Beyond Misunderstanding: Linguistic Analyses of Intercultural Communication (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Beyond Misunderstanding

Pragmatics & Beyond Editor Andreas H. Jucker University of Zurich, English Department Plattenstrasse 47, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland e-mail: [email protected]

Associate Editors Jacob L. Mey University of Southern Denmark

Herman Parret Belgian National Science Foundation, Universities of Louvain and Antwerp

Jef Verschueren Belgian National Science Foundation, University of Antwerp

Editorial Board Shoshana Blum-Kulka

Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

University of Lyon 2

Jean Caron

Claudia de Lemos

Université de Poitiers

University of Campinas, Brazil

Robyn Carston

Marina Sbisà

University College London

University of Trieste

Bruce Fraser

Emanuel Schegloff

Boston University

University of California at Los Angeles

Thorstein Fretheim

Deborah Schiffrin

University of Trondheim

Georgetown University

John Heritage University of California at Los Angeles

Paul O. Takahara Sandra Thompson

Susan Herring

University of California at Santa Barbara

University of Texas at Arlington

Teun A. Van Dijk

Masako K. Hiraga

Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona

St. Paul’s (Rikkyo) University

Richard J. Watts

David Holdcroft

University of Berne

University of Leeds

Sachiko Ide Japan Women’s University

Volume 144 Beyond Misunderstanding: Linguistic analyses of intercultural communication Edited by Kristin Bührig and Jan D. ten Thije

Beyond Misunderstanding Linguistic analyses of intercultural communication

Edited by

Kristin Bührig Universität Hamburg

Jan D. ten Thije Utrecht University

John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam
/
Philadelphia

8

TM

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Beyond Misunderstanding : Linguistic analyses of intercultural communication / edited by Kristin Bührig and Jan D. ten Thije. p. cm. (Pragmatics & Beyond, New Series, issn 0922-842X ; v. 144) Includes bibliographical references and indexes. 1. Intercultural communication. I. Bührig, Kristin. II. Thije, Jan D. ten. III. Pragmatics & beyond ; new ser., 144. P94.6.B49 2006 302.2--dc22 isbn 90 272 5387 0 (Hb; alk. paper)

2005057190

© 2006 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa

Table of contents

Beyond misunderstanding: Introduction Jan D. ten Thije

1

Part I. Basic assumptions of the linguistic reconstruction of intercultural communication Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory Georges Lüdi

11

The cultural apparatus: Thoughts on the relationship between language, culture, and society Jochen Rehbein

43

Notions of perspective and perspectivising in intercultural communication research Jan D. ten Thije

97

Part II. Interactive analyses of intercultural discourse Perspectives in conflict: An analysis of German-German conversations Grit Liebscher Beyond ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘cultural stereotypes’: Analysing intercultural communication Jennifer Hartog

155

175

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions Martina Rost-Roth

189

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization Dennis Day

217



Table of contents

“How are you?” “I’m hot”: An interactive analysis of small talk sequences in British-German telephone sales Claudia Bubel

245

Where do ‘we’ fit in?: Linguistic inclusion and exclusion in a virtual community Lise Fontaine

261

Communicating affect in intercultural lamentations in Caucasian Georgia Helga Kotthoff

289

Beyond competence: A multiculturalist approach to intercultural communication Shi-xu

313

Authors of Beyond Misunderstanding

331

Index

335

Beyond misunderstanding Introduction Jan D. ten Thije

This volume challenges two tacit presumptions in the field of intercultural communication research. Firstly, misunderstandings can frequently be found in intercultural communication, although, one could not claim that intercultural communication is constituted by misunderstandings alone. The main purpose of the contributions to this volume is to reconstruct intercultural understanding linguistically. Secondly, intercultural communication is not solely constituted by the fact that individuals from different cultural groups interact. Each contribution of this volume analyses to what extent instances of discourse are institutionally and/or interculturally determined. This volume shows how new perspectives on linguistic analyses of intercultural communication go beyond the analysis of misunderstanding. In fact, the volume documents a shift in the research focus towards the question as to what extent different linguistic means contribute to intercultural understanding. Edward T. Hall (1959, 1981) is considered to be the first scholar, who used the notion of ‘intercultural communication’ in order to denote the specific communication constellation that occurs when people from different cultural backgrounds meet. His statement ‘culture is communication’ inspired many scholars from anthropology, ethnography, cultural psychology and communication studies to attempt to offer causal explanations of communicative failure and success in intercultural contact. In actual fact, these analyses focus on psychological, cultural and communicative differences across cultures (cf. Prosser 1978; Asante 1980; Hofstede 1980; Bochner 1982; Carbaugh 1990). In the eighties of the last century, John Gumperz and colleagues concentrated the research more intensively on the intercultural encounter itself and analysed intercultural misunderstandings in ‘gate keeping situations’. Their



Jan D. ten Thije

work on contextualisation has been a bench-mark for the discourse analytical approach to intercultural discourse (cf. Thomas 1983; Knapp et al. 1987; Moerman 1988; Scollon & Scollon 1994; Müller 1999). These discourse analyses raised an animated discussion about the static or dynamic relationship between communication and culture and “how much culture can be found in intercultural discourse” (cf. Rehbein 1985; Blommaert 1991; Koole & ten Thije 1994; Ehlich 1996). Srikant Sarangi’s article (1994) “Intercultural or not. Beyond the celebration of cultural differences in miscommunication analysis” exemplifies the beginning of the fore-mentioned shift in focus in intercultural communication research. Gradually, scholars incorporate more linguistic notions in their intercultural analyses and attempt to reconstruct how mutual understanding is being achieved in discourse instead of explaining misunderstanding based on different cultural systems (cf. Clyne 1995; Apfelbaum & Müller 1998; Tzanne 1999; Kotthoff 2002; ten Thije 2002, 2003a, b; Kameyama 2004). This book documents and summarises this discussion beyond the analyses of misunderstandings in intercultural discourse. The chapters reflect on the question as to whether linguistic involvement in intercultural research has resulted in the extension and enhancement of new linguistic categories and methods. These reflections involve different theoretical frameworks (e.g. functional grammar (Lüdi), systemic functional linguistics (Fontaine), functional pragmatics (Hartog, Rehbein, ten Thije), rhetorical conversational analysis (Liebscher), ethno-methodological conversational analysis (Bubel, Day, Rost Roth), an approach from linguistic anthropology (Kotthoff) and a cultural approach (Shixu)). Furthermore, interactive approaches to the analysis of intercultural communication are surveyed, by analysing both authentic and elicited data. As the contributions focus on the discourse of counselling or gate-keeping situations, international team cooperation, international business communication, workplace discourse, internet communication, and lamentation discourse, the volume shows that the analysis of intercultural communication is essentially organized in direct response to social needs and, therefore, contributes to the social justification of linguistics. The volume comprises two parts. Part one discusses basic assumptions. In order to make the shift in linguistic reconstruction from misunderstanding to understanding in intercultural communication, the presumptions of mainstream linguistics – that every language has to be considered as a homogeneous entity – are discussed. Intercultural discourse is analysed as a substantive form of multilingualism and not as a deviation from monolingualism. Multilingual-

Beyond misunderstanding

ism is accepted as the starting point for the linguistic analysis of intercultural communication. A related basic assumption concerns the issue as to how the relationship between language and culture can be fruitfully conceptualised for the analysis of intercultural communication. Culture is not considered as a static set of norms and values (materialized in artefacts) within or for a specific group or nation state, but as the social or group capacity to find solutions for recurrent societal needs and standard problems. Culture is interactively produced and reproduced in the perception, understanding and formation of reality (ten Thije 2002). Consequently, intercultural communication can be taken as the confrontation, overlap, or competition between, and sometimes as the extension or exclusion of, different pragmatic and cognitive systems. Since culture is interactively accomplished, intercultural communication has the potential to enrich both linguistic systems with new discursive structures or even contribute to the creation of new linguistic systems like discursive intercultures. The contributions in part two give an account of interactive analyses of intercultural discourse. The question regarding the concurrence of institutional and intercultural discourse structures is discussed here in different institutional constellations. Their linguistic reconstruction enables intercultural discourse beyond misunderstanding.

Contributions Georges Lüdi discusses the question as to whether the study of phenomena such as like loan words, interferences and code-switching that often constitute intercultural discourse are of peripheral interest for linguistics, or whether the results of research on these so called ‘translinguistic markers’ are of immediate relevance for linguistic theory. He states that these phenomena of plurilingualism should no longer be interpreted from a monolingual ideology, but be respected as a sign of a rich multilingualism. On the basis of study of the language varieties of Chiac in Acadia and Italoschwyz in Zurich, he reveals how code-switching in these cases can be analysed as a variety of its own. Consequently, he discusses the definition of ‘language’ and the boundaries between different ‘languages’. He concludes that shaping linguistic differences has an important identity function and is often politically determined. He states that we need a language theory that gives special prominence to the ways the interactors exploit all the linguistic resources at their disposal. Jochen Rehbein elaborates on the concept of cultural apparatus that was proposed by Redder and Rehbein (1987). The cultural apparatus is a repro-





Jan D. ten Thije

ductive and creative aggregate with an historical dimension. This contribution offers a concrete model of the structure of the cultural apparatus and looks for new forms of intercultural communication. He states that intercultural communication is a cultural act performed in multilingual constellations. On the basis of his cultural apparatus theory, it is possible to differentiate between one-sided and two-sided intercultural communication, depending on whether the interactors change their action system in discourse. This theory enables the creation of a concept and analysis of intercultural discourse beyond misunderstanding. Jan D. ten Thije discusses the special attraction of the notion of perspective in the field of intercultural research. Disciplines such as Psychology and Sociology have taken the lead in the analysis of perspective phenomena and linguists are trying to integrate these findings. In a review of various studies on perspectivity in intercultural discourse, ten Thije discusses the epistemological and interactional concepts of perspectivity, as identified by Graumann and Kallmeyer (2002: 2). In actual fact, studies on intercultural discourse integrate these concepts in order to comprehend the interculturality of such discourse. Subsequently, ten Thije proposes the communicative apparatus of perspectivising. This apparatus operates on the basis of the prerequisites for the verbalization of the propositional content of an utterance. By means of this apparatus, the propositional content is generalized and, subsequently, perspectivized in order to enable the hearer to make a comparison between the speaker’s cultural standards and his own. This communicative apparatus is a discursive means that exemplifies intercultural discourse going beyond misunderstanding. The second part gives account of interactive analyses of intercultural discourse. Grit Liebscher reveals how speakers construct intercultural discourse through the management of cultural perspectives. Speakers manage perspectives through rhetorical devices, which include the selection of words and the use of interactional devices (e.g. pauses and gestures). The examples discussed in this chapter provide evidence that interculturality is a matter of negotiation between participants in the interaction rather than a concept that can be defined a priori. The analysis reveals that, though there may not be a unified cultural belief or value system, speakers use lexical items to express cultural perspectives. She shows that interactants select strategically from among linguistic alternatives. Jennifer Hartog reconstructs the concept of Rehbein’s cultural apparatus (Rehbein, this volume) in genetic counselling discourse between two Turkish clients, a Turkish mediator and a German doctor. Her analysis confirms that discourse between persons of different cultures is not intercultural at all times.

Beyond misunderstanding

With the concept of cultural apparatus she is able to reconstruct exactly where interculturality actually takes place. Moreover, the analysis disentangles the role of the institution and that of culture. She shows that although the mediator was a native speaker of Turkish, his speech actions were more steered by the goals of the institution than by the desire to help bridge the gap between cultures. Martina Rost Roth analyses counselling interviews in intercultural and intracultural settings, with a special focus on findings relating to miscommunication and problems in understanding. Her analyses concentrate on central stages of counselling interviews: the presentation of problems and the formulation of requests on the one hand, and the processing of proposed solutions on the other. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the potential for problems in understanding, and asks the question as to whether this is inherent in intercultural communication in institutional settings. As noted before, the contributions in this volume aspire to reflect upon what studies of intercultural communication may contribute to more general concerns within linguistics. In this regard, Dennis Day analyses expressions referring to collectives of people, in particular, expressions, which have the potential to refer to people as members of social groups generally, and ethnic or cultural groups specifically. By comparing a referential semantic with a conversational analysis, he reconstructs the interactive dimensions of ethnic group categorization. He concludes that taking into account how actors interact in their workplaces and the social activities in which they participate can successfully identify further studies into membership categorization devices. Claudia Bubel analyses British-German business communication that yields indications of potential intercultural mismatches. Her corpus of telephone conversations shows, however, that these mismatches do not result in misunderstandings and disorder. She shows in detail how cultural knowledge is retrieved and adjusted cooperatively through the application of basic conversational mechanisms for the sake of institutional order. Consequently, intercultural misunderstandings do not surface in these sequences; instead a discursive interculture, as described by Koole and ten Thije (1994), is created. Lise Fontaine explores inclusion and exclusion in the construction of a virtual community that is also considered to be a discursive interculture. The primary goal of her contribution is to describe how members of the Internet community position themselves with respect to group identity and cohesion, through an examination of the uses of inclusive and exclusive ‘we’. Her taxonomy of ‘we’ shows the range available to speakers in negotiating their own self-reference with respect to others and their virtual community.





Jan D. ten Thije

Helga Kotthoff inquires about the consequences resulting from the fact that in Georgia, regional lamentation styles and other cultural differences are given expression in the ritual mourning process. She takes a social constructionist perspective, which attempts to understand social life as a steady stream of interactive performances based on a describable complex of dramaturgical accomplishments. Comparisons between the expressions of grief in different cultures reveal both similarities and differences. She discusses how semiotic universals and culture specific practices together form emotive display conventions, which are interpreted as ‘natural’ expression. Despite the ideology of the natural expression of emotion, lamenters are able to adapt their style and their language to an intercultural audience if the situation demands it. Shixu formulates a cultural approach that emphasises the importance of analysing culturally oppressive relations and practices in and through intercultural communication. In the practical analysis of empirical print media data, he highlights the discursive (i.e. textual and contextual) structures and strategies through which forms of cultural confrontation, domination and repression are produced. He shows that representations (of the cultural Other) can be a powerful tool to achieve particular intercultural purposes.

References Apfelbaum, Birgit & Müller, Hermann (Eds.). (1998). Fremde im Gespräch. Gesprächsanalytische Untersuchungen zu Dolmetschinteraktionen, interkultureller Kommunikation und institutionalisierten Interaktionsformen. Frankfurt: IKO – Verlag für interkulturelle Kommunikation. Asante, Molefik (1980). “Intercultural Communication: An Inquiry into Research Directions”. In D. Nimmo (Ed.), Communication Yearbook 4, An Annual Review (pp. 401–410). Published by the International Communication Association. Blommaert, Jan (1991). “How much culture is there in intercultural communication?” In J. Blommaert & J. Verschueren (Eds.), The Pragmatics of International and Intercultural Communication (pp. 13–33). Amsterdam / Philadelphia: Benjamins. Bochner, Stephen (1982). “The social psychology of cross-cultural relations”. In S. Bochner (Ed.), Cultures in Contact; Studies in Cross-cultural Interaction (pp. 5–44). Oxford: Pergamon Press. Carbaugh, Donald (Ed.). (1990). Cultural Communication and Intercultural Contact. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Ass. Clyne, Michael (1994). Inter-cultural Communication at Work; Cultural Values in Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Beyond misunderstanding

Ehlich, Konrad (1996). “Interkulturelle Kommunikation”. In H. Goebl, P. H. Nelde, Z. Starý, & W. Wölck (Eds.), Kontaktlinguistik, Ein internationales Handbuch zeitgenössischer Forschung (pp. 920–931). Berlin and New York: De Gruyter. Graumann, Carl F. & Kallmeyer, Werner (Eds.). (2002). Perspectivity and Perspectivation in Discourse. Den Haag: Mouton. Gudykunst, William B. & Kim, Young Yun (1992). Communicating with Strangers. An Approach to Intercultural Communication. New York: McGraw-Hill. Gumperz, John J. (1982). “The conversational analysis of interethnic communication”. In J. J. Gumperz (Ed.), Language and Social Identity (pp. 13–31). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hall, Edward T. (1981 [1959]). The Silent Language. New York u.a.: Doubleday. Hofstede, Geert (1991). Cultures and Organizations. Software of the mind. London: McGraw. Kameyama, Shinichi (2004). Verständnissicherendes Handeln. Zur reparativen Bearbeitung von Rezeptionsdefiziten in deutschen und japanischen Diskursen. Münster: Waxmann. Knapp, Karlfried, Enninger, Werner, & Knapp-Potthoff, Annelie (Eds.). (1987). Analyzing Intercultural Communication. Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter. Koole, Tom & Thije, Jan D. ten (1994). The Construction of Intercultural Discourse: Team Discussions of Educational Advisers. Amsterdam and Atlanta: RODOPI. Kotthoff, Helga (Ed.). (2002). Kultur(en) im Gespräch. Studien zur Fremdheit und Interaktion. Tübingen: Narr. Moerman, Michael (1988). Talking Culture; Ethnography and Conversation Analysis. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. Müller, Bernd Dieter (Ed.). (1991). Interkulturelle Wirtschaftkommunikation. München: iudicium. Prosser, Michael H. (1978). “Intercultural communication. Theory and research: An overview of major constructs”. In B. D. Ruben (Ed.), Communication Yearbook 2, An Annual Review (pp. 335–340). Published by the International Communication Association. Redder, Angelika & Rehbein, Jochen (1987). “Zum Begriff der Kultur”. In A. Redder & J. Rehbein (Eds.), Arbeiten zur interkulturellen Kommunikation. Osnabrücker Beiträge zur Sprachtheorie, 38(87), 7–21. Rehbein, Jochen (Ed.). (1985). Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Tübingen: Narr. Sarangi, Srikant (1994). “Intercultural or not? Beyond the celebration of cultural differences in miscommunication analysis”. Pragmatics, 4(3), 409–427. Scollon, Ron & Scollon, Suzanne Wong (1995). Intercultural Communication: A Discourse Approach. Oxford: Blackwell. Thije, Jan D. ten (2002). “Stufen des Verstehens in der Analyse interkultureller Kommunikation”. In H. Kotthoff (Ed.), Kultur(en) im Gespräch. Studien zur Fremdheit und Interaktion (pp. 57–97). Tübingen: Narr. Thije, Jan D. ten (2003a). “The Transition from misunderstanding to understanding in intercultural communication”. In L. Komlósi, P. Houtlosser, & M. Leezenberg (Eds.), Communication and Culture; Argumentative, Cognitive and Linguistic Perspectives (pp. 187–197). Amsterdam: SIC SAT.





Jan D. ten Thije

Thije, Jan D. ten (2003b). “Eine Pragmatik der Mehrsprachigkeit: zur Analyse ‘diskursiver Interkulturen”’. In R. De Cillia, J. Krumm, & R. Wodak (Eds.), Die Kosten der Mehrsprachigkeit – Globalisierung und sprachliche Vielfalt / The Cost of Multilingualism – Globalisation and Linguistic Diverstity / Le Cout du Plurilinguism – Mondialisation et diversité linguistique’ (pp. 101–125). Wien: Akademie der Wissenschaften. Thomas, Jennifer A. (1983). “Cross-cultrural pragmatic failure”. Applied Linguistics, 4(2), 91–112. Tzanne, Angeliki (1999). Talking at Cross-Purposes. The Dynamics of Miscommunication. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

 

Basic assumptions of the linguistic reconstruction of intercultural communication

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory* Georges Lüdi

Introduction In cultural studies, the idea of monolithical ‘Cultures’ was replaced long ago by a more dynamic and constructivist. Cultures are thus conceived as sets of norms and behaviours that are constructed and deconstructed in interaction with relevant others. In modern societies, this happens in the compass of open social networks; each individual participates in several groups, assimilates norms, behaviours and values of different origins and combines them forming a more or less coherent whole. It is, however, sometimes difficult to make these processes manifest inside a society (see Werlen et al. 1992 for an interesting example of cultural differences among speakers of the same dialect in a district of Berne). In interaction between members of more distant cultures, the same types of processes become more visible; the resulting ‘interculture’ is quantitatively, but not qualitatively different from normal everyday culture in modern societies. The impact which the analysis of the socio-cognitive dynamics of intercultural communication has on cultural theory thus matches the possible impact of socio-cognitive aspects of bi- and multilingualism on language theory. We will argue that the reverse is also true. There may be instances of intercultural communication without the use of any natural language or among monolingual speakers of the same language. In most cases, however, intercultural communication takes place between speakers of different languages, either in direct interaction or with the help of mediators (interpreters, translators). In either case, multilingual competences are presupposed. They are considered here as linguistic resources available to members of a community for socially significant interactions. The totality of these resources constitutes



Georges Lüdi

the linguistic repertoire of a person or a community and may include different languages, dialects, registers, styles and routines spoken. The interactionist interpretation of repertoire underlying this chapter is grounded on a contextualised and collective conception of activities and of human cognition, and focuses on the central role that practical communication (and, therefore, social action) play in their formatting. According to this concept, multilingual repertoires are configured in the course of practical activities that are linked with specific sociocultural contexts and with particular forms of action, interaction and intersubjectivity. This leads to various forms of multilingual speech as a response of precise, locally situated communicative needs. We will argue that the analysis of formal manifestations of multilingual repertoires contributes to a better understanding of intercultural communication. But the reverse is true also. The careful analysis of different manifestations of multilingual repertoires, situated in specific intercultural contexts and negotiated between interlocutors, questions a number of established representations of what a ‘language’ is. Thus, the investigation of the use of multilingual repertoires in the dynamics of intercultural communication may contribute to a more appropriate theory of language and of language use. A major concern in this respect refers to representations of multilingualism, its normality and the values assigned to it. In 1890, a famous professor from the University of Cambridge could still affirm: “If it were possible for a child to live in two languages at once equally well, so much the worse. His intellectual and spiritual growth would not thereby be doubled, but halved. Unity of mind and character would have great difficulty in asserting itself in such circumstances” (Laurie 1890: 15). Today, he would seem ridiculous with such a statement. Since the early eighties, specialists agree on a ‘holistic’ view of bi- or multilingual competence and of bi- or multilingual persons respectively. The ‘additive’ conception of independent monolingual competences has been replaced by the idea of an integrated bi- or multilingual or polylectal competence (Lüdi & Py 1984, 3 2003; Grosjean 1985; Titone 1987; Siguan 1987 etc.). Of course, multilingualism does not concern linguistic competence alone. It normally entails life in two or more cultures. This does not mean a ideal, coordinated, unrestricted membership of several cultural communities. In the following, we will define multilingualism functionally – in the sense that a multilingual individual is able to adapt his or her language choice to the situation and to switch from one language to the other, if necessary, independently from the balance between his or her competences. Similarly, we define pluriculturalism as the capacity of crossing borders between cultures, of sharing, more or less completely, several perspectives on the world. Thus, multilingualism en-

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

tails breaking up the prison of a single culture, putting the concepts and values of each distinct cultural system in relative terms, bridging cultures and integrating them into a proper metasystem. The resulting social identity can be harmonious or characterised by breaks and contradictions, but is in any case plural. Becoming multilingual thus entails, in most cases, the development of an intercultural communicative competence. We would like to argue that the translinguistic markers that will be analysed in the following article may be viewed as its emblematic expression (see Lüdi & Py et al. 1994 and Lüdi & Py 3 2003 for more details). The actual state of research on multilingualism is characterised by a large number of publications on numerous situations of languages in contact. One central domain of work is the ways in which social groups deal and ‘manage’ with multilingual repertoires. Increasing professional and private mobility is indeed generating multiple forms of intertwining of language groups. Rapid political and economic changes affect the status and the use of less frequently spoken languages. Social multilingualism is increasingly coming to be considered normal. This is also reflected in the topics of research. Special attention has been paid to macrosociolinguistic aspects of diglossia and polyglossia – including the ways political and educational measures influence the social functions of the languages in contact. Traces of multilingualism at the surface of discourse constitute a second important area of research. The European Science Foundation acknowledged the importance of this theme by the creation of a ‘scientific network’ (Milroy & Muysken 1995). This chapter stands in the tradition last mentioned. It deals mainly with “translinguistic markers” (Lüdi 1987; Auer 1990). These are forms at the surface of discourse like loans, interferences, code-switching etc., which seem to result from an influence exerted by a language/variety A on a language/variety B or which seem to represent a mixture of both. Recent research proposes different competing systems for classifying translinguistic markers. Given the variety of criteria, the same observations may well be very differently interpreted according to different theoretical models. The objective of this chapter, however, is not to describe these phenomena. The ‘quaestio’ underlying our reflections is rather whether this type of investigation is of marginal interest for linguistics and diverts from the ‘core business’, or whether the results of research on multilingual repertoires and translinguistic markers are of immediate relevance for linguistic theory and for a better understanding of intercultural communication. In respect of the above mentioned shift in paradigm, this question is of major importance. The phenonema of multilingualism and particularly of translinguistic markers are





Georges Lüdi

not haunted any more by an antiquated monolingual ideology, but rather respected as a sign of a rich multilingual personality. In this conception, linguistic and cultural identity is not necessarily indivisible and translinguistic markers announce a self confident plural – multicultural and multilingual – identity. A good example of this phenomenon is given by the numerous forms of functions of ‘language mixing’ in modern literature (Riatsch 1994; Franceschini 1995; Lüdi 1998b; Grutman 1997; Lüdi 2001 etc.). But if multilingualism is considered normal, shouldn’t this influence the ways linguists build their models of language and language behaviour? We argue, in other words, that the main linguistic models must be evaluated on their capacity to explain multilingual competence and its traces appropriately. Multilingualism studies could then be prototypical for linguistic research as certain phenomena are more perceptible in contact situations (the ‘magnifying-glass effect’). Given that intercultural communication is more than just the exchange of information across cultural borders, but entails cultural changes and phenomena of hybridisation – and adopting an interactionist conception of speech as mentioned before –, one may argue that the detailed analysis of language use by multilinguals will bring a major contribution to the understanding of the dynamics of intercultural communication. The following issues will be discussed: First, we will deal with the question of how general linguistic theory could be influenced by a functional grammar of code-switching. In the second part the attitudes towards translinguistic markers will be outlined. We shall identify ambiguities in respect to the problem of their emblematic or stigmatising status because of confusion between ‘exolingual’ and bilingual phenomena. We shall argue that formal linguistic criteria alone are not sufficient to classify translinguistic markers. Their characterisation must rather take into account the negotiation between the partners involved in the interaction and must be interpreted according to the methodology of conversational analysis. We will argue that forms of multilingual speech manifest – and contribute to the construction of – plural identities in intercultural communication. We will conclude with a discussion of how investigation of translinguistic markers might actually question the traditional meaning of the term ‘language’.

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

Translinguistic markers are not abnormalities but rule-governed phenomena Rule-governed language choice How does a bilingual person make an appropriate choice from among the varieties that constitute his/her repertoire? There is consensus among specialists that this choice is not arbitrary but governed by rules (Grosjean 1982: 145). Macrosociolinguistic research established the existence of domains appropriate for the use of one or the other language in diglossic societies (Fishman 1967). Bilinguals would thus choose the appropriate variety taking into account whether it is a private or public affair, whether the conversation concerns the professional world or leisure activities, religion or education, etc. Where domains entwine (e.g. when an adolescent speaks with a minister [religion] about football [leisure] in the school building [education]), individual factors are isolated and pondered over. Language choice would be determined by characteristic bundles of situational factors (Grosjean 1982: 135ff.). The same applies to heterogeneous diglossic societies. In all these cases, the value of each language is thoroughly appreciated. By choosing one or the other variety of his/her repertoire, the bilingual speaker makes the most rewarding use of his communicative resources. On the other hand, one important result of microsociolinguistic investigation has been to show that the ‘situation’ is not simply given in advance, but constructed by the partners in the interaction itself by a common effort of interpretation and definition. In other words, language choice is not the outcome of a mechanistic calculation of situational factors, but, on the contrary, a significant tool at the disposal of interlocutors for defining the situation in a way that suites their intentions. The room for action is of course variable. Interlocutors will mostly choose the same language when there is strong social determination or when there is only one common language. Stable language choice may also result from personal habits or from automatisms (i.e. when a particular perceptive scheme entails an unconscious language choice). But in many situations there are no clear rules or habits and the interlocutors must make an active, creative choice (Lüdi 1986). The exploitation of this free game in the ‘grammar’ of language choice as well as the conscious break of social rules (e.g. when a bilingual intentionally chooses a language her interlocutor does not speak) are socially meaningful (Gumperz 1982; Myers-Scotton 1993a).





Georges Lüdi

Mixing is rule-governed too Sometimes the choice of the appropriate language is not evident. Bilinguals can choose between a monolingual mode and a bilingual mode (Grosjean 1985), i.e. between monolingual and bilingual speech (Lüdi & Py 1984, 3 2003) respectively. In the first case, the language that is not used is ‘switched off ’ as far as possible. In the second case, the speaker’s whole repertoire is activated. Possible criteria for the choice of the monolingual or bilingual mode are: the interlocutors’ repertoire, the degree of formality of the situation, normative representations of the interlocutors, etc. In other words, the situation is not ‘automatically’ bilingual even if both interlocutors are similarly bilingual. Bilingual mode requires a – locally established – mutual agreement on its appropriateness. This holds true for balanced as well as for unbalanced bilingualism (e.g. in the case of learners). In bilingual mode, the choice of the basis, or matrix, language is less stable and translinguistic markers appear with a much higher frequency. The use of translinguistic markers, particularly the mechanisms of borrowing and codeswitching, has been shown to be rule-governed by numerous investigations. In their groundbreaking work, Sankoff and Poplack (e.g. 1979) established the bases of a “grammar of code-switching”. It has been completed (and partially contradicted) by more recent publications (cf. Romaine 1989: 110ff. for an overview and Myers-Scotton 1993b). As for the – sociolinguistic and pragmatic – “functions of code-switching”, seminal papers by Gumperz (1967, 1982) and others have been taken up and integrated into more sophisticated systems, among others by Auer (1984), Heller (1988), Gardner-Chloros (1991) and Myers-Scotton (1993a). The following sentence was uttered by a Spanish migrant in Neuchâtel, situated in the French-speaking part of Switzerland (cf. Lüdi & Py 1984, 3 2003 for full details): (1) Vamos a la gare. Let’s go to the railway-station.

The matrix language Spanish provides the syntactical frame and all the grammatical morphemes. The code-switching to the French “gare” is possible because the French lemma fits into the open slot offered by the Spanish grammar. Its function is ‘deictic’. By using the French word instead of the Spanish “estación”, the speaker indicates that she is referring not to the corresponding Spanish institution, but to the Swiss railway station of Neuchâtel with all its

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

specific functions for the migrant community (meeting place, starting point for a return to the country of origin, etc.). The next example comes from a German speaking apprentice (=E) with only approximate French skills. He participates in an apprentice exchange, currently lives in the French part of the country and explains his usual work place to a French speaking instructor (=V). Many lexical morphemes are German, however the matrix language French even provides the construction plan for word composition (object + de + material) and the (inaudible) plural mark for mast. One also notices the problem caused by the differences in the gender systems: two genders in French, three genders in German, often with non matching genders of corresponding words (see Lüdi 1997 for an initial discussion of this example): (2) E: et il y a un petit moteur (. . . ) qui tire le cocon il y a la vorrichtung il y a de grands mast de stahl and there is a little motor (. . . ) that pulls the cocoon and there is the device [n. fem.] there are tall masts [n. masc] of steel V: oui donc/ yes then/ E: avec de des . . . bottes oder eine Schiene with [partitive article] . . . boots or a rail V: un rail a rail E: un rail et le cocon a une petite roulette a rail and the coccon has a little reel V: oui yes E: et la roulette est dans la rail and the reel is in the rail V: oui donc ça bouge comme ça yes so it moves like that E: oui oui . et la la Gestell> yes yes . and the the support [n. neutr.] V: oui yes E: où est le la rail est where the [art. masc.] the [art. fem.] rail is V: fixé> fixed





Georges Lüdi

E: fixé oui c’est la Aufhängungsvorrichtung fixed yes that is the suspending device [n. fem.] V: ah d’accord ah okay (corpus Victor Saudan)

Systematic observations of examples like this have led to the hypothesis that there are rules and norms that overlap single languages and govern the harmonic, i.e. the ‘grammatical’, mixing of elements from different languages. It may be assumed that the matrix language chosen for various reasons (level of competence of the speaker, presumed level of competence of the audience, conformity with the situation) is activated and provides the cognitive scaffolding for the semiotic organisation of a representation (Talmy 1985, 1995). Searching for the appropriate words for what he wants to say, the speaker then scans both of his lexica (or both subsets of his global bilingual lexicon). To fill the gap of words he does not know, that are momentarily not accessible or that may not even exist in the matrix language – or to achieve a special discourse effect –, he will switch to the embedded language. But this is only possible if the lemma of the embedded language word matches the slot provided by the matrix language. If this is not the case, the speaker will choose to switch to the embedded language for a larger stretch and produce an “embedded language island” (Myers-Scotton 1993a). Thus, a model of bilingual speech must provide control procedures for the local matching of both language systems (cf. Myers-Scotton & Jake 1995; Jake & Myers-Scotton 1997). Recently, MacSwan (1997, 1999) presented a minimalist approach to intrasentential code-switching. He claims that “nothing constrains code switching apart from the requirements of the mixed grammars”, a claim that does not entail a theory about which principles of grammar are relevant to code switching, but “leaves open any and all independently motivated considerations in linguistic theory to the analysis of code-switching data”. His approach is lexicalist. He assumes “that lexical items may be drawn from the lexicon of either language to introduce features into the numeration which must be checked for convergence in just the same way as monolingual features must be checked (or must not “mismatch”), with no special mechanisms permitted. (. . . ) No “control structure” is required to mediate contradictory requirements of the mixed systems. The requirements are simply carried along with the lexical items of the respective systems.” This approach is particularly interesting because there is no need for a kind of third grammar nor for specific universal principles for code-switching. A theory of a multilingual competence should thus be identical

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

with any linguistic theory in general. Consequently, we may draw the conclusion that a linguistic theory must, in order to be complete, give a full account of the ways multilingual repertoires can be used to produce mixed utterances. We might quote, as an example, Kees de Bot who adapted Levelt’s language production model in order to fit the specific operations of bilingual speech production (de Bot 1992). Thus, new research on the bilingual or multilingual lexicon (e.g. de Groot & Nas 1991; Cenoz et al. 2003) must be taken into account by every general theory of the lexicon. Vice versa, each lexical – and language – theory will have to be judged by its capacity to account for bilingual speech.

Stigmata or emblems? As far as linguistic and psycholinguistic models are concerned, the investigators are free to define the premises of their theories and describe and explain their observations in a framework of their own. This is not the case for the domain of sociolinguistics and in particular for the question of the degree of acceptance of translinguistic markers. In other words, in order to answer this question, we need to analyse the beliefs of the community and, more generally, the socially constructed meaning of bilingualism and bilingual speech.

Multilingualism Status and evaluation of translinguistic markers depend heavily on social representations of multilingualism. And the discussion about individual multilingualism is deeply influenced by a series of misunderstandings and stereotypes. For many years, the popular belief was that a multilingual person should have learnt all of his or her languages simultaneously in early childhood and that he or she should have a native-like oral and written competence in all of them (cf. already Bloomfield 1933: 56). Today, a broader definition is more common. Accordingly, a person may be called multilingual if s/he uses his or her languages on a regular base and is able to switch from one to another where ever it is necessary, independently from the symmetry of his/her command of the languages, of the modalities of acquisition and of the distance between the varieties (cf. Haugen 1953; Oksaar 1980 and Grosjean 1982). Thus, a Sicilian guest worker who learnt enough Swiss German dialect for his struggle for life in Switzerland may be considered bilingual with the same right (but not, of course, in the same way) as an interpreter working at the European Union and having systematically extended his or her ‘native’ French-English bilingualism.





Georges Lüdi

In any case, the normal situation in a statistical sense is not constituted by monolingualism. At the end of the 20th century, one or another form of multilingualism affect 60 per cent of the world’s population. In other words, monolingualism is a boundary case of multilingualism, originated by very specific cultural conditions – and bilingualism is a particular form of multilingualism. Nevertheless, the ruling groups of a society often reject multilingualism in general. Their scepticism is founded upon two veins of tradition: –

–

the belief, expressed by the Bible, in the myth of the tower of Babel, that mankind was originally monolingual and that multilingualism resulted from the confusion of tongues by God and has since weighed upon humanity like a malediction (Moses I.11, 6–7); the idea, dating back to the days when European nation states were established, that ‘states’ naturally coincide with language territories and that ‘national languages’ are an important cohesive factor of ‘nations’.

Both traditions originate from the stereotype, dating back to Greek philosophers, that monolingualism is the natural and politically legitimate state of mankind. In the time between French Revolution and Word War I and under the influence of the philosophy of Romanticism (for example Herder), this idea got ideological, almost religious dimensions (Goebl 1989: 162ff.; Bronckart 1988: 122). The myth of the “urwüchsige Nation”, expressed by the national language, was born (Hentschel 1997; Schulze 1994). Fortunately, the ideological background of these ideas has been deconstructed and demystified in recent years. Cultural philosophy denounces the stubbornness of all those who continue working for ‘monolingual’ solutions to the communicative problems of humanity on the basis of a ‘universal language’. Umberto Eco, for example, pleads for a “re-evaluation of Babel” (Le Monde, 7.10.1994). At a more practical level, politicians of the European Union and of the Council of Europe unanimously judge multilingualism as to be a part of Europe’s indisputable heritage (European Commission 1996; Conseil de l’Europe 1997).

Which status for translinguistic markers? But how is multilingualism really judged? An important instrument used in answering this question is discourse analysis. The ways in which translinguistic markers are used by interlocutors during the conversation constitute a key issue in this respect.

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

Two traditions coincide in the literature on translinguistic markers. Those who adhere to “holistic” models of multilingualism conceive them as proof of a very high level of multilingual competence (Grosjean 1982; Lüdi & Py 1984; Heller 1988; Myers-Scotton 1993a and b etc.). On the other hand, they are considered as examples of linguistic degeneration (compare the references given by Cadiot 1987), as typical sign of learners’ approximate competence (e.g. Faerch & Kasper 1983a and b; Siguán 1987: 211; Perdue et al. 1993), as an indicator of bilingual children’s lack of capacity to separate their languages (Volterra & Taeschner 1978), or as evidence of a beginning language loss in a situation of languages in contact (Weltens et al. 1986). We will argue that these judgements frequently do not relate to the ‘same’ translinguistic markers. The question of the status of translinguistic markers is of particular relevance where they are used to classify the speakers, i.e. to determine their social identity. It is well known that identity does not only serve to single out an individual, but also to determine his or her membership in a larger (linguistic, social, ethnic, etc.) group (cf. Le Page & Tabouret-Keller 1985: 3). Linguistic forms play a key role in this determination of one’s “social identity”1 (Labov 1976: 187; Giles, Scherer, & Taylor 1979). Some linguistic variables refer to components of identity as such as age, sex, social origins etc. that are not controlled by the speaker. Others “assume salience (. . . ) in marking our beliefs about and attitudes towards (. . . ) social categories” (Giles, Scherer, & Taylor 1979: 344). The unconsciously “manifested” or “covert” identity is often not identical with the “claimed” identity (Centlivres 1986). Translinguistic markers are particularly suited to indicating identity. But which identity? Is it a “manifested” or a “claimed” identity? Is it “emblematic” (accepted with pride) or “stigmatised” (something to be ashamed of)? And who is at the root of these evaluations?

Language mixture as stigma The stigmatising function of translinguistic markers is grounded on general language value systems. Hybrid forms of languages are usually ranked very low on a prestige scale as is testified by several pejorative terms like “hybridisation” (Gardès-Madray & Brès 1987: 79), “métissage” (Wald 1986: 62; from “métis” mestizo), “mixity” or “mixing” (Valdman ed. 1979: 10) etc. Cadiot (1987: 50) claims that the mixing of languages is traditionally viewed as shameful and even cursed. Even the less prestigious ‘pure’ language variety would be preferable to any form of language mixing that would indicate decay and lack of psychic stability.





Georges Lüdi

French speakers are particularly eager to interpret translinguistic markers as an attack against the integrity of their language.2 But violations of prescriptive linguistic norms generate social proscription in other language communities too. Those who cannot properly speak – and write – will not get prestigious jobs and will be excluded from rewarding professional training possibilities as well as from important social functions. Lack of tolerance towards linguistic ‘errors’ develops thus into an instrument of power used by those who share the norm in order to maintain their superiority. In this sense, the investigation of the way translinguistic markers are treated makes an important contribution to the research on language attitudes and their consequences in language contact situations.

Exolingual functions of translinguistic markers To speak a language variety primarily means acknowledging one’s membership of a social group. Whoever doesn’t speak a language well manifests, on the contrary, his or her “strangeness” and lack of familiarity with the norms of the group (Ehlich 1986: 48). The manifestation of an outsider status can generate particular attention and willingness to help. The interlocutor knows s/he cannot take for granted that the speaker will adhere to usual comportment norms, which are inherent to the group membership. If somebody addresses me with the familiar ‘Du’ in German where the formal ‘Sie’ would be appropriate, I’ll perceive this behaviour as impolite. But if s/he has a strong foreign accent, I’ll debit this behaviour to her/his lack of language control and local rules and accept it. As it is, translinguistic markers are usually interpreted as indicators of lack of competence in the exolingual situation. They are part of communicative strategies used to overcome the asymmetrical control of the language used. In example (2), the use of German words by the interlocutor E (mostly with a rising intonation) regularly provokes V to propose the corresponding French word, which is often repeated by E. In addition to the immediate communicative functions, this is also a teaching-learning-strategy (Lüdi 1993, 1999). However, group membership and its manifestation by language use are not value free. They are integrated in a system of social representations and principles. Each language variety has its own ‘value’ on the ‘linguistic marketplace’. If translinguistic markers manifest the membership of the speaker to a socially or ethnically disdained group, translinguistic markers will have a stigmatising effect as in the case of a strong Turkish accent in German. However, a disc jockey

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

mixing German, Swiss German and English at a local radio station in Basle will lead to an increased audience. . .

Bilingual speech as an identity marker among multilinguals The examples quoted above concern ‘monolingual’ situations. Despite the fact that multilinguals produce more translinguistic markers, they don’t necessarily accept them. Monolingual ideologies often also determine the representations of multilingual persons. Thus, in a situation of immigration, the same traces of the host language when using the language of origin are judged by some speakers as an indicator of the beginning of a loss of identity while others see them as sign of a – positive – change of identity. The important point is not, in other words, whether the competence is modified or not, but rather which social meaning is attributed to these changes. The following examples show the ambiguities in the evaluation of language mixing by civil servants of Swiss Italian origin living in the capital city of Bern. A first informant happens to use German words while speaking French to his wife. However she does not follow this pattern, even though her German is better than his, because she does not like mixing. This couple only uses lexical insertions in Italian with a teasing objective: “A me capita di mettere parole tedesche nel discorso ma mia moglie no perché anche se parla meglio di me il tedesco proprio non gli piace; mettiamo delle parole in italiano questo sì certe volte più per ridere che per altro”. Another civil servant tells us that mixing is a frequent and tolerated habit among his friends. Nevertheless, he is afraid of falling into the pitfall of interference, “nel tanto deprecato errore dell’interferenza.” His attitude towards mixing is characterised by a lack of security. If he had a child, he would observe with interest its double language acquisition characterised by the mixing of both languages; he would watch this practice waiting to see signs of self-correction. But should the child still be mixing upon entering school, he would judge it as a lack of language competence in both languages (cf. Lüdi & Py et al. 1994 for complete results). As can be seen, bilingual speech is assumed to be very frequent and a potential marker of bilingual identity. But very few bilinguals fully accept this behaviour. It is thus less an emblem of explicitly claimed bilingual identity than the means of its uncontrolled manifestation. Let us add here that a formally identical translinguistic marker can convey very different social meanings in different situations of languages in contact. Consequently, the English-French bilinguals in Ottawa “flag” their translinguistic markers, i.e. they indicate they are consciously passing from one lan-





Georges Lüdi

guage to the other. The Spanish-English bilingual Puertoricans in New York prefer smooth forms of code-switching, probably because mixing phenomena are negatively marked in the first case (flagging is then a way of preserving one’s face), but positively valued as emblem of a bilingual identity in the second. In conclusion, the social meaning of translinguistic markers depends on the context. This is particularly true in diglossic situations where languages with different status and different communicative ranges are in contact, for example national languages being confronted with the languages of historical minorities or with the languages of immigrants, i.e. of “new minorities” (Lüdi 1990).

Subcategories of translinguistic markers In addition, it is questionable whether the translinguistic markers in all these cases are all ‘of the same kind’. Let us start by distinguishing along two dimensions: First, one must distinguish between two classes of phenomena. One is at the language competence level (“langue”, as defined by Saussure), the other lies at the level of the enunciation process (or “parole”). Loan words, but also interferences in learners’ interlanguages belong to the first, code-switching and translinguistic wording3 to the second category. Second, we shall elucidate a distinction between two types of speakers: (a) techniques used by competent speakers to expand the referential potential of their language (borrowing) or to fully exploit a bilingual repertoire (codeswitching) and (b) traces of learners’ lack of competence like temporary rules in an interlanguage (interferences) or the conscious recourse to L1 because of limited lexical resources (translinguistic wording). A more stringent examination, however, reveals that the distinction between the categories is somewhat ambiguous. It certainly cannot be “etically” determined from outside. In cases of exolingual interaction determined by strongly unbalanced competencies, we found examples of code-switching (i.e. use of L1 that was interactively interpreted as bilingual strategy with precise discourse functions; cf. Lüdi 1993). On the other hand, even competent bilinguals (and monolinguals!) may sometimes find themselves in situations of lexical distress and may resort to translinguistic wording. Likewise a distinction between stigmatising and emblematic translinguistic markers based on purely formal criteria is not possible as we have seen; it is on the contrary crucial to know which status and functions are attributed to them interactively. In a way, translinguistic markers serve a double purpose. They are firstly traces of

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

the definition of the situation by the partners, but they serve secondly also as means for the partners to do this definition work. This either on the bilingualmonolingual axis, or on the exolingual – endolingual axis (Lüdi 1993). In this sense, each language choice and each translinguistic marker represents an “act of identity” (Le Page & Tabouret-Keller 1985) manifesting the desired social membership of the speaker. As any other form of social identity, multilingual identity is constantly being redefined as part of the continuous evolution of social interactions (Stienen & Wolf 1991: 101). It is true that the processes shaping linguistic identities take place in a social environment only partially controlled by the affected persons. An existing system of linguistic values determines which “linguistic capital” the knowledge and use of one or the other variety convey (Gumperz 1982; Bourdieu 1982). Conflicts between different systems of linguistic values arise frequently, for example between linguistic minorities and majorities. But despite these facts, we are not just determined in the way we use our repertoires. This applies particularly if we swap a perspective that is centred on modelling the behaviour of speakers or hearers for an interactive perspective. Interactivity means a reciprocal definition of the situation of communication by all interacting partners (Schuetz 1967). Based upon Schegloff ’s definition of “discourse as an interactional achievement” (Schegloff 1982), we claim that the meaning and status of translinguistic markers are locally negotiated and defined by the partners – in the compass of systems of social values, but sometimes with the explicit intention of questioning and reshaping these systems. Translinguistic markers are ideally suited to analyse and exemplify such processes of negotiation, because amongst other things they are particularly striking and “visible” to all participants.

Translinguistic markers as traces of a contact between ‘codes’ or as manifestation of a plural repertoire? From on-line mixing to an autonomous variety? The discussion about code-switching normally grounds on the following premises: – –

the matrix language can be identified unequivocally; there are two clearly distinct social varieties;





Georges Lüdi

–

–

there is an “on line”-switching between a matrix and an embedded language which are both also used in their “pure” form by the same speakers, sometimes even in the same situation; the two language systems are separated in the brain; namely the bilingual speaker possesses one set of lexical items per language even if there is a common underlying conceptual system (Paradis 1980, 1985, 1995).

Given these assumptions, one doubts considering code switching as an autonomous variety. We may indeed define ‘bilingual speech’ (with many additional differentiations) as a register or style appropriate to a ‘bilingual’ situation, but in the compass of such a style the speakers rely freely and spontaneously on two varieties of their repertoire simultaneously. But there may well be cases where not all the premises hold true.

The case of Chiac in Acadia Chiac is the name of a contact variety resulting from the extensive cohabitation of French and English speakers in the region of Moncton (New Brunswick), Canada. It is namely the vernacular of the younger generation and can be exemplified by utterances as the following: (3) je l’ai juste callé but i était pas là / i m’a back callé la même soirée I just called him but he wasn’t there / he called me back the same evening (Perrot 1994: 243)

Recently, there have been pieces of literature written in Chiac as the novel “Bloupe” published by Jean Babineau in 1993. Several authors have put forward the hypothesis that Chiac represents an autonomous variety alongside English and French (for example Gerin & Philipponeau 1984; Perrot 1994; Boudreau & Perrot 1994). However, in order to consider Chiac as “régi par ses propres règles, et non comme le résultat hétéroclite d’une sorte de “mélange arbitraire”” (1994: 274), there is no need to admit a separate variety (in the sense of an autonomous system). To explain these regularities, it seems at first glance sufficient to admit the existence of a “grammar of code-switching”, i.e. that switching codes is rule-governed, that switching points are not arbitrary but result from an analysis of the congruence of both language structures and that code-switching is functional (see namely the work done by Myers-Scotton and her colleagues, Auer ed. 1998 and the synthesis in Milroy & Muysken 1995). At a second glance, however, there are good reasons to argue in favour of the hypothesis of a third, autonomous code re-

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

sulting from the contact, i.e. a “troisième code autonome par rapport aux deux codes en contact dont il est issu” (ibid.), what Auer (1999) would certainly call a “fused lect”: –

–

–

– –

This form of speech has its own name (Chiac) and plays an important role in the triglossic repertoire of the region. It also holds a well defined position in the local language value system where it has both negative and positive connotations as it functions as an emblem of group identity (Boudreau & Perrot 1994: 277f.). Even if the frequency of English within the various oral corpora varies significantly from speaker to speaker, there seem to be common patterns: “une homogénéité d’ensemble, vérifiée à partir de récurrences assez fréquentes pour être véritablement significatives” (Boudreau & Perrot 1994: 274). Perrot’s work on back and still (1994) shows usage patterns for both morphemes differing from those for the English as well as from those for the corresponding French words. A comparison between corpora collected at intervals of several decades shows how these rules emerge and stabilise. In addition, one could argue that the third code corresponds to an autonomous regional culture, an “interculture” (Koole & ten Thije 1994) resulting from the contact between Francocanadian and Anglocanadian concepts and values.

But there are also several arguments against the assumption of a third code: –

–

– –

–

We do not only find lexically integrated anglicisms like starter, watcher, caller, back etc., but also spontaneous lexical insertions (lexical codeswitching, nonce-borrowing) as well as longer English islands, also known from other situations of languages in contact. The students analysed by Perrot and Boudreau consider themselves as French speakers even if they evaluate their vernacular rather negatively in opposition to the mythical French norm. Based on criteria such as morpheme frequency and grammatical structure, the matrix language is clearly French. Speakers do not stick to this register. In the presence of a monolingual French interviewer they try – with good results – to adapt their speech to the monolinguality of the situation, i.e. to speak their best possible French and to eliminate as far as possible all traces of their bilingualism. On the other hand, English embedded islands completely follow the rules of English.





Georges Lüdi

–

Finally, the regional culture is not stable either but is characterised by dynamic changes due to the growing mobility of the population, access to the new media etc.

These observations might not be sufficient to exclude the hypothesis of a ‘third code’. But they remind us of the fact that interpretation of the data is not simple. In opposition to Gerin and Philipponeau, Perrot and Boudreau, we prefer to construct a tentative explanation as follows: Firstly, the matrix language is not standard French, but a regional variety4 shaped by centuries of contact with English and characterised by numerous English loans which have been extensively modified and integrated and do not follow the English patterns any more (e.g. back and still). Secondly, we find code-switching techniques that are ‘normal’ in situations of language contact characterised by frequent individual bilingualism, i.e. (a) mixed constituents formed by the on-line insertion of English lexical units into French propositions and (b) – less frequently – English embedded islands. And this code-switchings clearly assume local or global functions. It is thus a form of bilingual speech which is normally spoken in very informal situations and can exceptionally be exploited for literary purposes (e.g. by Jean Babineau). The French spoken in formal situations can then better match the standard norm. What the speakers themselves call Chiac is, in fact, a combination of regional dialect and code-switching. They do not choose between ‘regional French’ and ‘French & English’, but they chose to use (1) a ‘regiolect’ and (2) ‘English/French bilingual speech’. Lead by their normative consciousness, normally acquired at school, the speakers are willing – and able – to avoid not only anglicisms, but also other strongly marked regional forms in situations perceived as formal. They are, in a way, gliding up and down a continuous scale between standard and regional French. The result is an increasing tension between the norm and the emblematic bilingual and regional speech: “Le changement en cours se fait dans deux directions tout à fait opposées, d’un côté vers un français plus standard, de l’autre vers un français plus anglicisé” (Péronnet 1996: 121).

The case of Italoschwyz in Zurich Originating in Italy, more or less continuous migration movements have reached the larger cities in the German part of Switzerland over the last century. When the migrant workers first arrived they intended to return soon to their

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

country of origin. Socio-political measures supporting the reunion of families and the macroeconomic development in both countries motivated many Italians to stay in Switzerland. This led to a growing Italian-Swiss community raising their children in Switzerland, who are commonly referred to as “second generation”. Since the late seventies and early eighties a typical form of code switching has been observed among these adolescents. This is correlated to their bilingual identity as well as the discovery of their own cultural roots. Franceschini (1998a: 59s.) published the following typical example: (4) A: perché meinsch che se tu ti mangi Emmentaler o se tu ti mangi una fontina isch au en because, do you mean, that when you eat Emmentaler cheese or when you eat a Fontina there is also a Unterschied, oder? schlussändlich è sempre dentro lì però il gusto isch andersch. difference isn’t it? finally it is always in there but the taste is different B: è vero! that’s true

Forms of bilingual speech have also been adopted by the “first generation” which normally has a lower competence in the host language. For this reason, their switches show different patterns and are in general limited to insertion of discourse markers like joo [yeah], oder [isn’t it] and meinsch [you mean] (Franceschini 1998a: 56). For Franceschini several observations can be interpreted in the way that there is some kind of autonomous variety emerging out from this practice: – –

–

The members of the community have coined a name for this “mixture”; they call it “italo-schwyz”; this type of bilingual speech is also used by friends and peers who do not have Italian roots, in other words it is “learnable” (Franceschini 1998a: 57); it is not motivated by the wish to express a certain national or ethnic identity, but rather to signal the (temporary) willingness to be a member of the respective group; a single switch often does not seem to have “local” conversational functions (ibid.: 61); the two languages are in a kind of free variation.

Franceschini concludes from her observations: “code-switching resembles the use of a code in itself, a language of its own” (loc.cit.). Have we really crossed the boundary between switching from one variety to another and a new, autonomous variety? I doubt it for several reasons:





Georges Lüdi

–

–

–

In the examples quoted by Franceschini, nothing indicates that the members of the “italo-schwyz” group are not able to speak each of their two languages in a monolingual mode, that is to switch off the “other” language where the situation requires it (e.g. in the class-room or in interaction with relatives living in the region of origin), even if they may have some difficulties due to their asymmetric bilingualism. The case of the Swiss German friends of italo-schwyz is certainly different. However, if we admit that they have an astonishingly high passive competence in Italian (a fact brought forward by Franceschini herself), we may hypothetically explain their behaviour as code-switching between their Italian interlanguage and Swiss German in a situation they perceive as bilingual. This type of “bilingual” behaviour of learners has also been observed in other situations (cf. Rampton 1997; Lüdi 1999). It is well known that bilingual speech as such can be the normal, “unmarked” choice for bilingual communities in bilingual situations and that single switches do not, then, necessarily perform local discourse functions (Lüdi & Py 3 2003; Myers-Scotton 1993a).5

Further and more detailed research will be necessary in order clarify definitively the precise status of Italo-schwyz. But there are sound arguments supporting the hypothesis that the process of stabilisation and grammaticalisation of Italoschwyz is less advanced than in the case of Chiac.

What is a ‘language’? There is, however, another possible explanation. Isn’t the basic question we asked at the beginning turning out to be wrong? Indeed the examples quoted suggest a redefinition of our initial problem: in order to characterise the status of code-switching as a variety of its own, neither a formal definition of the term language itself nor new boundaries between ‘one language’ and ‘two languages’ are required. Possibly even the term code switching is misleading, as suggested by the title of an article by Penelope Gardner-Chloros (1995) evoking the “myth of the discreteness of linguistic systems”. The term ‘code-switching’ indeed implies the existence of clearly separated linguistic systems between which switching takes place. For Myers-Scotton “well-formedness” of the constituents either in the matrix language or in the embedded language is an obvious premise of her model, even in the case of code-switching between a standard variety and a dialect or between dialects, styles and registers (Myers-Scotton 1993b: 3).

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

However research results raise doubts about the universal validity of this premise (Lüdi 1998a): The promoters of a “polylectal grammar” (e.g. Berrendonner 1983) claim that the principle of variation is constitutive for all languages. Single “lects” (sociolects, dialects, chronolects, styles etc.) exploit an existing space of variation in different ways. A clear difference is made between the grammaticality of a variant and its (social, stylistic etc.) meaning. If one admits that bilinguality is an extension of polylectality (see Lüdi & Py 1984, 3 2003 for such a position), the question must be raised as to whether the attribution of the Chiac back to one or the other single language grammar is at all relevant. In such a space of variation, the existence of clearly separated varieties does not result from a law of nature, but from an important focussing effort of the speakers as suggested by Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985). Linguistic norms are the result of such an effort, i.e. of a repeated coherent selection of variables, by the individual as well as by the group (1985: 181f.). But there are also speakers and groups using “diffuse, or non focussed linguistic systems” (loc.cit.), where variables co-occur that are otherwise clearly assigned to two different lects. When Tabouret-Keller was asked to reanalyse her Belize materials for the Neuchâtel symposium on languages in contact in 1987, her conclusion was that the term ‘translinguistic marker’ defined as a trace of language A in utterances in language B did not apply, because there were no discrete systems in contact, but rather a kind of variational continuum (Tabouret-Keller 1987: 237). For similar reasons, Gardner-Chloros argues, “that what has been called codeswitching in fact merges into various other interlingual phenomena, and that drawing clear lines between these phenomena is an ideological rather than an objective linguistic activity” (1995: 70). Interpretation of what ‘a language’ is – and where the boundaries between different ‘languages’ lie – is highly ideologically biased. Some politicians in Valencia (Spain) argue for instance that their idiom, defined by all linguists as a variety of Catalan, is an autonomous ‘language’. They try to make the difference more visible by reforming the orthography (Strubell 1994). Similar attempts have been made in regard to Serbian and Croatian (and Bosnian). On the other hand, Flemings and Dutchmen insist that their idioms appertain to the same diasystem and manifest this claim by a common standardisation effort (Deprez & Wynants 1994). Thus, Franceschini (1998a) is certainly right when she maintains, with reference to Gumperz (1982) and Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985), that “shaping linguistic differences also has an identity function”. However, she offers additional insight. In her publications (1998b, 1999) she argues that the





Georges Lüdi

single speaker’s linguistic repertoire is not composed of various single language systems, but represents, in fact, only one holistic system. It “consists of his/her linguistic abilities, which s/he has acquired through interaction in the course of her/his biography”. In this model, monolingual speech corresponds to a focussing effort on the norms of a single language. Franceschini coins the term of “monofocus of attention” (1998a). In bilingual mode, focus lies on two varieties simultaneously: “a CS speaker can now be represented as a bi-focalising speaker” (loc.cit.). Comparing different strands of research on code-switching reveals additional difficulties. Starting on different premises, linguistic, sociolinguistic, psycholinguistic and interactional models arrive at results which are not always inter-compatible. In my synthesis of a workshop on code-switching in November 1990, I wrote: “As it is, code-switching has in fact proven to represent a litmus test for different interfaces between linguistic, psychological and sociological theories”. I argued in favour of one single model “which would allow an integration of linguistic constraints (formal properties of linguistic systems), psychological constraints (properties of the human brain) and socio-pragmatic constraints (social and interactional properties of social systems in general and/or of specific social systems in particular)” (Lüdi 1991). The participants at the colloquium questioned whether such a model could be developed in the next decade. Indeed such a model remains to be established. As a matter of fact, all positions quoted above are based upon a linguistic, sociolinguistic or psycholinguistic perspective. The question as to whether code-switching is a variety of its own or a combination of several varieties is almost never addressed in an interdisciplinary way. At the moment, the – unsatisfactory – conclusion seems to be that Chiac is grammatically on the way to developing its own set of norms in the compass of Acadian French, that Italoschwyz can be defined socio-pragmatically as an individual variety (resulting from a bi-focalisation on Swiss German and Italian) etc. The issue remains unresolved as to whether Perrot’s method and Franceschini’s approach would produce similar results for Italo-schwyz and Chiac respectively. And we are far away from psycho- and neuro-linguistic confirmations of the kind Grosjean, Paradis and others request. Thus, it seems probable that the decision of as to whether Italo-schwyz, Chiac, etc. represent autonomous varieties or not, will be heavily biased by the subdiscipline investigating the issue.

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

Perspectives We stated at the beginning that we would analyse ‘magnifying-glass effects’ at three different levels. Our main conclusion is that the way language studies have been conceived in the past is questionable. Often enough they have been heavily influenced by a ‘monolingual’ ideology. Even research on second language acquisition was founded on the premise that the goal to reach is a ‘native like’ (i.e. monolingual) competence in L2. Bilingualism was seen as the addition of – more or less perfect – competencies in single languages. Fortunately the developments sketched in previous sections are gaining growing acceptance but they are still a long way from being incorporated in mainstream textbooks. We fully agree with Franceschini (1999), who criticises a “riduzione di complessità persino grotesca” (p. 254), a quasi grotesque reduction of the complexity of language behaviour in most linguistic models and postulates a theory of language taking into account the complexity of modern societies, namely the diversity, lack of stability and variability of language use in the large metropolitan areas (but Le Page and Tabouret-Keller have shown similar phenomena in rural areas). Research on language acquisition confirms the high degree of unpredictability and the complex dynamics of face to face interaction in authentic interaction (and the lack of consideration of this fact in second language teaching) (Lüdi, Pekarek, & Saudan 2001; Pekarek 1999). At the same time, it sheds new light on the ways native and non-native speakers of a language take mutual profit in their entire repertoires using their respective first languages and other support languages (e.g. English when speaking French as L2 (Lüdi in press), French, English, Spanish and Latin when speaking Italian (Franceschini 1999) etc.). We thus need a language theory giving special prominence to the ways the interlocutors exploit all the resources that are at their disposal. Franceschini resumes her considerations as follows: . . . concepisco il sistema linguistico a partire del suo uso in interazioni: è attraverso l’uso che il Sistema Lingua emerge nello sviluppo umano, sia nella filo- che nell’ontogenesi. La lingua si è sviluppata sì su una base biologica, ma sempre nel contesto delle interazioni sociali. (p. 272)6

At this point, one should not forget the extreme diversity of ways multilingual repertoires are built and work, originating from double L1-acquisition, second (or third) language acquisition in social contexts by adult immigrants or from formal language tuition in the class room. Most forms of (second) language acquisition do not lead to a “perfect” competence. There are good reasons why educational language policy makers begin to question the myth





Georges Lüdi

that students are to acquire native-like competencies in modern languages at school (Lüdi 1998c). We assume here that learning a (second) language is a series of cognitive procedures by which the learner progressively constructs the grammar of the new language, not only assisted by a “language acquisition device” (more for L1, less for L2), but also and significantly thanks to support from more competent members of the community (Vygotsky 1978: 86) in the compass of a “language acquisition support system” based on social interaction (Bruner 1982, 1983). Research on second language acquisition has shown the importance of a set of interactive procedures. These may be observed in exolingual situations that provide the non-native speaker the necessary help not only to communicate, but also to continue his/her learning process (e.g. Krafft & Dausendschön-Gay 1994). Languages are learnt at different ages, in different situations and up to very different levels of competence. This has of course consequences for the way multilingual repertoires will be structured. It is thus crucial to analyse the social context in which the different varieties making up a multilingual repertoire have been acquired. Recent research has shown for instance that “passive” exposure to other languages during childhood can lead to an unfocussed form of language learning and to a form of competence that can be reactivated at later stages if necessary (Ellis 1995; Franceschini 1996, 1999). However, the question whether we may speak of one entwined or several separated systems cannot be fully answered by linguists alone. Neurosciences may offer additional insights. Thanks to the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) we can actually observe in detail how the brain processes linguistic (and other) data. Do early bilinguals process language data the same way (i.e. in the same areas of the brain) as late bilinguals? Is there a difference between balanced and unbalanced bilinguals? What is the relation between the neuronal network constructed when learning a second language and the ‘classical’ language centres? Can the first be integrated into the latter? Can early bilingualism support these processes? At the moment, research findings in the neuroanatomy of bilinguals are still contradictory (e.g. Paradis 1995; Kim et al. 1997; Perani et al. 1996, 1998; Dehaene et al. 1997). The analysis of cases of bilingual speech used by speakers with different kinds of multilingual competencies could shed new light on these questions. What is the relation between the modalities of language acquisition, contexts and grammatical structure of translinguistic markers? Is there a correlation between these findings and the areas activated in the brain? First research results in this direction exist. At the University of Basle for example, seven right-handed subjects, aged

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

between 20 and 35 years, fluent in three languages, were requested to formulate covertly the routine of the previous day. They were classified into early bilinguals (two languages before the age of 3 years, n = 3) and late bilinguals (second language after the age of 9 years, n = 4). All subjects had acquired a third language at school. By carefully controlling for language and baseline condition, a regional activation pattern in Broca’s area during free language production was found. This pattern varies for each language of a multilingual person and has the following properties: firstly, simultaneously acquired early languages differ less in their demands on neural substrate than late languages. Secondly, in a comparison between early- and late-acquired languages, the separate analysis of both subfields of Broca show that BA 44, in particular, behaves in a clearly defined manner. Thus, early bilinguals seem to build up a network in BA 44 sufficiently adaptable to allow the integration of later acquired languages. Late bilinguals have to establish new neural areas to guarantee development of their late-acquired languages (Wattendorf & Westermann et al. 2001). These results could have an important impact on the structure of an integrated language theory. Such a theory will consider multilingual repertoires and their use in different contexts the default case, monolingual competencies and monolingual speech representing just one many cases to be explained. It will match new ways of modelling the dynamics of intercultural communication and contribute to it.

Notes * This paper was first submitted to the editors of this volume for publication in December 2000. Its structure reflects the state of the discussion at this time. Invited by the editors to update our paper, we decided to focus more on the general topic of the volume, to add some references to recent research results and some relevant publications in the field, but to let the general argumentation untouched. . Defined with Tajfel as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his or her knowledge of his or her membership in a social group (or groups) together with the values and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel & Turner 1979). . Further evidence to this is added by the results of a study of social acceptance of deviant items in Neuchâtel (Switzerland). The informants had to classify the acceptance of unconventional expressions (conventional forms in brackets) in a informal oral situation on a scale going from 1 (unacceptable) to 7 (fully acceptable), indicating, at the same time, the reasons for an eventual rejection. The result was that the acceptance was systematically and significantly lower when the deviant element was (correctly or erroneously) categorised





Georges Lüdi

as a translinguistic marker (i.e. as an influence from German) rather than as regionalism, grammatical error etc.:

Item

acceptance if categorised acceptance if not as Germanism categorised as Germanism

Il veut [va] pleuvoir It will rain. Je voudrais le visiter [lui rendre visite] I’d like to pay him a visit. Elle lui [l’] aide She helps him. On a personne vu [On n’a vu personne] We didn’t see anybody.

2.4

2.8

2.0

4.1

2.0

4.6

2.8

3.5

For detailed results see the contribution of Bernard Py in Lüdi/Py et al. (1994: 115ff.) . We define translinguistic wording as a communicative strategy for getting oneself out of a predicament caused by limited lexical resources in L2; it consists in the conscious use of single words or longer sequences of L1 (or in any other language likely to be understood by the native speaker of L2) as a form of rescue-like in example (2). . Péronnet (1996) calls it “traditional Acadian French” (“français acadien traditionnel”) and acknowledges new borrowings from English as a line of development in the direction of a “non standard French”. . Auer (1999) calls this type of translinguistic markers code-mixing. Even if we refrain from adopting his terminology, we fully agree that there is an important difference between codeswitching with global and local functions, but only on a semantic, not on a grammatical level. . “I conceive the linguistic system from the perspective of its use in interaction. In human evolution, the System Language emerges from its use, in a phylogenetic as well as in an ontogenetic perspective. Language developed on a biological base, but always in the context of social interaction.”

References Auer, Peter (1984). Bilingual conversation. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Auer, Peter (1990). “A discussion paper on code alternation”. In ESF Network on CodeSwitching and Language Contact: Papers for the workshop on concepts, methodology and data (pp. 69–87). Basel, 12–13 January 1990. Strasbourg: European Science Foundation. Auer, Peter (1999). “From codeswitching via language mixing to fused lects: Toward a dynamic typology of bilingual speech”. International Journal of Bilingualism, 3, 309–332.

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

Auer, Peter (Ed.). (1998). Code-switching in conversation. London: Routledge. Berrendonner, Alain (1983). Principes de grammaire polylectale. Lyon: P.U.L. Bloomfield, Leonard (1933). Language. New York: H. Holt. Boudreau, Annette & Perrot, Marie-Eve (1994). “Productions discursives d’un groupe d’adolescents acadiens du sud-est du Nouveau-Brunswick. Là je me surveille, là j’me watch pas”. In D. Philipponneau (Ed.), Sociolinguistique et aménagement des langues. Actes du XVIe Colloque annuel de l’Association de linguistique des Provinces atlantiques (pp. 271–285). Moncton: Centre de recherche en linguistique appliquée. Bourdieu, Pierre (1982). Ce que parler veut dire: L’économie des échanges linguistiques. Paris: Fayard. Bronckart, Jean-Paul (1988). “Fonctionnement langagier et entreprises normatives”. In G. Schöni et al. (Eds.), La langue française est-elle gouvernable? (pp. 109–132). Neuchâtel and Paris: Delachaux & Niestlé. Bruner, Jerome (1982). “The formats of language acquisition”. American Journal of Semiotics, 1, 1–16. Bruner, Jerome (1983). Child’s talk. Learning to use language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cadiot, Pierre (1987). “Les mélanges de langue”. In G. Vermes & J. Boutet (Eds.), France, pays multilingue. t.2: Pratiques des langues en France (pp. 50–61). Paris: l’Harmattan. Cenoz, Jasone, Hufeisen, Brigitte, & Jessner, Ulrike (Eds.). (2003). The multilingual lexicon. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Centlivres, Pierre (1986). “L’identité régionale: langages et pratiques. Approche ethnologique, Suisse romande et Tessin”. In P. Centlivres et al. (Eds.), Regionale Identität und Perspektiven: fünf sozialwissenschaftliche Ansätze – Les sciences sociales face à l’identité régionale: cinq approches (pp. 77–126). Berne: Haupt. Conseil de l’Europe (1997). Apprentissage des langues et citoyenneté européenne. Rapport final 1989–1996. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. De Bot, Kees (1992). “A bilingual production model: Levelt’s ‘speaking’ model adapted”. Applied Linguistics, 13(1), 1–24. De Groot, Annette & Nas, Gerard (1991). “Lexical representations of cognates and noncognates in compound bilinguals”. Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 90–123. Dehaene, Stanislas, Dupoux, Emmanuel, & Mehler, Jacques et al. (1997). “Anatomical variability in the cortical representation of first and second language”. NeuroReport, 8, 3809–3815. Deprez, Kas & Wynants, Armel (1994). “Les Flamands et leur(s) langue(s)”. In G. Lüdi (Ed.), Sprachstandardisierung (pp. 41–64). Freiburg: Universitätsverlag. Ehlich, Konrad (1986). “Xenismen und die bleibende Fremdheit des Fremdsprachensprechers”. In E. Hess-Lüttich (Ed.), Integration und Identität. Soziokulturelle und psychopädagogische Probleme im Sprachunterricht mit Ausländern (pp. 43–54). Tübingen: Narr. Ellis, Rod (1995). Understanding second language acquisition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ESF (1991). ESF Network on Code-switching and Language Contact. Papers for the workshop on impact and consequences: broader considerations, Brussels, 22–24 November 1990. Strasbourg: European Science Foundation.





Georges Lüdi

European Commission (1996). White Paper on education and training. Teaching and learning – Towards the learning society. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Faerch, Claus & Kasper, Gabriele (1983a). “Plans and strategies in foreign language communication”. In C. Faerch & G. Kasper (Eds.), Strategies in Interlanguage Communication (pp. 20–60). London and New York: Longman. Faerch, Claus & Kasper, Gabriele (1983b). “On identifying communication strategies in interlanguage production”. In C. Faerch & G. Kasper (Eds.), Strategies in Interlanguage Communication (pp. 210–238). London and New York: Longman. Fishman, Joshua (1967). “Bilingualism with and without diglossia; diglossia with and without bilingualism”. Journal of Social Issues, 23(2), 29–38. Franceschini, Rita (1995). “Immacolata Amodeo: “Unter fremdem Himmel””. In C. Lüderssen & S. A. Sanna (Eds.), Letteratura de-centrata. Italienische Autorinnen und Autoren in Deutschland (pp. 72–77). Frankfurt a.M.: Diesterweg. Franceschini, Rita (1996). “Die Reaktivierung von latenten Kompetenzen bei Gelegenheitssprechern”. In M. Riegel (Ed.), Sémantique et cognition. Sciences cognitives, Linguistique et Intelligence Artificielle (Scolia) 9 (pp. 85–109). Franceschini, Rita (1998a). “Code Switching and the notion of code in Linguistics: proposals for a dual focus model”. In P. Auer (Ed.), Code-switching in conversation (pp. 51–72). London: Routledge. Franceschini, Rita (1998b). “Varianz innerhalb zweier Sprachsysteme: eine Handlungswahl?”. In B. Henn-Memmesheimer (Ed.), Varianz als Ergebnis von Handlungswahl (pp. 11–26). Tübingen: Narr. Franceschini, Rita (1999). Italiano di contatto: Parlanti occasionali e riattivazioni di conoscenze non focalizzate. Basel, Habilitationsschrift. Gardès-Madray, Françoise & Brès, Jacques (1987). “Conflits de nomination en situation diglossique”. In G. Vermes & J. Boutet (Eds.), France, pays multilingue. t.2: Pratiques des langues en France (pp. 78–90). Paris: l’Harmattan. Gardner-Chloros, Penelope (1991). Language selection and switching in Strasbourg. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gardner-Chloros, Penelope (1995). “Code-switching in the community, regional and national repertoires: the myth of the discreteness of linguistic systems”. In L. Milroy & P. Muysken (Eds.), One speaker, two languages. Cross-disciplinary perspectives on code-switching (pp. 68–89). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gérin, Pierre & Philipponeau, Catherine (1984). “La création d’un troisième code comme mode d’adaptation à une situation où deux langues sont en contact, le chiac”. In A. Prujiner et al. (Eds.), Variation du comportement langagier lorsque deux langues sont en contact. Québec: Université Laval. Giles, Howard, Scherer, Klaus, & Taylor, Donald (1979). “Speech markers in social interaction”. In K. Scherer & H. Giles (Eds.), Social markers in speech (pp. 343–381). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme.

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

Goebl, Hans (1989). “Spracheinheit – unité de la langue – unità della lingua – unidad de la lengua. Bemerkungen zur Problematik des Sprachunitarismus”. In F. Riedl (Ed.), Fédéralisme, régionalisme et droit des groupes ethniques en Europe. Hommage à Guy Héraud (pp. 162–171). Wien: Braumüller. Grosjean, François (1982). Life with two languages: an introduction to bilingualism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Grosjean, François (1985). “The bilingual as a competent but specific speaker-hearer”. Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural development, 6, 467–477. Grutman, Rainier (1997). Des langues qui résonnent: L’hétérolinguisme au XIXe siècle québecois. Montréal: Fides-CÉTUQ. Gumperz, John (1967). “On the linguistic markers of bilingual communication”. Journal of Social Issues, 23, 48–57. Gumperz, John (1982). Discourse strategies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Haugen, Einar (1953). The Norvegian Language in America: A study in bilingual behavior. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Heller, Monica (Ed.). (1988). Codeswitching: Anthropological and Sociolinguistic Perspectives. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Hentschel, Gerd (Ed.). (1997). Über Muttersprachen und Vaterländer: Zur Entwicklung von Standardsprachen und Nationen in Europa. Frankfurt am Main: Lang. Jake, Jane & Myers-Scotton, Carol (1997). “Codeswitching and compromise strategies: Implications for lexical structure”. The International Journal of Bilingualism, 1, 25–39. Kim, Karl H. S., Relkin, Norman R., Lee, Kyoung-Min, & Hirsch, Joy (1997). “Distinct cortical areas associated with native languages”. Nature, 388, 171–174. Koole, Tom & Thije, Jan D. ten (1994). The construction of intercultural discourse: Team discussion of educational advisers. Amsterdam and Atlanta: RODOPI. Krafft, Ulrich & Dausendschön-Gay, Ulrich (1994). “Analyse conversationnelle et recherche sur l’acquisition”. Bulletin suisse de linguistique appliquée, 59, 127–158. Labov, William (1976). Sociolinguistique. Paris: Minuit. Laurie, Simon S. (1890). Lectures on Language and Linguistic Method in School. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Le Page, Robert & Tabouret-Keller, Andrée (1985). Acts of identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lüderssen, Caroline & Sanna, Salvatore A. (Eds.). (1995). Letteratura de-centrata. Italienische Autorinnen und Autoren in Deutschland. Frankfurt am Main: Diesterweg. Lüdi, Georges (1986). “Forms and functions of bilingual speech in pluricultural migrant communities in Switzerland”. In J. A. Fishman et al. (Eds.), The Fergusonian Impact. Vol. 2: Sociolinguistics and the Sociology of Language (pp. 217–236). Berlin, New York and Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter. Lüdi, Georges (1987). “Les marques transcodiques: regards nouveaux sur le bilinguisme” In G. Lüdi (Ed.), Devenir bilingue – parler bilingue (pp. 1–21). Tübingen: Niemeyer. Lüdi, Georges (1990). “Les migrants comme minorité linguistique en Europe”. Sociolinguistica, 4, 113–135. Lüdi, Georges (1991). “Synthesis of the Workshop on “Impact and consequences: broader considerations””. ESF 1991, 1–3.





Georges Lüdi

Lüdi, Georges (1993). “Statuts et fonctions des marques transcodiques en conversation exolingue”. In G. Hilty (Ed.), Actes du XXe Congrès International de Linguistique et Philologie Romane. T. III (pp. 123–136). Tübingen: Narr. Lüdi, Georges (1997). “Aspects cognitifs du parler bilingue”. In N. Labrie (Ed.), Etudes récentes en linguistique de contact [Plurilingua XX] (pp. 250–259). Bonn: Dümmler. Lüdi, Georges (1998a). “Le code-switching comme variété mixte?” Sociolinguistica, 12, 140– 154. Lüdi, Georges (1998b). ““Zweisprachige Rede” in literarischen Texten”. In E. Werner et al. (Eds.), et multum et multa. Festschrift für Peter Wunderli zum 60. Geburtstag (pp. 347– 357). Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag. Lüdi, Georges (1998c). “How can a coherent educational policy support multilingual repertoires?” In B. Fink (Ed.), Modern language learning and teaching in central and eastern Europe: which diversification and how can it be achieved? Proceedings of the second colloquy of the European Center for Modern Languages, Graz (13–15 February 1997) (pp. 329–336). Strasbourg: Council of Europe Press. Lüdi, Georges (1999). “Alternance des langues et acquisition d’une langue seconde”. In V. Castellotti & D. Moore (Eds.), Alternance des langues et contruction de savoirs. Cahiers du français contemporain, 5 (pp. 25–51). Lüdi, Georges (in press). “Mehrsprachigkeit, Code-switching und Wortfindungsprozesse”. In Michael Schecker (Ed.). Lüdi, Georges (2001). “Le “mélange de langes” comme moyen stylistique et/ou comme marqueur d’appartenance dans le discours littéraire”. In J. Bem & A. Hudlett (Eds.), Ecrire aux confins des langues. Actes du colloque de Mulhouse 30, 31 janvier et 1er février 1997. [Crealiana, volume hors série I] (pp. 13–31). Mulhouse: Centre de Recherche sur l’Europe littéraire. Lüdi, Georges (2003). “Code-switching and unbalanced bilingualism”. In J.-M. Dewaele, A. Housen, & W. Li (Eds.), Bilingualism: Beyond Basic Principles. Festschrift in honour of Hugo Baetens Beardsmore (pp. 174–188). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Lüdi, Georges, Pekarek, Simona, & Saudan, Victor (2001). Französischlernen in der Deutschschweiz. Zur Entwicklung der diskursiven Fähigkeiten innerhalb und ausserhalb der Schule. Chur and Zürich: Rüegger. Lüdi, Georges & Py, Bernard (1984). Zweisprachig durch Migration: Einführung in die Erforschung der Mehrsprachigkeit am Beispiel zweier Zuwanderergruppen in Neuenburg (Schweiz). Tübingen: Niemeyer. Lüdi, Georges & Py, Bernard (2003). Etre bilingue (3e éd. revue). Berne. Francfort -s. Main and New York: Lang. Lüdi, Georges & Py, Bernard et al. (1994). Fremdsprachig im eigenen Land: Wenn Binnenwanderer in der Schweiz das Sprachgebiet wechseln und wie sie darüber reden. Basel: Helbing und Lichtenhahn. MacSwan, Jeff (1999). A Minimalist Approach to Intrasentential Code Switching. New York: Garland Press. MacSwan, Jeff (2000). “The Architecture of the Bilingual Language Faculty: Evidence from Intrasentential Code Switching”. Bilingualism, 3, 37–54.

Multilingual repertoires and the consequences for linguistic theory

Milroy, Lesley & Muysken, Pieter (Eds.). (1995). One speaker, two languages: Crossdisciplinary perspectives on code-switching. Cambridge, London and New York: Cambridge University Press. Myers-Scotton, Carol (1993a). Social Motivations for Codeswitching: Evidence from Africa. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Myers-Scotton, Carol (1993b, 2 1997). Dueling languages: Grammatical structure in codeswitching. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1997 edition with a new afterword). Myers-Scotton, Carol & Jake, Jane (1995). “Matching lemmas in bilingual competence and performance model: evidence from intrasentential code switching”. Linguistics, 33, 98– 124. Oksaar, Els (1980). “Mehrsprachigkeit, Sprachkontakt und Sprachkonflikt”. In P. H. Nelde (Ed.), Sprachkontakt und Sprachkonflikt (pp. 43–51). Wiesbaden: Steiner. Paradis, Michel (1980). “The language switch in bilinguals: psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic perspectives”. In P. H. Nelde (Ed.), Languages in contact and conflict (pp. 501–506). Wiesbaden: Steiner. Paradis, Michel (1985). “On representation of two languages in one brain”. Language Sciences, 7, 1–40. Paradis, Michel (Ed.). (1995). Aspects of bilingual aphasia. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Pekarek, Simona (1999). “Leçons de conversation”: dynamiques de l’interaction et acquisition de compétences discursives. Neuchâtel and Paris: Delachaux and Niestlé. Perani, Daniela, Dehaene, Stanislas, & Grassi, Franco et al. (1996). “Brain processing of native and foreign languages”. NeuroReport, 7, 2439–2444. Perani, Daniela, Paulesu, Eraldo, & Galles, Nuria Sebastian et al. (1998). “The bilingual brain. Proficiency and age of acquisition of the second language”. Brain, 121, 1841– 1852. Perdue, Clive (Ed.). (1993). Adult language acquisition: cross-linguistic perspectives. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Péronnet, Louise (1996). “Nouvelles variétés du français parlé en Acadie du NouveauBrunswick”. In L. Dubois & A. Boudreau (Eds.), Les Acadiens et leur(s) langue(s) quand le français est minoritaire (pp. 121–135). Moncton: CRLA / Les éditions d’Acadie. Perrot, Marie-Eve (1994). “Le chiac ou . . . whatever: Le vernaculaire des jeunes d’une école secondaire francophone de Moncton”. Etudes canadiennes, 37, 237–246. Rampton, Ben (1997). Language Crossing and the Redefinition of Reality: Implications for Research on Codeswitching community. Paper 5. King’s College London. Romaine, Susan (1989, 2 1995). Bilingualism. Oxford: Blackwell. Sankoff, David & Poplack, Shana (1979). “A formal grammar for code-switching”. Papers in Linguistics, 14, 3–46. Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1982). “Discourse as an interactional achievement: some uses of and other things that come between sentences”. In D. Tannen (Ed.), Analysing discourse: text and talk (pp. 71–93). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Schütz, Alfred (1967[1962]). Collected papers I: The problem of social reality. The Hague: Nijhoff. Schulze, Hagen (1994). Staat und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte. München: Beck.





Georges Lüdi

Siguán, Miquel (1987). “Code switching and code mixing in the bilingual speaker: a cognitive approach”. In G. Lüdi (Ed.), Devenir bilingue – parler bilingue (pp. 211–224). Tübingen: Niemeyer. Stienen, Angela & Wolf, Manuela (1991). Integration – Emanzipation: Ein Widerspruch. Saarbrücken: Breitenbach. Strubell i Trueta, Miquel (1994). “Catalan in Valencia: the story of an attempted secession”. In G. Lüdi (Ed.), Sprachstandardisierung (pp. 229–254). Freiburg: Universitätsverlag. Tabouret-Keller, Andrée (1987). “Parler créole, devenir créole: le cas complexe du district de Cayo, à Belize”. In Georges Lüdi (Ed.), Devenir bilingue – parler bilingue (pp. 227–241). Tübingen: Niemeyer. Tajfel, Henri & Turner, John C. (1979). “An integrative theory of intergroup conflict”. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publ. Talmy, Leonard (1985). “Lexicalization patterns: semantic structure in lexical form”. In T. Shopen (Ed.), Language typology and syntactic description III (pp. 51–149). New York: Cambridge University Press. Talmy, Leonard (1995). “The relation of grammar to cognition”. In G. Lüdi & Cl.A. Zuber (Eds.), Linguistique et modèles cognitifs (pp. 139–173). Bâle: Institut des langues et littératures romanes/Sion, Institut universitaire Kurt Bösch [=Acta Romanica Basiliensia [ARBA], 3]. Titone, Renzo (1987). “The psychological roots of code-switching”. In G. Lüdi (Ed.), Devenir bilingue – parler bilingue (pp. 259–270). Tübingen: Niemeyer. Valdman, Albert (Ed.). (1979). Le français hors de France. Paris: Champion. Volterra, Virginia & Taeschner, Traute (1978). “The acquisition and development of language by bilingual children”. Journal of Child Language, 5, 311–326. Vygotsky, Lev Semenoviˇc (1978). Mind in Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wald, Paul (1986). “La diglossie immergée: représentations alternatives du répertoire linguistique chez les Yakoma de Bangui”. Langages et société, 38, 51–67. Wattendorf, Elise & Westermann, Birgit et al. (2001). “Different languages activate different subfields in Broca’s area”. Neuroimage, 13, 624. Weltens, Bert, de Bot, Kees, & van Els, Theo (Eds.). (1986). Language attrition in progress. Dordrecht: Foris. Werlen, Iwar, Lieverscheidt, Esther, Wymann, Adrian, & Zimmermann, Hansmartin (1992). “. . . mit denen reden wir nicht”. Schweigen und Reden im Quartier. Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn.

The cultural apparatus Thoughts on the relationship between language, culture, and society* Jochen Rehbein

La quarta definizione di cultura Ci sono dunque culture e culture, e una cultura per poter sopravvivere deve riuscire a riconoscersi e a criticarsi. Questa attività di critica del proprio modello culturale e di quello altrui, è la quarta accezione di cultura. Si innerva sulla terza, ma a un livello metalinguistico immediatamente superiore. È la cultura come definizione critica della cultura dominante e riconoscimento critico delle culture alternative emergenti. Marx quando scrive il Capitale fa cultura in questo quatro senso. Un membro di una cultura arcaica che riconosce i limiti del proprio modello e lo compara a quello che si sta formando come alternativa dal di dentro o dal di fuori, fa cultura in questo quatro senso. Questo quatro senso di “cultura” è sempre e positivamente “controcultura”. La controcultura allora è l’azione critica di ricambio del paradigma sociale o scientifico o estetico esistente. È la riforma religiosa. È l’eresia che si dà uno statuto e prefigura un’altra chiesa. È l’unica manifestazione culturale che una cultura dominante non riesce a riconoscere e ad accetare; la cultura dominante tollera come devianze più o meno innocue le controculture parassitarie, ma non può accettare le manifestazioni di critica che la mettono in questione. C’è controcultura quando i trasformatori della cultura in cui vivino diventano criticamente coscienti di quel che fanno ed elaborano una teoria della loro pratica di deviazione dal modello dominante, proponendo un modello capace di autosostentamento. (Umberto Eco 1977: 227)1



Jochen Rehbein

Foreword Concerning the presumption of the editors that intercultural communication is not constituted by misunderstandings2 alone, the paper argues that misunderstandings are a second step within a sequence of communication, which, in its turn, does not achieve its completion as long as the misunderstandings are not solved. However, the solution of misunderstandings, their “beyond”, can be reached via alternative courses of action, which involve alternative qualities of interaction as well as different mental processes. A solution of a misunderstanding reached – according to Kameyama (2004) – by ‘ensuring (mutual) understanding’ (verständnissicherndes Handeln) may be regarded as “flat”, when the participants are retraced back to familiar and routinized structures of knowledge and discourse after having passed insertions of discourse as repairs, redraftings, elucidations and the like. Mutual understanding beyond misunderstanding, then, amounts to standardized procedures of communication being re-established as they were before the misunderstanding emerged. Another – alternative – kind of resolving misunderstandings requires for cultural action in a strict sense, i.e. that at least one of the participants should submit the communication to reflection by opening his or her eyes on the tacit presuppositions made and should try to reorganize (at least partially) mental structures and processes, like action practices, thought patterns, conceptual forms, experience, pattern knowledge a.o. which underly communication. In the paper, the device in charge of this reorganizing work will be called “cultural apparatus”. The cultural apparatus deconstructs those standardized forms of acting and speaking which bring about the actors’ getting entangled in aporetic ways of communication and it constructs means of an understanding by making recourse to a higher level of mediation, “generating” productive and receptive new forms on the part of speaker and hearer and giving rise to innovative forms of communication. Moreover, the cultural apparatus’ mediating the participants’ frictions through communication may have the positive effect of approaching the parties on a mental level of synthesis. In a longterm perspective, the iterated application of the cultural apparatus may bring about what Koole and ten Thije (1994) call a “discoursive interculture”. With reference to the theory developed by Redder and Rehbein in 1987 and following the work of Koole and ten Thije (1994), the paper offers a concrete model of the cultural apparatus and looks for new forms of intercultural communication on the basis of authentic scenarios.

The cultural apparatus

In the light of the theory of “cultural apparatus”, prejudices are based on the repetitive usage of unquestioned systems of presuppositions which, paradoxically, stem from cultural action. Action practices, thought patterns, conceptual forms, experiences, pattern knowledge a.o are altered into and fixated as prejudices (unreflected knowledge) by being repetitively used with everyday familiarity and custom, and intersperse intercultural communication as a “cultural filter” (House 1997). In contrast to a cultural filter, however, a cultural apparatus reflects communicative structures in such a way that a falling back into a status quo ante is not at all possible. Breaking the cultural filter by applying the cultural apparatus to mental processes of the respective participants seems to be especially necessary in international confrontations against the shadow of unquestioned warfare action practices, as in the Near East. Concerning the second presumption of the editors that intercultural communication is not solely constituted by the fact that individuals from different cultural groups interact it should be emphasized that the cultural apparatus is conceived as a non-individual design which operates as a complex communicative device. It processes on various forms of communication as institutions (which according to Poulantzas 1975 may be conceptualized as social apparatuses), patterns of acting and speaking, linguistic procedures and other linguistic communicative unities transforming them. The “job” of the cultural apparatus lies in the reorganization of the above-mentioned mental processes in relation to the respective constellation of action (Rehbein 1977), be it multilingual or not. To give an example: In the course of a negotation, a German representative of a publishing house successively adapts his forms of imagining the American market practices to what he perceives from his American interlocutor’s words, and reaches, in doing so, an agreement with her over the price of the royalties. Instead of attempting to define “culture”, I shall be seeking for the basic procedures of cultural action, bearing in mind Eco’s concept of “critica del proprio modello culturale”. To this purpose the distinctions made by Isolde Baur in 1951 will be used to define three areas covered by the everyday use of the concept “culture”: – – –

the material/social sphere, such as the hydraulic engineering culture of China, or the wine-growing culture of France the mental and spiritual sphere, such as the ideas of the Enlightenment the sphere of verbal communication, such as the culture of conversation nurtured in the French salon.3





Jochen Rehbein

The paper concentrates on the sphere of verbal communication and aims to present in exemplary form the relationship between language and culture. In so doing, I am assuming that a structural complex such as “culture” finds its expression in the forms, specifically the surface forms, adopted by the various spheres; these are anchored in history and appear familiar and normal to the actors who use them repetitively. Practices, perceptions, concepts, thought structures, forms of imagining, experiences etc. all relate to these forms. But it is their transformation which makes for the essence of cultural action. The thesis expounded during the course of the paper, then, is that communication, if it is to be called intercultural, is based on cultural action of at least one of the interactants.

Intercultural communication revisited Three questions will be treated in the following: Is communication achieved in intercultural encounters where misunderstandings are not cleared up? Is communication “intercultural” if the misunderstandings are cleared up? Is communication between people of differing tongues to be called intercultural or is there a difference to be made between interlingual and intercultural communication?4

Misunderstanding, cultural filter, action practice Let us examine a first case. At the root of the following “misunderstanding” are the divergent patterns for opening a telephone conversation: (1) ((Telephone rings, Prof. Müller answers:)) (s1) Prof. Müller: Müller. (s2) American woman: Professor Müller? (s3) Prof. Müller: Am Apparat. Speaking. [Literally: at the apparatus] (s4) American woman: Bitte? Pardon? (s5) Prof. Müller: Am Apparat. Speaking. [Literally: at the apparatus] (s6) American woman: Wo ist er? Where is he?

The cultural apparatus

(s7)

Ich verstehe nicht. I don’t understand. (s8) Prof. Müller: Er spricht selbst zu Ihnen. ((smiling)) He is speaking to you himself. (s9) American woman: Bitte? Pardon? (s10) Prof. Müller: Er selbst spricht zu Ihnen. ((louder)) He himself is speaking to you. (s11) American woman: Sprechen Sie Englisch? Do you speak English? (s12) Prof. Müller: Yes. ((whereupon introductions and further conversation are in English)) ((20.06.1994, Notices))

Godard’s comparative study (1977) shows that American phone calls take roughly the following pattern: (1) ringing tone, (2) person answering: a greeting (e.g. ‘hello?’), (3) person calling: greeting in response (e.g. ‘hello!’) + request for identification (e.g. Mr. X?), (4) person answering: self-identification (e.g. ‘yes’) or a quid pro quo (e.g. ‘no’). In contrast, the German pattern is for (1) the person being called (2) to respond with a self-identification which simultaneously signalizes he/she is ready to listen (as in France, where Godard 1977: 217, identifies an “availability” signal); (3) then, the caller identifies herself/himself. In the above example (1) these two patterns determine the participants’ expectations of the interaction. The American caller is expecting a greeting, not a name, as done with utterance (s1), and thereafter a reply in which the other person identifies himself; Professor Müller has, however, in line with the German pattern, already done this at (s1) – which is a most unexpected opening from the American viewpoint. Which element of discourse causes the American’s non-understanding? The question (s2) stems from the caller’s problem in perceiving an unexpected communicative pattern in a foreign language. She is confused (s4) not by the fact that the professor seems to be hanging on a piece of apparatus (s3) but by having to locate the speaker in the speech situation by means of the formula ‘am Apparat’ (= German telephone convention for ‘speaking’), instead by a reply such as ‘yes’ or ‘correct’. Her first appeal for repair (s4) only elicits a reiteration from the professor (‘am Apparat’ (s5)); the second (s6), explained by (s7), induces him to change the kind of linguistic procedure. Instead of using an explicit speaker deixis (such as ‘I’) he makes crypto-speaker deictic use (cf. Ehlich 1992; Graefen 1996) of the phoric expression ‘he’ by saying ‘he is





Jochen Rehbein

speaking to you himself ’ (s8). For the American woman ‘he’ means the continuation of the noun phrase ‘Professor Müller’ in (s6) and is not a reference to the speaker in the current speech situation. The word ‘himself ’ (selbst) in (s8) and (s10) which Müller uses to underpin the crypto-speaker deixis, is understood by the American to be a reinforcement of the phoric quality of ‘he’, thus further distancing her from the actual speech situation. In order to equate ‘he’ with Professor Müller at the other end of the line, the American caller must have understood that ‘he’ is a crypto-deixis with which the speaker focuses himself. She would then be able to identify the words about Müller as being words by Müller.

“Cultural filter” vs. “action practice” Following the linguistic reconstruction of misunderstanding and incomprehension we examine now the influence of cultural components in the telephone conversation. House (1997) contends that certain characteristics of German texts act as cultural filters, at least to Anglo-Saxon eyes and ears. She asserts that German texts translated into English, in contrast with those written originally in English, are characterized by more “directness, . . . orientation towards self . . ., orientation towards content, . . .. explicitness, . . . ad-hoc formulation” (ibid.: 97). Indeed, she adds, many German texts display, for example, “a greater social distance” (ibid.: 97) making them appear “less personalized” (ibid.: 116). German translations are often “more explicit” than the English original. Some of these features described by Juliane House as a cultural filter of German will be picked up in the following.

In the above example, two of Müller’s utterances might be characterized as “cultural filters”: “am Apparat” (s3/s5) and “er spricht selbst zu Ihnen” (s8 and the variant at s10). At the outset it must be said that both phrases are more or less standard expressions in institutional talk, particularly that used by authorities (cf. Rehbein 1998a). Let us start with “am Apparat”, where the caller would have expected an expression containing a speaker deixis like, “yes, that’s me”. Instead, the person chooses to identify himself with a speech formula using symbol field procedures5 that make him an appendage of a machine – in actual fact a polite form of meiotic synecdoche (a self-effacing pars-pro-toto; cf. Ueding 2001: 1360ff.) – even if to non-German ears that sounds impersonal or distanced. The crucial point is, however, that for a native speaker of German the speech formula (or stock phrase) “am Apparat” is firmly bound to a specific constellation meaning I’m awaiting your turn/am available for you on the other end of this telephone

The cultural apparatus

line. In addition, it is the next pattern position in the sequence after he has identified himself and adjacent to the query of the caller (it is a function of a turn taking device integrated into the conversational pattern; see Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson 1974). It is difficult to generalize and call linguistic surface forms such as speech formulae in toto “cultural filters” even when they impede understanding. But in the case at hand, the speech formulae is tied to what Bühler (1934) calls an “empractical environment”, i.e. to a specific constellation within a pattern of action. In this sense, the speech formula “am Apparat” forms an action practice (cf. below). Action practices bear these firm ties to ready made linguistic expressions, moreover, they are often the reason for their development. In this sense they are essential structural elements of cultural action. The ‘action practice’ does not, however, refer to the linguistic structure of an utterance but to the underlying mental process, which creates or supports the ways and means by which specific linguistic forms are tied to specific constellations of action (see below “modular structure”). Once, however, an action practice has become commonplace, i.e. as soon as set phrases and speech formulae have crystallized into a generally known stock of language (here the language of the authorities), these can no longer be termed cultural. Rather, the action practice has become reified and is thus no longer a creative mental process. Evidence for this is the way in which such phrases are so routinely used, without any sense of the problems or reflection on the institutional constellations with which they are tightly bound. Thus the communicative forms which are tied to a constellation based on an action practice are to be regarded as having “cultural load”. Whenever the link between speech formula and constellation is weakened or thought about, it is indicative of the (re)activation of action practices. Cultural action therefore (re)activates the potential of the action practices that underlie given linguistic forms. A discourse analysis which manifests the reflective aspects of communication in the specific case will reveal whether the culturally loaded element is being used as a reified form or is being supported by cultural action. Action practices, therefore, may appear to be “cultural filters” in multilingual communication, but in fact they are more likely to create linguistic misunderstandings. In this sense, it is likely that “am Apparat”, the meiotic synecdoche, would have led the American woman to perceive a certain degree of stiffness and formality in the German, but would also have let her identify the person required – had she been able to interpret the reified action practice





Jochen Rehbein

in the institutional speech formula. As it is, the concrete nature of the institutional terminology remains unclear to her and results in incomprehension. The “cultural filter” aspect of the clause “Er spricht selbst zu Ihnen” (he is speaking to you himself; s8, variant s10) would seem to be that German verbalizes elements of the speech situation and, in the more general sense, of the constellation of action, by using the tools of the symbol field and the relating operative (e.g. phoric) procedures6 instead of employing deixis (cf. Ehlich 1979, 1986). In German the use of “he” in the role of a personal crypto-deixis is really a polite-form phenomenon whose core function is to avoid the original personal deixis accompanied by the gesture of pointing to the human actor in the speech situation (Rehbein 1997, 2002b); it is thus based on a polite action practice. Although, however, it links expression with constellation it has become a traditional form of an action practice which no longer counts as a cultural action, but rather works as a filter preventing those with little knowledge of the language from perceiving the cryptodeictic polite usage whereas e.g. deixis would have provided an “explicit” steering function.7

Emergence of “culturally loaded” forms in discourse Let us now look at the prototypical way misunderstandings work in sequential discourse. One of the heuristic assumptions is that the culturally loaded forms do not usually emerge until after a misunderstanding or some similar negative event has occurred in the discourse, appearing then ‘in third position’ as it were.8 In the example (1) the stock phrase “am Apparat” (s3) seems to be a “culturally loaded” element by virtue of an earlier action practice, following on from the simple statement of his name in segment (s1) which has created a comprehension problem and caused the caller to make her irritated appeal for repair (s2). As shown, the stock phrase “am Apparat” creates a fresh misunderstanding which leads to a return to the first position in the system from whence – again in second position – the caller makes her query (appeal for repair) and Prof. Müller tries to clarify the situation by repeating “am Apparat” (s5) again in a third position. However, this is also, in systematic terms, a return to the first position, since his answer causes the American woman to put her question again, explaining that she has not understood (3rd appeal for repair, again in a second system position). The rephrasing action (Bührig 1996) which turns “am Apparat” to “er spricht selbst zu Ihnen” (he is speaking to you himself ) (s8) is a further attempt on the German’s part to process the caller’s incomprehension and therefore a third position, provoking however a further (second position) appeal for repair with “Bitte?” (Pardon?) which he –

The cultural apparatus

again in third position – tries unsuccessfully to counter with a paraphrased version (s10). The underlying schema reveals the queries of the American woman as interactions which carry the discourse forward, signalising as they do the specific mental activity of being unable to process the dialogue and a general non-reception: in sum, this can be viewed as a “negating action”, which takes the second position within the sequential system. Each time Müller’s answers backtrack (in terms of the system) he is not simply repeating the communication but effecting a progression, since his efforts to create an understanding in response to the American’s negating speech actions instead serve to progressively and firmly fix her incomprehension. The communication has thus become a “communicative spiral” (Ehlich & Rehbein 1972) in which the sequence of speech actions takes the shape of a funnel and results in an impasse that it is almost impossible to breach. This impasse is step four in the sequence. The mutual aporia is not resolved until the speakers switch to a different language (step 5) (post-history of the sequential system). The result is that an action practice which controls the German’s use of verbal expressions is elicited during the actual communication by the negating (speech) action which signalizes the hearer’s problem with reception and appears as a discourse reaction in the third position of the sequence and in further positions. The action practice, however, manifests in a reified form and appears to be a culturally loaded element. The example of non-cultural interaction discussed here is illustrated in Figure 1. The steps (I)–(V) are to be seen as basic positions which can appear in different forms during the discourse. The negating (speech) action of the caller (actor A2) which is expressed in the second position stems – as demonstrated – from a problem of reception (explaining the use of the term “negating”, here). Not every problem with reception (such as a quiet voice) necessarily leads to negating action. At step three the action practice9 appears interactional. That means there are two fundamental options: i.

the action practice is used in standardized form (–> as a culturally loaded form), but remains inactivated, reified and unrecognized; ii. the action practice is reflected upon and/or reorganized (–> cultural apparatus). With the non-reflective use of the action practice, the reception problems linked to its surface forms become firmly fixed and thus prolong the misunderstanding. The post-history is that the discourse is broken off or clarification of a different quality is achieved.





Jochen Rehbein

example (E 1) standardized sequence

underlying form (contains problem)

negating speech actions

use of standardized forms (“cultural charging”)

repetitive fixation of problem

posthistory

Figure 1.

phase no.

I

A1 (German prof.)

A2 (American woman)

naming name “am Apparat”

system. backtracking

query, misunderstanding, incomprehension, request to change language

II

repetitions III reformulating actions

IV

heightened problem with reception, greater misunderstanding

V

change of language

The cultural apparatus

Evaluation, thought structures, and forms of imagining in conflicts By means of the previous example, it has been shown that where misunderstandings caused by covered unquestioned action practices are left as facts which prove fatal without efforts to solve them, we are not, strictly speaking, dealing with intercultural communication at all. This leads us to argue that cultural action calls typical thought structures [Denkstrukturen] and forms of imagining [Vorstellungsformen] into question, whereas non-cultural action cements, i.e. hypostasizes, them. Even if the process of calling into question – as in the following case – is pursued by only one of the participants, the communication may be termed intercultural, even though it is a one-sided affair.

Evaluation and membership categorization During royalties negotiations10 between an American author (Mrs. S) and a German publisher’s representative (Mr. P) the American woman rejects the offers made by the publisher with arguments that we shall investigate in more detail: (2) (s23) Mrs. S: E from:, f/ from: my experience at least, y’know, the idea of . first/ not getting royalty from the very first copy . is a brand new one. (s27) . Because that, that is just . one of those givens, y’know, that, that royalties start . when the first copy is sold. (s30) If you go to that level of effort to produce something . of this quality, the payoff should at least be there. (s34) Ahm especially if the work’s been done well and the market’s already been established. (s38) So I think that’s, that’s certainly the first issue . that would need to be addressed. (s41) Ahm the other thing is if you’re talking about ten percent royalty to be divided between two people, . . that seems:: on the low side.

The dialogue builds a dichotomy between the supra-individual standard claimed by Mrs. S and the German interlocutor’s offer which appears totally inadequate by comparison. She presupposes the existence of a standard that is valid everywhere (“those givens”, s27). The words “something of this quality” (s30) reveal her assumption that her work objectively meets high standards.





Jochen Rehbein

The concluding argument (s41) asserts her negative evaluation of her opposite number, “that seems:: on the low side.” Although Mrs. S’s utterances are a massive expression of evaluations, they are not marked as such; instead she behaves as if the benchmark values she claims were generally established. By using them as self-evident standards she acts as a representative of the benchmark values, American values, and applies them to herself and her German interlocutor as if they were normal objective values. Seen from this perspective the low offer is scandalous, for it ignores the high standards of the two authoresses (“on the low side”). In linguistic terms, the impersonal constructions and matrix verbs such as “seems” objectivize her claims. By applying her set of values, she places the German publisher’s agent in the group of those who do not adhere to the standard, whereas she herself is in the group of those who meet the standards; she uses a procedure that Sacks once termed the “membership categorization device” (Sacks 1972). This categorization device presupposes the evaluations verbalized here. The agent’s second offer is also rejected: (3) (s56) Mrs. S: Well, I think, as you said . right at the beginning of our conversation, this is obviously information-gathering on. . on both sides. (s62) ((2s)) But I do think part of the information has to be: . . at least a realistic framework ((chuckles)) to know where we’re going to.

Although the matrix clause “I do think” anchors the utterance in the speech situation in a way that marks what follows as a subjective opinion, she again categorizes herself as someone belonging to a group that adheres to the benchmark standards. The benchmark itself is defined as a standard in the subordinate propositional content (“has to be . . . a realistic framework”) which is reinforced by the qualifier “at least”. The repetitive way in which she categorizes herself as meeting the standards, simultaneously implies that the German co-actor fails to meet the standards and marks him as a non-member of the group. Only when the German agent has agreed to her demands does she say: (4) (s80) Mrs. S: [That’s at least getting a little more realistic.] [ chuckles (s81) Mr. P: Okay, fine. (s82) ((laughs))

The cultural apparatus

She greets the German publishing agent’s utterance (“That”) with relief (“chuckles” in s80) and her reaction indicates that the correct standard of evaluation has finally been reached (“realistic”) i.e. the proper relationship between price and product. The German publisher’s agent is thus admitted to membership of the group of standard possessors, his laugh is indicative of his relief at having attained new membership of the American standard.

Thought structures The American’s repeated use of her evaluation standards is supported by a traditional thought structure. Her choice of words (e.g. “givens” (s27), “the payoff should at least be there” (s30), “that seems on the low side” (s41), “at least a realistic framework” (s62), “That’s at least getting a little more realistic” (s80), as well as (s56) et al.) provide glimpses of the rhetorical tradition of Hobbesian iudicium. The historical dictionary of philosophy states: On the question of I[udicium]. . . Chapter 8 of the “Leviathan”, which deals with the intellectual virtues of man, is the relevant source. In this chapter Hobbes provides a detailed account of I[udicium]. Like Descartes, Hobbes views I[udicium] as an intellectual virtue which is based on natural characteristics, expressed to varying degrees in each individual according to how passionate his nature is. In accordance with the tradition of rhetoric Hobbes sees I[udicium] as the pendant to phantasia. . .; whereas imagination (fantasy) is the ability to detect similarities which are not immediately obvious, I[udicium] is the ability to perceive relevant but not obvious differences. . . I[udicium] as a pragmatic power of judgment is thus found in social self-reflections, such as private persons make from their own standpoint. (Wagner 1998: 686–688)

The point here is the contrast between judgement and phantasia – a dichotomy that is without doubt supported by the “apparatus of theory” (cf. Rehbein 1994a). One may suppose that the American authoress, a professor for communication sciences, is using the rhetorical device of iudicium which was developed by Hobbes and is widely used in the Anglo-Saxon world, to form a rational basis for presenting her own value judgements as being indisputable, and dismissing the arguments of her interlocutor as belonging to the realm of fantasy. This structure of thought is expressed in the judgements she asserts verbally. In this manner, the American standard is considered “realistic” and the German non-standard “fantastical”, and this evaluation apparatus is maintained throughout the entire negotiation. From the theoretical viewpoint, we are witnessing the repetitive reproduction of thought structures via the eval-





Jochen Rehbein

uation apparatus. Since Mrs. S does not modify her thought structures, despite the negating acts during the negotiation conflict, her activity may not be termed cultural action nor referred to as intercultural communication.11

Forms of imagining Why is the German publishing agent so quick to agree to all the American woman’s demands, whilst she stubbornly insists on what she needs? Let us take a closer look at the two offers made by the German actor: (5) (s17) (s18) (s19a) (s19b) (s19c) (s19d) (s19e) (s19f) (s20)

Mr. P: Generally . we: . . do not pay royalties . . erm: with projects that are entirely financed by the publisher. . . At least not . . for the first two hundred copies. . . We could agree, depending on how many . authors are involved – if there’s only one author, there’s no problem, if we have six, seven, . eight . contributors, that’s a different matter – we could agree on let’s say: ((2s)) – this is very preliminary now, and er: I wouldn’t commit myself at this stage . to a final setting of royalties, of course – but generally . from . let’s say: the um two hundred-first copy . they would be ten percent . . of the gross receipts, not the nett receipts but the gross receipts. ((5s)) Does that grab you?

The utterances clearly reveal a conditional >no-but< strategy ((s17–s19f) vs. (s19e–f)): it is true that the publisher does “not” “generally” pay “royalties” (whereby the word “generally” already indicates that Mrs. S’ case is an exception). The qualifying phrase “at least not for the first two hundred copies” is the first revision of the general clause. The second revision (s19a–f) is presented in a construction made complex by the use of parentheses (cf. v. Kügelgen 2003) (s19b) and (s19d). In the main clause elements of segments (s19a), (s19c), (s19e) and (s19f) Mr. P appears to be making a mental check of the usual practice adopted by his publishing house; in the parentheses (s19b) and (s19d) the comments refer directly to his interlocutor. Following the rejecting propositional elements in (s17) and (s18) he works his way through (s19a) and (s19c) (stressed “we could”) to the phrase “but generally” (s19e) to offer a percentage which is already unusual for the company. Even from the purely formal aspect “but generally” contradicts the initial, general rejection of “royalties”. His use of “but” would appear to be a transfer of the German usage of “aber”, since it

The cultural apparatus

does not negate the proposition immediately preceding it (as in English) but refers instead to a presupposed mental argument that P is updating in his head, one that the listener does not know. Altogether, the arguments are linked in a subordinating but unfocussed manner, which the American listener is likely to regard as unnecessarily, i.e. purely subjectively complex, in view of the overall result formulated in (s19e) and (s19f). Mr. P’s speech is highly segmented and employs a large number of connectors, indicating that he is not only talking to his interlocutor but is simultaneously engaged in a discourse with himself (an “inner dialogue”) in which he makes a mental review of written sales regulations. This manner of speaking may be termed text-applicative12 because it modifies the linguistic style of administrative texts. The linguistic realization is indicative of a considerable amount of mental activity. In the following section, then, he makes all the concessions desired by the American authoress. (6) (s73) (s74)

Mr. P: ((6s)) [1 Erm: [2 what about. . . I mean, . we could, we could agree on let’s say six . . or even eight percent . [3 from copy one . . [4 per author . if that agrees with you. [1 breathes in [2 loud expulsion of breath [3 flicks pen clip [4 flicks pen clip (s75a) . Depending again (s75b) – and . that is . very very preliminary – (s75c) depending on . our calculation, depending on the size of edition and on the actual sales price. (s77) But that would be something we could agree on: . . about . eight percent . for both you and the co-author. (s78) From copy one. (s79) Scratch nil.

After an unusually long pause for reflection lasting 6 seconds Mr. P starts to make a new offer but breaks off his first utterance (s73) to continue with a matrix construction and modal verb signifying his process of reflection (“I mean we could”; s74) and present the offer. He clearly signalizes that he has changed (restructured) his preferences. This is followed by a pseudo-limitation (s75a/75c) and a parenthesis (s75b), leading to a three-part precision of the offer: “about . eight percent . for both you and the co-author.” (s77) “From copy one” (s78) and “scratch nil” (s79) are predicates with their own illocutionary force, and each serves to increase the offer. The numerous modal verbs and





Jochen Rehbein

the matrix constructions are strong indicators that the actor is making mental consideration of the joint constellation and verbalizing his reflections. These elements are all linguistic indicators of a type of speech “directed to oneself ” to consult his own ideas, concepts, and mental images.13 The auxiliary procedure termed negotiation thus results in a one-sided agreement in favour of the American seller. Mr. P concedes to all her demands by conducting an “inner dialogue” in which he takes on both roles, adding that of the American authoress to his own negotiator role.14 He develops a new form of procedure which I have termed “virtual processing” (Rehbein 2001a); it arises because he re-structures his forms of imagining. The result is that only the German actor actually goes through a process of negotiation, the American does not negotiate.15, 16 In this sense, therefore, the virtual processing conducted by the German publishing house agent is directed by a concept, or rather a system of concepts, which is to be counted as part of a German “cultural apparatus” in relation to the USA, thus influencing his mental processing of the pattern. P’s communicative action at least is guided by his concepts and should thus be regarded as an intercultural act. By contrast the American woman’s focussed insistence on a single pattern position is not an action practice based upon her ideas of Germany or Europe but upon a repetitive form of thinking and a traditional schema of making judgements (iudicium) found in the American style of rhetoric. Only the German displays the “cultural apparatus”, in particular in the second part of each of his turns. – Put in diagram form the sequences for actors A1 and A2 are as schematized in Figure 2. A summary of the system of sequences reveals the emergence of cultural action thus: Joint yet conflicting starting constellation: author’s royalties vs. too low offer a.

The American author: (ii) applies a traditional thought structure to the evaluation apparatus (iii) and, despite concessions made by the German publisher’s agent, keeps repeating the same demands (iv) which become firmly fixed during subsequent phases of negotiation.

b.

The German publisher’s agent (ii) rejects the demands of the American party to the negotiation in the first part of each turn (negating action); (iii) but alters his forms of imagining of American standards, which is expressed by a sudden change of course in the second part of his turn in

The cultural apparatus

which an improved offer is made, finally leading to his recognition as “member”. (iv) As a consequence of the change in forms of imagining, the normal German pattern of “no royalties” is altered; the change in his own pattern realization emerges in “new” forms of communication; (v) Agreement: the German acquiesces to the demands of the American due to virtual processing of the opposite party’s position.

cultural standardized apparatus phase (: CA) no. sequence

underlying form (contains problem)

example (E 1) A1 A2 (Germ. (Americ. prof.) woman) no int. com. no int. com. Naming name

I

example (E 2) A1 A2 (Amer. (Germ. prof.) agent) no int. com. no int. com. demand for royalties

offer

rejection

refusal

iudicium (thought pattern)

modification of offer, adaptation of ideas (about market)

retention of thought pattern (iudicium)

new action practice and “membership” change

“am Apparat”

negating system. backspeech actions tracking

II

use of standardized forms (“cultural load”)

influence of cul- III tural apparatus

repetitive fixation of problem

emergence of new forms (of IV communication)

posthistory

Figure 2.

query misunderstanding, incomprehension, request for repair, request to change language

V

repetitions reformulating actions

heightened problem with reception greater misunderstanding change of language

agreement





Jochen Rehbein

In systematic terms therefore (b-iii) is the position at which the possibility of a change of the mental process occurs: it is the position of deciding to use the cultural apparatus as a result of critical self-examination or to misuse it for the repetition of standardized forms.17

Cultural apparatus In summary, studying examples of different scenarios revealed that cultural action displays mental qualities, it can appear at certain places in the communication or become an intractable problem and a repetitive state of incomprehension. The following section now looks at the theoretical cornerstones of the cultural apparatus (: CA) and describes its characteristics as a systematic sequence of steps: a pre-condition for the applicability of the CA is the existence of action systems with presuppositions which underpin the standardized actions performed by the actors (step one) and which lead to problems in the interaction. Step two: The actors suspend the standardized sequence of action and thematize the problems in a process termed “negating action”. The third step consists of a mental reorganization of underlying action practices, thought structures, conceptual forms and social experience, with the result that – in step four – various forms of speech actions appear and become visible on the surface of communication. This process of becoming visible is termed the “emergence” of the cultural apparatus and facilitates the use of methods whereby the underlying mental restructuring can be deduced. This restructuring leads – in the post-history of the cultural apparatus in step five – in the short or even longterm to changes in presuppositions and thus in action systems. In terms of discourse analysis the potential application of the cultural apparatus is based on a “cultural load” of speech action. If cultural action is suppressed at these points, because there is no restructuring of the mental processes involved, the cultural load of forms leads to a process of fixing or reifying which – like the post-history – is added to the presuppositions and thus insulates the action systems even more strongly against negating action.

Social groups as action systems Since the pre-conditions also include the way standardized action and the underlying mental processes are bound up with social groups, a few remarks should first be made about the concept of ‘group’. It will be argued that social

The cultural apparatus

groups comprise more or less comprehensive action systems of social actors, that they constitute common presuppositions and are in turn constituted by them. More precisely, the actors adopt presuppositions18 to the extent that they reproduce and share with other members of the same group the communication forms of a specific group (up to and including society), thus forming action systems. The “action system” thus based on common presuppositions is the true criterion for determining whether people form a social group or a “social unit”.19 Individual actors belong to a variety of action systems, e.g. a group of educators, immigrants, a family, patients, special readerships etc.; they are also capable of switching the action systems. And certain presuppositions are more relevant than others. Thus, action presuppositions do not form some static repertoire of knowledge, but play an active standardizing role in individual action. Action systems have their limits, which determine the range within which communication can occur. The categorization of memberships also happens “behind the backs” of those involved. Limits to communication and memberships are difficult to address. This is, of course, due to their presuppositional character, of which the individual actors are barely aware, since presuppositions are givens which transcend the individual person. Not until cultural action comes into play is there any reflection on presuppositions, their range and limits. If, as proposed, intercultural communication is cultural action in multilingual constellations, then the actors will, above all, be members of a variety of differing language action systems. They try to harmonize these systems by building “verbal and communicative bridges” by developing common action systems with newly acquired or formed presuppositions. In this manner the development of verbal and communicative bridges leads to an “intercultural discourse” or even – if they stabilize and become durable and vivid without getting dogmatized – to a “discursive interculture” (Koole & ten Thije 1994: 200ff.).

Ambivalence of negating actions What is to be addressed now is the role of the “culture-specific forms of communication” which can act as a brake and filter20 in intercultural communication between members of different language groups. The thesis propounded here is, however, that the unquestioning use of “culture-specific forms of communication” is an expression of the reification of culture and serves to cloud the process of mutual understanding.





Jochen Rehbein

The suspension of discourse When people act in accordance with their presuppositions, i.e. in a standard or routine manner, problems and misunderstandings can arise which suspend the normal progression of their communication, although this is an expression of the unquestioning functioning of their presuppositions. The problems and misunderstandings themselves are not always obvious, but often latent or so obscured that they are difficult to recognize. The actors themselves would however need to recognize these problems if they wished to continue the communication.21 In a recent study Hinnenkamp (2001) employs conversation analysis to provide an overview of the different types of “misunderstandings” which may arise. He also offers examples of repaired and unrepaired misunderstandings and writes: What all types of misunderstandings seem to have in common is the illusion of understanding up to a certain point. . . . The overt one implies in particular the illusion of a first understanding being retrospectively falsified; the covert one the illusion of an understanding being gradually questioned and dismantled; the latent one the illusion of an understanding being questionable and falsifiable only by an outside observer. (ibid.: 222)22

First we must ask what happens when the actors, in an unquestioning adherence to their familiar standard solutions and action sequences, become entangled in misunderstandings and communicational problems? The following cases give some answers: In a telephone conversation (example 1) both the German who answers the phone and the American making the call act in line with their standard expectations, without questioning those action practices which control the standardized speech formulas, so that after a series of attempted repairs the caller’s incomprehension becomes fixed. – In another case, the standardized characterizations used by a native speaker of French in conversation with Germans reveal the prejudices still held against the inhabitants of a rural region (Vendée) and thus a lack of acceptance (cf. Sader-Yin 1987). – Adopting his customary action practices, an Italian remanded in custody suggests to a German lawyer that he could use legal means outside the institutional process of German law, which the lawyer refuses to do (cf. Mattel-Pegam 1985). Thus, the unreflecting use of standardized communication structures and forms which match existing presuppositions leads to obvious, hidden or latent perils for communication but not to the creation of a common action system based on transformed presuppositions. Moreover, presuppositions have even been transformed into prejudices working in misunderstanding discourses.

The cultural apparatus

The crucial element in the context of this discussion is therefore that misunderstandings, be they latent, open or covert, lead the participants to sense – following a variable phase of “illusion” in the discourse or an opacity of understanding – that it is problematic to continue the current communication in the standard manner, because they see that their presuppositions, whilst remaining in force, do not function automatically and prevent the (necessary) alteration or modification of action leading to the creation of new presuppositions. A strange hiatus or “suspension” in the discourse may then be observed, although the communication continues simultaneously in linear fashion; this can be shown in systematic terms using discourse analysis methods.

Identifying presupposed structures The hiatus in the standardized processing (or a departure from the avoidance of reflection) can lead the participants to take the step that one might term the identification of the misunderstanding or of the problem with the verbal communication. The characteristic of this is that presuppositions, both one’s own and those of the others, are thematized in the interaction; much in the sense of the thematizing process described by Koole and ten Thije (1994, sec. 11: 176ff.) (which can result in intercultural discourse).23 Identifying the problem is, functionally speaking, the first stage of criticism, whose central role in cultural action was sketched by Redder and Rehbein: An essential characteristic of culture is criticism: unreflected forms of action in existing practices are evaluated, assessed and transformed against the background of the formation of society into more suitable, which also means more suited to the real contradictions, options for action. The constellation of modalities for action are thereby differentiated and modified, in particular the strategies, aims and even purposes of action are refined. These refinements in turn then become the common knowledge of the social actors and thus part of their general practice, forming an ensemble of social experiences, thought structures and notions as well as action practices (Ehlich offers a similar view in 1984). Culture therefore has an action quality. That does not however mean that social formations are directly altered by culture. Rather cultural actions initially serve to stabilize the given forms of action by making full use of their immanent potential for action. This immanent utilization harbours the seed of new action potential, showing the way beyond the existing practices of the society. Culture thus has two sides to its character, in the dichotomy between stabilization and new beginnings, between affirmation and negation. Cultural acts are not per se societal and cannot replace social action, being always related to social acts. (Redder & Rehbein 1987: 16)





Jochen Rehbein

When presuppositions are identified and thereby called into question, the result is not necessarily (as yet) cultural action but – even after the issue has been clarified – might instead be a renewed and more forceful repetition of standardized forms. The transition from standardized to cultural action occurs through switching to an act of thematizing the presuppositions, once the communication has gone past the point of no repair and it is impossible to return to the status quo ante. This is not the same as “action to ensure (mutual) understanding” (see Kameyama 2004), which is based on a specific type of problem encountered in multilingual communication, namely the hearer’s reception deficit (according to Kameyama). Once the problem has been solved through action designed to ensure comprehension, the communication reverts to the starting point of standardized understanding.24

Restructuring mental processes We shall now turn our attention to the mental processes which characterize cultural action, to the differences and overall commonality of their procedures and manner of access. It is not currently possible to define each one individually, since some questions are still open and require further research, but one thing does stand out, namely that restructuring and reorganizing these processes often entails overcoming considerable resistance on the actors’ part. Intensive study and analysis of the transcripts shed both theoretical and empirical light, or to put it another way, a reflecting empirical approach should lead to further refinements of the theoretical definitions. With regard to their essential role in cultural action, especially in terms of criticism, we may collectively term social experience, thought structures, forms of imagining and action practices by the Greek word τÜ7χναι (: ‘technai’ = higher skills, techniques).25 At the outset it should be stressed that in cultural action it is always the formal quality of the τÜ7χναι which provokes negating action and their formal quality consists of the high degree of routinization. To break through this routinization by questioning the presuppositions usually requires the actors to make a considerable mental effort, which is characterized by three things: i.

The technai (τÜ7χναι) have sets of organized (standardized form, structure etc.) mental concatenations (: Π-domain);

The cultural apparatus

ii. the existing organization is restructured; the questioning of presuppositions leads to restructuring and reorganization, which requires considerable mental effort; iii. the accessibility of language and languages differs for all τÜ7χναι.26 It now remains to show that, depending on the underlying mental processes involved with the particular τÜ7χναι, cultural action affects the presuppositions in different ways. In addition, it should be determined what exactly lends it an innovative, shaping force as opposed to the fixation of standardized forms.27

Action practices [Handlungspraktiken] Action practices are acts which create and support habits. Their structural genesis is most likely to be similar to that of maxims of action and, like the latter, they would be a form of knowledge. Action practices allocate those forms of realization for verbal and non-verbal action which have proved practicable for a group of actors to the deep structures of patterns and apparatuses and pave the way for the establishment of the ability to assess situations for action processes. In particular, they generate firm bonds between constellations and speech formulae. This constitutes the cultural achievement of the action practice.28 In an intercultural discussion of a complaint (s. the transcript discussed by Ohama 1987), it is to be seen that by altering the action practice a German saleswoman varied the relationship between the pattern of complaint and its realization so much that new communicative surface forms appeared for some pattern positions. Action practices also play a part in the constructive changes to the way the communicative apparatus is applied by the Japanese buyer in the same discourse. Above all, it became evident that the action practices themselves are changed by cultural action. Here the meaning of reorganization or restructuring becomes obvious. In the case of the telephone conversation between the German professor and an American woman, no action practices were reorganized, so that despite several attempts, the misunderstandings became insoluble. If, therefore, an action practice has fixed the relationship between action structure, surface realization and constellation for a particular case, repeated application is not a cultural action but one that creates a higher grade of reification – which requires the actors to undertake even greater mental efforts if they wish to break through it.





Jochen Rehbein

Thought structures [Denkstrukturen] Thought structures are mostly part of a tradition, they divide the world into pairs of opposites and are often supported by academic theories.29 They are communicated to children through language (as demonstrated by Vygotsky’s work30 ) and probably affect numerous patterns and apparatuses. Since they are deeply embedded it requires considerable effort to restructure thought structures and reactivate them as cultural action.31 Thought structures and their modification are largely controlled by the symbol field of languages – a relatively unknown field in linguistics.32 Koole and ten Thije (1994) showed that when opposing structures of thought are thematized, new intercultural patterns do indeed arise (ibid.: 194). The main reason for this is likely to be that thought structures can be changed by the act of thematizing them. The authors show clearly that the persistent “myth of tolerance” in the Netherlands, an ideological structure of thought, reproduces a standardized intercultural pattern that refuses to thematize racism in Holland (they quote a statement by Essed 1991: “The Dutch take it for granted that they are tolerant and that racism is virtually non-existent in their country,” ibid.: 194). In the case of the American professor engaged in negotiations over royalties, the underlying thought structure proved not only to be a structure by which the pattern of sales talk and the auxiliary device of negotiation became fixed through repetition, but also to utilize a system of values which produced negating action, thereby casting doubts on the discourse partner. However, an insistence on one’s own thought structures when communicating with someone from a different culture, can still give rise to cultural action: the German publisher’s agent thus embarks on “virtual negotiations” – a productive pattern variant produced by the restructuring of thought structures in reaction to the invariable thought structures of his (intercultural) interlocutor. In discourse and text the use of thought structures is often recognizable from inference schemata. Thus a patient whose doctor views her illness as psychosomatic insists that there must be a somatic cause by drawing her own conclusions, with which she connects the propositional contents of her utterances (the case is discussed in Rehbein 1994). With regard to academic intercultural debates, thematizing the opposing notions is likely to lead to a reflection and restructuring of thought structures. Forms of imagining [Vorstellungsformen] The process of imagining a concept or idea is “non-defined thinking” and a medium for the mental representations of an internal, external and commu-

The cultural apparatus

nicative world; phenotypically it is not far removed from the “mechanism of belief ” (see Rehbein 1977: §1). The spatial character of an idea derives from the mental extension of perceived space. Thus imagination lends the verbally represented objects a foreground-background structure. Deictic procedures are often the means to control ideas, indeed an established imagination space33 [Vorstellungsraum] is the pre-requisite for deictic procedures to function. Anticipation and planning (forming aims), imagination and the inner representations used to consult one’s own knowledge (e.g. by patients at the doctor’s) make use of concepts/ideas and their forms. The implementation of action schemes is likewise guided by forms of imagining. Forms of imagining are linked with wishes, intentions and modalities (of willing and liking) or even with preferences and they are responsible for the specific (often standardized) form that the latter manifest in discourse and text. This characteristic means that imagining is closely related to the apparatus of evaluation, since they are often its foundation. Cultural action involves the restructuring of the forms of imagining which constitute part of a group’s set of presuppositions. During the negotiations about royalties, the German publisher’s agent revises his own forms of imagining by creating a mental representation of the American’s wishes and verbalizes both forms in his turns. In depicting her arrival at a Turkish village within a biographical account, a Bulgarian woman verbalized forms of imagining to present “new experiences” of a Turkish village “in general” against the backdrop of contrasting experiences from the past.34 The examples demonstrate the mind’s basic ability to create a synthesis of separate parts and not merely to associate them automatically: The forms of imagining, the ready-made links between mental elements, stem from a presuppositional synthesis of separate mental elements when they are applied in standardized ways of speaking and acting. When opposed by negation during cultural action, the forms of imagining are successively extended and restructured to proceed beyond their boundaries. They latch on to the propositional side of pattern positions and to the verbalizations of propositional components and their variants. This process of restructuring forms of imagining thus leads the person to reflect on the way the propositional elements are bound to the constellation – such restructuring through reflection is expressed in matrix constructions, modalizations, special connectors etc. In view of a doctor’s massive doubts about their correctness, a patient reflects on her ideas about illness, expressed in repeated use of verba dicendi and sentiendi, preference forms etc. Towards the end of the consultation she attempts to synthesize her own forms of imagining with





Jochen Rehbein

the treatment structures being stubbornly implemented by the doctor (these “treatment structures” in turn appear to the woman to be the doctor’s concepts). This attempted synthesis may be seen as an indicator of how she is mentally restructuring her forms of imagining and thus be classed as cultural action, although it does generate verbal forms which are difficult to understand or even neologisms.35, 36

Social experiences [gesellschaftliche Erfahrungen] Social experiences belong to types of knowledge structure which especially differ from each other in the fields of particular experience, assessments, images and aphorisms (cf. Ehlich & Rehbein 1977). Their specific feature is that one or more of those with knowledge allocates a rheme of knowledge to a theme of knowledge, each with varying weight (= pragmatic operator). I count “prejudices” as part of this complex, but not stereotypes37 which are to be understood as behavioural but not knowledge structures (Redder 1995). “Sentential knowledge” turn into prejudices when a social group (or one of its members) is the theme of knowledge and when what is known about it (or him/her) comprises evaluating predicates (one may also speak of the attribution of evaluating predicates to a social group or individual). The prejudice is thus a variation of the sentential knowledge (Ehlich & Rehbein 1977; Redder 1995; Ehlich 1998) when another apparatus, namely that of evaluating (see below) is included as a “stabilizer”. The nature of cultural action is to alter, modify, reflect upon types of knowledge structures, in short to restructure them. Retention of knowledge structures despite negating action is non-cultural action. The experience structures are not reorganized en bloc, but to the extent that they form part of a system of presuppositions specific to the group in which the actors involved are members. Therefore not every change of a knowledge structure is always cultural action. Perception and evaluation Let us take a look at the mental processes of perception and evaluation. Essentially, perception is a mechanism constituting the perception field and the perception space.38 There would appear to be a close relationship between social experience as it appears in knowledge structures, action practices, and perception, since the perception of elements in the constellation can contribute to a restructuring of experiential knowledge and action practices by virtue of the altered assessments of the situation. The cultural action of restructuring the forms of imagining is triggered by the perception of reality, but the actual

The cultural apparatus

restructuring takes place mentally in relation to experiential knowledge. The following example is an illustration of the restructuring of action practices. (7) Of interest here is the interplay between constellation (in particular the assessment of the situation), perception, knowledge accessibility and action practice in the course of understanding the Turkish term “aidat”, meaning monthly fees for services in a rented flat. The constellation described is thus: a German sub-tenant, who has just moved into a 15-storey house, answers the doorbell to find the janitor couple outside. They greet him curtly and then say “aidat” several times. Not knowing what the word means the German believes that the couple is enquiring after someone of that name (he uses a standardized action practice). His answer in the negative (negating action) only results in further repetitions by the couple of “aidat”. But when the German perceives that the people at the door are holding pencil and paper and the woman adds the words “garbage” and “lift” the German arrives at a different assessment of the situation, using his linguistic knowledge to retrieve the word “ay” (month) and add the locative “da” to arrive at “ayda” in the meaning of “monthly” and from there to deduce that “aidat” means a fee payable once a month, thus leading him to restructure the action practice that has been linked to the symbol field “aidat”.39 The assessment of the situation made by the German sub-tenant thus alters from >enquiring after a tenant< to >demanding a monthly payment of service fees<. It is true that cultural action is effected through the perception during an intercultural exchange and results in the restructuring of an action practice, but it is not itself a part of it. The more precise explanation is that the assessment of the situation and the action practice alter in mutual interdependence.

Evaluation40 is a mental apparatus akin to a measuring rod, usually having a positive and a negative pole at either end and a neutral or adequate point in the centre. Benchmarking instruments of this type are also termed “preferences” (with graduations of preference/value). A close reciprocal relationship exists between thought structures and evaluation on the one hand and social experiential knowledge and evaluation on the other. Particularly in intercultural communication,41 as shown in some of the cases discussed in this paper, we observe a use of evaluation which actually hinders the restructuring of mental processes which is the mark of cultural action. For example, the American professor’s positive evaluations encourage her not to reflect upon her thought structures during the intercultural discourse.





Jochen Rehbein

It is more difficult, by contrast, to clearly separate knowledge from evaluation in the case of prejudices where the evaluation apparatus has been included in the sentential knowledge, since here the evaluation apparatus tends to act as an integral part of the knowledge structures. But very often cultural action is linked with a positive evaluation of the newly arising forms of communication and thus supports the process of understanding in intercultural communication. This paper does not therefore count the evaluation apparatus as part of the apparatus of cultural action. Its relationship to cultural action is rather that of functionalization and thus ambivalent: evaluation can be supportive but also obstructive. In the framework of cultural action it can stabilize the newly emerging forms of cooperation as well as perpetuating a fixed state and thus misunderstanding and opposition between various groups or other forms of non-cultural action.

The emergence of the cultural apparatus in communication The mental processes of the τÜ7χναι prove to be bound with formal procedures rather than with content, but they can for their part give form to content. The τÜ7χναι together with the corresponding changes in presuppositions may be collectively regarded as an apparatus: Social experiences, thought structures, forms of imagining and action practices form an ensemble, as said above. In our view this ensemble should be seen as an apparatus. An “apparatus” is a functional aggregate of a variety of actions for specific purposes. Organized thus an apparatus is reproductive (but that does not mean that it is only useful for reproduction purposes). Apparatuses are varied and stand above the individual in terms of character, degree of complexity and reach. Apparatuses of the social kind are institutions (in the meaning of Poulantzas); linguistic and communicational apparatuses are, for example, the modal apparatus, the apparatus for steering speakerhearer activity (argumentation), the turn apparatus; a mental apparatus is, for example, evaluation. The cultural apparatus also belongs in the mental category. It may externalize into a social apparatus (cultural institutions). Once organized in the cultural apparatus the ensembles of social experiences, thought structures, forms of imagining and action practices are applied in a manner that transcends the borders of patterns and discourses. Cultural action is therefore not limited to a single action pattern. A cultural apparatus exists e.g. in the action practice “punctuality”; the process leading to greater volumes of transport and traffic meant people in general felt a need for temporal coordination, thus developing an action practice to cope. Thought structures in

The cultural apparatus

a cultural apparatus become clear in analogy formations as opposed to the focussed procedure for making explanations; forms of imagining become clear in literature in the naturalistic phenomenological presentation as opposed to the idealizing view; an ensemble of action practices, experiences and thought structures underlies the development of different forms of writing as a cultural skill; the development of a script is “social problem solving” (Ehlich 1983) . . . The characteristic of an apparatus is that it allows cultural actions to be passed on to and learnt by the next generation. (Redder & Rehbein 1987: 17)

The cultural apparatus thus displays the following characteristics: –

–

–

The mental processes (τÜ7χναι) involved in cultural action, namely social experiences, thought structures, forms of imagining and action practices, the core of critical action, form an aggregate, i.e. an ensemble, in which formations arise due to the interaction of elements, without all elements having to be involved all the time. The effect of the τÜ7χναι on communication is neither linear, as a sequence of actions following directly one after the other, nor yet that of a holistic pattern; instead they emerge at differing parts of the communication within the framework of other structures. The cultural apparatus has an historical aspect: individual cultural τÜ7χναι develop and grow on the foundation of existing forms, their developments are reified in communicative forms and can thus become the object of a renewed critique etc.

The shaping action of the cultural apparatus Let us now look at further differentiation of the term apparatus. To clarify what effect the restructuring of the mental processes, the crucial criterion of the cultural apparatus, actually has, we must call to mind the fundamental difference between the surface structures of language and communication on the one hand and the deep structures, such as pattern and apparatus, on the other. This distinction must be seen in the context of the structure of the constellation (Rehbein 1977: §11; Bührig 1992) and the stages of the action process (pre-history, history, post-history) through which the constellation progresses. It is obvious that the issue is always the constellation common to speaker and hearer and their joint effort to process the action sequence, with each actor playing his role.42 Generally speaking, according to constellation and stage in the action process, there are standard realizations at the linguistic-communicative surfaces: the aspect of the process which is of interest here is that through being





Jochen Rehbein

verbalized, said realizations become the presuppositions of social groups. As shown earlier, cultural action, sparked off by negating action, intervenes in this complex network of presuppositions to reflect, modify, alter or firmly fix it. Intercultural communication, where differing groups with differing systems of presuppositions taken from different languages meet together, where new groups form with their own sets of interculturally viable systems of presuppositions taken from differing languages, is set to be (increasingly) the main site of cultural action – or its specific non-occurrence. In the communication setting, the restructuring of the mental forms, which, taken altogether, are the essence of the cultural apparatus, generates changes in the surface elements of patterns and apparatuses in reference to the act of processing the constellation and/or the stages of the action process, which may either result in peripheral, temporary changes in structure or permanent ones. Verbalization is such that the restructuring of the mental processes is clearly marked, since the changes occur during the (intercultural) discourse. In this sense, cultural action, especially in the intercultural constellation, can contribute to language change, i.e. to a change of linguistic action in its formal (∼ surface structural) aspects. The restructuring of the τÜ7χναι is thus of a formal nature and this in turn leads, with reference to the constellation, to changes in the relationship between linguistic forms and pattern positions or between linguistic forms and apparatuses, which (can) give rise to new forms of action.43

Emergence of the apparatus in communication: fourth position The cultural apparatus does not appear in the discourse as a complete unit but as components thereof – nor do these appear as a linear, progressive sequence of speech actions. Instead, the cultural apparatus emerges in steps scattered throughout the entire discourse. The central feature is that when cultural action mentally processes the presuppositions (that have been called into question) two outcomes are possible: a. The presuppositions are retained; not only do they continue as before, but their validity becomes even more firmly fixed, i.e. even more immune to potential querying. b. Through the restructuring of the τÜ7χναι, the presuppositions are altered, modified or reflected upon: cultural action. Only when case (b) occurs in communication will the above-mentioned peripheral and temporary or permanent changes occur on the surface of the deep structure of patterns and apparatuses in reference to processing the con-

The cultural apparatus

presuppositions, actions systems

I Action to secure (mutual) understanding Reinforcement of preNo cultural supposiaction, retions newed use and of standard action sys- forms (nortems mal course (insulaof action) tion)

Pursuit of standard action

Negating action II (suspension due to problems; identification of the problem) III restructuring action practices, thought patterns, forms of imagining, social experiences, pattern knowledge etc. in the course of communication possible

Problems become fixed through re- IV petition

presuppositions of the normal course of action become fixed

learning

PostV history

process of reflection

Critique Modificaton of presuppositions (change of actions systems)

Emergence of new forms possible

Subsequent effects on action practices, thought patterns, conceptual forms, forms of imagining, social experiences, pattern knowledge etc.

A distinction must be drawn between the concrete emergence of the cultural apparatus in/at a selected stylistic surface form and a subsequent effect of the stylistic forms on the apparatus leading long-term to a historically new form (such long-term modification does not always happen). Action to ensure mutual understanding (comprehension) (Kameyama 2004) can clarify the misunderstandings/problems at the negating action positions, so that the communication structures obtaining before the misunderstanding are restored.

Figure 3. Emergence of the cultural apparatus

stellation and/or the stages of the action process and thus to the production of critique. Summarizing, the emergence of the cultural apparatus (“emergence schema” for short) manifests in the following steps (cf. Figure 3):





Jochen Rehbein

I II

III

IV

V

the underlying form of standard action (with action systems) contains a problem; negating action, which consists of two parts, suspension of discourse and identification of the problem, calls the presuppositions of (one or more of) the participants into question; there follows a (partial) restructuring of mental processes such as action practices, thought structures, forms of imagining and/or social experiences, pattern knowledge etc. (τÜ7χναι) (“third position”); this results in new forms of (speech) action through an alteration of the relationship between surface and deep structure, i.e. through the act of reflection (“fourth position”); finally the post-history of the apparatus manifests with consequences etc.

Before cultural action appears there has first been the realization that standard actions (“first position” in the discourse) are creating a problem, which is then thematized in step II (“second position” in the discourse; negating action). Following the mental restructuring of the τÜ7χναι in the “third position”, the cultural apparatus emerges in the “fourth position” of the system. The processing of the τÜ7χναι, i.e. a mental restructuring, the crucial process of cultural action, is based on reflection and is to be regarded as an independent stage of the interaction. Since, however, the reorganization takes place in the mind, it is often not apparent that the cultural apparatus has been used until it emerges at fourth position, likewise non-emergence will indicate non-use. Due to the fact that mental restructuring is integrated into the emergence, one may also think of emergence as taking place in “third position” of discourse or text (cf. Figure 6 below).

The apparatus as an aggregate As mentioned before, the τÜ7χναι are social and mental structures which are formed throughout history in a reciprocal relationship to social reality (: P); their forms are thus characterized by their social and historical emergence.44 The τÜ7χναι form “aggregates” in that they operate on standardized communication structures, have a potential reciprocal relationship with each other and shape formal elements of communication according to the principles of emergence. Where they create lasting changes, these are historical versions, in which an interdependence between the social reality (: P) and collective knowledge (: Π[S,H] ) of a group is fixed as presuppositions and “sedimented” in group-forming action systems.

The cultural apparatus P

social historical reality critical examination of the group’s social historical reality

action system (presuppositional structure) aggregate of forms within socio-mental domain

action practices thought structures forms of imagining social experiences

general domain of knowledge P

linguistic of knowledge

Figure 4. Elements of cultural apparatus within the (general) Π-domain in relationship to reality (P) and linguistic knowledge

Innovations of linguistic action Linguistic knowledge Linguistic communication plays a crucial role in the genesis of systems of presuppositions that are specific to a particular social group. It is the means whereby certain thought structures, forms of imagining, general experiences, pattern knowledge and action practices of the social group are put into words and preserved in the group’s linguistic knowledge.45 Language – in the sense of the result of manifold communication processes which have become fixed and generalized – acts as a catalyst to stabilize a relationship between reality and knowledge that has grown (the τÜ7χναι are all categorized as being part of knowledge). In particular when a single language is passed from one generation to the next, the traditional relationship between knowledge and reality is also passed on as part of the linguistic knowledge or, if appropriate, altered and adjusted.46





Jochen Rehbein

Communication in progress It is now time to draw up a model showing the effects of cultural action during communication. As a general rule it can be said that the mental τÜ7χναι act on characteristic points of the communication in progress; these are shown here in accordance with the pragmatic model of knowledge (Ehlich & Rehbein 1986). The following distinctions must be made: in the dimension of action (: F) the action practices are restructured; in that of knowledge (: Π), the thought structures; in the relationship between knowledge and speaking the forms of imagining are restructured, and in the relationship between knowledge and reality (: P), the social experiences. Correspondingly, cultural action takes place in communication when it is applied to the latter’s structures.47 The thesis propounded is that the τÜ7χναι do not only modify the communication process, i.e. the underlying mental processes of speaker and hearer which are expressed in the forms, but are themselves restructured. Communication and τÜ7χναι thus stand in reciprocal relationship to each other (this is symbolized in Figure 5 by the dotted double arrows). Depending on the mental process involved, a variety of dynamic relationships between culture and language thus arises during communication. Fusion: The additional processing of linguistic forms The cultural apparatus exerts a generalized influence to pre-structure and control the production and especially the reception of speech actions. Its characteristics are that it may lead to fixed forms or productive emergence when the τÜ7χναι are employed as mental, formative schemata (Rehbein 1977), the effect being to mark verbal or non-verbal forms (e.g. stylistic forms) with an additional feature. Part of the reason that the named effects combine to constitute the apparatus is the fact that the τÜ7χναι provide mental schemata which S and H use to shape the linguistic forms during the communication in progress. This shaping process occurs at and on the surface of speech actions. Cultural action implements standard forms with shaped elements.48 The restructuring of the τÜ7χναι is not manifest in discrete units (e.g. it usually affects several utterances in the discourse but nevertheless determines the form of the individual utterance); appropriate analysis must necessarily range across more than one communicative speech unit whilst encompassing the units as such. The influence of cultural action shapes the surface of the communication, thus making it reproducible. The forms include the stylistic features of procedures, acts and actions (patterns) of speech acts which are applied to

The cultural apparatus

social historical reality

P

action system (presuppositional structure) action practices thought structures forms of imagining social experiences CA

effects of the current communication on the historic modification of the cultural apparatus

P

application of the cultural apparatus in a current constellation of communication

linguistic of knowledge P DP FS SU

S

PS

p

PH

FH

H

Series of utterances at the surface of the current communication

‘CA’: cultural apparatus; ‘DP’: communicative deep structure; ‘SU’: surface of communication with speaker (‘S’) and hearer (‘H’) and a series of utterance acts; ‘Π’: knowledge domain; ‘P’: social historical reality; ‘p’: propositional act; ‘F’: (speech)action

Figure 5. Effects of the cultural apparatus being applied in a constellation of communication

the communication constellation in progress. Graphic representation may be made of the surface (see Figure 5).49 One example of non-verbal communication may be cited: a study revealed (s. Rehbein 1980) that Turkish youths have synthesized a “mixed gesture” meaning “a small quantity” when they are speaking German; the Turkish gesture “with two parallel hands” and the German gesture “with two fingers of one hand” have combined to give “two fingers with two hands”.





Jochen Rehbein

(8) Gestures which characterize the symbol field can also be regarded as having potential for intercultural action, as when, e.g., a woman speaking Estonian illustrates being trapped in a car by pulling her two outstretched hands side by side up in front of her chest, a situation she verbalizes with the symbol field expression “squashed”. This presentational, independent gesture gives the non-verbal action a dramatic quality. One might even say that this gesture has a propositional quality, since it enriches the symbol field expression “squashed” by indicating the degree to which she was squashed in, an extra piece of information not provided by the verbal communication. Taken over into another language, the non-verbal illustration of symbol fields would be productive intercultural discourse. (cf. Rehbein, Fienemann, Oldörp, & Ohlus 2001: 184)

In all these cases we are not looking at the simple import of sign structures from another language but at the fusion of forms in order to present deep structures of communication at various dimensions of linguistic action. This formal fusion may be termed “intercultural fusion”.50

Historical modification of the systems of presuppositions The forms of expression used in speech actions (“results” of communication) act upon the cultural apparatus and stabilize it or alter its emergence: they act upon the action systems underlying the communicative processes, possibly going a step further to act on the linguistic knowledge. This derives from the retroactive effect of the communication process on the systems of presuppositions held by separate social groups (: action system based on communication), which in their turn mediate between the cultural apparatus and reality. Change can be long- or short-term. Modular construction of the cultural apparatus in discourse In Figure 5 above it was possible to distinguish three stages (CA, DP, SU), with combined effects which are portrayed in a simplified manner below: this makes the “positionality” of the cultural apparatus (: ‘CA’) in the discourse clearer (s. Figure 6). The surface of communication (: ‘SU’) with its sequence of utterance units realizes the deep structure (: ‘DP’) with its standardized constellations. The τÜ7χναι are restructured or implemented in a standardized manner at the mental level and act upon the specific relationship between DP and SU via a change in constellation to emerge at fourth position. During the discourse the cultural apparatus thus acts reciprocally upon the realization relationship between DP

The cultural apparatus Mental restructuring/ reorganisation of te¢ cnai in a process of reflection effected by cultural apparatus (CA)

CA

Communicative deep structure (DP), standardized action constellation (I), change in constellation (II-III-IV) through influence of CA

DP

DP

DP

Sequel of communicative surface elements (SU; utterance acts)

SU

SU

SU

Systematic discourse positions (not local structure)

I

II

first position: standardized action

second position: negating action

III

IV

third fourth position: position: mental process emergence of of restructuring CA in discourse

Figure 6. Modular construction of the cultural apparatus

and SU in translocal manner. The communication in progress acts to reify or alter the cultural apparatus. The diagram shows the separate components in the “modular construction” of the cultural apparatus.

Cultural apparatus – Summary of operation A summary of findings produces a schema for defining the cultural apparatus (: CA) as one of the underlying influences on communication (especially intercultural communication). It displays the following characteristics: i.

The CA is a reproductive and creative aggregate with an historical dimension, ii. which calls into question the presuppositions (action systems) specific to the varying social groups to which the participants belong, iii. whose mental processes (τÜ7χναι), such as action practices, thought structures, pattern knowledge, forms of imagining and social experiences, are restructured iv. with the aim of processing the contradictions between varying social groups in specific social constellations,





Jochen Rehbein

v. by means of reshaping communicative structures such as discourse and text, knowledge and action and the units of action – patterns, acts and procedures. vi. The CA emerges at various (not necessarily sequentially linked) points in the discourse and text, mostly in fourth position. From these definitions we can draw the following conclusions: a. The CA is bound up with all forms of communication including other mental processes, particularly those of evaluation and perception (from (iv)). b. The CA is for the most part tied to a language and can effect processes of linguistic transformation, especially in relation to symbol fields (from (ii)). c. The CA has two opposite effects on reaching understanding (from (iv)) (1) stabilizing (through insistence, fixing or reifying), or (2) producing critical reflection (restructuring).

Conclusions, methodological issues So far the basic definitions of the cultural apparatus have been extrapolated from several scenarios; the analysis has been exhaustive to the extent that the theoretical concepts have often been found to be unexpectedly specialized. At the same time the scenarios were taken as heuristic cases which could serve to test and generalize the abstract categories for their ability to produce analytic findings. Nevertheless, the scenarios examined in this manner remain limited in the extent to which generalizations may be based on them. Therefore it is necessary to make a broader study of the theoretical definitions in various constellations and realizations and to develop the terminology further by using more varied data. One frequently asked question concerns the conditions under which cultural action emerges. To start with, we can return to the thesis outlined at the beginning, namely that intercultural communication is cultural action in multilingual constellations;51 this gives rise to a general condition that multilingual constellations always make communication more difficult, since it involves the differing action systems that are based on the participants’ differing native languages. When communication becomes difficult the participants are inclined to look for new, creative methods of reaching understanding, or at least they cease to trust implicitly in the efficacy of old familiar methods.

The cultural apparatus

However, it is not possible to “predict” cultural action from the difficulties in communication; the process may stop at “mere understanding.” As already shown, a regular pre-condition for cultural action is that the participants pursue standardized forms of speech actions within the context of their systems of presuppositions and that this leads to open, latent or covert problems of understanding or even misunderstanding in a wide range of linguistic and communicative dimensions, but that the participants are not usually or even necessarily aware that the entire situation has an aporetic character. Here the conditions are spread across the entire interaction space of the actors. Problems with understanding lead to a suspension of discourse, which is often not apparent until a discourse analysis is performed. This suspension is to be seen as a special condition for cultural action. The subsequent steps of negating action, collectively referred to as identification of the problem and a querying of the presuppositions, are not fully “observable” since they contain mental elements of the interaction, but they do permit conclusions to be drawn about the restructuring of action practices, thought structures, pattern knowledge, forms of imagining and social experiences. This assertion may be illustrated using the cases under observation. The telephone conversation between the American woman and the German professor went round fruitlessly in circles and was suspended; no restructuring of action practices could be observed, since the participants neither identified the language problem nor did they query their own presuppositions. – The negotiations about royalties revealed the American insisting on her ideas about royalties, thus suspending the conversation but without querying her presuppositions; however, the German publisher’s agent adapted his ideas about selling to the American’s thought structures and thus created the conditions for the emergence of the cultural apparatus, which then led to an agreement at the end of the conversation. – A high level of repetitiveness (suspension) runs through the conversation about a complaint between a German and a Japanese woman, however, both sides repeatedly thematize the problem and query their own presuppositions (about making a complaint) – so that one can deduce that, at least for a trial period, the mental conditions for the emergence of the cultural apparatus were created. Necessary conditions to enable the cultural apparatus to emerge in discourse are: –

The appearance during communication of problems (e.g. misunderstandings) in various dimensions of the action (conditions which can be seen from what manifests in the interaction space)





Jochen Rehbein

– – –

----------------------------------------Suspension of communication Identification of the problem Querying own presuppositions on the part of at least one of the actors

(These last three are conditions most readily seen in the manifestations of subjective dimensions of the actors’ action space.) By themselves, the existence of the various conditions which permit cultural action are no guarantee that the cultural apparatus will emerge, since that requires the actors to reflect on the situation, i.e. to take critical stock and query their presuppositions – and this complex activity is the main condition needed for the τÜ7χναι to be restructured and thus, consequently, for the cultural apparatus to emerge. The “conditions” sketched here for the emergence of cultural action – which are most easily seen through analysis, not through observation – must be complemented by the discourse analysis concept of positionality: usually the standardized action which then causes a problem stands in the “first position” in the discourse and is thematized in the second position (: negating action). Following the mental restructuring of the τÜ7χναι in the “third position” the cultural apparatus emerges (systematically speaking) in the “fourth position”. The conditions for non-cultural action are, by contrast, easy to describe: during or even despite suspension, identification and querying of presuppositions, cultural action can be suppressed. Moreover, if the standardized forms of action are used repetitively and presuppositions maintained, the participants will pass through a culturally “loaded” portion of discourse, leading them to fortify and reaffirm their sets of presuppositions (fixing) and thus to the loss of some conditions which would permit intercultural communication, the overall result being non-cultural action. Therefore an important condition for noncultural action is to react to communication problems by carrying on with business as usual. For many researchers, however, the issue of how to record the restructuring of mental forms, i.e. the preliminary stage directly before the cultural apparatus emerges, is a methodological problem. They ask if there is indeed any procedure at all which could prove the emergence of the cultural apparatus stemming from mental changes in forms? An answer to that is that standardized forms of speech actions must be modelled as a routinized allocation of surface to deep structures of the action. Working from this hypothesis, the proposal is that the restructuring of the mental τÜ7χναι affects deep structures such

The cultural apparatus

as patterns, apparatuses and constellations52 of action and how they relate to the linguistic surface. Therefore the restructuring of the mental processes is revealed in the linguistic forms at the surface, if they are manifestations of deep structure, where they can be made visible through analysis. Let us take one more look at the above examples: –

–

–

The publisher’s agent uses no-but strategies, to signalize the abrupt reversal of his ideas. In addition he uses connectors and matrix constructions; particularly obvious are the passages where he “thinks aloud” by voicing arguments. These realizations illustrate a lively process of sifting through forms of imagining, triggered by the negating action of the American author, and they signalize a break with standardized pattern realizations which goes so far as to suddenly submit to her thought structures. The Japanese customer uses consensual forms of the German communicative apparatus (without negative evaluations) and modifies the linguistic elements contrary to the expectation structures of the saleswoman. She thus restructures a specific action practice for the implementation of the communicative apparatus to suit the situation and her objectives. The German saleswoman uses the conjunctive II in her utterance act to query certain structures of reality and to restructure the “real reality” to produce a common, hearer-based “mental reality”. Using new conceptions, the German action practices for a complaint are adapted to a Japanese inference schema. Confronted with the Turkish word “aidat”, a German hearer reconstructs his experiential knowledge and his perception-driven restructuring of the previous assessment of the situation (: the constellation) leads to “knowledge” of the expression.

What cultural action does in the linguistic and communicative domain is to break with the presuppositions of the action and produce (communicative) reflection thereon in a range of linguistic forms of expression (utterance acts). To be more explicit, the speaker needs to seek and find somewhere to anchor in the subjective dimensions of the hearer’s action space. Otherwise a “formal” action takes place, i.e. one that has standardized externals. Cultural action therefore calls for complex procedures to anchor utterances in the subjective dimensions of the action space, those relating to the categories of constellation, pattern and apparatus and manifesting in the reorganization of surface structures. We now know how tightly these subjective dimensions are bound to the category of constellation. This process of anchoring is not usually accomplished with a single utterance, but stretches over several utterances or the entire discourse.





Jochen Rehbein

Let us now summarize these thoughts in reference to making the cultural apparatus accessible for analysis: restructuring involves a restructuring process in the subjective dimensions of the action space (needs, motivation, perceptions, situation assessment, orientation, evaluation etc.), which takes place where they are bound in standard manner to the realizations of speech action. Thus, the way in which specific subjective dimensions of the action space reveal a change of expression and how that is introduced into the action process allows us to deduce the restructuring that has taken place. Therefore one suggested solution for research into cultural action and intercultural communication is a discourse analysis which is able to reconstruct the functions determined by deep structure from the existing surface forms and measure their formal innovative content in the constellation.

Notes * The paper has been written within the project “The Language of Politeness in Intercultural Communication”, which was sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation (“Stiftung Volkswagenwerk”). Basic reflections were presented for debate in a series of lectures. I should like to thank all the participants in these discussions, in particular Kristin Bührig, Jan ten Thije, Ernst Apeltauer, Hiltraud Caspar-Hehne, Ludger Hoffmann, for their encouraging criticism. – The names, places, times and other means of identification have been altered in the transcriptions. . “The fourth definition of culture. There are cultures and cultures, but in order to survive, a culture must be able to recognize and criticize itself. The act of criticizing its own model and that of other cultures is the fourth meaning of culture. It develops from the third, but at a metalinguistic level that lies directly above it. It is culture in the sense of a critical definition of the dominant culture and a critical recognition of the emerging alternative cultures. In writing “Das Kapital” Marx engaged in this fourth sense of culture – just as the member of an archaic culture who recognizes the limits of his own model and compares it with the alternative model evolving from within or without engages in this fourth sense of culture. This fourth sense of “culture” is always a “counter-culture” in the positive meaning of the term. Counter-culture is thus the critical process of exchange between existing social, scientific and aesthetic paradigms. It is the essence of religious reform; the heresy that draws up its own rules and prefigures a new church. It is the only cultural manifestation which the dominant culture is unable to recognize and accept; the dominant culture tolerates parasitic counter-cultures as more or less harmless deviations, but it cannot accept manifestations of criticism which call its very being into question. Counter-culture is when the transformational forces of culture develop a critical awareness leading to the creation and elaboration of a theory of practice which deviates from that of the dominant model, whilst proposing a model which can be self-sustaining” (Umberto Eco 1977).

The cultural apparatus . Regarding the concept of intercultural communication with “misunderstanding” as its kernel definition, cf. work of e.g. Gumperz (1982, 1992), Becker and Perdue (1982), Rehbein (1986), Knapp (1987), Günthner (1993: 8), Gumperz and Roberts (1991) and many others. . Cf. e.g. Strosetzki (1978). . In Rehbein (1985a), I assumed that communication between people “of differing tongues” is always per se intercultural communication. . The symbol field of language – a concept developed in 1934 by Bühler to describe the functions of the lexical elements contained, e.g., in nouns, verbs, adjectives and prepositions (using traditional terminology) – includes the naming procedures (Ehlich 1986a, 1997). In a naming (or symbol field) procedure an element of reality is verbalized, which can be detached from its situational setting and identified by other actors if they also know the name. If S uses a naming procedure, H is thus in a position, due to his/her knowledge, to find the named element in the real world. Symbol field expressions thus provide the linguistic potential to verbalize and understand particles of knowledge; in the discourse/text, being the synsemantic environment, the linguistic naming of reality is transported by knowledge (further details in Rehbein 1998b). . Whether the linguistic tools of German are indeed “more explicit” depends on what one means by that (see next note). It is a fact that “routine-reliance” (House 1997: 115 et pass.), i.e. the use of stock phrases, is equally common in all languages and should not be seen as an indication of intercultural difference. . The effect of reified action practices thus couched in stock phrases is to make the German utterances appear inexplicit to Anglo-Saxon listeners, since they need additional, linguistic final procedures. A speaker deixis which includes the constellation/speech situation would be explicit to Anglo Saxon ears (because familiar), as would a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to (propositional) questions. Obviously Anglo-Saxon “linguacultures” (House 1997: 117) make more frequent reference to the speech situation, particularly in personal deictic form than German lingacultures do. The observations House (1997) makes on “implicit” German vs. “explicit” English texts point in the right direction, but the factual difference cannot be described in linguistic terms unless the differences in reference to the constellation are taken into account. The above phrase from institutional usage, therefore, should not be interpreted as a “cultural” act, with a view to upholding a prejudice like “German universities are bureaucracies.” . For illustration see the analysis of a Turkish patient talking to his doctor conducted by Hartog (2002), where discourse analysis documents the emergence of cultural action in third position. . Later on, we shall show that as well as incomprehension of action practices, problems with reception relating to forms of perception, imagining, thought and experience can lead to negating actions. . A detailed analysis of the above case paying special attention to the “negotiating” aspect has been published by Rehbein (2001a). . Native like competence of English as opposed to L2 skills is a major factor in membership categorization and both actors are likely to be aware of this fact (on the use of L1 compe-





Jochen Rehbein

tence as a means of exercising power in intercultural communication see Hinnenkamp 1985; Koole & ten Thije 1994). . See Rehbein (1998a) on this term. . Using the terms of Hohenstein and Kameyama (2001) this type of speech may be termed “exothetic speaking”; see also Hohenstein (1999). . This idea was first discussed with Jennifer Hartog. . At present there is not enough material available to draw conclusions about whether the above analysis points to a general problem American diplomacy has in using potential latitude by making concessions (which might be why e.g. the talks in Rambouillet about the Balkan conflict were prematurely broken off in the spring of 1999). . One explanation is offered using Gramsci’s terms: by giving in to the demands of the American co-actor, he appears to be submitting to a kind of “cultural hegemony” (cf. Gramsci 1983) exerted by the North American standard, thus creating what is probably a frequent type of German-American relationship. . In other instances, where the “cultural apparatus” is not applied, we are dealing with a perfectly normal process of interaction in L2 with the associated problems of nonproficiency (see here Meierkord 1996). . The concept of ‘presupposition’ as introduced here is understood in the sense of the “action presuppositions” developed by Ehlich and Rehbein (1972a). According to this concept presuppositions do not “operate” purely locally as pre-conditions for a single utterance or sentence, but permeate discourse and text and are transformed in and through them. A pragmatic analysis of the utterances can, however, reveal the presuppositions. Starting from a logical point of view Oswald Ducrot, in a number of studies, elaborated a semantic concept of ‘presupposition’ which is of great importance for the discussion in pragmatically oriented linguistics (s. esp. Ducrot 1972, 1984). In more recent debates, the categorial relationship of presuppositions to the common stock of knowledge of the interactors, to the foundation of discourse and to the information processing in theme-rheme-/topic-comment structures have been focussed on by several authors (cf. Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990; Levinson 1990: §4; Lambrecht 1994; Grundy 1995; Meibauer 1999: §4). . The systems of address (titles, speaker-hearer deixis etc.) e.g. create specific sociohistorical relationships between the actors and are based on action practices, albeit standardized ones – inasmuch they are not per se cultural acts but they do help to constitute groups. The realization of non-formal politeness in forms of address is to be seen as cultural action because it represents a “break” with standardized action constraints and stylizes the hearer as a member of the public (cf. Rehbein 2002b). . House (1997) takes the view that “culture-specific forms of communication” act as “cultural filters” which make it more difficult or even impossible to understand e.g. translated texts. The concept behind this paper holds that such “cultural filters” are reified forms of cultural action, which must first be extricated and reactivated through reflection and de-hypostazation by the actor and/or analyst. . This clearly reveals the tasks performed by qualitative linguistic discourse analysis, in particular that of reconstructing from the (transcribed) verbal communication data the mental processes involved in the latent or hidden misunderstandings. In so doing the

The cultural apparatus

“construal of participants’ knowledge” which the ethnomethodological approach so often demands becomes an important procedure, which should, however, be complemented by procedures for understanding foreigners in multilingual communication. . Gumperz (1992) e.g. assumes that the correct or incorrect “contextualization of conversational” cues is one major factor that can lead to misunderstanding. Various aspects of “miscommunication”, especially in institutional communication, are treated in the compilation by Coupland, Giles and Wiemann (1991). . Koole and ten Thije (1994) discovered specific “intercultural action patterns to thematize and de-thematize racism”. In particular the pattern whereby something may be thematized often requires the actors to make special efforts such as using tactical action and competence or quoting authorities to ensure that the pattern holds its place in the discourse; in addition it is imperative that other action patterns being used at the time are put on hold (ibid.: 181ff.). . Which can be observed e.g. in inserted repairs. Hinnenkamp points out that discourse is picked up again at the point where it was interrupted by the misunderstanding: “Ideally, the end of a misunderstanding event is constituted by an uptake of the prior thread of conversation, now cleared, of course, of its misunderstandability. I have named this the return to status quo ante” (Hinnenkamp 2001: 225). According to what has been said above, such return may be noted only when action to ensure understanding (Kameyama 2004) has been taken; where there is cultural action the knowledge structures of the interlocutors change when the misunderstanding has been cleared up, but the structures become fixed when no clarification occurs – in the last two cases the ex post discourse is no longer as it was before. . Another mental structure is to be incorporated into the cultural apparatus: ‘pattern knowledge’. Pattern knowledge is one of those knowledge structures which, when it is reorganised in the course of multilingual communication by means of the cultural apparatus, gives rise to positive effects of cultural action but which also, conversely, when the pattern is perpetuated, can lead to a fossilisation that is very hard to reverse. Earlier studies of pattern knowledge in inter-cultural communication (such as the patterns for asking advice, making an appointment or a complaint, or those present in teacher-student communication etc.) examined only the aspect of how rigid action structures can collide when people of differing linguistic background communicate and how this leads to “misunderstandings” or “problematic communication”. In contrast to these approaches, positive adjustments of communicative patterns are described in Koole and ten Thije (1994); the partial revision of the “making a complaint” pattern in a retail shop is discussed in Ohama (1987); Rehbein and Fienemann (2004) write with reference to Clyne (1994): “Many people who communicate in a lingua franca such as Australian English or German in Germany, per presupposition, have at their command the pattern knowledge in their native tongue and in part the same or a similar pattern knowledge in the target language” (p. 264). . It will be seen that the “restructuring” takes places during the discourse, and is thus an expression of discursive processing. It can involve new interpretations or reinterpretations of other (linguistic) forms, and is in this respect not similar to a transformation of linguistic forms in and through the current discourse(s).





Jochen Rehbein . On the position the mental processes which will be discussed in the following occupy within the context of functional pragmatic action theory, see Redder and Rehbein (1999: Sec. 2.4, p. 7ff.). . Action practices are based both conceptually and historically on a communicative process. In 1999 Groebner charted the increasingly politicised semantic history of “practice” since the end of the Middle Ages. “At the start of the 16th century, at first in memos and letters, i.e. in political and diplomatic writings in the narrower sense and then in chronicles, political treatises and polemical articles in Upper Germany and Switzerland a new word for covert actions appears – Practick or, as a verb, practicieren. The word is a borrowing from Italian and French, from pratticare or pratiques. In Italian the word is used in a neutral manner to mean negotiation; for example the official minutes of Florentine council committees are known as consulte e pratiche. In German, by contrast, Practick or prakticieren is a very negative word” (ibid.: 71). “But Practick is not a new word. It has been in use in its Latin form since the 13th century in medical textbooks. Ever since Guido von Arezzo those parts of the textbook which deal with bodily functions and symptoms are headed Practica, those dealing with the treatment of internal diseases are called Theoretica. . ..they contain collections of popular rules for cupping, bathing, blood-letting etc., weather forecasts and prophecies about heavenly portents and darkly allegorical predictions on political affairs” (ibid.: 74). “Practizieren and Practick have a paradoxical double meaning: they are closely linked to the increased importance of the invisible in the discourse on politics” (ibid.: 77). “In the 16th and 17th century the word Practick embarks on a remarkable career as battle slogan in the debate about the raison d’état and arcana imperii. It retained for a long time its polemical connotation of ambiguity – the amphibolic speech which was an object of Luther’s polemics – both during the Peasants’ War and in Reformation polemics, in connection with debates about Machiavelli and later Jesuit “Practicks”” (ibid.: 78). In summary, a Practick is a politically motivated arrangement based on communicative agreements for specific purposes and is directed against the ruling social orders. Its covert character is no longer felt to be negative; rather it should be viewed as the result of communication, as a part of all participants’ mental store which can be triggered for automatic recall in specific constellations. When it enters different types of text and discourse, both written and oral, it lends them a certain formal and stylistic ambiguity, which the listener can interpret to mean one thing or another depending on his association with a political grouping and the knowledge that involves. . Likewise a mental form of apparatus; see Rehbein (1994a). . Compare his chapter on “Gedanke und Wort” (Thought and Word) (1964), which postulates the genesis of thought from the internalization and gradual abstraction of the argument-predicate structures used in children’s talk. . Apart from Vygotsky (1964), Otto Selz presented a series of experimental work on the subject of thought patterns (e.g. Selz 1913). . It is probable that more than 90% of the expressions in a language can be allocated to the symbol field (cf. Ehlich 1997). . According to Ehlich, Mackenzie, Rehbein and ten Thije (2000). . This case is analyzed in detail in Rehbein (2002b).

The cultural apparatus . An alteration of forms of imagining during the intercultural discourse is, in numerous cases, likely to be responsible for linguistic change (cf. the theoretical deliberations s. below). . In another case, not further detailed here, where American ideas are adopted in German press releases (e.g. Die Welt 18.12.1999) the preferred concepts are not changed but retained despite the negation of the language system and the linguistic forms are adjusted to fit the conceptual world. Here one must assume that the conceptual world does not change during the process of writing but that no restructuring of the ideas takes place when linguistic forms are applied which are not suited to the German language system and that the linguistic change is, so to speak, an afterthought. . I agree with Redder’s (1995) statement that “stereotypes” represent behaviours (surface forms of natural behaviour) and that the term “stereotype” is thus not suitable for a description of prejudices which are knowledge structures. . Perception was analysed in 1997 by Rehbein as a “mechanism” – a category which above all refers to the application of (pre)knowledge in the perception field. The category “perception space” was discussed in connection with the analysis of local and temporal deixis by Ehlich (1979). . This analysis is not, however, etymologically correct, since “aidat” (income, membership fees, deductions) has nothing to do with the Turkish word “ay” (moon, month) but is taken from the Arabic meaning “benefit, use, advantage, profit”; Arabic “aid” (belonging to), “aidiya” (belonging, Turkish “aidiyet” or “aitlik” and Arabic “iada” (return, sending back, restoration, repetition, reinstatement etc., Turkish “iade”) all come from the same root (cf. Wehr 1977: 586–587). Persian (e.g. Persian “ida–”, deposit, hand over, pay in) has, just like Turkish, borrowed these words from Arabic. I thank Birsel Karakoç (project “Linguistic connectivity in children growing up in a bilingual Turkish-German environment” at the Collaborative Research Centre SFB 538 in Hamburg) for pointing this out. – In this particular example the qualitative and quantitative scope of the payment due remain an open matter, i.e. the reference to reality (: P-reference) of the word remains unspecified in this subjective derivation of the term. . Cf. more detailed, data-based analyses of evaluation in narratives and their significance for second language narration, Fienemann (2006). . Cf. too Koole and ten Thije (1994: 191ff.). . This explains why, when retaining presuppositions in altered constellations, the result can be a “cultural crisis” for all the actors participating in the action system (personal comment from R. v. Kügelgen). . My thanks are due to R. v. Kügelgen for pointing out and discussing the following problem. The question of whether the characteristic of cultural action, the “restructuring of mental processes”, is in fact nothing more than a learning process is very pertinent, since learning and cultural action are both mental functions. However, the restructuring is anchored in diacritical manner. Thus the specific features of cultural action are (a) the starting point in a social action system (b) negating action and (c) the social shaping of the alteration/modification with regard to the relationship between interactional deep structures and surface realization. But in the final analysis, learning is an individual change, cultural action a collective one. Thus the acquisition of writing or language skills is a learning process, not





Jochen Rehbein

cultural action, even though mental processes are restructured in the course thereof; by contrast the actual (phylogenetic) creation of collectively used systems of writing and language is cultural action. The individual thought process and the acquisition of thought structures are not per se cultural action, even if the process involves the individual modification of general knowledge; cultural action starts with the collective reshaping of common thought structures with the aim of adapting and gaining access to the thought structures and thus effecting a change in the communication structure. Cultural action is thus the “inscription” of common action practices, thought structures, forms of imagining and experiential knowledge into the communication structures of social groups, once negating action has shown that what was hitherto presupposed is unsuited to an inter-group interaction. For these reasons the scenarios of cultural action discussed here may be assumed to have structures which permit generalization. . Regarding the τÜ7χναι as specifically mental structural transformations within a set of mental processes collectively termed an “aggregate” rules out the possibility that they might be considered “norms”, “values”, “mentalities”, “morals”, “customs” or similar structures – these being collective mental structures which are often quoted as a definition of “culture”. Nor does the sum of these parts mean “culture” in the sense of “apparatus” as used here, which is a dynamic concept. If, however, the collective mental structures are processed through cultural action, they will be turned into “cultural objects” which are better counted as part of the “mental and spiritual domain” mentioned in the foreword, to which cultural action is applied in a different manner, but which can also contribute to the “de-reification” of mental structures. . The preservation of τÜ7χναι in linguistic knowledge is somewhat similar to the reification of cultural action; therefore specific forms of speech actions are necessary to seek out and reactivate, i.e. to “de-reify” the results of cultural action which have thus been fixed in systems of presuppositions. . The linguistic fields do of course have different functions here, however, the symbol fields (and special aspects of prosody and non-verbal communication) are most probably especially sensitive to the process of preserving the results and providing a starting point for cultural action. With regard to intercultural communication bi-lingual dictionaries are important sources of data, offering documentation of linguistic knowledge in the form of systematic “knowledge adaptations” (Ayivi 2000) in reference to each single language. . The above conditions obtain in a theoretical linguistic model based on the speaker and hearer, which cannot be explained in detail here. Therefore we confine ourselves to listing the abbreviations; the propositional content (p), reality (P), the speaker’s (: S) knowledge (ΠS ) and hearer’s (: H) knowledge (ΠH ). Moreover underlying directional relationships exist between the dimensions. The relationship between reality and (its perception and processing in the) knowledge of S differs fundamentally from the relationship between the knowledge of S and its verbalization in the propositional content p as well as the reception of the propositional content in the knowledge of H (relationship p – ΠH ). The reception (with a check against reality) leads H to process the content in his or her knowledge or to start a subsequent action (cf. also Rehbein 1999). . Within the context of various papers concerning mentalism-free semiotics, e.g. “Système de la mode”, Roland Barthes introduced the connotation as an additional component

The cultural apparatus

of denotation. The idea behind this is that of an extra “investissement” of formal work – performing a similar, extra task which also results from cultural action but which can only be explained as an additional sign structure in a structuralist concept of semiology. Taking certain observations into account, this is, however, contrasted here with the dynamic concept of restructuring mental forms. . These are really examples of reification. The issue of the cultural apparatus is not, however, the reproduction of standard surface forms and their hypostasis but rather their alteration. . ‘Fusion’ as a result of the mixture of linguistic procedures from typologically different languages is discussed by Matras (1996) (and pass.). . Of course cultural action exists outside of multilingualism and can also emerge in monolingual constellations. . It remains to be seen to what extent institutions, institutes and discourse or text types should be included.

References Ayivi, Christian Kodzo (2000). Zweisprachige Lexikographie: Zur Adaptation von Wissen in ewe-deutschen und deutsch-ewe Wörterbüchern. Münster: Waxmann. Barthes, Roland (1967). Système de la Mode. Paris: Seuil. Baur, Isolde (1951). Die Geschichte des Wortes “Kultur” und seiner Zusammensetzungen. Universität München: Philosophische Fakultät (Diss.). Becker, Angelika & Perdue, Clive (1982). “Ein einziges Mißverständnis – wie die Kommunikation schieflaufen kann und weshalb”. In F. Januschek & W. Stölting (Eds.), Handlungsorientierung im Zweitspracherwerb. Osnabrück: OBST, 22(82), 96–121. Bühler, Karl (1934). Sprachtheorie. Jena: Fischer. Bührig, Kristin (1992). Zur Generalisierung qualitativer Forschungsergebnisse. Arbeitspapier des Projekts “Entwicklung von Narrativität bei türkischen und deutschen Schülern in Familie und Schule (ENDFAS)”. Universität Hamburg: Institut für Germanistik I (mimeo). Bührig, Kristin (1996). Reformulierende Handlungen: Zur Analyse sprachlicher Adaptierungsprozesse in institutioneller Kommunikation. Tübingen: Narr. Bührig, Kristin & Rehbein, Jochen (2000). Reproduzierendes Handeln. Übersetzen, simultanes und konsekutives Dolmetschen im diskursanalytischen Vergleich. Working Papaers on Multilingualism, Series B (Nr. 6). Universität Hamburg: Sonderforschungsbereich 538 Mehrsprachigkeit. Caspar-Hehne, Hiltraud (1999). Interkulturelle Kommunikation: Neue Perspektiven und alte Einsichten. Zeitschrift für Angewandte Linguistik, 31(1999), 77–107. Chierchia, Gennaro & McConnell-Ginet, Sally (1990). Meaning and Grammar – an Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge: MIT Press. Clyne, Michael (1994). Inter-cultural communication at work: Cultural values in discourse. Cambridge: University Press.





Jochen Rehbein

Coupland, Nikolas, Giles, Howard, & Wiemann, John M. (Eds.). (1991). “Miscommunication” and Problematic Talk. Newbury Park etc.: Sage. Die Welt 18.12.1999 Ducrot, Oswald (1972). Dire et ne pas dire: Principes de sémantique linguistique. Paris: Hermann. Ducrot, Oswald (1982). “Présuppositions et actes de langages”. In Oswald Ducrot (Ed.), Le dire et le dit (pp. 13–114). Paris: Minuit. Eco, Umberto (1977). “Esiste la contrecultura?”. In Umberto Eco (Ed.), Sette anni di desiderio (1983/2000) (pp. 217–231). Milano: Bompiani. Ehlich, Konrad (1979). Verwendungen der Deixis beim sprachlichen Handeln: Linguistischphilologische Untersuchungen zum hebräischen deiktischen System. 2 Bde. Frankfurt am Main: Lang. Ehlich, Konrad (1983). “Development of writing as social problem solving”. In F. Coulmas & K. Ehlich (Eds.), Writing in Focus (pp. 99–129). Berlin usw.: de Gruyter/Mouton. Ehlich, Konrad (1984). “Stichwort Interkulturelle Kommunikation”. In W.-D. Klein & I. Paul (Eds.), Sprachliche Aufmerksamkeit: Glossen und Marginalien zur Sprache der Gegenwart (pp. 42–48). Heidelberg: Winter. Ehlich, Konrad (1986). Interjektionen. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Ehlich, Konrad (1986a). “Funktional-pragmatische Kommunikationsanalyse”. In D. Flader (Ed.). (1991), Verbale Interaktion. Studien zur Empirie und Methodologie der Pragmatik (pp. 124–143). Stuttgart: Metzler. Ehlich, Konrad (1992). “Scientific texts and deictic structures”. In D. Stein (Ed.), Cooperating with written texts (pp. 201–229). Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Ehlich, Konrad (1997). “Linguistisches Feld und poetischer Fall – Eichendorffs Lockung”. In K. Ehlich (Ed.), Eichendorffs Inkognito (pp. 163–194). Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Ehlich, Konrad (1998). “Interkulturelle Kommunikation”. In H. Goebl, P. Nelde, Z. Star, & W. Wölck (Eds.), Kontaktlinguistik/Contact Linguistics/Linguistique de contact. 1. Vol. (pp. 920–931). Berlin usw.: de Gruyter. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1972). “Zur Konstitution pragmatischer Einheiten in einer Institution: das Speiserestaurant”. In D. Wunderlich (Ed.), Linguistische Pragmatik (pp. 209–254). Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1972a). “Erwarten”. In D. Wunderlich (Ed.), Linguistische Pragmatik (pp. 99–114). Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1972b). “Einige Interrelationen von Modalverben”. In D. Wunderlich (Ed.), Linguistische Pragmatik (pp. 318–341). Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1977). “Wissen, kommunikatives Handeln und die Schule”. In H. C. Goeppert (Ed.), Sprachverhalten im Unterricht (pp. 36–113). München: Fink. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1986). Muster und Institution: Untersuchungen zur schulischen Kommunikation. Tübingen: Narr. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1994). “Institutionsanalyse. Prolegomena zur Untersuchung von Kommunikation in Institutionen.” In G. Brünner & G. Graefen (Eds.), Texte und Diskurse. Methoden und Forschungsergebnisse der Funktionalen Pragmatik (pp. 287–327). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

The cultural apparatus

Ehlich, Konrad, Mackenzie, Lachlan, Rehbein, Jochen, & Thije, Jan D. ten (2000). “A German-English-Dutch Glossary for Functional Pragmatics.” Edited by J. D. ten Thije. (to appear in J. Rehbein (Ed.), Funktionale Pragmatik im Spektrum (forthcoming)). Essed, Philomena (1991). Understanding everyday racism: An interdisciplinary theory. London: Sage. Fienemann, Jutta (2006). Erzählen in zwei Sprachen: Diskursanalytische Untersuchungen von Erzählungen auf Deutsch und Französisch. Münster: Waxmann. Godard, Daniele (1977). “Same setting, different norms: Phone call beginnings in France and the united States”. Language in Society, 6(1977), 209–219. Graefen, Gaby (1997). Der Wissenschaftliche Artikel: Textart und Textorganisation. Frankfurt/M.: Lang. Gramsci, Antonio (1983). Marxismus und Kultur. Ideologie, Alltag, Literatur. Edited and translated S. Kebir. Hamburg: VSA. Grießhaber, Wilhelm (1985). “Zitieren von Handlungsmustern: “Recht im Alltag” im Unterricht für ausländische Arbeiter”. In J. Rehbein (Ed.), Interkulturelle Kommunikation (pp. 257–275). Tübingen: Narr. Grießhaber, Wilhelm (1987). Authentisches und zitierendes Handeln. Bd I. Einstellungsgespräche. Tübingen: Narr. Groebner, Valentin (1999). “Trügerische Zeichen: Practick und das politisch Unsichtbare am Beginn der Neuzeit”. In H. D. Kittsteiner (Ed.), Geschichtszeichen (pp. 63–80). Köln etc.: Böhlau. Grundy, Peter (1995). Doing Pragmatics. London: Arnold. Günthner, Susanne (1993). Diskursstrategien in der Interkulturellen Kommunikation: Analysen deutsch-chinesischer gespräche. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Gumperz, John J. (1982). Discourse Strategies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gumperz, John J. (1992). “Contextualization and understanding.” In A. Duranti & Ch. Goodwin (Eds.), Rethinking context (pp. 229–252). New York: Cambridge University Press, 229–252. Gumperz, John J. & Roberts, Celia (1991). “Understanding in intercultural encounters.” In J. Blommaert & J. Verschueren (Eds.), The Pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication (pp. 51–90). Amsterdam: Benjamins. Hartog, Jennifer (2002). “‘Beyond ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘cultural stereotypes”’. (this volume) Hinnenkamp, Volker (1985). “Zwangskommunikative Interaktion zwischen Gastarbeitern und deutscher Behörde”. In J. Rehbein (Ed.), Interkulturelle Kommunikation (pp. 276– 298). Tübingen: Narr. Hinnenkamp, Volker (2001). “Constructing misunderstanding as a cultural event”. In A. Di Luzio, S. Günthner, & F. Orletti (Eds.), Culture in Communication. Analyses of intercultural situations (pp. 211–243). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Hoffmann, Ludger (Ed.). (2003). Funktionale Syntax. Die pragmatische Perspektive. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter. Hohenstein, Christiane (1999). “Sprecherexothesen im Japanischen (I): Vokallängung und ‘ano”’. In K. Bührig & Y. Matras (Eds.), Sprachtheorie und sprachliches Handeln (pp. 265–281). Tübingen: Stauffenburg.





Jochen Rehbein

Hohenstein, Christiane (2002). Erklärendes Handeln in der Diskursart ‘Wissenschaftlicher Vortrag’: Ein Vergleich des Deutschen mit dem Japanischen. Universität Hamburg (Diss.). Hohenstein, Christiane & Kameyama, Shinichi (1996). “Exothesen”. [Verbmobil-Memo 105]. Universität Hamburg, Institut für Germanistik. In J. Rehbein & Sh. Kameyama (Ed.) (2001), Bausteine diskursanalytischen Wissens (in prep.). House, Juliane (19972 ). Translation Quality Assessment: A model revisited. Tübingen: Narr. Kameyama, Shinichi (1999). “Wiederholen”. In K. Bührig & Y. Matras (Eds.), Sprachtheorie und sprachliches Handeln (pp. 187–211). Tübingen: Stauffenburg. Kameyama, Shinichi (1997). “Realisierungsmengen: Die Realisierung sprachlicher Handlungsmuster am Beispiel des Musters der Terminabsprache”. In J. Rehbein & Sh. Kameyama (Ed.). (2001), Bausteine diskursanalytischen Wissens (in prep.). Kameyama, Shinichi (2004). Verständnissicherndes Handeln. Zur reparativen Bearbeitung von Rezeptionsdefiziten in deutschen und japanischen Diskursen. Münster: Waxmann. Karakoç, Birsel personal communication. Koole, Tom & Thije, Jan D. ten (1992). “Der interkulturelle Diskurs von Teambesprechungen: Zu einer Pragmatik der Mehrsprachigkeit”. In G. Brünner & G. Graefen (Eds.), Texte und Diskurse (pp. 412–434). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Koole, Tom & Thije, Jan D. ten (1994). The construction of intercultural discourse: Team discussions of educational advisers. [Utrecht Studies in Language and Communication 2]. Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi. von Kügelgen, Rainer (2003). “Parenthesen handlungstheoretisch betrachtet”. In Ludger Hoffmann (Ed.), Funktionale Syntax. Die pragmatische Perspektive (pp. 208–230). Berlin, New York: de Gruyter. Lambrecht, Knud (1994). Information structure and sentence form: Topic, focus and the mental representation of discourse referents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levinson, Steven C. (19902 ). Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Matras, Yaron (1996). “Prozedurale Fusion: Grammatische Interferenzschichten im Romanes”. Sprachtypologie und Universalienforschung, 49(1), 60–78. Mattel-Pegam, Gesine (1985). “Ein italienischer Strafgefangener konsultiert einen deutschen Rechtsanwalt”. In J. Rehbein (Ed.), Interkulturelle Kommunikation (pp. 299– 323). Tübingen: Narr. Meibauer, Jörg (1999). Pragmatik. Tübingen: Stauffenburg. Meierchord, Christiane (1996). Englisch als Medium der interkulturellen Kommunikation. Untersuchungen zum non-native-/non-native-speaker-Diskurs. Frankfurt/M.: Lang. Ohama, Ruiko (1987). “Eine Reklamation”. In A. Redder & J. Rehbein (Eds.), Osnabrücker Beiträge zur Sprachtheorie, 38(87), 27–51. Arbeiten zur interkulturellen Kommunikation. Pauwels, Anne (Ed.). (1994). “Special Issue on Intercultural Communication in the Professions”. Multilingua – Journal of Cross-Cultural and Interlanguage Communication, 13(1/2). Poulantzas, Nikos (1975). Klassen im Kapitalismus – heute. Berlin: VSA. Redder, Angelika (1986). Modalverben im Unterrichtsdiskurs. Zur Pragmatik der Modalverben am Beispiel eines institutionellen Diskurses. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Redder, Angelika (1995). ““Stereotyp”: eine sprachwissenschaftliche Kritik”. Jahrbuch Deutsch als Fremdsprache, 21, 311–329.

The cultural apparatus

Redder, Angelika (1999). “‘Werden’: funktional-grammatische Bestimmungen”. In A. Redder & J. Rehbein (Eds.), Grammatik und mentale Prozesse (pp. 295–336). Tübingen: Stauffenburg. Redder, Angelika & Rehbein, Jochen (1987). “Zum Begriff der Kultur”. In A. Redder & J. Rehbein (Eds.), Osnabrücker Beiträge zur Sprachtheorie, 38(87), 7–21. Arbeiten zur interkulturellen Kommunikation. Redder, Angelika & Rehbein, Jochen (1999). “Zusammenhänge zwischen Grammatik und mentalen Prozessen”. In A. Redder & J. Rehbein (Eds.), Grammatik und mentale Prozesse (pp. 1–12). Tübingen: Stauffenburg. Rehbein, Jochen (1977). Komplexes Handeln. Elemente zur Handlungstheorie der Sprache. Stuttgart: Metzler. Rehbein, Jochen (1980). “Verbale und nonverbale Kommunikation im interkulturellen Kontakt.” In P. Nelde et al. (Eds.), Sprachprobleme bei Gastarbeiterkindern (pp. 111– 127). Tübingen: Narr. Rehbein, Jochen (1985a). “Einführung in die interkulturelle Kommunikation”. In J. Rehbein (Ed.), Interkulturelle Kommunikation (pp. 7–38). Tübingen: Narr. Rehbein, Jochen (1986). “Institutioneller Ablauf und interkulturelle Mißverständnisse in der Allgemeinpraxis. Diskursanalytische Aspekte der Arzt-Patient-Kommunikation”. Curare, 9, 297–328. Rehbein, Jochen (1994). “Rejective Proposals”. [Special Issue on Intercultural Communication in the Professions] Multilingua – Journal of Cross-Cultural and Interlanguage Communication, 13(1/2), 83–130. Rehbein, Jochen (1994a). “Theorien, sprachwissenschaftlich betrachtet”. In G. Brünner & G. Graefen (Eds.), Texte und Diskurse. Methoden und Forschungsergebnisse der Funktionalen Pragmatik (pp. 25–67). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Rehbein, Jochen (1997). “Sie?”. In D. Gipser, I. Schalabi, & E. Tichy (Eds.), Das nahe Fremde und das entfremdete Eigene im Dialog zwischen den Kulturen. Festschrift für Nabil Kassem (pp. 253–256). Hamburg, Kairo: edition zebra. Rehbein, Jochen (1998a). “Die Verwendung von Institutionensprache in Ämtern und Behörden”. In L. Hoffmann, H. Kalverkämper, & E. H. Wiegand (Eds.), Fachsprachen. Ein internationales Handbuch zur Fachsprachenforschung und Terminologiewissenschaft (pp. 660–675). Berlin: de Gruyter. Rehbein, Jochen (1998b). “Austauschprozesse zwischen unterschiedlichen fachlichen Kommunikationsbereichen”. In L. Hoffmann, H. Kalverkämper, & E. H. Wiegand (Eds.), Fachsprachen. Ein internationales Handbuch zur Fachsprachenforschung und Terminologiewissenschaft. Vol. I. (pp. 689–710). Berlin: de Gruyter Mouton. Rehbein, Jochen (1999). “Zum Modus von Äußerungen”. In A. Redder & J. Rehbein (Eds.), Grammatik und mentale Prozesse (pp. 91–143). Tübingen: Stauffenburg. Rehbein, Jochen (2001a). “Intercultural negotiation”. In A. Di Luzio, S. Günthner, & F. Orletti (Eds.), Culture in Communication. Analyses of intercultural situations (pp. 173– 207). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.





Jochen Rehbein

Rehbein, Jochen (2001b). “Prolegomena zu Untersuchungen von Diskurs, Text, Oralität und Literalität unter dem Aspekt mehrsprachiger Kommunikation”. In B. Meyer & N. Toufexis (Eds.), Text/Diskurs, Oralität/Literalität unter dem Aspekt mehrsprachiger Kommunikation [Arbeiten zur Mehrsprachigkeit, Folge B 11]. Universität Hamburg: SFB Mehrsprachigkeit. Rehbein, Jochen (2001c). “Konzepte der Diskursanalyse”. In K. Brinker, G. Antos, W. Heinemann, & S. Sager (Eds.). (2001), Text- und Gesprächslinguistik. 2. Halbband. HSK (pp. 927–945). Berlin: de Gruyter. Rehbein, Jochen, Fienemann, Jutta, Ohlhus, Sören, & Oldörp, Christine (2001). “Nonverbale Kommunikation im Videotranskript: Zu nonverbalen Aspekten höflichen Handelns in interkulturellen Konstellationen und ihre Darstellung in computergestützten Videotranskriptionen”. In D. Möhn, D. Roß, & M. Tjarks-Sobhani (Eds.), Mediensprache und Medienlinguistik. Festschrift für Jörg Hennig (pp. 167–198). Frankfurt/M.: Lang. Rehbein, Jochen & Fienemann, Jutta (2004). “Introductions: Being polite in multilingual settings”. In J. House & J. Rehbein (Eds.), Multilingual Communication (pp. 223–278). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Rehbein, Jochen (Ed.). (1985). Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Tübingen: Narr. Sacks, Harvey (1972). “On the analyzability of stories by children”. In J. J. Gumperz & D. Hymes (Eds.), Directions in Sociolinguistics. The Ethnography of Communication (pp. 325–345). New York etc.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Sacks, Harvey, Schegloff, Emmanuel, & Jefferson, Gail (1974). “A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation”. Language, 50, 696–735. Sader-Jin, Friederike (1987). “Erklären als interaktiver Prozeß”. In J. Gerighausen & P. C. Seel (Ed.), Aspekte einer interkulturellen Didaktik (pp. 46–59). München: Iudicium. Selz, Otto (1913). Über die Gesetze des geordneten Denkverlaufs: Eine eperimentelle Untersuchung. Stuttgart: Spemann. Strosetzki, Christoph (1978). Konversation. Ein Kapitel gesellschaftlicher und literarischer Pragmatik im Frankreich des 17. Jahrhunderts. Frankfurt/M.: Lang. The new Oxford dictionary of English (1998). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ueding, Gert (2001). Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, 1360–1366. Vol. 5: L–Musi. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Wagner, Jochen (1998). “Iudicium”. In Ueding, Gert (Ed.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Vol. 4. (pp. 662–692). Hu – K. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Wehr, Hans (1977). Arabisches Wörterbuch. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Wygotski, Lew S. (1934). “Gedanke und Wort”. In Lew S. Wygotsky (1964), Denken und Sprechen (pp. 291–359). Berlin: Akademie.

Notions of perspective and perspectivising in intercultural communication research Jan D. ten Thije

The appeal of the notion of perspective The notion of perspective has aroused the interest of an increasing number of researchers within linguistics. If we take a good look at the linguistic phenomena that are analysed with reference to perspective, it is possible to discern at least five different phenomena (Lindeman 1993: 7). These are: – – –

– –

spatial orientation (deixis) (Ballweg 1997; Fillmore 1982; Hoffmann 1997; Zifonun 1997) judging (Bredel & Dittmar 1997; Keim 1996; Rehbein 1984; Sandig 1996; Vonderwülbecke 1997; Bredel 2002) subjectivity and its specific knowledge structure (Cornelis 1995; Edelstein & Keller 1982; Köller 1993; Langacker 1995; Lindemann 1993; Zifonun 2002, 2003; Graumann & Karlmeyer 2002) intonation (Canisius 1993), and the propositional attitude or the relation between the matrix sentence and the subordinated clause (Brünner 1991; Hartung 1996; Dittmar & Bredel 1998; Sanders 1994; Sanders & Redeker 1993; Rehbein 2003)

What could be the reason as to why so many different phenomena are analysed under the same heading? I can formulate three possible reasons for the appeal of perspective. First of all, the original meaning of perspective, as the organising principle of the representation of a three-dimensional space on a plane surface, still stimulates the academic imagination. Every day, we are faced with the temptations of all kinds of virtual realities on television, games and the Internet. However, the aspects that you observe in these constantly changing environments are still



Jan D. ten Thije

determined by one vanishing point. This brilliant discovery from the sixteenth century is easily understood as a metaphor and, as a consequence, perspectivity is transposed as an organising principle to other cognitive domains and mental activities. However, the appeal of perspective may also have another reason. To shift perspective from the author to the character to the reader, from the speaker to the hearer to the audience and vice versa is fundamental to any interpretation process. As soon as the reconstruction of meaning goes beyond introspection, the shifting of perspectives comes into sight. Could it be that this methodical principle has simply been elevated to a theory? That a technical notion has become a theoretical one? Finally, the notion of perspective has a particular attraction for linguists today. It is apparent that the notion of perspective covers a range of phenomena that have been on the periphery of structural linguistics for a long time. A common feature of elements of these phenomena is that they go beyond the boundaries of the clause – that clause in its ‘splendid’ isolation. Other disciplines like Psychology or Sociology have taken the lead in the analysis of these perspective phenomena and linguists are trying to integrate their findings. Could perspective be one of the notions that signal compensation for the object reduction of linguistics (Ehlich 1996)? In this book we ask the question as to whether analyses of intercultural communication have determined and enriched linguistic methodology and theory. In this chapter, I will try to answer this question with respect to the use of the notion of perspective. It is clear that perspective and perspectivity were not invented within the field of intercultural communication, as I will illustrate in the next section. Subsequently in Section 3, the application of the notion of perspective within various studies of intercultural discourse will be discussed. Section 4 contains an example of an analysis of intercultural discourse beyond misunderstanding that illustrates my conception of perspectivising intercultural discourse. In Section 5, conclusions are drawn with respect to the effect of intercultural studies on linguistics.

A short historical survey König (1989) provides us with a very informative historical survey of the notion of perspective. This notion was already used in the Middle Ages to denote a special branch of applied science, namely the optics. The term is derived from the Latin verb perspicere, which means ‘to observe accurately’. As Köller (1993)

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

points out, perspective was understood as the ‘doctrine of accurately observing’ until the Renaissance. The discovery at that time of the technique of the vanishing point to create depth in painting set a new standard for representing reality. Only ‘paintings in perspective’ could reach the standard of a realistic representation. Leibniz (1646–1716) was the scholar who introduced the notion of perspective in Philosophy. He formulated the idea that every representation depends on the point of view of its observer: II est vray que la même chose peut etre representée differemment; mais il doit tousjours y avoir un rapport exact entre la representation et la chose, et par consequent entre les differentes representations d’une même chose. (Leibniz, cit. in König 1989) It is true that the same object can be represented in different ways, but there should always be a clear connection between the representation and the object, and consequently between the different representations of the same object. (my translation)

From Philosophy, the notion found its way into other disciplines within the Humanities. In History, the notion became important with respect to epistemological discussions on the value of historical knowledge. In Sociology, perspective was adopted by Herbert Mead ([1927] 1983) in his well-known theory on sociality that we will discuss later more extensively. In Psychology, Graumann (1960) formulated his phenomenological theory on observation and in Literary Studies, the notion of perspective has stimulated the novel theory that differentiates between the author’s and the character’s perspective (Bakhtin 1973). Finally, mention should be made of Panovky’s (1992) report on the debate within the History of Art referring to the question as to whether the use of the central perspective should be regarded as the visual truth or solely as a convention. It is striking that König (1989) does not pay any attention to the linguistic developments of perspective in his survey. We can conclude that the use of the notion within linguistics is relatively recent. For instance, Köller (1993) states that the notion of perspective is not used in discussions on language and culture (e.g. Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis). The first real terminological use of perspective may be the theory on ‘functional sentence perspective’ (Mathesius 1929). It would appear that recent linguistic use of perspective has mainly been influenced by the developments in Sociology, Psychology and Literary Studies that form the basis of this survey.



 Jan D. ten Thije

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to reconstruct the complete development of the notion of perspective within Linguistics, but we cannot ignore the way Ferdinand De Saussure used the notion. In order to distinguish between his synchronic and diachronic approach to language, he states: La synchrony ne connait qu’une perspective, celle des sujets parlants, et toute sa méthode consiste à recueillir leur témoignage; pour savoir dans quelle mesure une chose est une réalité, il faudra et il suffira de rechercher dans quelle mesure elle existe pour la conscience des sujets. La linguistique diachronique, au contraire, doit distinguer deux perspectives, l’une prospective, qui suit le cours du temps ‘l áutre rétrospective, qui le remonte. (De Saussure [1916] 1972: 128) Synchrony only has one perspective, that of the speaking subjects, and its entire method consists of gathering their accounts; in order to find out to what extent an object is real, it is sufficient to investigate to what extent it exists in the consciousness of the subjects. Diachronic linguistics, on the other hand, distinguishes between two perspectives, one being long-term following the path of time, and the one retrospective, going back in time. (my translation)

This fragment shows that the notion of perspective is a technical one and was already part of everyday scientific language at the beginning of the last century. With respect to the study of language and discourse in recent decades, Graumann and Kallmeyer (2002: 2) observe the development of two concepts of perspectivity side by side. On the one hand, they observe the tradition of Leibniz, Nietzsche and Husserl that resulted in an epistemological concept of perspectivity as a general characteristic of human consciousness and knowledge, and on the other hand they observe the tradition of Herbert Mead and Alfred Schultz that resulted in a social-interactional concept. The latter states that perspective setting and taking and, consequently, the mutuality of perspectivity is a prerequisite of human communication (ibid.). As an example of a very specific linguistic application within the epistemological concept of perspective, we should mention Functional Grammar. In Functional Grammar the notion of perspective is reserved for the active-passive distinction alone. The perspective depends on the subject-object assignment. The first perspective is claimed to depict the perspective of the subject. The second perspective depends on the object (Siewierska 1993). Another application within this tradition more related to text linguistics can be found in studies on text perspective. For instance, Sanders and Redeker (1993: 69) define textual perspective as “the introduction of a subjective viewpoint that restricts the validity of the presented information to a particular person in discourse.” Finally,

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

the psychologist Graumann should be mentioned as representative of this tradition, as his concept of perspectivity has also inspired many discourse analyses on perspectivity. Keim (2002: 144–145) provides us with a clear summary of his concept in which original mathematical notions are related to the notions of the conversational rhetoric approach. She clarifies the correspondence between mathematics and conversation analysis as follows: According to Graumann (1993) “perspectivity” is a cognitive concept that denotes the interrelationship and mutual definition of the elements “viewpoint” (= the position of the observer), “aspect” (= what can be seen of an object from a given viewpoint), and “horizon” (= whole context of reference for the experience for that object). The perception of certain aspects of an object (in relation to one’s position) is always combined with the anticipation of further aspects of this object in relation to its horizon. Perspectivity has a dynamic quality that is characterized by a permanent transition from experience to the potentiality of further experience. Setting or adopting a perspective means structuring and framing the perceived object in relation to a given viewpoint. Therefore, the perception and categorization of objects as much as the solutions of problems differ in relation to the perceiver’s or actor’s point of view. (Keim 2002: 144–145)

This summary clearly illustrates the epistemological concept of perspectivity. Section 3.3 will review the conversational rhetoric studies on perspectivity in intercultural discourse. The social-interactional conception of perspective goes back to sociology and is determined via Goffmann and Garfinkel by Herbert Mead’s philosophy of sociality. It was Herbert Mead who transposed the notion of perspective as a means for spacial orientation to the domain of social orientation. Each individual has the opportunity to develop a relationship with others by shifting to their perspectives. He even states: Die Grenzen sozialer Organisation sind in der Unfähigkeit von Individuum zu suchen, die Perspektive von anderen zu übernehmen, sich an ihre Stelle zu versetzen. ([1927] 1983: 215) The boundaries of social organisation are to be found in the inability of individuals to adopt the perspective of others, to empathize with their situation. (my translation)

Mead notes that the individual has two possible perspectives towards himself, which he calls ‘I’ and ‘me’, where the latter represents the ‘generalised others’. The opportunity and the ability to anticipate different perspectives are summarised in this notion of ‘the generalised others’. Attitudes, which the



 Jan D. ten Thije

individual presupposes others have, are deeply rooted in his experience; the reaction, however, to the attitudes may also have new unexpected elements. The discussion of subsequent analyses of perspective in intercultural discourse will illustrate that the two concepts of perspectivity are not as distinctive as Graumann and Kallmeyer (2002) claim. In actual fact, studies on intercultural discourse integrate the epistemological and the social-interactional concepts of perspectivity in order to comprehend the interculturality of intercultural discourse.

Studies on perspectivity in intercultural discourse Research in the field of intercultural communication has developed into interdisciplinary cooperation. Motivated by the social needs in a globalising world with hybrid identities and constantly changing ethnic boundaries, the field has been a meeting place for theories and methods from various disciplines. This means that different concepts of perspectivity can be traced back to one another. In the following sections we discuss various concepts.

Shift of perspective as an empathy strategy In the 1970s, we find early references to the notion of perspective in the work of the American communication researcher Milton Bennett on intercultural communication (Bennett 1979). He states that, in contrast to the assumption that people are basically similar, we should assume that each human being is essentially unique and, therefore, differences between people occur. The socalled ‘Golden Rule’ from the Bible, ‘Do unto others as you would have done unto you’, can be traced back to this misplaced assumption of similarity. As a consequence many misunderstandings occur in intercultural communication (Bennett 1979: 418). He therefore proposes that intercultural misunderstandings could be solved with the help of an empathy strategy. In his definition of empathy he refers to the notion of perspective, or in actual fact to the notion of shifting of perspective. He states that empathy concerns “a shift of perspective away from our own to an acknowledgment of the other person’s different experience. This shift in perspective is often accompanied by a willingness to participate in the other person’s experience, at least to the extent of behaving in ways appropriate to that experience” (Bennett 1979: 419). According to Bennett the empathy strategy consists of seven steps based upon Goffmann’s Self Concept. The steps that develop empathy skills are: As-

Notions of perspective and perspectivising 

suming Difference, Knowing Self, Suspending Self, Allowing Guided Imagination, Allowing Emphatic Experience, Re-establishing Self, and Implementing Empathy. In conclusion he notes: “With empathy, we might indeed be able to overcome the Golden Rule putting in its place the “Platinum Rule”: ‘Do unto others as they themselves would have done unto them”’ (ibid.: 422). This empathy strategy has been widely professionalised in the field of (multicultural and intercultural) counselling. For instance, Ridley and Lingle (1996) developed the notion of cultural empathy in order to deal with complaints about intercultural misunderstanding and increasing racism in various settings. They define cultural empathy as “the learned ability of counsellors to accurately gain an understanding of the self-experience of clients from other cultures – an understanding informed by counsellors’ interpretation of cultural data” (Ridley & Ingle 1996: 32). The notion of perspective becomes one of the central cognitive activities in these counselling processes. In fact, taking perspective is the cognitive process at the heart of cultural empathic responsiveness, which Ridley and Ingle describe as follows: Counsellors should attempt to understand clients from an external frame of reference. Using a perceptual schema as previously described, counsellors can move beyond naïveté to a more informed understanding of clients. This shift in perspective is a way of understanding clients from “the outside in,” and it stands in contrast to the adage that empathy equals ‘walking in another’s shoes’. (Ridley & Lingle 1996: 37)

Note that this description disputes Bennett’s aforementioned concept of empathy (1979), since ‘walking in another’s shoes’ corresponds to Bennett’s Platinum Rule ‘Do unto others as they themselves would have done unto them’. According to Ridley and Lingle, the counsellor has to develop an external frame of reference for the interpretation of clients’ experiences from other cultures. In fact, they elaborated Mead’s concept of ‘the generalised others’ into a specific interpretation method. Consequently, the notion of taking perspective becomes three-fold since it presupposes three frames of reference: first of all, the perceptual schema of the client itself; subsequently, the counsellor’s own cultural frames; and, thirdly, the external frame of reference about the client’s culture that the counsellor gains on the basis of his interpretation of cultural data. However, what both empathy strategies have in common is their focus on the cognitive processes of taking perspective without considering the discourse structures that are also involved. In this respect, these approaches are examples of the epistemological tradition of perspectivity.

 Jan D. ten Thije

The most recent development in the professional field of intercultural counselling concerns intercultural mediation. This approach interests us here because of its special emphasis on the communicative structure of counselling. Mediation concerns a conflict solving procedure, in which a third person “without power of decision” supports two parties towards a common settlement (Altman et al. 1999). This constellation with a third person “opens up a perspective for the conflict partners to refocus their orientation” (Haumersen & Liebe 1998: 154, my translation and stress). Instead of arguing with each other, the participants aim to convince this third person that they are right and the other is wrong. The main task of the mediator, therefore, consists of the organisation and control of decent communication between the conflict partners. However, with respect to intercultural mediation, Herlyn (2001) stresses the fact that different expectations with regard to the essence of decent communication essentially determine the conflict. The intercultural mediator cannot assume agreement on common communicative rules and expectations. In actual fact, new interculturally acceptable discourse structures have to be developed within the framework of the intercultural mediation. Haumersen and Liebe (1998: 156) conclude that a successful mediation process may result in an interculture. In sum, within the framework of intercultural mediation, the notion of perspective does not primarily concern cognitive activities, but focuses on a specific discourse constellation. More discourse analyses would reveal the discursive structures of this third-person-interaction in intercultural mediation. They could thus profit from other analyses within the social-interactional concept of perspectivity. Discourse strategies of third-person-interaction will be discussed in Section 3.4 with respect to the language mediator. For instance, Lambertini and ten Thije (2004) analyse third-person-interaction in intercultural training by reconstructing the reflections of the participants on successful intercultural understanding.

Taking the Other’s Perspective as a motor for the analysis In the work of John Gumperz (1992), we find an example as to how Mead’s framework of taking the other’s perspective constitutes the basis of his argumentation with respect to the analysis of intercultural communication. I take as an example his paper on ‘Contextualisation and Understanding’ (1992). It is surprising to note that the collection of all the text fragments that contain the notion of perspective – nine in total – resulted in a very accurate summary of his complete argument. I would like to emphasize that perspective is neither a

Notions of perspective and perspectivising 

theoretical notion in Gumperz’s interactional sociolinguistics nor in his theory on contextualisation, but is used as a technical term. The analysis in Gumperz (1992) concerns interethnic communication between an English instructor, Lee, and an adult student, Don, from India, who has applied for admission to a newly created language course. The student blames the instructor for not giving him the application forms, although she promised to do so. Moreover, the student states that the instructor is able to decide who can participate in the course, which the instructor denies. The Indian sticks to his statement, with a resulting escalation in the argument. Gumperz analyses the different levels of contextualisation with which the participants exchange their views and concludes that a misunderstanding occurs. In fact, he states that the Indian is not claiming that the instructor is in a position to decide on the application; on the contrary, he realises a culturally specific Indian speech action that is a sort of a plea, by means of which he asks her to favour his application. She does not recognize this intention and reacts as if he is accusing her of being a liar. I will discuss nine excerpts. The first excerpt contains the theoretical framework of the analysis. Note that perspective is used in its everyday scientific meaning. The emphasis of the notion perspective is added to the quoted excerpts. (1) The second level [where contextualisation cues enter into the inferential process, jtt] is that of local assessments of what conversational analysts call ‘sequencing’ and what from a pragmatics’ PERSPECTIVE one might refer to as ‘speech act level implicatures’. Inferences at this level yield situated interpretations (Cook-Gumperz 1977) of what I have called ‘communicative intent’ (Gumperz et al. 1982, 1984). (1991: 232)

In the next excerpt we find the description of his analytical strategy: (2) In my analysis of the transcript, I will adopt the strategy of examining the same data successively from several distinct PERSPECTIVES. (ibid.: 234)

In the following, he paraphrases the instructor’s point of view: (3) Line (2L3) is followed by a brief, seemingly rhetorical pause, which introduces Lee’s exposition of her own PERSPECTIVE. (ibid.: 237)

In (4) he paraphrases the way the instructor perceives the student. (4) Beginning with line (2L6) the PERSPECTIVE shifts from what Lee had said, to the present and to what Don might want to do. (ibid.: 237)

In (5) and (6) Gumperz concludes that no understanding is reached.

 Jan D. ten Thije

(5) Although on the surface it would seem that both speakers are talking about the same general issues, they clearly approach these issues from different PERSPECTIVES. (ibid.: 242) (6) In spite of several attempts, they are unable to undo what both seem to sense are, in part, misunderstandings and to negotiate a shared PERSPECTIVE. (ibid.: 242)

In (7) he compares the results so far with the point of view of what Mead called the ‘generalised other’: (7) If we look at the content of Don’s responses, they seem – on the surface at least and from a native English speaking PERSPECTIVE strangely inconsistent. (ibid.: 242)

From the point of view of ‘the generalised other’ he reanalyses the excerpt which results in a more appropriate formulation of the student’s intentions. The result is in (11): (8) He is asking her to take his, Don’s, PERSPECTIVE and support him in making a good case for admission to the course. (ibid.: 245)

Excerpt (9) contains Gumperz’s conclusions (9) Such differences are not rare and not confined to interethnic situations. But what makes this kind of situation special is that the differences in the contextualisation conventions, the inferences made at the first and sequential levels, and the resulting misunderstandings keep each conversationalist from recognizing the other’s PERSPECTIVE at the third level of activity. As a result, attempts at repair misfire and miscommunication is compounded rather than resolved by further talk. (1992: 246)

I have not quoted Gumperz’s analysis to discuss the concept of contextualisation cues, but to show how the notion of perspective directly determines his way of analysing intercultural communication. It shapes the framework in which the contextualisation theory is justified. Hinnenkamp (1989) discusses the interactional sociolinguistics method in his study of intercultural communication extensively and states that taking perspective should be considered as a consequence of hermeneutical methodology. He notes: ‘Hermeneutik’ soll hier keine spezialisierten “Wissenschemata” dazu in Gang setzen, sondern versteht sich einfach als von außen, aus Analysandenperspektive (stress added, jtt), an einen Text angelegte Leseweise, wobei ich natürlich

Notions of perspective and perspectivising 

ganz bestimmte vorgängige Fragen und Hypothesen im Kopf habe. (Hinnenkamp 1989: 47) Here, hermeneutics should not create specialised ‘knowledge schemas’ for this, but can be considered simply as methods of reading a text from the outside, from an analytical perspective, whereby I have, of course, very specific questions and hypotheses in mind beforehand. (my translation)

A chord is struck between the hermeneutical analytical perspective and the perspective shift of the counsellor moving beyond naïveté (Ridley & Lingle 1996: 37) that we discussed in Section 3.1. Both approaches use the notion of perspective primarily to analyse the processes of meaning construction of the participants themselves and, subsequently, overcome this ‘walking in the participants’ shoes’ by analysing from the perspective of a generalized other. In fact, one could raise the question as to whether the analysis of intercultural discourse should presuppose at least ‘two generalized others’ depending on the number of cultures involved in the intercultural discourse.

Perspectivation as a rhetoric device Gumperz’s studies from the 1980s have inspired many other studies (Bilmes 1992; Bremer et al. 1996; Günthner 1993; Kotthoff 1994). At first, Gumperz’s studies focused particularly on intercultural interactions in gate keeping situations in which the ethnic distinctions corresponded to the institutional dichotomy. In most cases the functionary originated from the ethnic majority group and the clients from ethnic minority groups. The system change in Eastern Europe and the unification process in Europe have created many intercultural situations in which the institutional dichotomy no longer corresponds to clear-cut ethnic and cultural distinctions. Intercultural situations are becoming more and more complex and multiple identities have to be expressed in various institutional interactions. Participants therefore need strong rhetorical skills in order to achieve their goals in intercultural discourse. Conversational Rhetoric is a discourse analytical approach that has elaborated on the notions of perspectivity in a more theoretical sense in order to analyse this complexity. Conversational Rhetoric is a discourse analytical approach that is closely related to interactional sociolinguistics. The analyses focus on specific European intercultural situations, for instance on German-German interactions in various – not only gate keeping – settings, like radio interviews, biographical interviews and talk shows (see Keim 1996, 2002; Shethar & Hartung 1998;

 Jan D. ten Thije

Pache 1998; Graumann & Kallmeyer 2002; Liebscher this volume). In these analyses, the notion of perspective is applied as an analytical tool, much like John Gumperz uses it. However, the notion is also elaborated into a theoretical notion in order to explain the complexity of coincidence of institutional and intercultural structures. This can be illustrated by the many compositions in which the notion of perspective is proposed, like Perspektivenabschottung (hedging of perspectives) (Keim 1996), kontrastive Perspektivenwechsel (contrastive shifts of perspective) (Shethar & Hartung 1998), or framerelevante Perspektivenübernahme (frame relevant perspective takeover) Adelswärds (1988). Moreover, the notion of perspective is defined not only as a cognitive but also as a pragmatic concept. This elaboration is documented by Keim’s (1996) definition, as follows: Von Perspektivik als übergeordnetem Begriff unterscheiden wir Perspektive als die Realisierung einer konkreten, an eine bestimmte soziale Zuständigkeit eines Akteurs gebundene Sichtweise auf einen Sachverhalt. Eine Perspektive bezieht sich auf eine nicht lokal an eine Äußerungseinheit gebundene Eigenschaft des sprachlichen Handelns; in diesem Sinne ist sie eine Einzelaktivität überspannende Handlungsorientierung und Handlungsstrukturierung. (Keim 1996: 194) To distinguish from perspective as a generic term, we define perspective as the realisation of a concrete view of facts linked to a specific social competence of an actor. A perspective relates to a characteristic of speech acts that is not linked locally to an individual comment; in this sense it is a single activity of the overall orientation and structure of action. (my translation)

In a more recent paper Keim (2002) adds: “In most cases, a specific perspective is not directly visible or explicitly expressed in a single utterance, but has to be reconstructed. The relation between an overarching perspective and a locally produced verbal activity is established by contextualisation” (Keim 2002: 145). It is apparent that the notion of perspective is being used to depict not only a cognitive schema, but also concrete interactive structures. For instance, Keim and Schmidt (1995) analyse an interaction in an Austrian village on the Slovakian border in which, among others, two Slovakian linguists talk to the local mayor, who has Slovakian family roots. In the analysis, Keim and Schmidt focus on the mayor’s unprompted and detailed biographical account of his ethnic and national identity at the very beginning of the meeting. They state that this perspective secures the mayor’s right to speak for a long time. In fact, the notion of perspective is used as an explanation for the outcome of their sequential analysis of turn taking.

Notions of perspective and perspectivising 

Shethar and Hartung (1998) analyse interactions between East and West Germans and focus on the radio discourse about so-called Ostjammer (‘Eastern misery’). Interestingly, they introduce the notions of position and positioning alongside the notions of perspective and perspectivation. Whereas the former terms express the speaker’s membership of a cultural group, the latter indicate thematic relevancies and specific judgements in the verbalization of states of affairs. With the help of compound notions like personal perspective, critical perspective, contrastive perspective, shift of perspectives, and overall German perspective, they reconstruct the rhetoric devices of former East German argumentation. They conclude that although the latter make use of these sophisticated rhetorical structures, they are excluded from hegemonic media discourse (Shethar & Hartung 1998: 55). Finally, I refer to Pache’s analysis of German-German discourse during an interview as an example of intercultural analysis beyond misunderstanding (Pache 1998). Pache uses the notion of perspective from conversational rhetoric. In fact, she states that perspectivation in discourse is determined by the contextualisation of ethnic-cultural membership (ibid.: 201). Her analysis concerns an interview of an Eastern German female applicant by a Western German female committee. She focuses on the applicant’s rhetoric strategies in reaction to the following question: “Wir sind alles deutsche weisse Frauen, wie wärn das für dich als einzige Migrantin denn in so einem Team” (We all are German white women; how would you cope as the only migrant in such a team?). I will not discuss the details of her analysis as to how the applicant copes with this very complex intercultural situation. Pache reconstructs the way she crosses fixed ethnic-cultural identities and, thereby creates the possibility of reciprocal perspectives (Pache 1998: 215). She concludes with the statement: Der hier analysierte Vorfall ist ein Beispiel dafür, wie der bipolare Gebrauch symbolisch aufgeladener Kategorien notwendige Reziprozität gefährden kann. Es ist aber auch ein Beispiel dafür, dass lähmende Effekte aufgelöst werden können, wenn fixierte Perspektivendivergenzen durch flexibele Perspektivierungen ersetzt werden. (Pache 1998: 216) The incident analysed here exemplifies how the bipolar use of symbolically laden categories can endanger necessary reciprocity. However, it also illustrates how this paralysing effect can be neutralised if fixed differences in perspectives are replaced by flexible perspectivations. (my translation)

In actual fact, Pache illustrates how the use of the notions of perspective and perspectivation facilitate an analysis of intercultural communication beyond

 Jan D. ten Thije

misunderstanding. She considers the notion of perspectivation as a rhetorical device to overcome intercultural misunderstanding. Resuming these conversational rhetoric analyses it is apparent that the notions of perspective and perspectivation help to overcome the restrictions of a strictly sequential analysis that is traditionally carried out in conversational analysis (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson 1974). Conversational Rhetoric, however, does not restrict itself to the communicative surface, but considers the mental activities of participants as well as the verbal ones. As a matter of fact, the notion of perspectivation refers to cognitive as well as interactive structures; it concerns the overall action potential of the participants during a sequence of discourse that is related to their social position and cultural group membership. It would be interesting to reanalyse the stretches of discourse from a functional pragmatic theoretical framework and reflect upon the question as to which notions would be used to denote the interrelationship between the social, mental and interactive determinations. One could detect, for instance, a correspondence between the function of perspectivation and of the cultural apparatus (Rehbein this volume; Hartog this volume).

Perspectivation as a strategy for the language mediator In the following example, we find the notion of perspective or perspectivation in a far more restricted meaning. Actually, we see how the taking of perspective is expressed in intercultural communication itself and is used to denote specific discourse strategies. The example originates from the work of Knapp and Knapp-Potthoff (1985) on the differences between the position of the interpreter and that of the language mediator. The authors note that the language mediator not only has the task of translating but also of interfering in the ongoing interaction if necessary, to explain possible cultural or linguistic differences. Therefore, the language mediator (M) has to perspectivate his talk in order to make clear who should be understood to be the original speaker. Knapp and Knapp-Potthoff define perspectivation as follows: Unter Perspektivierung verstehen wir solche Verfahren, mit denen M für den angesprochenen S anzeigt, ob M zu einem gegebenen Zeitpunkt als M selbst spricht oder im Auftrag des jeweils anderen S; m.a.W.: solcher Verfahren, mit denen M ausdrückt, wer der Urheber einer Mitteilungsintention ist. (Knapp & Knapp-Potthoff 1985: 455) By perspectivation we refer to those strategies, by means of which M indicates to the addressee S, whether, at a specific point in time, M speaks on his own

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

behalf or on the behalf of someone else; in other words, those strategies by means of which M indicates who is to be considered as the instigator of the communicative act. (my translation)

Knapp and Knapp-Potthoff (1985) have elaborated three perspectivation strategies. These are: 1. the transformation of the personal deixis in order to guarantee referential identity; 2. the use of ‘mediator-performative-formels’, to indicate the original speaker of the speech action, e.g. the use of reported speech; 3. the verbal characterisation of emphatic intonation. Obviously, the language mediator has an important task in achieving understanding in intercultural communication and perspectivation strategies will help him to fulfil his task. However, these strategies are not limited to his position, as we have seen in the previous sections. Other participants may make use of perspectivation strategies in order to improve their intercultural understanding as well.

Perspective as a heuristic axis to analyse intersubjectivity Shea (1994) proposes a model to analyse intercultural communication that challenges Gumperz’s notion of mismatching contextualisation. He demonstrates that NS-NNS conversation is not simply characterized by cultural differences and communicative styles, and claims that “differences are taken up and acted upon within the social character of the activity” (ibid.: 383). In his model he takes perspective and production as the two constituting axes. He defines these axes as follows: On the axis of perspective, interactants position themselves referentially, defining the relative distance between their focus of attention and whether it acknowledges the other’s perspective of the world, or indexes distinct orientations and different commitments. On the axis of production, speakers reciprocally position themselves with reference to the interactional authority and control over the talk, defined in terms of such indices as access to the floor, patterns of assertion and solicitation, and the quality of uptake and extending engagement with the other speaker’s talk. (Shea 1994: 375)

The work of Shea shows us the notion of perspective in a complete different light, used as a substitute for the referential function of language. Each utterance indicates to what extent participants share the same commitment to the





Jan D. ten Thije

world. In my opinion, Shea’s analysis shows how a metaphor can substitute real analysis. In actual fact, too many different discursive features are taken together, so that in the end no new insight into discourse is revealed.

Perspectivising as a communicative apparatus Koole and ten Thije (1994) analysed the speech action pattern of reporting in intercultural communication and detected different versions of this pattern depending on the chosen perspective. The notion of perspective is defined as “the indication of the linguistic means that make the hearers interpret the report from a certain point of view” (Koole & ten Thije 1994: 105). Apart from deictic procedures there are also appellative procedures necessary to shape a perspective such as co-referential nouns, verbs, and adjectives. Koole and ten Thije distinguish between the reporter’s report that originates (see for this notion: Bühler 1934) in the actual speech situation and the messenger’s report that has its origo in an imagination space (Ehlich 1979). The third option is called switching of perspective and may be characterized mainly as a report that does not have a fixed origo. In this option, the origo switches between the reporting situation, the actual speech situation and the reported situation (see also Brünner 1981; Tannen 1989; ten Thije to appear with respect to the discourse function of different forms of reported speech). The different options for reporting are not intercultural discourse structures, although they can be functionalised for intercultural purposes. Koole and ten Thije (1994) conclude from their analyses that the different perspectives provide team members with a discursive means to express their identification with different cultural groups. In this way, the use of perspectives is a linguistic means that may contribute to the neutralization of the oppositions with which participants in intercultural communication are confronted. In actual fact, their analysis exemplifies a study of intercultural discourse beyond misunderstanding. Ten Thije (2003) elaborates on the analysis of perspective in a study on biographical narratives, in which people from former East and West Germany tell biographical anecdotes about the famous East German car, ‘der Trabi’. From a corpus of biographical interviews, I collected the names and nicknames storytellers use to refer to this peculiar car. Interestingly, these names often presuppose much culturally specific knowledge, like for instance Asphaltblase (Asphalt-Bubble) or Pappe (Pasteboard). Depending on the intercultural constellation of the interview, storytellers indicate whether an East German speaker presupposes less common cultural knowledge on the part of the West

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

German hearer. When the speaker presupposes that the hearer lacks important knowledge to interpret the story properly, the speaker changes his speaker plan and inserts extra explanations or introduces reformulations. In actual fact, ten Thije (2003) lists various discourse structures, such as attributive apposition, repair, reformulation, quotation introducers, reported speech, prosodic structure and speech accompanying laughter that have the same function. These discourse structures have in common that they are the result of changes in the speaker’s plan. Furthermore, these discourse structures do not primarily concern the propositional content, but indicate the personal attitude of the speaker towards the verbalized state of affairs. In functional pragmatics speaker and hearer are both be denoted as interactants. Within the functional pragmatic approach to discourse the notion of communicative apparatus has been proposed to refer to linguistic structures that differ from either speech actions or linguistic procedures (Rehbein 2002). Apparatus concern fixed configurations that realise purposes and may have a different discourse extension (Diskurserstreckung, Rehbein 2001). Communicative apparatus may change the realisation of linguistic procedures. They may also change the pass through an action pattern, or change the discourse structure itself by initiating a new speech action pattern. Communicative apparatus work locally; they function in an ad hoc manner, like for instance, turn taking apparatus and repair apparatus (Rehbein 2001). On the basis of analyses of biographical interviews, ten Thije (2003) proposes the communicative apparatus of perspectivising. This apparatus is the prerequisite for the verbalization of propositional content of an utterance. My definition of perspectivising elaborates the definition of Koole and ten Thije (1994: 105) in which perspective is determined as the “indication of the linguistic means that make the hearers interpret the report from a certain point of view” (stress added). The communicative apparatus modifies the knowledge that is verbalized in the propositional content in two different directions. It modifies the relationship between the knowledge of the speaker and reality or it modifies the relationship between the speaker’s knowledge and the propositional content. By referring to the functional pragmatic knowledge model (Ehlich & Rehbein 1986), it is possible to clarify the relation between reality (P), knowledge of the interactants (π) and the propositional content (p) with the acronym ‘P-π-p’, in which ‘P’ indicates the social reality, ‘π’ the knowledge of the interactants, and ‘p’ the propositional content. The communicative apparatus of perspectivising operates on the relationship between ‘P-π’, for instance, by taking into account the social position or the membership of the interactants. Furthermore, the apparatus operates upon the relationship be-





Jan D. ten Thije

tween ‘π-p’, for instance, by taking into account missing cultural knowledge of the hearer. The communicative apparatus of perspectivising is part of the execution of the speaker’s control plan. The apparatus works as a result of the speaker monitoring the hearer’s reactions in discourse. In particular, perspectivising concerns the conditions for verbalizing the propositional content in a sequence of utterances. Whenever a speaker spots (re)actions from the hearer that show that his verbalizations of knowledge about social reality are not being understood, because the hearer does not take up the expected hearer side of speech actions, the speaker can adapt his speaker plan. In Section 4 I will discuss the communicative apparatus of perspectivising in more detail.

The contribution of the different notions of perspectivity to intercultural understanding As a starting point for a comparison of the different notions of perspectivity, Rehbein’s definition of intercultural understanding from twenty years ago (Rehbein 1985) is quoted. On the basis of Rehbein’s description, subsequent studies can be classified according to their contribution to the insight into the process of intercultural misunderstanding and even beyond misunderstanding. Rehbein states: Interkulturelle Verständigung ist an das Verstehen des sprachlichen Handelns des anderen gebunden. Dieses setzt an am sprachlichen und nonverbalen Ausdruck als der Inskription des zugrundeliegenden sprachlichen Musters und dessen Handlungsdimensionen. Daraus entsteht das Problem interkultureller Verständigung, denn die Inskription lässt sich nur verstehen, wenn ein gemeinsames Wissen zugrundeliegt; andernfalls wird das (normalerweise automatisch ablaufende) Verstehen zu einem kommunikativen Entziffern bzw. zu einem Projizieren eigenen Wissens in den anderen, zu einem tastenden Etablieren ein gemeinsames Wissens im Diskurs. (Rehbein 1985: 10; stress as in the original text) Intercultural understanding (Verständigung) is linked to the mutual understanding of the other’s speech actions. This estimates the verbal and nonverbal expression to be the inscription of the underlying speech action patterns and its dimensions for action. This results in the problem of intercultural understanding, since the inscription can only be understood when there is a basis of common knowledge; otherwise the process (which normally develops automatically) becomes a communicative deciphering process (Entziffern) or leads to the projection (Projektion) of one’s own knowledge onto the other, lead-

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

ing to a feeling for the establishment (Etablieren) of common knowledge in discourse. (my translation)

The central notion in this definition concerns inscription. Rehbein (1979: 351) derives the notion of inscription from Kasher (1971). The latter relates this notion to the type-token relation, but acknowledges these two notions within Peirce’s tradition as a three-position relation: type refers to the necessary sign, token to the actual sign and tone to the possible sign (mode of being). Inscription represents the third position, namely the possible mode of being. Consequently Rehbein’s definition of understanding can be represented as the connection between a verbal or non-verbal expression with an underlying action that is labelled (inscribed) in its possible position within an overall pattern. On the basis of common knowledge interactants automatically know which expression inscribes which action in which overall pattern. Rehbein (1977: 88) notes that inscriptions are indicated by specific linguistic means, but does not mention them directly. With respect to his definition of intercultural communication this means that common knowledge is often lacking and, therefore, the linking of an expression to action cannot automatically be completed. The speakers have to decipher the communication sequence or project their expectations upon the hearer side or have to establish common knowledge in discourse, since inscription is basically multi-directional. When we take this definition of intercultural understanding as a starting point, we can relate the distinctive conceptions of perspectivity to specific elements of intercultural understanding. First of all, the basic idea of Herbert Mead, that communication is based on mutuality of perspectives and that understanding is accomplished by taking up the other’s perspective (Section 2), can be related to the principle of the multidimensionality of inscription and its function of labelling and linking up an expression with an underlying action. Only on the basis of common knowledge can an accurate labelling understanding be accomplished. Gumperz’s taking up the hearer’s perspective (Section 3.2) can be considered as the methodical extrapolation of this basic insight. Secondly, the notion of perspectivation as an empathy strategy (Section 3.1) refers to the projection of common knowledge in the case of a lack of common knowledge. Analyses of intercultural mediation illustrate how the process of establishing common knowledge in discourse can be described in more detail. Thirdly, the notion of perspectivation as a rhetoric device (Section 3.3) refers, first of all, to a communicative practice in which the inscription of expression to action is automatically less self-evidential than Rehbein (1985)





Jan D. ten Thije

presupposed. The rhetoric devices that conversational rhetoric have identified can be considered as detailed designations of the process of establishment of common knowledge in discourse. Fourthly, the perspectivation strategies of language mediator (Section 3.4) illustrate a discourse in which the inscription is structurally de-automatised. Perspectivation strategies can be considered as indicators of inscription, since these strategies help the original speaker and hearer to complete the inscription even when common knowledge is absent. Fifthly, the conceptualisation of perspectivation as a communication apparatus is also an elaboration of the process of indicating the inscription. Finally, one could state that the conception of perspective as the heuristic axis to analyse intersubjectivity does not refer to the inscription of understanding, but to expression itself.

An analysis beyond misunderstanding Introduction of the analysis The following stretches of discourse are selected for this analysis because they are not characterized by intercultural misunderstanding. The interactants attain their interactive goals and intercultural understanding is accomplished. Therefore, the analysis focuses particularly on those discourse structures that facilitate this intercultural understanding. In fact, the analysis can be considered as illustrative for intercultural discourse beyond misunderstanding. Moreover, it illustrates the previous argument on perspectivising intercultural discourse. As stated before, I consider perspectivising of discourse to be an outcome of a communicative apparatus (see Rehbein 2001). This apparatus modifies knowledge during the verbalizing process in ongoing discourse. These modifications take place as a consequence of the speaker monitoring the hearer’s reactions in discourse. In particular, perspectivising concerns the conditions for verbalizing the propositional content in a sequence of utterances. In the stretches of discourse below we find modifications that are especially interesting with respect to verbalising knowledge in intercultural discourse. The reconstruction detects discourse structures as to how speakers anticipate cultural differences or potential intercultural ignorance and ensure intercultural understanding. Michael Clyne gives an appropriate description of successful intercultural discourse with the following maxim: “Successful inter-cultural

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

communication is achieved by making the communicative intent very clear and, where possible, being aware of the interlocutor’s cultural expectations” (Clyne 1994: 195). Ten Thije (2003) proposes that this process of taking into account the communicative expectations in intercultural discourse can be considered to be structured by three steps in the verbalizing process: generalising, perspectivising and contrasting cultures. As we see, perspectivising is connected to the other two steps in verbalization. I will give a short outline in advance of what will be illustrated in detail in the analysis below. The three steps of verbalising propositional content can be determined as follows: by generalising, an interactant verbalizes the propositional content as a cultural standard solution; by perspectivising, he locates the propositional content in the actual speech situation, taking into account cultural standards of the other. By contrasting cultures, the speaker enables the hearer to compare the speaker’s cultural standards with his own and, subsequently, attain an adequate interpretation of the discourse. These three steps of verbalizing propositional content are based on a pragmatic conceptualisation of culture (Sarangi 1995; Redder & Rehbein 1987; Koole & ten Thije 1994). According to ten Thije (2002, 2003), culture is considered to be potential standard solutions to recurrent collective standard problems. Human groups construct structures of action that enable them to deal with problems that the collective or group often experiences and can, therefore, be called cultural structures of action. Members of cultural groups share common knowledge of these standard solutions and transfer these solutions within the group and on to the next generation. In intercultural discourse, two systems of standard problems and solutions are in contact. When people have to be aware of cultural expectations of interactants in intercultural discourse, Clyne’s (1994) maxim could be rephrased as follows: participants should verbalize their own expectations as realizations of standard solutions of their own cultural group and anticipate possible differences with the standard problems and solutions of other cultural groups. Subsequently, they should enable the other to compare the different cultural standards, and, finally, attain intercultural understanding. The analysis reconstructs this interactive process in detail, and illustrates how interactants generalize, perspectivize and compare their cultural standards in interaction.

The constellation of the fragment The following fragments originate from a data corpus collected in one of the many international European Tempus projects that have been developed over





Jan D. ten Thije

the last decades. These projects have the purpose of facilitating the development of academic curricula in Eastern Europe. They are often faced with organizational and communications difficulties as a consequence of bureaucratic procedures and cultural differences. These problems often result in many personnel changes or even dissolution of the project. In the project in which the data were collected, German, Dutch and Danish academics cooperated with a russian university in X (see also ten Thije 2002). The Dutch university had initiated the project. The officials at the German University situated in the former East Germany were also very positive about the importance of this Tempus project because it would support the university mission statement to bridge East and West Europe. However, when the project began, the German university officials could not find a native representative to participate in the project. Therefore, a Dutch lecturer who recently received a job at the German university was invited to represent his university in this international project. The conversation that will be analysed below concerns the first encounter between the Dutchman and a local German university official about the background and purposes of the project. She tries to convince him to participate in the project. Since this project follows other cooperation projects between the German and Russian university even prior to the system change in 1989, she is involved in promoting cooperation and has a need to justify this project. In the excerpts below they discuss the problem of the reluctance of current German students to visit and study at the Russian university. Subsequently, they discuss the problem as to whether the project makes sense at all, if the purpose of student exchange cannot be achieved. The German official, however, argues that curriculum development is the main goal and, therefore, the project is still important and the Dutchman should participate. Following ten Thije’s approach to intercultural discourse (ten Thije 2002), institutional and intercultural preconditions should be considered separately in the discourse analysis of intercultural communication. In respecting the institutional constellation, one should consider that the interactants are both functonaries (e.g. agents) of the same university. The German (DF) in the excerpt is the administrative coordinator whereas the Dutchman (NT) is a lecturer. The interaction is therefore an agent-agent interaction. The discourse contains various speech action patterns that characterize the discourse type of meeting, such as interactive planning and reporting, but the patterns of explaining, clarify, illustrating and justifying form the major part. The pattern of arguing is seldom realised. The intercultural constellation is influenced by Dutch and (Eastern) German cultural standards, as well as by their distinct historical relationship with the former Soviet Union. The German official ex-

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

perienced the structural changes in Eastern Europe in the 1990s as a citizen of the former German Democratic Republic, whereas the Dutchman was educated and worked in Netherlands before he accepted his job at the German university. They are of more or less the same age. The fact that the Russian academic partner is situated in the former Stalingrad, is also of historical significance. However, the consequences of the Second World War only affect this international German – Russian project very indirectly. The reconstruction will show how these institutional and intercultural structures do not determine the discourse as intercultural automatically, but shows how the interculturality of the discourse has to be revealed as an interactive accomplishment.

The sequential and action structure of the discourse fragment Before we enter into the analysis of the perspectivising excerpts, a survey of the subsequent sections of the discourse will be presented. The twelve sections in Diagram 1 give an insight into the sequential overall structure of the discourse. The segments refer to the single utterances in the transcript that can be found at the end of this chapter. This diagram shows the action structure of the speaker – hearer interaction. A short characterization of each section reveals its position in the overall argument in this fragment. The segments (s1, s2, . . . ) refer to subsequent utterances of the interactants in the transcript.

‘Rich points’ to focus on in intercultural research One of the sections in this survey in Diagram 1 attracts special attention, namely the disagreement between the German official and the Dutch colleague in Section X. The most striking utterance in this section concerns segment 38, in which DF formulates a political statement: 38a

Und ich sage immer wieder: [38b “Da wo wir nicht sind, [38c als Bundesrepublik Deutschland,[38d ist der Amerikaner. But I am saying over and over again: Where we are not present, as Federal Germany Republik, there is the American.

After an explanation of the academic and pedagogic importance of the international project, in s38 the German official not only contrasts the German nation state (FRG) with the United States of America, but also personalises this contrast by making use of the speaker deictic procedure ‘we’ in contrast to the symbolic procedure ‘der Amerikaner’. According to Bauer (1995) and



 Jan D. ten Thije

Diagram 1. Overview of the section and action structure of the analysed excerpt Section Segments Characterization Description of the action structure of the section I

s1–4

II

s5–11

III

s8–21

IV

s22–29

V

s29–30

VI

s32–37

VII

s38–41

VIII

s42–44

Introduction of the 1st problem

DF introduces the problem of the unsatisfactory exchange programme of German students to Russia (s1–4). Reformulation NT presupposes potential visa problems (s5). DF of the problem rejects this (s6a) and reformulates the problem (s6b). and its NT questions this (s7), and demonstrates acceptance non-understanding of the problem definition (s8, s10), DF acknowledges. 1st explanation NT asks whether students are not interested (s11). and DF explains that their lack of interest comes from understanding travel restrictions under Soviet regimes (s12a–c) and of the problem their current preference for France (s12d–f). NT demonstrates that he understands the problem (s14) and accepts the explanation (s15, 16, 17, 18, 20). 2nd explanation DF exemplifies her explanation by quoting the and internal dialogue of an imaginary student (s22a–e), confirmation which NT accepts (s23). DF encourages NT to switch perspective to the student’s mind (s24), which NT confirms (s25). DF continues the student’s internal dialogue (s26a–e), which NT confirms (s27, 28). 3rd explanation After a pause (s29), DF mentions political animosity and as possible reason (s30), which NT confirms (s31). confirmation 4th explanation DF mentions the reluctancy of foreign language and learning of Russian by students in the GDR (s32) confirmation and mentions her own reluctant language learning experiences (s33), which she generalizes to more students (s34a–b) and quotes (s34c) their refusal to participate in the exchange (s34d–g). NT concurs (s35, 36, 37). Consensus After a pause (s38) DF concludes that one should not neglect these considerations (s39), which NT confirms elaborately (s41a, b). Introduction of NT asks whether DF is still convinced that the 2nd problem international project makes sense (s42a–d). DF and 1st concurs (s43a) referring to the assistance to explanation: the curriculum development, which NT accepts (s44). educational importance

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

Diagram 1. (continued) Section Segments Characterization Description of the action structure of the section IX

s45–49

X

s50–56

XI

s57–58

XII

s59–61

XII

s62–72

2nd explanation: the academic importance of the project

DF states her conviction (s45a) that the curriculum content that was developed in the former West Germany (s45b–c) and is now being practiced in the former East Germany (s45d) is of good quality (s45e). NT accepts this (s46, 47). DF apologises for her lack of professional knowledge (s48a–b). Even so she repeats her strong convictions (s48c–d). NT acknowledges this (s49). Dissent about DF formulates sentential knowledge (s50a) the concerning potential American hegemony over international Germany in the world (s50b) that NT does not political understand (s51). DF confirms her statements importance of (s50–55). NT laughs (s52) and acknowledges with the cooperation slight dissent (s56). Reformulation DF reformulates her statement by referring to the concerning the interest of the German nation state (s57a), as well as national and the interest of each university (s57b) to transfer institutional curriculum models (s57c) that are considered to be importance of of high quality (s57d–g). NT acknowledges with the cooperation slight dissent (s58). Confirmation of DF asks whether NT agrees (s59a–c) and if so why participation one should not participate (s59d). NT confirms (s60). DF reformulates her political statement as an everyday saying (s61a–d). Consensus DF mentions other reasons for the participation, cf. students exchange (s65) NT concurs (s66, 67).

Hoffman (1999) the naming of inhabitants in the singular – as is done in der Amerikaner – may function as a proper as well as a generic noun. The primary function of proper nouns is to identify people, whereas generic nouns have the function of characterizing people. Interestingly, the use of nouns in the singular may realise both functions at the same time and, therefore, have a strong potential for evoking self-evidential and often stereotypical knowledge (see also ten Thije to appear). Consequently, s38 DF not only identifies the inhabitants of Germany and the USA as belonging to opposing nation states, but also characterizes them as being engaged in a hegemonial world competition. This is a strong political statement. For many inhabitants in the former East Germany, the system change in Eastern Europe caused the need to reformulate international relationships of the former West and East Germany with their international partners, of which the USA and Russia are the most important. The



 Jan D. ten Thije

political statement causes surprise. The Dutchman signals his non-acceptance with slight, ironic laughter (s52). This peculiar political statement from the German official and the reactions of the Dutchman can be considered as a ‘rich point’ (Agar 1994; cit. in ten Thije 2002), since these utterances evoke astonishment about the mutual foreignness of the German and the Dutchman in the actual discourse. Their interaction cannot be interpreted from their institutional positions alone and, therefore, one may question whether the interculturality of their interaction can be reconstructed by starting from this section. In actual fact, this excerpt was presented and discussed on several international occasions1 and caused heated discussions between discourse analysts from Western and Eastern Germany as well as between colleagues from various European countries on the one hand, and Americans at the other. The statement was interpreted in contrasting ways: either as a reformulation of East German Cold War rhetoric or as a formulation of new German imperialism. I do not mention these interpretations to evaluate them, but to underpin my reasons for focusing on this excerpt. The rich point in this excerpt needs detailed reconstruction by making use of all the recordings, data, interviews, presentations and discussions that has been organised in recent years. Koole and ten Thije (2001) and ten Thije (2002) contain an account of this approach of analysing intercultural discourse.

Generalizing, perspectivising and contrasting cultural standards On the basis of the description of the overall structure in the previous paragraph and taking the rich point of the political statement as a starting point, we focus on four stretches of discourse in which knowledge of the propositional content is generalized and, subsequently, perspectivized in order to enable the interactants to make a comparison between the differences between their cultural standards. This verbalization sequence supports intercultural understanding. In the presentation, the analysis will be structured according to these three verbalization steps: Step 1: by generalising, an interactant verbalizes the knowledge of the propositional content as a cultural standard. Step 2: by perspectivising, the speaker transmits the knowledge of the propositional content in the actual speech situation by taking into account cultural standards of the other.

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

Step 3: by contrasting cultures, the speaker enables the hearer to compare the speaker’s cultural standards with his own and attain an adequate interpretation of the discourse. As the analysis will make clear, these steps are not always distinct in the sequence of discourse, but for analytical reasons, they will be kept apart.

Non-understanding of unsatisfactory student exchange The first excerpt is located in sections I and II, in which DF introduces the problem of unsatisfactory participation in exchange programmes to Russia by German students. This is the first time in the discussion that this theme is discussed. From the verbalization of her problem it becomes clear that the German official anticipates potential cultural ignorance on the part of her Dutch colleague. Excerpt 11



 Jan D. ten Thije

According to my general description of the three steps of verbalising knowledge in a propositional content, the first phase concerns generalizing the knowledge as a cultural standard solution. Let us have a close look at segment 1a-b-c-f and see whether this type of verbalizing takes place: [1a Und wenn es dann um Studenten geht, [1b dann wird es sowieso nich so einfach sein . . . studenten nach Russland zu schicken And with respect to students, it won’t be that easy anyway . . . to send students to Russia

The knowledge that is transferred in these segments does not concern a standard solution, but a standard problem. From a feedback interview with DF, it appears that officials in former East Germany had and continue to have lots of problems with respect to students participating in exchange programmes with their former ‘helper’ and ‘big brother’ in the former Soviet Union. After the system change in Eastern Europe, German officials have had to develop a new relationship with Russian institutions. One of the domains for these new developments concerns student exchange programmes. DF states in s1 that one can no longer send students to Russia as was usually done in East Germany. Nowadays, students have their own responsibility and freedom and, therefore, have to be motivated to participate in exchange programmes. In sum, in s1 the German official verbalizes a recurrent problem for a specific cultural group, namely citizens – and especially officials – in the former East Germany. This construction, in which the students become the role of object, contributes to the general validity of the assertion, as does the use of the linguistic expression ‘sowieso’ (in any case). In the second phase (perspectivising), the interactant inserts the knowledge into the actual speech situation by taking into account cultural standards of the other. In s1c–e we find the following example. [1c Studenten/ [1d zwar n/nach /ähm in die Niederlande zu bekommen, [1e das ist nicht das Problem, it is true to get students em into the Netherlands, that’s not the problem

Directly after formulating the general problem in s1a–b, DF interrupts herself by adapting her assertion in two ways. On the one hand she explicitly mentions the Netherlands, which is the native country of NT. On the other hand DF restarts her construction in s1c–d and changes the preposition from nach into in. The former belongs with the verb schicken nach (to send to), whereas in corresponds to the verb bekommen in (to receive). The verbs schicken nach and bekommen in are complementary with respect to the depicted direction of

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

movement. Schicken nach relates to the person who is sending away, where as bekommen in relates to the person who is receiving. This repair is an example of a semantic switch of perspective (Zifonun 1997). The repair of these contrasting verbs as well as the mention of NT’s native country locates the propositional content in the actual speech situation in which the German and Dutchman interact. The problem of exchanges for former East German officials is now verbalized as a problem that also exists in the Netherlands, but not to the same degree. The Dutchman acknowledges this in s3. The segments 1d–e can be considered as a neat example of the communication apparatus of perspectivising. The overall plan of the speaker in s1a–g changes during the ongoing discourse. The speaker plan changes even before the central propositional content is verbalized in s1f–g. The analysis cannot determine whether the hearer is not reacting in the way DF expected, or whether DF solely anticipates possible ignorance by NT. From the non-verbal actions of NT it would be possible to have extracted some relevant interpretation, but since video data are not available, such reactions are not open to analysis. Nevertheless, it is clear that DF changes her speaker plan in order to support the hearer with more culturally adapted knowledge. In the third phase (contrasting), the interactant enables the hearer to compare the speaker’s cultural standards with his own and attain an adequate interpretation of the discourse. Segment 1d–f illustrates this phase clearly: 1d

zwar n/nach /ähm in die Niederlande zu bekommen, [1e das ist nicht das Problem, 1f aber Studenten nach Russland zu schicken ist nicht ganz so einfach it is true to get students em into the Netherlands, that’s not the problem but to send students to Russia that is really not that easy

The stretches of discourse 1d and 1f are connected to each other with the conjunctions zwar . . . aber (it is true . . . but). This connection brings about a comparison between the cultural standards with respect to the international exchange between the former East Germany and the Netherlands and Russia respectively. The subsequent segment (4a–b) contains an example of the combination of perspectivising and contrasting. [4a Vielleicht für Sie/ [4b (hh) für die Niederländer nich so problematisch wie für die Xxxxxxxxxx? Maybe for you/ for the it’s not as problematic as for the Xxxxxxxxxx?

With respect to perspectivising the direct address of NT and the illocution of segment 4 should be mentioned: speaker DF addresses NT directly by making



 Jan D. ten Thije

use of the deictic procedure Sie (you). Subsequently, she realises a self-initiated self repair, in which she makes use of the symbolic procedure die Niederländer (the Dutch). Zifonun (1997: 1604) determines such an insertion as an attributive Adjunktorphrase (attributive adjunct), by which the speaker categorizes NT as a member of the cultural group or as a citizen of his nation state. This insertion can be also reconstructed as the result of perspectivising the communication since the speaker plan changes during the ongoing discourse. The speech action in s4 contributes to perspectivising the knowledge in the actual speech situation, as DF poses a question, so that NT has to refresh his knowledge in order to give an answer. With respect to contrasting, it is important to mention that the segment s4a–b is structured as a comparison. The construction für X nicht so Y, wie für Z (it is not as Y for X as it is for Z) facilitates a comparison between two entities and determines a dimension for comparison as well. Finally, the use of the adverb vielleicht (perhaps) indicates the speaker’s degree of uncertainty with respect to her knowledge of the hearer’s cultural standards. In sum, this section illustrates the three steps of verbalising cultural knowledge into propositional content. By making use of generalising, perspectivising and contrasting cultural standards, the speaker enables the hearer to attain intercultural understanding. From his reaction, it should become clear whether the hearer actually understands the speaker, if the former takes over the hearer side of the realised speech action patterns in an expected way. With respect to the first step (generalising), I had already mentioned the acknowledgement of NT in s3. Whether the hearer understands the perspectivized verbalization cannot be determined on the basis of the hearer reaction in this section. However, the hearer takes the hearer side in the question and answer pattern initiated in s4, since he formulates a counter question in s5. This counter question is an adequate reaction to a question, so in a formal sense he cooperates in the interaction. When we look at the propositional content, we see that NT formulates one possible problem that hinders students’ participating in the exchange. In s5, he asks; Um ein Visum zu bekommen, oder? (To get visa, or what do you mean?). From his counter question, it is possible to conclude that NT understands the general scope of the standard cultural problem. However, the quintessence of the standard cultural problem is not yet understood, as also becomes clear from the augmented speech action (Rehbein 1979), oder? (or what do you mean?). This understanding is attained in the following section.

Notions of perspective and perspectivising 

Understanding travel restrictions The next excerpt is directly connected to the previous, and concerns sections II and III: NT inquires whether students have visa problems (s7), and demonstrates non-understanding of DF’s definition of the problem (s8, s10). DF acknowledges this. Subsequently, NT asks whether students are not interested at all in international exchange programmes (s11). Thereafter, DF explains their lack of interest due to the travel restrictions under Soviet regimes (s12a–c) and their current preference for France (s12d–f). NT demonstrates his understanding of the problem (s14) and accepts her explanation (s15, 16, 17, 18, 20). Excerpt 12

DF’s explanation in the excerpt above is structured according to the three steps of verbalization. Segment 12 is constructed as a conditional sentence by means of the conjunctions wenn . . . , dann. . . (if . . . then. . . ). The conditional parts (s12b) contain sententional knowledge that represents a generalised standard solution of the former East Germans with respect to their restricted international mobility: 12b

wenn Sie vierzig Jahre lang nur die eine Richtung hatten [12c und die hieß Sowjetunion, [12d dann können Sie sich vielleicht vorstellen,

 Jan D. ten Thije

If you could only go one direction for forty years and that was to the Soviet Union, then you might be able to imagine

In subsequent segments in s12c–d, the verbalisation of the standard cultural solution is perspectived by a combination of linguistic means: first of all, s12d contains an insertion after the expression die eine Richtung (only one direction) by naming its nationality: und die hieß Sowjetunion (and that was the Soviet Union). Secondly, the use of the past tense in 12c orientates the hearer to the time before the system change in Eastern Europe and indicates the distance between the current speech situation and the recent past. Thirdly, the hearer is personally addressed twice in s12b and 12d with Sie (you) and, finally, the illocution of the speech action in 12c realises a request to the hearer (stellen sie sich vor, imagine) to open up an imaginary space. With these different linguistic means the speaker locates the knowledge for the propositional content in the current speech situation. Subsequently, DF contrasts the speaker’s and hearer’s standard solutions with respect to international mobility. [12e dass man vielleicht eher nach Frankreich geht als in/ in/ in die Sowjetunion, [12f also jetzt nach Russland. that one would maybe rather go to France than to/ to/ to the Soviet Union, or Russia as it is now.

These segments (s12e–f) contain a comparison by making use of eher . . . als (rather . . . than). This comparison considers France and Russia to be two possible contrasting destinations for international exchanges. The use of general man (one) in 12e underlines that the comparison considers two collective standard solutions to international mobility before and after the system change (Bredel 1999). Moreover, the use of man in the formulation of the new standard solution for the speaker’s groups may include the cultural standard solution for the hearer as well. Subsequently, the recent mobility problems for people in Eastern Germany are illustrated very nice linguistically, in DF’s repair in s12e–f, as she falters in/ in/ in die Soviet Union (to, to, to the Soviet Union), and, subsequently, inserts the supplement also jetzt nach Russland (thus now to Russia). Within one utterance she refers twice to the name change of Russia into the Soviet Union and vice versa. Interestingly, the use of the present tense geht (goes) in s12e corresponds to the current destination of France, but not to the destination the Soviet Union, since it is now impossible to go the Soviet Union. This contradiction is solved by her insertion containing the name of the nation state

Notions of perspective and perspectivising 

a second time. The use of also (thus) at the beginning of s12f is characterised by Bührig (1996: 240) as a supplement to previously verbalised knowledge and secures the hearer’s understanding. Finally, we can refer to the use of the adverb vielleicht (perhaps) in s12e that can be interpreted as an indication of the speaker’s uncertainty with respect to the choice between the many destinations for exchanges, of which France is only one possibility. The hearer clearly shows his understanding of the general standard problem as in s14 he says aha. According to Hoffmann (1997: 407) this interjection has the function of indicating the successful resolution of a problem solving process. NT has reconstructed the standard problem that DF has verbalized up to then. Subsequently, NT affirms his understanding of the historical distancing of the former Soviet Union from present-day Russia by saying jetzt (now) in s16. In sum, this section also illustrates the three steps of verbalising cultural knowledge into propositional content. Moreover, we see how the hearer acknowledges his understanding.

Understanding redundant foreign language learning The third fragment contains only two of the verbalising steps, namely generalising and perspectivising. The contrasting of cultural standard fails. After generalising the problem of learning Russian as a foreign language, DH perspectivises this standard problem by giving voice to imaginary students who refuse to go to Russia. However, no comparison to the hearer’s cultural standards is voiced. In contrast, the construction of an imaginary dialogue of a student contributes to the hearer relating to the represented collective problem of students in the former East Germany (Tannen 1989). The hearer acknowledges his acceptance several times. Brünner (1989) also analyses constructed dialogues and comes to the same conclusions. Hinzu kommt 32b dass das/ dass das Russische uns als Fremdsprache/[33 Ich hab es zwölf oder fünfzehn Jahre lernen müssen und hab da nie Lust dazu gehabt.[34a Hm ja, und so gibt es natürlich noch paar mehr Studenten, [34b die das haben lernen müssen ohne irgendeinen Effekt damit zu erzielen [34c und die jetzt einfach sagen [34d “Ich will nicht.” [34e “Na es ist zu/ [34f Ich muss NICH mehr [34g und ich will auch nicht mehr.” Furthermore, that the/ that Russian us as foreign language/ I had to learn it for ten or twelve years, and never felt like doing it. Hm. yeah. And there are definitely some more Students who had to learn it without achieving any-

 Jan D. ten Thije

thing with it and who are just saying now: “I don’t want it.” Well, it is to/ “I DON’T have to anymore. and I don’t want to anymore.”

In the feedback interview the German official explains the historical background of foreign language learning in relation to international exchange programmes. We lived in a country in which Russian was the first foreign language and where the Soviet Union was our Friend and Helper. That is a fixed expression. Perhaps only an East German can understand what Friend and Helper means; in a sense it refers to Big Brother and that was the Soviet Union. (. . . ) We were an ‘appendix’; we were a ‘political outpost’. Well, you can link that now with everything you know about the Cold War and the Iron Curtain etc. And so we were simply the tip of the spear or a ‘lighthouse’ or whatever you want to call it. That was the political requirement, and, consequently the first foreign language was Russian and other languages came later. And despite that, you still couldn’t even visit the country. I personally went to Russia for the first time in 1992. (Feedback interview 23.06.98/11)2

This quote clearly illustrates the standard cultural solution for former East Germans concerning their international mobility. In fact, it shows the paradox of this solution as well. The collective standard with respect to international exchanges that had ‘only one direction, and that was the Soviet Union’ was only ideological, since these exchanges were not open to ordinary people. The German official made her first trip to Russia only after the system change in Germany in 1989.

Disagreement concerning the international political importance The fourth excerpt contains the rich point that initiated this analysis in the first place. After the interactants agree on the problems regarding the students’ exchange programme, the Dutchman introduces a new problem, namely NT asks whether DF is still convinced that the international project makes sense (s42a–d). DF confirms the relevance of the project (s43a) by referring to the assistance in curriculum development, which NT accepts (s44). DF states her conviction (s45a) that the content of the curriculum that was developed in the former West Germany (s45b–c) and is now being practised in the former East Germany (s45d) is of good quality (s45e). NT accepts this (s46, s47); DF apologises for her lack of professional knowledge (s48a–b), but repeats her conviction (s48c–d). NT acknowledges (s49) this. DF formulates sentential knowledge (s50a) concerning the potential American hegemony over Germany in the world (s50b), which NT does not understand (s51). DF reaffirms her

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

statements (s50–55). NT laughs (s52) and acknowledges this with slight dissent (s56). Excerpt 13



 Jan D. ten Thije

DF’s explanation of the relevance of the international project in this excerpt contains the three steps of verbalizing knowledge: generalising, perspectivising and contrasting. Let us have a closer look at the steps: Her explanation contains the generalising verbalisation of a positive personal assessment (Ehlich & Rehbein 1977) of the results of academic research in the field of social pedagogy. This assessment concerns institutional knowledge for officials at school. In fact this knowledge concerns the development of cultural standard solutions for standard problems. The statement sounds as follows: 44a

Das/ Davon bin ich überzeugt, [44b dass das was auf der Strecke der Sozialpädagogik gemacht worden ist in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 44d das halt ich für sehr positiv. That/ I am convinced that what has been done in the field of social pedagogic in the Federal German Republic is positive.

Interestingly, in s44c she perspectivizes her assessment by relating the knowledge to the current speech situation. [44c also im Westen, [44d Äh was jetzt auch hier bei uns gemacht wird Well in the West. Er what has also been done now here with us,

First of all, she adapts Bundesrepublik Deutschland with the expression also im Westen (thus in the West). By making use of the also, this concerns the same sort of insertion as we saw before in s12f. This supplement restricts the range of Germany to the former West Germany, to the old federal states. Subsequently, she verbalizes an apposition, in which she supports the hearer with supplementary knowledge about the current relevance of social pedagogy. Interestingly, she realises the deictic procedure wir (we), which may include or exclude the hearer. This plural speaker deixis, however, orientates the hearer towards the new federal states (former East Germany). In actual fact, DF orientates NT in particular towards the university in which both participants work. The speaker contrasts the results of the discipline of social pedagogy in western and eastern Germany. At the same time she addresses the hearer as a member of the local university by using the deictic procedures hier bei uns (here with us) in s44d. She thus locates the knowledge of the propositional content to the current speech situation and enables the hearer to assess the propositional content from his newly acquired institutional position. The hearer acknowledges his acceptance in s46 (ja, yes) and s47 (hm).

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

Subsequently, in s48a–d she apologises for her lack of professional knowledge, which she compensates for by uttering her conviction that the academic content of social pedagogy is okay. Then she utters s50a–d: [50a Und ich sage immer wieder: [50b “Da wo wir nicht sind, [50c als Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [50d ist der Amerikaner”. But I say over and over again: “If we are not present, as Federal Republic of Germany, the American will be”.

In Section 4, I analysed the generic use of the noun der Amerikaner. This marks the national division between Germany and the USA. The personification of the national division is enforced by the attributive Adjunktorphrase (attributive adjunct) (Zifonun 1997: 1604), in which the speaker reformulates the personal deictic procedure wir by using the symbolic procedure Bundesrepublik Deutschland. She thus excludes the hearer from the range of persons that the personal deictic procedure is orientated to. Although he was included as a member of the same university in s44d, he is now excluded since he is not of the same nationality. The marking of ethnic and national boundaries has been studied frequently in studies on intercultural discourse (Barth 1969; Erickon & Schultz 1982; Koole & ten Thije 1994; Day this volume). Ten Thije (2003) analyses the indication of ethnic boundaries as the realisation of an intercultural pattern of ‘thematising and dethematising ethnicity’. The thematizer of an ethnic boundary may use specific discourse tactics in order to decrease the potential threat of marking the ethnic boundary, for instance by using the ‘alibi tactic’. Following this alibi tactic an authority is quoted in the formulation of the ethnic boundary. As a consequence, the speaker himself is held less responsible for the interactive effect of the formulation. When we analyse segment 50 it is apparent that DF is not quoting someone else. On the contrary, she clearly introduces herself as an authority, as she says in s50a: Und ich sage immer wieder (And as I always says). She introduces herself as an expert. Therefore, she can be held responsible for the interactive effect of her defining an ethnic boundary. In the feedback interview DF explains the background of her statement. She refers to the marketing strategy of American universities with respect to the successful distribution of their curriculum all over the world. She states: If Germany as a country does not take off its blinkers as far as its educational policy is concerned and finally grasps that the world has been divided up or is still being divided up, or perhaps there might even still be chances somewhere to acquire a share of the world market, then it is simply that if we don’t try, others will make an effort. And by others, I really do refer to America in



 Jan D. ten Thije

particular. That is not meant to paint them as an enemy, but what I want to underline here is that it simply is that way because they have a completely different approach in the world as far as educational policy is concerned. And in the Soviet Union there was a unique constellation, that the biggest enemies in world political terms until about 1989, although not exactly became the best of friends, the continuous conflict has naturally made them curious, both the Russians and the Americans. (23.06.98/12)3

In the discourse, however, the Dutchman does not understand the formulation of the ethnic boundary as a critical comment towards the passive marketing strategy of the German educational policy. He asks what will be the consequence of the USA taking over.

Agreement concerning institutional importance The last excerpt concerns section X and XI in the diagram above, in which DF adapts her political statement by referring to the interests of the German nation state (s57a), as well as the interests of each university (s57b) in transferring curriculum models (s57c) that are considered to be of high quality (s57d–g). As NT acknowledges this with slight dissent (s58), DF asks whether NT agrees with her statement (s59a–c) and if not why one should not participate in the international project (s59d). NT agrees (s60). Finally, DF adapts her political statement into an everyday saying (s61a–d). Excerpt 14

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

In reaction to the Dutchman’s disagreement, DF reshapes her statement. Her arguments now consist of a string of statements that state the importance of the international project for the distribution of good curriculum models. She starts at a national level and then repeats her statement relating it to the institutional level of every university. In fact, she generalises her knowledge about international educational marketing as a standard solution. eigentlich muss die Bundesrepublik daran interessiert sein, [57b eigentlich muss jede Ho/Hochschule daran interessiert sein, [57c dass die Ausbildungsmodelle, [57g dass die auch in andere Länder getragen werden, Actually Germany has to be interested in it, actually every u/ university has to be interested in it, that the education models which / That they are also taken to other countries.

Subsequently, in s57c she perspectives her knowledge in the current speech situation by using the personal deictic procedure we that includes speaker and hearer. Then she constructs a dialogue that expresses a clear, positive evaluation. [57d die/ für die wir ja auch stehen [57e und sagen [57f “Die sind gut”, which/ for which we stand for and say: “They are good”.

Moreover, she addresses the hearer directly, by asking him the question as to whether he already agrees with her statement. By assuming a positive answer,



 Jan D. ten Thije

she asks the hearer why one should not cooperate. Interestingly, she generalises again by using the genetic form man (one). [59b Oder wenn [59b Oder wenn Sie schon der Meinung sind, [59c dass das so ist, [59d warum soll man es dann nicht tun. [61a Na, Or if you have already of the opinion that it is like that why should one do it then.

Finally, she repeats her political statement, but without determining any national boundaries. She notes: [61b und Sie wissen [61c “Immer wo der eine nich ist, [61d ist der . grad ein andrer.” No, and you know: “Wherever one person is not present the other one will be.”

Whereas she introduced herself in s50 as an expert on the topic, she now announces the statement with the presupposition that the hearer already knows this. Moreover she makes use of what Koole and ten Thije (1994) have called a dethematising tactic, since this adaptation in s57 consists of the paralel construction as in s50. However, the evaluation scales make use of another criterion. No longer is nationality the criterion to evaluate whether there is a place on earth, but the criterion does not express any details about the values being used; it is completely neutral. In the feedback interview she explains the marketing strategy, by stating: I have permitted myself to include [the Dutchman] in using this ‘we’. I use this kind of ‘we’ very often, because in my opinion this ‘we’ gets a raw deal in this university. What the Americans call corporate identity is scarcely expressed at this university. In fact, I believe this ‘we’ is very important and this is what results in the frustration that comes across here. (23.06.98/19)4

The Dutchman agrees with her statement, by acknowledging it. The argument based on nationality has been replaced by an ‘institutional argument’ that rests on the common institutional interest of both speaker and hearer.

Conclusion This analysis has shown how making use of a combination of verbalising steps, which I have called generalising, perspectivising and contrasting cultural standards can attain intercultural understanding. The analysis does not argue that

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

this combination is the only way to way to attain intercultural understanding. However, this combination is specific to intercultural communication because these steps are constituted in particular by the fact that different cultural standards are represented in intercultural discourse. Finally, I want to use the notion of perspective as it is used in mathematics in order to illustrate the verbalising steps that are discussed in this paper. In mathematics the notion of perspective is the organising principle of the representation of a three dimensional space on a plane surface. In this context the notion of perspective is always combined with the notions of horizon, standpoint and aspect. An object is designed in front of a horizon as the collection of all vanishing points. The aspect is what can be seen of an object from a given standpoint. By changing the standpoint the aspect of the visualised object changes. The function of the three verbalising steps can be illustrated as follows. Let us take the abstract problem X that is being discussed in intercultural discourse. By generalising knowledge about X as a cultural standard the speaker establishes a horizon behind X in a common knowledge space for speaker and hearer. By perspectivising the knowledge about X in the actual speech situation the speaker establishes a standpoint for the speaker and for the hearer taking into account their horizons in their common knowledge space. Finally, by contrasting these cultural standards a connection is established between the aspects that both speaker and the hearer may see from their different standpoints in their common knowledge space. This connection between these different aspects can be considered as the accomplishment of intercultural understanding. At the end of this chapter, I would like to return to the three questions I mentioned at the beginning with respect to the appeal of the notion of perspective. Firstly, the studies discussed in Sections 3.1–3.7 show how very different linguistic phenomena can be brought together under the heading of perspective or perspectivation. In a sense, these analyses illustrate the power of a good metaphor. In Section 3.7 I have argued that these conceptions of perspectivity refer to different aspects of the process of intercultural understanding. Secondly, the Gumperz example clearly illustrates how taking the other perspective is a fruitful research strategy that is applied in many other analyses of intracultural and intercultural communication. In Section 4 I have presented the three steps of verbalising the propositional content. These verbalising steps illustrate how the relationship between discourse and society or culture can be conceptualised.



 Jan D. ten Thije

Thirdly, although I did not present a complete reconstruction of the use of perspective in intercultural communication and linguistics, I hope to have drawn plausible conclusions as to how perspective covers many different phenomena in the periphery of what De Saussure has defined as the object of linguistics. That means that perspective has served as vehicle for new research questions. To what extent these questions have always got satisfactory answers, may become clear, for instance, if we evaluate the solutions of various recent grammars such as what German IDS Grammar (Zifonun 1997) have chosen in the cases where they used the notion of perspective. However, that is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Notes . This fragment was presented and discussed at the following occasions: the 4th International Functional Pragmatics Conference, on 20–22 November, 1997 in Münster; the Winter workshop on language and cultural difference in Germany, 9–10 January, 1998 at the Centre for Applied Linguistic Research, Thames Valley, University of London; and the Hamburg-Münsteraner Workshop on Pragmatics and Language Learning, 16 January, 1998 at Hamburg University. I should like to thank all the participants in these discussions for their comments. I also thank Kristin Bührig and Anne Ribbert for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. . Original text of the feedback interview: “Wir haben in einem Land gelebt, in dem Russisch die erste Fremdsprache war und in dem die Sowjetunion unser Freund und Helfer war, das ist eine feststehende Wendung, die dann auch vielleicht nur jeder Ostdeutsche versteht, was ein Freund und Helfer ist, also sprich der grosse Bruder und das war die Sowjetunion. (. . . ) Wir waren ein Anhängsel, wir waren ein politischer Vorposten, nun, sie können das jetzt mit allem belegen, was den kalten Krieg anbelangt und den eisernen Vorhang, etc. Und waren halt so diese Speerspitze oder dieser Leuchtturm oder wie Sie’s auch immer benennen wollen. Das war politisch gewollt, demzufolge war die erste Fremdsprache russisch. Und dann kamen die anderen Fremdsprachen hinterher. Und trotzdem konnte man das Land ja nicht bereisen, ich persönlich bin 1992 das erste Mal in Russland gewesen” (23.06.98/6,7). . Original text of the feedback interview: “Wenn die Bundesrepublik als Staat mit ihrer Bildungspolitik nicht aus dem Knick kommt und endlich begreift, dass die Welt aufgeteilt ist, oder man noch immer am Aufteilen ist, oder vielleicht gibt’s noch irgendwo Chancen, Marktanteile zu gewinnen, dann ist es halt so, dass wo wir nicht sind, sich andere darum bemühen. Und mit ‘andere’ meine ich eben sehr stark Amerika, das ist kein Feindbild, was ich da aufbauen will und werde, aber es ist halt so, weil sie ein ganz anderes Herangehen haben auf der gesamten Welt was Bildungspolitik anbelangt und grade in der Sowjetunion gab es ja so eine eigenartige Konstellation, dass die grössten Feinde, jetzt mal weltpolitisch gesehen bis ’89, oder wie auch immer, nich gerade zu grossen Freunden geworden sind, aber

Notions of perspective and perspectivising 

dieser unendliche Gegensatz hat natürlich neugierig gemacht. Sowohl für die Russen als für die Amerikaner” (23.06.98/12). . Original text of the feedback interview: “Ich hab mir also erlaubt, den Niederländer hier zu (kooptieren) und in mein ‘wir’ miteinzuschliessen. Ich gebrauche das sehr häufig, dieses ‘wir’, weil (. . . ) es mir ein bisschen zu kurz kommt, dieses ‘wir’ an unserer Universität (. . . ) Diese, wie die Amerikaner, dieses nennen corporate identity, ist null ausgeprägt oder ganz gering ausgeprägt und ich glaube, dass das halt sehr sehr notwendig ist, und das ist ein bisschen der Frust, der hier reinspielt.”

References Adelswärds, Viveka (1988). Styles of Success: On impression management as collaborative action in job interviews. Linköping: University of Linköping. Altmann, Gerhard, Fiebiger, Heinrich, & Müller, Rolf (1999). Mediation: Konfliktmanagement für moderne Unternehmen. Weinheim/Basel: Beltz. Bakhtin, Mikhail M. (1973). Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Ann Arbor: Ardis. Ballweg, Joachim (1997). “Satzadverbalia”. In Gisela Zifonun, Ludger Hoffmann, & Bruno Strecker (Eds.), Grammatik der deutschen Sprache (pp. 1124–1176). Band 2. Berlin: De Gruyter. Barth, Fredrik (1969). “Introduction”. In Fredrik Barth (Ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organisation of Cultural Difference (pp. 9–39). Bergen/Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Bauer, Gerhard (1995). “Übergangsformen zwischen Eigennamen und Gattungsnamen”. In Gerold Ernst-Hilty, Heinrich Löffler, Hugo Steger, & Ladisla Zgusta (Eds.), Namenforschung. Ein internationales Handbuch zur Onomastik (pp. 1616–1620). 2. Teilband Eichler Berlin / New York: de Gruyter. Bennett, Milton J. (1979). “Overcoming the Golden Rule: Sympathy and Empathy”. In Dan Nimmo (Ed.), Communication Yearbook 3. An annual Review (pp. 407–433). New Brunswick, NJ. Published by the International Communication Association Bilmes, Jack (1992). “Dividing the rice: A microanalysis of the mediator’s role in a Northern Thai negotiation”. Language in Society, 21, 569–602. Bredel, Ursula (1999). Erzählen im Umbruch. Studien zur narrativen Verarbeitung der Wende 1989. Tübingen: Stauffenburg. Bredel, Ursula (2003). “You can say you to yourself. Establishing perspectives personal pronouns”. In Carl F. Graumann & Werner Kallmeyer (Eds.), Perspectivity and perspectivation in Discourse (pp. 167–181). Amsterdam: Benjamins. Bredel, Ursula & Dittmar, Jeanette (1997). “Völlisch fer die katz – Zur Perspektivierung von Ereignissen in Schlichtungsverhandlungen”. Linguistische Berichte, 168(1997), 134–167. Bredel, Ursula & Dittmar, Norbert (1998). “‘Naja dit sind allet so + verschiedene dinge die einem da so durch-n kopp gehen . . . zuviel neues mit eenem schlach. Verfahren sprachlicher Bearbeitung sozialer Umbruchsituationen”. In Ruth Reiher & Undine Kramer (Eds.), Sprache als Mittel von Identifikation und Distranzierung (pp. 129–152). Frankfurt am Main: Lang.

 Jan D. ten Thije

Bremer, Katharina C., Vasseur, M.-T., Simonot, M., & Broeder, P. (Eds.). (1996). Achieving understanding: discourse in intercultural encounters. London: Longman. Brünner, Gisela (1991). “Redewiedergabe in Gesprächen”. Deutsche Sprache, 19(1991), 1–15. Bühler, Karl (1934). Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache. Stuttgart: Fink. Bührig, Kristin (1996). Reformulierende Handlungen. Zur Analyse sprachlicher Adaptierungsprozesse in institutioneller Kommunikation. Tübingen: Narr. Canisius, Peter (1993). “Der fremde Mann und der Scharfrichter: Eine Beobachtung zur perspektivischen Funktion der Betonung”. In Peter Canesius & Marcus Gerlach (Eds.), Perspektivität in Sprache und Text (pp. 63–81). Bochum: Brockmeyer. Clyne, Michael (1994). Inter-cultural communication at work; cultural values in discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Collier, Mary Jane (2000). “Reconstructing Cultural Diversity in Global Relationships: Negotiating the Borderlands”. In Guo-Ming Chen & William J. Starosta (Eds.), Communication and Global Society (pp. 213–236). New York etc.: Lang. Cornelis, Louise (1997). Passive and Perspective. Amsterdam / Atlanta: RODOPI. De Saussure, Ferdinand ([1916] 1972). Cours de linguistique générale. Publié pas Charles Bally et Albert Séchehaye. Avec le collaboration de Albert Riedlinger. Edition critique préparée par Tulio de Mauro 1971; 1985, Paris: Payot. Dijk, Teun A. van, Ting-Toomey, Stella, Smitherman, Geneva, & Troutman, Denise (1997). “Discourse, Ethnicity, Culture and Racism”. In Teun A. van Dijk (Ed.), Discourse as Social Interaction. Discourse Studies: A Multidiciplinary Introduction (pp. 144–180). Volume 2. London etc.: Sage. Dik, Simon C. (1997). (Hengeveld, Kees (Ed.)). The Theory of Functional Grammar. Part 1: The Structure of the Clause. Berlin: Mouton. Edelstein, Wolfgang & Keller, Monika (1982). “Perspektivität und Interpretation. Zur Entwicklung des sozialen Verstehens”. In W. Edelstein (Ed.), Perspektivität und Interpretation. Beiträge zur Entwicklung des sozialen Verstehens (pp. 9–47). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Ehlich, Konrad (1979). Verwendungen der Deixis beim sprachlichen Handeln: linguistische – philologische Untersuchungen zum hebräischen deiktischen System. Frankfurt am Main: Lang. Ehlich, Konrad (1996). “‘Kommunikation’ – Aspekte einer Konzeptkarriere”. In Gerhard Binder & Konrad Ehlich (Eds.), Kommunikation in politischen und kultischen Gemeinschaften (pp. 257–285). Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1977). “Wissen, kommunikatives Handeln und die Schule.” In H. C. Goeppert (Ed.), Sprachverhalten im Unterricht (pp. 36–114). München: Fink. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1986). Muster und Institution. Untersuchungen zur schulischen Kommunikation. Tübingen: Narr. Erikson, Frederick & Shultz, Jeffrey (1982). The Counselor as Gatekeeper. Social Interaction in Interviews. New York etc.: Academic Press. Fillmore, Charles (1982). “Towards a Descriptive Framework for Spatial Deixis”. In Robert Jarvella & Wolfgang Klein (Eds.), Speech, Place and Action Studies in Deixis and Related Topics (pp. 31–59). Chichester: Wiley.

Notions of perspective and perspectivising

Graumann, Carl F. (1960). Grundlagen einer Phänomenologie und Psychologie der Perspektivität. Berlin: De Gruyter. Graumann, Carl F. (1992). “Speaking and Understanding from Viewpoint: Studies in Perspectivity”. In Gün R. Semin & Klaus Fiedler (Eds.), Interaction and Social Cognition (pp. 237–255). London: Sage. Graumann, Carl F. & Kallmeyer, Werner (Eds.). (2002). Perspectivity and perspectivation in Discourse. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Gumperz, John J. (1992). “Contextualization and understanding”. In Alessandro Duranti & Charles Goodwin (Eds.), Rethinking Context. Language as a interpretative phenomenon (pp. 229–253). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Günthner, Suzanne (1993). Diskursstrategien in der interkulturellen Kommunikation. Analysen deutsch-chinesischer Gespräche. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Hartung, Wolfdrietrich (1996). “Wir können darüber ruhig weiterspechen bis mittags wenn wir wollen. Die Bearbeitung von Perspektivendivergenz durch das Ausdrücken von Gereiztheit”. In Werner Kallmeyer (Ed.), Gesprächsrhetorik. Rhetorische Verfahren im Gesprächsprozeß (pp. 119–190). Tübingen: Narr. Haumersen, Petra & Liebe, Frank (1998). “Interkulturelle Mediation. Empirisch-analytische Annäherung zur Bedeutung von kulturellen Unterschieden”. In Lothar Breidenstein, Doron Kiesel, & Jörg Walther (Eds.), Migration, Konflikt, Mediation (pp. 135–156) Bd. 99. Frankfurt am Main: Arnoldshainer Texte. Herlyn, Menno-Arendt (2001). “Interkulturelle Aspekte von Mediation und Dialog in der internationalen Unternehmenszusammenarbeit”. In Rolf-Dieter Reineke & Christine Fussinger (Eds.), Interkulturelles Management. Konzeption – Beratung – Training (pp. 51–72). Wiesbaden: Gabler. Hinnenkamp, Volker (1989). Interaktionale Soziolinguistik und interkulturelle Kommunikation, Gesprächsmanagment zwischen Deutschen und Türken. Tübingen: Niemeijer. Hoffmann, Ludger (1997). “Deixis und situative Orientierung”. In Gisela Zifonun, Ludger Hoffmann, & Bruno Strecker (Eds.), Grammatik der deutschen Sprache (pp. 310–360). Band 1. Berlin: De Gruyter. Hoffmann, Ludger (1999). “Eigennamen im sprachlichen Handeln”. In Kristin Bührig & Yaron Matras (Eds.), Sprachtheorie und sprachliches Handeln (pp. 213–234). Tübingen: Stauffenburg. Kasher, A. (1971). “A Step toward a Theory of Linguistic Performance”. In Yehoshua BarHillel (Eds.), Pragmatics of Natural Languages (pp. 84–93). Dordrecht: Reidel. Keim, Inken (1996). “Verfahren der Perspektivenabschottung und ihre Auswirkung auf die Dynamik des Argumentierens”. In Werner Kallmeyer (Ed.), Gesprächsrhetorik. Rhetorische Verfahren im Gesprächsprozeß (pp. 192–265). Tübingen: Narr. Keim, Inken (2002). “Perspectivity and professional role in verbal interaction”. In Carl F. Graumann & Werner Kallmeyer (Eds.), Perspectivity and perspectivation in Discourse (pp. 143–167). Amsterdam: Benjamins. Keim, Inken & Schmitt, Reinhold (1995). “Das Problem der subsumtionslogischen Konstitution von Interkulturalität”. In Marek Czy˙zewski, Elisabeth Gülich, Heiko Hausendorf, & Maria Kastner (Eds.), Nationale Selbst- und Fremdbilder im Gespräch. Kommunikative Prozesse nach der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands und dem Systemwandel in Ostmitteleuropa (pp. 413–430). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.



 Jan D. ten Thije

Knapp, Karlfried & Knapp-Potthoff, Annelie (1985). “Sprachmittlertätigkeit in der interkulturellen Kommunikation”. In Jochen Rehbein (Ed.), Interkulturelle Kommunikation (pp. 450–464). Tübingen: Narr. Köller, Wilhelm (1993). “Perspektivität in Bildern und Sprachsystemen”. In Peter Eisenberg & Peter Klotz (Eds.), Sprache gebrauchen – Sprachwissen erwerben (pp. 15–35). Stuttgart: Klett. König, G. (1989). “Perspektive, Perspektivismus, perspektivisch”. In Joachim Ritter & Karlfried Gründer (Eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (pp. 363–375). Band 7. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Koole, Tom & Thije, Jan D. ten (1994). The construction of intercultural discourse. Team discussion of educational advisers. Amsterdam / Atlanta: RODOPI. Kotthoff, Helga (1989). Pro und Kontra in der Fremdsprache. Frankfurt am Main: Lang. Kotthoff, Helga (1994). “Zur Rolle der Konversationsanalyse in der interkulturellen Kommunikationsforschung, Gesprächsbedingungen im Schnittfeld von Mikro und Makro”. Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik (Themenheft 93: Interkulturelle Kommunikation) (pp. 75–96). Lambertini, Lucia & Thije, Jan D. ten (2004). “Die Vermittlung interkulturellen Handlungswissens mittels der Simulation authentischer Fälle”. In M. Becker-Mrotzek & G. Brünner (Eds.), Analyse und Vermittlung von Gesprächskompetenz (pp. 175–199). Frankfurt: Lang and Verlag für Gesprächsforschung (online). Langacker, Ronald W. (1995). “Cognitive Grammar”. In E. F. K. Koerner & R. E. Ascher (Eds.), Concise History of the Language Sciences. From the Sumerians to the Cognitivits (pp. 364–171). Oxford: Pergamon / Elsevier. Lindemann, Bernhard (1993). “Einige Fragen an eine Theorie der sprachlichen Perspektivierung”. In Peter Canesius & Marcus Gerlach (Eds.), Perspektivität in Sprache und Text (pp. 1–39). Bochum: Brockmeyer. Linell, Per & Jönsson, Linda (1991). “Suspect stories: perspective-setting in an asymmetrical situation”. In Ivana Marková & Klaus Foppa (Eds.), Asymmetries in Dialogue (pp. 75– 100). Hemel Hempstead: Harverster Wheatsheaf, Barnes & Noble Books. Mathesius, Vilém (1929). “Zur Satzperspektive im modernen Englisch”. Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen, 155, 202–210. Mead, Herbert ([1927] 1983). “Die objektive Realität der Perspektiven”. In Hans Joas (Ed.), Gesammelte Aufsätze Band 2, Mead, George Herbert (pp. 211–215). Frankurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Pache, Ilona (1998). “Perspektivierung als Verfahren der Konstitution und Bearbeitung von Fremdheit in Bewerbungsgesprächen”. In Birgit Apfelbaum & Frank Müller (Eds.), Fremde im Gespräch, Gesprächsanalytische Untersuchungen zu Dolmetschinteraktionen, interkulturelle Kommunikation und institutionalisierten Interaktionsformen (pp. 199– 219). Frankfurt am Main: IKO. Panovky, Erwin (1992). “Die Perspektive als ‘symbolische Form”’. In Hariolf Oberer & Egon Verheyen (Eds.), Aufsätze zu Grundfragen der Kunstwissenschaft. Panovky, Erwin (pp. 99–169). Berlin: Spiess. Redder, Angelika & Rehbein, Jochen (1987). “Zum Begriff der Kultur”. In Angelika Redder & Jochen Rehbein (Eds.), Arbeiten zur interkulturellen Kommunikation (pp. 7–21). OBST 38.

Notions of perspective and perspectivising 

Rehbein, Jochen (1977). Komplexes Handeln. Elemente zur Handlungstheorie der Sprache. Stuttgart: Metzler. Rehbein, Jochen (1979). “Sprechhandlungsaugmente. Zur Organisation der Hörersteuerung”. In Harald Weydt (Ed.), Die Partikeln der deutschen Sprache (pp. 58–74). Berlin: de Gruyter. Rehbein, Jochen (1984). “Beschreiben, Berichten und Erzählen”. In Konrad Ehlich (Ed.), Erzählen in der Schule (pp. 67–126). Tübingen: Narr. Rehbein, Jochen (2001). “Das Konzept der Diskursanalyse”. In Klaus Brinker, Gerd Antos, Wolfgang Heinemann, & Sven F. Sager (Eds.), Text- und Gesprächslinguistik. Linguistics of Text and Conversation (pp. 927–945). Band 2. Berlin: de Gruyter. Rehbein, Jochen (2003). “Matrix-Konstruktionen in Diskurs und Text”. In Nicole Baumgarten, Claudia Böttger, Markus Motz, & Julia Probst (Eds.), Übersetzen, Interkulturelle Kommunikation, Spracherwerb und Sprachvermittlung – das Leben mit mehreren Sprachen. Festschrift für Juliane House zum 60. Geburtstag (pp. 252–276). Zeitschrift für Interkulturellen Fremdsprachenunterricht, (Online) 8(2,3). Rehbein, Jochen (Ed.). (1985). Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Tübingen: Narr. Ridley, Charles R. & Lingle, Danielle W. (1996). “Cultural Empathy in multicultural counseling”. In Paul B. Pedersen, Juris G. Dragungs, Walter J. Lonner, & Joseph E. Trimble (Eds.), Counseling across Cultures (pp. 21–46). Thousand Oaks: Sage. Sacks, Harvey, Schegloff, Emanuel A., & Jefferson, Gail (1974). “A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of Turn Taking for Conversation”. Language, 50, 696–735. Sanders, José (1994). Perspective in Narrative Discourse. Tilburg: KUB. Sanders, José & Redeker, Gisela (1993). “Linguistic perspective in short news stories”. Poetics, 22, 69–87. Sandig, Barbara (1996). “Sprachliche Perspektivierung und perspektivierende Stile”. Zeitschift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik, 102, 36–63. Sarangi, Srikant (1995). “Culture”. In Jef Verschueren, Jan-Ola Östman, & Jan Blommaert (Eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics Manual. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Shea, David P. (1994). “Perspective and Production. Structering conversational participation across cultural borders”. Pragmatics, 4(3), 357–391. Shethar, Alissa & Hartung, Wolfdietrich (1998). “Was ist ‘Ostjammer’ wirklich? DiskursIdeologie und die Konstruktion deutsch-deutscher Interkulturalität”. In Ruth Reiher & Undine Kramer (Eds.), Sprache als Mittel von Identifikation und Distanzierung (pp. 39–66). Frankfurt am Main etc.: Lang. Siewierska, Anna (1991). Functional Grammar. London: Routledge. Tannen, Deborah (1989). Talking voices. Repetition, dialogue, and imagery in conversational discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thije, Jan D. ten (2002). “Stufen des Verstehens in der Analyse interkultureller Kommunikation”. In Helga Kotthoff (Ed.), Kultur(en) im Gespräch. Studien zur Fremdheit und Interaktion (pp. 57–97). Tübingen: Narr. Thije, Jan D. ten (2003). “The Transition from Misunderstanding to Understanding in Intercultural Communication”. In Lásló I. Komlósi, Peter Houtlosser, & Michiel Leezenberg (Eds.), Communication and Culture. Argumentative, Cognitive and Linguistic Perspectives (pp. 197–215). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.

 Jan D. ten Thije

Thije, Jan D. ten (forthc.). “Die Funktion von verba dicendi bei der Redewiedergabe in Berichten.” In Jochen Rehbein (Ed.), Sprektrum der Funktionalen Pragmatik. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Thije, Jan D. ten (forthc.). “Die Benennungen von Ländern und Völkern in der interkulturellen Kommunikation”. In K. Ehlich & S. Scheiter (Eds.), lnterkulturelle Kommunikation – Möglichkeiten und Bedingungen ihrer Untersuchung. Münster: Waxmann. Vonderwülbecke, Klaus (1997) “Sprecher-Hörer-Relation, personale Bezugnahme und Beziehungskonstitution”. In Gisela Zifonun, Ludger Hoffmann, & Bruno Strecker (Eds.), Grammatik der deutschen Sprache (pp. 913–952). Band 1. Berlin: De Gruyter. Zifonun, Gisela (1997). “Grammatik der Ereignisperspektivierung”. In Gisela Zifonun, Ludger Hoffmann, & Bruno Strecker (Eds.), Grammatik der deutschen Sprache (pp. 1859–1881). Band 3. Berlin: De Gruyter. Zifonun, Gisela (2002). “Grammaticalization of perspectivity”. In Carl F. Graumann & Werner Kallmeyer (Eds.), Perspectivity and perspectivation in Discourse (pp. 89–113). Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Transcription conventions verbal communication line / repair () not understood (walks) good guess ((1 sec.)) pause of 1 second . pause of less than 1 second ((laughs)) naming a verbal activity ? Hm not certain which speaker uttered ‘Hm’ information on the section between brackets is given under the score [1 Hm 1 ] number of segment [1 number of subsegment [1a . (full stop) sentence final falling intonation , non sentence final rising intonation ? sentence final rising intonation intonation line ! stress lengthened / rising intonation \ falling intonation v doubling ^ shortened

Notions of perspective and perspectivising 

Appendix: Transcript DF: German official NT: Dutch lecturer

 Jan D. ten Thije

Notions of perspective and perspectivising 

 Jan D. ten Thije

Notions of perspective and perspectivising 

 Jan D. ten Thije

Notions of perspective and perspectivising



 

Interactive analyses of intercultural discourse

Perspectives in conflict An analysis of German-German conversations* Grit Liebscher

Introduction By focusing on the management of perspectives in interactions, this paper challenges the assumption that interculturality leads to misunderstanding.1 Rather, as pointed out in the introduction to this volume, we examine the nature of “intercultural understanding”. Further in line with the other contributions to this volume, we investigate in how far discourse can be characterised as intercultural and institutional as a results of the interactants’ actions and the context.2 We do not, therefore, consider culture3 and institution to be a-priori concepts which determine the outcome of the discourse. The analysed interactions become intercultural encounters through the speakers’ selection of words and interactional resources by which they formulate intercultural relationships between themselves and others. These words and resources, though they may be culturally specific, are not the source for miscommunication but rather a resource to negotiate the interculturality of the interaction. While I argue that there are culturally and stylistically different resources that speakers utilize in the interaction, the use of these resources does not automatically lead to miscommunication. In going beyond miscommunication in the analysis of intercultural communication, I argue first, that the nature of interculturality is established in the interaction by speakers themselves, second, that interculturality is negotiated by speakers utilizing different cultural and interactional resources and third, that these negotiations reflect an understanding, rather than a misunderstanding, of participants’ perspectives. I illustrate these points further below in a discussion of conversational data from televised talk shows. This discussion focuses on the management of (East and West) German perspectives.

 Grit Liebscher

An analysis of perspective management rather than an a priori definition of the interaction as intercultural helps to deconstruct a conceptual and analytic bias in intercultural communication research that assumes a priori differences between speakers of different cultures. This bias has been criticized recently in intercultural communication research (Sarangi 1994; Koole & ten Thije 1999). As Sarangi (1994) points out: If we define, prior to analysis, an intercultural context in terms of cultural’ attributes of the participants, then it is very likely that any miscommunication which takes place in the discourse is identified and subsequently explained on the basis of ‘cultural differences’. (Sarangi 1994: 414)

In contrast to defining the intercultural context a priori, I investigate how interactants construct their talk as intercultural encounters through perspective management. This focus also takes us away from assuming a unified view of culture, since “[t]he conceptualisation of culture as people embodying a unified belief or value system is increasingly being regarded as myth” (ibid.: 415). The main methodological framework for my analysis is rhetorical conversation analysis, as outlined in Kallmeyer (1996).4 Even though this framework was not developed specifically to analyse intercultural communication,5 it can inform our understanding of intercultural communication. First of all, it posits that speakers communicate with intentions and goals. Rhetorical conversation analysis as applied to intercultural communication helps focus on effectiveness and goal-orientation in communicative events rather than on miscommunication. Interactants’ individual goals may result from specifics of the situational context, like the understanding about each other’s roles and biographies. Furthermore, rhetorical conversation analysis is interested in operations that interactants perform using language and interactional devices as resources. In performing these operations, speakers are actors, but their individual acting depends on the co-operation of their interlocutors. Rhetorical conversation analysis examines how speakers use stylistically different resources to perform operations by which they pursue their own interests and goals. Kallmeyer and Keim (1996) note that “it is not the existence of sociostylistic differences as such which creates misunderstandings and aggressiveness. It is much more the protagonists’ using these differences as resources in order to polarize their own and others’ positions” (Kallmeyer & Keim 1996: 273). This approach enriches our understanding of intercultural communication by focusing on social categories and relationships developed by interactants themselves. This makes it possible to define new categories and questions for the analysis rather than applying preconceived ones.6

Perspectives in conflict

One operational procedure in Kallmeyer and Keim’s model is the management of perspectives. Following Graumann, this model distinguishes between perspective-setting7 and perspective-taking (Graumann 1989: 113). Perspective work is that of “manifesting one’s own perspective and of coping with the opponents”’ (Kallmeyer & Keim 1996: 273). While the coping with others’ perspectives can be the reaction to another’s manifestation of perspective, it may also be part of the manifestation itself and result from the anticipation of others’ perspectives. While speakers of a cultural background are often not aware that their resources are culturally specific (Koole & ten Thije 1999: 7; Liebscher 1999), we also find evidence that they use differing linguistic recources to construct cultural differences and to manifest their perspectives. The management of perspectives in intercultural discourse is always a potential site for problem or conflict. The conflict or problem is inherent in the situation in which the speaker displays a perspective that potentially differs from the audience’s or interlocutors’ perspectives.8 Formulating a perspective may result, for instance, in the loss of face or the exclusion from cultures. The consequences of such loss of face or exclusions are even more far-reaching when they happen on televised talk shows viewed by a large audience. In setting a perspective, interactants encounter different, and potentially contradicting, perspectives by the audience(s). While the audience always has an influence on how speakers design utterances (Bell 2001), speakers on talk shows may also orient to their institutional roles as talk show host and guests. As Rost-Roth (this volume) points out, institutional settings may reinforce miscommunication problems, because the ways to resolve these problems may be limited by the institutional roles of participants. In considering the institutional character of the data, I will observe how participants in the interaction construct the encounter as institutional, e.g. how do speakers’ selections from among linguistic and interactional resources contribute to define institutional roles? According to Keim (1996) and Kallmeyer and Keim (1996), interactants’ perspectives are relatively stable dispositions displayed in the course of an interaction. They are displayed through systematic selection from alternative linguistic and interactional resources. Perspectival inconsistency may point to a social problem for the speaker, for example the negotiation of professional roles (Keim 2002). Keim (1996) notes that perspective is the relationship between language and social category. A particular “communicative social style” or “cultural style” (Kallmeyer & Keim 1996: 271/272) used in the interaction may lead to “perspectivation”.9 Through perspectivation, speakers express their identification with groups (cf. ten Thije 2000).



 Grit Liebscher

While different linguistic phenomena have been studied to express perspectivation,10 my focus in this paper are those that traditionally have been called “deictics.” Deictics such as now and then, here and there, and go there and come here have been discussed as displaying linguistic and cognitive viewpoints in the interaction (e.g. Bühler 1990 [1965]; Graumann 1960), and more specifically a local and temporal position of the speaker in relation to another person or object anticipated in the discourse. My discussion of deictics in this chapter goes beyond the treatment of deixis to display linguistic and psychological viewpoints. The deictics I discuss in this chapter are also resources for speakers to index cultural perspectives. These deictics, if used in the interaction, express relationships within the social space,11 e.g. between we and they, here and there. In a particular social and cultural context, certain deictics may have developed a semantic component that expresses an intercultural relationship. For example, during the time of East and West German division, come here and go there, were used to express the move or escape from East to West Germany across the East-West German border in intercultural encounters. With each use of these deictics, speakers express their own relationship to groups in the social space, thus give their talk a certain perspective. Interactants formulate perspectives by selecting from alternative linguistic resources12 and by combining linguistic resources (e.g. deictics) with interactional resources (e.g. pauses and gesture). A further focus in my analysis is the clarity with which speakers index their own relationship to groups within the social space. For example, speakers make linguistic choices in order to be less explicit in formulating this relationship, a process that ten Thije (2000: 12 and this volume) refers to as “neutralization of the oppositions,” and which speakers use to manage divergent perspectives. Deictics in particular may become resources for speakers to scale this clarity, since the contextualisation process13 for deictics, in contrast to non-deictics, involves more interpretive work from interlocutors. In their selection of words, speakers therefore have options as to how much responsibility they take for making their perspective explicit (cf. Tetreault 1997). Less responsibility corresponds to more vagueness and more neutralization. Finally, my approach has an ethnographic component. I consider two points as central aspects in intercultural encounters: (1) interlocutors’ knowledge about the biographies of speakers and (2) assumptions about interlocutors’ perceptions of relationships between groups in the social space. Interactants formulate and negotiate these points in the interaction. For example, Kallmeyer (2002: 113) found that perspectives are often grounded in personal experience and in social categorization. Biographical knowledge and assumptions about others’ views of the social space may also allow for, or limit, the

Perspectives in conflict 

legitimate expression of certain perspectives. Biographical knowledge in this sense is seen as “symbolic capital” (Bourdieu 1994).

German-German data My data are conversations from talk shows with speakers who live, or lived, in East and/or West Germany. In my discussion of these data, I focus more specifically on perspectives related to social identities in the context of East and West Germany. From a corpus of these talk shows aired between 1982 and 1995, I discuss two examples in this paper.14 An analysis of German-German data is particularly revealing since the relationship between the two countries (before unification) or places (after unification) as one culture or as two separate cultural spaces has been contested over the years of division and even after unification in 1990. It has been argued that the people are of different cultures as much as it has been argued that they are of the same (German) culture. While most of these arguments were made based on socio-political comparisons between the systems, an analysis of conversations reveals an intercultural understanding as presented and negotiated by the speakers themselves. An analysis of the corpus data has revealed characteristics of intercultural discourse. For example, speakers code-switch, i.e. they treat East German and West German as two different codes or semiotic systems.15 Speakers also explain cultural terms and cultural knowledge they suspect to be unknown by members of the “other” culture through formulations such as these actors are known, at least in East Germany. In addition, speakers often formulate their cultural background as cultural perspectives, for example, we in the East vs. they in the West. Conversations among speakers from East and West Germany are therefore potential sites for intercultural encounters (cf. Auer & Kern 2001). The present study can already look at a substantial body of research on German-German communication. Studies focusing on differences in lexicon and style as well as on miscommunication still seem to outnumber research searching for commonalties in interactive patterns and the ways that speakers, despite their different biographical backgrounds, build common ground. Above all, there is an abundance of studies on differences in the East and West German vocabulary as well as on Wende16 terminology (Hellmann 1993; Lerchner 1992; Reiher 1995). More communicatively oriented studies have focused on differences between East German and West German communicative styles in job interviews (Auer et al. 1997; Birkner & Kern 1996) and differences in

 Grit Liebscher

text types and genres in East and West Germany (Fix 1994). Besides these contrastive studies, there are two diverse collections of articles from the domain of culture, communication and society in post-Wende times (Stevenson & Theobald 2000; Czyzewski et al. 1995). Most recently, Bredel (1999), in her analysis of Wende narrations, has left the contrastive focus to analyse how speakers diverge from usual narrative patterns in times of social change.

Data analysis In order to demonstrate two contrasting ways of perspective management, I have chosen two examples from the corpus data. The first example shows how interactants’ perspective-setting may help to avoid conflicts or problems in anticipation of interlocutors’ perspectives. The analysis of the second example reveals ways in which speakers construct and deconstruct an encounter as an intercultural situation through the discursive management of divergent perspectives. The first example is from the MDR Talk Show produced on April 23, 1993 by the station MDR in Dresden, in what used to be East Germany. The speaker is the talk show host (T1)17 who lived in West Germany before 1989. He interviews a guest (G1), an actress, who had escaped East Germany in the summer of 1989 to live in West Germany. He asks her about this escape and in his question he uses linguistic resources through which he expresses an East German perspective. These resources are the verbs of motion expressing to go (or move) across the wall (to the West). These verbs are not simply motion verbs in this (German) context18 but they position the speaker in either East or West Germany. To go expresses the East German perspective because the speaker is positioned in East Germany; to come expresses the West German perspective, whereby the speaker is positioned in West Germany. (1)19 1

TS1:

sie waren eines der ganz grossen talente der ddr und ‘you were one of the big talents in the gdr and

2

1989 haben sie sich dann trotzdem entschlossen (0.2) in 1989 you nevertheless decided to (0.2)

3

rüberzumachen (0.1) sind sie in den westen go across (0.1) you went (or: moved) to the

Perspectives in conflict

4 5

gegangen, hat ihnen das gut getan west, was that good for you’ G1:

ja das hat mir glaube ich sehr gut getan ‘yes I believe that was very good for me’

The talk show host is faced with the problem that he is in the former East Germany talking about a time when he had lived in West Germany. He uses a linguistic resource with an East German viewpoint (to go across the border). More specifically, in his selection of the verb rübermachen instead of rübergehen, he chooses the verb indexing an East German communicative style. Through this selection, T1 shows “involvement”20 (Scollon & Scollon 1995: 36), a communicative move taking the perspective of another. T1 thus displays awareness of the local audience’s perspective. However, he also distances himself from this perspective by using interactional resources in addition to these linguistic ones. These interactional resources are the pauses in lines 2 and 3, before rüberzumachen ‘go across’ and before sind sie in den westen gegangen ‘you went (or: moved) to the west’. In conjunction with the first pause, T1 also smiles and moves his upper body forward, a gesture that may be understood as so to speak, similar to a hand gesture indexing quotation marks. With Goffman’s words, T1 does not claim to be the “principal,” “someone whose position is established by the words that are spoken” but rather the “author,” “someone who has selected the sentiments that are being expressed and the words in which they are encoded” (Goffman 1979: 17). These devices index the speaker’s distance from the group he at the same time identifies with by using its communicative style. T1’s resourcefulness in using a combination of linguistic and interactional devices works to serve several audiences. Addressing several audience groups (Mehrfachadressierung) has been pointed out as a characteristic of television talk (Hoffmann 1985: 108; Hess-Lüttich 1992: 162). However, both authors regret the lack of studies demonstrating how this characteristic is actually realized by speakers. T1’s management of perspectives seems to be one way of constructing such “institutionality.” T1’s strategy to address, and thus identify with, several audience groups, makes him a mediator between these groups. He is able to communicatively resolve a clash of different perspectives, such as perceiving East and West German culture as same or different. T1 demonstrates his awareness of different perspectives while at the same time not identifying solely with one or the other perspective. His own personal history may, in fact, limit his options to manifest one particular perspective. Since he himself did not live in East Germany before 1990, he may not be able to claim the right to a perspective, mani-



 Grit Liebscher

fested through the East German communicative style, that does not respond to his personal experience.21 Thus, grounding a singular East German perspective would conflict with his own biography. In addressing the part of his audience that perceives East and West German experience as different, he does not claim an East German perspective himself for the time when he lived in West Germany. Thus, he constructs interculturality out of the need to serve his audience. While T1, in the first example, enacts cultural borders for possible reasons of involvement and thus creates an intercultural situation, the speakers in the second example negotiate perspectives through the discursive enactment and breaking of cultural borders. The interculturality of the encounter is negotiated in the second example by the interactants’ management of perspective divergence. The analysis of the second example also reveals how speakers display different levels of responsibility through their selection of vocabulary. Example two is from the talk show III nach 9 aired by N3, a northwestern German TV station. It was first aired in 1982 in West Germany and was rebroadcast in 1994 by the same station in what used to be West Germany. The speakers are the talk show host (T2) and her guest (G2), an actor. G2’s personal experience is unique compared to other people who lived in East and West Germany before 1989, a time when free travel between the two countries was not possible. G2 had moved between the countries as a child, then lived in East Germany and worked as an actor, and escaped to West Germany where he had lived for five years at the time of the interaction. To facilitate the discussion of the lengthy example, it is spilt into several data segments that follow each other as in the actual conversation, except where I omitted a short stretch of talk (lines 11–16). The first segment marks the beginning of the interaction, which the talk show host opens with a question addressed to the guest. (2) 1

T2:

glaubn sie tatsächlich dass wir uns überhaupt nicht ‘do you really believe that we haven’t diverged

2

entfernt haben (.) von den leuten die in der ddr at all (.) from the people who have lived

3

ein paralleles leben hinter sich gebracht haben? parallel lives in the gdr?’

In the question (lines 1–3), T2 formulates herself as West German through the pronoun wir ‘we’. It is not clear if T2 includes G2 in the we-group because Ger-

Perspectives in conflict 

man, among other languages, does not have different pronouns to distinguish the inclusion or exclusion of the co-present party, as some languages do.22 T2 formulates the we-group in contrast to a they-group, the leute[n] ... in der ddr ‘people ... in the gdr’. Thus, T2 projects her perspective about the relationship between East and West Germans, and therefore East and West Germany: the people, and therefore the countries, are (culturally) different from each other. Therefore, T2 contextualises the interaction as an intercultural encounter. In her question, T2 more specifically suggests that West Germans have advanced from East Germans. The question contains a value judgement about the relationship between the two cultures that T2 formulates, whereby West Germany, the speaker’s own culture, is formulated as more advanced and East Germany as more backward. T2 formulates her question with the assumption that G2’s perspective differs from her own (glaubn sie tatsächlich ‘do you really believe’).23 With the addition of tatsächlich ‘really’, T2 displays disbelief in G2’s perspective and sets a preference structure that asks for agreement with her own perspective. In answering, G2 is faced with two conflicts. T2’s question suggests that she does not welcome G2’s divergent perspective. As Pomerantz (1984) demonstrates, the conversational system is such that there is a preference for agreement. Disagreement between interactants is “dispreferred.” Thus, the more preferred answer would be G2’s alignment with T2’s perspective. However, G2 may see his personal experience conflicting with T2’s perception of East and West Germany as separate cultures. Since G2 lived in East as well as West Germany, his personal identity merges the two cultures T2 has posited, i.e. neither that of a “true” East German nor that of a “true” West German. G2’s answer below starts with a mitigation (line 4) typical for introducing disagreement, followed by aber ‘but’ introducing his divergent perspective. (3) 4 5

G2:

überhaupt nicht kann man sicherlich nicht sagen ‘one couldn’t say not at all but not as aber nicht so weit wie man annehmen:: sollte much as one would think’

In lines 4 and 5 above as well as in the next segment below, G2’s selection from among linguistic items is indicative of an alternation between different cultural perspectives as well as expressing neither a clearly East German nor a clearly West German perspective but rather a German perspective. These linguistic items are deictics such as pronouns and place and person references, which

 Grit Liebscher

are an important source for the recognition of perspectives. For example, lines 4 and 5 repeatedly contain the pronoun man.24 The German man is similar to the English one. Man describes individuals or groups to the exclusion of the speaker and/or addressee or including the speaker and/or addressee. The more specific meaning results from the linguistic environment, the speaker and other cultural factors that contextualise man. Deictics, and it has been argued any linguistic elements, always depend on this contexualisation to a certain extent. However, there are differences in the linguistic inventories of a language, including deictics, regarding the extent to which the viewpoint and through it possibly a speaker’s perspective is expressed. In contrast to other deictics such as I or they, the pronoun man is less explicit in its reference. Consequently, it places less responsibility on the speaker in explicitly formulating a perspective. The first case of man (lines 4) is an example for Bredel’s category of “circumstantial” man (1999: 132), since the referent can be reconstructed through the linguistic and situational context. It refers to the speaker because it comes at a point where the speaker’s personal opinion in response to T2’s question is relevant. An alternative selection to man in this response with a much clearer I-perspective would have been: I do not believe x. Bredel argues that man as substitution for ich (I) is used by the speaker whenever a problematic experience is activated (1999: 132). Based on our example, we can expand Bredel’s argument to include interactional circumstances that are problematic for G2. In his turn starting in line 4, G2 disagrees with the previous speaker; man instead of I can be seen as a mitigation of this disagreement. The more neutral man is also less confrontational, since the contrast I vs. you would be evoked more directly if the speaker had used I. Bredel’s argument may further be expanded by considering speakerinclusive man vs. speaker-exclusive man. While Bredel in her discussion focuses solely on the former, her observations may also hold for the latter, as can be demonstrated with the usage of man in line 5. This second man (line 5) is embedded in a formulation that echoes T2’s perspective: aber nicht soweit wie man annehmen sollte ‘but not as much as one would think’. In line with G2’s argument, man excludes the speaker, G2, and refers to T2. Selecting man, G2 does not address T2 directly as with the alternative you, which avoids the formulation of confronting perspectives. G2’s usage of man as a discursive resource avoids an interactional problem. Instead of disagreeing by addressing T2 directly through you, man neutralizes perspectives. In both cases of man (lines 4 and 5), the pronoun requires that its meaning potential is co-constructed by all co-participants. In the interpretive process, G2 shifts responsibility away from himself as the speaker. G2 leaves open whether man includes other peo-

Perspectives in conflict 

ple, which would suggest that G2’s perspective is held by others as well. The pronoun man in line 5 combines characteristics of Bredel’s “attributive man”25 and “circumstantial man” (1999: 130–133), which suggests that these categories overlap. This overlap, however, may also result from transferring these two categories from Bredel’s analysis of the speaker-inclusive man to the speakerexclusive man in our example. As far as the construction of T2’s and G2’s respective institutional roles as talk show host and as guest go, G2 is able to neutralize these roles to a certain extent26 by using man as an alternative to ich (I) in line 4, and man as an alternative to du or Sie (you) in line 5. It is especially noteworthy that man neutralizes the distinction between the informal du and the formal Sie, a distinction that possibly makes G2 uncomfortable considering that T2 is a journalist colleague.27 Du conventionally displays no asymmetries (e.g. age and status differences) and familiarity between the speakers (e.g. collegial and friendly relationships). Again, it seems that the speaker is able to negotiate interactional circumstances, institutional roles, rather than problematic experiences through the usage of man. In his ongoing turn, in line 6 G2 selects another pronoun, diejenigen (‘those’).28 Within the linguistic context, this pronoun refers to a group of people in the GDR further described in lines 7 and 8 of the same turn. (4) 6

G2:

und auch nicht soweit wie diejenigen die mhm nun ‘and also not as much as those believe who uhm

7

seit kriegsende die bevölkerung der ddr erziehen (.) since the end of the war educate the people in the

8

moralisch politisch erziehen glauben nich, gdr morally politically,’

Diejenigen excludes the speaker and suggests that his own perspective is different. Both he as well as the people that he refers to using diejenigen, have experienced East Germany. However, G2 assigns the latter group a perspective that is different from his own. He breaks up the interculturality between East and West Germany as suggested by T2 and instead posits an “interculturality” within the cultural space East Germany. G2 uses deictics delineating different viewpoints in order to place two different social categories with different perspectives within the same cultural space. Thus, perspective management helps him to deconstruct the concept of a unified culture.

 Grit Liebscher

The following man (line 9) is co-referential to diejenigen (line 6). While diejenigen is explicitly exclusive of the speaker, man again leaves more interpretive responsibility with the co-participants. Since this man is embedded in a turn where East German experience is made relevant, the connection to G2’s biography, especially his living in East Germany, leaves room to interpret man inclusively. The fact that this ambiguity cannot be resolved clearly from the context or the co-text points to the discursive power that the pronoun man has in order to shift interpretive responsibility from the speaker to interlocutors. Using man allows speakers to collapse different viewpoints and to neutralize perspectives. (5) 9

G2:

10

irgendwann hat man ja mal angenommen es wäre ne frage ‘at some point one assumed that it was a question von zwei drei generationen of two or three generations’

[. . . ] 17

G2:

die leute zur arbeit und zu dem fleiß zu bringen von ‘to make the people go to work and motivate

18

dem herr kraus vorhin sprach da er er sagte dass them to be diligent as mister kraus said earlier

19

er uns hier fehlt oder euch hier mirs es-jetz a diligence that we lack here or you [lack] here-

20

mittlerweile rutscht mir schon en uns raus I am- now by now [the word] us slips out

21

◦ ◦

22

weil ich ja schon fünf jahre da bin◦ because I have been at that place for 5 years

eh da hat sich wenig verändert already◦ uhm little has changed at that place’

Though G2 does not align himself with either an East German or a West perspective, the narration in lines 6–17 documents his experience of the East German culture. This narration may be interpreted as displaying an East German perspective because of the inside information given. The use of the indefinite pronoun man (‘one’) in line 9 may additionally have created a context in which the speaker can be associated with an East German perspective. So far we have seen that, while T2 in her question at the outset displays her perspective rather explicitly through linguistic means by indexing a particular

Perspectives in conflict 

perspective, G2 in his answer explicitly formulates neither an East nor a West German perspective. This indefiniteness towards one or the other perspective may be an indication that G2 rejects T2’s definition of an intercultural relationship between East and West Germany, in which case G2 would disagree with T2. G2’s indefiniteness in selecting vocabulary with no explicit viewpoint may also give the impression that G2 does not want to be identified with a West German perspective. In line 19 of the segment above, G2 himself indicates through a self-repair (Sacks et al. 1974)29 that the change to a West German perspective formulated by inclusion through uns ‘we’ is problematic to him. In this self-repair from uns hier (‘we here’) to euch hier (‘you here’), G2 changes perspective from that of an insider to that of an outsider to West German culture: he first makes himself discursively part of West German culture through uns hier but marks this inclusion as problematic in repairing to euch hier. In addition, he formulates this inclusion as a slip of the tongue (line 20) and gives an account for this slip by adding that he has lived in West Germany for five years already. Thus, he justifies his slip of the tongue by reasoning that a viewpoint gets adopted automatically with living in a place for a certain time. The clash between viewpoint and perspective becomes obvious: the deictic pronouns discursively construct two different viewpoints that are tied to two different cultural perspectives. G2, however, wants to argue for one single German perspective which is only discursively possible once he resorts to vocabulary such as man with a less specific viewpoint. Similar to man, the adverb da (‘that place’) in lines 21 and 22 above displays no specific viewpoint. The deictic-locative adverb da is less specific than both here and there and translates maybe best into that place. It is curious that the speaker selects da in reference to the place West Germany at the point when he has marked his own inclusion to West Germans as a group as problematic. Since the talk show takes place in West Germany, here would have been as appropriate in reference to the local place. However, here exhibits a viewpoint that ties the speaker to that place more closely than da does. The speaker’s perspective is thus less explicit when he selects da instead of here. In selecting da, G2 can be held less responsible for formulating a perspective that may be denied to him, i.e. his inclusion among the group of West Germans. G2 continues with his turn which is shown in the next segment below. He now argues for a commonality between East and West Germany in providing examples for their Germanness.

 Grit Liebscher

(6) 23

G2:

und auch dieses deutsche eh was da eben in der ‘and also this germanness uhm that here

24

hymnentafel so schön besungen worden ist im letzten was sung about in the hymn earlier in the last song,

25

lied finde ich auch in beiden deutschlands gleich i find [this germanness] similarly strong

26

stark ausgeprägt in both germanies

27

aber diese dieses ganze (.) deutsche das meine ich but all this (.) germanness I don’t want to sound

28

jetz gar nicht böse aber diese- die freude mean now but this- the pleasure in one’s

29

am eigenen- am eigenheim am am am an der datscha own- in the own home in in in the datscha

30

am weekend-haus usw. alle diese dinge die das leben in the weekend home all these things which make up

31

in deutschland ausmachen die kommen mir eh gar life in germany they don’t seem to me uhm so out- eh

32

nicht weit voneiander entfernt aus- eh vor different from each other’

In resorting to dieses deutsche (‘this germanness’), in line 23, G2 is able to position himself discursively in between East and West Germany. G2 uses Germany and Germanness for both East and West Germany in 1982, a time when unification in 1990 was not yet a concrete matter. In fact, the construction of a common German perspective is not unproblematic for G2. In lines 30–31, G2 frames this perspective by providing a hedge: das meine ich jetzt gar nicht böse (‘i don’t want to sound mean now’). This hedge reflects G2’s perception that the example that displays his perspective (lines 28–30) could offend his audience, especially those who “nurture” their homes, something that may be considered a negative German stereotype. In addition, a perspective that views East and West Germany as the same German cultural space is certainly in contrast to T2’s perspective that posits them as different. Also problematic may be that deutsch (‘German’) and deutschland (‘Germanness’) was very unusual at the time to be used in reference to East Germany. It was more common to refer to West Germany as Deutschland and to West

Perspectives in conflict 

German as deutsch. While G2 can make his argument based on a common history of East and West Germany, his argument and the discursive formulation of it are highly contested at the same time. In his example for a common Germanness (lines 28–30), G2 enumerates several kinds of houses (eigenheim, datscha, weekend-haus). His own formulation alle diese dinge (‘all these things’), line 33, indicates that he lists these houses to represent several different things. However, this list may also index a word search. In fact, T2 displays in her next turn below that she understands G2’s listing to be a word search. (7) 33

T2:

nur das wir datscha hier bungalow nennen ‘only that we say bungalow for datscha here’

In line 33 above, T2 provides the term bungalow as the (presumably) proper term used in West Germany in rejection of datscha, a Russian loan word associated with East Germany. Line 33 is the final response in this example. It is a clever move by T2 in support of her perspective that East and West German are two different cultures. T2 plays with cultural perspectives based on words indexing one or the other culture. She provides linguistic evidence in support of her perspective projected in her question in segment 1. In fact, she uses G2’s linguistic selections for her own argument. This may point to G2’s displayed contradiction between viewpoint-saturated vocabulary such as uns and his going back and forth between perspectives. T2’s providing of linguistic evidence and pun constructs an intercultural situation in which G2 is identified with East German but not West German culture. The management of perspectives is used here to negotiate interculturality through the relationship of the individuals to culture.

Summary In conclusion, I have demonstrated that an analysis of interaction reveals how speakers construct intercultural discourse through the management of cultural perspectives. Speakers manage perspectives through rhetorical devices, which include the selection of words and the use of interactional devices (e.g. pauses and gestures). The examples discussed in this paper provide evidence that interculturality is a matter of negotiation between participants in the interaction rather than a concept that can be defined a priori.

 Grit Liebscher

The analysis has also revealed that, though there may not be a unified cultural belief or value system, speakers use lexical items to express cultural perspectives. Thus, speakers can be held responsible for their selections as evidence of them indexing a particular perspective, since the selection may identify a speaker as part of that culture and suggest a cultural perspective. It was also my intent to show that interactants select strategically from among linguistic alternatives. By doing so, they are able to manipulate their discursive responsibility towards words they use, i.e. speakers can be held more or less accountable for what they say. Within the framework of this book, I discussed how interactants employ different linguistic resources to indicate their intercultural understanding. Furthermore, the interactants’ selection of these resources takes into account individual experiences, especially interactants’ own personal history, as well as assumptions about the interlocutors’ perceptions of relationships between cultures. Interculturality seems to meet at the crossroad between these individual experiences and collective understandings about cultural relationships.

Notes * A version of this paper was presented at the 7th International Pragmatics Conference in Budapest. I am grateful to the University of Waterloo for their financial support to participate in the conference. . I would like to thank Kristin Bührig and Jan D. ten Thije for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper. . Tzanne (2000) provides an excellent analysis of intercultural encounters using this approach. She states that “scholars should look for factors contributing to miscommunication in the linguistic, social and physical context of the specific encounter in which a misunderstanding occurs” (7). . Following ten Thije (this volume), our concept of culture is informed by pragmatics. . See also ten Thije (this volume) for in-depth descriptions of this and other approaches involving perspective. . Variations of this framework have been used in the analysis of intercultural communication (see, for example, Czyzewski et al. 1995; and Wolf 1995). . There is no denying that, in our own analysis, we are often caught in these categories. The social division between East and West Germany seems to dictate the categories of the “East German” vs. the “West German”. And even though we admit that there are nuances of these categories expressed by interactants, our own vocabulary dictates limits in expressing these nuances.

Perspectives in conflict . Graumann defines perspective-setting as the “representation of something by someone for someone from a given position” (Graumann 1993: 159 and 1960). . Problem or conflict so defined seems in line with rhetorical conversation analysis’ interest in conversations of problem and conflict management (Keim 1996: 194; Kallmeyer 1996: 11– 13) where the interactants have to manage controversial perspectives. . Kallmeyer and Keim define “perspectivation” as “[t]he mutual revealing of perspective and of relating one’s own [perspective] to the other’s” (1998: 287). . For an overview, see ten Thije (2000) and in this volume. . “Social space” is used here in Bourdieu’s (1990, 1994) understanding of “social space” as relationships between individuals and groups within society. . Whenever something is said, there is always an alternative way of saying it. . Contextualisation is a practice by which meaning gets attributed to linguistic and interactional elements in the interaction. This meaning is co-constructed by speaker and co-participants in the interaction (Gumperz 1982; Auer 1996). . For a more extensive discussion of data from this corpus, see Liebscher (1999). . I adopt Auer’s definition of code-switching as “code-alternation ... defined as a relationship of contiguous juxtaposition of semiotic systems, such that the appropriate recipients of the resulting complex sign are in a position to interpret this juxtaposition as such” (1995: 116). . Wende means turning point. It became a common term in reference to the period of social change in (East and West) Germany from 1989 to 1990. . I am using the abbreviations T1 and G1 for talk show host and guest in the first talk show and T2 and G2 in the second talk show. . As part of the verb semantic of German verbs, Zifonun (1997) distinguishes between verbs with outside perspective (Außenperspektive) such as kommen (to come) and inner perspective (Binnenperspektive) such as gehen (to go). The latter do not take preceding or following events into account, while the former do. . I am using a simplified version of the transcription notation developed by Jefferson as described by Atkinson and Heritage (1984). Bolding is for emphasis. Since capitalization is used to mark stress, the transcript may differ from usual German orthographic spelling. . “One shows involvement by taking the point of view of other participants” (Scollon & Scollon 1995: 36). . The (East German) audience in Dresden or watching the broadcast on television may still consider West Germany a different, dominant, possibly negative “other” culture taking over East Germany and T1 an East German outsider, since he did not live in East Germany at the time of division. . For example, Austronesian languages. . The example is possibly preceded by a segment in which G2 has already displayed his perspective. The 1994 talk show, from which this example is taken, only presents excerpts from earlier shows and not the complete interaction.



 Grit Liebscher . Judging by its semantic, syntactic and functional features, Bredel (1999: 127) suggests, together with Weinreich (1993, 1998), characterizing man as a “neutral personal pronoun” rather than indefinite pronoun. It is beyond the scope of this paper to take sides in this discussion; I refer to man simply as a pronoun. . According to Bredel (1999: 130), the attributive man has no referential function; its interpretation comes closest to whoever (“wer auch immer”). . Their institutional roles are also established by the talk show host asking and the guest answering. . There is no general convention of the du/Sie-usage across different talk shows. When du is used on talk shows between hosts and guests, the audience can assume a long-term friendship or a collegial relationship. Talk show producers may also introduce du as form of address between hosts and guests as well as among guests to “produce” non-asymmetric relationships, as done, for example, in youth talk shows such as Doppelpunkt. . Though diejenigen in this instance seems like an alternative to man, man could not be substituted in its place because of syntactic constraints (cf. Bredel 1999: 127). . Repair is a conversational technique to resolve trouble in speaking, hearing and understanding (Sacks et al. 1974). Self-repair is the repair initiated and corrected by the speaker him- or herself.

References Atkinson, Maxwell J. & Heritage, John (1984). “Transcript notation”. In M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), Structures of Social Action (pp. ix–xvi). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Auer, Peter (1995). “The pragmatics of code-switching: a sequential approach.” In L. Milroy & P. Muysken (Eds.), One Speaker. Two Languages (pp. 115–135). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Auer, Peter (1996). “From context to contexualization”. Links and Letters, 3, 11–28. Auer, Peter, Birkner, Karin, & Kern, Friederike (1997). “Wörter – Formeln – Argumente. Was in Bewerbungsgesprächen “Spaß” macht.” In I. Barz & U. Fix (Eds.), Deutsch-Deutsche Kommunikationserfahrungen im arbeitsweltlichen Alltag (pp. 213–232). Heidelberg: Winter. Auer, Peter & Kern, Friederike (2001). “Three ways of analysing communication between East and West Germans as intercultural communication.” In A. di Luzio, S. Guenthner, & F. Orletti (Eds.), Culture in communication: Analyses of intercultural communication (pp. 89–116). Amsterdam: Benjamins. Bell, Allan (2001). “Back in style: reworking audience design.” In P. Eckert & J. R. Rickford (Eds.), Style and sociolinguistic variation (pp. 139–169). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Perspectives in conflict 

Birkner, Karin & Kern, Frederike (1996). “Deutsch-deutsche Reparaturversuche. Alltagsrhetorische Gestaltungsverfahren ostdeutscher Sprecherinnen und Sprecher im westdeutschen Aktivitätstyp ‘Bewerbungsgespräch”’. GAL-Bulletin. Zeitschrift für angewandte Linguistik, 25, 53–76. Bourdieu, Pierre (1994). Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bredel, Ursula (1999). Erzählen im Umbruch. Studie zur narrativen Verarbeitung der “Wende” 1989. Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag. Bühler, Karl (1990 [1965]). Theory of Language. [Sprachtheorie]. Amsterdam: John Benjamins [Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer Verlag]. Czyzewski, Marek, Gülich, Elisabeth, Hausendorfer, Heiko, & Kastner, Maria (Eds.). (1995). Nationale Selbst- und Fremdbilder im Gespräch. Kommunikative Prozesse nach der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands und dem Systemwandel in Ostmitteleuropa. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Fix, Ursula (1994). “Sprache vor und nach der ‘Wende’. ‘Gewendete Texte – ‘gewendete Textsorten.” In H. J. Heringer et al. (Eds.), Tendenzen der deutschen Gegenwartssprache (pp. 131–148). Tübingen: Niemeyer, Goffman, Erving (1979). “Footing”. Semiotica, 25, 1–29. Gumperz, John J. (1982). Discourse Strategies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Graumann, Carl F. (1960). Grundlagen einer Phänomenologie und Psychologie der Perspektivität. Berlin: de Gruyter. Graumann, Carl F. (1989). “Perspective-setting and taking in verbal interaction”. In R. Dietrich & C. F. Graumann (Eds.), Language Processing in Social Context (pp. 95–122). Amsterdam: North-Holland (Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.). Graumann, Carl F. (1993). “Perspektivität und Kognition und Sprache”. SPIEL (Siegener Periodicum zur Internationalen Empirischen Literaturwissenschaft), 12, 156–172. Hellmann, Manfred W. (1993). “Ostdeutsch – Westdeutsch im Kontakt – Brücke oder Schranke der Verständigung?” Germanistische Mitteilungen, 38, 3–35. Hess-Lüttich, Ernest W. B. (1992). “Schau-Gespräche, Freitagnacht. Dialogsorten öffentlicher Kommunikation und das Exempel einer Talkshow.” In H. Löffler (Ed.), Dialoganalyse IV. Referate der 4. Arbeitstagung Basel 1992 (pp. 161–175). Tübingen: Niemeyer. Hoffmann, Ludger (1985). “Die Bonner Runde – Ansätze zur Analyse einer Kommunikationsform.” In W. Sucharowski (Ed.), Analysen zur Bonner Runde nach der Hessenwahl 1982. (Gesprächsforschung im Vergleich.) (pp. 107–145). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. Kallmeyer, Werner (2002). “Verbal practices of perspective grounding.” In C. F. Graumann & W. Kallmeyer (Eds.), Perspective and Perspectivation in Discourse (pp. 113–142). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Kallmeyer, Werner (1996). “Einleitung”. In W. Kallmeyer (Ed.), Gesprächsrhetorik (pp. 7– 18). Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag. Kallmeyer, Werner & Keim, Inken (1996). “Divergent perspectives and social style in conflict talk”. Folia Linguistica, 3, 271–297. Keim, Inken (1996). “Verfahren der Perspektivenabschottung”. In W. Kallmeyer (Ed.), Gesprächsrhetorik (pp. 192–277). Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag.

 Grit Liebscher

Keim, Inken (2002). “Perspectivity and professional role in verbal interaction”. In C. F. Graumann & W. Kallmeyer (Eds.), Perspective and Perspectivation in Discourse (pp. 143–165). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Koole, Tom & ten Thije, Jan D. (2001). “The reconstruction of intercultural discourse; methodological considerations”. Journal of Pragmatics, 33, 571–587. Lerchner, Gotthard (1992). Sprachgebrauch im Wandel. Anmerkungen zur Kommunikationskultur in der DDR vor und nach der Wende. Frankfurt/M.: Lang. Liebscher, Grit (1999). Arriving at Identities: Voice and Positioning in German Talk Shows between 1989 and 1994. Unpublished Dissertation. University of Texas at Austin. Pomerantz, Anita (1984). “Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments: some features of preferred/dispreferred turn shapes”. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), Structures of Social Action (pp. 57–101). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reiher, Ruth (1995). “Deutsch-deutscher Sprachwandel.” In R. Reiher (Ed.), Sprache im Konflikt. Zur Rolle der Sprache in sozialen, politischen und militärischen Auseinandersetzungen (pp. 232–243). Berlin/New York: W. De Gruyter. Sarangi, Srikant (1994). “Intercultural or not? Beyond the celebration of cultural differences in miscommunication analysis”. Pragmatics, 4, 409–427. Sacks, Harvey, Schegloff, Emanuel A., & Jefferson, Gail (1974). “A simplest systematics for the organization of turn taking in conversation”. Language, 50, 679–735. Scollon, Ron & Scollon, Suzanne Wong (1995). Intercultural Communication. A Discourse Approach. Oxford: Blackwell. Stevenson, Patrick & Theobald, John (2000). Relocating Germanness. Discursive Disunity in Unified Germany. London: MacMillan. Tetreault, Chantal (1997). “Strategically splitting the self:constructions of responsibility in talk about immigration”. In Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Symposium About Language and Society-Austin (pp. 71–80). Austin: University of Texas, Department of Linguistics. Thije, Jan D. ten (2000). “The notion of ‘perspective’ in intercultural communication research”. Revised manuscript of paper presented at the 20th DGfS conference, Halle/Saale March 4–6, 1998. Thije, Jan D. ten (2005). “The notion of ‘perspective’ and ‘perspectivity’ in intercultural communication research”. This volume. Tzanne, Angeliki (2000). Talking at cross-purposes: the dynamics of miscommunication. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Wolf, Ricarda (1998). “Wo findet das Interkulturelle statt? Konversationsanalytische Überlegungen am Beispiel einer polnisch-deutschen Titelsuche”. In B. Apfelbaum & H. Müller (Eds.), Fremde im Gespräch (pp. 111–143). Opladen: IKO – Verlag für Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Zifonun, Gisela (1997). “Grammatik der Ereignisperspektivierung”. In G. Zifonun, L. Hoffmann, & B. Strecker (Eds.), Grammatik der deutschen Sprache (pp. 1859–1880). Berlin: De Gruyter.

Beyond ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘cultural stereotypes’ Analysing intercultural communication* Jennifer Hartog

Introduction A wealth of research in the last three decades has shown us that as people travel and migrate, communication becomes more and more ‘intercultural’ and – as studies have shown – ‘misunderstandings’ loom over every encounter (for reviews cf. Rehbein 1985; Knapp & Knapp-Potthoff 1990; Clyne 1994; Scollon & Scollon 1995; ten Thije 2001). It seems as if misunderstandings are an inherent thus unavoidable part of intercultural communication. Looking more closely though at, for instance, Gumperz’ pioneering work (Gumperz 1982) on intercultural communication, it appears that the situations described were extremely clear-cut so that it was possible to determine precisely what the source of communicative trouble was: in Gumperz (1982) the Indian’s falling intonation in English questions made them sound rude to British natives thus causing interactional problems. Of course, there still are new migrants arriving in foreign places nowadays whose command of the new language is poor and who therefore meet the same kind of problems as those described by Gumperz. There are, however, now many cases of second or third generation migrants who have learned to live in the countries their parents or grandparents came to. Here ‘living’ means to a large extent ‘communicating’. Also, first generation migrants have often been living for twenty or thirty years in their ‘new’ country and have adapted – linguistically too. How can one analyse what is still intercultural about the communication involving these persons? Is all communication intercultural simply because members of different cultures meet (cf. also Rehbein 1985 and in this volume or Koole & ten

 Jennifer Hartog

Thije 1994)? When do the boundaries of these cultural groups get blurred – analysably blurred in their verbal expression? Further, some intercultural communication does succeed. And persons of the same culture also have misunderstandings. One can therefore ask whether the category of ‘misunderstanding’ is discriminating and thus relevant for analysing intercultural communication. Perhaps the notion of ‘misunderstanding’ merely points towards some interactional trouble which needs to be analysed in more linguistic detail and does not get an analytical hold on ‘interculturality’. The idea of ‘cultural stereotypes’ has also been used in the study of intercultural communication (Günthner 1993; Tiittula 1995) Unfortunately, as will be shown below the term has been used in a vague and commonsense meaning where it needs a linguistic definition. In summary it is necessary to get a linguistic hold on the cultural element in what is commonly called intercultural communication. The analysis of the transcript which follows reveals some of the pitfalls of intercultural communication studies, puts interculturality in contrast with the concept of institution and suggests how to get a grip on interculturality.

Intercultural vs. institutional? A transcript analysis The idea for the analysis presented below is to take an instance of communication which would certainly count intuitively as intercultural (talk between a German and a Turk), chosen from communication taking place in an institution in order to analyse the nature of occuring ‘trouble’ by contrasting the effects of the institution with those of interculturality. Functional pragmatics and its methodology of discourse analysis enables the researcher to discern between various levels of speech actions carried out between two or more speakers and hearers. Using transcripts it is possible to reconstruct the speech actions used, at all levels of verbalisation (from patterns to procedures), by speakers and hearers to attain their goals. Within a theory of language seen as action, culture, too, is seen as action and not merely as a status (e.g. being a German or a Turk). Before launching into the analysis of ‘intercultural communication’ within an institution, it is important to have analysed the workings of the institution itself. In Hartog (1996) a functional-pragmatic analysis of an institution characteristically structured by language was presented. The institution chosen was that of genetic counselling as it enabled one to analyse the workings of com-

Beyond ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘cultural stereotypes’ 

plex communication between experts and non-experts on a difficult abstract medical genetic subject relevant to the non-expert counsellees for their own decision-making concerning their reproductive future, their health or that of their relatives. The results of the analysis of a large corpus of counselling sessions revealed an overall action-pattern belonging to the type of decisionmaking patterns. The beginning of the pattern is characterized by perplexity among the counsellees who require expert knowledge assessed by an expert in order to plan further action. For ethical reasons the experts are not supposed to tell the counsellees what to do but in fact they use all kinds of means to tell them ‘indirectly’ how to assess their situation ‘reasonably’ (from the experts’ point of view). The linguistic analysis resulted in a clear idea of what ideal counselling would be: it would require the counsellor to help the counsellees practise forming new plans of action using the both new and assessed knowledge verbalized by the counsellor during the session. Much has been written on counselling often by the professionals working in the institution (e.g. medical doctors, psychologists) but little work has been done actually analysing transcripts of counselling communication (cf. Hartog 1996; Mitchie, McDonald, & Marteau 1996 or, for the institution of AIDS counselling, Silvermann 1997). Questionnaires or rating procedures, which are frequently used in assessing counselling, yield other results than the analysis of transcripts (cf. Hartog 1994). The example analysed below from the same institution of genetic counselling but now involves a German doctor and Turkish counsellees in a university hospital in southern Germany. Generally speaking, a genetic counselling session takes place between a medical doctor specialized in human genetics and a patient (often a couple) and deals with questions concerning heredity, inherited disorders and diseases or genetic testing.

The case A Turkish couple who have been living for over 15 years in Germany have a mentally retarded child and consulted a (German) doctor to discover the cause of the retardation. He took blood samples of the parents and of the child and found out with molecular genetic analyses that the child’s mental retardation was caused by an unbalanced translocation in the child‘s genes. This translocation could be traced back to a balanced translocation in the mother. This means that the mother has the right total amount of genetic information. However, it is located on genes it normally should not be located on. This creates problems when the chromosomes divide as they divide at given places no matter

 Jennifer Hartog

which information is on them, thus passing on the wrong quantities of genetic information. So without being affected herself (as her total amount of genetic information is correct) the mother had the genetic ‘flaw’ which caused her son’s condition. The doctor, knowing what he thought he knew about Turks in general, thought that the Turkish husband would repudiate his wife and did not dare to disclose the diagnosis. Instead, he referred the patients to the genetic counselling centre where the transcript to be analysed below comes from. The geneticist conducting the session is German and speaks not a single word of Turkish. As the patients’ German is not very good, a Turkish intern in the Department of Human Genetics acts as an interpreter, a lay interpreter as he has no formal training in this skill (for lay and community interpreting as opposed to professional interpreting cf. Bührig & Meyer 2004).

The transcript The counselling session has been transcribed according to HIAT along the lines of musical scores (Ehlich & Rehbein 1976). Utterances are located in ‘score areas’.

Beyond ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘cultural stereotypes’ 

 Jennifer Hartog

Analysis In functional-pragmatic discourse analysis societal purposes form “deep actional structures” (for instance patterns) which get “put into language” in varying surface manifestations according to the individual goals of the speakers. The transcript fragment starts at the end of a position in the overall “speech action-pattern” (cf. Ehlich & Rehbein 1979 and 1986) of genetic counselling (cf. Hartog 1996) in which relevant genetic knowledge for the case in point is verbalized by the counsellor. The geneticist has just been talking about the amount of genetic knowledge transmitted. The patients’ reaction enables us to reconstruct how they have processed these facts. At a first glance it seems as though the whole fragment is a prize example of misunderstanding in intercultural communication judging from the counsellor’s reaction in score areas 10ff: he seems not to have understood the Turkish man’s irony. But is this really the case? Further, how much ‘misunderstanding’ can be attributed to the fact that the couple is Turkish and the geneticist is German? And what influence does the institutional nature of the setting have? The first methodological point to be made concerning the analysis is that it is essential in order to determine what is actually intercultural about the communication to have done analyses of the same discourse type in a so-called monocultural setting. Without the analyses of genetic counselling sessions involving German counsellors and German counsellees (cf. Hartog 1996), it would not be possible to distinguish between institutionality and interculturality (for a discussion cf. e.g. Koole & ten Thije 1994; Liedke 1997 or Rost-Roth in this vol.). Although the couple’s command of German seems to be not very good, they do appear to have understood the genetic cause of their son’s handicap: of course, it is not the first time chromosomes have been explained to them. In fact, they already have quite a long “patient’s career” (Gerhardt 1989). This the geneticist knows too as the case – with all the records – has been referred to him previously. The counsellees have probably understood as much or as

Beyond ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘cultural stereotypes’

little as any lay person – German or Turkish – does. Research in the outcome of genetic counselling has shown that the level of education of the counsellees had a great influence on the successful processing of complex knowledge (Chapple, May, & Campion 1995). In the case of Turkish counsellees who have been living in Germany for many years, the command of the German language has to be weighed against the fact that many concepts of modern medicine may have become familiar (in principle) over time and because they have dealt with their complex medical history for some time. So it is not necessarily because their German is bad that they have not understood the genetic origin of their child’s handicap – a conclusion often drawn by doctors faced with foreign patients. In score areas 1 to 3 IntM interprets general genetic information which the Turkish woman then applies – correctly – to her case: benden fazla gitmi¸s (that is, too much from me went across). The German counsellor knows that the harsh information has now hit the patients and leaves them time ((3s)) Hmhm in score area 4 to process it. In fact, he leaves them as much space as though it were the very first time they had heard the bad news. The main purpose of the processing of new knowledge is to assess it in order to integrate it in one’s own knowledge structures and to make plans for the next step of action (Hartog 1996). In the Turkish man’s turn we get the result of his processing the bad news in score areas 4–5: first, the audible inbreath, then his questions followed by the laughter. What the Turkish man says would probably be seen as a culturally ‘stereotypical’ answer – and this is the reaction the German counsellor and the intern had been fearing right from the start. And here it is. But that is only if one does not look carefully at the language used: Hatun, bi daha mıevlensem n’apsam? (Wife, ought I to marry again, what ought I to do?, 4–5). First of all, the man addresses his wife with the expression hatun (wife) which is an old Ottoman term which can be used nowadays in an ironic manner. It reminds one of the use of the term ‘wife’ in English fairy tales. In the Ottoman Empire the term hatun was used to refer to women of a high social status. Today it can be used in a derogatory sense or, more often, ironically. Here, the Turkish man who has a simple social background may be quoting, with a noticeable smile in his voice, other constellations in other times thereby introducing an ironical distance to his utterance right from the start (cf. Grießhaber 1987 for the quoting of speech actions). This kind of playing with terms of address can be understood only by native speakers; thus this irony uttered within an institutional setting can be seen as a sign of intimacy and understanding between the Turkish husband and wife especially as the nuances will probably get lost in the course of the lay interpreting. Importantly for the interpretation, the term of address (hatun, wife) is the very first expression in the Turkish man’s utterance.



 Jennifer Hartog

The question – in a deliberative mode of talk – as to whether he should marry again is addressed to the wife and not to the counsellor. It is done quickly and at low voice which makes it partly an aside, a bit of private talk. The consequence the Turkish man draws (marrying again) is a consequence any sensible person could draw when faced with a genetic ‘flaw’ in his/her partner. It is not just a Turkish consequence. But, of course, Islamic law hovers closer over a Turkish couple than, for instance, over a German couple. And it is perhaps just because this is so that the man addresses the issue. He does it in a way which makes the consequence drawn an impossible one: (i) He does it with the term hatun. (ii) He does it with the specific suffix – se/sa – indicating a potential conditional of the verb series evlemsem, yapsam making it highly improbable. In Turkish everyday talk this type of rhetorical question is used as a means of pushing an argument ad absurdum. (iii) Finally, in the laughter it becomes clear that this is an utterly impossible conclusion to be drawn and that the Turkish man was reacting jokingly in the way the counsellor was fearing he would react. The Turk is playing with notions concerning the ‘typical’ German by reflecting on the action practices which seem to be Turkish ones. IntM interprets in score areas 5–7 (ob er nochmals / nochmal heiraten soll oder was er machen sollte, whether he should marry again / once more or what he ought to do) what the Turkish patient said. Why did he translate a private moment at all? If we had only this bit of transcript we might say that it is considered to be rude to keep someone out of an ongoing joke and therefore IntM translated it so that DocM would know what was going on. But this is institutionalized talk and IntM is not usually bothered about manners – as other transcripts of IntM have revealed. He usually makes his own diagnoses based on the stories the patients tell and reports only the results of his diagnosis to the counsellor but certainly does not translate the minutiae of the stories thereby acting in an efficient way – as a mediator – in this medical institution but in a poor way if one considers his skills as an interpreter. While interpreters try to act as non-persons in the Goffman sense, mediators act as persons in their right, as a speaker and hearer trying to bridge the gap between persons of different cultures for instance by adding explanations (cf. Bührig & Rehbein 2000; Clyne & Platt 1991; Knapp & Knapp-Potthoff 1987; Rehbein 1985). The purpose of the institution is of utmost importance though. It is interesting to see what exactly he translates: he translates the propositional content of the questions asked by the patient. The modal verb soll he uses makes the possibility of remarrying a more probable one than in the Turkish version. Further, he does not say that the questions were addressed to the man’s wife. From Int’s translation (ob er nochmals / nochmal heiraten soll oder was er machen sollte, whether

Beyond ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘cultural stereotypes’ 

he should marry again / once more or what he ought to do, score areas 5–6) the addressee clearly is the counsellor, at least until the correct addressees (fragt er sich oder Frau Günes, Mr. Günes, he asks himself or he asks Mrs. Günes) are tagged on not even at the end of the utterance containing the questions but in the next utterance in score area 7. And finally, Int leaves out the fact that the mere possibility of remarrying has been laughed at and thus discarded. By the fact that Int (a) translates the Turkish man’s utterance and (b) does it the way he does, he is telling the counsellor that they now have the situation they were dreading right from the start, i.e. the Turk is thinking of repudiating his wife. Why did the Turkish intern not get the joke? Was he already so wedded to the institution that he forgot the nuances of his mother tongue? This seems to be the most probable interpretation. Not understanding a word of Turkish and ignoring the laughter, the counsellor, however, can only respond to what Int has said and starts in, very seriously, to argue against the idea of remarrying in score areas 8 and 9. The Turkish patient though understands what the counsellor is engaging in and interrupts him by verbalizing what had been contained in the laughter between himself and his wife. The patient’s utterances Ich Spaß machen, ja! Ich liebe meine Frau (score area 9) are probably what the term ‘de-stereotyping’ would cover. It seems that ‘de-stereotyping’ is a non-linguistic term meaning something like ‘undoing a stereotype’. These expressions all seem to be used as commonsense terms for something one can analyse more precisely. In her criticism of much of the work done under the heading of ‘stereotypes’, Redder (1995) analysed how stereotypes have in fact little to do with selective perception and much more with knowledge structure types as they were analysed by Ehlich and Rehbein (1977). Ehlich and Rehbein analysed knowledge as the result of processing reality through language and storing it in structures ranging from particular knowledge structures to knowledge structures shared by several or many persons. According to Redder, however, the term stereotype is a collective term for several knowledge structure types and not a knowledge structure of its own. Thus, it is not an analytical category. The example here in the transcript of what would be called ‘de-stereotyping’ (ich Spaß machen, ja! Ich liebe meine Frau, I making joke, yes! I love my wife, score area 9) could be more precisely analysed using an idea Rehbein (in this volume) developed as the ‘cultural apparatus’. The concept of ‘apparatus’ was developed in functional pragmatics to analyse communicative structures larger than acts, patterns and procedures stretching over varying lengths of discourse and fulfilling complex purposes (cf. Rehbein 2001). The cultural apparatus is based on a Gramscian concept of cul-

 Jennifer Hartog

ture as criticism – usually of actions carried out in a society (Redder & Rehbein 1987). Culture either stabilizes actions in a society by using them as long as they work or invents new actions in order to overcome contradictions between different societal groups. The interesting aspect of the concept of apparatus is that it does not blanket the whole of the ongoing interaction at all times but rather docks on to interaction in case of ‘intercultural trouble’; in the case of the cultural apparatus it is the means of putting into language what has been criticized by culture. This means that not the whole interaction is intercultural but only certain moments: The (deep structure) mental processes of the cultural apparatus take place before the interaction they create can emerge on the surface. This interaction can be reconstructed under analysis as follows: i.

Rhetorical means of the Turkish talking culture: Hatun, bi daha mıevlensem n’apsam? (Wife, ought I to marry again, what ought I to do?, 4–5) here, the Turkish counsellee is joking about his own culture in a Turkish aside to his wife. This is purely Turkish-Turkish communication. ii. Incorrect transfer – particularly concerning the addressee (score areas 5– 7): the incorrect transfer is due to IntM’s interpreting the rhetorical, joking questions in terms of the institution, i.e. checking whether the information is being “correctly” (in terms of the institution) processed (for these transferring processes cf. Bührig & Rehbein 2000). The incorrect interpretation triggers the doctor’s explanations aimed at getting the counsellee to process the genetic information “correctly” (in terms of the institution): Ich glaube nicht, daß Sie diese Überlegungen anstellen müssen (I don’t think that you have to consider those thoughts, score areas 8–9). iii. Sorting out the problem (in score area 9) which neither IntM nor Doc could perceive because of their own communication culture. Here the Turkish intern is acting completely as an agent of the medical institution. It is precisely in score area 9 (ich Spaß machen, ja! Ich liebe meine Frau) that we see that the cultural apparatus at work when the Turkish patient realizes by what the counsellor says (taking the idea of remarrying seriously) that he did not understand that it was not to be taken seriously. The Turkish counsellee resorts to describing explicitly (ich Spaß machen) what his linguistic action has been namely joking. Further, the Turkish counsellee states the second reason for not remarrying: Ich liebe meine Frau. This statement has a certain quality of quotation as if he is quoting a standard reason. Interestingly, the cultural apparatus can be used one-sidedly, attaching itself to the communicative moment which has come under cultural criticism. By saying explicitly what had been

Beyond ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘cultural stereotypes’

expressed in the laughter, the Turkish patient makes use of the action potential of the cultural apparatus in order to bridge the now obvious gap between the Turks and the German. This he prefers to do directly himself – albeit in slightly faulty German – rather than trust the intern with the translation. If we do not use a concept such as the one of a cultural apparatus in order to analyse precisely what is merely sensed in the term ‘de-stereotyping’, it is difficult to grasp what the Turkish patient is doing when he says Ich Spaß machen. This is the one genuine moment of inter-culturality. DoM, as an agent of the institution, obviously still does not believe that the Turkish couple have really understood the genetic concepts and launches into lengthy explanations about heredity and chromosomes (score areas 10ff.).

Conclusion Several steps of important insight have been gained from the analysis presented above: Firstly, all is not intercultural at all times in discourse simply because persons of different cultures meet. Nowadays in a world subject to the processes of globalization and increased mobility (cf. Baumann 1998 or Sapir 2002) clear-cut boundaries between cultures are disappearing. Yet, at some points differences do remain. They do not, however, make communication ‘intercultural’ throughout a whole discourse. The counselling between the Turkish counsellees and the German doctor was intercultural at one point only. We therefore need an analytical tool such as the concept of the cultural apparatus which will allow one to discern the moments of interculturality. Secondly, it was shown to be of outmost importance to disentangle the role of the institution and that of culture. Data should be collected and analysed so as to know how the institution works before analysing cultural action within a chosen institution. In the analysis presented above, even though the mediator was a native speaker of Turkish his speech actions were more steered by the goals of the institution than by the desire to help bridge the gap between the cultures. Finally, it has become clear that intercultural communication cannot be adequately described as a perennial string of misunderstandings. It is not that and furthermore the category of ‘misunderstanding’ has turned out not to be helpful in order to analyse intercultural communication. It is useful in describing many kinds of communicative trouble (cf. Tzanne 2000) but it is not



 Jennifer Hartog

specific enough for grasping interculturality and for analysing the creativity lying within the moments of cultural action.

Note * I should like to thank Kristin Bührig, Muhsin Omurca, Erkan Özdil, Jochen Rehbein and Joyce Whitney for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

References Baumann, Zygmunt (1998). Gobalization. The human consequences. Cmbridge: Polity. Bührig, Kristin & Meyer, Bernd (2004). “Ad-hoc interpreting and achievement of communicative purposes in doctor-patient-communication”. In J. House & J. Rehbein (Eds.), Multilingual Communication (pp. 43–62). Amsterdam, Philadelphia: Benjamins. Bührig, Kristin & Rehbein, Jochen (2000). Reproduzierendes Handeln. Übersetzen, simultanes und konsekutives Dolmetschen im diskursanalytischen Vergleich. Hamburg: Arbeiten zur Mehrsprachigkeit (Folge B, Nr. 6) Universität Hamburg. Chapple, Alison, May, Carl, & Campion, Peter (1995). “Lay Understanding of genetic disease”. Journal of Genetic Counseling, 4, 281–300. Clyne, Michael (1994). Inter-cultural communication at work – cultural values in discourse. Cambridge University Press. Clyne, Michael & Platt, John (1991). “The Role of Language in Cross-Cultural Communication”. In A. Pauwels (Ed.), Cross-Cultural Communication in Medical Encounters (pp. 38–55). Melbourne: Monash University. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1976). “Halbinterpretative Arbeitstrankriptionen (HIAT)”. Linguistische Berichte, 45, 21–41. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1977). “Wissen, kommunikatives Handeln und die Schule”. In H. Goeppert (Ed.), Sprachverhalten im Unterricht (pp. 36–114). München: Fink. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1979). “Sprachliche Handlungsmuster”. In H. H. Soeffner (Ed.), Interpretative Verfahren in den Sozial- und Textwissenschaften (pp. 243– 274). Stuttgart: Metzler. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1986). Muster und Institution. Untersuchungen zur schulischen Kommunikation. Tübingen: Narr. Gerhardt, Uta (1986). Patientenkarrieren. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Grießhaber, Wilhelm (1987). Authentisches und zitierendes Handeln. Vol. I. Einstellungsgespräche. Tübingen: Narr. Gumperz, John (1982). Discourse Strategies. Cambridge University Press. Günthner, Susanne (1993). Diskursstrategien in der interkulturellen Kommunikation. Analysen deutsch-chinesischer Gespräche. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Beyond ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘cultural stereotypes’ 

Hartog, Jennifer (1994). “Die Methode des Zentralen Beziehungs-Konflikts-Themas (ZBKT): eine linguistische Kritik”. In A. Redder & I. Wiese (Eds.), Medizinische Kommunikation. Diskurspraxis, Diskursethik, Diskursanalyse (pp. 306–326). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Hartog, Jennifer (1996). Das genetische Beratungsgespräch. Institutionalisierte Kommunikation zwischen Experten und Nicht-Experten. Tübingen: Narr. Knapp, Karlfried & Knapp-Potthoff, Annelie (1987). “The man (or the woman) in the middle. Discoursal aspects of non-professional interpreting”. In W. Enninger, K. Knapp, & A. Knapp-Potthoff (Eds.), Analyzing Intercultural Communication (pp. 181–211). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Knapp, Karlfried & Knapp-Potthoff, Annelie (1990). “Interkulturelle Kommunikation”. Zeitschrift für Fremdsprachenforschung, 1, 62–93. Koole, Tom & Thije, Jan D. ten (1994). The construction of intercultural discourse. Team discussions of educational advisers. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Liedke, Martina (1997). “Institution und Interkulturalität”. In A. Knapp-Potthoff & M. Liedke (Eds.), Aspekte interkultureller Kommunikationsfähigkeit (pp. 155–180). München: Iudicium. Michie, Susan, McDonald, Valerie, & Marteau, Theresa (1996). “Understanding responses to predictive genetic testing: a grounded theory approach”. Psychology and Health, 11, 455–470. Redder, Angelika (1995). ““Stereotyp” – eine sprachwissenschaftliche Kritik”. In A. Wierlacher et al. (Eds.), Jahrbuch Deutsch als Fremdsprache, 21 (pp. 311–329). Redder, Angelika & Rehbein, Jochen (1987). “Zum Begriff der Kultur”. OBST, 38, 7–21. Rehbein, Jochen (Ed.). (1985). Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Tübingen: Narr. Rehbein, Jochen (1985). “Ein ungleiches Paar – Verfahren des Sprachmittelns in der medizinischen Beratung”. In Rehbein (pp. 420–448). Rehbein, Jochen (2001). “Das Konzept der Diskursanalyse”. In K. Brinker, G. Antos, & S. Sager (Eds.), Text- und Gesprächslinguistik – Linguistics of Text and Conversation, Vol. 2 (pp. 927–945). Berlin: de Gruyter. Rehbein, Jochen (2005). “The Cultural Apparatus. Thoughts on the relationship between language, culture, and society”. In this volume. Rost-Roth, Martina (2005). “Intercultural communiation in institutional counselling sessions”. In this volume. Sapir, Jacques (2002). Les économistes contre la démocratie. Pouvoir, mondialisation et démocratie. Paris: Albin Michel. Scollon, Ron & Scollon, Suzanne (1995). Intercultural Communication: a discourse approach. Oxford: Blackwell. Silverman, David (1997). Discourses of Counselling. HIV Counselling as Social Interaction. London: Sage. Thije, Jan D. ten (2001). “Ein diskursanalytisches Konzept zum interkulturellen Kommunikationstraining”. In J. Bolten & D. Schröter (Eds.), Im Netz interkulturellen Handelns. Theoretische und praktische Perspektiven der interkulturellen Kommunikationsforschung (pp. 176–204). Sternenfels: Wissenschaft und Praxis.

 Jennifer Hartog

Tiittula, Liisa (1995). “Kulturen treffen aufeinander. Wie finnische und deutsche Geschäftsleute über Gespräche berichten, die sie miteinander führen”. In A. Wierlacher et al. (Eds.), Jahrbuch Deutsch als Fremdsprache, 21 (pp. 293–310). Tzanne, Angeliki (2000). Talking at cross purposes. The dynamics of miscommunication. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions Martina Rost-Roth

Introduction In this chapter, data derived from counselling interviews in a university context are used to examine intercultural communication in institutional settings. Participants take on specific roles in this institutional setting: lecturers and other university staff act as advisers, non-native students as seekers of advice. Analyses show that the interactions are, to a large extent, marked by miscommunication and problems in understanding. Studies on intercultural communication often concentrate on the analysis of miscommunication and problems in understanding. This approach has been subject to criticism, however, and it has been argued that the intercultural dimension is perceived by analysts rather than by participants.1 In this context, secondary data from follow-up interviews with participants make it possible to identify instances in which participants, too, perceive miscommunication as being linked to differing cultural expectations or culture-specific knowledge. Although many of the communication problems can be attributed to culture-specific expectations and differences, not all problems that arise in intercultural encounters can be clearly distinguished from other types of problems. Problems are often closely linked to deficits in second language competence, to everyday difficulties, or to problems rooted in the institutional context. It is therefore argued that the potential for communication problems is particularly high where intercultural communication takes place in institutional settings, because the various problem areas coincide and reinforce one another. This chapter starts with a brief review of research on counselling interviews in intercultural and intracultural settings, with a special focus on findings relat-

 Martina Rost-Roth

ing to miscommunication and problems in understanding. Discourse analytic approaches to the description of miscommunication and to problems in understanding are then introduced and methods of data analysis shown. Following a description of the database, a number of problematic exchanges from the counselling sessions are analysed. The analyses concentrate on central stages of counselling interviews; the presentation of problems and the formulation of requests on the one hand, and the processing of proposed solutions on the other. This chapter closes with a general discussion of the potential for problems in understanding which is inherent in intercultural communication in institutional settings.

Research on counselling Counselling as an institutional setting The type of communication which occurs in counselling encounters within institutional settings has been investigated in a number of studies, and various communication problems have been observed. Nothdurft (1984), starting from a consersationanalytical approach, makes a detailed investigation of the problem presentation in counselling sessions. Nothdurft, Reitemeyer and Schröder (1994) focus their studies on the potential for communication difficulties in the different stages of counselling. Analyses show that relying on institutional and situation-bound conditions as “resources”, which seem to make an explicit verbalisation of the reason for the encounter redundant at the opening of the conversation and/or in the problem presentation stage, can increase the potential for misunderstandings and misinterpretation. A further potential problem area lies in the mismatch of the participants’ perspectives; advisers and those seeking advice do not share common knowledge or common goals.2 On the basis of data drawn from interaction in social security offices, Wenzel (1984) differentiates between strategies, which promote comprehension, and those, which hinder it. Selting (1987) examines communication problems in a bureaucratic context. She analyses different types of problems in understanding and the linguistic mechanisms used to signal these. Investigations of institutional speech events in the field of applied linguistics and functional pragmatics have also identified numerous potential sources of communication problems. Becker-Mrotzeck (1991) associates communication problems with the following circumstances: lack of common knowl-

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions

edge (“institutional knowledge of professionals” vs. “everyday knowledge of clients”), different action-related experiences (“routine” vs. “singularity”), divergent action-related interests (“task-orientation” vs. “involvement”) and the asymmetric distribution of tasks. Further proposed sources of problems are the transference of everyday content to institutional categories, the dominance of the institution, and the violation of interaction patterns by institutional representatives. Ehlich et al. (1989) highlight problems such as the insufficient explanation of proposed solutions and the use of incomprehensible technical terminology. Hartog (1996) and Hartog (this volume) analyse genetic counsellings. In doing so she concentrates on problems, which stem from varying degrees of knowledge.

Counselling in intercultural encounters Research on counselling encounters that occur in intercultural settings is of particular significance for the present topic of research.3 Early investigations of intercultural communication carried out by Gumperz (1982) and Gumperz et al. (1979) took counselling sessions as the starting point for basic descriptions of miscommunication in intercultural settings. Sources of misunderstanding identified in the studies include cultural differences in ways of structuring information or arguments. Particular importance is attached to the role of so-called contextualisation cues, i.e., culture-specific conventions in ways of speaking which determine how particular utterances are to be interpreted.4 As such contextualisation conventions are often taken for granted and cultural differences of this type usually operate below the level of awareness, the potential for misinterpretation and misunderstanding is particularly high when they are employed. Another ‘classical’ study on consultations in intercultural contact is Erickson and Shultz (1982). The role played by culture-specific knowledge is primarily shown by research conducted in the field of linguistic pragmatics. Rehbein (1985a) uses the example of German-Turkish medical consultations to illustrate this point. Backa (1987) analyses a counselling situation in a centre for immigrants, and shows how less formal counselling situations can give rise to problems for nonnative clients. Using the example of German-American comparisons, Kotthoff (1989) shows how cultural differences, linguistic deficits and the characteristics of non-native speech can lead to problems where conversational openings, closings and argumentation are concerned. The findings of her investigation of faculty-student counselling sessions in a university context show that in intercultural settings, not only transfer phenomena, but also the linguistic char-



 Martina Rost-Roth

acteristics of non-native speakers can have a negative effect on conversational agendas and outcomes. Günthner (1993) investigates German-Chinese interactions, focussing on culture-specific contextualisation conventions and ways of dealing with communication problems. Günthner (1992) analyses the extent to which identity-related factors, such as cultural, institutional and gender affiliation, are manifested in different discourse styles in counselling situations. Hinnenkamp’s (1987, 1989 and 1991) analyses of communication in bureaucratic settings address various problems and coping strategies which arise in counselling situations (including ways of dealing with communication problems, “contraconflictive procedures”, discrimination and the reproduction of societal structures), with the primary aim of achieving a connection between micro- and macrostructures. Koole and ten Thije (1994) analyse counselling in pedagogical contexts and team discussions of educational advisors as embedded in complex institutional processes. To sum up, it can be concluded that communication difficulties and miscommunication are the main topics of investigation throughout the field of “intercultural communication” research. In her review article, Rost-Roth (1994a) therefore asks which types of communication problems and/or miscommunication are diagnosed in the various studies, and to which factors these are attributed. This overview of research findings reveals that different studies focus on various aspects of the phenomenon of ‘communication problems in intercultural interactions’ – e.g., individual speech acts, particular settings, culture-specific background knowledge, different levels of linguistic competence, and social dimensions.

Methodological approach Database The database comprises approximately 160 recordings of counselling sessions conducted at various locations in the Free University of Berlin: the Institute of German Philology (during faculty office hours), the General Counselling Office (‘Allgemeine Studienberatung’) and the International Office (‘Akademisches Auslandsamt’). Approximately 80 of the recordings are also documented on videotape. The length of the sessions varies from 2 to 30 minutes, most of them lasting between 7 and 10 minutes. Both German and non-native students took part in the counselling sessions.5 In 30 cases, the participants (staff and/or students) were asked to com-

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions 

ment on the recordings.6 Whereas video and audio tapes and their transcriptions serve as ‘primary data’, indicating which problems arise in the respective situations and how they are dealt with by the participants, the comments and follow-up interviews provide ‘secondary data’, documenting participants’ own perspectives of the problems and their view on possible relations to intercultural differences. Furthermore, the ‘secondary data’ make it possible to identify problems which did not leave any noticeable ‘traces’ on the interaction documented.7

The identification of problems in understanding and miscommunication Methodological approaches to the identification of problems in understanding and miscommunication may be derived from the fields of conversation analysis and functional pragmatics. In conversation analysis, the sequential organisation of interaction and the organisation of “repair”, in particular, are taken as points of departure to analyse how “trouble” is dealt with in interaction.8 Analysts attempt to identify the parts of exchanges in which interactants signal a problem and try to solve it. In particular, ways of initiating repair and general principles of repair have been studied.9 In the functional pragmatic approach, social parameters such as institutional and cultural knowledge are also taken into account. The analysis of miscommunication is carried out with respect to macrostructures and communicative action patterns. Manifestations of miscommunication may be such that some steps or phases of the pattern have to be repeated. Reactions to trouble and miscommunication are analysed primarily with respect to speech acts and macro structures.10 The present study identifies problems in understanding and miscommunication based on these discourse analytic approaches, their methodological reasons for analysing trouble and miscommunication, and the presupposed idea of a prototypical and undisturbed course of interaction, according to the following criteria: –

Interactional sequences in which repair occurs, are regarded as manifestations of trouble. The interactants’ response to the trouble may be analysed with respect to their indications that a problem has arisen and their attempts to resolve it.11

 Martina Rost-Roth

–

–

Recordings and transcriptions are analysed for sequential and macrostructural patterns. Discontinuities are regarded as potential signs of problems in interpretation and mutual understanding. Follow-up interviews and comments are evaluated with respect to interactants’ comments on communication problems, especially those which left no noticeable traces on the “surface” of the interaction.

An interactive model of the stages in counselling encounters Most of the situations documented in the data show analogies to the following communicative pattern (derived from Schröder et al. 1993) for counselling sessions: opening (‘Situationseröffnung’) presentation of problems (‘Problempräsentation’) development of a solution (‘Lösungsentwicklung’) proposal of a solution (‘Lösungsvorschlag’) processing of the proposal (‘Lösungsverarbeitung’) closing (‘Situationsauflösung’)

These components of the interactive model are not only an integral part of official counselling sessions, but of the consultation hours (‘Sprechstunden’) provided for students by professors and other academic staff.

Case studies and examples In the following section, interactional sequences are analysed with respect to the communicative pattern of counselling described above. The examples presented here concentrate primarily on the stages of problem presentation and processing of proposed solutions.

Presentation of problems and formulation of requests In the following example, a student from Iran approaches a faculty member during her consultation hours. After initial greetings and the request for permission to record the session, the student starts to formulate his request:12

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions 

(1) Cl-NNS: e:h ..(s).. u:h ..(s).. ich bin im zehnten semester I’m in the tenth semester Co-NS:

ja yes

Cl-NNS: neuere deutsche lit/ neuere deutsche lite&ra&tur modern german lit/ modern german literature Co-NS:

&ja& &yes&

Cl-NNS: hab abgeschlossen have completed also ich brauche nur magisterarbeit zu schreibn that is I only need to write master’s thesis Co-NS:

mhm mhm

Cl-NNS: und eh de/ diese veranstaltung and uh ‘de’/ this course de a ef dey ah eff13 mich ‘so: brennend interessierte interested me so passionately14 interessiert immer noch still interests ich mein zweites fach gewechselt I changed my second major linguistik (hat hier) besucht linguistics (has here) attended Co-NS:

mhm mhm

Cl-NNS: damit ich (dafür/da hier) diesen kurs besuchen kann so that I (for that/there here) can attend this course e:h u:h Co-NS:

e:h welchn kurs speziell? u:h which course in particular?

 Martina Rost-Roth

was hat sie so &interssiert?& what interested you so much? Cl-NNS: Co-NS:

&linguistik!& linguistics %ja% yes

Cl-NNS: >>also ‘de a ‘ef>> hat mich interessiert well ‘dey ah eff ’ interested me Co-NS:

>>’ah>> ja! >>’oh>> yes!

Cl-NNS: und das ist voraussetzung dafür and that’s the precondition for it Co-NS:

ja yes

Cl-NNS: linguistik linguistics Co-NS:

ja yes

Cl-NNS: eh uh Co-NS:

da ham sie ja (neulandxxxxx) so you’re on (new territoryxxx)

Cl-NNS: e:h das mein problem ist jetzt u:h the my problem is now . . . daß ich a und be scheine gemacht habe . . . that I’ve done certificates a and b Co-NS:

ja yes

Cl-NNS: in linguistik in linguistics . . . wollte sie fragen . . . wanted to ask you ob es ’irgendwie möglich wäre if it would be at all possible ..(s)..

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions 

bei dem/ bei dem kommendn semester mitzumachn to participate in the coming semester ..(s).. weil ich mein grundstudium ’nicht abgeschlossn habe because I haven’t finished my basic course in linguistik in linguistics Co-NS:

ja yes >>sie meinen jetzt bei der>> bewerbung you mean in the application für das zusatzstudium deutsch als fremdsprache for the ‘supplementary degree’ in german as a foreign language

Cl-NNS: %genau% %exactly% ..(s)..

This way of presenting the problem corresponds to the type of ‘focussing of the request’ (‘Anliegens-Fokussierung’) described by Nothdurft (1984: 54ff.), where important preconditions for the understanding of the problem are reported before the problem itself is introduced. Although this way of presenting problems is also common among native speakers, in this case the necessary background information is not structured very clearly. In this encounter, repairs are initiated as early as the problem presentation stage. The first repair is initiated by the counsellor with the questions: “welchn kurs speziell? was hat sie so interessiert?”, “which course in particular? what interested you so much?”. As a further measure to achieve understanding, the counsellor inserts a comprehension check at the end of the student’s presentation of the problem (“sie meinen jetzt bei der bewerbung für das zusatzstudium deutsch als fremdsprache”, “you mean in the application for the supplementary degree in german as a foreign language”). Such comprehension checks are carried out by means of paraphrases and reformulations.15 Comments made by the counsellor during the follow-up interview confirm her comprehension difficulties (“mir wird auch nach mehrmaligem abhören nicht klar, was er eigentlich von mir will”, “even after listening to the recording several times, I still can’t figure out what he actually wants of me”). From the recordings, it is impossible to gauge the extent to which the obscurity of the presentation can be attributed to the fact that the person seeking

 Martina Rost-Roth

advice is a non-native speaker. In the follow-up interview, however, the student refers to his difficulty expressing himself in German: “drei-, viemal hab ich den satz wiederholt ‘es interessiert mich brennend’. Ich glaub ich hab den satz neulich gelernt oder gehört, ich wußte keine alternative zu sagen wie ich mich dafür interessiert”, “three, four times I repeated the sentence ‘I’m passionately interested in it’. I think I learned or heard the sentence recently, I didn’t know any other way to say how interested I am.”). In the discourse of native speakers, emotional ways of expressing oneself are also to be found, but more reference is made to the facts and matters described, than to personal conditions and states. Therefore, it is also noticeable that many of the arguments which the student puts forward to support the urgency of his request refer to emotions and personal conditions and states, as illustrated in the example below. (2) Cl-NNS: ich weiß nich ob ich I don’t know whether I . vermitteln kann was was (is) das für ein Gefühl is . can convey what what (is) kind of a feeling it is Co-NS: ja doch ich kann mir das: yes, I can: Cl-NNS: wenn ich den kommentar lese when I read the comment Co-NS: mm mm Cl-NNS: so multikulturelle gesellschaft like multicultural society eh die schwierigkeiten uh the difficulties . ich erzähl eine kurze geschichte . I’ll tell you a short story Co-NS: ja yes Cl-NNS: es is interessant it is interesting gestern hab ich mein mein eine klausur geschrieben yesterday I took my my a test ((the story is continued over a further 34 lines of the transcript))

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions 

The announcement and telling of a story which is designed to lend support to the impression of urgency is particularly striking. It is not only of note that a story is related with an argumentative function as part of the counselling model, but also the reactions and clear signs of irritation shown by the counsellor are of particular interest. The narration is accompanied only by infrequent back channel signals. The video tape shows an indifferent posture and a facial expression which can only be interpreted as one of nonunderstanding. The follow-up interview reveals that the counsellor failed to understand even the introduction to the story. Nevertheless, in accordance with the ‘wait and see’ strategy, she refrained from indicating non-understanding (“ich habe des nämlich in der situation nicht richtig verstanden (. . . ) also oft ist es so, daß man im augenblick noch nicht den sinn interpretiern kann, aber denkt, naja das nächste wird mir zeigen”, “I didn’t really understand it at the time (. . . ) it’s often the case that you can’t figure out the meaning at the moment in question, but you think, well, it will become clear any minute”). When the student has finished his story, there is a short silence before the counsellor makes a remark which refers only superficially to what the student has said, using ‘dazu’ (‘on that’) as a superficial anaphoric link: (3) Cl-NNS: und erst danach zu hause hab ich gemerkt and only after coming home did I notice . . . ’so/solche sachn interessiern mich so ’brennend . . . ’s/such things are of such passionate interest to me Co-NS:

%ja% yes ..(2s).. >>’also>> zwei sachn falln mir dazu ein well, two things come to my mind on that

The fact that the counsellor’s remarks (“>>’also>> zwei sachn falln mir dazu ein”, “>>well>>, two things come to my mind on that”) do not relate directly to what the student has said can be interpreted as thematic discontinuity and a result of interpretation problems. These problems of interpretation can be attributed to differing conceptions of the suitability and function of storytelling in argumentation and counselling situations. Divergent expectations of this kind may cause problems in the achievement of individual components of the counselling model.16

 Martina Rost-Roth

Counsellors who are aware that non-native clients may have problems with the target language may develop special strategies. One such strategy is the use of frequent comprehension checks and clarification requests. (4) Cl-NNS: mh mh Co-NS:

?sie ham bis z/ bis zu diesem jahr ?up t/ up to this year you’ve an dem doktorkurs teilgenomm ?ja? participated in the doctoral programme ?right?

Cl-NNS: jaja ..(2).. äh ich hab den . doktorkurs äh ja . yeah yeah ..(2).. uh in the doctoral programme uh yes . Co-NS:

?also praktisch bis ins jahr vierunneunzich? ?so practically on into the year ninety four?

Cl-NNS: ja yes Co-NS:

ja . ?und sie wolln auch hier bei ’uns promoviern yes . ?and you also want to do your doctorate here nich zu hause? not at home?

Cl-NNS: jaja yes yes Co-NS:

?bei uns? ?here?

Cl-NNS: ja&ja& yes yes Co-NS:

&ja&ja hm . . . (5s). . . yes yes hm . . . (5s). . . das sind sch:f:/ achtsemester *b a*^ that makes (xx)/eight semesters b a^

The counsellor’s comments in the follow-up interview reveal that he has a conscious strategy to use frequent comprehension checks and clarification requests:

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions 

(5) D-NS:

Aber es gibt viele Mißverständnisse mit den Ausländern und Ausländerinnen weil/ deswegen hab ich mir auch angewöhnt immer erst ein Protokoll zu schreiben, wo ich ganz viel verbessern kann; und auf der Grundlage wenn alles klar ist mach ich hinterher in Ruhe die Bescheinigung fertig. Und diese vielen Rückfragen haben natürlich die Funktion zu vermeiden (xx) ((erzählt, daß sonst oft wichtige Informationen erst später kommen)) But there are many misunderstandings with the international students because/ that’s why I got into the habit of always writing a protocol first where I can make lots of corrections; and on that basis when everything is clear I calmly write out the certificate afterwards. And all these questions naturally help to avoid (xxx) ((he indicates that important information often only comes out later otherwise))

When asked whether he is able to assess the non-native students’ language ability fairly quickly, the counsellor remarks that he also makes a conscious attempt to allow non-native students to speak for some time at the beginning of the interview: (6) Int:

können Sie das Sprachniveau inzwischen schon relativ schnell einschätzen? Denn Sie behandeln die Leute ja auch unterschiedlich, bei manchen sprechen Sie langsamer Are you now able to assess the language level quite quickly? Because you treat people differently, you speak more slowly with some Co-NS: bei den meisten frag ich immer erst mal ‘was kann ich für sie tun?’ und laß die mal n’bißchen was sagn (. . . ) und kann dann, von dem ab kann ich das/ aber das is natürlich auch vom Tag abhängig und ob (. . . ) welche Stimmung ich grade hab (. . . ) aber ich bemühe mich natürlich darauf einzugehn with most of them I start by asking ‘what can I do for you?’ and let them talk a bit (. . . ) and then I can, from then on I can/ but of course it also depends on the particular day and whether (. . . ) what mood I am in at that moment (. . .) but of course I try to adapt to it

While this counsellor consciously gives his non-native clients an opportunity to speak at the beginning of the encounter, others adopt a strategy which consists of posing a string of questions requiring only ‘Yes-’ or ‘No-’answers. In

 Martina Rost-Roth

studies of native/non-native interaction and ‘foreigner talk’,17 this has been characterised as a strategy designed to facilitate the participation of non-native speakers. However, reducing the non-native clients’ role to the provision of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers runs the risk of denying non-native speakers the opportunity to explain the problem from their own perspective. In particular, this strategy seems to be applied in counselling settings where counsellors assume that they already know the reason for their clients’ visit.18

Processing of proposed solutions and decisions The following example stems from a faculty member consultation hour in which a student from Egypt explains that she is having difficulties in preparing a written version of one of her oral presentations. The faculty member offers her some general advice, then makes this more concrete by dictating a proposal for an essay outline with section headings. The proposal for the outline includes ‘conclusions’: (7) Co-NS:

da kann man dann sagn..(s)..diskus’sion.. there you can say ..(s). . . discussion %nein% wartn se mal..(s). %no% wait a minute..s).. ‘schlußfolgerungen .. s).. conclusions..s)..

Cl-NNS: und dann= and then= Co-NS:

=’schlußfolgerungen ist immer dann gut =conclusions is always good wenn man eh irgendwie noch was neues ‘bringen will when you uh kind of want to say something new aber noch nich genau weiß ‘was @@ but don’t yet know exactly what @@

Cl-NNS: (x) ja was es is (x) yeah what it is

Although the student’s final comment (completing the counsellor’s utterance with “was es ist”, “what it is”) suggests that she has understood the proposal (“schlußfolgerungen ist immer dann gut wenn. . . ”, “conclusions is always good when. . . ”), the follow-up interview reveals that she did not actually understand

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions 

what the counsellor meant by ‘conclusions’. The student herself refers to this contradiction: (8) Cl-NNS: ich sag das so, als ob ich das wüßte, oder (irgendwann) schon vorher gemacht habe (xxxx) ich hab das so sicher gesagt, obwohl ich das vorher.. ich hab keine Arbeiten geschrieben, wo ich so eine richtige Schl\ ah Schlußfolgerungen gemacht habe.. die Arbeiten, die ich geschrieben habe in Ägypten, die warn irgendwie/ man hat nicht seine Meinung zum Ausdruck, (. . . ) des wegen also.. ich wundere mich jetzt auch, wie wie ich das sage, ich sag das so (!) sicher, ja, das ist das, oder so ist das, als ob ich das wüßte.. I say it as if I knew it, or had done it before (xxx) I said it so confidently, even though before I.. I haven’t written any essays where I made real concl\ah conclusions.. the essays I wrote in Egypt, they were kind of/ you didn’t express your opinions (. . . ) so that’s why.. I’m surprised now, how how I say it, I say it so (!) confidently, yes, that’s that, or that’s how it is, as if I knew..

In another case, discontinuities become apparent during the session itself. The following sequence is drawn from the end of a counselling session in which registration problems have been discussed. The counsellor summarises the student’s chances of being admitted to the university, and confirms that the student will be able to register for a meteorology degree. Meteorology is only her ‘second choice’, however, as she actually wants to study art history. (9) Co-NS:

äh dann würden sie etwas später uh then a bit later you would die zulassung für meteorologie bekommen get admitted to the meteorology course

Cl-NNS: ja @danke@= yes @thank you@ Co-NS:

=in jedem fall also sein sie nicht traurig in any case don’t be sad

Cl-NNS: an der schule hab ich eh ein bißchen theaterkunstgesch/ &eh & at school I have uh a bit of theatre art hist/ uh Co-NS: Cl-NNS: gelernt studied

&mh hm& mh hm

 Martina Rost-Roth

Co-NS:

mh hm= mh hm

Cl-NNS: =und ich weiß über russisches the/ eh eh theater = and I know about russian the/ uh uh theatre also das ist für mich nicht eh fremd @@ so it’s not uh unfamiliar to me Co-NS:

@klar@ @sure@ ‘gut= good=

Cl-NNS: =danke =thank you Co-NS:

mh bitte schön mm you’re welcome &tschüß & bye

Cl-NNS: &wiedersehn& good bye

The student’s utterances (“an der schule habe ich. . . ”, “at school I have. . . ” and “ich weiß über russisches theater also das ist für micht nicht fremd”, “I know about russian theatre so it’s not unfamiliar to me”) come unexpectedly and seem to have little relevance to what had been said before. The counsellor’s reaction (“klar”,“sure”) is not related to the content of this statement either, and indicates that the counsellor has little interest in pursuing the interview. With “gut” (“good”), she signals the closing of the situation and moves towards concluding the session. The interviewer conducting the follow-up discussion comments on the problems of this interactional sequence, the relation of the student’s utterance to the previous context, and the counsellor’s reaction: (10) Int:

sie lacht so und sagt klar@@@@ (xxxxx) mir ist das jetzt auch nicht klar; also weil das eben so so bekannt ist bei uns; kunstgeschichte ist also wirklich nur bildende kunst und dann gibt’s halt theaterwissenschaft nochmal, das ist noch was she laughs like this and says sure@@@@ (xxxxx) it’s not clear to me either now; well because it is just so so familiar here; art history is well really only fine art and then there’s theatre studies as well, that’s something else

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions 

The non-native student’s commentary reveals a different understanding of the term ‘Kunstgeschichte’ (‘art history’): (11) Cl-NNS: kunstgeschichte das soll alles umfangen; nicht nur irgendwelche gemälde auch ähm vielleicht theater musik (. . . ); für mich das war ganz klar; daß kunst theater kunst das alles zusammenhängt @@@ art history that’s supposed to include everything; not only various paintings; also uhm perhaps theater music (. . . ); for me that was very clear that art theater art that they’re all connected @@@

Significantly, during the follow-up interview (of which only short extracts are cited), further explanations are necessary to elucidate the different conceptions of the term. From this it is clear that the presumed discontinuity is a result of different understandings of the term ‘Kunstgeschichte’. Here, different concepts of a particular term become problematic because the thematic continuity and the status of the utterances are no longer recognised by both participants. The following example also stems from the end of a counselling session in which a student’s problems of registration and visa acquisition have been at issue. Here again, the student’s requests cannot be complied with: (12) Cl-NNS: ja gut okay dann nach zwanzigsten komme &ich mal (wieder)& then after twentieth I come (back) Co-NS:

&mhm mhm

&

Cl-NNS: ?nehme ich schon die bestätigung mit^ oder? ?I take the confirmation with me now right? Co-NS:

das machen wir dann we will do that then wenn sie &sich neu& when you again

Cl-NNS:

&ah ja & &oh yeah &

The utterance “nehme ich schon die bestätigung mit”, “I take the confirmation with me now” is brought up because, from the context, it seemed clear that the confirmation could only be obtained after a further visit to the office. During

 Martina Rost-Roth

the follow-up interview the interviewer’s question “du wußtest doch da was für ne bestätigung das is?”, “but you knew what kind of confirmation that was?” is then confirmed with a laugh. Then, national stereotypes are mentioned: The interpreter, who also comes from Brazil, comments on the student’s behaviour with respect to the peculiarities of the Brazilian mentality: “natürlich war es ihr klar, nur weil sie/ die Brasilianer sind so ((lachen))”, “of course it was clear to her, just because they/ the Brazilians are like that ((laughing))”. The student herself then illustrates this characterisation ‘in a silly voice’: “wirklich nich eine (x), gibt es nich wirklich nich eine kleine (xxx), muß immer am Ende weinen”, “really not a (x), is there really not a little (xxx), always have to cry at the end”. The next example derives its importance from the fact that making appointments is not only a common ‘speech event’ in counselling sessions and institutional interaction, but also in informal settings. Even when appointments are made in native/native and intracultural interaction, efforts to ensure understanding of the exchanged information are increased. In the following sequence, an assistant lecturer tells a Korean student who has applied for a course with restricted entry when he can expect to receive a decision: (13) Co-NS:

ich rufe sie dann an I will call you then und dann ist dann eh and then is then uh in der zweitn woche nach ostern in the second week after easter

Cl-NNS: mhm mhm Co-NS:

ja? (aso) nich die woche direkt nach ostern yeah? (so) not the week directly after easter . sondern die zwei&te& woche nach &ostern but the second week after easter

Cl-NNS:

&ja& yeah

&(mhm) (ja) (mhm)& (mhm) (yeah) (mhm)

vielleicht die letzte woche (in april) (xxx) perhaps the last week (of april) (xxx) Co-NS:

ja (xx) yeah (xx)

& und and

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions 

Cl-NNS: (xxx) (xxx) Co-NS:

ja das is die woche vom: yeah that’s the week from: ..(s).. (ja noch nich) die allerletzte (yeah not yet) the very last

Cl-NNS: (xx) (xx) Co-NS:

einunzwanzig bis eh: twenty-one to uh:

Here, the temporal reference (“in der zweitn woche nach ostern”, “in the second week after easter”) is clarified with additional explanations and reformulations (“nicht die woche direkt nach ostern”, “die zweite woche nach ostern”, “das is die woche vom: (. . . ) einundzwanzig bis eh:”, “not the week directly after easter”,“the second week after easter”, “that’s the week from (. . . ) twenty-one to uh:”). The student’s back channel behavior and his comprehension checks (“vielleicht die letzte woche in april”, “perhaps the last week of april”) show that there seem to be problems with the interpretation of this time reference, and that he is seeking confirmation of his interpretation. His comments in the follow-up interview show that time references are conceived as more general problems: (14) Cl-NNS: Mir ist ja so angenehm.. zum Beispiel erste Woche, zweite Woche in einem Monat oder letzte Woche oder vorletzte Woche in einem Monat; aber wenn die/ also wenn sie zum Beispiel eine Woche nachm Ostern oder eine Woche vor Ostern sagen muß ich ja nochmal überlegn also nachdenken äh ‘wann ist Ostern und nochmal eine Woche vorher oder eine Woche nachher ((Lachen)) I like it..for example first week, second week in a month or last week or second last week in a month; but when they/ well when they for example say a week after Easter or a week before Easter I have to put more thought into it, well think about it uh ‘when is Easter; and again, a week before or a week after ((laughing))

Here, the type of temporal reference made by the counsellor is contrasted with other ways of referring to time (“erste Woche, zweite Woche”, “first week, second week”), whereby the reference to Easter is seen as particularly problematic. Fur-

 Martina Rost-Roth

thermore, these comments show that additional attention is generally paid to temporal references in order to ensure understanding.

Problems in understanding and miscommunication: Potential problem areas Many communication problems are directly linked to differences in cultural conventions, for example: – – – –

when temporal references are made, when urgency is expressed, e.g., in stories, or when certain terms associated with a particular institution have different connotations; etc.

However, it is not always possible to draw a clear-cut distinction between this sort of communication difficulty and other problematic areas. In some cases, communication problems are more closely associated with deficits in nonnative language competences. In other cases, they are linked to more general institutional problems. And finally, intercultural contact, too, can be subject to the sort of communication problems and breakdowns which occur in all types of conversations, and can disrupt all kinds of oral communication. Therefore, it is possible to differentiate between four basic sources of miscommunication: (1) general problems in understanding which can occur in any conversation,19 (2) problems in understanding which can be attributed to the institutional setting and the conversational roles of the participants, (3) problems in understanding which can be traced back to differences in the linguistic competence of native and non-native speakers and language acquisition problems, (4) problems in understanding which arise due to a mismatch in culturespecific knowledge and to cultural contrasts in action-related norms and expectations. Furthermore, it can be assumed that these potential problem areas interact with one another: (1) and (2): ‘Generally possible’ problems in understanding progress differently when they occur in institutional settings because, for example, institutional roles can affect the available ways of resolving the problem.

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions 

(1) and (3): ‘Generally possible’ problems in understanding progress differently when they occur in interactions between native and non-native speakers. In the case of acoustic interference, for example, limitations in linguistic competence place constraints both on the extent to which missing parts of the utterance can be reconstructed and on the measures which can be taken to repair the problem. (1) and (4): ‘Generally possible’ problems in understanding progress differently when they occur in intercultural contexts because cooperation in repair work can be hampered by differing conventions and routines, and the resolution of problems in understanding can be obstructed by differences in cultural norms. (3) and (4): Different linguistic competences can be associated with a higher potential for problems in understanding in intercultural settings, for example, because particular features of non-native speech can lead to misinterpretation and stigmatisation. Moreover, a higher potential for problems in understanding is inherently linked to limited possibilities for repair for both of the contributory factors. (2) and (3): Different linguistic competences can be associated with a higher potential for problems in understanding in institutional settings, especially, when the ability to produce complex utterances is a prerequisite for the necessary conversational roles and individual action components. This can be disadvantageous with respect to the realisation of action models and the pursuit of action goals. (2) and (4): The combination of intercultural communication and institutional settings leads to a higher potential for problems in understanding because institutional interactions are generally characterised by culture-specific notions about the sequence of actions and the realisation of individual action components. This leads to problems with respect to the complementary nature of the conversational roles and to cooperation expectations. Moreover, the following combinations can occur: (1) and (2) and (3), (1) and (2) and (4), (1) and (3) and (4), (2) and (3) and (4).

as can: (1) and (2) and (3) and (4).

 Martina Rost-Roth

Conclusion On the basis of the analysis and discussion of different problem areas, it is safe to assume that when the various problem areas coincide, the potential for problems in understanding not only cumulates, but that the difficulties are compounded. Hence, the finding that intercultural communication in institutional settings is particularly prone to communication problems cannot only be attributed to the fact that the various problem areas co-occur, but that the problem areas interact and reinforce one another.

Notes . See Heyman (1990), in particular. . See Schröder (1994), Koerfer (1994), Ehlich and Rehbein (1994) and Becker-Mrotzeck (1992) for a discussion of more general communication problems in institutional settings. See Kallmeyer (1983), Becker-Drescher and Kotschi (1988), Mrotzek and Fickerman (1989) for further studies on counselling. . The problem is closely linked to problems in understanding in native/non-native communications (cf. also Bremer 1997; Bremer et al. 1996; Varonis & Gass 1985). For miscommunication in intercultural communication see also Thomas (1983), Brommaert Verschueren (1991), Coupland et al. (1991), Knapp et al. (1987), Rehbein (1985), Redder and Rehbein (1987), and Rost-Roth (1995, 1996 and 2003). . For example, prosodic cues can indicate whether an utterance is to be interpreted as a request or a command. See also Auer (1990) for further discussion of the contextualization approach. . The data collection has been designed to allow comparisons between intercultural and intracultural interacton. See Rost-Roth (1998) for such a comparison. . In some cases, follow-up interviews were done with the aid of interpreters. . See Rost-Roth (2000) for more detailed remarks on this methodological approach. . ‘Trouble’ may be any kind of problem in understanding or any instance of conceiving something as ‘wrong’. It may therefore generate clarification requests, corrections etc. The concept of ‘trouble’ is closely linked to that of ‘repair’, i.e., participants’ reactions to the ‘source of trouble’. . See Schegloff, Jefferson amd Sacks (1977) for the principles of the organisation of repair. . See especially Ehlich and Rehbein (1979), Ehlich (1991) and Rehbein (1984). . For the identification of miscommunication see also Hinnenkamp 1989 Coupland and Wiemann and Giles (1991) and Tzanne (2000: 18ff.). . The transcripts make use of the following notations:

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions

Co-NS Cl-NNS Int ... &xx& @ (h) ^ _ << >>

Counsellor-Native Speaker Client-Non-Native Speaker Interviewer silence (s: seconds) simultenous speaking laughing breathing rising intonation falling intonation speaking louder lower voice

:: (xx) = *xx* / \ ?xx?

lengthening assumed lexem quick succession foreign language cut off interruption questions

. ‘DaF’ stands for ‘Deutsch als Fremdsprache’ (German as a Foreign Language, GFL). The acronym is usually pronounced ‘daff ’, but here the student pronounces each initial separately: ‘dey ah eff ’. . Literally: burningly; “was of such burning interest to me”. . Reformulations and paraphrasing may be seen as a constitutive part of the counselling model, independent of repair (cf. Gülich 1988). If the achievement of understanding is impeded, however, the rate of comprehension checks is increased. . In this regard, miscommunication shows analogies to problems that Gumperz has described. See Gumperz (1982) and Gumperz et al. (1979), in particular. . For ‘foreigner talk’, see Hinnenkamp (1982). . This coincides with the observation of Nothdurft et al. (1994) who see a danger of miscommunication especially occuring in situations where people rely on ‘ressources’ of the situation rather than on explicite indications. . Cf., e.g., Kindt and Weingarten (1984), Fiehler (1998).

References Auer, Peter (1990). “Contextualizing Language”. In Alessandro Duranti & Charles Goodwin (Eds.), Rethinking Context: Language as an interactive phenomenon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Auer, Peter & Kotthoff, Helga (1987) “Interkulturelle vs. lernersprachliche Erklärungen für pragmatische Defizite”. Englisch-Amerikanische Studien, 2, 239–249. Backa, Susanne (1987). “Interkulturelle Probleme in der Beratung”. OBST, 38, 53–68. Becker-Mrotzeck, Michael (1991). “Professionelles Sprechhandeln in Institutionen”. In L.A.U.D (Duisburg Series E:) Speech Communication/Sprechkommunikation, Paper No. 1. Becker-Mrotzeck, Michael (1992). Diskursforschung und Kommunikation in Institutionen. [Studienbibliographien Sprachwissenschaft 4]. Heidelberg: Gross.



 Martina Rost-Roth

Becker-Mrotzek, Michael & Fickermann, Ingeborg (1989). “Beratungsgespräche”. In Ergebnisband des Projekts: Zum Verhältnis von Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit in kommunikationsintensiven Berufen (mimeo), (pp. 1–16). Bremer, Katharina (1997). Verständigungsarbeit: Problembearbeitung und Gesprächsverlauf zwischen Sprechern verschiedener Muttersprachen. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Bremer, Katharina, Roberts, Celia, Vasseur, Marie-Thérèse, Simonot, Margaret, & Broeder, Peter (1996). Achieving Understanding: Discourse in Intercultural Encounters. New York: Longman. Brommaert, Jan & Verschueren, Jef (Eds.). (1991). The Pragmatics of International and Intercultural Communication. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Coupland, Nikolas, Wiemann, John M., & Giles, Howard (Eds.). (1991). Miscommunication’ and Problematic Talk. Newbury Park, London and Delhi: Sage Publications. Drescher, Martina & Kotschi, Thomas (1988). “Das ‘Genfer Modell’. Diskussion eines Ansatzes zur Diskursanalyse am Beispiel der Analyse eines Beratungsgesprächs”. In Forschungsprogramm Sprache und Pragmatik (pp. 1–41). Arbeitsberichte Universität Lund 8/1988. Ehlich, Konrad (1991). “Funktional pragmatische Kommunikationsanalyse”. In D. Flader (Ed.), Verbale Interaktion: Studien zur Empirie und Methodologie der Pragmatik (pp. 127–147). Stuttgart: Metzler. Ehlich, Konrad, Becker-Mrotzek, Michael, & Fickermann, Ingeborg (1989). Gesprächsfibel: Ein Leitfaden für Angehörige kommunikationsintensiver Berufe in Verwaltungsinstitutionen. Hinweise und Tips zur professionellen Gesprächsführung. Dortmund: Institut für deutsche Sprache und Literatur der Universität Dortmund. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1979). “Sprachliche Handlungsmuster”. In H.-G. Soeffner (Ed.), Interpretative Verfahren in den Sozial- und Textwissenschaften (pp. 243– 274). Stuttgart: Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1994). “Institutionsanalyse. Prolegomena zur Untersuchung von Kommunikation in Institutionen”. In G. Brünner & G. Graefen (Eds.), Texte und Diskurse: Methoden und Forschungsergebnisse der Funktionalen Pragmatik (pp. 287–327). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Erickson, Frederik & Shultz, Jeffrey (1982). The Counselor as Gatekeeper. New York: Academic Press. Fiehler, Reinhard (Ed.). (1998). Verständigungsprobleme und gestörte Kommunikation. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Gülich, Elisabeth (1988). Handlungsschema und Formulierungsstruktur am Beispiel eines Beratungsgesprächs (‘Das Zeitungsabonnement’). Ein Diskussionsbeitrag”. In Sprache und Pragmatik (pp. 43–66). Arbeitsberichte. Lund: Germanistisches Institut der Universität Lund. Gumperz, John J. (1982). Discourse Strategies. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Gumperz, John J., Jupp, Thomas, & Roberts, Cilia (1979). Cross talk. Southal: National Council for Industrial Training.

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions 

Günthner, Susanne (1992). “Die interaktive Konstruktion von Geschlechterrollen, kulturellen Identitäten und institutioneller Dominanz”. In S. Günthner & H. Kotthoff (Eds.), Die Geschlechter im Gespräch: Kommunikation in Institutionen (pp. 90–124). Stuttgart: Metzler. Günthner, Susanne (1993). Diskursstrategien in der interkulturellen Kommunikation: Analysen deutsch-chinesischer Gespräche. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Hartog, Jennifer (1996). Das genetische Beratungsgespräch. Institutionalisierte Kommunikation zwischen Experten und Nicht-Experten. Tübingen: Narr. Heyman, Richard D. (1990). “The Problem of Locating Ethnicity in Talk”. Sociolinguistics, 19, 37–51. Hinnenkamp, Volker (1982). “Foreigner Talk und Tarzanisch”. Eine vergleichende Studie über die Sprechweise gegenüber Ausländern am Beispiel des Deutschen und des Türkischen. Hamburg: Buske. Hinnenkamp, Volker (1987). “Foreigner talk, code switching and the concept of trouble.” In K. Knapp, W. Enninger, & A. Knapp-Potthoff (Eds.), Analyzing Intercultural Communication (pp. 37–180). Berlin etc.: Mouton de Gruyter. Hinnenkamp, Volker (1989). Interaktionale Soziolinguistik und interkulturelle Kommunikation: Gesprächsmanagement zwischen Deutschen und Türken. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Hinnenkamp, Volker (1991). “Talking a person into interethnic distinction: A discourse analytic case study”. In J. Brommaert & J. Verschueren (Eds.), The Pragmatics of International and Intercultural Communication (pp. 91–110). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Hinnenkamp, Volker (1994). Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Heidelberg: Studienbibliographien Sprachwissenschaft des IDS. Heidelberg: Groos. Kallmeyer, Werner (1985). “Handlungskonstitution im Gespräch. Dupont und sein Experte führen ein Beratungsgespräch”. In E. Gülich & T. Kotschi (Eds.), Grammatik, Konversation, Interaktion, Beiträge zum Romanistentag (pp. 81–122). Tübingen: Niemeyer. Kindt, Walther & Weingarten, Rüdiger (1984). “Verständigungsprobleme”. Deutsche Sprache, 12, 193–218. Knapp, Karlfried, Enninger, Werner, & Knapp-Potthoff, Annelie (Eds.). (1987). Analyzing Intercultural Communication. Berlin, New York and Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter. Koerfer, Armin (1994). Institutionelle Kommunikation: Zur Methodologie und Empirie der Handlungsanalyse. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Koole, Tom & Thije, Jan D. ten (1994). The Construction of Intercultural Discourse. Team discussions of educational advisers. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Kotthoff, Helga (1989). Pro und Contra in der Fremdsprache: Pragmatische Defizite in interkulturellen Argumentationen. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Liedke, Martina (1998). “Fremdsprachliches Handeln: Kommunikationsstörung als Normalität”. In R. Fiehler (Ed.), Verständigungsprobleme und gestörte Kommunikation (pp. 198–215). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Liedke, Martina (1997). “Institution und Interkulturalität”. In A. Knapp-Potthoff & M. Liedke (Eds.), Aspekte interkultureller Kommunikationsfähigkeit (pp. 155–180). München: iudicium.

 Martina Rost-Roth

Kindt, Walther (1998). “Konzeptuelle Grundlagen einer Theorie der Verständigungsprobleme.” In R. Fiehler (Ed.), Verständigungsprobleme und gestörte Kommunikation (pp. 17–43). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Knapp-Potthoff, Annelie & Liedke, Martina (Eds.). (1997). Aspekte interkultureller Kommunikationsfähigkeit. München: iudicium. Kotthoff, Helga (1991). “Lernersprachliche und interkulturelle Ursachen für kommunikative Irritationen. Zugeständnisse und Dissens in deutschen, anglo-amerikanischen und in nativ-nichtnativen Gesprächen”. Linguistische Berichte, 153, 375–397. Nothdurft, Werner (1984). ‘Äh folgendes problem äh’: Die Interaktive Ausarbeitung ‘des Problems’ in Beratungsgesprächen. Tübingen: Narr. Nothdurft, Werner (1994). “Herstellung der Beratungssituation”. In W. Nothdurft, U. Reitemeier, & P. Schröder (Eds.), Beratungsgespräche: Analyse asymmetrischer Dialoge (pp. 20–87). Tübingen: Narr. Nothdurft, Werner, Reitemeier, Ulrich, & Schröder, Peter (1994). Beratungsgespräche: Analyse asymmetrischer Dialoge. Tübingen: Narr. Redder, Angelica & Rehbein, Jochen (Eds.). (1987). Arbeiten zur interkulturellen Kommunikation. OBST, 38. Rehbein, Jochen (1984). Reparative Handlungsmuster und ihre Verwendung im Fremdsprachenunterricht. Roskilde: Universitetscenter [Rolig papir 30]. Rehbein, Jochen (1985a). “Medizinische Beratung türkischer Eltern”. In J. Rehbein (Ed.), Interkulturelle Kommunikation (pp. 349–419). Tübingen: Narr. Rehbein, Jochen (Ed.). (1985b). Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Tübingen: Narr. Rost-Roth, Martina (1994a). “Verständigungsprobleme in der interkulturellen Kommunikation: Ein Forschungsüberblick zu Analysen und Diagnosen in empirischen Untersuchungen”. Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik, 93, 9–45. Rost-Roth, Martina (1995). “Language in Intercultural Communication”. In P. Stevenson (Ed.), The German Language and the Real World (pp. 169–204). Cambridge: University Press. Rost-Roth, Martina (1996). “Deutsch als Fremdsprache und interkulturelle Kommunikation. Relevanzbereiche für den Fremdsprachenunterricht und Untersuchungen zu ethnographischen Besonderheiten deutschsprachiger Interaktionen im Kulturvergleich”. Elektronische Zeitschrift für Interkulturellen Fremdsprachenunterricht. Didaktik und Methodik im Bereich Deutsch als Fremdsprache 1 (http://www.ualberta.ca/ ∼german/ ejournal/ startbei. htm, 3.11.2003). Rost-Roth, Martina (1998). “Kommunikative Störungen in Beratungsgesprächen. Problempotentiale in inter- und intrakulturellen Gesprächssituationen.” In R. Fiehler (Ed.), Verständigungsprobleme und gestörte Kommunikation (pp. 216–244). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Rost-Roth, Martina (2000). “Methodische Anmerkungen zur Erfassung von Kommunikationsstörungen in interkulturellen Kommunikationen. Primärdaten und Sekundärdaten für diskursanalytische Interpretationen”. In K. Aguado (Ed.), Forschungsmethdologien in der Fremd- und Zweitspracherwerbsforschung (pp. 63–73). Bielefeld: Schneider Verlag.

Intercultural communication in institutional counselling sessions 

Rost-Roth, Martina (2003). “Anliegensformulierungen: Aufgabenkomplexe und Sprachliche Mittel. Analysen zu Anliegensformulierungen von Muttersprachlern und Nichtmuttersprachlern am Beispiel von Beratungsgesprächen und Antragsbearbeitungsgesprächen im Hochschulkontext”. Zeitschrift für interkulturellen Fremdsprachenunterricht Sonderausgabe: Festschrift für Juliane House zum 60. Geburtstag “Übersetzen, interkulturelle Kommunikation, Spracherwerb und Sprachvermittlung – das Leben mit mehreren Sprachen”. (http://www.ualberta.ca/∼german/ejournal/startbei.htm, 3.11.2003). Schegloff, Emanuel A., Jefferson, Gail, & Sacks, Harvey (1977). “The Preference for SelfCorrection in the Organization of Repair in Conversation.” Language, 53, 361–382. Schröder, Peter (1994). “Perspektivendivergenzen in Beratungsgesprächen”. In W. Nothdurft, U. Reitemeier, & P. Schröder (Eds.), Beratungsgespräche: Analyse asymmetrischer Dialoge (pp. 90–183). Tübingen: Narr. Selting, Margret (1987). Verständigungsprobleme: Eine empirische Analyse am Beispiel der Bürger-Verwaltungs-Kommunikation. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Thomas, Jenny (1983). “Cross-Cultural Pragmatic Failure”. Applied Linguistics, 4(2), 91–112. Tzanne, Angeliki (2000). Talking at Cross-Purposes. The Dynamics of Miscommunication. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Varonis, E. & Gass, Susan (1985). “Miscommunication in Native/Nonnative Conversation”. Language in Society, 14, 327–343. Wenzel, Angelika (1984). Verstehen und Verständigung in Gesprächen am Sozialamt: Eine empirische Untersuchung. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization Dennis Day

Introduction The notion of identity has recently had some purchase in studies of communication as evidenced by an increased interested in topics such as social categorization (for example Zupnik 1994), membership categorization (for example Hester 1992), the discursive accomplishment of identity (for example Antaki & Widdencombe 1998), and related topics. In relation to studies of intercultural communication, this type of work has fit quite nicely into a substantial shift in thinking whereby the interculturality of interaction between individuals with different cultural backgrounds is no longer taken for granted (see for example Weider & Platt 1990; Blommaert 1991; Hinnenkamp 1991; Day 1994, 1998). That is to say there is an increased interest in how a particular spate of communication becomes intercultural for interlocutors. This shift in thinking has followed a substantial critique of previous work on grounds that, to the extent that actual communication was even studied, (1) the interculturality of interaction was, aside for being taken for granted, rather naively determined by the nationalities of interlocutors, (2) that intercultural communication was inevitably a problem caused by cultural backgrounds often far removed in time and space, and (3) on grounds that these cultural backgrounds were often only considered from a social psychological perspective in terms, for example, of values, attitudes, and so forth. The contributions in this volume add yet another development. Rather than having as points of departure a critique of previous intercultural communication studies, our ambition is to reflect upon what studies of intercultural communication can contribute to more general concerns within linguistics and its subdomains of discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, pragmatics, etc. My own

 Dennis Day

contribution here concerns in this regard expressions referring to collectives of people, in particular expressions which have the potential to refer to people as members of social groups generally and ethnic or cultural groups specifically. My aim is to show how a close analysis of these expressions in the local contexts of their use can enrich discussions of collective versus distributive reference and more generally, reference to people as members of social groups. My data come from field studies at two industrial work places in Sweden, conducted in 1988–1989 and 1992–1993 respectively, whose workforces were comprised to a large extent of immigrants. The data from these studies relevant to this paper comprise field notes, some 40 hours of video and audio recordings of daily activities at the workplaces and of ethnographic interviews, and a database of some 2500 tokens of references to people gleaned from the aforementioned recordings. I found in these studies that ethnic group categorizations such as a “Chinese”, “Polish” etc. were often inappropriate and even contested categorizations amongst employees. These observations led me to rethink a basic question in studies of interethnic communication: How does one go about identifying communication as interethnic from an interlocutor’s perspective? My attempt to answer this question led to what I have termed ethnification processes by which I mean processes through which people distinguish some individual or collection of individuals as a member or members respectively of an ethnic group. A communicative variant of ethnification processes, linguistic ethnic categorization, has been the focus of my analyses.1

Linguistic ethnic categorizations Linguistic ethnic categorizations ascribe to people membership in a particular sort of social group, namely an ethnic group. By that token, ethnic categorizations are a type of social group categorization. My discussion below will focus on ethnic group categorization, however, it should be taken to apply generally for all types of social group categorizations. Ethnic categorizations are a type of ethnification process, i.e. a process which either directly or indirectly distinguishes some individual or group on the basis of ethnicity. By the term ethnicity I mean a particular set of characteristics conventionally associated with an ethnic group. These characteristics typically include belief in a common origin, political autonomy, common language, etc. Examples of ethnification processes would include the establishment of schools for particular ethnic groups, the segregation of particular ethnic group members in housing or in the labor market, and so forth. An example

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization 

of a linguistic ethnic categorization might be referring to a fellow interlocutor with an ethnic group label such as “Chinese”, as in the examples below. What I have termed ethnification processes are found in Hinnenkamp’s (1987, 1989, 1991) work on, for example, the function of “foreigner talk” as an ethnifying device (a special case of relevance in my terminology below). My views are consistent with Hinnenkamp’s yet I attempt to augment them by framing interactive aspects of ethnic identity within more general communicative processes, such as categorizations, as well as linking ethnic identity to social activities and their local contexts, e.g. particular workplaces. Thus, whereas Hinnenkamp has focused on relationships between a macro-level social order and the micro level discursive establishment of an individual’s identity, I seek to delineate the ground between these two analytic levels. Although descriptions of people, linguistic ethnic group categorizations are not bound to, for example, assertative speech acts. Rather, by saying they are descriptions I am alluding to the descriptive content of communicative contributions which may be realized as diverse communicative acts and to the various sources of contextual information interlocutors may have available to them in interpreting those acts. There is of course no isomorphism between a linguistic utterance and a sense of that utterance. Thus, there are no a priori guarantees that a particular referring expression will pick out its referents as members of a ethnic group. Some linguistic utterances do so, however. Consider the examples from my data in bold face in Table 1.2

Table 1. Types of description Type

Examples

Referring expression

(1) A: Who does one sit with the, when you have a break, who do you sit with? B: Sometimes I sit with the chinese.

Ascriptive predications (2) A: Who is your friend that you sit with? B: My friend, she’s from the Philippines. her husband is swedish. She and I pack every day. We talk, joke. Equative predications

(3) A: No but if one looks then I mean almost everyone on your shift except for Björn and Johan have some foreign heritage. B: Yes, yes, they probably mean that, they don’t count so to speak me, Matti, and Kaarlo because we’re finns, then they probably mean (those who are) a little darker then.

 Dennis Day

The cover term description here refers to the descriptive content of referring expressions within contributions as in “the Chinese” in example (1), as well as the descriptive content of ascriptive and equative predications within contributions as in “is Swedish” in example (2) and “we’re finns” in example (3). I take these types of cases as being rather unproblematic uses of proper names for social groups. Below I will discuss how they might be dealt with in referential semantics, but first I want to clarify what I mean by ethnic and social groups.

The categorization of social and cultural groups As mentioned above, linguistic ethnic categorizations ascribe to people membership in a particular sort of social group, namely an ethnic group. Gilbert (1989) proposes that our everyday concept of a social group is as follows: Ideally, a social group is constituted if it is common knowledge amongst a collection of individuals that they have mutually expressed a readiness to share in some joint action, belief, attitude, or other such attribute. The readiness expressed by group members is a commitment of their will to a pool of wills. With this mutual commitment the group constitutes a plural subject. This is the ideal case according to Gilbert. Extended and more complex forms of social groups will be discussed below. Social groups need not do anything beyond becoming plural subjects. They may never go beyond this as in, for example, the social group created in a mutual exchange of “let’s do lunch sometime” with no mutual lunch ever taking place. Other social groups may go far beyond plural subjecthood to the extent that, for example, they may enroll members by group fiat, or appoint certain members to positions of authority through which they act for the group as a whole. It may be, for example, a principle of a social group that every child born within the group is a member of the group. That is to say, the principle is constitutional in regards to group membership. Ethnic groups where membership is gained through birth would exemplify enrollment by fiat, and “national” social groups, as referred to in expressions such as “The Americans invaded Iraq”, would exemplify social groups with appointed representatives. It is important to note that Gilbert’s goal is to characterize our everyday concept of a social group, not necessarily to generalize over someone’s empirical examples of groups. Some social groups may be ‘better’ than others. They may disintegrate over time, be subject to internal strife, and so on. Further, it is important to note that social groups need not be so benevolently predisposed

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization 

as these examples might suggest. As mentioned above, social groups may institutionalize procedures whereby individuals are deemed members of the group by fiat. Moreover, two people having a fight might also be considered a social group given that we can assume they have mutually agreed to share in that activity. Between these more extreme forms of social groups, the forever ready but non-acting and the social group which enrolls members by fiat or force, lies what Gilbert claims is our most ubiquitous cases of plural subjecthood, two people conversing. This reasoning is consistent with Searles’s notion of collective intentionality (Searle 1992). For Searle, any “conversation”, taken broadly as any pairing of interlocutor activity, is a form of collective intentionality just as any other joint action. Further, collective intentionality does not reduce to individual intentionality, i.e. of the sort involved with speech acts. Searle’s example of this is two people, say A and B, pushing a car together. It is not the case that A and B are pushing as individuals. Rather each person is pushing as part of their pushing together. If it turns out that A was not pushing at all, nor did he intend to push together with B, then B, who had believed he and A were pushing the car together, was not only mistaken about what A was doing, but also about what he, B, was doing. B believed mistakenly that he was pushing the car as part of A and B pushing a car together. Gilbert claims are Durkheimian in spirit. She holds that in her reading of Durkheim, social phenomena in general are phenomena whose sub-strata are social groups. Her term for this relationship is “inherence”. Social phenomena, then, inhere in social groups. Gilbert’s conception of a social group does not allow for it to be analyzed independently of the individuals which comprised it. This is to be taken as Durkheim’s “externality” thesis i.e. that social beliefs are external to individual consciousness. Gilbert’s notion of inherence, however, offers a more nuanced version of this thesis. . . . to evidently, to inhere in something constituted by individual human beings in association. Hence in a sense no phenomenon inhering in a social group is totally independent of individual human beings. However, it is proper and perspicuous to insist that a special and significant relation to a group is involved here, if it is the case that the existence of any phenomena of this type is causally dependent upon individuals ‘synthesized’. (Gilbert 1989: 123)3

Extending Gilbert’s analysis I suggest that our concept of an ideal social group, whatever its particulars, allows that a social group may constitute itself, or be constituted by others, as a cultural group. The cultural resources taken by a social group as its own comprise a culture.4 By cultural resources I mean hu-

 Dennis Day

man means, including artifacts, and abilities not given by natural necessity for purposive interaction with the natural environment, with ourselves, and with other humans (cf. Kroeber & Kluckholn 1952). Particular human means and abilities for purposive interaction I will shorthand simply as “cultural resources” or just “resources” where my intent is clear. The notions of a social group and a cultural group is intended to account for the distinction, in this view, between a social group jointly pursuing some course of action, say a group conversing, and the secondary constitution of this social group as say, the “Debating Society”. In the latter, the relevant cultural resources, for example, for rules of debate or procedures for membership might be institutionalized by the social group and taken as its “own”. In this way it becomes a cultural group. A cultural group, in my sense, is thus a subtype of social group which has undergone institutionalization of a particular sort. Similarly an ethnic group can be seen as a sub-type of cultural group distinguished by an institutionalization process concerning distinctive cultural resources such as belief in a common origin, political autonomy, common language, etc. (cf. Barth 1969). The notions that people may be born into a nation, and thereby an ethnic group, or be born “genetically” into an ethnic group would seem to clash with Gilbert’s voluntarianism. However, it should be recalled that the analysis of social groups by Gilbert proposed above allows through the related notion of group fiat by which groups may establish their own “recruitment” criteria: Plural subjects proper can develop along a variety of lines. For instance, a plural subject may adopt a name; it may develop a sense of specialness and a desire for exclusivity: ‘We don’t want anyone else in on this, unless we all really like her’. Or it may have a sense of need for more members. For such reasons the existing members may establish rules that determine who may become a member. The possibility of such entry rules allows for complex cases. The rules can be so capacious as to allow those lacking the ability to be members of the initial plural subject to be considered members none the less. Thus infants can be thought of as “members of the tribe”, though they have no conception of the tribe as a whole. Similarly, an adult may know nothing of the tribe but still be a member according to the group’s rules. . . The possibility of group fiats enables a group to make its own rules including rules regarded as ‘constitutional’ and entry rules. (Gilbert 1989: 233)

The ethnic group must begin somewhere, namely in the joint commitment of individual wills of at least two people. An extant group’s joint establishment, or institutionalization, of how the group is to continue through time is another and secondary issue.

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization 

I would now like to characterize what it means to categorize linguistically some person or persons as members of a social group as characterized above. To categorize some person or persons, including oneself, as a member of a social group in some communicative situation is to describe them in such a way that allows the inference their wills are jointly committed and that they normatively share cultural resources as members of that group.5 Such a categorization can be termed a social group categorization (SG-categorization). A social group, and its subtypes cultural and ethnic groups, can be distinguished in terms of institutionalization, i.e. the explicitness, particularity, and regularity in usage of cultural resources. To categorize some collection as a cultural group allows the inference that their wills are jointly committed and that there is some institutionalized collection of “owned” characteristics which follow from this. To categorize some collection as an ethnic group allows the inference that their wills are jointly committed and there is some particular institutionalized collection of “owned” characteristics, such as a shared history, common language, etc., which follow from this. Such a categorization I call an ethnic categorization. To say of some individual(s) that he normatively shares something is to say that he does so as member of a social group. Thus to categorize some individual(s) ethnically is to imply he is a member of some ethnic group.

Differences between social group categorization and collective reference My analysis of social group categorizations by way of proper names may have bearing on the notions of collective and distributive reference within referential semantics. The distinction between the generality of something amongst a collection of individuals, i.e. distributive reference, and that something being taken as part and parcel of that collection as a social group, i.e. collective reference, is reflected to some extent in many languages, such as English and Swedish. The issue of what type of groups referring expressions pick out in the world is rarely a concern in discussions of reference, however, an understanding of social groups as I have proposed is, I believe, implicit in several accounts (e.g. Lyons 1977; Schiffrin 1994; Grimshaw 1994). One of the most extensive discussions of distributive and collective reference is found in Lasersohn (1990). Lasersohn suggests the following glosses for the expression “The TA’s (teaching assistants) made $6,000” in terms of collective and distributive senses. Quoted terms under types of reference are Lasersohn’s (ibid.: 108).

 Dennis Day

Table 2. Lasersohn’s analysis of collective reference Gloss

Type of reference

(1) each TA makes $6,000 (2) the TA’s jointly made $6,000 (3) each TA made less than $6,000 but in total they made $6,000 (4) some subset of the TA’s made $6,000, but the group of TA’s as a hole “gets credit”

Distributive reference Collective reference – “pure collective” Collective reference – “additive properties” Collective reference – “team credit”

At first glance, the gloss most clearly related to my understanding of a social group is number (2) ‘the TA’s jointly made $6,000’, and it would seem that Lasersohn might concur as he calls this type of reference the “pure collective” (ibid.: 108). I am keying on the word jointly for my comparison and on Lasersohn’s own usage of the term “pure collective”. In this example one can take that by “jointly”, Lasersohn means that each TA contributed to the common “good” resulting in a collection of $6.000. The “pure collective” is also used by Lasersohn for social groups such as committees. I contend, however, that gloss number (4) fits the bill equally well. The distinction between it and number (2) is unclear. Surely it makes no difference in either gloss (2) or (4) which or if all of the TA’s earned a particular sum. In other words, the state of affairs depicted in (4) could be true and still render the gloss in reading (2). In fact, the idea that whomever actually does the deed, the group gets the credit, or blame as the case may be, seems to be a integral part of the notion of a “collective”. Glosses number (3) is the case which would seem to distinguish “bare” collective reference from collective and social group reference. It is an example of collective reference whereby nothing is connoted of the possible referents in the subjective noun phrase concerning their membership in a social group. In fact, the possible referents are not distinguished in any particular way – this is to say that the predication may hold for one, some, or all of the referents. The interpretation focuses on the summative results of their actions, however they may have come about. The referring expression “The TA’s” in this example is therefore not an SG-categorization. Having noted this, however, consider that instead of the “TA’s” we use the term the “Boy Scouts”. To my mind, almost any reading of the expression “The Boy Scouts earned $6.000” contains an SG-categorization of a social group of Boy Scouts, provided naturally that the reader knows what “The Boy Scouts” is referring to. This is to say that “The Boy Scouts” may be an SG-categorization regardless of how the predication is distributed amongst its possible referents. Thus the expression has no, straightforward, collective nor distributive reading.

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization 

For that matter, even if a boy who happens to be a Boy Scout acts singularly, if we describe his actions linguistically as the actions of a Boy Scout, e.g. “the boy scout has on brown shoes”, we have nonetheless most likely SG-categorized him. By using the term “Boy Scout” we have, in most circumstances, referred to him as a member of a social group. If the expressed fact of his being a Boy Scout has no bearing on his wearing of brown shoes, one may very well wonder why he was referred to as a Boy Scout.6 The basic problem here seems to be a concern with the fact that what is predicated of a social group may apply differentially to one of more of the referents of the SG-categorization (cf. Lyons 1977; Schiffrin 1994; Grimshaw 1994). While this may be a concern in discussions of collective and distributive reference, it appears to have no bearing in SG-categorizations as I have characterized them here. Thus, their “collective” sense does not appear to be the same general “collective” sense of the linguistic notion. Rather it would appear that they are, in Lasersohn’s terms, “pure collectives”, throughout. As noted, the distribution of the predication has nothing to do with SGcategorizations. What is involved is an interplay between the contexted sense of the referring expression and/or the predicate’s applicability to the referent(s) in light of it having come about under the conditions of plural subjecthood. If the contexted sense of the referring expression unexceptionally demarcates the referents as members of a social group, as in the case with social group labels such “Boy Scouts”, then whatever is predicated of the referents meets the predicate applicability requirements stated above. In other words, there is some inference that what is predicated has something to do with the persons referred to as members of a social group. If there is no such sense in the referring expression, for example, the “TA” example above as well as other examples of possible social groups without ‘proper nouns’, then we are left with predicate applicability to make the case for an SG-categorization. My analysis of Lasersohn’s glosses is an example of such an analysis. Glosses (2) and (4) are examples of SG-categorizations to the extent that what is predicated of the TA’s is applicable to them as a social group.7 In light of the differences, as I see them, between SG-categorizations and collective reference, a tentative conclusion concerning the latter can be made. We should perhaps consider allowing some finer distinctions in the notion of collective reference, as indeed Lasersohn does above. The case in point is Lasersohn’s ‘pure collective’. However, in contrast to Lasersohn, I propose that the pure collective need not be concerned with the distribution of predication, which allowed the unintuitive distinction between examples (2) and (4) above. Rather pure collectives can be taken as default readings reserved for

 Dennis Day

social groups. Further, once we move away from the simpler cases of proper nouns, as in my “Boy Scout” example, indeed once we begin to investigate ‘real’ language use, we require other means to determine if we are in fact dealing with social groups. It is here that our analysis of collective reference generally, and social group categorizations particularly, moves empirically and conceptually beyond the treatment afforded it within referential semantics. We are left to sort out, as it were, how interlocutors might relevantly apply a social group interpretation to some referring expression other than by way of the conventional senses of some proper names. And to do so we must broaden our search from the conventional meanings of words to the contexts of their use, that is to say to a pragmatic and interaction-sensitive analysis. Linguistic ethnic group categorizations operate upon the intended referents of some specifically referring expression within some noun phrase. What ethnically categorizes the expression’s referent, I contend, may lie within the referring expression itself or it may lie in the expression’s linguistic and extralinguistic context. Consider now the following examples (Table 3). Examples (1) and (2) can be seen as examples of direct categorization whereas A’s response (“That can’t eat pork . . . ”) in example (4) is indirect. Direct categorization is a result of using a nominal in a context where its sense is of an ethnic group, here the use of the proper names “Chinese”, “finns”, etc. Indirect categorization occurs where some other means implicitly provide the description through inference. For example, in example (4) the bold faced expressions one might see as holding for someone as a “muslim”. I suggest that this allows one to draw the inference that “mohammed” may be a muslim and is thus being ethnically categorized.8 Names such as ‘Mohammed’ can be seen as normatively available resources for Muslims. That the initial utterance contains the term “religions” also plays into this inference (see below). Referring expressions and ascriptive or equative predications may, in regards to linguistic social group-categorization, be either direct or indirect, whereas other types of predication will be indirect. Examples (4)–(7) in Table 3 (below) illustrate that inferences concerning membership in some social group may be derived from a variety of sources within a communicative interaction. In example (5), for example, we can firstly note the contribution “religions” by B as a formulation of the topic for the surrounding talk which has dealt and deals with religious restrictions on food. Following A’s assertion concerning “that guy over in the measurement’s room”, the personal name provided by C can then be heard not only as an unique identifier, but also as an indicator of particular religious beliefs. A’s predication

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization 

Table 3. Direct and indirect categorization Type

Direct

Referring expression

(1) A: Who does one sit with the, when you have a break, who do you sit with? B: Sometimes I sit with the chinese.

Ascriptive (2) predications A: B:

Equative (3) predications A:

B:

Other predications (e.g. locative)

Indirect

(4) A: That’s the way they are, all of them B: (xxxx) religions A: The guy over in the measurements room, he’s really like that C. (Mohammed) A: that one can’t eat pork but he still eats (5) Who is your friend that you sit A: That’s the way they are, all of them with? B: (xxxx) religions My friend, she’s from the A: The guy over in the measurements Philippines. her husband is room, he’s really like that swedish. She and I pack every C. (Mohammed) day. We talk, joke. A: that one can’t eat pork but he still eats (6) No but if one looks then I mean A: One actually notices that when one almost everyone on your shift works. can you think of any except for Björn and Johan have examples of it? some foreign heritage. B: Yes I can, I can take one directly, Yes, yes, they probably mean there are jobs like cleaning.Males that, they don’t count so to from southern latitudes will speak me, Matti, and Kaarlo seldom grab a cleaning brush, because we’re finns, then they scrub with it, and make things probably mean (those who are) clean, they’ve never done it before a little darker then. and before one can get them to understand that’s the way we do things at this workplace (7) A: Who is your friend that you sit with? B: My friend, she’s from the philippines. Her husband is swedish. She and I pack every day. We talk, joke.

concerning Mohammed’s eating habits may then be heard in light of these beliefs. Thus eating pork is not to be heard only as concerning Mohammed as an individual, but as a member of a particular group. In example (6), B’s answer to A’s question comprises a referring expression, “males from southern latitudes”,

 Dennis Day

and a list. The list, in its turn, comprises a series of predications. The list may be seen as a list of features of an admittedly vague category [southern cultures] which is constructed on the spot for the practical task at hand (Jaysui 1986). I noted above that examples (4)–(7) contained indirect linguistic ethnic group categorizations as the referent is ethnically categorized not by a particular ethnic group label but by inference. There is another type of indirect linguistic ethnic group categorization in which the ethnic categorization of some thing or person lays grounds of inference for the ethnic categorization of some other thing or person. Thus, interlocutors may indirectly describe people as members of ethnic groups through the description of some other person or thing. In such cases, description of some other person or thing as a member or resource respectively of an ethnic group, may serve to set up what I will term a case of special relevance. A special case of relevance can be characterized as follows: if amongst a group of interlocutors where at least one interlocutor A is describable as a member of X ethnic group and someone ethnically categorizes something or someone other than A as of an X ethnic group type, then X ethnicity can be taken to be of special relevance for A given that neither A nor any other interlocutor has any other special attachment to the thing or person ethnically categorized. I exemplify such a categorization from the party planning activity in example (1) below. (Notation used in the transcripts are listed at the end of the article.) (1) 58 M:

eh:(0.5)*underhållning (.) man skulle eh entertainment one 59 kunna ha med chin chon huang* could have chin chon huang 60 <skratt> *men det är lite svårt.* but it’s a little hard 61 MA: mm:, mm 62 T: !ah!>det är det< yea it is 63 M: underhållning (0.2) å först å sen ska M: entertainment first and then we can 64 vi ta vilken mat.(.)å drick. o sen take which food and drink and then 65 underhållning. det tar vi sist. entertainment, we’ll take it last

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization 

66 MA: ja! [ ] 67 T: mm mm

Malia (M) suggests that at the party they have “chin chon huang” for entertainment. I take this to be Malia’s guess at what a Chinese expression might be like. In this way, Malia has initiated an “identity rich puzzle?” (Schenkein 1978). By saying something in the form of an assessment which none will understand, but which is obviously related to someone “Chinese-like?”, i.e. Tang (T), and by passing the turn directly over to Tang so that she should agree or disagree with the assessment, she has made Tang accountable for explaining “chin chon huang” to the other participant. And by explaining “chin chon huang”, Tang will identify herself as being Chinese. Malia does attempt to downgrade, i.e. make less face-threatening, the identity rich puzzle by speaking quietly, as indicated by the asterisks, and by noting that her assessment might be difficult to implement, “but that might be difficult” (men de är lite svårt.*) (lines 59–60). I take Malia’s expression “chin chon huang” together with its reception by Tang, to be an example of linguistic ethnic group categorization by special relevance. There is a suggestion of what I assume is Chinese entertainment amongst a group where there is one interlocutor, Tang, who, for others there, can be described as Chinese. Thus, the suggestion is of special relevance for Tang. As we see in the above example, the result of an linguistic ethnic group categorization is that some individual or collection of individuals specifically referred to in some utterance can be understood by interlocutors as a member or members respectively of an ethnic group. What is then said by, about or to the individual or collection of individuals may then be heard relative to this identity.9 And in this particular case, it is the turn taken by Tang after the turn by Malia in which the categorization is embedded, which allows the interpretation that “chin chon huang” is an ethnic group categorization. In other words, the inferential device which generates cases of special relevance projects a next turn to be taken by the categorized interlocutor. The interlocutor is thereby accountable for the turn and the orientation to him or her provided in the ethnic categorization. In this way we see how an interlocutor’s ethnic identity becomes a negotiated and endogenous concern.10 How people categorize each other in everyday face-to-face communicative interaction has been of particular interest within ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. A central element in these fields of study has been the notion of membership categorization device (MCD) which, as formulated by

 Dennis Day

Sacks (Sacks 1974) refers, in particular, to common nouns whose senses rely on social categories, e.g. policeman, mother, deviant, and how these and associated social categories might be organized into “natural” collections sharing family resemblance to each other. Sack’s work has been further developed and applied in empirical studies by, e.g. Antaki and Widdencombe (1998), Watson (1976, 1978, 1983), Payne (1976) Drew (1978), Jayusi (1984), Hester (1992), Linell and Fredin (1995), Mazeland et al. (1995). One special interest to Sacks, and those who have followed him has been the following problem: Given that a person may be described “correctly” in a myriad of ways on a given occasion, what are the principles of a “proper” description. One such principle by which a description becomes proper is through its being heard as relevant in lieu of it falling under an MCD which is relevant to the talk at hand. The types of categorizations used by Sacks in his examples and subsequently studied by his successors have dealt with what we may call individual social categories. The orientations to people displayed in interactions have concerned them as singular agents, such as policeman, teachers, deviants etc. Although people thus categorized have been studied in “institutional” interactions, and such categorizations help to confirm this, in and of themselves they are not orientations to people as members of social groups. Sacks describes, however, a certain type of device which may remind one of social groups, namely devices which are duplicatively organized: If some population has been categorized by use of categories from the same device whose collection has the “duplicative organization” property e.g. “family”, “baseball team”, etc.) and a member is presented with a categorized population which can be heard as “coincumbents” of a case of that device’s unit, then Hear it that way. (Sacks 74: 221)

Although the examples Sacks uses here, i.e. “families”, “baseball teams” are, at least intuitively, what one might call types of social group, this point is not made by Sacks. In Lerner (1993) the notion of “associations” appears to be synonymous with the notion of social groups as I have characterized it, and is utilized in an analysis of turn taking in multiparty interactions. Of interest in this regard is how interlocutors implicate some sub-set of them as members of social groups, most notably it would appear by the use of a collective ‘we’, and how particular turns implicate a sub-set of fellow interlocutors as members of social groups and project following turns for which the members are co-responsible. As an example of the former the following is offered (Lerner 1993: 222):

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization 

(2) 1 Nancy: We’ad ravioli last Sundee night? 2 ((Nancy looks to Michael at ‘Sun’))

where Lerner maintains that Nancy’s solicitation of recognition, by looking at him, allows the understanding that ‘Nancy is speaking about something she and Michael did as a couple’ (ibid.: 222). An example of the latter follows (ibid.: 220): (3) 1 B: So what’ve you guys bin doin? 2 T: Oh not much, we went to Santa Barbera last weekend

Where it is suggested that B is ‘cojointly address[ing] co-recipients as an association’ (ibid.: 220). Whereas categorizations are studied in vivo in this approach, categories are taken to be available to interactants and analysts alike as “members of society” or as “members of a culture”. This may be so, however, I believe categories and categorizations are bound to more local contexts. This is to say that the use of a category, although generally available, may be constrained by more immediate relevancies. In some social context, for example at a particular workplace, not every possible way of categorizing some group of individuals may be seen as relevant, perspicuous, or even allowable. Similarly, local relevancies extend beyond the micro-politics of a single interaction. This is most easily seen in the fact that some categorization in a previous instantiation of a social activity may set a precedent for its use in future instantiations. What I have thus far referred to as local relevancies are used in understanding indirect ethnic categorizations. Recall for example, cases of special relevance where ‘at least one interlocutor A is describable as a member of X ethnic group and someone ethnically categorizes something or someone other than A as of an X ethnic group type, then X ethnicity can be taken to be of special relevance for A. . . ’. The notion that an interlocutor is ‘describable as a member of an ethnic group’ presupposes some contextual resource upon which interlocutors may draw beyond the conventional meaning of nouns. For my studies, this has meant the actual occurrence of such descriptions within the workplaces generally such that it could be understood that this is one way of orienting to the person.11 Rather than assuming that interlocutors only utilize resources such as the conceptions of ethnic groups as “members of society”, as in the work described above, I contend there are resources specific to the workplaces which can be found in a variety of social activities there. In the example given above Datasegment 1, for example, it is necessary, I believe, to have some independent evidence that Tang is describable as “Chi-

 Dennis Day

nese” in the workplace in order to interpret “chin chon huang” as an ethnic group categorization of her. Her taking the next turn, as well as the other interactive features of the exchange, while compelling, are not sufficient in this view for the ethnic group interpretation. Relying on one’s own, and by implication interlocutors’, knowledge as a ’member of society’, would be to ignore the potential contribution these interlocutors may bring to bear in the here and now of this interaction. On the one hand, ignoring interlocutor’s sensibilities in this fashion, still leaves us with an understanding of some of the interactive structures which enable indirect ethnic group categorizations. On the other hand, ignoring interlocutor’s sensibilities, aside from running the risk of being wrong in this instance, impoverishes our understanding of the phenomenon we are investigating, in this case ethnic group categorizations. As an indication of this complexity, in this instance, it was found in the workplace investigations that workers were ethnically categorized in very different ways by others and themselves, that they at times resisted such categorizations, and that instances of ethnic group categorization varied according to activity type which in its turn was related to various ways in which work and workers were organized at the workplaces. The crux of this is that understanding particular interactions means understanding a host of other interactions within the workplaces as such which may have no direct bearing on the interaction under study other than as precedents, in my cases here, for particular ways of describing people. To say then, that an interlocutor is ‘describable’ as a member of an ethnic group is therefore, for the analyst, reliant on analyses of these other interactions and the resources they provide. A direct implication of this view, again for the analyst, is that we need some way to delineate local interactional resources beyond the micro-contexts of individual interactions but within the workplace as a social context.12 To describe such resources I have utilized the notion of social activities (Allwood 1980; Levinson 1992). The analysis proceeds by showing how understanding some categorization as an ethnic categorization can be accomplished as something relevant to the social activity at hand. I distinguish between global resources, those which may pertain to an entire activity, and local resources, those whose utility is confined to a sub-sequence within an activity. Furthermore a distinction is made between global and local products referring to communicative behavior holding across the entire activity, for example a particular accent, and that holding across some contribution, for example a turn at talk comprising a particular utterance. Global resources of a current and other social activities comprise parameters such as purpose, roles, artifacts, physical circumstances, as well as inter-

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization 

locutors’ physical, mental, and social characteristics.13 The candidate ethnic categorization, which we may term a ‘local product’ of the interaction, is a partial description of a participant’s (or some non-present individual’s) global individual resources, i.e. some individual characteristic of the person which is global in the sense that it may hold throughout the interaction and a resource in that it may be called into use in some interpretation.14 Linguistic and extralinguistic context can be viewed in terms of the parameters of social activities; the relevance of a social group interpretation of the ethnic categorization may be determined by a tie between this global individual resource, i.e. in this case the referent’s ‘describability’ as a member of an ethnic group, and the parameters of the social activity mentioned above. The activity relevance of an ethnic categorization may rely on both global and local resources and products. For example, an ethnic categorization may be relevantly tied to the prior utterance (a local product), the role of an interlocutor (a global resource), an so forth.15 An intricate web of relevance ties might be suggested for any SG categorizations. For my purposes, ties of relevance to local products and global resources have been most important. Ties of relevance to local products are crucial for the determination of an expression as a SG-categorization to begin with. Ties of relevance to global resources have been important because of their relatively high degree of institutionalization, i.e. for a resource to be global implies that it is a stable, regular feature with broad scope within and across extant social activities. This allows for connections to be made to more general ethnographic descriptions of the workplaces as social contexts.16 A similar approach to analysing discoursive phenomena beyond the immediate context of their occurence which is more specifically geared to intercultural communication is outlined by Koole and ten Thije (2001) and is subsumed under the notions of ‘intercultural discourse’, which corresponds closely to the notion of ‘products’ above, and ‘discursive interculture’, which corresponds closely to ‘resources’ above. To illustrate how I have determined the activity relevance of SG categorizations in my material, I provide the following excerpts from recordings of coffee breaks at one of the companies. Coffee breaks as social activities at the work places can be roughly categorized as having the joint purpose of maintaining amicable relations between workers.17 Following the excerpts I present a suggestion as to how their relevance ties to the global resources of the social activities of which they are a part.

 Dennis Day

(4) Lamb Fat 1 T: vad sa du att man gör? what did you say one did? 2 A: smälta melt 3 T: ah fettet där då= ah the fat there then 4 A: =ja drycka upp den HAHAAhahahaha sen är yea drink it up (laughter) then 5 det kört (2) smälter man den that’s it one (2) one melts it 6 T: va fan kan det vara för nåt är det nåt man gör i what the hell is this is it something one does 7 Sverige eller utomlands eller/ in Sweden or abroad or what 8 A: utomlands dom göra they do it abroad 9 T: ahh I see 10 K: *etiopia* ethiopia 11 A: nah det är hela världen (3) smälta det no, the whole world (3) melt it 12 [ ] 13 M: i sverige in sweden 14 A: naa det finns (xx) no: yes they do (xx)

In this excerpt, Ahmad (A) has just mentioned that if one wants to gain weight, then one can drink liquefied lamb’s fat. His contribution follows previous talk on the same topic. At line 6 Tommy (T) asks Ahmad if drinking lamb’s fat is practiced in Sweden or abroad, to which Ahmad responds that it is done abroad. Kaarlo (K) specifies Ahmad’s answer by saying that it is done in “Ethiopia” (line 10). Ahmad takes this as meaning only in Ethiopia and states that it is done all over the world (line 11). Matti then seemingly questions the implication in the assertion by Ahmad that this is done in Sweden (line 14). Ahmad then confirms that this is the case (line 14). The discussion as such here involves locating a particular practice geographically and culturally. The first distinction raised in this regard is Tommy’s

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization 

question at line 7 if the practice is to be heard as located in Sweden, as a geographical and cultural place, or “abroad”, which we must take culturally and geographically as the negation of “Sweden”, i.e. as non-“Swedish” and non“Sweden”.18 In a weak sense, I believe Tommy’s question concerning whether the practice is done in Sweden or abroad could be taken as ethnifying Ahmad given that such a question might not arise so quickly between two “Swedes”. At any rate, Tommy’s question certainly sets up Kaarlo’s further specification of the place as Ethiopia. I take Kaarlo’s specification of “Ethiopia”, as the geographic and cultural place where drinking lamb’s fat is done, is heard by Ahmad as a possible ethnic categorization of him as an Ethiopian. Further, I take this to be a case of special relevance. In distinction to other cases, however, Kaarlo is not “suggesting” something “Ethiopian”, rather he is taken as “asserting” that something, i.e. the practice of drinking lamb’s fat, is “Ethiopian”. That this is taken in this way hinges on Ahmad’s following contribution where he denies the assertion, i.e. if he had taken Kaarlo’s assertion to be “Ethiopia is one place of many in the world where this is done”, then negating it would be contradictory. What he is negating then is that the practice is ethnically Ethiopian. (5) The tease 1 D: . . . lite bakis idag, lite törstig . . . (I’m) a little hungover today, a little thirsty 2 (6) 3 J: aha? Aha? 4 [ ] 5 D: fredag kväll på ön vet du, Friday night on the island you know 6 när det är fint väder when the weather’s nice 7 [ ] 8 A: (xxxxx) 9 vassa armbågar sharp elbows 10 D: sitter man gärna ute på balkongen (2) one sits out on the balcony 11 A: vad betyder sarbo?= what does ‘sarbo’ mean? 12 D: =friska upp sig and enjoys oneself

 Dennis Day

13 (2) 14 A: du vet you know 15 M: va? what? 16 A: SArbo sarbo 17 (3) 18 D: SARbo? sarbo? 19 A: mm mm 20 J: sor= sor 21 A: =yea= yes 22 J: =bo (2) *nej* (1) vilken sammanhäng? bo no in what context? 23 (3) 24 A: dom folk (.) det är man säger (.) ens en kvinna those people, like people say, a woman 25 å en man (.) dom som till exempel inte bor ihop and a man, they for example don’t live together 26 (1) dom (1) dom kommer att träffas kanske nån they, they meet occasionally (xx) a married couple maybe, 27 gång (xx) gift par kanske dom bor i olika they live in different 28 lägenheter, vad kallas man det? apartments, what’s that called? 29 D: särbo ha ha ha ha särbo (laughter) 30 A: det är särbo va? it’s ’särbo’ right? 31 D: HA HA HA HA ha ha ha (laughter) 32 J: å det and it’s 33 [ ] 34 M: spermbo är det and its spermbo too

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization 

35 J: 36 M: 37 38 A: 39 M: 40 D: 41 A: 42 M: 43 K: 44 D: 45 L: 46 47 A: 48 D: 49 A: 50 51 D: 52 A: 53 M: 54 D: 55 A:

det är så det blir that’s what it becomes SPErmbo spermbo (1) inte sambo not ‘sambo’ SPERMbo spermbo spermbo ha ha ha ha ha ha permbo (laughter) det är på finska eller? is that in Finnish or what? nej (.) på svenska no, in Swedish nej no *(x sperm)bo* (x ssperm)bo det är lika bra du stickar iväg och you might as well go and köper en spermattrap nu (xxxx) buy a sperm container now (xxxx) inte som spermbo er (1 (sar)bo står det not spermbo er (sar)bo’s what it says (sär)bo (sär)bo yea (3) särbo s-a yea särbo s-a [ ] vad skulle man kalla det what would you call it s-a-r-b-o s-a-r-b-o (spelling) s-ä- / s-ä-r-b-o s-ä- / s-ä-r-b-o (spelling) sä:/ (.) särbo sä, särbo sparmbo ha ha ha ha ha ha sparmbo (laughter)

 Dennis Day

56 57 D:

[ ] ha ha ha ha ha ha (laughter) 58 [ ] 59 M: ha ha ha ha ha ha (laughter) 60 D: spar/ sparbo (.) två snålar som . . . . . . spar sparbo, two cheapskates who

The “joke” in this excerpt depends on an expression in Swedish, which in relation to English is somewhat unique, and neologisms based on this expression. I will provide therefore a short glossary: “sambo” – to cohabitate, “sam” meaning together and “bo” to live; “spermbo” – “sperm” means sperm and “bo” to live, the idea here is that a couple only meets in order to have sex; “särbo”, “sär” means separate and “bo” to live, the idea here is that the couple is still a couple though they do not live together; “sparb” – “spar” means to save and “bo” to live, the idea here that people live together only because it is cheaper. In this excerpt Ahmad (A) looks up from the newspaper he is reading and asks the others what the word “särbo” means. He is taken to be saying “sarbo” and, because of this, no one can give him an answer. Matti (M), at line 37, gives his rendition of what “särbo” means with an analogous neologism “spermbo”, alluding to the fact that people who are “särbo” may still have intimate relations. Ahmad does not catch the expression “spermbo” rather he hears “sambo” (a conventional term for co-habitation without marriage). Matti repeats the term “spermbo”, to which Ahmad responds with the questions “is that in Finnish, or what?”. What follows are various attempts to clear the matter of “särbo” up by spelling it, pronouncing it slowly and emphatically, etc. If one hears the various attempts to correct and otherwise comment on Ahmad’s “särbo” as concerning a “foreigner’s” Swedish, then this example can be taken to demonstrate an ethnic categorization of Ahmad by means of special relevance. The case of special relevance is set up by an implicit mentioning of Ahmad’s Swedish as being “non-Swedish” or “foreign” which allows for the inference that the same is true of Ahmad. His question to Matti concerning Finnish is, in its turn, an indirect ethnic categorization of Matti, i.e. his ability to answer the question hinges on his being “Finnish”. Focusing on the global resources of the coffee break as a social activity the following ties of relevance between those resources and the ethnic categorizations noted above can be suggested. These should be read as a collection of interpretative procedures through which interlocutors might find an ethnic

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization 

categorization, a relevant categorization. Following each procedure it is noted in which of the datasegments above the procedure might be exmplified:

Purpose 1. In order to “normalize” relations co-workers, the most ethnically distinct co-workers “deviant” behavior should be explained as arising from his ethnicity.19 Example: Lambfat (the discussion of Ahmad being from Ethiopia as an explanation for his knowledge of lambfat usage, line 10).20 2. In order to maintain good relations amongst co-workers, the most ethnically distinct co-worker’s ethnic background should be joked about. Example: The tease (the teasing of Ahmad, especially at line 34 with the term “spermbo”).

Roles 1. The most ethnically distinct co-worker takes the role of the co-worker whose behavior must be explained ethnically. Example: Lambfat (as in 1 above, essentially this follows from the purpose noted). 2. The most ethnically distinct co-worker has the role of “butt” of the tease, i.e. the person who is to be teased. Example: The tease (as in 2 above, again, this follows from it the purpose noted).

Artifacts The foreign accent of the most ethnically co-worker may be joked about. Example: The tease (Comments on Ahmad’s difficulty with pronouncing “särbo”). Physical circumstances The “non-Swedish” geographic origin of some practice interprets that practice as an ethnic practice. Example: Lambfat (the ‘abroad’ question at line 7). What we arrive at in such analyses is a set of resources utilizable by workers/interlocutors within and across social activities both to produce relevant descriptions of people and to ascertain their relevance, and thereby an important aspect of their sense, within the activities. In this case, we have dealt with coffee breaks at one of the work places I studied. These resources may be shared with other social activities. Analyses at the level of social activities, for example uncovering when such resources are shared or not, allows for an understanding of the workplaces which transcends individual interactions yet remains sensi-

 Dennis Day

tive to them, providing a richness of description lacking in studies restricted to microanalysis.

Conclusions The approach to ethnic group categorizations presented in this paper relies both on work in referential semantics and on membership categorization devices via Conversation Analysis, yet problematizes both in the following ways. For clarity, I propose a notion of our everyday concept of social groups upon which both seem to rely. Using this notion as a point of departure, I suggest that the distinction between distributive and collective reference in referential semantics, at least in regards to reference to social groups, has been unduly concerned with the distribution of what is predicated about members of the social group. Moving into the interactive dimensions of ethnic group categorization I have suggested that the reliance on interlocutor’s knowledge as “members of society” in conversation analytic studies of membership categorization devices can fruitfully be further specified such that it is not just the concerns of interlocutors as “members of society” which are of interest, but also, and perhaps more perspicuously, their concerns as actors within a more delimited experiential context, namely the workplaces at which they work and the social activities there in which they participate. Likewise, rather than focusing solely on the interactive structures enabling ethnic group categorization by these “members of society”, I have suggested the usefulness of exploring the social activities in which these interactive moments occur for dealing with some of the complexity I believe exists in the use of ethnic group categorizations.

Transcription notation [. . . ] (.) (1) ((laugh)) = *quiet* (xxx)

overlapped speech micro-pause (less than 1/10 second) pause in seconds non-verbal note latched speech quieter speech uninterpretable speech, each ’x’ is one syllable

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization 

Notes . The analysis I am offering is also relevant for other cultural groups. My distinction between the notion of an ethnic group and the superordinate notion of cultural group will be discussed below. . For reasons of disposition, I provide only English glosses in these examples. The examples are excerpts from the recordings of the interviews and the coffee breaks. . The term synthesized’ refers to Durkheim’s proposed sui generis characteristic of social groups. In precisely the relevant way [i.e. as a social group]. . For an analysis of cultural resources as “owned”, see Sharrock and Anderson (1982). His point is that the relation between some set of practices, beliefs, traditions, etc. is a relation of ownership vis a vis a social group. Further, ownership is not the same as possession. Thus, for example, pizza making and eating in the United States is thought of as “Italian” despite the fact that none of the people involved in this tradition may be taken as “Italian”. “Italians” then, in some sense, still “own” the tradition. . By normatively share, I mean that members are expected to have the resources available to them. Whether they actually have them or not is another matter. . The obvious exceptions to this might be for example if the expression “boy scout” is being used ironically, in jest, or in a deferred reference. Perhaps the boy is not a Boy Scout but a “boy Scout type” (see Jayusi 1984) or merely an actor in a play playing the role of a Boy Scout. . There are other standard linguistic issues which could be addressed here but for reasons of space will not. One such issue is worth noting, however, namely the 1st person plural personal pronoun, e.g. ‘we’. Gilbert (1989) claims that a central sense of ‘we’ is the concept of a social group. This claim must be seen in light of the use of particular predicates, as well as other contextual information related to the social activity interlocutors are pursuing. Nonetheless, it does at least seem easier to envisage situations where ‘we’ together with a possible predication of a social group has a default reading as referring to a social group rather than otherwise. Consider the following invented dialogue. A: what are we doing this evening? B: we’re eating out (C1: “we’re both eating ou) (C2: “we’re eating out together”) My sense of this is that from B we more readily infer C2 and not C1. This inference can be said to be based on the following convention: A question concerning either the listener and minimally the speaker or the listener and, minimally one other person is heard as a question concerning them firstly as a social group providing the predication of the question is possible of a social group. . In this context, I feel it is motivated to claim that calling someone a “muslim” is to allow the inference that he is a member of an ethnic group. I have found that informants seem to orient to people referred to as [muslims], [immigrants], [chinese], and so forth in essentially

 Dennis Day

similar ways, i.e. as cultural groups normatively bound to a common history, language, and so on. . Of particular interest in my work has been the resistance offered ethnic group categorizations by those thus categorized, as indeed I would claim Tang does above (see for example Day 1998). My focus here, however, is on the categorizations themselves. . Likewise, deliberations as to the criteria for membership in an ethnic group may vary with the interactive occasion of the categorization (Jayusi 1984; Moerman 1974; Weider & Platt 1990; Barth 1969; Marcus & Fischer 1986; Clifford & Marcus 1986). . Some 2500 categorizations were collected at the two workplaces. . Recent work by Fitzgerlad and Housley (2002) take a similar tact using Sack’s suggestions concerning the relation between categorization and conversational sequence. They show how various sorts of identities are made sequentially relevant thorughout a set of radio ‘callin’ interactions. My intent here is to show how cateorizations may roam more widely, across activity types within a delimited context, namely the work places. . This information might concern other activities which are being referred to either directly or indirectly in the interaction. This information may be presupposed as intersubjectively shared by interlocutors. . SG categorizations obviously need not only concern co-present interactants (or candidate interactants). During the course of the activity an SG-categorization of a “noninteractant” individual or collection of individuals might be made. The mentioning of his social group membership will be linked, however, to the talk as a resource of the activity at hand. In other words, one could simply ask the question how this person’s social group membership is relevant to what interactants are doing. . That is to say a local product may become a resource for some next product. In this way products and resources are reflexively related. . An important part of the field studies was to establish the institutionalization or generality of ethnic group categories and categorizations in the workplaces. Further, there was an interest in comparing different social activity types in regards to the occurrence of SG categorizations. A different research focus would suggest an interest in different ties of relevance. . Individuals may, of course, have other purposes with the coffee break, however, what seemed to be the major joint purpose was as stated above. . While we may certainly ask “solely” about the geographic location of some thing or practice, I take Tommy’s question to be a question of both geography and culture. “Purely” geographic questions would seemingly either take place amongst geographers and/or be heard as questions of, e.g. longitude and latitude. . The notion of ‘the most ethnically distinct co-worker’ is grounded in a semantic features analysis of categorizations of people at the workplaces. . That a co-worker’s behavior needs to be explained is further suggested in the examples by the fact that Tommy (T) is a beginner at the work place. This would then motivate Kaarlo (K) to “explain” things to him.

Ethnic and social groups and their linguistic categorization 

References Allwood, Jens (1980). “On the analysis of communicative action”. In M. Brenner (Ed.), The Structure of Action (pp. 67–85). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Antaki, Charles & Widdicombe, Sue (Eds.). (1998). Identities in Talk. London: Sage. Barth, Fredrik (1969). Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. Oslo University: Oslo. Blommaert, Jan (1991). “How much culture is there in intercultural communication?”. In J. Blommaert & J. Verschueren (Eds.), The Pragmatics of International and Intercultural Communication (pp. 13–32). Amsterdam: Benjamins. Day, Dennis (1998). “Being ascribed, and resisting, membership of an ethnic group”. In C. Antaki & S. Widdicombe (Eds.), Identities in Talk (pp. 151–170). London: Sage. Day, Dennis (1994). “Tang’s dilemma and other problems: Ethnification processes at some multicultural workplaces”. Pragmatics, 4, 315–336. Drew, Paul (1978). “Accusations: The occasioned use of members’ knowledge of ‘religous geography’ in describing events”. Sociology, 12, 1–22. Fitzgerlad, Richard & Housley, William (2002). “Identity, categorization and sequential organization: the sequential and categorial flow of identity in a radio phone-in”. Discourse and Society, 13, 579–602. Gilbert, Margareth (1989). On Social Facts. London: Routledge. Grimshaw, Allan (1994). “Referential Ambiguity in pronominal inclusion: social and linguistic boundary marking”. In A. D. Grimshaw (Ed.), What’s Going on here: Complementary Studies of Professional Talk (pp. 311–371). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Hester, Stephen (1992). “Recognizing references to deviance in referral talk”. In G. Watson & R. M. Seiler (Eds.), Text in Context: Contributions to Ethnomethodology (pp. 156–174). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Hinnenkamp, Volker (1987). “Foreigner talk, code switching and the concept of trouble”. In H. Knapp, K. Knapp, W. Enninger, & A. Knapp-Potthoff (Eds.), Analyzing Intercultural Communication [Studies in Anthropological Linguistics 1] (pp. 137–180). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Hinnenkamp, Volker (1989). “Turkish Man You?: The conversational accomplishment of the social and ethnic category of ‘Turkish Guestworker”’. Human-Studies, 12, 117–146. Hinnenkamp, Volker (1991). “Talking a person into interethnic distinction: a discourse analytic case study”. In J. Blommaert & J. Verschueren (Eds.), The Pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication: Selected Papers of the International Pragmatics Conference, Antwerp, August 17–22, 1987, II (pp. 91–110). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Jayusi, Lena (1984). Categorization and the Moral Order. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Koole, Tom & Thije, Jan D. ten (2001). “The reconstruction of intercultural discourse: Methodological considerations”. Journal of Pragmatics, 33, 571–587. Kroeber, Al & Kluckholn, Clyde (1952). Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. New York: Random House. Lasersohn, Peter (1990). A Semantics for Groups and Events. Garland Publishing: New York. Lerner, Gene (1993). “Collectivities in action: Establishing the relevance of conjoined participation in conversation”. Text, 13, 213–245.

 Dennis Day

Levinson, Stephen (1992). “Activity Types and Language”. In P. Drew & J. Heritage (Eds.), Talk at Work (pp. 66–100). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Linell, Per & Fredin, Erik (1995). “Negotiating Terms in Social Welfare Office Talk”. In A. Firth (Ed.), The Discourse of Negotiation: Studies of Language in the Workplace (pp. 299– 318). Oxford: Pergamon. Lyons, John (1977). Semantics. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press. Mazeland, Harry, Huisman, Marjan, & Schasfoort, Marca (1995). “Negotiating categories in travel agency calls”. In A. Firth (Ed.), The Discourse of Negotiation: Studies of Language in the Workplace (pp. 271–297). Oxford: Pergamon. Payne, George C. F. (1976). “Making a lesson happen: An ethnomethodological analysis”. In M. Hammersley & P. Woods (Eds.), The process of Schooling (pp. 259–274). London: Routledge and Keegan Paul. Sacks, Harvey (1974). “On the analyzability of stories by children”. In R. Turner (Ed.), Ethnomethodology (pp. 216–232). Harmondsworth: Penguin. Schenkein, Jim (1978). “Identity negotiations in conversation”. In J. Schenkien (Ed.), Studies in the Organization of Conversational Interaction (pp. 57–78). New York: Academic Press. Schiffrin, Deborah (1994). Approaches to Discourse. Oxford: Blackwell. Searle, John (1992). “Conversation”. In John R. Searle et al. (Eds.), (On) Searle on Conversation (pp. 7–31). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Sharrock, Wes & Anderson, Robert (1982). “On the demise of the native: some observations on and a proposal for ethnography”. Human Studies, 5, 119–135. Watson, Ron (1976). “Some conceptual issues in the social identification of victims and offenders”. In E. Viano (Ed.), Victims and Society (pp. 60–71). Washington, DC: Vintage. Watson, Ron (1978). “Categorization, authorization and blame-negotiation in conversation”. Sociology, 12(1), 105–113. Watson, Ron (1983). “The presentation of victim and motive in discourse: The case of police interrrogations and interviews”. Victimology: An international journal, 8, 31–52. Wieder, D. Lawrence & Platt, Steven (1990). “On being a recognizable indian”. In D. Carbaugh (Ed.), Cultural Communication and Intercultural Contact (pp. 45–64). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. Zupnik, Yael-Janette (1994). “A pragmatic analysis of the use of person deixis in political discourse”. Journal of Pragmatics, 21, 339–383.

“How are you?” “I’m hot” An interactive analysis of small talk sequences in British-German telephone sales* Claudia Bubel

When I’m talking about the weather, I know what I’m talking about. (Kurt Schwitters)

Introduction One of the most persistent cultural stereotypes to encumber German business executives is their reputed inability or refusal to engage in what is commonly called “small talk”.1 In almost every guide to German culture, there are such statements as the following: “Germany is a notoriously low-context culture, and they don’t need to know much about the people they are dealing with. German businesses are plainly concerned with time, so long preliminaries are not appreciated here” (Lord 1996: 255).2 Or the authors warn: “There is no direct German equivalent for the expression ‘small talk’ – Germans would be shocked to think that anything they said was frivolous” (Flanini 1997: 58). British people on the other hand are considered to be experts at small talk; as Samuel Johnson once remarked in The Idler: “When two Englishmen meet their first talk is of the weather” (24.06.1758). Analyses of actual British-German business communication should consequently yield indications of this mismatch. My corpus of telephone conversations between a British sales executive and his German customers, however, shows that these mismatches do not result in misunderstandings and disorders, because both parties are intent on maintaining the “orderliness” of their discourse in the sense of Schegloff and Sacks (1973: 290). They negotiate an understanding on whether and how much to talk about the weather in the

 Claudia Bubel

conversation openings. Just as disorders on the level of grammar or phonology are “made normal” in the course of non-native speaker interactions (Firth 1996: 245ff.), disorders due to conflicting underlying expectations are “made normal” in my data. A discourse-analytic approach like that postulated by Sarangi (1994: 424) allows us “to interpret specific discursive practices of individual interactants both in terms of their cultural attributes and in the context of their societal and institutional role-relationship”. Following Schegloff (1986) and Hopper (1992) in their work on telephone openings as well as Firth (1990, 1996) in his research on lingua franca conversations, I analyse the calls turn-by-turn to show in detail how cultural knowledge is retrieved and adjusted cooperatively through the application of basic conversational mechanisms for the sake of institutional order. Hence, my analyses reveal how intercultural communication can move beyond misunderstanding.

Data The data analysed for this paper is taken from a small pilot corpus collected in a British publishing house. The sales department routinely tapes telephone negotiations for training purposes, and I was provided with tapes of twodays’ telephone negotiations conducted by one of their senior sales executives, whom I have given the pseudonym Peter Sikes to ensure anonymity. The corpus consists of 40 calls to German companies to solicit advertising in customer magazines. Half of these interactions are extended conversations with personnel in marketing departments; the other half consists of mere switchboard requests. Peter does not speak any foreign language, and all communication is conducted in English with the non-native speakers displaying different levels of proficiency in the foreign language. This difference in language proficiency between the interlocutors causes an imbalance and constitutes one of the contextual factors influencing the sequencing of the conversations.3 Another feature which affects the course of these conversations is the lack of face-to-face contact. While Hopper (1992) comments that studies designed to contrast sound-only and face-to-face communication have failed to confirm differences in discourse features, Liang (1993) shows that silences are more marked in telephone conversations, and that all pauses are constructed as communicative. This is supported by my data, where pauses are avoided by initiating small talk even in untypical places within the course of a sales negotiation. Furthermore, the degree of familiar-

“How are you?” “I’m hot” 

ity between the interlocutors is relevant. In order to obtain comparable data I excluded calls, which constitute a first contact between sales executive and prospective customers. All the telephone conversations are part of a series of interactions, and the participants orient to preceding and following communication.4 In each telephone conversation, the interactants re-establish their relationship through the identification/recognition sequence. This sequence is typically followed by the “how are you?” – sequence, which usually leads on to small talk also serving the purpose of (re-)establishing a social relationship, on the basis of which more complex tasks can be accomplished (Schegloff 1986; Firth 1995a).

Small talk Characteristics and functions Small talk has a clearly phatic function, although I prefer not to equate small talk with phatic communion (Malinowski 1923). The latter I consider to be a wider concept which can encompass other types of talk like teasing, joke-telling and routine formulae such as greetings or “Bless you!”.5 Phatic communion itself cannot be defined as a type of talk. Coupland et al. (1992: 214ff.) state that the term merely locates “a cluster of sociopsychological orientations to talk”. They also contend that utterances cannot generally be classified in these terms and that the phaticity of any utterance is “a matter for on-the-ground negotiation by participants as talk proceeds”. Consequently, participants negotiate whether to engage in small talk by orienting to talk as phatic or not. Laver’s (1975) phatic communion in marginal phases of communication corresponds to what I call small talk, and I follow him in what he describes as the functions of this type of discourse. Small talk defuses “the potential hostility of silence in situations where speech is conventionally anticipated”, “it allows the participants to feel their way towards the working consensus of their interaction” and “to cooperate in getting the interaction comfortably under way” (Laver 1975: 220–221). I would like to point out, though, that participants are rarely conscious of these functions, and usually assess small talk as superficial, irrelevant, and boring (cf. Schneider 1988).6 As for the forms of small talk, there is a generally agreed on distinction on the basis of the topics chosen. Laver (1975) differentiates between “neutral tokens”, referring to issues specific to the time and place of the utterance, and “participant-oriented tokens”, relating to either the speaker or the listener. Us-

 Claudia Bubel

age of the former category is governed by what Schneider (1988: 157ff.) calls the “maxim of politesse”, which entails the avoidance of silence, curiosity, conflict and pessimism. The latter category of tokens is used, if discourse is governed by the “maxim of friendliness”, which entails saying something nice, showing interest in the interlocutor, creating common ground and displaying optimism (Schneider 1988: 157ff.). Generally, the applicability of the two maxims and thus the choice of tokens is dependent on the social status of the participants and the degree of familiarity.7 Neutral tokens can be used in any situation by interlocutors of any relative social status, and by friends or strangers, because they protect the participants’ privacy while still signalling a readiness to communicate. Participant-oriented tokens, on the other hand, are more hazardous, because they either invade the psychological territory of the other or offer access to the speaker’s own psychological territory. Therefore, they are conventionally forbidden choices for strangers. Still, participant-oriented tokens are used by non-solidary interlocutors, a socially marked behaviour which can be interpreted as an attempt to redefine a relationship, and to claim greater or at least momentary solidarity (Laver 1975). My data show that the distinction between neutral and participant-oriented tokens is not always clear-cut. A typically neutral topic can be turned into a participant-oriented topic, shifting from independence strategies prescribed by the maxim of politesse to involvement strategies inherent in the friendliness maxim. These shifts I interpret as attempts to redefine the interlocutors’ relationship.

Small talk in business settings In business settings, the occurrence of small talk is determined by a delicate balance between the limited amount of time available at the workplace on the one hand, and the necessity to establish a good working relationship with business partners on the other. Even the most overtly transactional conversations, e.g. telephone-mediated service dialogues, contain “brief, friendly, semi-ritualised phatic tokens” and “more extended sequences, which occur as ‘interactional islands’ in the predominantly transactional flow of the talk” (Cheepen 2000: 290). These islands can function as “a catalyst for the big talk” (Tracy & Naughton 2000).8 Whether and how extensively small talk is engaged in is a matter of on-the-ground negotiation. A study of business calls by Alan Firth (1995a) yielded structural regularities. From what Schegloff (1986: 116) calls the “anchor position”, i.e. after the identification/recognition, greeting and “how are you?” – sequences, the participants cooperatively decide on the first topic, which can be either small talk or the business issue at hand. Interlocutors

“How are you?” “I’m hot” 

have at their disposal a fund of methods to indicate their willingness or unwillingness to engage in small talk. Laugh tokens, for example, indicate a positive response, whereas pausing leads to topic shifts, and pausing straight after the “how are you?” – sequence usually prevents a topicalisation of typical small talk issues like the weather (Firth 1995a). I consider the “how are you?” – sequence to be part of small talk, if it is expanded without the interlocutors embarking on intimate self-disclosure.9

Small talk across cultures As Senft (1995) summarises, the universality of the concept of phatic communion and of the topics characteristic for it have been widely questioned. Crystal (1987) states that there is significant variation in the topics cultures permit as phatic communion and warns the English that “the weather is not as universal a conversation filler as [they] might think” (Crystal 1987: 10–11). A study by Béal (1992) on conversations between Australian and French colleagues yields differences in what is considered appropriate in a chat about the week-end, with the French considering the question “Did you have a good week-end?” as a way of getting closer to someone, whereas the Australians expect only short and neutral answers. Similarly Wierzbicka (1991) contends that different social groups of speakers of English employ different response strategies to the question “How are you?”. Tannen (1986) notes that American business executives prefer to proceed to business matters straight away, which leads to problems with Greek, Japanese, and Arab business partners “for whom ‘small talk’ is necessary to establish the social relationship that must provide the foundation for conducting business” (Tannen 1986: 32). In summation, there clearly are differences in cultural assumptions and expectations with regard to the status of small talk, the situations in which small talk is conventionally engaged in, and the topics considered appropriate.

Small talk sequences in German-British telephone sales The intercultural and institutional determination of small talk sequences render them a rewarding research object. In the following two telephone conversation openings – conducted on the same day – , the participants accomplish small talk sequences in spite of institutional and cultural restrictions through on-the-ground negotiation of the course of the sequence.

 Claudia Bubel

(1)

13 R Richner. 14 P ah hello good morning. Mr Rikner? 15 R yes. 16 P hello. it’s Peter Sikes speaking. 17 R [yes.] 18 P [you] recall me. how are you? 19 R yes thank you. I’m fine. 20 P that’s [nice,] 21 R [how] are you? 22 P I’m u:h .. hot. Hh 23 R ha ha ha hot. ((laughs)) 24 P ((laughs)) we have, uh we are enjoying very nice weather here. 25 R yes. we had it uh recent days uh ago uh very hot season. but uh, 26 P [yes] 27 R [at the] present moment it’s- it’s just, uh the temperature is going down. 28 P ah it t t there’s not too cold I hope though= 29 R =no no no, it has been it’s quite nice now. 30 P ah that’s that’s that’s reasonable. ((laughs)) 31 R all right. 32 P um very quickly, uh well not so quickly if it doesn’t have to be, uh but last time we’ve been uh spoken,

(2)

1 2

A yes? P yes hello Mrs. Adler. it’s Peter Sikes again speaking. 3 A ah hello Peter= 4 P =hi= 5 A =how are you? 6 P I a:m very very hot. ((clears his throat)) 7 A you’re what? 8 P very hot. 9 A oh, ((embarrassed laughter)) 10 P but otherwise not too bad. 11 A it’s- it isn’t raining in London?

“How are you?” “I’m hot” 

12 P not at all for once. uh we virtually had about, uh one and a half weeks of sunshine. 13 A oh. . . . because now um in Munich, . . . it’s raining now. 14 P oh uh I actually think this is lucky for you. ((laughs)) 15 A yeah it is. 16 P because uh it has been far too hot these last few days. 17 A okay. so. .. Peter, I got your fax. 18 P okay.

Both conversations start off with an identification/recognition sequence and an interlocking greeting sequence similar to those in the core opening sequences described by Schegloff (1986). Through the accomplishment of these routine sequences the interlocutors know that the channel of communication is open, and they agree on English as the code to be used in their interaction;10 they also establish their identities — though the establishment of a work relationship is yet implicit, none of them explicitly identifies as a member of a business organisation, but relies on the interlocutor’s memory to identify them as such. Unlike in the example of a German-English telephone conversation analysed in Rehbein (this volume), here, the identification/recognition and greeting sequences are accomplished smoothly. There are no dysfluencies, and in the second conversation we even find a marker of smooth comfortable interaction: latching (2: 3–5). From this point onwards, however, the phone calls are interspersed with cut offs, hesitations and fillers. According to Scollon and Scollon (1995) this is typical of non-native/native speaker interactions, since initial routine adjacency sequences are learnt early on in second language acquisition, often leading to the impression that the non-native speakers are more fluent than they actually are. The dysfluencies, however, cannot fully be accounted for by limited language competence, as there are hesitations, cut offs and fillers on part of the native speaker as well. After the greeting sequence, the callers have reached the point at which they are ready to participate in extended talk with each other. This is typically followed by an exchange sequence in which the interlocutors inquire about each other’s well being. These “how are you?” – sequences have a special status in so far as they provide an early opportunity to make the participants’ personal state a first topic (Schegloff 1986). In business settings, where the status of the participants can be considered equal but non-solidary, the other-oriented question

 Claudia Bubel

“how are you?” is socially marked as it invades the psychological territory of the interlocutor. Acknowledging this bid for momentary solidarity, the interlocutor has to at least answer with what Sacks (1975) categorises as neutral response. Richner does this by saying “yes thank you. I am fine” (1: 19). This neutral response does not make any further comments relevant and a reciprocating “how are you?” could follow immediately. Richner, however, only poses the relevant question once Peter has started assessing the neutral response in a sequence-closing third turn (1: 20). Peter’s response then is hesitant, as if he had not expected Richner’s question. Only after a filler and a short pause does he finish his answer with a token which belongs to the negative set (1: 22). Peter’s exhalation and laughter indicate that he is aware of the fact that his statement requires an account and is thus an imposition on his interlocutor. In the second conversation, the recipient initiates the “how are you?” – sequence and Peter gives the same response as in the conversation with Richner; this time with less hesitation – only a drawled out “a:m” and even a repeated intensifier “very, very hot” (2: 6). As there is yet another instance in the corpus in which he gives a similar statement as an answer to the “how are you?” – question, Peter’s “I’m hot” can be considered a strategy to provoke the interlocutors into talking about the weather.11 A typical topic for small talk in personal calls in Britain (cf. Drew & Chilton 2000), the weather noticing causes confusion in the context of a German-English business call. This is indicated by Adler’s repeat request (2: 7–8), in which she asks for confirmation of what she thinks she understood. This sequence might be due to acoustic difficulties as Peter clears his throat after his utterance, but it might also express disorientation. According to Jefferson (1980), such a request, following a response to an inquiry about the recipient’s well-being, “proposes that the recipient is not tracking and requires another chance to catch what is being said”, implying that the “prior speaker has not done proper work to orient [the] recipient” (Jefferson 1980: 163–164). The interpretation that the recipients feel disoriented is confirmed by the embarrassed laughter from both Richner and Adler. There are two explanations for this: firstly, it could be caused by the sexual connotations of the word hot; and secondly, even if hot is interpreted as being part of a weather frame there still is a schema conflict as “I’m hot” is not one of the routine answers to be found in this slot of a business conversation.12 Richner chose a neutral token (2: 19) and expects Peter to proceed in the same way to avoid an expansion of the sequence, which is a much greater imposition especially in a business context where time is scarce. The interactional consequence of the unexpected answer is that Peter has to expand on his utterance. In the first conversation, he accounts for his state of being “hot” by explaining that

“How are you?” “I’m hot” 

the weather is very nice (1: 24). In the second conversation, he clarifies that he’s fine but for the heat (2: 10). In this case, it is the German interlocutor who picks up the weather topic as a relevant response to his statement. So Peter succeeds in introducing the weather as a first topic; a pre-emptive move in both conversations. In the conversation with Richner, Peter does not wait until the anchor position is reached, and in the second case, he does not reciprocate the “how are you?” and thus makes a comment on the weather relevant. In all but one conversation, the small talk topic introduced by the British sales executive is the weather, i.e. in Laver’s (1975) terms a neutral token as the weather affects both participants equally – though in these conversations, the weather conditions vary and the two interlocutors are affected by different climatic conditions.13 Consequently, what follows is an exchange of turns on the weather situation in England and Germany, and how it has changed over the last few days (1: 24–30; 2: 11–16). This fits into a typical pattern of weather talk that Schneider (1988) refers to as local and temporal contrasting. Both weather sequences are characterised by hesitations and fillers, which indicate that there are difficulties, even on Peter’s part. He has to orient to the interlocutors’ difficulties and does so by giving support (1: 26). Adler and Richner succeed in providing the relevant turns, inquiring about the weather situation in Britain (2: 11) and describing the weather in Germany (1: 25, 27, 29 and 2: 13). In both conversations, Peter tries to make light of the weather in Germany. Weatherwise, he seems to be in a better position, but he stresses that it is actually too hot, thus not to be envied (2: 14, 16), and that lower temperatures are just fine (1: 28, 30). Thereby he turns this neutral topic into a personal matter, i.e. a participant-oriented and thus solidarity-claiming token. He reveals his state of being as negatively affected by the weather and displays empathy with respect to the weather conditions in Germany, indicating that he is concerned about his interlocutors’ well-being. Furthermore, by initiating the negotiation of a consensus on the weather, he shows that they are generally able to reach agreement and, on this basis, can solve more complex issues like the negotiation of a business agreement, which is to follow. As the German executives cooperate in this negotiation of a consensus on the weather, they corroborate that the interlocutors have established this common basis. Adler, for example, explicitly confirms Peter’s statement “I actually think this is lucky for you” (2: 14) with “yeah it is” (2: 15). Once agreement has been achieved, the small talk sequence is jointly ended. After a comment by Peter, which can be interpreted as a final remark on the weather situation, the German interlocutors manage the transition to the actual business at hand, by uttering typical transition markers: Adler says

 Claudia Bubel

“okay” (2: 17), which cannot be interpreted as another comment on Peter’s description of the weather in Britain, and Richner utters “all right” (1: 31) to mark that he considers the weather topic exhausted. As Adler has expected Peter’s call and knows what is on the agenda, she initiates the business talk by referring to their preceding interaction, which was the receipt of a fax by Peter. This “retrospective tying reference” (Firth 1995a: 196) signals the end of the small talk sequence and initiates a work-related topic. Richner, on the other hand, did not expect Peter’s phone call and does not know what the specific reason for the call is. He merely initiates the closing of the small talk sequence by uttering the transition marker, but leaves the introduction of the specific topic to the caller (1: 32).

Conclusion The analysis of these two opening sections shows that small talk is accomplished in an orderly fashion in spite of all the conflicting factors. Firstly, the time-pressure caused by the work setting vs. the necessity to establish a sound basis on which to negotiate business matters and secondly, the stereotype of the task-oriented German business executive vs. the Englishman who loves to talk about the weather. As far as topic initiation is concerned, the cultural stereotypes are confirmed. In my corpus, it is – with the exception of one call to a secretary with which he has an almost flirtatious relationship – the British executive who initiates the weather topic. Yet, whenever Peter initiates small talk, the German executives participate. They know how to talk about the weather, which they do in other speech situations such as a chat with a neighbour; but it is not a vital part of their schema for business negotiations. The schema conflict causes embarrassed laughter and dysfluencies, but the German executives generally accept the weather topic and retrieve their knowledge of how to engage in small talk. None of them interrupts the small talk sequences prematurely. In spite of the lack of face-to-face contact and the non-native/native speaker situation, the interlocutors are able to deal with differences in underlying schemata and to jointly achieve their goals. The participants in the conversations I analysed are confronted with intercultural phone calls every day, and they are willing to accommodate to their interlocutors for the sake of achieving normality, which is an important prerequisite for complex interactions such as business negotiations. Even if these small talk sequences appear awkward to the observer, it is obvious that the participants work through the awkwardness with the goal of making them normal.

“How are you?” “I’m hot” 

This is accomplished by applying their knowledge of what weather talk sounds like and by supportive utterances on part of the British interlocutor. Miscommunication in the call openings is taboo in this setting as it implies that the participants’ relationship is uneasy. Intercultural misunderstandings consequently do not surface in these sequences, instead a discursive interculture as described by Koole and ten Thije (1994) and ten Thije (2002) is created. Rather than subscribing to static cultural stereotypes like the “low-context German”, this concept implies that culture is discursively accomplished with all parties to the interaction contributing. This discursive accomplishment is influenced by the context in which the interaction is located. In the sequences described above, the institutional context has a significant impact and cultural identity is relinquished in favour of creating orderly communication with the business partner. The turn-by-turn analysis proves valuable as it prevents the researcher from simply applying culture as an a priori concept, which often leads to the construction or enforcement of stereotypes. Detailed conversation analysis of intercultural communication in different structural locations of interactions, such as openings or closings, and in different contexts, from business setting to a private party, can reveal a fuller picture of the situations in which interactants orient to their cultural background or sometimes even drop their identities (Blommaert 1998).

Transcription conventions The transcription system I employ follows Dressler and Kreuz’s (2000) model transcription system. However, following Chafe (1994) I transcribe one intonation unit per line. she’s out. oh yeah? nine, ten. ..

Period shows falling tone in the preceding element. Question mark shows rising tone in the preceding element. Comma indicates a level, continuing intonation. A truncated ellipsis is used to indicate pauses of one-half second or less. ... An ellipsis is used to indicate a pause of more than a half-second. ye:s The colon indicates the prolonging of the prior sound or syllable. bu- but A single dash indicates a cut off with a glottal stop. [and so] Square brackets on successive lines mark beginning and end of [Why] her? overlapping talk.

 Claudia Bubel

never= =yeah h

Equals signs on successive lines show latching between turns.

Exhalations are denoted with a small h (without a preceding period). A longer exhalation is denoted by multiple hs. ((laughter)) Aspects of the utterance, such as whispers, coughing, and laughter are indicated with double parentheses.

Notes * This paper was presented at the 7th International Pragmatics Conference in July 2000. . Cf. Redder (1995) for a linguistic critique of the concept stereotype. . Cf. Hall’s distinction: “A high-context communication or message is one in which most of the information is either in the physical context or internalised in the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message. A low-context communication is just the opposite; i.e., the mass of the information is vested in the explicit code. . . . Although no culture exists exclusively at one end of the scale, some are high while others are low” (1976: 79). . Cf. Ammon’s (1990) research on the disadvantages German scientists experience due to the dominance of the English language in scientific publishing, for example. . According to Firth (1995a, 1995b), this is typical of telenegotiating. A first call, in which an offer is made, is followed by the offer in print (sent via fax), then there are further calls in which an agreement is negotiated and thereafter, the deal is finalised in a fax. . A discussion of which types of talk are considered phatic communion can be found in Cheepen (1988). . Similarly, Antaki (2000) discusses the paradoxical nature of the word “chat”. It is used as an insult “to dismiss an opponent who wants words to be responsible for some rather substantial things,” and it is also used as a “pleasant, socially positive and blameless description,” which can for example smooth difficult interactions. . Schneider bases his two maxims on the politeness theories of Lakoff (1973) and Brown and Levinson (1987). . McHoul and Rapley (2000) consider another organisationally relevant function of small talk or “chat” in a call to a software helpdesk. Waiting for the computer to finish a subroutine, the helpdesk consultant initiates small talk, in order to “maintain the parties as being in a state of talk while, as far as the formal business is concerned, they mutually know they have ‘nothing to talk about’ – for now, but must later”. . In their discussion of institutional talk, Ehlich and Rehbein (1980: 343) refer to discourse which is not institutionally relevant or seems dysfunctional in the institutional context. This discourse can be put into a category, for which Ehlich and Rehbein coin the term “homileischer Diskurs”, and which corresponds roughly to the term “casual conversation” in English publications. Ehlich and Rehbein list break-time conversations as an example for this type

“How are you?” “I’m hot” 

of discourse within institutional talk. I consider small talk sequences within business calls to belong into this category. . For an extended discussion of language choice in international telephone conversations cf. Rasmussen and Wagner (2002). . Compare the exchange below: 3 H Good morning [Mr Sikes.] 4 P [how are you?] 5 H ((laughs)) yes I am fine. and you? 6 P not too bad. a little bit hot. 7 H a little bit hot? ... uh here in Germany it’s a little bit um uh .. cold.

. Cf. Raskin’s (1985) semantic script oppositeness. The script oppositeness between business talk and weather talk or even sexual innuendo triggers laughter in Richner and Adler, although Richner’s laughter initially sounds rather artificial and Adler’s displays embarrassment. . For an extended discussion of weather as a small talk topic cf. Coupland and YlänneMcEwen (2000). Sacks (1992: 205) considers the weather a “false first topic”, which has a transitional quality and moves the talk from the opening sequence into topical talk.

References Ammon, Ulrich (1990). “German or English?: The problems of language choice experienced by German-speaking scientists.” In P. H. Nelde (Ed.), Language Conflict and Minorities (pp. 33–51). Bonn: Dümmler. Antaki, Charles (2000). “Two rhetorical uses of the description ‘chat’.” M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture, 3(4). ([23.08.2000]). Béal, Christine (1992). “‘Did you have a good week-end?’: Or why there is no such thing as a simple question in cross-cultural encounters.” Annual Review of Applied Linguistics, 15(1), 23–52. Blommaert, Jan (1998). “Different approaches to intercultural communication: A critical survey.” [Plenary lecture, Lernen und Arbeiten in einer international vernetzten und multikulturellen Gesellschaft, Expertentagung Universität Bremen, Institut für Projektmanagement und Wirtschaftsinformatik (IPMP), 27–28 February.] ([28.06.2000]) Brown, Penelope & Levinson, Stephen (1987). Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chafe, Wallace (1994). Discourse, Consciousness and Time. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Cheepen, Christine (1988). The Predictability of Informal Conversation. London: Pinter.

 Claudia Bubel

Cheepen, Christine (2000). “Small talk in service dialogues: The conversational aspects of transactional telephone talk.” In J. Coupland (Ed.), Small talk (pp. 288–311). Harlow: Pearson. Coupland, Justine, Coupland, Nikolas, & Robinson, Jeffrey D. (1992). “‘How are you?’: Negotiating phatic communion.” Language in Society, 21(2), 207–230. Coupland, Nikolas & Ylänne-McEwen, Virpi (2000). “Talk about the weather: Small talk, leisure talk and the travel industry.” In J. Coupland (Ed.), Small talk (pp. 163–182). Harlow: Pearson. Crystal, David (1987). The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dressler, Richard A. & Kreuz, Roger J. (2000). “Transcribing oral discourse: A survey and model system.” Discourse Processes, 29(1), 25–36. Drew, Paul & Chilton, Kathy (2000). “Calling just to keep in touch: Regular and habitualised telephone calls as an environment for small talk.” In J. Coupland (Ed.), Small talk (pp. 137–162). Harlow: Pearson. Ehlich, Konrad & Rehbein, Jochen (1980). “Sprache in Institutionen.” In H. P. Althaus et al. (Eds.), Lexikon der Germanistischen Linguistik, 2, erweiterte Auflage (pp. 338–345). Tübingen: Niemeyer. Firth, Alan (1990). “‘Lingua franca’ negotiations: Towards an interactional approach.” World Englishes, 9(3), 269–280. Firth, Alan (1995a). “Talking for a change: Commodity negotiating by telephone.” In A. Firth (Ed.), The Discourse of Negotiation (pp. 183–222). Oxford: Pergamom. Firth, Alan (1995b). “Multiple mode, single activity: Telenegotiating as a social accomplishment.” In P. ten Have & G. Psathas (Eds.), Situated Order: Studies in the Organization of Talk and Embodied Activities (pp. 151–175). Washington: University of America Press. Firth, Alan (1996). “The discursive accomplishment of normality: On ‘lingua franca’ English and Conversation Analysis.” Journal of Pragmatics, 26(2), 237–259. Flanini, Roand (1997). Passport Germany: Your Pocket Guide to German Business, Customs and Etiquette. San Rafael: World Trade Press. Hopper, Robert (1992). Telephone Conversation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Jefferson, Gail (1980). “On ‘trouble-premonitory’ response to inquiry.” Sociological Inquiry, 50, 153–185. Koole, Tom & Thije, Jan D. ten (1994). The Construction of Intercultural Discourse. Team discussions of educational advisers. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Lakoff, Robin (1973). “The logic of politeness; or, minding your p’s and q’s.” In C. Corum et al. (Eds.), Papers from the 9th Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society (pp. 292–305). Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. Laver, John (1975). “Communicative functions of phatic communion.” In A. Kendon et al. (Eds.), Organization of Behaviour in Face-to-Face Interaction (pp. 216–238). The Hague: Mouton. Liang, Anita (1993). “Pauses in face-to-face and telephone conversations.” In J. Günther et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 19th Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society (pp. 232–244). Berkeley: Berkeley Linguistics Society.

“How are you?” “I’m hot” 

Lord, Richard (1996). Culture Shock: A Guide to Customs and Etiquette: Germany. Portland: Graphic Arts Centre. Malinowski, Bronislaw (1923). “The problem of meaning in primitive languages.” Supplement to The Meaning of Meaning, C. K. Ogden & A. Richards. London: Routledge. McHoul, Alec & Mark Rapley (2000). “‘Still on holidays Hank?’: ‘Doing business’ by ‘having a chat’.” M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture, 3(4). ([23.08.2000]). Raskin, Victor (1985). Semantic Mechanisms of Humor. New York: Reidel/Kluwer. Rasmussen, Gitte & Wagner, Johannes (2002). “Language choice in international telephone conversations.” In K. K. Luke & T. S. Pavlidou (Eds.), Telephone Calls: Unity and Diversity in Conversational Structure across Languages and Cultures (pp. 111–131). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Sacks, Harvey (1975). “Everyone has to lie.” In M. Sanches & B. G. Blount (Eds.), Sociocultural Dimensions of Language Use (pp. 57–80). New York: Academic Press. Sacks, Harvey (1992). Lectures on Conversation. Volume II. Edited by G. Jefferson. Oxford: Blackwell. Sarangi, Srikant (1994). “Intercultural or not? Beyond celebration of cultural differences in miscommunication analysis.” Journal of Pragmatics, 4(3), 409–427. Schegloff, Emanuel A. & Sacks, Harvey (1973). “Opening up closings.” Semiotica, 8, 289– 237. Schegloff, Emanuel A. & Sacks, Harvey (1986). “The routine as achievement.” Human Studies, 9(2–3), 111–151. Schneider, Klaus P. (1988). Small Talk: Analysing Phatic Discourse. Marburg: Hitzeroth. Scollon, Ron & Scollon, Suzanne Wong (1995). Intercultural Communication. Oxford: Blackwell. Senft, Gunter (1995). “Phatic communion.” In J. Verschueren et al. (Eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics (pp. 1–10). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Tannen, Deborah (1986). That’s Not What I Meant!’: How Conversational Style Makes or Breaks your Relationships with Others. New York: William Morrow. Thije, Jan D. ten (2002). “Stufen des Verstehens bei der Interpretation von Interkulturellen Diskursen.” In H. Kotthoff (Ed.), Kultur(en) im Gespräch (pp. 61–98). Tübingen: Narr. Tracy, Karen & Naughton, Julie M. (2000). “Institutional identity-work: A better lens.” In J. Coupland (Ed.), Small talk (pp. 62–83). Harlow: Pearson. Wierzbicka, Anna (1991). Cross-cultural Pragmatics: The Semantics of Human Interaction. Berlin: Mouton.

Where do ‘we’ fit in? Linguistic inclusion and exclusion in a virtual community Lise Fontaine

Introduction Whether or not its structural boundaries remain intact, the reality of community lies in its members’ perception of the vitality of its culture. People construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity. (Cohen 1985: 118)

This view of community is especially relevant to the construction of a virtual community. With no structural boundaries, the reality of the virtual community can only be observed through the language used by its members. This paper explores members’ uses of linguistic strategies of inclusion and exclusion in one intercultural virtual community. Research on computer mediated intercultural communication has generally studied educational and workplace settings (Ma 1996; Chen 1998; Colomb & Simutus 1996). Ma (1996) compares intercultural face to face communication with its CMC counterpart. Korenman and Wyatt (1996) use a case study approach to determine whether or not this mode of communication facilitates communication across traditional boundaries (social, institutional, and geographic). McIlvenny (1999) notes that “race and ethnicity have received only limited attention”.1 To the best of my knowledge, no work has been done on self-forming intercultural communities. This chapter examines members’ use of the pronoun ‘we’ in the construction of an intercultural virtual community that uses English as a lingua franca. The primary goal is to describe how members position themselves with respect to group identity and cohesion. This study examines the construction of the group and how members manage to build their community. The position

 Lise Fontaine

taken here focuses on what has occurred and how members have positioned themselves despite the potentially adverse conditions they are faced with (for example, asynchronous communication, electronic communication, no face to face contact, cultural diversity, etc.). The impetus for this particular study was largely intuitive, seeking to answer the following question: given the intercultural nature of the group and its complex issues of identity, how do speakers use ‘we’? ‘We’ is a deixical referring expression, which is used to refer to a group of people including the Speaker. This chapter can be seen as complementary, in a sense, to Day’s paper (this volume), which provides a detailed analysis of lexical referring expressions that are used to refer to “collectives of people”. The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section presents the necessary background information for this study, including a description of the virtual community in question. Section 3 describes the construction of the corpus and the data analyzed. Then, in Section 4, the processes of inclusion and exclusion are detailed in terms of uses of ‘we’. Finally, Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.

Background Despite the cultural diversity of the European Asatru community, all members try to create and maintain a European Asatru culture. Asatru can be defined2 as a re-creation of the pre-Christian beliefs and practices of the proto North Germanic peoples. Thus, Asatru-E members share a target culture. The term target is important since members of this community are trying to construct a culture that does not yet exist; in fact, members wish to transpose an ancient, eradicated culture onto a modern setting. The difference might best be understood in terms of deductive and inductive approaches. The target culture, in the foreign language setting, is always an established culture (for example the French culture), and so the learner, in developing cross-cultural awareness is in fact applying a model of French culture deductively. Conversely, when a group constructs a model of a culture collectively, they do so inductively. The group shares a target culture as a group goal whereas in the foreign language setting, the target culture is an individual goal. See also Jochen Rehbein (this volume) for an excellent discussion of the relationship between language and culture. The notion of target culture can be related to the possible outcomes of intercultural communication as presented in Koole and ten Thije (1994). The five resolutions they present presuppose the existence of both an indigenous collec-

Where do ‘we’ fit in? 

tivity (called A) and an intrusive collectivity (called B), where in fact B could be either monolingual or multilingual (ibid.: 3). With the Asatru community there is no indigenous collectivity; it is in the process of being constructed.

Intercultural communication in a virtual community Clearly not all discussion lists can be called communities. The concept of community generally evokes a close collective group that shares physical space and some kind of cultural ties. See Day’s paper (this volume) for a detailed discussion of social group and cultural group. Rheingold (Rheingold 1993: 53) points out that “different people in cyberspace look at their virtual communities through differently shaped keyholes. In traditional communities, people have a strongly shared mental model of the sense of place. In virtual communities, the sense of place requires an individual act of imagination”. Yet, the question of whether or not a set of online connections and interactions can be construed as a community remains largely under debate. Slevin (2000: 91), for example, criticizes the work of Rheingold and others: “the problem with most of these studies is that they elaborate the impact of the Internet on forms of human association and conduct within strictly limited terms. They do not develop a critical approach to the concept of ’community’ in late modernity”. Dawson (2000: 39), on the other hand, discusses the notion of virtual community and its criticisms: “explicitly or implicitly these perceptive criticisms of the notion of virtual community rest upon some Gemeinschaft-like conception of traditional communities”. Rheingold (1993) suggests that a transition similar to the move from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft 3 could possibly be taking place online but that we have no technical name for it. According to Tönnies (Tönnies 1993: 64–65), “in the Gemeinschaft, (individuals) remain essentially united in spite of all separating factors, whereas in the Gesellschaft they are essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors”. The concept of Gemeinschaft is specifically important to intercultural Internet groups: members are united in spite of all separating factors (lack of visual/physical contact, differences in time and space; unseen and often unknown or unidentified differences in race, ethnicity and culture, and so on). With this in mind, the position taken here follows Sabean’s (1997: 29) views on community: What is common in community is not shared values or common understanding so much as the fact that the members of a community are engaged in the

 Lise Fontaine

same argument, the same raisonnement, the same Rede, the same discourse, in which alternative strategies, misunderstandings, conflicting goals and values are threshed out. In so far as the individuals in a community may all be caught up in different webs of connection to the outside, no one is bounded in his relations by the community.

From this perspective the Asatru-Europe discussion list forms a community. The question to be asked now is to what extent it provides a forum for intercultural communication. Intercultural communication as defined by Knapp (1998: Section 1; see also Day this volume) refers to “the interpersonal interaction between members of different groups, which differ from each other in respect of the knowledge shared by their members and in respect of their linguistic forms of symbolic behavior”. The degree of intercultural and shared cultural communication is variable in Asatru-E as members come from a variety of different groups: different nations, different regions within nations, different languages, different religious environments locally, different political views, different genders, and so on. This definition poses some problems in terms of claiming that the communication of Asatru-E members is intercultural since they are, of their own will, part of the same target culture even though they come from different (cultural, national, and linguistic) groups. According to ten Thije (2001: 2), “the presence of people with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds alone does not guarantee that the interaction between these actors automatically results in intercultural discourse” Further, analysis in intercultural communication research “should reveal to what extent the discourse is institutional and to what extent interculturally determined” (ibid.). If we define, as do Koole and ten Thije (1994: 74), institution as a societal apparatus that consists of “structures of action”, we can consider to what extent the discourse of the Asatru-E community is institutionally determined. Ultimately, the list has two main purposes: to define and institute Asatru in Europe and to create a community for Asatru Europeans to develop social links. We can think of these two aspects in terms of the first being linked to the institutionally determined nature of the group (more of a Gesellschaft-type relationship) and the second being linked to the interculturally determined nature of the group (more of a Gemeinschaft-type relationship). The internal structure of the group itself is loose but it is there. The group is unmoderated: messages are not pre-approved before being sent to the entire group. The list owner is the only person who can subscribe or unsubscribe a member. However, members generally handle their own membership. The Asatru-E list owner described the moderator’s duties as follows: “the main

Where do ‘we’ fit in? 

duty of the co-moderator is to keep the discussion going and putting discussion themes in the list. . . . The main duty of keeping the netiquette and the technical details will be performed by me” (email to group 12/03/1999). In reality, however, the group is largely self-regulating. There was one occasion where the group’s list owner exercised the power to unsubscribe a member: “We have decided to unsub the American Front, because this list is clearly not for them, (as they would have seen if they had looked at the webpage!)” (email to group 9/06/2000). Nevertheless, group behavior guidelines are left implicit and general principles of politeness are assumed to govern. Although structures of action do exist, they are rarely felt. English lingua franca is the language used by members. Sometimes other Germanic languages are used, especially when ancient texts are being discussed. Meierkord (2000: Section 2) points out that lingua franca communication can be distinguished from other forms of intercultural communication since “participants in lingua franca (communication) are representatives of their individual mother cultures”. With the lingua franca there are therefore, “at least three but sometimes even more cultures involved at any given time” (ibid.). English is not the mother tongue of the majority of members and as a result, the English used by this group contains evidence of first language interference. Openings and closings are often cultural mixtures of English, the speaker’s first language and the target culture of Asatru, but as with typical email texts, the opening or the closing can be left out completely. Examples of openings: Hoi, Hail!, Greetings!, Heile!, Hoi hoi, Wassail all!, Hi, hallo, Heilsa, Good health to all!, Hej Examples of closings: In Frith, With Germanic greetings, Til ár ók friðr, May the gods be with you, cu, In Nerthus, frith, Wotan with you, Hail the Gods! Hail the Goddesses!, wassail

Overall, these openings and closings reflect the group culture rather than any one individual culture. Some openings and closings are easily identified as conforming to English, German or Dutch norms, but others are complex constructions such as: in frith and Wassail al, for example. Due to the nature of such informal electronic text, it is difficult to compare it with any pre-established rhetorical structure (see ten Thije 2001). Asatru-E is inherently intercultural in its make-up: individuals partially dissociate from their local culture in a move towards a merged European Asatru culture. We can conclude that the discourse

 Lise Fontaine

of the Asatru-E community is mostly interculturally determined but also to a certain extent institutionally determined. The intercultural nature of the discourse of this particular community forms its own culture: “intercultural discourse . . . is also a form of culture” (Koole & ten Thije 1994: 69). The discourse that enables the community to construct itself can be referred to as the discursive interculture (Koole & ten Thije 1994; and ten Thije 2001). The preconditions for the development of a discursive interculture are outlined in ten Thije (2001). We will now consider each of his seven preconditions with respect to the present case. 1. Discursive intercultures are constructed by actors that originate from different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. This condition holds for the Asatru-E community since all actors originate from different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. 2. The language contact constituting discursive intercultures occurs within institutional constellations. As we have seen, the language contact in this case does occur within institutional constellations, although the intercultural constellations are greater. 3. The language contact constituting a discursive interculture is not unique, but has certain duration without being unlimited. This point is more complex in a virtual community. Membership is not fixed and an analogy that would be more appropriate here for this group is a church congregation rather than a professional team. However since the group is trying to establish itself, there is an unidentified limit. Once this limit is reached, then the discourse changes from that of construction to that of maintaining. 4. The multi-lingual and multicultural recourses underlying the teamwork favour the attaining of institutional purposes. Asatru-E differs here in the sense that there is no real teamwork per se. A more in depth study would be necessary in order to effectively measure this precondition. 5. The language choice that determines discursive intercultures is not completely determined by a language policy and non-standard utterances within certain margins are tolerated. The language policy applied in this group is not strictly held in the sense that members will use non-English utterances for a variety of reasons (solidarity, lack of linguistic competence in English, and so on). 6. Most speakers engaged in an interculture are not monolingual and have general knowledge about culture and communication.

Where do ‘we’ fit in? 

The members of this community are not monolingual and prestige is gained through increased knowledge about culture and language. 7. Discursive intercultures originate in supra national constellations. As already discussed regarding the nature of this group, this precondition holds. These preconditions do not map conveniently onto this type of (virtual) group: Precondition 4, in particular, since the notion of teamwork is absent in the Asatru-E community. Discursive interculture, in its strictest sense, arises from the structures constructed by team members in intercultural discourse that is mostly institutionally determined in order to solve recurring problems within the team (ten Thije 2001). As we have seen, the discourse of this community is mostly interculturally determined and the construction of the community is what is essential, rather than the construction of a work group that will eventually dissolve. A detailed study is necessary to determine to what extent members of Asatru-E have constructed “specific common communication conventions” (ibid.: 3), or a discursive interculture. It is entirely possible that the virtual nature of this community makes it impossible to compare with face-to-face teamwork situations. As a result, virtual intercultural discourse forms a new area for research in discursive interculture. The structures are less visible perhaps but they are still present. In analyzing uses of ‘we’, we are able to reveal some aspects of these structures by considering the positions that members take and impose on others. Wales (1996: 61) speaks of the “pragmatic power” of the pronoun ‘we’ to “delimit and oppose groups”. This in and of itself is not an element of a discursive interculture. However it can be when these positions are “interculturally determined” (see Koole & ten Thije 1994: 69), as we will see in the types of ‘we’ found in the data and which grouping of people ‘we’ refers to in a given instance.

The social context of Asatru-E The analysis presented here is largely contained within the framework of Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday 1994), however there is some common ground with the other approaches used in this book, namely the Functional Pragmatic approach (Koole & ten Thije 1994). The Functional Pragmatic approach draws heavily from Bühler’s work (Koole & ten Thije 1994: 73). Bühler’s

 Lise Fontaine

approach makes a three-way functional distinction, as does Halliday4 whose three distinctions are: Ideational, Interpersonal, and Textual. In Systemic Functional Linguistics, language is seen as a realization of social context through a dynamic relationship between context and text (Martin & Plum 1996). The social context is divided into three main register variables: 1. field of discourse: the roles of the participants and the subject matter of the discourse; 2. tenor of discourse: the roles and relationships between participants in the discourse; 3. mode of discourse : the role language plays in the interaction. The social context of the Asatru-E community will be described here briefly as follows (see Fontaine 2005 for more detail). The members of Asatru-E share long term goals that include learning more about Asatru, developing the Asatru religion, and building a European Asatru community. Although individual members will vary as members leave and join the group, membership is selfselective and members choose whether or not to join or to continue to remain members. In Asatru-E, the role of the language used is typically constitutive, however, it can be ancillary when ancient texts are used for discussion and debate. The language used has a relatively high degree of informality, however the social roles between individuals are highly variable, depending on experience and knowledge and outside roles are minimized. As is the case with all email discussion lists, the messages are of a oneto-many nature where individual members send messages to the entire group at once and as a result, each message has multiple recipients as a receiver. The texts are often explicitly intertextual and contain either reported (embedded) discourse or referential sections from previous exchanges in the discourse (see Fontaine 2004). Occasionally members will communicate “privately” in which case the dialogue is one-to-one but private messages have not been included in this study (see Korenman & Wyatt 1996). The medium is electronic asynchronous text-based computer mediated communication. I have identified five primary text variables for the mode of discourse for this medium: Linear vs. non-linear; POP mail/web-based mail; On-/off-line writing and reading; Reading vs. response time; Individual messages/digest mode. Since these text variables depend on individual user preferences, their analysis has not been included in this study (see Fontaine 2005 for more details).

Where do ‘we’ fit in? 

Data analysis To date, no firmly established methodology has been set for analyzing Internet data and as a result, individual researchers are left to either create or adapt methodologies that seem relevant and appropriate (Herring 1996: 5). The construction of the corpus is critical to any study, but it is especially important to render explicit the construction of CMC data. The archives for Asatru-E are public and available on the Web. In total, this archive consists of the first two years of the group, from 1999 to 2001. The approach used here follows Yates (1996), who selected a sampling technique of 50 message blocks in order to have a word count that would allow him to compare his results with his spoken corpora. A 50-message block is a reasonable sample size for this community as it gives blocks with word counts that are comparable with other studies. Since each message represents an individual turn in the discourse, it is desirable to maintain the number of messages for repeated sampling in order to reflect a similar number of turns. In addition to this, maintaining the number of messages in the samples allows us to compare individual message length, participation and frequency of member contributions, for example. In order to analyze the use of ‘we’ in the construction of the community, it was essential to include the first set of 50 messages, which would indicate the state of uses of ‘we’ in the very earliest stages of the group’s development. Then the last 50-message block was selected, which reflects the most recent stages in the group’s development. The purpose of dividing the archives is to attempt to compare the uses of ‘we’ in the earliest stage to the most recent stage in the group’s development. With members joining and leaving on a regular basis, taking a diachronic approach is important in order to determine whether the features in question remain constant or not. As a means of control, a third block of 50-messages was selected halfway in between these two extremes. Therefore, the corpus consists of three 50-message blocks: period I (first 50-message block), period II (middle 50-block message) and period III (final 50-message block). Table 1 shows the distribution of the number of messages to the group per month since it began in March 1999; periods I, II, and III have been blocked off. Even though the archives are public, all names have been removed from this paper replaced by XXX. All message extracts presented here appear as they were written, with the exception of brackets [ ] to indicate where a message was cut off to save space.

 Lise Fontaine

Table 1. Distribution of messages

There are essentially three text types in the corpus: referential reported text, functional reported text, simple narrative text. Referential reported text is a text that contains reported text from a previous message where the reported discourse is not integrated into the exchange. In the second text type, functional reported text, the reported discourse is integrated into the current exchange, and it is used to construct the current message. Simple narrative text does not contain any reported text, in other words, it only contains what the current speaker is saying. Examples of each text type can be found in the appendix. All types of reported text were removed from the corpus for frequency calculations.

Inclusion and exclusion Two mechanisms can be distinguished that are used to satisfy the human need for forming groups. The first mechanism can be labeled ‘integration’ and the second ‘segregation’. Group formation through integration means sharing material or symbolic goods in order to become one group. Group formation through segregation, on the other hand, is the denial of group membership to certain people, and thus the formation of a group through boundary formation (Koole & ten Thije 1994: 58).

‘We’ The personal pronoun ‘we’ belongs to the person system in Systemic Linguistics (see Halliday & Hasan 1976): “it is the means of referring to relevant persons and objects, making use of a small set of options centering around the particular nature of their relevance to the speech situation” (ibid.: 45). The system branches in two in order to distinguish between those having a speech role in the communication process (Speaker and Addressee) and those having some other role (not the Speaker or Addressee). According to Halliday and Hasan (1976: 48), ‘we’ “does not normally refer to the text at all; (its) referents

Where do ‘we’ fit in? 

are defined by the speech roles of speaker and hearer, and hence are normally interpreted exophorically, by reference to the situation”. This brings us to what is referred to in Pragmatics as person deixis. “Person deixis concerns the encoding of the role of participants in the speech event in which the utterance in question is delivered” (Levinson 2000: 62). What we are interested in here is one specific use of person deixis, the first person plural, and more specifically, the use of ‘we’. In Grammatik der Deutschen Sprache (Zifonun et al. 1997), the authors take the notion of person deixis further, essentially dividing it into Speaker deixis and Hearer deixis. Only the first person singular pronoun, ich in German, and the same is true for English I, has the communicative role (equivalent to speech role, see above) of speaker (ibid.: 317). Hearer deixis is further divided in German into forms of equality, du, and forms of social distance, Sie (ibid.). This distinction has been lost in English. Most often, ‘we’ is used by one speaker in order to group himself or herself with one or more participants. Zifonun et al. call this group deixis. “The discourse context always determines who, in addition to Speaker or Hearer belongs in the group (‘we’-referent) and therefore it must be known or disclosed” (ibid.: 319).5 Within group deixis, the speaker form, ‘we’, has the following possible references: Speaker + Hearer; Speaker + n other persons; Speaker + Hearer + n other persons (ibid.). Since none of these variations are marked, other attributes can be added to clarify the referent (ibid.: 321), as in the following example: (1) wir, zwei/alle/Mitglieder des Turnvereins 1898 we two/all/members the-dat gymnastics-club 1898 ‘We both/all/members of the gymnastics club of 1898’ (from Zifonun et al. 1997: 321)

The same is true in English in the following invented sentences: (2) a. b. c. d.

We Canadians love the snow. (Speaker + n other persons) We both agree. (Speaker + 1 Hearer) We both agree. (Speaker + 1 other person) We women must work together. (Speaker + n Hearers + n other persons)

Clearly, the circle of reference for the speaker group can vary a great deal, only the speaker can be certain of who is being included in the group (ibid.). When the Hearer is known to be included in the reference, ‘we’ is referred to as

 Lise Fontaine

inclusive-‘we’ and when the Hearer is known to not be included, it is referred to as exclusive-‘we’. ‘We’ has several “generalized exophoric uses (where) the referent is treated as being as if it were immanent in all contexts of situation” (Halliday & Hasan 1976: 53). Halliday and Hasan include the following examples (ibid.): identifying with a particular group, as in we don’t do that sort of thing here; giving status to what is being said (royal and editorial ‘we’ for example), as in we consider it our duty; and identifying with a patient in medical settings as in how are we today? (ibid., see also Zifonun et al. 1997 for a more elaborate discussion). However, ‘we’ can be used to position the speaker within or without the group that the speaker is either adhering to or avoiding. “The pronoun first person plural (we), can be used (apart from its inclusive and exclusive utilization) to refer to the speaker, a group of entities from which the speaker is excluded but with whom he/she identifies on account of social or ideological cohesion, or to disclose his/her solidarity with a category of entities as such” (Botha 2000: Section 5.1). In the Asatru-E community, the speaker could use ‘we’ in many different ways, for example, to identify with Asatru, with his or her own local community, or to exclude someone or some other group. Further, it is reasonable to assume that an analysis of ‘we’ uses will shed some light on how speakers are negotiating their position vis-à-vis their community, their nation, their religion and their political views, as well as how they exclude themselves from other groups.

Participation and disengagement6 By nature, a study that looks at uses of ‘we’ can only consider the instances that occur. This implies a necessary restriction to only those members who participate on the list. On an email discussion list, the choice of participating or not translates as existence vs. non-existence (unless you are ‘known’ to be a member). It would seem important then, to consider what part of the community is visible. In period I, for which the total population is unknown7 there were 16 members participating. Three of those members are responsible for 50% of the messages in this period. There were also 16 members participating in period II, again with three members responsible for 50% of the messages being sent to the group. It should be noted that they were not the exact same three members as in period I. One member alone sent 11 messages in this period. Finally, in period III, only 14 members sent messages. On March 22, 2001, the total population of the group was 77 members, if we assume that this population was

Where do ‘we’ fit in? 

stable for the 50-message block in period III, then we can conclude that 18.2% of the population was participating. Two of the participating members sent a combined total of 26 messages, which would translate to 2.3% of the members being responsible for 51% of the messages. These rates are not surprising. There are no figures from other studies for comparing group participation online, however it is not likely that more than 20% of an online population is participating. With respect to the small percentage of the group producing the majority of texts, Korenman and Wyatt (1996: 230) found similar results in their study: We find a remarkable consistency of regular participation by a small group of persons, who apparently serve as the “core” of the discussion. This small core of regular posters contributes four times as often as the rest of the membership. . . . Regular contributors to other e-mail discussions often exceed this average. . . . Nonetheless, the pattern of a small core of regular participants corresponds closely to the behavior of participants in face-to-face interaction.

In one study comparing online and face-to-face groups, it was found that 4% and 6% of members posted 33% and 53% of the total number of words, respectively, which constitutes more than eight times the participant average (Herring 1993). The fact that a small minority has a greater voice in a given group seems typical of both online and face-to-face group interaction. Understanding what the absence of participation means in virtual communities is difficult since there is nothing to analyze but the absence. Membership in a virtual community is self-selective, and individuals can include or exclude themselves by their textual presence in the community. Silence could be due to several factors: culturally determined response time, self-perceived insufficient lingua franca competence, intimidation, nonchalance, or some other factor. These factors should be explored in a more extensive study. Meierkord’s study of lingua franca conversation may be relevant here. She states (Meierkord 2000: Section 3.2.3): As a general rule, the linguistic behaviour of participants in lingua franca faceto-face conversations seems to be governed by the following two principles: Participants wish to save face. They avoid insulting behaviour and putting their partners into embarrassing situations by e.g. using expressions their interlocutors may not understand. As a result of the uncertainty regarding the cultural norms and standards that apply to lingua franca conversations, participants wish to assure each other of a benevolent attitude. The high amount of supportive back-channels – both verbal or in the form of laughter – as well as the excessive use of cajolers found in the corpus are discursive manifestations of this intention.

 Lise Fontaine

Table 2. Representation of the frequencies of the first person plural pronoun in the corpus Category

Period I

Period II

Period III

We Us Our total 1st person plural pronoun:

0.37% (32) 0.05% (4) 0.16% (14) 0.58% (50)

0.47% (26) 0.20% (11) 0.51% (28) 1.18% (65)

0.32% (39) 0.11% (13) 0.21% (26) 0.64% (78)

# words # types type:token ratio Period dates:

8 551 2 017 1 : 4.2 03–04, 1999

5 489 1562 1 : 3.5 05–06, 2000

12 252 2 444 1 : 5.0 01–03, 2001

Similar principles may govern participation in Internet group discussion. Having to put their thoughts into words and send them to the entire group may be too threatening for speakers who have not reached a high enough level of lingua franca competence. The absence of supportive back channels on email discussion lists may prohibit participation.

Distribution of ‘we’ The Table 2 presents the distributions of ‘we’ over the three periods. Each column contains the frequency in percentage followed by the number count in parenthesis. The frequency was calculated as follows: the frequency, F, is equal to the number of occurrences divided by the number of words. ‘We’ has multiple possible uses and a closer look is needed to begin to draw any reasonable conclusions.

Towards a classification of ‘we’ types “Systemic linguistics has its roots in Firthian linguistics, and so, not surprisingly it is a type of system structure theory. Unlike Firth however, who gave equal status to the concepts of system and structure in his model, systemic linguistics gives priority to system” (Martin 1992: 4). These choices made by speakers are described through paradigmatic opposition. As Fawcett points out “we must distinguish between those occasions when one wants to show an overall picture of the grammar, and those when one is exploring a part of it” (Fawcett 1988a: 16). In this paper, we are specifically concerned with the use of ‘we’ with respect to group construction (see Fawcett 1988b for a description of the English personal pronoun system). The classification of ‘we’ types found

Where do ‘we’ fit in?  general cohesive inclusive INCLUSIVETYPE

promoting COHESIVE- identity TYPE argumentative redirect

subgroup restrictive RESTRICTIVETYPE other ambigous

REFERENCETYPE

group-restriction exclusive EXCLUSION- personal TYPE regional

Figure 1. A taxonomy of we-types

in this study is represented by a taxonomy. Taxonomies can be useful when “we wish to propose a classification of some aspect of semiotic behavior without claiming that we are modeling the behavior potential stored in the mind of a member of some social group” (Fawcett 1988a: 6). The taxonomy in Figure 1 classifies the uses of ‘we’ identified in the corpus, beginning with the entry point of having selected ‘we’. Then, either inclusive or exclusive must be selected. Within the system of inclusive, one of the four choices presented must be selected, which means that the use of ‘we’ is either general, ambiguous, restrictive, or cohesive, and so on throughout the system. Within the system of exclusive, one of two choices must be made. The choices presented in the taxonomy given in Figure 1, can be explained through the following examples of each type. First within the system of inclusive-we, ‘we’ is said to be general if it could be replaced by ‘anyone’, in other words, the referent for ‘we’ is its most general case as in example (3). (3) I reckon, but without wanting to start this up all over again, I don’t think we, as mortal humans, can ever really understand the Gods or their cohorts. Frith

This example is particularly interesting since the speaker post-modified his or her own ’we’ use, thereby explicitly grouping everyone with the group of ‘mortal humans’, and the group deixis is the largest possible: Speaker + Hearer (= the entire group) + n (= all humans). There are cases where it is difficult to be certain whether or not ‘we’ is indeed general. The test I use is similar to the general type but with the added

 Lise Fontaine

condition of whether or not ‘we’ can be post-modified (nominal aposition) by ‘Asatruar’ (as in we Asatruar), if both are possible, then it is considered to be ambiguous, as in example (4). (4) Since we don’t know what really went on in “the olden days”; as there is a very reasonable argument that the often quoted texts (Tacitus et al.) are of doubtful validity, it must surely be up to every individual to find ways that work for them.

The restrictive type is used for cases of inclusive ‘we’ that only consider a restrictive section of the Addressees. This could either be to include the speaker and a subgroup within Asatru-E or the speaker and other members of the group. Examples of the subgroup restrictive type and the other (personal) restrictive type can be seen in (5) and (6) respectively. (5) however at this stage I do know we will be talking about both the Thing and next years conference. (6) if you like, we can have a beer or two in the summer, and speak of the old gods.

A use of ‘we’ is said to be (group) cohesive if it is referring to the Asatru-E community, where the speaker is showing solidarity (cohesion) with the group. This is further divided into four categories: promoting, identity, argumentative, and redirect. A cohesive use of ‘we’ is said to be promoting if the speaker is trying to promote the community. Going further, in a sense, than simply identifying with the group, the speaker in this case seeks to suggest something, looking to the future. This is the case in example (7). (7) It is because there is the one faith of Avatru [sic], but many ways; and the more we can talk about our faith, and offer our various views, the better chance we have of developing an understanding, rather than waste our time with inter group and individual strife.

A promoting type of ‘we’ use is important to the construction of interculture. In early stages, it is used as a means of establishing some kind of structure or norm. In later stages, it serves to expand and develop it. In either case, it contains a degree of modality in the sense that there is an implicit should overriding the promoting type. When no such additional effect is present, and the speaker uses ‘we’ to include him or herself with the entire Asatru-E community, then ‘we’ is labeled as an identity type, as in (8).

Where do ‘we’ fit in? 

(8) We tend to give the god in question a similar role, and similar powers but with less intensity.

The argumentative type is perhaps more complex; it is very similar to the promoting type, yet there is a strong argument being presented (sometimes it’s a dispute). As in example (9), it is used to include the speaker with the community but it is done to argue a point. (9) In fact, you presenting this as if I had actually quoted you is a misquoteisn’t it? So you are guilty of the same thing that you accuse me of! And I am reveiwing Cleasby-Vigfusson on ’Heim’ tommorrow and we shall see who is guilty of misquoting.

Finally, the last type of cohesive ‘we’ is called a redirect, as in (10). This use of ‘we’ associates the speaker with all addressees but it is used to redirect the topic of discussion. (10) I believe we may have drifted away from the original thread

The use of exclusive ‘we’ has been sub-divided into three types: grouprestriction, personal and regional. When ‘we’ is used to the exclusion of the Asatru-E group, but includes the speaker with another Asatru group, then this use is considered to be a group restriction within the exclusive system, as in (11) where the speaker is excluding fellow Asatru-E members while making reference to a related but outside Asatru group of which the speaker is also a member. (11) To fight this prejudice we have a pagan organisation called Rabenclan, it is one of there main goals to separate between Nazis and Paganism.

Often speakers make reference to personal experiences through the use of ‘we’. In these cases, the speaker is including him or herself with one or more participants of a more personal nature (friends or family for example). These references do not directly relate to the group, but as we will see, relating personal experience is an important element in group cohesion. In (12) ‘we’ is used for just this reason and leads into a request for information. (12) Heilsa its spring & we are redecorating I want to paint some runes for protection on the front door, partly to deter burglars, partly for general protection.

The last use of ‘we’, regional type, is used to refer to some regional or local community to which the speaker belongs as in example (13):

 Lise Fontaine

(13) though we have some interesting places here in germany to visit, too.

Clearly, the ‘we’ in (13) is equivalent to we Germans and the speaker is aligning him or herself locally (geographically or nationally). This use is considered to be exclusive despite the fact that there may be other Germans on the list. In order to analyze the ‘we’ types found in the data the Systemic Coder was used (O’Donnell 1995, and available online as freeware at www.wagsoft.com). The Coder allows the user to use a system network or a taxonomy to code the data. Table 3 shows the distribution of ‘we’ among the three periods of the corpus, I, II, and III. The Table indicates the number of occurrences, N, together with the local mean, which represents the likelihood of the particular choice within the system in which it is contained. Therefore, the sum of means for all features in a (sub) system is always 100%. The Coder has some basic statistical analysis built-in that allow the user to compare sets and determine whether or not differences between the sets are statistically significant. It is important to note that while we see some differences in the various uses of we, there were no significant differences in the clause structures for Table 3. Distribution of we-inclusive and we-exclusive by period we type

N

Period I Mean

N

Period II Mean

N

Period III Mean

Inclusive Exclusive

16 16

50.0% 50.0%

25 1

96.2% 3.8%

32 7

82.1% 17.9%

Inclusive type General Cohesive Restrictive Ambiguous Cohesive type Promoting Identity Argumentative Redirect

3 10 1 2

18.8% 62.5% 6.2% 12.5%

4 16 5 0

16.0% 64.0% 20.0% 0.0%

6 16 3 7

18.8% 50.0% 9.3% 21.9%

3 3 3 1

30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 10.0%

11 5 0 0

68.8% 31.2% 0% 0%

5 2 9 0

31.3% 12.5% 56.2% 0%

Restrictive type Subgroup Other (Personal)

1 0

100% 0%

5 0

100% 0%

0 3

0% 100%

Exclusive type Group-restriction Personal Regional

1 14 1

6.3% 87.4% 6.3%

0 1 0

0% 100% 0%

0 5 2

0% 71.4% 28.6%

Where do ‘we’ fit in? 

the clauses containing ‘we’. Clauses containing an instance of ‘we’ were also coded for the following features: mood (indicative or imperative and declarative or interrogative); voice (active or passive); verb process-type (relational or non-relational); polarity (positive or negative). Further distinctions (both syntactic and lexical) would need to be made in order to attempt to see if they can account for the distributions of the uses of ‘we’. For example, one question for further study is whether only a certain type of ‘we’ occurs in the position of Theme, or what role, if any, does ‘we’ play in the thematic progression of the text. If we recall that period I had the lowest frequency of ‘we’ in general, we see that in this period, inclusive ‘we’ has the same frequency as exclusive ‘we’. The distribution of inclusive ‘we’ is much lower in period I than in either of the other two periods. In fact, period I exhibits significantly lower use of the feature inclusive than in period II or III (at the 98% level, or with a 2% chance of error). The difference between period II and III in terms of the feature inclusive is significant to the 90% level. The low use of inclusive ‘we’ in the earliest stage of the group’s development is therefore significant for this community. Similarly, use of the feature exclusive is at its highest in period I, but the large majority of this use is to bring a higher than usual amount of personal experience or personal issues to the group. Exclusive ‘we’ is rarely used as a means of segregating oneself from the group through alliance with local groups. The differences between uses of ‘we’ in period I and period III are minimal. The two periods are statistically identical with the exception of the distribution of the features inclusive and exclusive. Therefore what is interesting is the change that takes place between period I and period II and the change that takes place between period II and period III. Period II exhibits features that do not appear in the other two periods. There were no cases of an ambiguous use of ‘we’ in period II. As compared to period I, this difference is significant to the 90% level (0% compared to 12.5%) and as compared to period III, the difference is significant to the 98% level (0% compared to 21.9%). The other feature that completely disappears in period II is argumentative. This difference in comparison with the other two periods is significant to the 98% level in both cases (30% in period I, 0% in period II, 56.3% in period III). Instead what we find that we don’t in the other two periods is a high rate of the feature promoting, which is significantly higher than in period I at the 90% level and significantly higher than in period III at the 95% level. In order to assess whether these results could have been influenced by idiosyncratic uses of ‘we’ types, due to the small number of participants, the ‘we’-types of the group member who sent the most messages in each period

 Lise Fontaine

was considered. In period I, instances of ‘we’ were found in 18 messages that were sent with eight different members participating. One person sent three messages and another sent four. The former exhibited eight uses of ‘we’ in total: four uses of exclusive ‘we’ (personal type), three uses of inclusive ‘we’ (cohesive type); and one use of exclusive ‘we’ (regional type). The latter used ‘we’ four times in total (once per message) distributed as follows: two cases of the cohesive type of inclusive ‘we’; one case of the restricted type of inclusive ‘we’; and one case of the ambiguous type of inclusive ‘we’. In period II, there were also eight different members participating, contributing a total of 17 messages. The member sending the most messages in this period sent five messages where we find 11 instances of ‘we’ distributed as follows: seven cases of inclusive ‘we’ (cohesive type); three cases of inclusive ‘we’ (general type) and one case of inclusive ‘we’ (restrictive type). In period III, for the 16 messages containing ‘we’ that were sent to the group in this period, nine members were participating. The most frequent poster sent a total of five messages containing a total of 15 uses of ‘we’: eight instances of the cohesive type of inclusive ‘we’; five cases of the general type of inclusive ‘we’; one case of exclusive ‘we’; and one case of the ambiguous type of inclusive ‘we’. Of the three members who contributed the most messages containing ‘we’ during the three periods, we find a majority of exclusive ‘we’ in period I and a majority of inclusive (cohesive) ‘we’ in period II and period III. This reflects the overall distribution for these periods. However, this means that in period III, for example, one person was responsible for eight instances of cohesive ‘we’ while eight different people were responsible for the remaining eight instances (total of 16 instances in period III). No single member exhibits an idiosyncratic use of a particular ‘we’ type, but clearly those members contributing the majority of messages (and the majority of instances of ‘we’) have a greater use of each type. This seems to reflect the overall nature of group participation as discussed above. These results indicate that there is something interesting going on in period II, something different from the other two periods. There seems to be a higher state of group solidarity. Here we find the greatest use of ‘we’ for identifying with the group. What happens next is also interesting. There seems to be a drop or shift in behavior. The use of inclusive or exclusive ‘we’ in the earliest stage of group construction is equally likely (for this group at least). At some point after this early period, a state of group solidarity was reached, with little ambiguity where alliance is concerned and a focus on promoting group identity. Uses of ‘we’ in this period were not for argumentative purposes. The group seems to have settled in a sense by period III, maintaining a high use of inclusive ‘we’, but

Where do ‘we’ fit in? 

having created a space where debate takes precedence over group promotion. This space may in fact reflect the attainment of a common ground, the realization of an interactively constructed (and intercultural) community. A more detailed and expanded study is needed before any conclusive statements can be made. However, this study clearly shows evidence that a more prolonged and detailed study would yield very interesting results.

Concluding remarks The construction of an intercultural community is necessarily accomplished through interaction. We have seen that intercultural discourse constructs its own culture. This discursive interculture is what has enabled this community to develop. We have also seen that the boundaries of discursive interculture are not without limits and that for this kind of virtual community, the limit was left undefined. The results of the distribution of ‘we’ types indicates that this limit was most likely reached at some point after period II but before period III. By this last block of time, the group had achieved a different space. The high use of inclusive ‘we’ suggests a coherent group that shares the same Rede, the same discourse. By this point, the group shares the same ‘we’ in the sense that a group deixis has been established. Whether or not the culture of a European Asatru has been attained is another matter. This study needs now to go further, looking at intermediary periods as well as extending the study to see whether or not the group has indeed reached a kind of stability. The main purpose of this paper was to explore of the group’s uses of ‘we’ given its complex composition. The taxonomy of ‘we’ developed here shows the range available to speakers in negotiating their own self-reference with respect to others and their community. ‘We’ is different from other pronouns in English and has special properties that allow it to work in different ways. The key to identifying the referent for group deixis, as Zifonun et al point out, is in the discourse context. It is this context that always determines who belongs in the ‘we’ referent. Gaining a better understanding of the different types of ‘we’ presented here means going deeper into the text. “There are patterns which contribute to the meaning of texts, but which are not open to direct observation. The patterns are not in the individual words, but in the grammar, and they require abstract descriptive categories to state them” (Stubbs 1996: 92). According to Jeffery (1976: 48), “meaning adheres not in the word but in the context: one distinguishes the various meanings of a polysemous word by categorizing the contexts which it is used in”. The dynamic nature of the discursive

 Lise Fontaine

interculture and the virtual community combined, as we have seen here, makes this categorization task more complex but nonetheless essential. Consequently, an exploration of the (discourse) context is a logical next step in furthering the pragmatic notions surrounding group deixis. In the Systemic Functional approach to textual analysis the text is seen as an instantiation of the language system. Instantiation, or realization, is a choice (or series of choices) made by the speaker from the systemic meaning potential available in the system. This implies that a system available to the speaker exists. However, with intercultural discourse, and specifically with lingua franca discourse, the systems involved are not necessarily shared among group members. The interactive nature of the construction of this discourse space negates the underlying presence of a system containing the meaning potential available to all speakers. In lingua franca discourse, the speaker’s system is then a complex intersystem that can only be understood in analysis by reconstruction. Clearly, even in systemic linguistics, there is no way to access the system inside a speaker’s head; a given language system is constructed recursively through the analysis of the system’s realizations. The Functional Pragmatic approach is “essentially an approach that seeks to reconstruct the activities speaker(s) and hearer(s) perform when they interact” (Koole & ten Thije 1994: 73). This approach would seem, then, a promising complement to a systemic approach in order to include the pragmatic structures and in order to be able to reconstruct the intercultural discourse structures. “The great advantage (of using data collection) is that it is real data, spontaneous and unscripted. People are being themselves, saying what they would actually say rather than what they think they would say” (Clyne 1991: 18). In this sense, analyzing virtual intercultural communities opens up a new world for collecting real data. There is a trade-off to be made of course. Studying an online community such as Astaru-E opens the window on group observation that evades the observer’s paradox and we can have access to what was really said. However, email text is not as easy to work with as one might think. The real loss (if we can consider it a loss) in moving interactive intercultural analysis into the asynchronic virtual community space is the absence of face-to-face observation. Without tracking down members who don’t participate and questioning them privately, their silence is impossible to understand. Given that a minority of members typically controls the shared space in a virtual community, the majority of members are left out of any study. However, as in the construction of any community, a minority will tend to have a greater voice than the rest of the group. With a virtual community, though, we may simply have to accept that the invisible majority remains inaccessible.

Where do ‘we’ fit in? 

As Stubbs (1996: 3) points out, “much of theoretical linguistics over the past fifty years has been based on the study of isolated sentences . . . it is important to show what can be learned by studying patterns of language across texts and corpora”. The study of intercultural discourse adds to this and enriches our understanding about language and how language works. The genesis of a discursive interculture is an especially rich and dynamic area for language study. The present paper has opened the way for new directions in linguistic analysis by combining real data across texts for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of the patterns in the construction of a virtual intercultural community.

Acknowledgements This paper is a revised version of a paper presented at GAL (Gesellschaft für Angewandte Sprachwissenschaft, Society for Applied Linguistics) Passau, Germany, September, 2001. I would like to thank Kristin Bührig and Jan ten Thije for their valuable comments. I would also like to thank Cassily Charles and Evelyn Perry for their time and insightful comments in reading this paper for me.

Notes . McIlvenny cites Bailey (1996), Nakamura (1995), Poster (1998), and Ulmer (1998) from his reference list, which I have not reproduced here. The majority of work done to date has focused on other forms of Internet-based intercultural communication (MUDs, MOOs, IRC, online classrooms, web-based meetings, etc.). . The following is a description of Asatru from the Wolfshof site in its original format in both English and German: (source: , site discontinued, see <www.eldaring.de> for more up-to-date information about Asatru): The term consists of ‘Asa’ and ‘Tru’. Asa – that’s the Æsir, one of the two sibs of Germanic deities. Tru – means (as in English) truth, being true. Asatru means: being true to the Æsir, faith in the Æsir and Vanir and it is the term for the reconstruction of the faith of the Germanic peoples. Asatru was the prechristian “pagan” religion of Central and Northern Europe. This term is a modern name for this religion. Other names or traditions are for example the Theodish belief, Odinism, Vanatru or Skertru. Siðr is the Old Norse word for this religion, it means ‘custom’. Like ‘truth’ it shows that this tradition wasn’t so much a religion

 Lise Fontaine

with fixed dogmas, prayers etc., but a ‘way of life’ or the art of correctly performed ritual sacrifices to make the gods answer with a gift in return. An original southern Germanic name for this religion has not come down to us. . Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, terms credited to Tönnies (Tönnies 1887, 1993 English edition cited here), are typically given without a translation, although when a one word correspondence is given, they are mapped onto community and society respectively: “the parenthetical English renditions of the words Gemeinschaft and Gelleschaft found in this section indicate the difficulty which would be encountered if one attempted their translation by any one pair of terms” (Loomis 1955: 37, Note 1, in Tönnies 1955). . The relationship between Halliday’s functional framework and that of Bühler’s is as follows: . . . ideational corresponds very closely to Bühler’s representational, except that I want to introduce the further distinction within it between experiential and logical, which corresponds to a fundamental distinction within language itself. My own interpersonal corresponds more or less to the sum of Bühler’s conative and expressive, because in the linguistic system these two are not distinguished. Then I need to add a third function, namely the textual function . . . the function that language has of creating text, of relating itself to the context – to the situation and the preceding text. (Halliday 1978: 48) . Original quote: “Wer außer dem Sprecher oder Hörer zur Gruppe gehört, ergibt sich jeweils aus dem Diskurszusammenhang, muß also gewußt oder erschlossen werden” (Zifonun et al. 1997: 319). . The term disengagements is taken from Knapp (2000): “Disengagements are temporary conversational “time outs” such as they occur e.g. in an office where colleagues after their morning greetings, some discussion of work-related issues or some chatting refrain from talking and concentrate on their work. While working without talk, they are clearly not concerned with mutually acknowledging their co presence; their posture and gaze, for example, will indicate that they are not oriented towards interaction” (Knapp 2000: Section 3). . In order to have a running count of group membership. I would have had to access the group web site daily to track the number of members. Still, without being the group owner, there is no way to assess who is joining or leaving the group. If the number of group members on a given day is 75, for example, 5 members could have left and 5 new members could have joined (granted this is highly unlikely in a given day). As a result, it is extremely difficult to know, for any given period, what percentage of the group is actually participating, unless the group is closed and membership is fixed.

References Botha, Willem J. (2000). “The deictic foundation of ideology. with reference to the African Renaissance.” In R. Dirven, R. Frank, & C. Ilie (Eds.), Language and Ideology: Cognitive Descriptive Approaches. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. (June 21, 2005).

Where do ‘we’ fit in? 

Chen, Guo-Ming (1998). “Intercultural communication via E-Mail debate”. The Edge: The E-Journal of Intercultural Relations, 1(4). HART-LI.COMmunictions. (June 21, 2005). Clyne, Michael (1991). Community Languages: The Australian Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cohen, A. P. (1985). The symbolic construction of community. London: Tavistock. Colomb, Greg & Simutis, Joyce (1996). “Visible conversation and academic inquiry: CMC in a culturally diverse classroom”. In S. Herring (Ed.), Computer-mediated Communication: Linguistic, Social and Cross-cultural Perspectives (pp. 203–222). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Dawson, Lorne L. (2000). “Researching religion in cyberspace: issues and strategies”. In Jeffrey K. Hadden & Douglas E. Cowan (Eds.), Religion on the Internet: Research Prospects and Promises [Religion and the Social Order 8] (pp. 25–54). New York: JAI Press. Day, Dennis “Some discursive characteristics of description in relation to cultural identity”. In Kristin Buehrig & Jan ten Thije (Eds.), Beyond Misunderstanding, the linguistic analysis of intercultural discourse. The Hague, Netherlands: John Benjamins. Fawcett, Robin (1988a). “What makes a ‘good’ system network good?”. In James D. Benson & William S. Greaves (Eds.), Systemic Functional Approaches to Discourse [Advances in Discourse Processes 26] (pp. 1–28). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Fawcett, Robin (1988b). “The English personal pronouns: An exercise in linguistic theory”. In James D. Benson & William S. Greaves (Eds.), Linguistics in a Systemic Perspective [Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 39] (pp. 185–220). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Fontaine, Lise (2004). “Textual Challenges in Recursive Texts”. In David Banks (Ed.), Text and Texture (pp. 301–328). Paris: Harmattan. Fontaine, Lise (2005). “Une analyse pragmatique des pronoms personnels: Etude d’un discours sur la propagande raciste dans une communauté virtuelle”. In David Banks (Ed), Linguistic Aspects of the Text of Propaganda (pp. 113–131). Paris: Harmattan. Halliday, Michael A. K. (1994). An introduction to Functional Grammar. London: Edward Arnold. Halliday, Michael A. K. (1978). Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning. London: Edward Arnold. Halliday, Michael A. K. & Hasan, Ruqaiya (1976). Cohesion in English. London: Longman. Herring, Susan (1993). “Gender and democracy in computer-mediated communication”. In Tom Benson (Ed.), Computer-Mediated Communication Electronic Journal of Communication, 3(2), special issue. Reprinted (1996) in R. Kling (Ed.), Computerization and Controversy: Value Conflicts and Social Choices (2nd edition, pp. 476–489). New York: Academic Press. Herring, Susan (Ed.). (1996). Computer-Mediated Communication: Linguistic. Social and Cross-cultural Perspectives. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Jeffrey, C. D. (1988). “How to Analyze Polysemous Words Using Firthian Principles”. In James D. Benson & William S. Greaves (Eds.), Systemic Functional Approaches to Discourse [Advances in Discourse Processes 26] (pp. 343–354). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

 Lise Fontaine

Knapp, Karlfried (2000). “Metaphorical and interactional uses of silence”. Erfurt Electronic Studies in English 7/2000. (December 17. 2001). Knapp, Karlfried (1998). “EESE Strategy Paper, No. 4: Intercultural Communication in EESE”. Erfurt Electronic Studies in English. (December 17. 2001) Koole, Tom & Thije, Jan D. ten (1994). The Construction of Intercultural Discourse: Team Discussions of Educational Advisers. Amsterdam and Atlanta: RODOPI. Korenman, Joan & Wyatt, Nancy (1996). “Group dynamics in an e-mail forum”. In S. Herring (Ed.), Computer-mediated communication: Linguistic, S social and CrossCultural Perspectives (pp. 225–242). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Levinson, Stephen (2000). Pragmatics. Cambridge: University Press. Ma, Ringo (1996. “Computer-mediated conversations as a new dimension of intercultural communication between East Asian and North American college students”. In S. Herring (Ed.), Computer-Mediated Communication: Linguistic, Social and CrossCultural Perspectives (pp. 173–185). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Martin, James R. (1992). English Text: System and Structure. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Martin, James R. & Plum, Guenter (1996). “A systemic functional perspective on genre: Modelling genre”. From The Texlinguistic Approach to Genre Colloquium – AAAL 1996 (pp. 1–18). McIlvenny, Paul (1999). “Avatars R Us? Discourses of Community and Embodiment in Intercultural Cyberspace”. Intercultural Communication, 1. (June 21, 2005) Meierkord, Christiane (2000). “Interpreting successful lingua franca interaction. An analysis of non-native-/non-native small talk conversations in English”. Linguistik online 5, 1/00 (June 21, 2005). O’Donnell, Michael (1995). “From Corpus to Codings: Semi-Automating the Acquisition of Linguistic Features”. In Proceedings of the AAAI Spring Symposium on Empirical Methods in Discourse Interpretation and Generation. Stanford University, California, March 27– 29. Rheingold, Howard (1993). The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Sabean, David (1984). Power in the Blood: Popular culture and village discourse in early modern Germany. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Slevin, James (2000). The Internet and Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Stubbs, M. (1996). Text and Corpus Analysis: Computer Assisted Studies of Language and Institutions. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Thije, Jan D. ten (2001). “Intercultural understanding by non-professional interpreters: An analysis of mediating teasing and toasting in an intercultural situation”. Presented at GAL (Gesellschaft für Angewandte Sprachwissenschaft, Society for Applied Linguistics) Passau, Germany, September, 2001. Tönnies, Ferdinand (1955 [1887]). Community and Association. Translated and edited by Charles P. Loomis. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Where do ‘we’ fit in? 

Yates, Simeon (1996). “Oral and Written Aspects of Computer Conferencing”. In S. Herring (Ed.), Computer-Mediated Communication: Linguistic, Ssocial and CrossCultural Perspectives (pp. 29–46). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Wales, Katie (1996). Personal Pronouns in Present-day English. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wolfshof Asatru Web site (March 26, 2001) Zifonun, Gisela, Hoffmann, Ludger, & Strecker, Bruno (1997). Grammatik der Deutschen Sprache. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Appendix Example of referential reported text: (1) wie gehts mein frund? bitte, mein deutsch ist sehr schlekt! (as is my spelling) my name is XXX, and i would be happy to get to know you! if you like, we can have a beer or two in the summer, and speak of the old gods. take care XXX >Hello everyone. I’m a lonely pagan in Munich who would like to get in >touch with others who have accepted the Norse pantheon. Everyone is >invited to reply! > >And great founder of this e-group: You said you are from the >Frankfurt area? Where exactly? I used to live in Aschaffenburg. Example of functional reported text: (2) heilsa all, XXX wrote (a lot of very knowledgable stuff) including, >There is, then, an assumption here which still isn’t clear to me: >1) What leads you to the conclusion that a sei man would >necessarily be >overly concerned about the spiritual, emotional, and physical >impacts involved in killing? I was only suggesting that perhaps in order to do seidh, one might need to learn how to think like a woman. However, if you recall, I ended with, “what do you think?” and you have very eloquently pointed out why you think its an invalid argument, and that’s fair enough. It is clear that you are very well read in this area, is it a pet subject of yours, or are you equally knowledgable in other areas of the northern trad? If you are, you must be an interesting conversationalist, and its a shame you are in new mexico! >>I believe it a grave error to equate the word man with warrior, >>a warrior is a distinct category within the male species, by no >>means are all men warriors or even warrior material. >I didn’t make that distinction.

 Lise Fontaine

no,but I did. . . . [cut for space] Example (2) becomes (2’) with the reported text removed: (2’) heilsa all, I was only suggesting that perhaps in order to do seidh, one might need to learn how to think like a woman. However, if you recall, I ended with, ”what do you think?” and you have very eloquently pointed out why you think its an invalid argument, and that’s fair enough. It is clear that you are very well read in this area, is it a pet subject of yours, or are you equally knowledgable in other areas of the northern trad? If you are, you must be an interesting conversationalist, and its a shame you are in new mexico! no, but I did. . . . [cut for space] Example of a simple narrative text: (3) I can only answer this question from a student’s point of view. This may a bit different from the situation at work, because you are probably not as dependent on your fellow students’ opinions about you. Still, the question does arise whether to be open about your religion or not. I try to be open, but not to the point of going on other peoples nerves. I wear my hammer on the outside of my shirt, as long as it isn’t uncomfortable, and if anyone asks me about it, he gets a short answer. If they seem interested they’ll get a more thorough answer. If anybody has a problem with my religion, it’s theirs. If they want to discuss it, I’m always willing to, as long as it stays a rational discussion. So far, this has worked quite well. Of course it depends on how open minded the people around you are. In the area where I live, there aren’t many radical Christians and no one really takes them seriously. Being a pagan is mostly considered strange or funny, but normally you’re left alone and that’s that. It is obvious that this message is a response to a question but the speaker did not use it to construct his or her text. This type of text was included in the cleaned corpus with no changes.

Communicating affect in intercultural lamentations in Caucasian Georgia Helga Kotthoff

Introduction Oral lamentation rituals have been frequently studied by anthropologists, ethnolinguists and cultural sociologists, and they play important roles in many cultures (Tiwary 1975; Burke 1979; Chaves 1980; Caraveli 1986; Metcalf & Huntington 1991; Seremetakis 1991). In Georgia, these mourning ceremonies are called xmit nat.irlebi (literally “crying with the voice”); the one who ritually cries is the mot.irali. The women of the family and neighbourhood of the deceased gather around the coffin and in lamenting they repeatedly appeal to the dead person, address him/her or one another using special exclamation formats, eulogise the deceased, those present and those who have died long before. Neighbours, colleagues and distant relatives at some point join in the ceremony and take turns in performing mourning improvisations. In Caucasian Georgia, mourning the death of close persons is a time consuming and expressive communal activity even today. In most regions, lamentations are performed for five consecutive days during the daylight hours. Nearly all the activities occurring in connection with leave-taking and burial are ritualised: ritual ablutions must be performed in a certain way; the deceased must be prepared for visitation, the room must be decorated, meals provided, and family members must dress in a certain way. In addition, there are restrictive rules for personal hygiene, and social interaction with both the dead and the living must be performed in a particular way. At night, men meet for ritual vigils, which involve the frequent drinking of toasts to both the dead and the living. Throughout Georgia, not only wailings, but also sumptuous mourning meals and nightly vigils are the important components of the mourning ritual.

 Helga Kotthoff

Only the residents of the capital city of Tbilisi no longer perform the genre of lamentation, although many migrants to the city continue the practice. Rituals are routinised, value-laden, sensitive to forms, and in their specific enactment emotionally (to a lesser or greater extent) significant for the participants. Rituals have a rich indexicality because they activate additional symbolic layers, and the instrumental-denotative level is of little or no significance (Leach 1968, 1976). The ritual layer we will pay special attention to in this article indexes a regional identity. The manner in which lamentations are performed provides clues for understanding the social relationships between the living and those between the living and the dead, structured in the transition complex. The state of grieving is in Georgia indicated on many symbolic levels; among these are: black clothing, a stooped, dejected body posture, meals without sweets or meat, personal encounters without greeting, utterance of specific formulae with a falling intonation, and frequent crying sounds. The particular social status of the deceased and the mourning family, as well as the particular quality of the relationships are always expressed in the symbolic process, e.g., in the length and intensity of the wailings, in the investment in the mourning meal, the number of guests, the length of time in which black clothing is worn, etc. When somebody dies in a family we find simultaneous ritualisations in various codes of behaviour and on different levels, and these vary over time. Georgian mourning rituals are always hyper-rituals (in the sense of Goffman 1967, 1981), to which new dimensions of meaning can be ascribed. In agreement with Geertz (1973), I view ritual performances as “meta-social commentaries” which can be interpreted by producers and recipients in all their shades of meaning. The variety of types and styles of dialogic wailings, meals, and nightly vigils is also used to communicate regional distinction. Regional identity is put on stage in many modalities of grieving, marking especially the distinction between West and East Georgian regions as well as to various mountain areas. Georgia is in fact a multi-cultural society whose population includes three million East and West Georgians and two million Armenians, Russians, Azerbaijanis, Ossetians, Greeks, Abkhasians, etc. In this Caucasian land there are also many regional groups (Pshavs, Gurians, Megrelians, Svans, Khevsurs, Tushs, Kakhetians, Kartlians, etc.) who have their own distinct cultural traditions and affirm their regional cultural identities by practising these traditions. Svan and Megrelian are distinct languages, which are not understood by people from other regions, although, like Georgian, they belong to the Ibero-Caucasian language group.

Lamentations in Caucasian Georgia 

Although there are striking similarities across cultures in the genre of lamentation – from Africa (Finnegan 1970) to Brazil (Stubbe 1985; Urban 1988) to the Caucasus (CocaniŠe 1990; NakašiŠe 1993; Kotthoff 2002) –, regionally specific, minimal differences in performance can be decisive for successful participation. Those who mourn “incorrectly” can be seen by others as not having “true” feelings. At the same time, expression of grief is strongly influenced by an ideology of the natural.1 On the one hand, there are cultureoverarching icons and indices, e.g., crying, sobbing and prostrating oneself which are cross-culturally identified with grief (Feld 1982). On the other hand, many semiotic forms of grief are culturally quite diverse. The variety is already evident in the simple existence of specific genres (lamentations, night vigils, obituaries, mourning dances, head huntings, etc.), in the ways of expressing affect (e.g., singing, praying, speaking, keeping silent), in the temporal and spatial location of the emotional activities, in their performance and social norms (who must/may participate, to what degree, and what does it mean). Local culture shapes, i.e., changes, intensifies, suppresses and stylises elementary expressive abilities and also invents codes independent of the body. In the domain of expression and interpretation of feelings there are significant intercultural potentials for conflict, which arise from different conventionalisations. Because the direct physical expression of grief is always shaped by cultural standards, the interpretation of feeling is an interesting field for studies of intercultural communication. Cultural differences in affect expression are sensitive matters, for one thing, because they are often interpreted in the frame of one’s own behavioural system. In addition, misunderstandings in this domain are seldom clarified. If, for example, a mourning appears to an observer from a different region too ostentatious, and in the observer’s behavioural system this would suggest hysteria, she will not ask whether these forms are conventional in the mourner’s region. This would all too clearly communicate doubt about the “authenticity” or “sincerity” of others’ feelings, a doubt that could seem disrespectful. It is therefore especially instructive for a theory of communicative misunderstandings to see what consequences follow from the fact that in Georgia mourning must often be shared with others whose lamentation styles and other mourning practices differ according to region. And in fact, people from culturally different parts of Georgia do often come together for common mourning. It is regarded as normal, for example, to undertake a difficult journey in order to participate in the funeral of a distant cousin. It is seldom the case, however, that the different mourning styles of those present are jointly performed. One such rare case will be discussed below, in which different mourning styles are

 Helga Kotthoff

interactively employed. Usually, however, mourners who belong to a cultural minority at a funeral remain silent. If potential mourners have the impression that their style is inappropriate in a particular village, they may choose not to perform dirges there and remain silent. Their silence is a significant silence then and can only be grasped by an ethnography which not only observes the ritual process, but also the ways in which participants talk about it later, evaluate the performances, and pass on the entire event. Rituals are seldom explicitly evaluated during their performance, and when this does occur, only positive evaluations are made. Active wailing is normally appreciated as a form of social involvement. But there are lamentation features, which are positively interpreted as expressing high involvement in one region, and as exaggerated and unpleasant in another. For example, wailers in Western Georgia often faint. Fainting is seen as being beside oneself with grief. In Eastern Georgia, however, it is interpreted as hysterical. East Georgians do not accept fainting as a natural expression of grief. At East Georgian wailings they urgently request their West Georgian relatives not to faint while lamenting. The concept of culture favoured in this study is based not on nationality, but rather on community of practice and on member-specific practices of inclusion and exclusion (in an ethno-methodological sense). Culture is thus placed in a continuum with other constructs such as “nation” or “ethnic group,” “region,” “sex” or “age.” With the aid of these concepts people can manage “we-group construction,” an “extremely variable procedure not needing necessary and ideal dimensions of territory or quantity”; they can be maintained and, from case to case, be devalued (Leggewie 1994).

On the communication of grief Grief is a human affect found in all cultures, which is not to say that only human beings are capable of experiencing this emotion.2 While some ethnologists and psychologists have identified universals in the area of feelings, others are more interested in cultural differences in their expression. For the conditio humana, there is no choice between the natural and the cultural. In social interaction, feelings are not only experienced, but also communicated, i.e., transmitted in a form understandable to other persons. The acquisition of culture begins at the moment a child is born. Whatever a child does is interpreted by adults and assigned a meaning which at least codetermines the child’s own understanding of her affects. Thus body and culture are bound together

Lamentations in Caucasian Georgia 

through communication in a manner, which makes it meaningless to ask which came first: the chicken or the egg.

A social constructionist perspective In this article, I take a social constructionist perspective, which attempts to understand social life as a steady stream of interactive performances and dramaturgical accomplishments (Hitzler 1998). In the sociology of emotions, it has been assumed since Durkheim that an emotion, e.g., grief, can become a meta-affect for others, or can be amalgamated with other emotions and evaluations (Kotthoff 1998b). Grief can, for example, be associated with aggression (cf. in particular Rosaldo 1984/1985), with religious concepts of transcendence, with anxieties of different sorts, with the need to join a community, etc. A comparison of contexts and cultures shows that combinations of affects differ. Thus mourning itself becomes “correct mourning” – with standards of appropriateness for the expressive repertoire. All feelings, even if their mere existence is anthropologically constant (and this constancy in the occurrence of grief when close persons are lost has been proved by ethology and ethnology), must be communicated – and the form of communication varies from culture to culture. For some people, black is the colour of grieving (Western cultural areas), for others white (in parts of Africa and Russia), or red (in some Mediterranean areas) or blue (North Frisian islands). Every colour symbolism has its respective history. Some mourners let their hair grow while grieving (a form of letting oneself go), others shave their heads (a rudimentary form of self-sacrifice). The symbolism is often close to the natural expressive repertoire of grieving, which according to psychologists includes both letting oneself go and self-flagellation; it is usually adapted and integrated into the ritual process. The common feature found across cultures is that the mourner loses vitality. The icons and indices of grieving are connected with this loss of vitality, with despondency which can be expressed directly through mime and pantomime. Crying and lowering one’s head in combination are everywhere seen as an expression of sadness. Plessner (1941/1961) has pointed out that natural, organic givens are taken as the material of mankind’s habitualised or intentional language of gestures. Thus, in particular with laughter and crying, we can usually only decide whether these are intentional or unintentional on the basis of additional information. To interpret feelings people look out for the co- and context of their expressions.

 Helga Kotthoff

Approaches to the analysis of emotive communication The conventionalisation of emotions, which often has a thoroughly situationbound, obligatory character, has nothing to do with doubt about the authenticity of feelings. We manipulate our feelings in accordance with cultural expectations – but we do actually have them, as Hochschild (1983) has pointed out. In every culture, degrees of intensity and also, to a limited extent, degrees of authenticity of feeling can be distinguished. The mediate, and, within the culture, understandable authenticity of a feeling depends on the congruence of multi-modal behaviour. Timing also plays a role. If someone grieves (cries, looks depressed, wears a serious expression, has stooped shoulders, or slow, brooding motions, etc.) only on the first day after the death of a sister, those around her will regard her grief as less profound than if this expressive complex continues for a longer period of time. If others are to be convinced of the sincerity of expressed emotions, the verbal level must correspond to the paraand nonverbal levels. Analysing the communication of affect is thus difficult. Feelings can be named (“I am angry,” “I am mad” . . . as examples of annoyance or other aggressive affects) or can be shown in a conventionalised way. Terms of abuse, specific exclamations and interjections, stylistic variants (“Get lost” or “Beat it” instead of “Go away”) express definite feelings of annoyance and anger (for example). Prosodic patterns also communicate affect but make it more difficult to be certain about the affective message. Depending on the degree of overlap of different expressive modalities, the emotive message can, however, be rather clearly recognisable: if a wrathful facial expression, a louder voice, exclamatory intonation and physical turning away occur jointly, a lexically unmarked “Let’s go” can sound quite angry. Since the communication of emotions often leaves the domain of denotation and is meta-communicatively contextualised, even ethno-theories do not necessarily assume intentionality. It is precisely “negative” affects like aggression and grief that can unintentionally slip into a speaker’s expression. In most societies the expression of both emotions is contextually limited. We follow Plessner (1941/1961) in assuming the “eccentricity of the body”; not only do we possess it, it also possesses us. Since emotions always have a body-based dimension, they are not completely controllable. We try to read from general body posture whether people feel inhibited, free or self-assured, e.g., expressions which are normally not in the centre of intentional communication. Thus, the presentation of affects should not be studied by asking people what they feel, but rather by recording them in situ in order to

Lamentations in Caucasian Georgia 

subsequently reconstruct their affective messages with the help of ethnographic information found in the original context. The unintentional appearance of affect is much more difficult to analyse than terms for affects. Thus it is not surprising that many linguists are above all interested in naming affects. For example, Wierzbicka (1992, 1995) studies “human emotions (or any other conceptual domain) from a universal, language-independent perspective” (Wierzbicka 1995: 236). However, the topics of her studies are actually not independent of language: She regards emotions as a domain of semantics which can be described in terms of universal “semantic primitives”: feel, want, say, think, know, good, bad, etc. (Wierzbicka 1992). Furthermore, in her view, all languages impose their own classificatory system on emotions, so that concepts such as “anger” or “sadness” become cultural artefacts of the English language and not culturally independent tools (Wierzbicka 1992: 456). She directs her critique at the psychological tradition of James Langer, who assumes that emotions are bodily states, each categorically distinct from the others. Wierzbicka criticises what she views as the ethnocentric universalism of this traditional theory of emotion. With Bamberg, (1996: 211), we ask whether the search for semantic universals underlying cultural concepts can help us to better understand what emotions mean for people from different cultures and how they are displayed. Bamberg finds Wierzbicka unclear about how language imposes its classificatory system on human experiences of emotions, “i.e. how the experiencer in actual settings transforms ‘the culture-independent psychology of human cognition and emotion’ (Wierzbicka 1995: 236) into language – and culture-specific concepts of ‘how-to-think’ and ‘how-to-feel’, and how these more specific concepts turn themselves into situated emotion talk in which participants are held accountable, and where blame is attributed” (Bamberg 1996: 211). Wierzbicka imagines the expression of emotion in a simplifying manner, so that feelings are simply said. Other communicative procedures are not considered.3 In the analysis of affect communication, the relationship among verbal, para- and non-verbal aspects must be of central concern. Roman Jakobson located the emotive and phatic functions on different levels of speech (Sebeok 1978; Bally 1970):4 the phonetic, grammatical and lexical. Péter (1984) and Besnier (1990) also find different loci of affective meaning at different levels of communication. In the last few years increasing numbers of studies in anthropological linguistics and sociology of communication have dealt with various levels of affective interaction (Ochs & Schieffelin 1989; Fiehler 1990; Christmann 1993; Günthner 1997; Irvine 1990).

 Helga Kotthoff

It is thus safe to say that the expression of grief is not limited to the verbal domain. From the presentation of the body, of space, the face, activities, on up to the verbal utterance, everything is included in the performance of grief. The dramatological perspective, to which I referred above, does not view people as actors dissimulating feelings they do not have. It simply assumes that human actions are interpreted and are not determined by instincts. People have developed symbolic repertoires of expression, which also provide information about their inner states.

Elements of Georgian grief semiotics In the domain of mourning, dejectedness is indexed simultaneously on several levels (bodily and facial expression, verbal, prosody, dress and other social signs). The house in which a death has occurred is immediately designated as special by the placement of a photograph of the deceased above the door. Everyone can immediately see what emotional state awaits them in the house. All festivities come to a standstill in the neighbourhood. Black clothing throughout Georgia symbolises that a close person has died. Laughter and smiling are avoided. The women who arrive to lament do not greet others. Forms used for expressing joy are regarded as incompatible with mourning. The mourners lament even while descending from the bus, acknowledging no one, and approach the coffin with lamenting exclamations (e.g., “Marina, Marina, you have left your beautiful children behind. Your pain on me. Marina, are you not happy with us anymore? What have we done to you? Your pain on me. Marina, now you are together with your aged parents again. Vaimeh, vaimeh, your pain on me.”). Men and non-lamenting women greet each other only with few words. People speak softly. Specific formulae and interjections expressive of pain are frequently uttered. The interjection “vaimeh” can be translated as “woe me” because of the similarity in sound and function. Also omnipresent is “deda” (mother), used as an interjection,5 often in combination with “vaimeh.” The formulae “genacvale” (approximately: I take your place) and “šeni cˇ. iri me” (your pain on me) are also quite common and semantically express the wish to assume the pain of another. All these formulae are often spoken with a sigh and a falling intonation contour, sometimes interspersed with sobs. People sit quietly on benches and chairs, converse in soft voices, some hold their heads in their hands. The chief room for mourning is dimly illuminated. Only women are seated there.6 They lament, cry, sob or keep silent. Often someone stands up, goes

Lamentations in Caucasian Georgia 

to the coffin, strokes the deceased and addresses her lament to him or her. The wailers sigh, make exclamations, lean against the coffin, practically throw themselves on it, etc., employ dejected bodily positions.

West and East Georgian differences in the communication of grief Differentiation of styles Although mourning is carried out in rather similar ways throughout Georgia, there are considerable regional differences. The differences between the East and the West of Georgia penetrate nearly all levels of action in everyday life, and they have various historical origins. From the sixth century BC until the eleventh century AD there were two empires in the West and the East, Kolkhis (later Lazika) and Iberia (later Kartli). The West was more strongly influenced by Greece, the East by Persia. Historical differences are, however, only relevant for the life world so long as they are still performed. To the extent that the historical relations survive in the ritual mourning complexes, the forms of mourning index regional identities. In the West and the East, there are also more subtle intra-regional differences. Bolle-Zempe (1997), for example, describes the dirges of Svanetia, a region situated at a high altitude in the Caucasian mountains. Participant observation of mourning rituals in West and East Georgian regions, tape recordings and above all conversations with participants have clarified how it is that in grieving relevance is ascribed to regional differences. In general, we often encountered the following stereotyping: From the East Georgian perspective (above all in Kartli and Kakhetia), the West Georgians (especially from Guria and Megrelia) are often said to be ostentatious, artificial, dishonest and snobbish. From the West Georgian perspective, the East Georgians (above all the Kartlians and Kakhetians) are seen as arrogant, cold and egoistic. The stereotypes carry over to the perception of the other region’s expression of grief. Thus, in lamentation, women from Megrelia and Guria scratch their faces (this gesture is found in many cultures); in East Georgia these forms are regarded as exaggerated (gadaˇc.arbebuli) and artificial (ar namdvili). In West Georgia, fainting is an expression of a woman’s extreme grief. In East Georgia it is strongly rejected, as was already pointed out above. Fainting is a physical practice in which one is “outside oneself,” and not everyone can achieve this state voluntarily. In East Georgia, West Georgian relatives who participate in mourning are asked not to faint. The West Georgians experience the request to refrain from this body practice as a demand for particular

 Helga Kotthoff

self-control requiring great effort. Thus, it is no surprise that they regard East Georgian mourning on the whole as highly disciplined. They say it demands more effort not to faint than to faint. In East Georgia, only women close to the deceased lament, in Megrelia and Guria lamentation can also be delegated to very competent outsiders to whom the grieving family will afterward feel obligated. In West Georgia, lamenters let their hair down and tear at it constantly; they scratch their faces and cry loudly. This is regarded in this region as a strong expression of pain – in East Georgia it is also regarded as completely inappropriate exaggeration. In East Georgia, the background crying of the others present must be soft, in West Georgia loud. In East Georgia the wife of a deceased man is free to choose not to lament; there is tolerance for the idea that people can be made speechless by pain – in West Georgia there is little or no tolerance for this. Not only background music, but also lament melodies, are regionally different. The Gurian or Megrelian lament melody does not fall at the end, but is rather maintained on a middle tone level. In the middle of a line, the melody either remains steady or there are tone leaps, which are lacking in East Georgian laments. Voice modulations also play a different role. We have recordings from Guria and Megrelia (West) in which mourners cry with a trembling voice for long periods; that is not done in the Eastern parts. During their lamentation, other mourners frequently utter interjections, e.g., the exclamations “deda” (mother) and “švilo” (child). Such interspersed exclamations are less common in East Georgian laments. In addition, Gurians slur their sounds; they probably achieve this effect by singing with an open lip position and maintaining the position of their lips. Words often sound as though the lamenters suffer from toothache.

Evaluation of lamentation styles in an ethnography of communication In every lamentation there are participants and non-participants. If a potential but silent lamenter is present for several hours each day at a lamentation, the reasons for her non-participation are difficult to determine. One important reason for non-participation is that participants may feel that their style of mourning is situationally inappropriate. I obtained insight into such a decision to refrain from wailing by accompanying an East Georgian lamenter to a wailing in West Georgia. In 1996, an East Georgian in Guria invited me to attend the mourning for her nephew Beso TevsaŠe. Although it is almost obligatory for an aunt to lament, she remained silent. Later she explained to me that she found the West Georgian

Lamentations in Caucasian Georgia 

style of mourning terrible and felt that her own Eastern style was out of place. Furthermore, the West Georgian “t.irili” (crying) did not make her sad. Thus I discovered that lamenters mutually reinforce each other’s grief. Each woman encourages and frees the grief of others. However, this stimulation is successful only when a woman listens to a dirge style to which she is accustomed and practices herself. How a style affects a person depends on her/his own acquired style. Another wailer’s style needs to infect oneself to be reinforcing. This episode and others like it convinced me that for the study of cultural communication we need an ethnographical procedure, which is open in principle to accepting non-standardised data collection. Only in natural conversation with lamenters could I get access to the unperformed performances, i.e., to the lamenters’ reasons for participating or not. In addition, the research process, which entailed listening to the tapes, transcribing, and interpreting, in which, among others the East-Georgians Elza Gabedava and Manana Matcharadze and I worked together, gave me important further clues, which must rightly be considered part of the ethnographic results. While listening to the tape recordings from Guria (West), my East Georgian co-workers made critical comments,7 which I mention here because I see them as examples of how unaccustomed lamentation styles are typically evaluated. Becoming very irritated, they criticised that the grandmother continually cried “švilo, deda, švilo” (child, mother, child) – they commented that if she was obviously exhausted she should then keep silent. She would be producing empty phrases. They objected that apparently mourners must have constantly been saying something in West Georgia. To my East Georgian co-workers the lament was therefore exaggerated. Since we had just listened to parts of a lamentation which consisted of repetitive interjections, I concluded from these comments that too many repetitions of vocatives and interjections are not perceived as natural and authentic in the East. They suggest disproportionate effort, an effort, namely, to continue lamenting contrary to one’s own affective need. My colleagues said that people should only lament when they have something beyond formulae to say. Only such lamentations would be authentic. Concerning the daughter, who lamented with a high, vibrating voice and slurring sounds, they criticised: “She is an adult, married woman and yet she laments like a child. She makes her voice tremble and probably believes that she is giving the impression of being helpless and tortured by grief. It is not appropriate for an adult woman to sound like a child.” My East Georgian colleagues gave the daughter’s lament no credit for naturalness. They attributed deliberateness to her expression of grief, which is rated lower than feelings, which

 Helga Kotthoff

appear to be expressed spontaneously. The attribution of authenticity plays an important ideological role. Gurian mourning music is also too cheerful for East Georgian tastes. To underline the strong differences separating East and West Georgia that will be summarised at the end of this article, I again cite a comment by an East Georgian co-worker: “In recent times the Westerners [from Georgia] have sometimes added odd ideas to the mourning ritual. They play cheerful music during funerals. Under West Georgian influence this is even happening in Tbilisi. Do not ask me where this unnatural tradition comes from, and thank God there are still people who resist it.” West Georgians also express reserve in regard to East Georgian wailing styles. In questioning West Georgians in the East Georgian village of Muxrani, we were told that they find the lamentation there quite moderate and too controlled. They themselves would prefer to scream in pain and faint. Again we were told that Westerners were explicitly forbidden to faint at the funeral. If West Georgians do choose to lament in East Georgia, they usually do so in groups; thereby taking charge of the overall dialogue and choosing their own style for this short period. The spectators’ evaluation of the expression of feelings is not disclosed in the ritual situation, but rather is expressed in other situations in which people speak about the lamentations. Mourning is always made the topic of conversation on a later occasion. For example, people offer their evaluation of whose lament was the best. The contents of laments are also discussed, and people often learn new things about the deceased. In lamentation, the cultural memory is organised, insofar as specific characteristics of the deceased or experiences with her/him are presented in the lamentation. An important criterion for the evaluation of the lament is the extent to which the spectators are moved to tears. “Incorrect” voice technique, body technique, and volume, “incorrect” melodies and interjections discourage crying. Procedures which are viewed as exaggerated (volume shifts, voice manipulation, scratching the face, fainting, loud interjections) are suspected of being artificial. Outside the ritual situation not only the style of lamentation is evaluated, the overall performance is also judged: What can one conclude from the quantity of flowers? How many people attended the funeral and what does this imply? How good was the food, service, etc.? The participants seem to attribute the differences in style, on the one hand, to an ethno-theory of feelings. But on the other hand, they also assume that culture-bound feeling work takes place. The attribution of spontaneity and sin-

Lamentations in Caucasian Georgia 

cerity also often follows the model of one’s own accustomed practice. And in fact people are sometimes well aware of the cultural relativity of practice. Differences in affect performance can always be used to construct a “we” and a “you,” thereby creating cultural distinction (Hahn 1994).8 Mourners can, however, likewise perform a joint lamentation, ignoring linguistic and stylistic differences, and thus stage cultural togetherness. Both practices can be observed in Georgia. We will discuss the latter case now.

Combination of styles: Code switching and style switching The following section analyses an intercultural lamentation, which was held in 1997 in Tbilisi. The two chief mourners, the mother and the aunt of the deceased, adapted their performance to the Kartlian main culture, where the lament took place (Tbilisi belongs to it). The deceased Ak.ak.i Danelia took his own life at the age of thirty-two. The Danelia family is Megrelian (from Samegrelo/Megrelia in West Georgia) and lived in Abkhasia, before all the Georgians were driven out in a military conflict. They now live as refugees in Tbilisi. The family’s first language is Megrelian. All Megrelians speak Georgian at a first language level, but Georgians from other regions usually do not understand Megrelian. In the lament there is a continual code switching between Megrelian and Georgian, and beyond this there is also style switching between the Megrelian and the East Georgian lamentation styles. Ak.ak.i’s mother was the chief mourner for longer periods of time. She laments in the Georgian language, which is a gesture of consideration for the guests from the capital city. Stylistically she often laments with the typical West Georgian high, hoarse voice, which is hard for East Georgians to bear. The aunt, to the contrary, speaks chiefly Megrelian, but refrains from using a high voice register and does not scream. Those present understood this as a sort of division of labour, with the style adjusted to the recipients. The explanation we were given for this interesting mixture was that the mourners were showing consideration for the mixed Megrelian-East Georgian public. The mother lamented with a voice, which differed, from her normal voice. In the extended vowels (indicated with a colon in the transcription lines) at the ends of the lines, we hear a sort of rising and falling whining tone, which is not integrated into the transcription conventions. In the transcript we mainly see the shifts in language rather than the shifts in style, since this is chiefly indicated using the voice.9 Therefore I already pointed it out. The Georgian lines are transcribed in Georgian charac-

 Helga Kotthoff

ters, the Megrelian in Latin characters because Megrelian has no writing system of its own.

Mourning for Akaki Danelia, Tbilisi 1997 M (mother), ? (unidentified person), A (aunt), W (wife Tamuna), F (father), s (several persons).10 The mother, the aunt and the deceased’s wife Tamuna sit directly at the head of the coffin. Tamuna continually strokes Ak.ak.i’s hand, the mother his head. The aunt is not in the picture of the video.11 1

2 3

4 5 6 7

8 9

M: [ Svilo Svilo švilo švilo:::::::::::: child child ?: [(? M: [ dedis imedo dedis imedo::::::::::::::::::: mother’s hope ?: [ (? ?: [ o::::::::::: o:::::::::: A: skani guluapiro, nana::::::: I should assume your suffering, mother M: dedis nugeSo dedis nugešo:::::::::::::::: mother’s consolation A: [mu moxvaru, skua, nana (? ?) what is my help, child, mother M: [%%%%%%%%%%

The passage reproduced here contains numerous formulae.12 The mother expresses appeals typical of laments. Above all the appeal “dedis imedo/mother’s hope,” which is continually cried, is completely in contrast to the real situation in which there is no hope – and thereby underlines that. She and the aunt cooperate closely in the exchange of fixed phrases and to this degree share a style level. Both employ appeal contours, but the mother, as already mentioned, uses a drawn out tremolo in the extended vowels at the ends of the lines and an essentially higher voice register. The use of line structures and the recurrence of the formulation poeticise the text of both. The deceased, Ak.ak.i, is the addressee of their appeals. In line 6 the aunt speaks in Megrelian, using a formula of assumed suffering which is very common in lamentations and also exists in

Lamentations in Caucasian Georgia 

Georgian. The mother responds in Georgian, the aunt in line 8 again in Megrelian. The coherence of this discourse is far removed from everyday discourse and is similar to a group prayer, in which the various participants take turns in appealing to God. The lines 6 and 8 contain examples of address inversion. In address inversion, one can speak to addressees in one’s own role or using one’s own name. This is also regarded as a very strong expression of feeling in Georgia (Boeder 1988). The aunt cries the interjection or inverted address “mother” in Megrelian (nana) and in lines 13 and 15 also Georgian (deda); occasionally she integrates Georgian words into her basically Megrelian dirge. Since address inversion is so common in West Georgia, we cannot determine the meaning of “deda” and “nana” because both words are also used as interjections in the sense of the Italian interjection “mama mia.” Both mourners in this transcription are mothers; therefore it makes sense to address the deceased as mother in order to indicate greater involvement. ?: 10 A: 11 M:

12 A: 13 14 ?: 15 A: 16 ?:

[ˇckim coda, deda13 :::::: mu vkimina my sins, mother, what should I do [vo skan didas, deda,14 Merabi woe to your mother, mother, Merabi15 [ dedis imedo $ dedis imedo::::::::::::::::::::%%%::::::$ mother’s hope vai skan mamidas, Ak.ak.i, skua, nana woe to your aunt, Ak.ak.i, child, mother mu mo¦Šcˇ. ir skua, deda16 what has happened to me, child, mother a::::::::, a:::::::::: [mu mo¦Šcˇ. ir skua, deda, Ak.ak.i, deda:::: what has happened to me, child, mother, Ak.ak.i, mother [a:::::[::::::::::::::::::

The aunt addresses line 10 to her deceased son Merabi. In the lament it is always possible to address another deceased person, whereby a community of the deceased, and of the living with the deceased, is symbolically created. Line 12 is nearly identical to line 10; only the addressee is different and, correspondingly, the self-reference of the mourner. Typically, mourners put themselves in the perspective of the deceased addressee. Lines 13 and 15 also repeat the same phrase. Repetition is functional in the genre and increases its pathos.

 Helga Kotthoff

17 M: [ modian, deda, stumrebi da Sen [aravis ar xvdeba, Svilo %modian, deda, st.umrebi da šen [aravis ar xvdeba, švilo% guests are coming, mother, and you are receiving no one, child 18 s: [(? 19 A: [muˇc.om cˇ. ivil vorek, skua, nana how burnt I am, child, mother 20 [muˇc.om dugil vorek, deda:::: how overheated I am, Mother 21 M: [ Cemo sayvarelo biWo $ cˇ emo saq.varelo biˇc.o (? $ my dear son 22 s: [(? 23 A: o: Merabi [skua oh Merabi [child 24 M: [ Cemo imedo, deda [$ cˇ emo imedo, deda:::$ my hope, mother 25 s: (? 26 A: o: Ak.ak.i deda, nana oh Ak.ak.i mother, mother 27 M: Cemo imedo, deda $ cˇ emo imedo:: deda::$ my hope, mother 28 ?: (? 29 A: [mu važk.cepi, deda what men, mother 30 M: [ Cemo sicocxle, deda [ $ cˇ emo sicocxle, de::da$ my life, mother 31 A: [mu bošepi, nana what boys, mother 32 M: [ dedis imedo, deda $ de:dis imedo:, de::da$ mother’s hope, mother 33 s: [(? 34 A: udrood17 dinapilep, deda lost too soon, mother

In line 17 we see another strategy, which is quite common in lamentation. The mot.irali pretends normal everyday reality. Naturally, the occasion is far away

Lamentations in Caucasian Georgia 

from an ordinary visit. The creation of the fiction of normality makes it possible to repeatedly perform Ak.ak.i’s death as a break of normality. The silence and lack of action on the part of the deceased is repeatedly metaphorised as intentional action (You receive no one, you do not help me, etc.). In lines 19 and 20, the aunt expresses her pain in two similarly structured lines. Lines 21–27 consist of appeals to Ak.ak.i. Again the aunt cries “mother” in line 26 in both Georgian and Megrelian. In line 34 there is also conspicuous code switching between Georgian and Megrelian. 35 36 37 38

?: M: ?: A:

39 M:

40 A: 41 M:

42

43 ?: 44 M:

45

46

47 ?: 48 M:

[(? [(? [(? [ˇckim skua Šalit nadinep-re, nana, do my son was killed violently, mother, and [(? Cemo patara biWo, deda $ cˇ emo p.at.ara biˇc.o, deda $ my little boy, mother [si skan xet, mušen ivili dudi, deda you with your hand, why did you kill yourself, mother Sen xom kai biWi xar, deda $ šen xom k.ai biˇc.i xar, deda%%%%%% $ you are a very good boy, mother deda Svilo, deda $ de::da švilo, de:::da $ mother, child, mother (? mogikvdes deda, deda $ mogikvdes de:da, de:da%%%%% $ mother should die for you, mother uSenod rogor un da gavZlo, deda ‘H $ % ušenod rogor unda gavŠlo, de:da %%% $ without you how can I bear it Sen aRar momeferi, [deda ‘H % šen a˙rar momeperi, [de:::da%%%%%%%%% you will never caress me again, mother [a::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: Sen i Tamuna daubare, deda $ % šeni tamuna daubare, de::da % $ your Tamuna, tell her, mother

 Helga Kotthoff

49

50

51

52

53 F: 54 M:

55 F: 56 57 ?: 58 A: 59 M:

60

61

da uTxari, deda ‘H $ da utxari, de::da: $ and tell her, mother ase rogor gaimete Sen i Tavi, deda $ ase rogor gaimet.e šeni tavi, deda%%%% how could you do something like this to me, mother ar gtkiva, deda ‘H $ % ar gt.k.iva deda%%%%%%% $ does it not hurt you, mother mogikvdes deda, deda ‘H % $ mogik.vdes deda, deda%%%%%%% $ mother should die for you, mother (? deda mogikvdes Svilo, [deda ‘H $ deda mogik.vdes švilo [deda%%%%%%% $ mother should die for you, child (? [mu vkimina, deda what should I do, mother o, deda (? o:: mu vkimina, deda oh what should I do, mother a::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: (? incomprehensible song ?) deda, Tamunas biWebi (? ?) biWebi imas exvewebodn en, deda deda, tamunas biˇc.ebi biˇc.ebi imas exvec.ebodnen, deda::::: mother the boys, the boys asked Tamuna rom Cven Tamun as biWi eyolebodeso rom cˇ ven tamuna biˇc.i eq.olebodeso that our Tamuna bring a son into the world RmerTsa vTxovoTo, deda r˙ mertma vtxovoto, deda we ask God for this, mother

In line 38 the aunt remembers the sad occasion of her son being killed. The rate of murder is generally very high in Georgia, especially among young men. The aunt also explicitly asks why Ak.ak.i killed himself (line 40). The mother praises him and tells him, how she misses him. The deceased is the main addressee of the lines. In line 48 she mentions Ak.ak.i’s young and pregnant wife Tamuna who also sits at the coffin. Also the father expresses two lamentation lines (53, 55). Men seldomly lament. The mother wishes Tamuna to give birth to a son. A son is generally more welcome in Georgia than a daughter. Here, however, the

Lamentations in Caucasian Georgia 

wish might express continuation of life similar to how as it was. The grandson might remind her of her son. Mother and aunt produce stylistic similarity, chiefly in that both address short appeals to the deceased and variants of “mother.” The aunt uses chiefly her own language, but nevertheless integrates brief switches into Georgian. She adapts to the East Georgian style: she laments with her everyday voice and normal voice register. The mother, in contrast, cries in a high voice, screams, slurs sounds, produces many sound extensions and uses a vibrato. The two chief lamenters produce, despite the code and style switch, a coherent lament. One common feature is the structuring of their utterances as short appeals. The intercultural presentation reflects the special situation in which the participants find themselves. The whole extended family has only guest status as a refugee family in Tbilisi. In the lamentation to her dead son the mother expresses reverence to the Tbilissians. Being a guest and being a host are connected with a special ethic in Georgia. Georgia, with its poor infrastructure, is not able to manage refugees bureaucratically and thereby guarantee their material security. Much more strongly than in Western Europe, refugees depend on help from neighbours and networks of relationships. Many Tbilisians are present and must be treated with respect. Their presence is seen as an expression of respect for the Danelia family. This expression of respect is acknowledged in that the mother uses the language of the guest’s culture. Thereby she pays back the respect her family receives. They are not only in an East Georgian region, but also in the capital city, where natives have for decades ceased to practice lamentation. Therefore, we cannot assume that women from the host culture will participate in the discourse of lamentation. Thus the necessity is greater for the refugee women themselves to perform symbolic integrative gestures.

Conclusions Both lamenters have endowed their expression of grief with a specific recipient design by using features from both the Megrelian and the East Georgian cultures. Both groups are present at the wailing. Thereby the two lamenters manage an affect presentation, which draws in the culturally heterogeneous public as much as possible. The shaping of emotions does not, as stated above, imply doubts about their sincerity per se. In lamentations, not only private feelings, but also purported group feelings, are given expression. The purpose of this is to join those present in grief. Even the obligation to act as a sort of

 Helga Kotthoff

mouthpiece for the mourning community is felt by the mourners themselves as a personal need, as they themselves report. “Second nature,” in the sense of Plessner (1941), is practically indistinguishably interwoven with first nature. Whether rules of displaying affect are experienced as an obligation or a need depends on complex preconditions. Normally, members of a society are competent in reading affect presentations and can distinguish fine nuances. In this domain, however, we must expect idiosyncrasies, exaggerations, faulty transmission and intercultural irritation. Hyper-rituals – including the Georgian dirges discussed here – are complex indexical systems, which mutually comment on each other. Currently in Georgia one can observe symbolic distancing from ritualisations practised under Communist rule. Thus great mourning meals were, until recently, viewed as ritual indications of material well-being and were morally highly-valued initiatives for the sake of the deceased, as in the Georgian religious world view, life on earth parallels life in the hereafter: with the same meal, “new souls” are to be received by “old souls.” Today, an ideology of returning to simplicity is observable in Georgia. Only a few Georgians can afford the once common provision of mourning meals for 200 persons at present. Simplicity is, however, not identified with poverty, but rather with going back to original versions of mourning customs and thus also with genuine “being Georgian.” The communists offered ostentatious mourning meals, as I have often been told. One meta-social dimension of the rich tables is now being revalued: in former times, a generous mourning meal was seen as typical for the Georgian culture, now it has been reinterpreted as characteristic of communism. Thus the societal change from the socialist system is also acted out on the level of everyday rituals and presentations of emotions.

Notes . A topic issue of the journal Pragmatics (Vol. 2, No. 3, Sept. 1992) deals with “Language Ideologies” as mediating authorities between social structures and speech forms. . In particular, Eibl-Eibesfeld (1964) and Ekman (1984) have shown the pan-cultural status of some emotions. . For a critique of the pan-cultural status of grief see Rosaldo (1984/1985: 375–402). . Jakobson (1960: 354), in contrast to e.g. Bally (1970), does not assume a clear separation between cognitive and emotive activities. The same speech activity can perform different functions simultaneously.

Lamentations in Caucasian Georgia  . In other articles I have translated this interjection as ‘Mama mia’, because this Italian interjection is expressed with an equivalent function in English. . On the particularities of cultural gender politics in the domain of grieving see Kotthoff (2002). . At that time Elza Gabedava and Manana Maˇc.araŠe were working on the project, e.g., transcribing tape recordings of lamentations. . Hahn (1994: 140–167) has shown that foreignness can be socially constructed and made plausible through arbitrary differences. . Conversational analysis does not have forms of notating different voices. My own training in perceiving voices does not suffice to make exact statements. . These transcription conventions are used only in the transliterated lines: % =crying sound; if the % sign is placed at the beginning and end of a line, it is spoken with nearly continuous crying sounds. $ designates a very high voice register, which, here, is very breathy and contains a sort of tremolo. Overlapping speech parts are preceded by brackets [ and printed one above the other. A colon symbolizes the extension of a sound, ‘H stands for audible inhalation, here often sighing. Commas divide phrase units in which the tone does not fall, full stops end phrase units in which the tone falls. (?) indicates indecipherable speech. Megrelian is only transliterated in the Latin alphabet, since it is not a written language. . The video of the mourning was generously made available to us by the Danelia family. A co-worker of the project, Manana Maˇc.araŠe, was present at the mourning. . In Kotthoff (1998, 1999a and b) passages from other lamentations are presented which contain fewer set phrases. . The word “deda” is Georgian for “mother”; but can also be translated here as an interjection such as the Italian “Mama mia” which is used in many languages. . Georgian. . Merabi is a son of this aunt who had died previously. . Georgian. After this “deda” will be repeated without a note. . Georgian.

References Bally, Charles (1970). Traité de stylistique francaise (5th ed.). Geneva. Bamberg, Michael (1996). “Emotion talk(s): The role of perspective in the construction of emotions”. In Susanne Niemeyer & René Dirven (Eds.), The Language of Emotions (p. 211). Amsterdam. Besnier, Nico (1990). “Language and affect”. Annual Review of Anthropology, 19, 419–451. Boeder, Winfried (1988). Über einige Anredeformen im Kaukasus (pp. 11–20). Georgica 11. Bolle-Zemp, Sylvie (1997). “Rhétorique et musique: un ritual funéraire svane 8sud Caucase”. In Musique et cetera (pp. 165–182). GHK Neuchátel: Musée d’ ethnographie.

 Helga Kotthoff

Burke, William L. (1979). “Notes on a Rhetoric of Lamentation”. Central States Speech Journal, 29, 109–121. Caraveli, Anna (1986). “The bitter wounding: The lament as social protest”. In Jill Dubisch (Ed.), Gender and Power in Rural Greece (pp. 189–194). Princeton, NJ. Caraveli-Chaves, Anna (1980). “Bridge between worlds. The Greek women’s lament as communicative event”. Journal of American Folklore, 129–157. Christmann, Gabriella (1993). “‘Und da hab ich wirklich so einen Zornesausbruch gekriegt. . . ’. Moral mit Affekt: Die moralische Entrüstung am Beispiel von ÖkologieGruppen”. Moral-Projekt, Working Paper No. 6. University of Konstanz. CocaniŠe, Giorgi (1990). Giorgobidan giorgobamde. Tbilisi. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus (1964). Grundriß der vergleichenden Verhaltensforschung. Munich. Ekman, Paul (1984). “Expression and the Nature of Emotion”. In Klaus Scherer & Paul Ekman (Eds.), Approaches to Emotion. Hillsdale, NJ. Feld, Steven (1982). Sound and Sentiment: Birds, Weeping, Poetics, and Song in Kaluli Expression. Philadelphia. Fiehler, Reinhard (1990). Kommunikation und Emotion. Theoretische und empirische Untersuchungen zur Rolle von Emotionen in der verbalen Interaktio. Berlin, New York. Finnegan, Ruth (1970). Oral Literature in Africa. Nairobi. Geertz, Clifford (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York. Goffman, Erving (1967). Interaction Ritual. Garden City, NY. Goffman, Erving (1981). “The Interaction Order”. American Sociological Review, 48, 1–17. Günthner, Susanne (1996). “The Contextualization of Affect in reported Dialogues.” In S. Niemeier & R. Dirven (Eds.), The Language of Emotion (pp. 247–277). Amsterdam. Hahn, Alois (1994). “Die soziale Konstruktion des Fremden”. In Walter M. Sprondel (Ed.), Die Objektivität der Ordnungen und ihre soziale Konstruktion (pp. 140–167). Frankfurt. Hitzler, Ronald (1998). “Das Problem, sich verständlich zu machen”. In Herbert Willems & Martin Jurga (Eds.), Inszenierungsgesellschaft (pp. 93–107). Opladen. Hochschild, Arlie (1983). The Managed Heart. Berkeley. Irvine, Judith (1990). “Registering affect: heteroglossia in the linguistic expression of emotion”. In Catherine Lutz & Lila Abu-Lughod (Eds.), Language and the Politics of Emotion (pp. 126–162). Cambridge. Jakobson, Roman (1960/1978). “Concluding Statement: Linguistics and Poetics”. In Thomas Sebeok (Ed.), Style in language (pp. 350–377). Cambridge. Kotthoff, Helga (1998). “Trauern in Georgien: Zur Theatralisierung von Emotion, Religion und Moral”. In Herbert Willems & Martin Jurga (Eds.), Inszenierungsge sellschaft (pp. 143–163). Opladen. Kotthoff, Helga (1999). “Affect and Meta-Affect in Georgian Grief Rituals”. In Juergen Schlaeger & Gesa Stedman (Eds.), Representations of Emotion (pp. 149–173). Tübingen. Kotthoff, Helga (2003). “Gender and Meta-Affect in Georgian Grief Rituals”. In Helga Kotthoff & Bettina Baron (Eds.), Gender in Interaction (pp. 283–329). Amsterdam. Leach, Edmund (1976). Rethinking Anthropology. New York 1968. Culture and Communication. Cambridge. Leggewie, Claus (1994). “Ethnizität, Nationalismus und multikulturelle Gesellschaft”. In Helmut Berding (Ed.), Nationales Bewußtsein und kollek tive Identität. Studien zur Entwicklung des kollektiven Bewußtseins in der Neuzeit, 2 (pp. 46–65). Frankfurt.

Lamentations in Caucasian Georgia

Metcalf, Peter & Huntington, Richard (1991). Celebrations of Death. The Anthropology of Mortuary Ritual. Cambridge. NakašiŠe, Ketevan (1993). “Gruzinskie Plaˇci”. Working Paper of the Š¦ avaxišvili Institute. Tbilisi. Ochs, Elinor & Bambi Schieffelin (1989). “Language has a Heart” (pp. 7–25). Special Edition of Text. Péter, M. (1984). “Das Problem des sprachlichen Gefühlsausdrucks in besonderem Hinblick auf das Bühlersche Organon-Modell”. In A. Eschbach (Ed.), Bühler-Studien, I (pp. 239– 260). Frankfurt. Plessner, Helmuth (1941/1961). Lachen und Weinen. Eine Untersuchung nach den Grenzen des menschlichen Verhaltens. Berne: Munich. Rosaldo, Renato (1984/1985). “Der Kummer und die Wut des Kopfjägers. Über die kulturelle Intensität der Emotionen”. In Eberhard Berg & Martin Fuchs (Eds.), Kultur, soziale Praxis, Text (pp. 375–402). Frankfurt. Seremetakis, Nadia C. (1991). The Last Word. Women, Death, and Divination in Inner Mani. Chicago and London. Stubbe, Hannes (1985). Formen der Trauer. Eine kulturanthropologische Untersuchung. Berlin. Tiwary, K. M. (1975). “Tuneful Weeping: A Mode of Communication”. Working Papers in Sociolinguistics, 27. Urban, Greg (1988). “Ritual Wailing in Amerindian Brazil”. American Anthropologist, 90, 385–400. Wierzbicka, Anna (1992). “Defining Emotion Concepts”. Cognitive Science, 16, 539–581. Wierzbicka, Anna (1995). “Emotion and Facial Expression: A Semantic Perspective”. Culture and Psychology, 1, 227–258.



Beyond competence A multiculturalist approach to intercultural communication* Shi-xu

Mainstream intercultural communication theory, research and pedagogy seem to have been dominated by what might be called the linguistic-culturalknowledge-deficiency paradigm. In this paradigm, intercultural communication is seen as an activity in which two knowledge systems conflict and as a result misunderstanding and miscommunication may occur. The solution to the problem and guarantee of success then is to gain as much as possible the knowledge including skills, or ‘competence’, about the target language and culture. Further, in this paradigm, there has seemed to tendency to conceptualise culture in nationalist terms; that is, every nation (state) forms its own system of communication and will manifest it in intercultural communication as well. In this contribution, I want to argue that we ought to take a thoroughly culturalist stance and accordingly see intercultural communication as primarily a cultural-power practice, beyond competence. In such a perspective, intercultural communication is not merely a matter of exchanging linguistic and cultural information between two parties at an equal footing, but a powersaturated form of interaction that is embedded in the historically evolved cultural context. This context is the particular imperial order of colonialism, neo-expansionism and resistance. As power-saturated practice, intercultural communication may be seen as contested ways of representing and acting upon the world. To study intercultural communication, then, is to study, beyond ‘(mis)understandings’, ‘competence’, ‘deficiencies’, relations of power, practices of repression, dominance, confrontation, exclusion and prejudice, and such like. From the point of view of language, discourse and communication studies, this means to analyse how such relations and practices of power are produced

 Shi-xu

or accomplished through lexical, grammatical, textual and contextual features or combinations of these. Further, research may be done in order to create ways to resist power and to achieve intercultural harmony and progress. Below I shall first critically examine mainstream theory of intercultural communication and then sketch out the alternative, thoroughly culturalist, perspective. To illustrate this approach I shall finally examine a series of media texts in different cultural settings and show how discursive acts of domination and resistance are achieved.

Communication and culture Theorists of intercultural communication, including those of cross-cultural communication and psychology, have generally attempted to offer causal explanations of failure or success of intercultural contact and communication and their central focus has been on linguistic and psychological differences across cultures (e.g. Cushner & Brislin 1996; Hofstede 1980; Ting-Toomey 1999; Trompenaars 1993). Hence, ‘competence’ in the target language and culture is regarded as the key to success; otherwise, ‘mis-communication’, ‘misunderstanding’, hence ‘communication breakdown’ will result. As the central, quintessential problem in intercultural communication, ‘misunderstanding’, as may be pointed out, is also seen as the consequence of individual or, more charitably, cultural, difference in semantics or cognition. For instance, in their Intercultural Communication (Scollon & Scollon 1995), the authors claim that communication works better the more the participants share assumptions and knowledge about the world. Where two people have very similar histories, backgrounds, and experiences, their communication works fairly easily because the inferences each makes about what the other means will be based on common experience and knowledge. [. . .] Successful communication is based on sharing as much as possible the assumptions we make about what others mean. (pp. 11–12)

Therefore, they suggest two principles for solving the intercultural problem: The first approach is based on knowing as much as possible about the people with whom one is communicating. [. . .] The second approach is based on making the assumption that misunderstandings are the only thing certain about interdiscourse [intercultural] professional communication. (p. 13)

Guided by this kind of underlying notions of person, culture and communication, researchers have usually devoted their attention to investigating differ-

Beyond competence

ences in linguistic structure (e.g. Wierzbicka 1991), discourse structure (e.g. Scollon & Scollon 1995), speech acts (e.g. Blum-Kulka, House, & Kasper 1989), cognition (Gudykunst 1988; Kim 1991) and social systems (e.g. Hofstede 1980; Trompenaar 1993) between peoples of different cultural backgrounds. In identifying the differences between one’s native language and culture and those of the cultural Other, their ultimate goal is to explain ‘misunderstanding’ and ‘miscommunication’. In education on intercultural communication as well as foreign languages, the main objective then is to impart as much as possible relevant knowledge and skill. Central to this kind of understanding of (intercultural) communication are two implicit assumptions that should be subjected to critical attention. One is the notion that communicating individuals are in an equal relation and so are their cultures that they embody. Another is the idea that what people do in (intercultural) communication is primarily exchanging information. In such an understanding, I should like to point out, however, that culture is presented as being without history and, so, without the habits of prejudice, stereotyping, repression or exclusion. Moreover, communication is rendered powerless. But when ‘misunderstanding’, ‘miscommunication’, or no communication at all, is attributed to merely deficiencies in linguistic and cultural knowledge or competence, one consequence is that attention is diverted from relations of power and practices of oppression, prejudice or resistance. The intellectual, professional practice serves not only to collude with the existing unequal power relations-including the dominating (socio-economic) power, (cultural) interest, (business) motive – in which all intercultural communication takes place, but also, at least potentially, to obscure, legitimate the power-motivated practices of control, domination or prejudice associated with the so-called misunderstandings, mis-communications and frustrations. Ultimately, it helps perpetuate existing conditions of inequality and injustice. Of course this kind of (intercultural) communication theory can be related back to the dominant American Western ideological discourses of individualism, cultural-relativism and ultimately universalism. There has recently been a fair amount of critical work that has taken these to task and point to the role of power and history in the process of intercultural communication (e.g. Koole & Ten Thije 1994; see also Bubel, Day, Liebscher, & Rehbein this volume). But here I should like to move on and argue that, in order to create a more adequate and more effective theory of intercultural communication, the inherent and implicit notion of culture, which is often taken for granted in the dominant cultural-relativist paradigm, must be replaced by a radically different view.



 Shi-xu

Given the problems of the above-sketched popular notion of culture, I turn outside of intercultural communication literature to cultural studies (e.g. Bhabha 1994; Clifford 1988, 1992; Hall 1996a, 1996b, 1999; Said 1978, 1993; Spivak 1988; Williams 1976). According to this tradition, culture may be seen as a group’s contested way of making meaning through symbolic means. There are a number of interrelated aspects in the definition that may be unpacked here. First and foremost, culture is not an independent dimension of society, but penetrates the whole way of life of a group of people. Not only may literature or art be called culture, but also are all other sense making activities such as conversation, journalism, education, science, etc. As such, secondly, culture should be understood as, not fixed structure, but shifting and diversified process. Cultural practices in education for example are changing, hybridising and re-inventing themselves in relation and interaction with the broader cultural context. Thirdly, culture is a social practice that requires symbolic means, visual, audio, spoken, written, etc. While it is not easy to distinguish the symbolic from what is not symbolic, from the practical, semiotic, professional point of view, we may agree that language, gesture, facial expression, image, sound are among the more common ones. Fourth and more importantly, human cultures are diversified patterns of meaning making and so competing with one another. Western culture has rarely if ever represented and treated other cultures as equals. Finally, because of its intrinsic power, culture also functions as norm or hegemony (in Gramsci’s sense) to guide, regulate or control cultural members’ action. Beyond the tradition of cultural studies, however, I want to re-orient the notion of culture into a discursive one. That is, cultural studies seem not to have recognised the central role of use of texts and talk in the construction of cultural meaning and consequently not to have paid detailed attention to the organisation of discourse, about which discourse studies is specialised. Film, (fine) art, multimedia, music, architecture and the like are all important forms of culture, but none would make the sort of sense they do were they deprived of use of language, in or around them. As a matter of fact, our everyday life is made up of largely our reading, writing, listening and speaking to one another. Discourse permeates our cultural life (Williams sees such ways of life as ways of ‘communicating’). Thus, drawing on insights from a range of schools in Western and Chinese discourse studies (e.g. Van Dijk 1997; Shen 2001; see also Shi-xu 2005, 2000a, 2000b; Shi-xu et al. 2005), I would like to suggest that human cultures can be usefully seen as composed of a diversity of historically situated, contested ways of meaning making through primarily verbal and contextual symbols.

Beyond competence

This kind of cultural stance has a number of advantages. Since it regards culture as diversified and competing, it opposes grand, totalising theory and highlights power at the same time. Because it sees culture as a shifting process of social practice, it avoids essentialism. Further, it links up almost seamlessly with (intercultural) communication. In addition, since cultures are seen in discursive terms, we can yield insights into their rhetorical, responsive and interactional properties. Not infrequently, some scholars have objected by charging ‘essentialism’, ‘fixity’ or ‘homogeneity’ to such culturalist notions of culture. I do not wish to be mistaken. The proposed understanding is that culture is a constructed version, it is changing and internally diversified and externally hybridised. But it also implies that culture is also historically specific and therefore imbued with particular traditions and saturated with the world history of colonialism. Therefore notions of ‘fluidity’, ‘hybridity’ and ‘globalisation’ must not be used as excuses, or rhetoric, for erasing the fundamental power imbalance existing between the West and the Rest and for refusing to take into account the issues, concerns, wisdoms and aspirations of the non-Western worlds. I should like to note, too, that often culture has been taken in nationalistic terms, such that every nation and nation state are considered to possess mutually different and distinct systems of linguistic and cultural knowledge. Of course countries, nations or regions may have contact, communication and so also conflicts. But the nature of the communication involved is different and so are the consequences. For example, the communication between the US and Canada or their peoples will involve issues of power but these would be radically different from a case of communication between the US and a third world country, say Mexico or Tanzania. The former would more often than not particular and unique whereas the latter would be more general and typical. That is, as the world history has repeatedly shown, the American West has systematically and continuously been dominant and repressive in its communication with peoples of the non-Western, Third World cultures. To illustrate this let us examine an example of print media article involving the beef-crisis between Britain and France. It is an editorial in the British newspaper, Daily Mail can be seen as part of an intercultural and international communication process. Here they present to the British reading public ‘our’ ‘British’ understandings about the French, their words and deeds, including ‘their’ understandings and misunderstandings, during the BSE crisis. They are intercultural also because they ‘plan’ and shape potential future response to the French. In addition, given the modern conditions of communication flow, these printed texts may be seen as being intended for the French readers as well.



 Shi-xu

Tony Blair was resigned to a long legal battle over beef last night as France accused Britain of ‘xenophobic hatred’. The Prime Minister’s admission that diplomacy has failed emerged as French Agriculture Minister Jean Glavany branded the British ‘people who detest the French’. Mr Glavany’s words, on live television, were a clear attempt to wreck negotiations on a face-saving compromise. [. . .] He accused Britain of ‘unleashing a torrent of xenophobic hatred’ against France over the embargo. ‘We have nothing but a stream of anti-French sentiment,’ he stormed. ‘Why do they direct their hatred at us and not at the Germans, or the other 16 countries around the world who still won’t lift the beef embargo?’ he told a French TV station. France’s attack on British ‘Xenophobia’. (Daily Mail, 13/11/99)

It would be hard to imagine that what the British paper article does here, in terms of form and content, would happen to the US or Japan or India. For, this is an activity occurring between the two particular countries. Here the occasion and the purpose of the activity are quite specific, contingent and unique. What such a Western newspaper would do to a Third World community would be quite different in form and content and so in nature. It would be more general, stereotypical and systematic, as so many studies have shown. For, a much larger and more complex, historical, context would be involved. By drawing attention to history, power and interaction, I do not intend to deny the potential interest of competence in linguistic and cultural competence. General knowledge of, and skills in, the relevant languages and cultures are useful resources but what I do want to question is the theoretical basis, self-interest involved and especially the political consequences of such misunderstanding-oriented and competence-minded discourse. Now a reconstructed concept and theory of intercultural communication is in order. We must begin with a re-conceptualisation of communication. In the present approach, we regard communication as a diversity of situated, powersaturated discourses. In this case, communication and culture co-constitute each other, as indicated above. A very important dimension of the interpenetration of culture and communication, power is conceived of as the effect of human social practice whereby things get done or people are put under control (cf. Giddens 1984). It may be manifested in various aspects of social relations, events and practices and can be related to instruments or resources for action (e.g. languages, knowledge and social positions). As integral part of social action and hence social event, it is always morally defined, i.e. depending on norms and values of the specific cultural and historical context, such that power can be in the state of domination, exclusion, resistance or equilibrium. These power relations may be defined in terms of individuals, groups or insti-

Beyond competence 

tutions. Power can be, for example, such relations and practices of domination, exploitation, exclusion, prejudice, resistance and the like between the East and the West, the North and the South, the centre and the peripheral, the Empire and the colony and so on. Intercultural communication then is a process of power relations and power contest par excellence. Proceeding from this basic notion of communication, I would like to sketch out our radical multiculturalist perspective on intercultural communication. Firstly, beyond surface forms and abstract knowledge, intercultural communication must be considered in its concrete and specific historical context. The complex web of historical and cultural relations forms integral part of intercultural communication. Misunderstandings, miscommunication, noncommunication, racist talk, etc. can only make full sense if we subject them to this contextual background of historically evolved symbols, concepts, relations, stereotypes and so on and so forth. More specifically, it may be said that intercultural communication has always been situated in the very context of imbalance in power and inequality in resources between the East and the West, the North and the South, the majority and the minority, the rich and poor, etc. The global, international, and regional order is not one of equilibrium and peace, but essentially one of dominance and control. Secondly, beyond individualism and monologism, intercultural communication must be understood in relational, dialogical and social-interactional terms. Meanings of contributions in processes of intercultural communication and interpretations thereof are other-related and other-oriented. Put another way, intercultural communication is socially organised activity, so that the meaning of communication, hence ‘understanding’, cannot be reduced to an individual(’s words) (Leeds-Hurwitz 1995). Just as in everyday conversation (Atkinson & Heritage 1984), meaning in intercultural communication is jointly constructed, negotiated, transformed. This means consequently that problems of intercultural communication cannot be attributed to singular forms or speaking parties. Thirdly, beyond representationalism, intercultural communication must be viewed as primarily forms of action. In such intercultural interaction, speakers are acting and acting upon each other and consequently power consequences are involved, too. In their interaction, people are not simply ‘understanding’ each other; rather, they are concerned with changing states of affairs, through talking and writing. Consequently, people cannot be analysed merely in terms of ‘understandings’ or ‘misunderstandings’. This leads to my next point.

 Shi-xu

Fourthly, beyond cultural relativism, intercultural communication must be understood in power terms. It has already been alluded to earlier that intercultural communication does not take place in a power vacuum, or in equal-power relations. But I want to stress that speech action in processes of intercultural communication ought to be examined from the viewpoint of acts of control, domination, exclusion or resistance, respect, cooperation, etc. Finally, beyond the notion of a singular ‘target language and culture’, intercultural communication must be regarded as multicultural phenomenon. In the age of globalisation, cultural discourses are interconnecting and infiltrating one another as they are confronting and challenging one another. They embody multifarious forms and dimensions, which are proliferating as well. Consequently, culturally exclusive norms and standards cannot be applied to the analysis of the conduct of intercultural communication. Given the complex and multicultural nature of intercultural communication, I suggest that the researcher adopts a culturally informed but personally critical stance on particular cases of intercultural communication. Specifically, I would like to propose that our intercultural communication research commits itself to undermining cultural repression and prejudice on the one hand and facilitating cultural solidarity and prosperity on the other hand. Research topics, objectives and procedures then should be guided by this double-edged cultural politics.

Power relations and contest In the remainder of the paper I look at a few examples of intercultural communication to illustrate some of the uses that the proposed multiculturalist approach can be put to. I shall confine myself only to analysis of some limited events or incidents of intercultural communication. (Questions of practical strategies for or education in intercultural communication must be deferred to future studies elsewhere.) From the above account, it should become clear now that analysis, interpretation and education about intercultural communication cannot be adequately accomplished by tightening up a few syntactic screws here and loosening a few lexical bolts there. The historical, so powerinteractive, context must also be taken into account. In the following sample analysis, therefore, I shall draw eclectically on existing notions in discourse studies but at the same time other concepts from the perspectives of international history, political science and cultural studies. So for example, aspects ranging from lexico-grammatical forms of argumentation, narrative, speech

Beyond competence

act, choice of words, etc. to contextual symbols of cultural history, economics, international politics and so on all become foci of attention wherever they become relevant.

Demonisation and antagonism In the following first example, I want to highlight what harmful cultural power effects are being accomplished and what textual and contextual features have rendered them possible. The data are found in a news story carried in the British paper, Sunday Telegraph (Dec. 15, 2002). (1) North Korea, singled out by America as part of the world’s ‘axis of evil’, yesterday launched a vitriolic attack on Britain’s favourite secret agent, accusing him of ‘insulting the Korean nation’. 2) In a statement, the Communist country’s Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, condemned the new Bond film Die Another Day, which shows 007 being tortured in a North Korean jail, as a smear and called for it to be removed from cinema screens worldwide. 3) ‘It is a dirty and cursed burlesque aimed to slander North Korea and insult the Korean nation,’ the statement said. ‘It clearly proves that the United States is the root cause of all disasters and misfortune of the Korean nation and is an empire of evil’.

To begin with, the intercultural communication dimension can be seen as constructed through textual and contextual means: 1) the difference of North Korea(’s action) and as defined by America and indirectly by the British (‘favourite’) image of 007 and his fate (‘tortured in a North Korea’s jail’); 2) the historically shared background knowledge of the American/British west as opposed to a country like North Korea. The journalistic construction of the intercultural communication produces great antagonism against and ridicule at North Korea through a variety of discursive strategies. For one thing, the text draws on the British ally, America, hence its authority, in understanding and labelling the ‘other’: North Korea as ‘part of the world’s ‘axis of evil’. It demonises the Other. In connection with the definition of the ‘other’, for another, the text portrays it as acting aggressively (‘launched a vitriolic attack’, ‘accusing [. . .] of insulting’, ‘condemned [. . .] as a smear’). It demonises the Other’s actions. For still another, the selective quotation demonises the other’s speech (see the last sentence). The demonising representations of the cultural ‘Other’s’ character, action and speech serve effectively to incite cultural antagonism and justify cultural repression and domination.



 Shi-xu

Consequences and threat In the next example, I want to show how Hong Kong’s future is monopolized by Western media discourse. Here it may be observed that although the Western media typically raise questions about the aftermath of Hong Kong’s return, their answers’ are rarely predictive. Rather, they are more often than not imperative: i.e. China must follow a particular pattern of action with regard to Hong Kong. (2) Human rights in Hong Kong are already emerging as another focal point for China-American relations, and any kind of crackdown in the territory could trigger a serious downward spiral in relations between Washington and Beijing. ‘Big change is coming – to whom and how?’ (International Herald Tribune, 01/07/97)

Apparently, there is an inquisitive question about what Hong Kong will turn out to be like after its return to China; NB. ‘the most fascinating question’. And yet, far from being a scenario to be predicted, Hong Kong’s future is fashioned by a discourse of threat. Namely, on the one side, the text points it out that human rights in Hong Kong have already emerged as an issue or problem and, further, warns China that it is becoming central to its relation with the United States. This warning is directed at the Chinese government (N. B. ‘Beijing and Washington’). At the same time, one of the commonly shared assumptions underlying these statements is that China needs or desires a good relationship with the U.S. On the other side, instead of talking about the consequences on the well-being of the Hong Kong people, for example, the text flags the disastrous impact on relations between Washington and Beijing. Here, the text describes explicitly what the punishment (N. B. ‘could trigger a serious downward spiral) will befalls China, if it attempts ‘any kind of crackdown in the territory’. By naming the negative consequences of the other’s possible action, the text effectively exercises a form of threat towards the other.

Condition and reward Hong Kong’s future (and in that connection, what China must (not) do) is not only an object of discursive coercion as we just saw, but it may be an object for American-western reward as well – if its conditions are met. At the outset, it may be noted that the Australian text below may be conceived to be in the same general context of doubting the ‘other’ – China and hence what Hong Kong will become after the return of sovereignty.

Beyond competence 

(3) Will the Hong Kong handover advance or retard US-China relations? It depends upon two factors. First, China must ensure that ‘one country, two systems’ works, which means honouring the Basic Law it has endorsed to secure Hong Kong’s guarantees. [. . . ] But if ‘one country, two systems’ has this design tension, it contains its reward. [...] Once China shows the concept works in practice, then it has the perfect argument to put the incorporation of Taiwan on the agenda. ‘Whose values will prevail?’ (The Australian, 02/07/97)

To start with, it may be noted that the question about China and US’s future relations is formulated explicitly: it is linked, specifically, with the ‘make or break’ of the Sino-American relations (‘advance or retard’). In addition, it is concerned with ‘[w]hose values prevail? (see the title)’. Here one may be reminded that, as in the situation surrounding the forgoing text (1), it is widely understood that China needs a good relationship with Washington, not least with regard to the issue of Taiwan (as alluded to in the text). More importantly, the text produces a system of conditions and ‘reward’ for the Other (but not expression of concern for the people of Hong Kong). That is, it defines and specifies the conditions for China to achieve its goal. Further, it describes explicitly the ‘reward’ for China if it fulfils that condition. N.B. China has always maintained that Taiwan is an internal affair. And yet this is formulated as part of the US-China relations. Thus, pressure is piled upon China; in other words, the newspaper article attempts to control China’s handling of the future of Hong Kong. It should be noted in particular that the conditions the text lays down are imperative, because it tells China what it must do (‘must ensure’) and also because it specifies or stipulates for China (the meaning of) what it must do (‘which means’).

Resistance to discourse of domination Finally I want to turn to a case of discourse of cultural resistance against domination, exploitation and control. The material is the Chinese public, massmediated and official discourse on the topic of human rights in reaction largely to a relevant American political discourse. To make sense of the Chinese communication in question, it will be necessary to spell out the concrete, local-global, cultural-interactive, context first. Namely, the American government’s (State Department’s) annual report alleges problems of human rights in a large number of mostly non-Western,

 Shi-xu

Third World countries, including China. In particular, the report has included China for many consecutive years. This practice of negatively evaluating human right situations in especially non-Western, Third World, countries is not intended for genuine intercultural dialogue and critique on human rights issues, however. It is selective, politically and economically motivated and totalitarian. For example, the United States has also always linked the alleged issues of human rights of China, as of other countries, to matters of trade, diplomacy, international politics, etc. involving China. Further, the concepts, values and standards employed in the American government’s reports are all presented as universal, self-righteous and matter-of-factly. From these it may be claimed that the American State Department’s human right reports form explicitly cultural-other-directed acts and that these acts constitute a culturally high-handed and highly motivated practice that effectively creates cultural domination, control and discrimination. The more immediate context of the Chinese discourse in question of course is the particular publication of “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” by the US Department of State (submitted to its Congress) (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/). Because of this historical and trans-national relationship, we can say it merits our definition of intercultural communication. Against this American-Western, political discourse, background, let us look at a series of acts on the part of China. These are in the form of print media and specifically in the broadsheet newspaper Guangming Daily (this is a paper catering mainly for Chinese academic and educational readerships). (The newspaper data presented here have appeared in other major and minor papers as well as other mass media channels including the internet.) My analysis below will focus on the Chinese discursive ‘turns’ in order to identify and characterise the Chinese response to the American-Western discourse and to some extent also the processes and relations involved in the intercultural communication. I have found the following phenomena particularly relevant: the construction of cultural selves and others, relationships and interrelations, the reconstruction or transformation of relevant, key concepts and the exercise of cultural power. And I shall explain why. On March 3, 2005, Guangming Daily carries a small news text that reports that the American State Department issued Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (2004) involving various other countries on Feb 28 (as referred to above), with the title ‘China resolutely opposes America’s unfounded accusations of our human rights situation’. The text contains a set of features that rebuff the US government’s action. These include verbs and verbal phrases of oppositional action (e.g. ‘oppose’ and ‘express strong dissatisfaction’), other-

Beyond competence 

invaliding adjectives (e.g. ‘unfounded’, ‘so-called’), re-claiming of knowledge (e.g. ‘the Chinese people have the most authority’), counter-evidence (e.g. ‘holds the principles of treating the people as the starting point’ and ‘enjoying a higher level of human rights in various areas’) and admonition (e.g. ‘pay more attention’). Effectively, these disqualify the American government’s accusation and challenge its authority more generally. The very reportage of the American government’s accusations of Chinese human rights’ ‘problems’ is notable, too, because it shows that the Chinese media is ready to take up the politically sensitive and challenging issue publicly, both at home and abroad. On the following day (March 4th), Guangming Daily files another report on the same incident but with additional information and greater force. The report and the statement contained therein are harsher with respect to the US. Moreover, more attention is devoted to the US’s own wrong-doing in human rights. These actions on the part of China undermine the US action of accusation and provide justifications for its own oppositional action as well. On the same day of the publication of the foregoing news report, more noticeably and more importantly, the Chinese State Council Information Office publishes in the same newspaper an extended report (dated March 3), which occupies a little over one page, entitled ‘America’s Human Rights Record 2004’. It enumerates America’s human rights abuses both at home and abroad (see also People’s Daily Online: Full text of Human Rights Record of the US in 2004 http://english.people.com.cn/200503/03/eng20050303_175406.html). A set of features is noteworthy here. One is the scope of allegations: the report details human rights mishaps in six areas of American social and cultural life (1. Life, freedom and safety; 2. Political rights and freedom; 3. Economic, social and cultural rights; 4. Racial discrimination; 5. Women and children’s rights; 6. Violating other countries’ human rights) and uses a large space – in excess of one broadsheet page. Another is the use of mimicry, humour and revelation at the beginning. Still another device is a list of 82 endnotes, offering the sources of the information used in the article – an extraordinary practice for just any newspaper. All these devices serve to invalidate the moral foundations of the earlier American government’s report. Then, according to Guangming Daily (April 1), the American State Department issued another human rights report, Supporting Human Right and Democracy: The US Record 2004–2005 (March 28), again accusing China of human rights abuses. This constitutes an immediate contextual circumstance (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2004/) for the subsequent, new action on the part of China. That is, the very piece of Chinese news report, entitled ‘China opposes American unfounded accusations on China’s state of human rights’

 Shi-xu

puts up a resistance. Further, it presents an opposition similar to the two actions we saw above but uses a stronger description of the US government’s action, ‘abhorrent practice’. Finally, over two weeks later, on April 14, the Chinese State Council Information Office published, again in the same newspaper, a one-andquarter-page-long report, ‘China’s Progress in Human Rights in 2004’ (see also http://english.people.com.cn/200504/13/eng20050413_180786.html). The report includes seven sections: Foreword; I. People’s Rights to Subsistence and Development; II. Civil and Political Rights; III. Judicial Guarantee for Human Rights; IV. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; V. Equal Rights and Special Protection for Ethnic Minorities; VI. The Rights and Interests of the Disabled; VII. International Exchanges and Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights. The opening section is particularly interesting in that it displays the intercultural orientation clearly when it says, ‘To help the international community toward a better understanding of the human rights situation in China, we hereby present an overview of the developments in the field of human rights in China in 2004.’ This huge newspaper report presents a wide-ranging and detailed account of the achievements that China has made in the year of 2004. It offers a completely opposite and positive picture of the human rights situation in China. Thus, the official, public and explicitly interculturally oriented display of the accomplishments on the part of China constitutes a direct counter, and undermining, action with respect to the earlier American repressive action. To sum it up, it may be asserted that in relation and response to the Otherrepressive and motivated American government’s action against China, the Chinese media puts up resistance openly and publicly through speedy reaction, verbal actions of opposition and provision of counter-evidence. Further, China also counter-acts against the US (earlier action): the government publishes a large report showing human rights abuses of the US, which not only undermines the trustworthiness of the American earlier accusations but also directly criticises the US on an important political area.

Conclusion In this study, going beyond linguistic/cultural causal explanations of (mis)understandings and (mis)communication, I have formulated a thoroughly culturalist approach that emphasises the importance of analysing culturally oppressive relations and practices. In the practical analysis of empirical print media data, I have tried to highlight the discursive (i.e. textual and contextual) struc-

Beyond competence 

tures and strategies through which forms of cultural domination, repression as well as resistance are produced. Now the real issue behind all the confrontation, conflict, misunderstanding, miscommunication or non-communication is the question of how to overcome the existing power imbalance and power practices. The almost insurmountable difficulty lies in the historically evolved prejudice and present and practical interests, in economical, political, military and cultural struggle. For example, when the manager of a German Volkswagen company communicates with members of a Chinese partner company, he is, from a cultural-historical point of view (i.e. the West/Europe vs. the East/China relations), already situated in an advantageous position. From a business point of view, e.g. as investor, he may be motivated to make maximum profit for his company. My suggestion then is that both intercultural parties adopt a political policy and go out of their way, by trying, again and again, to construct mutually meaningful and commonly profitable communication and business action with each other on an equal footing (Shi-xu 2001).

Note * I would like to express my gratitude to Jan ten Thije and Kristin Bührig for their detailed and helpful comments and suggestions.

References Appadurai, Arjun (1996). Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Arundale, Robert (1999). “An alternative model and ideology of communication: for an alternative to politeness theory”. Pragmatics, 9(1), 119–153. Atkinson, J. Maxwell & Heritage, John (Eds.). (1984). Structures of Social Action: Studies in conversation analysis. Cambridge: CUP. Austin, John L. (1962). How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Bakhtin, Mikhail M. (1981). The Dialogic Imagination: four essays. (Ed. by M. Holquist; trans. C. Emerson & M. Holquist). Austin: University of Texas Press. Billig, Michael (1991). Ideology and Opinions. London: Sage Publications Ltd. Blommaert, Jan & Verschueren, Jef (Eds.). (1991). The Pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Blommaert, Jan & Verschueren, Jef (1998). Debating Diversity: Analysing the discourse of tolerance. London: Routledge.

 Shi-xu

Blum-Kulka, Shoshana, House, Juliane, & Kasper, Gabriele (Eds.). (1989). Cross-cultural Pragmatics: Requests and Apologies. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation. Bourdieu, Pierre (1991). Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Polity Press. Carbaugh, Donald (Ed.). (1990). Cultural Communication and Intercultural Contact. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates. Clifford, James (1988). The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-century ethnography, literature, and art. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Clifford, James (1992). “Traveling cultures”. In L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, & P. A. Treichler (Eds.), Cultural Studies (pp. 96–116). New York: Routledge. Cushner, Kenneth & Brislin, Richard W. (1996). Intercultural Interactions: A practical guide (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Fairclough, Norman (1989) Language and Power. London: Longman. Fairclough, Norman (1992). Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press. Fairclough, Norman (1995). Critical Discourse Analysis: The critical study of language. London: Longman. Farganis, Sondra (1986). Social Reconstruction of the Feminine Character. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield. Freire, Paulo (1972). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Freire, Paulo (1976). Education: the practice of freedom. London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative. Freire, Paulo (1985). The Politics of Education: Culture, Power and Liberation. London: Macmillan. Gadamer, Hans-Georg ([1975] 1989). Truth and Method (2nd, revised ed.). (Trans. revised by J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marchall). London: Sheed and Ward. Geertz, Clifford (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected essays. New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers. Gergen, Kenneth J. (1994). Realities and Relationships: Soundings in social construction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Giddens, Anthony (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the theory of structuration. Cambridge: Polity Press. Gramsci, Antonio (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. (Ed. and trans. Q. Hoare & G. N. Smith). London: Lawrence and Wishart. Gudykunst, William B. (1988). “Uncertainty and anxiety”. In Y. Kim & W. Gudykunst (Eds.), Theories in Intercultural communcation (pp. 123–156). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Habermas, Jürgen (1972). Knowledge and Human Interests. (Trans. by J. J. Shapiro). London: Heinemann. Habermas, Jürgen (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action vol. I: Reason and the rationalization of society. (Trans. T. McCarthy). Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, Jürgen (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action vol. II: Lifeword and system: a critique of functionalist reason. (Trans. T. McCarthy). Oxford: Polity Press. Hall, Stuart (1996a). “Cultural studies: two paradigms”. In J. Storey (Ed.), What is Cultural Studies: A reader (pp. 31–48). London: Arnold. (Also 1980, Media, Culture and Society, 2.) Hall, Stuart (1996b). “Introduction: who needs ‘identity”’. In S. Hall & P. du Gay (Eds.), Questions of Cultural Identity (pp. 1–17). London: Sage Publications.

Beyond competence 

Hall, Stuart (1999). “Cultural studies and its theoretical legacies”. In S. During (Ed.), The Cultural Studies Reader (pp. 97–109). London: Routledge. (Also in L. Grossberg et al. (Eds.) 1992, Cultural Studies. London: Routledge.) Harding, Sandra (Ed.). (1987). Feminism and Methodology. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Hofstede, Geert (1980). Culture’s Consequences: International differences in work-related values. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Johnstone, Barbara (1989). Linguistic strategies and cultural styles for persuasive discourse. In S. Ting-Toomey & F. Korzenny (Eds.), Language, Communication, and Culture: Current directions (pp. 139–156). Newbury Park: Sage Publications. Keesing, Roger M. (1991). “Asian cultures?” Asian Studies Review, 15(2), 43–50. Kim, Young Yun (1991). Intercultural communication competence: a systems-theoretic view. In S. Ting-Toomey & F. Korzenny (Eds.), Cross-Cultural Interpersonal Communication (pp. 259–275). Newbury Park: Sage Publications. Koole, Tom & Thije, Jan D. ten (1994). The Construction of Intercultural Discourse. Team discussions of educational advisers. Amsterdam: RODOPI. Kress, Günther (1991). “Critical discourse analysis”. Annual Review of Applied Linguistics, 11, 84–99. Kristeva, Julia (1986). “Word, dialogue and novel”. In T. Moi (Ed.), The Kristeva Reader (pp. 34–61). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Leeds-Hurwitz, Wendy (1995). “Introducing social approaches”. In W. Leeds-Hurwitz (Ed.), Social Approaches to Communication (pp. 3–20). New York: The Guilford Press. Potter, Jonathan & Wetherell, Margaret (1987). Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond attitudes and behaviour. London: Sage Publications. Richards, Janet Radcliffe (1982). The Sceptical Feminist: A philosophical enquiry. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Scollon, Ron & Scollon, Suzanne W. (1995). Intercultural Communication: A discourse approach. Oxford: Blackwell. ) (2001). (Chinese Syntax). (Nanjing: Shen, Xiao-long ( Jiangsu Educational Press). Shi-xu (1994a). “Ideology: strategies of reason and functions of control in accounts of the non-Western Other”. Journal of Pragmatics, 21(6), 645–669. Shi-xu (1994b). “Discursive attributions and cross-cultural communication”. Pragmatics, 4(3), 337–355. Shi-xu (1995). “Cultural perceptions: exploiting the unexpected of the Other”. Culture and Psychology, 1(3), 315–342. Shi-xu (1996). “Concepts of ‘language’ in discourse: an interactional resource in troubled intercultural contexts”. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 122, 47–72. Shi-xu (1997). Cultural Representations: Analyzing the discourse about the Other. New York: Peter Lang. Shi-xu (2001). “Critical Pedagogy and Intercultural Communication: Creating discourses of diversity, equality, common goals and rational-moral motivation”. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 22(3), 279–293. Shi-xu (2005). A Cultural Approach to Discourse. Houndmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

 Shi-xu

Shi-xu, Kienpointner, Manfred, & Servaes, Jan (Eds.). (2005). Read the Cultural Other. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Stanley, Liz & Wise, Sue (1983). Breaking Out: Feminist consciousness and feminist research. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ting-Toomey, Stella (1999). Communicating Across Cultures. New York: The Guilford Press. Tong, Rosemarie (1995). Feminist Thought: A comprehensive introduction. London: Routledge. Trompenaars, Fons (1993). Riding the waves of culture: understanding cultural diversity in business. London: Brealey Publishing. Van Dijk, Teun (1997). Discourse Studies. In two volumes. London: Sage Publications Ltd. Wetherell, Margaret & Potter, Jonathan (1992). Mapping the Language of Racism: Discourse and legitimation of exploitation. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Williams, Raymond (1976). Keywords. London: Fontana. (2nd ed., 1983). Wilson, John (1990). Politically Speaking: The pragmatic analysis of political language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wilson, John (1994). “Paradoxes, Sociolinguistics and everyday accounts”. Multilingual, 13(3), 265–300. Wilson, John & Ross, J. (1997). “The language of peace and conflict: relevance theory and the Anglo Irish Agreement”. The Journal of Conflict Studies, XVII, 51–73. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1968). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wodak, Ruth (1996). Disorders of Discourse. London: Longman.

Authors of Beyond Misunderstanding

Claudia Bubel Claudia Bubel studied English linguistics at Saarland University, Germany. Her doctoral dissertation focused on the linguistic construction of friendship relations in the scripted dialogue of TV drama. She now teaches English and Geography at a secondary school as well as courses in applied linguistics for EFL teachers at Saarland University. Her current research interest is in second language acquisition, in particular the acquisition of discourse markers. Universität des Saarlandes, Fachrichtung 4.3 Anglistik, Amerikanistik und Anglophone Kulturen; Postfach 15 11 50; D-66041 Saarbrücken, Germany Email: [email protected] Kristin Bührig Kristin Bührig studied German linguistics, literature and sociology. She is lecturer at the Department of Language, Literature and Media (Institut für Germanistik I; Arbeitsbereich DaF I), University of Hamburg. In research and teaching her main emphasis is on institutional and intercultural communication, community interpreting, translating, language acquisition/bilingualism, teaching German as a foreign language and functional grammar. Universität Hamburg, Department für Sprache, Literatur und Medien (Institut für Germanistik I), Von-Melle-Park 6, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany Email: [email protected] Jennifer Hartog Jennifer Hartog studied literature, philosophy, sociology and linguistics in Leeds, Göttingen, Konstanz and obtained her Ph.D. in linguistics from the University of Hamburg. In the last decade her research in Functional Pragmatics covered areas in anthropology, human genetics, medical sociology and psychotherapeutic processes. Recently her work has focussed on translation and interpretation studies.

 Authors of Beyond Misunderstanding

Universität Hamburg, Department für Sprache, Literatur und Medien (Institut für Germanistik I; Arbeitsbereich DaF I) Von-Melle-Park 6, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany Email: [email protected] Dennis Day Dennis Day is currently Senior Lecturer in the Institute of Language and Communication at the University of Southern Denmark, Odense. He is currently leading a research project on global communication in Danish organizations. His research interests include ethnographies of communication in multicultural workplaces, ethnomethodological and conversation analytic investigations of identity work, and the pragmatics of person-reference. Dept. of Language & Communication, Syddansk Universitet Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense, Denmark Email: [email protected] Lise Fontaine Lise Fontaine is currently Lecturer in the Centre for Language and Communication Research at Cardiff University. Her research interests include systemic functional linguistics (theoretical and applied), referring expressions, grammatical structure, and computer-mediated communication. She is now conducting research in complex referring expressions and their realization in the nominal group. School of English, Communication and Philosophy, Cardiff University, Humanities Building, Colum Drive, Cardiff CF10 3EU, United Kingdom Email: [email protected] Helga Kotthoff Helga Kotthoff is professor in the German Department at Freiburg University of Education in Germany. She worked in the fields of Applied, German and Anthropological Linguistics – basically on questions of interaction analysis, gender studies, humor, sociolinguistics and ethnography of communication. Her current research includes interactional sociolinguistics, linguistics of German, conversational humor and irony, language socialization, gender and communication and intercultural communication conflicts. She published on all these subjects. Freiburg University of Education Kunzenweg 21, D 79117 Freibrug, Germany Email: [email protected]

Authors of Beyond Misunderstanding 

Grit Liebscher Grit Liebscher is Associate Professor of German at the University of Waterloo. She is an applied linguist and a sociolinguist and is mainly interested in questions of language and identity. Current research projects include linguistic accommodation and identity of West Germans in the former East Germany, linguistic behaviour among German-Canadians in Ontario, L1 use in secondlanguage classrooms, and computer-assisted language learning. In recent publications, she has focused on narrative structure, deictics and code-switching. Department of Germanic and Slavic Studies, University of Waterloo 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1 Email: [email protected] Georges Lüdi Georges Ludi studied Romance Philology; full professor for general linguistics at the University of Neuchâtel 1979–1982; director of the Institute of Romance Philology at the University of Basle since 1982. Former Dean of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Basle. Research on multilingualism, second language acquisition, biliteracy, intercultural communication and language policy and planning. Institut für Französische Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft, Universität Basel, Stapfelberg 7–9, CH-4051 Basel, Swiss Email: [email protected] Martina Rost Roth Martina Rost-Roth is a reader in Linguistics/German at the Free University Berlin, has been a Visiting Scholar at the UC Berkeley (Department of Anthropology/Gumperz) and has held an acting professorship of intercultural communication at Chemnitz University of Technology, among other positions. Her work focuses on conversational analysis, second language acquisition and intercultural communication. Eichkatzweg 60, D 14055 Berlin, Germany Email: [email protected] Jochen Rehbein Jochen Rehbein is professor for German as a foreign language in Hamburg. Fields of publication: Functional Pragmatics and theory of action; discourse analysis; language in institutions (classroom discourse, sales talk, communication in administration and medical practice etc.); intercultural communi-

 Authors of Beyond Misunderstanding

cation; multilingualism; Turkish linguistics; grammar and mental processes; language of politeness. He conducted various projects, esp. on “politeness” and on Turkish-German bilingualism at the Research Centre 538 Multilingualism at the University of Hamburg. German Department/German as a foreign language, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 6, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany Email: [email protected] Jan D. ten Thije Jan ten Thije studied General Linguistics and Dutch Philology; Associate Professor Intercultural Communication at Chemnitz University of Technology and visiting Professor at Vienna University. Currently assistant Professor at Departement of Dutch at Utrecht University. Research on intercultural and institutional discourse, receptive multilingualism, biographic narratives and intercultural trainings. Utrecht University, Department of Dutch, Utrecht Institute of Linguistics (UIL-OTS) Trans 10, NL 3512 JK Utrecht, The Netherlands Email: [email protected] Shi-xu Shi-xu had undergraduate and postgraduate education in China and did his PhD at the University of Amsterdam. Over the past twenty years or so, his research interests have moved from structuralist and functionalist linguistics to discourse studies and cultural studies as he has been teaching in China, the Netherlands, Singapore and UK. He is the founding editor-in-chief of Journal of Multicultural Discourses. Currently he is Professor and Director of the Institute of Discourse and Cultural Studies, Zhejiang University, China. Institute of Discourse & Cultural Studies, Zhejiang University Zijingang Campus, 310058 Hangzhou, China Email: [email protected]

Index

Institutional constellations business talk , – counselling discourse , ,  genetic counselling – intercultural counselling ,  student counselling – international teamwork , , – university context ,  internet group discussions , ,  medical communication – non professional interpretation – oral lamentation ritual  phatic communication  see also small talk –, – political discourse , – royalties negotiations – sales talk ,  small talk –, – see also phatic communication  talk shows – telephone conversation , , , , ,  opening a telephone conversation – workplace communication –, –

Intercultural constellations American-Chinese –,  American-German –, –, –, , American-Korean  Arab-Swedish – Australian-French  British-French – British-German  Chinese-German  Chinese-Swedish – Dutch-German , –, – Egypt-German ,  English-Indian  European Asatru community ,  Ehtiopian-Swedish – German-German (East and West Germany) , – German-Korean  German-Iranic –,  German-Japanese  German-Turkish , –

Languages and language areas Caucasian Georgia  Chiac –, – English as a lingua franca –, ,  Finnish ,  German , –, –, , , –, –, –, –, – Spanish  Swedish , , , , , ,  Italian , – Italoschwyz , ,  Russian – Turkish , , , , , , –

 Index

A ‘aidat’ ,  action practice –, ,  action system  actual speech situation  affect – see also grief – aggregate ,  alibi tactic  American Western ideological discourse ,  apposition ,  argumentation ,  attributive adjunct ,  audience , , , , , , , ,  augmented speech act  B biographical narratives  borrowing ,  see also code switching , , –, –, –,  see also language mixing –, – see also translinguistic markers –, –,  C categorizations –, –, , –, , ,  categorization of s.o. as Ethiopian  social group categorization ,  clarification requests  closing , , , ,  co-referential nouns  code-switching , , –, –, –,  using French words – see also language mixing –, – cognitive schema  collective intentionality  communicative apparatus , , –,  communicative apparatus of perspectivising , 

communicative spiral  community –,  comprehension check  constellation , , –, , , – constellation of (speech) action  constructed dialogues  contextualisation –, , , – contextualisation cues , , ,  conversational openings  see also closings , , , ,  conversational rhetorics – (multinational and intercultural) counselling ,  crypto deixis ,  cultural apparatus –, , , –, – cultural action –, , , – reorganizing mental processes ,  restructuring , –, , , , , – restructuring of mental processes –, , , – technai – Vorstellungsform , – cultural filter – cultural hegemony  cultural load ,  cultural resources –,  cultural stereotypes , , ,  see also stereotype  see also de-stereotyping  cultural studies  culture , –, , , , , , , –, –, , , , , , , , –, – see also interculture , , , , , –

see also discursive interculture , , – culture and history ,  culture-specific knowledge ,  see also knowlege members of a culture  pragmatic conceptualisation of culture  target culture , ,  D deep structure , , ,  see also surface of communication ,  deictics  crypto deixis ,  group deixis ,  personal deixis ,  speaker deixis , , ,  deictic procedure , , , ,  personal deictic procedure ,  Denkstruktur ,  disagreement , , , ,  discourse , , –,  oderliness of discourse  disengagement ,  discursive interculture , , – E empathy –,  empathy strategy – ensuring (mutual) understanding  see also Verständnissicherung  epistemological concept of perspectivity – ethnic and national identity  ethnic boundaries  ethnic group , –, , , , , , –, –, 

Index  ethnification – evaluation –, –, ,  evaluation apparatus , ,  evaluation of laments  evaluation of language mixing – exothetic  experience , –,  social experience(s) ,  F feed back interview , –,  follow-up interview , , , –, ,  foreigner talk , ,  foreignness  forms of imagining , , –, , –,  formulae , , , , , ,  speech formula – Functional Grammar  Functional Pragmatics , ,  functional pragmatic knowledge model  functional sentence perspective  fusion –,  G Gemeinschaft ,  general man  generalised others  generalising, perspectivising and contrasting cultures  Gesellschaft ,  gesture , ,  H hedge  hermeneutical methodology – I identification , 

identification with different cultural groups ,  see also perspective , – identification of problems in understanding ,  see also negating action ,  identification sequence , ,  identity , , , , , , , , ,  identity rich puzzle  identity type  acts of identity  ethnic and national identity ,  indicating identity  linguistic and cultural identity  bilingual identity – referential identity  regional identity  social identity  imagination space  inscription , – indicators of inscription  insertion , , ,  lexical insertion ,  institution , –, – institutional communication  institutional roles , , ,  institutional setting , , , ,  interactional sociolinguistics ,  intercultural communication –, –, , , , , , , , –, ,  intercultural communication and history –, –

intercultural communication and power –,  computer mediated intercultural communication  intercultural discourse , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , ,  intercultural fusion  intercultural mediation  intercultural misunderstanding  intercultural understanding , –, , , ,  interculturality  interculture , , , , , – see also discursive interculture , , – interjection , , , ,  interpreter ,  intonation , , , ,  introspection  iudicium  K knowledge –, , , , , , , , , , –, , –, , , , –, – biographical knowledge – common knowledge , –, ,  establishing common knowledge  culture specific knowledge – functional pragmatic knowledge model  linguistic knowledge , , ,  pattern knowledge , ,  rheme of knowledge 

 Index sentential knowledge , ,  theme of knowledge  learning – L lamentation styles , ,  language , –, , , , ,  language and emotions  language choice  language contact  language mixing –, – Spanish-French code mixing  see also code-switching , , –, –, –,  language theory  learning a second language  language acquisition ,  language mediator ,  mediator-performativeformels  latent , , ,  lay interpreting  linguaculture  linguistic norms  linguistic procedure ,  see also deictic procedure , , , ,  see also phoric procedure  see also symbolic procedure , ,  linguistic repertoire ,  M matrix clause  matrix construction , , ,  maxim , ,  mediator , ,  membership categorization ,  membership categorization device , 

membership of a cultural group  mental apparatus ,  mental reorganization  miscommunication , , –, , –, , ,  misinterpretation ,  misunderstanding , , , , , –, , , , , ,  beyond misunderstanding –, ,  mixed gesture  modular construction – monitoring ,  multilingual competence , , ,  multilingual constellation ,  myth of tolerance  N narration ,  nationalities  negating action , , –,  negotiation , , , , , – neutralization ,  ‘no-but’-strategy – non-native speakers , , , , , ,  O origo  Ostjammer  P paraphrases  pattern , ,  action pattern  speech action pattern , , ,  decision making patterns  pattern knowledge , ,  perception –, , , , 

performance , , , ,  ritual performance  life as a steady stream of interactive performances  personification of the national division  perspective –, –, ,  see also point of view , , ,  author’s and character’s perspective  text perspective  perspective management ,  see also management of perspectives  perspective setting and taking  perspectivising , , –, , ,  perspectivity , –, ,  epistemological concept of perspectivity – social-interactional concept of perspectivity  shifting of perspective  switching of perspective  taking the other’s perspective  phantasia  phoric , ,  phoric procedure  place and person references  plural subject ,  pluriculturalism  point of view , , ,  see also perspective –, –, ,  power ,  see also intercultural communication and power –,  pragmatic operator  prejudice , 

Index  presupposition –, –, , –,  problems in understanding , , , – see also misunderstanding , , , , , –, , , , , ,  propositional content , –, ,  Π-domain ,  see also functionalpragmatic knowledge model  R reality –, , , , ,  social historical reality ,  see also functional pragmatic knowledge model  reduction of linguistics  referential function of language  referential semantics ,  referring expressions , , ,  reflection , ,  reformulations , ,  rephrasing  reification , , ,  reified form ,  repair , , , , , , , , , , , ,  reported situation  reporting situation  reported speech – requests – responsibility , , , ,  rhetorical conversation analysis  rich points  ritual , , , 

S Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis  scenario  sequential analysis ,  silence , , , , ,  slip of the tongue  social activities , –, ,  social apparatus  social context , ,  social experience , , ,  social group –, , –, , , , ,  social group categorization ,  social-interactional concept of perspectivity  speaker plan ,  speaker’s control plan  standard realization  stereotypes , , , , ,  see also de-stereotyping  stigmatisation  style switching – surface (of communication) ,  see also deep structure , , ,  suspension , ,  see also miscommunication , , –, , –, , ,  see also misunderstanding , , , , , –, , , , , ,  see also problems in understanding , , , – symbol field , , , ,  symbolic procedure , , 

synecdoche  system change in Eastern Europe , , ,  systemic coder  Systemic Functional Linguistic ,  T taxonomy ,  technai – techniques ,  temporal references  text-applicative  thematize , , , , ,  thematizing , ,  thematising and dethematising ethnicity  thought pattern , ,  see also iudicium  translinguistic markers –, –,  U unification ,  unification process in Europe  V verbs of motion  ‘verständnissicherndes Handeln’  viewpoint-saturated vocabulary  virtual community –, , , ,  virtual processing ,  virtual negotiation  W Wende ,  word search 

In the Pragmatics & Beyond New Series the following titles have been published thus far or are scheduled for publication: 149 LOCHER, Miriam A.: Advice Online. Advice-giving in an American Internet health column. Expected August 2006 148 FLØTTUM, Kjersti, Trine DAHL and Torodd KINN: Academic Voices. Across languages and disciplines. Expected August 2006 147 HINRICHS, Lars: Codeswitching on the Web. English and Jamaican Creole in e-mail communication. Expected August 2006 146 TANSKANEN, Sanna-Kaisa: Collaborating towards Coherence. Lexical cohesion in English Discourse. x, 187 pp. + index. Expected July 2006 145 KURHILA, Salla: Second Language Interaction. 2006. vii, 257 pp. 144 BÜHRIG, Kristin and Jan D. ten THIJE (eds.): Beyond Misunderstanding. Linguistic analyses of intercultural communication. 2006. vi, 339 pp. 143 BAKER, Carolyn, Michael EMMISON and Alan FIRTH (eds.): Calling for Help. Language and social interaction in telephone helplines. 2005. xviii, 352 pp. 142 SIDNELL, Jack: Talk and Practical Epistemology. The social life of knowledge in a Caribbean community. 2005. xvi, 255 pp. 141 ZHU, Yunxia: Written Communication across Cultures. A sociocognitive perspective on business genres. 2005. xviii, 216 pp. 140 BUTLER, Christopher S., María de los Ángeles GÓMEZ-GONZÁLEZ and Susana M. DOVAL-SUÁREZ (eds.): The Dynamics of Language Use. Functional and contrastive perspectives. 2005. xvi, 413 pp. 139 LAKOFF, Robin T. and Sachiko IDE (eds.): Broadening the Horizon of Linguistic Politeness. 2005. xii, 342 pp. 138 MÜLLER, Simone: Discourse Markers in Native and Non-native English Discourse. 2005. xviii, 290 pp. 137 MORITA, Emi: Negotiation of Contingent Talk. The Japanese interactional particles ne and sa. 2005. xvi, 240 pp. 136 SASSEN, Claudia: Linguistic Dimensions of Crisis Talk. Formalising structures in a controlled language. 2005. ix, 230 pp. 135 ARCHER, Dawn: Questions and Answers in the English Courtroom (1640–1760). A sociopragmatic analysis. 2005. xiv, 374 pp. 134 SKAFFARI, Janne, Matti PEIKOLA, Ruth CARROLL, Risto HILTUNEN and Brita WÅRVIK (eds.): Opening Windows on Texts and Discourses of the Past. 2005. x, 418 pp. 133 MARNETTE, Sophie: Speech and Thought Presentation in French. Concepts and strategies. 2005. xiv, 379 pp. 132 ONODERA, Noriko O.: Japanese Discourse Markers. Synchronic and diachronic discourse analysis. 2004. xiv, 253 pp. 131 JANOSCHKA, Anja: Web Advertising. New forms of communication on the Internet. 2004. xiv, 230 pp. 130 HALMARI, Helena and Tuija VIRTANEN (eds.): Persuasion Across Genres. A linguistic approach. 2005. x, 257 pp. 129 TABOADA, María Teresa: Building Coherence and Cohesion. Task-oriented dialogue in English and Spanish. 2004. xvii, 264 pp. 128 CORDELLA, Marisa: The Dynamic Consultation. A discourse analytical study of doctor–patient communication. 2004. xvi, 254 pp. 127 BRISARD, Frank, Michael MEEUWIS and Bart VANDENABEELE (eds.): Seduction, Community, Speech. A Festschrift for Herman Parret. 2004. vi, 202 pp. 126 WU, Yi’an: Spatial Demonstratives in English and Chinese. Text and Cognition. 2004. xviii, 236 pp. 125 LERNER, Gene H. (ed.): Conversation Analysis. Studies from the first generation. 2004. x, 302 pp. 124 VINE, Bernadette: Getting Things Done at Work. The discourse of power in workplace interaction. 2004. x, 278 pp. 123 MÁRQUEZ REITER, Rosina and María Elena PLACENCIA (eds.): Current Trends in the Pragmatics of Spanish. 2004. xvi, 383 pp. 122 GONZÁLEZ, Montserrat: Pragmatic Markers in Oral Narrative. The case of English and Catalan. 2004. xvi, 410 pp. 121 FETZER, Anita: Recontextualizing Context. Grammaticality meets appropriateness. 2004. x, 272 pp. 120 AIJMER, Karin and Anna-Brita STENSTRÖM (eds.): Discourse Patterns in Spoken and Written Corpora. 2004. viii, 279 pp. 119 HILTUNEN, Risto and Janne SKAFFARI (eds.): Discourse Perspectives on English. Medieval to modern. 2003. viii, 243 pp. 118 CHENG, Winnie: Intercultural Conversation. 2003. xii, 279 pp.

117 WU, Ruey-Jiuan Regina: Stance in Talk. A conversation analysis of Mandarin final particles. 2004. xvi, 260 pp. 116 GRANT, Colin B. (ed.): Rethinking Communicative Interaction. New interdisciplinary horizons. 2003. viii, 330 pp. 115 KÄRKKÄINEN, Elise: Epistemic Stance in English Conversation. A description of its interactional functions, with a focus on I think. 2003. xii, 213 pp. 114 KÜHNLEIN, Peter, Hannes RIESER and Henk ZEEVAT (eds.): Perspectives on Dialogue in the New Millennium. 2003. xii, 400 pp. 113 PANTHER, Klaus-Uwe and Linda L. THORNBURG (eds.): Metonymy and Pragmatic Inferencing. 2003. xii, 285 pp. 112 LENZ, Friedrich (ed.): Deictic Conceptualisation of Space, Time and Person. 2003. xiv, 279 pp. 111 ENSINK, Titus and Christoph SAUER (eds.): Framing and Perspectivising in Discourse. 2003. viii, 227 pp. 110 ANDROUTSOPOULOS, Jannis K. and Alexandra GEORGAKOPOULOU (eds.): Discourse Constructions of Youth Identities. 2003. viii, 343 pp. 109 MAYES, Patricia: Language, Social Structure, and Culture. A genre analysis of cooking classes in Japan and America. 2003. xiv, 228 pp. 108 BARRON, Anne: Acquisition in Interlanguage Pragmatics. Learning how to do things with words in a study abroad context. 2003. xviii, 403 pp. 107 TAAVITSAINEN, Irma and Andreas H. JUCKER (eds.): Diachronic Perspectives on Address Term Systems. 2003. viii, 446 pp. 106 BUSSE, Ulrich: Linguistic Variation in the Shakespeare Corpus. Morpho-syntactic variability of second person pronouns. 2002. xiv, 344 pp. 105 BLACKWELL, Sarah E.: Implicatures in Discourse. The case of Spanish NP anaphora. 2003. xvi, 303 pp. 104 BEECHING, Kate: Gender, Politeness and Pragmatic Particles in French. 2002. x, 251 pp. 103 FETZER, Anita and Christiane MEIERKORD (eds.): Rethinking Sequentiality. Linguistics meets conversational interaction. 2002. vi, 300 pp. 102 LEAFGREN, John: Degrees of Explicitness. Information structure and the packaging of Bulgarian subjects and objects. 2002. xii, 252 pp. 101 LUKE, Kang Kwong and Theodossia-Soula PAVLIDOU (eds.): Telephone Calls. Unity and diversity in conversational structure across languages and cultures. 2002. x, 295 pp. 100 JASZCZOLT, Katarzyna M. and Ken TURNER (eds.): Meaning Through Language Contrast. Volume 2. 2003. viii, 496 pp. 99 JASZCZOLT, Katarzyna M. and Ken TURNER (eds.): Meaning Through Language Contrast. Volume 1. 2003. xii, 388 pp. 98 DUSZAK, Anna (ed.): Us and Others. Social identities across languages, discourses and cultures. 2002. viii, 522 pp. 97 MAYNARD, Senko K.: Linguistic Emotivity. Centrality of place, the topic-comment dynamic, and an ideology of pathos in Japanese discourse. 2002. xiv, 481 pp. 96 HAVERKATE, Henk: The Syntax, Semantics and Pragmatics of Spanish Mood. 2002. vi, 241 pp. 95 FITZMAURICE, Susan M.: The Familiar Letter in Early Modern English. A pragmatic approach. 2002. viii, 263 pp. 94 McILVENNY, Paul (ed.): Talking Gender and Sexuality. 2002. x, 332 pp. 93 BARON, Bettina and Helga KOTTHOFF (eds.): Gender in Interaction. Perspectives on femininity and masculinity in ethnography and discourse. 2002. xxiv, 357 pp. 92 GARDNER, Rod: When Listeners Talk. Response tokens and listener stance. 2001. xxii, 281 pp. 91 GROSS, Joan: Speaking in Other Voices. An ethnography of Walloon puppet theaters. 2001. xxviii, 341 pp. 90 KENESEI, István and Robert M. HARNISH (eds.): Perspectives on Semantics, Pragmatics, and Discourse. A Festschrift for Ferenc Kiefer. 2001. xxii, 352 pp. 89 ITAKURA, Hiroko: Conversational Dominance and Gender. A study of Japanese speakers in first and second language contexts. 2001. xviii, 231 pp. 88 BAYRAKTAROĞLU, Arın and Maria SIFIANOU (eds.): Linguistic Politeness Across Boundaries. The case of Greek and Turkish. 2001. xiv, 439 pp. 87 MUSHIN, Ilana: Evidentiality and Epistemological Stance. Narrative Retelling. 2001. xviii, 244 pp. 86 IFANTIDOU, Elly: Evidentials and Relevance. 2001. xii, 225 pp. 85 COLLINS, Daniel E.: Reanimated Voices. Speech reporting in a historical-pragmatic perspective. 2001. xx, 384 pp. 84 ANDERSEN, Gisle: Pragmatic Markers and Sociolinguistic Variation. A relevance-theoretic approach to the language of adolescents. 2001. ix, 352 pp.

83 MÁRQUEZ REITER, Rosina: Linguistic Politeness in Britain and Uruguay. A contrastive study of requests and apologies. 2000. xviii, 225 pp. 82 KHALIL, Esam N.: Grounding in English and Arabic News Discourse. 2000. x, 274 pp. 81 DI LUZIO, Aldo, Susanne GÜNTHNER and Franca ORLETTI (eds.): Culture in Communication. Analyses of intercultural situations. 2001. xvi, 341 pp. 80 UNGERER, Friedrich (ed.): English Media Texts – Past and Present. Language and textual structure. 2000. xiv, 286 pp. 79 ANDERSEN, Gisle and Thorstein FRETHEIM (eds.): Pragmatic Markers and Propositional Attitude. 2000. viii, 273 pp. 78 SELL, Roger D.: Literature as Communication. The foundations of mediating criticism. 2000. xiv, 348 pp. 77 VANDERVEKEN, Daniel and Susumu KUBO (eds.): Essays in Speech Act Theory. 2002. vi, 328 pp. 76 MATSUI, Tomoko: Bridging and Relevance. 2000. xii, 251 pp. 75 PILKINGTON, Adrian: Poetic Effects. A relevance theory perspective. 2000. xiv, 214 pp. 74 TROSBORG, Anna (ed.): Analysing Professional Genres. 2000. xvi, 256 pp. 73 HESTER, Stephen K. and David FRANCIS (eds.): Local Educational Order. Ethnomethodological studies of knowledge in action. 2000. viii, 326 pp. 72 MARMARIDOU, Sophia S.A.: Pragmatic Meaning and Cognition. 2000. xii, 322 pp. 71 GÓMEZ-GONZÁLEZ, María de los Ángeles: The Theme–Topic Interface. Evidence from English. 2001. xxiv, 438 pp. 70 SORJONEN, Marja-Leena: Responding in Conversation. A study of response particles in Finnish. 2001. x, 330 pp. 69 NOH, Eun-Ju: Metarepresentation. A relevance-theory approach. 2000. xii, 242 pp. 68 ARNOVICK, Leslie K.: Diachronic Pragmatics. Seven case studies in English illocutionary development. 2000. xii, 196 pp. 67 TAAVITSAINEN, Irma, Gunnel MELCHERS and Päivi PAHTA (eds.): Writing in Nonstandard English. 2000. viii, 404 pp. 66 JUCKER, Andreas H., Gerd FRITZ and Franz LEBSANFT (eds.): Historical Dialogue Analysis. 1999. viii, 478 pp. 65 COOREN, François: The Organizing Property of Communication. 2000. xvi, 272 pp. 64 SVENNEVIG, Jan: Getting Acquainted in Conversation. A study of initial interactions. 2000. x, 384 pp. 63 BUBLITZ, Wolfram, Uta LENK and Eija VENTOLA (eds.): Coherence in Spoken and Written Discourse. How to create it and how to describe it. Selected papers from the International Workshop on Coherence, Augsburg, 24-27 April 1997. 1999. xiv, 300 pp. 62 TZANNE, Angeliki: Talking at Cross-Purposes. The dynamics of miscommunication. 2000. xiv, 263 pp. 61 MILLS, Margaret H. (ed.): Slavic Gender Linguistics. 1999. xviii, 251 pp. 60 JACOBS, Geert: Preformulating the News. An analysis of the metapragmatics of press releases. 1999. xviii, 428 pp. 59 KAMIO, Akio and Ken-ichi TAKAMI (eds.): Function and Structure. In honor of Susumu Kuno. 1999. x, 398 pp. 58 ROUCHOTA, Villy and Andreas H. JUCKER (eds.): Current Issues in Relevance Theory. 1998. xii, 368 pp. 57 JUCKER, Andreas H. and Yael ZIV (eds.): Discourse Markers. Descriptions and theory. 1998. x, 363 pp. 56 TANAKA, Hiroko: Turn-Taking in Japanese Conversation. A Study in Grammar and Interaction. 2000. xiv, 242 pp. 55 ALLWOOD, Jens and Peter GÄRDENFORS (eds.): Cognitive Semantics. Meaning and cognition. 1999. x, 201 pp. 54 HYLAND, Ken: Hedging in Scientific Research Articles. 1998. x, 308 pp. 53 MOSEGAARD HANSEN, Maj-Britt: The Function of Discourse Particles. A study with special reference to spoken standard French. 1998. xii, 418 pp. 52 GILLIS, Steven and Annick DE HOUWER (eds.): The Acquisition of Dutch. With a Preface by Catherine E. Snow. 1998. xvi, 444 pp. 51 BOULIMA, Jamila: Negotiated Interaction in Target Language Classroom Discourse. 1999. xiv, 338 pp. 50 GRENOBLE, Lenore A.: Deixis and Information Packaging in Russian Discourse. 1998. xviii, 338 pp. 49 KURZON, Dennis: Discourse of Silence. 1998. vi, 162 pp. 48 KAMIO, Akio: Territory of Information. 1997. xiv, 227 pp. 47 CHESTERMAN, Andrew: Contrastive Functional Analysis. 1998. viii, 230 pp. 46 GEORGAKOPOULOU, Alexandra: Narrative Performances. A study of Modern Greek storytelling. 1997. xvii, 282 pp.

45 PALTRIDGE, Brian: Genre, Frames and Writing in Research Settings. 1997. x, 192 pp. 44 BARGIELA-CHIAPPINI, Francesca and Sandra J. HARRIS: Managing Language. The discourse of corporate meetings. 1997. ix, 295 pp. 43 JANSSEN, Theo and Wim van der WURFF (eds.): Reported Speech. Forms and functions of the verb. 1996. x, 312 pp. 42 KOTTHOFF, Helga and Ruth WODAK (eds.): Communicating Gender in Context. 1997. xxvi, 424 pp. 41 VENTOLA, Eija and Anna MAURANEN (eds.): Academic Writing. Intercultural and textual issues. 1996. xiv, 258 pp. 40 DIAMOND, Julie: Status and Power in Verbal Interaction. A study of discourse in a close-knit social network. 1996. viii, 184 pp. 39 HERRING, Susan C. (ed.): Computer-Mediated Communication. Linguistic, social, and cross-cultural perspectives. 1996. viii, 326 pp. 38 FRETHEIM, Thorstein and Jeanette K. GUNDEL (eds.): Reference and Referent Accessibility. 1996. xii, 312 pp. 37 CARSTON, Robyn and Seiji UCHIDA (eds.): Relevance Theory. Applications and implications. 1998. x, 300 pp. 36 CHILTON, Paul, Mikhail V. ILYIN and Jacob L. MEY (eds.): Political Discourse in Transition in Europe 1989–1991. 1998. xi, 272 pp. 35 JUCKER, Andreas H. (ed.): Historical Pragmatics. Pragmatic developments in the history of English. 1995. xvi, 624 pp. 34 BARBE, Katharina: Irony in Context. 1995. x, 208 pp. 33 GOOSSENS, Louis, Paul PAUWELS, Brygida RUDZKA-OSTYN, Anne-Marie SIMON-VANDENBERGEN and Johan VANPARYS: By Word of Mouth. Metaphor, metonymy and linguistic action in a cognitive perspective. 1995. xii, 254 pp. 32 SHIBATANI, Masayoshi and Sandra A. THOMPSON (eds.): Essays in Semantics and Pragmatics. In honor of Charles J. Fillmore. 1996. x, 322 pp. 31 WILDGEN, Wolfgang: Process, Image, and Meaning. A realistic model of the meaning of sentences and narrative texts. 1994. xii, 281 pp. 30 WORTHAM, Stanton E.F.: Acting Out Participant Examples in the Classroom. 1994. xiv, 178 pp. 29 BARSKY, Robert F.: Constructing a Productive Other. Discourse theory and the Convention refugee hearing. 1994. x, 272 pp. 28 VAN DE WALLE, Lieve: Pragmatics and Classical Sanskrit. A pilot study in linguistic politeness. 1993. xii, 454 pp. 27 SÜTER, Hans-Jürg: The Wedding Report. A prototypical approach to the study of traditional text types. 1993. xii, 314 pp. 26 STYGALL, Gail: Trial Language. Differential discourse processing and discursive formation. 1994. xii, 226 pp. 25 COUPER-KUHLEN, Elizabeth: English Speech Rhythm. Form and function in everyday verbal interaction. 1993. x, 346 pp. 24 MAYNARD, Senko K.: Discourse Modality. Subjectivity, Emotion and Voice in the Japanese Language. 1993. x, 315 pp. 23 FORTESCUE, Michael, Peter HARDER and Lars KRISTOFFERSEN (eds.): Layered Structure and Reference in a Functional Perspective. Papers from the Functional Grammar Conference, Copenhagen, 1990. 1992. xiii, 444 pp. 22 AUER, Peter and Aldo DI LUZIO (eds.): The Contextualization of Language. 1992. xvi, 402 pp. 21 SEARLE, John R., Herman PARRET and Jef VERSCHUEREN: (On) Searle on Conversation. Compiled and introduced by Herman Parret and Jef Verschueren. 1992. vi, 154 pp. 20 NUYTS, Jan: Aspects of a Cognitive-Pragmatic Theory of Language. On cognition, functionalism, and grammar. 1991. xii, 399 pp. 19 BAKER, Carolyn and Allan LUKE (eds.): Towards a Critical Sociology of Reading Pedagogy. Papers of the XII World Congress on Reading. 1991. xxi, 287 pp. 18 JOHNSTONE, Barbara: Repetition in Arabic Discourse. Paradigms, syntagms and the ecology of language. 1991. viii, 130 pp. 17 PIÉRAUT-LE BONNIEC, Gilberte and Marlene DOLITSKY (eds.): Language Bases ... Discourse Bases. Some aspects of contemporary French-language psycholinguistics research. 1991. vi, 342 pp. 16 MANN, William C. and Sandra A. THOMPSON (eds.): Discourse Description. Diverse linguistic analyses of a fund-raising text. 1992. xiii, 409 pp. 15 KOMTER, Martha L.: Conflict and Cooperation in Job Interviews. A study of talks, tasks and ideas. 1991. viii, 252 pp. 14 SCHWARTZ, Ursula V.: Young Children's Dyadic Pretend Play. A communication analysis of plot structure and plot generative strategies. 1991. vi, 151 pp.

13 NUYTS, Jan, A. Machtelt BOLKESTEIN and Co VET (eds.): Layers and Levels of Representation in Language Theory. A functional view. 1990. xii, 348 pp. 12 ABRAHAM, Werner (ed.): Discourse Particles. Descriptive and theoretical investigations on the logical, syntactic and pragmatic properties of discourse particles in German. 1991. viii, 338 pp. 11 LUONG, Hy V.: Discursive Practices and Linguistic Meanings. The Vietnamese system of person reference. 1990. x, 213 pp. 10 MURRAY, Denise E.: Conversation for Action. The computer terminal as medium of communication. 1991. xii, 176 pp. 9 LUKE, Kang Kwong: Utterance Particles in Cantonese Conversation. 1990. xvi, 329 pp. 8 YOUNG, Lynne: Language as Behaviour, Language as Code. A study of academic English. 1991. ix, 304 pp. 7 LINDENFELD, Jacqueline: Speech and Sociability at French Urban Marketplaces. 1990. viii, 173 pp. 6:3 BLOMMAERT, Jan and Jef VERSCHUEREN (eds.): The Pragmatics of International and Intercultural Communication. Selected papers from the International Pragmatics Conference, Antwerp, August 1987. Volume 3: The Pragmatics of International and Intercultural Communication. 1991. viii, 249 pp. 6:2 VERSCHUEREN, Jef (ed.): Levels of Linguistic Adaptation. Selected papers from the International Pragmatics Conference, Antwerp, August 1987. Volume 2: Levels of Linguistic Adaptation. 1991. viii, 339 pp. 6:1 VERSCHUEREN, Jef (ed.): Pragmatics at Issue. Selected papers of the International Pragmatics Conference, Antwerp, August 17–22, 1987. Volume 1: Pragmatics at Issue. 1991. viii, 314 pp. 5 THELIN, Nils B. (ed.): Verbal Aspect in Discourse. 1990. xvi, 490 pp. 4 RAFFLER-ENGEL, Walburga von (ed.): Doctor–Patient Interaction. 1989. xxxviii, 294 pp. 3 OLEKSY, Wieslaw (ed.): Contrastive Pragmatics. 1988. xiv, 282 pp. 2 BARTON, Ellen L.: Nonsentential Constituents. A theory of grammatical structure and pragmatic interpretation. 1990. xviii, 247 pp. 1 WALTER, Bettyruth: The Jury Summation as Speech Genre. An ethnographic study of what it means to those who use it. 1988. xvii, 264 pp.