sex addressees cannot easily be attributed to their position in the professional hierarchy (i.e. to any real, ‘observable’ control they have over their interlocutors), given the scarcity of women in high places in the work settings recorded. While this explanation may be along the correct lines, note that Power is now construed as a matter of interlocutors’ stable attributes, such as sex, as opposed to being dependent on the relationship in which they stand for the purposes of the exchange. (Recall that evidence was inconclusive regarding the context-dependence of Power in the exchanges between customers and salespersons discussed above.) On the other hand, if we look at the relative ages of speaker and addressee, we find same-age interlocutors exchanging more requests in the T-imperative (72.73%), compared to different-age ones, a result we can attribute to the low D (greater degree of similarity) in same-age relationships. However, if Distance is “a symmetric social dimension of similarity/difference” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 76; emphasis added), a difference in age should produce an increase in social Distance both when the speaker is younger and when s/he is older. Nevertheless, the greater percentage of requests in the T-imperative to older addressees (66.12%) than to younger addressees (60.55%) suggests that these two relationships are different. Since this result cannot be attributed to D, it must be explained away by appealing to the hearer’s Power over the speaker. Only this time we would have to claim that it is younger addressees that have
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Power compared to older addressees, a rather counter-intuitive claim given the great esteem in which traditional family values are held in Cypriot society. Earlier, we turned to interlocutors’ stable attributes, such as sex, age and social class, in a last attempt to account for the distribution of T-imperatives by appealing to the variables of Distance and Power as Brown and Levinson define these. Still, some of our findings remain unaccounted for, or indeed go against their predictions. Rather, the data analysis suggests that interlocutors’ stable attributes enter politeness assessments in a more direct way than merely through motivating assessments of social Distance and relative Power. In other words, appealing to immediately perceivable features of the situation provides an alternative, possibly more reliable, basis on which to theorise about politeness phenomena. As a final argument in this direction, notice the impact of another such feature, setting, on speakers’ relative preference for the T-imperative in requests performed for the first time. Attempting to explain this preference with reference to the variables of Power and Distance will not do, given that this is more pronounced in work settings (57.07%) than at home/informal social gatherings (50.47%), where lower values for D and P may reasonably be expected. This trend is however reversed in requests performed during formal discussions or on radio/TV. While it may be surmised that the setting of the exchange affects the context-dependent values of D, P and Rx , it is not clear in what way, having failed to account for variation within settings, these same variables might be made to account for variation between settings. If it is the case that their values generally increase in formal discussions/on radio/TV, then why does the imperative still figure in second place (24%) in speakers’ preferences after the subjunctive (42.6%), scoring over twice as high as the next expression, the indicative (9.26%)? The difficulties in operationalising Brown and Levinson’s sociological variables of Power and Distance (and, by implication, their proposed formula for computing the weightiness of an FTAx ), are likely to be alleviated when the various extra-linguistic variables discussed above as ‘sources’ of Power and Distance are considered jointly, rather than in isolation from each other. The onus of proof now lies on the side of those who would like to claim that Power and Distance thus understood (as clusters of extra-linguistic variables) are endowed with psychological reality above and beyond that of being the sum of their parts (as Brown & Levinson would seem to imply, when they discuss the formula yielding Wx as “at least a partially accurate representation of cognitive process” (1987: 81), or when they attribute specific assumptions to the speaker regarding the social Distance between himself and the hearer, the Power of the
A frame-based approach to politeness
hearer over him, and the culture-dependent ranking of the FTA in question (1987: 74–75)).5 This analysis points in the direction of an alternative approach to politeness, which will account for politeness assessments in different cultures with reference to indispensable, immediately observable features of the situation. This approach is placed within a wider trend across the human memory literature to move from traditional models based on economy of storage and heavy reliance on computational machinery to episodic or instance-based models. In the latter, a highly detailed representation of every stimulus pattern is encoded and retained in long-term memory. . . . Representations include the stimulus and information about its surrounding context. Retrieval is accomplished by comparing new inputs to all traces stored in long-term memory in parallel. Stored traces that are similar to the input are counted as strong evidence toward the recognition of the input. (Lively et al. 1994: 292)
Having argued for the need for an approach to politeness along these lines using empirical evidence from Cypriot Greek, I now turn to considering the theoretical apparatus which would make it possible.
Outlining the frame-based approach to politeness A safe bet, or why being polite makes sense Traditional grammars of many languages are interspersed with remarks about politeness. In such descriptive accounts of languages, politeness is indicated by a deviation from rational efficiency (as captured by Grice’s (1975/1989: 26– 27) Cooperative Principle (henceforth CP) and the subsumed maxims) either at the level of the lexicon or at that of syntax or of morphology: politeness is inherent to certain terms or constructions in virtue of this deviation. Though such commonsensical understanding of ‘politeness’ is inappropriate as a starting point for a theory of linguistic politeness (Braun 1988: 49–53; Held 1992: 136ff.; Terkourafi 2001: 4ff.), it remains implicit in several influential approaches which, in a move consonant with the intuition “no deviation from rational efficiency, no politeness”, seek politeness in deviations from the CP (R. Lakoff 1973: 296; Leech 1983: 7, 80; Brown & Levinson 1987: 5ff.). Contrary to this stance, Fraser (1990: 233) claims that “being polite is a hallmark of abiding
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by the CP”. In the light of the preceding remarks, how can we make sense of Fraser’s claim? I should like to argue that to be polite is indeed to be rational